REDUCTIVE RIPPLES IN THE NEW WORLD:
CONFLICT, CRISIS, AND VIOLENCE IN THE VIRGINIA COASTAL LANDS

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Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1

- Argument ........................................................................................................................................... 2
- Reductivism ....................................................................................................................................... 4
- Ambivalence ....................................................................................................................................... 6
- Reducción .......................................................................................................................................... 7
- Scarcity ............................................................................................................................................... 9
- Mapping ............................................................................................................................................ 10
- Christian Religious Ideologies ........................................................................................................ 12
- Structure of Thesis .......................................................................................................................... 14
  - Don Luis and the Jesuit Murders .................................................................................................. 16
  - The Roanoke Colony and the Silver Cup ....................................................................................... 18
  - Algonquian Prophecies and the Starving Time .......................................................................... 20
- The Algonquian Powhatans ............................................................................................................... 23
  - Mantoac and Powhatan Religious Ideologies ............................................................................ 25
  - Algonquian Warfare ..................................................................................................................... 29
- Genocide ........................................................................................................................................... 30

Chapter 1: Don Luis and the Jesuit Murders ....................................................................................... 31

Chapter 2: Roanoke and the Silver Cup .............................................................................................. 78

Chapter 3: Algonquian Prophecies and the Starving Time ............................................................... 143

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 176

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 185
Introduction

In less than two days, during the spring of 1571, Algonquian Indians vanquished the Spanish near their tiny settlement in Ajacán. The Powhatans used the axes the Europeans refused to trade in exchange for foodstuffs against them. Only one Spanish boy survived to tell the story.

Thirteen years later, the English, hoping to build a military outpost to attack Spanish ships laden with American treasure, met with the inhabitants of Roanoke and determined the island would become the home to England’s first permanent American colony. In 1585, the English returned to Roanoke. Within the year, the Europeans razed a village and set fire to an Indian communities’ maize on account of a silver chalice they believed the “savages” stole from them. Conditions between the indigenous, mainland communities and the starving Europeans continued to deteriorate until rumors of an Indian war prompted the English to preemptively attack the Algonquian Secotans. Numerous Secotans died in the attacks, and the battle ended violently when an Irish man, Edward Nugent, chopped off the head of Pemisapan, the Secotans’ werowance. The English then temporarily abandoned the island, along with hundreds of Caribbean slaves. Those African and Indian slaves were the first “lost people” of Roanoke. The English returned yet again in 1587 and left behind another 110 colonists. This second batch of colonists disappeared as well, but it now appears that they may have moved north and settled among the Algonquian Chesapeakes, east of the Powhatans’ paramount chiefdom.

Sometime between 1600 and 1607 — the dates are still undetermined — the Powhatans exterminated the entire Chesapeake nation. It was a singular event that was extraordinarily violent and entirely uncommon for Algonquian Indians living along the Virginian coastlands previous to European contact. The Powhatans later explained to the English that they needed to
totally eradicate “all of the [Chesapeake] inhabitants” because their priests prophesied that “ancient enemies” from the Chesapeake Bay threatened to not only attack them, but “dissolve them and give end to their empire.” The Chesapeake bore the brunt of the prophecy, but it was ultimately the English and their European policies that undermined Powhatan lifeways in the New World.

This thesis argues that Spanish and English colonists brought ideologies to the New World that created a series of crises in the Virginian coastal lands where Algonquian Indians made their home. There was not one crisis that occurred at one time with one people. Rather, there were several crises that occurred as Europeans moved west into Algonquian territory in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The reasons for the conflicts and violence vary from situation to situation, but this thesis examines the roles that reductive, colonial policies based in accumulation and the demands of the marketplace; extractionism — taking value from an environment or people and leaving them and their environment with less value; scarcity; and religion played in exacerbating the crises that followed early interactions between Europeans “Strangers” and Algonquian “Real People.”¹

To begin, this thesis examines three, European, colonial case studies: the Spanish at Ajacán; the English at Roanoke; and the English at Jamestown. It is not enough, however, to focus merely on crises Europeans created as they interacted with Eastern Woodland Algonquians in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. To understand the magnitude and reach of European ideologies based in reductive logic — which I explain shortly — and how those ideologies may have impacted Algonquians living along the Atlantic coastal lands, indigenous

¹ Helen Rountree, *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown*, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 5-6. Since Europeans invaded Algonquian lands, this thesis uses the terms Stranger and Real People throughout the text. Also, I follow Randolph Turner and Helen Rountree’s lead, as both use Algonquian and Powhatan interchangeably when “applied to all the Algonquian-speaking Indians of the coastal plain of Virginia.”
violence and conflicts between disparate Indian nations must also be examined. On one hand, this thesis draws a fine line between Indian agency and ritualized indigenous violence that was a normative feature of indigenes at the time, and on the other, I analyze the impact of newly emerging European ideologies based in unequivocal transformation tied to the emerging globalized marketplace. Such ideologies were not inert; rather, they were iterative and carried to the New World by those who hoped to change it.

The words “unequivocal transformation” does not mean that the process of reductivism was predetermined in any way or that it would necessarily replace indigenous, economic ways based in reciprocity and tribute. Historically speaking, it did no such thing. Furthermore, I do not argue that reductive ideologies underpinned by change would always result in inevitable violence. Although Europeans arrived in the New World hoping to transform it, the colonists, adventurers, artists, scientists, soldiers, and chroniclers of history exhibited ongoing ambivalence over their actions, whereby numerous instances of contingency and conflict occurred that did not necessarily result in violence. The reason reductivism may appear at times as deterministic was simply because it was a structural system rather than a purely contingent one. Walter Hixson cites Patrick Wolfe in *American Settler Colonialism* to explain the inherent violence of European colonialism; he writes, “The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event.” Hixson follows this sentiment and relates that “Because it was structural rather than contingent,” the system of violence outlasted colonialism and went much farther beyond it.2 Lastly, there was always room for transformation that did not include violent change, but it should surprise no one that such instances, when they did occur through diplomacy, accommodation, assimilation, or the withdrawal of Algonquians or Europeans from Algonquian spaces, they were the exception rather than the rule.

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At this point, the logic of transformation and ideologies based in reduction needs explaining. Reductivism was not specifically a process that physically reduced people or the environment from one thing into another. Reductivism goes far beyond that narrow scope of physical change. Reductivism pertains to the discourse of change specifically rooted in economics tied to the demands of the marketplace and change based in reducing nature, people, and the organisms that live in any given environment to ideas constructed in the imaginarium — that ubiquitous place where ideas exist only in the minds of people prior to the construction of their created manifestation as tangible formulations eventually evidenced in politics, religions, bureaucracies, technologies, and inventions. Reductivism was, in part, about transforming people to numbers, statistics, individuated groups, and converts, which were then processed into bureaucracies of power systems. That transformative process, I argue, was both unintentionally and intentionally violent; therefore, European cultures that practiced and perpetuated discourses rooted in the fundamental transformation of the New World produced in most situations, biological and environmental conflict, crisis, and violence. Reduction was primarily concerned with transformation for religious and economic reasons above and beyond all other biological, social, and communal considerations.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans were especially interested in the hypothetical transformation of the unknown, whether it be people, the environment, or any living organism, into smaller, more manageable and compliant utilities for the purpose of transmogrifying people and nature into workers and resources with value added to them, to be traded, bought and sold, consumed, or in some way inserted into the burgeoning, world marketplace. Karen Kupperman aptly notes that

Everyone who reads the literature of colonization is struck by the constant use of the word reduction for the proposed relationship with the Indians. Writers from all over Europe asserted that the Americans must be reduced to civility and Christianity; to
modern readers this language seems to indicate absolute self-confidence on the Europeans’ part and their expectation that they would impose harsh humiliation on America’s proud savages.

Thus Richard Hakluyt, demonstrating the layered nature of these sentiments, could write in one place that England could “reduce many Pagans to the faith of Christ” and, in another, praise Raleigh’s plan “to recall the savage and the pagan to civility.” Certainly, according to Hakluyt, the American natives were “waiting to be discovered and subdued, quickly and easily.”

The process of transforming people into slaves and converts, and reducing nature to commodities and fetishized goods was always problematic and due to religious strictures established over two millennia, coupled by separation from one’s community — in this case, the process of colonial individuation, where singular behavior might contradict normative mores based in “civilized conduct” — produced crises in disparate forms.

At Ajacán in 1570-71, religious conversion made Algonquian accommodation improbable, as the Jesuits’ primary objection was spiritual transformation, even as they began starving to death. At Roanoke in 1584, European agents competing over scarce resources led the English to the New World with the hope of pirating Spanish ships, and once there, to see the island and surrounding areas as a potential warehouse filled with commodities to be utilized and returned to the European marketplace. Finally, European diseases, coupled with slaving missions and two problematic colonial attempts along the Virginia and Carolina coast — Ajacán and Roanoke — may have contributed to the Powhatans exterminating their Chesapeake neighbors at the turn of the seventeenth century.

Reductive rationale also appeared to be ambivalent after the fact. As a matter of hindsight, Europeans, in many cases, lamented the contradiction inherent in proselytizing their “peaceful” religion at the end of a sword. The documents reflect that all of the European groups

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— the Spanish Jesuits at Ajacán; the English privateers, soldiers, and scientists at Roanoke; and
the English colonizers at Jamestown — not only suffered from cognitive dissonance that led to
conflicts with the Algonquians of the region, but they also experienced ambivalence in the form
of regret because some among them acted as poor examples of their religion or culture. To this
end, Kupperman asserts that “American [colonial] projects grew out of Old World aspirations.
Transatlantic colonization was undertaken in the atmosphere of religious conflict that touched
everything Europeans did.”4 Again, she notes that “Every letter, broadside, and book about
America by a writer [of that time] with transatlantic experience was steeped in ambivalence.”5

Therefore, when the Jesuits arrived off the coast of the Chesapeake Bay in 1570 — in a
region the Powhatans called Ajacán — they understood that religious conversion had been
concomitant to regular acts of violence committed against indigenes throughout the New World.
To minimize the violence, the Jesuits decided to build their colony without military support.
Despite the Jesuits’ best intentions, they brought with them a system of Christian control
developed in the New World with Old World ideologies that literally intended to reduce the
indigenous populations through what would become known as the Spanish reducción.

The Spanish created the reducción as a modified form of the encomienda system. The
encomienda system had been established almost immediately after the Spanish arrived in the
Caribbean and Mexico to control indigenes. Under encomienda, private Spanish citizens,
typically conquistadores, who became Señores — Lords, took control of large indigenous spaces
and forced the indigenes into servitude and slavery. The loss of indigenous life that followed the
violence of encomienda was staggering. To counteract that violence, a Dominican friar,
Bartolomé de las Casas, vehemently attacked encomienda in his *A Short Account of the

5 Ibid., 30.
Destruction of the Indies, and he also sent letters to the Spanish crown in order to argue for a kinder, mission based model of exploitation that did not utterly destroy indigenes. Las Casas not only succeeded in helping create the reducción, but when his Short Account reached the English, he inadvertently shored up Black Legend rhetoric that cast the Spanish as uniquely cruel among their European counterparts in their capacity for extraordinary violence.  

Going back to the reducción, the project literally contained indigenes to spheres of space as it attempted to transform Indian conduct, language… and ways of perceiving… The act of “reducing” always implied an analysis of its object and the (attempted) imposition of a different regularity. Like conversion more generally, it always established a break between the present and the order to which it would be turned. Practically, it did this by establishing codes of conduct and space, such as radial spheres of administration (center + periphery) and the perimetric boundaries delimiting spaces of jurisdiction. 

The plan was to inculcate a coherent set of mental habits and practices, to instill what in current social theory is called a “habitus.” As much as any other factor, this self-replicating capacity in the very logic of reducción accounts for its impact, despite the relatively small number of missionaries who actually implemented the project and despite the fragmented and resistant circumstances by which their efforts were compromised.

The Spanish implemented the reducción in order to curb European violence committed against New World Indians. However, it also served an altogether different purpose. As Alejandro Murguia posits in The Medicine of Memory, the Spanish Crown instituted the reducción to wrest political power away from the conquistadores, who were becoming increasingly difficult to control. Under the new system, “neophytes were separated from their communities and forced to live in the mission compound, under the strict supervision of priests and soldiers.” The main difference from encomienda was that “the converts were more under the control of ecclesiastical hegemony rather than a private Spanish citizen.”

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6 Ibid., 25-27.
7 Ibid. xv.
Using *reducción*, the Spanish maintained “peace” with indigenous communities if, and only if, religious conversion occurred. In *Converting Words*, William Hanks points out that the *reducción* was a project “glossed as pacification” that became “self-replicating and iterative quite apart from anyone’s beliefs or intentions,” which is why it was so formidable and far reaching. In sum, the *reducción* was a system contrived in indigenous transformation, whereby Spaniards forced the converted Indians to live on an allotted portion of land in order to support the Church and the European marketplace. Submission and dependence by the indigenes was integral to its success.

To this day, European colonial schemes caused the deaths of millions of indigenous people around the world, with disease and warfare being responsible for the majority of those deaths. And since disease cannot be extricated from the violence of warfare, transformation logic may have played an integral part in creating one of the most volatile systems of change ever patched together, yet Europeans consciously and unconsciously hid or subverted the destruction behind a series of seemingly innocuous binaries like heathen vs. Christian; savage/wild vs. civilized; the seductive woman vs. the tempted man; the Indian Other vs. the English or European; and finally, the superstitious vs. the enlightened or educated. Conflict was always at the core of ideologies based in reduction because the transformation of people and their habitats, which was concomitant to the burgeoning European marketplace, coupled with religious strictures that sought to confine “unlawful inhibition” or “un-Christian-like behavior” outside the metropole, effectively defined colonialism and imperialism as a global war of good versus evil that ultimately had nothing to do with either, but everything to do with accumulation based in scarcity legitimatized by European religion.

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This thesis uses “scarcity” vis-à-vis its relationship to economics to examine colonial conflicts and violence in the same way economists currently understand scarcity, as defined by leading economist, Paul Samuelson. He wrote that economics was and is “the study of how societies choose to employ scarce resources that could have alternative uses in order to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various persons and groups in society.”

Whereas economists are principally concerned with real scarcity — which involves the efficient management of scarce or finite resources governed by laws of supply and demand for the purpose of their reallocation in the marketplace — this thesis is primarily concerned with scarcity’s abstraction, the perception of scarcity, real or imagined. The study of economics is not a hard science. Economic principles are not based in variables that produce the same results again and again. Human emotions constantly interfere with economic principles, skewing otherwise normative responses to the supply, demand, and redistribution of resources and goods. That is why this thesis is primarily concerned with the perception of scarcity as a reductive lens western Europeans used while exploring, mapping, and then colonizing North America. The reason the perception of scarcity plays a significant role in examining colonialism is because colonists in the newly reconnoitered Chesapeake Bay region encountered both a fertile environment mapped in abundant foodstuffs and animal protein that sustained indigenous people.

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10 Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, *Economics, 19th Edition*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2010), 19. Samuelson and Nordhaus’s definition of scarcity in its connection to economics is nearly universal among the field of economic theory, arguing that “goods are scarce because people desire much more than the economy can produce. Economic goods are scarce, not free, and society must choose among the limited goods that can be produced with its available resources.” Richard Layard and Alan Walters, authors of *Microeconomic Theory*, support the principle economic idea pertaining to scarcity, arguing, “Economics is about making the best of things. In other words, it is about choice subject to constraints.” Richard Layard and Alan Walters, *Microeconomic Theory*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 13. Scarcity in economic theory is fundamentally defined by the principle of limitation and restraint, followed by the efficient use of any resource to maximize its fetishized potential as a consumer good.
for generations, as well as a foreign ecology that through ignorance and a lack of planning, continuously appeared as a land of dearth that frequently resulted in starvation for those unfamiliar with managing an alien ecology.

In the seventeenth century there was little discourse about the trajectory of how mapping the remainder of the “unknown” world would help facilitate managing or controlling newly reconnoitered “exotic” regions outside of Europe. The need for mapping newly discovered lands was paramount to utilizing those lands and possibly the people living on them, but reconnaissance missions and the mapping that followed were part of a larger discursive movement based in power relations, “civilization efforts,” and controlling or managing otherwise impossible biological and ecological factors — indigenous people and the environment in which they lived, respectively. I do not focus a lot of time on the effects of mapping the world as a tool of European hegemony, as the subject has received quite a bit of attention in the last two or three decades, but in order to draw together the extensive reach reductivism played in reordering the modern world, the importance of reconnaissance missions, mapping, and then transforming people into slaves or converts and land into property theoretically controlled by Europeans, is examined.

When the first English adventurers and the financiers and monarchs who backed them devised plans for colonizing North America, they came with plans to “civilize” the “heathen savage,” which meant they would promote a message of stability, law, peace, and the promulgation of the Christian religion if the Indian other submitted to the process of conversion — religious or otherwise. Europeans hoped to transform indigenes into subjects bound by the adjudication of their laws and mores if indigenous land and its resources were to be effectively utilized for the metropole back in Europe. This is why the Spanish and the English, when they
attempted to “civilize” indigenous people, did so with punctuated episodes of violence, juxtaposed by political coercion.

Europeans underpinned colonial projects with crisis driven ideologies, and as such, violent conflict was a regular feature of policies based in internal contradiction grounded in Christian principles and mercantile based economics. The Roman Catholic and Protestant ethos ensured that Christians would always need the pagan other, and since pagans sat outside the acceptable limits of orthodoxy — it was never okay to allow the souls of the presumably damned to be left unattended — the pagan would have to be subjugated and reduced to Christian conversion for their own eternal good. This process also simultaneously evolved at a time when Europeans became increasingly isolated from a more sustainable relationship with the environment. More than ever, Europeans felt that the earth needed to be properly transformed into a fetishized commodity, which meant the wild needed to be taken out of the wilderness in order to properly utilize its resources in the marketplace. Helen Rountree, one of the foremost scholars on the Powhatans, sums this up nicely:

By the early seventeenth century the English had long taken it for granted that Man (the species, but especially males) had to be an exploiter of land, a subduer of Nature, in order to survive. “Wild” country was not just unused, it was menacing. Unfarmed country was a “desert.” Humankind was supposed to “reduce” (which meant “change”) the wilderness and any people in it to “civilized” use, which meant intensive plant and animal husbandry needed to feed millions of people. Just as the Israelites were given the task of taking Canaan and using it for God’s glory, so the Europeans were given the job of taking and transforming the New World.¹¹

Also apparent in some parts of Europe in the late sixteenth century was the slow crawl away from communalism and its common spaces in the Old World, to societal individuation and private property in the New World. European colonialism attracted individuated agents because of the nature of colonialism itself. It was initially adventurers, merchants, sailors, privateers,

traders, at times felons on the lam, soldiers, and persons capable of living with the possible strain of continual risk who might consider leaving the community they knew for the settlement or colony they did not. A certain amount of ignorance most likely overcame the prospect of what living in a new part of the world actually entailed, but even the most ignorant left their community, the one they knew, because they were optimistic about their chances of surviving in a foreign environment they did not know. This optimism, even in the face of starvation, attacks from indigenes, suffering from unknown diseases, and living in a place with little or no access to female counterparts, suggests that reductive reasoning was ideologically sanguine in spite of itself. To borrow an anachronistic phrase from the economist Robert Shiller, reductive colonialism appears irrationally exuberant.  

The reason for its exuberant or positive outlook, despite the isolation or alienation of living without one’s home community, and despite the high risk of death through any number of unknown variables, may have stemmed from a separate phenomenon that included the bifurcation and so called separation of “man from his environment.” Rountree avers that part of the reason the people of Europe became divorced from a close relationship to the land stemmed from the Judeo-Christian religion. She suggests that  

the religion practiced then (and now) in Christian England was not a European one; it was one imported from the Hellenized Middle East. It was therefore automatically divorced from closeness with the land in the British Isles, and its ideology emphasized things other than land, plants, and animals.  

With the “Great Chain of Being” firmly established in the minds of seventeenth century Christians, Western Europeans, more than ever, pitted themselves against the environment. The

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12 Robert Shiller, *Irrational Exuberance*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2000), 1-3. Although the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, was widely believed to have coined the phrase in the mid-1990s, he borrowed it from Shiller, who was then an economics professor at Yale University during the same period. The phrase became popular in the late 1990s as a way of explaining the affect the internet bubble had on stock prices around the globe. Shiller’s book of the same name, explained the phrase’s origins long after it entered the American English vernacular.

13 Rountree, “Powhatan Priests,” 486.
privateer or settler heading to the New World engaged in a battle with both the environment and those living within it. The colonizer that survived purportedly did so by “conquering” the unknown and “mastering nature.” The key to marketing colonial efforts would involve the idea of a self-reliant individual: a man of wits, adept at maneuvering around impossible situations, “a man’s man” not prone to suffering those who might impede the goals of the colonial charter — a man like John Smith or any number of his contemporaries, helped perpetuate this narrative. The European man, replete with an identity of self-reliance and overcoming impossible odds through wit, levelheadedness, cunning, risk taking, and his God’s assistance was a contrived fiction. However that fiction was integral to colonial efforts if Europeans hoped to survive the trauma and violence of displacement and reductive policies. In sum, those who backed European colonialism around the world tended to support the optimist, positive discourse of imbuing the individual with the psychological tools necessary for survival without a properly functioning community supporting the colonists’ emotional, cultural, and even biological needs. The negative “rumors of excessive violence” concerning early frontier experience needed to be filtered into the colonial discourse and ultimately discounted as outlier experiences blamed on the personal failure of the individual, or the resistance of the “native savage,” but the colonial mission would remain an imperative.

The negative outliers of colonialism, as evidenced in those “rumors of excessive violence” committed against indigenes, may not have been aberrations to reductive reasoning, but were treated as such to minimize the negative impact of violence, isolation, and individuation that colonialism tended to exert upon those experiencing it. The result was an overly optimistic form of violent appropriation that formed the basis of a process of personal alienation — from others, their community, their culture, and the environment they traversed through — that needed
pagans or “savages” to cast aspersions upon, to be pitted against and conquered, and to reinforce the optimism of single handedly civilizing an “uncivilized world” when catastrophic change actually occurred. Wherever Europeans introduced their laws and policies, the ethos of man winning against nature, technology winning against nature, and the optimism of political economy finding a solution to whatever vexed the shortcomings of European existence was sure to follow. The Spanish and the English were optimistic enough to justify undermining all of the ideals of “civilization” if the “means” one day met the goals of the “ends.” True to what the Black and White Legends explicated — tales told about the brutality of the Spanish and the English, respectively — all too often, the goals of “civilization” were never met but extended further and further into the future.

In regards to the structure of this thesis, I begin my examination of European colonialism in Upper Florida, a vast region in the early sixteenth century that stretched from the southern tip of the Florida Keys, all the way north of the Chesapeake Bay. Some Spaniards claimed land for the Crown that stretched as far north as Newfoundland, on account of the munificent supplies of North Atlantic fish, but without settlements, they had no ability to defend such a massive area from European encroachment. The Spanish claimed Upper Florida as their own, but for most of the sixteenth century, less than a thousand colonists called it their home; the majority died from illness, poor sanitation, indigenous warfare, and disease within the first months of settlement. Those who did survive were located primarily in two locations: what is now St. Augustine, Florida and Santa Elena, South Carolina.

This thesis briefly touches on Spain’s first attempt to colonize Chicora, a so called New Andalucia that the Spanish “discovered” in 1521. I introduce Chicora as a template for Spanish colonialism because of how the Spanish acted when they first arrived and how it ultimately
failed as a suitable location for the Strangers. After meeting the Chicorans — located just south of modern day Charleston, South Carolina — the Spanish took dozens of them captive and the majority of the survivors died working on Caribbean plantations. One of the Chicorans, el Chicorana, however, returned to his homeland in 1526 after he convinced the Spanish that he had converted to their religion and wished to act as their interpreter in Chicora. He also promised to aid them in their attempts to convert the Chicorans to Christianity. When the Spanish did return, he and several other interpreters and slaves vanished into the interior and the Spanish never saw them again. I argue that this failed colonial attempt created the first reductive ripple in Upper Florida. Just as the term sounds, ripples are small waves that emanate out from a source and have the ability to reach distances far from their initial point of contact. Europeans, who came with ideologies based in transformation logic, created reductive ripples whenever they interacted with indigenes, which, in turn, exposed those indigenes to European culture and practices based in economic and religious change. It goes without saying that each culture impacted the other. However, because Europeans at the time believed themselves to be superior to indigenes, and because Europeans were invading the New World rather than Indians invading the Old World, the weight of European reductive policies tended to have a far greater impact on indigenes, at least initially, than indigenous lifeways based in reciprocity had on Europeans. For example, Hixson notes that

While Europeans did not introduce violence and militarism, already well ensconced within Indian cultures, colonialism did profoundly intensify indigenous violence. Colonial violence functioned in the context of the demands of a globalizing market economy. While Indians took captives, the arrival of European colonialism precipitated a “frenzy of slaving,” the marketing of captives for weapons, ammunition, and other goods.\footnote{Hixson, American Settler, 25.}
The “frenzy of slaving” that Hixson points toward was but one example of the first reductive ripples to impact the coastal lands of Upper Florida. Because slaving was an integral component of Spanish colonialism rooted in market ideologies, violence not only intensified at the point of contact, but Indians quickly transmitted the knowledge they gained about the Spanish, and later the English, hundreds of miles from where the violent interactions initially took place. Sometimes called the “moccasin telegraph,” Indians transmitted information on trade routes throughout Upper Florida and disparate indigenous people quickly learned to distinguish the Spanish from other Europeans precisely because of their desire for slaves and gold. The end result was that Europeans quickly made a reputation for themselves that went beyond captive taking; instead, they became notorious as slavers that coastal Indians learned not to trust. Europeans were not just Strangers; they were increasing understood to be dangerous, even by those who had never personally interacted with them.

Moving on from Chicora, I examine the life of Don Luis, an Algonquian cacique from Ajacán — which presumably belonged to the expanding Powhatan paramount chiefdom located along the Chesapeake Bay, to the fall line roughly 50 miles west of the coast — who lived among the Spanish from 1561 to 1570. During that time, he converted to Christianity and convinced the Jesuits to build a mission in Upper Florida in order to convert his people to the Christian religion. Like el Chicorana, once Don Luis returned to his homeland, he promptly deserted the Spanish to live as an “apostate” among his people. In the spring of 1571, the cacique returned with a small cadre of warriors and killed all eight of the Jesuit priests, only one boy survived. This thesis argues that there may have been numerous reasons for disposing of the missionaries, but among those, Spanish reductive policies no doubt played a part in their own
demise. The Jesuits meant to reduce the Powhatans through the implementation of the *reducción*, which would have catastrophically transformed their indigenous lifeways.

To better understand why Don Luis rejected the Spanish and ultimately removed them from any kind of Powhatan sphere of influence, I analyze the cacique’s life while living among the Spanish in Spain, Mexico, and Cuba. During the 1560s, while Don Luis lived in Mexico, the Dominicans carried out an inquisition against Indian neophytes and they tortured thousands of individuals before it finally subsided a decade later. Don Luis would have been an eyewitness to the violent transformation of the New World. Since he lived in Cuba, he would have also been aware of the devastation that disease, slavery, and warfare had on the indigenous populations, whereby over 90 percent of indigenes disappeared from the island in less than a century. He may not have personally empathized with the indigene Strangers, but such catastrophic transformation of Indian lifeways would have been visible everywhere he visited and lived. What this thesis hopes to highlight is how indigenes related to the first reductive ripples hitting their communities. In the case of Don Luis and the Powhatans, they rejected any kind of relationship with the Spanish, which, as I argue, was partially because they were rejecting policies that threatened to violently transform their culture with religiously glossed, market driven ideologies that would ultimately undermine indigenous reciprocity, communal cohesion, and a close connection to the land that sustained them.

The next chapter moves away from the life of Don Luis and the colonial efforts of the Spanish and focuses instead on the first English colonial venture on Roanoke Island from 1584-1587. The English at Roanoke were not interested in taking captives as slaves for labor, but like the Spanish, the promulgation of their religion was important to them, as evidenced by some of the founders of the Virginia Company in London who intended to spread Christianity to the
Indians as “the top of their agenda for colonization.”15 Be that as it may, no Protestant ministers were present on the first exploratory expedition, but one did return with the colonists in 1585. Although the English were serious about converting New World Indians, they came to the land they named “Virginia,” after Queen Elizabeth I, for exactly one reason: to set up a privateering venture to loot the Spanish. Trade with the Algonquians, as well as Christian conversion, was ancillary to the goal of theft and pillaging. The English hoped to trade their trinkets for foodstuffs, locally, and for gold, copper, pearls, or fur pelts that had value in an English market, but their first priority was obtaining a piece of land they could hold privately for the exclusive purpose of pirating Spanish ships flush with gold and silver from Spanish colonies in South America. In sum, violence by way of legalized theft was the foundation upon which the English hoped to build their colony in the New World.

The aim of the English at Roanoke may have been driven by dreams of pirating the Spanish, but they had loftier goals for the whole of North America. English explorers and adventurers had wanted to build a permanent colony along the American coast since the 1560s. It was not until 1583, however that Sir Humphrey Gilbert tried and failed to establish England’s first colony on the banks of Newfoundland’s formidable shores. He was drawn to the area, as numerous other European competitors had been over the preceding century, because of the vast schools of North Atlantic cod. By the end of the fifteenth century, more Europeans were engaged in fishing activities than any other occupation besides farming. Fish was the most important source of protein to Western Europeans and due to the ease in which it could be

15 Martin H. Quitt, “Trade and Acculturation at Jamestown, 1607-1609: The Limits of Understanding,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 52, no. 2 (April 1, 1995): 229, doi:10.2307/2946974. Quitt quotes Fausz who writes that “Part of the Virginia mission was “to reestablish the good image of Christian Europeans” among the Indian people of the Virginia coastal lands. Holding to Black Legend ideologies, the founders understood how difficult trade might be if they treated the Powhatans as the Spanish had treated other indigenous people throughout their empire.
preserved, it was the ideal military ration. Europeans were shocked to learn in the late fifteenth century that any one place — the deep waters located off the coast of Canada — in the world teemed with such prodigious amounts of fish, and it helped fuel the idea that the New World was bountiful in everything that the Old World lacked. European nation-states quickly came to see the New World as a storehouse they needed to immediately exploit before other European competitors did the same.

I suggest that the source of English violence in Roanoke stemmed from having been entrenched in competitive, militaristic ideologies that saw the New World as an empty space ripe for biological, spiritual, and economic transformation. In other words, the English arrived seeing forests as commodity fields, oceans as fish hatcheries, mountains as mines, Indians as either would-be converts or “savages” to be exterminated outright, and islands as outposts for pirating the Spanish. Even more so than the Spanish, the English viewed the New World through an economic lens. The Spanish and the English were both steeped in Christian ideologies — the former Roman Catholic and the latter Protestant — but sixteenth century Spaniards truly attempted to create religious communities in those areas they colonized, while the English specifically came to Roanoke for economic reasons. That premise alone ensured that when the English attempted to colonize Roanoke, they did not come as ambassadors hoping to establish peaceful trade, but as interlopers determined to drag Old World conflicts into the New.

The final chapter shifts to the early seventeenth century and examines the arrival of the English in Powhatan territory in 1607. At the time, the English essentially came from a

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backwater kingdom in Europe — John Donne called it the “Suburbs of the old world”\textsuperscript{18} — and hoped to make their mark on a backwater region of the New World, competing primarily against the Spanish, the Dutch, and the French. At Jamestown, the colonial venture was one long string of crises that started internally with the English as the colonists competed against each other, rather than work together as a community. Inevitably, their internal crises overflowed onto their Algonquian neighbors. The first Jamestown colonists hoped to get rich by exploiting indigenous resources, which led to backbiting, dissension, and paranoia the moment they realized food scarcity was their biggest problem in the foreign environment. The English then stole Algonquian food caches and retaliated with extreme prejudice when the Powhatans, in return, stole iron tools from the colonists. The crises reached a fever pitch when, at least in one case, the colonists resorted to devouring one of their own.

Moreover, the final chapter deviates into two interconnected parts: on the one hand, I connect European reductive policies to the near destruction of the English in their first years of settlement, and on the other, I examine the potential role that European reductive ripples played in the extermination of the Chesapeakes, by Powhatans, just a year prior to when the English arrived in the Chesapeake Bay. Establishing cause and effect relationships between Europeans and indigenes is complicated and problematic, to say the least. And although my focus is on the role European reductive policies played in causing violence with disparate Algonquian communities living along the Carolina and Virginia coastal lands, I briefly point to the impact that the European fur trade had on disparate Indian communities located hundreds of miles apart from one another in the \textit{pays d’en haut} — the region that spanned from Lake Superior in the north, to the Ohio River Valley in the south and reached the edge of Lake Erie in the east — a

\textsuperscript{18} John Donne, \textit{A Sermon Preached to the Honourable Company of the Virginian Plantation}, in his \textit{Five Sermons Upon Special Occasions}, (London, 1626), 44.
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century later. In the *pays d’en haut*, French traders’ needs for furs initially caused a small ripple in the reciprocal lifeways of the Indians in Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence River Valley. Within 40 years, however, that same ripple transformed into waves of violence that impacted Indian communities in places no Europeans had ever explored, over a thousand miles away.

More important to this thesis is the correlation of how Spanish and English reductive activities could affect the cultures of any number of unknown indigenous communities, without directly interacting with those communities. To better suss out the possible correlation between European reductive policies and indigenous violence, I look to Ned Blackhawk’s important analysis in *Violence Over the Land* to better understand how “waves of violence” disproportionally impacted disparate Indian communities that were spread out over hundreds, if not thousands of miles apart from each other. Violence perpetrated between native groups, influenced directly or indirectly by outsiders, Blackhawk notes, could be used as an “interpretive concept as well as a method for understanding… understudied worlds.” ¹⁹ I do not argue that the Spanish in Florida or the English in Roanoke created waves of violence that *directly* impacted Powhatan lifeways in the sixteenth century; rather, I contend that starting in 1521, disparate European groups produced reductive ripples — not quite waves — that may have bolstered psychic anxieties that impacted the Powhatans in Virginia to act out against their Chesapeake neighbors in an extraordinarily violent way at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Furthermore, this thesis suggests that European policies based in reductivism may have contributed to Algonquian prophecies that emerged in the sixteenth century warning of enemies coming from the Chesapeake Bay — that is, from the east — to displace or overthrow indigenous nations living along the Virginian fall line. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, at least three different Algonquian groups living along the coast of Upper Florida had prophecies or stories about enemy Strangers who would come from the east or the Underworld to either supplant or destroy them. I argue that these prophecies emerged as indigenes shared, through the moccasin telegraph, oral tales that spoke of an intensification of violence wherever Strangers from the east made contact. Such stories would have reinforced how the Strangers valued the taking of slaves through treachery, how the Strangers hoped to replace their priests, reduce their autonomy, and how they valued their prestigious items, like gold and silver, more than the people who used those items to maintain a reciprocal relationship with their community and environment.

Currently, the only primary sources documenting the prophecies and the following Indian attack comes from the English; however, nearly all Powhatan historians accept that the event did occur and that it coincided with Indian prophecies that precipitated it. Whether or not the total eradication of the Chesapeakes did occur, the Indian prophecies may have been, metaphorically speaking, the canaries in the coalmine. The prophecies might be the first indicators that indigenes understood early on just how destructive Europeans policies were to indigenous lifeways and the environment they relied on to perpetuate their cultures.

The Chesapeake Bay may have been a backwater locale to Europeans passing north-west out of the Caribbean as they readied for the stormy seas of the Atlantic, but it was the seat of the Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom at the height of his power in 1607. The Powhatans, like all societies, understood scarcity and othering as well, with both resulting in near continual violence that was a normal feature of Amerindian life in the Eastern Woodlands. Rountree went so far as to suggest that the Powhatans, like numerous other Indian nations, ritualized violence as a way to
maintain and restore order in their communities.\textsuperscript{20} A failure to act vengefully brought dire consequences, like the threat of unending violence, drought, or a lack of available prey during a hunt. Furthermore, conflict and violence acted as a check against overpopulation, which also helped maintain an ongoing source of animal proteins in boundary areas, where hunting included the risk of death by enemies living outside of the Powhatan periphery.\textsuperscript{21}

In regards to how Algonquian people viewed scarcity, accumulation, and private property, a uniquely Amerindian approach to the environment emerged along the Atlantic coast that had been in practice for thousands of years. As numerous ethnologists have noted, there was no concept of private property in Powhatan territory. As long as the people who foraged, hunted, planted or utilized the land were Powhatan Real People, they could access the land equally and without restriction. Rountree explains that there was no need for private ownership as the Powhatans did not use fertilizer to regenerate the soil that went fallow after just a few years of use; it was a usufruct system: “fields left fallow reverted to general ownership” and became places where deer and other game would frequent immediately after agricultural abandonment.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite the Spanish and English labeling the coastal swamplands along the Chesapeake Bay “a desert,” the low lying woodlands were incredibly productive in foodstuffs that ranged from acorns, nuts, and berries, to domesticated crops like maize, beans, and squash, to myriad types of fish, to other meat proteins that included elk — hunted to extinction along the Virginia lowlands once the English arrived — deer, turkey, beaver, muskrat, and various water fowl. Rountree further elaborates that “a knowledgeable Indian person would not starve completely…”

\textsuperscript{20} Helen Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries}, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 12. Rountree calls the Powhatans “‘real he-men,’ ever ready for war and councils of war, ever ready to gain honor in going against foreigners…” She went on to explain most Powhatan warfare “took the form of small-scale raids and ambushes.” Rarely did Powhatan violence on the battlefield result in more than dozens of deaths at any given time.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. See also Rountree, \textit{The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Cultures}, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 41.

\textsuperscript{22} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough}, 9.
even during times of regular scarcity that occurred every year during late winter and early summer. Instead, when droughts occurred or seasonal periods of want took place, Powhatans suffered together and believed “the hungry time would not last.”

Chief Powhatan maintained a decentralized form of power based in reciprocity, tribute, and exchange. Like nearly all eastern Woodland Indians, reciprocity remained a strong social component for communal cohesion. The giving of gifts was not about maintaining equality among the Powhatans, but reinforced “interdependence among individuals of unequal power and prestige.” Tribute paid to the head chief, Powhatan, as well as to his district chiefs — the werowances, “reinforced cooperation with a strong sense of order,” while simultaneously bolstering social conformity. Normal foodstuffs, like maize, beans, and other foraged items, stood outside the tribute system, unless their district chief needed tribute while on a diplomatic mission. Planters of foodstuffs — the women and children — kept everything they harvested for their families. There was little surplus at the end of the harvest, but what remained would be traded for what the household lacked, or cached for future use. The Powhatans tribute system also excluded small game, while 80 percent of large game obtained by hunters was redistributed among the district chiefs and allowed the hunter to gain prestige among the werowances and priests. The high “eight-tenths tax,” according to Rountree, discouraged overhunting large game in Powhatan territories, although deer populations had already been substantially reduced by the

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23 Rountree, *Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1722*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 43-44. Rountree went on to argue that “Thanks to the easy access to waterways, farmland, and forest throughout eastern Virginia, each village appears to have been able to produce everything it needed except certain luxury goods.” See also Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians of Virginia*, 32.

24 See Rountree, *Powhatan Foreign Relations*, 13-18. Rountree avers that Chief Powhatan had over 100 wives for this very reason: since the women and children were responsible for procuring enough foodstuffs to survive the most harsh winters, more wives ensured access to surplus foods for festivities and gift giving, which Powhatan used to maintain power and manage ever shifting Indian alliances.
time the English arrived. Chief Powhatan taxed prestigious goods that included copper, pearls, or any European iron implements that might be used as for crafting canoes, chopping down trees, and farming. In most cases, however, sixteenth century Algonquians refashioned iron and copper objects into instruments of war.

The Powhatans were polytheists; their religious beliefs intertwined completely into the environment in which they lived and remained rooted in pre-agricultural traditions. The most important god among the Powhatan pantheon was Okeus, and as Rountree avers, Okeus was “a severe deity” that “rewarded and punished” and policed the daily actions of the Powhatans. Powhatans revered Okeus in “all things that could hurt them, but the deity also maintained a sort of balance in nature, which included respect for game killed in the hunt. If the heart or liver was not offered to Okeus at the time of the kill, the vengeful deity might punish the hunter or his entire community with drought or some other supernatural inspired calamity. Okeus also gave warriors courage and strength during warfare, which exalted the deity in importance above the “great god,” Ohone — creator of the earth, the sky, the Powhatans, and all the other deities.

Powhatan people also believed that Mantoac or Manitou infused almost every living and nonliving thing on earth. Mantoac was a “manifestation of spiritual power” that occurred in “almost any form.” Simply put, Mantoac was power transmitted by incomprehensible forces in animate and inanimate objects. By infusing Mantoac into nearly everything, Neal Salisbury surmises that “it enabled its adherents to accommodate traditional religion to changing circumstances.” Instead of rejecting the unknown, Algonquians “welcomed it and sought to

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25 Rountree, *The Powhatan Indians of Virginia: Their Traditional Culture*, 40-41. Rountree suggests that Indians had already placed too much pressure on deer populations in the eastern Woodlands beginning in the late Archaic Period. She did admit that her findings were at odds with Calvin Martin, who postulates that European influences changed Indian attitudes, which resulted in “serious overhunting in the fur-trade era.”

26 Ibid., 130-137. In some iterations of the Powhatans’ creation myths, Okeus created humankind as well as the heavens and maize. He then showed Powhatans how to grow their most important staple crop, which was why small gifts of maize were left behind at his temples.
come to terms with it.” *Mantoac* might emerge through an elder’s wisdom; it could appear as a European shipwreck off the coast, laden with metal prestigious goods; it might show up in the form of a newly introduced technology; or anything worthy of respect that was not immediately comprehensible.\(^{27}\) Roger Williams described 37 different types of *Mantoac* among the Narragansett that he mistook as their gods:

> There is a general Custome amongst them, at the apprehension of any Excellency in Men, Women, Birds, Beasts, Fish, &c. to cry out *Manitoo*, that is, it is a God, as thus if they see one man excel others in Wisdome, Valour, strength, Activity &c. they cry out Manitoo A God: and therefore when they talke amongst themselves of the *English* ships, and great buildings, of the plowing their Fields, and especially of Bookes and Letters, they will end thus: *Manitowock* [Mantoac] They are Gods: *Cummanitto*, you are a God, &c.\(^{28}\)

When examining Powhatan spiritual beliefs, it is important to note the close connection between the reverence they showed for certain deities and the powers ascribed to all things *Mantoac*, and their relationship to the environment in which they lived, because hopeful optimism about the future ultimately balanced Algonquian fears of Okeus’s severe punishments. If Powhatans displeased Okeus or the other *kwiokos* — minor deities, the rain might not fall or the land might be punished in some way, but they understood the occasionally vicious cycles of drought and scarcity as part of an otherwise abundant world.\(^ {29}\) Whereas Europeans more readily viewed their world through the prism of economic interests and the value scarcity had in regulating not only commerce, but people and resources, Powhatans experienced drought, famine, and scarcity as a community, suffering through it together, even when faced with

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\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Rountree, *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough*, 8-15. In regards to spiritual matters, the Powhatans “needed religion not only to face hazards but also to deal with injuries and diseases that shortened people’s lifespans.” See also Rountree, *Powhatan Foreign Relations*, 53. Quoting John Lawson, Rountree writes, “They never walk backward and forward as we do, nor contemplate on the Affairs of Loss and Gain; the things which daily perplex us.”
starvation and death. In *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi aptly notes that in indigenous societies, no one is in danger of dying of hunger unless everyone is.\(^30\)

In sum, the Powhatans did not live with the contradictions of “civilization” and the ambivalence-in-hindsight that appeared to accompany the Christian religion. Their wars were not huge events fought between kingdoms or city-states, but a brutal aspect of everyday life. Moreover, whereas European wars might result in the deaths of tens of thousands of fatalities and stemmed from crises enveloped in religious strictures, territory acquisition, and accumulation, Powhatan wars were not reductive, but reiterative — they did not stem from a notion that meant to turn entire forests into ships or homes, their communities into workers competing in the marketplace, and their culture into a religious “civilization.”

What may appear odd to the modern reader was how much Algonquian warfare, as bloody at times as it was, worked to maintain and even bolster membership in their community by adopting the sons of dead warriors and marrying the wives of the deceased. Powhatan violence was in some ways concomitant to biologically reaffirming their community as a matter of perpetuating Algonquian culture. Their metaphysical views on the spiritual world encompassed in *Mantoac* did not contradict their views on violence or how they were supposed to treat the Stranger or enemy in their midst. Their deities were based in ideas that helped the Algonquians negotiate and survive in an environment that was taxing and ever changing. They had no need for maxims that might encourage cognitive dissonance and crisis, especially during the 1560s and early 1600s — times in which two of the worst droughts in nearly eight hundred years occurred.

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To be clear, I am aware of the “magical Indian” trope based in the overcompensation of white ethnocentrism in academic studies, especially when it comes to comparing or contrasting cultures, as if Europeans were inadvertently the touchstone by which all others are measured. Even this analogy is problematic. Anthropologist Seth Mallios, in *The Deadly Politics of Giving*, notes that there is no escaping “the aura of whiteness” that blankets Western European history, especially when it comes to interpreting indigenous Algonquians living four hundred years in the past. The first order is to recognize Western bias, along with the power system concomitant to whiteness, which, according to George Lipsitz, “creates a system of advantage that mandates the subordination of nonwhites.”

To that end, there is simply no way around one’s cultural bias, as everyone is culturally biased.

In regards to this thesis, I am in agreement with Mallios, who writes, “Guilt does not fuel my investigations of the past. I do not seek to undo European colonization, justify indigenous violence, or idealize eroded native lifeways.” This thesis examines unequal conflict and crisis perpetrated by Europeans and Algonquians. If the Spanish and English hoped to transform the New World through inherently violent, colonial reductive ways, Powhatan society, Rountree avers, was based on “authority, warfare, and trade, each of which reflected the Chesapeake Algonquin cultural worldview…” and that worldview included efforts to bring the English under the umbrella of Powhatan hegemony. Powhatan himself was the paramount chief of a burgeoning chiefdom when the English halted his advances. The Powhatans had been at war with numerous Algonquian nations along the Virginia coastland since at least 1570, but sometime in the early seventeenth century, they went beyond the normal scope of Indian warfare

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and permanently removed every trace of their eastern Chesapeake rivals. According to Hixson, “Pre-contact Indians typically did not engage in genocidal campaigns against their rivals,” but as Europeans demanded more goods from the emerging globalized market economy, colonists the world over sought to meet those demands, which profoundly intensified and increased indigenous violence.  

Any discussion of the “g” word — genocide, in connection to Amerindian violence is at best, complicated; at worst, it is irresponsible. As Carroll Kakel points out, “an almost universal reluctance on the part of mainstream American historians to consider ‘genocide’ in the case of the American Indians” has prevailed until “very recently. ” This thesis does not focus on genocidal studies, but it is important to move beyond white guilt or the psychic traumas of the past that have prohibited any discussion of Amerindian genocide in order to effectively examine why Powhatans at the turn of the seventeenth century killed and removed all of their Chesapeake rivals. If modern definitions of genocide hold, which emanated out of World War II and the Nazi Shoah, then genocide is defined by Raphael Lemkin in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe as “a conscious plan to destroy a defined group by killing them or undermining their ability to sustain life, through military, cultural, economic, biological, or psychological means.” The United Nations defines genocide as “any of a number of acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” These acts included “killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group… [and] notably attempting to prevent births…”

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34 Hixson, American Settler, 25.
36 Hixson, American Settler, 18.
37 Ibid.
Even if the Powhatans managed to only kill the Chesapeake warriors, when they removed all the remaining Chesapeakes from their land, and when they forced the wives of the deceased to marry other Algonquians, and when they relocated the children of the deceased into non-Chesapeake homes, they undermined the Chesapeakes ability to sustain life and ultimately destroyed them and their culture. In short, by modern definitions, the Powhatans committed genocide. Hixson argues that as American settler colonialism came to the New World, the entire continent was plunged into a disjointed, “genocidal regime” that impacted indigenes and colonizers alike.38 The point here is not to point fingers or attribute moralistic levels of religiously defined evil to one form of violence juxtaposed to the next, but to examine the role that European reductive policies may have contributed to an intensification in violence on the American continent between disparate Indian nations in the early seventeenth century. The extermination of the Chesapeake was an important event precisely because less than a century after it occurred, the most violent episodes in the history of North American Indian warfare exploded across the north-eastern continent. All of this occurred as Europeans attempted to transform the New World into a place they hoped to call home.

38 Ibid., 18-20.
Don Luis and the Jesuit Murders

Spanish Jesuits first attempted to colonize the Chesapeake coastal lands, which they called Ajacán or Jacán, in 1570. Due to the Black Legend and the well accounted tales of the time that sought to cast aspersions on the Spaniards’ intentions in the New World, it might be easy to dismiss the Jesuits’ sincere goals of hoping to convert the American Indians as nothing more than a pretense for Spanish imperial control of the coastal lands north of Florida. Although Spanish interests were always a mix of “both material and religious considerations,” the Spanish were genuine in their efforts to transform the religious beliefs of the indigenous inhabitants they believed were under their spiritual hegemony.39 In a Papal Bull dating back to 1496, Pope Alexander VI dictated that King Ferdinand V and Queen Isabella I of Spain “take spiritual responsibility for the inhabitants of the land” they meant to occupy in the Americas.40 Mallios’s examination of commodity and gift exchange among the Spanish colonizers and Powhatan people highlights the sincerity of the Roman Catholic Church in their attempts to convert the indigenous populations they believed were under their spiritual care; he points out that after Christopher Columbus returned to Spain, all of Columbus’s following ventures in the New World included priests to take up the charge of religious conversion.41

By the early sixteenth century, the Spanish had begun reconnoitering the Florida coastal lands, and by the middle of the century, there was an increasing interest in maintaining a permanent presence in Upper Florida, around 37° north of the equator, because that was the latitude where the Gulf Stream, flowing in a massive circuitous route, reached Cape Hatteras and veered off east across the Atlantic, which reduced the time it took to sail back to Europe by as

39 Mallios, Deadly Politics, 38.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
much as two months. The Spanish were well aware that a base set up on a deep harbor, anywhere within sixty miles of the Gulf Stream’s easterly current, would be a strategic location for either defending their treasure fleets or, as was increasingly becoming the norm, the place of a possible haven for Spanish enemies to attack and ultimately confiscate their treasure.\textsuperscript{42} The Chesapeake Bay, located at 37°, seemed to offer exactly what the Spanish needed to protect their American interests.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, French Protestants and English privateers, respectively, set their sights on Spanish territories that stretched from Florida to a large inlet of water that was rumored to connect North America’s east coast to the Orient. Therefore, according to Clifford Lewis and Albert Loomie, King Philip II, in 1558, “demanded settlement of that coast,” and Spanish conquistadors attempted to fulfill the king’s mandate in 1561.\textsuperscript{43}

The earliest recorded interaction of the Chesapeake Powhatans and the Spanish explorers came from a Spanish passenger named Bartolemé Martinez, who claimed he sailed with Pedro Menéndez de Avilés on the \textit{Santa Catalina}; he wrote, “Pedro Menéndez… discovered on the coast a large bay [the Chesapeake]. He entered further into the harbor and sailed up into it. When the Indians saw the boats, they came alongside in canoes and boarded the flagship. There His Excellency regaled them with food and clothing.”\textsuperscript{44} As it turns out, Martinez probably did not sail with the crew in 1561 that first encountered the Indians of the land of Ajacán.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 12. Father Lewis and Father Loomie were the foremost historians of Spain’s colonial efforts in the Chesapeake until the 1950s. They translated nearly every Spanish document that was available at the time pertaining to Spain’s colonial schemes in “the land of Ajacán.” They included all the original reports and letters in Spanish and then directly followed with their English translation of those same documents.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{45} Lewis and Loomie speculate that since no record exists placing Menéndez in the area at the time, the ship must have been captained by Ángel de Villafañe. See \textit{Spanish Jesuit}, 15. Villafañe, however, never reached as far north as \textit{la Bahía de Santa María}. See Paul Hoffman, \textit{A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century}, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 183. Hoffman cogently
Martinez been on that caravel, he would have known that it was not Menéndez who commanded that Spanish caravel, but one Antonio Velásquez, acting as a factor [agent] under Ángel de Villafañe. According to “Spain’s House of Trade records,” a Spanish crew aboard the caravel, *Santa Catalina*, was the first to “discover” the land of Ajacán, “piloted by Alonso González de Arroche,” under Antonio Velásquez’s command, sponsored by Villafañe.⁴⁶

After regaling the Powhatans with food and clothing, Velásquez hosted a chief of Ajacán “who brought his son [Paquiqueño], who for an Indian was of fine presence and bearing.”

Martinez wrote that the captain asked the chief for permission to take him [the chief’s son] along that the King of Spain, his lord, might see him and others whom he had brought along. He gave his pledged word to return him with much wealth and many garments. The chief granted this and His Excellency took him to Castile, to the Court of King Philip II, God save him. The King our lord and his Court were very pleased with him and other Indians from the land of San Austin and Santa Elena. His Excellency gave them many courtly favors and rich garments.”⁴⁷

The son of the Ajacán chief willingly went with the Spanish, despite later accounts that claimed the Spanish kidnapped him; reasons which helped explain the part he would play in the deaths of the Jesuits, but nevertheless contradicted the historical record. Both Father Oré and

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⁴⁶ Hoffman, New Andalucía, 173, 184-185. Hoffman translated the Spanish documents from Spain’s House of Trade records, which notes that after the *Santa Catalina*, piloted by González, departed from the land of Ajacán in 1561, it briefly stopped in Portugal before sailing onward to Spain. Martinez, reading the same House of Trade records, appears to have conflated two different *Santa Catalinas* into one caravel. The *Santa Catalina* piloted by González was in such “bad condition” after it returned from the land of Ajacán in 1561, that “the king ordered the *Santa Catalina* sold” in an auction that took place on February 21 of that same year. The ship was presumably scuttled. Five years later, in January of 1566, Menéndez began financing his Caribbean exploits by pirating French corsairs. His pirating antics earned him the ire of Cuba’s governor, Pardo Osorio, who confiscated Menéndez’s caravel, the *Santa Catalina*: “Pardo Osorio seized the *Santa Catalina’s* prize when it entered port.” 241. It is highly improbable that the same *Santa Catalina* that was in such poor condition that it was sold at auction for “310 ducats” would be fit enough to be used as a vessel for pirating French corsairs, which “had the advantage of [being] faster ships than those Menéndez commanded” in 1565-66. 230. Furthermore, there were, according to Hoffman, at least three *Santa Catalinas* making their way around the Caribbean between 1521 and 1566. 62.

⁴⁷ See the “Relation of Bartolemé Martinez: The Martyrdom of the Fathers and Brothers of the Company of Jesus whom the Indians of Ajacán, in the Land of Florida, martyred, about which Father Pedro de Ribadeneyra has written briefly in the third book, chapter six, of the Life of the Blessed Father Francis Borgia.” October 24, 1610 in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 156.
Father Sacchini “confirmed that the indigenous youth was not abducted; rather the chief’s son voluntarily joined the Spanish.”\textsuperscript{48} The Spanish did often resort to taking captives to be sold as slaves and abducting women and children to act as interpreters, but the Algonquians had their own reasons for sending one of their own away with the Strangers who came bearing food and gifts. According to Mallios, the

Algonquians had already eagerly accepted gifts offered by the Spanish leader… [and] according to gift-exchange norms, they were now indebted. Thus, the Spanish leader provided a convenient avenue for the natives to repay their debt when he made his request to have an Algonquian accompany his crew.\textsuperscript{49}

Indebtedness probably did not entirely explain an Algonquian chief’s willingness to send away his son. Mallios went on to argue that the Powhatans “had numerous gift-based reasons to accept the Spanish leader’s arrangement.” The Spanish had “promised more exotic gifts upon the Algonquian prince’s return.” Furthermore, the Powhatans were in the midst of expanding their paramount chiefdom. At the time, they were dependent upon their neighbors for brass and other prestigious trade items. Mallios suggests that “the trade” was highly strategic as it allowed the Powhatans to control the flow of prestigious goods once the Spanish returned, as they promised they would. The Powhatans “could reaffirm [their] social dominance within the native world by obtaining this elite associate [the Spanish] as an ally and exchange partner.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} Mallios, \textit{Deadly Politics}, 39. See also the letter from Francisco Sacchini, “Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus,” 1615, in \textit{Spanish Jesuit}, Lewis and Loomie, 220-222. Sacchini recorded that the Spanish came upon “the brother of a principal chief of that region.” Sacchini contended the boy “gave himself up to some Spaniards sailing near Ajacán.” Unlike Martinez’s account, whereby the Ajacán chief negotiated the trade of his son to the Spanish, Sacchini contended the boy volunteered and did so without informing his family. Sacchini related that the Powhatans evidently knew nothing of it. Sacchini went onto explain that “Don Luis de Velasco… [was] treated honorably and kindly, he was baptized by Luis de Velasco, Viceroy of Mexico, whose name he received.” 15-16. Father Oré also recorded “from among some Indians who came aboard they retained a young cacique, whom they took along with to Spain.” Again, he failed to mention an abduction. Martinez’s testimony was the most clear: the boy’s family was indeed notified, for “with the permission of the Indians, [the Spanish] took the young son of a chief to Spain, where he was six or seven years with the Jesuits of Castile until, after the age of twenty, he desired to return to his country.” 16.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 40.
Depending upon the source, the young cacique was a chief, the son of a chief, the nephew of a chief, or the brother of a chief—all of which may have been true.51 According to Martinez, Menéndez “pledged… to return [Paquiquineo] with much wealth and many garments…” Martinez explained that the young cacique then sailed with the captain to Castile “to the Court of King Philip II. The King our lord and his Court were very pleased with him and other Indians from the land of San Agustin and Santa Elena. His Excellency gave them many courtly favors and rich garments.” Martinez went on to relate that the boy “became a Christian and they gave him the name Don Luis” — named after his sponsor, the Viceroy of Mexico — “and he stayed in Castile six or seven years in the house of the Society, where they instructed him in the matter of our Holy Faith and Christian religion.”52

Again, the details of Don Luis’s exact whereabouts between 1561 and 1570 were difficult to establish since some of the primary sources contradicted one another.53 However, by examining Dominican letters of correspondence written in Mexico by the friars who baptized Don Luis in Mexico City, Anna Brickhouse lined out a chronological record that shows the young cacique went on “at least four transoceanic and numerous shorter voyages…” between

51 See the “Letter of Luis de Quirós and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa” in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 89. See also “Relation of Bartolomé Martinez,” 156, 159; “Relation of Juan de la Carrera,” 131, 134; “Relation of Juan Rogel,” 118; “Life of Father Francis Borgia, Third General of the Society of Jesus, Book III, Chapter 6,” 145; and “Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Oré, An Account of the Martyrs of the Provinces of Florida,” 180-182.

52 See the “Relation of Bartolomé Martinez,” Ibid., 154. As to the use of Don Luis’s European name throughout the remainder of this thesis, Paquiquineo changed his name to Don Luis Velasco, taking the name of his god-father and sponsor in Mexico, don Luis Velasquez (Velasco is the English translation of the Spanish name). Following Lewis and Loomie’s lead, as well as that of David Quinn, Helen Rountree, and Anna Brickhouse; the latter writes that she referred to the Ajacán native as “Don Luis” and not primarily as Velasquez or Velasco because it was “the name under which his own narratives of his homeland and his potential work as a translator and guide were circulated—and the…” name “by which the subsequent writers discussed in this book all knew him.” The “subsequent writers” Brickhouse referred to were the aforementioned Lewis and Loomie, along with Quinn and a host of other historians who have studied the life of Don Luis Velasco. See Anna Brickhouse, The Unsettlement of America: Translation, Interpretation, and the Story of Don Luis de Velasco, 1560-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 300.

According to Brickhouse, the Spanish caravel, *Santa Catalina*, picked up Paquiquino in 1561. The cacique accompanied the agent of the voyage, Antonio Velásquez, to the court of King Philip II in Castile later that same year. Paquiquineo “stayed at the king’s court… over the next five months… where he appears to have caught Philip’s attention and earned his esteem.” From that time on, until 1570, Paquiquineo lived as a direct sponsor of the royal court of Spain. The king was so impressed with Paquiquineo that he ordered the cacique’s return to Ajacán in 1561. Upon hearing that Paquiquineo was to return to his homeland, a second interpreter from Mexico “petitioned for the right to accompany the Algonquian-speaking Indian back to Ajacán” on the grounds that he had become “devoted” to the cacique. The second interpreter was Alonso de Aguirre.54

The following year, Paquiquineo and Aguirre were on their way to Mexico City when they both became deathly ill. They were supposed to help guide a group of Dominicans from Mexico City to Upper Florida, but their trip was “indefinitely thwarted” due to their illnesses. The two requested emergency baptismal rites. The head of the Dominican Order in Mexico City, Fray Pedro de Feria, wrote in his letter concerning the two: “Our Lord was moved to give them back their health.” After the two recovered, Paquiquineo converted to Christianity and took the name of Don Luis Velasco, after his new god-father, the viceroy of Mexico. He and Aguirre remained in Mexico until at least 1565. Aguirre then faded from the historical record. Brickhouse conjectures that he may have passed from sickness at a later date.55

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54 Brickhouse, *Unsettlement*, 6, 48-54.
55 See the Feria Letter in *American Indian History*. Camilla Townsend, *American Indian History: A Documentary Reader*, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 31-33. Feria recorded that the two ailing men “arrived at such a point that it was not thought they would escape death… For that reason, having learned of their desire to be baptized, as they had asked for it more than once, they were given the sacrament of baptism.” The two fully recovered in what Feria described as a miracle; he wrote, “Our lord was moved to give them back their health.” See also Brickhouse, *Unsettlement*, 50-52.
From 1563 to 1565, both Feria and Menéndez fought to control the fate of Don Luis. Menéndez wished to use Don Luis as an interpreter in Upper Florida, while Feria feared the young cacique would become corrupted if he returned to his people. Feria won the debate for a time, which was why Don Luis remained in Mexico City until late 1565 or early 1566. Feria ultimately lost his ability to confine Don Luis to New Spain when Menéndez was named adelantado in 1565. With permission from King Philip II, Don Luis journeyed to Cuba where he rendezvoused with Admiral Menéndez in 1566. They ventured together to Florida and briefly stopped in the Chesapeake, but a storm blew them back out into rough waters. Don Luis then returned to Spain with Menéndez and remained in Seville until 1568. Menéndez, with a “thousand slave licenses” worked to return to La Bahía de Santa María in order to fill his quota of slave licenses, “pacify the people” of Ajacán, discover “a passage to the Orient,” and “benefit from the mines” of copper, silver, and gold that Don Luis evidently described to the adelantado in previous letters. The following year, Don Luis sailed to Cuba and again met with the governor of Cuba, along with adelantado Menéndez. They gathered eight Jesuit missionaries and made their way north to Santa Elena in 1569. In August of 1570, Don Luis finally returned to Ajacán.\textsuperscript{56}

During Don Luis’s time among the Dominicans in Mexico, Feria never mentioned any kind of duplicitous behavior or shortcomings in the cacique’s character that might hint at what was to commence once he finally returned to Ajacán. Moreover, Feria never questioned the veracity of the neophyte as Don Luis settled in Mexico City and began writing letters to King Philip II for the purpose of returning to his homeland and converting his Algonquian

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 52-54.
Feria was fond of Don Luis and worried that if he returned to his people, the young neophyte would lapse back into paganism. This fear was not based on any particular trait of the cacique; rather, it was a familiar pattern many Spaniards had witnessed as transnationals often adopted the religion of their hosts, only to discard it once back in the environs of their own people and culture. Feria then did his best to block all attempts by Menéndez, who was simultaneously petitioning the king, because the adelantado wanted to return with the cacique back to the land purportedly filled with copper, pearls, and silver, as well discover the long rumored passageway that led through North America to the Orient.

It was only after Don Luis disappeared into the Virginian coastlands in 1571 that other Spaniards who knew the cacique began to revise their initial attitude toward him. Juan de la Carrera was one such person. He taught Don Luis in Mexico City and even claimed to have clothed the boy when he first arrived in New Spain. Writing in 1600, nearly thirty years after the attack, Carrera described Don Luis as a “big talker” and a self-described “big chief.” Other Spaniards followed suit and characterized Don Luis in the same way—as a “big talker,” meaning he was boastful, arrogant, and did not speak truthfully. These after-the-fact descriptions purposefully reshaped the narrative of the “savage” who managed to deceive not only the priests, Brothers, and Fathers of the Roman Catholic Church, but the adelantado of Florida—Pedro Menéndez, as well as the very king of Spain, Philip II. However, according to Carrera, not everyone was fooled. Using keen discernment, Carrera, and the others who followed his lead, like Francisco Sacchini, claimed they saw through the cacique’s guise and detected deceit and

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57 Townsend, *American Indian*, 32. Feria, again writing to King Philip II, explained that Don Luis and Aguirre were “treated like sons and taught the things of our faith,” and that the Viceroy of Mexico had taken “a special interest in them and oversees their good treatment.” He went on to explain that Paquiquineo had a “fine presence” and how much he was impressed by the “capacity of this Indian.” 54.

58 Ibid. Feria warned King Philip II that if they returned “to their land alone and without ministers who could keep them from straying from the faith and from Christian law, and if they were to return to their rites and idolatries and thus lose their souls, their baptism would have caused them to be damned.” During that same time, Menéndez petitioned King Philip II to redraft Don Luis for an expedition to the cacique’s homeland.
treachery long before Don Luis had ever committed any crime. If the cacique at one time appeared good, honest, or truly converted to the Christian faith, as Father Segura noted, everything that followed, from a European’s perspective, could only be understood through the lens of deceit, treachery, cleverness, and “savage,” Indian guile. The devil had masqueraded as an angel of light and Carrera had tried to warn Father Segura to no avail: “I pointed out the difficulty in the execution of the plan [to return to Ajacán] without the guard of soldiers, saying that the Indian did not satisfy me, and judging from what he had told me, I saw that he was a liar.” Carrera went on to suggest that “all the Fathers assembled [in Santa Elena] reached the same conclusion except Father Quirós.”

The description of “big talking” that Carrera alluded to in 1600 dealt with the land and the people Don Luis described to Feria, Menéndez, and King Philip II in his correspondence or communications to the aforementioned from 1562-65. Carrera noted that Don Luis, while in the company of the then Admiral, Pedro Menéndez, “told him of the grandeurs of his land,” whereby “another sea in [his] region” led to “great kingdoms, such as Tartary and others contiguous to it.” By 1600, the Spanish understood that an inland sea to China probably did not exist, but in the 1570s, the English, French, Dutch, and Spanish were all actively looking for a sea route through North America that would more easily connect Europe with Asia. Furthermore, Don Luis purposefully described Ajacán as the fulfillment of the imagined New Andalucía — a

59 See “Relation of Juan de la Carrera,” March 1, 1600, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 131-134. See also “Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus,” 221. Sacchini wrote that most of the Jesuits who Father Segura corresponded with concerning the Ajacán mission, and its dependence on Don Luis, were against it, for they did not trust the Indian cacique: “Segura would not hesitate to use him as a guide. Nevertheless, as in any important matter, Segura first sought the opinions of his brethren by letter. Practically everyone was against it.” It is important to note that Sacchini wrote about Don Luis fifty years after the attack. Sacchini later related that the tales of Ajacán were nothing more than the crafted lies of a untrustworthy Indian: “Florida… was only sandy, inhospitable, and filled with marshes and swamps. They said the character of the people was patently the same, changeable, untrustworthy, confirmed in vices and superstitions. Never believe a native!”

60 Ibid., 16, 132. Father Segura offered “convincing proofs that [Don Luis] was a good man…” Again, the Spanish account implies that Father Segura was the victim of Don Luis’s deceptions, and in turn, the Spanish had been duped by the “savage” Indian.

61 Ibid., 131.
fabled land supposedly peopled with peaceful people living in a terrain and climate nearly similar with that of Spain, located somewhere along the Atlantic coast south of the 37° parallel north.  

The Eden-like “New Andalucia” first appeared in the annals of Spanish records as Chicora — a place “discovered” by captains Pedro de Quejo and Francisco Gordillo on June 24, 1521, while on a slaving mission north of the Caribbean. Lucas Vasquez de Ayllón sponsored the expedition and described the Indians as the “peace loving” people of Chicora; to drum up support from the monarchy in Spain, he claimed the Chicora were “white” and had “blond hair to the heels,” while their King Datha was of “gigantic stature.” The Chicora queen was also “gigantic” and supposedly mothered five “tall young men” who carried their “king about on their shoulders.” Ayllón also boasted that the Chicora “had horses” and lived in a land teeming with “pearls and other terrestrial gems.”

After the Chicorans entertained the Spanish and provided them with foodstuffs, the Spanish captains lured 60 or more of them on board their ships by offering them prestigious European gifts. Once onboard, the Spanish detained the Chicorans and set sail for Santa Domingo in order to sell the Indians as slaves in the Caribbean. Ayllón quickly learned of the treachery and instead of selling the Chicorans, he distributed the Indians among a handful of financial partners and forced them all to work on their properties as unpaid “servants.” Hoffman points out that 14 Chicorans immediately fled into the interior of Santo Domingo; one became a pearl diver at Cubagua; several others were so poorly treated they resorted to “eating decaying garbage, especially dead puppies and donkeys,” while nearly all the others died from European illnesses.

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63 Ibid., 3-4. Hoffman suggests the location of Chicora was south of present day Charleston, South Carolina. It was bordered by Duhare, according to the Spanish, and James Mooney offers that Duhare was a corruption of the Cherokee name, Duksei or Dukwsai, which was located “on the headwaters of the Keowee River,” later known as Toxaway, northeast of Myrtle Beach. 11.
diseases by 1526. There was one man, however, who befriended Ayllón and became his trusted servant and translator. For reasons never recorded, Ayllón nicknamed the Indian “el Chicorana,” which translated to “Little Frog,” but he went by Francisco while among the Spanish.\footnote{Ibid., 11-12.}

In 1523, Ayllón sailed to Spain because he needed to petition the king for a real \textit{acuerdo}—a contract to fully alienate the discovery for the purpose of exploiting the indigenes as slaves and to utilize any and all resources found within the parameters of the \textit{acuerdo}.\footnote{Ibid., 17-20.} Francisco converted to Christianity and volunteered to accompany Ayllón to substantiate some of Ayllón’s more outrageous claims concerning Chicora. Francisco also convinced Ayllón that he would help convert his fellow Chicorans to Christianity if he were allowed to return to his homeland.\footnote{Ibid.}

Meanwhile, in Spain, Ayllón created the “Legend of Chicora” by embellishing the details of his discovery to bolster support for his claim to settle the area. He spoke of a land that had “identical parallels” to that of Andalucia; a land covered in “trees and plants similar to those in southern Spain;” a land that probably connected to the cod fisheries in the north. In short, as Hoffman explains, Chicora was rich in “human, sylvan, agricultural, and mineral resources;” a land “waiting for colonization;” a prize that would be called “New Andalucia;” a “new province rich in viticulture or at least the potential for it;” and a land with “native olive trees” where the pagans waited to be converted.\footnote{Ibid.}

Ayllón feared that other Spanish explorers would hone in on his discovery, so he purposefully stretched the northern border of Chicora to 37° north, which, coincidentally, would
encompass the land of Ajacán four decades later. On August 9, 1526, Ayllón returned to Chicora with “600 to 700” colonists from Santa Domingo, a small team of Indian translators, and his trusted servant, Francisco. They found that the old site where they had captured the Chichorans in 1521 was abandoned, and within a few days, Francisco and the other Indian translators “fled from the camp, never to be seen again.” Over the next couple of months, the colonists suffered from hunger, dehydration, exhaustion, and disease. With contaminated water supplies, the death toll began to mount and Ayllón died of some unknown illness on October 18. The crew then mutinied as the winter weather began, and they unceremoniously returned to Santa Domingo with roughly 150 survivors.

From 1521-1561, several Spanish explorers did attempt to locate and settle “New Andalucia,” but all of those ventures failed. Those setbacks caused the Spanish to lose interest in Chicora, and Upper Florida in general, after 1550, but the Legend of Chicora reached France, and French Huguenots determined to make “New Andalucia” their home in 1565. At the same time, adelantado Menéndez had been corresponding with Don Luis, who seemed to confirm all the legendary details of Chicora within his letters. According to Brickhouse, Don Luis was instrumental in reviving Spanish interest in a part of the New World rarely explored and geographically misunderstood. To Feria, Don Luis spoke of a land populated “with peaceful people,” a people easily subdued — information that made its way to King Philip II through Feria, who reminded the king that the land of Ajacán would “augment your territories” against French encroachment. To further whet Menéndez’s appetite for an expedition to Ajacán, Don Luis described his land as having “mines” that the adelantado and the Spanish would “benefit from.” Don Luis claimed the Chesapeake Bay — la Bahia de Santa Maria, was in fact adjacent

68 Ibid., 21, 35.
69 Ibid., 62, 67.
70 Ibid., 73-79.
to “another arm of the sea which goes in the direction of China, and comes out in the Southern Sea.”\textsuperscript{71} Taken together, Don Luis dangled a prize before the Spanish they could not resist.

While Menéndez and King Philip II prepared to colonize Upper Florida, rumors of French Protestants settling in the exact vicinity of Chicora reached Spain. Menéndez feared that the French had found the passageway to the Orient and would begin attacking Spanish ships with the goal of robbing the Spanish of their Caribbean and Peruvian gold and silver. Menéndez’s primarily goals in 1565 were to eradicate any French presence in Upper Florida; meet with Don Luis in Havana; head north with “the Indian Velasco” and a small group of Dominicans to first settle the northern reaches of Ayllón’s embellished Chicoran border — what would become Santa Elena; and then to make his way even further north to the land of Ajacán to once and for all colonize the “peaceful” Algonquians, convert them, establish a military outpost, and map the inland sea that led to the Orient.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1565, however, there were ongoing tensions between Menéndez; the provincial leader of the Dominicans in Mexico City — Fray Feria; the Dominican Archbishop of Mexico; and the viceroy of Mexico — Don Luis de Velasco. The tensions arose due to Don Luis’s change in status from a “pagan Indian” to a Christian convert. While back in Spain in 1561, King Philip II had commanded that Menéndez return the cacique to his homeland without stipulations. Now, however, there were stipulations since Don Luis had converted to the Christian faith. Simply put, Feria did not want to lose the neophyte since he had plans to build a new Dominican order in the Chesapeake Bay region, and he did everything he could to maintain control over the cacique.

Townsend examines this tension and suggests that Fray Pedro de Feria had come to rest certain hopes for his order squarely on the young man’s shoulders [Don Luis]… The Dominicans would organize a great mission, and Don

\textsuperscript{71} Brickhouse, \textit{Unsettlement}, 54-55.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
Luis would be the intermediary who would make it work. The order could use such a success, for the Franciscans had arrived in Mexico first and had acquired far more power in the new land than the Dominicans. If the Dominicans could be the ones to tame the supposedly untamable wilderness of the North, their prestige would grow enormously.\footnote{Douglas Bradburn, John C. Coombs, and Camilla Townsend, Eds., \textit{Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 60-62.}

Townsend went on to argue that in 1565, “Feria approached Captain Menéndez about sending out some Dominican volunteers, extensive supplies, and maybe forty or fifty soldiers, and Menéndez flatly refused.” Menéndez hoped to establish a settlement in Ajacán, but the French Protestants in Upper Florida were his top priority and the captain did not have the space on his ships for the provincial’s plans.\footnote{Ibid.} Menéndez’s solution was to take Don Luis with him on his 1566 journey to the Chesapeake, along with one or two Dominicans, but the new settlement would be a primarily militaristic venture, not a religious one. Again, the adelantado’s goals were manifold: he hoped to exploit the indigenous population as slave labor until they were properly converted — he had over a thousand slave licenses he wished to use and a large contingency of Dominicans would only get in his way; he wanted to find a passage west to the Orient; and he wanted to extract wealth from the environment. Christian conversion for the Indians would come eventually, but it was not high on the captain’s list of priorities in 1565.\footnote{Ibid.}

Feria, as Townsend iterates, was not going to let go of the neophyte so easily. He gathered together a group of allies that included Don Luis’s sponsor, Don Luis de Velasco — the viceroy of Mexico, as well as the Archbishop of Mexico. He also wrote to King Philip II to plead Don Luis’s case:

Seeing that these are now Christians and members of the faith, and that if they were returned to their lands alone and without ministers to keep them in the faith, … and were to go back to their rites and idolatries and thus be lost [to perdition], their baptism would have caused them a greater condemnation. Permitting it seems a great inhumanity… [It would be] and offense to Our Lord and even to Your Majesty to return them to their
It is believed that it was so ordered only supposing them to be infidels, as they were when they left your kingdom.\(^{76}\)

From 1562-65, Don Luis was forced to remain with the Dominicans in Mexico City. It was a tumultuous time in the old Aztec capital. In 1564, Don Luis de Velasco — the viceroy of Mexico, died suddenly. The Dominicans lost their greatest sponsor and primary financial backer. Townsend sums up the crisis that unfolded:

For the next few years, in the ensuing power vacuum, chaos reigned... [Don Luis] would have been witness to a great crisis among the indigenous nobility who worked as scribes and artisans for the Dominicans and other religious. They were suddenly told that they, too, would for the first time have to pay tribute to the Spanish government, which in this time of trouble needed for funds. Those who protested were carted ignominiously off to prison in irons. “We are a conquered people,” wailed the sons of men who had once ruled the Aztec empire.\(^ {77}\)

Don Luis took advantage of the instability and argued the time had come to return to Ajacán. His request fell on empathetic ears, for at the same time, Menéndez had also written King Philip II to argue that Ajacán was the key to protecting Spanish interests in Florida and the Caribbean. The Chesapeake Bay would allow the Spanish to control “a rich trade with the Indians of the interior,” but the captain first needed Don Luis’s help for the venture to be successful.\(^ {78}\) King Philip II immediately responded and remanded Don Luis into the custody of Captain Menéndez on March 22, 1565, which paved the way for his return home. This happened despite the continued protests of the Archbishop of Mexico, who “had been trying to prevent the return of Don Luis to his homeland...” fearing “his corruption.”\(^ {79}\)

The “corruption” the Archbishop feared entailed “devil-worship” and the ongoing practice of seemingly converted Indians secretly returning to their old gods, which the Roman

\(^{76}\) Townsend, *American Indian*, 31-33.

\(^{77}\) Townsend, *Early Modern Virginia*, 62.

\(^{78}\) Lewis and Loomie, *Spanish Jesuit*, 23.

\(^{79}\) Ibid., 21. Here Lewis and Loomie argue that Michael Kenny (see *Romance of the Floridas*, 1943) contends, based on earlier correspondences between the Archbishop and King Philip II, that Don Luis wished to return to his home but was continually thwarted by those within the religious hierarchy or by circumstances beyond his control. Brickhouse also made this clear in *The Unsettlement*, 51-54.
Catholics considered devils. The Spanish did not comprehend what they were demanding of the indigenous populations when they attempted to convert Indians to a Christian God that purportedly wanted them to turn the other cheek and seek forgiveness and pacifism in lieu of any kind of aggression, warranted or not. Father Rogel witnessed the European contradiction first hand while attempting to convert Indians in Orista, Florida. John Shea suggests the Indians were Cherokees “dwelling in peace in their native mountains” when Father Rogel came into contact with them in 1566. Father Rogel learned enough of their language within six months to announce “the mysteries” of the Christian faith to them, but his timing was bad. The harvest season began and, according to Shea, his reluctant converts “plunged into the woods, leaving their teacher baffled for the moment.” Father Rogel gave up on evangelizing the Indians for several years, but in 1569 he returned. His return was prompted by a brief from St. Pius V, who extolled his Christian laborers to make Indian conversion to the Catholic faith their highest priority; he wrote, “Nothing is more important in the conversion of these Indians and idolaters, than to endeavor by all means to prevent scandal being given by the vices and immoralities of such as go to those western parts.”

Father Rogel took the Pope’s brief seriously and with an evangelist’s zeal, returned to the Cherokees to plant a mission among them.

This time, however, he changed his tactics. Rogel knew that once the harvest collecting season came to pass, his would-be congregation would leave him just as they had done previously. To thwart the exodus of his imagined parishioners, he attempted to introduce the Indians to the Spanish reducción. The reducción was a conversion process that would be used time and again over the following centuries and its purpose was ultimately a transformative system of turning Indians into European subjects and producers of religion, goods, or foodstuffs.

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Initially this would be done for the benefit of the Indian, as it was argued, but the *reducción* was, according to Peter Klarén, a hegemonic tool of bureaucratic Spain to “aggrandize Spanish power by consolidating viceregal rule and to revive the flow of Andean silver to the metropolitan treasury.” Again, William Hanks briefly describes “the project of *reducción*” as a European policy of Indian “pacification, conversion, [and] ordering… a powerful agent of change. *Reducción*, he concludes, “was a total project, aimed at coordinated transformations of space, conduct, and language.”

Rogel believed the *reducción* would succeed in Florida if only he could get the Cherokee to give up their semi-nomadic ways of hunting and gathering foodstuffs. Shea explains how “lands were chosen; agricultural implements procured; twenty commodious houses raised;” and the land cultivated. Then, as before, once the harvest season began, the Cherokee “abandoned their village and returned to the woods.” Rogel adapted and worked to become a part of their society, teaching and instructing them in the Christian faith for eight months. He must have believed his time among them had borne some spiritual fruit, because he called “a council of the chiefs [and] proposed that the tribe should renounce the devil” and embrace their new faith. What followed might be considered one of the more honest and comical reactions to a colonizer’s attempt at conversion recorded; the Indians responded, “The devil is the best thing in the world. We adore him: he makes men valiant.” Sacchini — another Jesuit who worked with Father Segura in Florida, and the same one who clothed Don Luis in Mexico — related the same: “They refused to deny Satan when ordered to do so and asserted that he was the god of their

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82 Hanks, *Converting Words*, xiv.
youth to whom they owed so much.”83 The Cherokee rejected the Christian religion and Father Rogel returned to Santa Elena slightly disillusioned but still hopeful in 1570.84

Pacification and the European gospel that demanded forgiveness, turning the other cheek, and submission to Roman Catholicism as its central tenet, at least for the would-be converts, held little allure to a people Shea admits, came to dwell “in peace in their native mountains” because “they defied their enemies at the north and south.”85 To accept the Christian faith was to succumb to their enemies machinations and live in subjugation to those who might destroy them. If the enemy of the Christian God was “the devil,” then logically he was the antithesis of the pacifist, Jesus Christ, and a warrior god they had no reason to renounce. They knew who this god was, earlier explained as Okeus, but the deity went by several names in the region, which ranged from Oke, Okee, or Quioccos, and unlike the European Satan, Okeus was not evil, but as mentioned, a deity that gave the warrior strength in battle, prowess in hunting, and courage when it was most needed. In short, with the help of Okeus, the Cherokee gained social status by completing heroic deeds and defeating their enemies in violent, guerilla warfare. Ultimately, Father Rogel failed because the Cherokee were well aware that conversion to the Christian faith involved a spiritual transformation tantamount to either Spanish subjugation or eradication from those who continued to worship “the devil.”

Suffice it to say, Feria knew all too well that Indian converts regularly returned to the religion of their youth. Despite his protests, Don Luis departed Mexico City for Cuba, and in August of 1566, the cacique disembarked from Havana with thirty-seven soldiers and two Dominican friars. After living among the Spanish for half a decade, Don Luis was heading

83 See “Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus,” 1622, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 221.
85 Ibid., 59.
home. Luis Gerónimo de Oré wrote of the voyage in 1617 and once again referred to Don Luis as the “the very crafty… good Christian,” who, because of his “good understanding” of the area, was chosen by Menéndez in order to assist in settling the land and making Christian converts of the Indians.\textsuperscript{86} Due to their late summer arrival, a storm hampered any exploration of the land. While still far from the coast, the two Dominican friars encouraged the soldiers to mutiny against the pilot if he did not give up the expedition and immediately return to Spain. To further complicate matters, the pilot of the ship, Pedro de Coronas, emphatically placed the blame on Don Luis. In his report on the incident, he wrote that he had sailed up and down the coast, from 36° to 37.5° north, but the Indian chief had been unable to recognize any of the land he claimed as his own territory. When a strong wind blew the ship out to sea, the pilot acquiesced to the disquieted Dominicans, and they returned to Spain.\textsuperscript{87}

Don Luis’s inability to recognize the mainland was odd, especially, as Lewis and Loomie point out, when he returned in 1570, he had no problem locating his community. If Don Luis had ulterior motives for purposefully misleading the Spanish, they were unknown. There is a chance, however that the cacique’s inability to locate his homeland was an elaborate ruse with an outcome he could not have predicted. Don Luis may have been intentionally deceiving the Spanish because he feared what might happen to his people once Menéndez’s soldiers began building their outpost on Powhatan land. To buy the time needed, he would have simply feigned ignorance as to the exact location of his community and led the captain up and down the coast with the hope that an opportunity for escape would present itself. He would not have known that the winds were going to permanently blow Menéndez’s ship out to sea or that an attempted mutiny would force him back to Spain.

\textsuperscript{86} See “Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Oré,” 1617, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 179.  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 179-185.
It is only a matter of conjecture, but Don Luis had every reason to mislead the Spanish in 1566. In 1560, just a couple of years prior to when Don Luis converted to Christianity, the Spanish Franciscans of New Spain were feeling confident that the *conquista pacífica* — the peaceful conquest — of indigenes in the Yucatán Peninsula was working. The Indians would make good converts and with merely the help of a dozen Franciscan missionaries, a land mass roughly 10 percent of the size of all Spain, was steadily transitioning into the Christian fold. All that changed in May of 1562. The Franciscans learned of a cave filled with human skulls and pagan idols in the small village of Mani in the central region of the Yucatán Peninsula. What made the discovery worse was that most of the local Indians from the region confessed to worshipping the idols in an effort to bring “rain and that they would give them much corn and so that they would kill many deer.” Moreover, as Inga Clendinnen highlights in *Ambivalent Conquest*, those who confessed of the idolatry also told the clergy that “neighboring villages also retained their idols and continued to worship them.” The response by the Franciscans was swift and extraordinarily violent. An “episcopal inquisition under the terms of the concessionary Papal Bull” was conducted, which resulted in the systematic torture of 4,500 Indians over a three month period.  

The violence of the *conquista pacífica* continued long after, but the “crisis in the Yucatán Peninsula,” as Clendinnen calls it, largely abated by 1570. During that same time, Don Luis spent three years in Mexico City and then traveled up the Florida coast following the “French massacre” of 1565.  

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89 Ibid., 72.  
vanquish those who resisted them. There is no way to know how Spanish culture influenced Don Luis, but with the dramatic transformation of an indigenous world giving way to a mixed European-creole culture in New Spain, there would have been ominous signs throughout the New World that not all bode well for the recently relocated and converted. As Brickhouse argues, Don Luis came to see firsthand “what New World colonialism looked like fifty years after the Conquest of Mexico: [he] had by then witnessed… the mass enslavement of Indians throughout New Spain,” as well as “the violent subjugation of the indigenous people of [Mexico].”91 In addition to the violent policies of the Spanish reducción, it was also probable that Don Luis had learned of the tortures of the episcopal inquisition going on while his nascent faith was nurtured; or worse yet, he may have personally witnessed the condition of the subjugated while living on the island of Cuba, where over 90 percent of the indigenous population had already been reduced through disease, warfare, slavery, and “peaceful conquest.”

It would have been quite strange that after nearly five years of living among the Spanish that Don Luis would know nothing of their heavy handed policies directed against indigenous communities. Suffice it to say, the Spanish did not localize the violence to one region or people in the New World. It was systemic and systematic, taking place wherever the Spanish colonized.92 All of this did not mean the Algonquian cacique personally empathized with the conquered subjects. The Indians of Mexico and the Caribbean would have been Strangers to him in the same way the Spanish were. Be that as it may, their otherness did not mean he did not internalize their suffering with the hope that his own people would never experience such a miserable fate — a fate that must have appeared more real than ever as the young cacique

91 Brickhouse, Unsettlement, 51, 54.
92 Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests, 1-20.
returned to the lands of his people among a group of soldiers and Spanish priests hoping to bring *reducción* to the Powhatans of Ajacán.

After Don Luis returned to Spain, he used his influence as the chief of the Ajacán to convince the Jesuits that where their efforts to convert the Indians in Florida had failed, his efforts would provide the Christian missionaries in Ajacán with the foothold in the New World they desperately desired.93 This time, however, he convinced the Jesuits that they needed to exclude soldiers from the endeavor if they wanted to create a successful mission.

Don Luis sailed to Havana and once there, he, Menéndez, the Governor, and Father Segura discussed plans of a “mission in Ajacán, territory of the Indian.” Segura liked Don Luis instantly and considered him as important a helper to him as Timothy had been to St. Paul.94 However, not everyone shared Segura’s sentiment for the Indian. In the spring of 1570, “Fathers Sedeño, Rogel, Quirós, Segura, and Brother Carrera and several of the Brothers and catechists…” met in Santa Elena to discuss the expedition north into the “land of Ajacán.” At least part of the discussion involved Don Luis and whether or not he could be trusted. Lewis and Loomie summarized Rogel’s letters, noting that “Brother Carrera distrusted Don Luis and thought an experienced Father should go ahead and spy out the land.”95 Segura had already “decided beforehand to take with him Father Quirós and Brother Gabriel Gómez, both recently arrived from Spain, and Brother Sancho de Zaballos who was still a novice… and other young men who sought to enter the company.” To the point, Rogel and Carrera believed Segura had

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94 See “Relation of Juan Rogel,” in *Spanish Jesuit*, Lewis and Loomie, 92, 118. Rogel wrote that Segura believed Don Luis “seemed wise” and that “Don Luis afforded the help which Timothy gave to Saint Paul.” In the “Letter of Luis de Quirós and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa,” Sept. 12, 1570, Segura mentioned that “Don Luis has turned out well as was hoped, he is most obedient to the wishes of Father and shows deep respect for him…”
95 Ibid., 27.
made a mistake by choosing young and inexperienced men to accompany Don Luis into his native lands.  

Segura did not believe his choice of men was a mistake. He purposefully chose men who were excited about the prospect of evangelizing a part of the world where the elder Jesuits, including himself, had disparaged as futile to Christian conversion. He wanted men not accustomed to the violence and vice that was so prevalent in the Yucatan Peninsula. Finally, as Lewis and Loomie posit, Segura, possibly influenced by Don Luis, “was determined to establish himself at Ajacán without the encumbrance of any garrison of soldiers who might live as bad examples and stir up trouble among the natives as they had in Florida.” Segura hoped to create a new pattern for Spanish colonization, and he believed he could not succeed with soldiers and older brethren entrenched in habits that might hinder the work of Indian evangelization.

On September 10, 1570, the Spanish arrived in “the land of Don Luis.” The Jesuits’ first concern involved gathering foodstuffs and Father Quirós related how “only with great difficulty” could they “find roots by which they usually sustain themselves…” Winter was fast approaching and if they were to survive it, they would have to rely on the kindness of Don Luis’s nation. Don Luis, the cacique of “Bahia de Madre de Dios at Jacán,” did not disappoint the Spanish. The chief’s towns were located along the Chesapeake Bay and Luis Gerónimo de Oré later recorded that “two brother caciques of Don Luis together with other Indians received them and gave them lodgings amid demonstrations of great joy.” Father Quirós offered another account, adding to the situation the Spanish entered into:

We find the land of Don Luis in quite another condition than expected, not because he was at fault in his description of it, but because Our Lord has chastised it with six years

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96 See “Relation of Juan Rogel,” Ibid., 118-120. See also Lewis and Loomie’s opinions concerning Don Luis: 27-28.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 37.
of famine and death, which has brought it about that there is much less population than usual. Since many have died and many also have moved to other regions to ease their hunger, there remain but few of the tribe, whose leaders say that they wish to die where their fathers have died, although they have no grain, and have not found wild fruit, which they are accustomed to eat.99

Sacchini bolstered this description of Ajacán and recorded that the Jesuits “found the natives afflicted with famine and disease for the past seven years.”100 Therefore, when the Ajacán Indians received the Spanish with great joy, it not only came at a tremendous cost to them, but at a time following six years of famine, disease, and death. Those who remained in the area did so with the anticipation of joining their fathers in death. Foodstuffs were more than scarce: the land could not support those dwelling on it, let alone a new group of proselytizers who came with their own need for foodstuffs a few months prior to winter.

Early on, Segura understood the importance of managing the group’s resources if the Jesuits hoped to survive through their first winter in Ajacán. As each day passed, the Jesuits hemorrhaged foodstuffs while feeding the crew aboard Menéndez’s ship. To halt the hemorrhaging, Segura sent the ship back to Cuba. On the ship were two letters: one to Hinistrosa requesting “immediate supplies of food and grain seeds which the Indians could plant,” and the other to King Philip, “also requesting provisions.” Segura believed the famine might act as a portentous gift to the Spanish. Starving Indians could be turned into tractable, subservient converts, if the Spanish were to return before the following spring with a sufficient supply of seeds for the growing season. He wrote,

…it is imperative that some provisions arrive some time during March or at the beginning of April so that we can give seeds to the tribe for planting. At this time the planting is done here and thus many of the tribes will come here after being scattered over the region in search of food and there will be good opportunity for the Holy Gospel. The chief has sought this very thing especially.101

99 Ibid., 89-90.
100 Ibid., 222.
101 Ibid., 89-90.
The Jesuits were now on their own and according to Father Rogel, “seeing themselves abandoned and without other resources, they built a small cottage where they might have shelter and say Mass.”¹⁰² They were heavily dependent upon Don Luis and his community for survival, and for a week or so, Don Luis seemed to look after the Spanish missionaries. The cacique realized his younger, three year old brother was dying, and asked Segura if he would baptize him. Moreover, Sacchini posited that Don Luis was offered the headship to rule his people because his brother or father had passed away, but turned it down in order to lead his people in “spiritual business and not for temporal gain.”¹⁰³ There were signs, however, of contradiction and cognitive dissonance in Don Luis. Like many transnationals who attempt to navigate between two worlds, the religious values of the Spanish conflicted with the cultural norms of the werowances who led their communities. Tensions in Ajacán arose over the issue of Indian polygamy, which was “the prerogatives of the werowances” like Don Luis and his brothers. Lewis and Loomie speculate that in the nearly unanimous view of the Spanish, “marital aberrations [were] the cause of Don Luis’ downfall.” Sacchini compared Don Luis to Solomon, a once godly man who “took unto himself many wives after the manner or the Gentiles,” which, from the perspective of the Spanish missionaries, turned his heart away from them. Don Luis spent less and less time with the Spanish, offering various excuses for his absence among them, until he finally returned to the territory of his uncle, “a day and a half journey away.”¹⁰⁴

Looking again at *Deadly Politics*, Mallios offers a different rationale to explain the escalating tensions between Don Luis, the Algónquians, and the Jesuits. Mallios argues that the Spaniards violated nearly all the rules surrounding gift exchanges between the two cultures. The Jesuits wished to convert the Indians to Christianity and that process included Jesus Christ as an

¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ See “Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus,” Ibid., 44, 222.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
“eternal gift” to the Algonquian people. In exchange for Jesus Christ, Mallios contends, the Ajacán natives were to submit to the Spanish by effectively sponsoring their mission in the Chesapeake Bay. The terms of the gift exchange, from the Spanish perspective, would exact foodstuffs from Don Luis’s community, which would keep the Jesuits physically alive, and the Algonquians would receive spiritual sustenance in return — a European gift of spiritual life.\textsuperscript{105} Mallios relates that from the Indians’ perspective, this was a “nothing-for-something” gift exchange, which violated Algonquian cultural norms that caused Don Luis and his family to lose face and suffer constant humiliation. Mallios’s synopsis of the trade deficit stemmed from Segura’s account of gift exchanges that occurred once the Spanish arrived in Ajacán. Segura lamented that

by a bit of blundering (I don’t know who on the ship did it) someone made some sort of a poor trade in food. I see now the misfortune which followed, in that while up till now the Indians whom we met on the way would give to us from their poverty, now they are reluctant when they see they receive no trinkets for their ears of corn. They have brought the ears of corn and other foods and asked that they be given something when they handed them over. They say that they have done that with the others. Since Father had forbidden that they be given something, so that they would not be accustomed to receiving it and then afterwards not want to bargain with us, the Indians took the food away with them.

Thus it seemed good to Father that he should tell this to you since we live in this land mainly with what the Indians give us. Take care that whoever comes here in no wise barters with the Indians, if need be under threat of severe punishments.\textsuperscript{106}

In short, the Jesuits created an exchange imbalance and were startled to learn that their hosts did not intend to continue trading maize for the metaphysical, religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Christians. To make matters worse, Segura initiated a ban on exchanging European goods for Indian foodstuffs, which forbade the Spanish from future gift exchange and kept the Spanish unknowingly indebted to their Algonquian hosts.

\textsuperscript{105} Mallios, \textit{Deadly Politics}, 45-47.
\textsuperscript{106} See “Letter of Luis de Quiróś and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa,” Sept. 12, 1570, in \textit{Spanish Jesuit}, Lewis and Loomie, 92.
The exchange imbalance was no small matter to the Algonquians hosting the Jesuits. By accepting maize from the Algonquians, the Jesuits had entered into more than a simple barter process of religious conversion for foodstuffs. Although not entirely economic in nature, the gift exchange was based in Spanish ideals that were reductive, which diminished the value of indigenous foodstuffs and inflated the value of European, metaphysical teachings.

Maize was never just corn in most Indian communities. In the minds of the Powhatans and other indigenous people living along the Atlantic Coast in North America, maize was a gift from the gods that indicated balance, reward, and reciprocity. Powhatans propitiated Okeus with maize and revered disparate Amerind deities to maintain that balance, as Jean O’Brien suggests in *Dispossession by Degrees*:

> Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and gathering were accompanied by rituals and ceremonies performed by individuals and groups to maintain spiritual balance that marked economic activities as also essentially religious. In a universe infused with Manitou (power), reciprocal relations, including the proper performance of ritual and the maintenance of a ceremonial cycle, kept the world in balance, and ensured the wellbeing of the people: “If they receive any good in hunting, fishing, Harvest &c. they acknowledge God in it…”107

For the Spanish, and later the English, it was easy to miss the connection between exchange goods and how Mantoac suffused and permeated those goods. The Algonquians reverence for Okeus could not be extricated from the maize, just as Mantoac could not be disentangled from harvesting their gift of life. The rituals and the physical acts of propitiation made to indigenous deities permeated not only Algonquian belief systems, they permeated those gifts of life, like maize, fish, and deer, to the extent that harvesting the maize, catching the fish, and killing the deer, were all manifestations of the physical world saturated with “God in it.” In short, evidence of indigenous deities, their relationship to those deities, and the delicate balance of sustaining and prolonging Powhatan culture manifested physically as foodstuffs, and

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spiritually as reverence for those foodstuffs. This made it dangerous to show reverence for Okeus without a tangible gift that exemplified how imbued the deity was in the cycle of life and regeneration. Conversely, if there was drought that resulted in a diminished maize harvest, Algonquians believed Okeus was angry with them and their world was out of balance. In *A Key into the Language of America*, Roger Williams noted that if some misfortune occurred among the Natick Indians living south-east of Plymouth, however slight that misfortune was, “they will say God was angry and did it. *musquantum manit* God is angry.”\(^{108}\) Similarly, with Algonquians, their gods were responsible for everything that befell them, good or bad.

In the Algonquian world, where foodstuffs and prestigious goods evidenced gods and vice versa, the exchange of Indian maize for Christian conversion not only created a trade imbalance, it mandated that Don Luis’s community accept a religion separate from nature that would perpetually diminish their ability to balance the needs of their biological world against the needs of those deities that sustained it. If the transaction were ever to work, the Jesuits needed to offer their Christian God, who they claimed was a superior God, with *superior exchange items*. Instead, the Jesuits refused to trade their prestigious goods that evidenced the Christian God and that God’s power within those items. With nothing to show for from the exchange, it left the Powhatans psychologically and spiritually less than whole, as if they were exchanging a something-Okeus for a nothing-God. From their perspective, the exchange diminished the Algonquians as a total social fact, that is, the event reduced them socially, religiously, magically, economically, and morally.

Aside from any religious considerations, the Spanish, long entrenched in reductive patterns of accumulation, refused to acknowledge the expectations that Don Luis’s friends and family would have had in offering them their sacred gift. Mallios maintains that

in societies where gift giving dominates… those societies give, accept, and reciprocate nearly everything. The offerings link all givers and recipients in every aspect of society. This seemingly infinite transference of gifts and debts creates groups of people who are permanently allied and perpetually interdependent.\textsuperscript{109}

The Algonquian Indians hoped to create interdependency between the Strangers and themselves. Using the gift of life — maize — the Algonquians hoped to expand their community for the purpose of aligning with the Spanish Jesuits. That alignment would potentially increase the amount of prestigious goods available to the Algonquians, as well as increase their military strength. Mallios concludes that “Gifts, therefore, serve as powerful tools that create and manipulate relationships between people.”\textsuperscript{110}

Simply put, the Jesuits rejected the something for something gift exchange. The Spanish had been in the Americas for three-quarters of a century and they understood the basic tenets of gift exchange quite well. On an expedition to explore the American Southeast in 1540, Hernando de Soto met with the Altamahas in today’s central Georgia. The leader of the Altamahas, Chief Zamumo, sent the Spanish a messenger who welcomed them, as well as several women who approached with foodstuffs. In response to the gifts, De Soto gave Zamumo a silver-colored feather. After interacting with the Aztecs in Mexico City, the Spanish learned that feathers were highly valued prestigious items in numerous regions throughout the Americas — “[they] were powerful symbols, representing lightness, purity, and power. They came from the creatures of the skies…” — and they could be used as gifts to align Spanish and Indian interests. Zamumo accepted the gift from De Soto with gratitude and responded, “You are from

\textsuperscript{109} Mallios, \textit{Deadly Politics}, 28.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 27. Mallios went on to quote Marcel Mauss, who avers that “the [gift] that is given forges a bilateral, irrevocable bond, above all when it consists of food.” 48.
heaven, and this feather that you give me, I can eat with it; I will go forth to war with it; I will sleep with my wife with it.”  

After the gift exchange, Zamumo offered De Soto “the tribute he usually sent to Ocute.” In Zamumo’s Gifts, Joseph Hall suggests the chief’s reasons were straightforward and simple: the tribute and the foodstuffs “symbolized how the power of the foreign supported the security and autonomy of the leader and his community.” Hall avers that “Zamumo revealed his hopes that De Soto and Ocute might both compete for his friendship…” in a land where competition among multiple partners might result in leveraging or pitting the competitors against each other.  

He concludes that “Exchange between Europeans and Indians had provided the foundation for all early contacts in North America…” Yet in Ajacán, again from the Indians’ perspective, the Jesuits attempted to ignore the rules of a something for something gift exchange by offering their highly valued, European, nothingness.

By accepting the maize that Don Luis’s community offered to the Spanish, the Jesuits had become indebted as they inadvertently entered into a contract or bond that would either make them allies or enemies, depending upon the gifts they offered in return. The Jesuits resented that the Algonquians stopped gifting them maize, while at the same time, the Algonquians demanded reciprocal gifts before they would hand over any more lifesaving foodstuffs. Don Luis’s community told the Jesuits what they expected, but the missionaries refused to meet the criteria of a something for something exchange. The Jesuits offered, according to Segura, “some trinkets for their ears of corn,” but the Algonquians rejected the

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111 Joseph M. Hall, Jr., Zamumo’s Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 2-3. Hall surmises that Zamumo’s appreciation for the silver-colored feather was not the product of Spanish myth making, but a potent prestigious item that fit into the Indian community’s larger cosmology. Zamumo’s response sheds light on that cosmology, for the feather would be incorporated into the three celebrated rituals of communal cohesion among Southeastern Indians: the harvest, warfare, and ancestral worship rituals.

112 Ibid., 3-4.
religious trifles and after a week, Don Luis departed with his people and moved to his own community. Communication between the two groups came to a near halt.113

The Spanish missionaries, on the brink of starving to death, survived the winter on two barrels of flour, but by February, they had no alternative but to scavenge for roots and berries. Father Segura became desperate. He feared that not only would the missionaries starve to death, but their mission of converting Don Luis’s community had failed. With his health faltering, Segura sent three Jesuits to the village of Don Luis’s uncle for the purpose of pleading their Christian case, securing foodstuffs, and to censure and reprimand Don Luis “for his way of life.” In the meantime, they further alienated the cacique and his community by “going to other villages to barter for maize with copper and tin...”114 Don Luis finally acquiesced and returned to them. Rather than trade Spanish iron implements — the European axes were highly prestigious and held great value due to their extreme scarcity — with Don Luis’s community, Segura asked Don Luis to act as a translator so that the Jesuits could trade “tin and copper” with Don Luis’s Algonquian rivals.115

Mallios contends that the Jesuits’ long term goal had involved making Don Luis’s Ajacán community dependent upon the Spanish through Christian conversion, which allowed them to trade with Don Luis’s neighbors, because the Jesuits did not intend to immediately convert the Indians living beyond their spiritual reach. However, their indiscretion “socially diminished” the Algonquians of Ajacán as the Jesuits continued to restrict the food trade with those who had first

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113 See “Letter of Luis de Quirós and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa,” Sept. 12, 1570, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 92. See also The Deadly Politics, 50-52. Mallios surmises that the first sign of Indian dissatisfaction occurred when the Jesuits offered “some trinkets” for maize. The Jesuits should have understood that by rejecting their trinkets, the Indians of Ajacán were unhappy with the terms of the gift exchange and were effectively rejecting a relationship with the missionaries. The next logical step for the Indians was to leave the missionaries to themselves, which they did after a week or two.


115 Ibid. See also “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” 110. Rogel, writing less than two years after the deaths of the Jesuits, suggested that Segura sent three Brothers to Don Luis for the purpose of having the cacique go “along with them and barter for maize on the way back.”
offered friendship in the form of gifted maize. This mistake, Mallios maintains, may have sealed the Jesuits’ fate, because the Algonquians they traded with were “rivals to the native inhabitants of Ajacán.”

The Jesuits’ indiscretion may have explained what happened next. Don Luis met with the Jesuits, greeted them kindly, offered them a gift of “a little grain” and promised Quirós, Solís, and Mendéz that he would return to them shortly. The cacique kept his word. He not only returned to the Spanish, but he offered them an additional gift as well. Luis Oré wrote that

the next day being the solemn feast of Candlemas, [Don Luis] wished to go with all the Indians to cut wood in order to construct a church for the Virgin; and that a Father should say Mass in the morning. There he asked for hatchets and other tools in order to distribute them among the Indians.

Paul Dumouchel describes the types of gifts given during negative exchanges and references anthropologist Marshall Sahlins to express how “negative reciprocity” often results in acts of violence in indigenous societies. Negative reciprocity is simply the act of one group attempting to “get something for nothing” and doing so with impunity:

This goes from transactions conducted to obtain an advantage or maximize one’s gain at a trading partner’s expense, to theft, violence, and raids. It is significant that the exchanges that correspond most closely to our criteria of trade—in other words, exchanges governed by self-interest, [indigenous] peoples put them in the same category as violence.

According to the precepts of negative reciprocity, the Powhatans, naturally suspicious of the Jesuits’ something for nothing exchange of foodstuffs for discursive Christianity, deduced that the Spanish were purposefully gaming the trade exchange in the European’s favor. Therefore, by

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116 Mallios, Deadly Politics, 50.
117 See “Borgia, the Third Part of the History of the Society of Jesus,” in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 223. See also “Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Oré,” 181. Oré recorded that “the gift” from Don Luis was “chestnuts and other varieties of nuts.”
118 Ibid.
attempting to repeatedly pinchfist the trade negotiations, the Jesuits ended up in the same
category as those who deserved violence, not an alliance or friendship.

Mallios essentially agrees with Dumouchel and posits that this Algonquian “model of the
gift economy equated failure to reciprocate with a loss of status, freedom, and spiritual essence.
Under these guide lines, the missionaries were socially dead creatures.”\textsuperscript{120} Although the reaction
of the Ajacán warriors might appear extreme, attacking a Stranger or enemy after suffering social
and spiritual reduction was not uncommon. Thirty years later, when captain John Smith
encountered the Powhatans of the Chesapeake, he explained that the Indians of the region
“seldome make warrs for lands or goods, but for women and children, and principally for
revenge, so vindictive and jealous they be to be made a derision of, and to be insulted upon by an
enemy.”\textsuperscript{121}

David Murray, in \textit{Indian Giving}, offers a slightly different explanation concerning gift
giving in reciprocal societies. He understood the problem as based in exploitation and how
offended parties deal with those who attempt to exploit trade negotiations. Murray surmises that
in rational exchanges between two groups of people, each group must offer mutually beneficial
or useful objects. Europeans hoped, he argues, to create “Wants” among their indigenous trading
partners. Those Wants ranged from religion, early on, all the way to alcohol, later in the century.
Indians recognized that when it came to exchanging their indigenous goods and foods for so
called “European Wants,” Europeans hoped to impoverish Indians rather than enrich them:
“Instead of adding something… the effect of contact is to reduce and create a need.”\textsuperscript{122} Since
reciprocity was a power system based in alliance, many trade exchanges failed because

\textsuperscript{120} Mallios, \textit{Deadly Politics}, 51.
\textsuperscript{121} John Smith, \textit{Captain John Smith: Writings With Other Narratives of Roanoke, Jamestown, and the First English
\textsuperscript{122} David Murray, \textit{Indian Giving: Economics of Power in Indian-White Exchanges}, (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2000), 24-25.
Europeans were more interested in reducing indigenous communities than aligning with them. Murray suggests that in such situations, reciprocity denigrated into “trade as exploitation and deception,” which created the space for conflict and violence.

Murray then expanded on this point in an examination of Jesuit missionary, Paul Le Jeune, who gave an account of Indian exchange farther north in Canada in 1634: “When you refuse anything to a Savage, he immediately says Khisakhitan, ‘thou lovest that’, sakhita, sakhita, ‘Love it, Love it’, as if they would say that we are attached to what we love, and that we prefer it to their friendship.” According to Le Jeune, one of the greatest insults an Indian could pay to another person was to say “That man likes everything, he is stingy,” which meant the person valued their possessions more than reciprocal friendship. Murray, who quotes Le Jeune one final time, concludes that since the French were unwilling to share everything they possessed, the Indians in the region treated them as strangers and were apt to “drain from you, if they can, even your blood.”

The Jesuits had received the gift of food, a something for nothing exchange, and they were offered a second, additional something for nothing gift in the form of the construction of a church to honor “the Virgin” and the Jesuits. The Jesuits did not comprehend that the two final gifts were not something for nothing exchanges, but according to Mallios, the Jesuits had accepted the “false gifts” as symbolically and “socially dead creatures,” and the price of the free gifts brought on by their unintended “derision” would cost them their lives. In sum, if maize was the gift of life that received inadequate reciprocation from the Jesuits, the false gift would become the gift of death to cancel the exchange imbalance.

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123 Ibid., 28.
124 Ibid., 35-36.
125 Mallios, Deadly Politics, 52-53.
Thus, on February 4, 1571, “Don Luis himself was the first to draw blood with one of those hatchets which were brought along for trading with the Indians; then he finished the killing of Father Master Baptista with his axe, and his companions finished off the others,” Rogel later explained in his letters.126 Carrera further related that

Father [Quirós] and the Brothers made a cautious trip to the country of Don Luis’ uncle, where he was living, as has been narrated. While going along safely with these bundles on their back, lo! The traitor with armed companions suddenly springs out on the path to kill them with bows and arrows. When they saw the sudden attack, Father Quirós turned to Don Luis and asked him what they wanted to do and why they were about to kill them. Then the good Father began to preach to them but the answer was a volley of arrows, and so after wounding them many times they slew Father Quirós and Brother Gabriel de Solís. Brother Baptista Méndez fled to the woods with blood running from his deep wounds. There he hid himself that night and in the morning he was discovered and killed. After that the murderers burned the bodies and stole their clothing and bundles.127 Rogel was closest to the event and learned of the Jesuits’ fates less than two years later, while traveling with Captain Menéndez on a retaliatory mission meant to punish the offenders.

Rogel’s inclusion of the hatchets as the initial weapons of destruction was especially telling, since, as Mallios points out, they would have been “greatly desired… because they would have allowed [the Ajacán Indians] to gain status with indigenous leaders via a tribute offering.”128

Moreover, Mallios reiterates just how important the hatchets meant to the Algonquian natives:

The natives transported the hatchets, along with the rest of the Jesuits’ belongings, as part of a laborious task that went unrewarded. In addition, the Ajacán natives provided daily sustenance for the missionaries. Yet, the clerics never reciprocated by offering goods, especially the hatchets, to the Ajacán natives. To the Algonquians, the missionaries’ failure to part with these tools was a refusal of alliance… The final insult occurred when the clerics traded the hatchets to the neighboring rivals of the former Ajacán locals… The former Ajacán Algonquians purposefully elected to punish the Jesuits for their exchange violations with the hatchets. Overall, the missionaries incited the Algonquians to strike by transgressing the native gift-exchange system and were slaughtered with the exact

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127 See “Relation of Juan de la Carrera,” March 1, 1600, Ibid., 135.
128 Mallios, Deadly Politics, 53.
items that they refused to give. Don Luis and his followers responded to the Jesuits’ socioeconomic violations with reciprocal vengeance.\textsuperscript{129}

The European tools became weapons that Don Luis and his companions used against the Spanish. The Jesuits intended to convert the indigenous population to Christianity, establish a mission sponsored by the Algonquians, train the Indians as sedentary farmers through reducción, impose European laws and mores upon the Indian community, and eventually transmogrify a semi-nomadic, hunter-gatherer society, into Christian subjects who labored on behalf of the Spanish Empire. With a handful of hatchets, the Algonquian warriors undermined Audre Lorde’s famous maxim: “The Master’s tools will never dismantle the Master’s house.”\textsuperscript{130} The Jesuits were not the masters of the Ajacán Indians, but they intended to make the Indians their subjects and utterly failed in their endeavor. Brickhouse similarly sums up the attack as an instance when European hatchets, meant for peace, trade, and building, became “an instrument of colonial settlement now turned against them.”\textsuperscript{131}

In this context then, the murders were wholly rationale. There would be no alliance and no more interference from those who were socially dead creatures. Don Luis and his companions tricked the Jesuits into handing over the tools that the Jesuits prized above their friendship with the Powhatans. Mallios aptly notes that it was no accident the Jesuits “were slaughtered with the exact items that they refused to give.”\textsuperscript{132} Don Luis and his companions took hold of the hatchets — tools that the Jesuits made clear would not benefit Don Luis’s community in any future alliance — and appropriated them for their own use. First, the hatchets became weapons of anti-reductive destruction, but second, with the exchange of Jesuit lives for the hatchets, the objects entered into the cycle of reciprocal exchange that permeated Powhatan

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Audre Lorde, Ed.\textit{ Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches}, Berkeley: Crossing Press, 2007), 111.
\textsuperscript{131} Brickhouse,\textit{ Unsettlement}, 79.
\textsuperscript{132} Mallios,\textit{ Deadly Politics}, 54.
lifeways. Ultimately, the Powhatans used the Jesuits’ hatchets to reaffirm their indigeneity and culture.

Don Luis and his companions then stripped the Jesuits of their religious cassocks and robes, most of which also entered into the indigenous, discursive economy. Don Luis’s brother, Alonso later lamented to Rogel, went “around clothed in the Mass vestments and altar clothes.” Pedro Ribadeneyra recorded that “they stripped [the Jesuits] of their garments, stole the ornaments and vessels of the altar, and danced about in a drunken revel.” Martínez perhaps went the furthest and recorded how the Indians cut off the heads of the Jesuits and “fashion[ed] the skulls into cups… [and] waved them about in their drunken feasts, and put… on the sacred vestments and clothes of the saintly martyrs [and sang] of their mighty conquests.”

Brickhouse argues that this act of taking and wearing “the Jesuits’ belongings” was “carefully discern[ed]” and represented “partially symbolic acts of resistance to… religious colonialism.” She concludes that the Indians reversed the Spanish repartimiento when they apportioned the Jesuits’ vestments among themselves, taking part in “a strange and ironic restaging of the colonial labor division that apportioned Indian slaves to Spanish colonists.”

Moreover, Brickhouse contends that the Algonquians ended the violent ordeal with one final act of destruction: Don Luis and his companions threw away the Jesuits’ religious “images” and “about the books, Alonso said that after pulling off the clasps, the Indians tore them all up and threw them away.” The indigenous message of resistance appears clear to Brickhouse, who writes, “the Natives’ obliteration of the devotional texts suggests a powerful response to a

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133 See “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” August 28, 1572, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 111.
135 See “Relation of Bartolomé Martínez,” October 24, 1610, Ibid., 159-160.
more literal source of danger: the religious ideology of the Spaniards who wish to colonize Ajacán.”

Finally, Don Luis’s companions girded themselves with the religious items of the Jesuits, not to appropriate Spanish Mantoac or recognize Christian power, as Frederic Gleach suggests in *Powhatan’s World*, but to showcase “native independence, dominance, and retribution,” as Mallios avers. Mallios continues in this vein and surmises that

> The Algonquians wore the Jesuit items as symbols of conquest… Using the altar cloth as a loincloth is hardly a sign of respect… John Smith reported that early 17th-century Chesapeake Algonquians frequently decorated themselves with trophies from their victims (Smith et al. 1986, 1:161). The wearing of enemy goods most likely symbolized conflict and conquest, not acculturation and reverence for another group’s religious beliefs.

In short, Don Luis’s companions may have “covered their private parts with the corporals [altar cloths]” to deride Spanish arrogance and highlight indigenous ingenuity — what the Spanish called treachery — over the Strangers who came to transform them and their way of life.

Since Don Luis’s motives can only be surmised, many European opinions surfaced almost immediately to explain why the cacique killed his former companions. Carrera placed the blame on the temptation of the “precious vessels” the Spanish brought with them, which purportedly bewitched the Indians into acting out of greed and covetous behavior. When Carrera learned what Father Segura intended to bring to Ajacán, he became convinced the religious artifacts would “contribute greatly to the death of everyone going there.” Carrera conjectured that Don Luis promised the religious artifacts as booty to the warriors who followed him. This belief probably said more about Carrera and how much value he placed on the holy objects, as

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137 Brickhouse, *Unsettlement*, 75.
139 Mallios, *Deadly Politics*, 54.
141 See “Relation of Juan de la Carrera,” March 1, 1600, Ibid., 132.
opposed to discovering Don Luis’s true intentions. Granted, the religious artifacts may have been promised as spoils of war as prestigious exchange items, the motive for the attack was more than likely something greater than fetishized objects of Mantoac power.\(^\text{142}\)

Lewis and Loomie located at least part of the breakdown in relations when Father Baptista or Father Segura chose to send the “novice,” Alonso, to confront Don Luis, as it would have been a poor political action that undoubtedly caused the cacique to lose face among his Algonquian peers.\(^\text{143}\) According to this account, recorded by Martínez, “the good Fathers… sent one of the young men called Alonso de Olmos, who was very friendly with Don Luis,” to bring the cacique back into the Christian fold.\(^\text{144}\) Rogel asserted that “a novice Brother” made two different trips to Don Luis, with the ultimate goal of causing the cacique to repent, disavow his marriages, and return to the Christian fold. When the novice failed, Segura sent “Father Quirós and Brother Gabriel de Solís and Brother Juan Baptista to the village…”\(^\text{145}\) The novice Brother, Quirós, or the boy, Alonso, may have been friends with Don Luis, but Lewis and Loomie posit that Baptista’s act of spiritually chastising a chief at the behest of an interloper seemed to tip the scale of impropriety against the Spanish. Don Luis, evidently now married, as Carrera pointed out — perhaps to more than one wife\(^\text{146}\) — would have to forsake his marriage — or marriages — and his place among his people if he were to return to the Spanish. Lewis and Loomie emphasize that the revocation of a marriage was no small task that could be undertaken lightly.\(^\text{147}\)

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 47.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 109, 145-146. Rogel wrote that it was Baptista who sent the novice to Don Luis, while Ribadeneyra claimed it was Segura.

\(^{144}\) See “Relation of Bartolomé Martinez,” October 24, 1610, Ibid., 159.

\(^{145}\) See the “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” August 28, 1572, Ibid., 109.

\(^{146}\) See “Relation of Juan de la Carrera,” March 1, 1600, Ibid., 134. Carrera complained that after Don Luis returned to his people, “he allowed himself free rein in his sins, marrying many women in a pagan way.”

\(^{147}\) Ibid., 47-48.
In 1597, the Franciscans in Guale refused to “permit an Indian youth, who as a Christian and heir to the caciquedom, to have more than one wife to whom he was married.” The end result was bloody and violent. The chiefs conspired together and “planned the massacre of the Fathers.” After the deed was finished, they too dressed themselves in the “habits of the Religious.” Later, after the Spanish interrogated the Indians in question at the trial in Saint Augustine, they admitted the cause for the attack stemmed from the friars who “enjoined monogamy upon them.” Other Indians, however, “maintained the cause was interference with their elections.”

In sum, Christian conversion, coupled with monogamous marriage, could not be intertwined into Algonquian culture without submission to Christian ideologies. If the novice was sent as an emissary of religious castigation, his mission could only succeed if the cacique, Don Luis, submitted to the Jesuits.

For numerous reasons, the Spanish Jesuits were either unaware or chose to ignore the indigenous politics of the Algonquian sacred practitioners they hoped to replace. The Powhatan priests, typically glossed as Indian “conjurors,” could not simply be replaced by the Jesuits without irrevocably transforming Ajacán politics and the native cosmologies undergirding those politics. In Algonquian cultures, Martin Gallivan points out, the sacred practitioners gathered

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148 Ibid., 48.
149 Ibid., 47.
150 Rogel, who learned of the details of the last days of the Jesuits directly from Alonso just two years after the attack, related that the one who confronted Don Luis was “a novice Brother,” which Alonso certainly was not. Martinez did speak with Alonso four years after the attack, but he wrote his account forty years later. It seems Martinez conflated Alonso and the novice Brother into one person. Carrera and Rogel, both closest to the incident, neglected to mention Alonso as playing any part in Don Luis’s apparent humiliation. Surely Father Segura and Baptista, both of whom rose up through the ranks of the Jesuit hierarchy and understood the delicate politics of social order, would not send a boy to summon or retrieve an Indian chief. Moreover, it would seem strange that if Alonso had delivered the messages of repentance that were intended to force Don Luis into a position of Spanish submission, that Don Luis would not have dispatched with the youth as quickly as he did the other three who confronted him shortly before their deaths. Martinez later contradicted himself in this matter anyway, because he admitted Alonso had never been with the Jesuits when the attacks occurred. Alonso personally maintained this position. See “Relation of Bartolomé Martínez,” October 24, 1610, Ibid., 161. Ribadeneyra noted that the Algonquians saved Alonso precisely because they “knew he had not come to preach and to prohibit them from the worship of their idols.” See “Life of Father Francis Borgia, Third General of the Society of Jesus Book III, Chapter 6,” 1592 and 1594, 146.
with the chiefs to form councils that advised the head chief. Only those men “who had undergone the Huskanaw rite of passage” were able to act as advisors. According to the passage rites of the Huskanaw — translated as “he has a new body” — the advisors were men who had submitted to the tribulations of dying ritualistic deaths, which culminated in their symbolic resurrections; afterwards, they “embodied a divine status.” Following the Huskanaw, Powhatan priests “settled spaces… outside the social order” and tended “quioccosans (temples) located outside the village core.”

When the Jesuits demanded that Don Luis renounce his wife or wives and return to their settlement, their prerogatives threatened the authority of the head chief, his counsel chiefs, and the sacred practitioners of the Powhatan spiritual cosmology.

Perhaps more than any other anthropologist, Rountree analyzes the differences in the religious beliefs of the two groups and offers her own insight into these spiritual matters. She emphasizes that the “Powhatan religion was native to the region, and as such it reflected the people-to-land relationship closely.” Powhatan priests worked with Mantoac and offered “tobacco, puccoon, and deer suet whenever they saw an omen… [and] used an ancient language not understood by ordinary people.” The priests, by worshiping many gods, including Okeus, prepared young warriors to become “real men.” During the Huskanaw, priests oversaw the transformation of boys into manhood, which was “designed to make them ‘forget’ family ties and concentrate their energies for the good of society as a whole.” The act of reducing Okeus to a “Christian devil” or undermining polygamous marriage, threatened the Algonquians and their ecology with punishments that included: “poor hunting, a bad crop, marital discord, injuries while traveling,” among other things.

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152 Rountree, “Powhatan Priests,” 485-490, 493-494. Rountree explains that when the English later began settling the Chesapeake Bay in 1607, those first threatened by the English were the Powhatan priests. It was the Indian
act as spiritual mediators to the Algonquians of Ajacán. To do so, threatened Algonquian autonomy on numerous levels.

At last, the issue of economic scarcity — dictated by supply and demand and the needs of the marketplace — and real scarcity: starvation, death, or extinction, may have also factored into Don Luis’s decision to eradicate the colonists who were increasingly dependent on the goodwill of the Chesapeake Indians. The notion of scarcity in this example had little to do with a dearth of foodstuffs, but with reductive ideologies based in creating Indian dependence upon the Spanish colonists. To do this, the Jesuits needed to control Algonquian Mantoac, that is, the spiritual powers that bound the Ajacán community together. To be successful missionaries, they needed to usurp the role of the priests and werowances and reorder the religious and political hierarchy by placing their one Christian God — a God in short supply that the Spanish were the sole mediators of — at the center of what they hoped would become a sedentary lifestyle grounded in reducción. This is why reducción was an inherently violent system; it demanded transformation through reductive processes established in religious creeds that allowed no room for compromise.

If the cacique’s polygamy is viewed through a reductive lens, Don Luis had to renounce his marriages because acceptance of them forced the Jesuits into an inferior power position where Ajacán culture and community might continue to thrive and expand. Even with real food scarcity, the Algonquian community could relocate on their own and leave the struggling reducción behind. The Algonquians that survived seven years of drought were still too
independent. The people of Ajacán did not need anything from the Spaniards, which allowed them to reject ideologies based in dependence on a system outside of their control or a monotheistic God that diminished access to their pantheon.

Real scarcity, which manifested in the famine due to a seven year long drought, acted as a tool for Ajacán autonomy while the Jesuits struggled to survive in the alien environment. The Real People then wielded that power against the colonists to eradicate the threat caused by those who needed to be cared for when there was too little foodstuffs for the already famished Algonquians. Every berry and root the Jesuits harvested from the land equaled a lost opportunity cost for their indigenous hosts, and since the attack occurred during February — still very much winter in the region at that time, there is little doubt that foodstuffs were low when Segura foolishly sent three interlopers into the Indian camp to chastise a cacique over sins Don Luis had no further reason to acknowledge.

After the attack against the Jesuits, the only survivor, Alonso, related to Father Rogel that he stayed with the chief of Ajacán for fifteen days, but “because of the famine in the land, Don Luis told him that they should go and seek grain.”¹⁵³ According to Rogel, Alonso believed Don Luis did this as a pretext to murder him. Alonso further iterated those intertwined complexities when he explained that after returning with grain, “Don Luis went away very anxious to get hold of the boy to kill him, so that there would be no one to give details of what happened to Ours, but because of his fear of the chief with whom the boy was staying, he gave up the idea.”¹⁵⁴ In sum, Don Luis, having spent a decade with Europeans, used scarcity of foodstuffs as justification for sending the boy out of his brother’s home. Don Luis’s brother evidently realized this, because

¹⁵³ See the “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” August 28, 1572, in Spanish Jesuit, Lewis and Loomie, 110.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid.
the cacique then permanently took the boy in and told him “he would treat him well and hold him as a son.”

The point is not that one boy would impact the food supply of an Indian chief, but that Alonso later claimed that Don Luis attempted to remove him from under the protection of the brother cacique because of the famine. This proposition is intriguing because it points to the influence of European ideologies to justify violence through the screen of lacking resources. Those influenced by reductive ideologies would have no problem with this line of thinking. As it goes, the famine was part and parcel of the political machinations of a community threatened by a foreign presence, especially since the famine occurred during what has been called the Little Ice Age, an event which truly impacted the region on a level that, according to Kupperman,

The greater cold led to shortened growing seasons, and to changes in wind and rainfall patterns. These conditions probably led to the intense drought conditions researchers have found in the Chesapeake and along the Carolina Outer Banks at the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth, which they have labeled the worst conditions in eight hundred years… The colonists, none of whom produced their own food in the early years, must have created intolerable burdens on native food supplies.

Karen Kupperman, Helen Rountree, Daniel Richter, and David Quinn all assert that environmental factors, such as the prolonged drought, may have played into the Algonquians’ decision to eradicate their intrusive neighbors. However, the drought was never so detrimental

155 Ibid.
156 Kupperman, Indians and English, 36.
157 Kupperman, Jamestown Project, 104. Kupperman writes that “devastating drought had sown despair among the Americans [Indians]…” and may have initially chose to help the Jesuits because they believed “Don Luis had returned from the dead…” This would partially explain why, according to Kupperman, Don Luis and his companions deserted the Jesuits after just a few days. See Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 47. See also David Quinn, New American World: A Documentary History of North America to 1612, (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 475-490. Quinn was one of the first historians to connect the seven year Chesapeake drought to the violence committed against the Jesuits. See also Daniel Richter, The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550-1624, Ed. Peter Mancall, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2007), 41-43. Richter downplays scarcities’ importance, but argues the “years of famine and death” was so detrimental to the region it caused many Algonquians to flee the area, and those who remained were desperate, wishing “to die where their fathers have died…” Therefore, when the Spanish arrived, “no one on either side, Spanish or Indian, had enough food,” which may have forced the Indians to end their alliance with the Spanish, especially after they “failed to live up to behavioral expectations of a prestige-goods” exchange partner. The point Richter makes emphasizes that the politics of trade and exchange were built upon a balance of ecology: if that balance was disrupted by drought, small infractions that might have previously
to the Algonquians that they did not initially attempt to foster an alliance with the Spanish by offering them maize in exchange for prestigious material goods. Kupperman stipulates that only after Don Luis “could not tolerate their [Spanish] efforts to change his people’s culture” did he change his months long behavior toward them, which resulted in their deaths.\(^{158}\) Ultimately, the Powhatans gifted maize to the Jesuits despite the drought and saved Alonso because they hoped to incorporate the boy into their own Algonquian culture.\(^{159}\) In time, Don Luis’s brother would presumably adopt the boy. The cacique chose an inclusive act that further knitted the Algonquian community together. The boy would become a Powhatan Real Person. They would live together or die together, regardless of the famine. The community would remain intact and independent until it did not exist at all. The Algonquians killed the Jesuits presumably because their reductive behavior made Real Person transformation impossible.

Discursive scarcity based in creating demand was a system built upon an altogether different premise. The marketplace, in whatever artificially constructed schema it emerged as — mercantilism, at the time — needed a finite supply of goods to drive profit, whether or not profits were realized during the myriad of exchanges that brought commodities to the eventual consumer. In a similar way, Christianity appeared to mirror some of the mercantile forces at work in the New World. Both drove value through scarcity. To the Spanish, the Christian God was the only God and Roman Catholic priests were the only “true vicars” or mediators of that very finite spiritual resource. Dependency was the goal, whether it was subjugation to the Church, their foodstuffs, or their goods. With that dependency came relocation, a total

\(^{158}\)Kupperman, *Jamestown Project*, 104.

\(^{159}\)See Kupperman, *Indians and English*, 106. Kupperman points out that Algonquian communities along the coast were quite perceptive to European beliefs of superiority. In Maryland a half century later, a “native emissary argued ‘since that you are here strangers, and come into our Countrey, you should rather conforme your selves to the Customes of our Countrey, then impose yours upon us.’”
breakdown of indigenous cultural ways as it formally existed, and a transformed sociological ethos that reduced everyone in the community to converts, laborers, mothers, or potential new consumers educated in the ways of sedentary living, and by extension, mercantilism.

The first details of the Spanish tragedy emerged in the spring of 1571, when Vicente Gonzales returned to the Chesapeake Bay with the Jesuits’ much needed provisions. Gonzales was at once suspicious, because “When he arrived within sight of [Ajacán], he saw, along the beach, people vested in cassocks and religious robes, and it seemed to him that these were the Religious.” Gonzales called out to them and asked why the Fathers did not come on board. The men dressed in the Jesuit cassocks did not respond and “suspicion of evil arose.” Gonzales managed to capture two of the Algonquian natives, but sailed away in haste as “many Indians were coming in canoes.” One of the Indians jumped overboard and swam away, never to be seen again, but the other, the Spanish interrogated and tortured, and by the time they reached Santa Elena, the Spanish had learned that the cacique, Don Luis, masterminded a plot that culminated with the deaths of all the Jesuits. Only the boy, Alonso, survived.

Gonzales dispatched Menéndez, who was just about to embark for Spain, but had stopped in Santa Elena and decided, “at the importunity of the Religious,” to sail first to Ajacán to locate Alonso and punish Don Luis and his companions for deceiving and murdering the Jesuits. The adelantado arrived at Ajacán with one hundred and fifty soldiers among four ships, Menéndez gave gifts to “two Indians who belonged the cacique” and requested they return Alonso to the Spanish. The next day, Menéndez sent Gonzales “with a tender and thirty soldiers to hide below the decks” in anticipation of luring the Indians on board the Spanish ship. The ruse worked: “Since the Indians saw no more than six men, sixty Indians in canoes came on board, wearing

160 See “Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Oré,” Ibid., 183.
161 Ibid.
the patens belonging to the chalices as ornaments about their necks… [and] they covered their private parts with the corporals.” Gonzales offered his guests honey cakes, and while they ate, the Spanish soldiers “sallied forth from below the decks, seized hold of thirteen of the more important Indians, and killed more than twenty.”

Two days later, “two hundred Indians” escorted Alonso to the ships waiting in the Chesapeake Bay. They returned the boy unharmed and “naked, in Indian fashion.” The boy, according to Rogel and Oré, barely remembered how to speak Spanish after living with the Algonquians for nearly two years. Meanwhile, Menéndez attempted to use his thirteen “important Indians” to regain control of “the treacherous Don Luis.” He asked the men if one of them might “venture to bring Don Luis to him dead or alive?” One volunteered. Menéndez gave the Indian ten days to return with Don Luis or he threatened to “have to hang them all.” The ten days lapsed and the Indian never returned. The remaining 12 supposedly “wished to die as Christians” and “willingly they asked for baptism.” Afterward, “they were hanged from the yardarms.” Menéndez hoped to further chastise the Indians of the area for their complicity in killing the Jesuits, so “by way of farewell, the pilot steered the ship towards land with the excuse that he wanted to speak to [the Indians], and then he ordered a blast from the arquebuses into the group of Indians who were standing crowded together on the shore. I believe many of them were killed,” Rogel lamented in a schadenfreude tone. Menéndez immediately returned to Spain, but sent Gonzales, the “Religious, and Alonso de Lara” back to Havana. Thus concluded the Spanish attempt to colonize the Chesapeake.

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162 Ibid., 183-184.
163 Ibid., and see also “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” August 28, 1572, 110. Rogel was on the expedition to recover Alonso. His eye witness testimony is by far the most accurate primary source available, pertaining to the last days of the Spanish in the Chesapeake Bay region.
164 See the “Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia,” August 28, 1572, Ibid., 109.
165 See “Relation of Luis Gerônimo de Oré,” Ibid., 184-185.
Roanoke and the Silver Cup

The first English colony along the Outer Banks of what would become North Carolina started out peacefully enough on Roanoke Island. In 1584, Sir Walter Raleigh attempted to establish England’s first permanent colony in the New World. Raleigh’s desire for a permanent presence on the western side of the Atlantic, however, was not with peace in mind. Raleigh’s elder half-brother, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, had initiated England’s colonial expansion in North America a year earlier when he landed on the shores of Newfoundland’s “hideous rockes and mountains, bare of trees and voide of any greene herbe.” The colony lasted only a few weeks and upon departing the “extreme cold,” Gilbert’s flagship, Delight, “stroke aground and had soone after her sterne and hinder partes beaten in pieces.”

Gilbert’s men persuaded him to return to England, but during the course of their journey home, they took up mocking him as if he was afraid of the sea. To show his courage, he boarded the heavily laden frigate, Squirrel, which sat so low in the water, any storm might swamp it. That is exactly what happened. As they drew close to the Azores, “we met with very foule weather, and terrible seas, breaking short and high, pyramid wise… Men which all their lifetime had occupied the sea never saw more outrageous seas.” At close to midnight, the “frigat being ahead of us… suddenly her lights were out.” Gilbert was lost at sea in 1583.

Concerning the intentions of the new English colonies, Gilbert, in 1577, submitted a proposal to Queen Elizabeth, which was called How Her Majesty May Annoy the King of Spain. Gilbert hoped to follow the wildly successful, Sir Francis Drake, by attacking and pirating Spanish ships in the Atlantic. Unlike Drake, who had a penchant for Spanish gold and silver,
Gilbert was interested in Spain’s fishing fleets off the east coast of Newfoundland. He was unable to make good on his desire to annoy England’s Spanish competitors. There were other adventurers, ready to inherit Gilbert’s American project though. Sir George Peckham, despite losing his investment when the Delight went down off of the coast of Newfoundland, wholeheartedly believed in the English cause and did his best to raise capital through potential merchants and investors. Sadly for Peckham, only “seven men bothered to show up.” Disappointed, Peckham raised the incredibly paltry sum of “£12 10s.” The colonial effort fell to another adventurer’s shoulders.

Sir Walter Raleigh followed in his half-brother’s footsteps by attempting to build a permanent presence in the Americas. He petitioned the queen and took over Gilbert’s royal patent in 1584, which gave him ultimate authority over all “cittyes, castles, townes, villages and places” he discovered. He too set his sights set on Spanish treasure. Since the new English colonies were primarily a privateering adjunct, conflict in the Americas was inevitable. Kupperman made this point clear when she notes that “war was England’s first sustained activity in the Americas.”

The reason the English wanted privateering outposts in the America was simple: in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, as Kupperman put it, crossing the Atlantic “was considered too dangerous except during the spring and early summer.” Those dangers made the privateering season especially short; to remedy the situation, privateers wanted to build an English base of
operations “where crews could safely provision and refit their ships” in order to pirate Spanish ships year around in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{171}

After the Spanish government “seized English merchant ships in Spain’s harbors” in 1585, the English government responded by issuing a “large numbers of licenses for privateering.” From that time on, English piracy was legal until Elizabeth’s death in 1603.\textsuperscript{172} Prior to the seizure of English grain ships — while England’s privateering policies on the open sea continued to evolve, Raleigh sent a party to reconnoiter the coastal lands between Spanish Florida and Newfoundland for the purpose of establishing a permanent outpost for privateering. “Two barks sailed in April 1584 — Amadas and Barlowe captains; Simon Ferdinando, an Azorian pilot.”\textsuperscript{173} In Barlowe’s report to Raleigh, they arrived on the coast — between North Carolina on one side and Roanoke Island and the Outer Banks on the other — on July 4 took possession “in the right of the Queene’s most excellent majestie.”\textsuperscript{174} Three days later, they made contact with the first Indians, and one of whom, “never making any show of fear or doubt,” entered the English bark, whereby he received food and gifts. The nameless Indian then returned to his dugout (canoe) and “fell to fishing, and in less than half an hour he had laden his boat as deep as it could swim… [and] divided his fish into two parts, appointing one part to the ship and the other to the pinnace.”

The entire reconnoissance mission was, by anyone standards of the day, a complete success. Much to the delight of Amadas and Barlowe, the Indians related to their chief that the English were not a threat. They returned with Chief Granganimeo, a man of good bearing, who was accompanied by at least forty men, who were a “very handsome and goodly people, and in

\textsuperscript{171} Kupperman, \textit{Jamestown Project}, 32.

\textsuperscript{172} Kupperman, \textit{Jamestown Project}, 31.


\textsuperscript{174} Milton, \textit{Big Chief}, 54.
their behavior as mannerly and civil as any of Europe.” Thomas Hariot, Raleigh’s chief scientist, gave a slightly different version from the official account. He claimed that as soone as they saw us, [the Indians] began to make a great and horrible crye, as people which never before had seene men appareled like us, and came away making out crys like wild-beasts or men out of their wyts. But beeinge gentlye called backe, wee offred them of our wares, as glasses, knives, babies [toys] and other tribles which wee thougt they delighted in.176

It is clear from the purposeful oversight that the official reports were pieces of propaganda and manipulated to serve England’s burgeoning colonial interests. To those ends, the initial descriptions of the land were overwhelmingly positive. Barlowe’s report gushed with compliments for the inhabitants of Roanoke and the neighboring mainland: “We were entertained with all love and kindness, and with as much bounty as they could possibly devise… We found the people most gentle, loving, and faithful, void of all guile and treason, and such as lived after the manner of the golden rule.” Reconnaissance reports of this kind were not unusual. Many others have shown that “Barlowe’s report was written… to aid Raleigh in promoting his colony” for future investors. After all, the report meant to convey the placatory and amicable attitude of those who might soon be the neighbors of settling colonists. A hostile belligerent who showed early animosity for foreigners was not ideal in any location. Barlowe described in specific detail how the inhabitants along the Carolina and Virginia coast were anything but hostile. Carl Sauer highlights this, as the small English group was well entertained by no less than the “Queen” of Roanoke herself — Grangameo’s wife. Every day, they received “bucks, conies, fish, divers kinds of fruits, melons, walnuts, cucumbers, gourds, pease,

175 Sauer, Sixteenth Century, 252.
176 Milton, Big Chief, 55.
177 Ibid., 56. Barlowe failed to mention how they kept guns and culverins raised on Grangameo and the other Indians until they were certain of their benevolent intent.
and divers roots, and fruits very excellent good, and corn of their country, which… grows three times in five months.”

Circumstances seemingly changed quickly. Barlowe was having quite the time, grinning ear to ear while being entertained by the Indians, when Granganimeo started attacking him, “striking on his head and his breast, and afterwards on ours.” This happened shortly after Barlowe first encountered the chief. He and the others were shaken, but they did not fight back. The English soon learned that the act was, according to Giles Milton, “a one-sided boxing match [and] a traditional Indian greeting.” Marlowe wrote that the supposed attack meant “to shewe we were all one, smiling, and making shewe the best hee could, of all love and familiaritie.”

The reason for the generous hospitality may have been manifold, but the most plausible explanation was that the Roanoke Indians did not feel threatened by the small reconnaissance group in their midst. The generosity would not act as a permanent drain on their resources. Moreover, Indians understood enough about European travelers that they could already discern between the English and the Spanish. The Spanish had been sailing the coastal waters for nearly a century and during that time, they had made many enemies by kidnapping indigenes to use as slaves, guides, or interpreters. Even in 1584, the Spanish had a reputation that preceded them along the eastern Atlantic Coast.

Of more importance still, the Indians along the coast were acutely aware of the trading goods that European sailors carried. Barlowe mentioned how the Indians had iron tools repurposed from the spikes and nails of “a ship wrecked twenty years before.”

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181 Ibid., 253.
there had been at least eight ship wrecks along the coast going back to 1528.\(^\text{182}\) By treating the English as honored guests, the Roanokes ensured access to European prestigious goods they sought. Those same goods could be traded with other indigenous communities to facilitate peaceful relations, influence neighboring nations, or be turned into weapons for war. With European tools and weapons, warriors could gain *Mantoac* and increase their social status.

Hariot first described *Mantoac* or *Manitou* — used interchangeably, in his journals as the “many Gods… but of different sortes and degrees…” of the Algonquian Indians he surveyed in his travels. According to Hariot’s version of *Mantoac*, the one “great God,” Ahone, created *Mantoac* to act as “instruments to be vsed in the creation and gouernment to follow.”\(^\text{183}\) Therefore, *Mantoac* might come in numerous manifestations and it was not exclusive to any one Indian community, but animated the world and the power that resided in it. Michael Oberg nicely describes how Roanoke Indians believed that their universe was suffused with power, or *Mantoac*, and that rituals were an important means for acquiring this power. But power existed in many forms and some things and beings possessed more power than others... Evans Dowd has pointed out in his excellent study of religious awakenings in eighteenth-century Eastern Woodland communities that 'nothing was more important for life than power'. Those who had it would fight well in battle, hunt successfully, and raise an abundant harvest. As throughout the Eastern Woodlands, so along the Carolina coast: native peoples needed power to survive.\(^\text{184}\)

The English had access to *Mantoac* and with their material culture acting as a “beneficent power,” Oberg argues that the conception of *Mantoac* in regards to creating and maintaining relations of power was sufficient in explaining Granaganimeo’s alliance with the English. If

\(^{182}\) Lewis and Loomie, *The Spanish Jesuit*, 13. The years of the wrecks are as follows: 1528, 1545, 1551, 1553, 1554, 1559, 1561, and 1564.


Mantoac was the key, it might also explain why two Indians decided to travel with the English once the reconnaissance mission was over.

After six weeks, the English departed for Britain. Previously, Raleigh instructed his men to return with Indians so that they could reveal the secrets of their lands. His scientists and soldiers did not disappoint him. Two “lustie men,” Chief Manteo and Wanchese, volunteered to sail with the English to London. Milton avers the two men did not know one another prior to the reconnaissance mission. Manteo was a Croatoan chief of a small coastal nation aligned with the more powerful Roanokes, while Wanchese was a Roanoke warrior who lived on the island. In England, the two were instantly famous. Barlowe published his account of the New World and promoted America “as a second Eden,” exaggerating, for full affect, the wild land full of “people most gentle, loving and faithfull.” They were “void of all guile and treason, and such as lived after the manner of the golden rule.” Milton contends that with these accounts of the Indians, “the myth of the noble savage was born.”

It is interesting to point out that Christopher Columbus’s initial accounts of the Taíno on the island that would become Hispaniola, read similarly:

they took everything [we gave them] and gave of what they had very willingly. But it seemed to me that they were a people very poor in everything. All of them go around as naked as their mothers bore them… They do not carry arms nor are they acquainted with them, because I showed them swords and they took them by the edge and through ignorance cut themselves… They should be good intelligent servants, for I see that they say very quickly everything that is said to them; and I believe that they would become Christians very easily, for it seemed to me that they had no religion.

185 Milton, Big Chief, 60-61.
186 Ibid., 63-64. One visitor, Lupold von Wedel, when meeting with the two at church, wrote that “their faces as well as their whole bodies were very similar to those of the white Moors at home.” Their presence in England was being constructed and framed, from the very first interactions, as “Moorish,” to help explain who they descended from, in accordance to the book of Genesis’s “Table of Seventy Nations.”
If the descriptions of the so called innocent and “naïve savages” that Columbus described were any indication of how the Taíno would later be treated, it certainly did not bode well to expect the English to be any kinder or gentler to the “loving and faithful” inhabitants of Roanoke.

Both Manteo and Wanchese went to England freely and agreed to act as future interpreters and guides for the English.\(^{188}\) The reason two Indians from separate communities agreed to leave their homes and travel to a part of the world they did not know, probably stemmed from their desire — a desire concomitant to that of their community and its leaders — to map the culture of the English and gain insight that could later be used to benefit their people. The English, too, desired the same. Cynthia Zandt argues that Europeans and Native Americans “continuously mapped one another as they pursued intercultural alliances” with one another during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^{189}\) Although the idea of mapping typically conjured images of ink, cartographers, and compasses pointing north as information permanently etched on parchment or paper, such concrete representations of maps tended to favor Europeans as the sole arbiters of the diffusion of knowledge. It was true that Europeans literally mapped the people they encountered as an “ethnographic enterprise,” but Indians also mapped their world and the people living in it. Zandt went onto explain that “almost no Indian nation had a word for “map” before European contact, [but] the evidence makes it clear that mapping was a significant cultural practice for native peoples.”\(^{190}\)

Mapping, in and of itself, does not explain its importance in both European and Indian cultures. In Indian cultures, according to Zandt, mapping “regularly charted their relationships with other nations.” Instead of geographic space, Indian maps were by and large instruments of

\(^{188}\) Smith and Smith, *Jamestown*, 118-119.


\(^{190}\) Ibid.
“social and political” relationships, evidenced in wampum, oral traditions, and in one specific example from the region, Powhatan’s mantle. Many Indian communities mapped the underworld along with their cosmological traditions. Mapping was a way of reinforcing cultural ideals that bound the community together. It was not specifically a tool of commodification, but one of communal cohesion. Mapping, to Algonquian people, entailed an entire system maintained through inter-dependence and derived in the social landscape. Their “native cosmology” was intertwined with their environment, meaning, their community could only exist if the right people — the werowances, acted rightly for the community — the Real People, who, altogether, acted rightly to the space they depended on for life.191

European maps, on the other hand, since late in the fifteenth century, were primarily instruments used for military power. Peter Barber relates in Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps that the Golden Age of English map making began in 1520 as a response to Machiavelli’s Arte della Guerra and Castiglione’s Il Cortegiano, “both of which laid some emphasis on the necessity for maps in defense and warfare…” Barber cogently argues that just a century earlier, maps in England were virtually nonexistent, but by the 1530s, maps were regularly used to extend “authority [so that] control throughout the land could be achieved.” A decade later, cartographers and engineers worked as spies on behalf of the monarchy, while the first “maps of colonization” for the purposed settlement within the Pale of Calais was commissioned by Henry VIII. Meanwhile, the Spanish sent their own cartographers into England to spy on their neighbors to the north, which forced English leaders to realize that “if maps in the right hands could be an aid to conquest and defense, in the wrong hands they could facilitate invasion and defeat.” In 1546, French cartographers “attached to [an] English team that negotiated” the boundaries of Boulogne, produced maps with purposefully distorted boundary lines. The

191 Ibid.
“mistake” would have defrauded the English of land in their own territory had Henry VIII’s advisers not caught the intentional discrepancies of the French. For the English monarchy, it was the first time a map — a two dimensional abstraction, was used to intentionally confiscate three dimensional space. 192 It was an important lesson in the power that cartographers wielded, one that would be used time and again in the New World.

William Boelhower elaborates on the power of maps to transform Indian lands in North America and wrote in “Inventing America,” that “without the map, there could have been no new world and no new settlement.” He went on to suggest that “the map as a minimal and maximal cultural sign is the ideal text for studying the way Indian land was transformed into EuroAmerican territory…” because in the context of “inventing America… [it was] not so much the discovery of the new continent that matters as it is the way it is seen.” And the way the English first saw the New World was on maps, which was “not so much as a representation of space but as a space of representation.” This meant that “the centre of the map is not geography… but the eye of the cartographer” — a mix of “political muscle [and] military potential.”193 Similarly, A. Sarah Bendall underscores the power of map making as a tool for reinforcing “patterns of control in Europe” and abroad. She avers that the first people in England to own globes were the landowning classes, and the purpose of globes was to show their power over the world. Bendall contends that it was during the middle of the sixteenth century that “silences on maps” — purposeful omissions, started appearing as negative demonstrations of an entirely new kind of mapping power. Landlords struggling with the laboring classes frequently omitted “the hovels of landless labourers” from property maps, which may explain why the first

colonial maps showed few indigenous people living in an otherwise empty “desert” or “wilderness.”\textsuperscript{194} Lastly, Jess Edwards surmises in \textit{Writing, Geometry and Space} that in regards to negative spaces,

As long as it has been possible to speak of a general ideology or ‘discourse’ of American colonization, a theory of property and value based on the ‘improvement’ of ‘waste’ land has been its best-known characteristic. Colonial representations of America are notorious amongst historians for their tendency to evacuate their subject: to deem it empty of significant habitation, or at least legitimate use, and thereby open for appropriation.\textsuperscript{195}

The map was so integral to European colonial plans, Gallivan and Sandra Scham argue, “When English colonists showed up in the New World, their view was that the ‘first thing you do is produce a map.’”\textsuperscript{196} Thomas Hariot and John White were the first Englishmen to map Roanoke and what would become North Carolina.\textsuperscript{197} Together, they produced numerous maps, but only a few remain due to the indiscretion of Drake’s men, who dumped them overboard in 1586 — there will be more on this later. Suffice it to say, it may be unfair to extensively critique White’s two maps and Hariot’s one map, since the others may have offered more detailed information concerning the Algonquians and the territories they controlled.

\textsuperscript{196} Sandra Scham, “A Native Take on Jamestown,” \textit{Archaeology} 59, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 24–29. Scham analyzes the arguments pertaining to the first origins of English colonialism in North America and quotes Gallivan to express the importance the English placed on maps vis-à-vis early colonialism.
\textsuperscript{197} Hariot’s maps were lost when Drake’s men threw them overboard on June 16, 1586. The sailors were in a hurry to evacuate Roanoke Island after experiencing an unusually strong hurricane. As winds increased after a lull in the storm, most of Ralph Lane’s journals were cast into the ocean, as were the majority of Whites and Hariot’s meticulous records of their extensive examinations of the New World. There is more on this later in the chapter. See “Ralph Lane’s Discourse on the First Colony,” in \textit{Roanoke Voyages}, Quinn, 268-269. See also Milton, \textit{Big Chief}, 125.
To begin, White’s earliest map of the Carolina and Virginia coastal lands was not included in Hariot’s *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia.* White painted over 70 watercolors of the Algonquians and the lands they lived on, but he gave the majority of those away to wealthy patrons upon his return to England. Those watercolors, along with his initial map of Virginia, eventually made their way into the British Museum. The entire collection was not published until the twentieth century.¹⁹⁸ This map showed four English ships sailing along the coast, accompanied by three ships anchored south-west of Wococon. The map extended from the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay to south of the modern day Cape Lookout. White drew 11 Algonquian canoes manned by a number of Indians, and showed three Indians north of Albermarle Sound, “one north-west off Roanoke Island, one near 'Aquascogoc', one near 'Secotan' and five more in the mouth of the Neuse

River.”199 He labeled the Indian nations living along the coast and marked the villages with a red dot. What stands out the most, because of the vibrant red ochre he used in detailing it, was the English royal coat of arms. Unlike the second De Bry/White map of Virginia, which Hariot published in his *Briefe and True Report*, it was not a speculative map showcasing the regions commodities; therefore, the land was virtually featureless, as if “Virginia” was one gigantic negative space the English could envelope.

According to Ken MacMillan, in “Sovereignty ‘More Plainly Described,’” the featureless areas cartographers commonly drew on English frontier maps was no accident. During the first half-century of English colonial settlement, he avers, geographical accuracy took a backseat to “expressing sovereignty in overseas territories.” Printed maps of newfound lands, MacMillan continues, “were usually optimistic, speculative, and unrepresentative and could be used as propaganda without compromising secret knowledge.” This was why under represented spaces were also stamped with symbols — like White’s use of the English royal coat of arms; taken together, maps contained a number of rhetorical devices that demonstrated English sovereignty, perpetual crown authority, and complete territorial possession and effective control, all of which were important assertions according to the jus gentium. Cartographers made a claim to sovereignty that was much stronger than could be made through mundane or ceremonial acts of possession, or in English-language descriptions of the territory.200

White’s earlier map was not speculative in that he did not intend for the viewers to use it to locate ubiquitous American commodities; instead, it was a document to express English sovereignty over the Carolina and Virginia coastal lands. White’s second map was speculative in nature. In truth, he was not ultimately responsible for its creation. Theordore de Bry, a Dutch

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engraver, reprinted Hariot’s Report in 1590 with the support of the Hakluyt Society.201 De Bry transformed White’s watercolor rendering of Virginia into a speculative map. The De Bry/White map showed an elaborately “decorated cartouche, on the top of which rests a carefully drawn depiction of Walter Raleigh’s coat of arms.” Within the oval that surrounds the coat of arms is a statement proclaiming Queen Elizabeth I’s “royal authority” and “lawful rule.”202

De Bry labeled 20 Algonquian nations living on the land the English renamed “Virginia.” He noted the most significant waterways in the region and dotted the landscape with trees on what appeared to be otherwise arable land — instead of the sandy and clay soiled woodlands

201 Ibid.
covered in densely packed forests and swamplands. He also included “Other symbols and images [that spoke] to the control (the ‘power’) that the English have established over the environment and peoples.” MacMillan further argues that perhaps most pointedly,

The ocean is choppy and turbulent, contains huge sea creatures, and White's seven ships have become eight much more prominent ones, four of which are flying the English ensign. This is a statement of English prescriptive use of the region—of the bustling commercial, and perhaps military, activities undertaken by the English in America. On the mainland, the names of native tribes and their geographical location are written in large block letters. Much larger still is the word “Virginia,” which runs across the top portion of the image and gives the impression of English authority over everything depicted on the map. Finally, de Bry has decorated the vacant and unknown spaces on the land by arbitrarily placing trees and rivers, speculating about the lay of rivers that were not shown on White's map, drawing pictures of Indian men and women, and adding, at the top center of the map, a mountain range that is not part of the North Carolina landscape.

De Bry reprinted Thomas Hariot’s map of Virginia as well, and although the Dutch engraver had transformed White’s initial map to encourage speculation, Hariot specifically created a speculative map to underpin his *Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia*, which, contrary to its title, was neither entirely brief nor true. The De Bry/Hariot map offered extra details, however, which went beyond the scope of speculative purposes. One the one hand, Hariot hoped to showcase the commodities of the “wilderness” to potential investors, but on the other, he purposefully added several ships wrecked off the coast, when in fact only the *Tiger* had gone down in the turbulent, Atlantic waters. Cartographers, engravers, scientists, and artists alike added such obstacles for myriad reasons; however, in this case, Hariot hoped to highlight the dangerously shallow waters that could not only hinder English ships, but would hopefully deter the Spanish from attacking the English colony when they eventually came across a copy of his *Report*.

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204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
The De Bry/Hariot map not only included labels of the two largest nations in the area — the Secotans and the Weapemeocs — Hariot specifically showed three Algonquian villages belonging to the Dasamonquepeucs, the Pasquenokes, and the Roanoacs, all located in close proximity to each other. 206 Instead of empty spaces, he covered the land more extensively in trees and shrubs. He also included six indigenous fishing vessels occupied by 12 distinct Indians, all of whom actively fished the waters surrounding their villages. Once again, De Bry added a giant sea monster in the waters directly off the coast to reinforce the region’s exotic and “wild” appeal, which was commercially ripe for fishing. 207

Similar to his map, Hariot detailed an extensive list of the “marchantable goods” in his *Briefe and True Report*. He described the North Carolinian and Virginian coastal lands as an Eden-like place filled with munificent items, like some kind of anachronistic *Sears Wishbook* — the mail order catalogue that came out during the Christmas holidays several centuries later. The full title of Hariot’s report was a paragraph long and included “Commodities There Found and to be Raysed, as Well Marchantable.”\(^{208}\) His *Report*, like many produced in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, marketed the hopeful English colonial lands of Virginia to potential investors back home.\(^{209}\) It was a work of propaganda meant to allay and assuage the fears of those who had already invested, but may have heard the negative rumors or read the derogatory reports concerning the American coastal lands of Virginia. Hariot posited that the rumors leveled against the colony stemmed from ignorant men who most likely overlooked the bounty of the region because they only yearned for gold and silver and taking care to “pamper their bellies,” as they were not adventurers but of a weak stock accustomed to “dainte food” and “soft beds.”\(^{210}\)

Hariot extolled the value of the “marchantable” commodities and exaggerated their worth to lure investors or adventurers into either purchasing stock or returning to the Virginia coastland in order to appropriate the aforementioned goods and enlarge the English marketplace. His list of commodities was exhaustive and spanned from “grass silk,” to a variety of trees, to an assortment of wild animals good for eating, which included but was not limited to: “Silke Grasse,” described as “good silke” that grew two and a half feet high. “Worme Silke,” described

\(^{209}\) See Scham, “A Native Take on Jamestown,” 7-8. Scham references Noel Hume, who argues that the genesis of English North America began with Thomas Hariot’s report of the land of Virginia. The report was wildly successful; “Hariot’s vivid images of the natural treasures to be found in the New World convinced his audience that the land was ripe for colonization.”
as “fayre and great” and “as bigge as our ordinary walnuttes.” “Flaxe and Hempe,” its quality “as
good as ours.” “Allum, White Copresse, Nitrum and Alumen Plumeum,” which apparently grew
in a rich “veine of earth along the sea coast for the space of fourtie or fiftie miles.” “Wapeih… a
kind of earth” used for its salubrious effects to “cure sores.” “Pitch, Tarre, Pozen and
Turpentine,” harvested from trees. Roanoke Island alone boasted “fifteene miles” of the groves
necessary for producing what English ships needed for regular maintenance. “Sassafras,” used
for its “rare vertures in phisick for the cure of many diseases.” “Cedar… fine timber” to be used
in the making of “nests of chests… fine bedsteads, tables, deskes, lutes, virginalles & many
things else… to make vp fraite with other principal commodities will yeeld profite.” “Wine,”
described as “lushious sweet” and if husbanded correctly, could become a “principall
commoditie of wines” for those interested in undertaking the necessary risks involved. “Oyle,”
specifically “walnutte oyle” and that derived from “Oke akornes.” “Furres,” as otters were
prolific “all along the Sea coast [a] great store” of them. They would “yeelde good profite,”
especially as the countryside also contained “Marterne furres,” but were in shorter supply than
the bountiful otter. “Deare skinnes:” deer skin could be obtained in the “thousands” if the
English traded “trifles” in exchange for the skins with the “saluage or inhabitant. “Ciuet cattes:”
wild “cats” killed by the inhabitants of the country. Rare but would bring “good profite.”
“Iron,” roughly one hundred and twenty miles away, along the waterside, the ground was “rockie
[and] founde to holde yron rickly.” “Copper: A hundred and fiftie miles into the maine in two
townes.”211

Hariot’s report was elaborate and he filled more than thirty pages with the American
goods. He went on to explain how the English discovered “small plates of copper” while
reconnoitering lands north of Roanoke. The Indians reported that the copper came from “farther

211 Ibid.
into the countrey.” “Silver:” it hung from the “eares of a Wiroans or chiefe Lorde[s].” The chief came upon the silver in an area that Hariot reckoned the copper was mined. “Pearle,” found in some of the muscles the English fed upon. An Englishman in their company gathered “together from among the saussiae people aboute fiue thousande… with equalitie in greatness, verie fayre and rare.” “Sweete Gummies,” combined with “many other Apothecary drugges.” “Dyes of diuers kindes:” the red and black dyes had “yet to be proued,” but the inhabitants used them to dye their hair, color their faces, “Mantles” and “Deare skinnes.” “Oader and Madder,” used by “English Diers.” Rare in England, but if planted in Virginia, the harvest could compare to that of the “Ilandes of the Asores.”

Hariot also reasoned that the climate would be conducive to growing sugar cane, lemons, oranges and “quinses” to be made into “sugers, suckets, and marmalades.” He offered to all potential investors that “many other commodities” might grow in the countryside. His point was clear: in less than a year, he chronicled only a portion of the land’s bounty and for those willing enough to venture to the New World, there would be a veritable cornucopia of marketable commodities that could be sold in the English marketplace.

Citing David Quinn’s work from The Roanoke Voyages, David Murray drew attention to Hariot’s report and how it was a

‘propagandist tract to discourage adverse rumours about Raleigh’s Virginia, and to set out the facts that would encourage settlers to go there’ and [it] specifically prioritizes the possibilities of an abundance, ‘an overplus’, of commodities that could enrich European trade and exploitation.

Moreover, as April Hatfield reiterates in “Spanish Colonization Literature,” Strachey and Hariot’s detailed mapping of Virginia served as a meticulous boundary contract for the English

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212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Murray, Indian Giving, 75.
charter against Spanish claims in the area. Their exhaustively detailed records catalogued what
the English believed belonged to them. Hatfield avers, “Virginia Company officials and English
Virginians understood their colonization project within an American context, for which the
Spanish provided the most relevant model — the appropriation and transformation of indigenous
political and economic structures to serve the process of colonization.”

The European reports, which contained maps, lists of goods, and recorded the New
World’s potential, were quite literally tools of transmogrification. The mapped world was
possibly the future domain of the European, mercantile marketplace, or a space for religious
conversion and domination. At the time, European mapping drew the lines on the economic and
religious spheres that would become the battleground for those involved in colonial ventures.
Zandt points out that when the English came to colonize the Chesapeake Bay thirty years later,
John Smith’s most famous work was his book, *A Map of Virginia*, which contained one actual
map but more than a hundred pages of text that effectively mapped “a Description of the
Covntrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion” of the Virginian Algonquians.
Investors back in England could peruse the pages of the Virginia map, examining the space
packed with goods to be transformed and then stocked onto an English shelf.

In his *Report*, Hariot imagined the transformation of the Algonquians as docile, English
subjects. His goal was to convince English investors that the ever rising costs of financing a
military force to subdue the Indians would be negligible or nonexistent. Hence it was no
accident he described the Algonquians as “a people poore,” who “esteeme our trifles before

\[215\] April Lee Hatfield, “Spanish Colonization Literature, Powhatan Geographies, and English Perceptions of Tsenacommacah/Virginia,” *Journal of Southern History* 69, no. 2 (2003): 245-246, 248. Hatfield went on to argue that English Virginian concepts of colonialism were rooted in Spanish models of appropriation to such an extent that the first efforts of the colonists involved an attempt to conquer “Tsenacommacah’s core” as a process of “appropriating Powhatan’s paramount chiefdom.” Edmund Morgan and Neal Salisbury, according to Hatfield, both note “that John Smith tried to imitate Hernán Cortés” when dealing with the Powhatans.

things of greater value.” Accordingly, the Indians were a naturally submissive people, and due to their “desire [of] our friendships & loue,” they have a “greater respect for pleasing and obeying vs… and the imbracing of true religion.” Although they warred among themselves, Hariot averred that in any war between the English and the Indians, the English “hauing aduantages against them [in] so many maner of waies,” the most probable outcome would result in the Indians “turning vp of their heeles against vs in running away,” because that was “their best defence.” In short, Hariot glossed the Algonquians as pliable for peaceful transformation. They would make good Christian subjects enamored with English trinkets and curiosities, much like children wandering about in an English marketplace willing to sell the milch cow for a bag of magic beans. And finally, the Indians would not put up much of a fight while English society reduced them to converted servants or workers.

The truth, of course, was much more complicated than Hariot wanted his readers to believe. While Hariot prepared to return to the Virginian coastal lands for a second time, Wanchese and Chief Manteo began exploring the English world as ambassadors of the disparate, Algonquian Real People. By willingly traveling with the English, both must have initially hoped to make space for the Europeans in their alliance networks back home. However, as Wanchese and Chief Manteo absorbed English culture and everything it represented, they reacted by drawing divergent conclusions about Europeans and their Mantoac.

On the one hand, Oberg suggests that Manteo, the chief of a small nation aligned to the Roanoke, came to revere the English and their Mantoac inspired technology immediately upon meeting them on the Outer Banks of North Carolina. In other words, Manteo’s nation had more to gain by embracing the English, especially, as Oberg offers, that there was good reason to believe the Croatoans paid tribute to the Roanokes. Wanchese, on the other hand, was a warrior

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who, like most Algonquian men, hoped his adventure or experience would raise his social standing through the knowledge he gained of the Strangers.\textsuperscript{218} At some point, Wanchese gained the information he needed to assess the English and instead of embracing them and their instruments of power, he grew despondent and withdrew from the English. Oberg postulates that the everyday violence of English society may have been one of the reasons that caused Wanchese to withdraw from his hosts.\textsuperscript{219} Thus he posits that Wanchese, in all likelihood, personally witnessed “the carting and whipping of criminals… the spiked heads of malefactors executed for crimes against the state” as he made his way around the streets of London. Over time, he continues, Wanchese came to see how easily English Mantoac could be turned against him and his people.\textsuperscript{220}

Milton’s assessment was slightly different; he speculates that Wanchese quickly came to see himself as a captive and not an honored guest.\textsuperscript{221} Neither explanation, however, accounts for Manteo’s antithetical view while seemingly experiencing the same English society. What seems more probable was that Wanchese, an inhabitant of Roanoke, understood that he and his people had less to gain from an alliance with those who hoped to colonize the island. Whereas the Croatoans might gain power from an English alliance, Wanchese appeared to comprehend that the European colonists meant to reduce Roanoke autonomy.

In the spring of 1585, Wanchese witnessed, for the first time, the incredible size of the outfitted fleet that Raleigh intended to send to Roanoke. Unlike the reconnaissance mission of

\textsuperscript{218}See Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas’s People}, 11-15. Rountree suggests that every Algonquian man, aside from the priests and those born into political power, gained honor through courageous acts on the battlefield “against foreigners.” Warriors also increased their social standing by going on adventures and returning with knowledge that set them apart from their peers. \textit{Manitou} permeated such knowledge, because it was used to undermine an enemy during war, or it might provide the warrior with access to highly sought prestigious items.


\textsuperscript{220}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{221}Milton, \textit{Big Chief}, 61.
two small barks and a handful of men, now there were seven ships and 600 men, over half of whom were “harqubusiers, soldiers, archers with longbows, and swordsmen.” Surely the English planned to remain in the Algonquian world, and Wanchese must have suspected the worst; with the amount of weapons and men returning to the Americas, there was little doubt that conflict between the two people was inevitable.\textsuperscript{222} No record exists of Wanchese’s thoughts at the time, but to express his disapproval of the Europeans, after the first month, he refused to learn any more English. His simple act revoked the space the English meant to occupy among his people. The communal aspect of integrating the European world into Roanoke space evidently made no sense to him. He made up his mind and concluded no charted relationship with the Europeans would benefit the Roanoke community. Instead of social and political relationships bound in interdependence and reciprocity, he must have reasoned that any alliance with the English was untenable, because he did little to further the economic or social interests of the Roanoke while in England. His silent defiance of refusing to act as an interpreter may have been Wanchese’s way of limiting English influence in the New World.

Nine months passed and Raleigh readied his fleet for North America. Having thoroughly read Barlowe’s reports on the Outer Banks, he decided to move forward on what was initially a tentative plan to build a privateering outpost on Roanoke Island. It appeared to be a good location in proximity to the Caribbean and due to the shallow waters between the mainland and the Outer Banks, defending it against the Spanish would be that much easier. The English and the two Algonquian ambassadors departed from Plymouth for the Americas on April 9, 1585.

The English made incredible time and the \textit{Tiger}, commanded by Raleigh’s cousin, Sir Richard Grenville, reached the Caribbean in just 21 days. After resupplying their ships in Puerto Rico and Hispaniola, the colonists arrived on the Outer Banks and made Roanoke Island the

\textsuperscript{222} Oberg, \textit{Head in Edward}, 72-74.
location of what he hoped would be England’s first permanent settlement. With Raleigh, on seven ships under the command of Sir Grenville and Master Ralph Lane, were “500 or 600 men,” as well as Chief Manteo and Wanchese.223

The world Amadas and Barlowe wrote of just a year earlier had already changed. During that time, English records indicate that astral signs in the heavens predicted catastrophe for both them and the Algonquians they hoped to settle among. John Aubrey, writing about Hariot, purported how the scientist “predicted seaven” comets that year and witnessed nine of them. To Aubrey, it was all “very strange: excogitent astronomi;” to most of the English, the comets were an unwelcome sign of portentous events yet to come.224 Milton attests to the “doom and gloom” prophecies of the day, explaining how “quacks and soothsayers” abounded due to the planets showing “malevolent conjunctions… and the moon [which] revealed disturbing signs.” Worse still, there was to be an eclipse on April 19, no doubt a solemn warning of “impending disaster.”225 Thomas Porter, a supposed expert in reading heavenly auguries, dutifully warned, “Yf any man hat many journeys to take by land or by water, let hym have an eye rounde about hym, for foce is likely to exceede in all places, and violence already shaketh its head and frowneth upon travaylers.” He went so far as to properly frame his dire forecasts by adding, “warinesse and courage are the best spelles against such sprites and goblins.” Goblins or no, the astronomer, Euan Lloyd, was more concerned for the weather that year, lamenting “many tempests, fogges and mysts at the sea; also many stormes, muche foule weather and shipwracke by occasion thereof.”226

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223 Milton, Big Chief, 93. According to Milton, Manteo warned Grenville that although food was relatively easy to come by in the autumn, there was a shortage of food every year during the winter. He advised resupplying in the Caribbean, as it was imperative for survival.
224 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 380, 388.
225 Milton, Big Chief, 74-75.
226 Ibid.
Although Raleigh dismissed these fearful omens, the sailors and impressed seamen who followed him, did not. According to Hariot, the Indians on the other side of the Atlantic also believed the “signs” in the skies pointed toward soon coming distress. The “peculiar darkening of the western sky” that Raleigh’s men witnessed ten days after leaving Plymouth was a partial eclipse of the sun, but a couple of thousand miles west, along the coast of Virginia, the eclipse was total. Hariot, clearly biased, argued that some of the Indians believed the signs to be the speciall worke of God for our sakes, as wee our selues haue cause in some sorte to thinke no lesse, whatsoeuer some doe or maie imagine to the contrarie, specially some Astrolgers knowing of the Eclipse of the Sunne which wee saw the same yeere before in our voyage thytherward, which vnto them appeared very terrible. And also of a Comet which beganne to appeare but a few daies before the beginning of the said sickenesse. But to exclude them from being the speciall an accident, there are farther reasons then I thinke fit at this present to bee alleadged.\footnote{Hariot, \textit{Briefe and True Report}, 29.}

The Indian “astrologers” apparently discerned something “terrible,” especially as “sicknesse” trailed behind the comet, which left many of the Algonquians fighting for their lives.

Having reached the Virginian coast, food scarcity became an immediate problem for the English, which adversely affected the relationship between the English and the inhabitants of Roanoke. According to the author of the \textit{Tiger} journal, Richard Hakluyt recorded how the English lost their “victuals” in \textit{The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation}: “Wee weighed anker to bring the \textit{Tiger} into the harbor, where through the vunskilfulnesse of the Master whose name was Fernando, the Admirall stroke on ground, and sunke.”\footnote{Quinn, \textit{Roanoke Voyages}, 164.} Lane wrote, “we were all in extreme hasarde of being casteawaye.”\footnote{Richard Hakluyt, \textit{The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Vol. 13}, (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1904), 298. See also Milton, \textit{Big Chief}, 97.} The same shallow waters meant to protect the English from the Spanish, forced the \textit{Tiger} “harde to ye shoare” and the result was that “the saltwater came so aboundantlie into [the ship] that the most
part of his corne, salt, meale, rice, bisket and other provisions, that he should have left with them that remained behind him in the countrie, was spoiled.”

With victuals suddenly low, “Master Arundell, Stukeley, and diuers other Gentlemen… and John White… passed ouer the water from Wocokon to the maine land victualled for eight days.” The party crossed over the sound into the territory of the Algonquian speaking communities, hunted, gathered whatever they could find that was edible and traded beads and copper for foodstuffs. While exploring the countryside, the people of Pomeioc met with them and friendly relationships between the two groups were temporarily established. The official record showed that they “were well entertained there of the Sauages.” The English left the Pomeioc village the same day and tried to instigate trade with Indians from a settlement called Aquascogok, but the men of the area showed no interest in meeting the strangers.

Upon returning to Wocokon, however, Grenville came to the conclusion that a silver cup was missing and the “savages” were to blame. Evidently the people who the English projected as living by the “golden rule,” no longer measured English goods by such arbitrary moral means as those foisted upon them. Grenville dispatched Amadas to Aquascogok and demanded the “stolen” item back, and in accordance to fulfilling his dire threats, “wee burnt, and spoyled their corne, and Towne, all the people being fled,” because the Indians denied the accusation. This initial overreaction to the presumed theft of a silver cup seems incredibly short sighted, especially as the English were running out of food. However, Zandt avers that in the minds of the “learned gentlemen” of the day, like those who led the English colonists — namely Ralph Lane and Richard Grenville — that when dealing with Indians, prior to 1610, most were “influenced by the assumption that successful alliances would be possible only when Europeans

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230 Milton, Big Chief, 89-95.
231 Hakluyt, Principal Voyage, Vol. 13, 298.
232 Ibid., 299.
retained a defensive or military advantage.” Sir George Peckham reinforced this ideology when Hakluyt recorded his earlier observations of what exactly was needed when dealing with Indians who transgressed the peace between the two groups:

Wherein if also [Indians] shal not be suffered in reasonable quietnesse to continue, there is no barre (as I iudge) but that in stoute assemblies the Christians may issue out, and by strong hand pursue their enemies, subdue them, take possession of their Townes, Cities, or Villages, and (in auoyding murtherous tyrannie) to vse the Law of Armes, as in like case among all Nations at this day is vsed.

The English used the “Law of Armes” in Ireland to the exclusion of all others, at times, and Grenville brought that Law to the Carolina coastal lands. In *The London Hanged*, Peter Linebaugh expresses the deep connection between *capital* — “the ‘substance’ or the ‘stock’ of life… and the accumulation of wealth founded on the produce of previous (or dead) labour” — and *capital*—the “discipline [that] denotes death [and] crimes punishable by death…” Linebaugh primarily examines the expansion of the death state in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth century — what he refers to as the English “Thanatocracy” — but his analysis may still offer insights into the violence Grenville perpetrated against the people of Aquascogok in the sixteenth century. It is not difficult to see the first resonances of the Thanatocracy in action if the silver cup replaced capital, and razing a village and setting fire to the very thing that sustains life, replaced a capital offence.

Linebaugh’s entire argument centers on the relationship between the English government and how it adjudicated criminal behavior by sanctioning state sponsored violence on the one hand, and on the other, increased the number of capital offences for monetary crimes as capitalism replaced mercantilism in England. English lawmakers justified the use of capital violence in crimes that ranged from murder to simple theft, in order to maintain the moral good

of society. In other words, English lawmakers believed only the threat of death or death itself could curtail the iniquitous ambitions of those who transgressed the law, and only when the adjudicators fully carried out the full extent of the law, could justice prevail to restore English order.\textsuperscript{236} Ultimately, Linebaugh suggests, as the English exchanged a system of barter for one based in accumulation and capital, state sanctioned violence committed against the lowest social orders increased exponentially.\textsuperscript{237}

It is important to note, however, that despite the preexisting cultural beliefs the English held toward “savages,” even if they were deemed criminals by the colonists, most colonial planners in England would have roundly condemned Grenville’s attack on the village.\textsuperscript{238} The contradictions of “peaceful cohabitation” and the ease by which violence was a first resort of the English, emerged early and often in the New World.

On August 25, Grenville disembarked for England with the hope of returning the following year with adequate foodstuffs to ensure the survival of the new colony. One hundred and seven men remained behind on Roanoke to build an outpost on the island and due to the privateering nature of the expedition, most were soldiers, including their new governor, Ralph Lane, who was a veteran of the Irish wars. Others were learned gentlemen who came for gold and riches. Once it became apparent no riches were to be found on the sandy island of Roanoke, Hariot complained that the men “were never out of the iland where wee were seated... [and they] had little or no care of any other thing but to pamper their bellies.”\textsuperscript{239} Agricultural work was not their forte. The men quickly exhausted the resources of the once friendly Roanokes by

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 74-111.
\textsuperscript{238} Hakluyt, \textit{Principal Voyages}, Vol. 2, 318.
\textsuperscript{239} Milton, \textit{Big Chief}, 114.
attempting to extract food and concessions from them. They became desperate and acted as “wylde men… whose unrulynes ys suche as not to gyve leasure to ye goovernour to bee almost at eny time from them.”

Lane, ever the military man, did not put up with those who were full of “misdemeanor and ill-dealing in the countrey.” Those deemed worthy of receiving punishment, got it, and according to Milton, it was likely that “at least one unruly soldier was hanged, and his rotting corpse left dangling from a tree as a grim warning to the others.” The only way to maintain order was to reduce the colony to a military rule, replete with its harsh penalties for those who constantly sought to rebel against any kind of authority or rule of law.

The colonists suffered through the winter and food scarcity was always on their minds, which probably contributed to Governor Lane’s suspicions that “the savages” meant to starve his company out by denying them food. He complained they narrowly escaped starvation and worried a confederacy of “savages” was aligning against the English. Lane claimed Menatonon—a Croatoan Chief, shared vital information with him that exposed a plot by the Choanists and Mangoaks, “procured by Pemisapan himselfe,” to destroy the English.

Initially known as Wingina by his own people, the Algonquian chief of Albemarle and Pamlico Sound — who later called himself Pemisapan when his attitude toward the English became antagonistic — played an important part in the days leading up to the bloody altercation between the two groups. Wingina governed from Dasamonquepeuc, located directly across the sound from Roanoke Island. Described as an “overlord, [he] ruled Roanoke itself through his brother, the werowance Grangamieo.” It was Grangameo who hosted Barlowe and Amadas when they reconnoitered the island a year earlier. As previously noted, the initial interaction

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240 Smith and Smith, *Jamestown*, 120.
241 Milton, *Big Chief*, 113. See also Quinn, *Roanoke Voyages*, 323. Hariot took pride in “roughing” it outdoors. He looked down on the other adventurers and gentlemen who he saw as lazy and greedy.
242 Ibid., 115.
between the two groups was peaceful. So peaceful, in fact, that after Wingina finally met with Lane and other English leaders, he told his people to “plant crops and set fish weirs for the English in return for their trade goods.” Hariot truly believed that the example of the Algonquian Indians proved the trope that they had come to “honour, obey, feare, and love” the English colonizers. By springtime, however, everything had changed. Wingina, as the “overlord” and “great” chief over Roanoke, recognized the threat the English posed to his people and implemented a strategy to either drive them from the island, or eradicate them altogether.244

The threat the English posed went beyond mere violence and the food pressures they created by colonizing an island that could not adequately feed the indigenous population through the winter, let alone one hundred strangers into perpetuity. Along with a scarcity of resources, there was a “magical” or religious component involved in the breakdown of relations. Much has been written on the European trope whereby the Spanish and English exaggerated claims that the indigenous communities were so superstitious that they ignorantly believed the white foreigners to be gods with incredible power. Despite the trope, both Europeans and Indians of the time tended to give credence to supernatural or spiritual forces acting and operating in the physical world.

While the English were prone to fearing the deleterious effects of witchcraft and devil worship, it is probable that Chief Wingina’s distrust of the English partly stemmed from the diseases they carried, which contributed to a temporary notion that the Europeans had control over the powers of life and death. As a somewhat portentous augury for the Algonquians, the aforementioned full eclipse of the sun preceded the Europeans, followed by scores of deaths that came in the form of new diseases. Hariot asserted that some Indians believed that the English shot

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“inuisible bullets into them” from afar. Moreover, he contended, a few days before the English arrived, the aforementioned comet “beganne to appeare” in the night skies. Hariot concluded the sickness and disease that followed the astrological signs were not only fortuitous, but the “a maruelous accident” and a “woorke of God for our sakes.” Astral prognostications, the diseases that followed, and ultimately death, Hariot ecstatically intoned, made conversion to Christianity and the “imbracing of the trueth” easier, and it was these factors that he believed caused the Indians to “honour, obey, feare and love vs.”

Hariot no doubt exaggerated the Algonquians’ “feare and love” for the English, but Chief Wingina received many reports from up and down the coast that, from Hariot’s perspective, did not bode well for numerous Indian communities of the region: “Within a few dayes after our departure from everie such towne, the people began to die ver fast, and many in short space; in some townes about twentie; in some fortie, in some sistie, and in one sixe score, which — in truth — was very manie in respect of their numbers.” The “supernatural power” of the English was no doubt smallpox. Hariot added that “the disease was so strange that they neither knew what it was, nor how to cure it.” However, Wingina did not go so far as to think the English were gods; rather, he was “perswaded that it was the worke of our God through our meanes, and that wee — by Him — might kil and slaie whom wee woulde without weapons, and not come neere them.”

Wingina’s interest in the God of the English was piqued due to the disease that swept through his communities. He frequently joined the English in “prayer time,” and sent for them to pray for him on two separate occasions when he feared sickness would take his life. Moreover, Hariot recorded an incident that followed a long line of “amusing anecdotes” concerning the magical technology trope that Columbus first made note of in the New World when the Taíno

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246 Ibid.
examined European gifts, which continued well into the twentieth century. This trope included the English projecting “magic” onto any prestigious item Indians showed enthusiasm for, which had the effect of exaggerating European superiority while simultaneously diminishing the Indian as an infantile other. This particular anecdote occurred when Hariot, holding his bible, translated a passage into Algonquian, which he reported, caused considerable confusion among them. Rather than attribute their confusion to a Stranger speaking their Algonquian language, he claimed they believed the book itself held the key to his linguistic prowess. They pulled the bible from Hariot’s hands, “glad to touch it, to embrace it, to kisse it, to holde it to their brestes and heades.” The chiefs began to “stroke over all their bodie with it [and] to shew their hungrie desire of that knowledge which was spoken of.”

It is possible that the Algonquians viewed the bible as having Mantoac that could be used to reaffirm relations of power with those they aligned with, but it is equally probable that the entire ordeal was a bit of English myth making that further perpetrated the English stereotype of the “noble savage” that was gaining traction in Europe at the time.

Whether or not the Algonquians actually feared and loved the Europeans and their God, within several months, the tides of fortune turned against the English as Wingina’s interest in the Christian God waned. It did not take long for him to overcome his initial concerns and continue with his earlier assessment that the English needed to be driven from the island. As the days grew longer, Hariot observed how the spirits of the English dampened with the spring rains. Foodstuffs were incredibly low and Lane noticed that Wingina was losing patience with the ever hungry colonists and their incessant demand for food. During the winter months, Hariot explored as far north as the Chesapeake Bay, but because most of those records were later lost, whatever occurred at that time is unknown. Milton contends that regardless of the lack of

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247 Ibid., 118.
official reports, Wingina’s nation may have been “at the receiving end of a number of violent clashes with the English and that these had caused a dangerous rift between the two communities.”  

Quinn calls attention to the same problem, remarking how “Lane reacted with violence to [Wingina’s] people on every provocation, however slight.”  

Both were referencing Hariot, who, upon his return, wrote that “some of our companie towards the ende of the yeare, shewed themselfes too fierce, in slaying some of the people, in some towns, upon causes that on our part, might easily enough have bene borne withal.”

Hariot admitted that if the English had “borne withal,” that is, if they had not so quickly resorted to violence and showed some restraint, most of the interactions that resulted in conflict could have been avoided. Hariot felt some level of ambivalence when he recalled the fierce actions of his countrymen in America. He framed his brief description with the backdrop of Christian “love and fear” that he frequently projected upon the Algonquians. Melanie Perreault examines Christian love and fear during this time and as she suggests, the English of the early seventeenth century did not parse “love” and “fear” as antithetical, as modern readers today might do. Fear was the precursor to “promoting love.” To the English, fear reinforced social norms and helped maintain the hierarchy. The English claimed to have a “unique and superior identity in the Atlantic world,” and part of that identity rested in what they believed was their Protestant Christian principles tied to love and fear. Love was pacifist or New Testament, but fear was first needed, just as the Old Testament preceded the New. Perreault argues that the English practiced situational violence because of this understanding; therefore,

on occasion, [they] used physical force to assert themselves, but carefully distinguished justifiable acts of violence from those they considered to be illegitimate. All violence…

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248 Ibid., 122.
249 Quinn, Roanoke, 246.
was situational, and the context of any individual act of violence had to be considered before it could be properly evaluated.

As colonial schemes became a higher priority at that time, propagandists like Hariot needed to legitimate the violence that occurred, even when such violence was frowned upon by company officials. The easiest way was to do this was through class politics. In English society, “violence was considered ‘legitimate when used by superiors against inferiors.’” Since the Indians were “pagans,” they were automatically inferior and could be treated as a father treated or punished his child. Christian notions reduced the Indian to a dependent, and “male heads of the households had the right and even the obligation to punish their dependents.”

It was only acts of illegitimate violence that caused ambivalence among some of the English when they later recounted why they preemptively attacked the Algonquian Indians.

Lane reported little during this time, but whether or not winter clashes with Wingina occurred, and it was likely they did, the chief was becoming ever more weary of his neighbors. There were several reasons that may have contributed to the disintegrating relationship between the Real People and the Strangers: the destruction of a village over the supposed theft of a metal cup; the constant demand for foodstuffs; and the loss of lives from a mysterious disease that continued to plague the Indian communities. By the winter and spring of 1585 and 1586, respectively, Wingina’s attitude toward the English became permanently antagonistic. What had previously been a passive anger on Wingina’s part, transformed into the chief’s active desire to disentangle him and his people from the English. Wingina and other Algonquian speaking chiefs finished communicating with the English and concluded there was no space for them in their world. There would be no planting of Indian seeds for the English, as Lane claimed Wingina promised; there would be no more trading English goods for Indian foodstuffs; and other Indian

\[251\] Ibid.
communities were encouraged to take part in the English sanctions. Lane bitterly decried the English situation. He focused his ire on Wingina and blamed the chief for bringing ruin upon him and his men. He went so far as to bemoan the fact that “the King… with all his Sauages… haue left his ground in the Iland vnsowed.” Lane continued lamenting his intolerable condition, “For at that time wee had no weares for fishe, neither could our men skill of the making of them, neither had wee one grayne of corne for seede to put into the ground.”

In March, Wingina threatened Lane and his men with war. The chief, hoping to scare the English into leaving the island, boasted to Lane that he was gathering an army of warriors “to the number of 3,000 bowes.” Wingina exaggerated the amount of warriors at his disposal, but his boasts were not entirely empty. He was indeed building a coalition of Algonquian Indians — perhaps as many as 1,500, to deal with the English once and for all. To prove his threats, he gave Lane guides to lure the English to the location of his amassing army. Lane believed Wingina was partly bluffing about the size of his army, but he feared the worst. He responded by gathering his own small force — a phalanx of forty heavily armed troops — and marched directly to Chawanoac, where, as Quinn relates, “[Lane] found a great assembly in progress, with representatives of the Weapemeoc and Moratuc [nations], as well as the Iroquoian Mangoaks, conferring with Menatonon, the Chawanoac chief, about the project of allying with Wingina.”

Menatonon was not a warrior in his prime. Lane described the elderly chief as “a man impotent in his lims, but otherwise a Sauage, a very graue and wise man…” Apparently paralyzed from the waist down, Lane’s sudden presence in his village, accompanied by armed soldiers, surprised him and caught the other assembling chiefs off guard. Manteo acted as the translator, and after conversing with Menatonon, Lane learned that Menatonon planned to attack

252 Ibid., 276.
253 Ibid., 246-247.
254 Ibid., 259.
the English colony because Wingina “sent them continuall worde that our [the English] purpose was fully bent to destroy them.” Lane dismissed Wingina’s information as false and prized an apology from the chief. The apology may or may not have been sincere, as Lane handcuffed the old man and took him prisoner for the entirety of his stay in Chawanoac. He also took Menatonon’s son hostage and sent him back to Roanoke Island to be held by the English in case the chief changed his mind about going to war with the English. Surprisingly, Milton left this entire episode out of his very detailed description of Lane and his time among the Algonquian Indians. Milton suggests that Lane and Menatonon “sealed their newfound friendship with a chat around the campfire.” He neglected to mention that this “friendship” began when Lane entered Chawanoac with heavily armed soldiers in full combat regalia, followed by taking an invalid chief prisoner, followed by capturing the chief’s son and sending him away to live as a prisoner of the English more than one hundred miles away.

Having established “a friendship” over a period of two days, Lane learned many exciting things about the land he hoped with would eventually make the English rich. Menatonon was shrewd. He convinced Lane that further inland was a nation with a munificent supply of copper, a quantity so great that they “beautifie their houses with great plates” of it. There was also, in a “land Northeast to a certaine Kings countrey, whose Prouince lyeth vpon the Sea…” a king with a “great quantitie of Pearle… [and] his beds, and houses are garnished with them, and that hee hath such quantitie of them, that it is a wonder to see.” Menatonon elaborated further, baiting the English with stories of the remote land, full of pearls, storehouses of them, “white,

255 Milton, Big Chief, 122.
256 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 259.
257 Milton, Big Chief, 122. Milton never mentions the imprisonment of the chief or the kidnapping of his son. The omission is strange, especially as numerous other accounts of English violence against the Algonquian communities were so prevalent.
258 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 270.
great, and round.” The ears of the English must have burned in excitement as they heard about the town of “Chaunis Temoatan” and how there were ample supplies of “strange Minerall,” which they concluded was either copper or gold. In a fine bit of yarn spinning that would have tantalized any European trader, Menatonon ended his story by telling Lane that “the sayde king had traffike with white men that had clothes as we haue, for these white Pearle.”

Lane and his men took the bait and set off in search of the commodities precious to both the Indians and the English. His company crossed 160 miles of rugged land over the course of six days and quickly diminished their foodstuffs. By the end of the week, he feared he and his group would starve to death. The fear of starvation was compounded when the indigenous populations refused to trade or sell any goods to the English. “Having passed three dayes voyage up the river, we could not meete a man, nor finde a graine of corne in any of their townes.” Most of the Indians living along the riverbank fled deep into the forest, heeding the instructions of Wingina, who, unbeknownst to them, “sent messengers ahead of [the English] to warn the people of the Moratuc and Mangoak tribes that he meant them harm.”

Lane, anxious about the possibility of discovering minerals of great value and a storehouse of pearls on the one hand, while their foodstuffs diminished to sassafras leaves and bitter soups on the other, started to accuse his guides of subterfuge. It was an astute assumption based on the villages in question always being another twenty or thirty days to the north or west. He wrote as one who owned slaves, claiming the “savages” had betrayed him: “Whereupon considering with my selfe that wee had but two dayes victuall left… suspecting treason… [I am of the] opinion that we were betrayed by our owne Sauages.” The “savages” he wrote of were the guides sent with him by Menatonon to help his company find the mythical lands of copper,

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259 Ibid., 260, 268.
260 Ibid., 247.
gold, and pearls. And yet with only “two days victuals” left among the lot of them, Lane put the matter to a vote and the entire European group decided to continue up the river for another two more days. Their desire for evidence of commodities that might justify their presence in the Americas was slowly pushing them toward the deadly precipice of starvation. Finally, after suffering through a day of bad weather and a second day with nary a deep harbor, the English came to the conclusion it was time to return to Roanoke. They would do so empty handed.262

En route back to the island, Lane’s men noticed the light of campfires flickering in the distance and hoped to trade their English trinkets for Indian food. Some in the group thought they heard the Indians call out Manteo’s name around “three of the clocke” in the afternoon, and they took it as a good sign that the Indian’s intentions were friendly. Lane wrote, “In the evening, we heard certaine savages call as we thought, ‘Manteo,’ who was also at that time with mee in the boate.” The “welcoming” Indians sang a song for Lane and his men, but Manteo did not think their intentions were harmless. Startled by what he heard, Manteo “presently betooke him to his peece [weapon] and tolde mee that they ment to fight with vs.” Soon afterward, “there lighted a vollie of their arrows amongst them in the boat, but did no hurt.” Lane and the soldiers, “wearing their buff jerkins,” escaped unscathed.263 Several soldiers jumped ashore, chased after the Indians, but since it was late in the day, they decided to lodge for the night. Still starving, the following morning they killed their two bull mastiffs and mixed them with sassafras to make “dogs porridge.” The guard dogs kept the group alive, just barely, until they robbed fish weirs near a Weapemeoc village along the river. They arrived back in Roanoke, famished, the day

263 Ralph Lane, “Ralph Lane’s Discourse on the First Colony,” in *Roanoke Voyages*, Quinn, 268-269. See also Milton, *Big Chief*, 125.
before Easter. Milton notes Lane’s only joke in his entire journal. Being it “was upon Easter eve, which was fasted very trulie.”

Upon his return, Lane learned that Wingina had been busy spreading the rumor that he and his men were “part slayne and part starved.” Since the English had starved to death, Wingina explained to the “superstitious elders,” it proved the English were not “immortal spirits,” but ordinary men. They were of course ordinary men, but when Lane and his forty soldiers suddenly emerged from their expedition very much alive, if not half-starved, Wingina lost support from his expanding coalition of anti-English chieftains. Ensenor, Wingina’s father and a holy man who advised his son, supported the English and argued that they “being dead men, were able to doe them more hurt then now we coulde do being alive.” Furthermore, he contended the English “were the servants of God and… not subject to be destroyed by them.” Milton recounts how Wingina’s nation turned on him, “convinced the English were indeed reincarnated spirits.” They wished for no further antagonism with the English as they were “dead men returned into the worlde againe.”

Indian attitudes briefly changed in favor of the English immediately following Lane’s purported resurrection. Wingina agreed, however reluctantly, to supply the English colony with seeds and foodstuffs. Lane, fairly well satisfied with the turn of events, explained how Wingina’s attitude “thorowly change[d]… in [his] disposition toward vs.” An arrangement was reached: those Indians taking part in the confederacy that Ensenor, Wingina, and Menatonon built, would sew “a good quantitie of ground, so much as had bene sufficient, to haue fed our whole company… and that by the belly, for a whole yere.”

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The English planted crops and Lane believed the colony would be self-sufficient after the first harvest in two months. The governor wrote, “All our feare was of the two moneths betwixt, in which meane space, if the savages should not helpe us… we might well starve.” The two months he referred to was the time the English needed to survive until Grenville returned with supplies or until they gathered the first of three corn harvests that would help sustain them through a second winter. It was time they did not have. On April 20, Lane learned his strongest supporter, “the only frend to our nation,” was dead. Ensenor died unexpectedly. He most likely succumbed to smallpox or some other English disease. To make matters worse, a few days later, Wanchese cut off communication with the English and moved to the mainland. He had never particularly cared for the foreigners, but his departure coincided with renewed hostilities between Wingina’s Algonquian communities and the English colonizers.267

Without the old intermediaries maintaining the Indian peace, Wingina pursued his own plans to further isolate the English. Ensenor had only been dead a few days when Lane complained that “Pemisapan, as Osacan a Werowance, Tanaquiny and Wanchese most principally, were in hand againe to put their old practices in vse against vs.”268 The reason for the renewed hostilities, according to Lane, was because Wingina could no longer support the “dayly sending… for supply of victual.”269 In an alien world seemingly low on available foodstuffs, the reason Lane gave concerning the food pressures was certainly true to the English. For Wingina and those threatened by English violence and their penchant for dependence maintained at the end of sword, the reasons for the hostilities would have been manifold. The English were unwelcome invaders who meddled in local alliances — to the detriment of the chief who maintained reciprocal relations throughout the region, interjected themselves into the

267 Milton, Big Chief, 135.
268 Hakluyt, Principal Voyage, Vol. 13, 316.
269 Ibid.
political regimes of the indigenous communities, took the son of a chief hostage, and inadvertently brought disease and death with them everywhere they traveled.

Although the date was not recorded, sometime during the winter, Wingina’s brother, Granganimeo, passed away, and with his passing, Lane believed Wingina changed his name to Pemisapan, which “signaled a new policy of resistance to the English.” The policy of open resistance resumed immediately after Ensenor, Wingina’s father, died on April 20. Wingina and his people left the island, moved across the sound to Dasamonquepeuc and then further inland to “Addesmoceneo,” refused to trade with the English “for any copper” or “sell vs any victuals whatsoever,” and “ceased supplying the colony with fish and dried roots.” The chief also encouraged neighboring Indian communities to do the same by offering them copper and other spoils. Lane had no choice but to disband his colony and send groups of men to other places as Hakluyt recorded:

For the famine grew so extreme among vs, our weares failing vs of fish, that I was enforced to sende Captaine Stafford with 20. with him to Croatoan my Lord Admirals Iland to serue two turns in one, that is to say, to feede himselfe and his company, and also to keepe watch if any shipping came vpon the coast to warne vs of the same. I sent M. Pridiox with the pinnesse to Hatorask, and ten with him, with the Prouost Marshal to liue there, and also to wait for shipping: also I sent every weeke 16. or 20. of the rest of the company to the maine ouer against vs, to liue of Casada and oysters.

The English situation was precarious. Their base on Roanoke Island was now lightly guarded and Wingina knew it. Wingina went about strengthening his coalition with the “Moratuc,

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270 Bruggeman and Nash, “Wingina,” [accessed May 10, 214]. See also Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 265. Granganimeo was as integral to maintaining the peace between Wingina and the English colonists as the elderly sage, Ensenor. Granganimeo was Wingina’s respected brother, and he governed Roanoke as Wingina’s werowance. After he passed, Wingina no longer felt the need to act amicably toward the English.

271 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 248, 282.

272 Hakluyt, Principal Voyages, Vol. 13, 317. Hatorask and Otterasco were Cape Hatteras and Port Ferdinando, respectively. “Casada” was cassava, but is known worldwide as manioc, yucca, and tapioca.
Mangoak and Chesepiuc Indians against Lane… [in order] to attack and overwhelm the settlement.”

Meanwhile, the English still held Chief Menatonan’s son, Skyco, as their captive. Lane trusted the young cacique and allowed the boy to go back and forth to Dasamonquepeuc — to visit Wingina — in exchange for his promise to return to the English afterwards. On one such visit, Wingina shared the details of his plot with Skyco to attack the English colony. Skyco must have decided that it was too dangerous to return to Roanoke and he instead “ran away” from the English. Lane learned of Skyco’s escape and quickly recaptured the boy. Lane did not chronicle how he found him, but he wrote how “Skyco, the king Menatonon his sonne my prisoner, who hauing once attemted to run away, I laid him in the Bylboes [English leg irons], threatning to cut off his head, whome I remitted at Pemisapans request.” The threat of cutting off a young cacique’s head for running away was severe, to say the least, but in light of the incident that led to the razing of a village over a supposed stolen cup, it was not outside the realm of possibility. To kill a young cacique in such a dramatic fashion would have ended any hope of maintaining peace between the English and the Indians, and it would have undermined Lane’s ability to locate the commodities he needed to justify and fund the colonial endeavor. Lane’s actions were excessive, especially as the governor of the colony, but not outside of European reductive ways based in contradiction.

Wingina requested that Governor Lane not kill the boy, which saved Skyco’s life, but the boy was now back in the hands of the English, and he was not safe. “On the other side” of the sound, in Roanoke, Lane beat the boy for information, claiming, Skyco was “well vsed at my

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273 Ralph Lane, “Ralph Lane’s Discourse on the First Colony,” in Roanoke Voyages, Quinn, 283, 246. The final quote in the paragraph is from Quinn.
274 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 285.
275 Ibid.
hand.” To put it another way, Lane struck Skyco until his body was “well used,” and after “all my companie made much of [Skyco]… he flatly discovered all vnto me, which… reualed vnto me by one of Pemisapans owne men…” What exactly the entire company of Lane’s men did to Skyco was not recorded, but it had to have been severe. The boy broke due to the tortuous beatings and gave up Wingina’s plot against the English. Lane confirmed Wingina’s conspiracy with the testimony of another unnamed Indian, and he also noted in his journal that the unnamed Indian was killed the night before Lane’s preemptive attack. Evidently Wingina executed the unnamed Indian for treason, as Quinn suggests.276

Lane conferred with Menatonon and the Chaonists — most likely through delegates, and wrote how the elderly chief and others were “offended with Pemisapan and Weopomeiok” for the role they were playing against the English. Although it is not clear where Lane received the bulk of his insider information, whether it was from Skyco, Menatonan’s delegates, or the unnamed Indian who died the night before the attack, the governor learned Wingina planned to attack on June 10. Wingina and his warriors meant to beset the governor’s home “in the dead of night” to “put fire in the reedes,” with the intention of forcing Lane outside that “they would haue knocked out my braines.” According to the informant, Wingina hoped to burn down all the houses and the fort that guarded the makeshift town. The informant also confirmed Lane’s fears of an organized plan to not only remove foodstuffs from Roanoke in an effort to starve out the English, but to also steal and break all the cooking utensils and “weares” they could find in the English town prior to the attack. The English “weares” remained unmolested, but Lane decided not to take any chances, based on the hearsay of a witness, the confession of a tortured boy, and

276 Ibid., 285.
the confirmations of war he imagined from unmolested fishing “weares,” the governor organized England’s first preemptive strike against an indigenous population in Virginia.\textsuperscript{277}

Lane’s audience, reading of these “true reports” some years later, wanted to come to terms with not only the preemptive strike committed against the Algonquian Indians, but, in general, they wanted to comprehend the violence Lane and the men who followed him, regularly practiced against the Indians. This was not necessarily an audience reading of the violence for the first time. Many who read these “true reports” were potential investors who might pull their funding and decide that too much English effort went into permanent colonization. Lane’s retelling of the violence had to meet a finely constructed English narrative. Although Lane and his men would not go on trial, the Protestant Christian religion, along with English civility in an alien world, was being scrutinized, particularly as Protestants sought to differentiate themselves from discursive assumptions about the Spanish — those “Roman Catholic idolaters” who, according to the Black Legend, committed excessive and brutal attacks against the Indians in Mexico and Central and South America. What Lane and his men were about to do could come across as equally brutal to a genteel English reader. A common man — an Irish man no less, was about to decapitate the head of a chief, and any situation that led to a commoner killing Indian nobility, even if that chief was an “Indian heathen,” had to be carefully reconstructed; nothing short of English civilization and the Christian hierarchy that maintained it, was at stake.

The preemptive strike and the beheading of Wingina needed justification. Lane went about it by asserting that the “savages” were not just actively starving them out, but while on his expedition to the mainland, they blasphemed “Almightie God of heauen, and Iesus Christ whom wee serue and worship.” The nature of the blasphemy stemmed from Lane’s assertion that Wingina and his fellow Indians mocked the English and their god, “that our Lorde God was not

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{277} Hakluyt, \textit{Principal Voyage}, Vol. 13, 313-319.
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Blasphemy, however, did not entail the simple act of mocking. Blasphemy, by its nature, meant that Lane attributed a knowledge of the Christian God onto Wingina and his people; meaning, the Indians knew the truth and not only denied it, they mocked it. The Indians were more than pagans, as pagans might be brought to the truth; rather, they were beyond redemption because they had heard the gospel, joined in prayer and worship during church services, and openly disdained the English God who would save them. This simultaneously made Wingina “a traitor” and a devil and worthy of death, at least in Lane’s mind. In his own way, Lane — the soldier who killed Irish Catholics in Ireland — turned the Algonquians into Roman Catholic “heathens.” All these others easily fit into the English soldier’s construction of a treacherous and godless enemy worthy of the sword. The average English reader could identify the blasphemous other, which made it easier to ameliorate the Christian or civil prick of conscience that might obstruct plans for English colonization because savage Indians were occasionally decapitated or killed. Furthermore, in the eyes of the English, a commoner could get away with killing Wingina, because he was not truly a “King,” but a “heathen savage” undermining the English and their Christian God. From the Protestant Christian perspective, Wingina deserved to die.

Lane began planning his preemptive strike against Wingina and his army: “These mischieves being all instantly vpon me and my company to be put in execution, it stood mee in hand to study howe to prevent them, and also to saue all others.” Lane sent a message to Wingina that he was going to Croatoan because an English fleet of ships had just arrived. He was lying, but he hoped the ruse would buy him some time. Wingina responded by sending Weopomeioks and Mandoags to Roanoke with the message that a large assembly of Indians were going to meet on the island in eight days.

278 Ibid., 313-315.
Lane “resolved not to stay longer” and decided to instead visit Wingina the next day, all the while, he planned “to giue them in the Iland a camisado, and at the instant to seize vpon all the canoas about the Island, to keepe him from aduertisements.” The camisado did not go according to plan. One of Lane’s men, “the Master of the light horsemen,” came upon a canoe, overthrew it, “and cut off two Sauages heads.” The deed was not done in secret, as Lane complained, and, according to the governor, other “savages” discovered his intent because they, being naturally “villainous,” spied on the English both day and night. Lane lost the element of surprise, but sent word to Wingina to meet with him to “complaine vnto him of Osocon,” whom he held in a “hand-locke” as his prisoner. Wingina acquiesced, and Lane, followed by his heavily armed soldiers, entered the village and found himself “amidst seuen or eight of [Wingina’s] principall Werowances and followers.” While in their midst,

I gaue the watch-word agreed vpon, (which was, Christ our victory) and immediatly those his chiefe men and himselfe had by the mercy of God for our deliuerance, that which they had purposed for vs. The king himselfe being shot thorow by the Colonell with a pistoll, lying on the ground for dead, and I looking as watchfully for the sauing of Manteos friends, as others were busie that none of the rest should escape, suddenly he started vp, and ran away as though he had not bene touched, insomuch as he ouerran all the company, being by the way shot thwart the buttocks by mine Irish boy with my petronell.

In the end an Irish man seruing me, one Nugent, and the deputy prouost, vndertooke him; and following him in the woods, ouertooke him; and I in some doubt least we had lost both the king and my man by our owne negligence to haue beene intercepted by the Sauages, wee met him returning out of the woods with Pemisapans head in his hand.

Edward Nugent, the Irish man serving Lane, ended Wingina’s life, severed his head, and brought the evidence to Lane, who later stuck the head on a pike to warn any other potential enemies that this was how the English dealt with those who opposed them.

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279 Ibid., 318-319. A camisado was a night raid that involved hanging one’s shirt tails out so as not to mistake a friend for a foe, in order to prevent accidental friendly fire.

280 Ibid., 319-320.
A little over a week later, on June 10, Sir Francis Drake sailed into the area after one of the most successful and lucrative privateering ventures ever committed against the Spanish.

Drake’s pirating of Spanish towns, ports, and ships in the Caribbean has been well documented, and apart from one significant detail pertinent to Roanoke’s history, it would not need further examination here. Drake did not arrive off the Carolina coast with one ship, but with a fleet of 25 ships and 2,300 men, laden with confiscated booty, foodstuffs, and as many as 500 Caribbean African and Indian slaves. Pedro Fernández wrote to the Audiencia in Panama after the attacks on Santo Domingo, Cartagena, Hispaniola, and Saint Augustine, and described how

Captain Francis’s fleet appeared off the port of Cartagena at noon; and at sunset he occupied the harbor with 23 ships, not counting pinnaces. The enemy opened fire with his artillery and with increased fury attacked in close formation. Pell-mell [the English] entered the town and when the day began to break the enemy force of more than 500 men was in possession of the market square and more than 500 were fighting through the streets with the inhabitants of the place.

All the slaves were loosed from their irons and they, the captains and soldiers, have done more damage to the countryside than has the enemy, in stealing valuables which were buried. Some soldiers, especially Moors, deserted to the Englishman, as did the black slaves of the city, whom they find very useful.  

In Santo Domingo, the Audiencia wrote of similar experiences to the Crown in Spain:

They took with them the galley-slaves from the galley, whose irons had been removed that they might help us. Later they rose against us and did more looting than the English. Many negroes belonging to private persons (who are the labourers of this country) went with them of their own free will.

Finally, Pedro Sanchez, a seaman from Cartagena, lamented that Drake took

1200 men, seamen and soldiers, wretched people. Many of his men have died. He carried off the Moors from the galleys at Cartagena and at Santo Domingo, about 200, whom he promised to send to their own country, for they would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. He carried off 150 negroes and negresses from Santo Domingo and Cape Verde—more from Santo Domingo.

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283 See “Enclosure No. 2 [Pedro Sanchez, Summary of a Deposition Made at Havana],” Ibid., 212. Wright explains that Sanchez’s estimation of Drake taking 1,200 “wretched people” captive was an exaggeration. Quinn, in Roanoke
Don Luis de Guzman and Alonso de Tapia also recorded Drake’s attacks on “Cartagena and Turbaco,” respectively, and noted that there were “38 to 40 sails and 4000, or 5,000 fighting men” who attacked the Spanish. Guzman exaggerated the number of English ships and soldiers fighting, but he concurred with Fernández that “The galley-slaves were quickly unchained and, with the soldiers, landed and marched toward the bridge to its relief.” Guzman complained that with the help of the slaves, “the enemy [took] complete possession of the city and that none of our people remained inside it.” In Turbaco, Tapia concluded,

Most of the slaves and many of the convicts from the galleys went off with the English [as] did some of the negroes belonging to private owners. Although their masters were willing to ransom them the English would not give them up except when the slaves themselves desired to go.²⁸⁴

In the first aforementioned passages, Fernández referred specifically to the Moors, who were Portuguese and Turkish Muslims, as well as the black slaves forcibly taken to Cartagena from any one of the numerous slaving ports in Africa. Irene Wright, in Further English Voyages to Spanish America, writes that the Portuguese and Turkish Moors could not be held as slaves in England — the English were aligned with the Portuguese against the Spanish at the time, while the Turkish Muslims would be ransomed back to their families in Istanbul — so those who wished to return with Drake to Europe were allowed safe passage back to the Straits of Gibraltar, but the African and Indian slaves, as the Spanish records deduce, were destined for a new

²⁸⁴ See “Document No. 30 [Don Luis de Guzman and Alonso de Tapia to the Crown, Cartagena, June 1, 1586], Ibid., 153-159.
English settlement “already established in the region which they called Jacan [Ajacán — the Chesapeake Bay].”

Sadly, in *A Summary of the True Discourse of Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage*, Drake paid more attention to razing the Spanish towns in the Caribbean than providing details on what he planned to do with the slaves he freed. Although he mentioned one “negro boy” who waved a white flag to indicate that the Spanish intended to surrender to the English — “as is the Spaniards’ ordinary manner to doe,” he wrote, needling his enemies — the boy was merely a screen for Drake to further express Black Legend cruelty. Drake accepted the truce and sent the boy back to the Spaniards, only to watch as they “furiously struck the poor boy through the body,” to which, the boy died moments later. In sum, since Drake neglected to iterate what exactly he hoped to do with the former slaves aboard his ships, it was left to historians to deduce his motives based on his actions after he sailed north toward Havana.

To date, there is no consensus on the ratio of African to Indian slaves on Drake’s ships. In a report from Nicholas Clever to Nicholas Turner, dated May 26, 1586, Clever estimated that Drake rescued “no less than 1200 English, French, Flemings and Dutch” people from the galleys at Santo Domingo, and also took another “800 people of the country with him,” meaning two-thirds of the passengers from the Caribbean were either Indian or African, but these numbers were most likely exaggerated. Quinn surmises that “a substantial number... [were] South American Indians (about 300, including women), [and another] 100 [were] negro slaves” to be

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285 Wright, *Further English Voyages*, lxiv. See also “Document No. 35 [Pedro Sanchez, Deposition, Havana, June 26, 1586],” Ibid., 212. Pedro Sanchez wrote in his deposition that a witness “stated that the Englishman is carrying along with him many Moors from the galleys, to take them to his [their?] country...”


287 Nicholas Clever, “Nicholas Clever to Nicholas Turner, May 26, 1586,” in *Cal. S.P. Colonial, 1675-1676 and addenda 1574-1674*, (London), 28-29. Quinn notes that the “800 people of the country” was hyperbolic and nowhere near the correct number of Caribbean slaves. See *Roanoke Voyages*, 251.
“dispose[d] of as free labour for the Roanoke settlers.” However, the primary sources he used — from Further English Voyages — never specified between the exact number of Indian and African slaves. Furthermore, the Spanish records indicate that there were at least 150 “negroes and negresses from Santo Domingo,” traveling with Drake, which, if taken at face value, meant that nearly 40 percent of Quinn’s estimated 400 freed slaves were from Africa. Milton was less biased and argues that by the time Drake reached Roanoke, he still carried “500 African and Indian slaves that had been picked up in the Caribbean.”

Drake purportedly hoped to populate Havana with English settlers, and both Wright and Quinn speculate that Cuba was the intended home of the freed slaves, but then circumstances suddenly changed. In “Papers relating to the navy in the Spanish war, 1586-7,” Drake related that after he destroyed Santo Domingo and Cartagena, he unearthed hard evidence that the Spanish planned “an expedition to Virginia in order to root out utterly the British colony” at Roanoke. The captain figured that the Spanish would dispatch from St. Augustine, so in haste, the English fleet made for Florida. The Spanish navy may have been planning to attack the Roanoke colony, but Drake’s “crack troops” caught the governor and his soldiers mostly off guard, and according to an English account, they quickly routed the “fainte-haarted cowardes,” while the town’s inhabitants fled away into the wilderness. The English then entered the town of “abowte 250 howses” and picked it clean of everything from the windows to the doors, locks, and metalwork. Milton points out that after they stripped the town to its timbers, they set fire to it until “not one of [the homes was] standing.” Drake still believed the Spanish meant to

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288 Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 251, 254.
289 Milton, Big Chief, 153.
291 Ibid. See also Milton, Big Chief, 146-148.
punish the English at Roanoke, and with that in mind, his fleet “set course for Virginia, with the object, commendable of course, of rescuing Ralph Lane… and his people from death.”

Drake’s fleet reached the Outer Banks on June 8, 1586. The renowned privateer not only offered to provide at least four months victuals for the Roanoke colony, but he agreed to take the weak and infirm back to England with him, as well as leave behind a seventy ton vessel called the *Francis*, “two fine pinnaces and four small boats.” Furthermore, after Lane complained of Roanoke’s less than ideal location for a harbor, as well as its poor soil for planting, Drake decided to reconnoiter the Chesapeake Bay for a more suitable permanent colony. All that notwithstanding, the following August he would return and take Lane’s entire company back to England if needful provisions were not acquired in time.

Lane visited Drake on June 13 and drew up a report that described “…the accidents of their travels” concerning the lack of progress made in discovering any minerals of note on the mainland, when “a great storme arose…” on the horizon. Several of Lane’s men were loading the *Francis* with supplies as the “disaster struck.” Drake, ever the seasoned captain of the high seas, noted that the sudden hurricane was unusual in strength and tossed the smaller boats through the air, snapped cables, and caused immense waves to break on the upper decks of his ships:

> Our Shippes weere forced to [put to sea]; the weather was so sore & the Storme so [great th]at our Ankers woulde not holde, and no shipp [of them all] but eyther brake or lost ther Ankers. And our [ship th]e Prymrose Brake an Anker of 150 li waigthe. [All the] Time wee weare in thys countrie, Wee had thunder, [lightning] an d raigne with hailstones as Bigge as Hennes egges. [There were] greate Spowtes at the seas as thoughe heaven & [earth] woulde have mett.

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293 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
The hurricane lasted for three days and the moment the storm broke, Lane learned that the *Francis* was lost at sea, along with the men from the colony who were supplying the ship.297 Drake offered Lane a second ship, the *Bark Bonner*, but at that point, with the loss of supplies and men, and the fact that the *Bonner* was too cumbersome a vessel to navigate the shallow bays north of Roanoke, Lane put the matter of abandoning the colony to a vote. Due to the loss of provisions and the threat of the storm returning, Lane and his associates decided the colonists would immediately return with the remainder of Drake’s fleet to England.

Afterward, increased winds so disheartened Drake’s sailors that a bit of chaos ensued as the English prepared to abandon Roanoke. Most of Hariot’s “charts, maps, specimens, paintings, and seeds” were thrown overboard by those in charge of making sure they arrived safely on Drake’s lead ship, the *Elizabeth Bonaventure*. Many of John White’s meticulous drawings met the same fate, as did the bulk of Lane’s records of their year in Roanoke. “Most of all wee had,” Lane wrote, “with all our cardes, books and writings, were by the saylers cast over boord.”298

Milton, Kupperman, and Quinn all drew attention to the fact that more than records were left behind in Roanoke. According to Lane, three English colonists “had gone further into the country,” he wrote, but as “the wind grew so [much] we could not stay for them.” And although there is no record of what Drake did with the hundreds of freed slaves from the Caribbean, only 100 “Turkish galley slaves” returned to the Old World, because they could be ransomed for a tidy profit.299 Milton argues that since the ships were excessively overcrowded, there “were far too many mouths to feed on the long journey back to England, [and because of that] Sir Francis

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297 See *Roanoke Voyages*, 255. Quinn writes that the *Francis* turned up in England a month later with the crew intact.
298 Ralph Lane, “Ralph Lane’s Discourse on the First Colony,” in *Roanoke Voyages*, Quinn, 293. See also, Thomas Greepe, *The true and perfecte newes of the worthy and valiamunt explytoes performed and done by that valiant knight Syr Frauncis Drake*, (London: 1850), and “Ralph Lane’s Account of the Military Colony’s Occupation,” in *Grenville and the Lost Colony of Roanoke*, Ed. Andrew T. Powell, (Leicester: Troubador Publishing, 2011), 104.
299 Wright, *Further English Voyages*, 212.
set the rest of the slaves ashore on the Outer Banks and left them to fend for themselves.”

At that point, Hakluyt recorded, a storm, evidently directed by the “hand of God,” forced the English out of the New World, “as if they had bene chased from thence by a mighty army...” He concluded, that with little to show for, the English departed the “Colony out of this paradise of the world.”

Hakluyt, recording this bit of information about Lane’s final day on Roanoke, included a brief explanation as to why he believed the English colonial scheme failed. More to the point, the sentiment contained in the source he used, whether it was Thomas Hariot or John White is not known, described an imaginary and “mighty army” that forced Lane and the colonists from the island. The “mighty army,” or the storm system in this case — it was actually a growing coalition of Indians opposed to the English — did so with the intentional purpose of driving the English from paradise “for the crueltie, and outrages committed by some of them against the native inhabitantes of that Countrie.”

Here was a metaphor of Adam and Eve getting ejected from paradise. Instead of a cherub wielding a flaming sword outside the gates of Eden, Hakluyt recorded how God had raised up a raging tempest against Lane and his men for the sole purpose of punishing them for their cruelty against the “native inhabitants.” The first signs of ideologies based in crisis and religious ambivalence emerged to explain England’s failure to colonize the Carolina coast.

Despite the supposed “blasphemy” of the “savages,” and despite the schemes of the surrounding Indian communities to cut off trade with the English for the purpose of starving them and forcing them from the area, Hakluyt believed the “great storm” that came upon Roanoke and chased away Drake and his fleet was divine judgment meted against a group of

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300 Milton, Big Chief, 153-154. See also Kupperman, Roanoke, 91-93, and Quinn, Roanoke Voyages, 250-255.
301 Hakluyt, Principal Voyages, Vol. 2, 318.
302 Ibid., Vol. 13, 327.
Englishmen guilty of sinning against the native inhabitants. Whether or not anyone else felt the same way, it is certain that the source did not feel that what Lane and his men had done to Wingina, his warriors, and the Indians who suffered in Secotan from the missing cup, was justifiable. The colonists may have been cut off from English society, but English society was not cut off from them. Furthermore, not only were the violent acts beyond justification, they were so severe that the metaphor of Adam and Eve introducing sin into a perfect paradise, and by proxy, destroying that paradise with sin, was used to condemn Lane and the actions of his men.

What happened next in Roanoke has been extensively examined and only questions remain. Drake sailed away with the colony and returned to England, leaving behind some five hundred Indian and African slaves. Hakluyt recorded that “Immediately” afterward — or four days to a week, according to Kupperman — “Sir Walter Raleigh… arrived at Hatorask, who, after some time spent in seeking our colony up in the country, and not finding them, returned [to] England.”

Two weeks later, Grenville also arrived with three ships “well appointed” with victuals to feed the now deserted colony. He too searched for the colonists, but according to the Spanish pilot, Pedro Diaz, whom Grenville impressed into service while pirating the Caribbean a year before, they only found two hanged bodies, which “one of an Englishman and one of an Indian.”

Therefore, Grenville “vnwilling to loose the possession of the countrey which Englishmen had so long held… determined to leave some men behinde to reteine possession of the Countrey.” Fifteen men volunteered to stay behind. These men, along with the other two or three Englishmen Lane abandoned — one of them may have been hanged — and the hundreds of former slaves Drake abandoned became the first disparate groups of lost Roanoke people.

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Concerning the Caribbean Indians and Africans, Milton contends that since Raleigh saw no sign of the hundreds of freed slaves just a few days later, they “must have either starved to death or been butchered by the Indians.” Kupperman did not dispose of them so easily. She writes that

The Algonquians of North America’s east coast... lacked the European sense of racial exclusivity [and they may have] adopted into their tribes and clans anyone who became culturally one of them, and they did so on terms of equality. It is entirely possible that the people left by Drake lived on and produced descendants who would have been Indians in every sense meaningful to them.

Kupperman did find it suspicious that Raleigh’s company failed to witness a single person, Indian or otherwise, when they arrived several days later on the Carolina coast. She posits that the most likely scenario was not that they were killed, because there was no evidence to support such a theory — as in a lack of hundreds of corpses — but that the Caribbean Africans and Indians “did not know the ships’ country of origin, [and] they may have judged it wiser simply to keep out of sight during the short time the relief vessels were there, as did the Roanoke Indians.” This conclusion seems probable, especially as they would have no desire to return to slavery, whether or not those who wished to enslave them were English or Spanish.

Meanwhile, two of the 15 Englishmen who stayed behind to settle Roanoke died in an attack led by at least three Algonquian nations. The leader of the English colony was Captain

306 Milton, Big Chief, 154.
307 Kupperman, Roanoke, 92.
308 Ibid.
309 See N. Brent Kennedy, The Melungeons: The Resurrection of a Proud People, (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997). Kennedy explains that the Melungeons (pronounced Mel-un-juhns), are a people composed of North Carolina and Virginian Algonquians, as well as a broad mix of “Mediterranean descendants.” One recent genetic study shows there was “an undeniable link between the Melungeon people and the Mediterranean. A 1990 reanalysis of blood samples taken in 1969 from 177 Melungeon descendants concludes that they are Portuguese.” Kennedy, an expert on Melungeon ancestry, suggests that the Melungeons have maintained for hundreds of years that they were initially “Portygeee,” and their ancestors arrived off the Atlantic Coast after being abandoned or shipwrecked. The name itself, he claims, exists in “Old Spanish folk songs and usually translates as a disparaging term for a poor person or someone from a socially lower class. It is also pronounced identically to the Turkish term melon can and the Arabic melon jinn, both meaning ‘cursed soul’ or ‘one whose life has been cursed’ by Allah.” Kennedy’s study on the Melungeons is not entirely academic, but due to the genetic results he cites, EuroAmerican academics should not be dismiss it as myth or simple lore.
Coffin and apart from his unfortunate name, little is known about him. The English learned of his fate in 1587 when John White returned to Roanoke and attempted to settle the island for the last time. With the help of Manteo, White was disheartened to hear that Aquascogoc and Dasamonquepeuc Indians — “the latter village was inhabited by Wingina’s men” — joined forces with the much stronger Secotan Indians in an attack that was meant to eliminate the English presence from Roanoke once and for all. White wrote that 30 Indians hid behind trees and “near the houses where our men carelessly lived.” Two Indians approached as if friendly and asked if they could speak with Mr. Coffin. He emerged and as he extended his hand to greet one of them, the other “struck him on the head and killed him.” That was how the attack began. The Algonquians killed the second colonist in a hail of arrows as nine others fled for a boat and set out for Port Ferdinando, “the main entrance to the sounds from the Outer Banks.” While rowing out to sea, they picked up four other survivors from a smaller boat and together they made for an uninhabited island between the Outer Banks and Port Lane. The Indians who told the tale to White claimed the men stayed on the island a short time, but nothing more was known of them and they were never seen again.  

The most famous and widely known “lost colonists” were those who came with White in 1587. This thesis does not focus on the third and final English attempt to colonize Roanoke Island, suffice it to say that White originally intended to settle the Chesapeake Bay but due to personal conflicts with the Lion’s pilot, as well as an inability to purchase the necessary supplies in the Caribbean, the group was unable to proceed any further north than the Outer Banks. On July 16, White and 14 other families, composed of 110 colonists, of whom 17 were women, and nine were small boys, made Roanoke their home. They had only been there a few days when Indians from the mainland attacked and killed one of the colonists, George Howe. Manteo

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learned from the Croatoans that the attackers belonged to Wingina’s community and that his old friend, Wanchese, took part in the killing. White concluded that because the earlier colonists had lived “carelessly,” the entire enterprise was vulnerable to continued assaults from the “implacably hostile Roanokes” bent on avenging Wingina’s horrific death.\footnote{Ibid. See also Kupperman, \textit{Roanoke}, 116-117.}

White reacted to Howe’s death by attacking a small village on the mainland a week later: “The miserable souls herewith amazed fled into a place of thick reeds growing fast by.” The English soldiers killed one Indian and chased others into the forest. It was only afterward that they learned the truth: “these were friendly Indians from that tribe who, hearing that Wingina’s Roanokes had fled, came to their village to gather their corn, tobacco, and fruit.”\footnote{Ibid.} Sadly, the “friendly Indians” were Croatoan, which greatly distressed Manteo, who, not only belonged to their community, but was also one of their district chiefs. The English counterattack strained the good will of the Croatoans and further alienated the colonists from their last ally in the region.

In the meantime, according to Kupperman, the women in the colony came to realize how dire their situation was and pleaded with White to immediately move the colony to the Chesapeake Bay. White, Kupperman argues, was so fearful of losing his material possessions or having them “pilfered” by others along the journey north that he dismissed the idea outright. As provisions were already low, he agreed to return to England for supplies, but only after the women signed a bond that guaranteed the “safeguarding of his possessions.” Once he returned, they would sail to the Chesapeake Bay and establish the colony there. White said goodbye to his daughter, who had just given birth to his granddaughter, Virginia — the first English person born
in the New World — and sailed for England on August 27. He never saw either of them again.\textsuperscript{313} To the English, the 110 colonists mysteriously vanished.

Despite the reductive tendencies of the English colonists, Rountree, Kupperman, and Quinn all maintain that they may have survived long after White returned to Roanoke in 1590. Fearing starvation, the English colonists may have joined with a local ally, and as some have presumed, were absorbed into an Algonquian community and still living in the area just a year or two before the Jamestown colonists arrived in 1607. George Percy wrote in 1608 how “on the twentieth day of settling in their new world,” he came upon “a savage boy about the age of ten years, which had a head of hair of a perfect yellow and a reasonable white skin, which is a miracle amongst all savages.” Percy was with a group that explored outside of Port Cottage, “in our Voyage up the River,” when they spotted the child with European features.\textsuperscript{314}

William Strachey also learned from an Indian named Machumps, that at “Peccarecamek and Ochanahoen, the people have houses built with stone walls, and one story above another, so taught them by those English who escaped the slaughter at Roanoak… the people breed up tame turkeys about their houses, and take Apes into the mountains.”\textsuperscript{315} Most historians discount the story because of the so called “Apes” the colonists evidently took with them into the mountains, but Lee Miller astutely points out that the Pequot word for coal was \textit{apess}, while the Cree word was \textit{apisk}. Miller went on to highlight how Strachey frequently used Algonquian words in his writings and his use of \textit{Apes} was the Algonquian word for “metal.” In other words, if this story had any merit at all, some of the colonists from Roanoke lived roughly 50 miles away, along the Virginia fall line, and they took “metal” implements with them to dig for coal and other minerals.

\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.  
in the mountains. Miller cites linguist William Tooker, who notes that the Monacans were the hated enemies of the Powhatans and they lived beyond the fall line in the mountains; their capital was Rassawek, which stemmed from “wassau ‘it is bright, it glistens,’ conjoined to wek, ‘house or home.’ Monocan from Mona-ack’anough. Mona, ‘to dig’ + ack, ‘land or earth’ + anough, ‘nation or people.’ Meaning: ‘People Who Dig the Earth.’ Freely translated: ‘Miners.’”316 No evidence exists of Roanoke miners living among the Monacans when the English arrived on Powhatan lands in 1607, but a case could be made that if they had gone into the mountains to collect coal and minerals, they did so in order to take part in reciprocal exchange as Real People, absorbed in indigenous communities.

For the next twenty years, several eyewitnesses recorded seeing blond or yellow haired Indians living among the Algonquian communities along the coast. If such people truly existed, they no doubt were the progeny of Europeans and possibly the remaining descendants of the second batch of lost Roanoke people. It is disheartening then, as Rountree speculates, if the lost colonists had “fled northward and come to rest among the still-friendly Chesapeakes, [they] would have been exterminated along with their hosts when Powhatan took over that territory” twenty years later.317

It is important, finally, to address the Caribbean Africans and Indians unceremoniously dropped at Roanoke after the hurricane momentarily died down on June 16, 1586. Drake’s records indicate that he originally freed the slaves according to his desire to bolster a would-be English colony in Havana, but due to rumors he heard after attacking Cartagena, he sailed north to attack the Spanish before they retaliated against Lane’s colony at Roanoke. Kupperman and Quinn did not believe that Drake intended to set the slaves free to live out their lives as English

317 Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 49.
colonists; on the contrary, it seems that no matter where they ended up, the English meant to use them as the Spanish had — as slaves, or as Quinn put it, as “free labour.”

In regards to the fate of the freed slaves, the records are eerily silent. Silence, however, removes agency from the whole affair and continues to obscure the role of reductivism in the matter. One might argue that the incident was an oversight, one committed by Drake, Lane, White, and Hariot, among others; all of whom wrote meticulous details about their time in and around Roanoke, but failed to mention what became of hundreds of men, women, and children on their last day on the island. If the mistake was one of omission, it only further solidifies the point: the English inadvertently transformed the memory of hundreds of people who belonged to Europe’s lowest social order — because they were slaves, into something worse than nothing. It was almost as if the English deemed them negative people, whereby they were removed in the same way that lower social orders in England were disappeared into negative spaces on maps. Hence, the English managed to disappear upwards of 500 people before those people actually disappeared into the Carolina mainland. Even today, when historians discuss those who were lost on Roanoke, they rarely include those who outnumbered the final colony by a factor of five to one. The fact that there is nothing close to an exact number of freed slaves in Drake’s records speaks to the reductive nature of diminishing the other to less than a resource, because even the resources of Roanoke were covered extensively in the reports of Hariot, White, and Grenville. Without value, the English reduced the slaves to some notional category that relegated their lives to myth; that is, if they ever thought of them again.

Besides the colonists and freed slaves of Roanoke that disappeared, there was one item the English highly valued that never emerged again in European records: the silver chalice. The cup is important because of its connection to crisis and conflict once the English discovered it.

missing from their contents. By the sixteenth century, the English — especially those living in or near towns or cities — were largely dependent on an artificially constructed marketplace. With dependence, the process of fetishizing goods began and resources, ranging from but not limited to: minerals, trees, and food stuffs; in general, the bounty of nature, took on a role of supremacy dictated by their value as potential commodities. In that superior position, human life and acts imperative to the perpetuation of sustaining the bonds necessary to maintaining the basic needs of living — like nurturing reciprocal relationships with those who had access to foodstuffs — were diminished. The aforementioned superior position of European goods was also full of contradictions and both groups ended up suffering because of those contradictions. Nature and its antithesis, the commodified object, became, simultaneously, the most valuable and worthless concrete-abstraction those dependent upon accumulation and the marketplace — the English, could hope to possess or discard. In this way, the land could be both a garden and a desert, infinitely valuable and equally worthless — a place where foreigners faced with the prospect of starving to death, burned down a field of maize and displaced their neighbors by razing their village, all in exchange for a metal cup, which may or may not have been stolen by the community they attacked.

The crisis of the silver cup highlighted the resilience of reductive logic. The English colonists, dependent upon accumulation and the marketplace to meet their cultural and biological needs, did not seem to understand how dangerous their dependence upon fetishized objects had become. And the longer the English remained on the island, the more aggressive they became. The English acted as if they could not learn from their mistakes, precisely because they did not necessarily think they were making any. It was always the indigenous other at fault. Much like the Spanish they hoped to pirate, it appeared as if the English were afflicted with the same
“disease” the Aztecs attributed to the Spanish: “Their bodies fatten on [gold] and they hunger violently for it. They crave [it] like hungry swine.” Francisco Lopez de Gomara recalled that Cortes agreed with the Aztecs’ assessment of the Spanish and replied, “We… have a disease of the heart that can only be cured by gold.” The cure, for Europeans at least, appeared time and again as a justification for violence or war.

To the modern reader, burning down a village and destroying the food supply of a possible ally over the presumed theft of a cup, while attempting to navigate a foreign world thousands of miles from one’s home, appears, at the least, heavy handed, and at the most, something bordering on psychopathy or mental illness induced by the threat of starvation. Commander Grenville, however, merely played his part in a reductive system that placed more value on a transformed object than on indigenes and their environment. The silver cup not only connected to mercantilist, market based, economic solutions rooted in European dependence, it also acted as a conduit to manifest the Law of Arms, whereby Grenville could play the part of English adjudicator, restoring justice to the land as he understood it.

The cup carried the weight of violent transformation as a vessel underpinned by crisis and conflict. When it arrived in Roanoke, the value placed on it was more than the value of a life sustaining food source, like corn, and more than the value of an entire indigenous community that relied on that corn to feed them and their seemingly irrational guests. The silver cup was an object meant for dependence, just as the contents within it were held together and dependent upon the container that housed the liquid. The silver cup was a container meant to make a dependent people — the English in a foreign world, independent, and an independent people — the Aquascogok in their own communities, dependent. Instead, the stolen cup became a potent

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symbol of Indian independence, agency, and autonomy. The Aquascogok would take from the English what they wanted and their act reaffirmed the inferior position of the already isolated English. By stealing the cup, the Algonquians forced the English into subordinating to their culture, not the other way around.

Furthermore, some form of positive psychological phenomena concomitantly embedded within dependency to reductivism discounted the risks involved in valuing fetishized goods over people, communities, and the sociological bonds needed for inter-dependence in an alien environment. Grenville’s military training no doubt exacerbated the situation, but scarcity connected to mercantilism seemed to promote risk taking to a point that those adhering to its logic were willing to starve to death rather than lose the fetishized object they hoped to retrieve. English actions indicated that starving to death was not an option and that the inevitable consequences of razing their neighbor’s village and burning their maize crops to the ground would not irreparably harm their chances of surviving until the European market returned to them the following summer in the form of English ships laden with English goods.

Grenville, Lane, and White’s first priority should have been the stability of their colony, which would have included maintaining peace with their Algonquian neighbors at nearly any cost. That was not what happened. English ideologies based in contradiction and transformation prohibited them from seeing the Indians as not only their equals, but as necessary to their survival. Real scarcity and the threat of the English starving to death did not enervate their mercantilist predilections. Instead, the English pursued policies that contradicted any notion of maintaining a prolonged peace. Crisis after crisis followed the initial loss of the Tiger: first when Grenville attacked the Aquascogoks, next when Lane attacked the Secotans, and finally when White attacked the Croatoans — the only remaining ally the English had in the area.
Despite the negative consequences of the English treating the world as a fetishized object where conflict and violence initially undermined their colonial goals, the potential gain to be had from the “commodity field” of the New World overruled their fear of acting otherwise. As long as there was a steady supply of colonists willing to risk their lives in an antagonistic environment, the rewards of mercantilism would outweigh the negative consequences of individuated risk taking. In the end, conflict and violence in Roanoke occurred precisely because Grenville, Lane, and White were inculcated with ideologies based in fetishized dependence bolstered by the English marketplace. If they could gain a profit, there seemed to be no limit on how far the English would go in their attempts to either reduce the Algonquians, or at times, their environment. Ultimately, as the English inadvertently or consciously engaged in a world underpinned by discursively scarce thinking, they forced a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that resulted in real scarcity, because they either burned indigenous maize, razed an Indian village, kidnapped the son of an Algonquian chief, chopped off the head of another chief, or attacked and killed at least one member of the only nation still willing to trade their goods for Indian foodstuffs.

When the English returned to Roanoke in search of a land supposedly abundant in whatever they could transform and sell in the European marketplace, as opposed to a place where they might learn to coexist and live as communities with their indigenous hosts, they met resistance and hostility from the Indians. A written record of late sixteenth or early seventeenth century Algonquian speaking Indians does not exist to explain why Chief Wingina vehemently opposed the English on Roanoke Island, but his actions show that he did not desire an alliance with those who intended to convert the Algonquians, exact food from them, and transform their environment into a supply shop of commodified goods that would ultimately undermine their
communities and cultures. Reductive policies gave way to a preemptive English attack that claimed Wingina’s head and forced the English to dissolve their settlement on the island and wait for reinforcements. If any colonists did survive, they would have done so by replacing their culture of accumulation with indigenous, reciprocal values based in gift exchange and tribute. And even those survivors may have succumbed to the ripples of reductivism that were about to move across the Chesapeake coastal lands.
Algonquian Prophecies and the Starving Time

The arrival of the English in the Chesapeake coastal lands was certainly an early example of early contact between Old and New World people in North America; however, Indians living up and down the coast, all the way to the Mississippi River and deeper into what would later become the Southwest regions of New Mexico and West-Texas, had experienced the consequences of European contact on the continent long before colonial schemes came to fruition. Almost immediately after the Spanish started exploring the Yucatán Peninsula in the sixteenth century, reconnaissance missions north into Mexico Nuevo and across the southern plains took place. Arguably, the most famous of those expeditions belonged to Hernando de Soto and his company of 600 men. Not only were they the first Europeans to cross the Mississippi River, they were able to document a portion of North America that teemed with Indian nations supported by prodigious crops of maize and other indigenous foodstuffs before the dissemination of European diseases. On May 08, 1541, De Soto reached the eastern side of the Mississippi, south of modern day Memphis, and described a land “thickly set with great towns,” composed of thousands of warriors. He “discovered” villages everywhere the Spanish explored. Just over a century later, the French reconnoitered the same area and instead of finding “cities [packed] cheek by jowl. It was deserted.” The French did not find “an Indian village for two hundred miles.”

In most cases, these were not examples of the “empty wilderness” trope perpetuated by land hungry explorers, but the result of the devastation brought on by a combination of European diseases and Indian warfare.

One culprit, Charles Mann argues in 1491, was the Spaniards’ pigs, which hosted numerous “zoonotic diseases” ranging from anthrax to “brucellosis, leptospirosis, trichinosis,

and tuberculosis” and easily passed their microbes to deer and turkeys, which then infected the Indians. Mann cites anthropologists, Gregory Ramenofsky and Patricia Galloway, who both posit that “After De Soto’s army left [the Texas-Arkansas border] the Caddo stopped erecting community centers and began digging community cemeteries. The Caddoan population fell from about 200,000 to about 8,500 — a drop of nearly 96 percent.”

It is an understatement to say that the effects of Old World diseases were catastrophic to numerous Indian communities after Europeans made first contact. In Roanoke, as previously noted, Hariot wrote about the spread of an unknown disease among the Secotan nation as if it was schadenfreude judgment from God. Equally dismayed and jubilant, Hariot recorded that the disease not only followed the English, but it then went ahead of them killing upwards of 60 Indians at a time in villages they never reached. Furthermore, when enemies of the Roanokes began dying from what was likely an outbreak of smallpox, the Roanokes personally thanked the English as if they had gone to war on their behalf using disease as an invisible weapon.

Although the Powhatans did not suffer catastrophic loss of life from European diseases until a decade after the British arrived, the first “unidentifiable epidemic to [hit] the [Virginia] Bay region [occurred] as early as 1561.” The unknown disease appeared around the first time the Spanish visited Ajacán and “burned itself out in small communities rather than spreading in[to] a massive epidemic.” Additionally, Rountree relates that “There may also have been

321 Ibid., 111-112.
322 Hariot, Brief and True Report, 28-30.
323 Ibid., 29.
324 Philip D. Curtin, Grace S. Brush, and George W. Fisher, Ed. Discovering the Chesapeake: The History of an Ecosystem, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 137. See also Marie Tyler-McGraw, At the Falls: Richmond, Virginia and Its People, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 11. Tyler-McGraw points out that there is evidence that when the Spanish began exploring and then settling Florida in the middle of the sixteenth century, “they left European diseases behind, and many Indian villages had been decimated.” See also Rountree, Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough, 42. Rountree elaborates on the impact European diseases had on tidewater Indians prior to the arrival of the English. She explains that mortality rates steadily increased post contact wherever Europeans traded or settled. When the English first arrived in 1607, “Virginia
serious epidemics of European diseases in eastern Virginia” prior to 1607. She went onto to highlight that “Archaeological proof has yet to surface in the form of mass graves for the victims, but the likelihood of epidemics having occurred is still high.”

Chief Powhatan once told John Smith that he “had seen the death of all my people thrice and not anyone living of those three generations but myself.” Furthermore, Gabriel Archer noted in 1607 that “The great diseaze reignes in the men generally, full fraught with noodes botches and pulpable appearances in their forheades, we found aboue a hundred.” In 1612 William Strachey added: “And vncredible yt is, with what heat both Sexes of them are given over to those Intemperances, and the men to preposterous Venus, for which they are full of their owne country-disease (the Pox) very young.”

The highest rates of mortality took place in the Caribbean in the early sixteenth century, but by 1550, European diseases fanned out into the entire Southeast, which included: Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, East-Texas, and Louisiana. Ramenofsky further iterates that after De Soto’s expedition, “Some groups disappeared completely, and even those who survived seemed to have been quite unstable.

Indians and their neighbors were subjected to repeated epidemics with considerable mortality.” See also Discovering the Chesapeake, 133, 137. Prior to European contact, Eastern Woodland Indians had a mortality rate of around 16-17 percent for those under the age of three to five. Afterward European contact, the same regions saw mortality rates climb between 35-50 percent.

Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 24-25.


Curtin, Brush, and Fisher, Ed. Discovering the Chesapeake, 133-138. The evidence is scant, but the Mecklenburg’s study of 106 Indian skeletons taken from Montgomery County, Virginia, suggest that from 1550-1650, “20-25 percent [of those Indians studied] died before the age of 5.” Mortality rates in the tidewater Potomac region were worse. The remains of 131-161 Indians examined show that “Thirty percent of the population apparently died before the age of 5.” Curtin, Brush, and Fisher allow that mortality rates were already low in indigenous communities before the Spanish arrived, suggesting that 15 percent of Indians died before the age of five, but the effect of European diseases were felt as far north as Virginia just a decade after Columbus’s first visit, and mortality rates steadily inclined until numerous communities saw 90 percent mortality rates by the eighteenth century.

Mann, 1491, 110.
Abandonment, relocation, or amalgamation were frequent descriptions.\textsuperscript{329} Archaeologist, Philip Phillips, estimates that “Sometime between 1541 and 1682,” there was a population loss in the Southeast that “amount[ed] to at least eighty percent.” Phillips, however, did not place the onus of the blame squarely on disease, but instead speculates that Indian “warfare caused the massive loss of population.\textsuperscript{330} Currently, the general synopsis among anthropologists and archaeologists alike is that some combination of disease and Indian warfare was responsible.\textsuperscript{331}

As disease and Indian warfare began devastating the Southeast in the sixteenth century, another catalyst for violent transformation entered into the mix and it came from European demands for Indian furs a century later. There was roughly a 60 year lag between the emergence of the Spanish in the Southeast and the emergence of the French in Canada, but after the French first began trading for furs in the St. Lawrence River Valley in 1600, violence between Indian nations dramatically increased just 40 years later. The two first contact events were entirely unconnected, but the telltale signs of a pattern emerged early and often — an intensification of disease and violence followed contact. In the pays d’en haut, violence on a scale never before witnessed erupted in the area Richard White famously called “the middle ground”:

The Iroquois desired beaver and the hunting lands that yielded them, and they wanted captives to replace their dead or to atone at the torture stake for their loss. The coupling of the demands of the fur trade with Iroquois cultural imperatives for prisoners and victims created an engine of destruction that broke up the region’s peoples. Never again in North America would Indians fight each other on this scale or with this ferocity.\textsuperscript{332}

\textsuperscript{329} Gregory A. Ramenofsky, Vectors of Death: The Archaeology of European Contact, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 44.
\textsuperscript{331} See Ramenofsky, Vectors of Death, 46-48.
Europeans created numerous reductive ripples along the Atlantic Coast in the sixteenth century. As previously noted, when Spanish slavers encountered the Chicorans in 1521, they plied at least 60 of them with gifts in an elaborate ruse to draw the Indians onto their ship. Once captured on board, the Spanish forced the Chicorans into servitude in the Caribbean. El Chicorana survived his five years among the Spanish, but the moment he and the other Indian translators traveling with the Spanish reached the Carolina coastal lands, they disappeared and were never seen again by the Europeans. El Chicorana and the other translators would have explained to the Chicorans what happened to the 60-plus members of their community after the Spanish captured and reduced many of them to slaves. There is little doubt that he and the others would have informed the Chicorans of how the Spanish brought hundreds of European foreigners to the Carolina coast to establish a permanent colony. And since el Chicorana played an integral part in Ayllón’s marketing scheme in Spain, he might have expounded upon Spanish tropes that purposely misled potential colonists into believing that the real spaces Chicorans inhabited for centuries were — through the magic of storytelling — imaginatively transformed into a fictionalized New Andalucía, a place ideally suited for the foreigners to call home.

Moreover, he may have related how, once the foreigners colonized a new space, they tended to subjugate the indigenous people, turned communal lands into private property, and valued goods more than the people for which those goods traditionally cemented reciprocal relationships.

Through the moccasin telegraph, Indians traveling along well-worn trade paths would have disseminated knowledge of the foreigners from the east hundreds of miles away from the Carolina coastal lands. Rountree writes that Europeans were shocked to learn that “Indian people had a whole network of established contacts covering thousands of square miles.” She goes on to assert that post contact, indigenous communication networks “intensified… under the
pressure of foreign (i.e., European) invasion.” For instance, she notes, in 1673-74, Gabriel Arthur spent five months with the “Tomahitans,” during which time, they “visited Port Royal in South Carolina, Mobile Bay in Alabama, and a Shawnee village in Ohio, altogether covering a distance of about 2,200 miles.” Citing Francis Magnel, Rountree posits that by 1610, Powhatan sends some men by land every year to west India and to Newfoundland and other regions to bring back word of what is going on. And these messengers say that those who are in India treat their natives very badly, and like slaves and the English tell them those people are very cruel and wicked, meaning the Spanish.\textsuperscript{333}

Rountree concludes that in any matter where Indians felt threatened, they might travel “hundreds of miles” on a peace keeping mission.\textsuperscript{334} It is not difficult to imagine then that as the Spanish intruded further up the Florida coast in the sixteenth century, the threat that they posed would have rippled far beyond initial places of contact.

From 1526-1570, the Spanish began the slow process of colonization in Upper Florida, and their presence would have continued to ripple through a world where disease and an intensification in Indian warfare began taking its toll on indigenous communities. Probably the next reductive ripple of note would have been when the Jesuits attempted to build a mission in Ajacán by exchanging religious and spiritual teachings, for sacred, life giving foodstuffs. Like el Chicorana, Don Luis would have shared stories about the Strangers from the east who meant to take land and food from the Ajacán Real People in exchange for submission to their Stranger God and Spanish king. He might of retold the horrors perpetrated against the Aztecs he witnessed while living in Mexico City, or he may have explained the Spanish lust for gold that drove them to the corners of the earth to obtain it. Finally, after the Spanish returned in 1572, they “killed more than twenty” Powhatans who boarded their ship and executed 12 “important [Ajacán] Indians. They also shot at and killed several others on shore. With their need for

\textsuperscript{333} Rountree, \textit{Powhatan Foreign Relations}, 82.
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., 25.
revenge still not satiated, they also “took young people as prisoners (to make them interpreters) in the Potomac River area before sailing away.”\textsuperscript{335} This behavior was nothing new; according to James Mooney in “The Powhatan Confederacy,” Powhatans living along the coast were quite familiar with Europeans since “throughout the remainder of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century the Virginia coast was frequently raided by Spanish slave hunters from the West Indies.”\textsuperscript{336} Surely then, Don Luis’s knowledge of the Spanish would have been a tremendous source of \textit{Montoac} and the Powhatans of the region — who prized story telling from those who went on distant adventures — would have gained a greater understanding of the Spanish than perhaps any other Indian community in the area.

These reductive ripples may have been the catalyst for Algonquian prophecies that surfaced as early as 1585, when Thomas Hariot first heard of them when the English attempted to colonize Roanoke. The English, meanwhile, created their own reductive ripples in the New World when Grenville razed an Indian village and set indigenous crops ablaze over the presumed theft of a silver cup. Lane and other colonists followed with a series of violent confrontations that ranged from stealing indigenous food caches, to kidnapping and torturing the son of a local chief, to preemptively attacking the Secotans and decapitating the head of a Roanoke chief, to inadvertently attacking Croatoans who had acted as steadfast allies throughout all the failed English colonial attempts. Wanchese, who like el Chicorana and Don Luis, had visited Europe and personally witnessed a world transformed by reductive policies, must have contributed to Algonquian oral traditions that highlighted the violence of the Strangers from the

\textsuperscript{335} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough}, 48.

\textsuperscript{336} James Mooney, “The Powhatan Confederacy, Past and Present,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 9, no. 1 (January 1, 1907): 129. Mooney posits that the Spanish had been so violent along the Virginian coastal lands, on account of their continual slavery raids, that when the “Jamestown colonists landed,” they arrived “among a people who already knew and hated the whites.”
east. Manteo, who had long aligned with English and sought out their *Mantoac* to bolster Croatan power against the Roanokes, may have also, in the end, added oral evidence to the moccasin telegraph that related the dangers in maintaining an alliance with the Europeans.

Furthermore, there is evidence that the Powhatans felt the presence of reductivism rippling through their expanding paramount chiefdom an entire generation before the English arrived. Ralphe Hamor, in *A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia*, indicated in 1615 that the Powhatans and Chickahominies detested the Spanish, “for Powhatan’s father was driven by them from the West Indies into these parts.”

Rountree is quick to point out that no one currently understands exactly what Hamor meant by this statement, but Gleach avers it had something to do with Don Luis. Gleach follows Lewis, Loomie, and Carl Bridenbaugh’s lead in suggesting that Opechancanough, Powhatan’s brother, was actually Don Luis. Chesapeake historians and anthropologists alike generally discount the idea, but it is based on Robert Beverley’s description of Opechancanough 75 years after the powerful chief had passed. Beverley wrote in 1715 that Opechancanough did not come from Virginia. Instead “he was a prince of a foreign nation and came to them a great way from the southwest.”

Opechancanough also preferred the term *Itoyatan*, “Great King,” supposedly after the manner of European rulers, and his name in Algonquian, according to Bridenbaugh, purportedly meant “He Whose Soul is White.”

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Contrary to English discursive notions about the Spanish and their extraordinary use of violence against Indians, in 1606, Samuel Mace, an English captain, sailed into the Chesapeake Bay and put into motion a series of actions that resulted in the Powhatans capturing Captain John Smith a year and a half later to interrogate him, because they believed he and Mace were one in the same person. According to Smith, in the winter of 1607, Powhatan specifically targeted him and his party because prior to their arrival,

a shippe had beene in the River of Pamaunke, who having beene kindly entertained by Powhatan their Emperour, they [the English] returned thence, and discovered the River of Topahanocke, where being received with like kindnesse, yet he [the captain] slue the King, and tooke of his people, and they supposed I were hee.\textsuperscript{341}

Mace neglected to mention capturing Powhatans or killing their chief while he visited the region, but his actions, nevertheless, still resonated through the area long after his departure.

Ultimately, even if reductive European policies rippled throughout the American coastal lands in the sixteenth century, Algonquians had their own reasons for going to war or maintaining indigenous lifeways through violence. Reductivism as an analytical tool should not diminish or reduce those it hopes to better understand by placing too much focus on the presence of several disparate European groups scattered over thousands of miles in the sixteenth century. However, there is little doubt that European diseases played some role in destabilizing certain Indian communities in the region. In turn, those less affected by disease, like the Powhatans, were able to use newly opened buffer zones to expand their hegemony.

Currently, Powhatan historians are in consensus to the notion that when John Smith and the English colonists first arrived in the Chesapeake Bay in 1607, the Algonquians already had a working knowledge of the European Strangers. Rountree reiterates that if Chief Powhatan had not learned of the Spanish from Don Luis, then he had most certainly heard about the English

colonists of Roanoke who survived by “intruding themselves among the people of the Carolina Sounds,” especially as at least two of the Strangers may have “stayed for part of the cold season (1585-86) with the Chesapeakes.” Those two Strangers were John White and Thomas Hariot.\footnote{Rountree, *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough*, 48.} White and Hariot visited with “members of several other tribal groups” while stationed with the “Chesepieans… most of which [nations] cannot be identified…” but if the Chesapeakes were the “ancient enemy” of the Powhatans, as Strachey described them, it would have been unrealistic to think that the presence of two Europeans in the area was unknown to the most powerful expanding chiefdom a day’s journey to the north-west.\footnote{Ibid., 21-22.}

This is where the initial reductive ripples created by the Spanish at Ajacán, the English at Roanoke, and the English under Mace’s command in 1606, may have manifested in one of the first truly significant violent acts carried out in the New World post European contact. To understand the connection, it is important to briefly return to the second batch of missing Roanoke colonists. Rountree argues, as many have recently, that the colonists White left behind “went northward as refugees in 1587 and stayed among the Chesapeakes, while others moved westward to the Carolina mainland.” Moreover, Rountree, Kupperman, and Quinn suggest that this was likely due to the friendly relations between the English and the Chesapeakes first established during White and Hariot’s reconnaissance mission during the winter of 1585-86. According to Samuel Purchas, John Smith told him that Chief Powhatan took credit for the disappearance of “the lost colony.” Smith evidently received his information during the time Chief Powhatan held him captive, but Purchas did not write of it until 1625, and only then did he mention it as part of an “anti-Indian polemic” entitled “Virginia’s Verger,” which he published after Opechancanough went to war with the English and killed hundreds of Jamestown colonists.
in 1622. Purchas wrote that the English colonists had survived for twenty years, but Powhatan admitted he had killed “those at [from] Roanoke.” Strachey also believed this to be the case, relating in a statement that “King James had been told by 1609 that although the Roanoke colonists had lived for ‘20. and od yeares’ outside his dominions, Powhatan had killed them.”344 Another source came from the Virginia Company in 1609. The company gave instructions to Sir Thomas Gates that spoke of “the slaughter of [by] Powhatan of Roanocke [colonists], vppon the first arrival of our colonie.” Rountree points out that all of the sources were the product of second hand information, besides being incredibly “biased and flimsy.”345

Regardless of the reductive ripples that the Europeans caused in the sixteenth century, the Powhatans’ actions at the turn of the seventeenth century make it clear that they were more interested in the threat posed by their Chesapeake neighbors, as well as the Monacans in the west, than the interlopers attempting to colonize a portion of the boggy swamp the Powhatans used for fishing, but little else. Rountree characterizes the Powhatans at the time as “warlike and vengeful” toward anyone that threatened the expansion of their paramount chiefdom.346 She notes that all “Eastern Woodland peoples were chronically at war” as two separate phenomenon occurred in the sixteenth century. While European diseases caused instability and dislocation in some communities, other Indian nations appeared to have suffered little mortality loss from foreign pathogens. Instead their populations increased by a combination of reconsolidation, expansion through warfare, and enhanced agricultural practices. Rountree relates that depopulation in one region was not in contradiction to over population in other nearby regions. Rather, due to record high maize yields in the preceding century, the Monacans, the Powhatans, and the Chesapeakes overstressed the carrying capacity of the regions they controlled. In this

344 Ibid.
345 Ibid., 22-23.
346 Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 22.
atmosphere, “relations with [the Powhatans’] neighbors to the west similarly seem to have been almost exclusively hostile.”347 Conflict then increased when the severe regional drought commenced early in the seventeenth century, which created a perfect stew of crisis and explosive violence.

In line with this train of thought, Strachey recorded that “the Chickahamanias… were ever [Powhatan’s] enemyes… within some 10. Or 12. myles of James-towne…”348 “Ancient enemies” also pushed down from the north as “Iroquois-speakers” fought to extend their territories. Rountree argues “that Iroquoian-speakers expanded their territory in the protohistoric period, and that their ritual torture of male captives was a means of further terrorizing other Woodland groups.”349 She went on to explain that the Massawomecks “who so frightened some Powhatan groups may have been the Eries, moving down the Potomac valley in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.” She concludes that there was a high probability “that the Indians of eastern Virginia felt more threatened militarily at the end of the sixteenth century than they had ever felt before.”350

In the south-eastern region of the Chesapeake Bay, the Chesapeakes fought to maintain their autonomy during the expansion of the Powhatan paramount chiefdom, which made their presence on the Chesapeake waters — where Europeans were most likely to come into contact with the them and establish trade or possibly collude with them against the Powhatans in the west — a dire threat to the Powhatans’ hegemony. In such an atmosphere of Indian hostility, a prophecy arose among the Powhatans that described a serious threat that would come from the

347 Ibid., 49-50, 80.
348 Smith, Captain John Smith, Ed. Horn, 1043.
349 Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: 25. The Algonquians also took part in the ritualized torture of their enemies.
350 Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: 25. See also Hatfield, who highlights the “enmity [that existed] between the Powhatans and the Indians beyond the falls,” as it was of interest to both Strachey and Smith, who both “filled their accounts with references to the enmity.” Hatfield, “Spanish Colonization,” 261.
Chesapeake Bay and it portended Powhatan calamity and ruin. Referencing J. Frederick Fausz, Hatfield argues that at the beginning of the seventeenth century, a “prophecy created for Chief Powhatan a ‘strategic necessity to control the estuary and its major tributaries, which had already served as “highways” for hostile trans-Atlantic intruders.””

Hatfield contends that the Powhatan werowances probably used previous European incursions as justification for the Chesapeake attack.

William Strachey documented Powhatan anxieties concerning their “ancient enemies” a few years after the Jamestown colonists first came to the Chesapeake. The fears in question manifested in the form of the aforementioned prophecies foretold by Powhatan werowances that supposedly inspired Chief Powhatan to take immediate action against the Chesapeakes living on the south-eastern edge of his paramount chiefdom. Strachey’s treated the Indian prophecies as a European of the time would: he was biased, prone to reducing their metaphysical pronouncements to superstitious and devilish aberrations and generally concluded that the Powhatans acted like petulant children given to fits of evocative, erratic, and violent outbursts for cursory or infantile reasons — like avenging their loved ones for violent acts perpetrated against their community. Strachey first referenced “the prophecies” in Caput VIII of The History of Travaile Into Virginia Britannia, writing:

Their manner of Warrs, and consultations therein; of certayne Prophecyes amongst them; of Powhatons auntient Ennimyes, and how they may be turned against him by joyning in League with us:, and how his best Freindes may be wonne from him, wherby we may bring him likewise to be in Freindship with us: their Armes, and weopens.

Although the Powhatan werowances voiced their prophecies prior to the arrival of the English, Strachey believed they foretold the coming of the English and the alliances they would make with “the ancient enemies” of the Powhatans. He went on to record:

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351 Hatfield, “Spanish Colonization,” 255-256.
352 Smith, Captain John Smith, Ed. Horn, 1085.
They seldome make warrs for lands or goods, but for women and children, and principally for revenge, so vindictive and jealous they be to be made a derision of, and to be insulted upon by an enemy.

There be at this tyme certayne prophesies afoot amongst the people inhabiting about us, of which Powhatan ys not meanly jealous and careful to divert the consturciton and danger which his priests contynually put him in feare of. [It is] not long since that his priests told him how that from the Chesapeack Bay a nation should arise which should dissolve and give end to his empire, for which, not many yeares since (perplex with this divelish oracle, and divers understanding thereof), according to the ancyent and gentile cutoms, he destroyed and put to sword all such who might lye under any doubtful construccion of the said propesie, as all the inhabitants, the werowance and his sujects of their province, and so remaine all the Chessiopeians at this daye, and for this cause, extinct.353

Strachey’s myopic interpretation of the prophesies having been fulfilled with the coming of the English was not merely the ethnocentric hubris of a European chronicler thinking the world revolved around Protestant or Roman Catholic endeavors. This was the case in one sense, but it is equally imprudent to fully shift the onus of the prophecy and its fears of an eastern threat away from Europeans. Hariot had written back in 1588 in his Briefe and True Report that the Indians who hosted him in what was most likely the territory occupied by the Chesapeake, believed in a prophecy that indicated how much the presence of Europeans along the coast threatened indigenous ways of life. He wrote, “Some woulde likewise seeme to prophesie that there were more of our generation yet to come, to kill theirs and take their places, as some thought the purpose was by that which was already one.”354

Furthermore, the Chesapeakes and the Powhatans were not the only ones to have been warned about enemies coming from the east to supplant them. Jeffrey Hantman highlights in “Caliban’s Own Voice” a similar tale that existed among the Monacans. The English learned of it when Smith captured a Siouan Indian, named Amoroleck, who shot arrows at them as he hunted along the banks of the Rappahanock River. Smith questioned Amoroleck and asked him

353 Ibid.
354 Hariot, Briefe and True Report, 43.
why he had attacked the English. His response was that the Siouans (Monacans) “had heard the English were a people come from under the world, to take their world from them.” The English, therefore, already existed in the Monacan cosmology as “an odd mix of indigenous myth and colonial politics” before any Monacan had ever met them. Smith freed Amoroleck and attempted to establish trade with the Monacans, but Amoroleck held fast to his beliefs that the English were, according to Hantman, “threatening, unknown, uncontrollable, and ultimately not human,” and chose to avoid the English entirely because they meant to take the Monacan world away from his people.\textsuperscript{355}

Hariot’s recognition of some prophecy intimating a threat coming from the Chesapeake Bay from those who would “kill theirs and take their places” an entire generation prior to Strachey’s arrival in Powhatan territory seemed to indicate that some indigenous communities along the Virginian coastline took the previous exchanges between the foreigners and themselves seriously. At the very least, the Indians Hariot lived with during his stay away from Roanoke colonists in the winter of 1585-86 reckoned the European Strangers would fulfill the prophecies dire predictions. It was somewhat ironic that it turned out to be the Powhatans, their neighbors to the west, who ultimately killed the Chesapeakes and took “their places.”

Strachey certainly believed that with the arrival of the English, a second set of prophecies spread among the Powhatans that expressed how troublesome the presence of the white Strangers was to them:

Some of the inhabitants, againe, have not spared to give us to understand, how they have a second prophesie likewise amongst them, that twice they should give overthrow and dishearten the attempters, and such straungers as should invade their territories or labour to settle a plantation among them, but the third tyme they themselves should fall into their subjection, and under their conquest; and sure in the observacion of our settlement, and

the manner therof hitherto, we maye well suppose that this their apprehension may fully touch at us. I leave to expresse the particulers unto another place, albeyt, let me saye here, straunge whispers (indeed) and secrett at this hower run among these people and possesse them with amazement, what may be the yssue of these straung preparations landed in their coasts, and yearly supplyed with fresher trouppes. Every newes and blast of rumour strykes them, to which they open their eares wyde, and keepe their eyes waking…

There are a couple of issues concerning the prophecies to address. First of all, Strachey used European terminology to describe the way Chief Powhatan dealt with the Chesapeakes. He wrote, “[Powhatan] destroyed and put to sword all such who might lye under any doubtful construccion.” The insertion of the “sword” as having been the weapon of choice used by Powhatan appears as anachronistic at first glance, if the assumption was that the chief had used an iron sword to defeat the “ancient enemies.” Strachey clarified exactly what kind of sword he meant when he referenced Indian swords a few pages later:

Their Swoardes be made of a kynd of heavy wood which they have, much like such woodden Instruments, as our English women swingle their Flaxe withal, and which they call Monacocks as the Salvages in Dariena in the West Indies call their Macanas… but oftentymes they use for swordes, the horne of a deare, put through a piece of wood in forme of a Pickaxe; some use a long stone sharpened at both endes…

Another issue with the prophecies stems from Strachey’s claim that the Powhatans not only went into battle with the Chesapeakes, but utterly destroyed “all the inhabitants” of the land. He did not say how many Chesapeakes the Powhatans killed, but if every man, woman, and child among the Chesapeakes had been “put to the sword,” there may have been between three hundred and four hundred people who lost their lives; among those, upward of eighty-five would have been fighting warriors.

356 Smith, *Captain John Smith*, Ed. Horn, 1085.
357 Ibid., 1090.
358 See Mooney, “The Powhatan Confederacy,” 130. Using Captain Smith’s detailed notes written in 1607, there were 28 Powhatan nations belonging to the paramount chiefdom. Smith estimated 2,385 fighting warriors from among the total number of chiefdoms, which meant each nation contributed, on average, eighty-five warriors from their village. Strachey’s average was 3,320, but most agree his estimate was too high. Taking Smith’s low estimates, Mooney contends the paramount chiefdom was comprised of some 8,500 inhabitants. Again, using this average, the Chesapeakes likely had between 60 and 80 fighting warriors and was a village inhabited with roughly...
Currently there is no archaeological evidence to support any claims of the mass killing of three or four hundred people living in the region described by Strachey as the Chesapeake homeland, but part of the problem stems from the swampy and moist terrain where biological material degrades quickly. However, in the 1970s and 80s an Indian graveyard was discovered in Great Neck, Virginia in the newly constructed neighborhood of Pungo Ridge. The bodies, first discovered by a construction crew excavating footings for a new home, drew the attention of archaeologists from the National Historic Society who expanded the search and found the remains of 64 bodies. Based on James Mooney’s estimates, which he gathered from Smith, the number of dead discovered in the area fit nicely with the number of those who likely perished in the attack. “Amateurs also dug around the site,” which created quite a stir in the media when a painter from the area found “a body he called the “King of Great Neck.” The “king” was “covered in 30,000 beads” and in time the archeologists determined “the bones were those of the Chesapeake Indians, who were massacred by the Powhatan tribe around the same time Jamestown settlers arrived in 1607.” The number of the dead was far short of the complete destruction of all the Chesapeakes that once threatened the Powhatan paramount chiefdom, but it certainly bolstered Strachey’s assertion that the Powhatan attack did indeed occur.

Based on the archeological digs that occurred in the 1970s and 80s, the number of Chesapeakes killed by the Powhatans was nowhere near the number of those “ancient enemies” that threatened the Powhatans enough to utterly eradicate them in the early seventeenth century.

300 to 400 people. For a more detailed table of population figures of Powhatan fighting warriors from their respective nations, see Maurice Mook’s article, “The Aboriginal Population of Tidewater Virginia,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 46, no. 2 (April 1, 1944): 194. In Mook’s table, Smith estimated the number of Chesapeake fighting warriors at 100. Mooney’s estimation was much higher at 350.

Aaron Applegate, “Va. Beach Marker Remembers Area’s Early Residents,” PilotOnline.com, April 9, 2009, http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/va-beach-marker-remembers-areas-early-residents, [accessed February 23, 2015]. The physical description of the location where the bodies were found is here: “1914-1950 Thomas Bishop Lane, about 300 feet north of intersection with N Great Neck Road, Virginia Beach, VA 23454. The marker is on the right when traveling north on Thomas Bishop Lane, just past John B. Dey Elementary School.”
It may be that only the male, Chesapeake warriors were killed in the attack. The women, according to pre-contact customs, would have been taken as servants or wives, while the children may have been incorporated into Powhatan families and later adopted as sons and daughters. After four hundred years, it is still too soon to state with any certainty what happened to the Chesapeakes around the time English planned to make the coastal region their new home. There is not enough evidence to know exactly how many Chesapeakes died, if their deaths commenced just after the turn of the seventeenth century, and if those deaths were the result of a massive Powhatan attack meant to forever eradicate the Chesapeake people from the coastal lands of the Powhatan.  

Despite what appeared to be a lack of archeological evidence bolstering Strachey’s claims that every single one of the Chesapeakes was killed by the Powhatans, Rountree agrees with his assessment. She argues the attacks on the Chesapeakes happened because the paramount chief felt threatened by his “ancient enemies” due to the prophecies of his werowances: “Accordingly [Powhatan] completely obliterated that people with a thoroughness unusual in Virginia Algonquian warfare. Their territory was then resettled, probably by the neighboring Nansemonds.”

Hantman also concurs with Rountree’s conclusion that although unusual, the Powhatans did appear to annihilate not just some, but “all of the [Chesapeakes] inhabitants.” He reasons that although it was rare for an Algonquian leader to take the drastic measure of “obliterating” an entire population of one’s enemies, Chief Powhatan likely did so because he genuinely believed in the threat posed by enemies from the Chesapeake Bay. Hantman postulates that the prophecies were the key to understanding why Powhatan reacted so harshly to the Chesapeakes.

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360 Some of the skeletal remains dated much further back to the Pleistocene Age, but most date to the early seventeenth century.
and with far less force when it came time to effectively stymying the colonial efforts of the English. He suggests that the second set of prophecies fulfilled historical events that had played out in the Chesapeake coastal lands over the previous two and a half decades, bolstering the threat of a third invasion, of which the prophecies spoke, and what was needed, no matter how bloody, to deal with that threat.\footnote{Hantman, “Caliban’s Own Voice,” 76-78.} Strachey specifically indicated that the latter prophecies pointed to three distinct invasions, but only after the third would the invaders finally subjugate the Powhatans: “…twice they should give overthrow and dishearten the attempters, and such straungers as should invade their territories or labour to settle a plantation among them, but the third tyme they themselves should fall into their subjection.”\footnote{Smith, Captain John Smith, Ed. Horn, 1085.}

Looking back, Powhatan and his advisers may have, according to Hantman, interpreted the first threat to his people as having occurred when the Spanish invaded the Powhatan territory in the 1570s while the Powhatans were in the middle of expanding their paramount chiefdom. Don Luis vanquished those enemies when he and a few handpicked warriors killed the priests and left only one small boy alive. The assumptive second threat to the Powhatans may have been the arrival of the English to Roanoke Island and the Chesapeake Bay fifteen years after the Spanish failed to sustain the Jesuit mission in Powhatan territory. If the Powhatans viewed these events as part of the three attempts by enemies from the east to destroy their world, then those same werowances might have believed that eradicating any trace of the Chesapeakes, who were rumored to have Strangers from the east living among them — the supposed “lost colonists of Roanoke” that Strachey and Smith contended had survived until the decisive attack against the Chesapeakes — would once and for all undermine the veracity of the prophecies.
Hantman offers that the Powhatans annihilated the Chesapeakes to undermine the conclusion of the “third tyme” or attempt of the “invaders” to subjugate the Powhatans. In other words, the Powhatans would not fall into the subjection of the enemies from the east if there were no enemies in the east to subdue them. According to this theory, the Powhatans killed the Chesapeakes, along with the remainder of the Strangers from Roanoke — as Smith described in his conversation with Powhatan — and were surprised a short time later to find a new contingency of Strangers that arrived from the Chesapeake Bay and showed no sign of leaving the Powhatan territory any time soon. Hantman further suggests that

Powhatan operated within the historical context of a myth which predicted the conquest of his nation… by a people who would arrive via the Chesapeake Bay… and he was then resigned to the foretold success of the third colonial effort which occurred at Jamestown. While accepting that prophecy, he tried to attempt to control his own fate as a political and economic leader by controlling the economic alliance between the two nations.\textsuperscript{364}

Hantman was not merely speculating about the psychological state of Chief Powhatan and his advisers when the English Strangers first appeared in Chesapeake Bay. If the prophecies had led to the destruction of all the Chesapeakes, or at the very least the deaths of some fifty to sixty warriors, then the arrival of the English in spite of the Powhatans’ attempts to undermine their own prophecies may have signaled an acceptance of the inevitable outcome the prophecies portended: subjugation by an enemy from the Chesapeake Bay. As history unfolded, it became apparent to the Powhatans that they had attacked the wrong enemies. The “ancient enemies” of the Powhatans were gone, but then a new company of Strangers arrived at nearly the same time. As the new Strangers settled at Fort James, the Powhatans appeared to have changed their tactics from outright aggression to accommodation and appeasement.

In the winter of 1607, it seems likely that the Powhatans did attempt to change the trajectory of their relationship with the English. It had started out violent, with each group

\textsuperscript{364} Hantman, “Caliban’s Own Voice,” 76-78.
attacking the other for reasons usually connected to the others’ perceptions of theft and rightly adjudicating the matters according to their cultural prerogatives, but Chief Powhatan and his brother, Opechancanough, hoped that might change when Captain Smith and a small band of soldiers stumbled into the Virginian woodlands in the first week of December looking to trade English goods for Powhatan foodstuffs. From the moment the English arrived in the foreign environment, they had been dependent upon the Indians for foodstuffs and as the winter solstice drew nearer, the Powhatans reduced the amount of food supplies they were willing to give the English. Real scarcity, according to Philip Barbour, “forced Smith to initiate trading voyages” at a time when it would not have been advantageous for indigenous communities to reduce their own dwindling supply of foodstuffs.365

On December 12, 1607, a “hunting party under Opechancanough” captured Smith and killed most of the remaining English accompanying their captain. The “Pamaunck” Indians took Smith “to a temporary lodge” and he stayed with Opechancanough for three or four days, at which time the captain witnessed “certain Indian rites or conjurations” and then “marched around for four or five days” until he was “led to Opechancanough’s residence.” Smith related that Opechancanough entertained him for several more days, then led him to a different hunting town and finally, after two weeks, turned him over to Chief Powhatan.366

What followed was the infamous “Pocahontas episode,” and it probably did not occur as Smith described it. Although the tale hardly needs retelling, according to Smith — who first wrote of the incident a decade and a half after it supposedly took place — the fourth daughter of the paramount chief, “… a child of tenne yeares old,” Pocahontas, intervened in the nick of time

366 Ibid., 20-21.
to save the captain from an execution that purportedly would have left his skull crushed beneath “two great stones.” Writing in 1624, Smith explained,

Having feasted him after their best barbarous manner they could, a long consultation was held, but the conclusion was, two great stones were brought before Powhatan: then as many as could layd hands on him, dragged him to them, and theron laid his head, and being ready with their clubs, to beate out his braines, Pocahontas the Kings dearest daughter, when no intreaty could prevaile, got his head in her armes, and laid her owne upon his to save him from death: wherat the Emperour was contented he should live to make him hatchets, and her bells, beads, and copper; for they though him as well of all occupations as themselves.367

If Smith’s account is true, the captain experienced what he initially believed was a violent altercation with the Powhatans, which concluded with his life being spared due to the quick actions of an Indian princess named Pocahontas.

Most historians tend to discount the romantic narrative of a white or European, swashbuckling sea captain rescued from certain death by a “noble savage princess” mere moments after the paramount chief and his family had feasted to the honor of their exotic guest. Barbour surmises that the event did occur, but was one of the first to provide greater context to what he understood was an elaborate, indigenous adoption ritual most likely rooted in establishing peaceful relations between the English Strangers and the Powhatan Real People. In *Pocahontas and Her World*, Barbour contends that “the ceremony of which Smith had been the object was almost certainly a combination of mock execution and salvation, a token of adoption in Powhatan’s tribe.” He went on to suggest that Smith had experienced some kind of “adolescence rite,” whereby Chief Powhatan himself “possibly” acted as the captain’s “foster-father” in order to gain knowledge of how long the foreigners intended to stay in the region,

367 Ibid., 151.
“learn more about the whitemen,” and gain access to their prestigious goods that included weapons and tools.\(^{368}\)

William Rasmussen and Robert Tilton speculate that some variation of the “Pocahontas episode” likely took place, but rather than an elaborate adoption ritual, the entire event was staged to test the captain’s mettle. In short, it was not a mock execution, but an altered gauntlet of sorts. In this scenario, Smith passed the test and peaceful relations between the two would follow, accompanied by an exchange of agreed upon gifts.\(^{369}\)

Rountree has probably devoted the most attention to the “rescue incident.” Using her extensive knowledge of the Powhatan people, she poked numerous holes in a story she avers was far more fiction than fact. After analyzing Smith’s own writings, Rountree highlights that Smith had “a knack for getting into drastic situations” only to be “rescued by high-ranking females. He claimed it happened [to] him not only in Virginia but also in Turkey and the Russian steppes.” First of all, Rountree contends, the method of execution that Smith described in 1624 — death by having one’s head bludgeoned with stones and clubs, was “all wrong” for a foreigner. Such deaths, she concludes, were reserved for “disobedient subjects,” not foreigners. Captured prisoners, like Smith, were either forced to run a gantlet or succumbed to a slow death by torture immediately following their captivity.\(^{370}\)

Rountree further questions why Opechancanough and Powhatan feasted Smith with food and rituals for several days, only to threaten to kill him at the last moment. The feasting Smith and his companions experienced was reserved for honored guests, not captives about to be executed. She highlights that “the behaviors described by Smith [did] not correspond with the adoption procedures recorded for any other Woodland Indian tribe[s]” in the area. Neither did

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\(^{370}\) Rountree, *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough*, 76-80.
the “adolescent rite” of passing from a boy into a man fit Smith’s descriptions, since the
_Huskanaw_ involved Algonquian boys who ran a gauntlet three times, while older boys protected
them. Afterward, those boys partook in a feast, “ran the gauntlet a fourth time and were
[symbolically] ‘killed,’ and then spent several months in seclusion before returning to their
towns as ‘men.’” In short, Smith included a common “literary devise” of the day “to make his
stories more interesting.”

Rountree did not deny, however, that the Powhatans intended to “forge an alliance” with
the English by capturing their leader and involuntarily subjecting him to their rituals that would
conclude with his assimilation, and by proxy, the assimilation of the English into the “Powhatan
body.” According to Rountree, Pocahontas and her supposed heroics were neither needed nor
likely to have occurred for the purpose of forging an alliance with the English. Instead,

Powhatan concluded that the Strangers were worth gathering in as allies against his
inland enemies. However, they were also well worth keeping a close watch upon. So he
offered the town of Capahowasick and its environs, just downriver from his capital, to the
guest and his compatriots.

A couple of days later, just prior to the New Year, Smith “was taken to ‘a great house in the
woods,’ presumably a temple, led inside, and set down next to the fire in the anteroom.” This
particular event, Rountree surmises, “would have been a signal honor, [and] if true…” would
have “indicated his new status as a [Powhatan] werowance.”

Gallivan and Rountree agreed that following the ritual performed by Chief Powhatan,
Smith became a Powhatan werowance and son of Wahunsenacawh — the name Powhatan’s
people called him. The chief announced this publically to his people after Smith emerged from
the “structure in the woods,” and in February of 1608, Powhatan “reminded Smith that he was
now a werowance and that the colonists were no longer _Tassantasses_ (strangers) or Paspaehegs

\[371\] Ibid., 79-80.
\[372\] Ibid., 83.
\[373\] Ibid., 84.
(the territory surrounding Jamestown) but ‘Powhatans.’” Gallivan concludes that Wahunsenacawh attempted to incorporate the English into the Powhatan community “by creating lasting social and political dependencies through the language of kinship and the material of food and symbolically potent goods,” but it was all for naught.  

Captain Smith and by extension, the English, may not have understood the impact of the Powhatan “alliance rituals,” but there is little doubt the chief believed the English were now fully under the dominion of his paramount chiefdom. He sent Smith away with the promise of “corn, venison, or what I wanted to feed us;” in exchange for “hatchets and copper we should make him.” If the English remained good subjects, the chief promised them that “none should disturb us.”

To reiterate, Chief Powhatan hoped to assimilate the English into Powhatan Real People. He did not act out of indigenous naivety, nor did he underestimate the strength of the small English colony. According to Smith, Powhatan told him

some doubt I have of your coming hither, that makes me not so kindly seeke to relieve you as I would; for many do inform me, your coming hither is not for trade, but to invade my people, and possesse my Country, who dare not come to bring you corne, seeing you thus armed with your men. To fre us of this feare, leave aboard your weapons, for here they are needlesse, we being all friends, and forever Powhatans.

Powhatan could have easily killed John Smith and driven the English from his territory, as he had done with the Chesapeakes and possibly the remaining colonists from Roanoke, but he purposefully chose not to. In the long contested “adoption ceremony/alliance ritual,” Chief Powhatan made Smith and the English his subjects by transforming them into Powhatan Real People.

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374 Gallivan, “Powhatan’s Werowocomoco,” 89. Martin Quitt notes in “Trade and Acculturation at Jamestown, 1607-1609: The Limits of Understanding” that “the Powhatans were not nativists. They were willing to absorb strangers into their society. They had always done so successfully.” 230.

375 Ibid., 81-83.

If the alliance held, the English would no longer be treated as Strangers in the Powhatan territories. Strachey certainly believed this to be the case, for he wrote how Chief Powhatan flattered the English to “take order,” by which he made “the straungers, Kinge James his people, and his people, shalbe all one, brothers, and freindes…” Pocahontas also believed that John Smith had been transformed into a Powhatan Real Person, for she said as much in a letter delivered to Smith many years later in England: “You did promise Powhatan [that] what was yours should bee his, and he the like to you. You called him father, being in his land a stranger, and by the same reason so I must doe you.”

The political maneuver of Chief Powhatan was ingenious in that it transformed — from the perspective of the Powhatans at least, the Strangers from the east into people who would be more than allies, they would be Powhatan Real People and as such, they would be like any other subjected community that had become part of the paramount chiefdom after the Powhatans had conquered them. Theoretically, Powhatans would have no need to conquer other Powhatans, and by capturing the leader of the English colony, Chief Powhatan believed he had neutralized the eastern threat. Once the English Strangers had become Powhatan Real People, the chief attempted to deal with the Chickahamanias, for he considered them a greater threat than his perpetually starving, English subjects. He asked John Smith, and by extension the English, to join him in league against the “mighty people… his enemyes.” While at the same time, Powhatan, according to Strachey, worked to spread rumors to the Chickahamanias that the English could not be trusted and if the opportunity presented itself, to betray their confidence if the English should attempt “to trade with them for corne.” The Chickahamanias evidently took Powhatan’s advice and betrayed the English at their earliest convenience, because Strachey

377 Smith, Captain John Smith, Ed. Horn, 1043.
378 Milton, Big Chief, 322.
379 Smith, Captain John Smith, Ed. Horn, 1043.
complained that not long after the adoption process that transformed the English into Powhatan
Real People, the Chickahamanias, while trading English goods for corn, attacked and “slew three
of our men without Cause or offence given, only put into this Jelousy of our faire dealing with
them by Powhatan.”380

With hindsight being what it is, Chief Powhatan’s efforts did not come to fruition in the
way he hoped or expected. At times, the telos of western colonialism read like one inevitable
European victory after another, which has had the effect of diminishing how susceptible the
English were in their new environs while surrounded by the powerful Powhatans. Strachey felt
the insecurity and wrote that the Powhatans

Remained most perplexed by [our] baffling behavior… Because [we] did not hunt, fish,
or clear fields as was expected of Indian men, arrived without women from an unknown
world, and died in droves on an abandoned peninsula of “waste ground” while harvesting
common timber, the Powhatans could only conclude that the English were an odd,
inferior race from a desolate homeland, most similar to the primitive Monacan
“barbarians”—except for [our]… sophisticated weapons.381

The Strangers appearance in the Powhatan world did not manifest as European superiority;
rather, the English initially emerged as inferior in nearly all respects, minus their weapons and
technology.

Early on, especially as the English showed themselves to be poor farmers in need of
perpetual assistance, the Powhatans felt the reductive ripples of European lifeways as a mere
annoyance. However, it did not take long for those ripples to begin compounding into a steady
wave of violence across Powhatan territories. After Powhatan released Smith in January of
1608, the chief decreased the amount of foodstuffs he was willing to part with when Smith and
the English colonists refused to follow through on their agreement to exchange foodstuffs for

380 Ibid., 1043-44.
381 William Strachey, The Historie of Travaile Into Western Britania: Expressing the Cosmographie and Comodities
of the Country, Together With the Manners and Customes of the People. Gathered and Observed as Well by Those
Who Went First Thither as Collected by William Strachey, Gent., the First Secretary of the Colony., (London: The
Hakluyt Society, 1849), 101.
iron tools and weapons. Instead the English made demands on the Nandsamunds. A foraging party prized 400 bushels of corn from the Indians by threatening to destroy their canoes. As the English chopped their canoes to pieces, the Nandsamunds pleaded that the theft would deplete their entire supply of corn and endanger all of their lives. Tensions increased when a warrior fired off an arrow. The English responded with a musket volley, followed by setting fire to a Nandsamund home. The Nandsamunds acquiesced and gave up all their corn. The English then “visited one town after another, but found all the people fled until they reached Apamatuck, ‘where we found not much; that they had equally divided.’” The English left behind “copper and other trinkets in payment” and managed to return to the Fort James settlement with “as much [corn] as the boats could carry.”

As the winter dragged on, the number of healthy English men dwindled. They were starving to death and “we, having so much threatened their [Indian] ruin and the razing of their houses, boats, and weirs,” that in “extreme frost and snow, they brought us provision on their naked backs.” The harsh tactics of the English were not technically condoned by the Virginian charter or its founders, but they occurred precisely because of real scarcity, combined with English reductive reasoning that left no alternative but theft and violence. The English men in charge were quick to claim that the colony nearly starved to death in the winter of 1608 because the colonists refused to grow corn in the spring of 1607, but “laziness” may not have been the real culprit. Martin Quitt posits that “an immigrant to Jamestown did not have to be indolent to eschew planting for his sustenance. Englishmen were becoming accustomed to buying what they ate, especially if they were craftsmen in the metropolis, where much more food

382 Mooney, “The Powhatan Confederacy,” 137.
383 Ibid.
was bought than grown.” According to this line of thinking, the colonists had become so dependent on market based solutions for their sustenance back in England, that when it came time to shift toward subsistence living in Jamestown, they simply could not comprehend the necessary transformation needed to sustain them through the winter. Whether it was optimistic thinking, simple shortsightedness, deteriorating health, or an inability to sustain healthy crops because of inadequate knowledge or inadequate supplies of fresh water, their reliance on reductive reasoning left them unprepared for the realities of living in a foreign environment, while simultaneously cutoff from any community willing to see them through their crisis without the continual threat of violence.

Over the following year, there were numerous altercations that led to conflict and violence between the Powhatans and the English colonizers. To document them all would result in an exercise of repetition ad nauseum. Rather than continue in that same vein, the waves of violence based in transformation ideologies came full circle and crashed onto the Jamestown colony as a crisis known as “the starving times” commenced during the winter of 1609-10. The account of the English explained that

so great was our famine, that a Salvage we slew, and buried, the poorer sort tooke him up againe and eat him, and so did divers one another boyled and stewed with roots and herbs: And one amongst the rest did kill his wife, powdered her, and had eaten part of her before it was knowne, for which hee was executed, as hee well deserved; now whether shee was better roasted, boyled or carbonado’d, I know not, but of such a dish as powdered wife I never heard of. This was that time, which still to this day we called the starving time.\footnote{385}{Quitt, “Trade and Acculturation at Jamestown,” 233.}

These are they, that roared out the tragicall historie of the man eating of his dead wife in Virginia; when the master of this Ship willingly confess’d before 40 witnesses, that at their comming awaie, they left three moneths victuals, and all the cattell living in the Fort: sometimes they reported that they saw this horrible action, sometimes that Captaine Daviessayd so, sometimes that one Beadle the Lieutenant of Captaine Davies did relate it,\footnote{385}{John Smith, Captain John Smith: A Select Edition of His Writings, Ed. Karen Kupperman, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 130.}
varying this report into diversities of false colours, which hold no likeness and proportion.\textsuperscript{386}

The English typically viewed themselves as superior to the Indians in nearly every respect, but they were the ones who succumbed to an act normally attributed to “wild savages,” which was the consumption of human flesh — cannibalism.\textsuperscript{387} A number of explanations have been given to explain the famine and strife of “the starving time;” most popular of which, Hume argues, dealt with the ineptitude of the gentlemen colonists who were both inexperienced in agricultural planting, animal husbandry, and wilderness survival.\textsuperscript{388} More recently, other historians placed equal weight upon the environment; specifically, the seven year long drought that plagued the Virginian woodlands during the first decade of the seventeenth century.

Using dendrochronology to determine the amount of water captured in tree rings during the aforementioned early colonial period, Dennis Blanton maintains that “the most severe seven-year regional drought in the last 770 years occurred between 1606 and 1612.”\textsuperscript{389} Fausz suggests that the first two Anglo-Powhatan wars “occurred between 1609 and 1616” and Blanton adds that the end of major conflicts between the English and Powhatans corresponded with the “end of the drought… [which was] probably not coincidental.”\textsuperscript{390}

\textsuperscript{386} Counsel for Virginia (England and Wales), *A True Declaration of the Estate of the Colonie in Virginia, With a Confutation of Such Scandalous Reports as Have Tended to the Disgrace of so Worthy an Enterprise*, (Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 2008), 38.

\textsuperscript{387} See Bruce Bower, “Cannibalism in Colonial America,” *Science News* 183, no. 11 (June 1, 2013): 5–6. Historians have extensively discussed whether or not “the starving time” did in fact include cannibalism. New evidence supports the claim that at least one woman was cannibalized. The girl dubbed “Jane” suffered from “cuts and puncture marks on the left side of the cranium and the lower jaw [which] resulted from someone using a knife in a sawing motion to remove the brain and tissue from the face and throat, including the tongue.” Unique to the human bones of cannibalized bodies were “traditional butchery techniques” from disparate cutters. James Horn concludes that although “Jane’s” skeletal remains are the only surviving evidence of cannibalism in Jamestown, “We don’t think Jane was alone in being cannibalized at Jamestown.”


\textsuperscript{390} Ibid., 78.
The mortality rate of the English colonists in the first decade at Jamestown was shockingly high. By 1616, 80 percent of the transplanted colonists were dead. Referencing Quitt, Blanton avers that an analysis of Powhatans at the same time showed ‘the natives experiencing no evident increases in their death rate or notable declines in health, although their previously noted comments to John Smith imply a level of strain.’ That Powhatans did not resort to cannibalism during this time is not insignificant. The Powhatans were not displaced in their environment; they were agriculturists living as semi-nomadic people along a section of Virginia their ancestors had settled several hundred years previous; they were not dependent upon their neighbors for foodstuffs; and most importantly, they were a community with a culture where trade and exchange did not supplant their ability to exist in an environment racked by what was arguably the worst drought in eight hundred years.

For many of the early Jamestown colonists, the incentive to move to a foreign environment without a social support system, without the promise of ever returning home, and without all the accoutrements — whatever they might be — of English society, was based in some form of profit or gain. Profit was a great motivator for colonial projects, but the competition involved in reductive economic-ways promoted individuation, not community, which was inherently problematic for a people dependent on each other and their indigenous neighbors for foodstuffs. It was even more problematic for the individuated members of the English colony as they suffered through “the starving time.” The necessary bonds of social cohesion were lacking in Jamestown. Instead of suffering together, as Algonquian Indian communities did at the time, George Percy related firsthand how

A worlde of miseries ensewed as the Sequell will expresse unto yow, in so mutche that some to satisfye their hunger have Robbed the store for the w[hi]ch I Caused them to be

\[391\] Ibid.
\[392\] Ibid., 79.
executed. Then haveinge fedd [on] our horses and other beastes as longe as they Lasted, we weare gladd to make shifte w[i]th vermin as dogs Catts Ratts and myce all was fishe that Came to Nett to satisfye Crewell hunger, as to eate Bootes shoes or any other leather some Colde come by and those beinge Spente and devoured some weare inforced to searche the woodes and to feede upon Serpentts and snakes and to digge the earthe for wylde and unknowne Rootes, where many of our men ware Cutt of and slayne by the Salvages. And now famin beginneinge to Looke gastely and pale in very face, that notheinge was Spared to mainteyne Lyfe and to doe those things w[hi]ch seame incredible, as to digge upp deade corpes outt of graves and to eate them. And some have Licked upp the Bloode w[hi]ch hathe fallen from their weake fellowes.  

Percy wrote of the disastrous “starving time” over a decade and a half after the incident, and Mark Nicholls, following Phillip Barbour’s lead, notes that Percy was not only defending himself against attacks from John Smith — who had besmirched Percy’s name on at least two different occasions in his Generall Historie — but genuinely felt the lingering traces of an experience that still haunted him and wanted others to understand the “sense of bodily, and moral, failure… to set the details, suitably glossed, on the record.” Nicholls points out that Percy’s account highlighted “the catastrophic consequences of bad luck and weak command structures.” It was a document that explained how a colony “bereft of leadership” would lead to a situation where “the settlers fell out among themselves [as] disease and starvation took hold.”

Percy described Jamestown as a place utterly cut off from any sense of social cohesion, both inside and outside the fort walls. He lamented the terrible fate of a hunting party that went in search of food, “only to be ambushed by Indians.” And as much as he “deplored the disaster,” Nicholls suggests that Percy “almost conceded the justice of the Indians’ actions when they contemptuously stuffed the mouths of the English corpses with food, a gesture redolent of the ‘violent application of irony.’” Nicholls concludes that the English corpses stuffed with Powhatan food represented a scene where “the bonds of common humanity fall away.” The reason the Indians might have been

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394 Ibid., 230.
justified in their violent application of irony, according to Percy, stemmed from a violent episode committed by the English against the Indians prior to the foraging attack. Paranoia set in among the English and “dyv[e]rs Indyans” that normally came to trade victuals for English goods, were accused of spying and “S[i]r Tho[mas] Gates Cawed [them] to be apprehended and executed…”

Meanwhile, the English set upon themselves. A man who was accused of killing and eating his wife was hanged “by the Thumbes w[i]th weightes att his feete a quarter of an howere berfore he wolde Confesse the same.” The crisis, Nicholls admits, allowed the English to descend into committing illegal acts of torture against their own countrymen. Those who attempted to flee and join Algonquian communities were recaptured as deserters and

in a moste severe mannor… executed. Some [were] hanged some burned some to be broken upon wheles others to be Staked and some to be shott to deathe, all theis extreme and crewel tortures… To terrify the reste for attempteinge the Lyke…

Although it would be unfair to telescope the colonists’ behavior as the inevitable culmination of the “starving times,” the breakdown of normative English cultural values occurred, in part, because reductive practices were in place that fostered division in the face of crisis, instead of cohesion. It was not that a series of mistakes inadvertently led the English to turn on one another, and in at least one case, resort to cannibalism. Since the entire enterprise was essentially based in the commodification of the environment and the reduction of the people living in it, the most base instincts for maintaining life, against the mores of “civilization,” subsumed any value outside of the individuated task of survival. Reductive ways and the response of transforming the New World and its indigenous inhabitants to resources or inferior Indian others, respectively, left no alternative but the complete reduction of those who hoped to make the New World into the Old, and partially succeeded in a manner they never intended.

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395 Ibid., 236.  
396 Ibid.
Conclusion

At this point and time, there is simply not enough information available to adequately determine whether or not the influence of Europeans and their reductive ideologies played any part in creating psychic anxieties among the Powhatans that led to the complete eradication of the Chesapeakes. The only evidence that exists, if biased English sources can be trusted at all, came from the colonizers of Roanoke and Jamestown, who, for obvious reasons, retold the tales that seemed to reaffirm through some kind of indigenous predestination the upcoming results of their colonial ambitions in the New World. Such a message appears after the fact as little more than a conqueror’s trope — a convenient bit of propaganda used by those who ultimately hope to control their historical arc.

English bias alone, however, is not enough to dismiss the Algonquian prophecies altogether. The fact that hundreds of Chesapeakes lived east of the Powhatans on the Chesapeake Peninsula when Thomas Hariot and John White visited them in the winter of 1585, but none could be found — not a single Chesapeake Indian remained in the area — just 23 years later, speaks to the brevity of Algonquian anxieties in the region at the time. It could be argued, however that as former rivals to the Powhatans, the Chesapeakes merely suffered from standing in the way of Chief Powhatan’s burgeoning paramount chiefdom. The problem with this argument is that it does little to explain why none of the other nations the Powhatans conquered had prophecies that inextricably intertwined their fates together in a zero-sum, kill or be destroyed, solution. Furthermore, Hariot concluded that the Chesapeakes who hosted him and White specifically attributed their prophecies of indigenous doom to the emergence of the English in their region in 1585. That is the marked difference between the Chesapeake and Powhatan prophecies: the Chesapeakes placed the onus of the threat on the English, while the
Powhatans vocally feared the Chesapeakes. According to Smith, Strachey, and all the primary sources that are currently available, only “ancient enemies” from the Chesapeake Bay were prophesied to destroy and supplant the Powhatans. What the Powhatan prophecies failed to vocalize was that the Powhatans’ enemies — the Chesapeakes — coincidentally, harbored the English in 1585 and may have taken in scores more of the English colonists after 1587. Whatever relationship the English had with the Powhatans — if they did indeed have a relationship of any kind, assuming they settled with the Chesapeakes after 1587 — is a matter of pure speculation.

Setting aside the speculative then, what is known for certain is that the English did impact the Powhatans in the Chesapeake Bay by creating a rippling effect that began in 1606 when Captain Samuel Mace killed a Powhatan chief and “took his people” in a trade negotiation that deteriorated into fatal violence, and ended when Chief Opechancanough took Captain John Smith captive, thinking he and Mace were one in the same person. If Strachey was correct when he noted that just prior to the establishment of Fort James that the Powhatans had wiped out any trace of the Chesapeakes — meaning, the event may have occurred in 1606 or 1607 — then there is yet another correlation between the actions of the English in the New World, in this case the attacks orchestrated by Mace, to the destruction of the Chesapeakes — a nation that befriended the English in 1585 — a short time later.

One attack may have had nothing to do with the other, but when the presence of Don Luis is factored into the mix — he lived less than a day’s walking distance from the Chesapeake Bay — then there is every indication that with the elimination of the Jesuits in Powhatan territory in 1571 that the district chief contributed to the rising levels of psychic anxieties that Algonquian people were experiencing toward the end of the century. By the middle of the sixteenth century,
indigenes living all along the coast had learned to be leery of the Spanish, but when the English went to war with the Algonquians of Roanoke and decapitated the head of one of their more powerful chiefs, it would have become evident to anyone in the region that they were a dangerous people with violent ambitions. Their reputation would have suffered further degradation after John White accidentally attacked his only allies when the English returned in 1587.

None of the violent interactions dissuaded Algonquians from attempting to trade with the Spanish or the English during the numerous times Europeans emerged on their shores, but permanent colonization and trade were never the same phenomenon. One could strengthen a community and the other could destroy it. Anna Johnston and Alan Lawson sum up the matter perfectly when they wrote in “Settle Colonies” that “Empty land can be settled, but occupied land can only be invaded.”\(^{397}\) The lost colonists of Roanoke would have been refugees to those who accepted them into their communities, but that did not mean that their presence in the Chesapeake Bay region did not come without unsettling realizations for those living in close proximity to them. The survivors would have eventually expressed their hope that more of their English piers were returning to find them, and when they did, they wished to permanently live on Algonquian land, not as Real People, but as perpetual Strangers — Strangers determined to transform indigenous lands into missions, outposts, or towns; indigenous belief systems into a Christian religion disconnected from the environment; and indigenous people into subjects ruled by those who valued goods over the people who used those goods to perpetuate Indian lifeways.

The reason for the emphasis on the introduction of reductive ideologies and how they may have rippled through Algonquian communities and contributed to an intensification in

violence between the Powhatans and their rivals stems from what most anthropologists and Early American historians have concluded was aberrant pre-contact behavior. The extermination of the Chesapeakes stood out as a catastrophic outlier that pointed toward a series of crises that manifested on the heels of a century long first contact event between disparate European groups and equally disparate Indigenous nations. Disease, warfare, displacement, slaving raids, trade, and colonial schemes impacted the New World directly and the result has been extensively examined, but ideologies concomitant to first contact events were equally powerful in their ability to disrupt indigenous communities, even when those events occurred hundreds of miles apart and only occasionally over several decades.

Chief Powhatan and his priests did not have to directly encounter the Jesuit missionaries in 1570, or the English colonists some 15 years later, or even the numerous European ships that sailed the Atlantic waters in search of slaves, in order to feel the rippling effects created by Europeans. Moreover, examining those connections should not diminish Indian agency or historical contingency either. Indian autonomy should not suffer reduction in the analysis of conflict, crisis, and violence in early colonial America. Instead, the ways in which cultures deal with change — because some change from contact is absolutely inevitable — provides an avenue for understanding why some communities were more adversely impacted by crisis and violence than others. For instance, the Monacans, who also had prophecies about Strangers coming to displace them, avoided the English for as long as they could. The Chesapeakes also believed in similar prophecies, but they befriended the English. It was only the Powhatans — struggling to maintain the largest and most power paramount chiefdom in the region — that decided to take a violent course of action to undermine the outcome that the prophecies portended.
It is noteworthy that the fears inspired by those who lived in the Chesapeake Bay may have inadvertently caused the destruction of the few remaining lost colonists of Roanoke. Especially so, considering the only way the colonists could have survived was if they worked at discarding their European culture, replete with its reductivism and ambivalence, and accepted Algonquian assimilation. The connection may hint at the possibility that if the colonists lived among the Chesapeakes, they did not entirely discard their Western ideologies, but continued to play a part in Chesapeake politics that furthered psychic anxieties in the region.

Perhaps it is a heavy handed conclusion, but it appears as if ideologies based in reductivism — that is, ideologies that are specifically based in violent transformation or reducing humans to subjects and environments to a wish list of catalogued goods — objectifies the real to such an extent that the process of isolation and individuation inadvertently destroys not just communities, but individuals, the environment, and finally itself. The process of calculated transformation rooted in economic competition is probably not intrinsically sustainable. In Jamestown, the English survived because an ever greater number of reinforcements arrived at the exact moment the final 60 colonists attempted to return home. European immigration powered reductive policies in Jamestown, whereby a kind of English diaspora fueled what otherwise should have ended with either more lost colonists assimilated into indigenous communities, or those colonists perishing from starvation and Indian warfare. Simply put, the ideologies that created Jamestown would have failed if not for the concentrated effort of hundreds, then thousands, then tens of thousands and millions of Europeans willing themselves against the shortcomings of an ambivalent-in-hindsight, violent system of change.

Violence, in North America at least, was part and parcel to European colonialism, and because reductive policies were iterative and self-replicating, small ripples created in the
sixteenth century did not dissipate or disappear in the following centuries. Instead, with each new interaction between Europeans and Indians, the ripples turned into cascading waves that did ultimately transform the continent. When Europeans worked to reshape the world by extending their hegemonic reach, or gain access to finite resources and occupy foreign soil in a hostile environment, their colonizing and trading schemes, underpinned by accumulation and mercantilism, intensified the levels of violence in North America. Therefore, violence would abound while “peaceful notions of civilization” ambivalently followed in its wake. Citing Francis Jennings, J. Frederick Fausz aptly describes the contradiction as the “‘cant of conquest’—the war of words with which the literate victors justified the demographic disasters and cultural catastrophes that had ravaged indigenous populations.”

It would be facile to state that the unintended consequences of European pathogens and the violence that followed Spanish, English, French, and Dutch colonialism were without agency or reason, or that the waves of violence that rolled over the New World at the end of the seventeenth century were altogether inevitable and the unfortunate fallout of biological dispersion between geographically distinct peoples. This line of reasoning suggests that because Europeans accidentally arrived with harmful contagions, those contagions were themselves inert and outside the any discussion involving agency or intention when it comes to examining colonial and indigenous violence. It is certainly true that Europeans did not purposefully infect American Indians. It is also true that those pathogens were carried inside of human vessels who came to the New World with ideologies based in transformation. Taken together, foreign pathogens created an unintentional space in the New World that many Europeans regarded as

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God’s providence, whereby dependency upon European goods was encouraged as evidence of the eventual transmogrification of the “savage” into the “civilized.”

Furthermore, it was no coincidence that Indians like Don Luis eradicated the Spanish threat in Powhatan territory at the end of the sixteenth century. The Ajacán Powhatans may not have left a written record of how the reducción worked to undermine their autonomy, their religion, and their dependence upon Powhatan culture and living on lands in common, but their arrows etched their dissatisfaction in Spanish bones. At some level, the Algonquians living up and down the Carolina and Virginia Coast understood that European traders, merchants, and colonists meant to reduce their independence, their religion, their resources, their cultures, and their very communities, but it was not the type of transformation they wanted or willingly accepted.

One of the more interesting aspects of reductivism and the ambivalence that followed was how it encouraged reckless and irrational behavior in the face of real scarcity. At a time when the English privateers on Roanoke had lost most of their foodstuff because of a shipwreck, they still burned a crop of maize because of the dependence they had on a fetishized silver cup. The contradiction inherent in reductivism emerged as a crisis that harmed normative relations that left the English with less food at a time when building communal relationships for the purpose of staving off death by starvation was imperative to their continued survival. None of that mattered, however. The reductive process of dependence upon market values over communal mores seemed to trigger an irrational optimism that discounted or dismissed the needs of the indigenous people, as well as the sustenance they provided that ensured the lives of the English until more supplies arrived later in the spring. Whether it was irrational exuberance, simple shortsightedness, or plain old military aggression, the people — in this case, the Indians
of Aquascogok — caught in the middle of ideologies based in reductivism tended to get reduced below the already established value of the fetishized good, meaning the silver cup was worth more, consciously or not, than the maize that was burned, the Indians who depended on that maize, and ultimately the English themselves, who could have starved to death for their capricious actions.

Furthermore, reductivism placed a higher value on consumer goods and dependence upon the marketplace, than on human life and the communal bonds that make people dependent upon each other for survival. This is why those who grow up with ideologies based in reduction could not allow others to exist autonomously outside their environment. The unspoken goal of reductivist ideologies was to transform people, plants, animals, and minerals into reduced objects beneficial to a system based in extraction, consumption, growth, accumulation, and utility. There was no easy way to transform a person into a utility, or a community into a marketplace, or a tree into a ship, or foodstuffs into scarce commodities, without creating some form of friction. That friction was the derivative of an iterative process and manifested as conflict, crisis, and violence.

Over time, as Europeans colonized the New World, they transformed indigenous spaces into places where conflict and crisis thrived. Violence — by demanding conversion, taking slaves, and imagining the New World into a warehouse of goods for the betterment of those living in the Old — was part and parcel to the notional system of transformation, and that which began one way, tended to create more of the same. The ideologies of reductivism that were based in scarcity, competition, mercantilism, market economics, and extractionism, worked as a binary-othering machine — a metaphorical machine of economic indicators bolstered by zero-sum, all or nothing religious principles that determined the superior value of goods over and
above the inferior value of people, human relationships, and the communities they belonged to. The ideologies of the “civilized” then made peaceful cohabitation with the “uncivilized” nearly impossible. The contradictions of reductivism helped create a world where violence was excised, as in reduced to the periphery and paradigm of the uncivilized other, and simultaneously enumerated, as in silently extolled by those who valued the world as a silver cup, but were unaware they placed so high a value upon it.
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