About this Issue

Drawing on the Aceh peace process that resulted in the Helsinki agreement, this study investigates the possibility of a peace process to resolve the conflict over the political status of Papua vis-à-vis Indonesia. After presenting essential features of the Papua conflict, the study discusses the key actors, explores who should be brought into the peace process, what are the issues of contention, and how they may be packaged for dialogue. It also explores the possible roles of the international community. The study advances six findings: First, peace through dialogue is possible in Papua, although the Papuan case will require a more complex approach than that used in Aceh; second, negotiations must be more open, and mechanisms must be built to facilitate communication between the negotiators and their constituencies; third, the Special Autonomy consultation process is one possible model for constructing such mechanisms; fourth, a lasting peace can only be built through a process that includes the radical secessionist elements; fifth, the accord must establish mechanisms to monitor implementation and guarantee the safety of the negotiators; and finally, the dialogue process requires international facilitation.

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Initiating a Peace Process in Papua:
Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role
of the International Community

Timo Kivimäki
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by Timo Kivimäki

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Crisis Management Initiative, Office of President Ahtisaari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Conflict Prevention Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>Dewan Adat Papua (Papua Tribal Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRP</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (Papua House of People’s Representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSHAM</td>
<td>Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORERI</td>
<td>Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)</td>
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<td>Gol</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUBES</td>
<td>Musyawarah Besar Papua (Papuan Mass Consultation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pansus</td>
<td>Special Committee for Special Autonomy of the Indonesian Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuanganan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUO</td>
<td>Papuan Umbrella Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satgas Papua</td>
<td>Satuan Tugas Papua (Papua Task Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Defense Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPN</td>
<td>Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Army of West Papua)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPN/OPM</td>
<td>Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Liberation Army of Free Papua Organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>WPNPCI</td>
<td>West Papua National People’s Coalition for Independence</td>
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Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to present the background of the conflict over the political status of Papua vis-à-vis Indonesia and investigate the possibilities of resolving the conflict by means of dialogue. The study concludes that: (1) peace is possible in Papua, although the Papuan case will require a more complex approach than that used in Aceh; (2) negotiation must be more open, and mechanisms must be built to facilitate communication between the negotiators and their constituencies; (3) in constructing these mechanisms, the Special Autonomy consultation process is one possible model, although this process has so far failed to pacify Papua; (4) a lasting peace can only be built in a process that brings in radical secessionist elements; (5) the dialogue must establish mechanisms to monitor agreement implementation and guarantee the safety of the negotiators; and (6) the dialogue process requires international facilitation.

The perspective used in this study is operative: it explores what different actors can do to promote a solution, with significant focus on the actors outside Papua and Indonesia. In the aftermath of the peace talks on Aceh, the study focuses especially on whether an external mediator, monitoring body, and international donor community might offer useful contributions to the peace process in Papua. The analysis explores the objective and perceived contexts of the conflict; the nature of violent episodes; the actors that can cause and control violence; the grievances and motivations that are the immediate sources of violence and which must be discussed and resolved to end violence; the attitudes of the relevant actors toward dialogue and international assistance; and, finally, the relevance of the Aceh peace process for Papua.
The peace process in Aceh offers six lessons or prescriptions that could be considered for Papua, including:

1. The importance of an inclusive dialogue for the modification of the principles of the Special Autonomy Law. Peace cannot be negotiated solely among friends and between existing legal institutions: illegal organizations and exiled individuals must be included in the process. Even a perfect solution will not work unless it is negotiated in a process recognized by all parties.
2. The need for coherent and practical principles of self-governance/autonomy.
3. The value of creating mechanisms, including for international monitoring, to ensure the implementation of the negotiated settlement.
4. The importance of mutually-trusted outsiders for the resolution of disputes over the implementation of the modified special autonomy agreement.
5. The usefulness of adjusting the terms of agreement after the democratic mobilization of Papuan civil society. This is the recipe for people’s ownership and compliance with the modified special autonomy in Papua.
6. The need for changes to the Indonesian political system to realize special autonomy in true spirit. Regional autonomy requires regional political mobilization and political parties.

There are also at least three aspects of the Aceh approach that will not be applicable to Papua. In the first two, one could use the lessons learned from the previous Papuan consultation process of 2000–01 related to the drafting of the Special Autonomy Law.

1. Papuan resistance is less organized than the resistance in Aceh. Therefore, special mechanisms have to be built for communication between Papuan negotiators and their constituencies. These mechanisms could also solve some of the problems that the Aceh peace process faced. Special consultations and special committees could be used as the second layer of negotiations, as was done also in the 2000–01 special autonomy consultations in Papua.
2. Due to the diverse perspectives in the Papuan resistance movement, Papuan representation by a single team is unrealistic. Unlike in
Aceh, Papuan officials and leaders tend to share most of the concerns of the resistance movement. Thus, official institutions could be used in the Papuan dialogue process. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to assume that such official institutions can fully represent the radical secessionist elements. As Papuan officials have had to distance themselves from the illegal secessionist elements, they have become unable to mobilize or control the radical forces in Papua. Thus dialogue in Papua should involve at least two Papuan umbrella actors:

a. The Papuan People’s Assembly, which, as a legal organization, has easy access to ordinary Papuans; and

b. A secessionist umbrella organization, which could also incorporate the most radical elements, including the exiled rebel leaders.

3. Finally, since the level of economic development in Papua is much lower than in Aceh, and since many of the problems in the implementation of any agreement will clash with economic realities, the international donor community should be involved in discussing modalities for implementation of the agreement. Papua will require development assistance to achieve peace.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the Indonesian government has shown that Indonesia is capable of settling its protracted secessionist conflicts. The experience in Aceh also offers many lessons on how to make peace in such conflicts, and has generated optimism that a settlement of the conflict in Papua can be reached.

The purpose of this study is twofold: to present the background of the conflict over the political status of Papua vis-à-vis Indonesia and to explore the possibilities of solving the conflict through dialogue. The perspective is operative: it looks at what different actors can do to promote a settlement, with emphasis on actors outside Papua and Indonesia. In the aftermath of the Aceh peace talks, the study will pay particular attention to whether an external mediator, a monitoring body, and the international donor community can make useful contributions to the peace process in Papua.

The approach in the mediation of the peace talks in Aceh was that of dispute resolution, tackling the main areas of dispute in the conflict. In addition, the approach aimed at creating a settlement that would transform some of the conflict structures, especially the issues related to the
capacity of compliance verification. This would alter the framework for interaction so that the agreements reached in these talks could be implemented in a way that made deception impossible, difficult, or at least politically costly. The conflict was transformed when measures were taken to establish an international monitoring mission and to disarm the offensive capabilities of the warring parties.

In order to assess the potential for dispute resolution in a conflict, one needs to have a general picture of the nature and dynamics of the conflict, identify the actors who should be included in the peace process and their competing interests (especially the problems that lower the threshold for taking up arms to settle them), and their attitude toward dispute resolution and dialogue, and toward the possible contribution of external parties. Identifying the potential role of the international donor community in transforming the conflict structures in Papua also requires an analysis of the nature of the problems and grievances, as well as of the patterns of conflict and the structure of the agents relevant to the conflict. Finally, it is necessary to review the existing efforts and initiatives for dialogue in order to see whether it is possible to support the process that is already in motion instead of creating something entirely new.

The main conclusion of this study is that peace in Papua is possible. However, Papua is a more complex setting than Aceh because Papua has a larger share of migrants and a less-organized form of resistance. The Papuan case will thus require a more complex peace approach than the one used in Aceh. Negotiation has to be more transparent and mechanisms of internal communication and legitimation will have to be built to facilitate communication between the negotiators and their constituencies. To build communication structures and facilitate a more complex structure of agency for the negotiations, the Papuan peace process could draw on the lessons learned from the negotiations that took place in drafting the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. However, that drafting process itself should not be the model for the Papuan peace process. A lasting peace can only be built if the process allows the participation of the radical secessionist elements. Furthermore, mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the agreement must be established.
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They must also guarantee the safety of the negotiators. This requires international assistance.

While the Aceh peace process is the main point of comparison, this study also draws on more general perspectives and lessons from other peace processes. The theoretical literature on conflict resolution and conflict transformation is an important component of this analysis.

The Context of Conflict in Papua

Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, is an Indonesian province with about 2.4 million inhabitants,5 of which about 60–65 percent are native Papuans of Melanesian origin and 35–40 percent are migrants, mainly of Asian origin. Melanesians differ in appearance, culture, and habits from the majority of Indonesian ethnic groups. The ease of identifying between Melanesians and Indonesians of Asian origin4 affects relations between Papua and Jakarta and between migrants and native Papuans.

The number of Papuans has tended to stay stagnant, while the number of migrants from outside Papua is increasing. The nonindigenous population moved into the province mainly after Indonesia’s independence, especially following the consolidation of Indonesian control over the province after the 1960s and partly as a result of public and private attempts to “Indonesianize” Papua. The process of Indonesianization is illustrated by Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti’s (2004) claim that in 2000, 772,684 Indonesian settlers lived in Papua (35 percent of the total population), while in 1960 the number was only 18,600 (2.5 percent).5 Other sources claim that the total population is now three million, with ethnic Papuans already in the minority.6 While the numbers are sometimes challenged, the important issue is the perception of many native Papuans that they have indeed become a minority in their own land.

Papua was declared part of the Independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. It has been under Indonesian control since 1963, and has been internationally acknowledged as part of Indonesia since 1969. According to Law No. 45/1999 and Presidential Decree 45/2003, the territory has been divided into three provinces, but the Papuan Special Autonomy Law still treats the area as one province.7 Currently, two of the three established provinces, Papua and West Irian Jaya, exist not just as a legal reality but also as a political reality. For example, both provinces were allowed to elect their own governors in March 2006. The division of Papua is part of the conflict under analysis. Without taking sides in the
conflict, the word *Papua* here will refer, as conventionally used in the literature, to the whole former Irian Jaya Province.

Even though there are several smaller vertical and horizontal conflict issues, the main issue of contention between Papuans and the Indonesian central administration is related to the Indonesian rule of Papua. According to Amnesty International and several other organizations, the conflict has killed about 100,000 Papuans, although official Indonesian sources estimate the number of casualties to be far lower. There have been non-Papuan casualties as well. Some fear that the conflict and the emphasis on military power as a means of resolving the conflict risk “undermining democratization in Indonesia as a whole” (Chauvel and Bhakti 2004: 2).

**Two Constructions of the Conflict**

The Papuan resistance is diverse. Most of it is specific to troubling issues in Indonesian governance. At the more extreme end, resistance is general secessionist opposition to any expression of Indonesian rule in Papua. Much of the opposition that is limited to specific grievances draws from the constructions formulated at the extreme end of the spectrum. In conflict resolution it is important to focus on the differences in constructions, and these differences are easiest to identify in an analysis of the most extreme groups in the conflict. On the side of the resistance, the extreme construction is often represented by two types of secessionist force: the traditional militant fighting force and the ideologically-based, more democratic, less-violent secessionist movement. The first style is represented by an umbrella concept, the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, or OPM), while the other is exemplified by several political groups: the Second Papuan Congress, the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya, or FORERI), the Papuan Presidium Council, Team 100 of the West Papuan Community, and so on.

The construction of the conflict on the part of the secessionists can be summarized with reference to some of their authoritative documents. These documents include:

1. Political Manifesto of the Papuan National Committee on September 19, 1961 (interpreted as the first Papuan declaration of independence);
2. The Independence Proclamation by OPM, on July 1, 1971 (for the text, see Osborne 1985: 56);
3. FORERI Statement on Jayapura, July 24, 1998;¹⁰
4. The (Political) Statement of Team 100 of the West Papuan Community on February 26, 1999, to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and his Cabinet; and

The content analysis of the main texts has been supplemented by interviews, discussions, and messages from some of the key figures in the independence movement and the movement to strengthen human rights in Papua. These include Jacob Prai, one of the leaders of the militant secessionist movement from 1968 to 1978; John Otto Ondawame, one-time deputy of Prai and later OPM’s international spokesperson; and some of the ordinary fighters. According to these documents, the conflict between supporters and opponents of Indonesian rule is a colonial war in which Papuans represent the victims of Indonesian colonial oppression and occupation. Regardless of whether we study the classical OPM documents, more recent documents by more peaceful independence-minded organizations in the resistance movement, or the discourse of people involved in resistance against a specific element in the Indonesian administration of Papua, the main characteristics of the construction of the conflict tend to be the same, even if some are less extreme, and based on the following foundations:

• Papuans are Melanesians and belong to the group of Melanesian states rather than to an Asian nation;¹¹
• Papuans also observe a different religion than the majority of Indonesians;¹²
• The people of West Papua would unanimously reject integration with Indonesia;¹³
• The integration of Papua into Indonesia in the historical Act of Free Choice in 1969 (A consultation process that was conducted to integrate Papua to Indonesia) was forced on Papuans,¹⁴ so de facto Indonesian rule in Papua is seen as colonial occupation of independent West Papua;¹⁵
• Indonesian administration in Papua has disregarded human rights and rejected calls for greater democracy and self-determination.¹⁶

The pro-Indonesian construction of the conflict is also somewhat heterogeneous. The military tends to have a slightly different discourse
from the civilian one, and the migrants tend to differ even more from the Jakartan military and civilian perspectives. Yet the foundation of the Indonesian position is relatively uniform, certainly more so than that of the resistance movement. The Indonesian construction of the conflict can be gleaned from the official Indonesian declarations and speeches designed to persuade Indonesians, Papuans, the United Nations, the United States, and the Netherlands of the Indonesian right to sovereignty over Papua. The main documents used for the Indonesian construction of the conflict include:

1. President Sukarno’s Independence Day speeches during the campaign to “return” West Irian to Indonesia;
2. A speech by Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, head of the Indonesian delegation in the United Nations interim rule in Papua, on May 1, 1963, the day that the United Nations turned over de facto sovereignty to Indonesia;
3. President Suharto’s Independence Day speeches at the time of the Act of Free Choice; and
4. Records of Indonesian efforts directed at Australia, the Netherlands, the United Nations, and the United States to justify their sovereignty over Papua.

The Indonesian point of view concerning the conflict encompasses the following points:

- Papua shares with the rest of Indonesia a history of Dutch colonial occupation. This is why the independence declaration included all of Indonesia, from Sabang (Aceh) to Merauke (Papua). “Without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is not complete to become the national territory of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.”
- Indonesia is a multicultural, not a Muslim/Asian country, and it does not consider race an issue in politics. “A nation is not only a matter of race or the color of skin. . . . Are Americans all white . . . the Hawaiians are another race, and black negroes are another race, the Papuans, yes, they, too are another race, and so are the Dayaks. But the Dayaks are happy as Indonesians.”
- The struggle for Papua was also an Indonesian military victory in its battle against colonialism; thus Papua belongs to Indonesia: any solution in Papua should not mean “that we abandon the fruits of our struggle for the liberation of West Irian, for which many sacrifices were made.”
Initiating a Peace Process in Papua

- Furthermore, according to an oft-repeated line, Papua has unanimously decided to be part of Indonesia in a process in which the United Nations participated, and which was accepted by the UN and its member countries (UNGA 1969).
- Thus speculation on Papua’s political status, which weakens the development of Indonesia as a nation, should be ended.\textsuperscript{22}

Deviations

It would be unfair to claim that these stereotypical constructions of the conflict are the entire reality. On the side of the resistance movement, the sentiment ranges from complaints that Indonesians do too little to develop Papua to an insistence that Papuans never have anything to do with Indonesians. Many independence movement supporters interviewed also complained about the less-than-genuine implementation of the special autonomy, which is a complaint that seems to belong to a construction of Papua as part of Indonesia. In this way, the claim for independence in many cases seems to be a part of Papuan communication toward Jakarta, a move in a bargaining process rather than an accurate description of a fixed position.

The claim that Indonesia has not acted in good faith in its implementation of the autonomy law is shared by Indonesia’s highest administration, as has been demonstrated in statements by Vice President Jusuf Kalla (\textit{Jakarta Post}, August 6, 2005). For the vice president, poor implementation has been an obstacle in the Indonesian strategy, whereas in the resistance movement it has been interpreted as indicating Indonesian intentions regarding the Special Autonomy Law. On the Indonesian integrationist side, the main constructions of the source of this conflict are universally shared. In spite of this, some in the bureaucracy, the high leadership, and even the military suggest that many of the Papuan constructions are understandable, given the reality of the Indonesian administration in Papua. There is a clear difference between the West Papuan independence movement and the Indonesian administration in public assessments of the quality of Indonesian administration in Papua, but private assessments are similar and point to the same problems.

Lieutenant General Kahpi Suriadireja criticized the political management of Papua because its development was lagging behind other provinces. These views were shared by General Muhammad Jusuf, who also pointed out the overly security-conscious approach to Papuan man-
agement and even introduced a “Smiling Policy,” which tackled the excessively military strategy and toned down the pursuit for the rebels. According to Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro (1968), adviser on Papua affairs to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and the head of the Indonesian delegation to UNTAE, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority and the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian), the Indonesian administration was characterized by colonialist patterns, with Indonesians running Papuan affairs without sufficiently involving Papuans. Tjondronegoro (1968) also made reference to the utilization of Papuan resources without sufficient compensation to the local population. Presidents B. Jusuf Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid explicitly apologized for the atrocities enacted in authoritarian Indonesia and the Indonesian military during Suharto’s “New Order” (Human Rights Watch 2000). The current administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has not shared Wahid’s daring permissiveness and inconsistency toward the Papuan independence movement, yet it has been more accepting of organizations critical of Indonesian administration and more open about the reality of Indonesian administration in Papua.

In addition to the immediate parties in the conflict, Indonesian students, especially those in Christian universities, have occasionally criticized the way in which the Indonesian government treats the Papuan administration. That Indonesians have not always seen Papuans as Indonesians, but rather as subjects fit for repression, was mentioned in a student declaration as one of the grounds for Papuan separatism. Indonesian self-criticism offers compromises toward the secessionist construction of the conflict; making it easier for the conflicting parties to understand the other points of view.

The fundamental difference between the conflicting parties is not in the identification of the problems: supporters and opponents of the Indonesian rule in Papua identify many of the same problems. Rather, the fundamental difference is whether key abuses are seen as characteristic of the Indonesian administration in general or are considered Papua-specific deviations from the norm. The abuse and colonialist patterns that both sides to some extent recognize are seen by Indonesians as a deviation from the “real” Indonesian policy, while for many Papuan human rights activists, they represent the core of Indonesian-ness, a program cloaked by deceptive concessional policies.
Enemy Perceptions
Two frames, the idea of colonialism and the emphasis on racial difference between Melanesians and Asians, condition the Papuan enemy perception. Due to the general construction of the conflict as a colonial war, the Papuan resistance fighters, especially secessionists, portray Indonesians as colonial occupiers. This image is always applied to the Indonesian officials in Papua and often also extended to Indonesian migrants. In more sophisticated analyses, the phenomenon of migration to Papua is seen as an expression of colonialism, while the image of the migrants themselves has ranged from victims of Indonesian colonialism (Author’s interview with Jacob Prai, September 1999) to agents of colonialism.25 The everyday interaction with migrants pushes Papuans to a more conciliatory interpretation: Indonesia’s policy of sending Indonesians to Papua is colonialism, even though by and large Papuan interaction with migrants occurs without any problems.

However, especially in the minds of the secessionists, the racial foundation of the claim for independence can easily bring out a wider definition in which the Asian/Indonesian migrants are defined as a colonial enemy. Racialism affects the discourse of the resistance movement, as it emphasizes the foundation and explanation of Indonesian actions and policies in Papua: “Indonesians cannot talk so they use guns. [They] do not care about talking to other people, they use guns to gain other islands for the Javanese. They do not care about Papuans, they just care about gold, copper, and other things we have. They even have a program to annihilate us Papuans in order to get their hands on the Papuan resources. This is in their character. They cheat people, as in the Act of Free Choice, they gave radio transmissions convincing the Indonesian do good in Papua . . . [and] some transmigrants are the same.”26 This shows how the Papuan secessionist image of the Indonesian enemy is framed: an image that has been polarized by the dehumanizing logic of conflict.

While a diabolical enemy image seems to be a pattern in all conflicts, the secessionist image of the diabolical Indonesian is marked by representations of the selfish, immoral, and calculating nature of the enemy in a colonial and racial framework.27 A representative case that one often hears
from independence activists concerns former Indonesian foreign minister Subandrio, who was in charge of negotiations with the Netherlands over Papua. According to the oft-repeated story, Subandrio explicitly confessed during the negotiations that Indonesians were not enthusiastic about ruling over Papuans but were certainly interested in Papua’s raw materials. This statement can be found neither in the archives of the U.S. political secretary of the Indonesian Embassy nor in the archives of Guy Pauker, America’s leading specialist on Indonesian communism, who also assisted the American mediator of the Papua negotiations. However, the historical truth is less important than that fact that the statement lives as a reality in the minds of Papuan freedom fighters.

According to Randolph Collins (2001), enemy images often also are influenced by the need for fighters to make the killing of enemy soldiers easier by justifying it in political terms. The colonial framework is clearly the one by which the Papuan resistance movement legitimates its violence, not only against Indonesian soldiers but also the migrants. This turns killing into a heroic act, and thus morally acceptable, while the use of traditional weaponry makes killing also an act of preservation of Papuan culture: “We Papuans only have bows and arrows against their weapons, but from ancient times, Papuans have been dangerous with bows and arrows... even a small arrow with a fire can burn a big house.”

Furthermore, within the resistance movement, the image of Indonesians is molded by racial stereotypes. Since the claim for sovereignty is partly based on the racial difference between Melanesian Papuans and Asian Indonesians, it is natural that the construction of the agents of conflict is also influenced by racial primordialism. Papuans see Indonesians and Asians as belligerent, arrogant, intolerant, and fanatical. This characterization of Indonesians has been a common theme in all the interviews I have conducted. In almost every interview, the member of the resistance movement has explained Indonesian “character” by referring to their Asian-ness. In almost all cases, Asian-ness was associated with a hot temper and belligerence; in more than half of the interviews, Asian-ness was associated with arrogance. Fanaticism was also mentioned in several interviews, especially those conducted after September 11, 2001.

As is typical of enemy images in conflicts, in Papua this racial interpretation prevents the resistance movement from trying empathetically to understand the concerns of Indonesians. West Papuan resistance movement members explain Indonesian motives for colonialism in terms of
immoral and metabolic racial characteristics and do not consider the actions to be the result of Indonesian national objectives.

After the growth of the global divide between the Christian and Muslim worlds as a consequence of terrorism and the U.S.-led war on terrorism, Papuan primordialism has also developed in the direction of religious xenophobia among the most radical circles of the independence movement. According to a December 21, 2001, statement by one of the groups of the independence movement to Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, for example, the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) supports a conspiracy in operation in West Papua with links to the international Islamic revolutionary movement, including Al-Qaeda.

Indonesian enemy pictures are more diverse than those of the independence movement, because the Indonesian discourse does not label all Papuans as enemies, only the Papuan fighters. The image of Papuan fighters among Indonesian soldiers, police, and migrants is, however, influenced by a relationship to all Papuans that is sometimes paternalistic and patronizing. Papuans are often characterized as Stone Age people, with their tribal clothing and nakedness taken as a sign of primitivism—a primitivism that is sometimes assumed to characterize educated Papuans as well. Abdurrahman Wahid, for instance, explained to the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR) his willingness to meet Papuan independence leaders—who, in reality, tend to be educated—at any time and in any context, stating that they could even wear the koteka (traditional Papuan penis gourd). This “joke” was greeted with loud laughter by the parliamentarians.29

This paternalistic Indonesian perception of Papuans also characterizes the relationships and self-image of Indonesians in Papua. The perceived primitivism of Papuans emphasizes Indonesia’s modernity and benevolent care of their “less-developed brothers.”

The perception of the “Stone Age people of Papua” also serves a purpose for the security forces, as it justifies breaking the norm against violence toward a fellow human being.30 In interviews with the police or members of the TNI, combat situations against the OPM were also often described with hunting metaphors, which similarly normalizes the killing of enemies.
Further, modern thinking that the state has the monopoly on legitimate violence serves a purpose for security forces by normalizing and legitimizing violence against Papuan separatists. Most modern state armies and police tend to resent the idea that they should be treated as parties to a conflict, since their violence is different from rebel violence: “When we resort to violence we do it out of duty in order to preserve law and order. It is not the same as it is with criminals and hooligans.”

**Violent Episodes**

War between the forces of independence and the Indonesian military/police has involved several larger military operations, the largest of which include:

1. Operasi Sadar, or Operation Consciousness (1965–67);
2. Operasi Brathayudha (1967–69);
3. Operasi Wibawa, or Operation Authority (1969);
4. The military operation in Jayawijaya district (1977);
5. Operasi Sapu Bersih I dan II, or Operation Clean Sweep I and II (1981);
6. Operasi Galang I dan II, or Operation Reinforcement I and II (1982);
7. Operasi Tumpas, or Operation Annihilation (1983–84);
8. Operasi Sapu Bersih, or Operation Clean Sweep (1985);
9. The designation of Papua as a “Daerah Operasi Militer,” or Military Operation Zone (1989–98); and
10. Ascribing Papua special conflict status with restrictions to international interaction (starting May 2003).

These operations have been a response to separatist pressures and violence. In addition to the incidents that these military operations were created to suppress, there have been countless small incidents against the Indonesian military and police as well as rivalries between the military and the rebels that have culminated in the killing of transmigrants by OPM groups. Examples can be seen in the incidents in Puncak Jaya and Mulia in September 2004.

Meanwhile, the resistance movement focuses on the main episodes of Indonesian violence against Papuans. These incidents were listed by the Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (FORERI 1998) as follows:

1. Clashes between the resistance movement and the Indonesian military in Manokwari (1965);
2. Fighting and human rights violations in Wamena (1977);
3. Independence protests and human rights violations in Biak (1980s);
4. Clashes in Sarmi (1992);
5. Human rights violations in Timika (June 1994–February 1995);
6. Human rights violations in Bella, Alama, Jila, and Mapnduma (1998);
7. Human rights violations in Sorong (1998); and

Additional incidents occurring after the 1998 FORERI statement include the following highly controversial and publicly debated incidents:
1. A Papuan flag-raising and revenge in Wamena (May 1998);
2. Clashes in Timika (December 1999);
3. An attack on a police station and revenge in Abepura (December 2000);
4. An attack on a military post and revenge by TNI in Wamena (April 2003); and
5. An independence movement attack on an Indonesian company, TNI response, and revenge against migrants in Enarotali (November 2003).

Violence by the Resistance Movement
The nature of incidents in the core conflict between independence forces and those of the central government follow a typical pattern with highly symbolic initial action. Often this initial action by one of the parties is not only a reaction to specific grievances or disputes but also is designed to articulate an interpretation of the social reality that the party is promoting. These acts can only be understood in the context of the opposing constructions of reality outlined above. The initial conflict behavior might be an act of “returning Papuan law and order” by the Satgas Papua, the “police of independent Papua,” or an act that demonstrates the criminality of the independence forces and the power of the Indonesian forces in Papua. Activities often involve regional units of the TNI or the police and relatively freely operating specific and gen-

provocative initial acts are commonly followed by a round of revenge acts
eral resistance units or individuals. They are often accompanied by personally or criminally motivated activities, and the provocative initial acts are commonly followed by a round of revenge acts on both sides.

A good example of an initial provocation occurred in April 2004. The incident began when twelve policemen were escorting several employees of the timber company PT Djajanti who were about to hand over 150 million rupiahs (US$18,750) in land compensation to local residents. “On their way to the village, they were ambushed by a group of nine Papuans with traditional weapons, such as machetes and spears” (Jakarta Post, April 22, 2004). The ambushing of employees of an Indonesian company operating on an Indonesian rather than a Papuan license articulates a reality in which Papua is independent. The use of traditional weaponry links the struggle to Papuan culture and articulates a Papuan identity and agency in opposition to an Indonesian identity and agency. That the convoy was also moving a considerable amount of money hints at the blending of personal motives with political ones. When the police fired back, the gang fled into the nearby forest. Later, as the convoy arrived at their destination in Meriedi Village, a person who was “allegedly a member of the Manase Furima group [of the independence movement] approached them and expressed displeasure with the arrival of the police and the employees of PT Djajanti in the village.” The behavior of this resistance operative again articulates a reality in which both Indonesian police and an international company without a Papuan license should be considered guests and foreigners. Later, thirty members of the same group continued the harassment. Eventually the police retaliated and killed two of the members of the OPM faction.

This incident exemplifies not only the symbolic nature of the initial phases of the conflict but also the close relationship between the general secessionist patterns of conflict and the patterns of spontaneous specific resistance, which are related to the protection of Papuan lands.

In another incident, according to an Associated Press report of November 4, 2003, police reported that ten armed men “belonging to a rebel group led by Titus Murib, . . . attacked construction workers in the District of Enarotali, killing one of them and leaving five others missing.” The provocation targeted a company that was involved in Indonesian construction work in Papua, and violence was targeted against transmigrants. A revenge attack the next day killed nine alleged Papuan rebels (Associated Press, November 5, 2003). In another sequence, a guerrilla faction attacked
a military post in Wamena, about 400 kilometers east of Enarotali, killing two soldiers and one villager and stealing several guns (Associated Press, November 5, 2003).

Attacks on soldiers are the main pattern of both TPN/OPM warfare and the spontaneous popular defense of Papuan rights motivated by specific grievances. In September 2004, for example, a group of suspected OPM rebels attacked fifteen TNI soldiers in Lima Jari Subdistrict, Puncak Jaya Regency, leaving one rebel dead and one soldier severely injured (Jakarta Post, September 16, 2004). In a continued action-reaction type of conflict, five migrants from Makassar (South Sulawesi) were also shot dead. OPM commander Golait Tabuni was believed to have led the group of a hundred or so (TNI source, cited in Jakarta Post, October 20, 2004). In another incident, suspected rebels in Papua Province ambushed an Indonesian army patrol, sparking a two-hour clash that left two of the attackers dead. The clash took place in Mulia Regency, close to the Carstenz mountain range, which bisects the remote and sparsely populated province (Jakarta Post, August 17, 2004).

Incidents involving the raising of the flag of independent Papua are also typical symbolic provocations by the independence movement. In some cases, as in Biak on July 6, 1998, flag raising has been accompanied with the guarding of the morning star flag (Jakarta Post, January 15, 2004). This incident will be examined more closely below, as will the patterns of TNI violence.

Symbolic activities often intended to articulate a social reality of the de facto independence of Papua are important as such for the independence-minded population and are not only used as provocations. This can be seen in the fact that the resistance movement is always larger during times of confusion, when symbolic actions can be assumed to be legitimate, or it is plausible that Jakarta is unable to retaliate. My interviews (1999 and 2001 in Jayapura, Abepura, Sentani, and Timika) with OPM fighters confirm that one of the necessary elements influencing people to join an OPM group and the military action against Jakarta has been misplaced confidence in Jakarta’s inability to retaliate. Unrealistic optimism about the prospects of Papuan military liberation has sometimes been
inflamed by misinterpretations of international statements and by international encouragement, especially by unrealistic radical solidarity groups. Especially deluding effects have resulted from non-authoritative initiatives of U.S. congressmen in 1999 and 2005, which Papuans have treated as official U.S. positions. However, by far the greatest incentive for misplaced optimism has been caused by a variety of unclear signals from Jakarta.

Three main violent periods in recent times of “optimistic independence provocations” can be identified as:

1. *Post-Suharto Optimism:* The first period of optimistic independence provocations was May–December 1998, in conjunction with the fall of President Suharto, which in many places was interpreted as the end of oppression.

2. *Optimism under President Abdurrahman Wahid:* A period of optimism caused by the tolerant attitude of President Wahid occurred between January 2000 and December 2000.

3. *Confusion under Megawati Sukarnoputri:* Starting in January 2003 there has been confusion caused by the perceived contradictions between the Special Autonomy Law and the law to split Papua into three provinces.

Confusing signals tend to be problematic in conflicts, given the tendency of warring parties to become overconfident in their positions. Within the logic of conflict, both sides tend to interpret ambiguous signals as supporting their positions (Gochman 1979), and Jakarta signals certainly leave considerable room for interpretation. Furthermore, in such a context of confusion, the lack of commonly accepted and uncontested constructions of reality increases the utility of symbolic acts that consolidate a favorable interpretation (Brummet 1982: 425–30; Carleton 1983: 325–41).

At the time of post-Suharto optimism, the TNI was busy securing the centers of power, so it could give less attention to Papua. As a result, misplaced optimism on the part of Papuan independence fighters resulted in flagraisings and other symbolic actions, which were met with a disproportionate TNI response in May 1998 in the villages of Bela, Alama, and Mapnduma in the District of Wamena. This resulted in 213 deaths among Papuan independence supporters, according to a report by ELSHAM, a Papuan human rights organization. Similar incidents in July 1998 in Biak left about a hundred Papuans dead, according to the state-sponsored Indonesian Council of Human Rights known as Komnasham (*Jakarta Post, January 15, 2004*).
The next period of misplaced Papuan optimism took place in 2000, when President Abdurrahman Wahid sponsored two pro-independence dialogue events, the Papuan Mass Consultation (Musyawarah Besar Papua, or MUBES) in February 2000 and the Second Papuan National Congress in the late spring of 2000. One outcome of the latter process was the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), but it was outlawed and most of the leaders were jailed before the end of the year. Again, this prompted flag-raising incidents, protests, and attacks against the TNI, which in turn sparked a disproportionate reaction from the Indonesian military. In October 2000, the aftermath of a flag-raising incident left thirty Papuans dead (*Jakarta Post*, October 6, 2000). Similar incidents took place simultaneously in many parts of the province, but with fewer casualties.

The third misinterpreted incident that created overconfidence and the perceived need for symbolic action was the introduction of the Special Autonomy Law, Law 45 of 1999, and the Presidential Decree of 1/2003. These pieces of legislation were generally considered to be contradictory. The resulting conflicts were sometimes clashes between supporters and opponents of further Papuan self-governance. The riots that killed five people in Timika from August 23 to September 7, 2003 exemplify this category of violence. In this case, migrants (Associated Free Press, September 1, 2003) and Papuan supporters of the would-be elite of the new province (McGibbon 2004: 61) were among the supporters of the plan to create a new province of Central Irian Jaya, while hundreds of independence-minded Amunge tribesmen, armed with bows and arrows and spears, were among the opponents. This violence also represented the conflict between two subregions of Papua, one wanting to maintain control over the entire province and the other wanting to exploit the new resources opened by the potential establishment of new provinces.

**Pro-Indonesian Violence**

In addition to the violence by the resistance movement, much violence has been initiated by the official institutions of the integrationist side. Some of this violence is related to what the integrationist side sees as legitimate law enforcement, while some of it is individually motivated or relates to group interests (of the TNI or a subgroup) rather than to national interests. Three factors have created a setting in which individuals and groups from the TNI have also become initiators of unprovoked acts of aggression in Papua.
First, the difficulties in supervising the military in Papua create opportunities for violations by the military or the police without risk of prosecution. The origin of these supervision difficulties is that only part of the military budget comes from the central government, while the rest comes from the military’s business activities. Second, the underdevelopment and corruption of the Indonesian judicial system in the prosecution of military abuses further decreases the risk of punishment (Amnesty International 2005). Third, the TNI has often failed to understand that acknowledging isolated violations is less damaging for the image of the TNI than cover-ups or defenses of individual TNI personnel who violate military ethics (ICG 2001).

There are many reports, of varying levels of reliability, about the contribution of the military (and the police) to violence in Papua. It is difficult to assess the truthfulness of individual reports on specific cases simply by analyzing the methodological premises of the investigation, since military abuse is a highly political issue that involves many motivations for misrepresentation. However, given the conditions in which the TNI operates in Papua, corruption in the judicial system, and the proven record of the TNI in defending the unprofessional behavior of individual officers (often even in cases where the TNI could not possibly have been in a position to judge the situation), it is safe to assume that abuse by military personnel does indeed take place in Papua. Furthermore, in light of a more general consensus on patterns of military abuse worldwide, it is unlikely that the Indonesian military would act in such a different manner from other militaries or that TNI behavior in Papua would differ greatly from its behavior in other places where there is stronger evidence. Thus it is safe to say that some of the reports of military abuse are likely to be true, even if others might be misrepresentations.

Many experts would go further and claim that military abuse is harsher in Papua than TNI violence elsewhere in Indonesia or military violence in other countries. According to these specialists, to say simply that military abuse takes place and that some of the reports of it might be accurate significantly downplays the problem. However, for the purposes of
examining conflict resolution, it is more important to identify the patterns of violence than to assess the extent of various types of violence.

The main types of TNI violence in Papua, according to existing investigations, include:

1. Criminal abuse;
2. Human rights violations in the line of duty;
3. Disproportionate responses that also target the civilian population; and
4. Use, training, arming, and support of pro-Indonesia migrant militias.

According to Randolph Collins (2001) and many other military sociologists, criminal violence by the military is almost inevitable in a context where the surveillance and accountability of the military force fails. Although the military institution often cannot be implicated in this type of violence (crime is by definition egoistic in its interests), military sociologists often claim that about 6 percent of the members of any military force will be likely to use their coercive power position to their own benefit. Often this is exemplified in businesses that compromise the security functions of the army or police. In some cases the TNI has been accused of fueling and maintaining the conflict in order to justify its strong position and business interests in Papua (e.g., protection of the mining company Freeport International, alcohol smuggling, illegal logging, prostitution). Violence against women, including rape by soldiers, is also common in any society where military accountability is insufficient. The U.S. State Department recently investigated the Papuan human rights situation and concluded that Papua is no exception—criminal violence by the military occurs widely (confirmed in ICG 2002). A good, if perhaps partisan, account of the criminal military violence can be found in the report of Rev. Socratiez Sofyan Yoman (2005), president of the Fellowship of Baptist Churches of West Papua Jayapura, West Papua.

In most cases violence by the military and the police is related to the political interests of the military institution and state security forces. Any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence in this category is a political matter. The line of the Indonesian state on this distinction is confusing, as will be discussed below. From the point of view of Indonesia’s international commitments in support of human rights and against genocide, some of the practices that violate international standards for human rights in the fight against separatism tend to contribute to violence in the province. According to an Indonesian Human Rights
Commission (Komnasham) report, an August 2004 fact-finding mission discovered “gross violations of human rights occurred as defined by Law No. 26/2000 on human rights.” According to Stuart Rees (2005) and his research team from ELSHAM, and as the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney and the ICG (2001) report point out, the abuse of human rights in the war against separatism also contradicts international norms against genocide. According to a recent report of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (2005), confirmed by a Yale University Law School report (2003), these abuses may even constitute crimes against humanity:

Since the so-called [1969 UN-supervised] Act of Free Choice, the West Papuan people have suffered persistent and horrible abuses at the hands of the Indonesian government. The Indonesian military and security forces have engaged in widespread violence and extra-judicial killings in West Papua. They have subjected Papuan men and women to acts of torture, disappearance, rape, and sexual violence, thus causing serious bodily and mental harm. Systematic resource exploitation, the destruction of Papuan resources and crops, compulsory (and often uncompensated) labor, transmigration schemes, and forced relocation have caused pervasive environmental harm to the region, undermined traditional subsistence practices, and led to widespread disease, malnutrition, and death among West Papuans. Such acts, taken as a whole, appear to constitute the imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the West Papuans. Many of these acts, individually and collectively, clearly constitute crimes against humanity under international law (Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights 2005).37

However, according to an analysis of recent violent incidents, the greatest violence by the Indonesian military seems to take the form of reaction to the symbolic provocations by the resistance movement. One of the most-cited examples of this was a military operation on May 12, 1998, that was launched as a reaction to Papuan independence flag-raising incidents in Bela, Alama, and Mapnduma in the District of Wamena. According to a report by ELSHAM, which has been rejected by the TNI, troops dropped into the area burnt down 166 homes and thirteen churches. A total of 213 people subsequently died because of a lack of food and medicine. Twenty people were killed outright, and seven women were raped.
There are innumerable examples of human rights abuses. On July 6, 1998, the army allegedly opened fire on a crowd of sleeping young people at Biak Harbor who had been guarding the morning star flag they had raised a few days earlier. The *Jakarta Post* (January 15, 2005) reports the incident, referring to Komnasham sources, as follows:

The entire population of Biak town was rounded up at gunpoint and forced to the harbor area, where for the whole day they were subjected to physical and sexual abuses. No one knows the exact death toll, but a Biak church report documents the recovery of a total of 70 bodies, including those of young children, that either washed ashore or were recovered from fishing nets.

Also according to the *Jakarta Post* (December 3, 1999), fifty-five people were injured on December 2, 1999, when security personnel opened fire on a crowd of about 3,000 people in Timika after they attempted to stop police from lowering the separatist West Papuan morning star flag. In response to a more serious rebel provocation against a police station in Abepura near Jayapura on December 7, 2000, security officials stormed into a student dormitory in Abepura, Papua. The assault and subsequent torture of over a hundred student detainees led to the deaths of three students and left one paralyzed for life (*Jakarta Post*, September 9, 2005).

If one compares this case with the more recent student provocation that killed several policemen and a soldier, it is possible to conclude that this type of violence has lessened. In March 2006, despite the seriousness of the student action, the police did not dare to engage in beatings inside police stations; in some cases, the police actually apologized to wrongfully-arrested students for the beatings they suffered (Author’s interviews with some of the beaten students, March 2006).

After a daring burglary at the Wamena military district’s arsenal in April 2003 in which two soldiers were killed and twenty-nine rifles stolen,
144 combat soldiers from the Army’s Special Forces were deployed to hunt down those responsible (Jakarta Post, April 7, 2003). According to ELSHAM, a joint military unit composed of Kopassus, Kostrad 413, and Rapid Reaction Force troops took action in the villages of Yugume, Luarem, Wupaga, Nengeagen, and Mume, with the apparent approval of the governor of Papua, Jacobus Solossa. In the District of Kuyawage west of Wamena, they burnt down the homes of inhabitants, schools, medical centers, and the homes of teachers. Livestock in the villages located near Kuyawage were also destroyed (ELSHAM report, April 21, 2003). According to the Australian newspaper The Age (April 2, 2003), which obtained documentary material in support of its claim, one of the modes of aggression on the side of pro-Indonesians, especially the TNI, is the use, training, and support of pro-Indonesian and anti-Papuan or anti-Christian militias in Papua. According to The Age, a list of candidates representing Satgas Merah Putih, a patriotic militia, from the Kodim 1702/Jayawijaya military area had been drafted, consisting of the names of eighty people described as “farmers” from Walesi Village, about fifteen kilometers from the town of Wamena. The document was signed by the commander of the Kodim military district for Wamena.

On February 20, 2003, the Australian radio station ABC cited John Rumbiak of ELSHAM as saying that Laskar Jihad, a notorious Indonesian Islamist militia was still active in Papua. According to Lawrence Mehui of the PDP, the group receives protection from the TNI in the border area. The Age (February 27, 2003) claimed that NGOs and even the Indonesian police do not enter this area. According to Rumbiak in the ABC report, the Kopassus special troops had built four training camps in border areas, just forty kilometers from the provincial capital, Jayapura. In Rumbiak’s account, Kopassus began recruiting people in the large transmigrant settlements around the town of Arso, south of Jayapura, in January. “There is a direct connection between the Islamic groups and the military because all the weapons used are military standard,” Mehui said. In addition, ELSHAM has tracked the arrival of Laskar Jihad in Papua over the past two years, beginning near the western town of Sorong, where twelve training camps guarded by the military were identified in 2002.

According to the Papua Tribal Council (Dewan Adat Papua, or DAP), in Manokwari, the TNI are developing and training local militias in Satgas Merah Putih (Red and White Special Forces, a patriotic pro-Indonesia
militia). They have two bases in Manokwari in the areas of Orang Sebari and SB7, where there are many transmigrants and Muslims. Weapons and ammunition are being smuggled in (DAP report, Biak, August 26, 2002).

The reports on militias tend to corroborate each other, but at the same time they tend to be based on the same sources. Although it is possible that the evidence on the TNI connection with Papuan militias is falsified, there is also a fair probability that these reports are correct. The TNI is known to have used the strategy of establishing militias in East Timor; and reliable reports indicate that this practice occurs in Aceh. Also, in my own research, I have interviewed Satgas Merah Putih militia members who admit that they have received their training from TNI trainers.39

Actors

The actors relevant to a peace dialogue are generally those with a collective political, religious, cultural, or social agenda. If there is a collective position40 at stake, representatives of that position have to be involved in order to end the violence (Kelman 1990: 199–215; Touval 1996: 547–70). Those with individual criminal agendas must also be taken into account when considering cooperation to transform structures of conflict (Reuck 1990). Those organizations that have influence over violence need to be considered so that the negotiations sacrifice nothing in legitimately representing the most relevant parties (Zartman and Touval 1985: 27–45).

It can be difficult to assess which institutions would be best at representing different groups with different agendas. The perceived legitimacy of the negotiating party is important, so that the constituencies of the negotiator will yield to the compromises their representative makes at the bargaining table. However, estimating this perceived legitimacy is a challenge. Often the legitimacy is only measurable after the fact, in the degree of compliance with compromises that a representative has made at the negotiating table.

Peace processes can benefit when the parties consider the involvement of stakeholder agents who have a moral right to be heard. Even though powerless stakeholders are not necessarily needed for the ending of military operations, their presence might add legitimacy to the process, especially if their presence is also generally seen as legitimate.

Despite a variety of conflicting adversaries, the main agent structure in Papua looks bipolar, divided between supporters of Papuan independence and those who believe that Papua is an integral part of Indonesia.
However, a more detailed look at the agent structure of the conflict establishes that this picture is overly simplistic.\textsuperscript{41}

Pro-Indonesian Agency

On the side of the pro-Indonesians, the situation is relatively simple. Those supporting Indonesian rule in Papua naturally also favor Indonesian official negotiations on Papua’s future.

There are differing views on many of the subtleties that should not be ignored. Negotiations on special autonomy, which sidelined the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior, proved a failure: because of the way negotiations were handled, the administration occasionally objected to, and did not genuinely implement the Papuan Special Autonomy Law (Law 21/2001).\textsuperscript{42} For example, the administration’s policies implementing the division of the province, which complicate the implementation of the special autonomy, indicate preferences against Papua’s autonomy.\textsuperscript{43} Here we can see that implementation of an agreement is easier if the people necessary for the implementation are involved in some way in the preparation of the agreement. Thus, the Indonesian negotiation panel should certainly exploit the expertise of the Ministry of the Interior.

In the Aceh negotiations, the two main difficulties on the Indonesian side were the roles of the parliament and of the military. Alternative approaches exist to preempt these problems in the Papuan dialogue. The report of the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Conflict Prevention Initiative (CPI), and the Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University (Building Sustainable Peace 2002), which have investigated the possibilities of a peace dialogue in Papua, suggests that in addition to the government, the central legislative body should be involved in a dialogue process. This idea is supported by the controversy over the Aceh negotiation between the government and Parliament, where many parliamentarians accused the government of keeping Parliament in the dark. Parliamentary involvement would also be desirable so that Indonesia might avoid the situation it has in Aceh, where the sidelining of Parliament has led to its unwillingness to issue the funds promised by the government for the integration of the separatist GAM fighters into the civilian sector. The process of negotiation related to the
Papuan Special Autonomy Law indicates that Parliament could possibly be directly included in the negotiations. During the special autonomy negotiations, the DPR established a Special Committee for Special Autonomy of the Indonesian Parliament (called Pansus). With the help of this committee, negotiators could keep the main parliamentary factions informed about the negotiation process. Furthermore, Pansus made it possible for those involved in the consultation process to stay informed about the parliamentary realities in Jakarta. It was, after all, Parliament that had to accept the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. Parliamentary cooperation will also be needed for the acceptance of any negotiated changes to the law.

In a future peace process in Papua, Parliament could establish a similar committee to serve as a consultative body for the government negotiation panel. Since any future negotiation process should involve the extreme elements on the resistance side, it would be important that the work of this consultative body be confidential so that parties would not court nationalist sentiment through tough posturing against the much-hated separatists. With a confidential consultancy mechanism, Parliament would be involved in the peace process from the beginning, and the process would not be too politicized, despite the involvement of the parliament, due to the confidentiality of the consultation mechanism.

In theory, the military of Indonesia should not have an independent political role with regard to the Papuan peace, or with regard to the conflict. The reality remains, however, that the military and the government do not always speak the same language, so it is important to consider the military as an actor in Papua. For example, when President Abdurrahman Wahid supported the fora that created the Papuan Presidium Council, the Papuan police and the TNI later pursued and jailed most of the leadership of this civilian organization. When the murder of Theys Hiyo Eluway, chair of the Papua Presidium Council, was prosecuted in the Indonesian judicial system, the number two person in the Indonesian armed forces hierarchy, General Ramizard Riyacudu, said that the TNI soldiers responsible for the murder were “heroes” of Indonesia and that the act of murder was a normal “military act in service of the nation” (“‘Special’ Testimony,” Tempo, January 7–13, 2002).

The military forces and the police have also sometimes held different opinions on the issue of using pro-Indonesian militias against the Papuan separatists. As a result of these differences, the government has not always been able to control its military. Success in the Papuan peace process will
depend, as was the case in Aceh, on the civilian subordination of the military, especially since military violence is not always of the kind that can be resolved by agreeing on principles of peace. In many of the cases of military violence, the motives have been opportunistic and illegal and have had nothing to do with principles that soldiers feel committed to. If the military units gain from war in Papua, they cannot be persuaded to peace by presenting acceptable principles. They simply have to be controlled better so that they will not contribute to further violence.

In Aceh, it was possible for the president to use international transparency in his effort to contain military spoilers of the peace process. In Aceh was packed with international donor organizations due to the tsunami, and the president could control the military, since the military could not shield its activities from scrutiny. The use of transparency against peace spoilers would not be possible in Papua, as the province is still largely inaccessible to international NGOs and the media, a condition that clearly contributes to the lack of transparency and to the intensity of military violence. However, since the Aceh process, military reform has progressed, which may have helped the situation somewhat. The military’s sense of ownership of the peace process could also be ensured by offering the military a part in the negotiations, as was suggested in the Gadjah Mada University/Harvard University report. This was the case in the Aceh negotiations, in which a TNI official worked closely with the head of the government negotiating panel, offering advice to the government team on a variety of military matters related to the peace process.

In addition to the differences in government and military views about the battle against separatism, the existence of migrant-based militias suggests that, in addition to the government and the military, migrants are responsible for part of the violence in Papua. This increases the need for some form of involvement on the part of the migrant community in the Papuan peace dialogue. However, it will be difficult to find a way to organize migrants as an actor in the peace dialogue, as there seems to be no organization representing their interests. Open organization of the entire migrant community (regardless of religion and ethnici-
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Clandestine militant organizations such as the Islamist Laskar Jihad, the nationalist Satgas Merah Putih, and the Islamic Defenders Front, which are still operating in Papua as defenders of the group interests of Muslim migrants, would not be viewed as legitimate representatives of the migrant community, as most migrants are moderate Muslims or Christians. Organization of the migrant communities is based on religion as well as on ethnicity. By using these ethnic organizations, it might be possible for the migrants to form a kind of consultative group that could assist the government negotiating panel regarding their interests. While the parliamentary special consultative committee would undoubtedly involve the main political groupings, a migrant consultative committee would involve the main ethnic organizations of the migrant communities.

The issue of the division of Papua could possibly be negotiated separately from the main process of negotiation. On this issue, the pro-Indonesian side would necessarily also include the political elite of West Irian Jaya, which tends to side with Jakarta in the question of division.

Agency of the Resistance Movement

The agent structure of the resistance to Indonesian rule in Papua is very complex. Resistance is not simply a matter of separatism, even if militant separatism also has to be taken into account in both the study of the Papuan war and the making of peace. Simplifications in the agent structure of resistance clearly serve some political interests, but acting on these simplified ideas does not necessarily serve the interests of dialogue and peace in Papua.

There are two political reasons to frame the conflict as one between separatists and Indonesians. For the Indonesian military, it is important that resistance against Indonesian rule be seen as separatist resistance. It is always legitimate, within the Indonesian administrative logic, to suppress separatism, but it is not legitimate to suppress reaction against human rights violations by Indonesian administrators in Papua. Thus, lumping all resistance together with the independence movement serves the interests of the Indonesian military. However, the reality is that resistance to Indonesian rule is often specific to events and practices of the Indonesian administration.48

The independence movement would also naturally want to consider all resistance as something that happens under their umbrella. For some
independence activists, this structure is simplified even further into a distinction between a Papuan position in favor of independence and an Indonesian position in favor of integration: There is no conflict “between integrationists and independence aspirants within West Papua. Integrationists functionally represent the Indonesian position.” The association of preference for independence with the Papuan ethnic group is an extreme form of the inclination to see all Pauans as members of the independence movement.

However, one must acknowledge at least the theoretical possibility of there being various types of resistance against the Indonesian administration, as well as the possibility of some ethnic Pauans supporting Indonesian rule. Therefore, agents of the conflict should not be viewed as Indonesians versus Pauans, nor should they be viewed as integrationists versus secessionists (let alone OPM versus integrationists). Instead, one should probably speak about the conflict between the heterogeneous resistance movement and the supporters of the Indonesian administration.

It is difficult to discern the identity of the Papuan resistance movement, because resistance to existing rule is never an issue where popular preferences can be openly and transparently expressed. It seems that while much of the Papuan resistance is specific to certain forms of Indonesian administration (insufficient respect for human rights, for example), issues (the operating license for Freeport International), or situations of conflict (resistance against excessive violence in response to a flag raising), many opponents of specific forms of Indonesian administration feel that Papua would be better off with minimal or no Indonesian influence. In many cases the logic of conflict pushes all resistance to this preference. The TNI’s treatment of resistance as separatism and the growing hatred toward the opponent often in fact push those who were simply resisting government authority toward more separatist inclinations. Some of the students involved and jailed for their participation in the violent riots of March 16, 2006, in Abepura, for example, identified themselves as human rights activists before the riot but became sure of their commitment to the cause of independence after the event.

Yet because resistance is often specific, the agent structure on the side of opponents of Indonesian administration is less unified than in the case of Aceh, for example. The students who committed resistance-related violence on March 16, 2006, were participating in a specific protest against Freeport International. They were not rioting for independence, and they
were not mobilized by a separatist organization, even if their specific cause might have been motivated by separatist convictions.

Due to the complexity of the resistance movement, it is difficult to identify its agency in conflict or in peace dialogue. During the extensive informal civil society dialogue for the preparation of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law, extreme groups, including the militant separatists, were on the margins. In most cases, independence-minded people ruled themselves out, while the OPM exiles had already been ruled out of Papuan politics and were never contacted for the consultations. As Yitzhak Rabin once said, “You don’t make peace with friends. You make peace with enemies.” The marginalization of the radical militants from the dialogue might have been the reason that this process of consolidation failed to reduce violence in Papua. The rejection by independence fighters of special autonomy triggered considerable violence, some of it directly controlled by one of the OPM groups or leaders, while other violent operations were more spontaneous, but done by people who support the cause of the OPM. The failure of the special autonomy consultations, the success in Aceh, and a wealth of literature on conflicts and conflict resolution (Sederberg 1995; Wallace 2006) all point in the same direction: the marginalized and exiled groups have to be involved in the peace process. Therefore, the resistance movement cannot be represented only by the people Jakarta accepts: Legal, official identification of the Papuan negotiators, using acceptable forums such as the Papuan People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, or MRP), would not let the illegal entities in. Then, as forces outside the dialogue, these illegal and exiled entities would continue their fight, as fighting would be the only channel of protest for these marginalized groups.

Any future Papuan peace dialogue should also involve the radical supporters of independence so that their exclusion does not spoil the process. This is true even though many analysts emphasized after Indonesian democratization that Papuan resistance has transformed from sporadic localized military activities of the OPM into a civilian mass movement (ICG 2001; Sumule 2003). Much of the new type of resistance has been based on human rights organizations, environmental groups, and...
Christian organizations, and thus apparently has undermined the role of the militant struggle and the OPM. Yet the frequency of violent operations under the umbrella of the OPM has not been scaled down; despite its organizational problems and internal struggles, OPM still commands some ideological power that can mobilize or prevent violence. “The OPM’s limited military capabilities and internal conflicts do not diminish its importance as the bearer of the ideal of independence” (ICG 2001). Lately it has been tactically wiser for those conducting the Papuan struggle to publicly distance themselves from the OPM and use the sanctity of human rights organizations (until the recent escalation of the harassment of human rights organizations, including Elsham Papua) and religious organizations: for the government it has been politically costly to attack human rights organizations and almost impossible to attack churches. These tactical issues have fundamentally changed the way in which Papuan resistance organizes, but they have not necessarily affected the loyalties of the independence movement and their readiness to accept solutions negotiated with participation of fighters that call themselves the OPM. OPM is much more an idea or an umbrella of Papuan resistance than an organization, but even as such it commands crucial importance both for war and peace in Papua.54 As many travelers in Papua hear, on the level of ideas “Papuans are all OPM.”

OPM’s direct control has diminished because so many of its leaders have been exiled. According to the ICG, “most of the Papuan leaders in exile identified themselves with the OPM” (ICG 2001). However, as was the case in the Aceh negotiations, these exiled and jailed resistance leaders have been marginalized by many, and their relevance to the peace process has been undermined, all due to their insufficient contact with the masses on the ground in Papua. The marginalization of exiled and jailed leaders is typical for any separatist or revolutionary conflict, but in most cases peace requires the inclusion of the exiled and jailed rebels. Indonesia is no exception, if one considers the cases of Aceh and East Timor, where the exiles turned out to be crucial for the settlement. The bulk of GAM leaders participating in the negotiation on the Acehnese side in Helsinki had not been in Aceh for twenty-seven years—but their leadership was needed for peace. Even though nobody in East Timor or Aceh dared to reveal their sympathies toward their exiled leaders, these leaders still commanded crucial support and control. Even if OPM is not as cohesive as GAM, this loose umbrella of groups is still needed in the dialogue for peace to hold in Papua.
At least some OPM leaders feel that negotiations will not end Papua-Jakarta conflict as long as the OPM is excluded from the negotiation table. According to John Otto Ondawame, “If the OPM is excluded from the peace talks, it would not bring any peace in the territory. It is, therefore, that the representation of the OPM as main key actor in the peace talks from the very beginning is very crucial and politically important” (private correspondence, January 2006). If one analyzes the opinions of the many people involved in specific resistance activities, it is easy to accept this assessment. The failure of the special autonomy-related informal negotiations and the success of the involvement of Acehnese exiled leaders in that dialogue suggest the same.

The role of the OPM in the conflict and in a possible peace process is, however, fundamentally different from the one GAM had in Aceh. Due to OPM’s violence against migrants and its preference for exclusion of the non-native population from Papua, OPM agency in any dialogue will probably be contested by migrants. While in Aceh the group of migrants was small and their ability to spoil the Aceh peace process was limited, migrants are such a large group in Papua that any successful peace process will have to accommodate them. This creates a dilemma, as it seems that the independence movement, and even most of the peaceful mass-based separatist organizations, will not accept any migrant representation in the peace process (Author’s interview with an anonymous informant, November 2005), while most migrants would be unlikely to accept OPM participation in the peace process. The secessionists have been clear that the negotiation process has to be between the Indonesian government and the Papuan side, with no role for the migrants: “OPM is a radical political movement, which has the same position as GAM in Aceh. Any peace talks in the future should be done between OPM and the Government of Indonesia” (Author’s correspondence with John Otto Ondawame, October 2005).

Yet peace would be difficult to imagine without both of these groups accepting the peace process and the peace agreement. It might be easier to persuade migrants to accept OPM participation, especially if this is preferred by the Indonesian government. Migrants consider that the Indonesian government authority is unchallenged, and so they will have to accept this government decision, too. At the same time, an institutionalized system of consultations between the government negotiators and the community of migrants might be possible for the OPM to accept.
The National Liberation Army of West Papua (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, or TPN), is often described as the military wing of the OPM. According to an OPM leader, the TPN is completely controlled by the OPM: “We should also remember that the National Liberation Army of West Papua . . . is not controlled by Presidium or any other organisation but only the OPM-political wings” (Author’s correspondence with John Otto Ondawame, January 2006). However, that there has to be a separate military organization even though the OPM itself has been conducting military operations suggests that the relationship between the OPM and the TPN is more complex. In Papua, accusations that the OPM is participating in a conspiratorial relationship with the enemy—the Indonesian military—are widespread. Some assessments suggest that the OPM as an organization has been tarnished by shady dealings with the enemy, which explains the need for alternative organizations. However, since the main information outlets of the TPN do not support this interpretation, one should conclude that, for the most part, TPN is under the control of the OPM and not an independent potential negotiator. However, in any Papuan peace process, one should not expect the same kind of discipline as demonstrated by the GAM in Aceh; instead, parties to the negotiations should show tolerance and patience over security breaches and jointly prepare for militant spoilers of the peace process.

Most analysts agree that mainstream Papuan resistance organizations after the democratization of Indonesia have been urban and relatively peaceful. These organizations should not be ignored in the peace process. It is unlikely that any formal dialogue between the resistance movement and the supporters of Indonesian rule could be conducted in a neatly bilateral basis, as was the case in the Aceh peace process. One of these resistance organizations is the PDP. This 22-person executive body was selected at the Second Papuan People’s Congress by a 200-member (later 501-member) Panel Papua. The latter consisted of nearly all civil society constituencies and was established as the Papuan legislature (ICG 2001; Alua 2002a, b). The democratic nature of the establishment of the PDP could add to its credibility as a negotiator in a Papuan peace dialogue.

However, the problem for the PDP is that it has been dissolved and most of its leaders have been put in jail. Furthermore, the chairman of the PDP, Theys H. Eluay, was murdered by the TNI. Those leaders who avoided a jail sentence continued in the leadership of another tribal actor in the Papuan independence struggle, DAP, an assembly for the protection of cul-
tural and tribal rights. While the PDP was repressed because it was an openly political organization, DAP has avoided serious prosecution due to its cultural identity. From the point of view of Indonesia’s multicultural state ideology, a cultural organization is more difficult for Jakarta to attack. Yet many people see this organization as the continuation of the PDP, even if its political agenda is subdued. This organization is led by the former co-chair of the PDP, Tom Beanal. For many Papuans, the PDP, DAP, and even the OPM are the same, but due to Indonesian suppression, these organizations and their apparently differing identities are all needed for the struggle.

DAP has some potential in a peace process as an organization with contacts to a large number of Papuans, including militant supporters of independence. It emerged before the Second Papuan People’s Congress in May–June 2000, which was attended by 3,000 delegates. DAP holds plenary sessions annually, each time in a different region, and in the past four years these sessions have been attended by approximately 300 people representing the many indigenous groups. In spite of this, DAP lacks the democratic credibility of the PDP. Yet this is a problem typical for separatist areas: if an organization tries to get a local Papuan political democratic mandate, it is promoting separatist mobilization and will therefore be banned.

Within the camp of independence-minded people, there are variations on the question of whether sovereignty and political empowerment should belong to and benefit traditional and decentralized traditional tribal structures or all of Papua. The Koteka Tribal Assembly, known as Demmak, represents an alliance of highlanders, especially the Dani people of West Papua, and takes the former position (Demmak position paper) while the traditional OPM stand has been in support of a more united independent West Papua. According to the former longtime leader of the organization, Jacob Prai, the structure of governance in Papua needs to be highly decentralized due to the structure of the society. At the same time, Prai places more trust in educated Papuans than in tribal leaders, who are often bought off.

Violence has often originated from the tribal structures, so Demmak and other organizations with the same agenda should be brought into the peace-building processes. It is possible that PDP involvement could make Demmak less relevant, as the PDP represents tribal consensus, but for its part Demmak does not fully recognize the authority of the PDP as a rep-
resentative of the tribes. Failure to involve Demmak could therefore result in problems of compliance within the independence movement.

The different independence movement actors also have varying definitions of their enemies. While the older declarations of the OPM emphasize that transmigrants are victims of Indonesia, as Papuans are, the practice of other OPM factions has varied. Many Papuans believe that the OPM would want to expel all migrants from Papua; in this respect they feel that the OPM differs from DAP and the PDP.

In spite of their economically nationalist tone and leftist orientation, the traditional OPM policy declarations seem to exclude international corporations from the list of targets. However, the nominal military wing of the OPM—the TPN—today declares on its web pages that West Papua should be “first of all and primarily, economically not dependent on foreign institutions and powers” and has defined multinationals as targets. The OPM Revolutionary Council based in Papua New Guinea is at the same time welcoming multinationals to Papua, seeing them as potential partners in the development of a liberal Papuan state. These differences within the independence movement on multinationals do not necessarily warrant the involvement of various independence groups in peace negotiations. Differences could be dealt with once a peace agreement has enabled a democratic autonomous mobilization of Papuans. However, multinational actors are also stakeholders in the future of West Papua, so their views matter.

Due to the differences and the lack of communication among the supporters of independence, it has been suggested by some key individuals in the independence movement that any dialogue between independence and integration supporters should be preceded by dialogue among supporters of independence (Tebay 2004). Such activities have indeed already taken place, in Holland in June 2003 and in Sydney in August 2004. By selecting international locations, the participants of these meetings tried to involve those forces that have been marginalized and exiled by Indonesia. At the same time, of course, this has excluded the greater masses of Papuans. There have also been suggestions of creating the Third Papuan Congress in Papua. Although this could offer opportunities to organize the Papuan movement, it would naturally leave out the already marginalized, jailed, and exiled voices. In fact it could, as has been the case before, add to the number of these actors: mobilization of all voices is not yet possible in Papua, as has been shown after the Second Papuan Congress, which was
accepted by Indonesian leadership but which resulted in mass arrests. Yet success in Papua would probably require the participation of both the “accepted” forces of resistance and the marginalized forces.

In 2006 a major effort has been undertaken to create a Papuan umbrella organization that would include elements of Papuan resistance and facilitate communication between several “Papuan actors” before and during negotiations. The development of a Papuan umbrella organization seems necessary in order to consolidate the agency of the radical secessionist Papuan resistance movements.

Papuan negotiators need a mandate from all relevant resistance groups, especially those who can initiate violent challenges, on principles that the official negotiators can agree upon. This mandate should be seen not as legitimizing a permanent representative of a separatist group, but rather as a temporary and imperfect arrangement that guarantees some respect for the concessions the Papuan negotiators make. This, I believe, would be the first goal of any Papuan umbrella organization. Furthermore, it would need to be able to create a mechanism that would enable the Papuan negotiators to consult the radical elements of the resistance movement on issues at the negotiation table as the process develops. However, the problem of representation can be seen as a “chicken and egg” issue: in order to be able to organize to determine autonomous Papuan representation in negotiations, a functioning Papuan political system would be necessary, but a functioning autonomous Papuan political system is the objective of negotiations.

Another problem with different umbrella organizations in Papua has been that they tend to claim to represent (or at least aspire to do so) all Papuans—this is the case with the new Papuan Umbrella Organization (PUO)—and the number of these umbrellas makes determining who represents whom difficult. Yet it is not the case that each organization would always be challenging the authority and status of the other groups. Many of the participants, including Agus Alua and Tom Beanal, are leading members of most of the alternative umbrellas. But the fact that OPM, DAP, MUBES, Second Papuan Congress, the PDP, and a dozen other organizations have each claimed to be representative of all Papuans makes
it difficult to establish which group would represent Papuans or secessionists in peace talks. Yet until there are local Papuan political parties, representative Papuan elections, and so on, no organization can claim definitive democratic representation of Papua.

The closest Papuans come to legal representation is the MRP. Established in November 2005 in accordance with the Papuan Special Autonomy Law, the 42-member MRP has the power to approve candidates for governor and for the MRP, as well as make recommendations and give its approval for cooperative projects between the Papuan administration and third parties. Within the framework of special autonomy, the MRP is established to represent ethnic Papuans. The MRP’s links with existing legal NGOs, human rights groups, and church leaders could also offer an important channel for consultations on negotiations.

However, because the Papuan Special Autonomy Law never included the militant supporters of independence, and especially because its implementation, including the establishment of the MRP, has been challenged by many in the resistance movement, the MRP cannot represent the radical elements within Papuan society. Its choice of MRP chairman has, however, restored some of the credibility for this organization among the radical elements of the resistance movement. Dr. Agus Alua, chair of the MRP, was the secretary of the PDP and a member of FORERI and Team 100, so he has been a key member of the democratic, peaceful independence movement.

Because the MRP is an important legal and at least semi-democratic mechanism of consultation within the Papuan community, it would make sense to involve the MRP in the Papuan dialogue. This would guarantee the mandate of many Papuans, although not the mandate of the militant independence movement. By using the mechanisms of consultation, already created when the Papuan Special Autonomy Law was drafted, the MRP could, as a legal organization, also guarantee an efficient consultation mechanism during the negotiation process.

At the same time, some kind of PUO is needed so that the Papuan dialogue does not alienate the Papuan leaders who have been marginalized from Papuan politics (exiles, active fighters, the OPM). This dual representation would not constitute any formal representation, but it might be the only realistic way to guarantee the representation of those Papuan resistance forces that often contribute to violence motivated by specific problems of governance and of those forces that are totally margin-
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alized as too extreme. It would be a mechanism of consultancy toward different Papuan constituencies and an instrument to maximize the degree of compliance with regard to principles agreed upon in negotiation with the pro-Indonesian side.

The starting point for negotiations has to be a recognition that the representation of the independence movement will always be imperfect. The process has to be open so that terms of agreement can develop after the Papuan side has organized its representation within the framework agreed upon in the initial negotiations between Papua and Jakarta. This would mean a two-phase process for the definition of Papua’s relations with Jakarta. In the Aceh process, the separatist GAM negotiated only a rough framework (MoU) for the peace agreement. On the basis of this framework, Acehnese civil society, including the militants, was able to mobilize and further define the terms of Aceh’s political relations with Jakarta. All this happened under the monitoring and protection of mutually trusted third parties. This formula could solve the “chicken and egg” problem by first resolving the issue of safety and inclusion of the militant elements in formal negotiations and then tackling the setup of the Papuan political status in a more inclusive, free, and democratic process.

The negotiation process (the goal of which is only the rough framework, the MoU) needs to be open in the sense that it does not claim a monopoly on contacts between the resistance movement and the pro-Jakarta side. No matter how carefully the issue of representing the independence movement is planned, it is important that nothing prevent the initiation of dialogue with the government by groups that have been excluded and have grievances they feel are not being represented in the existing dialogue. Even though such alternative processes were not initiated in the case of Aceh, the Helsinki process was open to such possibilities.

Other Constituencies
For the sake of transparency—the lack of which was mentioned as the main grievance in the Jakarta-based criticism of the Aceh negotiations—top-level negotiations could be combined with regional track two dialogues and

**For the sake of transparency... top-level negotiations could be combined with regional track two dialogues**
with expert fora, such as the Papua Forum, which would publicly debate the central issues on the agenda of high-level negotiations. Expert fora related to issues of the exploitation of Papuan resources could include representatives of the Indonesian and international companies operating in Papua. Expert fora related to economic grievances could involve representatives of the donor community.

It would be important that public fora not be allowed to formulate binding positions that top-level negotiators could then use as non-negotiables, as rigid realities emanating from the constituencies. Instead, their main function would be to:

1. Formulate the interests, fears, and hopes of different stakeholders;
2. Map out the instruments that different agents (such as the donor community, the Indonesian government, international corporations, NGOs) could use for different peace strategies; and
3. Develop alternative win-win strategies and partial solutions to problems that would not compromise any party’s core interests.

At the same time, for the sake of progress, it would be useful to keep the course of the high-level negotiations confidential, since compromises tend to be unpopular among constituencies that are unaware of the political realities that lead to them. Yet it would be necessary for the track two fora to be aware of the agendas of the various rounds of negotiations in order to make their wider fora relevant. The track two fora reports to the high-level negotiations could include a summary of the fears, hopes, and interests related to the issues on the agenda and a summary of the issues that the fora would like to place on the agenda. The summary could be compiled by trusted third parties, who would also eliminate the position-defining elements from the summaries. For the fears, hopes, and interests that, for example, members of the independence movement would not dare to express publicly, there could be a mechanism whereby these issues could be communicated to those compiling the summaries. The publicity policy of the expert fora could be determined by them, however, and its experts should agree to the wise conflict-resolution approach of trying to avoid a situation in which parties use publicity to create rigid positions (Kelman 1995: 199–215; Mitchell and Banks 1996; Reuck 1990).

Pre-Negotiation between Actors of Dialogue
At this stage, all pro-independence or resistance organizations still seem to lack confidence in proceeding to dialogue with Jakarta due to the lack of clarity about the representation of the independence movement.
International support for dialogue among independence movement factions would probably not be forthcoming, given that this activity would at the same time directly support the buildup of independent Papuan governance.

Furthermore, the formal organization of the independence movement has often been used not for the preparation of dialogue but as a platform for diplomacy and struggle for independence from Indonesia. In early 2000, there were strong signs of progress in the organization of the independence movement, with the MUBES mass consultation, the Second Papuan National Congress, and the establishment of the Papuan Presidium Council. It ended in violence, however, and the process did not manage to establish the position of the Papuan Presidium Council as the legitimate negotiator on behalf of the independence movement.

Only the establishment of FORERI, a group of prominent independence-minded Papuans, and Team 100 of the West Papuan Community led to negotiations with President Habibie in Autumn 1998. FORERI was established on July 24, 1998, and Team 100 was created by the FORERI as a negotiating team to represent twenty-five areas with four representatives each (HRW 2000: 3; Sumule 2003: 353–54; ICG 2001: 12). The reason that only the FORERI process led to negotiation and that other processes led to the mobilization of independence activities was simply because in this dialogue the Papuan party communicated with their opponent from the very beginning. Preparation for dialogue in Papua has too often meant the mobilization of one side without any effort to kick-start a pre-negotiation process. According to many studies of the preparation for dialogue, early contacts with “the enemy” are important so that the preparation will not lead to the consolidation of unilateral positions but rather contribute to the redirection of attitudes to focus on interests instead of positions—in other words, to the understanding of negotiation as an effort to meet the core interests of negotiating parties rather than fight between opposite positions (Souders 1991: 57–70; Rothman 1992; Zartman 1989: 237–53).

However, with the exception of FORERI, in which the resistance movement worked closely with the Indonesian State Secretariat, “pre-negotiation” has often been explicitly exclusive, with preparations on one side only: “Any such [preparatory] meeting should not include any Indonesian presence. Inclusion of Indonesian representatives should only [be] within the context of a formal external process . . . [B]eing inclusive means including all those people with whom one can agree, not including those people with whom one will end up negotiating later.”

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formation of an agency for negotiation should be coupled with Papuan efforts to communicate with Jakarta before any formal negotiation. Otherwise, consolidation could easily lead to partial mobilization of the resistance. However, in order for the resistance movement to approach Jakarta, Indonesian leadership should accept the idea that it is not up to Jakarta to decide who represents the Papuan side. In order to get results, it is necessary that Jakarta show tolerance toward Papuan efforts to create a radical Papuan agency for dialogue. The creation of a secessionist Papuan Umbrella Organization is necessary for peace. Accepting this will not be easy for Jakarta, as the emergence of a PUO will mean the mobilization of the enemy. Yet Jakarta can only make peace with its enemy, which is why Indonesia also needs the PUO.

**Grievances**

Grievances at the core of the violent disputes between supporters and opponents of Indonesian rule can be divided into two categories: those that are directly linked to people’s (sometimes egoistic or particular) motivations to use violence against the other group and collective motivations for the entire Papua. The latter motivations are more fundamental, as they form the context of the overall dispute about integration and separation. I will start from the more superficial level and move on to the core grievances.

**Individual Motivations**

In finding a way to avoid violence, motivations for violent resistance are more important to understand than motivations for political resistance. Interviews with Papuan members of the violent resistance reveal many things about why fighters choose the violent path. Very often the fighters interviewed for this study chose a violent path as an immediate reaction to abuse by the military or by the Indonesian bureaucracy. In Papua, priests, tribal leaders, and women often have been the victims of violence, abuse, or unfair treatment, which has sparked revenge. Consider the case in which a powerful local official swore revenge after villagers had been subjected to abuse by the TNI special forces (Kopassus) for refusing to reveal the informant’s hiding place. In all such cases, turning to rebellion has been a means of demonstrating loyalty to something: a parish, tribe, gender role, or subjects.
Most often, the incidents that motivated entry into the TPN/OPM were cases in which the national interest was not served by the abusive action by the public servant, police officer, or military officer. Instead the actions related to hiding or promoting military officers’ private economic activities or suppressing legitimate protests. As one resistance fighter stated: “It was clear that what the military was doing was a fraud, but when the villagers started protesting, the tribal chief was jailed for two years. I could not just watch and see how they take my tribal chief and punish him... It was the TNI who broke the law.”

Even in cases where rebellious action was triggered by a legitimate law enforcement or military operation against separatists, the means used by the authorities have been questionable. Many Papuans describe excessive TNI activities to extract confessions or information about rebel hideouts from ordinary villagers; in at least one case, an informant considered just such an incident as the trigger for his change from peaceful methods of independence activism to violent ones.

Employment discrimination, especially against the Papuan intelligentsia, has often been mentioned as another trigger that prompts decisions to join rebellious movements. Paul van der Veur (1964) and Peter Savage (1978: 981–95), for example, very convincingly link opportunistic Papuan career motivations with the birth of the OPM. According to more current interviews, the difficulty that the educated Papuan elite experiences in getting a job still is a strong motivation to turn to violence in Papua.

In some cases commitment to violent revolt has been brought about by behavior rather than by a change of attitude. Many of the students who participated in the Abepura riots of March 16, 2006, never anticipated that it would end in casualties, and almost no one anticipated that they themselves would be the ones causing these casualties. When the police started firing, students did not know that these were rubber bullets. Students ran away toward another group of security personnel, and, in a reaction known as “forward panic,” they attacked some fallen policemen and a TNI officer who had tried to escape from the angry students. After being part of a violent incident, these students necessarily became committed to violent resistance; they could no longer see themselves as anything but “freedom fighters.”

Finally, it is very important for the international community to keep in mind that many secessionist militants in Papua explain the role of
separatist military action as a way of attracting international attention to Papuan grievances. Papuans have traditionally seen the international community as offering opportunities for Papuan resistance, as they have felt that with the help of foreign powers, they could together persuade the Indonesian government. Thus, grievances combined with perceived opportunities seem to motivate violence much more effectively than grievances alone.

Even though much of the violence on the integrationist side takes place in the law enforcement framework, much of it is not really motivated by national grievances. Insecurity and hostility toward the TNI and non-Papuans is clearly an important immediate grievance that motivates violence, as we can see that most of the casualties caused by the TNI have occurred in the aftermath of rebel attacks on police stations and military installations.

The protection of legal and illegal economic activities also very often ignites military violence. That the military and the police in conflict areas are not fully funded by the public sector makes control over conflict escalation very difficult. Military units operating outside their regular duties, conducting or protecting illegal and legal businesses in a manner that is not conducive to the security of Papuans, is a major source of military violence.

The violence by the integrationist militant migrant groups is also clearly related to insecurity and hostility. In the case of Laskar Jihad, this feeling is blended with international conflict framings between the Christian and Muslim worlds. As one 26-year-old Laskar Jihad fighter told us, “We are defending Islam because the West hates our religion.” There is also a feeling that the majority position of Muslims in Indonesia is not reflected in national politics. Laskar Jihad emphasizes the national realities as a rational strategy in a situation where the local reality is that of balance between indigenous Christians and migrant Muslims.72

Collective Motivations

Individual decisions to resort to violence might be triggered by very individual grievances, but they are always framed by more general grievances. The conflict option exists because of the more general disputes and grievances, after all. The fundamental grievance in the Papua-Jakarta relationship relates to the differences in the definition of Papua’s political status.

According to many secessionist activists, strategies to increase the level of professionalism in Papuan administration and to raise the educational and economic standards of life in Papua merely treat the symptoms, not
the underlying causes of the problems. Any progress is likely to be temporary if the symptoms of bad management, low levels of education, a poor economy, and so on are treated separately from the cause of these problems, namely “Papuan colonial occupation by Indonesia. . . . Papua does not have a sick stomach, but it first has a sick head that decides what to feed to the stomach. The head would need to be dealt with first.” As was revealed in the analysis of the different constructions of the conflict, the secessionist foundation for the diagnosis of the root of the problems lies in the historical origin of Indonesia’s sovereignty over Papua and in the racial difference between Asian Indonesians and Melanesian Papuans.

Historical Grievances
At the same time, Jakarta claims that the status of Papua as a part of a unitary state of Indonesia is non-negotiable. As discussed above, this argument is based on the international recognition of Papua as part of Indonesia and on the history of Indonesia’s struggle against foreign domination. The Indonesian mission of developing Papua is also presented as a reason why the issue of the political status of Papua should not be raised continually. The Indonesians view the main problem with the “stomach” as the continuous effort by the secessionists to decapitate the body, which is also not good for the stomach. Thus, the issue of separatism is framed as an issue of law and order.

Although it would be difficult for the international community to support an explicitly racial basis for nationhood, or legitimacy of conquest based on military sacrifice, international actors have sometimes reacted to historical justifications. Most recently, in October 2005, two members of the European Parliament appealed for the annulment of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, or at least a review of its legitimacy. Indeed, recent historical investigation tends to cast a shadow of doubt on the process of Papuan integration into Indonesia. Public and recently declassified sources reveal the cynicism and “political realism” of the exercise, as well as the fact that neither of the main parties involved in the process in 1969—the United States (as mediator of the Dutch-Indonesian agreement on Papua) and the Netherlands—believed that the process truly reflected Papuan wishes.
Even the ambassador in charge of the UN supervisory mission to the Act of Free Choice objected to some of the limitations to fairness in the process. Ambassador Fernando Ortiz-Sans (1969) wrote: “I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the implementation of Article XXII of the (New York) Agreement relating to ‘the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area.’” According to reports by Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, the agreement on the status did not reflect his sense of justice but rather the logic of power, which forced the Netherlands to accept “a deal [New York Agreement of 1962] with Indonesia against the Dutch’s own will and against everything the Dutch population valued” (New York Times, August 17, 1962). Indonesian statements lead to similar conclusions. Major Soewondo of the Indonesian mission that prepared the Act of Free Choice described the free choice to village chiefs of Lake Sentani area in the following way: “I am drawing the line frankly and clearly. I say I will protect and guarantee the safety of everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead anyone who is against us—and all his followers.”

According to declassified sources, a U.S. embassy report of May 1967 reveals a U.S. assessment according to which “99 percent of the Papuan population favors independence from Indonesia.” In July 1969 a confidential aerogram from the embassy stated that “grievances and anti-GOI sentiment are quite real, however, and there is little question that a great majority of . . . Irianese favor a termination of Indonesian rule. . . . Opposition to the GOI stems from economic deprivation over the years, military repression and capriciousness and mal-administration.” The same source claimed that “death threats from the Indonesian military were issued to any Papuan who did not vote for integration in the Act of Free Choice.”

In his recent book, the eminent Dutch historian Pieter Drooglever piles up further evidence based on Dutch documentation that suggests the Act of Free Choice was neither representative nor free (Drooglever 2005). The UN report on which international acceptance of the Act of Free Choice was based also reveals serious misgivings in the way in which the process was conducted. The preparations for the process were neglected until the representative of the UN Secretary-General and his under-equipped team of sixteen members (instead of the planned fifty) arrived (Ortiz-Sans 1969: 987). As a result of problems in communication and cooperation between the UN team and the Indonesian government, the
UN team could observe the selection of only 195 members of the 1,028 leaders who participated in the Act of Free Choice. Instead of a direct and secret suffrage, as advocated by the UN team (first everywhere and later at least in urban areas), the Act of Free Choice was conducted as a negotiation process among community and group leaders; the individual opinion of the selected leaders had to be expressed publicly (Indonesian Government Decree 31/1969, reg. para 3(d)). Furthermore, representation was denied to groups that advocated independence, since such opinions were not legal and such organizations therefore could not have a legal status under Indonesian law: “Those few people—possibly existing—not in favor of retaining ties” are not organized legally “and so were not eligible for representation on the consultative assemblies” that selected the 1,028 representatives (ibid.).

If historical evidence suggests that the legal origin of Indonesia’s rule in Papua is shaky, it also suggests that the origin of the indigenous support for independence was not so indigenous. Instead, the development of an independence movement seems to have been very much facilitated by the Netherlands as part of a Dutch strategy of dividing the anti-Dutch opposition in Indonesia during the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on Indonesian independence and on Papua (van der Veur 1964: 57; Osborne 1985: 19). A large part of the original independence-minded elite was trained by the Dutch in institutions such as the Police Training School and School of Administration, which were created during Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. This elite was rather isolated from the masses of Papuans, and they first started to create institutions of an independent West Papua—New Guinea Council with legislative powers in February 1961; Regional Councils in late 1961; Komite Nasional, the National Committee, in September 1962—as part of a Dutch plan for gradual independence. The so-called Luns Plan was finally presented to the United Nations on September 27, 1961, where it failed to receive the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly.

Furthermore, interviews with a central figure in the establishment of the OPM reveal that one of the motivations of the Papuan elite was private and related to a promise by the Dutch administration of a high posi-
tion in the administration of an independent West Papua. Yet, of course, Papuan nationalism has deeper roots, and even the Papuan elite had their own intentions when they took advantage of the facilitation the Netherlands was keen on offering (Chauvel 2005: 37–47).

The approach of the mediators in the Aceh negotiations was that negotiating on the basis of historical claims was not fruitful for the process and that it would be difficult for the international community to accept historical claims for statehood, because it would put into question the legitimacy of the territorial integrity of a majority of the world’s nations. The focus in the Aceh negotiations was therefore placed on the future. However, the role of history was the first main obstacle to progress and the first issue that could have rocked the negotiation process. In Papua, a lot of work has to be done to prevent this from happening, as the core of Papuan grievances are historical. The rectification of Papuan history was already discussed in Pansus, and none of the factions were prepared to accept opening this issue to an official debate (Sumule 2003: 367).

Two elements of compromise could resolve this grievance: one requiring concessions from the Papuans and the other from the Indonesian side. Since the Act of Free Choice, two generations of Indonesians and Papuans have lived and moved in and out of Papua. Thus, regardless of the historical justifications, the current generations of migrants would be violated if they had to pay for a historical injustice by being forced out of Papua. The starting point of discussion on this issue could be that historical unfairness was committed by the Indonesian government before it was democratized. But the historical mistakes cannot be the foundation of decisions on Papua’s future position. If the secessionists could accept this, the dialogue would be able to progress.

Yet it would be possible for the Papuan dialogue to address history in a manner that would not lead to conclusions about the future. Democratic Indonesia could admit the wrongdoings of the former authoritarian regime—and perhaps even apologize for them—without implying that these wrongdoings would have any bearing on Papua’s future status. An apology could also come with a promise that, unlike in Indonesia’s authoritarian past, in which Papuans were not involved in decision-making on
Papuan matters, in the future Papuans would be responsible for their own destiny, as already indicated in the Indonesian decision to offer special autonomy to Papua.

**General Political Grievances**

Since the status of Papua and its current governance is at the core of Jakarta-Papua grievances, they would need to be discussed, and long-term solutions should be sought so that nation-building would not be disturbed by a continuous questioning of the unit of governance. As has been suggested by many conflict resolution theorists, however, it would be necessary to get beyond the positions on the issue of Papuan political status (Fisher, Kopelman, and Schneider 1994; Fisher and Ury 1981; Ancona, Friedman, and Kolb 1991: 155–73; Friedman 1994: 265–80). Instead, it would be more constructive to talk about the interests and grievances that lead supporters of independence to conclude that independence from Indonesia is desirable. The reasons that the “people of West Papua would unanimously reject integration with Indonesia,” as is claimed by Jacob Prai and other independence activists, should be explored, and win-win solutions should be sought, both to issues that should be handled in Papua and to those that should be left to Indonesia. Furthermore, dialogue should tackle the grievances of all of the stakeholders, including ethnic Papuans, migrants, and Indonesians outside Papua. This way, the issue of Papua’s political status could be addressed from the point of view of interests instead of continuing the fruitless bargaining between independence and integration positions.

This was the formula for the Aceh peace talks, which sought a solution that would both maintain Aceh as part of Indonesia and offer Aceh substantive self-governance. To borrow and apply the Aceh formula, one could define the task for Papuan dialogue as “seeking solutions that would merge Freedom/Merdeka—as freedom from bad governance, underdevelopment despite huge natural resources, oppression, discrimination and injustice—with Autonomy/Otonomi—as a concept of the Indonesian legislation on special autonomy, that does not compromise Indonesia’s territorial integrity.” Coincidentally, this approach of focusing on interests and trying to combine freedom with autonomy, as proposed by the Aceh mediator, seems very similar to the one chosen by negotiators of the special autonomy, Agus Sumule, a member of the Governorial Assistance Team, describes the approach of the special autonomy negotiations as fol-
We proposed that the Seminar should not treat the issues of M ['merdeka’ or independence] and O ['otonomi’ or special autonomy] as M or O, or M against O, or O against M, but should be M and O—meaning both M and O were the rights of the people and should not be made to conflict with each other” (Sumule 2003: 358).

For this kind of an agenda, one needs to take a closer look at more primary grievances than the grievance on political status.

Interviews with Papuan members of the independence movement reveal that the cultural survival of Papuans is an important issue, and the risks for Papuan culture(s) are felt as a serious grievance. Issues such as the influx of migrants; the expansion of Javanese, Indonesian, and international customs; and the change in local eating habits (for example, the increased popularity of rice dishes) are felt as important issues of identity linked to the dissolution of Papuan agency and Papuan ability to defend their interests.

Papuan control over the influx of migrants was suggested by the Papuan draft of the Special Autonomy Law, but this wish was not respected by the Indonesian Parliament. Thus the issue remains high on the list of concerns for Papuans. The issue of the levels of Papuan control over population/immigration policies and the strengthening of Papuan cultural institutions could be addressed in the Papua-Jakarta dialogue.

Specific Political Grievances

The issues of the development of democracy and the empowerment of Papuans need to be addressed in any dialogue between the pro- and anti-Indonesia groups. One expression of this grievance is the debate on the institution intended in the Special Autonomy Law for the representation of the cultural rights of Papuans, the MRP, which has been very difficult to establish and which has been challenged as inconsistent with the Special Autonomy Law.

Closely related is the issue of provincial governance, including the division of powers between province districts (kabubaten) and sub-districts (kecamatan) and division of Papua into two or three provinces. There is a need to settle in dialogue the perceived legal confusion on whether Papua is divided and, if so, how the special autonomy translates into the context of three provinces rather than one. At the same time, it is important to resolve whether all the provinces are seeking a similar formula for the divi-
sion of powers between the province and the state or whether it is possible to have solutions that vary by province. The issue of division could be a primary one for the central government.

Some opponents of special autonomy in the Indonesian bureaucracy have argued that partition of the province could be a solution to the problem of separatism in Papua (Suradinata 2002). According to this view, Papuan grievance-based motivations for separation could be tackled if Papuans were given sufficient freedom to decide their own lives and if the levels of economic governance and development were satisfactory. At the same time, opportunistic motivations could arise if autonomy mobilizes all Papuans within one political provincial system, so some security and law enforcement specialists believe that special autonomy should be coupled with the separation of Papua into three provinces (ibid.). In this formula, in addition to tackling the grievance-related motivations, Indonesia would also tackle opportunity-based motivations. According to the MRP, most Papuans are against the separation, so this would need to be discussed in the integrationist-secessionist dialogue.

While the analysis of resolutions, statements, and reports, along with analysis of violent expressions of grievances, reveal some of the grievances that need to be tackled in dialogue, preparatory work on the cultural, economic, security, and political agenda of negotiation needs to be continued by hearing various stakeholder groups. It is not enough if analysis reveals issues that need to be covered in Papua peace talks: the stakeholders must be heard. Also, the investigations already conducted within the independence movement by Elsham Papua could be utilized in the identification of the economic agenda of Jakarta-Papua dialogue.

Security Grievances
The other clear grievance in Papua is related to security. Adam Schwarz has suggested that in security affairs, Indonesian suspicion of Papuans is humiliating. Many of my interviews corroborate Schwarz’s assessment that Papuans view military surveillance coupled with the policy of sending retired military officials to Papua as migrants to be a sign that Papuans are not considered as equal Indonesians (Schwarz 1991: 25).

The security grievances are, however, much more severe than these identitive and psychological issues. As noted, the conflict has subjected the Papuan population to military abuse and human rights violations. Furthermore, it has subjected the Indonesian military and the migrant
community to organized and spontaneous acts of violence by the independence movement. The issue of human rights, particularly the right of safety in Papua, has two dimensions: one is justice related to past violations and the second relates to the prevention of future violations. Both dimensions will need to be covered in a Papuan dialogue. The Special Autonomy Law offers nothing in relation to the past violations, and the Aceh solution tended to emphasize the needs of the future. Yet the idea of a truth commission in the Aceh MoU could be useful for settling the grievances of Papuans and migrants in light of past violations.

The issue of preventing future violations depends very much on the degree of legitimacy of the security order in Papua. In the absence of perceived legitimacy of the Indonesian security apparatus, informal police (involving Satgas Papua and others) have occasionally clashed with the official police. Therefore, the issue of pacification of the independence movement and guarantees against military and police abuse and surveillance need to be tackled in a Papua-Jakarta dialogue. In addition to the question of how to improve the quality of security governance, the issue of security governance itself has to be tackled, as happened in Aceh. The Aceh formula, in which the united Indonesian security structure was maintained while local residents were given responsibility for the implementation of tasks within the TNI and the police, could be considered for Papua too.

Economic Grievances
Clearly some of the grievances are economic. According to Papua Governor Jacobus Solossa, 74.2 percent of the more than 2.3 million people in Papua are living in remote areas without access to proper transportation and other public facilities. The infant mortality rate stands at 7.9 percent, which is among the highest in the world and clearly higher than in the rest of Indonesia; 49.6 percent of Papuans have had no formal education or have failed to complete elementary school, and only 21.6 percent had completed elementary school, 10.1 percent had completed senior high school, and a mere 1.9 percent had graduated from university (The Age, February 27, 2003). It is understandable that many Papuans feel discriminated against, especially given the huge contribution of Papuan natural resources to the Indonesian economy. Clearly the issue of how Papuan nat-
ural resources could be translated into prosperity in Papua is another central issue of the Jakarta-Papua dialogue.

Regional economic discrimination is coupled with discrimination within Papua: while reliable statistics on the economic well-being of ethnic Papuans and non-Papuans is lacking, it is safe to conclude that Papuan access to services, positions, education, and government concessions and public contracts is inferior in comparison to migrants. This discrimination is slowly reversing, though, because of strong measures in the Special Autonomy Law—in those places where the law is genuinely implemented.

At the same time, despite the disparities, the Indonesian government budget reveals a greater per capita contribution to Papua Province than to the rest of Indonesia. The reality of discrimination does not, therefore, seem to originate from the intentions of the central government but rather results from problems of implementation of Indonesia’s policies in Papua and from the difficult working relationship between Jakarta and Papua. The paternalistic approach to “developing the primitive Papuans” that characterizes the approach of many Indonesian officials to Papua also creates psychological obstacles for economic development in Papua: if many Papuans view Indonesian efforts as humiliating, it is difficult for the central administration to get Papuan ownership into development programs, and in absence of this feeling of ownership, development efforts lack efficiency.

In addition to perceived discrimination, economic issues include the control of illegal business activities. According to Tapol, an organization generally critical of Indonesia, coercive and illegal involvement in business activities by the security forces is widespread in Papua, as is illegal logging, with the perpetrators protected by the military (Tapol Bulletin 180, October 2005). This issue is also easily perceived as part of systematic discrimination against Papua, even though such illegality also takes place in other parts of Indonesia, including Java.

The issue of land is another important economic grievance. Due to extensive migration to Papua and ambitious resource projects, land disputes have become common. This is partly due to the conflict between modern national laws on land ownership, on one hand, and customary laws and communal landownership on the other. This conflict has spurred dissatisfaction among native Papuans, who feel that their lands have been stolen, but also among business owners and migrants. The latter groups feel that in
addition to having to pay for their land officially, they occasionally have to pay the traditional owners, often repeatedly and to each generation. Land disputes have partly been due to corrupt practices of officials and security personnel against native Papuans. Many informants, for example, claim that areas are sometimes evacuated by the military using harassment and triggering conflict; once the inhabitants have been chased away, the land is then sold to new migrants or to companies.

In addition to the illegal activities, the issues of legal utilization of Papuan resources and of Indonesian and international companies will also need to be addressed to clear the air between Jakarta and Papua. Therefore, oversight of the governance and exploitation of Papuan natural resources is clearly an issue that needs to be tackled, with emphasis not only on the question of how oversight should be organized, but also on division of responsibilities between the province and the center in managing Papuan natural resources.

Participants in dialogue between Papua and Jakarta clearly would need to address questions of economic governance of the province and oversight of international and Indonesian companies using Papuan natural resources. They would also need to discuss education and affirmative action favoring ethnic Papuans in order to tackle the ethnic imbalances in Papuan education. This already influences the problem of Papuans lacking access to better jobs in Papua. In addition, they should address affirmative action to increase the share of ethnic Papuans in public- and private-sector jobs. Since many of these economic issues require solutions that are beyond the economic capacity of the Papuan Province and Indonesia as a whole, dialogue on these issues could also involve the international donor community from the very beginning. This is why country-specific donor coordination could help to meet the needs of Papua.

**Dialogue and International Assistance**

**Previous Dialogue Processes**

The platform of the Special Autonomy Law for further Papuan dialogue is a result of a previous process of dialogue and exchange of ideas. In late 1998, President Habibie conducted dialogue with the FORERI, which later led to the so-called Jakarta Informal Meetings organized by FORERI and the State Secretariat. The meetings included FORERI, the Indonesian government, and some Indonesian intellectuals. Since this process did not lead to an agreement, on February 26, 1999, a team of one hundred
provincial Papuan leaders presented President Habibie with a demand for independence. In a way, this was a noncooperative move in a peace process, as the independence movement returned to its original position. In a similar action, Parliament passed the law on the division of the Province of Papua (UU54/1999) to demonstrate Jakarta’s continuing authority and to divide the forces that opposed Jakarta’s position.

The process of dialogue continued, however, after a unilateral move by Jakarta toward a more conciliatory approach after Abdurrahman Wahid became president. The independence movement was allowed to mobilize; the Second Papuan Peoples’ Congress declared its support for peaceful dialogue (Alua 2002a); and the OPM submitted its peace plan (which was in fact primarily a plan for Papuan separation from Indonesia). Peace was proceeding on the terms of the independence movement, until it became clear to the government of Indonesia that this path could not offer an avenue to a peace acceptable for Jakarta. President Wahid came under heavy criticism in the People’s Consultative Assembly: by the end of the year, the confrontational approach had won, and the levels of violence had risen sharply. Meanwhile, however, an ad hoc dialogue with chosen parties continued, but some important radical elements were excluded. This dialogue resulted in the Special Autonomy Law UU21/2001, which was offered as an alternative to the military solution and to the conciliatory approach of the president. The process of preparing this law also involved consultations (again, not with the militant extreme elements) under Governor Solossa and informal negotiations by this team and a special committee of the Indonesian parliament. If one views the law as a legal document without considering the practice of its implementation, it indeed fell somewhere between the position of the independence movement and that of the integrationist camp. The difficulties in implementing it and the lack of commitment to it by the integrationist side testify that this is not a document that simply codifies the position of the government.

Potential for New Dialogue: Pro-Indonesia Side
The overall setting for dialogue is better now than in the past: the current government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is popular in Papua, winning a majority there during both rounds of the presidential election. Some signs suggest that if one party were prepared to accept dialogue and discussions based on the existing special autonomy legislation,
so would the other. The mixed signals from the supporters and the opponents of Indonesian rule regarding autonomy suggest that neither side wants to be seen as committing to the law more than the other. Both sides seem to be afraid that the law would be the starting point for further concessions in favor of the opponent. Each side would like to modify the special autonomy to achieve its own goals, and each side would like to frame the starting point of discussions so that it can claim that the law is the position of the other side.94

The starting point for any overtures toward dialogue will probably be, as was the case in Aceh, some informal activities of courageous, well-connected individuals on both sides, who at first will be working in their private capacities. That OPM has not been as significant a military threat to Indonesia as GAM makes any “heroism” on the part of the Indonesian government less likely. Furthermore, the attitude of Indonesian voters toward their Melanesian brothers might not be the same as their stance toward their fellow Asian Muslim brothers. There might be fewer political points to collect from peace in Papua than from success in Aceh. How to build up the political will in Jakarta in favor of the peace process is thus an important question. However, the positive experiences from Aceh could encourage the key individuals who were already involved in the Aceh, Poso, and Ambon peace processes to continue their work for peace in Papua. Although many of the recent reports by experts tend to be pessimistic about the publicly declared preparedness of the government to negotiate (ICG 2006), reasons for optimism also exist, based mainly on private communications with individual potential key players in the Indonesian government.

The current Indonesian efforts for dialogue have been grounded in the ideas of the Special Autonomy Law. In his speech to Parliament on August 17, 2005, President Yudhoyono defined the government position by emphasizing five points:

1. Now that the Aceh conflict has been resolved, for the time being at least, attention has predictably turned to Papua;
2. Aceh and Papua are, however, different: Papua has only a small, dis-integrated armed movement;
3. Yet Papua touches on historical matters that have elicited interest from abroad, so it would require a political settlement;
4. Settlement should be made within the framework of special autonomy as part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia; and
5. “The government wishes to solve the issue in Papua in a peaceful, just, and dignified manner by emphasizing dialog and persuasion.”

The wording of the president’s declaration was careful. On the one hand, he applied some of the words used by the Aceh mediator, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, in defining conditions for accepting the task of mediation between the government of Indonesia and GAM. Like Ahtisaari, President Yudhoyono defined his task as finding a solution that would be dignified for all rather than one forced upon the independence movement. At the same time, for the audience that had been critical of the ways in which the government had negotiated the Aceh deal, the president was careful not to make more explicit references to any other formula than the Parliament-initiated formula of special autonomy.

As the first compromise to the starting point of special autonomy, the Indonesian government (through the vice president) has already admitted that its implementation has partly failed and should be corrected (Jakarta Post, August 6, 2005). This view is largely shared by Indonesian intellectuals. According to one of the most powerful Indonesian opinion leaders, Jusuf Wanandi (2005), the Special Autonomy Law should be the platform for negotiations on a mutually acceptable solution. The Aceh solution should offer not only the main formula (dialogue on the modification of the Special Autonomy Law) but also the impetus for negotiations. The government needs to make compromises on the platform of special autonomy, including a more genuine implementation of it (Wanandi regrets the “divide and rule” policies of former President Megawati) and a more serious concentration on the issues of development in the province. Vidhyandika D. Pericasa (2005), a Papua specialist in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, also agrees that the special autonomy formula should offer a platform for negotiations between Jakarta and Papua.

Another internal government initiative is the establishment of the Forum Papua (Saraswati 2005). The forum was established on September 6, 2005: according to its deputy chair, Marzuki Darusman, its establishment was inspired by “a lack of transparency” in how the government dealt with the Aceh problem. As this forum seems to represent the most
any negotiation...should consider options for a multi-layered approach

prominent group of the Jakarta-based critics of the Aceh peace process, considerations related to a possible Papuan dialogue should take the issue of transparency into account. Due to claims of lack of transparency and the significantly more complicated agency structure of Papuan conflict, any negotiation between opponents and supporters of Indonesian rule should consider options for a multi-layered approach, involving track one and track two negotiations as well as mechanisms for more spontaneous inputs from civil society and expert groups on various issues on the negotiation table.

The official regional representation of Papua has also come up with constructive suggestions. Even though it formally belongs to the Indonesian administration, it often sides with the peaceful and democratic Papuan groups that tend to oppose Indonesian rule. In a report from the Papuan Members of the Indonesian Regional Representative Council on their visit to Papua from March 24 to May 2, 2005 (Jakarta Post, May 4, 2005), Papuan members of the council—Marcus Louis Zonggonau (B-125), Tonny Tesar (B-126), Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipay (B-127), and Rev. Max Demetouw (B-128)—demanded national and international dialogue on human rights, development, and the history of integration during the 1960s. The statement by Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipay on February 15, 2005, representing the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia, demanded national dialogue on special autonomy and international dialogue on the Act of Free Choice involving the United States, the Netherlands, Indonesia, and the United Nations.

Potential for New Dialogue: Resistance Movement

With regard to dialogue, the starting point for the independence movement should be the overall recognition of the need for a peaceful dialogue. According to many, the OPM is open for dialogue, and “the OPM is prepared to lay down its weapons if it turns out to be wrong, as long as the government would be prepared to pull out of Papua, if it turns out that it was wrong” (Author’s interview with an anonymous secessionist, October 2005). However, the assumption seems to be that history has determined what the fair and just course of action today would be.

The general willingness of the resistance movement to negotiate has been openly declared in the Second Papuan National Congress in 2000
(Alua 2002a, b), in the “OPM peace plan of 2000” (Tebay 2004), and in many of the more recent statements by the key figures of the movement (see Ondawame 2000).

Statements by the independence movement clearly indicate that there is strategic reservation toward the Special Autonomy Law but also realism tinged with temptation (Author’s interviews, November 2005). This has especially been the case after the MoU on Aceh, which took a positive stance toward self-rule within the framework of special autonomy. Prior to that, autonomy was seen as an alternative to independence, as was the case in the East Timorese popular referendum. A statement by DAP regarding a meeting with Vice President Jusuf Kalla in August 2004 appealed to the government for an immediate, significant review of its special autonomy policy in the province, or else the campaign for independence for the resource-rich province would become stronger (Jakarta Post, August 6, 2005). In this statement, the Special Autonomy Law was seen in a positive light, while its implementation was the reason for grievance.

The issue of implementation continued to be the bone of contention in the reaction by Leo Imbiri, general secretary of the Papua Tribal Council, to the president’s offer to solve the Papuan issue according to a special autonomy formula along the lines of the settlement in Aceh. According to that DAP position statement, “DAP appreciate[s] the president’s offer to solve the issue in Papua in a peaceful and dignified manner by emphasizing dialogue and a persuasive approach” and “hope[s] this is not an old song that is always repeated by the government without any real implementation.”

Even in the “Six Demands of the Dewan Adat Papua” of August 15, 2005, the DAP’s platform for criticism was the Special Autonomy Law, even though some modifications were suggested to it. DAP demanded the following:

1. a pause in the creation of the MRP, which was not representative [here it was not the idea of the MRP that was resisted, only the formula for the implementation of its creation];
2. the launching of a review initiated by the Papuan DPR (DPRP) of the legality of 1969 Act of Free Choice, together with the United States, the United Nations, and the Netherlands;
3. the implementation of government’s regulation on the control of DPRP over the TNI and police in Papua (as stipulated by the Special Autonomy Law);
4. an investigation into the use of specific autonomy money by Governor Jacobus Solossa; a more general investigation into the use of special autonomy money; and
5. an agreement between DAP and the DPRP on the timetable of demands 1–5.

Even when DAP took to the streets in many parts of Papua on August 12, 2005, calling on local administrations to “hand back” the Special Autonomy Law to Jakarta, the foundation of the protest was the less than wholehearted implementation of the law by Jakarta.  

Furthermore, DAP’s criticism of the Special Autonomy Law has not been fully accepted among Papuan tribes. For example, according to Martin Ndeken, chief of the Kanum ethnic community in Sota District of Merauke, Kanums do not reject the Special Autonomy Law but rather regard it as potentially beneficial.  

Since the question of the Special Autonomy Law’s implementation has been one of the main problems for the independence movement, it seems clear that the dialogue should seek to modify the law and to achieve greater clarity and easier operationalization. In addition to this, it is clear that dialogue should aim at modifying the law in a way that produces mutual benefits. It is likely that the experiences of bad implementation of the Special Autonomy Law have made it necessary that the international community play a role in the monitoring of the implementation before any commitment can be made on the part of the independence movement.

Potential Roles of the International Community

President Yudhoyono has said in _Kompas_ magazine that “we will not hand over the solution of Aceh and Papua to the United Nations or any third party. Those regions are our sovereign regions” (August 9, 2005). The president probably was reacting to the debate in which forty U.S. lawmakers called on the United Nations to allow Papua to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia, pointing to a long list of alleged human rights abuses carried out by security forces. Since the Indonesian president also mentioned Aceh, where international involvement was accepted in the monitoring and mediation of the peace deal, it is unlikely that he meant that an international role in mediation and monitoring should be ruled out entirely in the peace process in Papua. The views of the academic specialists, for
example Jusuf Wanandi and Vidhyandika D. Pericasa, seem to echo this logic with regard to the international community.

At the same time, although Jakarta seems to be open to international mediation, GoI has tried to treat the issue of Papuan dialogue internally. In 2004, President Yudhoyono asked the former governor of Papua, Freddy Numberi, to assist in the resolution of the Papua question. Numberi, a native Papuan who is Minister for Fisheries and Marine Affairs in Yudhoyono’s cabinet, has been asked to work with Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Widodo As, who is leading efforts to resolve the Papua question (Tempo Interactive, November 5, 2004).

Due to the overwhelming advantage of the Indonesian military over the military wing of the independence movement, the latter expects much more balancing from the international community than does the integrationist side. According to a report by the Biak Dewan Adat (2005), a tribal organization of the Island of Biak, the international community could make a positive contribution by exerting strong pressure on the TNI, the police, and the militias to halt their repressive activities and by providing protection to the indigenous people throughout West Papua.

In its “Manifesto for Freedom” (July 1, 2005), the West Papua National People’s Coalition for Independence (WPNPCI) went even further, and

1. appealed to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) to send a UN peacekeeping force before the end of 2005;
2. appealed to the UNSG to review the Act of Free Choice;
3. appealed to the UNSG, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia to pressure GoI to withdraw troops from Papua before the end of 2005;
4. appealed to the UNSG, the United States, the European Union, and international NGOs to stop aid to GoI; and
5. appealed to the UNSG to appoint a mediator for negotiation on resolution of the Papua issue between the WPNPCI and GoI.

Although exerting pressure against human rights violations has always been the policy of the European Union and the United States, it cannot be seen as part of the dialogue activity. Moreover, conditional aid has only been practiced with regard to military aid. The direct protection of indige-
nous people, let alone peacekeeping, would only be possible with the invitation of the Indonesian government, which in turn would only be possible in the context of international monitoring of a peace treaty between the opponents and supporters of Indonesian rule. It seems clear that, as in Aceh, international commitment is mostly needed to make it possible for the independence movement to make concessions that would otherwise represent a risk to the security of independence activists and militants. When confidence toward the Indonesian government and the military is lacking, then the international community could come into the picture. Any international role would, however, have to be invited by both camps, and should enter the situation strictly as a neutral third party. Some of the key people in the independence movement cannot return to Papua, so the negotiations need an international venue. Due to distrust, any activities related to disarming the militant independence advocates would also need international involvement.

It is highly unlikely that the international community would raise the issue of the Act of Free Choice; even if it did, Indonesian behavior toward Papua would probably not be affected. On the contrary, it could marginalize the international community on the issue and make it impossible for it to offer good services on issues where it could make a positive contribution to the peace in Papua. Instead, a formula could be found in which European and Latin American countries and South Africa, for example, together with international historians, could share their experiences on dealing with historical wrongdoings. On the issues of underdevelopment and human rights practices, the international donor community could be involved in dialogue between integrationists and the independence movement or other opponents of Indonesian rule.

The international community is not going to be able to push forward a particular formula for peace and negotiation on the Papuan conflict until there is quite explicit commitment to a dialogue process from the warring parties. Yet it seems clear that, given the relative success of the peace process in Aceh, many actors would be happy to see something similar happen in Papua. The first statement in that direction came from the outsider coun-
try most affected by the Papuan conflict, Papua New Guinea. Immediately after the successful conclusion of the Aceh negotiations, the Associated Free Press reported that a Papua New Guinean minister was urging Papuan rebels to choose the Aceh formula (AFP, August 18, 2005). Before it was even reported, the United States, the European Union, and the Pacific Island Forum explicitly expressed support for the full and proper implementation of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law as a measure to end conflict (Jakarta Post, June 27, 2005).

Because the position of the international community has been very positive in relation to the Aceh issue, one could imagine an international willingness to participate in the peace process in Papua. However, after success in Aceh, it is natural that many official international actors want to claim credit for the process. Yet the role of most international actors in the pre-negotiation phase could best be characterized as varying from obstruction to discouragement. The suspicion of the Indonesian military intelligence and the unpredictability of the political mood of the Indonesian Parliament and people make it very difficult for any country to participate in anything related to the possibilities of Papuan dialogue or the facilitation of pre-negotiation between the conflicting parties. The Aceh process suggests that before any country would become involved, facilitation of Papuan dialogue must be based on the track two level activities of unofficial actors who are willing to work with courageous individuals within the Indonesian administration and with the rebels, and who are willing to risk a political beating if things go wrong but careful enough to minimize the risk of the process failing.

Lessons from the Aceh Peace Process

It is important that the Papuan peace process be built on Papuan dialogue and not on a model imported from Aceh or elsewhere. At the same time, an examination of the Acehnese peace agreement makes it easier to see what is possible and what kind of options exist for Papuan peace.

At least six lessons can be derived from the problems and especially the success of the Aceh peace process. The parties to the Papuan dialogue should:

1. Allow an inclusive dialogue involving the radical secessionist elements for the modification of the principles of the Special Autonomy Law;
2. Make the Special Autonomy Law coherent and possible to implement;
3. Create mechanisms for ensuring its implementation, including international monitoring;
4. Use mutually trusted outsiders for the resolution of disputes over the implementation of the modified special autonomy agreement;
5. Allow the adjustment of the terms of agreement after the peace agreement has created conditions for safe and democratic mobilization of Papuan civil society; and
6. Sort out arrangements that allow the political system to work in the true spirit of special autonomy.

As has been planned in Papua, the solution in Aceh was based on an inclusive process of negotiation to modify the Special Autonomy Law. In general the Papuan Special Autonomy Law is similar to that used in Aceh. In the Aceh peace process, the Papuan Special Autonomy Law was often considered slightly less self-contradictory than that of Aceh, so the Papuan Special Autonomy Law may serve as a better foundation for a dialogue.

The basic principle of the Aceh and Papua autonomies and the Aceh peace agreement was that the province “will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.”

The continuation of the Papuan (and Acehnese) Special Autonomy Law and other national legislation incompatible with the Papuan Special Autonomy Law largely water down this basic principle. Development policies, for example, do not belong to foreign affairs, defense, monetary or fiscal matters, or religious affairs, and yet, article 7h of part 2 of the law defines the National Development Program as the main guideline for Papuan development. Furthermore, according to article 25 (2), members of the MRP shall be installed by the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, even though the function of the People’s Consultative Assembly clearly does not belong to the set of issue areas defined as being national. Also, article 48(5) stipulates that the “Head of Police of the Papua Province shall be appointed by the Head of Police of the Republic of Indonesia.” The autonomy of the Papuan parliament is naturally compromised by the Indonesian party law, which forbids provincial parties.

The idea of the Aceh peace agreement, and probably any viable agreement in Papua, would be that the entire concept of special autono-
my would have to be in line with the basic principles stipulating the division of authority by issue areas. Furthermore, this principle should also govern the implementation of the relationship, rather than the law and the reality of these relations following their separate paths, as has been the case with the Special Autonomy Law both in Papua and in Aceh. In this respect, the backbone of the Aceh solution was its Article 5 and Paragraphs 1.2.7. and 1.3.8, which establish international supervision for the implementation of the MoU. Article 5 establishes the Aceh Monitoring Mission with extensive powers, while Paragraph 1.2.7 stipulates that “outside monitors will be invited to monitor the elections in Aceh” and paragraph 1.3.8 that “GoI commits to the transparency of the collection and allocation of revenues between the Central Government and Aceh by agreeing to outside auditors to verify this activity and to communicate the results to the head of the Aceh administration.” This way the central elements of the implementation of Acehnese autonomy—revenue-sharing from Acehnese natural resources, the establishment of autonomous governance, and the expression of Acehnese popular sovereignty—will be monitored by the international community in the role of neutral outsider to the disputes between Jakarta and Banda Aceh.

The special autonomy formula with enhanced international monitoring has not been an easy issue for many nationalist parliamentarians to accept. For example, the former speaker of the MPR, Amien Rais, warned the Indonesian government of the big power interests in Aceh and Papua and felt that involvement of foreign countries could open access to these powers, which might have an agenda in disintegrating Indonesia (Antara News Agency, August 24). Legislator Sutradara Gintings from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a member of the House Commission I on defense and foreign affairs, also felt that the role of the monitoring mission as such was questionable from the point of view of Indonesia’s sovereignty: “The mission’s tasks show that it doesn’t only monitor, but also rules on disputes and
on complaints and alleged violations. The mission’s decision is binding and cannot be vetoed” (Jakarta Post, August 20, 2005).

However, after the conflict in Aceh had been settled within the Indonesian principle of the unitary state, the success of the main formula of modified special autonomy with foreign monitoring in the pacification of Aceh has resulted in an increase in the popularity of the formula. The feasibility of this formula for Papua is also largely dependent on its success in Aceh. If Aceh uses the formula as a springboard for independence, or if the formula results in intrusive international exercise of power in Aceh, the likelihood of a similar formula being accepted for Papua will decline drastically.

The issue of the management of revenue sharing has also not been entirely simple in the Acehnese case, as there have been voices from the Aceh legislative council demanding that it should be left to an outside body. Meanwhile, the Indonesian lower house has suggested a law on the governance of Aceh in which the management would be in Indonesian hands. In the end, the important issue is whether management of the revenue is handled in a transparent and honest way, and that the Acehnese perceive this to be true. The idea of a competent auditing process by an actor that both parties trust would be essential to alleviate any doubts.

The distrust of Papuans toward the Indonesian implementation of Papua policies clearly suggests that a similar mechanism to the Acehnese MoU would have to be used in Papua. Without neutral monitoring of the implementation of the Papuan special autonomy, a Papuan MoU would not have any more value for Papuans than the Special Autonomy Law, which has not been implemented in good faith. More specifically, in order to avoid the Acehnese problems regarding the monitoring of revenue sharing, Papuan negotiations should aim at stipulations that would be more specific about the nature of the international auditing of the revenue-sharing.

There are elements in the Acehnese MoU that are not drawn from the Special Autonomy Law. Perhaps the most crucial one is Article 1.2.1, according to which the Indonesian government “will create, within one year or at the latest 18 months from the signing of this MoU, the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament.” This stipulation deviates from the Indonesian Law on Political Parties, which stipulates that parties have to
have their headquarters in Jakarta and that they have to have a national mandate, with sufficient support in a large number of provinces. Local parties would naturally not have that support, so the law on government in Aceh will have to be accompanied by changes in the law on political parties. These changes have been difficult to sell in the lower house, where at least the military faction and many members of PDI-P have openly criticized the idea of local parties as allowing mobilization for a secession. The ultra-nationalists in the Indonesian Parliament view local parties, together with a Special Autonomy Law that also grants Aceh the right to fly its own flag next to the national Indonesian flag and an Aceh national song distinct from the national anthem, as dangerous concessions. The difficulties in the approval process of the Aceh Governance Law suggest that the Parliament would need to be more involved in the process of Papuan dialogue.

For making compromises easier in Papua, it would probably be wise to grant amnesty to all persons who have participated in separatist activities (as in Aceh MoU 3.1.1) and to unconditionally release political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict after the signing of the peace treaty (as in Aceh MoU 3.1.2). Without amnesty and the release of political prisoners and without the safety of the negotiators in the post-conflict Papua, it would be difficult to imagine the OPM making any substantial compromises. Even more important, without a basic agreement on the protection of all Papuans engaged in political mobilization within the accepted limits of modified special autonomy, the Papuan process will never garner the approval of civil society. One of the merits of the Aceh peace treaty was that it did not decide everything in negotiations based on imperfect representation of the Acehnese. Instead, formal negotiations merely created an environment of safe dialogue for the further development of the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta. Without that step, the people will not develop ownership toward the agreements, and the terms of peace are not likely to be honored.

Yet the demands for justice from the victims of both conflicting parties, especially among the Papuan victims of the TNI and the migrant victims of the Papuan militias, tend to create limitations to the amnesty
measures. The Aceh MoU stipulates that “a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating and determining reconciliation measures.” The success in Aceh and the failure in East Timor suggest that the safety of Indonesian soldiers would also help obtain the cooperation of the TNI in a peace process. At the same time, if a truth commission could be established with a mandate that would include authority for legal sanctions, issues of past injustices could be dealt with without tempting the TNI or the military wing of the OPM to sabotage negotiation success in Papua.

In Papua, the mobilization of autonomy would probably also require permission to establish local parties. Otherwise the Indonesian system of voting from party lists would enable Jakarta to wield considerable influence over Papuan politics. Also, the acceptability of this likely condition for Papuan peace will be a function of how well party reform is used in Aceh. If there is even a hint that this could lead to more efficient political mobilization of separatist ideas, the Parliament will not accept the same concession for Papua and will probably withdraw it from Aceh as well. At the same time, demonstrations of new loyalty to the Indonesian state on the part of erstwhile rebels—such as have been seen in Aceh, where former rebels have testified to their acceptance of the Indonesian unitary state and have sung the Indonesian national anthem together with Indonesian legislators (Saraswati 2006)—play down the fear of party reform as a means of fostering separatist activities. Party reform was an issue that was also discussed in conjunction with Papuan special autonomy, and then, among the currently important political forces, it was resisted in Pansus by the military and PDI-P of former President Megawati Sukarnoputri (Sumule 2003: 367). Today the military is no longer part of the legislative process, and the PDI-P has become an opposition party.

What Papua should learn from the Aceh experience in relation to local parties is that the issue of sequencing of party reform and elections will have to be well thought out and strictly defined in the peace agreement. Otherwise, there is a risk that the legal permission establishing local parties will come too late for the full mobilization of parties that include former rebels. Another possibility would be to try to ensure that candidates could run as independents in the first election, as has been attempted in Aceh (Saraswati 2006).
Conclusion

Peace is possible in Papua. Yet a solution similar to the one in Aceh would not be readily applicable to Papua. Neither would the experience of the Papuan special autonomy consultations of 2000–01 serve as a model. But Papuan dialogue could take elements from each—the Aceh Process and the special autonomy consultations—and it could learn from the mistakes of both previous processes. It could also utilize the lessons of many other processes generalized in conflict studies literature. Identifying these lessons and fitting them for Papua has been the objective of this study. The vital lessons Papua needs to learn are related to the identification of the actors in the dialogue, the issues to be covered, and the possible role of the international community.

Actors in the Dialogue

Much as in Aceh, the Papuan peace process would also probably require the initiative of some courageous individuals working in their private capacity to assist the relevant conflicting parties and trusted external communities.

The Papuan process could potentially be more broad-based, multi-layered, and more transparent than in the case of Aceh. Of special interest are the mechanisms ensuring the mandate of and consultation with actors whose compliance is necessary for the peace process. It seems that the Indonesian government could use some of the consultation mechanisms that were established for the dialogue that produced the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. The Parliament could be consulted again by forming a special committee that the government team would keep in the loop during the negotiations. A similar committee could be established to represent the various ethnic and religious organizations in Papua’s migrant community, which comprise a large proportion of the population.

Regarding participation in the Indonesian negotiation team, it would be useful to consider those parts of the Indonesian bureaucracy that are crucial for the implementation of the peace agreement, including the TNI.

It would probably be impossible to represent all the resistance groups in the negotiations. However, the Papuan negotiation teams should man-
age to organize consultation with and mandate from the elements of Papuan society who are necessary for peace, that is, those who could destabilize the process if they do not feel ownership toward the dialogue process. An umbrella organization sufficiently close to the main violent resistance organizations could, together with the MRP, manage to create sufficient structures of consultation for the Papuan dialogue. The resistance movement itself needs to keep in mind that once a peace agreement is enabled, a better mobilization of Papuan representation can be formed; mistakes made by imperfectly representative parties to peace talks can always be rectified.

The peace process in Papua may also require the attention of the international community, as well as its assistance in the dispute resolution effort in order to overcome the lack of trust among the warring parties. In addition, the services of the international community may be needed for the conduct (and the venue) of negotiations themselves and for the monitoring of the implementation of any peace agreement that emerges.

Given that some of the grievances behind the fight for independence are related to the extreme underdevelopment of the province, it would be wise for dialogue on Papuan peace to involve the donor community from the outset. Due to the presence of more complicated problems than existed in Aceh related to the Indonesian and international corporations operating in Papua, some level of involvement or representation of these stakeholders should also be considered.

**Issues of Dialogue**

The issues that would need to be addressed in a Papua-Jakarta dialogue certainly include the question of Papua’s political status. But the participants should not approach this issue from stale positions or from the point of view of history. Instead, it could be approached within the general framework of revision of the Special Autonomy Law, focusing on the existing grievances of Pauans and Indonesians and looking for administrative solutions for them. This search for solutions could then specify areas in which Papuan decision-making would make more sense than exclusively Indonesian decision-making. The agenda of grievances could be handled though an open process in which any group could present issues that they feel should be included.
From the point of view of the conflict episodes in Papua and the declarations and position papers of various Papuan and Indonesian groups, it seems clear that cultural grievances, including the control of immigration to Papua and the issue of representation in the MRP, need to be tackled within the framework of a modification of the Special Autonomy Law.

Economic grievances must also be addressed, including overall development policies and the perceived discrimination against the Province of Papua and ethnic Papuans in areas such as education, public services, and the public and private job markets. The economic issue of the control of illegal and legal exploitation of Papuan resources, as well as environmental concerns in economic activities, are equally important from the point of view of ending grievances that have previously been sources of violence.

The issue of security concerns with transmigrants and with ethnic Papuans will also need to be dealt with, and the organization of security will need to be resolved if a meaningful peace treaty is to be achieved. It is probable that the surveillance of human rights practices, the decommissioning of weapons of the independence militia, and the surveillance of police control of pro-independence militias will, again, require input from the international community.

Finally, the issue of the political empowerment of Papuans needs to be dealt with in a dialogue between supporters and opponents of Indonesian rule. It is likely that one or both parties will demand the inclusion on the agenda of the specific issues of political structures of provincial governance, the issue of division of Papua into three provinces, and the question of the role of the MRP.

International Community
The role of the international community will probably be to support processes that would otherwise be impossible because of the lack of trust. Due to the imbalance of military force in favor of the integrationists, many issues are characterized by a low level of trust from the independence movement toward Indonesia, especially its military and police forces. Monitoring the decommissioning of weapons and the registering of rebels, offering a venue for high-level negotiations, offering the good services of a rapporteur for the track two events, and the mediation itself will be among the issues where the international community will be needed in the process of brokering a peace deal. Furthermore, the international donor community will need to be mobilized for the implementation of some of
the economic solutions and for the transformation of economic structures of conflict in Papua. For example, measures needed for affirmative action in favor of ethnic Papuans will not be politically easy for the Indonesian government to offer, so the international donor community could play an important role here.

One can only speculate whether the general international support for a special autonomy platform for negotiations will translate into preparedness to respond to a possible peace deal by offering resources for a new monitoring mission or for the alleviation of the economic, human rights, and judicial grievances.

If the conflicting parties are willing to negotiate in good faith and if they accept each other as worthy of dialogue, the Papuan conflict can be resolved. A permanent resolution requires that both sides are able to secure their fundamental interests, so the parties involved need to develop lenses that enable both sides to see the settlement as a victory rather than as a defeat. This does not mean that parties should not prepare themselves for very difficult compromises, but it means that both sides can win the peace. If this requires international assistance, parties should not be too proud to accept it for the sake of peace.
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1. For this assessment, see for example King (2006). This assessment corresponds to my own, which is based on the optimism of many of the key actors of the conflict interviewed for this project.

2. A good analysis of the Aceh processes, 2000–03, under the facilitation of the Henry Dunant Center and the process in 2005 can be found in Aspinall and Crouch (2003); Huber (2004); Aspinall (2005).

3. *Chendrawsih Pos* refers to official Indonesian statistics for February 2004 claiming that the population of Papua was 2,352,518 people (March 30, 2004, 2).

4. I yield to the conventional practice of calling ethnic Papuans *Papuans* (*or native Papuans*) and calling ethnic non-Papuans *migrants*, even if they have lived there for generations. This is done for the sake of clarity and simplicity.


6. The latter statement is based on an estimate by the Catholic diocese of West Papua on the basis of religious demographic data. (Author’s interview with Frederika Korain, Office for Justice and Peace of the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura, November 7, 2005).
Another important point is that about 80 percent of migrants in Papua are Muslim, while almost all Papuans are Christian or animist.

7. The official name of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law is Law 21/2001. For the entire text, see www.papuaweb.org/goi/otsus/files/otsus-en.html. For a summary of the key points of Papuan special autonomy, see McGibbon (2004), annex B.

8. For example, two conflicting tribes in Papua province, the Damal and Nduga, have been fighting each other for several years (Jakarta Post, July 17, 2004).

9. This analysis of the documents is naturally related to the previous analyses of Papuan nationalism. See, for example, Chauvel (2005).

10. This forum initiated negotiations on Papuan independence with President B. Jusuf Habibie in the fall of 1998.

11. This argument was presented by the Dutch for not including Papua in the Republic of Indonesia both in the Round Table Negotiations on Indonesian independence—see, for example, account of the Dutch chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker (1965)—and in the 1961–62 negotiations on the decolonization of Papua (Lijphart 1966). But the same argument was already debated in the Dutch parliament in 1898 when it was decided that the territory would be taken over (Boone Jr. 1962: 20).

12. Religion is a major part of the OPM independence declaration. More recently, it seems that the rhetoric of various militant independence groups under the umbrella of the OPM have attempted to capitalize on the post-9/11 hysteria about terrorism as a way of influencing Western opinion by associating Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian Defense Force) violence against Christian Papuans and extremist militia cooperation with the acts of the enemies of the “global war on terrorism.” This can be seen for example in an OPM statement of December 21, 2001, by one of the OPM groups to Australia’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, in which Australia is warned of the TNI-supported International Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IIRM) that comprises Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, World Mataba, Abusayab, Jemaah Islamiah, and Laskar Jihad. Finally, after 2002, when the political space for human rights groups closed up in Papua, much of the expression of grievances of the Papuans moved to religious organizations, which were more difficult to close down in Indonesia. Author’s interviews with Frederika Korain, Office for Justice and Peace of the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura, November 7, 2005, and Deny Yomaki, November 8, 2005.


14. Ibid., declaration 3. The centrality of the fraud of 1969 is reflected in almost all of the post-1969 documents and declarations of the independence movement and was also confirmed in an interview with Jacob Prai, in Malmö, Sweden, September 28, 1999.

15. FORERI Statement on Jayapura, July 24, 1998. The statement of the Second Papuan Congress also refers to the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, ensuring the granting of independence to the colonized countries, and thus frames the conflict in a colonial context. Interviews explicitly verified the colonial interpretation as the main framing of the conflict (for example, author interview with Jakob Prai, September 28, 1999). There have even been Indonesian voices within the military who have labeled the problems of poor Papuan political participation as a product of colonialism. See Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro (1968), cited in Chauvel and Bhakti (2004: 18–19).

16. See statements of FORERI, Team 100, and the 2nd Papuan National Congress.
17. In his speech on May 1, 1963, the day that Indonesian de facto rule started, Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, head of the Indonesian delegation in the United Nations interim rule in Papua, explained why it was fair that Papua joined Indonesia, referring to the struggle and sacrifices of the Indonesian people. See Tjondronegoro (1963).


19. For the argument of non-racialism, as presented to the U.S. diplomats, see Gardner (1997: 175). See also Hamid (1995); and the same strategy of argumentation in the case of Christian Moluccan separatism, in Leimena (1950).

20. Sukarno’s comments come from Ambassador Jones’s report to the U.S. President, cited in U.S. State Department (1995: 383–84). That race is not a foundation of political rights is also written in the Indonesian constitution: Constitution of Indonesia 1945, ch. X, art. 26, sec. 1; ch. XIII, art. 32; ch. XV, art. 36.

21. Independence speech by President Suharto (August 17, 1968), who had also been the military commander of the Mandala liberation force that occupied Papua from the Dutch, cited in Osborne (1984: 38).

22. This argument has been used in the context of Papua, but it was most elegantly presented by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s current spokesman, Dino Patti Djalal, during the Indonesian campaign to legitimize their sovereignty in East Timor (Author’s interview and correspondence material, early 1998). At the time, Dr. Djalal was serving as a career diplomat; later he served as the spokesperson for the task force for the implementation of the East Timor Referendum. For a fuller analysis of the constructions of Papuan reality by the GoI and the OPM, see Kivimäki and Thorning (2002).

23. For a good presentation of these Indonesian self-critical statements, see Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, (2004: 23).


26. NN: arms-smith and a member of the Papuan Intelligence Service, PIS. Interviewed by Ruben Thorning, May 2001; interview was based on a questionnaire designed by the author.

27. For some classical work regarding the influence of a protracted conflict on the image of the “other,” see, for example, White (1968) and Bronfenbrenner (1970).

28. Author’s interview with a Papuan independence activist, November 2005.

29. Abdurrahman Wahid: “If necessary, we will make the OPM leader a member of the Assembly. If he later joins the meetings in Jakarta, he is permitted to wear a koteka, if that’s what he wants.” *Joyo Indonesian News*, February 28, 2000.

30. If one studies the rhetoric of combat, it quickly becomes clear that most violent groups have a specific way of getting around the psychological and moral obstacles of efficient fighting. See, for example, Horowitz 2001: 94–109.

31. Interview with a Javanese policeman based on a questionnaire created by the author and conducted by Pius Suratman Kartasasmita, January 2001.

32. The Office for Justice and Peace of the Catholic Diocese of Jayapura has launched a program for the socialization of correct information on the Papuan conflict. This program is among other things aimed against rumors that give rise to unfounded optimism, especially about the feasibility of military victory of the independence move-

33. In meetings and communications with Jacob Prai, John Otto Ondawame, and other influential international OPM figures, the failed resolution by twelve U.S. Congressmen in 1999, which actually made no reference to Papuan independence but focused only on the human rights problems in Papua, was repeatedly cited as evidence of international support for Papuan independence. During 2000 I was sent a number of copies of this failed resolution to convince me to change my assessment of the low likelihood of international community turning in favor of Papuan independence, or the low likelihood of Papua achieving independence.

34. Some scholars see the two periods as one. Chauvel and Bhakti, for example, call the period from late 1998 until late 2000 “the Papuan Spring” (2004, 4).

35. According to the interpretation of the government, there is no legal contradiction between the two pieces of legislation. For the president’s interpretation, see Detikcom, February 5, 2003; for the view of the vice president, see Jakarta Post, June 27, 2005.

36. The problems of surveillance have been acknowledged by the Indonesian authorities, and measures are being taken, for example to improve the judicial system. Investigators from Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) have studied several cases where offenders have bought their impunity by bribing judges.

37. For a similar but geographically more limited conclusion, see Biak Dewan Adat (2005).

38. There have been reports on the internal fighting among groups of the TNI and between the TNI and the police in Papua, as in many other provinces. This violence is somehow related to the training of paramilitaries, which also undermines the legitimate structures of the state security.

39. At the same time, official authorities of Indonesia and the police in Papua have prevented pro-Indonesia militia activity. In December 2003, the local government and Indonesian police barred a notorious militia leader, Eurico Guterres, from setting up a nationalist youth group in the restive region. (Associated Press, December 3, 2003).

40. Rather than, for example, an individual opportunistic (perhaps even criminal) position.

41. For enabling me to appreciate this complexity, I am indebted to the anonymous referees of the East-West Center Washington Policy Studies series as well as to Neles Tebay.

42. Objections toward the law have sometimes been expressed explicitly, as for example the Jakarta-appointed governor of Irian Jaya in 1998, Freddy Numberi. See AFP, “Indonesian Governor Says Irian Jaya Not Ready for Greater Autonomy,” August 25, 1998. In spite of this, Numberi and the Papuan local government were generally supportive of the special autonomy; the main resistance came from the central government, especially the Ministry for the Interior under President Megawati.

43. Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the Special Autonomy Law refers to Papua as the former province of Irian Jaya, which covers the entire Papuan area, and Chapter 1 defines the instruments of autonomy as instruments of a single province. The division of the province into three provinces clearly complicates the implementation of the law, though it does not make it impossible if the implementation uses the principles of the Special Autonomy Law in the two new provinces. Article 4 of the Chapter IV of the law negatively defines authority over issues as related to the division of the province to the province of Papua and thus seems to invalidate Presidential Decree 1/2003, as the division of the province should not be within the powers of the central administration. However, the Presidential Decree did not establish the two new provinces, it
only hastened the implementation of an earlier law on the establishment of the two new Papuan provinces, Law 45/1999, the Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. The legal setting is, however, confusing: if we consider Papua to be divided before the Special Autonomy Law, then why did that law treat Papua as one province? Yet the official view presented both by the president and the vice president is that there is no contradiction among the Presidential Decree 1/2003, Law 21/2001 and Law 45/1999.

44. For a good insider’s analysis of the process leading to the adoption of the Special Autonomy Bill, see Sumule (2003). On the parliamentary committee, see p. 366. Agus Sumule was a member of the Assistance Team to the Governor in the drafting of the Special Autonomy Law.

45. The problem of parties trying to spoil the peace process is a central problem in almost any peace process. A very good theoretical treatment and inventory of the empirical generalizations on the phenomenon can be found in Stedman (1997: 151–62).


47. According to laksamana.net, the patriotic militia Satgas Merah Putih had thousands of members in Papua. It has a history of attacking and intimidating pro-independence supporters (laksamana.net, April 2, 2003).

48. Correspondence with Neles Tebay, a leading Papuan Catholic scholar of theology and human rights activist.

49. Correspondence with Damien Kingsbury, a key organizer of the Papuan Umbrella Organization. The name Papuan Umbrella Organization as a name of a resistance organization toward the Indonesian rule is telling: resistance is assumed to be an ethnic Papuan position, so the name of a resistance group can be Papuan Umbrella. If one did not assume that all Papuans are against Indonesians, one would have to make it clear that this organization is against Indonesian rule.

50. Similarly, this seems to be the case within the political elite of the new province of West Irian Jaya. Whether this elite is genuinely committed ideologically to the integrationist position or whether “they have been bought” by the Indonesian administration is not central. What is important is to avoid seeing the pro-independence position as an ethnic Papuan position, as there clearly are ethnic Papuans who genuinely identify with Indonesia and Indonesians.

51. Discussions with students of several educational institutions in Abepura, March 27–29, 2006. These students were arrested and beaten and later released. In at least one case the police returned to apologize for the wrongful arrest and the beating.

52. The consultation and informal dialogue took place under the auspices of Governor Jacobus Solossa and his technical assistance team from the University of Cendrawasih. An excellent analysis of this informal negotiation process can be read in McGibbon (2004: 19–20). Another insider’s analysis (Sumule 2003) of the process reveals that many independence-minded people, including members of the Papuan Presidium Council, were indeed consulted, and some participated in the dialogue. Yet McGibbon’s conclusion that radicals were out of the consultation is of course an accurate generalization. The marginalization of the radicals took place even though the leader of the Papuan informal negotiation of special autonomy was Governor Jacobus Solossa, who was one of the members of the Team 100 Papuan leaders who
in February 1999 represented Papua in the national dialogue that demanded that President Habibie accept Papuan independence. For the list of Members of the Team 100, see Human Rights Watch (2000).

53. Theoretical foundations for the idea that militants have to be included in peace processes can be found in Sederberg (1995). For an elegant modeling of the theoretical idea, see Wallace (2006).


55. This conclusion is based on interviews by Ruben Thorning in 1999 and 2001, as well as my own discussions in Sentani and Jayapura. It is common to hear Papuans say “We all are OPM,” but it is likely that this comment is something people of European ethnic origin are more likely to hear than Indonesian experts. See also Osborne (1985) and May (1978: 182).

56. According to the impression of many Papuan independence-minded people, OPM, unlike the PDP or the DAP, wants all migrants out of Papua (Author’s interviews, November 2005).

57. This conclusion is based on my discussions in November 2005 with ethnic non-Papuans living in Jayapura and Timika.

58. The author of this study has personally heard most of the Papuan leaders being accused of receiving money from the TNI.

59. OPM also has militias, which are treated by these organizations as legitimate police authorities of independent Papua. These militias include Polisi Adat Papua, Satuan Tugas (Satgas) Papua, and Satuan Tugas (Satgas) Koteka.

60. www.melanesianews.org/demmak/


62. Policy declaration of the OPM, Malmö, Sweden, 1979. This policy declaration was authored by Jacob Prai and his associates and does not necessarily represent the position of other Papuan secessionists.

63. Ibid. This was also confirmed in author interview with Jacob Prai, 1999.

64. www.geocities.com/sp_tpnopm/mainpages/mission.htm#mission

65. www.geocities.com/sp_tpnopm/mainpages/mission.htm#target

66. These Papuan actors are assumed to be supporters of independence. It is in this umbrella group where integrationists are seen to “functionally represent the Indonesian position.” Correspondence with one of the key organizers of the Papuan Umbrella Organization.

67. See, for example, the statement of the chairman of the Indonesian Christian Church Synod (GKI) of Papua, Herman Saud. See “Assembled Chaos,” Tempo, No. 7/VI, October 18–24, 2005, which claims that the MRP represents Jakarta and not Papuans.

68. Instruction from Damien Kingsbury related to the consolidation process within the Papuan Umbrella Organization. Correspondence, April 2006.

69. Interviews of Papuan fighters include only a small number of OPM/TNP individuals interviewed by Ruben Thorning (5) and the author (5), based on a questionnaire by the author. One of the areas of inquiry in the questionnaire for all interviews addressed the informants’ personal history and the conditions related to their entry into the OPM.

71. “Forward panic” is a concept that has been analyzed in the psychology and sociology of conflict. A very good analysis of the phenomenon, where panic does not result in escape but in the destruction of weak individuals who represent the enemy to the panicking people, can be found in Daniel Horowitz (2001).

72. This assessment of the grievances behind the Laskar Jihad violence is based on author’s interviews with six Laskar Jihad fighters in February 2000.

73. Lunch talk by Deni Yomaki of ELSHAM at the Indonesian Conflict Studies Network workshop, November 9, 2005.


75. Sources compiled by Brad Simpson in 2005.

76. This was one of the three claims of Sukarno’s influential Trikora Speech of December 19, 1962, in which he commanded Indonesians to resist the Dutch conspiracy, to hoist the Indonesian flag in Papua, and to be prepared for a general mobilization.

77. See Savage (1978: 962). However, not all the independence-minded elite received Dutch training, as has been pointed out in Kroef (1968: 696).

78. Author’s interview with Jakob Prai, September 1999.

79. Discussions with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Meeri Jaarva, director of nation-building and democracy, at CMI (Crisis Management Initiative, Office of President Ahtisaari), Spring 2005. Through the CMI, Ahtisaari was mediator of the Aceh peace talks in 2005.

80. Quotation is from an otherwise confidential CMI document, 2005.


82. For an excellent analysis of these challenges, see McGibbon 2004.

83. There seems to be strong awareness regarding this issue in the Indonesian central administration. According to Indonesian Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Jacob Nuwa Wea, “Regions like Papua should decide if they need more people. Transmigration program has not been good when Muslims are moved to Christian areas” (*ABC Radio*, January 20, 2003).

84. See, for example, the statement of the chairman of the Indonesian Christian Church Synod (GKI) Papua, Herman Saud claiming that the MRP represents Jakarta rather than Papuans (“Assembled Chaos,” *Tempo*, October 18–24, 2005).

85. The issue of the need for political dialogue and dialogue on strengthening democracy in Papua was emphasized in the following important recent reports: Yudhoyono (2005); Yatipay (2005); DAP (2005a, b); WPNPCI (2005); Ondawame (2000).


87. The grievance of such security concerns is emphasized in the following important recent reports: Report from the Papuan Members (2005); Komnasham (2004); Rees (2005); Biak Dewan Adat (2005); Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights (2005); The Yale University Law School (2003); ICG (2001); Amnesty International (2005); Sanders (2005); Chauvel & Bhakti (2004); House 2006–2007 *Foreign Relations Authorization Act*, Ondawame (2000); Yoman (2005).
88. See, for example, the editorial by Vidhyandika D. Pericasa, a researcher at CSIS, in the *Jakarta Post*, August 11, 2005. Schwarz (1991) and McGibbon (2004) make the same observation.

89. The national budget of Indonesia for 2005 and figures on development projects both testify to this.

90. A good analysis of the clash between modern and traditional norms about land ownership can be found in McGibbon (2004: 20, 25–26).

91. Author interviews with two migrants from Sentani and one from Jayapura, November 2005, March 2006.

92. These grievances and the need to tackle them were emphasized in the following recent important reports: “Report from the Papuan Members” (2005); ICG (2002).

93. For excellent analyses of this informal negotiation process, see McGibbon (2004) and Sumule (2003).

94. For the effort of the independence movement to see the Special Autonomy Law as the position of the integrationists, see Tebay (2004). At the same time, in the context of the controversy between the implementation of the division of Papua into three provinces and the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, the integrationist side has often referred to autonomy as a concession to the wishes of the independence movement.

95. The forum is chaired by Hasibuan, a former member of the National Commission on Human Rights. Other members of this forum include H. S. Dillon, Sabam Siagian, Fikri Jufr, Tommy Legowo, Zoeinrotin K. Susilo, Asmara Nababan, Fajrul Falaakh, Faisal Basri, Tuty Herati Nurhadi, Bara Hasibuan, Rizal Sukma, Father J. Budi Hernawan OFM, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Shanti Poepsoetijnjo, Faisal Maarif, and Harry Tjan Silalahi.

96. Between 15,000 and 20,000 people demonstrated in Jayapura. Similar peaceful demonstrations took place in other towns, with 2,000 people involved in Manokwari and Sorong and 1,000 in Biak and Wamena.


98. The failure of the Henry Dunant Center-led peace process in Aceh has been partly explained by the failure of unofficial monitoring of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. An NGO cannot monitor a state and create sufficient political power to keep Indonesia on the right tack. This was the diagnosis of President Martti Ahtisaari (*Demari*, August 16, 2005). For a more analytical diagnosis, see Huber (2004).


101. For the empirical generalization that peace processes tend to be more successful if the imaginable future of post-conflict society does not threaten the negotiators, see Valenzuela Espinoza (1992).


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Drawing on the Aceh peace process that resulted in the Helsinki agreement, this study investigates the possibility of a peace process to resolve the conflict over the political status of Papua vis-à-vis Indonesia. After presenting essential features of the Papua conflict, the study discusses the key actors, explores who should be brought into the peace process, what are the issues of contention, and how they may be packaged for dialogue. It also explores the possible roles of the international community. The study advances six findings: First, peace through dialogue is possible in Papua, although the Papuan case will require a more complex approach than that used in Aceh; second, negotiations must be more open, and mechanisms must be built to facilitate communication between the negotiators and their constituencies; third, the Special Autonomy consultation process is one possible model for constructing such mechanisms; fourth, a lasting peace can only be built through a process that includes the radical secessionist elements; fifth, the accord must establish mechanisms to monitor implementation and guarantee the safety of the negotiators; and finally, the dialogue process requires international facilitation.

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Timo Kivimäki is Senior Researcher at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen. He was an adviser to President Martti Ahtisaari during the Aceh peace talks and is currently engaged in a study of the feasibility of a similar peace dialogue in Papua. He can be contacted at timo.kivimaki@nias.ku.dk


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