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PRIMACY OF THE PACIFIC
UNDER THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

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By
Jason Horn

Approved by
Charles H. Hunter
(Chairman)

[Signatures]
PREFACE

Existing accounts of international diplomatic developments in 1887 affecting Samoa do not cover adequately the important role played by the Hawaiian Kingdom. This has been due largely to the unavailability of the requisite source material because of the geographical isolation of the Hawaiian Islands. This study is based very largely upon hitherto unpublished manuscript material in the Archives of Hawaii. It seeks not only to show fully Hawaii's role in the Samoan imbroglio of 1887, but also to give the complete historical development of the expansionistic "Primacy" policy in Hawaii up to its culmination in its most important phase, the Bush Mission and Kaimiloa Expedition of 1887.

In doing the research for this study I have had the devoted assistance of my wife and the generous advice and assistance of Miss Maude Jones, head of the Archives of Hawaii, and of her staff, especially Mrs. Aurora Domingo, Mrs. Philomena Morrison, Mr. Henry C. K. Choy, Mrs. Rachael Chang, Mr. Eugene Chang, and Mr. David K. Piimanu. Mr. Piimanu translated some Hawaiian-language material which otherwise could not have been used. The quotation from the July, 1880, dispatch of the United States' Minister at Honolulu, cited in Chapter VII, was furnished by Professor Emeritus Ralph S. Kuykendall.

University of Hawaii
Honolulu, T. H.
January, 1951

Jason Horn
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CHAPTER I

THE EARLY PERIOD - KAMEHAMEHA I AND BOKI

The history of the foreign relations of the Hawaiian Kingdom during the nineteenth century usually is portrayed and conceived as the history of a small, weak state struggling to defend its sovereignty and maintain its independence against the imperialistic encroachments of the big powers of the period. This is a true perspective insofar as the broad picture is concerned. Nevertheless, there is another side to the story. That is the fact that the Hawaiian Kingdom itself sought from time to time to play the role of a big Pacific island power and to annex or obtain spheres of influence over various other islands and island groups in the Pacific Ocean area — in short to assume the "Primacy of the Pacific."

Hawaiian efforts in this regard constitute a tale as worthy of interest to the novelist as to the historian, containing, as it does, elements of high adventure, secret diplomacy, romance, comedy and tragedy. It is of historical interest not only with respect to the development of the Hawaiian Kingdom itself but also because of its occasional influence upon the Pacific policies and courses of action of major world powers.

It began possibly at the beginning of the Hawaiian Kingdom itself, with Kamehameha I, the Napoleon of the Pacific, and his reported dreams of uniting all Polynesia under one rule. It included the ill-fated 1829 New Hebrides expedition of Boki, Governor of Oahu, and the nineteen-year long (August, 1853 to May, 1872) tenure in office at Sydney, Australia, of Charles St. Julian, His Hawaiian Majesty's "Commissioner, Political and Commercial Agent to the Kings, Chiefs, and Rulers of the Islands in the Pacific Ocean, not under the protection or sovereignty of any European
Government. It ended with the efforts of Walter Murray Gibson, who dominated the Hawaiian government from May, 1882, to June, 1887, to carve out an Empire of the Pacific for King Kalakaua, the Merry Monarch. Gibson and St. Julian and their efforts constitute the bulk of the story. Without them, probably little of consequence in this regard would have occurred.

There is no primary documentary evidence that the idea of Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific" originated with Kamehameha I, who conquered and unified the main Hawaiian island group between 1780 and 1810. Recent biographers of Kamehameha I have relied upon the writings of such early historians as James J. Jarves and Manley Hopkins and, in effect, have attributed such an idea as a result to Kamehameha I. He is held to have desired to have united the peoples of Polynesia under one rule. Thus he is reported to have considered using a fleet, which he was building to conquer Kauai, to obtain control afterwards of Tahiti. Later on, during his last years, after these plans had been abandoned, Kamehameha I is reported to have conducted negotiations with King Pomare II of Tahiti, with the aim of arranging for the marriage of a son and a daughter of Kamehameha's to a daughter and son respectively of King Pomare II.

In addition, it has been suggested recently that later expansionistic

ideas of Kamehameha I may have had an economic basis in that Kamehameha may have desired a larger kingdom in order to have more sandalwood islands. He monopolised and controlled Hawaii's sandalwood trade and its exploitation of Hawaiian sandalwood resources, to the extent even of purchasing some of the ships used in the trade.6

One of Kamehameha's ships was the Kaahumanu under the command of Captain Alexander Adams. In the course of a voyage to Canton in 1817, Captain Adams charted the latitude and longitude of various islands enroute.6 It has been suggested that Kamehameha may have intended to add some of these islands to his domain. There is no primary documentary evidence, however, to prove this or to prove the more general suggestion cited in the preceding paragraph.

Indeed, the extent to which the accounts by early historians of a contemplated invasion of Tahiti and marriage negotiations with Pomare are true, cannot be judged. There are differing and contradictory reports among the early historians themselves. William Ellis, for example, specifically denied the authenticity of the report of a projected invasion of Tahiti by Kamehameha I.7

Regardless, however, of whether these accounts were true or not, they became part of the legendary about Kamehameha I, and as such they may have influenced indirectly later Hawaiians. Of this also there is no significant evidence. Nevertheless, the concept of Kamehameha I as an ambitious empire-builder must have been fairly common. Gibson in 1887 sent photographs of

6. Alexander Adams Journal, AH.
7. William Ellis, Polynesian Researches During A Residence Of Nearly Eight Years In The Society and Sandwich Islands (London, 1851), IV, 385.
King Kalakaua and of the Kamehameha Statue to John Edward Bush, head of an Hawaiian Mission to Samoa, Tonga and other islands, for distribution among native chieftains. He warned Bush not to compare Kalakaua and Kamehameha in such a manner as to be "wrongly construed elsewhere." Already severely harried by the major powers as to Hawaii's intentions towards other Pacific island areas, Gibson did not wish to throw additional fuel on the fire.

A second attempt to implement a concept of Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific" may have occurred in 1829 when Boki, Governor of Oahu, may have tried to annex the New Hebrides or some other islands. Boki was heavily in debt at the time since on November 2, 1829 he had assumed responsibility for the payment of about $12,000 of the national debt owed by the chiefs to American traders. At this time, in November, 1829, Thomas Blakesley had arrived in Honolulu on a ship from Sydney, Australia, bearing a report that sandalwood in abundance had been found in the New Hebrides.

Governor Boki, who was also guardian of the sixteen-year old King, Kamehameha III, fitted out two brigs, the Kamehameha and the Becket, and sailed from Honolulu on December 2, 1829. The two brigs arrived safely at the island of Rotuma, north of Fiji. From there, Boki in the Kamehameha sailed in advance of the Becket. The Becket followed later and reached its destination, Eromanga in the New Hebrides, but without finding any trace there of the Kamehameha. A combination of further adverse circumstances resulted in the return of the Becket to Honolulu with only twenty survivors. Nothing definite ever was learned of the fate of the Kamehameha, although some reports dealt with the manner of its purported destruction.

The important point for this discussion, however, is the purpose of the expedition itself, and this is not clear. The purpose may have been entirely economic, i.e., an attempt by Boki to recoup quickly his fortunes, pay off his assumed debt and make some additional money for himself. 10

Secondly, with respect to the purpose, it also has been suggested that Boki used the sandalwood discovery report as a pretext for departing permanently from Hawaii because of his bitter feeling and political opposition toward Kaahumanu, the regent and de facto ruler of the kingdom. Boki, it is claimed, was determined not to return to Hawaii and so settled upon some obscure island in the South Pacific. 11

A third possible explanation of the purpose is that the expedition, in addition to an economic motive, had as another objective, the annexation of the New Hebrides, and was, therefore, a fore-runner of the "Primacy of the Pacific" policy. 12 There is in the Archives of Hawaii a set of instructions, signed jointly by King Kamahameha III and Boki, to the commander of the "Vessel[sic] of War the Karimoku [sic]" accompanying the Kamahameha.

The instructions call in effect for the annexation of "Certain Islands in the South Seas" to Hawaii. 13 The document is full of misspellings which do not reflect necessarily, however, on its authenticity. There is in addition some further substantiation of the possibility that annexation was intended. Richard Charlton, then the British consul at Honolulu, reported to the British Foreign Office the departure of two brigs under Boki's command

10. Ibid., p. 97
11. Ibid., p. 98; Reginald Ysandoorn, History of the Catholic Mission in the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu, 1927), p. 32.
13. Instructions to Karimoku Commander, November 30, 1829, AR, FO & Ex.
A similar account is given in an 1843 book by a strong partisan of Charlton.

Alexander Simpson.

Here again, however, as in the case of Kamahameha I, regardless of whether or not annexation actually was intended, it probably became a part of the common Boki story, and, as such, of some indirect influence on later Hawaiians. Thus, in August, 1883, a Honolulu daily newspaper, not an organ of the Gibson government, referred to the Boki expedition in citing antecedents of the dispatch in July, 1883, of Captain Alfred Newton Tripp on a special mission for Hawaii to various Pacific islands. According to this newspaper account, the Boki expedition intended to conquer the New Hebrides, colonize them, and raise sandalwood for export. The plan allegedly was to settle on one island, gradually conquer it, and then proceed from island to island conquering each in turn. One vessel was to be retained for purposes of local transport and the other was to transport sandalwood from the group to Honolulu and bring reinforcements and supplies in return. There is no confirmation of these details.

That the expansionistic Gibson-Kalakaua regime was fully cognizant of the Boki expedition, however, there is no doubt. Henry Poor, the secretary of the 1887 Bush Mission sent by Hawaii to Samoa, reported from Apia that he had met an old Samoan who claimed to have lived long previously on Savaii Island in the Samoan group with a man named Boki who had been one of the chiefs of King Kamahameha III.

14. Charlton to Earl of Aberdeen, January 2, 1830, copy, AH, British Consulate Files. Hereafter cited as AB, BC.
17. Poor to Joseph S. Webb, Secretary of the Hawaiian P. C., March 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Not until Charles St. Julian appeared on the scene in the early 1850’s was there a clear and extensive effort made to achieve Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific." This human dynamo planned and endeavored without success at various intervals during a period of almost twenty years to have Hawaii "regarded as the guide, the guardian and the national head of a system of small sovereignties" in Polynesia — a "Polynesian Confederation" controlled by Hawaii. His efforts and ideas, though unsuccessful, did influence British Pacific policy, the internal development of certain Pacific Island groups, and the important Hawaiian "Primacy" efforts in the 1880’s of the Kalakaua-Gibson regime. St. Julian was given his start by Robert Crichton Wyllie’s sympathy for his ideas. Wyllie was a dreamer and supporter or propounder of many visionary schemes on his own. However, though Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Relations from 1845 until his death in 1865, he was unable to give St. Julian any effective backing.

Next to Walter Murray Gibson, St. Julian was probably the most vigorous exponent of Hawaiian "Primacy" in the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom. He was born in London in May, 1818, in the Roman Catholic faith. By 1828

1. St. Julian to Wyllie, Dec. 20, 1851; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 17, Oct 2, 1854; Wyllie to St. Julian, April 15, 1855, AH, FO & Ex.
2. (Honolulu) Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Jan. 23, 1876, hereafter cited as P.C. Advertiser.
he had emigrated to Australia and settled down in Sydney. 4 He was employed there as a newspaper court reporter 5 for the Sydney Morning Herald 6 until May, 1872, when he left for Fiji to assume the post of Chief Justice of the Kingdom of Fiji before Fiji was ceded to Great Britain. From about 1860 or 1861 he apparently also took an active part in local politics and was elected head of his borough four times. 8 He died in 1874. 9

His formal association with the Kingdom of Hawaii began on August 5, 1853, when the Privy Council approved his appointment by Wyllie as Hawaiian Commissioner, and Political and Commercial Agent to Polynesia. 10 In addition, he was the de facto Hawaiian Consul General to Australia until August 28, 1860, when he was appointed officially to that office. 11 From 1854 until mid-1857, he put a great deal of effort into his Hawaiian posts, but failing to receive much active support and cooperation from Hawaii, gradually tapered off until he had ceased all activity by the end of 1861. In 1870 he resumed his interest and remained active until his resignation in May, 1872, 12 when he went to Fiji to become its Chief Justice.

4. St. Julian to James J. Jarve, April 29, 1848, AH, FO & Ex.
6. St. Julian to Wyllie, April 27, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 5, Jan. 15, 1867, AH, FO & Ex.
7. Reeve to Harris, May 30, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
8. St. Julian to Harris, March 30, 1871; St. Julian to Wyllie, March 4, 1861, AH, FO & Ex.
9. Reeve to Min. of For. Affairs, No. 11, Dec. 31, 1874, AH, FO & Ex.
12. St. Julian correspondence, 1854-1872; St. Julian to Min. of For. Affairs, March 25, 1870; St. Julian to Harris, May 2, 1872; St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
During his active periods in his Hawaiian posts, he vigorously espoused the cause of Hawaiian expansionism and the achievement by Hawaii of "Primacy of the Pacific." In essence he sought by a broad construction of his already broad commission to Polynesia, to achieve four principal objectives: (1) to secure the annexation of territory to the Hawaiian Kingdom; (2) to promote the development of organized local government in certain island groups with the aim of organizing them into a Polynesian Confederation under Hawaiian hegemony; (3) to achieve for Hawaii a recognized "moral protectorate" over unprotected natives of all island groups lacking their own government, with the right to intervene on their behalf when necessary; and (4) to enhance the prestige of Hawaii in Australia as much as possible. At the outset, he was as confident of success in achieving these objectives, he later told Wyllie, "as I am of the sun's rising."

St. Julian as has been noted, was able to attempt such a grandiose program because his ideas were basically similar in that respect to those of Wyllie. The latter, born in 1798 in Scotland, received a medical education in Glasgow. He resided for many years in Spanish America as physician and merchant, becoming comparatively wealthy in the process. He came to the Hawaiian Islands early in 1844, expecting to proceed to China after a few months' stay in Hawaii and then to return to England. He was appointed to the Hawaiian foreign relations post on March 26, 1845 and never thereafter left the islands, continuing in office until his death on October 19, 1866.

He was always a vigorous booster of Hawaiian prestige and a staunch defender of Hawaiian independence, and the Hawaiian monarchy. He thought no opportunity should be lost to add to the trade and wealth of Hawaii.

He assumed office at a time when men in high position in England believed that Pacific Island natives were capable of achieving self government if not hindered by foreign nations and if helped actively by men of humanitarian impulses. He believed that because of Hawaii's advanced status it could not be indifferent to the less civilised Pacific Island areas. He thought Hawaii's foreign missionary efforts could be aided by an extension of Hawaiian influence and that the annexation of certain islands would provide potential missionising and civilising centers. The result of all this was a naturally favorable responsiveness to St. Julian's exposition of a doctrine which combined an amelioration of the lot of Pacific natives with an Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific" and an Hawaiian-dominated "Polynesian Confederation" of locally autonomous island sovereignties.15

St. Julian first came to Wyllie's particular attention in 1861 when Wyllie received from the former a little booklet on Polynesia which treated Hawaii very favorably.16 St. Julian early in 1862 followed up Wyllie's pleased acknowledgement by offering his services without remuneration as an Hawaiian Political Agent to Polynesia. The Pacific was being carved up and new states were being organised, he said in essence, and the "supremacy


of Hawaii among the nations of Polynesia should be preserved and its interests secured." He sought a commission with an area of accreditation including New Guinea and all islands between 15 degrees North Latitude and 30 degrees South Latitude, except French islands. For the latter he recommended the appointment of an Hawaiian consul at Tahiti. If commissioned, he planned to embark on an inspection tour of his area of accreditation.  

Wyllie decided to accept this offer. He secured Privy Council approval on August 5, 1863, of St. Julian's appointment as Commissioner to Polynesia and of the instructions which he, Wyllie, had drafted. In broaching the subject to the Privy Council and to the Legislature, probably because he was alone among Hawaii's leaders in favoring a "Primacy" program, Wyllie subtly stressed St. Julian's "offer to explore Southern Polynesia" for Hawaii without charge. There is no recorded mention of his discussing with them an Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific." Wyllie and not the King signed St. Julian's commission on August 4, 1863. Wyllie believed that this was proper so long as St. Julian was not of a higher rank than a chargé d'affaires, which was the diplomatic rank he considered the latter as possessing. Wyllie's firm resistance to St. Julian's later arguments that he was entitled to higher diplomatic status, therefore, may have been due largely to a reluctance to accord him a rank which would have required a commission signed by the King. Both Kamehameha III and Kamehameha IV, in general, were opposed to Hawaiian expansionism, of which St. Julian was the most vigorous exponent. 

The Privy Council-approved instructions, accompanying St. Julian's commission to all areas in Polynesia unappropriated as yet by any foreign powers,

were restrained. He was instructed to report in detail on islands visited, to offer advice when warranted during his visits, to promote peace and religion, to publicise among islands and island leaders visited the advanced status of Hawaii, pointing out to them in doing so, that Hawaii had a King of their own race, and to invite visits to Hawaii as a means towards learning good government. He was told specifically to make it clear to all concerned that Hawaii was not interested in possessing their islands.  

St. Julian officially accepted the commission to Polynesia on January 21, 1854, but chose in effect to do as he saw fit with it regardless of the instructions accompanying it. He sent Wyllie in mid-1854 a draft of a revised commission which he requested be issued him. The duties and powers he specifically requested be assigned him are important, because though no such set of instructions ever was sent him, he acted from the start as though such were his duties and powers, and even these he interpreted very broadly. He eliminated the implied restriction that he act only while visiting other islands. The more significant powers included in his suggested draft were the powers to accomplish the following: (1) to assist and advise chiefs and rulers without interfering in internal matters or foreign relationships; (2) to arbitrate disputes between different governments or tribes if his arbitration was agreed to by both parties; (3) to negotiate treaties subject to final ratification by the home government at Hawaii; (4) to appoint deputies as needed; (5) to write and advise all Hawaiian diplomatic and commercial agents in Australia and Polynesia; (6) to act as Hawaii's Consul General to all present or future British possessions in addition to continuing as Commissioner to all island areas unappropriated by any Powers; and (7) to act as Hawaii's

20. Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 1, Aug. 4, 1855, with enclosures, AH, FO & Ex.
Consul General for all Australian colonies except New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania) where Hawaii already had a representative.\textsuperscript{22}

After St. Julian in mid-1854 had requested of Wyllie this extension of his powers and revision of his commission, his general plans underwent further delineation. During 1855, before the lack of response from Hawaii had discouraged him completely, he considered moving permanently from Sydney to Apia in the Samoan Islands, resigning his previously assumed consulate general to Australia and making Apia the seat of his commission to Polynesia. He had hopes of supporting himself through a combination of income received from some newspaper work plus income from investments which he hoped to be able to make in planting and in trade.\textsuperscript{23}

Nothing ever came of these plans. In December 1855, he warned Wyllie not to delay action much longer lest Hawaii lose its chance "to take that lead in Polynesia which properly belongs to her...and which, I contend, would more than anything give a voice and influence among the greater nations."\textsuperscript{24}

Despite frequent subsequent entreaties by him to Wyllie for decisive action to be taken on his mid-1854 request, with, however, occasional changes depending upon his particular plans at the time of entreaty, no action was taken by Wyllie until 1859. On May 20, 1859, the latter issued him a new commission to Polynesia as "His Hawaiian Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul General to the Kings and Ruling Chiefs of the Independent States and Tribes in Polynesia South of the Equator."\textsuperscript{25} No special instructions and no specific allocation and delineation of expanded powers ever

\textsuperscript{22} Enclosure, St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 15, Aug. 7, 1854, AH, FO & Ex.
were issued him. In fact, long before May, 1859, he had lost most of his interest in his Hawaiian posts, and Wyllie, unable to do anything to help him effectively, had sought to have him curtail his activities. He expressed his feelings clearly in a dispatch in January, 1867:

I have no right to complain of my plans not having been adopted. If it is thought better that Hawaii should remain as she is, than that her domain should be doubled and her power and influence quadrupled, I am bound to assume that it is wisely so decided. But I do complain that my energies have been wasted. The complete success which was within my reach for Hawaii, might have been attained and followed up by another course and for another purpose.

With respect to his originally requested consular responsibility for Australia, St. Julian, despite remonstrances from Wyllie, acted from the start as though he had such authority for all Australia except New South Wales and Tasmania. In January 1855, as a result of the departure from Australia of the Hawaiian Consul General for the two latter areas, he assumed the additional responsibility of those areas also. Not until August 28, 1860, however, was he actually issued an official commission as Hawaiian Consul General to Australia. Because it was worded incorrectly, he had to return it and a correct commission was not issued him until 1871.

During those periods when he was active in his Hawaiian offices he reported in great detail to Wyllie on significant developments in the various island groups. At times he had such reports printed in the Australian

27. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, Secret, Jan 10, 1857, AH, FO & Ex.
29. St. Julian to Wyllie, March 1, 1855; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, May 9, 1855, AH, FO & Ex.
30. Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 5, Aug. 29, 1860, AH, FO & Ex.
31. St. Julian to Wyllie, Mar. 4, 1861; Wyllie to St. Julian, July 24, 1861; St. Julian to Harris, Dec. 31, 1870; William Jarrett to St. Julian, Jan. 26, 1871; St. Julian to Harris, Sept. 30, 1870, AH, FO & Ex.
press. He also made good use of the press to publicise Hawaii, and his position, favorably. 32

At times he utilised his Hawaiian Polynesian post to intervene in various ways in the name of Hawaii to secure humanitarian treatment by foreigners of Polynesian natives. His avowed aim thereby was to achieve for Hawaii a recognised "moral protectorate" over unprotected natives of all island groups lacking their own government. Thus, in mid-1854, he observed "officially" the Australian trial of three men involved in crimes against Polynesian natives. In 1855 he corresponded with the colonial government of South Australia on behalf of some Samoans there. He intervened in another court case in 1856. 33 As a result of such activities, he said, Hawaii was being recognised as "the natural head and guardian" of the natives of Oceania.

At first Wyllie approved completely of this effort. But in 1857, by which time the Hawaiian government's unwillingness to support St. Julian effectively was apparent, he suggested that since such activity was not required of St. Julian by Hawaii, the latter should curtail this type of effort and interfere only in rare instances. 35 Later, in 1863, long after St. Julian had lost all interest in his Hawaiian posts, but at a time when Wyllie desired to curb the activities of vessels engaged in the labor trade under the Peruvian flag, Wyllie wrote regretfully that St. Julian's entire efforts in the 1860's should have received more encouragement from Hawaii. If St. Julian's plans had succeeded, and Hawaii's position as protector of

32. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, Jan. 21, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, Jan. 24, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 6, Mar. 31, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 9, May 1, 1854, AH, FO & Ex.; etc.
33. St. Julian to Wyllie, Aug. 22, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, Oct. 2, 1855; St. Julian to Wyllie, Nov. 18, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
34. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, Secret, Feb. 5, 1855, AH, FO & Ex.
35. Wyllie to St. Julian, Oct. 31, 1854; Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 5, June 24, 1857, AH, FO & Ex.
Pacific natives had become recognized, Hawaii would not be encountering difficulty in obtaining a cessation of such labor traffic, he believed.  

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CHAPTER III
CHARLES ST. JULIAN AND PACIFIC ISLAND DEVELOPMENTS, 1854 - 1861

During his first period of active service for Hawaii, from 1854 to 1861, St. Julian endeavored to develop an Hawaiian sphere of influence in the South Pacific, and simultaneously sought to secure the adoption by Great Britain of a policy of British expansionism in the same area. There was no contradiction in this. He tried to do for Hawaii what he could not convince British policy makers to do for the British Empire - fill the power vacuum existing in Pacific island areas. In addition, he sought to promote a progressive internal development of those islands.

Although he at times negotiated with island rulers in the name of Hawaii, through his post as Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia, while simultaneously seeking as a private British subject to influence British policy makers concerned with the Pacific Island area, it is advantageous for purposes of clarity to treat each activity separately in this study. St. Julian's work for, and in the name of, Hawaii, will be discussed first in this chapter.

Although St. Julian had intended, after he had received his Hawaiian Polynesian commission, to visit various Pacific islands, he apparently never left Australia until he visited Fiji at Hawaiian expense in August, 1871. Instead, he maintained relations with various island groups by means of extensive correspondence with the kings, chiefs or other leading personages at those islands, and by his appointment at Fiji, Tonga and Samoa of resident agents with the rank of consul to represent Hawaii and be responsible to him as Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia. During the period from 1854
to 1861, he appointed the following men on the dates indicated for each:
Henry De Boos, as attache at Samoa, in 1864, and as consul at Samoa, in January, 1859;\(^1\) Alexander Blake, as consul at Tonga, in December, 1855;\(^2\) and Robert Sherson Swanston, as consul at Fiji, in April, 1868.\(^3\) Each of these appointments was approved later by the Hawaiian government but only after considerable delay.\(^4\)

From 1864 to 1867, St. Julian maintained significant relations with Tonga and Samoa. Concerning these relations some information is available. Little is known, however, of his relations with Fiji during the entire period 1864 to 1861, except that in March, 1861, he claimed that overtures had been made to him for conditional cessions of Fijian territory to Hawaii. He said that he had "steadily resisted" these because of Hawaii's previous lack of interest in any such venture.\(^5\)

In the case of Tonga, St. Julian rendered advisory assistance in the name of Hawaii to Tonga's ruler, King George, in the latter's efforts to establish a stable, progressive, internationally-recognized regime. Strongly Methodist, Tonga was receiving increasing French attention at this time and the King was looking elsewhere, particularly to England, for support.\(^6\) British policy, however, was set firmly against any such action. At this juncture, Henry De Boos, in accordance with St. Julian's instructions, visited briefly at Tonga in November, 1864, while enroute to Samoa, and offered

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1. V.P. Chapin to Wyllie, No. 2, Dec. 20, 1854; Enclosure, St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, June 29, 1859, AH, FO & Ex.
2. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, April 7, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
3. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, June 5, 1858, AH, FO & Ex.
5. St. Julian to Wyllie, Mar. 4, 1861, AH, FO & Ex.
Hawaii's advice and support in Tonga's efforts to maintain its independence. King George quite naturally was pleased, even though it was made clear to him that St. Julian's and Hawaii's offer of good offices did not apply to any disputes with foreign powers. St. Julian later explained to Wyllie, in essence, that he believed that Hawaii's position as a guiding and advising power with regards to Tonga would enable Tonga to be fitted into an Hawaiian-dominated Polynesian Confederation of locally autonomous Polynesian states.

In response to a request to him by King George, St. Julian provided advice on changes in Tongan laws. Detailed advice also was furnished by him on a constitution for Tonga and on means of obtaining international recognition. St. Julian also planned to negotiate an Hawaii-Tonga Convention of Friendship and Reciprocity, possibly in part as a means towards promoting Tonga's international recognition. He never did so, however, probably because of his discouragement at Wyllie's continued failure to act on his earlier request for extended powers and a revised commission.

After St. Julian appointed Alexander Blake on December 29, 1855 as Hawaiian Consul at Tonga, he offered the use of Blake's consular services to the consular officers at Sydney of the following nations without consular representation at Tonga of their own: United States, Sweden, Norway, France.

7. St. Julian to King of the Friendly Islands (Tonga), Oct. 28, 1854, copy, and Edward Reeve to De Boos, Oct. 28, 1854, copy, both enclosed in St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 21, Nov. 6, 1854; George Tubou to St. Julian, Nov. 24, 1854, copy of translation enclosed in St. Julian to Wyllie, Pvt., May 11, 1855, AH, FO & Ex.
Great Britain, Denmark, Hamburg and Bremen. Similar offers also were made to the Colonial Secretaries of otherwise unrepresented New South Wales and Tasmania. His offers, he informed Wyllie, were accepted by all. Blake proved to be of assistance to them St. Julian later claimed. In addition, he reported concluding an arrangement with the Postmaster General at Sydney whereby all mail communications between Sydney and the Tonga Islands would pass through Blake's Hawaiian consular office.

A suggestion in 1857 by St. Julian that King Kamehameha IV invite King George to Hawaii, though favored initially by Wyllie, was rebuffed by the Hawaiian King, to St. Julian's disgust. St. Julian was informed by Wyllie in mid-1857 of the attitude of the Hawaiian government towards St. Julian's efforts at Tonga and at Samoa. Hawaii wished him success, Wyllie said, but it had "no interest in the matter whatever, except a moral one" since Hawaii lacked the necessary communication facilities, the resources and the power.

In the case of Samoa, St. Julian attempted to bring some order out of the virtual anarchy prevailing therein. His first step was the drafting in 1854 of a constitution for Upolu Island in the Samoan group. Henry De Boos brought this to Samoa for him either in late 1854 or early 1855. The existence of native wars made it impossible for the constitution to be utilized and a constitutional government organized.

10. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, April 7, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
11. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 4, Nov. 17, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
12. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 9, April 25, 1857; Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 4, Sept. 15, 1857; Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 1, Jan. 15, 1858; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, June 5, 1858, AH, FO & Ex.
14. Robert Mackenzie Watson, History Of Samoa (Wellington, N.Z., 1918), pp. 41-42, hereafter cited as Watson, Samoa; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 21, Nov. 6, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, Fyr., Nov. 7, 1854; St. Julian to Wyllie, Mar. 1, 1855; St. Julian to Chapin, April 25, 1855, copy enclosed in St. Julian to Wyllie, April 7, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
Possibly as a result of this, St. Julian became convinced that Samoa was not capable of self-government to the degree that Tonga was and that, therefore, some sort of protectorate over Samoa was desirable. He would have preferred a British protectorate, but since such was not possible under then existing British policy, he reported to Wyllie in April, 1856, that he was endeavoring to pave the way for an Hawaiian protectorate. No notice of this was taken by Hawaii for such a long time that St. Julian abandoned these efforts. When official cognisance finally was taken in June, and again in September, 1857, by Hawaii, it was to inform St. Julian emphatically that the King was not interested. 15

While St. Julian was engaging in all these activities for, and in the name of, Hawaii, he also continuously sought as a private British subject to influence British policy towards the various Pacific islands. He was at that time one of a number of Australians and New Zealanders seeking to change Britain's general opposition to expansion of British territory and to acquisition of additional protectorates, particularly over Pacific Islands. He discussed developments concerning such islands with Sir Charles Augustus Fitzroy, Governor General of Australia, in 1854, and with Sir William Denison, Fitzroy's successor, in 1855. Both were concerned particularly with French intentions because the French had initiated a policy of annexation in the Pacific, their latest acquisition having been New Caledonia in

1855.

On August 5, 1854, St. Julian submitted to Governor General Fitzroy a short printed pamphlet which he had written, entitled *Suggestions As To The Policy Of Her Majesty's Government With Reference To The Various Groups of Central, Western and North-Western Polynesia*. The pamphlet may have been prepared at Fitzroy's request. In it, St. Julian divided the island world into four classes according to the capacity of the natives for self-government and the degree of protective control he believed necessary by foreign nations. As examples of each class he cited Tonga in the first or highest class; Samoa, in the second class; Fiji in the third class; and the Solomons, in the fourth class. Islands in the first class, he believed, could achieve self-government if their rulers were guided by foreign naval commanders and consuls. A protectorate was best for islands in the second and third classes, he thought, and absolute sovereignty, for those in the fourth class. Such foreign controls were bound to occur anyway, he estimated, and so, he said, they might as well be British. Until such British political leadership could be assumed, he urged the appointment of several additional consuls in key positions as a useful step. 16

Fitzroy forwarded St. Julian's pamphlet to London, where it was received in January, 1855, and sent the rounds of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Board of Trade and Admiralty. The pamphlet stimulated discussion in London not only with respect to its plan of additional consular appointments,

but also with respect to a proposal received the preceding year from a missionary, calling for the appointment of some higher official who would be competent to carry out a consistent policy in Oceania as a whole. In 1857, the British finally began action on the appointment of three additional consuls to the Pacific area. St. Julian was considered seriously for a post at Tonga, but was not accepted because the head of the Wesleyan organization in Australasia protested against the appointment of such an allegedly strong anti-Methodist partisan. He still was consulted, however, in 1868, as to the most desirable location for Great Britain of another consular post.

Because of the anarchic situation in Samoa, and his opinion that it would never stand by itself for long without becoming a dependency of some other power, St. Julian prepared a special memorandum in May, 1865, for Sir William Denison, Governor General of Australia, urging British intervention in Samoa. He emphasised in addition to the anarchic conditions, the growing strategic importance of the islands as the result of mid-century developments in trans-Pacific trade and communications. The memorandum was forwarded by Denison to the Foreign Office, but without result.

18. Ibid., p. 239; St. Julian to Wylie, No. 1, June 5, 1858, AH, FO & Ex.
CHAPTER IV
CHARLES ST. JULIAN AND HIS ATTEMPT TO ANNEX
FOR HAWAII A SOUTH PACIFIC ATOLL

From an over-all historical standpoint, St. Julian's activities for Hawaii and for Britain in Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, the last being in the 1870's, were of more importance than his efforts to secure Hawaiian acceptance of sovereignty over the Stewart's (Sikiana) Islands, a small South Pacific atoll. These last efforts were completely unsuccessful. Their only concrete result, and then only incidentally, was the creation by St. Julian of a sort of Polynesian Legion of Honor, the Order of Arossi, of which St. Julian himself was one of the very, very few recipients. The story of these efforts, however, is one of the colorful minor tales in the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom and in the history of the South Pacific.

The story began in 1851 when Benjamin Boyd of Australia, accompanied by John Webster, sailed on an expedition to the South Pacific aboard the yacht Wanderer for the purpose of obtaining land and forming a Republic in the South Seas. Boyd's first acquisition was a coral atoll of five small fertile islands, surrounding a lagoon of a reported fifteen-mile circumference. Called Stewart's Islands, they were located north of the Solomon Islands at an estimated 8.24 degrees South Latitude and 165 degrees East Longitude. All of the natives, reported to total about one hundred, lived on one of the islands and used the others only occasionally. Boyd secured full title to them on September 1, 1851, by paying the ruling chief one thousand dollars worth of merchandise.

Following this, the Wanderer proceeded to San Cristobal Island in the Solomons where cession was secured of the offshore island of Marau and of adjacent territory on San Cristobal. From there they sailed to Guadalcanal
where Boyd was killed by the natives. Webster then returned to Australia with the Wanderer. Boyd’s rights passed to Webster after Boyd’s death by virtue of a prior written arrangement.¹

Webster then formulated plans for the profitable use of the Stewart’s Islands but sought the protection of a recognized national flag for them. British policy at the time was known to be anti-expansionistic and so Webster had to look elsewhere than to Britain for a foreign flag. At what time he first met St. Julian is not known, but it probably was after St. Julian had received his Hawaiian Commission to Polynesia.

On February 10, 1855, he signed an agreement with St. Julian at Sydney ceding sovereignty over the atoll to Hawaii, subject to ratification by the Hawaiian government within six months. He thought that the atoll could be developed profitably for use as a depot for trading and for supplying ships, as well as for use as a sanatorium for missionaries or other white residents in any of the adjacent and less healthy areas. He had tentative plans for establishing himself on the populated island in the atoll and proposed to convert the lagoon into a harbor by blowing up a small portion of the reef, to create a channel. He was prepared to bear all expenses himself, but Hawaii was not to levy any taxes on him. An additional provision of the cession agreement, however, was a stipulation that unless Webster acted upon his plans within one month after having received notice of Hawaii’s ratification of the agreement, all of his claims to proprietary ownership of the atoll would lapse.

¹ St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, Secret, May 9, 1855; St. Julian to Wyllie, Jan. 10, 1857, with enclosures: copy of deed of Taono and Faro to Boyd, Sept. 1, 1851, AH, FO & Ex.; P. C. Advertiser, May 5, 1884.
² P. C. Advertiser, May 6, 1884; St. Julian - Webster Agreement, enclosure to St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, Secret, May 9, 1855, AH, FO & Ex.
St. Julian believed Webster's plans were sound and was of the opinion that even if Webster decided not to go through with them, he, St. Julian, could interest others in doing so. However, when he first informed Wyllie, in a letter dated March 1, 1866, that he had accepted the cession of the atoll to Hawaii, subject to approval by the Hawaiian government, he urged such approval be granted as a means of boosting Hawaii's position both in Polynesia and "internationally", and of doing so without any expense to Hawaii. 3 Despite this enthusiastic attitude, he delayed sending the cession agreement to Hawaii until May for some unknown reason. At that time he again urged its acceptance, citing also the potential value of the islands as a civilising center for the general area. Administrative control of the islands for Hawaii could be exercised, he suggested, through his office as Commissioner to Polynesia. 4

Wyllie introduced the cession offer at a Cabinet Council meeting on August 23, 1866 but no decision was reached. A Privy Council meeting on September 17, 1866, however, tentatively approved several resolutions introduced by Wyllie regarding the offer. Acceptance of the cession, the Privy Council decided, was to be recommended to the King principally as a means of introducing civilisation and Christianity into contiguous lands. A plebiscite would be taken of the Stewart's Islands' natives to secure their approval. St. Julian would exercise regional administration for Hawaii and appoint a governor to provide local administration. Wyllie, as Minister of Foreign Relations, would provide general instructions on policy to St. Julian. It was decided, however, to postpone a final decision on the actual acceptance pending inquiry by Wyllie of the Hawaiian missionary

3. St. Julian to Wyllie, Mar. 1, 1866, rec'd Aug. 19, 1856; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, Secret, May 9, 1866, AH, FO & Ex.
4. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, Secret, May 9, 1866, AH, FO & Ex.
societies, as to what they could do for the benefit of the natives of the islands.5

When Wyllie informed St. Julian of the results of this Privy Council meeting, he asked him to secure an extension of the six-month ratification period allowed Hawaii. Wyllie told him also that if the King could be convinced of the potential value of the islands as a missionizing and civilizing center, the King probably would favor acceptance of the cession. In general, however, he said, the King was opposed to Hawaiian annexation of territory.6

St. Julian, in his reply, supported the civilizing and missionizing center argument. He sought also to gain additional backing for the cession by holding out to Wyllie the prospect of the possible later cession to Hawaii of an additional area - the San Cristobal region originally acquired by Boyd but in December, 1855, controlled by Webster, St. Julian and a third party. This information was not received in Honolulu until June 1856,7 long after a final decision had been reached. No concrete offer regarding San Cristobal ever was made by St. Julian thereafter, probably because of his dissatisfaction with Hawaii's handling of the Stewart's Islands cession offer. However, he had obtained from Webster, meanwhile, a six-month extension of the ratification period.

A decision was reached by Hawaii in February, 1856, to accept the cession of the Stewart's Islands. This was done despite the fact that by then the first six-month extension of the ratification period had run out. The cession issue was discussed first on February 11 at a Privy Council meeting

at which Wyllie reported that the missionary group favored approval of the cession. He said nothing, however, of what they would do for the natives of the ceded islands - the subject on which he was supposed to report. The problem was considered next on February 15 at a Cabinet Council meeting at which the King gave his approval "solely for the good of the natives of these islands and of the Solomon Islands, and without any pecuniary or other responsibility." Final approval was not given until February 29, after second Privy Council and Cabinet Council meetings had been held.

When Wyllie wrote to St. Julian on March 4, 1856 to inform him of the decision, he told him that the cession had been accepted by Hawaii, subject to approval by the Stewart's Islanders of certain articles or conditions which Wyllie intended to prepare for the King's approval and then send to St. Julian. In the meantime he urged him not to contract any obligations. Wyllie's action in this regard probably was based on the Privy Council requirements that a plebiscite be held among the natives to determine their wishes with regards to annexation. Wyllie, however, never sent to St. Julian any such articles or conditions for a plebiscite. He chose instead to regard the whole issue as dead, partly, he claimed, because he had received no word as to whether a second and sufficient extension of the period for Hawaiian acceptance of the cession had been obtained.

Meanwhile, after St. Julian had learned from Wyllie of the February 29, 1856 Privy Council decision, with its plebiscite condition, he wrote

12. Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 11, May 2, 1856, AH, FO & Ex.
to Webster in July, 1856, asking for a second extension of time sufficient for full acceptance of the cession by Hawaii. Webster, by then, however, had abandoned his plans for the atoll. Having no further interest in it, he ceded full rights to it to St. Julian on October 28, 1856. The latter informed Wyllie of these developments in a letter Wyllie probably did not receive until after July, 1857. He offered as the new owner to cede the islands to Hawaii, providing that the plebiscite conditions Wyllie had said he would send him were acceptable. St. Julian pleaded with Wyllie for definitive early action to be taken, not only regarding the Stewart’s Islands, but also regarding his long pending previously requested revised commission and extended powers. By not cooperating, he asserted, Hawaii was casting away real opportunities to expand its territories and establish also an Hawaiian-dominated Polynesian Confederation.13

Wyllie in his subsequent correspondence sought to assuage St. Julian’s feelings, but the Stewart’s Island cession as well as an extension of St. Julian’s powers remained dead issues.14 With respect to St. Julian’s cession offer, whether Wyllie’s failure to act on it was because of unwritten instructions from the King, or because he had come to consider acceptance of the cession a mistake or a waste of time, is not fully clear. The former is the more likely possibility for the following reasons.

In his report to the Legislature in 1858, Wyllie said that personally he

strongly had favored taking possession of the islands as potential centers of missionary and civilizing activity. In addition, he previously had suggested to St. Julian in September, 1867, after having received the news of the latter's acquisition of proprietary rights to the islands, that St. Julian appoint a consular agent at the islands with instructions to hoist there the flag of the Hawaiian Kingdom, a step which Wyllie believed would enable St. Julian to guard his rights pending receipt of the definitive views of "the King's Government" (which never came.) St. Julian never acted on this suggestion. Wyllie, however, reported to St. Julian at this same time that the failure of Hawaii's missionaries to evince the interest in the islands, which Wyllie had expected of them, meant that Hawaii could have no means of communication with the islands, since Hawaii could effect such communication only via the missionary packet, Morning Star. It is possible, therefore, that this lack of missionary interest and cooperation, which Wyllie attributed to the political opposition of the missionaries towards him, could have made King Kamehameha IV reverse his previous approval of the Stewart's accession, particularly in view of his general opposition to Hawaiian expansionism.

Having failed thus to secure Hawaii's effective assumption of sovereignty over the Stewart's Islands, and having been unable to exploit either those islands or the San Cristobal area otherwise profitably, St. Julian in 1869 decided to use these lands to endow a Polynesian order of merit which he then created - the Order of Arossi. The name "Arossi" probably was taken


Another possible reason for this lack of Hawaiian missionary interest may have been the fact that American and British missionary organizations had a tacit understanding to the effect that the former would work in the North Pacific; the latter, in the South Pacific. The Hawaiian group may have followed the policy of its parent American society.
St. Julian founded the Order probably both as a means of obtaining
the recognition which he felt Wyllie had denied him, and as a means of aid­
ing his dealings with other island groups. The Order of Aroasi was to be
awarded to those who had aided materially the social and political advance­
ment of any Polynesian government or people. Kamehameha IV in April, 1860,
accepted the sovereignty of the Order, and approved its constitution as pre­
pared by St. Julian. There were to be two Grand Commanders, one for South­
er Polynesia and one for the Hawaiian Islands. St. Julian held the former
post. Subordinate ranks were Commander, Officer and Associate. The decora­
tion consisted of purple and gold ribbon and a cross of enamel, gold, silver
or bronze, depending on the rank.

Although King Kamehameha IV had expressed his willingness as Sovereign
of the Order, to do whatever was necessary, in accordance with future in­
structions from St. Julian, the latter, discouraged at the fate of his other
Hawaiian ventures, never sent any recommendations for decorations to Hawaii.
In 1861, while continuing himself to wear his decoration, St. Julian applied
to the British government at London for official permission to wear it. (Such
permission was required because it was a foreign decoration.) By this time,
however, he had ceased to promote the Order actively. The Order remained
largely forgotten, therefore, until Walter Murray Gibson in the 1880's

16. St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872; Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 1, April
23, 1860, AH, FO & Ex.
17. St. Julian to Wyllie, Jan. 15, 1857, AH, FO & Ex.; P.C. Advertiser, May
6, 1864.
18. Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 1, Apr. 23, 1860, AH, FO & Ex.
19. St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872; St. Julian to Wyllie, Pvt., Mar. 4,
1861, AH, FO & Ex.; P.C. Advertiser, May 6, 1884.
20. Wyllie to St. Julian, Pvt., Aug. 50, 1860; St. Julian to Wyllie, Mar. 4,
1861; St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
seized upon the idea of such an Order as a means of his promoting Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific." After doing research on St. Julian's Order, Gibson devised a similar type order, the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, which was established on December 16, 1886. 21

21. Statutes of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania (Honolulu, 1886.).
As a result of St. Julian's resumption in 1870 of interest in his old Hawaiian offices, Hawaii once again became involved in efforts to achieve an Hawaiian "Primaacy of the Pacific." These efforts lasted only from May, 1870, to February 7, 1873, when the Hawaiian government decided officially to terminate the post of Consulate General for Polynesia. ¹ Although St. Julian during this period wrote hopefully a few times of possible annexations by Hawaii in Samoa and New Guinea,² virtually all of his efforts in his Hawaiian Polynesia post at this time were devoted to the Fiji Islands. The net result for Hawaii of his activity, however, was nothing, for he resigned from his Hawaiian posts in May, 1872, to assume the Chief Justiceship of the native government at Fiji.³ Edward Reeve, his long-time assistant in the Hawaiian Polynesia post, then tried hard to continue its existence, but was forced to stop by the Hawaiian Cabinet Council decision of February 7, 1873, ending the post.

St. Julian's resumption of activity in his Hawaiian posts came about as a result of a favorable response by the Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles C. Harris, to an exploratory letter to him by St. Julian, dated March 25, 1870. In this letter, St. Julian offered his services...
again, writing as enthusiastically as formerly of what he could accomplish to help achieve an Hawaiian "Primacy." It was still possible, he said, if he received support and cooperation from Hawaii, to add to Hawaii's domains. In Fiji, for example, he continued, there was a desire for the establishment of a foreign protectorate, a desire which probably would not be acted upon either by Britain or the United States. 4

Native and white leaders in Fiji actually applied to Britain in March, 1870, for the establishment of a British protectorate, but without success. The United States rejected a similar petition in October, 1870. St. Julian's statement of the desire for the establishment of a protectorate, therefore, was true. There were important elements in Fiji and in other island areas, as there had been during the 1850's, who sought the establishment of organized island governments under foreign protection. A steady increase in foreign-owned plantations had led to strong desires for such protection and for stable, reliable governments rather than unorganized and capricious native regimes. 5

Harris was as sympathetic to St. Julian's ideas of capitalizing upon this situation for Hawaii as Wyllie had been, only he was able to offer St. Julian some effective support and cooperation. The favorable attitude towards St. Julian of Harris and the Hawaiian leadership was made clear in a letter to the former by Harris:

Your zeal on the subject of Polynesian establishme...
On July 16, 1870 Harris promptly forwarded to St. Julian renewed commissions as "His Hawaiian Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul General to the Kings and Ruling Chiefs of the Independent States and Tribes in Polynesia South of the Equator," and as Consul General for Australia (the latter still incorrectly worded.) Although particularly interested in St. Julian's efforts with regards to Fiji, Harris also expressed positive interest in St. Julian's brief reports in May and October, 1871, of tentative overtures to him (from parties not mentioned) regarding an Hawaiian annexation of Samoa, and in October, 1871, of tentative overtures to him regarding an Hawaiian protectorate over land in or near New Guinea. With respect to Fiji, Harris asked specifically in November, 1870, if Hawaii could help that fledgling native government "in any way advantageous to both" Hawaii and Fiji.

Pleased with Harris's speedy and sympathetic replies to his dispatches, St. Julian on December 31, 1870, asked him whether Hawaii would be willing to spend any money for an expansion program. Harris, in his reply, bluntly stated that "we cannot burden this Treasury with any considerable expense, for the purpose of governing a distant people, unless that expense should be returned with increase in the near future." If this were possible, he definitely, and King Kamehameha V probably, he said, would be willing to extend Hawaii's territory. They, therefore, would consider any reasonable offers from Fiji's leaders.

St. Julian's answer on March 30, 1870 was very explicit. None of Fiji's native or white leaders actually were asking for an Hawaiian
protectorate, he said. They preferred either a native government or intervention by one of the major powers. However, he suggested that if Hawaii would send him to Fiji, paying his expenses, an Hawaiian protectorate might be arranged. Such a protectorate would not involve any great expense to Hawaii, he argued. The divide-and-rule tactics of the British in India, and their reliance upon indirect rule there, he believed, could be utilised to advantage by Hawaii in Fiji to eliminate a costly drain on Hawaii's resources. If the purpose of a mission to Fiji by St. Julian was announced simply as the rendering of friendly advice and aid in the organisation of a Fijian government, towards which end St. Julian already had furnished some material for use in the preparation of a Fijian constitution, even if he failed in his efforts to arrange a protectorate for Hawaii, there would be, St. Julian said, no public knowledge of this and thus no loss of prestige by Hawaii. 12

While still awaiting a response to his proposal, St. Julian, acting on his own initiative, appointed D'Arcy Wentworth Lathrop Murray as Hawaiian consul at Fiji. 13 He sought also to secure British official support of his projected Hawaiian protectorate over Fiji. He suggested by letter, dated April 26, 1871, to Lord Behune, Governor of New South Wales, that since the British government would not establish its own protectorate over Fiji, that it support an Hawaiian protectorate there. Hawaii probably would be willing if asked, he said. Strategically it would be an advantageous solution, keeping Fiji "perpetually neutral under the rule of a Power, which although strong enough to govern efficiently could never be viewed with any alarm by

the nations having possessions in, or on the borders of, the Pacific.\(^\text{14}\)

Lord Behune thought favorably of St. Julian's suggestion and passed it on to London for consideration. His superiors dismissed the idea, however, as unworthy of consideration.\(^\text{15}\)

The Hawaiian government, unaware until later of this by-play, decided to act upon St. Julian's plan. He was appointed in May, 1871, as "Special Commissioner for the Fiji Islands," and was authorised two hundred pounds sterling expenditures to visit Fiji for Hawaii. No special instructions were issued him although he was asked to extend invitations to visit Hawaii, as the guests of King Kamehameha V, to Thakombau, King of Fiji, and Maafu, the latter's principal contender for power. St. Julian bore letters from Kamehameha V to Thakombau and Maafu stating that St. Julian had been commissioned by Kamehameha to offer any advice and assistance the latter could render them.\(^\text{16}\)

During June and July, 1871, St. Julian was busy laying the ground-work and preparing for his visit to Fiji in August.\(^\text{17}\) Meanwhile, on June 5, the formation of a new government was proclaimed at Fiji. Autographed letters from King Thakombau to the heads of several nations were sent to inform them of the birth of the new state. S. A. Saint Dohu was sent in June via Honolulu to the United States with such a letter for President Grant. He was accredited also to Hawaii and bore a letter from King Thakombau to King Kamehameha, requesting the latter's "countenance, support and recognition."\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{14}\) St. Julian to Lord Behune, No. 1, Apr. 26, 1871, copy enclosed in St. Julian to Harris, May 5, 1871, AH, FO & Ex.

\(^{15}\) Brookes, op. cit., p. 394 n. 16.

\(^{16}\) Harris to St. Julian, May 10, 1871; Harris to St. Julian, June 5, 1871, with enclosures, AH, FO & Ex.

\(^{17}\) St. Julian to Harris, June 30, 1871, AH, FO & Ex.

\(^{18}\) Min. of For. Rel. & Commerce, Fiji, to Min. of For. Rel., Sandwich Islands, June 12, 1871; Cakobau to Kamehameha, undated, AH, FO & Ex.; Brookes, op. cit., pp. 372-374.
Harris acted upon Thakombau's letter immediately. On June 30, 1871, he sent instructions directly to Murray, the Hawaiian consul at Fiji, to do everything he could to recognize and aid the de facto government. Upon receipt of these instructions, Murray accordingly officially recognized the regime.\(^9\) This took place prior to St. Julian's arrival at Levuka, Fiji, on August 10 or 11, 1871.\(^{20}\) Later, after St. Julian had returned from his mission to Fiji, but before Harris had received St. Julian's report on it, Harris requested Murray in October, 1871, to offer to the Fijian government the services at London of Manley Hopkins, the Charge d'Affaires there for the Hawaiian Kingdom.\(^{21}\) Nothing ever came of this offer.

During St. Julian's short stay at Levuka from August 10 or 11, 1871, to August 30, 1871, he was able to accomplish nothing with respect to promoting effectively an Hawaiian protectorate. "No one was disposed to think of anything short of Fijian nationality," he reported. If the government failed to secure sufficient international recognition for an independent Fiji, then an Hawaiian protectorate might become possible, he believed.

Even his offer of advisory services was not received well, he said, apparently because the ministers of the government feared him personally as a potentially "dangerous" contender for power. As a result, he utilized his time at Fiji to ingratiate himself into the good favor of the leaders of the government, while simultaneously establishing friendly relations with others who might become important if the government collapsed. He returned to Sydney with King Thakombau's acceptance of the invitation of King

\(^{19}\) Harris to Murray, June 30, 1871; St. Julian to Harris, Aug. 8, 1871, AH, FO \& Ex.

An answer to Thakombau from United States President Ulysses Grant, therefore, was not the only welcome extended the infant state. Cf. Brookes, op. cit., pp. 372-374.

\(^{20}\) St. Julian to Harris, Sept. 27, 1871, AH, FO \& Ex.

\(^{21}\) Harris to Murray, Oct. 13, 1871, AH, FO \& Ex.
Kamehameha V to visit Hawaii. The visit never was made, however.

After his return, St. Julian spoke with the Governor of New South Wales in an effort to have him recommend to London that Britain recognize the Fijian government, "provided that it shall first prove its capacity to govern." St. Julian believed that as a result of his talk the governor would make such a recommendation. St. Julian then assisted the Fijian government, with which he remained in communication by mail, in several small matters such as the designing and procuring of a royal standard, an ensign, boat flags, seals, etc. "They depend...upon me for everything," he wrote.

In January, 1872, he published a pamphlet entitled International Status of Fiji, and the Political Rights, Liabilities, Duties, Privileges of British Subjects and other Foreigners Residing in the Fijian Archipelago.

St. Julian's connections with, and work for, Fijian leaders paid off for himself eventually in the firm offer of the post of Chief Justice of Fiji. He left Sydney on May 5, 1872, "don' the Fijian 'Ermine," having resigned from his Hawaiian offices on May 2. He left for his new post with the best wishes of Harris. The latter informed him that whatever he believed Hawaii could do to assist the young Fijian government would receive serious consideration by Hawaii.

On resigning his posts, St. Julian recommended to Harris that instead of Hawaii having only a Consulate General for Southern Polynesia, Hawaii should establish two consulates general, one for Melanesia and Micronesia,

22. St. Julian to Harris, Sept. 27, 1871, AH, FO & Ex.
23. Ibid.
25. St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
27. St. Julian to Harris, May 2, 1872; St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 18, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
and the other for Central and Southern Polynesia. He recommended the appointment of Edward Reeve for the first post. With respect to the second, he suggested that it be located at Fiji, and stated that he would write further regarding it after his arrival at Fiji. He never did so. Possibly he had had hopes, however, of indirectly using this Hawaiian post by hand-picking its occupant and having it located at Fiji.

Edward Reeve was a fellow worker with St. Julian on the Sydney Morning Herald. He had been assisting him in the clerical duties of his Hawaiian offices since August, 1854. After St. Julian's departure for Fiji, Reeve assumed charge of St. Julian's former post calling himself "Secretary of Legation (in charge), Hawaiian Legation for Southern Polynesia." He asked Harris to issue him the necessary commission as Charge d'Affaires and Consul General for Polynesia to make his position proper and official.

Attempting to follow closely in the path previously well blazed by St. Julian, he said that the early receipt of his commission was essential for Hawaii to play its proper role in helping to cope with the very pressing South Pacific labor traffic problem. The full flavor of his approach can be obtained from the following extract from a dispatch he sent to Harris in August, 1872:

...not a week passes but that I am compelled to take some action, more or less direct, in defense of The Hawaiian Government and Nationality - which are frequently attacked by persons who are at last beginning to be dimly sensible of the fact that "Hawaii" is a Power in the Pacific, and that the bulwark of her moral support, to the rise of Fiji as a Polynesian State in the Southern Pacific, is a Barrier against which they are only exhausting themselves in vain.

Reeve did not receive his requested Polynesia commission but was sent...

29. St. Julian to Harris, May 2, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
30. Reeve to Harris, May 30, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
32. Reeve to Harris, May 30, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
33. Reeve to Harris, No. 5, Aug. 20, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
instead, in September, 1872, a commission as Consul General for Aus-
tralia. He continued his services in the Polynesia post, however, re-
iterating the need for the Polynesia commission.

At the request of E. G. Simon, the French Consul at Sydney, Reeve
briefed him on November 24, 1872 on the Fiji situation, recommending in his
briefing a prompt de jure recognition of Fiji by the French government.
Early in December, 1872, Reeve observed "officially" the Australian trial
of two men who had been engaging in the labor traffic.

His efforts and his hopes were to no avail. Lunalilo had succeeded
Kamehameha V on the Hawaiian throne, the latter having died on December 11,
1872. A new cabinet was announced on January 10, 1873, the Foreign Minis-
ter of which was Charles R. Bishop, the conservative head of the banking
house of Bishop and Company. Bishop immediately sought to end all this
Polynesia business once and for all. He brought up the problem at a Febru-
ary 7, 1873, Cabinet Council meeting and secured a decision definitely to
abandon the post on the grounds of inexpediency. Bishop's purpose was to
avoid any action from which might arise complications which he considered
capable of possibly adversely affecting Hawaii's interests. As a result
of his decisive action, although Reeve from time to time until mid-1874
sought a reversal of the decision, Hawaii's watch tower over the South
Pacific passed out of existence, and with it temporarily, the dream of an
Hawaiian-dominated Polynesian Confederation. Both watch-tower and dream,
however, later became significant influences in shaping Walter Murray

55. Reeve to Foreign Office (Hawaii), No. 10, Nov. 25, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
Polynesian Kingdom to American Commonwealth (New York, 1948), p. 140.,
hereafter cited as Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii; P. C. Advertiser, Jan.
18, 1873.
57. "Cabinet Council Minute Book 1866-1874," p. 353, AH; Bishop to Reeve,
Feb. 11, 1873, AH, FO & Ex.
58. Reeve to William R. Green, No. 9, July 29, 1874, AH, FO & Ex.
Gibson's "Primacy of the Pacific" policy of the 1880's. 39

39. After the abolition of the Hawaiian Polynesia post, Reeve, while still retaining his Hawaiian post of Consul General for Australia, entered into unofficial relations with Tonga. About March or April, 1873, the Reverend Shirley Waldmar Baker, Prime Minister of Tonga, visited Reeve to request Reeve's "friendly advice and assistance" and to request him to reappoint an Hawaiian consul at Tonga. Reeve could no longer do the latter but he could and did provide some advice. Apparently he and Baker discussed also the establishment by Tonga of a Tongan post of Commissioner to Southern Polynesia, to be occupied by Reeve. Nothing ever came of this but Reeve remained in close correspondence with Baker. Early in 1874 Reeve informed Bishop that he had been offered the post of Chief Secretary to the King of Tonga, to serve thereby as Chief Minister and High Steward. Nothing ever came of this either. Reeve continued to hold the post of Hawaiian Consul General for Australia until his resignation on January 17, 1879. — Reeve to Foreign Office (Hawaii), No. 5, July 5, 1873; Reeve to Bishop, Feb. 8, 1874; Reeve to Kapena, Jan. 17, 1879, AH, FO & Ex.
CHAPTER VI
CHARLES ST. JULIAN — AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

The positive accomplishments of Charles St. Julian, from an historical viewpoint, present no problem. He was one of a number of Australians of his time who brought pressure on Great Britain to change its anti-expansionistic policy in the Pacific, pressure which eventually succeeded after other major nations became actively expansionistic. He contributed significantly, along with others, to the attempted development at Tonga in the 1850's and at Fiji in the 1870's of independent, progressive, stable, organized native regimes. He was one of the large number of Western people of his time who raised their voices loudly and clearly against abusive treatment of the unprotected, unsophisticated natives of Oceania.

In none of these activities was he outstanding, however. His claim to attention lies in the fact that he combined these activities with a large amount of effort on behalf of, and in the name of, the Kingdom of Hawaii, and that as a result, his ideas of a Polynesian Confederation, and his attempts to achieve an Hawaiian hegemony over the Pacific area, significantly influenced the more important efforts by Walter Murray Gibson in the 1880's to achieve an Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific."

The problems thus raised in connection with St. Julian are not related to his positive accomplishments. They are concerned rather with his motives in seeking an Hawaiian Polynesia post, and with the reasons why Robert Grichton Wyllie, the Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Relations during the first and long period of St. Julian's activities in his Hawaiian post, was unable to give him any effective support, despite his sympathy for St. Julian's ideas and objectives. From this latter problem there arises the interesting
speculation as to what St. Julian possibly could have accomplished for Hawaii if he had received a much greater degree of cooperation at that time.

With respect to the motives of St. Julian, the interesting question is why should he, who never visited Hawaii, and who received only negligible monetary compensation from Hawaii, have been such a vigorous booster of the Hawaiian Kingdom? There are several possible reasons. The reason St. Julian himself advanced to Wyllie was a combination of humanitarianism and of an Hawaiian imperialistic-racist mystique.

The great end at which I aim is the political regeneration of the Polynesian communities;...I seek to work for Hawaii not because she is Hawaii, or because I have any greater regard for the Hawaiian nation than for any other race of Polynesians, but because I look upon her as the natural head of these communities,...

This obviously was neither an accurate nor a complete explanation of his motives. Humanitarianism was probably an influencing factor but was not among the more important ones. Possibly the most important factor was his particular personality.

Judging from his activities it may be presumed that he was a very energetic, ambitious man who probably aspired to greater heights than the position of a newspaper court reporter. He had no formal legal education and no future in Australia in that regard. Acting in a diplomatic capacity, therefore, even if only for a small state like Hawaii, boosted his pride, his ego and his stature in the community. He was very concerned with such prestige-producing and ego-satisfying matters as rank, titles, decorations, and so forth.

1. Wyllie to St. Julian No. 4, Sept. 25, 1858, AB, FO & Ex.
2. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 28, Dec. 21, 1854, AB, FO & Ex.
He carried on a very lengthy and heated correspondence with Wyllie in an effort to have his post as Commissioner to Polynesia given a higher equivalent rank than Wyllie wished to accord it. The latter regarded St. Julian as a charge d'affaires⁴ while St. Julian classed his position as one being "between that of an Ambassador and that of a Consular Officer,"⁵ thereby according himself much higher diplomatic standing in Sydney.

There is no question but that he enjoyed the official status his Hawaiian post gave him. He went to some expense and trouble to design a colorful uniform to be worn on official occasions by himself and by those people whom he appointed to assist him in his diplomatic duties. Uniform buttons and uniform design became another subject of lengthy correspondence between himself and Wyllie.⁶

After he had acquired proprietary rights in islands in and near the Solomons, he sent correspondence to Wyllie which he signed as Charles, Muara of Arossi (San Cristobal) and Sovereign Chief of Sikyana (Stewart's Islands).⁷

He sought honors from Hawaii, although claiming that he did so only as an aid in his work for Hawaii.⁸ He suggested that Hawaii establish an Hawaiian Order of Merit to reward all great services in the Pacific Ocean area.⁹ After some time had elapsed with no action taken upon his proposal,

5. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, Jan. 21, 1854, AH, FO & Ex.
he proceeded during the latter part of 1859, as we have seen, to create such an order, the Order of Arossi, and to give himself the recognition he desired by making himself a Grand Commander in that Order. He was bitter at Wyllie because when an Hawaiian Order was created later, he was not awarded it despite a promise to him by Wyllie that such an award would be made.

Later, when Charles C. Harris, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs was an active supporter of St. Julian’s, sent him in March, 1872, a Cross and Diploma as Knight Commander of the Order of Kamehameha I, he was very happy. He was about to leave for Fiji for the Chief Justice post of that native kingdom. Because of his being knighted by Hawaii, he said, he could adopt the title of Sir Charles St. Julian, which would "look better" and be "more fitting" for him in his new post. At Fiji he once again showed his love of pomp and circumstance by presiding over the Supreme Court in a scarlet gown, a full-bottomed wig, and all the millinery of an English judge.

Aside from some humanitarianism and from the desire to satisfy the demands of his ego, as described above, there probably were four other motives involved in St. Julian’s work for Hawaii.

One motive was his interest in preparing a comprehensive and authoritative "area survey" of the various Pacific Island groups, a work combining geographic, political, social and economic data. He felt that an appointment as Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia would aid him in the collection of material for such a work. The complete study was published

10. St. Julian to Harris, Mar. 25, 1870; St. Julian to Harris, Jan. 16, 1872; Wyllie to St. Julian, Apr. 16, 1863, AH, FO & Ex.
11. Harris to St. Julian, Mar. 11, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
12. St. Julian to Harris, May 2, 1872, AH, FO & Ex.
by him in Sydney in August, 1857, and appeared in the form of a 75-page official state paper of the Hawaiian Kingdom, entitled "Report on Central Polynesia." Another motive probably was the desire to voice his opinions effectively in high official British circles as to what British imperial policy in the Pacific should be. The combination of his being Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia and of his engaging in extensive study of Pacific Island groups enabled him to receive a hearing in quarters which otherwise probably would not have been open to him. In this connection he may have hoped also that the adoption by Britain of a more expansionistic policy in the Pacific, which he urged, would enable him to obtain a desirable official British salaried post. He came to be considered seriously, as we have seen, for appointment as British consul at Tonga.

A third motive for St. Julian probably was the hope that the close relationships which he could and did establish with various island groups, through his post as Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia, might enable him to obtain a desirable and responsible position in the native government of some fledgling island state. In this respect he succeeded in Fiji in 1872 when he secured the position of Chief Justice there and forthwith resigned his Hawaiian posts.

A fourth motive probably was the hope of profiting economically by annexing to Hawaii land in which he had some direct or indirect proprietary interest, and the exploitation of which best could be made secure and profitable by obtaining the protection of a recognized foreign flag. British policy was anti-expansionistic and so British protection was unavailable. Rather, however, than deal with another major maritime nation and

16. St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 8, Apr. 27, 1857; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 1, June 5, 1858; St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 2, June 17, 1858. AH, FO & Ex.
thus a potential rival of Britain's, St. Julian preferred to secure cession of the land to the Hawaiian Kingdom, which though a small, weak state, still was internationally recognised. St. Julian definitely was interested in the possibility of his developing an income from planting and trading in the Stewart's and other islands.17

In summary, then, St. Julian's vigorous activities on behalf of Hawaii were motivated by the demands of his ambitious, egotistical and frustrated personality, by his hope of some sort of material gain, and by his humanitarianism.

Given those motives and given Wyllie's sympathy for St. Julian's ideas and objectives, the question still remains as to why Hawaii did not effectively support St. Julian during the 1850's when, with the exception of France, the major powers were not engaged actively in expanding their territories in the Pacific. By 1870, when Charles C. Harris began supporting St. Julian, the situation had changed greatly as compared with the 1850's. St. Julian himself provides a good description of the change. The "time was," he wrote Harris in June, 1870, "when there would have been no difficulty in finding parties willing to bear all the expences of settlement, administration, and protection; and Chiefs ready to cede territory; for as a sole consideration - the mere 'legitimacy' which would have been afforded by an acceptance of Hawaiian Suserainty." It was now extremely difficult to accomplish this, he said.19

Wyllie himself had believed that something could be accomplished when St. Julian first assumed office for Hawaii. Wyllie wrote later in The

18. See above, pp. 9-10.
Polynesian, in 1863, long after St. Julian had ceased his first period of activity on behalf of Hawaii:

...with a little encouragement from the King's Government to Mr. St. Julian, and without involving it any expense whatever, not only Stewart's Islands, but the Samoan, and several other groups of islands, not under the protection of any European power in 1856 and 1857, would have added themselves to the King's Dominions as Confederate States under his suzerainty, claiming only the right to hoist his flag to make use of His Majesty's name, and in case of aggression or outrage to appeal to him for protection - it being well understood that that protection could never be more than a moral one - that is to say, the protection of the pen, not of the cannon.20

Wyllie, however, was alone among Hawaii's leaders in his opinions. Since this was the case he soon had ceased to encourage St. Julian, and had tried instead to make clear to him the definiteness and extent of the opposition of King Kamehameha III (died December 15, 1854) and King Kamehameha IV (died November 30, 1863). The latter, particularly, in addition to other leaders of the Hawaiian government, was not interested in, or in favor of, either the annexation of distant islands to Hawaii, or the assumption by Hawaii of protectorates over such islands. The Hawaiian government believed that Hawaii lacked the power, the funds and the means of communication necessary to implement properly such a program. There were no significant Hawaiian commercial interests in Australia and the South Pacific. All Hawaii's efforts, therefore, should be concentrated upon the development of Hawaii's own internal resources.21 In addition, the Hawaiian missionary movement, which possibly might have been expected to support St. Julian's program as a means of facilitating missionary activities, did not do so, partly, as we have seen, because of possible

20. The Polynesian, Apr. 4, 1863; Wyllie to St. Julian, Apr. 15, 1863, AH, Fo & Ex.
missionary political opposition to Wyllie, and partly because of a tacit
British-American missionary agreement leaving the South Pacific to Brit-
ish missionary efforts. 22

Of particular importance also in influencing the attitude of Hawaii's
leaders, and in limiting the amount of time Wyllie could devote to St.
Julian's cause, even if he so desired, was the fact that during this period
Hawaii's own independence was threatened seriously at times. Wyllie's ener-
gies perforce were devoted largely to safeguarding Hawaii's sovereignty and
to fighting to obtain equitable treaties with the major powers. 23 Lesser
factors handicapping Wyllie in his unsuccessful effort to maintain an effec-
tive and harmonious relationship with St. Julian, were the following: (1)
inadequate clerical assistance in his office; (2) scarce, irregular and
slow mail communication between Honolulu and Sydney, and (3) increasing
illness in his latter years. As a result, Wyllie often either did not have
the time, or was unable, to do more than reply perfunctorily to St. Julian's
bulky correspondence. 24

In view of the opposition of King Kamehameha IV and Hawaiian leaders
to the Hawaiian "Primacy" concepts and activities of St. Julian, it may
seem contradictory, therefore, that the Privy Council on March 23, 1857,
should have authorized the Minister of the Interior, Prince Lot Kamehame-
ha (later Kamehameha V), to expend the funds necessary to finance an ex-
ploratory and annexation voyage of the northwest islands of the Hawaiian
archipelago. 25 As a result of this authorization, Lot Kamehameha employed

22. See above, p. 30.
24. Wyllie to St. Julian, No. 5, Aug. 27, 1856; St. Julian To Wyllie, No.
7, Dec. 1, 1856; Wyllie to St. Julian No. 3, June 24, 1857; St. Julian
to Wyllie, No. 1, June 5, 1858, AH, FO & Ex.
Captain John Paty and the schooner Manuokawai. In carrying out his instructions, Paty annexed Nihoa Island on April 23, 1857, Laysan Island on May 1, 1857, and Lisiansky Island on May 11, 1857. The Privy Council confirmed these annexations on August 26, 1857.

It does not appear, however, that this voyage and its resultant annexations were involved in any way with any sort of doctrine aiming at an Hawaiian hegemony over the Pacific. Paty was hired by Hawaii explicitly to find guano deposits and to lay claim, wherever possible, to any place in the Hawaiian archipelago containing such deposits.

During the 1850's every country was interested in discovering new supplies of guano and breaking thereby the Peruvian monopoly price on that fertilizer. Hawaii was no exception in this respect.

In a similar manner the annexations to Hawaii of Cornwallis and Kalama Islands (Johnston Island) on June 14, and June 19, 1858, and of Palmyra Island on April 15, 1862, apparently were connected solely with the search for guano and the hope of a profitable exploitation of the islands by Hawaiian citizens.

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29. Guano was a grayish, powdery material, formed from the excrement of sea birds, which was high in phosphates and ammonium compounds and which, therefore, was in great demand for use as fertilizer. -- Edwin H. Bryan Jr., American Polynesia and the Hawaiian Chain (Honolulu, 2nd ed., rev., 1942), p. 25.
Even these guano annexations of 1857, 1858 and 1862 did not meet with general approval. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser censured them editorially. "The guano annexation scheme," it said in effect on September 30, 1858, "will fail as did St. Julian's "South Sea scheme. . . . We have already more territory than we can occupy or defend." It urged that Hawaii spend its money to develop its home resources. 31

The government paper, The Polynesian, over which Wyllie exercised strong influence, earlier had sought to defend the guano annexations. It said:

...the idea of the Hawaiian 'Sand-drift' undertaking to assume possession of inferior 'sanddrifs' may seem strange, especially to strangers, but a sovereign power enjoys its rights, whatever its size may be; the great advantage possessed by the larger powers is that they can also maintain their privileges." 32

Given thus the facts of, and reasons for, Hawaii's lack of support of St. Julian during the 1850's, there still arises the interesting speculation as to what St. Julian could have accomplished for Hawaii if he had received much more backing by Hawaii at that time. It is believed that the results for Hawaii would still have remained negligible. Though British policy was, and remained for some time, anti-expansionistic, British policy was and remained, definitely and positively in favor of the status quo in the Pacific. It was opposed to expansionism there by other powers. 33

It is doubtful, therefore, that Britain, if not other powers, would have acquiesced quietly in Hawaii's assumption of control over a Polynesian Confederation consisting of some of the most important island groups in Oceania. A power play thus would have developed and the Hawaiian Kingdom

31. P. C. Advertiser, April 2, 1857; Apr. 23, 1857; Sept. 30, 1858.
32. The Polynesian, Aug. 29, 1857.
33. Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, p. 186.
inevitably would have been the loser.

Even if no foreign opposition had developed, it is very doubtful that St. Julian actually could have brought some significant island groups into an Hawaiian-dominated Polynesian Confederation. St. Julian, it would seem, often saw the world through rose-colored glasses, particularly where his role and his capabilities in a given situation were concerned.
With the advent of Walter Murray Gibson to power as head of the cabinet on May 20, 1882, the Kingdom of Hawaii became involved in the biggest and most important effort in its history to achieve for Hawaii the "Primacy of the Pacific." This effort continued at increasing expense to Hawaii, and with increasing international complications for Hawaii, until a bloodless revolution on June 30, 1887 ousted Gibson from office and resulted in the installation of a new government opposed to all Gibson's policies.

While Gibson was in power, his "Primacy" ideas and program received the approval and support of King Kalakaua, who sought to play the role of a strong ruler. 1 With respect to the relative degree of responsibility, as between Gibson and Kalakaua, for the formulation and execution of a "Primacy of the Pacific" program, the major responsibility was Gibson's. There was no attempt made during Kalakaua's reign to carry out such a policy until Gibson came to power, and he was the principal architect of it. This is true despite the fact that one of the reasons he supported it so consistently probably was the desire to remain in Kalakaua's good graces by doing so, and also despite the fact that in the last two years of Gibson's tenure in office, Kalakaua came to play an increasing role in the execution of the "Primacy" policies. In planning and carrying out the "Primacy" program, Gibson was aware fully of the historical precedents of his policy, as also was King Kalakaua. They were conscious particularly of Charles

Gibson was an American adventurer and opportunist, born on January 16, 1822, aboard a Spanish vessel in the Bay of Biscay, and brought up along the eastern seaboard of the United States. In his early twenties he attempted unsuccessfully to sail an ex-United States government cutter Flirt to Guatemala with arms, in the hope of achieving power and success in Guatemalan politics as a Guatemalan admiral. The Flirt never was able to reach Guatemala, however, and sailed on around the Cape of Good Hope, reaching Banka Island north of Sumatra in early 1852. Gibson then became involved in native agitations and conspiracies in Sumatra against the Dutch administration, hoping probably to achieve thereby a position of personal importance.3

Because of his activities, he was imprisoned by the Dutch at Batavia, Java, but escaped on April 24, 1853. After returning to the United States, he was able by fast maneuvering to get the United States government in August, 1853, to demand $100,000 from the Dutch government in payment for damages to him. Nothing ever came of this. For a time thereafter he became an attache of the American Legation in Paris. Then he turned his attention to the Mormons and on October 29, 1859, sought to interest Brigham Young in establishing the principal Mormon colony in Papua, New Guinea. Although he was unsuccessful in this regard, he became a member of the Mormon


church on January 15, 1860, and in the latter part of the year was ordered to preach in the Pacific.

On July 4, 1861, he arrived in Hawaii and after a time assumed the leadership of the important Mormon settlement on the island of Lanai. Seeking to allay suspicion of his activities by the Hawaiian government, he said that he sought no personal advantage. "My heart is with Oceanian races," he wrote. "I was born on the ocean," he stated, "and I have felt a sort of brotherhood with islands, especially with the royal Malay, and his kindred, who reign and live here."

Actually, Gibson proceeded to use the Mormons to advance his own personal interests and created, in effect, his own little kingdom on Lanai. As a result, he was expelled from the church in 1864, but the church, nevertheless, lost its property on Lanai.

Meanwhile, he had done much research in Hawallana, particularly on the life of Kamehameha I, and also had become fluent in the native language. When Kamehameha V had first ascended the throne in 1863, Gibson had written him congratulating him on his possession of kingly attributes "so well fitted to advance Polynesian Civilisation." The framework for his later "Primacy of the Pacific" policy clearly already was being formulated.

After his excommunication from the Mormon church in 1864, Gibson involved himself in a great many business and political enterprises. Among other things, in 1868 he was commissioned as Hawaiian Commercial Agent for Singapore for the purpose of securing immigrants from Malaysia. He did not go to Singapore, however, but instead visited the United States for sixteen...
months. Later, in December and January, 1873, he played an important role in securing the election of Lunalilo as Royal successor to Kamehameha V; in February, 1874, after Lunalilo's death, he played a similarly important role in securing the election of Kalakaua as King. Through heavy flattery he later gradually secured the favor of Kalakaua. Thus, in 1876, he addressed a memorial to the latter, calling him "the hope of Polynesia."  

An important factor in Gibson's steady rise in political importance was his adroit use of the press and other means to stir up Hawaiian racial antagonism towards non-Hawaiians by speaking out strongly, like Kalakaua, for the native Hawaiian against the foreign interests in Hawaii. As a result, he achieved considerable popularity among the Hawaiians and in 1878 was elected a representative from Maui to the Legislative Assembly. He played a very active role in the legislative session of that year, supporting among other things an appropriation for construction of a new palace for Kalakaua. He was responsible also for an appropriation to erect the commemorative statue of Kamehameha I which still stands today in Honolulu.  

That Gibson's political tactics were successful among the native Hawaiians was indicated by his reelection to the Legislative Assembly in 1880 by a large majority. He again played an important role in the legislative session, becoming the recognized leader of the King's party in the House. He added to his political potential by purchasing the English-language Pacific Commercial Advertiser and by publishing the Wednesday Press or Halekolu, a bi-lingual paper aimed primarily at the native Hawaiian.  

Hawaiian group. Both papers were used effectively as instruments for flattering the King and his subjects.\textsuperscript{10}

All these activities paid off for Gibson in his appointment in 1880 by Kalakaua as a member of the Privy Council. In addition, the native Hawaiian electorate once more returned him to the Legislative Assembly in 1882. Strong and sure of himself by then, Gibson during the 1882 legislative session indirectly brought pressure against the ministry in power, causing them to resign. On May 20, 1882, Kalakaua appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs and Premier. Among the men Gibson appointed in his new cabinet was John Edward Bush, whom he made Minister of Finance. Bush later in 1887 headed the Hawaiian Mission to Samoa. For five years after May, 1882, Gibson dominated the Hawaiian scene. The record of these years of political power, however, has been called one of "unblushing corruption."\textsuperscript{11}

Throughout his entire time in power his regime encountered continuing bitter opposition, particularly from the business interests. The latter opposed its large expenditures. Other opposition developed as a result of the regime's political scandals, its use of the racial issue, etc.\textsuperscript{12} His "Primacy of the Pacific" policy and all actions taken by Hawaii under this policy also came under severe criticism. The extent to which these last criticisms were justified by the particular actions themselves, as opposed to the extent to which they were made simply as another means of attacking the Gibson regime, is a problem which can be discussed best elsewhere in this study.

The "Primacy" policy later adopted and carried out by Gibson when he came to office in May, 1882, was foreshadowed clearly by his introduction

\textsuperscript{10} Sousa, op. cit., pp. 161, 166, 177, 179.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 179, 194, 205-204; Conroy, op. cit., p. 104.
\textsuperscript{12} Kuykendall and Day, Hawaii, pp. 167, 169-170.
in the Legislative Assembly on June 28, 1880, of a resolution which was adopted by the Assembly. The resolution called for the appointment by King Kalakaua of a "Royal Hawaiian Commissioner to the States and Peoples of Polynesia" to investigate sources of immigration for Hawaii in Central and Western Polynesia and to bear Hawaii's good wishes "to the Kindred States of the Pacific Ocean." The preamble to the resolution enunciated clearly and succinctly Gibson's whole "Primacy" ideology. It said that "the Hawaiian Kingdom by its geographic position, and political status is entitled to claim a Primacy in the family of Polynesian States; and...it owes a duty in view of this Primacy to set the example of national enlightenment and integrity in all its relations with Polynesian races..." 13

The resolution passed unnoticed by the press and nothing further was done about it until Gibson assumed office as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1882.

In introducing the resolution, however, Gibson probably was aware of Kalakaua's whole-hearted sympathy with it. The latter's attitude was revealed clearly in a dispatch to Washington in July, 1880, from the United States' Minister at Honolulu, who reported:

...It is not generally known but I know from conversations with the King which I believe to have been entirely unique, that his imagination is inflamed with the idea of gathering all the cognate races of the Islands of the Pacific into a great Polynesian Confederacy, over which he will reign. 14

Despite Kalakaua's possession of such ideas, his regime, which began on February 12, 1874, did nothing to adopt an expansionistic "Primacy" program before Gibson came to power, although it had opportunities to do so. This indicates the extent of Gibson's responsibility for that program.

13. Journal of Legislative Assembly, 1880, p. 162; Resolution of Walter Gibson, June 28, 1880, Legislative Assembly Session Resolutions, 1880, AH.
Thus, in December, 1878, the Hawaiian government, after deliberation by the Cabinet Council, explicitly rejected a petition for annexation, dated July 10, 1878, which came from Tapiteuea atoll in the Gilbert Islands, where Hawaiian missionaries long had been active. In rejecting the petition, John M. Kapena, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Tapiteuea that Hawaii could not risk the possibility of getting into difficulty with some foreign nation as a result of a possible incident thousands of miles away where Hawaii could exercise no effective control, particularly since the petition requested local autonomy. 16

Another similar expression of Hawaiian policy occurred two years later in October, 1880, in correspondence between N. L. Green, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Edward Reeve. The latter, whose attempts years before to succeed Charles St. Julian as Consul General to Southern Polynesia had been unsuccessful, still occasionally corresponded with Hawaii, furnishing information regarding Pacific island developments. Green declined a suggestion by Reeve that Hawaii become the medium of publishing "ex parte" statements critical of the conduct of foreign nations with respect to the Pacific islands. Hawaii was too far away to render a correct judgment, he said, and furthermore, could have no effective influence. 16

The action of King Kalakaua with reference to Japan in 1881 indicates that even then, one year before Gibson came to power, he was not yet prepared actually to implement a policy of Hawaiian "Primacy of the Pacific."

16. Petition from Tapiteuea, July 10, 1878, translation, Reign of His Majesty Kalakaua - Thirteenth Year. Report Of the Minister of Foreign Affairs To The Legislative Assembly of 1886 (Honolulu, 1886), Appendix, p. xc, hereafter cited, along with all other annual reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, despite slight differences in actual report titles, as Rep. Of Min. Of For. Affairs, plus date; Kapena to Tapiteuea, Dec. 21, 1878, AH, FO & Ex.; F. C. Advertiser, Dec. 28, 1878.
despite his approval of such a policy. Kalakaua departed from Hawaii in January, 1881, on a trip around the world, and visited Japan enroute. He was received privately by Emperor Mutsuhito on March 10, 1881. Kalakaua was very concerned over a possible annexation of his Kingdom by the United States. As a means of enlisting the support of the Japanese government against any such efforts by the United States, he secretly proposed a marriage between one of the imperial princes of Japan and the Princess Kauulani, his niece and an heir to the throne.

Either during this same March 10 conversation with the Emperor, or during another such private talk, Kalakaua made another secret proposal to Mutsuhito, suggesting that the latter promote, and act as chief of, "a Union and Federation of the Asiatic nations and Sovereigns," including Hawaii. Such a powerful Oriental federation, Kalakaua believed, would serve to balance American influence in Hawaii. Both of these proposals were rejected later by Japan in order not to disturb adversely Japan's relationships with the United States.17 The fact remains, nevertheless, that King Kalakaua was prepared in 1881 to accept an Oriental federation dominated by Japan, although he probably would have preferred a Pacific Ocean area dominated by Hawaii.

No sooner, however, had Gibson taken over the Foreign Ministry in May, 1882, than he consciously and deliberately took the first step in his efforts to achieve the latter objective. Hawaii about that time was the recipient of a request from the Chief of Butaritari in the Gilbert Islands.

for the establishment, in effect, of an Hawaiian protectorate over his island. The Chief asked that Kalakaua send someone to Butaritari to negotiate an agreement with him.\textsuperscript{18} Gibson took advantage of the departure in June, 1882, from Honolulu for the Gilbert Islands, of Captain Isaiah Bray and the missionary brig \textit{Morning Star}, to give Bray a present to give to the Butaritari Chief. Bray also carried a letter from Gibson which, though it did not answer the Butaritari request directly, stated that Kalakaua "does heartily recognize a community of interest among the native Chiefs and People of Polynesia" and hoped for the establishment of close relations between Hawaii and Butaritari.\textsuperscript{19}

The result of Captain Bray's voyage was the receipt by Hawaii of two very similarly worded requests for annexation to Hawaii from the Chiefs of Butaritari and Apaiang Islands, both in the Gilberts. Kalakaua was requested by each to send a Commissioner to the islands to make the necessary annexation arrangements. It is evident from this and other correspondence that one or more of the Hawaiian missionaries in the Gilberts favored the extension of Hawaiian rule there, possibly either for reasons of national pride or as a means of facilitating Hawaiian missionary efforts.\textsuperscript{20}

The two chiefs were answered in November, 1882, by an invitation to visit Honolulu at Hawaii's expense to attend the special coronation ceremonies of King Kalakaua in February, 1885. While they were visiting in

\textsuperscript{18} Keale to Kalakaua, 1882, with translation, AH, FO & Ex.
\textsuperscript{19} Gibson to Ke Keokea, June 19, 1882, AH, FO & Ex.; (Honolulu) \textit{Hawaiian Gazette}, Jan. 31, 1883, hereafter cited as \textit{Gazette}.
Honolulu, it was suggested, they also could discuss their request more fully.\textsuperscript{21} The chiefs never came, either because they were unable, or unwilling, to do so. The former is more probable.

Several years later on July 23, 1886, in a debate on Gibson's policies in the Legislative Assembly, an opponent of Gibson charged that the similarity of the two letters in 1882 from Butaritari and Apaiang indicated that the writers evidently had been furnished with ready-made communications, besides having extravagant views of the importance and power of Hawaii. Gibson took the floor to deny the charges claiming that the similarity was due to the use of the same interpreter.\textsuperscript{22}

In the same month, November, 1882, that the two chiefs were invited to visit Honolulu, there appeared in the Gibson newspaper-mouthpiece an editorial predicting that Hawaii would become, in effect, the political and commercial capital of the Pacific. The editorial, probably inspired by Gibson, was significant in being the first appearance in the English-language press in Honolulu of a public intimation of the "Primacy" policy.\textsuperscript{23} The June 28, 1880, resolution in the Legislative Assembly had passed unnoticed by the press. This did not occur again. The opposition press recognised immediately the full extent of what was involved, and attacked the editorial, advising that "Hawaii's true policy is to confine her attention to herself" and not become involved in a sure-to-fail "Napoleonic policy of conquest and acquisition."\textsuperscript{24}

The next step in the development of Gibson's "Primacy" policy was the

\textsuperscript{21} Drafts of Kalakaua to Mantsitei and to Tekesia II (Apaiang), Nov. 27, 1882, AH, PO & Rx.

\textsuperscript{22} Gazette, Aug. 5, 1886; P. C. Advertiser, July 24, 1886.

\textsuperscript{23} P. C. Advertiser, Nov. 14, 1882.

\textsuperscript{24} Bulletin, Nov. 16, 1882.
commissioning by Gibson on July 31, 1883, of Captain Alfred Newton Tripp as "Special Commissioner for Central and Western Polynesia."

Tripp's specific written instructions were "to promote kindly relations between His Majesty's Government and the various Chiefs of the Islands you visit." Gibson nevertheless conceived of Tripp's Mission in larger terms, for on August 23, 1883, he explained that Tripp had been appointed pursuant to the Legislative Assembly resolution of June 28, 1880, and was being sent to the Chiefs "to advise them in their national affairs." 26

In appointing Tripp, Gibson was fully cognisant of the historical precedent set by Wyllie in his appointment of St. Julian, who, Gibson apparently believed, could have accomplished much more if he had had more support. 27

One Honolulu newspaper, not a pro-government organ, saw in the Boki expedition of 1829 an even earlier antecedent for the Tripp Mission. 28

Since Tripp was going to the Gilbert Islands, his appointment by Gibson was a logical consequence of the developments of 1882. However, a more inappropriate selection could not have been made. Tripp was Captain of the labor schooner Julia. He was scheduled to depart for the Gilberts to repatriate, for the Hawaiian government's Board of Immigration, a number of Gilbertese laborers whose terms of service in Hawaii had expired. After completing this mission, Tripp was scheduled to proceed to the New Hebrides to recruit new laborers for the Julia's owner, A. Frank Cooke, and then return with them to Honolulu.

The incongruity of appointing the master of a labor schooner as an emissary charged with promoting friendly relations apparently did not bother

25. Gibson to Tripp, July 31, 1883, AH, FO A Ex.
27. P. C. Advertiser, Sept. 7, 1883.
Gibson. In reporting on the Tripp Mission to the Legislative Assembly in 1884, he stated in effect that he just took advantage of Tripp's having to go to the Gilberts for the Board of Immigration to kill two birds with one stone.

Gibson commissioned F. L. Clarke to accompany Captain Tripp as Secretary, with a second mission of collecting objects for the Hawaiian National Museum. Both Tripp and Clarke were supplied with official Hawaiian diplomatic uniforms. The Hawaiian government agreed to pay Cooke for Clarke's expenses and Tripp was instructed not to delay the Julia at any place on account of Hawaiian government business.

Tripp bore letters from Kalakaua and Gibson to the Gilbertese Chiefs of Apaiang, Butaritari, and Apamama expressing Hawaii's friendship towards them. He returned with letters from Apaiang, Butaritari and Tarawa which requested advice and assistance, and in the case of Butaritari, also protection. The most powerful of the Gilbertese chiefs, who controlled Apamama plus four other islands, asked for military assistance against Tarawa.

The Julia did not have a happy voyage for it was wrecked on Bynris Island in the Gilberts on January 10, 1884. No one was hurt, however, and

30. Kalakaua and Gibson to Chiefs of Apaiang, Butaritari and Apamama, July 31, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.
return passage was secured eventually on other ships, with Clarke returning to Honolulu on April 22, 1884, and Tripp on June 15, 1884. Tripp's conclusion, in his final official report on his mission, was that the time was ripe and the need was present in the Gilberts for Hawaii to lend its assistance in the organization of a "united nation" out of the group. Hawaii's assistance would be welcomed by the Gilbertese, he said, particularly in view of Hawaii's thirty years of missionary activity in the Gilberts. Without outside assistance, he estimated, anarchy and civil wars would decimate the people. 32

Because of the Julia's wreck, the expenses to Hawaii for the Tripp Mission were considerably more than anticipated. 33 When these expenditures and the justification for the Tripp Mission itself came under attack in a legislative debate on June 28, 1884, Gibson strongly defended the Mission. Since Hawaii was recruiting laborers from the area, he said, it was essential to maintain friendly relations there. This could be promoted best, he asserted, by a courteous response to previous letters from chiefs in the area. There was nothing more in the instructions to Captain Tripp, he said, than that he present such courteous replies from Kalakaua. 34

Criticism of the Mission was not stilled, however, and continued intermittently in the months thereafter. One such criticism, for example, termed the Mission a stupid "idea of interviewing petty chiefs of half starved islands." Its results, it said, were only a wrecked vessel and

32. Official Report of Tripp to Gibson, June 17, 1884, AH, FO & Ex.; P. C. Advertiser, April 25, 1884; April 24, 1884.
33. Gibson to Cooke, Dec. 11, 1884; Cooke to Gibson, Dec. 11, 1884; Webb to Cooke, Dec. 11, 1884, AH, FO & Ex.
34. P. C. Advertiser, June 30, 1884; Gazette, July 2, 1884.
a bundle of letters signed by "umbreeched barbarians."
No sooner had Gibson completed on July 31, 1883, the necessary ar­rangements for dispatching Captain Tripp on his mission, than Gibson be­gan a major diplomatic offensive as a further extension of his "Primacy of the Pacific" policy. At his instigation, and under his signature as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hawaiian Kingdom on August 23, 1883, issued a diplomatic "protest" to the nations of the world against pro­posals then current for the annexation of various Pacific Island groups. The protest called also for a recognition and guarantee of the inalien­able rights of these Polynesian groups to the enjoyment of opportunities for progress and self-government.

The process of the carving up of the Pacific by the major powers was being speeded up at this time. There was strong agitation by British colonials in Australia and New Zealand and by French colonials in New Caledonia for their governments to expand their territories in the Pac­ific so as to include islands still nominally independent. Gibson was concerned by this particular agitation and by its prospects for success with reference to such specific islands and island groups as New Guinea, New Hebrides, Tonga, and Samoa.

There was good cause for concern. Queensland, worried about a pos­sible German annexation of nearby New Guinea, had sought to forestall Germany by annexing it herself for Britain on April 4, 1883. Though the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, immediately repudiated this action on April 11, Australian pressure for such an annexation continued.

2. Ibid., pp. 290-291, AH.; Gibson to Carter, Aug. 28, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.
At the same time, French and Australian rivalries and opposing ambitions ran high over the New Hebrides. Samoa and Tonga were included in extensive claims for land put forward by New Zealand.3

The issuance of the Hawaiian protest was foreshadowed clearly by the appearance on August 3, 1883, of an editorial in Gibson's newspaper-mouthpiece which argued that a multi-nation guarantee of the independence of remaining unappropriated Pacific islands was the only solution to their continued independent existence since they were too weak to stand alone. Hawaii should take the initiative, it urged, for "if anyone is to interfere to prevent further aggrandisement of foreign and distant powers in the Pacific, Hawaii ought to do it."4

Gibson first proposed the idea of a diplomatic protest by Hawaii at a Cabinet Council meeting on August 9, 1883. He presented information to the Cabinet on the pressures then existing for annexations of various Pacific Islands by foreign powers, and secured authorisation to prepare such a protest, based upon the Legislative Assembly resolution of June 28, 1880, which asserted Hawaii's claim of "Primacy in the family of Polynesia States." The Cabinet's resolution of authorisation cited, as another reason for making such a diplomatic move, the appeals for advice and guidance received by Hawaii from various island chiefs.5

After completing the preparation of the protest, Gibson submitted it to the Cabinet Council on August 23, 1883, and secured the Cabinet's unanimous approval.6 Issuance of the protest, with its appeal for guarantees of the right of other Pacific islands to enjoy opportunities for

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6. Ibid., pp. 293-295, AH.
self-government, was begun then through regular diplomatic channels. No public announcement of it was made in Hawaii, probably to forestall the inevitable criticism from Gibson's opponents. The secret of the protest leaked out, however, on September 5, 1885, and appeared in one of the opposition papers with very critical comments. The government, as a result, decided to proclaim the protest publicly, which it did on September 10, 1885.

To prepare the way for this public proclamation on September 10, Gibson sought to provide strong support for it by prior editorials on September 7 and 8 in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser. The first and more significant editorial asserted that despite much absurd, critical talk about Hawaii's purposes of annexation, Hawaii did not have such a scheme of annexation. It stated that Hawaii, however, in the past, as now, had considered that because of her political advantages, "she owed certain duties to weak and ignorant neighbors who had been denied her opportunities." St. Julian's activities were cited as an example. Hawaii, therefore, could not be silent now with respect to major developments in Polynesia, it said, "and the smallness of its area and the paucity of its population will not affect in this intelligent era, the potentiality of its utterance, if that utterance represents the spirit of international justice."

By various means, both before and after publication of the protest on September 10, Gibson dispatched copies of it to all of the major
powers and to many of the minor powers. It was sent to the foreign min-
sters and/or rulers of a total of twenty-six countries. Of these twenty-
six recipients only eight bothered to respond at all. Simple acknowledg-
edgements of receipt were sent by five (Brazil, Britain, Italy, Spain and
Sweden). Denmark's reply stated that its relations with the Pacific Is-
lands were too minor for it to have an opinion on the subject. The United

10. Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Chile, China, Denmark,
Egypt, France, Germany, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Johore, Mexico,
Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United States, and Venezuela. Gibson to Min. of For.
Affairs, Count G. Kalnoky de Koros-Fataki, Austria-Hungary, Aug. 28,
1883; Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, H. Frere-Orban, Belgium, Aug.
28, 1883; Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, E. F. de la, Brazil, Sept.
22, 1883; Gibson to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Karl
Granville, Britain, Aug. 27, 1883; Gibson to Min. of For. Rel., Chile,
Sept. 22, 1883; Gibson to Pres. of Admin. of For. Affairs, Prince
Koung, China, Sept. 25, 1883; Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, Baron
C. O. de Rosenorn-Sohn, Denmark, Aug. 26, 1883; Gibson to Dr. Abbati
Pacha, Cairo, for Khedive, Egypt, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to Min. of
For. Affairs, France, Aug. 27, 1883; Gibson to Councillor of the
German Empire, Prince Von Bismark, Aug. 25, 1883; Gibson to Min. of
For. Affairs, Fernando Cruz, Guatemala, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to
Min. of For. Affairs, P. S. Manzini, Italy, Aug. 27, 1883; Gibson to
Min. of For. Affairs, Kaoru Inouye, Japan, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to
Datu Munitri for Maharajah, Johore, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to Min.
of For. Affairs, J. Morisca!i, Mexico, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to Min.
of For. Affairs, W. F. Roehnussen, Netherlands, Aug. 27, 1883; Gibson to
Min. of For. Affairs, A. de Serpa Pimental, Portugal, Aug. 28, 1883;
Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, E. Statisco, Rumania, Aug. 28, 1883;
Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, Baron de Giens, Russia, Aug. 27, 1883;
Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, M. Pirotchatenets, Serbia, [Aug. 28],
1883; Gibson to Phya Chew for King, Siam, Sept. 21, 1883; Gibson to
Min. of For. Affairs, de la Vega de Amigo, Spain, Aug. 27, 1883;
Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, Baron C. F. L. Roehschild, Sweden,
Aug. 28, 1883; Gibson to Pres. of Swiss Confederation, L. Ruchomnet,
Aug. 28, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.; H. A. F. Carter to Secretary of State,
Frederick T. Frelinghuyzen, United States, Oct. 18, 1883, Papers
Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, Transmitted
To Congress, With the Annual Message Of The President, December 4,
1883. Proceeded By A List Of Papers And Followed By An Index Of
Persons And Subjects (Washington, 1884), p. 574; Gibson to Min. of
States sent a guarded reply discussed below. The Netherlands expressed its sympathy and its hope that the protest would help Hawaii succeed in its objective.11

The United States alone of the major powers considered the Hawaiian protest seriously. Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen discussed it on October 18 and again on November 15, 1883, with Hawaii’s resident Minister at Washington, H. A. P. Carter. During the first interview, Frelinghuysen expressed his regret that the Hawaiian action had taken the form of a protest rather than simply an appeal to the powers.12 Frelinghuysen’s written reply to the protest, on December 6, 1883, was guarded. He said that the United States was always in favor of self-government but that its attitude toward distant South Pacific groups such as the Solomons and New Hebrides differed from its attitude towards those in the North Pacific. He explained that the former were allied geographically to Australia rather than to Polynesia and never had maintained a separate national life as had Hawaii and Samoa. The United States, he concluded, therefore neither would oppose nor support the suggested measure.13 Gibson was not satisfied with Frelinghuysen’s reply but instructed Carter on January 31, 1884, not to press the issue further at that time since much of the agitation for annexation appeared to him to have

11. F. de C. Soares, Brandao, Min. of For. Affairs, Brazil, to Gibson, Dec. 21, 1883; Granville, Britain, to Gibson, Nov. 27, 1883; Mancini, Italy, to Gibson, Dec. 5, 1883; Baron Hochschild, Sweden, to Gibson, Nov. 19, 1883; S. Ruiz Camer, Min. of For. Affairs, Spain, to Gibson, Nov. 2, 1883; Baron Rosenorn-Sohn, Denmark, to Gibson, Oct. 12, 1883; S. D. D. Wallichel, Min. of For. Affairs, Netherlands, to Gibson, Oct. 26, 1883, copy enclosed in Gibson to Carter, Dec. 14, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.
12. Carter to Gibson, No. 58, Oct. 22, 1883; Carter to Gibson, No. 43, Nov. 15, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.
13. Frelinghuysen to Carter, December 6, 1883, AH, FO & Ex.
subsided. Since such annexation pressures in fact still remained strong, Gibson's instructions may have been based on a belief that there was nothing to be gained by attempting to seek more positive support than from Frelinghuysen.

With respect to Britain, Hawaii got into a little hot water over the protest. Audley Coots, Hawaii's Consul at Hobart, Tasmania, had forwarded his personal information copy of the protest to the Intercolonial Convention meeting at Sydney in December, 1885. He was unauthorized to do this, and since diplomatic communications with British colonies were supposed to go through the Colonial Office at London, Gibson had to apologize formally to Britain for Hawaii. The protest had no effect on the Convention anyway, since on December 4, 1885, the Convention passed a resolution supporting the annexation of New Guinea.

From the nature of its reception, it is obvious that the Hawaiian action was of no influence whatsoever, a natural result of Hawaii's lack of real power. Indeed, in New Zealand and possibly elsewhere, Hawaii's actions, including the commissioning and dispatch of Tripp, were regarded by some observers as actually moves by the United States. It seemed difficult for them to believe that weak Hawaii, of its own initiative, would have issued a sort of "Monroe doctrine" of the Pacific while claiming for itself, by virtue of its "Primacy" in Polynesia, the right to intervene with advice, assistance, etc.

The protest all the while came under heavy attack in Hawaii, with

15. Coots to Gibson, Dec. 6, 1885; Gibson to Coots, Jan. 26, 1884; Gibson to Granville, Feb. 27, 1884, AH, FO & Ex.; Scholefield, Pacific, pp. 47, 124-125.
the opposition press there charging particularly that it had no chance of success since it could carry no weight with the major powers. Later on, as annexations occurred or especially strong pressures for annexation were reported, the failure of the protest was thrown up to the government by its critics time and again.\textsuperscript{17}

Gibson's motives in issuing the protest are not wholly clear. There could have been five possible motives: (1) the desire to pave the way for a later expansion by Hawaii of its domains, as actually was attempted in 1887; (2) the stated desire to safeguard the independence of, and promote self-government among, Pacific islanders; (3) the desire to attempt to boost Hawaii's international prestige; (4) the desire to bolster indirectly Hawaii's own independent status so as to assure its continuance; and (5) the desire to insure the retention by Hawaii of sources of labor supply. Although direct documentary evidence exists only for the second and fifth,\textsuperscript{18} it is probable that all five motives were operable in varying degrees.

Almost two years elapsed after this diplomatic protest before Gibson made another move in the development of his "Primacy" policy. Foreshadowing Hawaii's major intervention in Samoan affairs in 1887, and indicating the extent of Hawaii's interest in Samoa, Gibson in April, 1885, sought to counter a reported establishment of a German protectorate over Samoa by endeavoring to secure the support of the major powers for the right of the Samoans to govern themselves.

On November 10, 1884, a German agent had forced the Samoan King and Vice-King to sign an agreement which virtually handed over to Germany

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Gazette}: Sept. 5, 1883; Oct. 17, 1883; Jan. 21, 1885; Mar. 4, 1885; Dec. 22, 1886; etc.; \textit{Bulletin}: Sept. 7, 1883; Oct. 2, 1883; etc.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{P. C. Advertiser}, Aug. 31, 1883.
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17. Gazette: Sept. 5, 1883; Oct. 17, 1883; Jan. 21, 1885; Mar. 4, 1885;
Dec. 22, 1885; etc.; Bulletin: Sept. 7, 1883; Oct. 2, 1885; etc.
18. P. C. Advertiser, Aug. 31, 1883.
control of the Samoan government. Although this agreement was not in
effect long, reports of the initial German action had reached Hawaii in
January, 1885, and Gibson acted upon the basis of these reports. 19

What Gibson decided to do was to send through diplomatic channels
to Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, copies of pertinent
documents relative to a request in 1875 to Hawaii from Samoa for recog-
nition of its government, and Hawaii’s resultant grant of recognition.
The documents hearkened back to the short-lived government established
by Col. A. B. Steinberger in 1875 during his second visit to Samoa. On
May 19, 1875, this government had forwarded to Hawaii a copy of its new
constitution with an accompanying request for recognition. This was grant-
ed by the Hawaiian Cabinet on July 14, 1875, and Samoa then was informed
that Hawaii did so "with Sentiments of great affection and respect for the
Government and people of Samoa..." 20

As usual, prior indications that Gibson was preparing a new move ap-
peared in his newspaper multipiece. On March 5, 1885, it was stated that
Germany’s reported actions in Samoa were contrary to Hawaiian policy, and
that Hawaii was concerned about how Germany’s evident drive for colonies
in the Pacific would affect Hawaii. 21

Gibson secured Cabinet Council authorization on March 30, 1885, to
send to Germany, Britain, and the United States letters regarding Samoa.

19. Sylvia Masterman, The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa,
1848-1884 (London, 1936), pp. 157, 158, hereafter cited as Masterman,
Samoan P. C. Advertiser, Feb. 18, 1885.
20. Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, Netherlands, April 1, 1885, with en-
closures, all copies: (1) Talnua of Samoa to Kalakaue, May 19, 1875,
with enclosure; (2) extract from "Cabinet Council Minute Book, 1874
to 1894", for July 14, 1875; and (3) Kalakaue and Green to Talnua of
Samoan, July 16, 1875, AR, PO & Rx.; Brookes, International Rivalry,
p. 239.
21. P. C. Advertiser, Mar. 6, 1885.
with the 1875 enclosures, all of which he had prepared during March.

The letters of transmittal emphasised two points: (1) Samoan competence for self-government and the fact that, therefore, Samoa should be afforded the opportunity to achieve such self-government; and (2) Hawaii’s interest in aiding other Polynesian islands to achieve the latter objective. 22 Later, in April, Gibson also sent similar correspondence to France and the Netherlands, the correspondence to the latter being motivated directly by the sympathetic Dutch response to Hawaii’s protest of August 23, 1883. 23

No attention at all was paid to Hawaii’s diplomatic move by any of the five nations approached by Hawaii. Only Great Britain and the Netherlands bothered even to send replies acknowledging receipt of the Samoan correspondence. With respect to the United States, H. A. P. Carter, Hawaii’s resident Minister at Washington, reported in mid-April after an interview with the new Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard, that the latter seemed to regard the Samoan matter as one solely between Great Britain and Germany, and felt that there was no danger to Hawaiian independence because the strong United States’ stand in its favor was well known. 24 Actually, Carter’s report on Bayard’s attitude towards Samoa was erroneous, for shortly after Bayard had assumed office in March,

22. Gibson to Von Batsfeld, Min. of For. Affairs, Germany, with enclosures, Mar. 14, 1885; Gibson to Secretary of State Bayard, United States, with enclosures, Mar. 26, 1885; Gibson to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Granville, Great Britain, with enclosures, Mar. 28, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.; “Cabinet Council Minute Book, 1874 to 1891,” p. 320, AH.

23. Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, Netherlands, with enclosures, Apr. 1, 1885; Gibson to Min. of For. Affairs, France, with enclosures, Apr. 14, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.

24. Granville to Gibson, May 9, 1885; Min. of For. Affairs, Netherlands, to Gibson, No. 4420, May 10, 1885; Carter to Gibson, No. 106, Apr. 19, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
1886, he is known to have written to the American Consul at Apia explicitly opposing German annexation of Samoa.25

The entire incident served largely to indicate the particular emphasis Gibson's future policies would lay upon Samoa. Shortly following it, in June, 1886, Joseph Webb, Secretary of the Hawaiian Foreign Office under Gibson, in the course of some routine correspondence with the German Consul General at Apia, Samoa, suggested that Gibson and the Hawaiian Government

...would be glad if Samoa would at this juncture seek the advice and accept the mediation of Hawaii ... The interference of Hawaii in this regard can awaken no jealousies elsewhere and might be very useful in promoting internal peace in Samoa as well as in obtaining the recognition of her independence by the European and American Governments. Hawaii cannot but be recognized as the natural ally of Samoa, and the results of the recognition of Hawaiian independence the best argument, in favor of that of Samoa.26

This is significant as the first explicit expression of the basis for Hawaii's later actual intervention in Samoa in 1887, along these lines, with the dispatch to Samoa of John Edward Bush as Hawaii's Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Samoa.

CHAPTER IX

THE CARTER MISSION OF 1885, ITS SEQUEL, AND THE 1886 ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THE NORTHWESTERN CHAIN OF ISLANDS

Because of his repeated failures to achieve any significant results in support of the "Primacy" policy by means of diplomatic correspondence alone, Gibson next decided to resort to personal diplomacy. With the apparently strong backing of King Kalakaua, a firm decision was reached in October, 1886, to send a diplomatic emissary to Europe. Gibson's aim was threefold: (1) to endeavor to halt the further partitioning of the Pacific Ocean area by the major powers; (2) to safeguard thereby Hawaii's own continued independence which was causing Gibson some concern as a result of recent annexations in the Pacific; and (3) to pave the way for, in effect, an Hawaiian-controlled Polynesian Confederation such as Wyllie and St. Julian long previously had advocated. ¹

From about March, 1886, Gibson had been of the opinion that a conference of the major world powers to discuss the Pacific islands was in the offing. His idea in October, when he ordered the departure for Europe of the emissary, was that the latter would be able to influence the participants of the expected Conference with respect to his policy objectives.² As often, the first indication of Gibson's ideas and plans appeared in March, 1886, in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser. If the major powers hold such a Conference, it editorialised, Hawaii, which is "the natural head and leader of all the Pacific States," by virtue of its recognised independence and its advanced state of civilisation, should be represented at the conference. It urged renewed overtures to the powers.

¹ Gibson to Carter, No. 16, Oct. 14, 1886; Gibson to Carter, No. 17, Oct. 16, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
² Gibson to Carter, No. 16, Oct. 14, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
so as to secure their approval for the administration of "unappropriated Polynesia" by the Hawaiian Government.  

On October 16, 1886, H. A. P. Carter, Hawaii’s resident Minister to the United States, was commissioned as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands, and instructed to depart for Europe as soon as possible.  

His instructions had been sent the preceding day. They called for him to endeavor to achieve Gibson’s objectives of halting further Pacific annexations, bolstering thereby Hawaii’s independence, and of paving the way for a Polynesian Confederation. With respect to the last, Gibson wrote Carter:

The main purpose of Your Excellency’s mission will be to make what I may term a political reconnaissance, to ascertain whether Hawaii may not be recognized as eligible to take a leading part in a more complete political organisation of Central Polynesia, by which the several Islands and Groups inhabited by the intelligent races known collectively as Eastern Polynesians which yet retain their independence may be united so far as their relations to foreign countries are concerned, and may have their present autonomy confirmed and strengthened.  

In supplementary instructions a few days later, on October 24, Gibson told Carter that if Carter deemed it advisable, he himself should suggest a conference on the Pacific question, if such a proposal was not otherwise forthcoming.

Upon receipt of his orders and instructions, Carter immediately inquired by telegraph of the Hawaiian charge d’affaires at London as to whether a conference regarding the Pacific actually was being planned.

3. P. C. Advertiser, Mar. 17, 1886.
4. Gibson to Carter, No. 17, with enclosures, Oct. 16, 1886; Gibson to Carter, No. 18, with enclosures, Oct. 24, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
After receiving a negative response on November 2, he delayed his departure for a few days to secure, if possible, the backing of the United States for his mission. He chose to ignore Gibson's implied plan of an Hawaiian-controll-
ed Polynesian Confederation. Thus, when he wrote Gibson requesting some definite information as to the extent of the advice and assistance Hawaii would give the Pacific islands, he stated that he assumed "that our only object is to assist these peoples to maintain their independence and therefore that our objects are wholly disinterested." He suggested that a practical means of assistance by Hawaii would be to appoint and dispatch a Commissioner to help organise governments among the island groups, and then to seek foreign recognition for such governments. Although he would obey his instructions, he stated, he did not think his mission was too wise but believed rather that "our wishes could be better attained by the advocacy of others than by putting ourselves forward in the matter."  

Gibson's reply to Carter's request for definite information as to Hawaii's plans for advising and assisting Pacific islanders did not arrive until Carter had completed his mission. His answer was illuminating, however, with respect to his original intentions. Definite plans, he said, could not be formulated by Hawaii until it knew the reaction of the powers to Hawaii's more general proposals. The Hawaiian government, was prepared to ask the Hawaiian Legislative Assembly for an appropriation for a Commissioner to visit the various islands to aid them in organising governments. Hawaii would seek also to secure foreign recognition for these governments and would establish consular agencies with special instructions to advise and assist those governments in every
possible way. In doing all this, he asserted, Hawaii would not be seeking either acquisition of territory or extension of its power. However, he said:

Should anything in the way of Federation in regard to their foreign relations be deemed desirable and be found to be feasible by the independent communities of Polynesia, the Hegemony of such union would naturally fall to Hawaii and her present organization of representation abroad might be usefully adopted for that of the Confederacy. Some such arrangement as this has necessarily presented itself to my mind in considering the future of the people whose independence His Majesty is seeking to secure. But the first and immediate object is to secure for them immunity from foreign domination.

Returning to Carter, his first important step after receiving his instructions and then ascertaining that a Pacific conference was not going to be held, was to call on United States Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard. In presenting the Hawaiian program to him, Carter sought to use a very moderate approach, explaining later to Gibson that he did so because the strong American attitude against foreign involvements or commitments of any sort extended to a desire to some extent that Hawaii similarly should not become involved. Hawaii, he told Bayard, was seeking merely to supplement the efforts of American and Hawaiian missionaries in the Pacific islands. He placed great emphasis on the extent of this missionary activity. He urged that the United States join Hawaii in suggesting to other powers (1) that Hawaii's past efforts on behalf of the Pacific islanders should be acknowledged, and (2) "that Hawaii should be encouraged to take a leading part in aiding the people of these islands to group themselves into political communities and establish forms of government in accordance with civilized

9. Gibson to Carter, Jan. 12, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
After conferring with Bayard, and while awaiting a written reply as to the latter's position, Carter informed the necessary diplomatic representatives at Washington of his mission in order for them to prepare their governments for his arrival. He decided not to visit Madrid because of lack of time. His communications were similar to his talks and correspondence with Bayard, emphasizing Hawaii's desire, as "the leading Polynesian power," to establish governments in certain Polynesian islands and to secure guarantees against their seizure or attack by any foreign power. In accordance with the confidential advice of one of the United States Assistant Secretaries of State, while stating firmly Hawaii's position as the leading Polynesian state, he did not refer in any way to anxiety as to Hawaiian rights or independence.

Bayard meanwhile conferred with the British Minister on Carter's mission before replying on November 11, 1885, in a significant statement of United States policy towards the Pacific. He informed Carter on November 11 that there was no general understanding among the Powers with reference to the Pacific. There was a partial understanding with reference to Samoa and therefore he did not expect Germany to annex

10. Ibid.; Carter to Gibson, No. 9, with enclosures, Nov. 10, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
Carter's reference to Hawaiian-supported missionary activity among Pacific islanders was based upon the efforts in Micronesia (including the Gilberts), and the Marquesas of missionaries of the Hawaiian Missionary Society (1851-1863) and the Board of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association (from 1863). — Gibson to Carter, No. 19, Dec. 16, 1885, with enclosure; A. O. Forbes, Corresponding Secretary, Board of Hawaiian Evangelical Association, to Gibson, Dec. 9, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.

11. Carter to Gibson, No. 5, Nov. 7, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.; Carter to Gibson, No. 6, Confid. Nov. 7, 1885; Carter to Gibson, No. 7, with enclosures, Nov. 7, 1885; Carter to Gibson, No. 9, Nov. 10, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.

12. Carter to Gibson, No. 9, Nov. 10, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
Samoa. He would hesitate to propose a general understanding for the
Pacific without some prior assurance from Germany and Great Britain that
it would receive serious consideration. He would witness "with pleasure
any initiative and participation of Hawaii" in attempting to achieve a
general guarantee of the autonomy and neutrality of unappropriated is-
land groups.

It would be most fitting that Hawaii should join in such an arrangement, if it be practicable....
We desire no domination in the Pacific for ourselves nor can we be expected to sanction, a doctrine whereby any one among the Powers equally interested in trade and in-
tercourse with these regions, might roam at will over the Pacific seas and absorb the jurisdiction of Islands, be-
cause unprotected or unadministered, thence to announce to other nations, whose rights are at least coequal, the terms
on which such islands may be visited or traded with.13

Carter was very pleased with Bayard's response although he report-
ed strong doubts in the State Department, regarding the practicability
of Hawaii's efforts. He sailed for London on November 14, arriving
there on November 23.14

Carter had met with a favorable response from the United States
because Bayard was an anti-imperialist. Such was not the case with
reference to the European powers. An Anglo-German partition agreement
regarding New Guinea had been reached on April 25, 1885. An advance
inkling in March, 1886, of an intention by Spain to occupy the Caroline
Islands with military forces had resulted in a German counter-claim to
those islands in August. Both nations, however, had agreed to papal
arbitration, and by a decision of the Pope on October 22, 1885, Spain
had been assigned the Caroline Islands, with Germany granted the right
to maintain a coaling and naval station some place in those islands.

13. Bayard to Carter, Confid. Nov. 11, 1885, copy enclosed in Carter
to Gibson, No. 10, Nov. 15, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
14. Carter to Gibson, No. 10, Nov. 13, 1885; Carter to Gibson, Nov.
24, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
A German-Spanish protocol based on the papal decision was signed on December 17, 1886, while Carter was still in Europe. Meanwhile, Germany on October 15, 1886, had taken possession of the Marshall Islands and the Brown and Providence groups. There were also strong conflicting German and New Zealand pressures against Samoa and other conflicting Australian and French pressures against the New Hebrides.

After Carter had arrived in London on November 23, he had only brief, preliminary conversations there with the British Foreign Office, before proceeding to Berlin, where he arrived on November 29. He obtained an interview with Count Herbert Bismarck, Germany's Foreign Minister, on December 2; Bismarck, he reported, was cordial and frank but uncooperative. Bismarck told him that Hawaii's proposal was too late to affect Germany's actions, although if the proposal had been received as early as June or July, when the annexation orders were sent to the Pacific, Germany might have been able to consider the proposal. When Carter suggested that Germany restore to the Marshall Islands their former independence, Bismarck told him that it was impossible, although he said that of course it still was up to the Emperor to approve finally the annexation.

With respect to the Carolines, Bismarck could say nothing except that the exact extent of Spanish claims was not yet clear. When Carter inquired about the Gilberts where Hawaiian missionary activity had been

16. Carter to Gibson, Nov. 24, 1885, All, FO & Ex.
greatest, he first learned that an Anglo-German agreement delimiting their respective spheres of influence in the Pacific was under negotia-
tion. Bismarck said that Germany henceforth would not be concerned with islands not in the German sphere of influence, whenever final agreement was reached with Great Britain.\(^\text{17}\)

As a result of this interview, Carter believed that his only hope of achieving anything lay primarily in endeavoring to seek British influence to induce a change in German policy and, secondly, in visiting France and the Netherlands to seek their good offices towards this same end. He, therefore, on December 4 sent to Sir Julian Paunceforte, British Undersecretary of State, a full report on his interview with Bismarck and suggested in particular that Britain first suggest to Germany that it restore the independence of the Marshalls.\(^\text{18}\)

Carter then left Berlin during the evening of December 7; he arrived at The Hague the next day and had an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs there on December 9. The latter expressed his government's sympathy with the object of Carter's mission and, while pointing out that the Dutch had little influence to exert in the matter, said that they would use that influence for Hawaii if the occasion for its use ever should arise.

\(^{17}\) Carter to Gibson, No. 12, Confid. Dec. 4, 1885, AH, FO & Ex. The Anglo-German negotiations continued until April, 1886, when final agreement on delimitation of spheres of influence was reached. Great Britain's decision to enter into such negotiations in 1885 was due to its desire to maintain friendly relations with Germany because of British fears of Russian intentions against India. The Russians on March 30, 1885, had defeated an Afghan force at Panjedh on the Afghan frontier, thereby raising British fears for India. — Tansill, Bayard, p. 21; Masterman, Samoa, p. 190.

\(^{18}\) Carter to Gibson, No. 15, with enclosures, Dec. 7, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
Carter next went to Paris; he arrived there on December 11, and obtained an interview with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on December 16. While in Paris awaiting this interview, Carter received Pauncefote's reply to his suggestion for British action regarding Germany and the Marshall Islands. Lord Salisbury, Pauncefote wrote, regrets "that he can see no possibility of compliance with your request, as Her Majesty's Government are unable to interfere in regard to Islands, which, in accordance with negotiations between them and the Government of the Emperor are recognised to be within the limits of German influence." As a result of Pauncefote's letter, the French Foreign Minister had little to say, regarding the situation as a fait accompli. 19

From Paris, Carter proceeded to London again, where on December 23, he met Pauncefote who queried him as to Hawaii's ideas regarding means of aiding and assisting Pacific islanders. Carter said he presumed a Commission would be sent to the various islands by Hawaii. Pauncefote then took Carter to the Colonial Office where he met Sir R. Herbert, Under Secretary of State for Colonies, who regretted that Hawaii had not made its proposal earlier when it might have been accepted. Herbert showed Carter a proposed Anglo-German line of demarcation in the Pacific. Both Herbert and Pauncefote assured Carter, the latter reported, that "it was not the desire of Great Britain to claim any exclusive rights over the groups left out of the German line." They both thought, without speaking authoritatively, Carter said, "that Her Majesty's Government would gladly welcome the aid of Hawaii in helping the people form themselves into political communities quite

independent of foreign control." Upon the basis of his interview, Carter estimated that Britain would make no decisive reply to Hawaii's proposal until the Anglo-German negotiations were concluded. He therefore requested Paumecofote to communicate the British reply to him in Washington, to which he then returned, arriving there early in January, 1886.20

In Washington, Carter found delayed instructions from Gibson ordering him to visit the Pope while in Europe. In replying, Carter informed him that these instructions had arrived after he had left, but said that even if he had been able to visit Rome, it obviously would have been too late for him to have accomplished anything. Carter told Gibson that he believed that as a whole the mission and its motives had added to Hawaii's international prestige despite its lack of success.21

His estimate of the situation was that as a result of the partitioning of the Pacific into spheres of influence, neither Germany nor Great Britain would make any sort of commitments involving islands outside their spheres. Within their respective spheres, he expected them to act as they saw fit. Thus, although Britain "of its own choice" might permit Hawaii to cooperate in some islands, such as the Gilberts, Hawaii's cooperation would be, for all practical effect, under British protection, and "other powers... would look to Great Britain in all matters where their interests are involved in that group ...."22

In March, 1886, the British reply to Hawaii's proposal, as broached by Carter in London the previous December, finally was sent to him.

21. Carter to Gibson, No. 20, Jan. 16, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
22. Carter to Gibson, No. 27, Feb. 24, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
A new Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Roseberry, was in office and informed Carter, through Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the British Minister to the United States, that Great Britain would not be opposed to a scheme whereby the independence of the Marshalls, Gilberts and part of the Carolines, "should be secured by a self denying agreement among the Powers in order to afford their inhabitants the opportunity of forming settled governments with the assistance and advice of Hawaii." Such an agreement would have to provide also for freedom of commerce and equality of treatment and would have to be in other respects of such a nature "as to offer a fair prospect of stability and success." This favorable-appearing British reply helped influence Gibson's formulation of new plans in 1886.

Meanwhile, once Carter's mission had become generally known in Hawaii in December, 1885, it had become the subject of sharp criticism. The opposition press considered any attempt by weak Hawaii to influence the major Powers, futile and a waste of money. The scheme was regarded basically as an attempt by Gibson to create a Polynesian Empire, humorously called the "Empire of the Calabash." James Wodehouse, the strongly anti-Gibson British consul general at Honolulu, reported to the British Foreign Office in December, 1885, that he could observe no Hawaiian popular support for, or concern about, the Carter Mission.  

25. Sackville-West to Carter, March 16, 1886, copy, enclosed in Carter to Gibson, No. 37, Mar. 20, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
   A "calabash relation" to the Hawaiians meant a non-blood relation. Since Gibson's arguments for his "Primacy" policy were based upon Hawaii's rights and obligations as the leading Polynesian nation among the various Polynesian peoples in the Pacific, critics called attention to this emphasis upon Polynesian relationships in labelling his scheme the "Empire of the Calabash."
Gibson's later defense of the Mission was that it had been a
good move by Hawaii but had been made too late to be of great effectiveness.26 It is doubtful, however, given the imperialistic forces and
pressures existing in the Pacific during the 1880's that Gibson could
have been successful at any time in securing a cessation of annexations
by the major powers. The latter, furthermore, would never have allowed
an attempt by Hawaii to establish its own Empire. This was proven
clearly in 1887 by the strong opposition of the powers to Hawaii's
moves in Samoa.

After Carter's return from his Mission, Gibson, in February, 1886,
displaying a remarkable capacity for ignoring the Mission's lack of re­
sults, decided to present the same proposals again to the same powers
by means of diplomatic correspondence. His first plan in January, 1886,
was to do this by means of a circular letter sent to a large number of
nations with accompanying letters of transmission, much in the same man­
er as Hawaii's diplomatic protest of 1883.27 He changed his mind,
however, and on February 12, 1886, sent to H. A. P. Carter at Washing­
ton instructions to communicate Hawaii's proposal to the governments of
the United States, Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Spain, and
Germany.28

Since American and European statesmen had approved of Carter's pre­
vious mission, Gibson said, Hawaii again asked all the Powers interested
in the Pacific to abstain from further annexations "until a fair
time has been given the experiment which the Government of this country
desires to make." This experiment, he continued, would be the dispatch
of an Hawaiian Commissioner to Polynesia and the placement of consuls

27. Draft of Circular Letter to the Ministers of State of Treaty Powers,
Jan. 16, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
or other agents on various islands, all with the aim of promoting self-
government. Should the replies to this appeal be favorable, he stated,
Hawaii "will then hope that the consenting Powers will join in a gener-
al Convention, guaranteeing the independence of all island communities
in which, within a reasonable time such governments as may properly be
recognized may be established." He reiterated that Hawaii had no mater-
rial aims but, citing the "Primacy" theory again, "entered upon the matter
from a sense of the duty owed by the most privileged section of the
Polynesian Race to kindred people not yet so happily placed as are the
Hawaiians..."  

Carter's reaction to these instructions was one of assessment. In
view of the reception to his proposals in December, no favorable re-
sponse logically could be expected now, he replied to Gibson. Rather
then ask for such assurances, Carter suggested that Hawaii negotiate
bilaterally "with each power regarding the groups or islands in which
they are to be paramount, if we want to interfere at all under present
circumstances."  

While awaiting further instructions from Gibson, based on his reply
to the latter, Carter decided to sound out United States Secretary of
State Thomas F. Bayard to see whether Bayard agreed with him, or not,
regarding Gibson's instructions. He therefore informed Bayard of them
and reported later to Gibson that both Bayard and A. A. Adee, the Second
Assistant Secretary of State, agreed with him as to the probable nega-
tive reception by the European Powers to the Hawaiian proposals and
thought that they might even cause some irritation. Carter reported

29. Gibson to Carter, No. 5, Feb. 15, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
30. Carter to Gibson, No. 29, March 4, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
also "a disposition to doubt the expediency of the assumption by Hawaii of the hegemony of groups" lying far away and with which Hawaii had had negligible relationships, particularly in view of Hawaii's lack of naval facilities.31

At this juncture, in March, 1886, the British reply to Hawaii's original proposal, as broached by Carter in London the preceding December, suddenly and unexpectedly was received by Carter. As already seen,52 the reply was generally favorable in tone, though it applied only to the Marshalls, Gilberts and part of the Carolines. It is rather puzzling that the British at this time should have supported a self-denying agreement among the Powers, with permission also to be granted in it to Hawaii to assist those island groups towards self-government.

It is puzzling because the very next month, April, 1886, saw the lengthy Anglo-German negotiations come to an end in the signing of an Anglo-German Delimitation Agreement which divided the Pacific into spheres of influence. Certain groups such as Samoa and Tonga were declared neutral territory by this agreement, but not the groups involved in the British reply to Hawaii in March.53 Whether or not the reply, therefore, had ulterior motives in a British pressure play against Germany, while the Anglo-German negotiations were still in progress, is not known.

After receiving the British reply, Carter spoke on March 23 to Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the British Minister to the United States, regarding Gibson's instructions of February 15. Sackville-West thought the transmission of Hawaii's proposal again might lead to a clearer

31. Carter to Gibson, No. 52, with enclosures, March 17, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
32. See above, p. 88.
33. Watson, Samoa, p. 68; Masterman, Samoa, p. 190.
and more desirable definition of the claims of the several governments in the South Pacific. Carter therefore thought that the British might reply favorably to the new proposal, which included more area than the previous British reply had covered, and that the replies of other governments thereby might also be influenced favorably. As a result of this interview, Carter the next day sent copies of Gibson's dispatch of February 13 to the Ministers at Washington of Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, and Italy.\(^{34}\)

Only Great Britain and the Netherlands sent replies, both of which were largely noncommittal. The Dutch Foreign Minister over seven months later in November, 1886, responded that he would favor a convention guaranteeing freedom of commerce in the Pacific but that he could express no definite opinion on the remainder of Gibson's proposal so long as he did not have the details of the proposed agreement.\(^{35}\) The British reply in July, 1886, stated similarly that more details were required before a definite opinion could be expressed.\(^{36}\)

The net concrete result of the entire action in 1886 by Hawaii thus was nothing. It served, however, to illustrate clearly that Gibson was determined to implement his "Primacy" policy regardless of the reaction of the Powers. For Gibson, while not yet the recipient of the initial British reply in March, 1886, and of the report by Carter on his subsequent interview with Sackville-West, had decided, on the basis of Carter's previous reports and estimates, to countermand his February 13

\(^{34}\) Carter to Gibson, No. 38, Conf., with enclosures, Mar. 24, 1886, Ai, FO & Ex.

\(^{35}\) Min. of For. Affairs, de Karnebeck, to Netherlands Min. to the U.S., de Weckherlin, Nov. 4, 1886, copy enclosed in Carter to Gibson, No. 64, Nov. 24, 1886, Ai, FO & Ex.

\(^{36}\) Charles Hardinge, the British Chargé d'Affaires, Washington, to Carter, July 20, 1886, copy, Ai, FO & Ex.
instructions. He had sent Carter new instructions on March 27, 1886, not to seek non-annexation assurances from any of the powers, but simply to thank them for any sympathy expressed for Hawaii's desires to assist Pacific islanders, and to intimate that Hawaii would go ahead anyway and send an advisory Commission to Polynesian groups still independent of foreign control. 37

Following all this diplomatic activity by Hawaii in February and March, 1886, the greater part by far of Gibson's efforts on behalf of his "Primacy" policy during the remainder of that year was concerned with preparations for the Samoan Mission of 1887. Nevertheless, a minor effort was made, also as part of the general "Primacy" policy, to consolidate Hawaiian control over the chain of islands extending northwest from the main Hawaiian group as far as Midway and Ocean (Kure) Islands.

The first step was the annexation by Hawaii of Ocean Island on September 20, 1886, in circumstances which caused a great deal of discomfiture to James Wodehouse, the British consul general at Honolulu. On September 13, 1886, news was received at Honolulu of the shipwreck the preceding July 15 on Ocean Island of the British ship Dunnottar Castle. Wodehouse immediately chartered a steamer, the Waialae, at British expense, to rescue the shipwrecked crew. Meanwhile, before this steamer was ready to sail, the Hawaiian cabinet, meeting at 7:30 a.m. the following day, September 14, and acting independently, authorized its Minister of the Interior to charter and dispatch a vessel to rescue the crew of the Dunnottar Castle. In addition, it secretly authorized the appointment of a commissioner to accompany the expedition so as to annex Ocean Island for Hawaii.

When it then learned that Wodehouse already had chartered a rescue

37. Gibson to Carter, Mar. 27, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
vessel, the Hawaiian government arranged with Wodehouse for the transport on this vessel of material which it then purchased for the erection of a shelter and water tanks on the island. It was hoped that they would benefit any future shipwrecked parties. Nothing was said about an intention to annex the island. Colonel James H. Boyd, secretly named by Hawaii as its Special Commissioner to Ocean Island, made the journey on the Waialae, ostensibly in connection with Hawaii's material assistance. On September 20 he took possession of the island for Hawaii, claiming that research by the Hawaiian Board of Genealogy, first appointed by King Kalakaua in 1882, had disclosed that the Hawaiian Islands formerly extended very far north and had included Ocean Island. 36

The annexation action resulted in immediate criticism by the opposition press in Hawaii on grounds of (1) the ridiculousness of the alleged findings of the Board of Genealogy, (2) the surreptitious method of acquisition, and (3) the lack of value of the island. 39 Probably another basic reason for this criticism, as indeed for press criticism from 1882 to 1887 of all phases of the "Primacy" policy, was the great opposition to Gibson by the business interests and by the foreign (white) community.

Undeterred, the Gibson regime decided to claim for Hawaii at one swoop all of the islands and reefs between Ocean Island and the main Hawaiian group, including Midway. Some of these islands, Nihoa, Lisiansky, and Laysan, already belonged to Hawaii by virtue of the claims for Hawaii

in 1867 of Captain John Paty. Others did not belong either to Hawaii or to anyone else, while Midway had been annexed by the United States.

On November 10, 1886, Gibson instructed Carter to make an official announcement to the Government of the United States that formal possession has been taken of Ocean Island in the name of the King and that His Majesty lays claim to the sovereignty of all the islands and islets which form the chain extending from Nihoa to Ocean Islands except Midway Island, and that, in regard to the latter, information is desired as to the claim, if any, which the United States may have to its possession in right of a former occupation for naval purposes and as to whether the U. S. Government would be willing to relinquish any such claim in His Majesty’s favor.40

Carter incorporated these instructions in a note to Secretary of State Bayard on January 10, 1887. As grounds for the Hawaiian request he stated that because of the growing maritime commerce in the area, Hawaii intended to place relief stations upon various islands in the chain, as had been done already at Ocean Island, and “to have them visited occasionally in the interests of humanity, commerce, and for scientific observations.” In view of this, Carter suggested that unless the United States had some reason for claiming Midway Island as a possession, it, along with the rest of the chain, would best be under Hawaiian sovereignty.41

The American attitude towards this proposal was made clear by Bayard, during an interview with Carter on April 29, 1887. Carter reported that Bayard told him, with reference to Midway, that

if the United States were sure of the permanence of present [Hawaii-United States] relations ... there might be a transfer of that island, though the naval authorities of the U. S. States regarded it as an important post being a thousand miles nearer Asia than Honolulu.42

40. Gibson to Carter, No. 29, Dec. 21, 1886, All, FO & Ex.
41. Carter to Bayard, Jan. 10, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
Gibson, however, was ousted from office two months later and there was no further pressure from Hawaii. Midway continued to remain an American possession.
CHAPTER X
PREPARATIONS FOR THE SAMOAN MISSION

The effort in the latter part of 1886 to consolidate Hawaiian control over the northwestern islands in the Hawaiian archipelago was, as has been seen, a minor one. From the time the 1886 legislative session opened on April 30, however, Gibson's major efforts on behalf of his "Primacy" policy were exerted in preparation for the Samoan Mission of 1887. By this time Gibson was being encouraged vigorously by Kalakaua who had dreams of heading a Pacific empire of native peoples. Gibson did what he could to fan Kalakaua's enthusiasm. Thus, in a speech in honor of the King in November, 1886, Gibson lauded Kalakaua, saying that "our King has inspired a great hope abroad, as well as at home, ... that he, King Kalakaua, was the appointed man - the man of the Pacific, to lead Hawaii onward to a higher destiny; to become a successful, beneficent and respected power."1

Gibson led the drive during the legislative session of 1886 to secure the appropriations necessary to carry out his plans. The delayed British reply in March, 1886, to Carter's proposals in London the preceding December, 1885, had encouraged him greatly because of its generally favorable tone. His newspaper mouthpiece in April said that the United States and Great Britain were in accord in supporting Hawaii's Pacific policy. "Never before in the history of diplomacy perhaps," it rhapsodized, "has there been such a frank and generous recognition of the principle of race autonomy; never has there been so generous a response to the appeals of right and justice..." Gibson as usual chose to believe what he wanted to

believe and then to act accordingly.  

Gibson informed the Legislative Assembly in April, 1886, that it was proposed (1) to send a Commissioner to Samoa and the Gilberts to assist in the organization of recognized governments there; (2) to establish Hawaiian consulates in the Marshalls and Eastern Carolines; and (3) to maintain a resident Minister Plenipotentiary in Europe, in part in connection with Hawaii's Pacific policies. The Gilberts, Marshalls, and Carolines were included in his plans, Gibson said, because of previous Hawaiian missionary activity there. Samoa, which is where the Mission began in 1887, and which was as far as it ever reached, probably was included because it was outside of the British or German spheres of influence and seemed therefore a fairly safe area in which Hawaii could operate. Reports had been received in Hawaii of internal dissension among the chiefs and people and Gibson thought that advice from racially related Hawaii would be heeded.

The specific inclusion of Samoa in Gibson's outline of his program to the Legislative Assembly in April, 1886, was not a sudden decision. As far back as June, 1885, a mission to Samoa had been under consideration. In December, 1885, Gibson and Kalakaua considered the dispatch of a Commissioner to Samoa in January, 1886, and so informed Carter. The latter warned Gibson correctly that Hawaiian intervention in Samoan affairs would not be welcome to the Powers. Undeterred, Gibson proceeded with his plans although the dispatch of the Commissioner was postponed

4. Gibson to Carter, No. 18, Dec. 16, 1885, AH, FO & Ex.
5. See above, pp. 77.
7. Carter to Gibson, No. 24, Feb. 4, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
temporarily for other reasons. In March, 1886, Gibson sent word to King Malietoa of Samoa that an Hawaiian Commissioner would visit him that summer. The Commissioner actually did not come until January, 1887.

In June, 1886, before definitive action had been taken by the Legislative Assembly, Gibson instructed Carter to inform the United States, Great Britain and Germany of Hawaii's intention to dispatch a Commissioner to Samoa to conciliate internal differences there. The "moral countenance and support" of those three Powers was to be requested. Carter transmitted the information and request to the British and German Ministers at Washington and conferred with James D. Porter, First Assistant Secretary of State for the United States. He reported that Porter said that if an Hawaiian Commissioner was sent to Samoa, he hoped that the latter would be successful in harmonising the native factions without incurring foreign displeasure. No reply was received from Great Britain or Germany.

Before and after Gibson's requested appropriations were acted upon and finally approved by the Gibson-controlled Legislative Assembly, they were attacked bitterly by some of the legislators and by the opposition press. Thirty thousand dollars had been requested for support of foreign missions, including particularly the proposed mission to Samoa and other South Pacific islands. Gibson defended this request in legislative debate on the grounds of Hawaiian "Primacy," i.e., on the grounds of Hawaii's rights and duties as the leading Polynesian state. In addition, in a deliberate falsehood, he transformed Carter's report on James D. Porter's opinion into a letter from the Secretary of State of the United States to

8. Gibson to Prime Minister, Samoan Majesty, Mar. 20, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
9. Gibson to Carter, No. 11, June 6, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
10. Carter to Gibson, No. 31, June 22, 1886, reo'd July 9, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
the effect that it was right and proper for Hawaii to take action in Samoa and send a representative there. \(^{11}\)

The appropriation was attacked particularly on the grounds that it was a needless and useless expense. During a lengthy and vigorous debate in the legislature it was charged that Gibson's foreign policy was "a policy of sentiment, show and nonsense." It was asserted that "it was a ridiculous farce for this one-horse Kingdom to maintain Consular Offices in all parts of the world ... There is no possible benefit from it. What was wanted is a strong government—a government that pays its debts and keeps peace within its borders."

On the contrary, Gibson said, his policy was succeeding in increasing Hawaiian influence and prestige abroad. Then, waxing eloquent, he asked,

What was Prussia but a one-horse State a few years ago, and others that can be mentioned? What was Rome but a one-horse State at its beginning? ... What are we in the midst of the broad Pacific that great nations should send their captains and officers to do honor to us... The Great Powers never think of us as a one-horse State.

Following this debate, the appropriation passed by a vote of 24 to 12 on July 23. \(^{12}\) On September 27, the Legislative Assembly added $5,000 to this appropriation for a new total of $35,000. \(^{13}\)

By this time the legislative steamroller of the Gibson machine was functioning smoothly. So when on October 1, Gibson introduced bills appropriating $100,000 for the purchase of an Hawaiian government steam vessel and an additional $50,000 for its running expenses, despite criticism of the requests as needless extravagance, the bills were approved.

\(^{11}\) F. C. Advertiser, July 22, 1886; Bulletin, July 22, 1886.
\(^{12}\) F. C. Advertiser, July 24, 1886.
\(^{13}\) Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 1886, pp. 350-351, AH.
rapidly that same day by votes of 22 to 10 and 21 to 12, respectively. In justifying these bills, Gibson told the legislators that the vessel would be useful in sending a Commissioner to Samoa, in stopping smuggling and in sea rescues. 14

As a further support for future implementation of his policy, Gibson had the Legislative Assembly appropriate funds for a King's Guard and for a military staff. The Military and Navy Department was revived and Gibson became, in addition to being Minister of Foreign Affairs, also Secretary of War and of the Navy. 16

Before the Legislative Assembly even had finished taking action on all of Gibson's program, Gibson had made his first concrete move in connection with the dispatch of a Mission to Samoa. On September 4 he commissioned as Hawaii's Vice-Consul at Samoa, Berthold Greenebaum, who was passing that day through Honolulu on his way to Samoa aboard the Mariposa. Gibson sent word through him to King Malietoa of Samoa that King Kalakaua intended to send an embassy to Malietoa before the end of the year. 16

Greenebaum's appointment meant trouble for Hawaii. This man had been the United States Consul at Apia, Samoa, since April 28, 1885. On May 14, 1886, at the request of Malietoa who was afraid of German intentions, he had raised the United States' flag over the Samoan banner, taking the islands under United States' protection. He then returned to Washington in August, 1886, his actions having been repudiated by Secretary of State

15. Laws Of His Majesty Kalakaua I, King Of The Hawaiian Islands, Passed By The Legislative Assembly, At Its Session 1886 (Honolulu, 1886), pp. 37; 70; "Cabinet Council Minute Book, 1874-1892," p. 542. AH.
16. Gibson to Greenebaum, Sept. 4, 1886, with enclosure; Gibson to Prime Minister, Samoan Majesty, Sept. 4, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.; P.C. Advertiser, Sept. 6, 1886.
Bayard. He had become persona non grata in Samoa to both Germany and Great Britain because of the flag-raising episode. Before he left Washington to return to Apia, the State Department had expected him to resign, but he had not done so. Gibbon, unaware of this State Department attitude towards Greenebaum, granted him a vice-consulship, hoping thereby to link Hawaii's projected Samoan policy with American policy.

Greenebaum's unexpected return to Samoa in an official capacity for both the United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom aroused, particularly, the ire of Germany's Count Bismarck, who probably first became convinced at that time that the United States was behind Hawaiian actions in Samoa. Immediately upon receipt of intelligence from Australia that Greenebaum had returned and had resumed charge of the American consulate, Bismarck on October 2 inquired of the United States Minister at Berlin, G. H. Pendleton, whether Greenebaum's actions were authorized. Pendleton telegraphed Bayard and as a result President Grover Cleveland suspended Greenebaum on October 4. Bayard explained to Bismarck that Greenebaum's return to Samoa in an official capacity had not been expected.

The fact of this suspension was communicated them to Gibson at Bayard's request. In response, the American representative at Honolulu was told by the Hawaiian government in November that after Hawaii's expected early appointment of either a diplomatic commissioner or a consul to reside permanently at the Samoan Islands, Greenebaum's functions as


as vice-consul would cease.

Greenebaum meanwhile also became persona non grata to King Malietoa. The latter informed Kalakaua in December that he would not receive the American in any official capacity.

Gibson received additional discouragement on October 23 from George H. Bates, who passed through Honolulu on that day while returning to Washington from Samoa. Bates was the Special United States Commissioner to Samoa, sent the preceding August to survey the situation there and to prepare a report recommending a suitable United States' policy towards Samoa, for consideration by a scheduled three-power Anglo-German-American Conference on Samoa at Washington in 1887.

Bates on October 23 sent a message unofficially to King Kalakaua advising him, with reference to the reported projected Hawaiian Mission to Samoa, that Hawaii should not interfere in any way at Samoa. Hawaii, he said, would not receive a generally favorable reception although Malietoa probably would welcome an Hawaiian Mission. He advised Kalakaua not to concern himself with distant places but to confine himself to the management of his own affairs.

Such an intimation of possible official United States' opposition to the projected Samoan Mission might have discouraged him, Gibson later told the French consul at Honolulu on January 2, 1887, had it not been for the receipt on December 16, 1886 of a dispatch from Carter. Actually, this

21. Malietoa to Kalakaua, Dec. 9, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
dispatch had contained little, if anything, of encouragement. In it Carter reported on an interview with Bates in Washington in which Bates repeated his previous advice; on an interview with the German Charge d'affaires who told him of Germany's disapproval of Mauioa and of his belief that an independent, autonomous government could not be maintained in Samoa; and on an interview with the British Minister who estimated that since Britain and the United States were in favor of Samoan independence, Germany would probably agree. Gibson, with Kalakaua now vigorously pushing the "Primacy" policy, and urging him onward, chose to interpret these three separate interviews as indicating that he could expect British and particularly United States support. Bates' warning, therefore, went unheeded. 24

The opposition press previously had charged that Gibson's attempts to make Hawaii the head of a Polynesian Confederation were impossible of success. 25 As the preparations continued criticism increased. Gibson was the villain, the press editorialised. Gibson was the man responsible for all this nonsense, the Hawaiian Gazette said; he dangled Samoa "as a prospective Empire, the 'Empire of the Calabash', ... before eyes that are too easily dazzled." Looked at practically, according to this paper, Hawaii could do nothing since she was too weak. 26

The decision to dispatch the Mission to Samoa remained unchanged. As a last preparation, following several years of research on the activities of Charles St. Julian, 27 a new order of merit was created on December 16,

26. Ibid., Nov. 2, 1886.
27. Webster to Gibson, March 27, 1884; Gibson to Webster, No. 5, Apr. 19, 1884; Creighton to Webster, Aug. 4, 1886, AH, FO & Ex.
1686, patterned after St. Julian's Order of Aressi. Called the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, it was established to reward those persons whose services have been instrumental in promoting the welfare of Our Kingdom, and especially in advancing the good name and influence of Hawaii in the Islands of Polynesia, and other groups of the surrounding Ocean in order to promote harmonious cooperation among kindred people and contiguous states and communities,...

After this last bit of business was completed, the appointment of the Hawaiian Mission took place on December 22 and 28, 1886. Heading the Mission was John Edward Bush, a half-caste Hawaiian, who was commissioned by Kalakaua as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Samoa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Tonga and High Commissioner to the Sovereign Chiefs and Peoples of Polynesia. Bush and his embassy left for Samoa on December 25, 1886, aboard the steamship Zealandia. With their departure, there began the greatest effort made by the Hawaiian Kingdom to bring the dream of an Hawaiian Empire of the Pacific to a reality.

28. See above, pp. 30-32.
CHAPTER XI

JOHN EDWARD BUSH NEGOTIATES AN HAWAII—SAMOA TREATY OF CONFEDERATION

The first six months of 1887 were the most important and most turbulent in the long history of Hawaiian efforts to achieve "Primacy of the Pacific." Through John Edward Bush and his Mission, Hawaii became engaged in Samoa in a clash of power politics involving Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. A hastily created one-ship Hawaiian Navy, the Kaimiloa, was sent by Hawaii to Samoa in a show of force which threw some comic relief into an otherwise grim situation.

Bush arrived at Apia, Samoa, on January 3, 1887, with a group of six or seven. They were his wife, daughter, two or three servants, Henry Poor, who had been appointed to serve as his secretary, and J. D. Strong, who had been commissioned to paint portraits of Polynesian kings and chiefs and other illustrations of Polynesian life. A carriage and span of horses, intended as a gift from King Kalakaua to King Malietoa, was left behind at Honolulu. Since the Zealandia, aboard which the Bush Mission travelled, stopped only at Tutuila, it was difficult to transship the gift from Tutuila Island to Apia, on Upolu Island.

When Bush departed from Honolulu on December 26, 1886, no native Hawaiians were on hand to see him off nor was there reportedly any significant

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1. Bush to Gibson, No. 1, Jan. 5, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
2. Gibson to J. D. Strong, Dec. 24, 1886; Commissions by Kalakaua for Henry Poor, Dec. 23, 1886; Webb to Godfrey Brown, No. 6, July 18, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.; P. C. Advertiser, Dec. 27, 1886.
Gibson's instructions to Bush never were made public. If they had been, the critical reaction to Bush's departure would have been much stronger. Bush was instructed to award Malietoa the Grand Cross of the newly-established Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, and to endeavor to secure a confederation of Samoa with Hawaii which would "render them but one state in their relations to foreign powers, ..." If the most that could be achieved in Samoa was an exchange of courtesies with King Malietoa, Bush was instructed to proceed next to Tonga to negotiate there a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce. If Bush was successful, however, in Samoa, he was instructed to get Tonga to join the confederation; if successful at the latter place, he was told to invite the Cook Islands to join.

The Gilbert Islands were considered by Gibson to be incapable of self-government. He considered their complete annexation by Hawaii as the best course of action. Fuller instructions regarding the Gilberts, he told Bush, would be sent later, along with authority to appoint native Hawaiian missionaries in the Gilberts as consuls or commercial agents for the Hawaiian Kingdom. Hawaii would provide Bush, Gibson informed him, with the necessary means of transportation to proceed later from Samoa to Tonga and to the other islands. Bush's instructions, it thus was clear, called for

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Dec. 21, 1886; Bulletin, Dec. 20, 1886; Gazette, Dec. 28, 1886.
an all-out attempt to establish at least an Hawaiian-dominated Polynesian Confederation, plus an attempt to achieve also some expansion of Hawaiian territory.

Gibson warned Bush in his instructions that before Bush committed Hawaii to any definitive action in Samoa, Bush first would have to try to end the civil warfare there. Bush was instructed to be very careful in doing this and to work through intermediaries. He was authorized to use some of his funds toward this objective. Gibson also requested that full information on conditions in Samoa be sent to him by Bush prior to Bush’s taking definitive action.6 There was much reason for such stress to be laid upon achieving an end to Samoa’s civil warfare in as circumspect a manner as possible. Power politics were involved.

There was no royal house in Samoa and native wars usually arose from disputed successions to title. There were five great names which carried allegiance from the inhabitants of the five major political districts comprising the whole group, and which though hereditary, required confirmation from those districts, either by bestowal or by reason of conquest. If all five names were united in one person, that chief became King of Samoa.7

As a result of the backing of the consuls of the three powers (Great Britain, Germany, and the United States), Malietoa in 1881 had been established as King although he held only three of the names. Tamasese and Mataafa each still held one of the names. Tamasese had been designated as Vice-King by the consuls. Germany then had sought increasingly to obtain control over all of Samoa, but finding Malietoa unwilling to accept such German control, had switched its support after November, 1884, to

Tamasese. The United States was opposed to German assumption of a protectorate and recognised Malietoa. By the terms of the April, 1886 Anglo-German agreement on delimitation of spheres of influence in the Pacific, Samoa and Tonga had been declared neutral territory. This did not deter Prince Otto von Bismarck, however, in his efforts to achieve control.9

Germany consistently took the view that Malietoa and Tamasese were merely rivals for the kingship with Tamasese enjoying Germany's special favor. Germany during the first half of 1887 was marking time until the scheduled three-power conference at Washington was held, in the expectation that it would grant her a mandate over Samoa. Meanwhile, Tamasese was supported by Germany as a possible puppet king. British policy backed Germany for the same reasons of global power politics as first had led to Great Britain's decision in 1886 to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Germany and enter into negotiations leading to the April, 1886, agreement.9

By sending Bush off to Samoa to recognize and deal with Malietoa, Gibson, therefore, was taking sides against Germany and its claimant for power, Tamasese. In instructing Bush to secure an end to the Malietoa-Tamasese rivalry, Hawaii, in effect, was seeking to undercut Germany. The immediate result of the Bush Mission's arrival was the dispatch later in January by the German consul of a Bavarian ex-officer and adventurer, Herr Brandeis, to the Tamasese camp to organize and arm a military force for Tamasese.10

Bush set about immediately to accomplish his assigned objectives. He arranged to be received officially by Malietoa on January 7, 1887, at which time formal welcomes were exchanged. Bush conveyed to Malietoa Kalakaua's deep interest "in the welfare of Yourself and the people of Samoa, recognizing in them a people of a kindred race." He presented him with the Grand Cross of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania in recognition for his contributions to the welfare and advancement of Samoa.

Shortly thereafter, Bush and his group left the International Hotel where they had been staying and moved temporarily to the home of one of the chiefs. Later they constructed a new house for their quarters. The Germans, they reported, had made life in the hotel very difficult for them, and were making a major effort, through spies and other means, to ascertain Hawaii's objectives. Bush moved, he said, in order to obtain more privacy, and built a house later, in order to entertain amply and put on a good show. He also considered the house to be a good investment.

After having moved, Bush entertained Malietoa, his Cabinet and several other chiefs at dinner on January 16, 1887. Poor described the meal: "Most of them had never sat down to such a good dinner before and when they got through as a matter of appreciative politeness they put all our napkins into their pockets." In addition, he said, King Malietoa had a buffoon who stood behind him and grabbed from his plate. After eating, Bush reported, they settled down for a long night of drinking toasts and making speeches. The party broke up at about 5 a.m. Throughout the evening Bush hammered home the advanced state of Hawaii and thus her ability

13. Bush to Kalakaua, Jan. 27, 1887; Poor to Webb, Jan. 31, 1887; Bush to Gibson, March 29, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
effectively to assist Samoa. 16

A good relationship having been established with Malietoa, Bush met him privately on January 20 and broached the subject of an Hawaiian-Samoan Confederation, stating that Kalakaua wanted to assist Samoa. To insure Malietoa's acquiescence, he secretly offered him an annual subsidy by Hawaii of from $5,000 to $6,000. Malietoa agreed but said that the assent of the Ta'imau and Faipule, the parliamentary body of his government, also would be required. 16

Malietoa's willingness to accept Hawaiian overtures was due in part to the fact that since he saw from Britain and the United States no effective support against German pressure, he had "sunk to the point at which an unfortunate begins to clutch at straws." 16 Other factors influencing Malietoa, besides the subsidy offer, probably were the high standing of Kalakaua and Hawaii in the eyes of the Samoan natives, 17 and the hope that United States' support might be gained indirectly because of Hawaii's unique political position with reference to the United States. 18

When some information on this meeting between Bush and Malietoa later became public in Hawaii, it was subjected to extensive ridicule by the opposition press, which said:

The dispatches published, so far, do not state whether the private interview passed away in the midst of exhaustive festivities in which the comparative merits of Hawaiian gin, German beer, English stout, or American white-eye were fully tested, or whether it was devoted entirely to statistics relative to the number of generals and officers of high rank in the Hawaiian army of two hundred and fifty men and boys.

14. Poor to Webb, Jan. 31, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 2, Feb. 1, 1887; Bush to Kalakaua, Jan. 27, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
15. Bush to Kalakaua, Jan. 27, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 2, Feb. 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
16. Robert Louis Stevenson, A Footnote To History; Eight Years Of Trouble In Samoa (New York, 1892), p. 69, hereafter cited as Stevenson, Samoa.
17. Ibid.
18. Ryden, Samoa, p. 335.
or the number of pounds avoirdupois of fighting meat carried by the jolly tars of the Hawaiian Navy.\textsuperscript{19}

The mention of an Hawaiian Navy referred to the newly-purchased ship, Kaimiloa, then being outfitted by Hawaii for a journey to Samoa.

As a result of his January 20 meeting with Bush, Malietoa made arrangements for Bush and Poor to address the Teimua and Faipule at Afega, about six miles from Apia, on February 4.\textsuperscript{20} This was done and the assent of the Teimua and Faipule to confederation was secured on that day, with actual details left up to Malietoa and Bush to decide.\textsuperscript{21}

Meanwhile, in anticipation of the later actual signing of an agreement, Bush and Poor began intervening actively on behalf of Malietoa in the turbulent Samoan political scene. In Bush’s opinion, neither Tamasese nor Malietoa had any real power, and he reported on February 1 to Gibson:

"Let Mr. Weber’s German support be withdrawn from Tamasese and let it be known that Malietoa has acquired foreign support and the rebellion by Tamasese is ended bloodlessly and the chiefs will gradually crawl back to their natural allegiance Malietoa."\textsuperscript{22} Bush’s and Poor’s reaction to this situation was to seek to eliminate German support while simultaneously attempting to bolster Malietoa.

As a first step, Poor secretly wrote a letter for William Coe, Malietoa’s Assistant Secretary of State, to sign and send to the German consul. Dated January 31, the letter protested strongly against Herr Brandeis’ aid to the rebellious Tamasese. The German reaction was very critical and Poor was forced to reassure a fearful Coe with respect to

\textsuperscript{19} Bulletin, March 17, 1887.
\textsuperscript{20} Bush to Gibson, No. 5, Feb. 2, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
\textsuperscript{21} Bush to Gibson, No. 11, March 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
\textsuperscript{22} Bush to Gibson, No. 2, Feb. 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
the wisdom of the move. The German reply on February 10 was very pointed. It said that Tamasese, so far as Germany was concerned, was not a rebel.23

As a second step, with a view towards Samoa being represented at Washington during the three-power conference scheduled to be held there to decide on a new policy for Samoa, Bush suggested to the Malietoa government that it request Kalakaua to let Carter accept a commission from Samoa. He and Poor believed Carter's appointment could help secure a favorable United States' stand towards Samoa. Poor, therefore, drew up all the necessary papers, all dated January 31, including letters from Malietoa to King Kalakaua and President Cleveland, and the instructions from the Samoan government to Carter. The letter to Cleveland requested him to accredit Carter as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Samoa at Washington. Carter's instructions required him (1) to secure a guarantee of Samoan independence from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany; (2) to secure the agreement of the three Powers to a Samoan union with Hawaii; and (3) to secure all treaty changes necessary to prevent any future participation by the consuls of the three Powers in Samoan domestic politics.24

While Bush and Poor thus were engaged busily in Samoa in paving the way for the signing of a treaty of confederation and in seeking to support Malietoa and weaken Tamasese, the Hawaiian government at home was

23. Becker to Malietoa, Feb. 10, 1887, enclosed in Bush to Gibson, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1887; Coe to Becker, Jan. 31, 1887, enclosed in Bush to Gibson, No. 6, Feb. 2, 1887; Poor to Webb, Feb. 2, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
purchasing and outfitting a vessel for the use of the Bush Mission. At a Cabinet Council meeting on January 10, 1887, Gibson proposed the purchase of the 171-ton steamer, Explorer, which had arrived in Honolulu on December 30, 1886, for repairs. This British-owned ship, first launched in Scotland in 1871, had come to Honolulu from Samoa, and had been engaged in the guano trade at various islands.

The Cabinet postponed a decision pending further investigation of the ship. At a subsequent meeting on January 19, however, it authorized its purchase for not more than $20,000.25

In addition, this same meeting secretly authorized Gibson to communicate with Hawaii's Charge d'Affaires in London with reference to obtaining a gunboat of the British Pacific Fleet at a cost, in case of purchase, not to exceed $100,000.26 The Cabinet's action in this last regard was significant in indicating its militant approach at that time towards the implementation of a "Primacy" policy. Nothing concrete ever came of this authorization, however, because of a combination of increasing diplomatic opposition later to the Bush Mission, increasing domestic political opposition to the Gibson regime, and the high costs of the Bush Mission and its ship.

Actual possession of the Explorer was taken by Hawaii on January 21.

It was announced that the steamer would be refitted as a naval training ship and would be utilised in conveying Hawaiian embassies to various island groups.27 The purchase naturally was attacked by the opposition.

27. Gazette, Jan. 25, 1887.
press which charged that the ship was in poor condition and that it was an expensive folly "to saddle the country with a toy ship for which she has as much need as a cow has for a diamond necklace." Although the ship reportedly actually was in poor physical condition, Theo. H. Davies & Company, which apparently was involved in its sale to the Hawaiian government, later defended the value of the ship with respect to the price paid for it.

After the purchase of the Explorer thus was completed, at the particular urging of Joseph S. Webb, Gibson's Secretary at the Foreign Office, a conflict of opinion as to its outfitting developed within the inner councils of the regime. King Kalakaua, Webb, and George E. Gresley Jackson, captain-designate of the ship, sought against Gibson's opposition to outfit it as a gun-boat. A decision was reached to mount on it four mid-caliber-loading six-pounders from Iolani Barracks and two Gatling guns. It also was decided to include among the projected 63-man crew, 24 boys from the Reformatory School, 21 of whom would comprise a band "to awe the natives with martial strains," and all of whom would receive naval training. Jackson, the captain-designate, was a former British naval officer who lately had been master of the Reformatory School on Oahu. He was an habitual drunkard.

Gibson was authorized at a Cabinet Council meeting on January 27, as Secretary of War and Navy, to call for bids for refitting the Explorer.

28. Ibid: Jan. 25, 1887; Feb. 8, 1887.
29. Webb to Poor, Jan. 23, 1887, AH, PO & Ex.
30. Letter from Theo. H. Davies & Co. to the Editor, P. C. Advertiser, May 19, 1887.
31. Webb to Gibson, Jan. 17, 1887, AH, PO & Ex.
32. Webb to Poor, Jan. 23, 1887; Gibson to Bush, No. 6, Feb. 19, 1887, AH, PO & Ex.; Farenholt, loc. cit., p. 518.
which was then renamed the *Kaimiloa*. On February 1, the Cabinet approved
proposed expenditures of $14,000 for this purpose. 53

By this time intelligence as to the dispatch of the Bush Mission and
of its activities in Samoa had reached the capitals of the major Powers
and Hawaii was encountering an adverse reaction not only from Germany but,
unexpectedly to Gibson, from Great Britain as well. On December 28, Lord
Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary, having been apprised previously
of Bush's impending departure, instructed Wodehouse, the British Consul
General at Honolulu, to discourage any attempt by Hawaii to interfere in
Samoa affairs. Wodehouse met together with both Gibson and Kalakaua on
January 23, 1887, and informed them of the British attitude, which he in-
dicated applied also to any projected Hawaiian action in Tonga. 34

Gibson and Kalakaua were very annoyed and worried at this opposition
from an unexpected quarter, 35 but decided to draft a firm reply, which
was approved at a meeting of the Cabinet Council on January 27. 36 Gibson's
reply to Wodehouse upheld the Bush Mission, claiming that it was a necessary,
prearranged sequel to previous Hawaiian activities on behalf of independent
Polynesian communities. Gibson also instructed the Hawaiian Charge at
London to express directly to Lord Salisbury the astonishment and indigna-
tion of Hawaii at the British attitude. Salisbury was to be informed that
the Bush Mission "is but a fulfillment of the promises made in the dis-
patches which Mr. Carter made known the contents of to the British Govern-
ment, and is, so far as Samoa is concerned, only the friendly greeting of
one Polynesian monarch to another." 37

54. Wodehouse to Salisbury, Pol. & Confid., Jan. 24, 1887, AH, BC.
55. Webb to Poor, Feb. 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
57. Wodehouse to Gibson, Feb. 11, 1887, AH, BC; Gibson to Hoffnung, No. 4,
     Jan. 25, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Wodehouse's rebuttal on February 11 to Gibson's note of January 27 stated that the designation of Samoa and Tonga as neutral areas, by the Anglo-German treaty delimiting spheres of influence in the Pacific, appeared to indicate that those islands "were not open to the operations of Hawaiian influence." Actually, the attitude of Germany towards any action by Hawaii in Samoa was the determining factor in the British decision to protest against the Bush Mission.

The British motives were made clear by Lord Salisbury in an interview on February 23, 1887, with Abraham Hoffnung, the Hawaiian Charge at London. Hoffnung reported that Salisbury was concerned about the probable views of Germany and of Britain's Australasian colonies with respect to the Hawaiian mission. In a later interview by Hoffnung in March with Sir Julian Pauncefote, British Undersecretary of State, over this same subject, Hoffnung reported that Pauncefote said that Britain's action had not been a "remonstrance" but "a friendly hint" that the British government regarded the mission as "inopportune at the present time - and might lead to further complications among the Powers," if such a project was persevered in. Britain really was willing, he said, to see Hawaii's views carried into effect in any islands outside the sphere of British interests and where Britain also had no treaty obligations. Great Power contentions in Samoa made that place exceptional, he said. He thought that only if the other Powers approved and the Samoans desired it, would Hawaiian aid to the Samoans in the formation of an independent government be acceptable also to Britain.

38. Wodehouse to Gibson, Feb. 11, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
40. Hoffnung to Gibson, No. 25, March 21, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
The catch, of course, was the necessary concurrence of Germany which Britain knew never would be forthcoming. Bismarck was determined not to let anything interfere with his plans to obtain control of Samoa and was deeply suspicious not only of the Bush Mission in itself but also of a possible United States' connection with Hawaii's actions. Contributing to Bismarck's suspicion was the fact that an early American annexation of Hawaii was expected then in many quarters. This was due to the action of the United States Senate on January 20, 1887, in adding to an Hawaiian-American Convention, extending the Hawaii-United States Reciprocity Treaty, an amendment giving the United States exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor.41

Gibson also had furnished Bismarck with grounds for suspicion of American complicity not only by his previous appointment of Berthold Greenebaum as Hawaii's vice consul at Samoa, but by informing the French consul on January 2, 1887, that he expected United States support because, with the great influence enjoyed by the United States in Hawaii, the United States possibly might annex Hawaii and thus eventually reap the fruits of whatever successes Hawaii might achieve. The French consul informed the British consul of this and probably informed other members of the consular corps so that it probably became known also to Germany.42

Only the United States expressed an initial approval of the Mission,


42. Wodehouse to Salisbury, No. 1, Pol., Jan. 14, 1887, AH, BC.
and then only because the sweeping extent of Bush’s instructions remained an Hawaiian secret. When Carter had learned of the definitely scheduled departure of Bush, he had apprised Bayard of this fact. On his own initiative, he then had suggested that as soon as Hawaii had concluded a treaty with Samoa such as the other Powers already had, that the consuls of the treaty Powers at Samoa should be placed under the control of diplomatic officials of the same Powers at Honolulu, with the authority to “refer their differences there for immediate settlement rather than leave matters unsettled for some months till the Home Governments could confer.” Bayard promised to consider this idea, and said that if Bush proved a wise and careful person, it might be adopted.

At the same time, Carter, not knowing the details of Bush’s instructions, suggested to Gibson that Bush’s first step should be the negotiation of a similar Treaty obtaining for Hawaii all the privileges given to the other powers including consular jurisdiction so that we might be in a position at some time to propose to the other powers the surrender of consular jurisdiction which would be of great advantage to Samoa as soon as she establishes proper tribunals of justice. When such a Treaty is obtained Hawaii would have an undoubted claim to be heard in Samoan affairs and could use that right to the great advantage of Samoa.

Gibson transmitted Carter’s suggestion to Bush but at a date too late to be of any effect.

On January 18, Gibson instructed Carter to inform Bayard and Bismarck of the Bush Mission’s departure and purpose. (Similar instructions were issued at the same time to Hoffnung to inform Salisbury and resulted in Hoffnung’s previously discussed interview with Salisbury on February 23).
No intimation of Bush's specific instructions were given. Instead,
Gibson assured the Powers that there would be no interference in internal
affairs, although it was hoped that Bush could aid in the settlement of
difficulties. "Mr. Bush's mission," Gibson said, "is no intermeddling
of a petty State, but the earnest endeavor of a favored Polynesian ruler
to assist and counsel for the best, one of the same race less fortunately
situated." 46

Carter had an interview with Bayard on February 4 to communicate to
him the above information. Carter reported Bayard's reply to be very
satisfactory.

Mr. Bayard expressed satisfaction at the mission and hoped
that good would result from it; he thought everything which
drew attention to those islands /Samoa/ and their political
rights was of advantage, and he hoped Mr. Bush would be able
to give good advice to the chiefs and people wherever it was
needed. 47

Bayard's response was an expression of his belief in the merits of trying
to form and maintain an autonomous native government at Samoa. 48 He was
opposed to the assumption of a German protectorate over Samoa. Had he
known Bush's true instructions, however, he never would have given a fa­
vorable opinion of the Mission.

As it was, unwittingly Bayard served initially to support Hawaii
against Germany in Samoa. On February 25, 1887, the German Minister to
the United States, H. von Alvensleben, had an interview with Bayard dur­ing
the course of which he inquired about the rumor "of the Sandwich Is­
lands annexing Samoa." Bayard's reply was that "it was all nonsense;

46. Gibson to Carter, No. 2, Jan. 18, 1887; Gibson to Hoffnung, No. 2,
    Jan. 18, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
47. Carter to Gibson, No. 82, Feb. 4, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
that Mr. Bush, the Sandwich Island agent, was simply going there rather
to evangelize those people than for anything else, and that his visit had
no political significance." Several days later, on March 2, Bayard
sent a note to Alvensleben protesting against Brandeis' actions in support
of Tamasese, concerning which he had been informed by the American vice-
consul at Apia.

Meanwhile, as a result of the adverse reaction encountered from Great
Britain, the Hawaiian Foreign Office had come to place even greater stress
then previously upon the necessity for obtaining American approval of
Hawaii's actions. Gibson and Kalakaua therefore decided to grant the
bush-inspired Samoan request for Samoan representation at Washington by
Carter. On February 12, Gibson forwarded to Carter the Samoan documents
and informed Carter that he could accept the appointment as Samoan Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary "if there is nothing in diplo-
matic practice to render it improper." Carter agreed to do what he
could to assist Samoa.

Carter consulted with three Assistant Secretaries of State regarding
the Samoan appointment, and reported on March 2 that their general opinion
was that "it would be wiser if I was to simply act as Hawaiian Minister
temporarily charged with the duty (by my own sovereign) of making such
diplomatic representations on behalf of Samoa as that government should
desire to have made." One official, he said, suggested that Hawaii do
the same for Tonga if requested to do so.
Carter then had an interview with Bayard on March 11 over this matter and Bayard's attitude was similar to that of the Assistant Secretaries. He preferred Carter not to present his credentials.66 He previously had intimated as much to Carter in a note on March 5 confirming arrangements for the March 11 interview. In the note, Bayard had added that he would "not be sorry to see you act in the same way for Tonga also."56

Bayard, in a memorandum written after his March 11 conversation with Carter, wrote that he told Carter the reason he took the stand he did toward Carter's appointment, was because although Carter might have authority from Samoa he could have no power, and if the Germans should disregard the wishes of Samoa it might place him in a very embarrassing position, and would probably create an inconsistency in his relations as the Minister of the Sandwich Islands if he mixed himself up officially with Samoa.57

Carter's report to Gibson on this interview struck a different note. Bayard apparently believed, Carter said, that formal acceptance of him in the Samoan appointment would commit the United States to Malietoa before the Washington Conference on Samoa was held. Carter said that he argued that the United States should not admit of any doubt as to Malietoa's supremacy. Bayard, however, he stated, held great hope that regardless of the position of Malietoa, the moral influence of the United States would preserve Samoa's autonomy at the Conference. If the Conference was successful in reaching an agreement, he told Carter, he would be glad for Hawaii to cooperate with the Powers in their efforts to establish peacefully an independent native Samoan government. Pending

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55. Carter to Gibson, No. 87, Confid., March 16, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
56. Bayard to Carter, Personal, March 5, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
57. Tansill, op. cit., p. 40, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after talk with Carter, March 11, 1887.
Malietoa's firm establishment in a position of authority, he added, too
definite a representation by Carter, if Malietoa collapsed, might weak-
en Carter's general position in Washington. 58

The net result of the interview was that Bayard on March 26 sent
Carter a note, which instead of officially recognizing him as Minister of
Samoa, stated merely that "it will be most agreeable to the Government of
the United States to receive through your courteous mediation whatever
communications may be addressed to it by the Government of Samoa,..." 59
The result of even this mild willingness to deal with Carter on Samoan
matters, when it became known to Germany, probably was the further strengthen-
ing of Bismarck's suspicions of American complicity in Hawaii's actions
in Samoa.

While all of these diplomatic negotiations were going on, however,
Bush in Samoa had capitalised on his previous winning of the approval of
Malietoa and of the Taimoa and Faipule towards a Samoan confederation
with Hawaii. The Treaty of Confederation was signed formally by Malietoa
on February 17, 1887, and accepted formally by Bush that same day. Its
consummation, of course, made apparent the real nature of Bush's objec-
tives and meant that a particularly strong diplomatic reaction could be
expected. Because of the slowness of communications with Samoa, and with
Hawaii, however, the Powers did not become aware of the treaty until the
beginning of April.

Although several months later on June 3, 1887, Carter, in a conver-
sation with Bayard, stated that Gibson had assured him in his private

58. Carter to Gibson, No. 87, Confid., March 16, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
59. Bayard to Carter, March 26, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
letters that the treaty with Samoa was arranged by Bush secretly without Gibson’s knowledge, and by connivance with the King,60 there was in fact no truth to this with reference to Gibson’s actual role. Not only had Gibson himself issued the original instructions to Bush to negotiate the treaty of confederation, but even after the January 23 warning from Britain, he never countermanded his instructions. Instead, he only urged Bush to be cautious.61

By the terms of the February 17 treaty, Malietoa swore:

... I do hereby freely and voluntarily offer and agree and bind Myself to enter into a political Confederation with His Majesty KAIKAUA, King of the Hawaiian Islands, and I hereby give this solemn pledge that I will conform to whatever measures may hereafter be adopted by His Majesty KAIKAUA and be mutually agreed upon to promote and carry into effect this political Confederation, and to maintain it now and forever...62

Bush in his acceptance of the treaty pledged that it would be accepted and upheld by King Kalakaua.63

After the ceremonies of signing the treaty had been concluded, Bush entertained Malietoa and about sixty members of the Taumau and Faipule at another all-night party that same evening, February 17.64 According to the description of a contemporary observer, Robert Louis Stevenson, the party was a wild drinking orgy:

Laupepa [Malietoa], always decent, withdrew at an early hour; by those that remained, all decency appears to have been forgotten; high chiefs were seen to dance; and day found the house carpeted with slumbering grandees, who must be roused, doctored with coffee, and sent home. As

60. Tansill, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
61. Gibson to Bush, No. 4, Feb. 19, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
63. Bush’s Acceptance, Feb. 17, 1887, copy enclosed in Gibson to Carter, No. 15, April 8, 1887, AH, FC & Ex.
64. Bush to Gibson, No. 11, March 1, 1887, rec’d Mar. 11, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
a first chapter in the history of Polynesian Confederation, it was hardly cheering, and Laupepa remarked to one of the Hawaiian embassy, with equal dignity and sense: "If you have come here to teach my people to drink, I wish you had stayed away." 65

CHAPTER XII

BIG POWER REACTION TO THE HAWAII-SAMOA CONFEDERATION
AND GIBSON’S DECISION TO RECALL BUSH AND THE KAIMILOA

From the time that the Hawaiian-Samoan Treaty of Confederation became known to the major Powers, increasing dissatisfaction with, and opposition to, Hawaii’s policy developed. For a time Gibson withstood the pressure but finally, on June 10, 1887, he issued instructions for Bush and for the Kaimiloa to return. Gibson did not abandon the Mission completely, however, but appointed Poor in place of Bush. Nevertheless, by that time, the situation in Samoa, in Hawaii’s foreign relations and in Hawaii itself had gotten completely out of Gibson’s control. Gibson’s remaining days in power, and the Mission’s remaining days of existence, already were numbered.

When Gibson first received from Bush on March 11 the information that a Treaty of Confederation had been signed, his initial reaction was one of complete and unhesitant approval. He informed Carter that same day of the treaty and said:

...Although no action could be taken in Cabinet on this subject before this Steamer leaves, I may say with confidence that this treaty will be ratified by His Majesty and that Hawaii will accept the responsibilities which it imposes upon her to see that a stable government formed on the Christian and civilized pattern of that of Hawaii shall be established in Samoa.

This Treaty is entirely spontaneous on the part of King Malietoa and his chiefs and was the prompt and not unnatural result of the appearance in Samoa of a Hawaiian Embassy representing as it did a King closely allied in blood to the Samoans, and holding his throne under a Constitution such as the Samoans would be glad to accept for their own. Under the existing circumstances at Samoa Mr. Bush, as it appears to me did wisely in accepting this Treaty.

1. Bush to Gibson, No. 11, March 1, 1887, reo’d March 11, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
2. Gibson to Carter, No. 11, March 11, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Gibson's above explanation to Carter of why Malietoa accepted the Treaty is an excellent example of what Joseph Webb, Gibson's secretary and administrative assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs, described as Gibson's "characteristic imaginative coloring to historical events...the main facts exist though hardly as he puts them." 3

After further reflection, and in consideration of the already generally adverse reaction to the Bush Mission even without a Treaty of Confederation being involved, Gibson adopted a more cautious attitude. He informed Bush on March 19 that ratification of the Treaty was under study but that it would be better to await the decision of the Washington Conference before committing Hawaii to a convention with Malietoa "which might possibly compromise both parties with the powers who already have treaty relations with Samoa." Malietoa can be assured, however, he said, that Hawaii definitely will ratify the treaty either absolutely or conditionally. In anticipation, therefore, he requested Bush to send his ideas as to how Hawaii could give practical assistance towards the establishment of organised government in Samoa.4

With Gibson by now more cautious, the Cabinet Council decided at a meeting the following day, March 20, to ratify the Bush-Malietoa Treaty only conditionally. A "savings clause" was inserted making the agreement "subject to the obligations which His Majesty MALIETOA may be under to those Foreign Powers with which He and the People of Samoa and the Government thereof have at this time any treaty relations...."5 From a practical point of view this made any subsequent action by Hawaii in Samoa dependent upon the approval of

3. Webb to Poor, March 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
the major Powers. Gibson hoped that the conditional nature of the Hawaiin ratification would make the whole action palatable to the Powers.

The decision to conditionally ratify the Treaty so rapidly, Gibson afterwards informed Bush, was due to the receipt on March 20 of dispatches from Carter and Hoffnung "indicating clearly the desirability of our having some Treaty relation with Samoa." Actually, there was nothing favorable in Hoffnung's dispatch, and Carter's dispatch referred to a different type of treaty. In reporting on the reaction of State Department officials to Carter's appointment as an Envoy by Samoa, Carter had stated that they had suggested that Hawaii first should have concluded a Treaty with Samoa so that Hawaii could be recognized as a "treaty power" at the Washington Conference. By treaty, however, they had meant some sort of treaty of commerce and friendship.

While Gibson to some extent was struck by qualms, Bush continued steadily on his aggressive course. Even before he had received Gibson's March 19 request for ideas as to how Hawaii could give practical assistance to Samoa, he had submitted on February 22 his long-range suggestions for Hawaiian planning. Hawaii, for a period, he said, would have to exercise a great deal of supervision over the Samoan government since such foreign supervision was necessary for Samoan stability. All other foreign consular interference would have to cease, he stated, since the Samoans had more confidence in Hawaii than in any other foreign nation. A Land Commission must be established, he urged, to settle numerous existing land claims and disputes. An effort also should be made to buy the large German land holdings, he said, as a means of eliminating the bulk of

7. Hoffnung to Gibson, Feb. 22, 1887, rec'd March 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
8. Carter to Gibson, No. 85, Confid., March 2, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Germany's economic interest in Samoa. Aside from any expense involved for Hawaii in the purchase of the German lands, an Hawaiian loan of about $100,000 would be required, he estimated, until the Samoan government could be established safely and a system of self-supporting revenues instituted.

At the same time that Bush made these suggestions, he reiterated a previous proposal by Poor that Hawaii make an effort to see that the Honolulu–Sydney steamship run stopped at Apia on Upolu Island rather than at Pago Pago on Tutuila Island. Gibson actually acted upon this latter proposal and attempted unsuccessfully to get the Oceanic Steamship Company to alter the course of its ships. Poor, later, in May, after receipt of the information of Gibson's failure in this regard, suggested that Hawaii subsidise a steamer run between Honolulu and Apia, and perhaps Tonga, once every four to six weeks.

With respect to Bush's larger suggestions, which involved in effect the establishment of an Hawaiian protectorate over Samoa, Gibson never took any action. He was influenced by the adverse foreign attitude to the whole venture. He informed Bush in mid-April that no definite development of the Treaty of Confederation could be undertaken until the Washington Conference had been held and had reached a decision. The Samoans should complete all their planning in the interim, he stated. He instructed Bush, as another interim measure, to negotiate a second and supplementary convention. This new agreement, he said, should cover four points: (1) recognition of the King of Hawaii as head of the Polynesian Confederation; (2) arrangements for making Hawaiian representatives abroad the representatives of the

10. Ibid., Poor to Webb, Jan. 31, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
11. Webb to Poor, April 15, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
12. Poor to Webb, May 7, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Confederation; (3) a joint foreign policy; and (4) an agreement to admit Tonga and any other independent Polynesian states into the Confederation. 13

Meanwhile Bush and Poor, not subject to the same restraining influences in as direct a manner as Gibson was, were continuing their aggressive efforts to bolster Malietoa and undermine all opposition. When Gibson first had notified Bush on January 22 of the purchase of the Explorer, he stated that it would be "commissioned as a Man of War." 14 Bush's reaction was one of great satisfaction. It will be invaluable, he replied, as a show of strength. To bolster Malietoa's cause, he reported, he had informed Malietoa's group of this purchase by Hawaii of a gunboat. 15

A special effort was made by Bush to wean various chiefs away from the Tamasese camp, particularly Mataafa, a chief of equal rank to Tamasese. 16 Mataafa first was contacted in March 17 and by April, according to Bush, had left Tamasese and adopted a neutral position. 18 He then became the object of a tug-of-war between Bush and the Germans, each seeking to gain his active support. Bush reported success in this regard after a visit to Mataafa's district in May. 19

About the time that Mataafa first was contacted, Bush secured the defection of the chief who was Tamasese's father-in-law. Poor reported in March that this chief had become "a generous admirer of our cheap gin and has even offered me his virgin daughter." In another by-play at this time, Tamasese's wife left him, and having "become charmed with the guitar music and songs" of one of Bush's Hawaiian servants, adopted the latter for her

15. Bush to Gibson, No. 10, Feb. 28, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
16. See above, p. 108.
17. Poor to Webb, March 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Bush's relations with Malietoa meanwhile became increasingly close and Gibson was assured by Bush and Poor from time to time that he could plan as he desired for Samoa since the Malietoa government would do whatever Hawaii asked of it. Poor described the situation clearly when he told Webb in March that "the King and his Govt. are so simple and have so little knowledge of Govt. that they are willing to accept and adopt any and every plan proposed by the Hawaiian Govt." In early March Malietoa even proposed marriage to Bush's daughter, Molly, offering to make her Queen Molly of Samoa, but Molly would not have him. After Bush received Gibson's mid-April instructions to negotiate a supplementary convention with Malietoa, he explained again that further negotiations of any sort were unnecessary because of Samoan willingness to follow Hawaii's guidance.

When Gibson, who meanwhile was coming under adverse foreign pressure, notified Bush in February that the Kaimiloa would be coming as a training ship, and not as a man-of-war, Bush and Poor were not happy. Gibson explained his position further in mid-March, stating that he could see only two avenues of solution for the Samoan situation. "The first and chief remedy for it," he said, "is unquestionably to bring about a united sovereignty," and this was Bush's special responsibility. A second means of solution was by means of diplomatic negotiations, and upon this Gibson was concentrating his efforts. With respect to the first, he hoped the Kaimiloa

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20. Poor to Webb, March 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
21. Extracts from Poor to Webb, April 10, 1887, AH, H.A.P. Carter Letters; Bush to Gibson, No. 19, May 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
22. Poor to Webb, March 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
23. Poor to Webb, March 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex. Molly Bush's age in 1887 is not known, although it has been estimated at about sixteen. - Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Aug. 5, 1889.
24. Bush to Gibson, No. 19, May 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
25. Gibson to Bush, No. 6, Feb. 19, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
would assist Bush in achieving his objectives, but warned again against the Kaimiloa’s misuse. "She will have her band and her saluting guns, and will be able to do ample honor to King Malietoa or other Polynesian Sovereigns," he said, but "Her instructions will be that she is not permitted to make war." 27

Poor expressed his and Bush’s reaction to this very clearly in early April:

I am sorry the official decision is that the ‘Kaimiloa’ ‘shall not make war.’ I think you should have given us discretionary powers with regard to Samoa and let us have the key to one of the padlocks which hold your ‘dogs of war.’ It might not be necessary to fire a shot but it would be foolish to bluff Tamasese without we knew we could fall back on powder and Shot. I believe his reconciliation could be promptly secured if he realised we would show our teeth.” 28

By this time strong sentiment for fighting had developed among supporters of Malietoa, according to Bush, and the situation was reported as explosive. 29 It was learned later, after the recall of the Mission, that Bush had made at least two secret loans of money to chiefs to enable them to purchase arms. One loan was for $538.65 and the other, for $500.00. 30 Although the dates of these loans are not known, it is possible that they were made in February or March and contributed to the reported “explosive” situation in April.

As a result of Gibson’s emphatic instructions, however, both Bush and Poor reassured Gibson in April and May, that they were counselling peace. Bush even came to believe, he said in May, that the Germans were intriguing to precipitate a war in order to give them an excuse to step in and

27. Gibson to Bush, No. 12, March 19, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
29. Bush to Gibson, No. 14, April 26, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
30. Poor to Godfrey Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
assume a protectorate. Bush claimed in April that he had cautioned the Taimua and Faipule early that month against any overt hostile actions. At the same time Poor reported that he had sent orators into certain war-like Malietoa districts, "to quiet the people and ask them to wait patiently till the Hawaiian Govt. had completed its business." In addition, Poor himself, according to Bush, was instrumental that same month, April, in preventing an uprising against Tamasese and the Germans in Taasalelega District on Savaii Island. Bush claimed in May to be still urging various chiefs to maintain the peace.31

Although Bush's efforts thus were concentrated upon the internal Samoan scene, he also sought to help Gibson in his diplomatic negotiations. On February 28, in response to an earlier request by Gibson for evidence of German meddling in Samoa, Bush forwarded two things to him: (1) a copy of the German February 10 rejection of the January 31 protest by Malietoa's government against Brandeis' activities; and (2) affidavits proving German sale of firearms. At that time and intermittently thereafter, Bush stressed the important aid that Carter in Washington could give Malietoa by negotiating with the Minister of Germany at Washington to secure a cessation of the German arms traffic.32 As a further means of aiding the Hawaiian diplomatic offensive, he sent to Gibson, on April 26, for transmission to Carter, lengthy genealogical tables designed to assist Carter in proving Malietoa's legitimate claim to the kingship as against Tamasese's claim.33

31. Extracts from Poor to Webb, April 16, 1887, AH, H.A.P. Carter Letters; Bush to Gibson, No. 14, April 26, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 15, April 28, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 19, May 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
32. Gibson to Bush, Jan. 22, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 14, April 26, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
33. Hawaiian Legation [Bush] to Kalakaua, April 24, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 17, April 26, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
In addition to all these efforts of seeking to bolster Malietoa and undermine Tamasese (1) by propaganda use of the scheduled arrival of the Kaimiloa, (2) by sales of firearms, (3) by liberal use of liquor, (4) by providing Carter with factual ammunition, (5) by trying to avoid giving Germany a pretext for overt intervention, and (6) by meaning Tamasese’s supporters away from him, a new major effort was begun by Bush in April to make a deal directly with Tamasese so as to eliminate his opposition. The idea of a bribe ($2,000) was suggested by Webb, the Foreign Office Secretary, in a letter to Poor in March.  

Bush considered it favorably and in mid-April a friendly chief was sent to sound out Tamasese and, if possible, to try to arrange a secret meeting between Tamasese and Poor. Similar overtures also were made through a relative of Tamasese’s Prime Minister. Nothing concrete developed from either attempt.

In mid-May, however, Bush tried again. There are two differing accounts of this attempt, one by Bush in a report on it to Gibson and the other by Robert Louis Stevenson, a contemporary observer of the Samoan scene.

According to Bush’s report, Poor, J. D. Strong, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s artist with the Bush Mission, and William Coe, Malietoa’s Assistant Secretary of State, were sent together on a journey through Tamasese’s area, ostensibly simply on a photographing expedition. The suspicious German consul immediately sent his vice-consul to Tamasese’s headquarters at Leulumoega to insure that nothing adversely affecting German interests occurred. An attempt by Tamasese secretly to meet Poor was blocked by guards placed around his house by Brandeis, Tamasese’s German military adviser. Two chiefs who were sent by Tamasese

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54. Webb to Poor, March 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
as emissaries, claimed, according to Bush, that they desired to make a deal and effect a reconciliation, but that they were firmly under German control and were indebted heavily to the Germans for firearms. Another attempt that same evening by Poor to discuss the situation with Tamasese's Prime Minister was balked by Brandeis' personal intervention. Coe was arrested by Brandeis' order but released on Poor's demand, Bush reported. Heavy pressure subsequently was applied against persons contacted by the Poor group.

According to Robert Louis Stevenson's account of the entire incident, the bribe offered Tamasese was free passage to Honolulu, a pension, and a home in Honolulu. Stevenson believed that Tamasese at this time was disgruntled with the Germans. "He had doubtless been promised prompt aid and a prompt success; he had seen himself surreptitiously helped, privately ordered about, and publicly disowned; and he was still the king of nothing more than his own province and already the second in command of Captain Brandeis." For these reasons, Stevenson said, Tamasese was ready to discuss Hawaiian overtures.

Poor and Strong, he reported, landed with a Samoan boat crew in Tamasese's district. Poor hid himself, according to a previous agreement, in the home of an English settler in an outlying area, while Strong, ostensibly on a photographing expedition, entered Leulumoea. The secret, however, had leaked out and the German vice-consul either had been sent or summoned to the scene. In the evening, Stevenson continued, Brandeis arrested some chiefs who were endeavoring to visit Poor at his hiding place and jailed them along with William Coe. As a result, Poor burst into town with his boat crew and visited Tamasese's Prime Minister to demand

36. Bush to Gibson, No. 19, May 23, 1837, AH, FO & Ex.
Coe's release. Brandeis then rushed to the scene, Stevenson stated, and
jailed Poor. Poor, Coe, and Tamasese's jailed chiefs all were liberated
as a result of an attack on the jail early the next morning before dawn,
Stevenson said. The attack was made by Poor's Samoan boat crew plus other
armed men. There was no opposition. In Stevenson's opinion, the rescue
was connived at by Brandeis, who had gained his point. Poor complained to
the German consul the next day, Stevenson concluded, but was told, with
effrontery: "You have been repeatedly warned, Mr. Poor, not to expose
yourself among these savages."[37]

Bush's conclusion from this incident was that neither the effecting
of a reconciliation of Tamasese with Malietoa, which Gibson repeatedly was
emphasising, nor the effecting of Tamasese's elimination from the scene,
was possible so long as Tamasese was directed and supported by the Germans.[38]

While Bush thus was finding himself blocked in his secret intrigues
and plans by the Germans, Gibson had run into a similar and more menacing
obstacle in the general diplomatic opposition of all the Powers to Samoan
confederation with Hawaii. Even before Carter had received Gibson's dis-
patch of March 11, containing the first information that a Treaty of Con-
federation had been signed, Carter had sent Gibson on March 16 a clear-
cut warning from Bayard that the latter regarded such a development as in-
advisable. Bayard's comments arose as a result of the inclusion in the
instructions which Carter had received from the Malietoa government (along
with his appointment by Malietoa as Envoy and Minister of Samoa) of a pro-
vision that he secure agreement of the three Powers to a Samoan union with

[37] Stevenson, Samoa, pp. 61-64.
[38] Bush to Gibson, No. 19, May 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Bayard, Carter reported, saw no objection to such a union so far as American interests were concerned, but felt that Hawaii would risk "her present political position in the family of nations by putting herself in danger of being drawn into the complications of Malietoa or of Samoa." Carter himself warned against such a union because of German opposition.

Meanwhile, Gibson, as we have seen had regretted his initial hasty and enthusiastic approving comments on March 11 on the Bush-Malietoa Treaty. He therefore sent Carter a dispatch on March 16 in which he adopted a more cautious stand. He told Carter that the treaty only was under consideration by Hawaii with respect to possible ratification. He also instructed Carter to ascertain whether the United States would permit a revision of the American-Samoan Treaty so as to enable Samoa to levy import and export duties denied it under that Treaty.

Carter, meanwhile, still unaware of the actual signing of a treaty in Samoa, not having received yet this information from Gibson, was making a major effort at Washington to urge the importance of recognizing Malietoa's supreme authority in Samoa. In part this effort stemmed from Carter's discovery, as reported by him on March 2, that there was a wide difference of State opinion within the United States/Department as to whether or not the United States should continue to acknowledge Malietoa as the only King in Samoa. During the latter part of March, he discussed the position of Malietoa with Alvensleben, Germany's Minister at Washington, and reported that the latter had denied emphatically the undivided authority of Malietoa, claiming instead equal authority for Tamasese. Bayard's personal attitude, Carter

39. See above, p. 113.
40. Carter to Gibson, No. 87, Confid., March 16, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
41. Carter to Gibson, No. 90, Confid., March 17, 1887, Ad, FO & Ex.
reported, was to try to avoid the whole question of Malietoa's authority until the Washington Conference had convened in order not to enter into any dispute with Germany.42

When Carter received the information of the signing of the confederation agreement and of its consideration by Hawaii, he informed Bayard of it in an interview with him on April 1. Bayard was upset because his policy at that time towards Samoa was concentrated upon a preparation for the scheduled three-power Conference at Washington. He desired to maintain the status quo until that Conference was held, so as to avoid any precipitate action by Germany. He was annoyed further because on February 25, he had assured Alvensleben that the rumor about Hawaii annexing Samoa was "all nonsense."43

Bayard, according to Carter's report on the April 1 interview, informed Carter that he was surprised at Bush's action since he had regarded Bush's mission as advisory. Bayard hoped that no hasty step would be taken. Carter said, but that Hawaii "would content itself with merely extending its good offices in the way of good counsel and advice." He said that he sought to avoid a situation of potential Hawaiian-German conflict and to avoid giving Germany a pretext for active interference.44

According to Bayard's account of the interview, Carter actually treated the confederation as a fait accompli, "accepted and approved by the Hawaiian Government." Carter's above report to Gibson said, however, that he had told Bayard only that Hawaii was considering the confederation with Samoa. Part of Bayard's memorandum on the interview dealt with an aspect

42. Carter to Gibson, No. 85, Confid., March 2, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.; Carter to Gibson, No. 89, Confid., March 17, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.; Carter to Gibson, No. 92, April 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
43. See above, pp. 120-121.
44. Carter to Gibson, No. 94, Confid., April 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
of it not reported upon by Carter to Gibson but an aspect very illuminating. Bayard stated that Carter had informed him that he believed that Gibson had talked the King into the whole thing. Carter also told him, Bayard said, that

...the Hawaiian Government had purchased a vessel and was arming it at an expense of $100,000, at Honolulu, and that it was to be used as a training ship. He also told me Bayard that a man of war was ordered in Great Britain. I said "What are they going to do with two armed vessels?" He answered "to send them to Samoa to protect Mr. Bush."

I asked him if he meant to protect Mr. Bush by getting into a conflict with the German man-of-war there. He said he did not know, but that the King was entirely misled by Mr. Gibson, and his Carter's idea was that the Hawaiian King wished to become the great leader of the Pacific Islands.

I told him that I heard this with astonishment; that I could see nothing in it that had a show of prudence or wisdom; that Samoa had not a breath of power which Germany would care to respect; that the only reason Malietoa had not been driven from the Island was the interest the United States had taken in the matter, and the treaty made with him; that I was acting upon this question on moral grounds, and holding Germany and England to obey the law of nations with regard to this weak little Kingdom.

Bayard reported that at the conclusion of this interview, he warned Carter that Hawaii's conduct was "unwise to the last degree." 45

On the day following this interview, April 2, Carter sent a note to Bayard on the confederation treaty, but stating only, since an information copy also had to be sent to Gibson, that the treaty was under consideration. Neither Bayard nor Carter, of course, knew then that the ratification actually already had been consummated on March 20. Carter's language in this note, with reference to the treaty, was very similar to the language in Gibson's note of March 11 to Carter informing the latter of it.

45. Tussill, Bayard, pp. 41-42, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after an interview with Carter, April 1, 1887.
At the same time, April 2, Carter transmitted to Bayard, Bush’s affidavits attesting to German arms sales in Samoa. He called this German activity to Bayard’s attention, he said, “in the hopes that the Governments of the powers interested will use their influence in preventing such sales.”

A third item also taken up in the April 2 note, in accordance with Gibson’s instructions, was a request for the United States to ease Samoa’s financial problems by eliminating a section of the Samoan-United States Treaty so as to permit Samoa to levy import and export duties on goods conveyed on United States’ vessels. Carter had broached this to Bayard during his interview, but reported that he found Bayard ignorant of the American-Samoan treaty stipulation against the levying of such duties by Samoa. 46

While awaiting Bayard’s reply to his April 2 note, Carter on April 9 reported further to Gibson on the nature and extent of State Department opposition to the Confederation. Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Adee, he said, had told him that “he had hoped, if the Powers could not agree upon a solution, that a proposition to invite Hawaii to cooperate with them might be made,” but that now it would be impossible. 47

When Bayard replied on April 12 to Carter’s note, he reiterated his disapproval of the proposed Confederation. The most that Hawaii should do, he said, should be to have an agent in Samoa offering advice. A Confederation would be handicapped by the difficulty for Hawaii to maintain communications with Samoa, and, he stated, “the expense of a naval

46. Ryder, Samoa, pp. 330-332, citing Carter to Bayard, April 2, 1887; Tansill, op. cit., p. 42, citing Carter to Bayard, April 2, 1887; Carter to Gibson, No. 94, Confid., April 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex. 47. Carter to Gibson, No. 96, Confid., April 9, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
force commensurate with the obligations assumed, would be a heavy burden upon the pecuniary resources of Hawaii." In addition, he said, the Hawaiian action would hinder the achievement of an agreement on Samoa by Britain, Germany, and the United States. With respect to Hawaii’s request as to whether the United States would give up its treaty rights regarding Samoa’s levying of duties, Bayard would give no response, he said, lest such a direct response be deemed to imply tacit United States acquiescence in the proposal.48

Bayard had more reason than ever by then to desire to tread cautious­ly. German pressure on Great Britain, coupled with Britain’s desire to conciliate Germany for reasons of "realpolitik," was resulting in a new political concert between those two nations towards Samoa. The German Minister to the United States, Alvensleben, on the day preceding Bayard’s April 12 letter to Carter, had given Bayard a note in answer to Bayard’s note to him of March 2 protesting against Brandeis’ actions. Alvensleben’s note denied Brandeis’ activities and denied also Malietoa’s position as king. The note had reflected Germany’s stiffening attitude. Thus Bayard, to insure that his opinion of Hawaii’s action should be known clearly, expressly stated his opposition to an alliance between Kalakaua and Malietoa in instructions he sent to the United States’ Ministers at Berlin and London on April 12, the same day that he sent his disapproving note to Carter.49 Neither Minister at Berlin or London was instructed to make any formal communications on this to the government to which each was accredited, but was instructed, however, to present Bayard’s opinion if the subject should be brought up by the secretary or the minister of foreign affairs in one

48. Bayard to Carter, April 12, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
49. Tansill, op. cit., pp. 42-45, 45, 47.
Meanwhile, on April 8, Gibson had notified Carter of the March 20 ratification, stressing its conditional nature, and instructing Carter to inform both the United States and Germany. Carter was instructed to reveal Hawaii’s intention to invite the Tongan, Cook, and Gilbert Islands to join in the Confederation. A survey of conditions in Samoa by Poor also was to be transmitted to the two nations. Similar instructions were sent to the Hawaiian Charge d’affaires at London with respect to the British government.\(^51\)

As soon as Carter received this notice of Hawaii’s March 20 ratification of the confederation agreement, he arranged an interview with Assistant Secretary of State Adee on April 26 to inform Bayard. In an effort to mollify Bayard, he addressed him a note that same day, April 26, calling attention to the “savings clause” in the ratification and stating that he would suggest to Gibson that any treaty negotiated under the confederation convention should be referred to the Powers for consultation. He then informed Gibson of this and said that he also intended to send a similar note to the German Minister (which he did on May 9). He warned Gibson that as a result of the confederation “I find our assurances of disinterestedness not as effective as they were...”\(^52\)

On the following day, April 27, Carter had another interview with Bayard. Bayard told him that he thought the only good point in the ratification was its savings clause. Again expressing his opposition to the

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51. Gibson to Carter, No. 16, April 8, 1887; Gibson to Hoffnvg, No. 8, April 11, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
52. Carter to Gibson, No. 92, April 26, 1887, with enclosure; copy of Carter to Bayard, April 26, 1887, rec’ed May 13, 1887; Carter to Alvensleben, May 9, 1887, copy enclosed in Carter to Gibson, No. 105, May 10, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
entire action, he urged that Hawaii not send an armed vessel to Samoa but that Hawaii's influence be exclusively moral. Carter reported:

Mr. Bayard said that the rights and position of Tanasee could not be ignored, and he very much regretted that the influence of Hawaii had not been exerted in favor of a reconciliation between the rival chiefs. He pointed out that Mr. Bush had before him the compact between Malietoa and Tanasee signed with the assent of the three consuls, and therefore could see that any alliance, or other Treaty of such importance, might be of questionable validity unless approved by the Vice King and he was afraid the influence of Hawaii was weakened by her espousal of the cause of Malietoa as sole sovereign.53

The compact referred to by Bayard was the consular-dictated settlement of 1881 under which Tanasee was made Vice-King and Malietoa, King. That Bayard, after Tanasee's lengthy German-supported rebellion, should discuss Tanasee's rights at this time indicated the extent of his desire to avoid any provocation of the Germans.

According to Bayard's account of this April 27 interview, Carter agreed with his adverse opinion of the treaty. According to Carter's report to Gibson on it, however, he told Bayard that the situation and events in Samoa had forced the matter and that it had come as a surprise both to Bush and to the Hawaiian Government.(1) Bayard, Carter stated, still hoped for an agreement under which Hawaii could cooperate with the Powers in Samoa and personally favored a leading role there for Hawaii, though as a disinterested mediator.54

Carter in follow-up reports on April 29 sought to explain further Bayard's stand. Bayard was being subjected to two anti-Hawaiian arguments, he said. One, he stated, was the realpolitik argument of the German

53. Tanenill, op. cit., p. 45, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after an interview with Carter, April 27, 1887; Carter to Gibson, No. 100, Confd., April 28, 1887, rec'd May 15, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.

54. Ibid.
Legation to the effect that Hawaii was too weak; the second was advanced by persons interested in missionary work to the effect that Hawaiian influence in Samoa would be immoral. The latter had troubled Bayard most, Carter reported. Carter suggested, therefore, that Hawaii survey Samoa's educational needs and consider the propriety of sending native Hawaiian ministers there also.55

On April 29, two days after Carter’s visit to Bayard, Alvensleben paid Bayard another visit and discussed in part Hawaii’s treaty with Samoa. Bayard remarked that he had been informed of it by Carter and that he did not regard it as "a treaty but as a proposition to form a treaty, as it was agreed upon so contingently upon the approval of the three powers; that it was a treaty in future." In concluding this interview, Bayard stated that

"...anything that could assist in building up a native civilisation in Samoa was highly desirable; that being of the same race with the Sandwich Islanders any advice from them might be taken more sympathetically by the Samoans, and I should be very glad if the Sandwich Islanders could give them any useful hints."

Why Bayard, who definitely disapproved strongly of the confederation treaty, should have adopted such a mild tone towards it when discussing it with the German Minister is not clear. The actual result of this was that Alvensleben reported to Berlin that Bayard seemed to approve King Kalakaua’s claims to interfere in Samoan affairs, thus increasing German suspicion of American complicity in Hawaii’s actions.57

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55. Carter to Gibson, Pvt. & Confid., April 29, 1887, rec’d May 13, 1887, AH, PO & Ex.
56. Tansill, op. cit., pp. 47-48, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after a conversation with Alvensleben, April 29, 1887.
During his interview with Carter on April 27, Bayard had requested Carter to submit his ideas regarding Samoa. Carter did this on May 10, using ideas basically taken from copies of, and extracts from, Bush's dispatches sent to him by Gibson. Carter recommended: (1) cessation of consular interference in Samoa; (2) revision by the major Powers of their Samoan treaties so as to enable Samoa to levy duties and raise revenues; (3) the end of a divided sovereignty in Samoa and the formation of a constitutional government there under one King; (4) a constitutional definition of the local powers of the districts; and (5) the establishment of a Land Commission.

Meanwhile, in Honolulu, a new plan by Gibson was being nipped in the bud. Gibson had intended to propose to the Powers that Hawaii participate in the Washington Conference. However, Sir Julian Paunoefote, the British Undersecretary of State, having been apprised by the German Ambassador at London that Hawaii would request its participation in the Conference, and having been requested by Germany to oppose such participation, had instructed James Wodehouse, British consul general at Honolulu, to express British and German opposition when a suitable opportunity arose. Wodehouse so informed Gibson on May 4, causing Gibson on May 7 to instruct Carter not to apply to Bayard for a place at the Conference.

In these instructions Gibson told Carter to emphasise to Bayard Hawaii's intention to attempt nothing which would bring Hawaii or Samoa into conflict with the action of the three Great Powers.... The idea of annexation or the attempt to assist King Malietoa with any force has never
been thought of. Bayard was to be assured that the Kaimiloa was not too much of an expense, that it would enable Hawaii to maintain communications with Samoa, and that its functions were limited solely to communication and training. Malietoa's rightful position as ruler also should be impressed upon Bayard, Gibson urged.60

Two days later, on May 9, Gibson suggested to Carter that a plebiscite be proposed and carried out in Samoa to determine the people's choice for king. The winner, he was sure, would be Malietoa. (Carter passed this suggestion on to Bayard early in June).

With respect to the Washington Conference, Gibson told Carter on May 9:

We may not take a part in the proposed Conference of the three Powers but the friendly and humane voice of Hawaii should penetrate their councils and reach and touch the generous spirit of the representatives of Great and Enlightened Nations; to point out to them and convince them that an interesting and homogeneous Race desire peace and good government and can obtain it in a way satisfying to the patriotism of the People by the non-intervention of Great foreign Powers.61

At the same time that Gibson was sending these instructions on May 7 and May 9 to Carter, he sent instructions of a similar nature to General Curtis P. Iaukea, whom he had commissioned on April 12 as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain to discuss both the Samoan situation and Hawaii's own treaty relationship with Great Britain.62

After a lengthy explanation of the peaceful nature of Hawaii's actions in

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60. Gibson to Carter, No. 17, May 7, 1887; Gibson to Carter, No. 18, May 7, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
61. Gibson to Carter, No. 19, May 9, 1887; Carter to Gibson, No. 104, June 9, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
62. Gibson to Iaukea, No. 1, April 12, 1887; Iaukea to Gibson, No. 2, June 15, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Samoa and the proposed mission of the \textit{Kaimiloa}, as well as a restatement of Hawaii's desire for non-intervention of the Powers in Polynesia, all for transmission by Iaukea to Salisbury, Gibson concluded: "If there are good reasons, unknown to His Majesty's Government, why the Treaty Powers should view the matter differently Hawaii will be prepared to retire."

On May 15, Gibson received Carter's dispatches of April 26 and April 29 informing him in detail of Bayard's adverse reaction to the information of Hawaii's ratification of the confederation treaty, and of Bayard's adverse opinion both of Bush's activities and of the projected dispatch of the \textit{Kaimiloa} from Honolulu to Samoa. By then, the \textit{Kaimiloa} was almost ready to depart, and so Gibson apparently decided that rather than cancel or delay further its departure, he would send his assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Webb, to Samoa on board the vessel to insure that it did not become involved in any undesirable incidents and thereby cause Hawaii further difficulty in its foreign relations.

Gibson informed Carter later that he had sent Webb "to ascertain the true condition of affairs in Samoa, and, perhaps, to act as a confidential adviser to the Legation during his stay there." On May 14, Gibson told Bush that Webb would be coming, explaining:

\begin{quote}
No official position has been given to Mr. Webb beyond that which he already holds.

The grave position of affairs in regard to the Foreign relations of Samoa has led me to deem it advisable to place Mr. Webb's personal knowledge of the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government and what has passed between the Government and the Powers interested in regard to Samoa,\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
63. Gibson to Iaukea, No. 2, May 9, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
64. Iaukea never transmitted these instructions to Salisbury for by the time he reached London, he concluded that nothing would be gained by including Samoa in his discussions. — Paunoefote to Wodehouse, No. 11A, June 16, 1887, copy, AH, Bo.
65. See above, pp. 142-144.
\end{footnotes}
at Your Excellency’s service. 66

There was no change, however, in Gibson’s original plans for Bush to proceed to Tonga and to other islands on his mission, utilizing the Laimilua to do so. Webb was not to go along, Gibson said, but was to return about July 1 to Honolulu. 67 Webb, Gibson also informed Bush, would bring him fifteen blank commissions for his use as follows: one for appointing a consul general at Samoa, one for a consul general at Tonga, one for a consul at Jaluit in the Marshalls, and six each for consuls and commercial agents, respectively, at other islands deemed desirable by Bush. Bush was authorised specifically in these instructions on May 14 to accept any annexation proposals made to him in the Gilberts, subject to ratification later by King Kalakaua.

Enclosed with these instructions were large and small portraits of Kalakaua; the large, for the leading chiefs; the small, for the minor ones. Bush was “to have them placed in such positions that the Samoan people may become familiar with the face of the Polynesian Monarch, our Sovereign.” Gibson also enclosed three photographs of the Kamahameha Statue, instructing Bush “to speak of this most famous Chief of the Hawaiian Islands, but without comparisons or suggestions which might be wrongly construed elsewhere.”

At the same time Bush also was informed that two Hawaiian teachers, whose salaries would be guaranteed by Hawaii, would leave for Samoa by the regular steamer on June 11 to initiate a system of education there. 68 This was not a new idea since Gibson first had discussed it in February

67. Ibid.
68. Gibson to Bush, Personal, May 14, 1887; Gibson to Bush, May 14, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
when he had informed Bush that Kalakaua had proposed the sending of a church and school-house to Samoa, along with an Hawaiian preacher and teacher. At that time Gibson had asked Bush to secure a Samoan request to Hawaii for such aid.69 Bush in March reported no objection from the Samoan government.70 Gibson, however, did not do anything in this regard until he received Carter’s dispatch of April 29 suggesting such action as a means of boosting Hawaii’s cause with Bayard.71 Later in May this proposed action became subject to newspaper criticism in Hawaii. The opposition press asked under what appropriation Gibson legally could proceed with the dispatch of the Reverend D. Keaweasmhi as a missionary teacher to Samoa. It also said Hawaii should not encroach in a field concentrated on by English societies.72

Four days after Gibson had informed Bush of his intention to send Webb to Samoa and of his other plans, the Kaimiloa sailed from Honolulu with Webb aboard. Its May 18 departure at 8:50 a.m.73 came only after many delays, after continuous criticism in Hawaii as well as from abroad, and under inauspicious circumstances. The Kaimiloa had been commissioned officially on March 28 by Gibson, acting as Secretary of War and of the Navy. It had been commissioned “for the Naval Service of the Kingdom,” in accordance with an authorisation by the Cabinet Council given that same day.74 The preamble to Gibson’s proclamation of commissioning had stated that the Hawaiian Navy was being reestablished:

WHEREAS, In consideration of the increasing commerce and foreign interests of the Kingdom, the Legislative Assembly

69. Gibson to Bush, No. 9, Feb. 19, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
70. Bush to Gibson, No. 13, March 29, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
71. See above, pp. 143-144.
73. P. C. Advertiser, May 19, 1887.
74. “Cabinet Council Minute Book, 1874-1891,” p. 369, AH.
deemed it proper to make provision for the purchase and maintenance of a Government vessel devoted to the public service of the nation, thereby not only providing for present needs, but also restoring a service which was actively in existence in the reigns of Kamehameha I, II and III,..."76

During the long period of the refitting of the Kaimiloa before its departure, a number of disciplinary cases had arisen involving the Reformatory School boys in the crew and causing criticism. The legality of the use of these boys had become another subject of criticism. It had been defended, however, on the grounds that those committed to the School during their minority were wards of the Board of Education for that period and could be apprenticed or otherwise disposed of by the Board pending their majority. It was argued that they would be learning a useful trade as sailors aboard the Kaimiloa.76

Press criticism of both the Kaimiloa and the Bush Mission had been continuous. The former had been criticised because of its expense and also had been ridiculed. The Hawaiian Navy, the Daily Bulletin had said, "will shortly make a demonstration in the great Pacific, to the South, to strike terror into the hearts of the natives, and teach the pigmy national ships of France, Germany, and Great Britain, in those waters, a necessary lesson." With respect to the Bush Mission's activities, doubt had been expressed by another newspaper as to Malietoa's real understanding of what was involved in a protectorate. The day before the Kaimiloa departed, this paper strongly had criticised the entire Samoan venture:

The affairs of Samoa are going to be settled by the three great powers and Hawaii is not likely to have much say in the matter. A Hawaiian clique may have been formed, due no doubt, to a liberal supply of square face gin, but square face, however liberally supplied, will have little effect upon the result of the deliberations of the powers, except

76. P. C. Advertiser, March 30, 1887.
76. Gazette, March 16, 1887; P. C. Advertiser, May 5, 1887.
to show that Hawaii is unfit for the position to which she has put forth her puny claim."

In an unsuccessful effort to ward off some of this type of criticism, Gibbon had sought to tie the Kaimiloa in with a mercy rescue mission. The Kaimiloa’s first mission, he had announced, would be to search for survivors of a long overdue Hawaiian schooner, the General Siegol, which had gone to French Frigate Shoal on a whaling expedition. It had taken so long, however, for the Kaimiloa to be fitted out, that the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company had dispatched its own rescue vessel to the Shoal. The Kaimiloa, therefore, went directly to Samoa.

Shortly before its May 18 departure, however, a disturbance had occurred on board during the evening of May 16 and had resulted in the last-minute dismissal of three officers. The affair had begun as a result of the refusal of a marine officer who was drinking with some sailors in the forecastle to return to his room when ordered to do so. The drunken officer instead had called out his marines for action. This incident resulted in severe criticism from the normally pro-government Pacific Commercial Advertiser which commented on it in an editorial entitled, "A National Disgrace." The incident also was a good indication of what lay ahead of the vessel.

Three days after the Kaimiloa’s departure, the Cabinet Council considered the restoration of the Order of Arcoi and Gibbon was selected to
investigate and report on it. The Cabinet's action was significant in indicating how much the spirit and historical precedent of Charles St. Julian influenced the Gibson regime.

Only three weeks after the Kaimiloa had departed, however, and even before it had reached its destination, Gibson sent new instructions on June 10 recalling Bush and the Kaimiloa, and appointing Poor in Bush's place. Some time after the Kaimiloa's May 18 departure, Gibson had received a letter very critical of Bush from William Coe, Malietoa's Assistant Secretary of State, and a copy sent by Coe of a similar type of letter allegedly from Malietoa, the original of which was not received.

Coe's letter said:

I beg to inform you that Mr. Bush's conduct during his residence here is of a most disreputable nature and his habits are very intemperate, as he appears to be addicted to an excessive use of ardent spirits. He is the most dissipated man who has held a high position at this place for many years. His associates here are mostly of the lowest kind of half castes and whites. His Majesty King Malietoa desires me to call your attention to this.

Gibson informed Webb that Kalakaua had come "to fear some hasty and ill-judged action" by Bush and thus Gibson felt it necessary to recall him. He asked Webb to remain to assist Poor.

Apparently there had been increasing concern by Gibson, after the departure of the Kaimiloa, as to the wisdom of its dispatch. On June 9, H. M. Sewall, the new United States Consul for Samoa, passed through Honolulu en route to Apia. He spoke to both Gibson and Kalakaua and was entertained by the former in the evening. Gibson sought vigorously to justify and defend Hawaii's mission to Polynesia to Sewall. Gibson

82. Gibson to Webb, June 10, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
83. San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1895.
84. Gibson to Webb, June 10, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
85. P. C. Advertiser, June 10, 1887; Sewall, Partition of Samoa, p. 12.
informed Poor later of his meeting with Sewall, reporting that Sewall appeared to desire "a happy issue of affairs in Samoa especially directed towards the maintenance of Polynesian independence, thus giving me strong hopes of the eventual success of our Mission." He instructed Poor to cultivate Sewall so that "the American Consulate and the Hawaiian Legation can be a united body working in harmony in favor of the peace and prosperity of Samoa and the eventual recognition of Malietoa."86

Probably influencing Gibson's recall decision of June 10 was his receipt that same day of dispatches from Carter in Washington and from Hoffnung in London informing him that nothing further could be done until after the Washington Conference was held. Hoffnung also enclosed a copy of a note sent him in April by Salisbury, reiterating British opposition to the Bush Mission in Samoa and explaining that Britain previously had warned Hawaii against such action out of a desire to help Hawaii.87

Gibson responded to Carter and Hoffnung on June 15 in separate notes stating that as a result of the British and American views, Hawaii did not intend to press any further diplomatic action but would await and abide by the results of the Washington Conference, (the first session of which was held ten days later on June 25).88

Gibson forwarded to Poor on June 10 his commissions as High Commissioner to the Sovereign Chiefs and Peoples of Polynesia, and as Charge

86. Gibson to Poor, June 10, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
87. Carter to Gibson, Personal, May 25, 1887, rec'd June 10, 1887; Sidney B. Francis-Hoffnung to Gibson, No. 35, May 11, 1887, with enclosure: Salisbury to Hoffnung, copy, April 22, 1887, rec'd June 10, 1887; Abraham Hoffnung to Gibson, No. 34, May 15, 1887, rec'd June 10, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
88. Gibson to S. B. Francis-Hoffnung, No. 11, June 15, 1887; Gibson to Carter, No. 25, June 15, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
d’Affaires for the Kingdom of Samoa at Apia. Both commissions also were dated June 10, indicating the rapidity of the decision.\(^{39}\) (Gibson in a June 4 dispatch to Carter regarding the Kaimiloa made no mention of any impending changes).\(^{40}\)

Gibson sent separate instructions on June 10 direct to Jackson and Bush, requesting the former to return immediately with the Kaimiloa to Honolulu, and ordering the latter to resign and return with Jackson. Copies of Coe’s letters were enclosed by Gibson in his instructions to Bush and the latter was told these were “the occasion of your recall.”\(^{41}\)

Though Gibson was recalling Bush and the Kaimiloa, he did not intend that the Mission to Polynesia should end. This was indicated not only by the commissioning of Poor as High Commissioner to the Sovereign Chiefs and Peoples of Polynesia, but also by his statement to Poor that he was considering the granting by Hawaii of a subsidy for a monthly steamer run between Hawaii and Samoa as previously suggested by Poor. Poor further was instructed to inform Malietoa of Kalakaua’s intention to educate Malietoa’s two sons in Hawaii. He was told to send the two boys to Honolulu when convenient.

The basic reason for the recall of the Kaimiloa and Bush was given to Poor by Gibson in his instructions:

In view of...the earnest appeal made to us by the great Powers of England and America, who are evidently desirous to favor our views so long as we deal faithfully with them, we desire to avoid any possible appearance of any indiscretion or precipitancy or to give them the slightest grounds of apprehension as to our conduct. For that reason His Majesty has instructed me to order Commander Jackson

\(^{39}\) Commissions to Poor by King Kalakaua, June 10, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
\(^{40}\) Gibson to Carter, No. 22, June 4, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
\(^{41}\) Gibson to Jackson, June 10, 1887, copy; Gibson to Bush, June 10, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
to bring H. M. S. Kaimiloa home direct without calling at any other place,

Bush was to be told to return for conferences on Samoan and other matters, Gibson said, and no impression of the return as a recall was to be given him. Why Gibson instructed Poor to handle Bush so gently, while at the same time, in his own communication with Bush he sent copies of Coe's letters and clearly intimated that Bush was being recalled, is not clear.

Sewall, the American consul at Samoa, wrote later that he considered that Bush had been made a scapegoat since Bush had followed his instructions in general and since Coe's letter, insofar as its support by Malietoa was concerned, later was proven false. Sewall's estimate probably is partly true in that by recalling Bush, as well as the Kaimiloa, Gibson probably hoped to assure the Powers of Hawaii's peaceful intentions. However, the letters from Coe probably helped influence his recall together with a belief that only by doing so could a safe and reliable course of action by Hawaii in Samoa be assured.

92. Gibson to Poor, June 10, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
CHAPTER XIII

THE END OF THE SAMOAN MISSION

Gibson’s action on June 10, 1887, in recalling Bush and the Kaimiloa was the last significant thing he did in connection with the Samoan Mission. His control of the domestic political situation in Hawaii had deteriorated so much by then that it occupied all of his attention for the remainder of the month until his ouster from office on June 30. Opposition to his regime because of its heavy expenditures, political scandals, foreign policy, etc., had existed for a long time in Hawaii but came to a head as a result of a bribery affair connected with government licensing of the sale of opium. This caused a mass meeting of protest on June 30 which resulted in the King dismissing Gibson and his cabinet. Godfrey Brown replaced Gibson on July 1 as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Gibson, who had been arrested on a charge of embezzlement that same day, was allowed to flee on a sailing ship for San Francisco on July 5.¹

Meanwhile, because the mail cutter from Apia had missed meeting at Pago Pago the steamer from Honolulu to Sydney, which had carried Gibson’s June 10 recall dispatches,² Bush remained ignorant of their contents until late July.³ Bush and Poor thus continued operating actively until then despite the change of policy in Honolulu.

The Kaimiloa arrived at Apia on June 16 after a difficult 29-day voyage from Honolulu. Captain George E. Gresley Jackson had been sick, probably drunk, for the first eleven days. The ship had been over-

². Webb to Gibson, Prt., June 21, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
³. Webb to Brown, No. 8, July 18, 1887, Alii, FO & Ex.
⁴. Webb to Gibson, No. 1, June 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
led. Except for Jackson, who however had been incapacitated much of the time, none of the officers had displayed any skill in navigation and the chronometers had been inaccurate. The Reformatory School boys had received no instruction at all. Books which had been taken along to enable them to continue their schooling had remained packed in their unopened crates. Discipline had been poor and there had been too much for the captain to do. Despite all this, Bush and Poor each reported that the Kaimiloa made a favorable impression at first after its arrival.

The ship brought as a gift from Kalakaua to Malietoa a gorgeous uniform and a fine wardrobe. Malietoa wore the uniform when he first formally received Captain Jackson and the ship’s officers in Apia. On his returning this visit on June 28 on board the Kaimiloa, he was greeted with a 21-gun salute. This was the type of pomp and circumstance Gibson and Kalakaua long had planned for in connection with a Mission to Polynesia.

The Kaimiloa’s arrival in mid-June coincided with another attempt by Bush and Poor to aid Malietoa by making a deal with Tamasese to eliminate his opposition. Both Webb and Bush reported separately, on June 21, that Tamasese then was weaker than he ever had been. Poor was making arrangements with Tiai, Tamasese’s secretary, Bush said, for a secret meeting to be held in the week following June 21 between some members of the Hawaiian Mission and some of Tamasese’s leading chiefs. Tiai, in fact, had requested a meeting with Bush in a June 14 letter to Malietoa’s

5. Webb to Gibson, June 21, 1887; Webb to Gibson, No. 2, June 20, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 22, June 21, 1887; Webb to Brown, No. 6, July 18, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
6. Bush to Gibson, No. 22, June 21, 1887; Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Assistant Secretary of State, William Coe. Nothing concrete apparently developed from these secret negotiations for nothing further was reported on them.

Although Bush previously had informed Gibson that he intended to proceed to Tonga soon after the arrival at Apia of the Kaimiloa, he changed his plans after its arrival and reported instead that he desired to make a tour aboard the Kaimiloa of all districts in Samoa, in the optimistic hope of securing thereby overwhelming support for Malietoa. Bush by this time also had developed more detailed plans for a government for Samoa which he forwarded to Gibson on June 21. A loan by Hawaii would still be necessary. In addition, he proposed a five-man Samoan Cabinet, the Secretary of Finance and the Attorney General of which would be appointed by King Kalakaua. The latter also would appoint, Bush said, the Chief Justice and a Director General with prescribed powers of inspection and direction. The Postmaster, according to his plan, would be under the direction of the Postmaster General at Honolulu.

Meanwhile, German opposition toward, and suspicion of, the Bush Mission had increased greatly. Several days after the Kaimiloa arrived, on June 21, Bush sent it to Tutuila to pick up mail. During this trip, because of German distrust, it was trailed by the German corvette Adler. This was fortunate for Captain Jackson because he became prostrated with dysentery and received medical aid from the Adler's surgeon.

8. Thai to Coe, June 14, 1887, translation; Webb to Gibson, No. 4, June 21, 1887; Bush to Gibson, No. 22, June 21, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
10. Webb to Gibson, No. 2, June 20, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.; Webb to Gibson, No. 23, June 21, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
Following the Kaimiloa's return on June 24, Bush decided to start implementing his plans by visiting Mataafa aboard the Kaimiloa, in an effort to insure Malietoa of Mataafa's support. Mataafa, as a chief of equal rank to Tamasese, still was the center of a tug of war between the Hawaiians and the Germans. Bush had remained since April in intermittent communication with him to the displeasure of the Germans.

Mataafa had been warned indirectly on June 1, by a Samoan interpreter for the German consulate, that "Germany will not allow Samoa to federate with Hawaii," and that Germany's plans for Samoa would prevail.

Because Jackson was still sick, Bush hired a native pilot to guide the Kaimiloa to Atua District on this visit to Mataafa. He left Apia on June 28, again trailed closely by the Adler, this time with the German vice-consul aboard it. Bush went ashore at his destination to participate in a feast Mataafa had prepared and to exchange presents. He found the chief's attitude very satisfactory. While they were thus together, two officers from the Adler came ashore to Mataafa and summoned him to come aboard the Adler. Mataafa told them that if any German officials wished to see him, they were welcome to come and join in the feast for Bush.

Snubbed in this manner, the Germans instead took two of Mataafa's subordinate chiefs on board and brought them back to Apia. In the evening, they illuminated the Adler and fired off rockets as though a victory had been achieved, all the while spreading a report that they had succeeded in bringing Mataafa away from the Hawaiians and had him aboard. They

13. Ibid. (Both items).
hoped thereby to save face and bolster Tamasese's position.  

Bush returned from this adventurous excursion on July 1.  

Some time after the ship's return and before it left again on July 9 on another trip, a mutiny occurred similar to that which had taken place just shortly before the Kaimiloa left Honolulu. Some of the crew, including the gunner, returned to the ship in a drunken condition after a period of shore liberty. The gunner got into a dispute with some of the officers and made an unsuccessful rush for the magazine in an attempt to blow up the ship. Three officers then went ashore and either tried to resign or were threatened with being fired by Jackson. Bush, however, ordered them to remain in service and sent Poor and Jackson to the ship to quell the mutiny. Although Strong and Webb later reported that Poor and Jackson succeeded in restoring order at gunpoint, Robert Louis Stevenson reported that the mutineers bound Poor to the deck. Another account, corroborating this, states that after Poor had been chained to the dock for three hours, the Adler hove alongside. Its captain reportedly threatened to take the Kaimiloa and sail it back to Honolulu with the mutineers in irons, thus finally quelling the disturbance. The gunner and two other white seamen who were involved, and who refused subsequently to obey orders, were not tried but were paid off at Apia and their passage to Sydney, Australia, arranged.

Despite the Kaimiloa's unsatisfactory disciplinary conditions, Bush

16. P. C. Advertiser, Aug. 3, 1887; Aug. 27, 1887; Stevenson, Samoa, p. 61;
18. P. C. Advertiser, Aug. 27, 1887. Webb to Brown, No. 6, July 18, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.; Stevenson, op. cit., p. 58; San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1893; Poor to E. O. Smith, Hawaiian Consul General, Sydney, July 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
persisted in his intention to visit as many areas of Samoa as possible to boost Malietoa's cause. Although Jackson was opposed to the projected voyage, he accompanied Bush this time since he was "fearful for the safety of the ship." They left on July 9 for a trip to Savaii Island, leaving Poor and Webb behind at Apia. They proceeded first to Afega near Apia to pick up Malietoa, who was scheduled to accompany Bush, but Malietoa elected not to go. Bush continued his journey anyway, visiting several chiefs on Savaii who were in the Tamasese faction in an effort to gain their support. He returned to Apia with the Kaimiloa on July 20. Webb reported that aside from the consumption of seven cases of gin on the trip, its only result "was to gratify the several chiefs visited by a sight of the ship, and by having the band sent ashore to entertain their people."19

When Bush returned to Apia on July 20, he found an entirely new situation confronting him. Gibson's long-delayed instructions of June 10 recalling Bush and the Kaimiloa finally had reached Samoa on July 17 on the mail steamer's return trip from Australasia. On the following day, July 18, new and additional instructions, dated July 7, had been received from Godfrey Brown, Gibson's successor in the Foreign Office. The regime which had replaced the Gibson cabinet had come into office with a completely different orientation. Thus Brown, on July 7, had sent Poor notice that it had been decided to recall the entire Mission, including Poor, and not only Bush and the Kaimiloa as Gibson had ordered. He had charged Poor with the responsibility for winding up the Mission, saying:

It will be unnecessary for you to suggest any further reasons for the recall of the Embassy than that the date of the Washington Conference being so indefinite, and the thorough understanding existing between Hawaii, the United States and Great Britain in regard to Samoan matters render it inadvisable to continue the Mission.  

Poor immediately acknowledged receipt of these orders in a dispatch to Brown on July 19 in which he informed Brown that Webb would remain in Samoa for another month to help him close out affairs. He added that since Bush had been handling all financial matters for the preceding two months, Poor was unfamiliar with what expenditures actually had been made during that time. He expressed regret at the decision to recall the entire Mission:

I fear it will be a great disappointment to Malietoa and his chiefs who rely on the Hawaiian Mission for moral support without which they might be forced into hostilities with the rebels who will grow bolder under their German leadership when they think Hawaii has forsaken Malietoa. It certainly is the fact that the presence of the Hawaiian Embassy in Samoa has tended to preserve the peace, and the arrival of the "Kaimiloa" served as a strong influence to reunite wavering chiefs under Malietoa and to break up the petty rebellion. I would urgently recommend that a Consul General be appointed here to represent us.  

Poor obeyed his instructions, however, and on July 23 informed the Malietoa government of the decision to recall the Hawaiian Mission at the same time he requested Captain Jackson to prepare the Kaimiloa to depart as soon as possible for its direct return to Honolulu. The Kaimiloa did not leave too quickly, nevertheless, because of various difficulties which developed as a result of (1) antagonistic attitudes towards Poor by Bush and Malietoa, (2) lack of funds, and (3) continued

20. Brown to Poor, July 7, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
21. Poor to Brown, No. 24, July 19, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
22. Poor to Selu, Secretary of State to Malietoa, July 25, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
23. Poor to Jackson, July 23, 1887, copy, AH, FO & Ex.
poor discipline aboard the vessel.

The day after Bush returned he read his recall instructions and immediately moved his family out of the Hawaiian Mission's quarters. He took with him all of the records of the Mission and despite repeated requests for them from Poor, refused to give them up, stating that he would mail them to the Hawaiian Foreign Office. Bush was enraged by his receipt, in Gibson's recall instructions to him, of copies of the critical letters sent to Gibson by Coe. Bush informed Malietoa of what had transpired and as an initial result Coe was forced to resign from office. Malietoa denied having instructed Coe to write a critical letter and from then on he and his chiefs were unfriendly towards Poor. Bush made them believe, Poor charged, that he had instructions from Hawaii superior to Poor's, i.e., from the King.

Bush later, in August, sent a letter to King Kalakaua, with whom he had been very close, enclosing a letter from Malietoa to Bush denying the authenticity of Coe's letter. Bush stated that Malietoa's real attitude towards him was indicated by Malietoa's request to him to remain in Samoa as his adviser. Bush charged in his letter that Poor had prompted and dictated the letter signed by Coe. Bush stated that he had learned that Molly, his daughter, had been living with Poor as the latter's mistress, thereby implying a possible motive for Poor's unfriendly action. Molly had become pregnant, Bush said, and had had to undergo an abortion.

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24. Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887; Poor to Bush, Aug. 11, 1887, copy; Bush to Webb, Aug. 16, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
25. See above, pp. 152, 154.
In point of fact, Bush's charges, with respect at least to Poor's prompting Coe to write the letter, probably were true. In the Archives of Hawaii there is a letter from Coe to Poor, dated July 30, in which Coe complains to Poor that "you and I are called conspirers, but we have not conspired against no one [sic], it is for the justice of the thing not against any one. Remember me to Molly...." In point of fact, also, Bush continued to advise Malietoa until Malietoa was attacked by the Germans in late August. Bush did not return on the Kaimiloa, refusing an offer of free transportation for himself, his family, and his servants. He claimed instead, in early August, that he had received private instructions from King Kalakaua to remain as Malietoa's adviser. Although it is possible that Kalakaua sent such instructions, it is not probable since Bush's lengthy letter to Kalakaua, arguing Bush's case, itself was dated only August 15. Bush probably, therefore, simply was putting up a front in claiming receipt of the instructions.

In addition to Bush's and Malietoa's hostilities as factors hindering the departure of the Kaimiloa, lack of funds for salaries, coal and provisions, was another important factor. The new regime at Honolulu had refused payment of two of Bush's previous bills and businessmen at Apia decided, therefore, that the new Hawaiian government probably would repudiate the debts of the old. No one, as a result, would extend any credit to the Hawaiian Mission. As an interim measure, surplus ship's stores were auctioned off. Finally, on August 5, Harry Jay Moors, an American businessman, came to Poor's rescue and loaned him at a high interest rate...

28. Coe to Poor, July 30, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
29. Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
the necessary funds. Moors at one time had been employed by Hawaii as a labor agent in the South Pacific. He had been friendly with and done much business with Bush. In addition, he had been in favor of Bush's real objectives. In October, 1866, he had written to the Hawaiian government advocating (1) the dispatch of an Hawaiian Commission to Samoa, (2) the annexation of Samoa to Hawaii, and (3) the payment by Hawaii of annual subsidies to both Malietoa and Tamasoa. Poor, just before his departure from Samoa, appointed Moors as Hawaii's consular agent.

Moors helped Poor liquidate the physical assets of the Hawaiian Mission. Bush had built the Mission's quarters on land for which he had secured no lease. Folau, the property owner, at Bush's instigation, demanded so much rent for the lot that no one would buy the quarters. Finally, on August 10, Poor sold the structures cheaply to Moors who then moved them elsewhere for resale. Folau, at Bush's continued urging, then brought suit against Moors, contesting the sale, and a compromise settlement was not reached until early in 1888.

Moors also agreed to help Poor by assuming the responsibility for collecting payments on two mortgages totalling $638.85. Bush had accepted these mortgages on Samoan properties as security for loans which he made to chiefs to pay for the purchase of arms. These debts were not cleared off the Hawaiian Foreign Office account books until June or July.
While Poor was engaged thus at Apia in late July and early August in arranging for the physical liquidation of the Mission, Webb supervised the preparations for departure of the Kaimiloa. He had a major problem on his hands. Two days after the Kaimiloa had returned on July 20 from its mission with Bush to Savaii, a semi-mutiny occurred. The marines aboard the ship refused for a while to help load coal without payment of a bonus, which, however, was not paid to them. From then on, the situation became worse. Poor later characterized the Kaimiloa as "a disgrace to her flag." He wrote in his final report:

The native officers were utterly incompetent in their duties and...conducted themselves in the most scandalous manner ashore entirely neglecting their duties on ship-board. There was a state of continuous insubordination on the ship and utter disregard of all order and discipline. With a few exceptions the marines and white sailors behaved badly, the marines continually breaking liberty by swimming ashore and disturbing the town with their drunken conduct.34

Both Poor and Webb claimed, however, that the conduct of the Reformatory School boys on the whole was good.35

Two marines and one Reformatory School boy deserted at Apia and were not captured. Others were. In one case, Webb reported later, a native hid and fed two boys and a marine with the intention of collecting a reward for giving them up. Webb heard about them, however, and arranged for their arrest independently. The native who had been sheltering them attempted, nevertheless, to collect for their board and lodging. When

33. Webb to Brown, No. 7, July 19, 1887; Secretary, Foreign Office to Moors, Dec. 17, 1887; Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887; Moors to W. W. Mist, Secretary to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 17, 1888, rec'd June 30, 1888, AH, FO & Ex.
34. Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887; Webb to Brown, Aug. 27, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
35. Ibid.
refused, he obtained the arrest of the man who had captured the boys for Webb on the grounds of "interfering with the duties of the Municipal police."^{36}

In preparation for the departure of the Kaimiloa and of the Mission, Poor and Webb attempted to see Malietoa on August 1 to bid him good-by. Still angry, he refused to see them. Arrangements subsequently were made, however, through Selu, Malietoa’s secretary of State, for a return visit on August 6.^{37} Malietoa sent a note, cold in tone, to Selu agreeing to it. He expressed his regret in the note at having failed to receive Poor and Webb because of his unsettled mind. However, he said, he always would honor Kalakaua and his government. A point of particular significance in Malietoa’s note was his reference to the Kaimiloa as a "man-of-war," this despite Gibson’s previous clear-cut characterization of the vessel to Bush as a vessel of peace.^{38}

The official farewell visit was made on August 6. According to Bush, Jackson also attended but had the D. T.’s.^{39} Malietoa expressed his disappointment at the Mission’s departure, stating, according to Poor, that he “would abide faithfully by the Treaty of Confederation made with King Kalakaua and wait patiently for the decision of the Convention at Washington hoping the result would be the independence of Samoa with a government under Hawaiian direction.”^{40} Well might Malietoa have regretted the Hawaiian Mission’s departure, for with it went the last visible sign of any foreign support against the increasingly strong German threat.

^{36} Webb to Brown, Aug. 27, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
^{37} Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
^{38} Malietoa to Secretary for Foreign Affairs [Selu], Aug. 1, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
^{40} Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
In reporting on this farewell visit, Poor disclosed some information of significance with respect to Malietoa's and possibly (previously) Gibson's plans. He said:

King Malietoa had intended to ask for a passage in the "Kaimiloa" to Honolulu as he desired to see Hawaii and to confer with King Kalakaua about the proposed Confederation and personally conclude a definite Treaty. The recent change of affairs in Hawaii induced him to defer his plans, but I think he still entertains the idea of visiting Hawaii some time in the near future. I did not refer to the subject in my interview with him thinking it might embarrass the Administration should he be encouraged to visit Hawaii at the present moment.41

The Kaimiloa finally left Apia on its return voyage at 4:30 p.m. on August 8. Just before it departed, Poor commissioned as Jackson's second in command, the boatswain, James Hilbus, whom he regarded as the only reliable man on the ship. Poor and Webb remained behind at Apia to finish liquidating the Mission's physical assets. They completed this the following week, and on August 16, they went by cutter toPago Pago on Tutuila Island to await the regular Sydney--Honolulu mail steamer due to touch briefly at Pago Pago the following day. To their great surprise, they discovered that instead of obeying instructions and going straight to Honolulu, Jackson had brought the Kaimiloa to Pago Pago, where it still remained. It had been there since August 10 while her crew bartered muskets for pigs, and the captain, her plated service to the chief of the bay area, for similar considerations. A warning sent to Jackson on August 18 by Poor to proceed to Honolulu resulted in Poor's receipt of a favorable answer from Hilbus the next day. Poor and Webb that same day, August 19, boarded the regular steamer Alameda to Honolulu.42

41. Ibid.
Poor and Webb reached Honolulu on August 25, long before the
Kaimiloa; the latter did not arrive until September 23. It had not left
Pago Pago until August 22. The press report on its return said simply
that the men were happy to be back and wanted some poi (native Hawaiian
food). The Kaimiloa was decommissioned on October 1, 1887, and turned
over to the Interior Department of the government.43

The Hawaiian Kingdom was not yet finished, however, with the Samoan
mission. In mid-October, Webb, having pleaded guilty to a charge of em­
bezzlement of $54.00 of official funds, was sentenced to one year of hard
labor and costs.44

Bush and his family returned to Honolulu the following month on
November 18.45 Bush tried to claim some back salary from the Foreign
Office but was refused on the grounds that he previously had drawn far
more on his salary account than he had been authorised.46

43. P. C. Advertiser, Sept. 24, 1887; Rep. Of Min. Of For. Affairs 1888,
   p. 5; "Log Book 1887 H.H.M.'s Training Ship 'Kaimiloa'," Alii, Kahanamoku
   Collection.
   The Kaimiloa was purchased some time after by the Inter-Island Steam-
   ship Company, then sold again in 1902 and refitted for use as an oil
tender. On June 7, 1910, a junkman named C. H. Brown purchased it
and in 1912 it was burned for its copper.— P. C. Advertiser, June 29,
1906; Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 21, 1945.
   Jackson, Captain of the Kaimiloa, returned to the United States where
he passed himself off as an Admiral. He spoke very disparagingly of
Hawaii and of the Kaimiloa in a press interview in November, 1887;
"The fitting out of the man-of-war was a complete farce as there is
no use for a navy, and then the natives are too cowardly to make
sailors, much less fighters. The native is devoid of all the charac­
teristics of an officer, is dishonest, and has none of the habits of
a gentleman—he is fit only to drink gin." P. C. Advertiser, Nov.
16, 1887.

44. P. C. Advertiser, Oct. 15, 1887.
45. Ibid., Nov. 19, 1887.
   AH, FO & Ex.
Requests for payment of bills for goods supplied to the Kalimiloa before its departure from Honolulu for Samoa still were being made of the Foreign Office in January of the next year, 1888.\textsuperscript{47} And in March of that year, Curtis P. Iaukea, Kalakaua's Chamberlain, requested Jonathan Austin, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to reimburse Kalakaua for $500.00 advanced by the latter the preceding December 10 to agents of the Oceanic Steamship Company, to pay for the return passage to Honolulu of Bush and his wife.\textsuperscript{48} Austin refused, stating that Bush had no valid claim since he had been offered free return passage on the Kalimiloa and had declined it. Bush himself should reimburse Kalakaua, Austin said.\textsuperscript{49} The significance of this is that Kalakaua, by advancing Bush the money in the first place, probably was indicating not only his continuing faith in, and friendship with, Bush, but also, indirectly, his continuing conviction in the rightness of Bush's Mission and of Bush's previous activities.

\textsuperscript{47} Pacific Hardware to Jonathan Austin, Min. of For. Affairs, Jan. 7, 1888; G. W. Macfarlane to Austin, Jan. 11, 1888, AH, FO & Ex.
\textsuperscript{48} Iaukea to Austin, March 2, 1888, AH, FO & Ex.
\textsuperscript{49} Austin to Iaukea, March 6, 1888, AH, FO & Ex.
CHAPTER XIV

GERMANY'S EXTREME REACTION TO THE SAMOAN MISSION
AND AN EVALUATION OF HAWAII'S POLICY

Just as the situation in Samoa itself had gotten beyond Gibson's immediate control by mid-June, 1887, even though on June 10 he had ordered the recall of Bush and the Kamiloa, so a similar situation had developed even before June 10 in Hawaii's foreign relations, with respect to the reaction of the major Powers towards Hawaii's Samoan policy. The recall instructions, furthermore, remained unknown to the Powers for a long time, thus contributing to this situation.

German pressure upon Great Britain had resulted in a firm, united Anglo-German opposition to Hawaii's activities. German suspicion of, and hostility towards, Hawaii then became so great that the diplomatic and other international consequences of Hawaii's actions made themselves evident for some time even after Gibson's ouster from office.

Concerted Anglo-German action against Hawaii had developed particularly after the Hawaiian ratification on March 20 of the Samoan confederation treaty. On May 16 Germany informed Great Britain, through the German embassy in London, that it had received copies of the Samoa-Hawaii treaty with the Hawaiian ratification thereof, and that Germany intended to ignore it. The German note stated also that the legality of the agreement was doubtful because "Malietaa has really ceased to be recognized as King by the majority of the Samoans."1 By this time Germany was certain of British support, for geopolitical reasons, with regard to Samoa, and

1. Prince Pless to Salisbury, Memo, May 16, 1887, copy enclosed in T. V. Lister to Woodhouse, No. 10, Pol., Confid., May 31, 1887, copy, AH, BC.
was making no attempt to conceal its sharp hostility towards both Malieta and Hawaii.\(^2\)

This was made clear on May 20 when Alvensleben, the Minister of Germany at Washington, had an interview with Secretary of State Bayard. Bayard was informed that the German Foreign Office regarded the Kalakaua-Malieta treaty as "a travesty" and that it would be "entirely ignored" by German officials. At this point in the interview, Alvensleben spoke so hastily and indistinctly that Bayard, in a memorandum on the conversation, wrote later that he could not understand his exact language, but it was evident that the German Government was disposed to give no recognition whatever to this alliance between Malieta and the Sandwich Islands as strengthening in any way the title of Malieta to be ruler of Samoa.\(^3\)

Later in their conversation, Bayard stated to Alvensleben that

...the United States would not desire to see the obliteration of the native control in these Islands; that I thought there was a chance for their advancement, and that I understood the conceded design of the three great powers was to promote that design and not to destroy it.\(^4\)

Bayard informed Carter of the German intention to ignore the Hawaii-Samoa treaty in a conversation with him on June 3, some two weeks later. According to Bayard, Carter agreed with him that Hawaiian policy towards Samoa had been very "unwise," and said also

...that Gibson the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hawaii, had assured him in his private letters that the treaty with Samoa was arranged by Mr. Bush secretly, without his knowledge and by connivance with the King. Bush had been the editor of a paper in Hawaii which was continually harping upon the necessity of the King obtaining the primacy of the Pacific, and had infected the King with that notion,

\(^2\) Tansill, Bayard, p. 48.
\(^3\) Tansill, op. cit., p. 48, citing Memo by Bayard after talk with Alvensleben, May 20, 1887.\(^4\) Ibid.
so that the King had been personally disposed to take 400 Hawaiian soldiers and go down to Samoa and help Mauitea.\textsuperscript{5} He said he had showered telegrams upon the King in opposition to this movement and thought that had restrained him.\textsuperscript{5}

Bayard concluded this conversation, he later wrote, by expressing the view that it was "obviously absurd for the King [Kalakaua] to bring himself into conflict with the wishes of the German Government and I hoped he had not made matters more difficult for the United States to settle favorably with Mauitea."\textsuperscript{6} Carter's report to Gibson on this interview merely stated that he had been informed that Germany regarded Hawaii's action as an unwarranted intrusion but that Bayard appeared "quite hopeful" of a satisfactory settlement.\textsuperscript{7}

With respect to Carter's comments to Bayard, as has been pointed out previously,\textsuperscript{8} his references to Gibson's lack of knowledge as to what was going on were completely untrue. With respect to the possibility of the dispatch of armed troops by Hawaii having been considered seriously, there is no evidence, other, of course, than the arming of the Kaimiloa and the Hawaiian Cabinet decision in January to try to obtain a British gunboat.\textsuperscript{9}

Poor, in a possibly relevant letter written in January, 1887, soon after the arrival in Samoa of the Bush Mission, had reported, however, that as a result of a general rumor in Samoa that an Hawaiian Embassy was coming with troops to annex Samoa, the Germans had become alarmed and had ordered arms and ammunition from Sydney.\textsuperscript{10} In addition, Brandeis had been dispatched as a military adviser to Tamasae, probably as a result of Bush's arrival on the scene.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{5} Tansill, op. cit., pp. 48-49, citing Memo by Bayard after talk with Carter, June 5, 1887.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{7} Carter to Gibson, No. 104, June 9, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.

\textsuperscript{8} See above, p.124.

\textsuperscript{9} See above, pp. 114, 115.

\textsuperscript{10} Poor to Webb, Jan. 31, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.

\textsuperscript{11} See above, p. 109.
On June 4, the day after Carter had been informed by Bayard of the German intention to ignore the Samoan confederation treaty, Carter visited Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the British Minister. According to the latter’s report on the ensuing conversation, Carter assured him that he had never counselled the course which the King had taken in sending Mr. Bush to Samoa to make a political Treaty,...

Had the three Treaty Powers, said Mr. Carter, formally notified to the Hawaiian Government that they would not tolerate any interference on the part of Hawaii in the affairs of Samoa, the King would have been forced to yield, and he was surprised that Germany had not suggested this step. 12

Carter in his report to Gibson on this talk merely stated that Sackville-West had regretted Hawaii’s treaty action but that he had no doubts about the preservation of Samoan autonomy. 13

Meanwhile, at the same time that Alvensleben had visited Bayard on May 20 to inform him of the German attitude towards the Hawaii-Samoan treaty, Lord Salisbury in London was informed by Germany that the German Foreign Office had received a dispatch from Alvensleben which seemed to indicate American approval of Hawaii’s action, and which estimated that the United States would “probably look favorably on the claims of King Kalakaua to interfere in Samoan affairs.” As a result, therefore, Salisbury was requested at this time to have the British Minister to the United States, Sackville-West, act jointly with the German Minister, Alvensleben, in opposing Hawaii’s pretensions. 14 Alvensleben’s report apparently had been

13. Carter to Gibson, No. 104, June 9, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
based upon his April 29 interview with Bayard, in which Bayard, for unknown reasons, had masked the full extent of his opposition to Hawaii's actions. 15

Salisbury acted upon the German request on May 31 when he instructed Sackville-West to act together with Alvensleben in informing Bayard of Anglo-German opposition to Hawaii's policy and to request the United States to join Britain and Germany in a joint presentation to Hawaii of this opposition. Salisbury wrote:

Her Majesty's Government cannot regard this intervention of Hawaii in Samoa as likely to lead to any advantageous result.

As regards King Malietoa, Her Majesty's Government have the right to insist that he shall be regarded as the lawful King of the Navigator's Islands until he is lawfully deposed, but he has been ill-advised to make the Hawaiian alliance without consulting the Treaty Powers, and cannot look for their sympathy or support.

I have therefore to request you to unite with your German colleague in informing the United States' Government that on the grounds above stated Her Majesty's Government view with dissatisfaction the action of Hawaii in Samoa, the more so as they have reason to believe that it is calculated to create anarchy and disorder, while the three Powers are using their best efforts to restore the blessings of peace and of a stable government to those islands.

They hope, therefore, that the United States' Government will join them and the German Government in signifying to the Government of Hawaii that the three Powers will not recognise their Hawaii's right of interference in the affairs of Samoa by means of the "Political Confederation" which they have recently attempted to establish with that group.16

Sackville-West acted upon these instructions as soon as he had received them and called on Bayard on June 14 to transmit them to him. He already had told Bayard only three days earlier, in another interview, that "the Germans were impatient" at the way things were going in Samoa.17

15. See above, p. 144.
17. Tan still, Bayard, p. 49, citing Memo written by Bayard after talk with Sackville-West, June 11, 1887.
Bayard assured Sackville-West, after hearing Salisbury's message, that he had expressed personally to Mr. Carter

...very much the same views entertained by Lord Salisbury; I had thought it a most ineffectual proposition in every respect, and one that might be full of difficulty and danger, especially to Hawaii; that the German Minister had also informed me of this arrangement and that his Government would wholly disregard it and would not pay the slightest attention to the proposed interference by the King of Hawaii. I said I had made the same statement to Mr. von Alvensleben... but I told him also that upon an inspection of the instrument that it seemed to me entirely conditional upon the approval of the treaty powers, and, as I recollected the document, it so expressly stated that it contemplated only a future action,...I said I would not answer him whether we would join Great Britain and Germany, but having the same views upon the subject I thought we could reach the same object by identical notes to the King of the Sandwich Islands.  

Sackville-West, in his report to Salisbury on this interview, stated that Bayard also had "thought it hard that it should be sought to depose King Malietoa, who had certainly been recognized for some time past as King of Samoa, but he appeared willing to concede the point of free election for the constitution of the new Government." Sackville-West estimated that it was not any difficulty in coming to an agreement which was restraining Bayard from acting fully jointly with Britain and Germany in addressing Hawaii. Bayard's problem, he said, was to endeavor "to escape from seeming joint action with European powers." Sackville-West explained also that Bayard did not object to Hawaii's activities to preserve the independence of Pacific islands but that Bayard did object to activities which would "create political complications," and

18. Ibid., pp. 49-60, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after a talk with Sackville-West, June 14, 1887.
19. Sackville-West to Salisbury, No. 156, Confid., June 15, 1887, copy enclosed in Pauncefoot to Woodhouse, No. 18, Confid., July 20, 1887, A/2, BC.
which would "interfere, as in the present case, with the action of the
three Powers for establishing order and good government in Samoa."²⁰

A few days after Sackville-West's interview with Bayard, Alvensleben
on June 20 called on Bayard on a similar mission. He complained that
Bush had spent large sums entertaining Samoan natives and had made "pre-
judicial remarks" to them against Germany. Bayard, much in the same manner
as he had informed Sackville-West, expressed his disapproval of the Bush
Mission and of the confederation treaty. He also told Alvensleben that
he thought Hawaii "perfectly incompetent" to deal with Samoan affairs and
that such had been the tenor of his remarks to Carter. When Alvensleben
then referred to the Kaimiloa, Bayard stated that he had understood that

...was not seaworthy, and from some defect in her machinery
could not go to sea at all, therefore I had no idea she
would proceed on a voyage of 2,000 miles. I told him also
he was probably as well or better aware than I of the con-
dition of affairs in Hawaii so far as the conduct and life
of the King was concerned.

Because of the serious financial difficulties facing King Kalakaua,
Alvensleben remarked to Bayard, it seemed to him absurd for Kalakaua to
embark upon an ambitious role in the South Pacific. Bayard was inclined
to agree with him in this regard.²¹

The day after this interview with Alvensleben, Bayard informed
Carter by note that the British, German and American consuls at Samoa
were being instructed to maintain the status quo pending a decision by
the soon-to-begin Washington Conference.²² Carter replied to Bayard

²⁰. Sackville-West to Salisbury, No. 163, Confid., June 15, 1887, copy
enclosed in Pauncefote to Woodhouse, No. 19, Confid., July 20, 1887,
Al, EC.
²¹. Tansill, op. cit., p. 50, citing Memorandum written by Bayard after
a talk with Alvensleben, June 20, 1887.
²². Bayard to Carter, June 21, 1887, Al, FO & Ex.
that Hawaii already had urged a peace policy in Samoa.  

Meanwhile Carter was reporting to the Hawaiian Foreign Office on the final preparations in Washington for the three-power conference on Samoa. "I think Mr. Bayard favors the idea that Hawaii be conceded to be entitled to a superior position" in Samoa, he stated. Carter intimated, however, that Hawaiian ratification of the agreement for continuation of the reciprocity treaty with the United States would boost Hawaii's cause with reference to Samoa. If Hawaii would ratify the treaty, he said, the United States Senate "would think it for the interest of the United States to say that the two kingdoms Hawaii and Samoa had an undoubted right to enter into such alliances as they pleased."  

Carter here was referring to Gibson's opposition to Hawaiian ratification of the reciprocity treaty continuation because of the amendment inserted in the treaty by the United States Senate, giving the United States exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor.

The first formal session of the Washington Conference was held on June 25, five days after Bayard's last interview with Alvensleben. The Conference adjourned in failure on July 26, without reaching any agreement. Britain had supported a proposal by Germany which would have resulted in German de facto control over the Samoan group. The United States had opposed this and unsuccessfully had advanced its proposal for temporary control of Samoan affairs through the appointment of three foreign

23. Carter to Gibson, June 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
24. Carter to Gibson, No. 107, Conf. June 18, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
representatives to the Samoan executive council.26

The steadfast American opposition to Germany's proposal during the Conference served only to increase German suspicion of American complicity in the Bush Mission. On July 27, Charles S. Scott of the British Embassy at Berlin had a confidential conversation with Count Berchem of the German Foreign Office. Scott had found Berchem examining a lengthy report just received from Alvensleben in Washington which "seemed to have conveyed the suspicion that Mr. Bayard had some secret connection" with the Hawaiian intervention in Samoa. Scott reported that Berchem

...said that the Hawaiian intervention in Samoa appeared to have been of a most mischievous nature, and had inspired such serious alarm at the German Consulate at Apia that the Commander of the German ship of war, which was preparing to leave those waters to attend to more important duties elsewhere, had thought it imperatively necessary to postpone his departure.

Count Berchem said that Baron Alvensleben had forwarded with his Report various extracts from the San Francisco press, which tended to confirm his suspicion that the King of Hawaii relied on the support of the United States'.

Scott sought to allay these suspicions and told Berchem that

...whatever might be Mr. Bayard's personal sympathies with the cause of Polynesian independence, I could scarcely believe that he had encouraged the sending of the Mission or the troubles in Hawaii. I thought too much importance ought not to be attached to the authority of American newspapers.

In addition, Scott said, Wodehouse, the British consul general at Honolulu, had reported that Hawaii's Samoa policy had no general support even


While the Conference was still in session, the British Foreign Office, not knowing yet of the recall of Bush and the Kaimiloa, and having received word from Wodehouse, its consul at Honolulu, that Bush intended to proceed from Samoa to Tonga, issued instructions on July 4 to Wodehouse "to use your best efforts to discourage such interference" by Hawaii in the Tongan group.— Pauncyfote to Wodehouse, No. 15, July 4, 1887, copy, AH, KG.
in the Hawaiian Kingdom itself. ²⁷ Count Berchema continued to maintain, however, that "the idea [of Hawaii's Samoan Mission] originated with Mr. Bayard, and was suggested by him to King Kalakaua." Nevertheless, he had seemed somewhat relieved by what Scott had told him, the latter said. ²⁸

In point of fact, however, German suspicion of the United States and hostility towards Hawaii with respect to Samoa, continued relatively undiminished. Bismarck's anger towards Hawaii in particular had been increasing steadily and at some time around, but before, August 1, he had expressed himself bluntly to one of his intimate associates:

'We should not have put up with insolence of the Hawaiians any longer; if a German squadron were at anchor before Samoa, it could sail for Hawaii, and King Kalakaua could be told that, unless he desisted from his insolent intrigues in Samoa, we should shoot his legs in two, despite his American protection.' ²⁹

After the Washington Conference had adjourned on July 26, Bismarck decided on a very strong, aggressive policy to gain the objectives in Samoa which he had not obtained at the Conference. On August 7, he sent similar messages to London and Washington informing them of Germany's intention, if necessary to protect Germany's interests in Samoa, to go to war against Malietoa. Salisbury received his message on August 15 but Bayard did not receive his until August 29, five days after Germany had launched its actual attack in Samoa. Prince Bismarck explained German motives and intentions to Salisbury by saying that German interests

²⁷ Scott was referring to Wodehouse's May 5 dispatch to Salisbury, in which Wodehouse stated that "outside the 'slavish following' of the King and His Ministers in the Legislature, this Polynesian policy finds no echo in this community whether Native or Foreign." —Wodehouse to Salisbury, No. 18, May 5, 1887, copy, AH, BC.

²⁸ Scott to Salisbury, No. 286, Confid., July 28, 1887, copy enclosed in Letter to Wodehouse, No. 21, Pol., Confid., August 13, 1887, copy, AH, BC.

²⁹ Stolberg-Wernigerode, Bismarck, p. 247, citing Rantzau to Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1887.
...have recently been directly threatened by the outbreak of a civil war, endangering the lives and property of the German residents, which has been provoked by the unwarranted interference of the Hawaiian Government in the political affairs of the islands. In these circumstances, and observing with deep regret that our representatives at Apia do not find the assistance we expected on the part of their colleagues in their differences with Malietoa, it becomes our duty independently to protect our interests and rights, and to obtain the satisfaction due to our national honour.

We shall therefore be compelled, in case Malietoa does not possess the will or the power to afford us the necessary satisfaction for the past, and sufficient guarantees for the future, to declare war against him....

Bismarck's note to Washington was similar but contained some additional threats. "In case Hawaii, whose king acts according to financial principles which it is not desirable to extend to Samoa, should try to interfere in favor of Malietoa," he said, "the King of the Sandwich Islands would thereby enter into a state of war with us."

Bismarck clearly was thinking also of the United States when he threatened war against Kalakaua. He reportedly stated about this time that "we do not intend to make trouble for the American interests in Hawaii, but we could not help doing so, if the United States created trouble in Samoa." He went so far as to ask his Foreign Office for suggestions as to how the United States might be molested in Hawaii or elsewhere. The German Chief of Admiralty on August 10 informed Bismarck that he considered as feasible the plan of a blockade of a few ports of the Sandwich Islands or occupation of Honolulu unless the Hawaiian Kingdom officially or unofficially received aid from the United States. Berlin

31. Sewall, Partition Of Samoa, p. 25; Ryden, Samoa, pp. 385-386, citing Bismarck to Alvensleben, Aug. 7, 1887.
applied the brakes, however, making it clear that Germany's action would be concentrated in Samoa and that any aggressive measures against Hawaii were reserved for decision later by the Imperial German Government. That Bismarck had been determined to go through with his plans in Samoa regardless of any overt adverse reaction from Great Britain or the United States was made clear by the fact that at the time he notified Bayard and Salisbury of Germany's general intentions, he already had ordered a German four-ship squadron at Sydney to proceed to Apia to take action. The warships reached Apia on August 19, only eleven days after the Kaimiloa had departed. On August 24, 700 marines were landed. On August 25, Tamasese was proclaimed formally as King, and on August 27, Germany declared martial law in the area. Robert Louis Stevenson, a contemporary observer, reported that German apologists excused the German action by claiming that the Bush Mission was an expression of American intrigue and that the Germans only did as they were done by.

Despite the callousness of the German action, and the falseness of the German suspicions of American complicity, there was no overt hostile reaction later by either Great Britain or the United States. Neither apparently wished to tangle with Germany over Samoa.

Meanwhile, much too late for the information to be of real value, Bayard on August 15 finally received word from Honolulu of the ordered recall of the Hawaiian Mission and of the Kaimiloa. By this time,

34. Ibid., pp. 371-375.
35. Stevenson, Samoa, p. 67
36. Tansill, Bayard, p. 43.
however, the Washington Conference had adjourned and Bismarck had order-
ed the German Navy and marines into action.

The Hawaiian Government did not learn of Bismarck’s threat against
it until Bayard informed Carter of it during a talk with him on November
9, 1887. Carter reported to Honolulu that Bayard had told him that
Germany had threatened that “if the German commander found a Hawaiian
Envoy or naval force there aiding King Malietoa in any way, that the Decl­
oration of War would be extended to Hawaii and a force sent to Honolulu.”
Carter further stated that Bayard said that he had informed the representa­t­
tives of Germany of the withdrawal of the Bush Mission so that Germany
“could have no pretext for war with Hawaii,” and had asked them “how war
could be declared against the ruler of a country while still affecting to
respect the independence of the country.” Carter commented on the strange­
ness of Germany having contemplated declaring war on Hawaii without pre­
viously having presented any formal remonstrance or ultimatum against the
Bush Mission.37

In January of the following year, 1888, Bayard wrote his final com­
ment on the Bush Mission in a personal letter to H. M. Sewall, the Amer­
ican consul at Apia. He rejected an appeal from Sewall for the United
States to sustain Malietoa and check German aggression, on the grounds
that it would mean war with Germany. Malietoa’s troubles, he said, were
not due to his friendship with the United States. The latter long pre­
viously had made it clear, he claimed, that its friendship extended only
to moral aid and influence. Instead, he said:

...The proximate cause of Malietoa’s misfortunes was the
ill-starred and mischievous mission of Mr. Bush from the
King of Hawaii...I was amused when the Hawaiian Minister,

Mr. Carter, informed me that a treaty creating an alliance, offensive and defensive, had been entered into by Malietoa with King Kalakaua....I advised its immediate abandonment and pointed out to Mr. Carter the great danger to both these weak governments of exciting the suspicion and hostility of Germany. Although the Bush mission soon collapsed,...the evil results of his mission, to poor Malietoa, were soon to bear fruit, and to them I ascribe the scenes witnessed in Samoa since August last.58

Despite Bayard's thus placing the full onus for the German intervention upon Hawaii and upon its Bush Mission, it is not believed that he was justified in doing so. Judging from Bismarck's policies and activities, it would seem that because of Bismarck's determination to control Samoa, even if there had never been an Hawaiian Mission, so long as the Washington Conference had ended without a decision favorable to Germany, Bismarck would have acted as he did anyway.

Although Hawaii, thus, cannot be held fully accountable for Bismarck's actions, there remains the question as to the merit, if any, of Gibson's policies from the viewpoint of Hawaii itself. The question of the extent of Gibson's responsibility has been discussed previously. Despite Kalakaua's espousal of the "Primacy" policy at least as early as 1880, Gibson was its principal architect, and no attempt was made during Kalakaua's reign to carry out such a policy until Gibson came to power in 1882, it has been pointed out earlier in this study.59 Gibson bore the major responsibility for the "Primacy" policy throughout his period in office, although by 1886 and 1887 the King came to share a larger part, than previously, of the burden for maintaining and implementing it. It is believed that Gibson's motives in formulating and executing such a policy were his life-long desires for political supremacy and fame, on

38. Tansill, op. cit., pp. 35-36, citing Bayard to Sewall, Personal, Jan. 6, 1888.
39. See above, p.54.
as large a scale as possible, and his concomitant belief that such a policy probably would aid him in achieving these objectives.

It seems clear that even in the earlier stages of the development of the policy, as in the diplomatic protest of 1883 and in the Carter Mission of 1885, when the real nature of Hawaii's objectives still were not known to the world, Hawaii's lack of real power rendered its actions totally ineffective in its efforts to halt further partitioning of the Pacific. A cold-blooded game of power politics was being played and at no time were the major Powers prepared to allow weak Hawaii to stop them from filling the tempting power vacuum existing in many Pacific island areas. They definitely were opposed to Hawaii's policy when finally it became apparent in 1887 that Hawaii sought to fill these vacuums itself. Robert Louis Stevenson described particularly well this attitude on the part of Germany, with respect to Hawaiian actions in 1887, when he said:

The Germans looked on from the first with natural irritation that a power of the powerlessness of Hawaii should thus profit by its undeniably footing in the family of nations, and send embassies, and make believe to have a navy, and bark and snap at the heels of the great German Empire.40

Actually it was fortunate for Hawaii that everything turned out as well as it did. H. M. Sewall, the American consul at Apia, reported later that "so seriously did the Germans regard the Hawaiian action that only the suspicion that in some way the U. S. was really involved in the mission," had prevented the German corvette Adler "from blowing the 'Kaimiloa' out of the water." Had the Kaimiloa not left a few days earlier and still been in the harbor when the German attack squadron came to Apia on August 19, Sewall believed that the Kaimiloa well might

40. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 60.
have met its end then and there. It is possible, of course, that Hawaii itself might have been attacked.

The above discussion represents an objective historical evaluation of Hawaii's actions. It is of some interest to compare it with the opinions expressed by some of the members of the Hawaiian Mission after their return from Samoa.

According to J. D. Strong on August 5, the English and American residents in Samoa, fearing German control, strongly favored some sort of autonomy being established with Hawaiian assistance. As a result of the Mission, he said, Tamasese's strength had been decreased significantly, and Malietoa's strength, increased. Webb on August 26 explained further that Malietoa and the major chiefs favored the Hawaiian Mission because "they are in favor of anything by which they can steer clear of the Germans." The Mission had much influence, he said, because "the natives could not tell how much we could do."

Poor estimated on August 23 that under propitious circumstances the Mission could have been beneficial economically to both Hawaii and Samoa. He asked if Hawaii could be called guilty of political wrong when it could have led Samoa forward to a glorious future.

A probably more objective comment on the Mission was made early in August by the British consul at Apia, William H. Wilson, who said:

It is the opinion of the majority of Europeans and the United States' citizens that the visit of the "Kaimiloa" to Samoa has not tended to increase or sustain the confidence of the Samoans in the preferred friendship and aid offered by His Hawaiian Majesty, owing to the generally loose way in which matters were conducted on board.

41. Sewall, Partition Of Samoa, pp. 24-25.
42. P. C. Advertiser, Aug. 5, 1887.
43. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1887.
44. Poor to Brown, Aug. 23, 1887, AH, FO & Ex.
45. Wilson to Salisbury, No. 25, Aug. 10, 1887, copy enclosed in Pauncefoot to Wodehouse, No. 27, Pol., Sept. 30, 1887, copy, AH, BC.
The comments of Strong, Webb, and Poor illustrate the relative lack of perspective of the leading members of the Hawaiian Mission with respect to the larger picture.

The whole of Gibson's policy from the time he commissioned Captain Alfred Newton Tripp, the master of a labour schooner, as an emissary charged with promoting friendly relations in Polynesia, until he impressed a Reformatory School band into service aboard the Laimihea to "awe" the natives with their "martial" strains, was full of futility and comedy, and, as we have seen, danger for Hawaii. The objective of seeking to prevent further partitioning of the Pacific by the Powers might have been morally commendable if Gibson had not had ulterior motives and ulterior aims. In view of this, and in view of Hawaii's lack of real power, the only real importance to Gibson's policy outside of Hawaii was that given it by Bismarck. It had no beneficial result unless it was Malietoa's gain of a uniform, a cocked hat and the decoration of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania.

With the ouster of Gibson and the recall of the Samoan Mission to Honolulu, the long history of Hawaiian efforts to achieve a "Primacy of the Pacific" came to an inglorious end.
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