Majority language death

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The notion of ‘language death’ is usually associated with one of the ‘endangered languages’, i.e. languages that are at risk of falling out of use as their speakers die out or shift to some other language. This paper describes another kind of language death: the situation in which a language remains a powerful identity marker and the mother tongue of a country’s privileged and numerically dominant group with all the features that are treated as constituting ethnicity, and yet ceases to be used as a means of expressing its speakers’ intellectual demands and preserving the community’s cultural traditions. This process may be defined as the ‘intellectual death’ of a language.

The focal point of the analysis undertaken is the sociolinguistic status of Punjabi in Pakistan. The aim of the paper is to explore the historical, economic, political, cultural and psychological reasons for the gradual removal of a majority language from the repertoires of native speakers.

1. Preface. The Punjabi-speaking community constitutes 44.15% of the total population of Pakistan and 47.56% of its urban population.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Pakistan is a multilingual country with six major languages and over fifty-nine smaller languages. The major languages are Punjabi (44.15% of the population), Pashto (15.42%), Sindhi (14.10%), Siraiki (10.53%), Urdu (7.57%) and Balochi (3.57%). Speakers of other languages account for 4.66% of the population; this category congregates over fifty languages, some of them on the verge of extinction (Census of Pakistan 2001, Table 2.7:...
Together with speakers of Saraiki\(^2\) (10.53%), which is treated by some linguists as a southern dialect of Punjabi (Namedi 2005),\(^3\) bearers of the Punjabi language represent the majority of the population of Pakistan. Even if Saraiki is excluded, Punjabi has the largest number of speakers in Pakistan: Pashto, with 15.42% of the speakers, and Sindhi, with 11.77%, occupy a distant second and third place. Urdu, the national language of the country, is the mother tongue of only 7.57% of the entire population of Pakistan.\(^4\)

The Punjabi community has all the features that are usually taken to constitute ethnicity: a shared territory, history, geography, and cultural roots. The basis of the people’s cultural heritage is their common language. The earliest poetic treatises produced in Western Punjabi date back to the 15th century, and the earliest available prose works are the *Janam Sakhis* – hagiographic stories of the life and teachings of the founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak (1469-1539) –, from the 17th century (McLeod 1980). They were popular mostly with the Sikh community, while Farid’s poetry, folk songs and *Qissa* stories constituted the common heritage of the three main religious communities of the Punjab – Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Saraiki is spelled also as Siraiki and Seraiki. Saraiki is the spelling used in universities in Pakistan.

\(^2\) Punjabi and Saraiki are mutually intelligible, differing in their consonant inventory and in the structure of the verb. As there are no clear-cut criteria for differentiating language and dialect, these problems must be solved on the basis of speakers’ self-identification.

\(^3\) Source: the Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division/Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics [http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/other_tables/pop_by_mother_tongue.pdf]. These statistics, based on a census conducted in 1998, have been challenged by many scholars and rejected by many politicians who claimed that a certain amount of educated urban speakers of Punjabi identified themselves as Urdu speakers (e.g. Mansoor 1993). The results of the 2008 census have not yet been disclosed.

\(^4\) There are controversies among scholars concerning the earliest traces of the Punjabi language. (Gopal Singh 1979). The verses by Sheikh Farid found in the *Adi Granth* are usually considered to constitute a clear link in the descent of modern Punjabi from the Multani dialect (Sekhon & Duggal 1992). Some scholars ascribe ‘Shloke Shaikh Farid ke’ incorporated into the *Adi Granth* to Farid-ud-din Ganj-i-Shakar (1173-1265), others attribute them to Farid Sani, the spiritual descendent of Ganj-i-Shakar. There is no unanimity over the lifetime of Farid Sani as well. Sometimes it is dated from 1450 to 1554, sometimes from 1450 to 1575. Some scholars argue that the ideas expressed by the author of ‘Shloke Shaikh Farid ke’ betray the first phase of influence of Vaishnava Vedantic Bhakti (i.e. a period which begins from the middle of the 15th century. (Sharda 1974: 107). In addition,
In today’s Pakistan, the Punjabi-speaking community is anything but a disadvantaged ethnic group. The influential class of rich Punjabi landlords, the largest educated middle class which provides most of the personnel for white-collar professions and is the pool for recruitment into civil and military service – all that makes the general public as well as political analysts regard Punjabis as a privileged group.

However, the mother tongue of this privileged and numerically dominant group has no institutional support in Pakistan. All cultural, intellectual or professional activity of the community takes place either in Urdu or in English. There are 36,750 Sindhi-medium schools in Sind and 10,731 Pashto-medium schools in the Northwestern Province, and both languages are also taught as compulsory subjects in these two provinces (Rahman 2002a: 515-524). However, there is not a single Punjabi-medium school, and Punjabi is nowhere taught as a compulsory subject. With the exception of several Punjabi films and short TV or radio programs, Punjabi is almost absent from the mass media, and completely absent from government services. One can do an M.A. or a Ph.D. in the University of the Punjab in Lahore, but it can hardly serve the cause of preserving the Punjabi language. People may watch a film in Punjabi, but they do not read Punjabi written texts, because they are only used to speaking and listening to Punjabi, not to reading it. Very few people would read a book or a newspaper in their ‘mother tongue’, because they have not got used to it in school. As a result, Punjabi-speaking poets and writers have to write in Urdu for Punjabi-speaking readers if they want their books to sell.

Of all the languages listed in censuses, only the figures for Punjabi speakers have decreased from 48.17% in 1981 to 44.15% in 1998. This decline cannot be explained by a drop in the Siraiki or Punjabi population (which did not occur) nor by the mass migration of Punjabis to other places. The reason might be that a number of Punjabis identified themselves in the 1998 census as speakers of Urdu. The sociological research undertaken by Mansoor (1993) and Rahman (2002a) in Lahore partially confirms this supposition, as a significant number of Punjabi students identified

there is vivid Kabir’s influence on Baba Farid’s compositions. As Kabir’s lifetime is dated between 1398 and 1520, it seems most reasonable to attribute Sheikh Farid’s poetry to the period from 1450 to 1554.
themselves as speakers of Urdu. They felt embarrassed to call themselves ‘Punjabi speakers’ as – according to them – the only topics suitable for Punjabi were gossip, swearing and jokes.

Why do Punjabis not support their own language? An attempt is made below to adduce historical, economic, political, cultural and psychological explanations for this phenomenon.

2. The sociolinguistic status of Punjabi from a historical perspective. Punjabi did not have any official status in the Mughal Empire. Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780 – 1839), the founder of the first Sikh Empire which lasted from 1799 to 1849, patronized Punjabi, but Persian remained the language of the court. It is worth mentioning that literacy (and, consequently, the number of people who had good command of the Persian language) was far more widespread in the Sikh kingdom than in other provinces. Before the British conquest of the Punjab in 1849, there were 300,000 pupils in indigenous schools, whereas in 1860-61 these numbers had come down to 60,168 pupils (Leitner 1882:16). There were both Persian and Arabic schools. Since Persian was the language of the government, bureaucracy, judiciary, education, etc., it was necessary to learn it in order to function as a munshi (clerk), a muallim (teacher), and generally as any state functionary (Rahman 2003: 2).

In 1849, the Punjab had passed into the hands of the British East India Company and later became a province of the British Empire in India. The Department of Public Instruction created by British rulers in 1855 retained Persian as the language of written documentation. Persian was later replaced with Urdu, the informal lingua franca of North India. In the Punjab, Urdu was accepted by the British rulers as the vernacular language after consulting the officers posted in the districts of the new provinces. Urdu became the medium of instruction in government schools attended by the working class, lower-middle and middle class children. Urdu was also the language of administration and of the lower-level judicial bodies, printing press and the army (Rahman 2011). Interestingly, in 1860 a medical course in Urdu was instituted in the Lahore Medical College (Rahman 2004: 22).6

The court munshis and the school teachers brought largely from the

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6 The name was later changed to Lahore Medical School.
United Provinces’ were promoters of Urdu in the Punjab and, due to their efforts, the language spread quickly. In the province of Sindh, however, Sindhi was also used, but not in competition with Urdu (Rahman 2002a: 210-218). The language which really competed with Urdu and gradually gained power in British India was Hindi. In 1890-1891, the ratio of subscribers of Urdu and Hindi newspapers was 2:1 (16256: 8002); by 1936, it was the opposite, 1:2 (182485: 324880). From 1891 to 1936, the amount of subscribers of Urdu newspapers increased 9-fold, while the amount of subscribers of Hindi newspapers increased 40.5 times (Bhatnagar 1947:153, 368-369). Similar ratios characterize book publications: in 1889-1890, there were 561 (61.2%) books published in Urdu and 361 (38.8%) books in Hindi. In 1935-1936, the number of Urdu books was 252 (10.9%), which constituted a 2.2-fold decrease, while the Hindi books amounted to 2139 (89.15), a 6-fold increase (Chatterji 1960: 248).

However, during the British period, there was a lot of official patronage for Urdu, first and foremost in the domain of employment. Because of this, and despite the efforts of Hindi activists, Urdu was predominant (Rahman 2011). English became the language of the upper judiciary and part of the educational system and administration. Upper class children attended English-medium institutions in order to later occupy high social positions in society. In fact, the British substituted Persian with English (Rahman 1996a: 22-38). In 1857, the British colonial administration started university education with the intention to give Indians a sense of participation in running the affairs of the state and create an educated elite loyal to the British government (Basu 1952: 303). All higher education in colleges and universities was in English. The spread of English caused the arrival of more newcomers from Bengal (Gopal Singh 1979: 587).

Education in English brought new ideas of democracy, human rights, individualism, etc. These new concepts quickly spread among the recently-formed professional middle class. The press played an important role in informing and leading the public opinion. One might expect that the

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7 The United Provinces were a province of British India which corresponded approximately to the combined regions of the present-day Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.

8 The educated elite of the Punjab was already acquainted with the Arabic script and borrowings from Persian and Arabic.
propagation of new methods of social organization would result in the national consolidation of Punjabi identity along secular politico-economic lines, but instead such consolidation had a religious basis.

It should be noted that, rather paradoxically, democratic reforms in India have only strengthened the division of the population on communal grounds. Through the Minto-Morley Reform of 1909, the British rulers enlarged the sphere of Indian participation in the Government. As a result, the various communities started competing in order to increase their representation in central and local administrative bodies. When Muslims acquired their separate electorates, the Sikhs immediately began to demand similar rights and, as their demands did not meet with success, agitation campaigns were organized.

It is not the case that the three main religious communities of the Punjab have always been hostile to each other but, under British rule, political life in the region was predominantly organized along religious lines. One important reason for this is that, as is well known, the British pursued communal policies, supporting different religious communities at different times (Gopal Singh 1979: 585-693). After the mutiny of 1857, Muslims were deprived of their power and position. Their traditional positions as land, civil and military servants were no longer available to them. Civil services were monopolized by Hindus, in most cases outsiders (the educated Hindus of Bengal and Madras). Military service became a privilege of the Sikhs, whom the British Government supported as a religious community. The British Governor-General decreed that all Sikhs entering the British army should receive the Pahul (a special ceremony of purification) and observe strictly the code of Sikh conduct. The Governor-General also encouraged the translation of the Sikh scripture (Guru Granth Sahib) into English. This work was supposed to be carried at Government expense and in consultation with the Sikh authorities.

However, by the beginning of the 20th century, British sympathies started to change. Various strata of Hindu and Sikh society were dissatisfied with British rule. Commercial classes resented the competition of the West in both their internal and external trade, and intellectuals demanded more liberties. As Hindus mostly took the lead in Home Rule agitations as well as in artistic, spiritual and educational movements, the British decided to abandon their distrust of the Muslims and encourage them to oppose the
growing Hindu national movement. British good-will for the Sikhs also changed around 1905. The foundation of the anti-British Gadar party, in 1913, made the British Government even more suspicious of the Sikh community. Having transferred their allegiance to the Muslims, the British supported the formation of their own political platform, the All-India Muslim League in 1906.

In the Punjab itself, the British also pursued communal policies: started in 1887, they supported the Muslim-majority West Punjab, in whose prosperity the Sikh Jats participated only as migrants, and neglected the famine-ridden East Punjab, where Hindus and Sikhs predominated (Gopal Singh 1979: 632-633).

In this context, in 1873, the Sikhs launched the Singh Sabha reform movement from Amritsar. Initially, its social basis consisted of big landlords, who were later joined by students and intellectuals; all of them were inspired by the idea that strict measures should urgently be taken to protect the Sikh faith. Branches of the Singh Sabha were created in different parts of the Punjab, and very soon two main groups emerged: supporters of the Amritsar Sabha came to be known as the ‘Traditional Khalsa’ (Sanatan Khalsa), and the more radical group, initially based in Lahore, acquired the name of ‘True Khalsa’ (Tat Khalsa). The conservative Sanatan Sikhs considered the Sikhs and their traditions as part of the wider Hindu world, while their opponents, the followers of the Tat Khalsa, were of the opinion that Sikhs should be treated as an entirely different community from the Hindus. The main ideas of Tat Khalsa Sikhs were perfectly expressed by Kahn Singh Nabha in his booklet Ham Hindu nahin ‘We are not Hindus’, published in 1899 (Singh 1979: 620). The author insisted on a separate Sikh identity and wrote that Sikhs should never observe castes or visit the shrines belonging to followers of other religions, and that they should abstain from practicing non-Sikh rituals. At the beginning of the 20th century, famous Sikh writers and reformists such as Bhai Vir Singh, Bhai Jodh Singh (among others) spoke of the Sikhs as a qaum ‘nation’.

Reformist Hindu movements were not only trying to defend their religion by drawing demarcation lines between different religious communities, they also organized campaigns against Muslims. The Arya Samaj campaigned in 1875 for Shudhi (re-conversion of Muslims), for a ban on cow-slaughter, etc.
Language played a very significant role in religious (rather than ethnic) self-identification of the population of North India, including the Punjab. During Mughal and Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s time, the main authors of prose and poetry which attained popularity among all three religious communities were Muslim: Waris Shah (1706-1798), Hafiz Barkhudar (1658-1707), Hashim Shah (1735?-1843?), Qadaryar (1802-1892), to name only a few. British education introduced new European genres and, predominantly, Sikh and Hindu authors: Nanak Singh (1897-1971), Puran Singh (1881-1931), Dhani Ram Chatrik (1876-1957), Diwan Singh (1897-1944), Mohan Singh (1905-1978), among others. Unlike qissa stories, known to common people of all religious communities, modern Punjabi literature was read by educated speakers of the Punjabi language, predominantly Sikhs and, to a lesser extent Hindus.

The idea that Urdu was the language of Muslims, Hindi belonged to Hindus and Punjabi to Sikhs was gradually becoming established in society. The islamization of Urdu which took place in the 18th and 19th centuries has been very well described by Tariq Rahman (2006a, 2011: ch. 5, 6). At the turn of the century, Urdu became a symbol of Muslim identity, propagated by the Pakistan movement.

Religious differentiation existed within the Urdu language as well. T. Khalmurzayev divides Urdu press into ‘Punjabi’ and ‘Muslim’. Many publishers of Urdu newspapers in the British Punjab were Sikhs and Hindus who supported Arya samaj – a religious reformist society which campaigned for the revival of Hinduism and the development of Hindi. The readers of ‘Punjabi’-style Urdu newspapers were Sikhs and Hindus. They preferred to read Urdu newspapers as they learned Urdu in school, but preferred to read about Hindu or Sikh issues, Sikh and Hindu holidays, rituals, etc. These newspapers used plenty of Sanskrit borrowings, in contradistinction with the ‘Muslim’ newspapers (published by Muslims for Muslims), which resorted to Persian and Arabic borrowings. These ‘Muslim’ Urdu newspapers were mainly published outside the Punjab and, despite their very wide geographical distribution, had much in common in terms of style, vocabulary, topics, etc. (Khalmurzayev 1979: 57-65).

As for Punjabi, it became a symbol of Sikh identity. It was through the efforts of Prof. Gurmukh Singh, a Lahore-based Singh Sabha activist, that teaching of Punjabi was introduced at the Oriental College of Lahore, in
1877 (Gopal Singh 1979: 610).

The notion of script as a religious symbol was not as important at that time as it is nowadays. Since the time of Khalif Umar, the educational policy of the Muslims towards their conquered lands did not place any obstacles in the way of Muslim settlers and converts using local languages, provided that these were written in the Arabic script. This script was employed by all communities to write both Urdu and Punjabi, whereas the Gurmukhi was used mostly by Sikhs (Sekhon & Duggal 1992). The idea that Punjabi should be written in Gurmukhi, Hindi in Devanagari and Urdu in the Arabic script is a later development.

Punjabi Sikhs usually believe in the sacred qualities of the Gurmukhi script introduced by the second Sikh Guru Angad Dev (1504-1552). However, some modern Sikh scholars argue that Gurmukhi existed long before the lifetime of the founder of Sikhism Guru Nanak (1469-1539) and could be used by Hindus for writing in Punjabi. This is proven by the fact that Guru Nanak wrote an acrostic called the patti or tablet in Rag Asa, in which he used all of the thirty five letters of the Gurmukhi script with the same sound values as they have nowadays (Sekhon & Duggal 1992).

Interestingly, the Gurmukhi type was first manufactured by Christian missionaries, and the first Punjabi work printed in the Gurmukhi script was the Christian Bible published at Sirampur and presented to Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1835. The first grammar of Punjabi and the first English-Punjabi dictionary were also prepared by Christian missionaries (Gopal Singh 1979: 607).

Divided into three religious communities, all Punjabis spoke one and the same language – Punjabi – even though, for a long time, it did not have any official status. Punjabi acquired the status of a state language (alongside Urdu) for the first time in its history in 1911, in the princely state of Patiala. By decree of the Maharaja of Patiala, teaching of Punjabi was made compulsory at primary and secondary state schools from 1942. The following landmark was the declaration of Punjabi as the court language of the then PEPSU state, in 1948.⁹

⁹ The Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) was created out of the merger of several Punjabi princely states on July 15, 1948, formally becoming a state of India in 1950. The capital and principal city was Patiala, and the last Maharaja of Patiala, Yadvindra Singh, served as Rajpramukh (equivalent to Governor) of the state during its
3. **Punjabi in independent India.** At the time of Partition (in June 1947) there were attempts to seek the support of Gandhi for a Punjabi-speaking state in India carved out of what was soon going to be East Punjab. The first sharp reaction of Gandhi was negative, as he suspected the desire to form a Sikh state. When told that no single community will form the majority in this state (the Muslims had not yet migrated to Pakistan), he calmed down and agreed to discuss the proposal. But this offer was never taken up by the Sikhs with any seriousness. It was soon made impracticable due to riots and the wholesale migration of the minorities from both parts of the Punjab, as well as the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a Hindu fanatic on January 30, 1948. Punjabi was nonetheless included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India and came to be recognized as one of the fifteen official languages of the country. However, the controversy concerning the status of Punjabi in Punjab was to persist until the creation of a separate Punjabi state – Punjabi Suba – in 1966.\(^{10}\)

The place of Hindi and Punjabi in educational institutions was governed by a formula developed by the former Chief Minister Bhimsen Sachar in 1949 and named after him. According to this formula, Hindi-medium and Punjabi-medium instruction should be provided at the primary level even if only one out of four students in a class requested it. In addition, there should be compulsory teaching of either Hindi or Punjabi, and another language should be an optional non-qualifying subject for examination purposes (Sharma 1995: 294). However, the choice of the medium of instruction was left to the parents, allowing Hindus to opt for Hindi and Sikhs for Punjabi. This divided the two communities further apart. Even the academic world got divided on communal lines. In 1949, The Punjab University, dominated by *Arya Samaj* elements, decided that Punjabi was not an appropriate medium of instruction, even if the Sikhs would (as they did) agree to both the Nagri

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\(^{10}\) Demands for Punjabi Suba were accepted by the central government in September 1966, when the former large state of Punjab was divided into three: areas in the south of the Punjab formed the new state of Haryana, the northern Pahari- and Kangri-speaking districts were merged with Himachal Pradesh, while the remaining areas formed the new Punjabi-speaking state, which retained the name of Punjab. As a result, Sikhs became the majority of the newly created state.
and Gurmukhi scripts. The Punjab became a linguistic battleground. In fact, the fight was communal on both sides. The main Sikh party, Akali Dal, took little interest in the development of the Punjabi language. This statement may be seen in the fact that none of the Sikh scholars who really contributed to enriching Sikh literature (such as Bhai Vir Singh, Bhai Jodh Singh, Prof. Teja Singh, etc.) were ever nominated to the S.G.P.C.\textsuperscript{11}

After much agitation promoted by the Akali Dal, a compromise called the “Regional formula” was finally accepted by all parties in 1956. The Punjab was divided into two regions – Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking. Punjabi became the sole medium in the Punjabi region and was to be taught in the Hindi region as well (and vice-versa). However, the Hindus never opted for it.

No Census ever shows linguistic reality, it shows people’s self-identification. The 1961 Census was remarkable for the religious, rather than ethnic, trends of self-identification among the population of the Indian Punjab. Contrary to actual practice, in this census the Sikhs stated \textit{en masse} that their mother tongue was Punjabi, while the Hindus usually insisted on Hindi.

The Central Government could not agree to form a linguistic state in the Punjab because of strong Hindu opposition. J. L. Nehru wrote in 1961 to Fateh Singh:

\begin{quote}
It is not out of any discrimination against the Punjab or distrust of the Sikhs that the process of forming a linguistic state was not possible. … Punjabi was essentially the dominant language of the Punjab state, common to both Hindus and Sikhs, though it is not possible to accept the principle of purely linguistic states in the case of Punjab.
\end{quote}

(quoted from Gopal Singh 1979: 727)

It was only on March 2, 1966 that the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution about the division of the existing state of Punjab to form a new state with Punjabi as the state language. However, this division did

\textsuperscript{11} S.G.P.C. (the \textit{Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee}) is an organization responsible for the upkeep of gurdwaras, Sikh places of worship, in the states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. The S.G.P.C. also administers the Golden temple in Amritsar. S.G.P.C. officials are elected in open conclaves held in Amritsar, in which all Sikhs may participate.
not demarcate the Punjabi-speaking areas from the Hindi-speaking ones; it only demarcated the Sikh-majority areas from the Hindu-populated lands.

The Punjab (State) Language Act 1967 declared Punjabi in Gurmukhi script the sole official language of the new Punjab State at all levels. Punjabi came to be accepted as a medium of instruction in schools and colleges. It was allowed as an alternative medium of examination for certain subjects at the post-graduate level (Gopal Singh 1979: 713-735).

4. **Punjabi in Independent Pakistan.** Pakistan was created according to the basic principle of its founders: ‘one nation, one religion, one language, one state’ (Zaidi 2010: 3). When it was formed, Pakistan was divided into two separate parts: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The population of West Pakistan was comprised of several large ethnic groups: Punjabis (67.08%), Sindhis (12.85%), Pathans (Pashto speakers: 8.16%), Mohajirs (Urdu speakers: 7.05%), Balochis (3.04%) and diverse ethno-linguistic groups of the Northern Areas (Kazi 1987). East Pakistan was mainly populated by Bengalis, who constituted the majority not only there but in the newly-born country as a whole, where they accounted for 55.6% of the population (Census of Pakistan 1951: Census Bulletin No. 1).

According to the democratic principle of the majority, Bengali should have been the main candidate to become the national/official language. However, in November 1947, the government of Pakistan declared Urdu the national language of the whole of Pakistan.\(^\text{12}\) Urdu was not the mother tongue of any indigenous ethnic group of Pakistan, but that of the Mohajirs\(^\text{13}\) who had migrated to West Pakistan from India during the Partition and settled in the urban centers of the province of Sind. Many of those immigrants were leading politicians and advocates of Urdu as an ‘Islamic language’ destined to weld different ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan into one nation. The other advantage of Urdu over the mother tongues of the numerous ethno-linguistic groups of the country was that, as the mother tongue of a small group of migrants, it would not place any large ethnic group in a privileged position. In addition, it had been an official language of British India, and the population had grown accustomed to it.

The attitude of the two largest ethnic groups of Pakistan towards the

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\(^{12}\) About parliament discussions on that matter see Rahman (1996a: 86).

\(^{13}\) The meaning of the term *mohajir* is ‘an emigrant/migrant’.
national language problem was absolutely different. The Bengalis, united by their common language and culture (Bartkus 1999: 125) launched a campaign against Urdu, but the government suppressed it. The suppression of the Bengali language caused in its speakers a feeling of economic and political deprivation which culminated in the separation of the Bengali part of the country and the formation of the state of Bangladesh in 1971 (Islam 2003; Umar 2004). However, the main reason for the opposition to Urdu was not merely linguistic or even cultural, but economic. Bengalis did not wish to see revenues from the Eastern wing, primarily from the export of jute and other products, spent for the development of West Pakistan or the army which, as it turns out, was West Pakistani- (or, rather, Punjabi-) dominated (Jahan 1972; HBWI 1982, vol. 6: 810-811; Rahman 2006b: 73-104).

Besides, if Urdu, and not Bengali, were used in the lower domains of power such as administration, the judiciary, education, media, or the military, the Bengalis, who were primarily civil servants, would have been deprived of their share in power both in the centre and in their own province, because the most powerful jobs would have been controlled by West Pakistani bureaucrats and the military. The Bengali language became a symbol of a consolidated Bengali identity. Details of the Bengali language movement are given in Alavi (1988), Rahman (1995, 1996a, 2002a, 2006b), to name only a few, and are beyond the scope of this paper.

Sind was another region where Urdu (the language of Mohajirs) faced serious opposition from local bureaucrats and intellectuals, supported by an substantial part of the urban population. The language riots of January 1971 and July 1972 in Sind are described in Ahmed (1992).

Balochi and Brahvi in Balochistan, Pashto in the N.W.F.P and Siraiki in South Western Punjab remained symbols of ethnic self-identification, but Urdu did not meet with much opposition in these regions (Rahman 1996a).

While speakers of Punjabi formed a coalition with the Mohajirs and actively supported Urdu as a symbol of national unity, it would be wrong to say that all the Punjabis were ready to support Urdu at the cost of their own

14 On February 21, 1952, several people were killed during protests to gain the recognition of Bengali as a state language for the then Dominion of Pakistan and to maintain the Bengali script. Since then, this day has been observed in Bangladesh as the Language Movement Day and, on November 17, 1999, it was proclaimed International Mother Language Day by UNESCO.
language. The role of Urdu as a symbol of religious, political and cultural unity was propagated first of all by the ruling elite, which consisted of feudal lords, ruling party politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers. They were opposed by middle class intellectuals who insisted on linguistic and democratic rights for themselves and for other ethno-linguistic communities of Pakistan.

Established in 1951 the Pak Punjabi League demanded that Punjabi be taught at schools and universities from primary to M.A. level. But, despite their protests, Punjabi was only allowed as an optional subject at the postgraduate level in the Punjab University. From time to time, pro-Punjabi organizations such as the Punjabi Majlis and the Punjabi Group of Writers intensively campaigned for the use of Punjabi in schools and in government services (Rahman 1996a). There were other individual and collective campaigns organized by intellectuals and politicians in support of Punjabi (Zaidi 2010: 1-34), but no serious large-scale ethnic movements of Punjabis (the majority of the country’s population), to back the protesters in their attempts to widen the social functions of their mother tongue.

In addition to the above described historical reasons for the prominence of Urdu – the primacy of religious self-identification and the specific sociolinguistic situation in British India, when Urdu and English were the official languages and Punjabi was restricted to non-official spheres –, there were also evident political reasons:

1) At the time of the creation of Pakistan, Bengalis made up more than half (55.6%) of the country’s population and, in reaction to this, the Punjabi-Mohajir elite pinned their hopes on Urdu as a unifying symbol of the state (Rahman 2002: 263). However, after Bangladesh seceded and Punjabis became the largest ethno-linguistic group in Pakistan, the attitude of the Punjabi elite towards its mother tongue did not change. One of the explanations given by the ruling Punjabi-Mohajir coalition was that, if they were to support Punjabi, the other provinces might also demand their linguistic rights, which was completely undesirable (Rahman 2002a).15 Using the slogan of Islam and Pakistani nationalism to prevent such movements in the country, Punjabi rulers and Mohajirs

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15 It is worth mentioning in this respect that Sindhi and Pashto are taught in schools, while the Punjabi language is not.
did not consider that what was promoted might not necessarily produce cohesiveness but resentment against the Punjabi-dominated centre (Rahman 2004: 4);

2) In the course of Pakistan’s modern history, any kind of internal opposition was suppressed in the name of Islam and national security (Mehdi 1994). When martial law was imposed by General Ayub in 1958 and by General Zia (ethnic Punjabi) in 1977, the government and state-controlled media presented the leaders of any indigenous language movement as anti-state criminals (Afzal 1986), any newly-created literary organization was proclaimed a ‘political party’ and immediately banned (Ayres 2003; Shackle 2007). It was only during the more or less democratic rule of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77) that the so-called ‘anti-state’ Punjabi intellectuals were allowed to teach Punjabi in the Punjab University and that Punjabi functions and cultural programs began to be encouraged.

The discrimination of the major language of Pakistan may also be explained by cultural reasons: the term ‘culture’ in Pakistan has always meant ‘Islamic culture’ (Rahman 1999). Teaching of Punjabi has been Islamized to the extent that the Punjabi Literature course at the Punjab University has turned into Islamic Studies in the Punjabi language. No reference is ever made in class to the ancient Harappan civilization, to the ancient Gandhara state or to the ancient university in Taxila, which was the first of its kind in the world (Zaidi 2010). Young people can only access the best of Punjabi cultural heritage within their families and through oral transmission. Most non-Muslim authors who write in Punjabi – such as, for example, the famous poet Shīr Kumār Batālvī – are virtually unknown to young Punjabis in Pakistan. As a result, young people from families which do not preserve common Punjabi cultural traditions consider Punjabi to be a language worth for nothing except gossiping, making jokes and swearing (see the above-mentioned sociological research of Mansoor (1993) and Rahman (2002a)).

One of the main reasons for the low esteem of the Punjabi language is – paradoxical though it may seem – the high economic and political status of the Punjabi community in today’s Pakistan. Language movements in modern South Asia are absolutely different from what
occurred in seemingly parallel historical processes of national development in Europe. In almost every European country, the rising bourgeoisie made efforts to standardize and promote its mother tongue, to convert it into the main means of communication at all levels and, through this, to make its use one of the most important tools of nation building. The modern epoch of globalization created a new tendency in such processes: nowadays, ethnic groups usually start language movements when they feel economically and/or politically and/or culturally depressed, in the hope of gaining some privileges as a result of those campaigns. Very often, the main impulse is the desire of the ‘sons of the soil’ to secure more job opportunities in comparison with the migrants.

Those were important incentives for the Dogri, Rajasthani and Maithili movements in India as well as for the Saraiki movement in Pakistan. The Saraiki movement started in the 1960s, with the aim to establish a collective identity for the Saraiki language group inside the Punjab Province of Pakistan and to secure official status for the language. However, the real reasons for the movement were different: the underdevelopment of the Southern Punjab and the desire of the ‘sons of the soil’ to improve their economic and political status. The latter becomes clear from the list of demands formulated by the participants: they requested a separate Saraiki regiment in the Pakistani army, insisted on changing employment quotas, and so forth. In the late 1990s and during the following decade, the language problem practically ceased to be important. It is noteworthy, for example, that, out of 21 ‘demands’ made at the Saraiki Conference held in December 2003, only one pertained to language issues per se (Rahman 1996a: ch. 10).

If the ‘sons of the soil’ are satisfied with their economic, political or social status, language movements do not arise. The situation with the Punjabi language in Pakistan may serve as a good example of this.

5. Language attitudes of the Punjabi educated elite in Pakistan. Many authors write about the low status of Punjabi in Pakistan, where it is considered the language of illiterates employed in unattractive kinds of jobs (Mansoor 1993:129). Tariq Rahman describes widespread culture-shame concerning Punjabi: in all the elitist English-medium schools he visited, there were policies forbidding students from speaking Punjabi,
teachers and classmates embarrassed students about their mother tongue, calling Punjabi speakers *Paendu* ‘village yokel’ (Rahman 2006a: 73-104).

However, some social groups are not ashamed of speaking Punjabi. One of them – paradoxical though it may seem – is the cream of the Punjabi elite: university professors, highly posted bureaucrats, diplomats, etc. –, people who graduated from elitist English-medium schools and the best universities. Their high social status allows them not to fear being called ‘village yokel’. The language attitudes of the educated elite are particularly interesting because these people determine both the present and the future of the country.

As a participant of the International Conference ‘History, Politics and Society: The Punjab’, organized by the University of the Punjab in Lahore, in December 2008, I interviewed journalists, university professors, students and clerks. Their attitude towards Punjabi was very positive. There must be people who feel embarrassed to call themselves ‘Punjabi speakers’, but I did not happen to meet a single one. On the contrary, all the interviewees demonstrated an attachment to their mother tongue. They were happy to meet a foreigner who spoke their language and willingly discussed the meaning of the term ‘Punjabiyat’. All cases of informal communication I had (at university departments, shops, museums, buses, dining-rooms, etc.) were either in Punjabi proper, or in a mix of Urdu, Punjabi and English. Formal communication was, of course, either in Urdu or in English. Most written work in the University was produced in English.

When asked if they identified any threat to the future of the Punjabi language, some of the interviewees expressed their regrets that it was not taught in school, but they were embarrassed when asked if they would send their children to a Punjabi-medium school if such an opportunity were to arise. The majority would undoubtedly not do it, not because they are ashamed of their language but because they do not wish to overburden their children by teaching them their mother tongue when it is useless for getting good jobs. It is worth mentioning that, according to article 251 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, a Provincial Assembly may prescribe measures

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16 The number of people interviewed (about 40) does not allow for large-scale statistical conclusions, but it helps to form a general idea concerning the sociolinguistic situation in Lahore.

17 The essence of Punjabi culture.
for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language (Urdu). Attempts at implementing that law have been made. In 1990, Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto were introduced as compulsory media of instruction in government schools and all necessary instruction materials were prepared by language enthusiasts; however, in November 1992, these languages were made optional and parents immediately chose Urdu as the medium of instruction for their children (Rahman 1996a: 169). It is easy to predict that had Punjabi language been introduced as medium of instruction at schools, the reaction of Punjabi parents would have been the same.

When asked about the future of their mother tongue, many people said that Punjabi will be preserved through oral transmission from generation to generation.

6. The future of the Punjabi language. Rahman (2006a) is a full-length description of the possible future of the languages of Pakistan. The author divides these languages into several groups:

1) small dying languages (such as Badeshi, Chilliso, Domaki, Gowro) whose native speakers are shifting to bigger neighbouring languages;
2) small languages under much pressure from Urdu (such as Balochi, Brahvi); as important identity markers, these languages will survive as informal languages in the private domain;
3) big languages (such as Pashto, Sindhi) which will definitely survive, being powerful identity markers and media of instruction in schools;
4) Urdu, an important national and religious symbol, used in lower-level jobs, the media, education, courts, commerce and other domains in Pakistan, is not in danger.

T. Rahman is also optimistic about the future of Punjabi, which he describes as

[…] a huge language, used in the Indian Punjab in many domains of power and, what is even more significant, it is the language of songs, jokes, intimacy and informality in both Pakistan and India. This makes it the language of private pleasure and if so many people use it in this manner, it is not in real danger. (Rahman 2006b: 80)
The representatives of the educated elite I interviewed were also optimistic about Punjabi. For them, Punjabi is the means of informal communication for various social groups and an integral part of the process of self-identification but, at the same time, no importance is given to widening its social functions. Its modest place in the speech repertoire\(^{18}\) of the educated elite is considered quite normal. This situation seems less paradoxical if we compare the language attitudes and behavior of the Punjabi-speaking Pakistani elite with those of the Punjabi-speaking elite in India.

*Prima facie*, the position occupied by Punjabi in Pakistan and in the Indian Punjab is absolutely contrasting. In India, the Punjabi language is officially admitted in all necessary social functions, while in Pakistan it is used only in a few radio and TV programs and also by certain writers and poets. However, the speech repertoire of the ‘upper strata of Punjabi society’ in these two countries is very much similar.

Sukhdev Singh (2006) made a detailed analysis of social background, language attitudes and motivations for choosing English, Punjabi or Hindi as medium of instruction to pursue an M.A. degree in an Indian context. The respondents comprised 253 post-graduate students doing an M.A. at the departments of English, Punjabi and Hindi of the Punjab University in Chandigarh, the Punjabi University in Patiala, and the Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar. Among those who chose English as the medium of instruction, 85.1% hailed from an urban setting, and 14.9% from rural settings. The children of educated parents, students from high-income families, usually preferred English over Punjabi as the medium of instruction because the latter would give them fewer opportunities of finding a good job. The young people who were educated in English (most of whom had graduated from English-medium schools) would hardly read anything in their mother tongue. At best, they would listen to Punjabi songs and talk in Punjabi with their parents and friends. In fact, the mother tongue occupied a similar place in their speech repertoire as in the speech repertoire of Pakistani Punjabis. It seems that, if Punjabi were to acquire in Pakistan the same social functions it has in India, the language attitude of the educated people

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\(^{18}\) Speech repertoire refers to the range of linguistic varieties which a speaker has at his disposal and which he may appropriately use as a member of his speech community.
there would remain practically the same: it would be the language of songs, jokes, intimacy and informal talks, but not a language of great culture, good poetry and prose, not a language for expressing the intellectual demands of the educated members of society.

In order to predict the future of the languages which, according to T. Rahman’s forecast, will survive, it is important to study the survey of Urdu-medium and English-medium schools undertaken in December 2002 and January 2003 by the same author (Rahman 2004: 327-346). T. Rahman interviewed students in three types of schools: 1) in Urdu-medium schools; 2) in schools called ‘English-medium schools’ but in which teaching was mostly in Urdu; 3) in elitist English-medium schools. The author concluded that the students who were studying in Urdu and those who were receiving their education in English had strikingly different opinions about the most fundamental political, religious or ethical problems. The difference was so great as to give the impression that the two communities lived in absolutely different worlds. Students from Urdu-medium schools supported an aggressive foreign policy and the growing islamization of the country, showed less tolerance for religious minorities, and did not support women equality (Rahman 2004: 327-346; Rahman 2005). According to T. Rahman, not only were the students’ textbooks and teaching methods different (Rahman 2001; 2002b; 2007), but the teachers’ views, the discourses the young people were exposed to inside and outside schools – everything differed significantly. Young people from elitist English-medium schools never read books in their mother tongue nor in Urdu. Even if they achieved ‘A’ grades in examinations, they claimed to be completely bored by Urdu literature. It has become fashionable among ‘the gilded youngsters’ to read and discuss English-language books only (Rahman 2004: 327-346, electronic version p.8).

T. Rahman’s analysis clearly shows that the real functional gap is not between Urdu as the national language and Punjabi as the majority language devoid of official status, but between English and all the indigenous languages. All creative activities of the most educated and influential social group (a large portion of which consists of the Punjabi-speaking elite) take place in English. Under such circumstances, neither Urdu nor Punjabi can become a motivating force of progress and vehicles of creative ideas. T. Rahman (2004:6) states that ‘English is like a sieve which separates the
‘sheep’ from the ‘goats’”. According to him, those with fluency in English could hardly make up more than 3 to 4 per cent of the population of Pakistan (Rahman 2005). These figures show perfectly the gap between the economic, political and cultural elite and the rest (about 96%) of the population (Rahman 2006c; 2010).

The English-speaking educated elite is usually said to be bilingual (Urdu/English), trilingual (Punjabi/Urdu/English; Sindhi/Urdu/English; Pashto/Urdu/English, etc.) or multilingual. However, all of the indigenous languages are under strong pressure from Urdu and English. Languages which are transmitted orally or have very limited social functions cannot preserve their vocabulary. Original words are gradually replaced by Urdu or English lexemes. When speaking a mother tongue or Urdu, English-medium graduates use English words for abstract notions or for political terms such as democracy, foreign policy, prime minister, parliament, etc. In fact, English and Urdu (and/or any mother tongue) are distributed complementarily in their speech repertoires: Urdu and/or their mother tongue are used to express concrete notions, while intellectual concepts are mainly expressed in English. As shown above, in India, where Punjabi performs all necessary social functions within the state of Punjab, the language plays a similarly limited role in the speech repertoire of the educated elite.

It would be wrong to say that no scholars are aware of the danger of a situation in which indigenous languages survive as cultural stigma rather than cultural capital. Such scholars do raise their voices in favor of ‘additive multilingualism’ (Rahman 2004), but the ruling bureaucrats and the rest of society do not appear to worry about the gradual demise of indigenous languages as means of expressing the intellectual demands of society.

### 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper analyzed the historical, economic, political and cultural factors concurring to explain why Punjabi, the language of the largest and most privileged ethnic group in Pakistan, has no institutional support in the country. It was shown that, throughout the history of the Punjabi community, religion has been a more important factor in self-identification than ethno-linguistic considerations.

A rather convincing theory claims that national self-identification has prevailed over the religious one in coastal regions of South Asia such as, for example, Gujarat and Bengal. The development of trade and of capitalist
economic relations expedited the awakening of national consciousness in those regions. In the Punjab, similarly to Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the religious basis has remained a more important factor of self-identification than the ethno-linguistic one (Brass 1974).

Besides, Punjabi speakers have grown accustomed to a situation in which the official language is different from their mother tongue. One of the main reasons for the lack of institutional support of the Punjabi language in today’s Pakistan is – paradoxically – the high economic and political status of the Punjabi community in the country. Language movements in modern South Asia are absolutely different from what occurred in seemingly parallel historical processes of national development in Europe. In almost every European country, the rising bourgeoisie made efforts to standardize and promote its mother tongue, to convert it into the main means of communication at all levels and, through this, to make its use one of the most important tools of nation building. In modern South Asia, ethnic groups usually start language movements when they feel economically and/or politically and/or culturally depressed, in the hope of gaining some privileges as a result of those campaigns. If the ‘sons of the soil’ are satisfied with their economic, political or social status, language movements do not arise. The situation with the Punjabi language in Pakistan may serve as a good example of this.

The official discrimination of the majority language of Pakistan may also be explained by political and cultural reasons: in the course of Pakistan’s modern history, any kind of internal opposition was suppressed in the name of Islam and national security, and, in the country, the term ‘culture’ has always meant ‘Islamic culture’.

The Punjabi community of contemporary Pakistan treats its mother tongue as a means of informal communication (songs, jokes, intimacy and informality) and also as an important identity marker. The fact that Punjabi plays a very limited role in the speech repertoire of native speakers, especially in the speech habits of younger people who are supposed to represent the ‘future of the country’, is considered quite normal by the educated elite. As a result, the language gradually loses its rich vocabulary and the ability to fulfill the intellectual demands of society, in a process that may be defined as intellectual death of the language.
Similar processes are taking place in various regions of South Asia, though at a different pace. The majority of the creative activities of the most educated and influential groups in society are being carried out in English, while local languages tend to be used by the socio-economically lower and less educated strata of the society. The role of South Asian languages as means of expressing the intellectual demands of their speakers and of preserving their cultural traditions is decreasing with each new generation.

One might say that South Asia has traditionally had a separate language for the educated elite (Sanskrit, Persian, etc.) and different local languages for the people who perform unskilled jobs. English has simply replaced the languages which were previously adopted by the educated elites. In that sense, it is not entirely unlike what is taking place in other parts of the world, such as Europe.

In the modern era of globalization, English is becoming a kind of a universal language for science and other fields of intellectual activity in a great many countries in Europe. However, this often elicits a negative reaction in almost all these countries. In her very popular book, Tove Skutnab-Kangas (2000) discusses the advantages of preserving linguistic diversity. She proposes that, in postindustrial information-based societies, uniformity will be a handicap. Multilingual societies have access to a greater diversity of knowledge and, consequently, they are more creative. Thus, an education leading to higher levels of multilingualism produces not only local linguistic and cultural capital, but also knowledge capital which, in the information society, may become exchangeable with other types of capital.

Despite the fact that, in Europe, linguistic unification is not as visible as in South Asia and national languages are used in all domains of power, supporters of multilingualism are already concerned. Even though the situation seems more dangerous than in Europe, there is much less worry about it in South Asia, where linguistically unified English-medium education is producing small economic, political and cultural elites whose values and ideas differ strikingly from the values and ideas of the majority of population.
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