The Asia Pacific Security Order and Implications for U.S. Policy
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The Senior Policy Seminar Series summarizes discussions and conclusions at an annual meeting of senior security officials and analysts from countries of the Asia Pacific region sponsored by the East-West Center. These seminars facilitate nonofficial, frank, and non-attribution discussions of regional security issues. The summary reflects the diverse perspectives of the participants and does not necessarily represent the views of the East-West Center. The price per copy is $7.50 plus shipping. For information on ordering, contact:

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PREFACE

Charles E. Morrison, President, East-West Center

The 2000 Senior Policy Seminar at East-West Center was the second in an annual series of high-level seminars focusing on security issues in the Asia Pacific region. The Senior Policy Seminars bring together senior security officials and analysts from countries around the region for nonofficial, frank, and non-attribution discussions of the differing perspectives on these issues. In keeping with the Center’s founding mission, the objective of this series is, through these exchanges, both to promote mutual understanding and to explore possibilities for improving the problem-solving capabilities and mechanisms in the region.

The Seminar series is also intended to further the East-West Center’s overall institutional objective, adopted by its Board of Governors in 1998, of facilitating the building of an Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a natural, valued, and leading member. For the United States to be an accepted and effective member of this community, not only must Americans gain a better understanding of the region’s dynamics, but U.S. policymaking must be better attuned to the perceptions and operating styles of the other countries in the region. It is the continuing hope of the East-West Center that the discussions at this Seminar series, and the reports from these meetings, will make a contribution toward this goal. In addition, they help inform the agenda of the East-West Center’s other research, dialogue, and education activities.

As in any such undertaking, this Seminar and report reflect the combined efforts and contributions of many individuals. East-West Center Senior Fellow Muthiah Alagappa was co-convener and co-moderator of the Seminar. International Relations Specialist and Director of Studies Richard Baker was the third co-organizer and also coordinated the preparation of the report. Chris Johnstone, of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, served as rapporteur and authored the summary. The Seminar was ably organized and supported by East-West Center Seminars Coordinator Sheree Groves, Program Officer Jane Smith-Martin, Seminars Project Assistant Rosevelt Dela Cruz, Seminars Secretary Marilu Khudari, Seminars Assistant Karen Kadohiro, and research interns Yoshi Amae, Akihiko Takahashi, and Takashi Yamamoto. The staff of the East-West Center’s Imin Conference Center under Assistant Manager Marshal Kingsbury very efficiently prepared the conference venue and associated facilities, and Benji Bennington and Bill
Feltz of the Center’s Arts Program created an attractive multicultural display. As in the case of the 1999 Seminar, editorial and production assistance for the report were provided by copy editor Deborah Forbis and the East-West Center Publications Office under Publications Manager Elisa Johnston. All have my deep appreciation.

Above all, however, I wish once again to express my gratitude to the Seminar participants. All participants have important multiple responsibilities and demands on their time; some hold major official positions. Yet the participants, many for the second year in a row, made the time to attend the Seminar and bring their respective expert insights to bear on the discussions. To both the Seminar “alumni” and those who were attending for the first time, our thanks for your contributions to the exchange of views, which is the driving purpose and most important product of the project.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The many uncertainties in the outlook for the Asia Pacific regional order dominated the discussions at the 2000 Senior Policy Seminar. A number of positive and welcome events over the preceding year were noted. Chief among these have been the unexpectedly swift recovery of most of the region from the economic-financial crisis of 1997–98, and the dramatic (though still not considered definitive) prospects for change on the Korean peninsula opened up by the summit meeting between the South and North Korean leaders in June. The multinational operation in late 1999 to restore order in East Timor was also considered to have been a basically successful case of international cooperation in dealing with a security and humanitarian crisis although the longer-term nation building lies ahead.

However, many if not most other aspects of the regional outlook were considered far more problematic. Problem areas discussed included:

- The basic lack of consensus over the nature, evolution, and possibilities of the regional security order;
- Uncertainties regarding the policies and relations of the major powers involved in the region (critically including U.S.-China relations);
- Continuing flash points and other sources of conflict between the states of the region, as well as serious internal problems in several cases, most particularly Indonesia;
- Inexorable forces of globalization that are weakening every government’s ability to control its own destiny; and
- An ominous combination of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems and of new and potentially destabilizing technological developments most visibly exemplified by the issue of missile defense systems.

All of these factors were seen as sources of continuing debate, differences, and even of possible conflict in the region.

Another major theme at the Seminar was the absence or weakness of international and regional institutions capable of dealing with the many issue areas identified. An increasing level of peacekeeping and peace-restoring
activities by the international community was noted, particularly under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). A major new area of interest is the rising emphasis on the “right” of the international community to conduct “humanitarian interventions” where fundamental human rights are being endangered even as a result of internal conflicts within states. Nevertheless, the general assessment of the Seminar was that international institutions, procedures, and norms for dealing with conflict still face serious obstacles and lag far behind the challenges posed in today’s world, challenges that seem bound to become even more complex in the future. In the absence of an effective international framework to deal with issues of global order, the lack of strong regional institutions in the Asia Pacific has even more serious potential consequences.

The Seminar concluded by examining the implications of these assessments for future U.S. policy. As in other areas of discussion, a range of views was offered, but there were several areas of broad agreement among both American and Asian participants on the U.S. role and desirable approach in the region. There was acceptance (and even general desire) that the United States will continue to play a major role in Asia Pacific affairs, including security. However, there was also a perception of inconsistency, imbalance, and overall relative inattention in U.S. relations with the region. One of the consequences of this perception on the part of other Asia Pacific states is a growing tendency to hedge against American unpredictability by establishing their own channels for dialogue, regardless of American support or participation.

Participants agreed that, if the United States it is to conduct its role in a positive and effective manner, a number of adjustments in its approach to the region are required. It needs to increase both the level and frequency of its attention to the region, as well as the sophistication of its understanding of regional actors, dynamics, and issues. It needs to emphasize consistency and predictability in the policy messages it sends to the region, however difficult this may be in terms of the American political process. It should exercise more creativity in supporting the various multilateral regional processes, and be more open toward supporting arrangements in which it is not a member; this creativity should include willingness to adjust its forward security presence as conditions in the region continue to evolve. Perhaps most importantly, the United States needs to rein in its ingrained tendency toward unilateralism in foreign policy, and must seek to create a better balance between listening and lecturing in its bilateral and multilateral dialogues in the Asia Pacific.
INTRODUCTION

The 2000 Senior Policy Seminar was held at the East-West Center on August 6–9. The first session examined the differing and evolving conceptions of the security order in the Asia Pacific. The second session analyzed a series of specific current security challenges in the region. The final session was devoted to an assessment of the implications of the preceding discussions for future U.S. policymaking with respect to the region. These themes were considered particularly pertinent and timely in anticipation of the transition to a new U.S. administration as a result of the November 2000 elections.

The participants in the Seminar are listed in the Appendix. Collectively they comprised an extraordinarily well-informed and authoritative group on the subjects covered by the Seminar. Participants included serving and former officials of government and international organizations, and experts from both academia and the private sector. Americans formed a larger proportion of the participants in 2000 than in the previous seminar, partly due to the inability of several Asia Pacific invitees to attend and partly due to a strong interest among senior American participants in the theme of this year’s Seminar.

The Senior Policy Seminar series is conducted on a non-attribution basis. That is, all concerned agree not to identify the source of statements and comments made by others during the discussion without obtaining the explicit permission of the speaker. The summary of the Seminar proceedings in Part I of this report accords with this principle, and no inferences should be drawn connecting any specific statement or viewpoint with particular participants. The views of individual participants on any of the subjects discussed should be sought directly from them.

Part II of the report contains excerpts from the prepared remarks made by the presenters who introduced each of the principal agenda topics. These texts have been reviewed and approved for publication by the speakers in each case. We believe that these more detailed presentations add further depth and detail to the report’s coverage of the issues addressed in the Seminar.

In addition, a number of distinguished participants gave luncheon addresses during the Seminar. Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal of the U.S. National Security Council spoke on American policy in Asia. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), gave a presentation on the “Role of Armed Forces in Regional Cooperation.” On
the final day of the Seminar four of the ranking Seminar participants attended a public Ambassadors’ Lunch and presented their individual insights on regional security issues. These were: Thomas S. Foley, U.S. Ambassador to Japan; Ambassador Yukio Satoh, Japan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Ambassador Sha Zukang, China’s Director-General of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Foreign Ministry; and Ambassador Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister. Admiral Blair’s address and a summary of the presentations at the Ambassadors’ Luncheon are being published separately by the East-West Center and are available on request.
PART I: SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

This section presents a summary of the Seminar proceedings, following the basic order of the agenda: the regional security order; principal security issues; and implications for future U.S. policy. In some cases, however, comments on a specific topic have been grouped together and reorganized for the sake of efficiency and clarity.

The Regional Order

Seminar discussions demonstrated the lack of consensus on the nature and definition of the present security order in the Asia Pacific region. There was even disagreement over which countries are the “status quo” powers. Some see the United States, with its network of alliances and forward military presence, as the key defender of the current order in Asia; on the other hand, as one American participant noted, the U.S. focus on promoting human rights, democracy, and economic liberalization hardly represents a “status quo” approach. At the same time, China is frequently described as a “rising power” that seeks to challenge the existing order in Asia; yet in another sense Beijing’s vocal defense of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference represents a decidedly status quo view of the norms that have traditionally governed international relations.

Despite disagreements on many aspects of the regional security order, several common themes emerged from the discussions.

New Threats, New Challenges, New Actors, and Traditional Concerns

- The concept of security is slowly shifting from a focus on the defense of borders (justice for states) toward greater emphasis on the defense of people (justice for individuals or so-called human security). As demonstrated by UN-sanctioned intervention in places as varied as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and East Timor, governments are increasingly being held accountable by the international community for the welfare of their people. Sovereignty, while still the guiding principle of international affairs, is no longer sacrosanct. Indeed, one participant suggested that a “global community of values” is beginning to emerge. This conceptual shift remains contested, however, particularly in the developing world where most of the recent interventions have occurred and where the new focus on human security can easily be perceived as a new form of “imperialism.” And even
participants from developed countries agreed that the state remains the basic unit of international relations.

Agreement on what constitutes a “just order” similarly remains elusive. One participant noted that the broadly shared goals of peace, stability, and human justice can at times work at cross-purposes. For example, Myanmar is in one sense a stable and relatively peaceful country, although it is hardly a just one in the eyes of much of the world; however, international action to force Myanmar’s government to be more “just” toward its citizens would almost certainly result in violence and instability. It was generally agreed that the international community will continue to struggle over how to find the proper balance between state and human security, how to determine when internal matters become external concerns, and how to make distinctions between justified intervention and interference.

The post-Cold War era brought new challenges to the security arena. Participants noted that security today encompasses far more than purely military matters. Socioeconomic factors have played important roles in what one participant termed the “mushrooming” of regional and local conflicts in recent years. Civil strife across parts of Indonesia, for example, can be traced at least in part to economic hardships brought on by the Asian financial crisis. Many participants linked these challenges to the broader phenomenon of globalization that has brought prosperity to the region while also subjecting governments to unprecedented strain. Although globalization is often viewed in the developing world as a force originating in the West—and in particular in the United States—it was argued that no country can escape the process or the often painful adjustments it imposes.

Other security challenges linked to globalization include terrorism, drug and small arms trafficking, piracy, illegal migration, environmental degradation, and the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS. These issues affect the most developed countries, including the United States, as well as the developing countries of the region.

With the emergence of new challenges, new actors are assuming roles on the security stage. Civil society organizations have developed sufficiently that governments no longer have a monopoly on efforts to enhance regional security. Non-government organizations (NGOs) are increasingly prominent in promoting democratization, economic development, and tougher environmental standards. Although relations between governments and NGOs can be tense, there is also scope for a cooperative “division of labor” between state
and civil society, and NGOs can both be valuable partners for governments in promoting regional security and facilitate cooperation at the international level.

Non-state actors are also increasingly a source of security threats in Asia. International organized crime syndicates, terrorist and separatist groups, arms and drug dealers, and modern-day pirates are responsible for many serious local and transnational problems. Participants noted that international cooperation is essential to address such threats effectively.

Nevertheless, traditional military concerns continue to dominate the regional security environment. Great power relationships in Northeast Asia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and the continued division of the Korean peninsula all remain the most immediate and violent threats to regional stability. There was broad agreement that the future of the region will largely be determined by the actions and interrelations of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

The Architecture of Asia Pacific Security

Because the nature of the security order in Asia remains contested, efforts to create regional institutions to promote peace and stability have met with mixed success. Not surprisingly, there was no consensus at the Seminar on the optimal Asia Pacific security “architecture.” It was generally agreed that a model of integration along the lines of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is impossible in Asia. There was similar agreement that reliance simply upon a balance of power approach in the region was potentially dangerous and in any event probably impossible in the age of globalization. Beyond these broad outlines, however, there were often sharp disagreements on specifics.

The fundamental reality of the Asia Pacific is diversity—geographic, cultural, and political. It includes a number of fragile states and a continuing emphasis by many governments on sovereignty and nationalism versus internationalism. In these circumstances, many participants agreed that what one called the “multilayered model” now existing in the region is the only viable approach to promoting regional security. The multilayered model includes the presence of major powers, bilateral alliances and relationships, some trilateral arrangements, and multilateral forums at both the regional and sub-regional levels.
One participant commented that a multilayered structure provides a convenient means for countries to explain bilateral actions—particularly with formal allies—to the region as a whole, thereby improving transparency and reducing misunderstanding. Another noted that Southeast Asian governments have adopted such a “layered” approach to regional security. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seeks first to promote security within the sub-region, while the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other dialogue channels sponsored by ASEAN include most countries in the broad Asia Pacific region.

Other participants were more skeptical or critical of the multilayered approach. Some argued that Asia should dedicate greater effort to strengthening regional multilateralism. Others maintained that the continuation of military alliances in the region represents “Cold War thinking” and that order in the region should instead be founded on the concept of “common security” and a “phased approach” focusing first on modest confidence-building measures. This group tended to point specifically to the ARF as an important vehicle for pursuing this alternative vision.

There was, however, broad consensus that any new regional order will have to be built from the existing order, in an evolutionary way and in keeping with the emphasis in Asia on consensus among the countries involved. Nevertheless, it was also accepted that this process is being forced by a number of factors, including globalization.

Security Issues in the Asia Pacific Region

Regional security challenges addressed ranged from longstanding regional “flash points” and conflict management issues through the proliferation of advanced weapons systems and technologies to the challenges of globalization and humanitarian intervention.

Flash Points and Conflict Management

The political, social, and economic diversity of the Asia Pacific implies that tolerance and a willingness to coexist are the prerequisites of regional peace and stability. At the same time, many countries in the region are undergoing significant political and economic change—or will be forced to do so in the near future. North Korea must open more to the outside world if it is to survive. China is embarked on a process of painful economic adjustments. South Korea is undergoing a transition to a new generation of political leadership.
Indonesia is in the throes of a tumultuous and fragile democratic transition. Even Japan is confronting the need for fundamental economic and political reform. There are also important ongoing changes in the relative power of major countries of the region including particularly China, India, and Japan. One participant observed that the overall challenge for the region is to pursue “dynamic stability”—preserving fundamental regional order while also managing significant internal changes across the region.

**U.S.-China Relations and Taiwan** Participants agreed that the U.S.-China relationship is the single most important variable in the region’s security equation. Despite an array of common interests, Washington and Beijing have yet to establish a “constructive strategic” partnership. Emotion and quasi-theological perspectives on such issues as Taiwan and missile defense continue to cloud the relationship on both sides. In the United States, the image of China as a “communist” menace persists; in China, American actions are viewed with a basic sense of suspicion. The conduct of the bilateral relationship on both sides is further complicated by a lack of transparency, a tendency toward reactive decision making that can easily produce vicious circles, and the role of the relationship in domestic political debate. Many American participants acknowledged the need for—as well as the difficulty of—better management of bilateral ties; some suggested that the challenge for the United States may not be so much to build domestic consensus on policy toward China as to learn how to operate without it.

The sensitivity of the Taiwan issue was particularly noted. Chinese participants stressed that reunification is an issue of “paramount” national importance to China, which will “not brook any interference from anyone” on this issue. However, Chinese participants also insisted that Beijing views the use of force as a last resort, and that China prefers to focus its energies on internal economic development.

On the American side, participants reiterated the basic U.S. government position that any settlement acceptable to people on both sides of the Strait of Taiwan is acceptable to the United States and that the United States would oppose either unilateral independence or the use of force to resolve the issue. American perspectives varied as to the prospects for progress in cross-strait relations. Some viewed current tensions as “increasingly dangerous,” while others argued that subsequent to the election of Chen Shui-bien to the presidency in Taiwan the atmosphere has improved considerably, opening a “real opportunity for dialogue.”
The Korean Peninsula Despite the astonishing success of the North-South Summit in June 2000, participants were uniformly cautious in predicting progress toward lasting peace on the peninsula. One suggested that the peninsula is now in a period of “euphoric expectation” about the future, and that “cautious optimism” was probably warranted. Another noted that the euphoria in South Korea has begun to fade as people focus on the “hard, difficult task ahead,” and pointed out that the Korean peninsula has witnessed similar breakthroughs in the past, only to slip back toward tension.

In the meantime, it was acknowledged that the demilitarized zone remains the most heavily armed border in the world. Real progress toward peace requires confidence-building measures such as mutual troop reductions and other concrete steps to reduce tension. North Korea has used skillful diplomacy, and its missile and nuclear programs, to further its interests, and undoubtedly will continue to do so. Ending the military threat will be very difficult. The long-term resolution of this problem will involve not just the efforts of the two Koreas but the active participation of the major powers in the region as well—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.

The Role of Japan Participants expressed concern about the future of Japan’s role in the region. Mired in an extended recession and hampered by weak and indecisive political leadership, Japan’s profile in the region has declined considerably since the beginning of the decade. Beyond these points, however, specific views again differed. Some participants argued that the health of the regional economy depends heavily on Japan, and that Tokyo’s willingness to carry out structural economic reforms will therefore be critical to the region’s well-being as well as to Japan’s efforts to exert positive political and economic influence in Asia. Others did not regard Japanese economic leadership as critical to the region’s overall health.

Still others were skeptical about Japan’s ability to play a significant regional role in the near term. One noted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is heavily burdened with “baggage of the past” that impedes its ability to implement economic and political reform, and suggested that at least one more election cycle will be necessary before progress in these areas will be possible. Another pointed to the “tremendous inertial element” in Japanese policymaking, noting that a decade after the end of the Cold War, Japanese defense policy continues to be geared primarily toward repelling an invasion from the north, making bold initiatives unlikely.
Crisis and Conflict Management  In the absence of effective mechanisms able to address the range of challenges confronting Asia, continued reliance on a multilayered security architecture appears unavoidable.

U.S. alliances in Asia have played a valuable role in shaping the region’s security environment, and some in the region tend to view the United States as the “great intervenor” particularly in the aftermath of the Gulf War and Kosovo. Some American participants argued that the United States may in fact be very reluctant to intervene in Asia (witness the East Timor experience), and argued that the U.S. alliance structure is not in fact a very effective mechanism for managing crises. Efforts to expand or link these alliances in theory might improve this capability, but in reality “few things are more alienating” to other powers in the region, especially China. Further, the U.S. forward presence in the region is increasingly vulnerable. In this context, it was argued that Washington needs to anticipate and plan for a new regional environment. Nevertheless, relatively little concerted strategic thinking is being done on the optimal form and purpose of U.S. forward deployed forces over the long term.

Participants also agreed that Asia’s multilateral institutions—such as ARF and APEC—are similarly unable to fill a crisis management function. Some argued that ARF can play a useful role in addressing “small issues,” but on matters involving the region’s major powers the forum remains “inoperative.” Others were more positive on the role of regional institutions, noting the important diplomacy and confidence-building role of summits and ministerial meetings and arguing for efforts to improve the ARF’s effectiveness, such as through the creation of a formal secretariat.

Several participants stressed the desirability of a separate forum focused on Northeast Asia, beyond the existing limited framework of the four-party talks (comprising the two Koreas, China, and the United States) on the future of the Korean peninsula. Some recommended expanding to a “six-party” framework including Japan and Russia, noting that the recent progress on the Korean peninsula may offer an opportunity to launch a broader dialogue. Others suggested that the so-called “ASEAN plus 3” process, which includes Japan, China, and South Korea, is beginning to fill the role of a Northeast Asian security forum, albeit in a very limited and preliminary way.

Participants were generally skeptical that the United Nations can be relied upon to address regional crises. UN action was successful in Cambodia and East Timor, but the particular circumstances surrounding those two cases
seem unlikely to be repeated. Some participants viewed the UN-mandated intervention in East Timor as having been a cautionary experience for many of the countries involved that is not likely to be repeated.

Other participants emphasized the emergence of informal “minilateralism” as a potentially promising avenue for addressing regional challenges. The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral coordination on policy toward the Korean peninsula—the so-called TRICOG process—was cited as one successful example. It was suggested that the Japan-South Korea-China relationship might similarly lend itself to informal minilateralism, to address competing and overlapping interests in the East China Sea.

Several participants stressed that the U.S.-China-Japan relationship would also profit from improved trilateral dialogue and coordination. However, serious obstacles to progress in this direction were also acknowledged. To be successful all three countries would have to change their approach to the others. The United States would need to recognize the legitimacy of China’s rising power, while at the same time reaffirming its commitment to Japan yet avoiding the appearance of using Japan to contain China. China should accept both the United States and Japan as major players in the region; and Japan must demonstrate that it is a “reliable ally” while also addressing more frankly the legacy of the Pacific war. None of these changes are easy for the governments concerned.

Some participants also noted the value of Track II dialogues in facilitating dialogue and averting conflict. An American official stated that such mechanisms have been particularly useful in promoting exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Still, the capacity of these mechanisms to manage crises is limited at best.

**Technological Change, Arms Competition, and Regional Security**

North Korea’s test of a three-stage ballistic missile in August 1998, coupled with the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan a few months earlier, have dramatically increased concern in the region about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. These events have provided new impetus in the United States for pursuing a national missile defense system capable of shielding the country from a limited attack. The prospect of the United States building such a system, regardless of its size and capabilities, has in turn provoked strong reactions in the region.
An American participant pointed to another problem stemming from technological change. Starting in the mid-1970s Washington pursued an “offset strategy” in its defense policy, focusing on developing advanced technology weapons that could compensate for the Soviet numerical advantages. This strategy was vindicated by the American triumph in the Gulf War, but other countries have now responded to the American technological advantage in the only way they can: by adopting relatively low-cost “asymmetric” weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. In essence, these countries have pursued their own offset strategy against the United States.

One American participant argued forcefully that traditional arms control approaches are unlikely to work in the current global security environment, due to three key factors. First, missile programs in the region represent long-term investments dating back a decade or more. Second, the integration of high technology into defense establishments has created vastly more powerful military-industrial complexes in countries with these programs. And third, missile development efforts represent a response to perceived external threats, rather than simply programs for national prestige. For all of these reasons, countries are unlikely to give up the programs willingly.

It was acknowledged that proliferation issues are inherently more complex in the Asia Pacific than in some other regions because of the interactions of four or five major countries. Participants also recognized that to deal successfully with the proliferation problem, it is necessary to understand and address the security motivations behind the acquisition of advanced technology weapons—particularly missiles but also advanced conventional weapons—both in Northeast and South Asia, and how to best respond to the underlying problems. The case of North Korea was cited as illustrative in this regard.

Other participants defended continued pursuit of traditional arms control strategies, in Asia as elsewhere, on the grounds that it remains possible to slow the pace of proliferation, to make it more costly, and to block the spread of certain critical technologies. Part of this strategy is simply to “play for time,” in the hope that the future will bring a more favorable political climate. It was pointed out that this approach has been successful in stopping nuclear weapons programs in South Korea, Argentina, and Brazil, and arms control regimes have largely succeeded in preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

American participants agreed that national missile defense (NMD) development in the United States is almost certain to proceed in some form, if only
due to domestic political factors: politically it is difficult to oppose NMD which holds out to the American people at least the possibility of invulnerability. (Similarly, Japan’s interest in NMD is also likely to continue, despite the argument that this might spark a regional arms race, due to domestic political concerns about North Korea’s missile program.) However, both the technology and the cost of missile defense systems remain problematic. Some suggest that effective missile defense would require using a “boost phase” system rather than the current interceptor (“hit-to-kill”) system; however, full coverage of the United States under such a system would require the use of far more satellites than the current program—and would therefore also be far more expensive.

Most Asian participants, with the notable exception of Japan, were skeptical or critical of U.S. NMD as well as more limited theater missile defense. There was agreement among American participants that the United States has not adequately explained American intentions regarding missile defense. For example, given the relative sizes of America’s and China’s strategic arsenals, China’s reluctance to engage in a nuclear dialogue is understandable, making it advisable for Washington to clarify the role of China in U.S. missile defense plans.

**Globalization, Vulnerability, and Domestic Adjustment**

Globalization is not simply an economic phenomenon. As the social and political upheaval brought on by the Asian financial crisis indicates, globalization must be included among the region’s security concerns. As one American participant noted, people are more exposed and vulnerable to global forces today than at any time in history; these forces can give rise to a range of challenges, from widening income disparities to rising local nationalisms. Further, the ability of national governments to control developments has been weakened by this phenomenon, and different governments are taking very different approaches. Participants agreed, however, that globalization is a reality rather than a choice; the forces driving the global economy are inexorable and cannot be stopped by national governments.

Most participants believed that globalization has been beneficial to the region, and that Asia Pacific countries will continue to embrace the global economy even as they struggle to manage its negative impacts. Others argued that globalization has primarily benefited the developed countries, while developing countries face the danger of having decades of progress wiped out overnight due to the volatility of the global economy. The impacts
are especially difficult for the more vulnerable developing economies, which still need to strengthen their domestic institutions, establish effective social safety nets, etc.

The United States is often seen as a primary force behind globalization—and is sometimes demonized as a result. There was some resentment in Asia that the United States did relatively little to help the region during the financial crisis by contrast with China and Japan. The emergence of the so-called ASEAN-plus-3 mechanism can be seen in part as a reaction to a belief in Asia that the United States “hasn’t done its job.”

There was general agreement that existing international institutions should be strengthened, and perhaps new organizations created, to manage the challenges of globalization. However, this process is likely to be slow. Much of Asia is still in the post-colonial nationalism stage, which complicates the development of international approaches. Many in the developing world are suspicious of the character of the global trading system, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) process. They argue that this system has allowed many advanced economies to maintain import restrictions in critical areas—such as American barriers in textiles and European agricultural subsidies—even as developing countries are being pressured into aggressive liberalization.

Another approach suggested to better manage the forces of globalization was greater tolerance of differing national responses to globalization. Some actions can be taken at the national level. For example, it was suggested that governments could go beyond creating “social safety nets” and focus on “empowering” people (such as through improved education) to take advantage of the opportunities that globalization provides. However, these governments also face the danger of “reform fatigue,” an increasing consciousness of economic inequality within as well as between countries, and resistance to change on the part of status quo groups, all of which hamper their ability to make the necessary adaptations at the national level.

A final recommendation was for more research and thinking about the effects of globalization, as well the desired end-state of the global economy. Specific questions mentioned include how much flexibility should be acceptable in the pursuit of economic liberalization.
Human Security and the Role of the International Community

Humanitarian interventions have been increasing in the post-Cold War period, and global forces are creating pressures for more interventions, due largely to the impact of the growth of civil society, the influence of the media and increasingly rapid communications. However, this is among the most divisive issues in international relations today. Countries in both the developed and developing worlds are torn by the implications of international action in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and—to a somewhat lesser degree—East Timor. Developed countries, generally the sponsors of intervention, point to the moral imperative of stopping violence by governments against their own citizens; at the same time, they remain wary of the costs, both financial and human, of involvement in open-ended peacemaking and peacekeeping operations with few measurable objectives. For their part, developing countries express understanding of the moral justifications for intervention, but are concerned about the overtones of a new imperialism. Seminar discussions demonstrated that, although the international community increasingly recognizes the need to defend “human security,” it is far from reaching a consensus on how to do so fairly and consistently.

Challenges and Constraints Many from the developing countries see humanitarian intervention as a new threat to national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. However, in the Seminar even strong critics acknowledged that intervention is legitimate when addressing internal problems that cross international borders such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and piracy.

Reservations were expressed about the ad hoc way in which interventions have thus far occurred. In this view, without clear criteria on when, how, and by whom intervention should be carried out, precedents may be set that further erode the principle of sovereignty. One remedy suggested was for the international community to develop a set of principles to guide humanitarian intervention.

Other participants argued that sovereignty needs to be viewed more flexibly than in the past—as a “social construction” that will inevitably be redefined as the international community evolves. One scholar argued that sovereignty is increasingly interpreted to imply a responsibility by the state to its people; thus the principle of non-intervention is not sacred, but “only irresponsible governments need fear.”
Participants also noted, however, that no one is calling for the elimination of sovereignty as an international norm. A central challenge for the international community in the future will be to balance continuing respect for sovereignty with the growing legitimacy of human security and humanitarian intervention.

A review of past humanitarian interventions suggested that such actions are unlikely to ever be undertaken consistently. The UN will almost certainly never take action against permanent members of the Security Council or their close allies. A corollary is that intervention is also unlikely in cases where no major power perceives its national interests to be at stake, because in the absence of a compelling rationale for involvement the costs are likely to be perceived as too high. Even in cases where there are strong interests, intervention is only likely to occur when there appears to be a reasonable chance for success. Thus the obstacles to humanitarian intervention are daunting. In this context, it was argued that the intervention in East Timor seems unlikely to set a precedent for international involvement in other regional conflicts such as in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, the southern Philippines, or even elsewhere in Indonesia.

**Prospects and Possibilities** Most participants were skeptical that anything but a case-by-case approach to intervention is possible. This is in part due to the weakness of international institutions—including the absence of a standing UN army. Thus the best the international community can do may be to piece together “coalitions of the willing” when crises arise, taking into account the particular circumstances surrounding each specific case.

A range of ideas was put forward for strengthening the effectiveness and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. For example, one suggestion was that the international community could create new norms of international law mandating and providing guidelines for intervention—although many participants viewed this approach as impractical. Several participants noted that, although interventions such as the Kosovo operation are unlikely to be repeated with any consistency, the international community could do more to develop guidelines and principles on actions short of military force. Areas proposed for consideration in this regard included economic sanctions, preventive diplomacy, and informal dialogues.

Other participants suggested that regional organizations could play a larger role in humanitarian intervention. It was pointed out that, relative to other parts of the world, regional institutions in Asia play an insignificant role in
promoting human security, and more thinking could be done on how institutions such as the ARF might better interact with the UN. Several participants stressed the need for an official forum in which intervention could be addressed and discussed, but others were skeptical that this would be feasible in the Asia Pacific.

Implications for U.S. Policy in the Twenty-First Century

There was a nearly universal consensus among Seminar participants that the United States will remain firmly engaged in Asia. Some Asians did question whether Americans would continue to be interested in events overseas in general and particularly in Asia (despite repeated assurances of interest from high officials and the American foreign policy elite). One Asian suggested that American interest in missile defense reflects the continuing salience of isolationist thinking. American participants disagreed, arguing that the central foreign policy debate in the United States today is not internationalism versus isolationism but rather multilateralism versus unilateralism, i.e., the degree to which Washington is willing to work with—and defer to—others to achieve its objectives.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, another American participant suggested that Asians, long frustrated by the lack of U.S. attention to the region, might in fact soon face the opposite problem—too much American attention and involvement. In this view, the combination of deepening economic interests and a series of major strategic challenges—reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, the rise of China, and the “normalization” of Japan—are likely to make Asia the center of attention for U.S. policymakers in the years ahead.

Either way, the outcome of the debate within the United States over the country’s appropriate international role and style will be of major consequence to Asian countries. A further complication in this equation is the fact that, while it is firmly engaged in Asia, the United States is still not highly knowledgeable about Asia. It was noted in this regard that Asia was receiving relatively little attention in the 2000 U.S. political campaign, but that it will inevitably require early attention from the next U.S. administration if only because of the need to prepare for the 2001 APEC meetings in Shanghai. Participants offered several general recommendations that could be helpful for the new U.S. administration in its policymaking for the Asia Pacific.
Consistency and Predictability in American Policy are Critical

Several participants noted the danger of sending mixed or confused messages to the region. One American observed that in broad terms U.S. policy toward Asia has been strikingly consistent since the end of World War II. For example, the U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia have been remarkably durable. Nevertheless, U.S. policy has also been marked by periodic dramatic changes that have undermined confidence in American credibility. Prominent examples include President Nixon’s surprise opening to China in 1971, and President Carter’s 1977 announcement of the intention to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. The complexity of the American political system—including the conflicting forces of idealism and realism—makes it very difficult to sustain consistency in many specific areas of foreign policy.

The current U.S. pursuit of NMD was cited by one American participant as a classic example of how decisions in Washington can generate fears elsewhere. Another American argued that Asians are just as worried about changes in American attitudes toward the Taiwan question as they are about developments in cross-strait relations themselves. The United States needs to work hard to reassure Asians as much as possible regarding both the national missile defense issue and China-Taiwan policy.

American participants also pointed to effective management of the U.S. forward military presence in the region as critical. Virtually all acknowledged the possibility—even the likelihood—of significant changes in the structure and size of American forces in Asia in the medium-term future. It will be critical, therefore, for the United States to consult widely (but especially with the host countries) and to clearly explain the rationale for any adjustments to the region.

The United States Should Avoid Hubris in Dealing with Asia

A continuing perception of American arrogance does more than simply irritate much of the region; it arguably precipitates developments that can damage American interests. Participants pointed to American heavy-handedness toward Asia as an important factor behind the emergence of the ASEAN-plus-3 and the “Shanghai Five” processes, both of which explicitly exclude the United States. Notably, however, no American participant expressed concern that either of these specific developments represents a direct threat to U.S. interests, and some suggested that such new forums should not be a problem for American policy as long as they remain open.
A related recommendation is that the United States should devote more effort to developing more two-way dialogues and consultations with the region. Too often, as one American participant noted, Washington tends to view such consultations simply as a way to encourage others to agree with and support U.S. policy.

Another point was that a policy of engagement, including involvement in specific problems and developments, does not necessarily require that United States take the leading role or propose grand initiatives—something that can be hard for a new administration to manage in any event. Rather, the United States can allow and encourage others to take the lead on key issues confronting the region. An American participant noted that Seoul, rather than Washington, is now driving the peace process on the Korean peninsula—and saw this as an entirely healthy development that American policy should embrace.

The delicacy of U.S. handling of relations with China, and the need for a more sophisticated understanding of China on the part of the United States—its background, sensitivities, and its present leadership’s preoccupation with the internal situation—were repeatedly emphasized in the Seminar discussions. It was argued that China should not be viewed just in terms of the dichotomies of a “rising power” versus the “status quo” or peaceful versus hegemonic aspirations. (Others noted that the same logic applies also to India, the other potential future giant of Asia.) Several participants stressed that the United States must recognize and accept China as a major player in the region, and that confrontation between the two countries is more likely to be avoided if Washington and Beijing clearly accept each other as equals.

Several Americans also noted in this context, however, that the U.S. emphasis on human rights is certain to continue as a prominent feature of U.S. policy in this region as elsewhere. Although, in the words of one American participant, this may make the United States “hard to deal with” on occasion, for their part, Asians need to recognize that American concern with human rights is genuine and is ingrained in the political culture. By the same token, the United States needs to be prepared to accept others’ comments on the American human rights record.

**The United States Should Work to Reinvigorate Multilateralism**

Many participants voiced dismay over the apparent lack of American interest in Asia’s nascent multilateral institutions. A perceived decline in attention
by the U.S. government to APEC was cited as particularly noteworthy against the background of President Clinton’s role in elevating the forum’s stature by hosting the first leaders’ meeting in 1993. A related comment was that U.S. participation in recent ARF meetings has largely been devoted to bilateral meetings with other countries’ representatives, rather than focusing on the multilateral aspects.

American participants offered various explanations of the apparent disillusionment in the United States with Asian multilateralism. One noted that many multilateral meetings are perceived as “talk shops” not worthy of senior policymakers’ time. To recapture American interest, these forums would have to move toward addressing more serious issues. Another American commented that APEC may have fallen victim to excessive expectations. Once the forum moved beyond broad policy statements to the detailed and often slow work necessary to achieve the liberalization goals, high-level American policymakers became less interested.

It was also pointed out that the United States is in something of a Catch-22 position in dealing with the region’s multilateral institutions. Too much effort to invigorate these processes can lead to charges of American dominance. At the same time, American enthusiasm for multilateralism can also precipitate fears of a reduction in the U.S. commitment to its bilateral alliances in the region. On the other hand, U.S. emphasis on the bilateral relationships is seen by some, especially China, as a potentially confrontational attempt to contain China. These conflicting considerations make strategic innovation in U.S. regional policy extremely difficult in the current context.

Despite these qualifications, participants almost uniformly agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to support Asian multilateralism. APEC and ARF constitute “Asia’s G-8,” in the words of one Asian participant, and these meetings constitute the best and most regular access to the region’s leaders. As such, it was the general view of Seminar participants that these forums deserve considerably more focused, active support from the U.S. government than they are currently receiving.
To analyze the security situation in the Asia Pacific region, it is useful to start with an analysis of what the end of the Cold War has meant to this region.

First, the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing demise of the Cold War confrontation have brought about a sea change in the international political order only rarely seen in recent history. Ideological confrontation between East and West, which divided the world in many senses, has given way to dialogue and a more unified world. Many nations in various regions of the world have chosen democratic forms of government and embraced market economic principles. This global sea change has also affected the Asia Pacific region.

What this will mean for the international system in the twenty-first century is as yet hard to predict. The contours of the post-Cold War world order are far from clear, and there are many uncertainties. Nevertheless, one thing that we can safely predict is that, for the immediate future, order will depend on cooperation among the major players—an order that might be called *pax consortis*. Contrary to some forecasts, I believe that the demise of the bipolar world with the United States emerging as the only superpower need not mean the advent of a unipolar system managed and controlled by that superpower. On the other hand, it is also clear that the United States will have to play a predominant role in this *pax consortis*, commensurate with its power. However, the United States can only play this role effectively and in a sustainable manner with the cooperation of other major powers.

A second point is that, as if to fill the power vacuum created by the end of the Cold War, there is a growing, ominous prospect of regional conflicts. The causes for these conflicts are diverse. In many cases they arise from socioeconomic factors: ethnic, religious, and other rivalries, often in the context of chaos created by the collapse of government or societal disintegration resulting from internal strife and social inequality. In other cases, they result from hegemonic ambitions at the regional or sub-regional level. Paradoxically, in many of these cases, these regional conflicts have been triggered...
by the disappearance of the tightly regimented framework of two opposing blocs dividing the world.

A third point is that, with globalization, values based on individual human dignity are emerging to compete with the traditional international values based on state sovereignty. In this new situation, human factors, such as excellence in economic activities, scientific and technological capability, and societal cohesiveness, have become much more relevant to the stability and security of a nation. Thus, it is now necessary to pay much more attention to human development in economic and social terms in order to attain peace and stability. This is as true in East Asia (e.g., East Timor) as in other regions.

**New Developments in the Security Landscape of the Region**

The Asia Pacific region is undergoing fundamental transformation under the impact of these three factors. On its surface, this process of transformation may not be as dramatic or spectacular in the Asia Pacific as in other parts of the world, notably Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the change in the Asia Pacific region is as significant as that in Europe, if not more so, even though the process may be taking place over a longer span of time. I believe that the most fundamental challenge facing the countries in this region is how to shape the new contours of their political and economic structures. Five major developments have had especially significant impact on the problem of security of the Asia Pacific region.

**The Security Implications of the Asian Economic Crisis** There are various theories as to what caused the Asian financial and economic crisis. However, it seems clear that the process of globalization has largely been responsible for the way this crisis has evolved. The economic crisis hit a number of East Asian countries in a way that not only threatened their economic prosperity, but jeopardized the security environment of the region as a whole by bringing about social dislocation and political instability. Some have been coping with the economic difficulties more successfully than others. Nevertheless, in all these countries the confidence of the people in their future security has been eroded. What is more, the crisis has revealed fundamental sociopolitical problems that need to be addressed in each case. Thus, the most immediate challenge to these countries is how to restructure their societies on the basis of good governance and social justice, so that a high degree of political stability and social cohesion may be established.
Because of their domestic concerns, many countries in the region appear to be less immediately focused on the security implications of this issue. However, our efforts to overcome the crisis must include not only its economic impacts but also its security implications.

**The Impact of Recent Developments in Nuclear Proliferation** Another challenge to the security of the region is the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, exemplified in particular by the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan but also by the activities of North Korea. Our region has been enjoying for many years a relative freedom from the threat of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have created a new security situation by seriously undermining the international non-proliferation regime. The security implications of this development go far beyond peace and stability in South Asia. A new security situation is being created that affects the security equation of East Asia as well, bringing down the nuclear threshold in this region. Still more serious, the nuclearization of the Indian subcontinent could trigger a chain reaction, which is bound to involve East Asia. India makes no secret of its concern that its real security threat is not just Pakistan, but China. Understood in that context, the implications of the recent efforts by India for nuclear development are enormous. In the worst case, a stepped-up effort of China to meet the challenge could drag the region into the quagmire of a new nuclear race.

This new situation could be further compounded by what may happen on the Korean peninsula. The tensions on the peninsula may be considered a residual legacy of the East-West standoff, but North Korea’s nuclear development program and the launching of missiles posed a new concern to regional security in Northeast Asia. While the North-Summit Summit meeting is a major development bringing hope for the future, the situation on the peninsula continues to contain the danger of a vicious circle of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including delivery systems, in the East Asian region.

**The New Opening on the Korean Peninsula** The dramatic meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas has triggered a degree of euphoria over the future of the peninsula. The encounter of the leaders of two countries that had been in perennial confrontation since their birth is in itself an historic event. It is bound to bring new fluidity to the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula, and there is hope that it may lead to a smooth transition from confrontation to reconciliation and from division to unification.
While this is still an open question, cautious optimism for the longer term seems in order. The Korean situation is practically the only major remnant of the Cold War confrontation and as such could not survive indefinitely. What is beyond our doubt is that North Korea’s leader has embarked upon this new course in all seriousness, with a view to creating a new environment in which the survival of the country under his regime can be ensured. The opportunity to forge a new security framework on the peninsula can help consolidate the peace and stability of the wider Northeast Asian region through engaging North Korea in a serious dialogue on reducing the military threat to its neighbors.

**Emerging Complex Power Relations in the Region** Another major factor to which we need to give careful thought is the evolving state of relations among the major players in the region. These players include the United States, China, Japan, and possibly Russia in the longer term. Relations among them in the Asia Pacific region are extremely complex, because their respective political agendas, economic interests, and historical legacies are extremely entangled and complicated.

However, in an age of globalization and deepening interdependence, it would be wrong and even dangerous to put an excessive emphasis on the geopolitical power relations of the major players. In spite of the Kissingerian diagnosis, present-day Asia Pacific is not, and cannot be, the same as nineteenth-century Europe where the dominant rule of the game was balance of power exercised through military strength. Rather, in my mind the real danger today is of succumbing to the temptation of believing that power struggles among major players are the key factor in the international relations of the region. This fallacy can actually lead the players in that direction through the famous process of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Particularly dangerous in this context is the future of China-U.S. relations. Both in China and in the United States, there appears to be intense suspicion and fear that the other side is pursuing a policy of hegemony in the region, to the detriment of its own perception of the order that should prevail in the region and more generally in the world. This suspicion and fear is magnified by the fact that the People’s Republic of China is effectively the only major power that holds a view of the world public order which is diametrically opposed to the one held by the United States. It is my humble submission that the issue of tension surrounding the Taiwan Strait between the United States and China stems largely from this factor. This specific issue could be well within our capacity to manage, if it were not for the basic mistrust.
Thus I would argue that in order to construct a secure regional environment in which peace and stability can be ensured on a durable basis, it would be of critical importance for the major players to discard the old paradigm of international relations based on the simplistic notion of the balance of power. Instead, we should try to devise a new paradigm in which the common interests that are rapidly growing due to the accelerated processes of interdependence and globalization can play a major role restraining the temptation to play the old power game.

Need for Consolidation of Common Values
Fifthly, I wish to emphasize that, as a basic prerequisite for our efforts to meet successfully all these challenges, we in the East Asian region must strive to identify common values among members of the international community such as respect for human rights, participatory democracy, environmental protection, and promotion of open and fair competition in the free market. These values are becoming a major focus of attention of this region, as the nations of the region make efforts to create societies that are more secure in human terms, more stable in societal terms and more prosperous in national terms. This has huge implications for the security of each of the countries and of the region as a whole, as they are the conditions *sine qua non* of a viable stable society. The recent case of East Timor demonstrates the relevance of this issue to the security of the region, and there are other potential flash points as well.

We are living in an era where a transformation of the international system is steadily taking place and the concept of sovereignty itself is undergoing a major modification. Universally accepted human values claim validity as guiding principles of society that transcend national borders. A significant factor behind this development is the growth of the middle class in many countries of the region. The members of this social stratum tend to be highly educated and highly sensitized to issues relating to individual freedom and human dignity.

The Future Security Framework for the Asia Pacific Region
The major rationale for a broader multilateral security framework is the changed environment of the region in recent years. In the Cold War period, the major players in the region doubted the need for such a regional security framework. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements may have also contributed to this state of affairs in that the U.S. presence has not only offered a security shield to Japan in the East-West confrontation, but has also provided a psychological safety net for the stability and prosperity of the East
Asian region. But the changed politico-security environment of the region following the end of the Cold War requires us to think through a new security framework for the region in light of the new geopolitical realities.

I submit that a more solid multilateral framework for regional security would be opportune for the region. Japan has been cooperating positively with other ASEAN partners in promoting movements in this direction through APEC and ARF. ARF, for example, especially at its initial stage in the early 1990s, carried out an extremely helpful pioneering role in the field of confidence-building measures. However, recent trends in this forum show signs of stagnation, due to the lack of fresh imagination and political will to go beyond the stage of exchange of information as part of confidence-building measures. To meet the diverse challenges to the security environment, we need bolder initiatives for a more structured approach.

What then are the possible scenarios that would meet the security requirements of the Asia Pacific region? Given the specific characteristics of the region, certain models are feasible, whereas other models are not going to be workable.

The first is an integration model, the type that Europe has maintained in the form of NATO and the EU. This model is based on firmly rooted shared common values and interests. However, this is almost impossible to realize in the Asia Pacific area, at least in the short term, given the diversity prevailing in this region.

The second is the balance-of-power model. Henry Kissinger, for instance, claims: “Peace requires either hegemony or balance of power. We Americans have neither the resources nor the stomach for the former. The only question is how much we have to suffer before we realize it.”

I question the universal validity of such a statement in the contemporary world. I do not think that the hegemony model is applicable to the Asian setting, where hegemony clearly does not offer a solution to the problems I have raised. However, I also doubt that a balance-of-power model is a viable model in the Asia Pacific context. The balance-of-power model could only work—if it works at all in this age of remarkable interdependence—in an environment where the players are more or less alike in terms of their size, their perception of the nature of the game to be played, and their power to influence the events taking place in the theater. These elements are conspicuously missing in East Asia.
This leads me to the third model, what I would describe as a multilayered network model. Admittedly, this is an eclectic model, but it is much more viable and feasible in Asia. It consists of a combination: a first layer of defense arrangements to take care of concrete security needs on a bilateral basis, and a second layer of a regional framework for consultations and adjustments on issues that affect the broad common security interests of the region. This second layer would be a comprehensive network that would take cognizance of all the bilateral defense arrangements. In between these two layers, one could also envisage sub-regional arrangements, which could serve as a connecting link between the regional framework and the concrete bilateral defense arrangements.

The Locarno Pact, which secured the status quo in the immediate aftermath of World War I in Europe, could be cited as a useful example of the kind of multilateral security arrangement that could be applied in this region. It is not a model, but much can be learned from it. The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee contained in the pact declares that all the parties collectively and severally guarantee the maintenance of the status quo, renounce the use of armed force and commit to peaceful settling of disputes among the partners. Such a format could offer a good starting point for discussion of a new multilateral security framework for this region.

But for the present, in order for the Asia Pacific region to pursue prosperity, it is necessary for the countries in the region to feel secure about their security environment. In my view, it is precisely the consolidation of such a security environment to which the Japan-U.S. security alliance is effectively contributing. Multilateral security and economic cooperation in such forums as the ARF and APEC are based on the firm foundation of these bilateral regimes. I should like to emphasize once again that these bilateral security regimes will continue to be important for specific security needs of the countries involved for some years to come, and that a broader framework of a multilateral security arrangement on a regional basis will contribute to a stable security environment by playing a complementary role of providing a broader framework for confidence building, for improvement of the security environment, and for constant consultations on issues that can affect the security situation in the region.
Security Challenges and Conflict Management

by Dr. Kurt C. Campbell

I want to lay out some ideas about how to think about the process of effective security management in the Asia Pacific region

The Complex Security Environment in the Asia Pacific

First, the most important thing to appreciate is that at the beginning of the twenty-first century for the first time in modern history every major challenge to peace and stability is found not in Europe but in Asia. Indeed, each of these challenges is such that you could imagine unforeseen developments occurring overnight, literally, and the region and indeed perhaps much of the world would be thrown into crisis. I’m speaking here of course of the still delicate situation across a divided Korean peninsula, the increasingly tense and unpredictable situation across the Taiwan Strait, and the very dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. On top of that, Asia is the scene—as many of us have discussed—of both rising powers, transforming powers, and complex relationships between states.

But it seems to me that in the short term we face three central issues. One is an issue that has been with us for the last several years and I think will probably increase as we go forward: the rise of China. And it is important to underscore here that it is not just China’s rise but the perception of rise, and because everyone anticipates China’s arrival as a great power, policies have already begun to change to account for this factor.

The second issue is one that I think has been underexamined: the effectiveness of Japanese reform. We have seen in the last several months a number of articles and commentaries in Japan that are starting to refer to the 1990s as the lost decade for Japan. And the fear is that it is not clear how much longer Asia can go on without effective and significant Japanese leadership in both the economic and political realm.

And the third issue is the complexities of the U.S. role. If you look at the U.S. election campaigns between 1992 and the year 2000, Asia policy has played roughly the same role, i.e., a very small one. But if you look at the situation in the year 2000, and compare that with 1992, it is interesting to note how much at least the perceptions have changed. In 1992, there was the perception of a rather significant American decline in the world. A second feature
in 1992, at least from an American perspective, was the almost complete absence of China. We were still in the midst of Tiananmen sanctions, and there was no real discussion about rebuilding U.S. relationships with China. Third, there was a sense of Japan as being on the march, potentially transforming its economic and political power into the security realm. And last, there was relative cohesion in ASEAN. In 2000, almost everything has shifted. There is relative discontinuity within ASEAN. There is very real concern about the role of Japan. China has a very real significance in our political dialogue. And there is perception, at least, of predominant American power. The frequently used term is hegemony—the perception of a domineering, dominant American power that has full-spectrum influence in military, political, commercial, and ideological matters.

Also, we tend to look back on the 1990s as a period of unusual placidity. But on a variety of fronts, recent events suggest that we are now potentially on the cusp of major strategic change in Asia. The Taiwanese election augurs a new period of potential unpredictability in cross-strait relations and great nervousness within Asia as a whole. There is increasing incoherence in Indonesia that reverberates throughout ASEAN, and makes it difficult for ASEAN to play the role that is so critical in Asia as a whole. And then there is the very hopeful development on the Korean peninsula, the North-Summit Summit. I hear it said that people in Korea think that since the summit everything has changed, and that skeptics in Washington believe that nothing has changed. The reality is somewhere in the middle, but I believe it probably tends toward everything having changed.

**The Absence of an Effective Crisis Management System**

One of the things that is similar between 1992 and 2000 is that Asia still does not have fundamental institutions responsible for crisis management, or even a central strategic discourse that would lead to the alleviation of problems. The most significant existing institution we have, of course, is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). I think too often people sort of dismiss the ARF as not terribly significant. I do think it plays a role and has played a role. There have been some successes: the 1995 discussions about the South China Sea are a clear example. ARF had a couple of down years after the economic crisis in the late 1990s, but I do think that it has some potential, both in terms of lower-level military to military multilateral operations and in terms of strategic dialogue. But the reality is that the operating consensus within the organization will still move very, very slowly. And so it is important not to pin our hopes too much on the ARF as a vehicle for really significant conflict prevention initiatives.
Second, I would argue that Track II nonofficial forums have played an unusually important role in Asia. Some of the Track II efforts with both China and Taiwan, as well as other opportunities with our friends in Japan and China, have been important at least in illuminating some of the areas of difficulties and the avenues of potential cooperation in the future.

The third point involves the United Nations. A recent occurrence that requires greater discussion and more understanding is the East Timor intervention. This was a fascinating case study that illuminated a variety of different factors. The UN played an important convening role in East Timor, but I increasingly believe that this operation was a one-off event, not an indication of potential future collaboration. One of the most troubling dynamics here, within Australia and in Southeast Asia as a whole, is the generally received wisdom that Australia’s role is a cautionary tale, something from which Australia barely escaped alive, something never to be repeated again. Like the Gulf War, I think that East Timor in its own way will be seen as a situation with very specific circumstances that will be extraordinarily difficult to replicate in another case.

The last issue I would raise in this context is the discussion, some of it emanating from the Department of Defense, that the U.S. security alliances have a crisis mechanism procedure or element built into them. Frankly, I think that is a ridiculous proposition. Our bilateral arrangements have been remarkably effective at shaping the strategic environment. I think they can in certain circumstances respond, particularly on the Korean peninsula. Elsewhere the situation becomes more dubious and uncertain. But ultimately our security alliances should not be seen as institutions for crisis management in Asia as a whole. One of the ideas that we will see increasingly in the debates in the United States is the notion of linking up our Asian alliances in some manner. I think this is a result of U.S. strategists who were primarily trained in Europe now looking more and more to Asia as the most interesting strategic arena for new thinking. And when they look at Asia, the first thing they think about is what may be possible in terms of linking up the bilateral arrangements in a more formal way, creating NATO-like structures. I believe it is fair to say that there are few things in Asia that are potentially more alienating than that sort of concept. I think the reality is that it is very difficult for the United States in the current environment to drive strategic innovation in Asia.

The reality is that any idea we come up with about multilateralism or even revitalizing our bilateral ties is now generally perceived as leading to one of
two directions. One is that the U.S. interest in multilateralism is a signal that we are withdrawing from Asia, no longer interested in bearing the burden of our responsibility in the ways that we have in the past. I believe some of those concerns are beginning to mitigate over time, but they are still a recurring feature in the Asian discourse. Second, and I think more problematic, is that most of the U.S. strategic innovations that we contemplated or discussed in the last couple of years have been perceived by China and others in Asia as vehicles for somehow constraining the emergence of China. So one of my recommendations for the next American administration is that the more prudent path is not to take a strategic initiative but look to others. Leadership does not necessarily mean taking initiative, it can mean actually supporting a process that is already underway.

**Major Challenges on the Horizon**

I see several of these. In addition to supporting multilateralism in the manner of the ASEAN Regional Forum, it is also important for the United States along with others in Northeast Asia to think about “minilateralism,” smaller scale multilateral activities both informal and formal. I think the Track II vehicle has been successful here and that it is important to think about structures that are not as cohesive or as legalistic as the kind that we have practiced in Europe before. I think the most important development in terms of minilateral dialogue in the last several years has been the really remarkable series of security and political dialogues that have emerged between South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This is now an accepted, survivable feature of Asian security diplomacy; five years ago it was nonexistent. But in reality this trilateral discussion is really two separate bilateral mechanisms that don't yet have very many trilateral characteristics. As we go forward, it is important to think about what might be possible in terms of trilateralizing these sorts of arrangements in ways that are perceived as building trust and constancy in the region and that transcend the division of the Korean peninsula. Obviously there are a lot of difficulties associated with this, not least of which is the problem of attitudes in Beijing. However, attitudes in Seoul may also be increasingly contentious, but for us to think about peace and stability over the horizon, the relationship among these three countries is extraordinarily important.

Secondly, a most important goal in Asia over the next five to ten years is to seek a “virtual trilateralism” between the United States, Japan, and China. It is impossible to imagine true crisis management or true stability in Asia if there is not a better relationship between the three great powers of Asia. To
its credit Japan has in the past tried to champion this idea, but it has met with mixed interest in both Beijing and Washington. However, clearly this situation has now changed. But ultimately to move forward each country needs some fundamental understandings with the others.

The most important commitment that the United States can make to China is that it is not seeking to contain China but rather that it accepts China’s role and China’s rise, and that the United States will work to integrate China into the international community and into Asia. To Japan, the United States would need to make a commitment that it is a stable and reliable partner, and that it will work with Japan to try to create new mechanisms for operating our bilateral relationship in the future.

China will have to make a more complex commitment. China has to make a fundamental commitment to the United States that the Asia Pacific region is big enough for both of them and that they can contemplate a region in the future where the United States and China can coexist. The most important commitment from China to Japan is to accept that Japan has a legitimate security and political role in Asia. I believe, frankly, that this is in China’s own self-interest and that the inability to make this commitment has been a problem for China’s foreign policy. China needs to get over the fact that Japan in the year 2000 is not in any way comparable to Japan in 1937. Even though there will always be painful memories from the past, the fact is that Chinese strategic interests are better served by a closer relationship with Japan; trying to isolate, condemn, or subtly undermine Japan’s security and political role is no longer in China’s strategic interest.

Finally, as for Japan, I think Japan has to be clear with the United States that it is a reliable partner itself, and that it will support the formal U.S. presence where necessary. Japan also needs to communicate to China a more fundamental series of apologies for actions committed in the 1930s.

I believe that these two vehicles—the trilateral between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and the virtual trilateral between the United States, China, and Japan—are perhaps the two best venues and activities for the United States over the next several years, the ones that have the most potential benefit of increasing trust and confidence in the overall Asia Pacific region.
Technological Change, Arms Competition, and Regional Security

by Professor Paul Bracken

The technological drivers behind the problem of proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction are reasonably clear—that is, if they are isolated from domestic political and strategic factors. More and more countries are acquiring advanced weapons, weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems to make them useful, as well as other conventional systems that could have major consequences in a number of different areas. There is no need to go over this well-plowed ground.

What is worth thinking about is the reaction to these trends. One major reaction in the United States and other developed countries is to continue to use arms control, broadly interpreted, as the centerpiece of their foreign policies despite its clear inability to stop the spread of these dangerous technologies. This spread is both horizontal and vertical. That is, some countries—India and China, for example—are increasing the sophistication of their weapons, as is the United States. Other countries that 10 years ago had little or no advanced military capacity—North Korea and Iran are examples—are now getting it.

The reason for reapplying the old wisdom of arms control is mostly because no one has any better idea about what to do. The present arms-control concepts are of declining utility and effectiveness, but it seems safe to say that arms control will remain the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. What is disturbing, however, is the absence of freshness and innovation in arms-control thinking. Broadly speaking, frameworks from the Cold War are being recycled for application to a very different set of problems in a multipolar world of nascent and growing military powers. Deterrent stability arguments are used despite the enormous differences between the U.S. nuclear arsenal and that of any other country. What made sense when there was strategic parity, as in the Soviet-American nuclear relationship in the 1980s, is being applied to situations as diverse as U.S. relations with North Korea, China, and Iran. Likewise, the national missile defense program in the United States is debated in terms of classic strategic stability, with almost no regard for its relationship to U.S. conventional superiority, deterrence of coercion and intimidation of allies, or most remarkably, escalation theory.

When I say that such traditional Cold War arms control and its application to the current strategic environment is “not working,” the burden is on me to say exactly what I mean by this. Let me do so in the following way.
For 30 years security experts, especially those in the United States and Western Europe, have made the following case: “In the 1950s and 1960s people thought that by the end of the century there would be 20 or 30 nuclear powers. This clearly has not happened, and this shows that we tend to be excessively pessimistic about the spread of atomic weapons. So while there may be negative indicators from current developments, we are probably too pessimistic about where all of this is heading.”

I do not believe this argument can be taken seriously any longer. The argument requires us to overlook the fact that in a connected belt of countries stretching all the way from Israel to North Korea (specifically, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea), every single one is developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. In each of these countries, the move to acquire advanced weapons has gone far beyond any mere decision to do so. What at one time was a choice made by political leaders to get the bomb, or to get missiles, has gone well beyond this. Large complex institutions have been built to design, develop, coordinate, and deploy these weapons. This is a new development that gradually took shape during the 1980s and 1990s. What we are seeing with the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the North Korean and Iranian missile programs, is not really a strategic decision to test these systems. It is the outcome of a large investment in new postures over the past 10-to-20 years. The “payoff” is coming in the late 1990s and early 2000s. So the problem of ending or reversing these programs is much greater today than it was in the early 1990s. Then, conceivably, leaders could have been talked out of their folly. Now, whole new institutional incentive structures are in place, as nascent military industrial complexes have become an important bureaucratic and political factor in national decision making. A large constituency exists today, which did not exist before, standing behind the continued expansion of these military programs.

A second reaction in the West to the increasing failure of arms control to check the horizontal and vertical spread of advanced weapons is to behave as if its consequences were a linear function of the spread of the weapons. The expectation is that change in the strategic balance is incremental, rather than disruptive, and that anticipating the longer-term full consequences of what is happening is not that useful, because it will be more of the same. The bias is toward short-term thinking. Or, in Herbert Simon’s words, “the short term drives out the long term, every time.”
I recall a conference in 1997 in Washington that dealt with non-proliferation and the Asian economy. The overwhelming sense of the attendees was that the problems of spreading advanced weapons were now hostage to the Asian financial crisis. Countries simply would not have enough money to spend on armaments—this was the widely held belief of this conference. I tried to point out that recessions were not unusual events, that they were periodic occurrences in all free-market economies. Even if arms spending were to slow down for a few years, it could easily catch up when the economic crisis was over. There was little interest in such arguments, I think, because it dealt with a longer time span than most participants usually consider. As is now understood, the defense budgets in South Korea, India, and China are increasing, as is the spread of new technologies to countries immune to the world macroeconomy, like Iran and Pakistan.

My purpose here is not to criticize arms control. Rather it is to call for greater attention to the longer-term consequences of current trends. We must develop a better sense of the shape of the new game board that is emerging as a result of technological and strategic developments. Otherwise we will be approaching the future by looking into the rear view mirror of the past.

**Political Complexity**

Describing the spread of advanced weapons within the framework of arms control fails to adequately capture the larger strategic purposes about why this phenomenon is taking place. Clearly, this rationale varies greatly from one country to the next. Israel is not like North Korea, and China is not like Iran. Broad generalizations can be made only with the greatest care. Having said this, it is interesting to emphasize that what is general is the spread of these weapons. That North Korea and Israel both want these systems suggests a fair generalization about the emerging security environment in Asia, because it is difficult to imagine two nations more different than these two.

It is striking that despite the diversity of countries in Asia, and their different security positions, how much is similar to so many of them. First, the reasons for going down the road of advanced weapons is a function of internal politics and external threats. To say that country $x$ is “only seeking these weapons for status” is simply incorrect. It may have been true in the past for particular countries. The Shah of Iran essentially had an American security guarantee, and chose to build a large arsenal mainly for reasons of status. But that was in the 1970s. Today, from Israel to North Korea, countries acquire these weapons for internal political reasons, for status certainly, but also because they feel threatened externally.
In other words, countries acquire advanced weapons for reasons of national security. This is really a fascinating development. Before and during the post-World War II era, most countries in Asia built large armies as a nation-building project, rather than for national security by which I mean defense from external threats. Armies were used to secure the state from internal threats and dangers, and also to accomplish the construction of the nation by forging a common identity. Today big weapons systems (missiles, ships, weapons of mass destruction) have taken over as the national project in security.

The shift to advanced technology weapons has many far-reaching consequences. It means that in the future there will be a continued erosion of the power and position of the army, with capital flowing to the more technological parts of the armed forces. Maintaining a giant oversized army does little to bolster security in the modern era. Nor does it provide the national cohesion and identity that it did in the postcolonial era. Now, throughout most of Asia the spread of capitalism means that markets allocate resources, rather than the state. Cohesion comes from participation in a national economic system, and not from military or police coercion. Thus, the need for a giant army is reduced compared to what it was 30 years ago.

What is arising in many Asian countries is a new power center based on the marriage of advanced technology and military purpose, in short, a military industrial complex. Observers may decry the inefficiency of this sector in many countries. But if we know anything about military industrial complexes, it is that they persist for long periods despite inefficiency. In the West, these complexes continue to go on, to resist reform, even at a time when other sectors of the economy veritably explode with new innovations and processes. The point here is that despite their economic inefficiency they are unlikely to go out of business.

**The Particular Character of the Weapons**

Armies are inherently short-range instruments compared to the new advanced weapons appearing in much of Asia. While there have been cases of long-range army power (Japan in 1941), the strategic environment no longer favors this form of power projection. Indeed, in the postcolonial era most Asian armies were built much more for internal rather than external use. The distances they could travel were a few hundred miles at most.

So a very striking feature of the particular character of the new military technologies is that they can work at much longer range than the prominent
instrument of the postcolonial era, the army. They have very different effects than armies on perception, deterrence, and ease of use.

Here we must guard against the tendency to describe extreme scenarios of all-out war. All-out interstate war in Asia, or any place else, seems to be increasingly unlikely. But missiles, to take one example, get their effect not from their actual use, but like most instruments of power, from their nonuse. Their deterrent effect, their capacity to inflict widespread damage, their provision of expanded escalation options, and their symbolism all need to be considered to fully comprehend the character of the changes now taking place.

Implications for Regional Security

Broadly speaking, since World War II the security spaces of most Asian countries did not overlap. What Iran or Iraq did had little impact on Israel. China and Japan had separate strategic geographies. What happened in North Korea had little bearing on Japan. Only on the Korean peninsula itself did the actions of one state materially worsen the security of the other.

So one consequence for regional security is an increased blurring and interaction in and between geographic spaces that were once either vacant, or dominated by a single power, usually the United States. The Sea of Japan, the Taiwan Strait, the western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and others are spaces that are being profoundly changed by military technologies. Security zones are changing, with increased interactions in them, changes in their character, and probably increased danger.

The last point needs explication. During the Cold War it took about 10 years for the two sides to learn how to interact safely in such areas as divided Germany, the polar regions, and in key offshore waters. Both sides needed to learn not only the military dynamics of the other, but the political significance of certain military thresholds and operations. This is why the first half of the Cold War was, in my judgment, so much more dangerous than the second half.

All of this has implications for regional security in Asia. The greater range of missiles and ships compared to armies fundamentally changes the interactions of one state with another. Buffer zones are disappearing. Spaces that once only had forces of one state present now have many. Around the Korean peninsula, submarine operations of six countries now routinely take place. A comparison with respect to missiles and anti-missile defenses is harder, but
the increasing frequency that we all see “missile geography maps”—i.e., maps with dotted lines on them showing the ranges of various national missile programs—demonstrates that this technology is changing the geography of Asia. Adding the more complicated effects of naval and air operations, sea mines, drones, and other technologies reinforces the fundamental changes now taking place in Asia.

There is a tendency to automatically see such changes as challenges, or even provocations. Some of these may be a challenge, but others are simply the byproduct of many countries now having longer-range forces. What needs to happen is greater recognition that the changes now underway are of a fundamental structural kind. I don’t think an arms-control scorecard is very useful in this respect. It would be like trying to understand the impact of the introduction of the airplane in the 1930s on colonial empires in terms of arms control. The arms-control framework is just not rich enough to do the subject justice.

A new emphasis on strategic geography and the ways it is changing would be a more powerful lever to prevent wasting vast sums of money trying to halt what are unstoppable trends. And a new emphasis on geography as a framework would also help channel capital flows to “good” military programs, ones that protect national security while at the same time do not needlessly upset regional stability.
Globalization, Vulnerability, and Adjustment

by Dr. Charles E. Morrison

“Globalization” has almost become the term to define this era. In its common and most general usage, it refers to the integrative forces knitting together a global society including economic phenomena such as enhanced capital flows, technology transfer, trade in goods and services, and the movement of legal and illegal labor, as well as non-economic forces such as the spread of ideas, norms, and values. None of these are new phenomena, but modern transportation and communications technology and the lowering of many political and regulatory barriers to transborder movement have so accelerated the speed and scope of cross-border movements that it is commonly argued that today’s globalization is qualitatively different from any past experience. As globalization can be both integrative across national borders and disintegrative within these borders, it has a transforming effect on national and world society. It holds great promise for the international security order by promoting deeper interactions across borders, creating new mutual interests, and increasing the costs of conflict. At the same time, by diffusing power, lessening national ability to control, and confusing concepts of national interest or even identity, it is frequently seen as subverting governmental institutions and the state system with profound implications for national and international governance. While creating individual opportunity, globalization also increases perceptions of individual and group insecurity, creating anxieties and pressures for policies or actions to stop, retard, or alter the terms of globalization. This discussion focuses on this last feature.

A prominent feature of the globalizing forces is their relatively “impersonal” character as compared to traditional sources of external vulnerability. To some, globalization represents a kind of Americanization or Westernization of global society. There are understandable reasons for this. Many of technological innovations associated with globalization appeared or became widespread first in the United States, and many of the features and core economic and political values of the emerging globalized society (primacy of market forces, reduced regulation, individual empowerment, use of the English language) seem identical or similar to those prevailing in the United States. The same is true of the pop culture associated with the new information society. Moreover, the American government has also made strenuous efforts to project its values internationally and to shape the emerging international norms and institutions in ways most comfortable to Americans. While many societies have benefited enormously from globalization, at the macroeconomic level
the United States is obviously the biggest beneficiary. Ironically, therefore, even as many Americans regard globalization with mistrust, for many non-Americans globalization is equated with inequitable benefit to Americans.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascribe globalization to the intended actions of any one nation or to groups of actors such as multinational corporations or international financial speculators, however much they may benefit from and therefore support globalization. Because globalization is significantly driven by technological change, it is frequently regarded as inevitable or irreversible. This shifts the debate on globalization toward the direction of how to cope with, adjust to, and benefit from forces of globalization. Whether or not globalization is inevitable, its pace can be accelerated or retarded by the actions of governments. Whether one believes governments should adopt a heady or a cautious approach to globalization depends in part on an assessment of the vulnerabilities it entails and the likelihood that these may catalyze a political backlash.

**Vulnerability**

As described below, globalization has raised different kinds of political pressures within the Asia Pacific region. Whatever the country, however, a common fault line of debate in the economic realm is between those who emphasize the macroeconomic benefits of globalization and those who focus on its economic and social adjustment costs. This rift is echoed in the cultural and political sphere. Proponents of globalization argue that it empowers individuals with broader perspectives and choices. Skeptics worry that external pressures may destroy or corrupt traditional institutions and beliefs, with moral consequences for individuals and a loosening of the fabric of the social and political order.

A common criticism is that globalization has removed buffers at the national or company level that protected individuals from volatile external events. An instructive lesson involves the run-up to the Asian financial crisis, where deregulation of capital flows led to enormous inflows of speculative cash that disappeared just as suddenly following the Asian collapse. Throughout the region, practices that provided considerable economic security such as so-called lifetime employment in elite Japanese and Korean companies, the “iron rice bowl” in China, or job guarantees under union-negotiated labor agreements in U.S. companies are disappearing. In some economies, government-initiated social safety nets in the public sector barely exist, and in others they are being reduced. The result is that individuals are increasingly affected by
global events over which they and their governments have little control. Moreover, the policy responses often seem shaped through institutions like the IMF or the WTO, which have no direct accountability to citizens.

It is widely argued that globalization increases economic disparities between those better able to take advantage of globalizing forces and those unprepared for it. The relative income gaps between and within countries are widening. The income ratio of the richest fifth of the world’s population and its poorest fifth have increased from 30 to 1 in 1960, to 60 to 1 in 1990, and 74 to 1 by 1997. In East Asia, at least prior to 1997, widening differences in national income figures were more the result of differential rates of growth rather than a worsening position of the poor, but globally average per capita incomes have declined in absolute terms over the past decade in more than 80 countries. This is also true within countries. In the United States, for example, the real per capita income declined for almost 60 percent of the population over a recent 20-year period of real overall economic growth. In Singapore, which boasts one of the more equitable societies in the region, the government recently reported that income gap between the top fifth and the bottom fifth of the households increased to 18 to 1 in 1999 compared to 15 to 1 a year earlier. Real wages declined among workers in more menial jobs, while salaries increased substantially for workers in the industries and high-level positions associated with the “new economy.”

Perceptions of vulnerability and dislocations give rise to ongoing debates throughout the region on the globalization processes, but the national circumstances and thus the character of these debates differ. The following are some very broad generalizations about these differences.

The Anglo-American cultures of the region (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) are immigrant societies that in many respects are on the cutting edge of globalization. These societies are frequently seen as pushing forward ideas that are essentially globalization projects—that is, they would further accelerate the freer movement of goods and ideas—in such forums as the APEC process. However, in these societies too, globalization has also been associated with the loss of higher paid wages in the manufacturing sector—”downsizing”—and fears of cultural dilution; and open societies give full expression to these fears in public debate. In fact, there has been little actual protectionism, even in the sphere of labor markets, but the fears have made further opening in the weaker sectors of these economies politically very difficult to achieve. The United States, of course, occupies a special place because of its preponderant size and self-perceived
capacity to determine its own destiny. Americans may have the greatest difficulty in understanding the imperatives of cooperation on a give and take basis in the management of global issues.

Despite their dependence on the global economy, Northeast Asian countries generally have had low rates of internal direct foreign investment, imports, and immigration, reflecting prevailing belief and political and economic systems, governmental policies and regulatory barriers, business cultures and practices, and social customs. Some also have placed formidable formal or informal barriers to unwanted cultural influences. Thus, the challenges of globalization may be more difficult for this region than for any other. In South Korea, changes have been propelled by the economic crisis and near national bankruptcy, which required the Korean government to speed some deregulation and opening processes that otherwise would have taken much longer. Many question how well this will proceed in the coming years with reduced economic pressures. Without the same immediate financial pressures, change has come much more slowly in Japan. But it is moving forward, arguably more through adjustments by individual firms that are in financial crisis or that welcome freedom from past business and governmental constraints to improve their competitive position. China’s situation is yet again quite different, with the government propelling a reform process. However, the broad scope of these reforms, their differential impacts on Chinese society and their uncertain impact on underlying values and the central governing structure threaten to increase social tensions.

Some Southeast Asian countries historically were crossroads of trade and cultural interaction and have long traditions of interaction with the outside world. There has been a tolerance in several countries for large-scale foreign investment, very high dependency on trade, and even large numbers of foreign workers (these, for example, equal 15 percent of Malaysia’s workforce). Globalization through much of recent history has been associated with strong growth rates, including a sharp reduction in poverty. The Asian economic crisis, however, was a sobering reminder of the vulnerabilities associated with globalization. In much of this region the task is to devise institutions to reduce these vulnerabilities while continuing to take advantage of globalization at a more sustained and measured pace.

South Asian countries generally have had low rates of economic interaction with the outside world, and thus globalization starts from a much different baseline but liberalization and deregulation continue to face resistance, particularly with the increased political participation of disadvantaged groups.
Globalization is also problematic in the Pacific Island world where it is frequently associated with advice from metropolitan countries and international institutions to pursue policies that have worked well for larger, less isolated economies. Some argue, for example, that heightened ethnic tensions in Fiji are at least in part rooted in reduced protectionism that accentuated economic disparities between those, mostly Indian Fijians, who were able to take advantage of the opening of Fiji’s economy and others, mostly indigenous Fijians, who found themselves at a relative disadvantage.

**Adjustments**

Adjustments can be thought of at the international, individual, and national levels. At the international level, the logical conclusion remains that with such an important part of human interaction crossing national borders and with so many global issues, it is essential to continue incremental processes of extending global governance. At the individual level, the ability to successfully take advantage of globalization and cope with its side effects appears to be highly correlated with education. The problem is that many individuals have neither the resources available to them nor the knowledge of what they need to do in order to increase their chances of individual security.

National and local governments will continue to play a critical role as the essential actors in devising global institutions and in providing the necessary protections and opportunities for adjustment for individuals. In the wake of the financial crisis, for example, it was clear that there needs to be some new architecture in the international system as well as better financial regulatory machinery in many countries. Neither is possible except through actions of individual nation-states.

However, some states and more governments are essentially quite fragile. They are squeezed between external demands for greater conformity to “global” norms of governance and access on one hand, and internal demands
for greater protection in an uncertain world. Not only do they find it difficult or impossible to meet these internal demands, but in fact they are being pressed externally to move in the opposite direction. Their instincts for political survival at the national level and the lack of an authoritative political process in the state system probably ensure that global rule-making will occur only slowly.

Governments and the international system have some capacity to affect the speed of globalization. Some believe that it is only through increased globalization that the resources will become available to carry out the adjustments entailed. Governments should get on the right side of history by moving with and even hastening globalizing forces. Politically, this strategy is intended to deal with resistance to globalization through a strong forward movement. An alternative is to move with technological and economic globalizing changes, but not to make special efforts to speed the process. This helps reduce uncertainty, contain problems of a political backlash, and manage the adjustments over a longer period. A debate earlier this year between two eminent American economists, both believers in the benefits of globalization, typified these different approaches. The first said that he believed in the bicycle theory of trade, that is, you have to keep pedaling furiously in a free trade direction or the bicycle will be overwhelmed by protectionist forces and topple over. The other said that he also believed in the bicycle theory, that you ride a while and then you get off and rest a while to regain your strength and move on. He expressed concern that too fast or sustained a pace threatened to outrace the ability of the society to adjust, increasing rather than decreasing protectionist pressures. These are the alternatives faced by many national governments and the international institutions.
Humanitarian Intervention and Human Security: Why Sovereignty Doesn’t Matter As Much as the Current Debate Suggests

by Professor Andrew Mack

Should the moral imperative to prevent genocide and other extreme violations of human rights take precedence over state concerns about violations of sovereignty and Article 2.7 of the UN Charter? This question has become increasingly salient since Kosovo and East Timor and has been the theme of a number of important speeches by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The controversy over this issue should be seen in historical context. More than 90 percent of today’s wars take place within states, not between them. Security is today more about the protection of individuals and communities within states than the defense of borders between them. The term “human security” is increasingly used where the “referent object” of security is citizens rather than borders. Since states are frequently a threat to their own peoples, the concept of human security has been somewhat controversial within the UN—an organization whose members are states, not peoples.

Mr. Annan’s powerful September 1999 speech to the General Assembly argued the case for humanitarian intervention by the international community to prevent or stop gross violations of human rights. It generated considerable controversy. Both in-house and independent analyses of member state responses to the speech indicated widespread opposition to the Secretary-General’s argument for humanitarian intervention. What support there was came primarily from the developed states; most developing states were skeptical if not outright hostile.

The reasons for this controversy are not difficult to understand. The General Assembly debate took place in the same year as an unauthorized NATO intervention against a sovereign state in the face of deep opposition from Russia and China. Many observers, and not just in the developing world, believe that intervention without the authority of the Security Council threatens to unravel the fragile fabric of international law.

In some cases the opposition to humanitarian intervention reflects little more than the self-serving response of governments that wish to remain free to repress their own citizens. But to assume, as some Western commentators do, that this is the sole source of concern would be a great mistake. Developing countries that have experienced centuries of colonial and other major power
interventions have reason to be concerned that history not repeat itself. And such interventions are less likely if they have to be authorized by the Security Council than if they are prosecuted by ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” that may act for less than altruistic motives.

Arguments to the effect that the intervention in Kosovo was motivated by moral, not realpolitik, concerns failed to persuade those critics who argue, with some justification, that aggressive states almost always invoke morality to justify their actions.

The Kosovo intervention is seen by many, not least the Russians and the Chinese, as particularly alarming because it facilitated secession and provided a worrying precedent that others might seek to follow. The Kosovo Liberation Army deliberately provoked repression in order to catalyze NATO intervention and achieve what they could never have achieved on their own—namely expulsion of the Serbs and de facto independence for the Kosovars. This precedent, say the critics, could encourage secessionist movements elsewhere to provoke aggression in order to cause the target state to embark on a campaign of indiscriminate repression so savage it would lead to intervention by the international community. This concern is almost certainly unfounded for reasons outlined below, but it is real and part of the general animus against humanitarian intervention.

Critics from the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South have also noted the contrast between the West’s willingness to mount a massive intervention in Europe to protect Europeans from gross violations of human rights and the lack of willingness to do anything to protect hundreds of thousands of Rwandans from even grosser violations of human rights.

In developing countries, opposition to humanitarian intervention also reflects genuinely held views that sovereignty offers a measure of protection for the weak against the strong. The impression gained from the UN General Assembly and media discussions thus far is that sovereignty concerns have been critical in decisions to intervene—or not to intervene—when confronted by gross violations of human rights.

**Why Sovereignty is Not the Real Impediment to Humanitarian Intervention**

General Assembly debates notwithstanding, concerns about violating sovereignty have not been a real impediment to humanitarian intervention. They
were of little relevance in Bosnia, Haiti, or Somalia, nor in the tragic failure to intervene in Rwanda.

Sovereignty was clearly a critical issue in the case of the Security Council and Kosovo. But Kosovo was a special case. It was not sovereignty per se that was the critical factor but secession—a deeply sensitive issue for both the Russians and the Chinese. In none of the other cases noted above was there any prospect of a Russian or Chinese veto arising out of sovereignty concerns.

In the case of Indonesia and East Timor, armed intervention without Jakarta’s go-ahead was not an option. But this was not because such an intervention would have violated Indonesian sovereignty. Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor was illegal—it had no sovereign rights over East Timor. The reason that intervention was not even considered was that there was no support for the use of force against a major regional power.

**Constraining Factors**

For those who believe that forcible humanitarian intervention is both moral and necessary (if not always legal) to prevent future Rwandas, it is necessary to ask why such interventions are so rare. Sovereignty, it turns out, is only one possible constraint—and is not usually the decisive one. At least eight other constraints can be identified.

- Council-mandated humanitarian intervention will never take place against the five states that are Permanent Members of the Security Council (P-5) for obvious reasons, not because of Council concern about transgressing the sovereignty of the P-5 state in question, but because the veto would be used.

- Such interventions are highly unlikely to be approved against allies of a P-5 state. Again the constraint has far more to do with loyalties to allies than respect for sovereignty.

- Such interventions are highly unlikely when (as in Kosovo) secession is at stake.

- Such interventions are highly unlikely against a major regional power. The Indonesia/East Timor case is instructive. Despite the fact that, as far as the UN was concerned, Indonesia had no sovereign rights over East Timor, there was never any prospect of armed intervention without Indonesia’s permission. Similarly, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine the Council voting
in favor of intervention against India, Brazil, or Nigeria if their governments committed gross violations of human rights.

- Such interventions are unlikely where major powers (particularly the United States) perceive no vital interests to be at stake and where there is a risk of casualties.

- Such interventions are unlikely where there is not a major power or a major regional power willing to play a leadership role. In almost all cases of armed intervention in the 1990s, a single power/regional organization has taken the lead: NATO in the case of Kosovo (where NATO credibility was on the line); the United States in the case of Haiti (where Washington was concerned about boat people fleeing to the United States); Nigeria and the Organization of West African States in the case of Sierra Leone; Australia in the case of East Timor (where domestic politics/refugees/Timor Gap oil were key factors). No such power was willing to take the lead in stopping the genocides in Cambodia or Rwanda.

- Intervention is also unlikely unless there is perceived to be some realistic prospect for success—at acceptable cost. This constraint has been increased by what might be called the “Somalia Syndrome.” There was a realistic prospect for success in Kosovo. But what if gross violations of human rights took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where half a dozen armies and at least three insurgent groups are deployed—what would be required for a forcible humanitarian intervention to succeed there? The United States deployed 200,000 plus troops for nearly a decade in Vietnam and still lost. Russia’s experience in Afghanistan, France’s in Algeria, and Portugal’s in Africa were similarly negative.

- Intervention is unlikely unless the human rights violations receive widespread publicity in the global media and are thus forced on to the radar screens of political leaders in the major powers. The United States was not moved to put heavy pressure (World Bank/IMF loans) on Jakarta until after the graphic post-referendum pictures of the rape of Dili started being shown on CNN.

**What Can Be Done?**

The current controversy reflects a broader crisis confronting the UN—namely the failure of the organization’s collective security mission. In the 1990s, with few exceptions, armed interventions and sanctions were applied incon-
sistently and unequally. They have failed to achieve their objectives more often than they have succeeded. In some cases, notably Rwanda, the international community has failed to act, with appalling consequences; Somalia was left to rot, and in many cases where gross violations of human rights have taken place intervention has not even been considered.

Within the Security Council the intervention issue is even more sensitive, and Council members are unlikely ever to agree on precise criteria to authorize operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However it might at some stage be possible to agree to broad guiding principles. An informal British paper has called for something like Catholic “just war” principles to determine when it would be legitimate to intervene, but the paper failed to mention the UN and was seen by many critics as seeking to provide a post hoc justification for the NATO action against Serbia.

The fact that the genocide took place in Rwanda with no serious effort to stop it has led to much heart searching and mea culpas in the international community. This gross moral failure may mean that Security Council inaction in similar circumstances in the future is less likely, although this is by no means certain. More likely, and almost as worrying, would be a failure to act in time—due to delays in getting forces into the field. When the Council is confronted by a political imperative to “do something,” but where individual Council members are also politically constrained in what they can do, the result is too often interventions that do too little too late. Inappropriate mandates matched by inadequate resources set the UN up to fail.

Addressing Real Constraints

The central argument is that sovereignty concerns have not been a major constraint on intervention. If this argument is accepted and if it is also accepted that armed intervention to prevent or stop genocide and other gross violations of human rights is desirable, then it follows that the international community should spend more time addressing the real constraints on intervention. Overcoming all of them will be difficult if not impossible.

- In the absence of a major reform of the Security Council, moral and political pressure may reduce the use, or threatened use, of the veto to prevent humanitarian intervention. Recent calls for P-5 states to explain publicly any use of the veto are one modest example of such pressure.
- It may be possible to invoke sanctions against major regional powers where armed intervention is politically impossible. But sanctions are, at best, slow acting. Even where they do work they would be effective too late to prevent a genocide. Mostly they don't work at all.

- Casualty-sensitive militaries and their governments might be persuaded that the concern about the political costs of casualties is misplaced. But the evidence for such claims is not wholly persuasive—and would certainly not apply to costly, drawn out interventions with no obvious light at the end of the tunnel. Moreover in the U.S. case, the evidence that publics are willing to bear much greater costs than governments credit them for has been around for years. During this time the United States appears to have become more, not less, casualty-sensitive. Where successful military interventions are followed by political failure (Haiti being an obvious example) support for intervention is likely to be reduced still further.

- Concern in the casualty-sensitive democracies (most importantly the United States) about their citizens being shipped home in body bags from distant conflicts could, in principle, be assuaged by having a UN standing force, or by resort to private security organizations (“corporate mercenaries”). But the first option will remain wholly impractical as long as it continues to be opposed by the United States on the grounds of cost and ceding too much power to the UN, and by the Group of 77 (G-77) developing countries whose members (rightly) believe that such a force would be used primarily against them. Turning to the private sector for security might seem logical and/or inevitable in a rapidly globalizing/privatizing world and indeed it is already happening in parts of Africa. Moreover the evidence seems to suggest that “corporate mercenaries” are at least as professional as many national armies if not more so, and are considerably cheaper than UN forces. However the political constraints on the UN proceeding down that path are also too great at the present time.

- Even when there is in-principle willingness to field a UN peace-enforcement operation, getting agreements in place and forces mobilized to get to the conflict zone in time to stop gross human rights violations is extremely difficult in the absence of a standing force. Timely action is also hampered by the requirement in the United States that Congress be given 15 days notice prior to the approval of any peace-keeping/peace-enforcement operation. More generally, the legal requirements of Presidential Decision Directive 25 make U.S. participation in any UN peace-enforcement operations extraordinarily difficult—and in many cases impossible.
Given the built-in delays in the system, the creation of a regional multinational force before Council authorization may reduce delays and save lives. Had Australia and its Multinational Force partners not made extensive preparations (in consultation with the UN) to intervene in East Timor prior to Security Council authorization, it would have taken a UN force at least another three months to deploy.

Partly in response to these obvious difficulties there has been a revival of interest in the security role of the regional organizations. These organizations not only confront many of the same restraints as the UN, but most also lack effective peace-enforcement capacities. In addition, there are real risks that regional organizations may be used by major regional powers to further their own regional interests rather than the common good.

**Conclusion**

The issue of humanitarian intervention poses a particular dilemma. When the Secretary-General argues that humanitarian intervention to prevent or stop gross violations of human rights is a moral imperative, but the Security Council fails to act, the UN will be accused, at best, of inconsistency and hypocrisy. The Secretary-General pointed out in his Millennium Report: “The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can.” But the very premise of this statement concedes the critique of inconsistency that is so troubling to many G-77 states. Since few outside the UN distinguish between the Secretary-General's role and that of the Security Council, he will inevitably bear some of the odium for the Council's failure to act. Yet he cannot defend himself without attacking the Security Council.

It is clear, however, that the global normative climate on this issue is changing—though the resulting “clash of rights” remains bitterly contested. The Secretary-General's moral leadership has been an important element in shifting the normative debate, but humanitarian intervention remains a highly contested issue, with more countries opposing than supporting.

Part of the problem with the debate that has been conducted in the media and in the General Assembly thus far is that it has pitted one general principle against another—right against right. As the Secretary-General noted in his Millennium Report: “Few would disagree that both the defense of humanity and the defense of sovereignty are principles that must be sup-
ported. Alas that does not tell us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict.”

Debating the specific issue might be more productive, namely: what should the international community, including the G-77 countries that are most opposed to humanitarian intervention, do in response to gross violations of human rights? In the Millennium Report the Secretary-General pointedly asked his critics this question: “If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, a Srebrenica—to gross violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”

Mr. Annan’s critics have yet to respond to his pointed question.
APPENDIX

Seminar Participants

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