

## Political Reviews

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*The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2012*

NIC MACLELLAN

*Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2012*

DAVID CHAPPELL, JON FRAENKEL, SOLOMON KANTHA,  
MURIDAN S WIDJOJO

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## PAPUA

In 2012 the Government of Indonesia failed in dealing with the sporadic attacks by the armed resistance groups called the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM])–National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional [TPN]) and other “unknown persons.” As far as their responsibility for this failure is concerned, the Indonesian government sometimes showed its frustration by blaming difficult geographical conditions, limited numbers of personnel, and lack of equipment. Even though the challenges were greater this year, the security policy of the government was similar to that of 2011 and did not succeed in coping with the complex reality. In general, it did not demonstrate to the public that the state was present and that laws were being enforced justly. Compared to 2011 (38 attacks resulting in 52 deaths and 573

injured), 2012 saw a higher number of violent cases (67 instances resulting in 45 deaths and 120 injured). The number of casualties during 2012 was lower than in the previous year only because 2011 saw three communal clashes during the local election in Puncak in which casualties were high (35 dead and about 500 injured).

In line with the government’s security policy, the political policy during 2012 looked stagnant on the surface. The government tried to maintain an image that Papua was under control. Disturbances were framed as minor and insignificant. The real policy, hidden from the public and civil society, was implemented behind the scenes. Intelligence units associated with the military/police/civil government bodies as well as formal intelligence bodies such as Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN, the State Intelligence Agency) and Badan Intelijen Strategis (BAIS, the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency) played a dominant role. But among these intelligence units there is a lack of coordination, and rivalries are rampant. The overarching goal of “defending the sovereignty of Indonesia” is not formulated in a clear policy but rather emerges in reactionary and ad hoc ways.

This closed political policy reflects the dominance of old political players within the central government bureaucracy, who were mostly high officers recruited from the army. These officials tend to look down on Papuans. The situation is worsened by a deep mutual distrust between the government and the people of Papua. The resulting policy has constructed a political configuration overwhelmed by intrigue, rumor, suspicion, and

character assassination among political factions, nongovernmental organization activists, journalists, and even security officers and TPN/OPM fighters. Mutual mistrust and fear, which have grown for so long, continued to spread steadily in 2012.

For its part, the TPN/OPM retained its usual pattern of movement in 2012, but the organization also produced a new group and became more active in hunting for weapons from the police and the military. The Paniai and Puncak Jaya regions were more dynamic, while the Kerom group, led by Lambert Pekikir, was quieter due to the pressure being applied by a military operation. The Jayapura group shrank, as its leader, Danny Kogoya, has been detained since September 2012, while a new fighting spot emerged in Lanny Jaya (Tiom). The latest trend shows that the action locus and guerilla fighters are concentrated mostly in the highlands—areas where the police and army presence is growing. The TPN/OPM sees these police officers and soldiers as targets, ambushing them when possible to confiscate weapons and to increase their reputations.

The political will of the government to employ peaceful means of solving the Papua conflict appeared more clearly at the end of 2011 and during the early part of 2012. On 9 November 2011 and again on 2 February 2012, President Yudhoyono stated that the government was prepared to hold open dialogue with Papuan leaders. However, the dialogue did not materialize in 2012. The Unit for Acceleration of Development in Papua and (West) Papua Barat (UP4B) that the president established in Septem-

ber 2011 only focused on social and economic issues. What the special envoys of the president had arranged with Papuan leaders in Papua in 2011 in terms of dialogue was not followed up by the president himself. The old political players, under the umbrella of the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (including the BIN, the home ministry, and the army) maintained a status quo, security-heavy policy. Many Papuan leaders, mostly the well-educated moderates, now question the goodwill of the government.

The central government is aware of the political and security difficulties. As compensation, the government has been giving greater attention to Papua development. During the period 2002–2012, funds provided under the special autonomy law (OTSUS) amounted to Rp 28.4 trillion (US\$1 is the equivalent of approximately 9,650 Indonesian rupiah, or Rp). For 2009–2012, the OTSUS budget for West Papua Province amounted to Rp 5.2 trillion. The funds were primarily for infrastructure development, with Papua Province receiving Rp 2.5 trillion and West Papua Province receiving Rp 2.2 trillion. In the 2013 national budget, the OTSUS funding for Papua Province has been increased to Rp 4.3 trillion and for West Papua to Rp 1.8 trillion. However, the development implementation has been hampered by corrupt practices—funds have been intercepted at lower levels—and the lack of capacity of the local governments. The main problems remain in the basic education sector and health services (subdistrict and village clinics), as well as in the economic empowerment of the people.

Significant improvements have been seen in several districts/municipalities in the development of education and health facilities, but these have not yet been accompanied by the presence of adequate officers, so the quality of service is still problematic. In the midst of this situation, the government created UP4B.

UP4B started operations in the beginning of 2012 and became the new coordinator of socioeconomic development, filling in the blanks between development actors, especially various development programs funded by the national budget (called the Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara, or APBN). Thanks to its efforts at facilitation and mediation, a number of decision-making bottlenecks hindering implementation of construction were overcome. During 2012, a number of affirmative policies were put in place allowing the acceleration of infrastructure development. However, the ultimate success and consistent implementation of UP4B's efforts depend on the performance of the various ministries and agencies as well as the local governments. If the weaknesses of the ministries and related agencies are not addressed and the capacity of the local governments remains low, then the facilitation and mediation conducted by UP4B will not be effective.

The term of office for the governor of Papua Province officially expired on 25 July 2011, but by the end of 2012 no gubernatorial election had been held. Over this period, Papua Province has had no definitive governor and vice governor. At first there was a dispute over who actually had the authority to conduct elections.

The Papua Legislative Body (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, or DPRP), under the law of special autonomy, felt entitled to conduct a registration of prospective governors and deputy governors, and it did so unilaterally. This process, however, was rejected by the General Elections Commission of Papua (KPU Papua). The long debate over this process resulted in the general election being stalled. The question of who had the authority to conduct the gubernatorial election was brought to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, or MK), which decided on 12 September 2012 that KPU Papua had the authority. However, the court also found that the registration process already completed by DPRP could be considered valid.

Toward the end of 2012, another election-related issue arose. On 14 December 2012, KPU Papua decided that the most recent governor, Barnabas Suebu, and his running mate, John Tabo, did not qualify to stand in the election because they lacked the required level of support—15 percent—from political parties. These two candidates, known as Bas-John, claimed that they were supported by eight parties with eighteen seats, or 32.13 percent, but during the verification process KPU Papua determined that Bas-John was supported by only six parties, representing only four seats, or 7.14 percent. The Bas-John team did not accept the determination of KPU Papua and vowed to seek legal redress. Despite the ongoing Bas-John lawsuit, KPU Papua announced that the voting would be conducted on 29 January 2013. Six pairs of candidates were set to contest the election: Lukas

Enembe-Klemen Tinal, Habel Suwae-Yop Kogoya, Manase Kambu-Blasius Pakage, and Alex Hesejem-Marthen Kayoi were all supported by political parties, while Wellington Wenda-Waynand Watory and Noak Nawipa-Johanes Wob were running independently.

Until 1999, the Province of Irian Jaya (renamed “Papua” in 2000) had only 9 districts and municipalities. In line with the move toward regional autonomy and decentralization throughout Indonesia, a policy of regional division (*pemekaran*) was implemented in Papua by Law 45/1999. Since then, the number of autonomous administrative units (districts) has increased rapidly. In 2012, there were two provinces: Papua (with as many as 2,833,381 inhabitants in 2010) with one municipality and 28 districts, while West Papua (with as many as 760,422 inhabitants in 2010) has one municipality and 12 districts. In total there are 40 districts and two major cities, with an overall population of 3,593,803. Based on the total number of inhabitants, the new districts are already disproportionately small. However, the demand for further division continued in 2012. On 13 July 2012, the DPRP formally decided that 18 new districts could be created. Going further, the spokesperson for the DPRP said that 21 new districts could be established in Papua Province, while West Papua Province also proposed creating 9 new districts and even one new province.

The normal basis of division is intended to narrow the span of government control, increase the government’s connection to the community, and ultimately improve

public services. In fact, very few new districts are experiencing any improvement in public services. Conversely, conflict between clan-based elites has increased, corruption is widespread, and the absence of district heads is high. In order to avoid demands and public protests, the district heads and their inner circles spend significant amounts of time and state funds around Jakarta instead of in their home districts. In Jakarta, or the provincial capital Jayapura, they enjoy a life of luxury living in hotels, driving luxurious cars, and marrying non-Papuan women. Most are able to buy a new home or apartment outside Papua. Many of the local elites fight for division primarily in order to exploit the political and financial resources of the State. Nevertheless, Minister of Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi said that the government will not stop the division and has prepared a grand design for Papua with as many as five provinces. Even DPRP Chairman John Ibo says that ideally Papua Province will be divided into seven regions, based on customary territorial division.

The new faction of the Papua People’s Congress III, which proclaimed a new Federal Republic of Papua in October 2011, shrank as it garnered little public support from Papuans and its main leaders were jailed. During 2012, street politics was dominated by the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, or KNPB), which organized around twenty demonstrations. The main political agenda of KNPB is a referendum on Papuan independence. To pursue this goal, KNPB is relying on International

Lawyers for West Papua (ILWP) and International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP), which promise to bring the Papuan cause to the International Court. Consequently, KNPB rejects any political agenda imposed by Jakarta.

Unfortunately, this year KNPB engaged in more hostile and even violent conduct. For example, on 20 February 2012, KNPB rallied to reject the creation of UP4B and demanded a referendum in the office of the Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, or MRP). Mobilizing 300 people, it forced MRP members who were attending the speeches to remain against their will in the hot sunshine until the event ended. On 20 March 2012, during the visit of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, KNPB mobilized its supporters to stop traffic in Abepura and extort money from drivers. To make it worse, protestors also blocked the gate of Cenderawasih University campus and dispersed students who were having classes.

On 1 May, one KNPB member, Terjoli Weya, was shot and killed by "unknown persons" (orang tak kenal, or OTK) in Abepura. The shooting occurred when Weya boarded a truck along with other members of KNPB after a demonstration. The next day a non-Papuan, Dedy Kurniawan (age twenty-eight), fell victim to an arbitrary attack, which was perceived by KNPB supporters to be revenge for the previous day's shooting.

KNPB has also displayed a negative attitude and unfriendly behavior toward journalists since March 2012. From the KNPB perspective, all journalists are pro-Indonesia. The

daily newspaper *Suara Pembaruan* reported intimidation of thirty journalists, including Victor Mambor, a Papuan and chairman of the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, or AJI) of Jayapura. KNPB Deputy Chairman Mako Tabuni publicly stated that "we are opposed to all journalists and the media in Papua and Indonesia. . . . If any of them still reports KNPB activities, then KNPB will kill him or her and the office will be turned to ashes" (*Suara Pembaruan*, 6 May 2012). The same threat was also repeated during a large KNPB demonstration on 19 May 2012 that was focused on calling for a referendum and rejecting the Indonesian government policies, especially regarding local or provincial elections.

On 3 June 2012, a non-Papuan student, Jimmy Purba (age nineteen), was found dead. The police indicated that the culprit was one of KNPB's supporters who was participating in a KNPB motorcycle convoy in Waena. On 4 June 2012, when their march was blocked by the police, about 500 supporters of KNPB vented their anger with vandalism and attacks on migrants' houses in Kampung Harapan. Two people were injured during the violence. Mako Tabuni really shocked the public when he spoke out against the detention of KNPB chairman Bukhtar Tabuni on 7 June 2012 at the DPRP office. He blamed the detainment on DPRP members and expressed his anger by threatening all DPRP members openly: "We will hunt the members of DPRP door to door in their houses. We will even empty the offices" (Jawa Pos National Network, 9 June 2012).

In addition to the numerous open

acts of hostility, the police alleged that Mako Tabuni was also involved in seven other cases of violence in Jayapura, including the shooting of a German citizen. On the morning of 14 June, Tabuni was shot dead by a special plainclothes police team when they attempted to detain him near Cenderawasih University. The killing enraged KNPB supporters and sparked violent riots in which hundreds of people attacked non-Papuans and destroyed a number of properties. Four migrants were mortally wounded. At the funeral ceremony of Tabuni in Sentani, around 600 people were present. There were rumors that the ceremony would turn into a riot, but due to the large number of security units present who were prepared for that possibility, the anticipated riot did not take place.

The details of the shooting of Mako Tabuni are disputed and possible human rights violations were raised, not only by KNPB, but also by local nongovernmental organizations and the Baptist church. According to KNPB, the police shot Tabuni five times without warning when he was chewing betel nut with two of his colleagues, and he later died at the hospital. Conversely, the police claimed that Tabuni resisted arrest and tried to grab their weapons. Furthermore, the police found a Taurus revolver and sixteen bullets in Tabuni's bag. Unfortunately, there has been no independent investigation into the shooting, so it has turned into a political football.

During the second half of the year, KNPB tried to behave more peacefully. However, while KNPB's campaign did expand the democratic space, it failed to maintain the nonviolent principles

of democracy. During protests, its leaders and supporters have shown a hostile attitude toward those not part of the group by threatening and carrying out violent actions against civilians, as well as other criminal acts. Due to their actions, KNPB has lost some legitimacy and public support for its cause, especially among migrants and coastal Papuans. Additionally, the group faced the legal ramifications of its members' actions since the police had enough justification to search and detain its leaders.

After the death of Mako Tabuni, the police intensified investigations into KNPB leaders suspected of crimes in various districts in Papua and West Papua. In Timika on 23 September and 19 October 2012, eleven leaders and members of KNPB were interrogated and released. A camera and a laptop were seized. In Jayapura on 2 October 2012, the police also interrogated KNPB leaders as they disembarked from the passenger vessel *Labobar*. Reacting to these incidents, the new KNPB chairman, Victor Yeimo, condemned the police for treating KNPB leaders arbitrarily. On 1 October 2012, the police searched the KNPB secretariat in Wamena. Police found dangerous materials including a pipe bomb with a 16 cm detonator, one 200 ml bottle bomb, traditional weapons such as bows and arrows, and a number of long machetes, along with KNPB and TPN/OPM symbols and documents. Nine people—the owners of these items and allegedly members of KNPB—were detained.

On 18 October 2012, police uncovered incriminating evidence when three kilograms of TNT powder (allegedly intended for a high-explo-

sive bomb) were found in Kurulu, around ten kilometers from Wamena town. After two more kilograms of explosives was found in the Wamena area, police suspected that the KNPB was training its members to assemble bombs there. Based on the information obtained from the arrested suspects, the KNPB have been planning to bomb public facilities. They are alleged to have tried to detonate a bomb in the Jayawijaya local parliament building on 1 September 2012 and at the Jayawijaya Police Post on 18 September 2012. Police have added five KNPB activists to the list of Wanted Persons (Daftar Pencarian Orang, or DPO).

The searches and arrests continued through the end of 2012. On 16 December 2012, police and army joint forces arrested six KNPB activists in and around the headquarters of the Papuan Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP) in Balim Valley, Wamena. They allegedly were involved in a plot to bomb public facilities. In Kurulu, where some of the explosives were found, two KNPB activists were shot, allegedly by a joint force of police and army.

KNPB members did not lessen their opposition, even though Mako Tabuni had been executed and the repressive searches by the police increased sharply. This was shown by their willingness to organize multiple demonstrations on 23 September 2012 to support the activities of the ILWP/IPWP in London. KNPB managed to simultaneously hold demonstrations in eight districts/municipalities in the land of Papua and one each in Makassar and Manado. This shows that the KNPB network has been expanding and is mostly con-

trolled by highlanders. Most of the demonstrations happened peacefully, except in Manokwari, where a clash between police and supporters of KNPB occurred. Police also dispersed the demonstrations in Jayapura and Fakfak without opposition from KNPB supporters.

On 20 November 2012, KNPB celebrated its sixth anniversary with prayer services in Jayapura and Merauke. In Jayapura, there was heavy police and army surveillance during the prayers. Hostilities almost erupted when the police tried to stop a speech by KNPB Chairman Victor Yeimo. Though the scene was quite tense, the worship service went well. Similarly, the ceremony in Merauke was quiet and went smoothly. The first of December is always celebrated as the anniversary of West Papua's "independence." This year on that day, Yeimo was captured as he was leading a long march from Waena toward the tomb of the great Papua leader Theys Eluay in Sentani. He was taken to the Abepura police post for questioning. Despite his detainment and the usual tight security, the 1 December prayer celebration at the tomb of Theys Eluay was peaceful.

Other cases of violence occurred during 2012. Nine shooting incidents took place in Puncak Jaya, which resulted in around 15 people being shot, including 1 member of the TPN/OPM and 2 members of the police/army. Out of the 15 who were shot, 3 people were killed. In the first week of the New Year, armed confrontations were started by the TPN/OPM when army troops from Infantry Battalion 811 Nabire stationed around Mulia were intercepted. Lindiron



Tabuni, one of the members of the TPN/OPM, was shot. The military seized an SS1 firearm and seventy-five bullets from Tabuni. Apart from this, real encounters between the police/army and the TPN/OPM were rare. It was alleged that TPN/OPM mostly ambushed their targets. For example, on 20 January 2012 at Mulia Lama, Krisna Rofik, a migrant settler who was keeping his stall, was approached by three OTK and shot for unknown reasons. On 28 January 2012, a member of the Mobile Brigade Sukarno was shot in the left cheek and killed. He and twelve other soldiers were guarding a private contractor's heavy equipment for a road project in the Wandigobak subdistrict.

It appears that the TPN/OPM now not only targets migrant settlers or individual members of the police/army but also seeks to disrupt transportation. On 8 April 2012, a Trigana Air Service plane that had just landed at Mulia airport was attacked by the TPN/OPM. Four people were injured, including the pilot and copilot, and one passenger, local journalist Leiron Kogoya, was killed. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono urged that the perpetrators be arrested. This incident led to the suspension of flights into Mulia and pushed a number of migrants to take refuge in Wamena. Regular flights into Mulia remained suspended until the end of June 2012, with only one or two charter planes operating. Supplies ran low as all the needs of the city and the surrounding area had to be filled by limited road transport between Wamena to Mulia. The shootings terrified migrant settlers and led them, especially public workers, to

protest openly and demand security assurances.

The TPN/OPM in Paniai were not as active as their compatriots in Puncak Jaya, with only four recorded cases of violence in 2012. The casualties as a result of these incidents were relatively low, with 2 civilians killed and 1 injured, while 2 police officers were killed and 1 was injured. Most of the TPN/OPM actions here were ambush shootings. For example, on the evening of 16 August 2012, one migrant was shot dead by OTK near the Obano airport, while his friend was shot and injured in his left hand. On 21 August 2012, Police Brigadier Yohan Kasimatau was shot in the chest and killed by unknown persons, possibly TPN/OPM from the direction of Paniai Lakes. The victim was washing a car when he was targeted, and the perpetrators escaped in speedboats after seizing police firearms. Kasimatau was evacuated from Enarotali to Nabire, and then his body was sent to Jayapura for an autopsy.

One attack, allegedly by the TPN/OPM, took place in a new area of resistance, Lanny Jaya. On 27 November 2012, a police post in Pirime was ambushed by about fifty attackers. Police Chief Rolfi Takubesi and his two subordinates were shot dead and burned inside the post. The police explained that the attackers were from a new group of TPN/OPM led by Yani Tabuni. The group also seized three revolvers and two assault rifles. In reaction, the police sent members of the Mobile Brigade platoon and one special team of the Papua police to pursue the perpetrators. On 27 November 2012, one of Puncak Jaya OPM's prominent leaders,

Goliath Tabuni, denied that his group was involved in the attack. Chairman of the Lani Pago Papuan Customary Council (DAP) Lemok Mabel insinuated that the incident had been engineered by the government.

Timika and the Freeport mining area were relatively quiet in 2012. In February, three shooting cases took place within the mine's concession area, resulting in three deaths and four injuries. The victims included police and civilians. It was difficult to be sure whether the perpetrators were TPN/OPM members or an army unit. This latter suspicion always emerges, as the rivalry between the police and the army for control of security in the Freeport area is still rampant. On 23 June 2012, a group of TPN/OPM tried to seize weapons from a police officer, but his colleagues helped him fend off the attackers. It was clear that the perpetrators were TPN/OPM members, as the police saw them.

From May through July, the inhabitants of Jayapura were caught in fear as about eleven reported violent incidents took place, mainly shootings. Most of the perpetrators were unknown. At least 12 lives were taken and 3 persons injured. The victims were varied: 9 migrant settlers, some of whom worked for a military-related institution; 1 highland Papuan; 1 German citizen; and 3 army soldiers. The series of killings started on 1 May with a mysterious death of a highland Papuan, followed by the death of a migrant the next day. The German, Dietma Pieper, was shot when he was enjoying the warmth and beauty of Base G Beach near Jayapura on 29 May. The police believe that KNPB people were involved in the shoot-

ing and have been searching for the perpetrators. It was during this search when the police shot Mako Tabuni, one of KNPB's important leaders. On 20 July the police also shot dead Pieter Penggu, who was the village head in Tolikara District. Penggu is believed to have been involved in KNPB-TPN/OPM-related activities. However, the reason for the killing was unclear and almost no one has questioned this.

MURIDAN S WIDJOJO

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## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

The year 2012 and the events in the latter part of 2011 leading up to the infamous “political impasse” in Papua New Guinea (PNG) will go down in the annals of PNG political history for a number of reasons. Most significant, it was a year that saw the end of nine years of rule by the National Alliance Party–led government of Prime Minister Grand Chief Sir Michael Somare—cutting short what would have been a historic two full terms as prime minister.

These events led to the biggest con-

stitutional and leadership crisis in the history of the country. The crisis put to test the thirty-seven-year-old constitution, challenged the principle of the separation of powers among the three arms of government (executive, legislative, and judicial), and shook the foundations of the Westminster system of government adopted by Papua New Guinea. Additionally, business houses and landowners around the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project area warned that if the impasse between the two groups claiming to be the legitimate government continued, it could negatively impact investor confidence and the economy at a time when the LNG project was at its peak construction phase (*Post-Courier*, 19 Dec 2011).

Fortunately, 2012 was an election year, which meant that Parliament was dissolved and political incumbents had to re-contest their seats. This somewhat ended the leadership tussle between the Peter O’Neill and Somare factions, who were forced to renew their leadership mandate through the ballot box. This was timely because the political impasse could have devolved further into social chaos, as the stalemate was gradually politicizing and dichotomizing the different groups in the country who supported one faction or the other.

There was a sense of political insecurity and uncertainty when Somare’s family announced that he was not medically fit to continue as the country’s leader in 2011. Somare’s absence from the country for almost three months created a leadership vacuum despite his having appointed Sam Abal (the member for Wabag and minister for foreign affairs and immigration)