Powerful Warriors and Influential Clergy
Interaction and Conflict between the Kamakura Bakufu and Religious Institutions

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ABSTRACT

The dramatic years of the Genpei War (1180-1185) ended with a fundamental restructuring of Japanese polity. Replacing the established system of a single ruling elite with a dual structure of court and bakufu had far-reaching effects on Japanese society, economy, and religion. Eastern Japan, which once was considered the land of barbarians, became the home of a new warrior elite, and the headquarters of their military government in Kamakura. This geographical separation from the court contributed to the political independence of the bakufu, in turn allowing warriors to distinguish themselves as a unique social elite. As such, warriors turned to develop not only a new social identity, but also a vibrant local economy, comparable only to that of Kyoto.

While Japanese society was transforming itself in unprecedented scope, Buddhism and Buddhist institutions were experiencing a revival in popularity among their elite patrons. Concern over the age of mappō, which the Genpei War brought to the fore, had both courtiers and warriors seeking religious guidance. The result was not only re-popularization of already established doctrines, but also a new emphasis on Amidism, and the promotion of new doctrines by reformer monks. This time, however, clergy and religious institutions benefitted not only from the traditional patrons at court. Kamakura warriors, who were genuinely concerned with their present
and future existences, who realized the practical benefits of religious patronage, or who imitate court practices, proved to be generous patrons.

This dissertation seeks to examine the role of religion, religious institutions, and clergy in the development of Kamakura's warrior society. The basic assumption is that when profound changes were occurring in Japanese society and religion, they inevitably were interrelated in some ways. Indeed, between the initial stages of the Genpei War until his death, Minamoto Yoritomo promoted the construction of large religious institutions to support both his political and religious needs, an approach that became an integral part of bakufu policy. Then, when warriors in general realized the many ways they could benefit from religious patronage, they engaged in construction of their own clan temples, while supporting those under bakufu patronage.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ................................................................. iii
Abstract ........................................................................ iv
List of Tables ................................................................... ix
List of Figures .................................................................... x
List of Abbreviations ........................................................ xi

Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................. 1
  Periodization ............................................................. 10
  Kamakura Buddhism ....................................................... 21
  Division of Power: The Kenmon Theory ....................... 24
  Thesis and Content ....................................................... 30
  Conclusion ................................................................... 36

Chapter 2: Kamakura Geography .................................................. 39
  Introduction .................................................................. 39
  Background and Development ....................................... 45
    Kamakura Before the Minamoto .................................. 45
    Kamakura and the Minamoto ....................................... 48
  Periods of Development ................................................ 53
  Kamakura City Layout ................................................... 55
    Bakufu Offices and Warrior Residences ....................... 55
    Highways, Avenues, and Streets ................................ 65
    Population .................................................................. 75
    Temples in Kamakura: The Case of Yōfukuji ................. 83
  Conclusion ................................................................... 93

Chapter 3: Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji: A Bakufu Institution .............. 96
  Introduction .................................................................. 96
  Early Development ...................................................... 98
    Yoritomo's Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji ....................... 98
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hachiman</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Appointments</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential Clergy</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Tsurugaoka Offices</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Administrator</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engyō and Yoritomo</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evil Bettō</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jōgō</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryūben and the Hōjō</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji: Rituals and Culture</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Rituals and Practices</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hōjōe: Origins in the Hachiman Cult</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hōjōe in Yoritomo's Kamakura</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hōjōe After Yoritomo</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hōjōe After the 1240s</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omens and Natural Disasters</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemics</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superstitions</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamakura Culture</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabusame, Kasagake</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugaku and Kagura: The case of Ō no Yoshikata</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Ujidera: Development and Religious Role</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and Characteristics</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrior Clan Ujidera</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Ujidera</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: The Economy of Buddhas and Clergy</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and Trade</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Economy</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhas by the Road</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhas in the Market</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakufu and Ujidera Affairs</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economy of Rituals and Services</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Protection: The Case of Tô Rokurô Moriyoshi</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Conclusion</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundane Geography and Divine Locations</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications and Perspectives</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A:</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B:</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C:</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D:</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E:</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix F:</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tsurugaoka Hachimangûji Bettô</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tsurugaoka Hachimangûji Nijûgobô</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Landholding of Tsurugaoka Hachiman Twenty-Five Monk Offices..</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji Offices</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shōmyōji</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bannaji</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kamakura Yōfukuji</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kamakura Passes</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kamakura Temples and Warrior Residences</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Center of Kamakura in the Thirteenth Century</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kantō</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJM</td>
<td>Bannaji monjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJM</td>
<td>Chórakuji monjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNS</td>
<td>Dainihon shiryô</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gusô shidai</td>
<td>Tsurugaoka hachimangû gusô shidai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBK</td>
<td>Kanazawa bunko komonjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ki</td>
<td>Kamakura ibun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THM</td>
<td>Tsurugaoka hachimangû monjoshû</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamu kiroku</td>
<td>Tsurugaoka hachimangû shamukiroku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamushiki shidai</td>
<td>Tsurugaoka hachimangû shamushiki shidai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshiki shidai</td>
<td>Tsurugaoka hachimangû shoshiki shidai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The significance of the Kamakura period lies in fundamental political changes that redefined the social and economic structure of Japanese society between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. The most notable of these changes was the formation of a governing apparatus by warriors of imperial descent, commonly known as the Kamakura bakufu, which served as the political and military focal point of a new, recognizable warrior society. In practical terms, the old ruling elite, consisting of courtiers and powerful clergy in the capital, was forced to compromise its claim to absolute authority, and bestow upon the bakufu the authority to exercise police and military powers.¹ In its capacity as protector of the state, with the objective of maintaining internal peace and security, the Kamakura bakufu and its coalition of powerful warrior families set the stage for a new era in Japanese history that lasted for some seven hundred years during which warriors were the dominant political and military power of the country. The Kamakura period, then, can be viewed as a time of transition from a single dominant ruling

elite to dual, shared rulership. In this period of transition, warriors learned and experimented in methods of ruling, in judicial processes, and in economic policies, while solidifying their new identity as a ruling elite at the top of the sociopolitical hierarchy.

The Kamakura bakufu's ability to dispense its authority and implement its policies has not been fully studied, but it is clear that its continued existence depended heavily on the acceptance of the role of the bakufu by the coalition of powerful warriors—the bakufu's housemen.


3 The Kamakura period has always been viewed by scholars as the early medieval period. The Genpei War (1180-85) and the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu seem to be a convenient turning point separating the ancient period, characterized by the single authority of the imperial court, and the medieval period when warriors formed a competing authority, the bakufu. In recent years, however, some scholars have begun to question the positioning of this historical chronology. The first to advance the idea that the Kamakura period should be classified as the last phase of the ancient period were Andrew Goble and Jeffrey Mass. Mass contended that "what was new in the 1180s was introduced into a context that was very old yet still vibrant, whereas what was new in the 1330s had broken free of the constraints of that framework." "Introduction," in The Origins of Japan's Medieval World: Courtiers, Clerics, Warriors, and Peasants in the Fourteenth Century, ed. Jeffrey P. Mass (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 3. For Goble, the era of Emperor Go-Daigo marked a departure from old practices, and the restoration of the authority of the emperor. See "Visions of an Emperor," in ibid., 113-137. At present the issue is still unresolved, with some scholars subscribing to this new notion, while many others prefer to hold to established periodization.

4 There seems to be a lack of information on crimes and punishments, and the competency of the bakufu in catching and punishing criminals. For an introductory study of crime and punishment in medieval Japan see Amino Yoshihiko et al., Chūsei no shimi to batsu (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983).

Though the judicial system was rather effective in processing legal matters, it is unclear how effective the bakufu was in enforcing laws. See Jeffrey P. Mass, Antiquity and Anachronism in Japanese History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 168-171.
(gokenin). For most of the Kamakura period, powerful eastern warriors such as the Ashikaga, who later succeeded the Kamakura bakufu rulers, did not hold offices in the bakufu. During most of the Kamakura period, bakufu offices were held by smaller, Kamakura-based warrior families, mainly branches of the Hōjō family, whose military power was matched by countryside based warrior families. Further discussion of this issue will follow later in this chapter. Suffice it to say that neither the bakufu nor any single warrior family, not even the main Hōjō family, had the capacity to enforce absolute authority over all the eastern warrior families. Furthermore, the sharing of authority and power between the bakufu and its gokenin should be viewed as a delicate matter that depended on mutual recognition of interests, and acceptance of each other's status. As long as the bakufu served the collective interests of the greater majority of its gokenin, it remained intact. In other words, the bakufu's existence depended on continued warriors' trust in the bakufu's ability to perform its role effectively.

Non-Hōjō who held bakufu offices included some twenty-seven families. However, the offices of regent (shikken), deputy-regent (rensha), Rokuhara liaison (tandai), Chinzei liaison, and the Board of Adjudications (hikitsukeshū), were filled solely with leading Hōjō warriors. For the most complete and up-to-date study of the Hōjō regency and the structure of the Kamakura bakufu see Hosokawa Shigeo, Kamakura seiken tokiusō senseiron (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000). Chapter 2 focuses on non-Hōjō gokenin who held offices in the Board of Adjudications (hikitsukeshū) and Council of State (hyōjōshū).

Nanami Masato examines the separation of gokenin from the bakufu in the late Kamakura period and their turn against it on the side of the court. In his study Nanami looks at the nature and characteristics of bakufu/Hōjō-gokenin relationships, and suggests that the key to bakufu control over its gokenin was its ability to supply them with satisfactory leadership, which meant that as long as the Hōjō-led bakufu acknowledged and supported the provincial needs of its gokenin, the gokenin supported the bakufu. When, in the late Kamakura period, the bakufu was unable to support their needs, they turned against it. Kamakura bakufu
The Kamakura period also marked a new era in the development of Japanese Buddhism. Many scholars, both Japanese and Western, have investigated Kamakura Buddhism in an attempt to define both doctrinal shifts and institutional restructuring. At the center of the investigation lies the dichotomy of "new-old" Buddhism (shinkyū ryō bunkyō), which in fact measures pre-Kamakura Buddhist schools—Tendai, Shingon, and the six Nara schools—against those schools that made their initial appearance on the Buddhist directory during the Kamakura period. Until recent years, the prevalent view of Kamakura Buddhism was that charismatic Buddhist monks, namely Eisai, Dōgen, Hōnen, Shinran, Nichiren, and Ippen, had separated Amidism and Zen from a more inclusive collection of Buddhist doctrines, and promulgated them as exclusive paths to salvation.\footnote{James C. Dobbins points out that the "new-old" distinction was formed by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japanese scholars who relied on Western historiography to characterize Kamakura Buddhism. Western scholars later followed Japanese scholarship to focus on the six new schools (Jōdo, Jōdo Shinshū, Jishū, Rinzai-shū, Sōtōshū, Nichirenshū), because the founders of these schools lived in the Kamakura period, and because they later became the most popular Buddhist schools. See "Envisioning Kamakura Buddhism," in Re-Visioning Kamakura Buddhism, ed. Richard K. Payne (Kuroda Institute, University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 24-5.}

In recent years, however, this view has been re-assessed and a new approach to Kamakura Buddhism has found support among many scholars of Kamakura religion and history.\footnote{Kuroda Toshio is considered the foremost postwar era proponent of this new approach to Kamakura Buddhism. His students, namely Taira Masayuki in Japan and a number of Western scholars, adopted and improved his theories. For representative works, see Kuroda Toshio, "Chūsei ni okeru kenmitsu taisei no tenkai," in Nihon chūsei no kokka to shukkyō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975), 413-537; and idem, Jisha seiryoku: mō hitotsu no chūsei shakai gokëninsen no tenkai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001).} According to the latter approach, though...
these reformer monks indeed focused on single doctrines, their attempts at promulgating single practices were not successful until their successors were able to achieve recognition, which happened either very late in the Kamakura period or afterward. Furthermore, while attempts to promulgate single practices were only partially successful, it has been argued successfully that Tendai, Shingon, and the Nara schools enjoyed a major revival, which in fact overshadowed Amidism and Zen. At any rate, reformer monks did not attempt to establish new schools because of new developments in the Buddhist world. Rather, they emphasized lineage in continuation of Heian traditions or even since their Chinese and Indian origins. They did so for historical legitimation based on continuity of teachings and lineages.

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate in depth the "old-new" dichotomy. What is important though, is to lay out a schematic and thematic view of Buddhism in the Kantō, specifically to illustrate what the dominant forces at play were, who the dominant monks were, and what the Kantō

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9 George Tanabe argues that Kōyasan suffered a major decline in the middle of the Heian period, but was revived by the monk Jōyo late in the period. In the Kamakura period Kōyasan benefitted from the support of the aristocracy in Kyoto and warriors in Kamakura. Warriors, in fact, became active patrons of Kōyasan, especially after the Jōkyū War (1221) when Hōjō Yasutoki ordered estate officials to secure Kōyasan income. Though the patterns of patronage and dissemination of Shingon doctrines may have changed in the Kamakura period, it was nonetheless a flourishing time for Kōyasan. George J. Tanabe Jr., "Kōyasan in the Countryside: The Rise of Shingon in the Kamakura Period," in Re-Visioning "Kamakura" Buddhism, 43-54.

warriors' attitudes toward Buddhism were.

Maintaining the two fundamental premises that the Japanese political and social structures were on a restructuring course, and that Buddhism entered a period of revival and renewal, it has become an issue of vital importance to understand where these two met and interacted. Western scholarship has thus far neglected to take a wide scope, cross-disciplinary approach to the subject of the interaction of bakufu politics and religion in the Kamakura period. In his study of the Gozan system in Kamakura, Martin Collcutt has investigated in depth the structure of the five temples in Kamakura that formed the core of Rinzai Zen in the East. His study, which focuses on the structure and development of the Gozan system, extends beyond the Kamakura period, and although a monumental study in its own right, it does not reveal much beyond the system itself.\(^\text{11}\) A more recent study of a major temple, that of Enryakuji by Mikael Adolphson,\(^\text{12}\) exposes much of the non-religious activity of that temple, with an excellent analysis of the fighting monks of Enryakuji. In addition to these studies there is Joan Piggott's study of Tōdaiji, and Janet Goodwin's study of the daily activity of


wandering monks. From an overall perspective, what is lacking in current scholarship is a broader perspective that brings into consideration both central religious institutions such as Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, the official bakufu shrine-temple, and local temples.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the Kamakura period by looking at the area where politics and religion intersect, with attention to such issues as authority, power, and interest groups. The goal of this examination is to provide an explanation of bakufu policies toward religious institutions, the role of these institutions in the development of the Kamakura polity and economy under bakufu rule, and to sketch a geographical distribution of centers of power and economy, focusing on the eastern provinces and the Kantō region.

In choosing my sources, I looked for as wide a perspective as I could find on the main subjects of my research. Thus, these sources include bakufu and jisha (temples and shrines) records, private letters, diaries, chronicles, and picture scrolls. Bakufu and jisha records proved to be the most accurate and reliable, because they are mostly legal documents in which information is presented in a direct and formal manner. These records reveal the outcome of judicial disputes, land commendations, orders and directives, and

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appointments of officials, among other things. 14 Although many of these
documents can be found in the major document collections, such as the
Kamakura ibun, there are still many that are excluded. Therefore, I used
temple and shrine collections, as well as family collections, as my primary
sources, referring to the large document collections when necessary. In some
cases, where a certain problem recurred in the sources, I referred to the
original document in any of the reproduction formats (e.g., shahon and
eishahon) to look at the original hand-written document. This method
proved to be effective in eliminating possible misreading. Furthermore,
looking at the original documents allowed me to examine their technical
aspects, which often revealed more information about the writers. For
example, the type of paper used, the shape of the signature, and the
handwriting could indicate a possible forgery or even the status of the
writer. 15

Other bakufu-related sources include diaries and chronicles. The
Azumakagami, for example, has been one of the most important sources for a
narrative history of the first half of the Kamakura period, and has been
thoroughly used by historians. Its shortcomings have been pointed out time

14 For the variety and characteristics of such documents, see Jeffrey P. Mass,
"Documents, Translation, and History," in Antiquity and Anachronism in Japanese History,
128-156; and Satō Shin'ichi, Konomjo gaku nyūmon (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku,
1971).

15 For an authoritative source on the technical aspect of old documents see Satō
Shin'ichi, Konomjo gaku nyūmon.
and again, but used with care it is still one of the most valuable sources.\textsuperscript{16}

Other works, such as the \textit{Shōkyūki} and \textit{Genpei seisuiki}, are also valuable sources of information.

Since this dissertation focuses on the role of temples and shrines under Kamakura rule, I have made extensive use of the document collections of various religious institutions. Among these, perhaps the most complete and well-organized collections are those of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex and Shōmyōji temple, whose related documents are in the Kanazawa Bunkō collection.\textsuperscript{17} Many documents in these shrine and temple collections also appear in bakufu related collections. But their collections also include records of local histories, maps, biographies of monks and priests, inventory lists, and other related records. The ultimate purpose of using such a wide variety of sources was to ensure a better understanding of the topics discussed, to provide the reader with an in-depth perspective, and to avoid mistakes or subjective views that might be, and often are, inherent in any single type of source.

\textsuperscript{16} For a discussion on sources and translations, see Jeffrey P. Mass, "Documents, Translations, and History," in \textit{Antiquity and Anachronism in Japanese History}, 128-156. For an analyses of the \textit{Azumakagami} as an historical document, its content and method of presentation, see Gomi Fumihiko and Kameda Kinuko, \textit{Azumakagami to chūsei monogatari} (Tokyo: Sōunsha Shuppan, 1994).

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Tsurugaoka sōsho}; and Shōmyōji temple records in \textit{Kanazawa bunkō komonjo}.
Periodization

Changing conditions generated by clearly identifiable events require us to divide the Kamakura period accordingly, and view the development of mutual relations between bakufu and jisha in that context. Just as the nature of the bakufu and the political power balance changed over time, so did the general development of jisha and clergy. In fact, there seems to exist a logical connection between the two— the bakufu being a warriors' political and military institution dealing with jisha that were patronized by Kamakura warriors. Consequently, each of the participants in this paradigm was influenced by the others. Therefore, defining sub-periods should correspond to events and conditions in which all three—bakufu, jisha and patronizing warriors—participated, and by which they were influenced.

The rule of the Kamakura bakufu during approximately a hundred and fifty years of shared kōbu (court-bakufu) polity went uninterrupted though not unchallenged. During the rule of the three Minamoto shoguns, challenges to shogunal rule included that of Kiso Yoshinaka’s attempt at winning court support for himself, Yoritomo’s pursuit of the alleged conspirator Yoshitsune, the elimination of Hiki Yoshikazu (1203), and the assassination of Sanetomo, among others. Under the Hōjō regency, the most threatening challenge came from the court and its supporters among warrior families, but also from among Kamakura warriors themselves such as the Miura (Hōji War, 1247) and Adachi (1285). Similarly, the two Mongol
invasions in the second half of the Kamakura period, though unsuccessful, challenged the bakufu’s ability to maintain control over its gokenin.

In addition to occasional military threats and economic instability, challenges to bakufu rule appeared due to changes in the Buddhist world resulting from heightened attention to the final decline of the Buddhist Law (mappō) and its contribution to a growing pessimism in society.¹⁸ Charismatic monks who promulgated new forms of Buddhist practices found the eastern provinces more accommodating than Kyoto and Nara. Most troublesome were scores of nenbutsu monks whose dogmatic promotion of ways to salvation in the age of mappō concerned the bakufu to the point that it outlawed their menacing activities in Kamakura. Unusually charismatic monks, namely Nichiren, whom the bakufu either was not interested in patronizing or plainly rejected, threatened to stir both the Buddhist establishment and the bakufu’s relationships with the Buddhist community.

The dual tracks of political and religious progression make the division of the Kamakura period a complex issue, especially because religious

¹⁸ Japanese calculated the beginning of the final decline of the Buddhist Law to be the year 1052. During that time, understanding and practice of the Buddhist Law would be impossible, leaving one’s fate with the Buddha. The acceptance of this, somewhat fatalistic, notion, contributed to the rise of Amidism, which offered a way to salvation by relying on the Buddha Amida. The effects of mappō, though, reached people’s daily lives. “It was a period of general uneasiness and the mood of mappō (Degeneration of the Dharma) dominated the land. The natural calamities of fire, plague, earthquake and famine that had struck the capital area during the long Genpei war made the advent of mappō a reality and the observant were aware that the end was near.” Alicia Matsunaga and Daigan Matsunaga, Foundation of Japanese Buddhism, vol. 2 (Los Angeles and Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, fourth printing 1988; 1976), 5, 6. See also Robert E. Morrell, Kamakura Buddhism: A Minority Report (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1987), 3-4, 9,28, 45; and James C. Dobbins, Jōdo Shinshū: Shin Buddhism in Medieval Japan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 157-58.
institutions and the bakufu were headed by social elites that depended on each other. Developments in the Buddhist world that had a wide effect on Japanese society make a compelling case for choosing the religious track. According to that, we might wish to mark the beginning of the first period at 1052, the first year of mappō. The second period may very likely begin sometime in the early thirteenth century with the promulgation of Amidism and Zen, followed by a period of Amidism, promotion of Nichiren's views, and Ippen's Jishū school. However, any such periodization suffers some fatal flaws. First, religious institutions or clergy, though they may have been

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19 Here it is important to distinguish between the large Kyoto and Nara institutions such as Enryakuji, Tódaiji and Kasuga Taisha, and much smaller Kantō jisha such as Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, Kashima Taisha and Bannaji, just to name a few. While the large and influential institutions were politically, economically, and some even militarily powerful to varying degrees, Kantō jisha did not hold any substantial political power, neither did they have their own private band of warrior monks or priests. Nevertheless, their being an important factor in the local economy, having a strong religious presence, and being an integral part of warrior clans' structure, place them at the social elite, perhaps with more direct influence on the Kantō than Kyoto and Nara institutions. Kuroda Toshio neglected to address such geographical and institutional distinctions in his kenmon theory, in *Nihon chūsei no kokka to shukyo*. My main concern here is to consider jisha in the Kantō not as reflecting the traits of Kyoto and Nara institutions. Instead, it is important to emphasize that these Kantō jisha were to a large extent part of warrior society itself. Yet, their religious function placed them apart from warrior institutions.


A recent study by Kawazoe Shōji provides an interesting analysis of Nishiren in the context of political and religious developments in the Kamakura period. *Nichiren to sono jidai* (Tokyo: Sankibō Bussorin, 1999); and idem., *Nichiren to kamakura bunka* (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 2002).
influential, did not hold any legal authority over the court or the bakufu, thus the possibility of enforcing new religious views on either courtiers or warriors was practically impossible. Second, reformer monks relied on patrons for economic support and welfare. Their economic dependency eliminated the possibility of exerting any real economic influence on the power elite. And third, the lack of cohesiveness within the religious community makes it impossible for us to determine a single powerful leadership. Thus, there was no common phenomenon which occurred simultaneously throughout the jisha community that we can clearly identify as being significant enough to justify choosing it as the basis for sub-periods.

Choosing a sociopolitical framework upon which to determine where to divide the Kamakura period seems to make a stronger case because it is much more comprehensive in scope. That is, while the extent to which changes within the religious community were mostly limited to that community, some fundamental political changes involved military confrontations and the re-defining of social relationships, all of which eventually influenced the religious community. Having such intertwining conditions complicates the process of clarifying causality or identifying its effect when looking at historical turning points. Thus, looking for mutual influence seems to be a more realistic approach. For example, political

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22 Adolphson identified this point as one of the central flaws in Kuroda’s kenmon taisei. See, The Gates of Power, 10-20.
instability promoted heightened religious activity which, in turn, led to tighter regulations of that activity. Such was the case when large numbers of nenbustu monks, who were active in Kamakura in the early decades of the thirteenth century, before and after the Jōkyū War (1221), were placed under strict regulations due to their disturbing behavior. Consequently, in discussing politics and religion such complexity cannot be avoided, and certainly should not be overlooked. Determining points of transition is, therefore, crucial for explaining the nature of the relationship between the bakufu and influential clergy.

The first period began with the Genpei War (1180-85) and ended when Hōjō Tokiyori established a regency in 1247 that was stable and secure. Politically, this period was marked by a fundamental change in the structure of the ruling elite from a single to a dual governing administration—court and bakufu. The nature of the period was defined by Yoritomo’s autocratic rule and his Minamoto successors’ failure to secure an effective transmission of power, the court’s challenge to bakufu existence, and continuous Hōjō attempts to obtain a leading role within the bakufu by eliminating challenges and rivals.

23 See, for example, Chūsei seiji shakai shisō, tsuika hō, items 70, 75. There have been a number of previous laws that prohibited monks from carrying arms. For example, a new legal system was issued by the court in 1212, which was similarly prohibitive. Earlier, in 1184, Yoritomo issued an order along these guidelines. Also, in Meigetsuki, the entry for Kangi 2 (1230)/4/27 tells about a system of prohibitions for monks who carry arms. However, it was only after the Jōkyū War that warriors became much more attentive to the subject.
For the court it was a traumatic change and a complete new reality to endure. For the newly established self-ruling warrior society it began a period of search for its sociopolitical identity. Economically powerful and politically influential religious institutions were caught in the middle between warriors and courtiers, having to espouse one side or the other, as in the case of Enryakuji and Onjōji, or remain neutral and try to satisfy both masters. For smaller temples and shrines, or clerics who chose to follow a new religious path, the rise of a warrior class meant fertile grounds where they could seek patronage and followers, and where they could escape the dominance of Kyoto and Nara institutions. The bakufu and its community of warriors provided police and judicial protection to small shrines and temples on the one hand, and often generous patronage on the other, which gradually attracted increasing numbers of monks and priests. The ensuing religious activity in the Kantō required the bakufu to issue regulations aimed at limiting and defining the activity of monks, priests and jisha.

The bakufu's continuous search for a stable and effective ruling mechanism, the elimination of the short-lived Minamoto shogunal dynasty, a lack of an effective shogun, and manipulative Hōjō politics created a sense at court that the bakufu was weak enough to be challenged. Emperor Go-Toba eventually attempted to return total rulership to the court in a failed coup
known as the Jōkyū War. While the Jōkyū War re-defined kōbu polity and boosted the Hōjō position within the bakufu, it nevertheless had little immediate implications on bakufu policy towards the religious community. Such policy, and the development of the religious community should more appropriately be seen in the context of Hōjō status within the bakufu.

The Hōjō ascent to power began during the Genpei war under the leadership of Tokimasa who, in supporting Yoritomo and marrying his daughter Masako to him, gained influence in bakufu affairs. Yet, it was not until Yasutoki's regency that the Hōjō regent established himself as the most influential political figure in the bakufu, and until Tokiyori that the Hōjō regency reached its prime. The first period, then, began with Yoritomo's leadership and continued through the process of solidification of Hōjō political control over the bakufu.

24 In the aftermath of the conflict, or "Jōkyū Settlement" as historians call it, the Hōjō-led bakufu took the unprecedented measure of determining imperial succession. It first sent to exile three ex-emperors--Go-Toba, Juntoku, and Tsuchimikado--and appointed Go-Takakura to the office of Ex-Emperor, and his son became Emperor Go-Horikawa. More substantial measures were massive confiscation of lands from Go-Toba and his supporters, the elimination of many courtiers' honke shiki and their transfer to major religious institutions; and country-wide appointments of new jito and shugo in response to a wave of lawlessness as many warriors took the opportunity of the court's defeat to make quick economic gains. These measures clearly indicate that, while the court maintained its symbolic divine authority, real power was now unquestionably in the hands of the bakufu. Yet, the bakufu supported, and in fact forced the court to form an effective judicial mechanism to handle matters in which the bakufu had no involvement. For further readings on the subject see Cameron G. Hurst, "The Kōbu Polity: Court-Bakufu Relations in Kamakura Japan," 3-28; Jeffrey Mass, chapters 1 and 2 in The Development of Kamakura Rule 1180-1250: A History With Documents (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979); and on the topic of Hōjō politics following the Jōkyū War see Paul Varley, "The Hōjō Family and Succession to Power" in Court and Bakufu in Japan: Essays in Kamakura History, 143-67.
The second period began with the appointment of Hōjō Tokiyori to the office of Kamakura regent (1246), and ended with the death of his son Tokimune in 1284. This period was marked by the establishment of autocratic rule by the tokushōke, by a significant rise in religious activity of both warriors and monks, and by an actively growing economy. The Mongol invasions that disrupted Japan in the latter part of this period are often seen by historians as a major turning point, which should therefore mark the end of the second period. But since their negative effects showed only after the death of Tokimune and the appointment of his successor, Hōjō Sadatoki, their inclusion in this period seems justified. Another reason for including them in the second period is that the Japanese victories were major military achievements that involved many warriors. These victories were the climax of Tokimune's regency, not its end. Until Tokimune's death, the negative effects of the invasions were still obscured.

25 Ishii Susumu views the death of Hōjō Tokiyori (1263) and the first contacts with the Mongols as the end of the Hōjō's "Golden Period." I, however, do not subscribe to that notion because the challenges confronted by the Hōjō did not threaten their supremacy. And in any case, even though there was a decline in their status, it does not justify identifying it as the end of a period. "The Decline of the Kamakura Bakufu," in Medieval Japan, vol. 3 of The Cambridge History of Japan, ed. Kozo Yamamura (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 128-74.

26 In 1274 and 1281 Mongol forces crossed the sea to Tsushima, continued to Hakata bay in Kyushu and attempted to invade Japan to subjugate Japanese territories. The Mongol invasions went down in history as two of the most impressive naval invasions that ended in complete failure of the invading forces. For many generations the failure of the Mongol forces to establish a permanent stronghold in Kyushu was linked to the divine nature of Japan (shinkoku). Tales of fierce winds, or typhoons, that swept the shores of Hakata and caused massive losses to the attacking armada that anchored in the bay, were embedded in Japanese culture. Over time, tales of the divine winds, or kamikaze, became an historical truism, too convenient for historians to bother looking for a different explanation for the defeat of the Mongols.
The victory of Adachi forces over Miura Yasumura marked the strengthening of what scholars commonly call *tokusō* autocracy (*tokusō sensei*). After the elimination of Miura Yasumura, Tokiyori conferred the title of Vice-Governor (*suke*) on Miura Moritoki of the Sahara branch of the Miura.27 Once the last military threat to the Hōjō was removed, Tokiyori continued to secure Hōjō control over the bakufu by replacing potential opponents in the Council of State (*hyōjōshū*), restructuring the *hyōjōshū*,

What concerned historians more than the reasons for the Mongols' inability to invade Japan was the effects these invasions had on the political arena of the late Kamakura period. In fact, the effect of the Mongol invasions on the political and economic structure has always been a favorite explanation for the decline and fall of the Kamakura bakufu. In preparation for the invasions, the bakufu needed to mobilize massive forces in Kyushu and from the Kantō to Kyushu, construct defense lines in Hakata, and manufacture enough weapons and supplies to support this defense operation that lasted for more than two decades. This explanation is not without merit since mobilization indeed took place as well as various other measures, which meant an enormous economic and political pressure on the bakufu. In addition, following the successful defeat of the Mongols, scores of claimants to compensation and rewards sent their written demands to Kamakura, requesting immediate recognition.

Moreover, heads of warrior families in the Kantō who sent forces to aid in the Kyushu, were no longer able to exercise authority over these forces led by immediate family members. In other words, the cohesion of the *sōryōsei* was greatly damaged to the extent of fracturing powerful families, thus undermining the concept of a single chieftain. "A military deployment of eastern vassals gradually became a resettlement, and ultimately a permanent colonization. Easterners were forbidden to return home and even forbidden to argue their suits in Kamakura."


27 For a fine account of the development of events before the battle see Paul Varley, "The Hōjō Family and Succession to Power," 164-167. Also, Okutomi Takayuki, *Tokiyori to Tokimune* (Tokyo: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2000), 59-71. According to Okutomi, Tokiyori selected Miura Moritoki because Moritoki was the son of Tokiyori's grandmother. In ibid., 54, 71.
and establishing the Board of Coadjutors (hikitsukeshū). The final step to take political power away from the bakufu and install it in the hands of the Hōjō was the establishment of the yoriai as a private council under the direct control of the tokusō and operating in his residence. Once these mechanisms of political administration and decision making operated under tokusō control, the Hōjō and its branches dominated Kamakura and its warrior families.

What added to the continuation of the success of the tokusō was Tokiyori's early retirement to religious life. After he failed to produce an heir with his first wife, he had a son with his second wife. However, just a few years later his first wife gave birth to a son. Tokiyori chose his second son to succeed him, but by doing so created animosity among his first son, himself and his second son. Since Tokiyori's second son was too young to take an effective role as a regent, he only held the title of tokusō with his father's supervision and support, and Hōjō Nagatoki, followed by Hōjō Masamura, held the office of the Kamakura regent. Then, when the second son,

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28 Andrew Goble, "The Hōjō and Consultative Government," in Court and Bakufu in Japan: Essays in Kamakura History, 186-8. Goble argues that the yoriai did not take over matters from the hyōjōshū, but rather worked in parallel to it. The yoriai was established in 1246 and had nine members, including Miura Yasumura. In 1247 Miura Yasumura and three other members were removed. The importance of the yoriai temporarily declined when in 1253 it had only one member from the Yano family, but was restored under the leadership of Hōjō Tokimune. For a detailed analysis and development of the yoriai see Hosokawa, Kamakura seiken tokusō sensei ron, 8-11.
Tokimune, was ready to become a regent, Tokiyori ensured that he was appointed without opposition.\(^{29}\)

Political and military stability allowed for economic growth in Kamakura and in the provinces. This economic growth benefitted greatly from the construction of new roads, or the repair and reconstruction of old ones, all of which were ordered and administered by the bakufu. Similarly, marine trade routes between the Kantō and western Japan, or direct trade routes between the Kantō and the continent, brought an influx of goods and money that were then distributed in Kamakura and in the provinces. Kamakura warriors as enthusiastic consumers of various goods, whether imported or produced locally, were the driving force behind this active economy, followed by religious institutions, as well as commoners.

The third period began with the death of Tokimune (d. 1284) and the appointment of Hōjō Sadatoki as tokusō and regent, and ended with the downfall of the bakufu.\(^{30}\) Political changes in the years following the Mongol invasions, particularly after the 1285 elimination of the Adachi, were meant to counter a deteriorating Hōjō authority by focusing administrative and political authority in the hands of Hōjō Sadatoki. While Hōjō dominance was deteriorating and attempts to regain it were underway, local warriors

\(^{29}\) Okutomi Takayuki, Tokiyori to Tokimune, 147-58.

\(^{30}\) Though it is tempting to use the period of the Mongol invasions as a turning point, its effects on the bakufu became visible only after Tokimune’s death. Kakehi Masahiko, Mōko shūrai to tokusei rei, 176-78.
further strengthened their hold on the countryside. During these final decades, mid-level religious institutions made significant progress in strengthening and securing their economic foundations and political and religious status in the countryside. Similarly, new Buddhist doctrines advanced by religious reformers before the Mongol invasions proliferated among both warriors and commoners.31

Kamakura Buddhism

The term “Kamakura Buddhism” is commonly used to refer to the state of the Buddhist world during the Kamakura period.32 It was during that time that Buddhism experienced a certain transformation that complemented political changes, resulting in heightened activity within the big institutions, while producing a number of reformer monks who either contributed to changes within the established community, or left it in order to promulgate their own world views. Understandably, modern scholarship, both Japanese

31 Although there is an agreement between Amino Yoshihiko and Gomi Fumihiko that the author of the Shinshikimoku was Adachi Yasumori, they disagree on the fundamental issue of who benefitted from this legislation. Amino argues that it was to support the shogun Minamoto no Koreyasu, while Gomi argues that it was to establish the tokusō as the ultimate authority, and in support of the fourteen years old Hōjō (Kanesawa) Sadaaki. Their disagreement focuses on their interpretation of the term “kubō.” Amino argues that it refers specifically to the shogun, while Gomi argues that it refers to the bakufu as a whole, and since the tokusō was the de facto leader of the bakufu, this set of legislation must have ultimately benefitted him alone. For a discussion on the debate between Amino Yoshihiko and Gomi Fumihiko, and for an excellent discussion of the complexity of the Shinshikimoku see Hosokawa Shigeo, Kamakura seiken tokusō senseiron, 222-64.

32 This was not always the case. Ōsumi Kazuo defines Kamakura Buddhism as "new" Buddhism. “Buddhism in the Kamakura Period,” in Medieval Japan, vol. 3 of The Cambridge History of Japan, 544.
and Western, has focused either on the reformer monks, the institutions, or a combination of both. Only in recent years have scholars of Kamakura Buddhism begun to look in more depth at developments in Kamakura Buddhism in the eastern provinces, with special interest in eastern warriors as patrons and followers. The importance of such an approach lies in the fact that Kamakura Buddhism was not a unified system of beliefs, and geographical and social distinctions constitute valid parameters in assessing it. It is therefore necessary to recognize the importance of “Kamakura Buddhism” not just in terms of a time period, but also as the characteristic of

33 James Dobbins provides a succinct review of scholarship on Kamakura Buddhism in his essay “Envisioning Kamakura Buddhism,” 25-28. Dobbins identifies Hara Katsurō’s 1911 article “Tōzai no shūkyō kalkaku” as one of the first attempts to view developments in Buddhism during the Kamakura period by comparing them to the Protestant Reformation. This essay promoted the idea that Kamakura schools were a new phenomena. Similarly, Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime brought Dōgen and Shinran to the forefront. Dobbins cites Nishida Kitarō’s study Nihon bunka no mondai and Basho teki ronri to shūkyō teki sekaikan, in Nishida Kitarō zenshil (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 11:371-464 and 12:272-383; and Tanabe Hajime’s study Shōbōgenzō no tetsugaku shikan and Zangedō to shite no tetsugaku, in Tanabe Hajime zenshil (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963), 5:443-494 and 9:1-269, as representative works of the Kyoto school’s approach to Buddhism in the Kamakura period.

Dobbins continues to identify two views of Kamakura Buddhism in Japanese scholarship. The first, represented by Ienaga Saburō, Ōno Tatsunosuke, and Inoue Mitsusada view the six Kamakura schools as a new form of popular Buddhism that was markedly different from the old Heian and Nara schools. This group, he argues, approached the issue from the perspective of religion. In contrast, Kuroda Toshio and his group of scholars examined Kamakura Buddhism from the perspective of politics, economy and society. They concluded, based on documentary evidence, that the “old” Buddhism was strong and vibrant, while the six Kamakura schools were rather marginal. Moreover, they went further to identify Eisai’s Rinzai school and Ippen’s Jishū school as actually belonging to “old” Buddhism.

Buddhism as it developed in the city of Kamakura and its surrounding provinces.

The potential for religious diversity and advancement of new doctrines existed in Kamakura. The religious world in the Kamakura area was less defined, less restricted, and more susceptible to personal preference of the local warriors than it was in and around Kyoto. Lack of major religious institutions and having been separated from the court allowed, at least in theory, for more flexibility and openness toward new ideas. Also, renegade monks and reformers who were exiled to the eastern provinces looked to promote themselves in their places of exile. Yet, Kamakura bushi showed clear preference to established tōmitsu (i.e., Shingon's esoteric doctrines) schools, and were much less interested in taimitsu schools (i.e., Tendai's esoteric doctrines). In this kind of environment, monks who promoted either Zen doctrines or single-practice Amidism were unable to form distinct institutions. Instead, those monks who tried to advance new world views and paths to salvation had to do so within the context of established institutions. Even Hōjō patronage of Eisai and his disciples, for example, was not based on preference for the sole practice of Rinzai zen.

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34 On the distinction between taimitsu and tōmitsu, see Takagi Yutaka and Komatsu Kuniaki, eds., Kamakura bukkyō no yoso (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1999).


36 Martin Cullcutt, Five Mountains, 40-41.
When new ideas were presented in a mild manner as part of a larger doctrinal package, there were warriors who were interested in becoming its patrons. Radicalism in the manner which was displayed by Nichiren was rejected until it toned down its views. The bakufu was concerned with not stirring, or preventing others from stirring the sociopolitical pot. Monks who did not belong to any established and recognized religious institution were either restricted by the bakufu, or banned all together. For example, nenbutsu monks in Kamakura were viewed by the bakufu as a threat to local stability, and thus were placed under strict regulations.\textsuperscript{37} Under such close bakufu oversight, any attempt to promote doctrines other than those accepted by the bakufu was destined to fail. And since Kamakura warriors followed the bakufu in this approach, even the provinces under these warriors' control were not as fertile religious ground as some monks had hoped. Kamakura Buddhism in the Kantō was therefore similar to that in and around the capital.

Division of Power: The Kenmon Theory

But what shall we do if we meet a solemn imperial expedition on the way, a force flying battle banners and led by His Majesty's own palanquin? ...Well put, son. A good point! It would never do to draw your bow against an imperial conveyance. If you meet any such

\textsuperscript{37} See note 23.
expedition, take off your helmet, cut your bowstring, and place yourself respectfully in His Majesty's hands.\textsuperscript{38}

Understanding the position of the bakufu and the court, and the status of temples and shrines in Kamakura and its surrounding provinces, requires us to first look at what we already know about power sharing among the Japanese social elites of courtiers, warriors and clergy. The urgent issues involved in such an examination focus on who had the authority to rule, the power to rule, and who in fact ruled Japan. The most significant work on this issue was advanced by Kuroda Toshio in his theory of the ruling power blocs (\textit{kenmon taisei}) in the Heian and Kamakura periods. According to Kuroda's theory, Japan was ruled by three social elites--court, bakufu, and powerful \textit{jisha}--who shared similar political and institutional characteristics. Each had its sphere of authority within which it exercised judicial and economic hegemony, but at the same time they were dependent on one another for stability.\textsuperscript{39}

Kuroda's theory was later revised and improved. Taira Masayuki, Kuroda's student, argued that religious institutions never could have held

\textsuperscript{38} A conversation between Hōjō Yoshitoki and his son, Yasutoki, before Yasutoki's departure from Kamakura to fight the imperial forces in the Jōkyō War. \textit{The Clear Mirror: A Chronicle of the Japanese Court During the Kamakura Period (1185-1333)}, trans. George W. Perkins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 51-52.

\textsuperscript{39} Kuroda Toshio, \textit{Nihon chūsei no kokka to shakai}; idem., \textit{jisha seiryoku: mō hitotsu no chūsei shakai}; idem., \textit{Kenmitsu taisei ron} (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1994); idem., \textit{Kenmon taisei} (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1994); idem., \textit{Kenmitsu Bukkyō to jisha seiryoku} (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1995).
the same level of authority and power as did the bakufu and court. 40 Mikael Adolphson added that Kuroda’s argument that religious institutions constituted a separate power bloc was based on a mistaken assumption that there was a certain unity among the powerful religious institutions. 41 But even after highlighting the weak points of Kuroda’s theory, applying it to Kamakura requires further review of it. First, the kenmon theory lacks geographical distinction, thus enforcing it ad hoc on all regions regardless of particular socio-demographic differences would be impossible. Second, the theory ignores powerful jisha that were outside the Heian and Nara institutions.

We should consider the kenmon theory as it applies to Kamakura in terms of power, authority, and legitimacy. In such a design, the Kyoto court always remained the ultimate source of authority, but during most of the time relied on a class of professional warriors as its arm of power. After this class of professional warriors established the Kamakura bakufu, the bakufu was potentially the ultimate military power. Both the court and the bakufu had vested interests they needed to protect, and spheres of autonomy to maintain. Not holding power and authority at the same time prevented any single elite from eliminating the other. This point has been proven by the

40 Taira Masayuki, Nihon chūsei no shakai to bukkyō (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1992); idem., “Kamakura bukkyō ron,” in Iwanami kōza, nihon tsūshi, 255-301.
failed court attempt at eliminating the bakufu in the Jōkyū War, and later in the Kenmu Restoration (1333-36). Similarly, the bakufu needed the court’s authority to provide it with the legitimacy to control warrior families that were a distinct social group of local power holders. The court, on the other hand, relied on the bakufu’s military power to protect its economic interests in the countryside, and to maintain its aristocratic lifestyle undisturbed. Having no real military power explains why the court needed the bakufu. But it is still unclear why the bakufu, considering its military supremacy, needed the court.

In answering this question we should not underestimate the power of established traditions. According to these traditions, the court was the ultimate source of authority long before the Kamakura bakufu was established. For leading Kamakura warrior families of imperial descent, who held court ranks, eliminating the court meant that they no longer considered their genealogy as a measure for determining hierarchy. In other words, warriors would have rejected the source upon which they relied to set a hierarchy within their own society. In practical terms, this would have meant that any warrior family could claim superiority based on its military

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prowess. If such was the case, the Genpei War would have taken the characteristics of the civil war as it was during the Sengoku period. But the social character of Kamakura warriors was too much of a continuation of Heian warriors' culture to let such conditions develop. In any case, since hierarchy within warrior society was based on court ranks and titles, should the leading Kamakura warriors have eliminated the court, they would have lost their justification for being superior to other warriors.43

However, we should not assume that all warrior families were under total bakufu control, nor that all warrior families shared a similar sense of loyalty toward the bakufu. Such an assumption would constitute gross oversimplification of power relationships within warrior society, between gokenin and the bakufu. The bakufu needed to avoid challenges to its authority, sometimes at the cost of compromising its own power. Consequently, the bakufu did not eliminate the court even when it seemed the natural thing to do, because the bakufu needed the court more than it feared it. The bakufu’s authority over its coalition of warriors relied on the court’s recognition of it as a governing body, to which it endowed authority to make it a politically and judicially functional force.

The geographical separation between the court and the bakufu made the keeping of the institutional balance of bakufu-power and court-authority

easier to sustain. The only mechanism that may have potentially allowed the court to exert more influence on the bakufu, and reduce its reliance on bakufu policing to protect its interests in the eastern provinces, would have been to establish an official central representation in Kamakura. That, however, never happened. On the other hand, it was the bakufu that established an office in Kyoto, the Rokuhara tandai, to which it appointed two of its leading warrior officials. Under such an arrangement, the court was in no position to threaten the bakufu, while the bakufu had established a mechanism that not only made its grip on western warriors more effective, but also served to detect and deter any opposition from the court.

Following this application of the kenmon theory to determine court-bakufu power sharing, we need to examine the status of influential jisha in Kamakura, which depended greatly on bakufu policy toward them. Unlike the Kyoto court, the Kamakura bakufu did not have difficulties in dealing with violent or rowdy monks similar to Hiei monks shaking portable shrines (mikoshi) on major intersections in Kyoto. The bakufu was much less tolerant of any social disorder, especially when it involved monks. Similarly, kanjin campaigns in which monks pressed potential patrons to contribute to temples or other projects did not really apply to Kamakura warriors.

Instead, leading warriors invited monks from Kyoto to found temples for

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44 Adolphson, "Protesting and Fighting in the name of the Kami and the Buddhas," chap. 6 in The Gates of Power.

45 Goodwin, Alms and Vagabonds, 11-14.
them.

What made Kamakura *jisha* so fundamentally different from their Kyoto and Nara counterparts was their status as land owners. While temples such as Enryakuji and Tōdaiji were at the top of the ownership hierarchy, Kamakura institutions only owned the rights to income but did not own the lands from which they benefitted. The former amassed extensive landholdings, while the latter had only what warriors and aristocrats occasionally presented them, which provided significantly less income. In other words, Kamakura *jisha* were totally dependant on the bakufu and warriors for their income—a mechanism which prevented the possibility of ever becoming economically strong enough to threaten the bakufu. The nature of the relationships between the Kamakura bakufu and warriors, and *jisha* under their patronage, always held the *jisha* in check.

*Thesis and Content*

Kantō religious institutions and their clergy became influential participants in Kamakura politics, economy, and society because the Kamakura bakufu and its coalition of powerful warrior families found them useful in the new reality that was created with the establishment of the bakufu. They provided warriors with the religiosity that was so ingrained in their lives, but also supported these warriors' connections to their lands, and their claims to status and authority by way of legitimizing divine roots. As
temples and shrines in Kamakura and in the provinces grew, they served their warrior patrons as centers of local trade and economy. Their religious, as well as mundane, activity attracted the local population, and thus provided their patrons with a mechanism of direct oversight of the local population, while creating a stronger association between the patrons and those under their control.

Chapter 2, “Kamakura: A Capital for Warriors,” explores the importance of the physical geography of the Kamakura area within the larger context of the Kantō. Choosing to establish the bakufu in Kamakura was mostly the result of geographical and demographic considerations, which, in essence, combined strategic advantages with potentially successful alliances with local warrior families. In contrast, the Izu peninsula, for example, where the Hōjō family held lands, would have been easy to isolate, thus disadvantageous in case of a well-organized military effort. The Kamakura basin, therefore, surrounded by relatively low yet impassable mountain ridges, provided an effective natural protective wall. The few paths cutting through the mountains, linking the basin with regions beyond the mountains, were narrow and easy to block when the need arose. Later, after the Kamakura bakufu achieved recognition and support from the court, thus reducing potential threats to its authority, the geographical location of the bakufu proved to be a most important asset. A system of rivers and major

46 See appendix F, fig. 5.
roads allowed the bakufu not only a quick and easy access to the Kantō, but also contributed economically to improving trade and tax collection. The Kamakura basin, then, provided the bakufu with an effective infrastructure for implementing its political and military role.

Another aspect of Kamakura geography was the layout of the city and the demographic distribution of warriors within its boundaries. The layout of Kamakura was based on that of Kyoto. There was a consideration of representation of power and authority, as well as economics and the military, in the city's layout. Temples were located on major roads to serve as markets. Other temples were located on smaller roads leading in and out of Kamakura, serving also as military posts. These temples controlled their communities, but they were ultimately controlled by the bakufu. The bakufu protected itself and constructed a city that was designed to serve as a self-sustaining natural fortress.

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the role and functions of Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji as the official shrine-temple complex of the Kamakura bakufu. In Chapter 3 I analyze the political function of Tsurugaoka as an official bakufu institution by first looking at its initial years of activity under

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47 According to Azumakagami, Yoritomo’s advisers strongly suggested Kamakura as the most appropriate place for the bakufu. It is therefore possible to interpret their advice as an attempt not to select a place that is strategically advantageous for Yoritomo, rather an area that would be easy for them to block and isolate in case Yoritomo’s actions did not go along with their interests. In other words, the geographical layout of Kamakura could have been either its making or breaking—it was easy to protect and was easy to isolate depending on one’s perspective. As events turned, Kamakura was easy to protect.
Yoritomo. The shrine and its god Hachiman were Yoritomo's divine proof of legitimacy when legitimacy was crucial for gaining recognition as a rightful heir and leader of the Minamoto clan. It was during these early years that Yoritomo set the shrine's structure of offices, its customs and practices, and its role as a bakufu institution. After Yoritomo's death, and throughout the Kamakura period, Tsurugaoka and its clergy actively served the bakufu according to bakufu needs. In order to understand how the shrine served the bakufu, and the extent of bakufu involvement in shrine affairs, the chapter offers a fairly detailed explanation of the shrine's structure. This includes an overview of the layout of its hierarchy of offices, with special attention to the office of chief administrator (bettō) as the highest authority in the shrine who was also the direct link between the bakufu and Tsurugaoka clergy.

Chapter 4 complements the previous chapter by looking at the religious and social role of Tsurugaoka shrine in supporting the religious needs of the bakufu and its Kamakura warriors through a large body of monks, priests and divination masters. Similarly, it was a place of gathering for mundane activities such as sports and entertainment in which warriors participated. The chapter contributes to our understanding of what religion and religiosity meant for Kamakura warriors by including detailed descriptions not only of religious practices and services, but also of events and experiences that caused religious anxiety. My approach in this chapter is less analytical and more descriptive, because I find the descriptions to be an excellent window into
warriors' lives, often without an urgent need for analysis, but rather an explanation. The descriptions of warriors' responses to bad omens, or their anxiety after a series of earthquakes, are vivid and engaging, thus allowing for a unique sense of participation in their experiences. It helps us understand the reasons for making Tsurugaoka shrine, and by implication other religious institutions, so influential.

 Chapters 5 and 6 investigate Kantō warriors' family temples (ujidera) in the context of the relationships between the bakufu and its control of the countryside. In chapter 5 I review the history of ujidera since their early development by court aristocrats, and continue with an examination of the development of Kamakura warriors' ujidera in the Kantō region. Since the early Kamakura period, warriors began to build family Buddha halls for the sole purpose of conducting memorial services and daily prayers. These halls were rather small structures with only a handful of monks of usually low ecclesiastical status who performed the various duties associated with such services. Though the Minamoto shoguns did construct a few ujidera, it was not until the middle of the thirteenth century that a number of provincial family warriors either expanded their Buddha halls and made them temple complexes, or constructed completely new temples. Whatever the case was, these ujidera received land commendations from both their patron family and the bakufu, had a considerable number of attending monks among whom the founding monk was of respectable stature, and performed
functions beyond their religious duties. Most noteworthy was the ujidera’s economic functions as part of the warrior family’s headquarters, and as an economic center in its locality. Having an increasingly important role in the provincial economy, and having been founded and managed by able monks, the ujidera attracted the attention of the bakufu leading them to intervene in ujidera affairs to some degree.

Chapter 6 establishes a connection between the construction of ujidera and the local economy. It presents their daily affairs as market places on major roads or near busy sea ports where products were sold and bartered. The chapter demonstrates that there was a sharp increase in the construction of ujidera after the 1240s when the Hōjō tokusôke reached the peak of its political power, and the economy was flourishing. Warriors realized the potential economic benefits of such temples for strengthening the local economy under their control. In this chapter I also provide a case study of an ujidera that became involved in a legal dispute with a Kamakura warrior. My analysis of this dispute, which continued even after the downfall of the Kamakura bakufu, illustrates the complexities of ujidera affairs, their legal standing, and the bakufu’s legal intervention in their affairs.

The case studies and examples included in these chapters are many and diverse. My purpose in presenting them is to demonstrate that religion, religious institutions, and clergy affected and were involved in every aspect of warriors’ lives, whether it was related to their beliefs, society, economy, or
even military affairs. I have added maps, charts, tables, and translations of original documents to make some of the explanations easier to understand. Maps provide excellent visual representations of locations, distances, and layouts of temple grounds and the city of Kamakura. Charts help us sift through the massive amount of information about people, namely the personnel of Tsurugaoka. And selected translations help convey the nature of relationships between warriors and clergy. Put together, these examples and case studies allow us to view the subject matter from many angles and better understand its depth and complexity.

Conclusion

The idea of shared sovereignty seems contradictory, because, by definition, sovereignty implies autonomous rulership. Yet, in the Kamakura period, the emperor shared his rulership with the bakufu. In theory, he remained the recognized sovereign, but in essence, his spheres of control were reduced, and geographically his political influence centered in the capital. The Kamakura shogun, or the Hōjō regent, exercised sovereign powers over military affairs, holding control over Kamakura warrior society. Each ruler held the other in check, though after the Jōkyū War only the Kamakura shogun and regent held military power to threaten the emperor, not vice versa. Though a unique political reality, it nonetheless remained throughout the Kamakura period.
The bakufu's sphere of authority and control included matters related to religious institutions and clergy, especially in the Kantō. In his recently published study of Buddhist relics, Brian Ruppert argues that the Kamakura bakufu established religious sites and promoted various rituals as important means to propagate its position as the ruling body of a warrior society, comparable in power to the court.48 Similarly, Sasaki Kaoru, Okuda Shinkei and other Japanese scholars have laid out aspects of the religious life of both individual warriors and the Kamakura bakufu as an official ruling authority. These studies have made clear that religious beliefs and practices were an integral part of the daily life of warriors. Furthermore, their studies indicate that warriors and the Kamakura bakufu had a complex interaction with religion, its doctrines and institutions, at various levels other than one based on religious beliefs.

Revealing the levels of interaction and the nature of the relationships between the bakufu and warriors, and religious institutions is made even more complex due to the lack of a single strong religious institution. If such a case had occurred, we would have been able to narrow the research to a single political institution--the bakufu--and a single religious institution--a temple, in a manner that resembles studies of Enryakuji, Tôdaiji, and other Kyoto and

Nara institutions. The eastern provinces, however, have never produced any such powerful institutions. Instead, the eastern provinces were marked by many locally powerful temples and shrines with enough landholdings and strong religious standing to make them important, but not beyond their immediate surrounding territory. It is therefore essential to consider a number of individual temples and shrines in any attempt to reach a meaningful conclusion pertaining to their role as religious as well as economic and social institutions.

What should have made this study easier is a bakufu without inner power struggles or outside adversaries. However, wishful thinking aside, we are not so fortunate here either. Some aspects of the Kamakura bakufu still remain an enigma. For example, bakufu offices, their bureaucracy and the manner of operation are not yet fully revealed. What is further puzzling is the make-up of bakufu officials, who they were, and why they were able to hold influential positions while coming from relatively militarily weak warrior families. In addition, considering the power of the Hōjō regent and the overall dominance of the Hōjō over the bakufu, the nature of the Kamakura bakufu and its role become even more difficult to understand.
CHAPTER 2
KAMAKURA: A CAPITAL FOR WARRIORS

Introduction

The next day I entered Kamakura and visited Gokuraku Temple. The behavior of the priests reminded me so much of Kyoto priests that I felt a touch of homesickness.

...Within the regent’s estate was a building known as the Sumidono, which was decorated much more lavishly than a palace. Inlays of gold, silver, and precious stones glistened like jeweled mirrors. It was not quite paradise, but everyone wore gowns of the finest silks and embroidered brocades, and the curtains and hangings were so dazzling in their beauty that the whole place seemed to glow.¹

Lady Nijō’s record of her visit to Kamakura provides a rare glance, if not the only one we have, into the daily world of Kamakura and a Hōjō regent through the critical eyes of an aristocrat who had already seen Kyoto’s


Towazugatari is the autobiography of Lady Nijō, daughter of Kuga Masatada who became a court concubine to former Emperor Go-Fukakusa. In 1271, at the age of fourteen, Lady Nijō entered the court, and in 1288, at the age of thirty one, she took Buddhist vows and left the court. After leaving the court, Lady Nijō embarked on a pilgrimage to holy sites that took her to the eastern provinces. She spent some time in Kamakura, visiting the residences of the shogun and Hōjō regent, and local temples and shrines.

Her diary, which covers the years from 1271 to 1306, is divided to five books. In the first three books Lady Nijō tells about her life at the Kyoto court, and in the last two books she describes her life and journeys after becoming a lay nun. Her impressions of Kamakura are unique in the sense that she compares Kamakura and its leading warriors with the Kyoto court and its nobles. Though only a fraction of her diary, this record of her visit to Kamakura provides us with some interesting, albeit few, clues to how Kamakura compared with Kyoto.
most lavish places. Kamakura warriors had built a unique city for themselves, where they were its architects, builders, and ultimate owners.

These warriors considered the capital as a model of a city for an elite society whose life-style they wished to emulate. As a result, a few decades of development produced a city worthy of being regarded as a warriors' capital. It had a shogunal palace, government offices and large warrior residences set according to principles adopted from the capital. And very appropriately, the warriors founded a large number of temples in the city, which then added a community of clergymen almost equal in size to their own warrior society.

Looking at the city, its spatial features and layout, should sharpen our perception of life in Kamakura for both warriors and the clergy.

Space and spatial layout--residential areas and roads--dictated the choice of locations and the city street plans of Nara and Kyoto. Following guidelines as elaborated in the Chinese legal codes that the Japanese adopted in the eighth century, both capitals were situated on land plains that were surrounded by mountains and crossed by rivers. In choosing the location for a capital to replace Nara, the courtiers had considered geographical separation from the influential Nara temples, as well as economic, political, and strategic advantages, such as roads, waterways, water sources, and mountains. Both Nara and Heian were aligned on a north-south axis, with the imperial palace
at the northern end and courtier residences arranged according to their occupants' court ranks--high ranks in the north, and low ranks in the south.²

The location and layout of a capital, therefore, reflected its elite's social structure, and determined the city's political, economic and military strength. Kyoto, for example, enjoyed the economic benefits of highways that connected it to both the eastern and south-western regions, water ways that allowed access to the Inland Sea, Lake Biwa and a number of rivers that supplied it with water and fish, and mountains around it that provided a sense of security. Such principles of a capital city's layout form the basis for determining the extent to which Kamakura was a planned city modeled on Kyoto. Consequently, ascertaining the characteristics of Kamakura is crucial for understanding the role of temples in the city, and ultimately their status under bakufu rule.

A common depiction of Kamakura in modern history books is that of a warriors' capital, a city built by warriors for the purpose of establishing a power base far from the imperial court. It is almost inevitable that, due to the lack of studies in Western languages of the layout and characteristics of medieval Kamakura city, we rely on what we imagine the city to have looked like. Perhaps images of the late medieval castle town, with a schematic design that placed a formidable castle at its center and samurai and towns-people's

(chōnin) residences surrounding it in a belt-like pattern, pervade such misconceptions. An image of Kamakura that even remotely resembles the late-medieval or early modern cities would be grossly inaccurate. While late medieval castle towns were established as part of a plan to remove samurai from the countryside, Kamakura was a city only for the elite and their retainers. Indeed, according to social affiliation these men were warriors, and Kamakura was their city, but just as these warriors were so much connected to the court by an invisible umbilical cord, so was their city a reflection of the imperial capital.

After Japanese scholars began to pay attention to the development of Kamakura as a city, especially its layout and city planning, there developed a scholarly debate that focused on the degree of resemblance between Kamakura and Heian. The first point of contention was whether Kamakura under Yoritomo was laid out on a north-south or an east-west axis. Scholars such as Mabuchi Kazuo and Ōmiwa Tatsuhiko support the theory that Wakamiya-ōji

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3 Late medieval castle towns were planned to have a castle as a focal point in the center, surrounded by three “belts.” Nearest to the castle lived high ranking samurai who held official positions under the daimyo. The second belt was made up of townsmen, and the third belt was lower level samurai who served as a first line of defense against a potential attacking force. Although this was the basic design of a castle town, as the population of the town grew the layout of the town tended to follow a natural growth pattern. John Whitney Hall, “The Castle Town and Japan’s Modern Urbanization,” Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, ed. John W. Hall and Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 169-188.

(avenue) was the central north-south axis from the time the city was constructed. Other scholars, namely Ishii Susumu, argue that Mutsura-dō (highway) was the central east-west axis even after Wakamiya-ōji had been constructed. The second point of dispute was the degree to which Kamakura resembled Heian. That is, scholars looked at the possibility that the bakufu attempted, even successfully enforced, a city plan that was modeled on the city layout of Heian.

Though there is still no consensus on these issues, new archeological discoveries of Kamakura period sites suggest that both scholarly issues have merits. Similarly, both have serious flaws. Only careful integration of the two approaches can provide a more accurate view of these issues.

In addition, we must look beyond the issue of major roads if we wish to determine the city layout of Kamakura and its resemblance to the capital. Looking at avenues, streets and roads provides a way to determine the overall design of the city. Looking at ditches and sewage systems, on the other hand, will show not only how much attention the bakufu gave to details, but will also help to reconstruct a Kamakura road map itself. It could provide clues about the size and distribution of the population, and location of houses.

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Finally, we must take a close look at the specific location of structures—warrior houses, the bakufu, temples and shrines—as well as the actual designs of some of those structures.

There are two sources that provide us with information: written records and archeology. Written records, though valuable, are, for the most part, limited to vague descriptions of structures and roads that record their existences rather than provide their designs. On the other hand, they indicate time lines, costs of construction, the names of people commissioned to manage certain projects, as well as the difficulties encountered during the construction, such as fire or earthquake. Written records also transmit well people's visual impressions of certain sites. In addition, it was an established practice to promulgate laws and regulations in official documents, which we can now review in order to know the kind of city regulations that the bakufu issued for Kamakura.

Complementing written records are archeological excavations. Information provided by archeological excavations tell us about distances, heights, floor plans, and building materials. Furthermore, in cases in which written records only name locations where certain structures were built, archeology may reveal their actual places. For example, we learn whether some warrior houses had their entrances towards Wakamiya-ōji or faced a back street; whether there were bridges over drainage channels, and what their sizes and locations were in relation to the surrounding structures. The
inherent problem with archeology, though, is that it cannot tell us about ideas, though sometimes it can provide clues, and it cannot inform us if there were restrictions on who could enter the city, for example. We therefore have to rely on both written records and archeology to complement one another if we are to attempt to understand what made Kamakura a warriors' capital.

Background and Development

Kamakura before the Minamoto

Kamakura existed as a village before the Heian period. It was most likely a mix of fishing, hunting and agrarian communities. A few written sources, together with archeological excavations in recent years, have shed some light on the nature of these communities. Yet, even Heian-period records only provide us with clues rather than detailed local history. The name “Kamakura,” for example, first appears in the Kojiki (712 C.E) as the name of Yamato Takeru’s son Kamakura Wake.7 Though this may have been the earliest mention of the name Kamakura, the real origins of the village’s name may have derived from that of Fujiwara no Kamatari (previously, Nakatomi no Kamako). Kamatari, who is best known for his

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7 Ishii Susumu prefers to refer to the Kojiki as the origin of the name “Kamakura,” and also mentions that the Manyōshū refers to Kamakura by the name “Azuma uta.” Although he identifies Yamato Takeru’s son as Kamakura Wake, the Kojiki mentions him as the fourth child Ashikagami-wake-no-miko. It also explains that Ashikagami was the ancestor of the wake of Kamakura. See Ishii, “Toshi toshite no kamakura,” 29.
role in the defeat of the Soga (645 C.E.) and his support of Emperor Kôtoku, took his military exploits as far as the eastern provinces. According to legends, Kamatari passed by the small coastal village and gave it the name "Kamakura."  

Linking "Kamakura" with Fujiwara no Kamatari seems to rely on local legends that Kamatari's military exploits have generated over the centuries. However, the record in the Kojiki, though considered a myth for that time period, makes it quite clear that a place called Kamakura had already existed as early as the fourth century, and perhaps even earlier. Listing the names of Yamato Takeru's six children, it identifies the fourth child as Ashikagami-wake-no-miko. The record further stipulates that the Ashikagami-wake-no-miko was "the ancestor of the wake of Kamakura." Since Yamato Takeru's first son has been identified as Emperor Chûai, who died in 362 C.E according to the Kojiki, his fourth son must have lived during that time as well.

The reason for raising the possibility that Kamakura existed before the fourth century is twofold. First, the Kojiki does not tell us the number of generations separating Ashikagami from Kamakura-wake--which could mean a few generations rather than immediate descent. Second, there is a discrepancy between the Kojiki and Nihon shoki concerning Emperor Chûai's

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8 Kawano Shinjirô identifies its origin with Fujiwara no Kamatari. See Kawano Shinjirô, Chûsei toshi kamakura: iseki ga kataru bushi no miyako (Tokyo: Kôdansha, 1995), 16.

9 Shirin sai'yoshô, 71.

death. According to the Kojiki he died in 362 C.E, while the Nihon shoki recorded his death in the year 200 C.E., which would then place Yamato Takeru and his sons in the second and third centuries, and the existence of Kamakura even before that.

By the Nara period (711-794) Kamakura had become a well established village. The inscription “Kamakura District (go), Kamakura Village (mura)” was found on a wooden tablet (mokkan) issued by a local official in 733. 11 Also, a Shōsōin document dated 735 has a record of Kamakura County (gun) and Kamakura District. 12 Ishii Susumu has pointed out that the existence of Wada zuka (previously Uneme zuka) burial site (kofun) in Kamakura is an indication of an imperial connection. He also believes that the remains of a Nara period structure found in archeological excavations at the Onari site (present day Onari Elementary School) are those of the local military headquarters or the official district office. 13 Such records and archeological findings suggest that Kamakura village had become a local center of administration and military affairs as early as the Nara period, though details of its demographic distribution and physical boundaries are unclear.

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11 This mokkan was found in recent archeological excavations at the Onari site. For a photo and explanation of the mokkan, see Ishii, "Toshi toshite no kamakura," 30.

12 Kanagawa kenshi: shiryō-hen 1 kodai chūsei, doc. 58, Tenpyō 7 (735)/intercalary 11/—, Kōekichō. This is a list of landholding in various places. It was compiled by the governor of Sagami Province and sent to the court. On the list there is one Lower Fourth Imperial Rank Takada whose holdings were in Kamakura County, Kamakura District. For commentary and full text of the document also see Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 2-10.

Kamakura and the Minamoto

It is common knowledge that during the latter half of the Heian period (794-1185) the Fujiwara family dominated court politics, while two branches of the imperial lineage—Minamoto and Taira—held military power. As warrior houses, the Minamoto and Taira were used by the Fujiwara and the imperial house to advance their political agendas in court, and protect and secure their economic interests in the provinces. In this role the two warrior houses clashed in a number of military confrontations both in the capital and in remote provinces. Consequently, when the Minamoto and Taira ventured outside the capital, they established strongholds in strategic locations in the provinces where they maintained constant vigilance.

The Minamoto hold in the eastern provinces was first established when Tsunetomo, grandson of Emperor Seiwa, received the family name Minamoto and the title Musashi no suke and Kōzuke no suke, which inaugurated his position in these provinces. Tsunetomo’s military control was later clearly established after his victory in the Tengyō Rebellion (936-41). In the 1020s, three generations after Tsunetomo, Minamoto Yorinobu expanded Minamoto power in the eastern provinces after defeating Taira Tadatsune and having been appointed as the provincial governor of Kōzuke and Hitachi. However, none of the Minamoto leaders established permanent residences in the provinces under their control. Instead, they remained in the
capital, while keeping proxies to manage daily affairs in their provincial headquarters.

It was not until the time of Minamoto Yoriyoshi, Yorinobu’s son, that the Minamoto took a significant step toward a physical separation from Kyoto. Yoriyoshi first subdued Taira Naokata and married his daughter who gave birth to Yoshiie. According to monk Yōa’s diary, Naokata deeded his residence in Kamakura to Yoriyoshi, an act that established a Minamoto base there. Then, after having been appointed as the governor of Sagami, Yoriyoshi traveled to the eastern provinces in pursuit of Abe Yoritoki, who was the appointed military commander of Mutsu province, but whom the court branded a rebel when reports of Yoritoki’s unlawful behavior reached Kyoto. Yoriyoshi, now governor of Mutsu and also its military commander instead of Yoritoki, began a campaign that lasted twelve years (though it is

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14 Shirin saiōshō, 71-72.

15 Yoritoki’s previous name was Yoriyoshi. According to Mutsuwaki, Abe Yoriyoshi changed his name to Yoritoki because Minamoto Yoriyoshi was appointed the military governor of Mutsu Province, and other warriors were not allowed to carry the same name as the governor. At that time Yoritoki attempted to gain the court’s trust, and thus changed his name in accordance with that practice. See Helen Craig McCullough, “A Tale of Mutsu,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 25 (1964-1965): 178-211. An explanation about the name change appears on p. 188.
called The Former Nine Years War) between 1050 and 1062. The military campaign resulted in Yoriyoshi and his son Yoshiie’s victory over Abe Yoritoki and his son Sadatō, and greatly contributed to increasing Minamoto fame and military power both at court and in the provinces.

Though winning the Former Nine Years War and holding office and title in the eastern provinces were sufficient proof of Minamoto military supremacy, they were not enough for Yoshiie. Realizing that rank and office alone could be temporary depending on court politics, Yoshiie sought to establish a permanent testimony to the Minamoto hold in that region. In the eighth month of 1063, just a few months after Yoshiie delivered the head of Sadatō to Kyoto, Yoriyoshi went to Iwashimizu Hachiman Shrine to express in prayer his gratitude to the god Hachiman—the protecting god of the Minamoto. At nightfall, after offering his prayers, Yoriyoshi transferred the spirit of Hachiman from Iwashimizu shrine to the newly constructed Tsurugaoka shrine in Yui district in Kamakura county. Construction of the

16 The Former Nine Years War refers to the campaign that resulted in the Abe clan’s demise in 1062. Though the campaign actually lasted twelve years, it is nevertheless referred to in official histories as having taken nine years. George Sansom defined the time period of this war to have been from 1050, when Minamoto Yoriyoshi received his commission to pursue Abe Yoritoki, until 1062, when the Abe clan was finally defeated upon the death of Abe Sadatō. The “Nine Years,” though, refer to times of actual fighting, not including three years of pause. It is my view that Sansom’s time frame is more historically accurate since, although there was a cessation of battles, the commission to pursue the Abe remained. See George Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 249-51.

17 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/12. This record recalls events that led to the first transfer of the image of the god Hachiman from Iwashimizu Hachiman to Kamakura. According to the record the transfer was done in secrecy (hisoka ni) in Köhei 6 (1063)/8/—. The secrecy, though, is most likely a reference to the common practice of transferring gods at night for fear of desecration and retribution.
shrine was perhaps the most significant step Yoriyoshi took to make Kamakura a permanent Minamoto stronghold, since it established the shrine as a divine link between the Minamoto house and the land itself. Eighteen years later Yoshiie re-affirmed this link in a symbolic act of repairs to the shrine.\textsuperscript{18}

Just a short time later, and some twenty years after The Former Nine Years War, Yoshiie received another opportunity to strengthen Minamoto control when infighting in the Kiyohara clan resulted in disturbances.\textsuperscript{19} In what is known as the Later Three Years War (1083-1087)\textsuperscript{20} Yoshiie was able to defeat the Kiyohara and prove again that the Minamoto held supreme military power in the eastern and northern provinces. George Sansom nicely describes Yoriyoshi and Yoshiie by stating that “[t]hey were jointly the heroes of a severe and protracted campaign against rebellious chieftains in northern Japan,....”\textsuperscript{21}

However, it was mostly by military exploits that the Minamoto leaders established their power base. For a more permanent hold in the region the Minamoto needed to create alliances that would secure their position and

\textsuperscript{18} AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/12.

\textsuperscript{19} For a concise description of the clash between the Minamoto and Kiyohara see, Sansom, \textit{A History of Japan to 1334}, 251-53.

\textsuperscript{20} Similar to the Early Nine Years War, the Latter Three Years War refers only to three years of fighting though the state of war lasted five years.

\textsuperscript{21} Sansom, \textit{A History of Japan to 1334}, 249.
reduce the possibility of rivalry. Such alliances were created by the marriage of Yoshiie’s grandson, Yoshitomo, to a Miura woman, who gave birth to his first son, Yoshihira. Yoshitomo’s second wife was a Hatano woman who became the mother of his second son, Tomonaga.

After forming a coalition of warriors with the military officials in Kamakura--Miura, Nakamura and Kiyohara--Yoshitomo fought Ôba who controlled the Ise shrine holdings of Ôba no Mikuriya. Yoshitomo went on to establish his primary residence in Ôgigayatsu (Ôgi valley) and another residence in Nuhama (present day Zushi city). He then continued to expand his control over local warrior families, fighting Sôma in Sôma no Mikuriya. Later, after Sagami province fell under his control, he continued to the Bôsô peninsula. Yoshitomo’s son, Yoshihira, followed in his father’s footsteps to become a daring general whose reputation and successful campaigns against his uncle Yoshikata and Chichibu Shigekata earned him the nickname Kamakura no akugenta (“bad young man of Kamakura”). At any rate, it is clear that by that time the Minamoto had successfully formed a permanent base in Kamakura and neighboring provinces. It was the kind of connection that would prove most valuable even after the Minamoto’s temporary fall from power and Court grace after they were defeated by Taira Kiyomori in the Heiji Disturbance (1159).
Periods of Development

When Minamoto Yoritomo first entered Kamakura in 1180, he saw a village of mixed communities spread on wide flat area -- the Kamakura plain - and on hills and in valleys enclosing that plain. Due to the uneven terrain and unorganized spread of communities along the coast, in valleys and on surrounding hills, there were no clear boundaries and borders defining the village’s territory. Instead, nature and geography defined where people lived, where and how they traveled, and even where they buried their dead. Impassable mountains and valleys in three directions and an ocean in the fourth constituted a physical barrier that created imagined, rather than marked, borders. But the inhabitants within these natural boundaries were not compelled to follow any rules or regulations that limited or allowed them to conduct their daily lives in this area or another. With a relatively small population for a large area, residences looked like incidental drops of paint on canvas. 22

Within the next four decades Kamakura became a developed urban center with a population rivaling only that of the capital. Communities were

22 Mabuchi argues that by the early twelfth-century Kamakura village had defined boundaries. Yamamura, on the other hand, argues that the population of the village was not organized in any specific area, but was concentrated along the Mutsura and another road leading to the east.

There is no disagreement that Mutsura road was the preferred living area, especially for warrior families such as the Nikaidō and Sugimoto. However, Yamamura ignores the fishing and agrarian communities that lived by the coast line or on the Kamakura plain. Similarly, Mabuchi ignores the lack of central authority that actually sets borders and protects them—features that did not exist until the establishment of the bakufu in Kamakura. See Yamamura Aki, “Chūsei kamakura no toshi kūkan kōzō,” Shirin 80, no. 2 (1997): 42-82; and Mabuchi, “Bushi no miyako kamakura: sono seiritsu to kōsō o megutte,” 15-71.
clearly defined by their social affiliations, economic and political statuses.

Avenues and streets were constructed and named, together with a sewage and drainage system of open channels that provided some measures of sanitation. Then, by the latter half of the Kamakura period, life in Kamakura came under written and enforced city regulations. During that time Kamakura's population continued to grow. The city had clear and well defined boundaries, a constant flow of people into and out of the city, a busy economic center, an active sea port, and lively communities.23

Kamakura was a city that was born in the 1180s and steadily developed during the following century and a half. Its development, though, was not incidental, nor was it entirely natural. The development of Kamakura from a local village to the largest concentration of population in the east was the result of political changes, military challenges, economic achievements, religious diversification, and the maturation of a legal system put in place by the Kamakura bakufu. We can see four stages in Kamakura's development:

1) 1180-1225, Kamakura under Minamoto leadership, and the Ôkura bakufu as the first seat of warrior government, 2) 1225-1247, Utsunomiya bakufu under

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23 The issue of city boundaries, or marked borders, continues to elude scholars since there is no bakufu documentation that identifies Kamakura's borders. Perhaps the best indication of a guarded entrance to the city is Ippen's arrival at Kobukuro pass where he confronted the Kamakura regent, Hōjō Tokimune. In Ippen hijiri-e (Ippen Hijiri Picture Scroll) Ippen stands with his followers next to a wooden fence in Kobukuro Pass. On the outer side of the gate there is the road and forest, but on the inner side there are a number of structures on both sides of the road, and a ditch with a few small bridges runs along the road. The structures include guards house, shops, and commoners' houses. The existence of a ditch and more structures in the background indicate that what we see is the end section of a larger residential area on the outskirts of the city. Ippen hijiri-e, pls. 91,92. For commentary on this scene, see, Ishii Susumu, Chūsei no katachi (Tokyo: Chûōkōron Shinsha, 2002), 132-7.
control of Hōjō regents, until the Hōji War between the Hōjō and Miura forces, 3) 1247-1284, from the Hōji War, through the Mongol invasions, until Hōjō Tokimune’s death, 4) 1284-1333 post-Mongol invasions period, from Tokimune’s death until the fall of the bakufu.

Kamakura City Layout

_Bakufu Offices and Warrior Residences_

From the early 1180s until the fall of the Kamakura bakufu, bakufu offices were the center of an administrative apparatus of political power. This central administration changed its location twice during the Kamakura period, each time re-shaping the distribution of warrior residential areas within the city.²⁴

In the twelfth month of 1180 Yoritomo decided on a location for his own residence and appointed Ōba Kageyoshi to supervise the construction.²⁵ His preferred location was along Mutsura-dō (road) on the north-eastern side of the Kamakura plain just east of the intersection where Komachi-dōji (avenue) met Mutsura-dō. Immediately east of Ôkura was Shirahata valley, to the north were mountains, and to the east on Mutsura-dō lived prominent warrior families, namely Nikaidō and Sugimoto, thus providing Yoritomo

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²⁴ See appendix F, fig. 6.
²⁵ _AK_, Jishō 4 (1180)/12/12.
with a strategically secured location. In this location Yoritomo also established his military headquarters starting with the Board of Samurai office (samuraidokoro). At this early stage of the bakufu, Kajiwara Kagetoki had a villa (bessō) on Mutsura-dō more than one kilometer east of Ôkura. Similarly, the Sugimoto family held an important strategic location on which they constructed a fortress that overlooked Mutsura-dō, some 300m east of Shirahata valley.

It is likely that Yoritomo considered the Sugimoto an immediate defense line that could block an attacking force advancing from the direction of Mutsura estate in the east. Although other warrior residences included those of Wada Yoshimori, who was Yoritomo’s first appointee to head the Board of Samurai, Satake Yoshimitsu and Hideyoshi, whom Yoritomo attacked and defeated, and Minamoto Yoshitomo and Kanemichi’s old residences, they were at a considerable distance from Yoritomo’s Ôkura bakufu.

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26 Bessō should more appropriately represent a second residence vis-a-vis the main residence or headquarters.

27 Shinpen kamakurashi, 45.

28 Genpei seisuiki.


30 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/27.

31 Reference to the remains of Minamoto Yoshitomo’s residence is made in AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/7. Kanemichi’s residence is mentioned in AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/9.
In the tenth month of 1184 Yoritomo added the Bureau of Investigation (monchūjo) and Bureau of Documents (kumonjo) to the offices within the Ôkura bakufu. Then, in 1192, he opened a Central Administration Office (mandokoro) in Ôkura. That year Yoritomo transferred the Monchūjo and Kumonjo to the residence of Director (shitsuji) Miyoshi Yoshinobu, thus marking the first separation of bakufu offices.

During these years only a handful of warriors who held administrative positions in the bakufu established residence immediately adjacent to the bakufu. Fujitsugi Yasuhira built his residence by the West Gate, Yata Chikaie’s house was located by the South Gate, and near the East Gate were the residences of Hiki Shirō and Hatakeyama Shigetada. It is interesting to note that, other than these warriors, no other warrior had his residence in Ôkura. Instead, they were spread over valleys and passes, along the coast and, of course, on the Kamakura plain.

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32 AK, Genryaku 1 (1184)/10/12.
33 AK, Kenkyū 10 (1199)/4/1.
34 According to Yamamura Aki it was Fujiwara Yasuhira. Yamamura, "Chūsei kamakura no toshi kukan kōzō," 47.
35 AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/1/13.
36 AK, Bunji 1 (1185)/9/1. According to Kamakura shishi it was possibly Munesada. However, Yamamura identified him as Norisada. See Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 305; and Yamamura, "Chūsei kamakura no toshi kukan kōzō," 47.
37 AK, Shōji 1 (1199)/5/7.
Between 1180 and Yoritomo’s death (1199) a number of powerful warriors established their residences along Mutsura-dō, while others chose strategic locations within Kamakura but farther from the bakufu. Ōe Hiromoto’s lodge (shukusho) was in the vicinity of the bakufu, while his main residence was at Jūnisho, and the Nikaidō family headquarters was in Nikaidō.\textsuperscript{38} Especially interesting was the concentration of some of the most powerful warrior houses, including Hōjō Yoshitoki, Ōuchi Koreyoshi, Murakami Motokuni, Hiki Norisada, Hiki Tomomune, Sasaki Saburō Naritsuna, Kudō Kojirō Yukimitsu, Nitta Shirō Tadatsune, and Sanuki Hirotsuna, in Komachi along Komachi-ōji. It was certainly the first concentration of warriors in what later became the center of Kamakura. Similarly, other powerful warriors established their primary residences in the outer periphery of the city. Most notable among these warriors were the Nagoe in the area of Nagoe pass,\textsuperscript{39} the Hiki in Hiki valley (Hikigayatsu),\textsuperscript{40} and the Adachi in Amanawa.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, a number of warriors established their residences in Maehama in the southern area of the city along the coast. In total, there were more than forty housemen (goKenin) residences in Kamakura by the time of Yoritomo’s death.

\textsuperscript{38} AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/4/14, Kenkyū 3 (1192)/9/24.
\textsuperscript{39} AK, Kenkyū 3 (1192)/7/18, 7/24, 10/19.
\textsuperscript{40} AK, Jūei 1 (1182)/7/12.
\textsuperscript{41} AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/12/20.

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The post-Yoritomo period of the Ōkura bakufu was a time of demographic transition of warrior residences from Mutsura-dō and the valleys adjacent to it to a concentration of them in Ōkura and the northern area of the Kamakura plain. In Ōkura, Hōjō Masako moved into the new East Residence (higashi gosho), after which she had Midō Residence built for her in that area. A few years later the bakufu built two new residences for the young shogun Fujiwara Yoritsune, who arrived from Kyoto. Adjacent to the shogun’s residential complex was Hōjō Yoshitoki’s residence, which he later deeded to Yasutoki after moving into Yoritomo’s old residence. In the meantime, Hōjō Tokifusa, Fujiwara Sanemasa, Ōe Hiromoto, Yata Tomoshige, Nikaidō Yukimura, Minamoto Nakaaki and other prominent warriors built lodges in Ōkura near the shogunal residence. At that time, Ōkura had become by far the most populated area, but what is more important is that it reflected a growing awareness of the organization of warriors in the city.

In 1225 the regent Hōjō Yoshitoki moved the bakufu to Utsunomiya-zushi (street), and located the bakufu between Jushi-zushi in the north and Utsunomiya-zushi in the south, and between Wakamiya-ōji and Komachi-

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42 AK, Kenpō 1 (1213)/5/4, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/3/9, Shōkyū 3 (1221)/5/19.
43 AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/7/19, 12/24.
44 AK, Shōji 2 (1200)/5/25, Shōkyū 3 (1221)/11/3.
45 AK, Kenpō 1 (1213)/12/1, Kenpō 5 (1217)/1/11, 3/10, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/1/15, 10/20.
On the twentieth day of the twelfth month, a formal procession of warriors led the shogun Yoritsune to his new residence. The Utsunomiya bakufu was in fact a complex of structures at the center of which, at least symbolically, was the Shogunal Residence (gosho). In reality there were bakufu offices constructed in that same space. In addition, from that time on the Hōjō regents had an official residence next to the bakufu—either immediately south of the bakufu or across Wakamiya-ōji. The shogun, bakufu and regent residences were now on both sides of Wakamiya-ōji, only a block south of Yoko-ōji, separating them from the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine. As a result, the surrounding areas filled up with gokenin and retainer residences even though there was no massive flow into the center of Kamakura. Yet, some gokenin still kept their existing residences, or established new residences on the outskirts of the city in Nagoe, for example. Nevertheless, this was undoubtedly the most important stage in setting the layout of the city and warrior houses in it until the next move of the bakufu to Wakamiya intersection.

In terms of city layout, moving the bakufu offices to Wakamiya was hardly as significant as the previous move to Utsunomiya, but it nevertheless placed the bakufu in a symbolic location immediately south of the

\[46\] AK, Karoku 1 (1225)/10/3. This date refers to when Yoshitoki selected the location for the bakufu. On the following day he visited the same location with a few attendants for taking measurements. Then, on Karoku 1(1225)/11/7 began the construction of the wooden parts of the structure.

\[47\] AK, Karoku 1 (1225)/12/20. See also appendix F, fig. 7.
Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine. Perhaps more than the new location it was the victory of Hōjō Tokiyori over the Miura in the Hōji War of 1247 that prompted warriors to line up their residences near the bakufu, which was now part of the regent’s residence. In the 1250s, Ōe, Adachi, Nikaidō and Nitta, among other high ranking gokenin, occupied the residential area of Utsunomiya. Other warriors, especially those who held provincial offices, built lodges along Wakamiya-ōji. In total, some thirty residences were added to the center of Kamakura on both sides of Wakamiya-ōji after the establishment of Wakamiya bakufu. Consequently, the area between Yoko-ōji, Kuruma-ōji, Komachi-ōji and Ima-ōji was almost completely occupied by warriors.48

Yet, not all warriors chose, or were required, to live in the center of Kamakura. A prime example were the two Hōjō branches, Nagoe and Gokurakuji, who had their primary residences in important strategic locations that controlled the entrance to the city. Many other warriors chose to live in Maehama along the coast, in Kame and Iwaya valleys, or in the mountains surrounding Kamakura. In these locations, where there was less concentration of warriors, the enforcement of city street and construction regulations was lax. Also, division between warrior and commoner residential areas was not as apparent as it was at the center of Kamakura. Therefore, warrior residences located away from the center were larger in size,

48 For the locations of the bakufu and warrior residences see appendix F, fig. 6.
and their lots were not restricted by vicinity to other warrior houses. But what did an average warrior residence look like? And, is it possible at all to determine a typical one?

Archeological excavations along Wakamiya-ōji and in Onari Elementary School (hereafter, Onari site) exposed a number of warrior houses (buke yashiki), and allowed scholars to collect valuable information concerning the identity of the residents, the life styles of their occupants, and the types and designs of the structures. This information was the basis for a mapping of Kamakura in a way that displayed the demographic distribution of warriors to such an extent that we can now describe the physical distribution of political and military power within the limited space of the city.

The warrior residence excavated at the Onari site is especially informative because of the well-preserved remains of the structure and artifacts found in it. The residence comprised at least two structures, one of which was identified as an inner structure. Based on the layout of its foundation stones, the size of the inner structure seems to have been nine meters from east to west, and a little over seven meters from north to south, though the actual structure may have slightly exceeded these measurements.
Inside the inner structure archaeologists found high quality ceramics, which suggest that the kitchen was located there. 49

A wooden fence surrounded the structures, marking the borders of the lot while creating a barrier for the purpose of protecting the house from infiltrators. In the southern section of the lot there was a gate supported by foundation stones and a low stone wall. 50 The size and shape of the wooden fence and the gate are unknown, though the size of the stone foundation of the gate suggests that it was moderate in size but still heavy enough to require a strong foundation. 51

Adjacent to the gate there was an east-west road approximately five meters wide that was paved sometime during the middle of the Kamakura period. What is unusual about the road is the existing tracks of carts, horses and people, created by constant traffic. At the side of the road, just a few

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50 Kawano calls this a “hidden wall (mekakushi hei) because it did not serve any visual purpose and was not part of the gate itself, yet it was an important feature of it. See Kawano Shinjirō, “Buke yashiki to machiya: chūsei toshi kamakura no tenkai,” in Chūsei toshi kamakura o haru, ed. Kamakura Kōkogaku Kenkyūjo (Tokyo: Nihon Editors School, 1994), 65.

51 For excellent visual depictions of two types of fences, or outer wooden walls, see Ippei hijiri e, pl. 7; Hōnen shōnin eden, color pl. 1; and Obusuma saburō emaki, 4-5. In the first two depictions, the fence is made of bamboos tied together to form a wall. It seems that this kind of bamboo wall could not have provided a real defense against attackers. The third depiction, however, shows a thick wall made of massive wooden boards. Obusuma Saburō, who lived in Musashi province, but outside the city of Kamakura, constructed a formidable defense around his residence. Perhaps the best depiction of a thick perimeter-wall in Kamakura is found in Mōko shūrai ekotoba, section 9, of the shogun’s residence. For a discussion on this residence see Matsuo, Chūsei toshi kamakura no fūkei.
meters away, were found the skeletal remains of a horse whose corpse was left to decompose were it fell and died. It appears that this was a local service road that connected to Mutsura-đô.

One of the most well preserved features of the residence was a water well embedded in a stone basin. The hexagonal shape of the well was somewhat unusual, and its purpose not quite clear. Many burnt ceramics were found in the well in what seems to have been an attempt to extinguish fire. The remains found in the well have led Kawano Shinjirô to conclude that the well was a source of water for daily life, as well as for extinguishing fires in the residence. In addition to the well there was an open pipe system (yarimizu) that delivered water to any part of the residence that required it. Unlike the drainage ditches located outside the residence, the pipe system was smaller and was constructed along the structures.

It is clear that the structures found at the Onari site did not belong to one compound. In one section there was a Nara-period structure, which may have been the provincial military headquarters. Other structures were part of the Ókura bakufu, or a private gokenin residence such as the one I discussed earlier. A comparison of these structures to one another, together with information found mostly in the Azumakagami, confirms that warrior residences differed dramatically according to their owner’s economic and military status.
Highways (dô), Avenues (ōji, kôji), and Streets (zushi)

Early studies of Kamakura roads by Ōmiwa Tatsuhiko and Ishii Susumu suggest that Kamakura had a grid-like road plan, while other studies by Takahashi Yasuo and Ashikaga Kenryô stipulate that zushi simply connected houses and developed with the fast pace of the city. In other words, zushi were opened when and where they were necessary, but were not pre-planned. 52 Yamamura Aki too suggests that for the most part Kamakura roads were developed out of necessity rather than out of a calculated vision of how the city should look. He further argues that there is no archeological evidence showing roads and ditches that will support Ōmiwa’s view. 53 It seems that for Yamamura, Ashikaga and Takahashi, the lack of a blueprint proves that roads did not exist. However, when one looks at a wide range of sources, including written documents and recent archeological excavations, it becomes apparent that roads at the center of Kamakura were carefully contrived. 54


53 Yamamura, “Chûsei kamakura no toshi kûkan kôzô,” 74-75.

54 For a map of ōji and kôji in the center of Kamakura see appendix F, fig. 7.
Three avenues (ōji) partitioned the center of Kamakura from north to south, dividing it into two strips. At the center was Wakamiya-ōji, which led from Zaimokuza coast in Yuigahama to the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex in a straight line. One block east of Wakamiya-ōji was Komachi-ōji, which was not nearly as straight as Wakamiya-ōji, making a distinct curve away to the north-east once it reached the eastern side of Tsurugaoka shrine. It is difficult to see an intersection with Mutsura-dō, but it is clear that the Komachi road connected to it. West of Wakamiya-ōji was Ima-ōji, which, like Wakamiya-ōji, began in Yuigahama and continued almost perfectly parallel to Wakamiya-ōji. Crossing these avenues from east to west was Yoko-ōji, located immediately south of Tsurugaoka Shrine in a way that marked the shrine’s southern perimeter. Kuruma-ōji was the main avenue at the southern part of the center of Kamakura, and Machi-ōji (or Ōmachi-ōji) was located between the two. These avenues were the principal veins at the center of Kamakura. They marked the center and defined its

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55 Ishii Susumu points out that the term "ōji (large road)" appears only in the Azumakagami, which was edited by the bakufu. Other sources use the term "komichi (small road)" to refer to the same Kamakura roads. See Ishii Susumu, "Ōji, kōji, zushi, tsuji," in Bushi no miyako kamakura, 70-71.
perimeters, separated neighborhoods within the center, and functioned as the basis for the city center layout.\textsuperscript{56}

All the main avenues with the exception of Wakamiya-ōji existed before the Kamakura period, as early as the middle of the Heian period. For example, as the famous Tōkaidō highway entered Kamakura at Inamuragasaki, it split into two roads that led to Inamuragasaki and Gokurakujizaka. Once reaching into the Kamakura plain it changed direction to the north. From that point Inamuragasaki road became Ima-ōji. In the Heian period Ima-ōji was the main connection between the Tōkaidō and Mutsura highways. As such, it served officials in their visits to the provincial administrative offices in Kamakura.\textsuperscript{57} The major additions to the city's roads that took place in the Kamakura period, then, were Wakamiya-ōji and a number of east-west avenues and streets.

Among Kamakura's avenues and streets, Wakamiya-ōji was arguably the most important feature in defining the layout of the city. Originally, Wakamiya-ōji was Yoritomo's Dankazura road, which he built as a sacred worshipers' road in conjunction with the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-

\textsuperscript{56} None of the pre-Kamakura period avenues and roads followed a straight line design. Moreover, the bakufu did not attempt to "straighten" these roads even when it already paved new ones. Ōmiwa Tatsuhiko stipulates that the reason for keeping the curved roads in Kamakura was the military nature of the city. According to Ōmiwa, curved roads made it more difficult for attacking forces to advance towards the center of the city where the bakufu was located. Ōmiwa Tatsuhiko, "Kamakura no toshi keikaku: seiji toshi toshite, gunji toshi toshite," in Bushi no miyako kamakura, 44-51.

\textsuperscript{57} Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 292-5. Ima-ōji was also called Ima-kōji in some records, but in the Azumakagami it only appears as ōji.
temple complex. The meaning of the name “Dankazura” is elevated road on which stones are pressed together to create a pavement. Edo-period records such as Shinpen kamakura shi (1685) and Kamakura kikō (1691) mention “dankazura” together with “okimichi” as elevated paved roads. In Shōyūki there is a similar mentioning of “okimichi” in reference to an elevated road in the capital. Also, in Fujiwara Tadazane’s Denreki, there is another early reference to such a road. In a later record, Kojidan, Minamoto Akikane’s record of life in the imperial court, refers to the road connecting the Daidairi, Yōmeimon and Taikenmon as “okimichi.” These records suggest that it was used in the capital long before Yoritomo constructed his Dankazura, and continued to be used during the Kamakura period.

In Gumaiki there is an indication that the purpose of “okimichi” was for people to show respect and decorum when approaching a place of importance. In other records, such as Heike monogatari, there is reference to “tsukuri michi” that was approximately ten chō (1 chō=109m) long and was

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58 The Azumakagami recorded the construction of the Dankazura in connection to Masako’s pregnancy. Yoritomo sought to create an easy access to the shrine for Masako. See AK, Jūei 1 (1182)/3/15. However, this explanation is not satisfactory. For an alternative explanation refer to Chapter 3.

59 Shōyūki, Chōwa 4 (1015)/4/19.

60 Denreki, Tennin 2 (1108)/5/15.

61 Kojidan, Kenpō 3 (1215).

62 Gumaiki, Sanjō Nakayama kuden.
similar to okimichi.\footnote{Heike monogatari, vol. 8, Seiitai shôgun insen.} As for "dankazura," it was already mentioned in the Kamakura period in \textit{Nakatomi Suksesada ki} as an elevated road that was supported by stone walls and was paved with stones.\footnote{Kasugasha kiroku, Kanki 4 (1232)/intercalary 9/13, \textit{Nakatomi suksesada ki}.} What we can conclude from these records is that "dankazura" and "okimichi" refer to a similar type of elevated road. The roads were associated with both the high aristocracy and sacred places, such as the imperial palace. Thus, "okimichi" was Yoritomo's model for his Dankazura in Kamakura.

Wakamiya-ōji, which developed in conjunction with the construction of the \textit{dankazura}, was not central to the Kamakura city layout for a while after its completion. During Yoritomo's rule, and to a lesser extent until 1225, the avenue served mostly as an access road to the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex.\footnote{Yamamura argues that Mabuchi's view of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex and Wakamiya-ōji as a replica of Kyoto is wrong because they did not exist before Yoritomo, and became the center of Kamakura only much later in the period. Also, there was no baseline such as Suzaku-ōji in Kyoto, and that Yoritomo did not try to enforce a city plan in which Wakamiya-ōji became the center, even if it did later. According to Yamamura, Wakamiya-ōji was nothing but a road leading to the complex. Moreover, the fact that Wakamiya-ōji was elevated, and that ditches were alongside and also split east and west, thus allowing for purification water to be wasted away, is another indication of the limited function of the road. Yamamura concludes that during Yoritomo's years Mutsura-dō was the main road leading to Tsurugaoka Hachiman. See, Yamamura, "Chûsei kamakura toshi no kûkan kôzô," 71-73.} The \textit{Azumakagami} informs us of formal shogunal processions in which hundreds of warriors, courtiers, clergymen and officials
lined up along the road before proceeding to Tsurugaoka.\footnote{AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/6/9, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/2/4. These records reflect the scale of Yoritomo's processions (gyôretsu). There are too many such processions recorded in the Azumakagami to mention here. Suffice it to say that the large number of participants, with their escorting retainers and horses, must have created quite a colorful site on Wakamiya-ôji (i.e., Dankazura).} This indicates that Wakamiya was long and wide, but the lack of residential areas along it suggests that its purpose was rather limited. It was only after Yoritomo's death that Wakamiya-ôji became increasingly more important for normal city life with regular human traffic.

Wakamiya-ôji was comparable in size to the larger roads in the capital, and has even been compared by a number of scholars to Suzaku-ôji.\footnote{See, for example, Kawano Shinjirô, Chûsei toshi kamakura: iseki ga kataru bushi no miyako (Tokyo: Kôdansha, 1995), 22-3.} The width of Wakamiya-ôji has been determined by measurements taken between the center of the ditches that were part of a sewage system along both sides of the avenue. Another measurement was taken between the walls of the ditches closest to Wakamiya-ôji. These measurements have produced an average width of 36.6 meters between two centers, and 33.6 meters between walls. This means that, given some distance between the ditches and the road itself, Wakamiya-ôji was some 30 meters wide with ditches that were 2-3 meters wide.\footnote{Ibid., 22.} The total length of Wakamiya-ôji is easier to determine because it has remained in the same location and shape until present day, totalling 1.8 kilometers. More importantly, the distance between Yoko-ôji and...
Machi-ōji was nearly 1000 meters. These measurements clearly set Wakamiya-ōji as the largest avenue in the center of Kamakura. But while scholars are still sharply divided on the similarities between Kamakura and Kyoto, at least there is a consensus concerning the width and length of Wakamiya-ōji.

Once the center of political power had shifted from Ōkura to Wakamiya, it gradually became the central divider of the most densely populated warriors residential area. As such, Wakamiya-ōji was no longer used exclusively for worshipers, but rather became an all purpose road. The ditches along the road, which were originally constructed for draining purification water used by worshipers, were now used to drain “dirty” sewage from warrior houses. Moreover, archeologist have found human and animal waste, animal corpses, garbage and dirt in these ditches.

The gates of warrior houses on both sides of Wakamiya-ōji did not face the avenue with the likely exception of the Regent and bakufu houses, and a few wooden bridges that allowed crossing over the ditches. Instead, the gates faced Komachi-ōji, Ima-ōji, or the small streets (zushi). Zushi were narrow local streets that connected Ima-ōji and Komachi-ōji with Wakamiya-ōji. The model for the Kamakura zushi was the city streets/roads system (hosei) in Kyoto, where the concept of zushi was

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69 Yamamura, "Chūsei kamakura no toshi kukan kōzō," 72.
70 Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura: iseki ga kataru bushi no miyako, 30.
implemented on the basis of the Chinese style. Following this style, zushi served as access roads between houses in the same block, or connected to main roads such as the avenues. In principle, zushi in Kamakura were relatively short and were symmetrically aligned parallel to one another on east-west axes. However, controversy over their location, or even historical existence, in Kamakura leaves the issue unresolved.

The controversy over the issue of zushi has been ongoing among scholars who rely mostly on written records, and archaeologists who depend on whatever they can unearth. Looking at written records, namely the Azumakagami, we see explicit reference to six such roads at the center of Kamakura between Yoko-ôji and Machi-ôji. In 1225 the bakufu moved to a new location in Utsunomiya zushi. Then, in 1227 there was a fire that spread from Wakamiya-ôji to Dengaku zushi. Later, in 1263, a fire broke out in Jushi zushi and spread through Wakamiya-ôji to Daigaku zushi. The Hôjô kudaikei tells about another major fire that broke out in Yanagi zushi and

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71 According to this system one house was one mon, eight mon made one gyô, four gyô made one cho, four cho made one ho, and four ho made one bo. In other words, the system divided the city to main city blocks, then further divided them to smaller units. This was also called yôbsei. For a discussion of the ho system in Kamakura, see Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 198-228.

72 AK, Karoku 1(1225)/10/3, Antei 1(1227)/1/2, Kôchô 3(1263)/12/10, Kôchô 3(1263)/12/10. The Azumakagami uses the Chinese character "tsuji" without "shi" but Kamakura shishi argues that it refers to zushi because in Tsurugaoka Hachimangû gosengûki the character for "tsuji" alone is used for zushi. Similarly reference to zushi in the Hôjô kudaikei uses a different character for "zu". A comparison of the record with that of Tsurugaoka hachiman sengûki confirms that it refers to zushi.
burnt most of the halls on the Tsurugaoka Hachiman grounds. Finally, records of Fujishima Shrine—a Nitta family shrine—confirm that Karagasa zushi was in the same location as the other zushi. Further analysis of the details that these records provide even allowed scholars to re-construct the location of each zushi in relation to one another.

However, archaeologists have doubts about whether the information given in written records can actually provide an accurate assessment of the historicity of these zushi. Archeological excavations, they say, have exposed only a small fraction of what might have been zushi—which is certainly not enough to make a definite conclusion about these streets viable. Tezuka Naoki claims that ditches excavated in areas where written records point to the location of zushi support the existence of some of these streets. He further stipulates that there is no proof of the existence of ditches south of the second torii on Wakamiya-ōji. Tezuka argues that the excavation near the second torii gate, which revealed wooden walls for some sort of a channel, was that of Ōgigayatsu river. The wooden structure was constructed to control the intersection of Ōgigayatsu and Sasuke rivers. Tezuka concludes that Wakamiya-ōji led as far as the second torii only, and that it is certain there

73 Hōjō Kūdaiki, Kōan 3 (1280)/11/12.

74 Fujishima jinja shōzō monjo, −/9/11, cited in Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 300. Since the document refers to Go-Daigo and Yuki Munehiro (~1338), it was probably written at the end of the Kamakura period.

75 Tezuka Naoki, "Chūsei toshi kamakura no seiritsu," in Kamakura o haru, 44-45.
were no *zushi* south of that area.\textsuperscript{76} Kawano and Yamamura are even more skeptical about *zushi*, arguing that the very concept of a city plan with grid-like streets cannot be proved—at least not on the basis of current archeological evidence.\textsuperscript{77}

By their own admission, archaeologists cannot search for *zushi*, or many other historical sites, because they are covered by modern construction. Instead, they rely on what cannot be unearthed to prove the non-existence of what has been recorded in writing. In this case, we, as historians, should focus on written records, which testify to the existence, location and direction of *zushi*. In fact, some archeological sites did confirm wide ditches where *zushi* were supposed to have been located, which further supports the historians' view of the existence of *zushi*.

Furthermore, since *zushi* were part of a larger city plan, a confirmation of this plan will support the existence of *zushi*. As mentioned earlier, the concept of *zushi* was taken from the *hosei* street system in Kyoto. In 1240, the bakufu set the *ho* system in Kamakura and appointed a magistrate (*ho-bugyō*) to supervise it.\textsuperscript{78} In the *Azumakagami* record of the *ho* system there is an explicit explanation of the basic duties of the Magistrate of City Regulations (*hoho-bugyōnin*). His duties included supervision of streets and

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 46, 57.

\textsuperscript{77} Kawano, *Chûsei toshi kamakura*, 20-21; Yamamura, "Chûsei kamakura no toshi kûkan kôzô," 77-82.

\textsuperscript{78} AK, Ninji 1(1240)/2/2.
intersections as well as people in a manner similar to police.\textsuperscript{79} Also in a copy of Tsunetoki \textit{migi\=osh\=o} that appears in the \textit{Azumakagami}, there is further explanation concerning \textit{hosei} and the duties of the magistrates. The document appointed the former governor of Sado, Gotô Mototsuna, to the office of the magistrate, and specified five restrictions concerning roads and house construction.\textsuperscript{80} We also learn from \textit{Buke meimokush\=o} that the city magistrate (\textit{bugyônin}) was selected from among \textit{mandokoro} officials.\textsuperscript{81} In sum, these records confirm that the Kamakura bakufu followed the \textit{hosei} system of city regulation and supervision that existed in the capital.

\textit{Population}

Ishii Susumu has estimated the size of the population of monks in Kamakura temples by looking at the records of the Gozan temples. According to these records, Kenchôji had 388 monks, Engakuji had 350 monks, Jûfukuji had 260 monks, and Jôchiji had 224 monks. He then estimated the number of monks in 38 other temples at 2000. In addition to monks there were people affiliated with temples whose number Ishii determined to be a multiplication factor of 1.7 of the number of monks. He then calculated the total number of Zenshû monks and their affiliates at 5,400 people, and the Zenritsu

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{AK}, Kangen 3 (1245)/4/22.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Buke meimokusho}, vol. 1, 174-85.
population at 10,000 people, totaling approximately 15,000 people in Kamakura temples. This figure was accepted by Kawano Shinjirō, who explained that it was impossible to estimate temples’ population because archeology does not provide any clues.83

Kawano Shinjirō extrapolated the number of warriors and commoners from archeological evidence. Kawano first divided the population in Kamakura into monks, warriors and commoners, assuming that each group occupied a defined area in the city in which city regulations provided unified building codes concerning space and size. With this assumption in mind, he calculated the number of warriors and commoners who lived in a measurable space. After calculating the area in which warriors resided according to available archeological findings, he used the figure of 450 square meters as the average size of a warrior residence to estimate the number of warrior houses at 2,900. Multiplying the number of houses by an average of ten people per household (e.g., 5-6 family members plus 5-6 servants), Kawano set the average number of warriors at 29,000.84

This time it was Ishii who was unable to extract enough information from written records to separate warriors from commoners. For his calculation of the total population of both warriors and commoners Ishii

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82 Ishii Susumu, “Bunken kara saguru jinkō,” in Bushi no miyako kamakura, 60.


84 Ibid., 63.
looked at a bakufu prohibition that limited the number of sake jars per household. After the bakufu issued the prohibition, it collected some 37,274 jars. Estimating the number of jars per household at 4, Ishii approximated the total number of households—warriors and commoners—at 10,000. With an average of 5 family members per household, the total number of the warriors and commoners population was 50,000.85 Kawano, on the other hand, using the same method he used for calculating the number of warriors, estimated the number of commoners to have been between 31,600 and 56,900. For his calculations Kawano divided the sizes of commoners’ living spaces by an average of 100-150 square meters per residence. He then multiplied it by an estimated average of 5-6 people per household.86 According to Kawano’s calculation, then, the total size of Kamakura’s population was approximately 100,000 people, while Ishii’s calculations set the size at approximately 65,000.

Each of the above calculations suffers faults that we should now review. First, in their calculations, both Kawano and Ishii limited their evaluations to specific times in the Kamakura period. Kawano’s figure of 450 square meters for the average size of a warrior’s house is taken from Hōjō Yasutoki’s regulation for warriors’ houses of 1225.87 This regulation, according to Mabuchi, refers to the minimum size of a residence, which

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85 Ishii, "Bunken kara saguru jinkō," 60.
86 Kawano, "Hakkutsu kara shisan shita jinkō," 63.
87 AK, Kareki 1 (1225)/10/4.
means that the average size was somewhat higher. At any rate, between 1180 and 1225 more than seventy high ranking gokenin established their residences in Kamakura. Many of them built up to three houses in various parts of the city. And since space was readily available, the sizes of their houses were considerably larger than 450 square meters. Similarly, Ishii’s calculations rely on a bakufu prohibition that was issued in 1252, which gives no indication of the number of households before or after it was issued.

Second, Kawano’s assumption that warriors and commoners occupied defined areas of the city contradicts archeological evidence that indicate some degree of blending. Similarly, Ishii’s generalization of the number of family members and jars of sake per household seems arbitrary. Third, Ishii’s estimate of clergymen appears to have been true only at a specific time, and only in Gozan temples. Furthermore, it is unclear how he selected 38 temples and the average number of clergymen per temple to arrive at 2,000 people. Even if we accept his calculations, it is still quite different from the 15,000 figure he introduced as the total population of all Kamakura temples.

When attempting to calculate the size of Kamakura’s population, one must keep in mind that the city developed into a major urban center and

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88 Mabuchi, “Bushi no miyako: sono seiritsu to kōsō o megutte,” 43.

89 Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 301-324. This source provides a list of warrior houses according to locations, with indication of the time they appear in records. The main source for this list is the Azumakagami. Also, Yamamura Aki compiled a list of warrior houses according to the time when they were built. See Yamamura, “Chūsei kamakura no toshi kūkan kōzō,” 46-49, table 1.
then reverted to a secondary one within the span of only a hundred and fifty years. In other words, the population was low in the early years of the Kamakura period, reached its peak before the Mongol invasions, and decreased dramatically at the end of the period in the early fourteenth century. Estimates should therefore follow, as much as possible, the demographic development of the city.

Family genealogies suggest that the head of a warrior family had an average of two to three wives. According to this calculation the average number of children per household was five to eight. With attendants and servants for the household head and each of the wives, the number of people per household was approximately 18-20 people. Using this figure as reference, a middle-rank gokenin house had 12-15 household members, and a low-rank gokenin house had 8-10 members. In addition, each gokenin had retainers who served as guards and a readily available military force. Consulting the records of official processions in which warriors appeared with their retainers, together with battle records and the archeological remains of mass grave sites in Kamakura, it seems that high-level gokenin each had an average of 200 warriors at his call, while middle- and low-ranking gokenin each had an average of 10-50 warriors under his command.

The number of high-ranking gokenin who built residences in Kamakura before 1225 was approximately seventy, out of which about 15 were of the highest rank, 20-30 middle rank, and the rest low level gokenin. These
figures suggest that there were approximately 5,500 warriors in Kamakura in the initial period. By the 1270s there were additional warrior houses, which added a total of approximately 90 residences. Considering natural elimination of some of the residences from the previous period while adding population growth, the total number of warriors residing in Kamakura was between 10,000 to 13,000. These figures most likely remained stable with a slight decrease in the 1270s as a result of a bakufu order to send warriors to Kyūshū in preparation for the arrival of the Mongol forces. These warriors were not allowed to return to Kamakura, thus the warrior population never regained its size even though there were about 20 additional residences built after the 1280s. We should therefore estimate the number of warriors at approximately 9,000 to 10,000. The sharpest decrease in the size of warrior population was after the downfall of the bakufu when most warriors returned either to their provincial headquarters or to Kyoto.

The method for calculating the temple and shrine populations applies Ishii’s calculations to the number of Kamakura temples and shrines according to their periods of construction as they appear in written records. This

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90 The bakufu sent eastern warriors who held lands in Kyushu to join the forces defending Kyushu from the Mongols. This military deployment of eastern gokenin became a permanent resettlement. The bakufu justified its refusal to allow gokenin to return to the Kantō by stressing the need for a continued defense line against further Mongol attacks. Other reasons were its inability to reward those who claimed and deserved it and might have posed a threat to the bakufu upon their return to Kamakura. See Jeffrey Mass, Lordship and Inheritance in Early Medieval Japan: A Study of the Kamakura Soryo System (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 98. For a discussion of the economic implications of the Mongol invasions see Hori Kyotsu, “The Economic and Political Effects of the Mongol Wars,” in Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History, ed. John W. Hall and Jeffrey P. Mass (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 184-198.
method is similar to that which I used for calculating the size of the warrior population. The number of temples and shrines built in Kamakura before 1225 was 30, out of which we should classify only three as large institutions. The largest of the three was the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex with approximately 200-250 monks and priests. The other two, Yōfukuji and Shōchōjūin may have had approximately 200 monks each. In the remaining 27 temples, shrines and Buddha halls, there was a total of about 800-900 clergymen. Using Ishii’s 1.7 multiplication factor, the total number of clergymen and others affiliated with temples and shrines was nearly 4,000 people. The additional 14 temples built by the 1240s were of small to moderate size. They increased the size of the temple population by approximately 500-700 people.

Between the 1250s and the end of the Kamakura period some additional 55-60 temples were constructed, some of which were large temples such as Kenchōji and Gokurakuji. Taking Ishii’s figures for Gozan temples, and applying it to other temples that were similar in size, the total number of monks in large temples was approximately 4,000-5,000. The population in the remaining temples and shrines, considering an average of 20-40 monks per temple or shrine, may have reached 3,000-4,000 people. To these numbers we must add an estimated number of 500-1,000 travelling monks who stayed in

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91 In making this estimate I considered the twenty-five monk offices with an average of 5-8 attendants and disciples, priests and their attendants (including female attendants), and divination masters.
Kamakura at any one time throughout the Kamakura period. In conclusion, the total size of that population after the 1250s was between 7,500 and 10,000 people.

Commoners were the majority of Kamakura's populace. Yet, their diverse occupations and mobility and the lack of records concerning commoners make an estimate of the size of their population an especially difficult task. In principle, Kawano's calculations may be the closest we can get to a reasonable estimate of the number of commoners who had houses in Kamakura, though his lower estimate of 31,600 people seems too low, and his higher estimate of 56,900 people seems too high. A more likely estimate should place the lower figure at 35,000 and the higher estimate at 45,000. However, a constant flow of merchants, craftsmen and others for whom Kamakura promised some economic benefits, may have increased the size of the population of commoners by 5,000-10,000 people. We should therefore consider an average of 50,000 commoners including those living in houses with their families and single people living in public places or on temple grounds.

These calculations show that the size of the warrior population was only slightly larger than that of the temple-shrine population, and that commoners were in considerably larger numbers than the first two groups combined. This, however, is not surprising, since many powerful gokenin

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92 Kawano, "Hakkutsu kara shisan shita jinkô," 63.
kept large residences in their provincial headquarters. Similarly, there were only a handful of large religious institutions, while most of them were as small as a single structure in the back yard of a warrior’s house. Nevertheless, a city in which fifteen percent of its total population was warriors, was indeed a warriors’ city. Only Kyoto and Nara had such a high percentage of its population affiliated with temples and shrines.

**Temples in Kamakura: The Case of Yōfukuji**

Like temples in Kyoto and Nara, Kamakura temples endowed the city with an aura of prestige and the atmosphere of a capital. The design of some of Kamakura’s largest temples was almost as grand as of those in the capital, with massive structures and lavish designs. Among these, for example, were Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, Shōchōjūin and Yōfukuji of the early Kamakura period, and Kenchōji and the Great Buddha (*daibutsu*) of the middle of the period. In every respect these temples displayed the wealth and power of their patrons—the Hōjō regents and the bakufu—comparable only to the high aristocracy in the capital.

The construction of temples in Kamakura began at a slow pace as dictated by Yoritomo, who was the sole patron of the larger temples at the time. During his rule, less than ten temples were built, the majority of which were relatively small buddhist halls such as the Hokke Hall, Saihōji and
Jômyôji temples. After Yoritomo's death, leading Hôjô warriors continued to establish new temples. Hôjô Masako, Yoritomo's widow, constructed Jûfukuji as her private prayer hall. She invited Myôan Eisai to serve as the temple's founding monk (kaizan) and deeded the grounds of Minamoto Yoshitomo's old residence to him. Similarly, Hôjô Yoshitoki constructed Hokkedô as his private prayer hall, and Hôjô Yasutoki built Shakadô Buddha Hall northeast of his residence. In choosing the location of such private prayer halls patrons considered proximity to their own residences and convenient access. In contrast, the location for Yoritomo's temples had been consciously determined according to the general city layout.

After the Hôji War (1247) until the end of the Kamakura period there was a dramatic increase in the construction of new temples and halls. The largest temples were built when the Hôjô family reached the peak of its political power. In 1249, Hôjô Tokiyori, one of the most powerful of the Hôjô regents, founded a Jizô Hall in Kobukuro Pass. Construction of a larger temple began almost immediately, and four years later Tokiyori appointed the

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93 AK, Kenkyû 6 (1195)/10/21; Shinpen sagami no kuni fudôkikô, Kenkyû 6 (1195); Inari yama jômyôzenji ryakki, Bunji 4 (1188), cited in Kamakura shishi, vol. 2, 240.

94 AK, Shôji 2 (1200)/intercalary 2/13, 7/15.

95 AK, Gennin 1(1224)/6/18, 8/8.

96 AK, Gennin 1(1224)/12/17, Karoku 1(1225)/6/13. The location of the hall became known as Shakadôgayatsu (Shakadô Valley).

97 See appendix F, fig. 6.
Chinese monk Rankei Dōryū (Ch. Lan-ch’i Tao-lung, 1213-1278) as the founder (kaizan) of Kenchōji. Similarly, Hōjō Shigetoki constructed the Gokurakuji temple complex in the 1250s, and appointed the illustrious monk Ninshō to perform the opening ceremony. Since Gokurakuji was a family temple of the Gokurakuji branch of the Hōjō, Shigetoki chose its location adjacent to the family’s main residence. But it was not a coincidence that the temple was located at Gokurakuji Pass, which was the main entrance to Kamakura for those coming on the Tōkaidō highway. Both Gokurakuji and Kenchōji are representative examples of the largest of Kamakura temples in which we witness their patrons—the Hōjō Regents—concern for having prominent founding monks, impressive designs, and “good” locations.

To better understand the function and importance of the large Kamakura temples I would like to provide an analysis of Yoritomo’s Yōfukuji. In 1189, shortly after successfully pursuing and eliminating his half-brother Yoshitsune in Mutsu province, Yoritomo issued orders to

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98 Records of Jizō Hall appear in Shinpen kamakura shi, Sagami no kuni fudō kikō, and Kamakura dainikki. According to Seiichi nenfu construction of Kenchōji began in Kenchō 1 (1249), while Azumakagami records mention it in Kenchō 3 (1251). The official opening of the temple was marked by the appointment of Rankei Dōryū and a ritual (kuyo) as recorded in AK, Kenchō 3(1253)/11/25. For detailed information concerning Kenchōji and Rankei Dōryū, see Collcutt, Five Mountains, 65-67; Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 266-312. For the location of the original structure of Kenchōji, see Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura: iseki ga kataru bushi no miyako, 104-108.

99 Chapters 5 and 6 offer a lengthy discussion of Gokurakuji.
construct a new temple, which he named Yōfukuji. The purpose for constructing the temple was to appease the spirits of those who died in the Ōshū campaign. During the two centuries or so until Yōfukuji’s destruction, most likely by fire sometimes between 1394 and 1428, a number of folk stories and legends about the temple began to circulate, adding to the temple’s mystique and prestige. Some of these originated in the belief that spirits of the war dead found refuge in Yōfukuji. In any case, after the temple was destroyed it was never rebuilt, leaving us with only vague records of its existence.

Although scholars never doubted the Azumakagami references to Yōfukuji, the lack of specific information about its location and design left much to discover. Even Tokugawa scholars showed interest in the temple, leaving us with records of its assumed location. In their records they refer to Yōfukuji as “sandō (three halls),” and “yotsuishi (four stones),” in addition to names that had already appeared earlier such as “Nikaidō.” Their records only strengthened the notion that the temple actually existed, but did nothing to alleviate the mystery of its location.

In the meantime, especially after WWII, Kamakura became a tightly packed residential area, which, once built, blocked access to whatever is buried

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100 The first character (kanji) “yō” used in the name “Yōfukuji” is usually read “ei.” This caused a number of non-Japanese scholars to pronounce the temple’s name “Eifukuji.” Consequently, one may read about Yoritomo’s temple “Eifukuji,” which causes confusion. Readers should pay attention to this mistake, and should not conclude that each name corresponds to a different temple.
underneath it. On the other hand, the construction of modern houses, which begins with digging out soil, has occasionally unearthed, and still does unearth, important archeological artifacts. In such cases, construction is stopped and the area is first excavated. These “accidental” discoveries have prompted some scholars and archaeologists to begin systematic excavations. One of these excavations led to the discovery of the remains of Yōfukuji.101

Yōfukuji grounds were 400 meters long and 200 meters wide, spread on a north-south axis, and covering an area of some 80,000m². By any account, this was a sizable parcel of land for an early Kamakura temple. This unusually large size of flat land in a part of Kamakura that is rather hilly has led Kawano Shinjirō to conclude that the temple grounds were a man-made flatland.102 Though Kawano does not estimate the number of people who participated in Yōfukuji’s construction, it must have involved several hundreds of workers and at least two gokenin to supervise them.103 Such an estimate is significant because it reflects on Yoritomo’s willingness to invest great sums of money and effort in projects that would add an aura of importance to Kamakura and transform it into a city.

101 Akaboshi Naotada, a pioneer in Kamakura archeology was the first to dig the Yōfukuji site in the late 1960s. See, Akaboshi Naotada, “Yōfukuji seki hakkutsu chōsa gaihō,” Yokosuka kōkogakukai nenpō 13, no. 14 (1969).

102 Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura, 98.

103 It seems that it was a common practice to appoint a minimum of two gokenin to supervise construction works. Such was the case for the construction of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex. Dōi Sanehira and Ōba Kageyoshi were assigned to supervise the construction of Wakamiya shrine. AK, Yōwa 1 (1181)/5/13. See Chapter 3.
The temple structure itself, as the name "sandō" suggests, was made of three structures, or Buddha halls. They were aligned along a north-south axis facing east and connected by wide corridors. At the center was the Nikaidō Hall, to its north was Yakushi Hall, and to its south was Amida Hall. North of Yakushi Hall and south of Amida Hall were two corridor extensions that turned eastward to a pond. Some scholars argue that the general design of the temple was modeled after Hiraizumi Mōtsuji temple, which Yoritomo visited during his Ōshū campaign. As the basis of their argument, they rely on the Azumakagami record of Yoritomo having been so impressed by the design of Mōtsuji that he decided to copy it in Kamakura. Kawano Shinjirō qualifies this view by arguing that what was actually copied was the technique for constructing the floor for the Nikaidō Hall, not the whole temple design.

The central structure of Yōfukuji is believed to have been a two story hall, as its name "Nikaidō" indicates. Further evidence of the hall's size

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104 Another name for the temple was "yotsuishi (four stones)," which scholars interpret to mean the gate of the temple. The four stones were perhaps the foundation stones for the gate. Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura, 96.

105 For Yōfukuji ground layout see appendix E, fig. 4.

106 AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/12/9. According to this record, Yoritomo was impressed by the appearance of Mōtsuji and Chūsonji temples. This version has been accepted by scholars before major archeological excavations have taken place in Kamakura. See, for example, Kamakura shishi, vol. 1, 468.

107 Kawano bases his conclusion on the fact that it was a unique floor-making technique found only in Mōtsuji temple, and since Yoritomo visited the temple, the only conclusion is that that was the source of the construction method. See Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura, 99.
comes from archeological excavations that reveal twenty foundation stones (soseki) arranged symmetrically on the ground below the structure. Each stone was the base for a wooden pillar that supported the ground floor of the hall, and necessarily the whole structure. The use of twenty support points is further indication that the structure was significantly bigger than the other two halls. The twenty foundation stones were spread over an area 20 meters long and 18 meters wide. Further excavations have revealed a wooden frame 22.5 meters long and 20.6 meters wide within which the foundations for the pillars were placed. The soil within that space was cleared and replaced by mud. After the mud dried it provided a tight support for the foundation stones because mud is less susceptible to changes resulting from ground movements and weather conditions. 108

The Yakushi and Amida halls were distinctly smaller than the Nikaidō Hall, which was far more massive in appearance. These two halls were similar in size and shape, and occupied a ground space of 16.5 meters long and 12.6 meters wide. 109 The two corridors connecting the Nikaidō Hall with the Yakushi and Amida halls were approximately 9 meters long and 3.6 meters wide. The corridors north of Yakushi Hall and south of Amida Hall were

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108 This technique is similar to that which was used for the construction of Mōtsuji temple, and to which Kawano refers to as the special building technique. Kawano, Chūsei toshi kamakura, 98-101.

109 The Amida Hall was the first to be excavated in 1984. Two years later, in 1986, archaeologists began excavations of Yakushi Hall. Vague wording in the Azumakagami have led some scholars to suspect that there were two Yakushi halls, but recent archeological evidence supports the view that there was only one hall.
approximately 7.2 meters long and 1.8 meters wide. These “outer” corridors made a 90 degrees turn eastward, and stretched all the way to the pond.\textsuperscript{110} These figures allow us to calculate the approximate total length of the structure itself, placing it at about 88.5 meters.

In front of the halls was a pond whose exact measurements are difficult to calculate because of a tennis court that covers most of it. However, it should be safe to say that the length of the pond roughly corresponded to the length of the three structures, with the strong likelihood that it exceeded it. A key element that helps us estimate the size of the pond is the remains of a wooden bridge that connected the ground in front of Yakushi Hall with an artificial island in the southern part of the pond. The bridge was approximately 9 meters long and 3.6 meters wide. Assuming that the western base of the bridge was some two meters away from the water line, there were seven meters left to the island. We therefore can estimate the width of the southern part of the pond in front of Yakushi Hall to have been at least 14 meters. Considering Kawano’s observation that the protruding corridors reached the water line of the pond,\textsuperscript{111} together with our estimate of the minimum width of the pond, we may conclude that the pond exceeded the length of the structure itself.

\textsuperscript{110} Exact measurements of the protruding corridor sections are still unavailable.

\textsuperscript{111} Kawano, \textit{Chûsei toshi kamakura}, 103.
The surface size of the pond, though, may have slightly fluctuated depending on season and rainfall. The bottom of the pond was a few tens of centimeters deep and covered with clay mud. Covering the bottom with clay mud was a common technique to prevent water from seeping through the soil. Two water sources to the north and north-east of the temple, and probably originating in a valley behind it, provided constant water flow. Nevertheless, natural fluctuations in the amount of rainfall during different times of the year resulted in shifts in the level of water in the pond. Regardless, the shape of the pond remained unchanged, only the space of the water surface fluctuated.

Based on the measures detailed above, it is clear that the ground layout and the floor plan of Yōfukuji follow late Heian period Pure Land architecture. Perhaps the best representation of this type of architecture was the Hōōdō Hall ("Phoenix Hall") at the Byōdōin Temple in Uji, Kyoto. The construction of the Hōōdō Hall was completed in 1053 by Fujiwara no Michinaga's son, Yorimichi, who attempted to display not only the Fujiwara family belief in Amida's Pure Land, but also its wealth and taste. The winged hall was designed as a central two-story structure from which two corridors extended north and south, then turned at a ninety degrees angle toward a pond. The structure was laid out on a north-south axis facing east, reaching a
length of almost 55 meters. The facade of the central two-story structure was approximately 15 meters long and 10 meters wide.\textsuperscript{112}

The resemblance between Yoritomo’s Yōfukuji and Fujiwara no Yorimichi’s Hōōdō cannot be mistaken. The architecture and design of Yōfukuji reflected Pure Land style as it was displayed in Fujiwara temples, specifically Hōjōji and Byōdōin. This architectural and artistic style was later displayed in Hiraizumi by the Northern Fujiwara in their Mōtsuji and Chūsonji temples. Earlier in my discussion I presented the argument made by some scholars that Yoritomo must have copied the design of Mōtsuji, because, while he visited that temple, he had not been to the capital to view the Hōōdō. Yet, variations in the architecture of these temples allow us to determine that the layout of Yōfukuji was closer to that of Hōōdō.

In all likelihood, a description of the architecture and design of the Hōōdō was brought to Yoritomo’s attention by one or more of those who traveled to the capital on Yoritomo’s behalf, by visiting courtiers, or perhaps by one of the many monks and courtiers who were invited to serve in Kamakura. Whichever the case, what is important is that Yoritomo was successful in bringing and incorporating court culture to Kamakura. Furthermore, such an undertaking shows Yoritomo’s commitment to constructing large-size monuments similar, if not bigger, than their

counterparts in the capital. After all, if the Hōdō was considered an impressive piece of architecture, one can only imagine what a larger, more massive and elaborate hall such as Yōfukuji must have looked like.

Conclusion

From before the Nara period (711-794) and the establishment of the Ritsuryō state, Kamakura village was essential for an active trade in the local provincial economy. The Nara court established the provincial administration office in Kamakura after it recognized the advantages of its geographic location and the terrain that shielded Kamakura against potential military threats on one hand and, on the other hand, allowed it access to the sea and main highways. When the Minamoto lineage was established in the middle of the Heian period, its founder was immediately assigned to the provincial office in Kamakura, after which the Minamoto gradually strengthened their hold in that region. Generations of Minamoto leaders were able to create a permanent Minamoto stronghold in Kamakura and the surrounding provinces by way of establishing military supremacy that was strengthened by alliances through marriage.

With the establishment of a warrior government in Kamakura during Yoritomo's leadership, Kamakura began a gradual process of urbanization that turned it into a major urban center. The development of the city depended on bakufu leaders and their leadership and on political and military
changes. Under Yoritomo’s rule there was an initial period of accelerated
growth that lasted for a short time and remained stable until Yasutoki was
appointed regent. Yasutoki’s regency marked a turning point in the city’s
development, which brought Kamakura to its first stage of maturity. Hôjô
Tokiyori, under whose leadership the Hôjô regency reached its golden age,
made Kamakura a fully developed city comparable to the capital. His son
Tokimune was able to maintain that prosperity until after the Mongol
Invasions. The gradual decline in Hôjô power that began with Tokimune’s
death caused a slowing of growth followed by a decline at the end of the
Kamakura period.

In the initial stage of the development of the city, warriors concentrated
along Mutsura-dera because of its economic and military advantages. At that
stage there was no attempt made by Yoritomo to create a city layout that
resembled the capital. Instead, Yoritomo made a conscious and real attempt
to bring to Kamakura the principles that distinguished the capital from other
large communities, namely elite society and a sense of divine presence. His
elite society was that of gokenin, and a divine presence was created by the
establishment of religious institutions on a scale and appearance similar to
those in the capital. Much less attention was given to city planning, and the
only principle that created any sense of unity was that the location of the
shogunal residence and bakufu offices determined the center of Kamakura’s
political activity.
The transfer of the bakufu to Utsunomiya by Yasutoki created a north-south axis that stretched south from the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex. It was the first calculated plan to contrive an axis on which the avenues and streets were constructed. At this stage the guiding principles for Kamakura city planning were similar to those employed for the Capital. In other words, the bakufu made a conscious attempt at achieving a city layout similar to that of Kyoto. However, Kamakura’s topography and the rough yet practical nature of Kamakura warriors dictated the actual outcome more than the desire for a Kyoto in Kamakura. Nevertheless, even if Kamakura lacked the clear lines of the streets and avenues of the capital, the political tension created by the city’s design was similar.

According to this design, the largest among Kamakura temples were located on the outskirts of the city in places that provided Kamakura divine protection, just as Heian temples protected their city. But the pragmatic nature of Kamakura warriors added a strategic dimension to these temples by making them Kamakura’s gates. Similar to Heian temples, the location of the largest of Kamakura temples on the outskirts of the city kept them from the center of power and eliminated possible nuisance to the bakufu. Only the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex took center stage in Kamakura as an official bakufu institution. In its final design, then, Kamakura without its temples would not have become the warrior capital that it did.
CHAPTER 3
TSURUGAOKA HACHIMANGŪJI: A BAKUFU INSTITUTION

Introduction

The total construct of Kamakura’s warrior society cannot be complete without a thoughtful consideration of that society’s most important religious institution, the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex (gūji).

Japanese historians have been paying attention to the importance of the shrine for molding Japan’s warrior class in many scholarly publications since the early 1900s, beginning with essays in Yoritomo-kai zasshi, to recent works by Ebe Yōko, Yuyama Manabu, Sasaki Kaoru and others.¹ Among Western scholars, only Ross Bender, Miyazaki Fumiko and, more recently, Martin Collcutt have investigated the religious life of Kamakura warriors, and made

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reference to Tsurugaoka Hachiman.\(^2\) Thus, a discussion of the role of Tsurugaoka in Western scholarship is long overdue.

During the Kamakura period, Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine was part of the Kamakura bakufu's structure, serving the bakufu and Kamakura warriors in its religious capacity but extending its role to social affairs and politics. Even after the downfall of the Kamakura bakufu, when Kamakura no longer hosted the bakufu headquarters, Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine continued to function as the religious center of the Minamoto clan and its branch families, including the Ashikaga and Tokugawa shoguns. Though its importance was greatly reduced after the establishment of the Ashikaga bakufu in Kyoto, it nevertheless remained a source of divine legitimacy for Minamoto descendants. Therefore, its role during the Kamakura period deserves careful attention if we are to achieve a more accurate view of the Kamakura bakufu and its warrior society.

Early Development

Yoritomo's Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji

"Although I have been under imperial censure for many years, now the Retired Emperor is naming me Barbarian-Subduing Commander because of my military exploits," Yoritomo said. "I cannot receive the edict at a private residence; I will accept it at the new shrine." He went to the new Hachiman Shrine, a place of worship built at Tsurugaoka on a site exactly like the one at Iwashimizu, with galleries and a two-story gate overlooking a formal approach more than thirty-six hundred feet long.³

"...It is the head of your father, the late Director of the Stables of the Left. After Heiji, it lay buried under the moss in front of the prison; there was nobody who offered prayers on the Director's behalf. I begged it from the warders for my own reasons and have carried it around my neck for more than ten years, visiting and praying at many mountains and temples, so I think the Director has been rescued from a kalpa of suffering. You can see I have done my best to be of service to him."

Although Yoritomo found the tale hard to believe, tears of nostalgia sprang to his eyes when he heard Mongaku identify the skull as his father's.⁴

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⁴ Ibid., 183.
One day before Yoritomo attacked the provincial military envoy (kebiishi), Yamagi Kanetaka, and a week before the battle at Ishibashiyama, he employed Sumiyoshi Masanaga, a Sumiyoshi shrine priest from Chikuzen, and Nagae Yoritaka, a priest from Ise shrine, to perform rituals and prayers for success of the battles. For that purpose Yoritomo entrusted a sacred mirror to Masanaga while Yoritaka performed a thousand-purification ceremony.5

On the day of battle, Masanaga, the senior priest, accompanied Yoritomo wearing only light body armor (haramaki); and as Yoritomo attacked, Masanaga prayed for victory. The following day, Yoritomo sent Tō Kurō Morinaga to Mishima shrine to pray for good fortune in battle.6 Five days later, Yoritomo attacked the combined forces of Ōba, Kumagai, Hatano, Shibuya and others; but, suffering defeat, he went into hiding in Awa province after barely escaping capture and, most likely, decapitation. The divine protection and assurance of success by the deity of Mishima shrine did not help Yoritomo.7

Yoritomo then settled in Kamakura where he ordered the construction of a new shrine for Hachiman, his clan's tutelary deity (ujigami), in the hope

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5 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/8/16.

6 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/8/16, 17, 18. Yoritomo attacked Yamagi Kanetaka on the 17th day, sent Tō Kurō Morinaga to Mishima shrine on the 18th day, and proceeded to Ishibashi on the 23rd day.

7 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/8/23. It is possible that Yoritomo turned to Mishima shrine for support because he was influenced by Hōjō Tokimasa, who venerated the Mishima deity. For a discussion of the relationship between Hōjō Tokimasa and Mishima shrine, see Imai Masaharu, “Hōjō Tokimasa no shinkō,” Bukkyō shigaku kenkyū 29, no. 2, (1986): 83-110.
of better divine support. Yoritomo, though, as religious as he may have been, was a pragmatist as he was a believer. He emphasized his connection to Hachiman while propagating Hachiman’s role as the Minamoto deity. In other words, Yoritomo molded Hachiman to become the source of legitimacy he so urgently needed in order to convince eastern warriors to accept his authority. Moreover, Yoritomo made the new Tsurugaoka Hachimangū shrine the first administrative apparatus of his Kamakura headquarters, though it never became an official bakufu institution. Tsurugaoka defined the physical layout of Kamakura, investing it with some of the characteristics of the imperial capital, Kyoto. The new Tsurugaoka was not only a spiritual

8 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/12. For the Azumakagami record of choosing the location for the new shrine see appendix A, excerpt 2.

9 The first Tsurugaoka shrine was established in Kamakura in 1064 by Minamoto Yoriyoshi. For the Azumakagami record of its construction see appendix A, excerpt 1.

10 Although the Azumakagami often refers to the first structure at Kitayama as Wakamiya, or ‘young shrine,’ other records refer to it as Tsurugaoka Hachimangū. According to descriptions in the Azumakagami it seems that the structure was rather simple. However, it included monks’ and priests’ residences, thus indicating that from its inception Yoritomo emphasized the role of the clergy. During the Genpei War (1180-85) Yoritomo increased the number of monks in Tsurugaoka and commended land for its regular income as well as special land commendations for specific festivals. In 1187 Yoritomo added the hōjō-e festival to the shrine’s schedule of annual festivals. With that Tsurugaoka became a center of religious and social activity for Yoritomo’s housemen (gokenin). Similarly, Yoritomo established the ‘system of monks’ (gusō shidai), which marked the shrine’s maturation and independence as Yoritomo distanced himself from its daily operation, yet remained its supreme director. These issues will be discussed later in this chapter. Some of the major studies on the role of Tsurugaoka after the Genpei War include: Nakano Hatayoshi, Hachiman shinkōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1975); Shimura Kunihiro, et al., eds., Hachiman jinjya no kenkyū (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1989); Ebe Yoko, “Minamoto no yoritomo to tsurugaoka hachimangū”; idem., “Tsurugaoka hachimangū hatten no sankaitai to minamoto no yoritomo no shinkō”; Yoshida Michiko, “Kamakurai tsurugaoka hachimangūji no shūkyōteki tokushitsu to sono yakuwari ni tsuite,” Nihon bukkyō shigaku 21 (1986): 12-32. For a discussion of the development and meaning of the hōjō-e in the cult of Hachiman see Jane Marie Law, “Violence, Ritual Recactment, and Ideology: The Hōjō-e of the Usa Hachiman Shrine in Japan,” History of Religions 33, no. 4 (May, 1994): 325-58.
cement for Yoritomo's warriors, it also held a pool of professionals who served Yoritomo as clerics as well as clerks. The shrine was one of Yoritomo's most important links to Kyoto, consequently making it easier for the court to accept him as the state's protector, eventually granting him high court rank and office.

**Hachiman**

In 1180 Yoritomo became a renegade to some, a potential benefactor to others, and before the year ended he lost his first battle, escaped to Awa, and finally settled in Kamakura. Then, moving the mighty Hachiman to a new residence in Kitayama, Kobayashi district, seemed a perfectly good strategy to Yoritomo, who wished to reunite with his ancestors—or at least have their spirits within reach—and in any case, Hachiman could protect Yoritomo in times when his future was so uncertain.\(^\text{11}\) That Yoritomo ignored Hachiman's shattered reputation is a bit surprising. After all, when Yoritomo entered Kamakura and went to worship his ancestors at Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine, he had little more than his dead ancestors' spirits on his

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\(^{11}\) Prince Mochihitoō, whose edict provided Yoritomo with the initial legitimacy to rally warriors against the Taira, was killed in Kyoto. Though Yoritomo continued to display the edict for a while, it was no longer a legitimate document. Losing both his support within the court and his first major battle at Ishibashiyama, Yoritomo was now left with little to succor his call to arms. See Kōchi Shōsuke, *Yoritomo no jidai: 1180 nendai nairanshi* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1990), 8-54; Yamamoto Kōji, *Yoritomo no tenka sōzō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001), 16-18, 35.
side and a god who performed poorly protecting his flock. Nevertheless, a place was chosen at Kitayama, and the perimeter for the new shrine was marked.

What followed was the precursor to a series of developments that established the new Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji as a place of worship dedicated to the god Hachiman, and a place through which Yoritomo initiated his role as the leader of a new warrior government. On the twelfth night of the tenth month of 1180, Yoritomo drew a lot (kuji) in front of the altar at the original Tsurugaoka shrine, for fear of Hachiman's retribution should the deity prefer his old home (or so the Azumakagami tell us in so many words). Another way to interpret this description in the Azumakagami, though, is in terms of seeking Hachiman's divine legitimization. Within the framework of source and recipient of legitimacy as a means of displaying authority, when Yoritomo pulled out the "Go Ahead" stick it was in fact Hachiman selecting him as the recipient of that divine legitimacy. Or, perhaps, Yoritomo used a two-faced coin to extract

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12 This refers to the Heiji Disturbance (1159) in which Yoshitomo and most of the Minamoto clan were killed. After the disturbance, Taira no Kiyomori sent Yoritomo into exile in Izu, and Yoshitsune to Kurama temple near Kyoto. See Kōchi Shōsuke, Hōgen no ran heiji no ran (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 102-171.

13 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/12.

14 The Azumakagami identifies Tsurugaoka as a shrine but occasionally refers to it as a shrine-temple (gūji). Tsurugaoka records identify it as a shrine-temple because from 1180 until the Meiji period the Tsurugaoka complex included a temple and a system of Buddhist offices.

15 AK, Jishō 4 (1180)/10/12. See appendix A, excerpt 2.
legitimization from Hachiman. In any case, Hachiman was the source and Yoritomo his earthly patron, and thus the covenant was sealed.

Tsurugaoka Hachiman initially rendered Yoritomo with a respected, prestigious Minamoto lineage to bolster his claim to legitimacy, thus providing him with the ideological justification for raising armies in response to Prince Mochihito's edict; and eventually he acquired military and political power to launch a campaign against those who nearly destroyed his clan. That Yoritomo was more concerned with establishing his control over the eastern provinces than he was interested in a personal vendetta against the Ise Taira does not alter the fact that this kind of spiritual framework was necessary as an ideology of "the good guys against the bad guys" who then opposed him and his plan for a self-ruled warrior society. In that sense, Hachiman's acknowledgment of Yoritomo was a symbolic act of sacred legitimation of his right to military and political authority, with the immediate effect of encouraging local warrior magnates to join him despite his embarrassing loss at the battle of Ishibashiyama. It is true, and commonly accepted among scholars, that warriors responded to Yoritomo's call because of his promise to reward their support by confirming their claims to lands.\footnote{The Ise Taira in the Heiji Disturbance (1159). Kōchi, Hōgen no ran heiji no ran, 102-171.}

\footnote{Jeffrey Mass has characterized the first three years of the Genpei War as a successful attempt made by Yoritomo to establish a hegemony over the eastern provinces by a variety of methods other than warfare. See Jeffrey Mass, "The Kamakura Bakufu" in Medieval Japan, vol. 3 of The Cambridge History of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).}
Nevertheless, the ideological framework Yoritomo provided served as a sort of divine assurance that he was the leader with the right résumé, at the right time, to lead them, or as it happened, send them into battle.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Early Appointments}

In the first two months after Yoritomo designated Kitayama as the new place for Tsurugaoka, he appointed five Buddhist monks and a Shinto priest as the first assembly of clergymen of the shrine.\textsuperscript{19} This number may seem insignificant until we consider the fact that the construction of the shrine itself was not begun until five months after the last of these appointments.\textsuperscript{20}

Of the six clergymen, Senkôbô Ryôsen was the chief administrator (bettô) and Rengebô Shôen was designated as a state-protector monk (gojisô). Ótomo Seigen was appointed as the first Shinto priest without specific duties or titles.


\textsuperscript{19} AK, Jishô 4 (1180)/10/12, 13, 15, 12/4; Shamushiki shidai, 143; Ótomo kannushi-ke keifushû, 18. The compilers of \textit{Azumakagami} recorded the appointment of the kannushi some years after the 1180 date recorded in the Ótomo records. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear, though I tend to accept the Ótomo record because it is expected that with the construction of Tsurugaoka for Hachiman, a Shinto deity, a Shinto priest would be appointed to worship the deity. See discussion in the commentary section of Ótomo kannushi-ke keifushû.

\textsuperscript{20} Ōba Kageyoshi and Doi Sanehira were employed in the construction, which began in Yôwa 1 (1181)/5/13. See that date in \textit{Azumakagami}.
Similarly, the offices of the Buddhist monks Zenshōbō Jūen, Tongakubō Ryōzen, ajari Ryōzen, Jōken and Renkōbō Sonnen were not clearly defined. In all likelihood, their principal duties were to perform Buddhist and Shinto rituals for Yoritomo’s success. However, their personal backgrounds suggest that their role was not limited to Hachiman’s realm of gods and Buddhas, but also, extended to more earthly duties of government.

By and large, Onjōji was Yoritomo’s choice of a religious center from which to import monks to Tsurugaoka. This is perhaps not surprising if we consider the temple’s apparent support of Yoritomo, and later, its miserable experience with Taira Kiyomori, whom Yoritomo viewed as his rival in court. The first five monks of Tsurugaoka were brought to Kamakura from Onjōji, adjacent to and rival of Enryakuji on Mt. Hiei near Kyoto, with the exception of Ryōsen, who became temporary betto because of his close relationship to Yoritomo. In fact, all other monks who were appointed by Yoritomo also received their training at Onjōji and lived there as resident

21 In Tendai and Shingon institutions, ajari (Sk. Ācārya) was a monk who received formal ordination (kanjō). For a concise explanation see Nakamura Hajime, Bukkyōgo diajiten, 8th ed. (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shoseki, 1994), 4; Brian Ruppert, Jewel in the Ashes: Buddha Relics and Power in Early Medieval Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 2000), 315.

22 Shoshiki shidai, 8, 43, 102-3; Gusō shidai, 177, 203, 248.


24 For a discussion on the rivalry between the two Tendai temples see Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 88-92, 204-211.
monks. Only after the Genpei War were monks from Enryakuji appointed to offices at Tsurugaoka in Kamakura; and it was not until Tsurugaoka's system of offices expanded that a few monks from Tōdaiji were selected to serve at the shrine. To better understand who those monks were whom Yoritomo selected, and similarly, their purpose at Tsurugaoka, let me consider two early appointees: Shōen and Jūen.

In 1180, the Second Monk (niban gusō) at Tsurugaoka was Shōen, an ajari from Onjōji temple, who was appointed by Yoritomo shortly after transferring Hachiman to Kitayama. Though there is no indication of aristocratic lineage, Yoritomo expressed respect for Shōen by using an otherwise unusual honorific language when asking him to accept an office at Tsurugaoka. Shōen accepted Yoritomo's invitation and remained at Tsurugaoka to become a senior monk whose initial duty, when Yoritomo appointed him, was to pray for the protection of the state as a "state-protector monk." At the same time Yoritomo also appointed Jūen, another Onjōji monk, whose biographical data was markedly different from that of Shōen. Jūen was the son of a high aristocrat, grandson of a holder of the Middle Counselor (chûnagon) rank, and the sixth generation descendant of a Great Minister (daijōdaijin). Moreover, the records confirmed Jūen's Buddhist title

25 This is confirmed in Gusō shidai and Shoshiki shidai. For each monk listed in these records there is a temple indication. For a list of Tsurugaoka Hachiman bettō see appendix D, table 1.

26 Gusō shidai, 241; Shoshiki shidai, 96.
and his other Buddhist names. His Buddhist ranking, however, put him in an inconspicuous position, in fact without clear duty or official designation at Tsurugaoka. As such, Jūen’s education qualified him for a whole variety of duties for which knowledge of administrative writing procedures and Kyoto culture in general was as important as reciting the sutras.

As mentioned earlier, among the first six appointees was Ötomo Seigen, whom Yoritomo selected as the only shrine priest. The record of Seigen in the Ötomo Head Priest Genealogy (Ötomo kannushi-ke keifushū) of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine reveals that Seigen himself held the Lower Fifth Rank and seems to have held a court office.²⁷ In other words, Seigen was not only the son of a high aristocratic family, he was also an insider at court with access to or knowledge of matters of interest to Yoritomo. At the same time he was skilled in the mechanisms of court administration—undoubtedly a valuable asset to Yoritomo, who sought to establish administrative capabilities. Why Seigen accepted Yoritomo’s invitation to serve him can only be speculated. Perhaps Yoritomo promised Seigen greater rewards, or Seigen may have been one of those discontented aristocrats who were unhappy with Kiyomori’s tyranny. In any event, it was Ryôsen who traveled to Kyoto as Yoritomo’s official messenger to bring Seigen to Kamakura.²⁸

²⁷ Ötomo kannushi-ke keifushū, 18.
²⁸ Ötomo kannushi-ke keifushū, 18-19.
That Ryōsen traveled to Kyoto is significant, but not because he was the only one from among Yoritomo's clergymen to have made the trip and "lived to tell about it." Rather, it is significant as evidence that Yoritomo, at a time when he was considered a rebel, was able to send messengers more than once for the purpose of recruiting monks and priests. He may have been able to do so because in the closing months of 1180 Kiyomori did not yet view Yoritomo as a real threat.\textsuperscript{29} Or, monks and priests were less obvious than warriors. Regardless of what the reason was, it worked. Yoritomo, then, was not truly isolated in the East; instead, he seems to have been not only well informed about Kyoto but also on his way to establishing an administration using Tsurugaoka clergymen for that purpose.

\textit{Location}

What had begun the process of urbanizing Kamakura and eventually constituted its center was undoubtedly Yoritomo's decision to construct Tsurugaoka and his Ōkura residence (gosho), adjacent to each other in Kitayama. Considering Yoritomo's interest in establishing himself at the center of eastern warrior society, the new location at Kitayama in the Kobayashi district was strategically far superior not only to the existing Minamoto residence on the eastern side of the Kamakura plain, but also to

the location of other warrior residences. It was located in the northern region of the Kamakura plain, overlooking the whole Kamakura basin to the south, and protected by mountains from all directions, leaving an opening to the south where the old Tōkaidō road crossed it from east to west, and it also allowed for convenient access to the sea.\textsuperscript{30} The new location was also protected by four rivers, yet adjacent to Mutsura road and two other roads that connected it to the Tōkaidō road, thus allowing easy commute to warrior residences located on that route. Indeed Yoritomo utilized the natural surroundings to build, in Kujō Kanezane’s words: a “Kamakura fortress” and “fortification in Kamakura.”\textsuperscript{31}

As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the layout of Yoritomo’s Kamakura has led some Japanese scholars to suggest, quite understandably, that Yoritomo modeled his warrior capital on the concept of the imperial capital. The placement of the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex and the Ōkura residence by the Kitayama foothills in the northern area of the Kamakura plain, overlooking the plain in the south, with the Dankazura road as the central north-south axis, and the rivers crossing the Kamakura plain remarkably resembled the layout of the Kyoto court. Though this view was pre-mature, as the final layout that resembled Kyoto was achieved only a few decades after Yoritomo, the remarkable attempt to assimilate the divine

\textsuperscript{30} See appendix F, fig. 5.

\textsuperscript{31} Gyokuyō, Juei 2 (1183)/intercalary 10/25.
and mundane in one location suggests that Yoritomo sought to disseminate an aura of leadership with intimate heavenly connections.\footnote{Yamamura Aki, “Chûsei kamakura no toshi kûkan közô,” Shirin 80:2 (1997), 42-62.}

Yoritomo chose Hachiman, the tutelary deity of the Minamoto clan, because Hachiman was essentially an important imperial deity whose potential contribution to Yoritomo’s success overshadowed his apparent frailty as the protector of the clan. Elevating Hachiman from his temporary obscurity to higher grounds at Kitayama rewarded Yoritomo with a strengthened political presence with which he asserted his authority. The new Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine-temple complex became the stage from which Yoritomo made his public appearance as the leader of a new coalition of Eastern warriors, though he never intended to entirely separate himself from the court. He saw himself as part of the court, yet his quest for an independent sphere of authority kept him physically distant from Kyoto. It was by creating a warrior capital in Kamakura with Tsurugaoka as its symbolic religious center with a body of able monks and priests, and by working unceasingly to win the trust and support of local Kantô warriors, that he successfully asserted command over his own autonomous camp. As for Yoritomo’s drawing of the lot, the covenant between Yoritomo and Hachiman proved successful after all.
Influential Clergy

Structure of Tsurugaoka Offices

The dual shrine-temple role of Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, and the variety of religious duties the bakufu required it to perform, resulted in a complex structure of offices. At the head of the structure was the office of the Chief Administrator (betto), who was a buddhist monk, and Head Priest (kannushi), who was a Shintō clergyman. Though these offices were the highest offices of their respective religious assemblies, the betto was undoubtedly the dominant figure of the two. While the selection of monks to the office of betto was based on lineage, temple affiliation, and reputation, the kannushi was a heritable office that remained under the control of the Ōtomo family—a practice that was the result of placing less emphasis on Shintō rituals, which had less to offer in terms of protection, and which ignored the stature of the priest himself. In contrast, under bakufu administration the betto of Tsurugaoka held full control of all Tsurugaoka’s affairs as imposed upon him by the bakufu. The betto directed the main body of twenty-five monk offices (nijūgobō), and a number of specialized offices that were created when the bakufu required specific duties or rituals. The result was a multi-office structure that was controlled by the bakufu and the betto.

33 For a detailed chart of Tsurugaoka Hachiman offices see appendix C, fig. 1.
The construction and organization of the twenty-five monk offices was a gradual process that was started by Yoritomo and completed some four decades later, and corresponded to the growth of Tsurugaoka shrine itself. The monks who were appointed to these offices were each given a private residence. Economic support for each monk was secured by land commendations, administered at the time of the establishment of the office. In addition, they were assigned junior monks to assist them in their duties. These junior monks were also disciples who often remained in the shrine after reaching seniority. Monk offices were indicated by Buddhist names that remained permanent regardless of the monks who occupied them. They were both abstract titles for the offices as well as the names of the physical locations and structures where the monks lived, taught and worked. For example, in the monk's name Rengebô Shôen, "Rengebô" referred to the office, while "Shôen" was the monk's private name. After being appointed to these offices, each of the twenty five senior resident monks was also assigned a duty (shiki) that was clearly defined according to its purpose, whether administrative or religious in nature.

The following examples illustrate this structure and mechanism of appointments. The office of Main Hall Attendant (godensu) was established in 1191 for one monk. Rengebô Shôen was its first appointee, but the need to

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34 For a list of lands commended to each office see appendix D, table 3.
35 For a list of offices see appendix D, table 2.
care for the images enshrined in Tsurugaoka during the following transfer of the shrine required the work of two monks. For that purpose the bakufu permitted an expansion of that office to include a second monk. The appointment of the second monk took place just before the scheduled transfer of the shrine in 1226. The transfer of the shrine was necessary after the bakufu ordered repairs for the main shrine, during which time the shrine's deity (shintai) was to be transferred temporarily to Wakamiya shrine. The repairs lasted six days and the image was then transferred back to the main shrine. When Yoritomo established the office, the shrine was still new and did not require many repairs, thus the need for such transfer was not anticipated. By 1226 it became apparent that repairs had to be conducted regularly. In addition, the overall size of the shrine grew, its scope of services and religious rituals expanded, and it was necessary to have at least two monks attending the inner sanctum of the shrine. These two monks were selected from among the senior resident monks.

Another example shows not only how senior resident monks were assigned special duties, but also the involvement of Kamakura warriors in the process. In 1193 Ashikaga Yoshikane, one of Kamakura's most powerful warriors, endowed Tsurugaoka shrine with lands to support two monks whose duties were to pray on behalf of the Ashikaga. Yoshikane wanted to secure ongoing services for himself, his ancestors and descendants, while at

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36 AK, Karoku 2 (1226)/10/21; Godensu shiki shidai, 114.
the same time forming a symbolic connection to the bakufu. For that purpose he commended lands under his control to the shrine, built a hall by the East gate, presented two mandalas, and in 1194 the two monks were assigned to the new office of the Sacred Platform of the Dual Realms (ryōkai danjō). The first monk was Nanzōbō Ryōsei, and the second monk was Rengebō Shōen. Shōen was the same monk who was appointed in 1191 to the office of Main Hall Attendant. While remaining in the senior resident monks office of Rengebō, he was temporarily assigned to special duties as the need arose.37

These two examples reveal a certain pattern. First, the title (e.g., Rengebō, Zenshōbō, etc') of a senior resident monk did not involve specific duties. The title of the office also served to identify the physical structure where a monk resided and worked. At the same time, in order to identify each monk with his office, the title was also used in conjunction with the monk's name (e.g., Rengebō Shōen). Second, the senior resident monk offices were often long-term appointments. Third, special duties involved additional offices and separate sources of support, and were short-term appointments.

37 Shoshiki shidai, 131-32, 134.
The Chief Administrator (bettō) of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine was undoubtedly the most influential clergymen in Kamakura. The selection and appointment of bettō required a careful consideration of his personal ability based on previous appointments and reputation. Special attention was given to his religious powers as revealed in successful prayers in cases of natural disasters or sickness for example, and to his skills as administrator in other temples. The main prerequisite, though, was that he be affiliated with a temple favored by the bakufu, specifically Onjōji of the jimon-ha or Tōji of the tōmitsu doctrines, and that he be a disciple of a respected teacher. After he was officially appointed, it was only a matter of his performance and bakufu considerations that determined his length of term in office.

The bettō held the status of a shogunal deputy (shōgun no daikan) and appointed monks under the authority of the shogun. The process of appointments of monks followed an established pattern according to which a monk, who inherited an office by receiving an inheritance decree (yuzurijō), filed an official claim to that office by posting his name in a registrar in the main shrine. The claim was then processed and confirmed by the bettō. If the bettō refused to acknowledge the claim for any reason, the monk could petition the shogun himself, and receive an official shogunal confirmation to office directly from the shogun. However, the practice of claiming one's

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38 For a list of Tsurugaoka Hachiman bettō see appendix D, table 1.
office by petition was only experimental during the Kamakura period. Most monks were selected and appointed by the bettō, then they were invited to take residence in Kamakura.\textsuperscript{39}

Similarly, the bettō could terminate monks’ appointments either in compliance with bakufu orders or on his own judgment. The first time such power of termination of office was exercised by a bettō was after the assassination of Minamoto Sanetomo. The assassin, the fourth bettō, Kugyō, was executed, and three monks who supported him were replaced. Kenshin was replaced by Enjōbō Enjō, and Ryūben was replaced by Jōrenbō Kyōjun.\textsuperscript{40} Then, some two and a half decades later, following the Hōji War (1247), the bakufu terminated the office term of the bettō Jōshin because of his association with Miura Yasumura, whom Hōjō Tokiyori eliminated. After the war Tokiyori appointed Ryūben in his stead. Once in office, Ryūben terminated the terms of four monks who joined Jōshin in support of Yasumura, and replaced them with four new monks. By the end of the Kamakura period, appointments to twelve of the twenty five senior resident monks’ offices have been terminated and replaced.\textsuperscript{41}

Once in office, the bettō’s responsibilities included organization of religious events, performance of rituals and prayers, appointments and

\textsuperscript{39} Shintō taikei, Jisha hen, Tsurugaoka hachimangū, 116.

\textsuperscript{40} Shoshiki shidai, 76, 109. AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/1/29, 30, 2/1. The third monk, Seiryobō Ryōyū, was not replaced until 1258.

\textsuperscript{41} Shintō taikei, Jishahen, Tsurugaoka hachimangū, 103-106.
confirmations, and special services for the bakufu, which often involved a political aspect to them. To illustrate all these components it is best to look at some of the most prominent administrators whose terms in office reflected the importance of the role they played under direct supervision of the Hōjō regents.

Engyō and Yoritomo

Yoritomo's selection of Engyō to the highest office in the Tsurugaoka shrine was undoubtedly due to Engyō's qualifications as a monk, and his respected genealogy as an aristocrat. He was the grandson of the third son of Emperor Go-Sanjō, and his mother was the daughter of Rokujō Tameyoshi, thus his lineage indeed provided him with the necessary genealogy for advancement. Go-Sanjō's reign was problematic for his attempts to restore political power to the imperial house after the Fujiwara influence at court threatened to undermine imperial authority. Unlike other potential heirs to the throne, his mother was not a Fujiwara but rather the daughter of Emperor Go-Sanjō.

During his reign Go-Sanjō brought into the aristocratic ranks a number of Minamoto in order to shift the balance away from the Fujiwara.42 Then, he tried to delay the appointment of his son, Sadahito, to Crown Prince

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because his mother was the daughter of Fujiwara no Moshi, and Go-Sanjō feared that the Fujiwara would once again gain power through this appointment. Sadahito was finally appointed Crown Prince in 1069 because there was no other son to take this appointment. However, when Go-Sanjō's second son, Prince Sanehito, was born to a Minamoto mother, Go-Sanjō abdicated and appointed Sanehito as Crown Prince. Later, when Sanehito's mother, Minamoto Motoko, gave birth to Go-Sanjō's third son, Prince Sukehito, Go-Sanjō selected Sukehito to succeed Sanehito.⁴³ Go-Sanjō's clear preference of the Minamoto on one hand, and his known support of Shingon and Tendai, but without showing favoritism toward either Enryakuji or Onjōji,⁴⁴ on the other, must have been an important factor in Yoritomo's choice of Engyō, whose lineage was a combination of Minamoto and the imperial house. In addition, Engyō held the chūnagon title, was educated in Onjōji, and was a senior disciple of the respected monks Gyōkei and Kōgyō. These factors made Engyō a prime candidate for the office of bettō.⁴⁵

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Three days after Engyō’s arrival in Kamakura, he had an audience with Yoritomo, on which occasion Yoritomo confirmed his appointment. It marked the establishment of the office of bettō and his residence in the western part of the shrine. For the construction of the residence Yoritomo appointed Ôba Heita Kageyoshi, one of his most trusted warriors, as a supervisor. This act was a clear indication of the importance of that office for Yoritomo. It also set the stage for warrior involvement in shrine affairs.

Yoritomo and Engyō set precedence for warrior involvement in the construction and patronage of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine, as well as warrior participation in ceremonies and rituals. In the second month of 1185, monks from Kamakura gathered at Tsurugaoka to recite the Daihannya-kyō in prayers for the subjugation of the Heike. On that occasion Kagetoki and Kageyoshi administered the offering of three hundred kan. Then, in the third month of 1188, Kajiwara Kagetoki was appointed the master of prayers (ganshū) for the Great Dharma Gathering (daihōe). Similarly, Yoritomo appointed warriors to supervise any major construction, such as raising the

46 AK, Jūei 1 (1182)/9/20, 23. Shoshiki shidai, 3; Shamushiki shidai, 143-44. On the twentieth day of the ninth month of 1182, Engyō arrived in Kamakura. Three days later, he met with Yoritomo at Tsurugaoka shrine. In that meeting, Yoritomo confirmed Engyō’s appointment as bettō.

47 AK, Jūei 1 (1182)/9/26. The bettō residence (bettōbō) was constructed in the western area of Tsurugaoka shrine.

48 AK, Genryaku 2 (1185)/2/13; Shamushiki shidai, 143.

49 AK, Bunji 4 (1188)/3/15.
nine-rings pagoda, construction of the upper shrine, or for occasional repairs. 50

Engyō, as the first bettō who had to be in contact with some of the most powerful and influential warriors in Kamakura, was in a position that placed him as the link between the bakufu and its warriors on one side, and on the other side, Tsurugaoka shrine. The extent of Engyō's influence reached beyond the immediate relationships in Kamakura. When Yoritomo had to resolve problems in Onjōji temple, he chose Engyō as his representative.

Onjōji supported Yoritomo from his early rise to leadership, and when the temple was threatened by internal disputes, Yoritomo had to intervene. From the outset, the dispute was about the appointment of an abbot to the temple, which caused violent confrontations between groups of monks. This may have coincided with another heated dispute between Onjōji and Enryakuji over the abbotship of Shitennōji. In 1196, Enryakuji challenged Onjōji's control of that abbotship which was confirmed seven years earlier by Emperor Go-Shirakawa. 51 The threat of escalation of the disputes to the level of armed clashes among Onjōji monks, and between Onjōji and Enryakuji, could have potentially affected the relationship between Yoritomo and the

50 Construction of the pagoda: AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/3/13; Shamushiki shidai, 144. Services for the new pagoda: AK, and Gyokuyō, vol. 2, Bunji 5 (1189)/6/9. Raising the beams for the upper shrine: AK, Kenkyū 2 (1191)/4/26; Shamu kiroku, 1; Shamushiki shidai, 144; Transfer of the god's image from Otokoyama to the upper shrine: AK, Kenkyū 2 (1191)/11/2; Shamushiki shidai, 144; Shamu kiroku, 1. Shrine repairs: AK, Kenkyū 3 (1192)/1/3; Shamu kiroku, 1.

51 Jimon kōsōdenki. Also, see Adolphson, The Gates of Power, 208.
court. It was, therefore, important that Yoritomo defuse the tensions before they escalated and caused political instability.

In the fourth month of 1196, Yoritomo sent Engyō as his emissary to "bring peace" to Onjōji. It is unclear how long Engyō remained in Onjōji, nor do we know the details of his efforts once he arrived at the temple. Yet, it seems that he was successful in calming down the tensions. The dispute between Onjōji and Enryakuji resolved in favor of Onjōji—at least until the death of the abbot of Shitennoji. Once stability had been restored, Engyō returned to Kamakura. This marked the first such duty of the bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine. The lack of written instructions concerning Engyō's duty and mission suggests that, as a trusted figure, he was allowed to represent Yoritomo's authority in any manner he thought would best serve Yoritomo's purpose of settling the dispute.

Engyō held the office of bettō for nineteen years, longer than most of those who succeeded him. After his death in 1200 at the age of fifty six, the bakufu under the regency of Hōjō Yoshitoki appointed Engyō's younger brother, Songyō, as the second bettō.52 Similar to Engyō, his lineage and education made him a natural successor. However, Songyō was less influential than his brother, and he was mostly occupied with religious practices. An example of his status was when shogun Sanetomo visited the

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52 Shamushiki shidai, 12; Shamu kiroku, 2.
shrine for the first time in 1204. At that time there was recitation of the ten thousand fascicles of the Jōmyōkyō and Daihanyakyo sutras at the upper shrine, followed by two days recitation of the Gohakko at the upper and lower shrines, and the Eighty-Four Thousand Pagodas Memorial services. At such an important occasion one would have expected Songyō to lead the services, but instead, the master of ceremonies was the monk Anrakubō Jūkyō. The reason for Songyō's weak stature, other than that he probably had a feeble personality, was that while Engyō benefitted from Yoritomo's favor, there was no appointed shogun to endow similar status to Songyō in the first two years of his appointment. His term in office was brought to an end after only six years, and in the fifth month of 1206, Jōgyō was appointed to the office of bettō.

53 AK, Genkyū 1 (1204)/1/5.

54 Between Yoritomo's death in 1199, and Yorifie's appointment in 1202, the bakufu was without an appointed shogun. The bakufu was dominated by Masako and the leading Hōjō. AK, Shōji 1 (1199)/1/13, Kennin 2 (1202)/7/23; Kugyō bunin, Kennin 2 (1202)/7/23. Also see Tabata Yasuko, Jōnin seiji no chūsei: hōjō masako to hino tomiko (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1996), 10-61. For a recent study of the life of Masako after the death of Yoritomo, see Nomura Ikuyo, Hōjō masako: ama shōgun no jidai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000).

55 According to Tsurugaoka records, Songyō deeded the office of bettō to Jōgyō in the fifth month of 1206. The bakufu later approved Jōgyō to the office. Shoshiki shidai, 3; Gusō shidai, 197. Songyō died in 1209, three years after he resigned from the office of bettō. For lack of any explanation concerning the transfer of office, the only plausible explanation, though speculation, is that Songyō was ill and could not perform his duties.
The Evil Bettô

The bettô at Tsurugaoka were not expected to take political initiatives, become involved in internal affairs of the bakufu, or worse, resort to violence against a bakufu official. The bakufu selected and appointed them to serve the bakufu's religious needs, and as such they were never seen as potentially harmful to the bakufu or to leading warriors. For that reason, no one suspected that a bettô would hold a personal grudge against the shogun himself, strong enough to end in a dramatic assassination. The perpetrator was Kugyô, commonly known as the "evil bettô (aku bettô)."

By birth Kugyô was a warrior, but as it often happened in accordance with customs and as necessity dictated, he was sent to become a monk. This practice, which was common among aristocrats when there was more than one son in the family, was adopted by warriors for the same purpose of reducing the division of inheritance and related disputes, while at the same time gaining power within religious institutions. Having been the second son meant that Kugyô was not necessary for the preservation of Yoriie's lineage.

He began his religious life at a young age, though exact details of his education are unclear. As a young monk in Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine he was a disciple of Jôgyô, who was the third bettô at the time. Prior to his appointment to that office, from the summer of 1216, Kugyô spent time in Onjôji as a visiting monk for the purpose of mastering doctrines and in
preparation for his promotion. Less than a year later he returned to Kamakura to receive his appointment to the office of bettō.\textsuperscript{56} Four months later, after praying at the shrine, Kugyō entered a thousand-day-retreat.\textsuperscript{57}

On the twenty seventh day of the first month of 1219, Kugyō, the fourth bettō, assassinated the third Minamoto shogun, Sanetomo.\textsuperscript{58} The motive for the assassination was personal revenge. Kugyō, who was the second son of the second Minamoto shogun, Yoriie, believed that Sanetomo, Yoriie's younger brother and Kugyō's uncle, was behind the death of his father. The assassination, according to the Azumakagami, came as a surprise attack that caught everyone off guard. It is also possible that what added to the surprise was the fact that Kugyō was supposed to be engaged in a thousand-days-retreat near the upper shrine. At any rate, if Sanetomo's assassination was indeed motivated by revenge and carried out by one person, which seems to be the impression the writers of the Azumakagami wanted to convey, then the whole incident would simply remain an unfortunate event that began and ended with Kugyō.

But circumstances hint otherwise, and a review of events before and after the assassination suggests that leading warriors were also involved. A

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Shamushiki shidai, 145-46; AK, Kenpō 5 (1217)/6/20.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Shamushiki shidai, 145-46; AK, Kenpō 5 (1217)/10/18.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Shamushiki shidai, 146; AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/1/27. Sanetomo's assassination is also recorded in Gukanshō, 311-12, as well as Masukagami, Shōkyūki, Kamakura nendaiki, and various Tsurugaoka records.
\end{itemize}
few days before the assassination, Minamoto Yorimochi visited Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine. While engaging in prayers, he fell asleep and saw a prophetic dream that had clear signs of a bad omen. He immediately reported his dream to bakufu officials who then ordered fortune telling. The results of the fortune telling were not recorded in the Azumakagami, but they seem to have disturbed Hōjō Yasusada and Nobutaka, who were bakufu officials. Yet, no special prayers were conducted, and no special measures were taken in regard to Sanetomo's scheduled visit to Tsurugaoka shrine just a few days later.

The purpose of Sanetomo's visit to the shrine was to express his gratitude for having received the title of Minister of the Right (udaijin) from the court two months earlier. Since such prayers were customarily conducted after nightfall, and because of an unexpectedly heavy snowfall earlier that day, the procession moved slowly. Unusual events already started upon passing Yagura gate in the entrance to the shrine. Under the excuse of sudden sickness, Hōjō Yoshitoki decided to return to his Kamakura residence instead of proceeding to the shrine. As the assigned carrier of the shogunal sword, an honorary position given to warriors close to the shogun, he had the responsibility of finding an appropriate person to replace him. Selection of the sword carrier was normally arranged well in advance, perhaps even in consultation with the shogun himself. For Yoshitoki there was no time for

59 AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/1/27.
consultation, thus it did not follow formal procedure. It had to be his own
decision, and it had to be done immediately. Yoshitoki then chose Minamoto
Nakaaki as his replacement, and returned to his residence in Komachi, not
far from the shrine. This was a peculiar choice because Nakaaki was a warrior
by birth but a scholar by profession. 60

Indeed, Nakaaki was unable to defend Sanetomo when Kugyô attacked
and cut him down as he climbed down the stone steps from the upper shrine.
Kugyô was able to escape in the commotion that followed. Yoshitoki was
then informed of the incident and, as if he was not suffering from ill health,
left his home in pursuit of the perpetrator. Kugyô was found hiding in the
residence of one of his followers, and was caught by Yoshitoki and executed.
A number of Kugyô's followers were also punished. The incident was
brought to a conclusion within a short time, leaving no apparent heir to
Yoritomo's line.

Among Yoritomo's nine children, Yoriie and Sanetomo were the
designated heirs, two were adopted by Yoritomo and were not entitled to
succeed him, two were sent to become monks, one remains unknown, and
two were daughters. 61 Yoriie, the eldest son, had five children. The first son
was killed in battle when he was six years old. The next three sons were

60 For the order of the procession, see AK, Shôkyû 1 (1219)/1/27.

61 There are inconsistent accounts concerning the number of Yoritomo's children. Here I
referred to the Sonpi bunmyaku, vol. 3, 296-98, which seems to offer the most detailed
genealogy.
monks, and the fifth child was a daughter. It is unclear why the second son, Kugyō, was sent to become a monk, even though he was the legal heir to Yoriie's lineage. As for Sanetomo, recorded genealogies fail to indicate heirs. Therefore, after the death of Yoritomo and Yoriie, Sanetomo was the sole heir to Yoritomo's line, and with his assassination the title of shogun was no longer a hereditary Minamoto office.

Jōgō

The assassination of Sanetomo by Kugyō caused the bakufu to change its policy of selecting Onjōji monks to fill the office of bettō. Though Keikō, the monk who succeeded Kugyō, was also an Onjōji monk, his appointment only lasted for a year and left no significant mark. In most likelihood he was appointed because of the unexpected elimination of Kugyō, and because he held the office of abbot of Yōfukuji, and was therefore the most qualified candidate at the time. His year in office at Tsurugaoka allowed the bakufu to re-evaluate its connection to Onjōji in light of the assassination of Sanetomo by Kugyō. Having an Onjōji lineage no longer guaranteed loyalty.

In 1220 the bakufu appointed Jōgō as the sixth bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine. He held the office for only two years, but his total service in Kamakura marked a significant change in Kamakura's religious world, and brought clergy influence to a higher level. He was also the first monk who
initially gained respect and reputation in Kamakura, and only then went to Kyoto.

His family lineage, similar to Tsurugaoka bettō before him, was a determining factor in his bakufu appointments. By birth Jōgō was of Minamoto lineage, son of Fifth Rank Minamoto Nobutoshi. He was a descendant of Emperor Daigo and Minamoto Takaakira. But unlike many Minamoto sons who were sent to Onjōji to become monks, Jōgō became a tōmitsu monk.

While Jōgō's family genealogy provided him with the necessary prerequisite to serve in a high post in Kamakura, his Buddhist genealogy actually gave him an advantage over other potential candidates. In 1180, at the age of thirty, Jōgō received the Dharma transmission from the monk Kengo at Ninniku-san Enseiji temple, which was affiliated with Ninnaji temple. Jōgō's teacher, Kengo, received his transmission from Kakuben, who was the designated protective monk (gojisō) to Emperor Go-Shirakawa. Kakuben was a respected Ninnaji monk who founded Enseiji in 1153 and established the Enseiji lineage. Kakuben, followed by his senior disciple, Jōben, became abbots of Tōji. After serving as the abbot of Tōji, Jōben became the abbot of

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62 Sonpi bunmyaku, vol. 3, 462, 474; Shokuiji bunin.

63 The affiliation of Enseiji to Ninnaji was recorded in Ninnaji shoingeki.

Jōgō received the Dharma transmission in Jishō 4 (1180)/2, but the record of the transmission is dated Ryakunin 1 (1238)/9/24, in Kechimyaku ruishuki, Tōji chōja bunin, and DNS 5:11, 950, Mei’in engi. Kengo himself had a family connection to the Fujiwara. He was the uncle of Fujiwara Takanobu, whose father's (Tametsune) wife remarried to Fujiwara Toshinari and gave birth to the famous poet Fujiwara Teika.
Tōdaiji, during which time he lead the ceremonies for the Daibutsu of Tōdaiji. For Jōgō, this Buddhist lineage and the precedents set by his teachers, though recent in historical terms, proved to be useful not only for qualifying him to serve in Kamakura, but also for posts in Kyoto.

In 1191 Yoritomo appointed Jōgō to the office of Eigenbō, one of the primary monk offices in the shrine. Three years later, Jōgō was among ten selected monks who conducted prayers and rituals for the first anniversary of Go-Shirakawa's death. Each of the ten monks led a group of one hundred monks, and was assisted by two warriors. Jōgō was assisted by the warriors Taira Moritoki and Nakahara Mitsuie. His participation in such a leading role reflected his rising status in Kamakura in advance of further promotions, albeit not in Tsurugaoka shrine. A promotion within the ranks of Tsurugaoka monks could only entail becoming the shrine's bettō. But Jōgō was not yet ready for the highest office.

Shortly after Yoritomo's death in 1199, and nine years in the office of Eigenbō, Jōgō was appointed to the prestigious position of bettō of Shōchōjūin. This was not only a considerable promotion but also an indication of appreciation of Jōgō's stature. Jōgō's appointment was the highest he could achieve at the time due to his lack of experience, which may

64 Tōdaiji bettō shidai; Tōji chōja bunin; Tōdaiji yōroku; Sankaiki, Bunji 1(1185)/8/28.
65 AK, Kenkyū 4 (1193)/3/13.
66 Shoshiiki shidai, 80, 232.
also have been the reason why Jōgō remained in this office for twenty years. However, Jōgō’s long time in that office made his seniority an appropriate qualification for heading the bakufu’s most influential religious institution. Yet, seniority was not the only reason, perhaps not even the primary one, for his final promotion in Kamakura.

Jōgō’s Buddhist genealogy was a major consideration in the bakufu’s decision to appoint him to Shōchōjūin. The bakufu seized the opportunity to bring to an end the strong influence of Mongaku’s disciples, who held the abbotship for all Kamakura temples that were established and patronized by Yoritomo, by appointing Jōgō. The previous abbot of the temple was Jōga, a former disciple of the famous monk Mongaku, who also held the office of bettō of Yōfukuji before he was appointed to Shōchōjūin. The close relationships between Mongaku and Yoritomo paved the way for Mongaku and his disciples to assume high clerical positions. Why Yoritomo appointed them to temples under his patronage but not to offices in Tsurugaoka shrine remains unclear. One explanation may be that since Mongaku was somewhat of an eccentric and recluse, he never gained the respect and reputation similar to monks who came from Onjōji, for example. As such, Mongaku could not have endowed his disciples with the kind of résumé necessary for recognition. In addition, Mongaku was an ardent Minamoto advocate that the Hōjō-dominated bakufu preferred not to support in order to strengthen Hōjō influence. After Yoritomo’s death, Jōgō’s tōmitsu gradually replaced
Mongaku's school. Finally, in 1220 Jōgō was appointed to the office of bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine, and was replaced by Shinkei as bettō of Shōchōjūin.

Jōgō held the office of bettō for less than two years, during which the construction the twenty-five monk offices that Yoritomo started was completed. But what marked his term in office was the services he provided the bakufu during its first real challenge, the Jōkyū War. Less than two weeks after Go-Toba issued a decree calling for the destruction of Hōjō Yoshitoki, the bakufu ordered Jōgō to organize Buddhist prayers and rituals with many monk participants. The services continued for two consecutive days and included among them a Daininnō-e ("Great Benevolent Kings Gathering"), which is a ceremony conducted for stopping all calamities and threats to the state. In this case, Go-Toba was the threatening calamity, and the bakufu saw itself as representing the state.

The bakufu's swift and successful handling of Go-Toba raised Jōgō esteem in the eyes of the bakufu. However, practical considerations dictated that the bakufu needed to tighten its control on western Japan, and since Jōgō was viewed as a strong bakufu supporter, the bakufu required his services to that effect. In 1221 Jōgō left Tsurugaoka shrine and traveled to Kumano, where he became the Kumano Controller (Kumano kengyō) of the Three Kumano Mountains (Kumano sanzan). Later he became the head abbot

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67 Shamushiki shidai, 146; Shoshiki shidai, 4; Kumano sanzan kengyō shidai; Yuyama Manabu argues that the bakufu rewarded Jōgō's successful prayers during the Jōkyū War by appointing him to Kumano. Yuyama, Tsurugaoka hachimangū no chūsei teki sekai, 7.
(zasu) of Denpōin, then left this office to become the head abbot of Tōji. Jōgō, however, did not stop at that. Following the abbotship of Tōji he was appointed abbot of Tōdaiji, then Meiōin. In addition he held some twenty offices in and around Kyoto. From among all his appointments, it seems that the longest one was in Shōchōjūin, and the abbotship in Tsurugaoka was one of the shortest. This may have been related to the fact that under the leadership of Yoritomo and Tokimasa he was unable to leave Kamakura, but the Jokyu War created a new reality for the bakufu and for Jōgō.

**Ryūben and the Hōjō**

The bakufu departed from its policy of appointing Onjōji monks to the office of bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine with the appointment of Jōgō in 1220, and ended it with the appointment of the Onjōji monk Ryūben in 1247. This reversal of policy was not pre-planned or the result of changing general attitudes, but rather a matter of unexpected developments. Ryūben first arrived in Kamakura in 1234 to serve as a personal monk of the shogun Fujiwara Yoritsune in the shogunal Buddha Hall (jibutsudō) of Kuonjūryōin.68 During the ten years he served Yoritsune, Ryūben became known for his powerful prayers. Then, a month before the bakufu replaced Yoritsune with his son Fujiwara Yoritsugu, Ryūben's destiny began to change.

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68 Shamushiki shidai, 147-48; AK, Bunryaku 1 (1234)/3/2.
Though Ryūben came from a respected court family, his genealogy gave him only a little help in climbing the ranks of Kamakura monks. He was the son of Senior Counselor (dainagon) Shijō Takafusa, who was an attendant (insu) in the service of Retired Emperor Go-Toba. His mother was the daughter of Middle Counselor (chûnagon) Fujiwara Mitsumasa, and the second wife of Takafusa (his first wife was the daughter of Taira no Kiyomori). Being the first son of the second wife placed him in secondary position as an heir. At the age of 13 (1219) he entered Onjōji Daigakuin as a young acolyte, and became a disciple of the monk Kakuchō. That excluded him from the Shijō lineage, and sealed his future as a monk, but his family background was still a factor in his advancement.

The son of Ryūben’s elder brother was Takatsuna, who married the daughter of Ōuchi Koreyoshi, a dominant figure among Kamakura warriors. He also married the daughter of Bômon Nobukiyo, who was the bettō of the office of the Retired Emperor Go-Toba. Nobukiyo’s wife was the daughter of the sister of shogun Sanetomo’s wife. Takachika, Nobukiyo’s son Tadanobu, and Koreyoshi’s son Korenobu joined the court’s army in the Jōkyū War of 1221. On Ryūben mother’s side, Fujiwara Mitsuchika, uncle of Ryūben’s mother, wrote the imperial order of arrest of Hôjō Yoshitoki. He was caught by bakufu forces during the war and was taken to Kamakura. On the way, however, he was beheaded. Takachika survived the war and was later

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69 Sonpi bunmyaku, vol. 2, 365; Mii zokutōki.
employed in Retired Emperor Go-Saga’s council (hyōjōshū).\footnote{See Hashimoto Yoshihiko, “In hyōjōshū ni tsuite” in Kamakura seiken, vol. 4 of Ronshū nihon rekishi (Yūseidō Shuppan, 1976), 305-18.} He then married the daughter of a prominent warrior, Ashikaga Yoshiuji. Ryūben’s brother’s nephew, Reizei Takamochi, was a private attendant to the Kamakura shogun.\footnote{AK, Shōka 1 (1257)/12/24, Bun’ō 2 (1261)/1/7.} These complex web-like family connections show that Ryūben was linked by family ties to those who opposed the bakufu and those who joined it. For Ryūben, that seem to have been a detriment to promotion that was only balanced by his Onjōji education, the fact that he received Dharma transmission and the Buddhist title of ajari from the Kamakura monk En’i, but most importantly, his personal ability.

Sicknesses and calamities helped Ryūben make a name for himself as a powerful monk. In the middle of the third month of 1244, Yoritsugu fell sick. The bakufu ordered Ryūben to perform special rituals, including a fire ceremony, to the deity Fudō to secure the health of Yoritsugu. But his sickness continued with high fever, and Ryūben continued with prayers until Yoritsugu regained his health.\footnote{AK, Kangen 2 (1244)/3/12-15, 18, 27, 30.} A month later, when Yoritsugu was appointed shogun instead of his father, Ryūben remained in his service. It seemed that Ryūben’s services to battle sickness were necessary because in the fifth month of that year Yoritsugu fell sick again. Ryūben was ordered to perform rituals and prayers for Yoritsugu in the fifth and seventh months,
and for both Yoritsugu and Yoritsune in the eighth month. In the eleventh month he performed rituals to Kasuga Daimyōjin because of flooding in Kamakura.73 This continued in the following year, most significantly when first Yoritsugu fell ill in the sixth month, followed by Hōjō Tsunetoki’s illness, after which Ryūben received a sword from the former shogun Yoritsune for his successful prayers.74 At the end of the year, Ryūben left Kamakura and went to Kyoto until the end of the ninth month of 1246.75

During Ryūben’s stay in Kyoto, Hōjō Tokiyori was appointed regent, and merely two days after Ryūben returned to Kamakura, Tokiyori solicited his services in carving an image of Yakushi-nyorai. When two weeks later Tokiyori ordered Ryūben to perform various services on his behalf, it became clear that Ryūben was now in the service of Tokiyori, not of the shogun. The final step toward establishing trust between Tokiyori and Ryūben was in the Hōji War.

By the beginning of 1247, Tokiyori viewed Miura Yasumura as a threat to the Hōjō and began preparations for the elimination of the Miura house. His main ally was Adachi Kagemori, who left Kii province and arrived in Kamakura together with his sons Yoshikage and Yasumori. Ryūben’s early success earned him Tokiyori’s respect, making Ryūben known among

73 AK, Kangen 2 (1244)/5/18,29, 11/3; DNS 5:19, 64, Shomonzekiden.
74 AK, Kangen 3 (1245)/6/14, 7/19, 24, 8/5.
75 DNS 5:20, 419, Shomonzekiden.
Kamakura warriors and clergy for his competence. That recognition prompted both Hōjō Tokiyori and Adachi Yoshikage to employ Ryūben for special prayers and rituals to ensure their success in eliminating Miura Yasumura. Yoshikage first had Ryūben perform esoteric rituals (hīhō) for a newly completed image of Aizen Myōō. A week later, Hōjō Tokiyori ordered Ryūben to conduct a fire ritual (goma) to Sonnōō for the same purpose of securing victory against the Miura. Eventually, Tokiyori secured a victory against the Miura house, and thus eliminated further threats to the Hōjō. For Tokiyori, Ryūben was instrumental in protecting the Hōjō. A few days after the war, the bakufu ended Jōshin’s term as the bettō of Tsurugaoka because of his support for Miura Yasumura. As his replacement, and as a reward for his services, Tokiyori appointed Ryūben to the office of bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine.

Ryūben was the longest serving bettō and his influence exceeded those who came before and after him. As bettō of Tsurugaoka Hachimangū, Ryūben acted on behalf of the bakufu in religious disputes which the bakufu

76 AK, Hōjī 1/4/28 (1247). Aizen Myōō (Sk. Rāga Vidyārāja) is the God of Love in the esoteric pantheon, for whom one prays in order to gain the affection of another. The Aizen Myōō ritual is also conducted to achieve success in subduing one’s enemy. See Bukkyōgo daijiten, 16.

77 AK, Hōjī 1/5/9 (1247). Sonnōō is a reference to the Big Dipper in terminology associated with Onjōji. It is also refers to the female bodhisattva form of Myōken, which is another term for the Big Dipper (hokuto shichisei). Services to Sonnōō are performed to prevent calamities and protect the land. See Bukkyōgo daijiten, 892, 1303.

78 AK, Hōjī 1 (1247)/5/9, 6/5,18, 27; Shamukireku, 7; Ryūben hōin saifōki; Shamushiki shidai, 147-48; Chōri kōsōryakuden, in jimon denki hōroku, 233.
normally preferred to avoid. Such involvement resulted from the re-emergence of hostilities between Onjōji and Enryakuji temples, starting with Onjōji’s demand for an independent ordination platform in 1257. Sparking the renewed demand was an apparent imperial preference of Onjōji, which gave Onjōji monks the confidence they needed. 79

In 1267 Ryūben became the only monk in the service of the Kamakura bakufu to hold the abbot offices of both Tsurugaoka shrine and Onjōji. Earlier, in 1250, the bakufu sent Ryūben to Onjōji to help Kiyohara Mitsuzane in various matters concerning Buddhist practices. 80 Then again, in the ninth month of that year, Ryūben traveled to Onjōji for the same purpose of helping raise the temple’s prosperity. 81 The confirmation of a Tsurugaoka monk by Ryūben, and a bakufu document to Ryūben ordering him to deal with rowdy Kamakura monks, suggest that he came back to Kamakura sometime before the end of the eleventh month. 82 However, a few days later Hōjō Tokiyori sent a messenger to Kyoto to inform Ryūben of the pregnancy of Tokiyori’s first wife and to ask him to pray for safe pregnancy. Tokiyori, whose first son was born from his second wife, wanted to secure a successful


80 *AK*, Kenchō 2 (1250)/2/23; *Shamu kiroku*, 8.

81 *AK*, Kenchō 2 (1250)/9/4; *DNS* 5:4, 764, *Kōdaireki*.

82 *THM*, doc. 7, Kenchō 2/11/28 (1250). Kantō migyōsho. This document, signed by the regent, Hōjō Tokiyori, and his co-signer, Hōjō Shigetoki, is an order to Ryūben to return to Kamakura. It explains that although Ryūben is handling the disturbance in Kyoto, he must return posthaste. For the text and explanation, see *THM*, 6-7.
birth of an appropriate successor. As per Tokiyori’s request, Ryûben returned
to Kamakura a few days later. As much as it was important for Tokiyori to
support Onjōji, securing a successor superseded such considerations.

The importance of this pregnancy is further illustrated by both Tokiyori
and Shigetoki’s orders to cease all killings of living things until after the fifth
month, when Tokiyori’s wife was scheduled to give birth. Until Shōjūmaru’s
(i.e., Tokimune) birth on the fifteenth day of the fifth month, Tokiyori
frequently requested Ryûben to perform rituals. Even after Tokimune was
born, Tokiyori assigned Ryûben to remain as the post-birth protective monk
(sangō no kaji) for his wife. This illustrates Ryûben’s strong personal
relationships with Tokiyori, who further entrusted Ryûben with political
responsibility by sending him to head Onjōji.

The rivalry between Onjōji and Enryakuji led to an attack by Enryaku
monks on Onjōji in the fifth month of 1264. The unrest and tension between
the temples, which threatened stability in the capital, caused considerable
concern in Kamakura. Finally, in the eleventh month of 1267, Ryûben, while
still bettō of Tsurugaoka Hachimangū, was appointed abbot of Onjōji. After
only a year Ryûben resigned from the abbotship and returned to Kamakura. His resignation came a few months after a letter from the Mongols that called

83 AK, Kenchô 2 (1250)/12/5, 13.
84 Shamu kiroku, 9; Sōkan bunin; DNS 5:5, 142, Monzekiden.
85 Shamu kiroku, 9.
for the establishment of Japan as a tributary state arrived at the Dazaifu.\textsuperscript{86} The letter caused immediate concern among courtiers and warriors, and in the fourth month, temples and shrines were ordered to pray for the protection of Japan.\textsuperscript{87} It is most likely that a sense of urgency overtook bakufu officials, who ordered Ryûben to return to Kamakura.

Since Ryûben's return to Kamakura until his next trip to the capital in 1271, the bakufu seems to have done some "house cleaning" in Tsurugaoka. In 1269 the bakufu enforced a law banishing anyone who was not a monk at Tsurugaoka from valleys near the shrine.\textsuperscript{88} Early in the Kamakura period these valleys were originally designated as monks' residences, but there was no clear restriction prohibiting laymen from residing there as well. Over the years, as Kamakura became a major metropolitan area in the Kantô, and as the population of both laymen and monks in the city grew, residential areas had to expand. Thus, Ryûben, as bettô of Tsurugaoka shrine, took part in the last significant stage of making Tsurugaoka shrine distinct in its size and influence from any other religious institution in Kamakura. Until his death in 1283, Ryûben continued to serve the bakufu, providing religious services

\textsuperscript{86} According to Hõjô kudaiki and Ichidai yôki the Mongol letter was received in Dazaifu on the first month of 1268.

\textsuperscript{87} Kichizokuki, Bun'ei 5/4 (1268).

\textsuperscript{88} DNS 5:5, 157, Kanda Yoshihira shi kyûzô monjo. According to this record, the bakufu issued the order in Bun'ei 6 (1269)/2/16.
and special rituals during the period of the Mongol invasions (1274, 1281). Attesting to his influence, Ryūben’s successors became abbots of Tsurugaoka shrine, Chōfukuji, and Seifukuji in Kamakura, and Onjōji in the capital.

**Conclusion**

For one who sought recognition as a leader of a coalition of powerful warrior families, but at the same time had no army of his own, no battle victories, not even battle experience, Yoritomo seemed in a rush to invest in a religious institution even before he had his own residence. Common sense would have dictated another course of action, perhaps building a fortress and gathering personal retainers first, then establishing a shrine. But it was precisely because Yoritomo had nothing but his clan's name that he needed to focus on reviving the fame of the Minamoto, re-establish its connection to the divine, and with that, convince others that he was the rightful leader of the Minamoto clan. Of course, Yoritomo offered those who followed him very real and substantial rewards, namely land confirmations. Yet, the act of constructing a new shrine had the psychological effect of convincing potential followers that Yoritomo would actually be successful.

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89 Ryūben died on Kōan 6 (1283)/9/15. Shamu kiroku, 13; Shoshiki shidai, 4.


In comparison to the old Tsurugaoka shrine, the new one was on a grand scale. Its location was carefully selected to provide the impression of superiority, the emphasis on re-affirmation of a connection to the god Hachiman served to confirm and legitimize, and the appointment of a number of monks from Kyoto to the new shrine provided the shrine with the respect it critically needed. For Yoritomo, then, Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine was both an anchor to Kamakura, his new headquarters, and a flag of his legitimacy, authority and clear intentions.

Dual function, Buddhist and Shinto, including Divination (onmyōdō), required that it included special structures for each function and its minor duties, and monks, priests and divination masters to conducted services. This required a hierarchy that could be achieved by clear separation of duties and offices. The ultimate purpose was to create a religious institution that could provide an answer to any problem, be it defense of the state from natural disasters, illnesses and epidemics, wars, or simply to provide the customary annual and seasonal rituals.

From the time Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine was established, it functioned beyond the religious institution that it was. Though a religious institution, in a reality in which religion and politics weave into each other in multiple ways, Tsurugaoka shrine became a practical political tool for the bakufu. Similarly, political issues influenced it. The bettō, as the head of Tsurugaoka, held political power, and was influential in a variety of ways. He
provided the bakufu with religious as well as political relief, conducting religious services on behalf of the bakufu, and solving political complications that the bakufu could not have resolved using its warriors.
CHAPTER 4
TSURUGAOKA HACHIMANGÔJI: RITUALS AND CULTURE

The fundamental role of Tsurugaoka Hachimangûji shrine-temple complex since its construction by Yoritomo was to provide Minamoto shoguns with direct association to a powerful divinity under whose protection they would prosper. The added political and social functions of Tsurugaoka resulting from the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu and its warrior society did not diminish its religious function, but enhanced it. As a bakufu institution Tsurugaoka Hachimangûji was required to not only provide religious services to the Minamoto shoguns themselves, but also to expand its activity to include the bakufu and the community of Kamakura warriors.

Religious Rituals and Practices

Hôjô: Origins in the Hachiman Cult

The origin of the Buddhist ritual of releasing living things (hôjô) in Kamakura can be traced to Yoritomo’s personal religious practices. Three months after Yoritomo received Prince Mochihito’s call-to-arms, he set a plan to attack and kill the military envoy (kebiishi) Yamagi Kanetaka. However, the Sasaki brothers, who were scheduled to arrive at Yoritomo’s
camp prior to the attack, were late and the attack had to be postponed. Yoritomo was inclined to postpone the attack under this pretext because the scheduled Buddhist ritual of releasing living things fell on the day of the attack, and would have prevented him from participation in the ritual. For Yoritomo, "who has practiced the release of living things in front of the image of Shô-Kannon for many years since his childhood, [hôjôe] was now a difficult [custom] to breach."¹

This entry in the Azumakagami is very revealing because it indicates that the origins of the hôjôe was not in a well-established ritual in which Kantô warriors had been participating regularly, but rather in Yoritomo's personal religious practices. Yet, at that time even Yoritomo did not regard the practice as unusually important. Use of the term "hôjô" in the Azumakagami text, vis-a-vis the later "hôjôe," tells us that it was not a formal gathering, but rather a personal practice that Yoritomo would have ignored if it were not for the late arrival of the Sasaki brothers. It took another seven years before the first performance of an official hôjôe was held in Kamakura. Until then, the ritual remained Yoritomo's private practice.²

¹ AK, Jishô 4/8/16 (1180).

² Martin Collcutt regards the hôjô ritual in 1180 as "one of the most important religious and symbolic ceremonies in Kamakura warrior society." See Martin Collcutt, "Religion in the Life of Minamoto Yoritomo and the Early Kamakura Bakufu," in Religion in Japan: Arrows to Heaven and Earth, ed. P. F. Kornicki and I. J. McMullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 96. However, on the eighth month of 1180 a warrior society in Kamakura did not yet exist. Therefore, identifying Yoritomo and the few warriors around him as "Kamakura warrior society" is somewhat misleading. Obviously, if such a society did not yet exist, we cannot talk of a Kamakura warriors' hôjôe custom.
The hōjōe ritual originated in Chinese Buddhist practices aimed at expressing compassion towards living beings. After first being practiced in Usa Hachiman shrine from the middle of the eighth century, it spread to other shrines and temples, most notably Iwashimizu Hachiman shrine. Unlike its purpose in Chinese Buddhism, in Japan the hōjōe was performed to appease the souls of the dead. The first practice of hōjōe in Usa Hachiman shrine followed a failed rebellion by the Hayato clan against imperial authority. For the first time the court adopted hōjōe as a way to appease the malevolent souls of a defeated enemy. This early event set the basic characteristics of the hōjōe as a ritual to protect the court from vengeful spirits of defeated enemies.  

The hōjōe was adopted into the Hachiman cult because of the complex character of the deity Hachiman, which qualified him as an amalgamation of a Shinto and a Buddhist deity. The imperial court viewed Hachiman as a powerful reincarnation of Emperor Ōjin, and as a great-bodhisattva (daibosatsu). Hachiman's dual identity made him both eternally connected to the imperial line and a protector of the realm. Thus, Hachiman was regarded

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as the god of war and protector of the state, who was later adopted by the warrior Minamoto clan as its tutelary deity.4

In this context we can see how the hōjōe came to play an important role in the Hachiman cult. First, warriors invoked Hachiman to help them eliminate their enemy, after which they performed a public, often spectacular hōjōe to appease the souls of the enemy dead. As Law has pointed out, performing the hōjōe in such manner and context "...ultimately legitimate[d] the violence of dominant authority..."5 It is not surprising, then, that Yoritomo made the hōjōe a central annual event at the heart of Kamakura warrior society in Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine.

Hōjōe in Yoritomo’s Kamakura

Preparations for the first hōjōe ritual at Tsurugaoka shrine began on the first day of the eighth month of 1187 with the issuance of an official notice concerning the upcoming ritual on the fifteenth day of the month. Nikaidō Yukimasa and Fujiwara Toshikane were selected to administer the notification of the event in and around Kamakura.6 Yoritomo decided to use


6 AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/8/1.
the occasion for a social gathering in which a customary mounted archery target competition (yabusame) would be performed by selected Kantō warriors. On the forth day of the month Yoritomo assigned five pairs of competing warriors for the yabusame, and on the ninth day four warriors supervised shrine cleaning and the construction of shrine stables.\(^7\) The hōjōe ritual itself took place on the fifteenth of the month, with Yoritomo and leading warriors participating in it. The Azumakagami, which is the main source of information about the hōjōe in Tsurugaoka shrine, does not provide a description of the ritual itself, perhaps because by the time Yoritomo established it as an annual ritual it had already been practiced for many years in the capital and its format was well known. It is also likely that because it is a short ritual there was not much to report other than that it was conducted. At any rate, the lack of elaborate preparations for the hōjōe and its seemingly casual occurrence indicate that Yoritomo had not yet made it a grand event.\(^8\)

After 1188, the hōjōe included not only yabusame but also court dance (bugaku).\(^9\) However, in 1190 Yoritomo changed the format of the hōjōe, clearly placing much more emphasis on its religious and social aspects. One and a half months before the scheduled hōjōe, Yoritomo ordered a cessation

\(^7\) AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/8/9. The warriors were Chiba Tsunetane, Koyama Tomomasa, Hatakeyama Shigetada, and Miura Yoshitsura.

\(^8\) AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/8/15.

\(^9\) AK, Bunji 4 (1188)/8/15.
of killing animals in Kantō provinces that were held in proprietorship (bunkoku). In addition, he changed the format of the hōjōe from a short one-day event to a two-day service. The first day began with hōjōe rituals, continued with a Hokkekyō (Hokke Sutra) service, and ended with a bugaku performance. The second day focused on social events and cultural entertainment, namely yabusame and formal display of horses (baba no gi). The two-day hōjōe in which the first day was devoted to rituals and religious services, and the second day to warrior and court cultures, became a model for the rest of the Kamakura period, though deviation from the model as it was set by Yoritomo became rather common.

The Hōjōe After Yoritomo

The hōjōe continued after Yoritomo's death (1199) although with less enthusiastic adherence to its ritual. In the first two decades after Yoritomo's death, postponements of the ritual occurred on a number of occasions. The result of these postponements, regardless of the causes, was that the date of its performance lost significance, and the number of participants was greatly reduced.

For the hōjōe in 1218, shogun Sanetomo arrived at Tsurugaoka shrine in a carriage escorted by just few attendants. Though the purpose of the visit was to participate in the annual hōjōe, it appeared as a personal visit that did not include a procession. On the second day there was only yabusame.
Perhaps Sanetomo was more interested in preparations for the waka poetry gathering (wakae) that was scheduled for the following month. As it happened, the wakae was especially exciting that year because fighting erupted between residents of Tsurugaoka shrine and Miura Mitsumura, which resulted in the bakufu barring those involved in the fighting from participation in the wakae. At any rate, Sanetomo's interest in court culture and poetry may have been the reason for his lack of enthusiasm for religious rituals. Shortly later he was assassinated.

The lack of any records of the hōjōe in the Azumakagami for the years 1219 and 1220 suggest that the ritual was canceled. A possible explanation is that, after Sanetomo's assassination, the bakufu remained without an appointed shogun. Then, after the end of the Jōkyū War (1221), the ritual that was scheduled to take place on its original date, the fifteenth day of the eighth month, was postponed because of "corruption and defilement." It is likely that the return of the hōjōe was prompted by the need to appease the spirits of those who died in the war, but numerous reports of warriors trying to take advantage of their victory in the war by lawless behavior (rōzeki) in the provinces may have hindered the preparations for the event. When the

10 AK, Kenpō 6 (1218)/8/15, 16.
11 AK, Kenpō 6 (1218)/9/13,14.
12 AK, Shōkyū 3 (1221)/8/15.
13 Shōkyū sannen yonnen hinamiki, 7th month. Also in Ninna ji hinamiki.
ritual was finally conducted, it was limited in scope and included only the viewing of prized horses (baba no gi).

Deaths of prominent Kamakura figures were another reason for postponements. In 1225 the bakufu postponed the hōjōe because of the death of Hōjō Masako, Yoritomo's widow, who had dominated the bakufu without holding a formal office. The hōjōe was postponed by more than three months and was finally performed toward the end of the eleventh month. No special events were conducted, thus ending the hōjōe on the same day.14 On a similar occasion, the scheduled hōjōe was postponed because of the death of a distant relative of shogun Yoritsune, and was performed four months late.15 It is curious that the death of a distant relative was the reason for a four-month delay instead of the more common one month.

The following alternative explanation for the postponement is more likely. At the end of the eighth month the shogun developed the symptoms of measles all over his body. Then, in the following days, there was unusual stormy weather, followed by a strong earthquake, and then stormy weather again. The tenth month seems to have been calm and allowed for some recuperation by the shogun, but it did not last long. In the beginning of the eleventh month another death of a relative kept the shogun's house busy. Two days later, another strong earthquake shook the Kantō, causing much

14 AK, Karoku 1 (1225)/8/15, 11/22.
15 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/8/15, 12/15.
damage in and around Kamakura. By that time the shogun had recovered from the measles, but almost as if following a written schedule Yoritsune developed syphilis. The red-spots-syphilis began to spread in Kamakura a few days before Yoritsune developed the symptoms, but within a week his condition had deteriorated. It was not before the middle of the twelve month, and after suffering serious pain, that he began to recover. The hōjōe was then performed in a most unremarkable manner, suggesting that Yoritsune did not participate in the services. Having no mention of his participation, together with the laconic description in the Azumakagami, suggests that the hōjōe was performed hastily just to maintain the custom.16

Two days before the hōjōe the bakufu made a quick decision to include wrestling (sumo) among the social events of that year's hōjōe. The inclusion of sumo was not unusual, but for reasons that are not immediately clear the bakufu waited until the last moment to make a decision on that matter. Similarly, the bakufu waited until two days before the hōjōe to issue new instructions concerning the arrangement of the procession and its participants. Hōjō Shigetoki first submitted a list of names on the basis of which the bakufu decided to increase the number of warriors in the leading guard from four to twelve. Then, on the day of the hōjōe the shogun, wearing a court robe, arrived in what seems to have been a moderately sized

procession. First he received a purification ritual (*harae*), followed by an incantation for strengthening his body. The shogun then proceeded to enter the shrine through the South Gate that was located on the Wakamiya road. By his side were Hōjō Shigetoki, who carried the shogunal sword, and Sahara Saburō, who carried the shogunal bow and arrows. This marked a return to customary decorum. In the following years the bakufu conducted the *hōjōe* regularly. The customary day was restored, and the shogun participated in the services and festivities.

*Hōjōe After the 1240s*

From the middle of the Kamakura period there were a few cancellations of the *hōjōe* for no apparent reason. The regencies of Tokiyori, Masamura, and Tokimune marked a gradual change in the procedures of the ritual, a trend that corresponded to changes in the political power and influence held by the Hōjō. Though it continued almost regularly, the *hōjōe* format was not rigidly fixed as in previous years. The event often lasted just one day, after the social events that followed the religious part were canceled. The *Kōan yonnen tsurugaoka hachiman sengūki* informs us that

17 *AK*, *Antei* 2 (1228)/8/11, 8/13, 8/15.


19 The *hōjōe* services in the years 1238, 1247, 1249, 1254, and 1264, were either canceled or shortened. We may assume that the services were affected by unpredicted reasons, such as the Hōji War, for example. Between 1264 and 1277 there was a major disruption in *hōjōe*
in 1281 the planned move of the Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine (sengū) was postponed due to the death of Hōjō Munemasa, but there is no mention of postponement of the hōjōe as had been common in similar cases in the past. Furthermore, the fact that a transfer of the shrine was scheduled for the day previously assigned for the hōjōe suggests that the bakufu did not even plan to conduct the ritual. Between 1297 and 1325 the hōjōe was postponed or canceled more times than it was performed. Surprisingly, in 1325, it was the first time in many years that the customary two-day hōjōe, which included the participation of the shogun, was again conducted. Yet it was a short-lived revival, as it was the last recorded hōjōe in the Kamakura period.

Omens and Natural Disasters

The use of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine for prayers and rituals in response to unusual natural phenomena and mysterious occurrences was common from the bakufu's early years. Following established court practices, Yoritomo and his successors prayed for the safety of the state, success in battle, services. It seems that the bakufu shifted its attention to the Mongol threat. Then again, between 1279 and 1296 there was another pause in services.

20 Kiōnen yonnen tsurugaoka hachiman sengū, Kiōnen 4 (1281)/8/14.

21 Shamu kiroku, 20. It is also interesting to note that it was also the last year the bakufu ordered a Dainin'ō-e ritual. See Matsuo Kenji, "Buke no toshi," in Bushi no miyako kamakura, ed. Ishii Susumu, 124-9. Especially, ibid., 126-7, table.

22 The next recorded hōjōe was in the Shamu kiroku in Engen 4 (1339)/8/15, but even after that year the practice did not seem to have been restored on regular basis.
protection of their health, and occasionally sought advice in matters of omens and heavenly phenomena.23

There is little doubt that Tsurugaoka provided Kamakura leaders and the bakufu with religious relief in cases of natural disasters, or guidance in matters of omens, but it was not until thirty years after the construction of Tsurugaoka that such prayers were institutionalized. In 1201 torrential rain and strong winds caused destruction in Kamakura, severely damaging Tsurugaoka shrine. Contrary to expectations, however, we find no indication that special prayers were conducted after the destruction.24 Then, in 1214, there were two strong earthquakes in Kamakura. Three months later, in the first month of 1215, fire broke out in the middle of Kamakura, burning houses around Tsurugaoka shrine and reducing to ashes an area of some twenty chô (1 chô = 2.45 acres).25 Though these disasters were comparable to any major disaster that struck the city in later years, once again there was no indication that the bakufu took any measures to cause the cessation of these calamities by performing rituals at Tsurugaoka shrine or anywhere else. Prayers were not held even when a strong typhoon caused the collapse of the

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23 For court practices, see Mitsuhashi Masa, Heian jidai no shinkô to shûkyô girei (Tokyo: Zoku Gunsho Ruiju Kanseikai, 2000); Yamanaka Yutaka and Suzuki Kazuo, eds., Heian jidai no shinkô to seikatsu (Tokyo: Shibundo, 1992); Hashimoto Yoshihiko, Heian kizoku shakai no kenkyū (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1976).

24 AK, Kennin 1(1201)/8/11; Shamu kiroku, 2-3.

25 AK, Kenpô 2(1214)/9/22, 10/6, Kenpô 3(1215)/1/11.
Great Torii at Maehama, and also caused severe damage to pagodas in Kamakura.²⁶

The bakufu's inconsistency in performing regular prayers and rituals after disasters may have been the result of the shogun's and regent's personal religious inclinations, the frequency and severity of natural disasters, or the constant changes and developments in the shrine. As a shrine-temple complex, Tsurugaoka had been under constant renovation and expansion since the first structure was erected by Yoritomo. Similarly, though the basic layout of offices and the clerical hierarchy of monks occupying the offices were set by Yoritomo, it remained an ongoing process of selecting monks to these offices. Following this process, even Shinto priests did not receive formal appointments at first. Divination masters were the last to be incorporated into Tsurugaoka's clergy. Lack of documentary evidence of formal appointments of divination masters indicate that their official status remained undecided as their appointments seem to have been temporary even though the bakufu employed them regularly. In sum, it was a period in which the role and practices of Tsurugaoka as a new religious institution of a society looking to formulate its identity were not yet defined in regular customs.

This, however, changed gradually during the rule of the third shogun, Minamoto Sanetomo. Perhaps the first indication that there was some

²⁶ AK, Kenpō 3 (1215)/8/18; Shamushiki shidai, 145.
attention given to battling natural disasters was the erection in 1216 of a new hall dedicated to the Big Dipper (hokuto) on the grounds of Tsurugaoka shrine. The bakufu's construction of the hall represented an important development in the expansion of the role of Tsurugaoka, allowing for regular rituals and prayers in matters concerning natural phenomena and omens, both of which were dealt with by monks and divination masters. Yet, in the case of omens, the question remains, were Kamakura leaders trying to imitate the court? Or did they display real concern for the meaning of omens?

An investigation of records from the 1220s provides some concrete answers to these questions, and individual cases illustrate the bakufu's religious practices. On the twenty-fourth day of the first month of 1219 Minamoto Yorimochi went alone to pray at Tsurugaoka shrine. In the evening, as he was kneeling in prayer and contemplating the meaning of the Buddhist teachings, he suddenly fell asleep. In his sleep he had a dream in which a dove was in front of him and a small child was at his side. After a while, the child picked up a stick, hit the dove and killed it. Then the child turned toward Yorimochi and hit his sleeve (kariginu). In the morning Yorimochi thought it was an odd dream, and to his surprise, when he went out to the garden, there was a dead dove lying on the ground. Alarmed by his experience, Yorimochi informed others of this odd occurrence. The bakufu then conducted fortune telling at the shrine. Since no action was taken other

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27 AK, Kenpō 4 (1216)/8/19; Shamushiki shidai, 145.
than an expression of discomfort by Hōjō Yasusada and Hōjō Norikata, we may assume that the results of the fortune telling did not reveal any reason for great concern. Yet, two days later, when walking down the stone steps from the main shrine at Tsurugaoka, shogun Sanetomo was cut down by his nephew Kugyō, who was the bettō of the shrine. Though Tsurugaoka failed to provide divine warning for what turned out to be a catastrophic event for the Minamoto, it did not diminish its role as provider of divine guidance.  

Some of the most common reasons for special rituals and prayers at Tsurugaoka were related to natural disasters: earthquakes, draughts, fires, and stormy weather. Some thirty days in 1222 without rainfall caused a draught that resulted in the spread of fires. To resolve the problem the bakufu ordered Tsurugaoka monks to conduct rain-producing rituals. After three days of such rituals it finally rained. But that was just the beginning of a series of disasters.

On the twenty-third day of the seventh month a strong earthquake struck Kamakura. Nine days later a comet appeared in the north-western skies. The comet emitted bright white light and had a reddish aura around it, which was an impressive one jō and seven shaku long (approx 5 m). By all

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28 AK, Shōkyū 1(1219)/1/25, 1/27.
29 AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/6/14.
30 AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/7/23.
31 AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/8/2.
accounts this was an unusually big comet that must have startled people, whether commoners or elite. By the middle of the month, when the bakufu conducted its annual hōjōe services, the comet's tail of light was down to one shaku (approx. 30 cm), but was probably blamed by Kamakura warriors for the uncharacteristically bad performance of yabuseme participants—not one was able to hit the target. Perhaps it was the latter that signaled to the bakufu that it must take actions to prevent the continuation of these destructive natural phenomena.32

Due to the severity of the situation the bakufu ordered a ritual for the thirty-six thousand gods (sanmanrokusenshin-sai), special rituals for heaven, earth, and nature (tenji saihen), a divination (onmyōdō) ritual for the master of hell (tensōchifusai), and a special ritual to the seven-stars constellation (shichiza no taizanfukun).33 In addition, the bakufu ordered the bettō of Tsurugaoka shrine to perform a fire ritual for the god Fudō (fudō goma), which lasted seven days.34 On the twenty-third day of the month the comet was still seen in the sky, and its tail was longer than in previous sightings, but

32 AK, Jō 1 (1222)/8/13, 8/15, 8/16. The monks probably read the Daiunrinshoukyō sutra because its purpose was specifically for rain making.

33 AK, Jō 1 (1222)/8/20. Taizanfukun originated in Chinese cosmology as the god of Mt. Tai, who governs people's fate. The belief was later fused into Chinese Buddhism and came to be known as Enma, the god of the realm of hell. In Japanese Buddhism the original Taizanfukun was identified with Jizō bosatsu (bodhisattva) and with Shakusan Gongen, who resided near Mt. Hiei. The purpose for the ritual of the Taizanfukun seems to have been to change the course of nature and save society from hell.

34 Ibid.
on the twenty-ninth day the master of meteorology finally announced that the comet had disappeared.\(^{35}\) This ordeal that kept the bakufu and the religious community at Tsurugaoka shrine worried, finally came to a successful end, though nature would not let the bakufu rest on its religious achievements for long.

Unusual natural phenomena and occasional disaster continued in 1224 and 1225. The sixth month of 1224 began with an earthquake, followed by a devastating draught and fires, and before the middle of the month Hōjō Yoshitoki suffered illness.\(^{36}\) This time the disaster seemed even more imminent than the previous year, leading the bakufu to order more intensive countermeasures. First it assigned seven divination masters to conduct seven-waterways-purification ritual (*nanase no oharae*), as well as an earthquake ritual (*jishinsai*), sun ritual (*nichiyōsai*), and seven-stars-constellation (*taizanjuku*nt) ritual. In addition, Jōgō and his disciples conducted a rain producing ritual (*suite*n).\(^{37}\) Their prayers had the desired effect as rain began to fall four days later.\(^{38}\)

The rain continued for a few days but in the meantime Hōjō Yoshitoki fell ill and once again the bakufu called upon divination masters to perform

\(^{35}\) AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/8/20, 8/23.

\(^{36}\) AK, Jōō 3 (1224)/6/1.

\(^{37}\) AK, Jōō 3 (1224)/6/6.

\(^{38}\) AK, Jōō 3 (1224)/6/10.
rituals, fortune telling, and prayers. In the next few days the bakufu had various rituals for protection from natural disasters, earthquakes and fires. It employed the precepts master (risshih) Raigyō to conduct esoteric rituals, and repeated the seven-waterways-purification ritual. But heaven seemed to have ignored all this as another earthquake struck. This time, either the earthquake was not strong, or the bakufu had already exhausted all possible rituals, or perhaps for both reasons, there were no special measures taken to protect Kamakura from heaven’s wrath. That is, not until a month later, when Hōjō Masako ordered Tsurugaoka monks and divination masters to perform various purification and protection rituals.

When this cycle of natural disasters followed by rituals became repetitive due to recurring disasters, the bakufu decided to turn Tsurugaoka shrine into a temporary center for rituals aimed at focusing all efforts in protecting the state. Twelve hundred monks were brought to Tsurugaoka shrine, where they conducted various rituals, prayers, and sutra copying. To ensure that the monks remain focused on their tasks, the bakufu constructed temporary lodging on the shrine's grounds for all the monks who participated in the event. Gifts were presented to the shrine and to the

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39 AK, Jōō 3 (1224)/6/12.
40 AK, Jōō 3 (1224)/6/13, 15 17.
41 AK, Gennin 1 (1224)/intercalary 7/11, 13.
participating monks, and copies of sacred texts were distributed among First Provincial-Shrines (*ichinomiya*).\(^{42}\)

An earthquake struck Kamakura on the thirteenth day of the fourth month of 1235, followed by a strong after shock on the twenty-eighth day, and continued for almost eight days until the seventh day of the fifth month. The writers of the *Azumakagami* remarked that such a continuous earthquake had never occurred.\(^{43}\) The bakufu's first response was on the eighth day of the earthquake with a shogunal visit to Tsurugaoka shrine, on which occasion priests performed Shinto rituals. Then, a day after the earthquake stopped, the bakufu had another day of prayers. There is no clear answer as to why there seem to have been so few rituals and prayers in comparison to previous, less remarkable earthquakes, but the bakufu's resolution to secretly cancel debts and reverse sales (*tokusei*) is quite revealing. It suggests that the continuous earthquake overwhelmed Kamakura, causing such a degree of turmoil that the bakufu had to respond in an immediate and practical manner, much less with religious rituals.\(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) *AK*, Karoku 1 (1225)/5/22. For a translation of the *Azumakagami* record concerning this event see appendix A, excerpt 4.

\(^{43}\) *AK*, Bunryaku 2 (1235)/4/13,28,29,30, 5/1,3, 4, 5, 7. The earthquake continued intermittently for nearly a month.

\(^{44}\) *AK*, Bunryaku 2 (1235)/4/8.
Epidemics

Epidemics and diseases caused much anxiety among bakufu officials, for they did not distinguish between commoners and the warrior elite. The natural growth of the city and the constant flow of merchants and travelers into Kamakura created a dense population distribution in which contagious diseases easily spread. This condition made epidemics a very real and serious threat to the bakufu. For example, toward the end of the 1227, a syphilis epidemic spread in Kamakura, eventually striking at the heart of the bakufu.45 This kind of threat presented a danger to political stability if bakufu leaders or heads of warrior clans died from the epidemics.

Unusual natural phenomena continued, and a syphilis epidemic spread in Kamakura.46 The immediate bakufu response called for intensive two-day rituals at Tsurugaoka shrine. On the first day there were Buddhist fire rituals for Yakushi Buddha and for a number of images of the bodhisattva Kannon.47 On the second day Shinto rituals included the Thirty-six Thousand Gods Ritual, Heaven-Earth Fire-Disaster Ritual, Moon Ritual (getsuyōsai), Jupiter Ritual (saishōsai), Saturn Ritual (chinsei), and Mars Ritual (keiwakuseisai).48 Nevertheless, the two-day rituals did not seem to

45 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/15.
46 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/15.
47 Ibid.
48 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/16. These are esoteric rituals related to the Taizōkai and Kongōkai mandala. See, for example, Bukkyōdo daijiten, 313.
provide the desired results. Two days after the rituals were conducted, the Kamakura shogun Yoritsune fell sick and went to pray at his ancestral hall.49

On the following day Yoritsune’s condition worsened, even though rituals were conducted on his behalf. During the following three days monks, priests and divination masters conducted elaborate rituals to pacify bad spirits or angry gods that may have caused Yoritsune’s illness.50 After all had been done, Yoritsune showed clear signs of having contracted a form of syphilis that caused red spots to appear on the body. Immediate measures were necessary to cure not only Yoritsune’s illness but also to fight the epidemic that “...has widely spread since last month. Courtiers and commoners could not escape [the disease]. Everybody, high and low, suffered. This was the same in Kyoto.”51

As it became apparent that the shogun was suffering from syphilis, the bakufu immediately began a series of rituals and prayers. First it presented a sacred horse to Tsurugaoka shrine and ordered prayers there. At the same time, the bakufu invited seven divination masters to the shogun’s residence and had them conduct rituals to the seven planets. Rituals continued the following day with buddhist monks conducting the Five Platforms Ritual (godan-hō) for the Five Heavenly Kings (godai myōdo) simultaneously. This

49 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/18.
50 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/19-21.
51 AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/23.
esoteric ritual had been performed at court since 1065 for the cessation of calamities. In addition there were divination rituals to the Big Dipper and to that year's designated star. The rituals continued in the following days with the Master of Hell Ritual (tensōchifusai) and Seven-Stars-Constellation Ritual (taizanfukun), and the buddhist Buddha Fire Ritual (gōma hotoke) ritual conducted by Jōgō.\textsuperscript{52}

All of these offerings, rituals and prayers, were for the sole purpose of repelling evil that appeared in the form of natural disasters and epidemics. The bakufu assigned warriors to organize, fund, and oversee the performance of these religious services, while prominent monks and divination masters performed the services repeatedly.\textsuperscript{53} It took another ten days, and, ironically, medical treatment by a medicine-man (gon jii), to cure Yoritsune of the syphilis, just in time for another set of rituals and hōjō at Tsurugaoka shrine.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Superstitions}

Special incantations and rituals to ward off bad spirits, or to respond to bad omens were rarely conducted until the 1220s. In fact, only in 1200 was there a prayer service conducted for what may have been an attempt to

\textsuperscript{52} AK, Antei 1 (1227)/11/23-28.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} AK, Antei 1/12/8, 13, 15 (1227).
protect the realm from evil spirits. On that occasion, Tsurugaoka monks
gathered at the shrine’s gallery to perform prayers to ward off evil hindrance
(mashō) and for the safe return of Sanetomo from a hunting excursion in
Aizawahara.\footnote{AK, Shōji 2/intercalary 2/8 (1200).} Perhaps the first clear case of bakufu-ordered prayers in
response to an omen were in the eighth month of 1202. On the eighteenth
day of that month a dove came flying from Mt. Nin and landed on the
western gate of the shrine’s gallery. It stood there for such a long time that
the monks declared it a mysterious appearance and began a session of
questions-and-answers (montō) for Enjoyment of the Dharma (hōraku), led
by the Shinseibō and Tongakubō monks. News about this unusual
occurrence spread quickly, and as soon as Yoriie heard it he went to the
shrine. Hōjō Tokimasa, Ōe Hiromoto, courtiers and nobles who heard the
news also arrived at the shrine to view the dove and participate in the special
prayer session.\footnote{AK, Kennin 2/8/18 (1202); Shamu kiroku, 3.}

On the evening of the thirteenth day of the tenth month of 1213, as
thunders roared, a fox cried loudly in the southern garden of the shogunal
residence. That seemed an odd occurrence to bakufu officials who ordered
that prayers and divination rituals must be conducted the following day at
Tsurugaoka shrine, and at Shōchōjūin and Yōfukuji temples. An indication
of the seriousness of the situation was not only the magnitude of services but
also the fact that Ōe Hiromoto, a top bakufu official, was personally assigned to administer the event.\footnote{AK, Kenpō 1/10/13,14 (1213).}

The belief in bad omens was a recurrent cause for special rituals and fortune telling at Tsurugaoka. As a result, the bakufu either ordered special services or offerings to repulse evil designs, or ignored omens for lack of conviction in their unavoidable evil outcomes.

Celestial phenomena has always puzzled and impressed humans, and Kamakura society was no exception. Yet, when bakufu officials began to consider the possible effect of a celestial phenomenon and the necessity to complement it with the appropriate rituals, they were uncertain what rituals they should order. The first such dilemma lasted for many months until rituals were finally conducted. Further investigation reveals why the bakufu finally decided to conduct rituals but tells nothing at all about the reason for the delay. On the twenty-ninth day of the twelve month of 1219, the head of the court's Office of Divination, Sukemitsu ason, arrived in Kamakura and reported the appearance of a comet over Kyoto.\footnote{AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/12/29.} According to his report, the comet appeared in the western skies, and had an advancing snake (tōda) in it, which indicated a rise in the number of snakes in the capital. The bakufu consulted with masters of astronomy (shiten), who believed that the comet

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\footnote{AK, Kenpō 1/10/13,14 (1213).}
\footnote{AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/12/29.}
would not reach the Kantō. Therefore, the question remains, why did the bakufu order special prayers half a year later.

On the tenth day of the sixth month of 1220, a messenger from the Office of the Left (safu) arrived in Kamakura with a complaint against the bakufu. According to his message the bakufu’s failure to conduct rituals in conjunction with rituals in Kyoto in the matter of the comet seemed suspicious. He further stipulated that not only courtiers were involved in prayers, but that in the previous month Enryakuji temple conducted a special ritual in which one thousand monks had participated. Hard pressed, the bakufu began to contemplate the possibility of conducting similar rituals in Kamakura. Once again the bakufu consulted with masters of astronomy, finally reaching a decision to appoint Jōgō the bettō of Tsurugaoka to conduct a one day reading of the Heart sutra (Hannyakyo). This chain of events shows that the bakufu’s decision to conduct rituals was the result of pressure from the court, not a clear recognition of the possible calamities a comet might bring. Nevertheless, this forced recognition set a precedent after which the bakufu showed better awareness and responded posthaste to unusual natural occurrences.

59 AK, Shōkyū 1 (1219)/12/29.
60 AK, Shōkyū 2 (1220)/6/10.
61 AK, Shōkyū 2 (1220)/6/10, 12.
The occurrence of a lunar eclipse some nine years later resulted in immediate series of rituals at Tsurugaoka shrine. Prayers included a Yakushi Fire Ritual (Yakushi goma) conducted by high ranking monks. One monk performed a Yakushi Fire Ritual (yakushi goma). The Dharma master Shinano conducted a One-Syllable Golden-Wheel Ritual (ichiji konrin) for protecting Kamakura from sicknesses that might cause loss of speech and hearing. A precept master (risshi) performed the Eight-syllable Manjusri Rite (hachiji monjō) aimed specifically at protecting against natural calamities caused by either a lunar or a solar eclipse. Finally, Jōgō performed the rite dedicated to the god Aizen (aizen ōbō) as a counter measure to social upheaval.62 The fundamental purpose of this rite was to create compassion and fondness, and to suppress one's enemies. When Jōgō performed the rite, it was to prevent the eclipse from badly affecting relationships within warrior society.63

While celestial phenomena gave a sense that their effects would be great and that they would affect large areas and many communities, "strange" human or animal behavior was viewed as having a more specific effect. According to such conception, if a leading warrior experienced something that was clearly out of the ordinary, it required special precaution, and preemptive measures. That was especially true for the shogun or any

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62 AK, Kangi 1 (1229)/5/15.
63 Ibid.
member of the Hōjō family. The bakufu responded to such occurrences with haste and determination, as revealed in the following incident.

A mysterious shining object (hikarimono) appeared at Hōjō Yoshitoki's younger brother's residence in Ōshû. Such a bright object was believed to have been a supernatural phenomena such as a ghost, a comet, or hell's fire. For example, in a record in The Tale of the Heike, hikarimono refers to a "shining figure." When courtiers escorting the Retired Emperor Shirakawa saw it they exclaimed: "It must be a demon." They later discovered that the shining figure was none other than an old monk carrying an oil lamp with which he intended to light the lamps in a buddhist hall. Their initial reaction, though, reflected a common fear of such appearances. The bakufu's concern, then, that the shining figure was possibly a demon was not without precedent. Because of that there were prayers at Yakushi Hall, including a Big Dipper ritual, and a prized sacred horse known as Kataoka was presented to Tsurugaoka shrine. 65


In this episode, Retired Emperor Shirakawa, escorted by courtiers and guards, was on his way to visit his consort, who was known as the Gion Consort. It was a dark cloudy afternoon, and as they approached a local Buddha hall they suddenly saw a shining image standing by the hall. Thinking that the shining figure was a demon, Shirakawa dispatched Tadanori to kill the demon. However, fearing it might be a god rather than a demon, Tadanori decided to catch it instead. After catching the figure they realized that it was an old monk carrying an oil lamp.

65 AK, Jō 2 (1223)/12/3.
One morning in the fifth month of 1229, dog excrement was found on the elevated tatami platform of the shogun's residence. This called for an immediate fortune telling, which indicated that the shogun was likely to contract a disease and therefore must be careful about his health. Since such a prediction may have caused speculation and possible disturbance, the three divination masters who conducted the fortune telling signed a joint letter in which they formally presented their conclusions.\(^{66}\) This incident reflected the importance and the common use of fortune telling, and especially the weight of the results. Having had to sign a joint letter was most likely at the bakufu's demand, fearing that uncertainty might lead to instability. Furthermore, to monitor the shogun's health, a delegation of bakufu officials arrived at the shogun's residence two days later.\(^{67}\)

In some instances the reason for a special ritual was not the result of some fantastic or mysterious occurrence, but rather something as mundane as opening a door. During a \textit{kagura} performance at Tsurugaoka shrine, the door to the upper shrine could not be opened for several hours. The head-priest (\textit{kannushi}) was alarmed and notified Hōjō Yasutoki, who was the governor of Musashi province and the shogunal regent at the time. Yasutoki was concerned about the possible meaning of this unusual occurrence and called for divination masters to explain why the door could not be opened. Their

\(^{66}\) AK, Kangi 1 (1229)/5/21.

\(^{67}\) AK, Kangi 1 (1229)/5/23.
fortune telling concluded that because of impurity in rituals and lack of belief in the gods, there was a possibility of fire breaking out.\textsuperscript{68} Similarly, unusual shaking and squeaking sounds at the branch of Mishima shrine in Tsurugaoka shrine caused fear among the clergy as well as bakufu officials. The following day the bakufu ordered fortune telling. Once again, the fortune telling revealed that because of impurities in rituals there was a clear danger of epidemics. The fear of natural disaster and epidemics prompted the bakufu to begin special prayers almost immediately.\textsuperscript{69}

In the 1230s superstitions seem to have accounted only rarely for special rituals. The last such ritual during Yasutoki’s term in office as shogunal regent was in 1236, six years before his death in 1242. In the forth month of 1236 Tsurugaoka Wakamiya shrine was swarmed by termites. Naturally, shrine officials were disturbed by the damaging effect of termites on the wooden structure; but, since the structure was the shrine itself, a deeper meaning had to accompany the appearance of those termites. Consequently, the bakufu ordered that a fortune telling session be held at the shrine. The result of the fortune telling predicted bad fortune. Upon hearing this, shogun Yoritsune canceled his trip to a hot spring in Izu, and the bakufu ordered prayers at the shogun’s house. Though the incident passed without any recorded disasters, it reflected the bakufu’s concern with almost any

\textsuperscript{68} AK, Karoku 2 (1226)/2/1.
\textsuperscript{69} AK, Kangi 3 (1231)/11/24,25.
matter that was even slightly out of the ordinary or seemingly unrelated to religious practices at the shrine.\textsuperscript{70}

The death of Yasutoki and the replacement of the Kamakura shogun Yoritsune with Fujiwara Yoritsugi marked the end of a long period of occasional special rituals and fortune telling. Under the regency of Hōjō Tokiyori and Nagatoki, there were no special practices, incantations, or rituals in response to any supernatural phenomena, and superstitions seem not to have occupied bakufu officials. Perhaps it was Tokiyori's strong character and stable regency, together with his preference for regular Buddhist practices, that reduced people's fears and concerns.

\textbf{Kamakura Culture}

In the eighth month of 1186, Yoritomo consulted with Satō Norikiyo, who became a Buddhist master known as Saigyō, about poetry and mounted archery.\textsuperscript{71} This private discussion was an early indication of Yoritomo's taste for court culture, later formalized by Yoritomo himself and sustained by succeeding bakufu leaders. The culture that developed as a result of efforts to mold a unique warrior society in Kamakura was a product of socio-cultural patterns of the aristocratic warriors in the Heian period, and, to a limited

\textsuperscript{70} AK, Katei 2 (1236)/4/2, 8, 11.

\textsuperscript{71} AK, Bunji 2 (1186)/8/15.
extent, newly created socio-cultural activity. Though this was necessary for the process of developing a unique culture, the lack of model cultures led Kamakura warriors to rely almost exclusively on established socio-cultural patterns of behavior, some of which they adopted in unchanged courtly form; in other cases, they adapted patterns to fit their new identity.

Court dance (bugaku), sacred music (kagura), and poetry (waka and hayauta) were identified specifically with the civil aristocracy, and were adopted in their original form as they were performed at court. Forms of mounted archery (yabusame and kasagake) and wrestling (sumo), which were practiced and performed by aristocratic warrior families (i.e., Minamoto and Taira), naturally remained warriors' favorites, but were emphasized more than before as warrior culture. Dog targeting (inuoumono) was arguably the only form of entertainment warriors developed that had no precedence at court.

While inuoumono was practiced by warriors in their private

72 Tonomura Hisae points out that the three Minamoto shoguns were fond of court culture, especially Sanetomo, who brought more of it to Kamakura. Because the later shoguns were courtiers, court culture was native to them, making aspects of that culture a regular pastime for them. Kamakura bunka no kenkyū: hayauta sōzō o megutte (Tokyo: Sanmii Shoten, 1996), 265-6.

73 Ōgi Mitsuo contends that all forms of warrior culture in the Kamakura period were borrowed from court culture. "Buke shakai," in Nenchō gyōji no rekishigaku, ed. Endō Motoō and Yamanaka Yutaka (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1981), 223.

74 Animal shooting practice was created sometime during the Genpei War as an effective practice of mounted archery whose chief purpose was to simulate the dynamics of the battlefield. In the first recorded practice, Yoritomo and his closest warriors used cattle as targets (ushi oumono). However, no one was able to hit the targets (mina atarazu). Yet, they were in good spirits as they continued their gathering with food and sake (AK, Juji 1 (1182)/6/7). The first recorded account of inuoumono is in AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/2/6, just a few days after a practice session of archery (AK, Jōō 1 (1222)/1/7). Four archers participated in the first inuoumono in which they used twenty dogs, and were judged by one referee. In 1230 there were
residences—in the provinces or in Kamakura—all the other cultural activities took place in Tsurugaoka shrine.  

**Yabusame, Kasagake**

As the primary form of warfare, the practice of mounted archery superseded those of swordsmanship or wielding a halberd, which, together, made the three principal battle skills. Moreover, the emphasis on mounted archery elevated its practice to become a form of entertainment, competitive or social, or a component in a set of shrine rituals. In *yabusame* and *kasagake*, the archers had to ride along a row of two or three targets that were set some distance apart, and shoot one arrow at each target while galloping fast. In *inouomonono* each mounted archer had to strike as many dogs running free within the confines of a courtyard as he could. At the end of a round, each archer reported the number of hits, and a referee announced the name of the best archer. From among the three types of mounted archery, *yabusame* was a
twelve archers in two groups, sixty dogs, and two referees (*AK*, Kangi 2 (1230)/2/19). In 1251 there were eighteen archers in three groups, though the number of dogs and referees are not mentioned (*AK*, Kenchō 3 (1251)/8/21).

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75 Scholars commonly identify *yabusame*, *kasagake*, and *inouomonono* as a single group of mounted archery practice with military characteristics. See, for example, Tonomura, *Kamakura bunka no kenkyū*, 28-30; Ishii Susumu, *Kamakura bakufu*, vol. 7 of *Nihon no rekishi* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1965), 122.

76 Kondō Yoshikazu, *Chūsei teki bugō no seiritsu to bushi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000), 57-102, 130-161. Kondō points out that the emphasis on mounted archery as the primary battle skill for the warrior aristocracy, together with swordsmanship and wielding a halberd, originated in the *ritsuryōsei*. These battlefield skills, and the technology that produced the weapons changed during the Heian period but remained fundamentally the same in the Kamakura period.
formal performance that followed strict rules, kasagake was semi-formal, and inuoumono was an informal practice that took the form of sports entertainment.

Yabusame was the only one of the three forms of mounted archery practice that was performed regularly at Tsurugaoka shrine as part of the annual hōjōe. It served to entertain the god Hachiman and his worldly worshipers, but at the same time it was organized as a competition in which winners and losers were either praised and presented with gifts, or were shamed and left empty handed. Furthermore, as a social event, archers and assistants were selected from among warriors according to their merits and services to the bakufu. The assistant set up the targets and fixed them after they were hit by arrows, collected the used arrows, and confirmed successful hits. Naturally, being an archer was prestigious, while the assistant duty

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77 Since inuoumono was not a regular event at Tsurugaoka shrine, but was usually practiced at private residences, or near Tsurugaoka, I will not expand on its nature. For more information on inuoumono see, Koji ruien, vol. 8, 573-690.

78 Yabusame was also a regular event at other major shrines. An inventory of costumes and uniforms in Itsukushima shrine includes a section for yabusame. KI, vol. 7, doc. 4951, Katei 2 (1236)/3/23, Itsukushimasha dengaku shōzoku to mokuroku. Also, a detailed list of annual events for Iwashimizu Hachiman shrine and Gokurakuji temple indicates that yabusame was performed there too. KI, vol. 9, doc. 6410, Kangen 2 (1244)/11/−, Iwashimizu hachimangū gōkokuji gokurakuji kōrei busshin no koto chūshinjō.

79 For early visual depictions of archery practice, see Nenjūgyōji emaki, 22-25, 42; Obusuma saburō emaki, 16-19. A depiction of an archer and his assistant in Obusuma saburō emaki shows the assistant sitting by the target and holding an arrow. The arrow has a rounded wooden tip, typical for kasagake practice. In this case, the arrows could be re-used immediately since they don’t get stuck in a hard target. The assistant seems to be examining an arrow after it had hit the target. Also, if the assistant was sitting in close proximity to the target, as depicted in this scene, there was a danger of being hit by a stray arrow.
was sometimes viewed as more degrading than being excluded from the competition.  

For the yabusame during the hōjōe of 1187, Yoritomo assigned Kumagai Naozane to set up the targets (matodate). However, Naozane declined the assignment, claiming that the task of setting the targets was done on foot while the archers were mounted, which, in all, was far inferior to being a mounted archer. Though Yoritomo attempted to persuade Naozane that his role was even more important than that of an archer, Naozane boldly refused. Yoritomo then punished Naozane by confiscating some of his landholding. After Yoritomo again took a position against Naozane in a legal dispute a few years later, Naozane felt that he could no longer serve Yoritomo and became a lay monk, which, for a gokenin, meant retirement from bakufu service. Miyazaki Fumiko argues that it was this confrontation with Yoritomo that pushed him to become a follower of the monk Hōnen. Another explanation is that Yoritomo resented Naozane's

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80 Secondary sources for information about yabusame are rather scarce. For a brief explanation, but with a good selection of excerpts from primary sources, see Koji ruien, vol. 8, 491-526. Also see Saitō Naoyoshi, Yabusame hōgi (Nikkō: Nikkō Tōshōgū, 1962).

81 AK, Bunji 3 (1187)/8/4, 15. Looking at the pairing of archers and their target setters, it seems that Naozane's complaint was not without merit. While the archers were from well known warrior families, their assistants were much less recognizable. For example, Shimokobe was paired with Teshigawara, Miura with Yokochi, and Date with Kawawa. The status of the Kumagai family should have placed Naozane as an archer.

82 AK, Kenkyū 3 (1192)/11/25.

religious inclinations towards Hōnen's teachings of Pure Land, and sought to humiliate Naozane in public in order to show not only his dissatisfaction, but also to deter others from following Naozane's example. 84

Both views of the confrontation between Naozane and Yoritomo seem only partially accurate. Naozane, who began to follow Hōnen's teachings before the yabusame incident, went against religious conventions. Thus, Yoritomo's dissatisfaction was justified. At the same time, Yoritomo's attempts to convince Naozane to reconsider his decision not to participate in the yabusame, together with continued employment of Naozane's sons, suggests that Yoritomo only intended to send a message rather than cause a rift between the two. Naozane's reaction, on the other hand, was only the beginning of a growing sense of alienation that ended in his retirement. At any rate, incidents similar to that between Naozane and Yoritomo did not occur again. This particular one set a precedent for the social nature of yabusame in Tsurugaoka shrine in the years that followed.

From the first during Yoritomo's rule until the last recorded in the Kamakura period in 1325, yabusame was one of the main forms of entertainment at Tsurugaoka shrine. Records of yabusame in the Azumakagami, our main source of information, often list the names of archers and their assistants, which suggests that prestige remained part of the

84 Saitō Naoyoshi, Yabusame hongi.
performance throughout the Kamakura period.\textsuperscript{85} Over time, though, \textit{yabusame} lost its original appeal, most likely for lack of enthusiasm on the bakufu’s part, and also because of economic difficulties.

The last record of \textit{yabusame} in the \textit{Azumakagami} is somewhat peculiar, yet revealing. The annual \textit{hōjōe} that was scheduled for the fifteenth and sixteenth days of the eighth month of 1265 was conducted only on the fifteenth day, without the usual social entertainment on the second day and without the regular participation of the shogun.\textsuperscript{86} Instead, shogun Munetaka went in "great secrecy" (mitsumitsu) to Hōjō Tokimune’s private stage (gosajiki) to view horsemanship. The records inform us that, due to economic constraints, the shogun did not make a formal appearance, and that the size of the area set for viewers was smaller than usual. The first performance was \textit{yabusame}, followed by horse racing and \textit{sumo} wrestling.\textsuperscript{87} The question, though, is why the second day of the \textit{hōjōe} was performed in private and in such secrecy?

The \textit{Azumakagami} indirectly suggests two explanations. First, shogun Munetaka’s wife was in an advanced stage of pregnancy, which required Munetaka to be especially careful with his behavior in order to avoid misfortune. In fact, at the end of that day’s entertainment there were special

\textsuperscript{85} In other sources, specifically those related to Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine, records of \textit{yabusame} are usually limited to performance dates.

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{AK}, Bun’ei 2 (1265)/8/15.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{AK}, Bun’ei 2 (1265)/8/16.
prayers conducted for the safety of the birth.\textsuperscript{88} We are told that five days later Munetaka's wife gave birth to a healthy girl.\textsuperscript{89} But this explanation seems to blanket the real reason--that the bakufu's coffers could not provide for the lavish rituals and displays at Tsurugaoka shrine that called for hundreds of participants, viewers, and guests, to enjoy themselves at the expense of the bakufu. This was most likely the reason for the suspension of the \textit{yabusame} performance at Tsurugaoka shrine until a single revival in 1325. The only grand display of \textit{yabusame} during that time took place in Kyoto in 1295, under courtiers' patronage.\textsuperscript{90}

The high cost involved in the production of a \textit{yabusame} event, and perhaps even the strain of formalities, may explain the popularity of \textit{kasagake}. The meaning of the word \textit{kasagake} is "hanging kasa-type hat." This refers to the use of a flat warriors' hat as a target for mounted archery. The use of the hat instead of a real target, such as the \textit{yabusame}'s wooden board, suggests that it was an improvisation of \textit{yabusame}. In order to avoid damage to the hats, warriors used arrows with round, wooden heads. Later,

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{AK}, Bun'ei 2 (1265)/8/16.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{AK}, Bun'ei 2 (1265)/8/21.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Sanemi kyōki}, Einin 3 (1295)/5/25, 26. During that month there were a number of horsemanship-related performances at shrines in the capital. On the twenty-fifth day of the month there was a \textit{yabusame} practice rehearsal, which Sanemi and other high-ranking courtiers viewed. On the twenty-sixth day there was a grand display of \textit{yabusame} by warriors. The occasion was a festival in the New Hie shrine. The spectators were high-ranking courtiers, among them a number of Fujiwara of the highest three imperial ranks (kugyō). Among the bowmen were Takeda Hisanobu, Uno Sadamitsu, and others, six pairs in total. This was followed by horse racing and a formal display of horses.
when *kasagake* took roots as a regular form of entertainment, a leather pouch filled with sand or feathers replaced the *kasa* hat. Yet the improvised nature of *kasagake* remained, as it was an informal practice that did not involve strict decorum or elaborate settings. Warriors' costumes and protective gear were also kept simple to provide minimal protection, namely comfortable cloths and a chest cover made of leather to prevent the bowstring from scratching the shooter's chest.

There were a number of variations of *kasagake*. The two basic ones were long distance and short distance *kasagake*, both of which refer to the distance between the shooter and the target. Another form was lot (*kuji*) *kasagake* in which the participants drew lots to determine their order in what seemed like a competition. In addition, though fundamentally informal, *kasagake* also developed into specific forms that included a formal performance at a shrine (*jinji kasagake*) and on special religious festivals, such as the *tanabata kasagake*.

The first mention of *kasagake* in the written records was in 1057 in Taira Sadaie's diary. Little is known about that performance, but from a later record we learn that in the second month of 1092, on the day of a festival organized by Middle-Counselor Fujiwara Tadazane, Minamoto Yoshitsuna led a group of some twenty warriors in a performance of *kasagake*. Of the twenty, ten warriors held the Fifth Imperial Rank. These records tell us that the practice of *kasagake* became popular among aristocratic warriors.
sometime in the eleventh century—which suggests that warriors had been practicing it already for some years before it was considered important enough to be recorded by the highest civil aristocracy.

By the Kamakura period, *kasagake* was a recognized form of warfare practice, as well as an entertainment. The practice of *kasagake* was a regular activity in warriors' residences as depicted in *Obusuma Saburō emaki*. On the eve of the Genpei War, Retired Emperor Takakura asked to be entertained by a performance of *kasagake* and *yabusame* at the private residence of Yorimori. Similarly, Fujiwara Yorizane viewed *kasagake* for his personal entertainment. Emperor Go-Toba even practiced *kasagake* to improve his skills in mounted archery. For that purpose he employed Minamoto Tomomasa as a *kasagake* instructor. Also, the *Genpei seisuiki* tells us that Kiso Yoshinaka, upon realizing that he could not escape death, performed *kasagake* in a gesture of farewell. These examples show that, because *kasagake* was less formalized than *yabusame*, courtiers and warriors engaged in it for different reasons and in various private locations as dictated by

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91 *Obusuma saburō emaki*, 16-19. The text in this picture scroll refers to the depiction as *yabusame*, though details suggest otherwise. Many Japanese scholars, therefore, refer to this scene as a depiction of *kasagake*. Another possibility was that in this scene warriors were practicing for *yabusame* using the type of arrow and target commonly used for *kasagake*.

92 *Chūyūki*, *Kasagakeki, Takakura-in itsukushima gokoki*, Jishō 4 (1180)/4/5.

93 *Meigetsuki*, Genkyū 1 (1204)/7/11.

94 *Sonpi bunmyaku*, vol. 3, 356.

95 *Genpei seisuiki*, Juei 2 (1184)/10/8.
changing circumstances. At any rate, only rarely was kasagake performed at Tsurugaoka shrine. But when warriors performed it there, it appeared more formal for the occasion.

_Bugaku and Kagura: The Case of Ō no Yoshikata_

In the fourth month of 1186, Shizuka Gozen, lover of Minamoto Yoshitsune, performed a court dance for Yoritomo and Masako in Tsurugaoka shrine after she was caught by Yoritomo's allies in the mountains of Yoshino. Her performance remains the most well known of such performances in the shrine for its symbolism as an act of subjugation in the context of Yoritomo's pursuit of Yoshitsune.96 Contrary to the popular view of her performance, it held little or no real significance in the elimination of Yoshitsune, nor did it hold any real significance in the development of court music and dance in Kamakura. Perhaps the only contribution of that performance to the development of warrior culture was that Yoritomo set a precedent of displaying court culture in Kamakura.

During most of the 1180s, performance of court dance at the shrine was limited to entertainment alone. In 1186, for example, Masako viewed kagura dance by female shrine-attendants (miko) by herself and with Yoriie on a later occasion, when visiting Tsurugaoka shrine.97 Kajiwara Kagetoki prepared a

96 _AK, Bunji 2 (1186)/4/8._
97 _AK, Bunji 2 (1186)/12/6, Bunji 4 (1188)/1/26._
reception at the shogunal residence and invited the monk Gikei of Tsurugaoka shrine. Gikei brought with him dancers for a warawamai dance. The reception was a lavish eating and drinking gathering in which the dancers provided nothing but leisurely entertainment without any apparent religious function.98

A Dharma gathering (hōe) at Tsurugaoka shrine in 1189 marked a new phase in the performance of bugaku at Kamakura. For that occasion, eight bugaku dancers were brought from Hakone to perform for the gathering’s participants.99 This practice was quickly incorporated into Kamakura culture when three months later, Genjō, the deputy of the Tendai abbot, arrived from Kyoto to take part in a pagoda offering service. During the offering service, Engyō conducted a prayer after which there was a bugaku performance.100 Then, on that year’s hōjōe there was another bugaku performance.101 That was the first time bugaku was performed in connection with the most important event in Kamakura, thus marking its incorporation into the social fabric of Kamakura’s warrior society. Such incorporation further supports the notion of the use of Tsurugaoka shrine as a place for social interaction, since bugaku was not directly associated with Japan’s deities or with any other

98 AK, Bunji 4 (1188)/3/21.
99 AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/3/3.
100 AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/6/5, 9.
101 AK, Bunji 5 (1189)/8/15.
religious aspect, but became a common entertainment during religious and non-religious events.\textsuperscript{102}

The incorporation of \textit{kagura} dance into Kamakura's formal annual events filled the need for a form of entertainment that was directly associated with native Japanese deities, which necessarily made a connection to the imperial line. According to common beliefs based on records in the \textit{Kojiki}, the goddess Ame-no-uzume-no-mikoto performed the first \textit{kagura} dance in front of the cave where the goddess Amaterasu was hiding in order to trick her to come out of the cave.\textsuperscript{103} It is not surprising, therefore, that as part of forming cordial ties with the court Yoritomo ordered a grand performance of \textit{kagura} in Tsurugaoka shrine.

\textsuperscript{102} Ōgi Mitsuo, "Kamakura jidai ni okeru bugaku no denpa ni tsuite," in \textit{Kamakura jidai bunka denpa no kenkyū}, ed. Ōsumi Kazuo (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1993), 366-377, 389-392. Ōgi argues that, during the Heian period, major temples and shrines such as Tōdaiji, Kōfukuji, Shiten'o-ji, and Iwashimizu Hachiman shrine, among other, were instrumental in the development and spread of \textit{bugaku}. Bugaku was court dance and music imported from China and Korea. In Japan, \textit{bugaku} was divided into Left, representing Chinese style, and Right, representing Korean style. The Left is dominated by red costumes, with a wide variety of warrior figures, while the Right is dominated by green and yellow costumes. The combination of the two makes a \textit{bugaku} performance most lively and energetic. For visual descriptions of \textit{bugaku} performers arranged according to Left and Right see, \textit{Bugaku zu}, 2 volumes, (Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, Unpublished). For basic information and selected primary records see \textit{Koji ruien, Rakubu}, vol. 1, 641-686. \textit{Kojitsu sōsho: Bugaku zusetsu} (Tokyo: Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku Fuzoku Zushokan, 1906) provides concrete descriptions of stage and movements according to dances. Also, Geinoshi Kenkyūkai ed., \textit{Nihon shomin bunka shiryō shūsei}, vol. 1 (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1974).

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Kojiki}, trans. Donald D. Phillipi (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968), 84. For a concise description and selected primary sources concerning \textit{kagura} see \textit{Koji ruien, Rakubu}, 151-199. \textit{Kagura} developed two main types: \textit{mikagura}, which was performed in large shrines, and \textit{sato kagura}, which was performed in the countryside, usually in connection with agriculture. An informative description of the various types of \textit{kagura} and its regional variations is Ishizuka Tadatoshi's \textit{Nishi nihon shokagura no kenkyū} (Tokyo: Keiyūsha, 1979).
In preparation for the planned transfer of Tsurugaoka in the eleventh month of 1191, a group of dancers began to practice for a formal kagura dance performance for the occasion. To help the dancers, the bakufu invited Ô no Yoshikata from Kyoto. The Ô family specialized in court music and dance, and served in that capacity at the imperial court in Kyoto. In Kamakura, Yoshikata was charged with teaching Tsurugaoka dancers special court music and dance, a role which quickly gained him recognition in Kamakura as an expert whom the bakufu later sought to employ regularly. Yoshikata first taught and performed daily court music, but soon afterwards, on the request of Yoritomo himself, Yoshikata performed field music (yakyoku) followed by kagura music and dance that had been composed by and kept in the Ô family. On that occasion, Hatakeyama Shigetada and Kajiwara Kagesue even attempted to learn Yoshikata's kagura, upon which Yoshikata praised their talent. This event nicely illustrates the early importation and adoption of court culture by Kamakura warriors.\footnote{AK, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/10/25; Hôjô kûdaike, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/11/19.}

On the day of the shrine-transfer (sengu) of Tsurugaoka and branch shrines, Yoshikata and Tsurugaoka dancers performed various dances.\footnote{Buke nendaiki, AK, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/11/21; Shamushiki shidai, 144.} The following day Yoritomo and top bakufu officials showed a remarkable display of gratitude towards Ô no Yoshikata, as they presented him with numerous gifts. Among the many presents he received were forty horses,
cloths, leather and leather goods, furs, various utensils, boots and gloves. However, more than an expression of gratitude it was a formation of obligatory ties between the bakufu and Yoshikata. In other words, Yoshikata was now obligated to comply with bakufu orders to perform at Kamakura, and to teach whomever the bakufu instructed him to teach.

By the end of 1191, after the completion of the shrine-transfer, the appointment of a junior abbot (kobettō) to Tsurugaoka, commendation of lands to the shrine, and the confirmation of twenty-five monk offices by Go-Shirakawa, Yoritomo realized that elevating the shrine even further required more attention to the quality of its services. On the twelfth month of that year (1191) he ordered that Ōe Hisaie, together with thirteen retainers, travel to Kyoto to learn kagura from Ō no Yoshikata. A written order (migyōsho) issued on the nineteenth day of the twelfth month by Taira Moritoki reveals that Yoritomo himself ordered Moritoki to issue the letter, and that he expected full cooperation from Yoshikata. The order also conveyed Yoritomo’s wish that Yoshikata teach the warriors the poem “Yutate no hoshi,” which was known to have been a secret. For some reason that is not immediately apparent from the letter, bringing knowledge of this poem to Kamakura was a top priority for Yoritomo. After that, court and religious

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106 AK, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/11/22.
107 Kashōin monjo, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/11/22; Kazōin chinkyūkairoku, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/12/15.
108 Hōjō kudaiki, AK, Kenkyû 2 (1191)/12/19.
music and dance gradually became a fixed feature in annual events at the shrine.

The appointment of Ōe Hisaie to lead a group of warriors in kagura was only the beginning of his duty as the bakufu official in charge of these affairs. In 1192, Hisaie traveled to Kyoto to learn secret kagura music from Ō no Yoshitoki, son of Yoshikata. In the following year, Yoritomo sent Hisaie to Kyoto to learn more from Yoshikata himself. At that time Hisaie was identified as beijū of Tsurugaoka Wakamiya shrine, a title which referred to a professional kagura performer in major shrines, such as the Kamo and Iwashimizu Hachiman shrines. That year the bakufu invited Ō no Yoshikata to Kamakura in preparation for a kagura performance. As before, Hisaie was in charge of learning the new music from Yoshikata. On the day of the performance, Ō no Yoshitoki was the main guest performer, but what made this event different was a session of questions-and-answers that followed the performance, showing a deepening interest in kagura. A month after the performance, Yoritomo rewarded Yoshikata with a jito office in Araki district, Hida province. Furthermore, Yoritomo set the second

109 AK, Kenkyû 3 (1192)/3/4.
110 AK, Kenkyû 4 (1193)/7/18.
111 AK, Kenkyû 4 (1193)/10/7.
112 AK, Kenkyû 4 (1193)/11/4.
113 AK, Kenkyû 4 (1193)/11/12.
and eleventh months for mikagura performances, thus marking the formal integration of kagura into the set of annual events at Kamakura.\textsuperscript{114}

Kagura and bugaku performances were rare during the leadership of Yoriie and Sanetomo, but enjoyed renewed popularity during Hōjō Yasutoki's regency.\textsuperscript{115} In 1229, Yasutoki sent a written request to Ō no Yoshikata asking Yoshikata to teach him a secret wagoto (Japanese Koto) music.\textsuperscript{116} Less than a month later, Yasutoki, once again, requested Yoshikata to teach kagura and wagoto.\textsuperscript{117} After Yoshikata was no longer able to commute to Kamakura, due to old age, his descendants continued to serve the bakufu.

In preparation for an upcoming hōjōe in 1235, the bakufu sent a messenger to Kyoto to request Ō no Yoshitoki to attend the event and to perform bugaku. The bakufu also stipulated that should there be any kind of problem hindering Yoshitoki's attendance, his son Ō no Yoshitsugu should

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} Tonomura, Kamakura bunka no kenkyū: hayauta sózō o megutte, 93.
\item \textsuperscript{115} AK, Kenkyū 5 (1194)/11/4. Kagura performance at Tsurugaoka shrine. Hisaie, Hatakeyama Shigetada, and Kajiwara Kagesue engaged in tsukeuta. The following is a list of kagura and bugaku performances in Tsurugaoka between 1195 and 1222, as recorded in Azumakagami and Shamuikioku:
\begin{itemize}
  \item Kenkyū 6 (1195)/2/11 kagura
  \item Kenkyū 6 (1195)/8/15 bugaku (with gokenin)
  \item Kenkyū 6 (1195)/11/10 kagura
  \item Shōji 2 (1200)/11/3 kagura
  \item Kennin 2 (1202)/11/9 kagura
  \item Kennin 3 (1203)/2/4 kagura
  \item Jōō 1 (1222)/8/15 bugaku
\end{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} AK, Kangi 1 (1229)/12/17.
\item \textsuperscript{117} AK, Kangi 2 (1230)/intercalary 1/7.
\end{itemize}
come in his stead. For reasons not mentioned in the text, neither Yoshitoki nor Yoshitsugu could travel to Kamakura. Yoshitoki apparently sent his other son Yoshiuji, who, upon leaving Kamakura, received money, a white horse, and other presents from the shogun Yoritsune. And just as generations of the Ō family served as teachers and performers for the bakufu, so generations of the Ōe family became their warrior counterpart in Kamakura. Though these families did not monopolize kagura and bugaku in Kamakura, their services secured the continuation of this form of cultural activity.

Conclusion

From among the large Kamakura religious institutions serving the bakufu and leading warriors, no other was as central to the religious and social aspects of Kamakura warrior society as Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji shrine-temple complex. Even before the shrine's actual construction began, the idea of its reconstruction in a grander, more central form, symbolized the revival of the Minamoto clan. Under the three Minamoto leaders, mainly Yoritomo, the shrine acquired its religious and social characteristics, which set it as an active official bakufu institution for the Kamakura period.

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118 AK, Katei 1 (1235)/intercalary 6/24, 8/18.

119 AK, Katei 3 (1237)/7/8,9. The bakufu issued an order (migyōsha) to Nakahara Kageyasu to teach Ōe Hisayasu a kagura melody in what seems to have been preparations for that year's hōjō. In response, Kageyasu sent a written confirmation.
During the first decades of the Kamakura bakufu, when warrior society was still in its molding stage, the two-day hōjōe was the most significant event that brought together all the leading warriors and bakufu leadership. As the Minamoto shoguns disappeared from the political scene, and as the Hōjō regents came to control the bakufu, an event that was meant to promote a sense of unity and hierarchy among its participants was no longer necessary. The custom remained in a less rigid form, allowing for occasional cancellations, postponements, or changes of formalities. Similarly, we may conclude that in its development it was originally meant to be a religious ritual per se. It then became more of a social event, and finally the religious and social activities were separated, bringing the hōjōe back to its original religious purpose.

Nothing can reflect more clearly the deep religious beliefs of Kamakura warriors than a systematic examination of specific out-of-the-ordinary events. While participation in regular religious services could be viewed as a matter of conforming to customs, immediate reactions to super-natural phenomena, celestial events and destructive natural disasters expressed inner beliefs that might normally remain unnoticed. The numerous examples presented in this chapter confirm two important conclusions: that warriors were involved in and concerned with religious practices, and that the Tsurugaoka shrine provided a religious center to accommodate their religious needs.
Finally, Tsurugaoka shrine was the single most important place where warriors gathered for social events during which cultural activities stimulated a sense of solidarity among them. It also contributed to the creation of a distinct warrior culture, though in many respects it was borrowed culture from the Kyoto court. Nonetheless, the assimilation of court culture into Kamakura warrior society, which went through a filtering process of selection and adaptation, proved valuable in creating a distinction between warriors and courtiers, but at the same time maintaining a high degree of commonalities that helped to sustain productive relations. In Kamakura it was Tsurugaoka shrine that provided the place for preserving this culture.
CHAPTER 5

UJIDERA: DEVELOPMENT AND RELIGIOUS ROLE

Introduction

Clan temples (ujidera) increasingly became an important feature of Kamakura warrior society after the Genpei War ended (1185) and a self-governing body, the Kamakura bakufu, was established in Kamakura. During the Kamakura period, heads of warrior families invited and patronized outstanding monks, and occasionally solicited these monks to found private family Buddha halls (bodaiji) in which the patron families prayed for their ancestors. As the number of such halls increased and some of them became temple complexes, their congregations of monks grew, their physical appearances became more grand, and they received lands and donations, finally becoming semi-independent religious entities with dealings in the divine as well as the mundane. In other words, apart from their religious

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1 There are numerous such recorded cases. Among the warrior families who were actively inviting monks were heads of branch families of the Hōjō as well as the tokusō-ke himself. For an excellent discussion of Hōjō patrons and their monks see Martin Collcutt, Five Mountains: The Rinzai Zen Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1981), 57-89; Hosokawa Shigeo, Kamakura seiken tokusō senseiron, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000),25-45; Fukushima Kaneharu, Kanesawa hōjōshi to shōmyōji (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), 65-72.

There are examples of other powerful warriors who invited monks from the big temples in Kyoto and Nara. Some of these were the Nitta and Ashikaga, which I will discuss later in the main text.

2 I am characterizing these ujidera as semi-independent in contrast to kenmon religious institutions that were at the ryōke level, thus managed their affairs without direct intervention from the court. The notion of being semi-independent also corresponds to Sasaki Kaoru’s approach according to which ujidera were middle rank religious institutions while the
functions they became participants in the network of provincial economy, and factors in the distribution apparatus of provincial power of which the Kamakura bakufu was the source of legitimacy. Nevertheless, it was their role as religious institutions that provided *ujidera* the recognition needed to establish their footing in the social and economic spheres of Kamakura. It is this essential function that we should first examine in order to understand other aspects of *ujidera*.

**Development and Characteristics**

In this section I shall discuss the characteristics of Heian *ujidera* as family temples of mostly court aristocrats, followed by a discussion of the transition to the Kamakura period when there was a new wave of construction of *ujidera* by warrior families in the Kantō. The term *ujidera* has been used quite freely by historians, perhaps because many large and small temples were associated with either court or warrior families, and each family supported more than one temple. This multiplicity created confusion that requires us to determine which temples were primary *ujidera.*

Furthermore, the changing characteristics of *ujidera* during the Heian and

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kenmon temples were upper rank. For further analysis see, Sasaki Kaoru, *Chūsei būkyō to kamakura bakufu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), 72-113. Also, Funakoshi Yasuju, *Kanazawa shōmyōji jirō no kenkyū: chūsei chūkyū jisharyō no ichi tenkei, Yokohama Shiritsu Daigaku Kiyō, B-4,5, no. 9, 10* (March, 1952).
Kamakura periods makes a definition of *ujidera* even harder to formulate. I shall therefore begin my discussion with a description of what constituted an *ujidera* during these periods. The latter part of this chapter deals with the process of *ujidera* construction and structure.\(^3\)

**Warrior Clan *Ujidera***

*Ujidera* were temples built by powerful aristocratic and warrior families, fundamentally to serve the religious needs of their patrons. The most important function of the *ujidera* for which they were originally constructed was to perform regular daily recitations and prayers to ensure the welfare and preservation of the family, and to worship the family’s ancestors. For that, patrons of *ujidera* had to allocate enough resources for the construction of the temple and monks’ residences, for food and supplies, for periodic repairs or reconstruction, for occasional special services, and for various other miscellaneous expenses. Naturally, only a few families from among the aristocracy had enough landholdings on which they could depend for a steady flow of income, as well as labor and various products, all of which

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\(^3\) Records of early *ujidera* are scarce, leaving historians with only vague clues to the process of their construction, much less their relationships with their patrons. In some cases historians are left with secondary records, mythology and tales, thus having to rely on analyses of archeological findings. These can tell much about a temple’s layout but little, if any at all, about landholdings, monks and regulations. Some commendable efforts have been made by Japanese and Western historians who gathered information from whatever sources remain available. They were able to construct the history of the early Japanese court and the role of Buddhism and Buddhist temples in the early Japanese state. Recent studies include, Joan R. Piggott, *The Emergence of Japanese Kingship* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Ueda Masaaki, *Kodai kokka to shikiyô* (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1998).
were necessary for supporting the *ujidera*. One of the fundamental characteristics of the *ujidera* was their obligation to provide religious, political, and at times military support for their patrons. In that regard, it would be fair to say that a condition of reciprocity, or mutual support, emerged as the essential characteristic of the relationship between the patron and his family temple. ⁴

In the wide sense of this definition, any temple that was constructed by, and had reciprocal relationships with, a patron family falls into the category of *ujidera*. Indeed, historians often identify temples as *ujidera* of certain families in order to emphasize their affiliation in the larger context of power elites. This is not a mistake, but it is nonetheless misleading because the nature of the relationship between a patron family and its *ujidera* varied according to the role of each of its temples. This requires us to further qualify the definition of *ujidera* in order to evaluate the importance of its role as part of the structure of the patron family.

Okuda Shinkei in his monumental work on warrior religiosity contends that there were seven fundamental aspects underlying the purposes for and methods to acquire *ujidera*: 1) *Ujidera* served as burial grounds for family ancestors, and for ancestral worship, 2) Some temples developed from

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⁴ This is a rather common definition, or description of the characteristics of the *ujidera*. Such a simplified and generalized definition is common in any of the major dictionaries of Japanese history. See for example, *Kokushi Daijiten*, vol. 2 (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1980), 80; Okuda Shinkei challenges this definition on the basis of the actual complexity of and variety of *ujidera*. See, Okuda Shinkei, *Chūsei bushidan to shinkō* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1980), 289-294.
small Buddha halls, 3) *Ujidera* were built to house Buddhist images and newly converted monks, 4) Warriors used *ujidera* to establish the right to own lands by converting temples built by others to their own *ujidera*, 5) Through their role as estate administrators, warriors formed relationships with temples on their estates and made them their *ujidera*, 6) Warriors acquired *ujidera* through purchases, commendations, confiscations or gifts, and 7) Warriors constructed *ujidera* for religious purposes. It should be mentioned in passing that not all of the above listed aspects need to appear in order to qualify a temple as an *ujidera*. Any single aspect is sufficient for such categorization.

This definition of the establishment of *ujidera* illustrates the importance of *ujidera* for warrior clans, but further qualification is necessary if we are truly to understand the role of *ujidera*. I would like to suggest an additional classification of *ujidera* according to which we shall identify *ujidera* as primary and secondary. According to this classification, primary *ujidera* are those temples whose services and obligations to their patron families were greater than any of the families' other *ujidera*. A primary *ujidera* was the patron's first temple, and its most important function was collective ancestral worship. As such, the patron's support of the primary *ujidera* was markedly greater than his support for other temples, and he often became personally involved in regulating the temple's daily affairs. The

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5 Okuda, *Chüsei bushidán to shinkô*, 294-5.
primary *ujidera* was usually geographically adjacent to the patron's residence, and was closely monitored by him.\(^6\)

Following this logic, secondary *ujidera* necessarily received less support and attention from their patrons since they were considered less important. Their religious function was not necessarily that of ancestral worship of whole lineages, but rather for the promulgation of certain doctrines the patrons found appealing. In such cases, the construction of secondary *ujidera* was either for worshiping specific ancestors, or because the patrons were fond of certain monks and wanted to provide them with temples so that these monks would remain with the patrons. Occasionally when *ujidera* were acquired through transfer of lands, whether by confiscation, purchase, or legal deed, the temples were converted to the patrons' choices of religious affiliations. As a result, these *ujidera* had weaker connections to their patrons.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) My classification of *ujidera* as primary and secondary does not borrow from any current scholarship in Japan or in the West. Instead it should be viewed as a reaction to the loose use of this term by many historians, which eventually obscures the complexity and importance of *ujidera*. Secondary *ujidera* should generally correlate with Okuda's classification of *ujidera* acquired by way of land confiscation and land commendation. See Okuda, *Chūsei bushidan to shinkō*, 300-10.

\(^7\) Estate maps show that there were a number of temples and shrines located on any one estate, suggesting that small local temples could also be considered as *ujidera* of the person holding rights to that parcel of land on which they were located. One of the best such map depictions of an estate is that of Tomita estate in Owari province, Ikadachi estate in Ōmi province, and others in *Nihon shōen ezu shūei*, comp. Tokyo Daigaku Shiryou Hensanjo (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996). Also, Kuroda Hideo provides a case analysis of estate temples and shrines in Kuroda Hideo, *Chūsei shōen ezu no kaishakugaku* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai), 233-248.
Early Ujidera

It is unclear when and where the first ujidera was constructed, or who was its patron. According to common belief, Shōtoku Taishi (574-622) was the foremost proponent of early Buddhism in Japan, and was the person who actually granted it court legitimacy. Shōtoku Taishi is also regarded as having constructed Shitennoji in 593 to commemorate the subjugation of Mononobe no Moriya (d. 587), who opposed Shōtoku's attempt to provide state patronage to Buddhism. Shōtoku's turn to Buddhist divinities for protection and empowerment may have set the course for the recognition of Buddhism by the court, but it did not establish the model for ujidera. However, in the closing years of the sixth century Soga no Umako constructed a Soga clan temple, Asuka Gangōji (also called, Asukadera, or Hōkōji) and appointed his son Zentoku to the office of tera no tsukasa (temple administrator). It has been argued by both Western and Japanese scholars that the original purpose for constructing Asuka Gangōji was to reinforce the Soga position at court, since their claim to superior genealogy had not been rewarded as they had hoped for.8 Though the temple did not achieve for the Soga what they sought, their use of Buddhism for personal gain did not go unnoticed. While at that time it was a unique venture into an unfamiliar institutional

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Buddhism, a century later in the Nara period a number of influential court families of the Yamato region also constructed their own ujidera.⁹

During the Nara period, with the strengthening of Buddhism as a state-supported system of beliefs under the ritsuryō state, the number of new ujidera increased as other members of the aristocracy vied to keep up with the strengthening of Buddhism at the Kyoto court.¹⁰ It would be fair to say that the growing number of ujidera was in response to the inclusion of Buddhism as a state religion in the ruling apparatus of the early ritsuryō state.¹¹ Allan Grapard has pointed out that, with the establishment of the ritsuryō state and

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⁹ Some of the most well known families and their temples were:
- Hatano
- Kawachinofumi
- Kuratsukuri
- Yamato no aya
- Fune
- Fuji
- Kudara no koki
- Kurehara (controlled by Sakanoue)

¹⁰ Nara period temples included:
- Fujiwara
- Saeki
- Yuge
- Shimotsukenu
- Ōyake
- Nakatomi
- Ono
- Abe

¹¹ In 737 Emperor Shōmu ordered the erection of Buddha images in the provinces, and in 741 he issued an edict to the effect that there should be a provincial temple (kokubunji) in each province. Such actions have greatly contributed to the strengthening of Buddhism, and reflected the importance of Buddhist temples. For a discussion of this topic, see Joan Piggott, The Emergence of Japanese Kingship, 255-57.
the consequent abolishment of *kofun* burial practices, Buddhist temples came
to replace the *kofun* as burial sites.\textsuperscript{12}

Evidence to support Grapard's view also came from archeological
excavations on the grounds of Hōryūji in Nara. These excavations have
uncovered large deposits of tiles and haniwa figurines typical of kofun sites,
thus suggesting that at least some temples were intentionally built near kofun
burial sites. Edward Kidder, who analyzed the data from these excavations,
has further argued that the location of Hōryūji at the Ikaruga site was because
of its proximity to the Fujinoki tomb, which, according to Kidder, is the tomb
of Emperor Sushun, the uncle of Shōtoku Taishi.\textsuperscript{13} Consequently, the
symbolism of power and legitimacy carried by the construction of kofun had
been taken over by *ujidera*, which now served both to care for the family dead
and to strengthen its living.

Perhaps the construction of Kōfukuji as the clan temple of the
Fujiwara best reflected the dual role of the *ujidera*. Mikael Adolphson has
pointed out that Kōfukuji was second in power only to Tōdaiji, and that
subsequent control of the Office of Monastic Affairs (sōgō) by Kōfukuji monks
provided the Fujiwara with a powerful leverage over other court families.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{13} Edward Kidder, *The Lucky Seventh: Early Hōryūji and Its Time* (Tokyo:

\textsuperscript{14} Mikael S. Adolphson, *The Gates of Power: Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in
This observation reveals the most basic essence of the religious role of *ujidera*, and explains why other court families constructed their own. In addition to their religious function, they also served as links to the continent by sending their monks to China and Korea. Similarly, Chinese monks who traveled to Japan were invited by patrons to teach or take office in their *ujidera*. Consequently, the involvement of *ujidera* in contacts with China and Korea made them a source for the study of continental culture and philosophy.15

**Courtiers’ Ujidera in the Heian Period**

In the Heian period there was a significant change in the development of *ujidera*, undoubtedly as a result of social and political changes at the Kyoto court and due to the growing power of state-supported Buddhist temples.

Among the noticeable factors that contributed to changing patterns were the increasing Fujiwara influence at court, popularization of Buddhist practices

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among courtiers, and the maturation of the estate system. Undoubtedly, the most important change in the development of ujidera was their achievement of economic independence. Nara and early Heian ujidera were completely dependent on their patron families for the support of monks and occasional construction and repair of halls. Such economic support came directly from the patron families' coffers. Workers, as well as building materials and food supplies, were provided from the families' landholdings. Though commendations of lands to clan temples began as early as the Nara period, such land commendations were rather small, producing just enough income to sustain the temples.

The process by which clan temples became economically independent involved a change of status as land owners: an increase in the number and size of their landholdings, and special legal status which protected these temple holdings from taxation and legal intrusion. One way for temples to acquire lands was through occasional land commendations made by either their patrons or other court aristocrats for having the temples conduct special religious services for the welfare of the donors, or for using their influence to promote the donors' interests at court. Another way by which temples

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16 Two, recently published, works that provide an up-to-date research on the medieval estate (shōen) are, Nagahara Keiji, Shōen, in Nihon rekishi sōsho, ed. Nihon Rekishi Gakkai (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998); and Kuroda Hideo, Chūsei shōen ezu no kaishakugaku.

strengthened their economic base was when the patrons of clan temples sent their sons to join the *ujidera* to become monks. When that happened, patrons created a source of income to support their sons usually by commending annual produce from lands they owned. Eventually, the temples took control over these lands and added them to their inventories.¹⁸

By the late Heian period, temples became secondary land owners (*ryōke*) of whole estates that were then designated as legally protected and tax exempt estates. As *ryōke*, temples were obligated to transfer a share of the income to the primary land owners (*honke*), normally a court aristocrat or the imperial family itself. However, because these estates were exempted from paying taxes, the temples were able to collect even larger incomes.¹⁹ In practical terms, temples held total control over tax exempt estates, thus were economically independent, and became more influential than ever before.

The result of having developed a strong economic base, and at the same time enjoying state protection of their lands, was that Heian-period *ujidera* were no longer compelled to remain loyal to their patrons.

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Warriors’ Ujidera in the Kamakura Period

In the years following the Genpei War (1180-85), a number of prominent warriors, including Minamoto Yoritomo, the head of the Minamoto-led forces, attended the need for divine presence in the new warrior capital of Kamakura by supporting the construction of temples in the vicinity of the newly-established warrior government, the Kamakura bakufu. The first warrior to become patron of a private family temple was Yoritomo himself, who built Shôchôjûin as the designated hall of worship for his father, Yoshitomo. In 1188, following Yoritomo’s example, Ashikaga Yoshikane became the patron of Jômyôji. With functions and purposes similar to those of the early courtiers’ ujidera, both Shôchôjûin and Jômyôji served the purpose of ancestral worship. Once patrons commenced ancestral worship, they established “divine” connections to their provincial lands. Ultimately, using temples to form mundane connections between themselves and their provincial lands was these warriors’ act of self-legitimation similar to what courtiers did some five centuries earlier. 

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20 Though both temples are currently identified with the Rinzai school of Buddhism, at the time of their construction such affiliation did not yet take place. See Kamakura shishi, vol. 2, 240-55, 462-68.

21 See Okuda, Chûsei bushidan no shinkô, 295-8.
Later, after his victory in the Ōshû campaign, Yoritomo also constructed Yōfukuji in 1192, using the Byōdōin in Kyoto as a model. In the following decades local warriors, from the Hōjō, Nitta, and Ōe, among others, also joined the community of temple patrons. But their contributions were usually limited to small worship halls that only years later became temple complexes. Even though many of these temples still exist today, contemporary records do not suggest that they were anything near what we see today. Instead, their original appearance according to these sources seem to have been rather simple and compact. Occasional destructions of these temples, usually by fires, resulted in reconstructions that produced halls larger than their originals.

Until the Jōkyū War (1221) and its aftermath, construction of ujidera by Kantō warriors was limited mostly to a few temples that were built by Yoritomo, his successors, and his wife Masako. These temples were located in Kamakura, in the vicinity of bakufu offices, which were at the geographical center of the Kamakura basin. These temples and Buddha halls were either a short distance from Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, or located in the mountains surrounding the Kamakura basin. It is important to note that during this period some of what we usually recognize as Kamakura's central and largest

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23 For temples in the vicinity of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine see appendix F, fig. 6.
temples, which were constructed by the Hōjō and other warrior families, were only small single Buddha halls. It is a common mistake to view temples as having been originally built to the size we see them today. In any case, even the farthest temples were still a short horse ride distance from the center of Kamakura. The overall construction of temples and Buddha halls was part of the urban development of Kamakura as a political, economic, social and religious center, mirroring Kyoto in the western provinces, as was envisioned by Yoritomo and his successors.24

While Minamoto and Hōjō patrons built temples that added a sacred atmosphere to an otherwise worldly Kamakura, provincial gokenin invested in local Buddha halls (jibutsudō, or bodaiji) near their respective residences for the purpose of conducting daily prayers and periodic memorial services. Though relatively few Kantō gokenin brought Buddhist practices into their daily life, this was a clear trend. Such a trend was obviously the result of an increasing sense of confidence among warriors who were interested in establishing stronger power bases in the provinces. Warriors who invited monks from Kyoto to their local temples formed direct ties to major religious establishments such as Saidaiji temple, for example. For the bakufu, establishment of such ties must have been too alarming to be overlooked. However, the outcome of the ensuing attempt by the court to topple the bakufu posed a more immediate danger.

24 See chapter 2.
The bakufu’s victory over the imperial army in the Jōkyū War provided the perfect opportunity for strengthening the bakufu and the position of the Hōjō regents, who embarked upon a decade of sweeping political and judicial changes. These changes, however, were also a response to an alarming surge in lawlessness throughout the provinces by gokenin and non-gokenin alike, who saw the decisive victory over the imperial forces as an opportunity to forcefully pursue their own interests. The new power distribution between the bakufu and the court, and the effort to control the many cases of upheaval in the countryside, also gave the Hōjō an excellent opportunity to re-enforce their hold over the bakufu. However, though the Hōjō indeed established a firmer hold over the bakufu, their clan’s leadership still lacked cohesion. Eventually, this caused a succession dispute that resulted in the appointment of Yasutoki as the head of the main Hōjō lineage. Under Yasutoki’s leadership the bakufu reached maturity by establishing its military supremacy. But the test of its maturity was its independence from the court in judicial matters, as it began to issue laws and regulations. Finally, Yasutoki secured the position of the Hōjō regent as the bakufu’s real leader, while making the shogun a puppet figure who held mostly symbolic power.


26 Varley, “The Hōjō Family and Succession to Power,” 159.
One of the most important judicial actions Yasutoki took eight years after his appointment to the office of regent was the promulgation of the Goseibai shikimoku ("Jōei Law Code"), which was followed by a series of supplementary laws (tsuika hō). What is of interest to us is the bakufu's attempt to control and limit the rising power of temples and shrines by regulating their construction and maintenance. In addition, the bakufu issued specific laws to prevent monks and priests who carried arms and travelled extensively from becoming a threat to bakufu authority. Indeed, Yasutoki's efforts to put a check on religious activity were successful at least in preventing the growth of Buddhist representation in provincial offices of Kantō warriors. We can thus view Yasutoki's regency, and the legal system he promulgated, as having been an effective force in the postponement of the popularization of ujidera.

After Yasutoki's death in 1242, the bakufu experienced several years of instability as a result of threats to the continuity of the tokusō-ke. The crisis ended in 1247 when Adachi forces attacked and destroyed the Miura family, long-time bakufu supporters who were suspected of opposing and threatening the authority of the tokusō-ke. It has been argued that the annihilation of the Miura by the Adachi, who were manipulated to fight on the Hōjō behalf, ended a few years of crisis and re-assured the status of the

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27 Chūsei seiji shakai shisō, vol. 1, 8-38.
However, I would suggest that instead of viewing the end of the crisis as the beginning of renewed and reinforced tokusō-ke power alone, we should look at this era as a period of no apparent threats.

The distinction lies in the distribution of power among warriors. The tokusō-ke, led by the charismatic Hōjō Tokiyori, indeed strengthened itself by eliminating the Miuara clan. Yet, viewing the tokusō-ke as having been militarily significantly stronger than other warriors might be misleading. Eliminating the Miura clan did not mean that other warriors could not have mustered enough military power to threaten the tokusō-ke, but rather chose to support, instead of oppose the tokusō-ke because doing so served their interests. According to this perspective, then, the tokusō-ke reached a state of status quo with other Kantō warrior families. The implication of that was that while the Hōjō tokusō-ke secured Kamakura as its home territory, it could not prevent warrior families from seeking greater power in the provinces.

Provincial warriors who sought to strengthen their hold on the provinces had to establish greater involvement in the provincial economy. The options to achieve that goal were limited because these provincial...

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29 The yoriai was an exclusive council in which most powerful gokenin could not participate. On the yoriai see Hosokawa, Kamakura seiken tokusō senseiron, 8-12.
warriors were the bakufu’s housemen (*gokenin*) and had to operate within a set framework of reciprocity between them and the bakufu. They could not oppose bakufu orders, or establish a legal authority that would overshadow that of Kamakura. What helped these warriors was the lack of strong bakufu involvement in provincial communities. Added to that was the bakufu’s reliance on provincial warriors to protect its interests in the provinces, which ultimately transferred power to these warriors and placed them in direct and immediate control of their provinces. The way to achieve their goal was to take greater control over local economies by way of adding a social and religious aspect to their provincial headquarters.

With this option open, the problem was choosing a method with which to proceed in implementing it. From what we now know, the drive for self-strengthening began with modification at the headquarters. That is, warrior families such as the Ashikaga, Nitta and branches of the Hōjō, sought to broaden their power bases first by creating an appearance of strength through the physical appearance of their headquarters. The preferred method for such undertaking was to build temple complexes, which in some instances became larger than the original headquarters themselves. This path taken, warriors either upgraded existing *jibutsudō* to the level of temple complexes, or, when there were not *jibutsudō* to expand, they constructed...

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30 Jeffrey Mass has demonstrated that many *jito* abused the power given to them by the bakufu. See “The Indiscipline of *jito*,” in *Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu*.  

210
new temples. Provincial family temples held the potential to incorporate religious, social and economic functions, thus providing their patron families with an excellent solution to the question of how to strengthen their provincial power and authority.

Beginning in the 1250s a significant conceptual change concerning buddhist temples was taking place in the Kantō. What were previously small and obscure Buddha halls were now being upgraded to the level of local temples. This expansion, which was accompanied by a new designation as a "ji" or "tera", included the construction of a number of halls and structures on specified parcels of land. However, in some cases, the construction of temples was a completely new venture. Furthermore, patrons who either expanded existing halls, or constructed new temples, brought prominent monks to function as founders of the temples. At the same time they established hierarchies of offices that they staffed with lesser-known monks. The solicitation of a founding monk was based on a conscious decision by the patron to adopt a certain Buddhist school. In such a case, the patron's choice seem to have been consistent with a clear bakufu religious inclination towards Heian institutions, thus resulting in adopting Shingon, Tendai, or any of the Nara schools. As such, ujidera enjoyed unquestionable religious legitimacy, which further promoted their patrons' interests.\(^{31}\)

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To support the construction of clan temples, the heads of a provincial warrior clans commended lands to the temples. After the construction was completed, these parcels of land remained temple holdings. The temples' patrons also ensured a protected environment for the temples' monks by providing them with residences in the temples' vicinity.\(^{32}\) In addition to the patron's support, the Kamakura bakufu itself presented *ujidera* with gifts, and secured their landholdings when disputes erupted. Some temples even received lands from the bakufu; but, surprisingly enough, the purpose for such land commendations is often not mentioned in the documents of commendation, suggesting that it was common that such donations were for the purpose of gaining religious merit. Only when the commendation of lands and donation of goods and money was for specific occasional events can we find a more detailed explanation. Gifts for services usually took place following a natural disaster, illness or death of a leading figure, or most notably before and after the Mongol invasions.\(^{33}\)

The Mongol invasions in the latter half of the Kamakura period (1274 and 1281) have been portrayed by contemporaneous sources, as well as modern secondary scholarship, as traumatic events that triggered political and economic changes, finally leading to the downfall of the Kamakura

\(^{32}\) Okuda, *Chūsei bushidan to shinkō*, 300-10.

bakufu some five decades later. As mentioned earlier in the “Introduction,” it is more likely that the role of the kamikaze (divine winds) in defeating the Mongols was intentionally inflated by the bakufu, or the Hōjō under Tokimune’s leadership to be more precise, in order to justify political, judicial and economic actions. Looking at the development of ujidera during and following the invasions corresponds well to this view of the Mongol invasions. Though the bakufu issued new laws restricting certain religious activities, and prohibiting the construction of new temples and shrines, it was in fact those warriors closely related to the bakufu who were first to ignore these laws. Bakufu recognition of the contribution made by religious institutions to defeat the Mongols, influenced the development of ujidera.

In the aftermath of the Mongol invasions, the Kamakura bakufu was flooded with claims for rewards made by warriors who participated in the defense of Kyushu, and by temples and shrines whose prayers and rituals, they claimed, prompted the gods to send powerful storms which sunk the Mongol fleet. Having limited resources to use for rewards, the bakufu, while

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34 For example, Kuroda Toshio, Mōko shûrai, 3-4; George Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334, 451-467; John W. Hall, Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times, 93-94.


36 Rewarding religious institutions, was, in other words, recognition that divine winds defeated the Mongols. Some historians view this as the roots of modern nationalism.
commending lands or various *shiki* to these claimants, also issued a set of laws designed to help it satisfy both the claimants and its own needs. In the 1284 *Shinshikimoku* set of thirty eight laws, the bakufu prohibited the construction of new temples and shrines, while at the same time supporting existing ones by ordering their repair. In addition, to satisfy religious institutions’ claims for rewards, the bakufu ordered the unconditional return of lands and property that were formerly sold by temples and shrines. Such measures were designed to eliminate the possible strengthening of any single temple or shrine, which could have expanded its following and economic base. The logic underlying the bakufu’s judicial and economic policies is rather obvious, but only some were successfully implemented.

The construction of new *ujidera* during and after the Mongol invasions was only temporarily postponed. Just a few years after the bakufu issued the *Shin-goseibaishikimoku*, some warriors took to the task of building more temples. What is more surprising is that one of the leading warriors in this construction effort was in fact the main bakufu official himself, the regent Hōjō (Kanesawa) Sadatoki. In 1285 (Kōan 8) Sadatoki constructed Tōkeiji, followed by the construction of Kakuonji in 1296. Other

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37 See, for example, Kakehi, *Mōko shūrai to tokuseirei*, 114-151.

38 *Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū*, vol. 1, *Goseibai shinshikimoku*, art. 1, 250.
members of the Hōjō, as well as other Kantō warriors, also constructed temples in the Kamakura area or elsewhere in the Kantō. 39

The Mongol invasions not only prompted existing religious institutions to claim a central role in defeating the Mongols, but also brought to the fore Buddhist monks who were on a self promotion campaign. Nichiren and Ippen were only two among those who jumped on the bandwagon of victory in search of followers and patrons, offering new Buddhist doctrines to a larger audience. Indeed, Ippen was successful in establishing his 義真 school of Buddhism, gathering followers from among all levels of society--commoners and warrior retainers. 40

The spread of popular Buddhist movements such as 義真 did not fare well with efforts made by the 東条家 to sustain its hold on power. Restrictions on the construction of temples were designed to prevent new Buddhist schools from achieving a more permanent status. The logic behind these restrictions was that as long as there were no physical manifestations in the form of temples, which served as organized places of worship, new Buddhist schools would not be able to develop. Bakufu and warriors' patronage of temples in which there was adherence to "acceptable" doctrines of Buddhism was an effective countermeasure to Ippen and many other

travelling monks. The problem was that the bakufu could not effectively separate between what it viewed as desirable Buddhist activity and the undesirable promulgation of new schools. Not only did the bakufu lack power to enforce its decisions, warriors were not especially interested in helping the bakufu, nor were monks dismayed by the bakufu’s repressive efforts. The result was a revival in the construction of ujidera, especially of temples affiliated with Nichiren, Ippen, and Jōdo and Zen lineages.

The new trend in construction of ujidera was marked by the appearance of temples associated with or even founded by reformer monks. Furthermore, it was no longer the case that only powerful warrior families constructed ujidera. Less influential families were now anxious to adopt Buddhist affiliations, thus promoting their own interests similar to the way other, more powerful families had done before them.

Construction, Affiliation, and Structure of Ujidera

In recent years scholars have emphasized the emergence of reformer monks and new schools of Buddhism, while others have pointed out the importance of evaluating the re-emergence of “old Buddhism.”

41 Imai, “Odori nenbutsu to kamakura iri.”

42 For studies of the revival of pre-Kamakura schools, see, for example, Robert E. Morell, Kamakura Buddhism: A Minority Report (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1987); George J. Tanabe, Jr., Myōe the Dreamkeeper: Fantasy and Knowledge in Early Kamakura Buddhism (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, and Harvard
new schism should not be overlooked in our discussion of the *ujidera*,
because it contributed to a particular trend in the religious affiliations of
newly-established temples and worship halls, which, in essence, reflected the
religious preferences of their patron families. The emergence of a new
warrior society that was looking to solidify itself attracted many *nenbutsu*
monks, as well as known figures such as Nichiren, Hōnen, Shinran, Dōgen,
Ippen and Eisai, among others, who saw the potential in such a fertile social
ground. Looking to appeal to the rising, powerful warriors, monks offered
new doctrines and new interpretations of old ones. Some monks preached
easy ways to salvation, identifying, for example, single practices that centered
on the veneration of Amida. Their appeals to warriors who were occupied by
their new roles and duties in the provinces were well calculated attempts that
should have been well received, but most Kamakura warriors rejected
them. 43

Religious conservatism kept the Kantō bushi tethered to the old
Buddhism. The doctrinal preferences of some of the central figures among
the bakufu’s *gokenin* in the Kantō clearly leaned in favor of the *kenmitsu*
schools, and their temple affiliations were with the major Kyoto and Nara

43 The first leading warrior to reject new Buddhist doctrines was Yoritomo, who rejected
the teachings of Hōnen. Later, the bakufu rejected *nenbutsu* monks, and monks who did not
belong to established lineages. In some cases the bakufu tried to restrict the activities of
specific monks, such as Nichiren, and in other cases it addressed groups of monks. The actions
taken to restrict unwanted activity was in the form of legal decrees. *Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū*,
vol. 1, arts. 12, 38, 75, 90, 97.
religious institutions. This is not to say that the new Buddhism did not find its niche in the East. Amidism and Zen gradually attracted followers among warriors, but it was a slow process with substantive results only in the late Kamakura period. Even those Kamakura warriors who invited to the Kantō monks carrying new messages did not adopt the new practices and doctrines in place of the existing ones. Reformer monks such as Eisai (full name Myōan Eisai, also Yōsai and Senkō), who was invited to Kamakura by Hōjō Masako to found Jūfukuji, or the renegade monk Nichiren, were able to find their way to Kamakura bushi society only after they agreed to teach existing Buddhist doctrines. Eisai, even when he came to Kamakura after his second trip to China, remained closely associated with Tendai and kenmitsu doctrines. Because of that association, Eisai's Zen teachings, and the Chinese Zen establishment, were not viewed as a threat to either bushi authority or to existing doctrines.44 Nichiren, on the other hand, because of his extreme views and radical personality, was allowed to present his teachings only after he mixed them with Buddhist orthodoxy.45 These examples reinforce the

44 Martin Collcutt best characterized Eisai and his disciples stating that:
"Eisai and his immediate disciples were not engaged by the shoguns and their retainers as teachers of Zen meditation or philosophy. ...They may have admired Eisai's practical character and been curious about the new knowledge he had gained in China, but they treated him and his followers as a local, more amenable branch of Tendai than the unruly, militant enclave at Enryakuji." Five Monasteries, (Harvard University Press, 1981), 40-41.

45 See Kawazoe Shōji, Nichiren to sono jidai (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorinkan, 1999), 275-95.
view that warrior conservatism was not quick to dissipate, especially in a
controlled society bound by obligations and duties.

Affiliation

The religious affiliation of warriors' *ujidera* depended on the religious
preferences of the heads of the families, the statuses of the families within
*gozenin* society, and by geographical proximity to Kamakura. Generally,
powerful families in the vicinity of Kamakura were the most conservative in
their religious inclinations, while those that were geographically removed
from and less involved in Kamakura affairs were more susceptible to change.
Branches of the Hōjō whose main residences were in or just adjacent to
Kamakura invited Kyoto monks from Saidaiji and Kōya-san to found their
*ujidera*. For example, Hōjō (Kanesawa) Sanetoki, whose residence was in
Kanesawa, Mutsura estate, built a memorial temple for his late mother in
1260. Two years later, in 1262, the name Shōmyōji appears in the Saidaiji
monk Eison’s diary *Kantō okan-ki* (Record of A Trip to the Kantō), and in
1267 Sanetoki re-inaugurated Shōmyōji as a Shingon Risshū temple. 47 On

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46 "Kanesawa" is the premodern pronunciation of what is today known as “Kanazawa.”
Due to its historical context, and to maintain literary accuracy I chose to use “Kanesawa”
throughout the text.

47 Eison, *Kantō okan-ki*, Bun’ei 4 (1267)/2/27. I used two versions of the *Kantō okan-ki*,
one is a facsimile of the original (University of Tokyo, Shiryō Hersanjo), the second is a
printed version with an introduction edited by Kenjō at Kanazawa Bunkō (Tokyo: Nakamura
Takejirō, 1934). The reason for using the facsimile is due to discrepancies in the printed version.
In any case, according to Ninshō, the temple used to be a gathering place of nenbutsu monks but
changed its affiliation and at the time of his trip to the Kantō there were no longer nenbutsu
monks there.
that occasion Sanetoki appointed Myôshôbô Shinkai (1229-1304) of Yakushiji in Shimotsuke province as its founder (kaizan).

The powerful Ashikaga family, whose headquarters were located in Kazusa province, were the patrons of Bannaji, a temple that became an attraction to the local population and travelers. According to the Bannaji engi, in 1196 the provincial governor of Kazusa, Ashikaga Yoshikane, son of Ashikaga Yoshiyasu, invited Rishin Shônin, a monk from Sôtô-zan in Izu, to found a Buddha hall (jibutsudô) within the Ashikaga residence enclosure (hori no uchi). 48 Rishin Shônin first enshrined an image of Dainichi Nyorai, which became the primary image of veneration even as the temple grew, for the principal purpose of ancestral worship. 49

Similarly, in 1221 Nitta Yoshisue constructed (kaiki) a family temple for the Nitta Serada clan, and invited Shakuenbô Eichô to become the founder (kaizan) of that temple, which he named Chôrakuji. Eichô was a senior disciple of Eisai, the foremost proponent of the Rinzai Zen school of Buddhism in Japan. References in the Shasekishû mention Eichô as a top ranking kenmitsu monk of the highest calibre, who traveled in various provinces in the Kantô. They further describe Eichô as “profoundly compassionate (jihi mo fukaku),” and assert that “he possessed wisdom (chie) and conducted meritorious acts (tokugyô).” Finally, “at the time of his

48 BJM, doc. 123, Hôei 4 (1707)/--/--, Bannaji ryaku engi.

49 For an overview of Bannaji, see Ashikaga shishi, tsûshi hen (Ashikaga: Ashikaga shi, 1977), 260-264.
entering nirvana, there appeared a bright light even though candles were not lit...”

It is likely that Eichô’s strong connection to Eisai, and the reputation he established for himself while traveling in the Kantô, had attracted Yoshisue’s attention. By inviting Eichô to the provincial headquarters of the Nitta clan, Yoshisue followed the example of Hôjô Masako’s invitation of Eisai to Kamakura to found Jûfukuji as a memorial hall to Yoritomo. Like Masako before him, Yoshisue invited Eichô because of the latter’s qualification as a kenmitsu monk, and not for his Zen teachings. His goal was to employ a monk who could perform services for the dead, chant incantations for the protection of the Nitta clan, and perform the appropriate rituals in cases of natural disasters.

For similar reasons, Hôjô (Gokurakuji) Shigetoki (1198-1261) established Gokurakuji (also called Ryôju sankan ’öin Gokurakuji) as the family temple of the Gokurakuji branch of the Hôjô. Gokurakuji was originally a nenbutsu temple in Fukazawa village, built for the veneration of Amida Nyorai. From 1257 to 1259 there was only one monk performing services and rituals at the temple, thus keeping the temple’s role limited to the very basic religious needs of the family. After the death of that monk in 1259, Hôjô Shigetoki moved the temple to a new location in Jigoku dani in

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50 Shasekishû, 269, 454.

51 Collcutt, Five Mountains, 40.
the western outskirts of Kamakura.\(^{52}\) The new Gokurakuji was founded by Ninshô, a top disciple of Eison at Saidaiji in Nara and an eminent Shingon risshû (precepts school) monk. Ninshô, who was well known as one of the main proponents of the Shingon precepts movement, chose the temple’s new location, established its affiliation with Saidaiji, and placed an image of Shaka Nyorai instead of Amida Nyorai as the main image of veneration.\(^{53}\) However, it was not until 1267, when Ninshô became a permanent resident and abbot of Gokurakuji, that Gokurakuji was truly transformed into a Shingon risshû temple. All the while it was Shigetoki’s personal fondness with nenbutsu practices that kept the temple’s nenbutsu character, that is, until Shigetoki’s funeral services, conducted by a Jôdo saizanha shôkumon monk.

Even before Ninshô took permanent residence at Gokurakuji, the temple had attracted the top echelon of warrior society. In the fourth month of 1261 for example, Shigetoki invited shogun Munetaka to Gokurakuji for a session of arrow shooting (kasagake).\(^{54}\) Later, when Ninshô established residence at Gokurakuji, the temple’s religious stature became a fixed feature among Kamakura temples. The temple’s religious prominence convinced the bakufu to assign Gokurakuji as a goganji. Then, early in the fourteenth

\(^{52}\) Gokurakuji was located at Gokurakuji pass. Kamakura shishi, vol. 2, 193-98. Also, see appendix F, fig. 5.

\(^{53}\) Akizuki Suiko, Gokurakuji ninshô (Tokyo: Sôbunsha, 1999).

\(^{54}\) AK, Kôchô 1 (1261)/4/21, 24, 25.
century, Gokurakuji became one of the three Kamakura temples to hold regular bi-monthly services for relic veneration. These services were the result of the bakufu's interest in promoting relic veneration for the purpose of strengthening its legitimacy and protecting it from potential enemies. The unambiguous religious role of Gokurakuji almost immediately made the temple an attractive place for religious and social gatherings to warriors and commoners alike.55

Further contributing to the popularity of the temple was undoubtedly its impressive physical presence. The temple structure was completed by Shigetoki's two sons Nagatoki and Naritoki, but in 1275 a fire destroyed it. After the fire, Ninshō, under the patronage of Moritoki, built seven new halls, forty nine in, and twelve shrines. Equally remarkable was Ninshō's assignment of a separate area within the temple compound for the construction of an infirmary, a sanctuary for the treatment of leprosy, a hospital, a room to treat horse-riding injuries, and a pharmacy.56 Then, in 1287, the regent Hōjō Tokimune ordered Ninshō to construct another

55 On relics and Gokurakuji, see Ruppert, Jewel in the Ashes, 231, 245, 248.

56 The source for this information, and for the overall layout of Gokurakuji, is an old map of the temple grounds. Gokurakuji kozu (Tokyo Daigaku Shūryō Hensanjo, Unpublished).
hospital in Kuwagatani. Indeed, this was a remarkable social endeavor that had no precedent in Kamakura.\textsuperscript{57}

Construction and Structure

One of the fundamental aspects, and arguably the most important one, associated with the construction of \textit{ujidera} was land commendation. It was without exception that, when the head of a warrior family built an \textit{ujidera}, the first step was to assign sources of income and supplies for the construction and regular operation of the temple. Other factors involved in the construction of a temple, such as religious affiliation, temple regulation, and the identity of founding monks, were determined by the warrior patron, and differed from one temple to another. The appointment of a founding monk took place at about the same time as the land commendation, but temple regulations were usually not established until the temple was completed and the number of attending monks was such that the temple indeed needed clearly defined rules. Because land commendation was not only for the initial construction but also for regular operation and maintenance and served as the economic base of any \textit{ujidera}, it is necessary to investigate what was involved in commending lands and in assigning rights to lands. An

ujidera’s right of income to lands commended to it by its patron family or by the bakufu defined its economic status in the context of local economics.

Chôrakuji, the ujidera of the Nitta Serada family, provides an interesting case of land commendation, involving both its patron family and the Kamakura bakufu. In the sixth month of 1168, Nitta Yoshishige commended non-cultivated lands (kôkan) to Rai’ô Gozen. The original document of commendation stipulated that Onazuka, Oshikiri, Serada, Kamihirazuka, Mikki, and Shimohirazuka were to become the holdings of Gozen. Furthermore, the document protected Gozen from potential claimants to rights of these lands. In the last part of the document, Yoshishige ordered that the local peasants of these lands had the right to remain on the commended lands. Yoshishige also made a separate commendation of lands to the mother of Rai’ô Gozen, most likely in order to secure her welfare. In a commendation document which Yoshishige wrote and signed on the same day that he commended lands to Gozen, he confirmed Onazuka, Kami-Eda, Shimo-Eda, Takada, Ôtachi, Kasugawa, Kozumi, Oshikiri, Idezuka, Serada, Mikki, Kami Imai, Shimo Imai, Kami Hirazuka, Shimo Hirazuka, Kisaki, Chôfukuji, Takô, and Yaginuma as her holdings. He further asserted that, although she had many children, none

58 There is a problem identifying Gozen because it is a female’s name, but the first name Rai’ô, especially the “ô,” is a common component of a male’s name. See Osaki, Kôzuke no kuni chôrakuji no kenkyû, 231-240; Nitta shô to nitta shi, 79-84, 116,123,124. The final conclusion is that Rai’ô Gozen was Serada Yoshisue.

59 CJM, doc. 122, Nin’an 3 (1168)/6/20, Nitta Yoshishige yuzurijô.
should attempt to take over these lands and claim rights to them. In these
two commendations Yoshishige in fact established the economic base of the
Nitta Serada family in the countryside.\textsuperscript{60}

After the appointment of Rôyô ajari to head Chôrakuji in 1247, there
were a number of land commendations to the temple by both bakufu officials
and others not related to the Nitta Serada family. The earliest recorded
commendation by a person outside the Nitta family was that of Fujiwara
Tokiie in 1252.\textsuperscript{61} Tokiie commendation was unique in the sense that the
stated reason for it was to secure Buddhist merit, and ensure a state of
nirvana for members of the family, and to prevent adversity within the
family for generations to come. Another unusual feature of this
commendation was Tokiie stipulation that every autumn a temple
representative should receive the produce of one chô of paddy field, which
was rice seed plants (shushi).\textsuperscript{62} In any case, Tokiie commendation reflected
the variety of sources of ujidera income, and showed how warrior ujidera
reached a high level of recognition by members of the social elites. There is

\textsuperscript{60} CJM, doc. 123, Nin’an 3 (1168)/6/20, Nitta Yoshishige okibumi.

\textsuperscript{61} CJM, doc. 47, Kenchô 4 (1252)/7/5, Fujiwara Tokiie kishinjô-an.

\textsuperscript{62} It is unclear why the designated period for transferring the seed plants to the temple
is in autumn since it is the time of cropping rice. Rice planting usually takes place in early
summer. The Chinese characters for shushi (with a slight variation in pronunciation) also
refer to either the seeds embedded in one’s consciousness, or to sanskrit “seed letters” (sk. Bija)
representing Buddhist deities. See Bukkyôgo daijiten, 633-34.
no doubt that such prominence was the result of ujidera patrons’ work toward just such recognition.

During and following the period of the Mongol invasions (1274 and 1281), the number of land commendations to Chôrakuji increased dramatically. In 1276 Ama no Jôin, Serada Yoriuji’s widow, commended three chô of land and one house to the temple for the purpose of establishing an office for one monk in perpetuity.63 Though not clearly stated, the establishment of a fund to support an office was to gain Buddhist merit and to have regular prayers for Yoriuji. Similarly, in 1280 Minamoto Sukemura commended the land of the Buddha hall within the Naka-Imai compound, Nitta estate, for the purpose of providing divine protection to future generations of the Nitta lineage.64 In 1287, for similar reasons and following Sukemura’s example, Minamoto Yasumura commended a house in Kami-Imai, which was the legacy of the monk Dônin, to Chôrakuji.65 While these commendations were made by the living for the benefit of the deceased, others were made by the living for their benefit after their own deaths.

Toriyama Tokinari, a local warrior and probably a vassal of the Serada clan, commended his landholdings to his wife Nekû in 1275 for sponsoring Shintô and Buddhist services. However, in his will Tokinari stipulated that

63 CJM, doc. 48, Kenchô 3 (1251)/2/23, Ama Jôin kishinjô-an.

64 CJM, doc. 49, Kôan 3 (1280)/2/12, Minamoto Sukemura kishinjô-an.

65 CJM, doc. 50, Kôan 10 (1287)/11/3, Minamoto Yasumura kishinjô-an.
after one generation Nekû must transfer the lands to Jien, her granddaughter. In 1282 Tokinari wrote a new will in which he re-asserted his instructions, and added a list of his land holdings.\textsuperscript{66} It is curious that Tokinari wrote each of the wills following the first and second Mongol invasions, during times of high anxiety among warriors, and in anticipation of further invasions. Of course, having written his second will one year after the second invasion indicates that Tokinari’s death was not on the battle front in Hakata; rather, it was most likely a natural death. Following Tokinari’s will, the widows Nekû and Jien co-signed two documents of commendation in which they transferred his lands to Chôrakuji.\textsuperscript{67} Tokinari and other warriors after him secured commendations to Chôrakuji following such a pattern.\textsuperscript{68} Their methods not only ensured continued memorial services for themselves and for their families, but also added a significant source of income to the temple.

Finally, it is worth noting that the commendations mentioned earlier, were approved by the Kamakura shogun, who was represented by bakufu officials. For example, a 1289(???check date again) bakufu order (gechijô) confirmed the transfer of Hanzuka to Chôrakuji, and a 1291 gechijô

\textsuperscript{66} CJM, doc. 98, Kenji 2 (1276)/10/1, Toriyama Tokinari yuzurijô; ibid., doc. 99, Köan 5 (1282)/3/10, Toriyama Tokinari yuzurijô.

\textsuperscript{67} CJM, doc. 52, Einin 5 (1297)/6/11, Ama Jien Nekû kishinjô-an; ibid., doc. 53, Einin 5 (1297)/6/11, Ama Jien Nekû kishinjô-an. Included in the commendations were parcels of land in Nitta estate, and what was previously (naka mukashi) the legacy of Tôzôji in Hataki estate, Echigo province.

\textsuperscript{68} CJM, doc. 55, Kengen 2 (1303)/5/6, Sô Ryôken kishinjô-an; ibid., doc. 56, Tokuji 2 (1307)/2/11, Minamoto Naritsune kishinjô-an.
confirmed the transfer of ownership of lands from Toriyama Tokinari to his widow Nekū, who then commended the lands to Chōrakuji. These bakufu orders in matters of commendations and wills in connection with Chōrakuji significantly contributed to the sense of security and eventual prosperity of this and other ujidera.

Under warrior patronage and protection, ujidera were increasingly more active as religious as well as social institutions, and at the same time more self-sufficient and independent. Looking at the structure of the ujidera, we should be able to conceptualize them in their local social contexts, under the supervision of their patron families. It is also essential that we examine the degree of influence the patron families had on their ujidera and the economic activity that took place within and around them. Such an examination will allow us to observe the interest and involvement of the Kamakura bakufu in ujidera affairs. It is necessary to note here that, although warriors’ ujidera shared similar characteristics, understandably there were differences among them resulting from their affiliations, patrons, and locations.

As was common in many of the ujidera, the original structure was not designed as a temple, but rather as a small Buddha hall (jibutsudō) for memorial services for the patron family. One such hall was constructed by Ashikaga Yoshikane, and is mentioned only as the “hall within the moat”

69 CJM, doc. 4, Shō 4 (1289)/12/21, Kamakura shōgun-ke gechijō.
(hori no uchi midō), referring to a Buddha hall within the residential compound of the Ashikaga family. The original purpose of the hall was to provide Yoshikane a place for Buddhist services after his retirement and taking of the tonsure. According to Bannaji tōsetsusha, in 1234 Yoshikane’s son Yoshiuji built a hall five ken (approx. 9 m/27ft.) long for housing Dainichi Nyorai. He also built twelve residences for monks outside the moat and commended lands in Tsukiya and Hanzuka for the twelve monks offices (jūnigobō). From this information it is clear that the original memorial hall was larger than other similar halls. Although Yoshiuji built only one structure for an image of Dainichi, the additional twelve structures suggest that he planned for a large community of monks, whom he needed not only for their Buddhist services, but also for mundane work, such as teaching in the temple’s school.

Rules and Regulations

Between 1234 and 1251 the memorial hall grew in size to become the temple complex known as Bannaji under the patronage of Yasuuji. In 1251, Ashikaga Yasuuji issued temple regulations in which the name Bannaji was first recorded and which included the following:

70 The twelve offices included: Tōkō-in, Fuken-in, Fudō-in, Rokuji-in, Jōdo-in, Hōshu-in, Itoku-in, Enmei-in, Senshu-in (was in charge of the temple’s school), Kongōjō-in, Ryūfuku-in, Anyō-in, and separated them to east and west halls.

71 The first mentioning of the name Bannaji is in a document from Kenchō 3 (1251). BJM, Kenchō 3 (1251)/3/8, Ashikaga Yasuuji okibumi.
1. Those who are not at the rank of kanjō (in mikkyō: ajari level), shall not be appointed gusō.

2. Similarly, monks of other temples (tamon sōto) shall not be appointed [in this temple].

3. Those living at the altar area (danjo) shall not leave, and shall not be replaced by a deputy.

4. New monks (shinpō gusō) should confer with the older resident monks (jika).

5. [Monks] shall hold the duty to control all annual practices and events, such as the collection of donations for the Issaikyō-e, and the building and repairs of the temple.

Yasuji ended this set of temple regulations with a warning to all temple officials that they must obey them. Should there be a monk who disobeys any of the regulations, his name must be submitted in a legally binding statement.

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72 The term tamon also refers to a religious school, a denomination within an established school, or a family. The use of this term immediately endows a character of exclusivity to the person or institution who uses it. In more practical terms, it is used in the context of preservation and clear self-identity.

73 “Danjo” is an abbreviation of “ryōkai mandara danjo,” and refers to the place in Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji in Kamakura where the Ryōkai mandala, which Yoshikane presented to the shrine, were housed. These two monks were permanently stationed in Kamakura and were sponsored by the Ashikaga family. Ryōkaidan gusō shidai. See Arakawa Takeshi, “Ashikagashi to bannaji,” Rekishi shusho 6 (1974)4: 22.

74 BJM, Kenchō 3 (1251)/3/8, Ashikaga Yasuji okibumi.
There are some important aspects to the above regulations that we must now consider. Three years before the death of Ashikaga Yoshiuji, his son Yasuuji attempted to enforce strict guidelines and regulations for the ongoing administration of Bannaji, most likely in consultation with his father. Yasuuji first set the minimum requirement for the position of a member of the monks community (gusō) at an ordination ritual (kanjō), and officially acknowledged a monk who has taken the precepts. By doing so, he created a clear distinction between the fully-ordained, fully-employed monks from disciples and acolytes. This was the fundamental hierarchical division upon which more minute divisions were imposed later with the increase in the physical size of the temple complex and in the number of monks and acolytes.

Yasuji took such clear measures to limit the number and mobility of monks, and placed strict restrictions on the employment of monks from other temples. By limiting the number of monks while gradually increasing the temple’s landholdings, Yasuuji in fact increased the profit margin of the temple. At the same time, he secured the temple’s lineage during a time when nenbutsu monks, who found refuge and fertile ground in eastern Japan, were visiting temples and attempting to convert lay

75 Kanjō (also, kanjo) is a conferral ceremony in which water is sprinkled on the head of a monk to symbolize his acceptance of the precepts and becoming ordained. It also refers to a fully ordained monk who was confirmed by an ajari in a ceremony.

76 This seem to be in contrast to Okuda Shinkei’s assertion that ujidera were designed to attract monks from other temples. See Okuda Shinkei, Chūsei no bushidan to shinkō, 294-95.
followers as well as the temples' monks. In addition, the spread of new Buddhist schools, such as Jōdo and Zen, whose followers shifted towards single practice, threatened the temples' ability to maintain coherent structures, bodies of monks, and "acceptable" doctrinal orientations in accordance with the "old Buddhism."

Yasuji went further to give Bannaji de facto independence by ordering it to manage itself. The chief administrative offices were now responsible not only for day-to-day affairs, but also for managing the annual events of the temple, including monk gatherings, rituals, as well as raising funds to support special events and regular temple maintenance. Achieving this level of freedom was a significant step toward becoming an independent temple complex. Following the destruction of the temple in 1287 due to heavy snowfall and fire, Yasuuji's son Sadauji rebuilt it to an even greater size than it was before. An important feature of the temple under its new patron was its academy, which in later years became a separate entity known as the Ashikaga Gakkō. Bannaji therefore came to perform an important social role in addition to its religious one.

Ujidera as Warrior Sanctuaries

In the early Kamakura period, the practice of taking Buddhist vows was more common upon the inevitable prospect of death. Minamoto Yoritomo, for example, took Buddhist vows when suffering from illness, merely two
days before his death. Though such practice was not unusual, it was conducted with the intent of securing one's fate—re-birth in Amida's Pure Land (Jōdo). By the middle of the Kamakura period, warriors adopted the courtier practice of retirement from political life by taking Buddhist vows before reaching old age. After they took the vows, warriors spent time studying Buddhist scriptures and Chinese philosophy years before their deaths.

A prime example of taking early retirement from political life was the fifth Kamakura regent, Hōjō Tokiyori, whose retirement from office initiated a wave among warriors of taking Buddhist vows to become lay monks. On the second month of 1256, a measles epidemic broke out in the western provinces, and a year later it spread to Kamakura, causing many deaths in warrior houses. On the twelfth day of the second month of 1257, an attendant died at the regent Hōjō Tokiyori's house, and by the end of the month Tokiyori was also gravely ill. While Tokiyori was able to recover, many others died, and the epidemic continued to take lives. Upon learning of

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77 *Insuibyō* could be any one of a few illnesses. Whatever it was, the symptoms included gonorrhea. The date of Yoritomo taking Buddhist vows is mentioned in the *Hōjō kudai koki* according to which he took the vows on the eleventh day of the first month, and died on the thirteenth day. See Ikemi Chōryū, *Chūsei no seisin sekai* (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin, 1997), 115-208.

78 There were also many warriors' sons who were sent to monasteries as acolytes and later returned to Kamakura to serve as monks in any of the temples or Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji. Refer to the discussion in Chapter 3, and also to Taira Masayuki, "Kamakura bakufu no shūkyō seisakun ni tsuite," in *Nippon kodai no sōsei to shakai kankei no kisōeki kenkyū* (Osaka: Osaka Daigaku Bungakubu, 1995).
many deaths in the Nagoe, Utsunomiya, and Gokurakuji houses, Tokiyori began to plan his retirement to religious life. After losing his daughter and other relatives to the disease, Tokiyori fell ill again and remained unconscious for a few days. His surprising return to consciousness, followed by full recovery from his illness, seem to have left a strong impression on Tokiyori.\(^{79}\)

Upon his recovery, Tokiyori transferred the title and office of regent to Gokurakuji (Hōjō) Nagatoki, and a short while later, in the eleventh month of 1256, he took Buddhist vows at Saimyōji temple, adopting the Buddhist name Dōsū. Conducting the ceremony was the Chinese monk Lan-chi Tao-lung (Rankei Dōryū, 1213-1278), who had benefitted from Tokiyori’s patronage since 1249.\(^{80}\) In any event, the ceremony took place a month after Hōjō Tokisada took Buddhist vows in a ceremony that received little attention. However, Tokiyori’s retirement caused immediate reaction, and in no time Yūki Tomohiro, Tokimitsu and Tomomura, Sahara (Miura) Mitsumori, Moritoki and Tokitsura, and Nikaidō Yukiyasu, Yukitsuna and Yukitada, all took Buddhist vows.\(^{81}\) There is little doubt that the long period of epidemics had its effect on Kamakura warriors, who had confronted death

\(^{79}\) The Azumakagami provides detailed information on the spread of epidemics in Kamakura and the reaction of warriors to it. See, for example, the entries for \(AK,\) Kenchō 8/8, 9, 10, 11.

\(^{80}\) For the relationship between Tokiyori and Lan-chi Tao-lung see Collcutt, Five Mountains, 65-68.

\(^{81}\) AK, Kögen 1/11/23.
not on the battlefield where they could take some action, but rather at home, where they felt helpless. Taking Buddhist vows and retiring to temples was their way of seeking atonement. The *Azumakagami* certainly conveys such a despondent atmosphere in which turning to the buddhas was the only available way.  

But pragmatism was always a driving force in the life of Kamakura warriors, and it is possible they believed that retiring to a temple was a viable way to avoid contact with diseases.

**Conclusion**

The construction of *ujidera* by Kamakura warriors was a continuation of a religious practice that was begun some five hundred years earlier by Shôtoku Taishi and the Soga clan as part of a process of self-strengthening. Political power, having been closely related to one’s ability to demonstrate a superior lineage and religious fervor, dictated the need to display such religiosity in the grandest of ways. With knowledge of Buddhism came also knowledge of Chinese temple design, and the early Japanese *ujidera* followed meticulously-prescribed schema of ground plans and structural patterns, which provided grandeur and a strong sense of sacredness.  

The appropriation of relics of the family ancestors gave a temple its official

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82 Okutomi Takayuki also suggests that the recurrent waves of diseases were the reason for the retirement of many warriors. See, Okutomi, *Tokiyori to tokimune*, 139-146.

83 The seven temples built by Shôtoku Taishi follow such a plan, with small variations but similar principles. See Kidder, *The Lucky Seventh*, 199-204, and 8-9, fig. 3.
function as an *ujidera*, and with additional relics and scriptures imported from China, *ujidera* became symbols of religious authority and a testimony to their patrons’ right to high status. In this equation, affiliation with a strong Buddhist school, together with the employment of prominent Buddhist monks, provided the patrons formidable divine support. As patrons became wealthier and more influential they expanded the temples’ community of monks, made them centers of learning and copying of Buddhist scriptures, learning of Chinese thought. In addition, these temples conducted annual services and rituals (*nenjû gyôji*) that attracted the attention of court nobles. Keeping ancestral worship at the core of their duties to patrons, these *ujidera* grew powerful, and eventually achieved economic and religious independence. By the Kamakura period many of these temples were already fixed features in and around Nara and Kyoto, serving as models for Kantô warriors who sought to establish their own religious résumés.

Beginning with Yoritomo, Kantô warriors established memorial halls for their ancestors as part of their residence complexes. For them, as for courtiers before them, the purpose of building memorial halls to their ancestors was to establish strong, lasting connections to their land, and to display their right to status based on respectable lineages. Yoritomo made such efforts to establish his claim to rule from Kamakura, as did the Ashikaga, Kanesawa, and many others in their provincial headquarters. Kamakura warriors, however, learned from the pattern of courtiers’ *ujidera*
that unless they placed certain limitations on their *ujidera*, they might similarly become powerful and independent.

When in the middle of the Kamakura period warriors began to transform their ancestral memorial halls to temple complexes, they restricted the activity of the monks, regulated the duties of monks who managed temple affairs, and kept the temples’ financial activity in check through written regulations. At the same time, warriors molded their *ujidera* according to their religious needs, setting dates for memorial services and often prescribing the nature of and resources for such services. Finally, having been set according to the preference of their patrons, *ujidera* developed into sources of divine protection for entire clans, and sanctuaries for retired patrons who took the tonsure. In effect, *ujidera* became integral parts of warrior clans and religious centers in their localities.

For the Kamakura bakufu, *ujidera* were a testimony to the expansion of divine protection over the Kantô and to its society of warriors, and ultimately to the legitimacy of the bakufu itself in a manner similar to the court. The affiliation of *ujidera* with powerful Nara and Kyoto religious institutions, through the employment of monks from these temples, served the bakufu well in countering the spread of new schools of Buddhism, some of which the bakufu saw as a threat to stability in the Kantô. *Ujidera* were also considered by the bakufu as extra sources of protection during times of crisis. Depending on the severity of a crisis, the bakufu recruited the services
of various *ujidera* in addition to and in support of temples in the immediate vicinity of the bakufu. In return for their services, the bakufu endowed *ujidera* with gifts of symbolic and economic value. The economic support, as well as judicial protection, provided by the bakufu to these *ujidera* for their services went beyond ensuring their welfare. It was a recognition of their importance by both patrons and bakufu. Then, as their religious role solidified, and their economic bases secured, *ujidera* came to perform an important function in the Kamakura economy and trade as centers of local economies.
CHAPTER 6
THE ECONOMY OF BUDDHAS AND CLERGY

Introduction

An increasingly active economy in the Kamakura period manifested itself in the widespread use of coins, vibrant local production and trade, and more aggressive trade with the continent. Coastal regions such as the Inland Sea and the Izu and Kamakura developed an active industry of fishing and sea products. Among the products of this industry were salt, seaweed and various kinds of fish and clams, all of which were traded and sold in Kamakura.\(^1\) Maritime transportation became a common mode of transferring these goods, leading to the opening of more ports while creating large markets in existing ones.\(^2\) Busy trade routes prompted the development of new businesses and local markets, eventually leading to higher mobility and more diverse markets. Ultimately, it was this money economy that greatly influenced the development of the Kamakura period economy.


\(^2\) Testifying to the wide-spread use of boats are two sets of regulations for boats and marine trade. The first set of thirty articles, provides definitions for various types of boats, their purpose, handling, and navigating, among other things. The second set of forty four articles addresses matters such as cargo, piracy, theft, rental boats, and manners. Ki, vol. 5, docs. 3068, 3073, Jōdo 2 (1223)/3/16, kaisen. Also, Ki, vol. 3, doc. 1641, Ken'ei 1 (1206)/9/--, Izumi Otoriša shinjinra kai-an; Ki, vol. 12, doc. 8911, Kurōdokoro fudautsushi. All these documents show that boats were used to transfer cargo, people, and as floating shops. Piracy and theft were some of the common obstacles to marine activity, but accidents and disasters also took their toll.
Consequently, the Kyoto court lost its monopoly over the importation of coins, and the bakufu and independent entrepreneurs traded directly with the continent.³

Among the new and more active participants in the Kamakura period economy were warrior ujidera. Some ujidera were importers of Chinese coins, pottery, Buddhist scriptures, and other miscellaneous goods. Other ujidera held busy local markets, and some temples were involved in money lending. Most ujidera were involved in more than one type of economic activity, such as incorporating local trade with money lending, for example. This network of ujidera greatly contributed to making Kamakura the most important economic center in eastern Japan from the beginning of the thirteenth century until the bakufu’s downfall in 1333, reaching a height of activity in the middle of that period.⁴

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Economy and Trade

Local Economy

Land commendations and a variety of gifts provided the bakufu and warrior religious institutions with economic security. Once sources of income were secured, these religious institutions were able to partake in their provincial economies. In some cases, they expanded their trade activity beyond their immediate locales to form direct trade connections with temples in nearby provinces, and even established themselves as stations for foreign trade. Temple regulations for economic matters, issued by their patrons, or the lack of such regulations, suggest that ujidera exercised a fair degree of economic freedom. What may have affected their economic activities were the bakufu's own economic interests, which were expressed in the form of legislation.

From 1250 to 1253 the bakufu made a considerable effort to advance its interests in the developing economy by implementing its legal and political authority in economic matters. Thus, in 1250 the bakufu ordered the repair of the Sannai and Mutsura roads, which were used for trade between Kamakura and other parts of the Kanto. Repairing these roads improved the flow of

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5 It is important to keep in mind that, when we examine the terminology involved in the economy of a religious institution, the meaning of "commendation (kishin)," "gift (fuse)," or any synonym to these terms were often used interchangeably, somewhat blurring the differences. For example, lands were commended, but cloths, swords, and horses were presented as gifts. However, the commendation of lands could, in some cases, be categorized as gifts depending on the occasion, the giver, and the recipient.
trade and ensured a more efficient mechanism for tax collection.\textsuperscript{6} Ten days after it ordered the repairs, the bakufu issued a price regulation law (\textit{kokah\ö}) to control trade.\textsuperscript{7} In the ninth month of 1251, the bakufu assigned zones of trade and production within Kamakura, an act that established official bakufu patronage of guilds; and exactly a year later the bakufu attempted to monopolize the \textit{sake} trade by prohibiting it in Kamakura and various provinces.\textsuperscript{8} The bakufu also limited the number of \textit{sake} bottles per house to one, and ordered the remaining bottles destroyed.\textsuperscript{9} Then, in 1253 the bakufu regulated the trade of lumber and charcoal.\textsuperscript{10}

These regulations, which reflected the bakufu’s aggressive economic policy, sent a clear message to warrior families that the bakufu was now interested in monitoring and profiting from systematized and well-organized trade. Similarly, regulating trade within Kamakura, but refraining from placing other locations under such regulations, meant that potentially profitable markets could be developed under the direct control of provincial warriors. The implication of this economic policy for provincial warrior families was that they could either join the trade network or remain

\textsuperscript{6} AK, Kenchō 2 (1250)/6/3.

\textsuperscript{7} Hyakurenshō, Kenchō 2 (1250)/6/13.


\textsuperscript{9} AK, Kenchō 4 (1252)/9/30.

\textsuperscript{10} AK, Kenchō 5 (1253)/10/11.
independent and lose an important source of revenue—which would have potentially upset the balance of local power politics. Eventually, such conditions induced the rise of a semi-independent periphery of trade in the Kantō under the control of local magnates.

The appearance of a semi-independent periphery of trade in the Kantō, together with the emergence of warrior ujidera as markets, led to a transition from a center-based economy to multiple peripheral sub-centers of trade and distribution.11 The establishment of a warrior government in Kamakura led not only to the development of Kamakura as a center of political power, but also as a focal point of religious and economic activity in the eastern provinces. As such, some scholars believe that Kamakura in the east was the equivalent of Kyoto in the west. Together, Kyoto and Kamakura formed the two terminal points of a major trade route.12

However, this view has been challenged on the basis of archeological and documentary evidence, which clearly indicates that an active periphery of trade allowed for the exchange of goods without the mediation of

11 Archeology plays an important role in understanding the periphery. See, for example, Asano Haruki, “Doki kara mita chūsei no tōgoku,” in Chūsei nihon rettō no chūkijō, 63-93; Miyataki Kōji, “Kita musashi chiiki ni okeru chūsei dōro kenkyū no gerijō to kadai,” in Chūsei no michi to butsuryū, ed. Fujiwara Yoshiaki and Murai Shōsuke (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999).

12 The role of Kamakura as the most important economic center in the eastern provinces, and Kyoto’s counterpart, is delineated in Kozo Yamamura, “The growth of commerce in medieval Japan,” in Medieval Japan, vol. 3 of The Cambridge History of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Kamakura. This periphery relied on land, sea, and river transportation as effective methods of delivery that allowed continuous trade within and among local markets. In fact, if we look at the demographic distribution in the Kantō in the early and late Kamakura period, we see a significant increase in the number of communities and higher population density along major rivers and streams, as well as along the coast. Though there is overwhelming evidence for the increasing number of such new village communities, it does not signify a decline in the number of villages and towns along major highways. Instead, similar evidence shows the existence of villages along highways in the Kantō away from Kamakura.

The larger web-like layout of roads, highways, and rivers allowed for and contributed to the development of peripheral centers that were often

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14 Amino Yoshihiko and Gomi Fumihiko subscribe to this notion of center and periphery, and both emphasize the importance of archeological evidence in that matter. For analysis of recent archeological findings in the Kantō, and the construction of population distribution model, see Amino Yoshihiko, “Chiikiron no motsu imi,” 13-32; Amino Yoshihiko and Mori Kōichō discuss the use of boats, horses, and people in trade between western and eastern Japan in Uma, fune, jōmin: tōsai kōryū no nihon rettōshi (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1999).

15 Asano, “Doki kara mita chūsei no tōgoku,” 75-76, 81, figs. 5, 6, 8; Takahashi Hisakazu, “Bushi no taitō to shizen,” in Shizen kankyō to bunka, vol. 3 of Kōkōgaku ni yoru nihon no retōshi, 84, fig. 1, 89-91.

expansions of provincial residences of warrior families. What made such expansions possible was that warriors who held offices in their locales, namely the offices of jitō and shugo, came from families whose respected lineage, wealth, and close relationships with the bakufu made them powerful and influential. They had the economic capability of building more structures at their provincial residences and the political power to resist any potential restrictions by the bakufu. Their ujidera, therefore, benefitted from their patrons' status, allowing them to develop their economy even at times when the bakufu attempted to restrict economic activities.

**Foreign Trade**

Foreign trade with the continent was not new in the Kamakura period. Trade with China and Paekche had begun before the Heian period, but it gathered momentum in the eleventh-century, leading to a constant flow of Chinese products to Japan thereafter. While the flow of Chinese products before the Kamakura period was monitored by the court, after the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu, the bakufu also took part in this trade independent of the court's dealings. Consequently, with the two political

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17 Takahashi Osamu, Chūsei bushidan to chiiki shakai (Tokyo: Seibundō, 2000); Ichimura Takao, “Chūsei tōgoku ni okeru shuku no fukei,” in Toshi kamakura to sakato no umi ni kurasu, 73-121.

centers of court and bakufu actively involved in trade with the continent, the importation of Chinese products reached an unprecedented intensity in the second half of the Kamakura period.

As early as the Genpei War and the first years of the Kamakura bakufu, Minamoto Yoritomo recognized the importance of trade with China and the crucial role of Chinzei (i.e., Hakata) as the primary port for ships arriving in Japan. When the flow of Chinese goods was interrupted by the Dazaifu official Amano Tōkage, Shimazu estate officials filed a legal complaint to Yoritomo, who issued an edict rebuking Amano for confiscating goods from ships arriving from China at the Shimazu estate. Yoritomo not only protected the trade with China, he himself became a purchaser of Chinese craftsmanship, as we can learn from his presentation of Chinese gifts to his wife Masako. Among these gifts were Chinese brocades (karanishiki), fabrics (kara'aya), silk (karakinu), and silver coins (nantei). The interest of Yoritomo, wealthy warriors, court aristocrats, and the clergy, in Chinese goods

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19 KI, vol. 1, doc. 236, Bunji 3 (1187)/5/14, Minamoto no Yoritomo migyōsho-an. The plaintiffs in this case were Konoe-ke officials who held offices in Shimazu estate. They filed a law suit against Amano Tōkage. Amano Tōkage was a close ally of Yoritomo since the early days of the Genpei War. He was awarded the office of Chinzei bugyō most likely for his participation in the pursuit of the Heike in the western provinces, and for fighting alongside Minamoto Noriyori in Kyushu. Although the Konoe-ke officials won their complaint, Amano Tōkage kept his office until 1194. He continued to serve the bakufu after Yoritomo’s death under the regency of Hōjō Tokimasa.

20 The word “nantei” for silver coins was uncommon and may have been used to indicate Southern Sung coinage. The common term for silver coins was ginsen, or zeni. References to nantei appear in Shasekishō, in Okanoya kampakuki, Kangen 4 (1246)/1/15, and also in a bill of sale (baiken) owned by a Chinese monk in Japan. KI, vol. 5, doc. 404, Karoku 2(1226)/5/3, Sō Eishō denchi baiken; KI, vol. 8, doc. 310, Ninji 2 (1244)/10/11, Kansenji.
prompted Yoritomo to take steps to ensure their safe importation. Had he or the bakufu failed to secure this trade, it certainly would have caused dissatisfaction at court, and ultimately have brought forth a vexing flow of complaints, leading to mistrust in the bakufu's ability to protect the court's interests. 21

Taking even greater interest in China, Yoritomo's son, the third Kamakura shogun Sanetomo, ordered Wakei, a Chinese shipbuilder, to build a large ship for a trip to China. 22 The purpose of the trip was to worship at Iō-san (i.e., Mt. Iō). 23 Unfortunately, the ship never left Yuigahama in Kamakura bay. After recruiting a few hundred people and pulling out to sea, the ship sank. 24 Though Sanetomo never made it to China, this affair illustrates the degree of interest in China among the highest echelons of warrior society. In this case, Sanetomo's interest seems to have been purely
religious. But it was precisely this religious context that provided Kamakura warriors with the pretext to invited Chinese monks to Kamakura, and buy Chinese-made Buddhist scriptures, ichnography, and robes. At any rate, regardless of the real reason for Sanetomo’s attempt to visit China, it is a clear reflection of a growing interest in China among eastern warriors. It shows that maritime trade had become rather common, though it remained an adventure taken mostly by merchants and monks.

Sanetomo’s untimely death at the hands of his nephew Kugyō did not change the continuing maritime trade with China. On the contrary, it would be appropriate to characterize the years following his assassination, which included the Jōkyū War, as a period of active marine trade. The author of the Kaidōki tells us about a bustling Yuigahama port where there were hundreds of boats tied by chains to one another and about the sight of a hundred merchant families conducting transactions. Various other records make it clear that maritime trade and transportation between the Kantō and the western provinces were common practices in which a considerable number of bakufu vassals were involved. Ships sailing along the coast between Kamakura, Awaji, and Hakata were often the preferred mode for

25 The identity of the author of the Kaidōki is unclear. Two possible authors are Kamo no Chōmei, who wrote the well-known Hōjōki, and Minamoto Mitsuyuki. At any rate, the main focus of the Kaidōki is the author’s visit to Kamakura between Jōō 2 (1223)/4/4 and 17.

26 Kaidōki, Jōō 1 (1222)/4/17, and Jōō 2 (1223)/4/18. In his descriptions of Kamakura, the author makes a comparison with a busy port in Tōtōmi province, pointing out that these two ports were alike in the sense that they were very busy trade ports with many ships and merchants.
transporting goods as well as taxes, despite the rough seas and many acts of piracy.27

The Jōkyū War of 1221 disrupted the balance of power between Kyoto and Kamakura set by Yoritomo in the first fifteen years of warrior rule, and shifted it in favor of the bakufu. The disturbance resulted in the reshaping of the political role of the bakufu into a mature legislative body, as reflected in the first set of warrior legislation, Goseibai shikimoku (also, Jōei shikimoku) of 1232. There is a general agreement among scholars that the Jōkyū War, in Paul Varley’s words, “...provided the most important impetus to the strengthening of the [b]akufu as a national government after Yoritomo.”28 The war brought the bakufu to the forefront of rulership in a way that overshadowed the court itself.29 For us, the question is, did the Jōkyū War

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27 There are numerous recorded cases of piracy and bakufu attempts to deal with Japanese and foreign pirates. See, for example, Mongaku’s letter to Yoriie in AK, Shōji 2 (1200)/12/28 (in KI, vol. 2, doc. 1099, Mongaku shōnin ikenjō); KI, vol. 3, doc. 1400, Kansenji; KI, vol. 5, doc. 3068, Jōō 2 (1223)/3/16, Kaisen daijō; KI, vol. 10, doc. 7621, Kenchō 5 (1253)/10/1, Kanto gechijō; KI, vol. 11, doc. 8281, Shōga 2 (1258)/9/21, Kanto migyōsho; KI, vol. 12, doc. 8638, Kōchō 1(1261)/3/22, Kanto migyōsho-an; KI, vol. 14, doc. 11040, Bun’ei 9 (1272)/5/25, Nichiren shōjō; Also, Amino Yoshihiko, Akutō to kaizoku, nihon chūsei no shakai to seiji (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1995), 246-272. As for problems of gale winds and rough seas, the best example is the drifting of sixty one ships traveling from western Japan carrying annual taxes (nengū) from Chinzei to Kamakura. Due to a strong typhoon, the sixty-one ships drifted to Izu. In AK, Kōchō 3 (1263)/8/27). For a concise survey of foreign trade in the first decades of the Kamakura period see Kawazoe Shōji, Taiga kankei no shiteki tenkai (Tokyo: Bunken Shuppan, 1996), 51-58.


29 Ishii Susumu, Kamakura bakufu, 380-87.
and the promulgation of the Goseibai shikimoku compendium of laws a decade later have any implications on foreign trade? And if yes, how?

Documentary evidence shows that although marine activity and travels to China continued without interference, courtiers increased their involvement in this trade. There also appears to have been a decrease in records concerning the Kamakura bakufu and warrior involvement in trade with China, at least temporarily, until the middle of the Kamakura period. However, courtiers, especially the Saionji family, were actively involved in sending ships to China to acquire a wide variety of Chinese things (karamono), from the very popular Buddhist scriptures to silver coins and fabrics.

In 1242, the Minkeiki recorded a rumor circulating among courtiers and heard by Fujiwara no Tsunemitsu to the effect that Saionji Kintsune sent ships to trade in China. The ships returned to Japan carrying a hundred thousand kan of coins, cockatoos (ōmu) and water buffalo (suigyu), among other goods. In return, Kintsune sent back a structure made of hinoki wood.30 There is no indication what this structure was, only that it had four walls and three entrances. It is also unclear who Kintsune’s trade partner was. The records suggest that courtiers were not restricted by either the court or the bakufu from having direct and private dealings with China. The records also indicate that Chinese coins were highly desired, but for reasons

30 Minkeiki, Ninji 4 (1242)/7/4.
not mentioned. Perhaps they were wanted for the construction of buildings, namely temples, and for donations and the purchase of various products. It is thus evident that courtiers who were interested in foreign trade were indeed free to pursue it.

Between the 1250s and the Mongol invasions, a number of court families, powerful temples, the bakufu, the Hōjō regents, and other leading warrior families were involved in foreign trade more intensively than ever before. In general, there were three main categories of things Chinese that they imported from Sung and Yüan China: Buddhist scriptures and ichnography, coins, and luxury goods. The popularity of Buddhist scriptures in the Kamakura period made them desirable import products in many Kantō temples, but the import of copper Chinese coins exceeded that of scriptures. This was due to extensive use of Chinese coins in the Kamakura economy, especially since these coins were easier to handle than rice. Most popular among the luxury items imported from the continent, yet least recorded, was Chinese porcelain. Other luxury imports included silk cloths and clothing, and arts and crafts.

31 See n. 3. Also, Nagai Kumio, Chūsei no shutsudo sen (Amazaki: Hyōgo-ken Risōsen Chōsakai, 1994).

32 Archeological evidence suggests that imports of Chinese porcelain during the Kamakura period exceeded any other period before the seventeenth century. See, Tsuchihachi Riko, “Nissō bōeki no shosō,” in Taigai Kōshō, vol. 8 of Kōkogaku ni yoru nihon rekishi, 61-76. Silk products and Chinese crafts are often mentioned in contemporary records in the context of gift giving from husband to wife (e.g., Yoritomo’s gifts to Masako), patron to temple, warrior to Tsurugaoka Hachimangū or the shogun, etc.
Crucial for foreign trade were routes for transporting and distributing imported goods. Two major routes served to transport goods to and from the eastern provinces. First was the Tōkaidō road, which was used to transfer goods between western and eastern Japan. The second route was along the Japanese seaboard. Ships carrying goods from western Japan and directly from the continent made their way up the coast to two major ports, one just south of Kamakura, the other on the southern tip of Musashi province (present day Tokyo bay, Yokohama). The first port was directly controlled by the Gokurakuji branch of the Hōjō, with their ujidera, Gokurakuji temple, as a center of distribution and sale. The second port was under the control of the Kanesawa Hōjō, who used their ujidera, Shōmyōji temple, as a trade post and market.\(^{33}\)

Though regulation of this marine activity as part of foreign trade in the first half of the Kamakura period seems to have been very limited, or even non-existent, economic and political changes during the middle of the period prompted the Kamakura bakufu to control this activity. Records of bakufu regulations of maritime trade further reveal the extent of Japan’s trade with China, the popularity of Chinese goods, and the increased importance of this trade for the bakufu. A 1254 regulation limiting the number of Chinese ships

\(^{33}\) The most recent work that treats the trade relations between Shōmyōji and Gokurakuji is, Fukushima Kaneharu, Kanesawa Hōjōshi to Shōmyōji (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997).
allowed to anchor in Kamakura to five at a time, an increase of lawlessness related to trade between 1256 and 1258, an edict issued in 1261 concerning the taxation of marine trade, a 1264 prohibition on Kamakura-bound ships from anchoring at Hakata, and a prohibition on the importation of sake wine from Chinzei were some of the indications of the importance of Chinese trade. By issuing these laws, the bakufu attempted to benefit from trade, and at the same time limit its negative effects.

Buddhas by the Road

Essential to successful local and foreign trade were the locations of the Kantō warriors' ujidera. The location of a warrior's ujidera, unlike its Kyoto counterpart, was never much removed from the main residence of its patron, and was often located within the residence compound (korinouchi) itself or immediately adjacent to it. As such, the ujidera enjoyed not only the immediate protection of its patron, but also a location that was conveniently accessible in terms of roads and transportation. That is not to say, however, that from a military perspective the terrain was at a strategic disadvantage.

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34 The document was addressed to Nikaidō Yukiyasu, the Former Governor of Chikuzen, and the official Ōta Yasutsura. AK, Kenchō 6 (1254)/4/29; KI, vol. 11, doc. 7739, Kantō bugyōnin rensho hōsho; Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū, vol. 1, art. 298.

35 KI, vol. 12, doc. 8717, Kōchō 1 (1261)/9/25, Senji-an. The edict, which appears in Myōkaiki by Fujiwara Noritsugi, states that in the following five years every ship anchoring in Yamashiro province and bringing construction materials for the building of halls on Kongozan shall pay tax in the amount of ten mon.

36 Chūsei hōsei shiryōshū, vol. 1, arts. 422, 423.
Instead, such residences were situated at locations that were both defendable and accessible by rivers and roads. Clearly marked roads were necessary for a quick deployment of warriors, while the surrounding terrain made it easy for local warriors to block the roads in case of an enemy attack. Rivers, on the other hand, were natural defense lines that were regularly used for the transportation of products and goods. Ujidera enjoyed all these benefits by being part of the patron’s residence.

In some cases where the ujidera was located in a narrow region accessible only by a road that passed next to the temple, and where the only open space was around the temple, it was only natural that the temple grounds served as a place of gathering for travelers. Such a case was by itself especially advantageous for the temple in the sense that it could use the gathering place for promoting its teachings. Moreover, it allowed the temple to develop a local market with relative ease.

Examination of the location of a number of ujidera in various provinces in the Kantô reveals a clear pattern following these guidelines. Gokurakuji temple, for example, was constructed on the western side of the Kamakura plain, near a road intersection of the well-known Tôkaidô.

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37 For a case study of residences in Nitta estate, see Nitta shô to nitta shi, vol. 4 of Nitta chôshi, ed. Nitta Chôshi Hensanshitsu (Nitta-machi: Nitta Chôshi Kankô Inkai, 1984). Also see Ishii Susumu, Kamakura bushi no jitsuzô: kassen to kurashi no okite (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987), 77-81, 341-43. For a map of the location of warrior families in the Kantô see idem., Kamakura bakufu, vol. 7 of Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo: Chûô Kôronsha, 1965), 499. For an overview of the development of warrior residences, using specific archeological sites, from the middle of the Kamakura period until the late medieval period, see Hasuguchi Sadashi, “Chûsei kyokan kenkyû no genjô to mondai ten,” in Kôkogaku to chûseiishi kenkyû, 5-28.
highway where another road split off to Nishigayatsu (Western Valley) in the mountains north of the temple. This relatively minor road could not have been heavily traveled, since it led to an obscure location. Yet leading uphill to the point where the roads separated and the Tōkaidō made a ninety degree turn toward the shore, it crossed through a low hill pass before entering the Kamakura plain. The pass, Gokurakuji kiritōshi, was one of the seven passes surrounding Kamakura, and served as a natural gate to Kamakura for Tōkaidō travelers.\(^{38}\) Such a location was necessarily a place where travelers stopped either to rest after climbing up the hill, or when stopped by Kamakura officials.\(^{39}\) The flat grounds of Gokurakuji, together with its Buddhist demeanor, were a natural attraction for those travelers. In addition, the location of Gokurakuji also gave it easy access to the western shore of Kamakura bay, where merchant ships and numerous fishing boats docked. Easy access to the shore permitted the transfer of goods and products to Gokurakuji, thus making its location ideal for a local market.

Across the northeastern mountains of the Kamakura plain on the other side of the Miura peninsula, just a short distance from the shore of Edo

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\(^{38}\) For the location of Gokurakuji pass see appendix F, fig. 5.

\(^{39}\) See, for example, the depiction of Ippen’s arrival in Kamakura and his confrontation with the regent Hōjō Tokimune, in *Ippen hijiri e*, pls. 91, 92, and color pl. 8. In this depiction, the entrance to Kamakura is marked by a wooden fence, a gate, and guard houses. For commentary on the meeting between Ippen and Tokimune, and current photographs of some of Kamakura’s passes, see Ishii, *Chūsei no katachi*, 132-144. For a general explanation of the boundaries of Kamakura see *Kamakura shishi*, vol. 1, 27-29; *Kanagawa kenshi*, vol. 1, *Tsushihen*, 547-48.

256
bay, was Shōmyōji temple. It was situated at the southern tip of Musashi province, Mutsura estate (shōen), at the end of Mutsura road, which originated in the center of Kamakura. The combined benefits of proximity to a major road and to a harbor practically defined Shōmyōji’s role as an important station for commuters and traders. The temple benefitted from its location, and also contributed to an increasing traffic on the Mutsura road, as well as to expansion of marine activity. The shoreline near Shōmyōji, with natural, safe harbors, became a regular departure point for boats en route to any number of destinations in Edo bay and the Chiba peninsula, or for ships traveling up the coast to Mutsu province. Similarly, ships arriving from western Japan sailed directly to Shōmyōji, bypassing Kamakura.40

The locations of Shōmyōji and Gokurakuji in relation to one another, and to Kamakura, have created a natural pair of trade and traffic posts. The distance from Gokurakuji to Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji, near which the Mutsura road begins, was not more than four kilometers, or about a one hour walk (and much less if one were on horseback). The distance from the Kamakura end of Mutsura road to Shōmyōji was another fifteen kilometers. A traveler on foot should have been able to commute between the temples in

half a day, or approximately three to four hours on horseback.\textsuperscript{41} Considering the alternative—a potentially dangerous and considerably slower travel by boat around the Miura peninsula—it is clear that the Mutsura road was much preferable. Consequently, within the larger context of trade and commuter routes, we may view Kamakura as a central station for roads and marine routes connecting the Kantō with the western provinces and with the continent. Accordingly, Shōmyōji was a major station of transit to and from Edo bay and the northeastern provinces.

The location of Bannaji, the Ashikaga clan's \textit{ujidera}, was at the clan's provincial residence near the southwestern border of Shimotsuke province, Ashikaga estate (\textit{shō}) in Ashikaga county (\textit{gun}).\textsuperscript{42} At this location the temple was surrounded by hills of up to 450 meters to the northwest, north, northeast, and east. Beyond these hills were mountains of more than 1000 meters high, with a number of narrow passes crossing them. This enclosure had an opening to the southwest, south, and south-east. About 700 meters to the southwest was the Watarase river. The river was rather wide near its origin in the mountains, specifically from lake Sōmoku at an altitude of 500 meters. Once it reached an altitude of 100 meters closer to Bannaji, however,

\textsuperscript{41} The distances cited here are based on measurements of maps, as well as on-site measurements performed by the author. The calculation of walking time is based on an average of four kilometers per hour for the common commuter. The calculation for horse riding time is an approximation of the distance a Japanese horse covers in one hour. See \textit{Kamakura bushi to uma}, ed. Baji Bunka Zaidan and Uma no Hakubutsukan (Tokyo: Meichō Shuppan, 1999).

\textsuperscript{42} For a detailed map of Shimotsuke province, see Takeuchi Rizō, ed., Shōen bumpuzu, vol. 1 (Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1975), 125.
it became even wider. From Bannaji the river maintained the same altitude, thus providing good conditions for river transportation.\textsuperscript{43}

Access to the river and road from the temple was easy because the terrain was flat without any natural obstacles. The Watarase river and the road stretching along the river were major routes of commuting to Mt. Akagi in Kōzuke province and all the way to Futarayama shrine in the mountains of Nikkō and northern parts of Shimotsuke province—which were popular destinations for pilgrims.\textsuperscript{44} Some 55 kilometers down stream, the Watarase river joined the Tone river, which continued its flow through the Kantō to Musashi and Kazusa provinces. Whether choosing the river or the road along it, commuting to and from Bannaji to the Kamakura area was indeed convenient.\textsuperscript{45}

The locations of ujidera, whether within the residence compounds of warrior families or separated from them, followed a common pattern. The great majority of ujidera were near major roads, road intersections, or waterways. This is not surprising, since warriors chose to establish their residences at such strategic locations. More importantly was the advantage of such locations for the ujidera, namely accessibility. Though the image of

\textsuperscript{43} See appendix F, fig. 8. The use of rivers for the transportation of cargo and people was rather common. There are some vivid illustrations of river boats in picture scrolls. For example, a colorful depiction of a large boat carrying seventeen people in Hōnen shōnin eden, color pl., 7; and an excellent depiction of cargo boats and rafts in Ippen hijiri e, pl. 16.

\textsuperscript{44} Tochigi kenshi, vol. 3, Tsūshihen, 340-423; Nikkō shishi, vol. 1, 834-46.

\textsuperscript{45} For a map of Kantō rivers see appendix F, fig. 8.
temples within warrior residential compounds connotes privacy and restricted territory, this was not the case for the Kamakura ujidera. The residence compounds, which were identified by moats surrounding them, allowed for separate entrances to the ujidera, as reflected in the layout of Bannaji, where the temple had a private gate facing the main road and waterway.\textsuperscript{46} The pattern, then, included not only proximity to roads and waterways but also direct access to the temples.

The advantage of accessibility manifested itself in allowing local residents as well as occasional travelers to enter the temples' grounds without the scrutiny of the patron warriors. For these visitors the temples were fundamentally places of worship, especially since the ujidera were associated with the veneration of central Buddhist images, such as Shakyamuni and Dainichi, or the ancestors of their patrons. In addition, ujidera were often founded and headed by monks who made names for themselves and were generously supported by the temples' patrons. These monks attracted others from among the Buddhist community and local residents who sought their presence. The consequent gatherings of people at the temples created suitable conditions for the development of the temples as places of social interaction, which in essence meant economic activity—bartering, trade, and sale of local and imported goods and products.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{46} For the ground layout of Bannaji see appendix E, fig. 3.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ippen hijiri e}, pls. 12, 21.
Buddhas in the Market

As emphasized earlier, Kamakura society had a strong commercial ambience, with inter-provincial and intra-provincial trade networks and an active marine trade with the continent. In these networks of trade and commerce, *ujidera* played an active role as sale, trade, and distribution centers in the provinces, acting in their own and their patrons' interests. The basis for *ujidera* economies were lands from which they received tax income, rice and agricultural products. In turn, the *ujidera* sold surplus commodities for either money or other necessities. Among these necessities were oil, paper, lumber for heating or as building material, art work such as statues or paintings, ritual instruments, robes for the monks, food, and cloth. On occasion, some of these commodities were presented to the temples either by their patrons, the bakufu, warriors, aristocrats, or the local population; but regular supply had to be managed by the temple itself. Consequently, though closely attached to their patrons, *ujidera* became self-sufficient, self-managed religious institutions.

Following an initial commendation of lands to *ujidera*, their patrons only gave occasional donations for the performance of rituals. Income from

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49 Funakoshi, Kanazawa shômyôji jiryô no kenkyû, 57-114.
land holdings was collected by temple officials or forwarded to temples by
local jità. The form of income was mainly rice, but also other seasonal crops,
and money. The size of income and its components were set according to the
sizes of the lands, the production capacities of these lands, and the needs of
the temples. The formula for calculating the share of income was set in
general terms by precedence, but the fine details were determined
individually for each temple.\textsuperscript{50}

In some cases, warriors could not afford to deliver the money portion
of the temples' income. For reasons that are not clearly revealed in the
documents of temple bookkeeping, it was acceptable for warriors to substitute
the money portions of the temples' incomes for the value in rice. In other
cases, rice was substituted money payment. For example, Shômyôji received
regular tax income from its land holdings in rice and money. One record of
income payments to Shômyôji included the following:\textsuperscript{51}

Lord Kanesawa : Rice (kome): 14 koku, 1 to and 1 shô

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
Money (zeni): 25 kan, 780 mon \\
\hline
[paid]: Genmai Rice: [ ], 3 shaku, 3 sai
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{50} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5228, Einin 1 (1293)/--/--, Shômyôji jiyou haibun sakuyaku chûmon;\n\textit{THM}, docs. 1,2, Jûei 2 (1182)/2/27, Minamoto Yoritomo kishinjô. For land commendations to
Tsurugaoka Hachiman monks see appendix D, table 3.

\textsuperscript{51} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5228. In the text I provide only a partial translation that includes
two names out of a total of at least ten others. Since the document is partially destroyed it is
impossible to determine the exact number and names of people listed.
There are a number of similar registries. For example, \textit{KBK}, vol. 7, doc. 5232, 5233, 5303.
Substitute for money (zenidai): [ ] 8 to, 2 gō of genmai

Kazusa Nyôbô: Rice: 11 koku, 8 to, 8 shô, 9 gō
[paid]: Genmai Rice: 4 koku, 2 to, 1 sho
Substitute for money: 7 koku, 6 to, 7 shô, 9 gō of genmai

According to this record, warriors owed the temple rice and money, which were either part of the temple’s regular income, or a return of loans. The format of the document, repeatedly using the term “zenidai,” suggests that this practice was common.

The question is whether the temple was forced to accept a rice substitute for money, or was it an intended exchange? There is no clear evidence, but the fact that there were no known legal disputes concerning this issue suggests that it was indeed a mutually acceptable exchange. The reason may be attributed to the periodic arrival of trade vessels from the continent, carrying constant supplies of Chinese coins. Shômyôji’s trade partner, Gokurakuji, received these coins, which could amount to a hundred thousand coins in one shipment, and then delivered them to the bakufu. Some portion of this money must have been retained by Gokurakuji and Shômyôji. Surplus money was then used for a money lending operation.

52 Unfortunately, a few characters indicating the amount of rice are missing. If this record were complete, it would have been possible to calculate the money-rice exchange rate at the time.
However, since the temple was in no short supply of coins, receiving the loan in money would have given the temple what it already had in surplus. Rice, on the other hand, was always a desired commodity, which the temple could use for itself, in further trading, or in the production of rice products.\textsuperscript{53}

The use of money by an \textit{ujidera} indicates that the temple was buying products it could not produce on its own, or that it was involved in money lending.\textsuperscript{54} There is clear evidence that it did both. A fragmented document dated 1293 gives instructions to inform all those who owe annual taxes to the temple to pay them by the first month of the new year. The term used for the type of debt is especially revealing since it refers to general debts, as well as premiums on debts. In other words, some borrowers were due to return the full amount, while others paid annual installments on either a loan or a periodic tax on temple-owned lands. This seems to have been an end-of-the-year bookkeeping. The names of the borrowers were not mentioned, only that they should be informed according to their statuses. From this information, and from the amount of money involved, we learn that the borrowers were people of status, not commoners. Also, we learn that the temple conducted regular auditing of its books, and that a considerable amount of money was involved in this business.\textsuperscript{55}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Amino, \textit{Nihon chūsei ni naniga okitaka}, 48-50.
\item \textsuperscript{55} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5227, Einin 1 (1293)/9/13, Shōmyōji jiyō ika kotogaki.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Yet, because *ujidera* were vital factors in the commercial activity in warrior-controlled lands in the provinces, without which any such activity would not have been possible, patrons remained the ultimate overseers of their *ujidera*. As such, patrons set the basic guidelines according to which *ujidera* operated. Ashikaga patrons, for example, issued guidelines for Bannaji, instructing in matters of performance of services, fund raising, and the monks' behavior and recruitment.\(^\text{56}\) Similarly, the patron used the *ujidera* for selling his own rice and produce surpluses, to borrow money, and to have monks as trade agents with China. For example, in 1325 the Hōjō sent a trading mission to China to raise money for the reconstruction of Kenchō-ji.\(^\text{57}\) It was such activity that established *ujidera* as formidable local economic institutions.

The role of *ujidera* as local economic institutions was also the result of their being part of a distribution network. When a Chinese ship arrived at Kamakura, for example, its load of Chinese goods was transferred to Gokurakuji temple. These Chinese products were then put on sale in a market in Gokurakuji, or sent to Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine and Shōmyō-ji temple. From Shōmyō-ji, products were sent on various local roads

\(^{56}\) *BJM*, doc. 1, Kenchō 3 (1251)/3/8, Ashikaga Yasuuji okibumi; *KI*, vol. 10, doc. 7300, Kenchō 3 (1251)/3/8, Ashikaga Yasuuji okibumi; *KI*, vol. 14, doc. 10431, Bun'ei 6 (1269)/4/--, Ashikaga Ietoki okibumi.

and highways to other temple markets, such as the market places at Bannaji and Chôrakuji. 58

Judging from its location and the demographic distribution around it, Bannaji must have been an active local market at the end of a trade route in Kamakura's extended periphery (i.e., Kantô provinces). From Bannaji, products were sent to their final destinations at the residences of buyers. 59 In a similar way, Bannaji and other ujidera, such as Chôrakuji, were the originating points for products and taxes delivered to Kamakura or Kyoto. Moreover, being the first post also meant that it was the initial place of marketing. This is a significant position because it was at that point where gifts, or more accurately land commendations to an ujidera, produced income to the temple and its patron family. In addition, the economic relations between ujidera and local cultivators also created trade in human labor, which seems to have been a common commodity. 60

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58 For an analysis of the Gokurakuji-Shômyôji trade co-operation see Fukushima, Kanesawa hōjôshi to shômyôji, 215-250.

59 A web-like network of roads and rivers allowed convenient access to most of the Kantô. Except for the main highways connecting eastern and western Japan, there were numerous local roads connecting Kamakura and its periphery. These roads also directly connected local communities. For a study of communities along the Tone river (Tonegawa), see Harada Nobuo, “Tonegawa chûryûiki ni okeru shôen no sonraku keikan,” in Chûsei tógokushi no kenkyû, ed. Chûsei Tógokushi Kenkyûkai (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1988). For a study of roads in the Kantô, see Miyataki, “Chûsei ‘kamakura kaidô’ no mura to shokunin.”

60 Chûsei hôsei shiryôshû, vol. 1, art. 19, Kôchô 3 (1263)/8/13, Senji. Human trade, or slavery, were the result of peasants not being able to pay rent or taxes. Instead, peasants had to sell their family members to pay off their debts. The problem became acute throughout the country, until the court issued an imperial order to cease such activity in temples and shrines.
As early as 1248, Bannaji was already a bustling market place, accommodating travelers and merchants. The activity at the temple, which was part of the Ashikaga provincial headquarters, apparently resulted in the disorderly behavior of visitors. In response, Ashikaga Yoshiuji issued an order to restrict the entrance of traveling townsmen, horses, and cattle into the confines of Ômidô, and to stop the misbehavior of temple child attendants. The strict wording of this order clearly indicated that there was intense activity on the temple’s grounds. This activity was also reflected in the high level of traffic on the road just outside the temple. Use of the term “townsmen” in the order was suggestive of the many types of people included under this category, such as peasants, travelers, merchants, craftsmen, and performers. Furthermore, the entry of water buffalos, animals used for labor, into a place where they had no actual use, could only mean that either peasants or merchants brought them to the temple for trade or sale. And a reference to horses indicates either the sale or trade of horses, or visits by people of higher status on horseback. This was not unique to

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61 BJM, doc. 72, Hōji 2 (1248)/7/6, Ashikaga Yoshiuji okibumi. See appendix B, doc. 2. The lacunae of this document does not hide the sense of urgency in taking control over disorder in the temple, but rather enhances it. Yoshiuji’s order addresses the temple’s child-attendants’ misbehavior, traveling townsmen, and the entry of cattle and horses to the confined premises of Ômidô. He assigns Shōji and Shimobe to enforce the order. Yoshiuji indicates in his order that it is not a temporary one, and that the Shōji and Shimobe who hold this duty cannot leave the confines of the temple. Those who neglect to follow the order are threatened with replacement. The contents of this order suggest that the temple had been visited by more people than it could accommodate, to the effect that even the monks lost control over the child attendants.
Bannaji, but rather reflected common market activity at all of the large ujidera.

The role of the ujidera as a marketplace is further illustrated by Kanesawa Hōjō Sadaaki's (1278-1333) private correspondence with the head monk of Gokurakuji temple. This personal correspondence is perhaps one of the most revealing source on the role of Gokurakuji as a local market, and of the involvement of a leading Kamakura warrior in the affairs of an ujidera. Following the arrival in Kamakura of a ship from China, Sadaaki wrote the following request to the head monk of Gokurakuji.62

I was planning on to visit you tomorrow after the council [meeting], hoping that you would display the Chinese things (karamono) for me to view. If tomorrow is inconvenient, I will be here until the evening of the day after tomorrow, so please keep them on display for me. However, I am worried about thieves. I think that the sooner I view them the better. Also, what about things belonging to Gokurakuji? I hear you will place [them also] on display. Have you decided about that? Please inform me [of that matter]. Once again, I will be very pleased to hear [from you] today or tomorrow. I shall be waiting for your reply.

Respectfully,

1st month, 24th day Sadaaki

Shōmyōji Residence Sadaaki

Ships from China arrived in Kamakura, Yuigahama, near Gokurakuji, where they unloaded their merchandise. From this correspondence alone we cannot be completely certain that this location was the only or even the preferred place of anchor. It does, however, tell us that when Sadaaki was the head of the Kanesawa branch of the Hōjō family, he had to travel to Kamakura and visit the Gokurakuji market whenever he wanted to purchase Chinese things. The arrival, then, of ships bringing Chinese goods directly to Shōmyōji, the Kanesawa ujidera, was apparently less common. After Chinese goods were taken from the ships to Gokurakuji, they were either transferred to Shōmyōji by land or shipped there on local boats. But it still remains unclear why Sadaaki insisted on traveling himself to view the goods if they were bound for Shōmyōji anyway.

The answer to this question lies in the above-mentioned letter and in another personal letter concerning a similar case. In the first case, Sadaaki’s declared reason was the danger that thieves might steal things before they were put on display for general customers. In a different letter, in which

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63 "Residence (hōjō)" usually refers to the monks' residence at a temple. In this case, "hōjō" refers to the head monk of Gokurakuji.

64 This line appears on the outer side of the document after it has been folded and tied (kirifû).
Sadaaki made a similar request to view products before they were offered for public purchase, he emphasized the commotion and even plundering that took place whenever a ship arrived. Sadaaki's similar requests suggest that, indeed, Kamakura and its surrounding area suffered from lawlessness, but the tone in the letters also implies that it was a common phenomena, almost as if it was an acceptable part of city and market life. What we cannot know from these letters is who exactly were the thieves and plunderers. Perhaps they were not only "real" thieves, but also warriors, since Sadaaki uses the term "rōzeki," which had been applied many times to warriors plundering the countryside. Whatever the case, we must conclude that the market at Gokurakuji attracted much interest at various levels of Kamakura society.

Bakufu and Ujidera Affairs

The Economy of Rituals and Services

While the construction of a clan temple required its patron to provide the initial necessary funding and labor, to designate a founding monk, and to

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65 KBK, vol. 1, doc. 435, −3/23, Kanesawa Sadaaki shōjō. The content of this document is similar to document 157 quoted in the text, but the signed date (3d month, 23d day) indicates that even if it was in the same year it refers to a different occasion. According to this document, Sada'aki wanted to view the goods that arrive on the ship from China. He says that there is much commotion (rōzeki) when the ship arrives, and he is therefore asking to come first before anybody else. Other motives for mentioning rōzeki, though, such as having the opportunity to select the best goods, should not be excluded.
ensure its daily maintenance, the bakufu had no obligation to provide any of such necessities. Yet, the bakufu occasionally confirmed land commendations to clan temples, presented temples with Buddhist ichnography, money donations, crafts, and other gifts. Occasionally, the presentation of gifts was a request for prayers and services, but on other occasions there was no apparent reason other than a display of benefaction by the ruling institution. Accordingly, the bakufu remained mostly indifferent to the temples' daily activities, their offices and appointees, and became directly involved in temple affairs only when temples required judicial intervention or when the bakufu sought divine protection.

On numerous occasions the bakufu requested prayers for the safety of the bakufu and its officials, and the country. Prayers were requested during or after natural disasters—earthquakes, floods, hail storms—and when the threat of a Mongol invasion seemed imminent. For such services the bakufu endowed ujidera with various gifts, including swords, cloth, money, oil, foodstuffs, and crafts and art work. What is even more remarkable is the bakufu’s use of some ujidera as permanent protective temples. In a recent study on relic veneration, Brian Ruppert convincingly demonstrates a clear bakufu reliance on Buddhist relics to provide it with religious legitimation.

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66 Regardless of who commended lands to temples, once acknowledged as such these lands were exempted from tax payments. KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5309, Genkō 1 (1321)/8/7, Kamakura shōgun-ke kishinjō-an, and doc. 5310, Genkō 1 (1321)/8/—, Yamakawa Akitaka kishirjō-an. In his document of commendation, lay monk Akitaka indicates that the lands were exempted from taxes because they were Shōmyōji lands that supported services for the bakufu.
and protection. The esoteric practices of relic veneration at Gokurakuji and Shōmyō-ji provided the bakufu with the first link to a tradition that enforces the legitimacy of its holders—a legitimacy equal to that of the court, which the bakufu clearly needed. Ruppert further argues that possession of relics and reliquaries in their ujidera gave the Hōjō family power comparable to that of the Fujiwara and other court families. Furthermore, bakufu association with and patronage of Zen monks owed much to the relic tradition of Zen. This association helped the bakufu to consolidate its power, while providing it with divine protection.

To ensure the continuation of land commendations to religious institutions, the bakufu legislated to that effect in 1260. The ultimate purpose, as stated in the legislation, was continued service for the protection of the bakufu (futai no gokitō). Specifically, the bakufu was concerned with the well being of shogun Munetaka, son of Emperor Go-Saga. The legislation ordered prompt transfer of rice and money from the commended lands to the heads of religious institutions. At that time, the legislation, as was common in such cases, was general in scope because the bakufu was not concerned with any specific threat to the shogun or any bakufu officials. A few years later, the


68 Ibid., 253. For a full and enlightening discussion of relic veneration and its significance for the bakufu and the Hōjō see chapter 7, 230-60.

69 Chūsei seiji shakai shisō, vol. 1, art. 573.
looming threat of invasions caused the bakufu to issue a call to temples and shrines throughout the country to conduct services for the protection of the country. 

Legal Security: The case of Tō Rokurō Moriyoshi

One of the most remarkable aspects of the bakufu's policy toward religious institutions was its unabated legal protection of them. Early examples of that policy date back to the Genpei War, even before Yoritomo's military headquarters in Kamakura were recognized as a permanent military governing body. War efforts drove some warriors to exact war levies from temples even though these temples were exempted from such contributions. Despite the objective interest to support his warriors' war efforts against Taira forces, Yoritomo and his generals recognized the validity of the temples' complaints by taking decisive action against the perpetrators. Later in the Kamakura period, provincial bakufu officials abused their power in various

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70 Kichizokuki, Bun'ei 5 (1268)/4/—.

71 The bakufu ordered warriors to stop exacting commissariat rice (hyōrō) and other levies under the pretext of war efforts from Kōya Dentshō temple in Kii Province. This order was repeated a few months later because of continued violations. Heian ibun, vol. 8, doc. 4174, Genryaku 1 (1184)/5/24, Minamoto Yoshitsuune kudashibumi-an; doc. 4189, Genryaku 1 (1184)/8/5, Kii kokushi Fujiwara Norsue ukebumi-an; doc. 4191, Genryaku 1 (1184)/8/8, Go-Shirakawa In-no-Chō kudashibumi-An; doc. 4192, Genryaku 1 (1184)/8/8, Kii kokushi chōsen-an; doc. 4204, Genryaku 1 (1184)/8/29, Kii-no-kuni shugo Teshima Aritsune ukebumi-an. All documents were translated in Jeffrey Mass, The Kamakura Bakufu: A Study in Documents (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 27, 153-155.

Similar cases of lawlessness by bakufu officials continued long after the Genpei War, and affected shrines as well. For example, in a 1209 dispute between Katori shrine and the local jito, the bakufu issued judgment in favor of the shrine. Kamakura bakufu saikyō jōshū, vol. 1, doc. 17. Translated in ibid. pp. 118-120.
ways. They either found seemingly appropriate pretenses for entering
protected landholdings of temples and shrines and used the opportunity to
extract money and products from local residents, or they attempted to expand
their local control by outright acts of encroachment. 72

In other, more complex, legal disputes between bakufu officials and
warriors' ujidera, especially when legal violations were not easily discernable,
the bakufu engaged in lengthy attempts to gather detailed information for fair
judgments. This was especially difficult because of political considerations--
there were warriors on both sides of disputes--which required the bakufu to
be extra sensitive about the implications of its judgments.

In the final years of the Kamakura bakufu its ability to display decisive
judicial resolutions in cases concerning warriors and ujidera was weakened
by the bakufu's overall political decline. 73 Nevertheless, it continued its long
established policy of legal protection of religious institutions against illegal
and abusive acts by local bakufu officials. Throughout the Kamakura period,
there were numerous cases of bakufu intervention in legal disputes between
its gokenin and temples. The following is one of the best documented of such

72 For example, the bakufu ordered its local officials to cease unlawful entries to
Kongōji and Kinzan Kannon temples. KI, vol. 5, doc. 3364, Gennin 2 (1225)/4/5 Rokuhara
migyōsho; vol. 6, doc. 3574, Karoku 3 (1227)/2/14 Rokuhara migyōsho; doc. 4390, Jōei 1
(1232)/intercalary 9/26 Rokuhara migyōsho; vol. 8, doc. 5886, Ninji 2 (1241)/6/11 Rokuhara
migyōsho. Translated in Jeffrey Mass, The Kamakura Bakufu: A Study in Documents (Stanford:

73 Satō Shin'ichi, Kamakura bakufu soshō seido no kenkyū (Tokyo: Meguro Shoten,
1946); Ishii Susumu, "The Decline of the Kamakura Bakufu," in The Cambridge History of
Japan, ed. Kozo Yamamura (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 149-150;
disputes. The perpetrator was Tō Rokurō Moriyoshi, and the plaintiff was Shōmyōji, represented by a litigating administrator (zasshō). Moriyoshi was accused of withholding proceedings from a number of lands under his control, including Tō estate, which had been commended to Shōmyōji and confirmed by the bakufu.

The Tō estate was located in Shimōsa province on the border of Kashima county in Hitachi province and was adjacent to Misaki estate and Kaijō estate. Until the Kamakura period, the Tō estate was commonly known as Tachibana estate, a name that continued to appear in a few documents.74 In 1136, Chiba Tsunetane’s father, Tsuneshige, confiscated the public land in the old Tachibana county from the administrative governor of Shimōsa, Fujiwara Chikamichi. Later, the Tachibana estate became the home of the Tō clan. This clan was one of the six branches of the Chiba clan, whose founder was Chiba Tsunetane’s sixth son, Rokurō Taneyori.75 According to the Chiba Taikei, Taneyori lived in Kamidai village after traveling to Kyoto and served in attendance for Jōzaimon-in, for which duty he received thirty-three gō of land in Katori county, Tō estate.76 Tō Moriyoshi owned twelve chō of

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74 Tō is a later name for the original “Tachibana.” For details about Tō estate see Chimei jiten, Chiba ken; Takeuchi Rizō, Shōen daijiten.

75 For the Tō lineage see Keizu sanyo, vol. 8, 191

76 Chiba Taikei.
cultivated fields and twelve houses in Shimôsa province, Tô estate, Kamidai district, worth four hundred kanmon.\textsuperscript{77}

However, the designation of estate lands to support temples and shrines caused Moriyoshi dissatisfaction that resulted in legal disputes, most notably between Moriyoshi and Shômyôji temple.\textsuperscript{78} According to bakufu orders as stipulated in a commendation document dated 1321, Moriyoshi was obligated to transfer one third of the income from specific parcels of lands to Shômyôji.\textsuperscript{79} Considering the fact that Moriyoshi had a considerable number of lands, this should not have been a problem.\textsuperscript{80} What made Moriyoshi apprehensive was that he had to contribute rice and building materials to Ise jingû, and a considerable amount of rice and money to Shômyôji. Moriyoshi


\textsuperscript{78} A number of documents related to the Tô estate mention the commendation of some of the estate’s lands to support temples and shrines. The reasons for such commendations are unclear, nor is the identity of the person who commended the lands. The only clue appears in KBK, doc. 5315 in which Ise shrine is indicated as a beneficiary of income, and in doc. 5316, which is very similar to the previous document, and in which the term “ryôke” appears. It is likely that the ryôke was either Ise shrine, or a court family.


\textsuperscript{79} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5308, Genkô 1 (1321)/6/22, Kamakura shôgun-ke kishinjô-an. The document is signed the Governor of Sagami, Hôjô Takatoki, and by the Former Governor of Musashi, Hôjô Sadaaki.

\textsuperscript{80} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5313, Genkô 2 (1322)/2/29, Tô Moriyoshi daikan Morinobu chigyô haibun chûshinjô-an. This document concerning landholdings of Tô Rokurô Moriyoshi in Shimôsa no kuni, Tô no shô, Kamidai-go, excludes those that were previously bought and paid for, generations earlier. The Tô family had been in this area since the beginning of the Kamakura period, and had its landholding there.
also had to allot more than eighty-nine chô of land to local temples and shrines.\footnote{KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5315, Tô Moriyoshi shoryô chûmon-an, and doc. 5316, Tô Moriyoshi shoryô chûmon-an. Although the documents are not signed, dates appearing in the text suggest that both are from the second year of Genkô (1322).}

Since Moriyoshi was unable, or unwilling, to transfer Shômyôji’s income regularly, a temple representative audited Moriyoshi’s payments to the temple. A report signed by bakufu officials and compiled on the request of the temple’s representative, the lay monk (nyûdô) Shiaku, confirmed Shômyôji’s share of Moriyoshi’s lands.\footnote{KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5300, after 1324, Shiaku shin ukon nyûdô chûmon.} However, Moriyoshi did not comply with bakufu orders, which resulted in legal action against him. The complaint was filed by the administrator (zasshô) Shiaku, after 1324.\footnote{KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5301, after 1324, Shiaku shin ukon nyûdô chûmon.} For a while after 1324, Moriyoshi appears to have transferred the correct amount of income to Shômyôji.

In the seventh month of 1328, Moriyoshi’s deputy, Takanao, confirmed in a letter to the Governor, Ebina Tadanori,\footnote{Although the common reading of this name is Koremori, it should be read Tadanori. See explanation in “Kuzushiji o yondemiyô: komonjo nyûmon” (Kanagawa Kenritsu Kanazawa Bunkô, 1999), 32.} that he had transferred the share of income to Kanehisa, a Shômyôji’s administrator. In return, Kanehisa issued a confirmation (uketorijô) for having received the income. However, sometime after Kanehisa sent his confirmation, Moriyoshi became
slack in his payments again, or stopped paying entirely. Since Takanao’s document was dated the seventh month of 1328, and a bakufu order was signed on the sixth and twelfth months of 1329, it seems that Moriyoshi withheld payments for over a year. In 1329, Shōmyōji’s share was re-assessed and confirmed.\textsuperscript{85}

The bakufu itself originally assigned income from Moriyoshi’s landholdings to Shōmyōji, and it remained responsible for the payment of it. Moriyoshi, however, ignored bakufu orders and the bakufu had to find ways to enforce payment. At the same time, there is no indication that the bakufu could enforce its decisions other than send written orders. In the following year (1330), Kōshin again filed a complaint against Moriyoshi. Moriyoshi admitted that he did not pay Shōmyōji its share of the income, but attempted to justify his lack of compliance by pointing out that the land was very small and after paying one third of the income to Shōmyōji he would not have enough for himself. In an official reply, Kōshin agreed that the fields were small. The bakufu agreed with Kōshin and ordered Moriyoshi to pay the accumulated amount he owed. In addition, the bakufu ordered that Shōmyōji would forthwith receive another one third of the income.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{85} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5376, Gentoku 1 (1329)/12/2, Kantō shōgun-ke gechijō-an; vol. 7, doc. 5377, Gentoku 1 (1329)/12/19, Shimōsa-no-kuni Tō-no-shō Kamidai-gō Tō Moriyoshi shoryō tokubun chūmon.

\textsuperscript{86} KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5376, Gentoku 1 (1329)/12/2, Kamakura shōgun-ke gechijō-an, and doc. 5386, Gentoku 2 (1330)/6/2, Kamakura shōgun gechijō-an.
The Kamakura bakufu was unable to resolve the dispute and bring an end to the litigation. The dispute between Moriyoshi and his descendants continued after the downfall of the Kamakura bakufu and the establishment of the Muromachi bakufu. Shortly after being appointed shogun, Ashikaga Takauji signed a lengthy document that concluded the litigation and ruled in favor of Shōmyōji. The dispute, though, still continued.

Conclusion

By the middle of the thirteenth century Kamakura had developed from a local port village to a city parallel in size and economic activity to Kyoto. Its growth had far-reaching effects on the local economy. Economic activity in western Japan had begun to intensify in the early twelfth century, making Kyoto the most important economic center. By the end of the century, the rapid urbanization of Kamakura, together with a pro-active bakufu economic policy, created a new regional economic center in eastern Japan. Economic support for the bakufu came from the provinces around Kamakura, while provincial warriors relied on income from their provincial lands, which were usually concentrated in separate areas under the control of each warrior. These areas also contained the warriors' residences. The implication was that warriors in and around Kamakura were economically independent.

\[\text{87 KBK, vol. 7, doc. 5443, Kenmu 2 (1334)/6/19, Shōmyōji ryō Tō Moriyoshi no ato sanbun ichibu tsuke monjo-an.}\]
provincial warriors who did not depend on the bakufu; and the bakufu did not have to rely on the court. These conditions allowed for the development of Kamakura as Kyoto's economic counterpart in the east, but also led to the development a self-sustained periphery around Kamakura. Supported by fertile cultivated lands, scores of professionals, and an abundance of consumers, Kamakura's economy could only expand its commercial activity.

In Kamakura the bakufu patronized guilds (e.g., zaimokuza), increased the usage of money, regulated local and foreign trade, and improved the major roads necessary for active trade. Contributing to the economy, and keeping it in motion, were the warrior ujidera. Their location on the outskirts of Kamakura in the vicinity of major roads and intersections was advantageous, for it allowed them to control the entries to Kamakura, where they established trading markets. In Kamakura’s immediate and extended periphery, the strategic location of ujidera as part of the headquarters of provincial warrior patrons, provided them immediate access to major local transportation routes, and enabled them to benefit from their patrons' protection from criminals or any unlawful activity.
The Kamakura period was a time of creation, adoption and adaptation, revival and integration, of culture and religion in the world of Kamakura warrior society. The formation of a new elite group of power holders in Kamakura challenged existing conventions of power, authority, and legitimacy as practiced by the imperial court for many centuries. But the new elite of warriors was also challenged to truly distinguish its rule from those conventions. In order to do this, Kamakura warriors created an independent apparatus of self-rule, the Kamakura bakufu, adopted and adapted the court's mechanisms of bureaucracy, and then integrated them into bakufu offices. The newly-created society of provincial warriors adopted court culture and religious practices, emphasizing aspects that appealed to them as warriors, because they viewed this culture as that of rulers with whom they now shared political authority. The goal of this study has been to establish the role of religion and religious institutions in the building process of the new warrior society, both as an aspect of its culture and as a major component in Kamakura politics and economy.

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1 This conclusion conforms with Jeffrey Mass' view of Yoritomo's adherence to old customs. In the "Introduction" to Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 8, he writes: "...Yoritomo sought to inculcate a respect for the laws and customs of the past, and this led him to uphold traditional hierarchies and to seek to define his own regime's limits."
As we have seen, religious beliefs and practices were already important elements in the daily lives of provincial warriors in the Kantō even before the Kamakura period, when leaders of warrior families had to fulfill their own religious needs, namely ancestral worship and practices related to agriculture. Things changed with the establishment of the bakufu, when social interaction among warriors became common in the city of Kamakura. At the same time, the obligatory ties formed between warriors and the bakufu meant that the religious inclination of the bakufu applied to the warriors it led, who reciprocated by accepting the bakufu's religious choices. Specifically, these religious choices were the acceptance of the god Hachiman as the official bakufu deity and adherence to Buddhist doctrines cherished by the court since the Nara and Heian periods, but with limited acceptance of newer ones advanced by what scholars call reformer monks.

The motivation behind the decision to follow the bakufu's religious preferences stemmed from the need to conform to its ideology by actual practice. But once warriors accepted this ideology they looked for ways to promote their own interests through their religious identities. Most apparent were their construction of ujidera, donations of lands and gifts to bakufu-patronized religious institutions, and participation in religious and social events at Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine.

The ongoing existence of the bakufu depended on its fulfillment of the collective interests of powerful Kantō warriors. Conversely, as long as the
majority of warriors supported the bakufu, any single warrior whose quest for self-strengthening threatened the bakufu risked his own existence. In this context, conformation to religious trends emanating from Kamakura was necessary for protecting one's status in the Kamakura hierarchy.

Mundane Geography and Divine Locations

In The Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel delineates the importance of geography for understanding societies. He points out that geography "is no longer an end in itself but a means to an end."2 In other words, incorporating our understanding of local geographies into an analysis of, in this particular study, politics and religion, is necessary for uncovering the nature of their interaction. Indeed, it has become apparent in this study that the selection of divine locations--for temples and shrines--was done in direct consideration of the mundane geography of power, politics, and the economy, all of which were thoughtfully laid out on physical geography. It began at Kamakura, then spread to its periphery, the provinces surrounding it where powerful warriors had their provincial headquarters.

Kamakura was chosen to become the seat of the bakufu for military, economic, and symbolic reasons. Militarily, it was strategically superior because of its topographic layout. Economically, roads, rivers, ports (i.e., for

sea transportation), and the surrounding agricultural lands endowed
Kamakura with the necessary tools for becoming a major center of trade and
the distribution of goods. Symbolically, it had been a Minamoto stronghold
for generations, and regaining control of Kamakura meant a revival of the
Minamoto clan. But to make it a capital, it had to look like Kyoto, for it was
the only model of an established capital warriors recognized. In that respect,
temples and shrines became some of the most significant aspects of such a
capital, without which the city would have lacked divine ambience.

Though the term bakufu, or tent government, implies temporary
military headquarters,\(^3\) Yoritomo's selection of Kamakura for his
headquarters carried a clear message of permanency. Yoritomo's first act was
to establish the new Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine in the Kitayama district of
Kamakura to symbolically reinforce his declared intention to create an
independent governing body for those warriors who followed him. Then, in
a move from symbolism to pragmatism, Yoritomo's successful military
campaigns secured the Kamakura region and allowed him to begin a process
that changed Kamakura from a provincial village to a bustling warrior
capital.

Early in the process of Kamakura's urbanization, provincial warriors
established residences in the developing city, where they were influenced by
the bakufu's religious policy. They were exposed to physical representations

\(^3\) \textit{Kokugo daijiten}, vol. 10, 1047.
of this policy in the form of temples and shrines within the city, and to the bakufu's attitudes toward Buddhist schools and institutions, namely Onjōji temple. The centrality of the god Hachiman and Tsurugaoka shrine was unmistakable in the Kamakura pantheon of buddhas and deities. For Kamakura warriors it was evident that the bakufu, though not saying so explicitly, expected each warrior to display a similar veneration to Hachiman. The results, some partially enforced and others willingly accepted, were warriors' active participation in management duties, ceremonies, and patronage of Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine, as well as construction of branch Hachiman shrines in their provincial residences.

Similarly, early temple constructions, especially those by Yoritomo—Yōfukuji, Jūfukuji, and Shōchōjūin⁴—set precedents for the importance of ancestral veneration and for Heian Buddhism. Yoritomo's choice of monks from Heian and Nara institutions for both his temples and for Tsurugaoka shrine set a religious direction that remained in effect even with the appearance of reformer monks after Yoritomo's passing. Therefore, we must view the city of Kamakura as a place that from its early years as a warrior's capital had imposed a unified religious ideology.

The strengthening of the Hōjō regency in the post-Jōkyū War era advanced Kamakura's urbanization as Yoshitoki and Yasutoki worked

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⁴ Jūfukuji was constructed as a bodaiji for ancestral worship on the site of Yoshitomo's old residence. See Kamakura shishi, vol. 3, 201.
resolutely to make Kamakura’s city layout similar to that of the capital. Making Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine the focal point of that layout equated it with the imperial palace in Kyoto, but instead of an emperor sovereign, it was the god Hachiman himself who overlooked the city and its warriors. Coinciding with this, the streets and avenues of the city were purposely planned to support a hierarchy among Kamakura warriors. For these warriors, the bakufu’s use of the divine to set worldly socio-political distinctions was an example of the potential benefits of large local religious institutions. Yet, under the regencies of Yoshitoki and especially Yasutoki, political power was highly concentrated in Kamakura, which prompted the use and further construction of religious institutions in the city, but did not allow a similar trend to develop fully in the provinces.

As in Kyoto, there was a consideration of the representation of power and authority, as well as economic and military strength, in the urban layout of the city. Temples were located on major roads to serve as markets. Other temples were located on smaller roads leading in and out of Kamakura and served as military posts. These temples controlled their communities, but they were ultimately controlled by the bakufu. The bakufu protected itself and constructed a city that was designed to serve as a self-sustaining natural fortification.

The heyday of construction of religious institutions, namely Buddhist temples, was during the regencies of Hōjō Tokiyori and Hōjō Tokimune. On
the one hand, a combination of political stability and active economy and, on the other hand, personal religious inclinations and the growing independence of provincial warriors led to the construction of some of the era's largest temples. In Kamakura, most temples were patronized by the leading Hōjō, who used the temples not only as places of worship but also as gates to the city, trade markets, hospitals, and libraries. In the provinces, warriors' ujidera functioned in a similar way, providing services and benefits to their local warrior patrons.

The Kamakura bakufu used warriors to protect its interests in the provinces, but because shugo and jito, or their provincial deputies, were under the administrative supervision of bakufu officials in Kamakura, there was no intermediary supervision over their daily affairs. The result was the development of a religious center in Kamakura and a religious periphery in the provinces. Those religious institutions in Kamakura were under direct oversight of the bakufu due to geographical proximity that made supervision considerably easy. And since the city was managed by the bakufu, any deviation from bakufu policy was immediately reported and corrected. This also applied to religious institutions in Kamakura's suburbs. Their patrons were heads of branch families of the Hōjō, who displayed overwhelming preference for Heian and Nara Buddhism. Even Gozan temples were viewed as a continuation of established traditions, rather than creative innovations of new Buddhist doctrines.
Beyond the immediate periphery there was less bakufu supervision and intervention, but powerful warriors remained loyal to bakufu preferences. This was not just because loyalty overshadowed their religious inclinations. Veneration of Buddhist deities according to old traditions provided provincial warriors with a recognizable Buddhist system that re-enforced their connections to their lands, just as the bakufu re-enforced its legitimacy and authority in Kamakura. Only in more remote provinces, often in provinces where reformer monks spent time in exile, were there warriors who were willing to give these monks an opportunity to propagate their teachings.

**Implications and Perspectives**

Overwhelming evidence of the continuous involvement of warriors, who were driven by strong religious beliefs, in religious activities, leads us to conclude that religion was an integral component in their daily affairs, which influenced all levels of the decision-making processes. We can no longer view Kamakura warriors as a rough band of military specialists whose actions and decisions were made only by pragmatic considerations. The notion that the bakufu and Kamakura warriors were only concerned with matters of the government, bureaucracy, and police seems to overlook the role of religion; thus, it undermines the importance of religion.
The association of Kamakura warriors with warfare, police and guard duties, political and judicial institutions, has often pushed the notion of warrior religiosity to the sidelines of medieval history. It is, therefore, consequential to acknowledge the specific role of religion and religious practices for the bakufu and its warriors, because they contributed to the strengthening of Kamakura warrior power and made the Kamakura clergy influential.

The nature of the relationships between the bakufu and the court was also reflected in the bakufu's use of its religious institutions as a means to maintain a connection to the court. For the bakufu, sharing religious trends similar to those of courtiers allowed for a connection to the court through the mediation of the divine. This connection did not entail servitude to the court. Instead, it avoided an hierarchical distinction, but at the same time regarded the court as a symbolic source of authority that legitimized the bakufu's use of military power and judicial bureaucracy.

The religious, economic, and social roles of religious institutions under the Kamakura bakufu were based on court patterns of political sovereignty and aristocratic culture. However, should we go as far as Jeffrey Mass and Andrew Goble to say that the Kamakura period belongs to the ancient era? Though this view is appealing, the very fact that a group of powerful warriors, who chose to set their headquarters in a place that was geographically remote from the capital and ruled themselves independent of
court supervision, only strengthens the notion of a significant break from the past hierarchy of rule. If adoption of another society’s mechanisms of rule and cultural patterns means an extension of that society, then how should we regard Japan’s massive borrowing from China and Korea? Was Japan a satellite state of China? Perhaps culturally it was re-formed on a Chinese design, but since it was a sovereign state the answer to that must be that Japan was not a satellite state. In comparison, the Kamakura bakufu borrowed heavily from the court, but its political and military decisions, and to a great extent decisions concerning economic issues, were made independent of the court’s own interests.

Acting as an independent ruling power did not prevent the bakufu from turning to court cultural trends for the fulfillment of its own social and cultural needs. The reliance on court ranks to formalize a social hierarchy within its own warrior society was only the preface to a larger display that included anything from fancy garbs and apparel to lavish architecture and imported ceramics. The social gatherings during religious festivals at Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine were indeed a grand display of that borrowed court culture. It was there that warriors were able to visually display their court dresses, show off their skills at mounted archery, participate in entertaining ball (kemari) games, and engage in writing poetry. The participation of Kyoto courtiers in these activities only boosted the self-esteem of Kamakura warriors, re-assuring them of their equal standing with their co-
rulers in the west. For that purpose, Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine proved to be a most valuable asset, having been established by the bakufu as a stage where politics and diplomacy were conducted on the context of religious activity.

Bakufu policies towards temples and shrines in Kamakura were designed to ultimately strengthen the political and economic bases of the bakufu. At the same time, the bakufu's minimal intervention in the affairs of provincial religious institutions allowed for the development of a religious periphery. Earlier we concluded that both the Kamakura ujidera and the provincial ujidera had a number of functions, all of which were assigned to them and supervised by their patrons. But the management of these temples was ultimately conducted by the monks themselves with a great deal of independence. This implies that the bakufu had only minimal control over ujidera affairs. Whatever degree of intervention there was, it had to be done under a pretext acceptable to ujidera patrons. This also shows that there was a limit to the bakufu's intervention in the overall provincial affairs of warriors.

The current study analyzes some of the central themes involved in the warrior-clergy dichotomy. It could not, however, treat many problems or answer some questions that still deserve our attention. Of these, it is worthwhile to mention at least two. First, the bakufu's policy concerning rewards after the two Mongol invasions. Understanding the bakufu's
considerations in distributing rewards among religious institutions and warriors may reveal a pragmatic approach to a pressing situation. For example, the bakufu may have preferred to reward temples and shrines because they did not pose any potential political threat to the bakufu. Strong warriors, on the other hand, could only be further strengthened by such rewards. Second, though I discussed in length the city of Kamakura as a warrior capital, the content of my analysis focuses on issues pertaining to the overall scope of this study. The city, however, deserves our fullest attention. I am convinced that a full length study of Kamakura could expose aspects of Kamakura culture, society, and economy, that would otherwise remain unknown to us.

The Mongol invasions provided the bakufu with an opportunity to reduce the population of warriors in the eastern provinces, and thus relieved the bakufu from potential instability in and around Kamakura. But it also created pressure in the form of claims for rewards from warriors and religious institutions. Rewarding warriors had been a slow process that left some discontented; and the bakufu's recognition of the divine contribution made by temples and shrines was unseemly hasty. Scholars still do not know why the bakufu so favored the temples and shrines over the warriors. On one hand, the bakufu suffered a shortage of land rewards for its warriors, but at the same time it gave many of these rewards to religious institutions.
This is especially intriguing due to the fact that dissatisfied warriors could potentially threaten the bakufu, while religious institutions held no military power to pose any such threat. Perhaps the answer, albeit speculative at this point, lies in the question itself. That is, the militarily incapable religious institutions could not have challenged the bakufu even with increased wealth, whereas the transfer of large tracts of land to a number of powerful warrior families might have disrupted the balance of power between the bakufu's leadership and its gokenin. Further study of this particular subject could illuminate a topic that is still unresolved, and that might help explain political and economic developments in the post-Mongol invasions years.

A detailed, in-depth study of the city of Kamakura is necessary if we are to fully understand its society of warriors. A City, especially a capital city, is a place designed with the goal of attesting to its rulers' achievements and their society's self-perception. Kamakura, therefore, may reveal the consciousness, as well as hidden intentions, of its elite residents. Study of the architectural design of their residences, together with the contents of these residences might open a window into the daily world of Kamakura warriors,

5 A recent publication by Ishii Susumu may signify a rising interest in medieval Kamakura. In his publication he summarizes a number of studies he has published in Japanese. See "The Distinctive Characteristics of the Environ of Kamakura as a Medieval City," Acta Asiatica 81 (September 2001): 53-71.

6 A good example of a study of the importance of the physical manifestation of power and authority is William H. Cochrane, Architecture and Authority in Japan (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).
a topic which still remains largely unknown. At the same time, religious
institutions in Kamakura, such as Tsurugaoka Hachiman shrine, and
important ujidera, such as Shōmyō-ji, Gokuraku-ji, Kenchō-ji, and Kakuonji
(to name just a few), were architectural expressions of their patrons' statuses,
concerns and wealth. Understanding their places in the city could provide
further insight into their patrons.

Moreover, since Kamakura accommodated one of the largest
concentrations of non-warrior commoner communities, we may be able to
enrich our knowledge of commoner customs, behavior, and beliefs, among
other things. Needless to say, we could learn much about epidemics that
struck the people of Kamakura mercilessly, or people's daily diets, the
technology they used, and so forth. Such a study has been impossible to
conduct until recent years because of a lack of archeological excavations.
However, ongoing excavations continuously reveal new aspects of city life in
the Kamakura period. Perhaps, in historical terms, it was the city's quick rise
to become one Japan's two political centers, followed by the sudden
termination of its role as a political center only a century and a half later, that
came to obscure the importance of Kamakura in Japanese history.

In light of the findings presented in this study, we need to adopt a more
comprehensive view of Kamakura warriors. In its one hundred and fifty
years of rule, the Kamakura bakufu resorted to warfare as a way to overcome
opposition only four times (i.e., the elimination of the Hiki, Miura, and
Adachi, and the court's challenge in the Jōkyū War). We speak of "Kamakura warriors" because the court itself distinguished them from its civil aristocracy, because they comprised family lineages that were classified by the court as warriors, and because their assigned duties involved warfare. Yet, the Kamakura bakufu established an effective judicial bureaucracy to enforce its authority. This meant that Kamakura warriors could spend less time on pursuing military skills, and more time on developing other interests. This, however, did not automatically provide them with new mechanisms of self-rule and civil bureaucracy, nor with a unique culture. These were acquired in a long process that began in the Genpei War and the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu, and continued throughout the Kamakura period. In this process, religious institutions were a defining factor that supported the creation of a unique warrior society, its polity, economy, and culture.
As for the original Tsurugaoka Hachimangû, during the era of Emperor Go-Reizei, Iyo Minamoto no ason Yoriyoshi, the Governor of Iyo [Province], received the emperor's order to pursue Abe Sadatô. In order to pray sincerely, he secretly transferred the god [Hachiman] from Iwashimizu Shrine to the inner shrine which he constructed at Yui District of that province in the autumn of the sixth year of Kôhei, 8th month. In the second month of the first year of Eihô, the Governor of Mutsu [Province] Minamoto Yoshiie, repaired the shrine.

For the purpose of worshiping his ancestors, [Yoritomo] set the parameters for the shrine on the chosen Kobayashi District by Mt. Kitayama, and moved Tsurugaoka Hachimangû to that location. ...As for the location of that shrine, Yoritomo, who feared the god's displeasure, personally drew a sacred lot (kuji) in front of the altar following his inspiration, and a decision was made.

The former military commander (buei) made a pilgrimage to Tsurugaoka Wakamiya, and without referring to the daily signs he set the first day of the
year for worship at that shrine. Miura-no-suke Yoshizumi, Hatakeyama
Shirō Shigetada, Ōba Heita Kageyoshi and other retainers were placed to
guard the crossroads since midnight for Yoritomo’s mounted procession.
Senkōbō Ryōsen was already present at the outer shrine when Yoritomo
arrived. [Yoritomo] first placed a sacred horse in front of the shrine. Usami
Saburō Sukemochi, Nitta Shirō Tadatsuna and others pulled [the horse]
forward. Next, Yoritomo listened to the recitation of the Hokke sutra, after
which he departed for a feast that Chiba-no-suke Tsunetane offered, in which
a three feet carp as well as countless delicacies were served.

There is a [bakufu] sanction for a one-thousand-monks offering services
(sensa kuyō). As for accommodation for the gathering monks, temporary
rooms (kariya) were built on the main ground-enclosure of Tsurugaoka.

Clear skies and light wind. There were twelve hundred monks at the monk-
offering-services at Tsurugaoka Hachimangū. At the Hour of the Tiger [the
monks] gathered. They lined up on both sides of the inner gallery (kairō) and
in the temporary lodging, and took their seats. First they conducted a rapid-
flip-reading (tendoku) of one volume of the Nin’ō sutra. Next they chanted
ten times the Heart sutra (shinkyō) and the August Sage mystic spell (sonshō-
darani, also butchô-sonshô-darani). Then, one thousand volumes were copied for each of the Heart sutra and the August Sage mystic spell. Next, [the monks] copied in gold ink one hundred volumes of each of these scriptures. The First-Shrine (ichinomiya) in every province was to receive one of each of these volumes. Next was the offering-services ceremony. The master of services (dôshi) was the retired sôjô, Jôgô. Fifteen types and ten articles [of gifts] were offered: clothes (kaburimono; also, headdress), gold dust (sakin), wrapping cloth (tsutsumimono), silk role (chôken), dyed cloths (somemono), patterned cloths (shimitsuku), thread (ishi), white cloth (shiranuno), indigo paint (ranshô), cotton, iron coins (tessen), miscellany goods (junpu). Additional gifts included one purple robe. Gifts for one thousand monks were divided for each monk: one piece of wrapping cloth, one role of silk, and one bag of three to of rice (14 gallons, or 55 liters). Two hundred monks received each one piece of cloth, one role of silk, and one bag of rice similar to the above [mentioned amount]. In addition, various people received gifts. There were so many gifts including cloth, money, fans, sutra, and more, [that no one] knows the number of gifts [given]. A number of gokenin administered the presentation of gifts to the monks for the rituals [they conducted] for the elimination of epidemics and for [safe] passage through the season of draughts and fires. Daizen-no-suke Hironaka and Sakon (Ôe) taifu shôkan Sukenfusa were the [chief] administrators.
APPENDIX B: Documents Related to Ujidera

[Doc. 1] *Bannaji monjo*, doc. 71, Ninji 2 (1241)/2/29, Ashikaga Yoshiuji kijitsu
butsuji yōto haibunjō.

The conduct of the buddhist memorial services on the eighth day of the third month will be under the Kumonjo administration.

Alms for the Buddha,

White cloth for the altar

Alms for a vocalized sutra reading

Alms:

master of the western hall

monks who were invited to the dharma meeting: 11 people

monk workers/administrators: 3 people

lower (laborers): 4 people

Food for the Buddha and monks

The determination of the aforementioned alms and provisions is thus.

[Doc. 2] *Bannaji monjo*, doc. 72, Hōji 2 (1248)/7/6, Ashikaga Yoshiuji
okibumi.

Concerning the three matters of chaotic childlike behavior, traveling townsmen, and entry of cattle and horses to the confined premisses of Ōmidō. Use shōji and shimobe to prohibit these. Accordingly, the shōji and shimobe
who hold this duty will not leave the confines of the temple. Replace immediately those who neglect to follow this order. Make this order known. It is thus.

[Doc. 3] Chôrakuji monjo, doc. 2, Shôô 2 (1289), Kamakura shôgun Morikuni Shin'ô ke kishinjo.

Commendation to: Serada Chôrakuji, Kôzuke no kuni, Hirazuka gô

The aforementioned is the holding of the that temple.

In accordance to precedent it has the sata.

Accordingly, it is thus commended and decreed.

Umagontô Taira ason (kaô) Hojo Shigetoki

Sagami no kami Taira ason (kaô) Akahashi Moritoki


I was planning on visiting you tomorrow after the council [meeting], hoping that you will display the Chinese things (karamono) for me to view. If tomorrow is inconvenient, I will be here until the evening of the day after tomorrow so please keep it on display for me. [However], I am worried about thieves. I think that the sooner I view it the better. Also, what about things belonging to Gokurakuji? I hear you will put [them] on display. Have you decided about that? Please let me know. Once again, I will be very pleased to hear [from you] today or tomorrow. I shall be waiting for your reply.
Respectfully,

1st month, 24th day Sadaaki

Residence
APPENDIX C: Structure of Tsurugaoka Shrine

Figure 1. Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji Offices

Source: Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji shoshikishidai.

302
### APPENDIX D: Tsurugaoka Shrine Monks

**Table 1. Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji Bettō**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Date of Appointment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Engyō</td>
<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Jūei 1 (1182)/9/23</td>
<td>Minamoto Yoritomo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Songyō</td>
<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Shōji 2 (1200)/12/2</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jōgyō</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Ken'ei 1 (1206)/5/18</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kugyō</td>
<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Kenpō 5 (1217)/6/20</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Keikō</td>
<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Shōkyū 1 (1219)/3/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Tōji</td>
<td>Shōkyū 2 (1220)/1/21</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Bakufu</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jōshin</td>
<td>Tōji</td>
<td>Kangi 1 (1229)/6/25</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Hōji 1 (1247)/6/27</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Raijō</td>
<td>Tōji</td>
<td>Kōan 6 (1283)/8/24</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Seijō</td>
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<td>Einin 4 (1296)/2/27</td>
<td>Bakufu</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Dōyu</td>
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<td>Bakufu</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Onjōji</td>
<td>Enkei 2 (1309)/6/18</td>
<td>Dōyu and Bakufu</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Kakuji</td>
<td>Imperial Prince</td>
<td>Genkō 3 (1333)/9/4</td>
<td>Ashikaga Takuji(?)</td>
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Sources: *Tsurugaoka shamukiroku, Tsurugaoka shamushiki shidai, Azumakagami.*
Table 2. Tsurugaoka Hachimangūji Nijūgobō

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<tr>
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Source: Tsurugaoka hachimangūji shoshikishidai.
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Source: *Tsurugaoka hachimangū gusōshidai* and *Tsurugaoka hachimangū shoshikishidai*. 
APPENDIX E: Ground Layout of Ujidera

Figure 2. Shōmyōji

Source: Shōmyōji kazu, Genko 3 (1323)2/4.


306
Figure 3. Bannaji

Source: *Bannaji funyūchi ezu* (University of Tokyo, Historiographical Institute).

1. Hon-dō
2. Tahō-to (Pagoda)
3. Rin-zō
4. Ashikaga Worship Halls
5. Bell
6. Niō-mon
7. West Gate
8. North Gate
9. Dirt Barrier
10. Horinouchi (moat)
11. East Gate
12. Ashikaga Gakkō (Academy)

307
Figure 4. Kamakura Yōfukuji

APPENDIX F: Kantō and Kamakura Maps

Figure 5. Kamakura Passes

Source: Okutomi Takayuki, "Hōjōshi kamakura chizu," in Kamakura hōjō ichizoku; Ishii Susumu, Chūsei no katachi, 133, fig. 5.
Figure 6. Kamakura Temples and Warrior Residences

Figure 7. The Center of Kamakura in the Thirteenth Century

Figure 8. Kantō
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333


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