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Dimensionality in Dōgen’s conception of enlightenment

Fujikawa, Robin Hisashi, Ph.D.

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DIMENSIONALITY
IN DOGEN'S CONCEPTION OF ENLIGHTENMENT

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By
Robin H. Fujikawa

Dissertation Committee:
Roger Ames, Chairman
Eliot Deutch
Graham Parkes
Steve Odin
David Chappell
We certify that we have read this dissertation and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy.

Dissertation Committee

[Signatures]

Chairman

[Signatures]
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Abstract

Dōgen's apparent play with language in the Shōbōgenzō constructs philosophically significant models of linguistic expression and enlightenment. Challenging the conception of enlightenment as exclusively unitarian and ineffable, he drives the expressive potentials of koan language to reveal three distinct dimensions of enlightenment, each with its own originative experience, language, and operations. By identifying the three-dimensional model of enlightenment that the koan model of linguistic expression is used to present in the Shōbōgenzō, this dissertation explains Dōgen's treatment of the relation between enlightenment and language as inseparable processes of mutual development.

The intrinsically expressive nature of enlightenment notwithstanding, the differentiation of enlightenment into dimensions is not the result of categorization of expressive forms or dialectical interaction of logical categories. By following the course of the realization of each dimension from its unique originative experience through its "total exertion" (gujin) in praxis to its expression, actualization, and "falling away" (datsuraku), this dissertation attempts to
identify dimensions as discrete domains of enlightenment that display definite and describable features, relations, careers, operations, and soteriological possibilities.

The first dimension is the domain of the unitary dharma that arises and disports in relations of dependent co-origination.

The second dimension is the domain of consummate (buddha) dharmas as multiple units of experience that are temporally and causally disengaged (zengo saidan) from each other but still enjoy a mutually dependent relation to a Hua-yen type of totality.

The third dimension is the domain of the tracelessness that results from datsuraku, "falling away." This is the only dimension in which compassion for another being and upaya can arise.

These domains of enlightenment determine rather than merely describe the various ways that praxis-clarified experience is expressed. Because these domains are not simply discontinuous and optional modes of experience, but are interpenetrating structures of experience that are investigated in praxis as an orderly continuum called the "way of impermanence" (mujō no dōri), they are dimensions of enlightenment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The primary goals of this dissertation are:

1) To justify a claim that one of Dōgen's major philosophical projects, the linguistic expression of enlightenment, must be understood in terms of the dimensionality thesis: the thesis that enlightenment is not a monolithic state or experience but rather consists of conceptually and experientially distinct domains of meaning that are based on originative experiences. I argue that one must distinguish between at least three such dimensions of enlightenment.

2) To use the dimensionality thesis as an explanatory model for such notions as impermanence, particularity, praxis, soteriology, and personal identity in a manner consistent with Dōgen's insistence upon: a) non-ascription of substance; and b) authentication in experience that is clarified in praxis.

This dissertation makes the claim that the Shōbōgenzō establishes three authenticated languages of enlightenment that develop within three dimensions of enlightenment. These languages of enlightenment collectively bridge the originative nondual experience and
the multifarious activities of daily life, allowing expression to enlightenment through daily activities and grounding daily activities in enlightenment. These interrelated languages depend upon a multidimensional and dynamic enlightenment for their experiential ground and development. Because of this dependence, clues embedded in the language of the Shōbōgenzō yield insights into the nature of enlightenment.

Instead of a description, analysis, and philosophical critique of what Dōgen wrote about, the present study advances a thesis that explains what his Shōbōgenzō does. Without an understanding of the what Dōgen was doing, the Shōbōgenzō defies a consistent exegesis of many of its conceptions. This dissertation is a response to the philosophical need for a comprehensive view of Dōgen's project. Unfortunately, inconsistencies and difficulties in interpretation of Dōgen's individual ideas prevents a comprehension of his project by merely categorizing them in catalog fashion. The present study addresses this difficulty by showing how a multidimensional and praxis-based model of Dōgen's notion of enlightenment works, and how it can afford even the most inconsistent and opaque of Dōgen's ideas a vehicle for interpretation. The dimensionality thesis is a praxis-based model that can
explain the need for these different types of expressions, their interrelations, and some of their expressive possibilities. For Dōgen, enlightenment operates with concepts as well as without. A model of enlightenment that elucidates its operation with concepts can serve the interpretive needs of a study of Dōgen's religious and philosophical projects.

Though comprehensive views of Dōgen's philosophical project and his conception of enlightenment motivate the construction of a conceptual model, exclusiveness or superiority are not virtues the proposed conceptual model presumes to command. Rather than a stipulation of how the Shōbōgenzō must be interpreted, the present study proposes a means whereby a diverse and coherent body of interpreted meanings can be understood within a specific range of purposes. If the proposed conceptual model is able to render Dōgen's expressive project in the Shōbōgenzō more intelligible, then the explanatory intentions of the present study will have succeeded in attaining its highest aspiration: improving methods of unpacking the Shōbōgenzō's wealth of meanings for specific purposes.
Section One:
Descriptions of Enlightenment

Western exegesis of Buddhism has traditionally placed great emphasis upon its unifying and harmonizing aspects, and rightly so: such continuity-oriented teachings as the interconnectedness of pratitya-samutpada, the standpoint of non-duality, and the universality of sunyata characterize Buddhism almost by definition. Since Buddhism in its various forms begins as a critique of the ordinary egocentric mind that engenders dukkha, or "unsatisfactoriness,"¹ one can even expect to find such a canonical emphasis upon an alternative to a particularizing mentality. From a philosophical tradition that has characteristically sought generic answers in universal principles often at the expense of the existential and unique circumstances of the individual being, the Western reader may even be predisposed to expect a Buddhist emphasis upon continuity-type answers to problems faced by the particular individual. Because of these expectations or predispositions, it is important to make certain that

¹ See David Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy (University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1976) for the rendering of dukkha as "unsatisfactoriness."
the emphasized truths of continuity do not obscure the truths of particularity.

There are several disadvantages to a Buddhist conception of a unitary enlightenment: 1) it promotes a conceptualization of enlightenment in terms of an external principle, an approach that leads to the eternalism that Buddhism generally avoids; 2) it is unable to account for impermanence except by externalizing change in a metaphysical account that is external to enlightenment; 3) it is unable to account for multiplicity and particularity within enlightenment; 4) it is unable to account for conceptualization within enlightenment; 5) it relegates most of the practical cognitive, discursive, and interpersonal activities to nonenlightenment; 6) it is unable to reconcile the contradictory accounts of various facets of enlightenment; and 7) it predisposes one to an understanding of enlightenment that is exclusively unitary.

Dōgen proceeds beyond an elucidation of continuity to a project apparently aimed at the elucidation of a discontinuity that is realized after continuity, a non-naive discontinuity. He writes, for example, of the "true person of a particular station" (u-i shinjin) and of things "abiding in the dharma station" (jū-hōi), and
thereby elucidates an attainment of the truth of particularity and the discrete identity of things in spite of the truth of continuity. While it is true that the identity of samsara and nirvana, the identity of non-duality and duality have been familiar Buddhist themes, the emphasis of interpretation has generally been placed on unity and continuity at the expense of particularity and discontinuity. In his writings may be found a rectification of this neglect while remaining within the mainstream of orthodox Buddhism. Precedence for this resuscitation of the importance of the particular may be found throughout Buddhist history since early Buddhism, but turning to his immediate predecessor in this project may serve to establish the historical context and the philosophical necessity of his project in view of the shortcomings of even his predecessors' attempts.

From a modern Western philosophical perspective, his writings offer a view into the mind of a spiritual genius who, far removed from us in time, culture, and philosophical history, provides us with possibilities for fresh starting points and new categories with which to entertain universal human concerns. Even as a medieval Eastern thinker, he addresses concerns shared by present-day philosophers—about religious language
and the reconceptualization of traditional problems, for example—with a penetration that belies his historical distance.

Access to his philosophy however, is achieved by the Western audience at a price, for translation cannot escape the prejudice of conceptual models inherent in the terminology employed. Be that as it may, to deal with the paradoxes that may arise in the course of working with this inherent danger may at least illuminate the implicit conceptual models of our own terminology and contribute to an appreciation of his accomplishments.

Dōgen appears to present a philosophical solution to the problems inherent in the description of enlightenment. The Shōbōgenzō's employed conceptual models and logic force a re-examination of the basic questions of our inquiry. Even before we ask what he is writing, we are forced to ask how he is writing. The present dissertation undertakes such a re-examination and in the process uncovers a project and philosophy in the Shōbōgenzō that has been hitherto obscured by partial truths expressed by interpretations of the Shōbōgenzō that assume an exclusively unitary conception of enlightenment and a straightforward representational use of language.
The findings presented in this dissertation will ultimately give credence to the alleged unity of enlightenment by displaying a complexity that admits of intelligible and organized integration. Within this structure, non-differentiation is located not as an all-encompassing or penultimate notion, but as a soteriologically elementary achievement. As a philosophical conception, enlightenment is not the domain of non-differentiation, a domain that can only be glimpsed from the outside with inadequate symbols. Enlightenment is arrayed throughout the Shōbōgenzō as openly as the firewood, flowers, rock walls, and other experiential events that present the operations and activities of enlightenment. Before we can read the dimensions of enlightenment that the Shōbōgenzō presents, it is necessary to understand what "presentation" means and how it operates. Presentation is a primary function of the koan and will be examined in Chapter Three. Its use in the Shōbōgenzō permits a reading of the operations and interrelations of its presented dimensions of enlightenment.

A facile understanding of the koan obscures its function of presentation, and necessitates a critique of paradox as the expressive form of enlightenment. Common to both the notions of the exclusive unity of
enlightenment and the paradox of expression of enlightenment is the assumption that there is a gap if not conflict between enlightenment and language, particularly conceptual language. Both of these challenged notions imply that enlightenment is describable only as a unity and that words and descriptive analysis have at best a qualified validity in that description. At stake here is not only the possibility of an intellectual understanding of Zen enlightenment, but also the possibility of according to words and particulars a legitimacy and authority within enlightenment. An enlightenment experience that remains only a passive experience is denied the possibility of soteriological significance and its expression in daily life. Dōgen appears to regard the appropriation and expression of clarified experience to be a largely conceptualization and linguistic problem. In other words, actualization of enlightenment and generation of authentic language are inseparable if not mutually dependent enterprises. By the Shōbōgenzō's demonstration of the actualization of enlightenment and generation of authentic language, Dōgen rescues conceptions of enlightenment from transcendent exile and creates possibilities for resolutions of basic human concerns.

There is an existential concern addressed by Dōgen's treatment of enlightenment. This concern may
be expressed as the general problem of meaning that arises when one reflects upon the multiplicity of particulars: disparate things, selves, and events in the world. A rejection of a naive unity as a solution notwithstanding, the problems of unsatisfactoriness and meaning remain. For purposes of discussion, this general problem will be treated as the problem of meaning arising from the reflection upon particulars. Clarification of the intent of his Shōbōgenzō with regard to this existential concern is vital to the interpretation his philosophy.

Enlightenment is frequently defined as incommensurable with psychological activities. Goal-directed actions, reasoning, analysis, calculation, judgment, and the like are generally considered to be actions of the nonenlightened ego that are incompatible with enlightenment. In the traditional view, enlightenment is a realization of a universal truth that necessarily transcends such psychological activities. Particularly if enlightenment abstracted, reified, and reduced to universal principles, such an enlightenment would have little possibility of addressing the existential concerns that presumably led one to praxis. Even if it be granted that enlightenment can be meaningful without being understood, enlightenment
must bear some relation to daily life to be meaningful. This relation, it would seem, ought to be expressible in words and activities. In order for it to be so, there must be understanding. Understanding implies conceptualization, and conceptualization implies differentiation. How can this differentiation arise in enlightenment?

The question of the relation between enlightenment and differentiation is addressed by the Buddhist doctrine of the identity of samsara and nirvana, and in Dōgen, this identity may be treated in terms of impermanence and enlightenment. While Dōgen would agree that samsara and nirvana are identical, he does not treat their agreement in a manner that first presupposes the dichotomy of particularity and enlightenment and then treats the explanation of their absolute identity as a project of logical or lexical refinement. The investigation of the relation between particularity and enlightenment is rather a necessarily praxeological2 enterprise in his view.

2The term "praxeological" is apt. For Dōgen, there are reasons for praxis being the way it is, and the investigation of both the reasons and nature of praxis amounts to an investigation of enlightenment. Unlike the reasons and logic of reflective thinking, the reasons and logic of praxis need to be discovered in praxis. For example, there is a notion of identity that is discovered in praxis: "when A is attained, B is attained." When A and B are attainments that are causally linked in praxis, they are simultaneous and
The present dissertation readdresses the question of the nature of enlightenment by an examination of possible discoveries that would prompt Dōgen's injunction to investigate "the way of impermanence," mujō no dōri, in praxis. This changing multiplicity of moments of enlightenment is neither random nor incommensurate, but reveals an order, a patternation, and even an organic system that are descriptive of what may be called a logic (dōri). This emphasis upon the way of impermanence shifts the locus of enlightenment away from the unitary and ineffable truths of single and unitary samadhic revelation to a changing field of experience, and it also clarifies his alternative to the logical mode of explanation of the relation enlightenment has to this changing field. More than merely a shift in theme and emphasis, however, this shift necessitates a radical reconstruction of soteriology, religious language, philosophical prob-

hence experientially identical though they may even be described as a logical contradiction: A and not-A. The reason for their identity is not a matter of a logical necessity in their relations. Not-A is not the case because it has a form that is logically opposed to A. Rather, the identity of A and not-A is discoverable upon the attainment of A in praxis. Investigation of the reason for this identity is tantamount to the investigation of the nature of enlightenment as path of such attainments.
lems, and expression of Buddhist doctrine to fit the needs of this new format.

Instead of the experience of unity or even its opposite, particularity, being the locus of enlightenment, the locus of enlightenment is properly the logic of impermanence of the dharma as actualized in praxis. This is praxis as the investigation of mujō no dōri. Praxis clarifies experience by removing the self-based interpretive format of experience and allows the clarified experience itself to be the basis of the new format. This might be called dharma-based experience in contrast to the self-based experience of non-enlightenment.

Though format normally follows content in an ancillary manner, format also determines content, as does the format of a computer disk. Format conditions content by limiting the form in which information is accepted as intelligible. Each format includes hidden instructions regarding the processing and storage of acceptable information that are specific to the disk operating system. That is, in order to read a disk, it is first necessary to determine its format and match it with the appropriate operating system. Human experience is similarly interpreted in modes that render the analogy to computer disk formatting appropriate. Read-
ing of the Shōbōgenzō would also benefit from an understanding of the various formats to which its expressions can be properly matched.

One of the insights presented by early Buddhism, is that a change in the way in which we normally address the world can cut off the root cause of dukka (Skt. dukkha), the state of unsatisfactoriness that inevitably arises as a result of living in this samsaric world. In other words, our experience is ordinarily formatted in such a way that dukka is an inevitable result of the human condition, a result that can only be averted by changing the fundamental format of experience. Realizing paticcasamupanna (Skt. pratitya-samutpāda) or the dependent co-origination of all things would reformat experience in such a way that attachment to things as discrete entities would cease, thus conditioning a release from dukka. If we may consider early Buddhism's solution as a reformatting of experience in this manner, Dōgen's solution may be expressed in similar terms as a reformatting process. Set against a historical background, the recognition of the samsaric world as the locus of nirvana has precedence in Nagarjuna for example, but seldom has anyone equalled him in scope and depth of response to the reformatting needs that attend this recognition.
Whereas early Buddhism's reformatting project centered upon the transition from nonenlightenment to enlightenment, his reformatting project is generally unconcerned with this transition. Instead, his project appears to be a reformatting of enlightenment within enlightenment. This dissertation attempts to identify three experientially interrelated but soteriologically discrete formats within his conception of enlightenment that prove to be key in the understanding of the Shobōgenzō and Dōgen's philosophy. Each of these formats displays an internal and external coherence that encourages us toward a more systematic analysis.

It is arguable that the emphasis upon unity that discussions about enlightenment frequently exhibit is conditioned by and limited by the nature of such discussions. Generally speaking, descriptions of the nature of enlightenment are addressed to a non-enlightened audience, for that is where need for description lies. A nonenlightened audience needs to be persuaded that their mode of thinking is not enlightened, that enlightenment is glorious, that enlightenment is desirable as a future attainment, and that an aspiration to enlightenment requires a change in behavior and thinking. A logical presupposition of each of these points is that enlightenment differs from
the audience's present way of thinking and living. It is not surprising that the descriptive language employed to accomplish any of these persuasive needs has frequently been the language of contrasts. Descriptions of enlightenment thus depend upon descriptions of the nonenlightenment to which they are contrasted. This description of nonenlightenment is further conditioned by the need for the terms to be understandable to the audience.

If this is so, then what would happen to the nature of the discussion of enlightenment when the audience changes to monks who have different degrees of experience with enlightenment? It would follow that there would no longer be the need to speak in terms of contrast with nonenlightenment as a point of reference. If nonenlightenment is conceived in terms of various differentiating, judging, constructive, and substance-ascribing activities, then a change in audience would no longer limit descriptions of enlightenment to terms that deny differentiation, multiplicity, judgment, self-concepts, objectification, conceptualization, description, rationality, and stages of attainment. Of course, the change of audience does not prove that enlightenment actually includes such activities and characteristics, but it can permit a search for them as possibilities.
A search of the *Shōbōgenzō* for clues to Dōgen's understanding of enlightenment that permits such descriptions is more plausible when it is considered that terms such as multiplicity would probably have reconstituted meanings in enlightenment. Enlightenment for him involves an experience-based restructure of the paradigms by which experience is interpreted. His innovative treatment of scripture is the result of a reinterpretation of doctrines and events in terms of experience clarified in praxis. In the *Shōbōgenzō*, meanings of words found in scripture are reconstituted in terms that are verifiable in praxis. Dōgen often concludes discussion of an ostensibly doctrinal point with the admonition, "Investigate this thoroughly in your practice." If he thinks that doctrine can be interpreted, discovered, and investigated in praxis, then it is reasonable to investigate the possibility of finding such praxis-based reconstituted meanings of differentiation, multiplicity, and particularity in the *Shōbōgenzō*’s treatment of enlightenment.

Neither the language of evocation nor the language of paradox serve explanations of enlightenment. Because ineffability has commonly been ascribed to enlightenment, the traditional mode of expression of enlightenment has been evocative poetry and the
paradoxical koan. While poetic and paradoxical evocations of enlightenment serve valuable functions, they also widen the conceptual gap between enlightenment and ordinary knowledge or discourse. When they are successful in evoking the atmosphere of enlightenment, poetry and the enigmatically conceived koan foster a sublime and exclusively nonconceptual understanding of enlightenment. While sublimity and nonconceptualization may accurately characterize enlightenment in limited senses, it is questionable how much more than these aspects of enlightenment poetry and paradox can convey or even how much they are able to serve the daily conceptual and discursive needs of enlightened people. More questionable is an impression that also prevails among scholars who treat enlightenment as a transcendental, mystical, and monolithic experience or state of consciousness that adamantly defies differentiation and conceptualization. The popular impression is that not only the enlightenment experience, but the expression of enlightenment in the words and deeds of daily life is a necessarily poetic or mystical process.

At the very least, it may be said that if enlightenment is to be expressible and viable as a way of life, enlightened people need more than poetry and
enigmatic statements with which to conduct the thinking and discourse of daily life. They need a conceptual language that will enable them to express a multifaceted world of experience.

As religious literature, much of the Buddhist scripture and commentatorial tradition has concerned itself with the transcendence of ordinary thinking and being. Inasmuch as concepts, language, and logic are paradigmatic to ordinary thinking, and inasmuch as relations oriented to notions of selfhood are paradigmatic of ordinary ways of being, the concern with transcendence is frequently evidenced by a rejection of concepts, language, logic, and selfhood. However, the scriptural and commentatorial tradition necessarily employs language. Employing language, the tradition is forced to employ the conceptualization, logic, and notions of selfhood that it rejects. Buddhism's ambivalent relation to language, concepts, logic and selfhood creates a need for a reconciliation of language with transcendence on the one hand and ordinary ways of thinking and being on the other.

In dealing with this need for reconciliation, some members of the Buddhist tradition such as Nagarjuna and Nishida have employed a form of dialectic to attain an identity of the transcendent and immanent. The result
of this method is a paradoxical language of transcendence that does little to be of use to immanent needs. Moreover, whereas both dialectics and paradox may develop a language of transcendence, neither escapes the governance of the relation of logical opposition. Both dialectics and paradox presuppose an underlying symmetry of opposites: thesis and antithesis, nirvana and samsara, transcendent and immanent, continuity and discontinuity, positive and negative. Though logical opposition may be axiomatic to dialectics and paradox, it is not intrinsic to the nature of the transcendent. In the Buddhist tradition, nirvana and enlightenment are defined by a transcendence of such opposites as self and other, positive and negative, form and emptiness. Thus, though dialectics and the language of paradox in Buddhism encourage and even presuppose notions of a transcendent reality, they are unable to offer explanation of the transcendent reality they are meant to explain. At best, dialectics and the language of paradox describe the language of transcendence. However, even by their proponents' own admission, dialectics and paradox fall short of explaining the transcendent.

Dōgen inherits the problem of reconciliation in a particularly acute form, though the terms in need of
reconciliation are of a different cast. To begin with, his adamant advocacy of a form of meditation called shikan taza, or "stark sitting," entails a rejection of dualistic thought processes that characterize ordinary thinking. Shikan taza was the principal occupation of monastic life in his temple. In Fukanzazengi, he gives instructions concerning the mental posture to be maintained in shikan taza:

Cast aside all involvements and cease all affairs. Do not think good or bad. Do not administer pros and cons. Cease all movements of the conscious mind, the gauging of all thoughts and views.3

As a teacher of meditative practice, Dōgen, like his own master, was extremely disciplined in both personal practice and student instruction. Adherence to each element of the practice of shikan taza was unquestionably thoroughgoing. The completeness of the unqualified cessation of all movements of the conscious mind would appear to result in a problem, for the practice of shikan taza would therefore strip movements of the conscious mind of a legitimate place in praxis. It furthermore becomes difficult to understand how praxis can be reconciled to conscious and expressive activities in enlightenment and/or daily life.

"Movements of the conscious mind, the gauging of all thoughts and views" evidently refers to directed activities of the ego, activities that include judgment, objectification, and other thoughts that are commonly called differentiated thoughts. Differentiated thoughts are generally based upon dualistic thinking. Dualistic thinking involves such dualisms as subject-object, noumenon-phenomenon, mind-body, and good-bad. The Zen Buddhist notion of muga, "no-self" typically involves a denial of the legitimacy of such "movements of the conscious mind" or ego.

In contrast to the ego's "movements of the conscious mind," enlightenment is sometimes characterized as fudōshin or "motionless mind." Contrary to what the term might suggest, fudōshin is not a mind of emotionlessness or insentiency. It is rather a mind of non-dual and undifferentiated awareness that expresses itself in a differentiation that emerges from the non-dual and undifferentiated awareness. It is a mind of quintessential sentiency and emotion. The statue of "Fudō Myoo," the Motionless Acala, is a figure of fury that is in no way blind.
Section Two:
Dōgen and the Language of Enlightenment

Because conceptual language emerges within specific dimensions and because the meaningfulness of a particular concept depends upon the originative experience and the other concepts in the language, the meaning of a particular concept is specific to the dimension. This is why in a mode of expression ("presentation") epitomized by the koan, a particular word or action "presents" the specific dimension it presupposes. The presentational significance of such a word is not a matter of intention, these implications nascent in a word or action are simply determined by the standpoint from which the word was uttered or the action performed. Within a particular dimension, all that one experiences and expresses is conditioned by the dimension, so presentation is automatic. By reading the Shōbōgenzō (Treasury of Authenticating Dharma Eyes) as a compendium of presentations of the different "eyes" through which the enlightened person views the world of experience, it becomes clear that what is being presented displays multiple generalizable and coherent natures that are distinct, internally coherent, and interrelated. These can be described as
dimensions of enlightenment.

Though the practice of cessation of the movements of the conscious mind does not entail the suspension of sentiency or consciousness, it does bear consequences that entail the need for a reestablishment of the legitimacy of differentiation, judgment, emotion, and other "movements of the conscious mind." Dōgen's insistence upon shikan taza also forces him to deal with such consequences as this need. It is arguable that the *Shōbōgenzō* is a response to this need that leads him to show how conscious and expressive activities can grow out of enlightenment as experienced and thereby achieve their grounding and authentication. The *Shōbōgenzō* can be understood as a genealogy of concepts and language that grow out of and becomes authenticated in enlightenment as experienced.

Dōgen's resulting language of enlightenment starts where the other languages associated with enlightenment appear to leave off. Instead of treating enlightenment exclusively as a distant experience, state of mind, or abstract principle, his language places enlightenment within the world of mountains, boat rides, and falling flowers. It is a multi-dimensional world. Instead of inducing the enlightenment experience, the *Shōbōgenzō* assumes that the sublime experience commonly defining
enlightenment has already been mastered and that one is faced with the problem of working out its meaning in a world rich in multiplicity and concrete facts. It is a problem that faces one who does not wish the experience to pass without expression in daily life.

The investigation of the origin and operation of language in the Shōbōgenzō's presentation of a multidimensional enlightenment permits some claims to be made about the relation between enlightenment and knowledge. Does enlightenment produce veridical knowledge and are claims made in the Shōbōgenzō true? Dōgen asked similar questions: can Buddhist claims be authenticated in experience and can enlightenment be expressed in writing? Answers to these questions that are to be found in the Shōbōgenzō may not be in expected forms. We cannot test the correspondences between experience and reality, interpretation and experience, or claim and interpretation because of two major obstacles. There is no external third position from which to judge the correspondences between the two entities, and furthermore entities being compared are not conceived either as two or as entities by Dōgen. Instead of experience reflecting reality truthfully, we must be prepared to find an answer expressed as the clarified dharma. Instead of truthful interpretation
of experience, we must be prepared to find an answer expressed as experience expressing itself as an answer. Instead of a correspondence among experience, expression, claim, and interpretation, we must be prepared to find an answer expressed in terms of how corresponding notions can be found operating in different dimensions of enlightenment.

Section Three:

Quarrying the Shōbōgenzō

This dissertation examines Dōgen's writings, principally the Shōbōgenzō, for indications of his understanding of the nature of enlightenment and its conceptual expression. This examination reveals a sequence of conceptual languages, each grounded in a qualitatively different experience of enlightenment. The Shōbōgenzō can thus be quarried for his insights into what enlightenment is and how it is expressed. Rich though the Shōbōgenzō is in this respect, a description of how he expresses enlightenment entails an interpolation of missing concepts and theories that are needed to excavate its latent meanings. This dissertation attempts to provide a philosophical theory of implicit preconditions that make Dōgen's linguistic presentation of enlightenment intelligible.
This investigation begins with the assumption that the *Shōbōgenzō* is the fulfilled accomplishment of Dōgen's philosophical project. Next, it proceeds to examine how to read the work for demonstrations of how the project can be accomplished. One reason for the difficulty in reading Dōgen is that there are a number of unstated theses that make the *Shōbōgenzō* intelligible. The novel ways language functions in the *Shōbōgenzō* also makes attention to how to read the work prudent.

As a result of this investigation, interpolation can add to the present vocabulary and conceptual tools with which enlightenment is describable. More fruitful excavation of the *Shōbōgenzō* and the demystification of enlightenment might be possible consequences. Without denying that enlightenment as a samadhic experience is a nonconceptual and in this sense mystical event, we can maintain that the enlightenment experience is nevertheless conceptualizable both in terms of being described by concepts and in terms of experience-based concepts being generated from it. These conceptual tools can also serve explanatory and exegetic functions as well. Descriptive, explanatory, or exegetic functions of the language of enlightenment can elucidate Dōgen's philosophical projects and it is the aim of
this dissertation to demonstrate how this can be accomplished.

Accounting for conceptualization within each level will permit an account of the number of levels of enlightenment implicit in the Shūbōgenzō. Neither of these accounts would be possible if each level of enlightenment were amorphous, unanalyzable, and monolithic. Assuming the opposite, that each level of enlightenment has an internal nature that permits differentiation, analysis, and multi-faceted description, a search throughout the Shūbōgenzō is rewarded by the disclosure of clusters of words that not only indicate a separation between dimensions, but indicate internal relations and operations that are unique to each dimension. These are concepts. Unlike ordinary concepts, however, these concepts do not represent abstractions, principles, or classes of things. They do not represent essences, either intrinsic or extrinsic to things. They do not represent objectified things. Strictly speaking, the concepts that the Shūbōgenzō generates at each level of enlightenment do not represent components of each level, at least not initially. The concepts present correlations unique to each level, but also unique to the immediate experience. Additional concepts arise ostensibly represent-
ing correlated "things" present in the correlations. In terms of experience and in terms of the genesis of concepts, however, there are no things that are first present to be correlated— the correlation comes first and the correlates are posited and represented in order to describe the correlation. In such a manner do non-substantialistic concepts emerge. They do not presuppose the notion of a reified thing with its identifying substance.

Proceeding in this manner, it is possible to uncover much more than concepts of correlation and correlates, and as these discoveries are made, discoveries of what Dōgen was revealing about the nature of each level of enlightenment are made. Ultimately, what emerges from such an investigation are three non-substantialistic conceptual languages revealing intricate processes unique to three interrelated levels of enlightenment. Because understanding and meaning are impossible without language, the working out of the language of each level of enlightenment is a working out of the possibility of understanding and meaning of the enlightenment experience.

Beyond the language that is descriptive of the unitary conception of enlightenment, the Shūbōgenzō presents other languages and other levels of enlighten-
ment. Not only as levels, enlightenment is presented as a matrix of language, mechanics, "laws," ethics, praxis, time experience, loci of identity, and ways of construing experience that characterizes and permits understanding and meaningful expression within each level. In examining these matrices, it becomes clear that enlightenment for Dōgen is amenable to a specific kind of analysis, description, categorization, and ordering. As part of its internal mechanics, moreover, there is a process interpenetration4 of levels of enlightenment. This interpenetration of levels of enlightenment also can be analyzed in terms of a necessary sequencing, experiential correlates, and outcomes in such a way that the changes in the enlightened experience manifest an internal working that he terms the way of impermanence. Understood as interpenetrating matrices of meaning structures, each level of enlightenment can be investigated as a "dimension" of enlightenment. The present study will attempt to justify the claim that the characterization of multiple dimensions of enlightenment is not only possible, it is necessary for an understanding of an important

4 Interpenetration of levels of enlightenment will be explained in terms of a sublation of dimensions of enlightenment.
philosophical and religious project of the Shōbōgenzō.

Needs addressed by this dissertation's examination of the problems. Dōgen's writings are particularly prone to be labyrinthine to his reader, and hence there arise various interpretations of his intent and accomplishments. This exegetic difficulty may have thus resulted in an appreciation of the richness of his thought, but it has also resulted in important points having been obscured or missed entirely. What is needed is a map to guide the reader. As a geographical map is used to fix a position relative to other locations in a broader field, a conceptual map is sometimes necessary to clarify the matrix in which notions are related to each other within a larger context. Further, as a map is not the area it depicts but an interpretation of it in abbreviated form, a conceptual map is to be distinguished from the ideas for which it is an account. To one who negotiates the way through Dōgen's philosophy with a map that only retraces Dōgen's steps, the impression of being in a labyrinth is unavoidable. Besetting such a wayfarer at every turn are interpretative difficulties that are at best opaque and at worst contradictory or heretical. A major cause of these difficulties is the inadequacy of the total conceptual map.
Accounting for Dōgen's thought by merely retracing his steps is like plotting the motion of the planets across the sky. It became evident even to early astronomers that the planetary motions exhibited anomalies that appeared to contradict common knowledge of physical and celestial motion. Planets sometimes stopped and reversed directions in their journey across the sky. Many attempts were made to account for this retrograde motion, but it was not until the Copernican revolution that this confusion was dispelled. The Copernican revolution that had tremendous impact on how we interpret our world was essentially a cartographical revolution. What Dōgen is doing in the Shōbōgenzō bears resemblance to this revolution. Prior to Dōgen, virtually every Buddhist school devoted considerable scholarship to the cataloging of the major Buddhist traditions in a way that usually resulted in a hierarchy of development with their own school at the pinnacle. Called "kyōso hanjaku," this was an attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions while maintaining the continuity of Buddhism. The continuity was typically maintained through an account of Buddhist history as a developmental hierarchy, and apparent contradictions were usually explained as indications of primitive stages in this hierarchy. In so doing, the orthodoxy
and also the superiority of their own tradition could be established. In the Shōbōgenzō, Dōgen also catalogs the insights of the major Buddhist traditions, but he accomplishes this using a different paradigm. In order to understand how he accomplishes this, it is necessary to understand the paradigm and the resulting conceptual map of Buddhist insight. Unfortunately for us, Dōgen does not make this map explicit, so we must extract what is implicit before we can use it to understand his accomplishment.

The present study formulates this conceptual map and shows how it can be used to interpret Dōgen's philosophy and major accomplishments. In brief, the paradigm is the structure of experience as revealed through Zen practice. The conceptual map is global and multidimensional rather than linear and vertical. The result is a model of the structure of a moment of human experience by means of which the insights of the various Buddhist traditions can be located. In this way can the insights of early Buddhism be affirmed and given credence along with those of Hua-yen and Ch'an Buddhism, for example. Thus, the Shōbōgenzō can be shown to live up to its name, the "Treasury of the Authenticating Dharma Eyes."

Using this conceptual map, we can trace a Buddhist theme as treated by Dōgen by attempting to use his con-
ceptual map. In this dissertation, we take as two such themes, the notions of particularity and causality in Buddhist thought. These two notions have been the source of contradictions and interpretative difficulties in Dōgen's philosophy, not to mention in Buddhism, and will serve as cases to test whether the method of this dissertation can clarify particular conceptions.

In the end, we find that with the aid of this map, we can better understand Dōgen's writings, and further, since this map of human experience was what Dōgen was attempting to convey, we can better understand what his philosophical intentions were. But even more importantly, we can use this map of his to understand the world.

Part of the exegetic difficulty can be appreciated when translations of the same passage are compared. From the "Uji" fascicle, the following passage is rendered by different translators:

Kennet:
...time is as this. They travel fastest who are not there, since arrival is hindered by arrival but quite definitely not hindered whilst on the journey. The journey is hindered by non-arrival but not hindered by arrival. It is my means of the will that we understand the will; it is my means of words that we understand words. By being hindered we understand hindrance, and hindrance is hindered by hindrance: this too is existence, time.

Waddell and Abe:
"Reaching" is not coming; "not-reaching" is not yet. This is how being-time is. Reaching is
impeded by reaching and is not impeded by not-reaching. Mind impedes mind and sees mind, word impedes word and sees word, impeding impedes itself and sees itself. Impeding impedes impeding—that is time.

Welch and Tanahashi:
Because the signs of time's coming and going are obvious, people do not doubt it. Although they do not doubt it, they do not understand it. Or when sentient beings doubt what they do not understand, their doubt is not firmly fixed. Because of that, their past doubts do not necessarily coincide with the present doubt. Yet doubt itself is nothing but time.

Nishiyama and Stevens:
Coming does not come from outside, not-coming has not yet come. Being-time is like this. Coming or not-coming should only be thought of as coming or not-coming. Think of mind as only mind and words as only words. They are the function of being-time.

Cleary:
Arriving is not coming; not arriving is not yet to come. This is the way being time is. Arriving is blocked by arriving, not blocked by not arriving. Not arriving is blocked by not arriving, not blocked by arriving. Intent blocks intent and sees intent; expression blocks expression and sees expression. Blocking blocks blocking and sees blocking. Blocking blocks blocking—this is time.

(my translation:)
What is meant by "attainment" is not that which is to come. What is meant by "non-attainment" is not this which is yet to be. Being time is like this. Attainment is obstructed by attainment, non-attainment is not obstructed. Non-attainment is obstructed by non-attainment. Consciousness obstructs consciousness and sees consciousness. Words obstruct words and see words. Obstruction obstructs obstructions and sees obstruction. Obstruction obstructs obstruction, and this is time.

The range of differences in interpretation of his works suggests less an arbitrariness than the need for
a careful and responsible methodology upon which interpre-
tation can be based. The present dissertation attempts to balance an interpretation of the structure of Dōgen's philosophy on the one hand with its self-
conscious justification on the other. If each project succeeds in elucidating and supporting the other, a measure of credence to the claim that this interpreta-
tion faithfully reflects Dōgen's intentions will have been achieved. This dissertation ultimately aspires to offer a key that simplifies even as it discloses new meanings in Dōgen's philosophy, a key to understanding Dōgen that can be used with some confidence.

Most interpretations of Dōgen accept one paradigm shift from the ordinary standpoint to the standpoint of pratitya-samutpada-derived non-substantiality. Dōgen, however, implicitly identifies no less than four shifts. That is, Dōgen speaks from no less than four standpoints if the nonenlightened standpoint is num-
bered as a standpoint.

Though a philosopher in his own right, he was first and foremost a Zen master. Beneath the words of the philosopher were the standpoint-shifts that he was guiding his students to attain for themselves. The structure of what he said can be described by elucidat-
ing the standpoint shifts that his written words
presuppose. Thus, by understanding what he was presupposing, we can at the same time understand what he was demonstrating to his followers.

The Shōbōgenzō and its philosophical project. The Shōbōgenzō of Dōgen is a testament to the expressibility of enlightenment. The problem of the expressibility of enlightenment is one aspect of a larger problem: how to live enlightenment. How is enlightenment related to judgment, desire, personal identity, particular things, planning, emotions, compassion, ethics, and how can enlightenment validate these aspects of ordinary life experiences within the domain of enlightenment? What does an enlightened person look like and how does an enlightened person act?

The Shōbōgenzō is a collection of fascicles or chapters, many of which are presumed to be lecture material for the monks under his charge, though some, notably "Genjōkōan," bear colophons indicating a lay audience. Depending upon the edition, there are as many as 95 and as few as 12 fascicles actually included in the collection, though Dōgen indicates that he had intended to write one hundred fascicles. "Shōbō" refers to the initial period of the reign of Buddhist teachings, a period which stands in direct contrast to the Mappō period in the midst of which the people of
Dōgen's time firmly believed they were living. Offering a treasury or repository (ぞ) of the "eye" (gen) of this age of the True Dharma to the world in this condition of darkness would be a needed and impressive statement to the world, and indeed it does appear that this was his intention. The "eye" of this age of the Authentic Dharma (or Authentic Teachings) refers to the eye that sees the teachings rather than the teachings themselves. Rather than in the transmission of teachings from the Authentic Dharma, Dōgen's intent was to speak and act from the standpoint of those teachings, from the standpoint of the Authentic Dharma. This is consistent with the meaning of his declaration upon his return to Japan, "I return home empty-handed."

Embodying the standpoint of the Authentic Dharma rather than offering any visible gifts upon his return, Dōgen makes his intentions clear at an early stage. It is evident that he is making the point that in comparison to the treasure of the standpoint of the Authentic Dharma that he embodies, what written words or articles he may bring back count as nothing. Rather than receiving descriptions from Dōgen, the message is that it is far more important to achieve the standpoint of realization for ourselves in order that we may be able to speak and make our own descriptions and true words.
The intended legacy of Dōgen may thus be found not in the intrinsic value of the words and admonitions, but in the demonstration of what they are doing. As such, words and letters reveal the eye or standpoint from which the words are uttered and the letters written. In Buddhism, Dōgen is saying, what is important is the personal apprehension of the standpoint for oneself, a gift that cannot be passed from the hand of one person to another. Having said this, he is also saying that words and letters may be seen as demonstrations of precisely this personal apprehension, and as such, words and letters may become the treasured embodiment or manifestation of authentic appropriation. As such, they may be effective in opening up possibilities for those who are committed to grasping not the conceptual form of the words, but their soteriological origins.

When interpreted with a phenomenological interest, the title, Shōbōgenzō suggests other meanings. Instead of the historical period subsequent to the Buddha's enlightenment, the occasion of the primordial enlightenment experience may be what Dōgen refers to by Shōbō. The term, 身 can also mean "body," yielding the reassembled meaning of the title, "The embodiment of the eye of the enlightenment experience." The notion of "embodiment" is consistent with Dōgen's concern with
the personalization of experience, and can refer to the process with which the enlightenment experience becomes integrated with the thinking and activities of the enlightened person. Viewed in this way, the Shōbōgenzō is a product of the process by which Dōgen worked out his personalization and conceptual understanding of enlightenment.

As the title suggests, it was probably meant to be a reference work which the samgha community he was establishing could use as a touchstone. That this touchstone should be in the form of a work intending to portray the eye, or standpoint, from which the Dharma is being conveyed and manifest bears a significance which will be worked out in the present dissertation, for the Shōbōgenzō is our main source of materials. In addition to the generally philosophical fascicles which supports the major weight of this dissertation, there are many others that deal with details of running the affairs of the temple. These latter fascicles were written for the most part during Dōgen's period at Eiheiji.

The Shōbōgenzō is a singular work that invites a reassessment of our understanding of enlightenment and its relation to language and daily life. In it, Dōgen shows how a reconstruction of concepts upon a founda-
tion of praxeologically clarified experience can render ordinary cognitive functions commensurable with enlightenment as a necessary step in grounding daily life activities in enlightenment.

Before we can understand the Shōbōgenzō, we must know how to read Dōgen. Reading Dōgen is like reading a person, for what we encounter in the Shōbōgenzō is portraiture. The portrait presented is not one of physical characteristics, but rather of selfhood in its various levels of experiential standpoints. The objective referents are not elements taken from his environment and historical circumstances, but the demonstrated standpoints display the range and interrelations of the possible dimensions of enlightenment.

The ways of reading Dōgen may be classified into two types. To illustrate these two types, consider the image of the mother monkey and her baby. While the young monkey is an infant, the mother monkey carries it in front with the baby looking at the mother's face. In this way, the baby can read the mother's expressions and they can otherwise communicate with each other. When the monkey grows older, the mother monkey will carry her child on her back so that the child now faces where the mother faces, sees what the mother sees, and goes through the various motions, positions, and atti-
tudes of the mother. In either case, the mother monkey goes through the same kinds of expressions and behavioral patterns in response to different stimuli, but what the child learns from these differs considerably depending upon its position relative to the mother. From the first position, the child may learn what the expressions of the mother mean. The child may learn about fear, love, frustration, and so on. Only from the second position, however, can the child learn about the mother qua adult and parent wise in the way of monkey affairs and responding to a variety of different situations. Drawing a parallel to the ways of reading Dōgen, it might be pointed out that one way of reading Dōgen is to read for the referents of his expressions. Whether the meanings are taken at face value or analyzed for their metaphorical or symbolic meaning, a one to one, expressive symbol to referent relation is the basis for interpretation of meaning. The second way of reading Dōgen is like that of the reading of the mother's responses to external conditions while from the position on her back. The reader reads for basic standpoints as responses to a variety of situations, and thereby learns what Dōgen is really trying to convey.
Section Four: Methodology

A standard approach to the investigation and explanation of a philosopher's thought negotiates through the available body of literature on the subject and draws conclusions of either agreement or disagreement with particular commentators. However productive this approach may be generally, the present dissertation follows a different course. This dissertation attempts to work closely with the writings of Dōgen at the expense of an adequate consideration of secondary literature on Dōgen's thought. The reasons for this are twofold.

1) The conclusions of the present dissertations are the product of working with the writings of Dōgen more than they are the product of an examination of theories about Dōgen. Explanation of the thesis in terms of primary rather than secondary literature reflects this methodology of investigation.

2) This dissertation presents an interpretation of the nature of enlightenment that is meant to be more than another competing interpretation. It aspires to provide other interpretations with a comprehensive schema within which they might be elucidated and recon-
ciled with each other. There is no intent to compare, contrast, or detract from existing interpretations in the secondary literature.

There are several fundamental methodological assumptions that make the present investigation possible:

1) Enlightenment is a meaningful concept that is based on actual experience. It meaningfully refers to specific types of experiences and to activities and processes that are based upon enlightenment experiences. This dissertation explores experiential and conceptual factors of praxis that can be used to explain transformations in self-conception, the meaningfulness of "growth" and "attainments" in a monastic context, and other ideas related to enlightenment, but that enlightenment is a meaningful concept that is based on actual experience is unquestioned.

2) Dōgen was writing from actual experience, i.e., from a personal attainment of enlightenment.

To the extent that Dōgen was writing from experience, his words can be examined in ways appropriate to language in general. For example, the Shōbōgenzō has a meaningful purpose that can be sought by the reader by heeding its words and their relations. The Shōbōgenzō
will be examined with the assumption that the relations among its concepts permit such logical procedures as inference. The thrust of this dissertation is a search for Dōgen's implicit understanding of enlightenment that makes the Shōbōgenzō intelligible and meaningful. The search for Dōgen's conception of enlightenment and praxis that is presupposed by his writings and that constitutes a theoretical precondition for a understanding of the purpose of his writings is based on the assumption that his works are conceptually intelligible and that the relations among concepts are logical at least to the extent that permits linguistic communication of complex ideas. Dōgen's conception of dōtoku (expression), for example, permits an inferential investigation of the process of concept formation from the enlightenment experience.

To the extent that Dōgen was writing from experience, his words can be examined in the context of the necessities imposed by what must be discovered in praxis. Principal experiential realizations are not products of logical deduction, but illustrate why praxis is necessarily more than an intellectual enterprise. Investigation of Dōgen's writings must acknowledge the possibility of ideas and their interrelations being necessarily attained in experience. Dōgen's con-
ception of *gyōji* (the praxis continuum), for example, that discussions of *gyōji* continuity be investigated as reports of causal links discerned in experience rather than by logical deduction.

With this set of assumptions as a starting point, this study will conduct an analysis of the languages that Dōgen developed in accordance with each of several levels of enlightenment. If successful as a working model, this attempt will add confirmation to each of the assumptions with which we began.

Presuppositionless reading may be fair to the writer, but is impossible in practice. At the very least, reading presupposes a language, and when broadly conceived as a matrix of conventions and tacit assumptions that make meaning and communication possible, language is not only a necessary evil, it offers a means to understand a person who operates within that matrix. Reading the *Shōbōgenzō* for its presuppositions is a way one can come to know Dōgen.

I believe that the *Shōbōgenzō* demands an active engagement of presuppositions rather than their abeyance. The adventure of reading the *Shōbōgenzō* takes place on the field of its presuppositions. As a Zen master, Dōgen is primarily concerned with his stu-
dents attainment of understandings that are necessary for a meaningful life. It is reasonable to expect the meaningfulness of his writings to demand by presupposition those understandings as well.

Whether by description of contrasting modes of thought or by making inferences about modes of thought based upon the range, relative position, and apparent usage of concepts found in the Shōbōgenzō, this dissertation attempts to engage presuppositions in a field of investigation in a manner comparable to the engagement of presuppositions that takes place during samu (work activity in a temple), sanzen (interview session with the master), or meditation. Indeed, there are fundamental differences between the activities of a scholar and that of a monk, but it should be recalled that it was Dōgen who brought the matter of enlightenment to the writing table. What enabled and motivated him to do so was the task common to both guiding his students in praxis and writing the Shōbōgenzō: the personal investigation of the presuppositions of the life of an enlightened person.

A rather grandiose conclusion results: that the understanding of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō presupposes enlightenment, or at least an understanding of enlightenment on the part of its reader. A daunting
obstacle to a proper reading of the Shōbōgenzō perhaps, but this presupposition can be useful. If there is a necessary connection between enlightenment and the meaningfulness of the Shōbōgenzō, this necessary connection can justify a use of the Shōbōgenzō as a field for the exploration of Dōgen's understanding of the nature of enlightenment. More importantly, the necessary connection can offer the exploration a methodology. It enables us to examine the nature of enlightenment, not by what the Shōbōgenzō says about enlightenment, but by what it presupposes as a necessary precondition of the meaningfulness of its statements. Taking the Shōbōgenzō's presupposition of enlightenment as a starting point, investigation of the nature of enlightenment can proceed by asking the question: what must an understanding of the nature of enlightenment be in order for the Shōbōgenzō to make sense? Coming upon the rudiments of a field site, methodology, starting point, and content of inquiry in this manner, an archaeology of enlightenment almost begs to be developed and undertaken.

Writing and reading are good test cases for enlightened behavior because they involve such basic yet, for the enlightenment apologist, problematic mental activities as conceptualization, inference, and
judgment. For Dōgen, these are as much a part of enlightened activity as the samadhic experience of undifferentiated unity. As such, how the latter activity can authenticate the former type of activity is a presupposition of the life of an enlightened person that requires investigation. The Shōbōgenzō is a promising site for that investigation into personal presuppositions both present and ideal. The implicit conditions that make possible the understanding of the Shōbōgenzō are the implicit conditions that make possible the presumably fulfilling life of an enlightened person.

To justify the claim that the proposed model reflects Dōgen's view of enlightenment, evidence will be drawn from passages in the Shōbōgenzō that demonstrate the dimensional standpoints of enlightenment. The nature of evidence advanced to justify the conceptualization and systematization attempted by this dissertation itself requires justification, for it differs in kind from the evidence normally required by the criteria of proof in most philosophical analyses, for it necessarily conforms to the sense of signification and order that informs Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō. Dōgen's solution, however, does not reduce the field of investigation to particularities alone.
The questions he was addressing may be framed along the following lines: How can I present the experienced world and person through the eyes of enlightenment? What is the enlightened person and how is enlightenment lived? If the "authentic" dharma is important to the living of enlightenment, what is it—does "authentic dharma" mean only "faithful Dharma"? Is this dharma changing or static? If this dharma is changing, is its change orderly or random? If this change is orderly, what is the nature of this order? How does this relate to stages of soteriological realization? How can we verify and authenticate Buddhist doctrine in practice? How can language and our understanding of religion and philosophy be reformatted to accommodate the various stages of enlightenment?

Dōgen does not evade the question about the one and the many, but establishes a reconstructed ground from which to answer it in terms of Buddhist praxis. For an investigation into how this is achieved, we highlight the problem of particularity in view of its causal efficacy at various dimensions of enlightenment.

The treatment of the presuppositions of the problem of the one and the many is particularly germane in studies of Buddhist philosophy. One of the cardinal
themes of the Buddhist critique of non-enlightened thinking is the doctrine of nairatmya, according to which all dharmas are without self or "substance." Concomitant to this theory is the rejection of thinking that commits the mistake of presupposing that things are substantial, that is, having an abiding essence that stands under its accidental qualities and differentiates things from other existing things. There will be a later occasion on which to treat this subject in detail, but mention is made here of the connection between these two problems of plurality and substantiality because it means that our interpretation of the many cannot be conceived in terms of many substances. More importantly, "the one" should not be conceived as an independently existing entity. This is an important constraint to which our and Dōgen's task are subject.

Similar problems involving the elevated status of discontinuity have arisen in the Buddhist tradition and may have been reconciled in the manner of a logical dialectic in which the true meaning of one term is ultimately derived from its relation with the other. While I have no quarrel with this manner of treatment, this dissertation explores an alternative dialectic that elucidates the nexus of problems hereinafter
referred to as the problem of particularity in Dōgen's philosophy. The language and apparent philosophical project of the Shōbōgenzō support the investigation of an alternative logic, and this dissertation responds to this need by attempting to extract the logic from the Shōbōgenzō and show how this logic not only is supported by Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō, but constitutes a conceptual key essential to disclosing a principal philosophical project of Dōgen.

The Shōbōgenzō of Dōgen calls for treatment as a koan, not because of its enigmatic appearance, but because it belongs to a variety of discourse of which the koan is paradigmatic. A koan is a communication not of meanings but of modes of experience as standpoints from which the words of the koan are uttered. Discourse of this type consists of standpoint demonstrations and will be called "presentation." Upon investigation, a series of discrete standpoints are demonstrated in the Shōbōgenzō, in strata resembling the classification of koans in a program of koan practice.

The recognition of this type of discourse implies the task of its clear exposition and examination of its implications for the proper reading, interpretation, and evaluation of Dōgen's writings and tasks the pre-
sent dissertation with another explanatory responsibility. It is the claim of this dissertation that not only new fields of investigation within which Dōgen is operating are disclosed, but important philosophical accomplishments and points hitherto submerged within general doctrine will allow Dōgen's contributions to be even more fully appreciated by a modern audience.
Dōgen was born in Kyoto, close to the beginning of the Kamakura period (1192-1333) at the start of the thirteenth century. He was a contemporary of St. Thomas Aquinas, who was younger by four years. Dōgen was a direct descendant of both the Koga and Fujiwara lines, two powerful aristocratic families close to the Imperial line. His father was Koga Michichika of the Minamoto clan and was a descendent of Emperor Murakami.

His mother was the daughter of Kujo Motofusa, a former adviser to the ex-Emperor Go-Shirakawa, ousted from the position and from the capital, who later tried to make a comeback through the marriage of his daughter, Ishi, to the then ascending Minamoto family.

His family name was Minamoto. According to traditional accounts he was called Monjumaru as a child (Monju is the name of the bōdhisattva of wisdom, Manjusri). Dōgen and Kigen were his Buddhist names. His posthumous name is Jōyō Daishi.

In Dōgen's early years, when he was not quite three, he lost his father. His mother died shortly thereafter in a tragic chain of events that profoundly affected him. It is recorded in one of his biographies, Sanso Kogyo-ki, that at the funeral serv-
ice for his mother, he was deeply moved by the coiling ascent of the incense smoke:

Meeting with the passing away of his living mother, watching the smoke rise from the burning incense, he privately awakened to the impermanence of the world and became deeply committed to seeking the Dharma.

Essentially the same account is related in the Kenzei-ki (15). This incident not only left him orphaned, it also marked the beginning of his spiritual quest at the age of seven. Turning to read Vasubandhu's Abhidharma Kosa, for example, Dōgen the child early personified the assiduity and discernment that were to distinguish his entire career.¹

The historical conditions of Kamakura Japan matched the turbulence of his family life and without doubt heightened his sense of impermanence. The rise and fall of families in the court hierarchy, especially that of his mother's father, as well as the economic conditions of the time, could only have confirmed Dōgen's sense of the impermanence of the world. Early Kamakura Japan was rife with internecine contention, natural disaster, famine, disease, and poverty. It was an era commonly characterized by the Buddhist temples as the era of Mappō, the Final Days of the Dharma.

¹ Kenzeiki, 15.
Dōgen was cared for by his half-brother, Michitomo and his education continued. In the Zuimonki (III:17), he relates that he was an avid reader of history and literature, which included a study of the Chinese classics. Kim (21) observes that his poetic sensibility and insight into language (especially Japanese) was cultivated in this environment. A maternal uncle, Mat-sudono Moroie, was interested in adopting Dōgen to raise as his successor to a family line enjoying court favor. Dōgen had other ideas however. He approached another uncle named Ryokan and asked him to help him enter a monastery on Mt. Hiei. Dōgen was thirteen years old at the time.

At this point, Dōgen was studying while engaging in temple life on Mt. Hiei, the center for religious studies at the time. He entered the main temple of Tendai Buddhism on Mt. Hiei, under the discipleship of Koen. Dōgen was an earnest student, mastering Chinese as well as Tendai doctrine. Dōgen also read a great deal. While studying there, a question became formulated which directed and gave substance to his quest:

Both exoteric and esoteric Buddhism teach that the Original Buddha-nature is naturally inherent in corporeal existence. If this is true, then why do all the buddhas of all
times become committed to seek enlightenment?²

The effort to give conceptual form to the crux of his existential problem, and the identification of this crux as a paradox indicate the conceptual and religious concerns that characterize his later philosophical work. The stated crux of the problem is the paradox of the truth of both the seeking of the mind enlightenment and the standpoint of the inherent enlightenment of all things, which appear incompatible with one another.

Dōgen engaged in koan practice for nine years during his practice at Kenninji, for the most part under Myōzen. As Yasutani Hakuun points out, his question to the old chief cook as recounted in the Tenzōkyōkun indicates Dōgen's belief that koan practice was an integral part of Zen practice.³ The story takes place soon after Dōgen arrives in China, when he meets an old monk from a Zen monastery who comes to the boat in search of mushrooms for his temple kitchen. The old monk is the chief cook, and Dōgen is surprised that a

² Kenzei-ki, 16a.

person of his stature should be on a mission of this
sort many miles from his temple. He asks the old monk:

Why should you, a senior monk of advanced
age, not be negotiating the Way in zazen and
studying the spoken cases (wato) of the
ancient ones?4

The term, "spoken cases of the ancient ones" is
another way of saying "koan," and the word used for
"study" is an as in the term "kanna zen," the common
term for koan-introspection-zen. Dōgen's choice of
words makes the reference to koan practice clear. From
his surprise that even a monk of high stature and
advanced age would not be engaging in koan practice, it
can be inferred that he took koan practice for
anted—and another indication that his own practice under
Myōzen at Kenninji had included koan practice.

The quest in praxis

Unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from those
at Enryakuji, he sought the guidance of Koin at Onjoji
in Miidera, a Tendai center rival of Enryakuji, who
referred Dōgen to Kenninji where Yosai (Eisai) of the
Rinzai Sect was master.

The Zuimonki (5.8:47) contains his account of the
origin and nature of his quest as it provides us with

insight into his own view of his state of mind at the inception of his quest:

When I was quite young, the realization of the transiency of this world stirred my mind towards seeking the Way. After leaving Mt. Hiei, I visited many temples during my practice of the Way, but until I arrived at Kenninji I had yet to meet a real teacher or good friend. I was deluded and filled with erroneous thoughts.

The real teacher and good friend referred to here was probably Yōsai's disciple, Myōzen. Dōgen began his practice there under Yōsai but briefly, since Yōsai died the following year leaving Myōzen as his successor. Dōgen engaged in practice presumably of the Rinzai tradition while he was at Kenninji, a period of six years from 1217 to 1223. Like Mt. Hiei, Kenninji was a center for Buddhist studies that went beyond sectarian lines, and there Dōgen no doubt gained further exposure to Shingon, Kegon (Hua-yen), and other schools of Buddhism.

Realization experience under Ju-ching's tutelage

Together, Dōgen and Myōzen followed the example of Yōsai by furthering their religious practice in Sung China. The trip to China was perilous. The previous trip made by a Japanese to China was made five years before Dōgen by two priests who were never heard from...
again, and the next boat to China after Dōgen's would not leave until nine years later.5 Indeed, his trip antedates Marco Polo's venture into China by more than fifty years. Once in China, Dōgen visited many temples, but it was not until he met Ju-ching as a master that he was able to resolve his quest. In his words:

Ultimately, I went to T'ai-pai peak and engaged in religious practice under the Zen master Ju-ching, until I had resolved the one great matter of Zen practice for my entire life.6

While docked at port, Dōgen was visited by an old monk from Ayuwang monastery who came seeking Japanese mushrooms. When Dōgen asked him why such an elderly one as he was entrusted with the heavy labors of food preparation, he was answered with a laugh, "Good man from a foreign country, evidently you are not yet versed in the negotiation of the Way and do not understand what words and letters are."7

5 Takeuchi, Dōgen, pp.73-4.
6 Waddell and Abe, "Bendōwa," Eastern Buddhist, p. 130.
Dōgen stayed two years at Ching-te-ssu (J. Tendōzan Keitokuji) and received certification, but he himself was dissatisfied with his attainments. He was considering returning home when he heard that a new master had assumed the position of head master at the T'ien-t'ung monastery on Mt. T'ai-pai. When Dōgen met Ju-Ching there, Dōgen was 26 years old. Ju-Ching immediately recognized Dōgen as a promising seeker and moreover treated him as he would a son, advising him to drop the formalities due a master and come to visit at any hour of the day or night.

While he was there, Dōgen practiced arduously day and night. During one session, Ju-Ching scolded the monk seated next to Dōgen for falling asleep: "Practicing Zen is a matter of dropping body-mind. Why then do you just-sleep?" At this, Dōgen experienced a realization in which the one great matter of his entire life was resolved.

Personalization of realization: Dōgen's later years

Taking leave of his master, Dōgen returned home in 1228 after a stay of four years in China.

8 Kenzei-ki, 20a.
Dōgen's experience with koans went beyond his receiving instruction in koan practice. His esteem for koans is evidenced in his concerted efforts to assemble and edit collections of koans, presumably either for transmission or as notebooks upon which his instruction to his own monks could be based. He compiled and edited a collection of 301 kosokukōans in a work popularly known as the Sambyaku Soku (The Three Hundred Cases). Of special interest is the name he originally gave to it: the Shōbōgenzō, the same name that he would later give to his magnum opus. The authenticity of the Sambyaku Soku has been challenged, but the recent discovery in 1969 of a volume of a 1287 copied edition of the work with the inscription "Kannon-dori Kosho Gokokuji" provided material for determining the work as Dōgen's.9

Actually, Dōgen's work with koans is legendary. Dōgen is said to have spent the last night of his stay at Mt. Tendo before returning to Japan in copying the P'i-yen lu (Hekigan Roku), the collection of one hundred koans and their extensive commentary notes. Com-

memorating this prodigious feat is the name subsequently given to the work: the One-Night Hekigan (Ichiya Hekigan). Dōgen was the first to introduce this work to Japan, the claim that he returned home "empty-handed" notwithstanding.

As soon as I arrived, I vowed to spread the Dharma for the salvation of all beings; it was like carrying a heavy burden on my shoulders.10

Part of this feeling of a heavy burden evidently was due to his disappointment with the state of Buddhism in Japan. Not only was it a poor contrast to the T'ai-pai temple that he had just left, but it had deteriorated even further than before.

As I compare what I saw when I entered the Kenninji temple for the first time with what I saw some seven or eight years later, some gradual changes were noticeable. Monks made in each of their huts elaborate closets, had personal belongings, cared for beautiful clothes, amassed fortunes, enjoyed talks, and defaulted greetings and worship. From this I could surmise the situation of other temples.11

Nevertheless, Dōgen stayed at Kenninji and remained there for the first three years after his

10 "Bendōwa," DZZ pp. 729-730.

return to Japan. There he wrote his Fukan-zazengi, a proclamation of the principles of zazen.

From the time he returned from his trip to China, Dōgen saw his contribution as being not one of transmitting any special sutras or teachings, but of embodying the very standpoint of those teachings and through that embodiment achieving his mission. For this reason, he said that he returned to his country "empty-handed." Empty-handedness is in keeping with the traditional position of Zen's non-reliance upon words and letters (furyu monji), and using this term, Dōgen makes the confident statement that his contribution consists not in the transmission of teachings, but rather in the embodiment of its essence.

When Dōgen moved out of Kenninji, he occupied an abandoned and dilapidated temple in Fukakusa called Anyoin. There he wrote Shōbōgenzō "Bendōwa," his answer to the conditions and viewpoints at Kenninji and especially at Hiei. With the move to his own temple, there was an accompanying development of a personal statement and style as evidenced in his writing. With "Bendōwa," he wrote in Japanese for the first time, instead of the Chinese that was the standard medium for such works. His message was evidently attracting attention, for he developed a following of students
which, because of its increasing size, necessitated another move, again after three years.

The next temple was situated in Yamashiro and was originally called "Kannon-dōri-in." At this site, over the next ten years, the monastic community Dōgen created achieved a distinctiveness that defines what may be called "Dōgen's Zen." With the construction of a meditation hall (sōdō), Dōgen created a true Zen temple centered on meditation and the monastic life. He commemorated the change with a change of name for the entire temple to Koshiro-horinji. They also built a hatto, or Lecture Hall and "Thus with the Buddha hall (butsuden) which had existed from the beginning, Dōgen's dream was realized, for in his view the monks' hall, the Dharma hall, and the Buddha hall were the three most important buildings of a monastic community." Milestones were set with the acceptance of his first true disciple and head monk, Ejo. With the help of Ejo and the growing community, this period at Kannondōriin was one of growing self-identity as a community and large-scale construction. There was a sense of purpose, drive, and identity that the community was developing and this could only come about with the

12 Kim, p. 51, citing Kannondōriin sōdō konryu kanjisho.
guiding vision of the master and the trust of the students. In response to this responsibility and because he could entrust the administrative matters to Ejo and his monks, Dōgen enjoyed the most creative literary period of his career. This period at Fukakusa is truly remarkable for its great burst of productivity of literary and philosophical genius.

Partly in response to the need for providing the guidance and the philosophy of their community, Dōgen wrote essays and gave speeches that were transcribed. At Kannondōriin, Dōgen edited Shōbōgenzō: "Maka Hannya Hara Mitsu" and "Genjōkōan." This was the period of his most philosophical writing in which more than half of Shōbōgenzō's fascicles were written.13 Two growing

demands conditioned these writings. The introspective and solitary practice that Dōgen was advocating—shikan taza (stark meditation)—is not practiced in a conceptual vacuum but instead ironically heightens the need for clarified philosophical groundwork. Though by definition shikan taza should not be performed for a purpose, shikan taza cannot be its own justification. While the individual monk's practice of shikan taza is free from conceptualization, the advocacy and guidance of such practice necessitates a clear historical, religious, or otherwise expressible context. Secondly, the growing community that was assembling around Dōgen created the need for clarified identity and standards of behavior.

Rather than staying near the capital at Koshoji, Dōgen finally was able to fulfill his promise to Ju-ching to live away from the city and its politics and establish a temple in the countryside. This he was able to accomplish in the remote reaches of Yamashiro, establishing his own temple and naming it Eiheiji, "The Temple of Eternal Peace." Here, Dōgen lived with his monks, establishing a monastic community based upon the ideals he was establishing in his writings.

The year before his death, Dōgen returned to the "Genjōkōan" fascicle he had written almost twenty years
earlier and this time placed it at the head of all fascicles in the *Shobôgenzô*. In spite of the great changes evidenced in the final chapters of the *Shobôgenzô*, this explicit reaffirmation of the ideas presented in "Genjôkôan" attests to the enduring priority of the *genjôkôan* in his overall project.

Dôgen's life is a story of a sustained and far-reaching quest for authentic Buddhist enlightenment and praxis. He studied Vasubandhu, T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Rinzai and Soto Zen. His praxis included both shikan taza and the koan.

**Background to Dôgen's treatment of the notion of continuity**

Samadhi in the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Platform Sutra*. An examination of Buddhist literature anteceding Dôgen's treatment of *hishiryô*, "nonthinking" may provide insight into the nature of Dôgen's expository project. Notably, the *Awakening of Faith* in the Mahayana and the *Platform Sutra* of Hui-neng provide representative examples of parallel Buddhist notions that have referents and treatments similar to Dôgen's *hishiryô*, but display fundamental deficiencies that Dogen may be attempting to rectify as part of his expository project.
In the *Awakening of Faith*, the term "samadhi of Suchness" and the "samadhi of unified activity" appear from the context of their treatment to be notions similar to what Dōgen means by *hishiryō*. As in Dōgen's exposition, the general context of their treatment is the description of the practice of cessation (*samatha*). As a description of practice, the passage begins with the selection of a quiet room in which to sit while maintaining an even temper, and continues with the practice of discarding thoughts. The samadhi of Suchness is the mental frame that is attained when this activity is correctly exercised, and it appears to be the equivalent of nonthinking in its "cessation" of activities of the ideating mind. The samadhi of unified activity (*i-hsing san-mei*) is described as the result of the samadhi of Suchness when the resultant non-duality is realized in the plurality of such realizations in this world of particulars manifesting the Dharma, "the Dharmakaya of all the Buddhas and the bodies of sentient beings."14

Also figuring significantly in the *Awakening of Faith* are the terms *nien* and *wu-nien*, whose meanings

probably come from the Sanskrit vikalpa and avikalpa respectively.\textsuperscript{15}

This characterization of i-hsing san-mei is closely paralleled in the Platform Sutra of Hui-neng. The term "no-thought" is found in the Platform Sutra and resembles the "samadhi of Suchness" in the Awakening of Faith. In the Platform Sutra (sec. 17), Hui-neng calls no-thought the "main doctrine" espoused by Buddhism since ancient times,\textsuperscript{16} and describes it:

No-thought is not to think even when involved in thought...To be unstained in all environments is called no-thought. If on the basis of your own thoughts you separate from environment, then, in regard to things, thoughts are not produced. If you stop thinking of the myriad things, and cast aside all thoughts, as soon as one instant of thought is cut off, you will be reborn in another realm....Men of the world, separate yourselves from views; do not activate thoughts. If there were no thinking, then no-thought would have no place to exist. 'No' is the 'no' of what? 'Thought' means 'thinking' of what? 'No' is the separation from the dualism that produces the passions. 'Thought' means thinking of the original nature of True Reality. True Reality is the substance of thoughts; thoughts are the function of


True Reality. If you give rise to thoughts from your self-nature, then, although you see, hear, perceive, and know, you are not stained by the manifold environments, and are always free."

Just as Dōgen distinguishes non-thinking from thinking without denigrating thinking, Hui-neng here distinguishes no-thought from activated thoughts while affirming thought as the locus of no-thought. Hui-neng is here avoiding the identification of no-thought with insentienty when he distinguishes no-thought from activated thinking. The term he uses for "activated" is ch'ì, which means "generated" or "giving rise to."

When Hui-neng says that impurity arises when one activates or engenders thoughts and maintains personal views with regard to things, he appears to be saying essentially what Dōgen has been describing in his account of "thinking." Although the term "thought" is used ambiguously as "activated thought" and "conscious activity," it is generally clear by context that Hui-neng is referring to two very different conceptions, just as Dōgen sharply distinguishes thinking qua ego-generated activity from non-thinking qua consciousness without artifice. The same point is made by Hui-neng when he states in clear terms that the "samadhi of

17 Yampolsky, pp. 138-9.
uniform activity," or i-hsing san-mei (J. ichigyo zam-mai) is to be distinguished from insentiently:

The deluded man clings to the characteristics of things, adheres to the samadhi of oneness, [thinks] that straightforward mind is sitting without moving and casting aside delusions without letting things arise in the mind. This he considers to be the samadhi of oneness. This kind of practice is the same as insentiently and the cause of an obstruction to the Tao.18

Here, i-hsing san-mei appears to refer to a sustained state of no-thought, for though Hui-neng explains i-hsing san-mei as a sustained state of chih-hsin, "straightforward mind," "no-thought" appears to be Hui-neng's reformulation of "straightforward mind."

First, Hui-neng explains the meaning of i-hsing san-mei in terms of "straightforward mind":

'The samadhi of oneness' is straightforward mind at all times, walking, staying, sitting, and lying. The Ching-ming ching says: 'Straightforward mind is the place of practice; straightforward mind is the Pure Land.' Do not with a dishonest mind speak of the straightforwardness of the Dharma. If while speaking of the samadhi of oneness, you fail to practice straightforward mind, you will not be disciples of the Buddha. Only practicing straightforward mind, and in all things having no attachments whatsoever, is called the samadhi of oneness.19

I-hsing san-mei in this sense perhaps may be more appropriately rendered as the "samadhi of unified prac-

18 Yampolsky, p. 136.
19 Yampolsky, p. 136.
tice." That is to say, it is a state of absorption in which an unbroken or unified series of activities as praxis is attained. Hui-neng refers to this unbroken series attained when one moment of thought is cut off from activated thought:

Successive thoughts do not stop; prior thoughts, present thoughts, and future thoughts follow one after the other without cessation. If one instant of thought is cut off, the Dharma body separates from the physical body, and in the midst of successive thoughts there will be no place for attachment to anything. If one instant of thought clings, then successive thoughts cling; this is known as being fettered. If in all things successive thoughts do not cling, then you are unfettered. Therefore, non-abiding is made the basis.20

This notion of a succession of "instants of thoughts" that attain separation from attached thoughts is an important one for Hui-neng, and appears to differ from its treatment in the Awakening of Faith. Whereas the Platform Sutra and the Awakening of Faith agree on the i-hsing san-mei being a realization subsequent to the realization of another more basic samadhi derivative of practice related to a single moment of experience, and whereas the Platform Sutra treats this latter kind of samadhi as an extension of the first given temporal extension of that moment in time, the Awakening of Faith appears to treat i-hsing san-mei in terms

20 Yampolsky, p. 138.
of extension in space and apparently discrete things. This notion of i-hsing san-mei assumes primal significance in Dōgen's philosophy as well, appearing in his related notion of gyōji, or "praxis continuum." As will be elaborated later, Dōgen's notion of gyōji appears to be an outgrowth of the notion of a sustained state of non-thinking considered in its active aspect. The apparent difference of temporal and spatial treatments of i-hsin san-mei becomes unproblematic in Dōgen's treatment of it, for what Dōgen is describing in this context is the dharma, which as thing as experienced, can be interpreted either in its aspect of time or in its aspect of spatial extension. These are aspects of one and the same thing which Dōgen calls being-time, uji.

From the passages in the Platform Sutra, it is evident that there are many parallels with the points Dōgen is making about non-thinking and related ideas. If their individual conceptions correlate, there are differences in accomplishment. Yampolsky notes two unexplained parts of the process being described: "But by cutting off attachment to one instant of thought, one may, by a process unexplained, cut off attachment to a succession of thoughts and thus attain no-thought,
which is a state of enlightenment."21 In other words, Hui-neng does not explain why it is that succeeding an instant of no-thought there should be a succession of other such thought instants. The nature of practice that occurs under these conditions also remains unexplained. "The Platform Sutra does not specifically deal with the period after sudden enlightenment has been gained."22

These two observations by Yampolsky both allude to a complex philosophical problem left unanswered in Hui-neng's treatment of the samadhic experience. Given this notion of a discrete and unified absorption in an all-inclusive experience world of the moment, the need to reconcile this notion with ordinary experience results in the philosophical problem of temporality. One thought-moment being described as totally exhaustive of the universe seems to imply an exclusion of other possible thought-moments at that moment, a notion that invites questions about how continuity in time would then be explained. If samadhic moments are as discrete as the treatment of "no-thought" makes them appear, then their ability to be linked to other such

21 Yampolsky, p. 116.
22 Yampolsky, p. 116.
moments would need to be explained in terms of something else. The problem to which Yampolsky refers is exacerbated by Hui-neng's use of words such as "sudden" to describe enlightenment, a concept emphasizing momentariness while begging reconciliation with the implicit distinction it is making with "gradual" and the rest of the time frame in which this moment is conceptualized. Further, given non-duality and non-differentiation of experience as being primordial, how are duality, multiplicity, and differentiation to be explained? Other common kinds of experience that defy simple explanation in terms of samadhi alone are the acts of judgment, decision-making, and local action based on far-reaching and abstract ideals. All of these experiences presuppose a multiplicity that defies explanation in terms of samadhi alone. An even more fundamental philosophical problem is the very possibility of an explanation of answers to these questions when the functioning of reason and logical relatedness of multiple ideas cannot be entertained within the thought mode under examination. These problems have more than a philosophical import for the orthodox Buddhist philosopher, for there is also a call for a reconciliation of no-thought with such basic doctrines and themes as impermanence, birth-death, karma,
and the question of what happens when a buddha meets a buddha. The problem of temporality thus questions the authenticity of no-thought as a Buddhist notion.

In this regard, the *Awakening of Faith* fares little better. With regard to the first point Yampolsky makes, there is no explanation of how one arrives at a samadhi that encompasses a multiplicity of events or things when samadhi is by definition a non-dual experience. The second point regarding the nature of practice after the different samadhis are attained is however addressed in the *Awakening of Faith* in its consideration of "clear observation" or vipasyana. It may be noted, however, that the problem remains largely unresolved, as the description of vipasyana here is sketchy and treated in a doctrinaire fashion. For example:

> He who practices "clear observation" should "reflect in the following way: all living beings, from the beginningless beginning, because they are permeated by ignorance, have allowed their mind to remain in samsara..."23

In this passage, we may observe that the locus of discussion has shifted from phenomenological description of aspects of praxeology to a prescription of what to experience and in what Buddhist terms one should

23 *Awakening of Faith*, p. 100.
experience it. Although both samatha and vipasyana are modes of praxis, the descriptive mode exposition derails in the *Awakening of Faith* when the subject of discussion turns to non-samatha praxis just as abruptly as Hui-neng's exposition stopped when just such a shift in subject matter was to have been made. It appears from this that the initial stage of praxis is amenable to a phenomenological mode of exposition in terms of samadhi and no-thought, but subsequent stages are not. An account that failed to account for subsequent stages would risk a monadic and static world view quite inimical to such fundamental Buddhist notions as impermanence and causality. For this reason Hui-neng needs to address the questions raised by Yampolsky and yet when the *Awakening of Faith* attempted to deal with the same issue, it found it necessary to shift from a consideration of aspects of experience to an objectification of the contents of experience. This latter course of exposition is fraught with difficulties, some of which are highlighted by Heidegger and Gadamer in their critiques of metaphysics.

The problems that emerge are not merely the result of omission, but are intrinsic to the nature of the exposition. Common to both works is the attempt to explain the nature of an initial state of consciousness
as one of the first attainments in meditative practice. The audience for this explanation is the beginner who needs to be told what to look for in terms of familiar mental events. Hence, Hui-neng indicates the nature of no-thought resorting to a term negating what he calls "activating thought." Because the language is cast in terms of the relation to thought explaining how to arrive at this no-thought, and cast moreover in terms of the language of thinking, it has limitations and criteria of meaning that make that language inappropriate and unable to describe the significance of what happens after its attainment except in the grossest of terms. The type of explanation we find after that point is that somehow this state of mind continues to the next moment and permits the observation of other Buddhist truths. In the case of the Awakening of Faith, the mode of explanation then switches from a praxis-based phenomenological account to a doctrinal account without benefit of explanatory transition.

The samadhic experience is by definition a realization of something, namely, unity, non-differentiation, and nonduality. It is a "putting together" (sam, "together" + adhi, "to put"), that is explainable either in terms of what is "put together"
or the nature of the realized unity. Either explanation of the meaning of the term would be abstract and theoretical by necessity. For example, if "multiplicity" were taken to refer to the multiplicity of entities in the world of ordinary experience, the unity that is attained in a samadhic realization would then presuppose the logically prior notions of world, multiple entities, and ordinary experience. Alternatively, if the adhi of samādhi were taken to refer to "god," then recognition that the experience is a union with god would still presuppose a logically prior notion of god. The term samadhi is thus fraught with presuppositions of dualism, substance, and other metaphysical ascriptions.

Dōgen appears to pick up where the Awakening of Faith and Hui-neng leave off, and he does so not only by filling in previously omitted explanations. Once the point is made about non-thinking and its relations to thinking and not-thinking, Dōgen has little more to say about the experience of non-thinking as such, and this is odd in view of the importance accorded this term in the literature.

Instead, unanswered questions about how samadhi is investigated in praxis as experience without metaphysical presuppositions and how it can be explored in posi-
tive, definite, and rich meanings dominate the concerns of Dōgen's writings. Interpretation of Dōgen that fails to recognize this by reducing his philosophy to inventive elaborations of the negative aspects of the non-thinking experience miss the mark. When understood in terms of the questions they are meant to address, analysis of Dōgen's writings reveals a sophisticated and coordinated complex of explanatory concepts that can be philosophically investigated for answers to such higher order questions as the relation of time to enlightenment, the relation of the multiplicity of things and moments to the non-duality of enlightenment, and the relation of one enlightened being to another enlightened being.

The kind of language used, the implicit criteria necessitated by the language, and the nature of the initial problem all predispose the exposition to encounter these difficulties.

How Hua-yen attempted to transcend the standpoint of unity.

The Awakening of Faith was highly prized by the Hua-yen school, two of the principal masters of which wrote definitive commentaries on the work. Hua-yen made advances in paradigm presentation that extended its expressive possibilities. The reformatting of the
paradigm is not unrelated to the reformatting of experience that enlightenment entails. There is a logic to these. Inadequacies in expressive possibilities that can keep pace with the soteriological realization impel a transcendence of present paradigms of understanding and the language or logic of that understanding.

The formatting of the paradigm of presentation can exhaust the expressive possibilities, the realization, however, does not exhaust. Enlightenment itself is a reformatting into formats that are not arbitrary in number or relation or internal logic. Hua-yen encountered inadequacies in the Awakening of Faith and we will see how it handled the paradigm reformatting.

Neither of the works uses the term continuity and discontinuity, none of them talks about it but all presuppose such notions in the end the expressive possibilities will be a criterion by which we can appreciated contributions of Hua-yen or Dōgen.

Historical connection to Ch'an (Zen). Dōgen's inheritance from Hua-yen and his legacy in the light of Hua-yen. Before Dōgen, there had been many historical and philosophical linkages connecting Hua-yen and Ch'an. Hua-yen's fourth and fifth patriarchs, Ch'eng-kuan (738-839) and Tsung-mi (780-841) were especially well versed in the Ch'an tradition, the latter being
considered a Ch'an patriarch as well. Since he
grounded to the Ch'an tradition, Dōgen's appropriation
of Hua-yen teachings comes as no surprise. He shares
in the philosophical legacy of Hua-yen and takes this
legacy to further development. Not only does he draw
directly from the Hua-yen literature, but much of his
project indirectly presupposes what had been clearly
delineated in the philosophical accomplishments of Hua-
yen. The results of this dissertation will show how
Dōgen takes up a project begun by Hua-yen and success­
fully develops it beyond Hua-yen's capabilities.

Early Hua-yen sources and world view. The Hua-yen
world view offers a schema characterized by order and
conceptual clarity through the writings of Tu-shun
(557-640), Chih-yen (602-668), Fa-tsang (643-712),
Ch'eng-kuan, Tsung-mi and others. It affords us a view
into a universe revealing in its structure many of the
things that Buddhist doctrine describes. Pratītya-
samutpāda and sūnyatā are two major examples of ele­
ments in Buddhism which acquire new perspectival con­
texts and explanatory possibilities within Hua-yen's
architectonic of totality. Although combining a strong
component of praxis in addition to philosophical
schematization and exposition, the Hua-yen tradition as
it is known to us is predominantly weighted in favor of
the latter.
Hua-yen's scheme of the universe is frequently represented by the Net of Indra. A magical net spread out in all directions to infinity, it has at each nexus of the net a totally transparent and radiant jewel. As is the net in extension, these jewels are infinite in number. The light from each jewel is received by each of all the other jewels in the universe, and in turn, the light from all of the jewels is received by each individual jewel. The interdependence and non-obstruction of particular and totality illustrated in this image are characteristic of the Hua-yen view of reality.

The Four Dharmadhatu. Tu-shun formulated the schema of the Four Dharmadhatu (dharma realms) to elucidate the range of levels of reality seen by those attaining the realizations of Hua-yen. Buddhism views the difference between delusory samsara and enlightened nirvana to be a difference in the way we address the world. To one who has achieved the realizations described by Buddhism, the experience-world is different from the world of the deluded. Thus we may speak in terms of reality in two distinct ways, as though there were actually two distinct levels of reality in which different truths account for their respective experiences. In Hua-yen, instead of two of
these levels of reality, there are four. They are called "dharmadhatu," or "dharma realms" because they refer to realms specific to the different dhammas as they are experienced. A Dharma is an experienced fact, an elementary unit of experience. It is often translated as "thing," with the understanding that for the Buddhist, this means "thing qua experienced" inasmuch as there is no nonempirical noumenal reality set in contradistinction to the world of experience. Each of the dharmadhatu of Tu-shun refers to levels of the understanding of reality as experienced by one who has ascended the steps to complete realization. Metaphysically, these realms present a multi-tiered structure to the world as seen from different levels of realization. Soteriologically, these realms present the range and sequential structure of the levels of realization.

The work attributed to Tu-shun, Discernments of the Dharma Element [Dharmadhatu]: A Meditation Upon the Maha-Vaipulya-Buddha-Avatamsaka Comprising in Outline Three Levels of Discernment, abbreviated Kuan-men, is where we should first turn for a Hua-yen exposition of the four dharmadhatu. The Hua-yen Dharmadhatu Vipasyana Entryway is a literal translation of the title of Tu-Shun's Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men. Gimello translates it, "Discernments of the Dharma Element."
By way of support for his rendering the term fa-chieh (Skt. dharmadhatu) as "dharma element," he cites a definition by Chih-yen: "He held that its first component, the word dharma, combined in this particular usage three of its many possible meanings. It meant "an object known by the intellect," "self-nature."
The actual Hua-yen formulation of the four dharmadhatu is attributed to Ch'eng-kuan who bases this formulation upon Tu-shun's Kuan-men. Ch'eng-kuan's commentary on the Kuan-men, the Hua-yen fa-chieh hsuan-ching (T1883:45.672a11-683a25), is in fact the most traditional source for the text of the Kuan-men and the Gimello translation is based upon this version of the Kuan-men contained in Ch'eng-kuan's commentary.

Tu-shun's Kuan-men explains the dharmadhatu from three levels: 1) the discernment of true emptiness [k'ung ]; 2) the discernment of the mutual non-obstruction of li (patternation) and shih ( particulars); 3) and the discernment of total pervasion and accommodation. From these three discernment levels of the dharmadhatu Ch'eng-kuan derives the second, third and fourth dharmadhatu respectively. Thus, Ch'eng-kuan formulates Tu-shun's discussion of the discernment of true emptiness (k'ung) as the dharmadhatu of li fa-chieh. The discernment of the mutual non-obstruction
of li (patternation) and shih (particulars) is formulated as the dharmadhatu of the non-obstruction of li and shih, and the discernment of total pervasion and accommodation is formulated as the dharmadhatu of the non-obstruction of shih and shih.

The dharmadhatu are arranged sequentially beginning with the dharmadhatu of particular events and entities. This first level is called the dharmadhatu of shih (J. ji). A description of the level of reality in which things and events are conceptualized as realities existing independently of each other, the dharmadhatu of shih is an attempt to account for the way in which we conventionally address the world in terms of particular things and particular events.

Particularity is signified by shih by Hua-yen. The term literally means "event" or matter, as in "a matter of, state of affairs." The intellectual origins of the notion of shih may be found in the earlier Buddhist treatment of "dharma." As the term "shih," "dharma" refers to a non-substantialistically conceived thing or particular. Never considered apart from experience, a possible translation of it is "thing as experienced."

A philological appreciation of the term "dharma" reveals a second aspect that invites speculation about
the notion of dharma in Buddhist as also being the intellectual origin of not only shih, but of li as well.

In contrast to this is the second realm, the dharmadhatu of the universal truth of sūnyatā. This is called the dharmadhatu of li (J. ri). It is the realm recognized upon the realization of sūnyatā, represented by the universal truth of sūnyatā [li]. This is the level seen through the eyes of one who has attained the realization of sūnyatā. At this level, instead of an agglomeration of things individually conceived, the world is appropriated through a realization of the universal "emptiness" that all things are. The idea of sūnyatā as emptiness refers to the emptiness of self-existing nature that is realized in the realization of sūnyatā. Thus, the characterization of the dharmadhatu of li is somewhat prone to a negative description based on differences from the first dharmadhatu of shih. Tu-shun's first discernment level (which in Ch'eng-kuan's formulation is the second dharmadhatu) is the discernment of true emptiness (k'ung) and is considered in four sections: 1) the discernment of the coalescence of forms and their reversion to emptiness; 2) the discernment of clarifying the identity of emptiness with forms; 3) the discernment of the mutual non-
obstruction of emptiness and forms; and 4) the discernment utterly without support. Here, the discussion of 諦 that one would expect in view of Ch'eng-kuan's schema is conspicuous in its absence. The discussion is couched purely in terms of form (se, Skt. rupa) and emptiness (k'ung, Skt. sūnyatā).

The Hua-yen concept of 諦 draws from and includes the sūnyatā tradition of Buddhism, particularly of Madhyamika. Like 諦, sūnyatā is a theoretical expression of the realization of the non-substantiality of all things. As a departure from the sūnyatā tradition, however, 諦 appears more appropriate to discussions of metaphysics, especially when elucidated in a bi-polar relation with particularity.

Considered as polarities,24 諦 and shih are concepts that refer to mutually dependent aspects of the world of events. Rather than there being an absolute principle explainable without reference to particular things and events, the realization of 諦 in Hua-yen is only attained through shih. This notion of attainment through shih deserves explanation. In a sense, 諦 is always presented in a mediated mode, as the meanings of

written communications are mediated by the written word. It bears note, however, that this still allows for one to describe the encounter with ideas and aesthetic impressions that occur during reading as a direct and unmediated encounter. The beginning reader will see only black and white forms, but once one is fully engaged in the process of reading, the reader is in the company of ideas and meanings. In thus describing the process of reading, this account is not an account of private impressions solipsistically considered nor does it require an explanation in terms of formations of black and white. Paradoxically however, in some sense, an account of reading cannot be divorced from such considerations. To utilize this analogy further, Hua-yen says that whereas we can see the world in terms of this or that form, there is a soteriological breakthrough pointed out by Buddhism that puts us in the company of a universal dynamism clearly manifesting itself. Unfortunately, this analogy breaks down when we pursue the correlation with Hua-yen further.

The third dharmadhatu is the realm of the interfusion of the first two realms without any obstruction whatsoever. It is called the dharmadhatu of the non-obstruction of li and shih. As in the Madhyamika Buddhist tradition in which the identity of Nirvana and
Samsara was maintained, the Hua-yen tradition maintains that in spite of the characterization of the Buddhist [enlightenment set] in terms contrasted to the world of the deluded person, they are not actually referring to two separate worlds. With the realization of Nirvana, it is also realized that this Nirvana is not different from Samsara after all. There is a return to an integration of the two realms rather than an increased separation between the two. Hua-yen explains how this is conceivable by means of a somewhat metaphysical explanation in terms of the notion of non-obstruction. Rather than the somewhat static and logical relation of identity, non-obstruction allows for greater explanatory power in terms of processes and levels of realization, for this identity between the worlds of delusion and enlightenment is not the final level of realization. The third dharmadhatu (which is Tu-shun's second discernment level) is the discernment of the mutual non-obstruction of \textit{li} (universal truth of \textit{sūnyatā}) and \textit{shih} (particulars). Tu-shun's exposition of this level is undertaken through ten themes: 1) \textit{li} pervades \textit{shih} (particulars); 2) each \textit{shih} pervades \textit{li}; 3) \textit{shih} are formed by \textit{li}; 4) \textit{shih} can reveal \textit{li}; 5) \textit{shih} are sublated by \textit{li}; 6) \textit{shih} can conceal \textit{li}; 7) true \textit{li} is identical with \textit{shih}; 8) \textit{shih} are identical with
li; 9) true li is not a shih (particular); and 10) shih are not li. Gimello's note regarding the introduction of li and shih at this point is illuminating and I quote at length:

The terms "li" (i.e., universal truth of śūnyatā) and "shih" (i.e., phenomena), which here replace the terms "k'ung" (sunyata, i.e., emptiness) and "se" (rupa, i.e., form), are not Tu-shun's inventions. They have a prior history of Buddhist usage nearly as old as the history of Chinese Buddhism itself, having been employed by thinkers as near in time to Tu-shun as Ching-ying Hui-yuan (523-592) but also by such "early fathers" of Chinese Buddhism as Seng-chao (374-414), Hsi Ch'ao (336-377), and Chih-tun (alias Chih Tao-in 314-366). In fact, the notions which these two terms convey—particularly the notion of li, principle—have traditionally been especially prominent among the variety of notions which Chinese have used to appropriate elements of Indian Buddhist thought into Chinese Buddhist conceptual structures. Ultimately, of course, the words have their roots in non-Buddhist and pre-Buddhist traditions—in the schools of Arcane Learning (hsuan-haueh), which were the intellectual hosts to Buddhism when it first arrived in China, but also in more classical forms of Confucianism and Taoism....At the very least one must realise that "li" and "shih" were elements of a Chinese hermeneutic of Buddhism, of an effort towards appropriative interpretation of a foreign intellectual tradition. They were surely not just instruments of the objective exegesis, much less of the literal translation, of Indian Buddhism. Although "li" and "shih" may parallel "k'ung" and "se"—"li" stands to "shih" as "k'ung" to "se"—yet the latter pair are only fairly literal translations of Sanskrit terms. Whereas the former pair here translate no Sanskrit terms, neither śūnyatā/rupa nor any others, but rather convey distinctively different and distinctively Chinese understandings of Buddhist truths.

The introduction of the terms "li" and "shih" into the Kuan-men should therefore be understood not as a merely terminological alteration but as a significant conceptual change. Borrowing language
from the philosophy of science, we may even go so far as to label this change a "paradigm shift." Ch'eng-kuan identifies several deficiencies in the prior discernments of emptiness and form. He maintains that such meditation is excessively abstract and excessively negative, at least in its connate if not in its cognitive import. It issues only in an abstract principle, and that principle is not of itself capable of suggesting the marvelous actuality of Suchness. Rather it leads only to a sort of spiritual aphasia and to a barren, featureless spiritual prospect. principle (li), however, subsumes both emptiness and forms, and the interfusion of li, principle with phenomena, shih gives a more affirmative and concrete cast to the discernment of the dharma-element....Just what the distinctive conceptual content of the terms principle (li) and phenomena (shih) is will be specified in what follows, but we may anticipate the general conclusion that principle is the "principle—that" all things are insubstantial and that phenomena are all things (not only all dharmas) which are governed by or "supported" by that principle.25

Li is not a principle or cosmic blueprint that exists in a Platonic world of forms. The locus of li is the world of shih. Li is not meant to explain the metaphysical basis of the world of phenomenal events through an appeal to a transcendent reality. At the same time, li is not reducible to shih, but maintains a soteriological as well as an explanatory stature. Perhaps the notion of li can best be translated as "dynamics." Compatible with the Hua-yen world view are the notions of energy, order, and a functioning totality that are inherent in the notion of dynamics.

25 Gimello, pp. 478-481.
With the qualification that dynamics is not meant to connote a motive force that imparts energy and direction to the world, the term meets the Hua-yen needs for a polar concept to shih.

The fourth dharmadhatu is the realm in which particulars are in harmony with shih (particulars) without any obstruction. This is called the dharmadhatu of non-obstruction among shih (particulars) and shih (particulars) (shih wu ai). According to Hua-yen's own classification of the doctrines of the various schools of Buddhism, the other schools have doctrines that at best attain the level of the third dharmadhatu. The attainment and exposition of the fourth dharmadhatu is presented as the unique contribution of Hua-yen above and beyond the accomplishments of the other schools.

The third level in the Kuan Men corresponding to the fourth dharmadhatu is called the "Discernment of Total Pervasion and Accommodation" and is explicated in ten principles: 1) li (universal truth of sunyata) as shih (particulars); 2) shih (particulars) as li; 3) each li subsumes the mutual non-obstruction of li and shih; 4) the diffuse and local are mutually non-obstructive; 5) the broad and narrow are mutually non-obstructive; 6) pervasion and accommodation are mutually non-obstructive; 7) inclusion and entrance are mutually
non-obstructive; 8) interpenetration is without obstruction; 9) coexistence is without obstruction; and 10) universal interfusion is without obstruction.

Metaphysically, these realms present a multi-tiered structure to the world as seen from different levels of realization. Soteriologically, these realms present the range and sequential structure of the levels of realization.

Difficulties with the Hua-yen treatment of the dharmadhatu. This dharmadhatu is the realm of the highest realization in Hua-yen and presents the greatest obstacles to understanding. This difficulty is invited by Tu-shun's own manner of exposition. Unlike his clear and philosophical analysis and exposition of the previous dharmadhatu, Tu-shun shifts to a symbolic mode of description when he describes the fourth dharmadhatu.

If this treatise of Tu-shun's is considered to be an exposition shih shih wu ai, an objection arises: whether considered in its title, its three major divisions, or in its various principles, this treatise clearly is not talking about the fourth dharmadhatu. The points raised here appear to address the third dharmadhatu instead. Where the reader expects an elucidation of the fourth dharmadhatu, either no
explanation is given, or the explanation turns out to be of the third dharmadhatu instead.

Like the metaphor of the Net of Indra, the form of the Hua-yen exposition of the structure of reality and spiritual realization also displays a crystalline appearance. There is a great deal of attention given to symmetrical treatment and to structuring exposition based upon the number ten. Ascribing the virtue of perfection to the number, the Hua Yen Sutra lists ten stages of bōdhisattvahood, as well as such explanations as the ten equalities (in the Dasabhumika), the ten concentrations, the ten superknowledges, the ten acceptances, the ten abodes, the ten practices, the ten inexhaustible treasures, the ten dedications, and so on. Tu Shun continues this tradition by his explanations of ten principles and ten non-obstructions, and Chih Yen lists ten mysteries. There are numerous other examples that indicate a kind of exposition that is structured and orderly as though following algorithms or other conceptual principles.

Let us examine one work from Hua-yen's Avatamsaka Sutra which approaches the project this dissertation is attempting to identify in Dōgen's writings. It is the Ten Stages Sutra, the Dasabhumika, a detailed account of the resplendent nature of enlightenment in a series
of progressive stages culminating in a vision of rapturous heights. Accordingly, Cleary says of it: "Within this overall cycle are parallel cycles of elevation of self and others; as the enlightening beings progress from stage to higher stage, there is an ongoing expansion not only of extent, depth and precision of awareness and perception, but also of corresponding versatility and power in communicative outreach."26

Certainly one of the hallmarks of Buddhist literature in its elevation and grandeur, the Dasabhumika appears to be most effective in encouraging its reader to reach to ever more sublime heights of enlightenment. From the viewpoint of one who searches it for an academic account of how this relates to the ordinary world of human affairs, however, the effectiveness of this work in depicting the sublime may cause create problems. As an example of the language employed in the work take the following sentence:

Enlightening beings in this stage have accurate knowledge of the totality of the realm of reality, the realm of desire, the realm of form the formless realm, the realm of worlds, the realm of all beings, the realm of consciousness, the realms of the created

and the uncreated, the realm of space, and the teaching of being and nonbeing; they have accurate knowledge of the totality of the realm of nirvana, and of afflictions created by views; they have accurate knowledge of the totality of the becoming and decay of worlds, of the practice of followers of the elementary Buddhist teachings, of the practice of individual illuminates, of the practice of enlightening beings, of the buddhas' powers, expertise, unique qualities of buddhahood, and material and spiritual bodies, of omniscience in all its aspects, of demonstration of attainment of enlightenment and turning the wheel of teaching—in sum, they have accurate knowledge of accomplishment of all the different ways of access to truth.27

In spite of the apparent similarity in delineating a progressive series of stages of enlightenment, there are certain attributes of its presentation that will highlight the significance of Dōgen's accomplishments.

In the final analysis, the view of the universe that Hua-yen affords is a magnificent edifice, but one with suggestions of being overly intellectual for an intuitive vision. Perhaps the vision it offers is so grand that it remains inescapably just that, a vision. Although being conceptual is not a weakness in itself, it invites charges of being procrustean 28) as well as problems of substance ascription that Hua-yen itself critiques in its espousal of sūnyatā. As mentioned

27 Flower, Cleary trans. v. 2 p. 104.
28 Chang, G., p. 155.
before, śūnyatā is a realization and doctrine principal to Buddhism and this is especially true of Mahayana Buddhism. Negatively described, it is a release from and critique of the conceit of harboring the presupposition of svabhava, or the idea of selfhood. The act of expression or activity that makes this presupposition is called "substance ascription," and Hua-yen is as adamant as any other line of Buddhism in repudiating both the conceit of svabhava and act of substance ascription. That being as it may, abstraction invites substance ascription, and by erecting a conceptual architectonic systematizing its view of reality, Hua-yen opens itself to the charge of committing the error of substance ascription that it repudiates. Thus, the Hua-yen scheme is constructed at a price. At the expense of the exposition of totality, śūnyatā becomes compromised. This price may seem worth paying if it is considered that the only alternative to substance ascription is not saying anything at all.

According to Hua-yen's own classification of the doctrines of the various schools of Buddhism, the other schools have doctrines that at best attain the level of the third dharma-dhatu. The attainment and exposition of the fourth dharma-dhatu is presented as the unique contribution of Hua-yen above and beyond the accomplishments of the other schools.
An examination of Tu Shun's exposition of the fourth dharmadhatu, shih shih wu ai begins with his work, Fa Chieh K’un, (On the Meditation of the Dharmadhatu Taisho 1883 pp. 684-92). Garma Chang for one attests that an important treatment of shih shih wu ai is found therein:

The germinal thoughts and characteristic approach of Hwa Yen Philosophy are clearly visible in this essay. The four famous masters subsequent to Tu Shun—Chih Yen, Fa Tsang, Ch'eng Kuan, and Tsung Mi—all gained their inspiration from this essay and wrote their works following the principles and arguments laid down therein. With regard to philosophy, this treatise is no doubt the most important piece of work of Hwa Yen Buddhism. The main theme is the development of a philosophy of the all-embracing Totality of Shih-shih Wu-ai. This is done by elaborating in sequence three philosophical observations.

1. Meditation on True Voidness.
2. Meditation on the Non-Obstruction of Li and Shih.
3. Meditation on the All-Embracing Totality. 29

Assuming that Garma Chang is correct in describing this treatise as Tu Shun's own explanation of shih shih wu ai, let us examine it in its major divisions. The first division is called "Meditation on True Voidness" and is treated in four observations in ten principles.

The four observations are: the observation of reducing form into Voidness; the observation of

29 Chang, G., p. 207.
identifying Voidness with form; the observation of the Non-Obstruction of form and Voidness; the observation of absolute dissolution and non-attachment.

The ten principles are (using Garma Chang's translation): 1) Form is not void because it is void; 2) form is not void because it is void; 3) Form is not void because it is void; 4) Form is void; 5) Voidness is not form because Voidness is form; 6) Voidness is not form because Voidness is form; 7) Voidness is not form because Voidness is form; 8) Voidness is form; [9 and 10 are not given]

The second division is called "Meditation on the Non-Obstruction of Li (Noumenon) against Shih (Phenomenon)" and is treated in ten principles (again using Garma Chang's translation: 1) The principal that Li [must] embrace Shih; 2) The principle that Shih [must] embrace Li; 3) The production of Shih must rely on Li; 4) Through Shih the Li is illustrated; 5) Through Li the Shih is annulled; 6) The Shih can hide the Li; 7) The True Li is Shih itself; 8) Things and events [Shih Fa] themselves are Li; 9) The True Li is not Shih; and 10) Things and events [Shih Fa] are not Li.

The third division is called "Meditation on the All-Embracing Totality" and is treated in ten princi-
pies (using Garma Chang's translation): 1) The principle that Li equals Shih; 2) The principle that Shih equals Li; 3) The principle that Shih includes the truth of the Non-Obstruction of Li and Shih; 4) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of the universal-whole and the local-spot; 5) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of the vast and the small; 6) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of [all] spreading and [all] containing; 7) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of entering and including; 8) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of interpenetration; 9) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of mutual existing; and 10) The principle of the Non-Obstruction of universal fusing.

There are similarities between the projects of Hua-yen and Dōgen. Both stress meditative practice as fundamental to the soteriological project. Not dwelling only in silent meditation, however, active and voluminous expression were also hallmarks of both. Moreover, this expression was characteristically not a description of the path to enlightenment as it leads from the ordinary way of looking at the world, but rather expression of the world from the standpoint of enlightenment. Also common to both was that they did not use the term "enlightenment" very much considering the primacy of enlightenment to their expressed task.
The reason for this was that neither were looking at enlightenment as one thing from the standpoint of enlightenment set in didactic contrast to non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is neither a single event nor a single-faceted state.

In the Hua-yen tradition, Dōgen's task bears similarity to what is found here in this schema. In the first place, there is a multi-tiered structure to the treatment of the world of enlightenment. Secondly, there are the same number of tiers to their respective structures.

In Dōgen's writings, there are many motifs and themes which directly incorporate Hua-yen ideas. The conception of interpenetration, for example, is a direct importation from Hua-yen, as is the elevation of the status of the particular thing. "Zenki," "Gyōji," and "Ikkamyōju" are names of fascicles in Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō which reveal this Hua-yen legacy as well. Dōgen also frequently uses another key term from the Hua-yen tradition, hokkai engi, буквально dharmadhatu pratītya-samutpāda and develops it into a major conception. Dōgen's ideas of pilgrimage and ascent can also be traced back to the Hua-yen Sutra's final chapter, "Entering the Realm of Reality" which relates the pilgrimage of Sudhana, a familiar theme of Hua-yen.
Moreover, Dōgen's project begins where Hua-yen leaves off. Whereas the complex conceptual nature of Hua-yen's schema appears to reduce Hua-yen's accessibility and soteriological value, Dōgen embarks upon a project of reinstating the particular as it relates to totality in order to set up a dynamic relation with the essentials of praxis. It appears though that Hua-yen was heading in this direction with its introduction of the Fourth Dharmadhatu. However, because of its inherently conceptual architectonic, Hua-yen at that point was ill-equipped to present a lucid explanation of it. This is where Dōgen excels.

There are other differences. In the first place, Dōgen would never have characterized either what he was talking about or his project so schematically. There are not found in Dōgen's writings descriptions of his descriptions, as are frequently found in Hua-yen treatises. Descriptions of his descriptive project in a systematic and schematic way belongs rather to the task of the present dissertation. In this way, the task of this dissertation can be likened to the task of Tu Shun.

Dōgen's method of treating sunyata is presentational. He demonstrates and acts it rather than merely characterizing it. What we find in his writings
are examples of non-substance-ascriptive presentations which describe things as they appear at the level of the fourth dharmadhatu. While it may seem that the treatment of śūnyatā in any way except as a concept or as a "thing" is impossible, Dōgen is successful in doing this. It is said that śūnyatā is treatable only at the level of direct realization, but Dōgen does this and more. What śūnyatā is as a realization, and how non-substance-ascriptive expression and activity are not only possible but accomplished, will constitute a principal issue the present dissertation needs to clarify.

Dōgen's reinstatement of the primacy of the particular offers a more appropriate basis for praxis than does the conceptual structure of Hua-yen. The relation is also reciprocal: praxis is able to become the basis for the exposition that Dōgen undertakes.

Hua-yen describes the structure of the world from the eyes of the enlightened, Dōgen describes the world as experienced by the enlightened in the spatio-temporal realities of the moment. The particular in Hua-yen, in terms of the Net of Indra, is without differences in textures, shapes, sizes, and colors; it is totally transparent. The world as therein described is far from the ordinary world of space and time. The
world described by Dōgen however, is pre-eminently spatio-temporal. It is indeed the very thing qua being-temporality which needs to be investigated in the realization of discreteness and particularity.

Dōgen inherited more than the Hua-yen notions of pratītya-samutpāda, totality, dharma-dhatu, and the reinvestiture of particularity. Perhaps even more influential in the development of Dōgen's philosophy were Hua-yen assumptions about modes of discourse implicit in these notions and their Hua-yen treatment. If particular dharmas imply their universes, then particular words can have their own implicit domains of meaning as well. The dharmadhatu of Hua-yen can be understood as just such domains in which dharmas have their meaning. These Hua-yen domains are multiple, discrete, describable, and attained through religious transformation. These universes of meaning are individuated not only by a difference in language, but by the difference in standpoint of meaning apprehension. What are thus revealed by words are not simply meanings that can be translated into other words in the same language. The universe of meaning within which the person using the words is situated is also revealed by words. A common example of such a difference in standpoint is the spiritual transformation that characterizes any religion.
Within the Hua-yen scheme, a particular such as a word or deed reveals its corresponding dharmadhatu among four possible dharmadhatu. Each dharma personifies its dharmadhatu, just as each dharma personifies its universe. This function of revealing or personalization that belongs to a dharma suggests the possibility of a rather unique kind of communication in which what is communicated by a word is its corresponding dharmadhatu rather than its meaning. This kind of communication will be examined as a mode of discourse that is shared by Dōgen in his understanding and use of the koan.
Chapter 3

The Shōbōgenzō Koan

The koan is an expression, a mode of expression, and a mode of communication that averts some of the discursive problems encountered when conceptualizing nonconceptual experience. What distinguishes a koan from other expressions is not its often paradoxical form but its mode of expression. The koan mode of expression is definable in terms of the koan's epistemic basis (an "originative experience"), what it conveys (the operations within and among dimensions of enlightenment), and the process that enable this expression to take place (dōtoku). As a mode of communication, the koan operates as an authenticating and transformative process that takes place not only between two people, but between dimension and dimension, dharma and dharma, and buddha and buddha. Though words are frequently the medium by which koans operate, koan words do not operate by representation or reference to things and abstractions from things; they do not originate and develop from the same sources of knowledge as do words of ordinary discourse. They operate instead as what may be called "presentations".

1 This distinction between representation and presentation is a gift from Roger Ames.
of modes of experience, and they originate and develop from specific kinds of experience, engaging clarified experience in transformations that collectively constitute the different dimensions of enlightenment. Instead of treating the descriptive problems in religious discourse as a matter of proper word choice, Dōgen is using words as koans that present and engage enlightenment in its various operations. Read in this manner, the Shōbōgenzō reveals multiple levels to the operations of enlightenment.

Section One:
Dōgen's Approach to the Problem of the Conceptual Expression of Enlightenment

Ever since the time of Siddhartha Gautama, Buddhism has espoused enlightenment as a religious solution to fundamental problems of human existence. However, construed as a modality of consciousness separate from the ordinary, this religious solution created theoretical problems regarding its attainability, meaning, and applicability to the fundamental problems which it purportedly solves. Attending the conception of enlightenment as a transcendent modality of con-
sciousness are problems that are latent, if not dominant issues in much of Buddhism's history. Whether it be early Buddhism's Four Noble Truths and the chain of dependent co-origination, or the Mādhyamika dialectic, the principal issue is salvation, and salvation is viewed in terms of a radical departure from fundamental errors of ordinary consciousness. Ignorance, egoistic attachments, substantialism, differentiation, human folly, and other Buddhist notions of nonenlightenment typically characterize problematic human existence in terms of activities of consciousness. Salvation thus conceived as a departure from fundamental activities of ordinary consciousness contributes to the persistence and pervasiveness of the problem of the legitimacy of activities of ordinary consciousness after Buddhist enlightenment is attained. Indeed, the possibility of understanding and describing enlightenment at all becomes a major philosophical problem as the speciousness of concepts and language makes the interpretation and linguistic expression of enlightenment not only a provisional, but perhaps even a self-defeating enterprise.

The popular understanding of the antithetical relation between enlightenment and conceptual thought fosters an understanding of enlightenment that is
limited to realizations of oneness, unity, non-differentiation, ineffability and a fundamental unidimensionality of experience. In view of the Buddhist doctrine of the inherent enlightenment of all things, there is a privileging of this unitarian conception of enlightenment that renders problematic most thinking activities and the multiplicity of particulars that populate the world of ordinary experience. Unresolved, this problematic relationship results in a dualism between undifferentiated enlightenment and the rest of human experience. Thus construed, enlightenment is not only a sublime experience, it is an experience with a relation to daily life and fundamental human problems that is also sublime. Enlightenment thus becomes construed as a type of experience that is separate from and yet must somehow explain ordinary experience.

When this dualism is regarded as a fundamental problem, prominent philosophical issues can be found in Buddhism which parallel the western philosophical concerns for reconciling the one and the many, the universal and the particular, the absolute and the relative, and the ineffable and the conceptualizable. In this manner, a hermeneutic categorization for interpreting such works as the Shōbōgenzō develops which
bears a striking resemblance to the hermeneutic basis for interpreting works from traditional western philosophy. Interpreted in this manner, the Shōbōgenzō can even be fruitfully explored for answers to these philosophical problems.

Yet, if the original conception of the antithetical relation between enlightenment and concepts that is an assumption of this hermeneutic categorization is examined in the light of the Shōbōgenzō, it becomes clear that this manner of interpreting Dogen is unjustifiable. Rather than extolling the virtues of a unitarian enlightenment, the Shōbōgenzō presents a kaleidoscope of views of experience through enlightened eyes. The presentation of these views is the product of a thoroughgoing reconstruction of conceptual language.

Implications for religious practice also result from this split between undifferentiated enlightenment and the rest of human experience. To the stereotypical koan belongs a view of practice that is judgmental with respect to ego-driven activities and products in a way that is unqualified and unvarnished with the reservation that is caused by contradiction of being unabashedly judgmental about not being judgmental.

It regards as ego-driven and hence unbefitting a meditative mind such activities as: conceptualization,
reason, logic, symbolic language, authority, explication, principles, substance, emotional attachments, judgments, acts based on intentions and judgment of all kinds, goal-oriented action, abstraction of universals from particulars, and contradistinctive relations. The definiteness with which Zen appears to reject these functions makes a forceful point about where the responsibility for nonenlightenment is thought to lie.

The breadth of Zen's rejection of such typically human functions creates the appearance of arbitrariness, excessiveness, destructiveness, and idiosyncrasy, yet the point Zen appears to be making cannot be dismissed easily. Zen's sweeping rejection is neither idiosyncratic nor coincidental. The constitutive elements of nonenlightenment cohere and support each other as interdependent components of a world view and mode of being in the world. These various functions are equally and collectively constitutive of the standpoint of nonenlightenment. Rather than ascribing responsibility for nonenlightenment to the ego or ignorance as Buddhism is frequently interpreted as doing, stereotypical Zen regards ego and ignorance as both product and cause of the other functions in nonenlightenment. The ego is as much a product of abstraction as its agent; abstraction of principles is
as much the cause of reason and logic as reason and logic promotes abstraction of universal principles. Logic is the product and the cause of dualistic thinking. Logic is an outcome of substance ascription, it is the logic of concepts that are regarded as having individual identities of their own. Thus, a host of the functions of the nonenlightenment set share responsibility for the constitution of nonenlightenment.

Rather than a thorough rejection of the functions of the standpoint of nonenlightenment, we find in Dogen their affirmation and utilization. The Shōbōgenzō contains judgments, concepts, scriptural references, explanations, logical argument, emotional attachment acknowledgment, goal oriented means, abstract universals, and contradistinctive relations. In fact, even those intellectual functions rejected by the practice of Dogen's method of shikan taza can be found in the Shōbōgenzō as either product or presupposition. This condition would invite charges of self-contradiction and incoherence were it not as blatant and as interrelated with his expressive project as it is. There are several ways of resolving the contradiction: 1) deny the other side of the duality, saying that there is no such thing as an enlightenment stand-
point; 2) affirm the nonenlightenment side of the duality, saying that all is nonenlightenment; 3) affirm both standpoints but deny their duality; 4) accepting the charge of contradiction but appealing to an immunity from an offense against logic, a law localized in the domain of nonenlightenment; 5) an appeal to the language of paradox; and 6) operate with a logos of praxeologically clarified experience, and hence, a temporalized theoretical model to replace the logical theoretical model.

Though each of these six options agree in the attempt to describe the nondualism and nonlogicality of enlightenment, the first five contain an inherent descriptive defect. In their explanations of the denial of dualism and logicality, the first five options undercut the logical and conceptual model upon which they depend while offering no conceptual model to take its place. Each of the first five options attempts to describe nonduality by negating duality. Not only does the meaningfulness of this kind of explanation of nonduality depend upon the prior dualistic conception of what is being negated, the very explanation in terms of negation necessarily entails the affirmation/negation, law of the excluded middle, and other operations of the logical system that is being denied. The self-
contradictions and circularity that arises cannot be dismissed as long as discussion remains within the domain of logic and dualistic conceptualization as the first five options are. Though the meaningfulness and descriptive ability of the conceptual model employed by the first five options is precluded by their own conclusions, they offer no replacement conceptual model to serve as a vehicle for the description of enlightenment.

Option six, description based upon a logos of praxeologically clarified experience, and hence, a temporalized theoretical model, offers a replacement for the conceptual model that can accommodate the description of enlightenment. It will enable Dōgen to affirm the limited truth of each of the first five resolutions within the model of the sixth. Option six offers a conceptual mechanism that can deal with the complexities, richness, and transformations of the impermanence characteristic of all experience in a way that the logical operations of affirmation/negation are unable to. Thus the identification of the components of the distinctions, as well as their distinguishing transformational structure needs to be grounded in the discoveries in praxis, not on logical contraries.

The weakness of the bifurcating standpoints into enlightenment and nonenlightenment is that their dif-
differentiation, and hence principle of transformation, is based upon logical opposition. Logical opposition has its locus in nonenlightenment. When it is applied between sets, it results in a negative instrumental conception of the koan as the sabotage of one modality of consciousness to achieve the other. When conceptual opposition is the basis for differentiation, there is a tendency to think of the opposite of nonenlightenment to be a single entity called enlightenment. This can obstruct an understanding of the dimensionality of enlightenment.

Following the dualistic predilection of conceptual thought, the bifurcation of categories leads to the limitation of conceptualization to a disjunctive or conjunctive mode. Hence, we speak of either A or not-A, both A and not-A. More sophistication in terms of both either a or not-A and either A or not-A, and neither both A and not-A and either A and not-A still is mired in the same trap of the assumption of conceptual opposition because the same model of bifurcation based on conceptual opposition is employed. The analytical and expressive style of Seng Chao, Madhyamika dialectic, the "absolute affirmation of negation" of Nishida, all fall within this type of superficial sophistication since they never depart from the dualistic model of
enlightenment in terms of on and off. Dialectical explanations formulated conceptually are similarly dualistic and succumb to the same limitations of the dualistic model it presupposes. The reason it presupposes and cannot escape from dualism is that dialectics derives its meaningfulness from opposition. To the extent that dialectics is intelligible, thesis and antithesis must be dualistically conceived in opposition to one another. When this pair of opposites is conceived, this pair is dualistically conceived in opposition to a synthesis. Dialectics employs only one type of conceptualization: conceptualization by contradistinction. Each of its three theses are conceptualized exclusively in terms of their being distinguished from one another by logical contrast or opposition. Even the impetus of dialectics as a process of change is derived from and conceptualized in terms of logical opposition.

The synthetic third term is nothing more than a denial of the disjunctive relation of the duality, but much as it might abjure a simple conjunctive relation, it still must resort to such terms as "synthesis," "absolute," and the language of paradox. Transcending the dualism of affirmation vs. negation does not occur in the positing of an "affirmation of absolute nega-
tion" or similar rephrasing of the dualistic problem. Paradoxical language in explication demonstrates the inadequacy of the dualistic model more than it serves an understanding of the solution. Hence, the explanatory efficacy of the paradoxical explanation is severely limited by the dualistic model it fails to escape.

It may be argued that the problem of integrating conceptualization and enlightenment is avoidable, since the practice of enlightenment is an unconscious activity. There are good reasons for raising this objection. In the first place, enlightenment is not an objectifiable theory or method which is first apprehended and subsequently put into practice. Second, by most accounts of enlightenment, including the testimony of Dōgen, the enlightened person is not conscious that he or she is enlightened. Third, the dichotomy that creates the problem is only a result of the nonenlightened mind and ceases to exist when enlightenment is attained. These objections, however, are based upon an understanding of enlightenment that is limited to the experience of enlightenment. While it is true that theory and method have nothing to do with the experience of enlightenment, it is also true that the experience of enlightenment is traditionally
followed by a long period of praxis that involves the working out of the experience of enlightenment. The great enlightenment experiences of Hui-neng, Dōgen, Hakuin, and even the Buddha were succeeded by such a period. Such a period would have been unnecessary if enlightenment automatically resulted in its practice. The nature of this period of praxis is of great significance, for it contains the key to the difference between the nonenlightened person's unconsciousness of enlightenment and the enlightened person's unconsciousness of enlightenment. According to the tradition of Buddhism which Dōgen accepts, everything is endowed with a Buddha nature regardless of whether it is recognized or not. If there were no difference between the unconsciousness of enlightenment of the nonenlightened person and the enlightened person, then there would be no soteriological difference as well. If there is no soteriological difference, then the original problems of human existence that enlightenment was supposed to have solved would be unresolved. If it is true that everyone has unrecognized samadhi experiences, then it is true that these experiences are ignored, just as the recognized enlightenment experience can be ignored. However, if the enlightenment experience were experienced and ignored by both enlightened and non-
enlightened persons, enlightenment would be no different from nonenlightenment. The soteriological efficacy of enlightenment rests upon there being a difference between enlightenment and nonenlightenment, however unselfconscious they both are. This difference cannot consist in ignoring or forgetting the enlightenment experience.

The only way this problem can be solved is by examining the post enlightenment period, that is the process by which the experience of enlightenment is expressed and actualized in daily life activities. Dōgen rejects the traditional degenerative interpretation of Buddhist history and instead views history as developments in authentication and actualization. Instead of interpreting the three periods of Buddhist history, Shōbō (the period of enlightenment), Zōbō (the period of imitation), and Mappō (the final period) as a regression or degeneration, Dōgen interprets them as a progressive generation that follows the experience of enlightenment. Viewed in this manner, these three periods overshadow the initial experience of enlightenment. This is the reason Dōgen does not dwell upon his personal experience of enlightenment in the
The generative activities displayed in the *Shōbōgenzō* revealed his enlightenment through what might be called a "presentation of enlightenment" much more effectively than could an account of the historical conditions surrounding his enlightenment experience. When Dōgen uses the term, *kūfū sangaku*, 'working out in personal investigation,' he is referring to a development of insight into a matter as a form of praxis. He directs the student to become conversant with a theme and thereby appropriate it as one's own. More than an appropriation of a thing or idea, however, it is more a making of a thing a part of oneself, and moreover attaining a "thing" as an experience of unity of such conceptually differentiated ideas as self and thing. Through making the enlightenment experience a part of one's daily life, one personalizes enlightenment. This is how the practice of enlightenment can be understood. Another frequently used term, *shōden no buppō*, "the Buddha Dharma of authentic transmission," can be interpreted in terms of the transmission through the stages of the evolution of experience within enlightenment as well as in terms of transmission.

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2 There is a growing trend of Dōgen scholarship, represented by Shudo Ishii and others, which denies that Dōgen had an enlightenment experience.
between historical periods.

If not by symbolic representation, and other than by the evocation of poetry or enigmatic expressions, how can concepts function in the expression of enlightenment? How can the enlightened person understand enlightenment and how can enlightenment be made a part of one's understanding of the experienced world? The activity of expression and conceptual integration of the experience of enlightenment is a necessary and integral part of the career of the enlightened person. Expressive and actualization of the experience of enlightenment, is what distinguishes an enlightened person from a nonenlightened person. Nonthinking experiences are common to nonenlightened and enlightened persons alike, but nonenlightened persons do not appropriate the experience and follow the experience through to its becoming a fundamental part of all experience. Dōgen appears to take up the challenge of integrating conceptual and nonconceptual activities with a special vehemence. In his writings, he methodically presents a verbal expression of enlightenment which can serve as a philosophical bridge between enlightenment on one side and language, reason, logic, and epistemological dualism on the other. The Shōbōgenzō's success in dealing with the apparently
logical impossibility of conceptualizing nonconceptual experience is due to its reconstruction of concepts as an internal development of the enlightenment experience's "total exertion" in a process Dōgen calls dōtoku (expressive attainment) that results in a mode of expression and communication called the koan.

Section Two:

Conceptions of the Koan and Enlightenment

The problem of the relation between enlightenment and the activities of ordinary consciousness is seen in dramatic relief in the popular conception of the Zen koan. This stereotype presents ordinary consciousness as a mode of consciousness that can be broken by an internal collapse of its activities caused by their forced conflict with the samadhic activities of another mode of consciousness that is induced by meditation. The koan is the instrument that forces this conflict in meditation. In this way, the value-laden dichotomization of consciousness is made into a praxeological device. Emerging with definition in this view is the conception of enlightenment as an extraordinary mode of consciousness to which belong extraordinary activities,
a mode that contrasts with the ordinary mode of consciousness to which belong ordinary activities. If conscious activities are thus segregated into separate modes of consciousness and if the enlightened mode of consciousness replaces the nonenlightened mode, then the activities of ordinary consciousness become replaced by extraordinary activities. This leads not only to a denigration of conceptualization, reason, and language, but to the mystification of enlightenment as well. The Zen master thus presents through the koan utterances that are meaningless, behavior that is chaotic, and a personality that is inscrutable. If this is the outcome of enlightenment, enlightenment frustrates rather than satisfies the existential needs for meaningfulness, coherence, efficacy in word and deed, wise judgment, and personal identity that can be expected from religious salvation.

Though this stereotype of the koan presents a caricature of Zen, its outcomes can be regarded as a logical if extreme conclusion to the latent tendency in Buddhism to conceptualize enlightenment in transcendent terms. Using the latent notions made explicit in the stereotype, we may examine weaknesses implicit in the transcendent conception of enlightenment. Using Dōgen's critique of the koan stereotype and his use of
the koan, we will examine Dogen's answer to the question: Is a non-transcendent enlightenment possible?

Dōgen's affirmative answer to this question is explainable in terms of experientially determinable relations that are described as the Buddha Dharma. The legitimation of activities of ordinary consciousness requires a reappropriation of conceptualization, logic, language, and personal identity within praxeologically clarified experience. What this means is explainable in terms of the appropriation of language that is epitomized in the authentic koan. Dōtoku, the appropriation of expressive activities, an important conception in Dōgen's thought, is achieved through a visceral experience of the Dharma as an expressive act. The metaphor of the authentic eye that penetrates the ordinary world through the Dharma refers to the experiential grasp and release of enlightenment and the activities of ordinary consciousness. The specific notion of identity that makes possible the conceptualization of the relation between enlightenment and the activities of ordinary consciousness will require separate treatment when Dōgen's notion of the "way" of impermanence is explained in terms of dimensions of enlightenment. We begin this examination by examining the stereotypical notion of the koan in greater detail.
Supported by a tradition that espouses "no dependence upon words and letters" and "a special teaching outside the scriptures," a common understanding of the koan as a conceptual self-destruct mechanism developed. Circumventing a reliance upon written scriptures, koan are said to make a mockery of words, reason, and authority. Words are not only derogated, as koan, words are used to sabotage their own function. According to this understanding of the koan, enlightenment can be induced by resorting to insoluble riddles that frustrate and eventually subvert conceptual and linguistic activities of the mind. When employed in meditative practice with its insistently intuitive demands, koan force the opposition between intuitive and ratiocinative faculties to a climactic breakthrough to enlightenment that is liberated from conceptualization. The enlightenment that is thus attained is ineffable, mystical, and extraordinary, revealing a substratum of the mind that is devoid of ordinary mental functions. This, at any rate, is a common stereotype of the koan present in Dōgen's day as it is in our own.
In Dōgen's view, the basic insight of separation of standpoints was correct even in the distorted view of koan practice. The derogation of words and language was the result of a failure to recognize that linguistic expression has more than one mode of discourse and that the koan's mode of discourse is not symbolic representation, but presentation, stimulating the student to an alternative standpoint through a personal model.

The representational mode of discourse works well within its own proper sphere, but not as a koan. Linguistic expression, however, also has another mode of discourse that is appropriate for all standpoint types because standpoint types are precisely what this mode of discourse evokes.

Even a stereotypical koan makes an important point. It presupposes and affirms a multiplicity of modalities of consciousness. The mistake committed by the stereotypical koan is that it ascribes only two

3 "Standpoint" is similar to "perspective," but will be used to connote the following: total bodily involvement beyond the visual connotation of perspective; active action of standing, taking a stance as opposed to seeing as a passive action; as standpoint, the site or domain in which action takes place; and the sense of field and focus that link the concept to the koan.
modalities to consciousness: nonenlightenment and enlightenment.

The koan in practice. The proper context in which to consider the nature of the koan is the sanzen exchange. In this exchange or interview, the Zen master and student engage in a dialogue the theme of which is designated by the assigned koan. In this exchange, neither the form of the disciple's reply nor his or her understanding of the meaning of the words is the criterion of evaluation; what matters is that the student match the master's standpoint accurately and be able to converse by means of the constitutive elements of that standpoint. Although the master may appear to point to the koan as that which the student must address, it is rather the standpoint of the pointing master that the student must match. Though the student initially may not understand what it means to match the standpoint of the master, when the student successfully accomplishes it, he or she simultaneously understands that there indeed had been a previously overlooked standpoint to be attained. A previously overlooked dimension of experience is thus attained and disclosed, and the student then receives another koan.

When initially assigned by the master, the koan is in effect a standpoint marker, a designated target for

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the monk to appropriate and master. When the koan is mastered, the koan during the ensuing sanzen interview is more than a marker: it becomes an original and true expression. Not just any expression, Dogen uses the term dōtoku to refer to this kind of original and genuine expression. Whether as standpoint marker or as dōtoku, the meaning of the koan is inseparable from its standpoint and its required presentation.

More than a type of expression or word, the koan is a mode of discourse that is employed in a successful sanzen interview. In other words, the communication that is inherent in the successful sanzen interview is of a form that has its unique expressive elements, meaning structures, rules of correctness that merits the term mode of discourse. Concomitant to the shift in mode of experience is the shift in mode of discourse that is also designated by the koan.

The most common mistake the student commits in the sanzen interview is explanation. Any answer that explains the student’s understanding is inadmissible, no matter how perceptive that understanding may be. Whether as adjectives that describe an experience, an account of how a realization was made, or a description of the content of a realization, answers are summarily rejected. They are explanations, and as such operate
within a different mode of discourse than that demanded by the nature of the koan and the sanzen interview. Presumably, explanations are rejected because the mode of discourse within which they operate reflects a mode of experience interpretation that is incommensurate with the designated koan. The explanation depends upon universal concepts derived independently from the mode of experience they are explaining. For an answer to be acceptable, it must be obtained from within the specific mode of experience required and it must be expressed with language derived from that mode as well. Sometimes, the language is body language. Sometimes, it is smell. In all cases, however, the language of the expression of enlightenment originates from within the level of enlightenment designated by the assigned koan.

Kosokūan and genjōkōan. Kōan are also classified as kosokukōan (Ch. ku-tse kung-an) and genjōkōan (Ch. hsien-ch'eng kung-an). Kosokukōan are recorded and formalized kōan that detail genjōkōan, or the specific presentation of realization. Genjōkōan had been used by masters as an instructional device as early as the time of Hang-po Psi-bun and Ch'en-.tsun-su.

Such presentations eventually became formalized into recorded cases and these became themes upon which
meditation was directed. Even when thus presented in praxis in an initially instrumental manner, when the koan is penetrated in praxis, the kosokukōan then provides the language of discourse for the ensuing exchange with the master. At this point, the kosokukōan becomes the genjōkōan that it originally was, and the discourse with the master on this level becomes its confirmation. It then becomes clear that the koan is not a puzzle, but is rather a "expressive attainment" (dōtoku). "Genjō" of the word "genjōkōan" means "to manifest" and "to realize" and refers less to a kind of koan than to the inherent nature of the koan as that which is realized in life activities. Proponents of the use of kosokukōan as meditative themes generally do not deny the validity of genjōkōan. Nevertheless, because the term koan is popularly construed as the kosokukōan, the term genjōkōan is used to distinguish this experience of personal realization from the popular conception.

What the koan is not. The popular definition of a koan as a conundrum intended to cudgel the rational mind into submission is not relevant to Dogen's idea of the koan. The frequently paradoxical form of the koan

4 Furuta Shokin, Kōan no Rekishiteki Hatten Keitai ni okeru Shinrisei no Mōndai.
is not a result of the attempt to use paradox as an instrument either of ensnarement or expression. Rather, paradox is an outcome of the inadequacy of logic of normal discourse.

Though not a puzzle, the koan is frequently puzzle-like in appearance. Consider the following examples:

A monk asked (Master) Tung-shan (J. Tōsan), "What is buddha?" Tung-shan replied, "Three chin of hemp."5

Master Shah-shuang (J. Sekiso Keisho, 797-888) said, "How do you step from the top of the hundred-foot pole?"6

One day a monk asked Master Chao-chou (J. Jōshu Jushin, 778-895), "Does a dog have Buddha-nature or not?" Chao-chou replied, "Mu."7

Meaningless though these expressions may seem, koan not only have meaning, but their meaning can be differentiated and categorized in a sequential hierarchy. Among the well-known collections, there are more than 1700 kōan contained in the Transmission of the Lamp (Ching-te ch’uan-teng flu), one hundred in the Blue Cliff Record (Pi-yen lu), and forty-seven in the Gateless Barrier (Wu-men kuan). The sheer volume of

5 Pi-yen lu, case no. 12.
6 Wu-men-kuan, case no. 46.
7 Wu-men-kuan, case no. 1.
these koan suggests a variety to their meanings. There are furthermore fundamental differences among the many koan that permit their classification and systematization. Hakuin (1686-1769) organized a sequence of koan in his instruction and his successors, Torei Enji (1721-1792), Inzan Ien (1751-1814), and Kakuji Kosen (1760-1833) further developed the system. Rinzai Zen temples commonly base their program of instruction on this tradition of koan organization.

The reevaluated koan. Hua-yen traces the historical origin of the koan to the Buddha's first sermon. The Buddha is said to have delivered it immediately after his enlightenment while he was in a samadhic state called "Ocean Image Samadhi" (Skt. sagara-mudra-samadhi, J. kai-in zammai). Ocean Image Samadhi is a samadhi in which the world is reflected in the clarity of a stilled sea. Significant here is the attitudinal perspective implicit in the name of this type of samadhi. In order for the world to be reflected in the ocean, the viewer must have an extraordinarily elevated, perhaps celestial perspective on the ocean. From this vantage point, individual things relinquish the clarity of particularity to the

continuity of the whole, and in this respect, Ocean Image Samadhi can be said to emphasize the whole as it comes to the fore in the focus of attention. This interpretation makes sense in the context of standard usage of the metaphor of the ocean and its waves. In this popular Buddhist and especially Hua-yen metaphor, the waves are the intelligible appearance of a whole that is represented by the ocean, the nature of which permeates all individual existences. To a wave belongs an individuality that contrasts with the amorphous immensity of the ocean. The ocean in this way is associated with the nature of the whole in contrast to the appearances of individual existences.

This sermon, however, was not comprehended by his human audience, so the Buddha retreated into meditation for eight days. The Buddha's puzzling first sermon from within Ocean Image Samadhi was recorded for a later audience to appreciate as the Avatamsaka Sutra (Hua-yen ch'ing), the principal canon of Hua-yen. At the end of this period, he went to a nearby village to deliver another sermon, the celebrated Deer Park Sermon.

Although the Buddha's success with the second sermon may be attributed to an adjustment in wording, subject matter, or the level of difficulty, the Hua-yen
school at least regarded the two sermons as radically different in kind. Only such a radical difference could explain the failure of many other Buddhist schools to have mentioned the Hua-yen doctrines.

This difference is further highlighted by the eight days of meditation that separated the two sermons. They might well reflect a radical shift in mode of discourse.

In a third sermon, the Buddha addressed a gathering at Vulture Peak by simply holding up and twirling a flower. Everyone in the audience was puzzled by this sermon except Mahakasyapa, who smiled. Seeing Mahakasyapa's smile, the Buddha made the following proclamation: "To Mahakasyapa I bequeath the treasury of the true Dharma eye Shōbōgenzō)."

The Buddha's nonverbal sermon cannot be reduced to a code or symbol representing some hidden meaning, for that would trivialize the interchange by making it into a game of hide and seek and private languages. Rather than as representation, the significance of the twirled flower needs to be sought elsewhere. The expression "I bequeath the treasury of the true Dharma eye" is a confirmation that the comprehensive and highest wisdom of the Buddha had already been transmitted to Mahakasyapa, and indeed Mahakasyapa's smile was also a confirmation
that this had taken place. This would seem to imply that the transmission of the Buddha's wisdom is a miraculous and mystical event that defies understanding. However, there is an alternative explanation found in the Zen koan tradition. According to this tradition, this dialog between the Buddha and Mahakasyapa was perhaps the first koan dialog. It is significant for our investigation that Dogen derived the title of his *magnum opus* from the first historical account of the koan mode of discourse.

In each koan discourse, the success of the interchange that takes place depends upon the presentation of a specific standpoint. Only when the standpoint is attained and personalized by the respondent does a dialog become possible—and a successful dialog becomes the verification of the mutuality and complementarity of a specific standpoint. The achievement of this dialog becomes clearly evident to both parties and can be further verified by simply continuing the dialog.

The Mahakasyapa story may be considered as an example of presentation as a mode of discourse. One implication of the story is that there is a kind of understanding enjoyed by the Buddha and Mahakasyapa that is different from the ordinary. However, what is also significant is that this understanding is not
dependent upon language or theory, for neither was employed by Mahakasyapa. Although it is possible to speak of the twirled flower as the Buddha's koan and the smile as Mahakasyapa's solution to the koan, this interpretation of the koan trivializes the significance of the exchange. This trivialized understanding results from an understanding of the flower as a symbolic referent in a substantialistic manner that overlooks the koan as an evocative interchange that entails an alternative mode of discourse. What is significant about Mahakasyapa's achievement is not simply that he was cleverer than the others in discerning the Buddha's message, or even that there is such a thing as success in understanding the solution of a problem, but rather, through his success in attaining a dialog with the Buddha, Mahakasyapa thereby personalizes the specific standpoint indicated by the Buddha. In the story, this presentation is significant because it indicates a "new" standpoint, one that is different from that of the other listeners. Rather than the meaning of the flower, symbolic or otherwise, it is the presentation of the "new" standpoint and the means by which the attainment of the standpoint is immediately verified that is significant. The koan is thus the twirling of the flower as a specific standpoint returned by
Mahakasyapa's flower-smile. In this way Mahakasyapa appropriated the flower and used it in his part of the dialog which personalized his matching standpoint. As the appropriated and utilized language of standpoint presentation, the koan is the avenue of intercourse, and only in a trivial sense a roadblock.

A koan is to the mind's eye a mirror for all to see. It mirrors the private spiritual attainment of the person for all to see. Every uttered statement has a presentational meaning, presenting the mode of thinking of the person who uttered it. There are several senses of personhood that operate here. One is the historical person who has a unique history of deeds, experiences, and relations. Another sense is the dharmakaya self, the self that is realized with the world of conditions as its locus. Another sense is the psychological self with its propensities and mental life. Another sense is the self of Tathata, the self of suchness, the self that is consummated. Another sense of self is the self with the stream of ordinary activities as its locus of identity.

As a presentation, the koan is particularized by the world of conditions at the time of its utterance. Just as it mirrors the private in the public domain, it mirrors the public domain in the private. The koan
also has activating efficacy. Daily activities, Dōgen says, will genjōkōan when the proper place is attained.

**Etymology.** The word "koan" is composed of two characters. Gung generally means "impartiality" which is based upon an order of the whole. The general sense of gung is thus a whole. Considered in a social context, the background or field of an individual person is the public arena. An refers to a court case, which as a set of circumstances, is based upon an order of particularity.

The correlative relation between gung and the individual unit is accentuated by the juxtaposition of gung with an. The an of koan originally denoted a tray on four legs at which an individual would partake of a meal. While the meal might be a social event shared by all, the locus of the individual's act of eating is the tray which served as the person's dining table. In this context, the act of partaking of a meal might be seen simultaneously as a social event, kō, or as the specific localized act of an individual, an. The same event, when seen from these two perspectives are describable in these different terms. Hence, the term koan refers to this notion of an intrinsically perspectively conditioned event that is dependent upon notions of identity unit and its contextual ground.
The act of partaking a meal served formally on a tray is not the same as the act of eating food. The act of partaking a meal is a necessarily social event that follows its own context of timing, etiquette, and social significances. There is a relation of mutual dependence between the identity unit and its ground, just as there can be no meal without the individual act of eating and there can be no individual act of eating a meal qua meal without the social context of the event. Viewed in this manner, a meal conveys the sense of a perspectival conditioned event that is dependent upon notions of identity unit and its contextual ground.

Dōgen and the kōan. Dōgen's recognition of the validity and importance of the kōan is evidenced in several ways. "Genjōkōan" is the name and theme of what is commonly taken to be the most important fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō. Nishiari Bokusan, a major commentator of Dōgen's works in the Meiji era says, "Shōbōgenzō is genjōkōan."9 Dōgen's treatment of genjōkōan reveals no intended distinction with the koan. He appears to use the term as a description of the koan rather than as a kind of koan. To give some examples

of his use of the term: in "Zazengi" and "Sansuikyo," he says, "the koan that manifests (genjō suru)," in "Shoakumakusa" he says, the koan that is the manifestation," in "Zazengi" he says, "the koan manifestation." Dōgen's praise of the koan is explicit: "Grasping the koan, one realizes Great Enlightenment!" in "Daigo." Nowhere in the Shobogenzo are the terms koan, genjōkōan, or watō (a synonym for kōan) used with less than appreciation.

In the Shōbōgenzō Dōgen's frequent use of a kosokukōan to open a fascicle is reminiscent of how teisho, (the Zen master's address to the samgha) is frequently structured. The koan is frequently the vehicle for Dōgen's own expression of his insight, often at the expense of traditional interpretation and fidelity to grammar. Any scriptural citation, in fact, is treated in the manner of a koan, disassembling its grammar as it is reconstructed it into the language of presentation.

The term "kūfu" or "kūfu sangaku" occurs 126 times in the Shōbōgenzō and literally means "to work out in praxis," a verb whose object is almost always a conceptualized point. For example, in "Bussho" (DZZ 20), Dōgen says, "You should very thoroughly investigate this logic (of mu-bussho) and work it out in praxis."
Even if it takes twenty or thirty years, you should work this out and investigate it in praxis." This type of exhortation to work out in praxis the truth of a particular theme is the thrust of koan praxis in which the koan is treated as the theme. The significance of this type of instruction is highlighted by the glaring disparity between it and current conceptions of shikan taza as themeless zazen, for if we are to take Dōgen's statement literally, he is saying that we should actively work out points of instruction while engaged in zazen. The conception of zazen implicit in these admonitions suggests that Dōgen regards koan praxis as the locus of zazen.

A close examination of Dōgen's notion of shikan taza and its relation to the koan is necessary. Shikan taza is commonly conceived as zazen which involves "just sitting" without any assigned theme for meditation. Accordingly, the kosokukōan, characterized by Dōgen as an ill-advised contrivance, has no application in shikan taza as genuine zazen. With daily activities as its locus, the kōan as genjōkōan has significance as the manifestation (genjō) of the paradox of the cosmic-particular (koan). Accordingly, the genuine koan is genjōkōan. It is tempting to infer that the koan is thus distinct from the praxis of zazen, but this is a misconception of Dōgen's notion of praxis.
One of the most significant points Dōgen is making is the identity of zazen praxis and daily life praxis, an identity the above view seems to deny. For this reason, I believe the appreciation of the koan's role in Dōgen's thought is essential to a proper contextualization of the moment of zazen. That is to say, zazen, and shikan taza as "stark" zazen, is not a unidimensional samadhi experience alone. The samadhi experience provides the soteriological basis for meaning-presentation of the kind Dōgen calls dōtoku and gyōji. This working out of meanings is the contextualization of the primordial samadhi experience in its historical and authenticated position within the flux of impermanence as uncovered in praxis. The locus for this work is zazen as well as daily life. This is what koan praxis entails. I believe that Dōgen regarded zazen, even koan-introspection zazen, as shikan taza in the sense of "total penetration of zazen."

The need for a different conceptual model of enlightenment. The inadmissibility of explanation in the sanzen interview is a practical indication of the necessity of a new mode of the expression of realization. Even when a student has attained the necessary
realization indicated by the koan, and even when the answer is accurate, the mode of discourse most often makes the answer unacceptable. Most answers are inadmissible because they are explanations of one's understanding. As explanations, they appeal to previously understood concepts for their elucidation of a recent realization. The student is forced to search for answers that not only arise within the specific mode of thinking required by the koan, but are expressed in the mode of discourse appropriate to that mode of thinking.

The stereotypical koan commits the error of construing enlightenment in terms of a nonenlightenment versus enlightenment model that derives its principle of differentiation from logical contradistinction. This conceptual model encouraged a treatment of enlightenment as a monistic state of unity which is beyond concepts, words, multiplicity, and particularity. Though supporting a conception of enlightenment which is also beyond the efficacy of logic to explain, the stereotype of the koan nevertheless based its conceptualization upon a logic of contradistinction and based its praxis upon a logical negation of non-enlightenment thinly disguised as a pedagogical catalyst under the pressure of a disciplinarian master.
Though this view of the koan was correct in regarding nonenlightenment as a modality of consciousness, because of its failure to recognize any serviceable alternate mode of discourse, it was forced to use the symbolic and logical mode of discourse characteristic of nonenlightenment for its description of enlightenment. As a result, stereotypical Zen succumbed to the same trap of monistic unity enlightenment conception that Hua-yen and Dōgen were attempting to avoid.

Whereas the project taken up by Hua-yen and Dōgen regarding a new emphasis in the interpretation of enlightenment was previously described in terms of a universal-particular model, we are now in a position to reconsider Dōgen's project in terms of a model less entrenched in a principle explanation reading of the problem. The new model is the mode of discourse of the koan, standpoint presentation. Like the four dharma-dhatu of Hua-yen, standpoint presentation is better equipped to explicate an enlightenment that is multidimensional and not a monistic unity.
Section Three:
The Shōbōgenzō Kōan

Dogen presents a different view of the relation between enlightenment and language. For Dōgen, the realization of enlightenment in the sense of "consummation" and "attainment," is an inherently expressive act, and expression does not preclude linguistic expression. Even when silent, one cannot help but engage in expressive acts which reveal significances and patterns in such a way that the word "language" becomes appropriate in describing even nonverbal deeds, carriage stances, and attitudes. Though each act is a unique expressive act, its expression and change manifest an orderliness that is discoverable in praxis. Dogen refers to this orderliness that is discoverable in praxis by the term, dōri, or logos. The logos of expression and change is not ruled by the logic of identity, noncontradiction, or excluded middle, except as required by the language that is used in its description.

The mode of discourse problem. The assumption that language is only conceptual leads to a reading of the text which assumes that a religious and philosophi-
cal work such as the Shobōgenzō can be read as an explication of principles. Whether called doctrines, truths, laws, teachings, or descriptions of absolute being, principles are claims to universal truths that are fundamental to other more particular truths. Principles are frequently claims to truths that are absolute, unchanging, and necessary. Such claims are generally cast in the form of abstractions that are in need of explication to excavate their meaning, credibility, value, implications, and application. Explication generally accompanies a presentation of principles, attempting to make intelligible some abstruse point. A principle as such has explanatory efficacy. That is, as well as being explainable, a principle can provide causal explanation, meaning, and value to particular items of experience. Explication can take the form of a logical argument which explains why one must intellectually conclude that a principle is true. Whatever the form of explication, reading religious and philosophical works for explication of principles is so universal that such exegesis is characteristic of all tradition.

It is common for religious and philosophical works to make claims to a universality that goes beyond contingency upon individual, historical, and cultural cir-
cumstances. As a member of this genre, the Shobōgenzō can easily be interpreted to make similar claims about universal principles. The title of Dōgen's work, The Treasury of the True Dharma Eye, as it is most often rendered in English, may suggest that there is a True Dharma (teaching, law, or principle) to be explained. Examples of apparent principles that might serve as parts of such a True Dharma abound: the unity of praxis and enlightenment, the doctrine of non-substantiality, nonduality, Buddha-nature no Buddha-nature, dependent co-origination, and other fundamental doctrines of Buddhism. Clearly, as each of these conceptions are explicitly employed as well as elucidated in Dōgen's writings, reading the Shobōgenzō for the explication of principles has a degree of validity. We may even search profitably for what appear to be Dōgen's logical arguments for the truth of principles. In sum, reading the Shobōgenzō as an explication of principles is reasonable.

However, principle exegesis operates on several assumptions that are inconsistent with the tenor and intent of the Shobōgenzō. From what can be safely generalized about the work, the Shobōgenzō was intended to present a nonsubstantialistic expression of the Buddha Dharma from the standpoint of praxis. If this
is so, there are certain explicatory assumptions at work that necessarily limit the effectiveness of an exegetical reading to quarry the text. First, there is the assumption that there is some truth that can be explicated which is beyond individual, historical, or cultural differences and which is universal, unchanging, and hence absolute. This assumption that there is an absolute truth makes praxis incidental and irrelevant to that truth. It also implies that there is an ascription of substantial essence to that truth, making it an existing entity. This reification is inimical to Dogen's aim of nonsubstantialistic expression.

A reading of the text as an explication of principles also operates on the assumption of a correspondence theory of meaning, with language in service as a description of some logically prior truth. Correspondence assumes that there is an alternate way of verification of correspondence and hence implies a possible displacement of praxis as necessary to the Buddha Dharma.

To read the text as explication is problematic in the following ways. It encourages an assumption of logical coherence where a given principle can be used as a criterion for interpretation. If a principle is
found in one passage, it is assumed to be univocal, and
is likely to be sought in subsequent passages as a
thematic and unifying condition of the text. The
reader is hence more likely to find the previously
entertained principle in subsequent passages whether or
not it actually is there with its original intent.
This danger of reading logical coherence into a passage
is exacerbated by the difficulty of the text. A con­
ceptual reading encourages reductionism. A difficult
passage x may be reduced to a restatement of principle
A because of a resemblance, and as difficult passages y
and z appear, we find that much of what Dogen wrote is
read as reiterations of principle A. This reduces what
Dōgen wrote to redundancy.10

A theoretical exegesis also works on the assump­
tion that this universal and unchanging truth can be
explained with language. With language as its medium,
it adopts the rules of definition, logic, and coherence
that govern theoretical language. It frequently con­
ducts its explication by illustrating a universal by
appeal to particular facts to make its meaning and
application clear, and hence operates on a conceptually
dichotomized scheme of a universal—particular duality.

10 A prime example of this tendency can be found
in the Keiteki of Nishiari Bokusai.
The possibility of an alternate mode of discourse in the Shōbōgenzō. In thinking through the Shōbōgenzō we must begin by asking the question: what was the purported function of the text? Other than devotional paeans, it would be difficult to imagine religious writing that is free of some implicit assumption of universal truth. The philosopher is generally held accountable for the justification and defense of his or her statements, and this justification generally follows logical lines of idea development and coherence. Hence the focus is on the principle and its explication. By contrast, the Zen master is less concerned with the defense or justification of stated principles than with the spiritual development of the monks in his or her charge. Mention of this is made not to make excuses for any deficiencies in its arguments, but rather to justify a search for an alternate mode of interpretation. This search will reject the familiar conceptual emphasis in favor of an evocative presentation that attempts to take into account the several stages of realization identifiable in the course of Zen meditative practice.

Using the notion of levels of realization cannot be taken for granted in a discussion of Dōgen's ideas and calls for justification. The notion of levels of
realization conjures forth a graduated and gradual model of enlightenment that appears antithetical to at least one cardinal tenet of Dōgen's philosophy: the immediate and complete realization of enlightenment in practice (Jap. shusho-ichinyo, shusho-itto, or honsho-myoshu). A graduated approach to enlightenment within practice implies the incompleteness of initial levels of practice, a position that cannot be ascribed to Dōgen.

This is a case in which a conceptual explication of Dōgen would rule out the positing of levels of realization in an interpretation of Dōgen because it logically contradicts the principle of the unity of practice and enlightenment. However, not only is it possible to reconcile the notions by means of the logic of impermanence in praxis, but it is this very facility with the logic of impermanence in praxis that is Dōgen's primary focus.

Although not excluded, conceptual explication is not the only or even the primary intent of the Shōbōgenzō. As often as there are apparent principles to be found, there can be found apparent contradictions to these principles. For example, Dōgen speaks of the unity of non-praxis and enlightenment and even suggests a disparity between praxis and enlightenment. There
are also passages that strongly suggest areas in which dependent co-origination does not operate. He refers at one point to the genjōkōan of the ego, and seems to glorify the particular facts of existence at the expense of the Buddhist doctrine of universal non-substantiality, unity, and nonduality. Interpreting Dōgen in a way that explains away such anomalies to preserve the principle becomes all too often necessary and yet contrived.

If Dōgen's own reading of Buddhist scriptures has any bearing on the way his own works ought to be read, we need to reexamine our reading of the Shōbōgenzō. Since Dōgen's arguments for the truth of principles do not amount to logical proofs, it brings conventional presuppositions concerning standards of evidence into question.

The rejection of rational constraints in interpreting the Shōbōgenzō may appear to entail an abrogation of reason that relegates the Shōbōgenzō to a mode of discourse that is not discourse at all: a set of ungeneralizable and isolated particular utterances that have value to no one but Dōgen. However, such an impression serves to underscore the inadequacy of the universal–particular conceptual dichotomy that is appropriate to the conceptual model of philosophical
analysis. What Dōgen advances is an escape from this duality by 1) working with an experientially-based conceptual model of enlightenment; and the 2) presentation of standpoints to replace pure representationalism and correspondence.

In our reinterpretation of principles, we will discover that each of the "principles" describing the world are not conventional metaphysical assertions, but are components of the structure of experience. Pratītya-samutpāda can be located within the experiential domain as part of the mechanics of experience. The same can be said of sūnyatā and impermanence. These are not principles that are inferred to be true based upon empirical evidence. Rather, they are experienceable data of experience itself.

The Shōbōgenzō's mode of discourse. Dōgen writes as he reads. Grammatical rules, even the Chinese language which was de rigueur are transmuted or replaced entirely. Dōgen wrote the Shōbōgenzō in Japanese, not for the ordinariness of the language, for the language of the Shōbōgenzō was far from pedestrian. Japanese, it might be surmised, was chosen for its direct and nonabstract concreteness. Dōgen crafted his own type of concepts from simple indigenous words such as
tokoro, place, and inochi, life. When Dōgen writes hana, flower, and hai, ash, in the hiragana syllabary, let the reader take heed. A transmutation of conventional language at its simplest points occurs in a way that is neither poetical nor metaphysical, but "presentational." Nouns become verbs, words employ multivocal services, semantic units are sundered and reconstructed when Dōgen writes.11

What did these adaptations to language indicate? To answer this question, we must first examine how Dōgen was writing, and this requires that we return our attention to the presentational function of language.

In contradistinction to the representational function of language as it is employed even in poetry and metaphysical speculation, presentational language signifies in a different manner. The difference in manner of signification may be explained as a difference in direction of signification. Whereas words serve as pointers that represent an idea or object, words also reveal the person who is pointing. Language presents the person, as it also presents the world of sig-

significant categories with which the person experiences, thinks, and communicates.

There are two conventional senses in which presentational use of language is meaningful that must be examined before Dōgen's use and development of presentational language can be described.

To contrast the presentational and representational use of language, the cliche of beauty being in the eye of the beholder presents a conventional understanding of such a difference in function. When an object is said to be beautiful, the act of saying so and the statement by which it says it signifies more about the values and perspective of the person making the statement than it reveals about the object. A suitor tacitly professes a degree of this signification in his flattery of a prospective mate. Through his praises, he displays a refinement of taste, a shrewd perspicacity into what is truly important in a person, and an eloquence in giving form to subtle beauty that he hopes will not be missed by the person being praised. In ascribing beauty to her, he is ascribing beauty to himself.

Presentational significance is not always intentional. A perjurer implicates himself by the act of accusation. In the presentational use of language,
rather than in the object being represented, the meaningfulness of a concept resides in the disclosure of the speaker's standpoint. As a further example, a fifteen minute conversation between two neighbors at a bus stop about the weather may appear shallow, redundant, and unnecessarily protracted from the point of view of an eavesdropper who interprets the exchange representationally. From the point of view of the participating neighbors, however, the affirmation of their neighborliness, a renewal of membership in a civil culture expressed through an etiquette that encompasses the art of subtle disagreement, a statement of the refinement of one's upbringing and deportment, and even complex adjustments of relative social standing are all being accomplished through the type and usage of language employed in those fifteen minutes. Whether described in terms of behavior as performative or in terms of status as presentational, a mode of language use and interpretation that is distinguished from the representational makes the difference between interpreting the exchange either as inane or as a cooperative artistic creation that celebrates three thousand years of civilized refinement through a friendly moment of shared and individual attainments and identities. In the sense in which the concept of weather was
irrelevant to the meaningfulness of the conversation, the notion of presentational use of language preserves the conceptual independence of its reflexive from its represented signification.

The representational function of the word "flower" is not an exclusive condition of meaningfulness. The eye of the beholder is neglected in an interpretation of a locution as a purely representational device, and from the perspective of one who is trying to communicate presentationally, the meaningfulness of the locution might be lost entirely. When the Buddha twirled a flower in hand, the significance of that flower was not representational, but presentational.

All language may be presentational. Any use of a language presents the person who is presenting and defining himself or herself in terms of the community of shared conceptual categorizations and conventions implicit in a language. It is the adoption of the terms of this community that makes language possible.

Ordinarily, the eye of the beholder is a historically and psychologically unique perspective belonging only to a particular individual. Another way of saying this is that the eye of the beholder is the person. The concept or word, insofar as it is meaningful, presents the eye of its beholder. Rather than the
object being represented to the understanding as the locus either of beauty or meaning, beholding person is the locus of meaning as it is of beauty. Approached in this manner, the notion of presentational language ordinarily would imply a relativism of meaning and a host of related problems about the possibility of such a language, but for present purposes, this approach makes the notion of presentational language at least intelligible.

Another conventional approach to an understanding of the language of presentation is found in evocative functions of language. The Shobōgenzō has been interpreted as an explication of enlightenment as the realization of the unity of all things, but this is as problematic as one listening to the Prague Symphony, no. 38 in D, to announce that music is sound. An examination of the inadequacy of this interpretation of Mozart's work can prove instructive as an analogy in determining an appropriate reading of Dogen's work.

Interpretation can err in a number of ways. The failure of the above description of Mozart's work is not merely one of obvious oversimplification. If oversimplification were the only problem, an elaboration of the statement would correct it, but the statement, "music is expressive, beautiful, rhythmic, and
harmonious sound" makes little progress toward an adequate description of Mozart's intended meanings and the expressive significance of the Prague Symphony. No amount of elaboration, embellishment, qualification, or specification can correct the description. The problem is not one of finding the right number or mix of qualifiers to the descriptor, "sound;" something is amiss with the description itself.

Reductionism might describe the problem more accurately. The description contends that each of the symphony's four movements is making a statement about music being a sound, and reduces the intricacies and uniquenesses of each to a redundant expression of a single truism. So, however, would almost any treatment of theme, and yet there is no question that thematic interpretation is justifiable. The problem would not be resolved by finding many themes in the many parts of an artistic work; again, the problem is not one of number or thoroughness.

Though present, oversimplification and reductionism are not the only problems involved in the above interpretation. To do justice to either work, description must be more sophisticated, not only in vocabulary and conceptual schemata, but more importantly in hermeneutic methodology.
A meager descriptive vocabulary would cause a musical artist to despair over even well intended musical criticism. To music belongs a rich vocabulary of descriptive terms with which a music critic can analyze a work. Thus, instead of applying different adjectives to the word, "sound," the critic can talk about scales, tones, overtones, undertones, pitch, key, and so forth. In addition to these are evocative concepts such as rhapsody, fugue, serenade, profundity, melancholy, gaiety, and other concepts from the world of human emotions. The music critic can take advantage of the extensive conceptual vocabulary to do more justice to a piece of music in description, analysis, and evaluation than we can with a work about enlightenment.

The vocabulary with which we can describe, analyze, and evaluate enlightenment is about as limited as the scientific definition of music in terms of qualities of sounds. There are terms like non-differentiation, nonduality, and identity, but not only is there a paucity of such terms, but these terms themselves presuppose the kind of thinking they deny.

Yet, enlightenment for Dōgen is as rich and multitudinous in form as music is to a music lover, and perhaps even more so. There are dimensions and worlds within these worlds.
Someone describing the conception of enlightenment in Dōgen's thought would have to work with a vocabulary of "enlightenment," "practice," "identity," and combinations thereof. There simply are not enough representational conceptual tools with which to describe, analyze, interpret, and evaluate the dimensions of enlightenment.

It is arguable that this paucity of conceptual tools applicable to enlightenment is a necessary consequence of the nature of its subject matter. Enlightenment, being intrinsically nonconceptual, does not permit adequate expression within the conceptual matrix of language. This line of reasoning, however, depends upon two assumptions with which Dōgen would take exception.

Dōgen beheld words as triggers of meaning transformation as much as conveyors of meaning. As an example, he would use a word like "ash" in two senses, "firewood becomes ash." "ash has no temporal context." The same word used in these two phrases sends messages that are contradictory if interpreted representationally. In the first citation, ash apparently represents a product of change; in the second, ash apparently represents something outside of time and change. Interpreted "presentationally," however, Dōgen
in presenting two "dimensions" from which he is beholding ash by using locutions that are clearly seen to work in their respective dimensions.

**The Shōbōgenzō as kōan.** While we may speak of the dharma as the locus of identity in each of the dimensions, there is a generalizability that attends the multiplicity of dharmas as we have seen in the case of dimensionality. In addition to this sense of generalizability, however, there is another. An example of this is the personality of Dōgen that emerges with the Shōbōgenzō. Dōgen the person emerges and we cannot meet him face to face without attaining the standpoint types he personifies. There we converse and understand each other's kindnesses, and personhood.

Thomas Kasulis in his monograph, "The Incomparable Philosopher: Dōgen on How to Read the Shōbōgenzō" observes, "One can easily forget that one must not only say what one sees in the text, but also where one stands when one sees it." One must also add that where Dōgen stands when he makes any statement needs similarly to be taken into account.

The opening of the Genjōkōan fascicle states:

There is a seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which dharmas are Buddha Dharmas, and this is precisely
when there is delusion/enlightenment, there is cultivation/authentication, there is life, there is death, there are buddhas, there are sentient beings. Even so, there is no delusion, there is no enlightenment, there are no buddhas, there are no sentient beings, there is no life, there is no death in the seasonal time frame in which all dharmas are collectively without a "me." Even so, the Buddha Way by nature leaps out from this feast-or-famine dichotomy, so there is life-death, there is delusion-enlightenment, there are beings-buddhas. Even with the attainment of these realizations, there is still yearning at the sight of falling flowers, as there is still chagrin at the proliferation of weeds.

Each of these four sentences reflect different dimensions of enlightenment. The difference in time frames (jisetsu) is underscored by the radically different, in fact contradictory experiential outcomes of the first two time frames. The discreteness of time frames that is evident here is an indication of a discreteness of modalities of consciousness. Enlightenment is not a monolithic state about which nothing can be said. Dōgen is saying something very assertive
here: enlightenment has structure. At the very least, the first two sentences indicate that there are two dimensions of enlightenment. One dimension reveals the existence of things. The other dimension reveals all things to be without self and to be nonexistent.

What Dōgen calls two time frames are two dimensions that are experienceable within enlightenment. This means that if enlightenment were interpreted as understanding principles, we would either have two contradictory principles, or one of them would have to be interpreted in such a way that dismisses it as a true principle.

The alternative is to read the text in a way that does not entail the explication of principles. Reading the text as a koan will provide our investigative engine with a methodology and further insights into the nature of the dimensionality and internal structure and workings of enlightenment.

At different times there may be different time frames within enlightenment, and from within these different time frames, there are different realities that come to the fore. At times a dharma emerges as a focus. At other times the depth of field expands unboundedly and dharmas are not particular foci. At other times there is delusion-enlightenment and the two are inseparable.
The evocation of standpoints of a musical work differs from the dimension presentation of the koan. Standpoints are as infinite in number as the nuances of human emotion. Dimensions are standpoint types, classes of standpoints, conceptual categories with which standpoints can be identified.

As a presentation of a standpoint, the koan is a unique mode of discourse. In this kind of discourse, what is expressed is not meaning in the ordinary sense. A koan's "meaning" is a specific disposition, and in this sense, it functions as a word, expressing something. The Shōbōgenzō can be understood to be a lexicon of the different "words" there are in this mode of discourse. As a lexicon, the Shōbōgenzō has a very poor vocabulary of only three or four "words." Perhaps a better analogy is a thesaurus. Just as a thesaurus contains many synonyms appearing in clusters, the Shōbōgenzō contains a large array of synonyms for a small number of meanings. In this case, however, the number of synonyms are infinite and the number of "meanings" is no more than three or four.

To examine how Dōgen personifies a set of dimensions of enlightenment in the Shōbōgenzō we must first consider how presentation is accomplished in the context of Zen praxis and how presentation can itself be a
mode of discourse operating in a work such as the Shōbōgenzō. What follows is an examination of kōan praxis as the practice of this special sense of presentation. The kōan will then be considered as the paradigm of a mode of discourse called "standpoint presentation" which informed Dōgen's interactions with his own master and students and hence is likely to have informed the discourse in the Shōbōgenzō.

Dōgen writes as the Zen master that he was, in the manner of one administering a kōan in the sanzen dialog. In administering a kōan, the master demonstrates it and awaits a suitable response. Though there is no one correct form of response, there is a consistently rejected one: the explanatory attempt. When Dōgen writes the Shōbōgenzō, he is demonstrating standpoints that we call enlightenment. He does so not in a vacuum, but while talking about things drawn from the world of common experience. In turn, the master awaits a response.

This dissertation attempts to present a theory about what Dōgen was demonstrating in the Shōbōgenzō. In effect, it interprets the text in precisely the manner prohibited by the Zen master. In mode and content, this dissertation is explanatory, reflectively derived, and not demonstrative in the way required of the stu-
dent in sanzen. The sense in which this dissertation violates the basic ground rules of a correct response in sanzen is very important to establish, for it reveals the limitations within which Dōgen was working. By the very nature of his enterprise as a Zen master guiding the spiritual progress of monks, he was unable to explicate what the present dissertation attempts to explicate. The novice monk needs to realize and appropriate a pre-reflective consciousness as an initial stage in spiritual progress. The antithesis of this pre-reflective consciousness is explication and discussion about a subject rather than appropriating the subject itself. The Shōbōgenzō is not an explication in words of what enlightenment is. It is its presentation.

Yet, the presentation's mode of presentation is written. In fact, Dōgen makes considerable use of words and language, driving their expressive possibilities beyond the bounds of linguistic convention.

In the metaphor of the finger and the moon, in addition to a mistaken emphasis upon the word rather than its lunar referent, there can also be a mistaken emphasis upon the meaning of the moon as metaphor. If, for example, the moon represents "enlightenment," it will invariably be interpreted as simply that which is
counterpoised to non-enlightenment, resulting in a unidimensional understanding of enlightenment. Further, when other such metaphors are similarly interpreted as signifying enlightenment, the value of the variety and individuality of such accounts becomes lost in the reduction of their meanings to repetitions of the same relation between enlightenment and non-enlightenment (or, as we shall later see, the relation between enlightenment and praxis). Thus reduced, these meanings invite interpretations that are consistent with our already held notions of general Buddhist doctrine, and these notions begin acting as criteria for the interpretation of yet other "metaphors" in Dōgen's writings. When this occurs, a criterial method of interpretation results. Coherence is attained, but at the expense of multidimensionality. This problem is keenly felt when reading Dōgen's writings because it is common to find the appearance of a metaphor where one would expect to find explication or elaboration of a concept.

This appearance of a metaphor is frequently just an appearance, however. What we actually find is often neither a conceptualization nor an illustration of a conception by means of a metaphor, but rather a presentation of a standpoint. Now there is a trivial
sense in which any utterance is a presentation of a standpoint, inasmuch as everyone can be said to occupy a unique and different standpoint where they are situated in space and time. To distinguish the non-trivial from the trivial meanings, I shall use the term "standpoint types" to refer to the qualitatively different classes of standpoints that the Zen master is epitomizing in the sanzen interview. Instead of limiting our exegetic investigation to metaphorical or criterial interpretation, this study should also engage in a search for the standpoint of the writer. This standpoint is reflected by the mode of the expression, but is not limited to the meaning of the expression. In other words, discourse as standpoint presentation can be distinguished from discourse through conceptual explication. It can also be distinguished from discourse through metaphor and poetry. In expanding the search for the discursive project of Dōgen in this way, the present task necessitates the articulation of an interpretive methodology alternative to the conceptual and metaphorical methods that can improve upon the ability to disclose new networks of meaning in Dōgen's writings and projects.

There is an important difference between the kōan of Mahakasyapa for example, and the kōan of the
Shōbōgenzō. Mahakasyapa's kōan exchange stopped at demonstrating that the standpoint had been matched, and similarly in the Zen temple, many sanzen interviews end with this presentation. However, when continued, kōan exchanges can investigate the nature of that specific standpoint, the wealth of its expressive possibilities, and other affirmations. This is the sense in which Dōgen appears to conceive "genjōkōan," and this may be why the Buddha bequeathed to Mahakasyapa the "Treasury of the Authentic Dharma Eyes" (Shōbōgenzō).

Section Four:

Implications

Just as there is a sense in which language stipulates the representational meanings with which its words can be used, there is a sense in which words, qua presentations, stipulate a specific language as the necessary condition within which they meaningfully operate. Rather than being determined by the speaker, this condition of meaningful operation is determined by the conventions of the audience community, and is conditioned by that community's cultural understandings, ethical presuppositions, categories of understanding, world views, logical system, personal identity con-
figurations, notions of order and meaningfulness, and types of spiritual attainment. For present purposes, this condition of meaningful operation that is stipulated presentationally by words can be loosely included in a broad conception of language as contextualized domain of meaningfulness. Because of the necessary connection between words and their languages, an examination of words and their usage can offer significant insights into the nature of their stipulated languages.

The stipulated language is so obvious and broadly encompassing that in most cases such an examination is unnecessary and meaningless. As an example, a technical article in a philosophical journal would stipulate as a condition of its intelligibility the language-world of the philosopher. To philosophy belongs a set of implicit conventions, assumptions, values, and importantly, language that not only conditions and constitutes the world of the philosopher but allows communication with other members of the community. As a presentation, the journal article would stipulate this world of the philosopher as its presented meaning in a specific manner. Contrasted to the representational meaning of the article, the presented meaning of the article is so broad that it is truistic.
However, understanding the stipulated language is not always insignificant. In religion, for example, membership and active participation in a specific community of beliefs has important soteriological implications. Appropriate language use confirms membership and appropriate use of language can be a form of active participation that constitutes religious answers to existential problems. When judged in religious terms, every word reflects either "in" or "out" of a community. All language is presentational, but nowhere is this as self-consciously so than in the koan, for it is the presentational meanings that are used to guide students, it is the presentational meanings that constitute the exclusive meaning of the discourse, and it is the presentational meanings that one uses to express one's enlightenment.

What makes the statement that the Shobōgenzō is a koan especially significant is that it not only presents a dimension of enlightenment, it presents a broad range of dimensions in an apparently self-conscious manner. Seldom has there been a work that manifests as great a range of enlightenment as the Shobōgenzō.

When the stipulated language of the Shobōgenzō is examined, there are to be found multiple languages, and the implications with respect to the nature of
enlightenment are especially significant because of their multiplicity.

Hypothesizing a standpoint of enlightenment separate from a standpoint of nonenlightenment to which belong different languages, categories, values, and so forth, it would be understandable that to one to whom the standpoint of enlightenment is familiar, would belong the ability to distinguish which standpoint was being presented by a locution, particularly when allowances are made for body language and an extended conversation. If so, it makes sense for us to ask, what separate standpoints and languages did Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō present? If the person reading the Shōbōgenzō were as familiar with the domain of enlightenment as Dōgen, the presentation of any particular passage it contains would be so definite as to stipulate specific standpoints. This dissertation hypothesizes what those stipulations must be in order for the Shōbōgenzō to be interpreted in its richest sense.

Employing this rationale, the present dissertation examines the languages of the Shōbōgenzō and finds that they are domains of linguistic usage and experiential attainments that are related to each other in the manner of dimensions.
In sum, because the Shōbōgenzō is a koan and by its nature primarily presentational in intent, by examining the words of the Shōbōgenzō, their choice, usage, and juxtaposition, we can investigate the languages that are presented by the words. Because the koan is not just a pedagogical aid, but a means of communication, to read the Shōbōgenzō is to engage in a dialog of affirming the common understandings that make the dialog possible. Simultaneously, the dialog affirms not only the common basis of understanding, but expresses the richness of particular perspectives and observations that are found on the common basis. In other words, the koan affirms not only the dimension of experience reflected in spiritual attainment that is common to both writer and reader, it is expressive of the internal world of the dimension. Through the examination of the language of the Shōbōgenzō, we can not only identify the different languages employed, but also investigate: 1) the nature and internal structure of each language; 2) how the world appears within each language context; and 3) the infinite multiplicity of observations possible about and within each presented language.
Implications for a dimensional model of enlightenment.

Presentation as a mode of expression is meaningful only when there is a distinction that can be drawn between its presented standpoints. Either the enlightenment or nonenlightenment of a person is presented through words and other expressive forms. If there were only these two modes of experience, nonenlightenment and enlightenment, that made koan presentation meaningful, then why the lengthy Shōbōgenzō would be filled with koan presentations would defy understanding, for it would be difficult to accept the work to be reiterations of the claim that its author is enlightened. The Shōbōgenzō and incidentally, koan praxis that normally employs many koans, only make sense when read as presenting further distinctions of standpoints within enlightenment.

Furthermore, when clusters of concepts and expressions are grouped according to what might be called levels, modes, or dimensions of enlightenment, coherent patterns within and among clusters emerge. When read as koan presentations, relations among expressions in the Shōbōgenzō appear to indicate an orderliness, variety, and intelligible structure to what they are presenting.
Chapter 4

Engi: The First Dimension of Enlightenment

When Great Master Yao-shan (J: Yakuzan) Hong-dao (751-834) was sitting in zazen, a monk asked him:

"When maintaining that steadfast position, what are you thinking?"
Yao-shan replied, "I am thinking that which is not thinking."
The monk asked, "How do you think that which is not thinking?"
The master answered, "Nonthinking." ¹

Dōgen uses Yao-shan's dialog to illustrate the nonconceptual origin and the expressive nature of enlightened activity. In the dialog, Yao-shan instructs the monk in the fundamentals of genuine praxis, which for Dōgen does not differ from enlightened activity. Specifically, Yao-shan demonstrates how to create a concept that originates from the nonconceptual experience of genuine zazen. This is a process that Dōgen calls dōtoku. Not limited to conceptual forms, dōtoku for Dōgen is expression that originates from the particular originative experience that distinguishes each dimension of enlightenment from nonenlightenment and from other dimensions of enlightenment. Dōtoku literally means "speech attainment." In the above dialog, Yao-shan is demonstrating

¹ "Zazenshin," DZZ, p. 90.
the process of conceptual expression that originates within the nonthinking mode of praxis. Together, the originative experience and its expressive attainments constitute a dimension of enlightenment. The experience originates and authenticates expressions and the expressions actualize the experience as a transformative (enlightened) event.

Nonthinking is the distinguishing originative experience of the first dimension of enlightenment (d1). It is the experience which supplants the self and its dualisms as the basis of action and expression. Nonenlightenment may be defined as a standpoint that is dualistic and substantialistic because of its basis upon the self and its thinking operations. The self as an objectified thing that has its own independent nature is not known by direct experience: it is a supposition. As a supposition, it appears to take on a life of its own, differentiating according to its needs, categorizing and creating dualisms to preserve its own identity, judging according to the standards of the judge, in short, performing the conscious activities normally called thinking. Thinking is non-enlightened because it makes an ontological error: it presupposes the existence of a substance that is the ground or agent of thinking, individuation, action, identity, continuity in time, and judgment.
Enlightenment may be defined as a standpoint that is based upon nondualistic experience. A standpoint is intrinsically expressive, even when one is silent or inactive. It is expressive through activity or inactivity in the presentational mode. Any action, thought, or word presents either: 1) its origin in the (nonenlightened) standpoint that is based on self and its dualistic and substantializing thinking; 2) its origin in the first dimension of enlightenment that is based on the nondualistic and nonsubstantializing (non-thinking) experience; 3) its origin in the second dimension of enlightenment that is based on a different nondualistic and nonsubstantializing (bodhi) experience; or 4) its origin in the third dimension of enlightenment that is based on a different nondualistic and nonsubstantializing (shikan taza) experience. Non-thinking is the experiential basis for expression (in act, word, or thought) in the first dimension of enlightenment. Though standpoints are necessarily expressive through activity or inactivity, and though activity and inactivity are necessarily presentationally expressive of their standpoint origins, nondualistic and nonsubstantializing experiences are not necessarily expressive. Having an experience does not necessarily change the standpoint from which one there-
after speaks and acts. Simply having an experience is not sufficient to determine the standpoint from which one acts. Even nonenlightened persons have nondualistic experiences, but the standpoint from which they act, think, and express themselves persists in being based on self and its dualistic and substantializing activities. A nondualistic experience does not constitute enlightenment; it is its necessary and originative condition. A nondualistic experience needs to originate expressions in actions, thoughts, or words that together with their authenticating experience constitute enlightenment. In other words, enlightenment is a necessarily expressive enterprise.

For nonthinking to be the basis of one's action and expression, one must first have the experience, and the experience must express itself in some form. Daily life abounds with nonthinking experiences but the nonenlightened person does not make them bases for action and expression. Consciousness is enlightened when its various activities presuppose a different basis, a basis that is not a supposition but an experience. Nonthinking provides that experiential basis. With the thinking operations of the self being held in abeyance, experience becomes clarified. Clarified, experience is a continuum of ever-changing units of experience called
"dharmas." Dharmas are things-as-experienced and experiences-as-units. Traditionally, "Dharma" means "law," "teaching," or "truth," but Dogen generally uses the term in either of two senses: 1) a momentary experience as a unit; or 2) the content of experience.

Nonthinking reveals a moment of experience as a unitary dharma that has neither internal differentiation nor external boundary. Dharmas, rather than things and selves, constitute the world of experience. Dogen describes the appearance of each dharma as the leaping and flapping of a fish. Neither objectified thing or any other creation of the self, the dharma is an alternative to the self as the ground of daily activities: expression, deeds, and consciousness.

In order for daily activities to be dharma-based and in order for the clarified dharma to be expressed in daily activities, the nonthinking experience must express itself. When there is the experience of nonthinking and its expression, there is enlightened activity in d1. Whether realized in word, deed, or otherwise, the resulting expression originates from the nonthinking experience and is authenticated by it. One might also say that the expression authenticates the experience, for without it, the experience would be but another unrecognized anomaly in the nonenlightened per-
son's life. The mutual authentication of nontinking and its expression is enlightenment in its first dimension. For these reasons, nontinking may be called the "originative experience" of d1.

DOtoku is expression that emerges from the attainment of an originative experience. "Without the buddhas and ancestral buddhas... there would be no DOtoku." Without originative experiences, there would be no attainment of genuine expression. The speech of the nonenlightened person is based upon an erroneous presupposition, the speech of the enlightened person is based upon the attainment of an enlightened dharma. Together with their originative experience, DOtoku expressions operate in a manner unique to a particular dimension of enlightenment to constitute enlightenment as a mode of experiencing daily life.

An elementary achievement of zazen, nontinking is an experience that is variously called samAdhi, original face, no-thought, non-differentiation (kompon mufunbetchi), and nirvikalpa jnana. Having the experience is one achievement, but having the experience speak is quite another. A new language of concepts must be created. This new language is not necessarily

2 "DOtoku," DZZ p. 301.
new in form or vocabulary, it is a newly authenticated language with a new presentational meaning and authenticating basis. Authenticated concepts are necessary for an enlightened person's performance of a wide range of daily life activities such as speaking, thinking, and acting.

Considering that the experience being explained in Yao-shan's discourse is typically regarded as unexplainable if not ineffable, Yao-shan's reply is a remarkably accommodating response to the monk's question. It is rare for a master to dwell on explanations at all, inasmuch as explanations usually resort to reasons and abstractions, quite the opposite of what is meant to be explained. It is even more remarkable because Yao-shan is speaking while engaged in zazen, during which practice neither actual nor mental conversations are entertained. Most significantly, this dialog offers a rare glimpse into a conceptualization within nontinking. In Yao-shan's dialog, there is not only nontinking, there is conceptual expression.

Instead of the usual nonconceptual and non-representational presentation of the proper frame of mind that is the typical response of Zen masters in such dialogs, Yao-shan makes his presentation in terms
of what may be called an authentic concept, nonthinking. A consideration of what conceptualization within enlightenment is and what authentic concepts are will elucidate the nature of the first dimension of enlightenment, how concepts arise from a nonconceptual experience, and how concepts can operate within their specific dimension of enlightenment.

Yao-shan's statement is authentic in the sense that it results from an enlightenment experience and is formulated without any presupposition of assumptions or notions, particularly those from nonenlightenment. As such it presents the mode of experience called enlightenment. What differentiates Yao-shan's statement from typical presentations of enlightenment is that it is conceptual, that is, it has the form of a word and can be utilized in ways beyond presentation. It can elucidate, express, communicate, and function in the many ways most words are said to function.

3 In form being logically related to an extrinsic operation (thinking) notwithstanding, nonthinking is a direct descendent concept. It is what I call a third generation concept of the first dimension, a concept that names a component of the dimension. In this case, it is another name for the "place" or field of freedom that is the precondition and expression of the total exertion of the single dharma in a Hua-yen hokkai engi relation.
If Yao-shan’s statement is examined as a koan, it presents the first dimension of enlightenment, but it further shows how a concept can be authenticated by its being a presentation and how a concept that is authenticated within a dimension of enlightenment can elucidate, explain, name, and function in different ways that are commensurate with that dimension of enlightenment as a functional domain. A word or gesture as a presentation of a dimension of enlightenment can be used to authenticate the attainment of that dimension of enlightenment, but in addition, the attainment of the dimension of enlightenment authenticates the originative experience.

The realization of each dimension begins with an originative experience. More precisely, it occurs with an experience in a particular mode. We may call this experience in a particular mode that is the occasion for the realization of a dimension of enlightenment an "originative experience." In the case of the first dimension, there is the originative experience called variously, nonthinking, samadhi, or engi. In addition to the originative experience, realization of a dimension also entails a process of making that originative experience real; it is a process that affords actual form or expression to the originative experience. An
action that actualizes the originative experience of a dimension realizes, as it is authenticated by, the originative experience. Without praxis, a "non-enlightened" person may have the originative experience of nonthinking many times each day without realizing the experience. "Realization" means both "awareness" and "actualization." The originative experience is brief and it is quickly obscured by the activities of nonenlightened understanding. By clarifying experience to uncover the originative experience, praxis enables one to actualize the originative experience.

Actualization of the d1 originative experience results in actions, feelings, and concepts that are conditioned by the experiential mode of the d1 originative experience. In other words, every component of experience, interpretation, expression, action, and creation within the first dimension confirms each other because the interpretation of each is conditioned by the d1 mode of experience.

The actualization of an originative experience does not occur automatically. Actualization is an outcome of praxis that is practiced not only as a negative or passive activity as it is initially, but as a positive appropriation of definite conditions as the originative experience displays when, as Dōgen says,
"the single dharma is totally exerted," ippo gujin. If having the originative experience is the same as allowing the single dharma to appear, then the actualization of the originative experience is the same as the total exertion of the single dharma. With the total exertion of the single dharma, either of two events occur: 1) expression (dōtoku); or 2) there is a realization of the originative experience of the next dimension of enlightenment, d2. The second event leads to the subject matter of the following chapter. In the first event, expression may be in the form of nonconceptual words such as exclamations and evocations, or in the form of concepts, actions, and other types of daily life activities.

If a dharma is to be anything more than a passive and passing experience, it is not simply experienced, it is totally exerted. Samadhi is not simply an observable experience in a time when nonobjectification reigns. It is also an actualization and expression in appropriated forms. In the fascicle called "Ocean Seal Samadhi," Kaiin Zammai, Dōgen says, "Samadhi is actualization, expression, it is the nighttime when one reaches back for the pillow."

4 I do not know what determines which of the two events is to occur upon the attainment of ippo gujin.
Reaching back for the pillow is an appropriation of appropriate forms. It expresses relations that can be found in words, concepts, and forms of various kinds.

Samadhi is the dimension in which there is not only mu or nothingness, but there is the actualization/expression of the dharma. For example, the reading of a Buddhist text for Dōgen entails samadhic absorption in different concepts. As reading a concept is possible, it is possible to nonthink a concept. When one meditates on the koan mu, one nonthinks mu. The samadhic absorption in a concept may seem to entail a logical impossibility, as a concept must have defined boundaries whereas the samadhic experience does not. However, the task is understandable when it is remembered that a koan functions presentationally rather than representationally, and that the meaning of a dharma-presentational concept is what is to be found in the functioning (life) of the dharma if only its total field of freedom (nonthinking) is provided. Identifying the presentational concept as the "face" of the dharma internal dynamics is to appropriate the concept in the attainment of the first dimension of enlightenment. This appropriation of the concept is an authentication of the concept in the achieved d1 experience as it is an authentication of the achieved d1 experience by the
passage being read. This appropriated concept can thus be expressed and actualized in the company of other appropriated concepts in this dimension. So, for example, Dōgen writes, "The reaching for the pillow wherein the nighttime is reaching back for the pillow is not merely for billions and billions of eons—it is a case of in the ocean I only expound the scripture of the lotus of the wonderful teaching eternally." The "I only expound" presents the d1 singularity ("I only") of the "original face" that expresses itself in dōtoku ("expound") when totally exerted. Dōgen is thus writing about the conceptualization process that originates from a timeless, singular, and expressive experience.

Writing as a presentation of that conceptualization process (reaching back for the pillow) is a total exertion of Dōgen's personal appropriation of the face of the d1 experience that was presented by the concepts in the Buddhist texts he was reading.

An authentic concept that originates from within the enlightenment experience is authentic to the degree in which it is free from the presupposition of other concepts. By examining the terms found in the Shōbōgenzō for the degree to which they presuppose

5 Cleary, p. 81.
other concepts in a given dimension, a genealogy of concepts can be discerned and understood as the product of an evolution of concepts from an originative experience. The genealogy of concepts as an explanation of the dōtoku process that constitutes a dimension from an originative experience is an attempt to justify the claim that the dimensionality of enlightenment is praxis-based.

Section One:
The Originative Experience in Praxis

Thomas Cleary says of Yao-shan's dialog: "'Thinking about that which is not thinking' can read 'thinking about who isn't thinking' or 'thinking about what doesn't think.' The particle after 'not thinking' in the original story makes it attributive, and by convention refers to the unexpressed subject modified by the attributive verbal expression; thus it means "contemplating the mind source," the technique of "turning the light around and looking back" (eko henshō), which Dōgen states he is recommending in this treatise as the essential art of zazen."6 According to Cleary, the

phrasing of Yao-shan's first answer to the monk's questioning permits the interpretation that zazen consists of thinking about the self that isn't thinking. Cleary points out that zazen may be considered as this self-reflexive activity that Dōgen calls えこう 恒釈.

In "Zazenshin" Dōgen writes, "There is a 'who' in non-thinking and 'who' maintains an 'I.'" Cleary's interpretation of the self-reflexive activity of zazen that is permitted by Yao-shan's phraseology and by Dōgen's use of such terms as "turning the light around and looking back" makes an important though possibly misleading point about the self-reflexive nature of the art of zazen. It is important to point out that zazen is self-reflexive, but if the self-reflexive activity of "looking back" is inferred to be an examination of the self, then the resulting interpretation invites a reversion to the substantialistic model of a subject-object dualism that the nonthinking experience serves to replace. Yet if all we have to work with is a subject-object model of experience, then if zazen is to be a self-reflexive activity rather than a contemplation of an object of experience, then we can only infer that what zazen examines is "who isn't thinking" or

7 "Zazenshin," DZZ, p. 90.
what Cleary calls the "mind source. It is clear from Dōgen's rejection of both the substantialism of the Senika Heresy and the instrumental view of praxis, however, that Dōgen would reject any substantialistic and dualistic conception of zazen.

The dimensionality thesis offers a solution to this problem in the form of a model of experience that supplants the subject-object dualistic model and its monistic alternative. The self-reflexive enterprise that Dōgen refers to does not have the self as its subject matter and point of departure. "To practice and confirm all things by conveying one's self to them, is illusion: for all things to advance forward and practice and confirm the self, is enlightenment."8 Instead of an object of experience or a self being clarified, what is clarified in praxis is experience itself, and when experience itself is clarified, it is discovered to operate in modes that change. Each experiential mode, or "dimension," lends itself to novel and distinct senses of self, but only as interpolations that become meaningful subsequent to the originative experience. A sense of self is neither experienced nor necessary to the explanation of experience within any

8 "Genjōkōan," Waddell and Abe trans., The Eastern Buddhist, p. 133.
dimension of enlightenment. Just how the concept of self may become meaningful and useful in other kinds of discourse, however, is readily explainable in terms that do explain the experience. The original face before one's parents were born that is called for in a common introductory koan is the first dimension of enlightenment. Within the first dimension of enlightenment there is no self that is conceivable apart from explanations of the entire dimension; the self is an experienced moment of the first dimension of enlightenment. It is this dimension of enlightenment that should be first illuminated in zazen and presented as one's original face. This illumination is the type of self-reflexive activity implicit in eko henshō.

The subject matter of the self-reflexive activity of zazen is not the self but the nature of experience itself, and the first dimension of experience to reveal itself in enlightenment is nonthinking. Also known as samadhi or the original face experience, nonthinking is the nonconceptual experience from which authenticated concepts in d1 originate. Nonthinking is the origina­tive experience of d1.

Yao-shan's statement, "Nonthinking," is an example of a authentic concept originating from nonthinking. Like other Zen masters' responses, it is a presentation
from an experientially-based enlightenment, but unlike traditional Zen answers, it is conceptual. It is an authentic concept. Though little more than a name at this point, "nonthinking" conceptualizes an idea that can be used to make distinctions, define operations, and serve explanatory functions. More than an ejaculatory utterance that may have authenticity but no conceptual meaning, "nonthinking" is a meaningful concept that functions among other concepts in a language. Yao-shan's answer is thus a point of departure for Dōgen's conceptual presentation of enlightenment.

There is good reason for Dōgen to use this dialog in "Zazenshin" to introduce his own explanation of the mental posture of zazen. When Yao-shan answered, "nonthinking," he simultaneously presented two notions with which Dōgen's Shobōgenzō is largely occupied: authentic praxis and authentic thinking. While the master's (authentic) praxis is attained as a result of achieving that which thinking does not reach, the fact that the master answers the monk's question with an explainable concept also shows how thinking is possible in the master's praxis. This apparent contradiction notwithstanding, Yao-shan demonstrates how "nonthinking" is possible by naming what goes on in authentic praxis while speaking from the standpoint of authentic
thinking. Rather than a project of eliminating thinking altogether, the monk in the dialog is presented with a demonstration of (authentic) thinking that originates from praxis. Authentic praxis, i.e., enlightenment, is not regarded by Yao-shan as ineffable and beyond authentic thinking. To understand this, how enlightenment admits of thinking although praxis which initially entails a suspension of thinking, there must be an examination of the nature of authentic praxis and how thinking can possibly originate within, and be authenticated by enlightenment. In order to proceed with this examination, it is first necessary to consider what enlightenment is in terms of both the standpoint and the thinking that Yao-shan is demonstrating in the above dialog.

In the above dialog, nonthinking is the answer to the question of how to not-think while engaged in zazen. Although somewhat cryptic, the master's reply indicates that the monk's question merits a reply, that an explanation is possible, and that the explanation can be articulated. It is also significant that the reply to the question of the attainment of not-thinking is phrased not in terms of how not to think, but rather in terms of another achievement, nonthinking. This other achievement is nameable and explainable in words.
Dōgen's early works such as *Fukanzazengi*, *Zazenshin*, and *Bendo wa* embark upon a project of conceptualization within enlightenment. *Zazengi*, a text for a novice audience, describes the mental posture of zazen. In this fascicle, Dōgen offers the fundamentals of seated meditation in a straightforward and concrete explanation. After explaining how to position such parts of the body as tongue and eyelids, he says:

In this way, set body-mind in order and exhale a breath. Effect mountain-like zazen and "think of not-thinking." "How do you think of not-thinking?" "nonthinking." This is the dharma-art (Ho-jutsu) of zazen.

Borrowing the notions of not-thinking and non-thinking from Yao-shan, Dōgen explains the procedure of what he calls the "dharma-art of zazen." Expressed negatively, the practice of zazen does not involve thinking about things in a deliberative manner as might be suggested by its contemplative appearance. Thinking is an act of the ego that necessarily asserts its identity through differentiation and judgment. Thinking is deliberative insofar as it objectifies and makes judgments about the content of thought. It is usually dualistic as a result of a characteristic differentiation of what is from what is not. Thinking is

9"Zazengi," DZZ, p. 89.
dualistic not only by virtue of the objects of thought being dualistically treated, but also by the attitude of the thinking subject that presupposes a subject-object dichotomy that is in turn based upon a dualistic conception of subject and object.

According to the traditional account of Dōgen's enlightenment experience, a monk sitting next to Dōgen was falling asleep when Master Ju-ching chastised, "Zazen is the falling off of body-mind. What are you doing, just sleeping like that?" Zazen as the absence of thinking is dramatically denied by Ju-ching. Sleep is not thinking, but neither is it nonthinking. Though sleep is a suspension of thinking, it is not zazen.

Evidence for Dōgen's rejection of the nihilistic view of nontinking may also be found in his critique of Tsung-kao's belief in an essence of mind that underlies its observable activities. Dōgen's criticism centered on Tsung-kao's negative approach to the phenomenal activities of the mind. It may be said that Tsung-kao espoused not-thinking. Dōgen's rejection of Tsung-kao's view of praxis was firm. Enlightenment cannot be attained by first objectifying thinking and then attempting to attain its logical negation, for this would result in a belief in an enlightened mind that is substantialized and irrevocably divorced from observable human thoughts.
Nonthinking is to be contrasted to this in its affirmation of normal functions of mind, of which non-thinking is one. If there is a confusion of the negation of thinking with the negation of consciousness, even if one were offered the name of an alternative, such as "nonthinking," there would still be no clarification of the process to which it refers. The attempt to not-think leads nowhere and praxis is initially dominated by the recognition of thinking as seemingly ubiquitous and inescapable. The effort to not-think, if initially unfruitful, does predispose one to recognize nonthinking when it does occur. This intention to perform a non-intentional act is inherently self-contradictory. To not think dualistic thoughts requires initial effort in directing the mind to its inherently self-contradictory task and results in repeated failure. This is the effort to not-think. "Its manner and principle is such that it cuts off the working of your consciousness and prevents you from heading for the path of intellectual understanding. This is precisely the method of inducement for the beginner. Thereafter it enables you to cast off your body and mind and transcend delusion and enlightenment....So experiment to cut off the working of your consciousness," Dōgen says, "and eight or nine times
out of ten, you will be able to find the Way in an instant." (Eihei-shiso-gakudo-yojin-shu p. 260) Not-thinking is thus explained as a process worked out in practice by means of which one arrives at a self-reflective awareness of nonthinking. This is why this process is a structured technique requiring discipline and practice, and why mastery of it is called an art.

Reference to nonthinking as an art suggests that a methodology and an achievement can be articulated and attributed to nonthinking. By describing this methodology and achievement, Dōgen can implement and detail the explanatory efficacy that Yao-shan attributed to nonthinking. Dōgen and Yao-shan agree that the content of zazen has attributes that can be conceptualized and expressed in terms of methodology and achievement.

The neologism "nonthinking" is Yao-shan's means of indicating that there is a way of attaining and describing authentic praxis that relies upon neither thinking nor its logical opposite. The use of logic to attain authentic praxis would not enable one to attain what thinking does not reach, for logic is a function of thinking. What Yao-shan introduces as a cryptic neologism, Dōgen uses as the first of many words to speak from the standpoint of enlightenment. When Dōgen speaks from the standpoint of enlightenment and des
cribes the experience of enlightenment, he uses words that are not necessarily neologistic, negative in form, or cryptic. For Dōgen, conceptualization using positive terms is possible in enlightenment, and when he speaks of the total exertion of the single dharma (ippō gōjin), the fish attaining its water, the clarity of bells, total dynamism (zenki), the one bright jewel (ikka myōju), or the jewel on a tray, he is describing in positive terms what Yao-shan called "nonthinking."
Including, but not restricted to metaphors, Dōgen's descriptions show how experience of the world can be positively described in images and concepts even when expressed from the standpoint of enlightenment. As this chapter attempts to show, these expressions collectively express in positive terms what can be called the first dimension of enlightenment (d1).

Ironically, despite its non-intentional nature, nonthinking requires an initial amount of intentional effort. In its early stages, the effort at even the bodily posture of zazen is strenuous and unnatural, and so is the initial stage of the mental posture of zazen. The effort of concentration must be applied to returning attention to the task at hand. As thoughts wander to "involvements" and "affairs," attention must return to zazen. Rather than the elimination of all thoughts,
nonthinking is the suspension of a particular category of thinking.

Dogen here treats neither thinking nor not-thinking as aspects of enlightenment. Rather, their opposition in praxis constitutes a foil, the repudiation of which is a necessary step in the realization of nonthinking. The level of discourse is rather elementary, treating both these terms in their ordinary senses relative to each other and dealing with basic postures and skills. The weakness of this relative opposition is borne out in praxis when it is soon found that the task of trying to not-think results in the conclusion that there is nothing but thinking and that not-thinking is apparently impossible. At this point, it appears that the distinction and task is meaningless.

As practice continues, one eventually achieves an experience that is neither thinking nor not-thinking. One achieves a state of absorption traditionally referred to as "samadhi." It is an experience of a mental act's unity so total that there is neither internal differentiation of any kind (e.g., subject-object bifurcation) nor external differentiation (e.g., relative good-bad, inside-outside bifurcations). The experience is one of the moment being an act of con-
sciousness that is so absorbed in the moment's experience that the object of consciousness is no longer an object-as-different from subject, not conceptualizable in terms of categories and distinctions from what it is not, and it has no external boundaries or external forms. The etymological root of the term is in the verbal, "samādha," which means "to put together." This root form evokes the activity of consciousness that suspends the discriminating and bifurcating functions of mind that makes objects of awareness objects and furthermore discrete objects in a multiplicity. The result is a singularity and unity of perception that is also traditionally rendered by the term eka agra citta (i-hsin), "single-pointed mind," and also by dhyana (ch'an-ting), or "meditative tranquility."

Understanding the distinction between samadhi and thinking becomes clear with the achievement of samadhi. When this distinction becomes clear, the meaning of thinking becomes clear. Understanding the meaning of nonthinking is thus prior to understanding the meaning of thinking.

There is textual evidence for Dōgen's conscious association of nonthinking with samadhi. Dōgen treats both samadhi and nonthinking in the same context. Dōgen describes the samadhi of self-fulfilling activity:
Buddha-tathagatas all have a wonderful means, which is unexcelled and free from human agency, for transmitting the wondrous Dharma from one to another without alteration and realizing supreme and complete awakening. That it is only transmitted without deviation from buddha to buddha is due to the jijūyū samadhi, which is its touchstone.

To disport oneself freely in this samadhi, the right entrance is proper sitting in zazen.

In both instances, the context of the discussion is a set of entrance-level instructions concerning the expectations of one who sits in zazen. In both cases, the treatment of zazen may be characterized as a naive instrumentalism, regarding zazen as a means to an end. This treatment has its appropriateness and even necessity in instructions to a novice, but Dōgen is to later repudiate this position and go to great lengths to avert the mistakes inherent in such a treatment.

What nonthinking is not. When it is said that nonthinking appears when thinking is held in abeyance, an important distinction must be made. Dōgen makes this distinction in his criticism of the views of Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089-1163). According to Dōgen, Ta-hui held that mind and its true nature are two separate functions, the former dealing with the phenomenal perceptive and cogitative activities, while the latter is an underlying unmoving tranquility that remains when mental functions of the mind cease. Enlightenment in this view consists in the cessation of such mental
activities which accrues when both mind and true nature are forgotten. The mistake that Tsung-kao allegedly made was that he started with the premise of a dualism and made one term into an underlying substance whose essence is revealed upon the negation of the other. In addition to the negativity implicit in not-thinking, there is the additional mistake of attributing substantial qualities and functions to an underlying essence of mind. Furthermore, in making these two functions of mind inherently different from each other, the negation of the phenomenal activities of mind results in a conception of a noumenal substrate that is unmoving and unchanging. Dōgen vehemently rejects this notion and with good reason. It is, for one thing, contrary to the Buddhist principle of nonsubstantiality. Something that gives support to phenomenal activities while itself not engaging in these activities is precisely what the Buddhist conception of anātman cannot allow. Secondly, the underlying true nature of mind is conceived by Ta-hui as inherently tranquil. Dōgen objects to this view as reflecting a misunderstanding of Buddha-nature and thusness and doing a disservice to the Buddha-Dharma.

By contrast, when Dōgen talks about nonthinking, he is referring to an experiential mode which includes
perception, thought, and other activities Ta-hui would regard as phenomenal functions of mind. Perception and thought would appear, however, as no-differentiated experience. In nonthinking, a bird song for example would appear with no presupposition of a hearing agent and a perceived object outside the window. Nonthinking is a mode in which the bird song is not even presumed to be a bird song. Rather, to the moment of the bird song in nonthinking belongs a clarity and exclusiveness indicative of the mode of nonthinking. There being nothing differentiated outside the bird song, there is only bird song in clear presencing. According to Dōgen, the experience would not necessarily be tranquil. Were pain to strike, there would be in nonthinking no underlying layer of tranquility separable from that pain. There would be only that pain-reaction as it is. This is the meaning of thusness, or as Dōgen calls it, thusness nature (nyōzeshō), and it remains necessary to distinguish it from any thought or reaction. Were one to react to that pain in irritation and distaste, this reaction would be an act of thinking, for this is not a non-differentiated experience, but rather an experience based on a comparison with personal preference and judgments of what might have otherwise been. In sum, nonthinking needs to be dis-
tinguished from a non-phenomenal experience as it needs to be distinguished from thinking.

Nonthinking is a momentary suspension of the constructive and constituting activities of ordinary thinking. Because thinking is dualistic, nonthinking can be expected to be a nondual experience. And indeed, much of the language of Dōgen bears this out. Dōgen says at the beginning of Zazengi, "Cast aside all involvements and cease all affairs. Do not think good or bad. Do not administer pros and cons. Cease all the movements of the conscious mind, the gauging of all thoughts and views. Have no designs on becoming a buddha." Subject-object, mind-body, being-nonbeing, universal-particular, space-time, essence-accident, now-then, good-bad, and inclusion-exclusion class conception of what a thing is are all dualities that are absent in nonthinking. Though consciousness may be usually directed by the ego, there are times when it is not. In the absence of the ego, there is an absence of its activities that include the imposition of duality. Dualities are impositions of the activities of the ego upon experience which characteristically result in the positing of the ego's counterpart, the thing as substance. When the ego is absent, duality and its other impositions disappear. In the absence of duality and
other constructive projections of the mind, there is, however, no absence of consciousness. Further, there is no absence of the content of consciousness. On the contrary, because of the suspension of the constructions and impositions of the ego, a vividness and vivacity of the content of consciousness becomes possible to such a degree that the experience can be retrospectively described as the birth of a dharma.

Thus far, the description of nontinking permits a fairly standard treatment of the nature of enlightenment. Various adjectives have been applied to the experience in a manner that allows one to distinguish nontinking from ordinary thinking. Further description of nontinking results in the use of increasingly paradoxical language as the characterization of nontinking is distinguished from language use employed in ordinary thinking. Yet in either mode of description, adjetival or paradoxical, the descriptors are external. That is to say, the terms applied to nontinking are relative to thinking, derived from thinking, and applied to nontinking externally. From its description, nontinking becomes a mysterious black box to which adjectives are vainly applied.

Instead of examining nontinking as though it were a black box, nontinking is a lived world that is rich
with its own empirically verifiable natural laws, components, in short, its own world view. The metaphysics of the first dimension of enlightenment are perhaps best characterized by the engi (pratītya-samutpāda) relation. Just as Dōgen used Yao-shan's concept of nonthinking to designate this dimension of enlightenment, he uses other Buddhist concepts to designate its ontological and cosmological aspects that constitute Dōgen's lived world in this dimension of enlightenment. Rather than as an assortment of various pertinent concepts, these concepts are more fruitfully examined as parts of Dōgen's project of accounting for a genealogy of concepts that operate within the first dimension of enlightenment. Perhaps in the manner of a genealogy of ancestral buddhas that traces a line of descent back to the original buddha, a genealogy of concepts that traces its line of descent back to the originative experience within this dimension authenticates that line of descent. The succession of concepts can be postulated by following the criterion of authenticity of a concept.

Praxis is not only a matter of observation, it is also an active investigation. Even as a deliberate suspension of all active directed activities of the mind can be an active investigation. What begins as a
deliberate suspension of directed activities becomes an actual suspension. There is first praxis as an art, and then there is praxis as an attained experience of nonthinking. Active and deliberate as this art may be, it establishes the occasion for the recognition of its objective more than it causes it. By trying to nonthink, the practitioner is engaged in a discriminative task that entails the initial recognition that every observed thought that initially appears is an act of thinking. Judging good and bad, labelling, categorizing, pursuing, rejecting, and engaging in mental conversations appear to be the only kinds of mental events that occur. However, these are thinking activities when one is attempting to nonthink. The recognition of this apparent failure develops the discriminative ability that is necessary for the recognition of its success. While one is seated in zazen, a mosquito lands on one's nose. Nonenlightened thoughts become directed at the mosquito and different scenarios are calculated. Zazen demands a suspension of such directed and calculating activities, and while continuing the discrimination task that results in the recognition of the failure to achieve zazen, sitting continues. When at last the offense becomes experienced as a sequence of immediate perceptions of pain, tickle,
itch, spreading warmth, and so on, one recognizes occasions of clear perception that are free from notions of affront, mosquito, self, and plans. Moments of nonthinking become recognized.

What are recognized, however, are passive experiences of nonthinking. While the recognition of nonthinking is an important milestone in zazen, the practitioner still experiences nonthinking as the passive experience that it always is in nonenlightenment. One is not enlightened yet.

The experience needs to be "totally exerted" (gōjin). Instead of passive witnessing that objectifies an event, total engagement of the experience in its causal relations is required by praxis. Totally exerted, an experience actualizes and transforms itself. Nonrecognition or passive witnessing preempts these processes. Total exertion results in either actualization in expressive forms of various kinds (dōtoku) or transformations within the structure of impermanence (gyōji).

Total exertion entails creative processes that result when a dharma vigorously fulfills its vocation in the provided field of conditions. Just as the word "vocation" simultaneously refers to an answering of a "call" and a "giving voice" in that answer, a totally
exerted dharma is engaged in mutually expressive relations with particular conditions. A dharma expresses itself in its field of conditions and as its field of conditions. Expression can be in the form of action, thought, or word. A dharma can express itself in a concept. From nontinking as the originative experience of the first dimension of enlightenment, a variety of dōtoku concepts emerge. These dōtoku concepts, together with their originative experience operate within the first dimension of enlightenment, as mentioned earlier. D1 dōtoku concepts depend upon nontinking experiences for their origin, meaning, and authentication, but they also depend upon each other as components of a coherent matrix of meanings. Each dōtoku concept implies other concepts that belong to the same dimension of enlightenment. By investigating implications of concepts that are commensurate with the originative experience, the authenticity of the originative experience can be transmitted to its concepts. In this way, new dōtoku concepts can be created or appropriated from scripture.

It also follows that by investigating the presuppositions of various Shōbōgenzō concepts, we can determine their general sequence of development. Concepts that least presuppose other d1 concepts are ear-
lier in the line of succession and those concepts that presuppose more concepts are later in the line of succession. The resulting genealogy of concepts suggests a praxeological interpretation of "buddhas and ancestral buddhas," a favored expression in the Shōbōgenzō that has more than historical import.

One might distinguish nonenlightenment from enlightenment on the basis of presuppositional analysis. Nonenlightenment activities presuppose a self; enlightenment activities presuppose an enlightenment experience that provides a non-self engagement of experience. Different phases of the enlightenment experience can further be distinguished, each engendering a different lineage of dōtoku concepts in different dimensions. Concepts from different dimensions presuppose different originative experiences. Ultimately, these different originative experiences are different holometabolous phases through which the experienced dharma undergoes in its participation in mujō no dōri, the logos of impermanence.

Presentation in sanzen is necessarily particular and experience-based. There can be no explanation in terms of universals, for that presupposes an idea not yet authenticated by the originative experience. Conceptualization, by contrast, is necessarily universal.
As an abstraction from the particular to a generalization about what is common to all members of a class, a concept is typically a universal. Conceptualization and presentation are inherently at odds with each other. The conceptual presentation that is Dōgen's project is thus difficult. Yao-shan achieves this by conceptualization which is concept-creation. Based on experience derived in praxis, Yao-shan's concept formation is a process of designation as well as presentation. What is being designated is the first dimension of enlightenment, the engi (pratītya-samutpāda) dimension. In a similar way, Dōgen conceptually designates other aspects of this dimension of enlightenment.

Section Two:

Affective Concepts

The dōtoku concepts that least presuppose other concepts, and are hence the most authentic, are concepts that express how the originative experience feels. Unlike theoretical accounts about the content or significance of the realization, affective concepts issue directly from the experience. Affective concepts describe the experience rather than explain why it
occurs. Affective concepts enjoy an advantage of greater authenticity by virtue of their proximity to the dōtoku concepts. Not simply non-conceptual exclamations, what may be called affective concepts convey ideas that are discovered in the originative experience. Clarity and vigor are examples of affective dōtoku concepts. Though they do little more than describe feelings that issue from the experience, they presuppose their originative experience and imply certain types of explanation. Exploring their experiential presupposition authenticates; exploring their implications leads to the creation or appropriation of new concepts. Both of these explorations are integral parts of praxis.

The nonthinking experience is distinguishable from ordinary experience by a distinctive cluster of traits. These traits are perhaps best described as changes in qualities of experience, such as changes in clarity of perception, vivacity, time perception, identification, and freedom. Dōgen's discussion of a bird flying in its sky, a jewel running on its tray, and the sound of jewels are examples of references to affective interpretations of the dōtoku originative experience.

Though images of jewels, fish, birds, and vermilion pavilions in Dōgen's writings encourage a
reading of them as purely rhapsodic variations of the same ode to a generic enlightenment, they refer to specific affective qualities of the d1 experience. To the novice monk, they are instructions on how to recognize a d1 experience when it occurs. To the philosopher, their typical cluster pattern supports speculation into the integrity of the d1 dimension, the genealogical origin of its concepts, and their explanatory power.

A good example of a fascicle in the Shōbōgenzō that deals primarily with the affective concomitants of the d1 experience is "Ikkamyoju," "The One Bright Jewel." As its title suggests, it extols the virtues of a spiritual attainment in terms of unity, brightness, and preciousness. Of Zen Master Hsuan-sha Shih-pei (J: Gensha), the principal figure in the fascicle, Dōgen says, "The unfished self-surfacing golden fish must have come to him without his waiting for it." The fish that Dōgen is referring to is neither an object of experience nor does it represent a Buddhist doctrine. Such interpretations of the discussion would be substantialistic and hence inappropriate. Instead, the golden fish can be interpreted as a specific state

10 "Ikkamyoju," DZZ, p. 59.
of consciousness that is achieved, the nonthinking experience. More laudatory than explanatory, this fascicle presents the world seen in the first dimension of enlightenment, particularly through expressions of its affective descriptors.

"Isn't it lovely—such lusters and lights of the bright jewel are unlimited."11

Lovely, precious, luminous are familiar expressions in the vocabulary of discourse about enlightenment, but these are concepts that extol and express a value judgment more than inform. Some affective concepts, however, provide information about the experience and serve explanatory needs.

Some affective concepts that describe the quality of the d1 originative experience are clarity, play, vivacity, unity and presencing of the universe, time suspension, and release.

1) Clarity. In another fascicle, Dōgen says:

Utilizations of nonthinking are the clear sounds of jewels.12

Here, as in "Ikkamyoju," the reference to jewels is usually interpreted to reflect Dōgen's moral judgment about the use of nonthinking: it is of excep-

11 "Ikkamyoju," DZZ, p. 61.
12 "Zazenshin," DZZ, p. 90.
tional value, beautiful, and praiseworthy. More than presenting attitudes or feelings that attend the experience of nonthinking, however, the passage serves an informative function. It presents the first dimension of enlightenment through concepts that evoke and name feelings. The reference to utilizations (shiyō) indicate that nonthinking can serve useful functions in spite of its being uncalculating, that it is capable of functioning in a manner analogous to sounding out, and that it functions as jewels sound, i.e., clearly.

More than an indication of what the speaker feels about the experience, clarity is a concept that helps other practitioners identify the nonthinking experience through their own discovery of experiences of unusual clarity. It is an idea expressed in words that can convey information about the quality of nonthinking experiences in general. Stories of persons being enlightened by sights and sounds relate occasions of experiences of this clarity of perception. Seng Chao's "What clear seeing, with nothing to be seen!" is a presentation of the first dimension of enlightenment in terms of the concept of clarity.

A concept that originates from a non-conceptual experience may seem to be a logical impossibility, but concepts must originate somewhere and Dōgen views a
concept's creation or appropriation as an act that originates with ippō gūjin, the total exertion of the single dharma. When the dharma is provided with its "field" or "place," and is allowed to live its life with vivacity, it exhaustively lives its field-dependent nature as an exploratory and creative act. When the dharma is totally exerted, it changes. One of the ways it changes13 is in dōtoku, "appropriated expression." The dharma expresses itself. The self-expression of the dharma may take the form of a concept. A unit of experience may express itself as an idea that results from a self-reflexive recognition of a generalization from experience in a form that communicates with others. Clarity is a dōtoku concept. It does not presuppose any experience, concept, or knowledge that is external to d1. Clarity is a quality of the originative experience that has been extracted from the experience, conceptualized, and as concept can be used to serve general functions. It can present the first dimension of enlightenment through an affective concept; it can point out to students what is among the

13 Gyōji is another way the totally exerted single dharma changes. Gyōji, literally, "sustaining praxis" is the follow through of the enactment of the dharma. In other words, when the dharma is totally exerted, the next phase of its metamorphosis is entered and the next dimension of enlightenment becomes operative.
first noticeable changes in experience that clues the practitioner to the occurrence of nonthinking. Non-thinking may be found among daily experiences. The initial problem is to recognize it, and the student may be aided in this task by the concept of clarity. This is an example of a utilization of nonthinking.

In the lineage of dōtoku concepts, clarity is an especially authentic concept, presupposing very little aside from the dō originative experience. It is not the result of an inference from loveliness, preciousness, or brightness. If anything, these affective responses metaphorically express the clarity of the experience. As in Dōgen's notion of ekō henshō, there is an investigative emphasis upon the experience rather than the object of experience, and one of the outcomes of investigation in praxis being reported here is clarity. As a word that serves such functions as reporting, informing, and signifying, "clarity" is a concept that accomplishes more than nonconceptual words that merely present a dimension. Though nearly presuppositionless, it does have implications that are explorable intellectually. It can, for example, give rise to ideas about the obscurity of nonenlightenment and the causes of that obscurity, to notions of non-obstruction and interpenetration, to notions of the
limitlessness and all-inclusiveness of the experience. In this way, the concept of clarity can grow as an explanatory concept, a concept that makes distinctions, a defining concept, a naming concept, and so on. Dōgen says in "Ikkamyōju," "...one bright jewel, though not yet a name, is expression." A authentic concept grows out of experience to become an expression, and then to later name a general concept, distinguishing it from others. Because an authentic concept grows out of a pure experience of nonthinking, it is grounded in experience. Because it is grounded in experience, it is authenticated by experience. Because it is the beginning of other concepts that operate within the parameters of that originative experience, it is not a non-conceptual paradoxical presentation of enlightenment. It is an authentic concept that presents the experience and actualizes it as part of the functioning of the world of d1. This development of concepts out of nonconceptual experience does not occur without effort. It is work, and is the task of the Shōbōgenzō.

The reader of Dōgen's writings about clarity can understand that the experience of nonthinking is signaled by a qualitative change in clarity. In the

14 "Ikkamyōju," DZZ, p. 59.
monastery, the concept can be used to point to an improvement in perceptual clarity as a signal in the recognition of an experience of nonthinking. Sounds and colors become more vivid. Feelings of preciousness and loveliness become keenly perceived. In view of what has been said about the nature of praxis, this description of what happens when praxis is attained makes sense. Zazen entails the dropping of the automatic gauging and entanglements of the thinking mind. When this dropping is accomplished, there is clarity. Stated in another way, in comparison to the clarity of successful praxis, unsuccessful praxis and ordinary thinking are characterized by entanglements and impediments to clarity. When experience is mediated by judgment and calculation, there is restricted clarity. When there is no mediation of judgment and calculation in experience, there is clarity. When there is clarity, there is the experience of things just as they are. Thus, instead of a homiletic admonition to use nonthinking, the passage contains information on how to recognize the experience.

15This is not to imply that judgment mediates between experience and an actual "thing out there," but only that there is no immediacy of experience when judgment becomes the medium through which experience occurs.
of things just as they are.

2) **Play.** When Dōgen refers to a bird flying in its sky or a jewel running freely on its tray, he is evoking the spirit of play that emerges in d1 experience. *Jijūyū zammai*, the samadhi of self-fulfilling enjoyment is a nonthinking experience in which this element of play comes to the fore. Play is the way of expressing the freedom of the single dharma as it plays on the field of limitless potentiality and limitless activity.

The originative experience, of course has none of these determinants, either positive or negative. Without categorizations, without judgments of good or bad, nondifferentiated, experience as perceived at the moment.

3) **Vivacity.** To the first dimension of enlightenment belongs a vigorous sense of dynamism as a dimension of enlightenment is attained in praxis and all identifiable components such as place and the single dharma work together. Dōgen calls it "life" in the following passage.

We can realize that water means life [for the fish] and the sky means life [for the bird]. It must be that the bird means life [for the sky],
and the fish means life [for the water]; that life is the bird and life is the fish.16

Here, Dōgen is referring to the relation between the field of conditions provided by nonthinking (dharma as unit of experience) and that which appears within that field of conditions (dharma as content of experience). The attainment of either is dependent upon the attainment of the other, as it is dependent upon the attainment of the entire dimension of enlightenment. When d1 "works" as a dimension of enlightenment, it is said to come to life. Kappappat and kappatsupatchi, the flapping sounds of a fish as it leaps out of the water, are particularly characteristic expressions of Dōgen that indicate that the attainment of d1 and the emergence of the dharma are signalled by the feeling of vigor in experience. Dharma do not simply exist, they burst with energy in definite, realistic, and perceptible ways. To the practitioner who experiences this vigor when hearing an ordinary sound or seeing an ordinary sight, the vigor and its clarity signal a change in mode of experience from the ordinary to one that is clearer and more dynamic.

4) Unity and presencing of the universe. In "Ikkamyoju," Hsuan-sha is quoted as saying, "The entire universe throughout the ten directions is one bright jewel." In other words, the entire world of the first dimension of enlightenment is presented in and as a unified experience. The attainment of nonthinking is the realization of the unified experience of the entire universe. The allusion to Hua-yen's vision of the universe is evident. The jewel of Indra's net comprehending the universe as it is comprehended by the universe, the luminosity and nonobstructed clarity of the experience, and the relations that characterize the li-shih wu-ai dharma-dhatu are recalled by Gensha's expression.

An affective concomitant to first dimension experience is the rather curious impression the practitioner may have when lifting a bowl of soup for example, that the universe is immediately presencing itself in the bowl of soup being lifted and that this event engages the dynamics that make the universe an all-encompassing and powerful reality. This is understandable when it is recalled that the d1 experience has no external boundaries. Having no external boundaries means that there is nothing that this experience does not exclude. Another way of describing
this experience is to call it the presencing of the universe. When the universe presencing is experienced simultaneously with the other affective concomitant, mutual freedom as the result of mutual provision of necessary preconditions, this results in the impression that the dynamics of the universe is manifest.

In religious terms, the presencing of the universe is the dharmakaya, the experience of the dharma body. The internal dynamics of the universe presences itself in the experience of the moment. In temple activity the entire universe may suddenly appear to be presencing itself in the tea bowl. The affective concomitant of the d1 enlightenment experience and of the authentic experience.

In terms of praxis, unity is the result of being single-minded:

In making a thorough investigation someone must see through it as being weightless, someone must find out it is being single-minded. All ten directions is the nonceasing of pursuing things as oneself, pursuing oneself as things."17

Yet it must be remembered that for Dōgen, this descriptions of unity, presencing of the universe, and the like are accounts of experiences that are inherently leaping out of themselves and flapping like

17 "Ikkamyōju," DZZ, p. 59.
a fish. When unity is experienced, it is experienced with the vigor with which a fish explores the coherence and unobstructed freedom of its water: "Fish swim the water, and however much they swim, there is no end to the water....When their need is great there is great activity; when their need is small there is small activity. In this way none ever fails to exert its every ability, and nowhere does any fail to move and turn freely."18 To a fish, water is not a concept. A fish swims its water, and all of the fish's life is an exploration of the changing perceived particularities of water's nature. The universe presents itself not as a concept, but as a perceived totality with an experienceable nature that is felt to be vigorously flapping out of the experience of the soup bowl being lifted.

5) **Time suspension.** The ordinary sense of time as passage is suspended in d1. Because the d1 experience has no demarcation, the present moment has no bounds and encompasses all time. In terms of temporality, this is the nikon, the eternal present. Rather than a frozen moment in time, nikon is a temporalized term for a d1 dharma. Just as a dharma is not an objectified thing, nikon is not a quantified moment. **Nikon**

expresses in terms of time what is experienced in d1 (experienced-moment-thing-world) in the same way that a dharma expresses the same thing in terms of a "thing."

6) Release. Because experiences in the first dimension of enlightenment are initially preceded by non-enlightenment, some impressions of the distinctive features of d1 are impressions of the change from non-enlightenment. Concepts that describe d1 are thus frequently couched in negative terms. "The essential message is that the whole universe is not vast, not small, not round or square, not balanced and correct, not lively and active, not standing way out...It is not the plants and trees of here and there, not the mountains and rivers of heaven and earth—it is a bright jewel."19

Because experiences of the first dimension of enlightenment generally emerge from a state of non-enlightenment, the affective responses are described in terms of a contrast with nonenlightenment. Hence, authentic concepts assume such forms as "freedom," "unity," and "nonthinking."

The nonthinking experience is intrinsically uninterpreted, but descriptions of the experience are

interpretations inasmuch as they are freighted with an implicit comparison to the previous nonenlightened mode of experience. The nonthinking experience leaves affective impressions that can be characterized by such positive terms as clarity, freedom of activity, play, oneness, unity, and by such negative terms as freedom from egoistic attachments, nonduality, mu, ku, nondifferentiation, and nonthinking. Products of a comparison with ordinary thinking, the negative terminology describes the originative experience in terms of privation of ordinary thinking. Ordinary thinking is placed in a contradictory position here with respect to the nonthinking experience: where one is the other is not, where one is not, the other is.

Because the d1 experience is a shift from nonenlightenment, typical affective descriptors also involve terms that result from a comparison to nonenlightenment. Hence, freedom, exceptional value, and negations of nonenlightened mental activities frequently attend such descriptions.

Section Three:
Internal Dynamics

A fish swims the water, and however much it swims, there is no end to the water. A bird flies...
the sky, and however much it flies there is no end to the sky. The fish and the bird from the first have never left the water and the sky. When their need is great there is great activity; when their need is small there is small activity. In this way none ever fails to exert its every ability, and nowhere does any fail to move and turn freely. Yet if a bird leaves the sky it quickly dies; if a fish leaves the water it immediately perishes. We can realize that water means life (for the fish) and the sky means life (for the bird). It must be that the bird means life (for the sky); that life is the bird and life is the fish. And it would be possible to proceed further (in this way). It is similar to this with practice and realization and with the lives of practicers.20

The standard reading of this passage interprets Dōgen to be illustrating the freedom experienced by the practitioner in zazen. This interpretation makes sense in view of what we know about Dōgen's view about the identity of practice and enlightenment. Nishiari Bokusan21, for example, employs this reductionistic interpretation. Even Waddell and Abe22 render this passage a description of the life of the practitioner of zazen. Hee-Jin Kim holds a similar view, but interprets "life" as the realization-koan (genjōkōan)23 The dictum has been made to come to the fore in this pas-

21 Keiteki.
22 Waddell and Abe, "Genjōkōan"
23 Kim, Flowers of Emptiness, p. 59.
sage, and the entire passage becomes subordinate to this idea made into a principle.

However Dōgen is not painting poetic pictures which merely extol the vast limitless freedom and auspiciousness of the Buddhist world of practice and enlightenment. This interpretation of the passage presupposes the notion of substance. Dōgen is in fact providing a demonstration of the very means to escape from a substance-ascribing description of reality. Dōgen is presenting the operation of experience in the first dimension of enlightenment.

If the practitioner were able to achieve a nonthinking experience, there would be achieved simultaneously the preconditions for the arising of experience without mediating, interpreting, differentiating filters of ordinary experience. In effect what is achieved is an unlimited field of freedom that encompasses the entire world of experience at that moment. World is not the substantialistically conceived world, but rather the total set of conditions that enables and allows the fish to be the fish that it is. There is neither external boundary nor internal division to this field of freedom. Dōgen calls this field of freedom tokoro, "place." This is nonthinking, but nonthinking is never without content. What arises
as the content of the achieved free field of experience is what Dogen calls the single dharma. The arising of the single dharma is dependent upon the field of freedom being provided and the field of freedom is dependent upon the single dharma for its content. The relation that is experienced between the field and the single dharma is the relation of pratitya-samutpada, what Hua-yen calls hokkai engi, the pratitya-samutpada of the dharmadhatu. The world and the experience unit (dharma) constitute each other. Hence, the fish and the water. Dogen says that water is life for the fish and fish is life for the water. Each is a precondition for the other in an indivisible symbiotic unity. In the experience of nonthinking there is no entity that is being represented by either fish or water; there is only one unit, and that is the dharma which is the same as the experience. However, in nonthinking, the relation between fish and water is available to experience as mutual preconditions without either of which there would be no nonthinking. The achievement of nonthinking is the achievement of the world of the fish; it is the achievement of the fish freely expressing its nature which is in turn a product of its world. It is the achievement of a mutual life-giving relation. The life that results is not the result of the efforts of
the practitioner, for there is no awareness or need of practitioner present in this experience. The life that results is not provided by any thing as such. It is what emerges when each moment of nonthinking is provided. If it is caused by anything, the life that emerges is a function of impermanence. The word Dōgen uses for life, shō, also means "birth." If we see impermanence as a constant succession of births of new moments, then continual births is a function of impermanence.

Instead of ascribing freedom to the practitioner in the standard interpretive stance which places the self as the subject, and instead of a restating the doctrine that praxis equals enlightenment, what Dōgen is doing in this passage is depicting relations not between things in a substantialistic manner, but between conditions that are simultaneously achieved in praxis. It is possible to experience relations without experiencing things being related. These relations characterize the unitary nonthinking experience and these relations that characterize the first dimension of enlightenment are what Dōgen is presenting. Dōgen is depicting how the first dimension of enlightenment works, not simply how it feels. By showing how the dimension works, he provides a means of explaining why
it feels the way it does. The concepts that he is presenting have explanatory power lacking in the passage if it were simply laudatory.

Metaphor at the hands of Dōgen goes beyond representational significance. Dōgen is not making a comparison between two things, saying that they are similar in quality. In the above passage Dōgen demonstrates a set of relations in which the relations are clarified and not what the fish represents. The metaphor of the fish is a demonstration of an alternative to the substance-ascripting and reductionistic interpretations of ordinary experience.

The water is not the field of the bird, the bird is not the denizen of the water; and the sky is not the field of the fish, and the fish is not the denizen of the sky. The metaphor isolates two interdependent elements within the dynamics of nonthinking and demonstrates how they are mutually constituting through mutually providing possibility and meaning. Each bestows life to the other and each derives meaning.

Dōgen frequently speaks of a mutual dependence and a simultaneity of two attainments in praxis. Though expressed in many different ways, the paradigmatic expression of this relation and these attainments is what he calls "the single dharma" and its field of
freedom. The single dharma is always dependent on its own field of freedom, and the field of freedom is always dependent on its single dharma. The necessary simultaneity of these attainments can be discovered and verified in praxis, thereby providing knowledge of and a way of speaking about the interdependent co-origination of world of conditions and particular entity that Hua-yen calls dharmakaya pratitya-samutpada. The pratitya-samutpada relation is experienced as a constitutive condition of experience. The experience of this relation as a constitutive condition of experience typifies the first dimension of enlightenment.

In "Zazenshin," Dōgen says:

Were a bird to fly in this sky, it would be the single dharma of its flight-sky. There is no measuring of the activities of this flight-sky. This is because flight-sky is the entire world, because entire-world-flight-sky. Even if one knew nothing of this flight, this expression could be expressed as the bird's vigor....At the time of the flying away from sky, there is the flying away from bird. At the time of flying away from bird, there is the flying away from sky.24

This simple image provides a paradigm of praxis that is much more sophisticated than the nontinking paradigm of praxis.

As "Genjōkōan" specifically states, the precondition for this field is non-objectification, the **sine qua non** of nonthinking: "...were there a bird or fish that wanted to go through the sky or the water after studying it thoroughly, it would in sky or water make no path, attain no place." The word "place" [tokoro] is significant here, for it signifies the preconditional locus for the appearance of the dharma. It is the single dharma's field of freedom. If there is no field of freedom provided by nonthinking, nothing would appear in its free form. In the sense that upon the appearance of the fish the field immediately becomes water, it may be said that the fish gives life to the water, making it what it is uniquely as it stands in this necessary relation to this fish. The same may be said of the bird and its field. It is possible to go on further with an explication of these relations.

Dōgen's image of fish and its water presents the experienced relations that can account for the perceived vitality of the first dimension of experience. The experience-world of enlightenment can be conceptually described in terms of constitutive relations rather than constitutive elements. The first dimension of enlightenment is conceptualizable in terms of the pratitya-samutpada relation that characterizes experi-
ence and world in this dimension. In various contexts, this relation conditions and results in expression in appropriate forms. That is, the relation is not only characteristic of all experience in d1, it gives form to how the relation is manifest in a way that constitutes experience. It gives rise to notions of components of the experience that are being thus related.

The principal relation being presented in the metaphor is between field of freedom and that which appears "in" the field, the single dharma. The dependent co-origination relation gives rise to notions of world and thing on the one hand, and praxis and content of experience on the other, depending on how one interprets the unit of experience, the dharma. The dharma is totally dependent upon the total field of conditions not only for the possibility for its emergence, but also for its nature. The total field of conditions is the nexus of pratitya-samutpada relations among conditions that constitutes what a dharma is. The dharma is totally free in its investigation of the world precisely because it is a product or manifestation of the world. Thus Dōgen says, "When their need is great there is great activity; when their need is small there is small activity. In this way no single dharma ever fails to exert its every ability, and nowhere does any
fail to move and turn freely." Conversely, the field of conditions that gives rise to the single dharma is totally dependent upon the single dharma for its manifestation or expression. Each gives life to the other in specific ways. The sky does not appear to the fish. Water and fish belong together. In nonthinking, there is a specificity and a uniqueness of the relations in its experience. The specificity of the conditions is a function of the particular dharma that appears as experienced moment, as it is a function of the ever-changing field of conditions that constitutes the emergent dharma. The total field of conditions is at once ever-changing and universal; the single dharma is a specific expression of this ever-changing universal set of conditions. In this way we experience the reciprocal relations that constitute the nature of the reorientation to experience that is called the first dimension of enlightenment. In this dimension, all experience is conditioned by this reorientation and the world is experienced and expressed as lively, clear, free, and authenticated in experience. A person in this dimension of enlightenment occupies a standpoint in which every experience, expression, thought, and act presents the nexus of relations and operations of the first dimension of enlightenment. Through these
means, the koan is able to communicate.

Dogen calls the dharma that appears as the particular content of experience the single dharma (ippo). It is the single dharma because it is nondual and because it alone emerges within the field of freedom that nonthinking (samadhi) occasions. Because samadhi is unitary, when the content of that experience is spoken of, it is a single entity. The single dharma moves in its newly provided field of freedom to be what it is. The vividness and vivacity with which it emerges leaves its mark in the understanding as play, freedom, and total exertion.

The experience of nonthinking does not permit a description of the single dharma as a thing as substance that is different from, or as an object that is presented to the subject. This makes logical sense, for there would have been no achievement of nonthinking had there been at that moment: 1) a consciousness of an observing subject; 2) the notion of the thing as conceptually distinguished from what it is not or from what surrounds it spatially or temporally; 3) the entertained notion of it being any different than it is, i.e., having any other accidental qualities; or 4) any of the thinking activities of the observing subject.
Because the experience of nonthinking does not permit a conceptualization of the single dharma as a thing as substance that is different from, or as an object that is presented to the subject, the experience of nonthinking does permit a description of the single dharma as a plausible locus of personal identity. There is nothing else in the experience to which personal identity can be ascribed with the exception of the providential field of freedom which, as will be seen, is nothing other than the single dharma itself.

This is the dimension of enlightenment that is the unitary enlightenment that is often regarded to be the only Buddhist enlightenment. First dimension experience is the experience of the birth of the dharma. It is a birth because it newly emerges.

In a sense, is also the simultaneous birth of the field of freedom, and just as it can be said that the field of freedom gives birth to the single dharma, the single dharma creates the field of freedom as the particular field of freedom, as what it is as a unique, vivid, and vitalized thing-event. The freedom experienced in d1 is a mutually provided freedom that results of provision of necessary preconditions for the other. **Hokkai engi** (Hua-ven's dharma dhatu pratitya-samutpada) is thus discovered in experience.
The word "dharma" has two senses: 1) the single dharma that appears in the field of freedom; and 2) the total unit of experience. They refer to the same experience, inasmuch as the dharma that is said to appear in the experience is the entire experience. This relation is expressed in Dōgen's use of the term _zenki_. *Zenki* literally means "total mechanism" and refers to the way in which the world presents itself to dharma experience, namely as a totally exerted dharma. The entire universe is seen to present itself in each dharmic event. Thus in "Zenki," Dōgen writes, "At this very moment, the boat is the world—even the sky, the water, and the shore all have become circumstances of the boat..."25 In other words, the total field of conditions which constitute the single dharma manifests itself as the single dharma. The dharma as total unit of experience is the single dharma and the single dharma is the total unit of experience. Samadhi has neither internal differentiation, nor external boundary. With no external boundary, the experience is all-inclusive and encompasses the dynamics of the entire universe of experience at that moment. This leaves the

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25 Cleary, p. 45.
affective response called the presencing of the universe, the dharmakaya.

The fundamental d1 relation of hokkai engi can be explained in terms of components such as single dharma and place, and it articulates the reason why affective results of the originative experience arise. The resulting lineage results: originative experience produces affective concepts which produce concepts of relations which produce concepts of components of experience that are being related. In this way all of these concepts derive authenticity from their basis in the originative experience, and in this way the originative experience expresses itself through such particularities as fish, water, bird, and sky.

Other lexical cues. Though we may speak of the practitioner who stands at the standpoint of d1, there is no room for any notion of such a self in the experience itself. In the d1 experience, there is no subject-object experience. Thus the term "no-self" is an appropriate expression. Similarly, there is nothing as such in the d1 experience for the same reason. Thus Dōgen says: "In the seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which the many dharmas are without a 'me,' there is
Reflection upon the d1 experience, however, yields a d1 notion of the self called the "original face." This original face is single dharma totally exerting itself and expressing itself as the actualization of the first dimension of enlightenment.

This is the Original Face experience. The particularity that emerges is a momentary configuration of all of the functions of this dimension disclosed as an experience. There is no self other than this particularity; this moment of experience is who I am. The idea of this being who I truly am arises because rather than this experience being detached and passive, this experience is imbued with a great deal of efficacy and the energy that comes from non-obstruction. This realization is the reconstitution of selfhood while at the same time confirming that the precondition of this is the nontinking act which in turn is nothing other than a demonstration of the truth of nairatmya. If there had been any agency of the ego, nontinking would not have been achieved. Without nontinking, the single-dharma and its function-set would not have been

experienced. Without this function-set of the single-dharma, there would have been no experience of the new particularity of the Original Face. In this way it is seen that the reconstitution of this selfhood is a demonstration of nairatmya.

This new particularity may be called the Original Face, but it may also be called simply a dharma. This entire nexus of functions is divisible conceptually but not experientially at the time. This entire nexus is the new particularity and is the clarified meaning of the dharma.

Conception of self. Unlike a mystical self that is inexplicably understood in such paradoxical terms as "both self and no-self," the concept of self that is revealed in each dimension of enlightenment is thoroughly open to investigation, illumination, conceptual amplification, and expression in ways that are not possible in nonenlightenment or in other dimensions of enlightenment. As a dimension-specific product of enlightened experience, the self is capable of being illuminated in the "turning the light around and looking back" of zazen. In fact, clarity is one of the hallmarks of the attainment of each dimension of enlightenment. Yet, this sense of self as dimension-specific moment of experience is completely different
from self in the ordinary, subject-object discriminat-
ing sense. Just as we ordinarily speak of a self as
that which has an identifying though changing face, the
changing dimension-specific moments of experience are
unique and identifiable. There is thus a self as
identity, but there is no self as essence, agency, or
provider of temporal continuity. The self that is
self-reflexively examined in zazen is thus not the sub-
ject in a subject-object dichotomy, the substrate of
qualities, the efficient cause of actions, the unchang-
ing essence that endures in spite of temporal change,
or the self that is based upon differentiation.

As the changing dimension-specific moment of
enlightened experience, the self is never present to
immediate experience as self, for during the moment of
experience, the experience is too all-encompassing to
admit of an "other" from which the self is dif-
ferentiated. Yet there is identity as definiteness of
the moment of experience brought to clear awareness.
Though a sense of personal identity as the dimension-
specific moment of enlightened experience radically
differs from the ordinary notion of self, when the
Shōbōgenzō presents the various dimension-specific
moments of enlightened experience, it is simultaneously
presenting Dōgen. Dōgen's personhood is presented
within its given circumstances, in its specific modalities of experience, as what is seen by Dōgen's authentic eye of the dharma. The Shōbōgenzō conceptually presents the product of Dōgen's ekō henshō, "turning the light around and looking back." This product is important not for what he wrote about the world of experience, but what his writings reveal about the worlds within which he responds to the particularities of his experience. Thus when Dōgen caps a discussion of enlightenment with mention of flowers falling to the emotion of yearning, the reader is treated to a view of what it is like to see the world through the eyes of Dōgen's enlightenment. This reading leaves the reader with an insight the personhood of Dōgen much more intimately than would a reading that reaps information about what flowers do or what Dōgen feels. In it, Dōgen reveals his "original face" (honrai no memmoku) when he looks at a fish and when he looks at a bird. Fish and bird are not symbols, they are Dōgen's experiences that present his original face. What fish do and how they live are described in Dōgen's writings as presentations of the activities and relations that belong both to enlightenment's first dimension and Dōgen's original face. Through his discussion of fish, he demonstrates a definite sense of self that
can be verbalized in the language of koan presentation. The art of zazen can thus be understood as the illumination of ordinary experience in a way that reveals its transforming structures and activities.

Section Four:
Interdimensional Dynamics

Dharmas are intrinsically relational and they are intrinsically impermanent. Impermanence characterizes change from dharma to dharma and from dimension of the dharma's life to dimension of a dharma's life. Dharmas not only have a set internal relations that characterize their operations, but these operations are linked to changes between dimensions of a dharma's life.

In terms of praxis, the attainment of a dharma is the result of a stark exercise of nonthinking called shikan taza. Shikan taza is not a passive exercise that results in a passive experience. It begins as an exercise that requires the total involvement of the person who must be fully engaged in the experience at hand. Providing the field of nonthinking in which the single dharma can make an entrance requires a total exertion of shikan taza. Once having achieved the field of freedom for the single dharma, the single
dharma is not passively allowed to enter and live; the attainment of d1 is an active engagement in the life and activities of the single dharma. Just as the total exertion of shikan taza is the provision of the field of freedom for the single dharma that enters, the total exertion of the single dharma is an activity intrinsic to shikan taza. The total exertion of the single dharma is called ippō gujin. İppō means single dharma and gujin means total exertion or total exhaustion. When a single dharma is totally exerted, it exhaustively fathoms the existential and expressive possibilities of its world in each of its actions and gives life and identity to its world. The totally exerted single dharma in ippō gujin becomes the fulfillment of its world, its possibilities, shikan taza, and the first dimension of enlightenment.

While the active engagement of ippō gujin is the fulfillment of d1, the activity of shikan taza does not end there. Difficult to attain, ippō gujin is experienced as an effortless play that exhausts its dimension and in so doing effects datsuraku, "falling away." D1 Datsuraku is the falling away of everything that was attained in d1: the mode of experience, the single dharma, the freedom, the place, the relations that characterize experience, the authenticity of d1 lan-
guage, and all other d1 activities and attributes. In praxis, ippo gūjin seems to cause datsuraku because the attainment of ippo gūjin is the occasion for the realization of datsuraku. Inpo gujin is also a necessary attainment for the realization of d1 datsuraku. The datsuraku that occurs upon the exhaustion of d1 in ippo gūjin cannot occur without the attainment of d1.

In praxis, a student may attain nonthinking without attaining ippo gūjin when for example, the attainment is experienced passively. Because ippo gūjin is a separate accomplishment in praxis, nonthinking is not a sufficient condition for the attainment of ippo gūjin. The same is true for datsuraku. The attainment of ippo gūjin may provide the necessary condition and occasion for datsuraku, but ippo gūjin, datsuraku, and the causal relation between the two are all separate attainments in praxis. For this reason, ippo gūjin is not a sufficient condition for the realization of datsuraku. Because ippo gūjin is the necessary condition and occasion for d1 datsuraku, ippo gūjin may be regarded as a trigger mechanism for effecting a change of dimensions.

Just as ippo gūjin is the trigger mechanism for d1 datsuraku, d1 datsuraku is the trigger mechanism for the originative experience of the next dimension of
enlightenment. Again, this trigger mechanism provides only the necessary but not the sufficient condition for the realization of the d2 originative experience.

Section Five:
Assessment of Explanatory Capabilities

In the seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which the many dharmas are without a 'me,' there is no delusion, no enlightenment, no buddhas, no sentient beings, no birth, no extinction.27

The first dimension of enlightenment is able to explain the popular conception of Buddhist enlightenment experience. As nonthinking, it is an experience of undifferentiated unity, it is nonconceptual, nondualistic, and fundamentally different from ordinary experience. Things are experienced in an all-encompassing and undifferentiated manner that precludes their ordinary experience as definable and objectified things. Hence, terms like "no sentient beings, no birth, no extinction" have their experiential basis in nonthinking. It is also able to explain how pratitya-samutpada is experienceable and verifiable in praxis as a relation that is fundamental to all clarified experi-

ence. Unlike the popular conception of enlightenment, however, the first dimension of enlightenment is not ineffable. Rather, it is definable in terms of relations that are accessible in experience and is furthermore a process of expressive activity that transpires when the single dharma is totally exerted. Through this process, a vocabulary of concepts develops which are authenticated by the experience and imply other concepts that explain experience in the first dimension.

As has been treated in a previous section, the li-shih schema afforded Hua-yen relief from the unfortunate association of negativity and ontological reification with the sunyata-rupa schema and providing at the same time a means for multiplying accountability of their internal relations by factors of ten while rendering the entire discussion more amenable to investigation in praxis. While clearly adopting the Hua-yen paradigm shift, Dōgen does not adopt their terms. An inspection of the disadvantages of the li-shih terminology will reveal points of departure that will place Dōgen's project in relief against the Hua-yen background. Two disadvantages are: 1) the appropriateness of li as descriptive term for what is investigated in praxis; and 2) the inability of the li-shih schema
to adequately account for the metaphysics and phenomenology of impermanence.

Although more accessible to investigation in praxis than sunyata, li as principle remains elusive as a descriptive term for what is investigated in praxis. Dōgen's answer to this deficiency is his notion of "place."

Let us examine a representative d1 passage in which Dōgen mentions many d1 themes in close proximity. The passage is from "Bendōwa," an introductory lecture on the fundamentals of his notion of praxis.

When even for a short period of time you sit properly in samādhi, imprinting the Buddha-seal in your three activities [deeds, words, and thought], each and every thing excluding none is the Buddha-seal, and all space without exception is enlightenment. Accordingly, it makes buddha-tathagatas all increase the Dharma-joy of their original source, and renew the adornments of the Way of enlightenment. Then, when all classes of all beings in the ten directions of the universe—the hell-dwellers, hungry ghosts, and animals; the fighting demons, men, and devas—all together at one time being bright and pure in body and mind, realize the stage of absolute emancipation and reveal their original aspect (Original Face), at that time all things together come to realization in themselves of the true enlightenment of the Buddha, utilize the Buddha-body, immediately leap the confines of this personal enlightenment, sit properly beneath the kingly Tree of Enlightenment, turn simultaneously the great and utterly incomparable Dharma wheel, and expound the ultimate and profound prajña free from all human agency.28 (My emphases.)

Conceptual and Explanatory Inadequacies. Because of the inherently unitary nature of the d1 originative experience, there is no experiential basis for any concept of multiplicity other than a multiplicity that is obtained by reflecting upon a series of d1 originative experiences. Within a given dharma (and that is all that is given at any one moment) there can be no simultaneous experience of a plurality of entities in d1, so there can be no authentic concept that involves multiplicity or separation in time. There can be no comparison, conjunction of ideas, or goal-oriented thinking. There can be no judgment of good or bad in this dimension. There can be no authentic thought of helping others in this dimension.

Because the d1 dharma in its total exertion necessarily casts off and is moment-specific, Buddhism speaks of impermanence. Also because of this, however, it is also true that the relation between d1 dharma and d1 dharma is not a pratitya-samutpada relation. Neither is it a relation of ordinary causality, for that presupposes a substance agent which has no basis as the findings up to this point confirm. The relation between d1 dharma and d1 dharma cannot be explained.
within the parameters of the functions inherent to the first dimension of enlightenment.
Chapter 5

Jūhō-i:
The Second Dimension of Enlightenment

An ancient buddha said:

Uji (being time) is standing atop a high high peak;

Uji is traversing the bottom of the deep deep ocean;

Uji is having three heads and eight arms;

Uji is sixteen feet and eight feet;

Uji is a pillar, staff, and whisk;

Uji is a pillar and a lantern;

Uji is Chang's third and Li's fourth;

Uji is the great earth and the empty sky.1

Dōgen's use of Yueh-shan Wei-yen's (745-828) remarks about a multiplicity and diversity of being times (uji) issues a challenge: attain and identify the originative experience that authenticates this ancient buddha's words, for the d1 experience is incapable of authenticating them. With only nonthinking, a buddha could not speak authentically of anything but a single entity at a time. The d1 undifferentiated and all-inclusive samadhic experience alone can offer no grounds for knowledge or expression of a multiplicity of entities. Yet Yueh-shan's statement is a conjunction of apparently simultaneous being times having a multiplicity of forms. The first dimension of

1 "Uji," DZZ, p. 189.
enlightenment does not have an originative experience that can make it possible for an old buddha to maintain that uji is a pillar and a lantern, the earth and the sky. In d1, there may be expressive forms, but there can be no communication, for there are no two beings between which communication can take place. An exclusively d1 enlightenment invites philosophical problems such as solipsism if the all-inclusiveness of d1 experience entails the exclusion of any reality external to personal experience. D1 enlightenment invites religious problems such as lack of compassion, if the unity of d1 experience precludes the possibility of judgment of happiness or suffering and no recognition of any "other being" to help.

Experientially and operationally distinct from d1, there is another dimension of enlightenment (d2) in which there are such concepts as the many buddhas, sentient beings, enlightenment and nonenlightenment. Dogen calls this dimension the jisetsu (seasonal time frame) in which the many dharmas are buddha dharmas:

In the jisetsu (seasonal time frame) in which the many dharmas are buddha dharmas, there is nonenlightenment/enlightenment, there is praxis, there is birth, there is death, there are the many buddhas, and there are sentient beings.2

In this jisetsu, there is not only a dharma, there are multiple dharmas. These many dharmas are not merely facts, they are buddha dharmas. Buddha dharmas are consummate dharmas that enjoy a position and identifying stature among other dharmas that are absent in the experience of the single dharma. The d1 single dharma is inextricably bound by the determinations of its conditioning field. In spite of its freedom in exploring the water, the fish is defined by and limited to its watery environment. It is this very causal determination that affords the fish its freedom, for it can never exceed its determining field no matter what its activity may be.

In the jisetsu of buddha dharmas, however, each buddha dharma is the consummate product of the d1 total exertion of the single dharma—not the product of a pratītya-samutpāda relation among other buddha dharmas that populate d2. The many dharmas of d2 are free of the unifying and conditioning relation that precludes the experience of self, identity, and consummation of the d1 single dharma. Hence, it is possible to speak of discrete sentient beings and buddhas in d2 but not in d1. The continuity of relations that constitutes the nature of the d1 single dharma contrasts with the discontinuity that allows the many dharmas in d2 to be individuated buddhas.
Dōgen's frequent reference to じゅうじ, "abiding in the dharma station," raises interpretive difficulties for the reader of Buddhist literature. "Abiding" and "station" are notions that flatly contradict the momentariness and the impermanence that is basic to Buddhism. "Non-abiding" and "stationlessness" are familiar notions that describe the view of enlightenment that characterizes Zen Buddhism and the first dimension of enlightenment in particular. A preservation of this logical contradiction between abiding and non-abiding is vital to an understanding of Dōgen's presentation of the second dimension of enlightenment. The logical contraddictoriness of the notions indicates a discreteness of the languages in which they operate, and the discreteness of their languages indicates a discreteness of the experiential and expressive origins of these languages. The second dimension of enlightenment differs from the first because it has a different originative experience, different affective responses, different concepts that express the experience and its affective responses, different languages in which the concepts operate, different means of actualization of the experience, and different causal relations.

The single-dharma in d1 would not be said to abide (じゅする) in its field, its existence being inherently
momentary. Yet firewood is said to abide in its own dharma-station. The word ju is commonly associated with the view of permanence, the substantialistic view of the self or thing in which an abiding essence continues its existence through time indefinitely. The word ju is the second character of jōju (Skt. nitya), the view which is refuted by Buddhism and specifically criticized in Dōgen's Bendōwa. In the Keitoku Dentō-Roku, it is used synonymously with attachment characteristic of non-enlightenment. The dharma of firewood is distinct from its dharma-station, a position it did not enjoy in the first dimension.

Juhō-i presents a separate dimension of enlightenment with its own originative experience, affective concomitants, genealogy of concepts, and operations. The logical contradictions that arise when components of these two dimensions are compared should be neither celebrated as paradox nor dismissed. Logical contradiction in the Shōbōgenzō rewards a search for its reconciliation. The logical contradiction in languages is resolved by what may be called a "praxeological" identity. In praxis, when one attainment is discovered to cause an attainment of a different kind, there is an experienced identity of effect and cause. The attainment of the cause occasions the attainment of effect.
and the attainment of effect is tantamount to having attained the cause. The attainment of the effect is dependent upon the attainment of the cause. For example:

To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one's self. To learn one's self is to forget one's self. To forget one's self is to be confirmed by all dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas is to effect the casting off of one's body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. All traces of enlightenment [then] disappear, and this traceless enlightenment is continued on and on endlessly. 3

The learning of one's self is logically contradictory to the forgetting of one's self, and yet an intelligible relation between the two activities can be investigated in praxis. In terms of what is experienced in praxis, the forgetting of self results in the learning of self. Upon the occasion of forgetting the self, the learning of self results. The learning of self is thus dependent upon the forgetting of self. The converse is also true. Authentic learning of self is the forgetting of self. The occasion of the learning of self is the occasion of the forgetting of self. The forgetting of self is dependent upon the authentic learning of self because of a praxeological identity.

Similarly, a praxeological identity between d1 and d2 becomes intelligible when a d1 cause results in a d2 effect. When the practitioner can wield the total exertion of the single dharma in d1 to produce the dat-suraku precondition for the emergence of a consummate dharma in d2, and when the practitioner can read d2 the jūhō-i experience for its presentation of the accomplishment of the total exertion of the single dharma in d1, the practitioner discovers a praxeological identity of d1 and d2 that makes the logical contradictoriness of their resulting languages intelligible. Not merely, intelligible, the logical contradictoriness of the two ways of expressing the nature of enlightenment serves an important presentational function: it presents separate dimensions of enlightenment as distinctly different standpoints from which the expressions were uttered. Causally linked but discrete experiential attainments generate and authenticate separate languages. Jūhō-i (multiple and discrete dharma stations) is a concept that originates from a d2 experiential attainment and belongs to the language of the second dimension of enlightenment. It has no meaning in the language of first dimension of enlightenment and is not experienced within nonthinking. The second dimension's causal links and genealogy of concepts are outlined in the sections to follow.
Section One:
The Originative Experience
and its Affective Consequences in Praxis

Praxis makes the d1 originative experience yield changes in experience such as datsuraku that in turn lead to a separate originative experience in d2. Upon this second originative experience is based a separate dimension of enlightenment. Dōgen refers to the d2 originative experience variously as jūhō-i, "abiding in the dharma station," uishinjin, "authentic person with determinate rank," or "becoming a buddha."

The d1 to d2 transition is a change in the status of an experience. Not only do dharmas change from one to another, there is a change in phases of a particular dharma's life. This change in phase is first realized in an experience called "becoming a buddha."

The originative experience in d2 is the awareness a buddha has that it is a buddha. In d2 there is the awareness of particularity as a consummate dharma. Distinguished from the exhilaration experienced in d1, particularly when there is a fresh emergence from non-enlightenment. In d2 there is a sense of identity and consummation as a dharma that is intrinsic to the d2
experience. Identity was the product of a retrospec-
tive and reflective inference in d1, but the locus of
identity in d2 is the originative experience itself.

In contrast to d1, the typical d2 affective con-
cept is not play, but rather a radiance, an afterglow
of play. The d2 dharma is not at play in a field of
freedom, it abides in its own fixed station. Using the
"net of Indra" metaphor that characterizes d2, the
dharma unit may be free in its unobstructed interrela-
tions with other dharma units, but it is nevertheless
tied down in a fixed position with respect to the
entire unity. Rather than play in its field that
expands and contracts according to the extent of its
exertion, the d2 dharma unit merely beams. This is the
experience of "abiding."

The originative experience of the second dimension
of enlightenment is a type of consummation that is
explanatory in terms of Hua-yen temporality. In con-
trast to the linear temporality of nonenlightenment and
the eternal constitution of the moment temporality of
the first dimension, Hua-yen's temporality figures the
moment as constitutive of the all in such a way that
there is a simultaneity of infinite particular-
universes without any obstruction among them. An
understanding of their constituting activities and non-
obstruction is possible if Hua-yen dharmadhatu and temporality were considered in terms of Dōgen's ekō henshō, or illumination of experience in praxis.

Section Two:
Internal Dynamics

It is not the case that firewood that turns to ash can thereupon turn back to being firewood. Just so, one should not hold the view that ash is after (firewood) and firewood is before (ash). Bear this in mind: firewood is abiding in the firewood-dharma-station which has before and after, but though we can say "before" and "after," it is really in a state of contextual disengagement. Thus we can say that ash, at the dharma-station of ash, has before and after. In the same way that after firewood becomes ash it does not become firewood again, after a person dies he does not come back to life. Because it is the orthodox Buddha Dharma to refrain from speaking of life becoming death, it speaks instead of "non-arising." Because it is the orthodox turning of the Dharma Wheel that death does not become life, it speaks of "non-extinction." Life is a station of a single-time. Death is a station of a single-time. This is as winter and spring—one does not think that winter becomes spring or say that spring becomes summer.4

Winter does not become spring but is a stage of time, as a dimension is a stage of experience. One dimension does not become another dimension but instead retains its unique mode of conditioning experiences. Life does not become death and death does not become

life. Each retains its discreteness as stages of experience. As stages of experience, dimensions also have a sequence to their appearance. Dimensions as stages of experience have a "before and after" a temporal context provided by praxis as a process. Yet, dharmas that appear in d₁ and d₂ do not have a "before and after." In d₁, nikon time is an all-inclusive perception of a moment that has neither before nor after. In d₂, there is an experience of the many buddha dharmas in a purview that Dōgen calls kyōryaku (or keireki), the time of ranging.5 Just as there is an indeterminacy to the sequence with which peaks in a mountain range can be viewed, there is an indeterminacy to the sequence in which past, present, and future buddha dharmas are experienced in d₂. This indeterminacy in which Yueh-shan speaks of past, present, and future being times (uji) in the passage that begins this chapter typifies the ranging nature of the kyōryaku purview of dharmas. Just as a mountain range can be viewed left to right, up to down, or near to far but still retain a coherence to individual perceptions, kyōryaku time retains a coherence to its arbitrary sequencing.

5 "Ranging" is Thomas Kasulis' interpretation of kyōryaku that aptly draws upon the metaphor of the visual experience of mountain ranges to explain kyōryaku time perception.
Uji "ranges from today to tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from yesterday to today, from today to today, and from tomorrow to tomorrow." 6

The term kyōryaku connotes a coherent connection. Kyō (or kei) refers to the warp of a woven fabric and is the Chinese term that translates sutra; and reki means continuity or passage as in the term rekishi, "history." In kyōryaku, though buddha dharmas do not enjoy temporal or causal connections among them, there is again a Hua-yen hokkai engi relation that each buddha dharma has with totality.

Dōgen appears to view this "totality" not as an aggregate totality to be found in the (d2) jūhō-i experience, but as the sublated achievement of the total exertion of the (d1) samadhic experience of the dharma. Each (d2) buddha dharma enjoys a hokkai engi to its sublated attainment of (d1) unity, but strictly speaking, there is no hokkai engi relation operative in the (d2) jūhō-i experience.

Firewood is at the hō-i (dharma station) of firewood and is beyond before and after. In d2, each dharma has its own station within which it takes up residence (jū). In d2 there are many dharma-stations,

6 Waddell and Abe, "Uji," p. 191.
each with its own dharma. In the dharma-station of firewood, the firewood dharma is a consummated (buddha) dharma that is in a timeless world beyond karmic past and karmic effects. Each dharma is a separate buddha dharma having its own particularity and its own station in the scheme of things.

In spite of the relation between Hua-yen time and dimension two, it is important to stress the fact that in じゅはい, the dharma-stations stand to each other in a relation of a-temporality. There is no such thing as one dharma-station coming before another. To understand this notion, we need to return to the Hua-yen conception of the universe. According to this view, each particular (shih), is utterly discrete with respect to each other and yet encompassing all of time within itself. Although providing a dynamic view of time with respect to particular time and universal time, there is no temporal relation among particulars whatsoever. One particular neither becomes another particular nor is there any antecedent conditioning by other particulars.

じゅはい, abiding in the dharma-station, is Dōgen's experiential description of what Hua-yen calls the fourth dharmadhatu. Illustrated by the net of Indra, the fourth dharmadhatu is a timeless domain of
infinitely many jewel-like particulars, each shining with the radiance of a mutually constitutive relation to totality. Each particular is totality, and though an infinite number of discrete totalities would seem to follow from this, there is no contradiction in saying that these particulars co-exist in the same totality: there is no obstruction between particular and particular. There is no overlap or contention for the same place in the total scheme. This is not a spatial universe. As each particular is unbounded temporally, it includes all time, making the particular moment a timeless moment beyond before and after. This is not a temporal universe. "Past" dharmas are arrayed with "present" and "future" dharmas without any regard to their relative positions. "Neighboring" dharmas do not relate to one another in any causal, karmic, or neighborly manner at all—the pratītya-samutpāda relation in this dharmadhatu does not apply to relations between dharmas but only between each dharma and totality.

In d2, each dharma is a realized buddha and is beyond the generation of karmic effects on other dharmas. Each buddha dharma is cut off from temporal or karmic causation. Dōgen calls this condition zengo saidan, "contextual disengagement" or "temporal disengagement." Zengo means "before and after" or "con-
text" while *saidan* means "cutting off." There is a discontinuity between buddha dharmas that affords each buddha dharma its own station, particularity, identity, and rightful self. The d2 buddha dharma has a determinate station in life, disengaged from temporal and causal relations with other buddha dharmas.

A (d2) buddha dharma's station is not determined by other buddha dharmas in the way that ordinary conceptions of causation would suggest. In the ordinary conception of causality, an independent thing exerts a causal effect upon a different independent thing. The relation of *pratitya-samutpāda* in effect replaces this ordinary notion of linear causality between objectified things. This ordinary notion of causality between buddha dharmas is absent in d2. Zengo *saidan* in effect denies not only this ordinary causal relation, but also the *pratitya-samutpāda* relation between one buddha dharma and another. One buddha dharma does not create or cause another buddha dharma. Each buddha dharma has its own station and identity.

While the dharma that abides in the dharma station may be timeless, the dimension it occupies is set within a time framework (*jisetsu*) that is determined by praxis. In one sense, d2 is the collective dharma station of all buddha dharmas, and is preceded by d1 and
succeeded by d3. It is in this sense that the dharma station of firewood has "before" and "after."

Although we ordinarily may speak of something becoming another thing, in praxis, we can never actually experience a thing as a before or as an after. In d2, the practitioner experiences dharmas within dharma stations within which there is no causal effect exerted from prior dharmas or to future dharmas.

If the nature of causality were determined by the nature of the preceding dharma, that causality would be very different from pratitya-samutpāda. Dōgen says that even were one to appropriate one dharma completely in ippo gijin, the completeness that obtains is itself insufficient by virtue of the dōri of the dharma. That recognition of completeness ignores the dōri of the dharma as it displays the infinite range of remaining virtues. Dōgen speaks of completeness in terms of "roundness" and "directional" in terms of "having corners" both playing with the dual meanings of "en" and "ho" respectively in the passage about embarking "into the midst of the mountainless ocean":

Ride a boat, go out into the midst of the mountainless ocean, and in looking in all directions, there will only be roundness. One does not see any quality other than roundness. However, this great ocean is neither round nor cornered,
its remaining ocean-virtues are inexhaustible. It is a palace, a necklace of jewels.  

The first part of this passage refers to the (d1) dimension of the single dharma. There are several signals alerting the reader to this. "Ocean" is traditionally related to samadhi, as in "ocean image samadhi." "Mountainless" refers to the sense of there being "nothing other" than the single dharma (the ocean). The Japanese term for "all directions" literally means "four directions," but may be pronounced "yomo" which is alludes to part of a koan demonstrating the samadhi of the single dharma on its pure field. A representative example of this is the koan, "Fushizen, fushiaku, shō, yomo no toki nako ka, nanji ga honrai no menmoku ikan?" ("Not thinking good, not thinking bad, right at this moment, what is your original face?") These qualities of samadhi, there being "nothing other" than the single dharma, and the "original face" type of koan signify the dimension of the single dharma.

The second part of the above passage refers to the (d2) dimension of jūhō-ī. Within the d1 dimension of the single dharma, there is a blindness: "One does not see any quality other than roundness. However, this

7 "Genjōkōan," DZZ, p. 9.
great ocean is...a palace, a necklace of jewels."

Though there is the vision that there is the entire universe present and displaying itself, that moment is blind to the fact that this is not the only dimension of experience. Another dimension of experience in which the above blindness can be recognized and overcome is the (d2) dimension of jūhō-i, "abiding in the dharma-station."

Blindness in the above passage is a reference to the experientially discrete nature of these two dimensions of enlightened experience. In the (d1) nonthinking experience, there is no (d2) jūhō-i experience. In the (d2) jūhō-i experience, there is no (d1) nonthinking experience. The (d2) concept of jūhō-i (multiple and discrete buddha dharmas) has no meaning within the language of d1 concepts. The (d1) concept of mutual interdependence has no meaning within the language of d2 concepts such as zengo saidan, "contextual disengagement." This inherent blindness is what is referred to in the "one side is in darkness" passage: "When one side is brought to light, one side is in darkness."8 The blindness is reciprocal, as this passage suggests.

8 "Genjōkōan," DZZ, p. 7.
The blindness of the $jūhō-i$ dimension originates from the contextual disengagement ($zen'go saidan$). In this dimension there is multiplicity but it is a multiplicity of dharmas that have no causal efficacy among themselves. Each dharma at this dimension is unable to produce effects, except by datsuraku, and at datsuraku, there is either the (d1) dimension of the single dharma or the (d2) dimension of the specious dharma. No dharma in d2 is caused by any other d2 dharma.

Dōgen also says of the array of discrete buddha dharmas in $jūhō-i$ in terms of kyōryaku time:

The world now is arrayed and presented as the horse and sheep and this has the ascendancy and descendancy of the suchness of $jūhō-i$. The rat is also a time, the tiger is also a time. Birth is also a time, budhha is also a time.9

In this passage Dōgen is saying that $jūhō-i$ has its correlate in the traditional way of reckoning time in which the day is divided into twelve "hours," each with the name of an animal. The hour of the horse is roughly from 11:00 in the morning to 1:00 in the afternoon; the hour of the sheep is from roughly 1:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon. Cardinal directions are also reckoned with the same animals. The horse is due south; the sheep is 30 degrees west of south. In this

9 "Uji," DZZ, p. 191.
sequence of time and directionality, there is an ascent and a descent. The morning hours of the rabbit, dragon, snake, and horse (east to south) are said to be ascendant and the afternoon hours of the sheep, monkey, and bird (southwest to west) are considered descendant. Contrary to a rectilinear and unidirectional conception of time, the twelve animal (jū-ni-shi) way of reckoning time has reversing directions of ascent and descent. Furthermore, as an animal, each time has a face, a life, and a name. Thus, uji and jūhō-i are both arrayed in the world in such a way that permits multidirectional possibilities. In a given day, there is a multiplicity of animals, each keeping to its own position. In jūhō-i there is similarly a multiplicity of dharmas, each keeping to its own dharma-station. In this dimension, there is a separation of dharma-stations such that the multidirectional possibilities are disclosed. However, since the determinant of the actual direction taken is technically not explicable within this dimension, the notion of ascendancy and descendancy will be treated in the next chapter. Suffice it to show here that Dōgen considers these jūhō-i arrayed out in the world like animals in an undulating field.

In contrast to the first dimension of enlightenment, in the second dimension of enlightenment, there
are unique and independent particulars within a given moment of experience. Uniqueness is lateral in the (d2) jūhō-i dimension (no two buddha dharmas within a d2 experience are alike) and vertical in the (d1) dimension (a comparison between two d1 experiences shows that no two nonthinking experiences are alike).

If Dōgen regarded Hua-yen's four dharmadhatu as discoverable in praxis, then he might have construed the dharmadhatu as holometabolous phases through which the dharma as unit of experience changes. Much as sea­sons undergo complete transformation in the way the year is experienced, the four dharmadhatu might thus be temporalized as moments in the constant metamorphosis of each dharma. The third dharmadhatu, li-shih wu ai, might be construed as the first dimension of enlighten­ment, for in it there is the nonobstruction of origina­tive experience realization and single dharma. The fourth dharmadhatu, shih-shih wu ai, might be construed as the second dimension of enlightenment with the non­obstruction of abiding dharma (which constitutes a con­summate universe) and abiding dharma (which also con­stitutes a parallel consummate universe).

The last dharmadhatu in the Hua-yen scheme is the shih-shih wu ai dharmadhatu, the dharma-universe of the nonobstruction of particular and particular. In
Dōgen's scheme of dimensions of experience, the dharmadhatu are as jisetsu, "seasonal time frames" in the experience of each dharma. Each jisetsu has its unique "universe" of experiences, concepts, and causal relations. Each jisetsu (dimension) sublates all previous jisetsu (dimensions) in such a way that the concluding jisetsu (d3) sublates (and is thus simultaneous with) the other jisetsu.

The particular shih of the fourth dharmadhatu then constitutes not only the entire universe, but sublates all the other dharmadhatu as dharma phases as well. Sublation entails not only an active inclusion but also a dependence upon the sublated components. That is, the other dharmadhatu or dharma phases are preconditions of the realization of the sublating dharmadhatu.

Identity locus and Identity conception. As in d1, the primitive experience is the locus of personal identity, the basis for personhood and original face of the person. Moreover as in d1, the conceptions of identity alternate between the major components. In d1, personal identity is at times conceived as the single dharma, as when the artist "becomes" the tree being painted. At other times, personal identity is conceived as the place that is provided to the single
dharma, as "the self that allows the dharmas to advance."

Similarly, in d2, the primitive experience is the locus of personal identity, the basis for personhood and the original face of the person, and similarly, in d2, the conceptions of identity alternate between the major components. At times personal identity is conceived as the dharma abiding in its dharma station, and at other times, personal identity is conceived in terms of the "All" of all dharma stations.

The "true person of particular with station" (ui no shinjin or uishinjin) passage provides an example of this. Nakamura Shuichi compares Rinzai's mui no shinjin to Dōgen's ui no shinjin:

"Mui no shinjin." "Mui" means not being attached to causality. "Shinjin" is the Original person. "Mui no shinjin" is the liberated person. "Ui no shinjin." "Ui" means attachment to causality. "Ui no shinjin" means that the person who has not been liberated from intentions is also the true person with the Inherent Mind of Original Liberation." 10

The two phrases under consideration differ in only one word: one contains _mu_, "with no," and the other contains _u_, "with." In the above explanation by Nakamura, Rinzai's "true person with no station" is

described as the enlightened person, making Dōgen's "true person with station" the unenlightened person who, by virtue of the inherent enlightenment of all beings, is somehow a true person as well. Three observations about this interpretation are of interest to us here. In the first place, there is nothing incorrect about this interpretation. It misrepresents neither Buddhism nor Dōgen. Secondly, there seems to be no other way to interpret these phrases, short of demoting Rinzai's term to refer to the nonenlightened person. This latter alternative would not only be too a drastic alteration of traditional interpretation, it would commit an injustice to the significance of Rinzai's thought and deprive the conception of intelligibility. Because of its inescapably opposite form Dōgen's ui no shinjin exhibits in contrast to Rinzai's conception, logic would compel agreement with Nakamura's conclusion that ui no shinjin refers to the unenlightened person. However, this interpretation appears to assume that enlightenment is unidimensional. Third, the account of Dōgen's position rests upon a logical inference based upon doctrine. The point of Dōgen's conception can be represented in the following manner: if the Buddhist doctrine of Inherent Mind of Original Liberation is true, then the unenlightened person is enlightened but
does not realize it. The unenlightened person is enlightened. The significance of this inherently enlightened person seems to be what Dōgen is charging Rinzai of failing to recognize.11

Based upon these observations taken up in reverse order, the following criticisms can be made. First of all, it is clear that the interpretation is alleging that Dōgen is using logical inference combined with the prior acceptance of doctrine as the method by which the point about the actual enlightenment of the unenlightened person is made. This is not a faithful account of Dōgen's project, either in terms of how he arrived at such insights, nor in terms of how he presents his insights. If this were the reasoning behind Dōgen's point, Dōgen could have easily resolved his major doubt at the age of fifteen without ever feeling the need to go to China. In terms of presentation, Dōgen does not often resort to the use of such terms as "therefore" and "because," but when he does, it is seldom employed in a straightforward way that draws upon the force of logic to argue a point. One example here might illustrate this point: that we do not speak

of birth becoming death is an established teaching in Buddhism, and it therefore speaks of the "unborn." 12

Although the logical conclusion indicator "therefore" (yue ni) is used, if logic were being appealed to here, then the conclusion to be drawn would have had to have been "no-death" rather than the "unborn." something else is evidently being appealed to here, and whatever that may be, it is not recognized by the above interpretation by Nakamura.

An example illustrative of this occurs in Dōgen's discussion that immediately precedes his introduction of the phrase, ui shinjin.

As there is the mastering of mind-edification at the time of no-person, there is the mind-edification of the domain of not reaching the field. As there is the mastering of the mind-edification at the time of existing person, there is the mind-edification of the domain of not reaching the field. There is the mastering of the no-person of the mind-edification, there is the mastering of the mind-edification of no-person. As there is the mastering of the mind-edification at the time of existing person, there is the domain of the mind-edification not reaching the field. There is the mastering of the no-person of the mind-edification, there is the mastering of the mind-edification of no-person. There is the mastering of the "this-person" of the mind-edification. There is the mastering of the mind-edification of the "this-person." 13

The "this-person" is a neologism referring to the standpoint of the "who is this?" koan of Zen master Sumitsu. Dōgen explains:

The "who is this" is the "inside mind-edification, essence-edification" of Zen Master Gohon. Accordingly, the time of the speech-appropriation of the "who is this" and the time of the thinking-appropriation of the "who is this" are the "mind-edification, essence-edification." As for this "mind-edification, essence-edification," others still do not know this place.14

The "place" referred to here is the realization-phase that we are calling the second dimensional enlightenment. Dōgen is saying here that other than the heretical (substantialistic non-enlightened) view that "mind-edification, essence-edification" normally evidences,15 and again other than the "mind-edification, essence-edification" of no-person (of first dimensional enlightenment), there is a phase of realization to which belong the "who is this," the "mind-edification, essence-edification" in the new sense, and by context, the "this-person." Dōgen is saying here that all of these are presentational words presupposing the appropriation of a separate phase of realization.


15 For Dōgen's earlier denouncement of the view espoused by "heart-edification, essence-edification," see Sōtō "Mountains and Waters Sutra," p. 260.
realization. This separate phase of realization is soteriologically more advanced than the other phase, as indicated by Dōgen's use of such terms as "still" and "not yet" in the following:

Rinzai's power of exhaustion in speech-appropriation can only attain "mui shinjin" (the true person of no-station) and does not yet speech-appropriate "ui shinjin" (the true person of particular station).16

It is in the same passage and context that Dōgen writes:

As for this "mind-edification, essence-edification," others still do not know this place.17

"This place" is the second dimension of enlightenment.

There is the mastering of the no-person of the mind-edification,

This is Rinzai's understanding.

There is the mastering of the mind-edification of no-person.

This is the work of philosophers who follow Rinzai.

There is the mastering of the "this-person" of the mind-edification."

This is the phase of uishinjin.

There is the mastering of the mind-edification of the 'this-person.'

Here Dōgen is saying that analysis of mind of the ūi shinjin is possible and this is precisely the project that Dōgen is engaging in here. Without the notion of phases of understanding, the above passage would be but repetitions of the same theme in different permutations of form. More than this is certainly Dōgen's intent.

Because of a presupposed multidimensionality of enlightenment, Dōgen can speak of the "authentic person with a particular station" (ūishinjin) as an experiential implication of Lin Ch'i's "authentic person without rank." Dōgen's expression makes a point of differentiating Lin Ch'i's d1 realization and expression from the d2 realization and expression. Just as d2 is not a denial of d1, Dōgen's expression does not deny Lin Ch'i's expression its authenticity.

D2 depends upon d1. Without the nondualistic experiential alternative to substantialism afforded by d1 nontinking, there would be no possibility of enlightenment in either d2 or d3. D1 nontinking provides the necessary condition for the d2 and d3 originative experiences to emerge as enlightenment experiences. Another necessary condition for the
The emergence of $d_2$ and $d_3$ originative experiences is a product of the total exertion of the single dharma in $d_1$: datsuraku.

**Section Three:**

**Interdimensional Dynamics**

Total exertion of the originative experience in $d_1$ is the necessary condition and occasion for datsuraku; datsuraku is the necessary condition and occasion of the originative experience in $d_2$; and the $d_2$ originative experience is the necessary condition for $d_2$ expression. To effect these and other causal relations between attainments in praxis constitutes an activity Dōgen calls gyōji dōkan, the continuity activation of the Way-cycle.

It should be minutely investigated that because gyōji is not engi, engi is gyōji. The gyōji that presents this gyōji is this our present gyōji. The now of gyōji is not the self's abiding essence. The now of gyōji is not something that enters and exits the self. The tao (speech act or Way) called now is not antecedent to gyōji, the presentation of gyōji is called now.18

Gyōji (continuity activation) is more primordial than engi (pratitya-samutpāda) because gyōji is the necessary condition for the engi dimension ($d_1$). The

18 "Gyōji," DZZ, p. 123.
total exertion of the engi dimension, however, effects gyōji's transformation to the next dimension (d2).
Hence, Dōgen says that "because gyōji is not engi, engi is gyōji." In other words, gyōji is not limited to the engi dimension, but instead activates and is activated by the total exertion of the engi dimension.

Because of the activation of gyōji, d2 and d3 become possible, and the dharmas of these dimensions owe their emergence to gyōji.

Through gyōji (continuity activation), there is the sun and moon, and there are the stars. Through gyōji (continuity activation), there is the earth and the heavens. Through gyōji (continuity activation), there is the conditioned body-mind. Through gyōji (continuity activation), there are the four elements and five skandhas.19

Gyōji is the activation of the causal chain that links one dimension of enlightenment to another. The continuity of transformations constitutes the praxis of all enlightened beings. The causal relations between attainments in praxis are activated through gyōji. Without gyōji, there would be no transformation and no orderliness to transformation. There would be no activation of the cycle of transformations from one dimension of enlightenment to another in the career of

the enlightened dharma. This cycle of transformations is called the Great Way of the buddhas.

In the Great Way of buddhas and buddha ancestors, there is always the supreme gyōji that activates the Way-cycle (dōkan) without any discontinuity. Awakening to the desire for enlightenment, praxis, bodhi, and nirvana never pauses, and this is gyōji dōkan, the continuity activation of the Way-cycle.20

Like seasons in the life cycle of an enlightened dharma, dimensions are discrete yet orderly in their transformations. As experiences, there would be no spring without winter. Without spring, there would be no summer, and so on. There is no thing called winter that becomes spring, nor is there any winter to be found in spring. Yet there is change and an orderliness to change. In a similar manner, there is a cycle to the change in dimensions of enlightenment that is activated by each dimension's fulfillment. Just as each year is different, each dharma is a radically different and unique particularity regardless of orderly transformation in modes of being that it shares with other dharmas. Just as a year is not a thing but the orderliness of the change in seasons, a dharma is not a thing but the orderly dimensional transformations of its unique condition-informed particularity. The

orderly transformations in dimensions is the Way-cycle of the buddhas that gyōji activates.

In terms of expression as well, seasonal changes parallel the way in which dimensions relate to each other. Just as spring may be read as an expression of the year's seasonality and as an expression of the severity of the preceding winter, a dimension may be read for its expression of the orderly change in dimensionality of enlightenment and its expression of the nature of the preceding dimension. A dimension's expressive forms present not only the dimension of their origin, they also present the consummation of the previous dimension's dharma.

As dōtoku entails expression of original experience into concepts that are based on causal relations that explain the original experience, the process of reading presentational concepts entails (as a reversal of the sequence) an understanding of the conceptual expression as the result of its origin in a particular originative experience. The understanding of concepts in presentational expression is a kind of reading process. Reading entails seeing letters as words and reading ideas. The reader sees the effects of the author's expression (words and letters) but reads the cause (ideas) of the author's expression. Reading pre-
sentational language entails seeing forms (concepts) and reading dimensions. Seeing a d2 expression and reading its presented d2 attainment is the task of the master in the sanzen interview when the student presents a response to a d2 koan. Knowing the student's history of attainments, the master also can read the authenticity of that (d2) response by reading the d1 attainment that authenticates the d2 attainment that is presented in the d2 koan response.

The relation that allows the master to read a d1 authenticating experience in a d2 presentation is necessary for: 1) the authentication of a d2 originate experience; and 2) the eventual ability of the student to perform authenticated but traceless activities without awareness of enlightenment. The relation that d1 attainments have to d2 attainments may be called "sublation." In chemistry, the term "sublation" refers to the synthesis one chemical into another as, for example, oxygen sublates in water. Though oxygen loses all of its familiar properties in the process, it still functions in its sublated condition. Analogously, the d1 originate experience loses all of its familiar properties in its sublation in d2 but still functions in its sublated condition. It authenticates its successors ("buddha ancestors") that
are attained in praxis. In this way, expressive d2 forms actualize the d2 originative experience and its sublated d1 attainments that made the d2 originative experience possible.

The complete attainment of the consummation of buddha dharmas in d2 praxis results in datsuraku. As in the case of d1 datsuraku, d2 datsuraku is occasioned by the consummation of the dimension in praxis. With datsuraku, everything falls away: the mode of experience, the applicability of the formerly authenticated language, the content of experience, the sense of identity, causal relations appropriate to the former dimension, and other determinates of a dimension. With the fall of the dimension, the possibility for a new "season" in the Way-cycle of the dharma emerges.

Section Four:
Assessment of Explanatory Capabilities

In the seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which all dharmas are buddha dharmas, there is delusion/enlightenment, there is praxis, there is birth, there is death, there are the many buddhas, there are sentient beings.

Having the experiential base of a d2 originative experience, a person can speak from experience about a
multiplicity of particulars. These particulars, moreover, are consummated in their expressive and actualized forms as well as in their authenticity. These particulars are what Dōgen calls "buddhas." Birth is a buddha, sentient beings are buddhas, "there are the many buddhas."

Dōgen is able to express in terms of praxis-based attainments what Hua-yen expressed in terms of dharmadhatu, li, and shih. Like Hua-yen, Dōgen stresses meditative practice as fundamental to the soteriological project. Not dwelling only in silent meditation, however, active and voluminous expression were also hallmarks of both. Moreover, this expression was characteristically not a description of the path to enlightenment as it leads from the ordinary way of looking at the world, but rather expression of the world from the standpoint of enlightenment. Also common to both was that they did not use the term "enlightenment" very much considering the primacy of enlightenment to their expressed task. The reason for this was that neither were looking at enlightenment as one thing from the standpoint of enlightenment set in didactic contrast to non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is neither a single event nor a single-faceted state. In both Hua-yen and Dōgen's views there is a complex
and identifiable structure to the nature of enlighten-
ment that permits an enlightened person to actualize
and express enlightenment in a complex and multi-
dimensional world of experience.

Because of the second dimension, Dōgen is able to
account for two relations that are not engi relations.
One is gyōji, the activation of the continuity provided
by the causal relations between dimensions. The second
relation that is not an engi relation is the relation
among dharma stations in jūhō-ji. Because of the dis-
creteness of the domains of experience and expression,
Dōgen can express the nature of enlightenment in logi-
cally contradictory ways. Because of the causal rela-
tions in experience that connect dimension to dimen-
sion, Dōgen is able to point out a praxeological
identity of dimensions that reconciles apparent con-
tradictions and makes the celebration of paradox for
its own sake unnecessary.

Contrary to a popular Buddhist emphasis upon con-
tinuity and unity through pratītya-samutpāda, there is
a further dimension in which the pratītya-samutpāda
causal relation is suspended among entities. This sec-
ond dimension of enlightenment permits a reconsidera-
tion of such basic Buddhist conceptions as causality,
continuity, totality, unity, non-duality, and time.
Dōgen departs from Hua-yen's world view in two significant ways. First, the Hua-yen view seems to admit of the particular shih being influenced by the aggregate or totality of particulars in the universe. Dōgen's view of jūhō-i does not, or at least the totality with which the d2 particulars relate is to be found in the d1 experience of unified totality. Unlike Hua-yen's view of totality, Dōgen's view of dimension one provides him with an escape from a view of totality as a mathematical aggregate because the universe exercises its causative influence by presencing itself through the life of the single-dharma. The universe that presences itself in Dōgen's dimension one is not a composite universe, for there is no room here for a multiplicity of things to make up the universe. The universe at d1 is as yet the undifferentiated field that provides for its life to emerge as the single-dharma.

Other explanatory benefits. The truth of the first dimension can obscure detection of the second dimension. This occurs when, for example, Dōgen's conception of "the identity of practice and enlightenment" shushō ittō, is interpreted as a universal dictum about which all of what Dōgen is saying is illustrative. When shu, "praxis" is identified with zazen and zazen
in identified with jijuyḥ samadhi, non-thinking, and kindred conceptions, then logic compels the identification of the first dimension with enlightenment, with two unfortunate consequences. In the first place, the identification of many conceptions with a central notion results in a reductive interpretative methodology that impoverishes rather than contributes to a body of ideas related to enlightenment. In some cases, the truth of the identity of notions obscures the investigation of their uniqueness.

Conceptual and Explanatory Inadequacies. Although d2 is able to account for the authenticated conception of multiple particulars in experience, these particulars stand to each other in an atemporal, non-causal, and non-spatial relation that makes them incapable of responding to other dharmas. Buddhist notions of compassion and upaya that are so essential to the career of the bōdhisattva would have no place in either d1 or d2. The (d1) samadhic experience admits of no "other" to which the single dharma could respond. In samadhi, there is neither any judgment of pain, unsatisfactoriness, or suffering that could engender a compassionate response. The d2 experience admits of no response, compassionate or otherwise, between dharma and dharma in their separate stations. It remains for another
phase of experience for the dharma to accommodate compassion and upaya as authentic experiences and activities of the enlightened being.

The timeless consummation of dharmas in d2 may well explain the development of a dharma, but it seems to make the Buddhist notion of impermanence unnecessary. If (d2) buddha dharmas are consummate dharmas, then they lack nothing as dharmas. If they lack nothing, then there is no need to speak of change, growth, or impermanence. The temporality and impermanence that characterize Dogen's accounts of experience would have little relevance to (d1) nikon "eternal moment" and (d2) jūhō-i (multiple atemporal stations) modes of experience if there were no third dimension and no connection between all three dimensions.

Furthermore, in spite of the notions of consummation and mastery that originate in d2, ordinary acts of judgment and human emotions remain unaccounted for in either of the two dimensions considered thus far. There would be no sense of historicality, no social consciousness, no sense of direction or growth in either d1 or d2. If enlightenment is to have any effect upon how we live, make decisions, and relate to each other, then d2 serves the practical efficacy of enlightenment even less than d1.
When in the d2 jisetsu a buddha experiences itself as a buddha, that self-awareness is a sign of incomplete realization. "When buddhas are genuinely buddhas there is no need for them to be conscious that they are buddhas. Yet they are realized buddhas, and they continue to realize buddha." D2 is unable to explain how this notion of an unself-consciously realized buddha is possible, and it remains for its relation to yet another dimension of enlightenment to serve these and other soteriological, explanatory, and philosophical purposes.

Chapter 6

Chōdō:
The Third Dimension of Enlightenment

To be confirmed by all dharmas is to effect the casting off one's own body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. All traces of enlightenment [then] disappear, and this traceless enlightenment is continued on and on forever.¹

The confirmation by all dharmas is a d2 activity that results in datsuraku, "falling away" or "casting off." D2 activities fall away, and all traces of enlightenment disappear. However, this is the occasion for another transformation. A traceless dimension of enlightenment, d₃, emerges.

When buddhas are genuinely buddhas, there is no need for them to be conscious that they are buddhas. Yet they are realized buddhas, and they continue to realize buddha.²

In contrast to d₂, awareness of both buddhahood and presentational activity as an affirmation disappears in the third dimension of enlightenment. Dōgen uses a common Buddhist image of the flight path of the waterfowl to refer to the tracelessness of enlightenment in d₃. He says, "Datsuraku is...the flight path of

² "Genjōkōan," Waddell and Abe trans., p. 134.
The achievement of datsuraku in praxis is tantamount to the achievement of d3. A waterfowl flying over a pond leaves no traces of its flight on the water. It is not conscious of making any impression and no impression lingers after the passing of the bird. The tracelessness of the waterfowl's flight characterizes activity within d3. There is no awareness of residual traces of d1 or d2 to be found in d3 activities. There is no consciousness of presenting d1 or d2 attainments in d3 activities. Yet, just as the bird does create a reflection in passing, d3 activities present their sublated d1 and d2 attainments that cause changes in experiential modes. In other words, d3 activities actualize d1 and d2 attainments without intention or awareness.

Presentation occurs in d3, but not as an attainment or affirmation. The significance of dōtoku disappears and is replaced by the continuity activation of gyōji. D3 activities lack the significance of being presentational dōtoku attainments. There is no longer any awareness of anything to be expressed, nor is there any awareness of any noteworthy accomplishment. D3 activities nevertheless perform operations such as the

3 "Busshō," DZZ, p. 27.
presentation of sublated dimensions. This natural and unself-conscious presentation by daily life activities is a special type of kōan presentation, genjōkōan.

When this place is attained, it genjōkōan through daily activities (anri). When this way is attained, it becomes genjōkōan through daily activities.4

The attainment of "this place," that is, the attainment of nonthinking, is a d1 activity that can be investigated in praxis as part of the causal chain that leads to its presentation by (d3) daily activities. The attainment of place may have been accompanied by the awareness of a remarkable clarity and freedom in d1, but it occasions and provides the necessary condition for dimensional transformations within which it becomes sublated in (d3) daily activities. Because the attainment of place activates transformations that lead to its sublation in and through daily activities in an unself-conscious manner, Dōgen says that it genjōkōans (genjōkōan su). Because the d3 presentation of the sublated (d1) place is no longer accompanied by the (d1) awareness of remarkable clarity and freedom, the (d2) awareness of consummation, or the awareness of presentation, it is a traceless presentation.

4 "Genjōkōan," DZZ, p. 10.
But it is not only the (d1) place, but also a more advanced attainment in praxis, the interdimensional continuum of transformations that Dōgen calls the "way of impermanence," mujō no dōri, that is also sublated in and presented by daily activities. As Dōgen indicates in the above passage, mujō no dōri becomes genjōkōan through traceless activities in the third dimension of enlightenment. Genjōkōan in d3 is a koan presentation that sublates not only the previously discussed dimensions, but also the way of impermanence within which these dimensions are phases of experience.

Dōgen says that "Mirror-polishing has a way of its own, a genjōkōan; this is no false theory." He examines this "way" in his commentary upon the tile-polishing encounter between Ma-tsu and Nan-yueh in which Nan-yueh uses a tile to question Ma-tsu's ten-year practice of zazen:

What is of great importance in this passage is that though many have thought in the hundreds of years since the incident, that Nan-yueh had urged Ma-tsu to practice and practice, this is not in fact necessarily the case. The daily activities of the great Sage are far beyond the sphere of the deluded. If the Great Sage did not have the method of tile-polishing, then how would this accommodate the upāya for the salvation of others? (Providing) this strength for others is the bones-and-marrow of the buddhas and the ancestral buddhas. Even if fabricated, it is still as an article of furniture. If it had not been as an article of furniture or household item, it should not have been handed down in the house of buddhas. Indeed, there is immediate contact
with Ma-tsu, pointing directly, without calculation, to the true transmission of merit of the buddhas and the patriarchs. Correctly understood, at the time of the tile-polishing becoming a mirror, Ma-tsu makes himself a buddha. At the time of Ma-tsu making himself a buddha, Ma-tsu immediately becomes Ma-tsu. When Ma-tsu becomes Ma-tsu, zazen immediately becomes zazen. Thus is polishing a tile to make a mirror preserved in the bones-and-marrow of the venerable buddhas. Hence, there exists the tile become the mirror of the ancients. At the time of the polishing of the mirror, past polishing becomes unblemished. It is not that the tile has any dust on it, it is just the tile-polishing of the tile. This is the place of the presentation of the merit of mirror-making as it is the improvisational practice of the buddhas and the ancestral buddhas. If tile-polishing did not produce a mirror, then neither could even mirror-polishing produce a mirror. Who would conceive that within the function of "making" there is "making a buddha" and also of making a mirror"? Or again, at the time of polishing the mirror of the ancients, could there be such a thing as mistakenly polishing something into a tile? Under the conditions of the time of polishing, there is no room for the calculations of other times. Yet, the utterance of Nan-yueh must truly be the expression (dotoku) of expression (dotoku) and hence in an ultimate sense, it is this that is the tile-polishing becoming a mirror. People today should pick up the present tile and try polishing it; they will assuredly become a mirror....Who is it that knows the mirror of the tile coming and the tile presenting? Who is it that knows the mirror of the mirror coming and the mirror presenting?5

The original passage of which this is a commentary presents Ma-tsu making the point that zazen for the sake of attaining enlightenment is pointless, presumably because of an instrumental view of praxis

such an intention entails. Dōgen is traditionally seen as rescuing zazen from this fallacy by pointing out that the very time of the polishing of the tile is the time of polishing the mirror. In short, praxis is simultaneous with the attainment of enlightenment.

While the interpretation of this lesson is unquestionably well taken, it seems that with his talent with words, Dōgen could certainly have managed to have made this point more succinctly without prolonged reiteration, especially when he can be seen to be making the very same point on numerous other occasions. Instead of marveling at the different ways Dōgen can say the same thing, the practicing monk would do well to heed the passage's message about the transformation of dimensions that leads to genjōkōan.

Far from commending Ma-tsu's example of years of resolute and unwavering (d1) zazen, Dōgen is recommending a complete transformation out of d1 to d3 praxis. Countering Ma-tsu's resolute adherence to exclusively d1 praxis, Nan-yueh uses an ordinary thing, a tile, to query that adherence and present the upaya possibilities inherent in a d3 transformation. Upaya as a compassionate response to the existential needs of another is impossible in d1 because there is no "other". It is impossible in d2 because dharmas are
completely disengaged from each other; there is no
"reaching out to another dharma." In d3, however, as
ordinary and unself-conscious a household article as a
roof tile can present in genjōkōan fashion the trans­
formative possibilities that are within enlightenment.
D1 enlightenment can become d3 enlightenment. A tile
can become a mirror, and in the process help Ma-­tsu to
become Ma-­tsu (d2). Ma-­tsu maintained a noble practice
of d1 praxis, but was taught by a tile to have
nyunanshin (flexible mind), a mind that is ready to
undergo transformations even within enlightenment. The
presentation of the tile was a genjōkōan presentation
of the (d1) place, (d2) consummation of self, (d3)
ordinariness, and the way of impermanent dimensions of
enlightenment, mujō no dōri. "People today should pick
up the present tile and try polishing it; they will
assuredly become a mirror....Who is it that knows the
mirror of the tile coming and the tile presenting? Who
is it that knows the mirror of the mirror coming and
the mirror presenting?"6

Section One:
The Originative Experience in Praxis and Its Affective Concepts

Because the Buddha Way originally leaps out of having many and having none, there is birth/extinction, delusion/enlightenment, and sentient beings/buddhas.

Though we might say that such is the case, blossoms fall pathetically, and weeds proliferate to our consternation.7

Pathos and consternation are emotional results of a failure of conditions to meet personal expectations. Expectations are born of personal attachments that become standards by which conditions are judged. Judgment, attachment, and expectations are hardly activities or conditions one would expect in any dimension of enlightenment, particularly when dharma accounts stipulate that the suspension of precisely these directed activities of the mind is a necessary precondition of originative experiences. One would hardly expect to find such emotions as pity, hate, frustration, and consternation in enlightenment, and Dōgen recognizes these expectations, for he writes, "Though we might say that such is the case..." In spite of the difficulty with which dimensions of

enlightenment are understood and attained, this passage claims, there is the appearance of simple emotions that can only result from self-centered desire. Ever since the Four Noble Truths were expounded, self-centered desire has been identified as the root of suffering that enlightenment undercuts. If this root of suffering is severed by enlightenment, then how is it that there can be pathos in the falling of flowers and consternation at the proliferation of weeds in enlightenment? It is with this question that the "Genjōkōan" fascicle begins. It is the absence of this question upon the arising of even such emotions that characterizes the dō originating experience. Tracelessness is the experience of unquestioning naturalness with which all facts of human experience sublate and present the praxeological achievements of the previous dimensions of enlightenment in the continuum of mujō no dōri. Without intention or awareness on the part of the enlightened person, ordinary facts of human experience present the transformations of dimensionality in mujō no dōri. Thus, ordinary facts can present sublated dimensions in genjōkōan fashion, and ordinary facts can expound, effect transformations, and help people.

The answer to the question of how such emotions arise at all in enlightenment requires a reexamination
of the question within a larger context of
dimensionality and praxis. **Shikan taza** is the practice of zazen in which the immediate conditions and content of experience are experienced without judgment, the taking of stances, or categorization. There is neither the pursuit of individual thoughts nor their avoidance. Not even a meditative object or theme is employed in **shikan taza** to attain this non-judgmental praxis.

**Shikan taza** is nontinking made into praxis that can be performed, described, and prescribed. When a painful thought arises, it is not judged as undesirable or driven away. The painful thought is experienced and allowed to pass on, being replaced by another thought. As praxis, **shikan taza** is a means of attaining nontinking.

However, **shikan taza** is also an effective means of actively expressing and actualizing nontinking. When the given facts of human experience are encountered, regardless of whether they are "enlightened" or "unenlightened," mine or another's, real or imagined— they are engaged as a samadhic experience. One does not simply observe them, the fact becomes the single dharma that is in a praxeological relation of identity with its place of freedom, and this dynamic unity is identical to observer and observed, painful and non-
painful, mine and the world's. This samadhic experience is never purely passive but expresses itself in the given conditions as it engages and activates gyōji and the transformation of experience in subsequent dimensions of its career. The samadhic painful thought becomes a consummated (buddha) dharma in d2 and a helpful dharma in d3. Like the tile in the hands of Nanyueh, the d1 painful thought is transformed into the transformative d3 genjōkōan which is nothing other than an ordinary fact of human experience being what it is. All facts of human experience, whether of suffering and attachment or liberation and consummation, and whether mine or another's, are indiscriminately engaged in this manner in shikan taza. There is nothing special about shikan taza since it is the experience of things as they are, but the engagement in the experience of things as they are is the activation of mujō no dōri, the way of transformation of dimensional experience. Shikan taza is the originative experience of the third dimension of enlightenment.

It is said that the enlightened person is extraordinarily ordinary in appearance and bearing. Judgment, attached emotions, compassion, purposive action, are activities common to both (d3) enlightened persons and nonenlightened persons. There is no self-consciousness of enlightenment in either.
Certain feelings more intense in the third dimension of enlightenment: impermanence and compassion, for example. A sense of impermanence is intense because impermanence is inherent in a radical structure of all experience. Compassion is intense because of the identification with all beings as they go through the deaths and struggles that are inherent in engagement with all beings.

The recognition of originative experiences in d1 and d2 are accompanied by pronounced affective responses that make such realizations described in terms of bliss and ecstasy. The d3 originative experience is remarkable for its lack of such affective responses in spite of the radical transformations inherent in the origination of a totally different dimension of enlightenment.

Section Two:
Internal Dynamics

In great Sung China, there was a lay person by the name of Su Tung-p'ō, whose official name was Shih and whose courtesy name was Tzu-chan. A veritable dragon in the ocean of letters, he studied the dragon-elephants of the ocean of buddhas, swimming in its unfathomable depths and soaring to its cumulus clouds. One day when he visited Lu-shan, he was awakened to the Way upon hearing the sounds of valley streams flowing at night. He composed a gatha, and presented it to Ch'ān Teacher Ch'āng-tsung, which ran:
Valley sounds are the (Buddha's) broad, long tongue,
Mountain sights are his pure body.
Eighty-four thousand gathas [heard] at night—
How can I expound to people on another day?....

How pitiful it is that we so often seem left out of the transformative process of the dharma-discourse through the [Buddha's] manifested body. How is it then that we still see the mountain sights and hear the valley sounds? Should we construe these as a single phrase [of the Buddha's dharma-discourse]? As half a phrase? As eighty-four thousand gathas? It is regrettable that there are sounds and sights hidden in the mountains and waters; yet, we should be glad that there are occasions and conditions manifest in the mountains and waters. The movements of the "tongue" are never remiss; how can the sights of the "body" be subject to appearance and disappearance? Even so, are we to understand that when they are manifest they are near? Or are we to understand that when they are hidden they are near? Are we to construe them as a single piece? As halves?...

On the day preceding the night of his awakening to the Way, this lay person had sought instruction from Ch'an Teacher Tsung concerning his talk on the nonsentient's dharma-discourse. Though radical change did not occur immediately upon hearing the master's words, when he heard the valley sounds [on the following night], it was as if the raging waves had leaped high into the heavens.8

The transformative processes of the Buddha's body are the natural activities of d3. There is nothing more tracelessly unaware of its processes than an insentient being, yet even insentient beings perform expounding and transformative operations. Even insentient beings

undergo dimensional transformations. First appearing as a single dharma in its field of freedom which is its precondition and its expression, a dharma totally exerts itself and "falls away." This datsuraku is a precondition and occasion for the realization of another dimension of the dharma's life in which the dharma enjoys a consummation along with, though disengaged from, other (buddha) dharmas. The consummation of the dharma in d2 effects another datsuraku which in turn establishes the precondition for the emergence of the dharma as a genjōkōan, an ordinary being engaged in its relations with other beings.

Through total exertion and consummation, the dharma effects a transformation of its world through datsuraku. In a more positive way as well, the total exertion and consummation of dharmas give rise to forms of expression that are their vocation and world. In these ways, each dimension in the life cycle of a dharma is dependent on the actualization of the preceding dimension and is experienced in praxis as the actualization of the preceding dimension.

The actualization of d1 takes the form of the total exertion of the single dharma. The total exer-
tion of the single dharma is the occasion and necessary condition that effects datsuraku. Datsuraku is the precondition of the emergence of d2 experience. The consummation of the d2 dharma is the occasion and necessary condition for datsuraku, and datsuraku is the precondition for the emergence of d3 experience. The d3 dharma is the product of all of these operations and as such sublates and presents all of them. Itself the product of a transformative process, it presents the "way" of these transformations. Should a person be transformed by a d3 dharma, it would be a result of its insentient presentation of the transformations of dimensions inherent in impermanence. The Buddha's broad long tongue is this continuity of transformations through which compassionate enlightening activities are performed.

Unlike words and actions in nonenlightenment, d1, and d2, words and actions in d3 to not present the specific dimension in which they operate. The (d3) tracelessness activities means that they do not present d3 in the mode of expression called presentation as either an affirmation or attainment. D3 activities do not announce themselves as being of a particular dimension. Suchness, normally conceived as the state of things being as they are without the constraints of
noneslightened thinking, assumes a different sig-
nificance in the third dimension of enlightenment.
Here, suchness (tathata, or J: immo) distinguishes d3
ordinary things and activities from those of d1 and d2
because of the absence of the announcing quality of
other dimensional presentations. In d3, things are
just as they are. Genjōkōans do not announce them-
selves as d3 authenticated events. Ordinary words are
used for the vocabulary of d3.

In d3, words and actions do not present d3, but
they do originate from a d3 experience and they do sub-
late the accomplishments of previous dimensions. D1
and d2 realizations are logically and praxeologically
prior to the d3 realization. D3 shares the dharma-
based standpoints of d1 and d2 in contradistinction to
the substance-based standpoint of nonenlightenment. Its
nonsubstantiality is a consequence of its sublation of
the experiential attainments of d1, its rightful
identity is a consequence of its sublation of d2, and
its impermanence is partly a consequence of its subla-
tion of the activated continuum of transformations of
dimensions. These processes of sublation take place
without intention. Whereas other dimensions employ
presentation as a mode of expression, d3 does not.
What is cast off in d3 is the presentational sig-
nificance of actions and words. This is what tracelessness means.

The acts of daily life ordinarily entail a juxtaposition of particulars, as for example, when one decides to go to the refrigerator for a snack. This decision entails the comparison of the merits of this act against the merits of other possible courses of action, say, washing windows. Of the two dimensions examined thus far, none has an experience capable of encompassing the two alternatives of action that entails their judgment of individual and relative merit that in turn usually entails a consideration of such details as future consequences, personal responsibility, and so forth. In d3, judgment is the compulsion of necessity that is based upon the presentation of praxis-clarified experience.

When a dharma is cast off, tracelessness results. This has two implications for the next dharma. The first implication is that any dharma is free to appear. There are no residues that limit or stipulate what the next dharma is to be. The second implication is that even though there are no conditions set for the next dharma, the very absence of conditions is itself a special achievement. It is, after all, the precondition of the next single dharma to appear in its freedom.
This means that the next dharma has the necessary (though not sufficient) condition for being enlightened.

The difference in time experience is one difference between $d_2$ and $d_3$. With regard to the disjunction of "when one side is illuminated, onaku, when Dōgen speaks of "when one side is illuminated, one side is in shadow," the word he uses for "presented" is a homonym for the word which has a Japanese reading terasu, meaning to illuminate, an obvious counterpoint to the word kurashi, meaning "dark." This light-dark relation describes the relation between kyōryaku and nikon. For one thing, at the time of nikon, there is only the awareness of an immediately presencing world of experience, not moments in time. Though the immediately presencing reality is limited to the present moment, that moment is not an infinitely small segment of time that would yield a frozen snapshot experience. The experience of the nikon moment is the moment of one activity, as in the boat example given in "Zenki." There is at that moment only the rowing of the boat, so much so that there is no perimeter and no outside to the awareness. Hence, there is the distinct impression that the entire universe is present, presenting itself in all its inherent dynamics of presencing in co-
origination. Everything arises together and the realization, the life of the moment permeates that entire universe of that moment. As it arises, so it vanishes entirely at the appearance of the next moment and its entirely new universe of nikon. Zenki and the single dharma are the same experience. They are conceptualizable in terms of one that explains the other, but their experience is in the time mode of nikon. At the one moment of nikon, there is no awareness of the moment as being one among other moments. On the contrary, there is the distinct impression that everything and all time is present. From the standpoint of kyōryaku, however, this latter impression contains a blindness. What is hidden in that moment is the presence and possibility of other discrete moments.

Just as there is a praxeological identity of cause and effect, there is a praxeological difference between dimensions. Dōgen refers to this discreteness in the experience of different dimensions as a blindness. When Dōgen speaks of "one side illuminated and one side in darkness," he is referring to this praxeological difference between dimensions of enlightenment. This blindness can be likened to the blindness the sun experiences as the act of illumination simultaneously makes it unable to see any shadows in its world. Any shadow

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would be hidden by the object creating the shadow. The sun in its position of illumination harbors a self-deception that detracts nothing from its role and provenance. It detracts nothing because this condition is simply in accordance with the way light and shadow relate to each other. Dōgen is not saying that darkness represents nonenlightenment. He is making the point that even within enlightenment, there is the actualization of transformation from one dimension to a praxeologically different dimension. There is a multi-dimensionality to experience within enlightenment.

Enlightenment should leave no mark upon the person. In monastic life, this point assumes an especially prescriptive tone: monks are warned that having the "smell" of enlightenment is a particularly odious aspersion, referring to the wearing of one's attainment like a badge. Philosophically, tracelessness refers to the need for even emptiness (sunyata) to be empty if it is to be genuine. Hence the distinction between nirvana and samsara is ultimately untenable from the standpoint of genuine nirvana. Soteriologically, tracelessness refers to the demythologizing of attainments, leaving behind all awareness and residue of buddhahood, sunyata, or freedom, yet actualizing these in daily activities with an ordinary bearing.
The tenth of the Ten Oxherding Pictures shows a person entering a village with swaying arms. Being affable among people in the ordinary world without reaching out to grasp or give means that the enlightened person's activities and bearing are natural, without any hint of intention or mission. The import of the image of arms hanging loosely at one's sides is made more explicit in the second case of the P'i Yen Lu. The commentary says of Chao Chou, "He's trifling with us a bit. The fish's swimming muddies the water. The flying bird drops a feather behind." Here, reference to the bird showing its feathers is an assertion that Chao Chou is revealing his command of the matter a bit too obviously. The residue of the bird is a display of flaunting impudence.

The forte of the d1 adept is intensity and the d1 chauvinist is likely to be overbearing. The forte of the d2 adept is authority and the d2 chauvinist is likely to be self-righteous. Counteracting these tendencies is another realization: the mastery of dat-suraku.

With the falling away of the d2 dharma stations along with the passing from d2, the dharma as momentary unit of experience undergoes a breakdown of the temporal and causal barriers that separated d2 dharma
stations. When this happens, the many dharmas relate to each other within a temporal and causal mode of experience. Whereas in d2, the many dharmas were experienced as consummate buddha dharmas, in d3 the many dharmas are juxtaposed in ordinary relations that include entanglements, attachments, and compassionate activities. Through such relations, the particularities and combinations of unique conditions make each dharma a historically constituted event. Each dharma is a historical dharma in d3, exerting its temporalized and conditioned experience as a particular among many particulars in a shared time continuum. Unlike the substance-based mode of experience that characterizes nonenlightenment, d3 experience is dharma-based by virtue of the experiential attainments of d1 and d2. As a dharma, d3 experience has d1 and d2 dimensions as naturally as a year has seasons. Having these multiple dimensions, d3 experience is authenticated and actualized in the world of ordinary human facts. Suffering, yearning, consternation, judgment, intention, regret, birth, death, and other human experiences are constituted by being dimensional dharmas that authenticate, enlighten, and actualize each other.
Section Three: Interdimensional Dynamics

The actualizing activities of the d₃ dharma consists of an engagement in the entire way of transformations (mujō no dōri) through which dharmas fulfill their careers. As in no other dimension, d₃ dharmas embrace the temporality of interdimensional praxis. Impermanence as transformations in structures of experience attains its highest expression in d₃ dharmas. D₃ dharmas are inherently interdimensional because of their operation in and activation of praxeological time. There is a seasonality to realization, expression, and actualization in praxis. As experienced moments, dimensions of enlightenment are as moments of a praxeological time that have senses of duration, appropriateness, sequence, opportunity, simultaneity, and uji (being time) that differ from other kinds of time experience. Unlike the time of passage from past to present to future, there is a simultaneity of all moments in praxeological time in d₃. Unlike even epochal time, praxeological time includes all other kinds of time experience. The dimensionality and praxeological temporality of d₃ dharmas makes d₃ an eminently dynamic dimension of experience in spite of
its lack of affirmative presentational awareness or intent. To actualize d3 is to activate the praxeological cycle of the Way (gyōji dōkan). To activate gyōji dōkan is to realize d3.

To effect the transformation of other beings in d3 is to become engaged in the authentic transmission of the buddha dharmas (shōden no buppō) from d2. To become engaged in the authentic transmission of the buddha dharmas is to actively power the transformations that occur in impermanence:

Then, when all classes of all beings in the ten directions of the universe—the hell dwellers, hungry ghosts, and animals; the fighting demons, men, and devas—all together at one time being bright and pure in body and mind, realize the stage of absolute emancipation and reveal themselves of the true enlightenment of the Buddha, utilize the Buddha-body, immediately leap the confines of this personal enlightenment, sit properly beneath the kingly Tree of Enlightenment, turn simultaneously the great and utterly incomparable Dharma wheel, and expound the ultimate and profound prajña free from all human agency.9

Tracelessly free from human agency, d3 activities turn the dharma wheel and effect the simultaneous enlightenment of all beings. This is how d3 is actualized and effects datsuraku. Datsuraku opens up the field of freedom (nonthinking) for a different (d1)

single dharma. Thus the cycle begins again and "this traceless enlightenment is continued on and on endlessly."10

Section Four:
Assessment of Explanatory Capabilities

Because the Buddha Way originally leaps out of having many and having none, there is birth/extinction, delusion/enlightenment, and sentient beings/buddhas. Though we might say that such is the case, blossoms fall pathetically, and weeds proliferate to our consternation.

Unlike d2, there is nothing special, nothing consummated or completed, no particular status signified in d3 expressions. Yet, d3 expressions reflect a great accomplishment. The samadhic experience of d1 admits of no multiplicity, the d2 experience admits of multiplicity, but no perspective from which judgment of multiplicity can be accomplished, nor can it afford a long range temporal framework in which vision, purposive activities, planning, communication activities, and many ordinary acts of consciousness can be conducted. D3 fulfills the conceptual needs created by d1 and d2. It can account for an authenticated conception of basic

human emotions and thinking processes. D3 as a dimension is partly constituted by the language creation process that builds upon its originative experience. The d3 originative experience both allows for and authenticates all concepts present in the language of ordinary discourse.
Chapter 7
The Dimensionality Thesis

The dimensionality thesis makes the general claim that an understanding of Dogen's notion of enlightenment is well served by a conceptual model that consists of inherently interrelated, though disparate, experiential and conceptual modes. This model replaces models of enlightenment based on either ineffable unity or language-based difference.

The dimensionality thesis is a theoretical framework intended to provide a paradigm and vocabulary which permit a detailed and integrated explanation of what the Shobogenzo as koan presents. It also provides a comprehensive framework within which Dogen's terms can be located, understood, and interrelated. Further, because it is derived from an examination of concepts in the Shobogenzo, it provides some insight into how Dogen solves conceptual problems associated with enlightenment.

The Shobogenzo (literally, "Treasury of Authenticating Dharma Eyes") can be appreciated as a compendium of concepts that present Dogen's "eyes" of enlightenment. By presenting these "authenticating dharma eyes," Dogen is making the point that there are
multiple levels or modes of enlightenment that operate in discrete and distinctive ways. They condition experience in distinctive ways and engender distinctive forms of expression.

Rather than simply different ways of understanding enlightenment, different aspects of enlightenment, or different ways we may speak about enlightenment, the dimensionality thesis asserts that there are different modes in which enlightenment operates which collectively explain enlightenment. Ways of understanding, aspects, and ways of speaking about enlightenment are categorizable according to logical or linguistic distinctions. The division and number of such categories are determined by criteria that are external to the enlightenment that they describe. There may be positive, negative, and paradoxical ways of speaking about enlightenment. There may be universal and particular aspects of enlightenment. There may be experiential, conceptual, and mystical ways of understanding enlightenment. However, these are not dimensions but distinctions that reveal more about the nature of logic or categories of the understanding than about multiple, discrete, and interacting modes in which enlightenment operates. The dimensionality thesis purports to be based on a division and number of phases that Dōgen
believes are discovered and verified in genuine praxis. Evidence that the dimensionality thesis describes what Dōgen actually believed or assumed is found in family groupings of related concepts in the Shōbōgenzō and in their collective presuppositions. That is, the division, number, and nature of the dimensions of enlightenment are determined by an understanding of the transformations of experience discoverable in enlightenment that make Shōbōgenzō concepts and their relations intelligible. Roughly stated, the Shōbōgenzō would not be intelligible if the dimensionality thesis were not what Dōgen had in mind. Rather than make what can be said about enlightenment conform to relations inherent in a given language or logic, we would do well to trace how Dōgen makes conceptual distinctions and authenticated language originate from enlightenment experiences. The result of such an investigation would then yield accounts of transformations rather than distinctions, growth sequences rather than categories, and causal relations rather than lists. Unlike a theoretical framework based on aspects, ways of description, or ways of understanding, the dimensionality thesis aspires to an explanation of enlightenment rather than its description.

Dōgen interprets a scriptural passage or a common notion of time for that matter, as though the passage,
word, or notion were making a direct reference to a correlate in praxis-authenticated experience. A praxis-oriented view of enlightenment is not an option, it is for Dōgen a necessity and the solely valid context for the consideration of enlightenment. More specific than the obvious and trivial claims that there are different ways of talking about enlightenment, that enlightenment displays different aspects, and that there are different perspectives enlightened experience enjoys, the dimensionality thesis asserts that these differences are undergirded by a common ground that is accessible in experience clarified in praxis. This common ground may be described as the career of dhammas as they are investigated in praxis. This dharma career is conceptualizable in terms of phases of enlightenment. Rather than the trivial claim that there is an arbitrary or infinite number of perspectives available within enlightenment, the dimensionality thesis must show that there is a praxis-based, determinate nature and number of the types of perspectives that characterize each of the dimensions. A study of the language in the Shōbōgenzō can hence be expected to reveal something about the nature of enlightenment as correlates to its employed vocabulary. When such a study is conducted, not one vocabulary, but several vocabularies
are detected. Inasmuch as these vocabularies correlate with the modes of enlightenment, these vocabularies also support speculation about the dimensionality of enlightenment. By looking to uses of language in the Shōbōgenzō and its correlation to experience, the present chapter develops and defends a theory about the multiple dimensions of enlightenment.

We may consider the change from nonenlightenment to enlightenment to be a shift in perspective. Yet, shifts in perspectives can and most often do take place within the mode of nonenlightenment without entailing any kind of assumptions about the enlightenment experience. If to every perception belongs a unique perspective that is the product of not only physical location, but emotional, physiological, theoretical, autobiographical, and an infinite number of other factors, then that perspective is constantly changing with changes in the various conditions. None of these shifts in perspectives necessarily entails enlightenment itself. Refining the definition somewhat, we may say that rather than being a shift in perspective that comes from placing oneself in a different set of conditions, enlightenment entails a radical shift in perspective that comes about when the self undergoes a transformation in mode of thinking. Yet, radical
shifts in perspective can and often do occur with a change in self-concept or circumstances. Thus, a transformation of the self does not necessarily entail enlightenment. In order to define enlightenment adequately, a more sophisticated conceptual model is required. I will attempt to demonstrate the adequacy of the model employed in the dimensionality thesis by appeals to coherence and utility of the general conceptual model and to conceptual grounding in terms of Dōgen's notion of praxis.

A second explanatory requirement of the dimensionality thesis is that it must not fall prey to Dōgen's critique of substantialistic thinking. In substantialistic thinking, thinking originates with substance as a category of the understanding as it conditions the experience of a thing (in which both the experience of a thing and the notion of "thingness" are antecedently conditioned by "substance") and proceeds via abstraction and projection of that category upon the thing (ascribing to the thing the function of differentiation and identity that belonged to the category by which the understanding conditioned the thing to be a thing in the first place) to a further abstracted class concept based upon relations of essences. From these concepts are formulated principles that are fur-
ther employed to interpret the experience of things, and so on. In short, there is a progression from a category of thing to class relations and universals via abstraction.

Rather than being merely modes of experience, dimensions of enlightenment implies a conceptual mode as well. This conceptual mode can be described in terms of the kōan. To the extent that "dimension" implies measure, we may say that it has two measures: unity (kō) and unit (an). Each dimension has its own conceptualizable unity (kō) and unit (an). Each dimension has its own kind of kō-an. Together, kō and an constitute that by which enlightenment as primordial nondual experience is conceptualizable and expressed.

The claim that enlightenment is multidimensional is driven by a number of explanatory requirements that both inform and test that claim. It should: 1) be based on and elucidate Dōgen's notions of praxis and enlightenment; 2) replace value-laden and substantialistic explanations of enlightenment that Dōgen himself avoided; 3) explain the interrelations among the expressions of enlightenment; and 4) serve a plausible interpretation of the Shōbōgenzō's philosophical project.
A division and grouping of related concepts are easily found in "Genjōkōan":

In the seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which all dharmas are buddha dharmas, there is delusion/enlightenment, there is praxis, there is birth, there is death, there are the many buddhas, there are sentient beings.

In the seasonal time frame (jisetsu) in which the many dharmas are without a 'me,' there is no delusion, no enlightenment, no buddhas, no sentient beings, no birth, no extinction.

Because the Buddha Way originally leaps out of having many and having none, there is birth/extinction, delusion/enlightenment, and sentient beings/buddhas.

That being said, blossoms fall pathetically, and weeds proliferate to our consternation.1

There is a seasonal time frame in which there is a multiplicity of things, there is another seasonal time frame in which there are no things, there is another seasonal time frame beyond the preceding two in which there is suffering and a compassionate regard for things. Three seasonal time frames, each mutually exclusive and enlightened, are distinguished in this passage. These three mutually exclusive seasonal time frames determine the three ways experience is conceptualized and expressed within enlightenment.

1 "Genjōkōan," DZZ, p. 7.
Notions of seasonality and leaping out indicate that the transitions between time frames are not based on logical or linguistic relations. The transitions are discoverable in a continuum of praxis.

The provocative "Genjōkōan" opening challenges the traditional notion of an exclusively unitary nature of enlightenment. Contrasting characterizations are commonly used to differentiate enlightenment from non-enlightenment, but here contrasting characterizations are presented completely within a discussion of enlightenment. This suggests a differentiation of levels or modes of enlightenment. Particularly because of its terse, parallel, and comparative construction, Dōgen's characterizations provoke a questioning of the exclusively unitary view of enlightenment. The "there is" versus the "there is no" characterizations of the first two sentences are patently contradictory and defy explanation in terms of a purely unitary notion of enlightenment. The effect of this presentation is divisive, and suggests the presence of discontinuities in enlightenment, if only in its appropriate descriptive language.

Dōgen appears to accept each of the disparate characterizations of enlightenment in spite of their different and even mutually contradictory character.
The straightforward and parallel descriptions appear to indicate an acceptance of their differences. Unlike most characterizations of enlightenment that are based on a contrast to nonenlightenment, there is the suggestion of privilege afforded to principal features of nonenlightenment. Not only are such human foibles as attachment and distaste introduced in an abstruse discussion of enlightenment, they are placed at the end of an apparent progression of descriptions of enlightenment. They thus present the reader with a further challenge to a unitary, transcendent conception of enlightenment.

One possible explanation of Dōgen's contradictory characterization of enlightenment argues that words are inadequate to capture the fullness of the enlightenment experience since enlightenment inherently transcends the concepts and conceptualizations employed in description. According to this view, describing enlightenment in contradictory terms points to the enigmas that arise when language is forcibly applied to enlightenment. Hence, paradox is not only acceptable, it is the means by which these enigmas are best expressed. Instead of pointing to actual discontinuities within enlightenment, Dōgen's descriptions point out inadequacies in language. Since descriptions of
enlightenment rely upon language to point to something beyond the comprehensibility of language, resulting characterizations of enlightenment describe a transcendent, enigmatic, and necessarily unitary state. This view may be called the paradoxical interpretation.

The paradoxical interpretation explains neither enlightenment nor the relation enlightenment shares with its descriptions. And, by describing these relations as paradoxical, it merely states that these descriptions stand to each other in logical opposition. As a product defined by logical opposition, paradox cannot be used to explain that which is beyond logic and opposition. It describes only relations among descriptions, and cannot explain how these descriptions relate to enlightenment. If paradoxical language is the result of an explanatory deficiency of language and reason, paradoxical explanations cannot profess to offer an explanation that is based on an explanatory deficiency.

Most importantly, paradoxical interpretation of Dōgen impedes inquiry into why he wrote at all. A celebration of contradiction would obstruct the attempt to reconcile and understand apparent contradictions. It would seem that if Dōgen had intended his "Genjōkōan" opening statement to say that there are many
and no ways to talk about enlightenment, then he would not require the entire Shobogenzo to belabor the point. If the explanation by paradox implies that there is an arbitrariness to descriptions, then the Shobogenzo would be reduced to about ninety fascicles of arbitrary utterances.

Implicit in the paradoxical interpretation is the claim that the various descriptions of enlightenment are actually descriptions of the relation between a given language and enlightenment. Reading the "Genjōkōan" passage in this way would yield little explanation of how enlightenment originates, develops, yields concepts, conditions experience and expression, and operates in various ways.

There is more to the passage than a statement about the relations among descriptions and their relation to enlightenment. The Shobogenzo would not have been written had Dōgen believed that either nothing can be said about enlightenment or anything can be said about it. If the Shobogenzo is to be read meaningfully, the "Genjōkōan" passage must be read as presentations of constitutive, experiential, and conceptual "discreters" within enlightenment. To the practitioner, these "discreters" may be construed as generic standpoints within which enlightenment is expressed. From
the standpoint of praxis, these "discretes" may be con-
strued as stages of enlightenment. Serving theoretical
needs, these "discretes" may be construed as modes of
experience that condition the construction of meanings
and concepts. The notion of dimensionality includes
these different ways of construing the discretes pre-
sented by the Shōbōgenzō but emphasizes that their num-
ber and natures are definite and presumably determined
by discoveries in praxis, and their collective nature
and interactions constitutes enlightenment. By
identifying major discoveries, operations, and
actualizations of enlightenment, the dimensionality
thesis introduces a vocabulary that can serve to
explain what the paradoxical interpretation cannot:
what in the nature of enlightenment can explain why
paradoxical expressions in "Genjōkōan" and the
Shōbōgenzō are employed, why their contradictions are
only apparent, and how such descriptions of the inner
world of the enlightened person can answer religious
and existential needs.

The "Genjōkōan" opening contains a lexical clue to
the kind of explanation it offers. The term jisetsu,
"seasonal time frame," indicates that the character-
izations of enlightenment and their difference are
explainable in terms of their temporal determination.
Dōgen is saying that within enlightenment there are multiple sets of experiential conditions that can be explained in terms of time frames. Unlike a paradoxical interpretation in which the different characterizations are related by logical relations of opposition, the "Genjōkōan" statements are related by the sequence of changes that the enlightened person experiences, much as though the enlightened person has "seasons."

The word jisetsu usually denotes an appropriate time for an event to occur. The term is composed of two characters. The first character alone denotes "time" or "temporal." The second character literally denotes the nodes in a stalk of bamboo and signifies "joint," "juncture," or "melody." The composite term is ordinarily rendered "season," "occasion," or "opportunity" in English. In the above passage, the term is usually understood to refer to the set of objective conditions that constitutes a particular point in time. Aside from objective conditions, however, subjective conditions undoubtedly are also important. It is clear from Dōgen's treatment of time in the "Uji" fascicle and elsewhere that subjective experience is at least as important to an understanding of time and space as objective conditions. In fact,
his treatment of the two indicates that the subjective and the objective are inseparable. *Jisetsu* is most appropriately explained in terms of dharmas, and more precisely in terms of "seasonal time frames" that are discoverable in praxically clarified dharmas.

The introduction of the concept of "seasons" relocates the characterization of enlightenment from the domain of universals, abstractions, and external distinctions to the domain of generalizations about internal nature of enlightenment from personal experience. By speaking considering the nature of enlightenment from within the domain of "seasonality," in other words, Dōgen's characterization of enlightenment displays how words and concepts arise as generalizations from the personal experience of dynamics internal to the subject rather than as abstractions that result from external distinctions. To illustrate the difference "seasonality" introduces to the discussion, the following analogy may be drawn.

A newcomer to a country with seasons, say Japan, may see cherry blossoms, hear nightingales, and enjoy fragrant breezes. The affective response to this experience would typically be, "Ah, Japan!"

A native of the same country would respond differently to the same site. Being "seasoned," that is,
emerging from the previous winter and year of seasonal changes, the native person's general response would typically be, "Ah, springtime!"

Though both persons would be responding to the same objective conditions, the characterizations of their experiences would reveal fundamentally different perceptions of temporality. As in the "Genjōkōan" opening, the difference in characterizations reveals a difference in the perspective of the person making the characterization. The native person's characterization indicates the characterizer's seasoned perspective. In a sense, only one who lived through the preceding winter can experience and appreciate this springtime as this springtime. The "unseasoned" newcomer lacks the experiential base for relating to the experience from within the temporal continuum of multiple seasons and hence resorts to an abstraction based on a distinction that is external to the experience, in this case a political distinction. "Japan" is an abstraction that is far removed from the blossoms and nightingales it characterizes. Instead of signifying something within the experience, the newcomer characterizes the experience in terms of an abstraction from a distinction from external countries. In the enjoyment of the breeze, the native would not have "Japan" in mind and the newcomer would not have "springtime" in mind.
Being "seasoned" entails knowing the general patternation inherent in the change particular experiences undergo. In the above analogy, rather than in terms of extrinsic relations to external countries, the seasoned person generalizes in terms of patterns of change that are intrinsic to the experience of cherry blossoms, nightingales, and fragrant breezes. Rather than the form of Platonic universals, description takes the form of temporalized and personalized generalizations. The time frame of the newcomer is atemporal as is the abstraction "Japan."

The time frame of the native person is seasonal. Seasonal temporality is a variety of the appreciation of "epochal time." In epochal time, to each epoch belongs its own distinctive nature, with the successive epoch emergent from within each epoch. In this manner is formed a temporal continuity of discontinuous natures. Epochal temporality is not rectilinear as in the time as passage from past to present to future sense of temporality. Neither is it temporal in the sense of occasion as a point in time defined in objective terms. Seasonal temporality implies a multiplicity of time frames, or seasons, that emerge from each other. Within each time frame, events are experienced in distinctive ways. Their continuity is pro-
vided by emergence rather than by logical relations between abstractions as is the case in a dialectical evolution. Spring can be said to "emerge" from winter in a sense that is impossible for autumn. Though epochal time has a directionality that resembles that of time as passage, epochal time does not accord priority as a point of reference to the present as does the notion of time as passage. Though dialectical evolution also appeals to time periods, winter does not give rise to its logical antithesis, summer, and effect a logical synthesis thereafter. In seasonal temporality, something other than logical necessity drives emergence. Whatever that driver of emergence is, it is true that the time frame of springtime must emerge from the time frame of wintertime, the time frame of summertime must emerge from springtime, and so on. It is for this reason that the newcomer to a country cannot know springtime as springtime. The newcomer has no seasonal time frame for the present experience and must judge that experience on the basis of abstracted difference rather than emergence. The atemporality of the newcomer is akin to the atemporality of Platonic forms. Spring is not an abstracted unchanging essence that expresses itself through blooming flowers and singing birds. As Dōgen
says in the "Uji" fascicle, spring is not a time when birds sing and flowers bloom, rather, the singing of birds and blooming of flowers is spring.

The jisetsu determinates in the "Genjūkōan" opening thus imply time frames as "seasonally temporalized modes of experience." By "mode of experience" I mean a set of conditions that defines functions or operations within a discrete continuum. Instead of differences that are purely linguistic, differences that emerge when abstractions are compared, or different points in time, the differences that are indicated in the "Genjūkōan" opening are based on the changes that take place within enlightenment.

As discrete modes of experience, time frames undergo change. In other words, just as Buddhism speaks of the objects of experience as impermanent, Dōgen appears to say that experience itself exhibits impermanence through shifts in modes. Enlightenment, for example, is conceivable as a shift from the mode of nonenlightenment. However, rather than a change between nonenlightenment and enlightenment, Dōgen's concern centers upon multiple shifts within enlightenment. By understanding these shifts, we can understand the acceptability and interrelationships of the different characterizations of enlightenment.
The epochal notion of time frame sequences in which radical transformation occurs has precedence in the Buddhist tradition. The content and modes of experience are describable in terms of dharmas. A dharma, or thing-as-experienced, refers to the content of experience without positing an objectified reified substance that is external to an experiencer. Every dharma is new and every dharma has its own new mode of experience. There are, however, experiential mode-types and these are what Dōgen seems to be referring to as "time frames," jisetsu. Time frames themselves undergo an evolution of sorts, as in the Buddhist notion of the Three Epochs. "Dharma" can also mean "law" or "truth," and what is referred to in Buddhist writings as "The Dharma" and "The Buddha Dharma" are the teachings of Buddhism. Dharmas in even this sense undergo transformation. According to the Buddha, there are three time periods that correspond to three transformative epochs of the Buddha Dharma. These are the periods of the "True Dharma" (Shobō), "Imaged Dharma" (Zōbō), and "Concluding Dharma" (Mappō).

Dōgen appears to interpret this historical epochal view of the Buddha Dharma in terms of experience clarified in praxis. As experience-things, dharmas also have epochs as phases in their career. The "Gen-
"Genjōkōan" opening's reference to time frames is evidence of this interpretation. Though easily overlooked, this notion of time frames is not only introduced and reiterated for emphasis by the "Genjōkōan" opening, it is singled out as the common denominator in otherwise completely contradictory accounts of enlightenment. This notion of time frames, the "Genjōkōan" opening emphasizes, can explain the various disparities that arise in the relation between language and enlightenment.

Rather than merely listing different ways of describing enlightenment, the opening emphasizes that this notion of time frames are key in not only the understanding of not only the different sets of linguistic descriptors, experiential cues, and internal relations that they have, but in the understanding of praxis, enlightenment, dharmas, impermanence, and Buddhist teaching as well. Given Dōgen's insistence upon praxis as the basis of understanding, it is understandable that he would interpret Buddhist doctrine in terms of dharmas as experience-things that undergo epochal transformation and other manifestations of impermanence. Time frames are conceivable as phases in the career of dharmas. To these phases belong not only individual distinctive natures, but an orderliness
and accessibility to experience that permits meaningful description of enlightenment variously in terms of having many and having none, and being beyond having many and having none. An account of the nature of these time frames is thus of paramount importance and arguably constitutes a major task of the Shōbōgenzō.

The "Genjōkōan" opening's introduction of the notion of seasonal time frames or modes of experience serves an important explanatory function. It mediates enlightenment and its description in a way that does not universalize enlightenment and particularize its descriptions in incommensurable and different categories. A set of seasonal time frames for enlightenment concretizes the universal and temporalizes the particular in such a way that conceptualization and explanation becomes possible in terms of direct experience.

Just as the opening to "Genjōkōan" reveals different ways of characterizing enlightenment, the rest of the Shōbōgenzō reveals clusters of concepts that Dōgen uses to describe (enlightened) experience. These clusters of concepts can be called languages, for they are primarily localized within particular modes of experience and appear to abide by their own distinctive rules of operation.
Identification, characterization, and explanation of the interrelations of time frames as separate modes of experience produces a conceptual model that clarifies Dōgen's languages of enlightenment and the philosophical enterprise of the Shōbōgenzō.

Section Two:

The Framework of the Dimensionality Thesis

As the Genjōkōan opening suggests, there are three dimensions of enlightenment. To each dimension belongs a distinctive originative experience which must be realized. Realization means "awareness" or "recognition; it also means "to make real" or "actualize." The recognition of an originative experience as an experience that is qualitatively distinctively different from hitherto recognized experiences is more than simply having an originative experience.

The recognition of the experience as qualitatively "new" is a necessary condition for the realization of the experience in the sense of it being actualized. Both of these senses of realization are inherently processes that entail the use of concepts. To recognize an experience as qualitatively new presupposes an idea of difference based on quality, and ideas of qual-
ity can be made explicit in concepts. Similarly, to actualize an experience is to have the experience originate some form or change of form, whether that form be expressed in action, word, emotion, or bearing. Whatever the form in which the originative experience is expressed, it is an expression. The actual expressive forms themselves are determinate and determined by qualities and operations within the originative experience.

This relation is what allows presentation as mode of expression to work. By observing the relations and commonalities among expressive forms that originate from each of the three types of originative experiences, it is possible to conceptualize relations, qualities, and operations of the different dimensions of enlightenment.

At a more fundamental level, conceptualization may even be a precondition of realization as actualization. This is because actualization in determinate form is necessarily dependent upon recognition as something, whether as qualitatively "new" experience, as insight, as dharma. Recognition is always recognition as something and that necessity makes possible the realization of that recognition. What that "as" condition is must first be brought to awareness as a determinate idea or
feeling. That determinate idea or feeling is a concept in a loose sense, or can be made into a concept in a strict sense by verbalization. Therefore, whereas the originative experience is nonconceptual and undifferentiated, its realization is inherently related to concepts. This relation can be utilized: 1) by the Zen master in the sanzen interview to determine the status and nature of the student's understanding by reading the student's concepts as presentations; 2) in reading Shōbōgenzō concepts as presentations of a range of dimensions that can be described in a comprehensive conceptual framework; and 3) in investigating the origins and development of authenticated concepts from an originative experience.

The first dimension is the dimension in which all dharmas are without a sense of self. In this dimension, experience of a dharma is without the internal or external differentiations that enable one to conceptualize, define, or categorize a thing. There is no experience of a thing as an independent objectified thing. Without this experiential ground for speaking about a thing as a thing, one might say that there is no delusion, no enlightenment, no buddhas, no sentient beings, no birth, no extinction. Nonthinking is the originative experience in this dimension and the

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pratītya-samutpāda relations exhibited in the origina­
tive experience condition actualizations and expres­sions within this dimension. Paradigmatic of this
dimension is the relation between what Dōgen calls
"place" and the single dharma. Characterizations of
experience within this dimension include: zenki, 
nikon, ippō gūjin, jijūyū, play, clarity, and unity.

The second dimension is the dimension that admits
of a multiplicity of dharmas in juxtaposition. This
juxtaposition, however, is not temporal, spatial, or
pratītya-samutpāda related. Each dharma "occupies its
own dharma-position," jūhō-i, and is cut off from any
causal relations with other dharmas in this dimension.
Each dharma is a consummate particularity and embodies
the totality of conditions that constitutes it. Though
each is a totality, and these totalities are juxtaposed
in this dimension, these totalities do not interfere
with each other. This is Dōgen's experiential account
of Hua-yen's fourth dharmadhatu, the non-obstruction of
particular and particular.

The third dimension is the dimension which sub­
lates the other two in a traceless presentation. Words
and actions in this dimension have no presentational
significance. Unlike the previous two dimensions,
there is the possibility of such activities as com­
passionate action and upaya, skill in means. This is the domain in which the bodhisattva has its career.

Section Three:
Languages That Develop Within Enlightenment

The language of presentation is possible only because there are a number of dimensions within enlightenment. Dimensions explain what is presented. The language of presentation further depends upon the number and nature of originative experiences (or more precisely, a praxeologically derived number of phases of the originative experience). Presentational words as concepts are meaningful only within specific languages that are in turn specific to certain dimensions. Like their cultural counterparts, dimensional languages depend upon a body of shared unique experiences for a justification of their distinct identities.

A consideration of the languages that develop within enlightenment is necessary to account for: 1) the developmental process that makes presentation possible and meaningful; 2) a justification for dimensional differentiation that is intrinsic to the operation of dimensions; and 3) the matrices of meanings that are necessary conditions for the emergence and meaningfulness of concepts within enlightenment.
To justify the claim that there are dimensions of enlightenment, it is not enough to simply divide Shōbōgenzō terms into a logically convenient number of lists or categories. The resulting catalog would only prove that Dōgen was contradicting himself and that all things can be said about enlightenment. From such conclusions, the charitable reader of Dōgen would be led either to a celebration of contradiction or to an appreciation of enlightenment that transcends an arbitrary language. To say that all things can be said of enlightenment is tantamount to saying that nothing can be said of enlightenment. Read as a compendium of different ways of writing about enlightenment, the Shōbōgenzō would be reduced to a monumental restatement of the popular truism that enlightenment is ultimately ineffable. These undesirable consequences ensue from a logical differentiation of linguistic forms when logic is extrinsic to the differentiation of the dimensions which the different lists of expressive forms allegedly reveal. A logically-based differentiation of expressive forms reveals more about the operation of logic than about differentiation in the origin of those expressive forms. A dialectical analysis of Dōgen's language ultimately describes the logical operations of categorization rather than the praxeological operations.
of transformation from one dimension of experience to another, for it cannot be claimed that the soteriological transformations of enlightenment result from logical distinctions and their synthesis. Zen master Dogen cannot claim that the logic that orders discursive thinking ultimately orders an objective world and the soteriological realizations of that reality. Without the claim that soteriological transformations are based on logical distinctions, it is impossible to claim that a dialectical analysis of language provides any insight into the nature of the enlightenment that language may describe. Such a dialectical analysis could at best claim that there is a dimensionality to expressive forms, but not that there is a dimensionality in enlightenment.

Undesirable consequences of claims to dimensionality that are based only on logical distinctions can be avoided. The dimensionality thesis can be justified internally by an appeal to differentiations that occur within operations within dimensions. There are three sources of justification of the differentiation in dimensions that are intrinsic to the operations of the dimensions: 1) the praxeology of impermanence; 2) an account of the development of languages intrinsic to each dimension of enlightenment; and 3) an account
of the differentiation in originative experiences. An internal justification can explain why there are the contradictory forms exhibited in logically differentiated categories of expressive forms.

Logical contradictions in expressive forms can be reconciled by an appeal to a common mechanism that can account for a divergence of expressive forms. Transformations of experience is one such mechanism that must be investigated in the clarified experience of praxis. Transformations of experience can yield what might be called a praxeological identity of dimensions. When the effecting of one dimension's "total exertion" is tantamount to the attainment of another dimension, the result is an experiential identity of otherwise discrete dimensions. There is a set of such causal relations between dimensions that constitutes what Dōgen calls mujō no dōri, the "way" (literally "reason") of impermanence. A study of these causal relations reveals how the complete attainment of one dimension provides the necessary condition and occasion for the realization of the originative experience of another dimension. In this limited sense, one dimension causes another dimension, and this causation makes possible a praxeological identity of one dimension and another. The concluding chapter of this dissertation
examines the praxeology of impermanence and an account of the differentiation in originative experiences.

The meaning of "languages of enlightenment." When Dōgen uses the term sho, "authentication," he is at times apparently referring to an empirical verification of Buddhist doctrines which in turn verify the authenticity of the verifying experience. Yet, it would be difficult to understand why he would have altered traditional readings of scripture if verification had been his only intent. His alteration of traditional readings of scripture is legendary and conducted in a style so distinctive and prominent in his works that it merits the term, "Dōgenian." The "Busshō" ("Buddha Nature") fascicle is the best source of examples of the way in which Dōgen takes liberties with grammar and scripture to make his statements, but examples can be found in virtually every other fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō as well.

Dōgen's creative appropriation of scriptural passages strongly suggests another sense of authentication that is more consistent with Dōgen's language usage and view of praxis. Instead of praxis as a verification of an extrinsic doctrine, authentication for Dōgen appears to consist of a process of language creation. When an originative experience is totally exerted in praxis,
the experience is never merely passive—the experience expresses itself in very definite terms. The totally exerted experience expresses itself through present conditions and makes expressive forms of actions, thoughts, entities, and words. This is a process that appropriates what is present, making it into a presentation of the originative experience, and authenticating the resulting expressive form with the originative experience. Dōgen calls this process of appropriation and its expression dotoku, the appropriation of authentic expression. If the originative experience authenticates the appropriated expressive form, the appropriated expressive form also authenticates the originative experience, for without expression, there is no actualization of the experience, and the experience would remain passive, unrecognized, fleeting, meaningless, and non-originative. Without the clarity and engagement of experience that constitutes praxis, all experience fails to be originative of authentic expression, and the expressive forms that are employed are based on either a mistake (viz., the ascription of substance) or abstractions that have lost their experiential grounding. Nonenlightened people have samadhic nonthinking experiences many times each day (and are in a sense already engaged in enlightenment), but these
experiences go unrecognized, unexpressed, unactualized, and the person persists thinking and acting on substance-based conceptions of self, things, and abstractions. To base conceptions upon originative experiences would be to authenticate conception and experience. Concepts become based on originative experiences by emerging from originative experiences as the result of the total exertion of the experience. Concepts as concepts must emerge within a matrix of other concepts that are also derived from the same type of originative experience.

As individual concepts are dependent upon their language of enlightenment, so too is the dimension itself. A dimension would not be a dimension if it consisted only of an originative experience. The experience would be unable to originate anything except exclamatory utterances that point to the experience in an all-inclusive but undefinable manner. Of course, nonauthenticated language could be used to evoke by image or paradox a feeling for the experience, but again it would be in an all-inclusive and undefinable manner. A person who lives within a given dimension of enlightenment must speak and act authentically, and this requires more than a vocabulary of exclamatory utterances that refer to and issue from the same all-
inclusive and undefinable experience. A dimension as a
domain of lived possibilities requires a language that
not only issues from the originative experience but is
furthermore capable of the differentiation and con­ceptualization that makes a practical range of speech
and purposive activities possible. Without language, a
dimension would be limited to an experience with a
vocabulary of one word, and all expressions within that
dimension would be homonyms of that one word,
"enlightenment." This limitation would obliterate the
distinctions that make dimensions dimensions.

Dimensions are not only numerically dif­ferentiated, they have internal operations. No inter­nal operation is more important than authentic language
creation. Authentic language creation not only
expresses and works out the meaningfulness of the
originative experience, it works out the relations that
make other internal operations possible. The com­passionate response of the bōdhisattva, for example, is
different from the compassionate response of the
unenlightened person, not for its form or degree of
sincerity, but for its originative standpoint. In the
standpoint of the bōdhisattva, there is no
independently-existing person to be helped, there is no
maximization of comfort as a motivating principle, and
there is no independently existing helper. The stand-
point of the bōdhisattva is informed instead by alter-
native experiential bases of action provided by
enlightenment. In the case of the bōdhisattva, the
enlightenment-based originative standpoint is conveyed
through an act of presentation. This act of present-
ation is an expressive act and requires an authenti-
cated language. Failure to use words and actions that
issue from personal experience of enlightenment results
in the actualization of the standpoint of nonenlighten-
ment, and nonenlightenment prevails. The development
of an authentic language of enlightenment is thus an
operation necessary to the performance of other opera-
tions within enlightenment.

This conception of authentication as the creation
of an authenticated language explains: 1) a source of
differentiation of dimensions that is intrinsic to the
operation of the dimensions of enlightenment; 2) an
account of how concepts arise from a nonconceptual
experience; and 3) an account of how authenticated con-
cepts develop a language and develop within a language
of enlightenment.

Just as language and culture emerge from the
shared experiences of a people, so do expressions and
concepts emerge from the distinctive originative expe-
riences that distinguish one dimension from another. Expressions emerge from a given type of originative experience in relation to other expressions that collectively form a matrix of meanings within which individual expressions derive their meaningfulness. Thus, expressions and their matrices of meanings develop specific forms and patterns of usage in a manner that warrants the term "language."

Without the realization of an originative experience, there would be no attainment of authentic expression (dōtoku). The realization of the originative experience and the expression of that experience are attainments in praxis. The attainment of the originative experience and its "total exertion" are events that do not follow logic or linguistic conventions. Their occurrence is not the result of reasoning or a dialectic based on logical opposition. The realization of the experience from which an authentic expression originates requires the abeyance of reasoning, judgment, calculation, and other directive activities. The expressions that result from the total exertion of the originative experience are similarly not the result of an application of linguistic convention or reasoning. The relation between originative experience and its expression is not a logical one, but is a result of "totally exerting" the experience.
Without the language that emerges within a dimension, expressions could not develop into concepts. A concept is an expression of an idea with a form and definition that distinguishes it from other concepts. Conceptual definition and syntax formation are processes that develop and develop within a logic of relations. Concepts are related to other concepts by the emergent logic. In the interrelations of concepts, there is inference, judgment, hierarchical arrangement, calculation, and other directive activities.

Languages that develop within dimensions. The preceding three chapters present an account of typical concepts employed in the Shōbōgenzō that are associated with each of the three dimensions of enlightenment. Individually, each of these chapters attempts to answer the questions: what kinds of concepts in the Shōbōgenzō typically present a particular dimension of enlightenment? How are they related to the enlightenment experience and to each other? Collectively, the preceding three chapters attempt to answer the questions: How is enlightenment conceptually presented in the Shōbōgenzō and how are its concepts authenticated by the enlightenment experience?

Each dimension will be characterized in terms of typical affective responses, relations, components, and
expressive capabilities. For each dimension, concepts will be categorized and sequenced to display a range that begins with a particular experience in each dimension and ends with inferences that explain the experience. Collectively, these three ranges of concepts offer a plausible conceptual account of the range of dimensions of enlightenment Dōgen intended to present in the Shōbōgenzō.

Within the range of concepts of each dimension are those that range from the direct descendents of an originative to more distant descendents. The most authentic concepts are those that issue directly from the originative experience without the mediation of other concepts. For example, exclamations that specify how the experience feels are more authentic than concepts that speculate on the causes of such feelings. The least authentic concepts are those that result from inferences that attempt to explain the more authentic concepts. Whether direct or distant, all descendent concepts of the first dimension are derivatives of the first dimension experience and thus can be said to collectively constitute an authenticated language of enlightenment.

The arrangement and organization of concepts contained in the Shōbōgenzō will reflect how Dōgen con-
constructed a genealogical account of first dimension concepts that originate from an originative experience. Each of these concepts presents a koan-type presentation of dimension one enlightenment. Conversely, the first dimension (d1) experience originates each of these concepts. However, rather than originating directly from the experience directly, there is a kind of indirect descent from the originative experience in generations. Within each dimension of enlightenment, there are various generations of concepts, beginning with most authentic concepts to more interpretative concepts. A plausible sequencing of these concept generations ensuing from an originative experience follows:

1) The concepts that describe the affective results of the enlightenment experience are largely unmediated direct descendents of the originative experience. "Clarity" and "play" are first generation examples from the first dimension of enlightenment.

2) To characterize the experience in a manner that can explain the affective results, concepts describing relations become appropriate. Pratityasamutpāda, and zengo saidan (contextual disengagement), are second generation concepts from the first and second dimensions, respectively.
3) To be able to speak of relations, concepts that explain what are being related become necessary. In this way, the components of a dimension develops conceptually. The concept of characteristic relations is prior to the concept of entities being related. This priority of relations is the result of the non-substance-based standpoint of all originative experiences qua enlightenment experiences. Because of the characteristic causal and temporal relations of the first and second dimensions of enlightenment, Dogen writes about the single dharma and its place in the first dimension and multiple consummate dharmas abiding in their respective dharma stations in the second dimension of enlightenment.

4) To further express the implications and application of these concepts, yet other concepts such as self, particularity, creativity, delusion, compassion, and yearning become necessary, and in this way an authenticated language emerging from and giving expression to an originative experience within a specific dimension of enlightenment develops.
Chapter 8
Mujo no Dōri:
The Way of Impermanence

Dimensions are phases in the experience of each dharma. As a year undergoes seasonal changes, each dharma undergoes transformations of its modes of experience. The transformations from one dimension to another are not random, but are causally interconnected in what may be called the "Way-cycle" (dōkan) of the dharma. One dimension's total exertion is the necessary condition and occasion for the originative experience of another dimension. In this context, investigating the effects of causes constitutes praxis. Investigating the causes of effects is authentication. Authentication of concepts is what occurs in the reading of presentational language:

Formerly, I used to read words and letters as one, two, three, four, five; now I read words and letters as six, seven, eight, nine, and ten. My disciples in the future will be able to attain the single-flavored Zen that is based on words and letters if they practice by reading the latter [understanding phase] through the former and by reading the former through the latter.¹

In Tenzōkyōkun, Dōgen writes about reading and sequential phases of understanding. Though sequential,

¹ "Tenzōkyōkun," DZZ, p. 299.
these phases are interpenetrating, for when these phases are read through each other, the reader will be able to attain single-flavored Zen. This single-flavored Zen does not resist linguistic expression: it is based on words and letters.

Dimensions are discrete phases of understanding that are sequentially attained in the sense that one dimension provides the necessary condition for another. Though sequential, dimensions are interpenetrating, and when the dimensions are read through each other, the reader will be able to attain an experiential grasp of the mechanics of the interpenetration of fundamental structures of change, mujō no dōri, literally, "the reason of impermanence." Impermanence does not resist reason as an intelligible orderliness (though the nature of zazen indicates that reason and its dependence upon substantialistic things resists a fundamental impermanence). Impermanence consists in transformations that occur within an orderly structure of experience that can be conceptualized as the dimensionality of enlightenment. The orderly transformations of the dharma that are realized in praxis is called the "Way of impermanence," mujō no dōri.

While few would describe zazen as a static experience, it is difficult to explain how zazen is dynamic.
Adjectives such as "dynamic" and "transformative" that describe the experience fail to explain what transforms and why transformation occurs. The dimensionality thesis is one way to make zazen and impermanence intelligible in terms of modes of discourse. When the realization of impermanence is examined in terms of changes in dimensions of the dharma, praxis becomes intelligible as the realization of the impermanence that is inherent in the phases through which a dharma is experienced.

Praxis is akin to writing. Both are processes in which originative experience in some sense causes expressive forms to be created and these in turn change experience when communication takes place.

Authentication of expressions is a process akin to reading. Like reading, authentication is a process of seeing effects but reading causes. The reading of presentational language entails seeing concepts but reading dimensions. Reading the Shobōgenzō as presentational literature is process of intellectually authenticating its concepts by reading its dimensions and its transformation of dimensions. Experientially attaining presentational languages' presented dimensions and exploring their causal efficacy is both authentication and praxis.
When Dōgen wrote, "...now I read words and letters as six, seven, eight, nine, and ten," he refers to the familiar experience of reading to describe how what is read changes over the course of time. When the child first sees words and letters, the child sees shapes and lines. Later, the child learns to see words and letters and read meanings. In a similar fashion, Dōgen shows the reader how to see meanings to read their presented dimension of enlightenment. Later, the reader can see dimensions of enlightenment to read their sublated dimensions. Still later, the reader can see sublated dimensions to read their activation of the Way of impermanence.

In praxis, words and letters can be read to reveal the world of the dimension of enlightenment to which they belong, but they can also be read to reveal one dimension through another. This is what occurs in koan praxis. Dimensions are presented through words and letters, and words and letters are read within specific dimensions. Dimensions are also presented through each other in sublation. Koan praxis is a communication
that takes place not only between two persons in a
given dimension of enlightenment, it is also a com-
mutation between dimensions of enlightenment. This
communication between dimensions of enlightenment is
called gyōji, the continuum of praxis that is effected
when one dimension gives way (datsuraku) to another.
When datsuraku occurs, there is not only a giving way
of a particular dimension, there is a simultaneous
giving way to another dimension. This is an achieve­
ment that is attained in praxis and is one meaning of
gyōji. Koan praxis is in this sense transformative.
It makes activates the transformative causal relations
in the interpenetration of dimensions that belong to
enlightened experience. In this sense, praxis makes
impermanence occur.

The nonenlightened person does not realize2 dat­
suraku because there is no total exertion. There can
be no total exertion of unified body-mind if there is a
dualistic self-based mode of experience. Thus while
the transformations in dimensions of enlightenment are
constantly occurring, without praxis, there is no
authentication and no actualization of enlightenment.

2 "Realize" means both "attain an experiential
awareness of" and "actualize."
Section Two:

Interdimensional Mechanics and Impermanence

Through gyōji (continuity activation), there is the sun and moon, and there are the stars. Through gyōji, there is the earth and the heavens. Through gyōji, there is the conditioned body-mind. Through gyōji, there are the four elements and five skandhas.3

Gyōji is the activation of the causal chain that links one dimension of enlightenment to another. The maintenance of the continuity of transformations constitutes genuine praxis. By exerting the experiential attainment of a given dimension to its experiential conclusions, change occurs in the fundamental structures of experience. The orderliness of this causal process and the need for its activation through exertion are investigated in what may be called the "Way of impermanence," mujō no dōri. Impermanence as a significant Buddhist insight does not consist simply of the recognition that the contents of experience (viz., objectified things) change. The metaphysical stature of entities abstracted from experience concerns Buddhism less than the nature of dharmas. How things as experienced change and how experience itself changes require investigation in praxis. Exertion of the

3 "Gyōji," DZZ, p. 122.
clarified dharma exerts change in the dharma's mode of activity. That is, shifts in the dimension of the dharma's activity is effected by the active consummation of the dimension in which the dharma operates. Exerting one dimension of enlightenment drives a causal sequence that results in a completely different dimension of dharmic activity. This causal sequence displays an orderliness and generalizability that can be investigated in praxis and put into practice. The investigation of this causal sequence is called *gyōji dōkan*, literally, the continuity activation of the Way-cycle. Metaphorically, praxis is the turning of the wheel of causation and impermanence.

In the Great Way of buddhas and buddha ancestors, there is always the supreme *gyōji* that activates the Way-cycle (*dōkan*) without any discontinuity. Awakening to the desire for enlightenment, praxis, bōdhi, and nirvana never pauses, and this is *gyōji dōkan*, the continuity activation of the Way-cycle.4

A recurring causal mechanism in the Way of impermanence is the exertion-datsu­ra­ku effect. Realization of the nature of dharma is not an exclusively passive observation, but is an active pursuit of that realization's praxeological consequences. The nature of the dharma is multidimensional and contingent

4 "Gyōji," DZZ, p. 122.
upon its moment in "praxeological" time. There appears to be a variety of time experience which displays a praxis-based set of causal relations among its moments. The praxis-based progression of its moments is clarified when praxis is clarified, and it is activated by exertion of realizations made in praxis. At times, praxeological time may stop, and the practitioner remains at a given dimension. At other times, the practitioner realizes the continuous transformations of dimensions of each dharma and praxeological time proceeds rapidly. Rather than a logic that precedes praxis, praxeological time is a variety of time experience in which an orderliness emerges from praxis and not the other way around. Rather than a rational principle, the way of impermanence is always a presentation which is dimension-specific. The way of impermanence is necessarily an accomplishment of expression. Thus, Dōgen's expression, mujō no dōri can be taken to mean "praxeology of impermanence" or "Tao (Way or utterance) of impermanence."

While the active engagement of ippō gujin is the fulfillment of d1, the activity of shikan taza does not end there. Difficult to attain, ippō gujin is experienced as an effortless play that exhausts its dimension and in so doing effects datsuraku, "falling away." D1
Datsuraku is the falling away of everything that was attained in d1: the mode of experience, the single dharma, the freedom, the place, the relations that characterize experience, the authenticity of d1 language, and all other d1 activities and attributes. In praxis, ippō gujin seems to cause datsuraku because the attainment of ippō gujin is the occasion for the realization of datsuraku. Ippo gujin is also a necessary attainment for the realization of d1 datsuraku. The datsuraku that occurs upon the exhaustion of d1 in ippō gujin cannot occur without the attainment of d1. In praxis, a student may attain nonthinking without attaining ippō gujin when for example, the attainment is experienced passively. Because ippō gujin is a separate accomplishment in praxis, nonthinking is not a sufficient condition for the attainment of ippō gujin. The same is true for datsuraku. The attainment of ippō gujin may provide the necessary condition and occasion for datsuraku, but ippō gujin, datsuraku, and the causal relation between the two are all separate attainments in praxis. For this reason, ippō gujin is not a sufficient condition for the realization of datsuraku. Because ippō gujin is the necessary condition and occasion for d1 datsuraku, ippō gujin may be regarded as an occasion and necessary condition for
effecting a change of dimensions.

Just as ippō gūjin is the occasion and necessary condition for d1 datsuraku, d1 datsuraku is the occasion and necessary condition for the originative experience of the next dimension of enlightenment. Again, this occasion and necessary condition provides only the necessary but not the sufficient condition for the realization of the d2 originative experience. Thus, the discreteness of dimensions are not the result of linguistic, logical, or historical convention.

To excavate the Shōbōgenzō for deeper and more complex strata of meanings in a manner that increases the coherent understanding of the whole, and to provide the conceptual paradigm and vocabulary that intelligibility of the increased complexity demands, the dimensionality thesis has presented several necessary conditions. In order to understand what Dogen means by zazen, enlightenment, authentication, impermanence, and other important concepts, it is necessary to understand that he is looking at these concepts in terms of dimensions of enlightenment. The dimensionality thesis can thus be considered to be implicit in the Shōbōgenzō. The present chapter summarizes the dimensionality thesis and its contribution to an understanding of the Shōbōgenzō's philosophical project in the light of Dōgen's religious project.
Every experienced moment changes. This moment is not a temporal unit as much as a unit of experience called a dharma. Dharmas appear to change not only from one dharma to the next, but also in their life phases. They present their life phases in different modes. These are the different modes of enlightened experience. There appears to be an orderliness to the changes a dharma undergoes that is best investigated in zazen. Zazen begins as the art of non-thinking and develops as an authentication of all activity that is based on this experience. For example, there may be such various activities as thinking, speaking, writing, performing, culminating, that collectively can be called the realization of the experience or the practice of enlightenment.

The experience of non-thinking changes. As unit of experience, the dharma appears to have a life-cycle consisting of phases: birth, Buddhahood, and death. These phases are holometabolous, that is, each is a phase of complete transformation. They have discrete modes of experience that condition the way the unit of experience is experienced. These distinctive modes of experience give rise to distinctive forms of expression, such as distinctive vocabularies and lineages of concepts. There is a lineage of concepts that emerges.
from the birth phase of an experienced moment. There is a separate lineage of concepts that emerges from the life phase of an experienced moment. There is a separate lineage of concepts that emerges from the death phase of an experienced moment. These different sets of concepts are used by the Shobōgenzō to show how the world of experience appears and how it is lived by an enlightened master when engaged in the different phases of experience. These phases of experience are discrete but phases of a metamorphosis of experience. Non-enlightenment is insidious because its substantialistic assumptions obscure its alternative: the natural phases and metamorphosis of experience. Enlightenment is the act of living in the natural phases and metamorphosis of experience. Because of the discreteness of the phases of experience, there are discrete modes of experience, discrete significances to actions, and discrete lineages of concepts unique to each phase. Experiencing and living a specific phase of an experienced moment entails actions, thoughts, types of experiences, and words that are native residents of that phase. It is because of this clustering of modes of experience, vocabularies, significances, and other relations around discrete phases of enlightened experience that we may speak of standpoints in enlightenment that are qualita-
tively discrete and ostensibly independent.

Experiencing and being at home in one phase of enlightenment does not mean that the vocabularies, significances, and relations that originate and work there will work in the other phases of experience. Though experience may change from one phase to another, one might not be able to experience, create, and operate within succeeding phases of the experienced moment. That being as it may, there are occasions and necessary conditions within each standpoint's set of activities that enable the possibility of the succeeding phase to be realized. There is thus not only a discreteness to these phases and their native modes of experience, vocabularies, significances, and relations, but there is a natural sequence to these phases. The realization of one phase is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the realization of its succeeding phase. It is therefore tempting to conjecture that there is a natural progression to these phases of experience to which the sequence of realizations owes its orderliness.

These realizations that are native to the discrete phases of experience are related to each other as discrete and at the same time phases of a single metamorphosis of a single moment of experience. Discrete
though they may be, they are mutually interdependent and pertain to a single metamorphosis of a single moment of experience. Because of the discreteness of their modes of experience, the discreteness of their realizations, their interdependence, their unity, these phases of experience are conceivable as phases. However, because there is an important sense in which these phases are not parts of a linear progression but are each determinative expressions of the whole, they are more than phases, they are dimensions of enlightenment.

Enlightenment is not just a d1 experience, it is the realization of that experience in expressive and creative activities. Enlightenment is not just the experience and realization of d1, it is the experience and realization of d2. Enlightenment is not just the experience of d1 and d2, it is the experience and realization of d3. When all of this is attained, there is the enlightenment of one dharma. With the impermanence of this dharma, there is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the birth of another dharma. The work of enlightenment goes on and on endlessly. This work is the praxeology of impermanence that is zazen and the conceptual task of the Shōbōgenzō.
If the Shōbōgenzō is a compendium of koans, and if presentation is the koan's characteristic mode of expression, what the Shōbōgenzō koans present are dimensions of enlightenment. The dimensions are presented not merely as possible generic standpoints, but as causally interrelated complex sets of operations that characterize experiential modes of enlightenment in specific and clearly definable terms. Concepts in the Shōbōgenzō present their lineages, their implicit complexes of other concepts, models of how the dimension functions, and their original experience. In so doing, Shōbōgenzō concepts present the multiple dimensions of enlightenment.

To the novice student, Dōgen offers concepts that present a view of the world when seen from the first dimension of enlightenment: what the original experience of non-thinking feels like, what kinds of concepts present it, what kinds of relations are operative, how the self is understood, how creativity and uniqueness are expressed, and so on.

To the student who has realized the original experience of non-thinking and becomes adept in its expression and practice, Dōgen offers concepts that present a view of the world when seen from the second dimension of enlightenment: what its original experi-
ence feels like, what kinds of concepts present it, what kinds of relations are operative, how the self is understood, how creativity and uniqueness are expressed, and so on.

To the student who has realized the original experience of shih-shih wu ai and becomes adept in its expression and practice, Dōgen offers concepts that present a view of the world when seen from the third dimension of enlightenment: what its original experience feels like, what kinds of concepts present it, what kinds of relations are operative, how the self is understood, how creativity and uniqueness are expressed, and so on.

To the student who has realized the original experience of the third dimension of enlightenment, dat-suraku datsuraku, and becomes adept in its expression and practice, Dōgen offers concepts that present a view of the world when seen from the constantly metamorphosing multiple dimensions of enlightenment. This is mujō no dōri, the way of impermanence. To the constantly changing nature of experience there belongs an orderliness that can be investigated as a "way" or "reason." The word dōri is composed of the ideograms for "Tao" and "principle," and compositely means "reason" or "nature." Participation in this nature of impermanence
is what ultimately constitutes praxis. Sanzen is thus the participation in the praxeology of impermanence. Realization of this participation is enlightenment. Working out the realization is praxis. Realized or not, the way of impermanence is what we are all engaged in. Enlightenment is inherent but participation in the praxeology of impermanence is a creative act of living and functioning in the world of particularities that present the ever-changing metamorphoses of experience. This creative act is praxis.

As Zen master, Dōgen set examples that guide his students to their personal apprehension of the original experience of enlightenment and to their practice of enlightenment. He could have merely instructed his students to single-mindedly sit in zazen, but for Dōgen zazen is not simply a physical or mental posture. The site of zazen is neither the cushion nor mental thoughts. The site of zazen is mujō no dōri, the way of impermanence. Merely instructing his students how to sit would place the site of engagement of zazen on the cushion. Merely instructing his students about the way of impermanence would place the site of engagement of zazen in mental thoughts. To guide his students in zazen on the site of mujō no dōri, Dōgen had to present the proper site of zazen through koans. These koans
are concepts that originate in particular dimensions of enlightenment and present their operations in experience. Through a presentation of the change through which these dimensions of enlightenment undergo, Dōgen was able to present examples of the way of impermanence as the proper site of zazen.

Praxis and enlightenment are always situated in mujō no dōri as the changing particular circumstances of specific experiences. To enlightenment belongs changing dimensions, each of which having its own particular circumstances. Moreover, each dharma has its own particular circumstances.

Section Three:
Conclusion

If the Shōbōgenzō was written as Dōgen's dōtoku, it can be read as presentational expression. What it presents are dimensions of enlightenment that are activated by gyōji. Because dōtoku is dimension-specific and because gyōji activates the causal links that make dimensions possible, the dimensionality thesis is a necessary conceptual framework for the understanding of Dōgen's philosophy of language and enlightenment. As dōtoku and gyōji are interdependent
functions that constitute enlightenment, dimensions are preconditions for the intelligibility of enlightenment as presented in the *Shōbōgenzō*.

When unity is a principle or definition of enlightenment from which logical deduction begins, the only conclusion that can be drawn is a unity that is set in opposition to differentiation. Though paradox and the language of evocation may provide a way of including differentiation into the discussion, they obscure the fact that there is no way of reconciling the opposition, given the employed methodology and premiss.

When unity is a (nonthinking) attainment in praxis from which begins a methodology of praxis that is based on total exertion an attainment that provides the necessary condition and occasion for an effect, the result is a differentiation of unity into causal relations. The differentiation implicit in these experienced causal relations can be expressed in concepts. Unity as an experience expresses itself as caused differentiation into concepts. As the relations and implications of concepts are explored, other concepts develop to fulfill explanatory, expressive, logical, and philosophical needs that develop, especially when these needs are demanded by an application of experi-
enced realizations in daily life. The interrelations and development of these other concepts are governed by logic, reason, and linguistic requirements inherent in the processes of understanding and communication. This expressive process that Dōgen calls dōtoku has two results: 1) a conceptual language (with grammatical and syntactical rules of operation that characterize any language) that is based on the experience of unity; and 2) an actualization of the experience of unity in expressions that reflect both its inherent causal relations and its inherent particularity of conditions within which the unity is experienced.

As one form of total exertion of the originative experience (nonthinking, in the case of dō), the latter result causes (in the sense of providing the necessary condition and occasion) a second type of differentiation: transformation of modes of experience. Actualization of one dimension causes (provides the necessary condition and occasion for) another dimension to emerge. The performance of this set of causal relations in praxis is called gyōji. When performance of the set of causal relations leads to an attainment of all dimensions of the dharma and the dharma falls away, a praxeological identity of all dimensions is realized. The experience and attainment of unity is achieved.
Whereas logical deduction from unity as principle and causal exploration of unity as experience are two different methods of describing enlightenment, and whereas both methods have unity as their beginning point and end point, only the latter method can consistently account for a proper place for differentiation, particularity, conceptual expression, and reason within unity.

The method that limits unity to a principle reduces enlightenment to a conceptual blur. Whatever adjectives may be ascribed to that blur, no meaningful explanation of enlightenment is possible. The reductionistic approach provides no room for particularity, individual identity and circumstances, the soteriological answer to existential problems that result from an encounter with differentiation and complexity.

By looking at the Shōbōgenzō as presentation, looking at expressive forms as expressions of conclusions of a praxeological investigation, what opens up is a multidimensional field of differentiated modes of manifold expression, particularity of conditions and identity, modes of experience, modes of causal relations, modes of time, modes of praxis, and modes of enlightenment. Then it ultimately attains a realized orderliness and identity, a praxeological unity.
If praxeological identity can be unpacked as a causal relation that differentiates out of the experience, then this causal differentiation can be explored and developed in concept formation. This process can be seen as a genealogy of concepts. As concepts arise from these causal relations, the way in which these formed concepts interrelate is governed by logic and reason. Here logic and reason have their domain: the interrelations of formed concepts. Praxeology includes this domain but is not limited to this domain. Causal relations can be experienced and expressed as identity.

Differentiation of cause and effect leads to dotoku differentiation that gives rise to concepts that arise from and are thereby authenticated by originative experiences. It also leads to (gyōji) differentiation into modes of experience, language, expression, actualization. This leads to gyōji dōkan.

Investigation and expression takes place on different dimensions. That results in manifold expressive forms, different expressions of the particularity of a given set of conditions.

This dissertation examines the Shōbōgenzō as an end point of Dōgen's expression of and in enlightenment, and examines the mode of presentation that is that expression's precondition. What it presents are
dimensions of experience and expression. This leads the reader from a unity of experience in d1 to a multiplicity of effects that emerge from that unity. The attainment of that unity in experience causes effects in expression in dōtoku and it causes changes in the domains of expression in the gyōji process. By examining the different domains within which gyōji occurs, the reader of the Shōbōgenzō has a philosophical format within which Dōgen's philosophical concepts may be understood. By looking at the various concepts in a genealogical development from dimension-specific originative experiences, we can understand Shōbōgenzō concepts as not only presentational, but as actualizations of the experiential attainments within specific dimensions. As actualizations, these participate in the causal processes that not only fulfill the dimensions, but enact or actualize the transformative process that provide the necessary condition and occasion for the attainment of another dimension. Ultimately, the identity of dimension and dimension in a sequence that Dōgen calls gyōji dōkan. Their causal relations are to be seen as provisions of necessary conditions that works biconditionally. For example, it is true that praxis is identical to enlightenment. This means that praxis is a necessary condition for
enlightenment and enlightenment is a necessary condition of praxis. These are different attainments. The end result is an expression of the identity of praxis and enlightenment.

In sum, when unity is an experiential attainment that is part of a causal process, the result is an experienced identity of differentiated cause and effect that emerge from unity. This differentiation of unity into cause and effect is a differentiation that can be conceptually expressed. Conceptual expression that is based on these causal relations discovered in praxis leads to further differentiated concepts as concepts that emerge for causal relations require further explanation. When the Shōbōgenzō is examined as the product of these differentiations, there is a genealogy of concepts that occurs on three levels. When this happens, what emerges is a conceptual framework for the expressive and performative function of the Shōbōgenzō. This framework is the dimensionality thesis.

Enlightenment and praxis are temporally contextualized processes that display discrete and causally interrelated phases that are differentiated into different domains of operation.

As expression is a result of language, a result of prior cause, it is also a cause of a larger cycle of
transformation in the gyōji process. In this way expression and actualization are necessarily interdependent, mutually providing necessary conditions and occasions for each other. In this way we can conclude the unity of expression, actualization, praxis, and enlightenment, and experience this unity characterizes the expression of what one is, a unity of discrete differentiated, historical, unique attainment of what a person is. This is what the Shōbōgenzō is: the expression of the identity of Dōgen as an enlightened particular person.
Bibliography


