THE PHILIPPINES' RICE SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM: 1966-68 AND 1973-75

by

Gabriel U. Iglesias

A Case History

January 1981

East-West Resource Systems Institute
East-West Center
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
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Achieving self-sufficiency in rice production has been one of the top priorities of the Philippine government. This case history discusses the government's two programs to attain this goal.

The case is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the 1966-68 program instituted soon after Ferdinand E. Marcos took over as president. This account discusses in detail the overall environment, program design, and implementation of the rice program, with special emphasis on production goal setting, marketing and distribution, field organization structure, and the framework for overall coordination and control. It brings out the numerous problems encountered at the various stages of the program; and the organizational and administrative steps taken to make this program yield significant results. The pivotal role of leadership in success of this program is also emphasized.

Part 2 of the case describes a second rice self-sufficiency program, Masagana 99, launched in 1973. The two programs are similar in content and are strongly linked to each other. They have, however, entirely different political environments, behavioral components, and major explanatory variables. The 1973 program provides a longer-term perspective for the 1966-68 program and clarifies the nature of the project management cycle. In the context of rice production, attaining self-sufficiency is an ongoing effort and one that cannot be set aside with the achievement of original goals.

Both rice self-sufficient programs are a complex of many subprograms and subprojects, requiring participation of many agencies. This case examines the administration of an interagency umbrella that coordinates, directs, and controls the operations of various agencies.
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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FREQUENTLY USED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Agricultural Credit Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCFA</td>
<td>Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGLF</td>
<td>Agricultural Guarantee and Loan Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Agricultural Productivity Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAE</td>
<td>Bureau of Agricultural Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAEcon</td>
<td>Bureau of Agricultural Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFM</td>
<td>Bureau of Farm Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPI</td>
<td>Bureau of Plant Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Bureau of Soils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANR</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>Department of Agrarian Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBP</td>
<td>Development Bank of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACOMA</td>
<td>Farmer's Cooperative and Marketing Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMT</td>
<td>Farm Management Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYV</td>
<td>High-Yielding Variety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRI</td>
<td>International Rice Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWT</td>
<td>J. Walter Thompson, a public relations agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-99</td>
<td>Masagana 99 Rice Self-Sufficiency Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>Municipal Action Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARIC</td>
<td>National Rice and Corn Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Economic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEDA</td>
<td>National Economic and Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>National Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Provincial Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Philippine National Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Provincial Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Production Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Rice and Corn Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCPCC</td>
<td>Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICOB</td>
<td>Rice and Corn Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPCA</td>
<td>University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-AID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Vast administrative and capital resources are channeled into development projects, but lack of viable policies coupled with poor management results in a waste of these resources in all countries, from highly industrialized to rural societies. Unequal access to these critical resources, together with their sub-optimal use, has seriously hindered the socioeconomic development of many countries.

Indeed, experience indicates that attempts to accelerate economic and social growth have often floundered due to serious problems with policy implementation, project planning, and the management of projects. Despite more than a quarter century of intensive investment in all sectors of the economy and society, there has been either negligible or no increase in the quality of life of the poor, often resulting in misunderstanding and poor relations, both within and among countries.

In response to this situation, the East-West Center has worked, in cooperation with over 50 organizations in 15 countries during the period 1972 to 1977, to develop prototype curriculum materials for the education and training of project managers. Focusing on a new dynamic approach to project management, the prototype curriculum has been formulated within a cohesive framework, one which considers the entire project cycle as an integrated process. Basic to the curriculum is a series of case histories covering the entire spectrum of development projects from identification through completion, with evaluation as a basis for feedback in order to refine the decision-making process and policy guidelines. All cases are written in the framework of the Integrated Project Planning and Management Cycle (IPPMC). The IPPMC is a conceptual tool for observing and analyzing the process that constitutes the life of a development project (see diagram on page viii).

In September 1978, the Exxon Education Foundation awarded the East-West Center Resource Systems Institute (RSI) a two-year grant to research and write 32 case histories of development projects. Awarded under the title of "Cooperative Education and Training of Managers for Development Projects" (MDP), the grant follows up on the initial research and curriculum development of the former PPIPM* project.

The case histories completed or in the process of being researched and written under the terms of reference of the Exxon grant include diverse projects such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, geothermal power stations, biomass energy projects, and small hydro projects for rural development in Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. An exciting spin-off from these cases is a series of books based on groups or packages of cases which are being published by Pergamon Press, Inc. as a part of their Pergamon Policy Studies Series. Clearly, these books will help to optimize the dissemination of knowledge for policymakers, project planners, and project managers.

*PPIPM stands for Public Policy Implementation and Project Management.
These cases would not have been possible without the collaboration and cooperation of many senior scholars and practitioners, and their respective institutions. The General Editors wish to convey warmest thanks and deepest appreciation to Dr. Gabriel Iglesias for this case. A special note of thanks must go to Vicki Nelson for her advice in working closely with the General Editors in the professional editing of the case. Thanks are also extended to Jean Brady for her assistance and to Brenda Steed for the camera-ready typing of the case preparatory to publication. Grateful acknowledgment is also due the Exxon Education Foundation for providing the support to continue the research and writing of these cases. It is hoped that the impact of this cooperative project will have profound implications in the context of international efforts to improve policy guidelines, as well as related project planning and management of development projects for all sectors of the economy and society.

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The Four Phases
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The case study discusses two programs to attain self-sufficiency in rice, a priority concern of the Philippine government since rice is the country's staple food. The primary focus is on the 1966-68 program instituted soon after Ferdinand E. Marcos ascended to the presidency. The factors and circumstances that led to its success, particularly the pivotal role of leadership, will be brought up in this narrative reconstruction of the rice program.

Rice self-sufficiency, however, is a continuing goal; it is one which is not automatically repeated once initial success is attained. This was in fact the experience in the Philippines. Thus, the case includes a discussion of another rice self-sufficiency program, Masagana 99, launched in 1973. The two programs are similar in intent and have strong links to each other. Yet they have different initiating circumstances, organizational and behavioral components, and major explanatory variables. They were also working under widely varying historico-political conditions, the second being under the aegis of the martial law government instituted in 1972. Thus, the discussion of the 1973 program provides a longer-term perspective for the 1966-68 program and clarifies the nature of the program management cycle, given different contexts, technology, individuals, and organizations. At the same time, it shows what happens after a goal which has been attained becomes elusive once more and becomes the object of another full-scale program.

In the course of this study, it will be evident that rice self-sufficiency is a complex of many subprograms and subprojects, each of which could have been the object of independent study and analysis. The sub-areas of the rice program are, however, so interrelated that they are here presented as they have been regarded in the Philippines: as an integrated program that requires the participation of many agencies and, consequently, of an interagency umbrella to coordinate, direct, and control its planning and implementation.

PART I: THE 1966-68 MARCOS RICE SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM

I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND

In predominantly agricultural economies such as the Philippines development efforts and strategies expressed in national development plans generally...
stress agricultural programs, and rice production in particular. However, unlike some export crops in agriculture (sugar, for example), rice production by the 1950's remained very traditional in methods and techniques, a fact which partly accounted for its low productivity.

Historically, the 1966 rice self-sufficiency program instituted by President Ferdinand Marcos may trace its origins from the rice program initiated under the administration of Carlos Garcia (1958-61) and Diosdado Macapagal (1962-65). The enactment of the legislation on "Rice and Corn Production Program" in 1958 was a significant watershed, for it created for the first time an administrative machinery to coordinate the efforts of various bureaus of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) and related agencies concerned with rice production. This was the first recognition that the perennial problem of low productivity (roughly 28 cavans per hectare in 1965) was caused partly by lack of coordinated efforts among government agencies, and partly by the inadequacy of resources allocated to the rice program.

The 1958 law created a Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council (RCPCC) and appropriated annually a sum of 20 million pesos for the program. The DANR Secretary served as chairman of this council, and the members were bureau directors or their equivalents who also coordinated various areas of the program. They were: the director of the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) who served as coordinator for pest control and the seed program; the director of the Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAE), for agricultural extension; the director of Bureau of Soils (BS), for soil management and fertilizer; the governor of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA), for credit services; and the dean of the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines (UPCA), for agricultural research. This organizational structure was replicated at the regional, provincial, and municipal levels (see Figure 1).

Not much headway, however, was made during the first four years of the program, least of all in the area of agency coordination, since the creation and the superimposition of a coordinative body such as the RCPCC tended to upset the prevailing power distribution and relations among the cooperating agencies. Thus, interagency squabbling and rivalries and incidents of lack of cooperation vitiated any concerted efforts towards improving rice production. Furthermore, the glaring omission of the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC), the government agency concerned with the price support and stabilization of rice as well as for its marketing and distribution, made it clear that the rice issue was being narrowly viewed as a simple problem in production.

The rice program received desultory support and attention during the Macapagal administration. President Macapagal instead considered land reform as his priority program. Following the enactment of the Land Reform Code in 1963, the bureaus concerned with the rice program, particularly BAE, provided personnel and resources for the implementation of land reform. This led to the deflection of emphasis away from rice production.

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1 The government recently created a separate Department of Natural Resources. The old Department of Agriculture remains.
FIGURE 1.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RICE & CORN PRODUCTION COORDINATING COUNCIL
(GARCIA ADMINISTRATION, 1958-61)
Aside from organizational problems, the rice program under Macapagal continued to suffer from anemic financial and other resources. For example, the annual commitment of 20 million pesos for the program was not only inadequate, but fund releases actually fell short of the programmed amount. According to one study, only 99 million out of the 140 million pesos committed to the program from 1958 to 1965 were actually released.  

II. PLANNING, APPRAISAL, AND APPROVAL

The formal document outlining the Marcos rice self-sufficiency master program was transmitted to the President on July 21, 1966, roughly six months after he assumed office. This fact reveals neither the time dimensions involved in drafting the program nor the actual start of its implementation.

Triggering Factors

It should be noted that rice self-sufficiency is a continuing program of the government. Thus, the process of identifying various subprograms and projects, of stressing particular aspects for more resource inputs, of appraising their feasibility, and of designing the program/project organization was based on the experience of previous administrations in handling the rice program. In view of the many other development programs competing for scarce resources, the strategy generally adopted by program leaders was to reformulate the existing program by either broadening its scope or adding a new dimension in order to attract political and administrative support. In the case of the 1966 program, a technological breakthrough -- the development of a high-yielding variety (HYV) -- served as the crucial impetus in magnetizing President Marcos' strong commitment to the program, a support essential for elevating it into the status of a high-priority activity of the Philippine government.

Another triggering factor was the persistence of a national program -- low rice production and its impact on prices. It is noteworthy that both the Garcia and Macapagal rice programs failed to achieve self-sufficiency in rice. There was actually a negligible increase in average yield per hectare of only 5.28 cavans during the eight-year period -- from 23.08 cavans in 1958 to 28.36 in 1965. Compounding this problem was the fact that during the Macapagal

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3The annual average yields per hectare in cavans (44 kilograms) from 1958 to 1965 were: 1958 - 23.08; 1959 - 25.15; 1960 - 25.75; 1961 - 26.33; 1962 - 27.95; 1963 - 28.52; 1964 - 28.29; and 1965 - 28.36. See Rafael M. Salas, The Philippines Food Production Program, paper presented to Director-General A.H. Boerma, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, November 1968, p. 11.
administration (1962-65), the government imported a staggering total of 1,543,658 metric tons, which was 1,140,215 metric tons more than the total rice imports for the preceding eight years.4

Presidential candidate Ferdinand E. Marcos included a promise to mount a massive program to attain rice self-sufficiency during the 1965 election campaign. He also charged President Macapagal with sabotaging the domestic rice program by allowing the heaviest importation of rice (569,000 metric tons) in an election year. According to Marcos, importation of rice not only drained precious foreign currency reserves but also helped foreign farmers at the expense of Filipinos.5 After Marcos became the Nationalists Party presidential nominee in mid-1965, he established a Rice Study Committee to be headed by UPCA Dean Dioscoro Umali.

A week after Marcos assumed the Presidency in January, 1966, the Umali Committee submitted its report to the President containing proposals for a "long-range program for self-sufficiency in rice and corn."6 This report was the basis of the Marcos rice program. It also served as the framework for a number of policy measures taken even before its formal adoption in mid-1966. For instance, RCPCC had already launched an experimental rice program in a relatively small area (45,000 hectares of irrigated land) using two innovative approaches recommended by the Umali Committee -- the intensification method (i.e., the concentration of production inputs such as personnel, funds, and technical assistance on a limited but potentially productive area) and the strategy of working out a coordinated program involving numerous public and private-sector agencies. A new set of key officials had also been appointed to strengthen both the policy-making and implementing functions of the council.

Program Design

Although some of the Umali Committee recommendations were already implemented, the RCPCC nonetheless decided that a special committee drawn from its technical staff should work out a formal draft of a four-year rice self-sufficiency program essentially based on the Umali Report. Several months were spent culling reports of agencies on various aspects of the rice program. The technical staff then identified the key component subprograms or projects of the rice program, such as seed, irrigation, soil management, and fertilizer. It is significant to note that agricultural credit, marketing, and survey and evaluation had been considered as components of the rice program to be planned for and implemented alongside the traditionally regarded subprograms of rice production mentioned earlier.

4 The Philippines had been importing rice since 1885. Rice imports since the start of the rice program in 1958 are as follows: 1958 - 230,669 m.t.; 1959 - 6,502; 1960 - no data; 1961 - 186,380; 1962 - no data; 1963 - 256,300; 1964 - 300,000; 1965 - 569,600. See Salas, ibid., p. 21.


Once the subprograms and projects were identified, an audit of existing human and financial resources and future requirements of agencies concerned with these subprograms was made. Potential sources of funds were identified and studies were made towards designing an organizational framework which would enhance coordination not only with the subprogram areas but also throughout the entire rice self-sufficiency program.

The technical staff submitted the draft program to the council around June, 1966, and the RCPCC held a series of meetings reviewing and finalizing this draft. On July 21, 1966 the four-year rice and corn program was transmitted to President Marcos.

Program Targets, Priorities, and Implementation Strategies

A distinguishing feature of this program was its broad perspective on the rice problem, viewing rice self-sufficiency not merely as a problem of increasing production levels but also of improving marketing and distribution; not only as one requiring the coordinated efforts of various government agencies but also enlisting the active participation of the private sector. This broader conceptualization of the rice problem was based on the assumption that to achieve self-sufficiency in rice, the program must tackle two basic and interrelated problems: low productivity and inefficient distribution.

Production goal setting and selection of priority areas. The production goal of the program was to increase yield per hectare from 28.4 cavans (the 1965-66 base) to 30.3 for 1966-67. The projection that rice self-sufficiency would be attained during the third year of the program (1968-69), which would end in a presidential election year, was obviously designed to attract political support.

The country was classified into three priority areas for purposes of inclusion into the program. Thirty-four provinces were selected and classified as priority provinces, based principally on the extent of their irrigated areas. Eleven provinces were categorized as Priority I and got first claims to the manpower, technical, financial, and material resources of the program. The need of the HYVs for regular and abundant water accounted for the adoption of irrigation as the principal criterion, although other criteria such as the presence of banks, an adequate road network, and productive capacity were also used.

Marketing and distribution. A price support and stabilization scheme for palay (unhusked rice) was set up to stabilize prices and to provide incentives for rice producers. The agency primarily charged with the regulation and supervision of this scheme was the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA), successor to the National Rice and Corn Corporation, which was pointedly left out of the RCPCC in 1950. The scheme involved the adoption of the "quedan system," an example of a technology transfer from one industry (sugar) to

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7 The final draft shown detailed statistical assessments of current as well as projected resource requirements for the next four years of the program.

another (rice). Under it, a farmer would deposit his produce in an RCA-designated warehouse. He would then get a warehouse receipt (the quedan) which was based on government-supported price levels and which he could cash in any Central Bank-approved rural bank.

The system was expected greatly to simplify marketing of rice for the farmer. It also transferred to the private sector the warehousing, milling, and distribution functions formerly exercised by the RCA. With its introduction, the government anticipated not only to derive savings from the RCA's buying operation but also to "minimize commission of irregularities which becomes rampant when the government itself directly engages in the rice business as was the case in the past."9

Other measures contemplated to rationalize marketing and distribution included strengthening the Farmer's Cooperative and Marketing Association (FACOMAs), modernizing milling and warehousing, and improving the farm-to-market transportation system.

III. SELECTION, APPROVAL, AND ACTIVATION

Formal Approval

The submission of the program to the President and his approval in July, 1966 constituted a mere formality designed to give legitimacy to some policies and decisions already implemented. Key RCPCC officials involved in formulating the program had been emboldened to go ahead on the assumption that the Marcos administration would provide all the necessary political and administrative support for the program.

This strong commitment was inferred by officials from policy statements made by Marcos during the electoral campaign, from the creation of the Umali Rice Study Committee, from the directives to the RCPCC to evolve a four-year rice self-sufficiency program out of the Umali Report, and from the President's "State of the Nation" address before Congress on January 24, 1966. In opening the first session of the legislature under his administration, Marcos declared:

One of our first concerns is to strengthen the agricultural sector. Self-sufficiency in the production of food, especially rice must be attained in the shortest possible time.10

Activating and Organizing the Rice Program

The exact point at which the actual organizing of the rice program began and the program planning ended cannot be demarcated with any degree of precision. As noted earlier, key officials in the RCPCC, the technical staff,


and the special committee which drew up the four-year "master program" were recruited early in 1966. In addition, the law amending the RCA charter and introducing the quedan system was enacted in March, 1966. Moreover, the establishment of an experimental rice program, the selection of Priority I provinces, the adoption of the supervised credit scheme under the Agricultural Guarantee and Loan Fund, and the reorganization of the RCPCC had all been effected during the early part of 1966. It is to the organizational machinery for implementation that we will now turn.

The absence in previous programs of a "master" plan to coordinate and integrate effectively the diverse subprograms led to duplication of functions and conflicts among cooperating agencies. Determined to avoid this, the RCPCC of 1966 made organizational reforms in three fronts and moved to strengthen the council, its technical staff, and the field organizational structure.

Expansion of the council. The first expansion of the council involved the appointment of the RCA manager as a regular member and of the heads of three agencies concerned with irrigation as auxiliary members, entitled to attend and participate in the council's deliberations. The expanded composition would facilitate coordination and control of key resources in production, marketing, and distribution through the involvement of those agencies in the council.

The council was further enlarged by Executive Order No. 50, issued by President Marcos on October 17, 1966, which added the Budget Commission, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAEcon) and the Rice and Corn Board (RICOB). Their inclusions reflected an awareness on the part of the council members that the direct involvement of more agencies would be essential to their implementation strategy. For example, the presence of the Budget Commissioner would facilitate fund releases, a major problem faced by the Garcia and Macapagal rice programs.

The Order was promulgated at the initiative of the RCPCC and restored to it "the sole power and responsibility of implementing the Rice and Corn Production Program." It thus conferred legitimacy upon the enlarged council and may be regarded as an important step towards facilitating the performance of the RCPCC's policy-making and coordinating functions.

The technical staff. The implementing machinery of the council was strengthened through the recruitment of highly qualified experts to man the technical staff units. Three staff units were created:

1. Plans and Program Office. Its task was to coordinate planning and programming. It had five expert programmers to deal with fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation and drainage, seeds and commercial farm development, farm credit, and research and demonstration farms.

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11 The Order also revoked Executive Order No. 64, issued by Macapagal in 1964, which created the Rice and Corn Authority as implementing agency for his rice crash program.
2. Surveys and Evaluation Office. The staff, which was supposed to conduct surveys and evaluation of the program, included a senior rice statistician.

3. Action Coordination Office. This office was the main implementing arm of the council and was charged with the coordination of the work of cooperating and supporting agencies and the supervision of the performance of Provincial Directors.

The field organizational structure. The field organizational structure was also strengthened (see Figure 2). First, staff control and coordination of field activities from the center were improved with the creation of the posts of executive director and assistant executive director (the latter also designated as chief of the technical staff) to "oversee all activities relating to implementation." These appointments effected a vital administrative link between the center and the field units in the implementation process.

Once the organization of the RCPCC central office was completed, the implementing machinery in the field level was immediately organized in the eleven provinces designated as Priority I. This was followed by the appointment of provincial directors (PD) and deputy directors. The PD would either be from the BPI or APC, depending on which agency had the most number of field personnel in a given province. PDs were directly supervised by the assistant executive director and were assisted by provincial technical (or coordinating) committees composed of representatives of cooperating units in the field.

Although this replication of bureaucratic forms at each level existed in earlier programs, the direct supervision by the council through the assistant executive director was a new concept. Furthermore, the earlier organizational relationship was less direct; for example, the regional RCPCC used to serve as another administrative level between the province and the central council. Under the new program, the regional directors of the cooperating agencies would compose the Performance Review Board "to check the activities of the Provincial Director and report directly to the Executive Director." There was, therefore, no intervening level here since the role of the Board was that of program review, not implementation.

Another innovation was the creation of an intermediary administrative level between the PDs and the production technicians or agricultural extension agents. Another important change was the reduction of the number of farming areas the latter covered, from approximately 2,000 down to 300 hectares each to improve services provided the farmers. Feedback from the experimental rice program launched in early 1966 led to both organizational changes.

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12 The Agricultural Productivity Council (APC) was the agency in charge of agricultural extension services from 1966-73. Before and since, its functions have been performed by the agency called the Bureau of Agricultural Extension (BAE).

13 Four-Year Rice Self-Sufficiency Program, p. 17.
PARTICIPATING & COOPERATING AGENCIES*

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

PARTICIPATING & COOPERATING AGENCIES*

PLANS & PROGRAM OFFICE

SURVEY & EVALUATION OFFICE

ACTION COORDINATING OFFICE

PERFORMANCE REVIEW BOARD

PROVINCIAL RCPCC

DISTRICT SUPERVISOR

PRODUCTION TECHNICIAN

FARMERS

*The RCPCC under the Marcos Administration had fifteen regular member agencies and three auxiliary agencies.
IV. OPERATION, CONTROL, AND HANOVER

Several key decisions greatly enhanced the council's capacity to plan, control, and coordinate the complex and disparate webs of activity undertaken by numerous public and private agencies. These include surveys and training programs, the introduction of the supervised credit scheme, and the appointment of Rafael Salas as action officer, the latter in turn making other decisions having wide-ranging repercussions.

Evaluation, Communication, and Information

To ensure the collection of reliable data as well as to monitor and evaluate progress in implementation, the council (following the recommendations of the Master Plan) created the Survey and Evaluation Unit to "conduct evaluation benchmark and other specialized surveys in the course of the program implementation." Two evaluation surveys were conducted in 800 barrios in the Priority I provinces: Phase I, conducted from June to July, 1966, was designed to evaluate program implementation, especially problems encountered in the field, and Phase II, conducted from December, 1966 to January, 1967, was designed to "assess the impact of the program, and to gather relevant information useful in future programming."14

In drafting the Four-Year Program in 1966, the planners also considered the "Training and Information Program" essential to the success of the rice program. The first year saw a massive training program on the new cultural practices and technical requirements of HYV cultivation. Key personnel of Priority Area I provinces from provincial directors down to production technicians as well as farmer-leaders and youth leaders received training at the U.P. College of Agriculture and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).15 A radio network was installed in each of the pilot provinces in Priority Area I to ensure the speedy flow of information between the council and the field units.

Financial Inputs: The "Supervised Credit" Scheme and the Private Sector

One of the more distinctive themes of the Marcos rice program was the greater involvement of the private sector. The Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), successor to the defunct ACCFA, although the government's major credit agency, could provide only 30 percent of the financial needs of the farmers.16 Meanwhile, government banks such as the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) either had stringent banking rules on collaterals or could only provide short-term credit.

Fortunately, as early as 1965, the Central Bank, in an effort to solve the problem of medium- and long-term financing, had already started its

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14 Ibid., p. 27.
"supervised credit" project in several rice-producing provinces. The success of the experiment led to an agreement between the National Economic Council (NEC) and the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) to provide P250,000 for relending by private rural banks (under the administration of the Central Bank) for production and commodity loans to farmers. A P5 million grant from NEC-AID provided the initial capital for the Agricultural Guarantee and Loan Fund (AGLF), under which the "supervised credit" scheme was operated. The AGLF made possible the exploitation of credit facilities available from private commercial banks, especially the rural banks, for the production loan needs of farmers (either in cash or in kind, i.e., fertilizers, pesticides, farm tools). The scheme eased credit considerably by dispensing with the required collaterals except for the submission by the farmer of a "Farm and Home Plan Budget."

Leadership Role in Implementation: Salas as "Action Officer"

Although the rice program implementation was not encountering any serious difficulty at this stage, President Marcos, on the advice of key officials that the program would need the prestige and influence of the Presidency, decided to give Executive Secretary Rafael Salas the additional task of overseeing the program.

Since he was the important hub in translating into viable and efficient terms the various elements which comprised the President's Four-Year Economic Program, Salas' direct participation in the implementation of the rice program was expected to serve as an important link between the agricultural development programs and other economic programs.

Although Vice President Fernando Lopez, as chairman and coordinator of the RCPCC, normally presided over council meetings, he was usually busy with other matters. Thus it was Salas who, in effect, acted as the council's coordinator as well as executive director. Before we go into the impact of Salas' leadership and role in the rice program, let us first examine the bases and conditions under which he exercised authority over the program. One notes, for instance, that the position of "Action Officer" had no basis in law (e.g., RA 2080 and RA 2084) nor in Presidential directives (e.g., Executive Order No. 62 of 1964 and No. 50 of 1966). Therefore, Salas' status in the RCPCC was unofficial and he derived authority mainly as an alter ego of the President.

Reforming financial control and allocation. As has been noted earlier, Salas brought to his job as action officer the prestige and power of the executive office, making him probably the most influential officer (next to the President himself) in the operations of the civil service bureaucracy. This was an important rationale in Marcos' decision to designate him czar of the rice program. When interviewed, Salas said:


I think what was most important, from the managerial viewpoint, was the authority exercised by the Executive Secretary. His decision is sanctioned over all administrative units. More than this was the power delegated to me by President Marcos which gave me the final say over budgetary allocation whether about the national budget or over the public financial banking sector.

In short, I have full authority to say whether x million pesos will be given to the Agricultural Credit Administration or when these amounts will be released. This authority over the Budget Commissioner was specifically delegated to me by the President. 19

In fact, it was the financial aspect of the program which required urgent attention. Despite the recent inclusion of the Budget Commissioner in the deliberations of the council, there was a need for speedy releases of funds to implement various phases of the program.

One of Salas' early moves was to request the attendance of the Budget Commissioner himself during council meetings so that decisions on fund releases could be made immediately at those sessions. As a result, the RCPCC and the Budget Commission were able to work out a new concept of budget consultation, called the "Work Plan and Financial Statement" wherein the amounts to be spent by the cooperating agencies were clearly indicated. The scheme ensured that budgetary releases for the coming fiscal year would be facilitated.

Improving decision-making and problem solving capabilities. Under Sales, the RCPCC became a vital and effective center for controlling and coordinating the implementation of the rice program. An average of thirty officials attended these weekly council meetings, not to mention two or three "special guests," such as foreign experts or representatives of the private sector who have claims or problems to present before the council.

To improve policy making in the council, Salas institutionalized the practice of creating ad hoc subcommittees to study specific problems raised and discussed during council meetings. For example, if during a council meeting the problem of delayed delivery of fertilizers and pesticides to farmers was presented, Salas would immediately designate a council member (say the director of the Bureau of Soils) to head a subcommittee to investigate this problem and to submit its recommendation within the period specified by Salas. The fertilizer and pesticide expert from the RCPCC technical staff would then be coopted to this committee. Once the subcommittee submitted its report and recommendations, it was automatically dissolved. A number of these ad hoc specialist and problem-oriented subcommittees were created from time to time. This administrative innovation enabled the council to act with greater efficiency and speed and to overcome obstacles encountered in the implementation process.

19 Former Secretary Salas was interviewed for this case writer by Dean Carlos P. Ramos at the United Nations Building, New York, on July 11, 1972.
Strengthening evaluation, information, and feedback capabilities. Implementing a program of such complexity created a need to strengthen communication between the center and the field. This was essential for providing the council with fairly accurate data as premises for decision making. A great number of problems in the field, particularly in the priority provinces, might not reach the council, since field reports tended to gloss over some important problems and at the same time over-emphasize trivial problems and accomplishments. The council's practice of inviting provincial directors during its regular monthly conferences was designed to facilitate evaluation and feedback so that the council could act more expeditiously on implementation problems.

Provincial directors were also required to submit the council quarterly program reports. Finally, the Council's Survey and Evaluation Office conducted regular surveys in the priority areas and other provinces while the Action Coordination Office, through on-the-spot inspections and visits, assisted in coordinating and evaluating performance in implementation.

Despite these controls, Salas still considered that the existing evaluation and feedback systems did not provide a very accurate assessment of implementation in the field. Thus, he made frequent and unannounced visits to the field not only to inspect the progress of implementation but also to obtain firsthand the views and opinions of the farmers and local officials. Through this follow-up system, Salas was able to check whether certain decisions had been carried out or not. Salas obviously considered these field visits extremely important in the implementation process.

I believe that you cannot supervise the rice program sitting in Manila -- you have to visit the fields. There was a time I visited three provinces in a day -- by plane, of course, just to check whether our field officials were feeding us the right information or simply taking credit for things they haven't done. I was told that I had logged more mileage than some pilots in the Philippine Air Force.

Rice surplus attainment. It is to be expected that many problems would emerge in the implementation of a program of such complexity and magnitude as rice self-sufficiency. For example, one of the unintended effects of the land reform program of 1963 was the resistance of farmers to increase their farm yields because under the Land Reform Code their land rental would be based on their average production for the last three years. Some of the problems included: (1) the seemingly insoluble problem of "adequate" funds, especially for the irrigation program; (2) seed deterioration and palatableness of "Miracle Rice"; (3) inadequate drying and warehousing facilities; and (4) the "slow pace of extension and credit program." For various reasons, the quedan system had not been fully operational in many areas. Key

20 Interview with Salas, New York, July 11, 1972. According to some critics, Salas used the rice program to enhance his own plan to run for the Senate.

personnel of the RCPCC and its technical staff left for other jobs, resigned, or returned to their agencies. Despite these problems, the President happily announced during his annual "State of the Nation" message to Congress on January 22, 1968 that self-sufficiency in rice (based on projections from the field) had been attained. After the crop year ending June, 1968, rice statistics based on field reports revealed an excess production of 8 million sacks of palay over total consumption requirements. Initial data from the field showed that average yield per hectare reached 33.97 cavans, although corrected figures placed average yield per hectare at 31.67 or 103,652,200 cavans from an area of 3,303,660 hectares. It was also reported that around 36,000 metric tons of the 1968 crop were exported in addition to approximately 3 million cavans of HYVs sent to Indonesia, Taiwan, Burma, and South Korea.

V. EVALUATION AND REFINEMENT

Rice self-sufficiency and its various subprograms and projects have been continuing activities of the Philippines government and as such have no strictly definable beginnings and endings. Evaluation of the Marcos rice self-sufficiency program thus took place within the context of the planning and implementation tasks discussed in previous chapters. (Part 3: OVERVIEWS OF THE TWO RICE PROGRAMS presents an analysis of the phase of the program cycle in both cases.)

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Let us briefly summarize the significant developments in the implementation of the Marcos rice self-sufficiency program covering the first two years -- from the formal promulgation of the program in 1966 up to June, 1968 when it achieved its objectives. Several themes seem to have emerged during program implementation as early as the first year. One important and dominant factor, which determined to a large extent implementation strategies adopted, was a technological one -- the availability in 1966 of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) and the need to demonstrate their value in increasing production.

While the multiplication of the HYVs was the initial and major thrust, the RCPCC and the Marcos administration also planned and implemented other paralleled measures designed to ensure the attainment of the goal of self-sufficiency in rice. These included the creation of a complex organizational structure operative from the national down to the lowest implementation level, the enlargement of the scope of the program beyond purely rice production, the adoption of the intensification approach and the selection of priority provinces, and the involvement of the private sector.

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23 Raul P. de Guzman, op. cit., p. 55.

This case outlined the dynamics and processes involved in the planning and implementation of the 1966 Marcos rice self-sufficiency program. It attempted to isolate certain critical factors which may account for goal attainment, of which the leadership role of top political (Marcos) and administrative (Salas) elites appeared to be the dominant factor. The case also suggested that certain conditions which constrain or impede goal achievement could be mitigated or mastered through careful planning, organization design, implementation strategies, and built-in monitoring and evaluation systems.

Aside from the obvious need to attend to organizational/structural aspects of programs and projects, there are the managerial, technical, and behavioral dimensions which could be critical in program success or failure. It is to be noted that the concept of leadership provides, as borne out by this case, a useful basis for explaining many facets of program behavior and processes. It does raise, however, a number of disturbing questions primarily because of the apparent dearth of program and project leaders in developing countries.

There is also a need to recruit and develop administrative leaders combining technical as well as political skills to cope with the inevitable uncertainties and problems that tend to envelope program and project implementation, e.g., the variability of support and resource inputs caused by changes in political fortunes and shifting developmental priorities.

For instance, are there many program and project managers in developing countries who not only possess a vast grant of authority and also strong leadership and managerial skills? What happens to equally important programs and project that cannot attract top political and administrative support as the rice program did? The answer, I believe, is that while the factors which conspired to create the conditions which led to the successful implementation of the rice program cannot be completely replicated, there are many technical and practical lessons that can be derived from this particular case. For this reason, the following interpretation is offered.

Leadership Role of Administrative Elites: Resource Planning and Management

Major administrative constraints on the rational allocation of financial resources stem from factors which are often beyond the control of program planners and implementors. This is especially true of budgetary allotments coming from the national budget since this increases the area of uncertainty regarding amounts voted for the program. The practice of annual budgetary outlays also precludes long-range planning and rational employment of financial resources for the program.

This study revealed possible ways of rationalizing financial allocation through the adoption of performance budgeting and through the simple expedient of coopting the Budget Commissioner. The "supervised credit scheme" under

the AGLF also pointed to the possibility of tapping the financial resources of private rural banks for the program and of helping train farmers to rationalize their own financial management (through the "Farm and Home Plan Budget").

The master program for rice self-sufficiency contained an implicit commitment towards careful and rational management of human and nonhuman resources. This may be gleaned from the prior determination of priority projects for implementation, which were based on detailed studies of current and projected resource requirements and costing of various key subprograms within the rice program, such as the fertilizer program, seed multiplication program, irrigation program, and so on. The decision to concentrate human, technical, and financial resources on a limited area (the "intensification approach") served the dual purpose of maximizing the employment of scarce financial, human, and physical resources and of demonstrating to farmers the benefits derived from using the HYVs and from following modern cultural practices.

Leadership Role in Coordination and Control: Process and Structural Aspects

The rice self-sufficiency program encompassed not only a wide range of activities concerned with the production, marketing, and distribution of rice but also innumerable agencies belonging to the public and private sectors. A program of such complexity usually imposes great responsibility for coordination and control on the leadership structure. While a "good" program plan is in a way a coordinative and control device, the translation of the plan into an effective program of action is largely a function of leadership.

The performance of coordinative and control bodies such as interdepartmental committees, commissions, and councils is dependent on so many factors (e.g., legal basis of authority, composition, location in the government structure, and so on) that it is best, for purposes of this study, to limit the analysis to certain aspects which may account for the effectiveness of the RCPCC during the period under study.

An analysis of the performance of Executive Secretary Salas could perhaps reveal many important dimensions in the exercise of leadership capability in program implementation. However, it should be stressed that this is simply an analytic technique; it should not be interpreted to mean that leadership roles of other administrators at various levels of the administrative hierarchy were not as important to the rice program. In fact, Salas benefitted much from the able support of highly qualified and technically proficient rice program officials and personnel from the center and the field.

The effectiveness of Salas was based on a distillate of many factors, including formal and informal powers and personal leadership style. It is not so much the listing of what was considered as the basis of his leadership effectiveness that was important -- although it is contributory -- but the manner with which he wove the various strands of authority into a potent factor for program control and coordination.

Salas immediately transformed the RCPCC into a more effective instrument for coordination and control. First, he "persuaded" the agency heads, including the Budget Commissioner, to attend council meetings themselves and not simply
to send their representatives. Only agency heads could make decisions concerning their agencies, and their attendance was of utmost importance to the work of the council. Also, in view of the numerous problems and requests for action from the field which were elevated to the council's attention, Salas introduced a number of innovative changes, such as the creation of ad hoc specialist subcommittees within the council and the practice of inviting experts, local officials, and interest group spokesmen to attend council meetings so that they could personally present their views before it. The changes introduced into the council's work methodology greatly enhanced its capability to decide on technical and nontechnical problems encountered during implementation. It should be stressed that the council sitting en banc was a less efficient structure than the specialist subcommittees in dealing with technical problems of implementation.

Third, Salas' frequent visits to the field were not only fine morale boosters but also served as an important device for determining firsthand the problems and actual progress of implementation.

This discussion of the coordination and control aspects of leadership capability dwelt more on the dynamic and process aspects. Coordination and control capability may also be looked at as an organizational/structural problem. Programs which require the interrelationship and, to a certain extent, the interdependence of activities performed by various agencies often rely on coordinative structures such as interdepartmental committees, commissions, and council for program coordination and control.

There might, however, be certain built-in weaknesses in collegial bodies, particularly those which perform both policy-making and implementation functions. For instance, they are often vulnerable either to the domination of a strong chairman (thereby losing their essential value as consensus-operating structures) or, in the absence of strong leadership, immobilism. Power within a committee or council is often so delicately balanced that incidents (say, one involving greater or lesser role of a cooperating agency) could easily introduce many dysfunctional elements into its operations.

The RCPCC from 1958 combined both functions. Salas, however, was able to provide strong leadership (especially significant because Vice President Lopez failed to assume this role for the council). Yet he was also capable of optimizing both individual contributions and the corporate role of the council. The striking organizational feature of the RCPCC under Marcos, in addition to its fluid and enlarged composition, was the designation of officers who acted as program implementors for the council (i.e., the action officer, executive and assistant executive director for the council, the provincial directors for the provincial committee). The lines of authority and communication were more direct and responsibility for the program clearly defined. This case reveals that coordination and control are simply abstract concepts that have no meaning outside the specific instruments used to structure cooperation among individuals, groups, and agencies, the strategies used in ensuring adherence to agreed guidelines, and the organization of channels for communication, evaluation, and feedback.
PART 2: THE 1973 MASAGANA 99 RICE SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM

I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND

The apparent success of the 1966 program spurred Secretary Salas and other RCPC officials to expand the program into other foodstuffs by using the same approach and methodology found to be effective in the rice program. Thus in 1969, an enlarged RCPC was created and named the National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC). The NFAC administration had the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as chairman, assisted by an executive director and a deputy executive director (see Figure 3). Under this scheme, rice became simply one of five programs, the others being corn, vegetable, food-grains, and meat and fish.

While rice remained considered as the top-priority program, the rice program from 1969 until the launching of Masagana 99 in 1973 may be considered only as a holding-out operation lacking the intensity and crisis emphasis of the 1966 program. The forces which propelled the 1966 program with such intensity (emanating from President Marcos, through Salas and down throughout the bureaucracy) tapered off following its success in 1968 and after the 1969 election which re-elected President Marcos. This was reflected in the NFAC policy to "relax in its all-out drive for increased rice production so that it could attend to second-generation problems of processing, marketing and financing."26

To compound its problem of competing with other programs in the NFAC network, a series of disasters befell the rice industry as the seventies began. Twenty-one typhoons visited the country in 1970 and 1971. There were also technical second-generation problems, such as the lessened resistance of HYVs to plant diseases such as tungro. Thus for the first time since 1969, the Philippines imported rice in 1971 -- nearly half a million metric tons. In 1972, a killer flood inundated most of the rice areas of Central Luzon and on September 22, President Marcos declared martial law, thus changing the political and administrative structure of the country.

II. PLANNING, APPRAISAL, AND DESIGN

A much publicized rice program -- Masagana 99 -- was launched in May, 1973 by President Marcos. Intended to be the showcase of Philippine agriculture, it was by far the most ambitious rice program ever undertaken. M-99 achieved the goal of rice self-sufficiency in 1976 for the first time in eight years. A comparison between the 1966 Marcos program and Masagana 99 should give us many insights into various aspects of program/project planning, implementation, and evaluation as well as changes in environmental factors impinging on the program.

Note: This is the organizational structure of NFAC prior to the M-99 program. From twenty-three member agencies, council membership increased to thirty-one, so that practically all government agencies became involved in the programs of NFAC.
Origins of the Masagana 99: Program Identification and Definition

Like the 1966 rice program, M-99 benefitted from a set of fortuitous events. While the former was marked by the discovery of HYVs and by Presidential support, the latter, while it also had Presidential support, started from a tested experimental rice program coupled with a real crisis in the rice production caused by typhoons, floods, and rice diseases.

The Masagana 99 Rice Production Program summarized in its name its goal: a bountiful harvest (masagana, meaning "bountiful"), targeted at 99 cavans per hectare. It evolved out of a research project jointly conducted by IRRI, the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, and NFAC. The pilot project, located in the province of Bulacan, experimented with the use of a "package of technology" involving seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, and so on, programmed into a sixteen-step procedure involving modern techniques and cultural practices of farming. In effect, the experiment integrated the two types of technology: "hardware" in the form of HYVs and chemicals, and "software," such as recommended farming techniques under the supervision of agricultural extension agents.

NFAC officials headed by Secretary Tanco immediately saw the potential of the Bulacan project as a national program. They then took two important steps. First was the planning of the details of the national program in terms of inputs, agencies to be involved and their respective responsibilities, and so on. A second group of activities focused on "selling" the program to top policy makers and President Marcos.

Program Design

Before the actual drafting of the program, Secretary Tanco and key NFAC officials decided on an overall strategy based on their previous experience as well as on the requirements of the packaged M-99 program. Owing to the urgent need to increase production to meet a growing crisis in the staple food, it was decided that the program would cover a larger area of irrigated and nonirrigated lands, particularly the former. Second, for the program to attract the broader participation of farmers, sufficient credit without collateral would be made available to all qualified farmers who wished to participate. It would be useful to discuss in some detail the planning and designing of three critical elements of the M-99 program: the supervised credit scheme, agricultural extension, and the machinery for implementation and evaluation.

The supervised credit scheme. Financing the rice production program has always been a major problem area. Thus, perhaps the most critical element of the M-99 program was the credit aspect. As Secretary Tanco noted:

Our principal factor of change was our credit system, because up to that time, credit was our main bottleneck. We were asking the

For example, the natural calamities led the government to import 860,000 metric tons of rice in 1971 and 1972.
poor subsistence farmer to become the new entrepreneur of our society. It was not enough therefore simply to teach him the new technology. We had to give him the credit so that he could buy the inputs he needed. So we had to change our entire rural credit system.28

To enable the farmers to take full advantage of the Masagana 99 package of technology, a financing scheme was devised. The main features of the planned credit system were: (1) credit would be given to qualified farmers not on the basis of collaterals but upon submission of the Home and Farm Budget; (2) of the total credit, about 60 percent would be in the form of inputs (fertilizers, chemicals) and the remainder in cash to safeguard against misuse of loans; and (3) the farmers would be organized into seldas, that is, a grouping of from five to fifteen farmers "who will agree to be jointly and severally responsible for each other's crop loans."29

Agricultural extension as main agent of technology transfer and credit aspects. As envisioned, the program would make extensive use of agricultural extension as a key instrument in assisting the farmers to adopt the "package of technology" and to follow the prescribed method of modern farming contained in the sixteen-step procedure of Masagana 99. The farm management technicians (FMTs) or production technicians (PTs) were the endpoints in the entire delivery system and the main hub of the credit program. The FMT would not only help the farmer draw up his loan as well as in collecting it after harvest. He would also be the main cog in the information and reporting system.

Machinery for plan implementation. Another important feature of the M-99 was the creation of subnational level planning and implementation committees headed by local officials. The involvement of local executives was the result of their participation in the relief and rehabilitation program following the 1972 floods which devastated the rice-growing areas of Central Luzon. While the idea of replicating coordinative bodies at various levels was also found in the 1966 RCPCC structure, the direct involvement of local officials in M-99 was an innovation.

III. SELECTION, APPROVAL, AND ACTIVATION

Negotiation and Approval

As noted earlier, the key to the entire M-99 program was the credit component. Because of this, Secretary Tanco and other NFAC officials worked out a detailed strategy to sell the program to the President, heads of government financing institutions, and the private rural banks. Since the technical men of the government financing institutions were already involved in drawing up the financing and credit aspects of the M-99 program, the next problem was to get the support of public and private financing institutions for the non-collateral supervised credit scheme. Government banks which had already been


29Ibid., p. 6.
providing loans for the existing program were convinced not only to grant loans without collateral but also to increase the volume of loans for the program. In view of the crisis situation, NFAC officials did not encounter any difficulty in persuading bank officials to support the M-99 program. President Marcos himself immediately gave it his full support. Thus, on May 21, 1973, Marcos officially launched in Malacañang Palace the M-99 program before high-ranking national officials, governors, and mayors, government and private banking officials, farmers, and mass media representatives.

Activation and Organization

At the apex of the planning and implementation machinery was the National Food and Agriculture Council, in which all the heads of cooperating agencies were members with the Secretary of Agriculture as chairman. Because the council could easily be an unwieldy body, actual management has been done through a National Management Committee (NMC) system. The NMC for each food crop was generally composed of middle-level technical officials of departments and agencies whose heads sat in the council proper.

The NFAC executive director served as chairman of all the management committees. To provide the information framework for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the program, the M-99 Management Information Systems (MIS) was set up with the assistance of US-AID and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

As soon as the Masagana 99 program was approved by the President, the machinery at the regional, provincial, and municipal levels was immediately set up (see Figure 4). A regional coordinator was appointed (usually selected from the BAE or BPI) to coordinate the provinces under his jurisdiction. In reality, the chain of command and reporting between the center and the field was more direct, that is, the regional coordinator was generally bypassed.

Provincial action committees (PACs), composed of agency and private-sector representatives, were the local counterpart of the National Management Committee. The provincial governor served as chairman, and the provincial program officer (PPO), as vice-chairman. Below the province, the municipal action team (MAT), with the municipal mayor as chairman and the production technician as vice-chairman, served as the lowest level in the coordinative chain. In some provinces, barangay (or village) action teams have been organized, headed by a barangay captain. The designation of governors and mayor as chairmen of their respective local committees was made on the assumption that they could exercise leadership over bureaucrats operating at the local government areas as well as preclude interagency squabbles evident in past programs. It was the PPO, however, generally the provincial director of the BAE, who was the direct administrative link of the NMC at the provincial level. As the rice program coordinator, he was held primarily responsible for the implementation of the program in his province.

IV. OPERATION, CONTROL, AND HANOVER

Strategies for Implementation

Massive campaign to inform public and farmers. To reach more farmers, a massive campaign strategy of "selling" the M-99 program was launched with
FIGURE 4

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR M-99 PROGRAM
(as of 1977)

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AS CHAIRMAN

NATIONAL FOOD AND AGRICULTURE COUNCIL (NFAC)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (for program administration, for field operations)

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE FOR M-99

NFAC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AS CHAIRMAN

PLANS & PROGRAM DIVISION
AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM EVALUATION SERVICE
ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR M-99

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
OTHER AD HOC BODIES

REGIONAL COORDINATOR

PROVINCIAL ACTION COMMITTEE (PAC)

GOVERNOR AS CHAIRMAN

MUNICIPAL ACTION TEAM (MAT)

MAYOR AS CHAIRMAN

BARANGAY ACTION TEAM (BAT)
the assistance of a public relations firm, J. Walter Thompson (JWT). Their work has been described as follows:

JWT donated their services free, and mounted for us the biggest broadcasting campaign the country had ever witnessed. Not through television and newspapers, because our farmers in the villages do not own TV sets, and the daily newspapers hardly reach them.

But, through radio, three out of every four farmers own transistor radios and they regard the local radio station as a source of authority and of information. JWT took the new technology and translated it into a series of down-to-each spot announcements, radio skits and musical jingles in seven different languages.

In addition, we set up 58 local half-hour radio programs before dawn every day, so that one of our local field technicians could guide the farmers every morning on radio. To supplement our radio campaign, we printed hundreds of thousands of simple brochures and magazine articles, containing illustrated instructions on the new technology.\(^{30}\)

The information campaign strategy made M-99 a byword not only in the villages but also in the cities. Cooperating agencies such as the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) had their own publicity efforts in behalf of their own loaning programs.

The supervised credit program. At the initial phase of the program, the management committee of NFAC reached an agreement with government and private lending institutions on the amount of contributions -- based on their lending capacity -- that they would make available for the program. The private rural banking system was expected to finance 394,000 or 66 percent of the 600,000 target hectares. The PNB and the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) would take care of areas not covered by the rural banks. To ensure the participation of the private rural banks, the government guaranteed them 85 percent of all losses on loans. The Central Bank would rediscount all loans and the farmers would pay the banks 12 percent annual interest. The amounts lent varied according to the phase\(^{31}\); for example, a minimum of 700 and a maximum of 900 pesos per hectare were given out during Phase I and 900 minimum and 1,200 pesos maximum for Phases III and IV.

In view of the shortage of its banking outlets, the PNB initiated a "bank on wheels" approach, wherein loan applications were processed and approved in mobile jeeps of the Bank. To further accelerate the loaning process, the FMTs concentrated on assisting farmers in loan application to

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp. 8-9

\(^{31}\)Phases are numbered according to the cropping season since the start of the program; i.e., each "phase" corresponds to a cropping season.
the extent that they devoted less time to providing technical supervision. This greatly reduced the time they could spend in assisting farmers to accept the recommended sixteen-step process and the package of technology it required.

Extension strategy. Since the M-99 program relied heavily on the work of extension agents, the immediate problem was to field a sufficient number of technicians. NFAC entered into a memorandum of agreement with the BPI and the BAE for these two bureaus to detail technicians to NFAC to devote full time to the M-99 program alone. A crash training program was mounted to train technicians for the M-99 program and in the first year alone around 3,200 were trained. A loan program was also established so that FMTs could acquire motorcycles at cost and pay for them by installment through a monthly allowance of 75 pesos given them by NFAC. Part of the "package of technology" was the FMT assistance to be extended to the farmer-cooperators in all aspects of the program. Each FMT was assigned to a specific area of operation to enable him to provide extensive supervision over farmers. In addition, the technicians would help the farmer prepare the farm plan and budget for purposes of securing loans. They also assisted in the collection of loan repayments. As noted earlier, the credit aspects soon become the major responsibility of the technician.

Mechanism for Communication and Control: The Management Information System for M-99

The management information system (MIS) was set up to establish a nationwide information network which would provide the NFAC with timely reports on the progress of implementation as well as identifying bottlenecks and problem areas. The management information system was created in coordination with BAEcon and with the assistance of US-AID. The Masagana MIS was designed in such a way that management would be supplied with standardized data from the field (provincial level) on predetermined program indicators. The data were sent monthly to the NFAC, where they were analyzed and used as bases of a comparative study of provinces. The management committee was informed monthly of the results of the reports for information, program corrective actions, or policy decisions.

The system required the production technicians to fill out a worksheet using a standard form. This was a basic record of the farmer's activities and included all pertinent facts about each farmer supervised by an FMT. Although this sheet was not submitted to NFAC, it would be made available to any of the council officials when they so required.

The production technician submitted to his PPO a summary of some items in this worksheet in what was called Form 2. The provincial program officer, like the PT, was required to maintain still another worksheet -- a monthly summary report on key data items reported by technicians under his supervision. It also served as a monitoring and control system so that the PPO could become aware of the achievements and/or failures of his technicians. In addition, the PPO received a report from the financial institutions in his province. He then sent an integration of the summary report of his technicians and the financial institutions to NFAC.
It is to be noted that the management information system reported on a cumulative basis. The reporting ended at the termination of a particular phase or cropping season.

The MIS prepared a profile of the rice situation in the province which was made available to management. Through this document, norms were established and provincial targets estimated.

In addition to the MIS, the NFAC sent audit teams continually to observe, inspect, and gather important information in the field regarding operational implementation, delivery system of inputs, and so on. The team was organized to improve the system and management by identifying constraints and bottlenecks in the process based on the MIS reports. Thus, causes of problems would be identified, and appropriate solutions provided, in as short time as possible.

V. EVALUATION AND REFINEMENT

As stated in the discussion of this phase in the Marcos program, the ongoing rice self-sufficiency program in the Philippines has no set beginning and end. Consequently, the evaluation task has been absorbed into the planning and implementation phases. The Masagana 99 program, which started with Phase I in 1973 and had reached Phase VIII by 1976, showed a similar pattern. Experience in the administration of the program often gave planners and implementors the necessary information to make evaluative judgment and thus solve identified problems during the planning and implementation stages of the succeeding phases. The "pilot projects" and other experimental approaches were used to evaluate the feasibility of certain program strategies, such as supervised credit, subsidized fertilizer, and the package of technology in M-99. Sample surveys were also done by the NFAC's Agricultural Productivity Evaluation Division, the focusing on critical problem areas. The concept of "phases" allowed the use of field evaluation and feedback in improving subsequent implementation of the program.

Evaluations by external institutions, particularly the universities, were also used by program planners and implementors as sources of new ideas or changes to improve the program. One example was the increase in the role and participation of regional and local government levels in both the planning and implementation stages.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Supervision, Coordination, and Control: Diffused Leadership

Stated simply, the entire coordinating system for Masagana 99 had hinged on the cooperation of the component elements which delivered outputs in the form of goods and services. To attain optimal program objectives (as, for example, 99 cavans), a coordinating framework has been imposed to

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ensure synchronization and integration of the innumerably activities of cooperating agencies concerned with providing strategic program inputs (e.g., extension, applied research, credit, fertilizer and chemicals) and processing the inputs to outputs. A coordinating framework such as NFAC aimed to reduce randomness and variability of role performance through policy, planning, and control mechanisms. Additionally, since the coordinating framework was an academic body in which the various specialized interests and units were represented, it had the important role of inducing not only the acceptance of corporate policy decisions but also of ensuring adherence to these decisions in the process of implementation, either as separate agency functions or collectively in coordination with other cooperating entities.

Yet the interfacing of these multiple authority and control networks could be themselves sources of coordination problems. Some of these problems were built-in or inherent to a machinery which dealt with governmental programs that cut across departmental and sectoral lines. The fact that the system was highly interdependent also introduced other difficulties, since inadequacies in the performance of one entity would affect the performance of other component elements in the coordinating system. Finally, the Masagana 99 program exacerbated coordination problems because it was time sensitive, that is, solutions had to be made within the ninety days involved in the planting-to-harvesting cycle.

It may be useful to categorize coordination problems in the implementation of M-99 into three aspects: structural, managerial, and behavioral.

**Structural-organizational aspects:** The NFAC machinery for coordinating Masagana 99 was a monocratic structure with duplicate systems at each level of authority: the council and the national management committee (NMC) at the center, and the PAC and MAT in the province and the municipality. The NMC for Masagana 99 was the coordinating body for the actual management of the program since the council itself seldom met as a body.

Yet the NMC operated under a basic weakness, i.e., NMC officials still needed approval of their respective heads for their decisions and therefore had no authority to commit their agencies. The committee concept, however, is an administrative innovation which deserves further attention because it has both positive and negative effects on the council's coordinative capacity.

Another source of many coordination problems was the structuring of the authority relationship between NFAC and the cooperating agencies. This organizational arrangement often led to dual authority and control systems -- the superimposed coordinating framework (NFAC) performing staff and planning functions and the member agencies charged with actual implementation of the Masagana 99 program. Problems such as nonattendance at meetings, failure to adhere to agreed-on policy and guidelines, resentment over bypassing of agency heads, and neglecting Masagana 99 in favor of their own agency programs, among others, have emerged. Although a higher level of authority may be invoked (such as President Marcos, Secretary Tanco, the Governor) and sanctions employed, there are serious limits to the nature of the authority that can be exercised by a coordinating body.
Confusion in the authority relationship has been compounded by a policy of NFAC requiring Rice PPOs to report directly to the Manila office. In effect, this makes coordination at the provincial level merely pro forma and without substance. This is so because often the NFAC chairman belongs to another agency from that of the PPO for rice.

Moreover, the machinery for coordinating below that of the management committee has been plagued with several "dead" layers, notably the regional coordinator and the NFAC provincial chairman. For instance, the reporting and monitoring systems of the MIS could be easier and more manageable if the NMC were to deal with only eleven regions rather than all fifty-seven provinces. But due to the policy of having provinces deal directly with the central office, NMC has had to create a large full-time MIS staff to cope with the work. The regional office is now an existing structure which may be able to perform coordinative functions. Admittedly, however, because of their longer experience along this line, provincial governors tend to have more potential leadership capability than regional coordinators to run the program.

The structural weakness in the field organization for implementation revolves around the question of the effectiveness of the local coordinating bodies, that is, the provincial action committee and the municipal action team. The M-99 made the governors and mayors chairmen of these bodies. Thus their effectiveness would depend largely on the leadership capacity of the local political officials and the support or technical leadership provided by provincial program officers. The inclusion of politicians was designed to solve administrative problems spawned by lack of authority, agency conflicts, and overlapping jurisdictions that arise whenever a program is headed by a technical man, especially if, as is the case here, he has the same rank as the other personnel he is supposed to direct.

It would seem, however, that because of equally urgent claims and interests of political officials, their optimum effectiveness in galvanizing and coordinating the program has not been fully realized. For instance, there has been a tendency among these coopted political officials to rely on the leadership of the PPOs for program implementation. This defeats the very rationale for their inclusion in the coordinating body in the field.

Managerial Aspects. Through its planning and control functions, the coordinating body could influence significantly the course of implementation. One distinctive feature and an important strategy for Masagana 99 -- understandable because it was developed by IRRI and BAE -- is the important role of the extension technician as the last and key link in providing goods and services to the farmers.³³ For instance, M-99's Phase III listed no less than thirty-seven duties for FMTs, each one requiring specific actions and coor-

³³This was the subject of a 1972 study by Rogelio Cuyno, a faculty member of the University of the Philippines at Los Banos specializing in extension education.
dination with other agencies. As a consequence, our findings indicate that the FMT is a highly overloaded coordinating and delivery unit.

The resulting problems, however, could have been anticipated in the planning stage. These could have included task analyses of how much work FMTs could and ought to do, the ratio for effective farmer supervision, the amount of reports and paperwork needed, the number of FMTs available from agencies and from the recruitment market. Personnel requirements, especially for extension technicians, could have been planned in terms of the target increase in program coverage from Phase I to Phase IV. Delayed reports, invariably causing a chain reaction, misplaced focus (i.e., deflection from providing technical advice to farmers towards a preoccupation with loan releases or fertilizer chits), and failure to visit farmers were some of the serious consequences of requiring too much from the existing extension staff.

The system overload at the data collection level might have affected negatively the performance of control mechanisms and the monitoring of progress by the MIS. Given the overburdened FMT noted earlier, the planning process should have considered the near physical impossibility of his visually verifying some information items like production figures which are required by MIS. Garbled, even invented, information is a possible and not wholly unanticipated consequence. The MIS, a relatively new type of management technology in the Philippines, is not yet fully appreciated, especially at the provincial level. Now on its fifth phase, its utility had not been maximized during the first four phases. Even now, efforts are still being made to educate the provincial implementors on its nature, purpose and uses. This failure to understand the nature of the MIS has resulted in many problems (i.e., "bloated" figures on performance, etc.). Fortunately, the multiple system of evaluation and feedback through the MIS, the Program Audit Teams of the Agricultural Program Evaluation Service and DA's Planning Service provide a self-corrective system which has benefitted the subsequent Masagana 99 phases.

Behavioral aspects. Some of the problems associated with the Structuring of authority noted earlier create behavioral constraints which affect coordination. While an ad hoc body could be galvanized into concerted cooperative action, the compelling sense of mission to meet a crisis is often difficult to sustain over time unless reinforced by a dominant ideology or leadership. Being basically staff in function, the NFAC is highly dependent on the cooperation of component agencies which implement the Masagana 99 Program.

Cooperating agencies, BAE for instance, are drawn to "service" various programs of the government. The often dual or multiple roles and statuses of detailed personnel generally create role ambiguity and conflict. In the case of extension program, this inherent conflict of interest between the

34Secretary Jose Rono of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development confirmed this when he noted that "PTs are overloaded with paper work, coupons, making estimates of loans, and spend most of their time in rural banks and not in the field." NFAC Monthly Meeting, August 27, 1974.
coordinating body and the member agencies on one hand, and among the member agencies themselves on the other, is probably the most intractable problem in the implementation of the rice program even before the Masagana 99. Reported cases of interagency and agency-NFAC conflict in the Masagana 99 today are reenactments of earlier ones although the actors and the scenario may have changed.

The extension program offers several examples of such disagreements. Among the better-known issues which had emerged as irritants in the relationships between and/or among the agency heads are: (1) the alleged failure of one agency head to transfer agricultural extension personnel items to another agency as promised; (2) the creation of the DAR Bureau of Farm Management which has similar functions as APC (which has been renamed as BAE); (3) the alleged failure of one agency to provide the needed extension services to the land reform areas on account of its own program; and (4) disagreements on the role allocation and control of extension work, particularly the Masagana 99 Program.

These examples reveal insights into the human dimensions of administration and how they relate intimately to problems of coordination. The issue is generally organizational rather than one of personal conflicts of interest, and is caused by the problem of sharing and distribution of power and control over program resources (financial and personnel) and differences in perception of how extension work should be provided.

Another problem area is the often unavoidable overlapping jurisdictions which spawn intense interagency rivalries, both at the center and in the field. This sometimes leads to noncooperative behavior such as absences in meetings, delay in reports, outright disobedience, and the relative neglect of the coordinated function vis-a-vis the mother agency's program. A coordination problem internal to BAE is traceable to the fact that almost one half (twenty-nine) of the sixty-two provincial agriculturists are appointed from local funds; thus they are not always amendable to central direction and control, for example, in submitting reports and in attending BAE meetings.

With the withdrawal of GFM technicians in the wake of a new presidential decree, an old problem, dating back from Macapagal's rice crash program in 1964, has resurfaced. This is the rivalry between the traditional major extension agencies, BAE and BPI. The latter's personnel have been coopted to perform extension services for Masagana 99. An important facet of the coordination problems faced by the PPOs, who, under the Masagana 99, are directly responsible for implementation in the field, is the supervision of field extension personnel of other agencies. To reduce conflict between BAE and BPI, a scheme was adopted to appoint the PPO from the agency with the most number of men in the province and to name as assistant director the official from the other agency. In addition, the present practice is to appoint the BAE or BPI in charge of Masaganang Maisan (Corn Self-Sufficiency Program) if the other agency holds the PPO position for M-99, thereby reducing conflicts experienced in the RCPCC days.

Our findings reveal that the problem of coordinating the work of personnel belonging to another agency still persists. Divided loyalties among extension
technicians (the PPO being the NFAC representative in the province) has been worsened by the traditional rivalry between BPI and BAE personnel dating back to 1952, when BAE was born out of the BPI's Agricultural Extension Division despite strong opposition from BPI and the Bureau of Animal Industry.

One PPO succinctly describes this problem: "The PPOs have responsibility to implement the program but they have no authority over personnel of other agencies. We can only suggest." Our study also showed that PPOs either deal directly with the FMTs or else work through their provincial heads, the latter being frequently used in dealing with recalcitrant field men. Sometimes the governor's authority is invoked.

Strong personalities heading BPI or BAE over the years, reacting to the creeping intrusions of an external coordinative authority such as the RCPCC and the NFAC, have engaged in famous feuds which have vitiated effective coordination. As mentioned earlier, these are often motivated by the need to promote and protect agency interests and project the importance of one's mother agency in the scheme of things.
PART 3: OVERVIEW OF THE TWO RICE PROGRAMS

This dual case history of the implementation of the government's rice self-sufficiency program could provide insights into a growing administrative problem among developing societies: how to improve the administration of development programs and projects which require interdepartmental and intersectoral coordination.

In the Philippines, an increasingly large number of developmental programs, such as tourism, rice production, export promotion, population, housing, and urban development involve many agencies in the process of planning and implementation. This is a product both of increasing specialization in the public bureaucracy as well as of the difficulty of assigning all the requisite activities for the performance of a particular government function to a single department or agency. There is also increasing recognition that the regular bureaucracy cannot cope with or is not suitable for dealing with the technical and behavioral requirements of some development programs and projects so that new or different organizational forms become necessary. Of particular interest in this case is the use of an administrative device such as an interdepartmental body superimposed over existing agencies to coordinate and control their activities toward the attainment of the objectives of a particular program.

What follows is a summary of our findings on the Philippine government's rice self-sufficiency programs. While there are important differences in the planning and implementation of the 1966-68 and the Masagana 99 programs, these are readily apparent in our analyses and interpretation following each narrative. Here we will highlight instead the role in both cases of a number of factors critical to program implementation: (1) structure, (2) leadership, (3) technology, (4) support, and (5) resources. These are discussed within the context of the program management cycle. Of these, structure and leadership seem to be the key factors in determining the capability of the organization to process effectively the critical program inputs (e.g., credit extension, fertilizers, marketing, and distribution) into outputs to attain program goals.

Structural Factors. One of the determining factors in this regard is the capability of the central body (RCPCC or NFAC) and its leadership to coordinate the activities of various cooperating agencies concerned with providing key inputs to the rice program. The structural changes undergone by the coordinating body from the inception of the program in 1958 up to Masagana 99 show an increase both in specialization and organizational complexity. This is reflected in the enlargement of the composition of the RCPCC and the NFAC and the creation of various specialized units within them for planning and implementation. These changes result not only from what experience in the rice program has engendered but are also partly administrative responses to the broadening and enlargement of what constitutes the rice self-sufficiency system, i.e., from simply a production problem to marketing and distribution, from a purely governmental responsibility to the inclusion of the private sector.

The need to relate the rice self-sufficiency program to the larger sectoral and national development plans has also led to linkages with, and the
representation of, powerful agencies such as the National Economic and Development Authority, the nation's planning body, and the Office of the President.

The need also to strengthen the coordination of key program inputs (e.g., credit, irrigation) or improve management control (MIS) has resulted in the involvement of government and rural banks (for credit) and the US-AID (for the management information system). Finally, the addition of other programs besides rice has created further organizational complexity. This has led to the creation, therefore, of national management committees composed of smaller and lower-level technical groups, compared to the unwieldy top-level NFAC.

There is also a trend towards establishing more direct administrative linkages with field implementors by clearly defining the PPO as the responsible official in the province, and allowing for a division of responsibility in the field (i.e., if the PPO for rice is from BAE, then the PPO for corn has to be from BPI). The coopting of local officials (the governors and the mayors) to head the provincial action committees and the municipal action teams was designed to involve the local government structure more closely in the implementation process as well as to improve coordination by interposing a political authority over field representatives of national cooperating agencies.

Leadership. Because of the increasing organizational complexity, specialization, and competence, leadership has shifted markedly from a single and dominating leadership style under Salas to a more dispersed leadership under Tanco. The current technocrats, such as the executive director for Masagana 99 and his staff, do not possess the authority positions of Salas, Ernesto Maceda, or Osmundo Mondonged, their counterparts in earlier programs.

The relatively lower status and positions of key national implementors have also caused problems in the coordination of M-99. Even Secretary Tanco, as council chairman, does not occupy a position of power comparable to Executive Secretary Salas. The current leaders, however, are skilled administrators who have been able to devise means to make the program go, even to the extent of going around a recalcitrant bureau director, if necessary.

Technology. The introduction of new technology, whether of the "hard" or "soft" variety, tends to complicate the administration of a program. The demands on both resources and manpower would require behavioral changes as well as technical skills on the part of program personnel and their clientele, the farmers. However, training programs for personnel as well as farmer-leaders have been designed primarily to prepare them for the technical requirements of the new technology and have not equipped them to cope equally with the behavioral and cultural issues involved in technology transfer. Thus, resistance to the new technologies, such as the introduction of credit without collaterals and the farm budget, has surfaced.

Support. The support for the rice self-sufficiency program from the top political and administrative elite has been very marked under President Marcos' regime. This elite support has increased the capability of program implementors to draw financial and other resources from domestic and foreign sources. It has also led to the involvement of top officials in the program which, to a
large extent, has mitigated coordination problems in implementation. Support of elites is variable, however, generally reaching its peak during crises such as floods and drought.

The "pilot project" approach is an administrative device to increase support by "demonstrating" the success of a new technology (HYV, pest control, supervised credit, and so on). It not only solves potential problems when the program is implemented on a larger scale, but also helps convince farmers about the efficiency of the program itself or of the new technique and technology.

Resources. In the early stages of the rice program (1958-1965), financing was very uncertain because of deficiencies in the resource allocation process, both for the program and the national planning system in general. This resulted, in part, in the anemic performance of the rice production program then. Under M-99, the uncertainties in fund allocation have been reduced. Weaknesses remain in the allocation system, however, because of agency policies and procedures and the difficulty NFAC has in influencing decisions of cooperating agencies such as the government banks. This has led to the creation of a committee within the council to improve the planning and implementation of the credit requirements of M-99. Low repayment rates and anomalies in the extension of loans may be traced to the apparent lack of adequate preparation of program implementors and the farmers on the technical and behavioral aspects of the supervised credit program.

The increase in number and in competence of the rice program personnel partly accounts for the relative success of Masagana 99. The problem of divided loyalties, however, would remain as long as program personnel are on detail status to NFAC. This has also led to role conflicts between those required by the M-99 Council and the mother agencies' own programs as well as interagency rivalries and conflicts.

The Program Management Cycle

While the main theoretical thrust of this dual case history is the analysis of the process and dynamics of implementing the government's rice-sufficiency program, it is nonetheless equally concerned with the program/project planning process insofar as it has affected the implementation of the program. An analysis of a number of case studies on implementation clearly shows that there is a need to examine the planning-implementation nexus. These cases have revealed that many problems in implementation are traceable to inadequacies and defects in the planning process. For example, the lack of participation of program implementors in plan formulation has often led to unfeasible and unrealistic plans, especially if the existing monitoring and feedback mechanism is weak. It is also realistic to view program planning and implementation as processes in a continuum, with plans continually adjusted in the light of problems as well as changes in the process of implementation.

Finally, a word about evaluation. Because evaluation in the rice self-sufficiency program has been regarded as a continuous activity, the fact that it has no terminal point makes an evaluation stage as such seem unnecessary. It may be argued, however, that a more distinct evaluation activity needs to be performed. For instance, no formal or deliberate assessment using rigorous before/after or similar experimental designs has been made. This may involve analyses not only of the direct outputs (e.g., rice production, distribution, and marketing) but also of outcomes and impacts on society at large, whether intended or not. These would involve considerations of such matters as the impact on the economy, or on the people's acceptance of modern technology, or on income inequality. The urgency and priority status of the rice program and its wide-ranging implications dictate the need for such an evaluation.