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FROM SOCIAL ACTIVISTS TO DEVELOPMENT BROKERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PHILIPPINE NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
INTO DEVELOPMENT INTERMEDIARIES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN
SOCIOLOGY

DECEMBER 2002

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It took me a while to complete the writing of this dissertation. In process, however, I came to know people who have blessed me with their gifts of ideas, time and more importantly, friendship.

I would like to express my gratitude to my chair, Dr. Hagen Koo, for his patience in reading and commenting on the earlier drafts of this paper. I have learned a lot from him. I also appreciated his willingness to allow me to sit in on his Civil Society class where I came across ideas that I found very useful for this paper. I am also thankful to Dr. Benedict Tria-Kerkvliet for taking time to comment on some chapters of this paper despite his busy schedule.

The members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Herbert Barringer, Dr. Kiyoshi Ikeda, Dr. Belinda Aquino and Dr. Rick Baldoz had also been gracious in reading my draft, despite its volume. I am especially appreciative, however, of Dr. Ikeda who not only provided me with insights on how to improve my paper, but also with the much needed advise and inspiration.

In the course of writing this paper, I also came across individuals who helped facilitate my data gathering and who provided me with inspiration and moral support. Fr. Salvador Orara, SJ gave me the opportunity to get involved with the ISO and the permission to use it as a case study. I also appreciated the time and effort he spared to share with me some of his insights about the ISO and the NGO sector as a whole. I am also indebted to Fr. Antonio Moreno, SJ who took on some of my responsibilities at the ISO in 1996 so I could pursue the writing this dissertation. Fr. John Carroll, SJ shared
with me most of the information about the early years of the ISO. He has been my mentor and my friend. Dr. Mary Racelis, Dr. Angelita Gregorio-Medel and Ms. Maria Lourdes Melegrito provided me not only a comprehensive overview of the history of civil society in the Philippines, but also significant insights on how these came to be. Mr. Alberto Catangcatang helped me locate materials and resource persons that I would not have been able to get, if I am going to look for them myself. The earlier study conducted by Krononalysts, Inc., on the other hand, relieved me of having to conduct the interviews with some key informants directly.

Lastly, I would like to thank the people whose friendships encouraged me to pursue this project at times when I almost wanted to let it go – my family, Eleanor Japon, Emma Porio, Patricia Calcetas, Antonio Fernadez, Jr., Mayumi Ma. Quintos, Clint and Josie Clausen, Macrina Abenoja, Diosdado Pascual, Lloyd Kuniyoshi, Tyros Buyama, Veronica Soriano, Maria Eva Pangilinan, and Youngjin Choi.
ABSTRACT

Since the 1986 People Power Revolution, the Philippine civil society groups, particularly the NGOs, had been considered as one of the most active in the world in terms of promoting democratization. Although it has only been recognized recently, the Philippine civil society has been in existence as early as the 16th century. Moreover, it is not only comprised of the middle class-based NGOs, but also the people’s organizations whose roles in the democratization process were crucial, yet underplayed.

Of late, however, the NGOs are more recognized as representatives of the Philippine civil society because of the critical roles they play as development intermediaries. As such, they broker influence and resources between the organized grassroots and the formal social institutions such as the state, the Catholic Church and the ideological parties. Because of this, they allowed some fractions of the Filipino middle class to get mainstreamed in the field of development administration and enabled them to strategically position themselves to countervail the influence of the elites on the state.

This paper examines how the Philippine social development NGOs emerged and over time, evolved into development intermediaries. It identifies the development within the Catholic Church, the changes in the ideological parties, the socio-economic situations at particular historical junctures and the responses of the state towards organized efforts of the citizenry as major factors that shaped the Philippine civil society’s transformation. It likewise described how such macro-processes compelled a particular NGO, the Institute of Social Order, to undertake professionalization and transform itself into a development intermediary organization over time.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Association of Foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALAMAT</td>
<td>Alyansa ng mga Manggagawa ng Tanay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRSP</td>
<td>Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATOM</td>
<td>August 21 Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWU</td>
<td>Associated Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANDILA</td>
<td>Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAYAN</td>
<td>Bagong Alyansang Makabayan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBMB</td>
<td>Bigkis Bisig ng mga Manggawa ng Bataan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCC</td>
<td>Basic Christian Communities</td>
</tr>
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<td>BINGOs</td>
<td>Big NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUDC</td>
<td>Barrio United Defense Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUFA</td>
<td>Balincaguing Upland Farmers’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPM</td>
<td>Cory Aquino for President Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Land Reform Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARRD</td>
<td>Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBCP</td>
<td>Catholic Bishops’ Congress of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Center for Community Services</td>
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<td>CLO</td>
<td>Congress of Labor Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO(s)</td>
<td>Community Organizing/Community Organizer(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODE-NGO</td>
<td>Caucus of Development NGO Networks</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORD</td>
<td>Coalition of Organizations for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
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<td>CPAR</td>
<td>Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
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<td>CTFCO</td>
<td>Council for Tondo Foreshoreland Community Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFF</td>
<td>Federation of Free Farmers</td>
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<td>FFW</td>
<td>Federation of Free Workers</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Farmers’ Service Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMB</td>
<td>Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan</td>
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<td>HUKBALAHAP/Huks</td>
<td>Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>Institute of Social Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAJA</td>
<td>Justice for Aquino, Justice For All</td>
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<td>KABABAIHAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>KC</td>
<td>Knights of Columbus</td>
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<td>Kilusang Mayo Uno</td>
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<td>KOMPIL</td>
<td>Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino</td>
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<td>LACC</td>
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<td>Laymen’s Association for Post-Vatican II Reforms</td>
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<td>LGC</td>
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<td>LMP</td>
<td>Lakas ng Magsasakang Pilipino</td>
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<td>LRFW</td>
<td>Livelihood Revolving Fund for Women</td>
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<td>MASAKA</td>
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<td>National Movement for Free Election</td>
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<td>NASSA</td>
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<td>NDF/natdems</td>
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<td>NEDA</td>
<td>National Economic and Development Authority</td>
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<td>NFSW</td>
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<td>NGO(s)</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization(s)</td>
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<td>NLLA</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
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<td>National Peace Coalition</td>
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<td>PDSP</td>
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<td>PHILDHRRA</td>
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<td>PHILSSA</td>
<td>Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies</td>
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<td>PKM</td>
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<td>PKP</td>
<td>Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas</td>
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<td>PMAP</td>
<td>People’s Movement Against Poverty</td>
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<td>PO(s)</td>
<td>People’s Organization(s)</td>
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<td>Popdems</td>
<td>Popular Democrats</td>
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<td>PRRM</td>
<td>Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO(s)</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization(s)</td>
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<td>RAM</td>
<td>Reform the Armed Forces Movement</td>
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<td>SDCCU</td>
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<td>URC</td>
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<td>WAO</td>
<td>Workers Assistance Office</td>
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<td>WC</td>
<td>Workers’ College</td>
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<td>YAPJ</td>
<td>Youth for the Advancement of Peace and Justice</td>
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ZOTTO/ZOTO

Zone One Temporary Tondo Organization/Zone One Tondo Organization
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1986 People Power Revolution ushered in a period of democratization, the Philippine civil society has expanded rapidly both in size and in the type of groups that comprise it. From 37,181 in 1986, the number of non-stock, non-profit organizations has increased to 116,882 in 2000, or by about 313 percent. Roughly 75 percent of these are non-government organizations (NGOs) while 20 percent are people’s organizations (POs). Clarke (1998: xxv) has, in fact, contended that the Philippines possesses the third largest NGO community in the developing world and also, one of the most organized and politically active. Since the restoration of the democratic space in 1986, they have initiated and participated in the open discussion of issues covering practically all aspects of society. They have also scrutinized, debated and openly challenged the policies and programs of the Philippine government. Moreover, they have taken on the lead roles in defining, formulating and articulating new visions of the Philippine society (Racelis, 1995: 413).

Of late, the biggest and the most organizationally sophisticated of the NGOs have taken one step further in ensuring that these visions are translated into concrete programs. They have assumed the roles of mediating between the grassroots sectors and their POs, and the formal institutions that control the power, opportunities and resources that can make these visions real namely, the state, the private business organizations, and the international funding institutions. As intermediary organizations, the NGOs actively source, broker and deploy material resources and expertise from private, government and international institutions to their partner POs. At the same time, they represent the
grassroots’ interests in the public sphere and the policy-deliberating bodies of the state. To
date, there are about 2,000 to 7,000 of these intermediary NGOs operating nationwide in
the country.

More recently, the intermediary NGOs have themselves organized networks and
c coalitions that limit the access of other groups in the civil society, particularly the POs, to
other formal social institutions. These coalitions institutionalized professional standards
for NGO work, making it an exclusive domain of the Filipino middle class professionals.
Simultaneously, they also engage in efforts that go beyond those that are equated with the
civil society. For one, they have formed alternative political parties that aimed to
participate in electoral politics to gain access to the state executive and legislative offices.
Secondly, they have engaged in profit-making ventures like investing in interest earning
bonds and securities, micro lending, and acting as marketing arm for POs engaged in
micro-enterprises. Lastly, they have become less associational in character and have
professionalized and bureaucratized their operations. All of these enhanced the position
of the NGOs and their middle class workers not only politically as agents of
democratization, but also economically as the state’s partners in development
administration.

These recent developments raise an issue of whether or not intermediary NGOs
still belonged to the realm of civil society. From both the organizational and relational
standpoint, the NGOs have moved beyond the traditional domain of civil society. They
engage in activities that are primarily equated with government agencies, business
organizations and political parties. For some social scientists, these do not bode well for
the civil society. For one, the fact that the NGOs are serving as alternative service
delivery mechanisms for governments and foreign funding institutions indicate that already, they are co-opted by these social institutions. Prasarseth (1990), for example, contends that this de-politicize the democratization process and sidetrack the empowerment of the grassroots sectors.

Yet, for others, the observation that at the normative level, the NGOs remained guided by the principles of voluntarism and the shared norms of values that govern the collective actions of civil society\(^1\) indicate that the NGOs could actually avoid such possibilities. For one, the participatory nature of the NGO initiatives could promote the vertical connection among people and institutions at different levels and permit upward and downward flows of information and resources which could eventually lead to equitable and sustainable distribution of resources (Carroll, 1992: 175). Moreover, the NGOs could unite fragmented and disunited grassroots groups around external threats and vertically link them to formal organizations that could address their concerns. They could also channel financial and logistical support from international funding institutions directly to the people’s organizations to strengthen these grassroots movements. This, in turn, could thicken the constituencies of the civil society. Last but not the least, they could lend legitimacy to the grassroots movements (Hall: 1992) and allow them to effectively participate in the legally acknowledged public sphere. Interestingly, although the contradictory characteristics of the intermediary NGOs as civil society organizations and their implications on the role of civil society in promoting and sustaining democracy, and the empowerment of the grassroots sectors had been extensively discussed, there is a dearth of studies on how some NGOs became intermediary organizations and why.
In the Philippines in particular, the history of the voluntary sector goes way back to the mutual aids associations and secret societies of the 16th century Spanish colonial period. Since then until now, the different cohorts of civil society groups have evolved in terms of programs, strategies and organizational set up. These mirrored how they adapted to the social, economic, political and institutional factors at play in particular historical junctures that they were in. Despite these, they shared similar social concerns namely, poverty alleviation, social justice, participation in decision-making and education. They also subscribed to common principles that identify them as civil society organizations namely, voluntarism and the concern for the common good. Given these, the emergence of intermediary NGOs could thus be viewed merely as the current organizational adaptation of the voluntary sector to the needs and opportunities of the time.

Studies that trace the historical roots of the NGOs, nonetheless, did not examine these extensively. Alegre’s (1996a) historical sketch of the evolution of the Philippine NGOs, the most exhaustive in terms of providing the historical background on the evolution of Philippine NGOs to date, merely identified what kinds of NGOs and their proto-types emerged at particular historical period and what their major contributions were to development of Philippine civil society. He did not analyze whether the nature and characteristics of these organizations were shaped by the social, economic, political and institutional factors at hand. Clarke (1998), on the other hand, examined the participation of Philippine NGOs in politics, their relationship with each other, and with the Philippine state over the years by analyzing the historical experiences of two of the biggest NGOs in the country. While it described the internal processes that transpired within these two NGOs as they undergo organizational changes, it did so only in terms of
how these affected the external institutional relationships between these NGOs and the other social institutions. It downplayed the tensions that ensued among the people managing these organizations, which could be traced to the differences in terms of professional and educational background, as well as political identification. Yet, different cohorts of NGO workers themselves acknowledged that conflicts and disunity among them do exist along this line.\textsuperscript{2}

The above studies, likewise, did not deal extensively with the relationship between the NGOs and POs, on which the premise of becoming intermediary organizations rest upon. However, the expressed purpose of the NGOs performing such function rest on their aim of empowering the POs as members of the citizenry to act effectively and autonomously in their own behalf (Racelis, 1995: 414).

These studies, as well as the existing literature that dealt with the evolution of social movements in the Philippines, nonetheless, hinted on the existence of two strands of the Philippine civil society from the time that the voluntary sector emerged in the country. The first strand represents the private, non-stock organizations that exhibited similar characteristics as those of the conventional western civil associations. These groups are autonomous from the state. Their purpose is to engage the state within permissible legal bounds, either by supporting or opposing its policies and programs. They are organized and led by the bourgeoisie and later on, middle class professionals with “common goods” such as social equity, social justice, and broader participation in governance and policy-making in mind. They are also strongly influenced by the western ethics of rationality, democracy, reformism and cooperativism. Groups that are equated to this strand ranged from philanthropic associations, intellectual circles, civic associations,
social action guilds, private voluntary organizations, “cause-oriented groups” and more recently, the non-government organizations (NGOs).

The second strand corresponds to the grassroots-based groups and social movements, which are more plural in terms of program focus and fluid in terms of organizational set up. Primarily, the membership base of these groups are the poor and marginalized sectors of society, who seek to improve and/or prevent further deterioration of their economic, social and political situations. They are either self-organized or organized by external agents such as the NGOs. These groups seek to legitimately participate in public discussions and policy decision-making. However, since they are generally ignored and/or viewed with suspicion by the state, they at times operate outside the bounds of the legally permissible public sphere to get their sentiments heard. Groups equated to this strand ranged from secret societies, peasant mutual aid associations, trade unions and people’s organizations (POs).

These two strands of civil society organizations have evolved historically in relationship with each other. Since the 1980s, however, the NGOs and POs have joined forces to bring down the Marcos dictatorship, advocate for social reforms and engage in programs aimed at alleviating poverty and addressing social inequality. Because of these, the equation “NGOs + POs” is automatically assumed when one speaks of Philippine civil society (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 7).

Interestingly, it was during the time when the interests and goals of these two strands of civil society organizations were supposedly interchangeable that some NGOs changed program strategies and underwent organizational changes that proved otherwise. First, they shifted their efforts from social activism towards social development. Then,
they professionalized their operations, bureaucratized their organizations and forged partnership with the state in the implementation of development administration programs. They became development intermediaries. Correspondingly, this led to increased access of the NGOs to government-controlled resources, including the official development assistance (ODA) coming from international funding institutions.

Meanwhile, the POs were pushed to the periphery of both the democratization process and development administration. They were relegated to that of being mere beneficiaries of the government’s poverty alleviation programs and/or providers of manpower for NGO-orchestrated mobilizations against the state. How these developed, however, could be better appreciated if examined within the context of the evolving relationship between the two strands of Philippine civil society organizations over time. However, no study has yet been undertaken on this to date.

Lastly, although the existing studies emphasized the positive and the negative aspects of these developments in the civil society as a whole, they have not examined how these affect the NGOs and POs themselves. However, it was my personal observation as a member of the NGO community that many NGOs went through some sort of organizational crisis during the period when they were professionalizing and adjusting their operations to better assume intermediary roles. Some suffered from rapid staff turnover and work stoppage. Those who were unable to deal with the crisis ceased to exist. In most cases, the organizational crisis was triggered by conflicts and competitions among the different cohorts of NGO workers. In fact, in a workshop held in 1995, the different generations of Philippine NGO workers pointed out that professionalization has been causing the breakdown of the culture of activism that defined NGO work in the
country (PHILDRRA-PHILSSA, 1995). Some of the participants in the said workshop also expressed that the personality types and concerns of the recent generations of NGO workers had changed vis-à-vis the pioneer generations (Ibid.). What was not pointed out in the said workshop was that professionals of diverse educational backgrounds and work experiences have joined the NGOs over the years. Yet, no study has been conducted to explore how this contributed to the organizational crisis experienced by many intermediary NGOs.

In view of the issues and concerns raised above, this dissertation embarked on a two-pronged study. At the macro level, it traces the evolution of the Philippine civil society from its early years up to the present, giving emphasis on the changes in the nature and characteristics of the various groups that comprise it and the socio-economic, political and institutional factors that triggered them. To determine how the interplay of broader social, economic, political and institutional factors trigger some internal dynamics that push individual NGOs to adopt changes in its goals, strategies and organizational characteristics over time, the dissertation also examines the experiences of the Institute of Social Order (ISO), the oldest existing NGO in the country, as it transformed from a social movement organization in the 1900s to a formally constituted professional intermediary NGO in recent years.

The study was conducted with the following specific questions in mind:

1. How did the Philippine civil society emerge? How did it change over time? What characteristics have persisted and what had changed among the groups that comprise it?

2. What social, economic, political and institutional factors facilitate the emergence and evolution of the groups comprising the Philippine civil society?
3. What particular factors pushed some civil associations to become professional intermediary NGOs in the recent period? What organizational changes accompany such transformation? What internal dynamics do these trigger and why?

4. How do these affect the relationship between the NGOs and the POs?

5. What implications do these have on intra-civil society relations and on the Philippine democratization process as a whole?

The dissertation is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of the study—what it is all about, what literature are available on the subject matter and the methodology used in conduct of the study. Chapter 1 describes the current state of Philippine civil society and the different groups that comprise it. It also points out the limits of the existing studies in describing and analyzing how the Philippine civil society emerged and evolved over time. The chapter also identifies the research problems that would be examined by the study and why the study is relevant at this time. Chapter 2 discusses the current theoretical debates regarding civil society and its role in democratization. It also provides a description of NGOs as civil society organizations and how their roles in democratization and development administration in the third world societies are perceived by social scientists. The chapter gives particular attention to the recent role of NGOs as professional intermediary organizations and how it affects their relationship with the POs. The middle class character of the NGOs is likewise explored as this is assumed to have significant influence on the pattern of organizational evolution of the NGOs over the years. Taking the strengths and limitations of the existing studies on civil society and NGOs into consideration, the chapter also discusses the theoretical framework of the study. Chapter 3 discusses the data collection process and analytical
techniques used in the study. It also identifies the strengths and limitations of these methods.

Part II describes the emergence and evolution of the Philippine civil society across three historical phases. Chapter 4 identifies and discusses the early forms of civil society groups from the Spanish colonial period and how these evolved into militant private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and POs of the pre-Martial Law era. Chapter 5, on the other hand, discusses how the PVOs gave birth to cause-oriented organizations and served as legal fronts for the underground ideological parties. In partnership with the POs, these cause-oriented groups mobilized the grassroots sectors against the Marcos dictatorship from 1972 to 1986. Chapter 6 discusses how the cause-oriented groups gave way to professional intermediary NGOs that work closely with the state and other formal social institutions during the re-democratization period that started in 1986. The chapter also identifies the social, economic, political and institutional factors that shaped the evolution of the two strands of Philippine civil society were likewise identified.

Part III describes how a particular NGO - the ISO - experienced and responded to the developments in the realm of civil society. Chapter 8 describes the external factors that facilitated the transformation of the ISO from a social movement organization into a professional intermediary NGO. Chapter 9 talks about the organizational transformation that the ISO went through over time, giving particular attention to the changes in its goals, program strategies, organizational structures and operations and staff composition. It also discusses the internal dynamics that ensue among the different cohorts of middle class workers that were involved in the organization. Chapter 10, on the other hand, tackles the effects of these developments on ISO’s partnership with the POs over time.
In Chapter 11, the persistent and evolving characteristics of the different groups that comprise the Philippine civil society are identified to determine what set them apart from their counterparts in other countries. From the in-depth examination of the experiences of the ISO, insights on how social, economic, political and institutional factors obtaining from the broader social environment facilitate the changes in an individual NGO’s goals, strategies and organizational characteristics are drawn.

This study aims to contribute to sociological knowledge by determining the applicability of the definition and concepts of civil society and its relationship with the notions of democracy on the Philippine situation. It also seeks to promote better understanding of the nature of intermediary NGOs as present day civil society organizations. Lastly, it aims to understand how this new role being played by the NGOs affect its relationship with the POs and what its implications are on the democratization process of the Philippines.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The last decades of the 20th century were marked by the organized efforts of private citizens to assert themselves over social institutions that impinge on their basic rights and constrain their abilities to become productive members of human society. This phenomenon prompted a revival of interest on the civil society and consequently, sparked theoretical debates regarding the context of its emergence, nature and purpose. The debate is fueled by the ambiguity of the very concept of civil society itself.

The difficulties in setting a definitive characterization of the civil society is exemplified by the existence of non-government organizations (NGOs) that lie in an ambiguous zone where bureaucratic and associational worlds overlap. This is further complicated by some NGOs assuming intermediary roles that involve actively sourcing, brokering and deploying material resources and expertise from private and government institutions to the other groups operating in the realm of civil society.

This chapter presents the current theoretical debates regarding civil society and its role in democratization. It also describes the nature and characteristics of the NGOs and POs as civil society organizations and analyzes the roles of the NGOs, particularly as professional intermediary organizations, in the democratization and development administration processes in the third world societies.
**The Nature and Characteristics of Civil Society**

Social scientists cannot agree on how to define civil society. However, Kim (2000) identifies three dimensions by which social scientists characterize civil society namely, the organizational, the relational and the normative.

**The Organizational Dimension**

The organizational dimension emphasizes the existence of self-organized groups that operate within the public sphere.

Civil society, in its original sense, refers to a certain kind of human association—in the shadow of law, and in the interest of both individual liberty and collective good (Hems and Tonkiss, 2000: 3-4).

Informal voluntary associations are considered to be representative of the ideal of social exchange or civic engagement (Putnam as cited by Passey and Tonkiss, 2000: 34). For such reason, they are considered essential features of civil society (Schwatz, n.d.: 6). Over the years, however, informal voluntary associations have given way to voluntary organizations that engage in diverse forms of activism, advocacy and service provision. In fact, the term civil society has been increasingly used to refer to the voluntary, non-profit, independent or third sector (Hems and Tonkiss, 2000: 3-4). These include, but are not limited to, NGOs and POs. While the principles of voluntarism continue to guide their efforts, these voluntary organizations are subject to increasing government regulations, and operate in more intensely competitive “markets” for public trust and support. In both senses, therefore, it becomes difficult to clearly mark off a “civil society sector” from the domains of the state and business (Passey and Tonkiss, 2000: 34).
The Relational Dimension

Social scientists that emphasize this dimension focus on the relationship of civil society with the state, the private units of production (i.e., business) and reproduction (i.e., families and clans), and the political society. According to Kim (2000: 12), what defines civil society in terms of the relational dimension is its relative autonomy from these three societal spheres.

In general, there is a consensus among social scientists that civil society is at an intermediary location between the private sphere that is comprised of the households, the market, and the state (Kim: 2000; Diamond: 1994). With regards to the relationship of the civil society vis-à-vis the state, social scientists agree that civil society is independent of, and is often in conflict with the state (Kim, 2000: 12-13). Yet, the relationship between the NGOs and governments in many third world countries belie this. NGOs criticize some policies and actions of the state. At the same time, however, they collaborate with their governments in implementing development administration programs. Not everyone thus agree that civil society is generally in opposition to the state.

Civil society cannot be understood in isolation. It must be understood in relation to the state, but it must not be understood in an *a priori* way in opposition to it… The relationship between civil society and the state can be engaged as well as disengaged, collaborative as well as conflictual (Bratton as cited by Schwartz, n.d.: 3).

Secondly, although civil society is premised on informal and personal relationships, its domain extends beyond the family into the community where the interactions between the individual household and the state takes place (Krut as cited by Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 11). Civil society groups derives membership, resource, and
support from the households in return for representing, defending and promoting their needs, concerns and interests (Kim, 2000: 13). At the public sphere, however, individual interests are reconciled with the collective or public good through the process of association, participation and collective action.

Civil society is also closely interwoven into the market economy as its existence is dependent on the existence of an autonomous economy and property rights (Schwartz, n.d.: 5). It provides a space that is autonomous from the state, but where individuals are bound to a larger society by moral and ethical codes (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 10). The groups where they belong serve as the public conscience that ensures that the market takes common good into consideration. In view of this, it is contended that minimum intervention by the state is needed by the civil society. In the Philippines at present, however, the notion of the civil society groups as vanguards against the abuses of the market is now brought into question since many NGOs began to undertake profit-making ventures in order to ensure long-term financial sustainability.

Likewise, civil society is separated from political society where various political actors compete to gain control over power and state apparatus (Kim, 2000: 13). It does not seek to replace state agents, but simply to engage or influence them (Ibid.). However, the close relationship between the groups within the civil society and the political parties makes the separation problematic, particularly in societies where party leadership and constituencies are based on social movements. This is doubly problematic in the case of the Philippines where revolutionary parties operate within the realm of civil
society through their leaders, organizers and front organizations (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 11).

*The Normative Dimension*

The normative dimension emphasizes the shared norms and rules governing the collective actions of groups within the civil society. Civil society has been linked to specific values as autonomy, plurality, publicity, solidarity, toleration, generalized social trust and civility (Schwartz, n.d.: 2). Of these, civility is closely associated to liberal democracy since it requires, at minimum, democratic participation and collective concern for the common good.

For the most part, these virtues are primarily associated with the bourgeoisie of 18th century Europe and of late, the middle classes. However, the very notion that some sectors in society are more civil than the others connotes the exclusivity of the civil society. This, on the other hand, is premised in the construction of civil society as either a historical or an analytical concept.

*Historical vs. Analytic Conception of Civil Society*

One major area of disagreement among social scientists lies on the conception of civil society either as a historically specific (i.e., western) phenomenon or an analytical ideal type construct. As a historical concept that emerged in specific European societies during the 18th century, civil society is equated with the bourgeoisie whose interest lies primarily on keeping state intervention to private activities as minimum as possible (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 10). It is characterized as follows:
First, (it is) a part of a society distinct from and independent of the state... Secondly, it provide(s) for the rights of individuals and particularly for the right to property. Thirdly, civil society (is) a constellation of many autonomous economic units or business firms, acting independently of the state and competing with one another (Shils, 1991: 5 and 7).

As a sphere dominated by the bourgeoisie, Marx and his followers saw an instrumentalist civil society that dominates and uses the state to perpetuate capitalism (Carnoy, 1984: 66-67). Gramsci further re-enforces this negative notion of civil society with the contention that the ruling class, by the perpetuation of justifying ideologies and through influence on mass consciousness, establishes hegemony over the subordinate groups within the civil society.¹ In line with this, he outlines a strategy for breaking the hegemony of the ruling class primarily through facilitating alternative consciousness among the subordinate classes.

However, the historical concept of civil society has been criticized for being too simplistic. Alexander (1998:5) argues that it reduces the civil society to a field of play of egoistical, purely private interests and downplays the sense of collectiveness and the moral basis of associational life. This conception ignores the civil society’s heterogeneity and complexity. It overlooks the anti-bourgeois sentiments and normative implications of the earlier civil society discourse when, in fact, debates about the civil society and the limits of state action in the late 18th to the early 19th century were energized by non-entrepreneurial social groups ((Keane, 1988: 64-65).

Following these criticisms, some social scientists propose a more inclusive conceptualization in lieu of the historically, or more accurately, capitalist and class-
determined notion of civil society. Diamond’s (1994) definition of civil society embodies this. He conceived of the civil society as

A realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state accountable (5).

In other words, the realm of civil society must include all spectrum of associational life, and the constellations of power centers and countervailing forces (Coronel-Ferrer: 1997, 12). Alexander (1998) expands this further by defining civil society as

A solidary sphere in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes gradually to be defined and to some degree enforced. To the degree that this solidary community exists, it is exhibited by “public opinion”, possesses its own cultural codes and narratives in a democratic idiom, is patterned by a set of particular institutions… and is visible in historically distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism, and respect (7).

Indeed, the historically and economically determined definition of civil society cannot adequately characterize the diverse NGOs and POs that make up the Philippine civil society nor account for the basis of their organization and/or cooperative linkages. However, while some NGOs and POs represent non-economic interests, they are bound together by a common analysis of the Philippine political economy.

**Civil Society and the Democratization Process**

The recent interest on the civil society, particularly in the third world countries, is premised primarily on its potential capacity to pose as countervailing power to the state that has become repressive, corrupt and inept in terms of enforcing accountability, transparency and efficiency that are required in the practice of good governance
In general, there is a prevailing consensus among social scientists that the existence of a vibrant civil society promotes wider participation in the decision-making processes that affect people’s lives, in protecting the citizens from the abuses of state power, and in guaranteeing the political accountabilities of the state (Krut as cited by Coronel-Ferrer, 1997: 6).

Prior to discussing the arguments concerning the role of civil society in promoting democracy, it is important to define what constitutes a democracy and how this social condition can be achieved. In a minimalist procedural sense, democracy denotes a system of fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and virtually all the adult population are eligible to vote (Huntington as cited by Abueva, 1997: 2). In consideration of the social situations in many third world countries, however, democracy cannot simply be limited to the right to vote (Clark, 1991: 14) or electoral participation because formal power is controlled by a few and is grossly misused (Wignaraja, 1993: 11-12). Moreover, in many of these societies, free and fair election still needs to be institutionalized (Coronel-Ferrer, 1993: 5). Thus, these countries require a broader definition of democracy that involves a whole set of rights which citizens must be afforded ... These rights include freedom of speech; an independent press, freedom to associate, for example, in trade unions or pressure groups; access to state information, particularly about specific state plans for those directly affected by them and the right to be consulted in such decisions; and the freedom from discrimination, whether on grounds of sex, race or creed (Clark, 1991: 14).

These rights are not equally available to the citizens because Deep-seated contradictions exist between different groups with conflict of interests. These are sharp relationships of dominance and dependence. These relationships give power to the dominant... bringing about crisis of immediate
survival to the poor. Serious divisions exist among the poor themselves... These divisions, the people's reluctance to take economic, social and political initiatives to collectively improve their lives, and their inability to change their lives individually, further compound their difficulties (Wignaraja, 1993: 11).

Given this, democracy could only be attained through a complex, multi-linear process that involves:

a. The broadening of the distribution of the control of productive assets;

b. The development of pluralistic institutions that ensure the accountability of their leaders to their members;

c. The education of the people in the political consciousness and skills essential to the maintenance of democratic institutions; and,

d. The establishment of the institutions and values that ensure an open flow of information (Korten, 1988: 12-14).

However, this requires the people - especially the poor - to be organized and empowered. This process of getting the people to participate in the state's decision-making and public administration is equated to the democratization process.

The debate regarding civil society's association with democracy centers on the role that it plays in facilitating and sustaining the democratization process. On one end, there are those who contend that even though civil society is not the most decisive, nor the most important factor in promoting democracy, it plays a significant role in building and consolidating democracy (Diamond, 1994: 7). They believe that civil society re-enforces democracy because groups comprising it enjoy relative autonomy from the state. Furthermore, the plurality of the groups comprising this realm mitigates polarities that create political conflicts. More importantly, the associational character of the civil society
promotes sharing of goals and collective action among its members (i.e. social capital), which makes demand for more effective public service possible (Putnam, 1993: 182).

On the other end, there are those that find the positive causal link between civil society and democracy too simplistic. Schmitter (1977) argues that civil society is not a prerequisite for the transition to democracy, nor is it ordinarily sufficient to bring about a change in the regime. Rather, it is democratic consolidation that promotes the growth and enhances the role of civil society.

Encarnacion (2000) further argues that the contention that civil society can serve as engine for democratic transition is flawed.

First, there is a problem of feasibility arising from the question of universality of civil society, at least, as the concept is traditionally understood in the West. Suitability is a second problem. Surprisingly little consideration has been given to the possibility that promoting civil society in the context of undeveloped political systems, overburdened newly democratic government, and highly politicized populations can have the unintended outcome of hindering rather than facilitating the consolidation of democracy (10).

He questions the universal application of civil society, arguing that the principles central to its existence such as the public sphere bound together by universal citizenship, the recognition of individual autonomy, and rights and collective conception of justice and moral order are specific to its western origin. According to him, most of the societies that succeeded in facilitating democratic transitions possess political cultures and socio-economic structures that most closely resemble those of the western core. By contrast, those with cultural traditions and economic structures diverging dramatically from the west were less successful (Ibid., 3-14).
Encarnacion also raises concern about the contention that a vigorous civil society could strengthen democracy. Drawing from the Brazilian experience, he points out that an expansive and highly mobilized civil society that converges with a poorly institutionalized political system and a government that lacks the capacity to deal with the demands of democratic consolidation could lead instead to its breakdown. Given these, he concludes that the impact of civil society on democratization is not a function of its collective strength, but rather, of surrounding political and economic conditions.

Consistent with the contention of Diamond and Putnam, the Philippine civil society did play a significant role in facilitating the events that led to the downfall of the Marcos regime in 1986 and the restoration of democratic institutions in the country. Since then, some segments of it, notably the NGOs and POs, have been at the center of efforts to promote democratic consolidation. Consequently also, the opening of the democratic space contributed not only to the growth in number but also to the organizational strengthening of groups that comprise the Philippine civil society. These contributed to the expansion of the public sphere, proving Schmitter's contention that democratic consolidation contributes to the strengthening of civil society. However, these merely indicate that the relationship between democratization and the civil society is not unidirectional. Viewing it as such limits the understanding of the mutually re-enforcing relationship between the two. To better understand the role of the civil society in the democratization process and vice versa, the dynamics of the relationship of the two should be examined as they unfold over time.
The validity of the contention that the existence of civil society does not guarantee democratic consolidation is also evident in the Philippines. This is proven by the persistence of corruption in government administration and of patronage politics dominated by the ruling elites amidst a highly critical and active civil society. The Philippine situation likewise affirms the contention that the existence of civil associations affiliated with specific classes and interest groups actually promote social conflict and division instead of promoting democratic coalitions. This is demonstrated by the recurring outbreak of civil uprisings in the country that are sponsored by civil associations closely affiliated with specific political groups seeking to advance their political interests. This also further indicates the validity Encarnacion’s argument that the civil society’s role in the democratization process is largely a function of its social, economic, political and institutional environment. Given this, it is only imperative that the initiatives of civil society vis-à-vis the democratization process must also be contextually examined.

The NGOs and POs as Civil Society Organizations

The revival of the interest on civil society is, in part, fueled by the increasing popularity of the NGOs and POs as the modern-day expressions of private, non-profit associations (i.e., the civil and political associations) that Tocqueville claimed to have sustained democracy in 19th century America. In the Philippines, although NGOs and POs are closely associated with and often lumped together as the “third or voluntary sector”, they actually represent two strands of civil society groups. However, NGOs refer to private, non-profit, professional organizations with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public
welfare or goals (Clarke, 1998: 2-3). They are primarily middle class-led and managed (Aldaba, 1993: 14). On the other hand, POs are local, non-profit, membership-based associations that organize and mobilize their constituents in support of collective welfare goals (Clarke, 1998: 3).

Like Tocqueville’s civil associations, NGOs and POs are considered as agents of democratization. They mobilize the people at the grassroots level so the latter could counter the socio-economic realities that force them into poverty. However, the POs fit the descriptions of Tocqueville’s civil associations more than the NGOs. For one, civil organizations are comprised of people who have banded together in pursuit of common interests. The NGOs, on the other hand, are usually set up by people to address the interests of sectors, or groups of people other than themselves. Moreover, while Tocqueville’s civil organizations are concerned primarily with the check and balance of state powers, NGOs actively engage in innovative and pro-active efforts that have significant impact on national and local development. In Chile, for example, NGOs are credited for introducing social participation combined with innovative methodologies appropriate for the popular culture in the field of health (Salinas and Solimano, 1995: 149-151). In Africa, they help people get out of absolute poverty and malnutrition by teaching them the rudiments of agriculture that would enable them to satisfy their basic needs and dietary requirements (Schneider, 1988: 222). In Asia, they are involved in the improvement of rural technologies and income generation activities (Ibid.; Farrington and Lewis, 1993: 51). The POs serve as their partners in these endeavors.
NGO Typologies, Features and Characteristics

The United Nation defines NGOs as organizations which are not part of government and which have not been established out of agreements between governments (Quizon, 1989: 31; Padron, 1987: 70). Because of the diversity of the private, non-profit organizations that can be subsumed under this definition, it is sometimes mistakenly construed that the NGOs represent the whole of civil society.\(^3\) In general, however, the term “NGOs” refers to non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs). These are private, not for profit agencies established by individuals receiving payments for their duties. They are initially established for socio-economic services, civic, religious, charitable and/or social welfare purposes but over time, began to focus their efforts on the design, study and/or execution of development programs and projects in the third world countries primarily with the support of international development cooperation institutions and direct involvement of the popular sectors (Padron. Ibid.).

NGOs are distinguished from corporate and public organizations by the following attributes:

1. They are organized around missions that focus on social change such as the expansion of economic opportunity and productivity, self-reliance and wider choices for the poor and powerless population.

2. Values and ideologies are important to them. Their staffs are strongly committed to the values embedded in their organizational missions.

3. They often start small and work in informal ways. They tend to have loose and informal structures and procedures for organizing their work. This allows flexibility for innovation and local adaptation.

4. They work with diverse external constituencies (Brown, 1988: 24).
They are also the biggest, most organized and highly advanced of the groups comprising the civil society. Their unique constitutions and location in the realm of social practice set them apart from the other civil society groups.

There are two types of NGOs namely, the private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and the professional social development agencies, otherwise known as the social development NGOs. PVOs are non-governmental (i.e., private), tax exempt, non-profit agencies, which derive at least a portion of their funds from private, charitable contributions (Gorman, 1984: 1-2). They mobilize contributions of time, money and other resources through appeals to shared values and contributions to society (Korten, 1990: 97-98). Even though they are sometimes managed and operated by salaried managers, their board of directors and rank and file workers generally render “voluntary services” out of a sense of altruism and/or moral obligation.

By contrast, professional social development NGOs are non-stock, non-profit organizations managed by full-time staffs that are paid commensurate salaries to provide a wide range of programs and services to their target clientele. Their programs are largely supported by donations from funding agencies and/or revenues generated from the services they offer. Because of this, they maximize the use of limited resources in the most effective and efficient manner (Constantino-David, 1992: 137). Among the NGOs, therefore, they are the ones most likely to assume intermediary roles.

PVOs and social development NGOs share a number of common features such as the centrality of mission and values, reliance on diverse sources and types of funding, and the existence of voluntary governing bodies. Among the civil society groups, they are also
the ones that have largely assumed many of the responsibilities previously undertaken by
government agencies (Billis and Mackeith, 1992: 122). This is true particularly in the
third world countries where the grassroots’ needs for basic services are not effectively
addressed by the state. Because of these, PVOs and social development NGOs also share
common organizational problems and challenges:

1. Their staffs view financial planning, budgeting, credit control, accountancy,
entrepreneurship and management with disdain. They consider these
organizational practices as reactionary and capitalistic (Landry, Morley,
Southwood and Wright, 1992).

2. Their missions to provide low-cost and/or free services contradict the need to
ensure long-term organizational sustainability.

3. They experience the organizational dilemma of balancing between authoritative
management vs. consultative leadership, timely/efficient actions vs. process-
oriented/ participatory decision making, resource generation concerns vs. the
moral imperatives of the organization, accountability, rationality and technical
competencies vs. commitment and sharing of values and ideals (Ibid.),
competence and expertise vs. learning by doing (Dartington, 1992) and internal
conflicts among individuals and groups/cliques within their organizations (Nadeau
and Sanders, 1992).

These mislead social scientists and policy makers into believing that all NGOs are
“voluntary” organizations. They overlook the competitiveness and concern for
sustainability that set the social development NGOs apart from the PVOs.

Other that these, there are also organizational characteristics that distinguish
PVOs from the social development NGOs. One of these is the nature of the staffs’
demand for consultation and involvement. Among PVOs, staffs demand to participate in
the interpretation of missions and the determination of goals and objectives of their
organizations. By contrast, the staffs of social development NGOs seek to participate in
the deliberation and formulation of administrative policies and systems. In India for
example, Jain (1995) observed that social development NGOs are more prone to serious conflicts regarding remuneration, compensation and financial administration.

This could be attributed to the difference in their staff recruitment process, which consequently translates to variations in the staffs’ commitment to organizational missions. PVO volunteers are primarily recruited from the communities and the sectors they are serving. Individuals join the PVOs because they believe in their goals and objectives. Due to this, they represent and are accountable, at least in principle, to their base membership (Carroll, 1992: 11). On the other hand, social development NGOs recruit staffs based on organizational needs. Thus, while they share the PVO volunteers’ drive to serve others and to advocate particular ideals, their organizational commitment are largely influenced by the opportunity costs and benefits derived from working in these organizations.

In studying the NGOs as civil society organizations, it is important to distinguish between the PVOs and the social development NGOs for two reasons. First, the PVOs typify the traditional conception of what civil society organizations are supposed to be. They are informal, voluntary and trust-based in organization and orientation. On the other hand, social development NGOs are closer to government and private bureaucracies. Although they share the PVO’s concern for the common good, they are more formally organized, contract-based and rule-specific. More importantly, the two differ in terms of the basis of ownership and control of the organization (Carroll, 1992). Workers of social development agencies are “outsiders” who are not personally accountable to their beneficiaries. PVOs, on the other hand, are composed of members who are stakeholders
in the organizations and are thus representatives of their constituencies (Ibid., 9-13). By recognizing these differences, their propensities to professionalize and bureaucratize, as well as to work with other formal social institutions could be better understood.

In recent years, however, the distinction between the two are getting blurred due to the emergence of hybrid organizations that exhibit features of both social development NGOs and PVOs. Some of them started out as PVOs but have professionalized their operations for efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability over time. According to Billis and MacKeith (1992), this variant of social development NGOs lie in an ambiguous zone where bureaucratic and associational worlds overlap.4 Their histories, voluntary governing bodies and ethos place them in an associational world (i.e., the civil society). But having taken on paid professional staffs that occupy formal roles within a hierarchy, they also show many features of the bureaucratic organizations (122-123). Since they possess characteristics that are acceptable in all realms, they can bridge the gap among them. This makes them effective as intermediary organizations. Despite the emergence of influential NGOs that mediate between the grassroots sectors and the formal social institutions, however, very few studies thoroughly examine how these organizations were able to harness their unique organizational characteristics to position themselves in strategic social location where they could advance their own interests and to influence the process of social change.

The Social Development NGOs as Intermediary Organizations

As intermediary organizations, the social development NGOs provide the mediating link between the popular associations operating within the sphere of the civil
society and the formal institutions in the other domains of social practice. On one hand, they work to build the capacity of the people to make demands on the social systems. They facilitate *horizontal integration* among various grassroots sectors by assisting them in organizing themselves into self-help associations and promoting coalition building among them. On the other hand, they challenge and/or establish alliances with the enlightened power holders in support of actions that would make the system more responsive to the people (Korten, 1987: 149; Korten, 1990: 121). They then provide the *vertical linkages* between the two. They energize local groups while simultaneously providing the mediating links between them and the higher reaches of financial, technical and political power structures (Carroll, 1992: 2).

**NGOs as Community Organizers**

NGOs had been initially recognized for their work in organizing the grassroots sectors. As community organizers, NGOs employ a multi-stage process of community organizing that promotes the emergence of empowered and autonomous POs capable of negotiating for participation in decision-making and for broader access to society's productive resources. Community organizing also involves alliance and coalition building among the POs, as well as between the POs and other social institutions sharing similar interests. By encouraging the POs to work together in pursuit of common goals, the NGOs facilitate the build up of social capital among the grassroots sectors. As POs establish networks and linkages among themselves horizontally, webs of grassroots organizations emerge resulting to a “thickened” civil society that is capable of transforming the grassroots’ power relations with the public sector (Annis, 1987: 129-134). In view of this,
most literatures focus on the documentation of how NGOs facilitate or hinder the processes of organizing the grassroots for power and its importance in promoting participatory development (PBSP: 1986; Lim: 1991; Friedmann, 1992). However, the interactions that ensue between the NGOs and POs as they forge partnerships remain largely neglected. The interplay of the differences in orientation and interests between them thus remained unexplored. Yet, the class compositions – and interests - of the NGO staffs and the PO members are quite distinct. This becomes critical especially in the distribution of opportunities and resources made available by the state and the other social institutions.

**NGOs as the Grassroots' Links to the State and International Funding Institutions**

Of late, the NGOs – the social development NGOs in particular - have become the most sought development organizations in the third world countries not just for their abilities to organize the grassroots, but for forging links among the poor and their community organizations, their governments and the international donor institutions (WB, 1995: 147). On one hand, they channel development resources to community-based organizations (like the POs), provide them services and technical assistance and help them strengthen their capacities (WB: 147). On the other hand, they articulate and represent the interests of the grassroots organizations with their governments.

As intermediary links between the POs and the formal social institutions in the other domains of social practice, social development NGOs exert considerable influence on the development administration processes in many third world societies. Since they have access to and credibility with the grassroots sectors, most international funding agencies prefer them as channels of services (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 2; Masoni as
cited by Brodhead, 1987: 1) even though PO federations, government line agencies, local
government units and private firms could also undertake such roles. International funding
institutions prefer the social development NGOs vis-à-vis the government agencies
because,

(They) have more field presence in a given area and employ local people familiar
with local conditions. They (are also) familiar with low cost techniques and
innovations relevant to poverty alleviation. And they usually have greater
flexibility... (Moreover), many (social development NGOs) have experience in
participatory project design, and have skills in participatory research, community
mobilization, facilitation techniques and group dynamics (WB: 147).

Compared to the local POs, they are less prone to internal organizational weaknesses such
as the lack of professionalism, poor linkages and susceptibility to state manipulation
(Carroll, 1992:174). Social development NGOs also have a relatively stable financial
condition, employ full-time personnel and could operate on more formalistic level
(Constantino-David, 1998: 42). At the same time, they have flexible and self-reflective
organizational features that allow room for innovation and local adaptation (Brown, 1987:
23).

While public administrators generally encourage social development NGOs to
engage in intermediary functions, social scientists and social activists are split in their
views about social development NGOs assuming intermediary functions. On one hand,
there are those who contend that the vertical connection among people and institutions at
different levels permit upward and downward flows of information and resources.
According to them, since social development NGO initiatives are primarily participatory
in nature, the link between people and institutions could eventually lead to equitable and
sustainable distribution of resources (Carroll, 1992: 175). Social development NGOs
could unite fragmented and disunited grassroots groups around external threats and vertically link them to formal organizations that could address their concerns. They could also channel financial and logistical support from international funding institutions directly to these groups to strengthen these grassroots movements. More importantly, they could lend legitimacy to the grassroots movements (Hall: 1992).

On the other hand, there are those who contend that becoming development intermediaries only increases the possibility of the social development NGOs becoming instrumental in the co-optation of the mass movements. Prasarseth (1990) contends that the discovery of the social development NGOs as alternative service delivery mechanisms by global agencies like the United Nation and foreign aid institutions de-politicized the democratization process and sidetracked the empowerment of the grassroots sectors. Fowler (2000: 591) further contends that involvement in the utilization of official development assistance (ODA) reduce the NGOs to unwitting instruments of northern globalization policy.

Though perhaps not their intention, it is a role that has characterized the 15 years of majority growth of NGOs as deliverers of placatory (socio-) economic services. This NGO tasks result inter-alia from donor ‘privatization’ policies consistent with ‘right-sizing’ governments and opening countries to market forces. It also reflects the origins, motivations and thinking of many NGOs as sources of caritas. Their recent evolution also reflects an addition to aid policy, which is to treat and fund NGOs as democratizing elements of civil society (Ibid.).

Also, based on Hudock’s (1999) observation of NGOs in Sierra Leone, intermediary NGOs have promoted a “democracy by proxy” instead of the thickening of civil society that could promote a genuine democracy.
Although these studies present the positive and negative aspects of NGOs assuming intermediary roles, they have not adequately tackled the reasons why social development NGOs engage in intermediary roles in the first place. Those that did, on the other hand, assume that international assistance is the major reason for it. In so doing they failed to see the social development NGOs as vehicles by which the middle class professionals respond to the interplay of social, economic, political and institutional factors in society. Given this, it is interesting to examine the contexts and motives that compel the social development NGOs to assume intermediary roles. It is equally interesting to find out how such affect their goals and operational strategies and how their partner POs view and respond to these changes.

**Why Social Development NGOs Become Development Intermediaries**

For most social development NGOs, becoming a conduit of funding assistance is prompted by a sense of moral obligation to help as many poor people as possible. For them, additional resources mean benefiting more people (Edwards and Hulme, 1992: 19). Social development NGOs both expect and create the expectations that their brand of development work will not only help alleviate poverty but also initiate the empowerment of the poor (Gregorio-Medel, 1993: 65).

According to Wils (1996), the extent of perceived and real poverty and the failure of government agencies to provide effective responses to it, influence the decisions of some social development NGOs to take on intermediary roles and to scale up their operations. When government could not provide the social services needed by the communities, social development NGOs are compelled to provide them because it is difficult to facilitate
conscientization, mobilization and empowerment when people are saddled with short-term livelihood needs. Likewise, legitimacy concerns encourage NGOs to establish links with support institutions such as the international institutions, charitable, church and business institutions. Strong lobby from sympathetic institutions such as these compel the state to make concessions with the grassroots movements (Hall, 1992: 148-158; Alegre, 1996: 12).

For Korten (1990), becoming development intermediaries is the only way for social development NGOs to ensure the incorporation of the people’s concerns into the development administration process. However, this also requires the social development NGOs to look beyond temporary interventions, to think of institutionalizing their functions and to position themselves for a long-term institutional role of catalyzing development (196). These necessitate scaling up of operations.

Scaling-up becomes a pressing issue when unexpected situations demanding sudden, sharp increase in staffs, funding and outreach crop up. It is also re-enforced by the expressed willingness of donor institutions to underwrite its costs (Wils, 1996: 68). The decision to do so, on the other hand, is influenced by the need and opportunity to “mainstream” grassroots participation (i.e., get it incorporated in the official development framework of the state).

While these help in the understanding of what motivates the NGOs to undergo organizational changes, they do not discuss what particular changes and dynamics these entail. Moreover, they do not tackle the motivations behind these changes. The reasons why these concerns have to be addressed still have to be explained.
Organizational Implications of Becoming Development Intermediaries

At the outset, assuming intermediary functions already require the social development NGOs to make adjustments on their program and organizational strategies. As more external resources get channeled to the social development NGOs, the pressure to systematize documentation increases as well. International funding institutions demand that their NGO partners adopt careful and honest accounting procedures of real costs and expenditures (Smith, 1987: 90-91). Moreover, since the social development NGOs are tapped as alternative conduits of development assistance, they are under pressure to prove that they are indeed more effective in getting these resources to their target beneficiaries. Because of these, monitoring and evaluation systems are made part of the requirements for government accreditation and/or funding approval.

In order to assure effectiveness in delivering services to the grassroots, international donor institutions also put pressure on the social development NGOs to identify and correct their organizational weaknesses. Among these are:

1. The high turnover of staff (Ledesma as quoted in Solidarity, 1990: 37), the chronic lack of sufficient management staff (Smith: 89) and the limited technical capacities of their existing personnel (Clark, 1991: 60-61; Brown, 1988: 27);

2. The underdeveloped mechanisms for information dissemination and feedback into future program planning (Smith, 1987: 89);

3. The inevitable question of long-term self-sustainability (Cernea, 1988: 19);

4. The tendency for social development NGO projects to be designed and implemented in isolation from the broader development strategies of other institutions (Smith, 1987: 89); and,

5. The difficulties of replicating social development NGO projects on a larger scale (Ibid.; Clark, 1991: 75, 82-88).
To ensure that these are addressed, donor institutions offer capability building and training support to social development NGOs. These, in turn, facilitate their professionalization.

Organizational development experts regard the systematization and professionalization as necessary requirements for addressing the needs of the grassroots more effectively. However, the social scientists have competing views regarding this. One view contends that a certain degree of formalization and professionalization is needed not only to improve the management of the POs, but also to ensure the effectiveness of their efforts to render the government bureaucracy more responsible (Lehmann as cited by Clark, 1991: 22). According to Rood (1993: 103-106), the availability of a pool of experts to replace inefficient government bureaucrats provides the people with alternative sources of services. He argues that competition coming from the social development NGOs could actually compel the government bureaucrats to be more efficient in their work.

While some do not totally agree with the idea of competing with the state, they also believe that the NGOs should look beyond operating on a project-to-project basis towards developing organizational competitiveness.

Resources in the third world are limited. If an NGO is to survive in this environment, it must take on the view that it competes for these same resources with other institutions. In short, it must be competitive as an organization... It has to develop a strategic vision that defines the future for the organization, and allows it to harness resources to carry out this vision in the form of programs (Garilao, 1987: 117).

They should thus invest in the development of their key competencies and adopt formal management systems to gain inimitable advantage over other development agencies and government departments (Hailey, 2000: 71-72).
These have down sides, however. For one, “mainstreaming” can result to the mutation of the NGO spirit (Constantino-David, 1998: 30-31). With resources becoming readily available, NGOs proliferate and compete with each other for such. This undermines the norm of solidarity that is the source of its strength. Furthermore, to be competitive, NGOs have to diversify and specialize their services to meet the requirements of funding institutions.

As NGOs become more involved in large-scale service delivery (or grow for other reasons) and become more reliant on official funding, one might expect some fallout in their flexibility, speed of response, and ability to innovate. Although organizational growth can be managed successfully, bureaucratization poses problems for any agency (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 7). This, in turn, undermines the informality and flexibility that make them effective in dealing with multiple client bases.

There are those who do not see this is a cause for serious concern, however. In his survey of Indian NGOs, Narayana (1992) found out that the bureaucratic tendencies of the NGOs differ from those of governmental organizations. For one, even though they grow in size, the NGOs retain their personal relationships with their clients. Moreover, they exhibit ambivalence in instituting and following a system of rules and procedures because they believe that these are detrimental to change and the achievement of satisfactory results. They also maintain the primary motive of servicing the targeted population in the most effective ways.

There are those, however, who are not as enthusiastic. Filipino social activists and social scientists, for example, express concerns over the commercialization, contractualization and loss of volunteerism of NGO work due to professionalization
(Ledesma as quoted in Solidarity, 1990: 38-39). In addition, problems stemming from multiple accountabilities threaten the legitimacy of NGOs as agents of democratization. Short-term functional accountabilities to donor institutions for the resources channeled to them, at times undermine their moral responsibility to facilitate grassroots empowerment and participation in the development process.

Organizational transformation also causes internal tensions within the NGOs. As mentioned earlier, the NGOs traditionally operate in the associational arena where collective bonding and action as well as the values of voting and election (i.e., participation) are given emphasis. However, as they get pulled into the bureaucratic arena where emphasis is placed more on hierarchical roles, accountability and authority, organizational values become ambiguous and confusing to their staffs (Billis and MacKeith, 1992: 121-124).

Organizational transformation could thus cause divisive tensions among the managers of the NGOs and the rest of the social development workers. For large social development NGOs particularly, this is manifested by the conflicts that ensue between the central office administrative staffs who follow clear-cut systems and procedures and the field officers who work closely with the local communities where personal and associational norms prevail. In most cases, the latter are convinced that the “moral ownership” of the social development NGOs is vested on their beneficiaries (Ibid., 130). The former, on the other hand, argues that their accountabilities are with the donor institutions.
The social development workers are not the only ones affected by the tensions created by the NGO professionalization and consequent bureaucratization, however. These also affect the partnership between the social development NGOs and the POs. Control of resources, overlapping of efforts, autonomy in decision-making and the transitory nature of NGO assistance are some of the most cited causes of strains in NGO-PO relations (Aldaba, 1993: 46-48).

The above studies concerning NGO professionalization and bureaucratization are important in understanding the organizational changes that NGOs go through as they increasingly assume development intermediary functions. They also provide us insights on the impact of these changes on the social development workers and on their relationships with the grassroots organizations. However, it would be interesting to find out how social development NGOs address the internal tensions among social development workers. Related to this, it is also interesting to find out how they are able to sustain their partnership with the POs and legitimize their representation of PO interests despite these tensions.

**The Middle Class Dimension of NGO Initiatives**

Consistent with the historical view of the emergence of civil society, it is contended that the middle class has been balancing the interests of the rich and the poor by promoting values and processes that encourage democracy throughout history (Glassman, 1997: 93). In process, they acquire for themselves power and influence that could be lost if democracy is compromised either by exclusionary oligarchy of the rich or tyranny in the name of the poor (Glassman, Swatos, Jr. and Kivisto, 1993: 9). In the early western capitalist society, the role of protecting democratic values and processes was lodged on the guilds and civic
associations founded by the small business middle class. In the advent of high technological industrial development, however, the small business middle class has declined in number and influence. On the other hand, new middle classes comprised of middle managers and bureaucrats, technocrats, professionals and service workers who are dependent on government and big global business bureaucracies have emerged (Glassman, 1997: 73). On this new middle class now lies the burden of finding the institutional means to defend the democratic system and the legitimating basis of their power and influence.

In third world societies, the social development NGOs serve as such institutions. They provide the means by which the middle classes insert themselves into the mainstream of political and economic processes in society. For such reason, they attract urban based and college educated professionals in search of alternative programs and social visions (Carroll, 1992: 12; Aldaba, 1993: 14; Clark, 1991: 99; Gregorio-Medel, 1993: 78; Pitschas, 1995: 20). However, social development NGOs also express the middle class ambivalence in treating the underclass as equals who are entitled the same kind of freedom they sought for themselves (Glassman, et. al., 1993: 15). Aldaba (1993: 49) attributes this to the middle class’ interest in establishing their hegemony over the grassroots sector.

The tendency towards hegemony is very strong in the desire of NGOs to remain the “rightful owners” of the POs they helped to organize, … in the attempts by some NGOs to influence political decision-making processes of PO partners…The drive of NGOs for sustainability is a reflection that middle class yearns to have a permanent vehicle for development work and also to be a part of the social transformation process (Ibid.).

Gregorio-Medel (1993) elaborates on this further when she argues that in the Philippine context, social development work is not only poverty oriented but also middle class oriented. According to her, the presence and interventions of social development
NGOs are prompted not just by the positive values and ideals that the Filipino middle classes upheld, but also by their strategic needs for resources and social inter-relations. To insert themselves into the mainstream of political and socio-economic processes in society, they have to establish themselves as a counter-strategic force vis-à-vis the state and the elites. Given their number and dependency on the dominant political and economic elite, however, they need to find an ally. The poor, given their numbers, are their most strategic allies. To win them over, however, the Filipino middle classes present and carry out a social transformatory project that promotes the emancipation of the poor from poverty through the democratization of the development process. Under such a project, the social development NGOs take on the roles of catalysts that help the poor become an active force in the transformation of society. Through these interventions, they legitimize the social development profession and NGO work.

Gregorio-Medel further contends that within the context of democratizing the development process, the relationship between the middle class-based social development NGOs and the grassroots-based POs becomes dialectical. For one, the social development workers/NGOs are able to assume and maintain their profession only for as long as the poor remain weak, lacking in skills and knowledge, and needing of services and support that they offer. As such, it is to their advantage that poverty situation remains and the poor are kept from gaining power. However, since they also create the expectations that they would alleviate poverty and empower the poor, the social development NGOs also have to ensure that they do these to some extent.
Nonetheless, the middle classes find ways to benefit more from the democratization of the development administration process than their grassroots partners. One of these is the establishment of a new field (the social development industry) and exclusive career option (social development work) for the middle class professionals (Ibid., 76; Garilao, 1987: 116). This dovetails well with the transformation of NGOs into development intermediaries that broker development resources, capabilities and political support among the various development agents. With their roles as development brokers secured, the middle classes are strategically positioned to exert influence over the other sectors of the civil society and to negotiate with the formal institutions comprising the other domains of social practice.

Although the above studies do indicate that class interest underlie the organizational transformation of social development NGOs, it is interesting to note that they have not adequately examined its implications on NGO-PO relations and on the consolidation of the civil society as a countervailing power against the state. Equally ignored are the conflicts that ensue among the NGO social development workers themselves as the NGOs attempt to establish their hegemony in the realm of the civil society. Despite common class orientation, the NGOs actually mirror the diversity and heterogeneity of the new middle classes who lead and manage them (Aldaba, 1993: 15). Interestingly, no study has yet been undertaken as to what particular groups of middle class professionals comprise the social development workers, how they got recruited into social development work and what interests and values do they bring into social development work.

At the micro-level, however, it has been acknowledged that various stages of growth of an NGO are very much reflective of the progression in the type of staffs that are attracted
by it (Hodson, 1992: 125). It is therefore interesting to find out if the succession of middle class professionals that went to work with the NGOs have something to do with the recent transformation of the NGOs into development intermediaries. It is also equally interesting to find out how this affects the institutional relationship of the NGOs and POs.

**Summary**

From the literature discussed above, the following limitations are identified in terms of analyzing the developments within the Philippine civil society. First, studies that discuss the distinctions of civil society groups from the organizations identified with the other domains of social practice do not take into consideration the fluidity of their boundaries. This poses a problem in terms of characterizing the Philippine civil society. For one, many of the Philippine NGOs and POs are closely linked with the ideological parties as they share common histories, leadership and constituencies. In addition, many of the NGOs at present engage in profit-making activities. Among these is serving as contractors for the government’s development programs. Yet, the NGOs and POs in the Philippines are the most active among the civil society groups in terms of promoting the common good and protecting democracy.

Secondly, the conception of the civil society as either historical or analytical type construct seems irrelevant in the analysis of the Philippine civil society because groups within this realm are bound together by a common analysis of the Philippine political economy. In the same manner, studies arguing the importance of civil society in democratization and democratic consolidation, and vice versa, are also limited in terms of
explaining the mutually re-enforcing relationship between the two concepts. These, nonetheless, could be addressed by examining how it evolves over time and why.

The literature reviewed also note the differences in the organizational evolution of the two most influential groups in the Philippine civil society namely, the NGOs and the POs. Of particular interest is the emergence of professional intermediary NGOs. While the existing literature provided ample explanations on the organizational changes that these NGOs go through as they assume intermediary roles, the motives behind these changes, the internal dynamics that these create among the people who comprise these organizations, as well as the impact of such on NGO-PO relations are not adequately examined.

This study aims to address these limitations by examining the evolution of the Philippine civil society over time. It will identify the changes in the composition, nature and characteristics of the civil society groups starting from the Spanish colonial period up to the present. It will also determine the social, economic, political and institutional factors that shape these changes. Within this context, it would examine the transformation of the NGOs into professional intermediary organizations – the dynamics that it involves, their implications on NGO-PO relations and on the democratization process as a whole.
ENDNOTES

1. Hegemony refers to an order in which certain way of life and thought is dominant and one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations. In Gramscian term, it meant the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes. For a more detailed discussion, see Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, New Jersey: Princeton, 1984, 65-88.

2. According to Tocqueville, private, non-profit civil associations serve as venues where private individuals get educated on the value of collective strength and unified action. Membership in these associations re-enforces the citizens’ feeling of commonality of goals and desires and compels them to pursue voluntary actions to help one another. Civil associations thus enable powerless citizens to feel that they have strength in unity and could address issues that they share in common. For Tocqueville, therefore, the proliferation of voluntary associations must be encouraged because they make the task of governance less burdensome. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see George Kateb, Some Remarks on Tocqueville's View of Voluntary Associations, J.Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Voluntary Associations, New York: Atherton Press, 1969, 139.


5. According to Billis and MacKeith, the voluntary sector operates on three conceptual “worlds”. First, there is the personal world comprised of relatives, friends and neighbors bound together by loyalty, affection and love. In this arena, no formal roles, rules or boundaries exist. Problems are resolved without recourse to contracts and without the aid of specialists or professionals. Second, there is the associational world where groups of people draw boundaries between themselves and others in order to meet some problems or take action. There is an objective mission, a group name and membership with rights and duties. The rules of the game are voting and elections. This is the realm of the voluntary associations. Lastly, there is the bureaucratic world occupied by the public sector and commercial organizations. Managers are not elected by subordinates but are appointed by superiors. The system is bound together by concepts such as accountability and authority. Billis and MacKeith note that social development agencies exist in the overlapping area between the associational world and the bureaucratic world. For more details, see David Billis and Joy MacKeith, Growth and Change in NGOs: Concepts and Comparative Experience, Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World, London: Earthscan, 1992, 118-126.

6. According to Narayan, social capital represents the norms and social relations embedded in social structures of society that enable people to coordinate their action and achieve desired goals. Unlike economic capital that focuses on the means of production and consumption, social capital is based on people’s relationships with others. For further discussion on the concept of social capital, see Deepa Narayan, Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty, The World Bank, August 1999.
CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter 2 locates the NGOs within the competing views concerning the conceptual definition of civil society and its role in the democratization process. It also identifies the nature, characteristics and functions that make the NGOs effective as intermediary organizations and discusses their relationship vis-à-vis the other agents of the civil society involved in the democratization process. This chapter discusses the conceptual framework of the dissertation. It also describes the data collection and analysis techniques used in the study, together with their limitations.

Definition of Terms

Civil Society

Taking the organizational, relational and normative dimensions into consideration, this study subscribes to Diamond’s definition of civil society as the realm of self-organized, autonomous groups and social movements that are situated between the households, the market and the state. Within this realm, relationships are bound by the principles of mutual recognition, respect and trust (Seligman, 2000:15). It is characterized by shared norms and values such as autonomy, plurality, publicity, solidarity, toleration, generalized social trust, voluntarism, and civility that govern the collective actions of groups operating within it. Its source of power lies on its capacity to mobilize collective action based on these shared norms and relationships. Its purpose is to provide the check and balance to both the state and market.
This study also acknowledges the notion of the civil society as an inclusive realm that is comprised of all groups short of the state and its various apparatus including the reactionary, revolutionary, conservative, and reformist groups. However, it privileges the exclusive subset of civil society groups equated with the voluntary, non-profit and independent sectors as the “real” civil society.

**Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and People’s Organizations (POs)**

The study recognizes the existence of two types of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) – the PVOs and the social development agencies. However, it focuses primarily on the variant of social development NGOs that exhibit the characteristics of both the PVOs and social development agencies. These are the non-stock, non-profit professional social development NGOs that subscribes to the informal, voluntary and trust-based orientation of the PVOs, but are managed primarily by middle class professional staffs that operate them as formal bureaucratic organizations. They are organized primarily to address and/or protect the common good. In general, they assist other groups in their pursuit of their interests and needs.

The study also focuses on the people’s organizations (POs), which it defines as membership-based organizations comprised primarily of the poor and the marginalized grassroots sectors (e.g., the peasants, the workers, the urban poor, etc.). POs are either spontaneously organized by community members themselves for self-help purposes or externally mobilized, usually by NGOs. They undertake group activities aimed at improving the living conditions of their members. These include, among others, livelihood initiatives, issue advocacy and lobbying for state policies.
Democracy and the Democratization Process

The study subscribes to Clark’s (1991) definition of democracy that includes the presence of institutions and processes that safeguard not only the people’s right to vote, but also their freedom of expression and associations, their right to be consulted in state decision making, and their freedom from discrimination, whether economically, socially or politically. Following this, it also subscribes to Korten’s notion of the democratization process as described in Chapter 2.

Social Development

This study equates social development with Korten’s concept of people-centered development. People-centered development is defined as the process by which members of society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in the quality of their lives, which are consistent with their aspirations (Korten, 1990: 67). Since poverty prevents people from doing these, however, it starts with addressing the causes of poverty. Weaker members of society are enabled to improve their situation by providing the services they need and removing the obstacles which prevent them from acquiring assets and improving their productivity (Clark, 1991: 23). Their vulnerability and isolation are addressed through the process of mobilization, conscientization and organization allowing them to develop collective consciousness that, in turn, make them more vigilant against the abuses committed against them by the people in power (Wignaraja, 1993: 12).
Development Administration

Development rarely occurs by itself. It usually involves the conscious intervention of social agents with specific goals and objectives in mind. Development administration is thus generally equated with the strategic planning and deliberate efforts of the state, in coordination with and participation of other social agents, aimed at facilitating the processes that could eventually lead to desired social outcomes or social conditions.

Development Intermediary Organizations

This study identifies organizations that link the grassroots sectors with the government agencies, the political parties, the business corporations and the international funding institutions as development intermediaries. They serve two broad functions of facilitating the horizontal integration among various grassroots sectors by assisting them in organizing themselves into self-help associations and promoting coalition building among them, and providing the vertically linkage between these self-help associations and the formal social institutions. Within the context of development administration, the roles of intermediary organizations include:

a. Community organizing, education and training, alliance/linkage building and mobilizing the grassroots organizations for unified and organized;

b. Alternative service delivery/allocation/distribution efforts, fund sourcing and brokering, conflict management and resolution, development program administration; and,

c. Lobbying and policy advocacy.

Development intermediaries catalyze or facilitate grassroots development through harnessing other organizations, both public and private, of capacities, linkages and commitments required to address the needs of the poor on a sustained basis (Korten,
1988: 149). Because of this, they can influence the development administration process and use it to advance their own organizational agenda. Ideally, the local and sub-national units of the government should assume the above-mentioned intermediary functions, except for community organizing. However, since the capabilities of these government units to undertake such roles are limited, NGOs have taken on the tasks of undertaking these activities.

**Middle Classes**

The study identifies the middle class as the intermediate social location between the capitalists and the working classes. According to Eder (1993), the middle class consists of powerless people, who are conscious of their powerlessness and who uses this to change the traditional world. This is what set them apart as a distinct social class. Although the members of this social class have never really gained real economic, social and political power, they have historically played decisive roles in facilitating both political and cultural changes through the communication of radical ideas and leading collective mobilizations. Their involvement in social movements, therefore, can be interpreted as attempts to create arenas where new forms of inclusion and class relationships can be constructed.

Vis-à-vis the traditional middle class of the industrial capitalist era, which consist of petty bourgeoisie and small entrepreneurs with access to capital, the *new middle class* in highly advanced technological societies is comprised of workers whose jobs involve some aspects of knowledge or mental work that cannot be accomplished by machines. According to Glassman (1997: 84-92), there are at least four categories of new middle class
found in both the technologically advanced societies of the west as well as the less advanced but nonetheless globally linked third world societies. These are:

a. The technocrats. These include the scientists such as physicists, mathematicians, chemists, biologists, engineers, computer programmers and others who work in varying degrees of applied or pure research. Technocrats are the “knowledge experts” who are critical in technology development that sustains capitalist development. While their inputs are crucial to the operations of modern-day computerized industries, they are also highly dependent on big businesses, universities and governments for equipment, research staff and salary. As such, technocrats are the least rebellious of the groups comprising the new middle class.

b. The service workers. These are professionals who engage in the business of helping and caring for people affected by the social changes that occur in society. These include among others psychologists, social workers, doctors, nurses, health care professionals, non-corporate lawyers and teachers. By virtue of their work, they possess humanistic concern for others that draw them to advocacy work.

c. The intellectuals – These are students and university professors who work with ideas and pursue them independently or in cooperation with other independent intellectuals. Among the new middle class groups, the intellectuals are regarded as potential threats to society. They tend to be critical and to focus on unsolved social and political problems. For such reason, they are also usually not included in key decision making processes.

d. The lower level white-collar workers – This group is comprised of those who are at the bottom of both private and public hierarchies such as the clerks, typists, secretaries, receptionists, telephone operators, etc. In the present societies, these white-collar workers have replaced the blue-collar labor as underpaid and exploited labor force. Because of this, they have the tendency to unionize in order to gain better wages and working conditions. In third world societies, this group is also among the most militant.

Except for the lower level white-collar workers, the work of these new middle class groups have to meet professional work standards established by their peers, which they have to internalize as part of their own values, responsibilities and personal contributions (Rose, 2000: 16). It requires analysis and interpretation of individual situations, which cannot be ordered into mechanical processes alone.
Ideally, the business managers and administrators who manage the day-to-day operations of the business corporations can also be considered part of the new middle class. However, in as much as they are responsible for making crucial decisions that have significant ramifications on the economy and politics, they can already be classified as part of the elites (Glassman: 1997, 74).

Assumptions and Thesis

The Composition of The Philippine Civil Society

The study conceptualizes the Philippine civil society as a realm that lies in an intermediate zone between the unorganized society, the state, the political community and the market economy. It is linked to the global community by its connection with international development agencies, which provide the groups within it direct assistance or indirect support through the agencies of the state. It is also an inclusive realm that caters to all non-state groups, including the revolutionary, reformist and conservative groups that have close ties with the other realms of social practice (e.g., the political community, the state and the market) in terms of orientation, but are engaging in efforts that promote common good and are operating within legally acceptable limits set for non-stock, non-profit organizations. However, it has an exclusive core comprised of voluntary, self-conscious organizations that engage, collaborate or contest the state in the effort to transform unequal power relations. This exclusive core consists of the NGOs, voluntary associations, philanthropic associations, church based groups, academic and professional associations, trade union organizations, POs and social movements. (See Figure 1 for illustration).
The study further contends that the core groups of Philippine civil society are clustered along two class-based strands. The first strand represents the private, non-stock organizations that exhibit similar characteristics as those of the conventional western civil associations. They are organized and led by the bourgeoisie and later on, the middle class professionals. They are also strongly influenced by the western ethics of rationality, democracy, reformism and cooperativism. Their purpose is to engage the state within permissible legal bounds, either by supporting or critiquing its policies and programs or proposing new ones. Groups equated to this strand ranges from philanthropic associations, civic associations, church-based groups, private voluntary organizations, “cause-oriented groups” and more recently, the non-government organizations (NGOs).

The second strand corresponds to the grassroots-based groups and social movements, which are more plural in terms of program focus and fluid in terms of organizational set up. Primarily, the membership base of these groups are the poor and marginalized sectors of society, who seek to improve and/or prevent further deterioration of their economic, social and political situations. They are either self-organized or organized by external agents like the NGOs. These groups seek to legitimately participate in public discussions and policy decision-making. However, since they are generally ignored and/or viewed with suspicion by the state, they at times operate outside the bounds of the legally permissible public sphere. Groups equated to this strand ranges
Figure 1 - Conceptual Presentation of the Composition and Relationship of Civil Society with Other Social Institutions
from secret societies, peasant mutual aid associations, trade unions and people’s organizations (POs).

Intra-Civil Society Relations

Although they are autonomous and distinct from each other, the two strands of civil society groups are closely associated. Historically, they emerged and evolved in consideration of each other’s efforts and initiatives. The nature of their relationship with each other is shaped by the political, social, economic and institutional factors working at particular historical junctures. The study contends that since the two civil society groups are class-based in composition and orientation, they are in competition for hegemony in, and representation of the whole civil society. This, in turn, depends on the strength of their organizations, the extent of their alliances and social networks, and their capacity to impose their norms and values on each other.

Over the years, their partnership ranged from indifference, to cooperation, to dependency, to partnership. Correspondingly, the changing pattern of relationship between these two civil society groups has resulted to either to the weakening or strengthening, as well as to the contraction or expansion of the civil society.

Factors Facilitating The Transformation of the Philippine Civil Society

The changes in the relationship between the middle-class based conventional civil organizations, and the grassroots-based groups and social movements are influenced by the interplay of economic, social, political and institutional factors at particular junctures of Philippine history. Among the most crucial factors that shape the evolving nature and characteristics of the Philippine civil society groups are the following:
1. Institutional Factors

a. The changing nature of the Catholic Church’s social involvement as manifested by the ideas embodied by its social doctrines, its creation and/or support of groups engaging in social action and its participation in partisan politics;

b. The state’s response to civil society initiatives, which could range from being repressive, indifferent, tolerant, open and supportive; and,

c. The support, or lack thereof, coming from international funding institutions.

2. Social Factors

a. The changing composition of the middle class professionals that make up the conventional strand of civil society. It is contended that different groups of new middle class professionals join the civil society at different historical periods;

b. The extent and gravity of social injustice against the grassroots population;

c. The lack of and/or inaccessibility of social services available to those who need them; and,

d. The ineffectiveness of government machineries to address the grievances of the disadvantaged sectors of society.

3. Political Factors

a. The systematic isolation and exclusion of some sectors of society from participating in productive activities and policy-making processes;

b. The developments in electoral politics as exemplified by: (1) the availability of political candidates that could represent the interests of the various groups in the civil society and (2) the capability of these candidates to win in elections;

c. The developments in the ideological party politics in the country as exemplified by the activities engaged in by the ideological groups;

4. Economic Factors

a. The extent and gravity of poverty among the grassroots;
b. The extent and gravity of social inequality between the rich and the poor;
c. The prospects of employment or unemployment; and
d. The stability or instability of the business environment in the country.

*Patterns of Organizational Transformation of Civil Society Organizations*

The study assumes that the interplay of these external factors facilitates organizational, relational and normative changes among the civil society groups. It further assumes that the types of organizations that dominate the civil society change in response to the demands of the times. For one, as the definition of common good becomes broader and more complex, the loosely organized “voluntary” associations are replaced by formally structured professional organizations such as the social development NGOs, the POs and their respective alliances, federations and networks which have defined organizational structures, systems and procedures and are duly accredited by the state as legal organizations.

Secondly, as their interactions with the state, market and political institutions becomes institutionalized, it is assumed that the civil society groups are compelled to professionalize, systematize their operations and to bureaucratize. As they increasingly assume the characteristics of modern bureaucratic organizations, however, they likewise imbibe their logic and tendencies. Among these are the concern for organizational sustainability and competitiveness. Correspondingly, these would result to changes in organizational goals and strategies. From issue-based social activism, they reorient their focus towards holistic social development.
Since the two groups of civil society vary in terms of resources, manpower competence and level of organization, their abilities to respond to these external stimuli likewise vary. Between the two strands of civil society, the middle-class based NGOs have the comparative advantage of responding more effectively to the opportunities and challenges posed by their external environment. In recent years, they harnessed this advantage by assuming the role of development intermediaries and mainstreaming their efforts as part of the government’s development administration efforts.

As intermediary organizations, the NGOs serve as the mediating links between the grassroots sectors and their representative POs, and the social institutions from the other domains of social practice. Since they engage in community organizing efforts, the NGOs are capable of inculcating their ideas among the grassroots sectors and mobilizing them for collective actions. These enable them to apply political pressure on the formal social institutions. On the other hand, the NGOs are likewise able to harness their links and use the resources they generate from these formal social institutions to enhance their influence over the grassroots sectors and their POs. They thus have the strategic advantage of brokering influence and resources between them. In so doing, they can strategically influence the state’s development administration process and maximize their abilities to check the influence of the elites on the state.

Nonetheless, assuming the role of intermediaries facilitate changes that produce tensions within these organizations. First, professionalization and bureaucratization erode the voluntaristic spirit and flexibility that set the NGOs apart from the government. Secondly, they promote the influx of different cohorts of middle class professionals into
the NGO sector who compete with each other for influence over the determination of the goals, program strategies, disposition financial and logistical resources, and determination of allies and enemies. Thirdly, they necessitate the establishment of close working relationship with the state.

These affect the abilities of the NGOs to address the needs of their PO clients. To address the tensions, strategies and mechanisms for negotiation and consensus building are developed by the NGOs. Parallel mechanisms are set up to mediate the conflicts among the different NGOs. These mechanisms enable the NGOs to make social development work an exclusive career option for middle class professionals and to accommodate the various groups of the new middle class within the realm of civil society. They thus serve as the means by which the NGOs establish dominance and hegemony over the other groups in the civil society, particularly the POs.

While the NGOs are able to take advantage of their unique organizational characteristics to strategically position themselves as development brokers, the POs, nonetheless, have been able to maximize their relationship with the NGOs to acquire organizational and technical skills that enable them to address their own concerns and assert their autonomy over the NGOs. The study contends that as the POs effectively harness the knowledge and skills they acquire from the NGOs, they begin to pose a challenge to the hegemony of the middle class-based NGOs in the realm of civil society.

Implications on the Democratization Process

These have two possible implications on the Philippine democratization process. On one hand, as the NGOs increasingly assume intermediary roles, there is a potential for
them to be instrumentalized by the state, the market and the political community to control the other groups in the realm of civil society, notably, the POs. This could weaken the civil society in terms of providing the check and balance to the powers of these institutions. Consequently, this would lend the grassroots vulnerable to exploitation and repression.

On the other hand, by becoming development intermediaries, the NGOs could also strengthen the civil society. For one, they could promote the recruitment of the grassroots sectors into the realm of civil society by organizing them into POs. Secondly, by providing the POs with the organizational and technical skills required to engage in pressure politics, they could likewise enable them to articulate and protect their interests. In addition, by providing the resources and services that the community needs, the NGOs could promote improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the grassroots sectors. These could motivate them to participate more actively in the public sphere thereby broadening and strengthening the civil society as a countervailing force to the state. These nonetheless rest on the ability of the new middle class to maintain their hegemony in the realm of civil society and to harness the NGOs as instruments for pursuing their class interest.

**Research Focus**

To better understand the transformation of the Philippine NGOs into development intermediary organizations, the phenomenon is examined both from the macro and micro perspectives. At the macro-level, the study examines the emergence and transformation of the Philippine NGOs within the broader context of the evolution of the Philippine civil
society. It examines the economic, social and political factors that gave birth and shaped
the Philippine civil over three historical phases namely, (a) the Pre-Authoritarian Period
(1890s to 1971), (b) the Authoritarian Regime (1972-86) and the Re-democratization Period
(1986-Present).

To determine how the developments in the social, political, economic and
institutional milieus were experienced by individual NGOs, the dissertation looked into
the experiences of the Institute of Social Order or ISO, the oldest existing NGO in the
country to date. ISO was chosen for the case study due to the following reasons:

1. As the oldest surviving NGO in the country, it has seen through the transitions
   and the changes in characteristics of the Philippine civil society;

2. Majority of the renowned leaders of the Philippine NGOs and the prime movers of
   the civil society movement in the country have been involved, one way or the
   other, with the ISO. The vision, mission and goals of the organization were thus
   reflective of the dominant value orientation of the civil society groups at particular
   historical junctures; and,

3. The changes in ISO’s program thrusts reflect the shifts in the program emphasis
   and strategies of the Philippine NGO sector at particular socio-historical phases.

First, the study traces the changes in ISO’s (a) program approaches, (b)
organizational, staff development and recruitment strategies and (c) networking and
alliance building strategies. It also examines the external factors that brought about these
changes, particularly those that compel the ISO to assume development intermediary
functions. Simultaneously, the dissertation also looks into the internal dynamics that
ensued among its staffs, as well as the changes in its relationship with its partner POs
during the transition phases.
By examining the evolution of the NGOs from both the macro and micro perspective, the dissertation provides a more holistic explanation of how the Philippine civil society came to assume its present form. In process, it also promotes better understanding of how Filipino middle class interests shape the Philippine civil society's democratization efforts.

Data Collection

The dissertation utilized a combination of socio-historical research and case study approach. At the macro level, the history of the Philippine civil society in general and the Philippine NGOs in particular were reconstructed using secondary data. Most of the information utilized for the study was drawn from academic interpretations of Philippine history as well as from news articles, commentaries and opinion columns. Information on the history of Philippine NGOs, on the other hand, was drawn from accounts of organizational experiences of individual NGOs, documentations of organizational diagnosis and evaluation studies commissioned by state agencies and international funding institutions as well as individual researches. Others came from the proceedings of workshops, conferences and reflection sessions organized and participated by the NGO leaders and workers themselves for purposes of determining how they fared in their efforts to influence the Philippine social transformation process, pinpointing areas of weaknesses and strengths and identifying possible areas of collaboration. Representatives of the different generations of NGO workers were also interviewed to validate and fill in the gaps of the secondary information gathered (See Appendix 1).
At the micro-level, a case study of an individual NGO – the ISO - was undertaken because it satisfied the justifications for the use of such. According to Yin (1994: 13), the case study approach is justifiable under the following conditions: (1) the issue being investigated is a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context where the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, (2) the inquiry deals with complex issues of interests, and, (3) the study deals with multiple sources of evidences with the data needing to converge in triangulating fashion. Information for the case study was generated from a combination of secondary data gathering, unobtrusive observation, focus group discussions and unstructured interviews of the people involved in the operations of the program at different times and in different capacities.

Secondary information regarding the history of the ISO from 1930 up to the 1970s were drawn primarily from published graduate thesis, well as from interviews of former volunteers and staffs of the ISO. Information from the 1970s up to the 1990s were derived from program documents, annual reports, communications and minutes of meetings of the ISO as well as from interviews conducted by an independent research group commissioned to reconstruct the history of the organization. These were supplemented by and validated through semi-structured interviews with key informants involved and/or familiar with ISO operations during the periods in question (See Appendix 2).

Information about the internal dynamics that took place while the ISO went through the process of organizational transformation into a professional development intermediary organization was derived from interviews with the former director and selected members of the Board of Trustees of the Institute, as well as from focus group discussions with the
coordinators and supervisors of its different program units. The outcomes of these processes were validated with the program personnel and the leaders of ISO's partner people's organizations also through focus group discussions (See Appendix 3).

To augment the information generated from the methods discussed above, I also directly observed the internal organizational processes experienced by the ISO as one of its staffs. I undertook this technique with prior clearance from the ISO leadership. As a participant observer, I used the process documentation method or the practice of systematically documenting unfolding events, activities and concerns of the NGO personnel and other actors involved in NGO operations for purposes of bringing out the underlying real causes and explanations of particular phenomena.¹

**Data Analysis**

Since information was culled from different sources using different data collection techniques, the macro and micro data generated were triangulated to determine common and/or re-enforcing patterns of organizational processes. Particular experiences of the ISO and its partner POs were juxtaposed with the experiences of various groups comprising the Philippine civil society at particular junctures of Philippine history. The convergence and divergence of individual organizational experiences of the ISO and its partner POs with those of the other Philippine civil society groups were then identified and analyzed using the theoretical assumptions and explanations set forth earlier.

**Limitations of the Study**

Since this dissertation utilized only one NGO for its case study, it is possible that the organizational experiences described and analyzed herewith are unique to it. This limits the
generalizability of the study. To address this limitation, efforts were undertaken to examine available documents on the experiences of other NGOs to ensure the comparability of ISO's experiences with these at particular time periods.

One other possible limitation of the study concerns its use of direct observation and qualitative data gathering techniques as part of the methods for case study research. Critics of these types of research techniques raise possibilities that these could generate subjectivity and introduce biases in the findings and conclusions. As Yin (1994: 11) noted, however, case studies are a form of inquiry that does not depend solely on ethnographic or participant observer data alone. Rather, case studies utilize various multiple sources of evidence, with data needing convergence in a triangulating fashion (Ibid., 13). Following Yin's guideline, this dissertation used multiple techniques of data collection.

Despite these limitations, however, the case study method seemed to be the most appropriate research tool for this study because it enabled me to gather information in a context where I have no control of, and where I would not be able to generate realistic information if I used a more structured data gathering techniques. For one, NGOs like the ISO do not have complete documentations of their activities since they only started putting their accomplishments and experiences on paper during the mid-1980s. Thus, reports and internal documents could only provide a limited picture of the organizational changes and internal dynamics that the NGOs experienced over the years. Secondly, NGO staffs are inherently indifferent to outsiders who look into their activities and who use formal research methods and inquiries to assess their activities. However, they welcome researchers who get involved in their day-to-day lives and utilize participatory and experiential research
techniques because they feel that they are part of the research process itself. This is in line with their orientation that the research process should not only be informative to the researcher, but also empowering for the respondents (Labrador and Serra, 1987, Farmers Action Board, 1983). Insisting on the use of structured research design, and on being a detached researcher could have only obstructed rather than facilitated my access to the information that I needed for this study.
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 4 – EARLY FORMS OF PHILIPPINE CIVIL SOCIETY: INFORMAL VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (16th CENTURY TO 1972)

With the state’s recognition of the legitimate role of civil society in nation building, the number of non-stock, non-profit organizations in the Philippines has grown to an unprecedented size and rate starting from 1986. Based on the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the number of registered non-stock entities increased by 313 percent from 1986 to 2000. From 37,191 in July 1986, it reached to 116,882 by October 2000 (See Table 1). Its highest growth rates occurred between the periods of 1990 and 1993 when popular participation became firmly institutionalized with the enforcement of the 1986 Philippine Constitution, the 1991 Local Government Code and other pertinent laws and government policies involving the NGOs and POs in state affairs. At present, the Philippine civil society groups are actively involved not only in the political process, but also in development administration. Politically, the most organized sectors of the civil society have succeeded in lobbying for landmark national policies like the Urban Development and Housing Act, the Fisheries Code and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, as well as against proposed policies adjudged to be detrimental to the interests of the nation like the extension of the U.S. Bases Agreement and the amendment of the Philippine Constitution extending the term of office of the president from six to twelve years. The clearest indication of the political power of the Philippine civil society groups nonetheless rest on their ability to mobilize protest actions against the state leadership. This is demonstrated by the organized protest actions that led to the flight downfall of Pres. Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and of late, Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada in 2000.
However, the most significant contributions of the Philippine civil society to nation building remain at the socio-economic realm, as channels of international development assistance to the poorest of the Filipino poor. The most influential among those which engage on this kind of efforts are the 2,000-7,000 social development NGOs that provide that link the poor Filipino households with the formal government and private institutions (Constantino-David, 1992: 138; Aldaba, Antezana, Valderrama and Fowler; 2000: 674). Their strategic institutional roles as channels of ODA enable them to considerably shape the interests and characteristics of the Philippine civil society. This also becomes the basis of their popularity as development stakeholders.

Although the Philippine civil society caught public attention only during the recent years, with the active participation of NGOs and POs in the democratization and development administration processes, organized people’s initiatives are not new to the Filipinos. Civil associations and social movements existed in the country as early as the Spanish colonial period. However, their forms, characteristics and constituencies have changed in accordance with the developments in the country’s social, political and economic milieus at particular historical junctures. The present-day NGOs and POs are merely their most recent organizational expressions.

But how did the social development NGOs emerged in the Philippines? What social, economic and political processes brought about the changes in the organizational
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Non-Stock Entities (NSEs)</th>
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<th>People's Organizations (POs)</th>
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* No available data for December, 1994 or January, 1995 so this time period is taken up instead.

a/ The data for this column were computed utilizing Clarke's assumption that 75% of the NSEs are classified as NGOs.

b/ The data for this column were extrapolated from Aldaba's assumption that 20% of organizations classified by the SEC as NGOs are actually people's organizations.

See Fernando Aldaba, Paula Antezana, Mariano Valderrama and Alan Fowler, NGO Strategies Beyond Aid: Perspectives from Central and South America and the Philippines, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4., 2000: 674.

c/ Computed by taking the increase in the number of NSEs as a percentage of the previous year's total.
nature of local civil associations? What characteristics of the Philippine civil society remained and changed over time?

This chapter discusses the emergence of the nascent Philippine civil society during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. It describes how colonial experience interplayed with the social, political and economic conditions in the country and shaped the early forms of civil associations and grassroots movements that became the forerunners of the formally constituted NGOs and POs that emerged during the Marcos Authoritarian regime.

**The Birth of the Philippine Civil Society**

*Nationalist Movements as Early Expressions of the Nascent Philippine Civil Society (16th Century to 1898)*

If an inclusive definition is used, the existence of Philippine civil society could be traced back to the 16th century Spanish colonial era albeit, in two forms: (a) the sector-based grassroots resistance movements and (b) the European influenced voluntary and civil associations of the emerging Filipino elites. Secret societies and peasant groups comprised of the *indios*\(^1\) engaged in sporadic resistance movements against the cruel collection of tributes and forced labor policy enforced by the Spanish colonial administration throughout the Spanish colonial period (Constantino, 1975: 83). Since the Catholic Church was the most visible representative of the Spanish colonial administration in the communities and in as much as the friars invoked the awesome power of the Christian God to cow the natives into submission, these resistance movements were primarily directed against it (*Ibid.*, 85).

On the other end, there were the religious and secular mutual aid associations formed by the native elites with sanction by the Catholic Church itself. By mid- to late 19th century, these mutual aid associations evolved into welfare-type philanthropic associations
that engaged in providing relief and maintaining social order during emergencies and natural
disasters, usually making up for the shortage of qualified personnel in the Spanish colonial
bureaucracy (APPIN/Philippines, n.d.; Clarke, 1998: 53). Since they perform functions that
should logically be undertaken by the colonial government, they were tolerated by the
Spanish colonial administration.

These philanthropic associations were founded by emerging elite families to secure
church approval of their wealth, legitimize their social prestige, secure and maintain political
offices, protect their economic interests and enable them to socially interact with the
colonial rulers (Ibid.). These elites were mostly local born Spaniards, natives, Chinese and
Spanish mestizos (mixed blood) who amassed wealth and properties from mercantile trading
and later on, export-crop cultivation towards the end of the 19th century. Despite their
considerable wealth, however, these mestizos were considered racially inferior to the
Spaniards born in continental Spain. They thus needed the acknowledgement of the church
and the Spanish colonial administrators to legitimize their social and political positions.

Many of these elite mestizo families were able to send their sons to Europe to study,
however. These scions of these prominent families, referred to as ilustrados², were thus in
Europe when ideas of the Enlightenment, the French and American Revolution and
eventually, American democracy became popular. Due to their new knowledge, the
ilustrados became conscious of the discriminatory policies of the Spanish colonial
administrators and the Spanish friars against the Filipino natives. This led them to nurture
the idea of becoming advocates of social reform and social justice that included not just the
mestizos, but also the indios.
In Europe, they made repeated attempts to establish associations by which they could project their demands for social reforms and counteract friar-supported newspapers (Constantino, 1975: 149). Encouraged by the ideas of liberal democracy and inspired by the French Revolution, the *ilustrados* demanded equality as citizens of the colony as well as participation in the practice of colonial administration. However, all their initiatives failed due to lack of funds, lack of unity, differences of opinions, petty jealousies and personal ambitions of their members (*Ibid.*, 150).

Eventually, the *ilustrados* brought the ideas they learned from Europe back to the colony. Philanthropic associations soon gave way to secret anti-clerical Masonic groups and intellectual circles that overtly lobbied for the recognition and eventually, the separation of the Philippine colony from Spanish rule (APPIN/Philippines, n.d.). One of these was the *La Liga Filipina* (League of Filipinos). Initially conceived as a mutual aid and self-help society of sorts, *La Liga Filipina* was instrumental in getting the *laborantes* involved in the call for national solidarity, social betterment, and redemption of the country from the Spanish rule (Kalaw, 1969: 2-3).

The *indios* were not included in these initial efforts to establish socio-political associations. Nonetheless, they too were actively engaged in collective mobilization against the colonial state and the Catholic Church. In fact, even prior to the foundation of *La Liga Filipina*, parallel quasi-religious movements led by the *laborantes* were already calling for independence from Spain and the Catholic Church. One of these was the *Kagalang-galangan, Kataas-taasang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* or the *Katipunan* (Assembly of the Sons of the Nation), a secret society led by a *laborante*, Andres Bonifacio.
At this nascent stage, some of the characteristics that pervade the Philippine civil society over the years could already be observed. One of this was the strong influence of the Catholic Church over it. Animosity towards the Catholic Church, which was the most visible agent of the Spanish colonial state, defined the motives of the citizens’ groups to engage in collective action. However, public resistance was not against the church teachings and the Catholic religious institution per se, but against the abuses committed by the Spanish friars. In fact, the emergence of grassroots-based resistance movements in the latter phase of the colonial era was precipitated in part by the execution of three Filipino clergy, Fathers Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora in 1872.  

The emerging class division within the Philippine society was also already manifested in the citizens’ groups that evolved during this early period. On one hand, the socio-political associations organized by the ilustrados strongly reflected the European notion of a civil society that provides check and balance to the state. They were intended only to serve as venues for discussing grievances and as mechanisms for pressuring the Spanish colonial administration to introduce social reforms that would allow the ilustrados equal rights to participate in colonial administration. They were not intended to serve as instruments for toppling the Spanish colonial administration. By contrast, the indio resistance movements clearly intended to overthrow the oppressive Spanish colonial administration, to get rid of the Spanish friars and install a new government.

Despite evident differences in purpose, however, the animosity towards the Spanish colonial administration and the Spanish friars provided the basis interaction and consequently, cooperation between the two groups. These, on the other hand, were facilitated by the mediation of the fledgling Filipino middle class, the laborantes, who were
closer in aspirations with the indios but who, at the same time, were deferent to the Europe-educated ilustrados. The laborantes incorporated the elitist aspiration for participation in governance with the grassroots separatist sentiments and formed them into a concept of Filipino nationalism. In so doing, they were able to unite these nascent civil society groups into a nationalist movement under the banner of the Katipunan.

After Jose Rizal, a staunch critic of the Catholic Church, was arrested and put to death in 1896, the Katipunan became the banner organization that united the ilustrado-based socio-political associations and the indio-based resistance movements in waging a revolution for the independence of the Philippines against the Spanish colonial rule (APPIN/Philippines: n.d.). However, long before the First Republic of the Philippines was established on January 23, 1899, the ilustrados systematically eased out the laborantes from leadership positions in the Katipunan by using education as the legitimating factor of their claim for political authority. This eventually led to the split of the Katipunan into two factions. The emphasis on knowledge and education as leadership quality is echoed at present by the current emphasis among NGOs on professionalization.

*Transplanted Voluntary Organizations as Agents of Democratization (1898-1940)*

The signing of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States triggered the Philippine-American War (1898-1901) that overtook the victory of the Philippine nationalist movement and the power struggle between the two factions of the Katipunan. Despite fierce resistance, the Americans succeeded in subjugating the Filipino revolutionaries. With the completion of the military phase of colonization, the Americans began the social and political stabilization of the colony by transplanting an American-style Tocquevillian democracy in the Philippines. In 1906, the American colonial government enacted laws that
encouraged American secular charitable and private volunteer organizations like the Red Cross, the Young Women’s and Men’s Christian Association (YWCA and YMCA) and the Boy and Girl Scouts to establish chapters in the colony, alongside the Protestant denominations (Velasco, 1995: 593; Karnow as cited by Clarke: 53), facilitated the establishment of social clubs and professional groups like the Rotary Club and the Philippine Chamber of Commerce (APPIN/Philippines, n.d.) as well as advocacy groups such as the Filipino women suffragists.

The institutionalization of public education also contributed indirectly to the growth of the Philippine civil society during the American period. It facilitated the establishment of academic and trade/profession-based associations in the country (Ibid.). One of this was the exclusive Philippine-Columban Association, an association of the alumni of the pensionado program, where middle class bureaucrats were able to interact with, and were welcomed into the exclusive circle of the traditional elites (Francisco and Arriola, 1987: 93).

However, according to Clarke (1998: 55-54), charitable organizations and professional associations were encouraged not so much to promote a vibrant civil society but to propagate values supportive of the American strategy of local government. By spearheading private voluntary efforts to assist the sick, the youth and the family, for example, the American colonial administration was able to get the Filipinos used to the idea of a limited government and the importance of independent, self-reliant initiatives. This, in turn, allowed the American colonial administration to commit itself fully to resource extraction. On the other hand, encouraging private voluntary organizations affiliated with the Protestant churches to set up local chapters in the colony also allowed the American colonial administration to control the only institution with the capacity to countervail its
authority in the colony – the Catholic Church. The YMCA particularly was established for the purpose of muting the Catholic Church’s conflict with the American colonial administration. Lastly, civic organizations were also used to maintain political stability in the colony. By allowing prominent Filipino families to be part of these transplanted civic organizations, the American colonial government affirmed the latter’s dominance in the Philippine society thereby neutralizing the potential instigators of resistance to American rule. While initially wary of the American private voluntary organizations, the *ilustrados* eventually accepted and participated in them because these legitimated their social status in the new regime. Moreover, these also served as venues where they could articulate their ambiguous and evolving sense of national identity.\(^{11}\)

During this period, therefore, American prototypes of charitable and voluntary organizations, and professional associations replaced the *ilustrado*-based philanthropic and socio-political organizations. Because the Catholic Church was markedly absent in the public sphere during this period, the Philippine civil society took on a more secular character.\(^{12}\) Also, since the colonial government heavily supported these groups, the latter were less inclined to countervail or criticize the policies of the state. The constituencies of the state-acknowledged civil society groups were also narrowed to the *ilustrados* and the emerging bureaucrat classes. The grassroots were marginalized from the public sphere. Thus, the Philippine civil society took a more exclusive character. The grassroots sectors got pushed outside the realm of civil society into the realm of the ideological revolutionary movements.

In contrast with the Spaniards, the Americans tapped the *ilustrados* as partners in economic ventures and colonial administration. These opportunities allowed them to acquire
more land, amass wealth and legitimize their dominant social status. In process, however, they themselves turned into oppressors and exploiters of the local people, sometimes even more unscrupulous and ruthless than their American partners. Because of this, the focus of popular resistance began to change. They became directed towards the native elites and their overseers. Between the 1920s and the eve of World War II, mass-based social movements with quasi-class orientation emerged (Constantino, 1975: 342-343), indicating the growing class awareness among the grassroots sectors.

Initially, mass-based mobilizations took forms reminiscent of the religious revivalist and/or messianic movements and secret societies of the Spanish colonial period. With the help of idealistic *ilustrados* who still nurtured aspirations for national independence, however, the sporadic, unorganized, and spontaneous movements gradually became self-help labor unions and peasant mutual aid societies. The first labor union, the *Union de Litografos e Impresores de Filipinas* (Union of Printing Press Workers in the Philippines), was initially founded in 1902 as an alliance between the laborers and the industrialists. Its original purpose was to provide education as well as sickness and funeral benefits to the workers (*Ibid.*, 356-358). As the laborers gain dominance over the organization, however, they began to take actions that were against the interest of the employers such as demanding higher wages and staging strikes. By 1907, the labor union completely prohibited employers from becoming union members. In 1913, some labor leaders founded the *Congreso Obrero de Filipinas* (Workers’ Congress of the Philippines), a federation of labor unions. Among its demands were an eight-hour working day, child and women labor laws, and an employer’s liability law.
The mutual aid societies came later as the labor leaders introduced the concept of trade unionism to the peasants. Since they were founded at the time when the laborers themselves were beginning to become class conscious, class conflict became a focal point of peasant organizing. Because of this, anti-landlord sentiment was a very strong feature of the peasant organizations. In 1917, the first peasant union, the *Union ng Magsasaka* (Peasants’ Union), was formed in Bulacan to fight the evils of tenancy and usury. By 1922, a federation of peasant unions, the *Union de Aparceros de Filipinas*, was established. The federation passed resolutions denouncing usury and the evils of tenancy (*Ibid.*, 359).

Seeing that the grassroots sectors were willing to be organized, the labor and peasant union leaders began to entertain the idea of establishing a grassroots-based communist movement. They established the communist-oriented the *Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid ng Pilipinas* (Association of Filipino Peasants) in 1928 and the *Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis ng Pilipinas* (Association of Filipino Workers) thereafter. These organizations were later subsumed under the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) or the Communist Party of the Philippines until it was outlawed in 1932.13 With this, the grassroots-based movements were excluded from participation in the public sphere.

The crash of the world export market in the 1930s due to the Great Depression led to the deepening of the social division between the Filipino elites and the poor grassroots sectors. They likewise contributed to the strengthening of the peasant and labor union movements as the peasants who got evicted from the land they were tilling and the urban workers who lose their jobs or suffered wage cuts turned to the unions for assistance. Strikes and demonstrations became prevalent. The elites, particularly the landlords, responded by organizing private armies to go after the peasant demonstrators. This led to peace and order
problems, particularly in Central Luzon. In response, the colonial government dispatched the Philippine Constabulary (PC) to suppress mass mobilizations. However, it failed to quell the peasant unrest.

The failure of the military solution compelled the colonial government to take the plight of the restive peasants more seriously (Francisco and Arriola: 110; Constantino, 1975: 367; Fabros, 1988: 8). To address the situation, Pres. Manuel L. Quezon launched a “Social Justice Program” that aimed to promote “justice for all, laborers and employers, the poor and rich alike” (Constantino, 1975: 375-375). The program was heavily influenced by ideas that emanated from associations sponsored by the Catholic Church\textsuperscript{14}, which at that time was becoming alarmed by the growing influence of the communist ideology on the laborers and the peasants. Using the anti-communist social encyclicals\textsuperscript{15} released by the Vatican as their justification, the Philippine Catholic Church entered the public sphere in the 1930s.

In 1932, the Bellarmine Evidence Guild and later on, the Chesterton Evidence Guild were founded. The efforts of the two social action guilds began the Catholic social action movement in the country, with very strong anti-socialist and anti-communist undertones. The Social Actionists supported Quezon’s Social Justice Program with the Share Tenancy Act of 1933 as central program. The Share Tenancy Act of 1933 dovetailed with the Social Actionists’ idea of peasant proprietorship\textsuperscript{16}, which they thought would address the exploitation of the peasants and thus, diminish the influence of communism at the grassroots level. With the Share Tenancy Act in place, they thought that ample education and appeals to moral principles would be enough to convince the landlords to give up their lands (\textit{Ibid.}, 26-27). However, the landlords did not only refuse to participate in the program, they even used their political power to influence national policies, manipulated the loopholes of the
law to retain control of their land, and in extreme cases, organized private armies to prevent the law from being implemented. Realizing that the landowners would not yield without coercion from the state, the Social Actionists toyed with the idea of establishing a corporatist state where the government would play a direct and active role in land redistribution. They lobbied the idea to Pres. Quezon who agreed to make it the platform for his re-election bid (Fabros: 26; Constantino: 1975: 382). Unfortunately, this did not see fruition as the Commonwealth presidential election was overtaken by the outbreak of World War II in 1941.

During the American era, therefore, the defining moment in the evolution of the Philippine civil society was the crystallization of the division between the legally recognized voluntary and professional organizations on the one hand, and the grassroots-based trade unions affiliated with the outlawed communist movement. This reflected the deepening class division and the brewing tensions between the elites and the poor grassroots sectors. As before, the emerging professional class attempted to defuse class tensions by mediating between the elites and the poor. The Catholic Church provided the ideas that the former could use to justify their interventions. In addition, it was likewise responsible for setting up the structures and venues by which the middle class could undertake such role.

The re-entry of the Catholic Church in the public sphere thus significantly altered the terrains of the Philippine civil society. Prior to the intervention of the Catholic Church, civic organizations existed only for the purpose of enhancing the social prestige of the elites and/or facilitating the acceptance of the middle class into the elite social circle. The Catholic Church facilitated the emergence of the social action guilds that dissociated themselves from the state and articulated ideas as to what policies the government must undertake. It likewise
introduced a social dimension to associational life in the form of concern for social justice for the poor.

The involvement of the Catholic Church in civic activities also changed the interaction between the civil society and the state. While before, voluntary and professional associations were not that keen to intervene in policy-making, the church-inspired social action guilds sought to persuade the state to undertake specific policy actions such as the implementation of the Share Tenancy Act. The fact that they were able to get Pres. Quezon to incorporate their ideas in his Social Justice Program indicated that through the Catholic Church, the position of the civil society vis-à-vis the state was strengthened.

The establishment of the social action guilds likewise modified the nationalistic aspirations of the Filipino elites and middle classes. Through them, the scions of the elites and government bureaucrats took notice of the restiveness of the grassroots sectors. They also became aware - even reflective - of the capacities of the organized popular movements to disrupt social order. As such, they became more open to exploring ways of addressing grassroots’ grievances. By participating in the social action movement, the emergent Filipino middle class assumed a new role as caretakers of the poor. Thus, while before, the *ilustrados* aspired to take over public administration from the Spanish colonialists, the 1930 Social Actionists sought to influence the American administrators by articulating and advocating fair and just treatments of the poor grassroots sectors as part of an autonomous civil society.

Lastly, the involvement of the Catholic Church pitted the “civil” associations against the “uncivil” grassroots movements. In so doing, however, the exclusion of the latter from the public sphere and consequently, the neglect of the interests of the grassroots sectors in
the discussions of public policies were highlighted. Thus, although the grassroots sectors remained excluded from direct participation in the legitimate public sphere, their concerns were articulated and brought to the attention of the state through the efforts of the social action guilds.

_Grassroots Democracy Amidst Repression (1941-1946)_

When the Japanese took control of the Philippine state from the Americans during World War II, all public and private institutions were either abolished or placed directly under Japanese control and direction. The activities of the Catholic Church were severely curtailed. All existing private voluntary associations were dissolved and replaced by state-controlled associations. At the community level, the Japanese introduced the neighborhood associations to facilitate the recruitment of compulsory labor and participants to Japanese mandated mass mobilizations and to check on the movements of citizens. However, the people refused to participate in them except during distribution of scarce food supplies (Constantino and Constantino, 1978: 74-75). At the national level, the Japanese colonial government sponsored the establishment of the _Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (KALIBAPI)_ or Association in the Service of the New Philippines, a non-political public service organization (Ibid., 75-76). Membership to the KALIBAPI was voluntary, but a requirement for employment in the government sector. Thus, some joined the organization while secretly supporting the underground guerilla movements simultaneously.

In the absence of a “civil” society, underground resistance movements thrived vibrantly throughout the Japanese occupation. One of those that remained active, even strengthened, during the repressive regime was the peasant movement. With the formation of the militant guerilla group, the _Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP)_ or
the Anti-Japanese Citizens' Army, the peasant movement was able to dominate the public sphere during the war. One of the Huks' achievements during the war was the establishment of the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDCs), a counterpart of the Japanese established neighborhood associations. The BUDCs were set up to protect the barrio people from depredations of bandit groups and to provide them with political education and experience in self-government (Ibid., 143-144). In addition, they also coordinated peasant-landlord relations by taking charge of the distribution of harvests and giving the landlords shares commensurate to their financial status and family size (Ibid., 145). Thus, while the elites and the bureaucrats were experiencing controlled living situations, the poor grassroots sectors were having their taste of popular democracy. Through the BUDCs, the grassroots had the opportunity to participate in community governance. Moreover, since the BUDCs were responsible for distributing harvests, the people also experienced relatively equitable distribution of resources that they were unable to enjoy before.

_Beginnings of the “Organized” Philippine Civil Society Movement (1946-1960)_

When the war ended, the American government granted the Philippines its national independence thereby officially ending the country’s status as a colony. However, the country was totally ravaged. All public and private efforts thus needed to be concentrated on welfare and relief provision as well as reconstruction work. This reflected even in the types of voluntary organizations that emerged during this period. Among the first to be established/re-established were the voluntary welfare agencies and private foundations (APPIN/Philippines, n.d.). Voluntary welfare agencies catered to the needs of disadvantaged groups. They were apolitical and worked in close collaboration with the government.17 Private individuals and corporations likewise set up philanthropic organizations in the
countryside to provide housing, education, or other social services to their workers and to fill in for the lack of government efforts. After the immediate need for relief and welfare services was satisfied, many of the philanthropic organizations reoriented their activities towards social reconstruction and community development work. They became the forerunners of the corporate foundations.

Within five years, the country recovered its pre-war productive capacity. Despite this, majority of the grassroots sectors remained poor. Thus, discontent once again became widespread among the grassroots sectors. This was further exacerbated by the refusal of the leaders of the newly independent Philippine state and their American partners to grant the HUKBALAHAP guerrillas a legitimate status as an anti-Japanese guerilla organization. Its members were thus rendered ineligible from receiving back wages and benefits given to other anti-Japanese guerilla units. Moreover, they were treated as unlawful armed bands and their leaders arrested and jailed (Constantino and Constantino, 1978: 166-168).

Initially, the leaders of the Huk-affiliated peasant and labor unions attempted to address these by seeking representation in the legislative process. In 1946, however, seven elected congressmen from the Huk-affiliated Democratic Alliance were refused their seats in Congress for allegedly committing election frauds and terrorism. This heightened the already building tension among the grassroots sectors. Demonstrations and strikes once again escalated in Central Luzon, the bailiwick of the Huks. Violent encounters ensued between the military and the Huk militia. By 1948, the government outlawed the Huks and its affiliate peasant union, the Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM) or the National Peasants’ Alliance, alongside the PKP. Constabulary units and civilian guards raided suspected barrios, arrested, tortured and executed suspected Huk and PKM members.
and sympathizers (Ibid., 222). Persecuted, the Hucks abandoned parliamentary struggle altogether to pursue armed revolution against the state and against the landlords. To signal its change in tactics, it changed its name into Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the Army of National Liberation. The HMB rebel force numbered from 5,000 to 10,000 armed men (Ibid., 222-223).

With the intensified military action against the peasant-based HMB, the PKP shifted its organizing efforts to the laborers. It established the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) as its legal arm in 1945, revived the pre-war labor unions and organized new ones (Ibid., 215). CLO’s militancy and effective strike tactics enabled it to win wage raises for its members. Because of this, it attracted a large number of union recruits. As of 1945, CLO membership included 76 affiliated unions and a total of 100,000 member workers (Ibid., 30; Fabros: 30).

The Catholic Church perceived the HMB insurgency and the CLO union organizing activities as a very serious threat to the status quo. To initially respond to the situation, it set up charitable organizations that provided counseling in addition to aid and services to the poor. A proto-type of these charity organizations was the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Manila. However, some priests and Catholic laymen found this quite limited in addressing the social injustice which they identified as the core issue that was fueling the rapid spread of the communist ideology among the grassroots. Inspired by the initiatives of the Social Actionists in the 1930s, they immersed themselves into the popular movements even without permission of the Catholic Church hierarchy (Fabros: 50). Among them were the American Jesuit, Fr. Walter B. Hogan, SJ and his student Mr. Juan Tan who got involved with the labor movement. Fr. Hogan and Mr. Tan set up the Institute of Social
Order (ISO) in 1947 initially as a place where labor and management could meet and discuss ideas on social change and later on, as a training center on labor-management relations. Out of the discussions held at the ISO, the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) and Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) were set up as the “Christian Democratic” counterweights to the communist-influenced peasant (PKM) and labor (CLO) federations (Alegre: 7). Unlike the PKM and CLO that were organized and led by peasant and labor leaders, the FFW and the FFF were organized and led by Jesuit-trained professionals (e.g., priests, lawyers and educators).

The FFW’s clout over the labor movement was boosted when in 1951, CLO was declared a subversive organization and its leaders put to jail on charges of sedition and rebellion (Dejillas, 1994: 37). With CLO’s demise, the FFW took over the advocacy of labor rights. FFW successfully lobbied for the passage of labor-friendly laws such as the Magna Carta of Labor or the Industrial Peace Act of 1953 and the Minimum Wage Law in the legislature. The passage of the Magna Carta of Labor upheld the legal rights of the laborers to unionize and bargain collectively for just wages. The FFF, on the other hand, was responsible for the formation of pioneers and leaders of rural-based NGOs and POs who work with the peasant sectors.

By the early 1950s, it was becoming evident that military action was failing in its efforts to curb grassroots support to the insurgents. At the same time, efforts of church-inspired trade union federations to win the laborers and peasants away from communist-inspired trade unions appeared to be gaining grounds. In light of these, the state, in partnership with the business sector and the U.S. government, decided that it was time to explore citizens’ participation as a counter-insurgency mechanism.
One factor that got the Philippine government to seriously consider this option was the success of the National Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL). The NAMFREL was a movement initiated by the Philippine Veteran’s League in light of the widespread incidences of violence, fraud and manipulation that took place during the 1946 and 1949 elections. 

In close coordination with the Philippine government, the NAMFREL was able to keep the 1951 congressional and local election generally peaceful and fair (Carlos and Banlaoi, 1996: 85 and 88). These favorable results made the Philippine government realize that tapping civil organizations for its counter-insurgency activities could yield beneficial results. In view of this, the legislature passed Republic Act 2067 in 1952 supporting the establishment of non-profit social service organizations, particularly those that could assist the government in winning the support of the rural population away from the Huk (Clarke: 57).

One of the non-profit social service organizations that emerged as an outcome of this law was the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), a duplicate of Taiwan’s Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Clarke: 57). PRRM was established by a cross-section of Manila’s political, philanthropic and business elites to set up “social laboratories” where a package of health, education and socio-economic services could be experimented on (Clarke: 141; Alegre: 7). It recruited fresh graduates from agricultural and social works schools in the country and trained them as rural extension services. Since its rural development programs dovetailed well with the government’s counter-insurgency efforts, PRRM was tapped by the Presidential Assistance for Community Development (PACD) to promote increase in productivity, build feeder roads and improve health and education services in the rural areas, particularly in the Huk-infested Central Luzon (Constantino and
Constantino, 1978: 265-266; Clarke: 138-148). Under the PRRM, community-based organizations were set up as implementing structures for rural development programs of the government. By 1960, PRRM was able to organize community organizations in 100 barrios in Central Luzon with a total combined membership of 18,000 (Clarke: 143).

From the above, it could be gleaned that the immediate post-war era was a period of deepening schism between the Filipino elites and the grassroots sectors. Class conflicts between the landowners cum exporters, and the peasants and the laborers had intensified. Unfortunately, the state could not mediate the conflict because it was closely identified with the ruling elites who dominated both its legislature and the executive branches. In light of this, the Catholic Church stepped in by supporting civil organizations to balance the situation in favor of the poor grassroots sectors.

Within this context, four different waves of civil organizations led and managed by the middle class professionals emerged. Right after the war, apolitical and conservative welfare and philanthropic organizations evolved to provide immediate relief and alleviate the sufferings of the general populace. As the country recovered economically, however, the widening social inequality fueled social unrest among the grassroots sectors. To address the situation, the Catholic Church set up charitable institutions that not only provided assistance but also consolation to the poor. However, these failed to win the latter away from the communist revolutionary movements, compelling some segments of the Catholic Church to organize their own versions of labor and peasant federations as alternatives to the communist-influenced trade unions.

The church-supported trade federations allowed the grassroots sectors better access to the public sphere. As socially committed professionals volunteered to get involved in
labor and peasant union organizing, they gained better understanding of the latter’s plight. Since these volunteers were highly educated, they were able to articulate the concerns of these sectors in terms understandable to the legislators. Moreover, since many of them were themselves children of the elites and government bureaucrats, they had ready access to those who were in control of economic and political resources. As such, they succeeded in getting legislations addressing the rights of the grassroots sectors approved.

In light of the success of the church-supported trade federations in winning the grassroots away from communism, the government saw the potentials of community organizing as a tool for controlling the grassroots movement. Thus, they encouraged the emergence of corporatist service-delivery organizations as the fourth wave of post war civil organizations. These service-delivery organizations were hybrid organizations, which were privately organized but government-controlled.

These new waves of civil organizations facilitated the expansion of the Philippine civil society to the grassroots sectors. Although led and managed by middle class professionals, their constituencies consisted of individual unions and peasant organizations whose membership comprised of the poor and marginalized sectors of the Philippine society. Nonetheless, grassroots participation in the public sphere remained limited. For one, they were treated as beneficiaries rather than active participants in policy-making and community development programs. Moreover, the leadership of the trade federations remained in the hands of the volunteer professionals. On the other hand, the service-delivery organizations controlled the distribution of knowledge and resources to the grassroots associations. Likewise, lobbying for social reforms and soliciting public support still rested primarily with the professional volunteers. On the whole, however, the opening of the public
sphere to the grassroots sectors and the limited opportunities to get their concerns articulated led to the legislation of grassroots-oriented state policies. These contributed to the relative pacification of grassroots discontent and the weakening of the communist movement in the 1950s (Constantino-David, 1997: 27).

**Expansion and Radicalization of the Philippine Civil Society (1961-1971)**

The period of grassroots pacification proved short, however, as the government’s post-war economic policies caused the large-scale impoverishment of the Filipino masses. Because of the restrictions of the *Bell Trade Act of 1945* on Philippine exports, the Filipino elites had to diversify their economic ventures. This divided the Filipino elites into agricultural producers/exporters and the manufacturing entrepreneurs who compete with each other for favorable government policies and concessions. Succeeding economic policies that sought to please one faction over the other brought negative economic consequences for the nation. By 1966, close to 1,500 corporations were already in a state of collapse (Doronilla, 1992: 117). By 1970, the government was forced to float the peso against the dollar to meet its foreign exchange obligations (*Ibid.*, 155). As a result, inflation rate soared to 14 percent, which was almost three times the 4.5 percent posted in 1960 (*Ibid.*). Income, however, failed to cope with the rising prices. Unemployment also increased significantly. From 470,000 in 1963, the number of unemployed rose to 1,000,000 in 1967, reaching 1,137,000 in 1971 (Sta. Romana as quoted by Doronilla: 158).

These caused widespread difficulties among Filipinos in all social classes (Daroy, 1988: 9). By 1971, it was estimated that 59.01 percent of the national population or 16 million Filipinos were unable to satisfy minimum food needs (DAP, 1975: 11-12). To make matters worse, the gap between the rich and the poor also become worse with the richest 20
percent of the population earning 15 times the income of the poorest 20 percent (Doronilla: 159). Strikes, riots and demonstrations became more frequent and intense. Once again, the communist-influenced peasant and labor movements pacified during the 1950s re-emerged in forms more radical than before.

As these were taking place, the Catholic Church was also undergoing changes as a result of the Vatican’s continuing reflections about the social problems that capitalism spawned in the third world countries. Two papal encyclicals initially provided the inspiration for the Philippine Catholic Church to take a more active social involvement.23 These were followed by several other progressive documents after the Vatican II Council from 1963 to 1965.24

One of the Catholic Church’s initial efforts was the promotion of credit unions.25 By 1964, the Knights of Columbus – an organization of male lay church workers - established 75 credit unions all over the country (Fabros: 93). However, since they were hastily set up without ample orientation on the principles and operations of credit unions, most of these credit unions eventually folded up. The experiment nonetheless succeeded in generating interest in grassroots organizing among the clergy throughout the country.

In the years that followed, the Catholic Church explored different forms of organizations for undertaking community development activities. One of these was the Asian Social Institute (ASI). Founded by the Archdiocese of Manila in 1962, ASI evolved into a graduate school for economics and sociology that trains social scientists and professionals to work for social justice (Ibid., 94). ASI offered research and training services to parishes that initiated cooperative-like programs such as small-scale industries, scientific farming, consumer and marketing cooperatives and training the grassroots in domestic and
vocational skills. Simultaneously, however, these parishes served as field laboratories for the ASI students. From the socio-economic projects that resulted from this collaboration, the Catholic social action centers emerged.

Building from these efforts, as well as in response to the challenge to translate the social encyclicals into concrete programs of action, the Philippine church created the Episcopal Commission on Social Action with National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) as its executive arm in 1967.26 The establishment of these offices marked the institutionalization of the Church’s social involvement in the Philippines.27 Prior to the Episcopal Commission/NASSA, church-inspired voluntary associations operated informally through part-time volunteers. Under NASSA, social action directors were appointed in several dioceses. Lay leaders were trained on grassroots works and eventually absorbed as staff of the social action centers. Many of these social action centers became the pioneers of the grassroots-oriented NGOs that engaged in community organizing in the 1970s (Alegre: 9). The social action centers organized the Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) that later evolved into POs.

The creation of the Episcopal Commission/NASSA likewise indicated the Catholic Church’s willingness, albeit tentatively, to deal with class-based issues. On February 1967, NASSA held a National Rural Congress as part of its initial promotional campaign. The Congress tackled the problems faced by the farmers and proposed solutions to them (Fabros: 99). During the Congress, the participants reached a consensus that social injustice was prevalent in the rural communities at the time, and that they generally emanate from the lack of tenure of farm workers as well as the unequal tenancy arrangements between the landlords and the tenant farmers. They also agreed that only land reform could rectify these
injustices. The Congress participants however recognized that a program such as this would be effective only if undertaken cooperatively by the government, the landlords and the peasants. For this to work, nonetheless, the peasants must be organized and trained to deal on equal terms with the government and the landlords. The Congress participants challenged the church-supported organizations to take on the tasks of grassroots organizing, providing the grassroots with the appropriate agricultural knowledge and technology, and inculcating in them the values of solidarity and self-help.

This further spurred interest in social action among the clergy and lay leaders of the Catholic Church. In a span of two years, 2,000 church-sponsored social development projects were undertaken. Forty-two out of 48 dioceses and prelatures established their social action centers (Ibid., 127). Nonetheless, the efforts of the social action centers remained limited to neutral projects such as cooperative development, cottage industries, youth recreational centers, etc.

At the time, many of the lay volunteers working in the social action centers were idealistic student activists and middle class professionals who saw Catholic social action as a non-violent way of facilitating change in lieu of a communist revolution. Hence, they were frustrated with the cautiousness of the Church in dealing with class-based social issues. Given the encyclicals issued by the Vatican, they expected the Church to be more aggressive and progressive in attacking social injustice. With the seeming tentativeness of the church hierarchy to do so, early protests movements in the 1960s included demands for reforms within the Catholic Church (Daroy: 3). Mounting pressures from the lay people and from its own clergy compelled the leaders of the Catholic Church to clarify its social responsibilities as follows: (a) sharing in the people’s poverty, (b) speaking out for the rights of the
disadvantaged and the powerless against all forms of injustice from whatever source, (c)
promotion of total human development which include speaking out on issues such as
 equitable distribution and socially responsible use of land and other resources, international
 trade agreements and development aids and loans and (d) supporting, cooperating and
 collaborating with other institutions in enabling the people to exercise and defend their
 rights according to the teachings of the church (Fabros:142-143). Amidst increased
 militancy within its ranks, however, it stood pat in its call for the cooperation among the
different social classes and on its anti-communist orientation.

By mid-1960s, social unrest had spread to practically all sectors of society. The
intermittent granting and withdrawal of government concessions intensified the intra-elite
conflicts, which found their way to the legislative discussions in the Congress and Senate.
Legislators who were identified with the manufacturing entrepreneurs argued for nationalist
policies with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist slants such as the nationalization and
protection of local industries against foreign businesses. These were bitterly contested and
opposed by big hacienda owners and exporters. The nationalists, nonetheless, gained
followings from the intellectuals who, at the time, were becoming disillusioned by the
government’s inability to withstand external pressures and to address the widespread
poverty, rising prices, unemployment and underdevelopment; the conspicuous consumption
of the rich; the prevalence of graft and corruption in government, the increasing violence,
crime and lawlessness coupled by the compartmentalized and delayed dispensation of
justice by the courts system (Dubsky, 1993: 52). They, in turn, influenced the students who
were able to link what they learned in school with the realities they observed at the
grassroots level and what they experienced themselves. In search of ideologies that could
explain what was happening around them, the students turned to Maoist communist ideas and/or to liberation theology. Their quests were concretely translated into the emergence of the student movements with two distinct ideological slants – the national democratic faction \textit{(natdem)} on the one hand, and the Christian social democratic \textit{(socdem)} faction, on the other.

The student activist movements began earlier in 1961, however, with the formation of the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP). The organization conducted teach-ins during which, they discussed issues ranging from the nationalist ideas of Congressman Claro M. Recto\textsuperscript{30} and the communist ideologies of Marx, Lenin and Mao. During the teach-ins, the students denounced government irregularities and protested the U.S. imperialist presence in the country (Caguicla, 1971: 48). Later on, the teach-in sessions gave way to student rallies, pickets and demonstrations. On November 30, 1964, the SCAUP gave birth to the \textit{Kabataang Makabayan} (KM) or Nationalist Youths, a students organization set to pursue the struggle for national democracy (\textit{Ibid.}, 49).

The SCAUP and the KM were initially just part of the PKP and the HMB network. However, the student leaders felt that PKP’s rigid party framework was no longer relevant to the country’s situation. They challenged the PKP old guards and reorganized it into the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) with the New People’s Army (NPA) as military arm (Fabros: 136). The CPP-NPA combined Maoism and national democracy as ideological party framework (Constantino-David: 1997, p. 27). Soon, other student-based national democratic organizations like the \textit{Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan} (SDK) or the Young Democrats’ Union, \textit{Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino} (MPKP) or the Union of Filipino Youths, \textit{Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan} (MAKIBAKA) or the
Movement for the New Women, and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) emerged (Caguicla, 1971: 49). All of them shared the anti-American imperialism, anti-feudalism and anti-fascism sentiments. FFW and FFF responded by strengthening their student wing. From this, a new generation of social democratic student activists emerged. They set up the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), the Lakasdiwa and the Youth Christian Socialist of the Philippines (YUSP) (Ibid.). Like the natdems, the socdems also subscribed to anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist slogans. However, they differed with the former in terms of priorities. For them, poverty, unemployment, social inequality and social injustice should be addressed first. Moreover, while the natdems believed in the necessity of a protracted struggle against the status quo, the socdems believed that peaceful change was possible within the context of the existing structure (Ibid., 56).

Deteriorating socio-economic conditions, bureaucratic inefficiency and political bickering in the elitist legislature eventually drove even the moderate socdems to more aggressive tactics. On January 26, 1970, the NUSP sponsored a massive rally seeking for a nonpartisan Constitutional Convention. The rally ended in a bloody confrontation between the students and the police that resulted to the death of six students and signaled a period of violent student activism known as the First Quarter Storm. Students of natdem and the socdem affiliations joined forces in demanding drastic changes in the socio-economic and political structures of the Philippine society (Fabros: 137). They were joined by groups of sympathetic grassroots sectors (laborers, peasants and urban poor), professionals (i.e., teachers, scientists, artists, journalists) and feminists (Daroy: 20-21).
With these developments, even the young priests, especially those who were deeply involved in grassroots efforts, found the combination of liberation theology and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts as a better framework for analyzing the social problems and for strategizing the liberation of the Philippines from the vestiges of feudalism and imperialism (Fabros: 152-153).

The primary social problem of the country was the malformation of the socio-economic, political, and cultural structures of Philippine society. It was a social order aggravated by international economic imperialism manifested in alien control of strategic local industries, in the exploitative nature of foreign investments, and in the political pressure on government policies with the help of willing Filipino partners... These unjust international and national structures perpetuated the two vicious cycles of poverty-ignorance-powerlessness and of wealth-education-power... Maldevelopment (sic)... could only be solved by social reform; i.e., the reformation of the power structure... to be attained by awakening the poor to their rights and organizing them to gather their voice and strength to denounce the unjust structures of society and effectively reform society (Ibid., 148-149).

Some clergy began to entertain conflict confrontation - even the use of violence - as acts of last recourse even though as a whole, the Catholic Church maintained its stand against the use of violence. From community development, Catholic social involvement began to take the form of political liberation.

The Philippine Church in the mid-sixties saw unemployment and the land tenancy system as the two social evils facing the country. Her answer was community development, concretely implemented in the various social action projects that had failed to revolutionize Philippine society...In the early seventies, submitting to the social analysis of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, some priests declared that social problem was not primarily underdevelopment but maldevelopment (sic). The solution was reformation of the power structure. This was to be achieved not by violence but by sociopolitical mass organizations, which would pressure the existing power, e.g., government officials, landlords, to radically reform Philippine society or to heed the demands of justice, e.g., equitable distribution of land (Ibid., 154).

The shift in the Catholic Church's orientation was evident in the activities of the federations that were closely affiliated to it such as the FFF. In 1969, the local FFF chapters and the clergies working at the grassroots level began to actively participate in the
parliament of the streets (Franco, 1994: 14-15). They led a picket in Agrifina Circle, Manila, a month-long barricade in Asuncion, Davao del Norte, the occupation of the Department of Justice and a peasant march to Malacanang Palace on October, 1970 (Ibid., 15).32

The church’s effort at political liberation, however, was strongest in the urban poor areas, particularly in Tondo, Manila.33 Impelled by the need for broader and stronger organization to negotiate for services and more importantly, to press for their claims for land, Tondo’s urban poor groups banded together to form the Council for Tondo Foreshoreland Community Organization (CTFCO) in 1968 and mobilized a march to Malacanang to oppose their forcible eviction. The effort failed because their leaders withdrew their demands after being wined and dined by government officials (Honculada, 1984: 14).

By the early 1970s, the Philippine Ecumenical Council on Community Organization (PECCO)34, an ecumenical church-based service organization, stepped in to assist the Tondo dwellers. PECCO was a unique service organization in the sense that it was a collaborative initiative not only of socially conscious Protestants and the Catholics, but also of middle class social activists of different ideological backgrounds united by the common vision of socially transforming urban communities through community organizing.35 It was also reflective of the efforts of the various groups of the Philippine civil society at the time to set aside their differences to work together in exploring effective strategies of mass mobilization. Like the FFF, PECCO produced a core of well-trained urban community organizers and grassroots leaders. It reconstituted the CTFCO into the Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO). With PECCO’s guidance, ZOTO pioneered unorthodox and creative protest strategies ranging from conflict confrontation and negotiations that enabled it to
score victories for its members (Ibid., 16). The PECCO-ZOTO also made community organizing a regular feature of social activism and later on, NGO social development work.

While the progressive priests and nuns were working with the middle class social activists and the grassroots, the leaders of the Catholic Church, on the other hand, were coordinating with the leaders of the private sector who were interested in doing something to facilitate social reform. In 1971, 50 businessmen established the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP). The motives of these businessmen were both altruistic and self-serving. On one hand, some genuinely had lofty ideals of helping the disadvantaged or sharing their wealth and expertise. On the other hand, they feared that if they would not act to change the situation, another ideology (i.e., communism) would take over that would not look too kindly on their way of life (Velasco: 594).

PBSP introduced a new approach in social involvement that reflected its corporate origin.

PBSP aimed at expanding people’s capacities to gain access to and utilize resources more effectively... At the same time, it also played a crucial role in conscientizing the private sector groups to engage in the upgrading of the situation of the Filipino poor on a productivity-enhancing and social justice basis rather than through welfare approaches (Racelis: 8).

Its approach dovetailed very well with the church’s idea of cooperation among classes and as such, garnered strong support from the latter.

After its establishment, PBSP’s initial project was to sponsor a conference between the Catholic bishops and three business groups in the country namely, the Council for Economic Development, the Philippine Business Council and the Association for Social Action. In the said conference, the business sector proclaimed its commitment to human development even if it meant foregoing high economic returns. The bishops and the
businessmen likewise issued a joint statement condemning communist class warfare, liberal capitalism, the inequitable distribution of burdens and benefits in Philippine society due to inappropriate interventions of the government, graft and corruption, and the patterns of economic relationships which made the tenant dependent on the landlord and the employee, on the employer (Fabros: 143).

By 1972, it was clear that majority of the social institutions (i.e., the church, the academe, even the private business institutions) and sectors of society (i.e., some segments of the elites, the middle class and the grassroots sectors) were in agreement over two issues: (a) the ineffectiveness of the state to address the needs of its citizens, and (b) their disapproval of the incursion of foreign interests on the economic and political well-being of the country. These sentiments were expressed loudly through daily protests and massive demonstrations of the students and the popular sectors. These expressions of popular dissent became the justification of the Marcos administration to impose authoritarian rule. On September 21, 1972, Pres. Marcos signed Presidential Decree 1081 placing the country under Martial Law.

From the above, it could be deduced that the 1960s up until the first two years of the 1970s was a period of social ferment. This situation was triggered by the state’s adoption of economic policies that brought widespread impoverishment to the grassroots sectors and widened the gap in the living conditions of the rich and the poor. Social inequality, in turn, polarized the Filipinos into the elites on the one hand, and the poor grassroots sectors on the other hand, with some factions of the middle class, notably the students and the church people, clearly taking the side and representing the interests of the latter. The elites, however, were divided in terms of economic interests. The manufacturing entrepreneurs had
taken the side of the poor because their economic interests were threatened both by the incursion of foreign businesses in the country as well as by the possibilities of a communist take-over.

Although as a whole, they express support to the grassroots sectors, the middle class was divided in terms of ideological preference. Majority of the intellectuals leaned towards the national democratic ideology and were advocating a nationalist revolution. The church-inspired professionals (i.e., priests, lawyers, educators, social workers, etc.), on the other hand, were opting for peacefully pressuring the state to adopt social reforms. Despite the differences in motivations and ideological preferences, however, the manufacturing elites, the factions of the socially active middle classes and the grassroots sectors were united in their clamor for social change. Amidst differences in preferred strategies, all of them agreed that poverty and social injustice were the priority issues facing the country.

The clamor for social change was further re-enforced by the efforts of the Philippine Catholic Church, which by then was increasingly influenced by liberation theology. Through church support and initiatives, social action centers and ecumenical service associations were set up to undertake the mobilization of the grassroots into self-help people’s organizations.

The 1960s up to 1971 thus saw the broadening of the civil society in the Philippines. For one, new civil organizations – the private voluntary organizations and community organizations – emerged and established alliances with each other. At the grassroots level, for example, the organized urban poor joined the labor and peasant unions in the popular movements for economic reform and social justice. They were joined and eventually led by organizations of students, intellectuals and professionals, and by businessmen.
During the said period also, the divide between the legally acknowledged “civil” society and the outlawed (i.e., “uncivil”) social movements began to blur as links between them were established. Moreover, the inability of the state to address economic and social reform issues as well as its increasing use of violence in responding to protest movements made even the church-inspired civil organizations more willing to engage in conflict confrontation and to use violence as acts of last resort. The period can thus also be described as the phase of initial radicalization of the Philippine civil society. Nonetheless, the blurring of the divide between the “civil” and “uncivil” society will not become crucial until later when the country entered into an era of dictatorship in the 1970s. While the base of the civil society was widening, however, the object of civil society protests became more focused on the state, more specifically, on the state leaders whom they perceived to be corrupt, ineffective in mediating the interests of the various sectors of society and “puppets” of the landowning elites and the foreign capitalists and American imperialists.

Lastly, at this point also, some groups in the civil society, notably the church-affiliated social action centers and service organizations and the corporate voluntary organizations, began to assume more formal organizational structures and adopt systematic program planning and implementation approaches. These would become useful in terms of mobilizing resources and support at the international level later during the period of dictatorship.

For a summary of the nature and characteristics of the Philippine civil society during the pre-authoritarian period, see Appendix 4.1.
Conclusion

From an inclusive standpoint, it could be gleaned that civil society is not a new phenomenon in the Philippines. Semblance of socio-political organizations akin to those described by Tocqueville and social movements that operate in a realm between the unorganized society, the state, the political community and the market economy already existed in the Philippines since the 16th century. These nascent Philippine civil society groups emerged as both the emerging local elites and the grassroots sectors developed consciousness of the wide social and economic differences between themselves and the colonial rulers. This was facilitated by the abuses meted out by the Spanish friars to its local subjects on the one hand, and the exposure of the first Filipino intellectuals – the ilustrados - to the ideas of the Enlightenment, notably, to the concepts of democracy and cooperativism.

These nascent civil society groups served as instruments by which the local elites and the grassroots sectors articulated their sentiments to the colonial state, albeit in two class-based strands, namely the reformist and the revolutionary. The reformist intellectual circles and socio-political associations were identified with the elites while the resistance movements were identified with the grassroots sectors particularly the peasants and the laborers.

Mediating between the two strands of civil society groups were the emerging white-collar middle class whose life conditions were closer to the poor grassroots sectors but whose intellectual affiliations were with the educated elites.

The parallel evolution of the two strands of Philippine civil society was likewise influenced by the differential responses of the colonial state, particularly the American colonial state, to the groups that comprise them. For example, the affirmation of the economic, political and social dominance of the landowning class and the recruitment of the
brightest of the poor into the bureaucracy by the American colonial administration deepened the social inequality between the elites and the poor grassroots sectors during the early American era. This was further exacerbated by its policy to encourage the formation of professional associations by the elites and the budding bureaucrats amidst the outlawing of the peasant and labor union organizations of the grassroots sectors. These led not only to the distinction between the legally acknowledged volunteer associations and the outlawed social movements (i.e., the PKP and its affiliate trade unions), but also to the exclusion of the grassroots sectors from the public sphere.

Corollary to this, differences in the nature of the relationship of the state with the grassroots movements, and the civil associations and volunteer organizations were also already evident even at this point. From the very start, the relationship between the grassroots movements and the state was antagonistic. The former had always associated the state with their oppressors. The latter, on the other hand, had always viewed the grassroots movements as communists and as such, illegal. On the other hand, civil associations associated with the elites and the middle class enjoyed relatively harmonious, at times mutually beneficial, relationship with the state. Even the church-supported social action groups and federations, which were critical of government policies at times, enjoyed relatively cordial relationship with the state. It was because of this that the latter had more success in lobbying for reforms in the legislature.

Related to this, the middle-class based volunteer organizations had been periodically tapped by both the government and the business sectors in the implementation of their assistance programs for the poor. These not only exposed them to the formal set up and procedures of both government and corporate bureaucracies, but also primed them to
eventually assume the role of being conduits of development assistance to the grassroots level.

It could also be gleaned that from the very beginning, the Catholic Church was at the center of the development of the Philippine civil society. Fearing communism, it enlisted the participation of the emerging professional classes (i.e., the lawyers, educators and the religious) to organize volunteer associations that address the social injustices committed against the poor. These church-inspired volunteer associations were able to influence the American colonial government to address the concerns of the grassroots sectors. During the post-colonial period, they were able to win the restive masses away from the communist revolutionary movements by facilitating the emergence of middle class led trade union organizations. In light of these, the government began to recognize the importance of citizens' participation, which in turn, led to the integration of the organized grassroots sectors into the civil society and opened the public sphere to them.

The evolution of the Philippine civil society during this period likewise proved that economic factors such as poverty and income inequality were significant catalysts for getting the citizenry to participate in organized actions. However, it was the response of the Catholic Church to the threat to its existence that compelled it to organize the grassroots sectors. This, in turn, promoted the expansion of the realm of civil society.

In terms of organizational characteristics, it could also be gleaned from the above discussions that it was from the early American period that the promotion of social justice and poverty alleviation started to become the normative premises of the efforts of civil and volunteer associations, as well as the private voluntary organizations and professional service delivery agencies comprising the middle-class led reformist civil society groups. The
Philippine civil society has persistently maintained these up to the present. Equally enduring is the demand for social equality and increased participation in governance and policy-making.

The early Philippine civil society has also been pluralistic from the very start. It has been comprised of various civil associations, private voluntary organizations and social movements that emerged as a result of the needs and context of the historical period on which they emerged. Because of its diversity, however, conflicts among the different civil society groups were also already evident even during the colonial period. In fact, failure to resolve the competition for authority and influence has led to the untimely demise of many of the Philippine civil society groups and social movements starting from the Filipino intellectual circles in Spain during the 18th century, up to the coalition of middle class professionals and urban poor associations, the PECCO-ZOTO, in the 1960s.
ENDNOTES

1. *Indios* refer to the non-property and uneducated natives residents who made up the masses of the colony.

2. Given their economic backgrounds, the *ilustrados* could actually be compared to the bourgeoisie of the European society. Among the most prominent of the *ilustrados* were Jose Rizal, Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, the brothers Juan and Antonio Luna and Mariano Ponce.

3. Among the early Filipino associations founded in Europe were the Circulo Hispano-Filipino founded by Juan Atayde in 1882 in Madrid, the Asociacion Hispano-Filipino founded by Spanish Professor Miguel Morayta in 1889, and the La Solidaridad, which was a purely Filipino organization founded by Galicano Apacible, a cousin of Rizal. They likewise attempted to establish propaganda organs such as the El Eco Filipino, the Revista del Circulo Hispano Filipino, the Espana en Filipinas and eventually, the La Solidaridad, which became the principal organ of the propaganda movement. See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975: 149-151.

4. La Liga Filipina is an organization founded by group of concerned citizens in 1892 to alleviate the social ills in the Philippine colonial society at that time through programs such as scholarships, legal aid and credit. It was an attempt to broaden the mass base of the reform movement. Jose Rizal, a leading critic of the Spanish administration and the Catholic Church, served as its adviser and was the one who prepared its constitution. See Constantino, 1975: 153-154.

5. The *laborantes* are equated to the lower middle class who neither own land nor businesses but were nonetheless educated in colleges and universities in Manila. As such, they share, to some extent, the liberal culture of the *ilustrados*. According to Constantino, the delineation between the Filipino lower middle class and the *ilustrados* of the late 19th century is defined by the extent of their education. The former

   had enough education to be able to imbibe the liberal ideas of the time and transmit them to the people in their own writing. They were also able to articulate the desires of the people. But unlike the *ilustrados*, they were incapable of abstractions. Thus, their writings voiced the raw ideas of the people.

   The *ilustrados*, on the other hand, having acquired more education, could articulate their demands with greater facility and skills; they had greater mastery of the liberal ideas that could be projected and put to use in the struggles of their compatriots.

   For more details, see Tomas M. Kalaw, The Philippine Revolution, Quezon City: Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Foundation, 1969: 2-4.

6. Fathers Gomez, Burgos and Zamora were advocates of the secularization and Filipinization of the Catholic Church in the colony. They were accused and publicly executed for allegedly conspiring in the mutiny of the native workers in the arsenal, artillery barracks and engineering corps of Fort San Felipe in Cavite. See Constantino: 1975: 141-144.

7. One of the issues raised by the *ilustrado* members of the Katipunan against the leadership of Andres Bonifacio at the time when the victory against Spain was becoming apparent was his lack of education. It was a typical *ilustrado* belief that leadership should be an exclusive prerogative of the educated. See Constantino, 1975, 180: 214.

8. The 1898 Treaty of Paris ceded the colonial administration of the Philippines from the Spain to the United States of America.
9. Among these were the Philippine Corporation Law (Republic Act No. 1459), which recognized religious corporations, colleges and other educational institutions as non-profit organizations and the creation of the Public Welfare Board that coordinated philanthropic activities in social services followed thereafter. APPIIN/Philippines. Third Sector History.

10. The _pensionado_ program is an arrangement whereby Filipino public school students were sent by the colonial government to the United States as scholars. Its purpose was to indoctrinate prospective Filipino leaders in the American ways. For more details about the program, see Lewis E. Gleeck Jr, _American Institutions in the Philippines 1898-1941_, Monograph No. XXVIII, Manila: Historical Conversation Society, 1976, 49.

11. This was illustrated by the controversy over the management of the Red Cross in 1916. Irked by the dominance of the Americans in the Red Cross and the exclusion of the Filipinos from many of civic organizations, Filipino civic leaders persuaded the newly established all-Filipino legislature to pass an act establishing a Philippine chapter that was independent of the American Red Cross. The American Attorney General eventually vetoed the legislation but not after it sparked intense lobbying for the faster Filipinization of public administration. As a consequence of the incidence, however, the American colonial administration desisted from supporting civic organizations by 1917. For more details about this incidence, see Gleeck Jr., 1986: 88.

12. Because of prior association with the Spanish colonial administration, the Philippine Catholic Church was unable to mobilize support either from the local elites or the grassroots sectors at this point. With the departure of the Spanish clergies, the Catholic Church was also left with limited manpower. In addition, they have to fend off the spread of Protestantism, whose propagation in the colony was openly supported by the American colonial government.

13. PKP's was established on November 3, 1930. However, its legal existence was short-lived. On January 25, 1931, it held a mass demonstration carrying red flags and anti-imperialist placards. Its leaders were charged with sedition as a result. On October 26, 1932, the Supreme Court declared PKP an illegal organization. See Constantino, 1975: 362-363.

14. At this time, the Catholic Church once again became active on the public sphere. With the coming of the American missionaries, notably the American Jesuits, Catholic educational institutions like the Ateneo de Manila University were revitalized. They soon attracted students from the prominent families and became exclusive schools for the scions of the Filipino elites.

15. These social encyclicals, notably _Quadragisimo Anno_ (The Reconstruction of the Social Order) and _Rerum Novarum_ (The Condition of Labor) emphasized just treatment for workers while they upheld the rights to property, which is the cornerstone of capitalism. _Quadragisimo Anno_ (The Reconstruction of the Social Order) was Vatican's response to the waves of socialism and communism that swept Europe in the early part of the 19th century. Although it condemned communism for supporting violence and the abolition of private ownership, the encyclical also criticized the capitalist imperialism for compelling people to engage in the struggle for domination. The document observed that economic concentration ended free competition and admonished the states for becoming instrumental in perpetuating such due to self-serving greed. In line with these, it called for the state to do its role of promoting social order in society through the establishment of harmony among the different social classes and of promoting common good and redistributive justice.

_Rerum Novarum_ (The Condition of Labor), on the other hand, was issued in 1891 in observation of the growing destitution of the masses and the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. It denounced the decline of public morality and the exploitation of the workers by greedy employers. In relation to this, the encyclical upheld the laborers' right to just labor and the duty of the
employers to take care of their workers. It acknowledged the right of people to association but called on the workers not to injure capital nor employ violent means to represent their cause. It also admonished the state for not looking after the protection of the rights of the poor and called on it to take an active role in the support and defense of the common good and in safeguarding the well being of the poor. For further details about these encyclicals, see CBCP, *Advent Promises*, Manila: 1992, 13 and 18.

16. Under the notion of peasant proprietorship, the Social Actionists believed that landlords could be persuaded to transfer land ownership to their tenants if they would be assured of just compensation for their lands. Within this scheme, the government’s role was limited to persuading the landlords to redistribute their lands, extending agricultural loans to the peasants through rural credit associations, cooperative marketing and other agencies, and passing laws that would protect the peasants against agitators and usurers. See Wilfredo Fabros, *The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines: 1930-1972*, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1988: 26.


18. The Democratic Alliance (DA) was a coalition of ideologically heterogeneous groups espousing anti-collaborationist sentiments and desire for reform. Its members included three guerrilla organizations - the HUKBALAHAP, the Free Philippines and the Blue Eagle; the Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM), a peasant union; the Committee of Labor Organization (CLO), a labor union, and four progressive organizations – the League for National Liberation, the Anti-Traitors League, the Anti-Japanese League, and the Civil Liberties Union. Their five-point program included support to independence without re-examination at anytime, democracy against fascism, anti-collaboration, social security and agrarian reform and industrialization. While the DA was comprised of predominantly reformist leaders with middle class backgrounds, four of its members were from the grassroots sectors. These included Vicente Lava, HUKBALAHAP advisor and Communist Party Leader, Luis Taruc, *Huk* Commander-in-Chief, Juan Feleo, vice-president of the PKM and Mariano Balgos and Pedro Castro of the PLO. All of them were members of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) or the Communist Party. The DA’s mass base of support came from the *Huk* and *Huk* sympathizers from Luzon as well as the CLO-affiliated unions in Manila. For details, see Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: A Continuing Past*, Quezon City: FNS, 1978, 182-183.

19. It was believed that Pres. Manuel Roxas manipulated the charges against the DA congressmen because he was desperate to pass the amendment to the Philippine Constitution that would allow the extension of parity rights to the Americans to own property and business to American citizens. Had the seven unseated DA representatives participated in the congressional vote, the Amendment would not have been ratified. See Constantino and Constantino, 1978: 202-203.

20. To date, ISO is considered the oldest surviving NGO in the country. The organizational evolution of the Institute of Social Order will be discussed more extensively in Chapters 7-9 of this paper.

21. The NAMFREL was funded by the CIA although it also drew support from other civic and business organizations like the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, the Jaycees, National Federation of

22. The *Bell Trade Act of 1945* imposed limits on the Philippine agricultural exports to the U.S. while allowing unlimited entry of American goods in the country. It also introduced a parity agreement granting U.S. citizens and corporations the same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine resources, the rights to acquire land of the public domain, to acquire grazing, fishing and mineral rights, and to engage in ownership and operations of public utilities. For details, see Constantino and Constantino, 1978: 197-206.

23. *Mater et Magistra* (Christianity and Social Progress) upheld the Catholic Church’s support of private ownership. However, it argued that private property should be treated as a social responsibility. It also argued that the industrialized countries should provide aid to the less developed agrarian countries. Nonetheless, the rural workers should be left with the ultimate responsibility to improve their lives.

On the other hand, *Pacem in Terris* (Peace on Earth) condemned colonialism and imperialism and stressed the right of third world nations to independence. It enjoined Catholics and non-Catholics alike to work for social justice. The encyclical further contended that enduring peace could only be attained with truth and justice. However, the structures and forms of most national governments were inadequate to promote such. In light of this, Catholics were enjoined to take active roles in public life and organization so they could influence the government to work for these goals. At the same time, however, the encyclical cautioned Christians to distinguish between false philosophical ideas and movements. For details, see CBCP, 1992: 13-15 and 18. See also Andy Collantes, OSB, *Social Teachings of the Church (Encyclical Letters: Leo XIII – John Paul II)*, n.d., n.p.

24. Through the Vatican II Council, the Catholic Church’s social teachings were significantly influenced by liberation theology from Latin America. Among the documents that came out of the Vatican II Council that significantly shaped the radicalization of the Philippine Catholic Church were:

a. *Gaudium et Spes* (The Church in the Modern World, 1965). This papal encyclical contended that public authorities and private citizens should, first and foremost, protect the common good. If the government and the private businesses do not do so, they are committing social injustice. The document also expressed the church’s view that private property must come with responsibility. It also expressed that if the government and private businesses are not protecting the common good, then it is the role of the Catholic Church to call attention to and address social injustice, even at the point of passing moral judgment. This is true particularly when human rights are at stake.

b. *Populorum Progressio* (The Development of Peoples, 1967). This encyclical elaborated the Catholic Church’s critique of capitalism. It contended that while the prime responsibility for their own development rests on the people themselves, it is the duty of the church to facilitate their self-development. This document also argued that keeping exclusive use of what one does not need when others lack necessities is an act of injustice. More importantly, this document stated that the church has the duty to witness against acts of injustice, as the struggle against injustice is itself an effort to promote common good.

c. *Octogesima Adveniens* (A Call to Action, 1971). This encyclical acknowledged the Marxist view that the quest for economic efficiency could also distort human nature. It also challenged Catholics to address various types of social injustice such as the exploitation of labor, urban-related issues (i.e. such as youth delinquency, the emergence
of the marginalized urban poor and environmental degradation), the persistence of discrimination on the basis of race, origin, color, culture, sex and religion. The encyclical particularly gave emphasis on the rights of the women to participate in social, cultural, economic and political life. It also called attention to the role of media in promoting positive or negative social change. The encyclical highlighted the need for organizing grassroots organizations to change both the oppressive social structures and the attitudes of the people. Unlike the earlier encyclicals, Octogesima Adveniens acknowledged the need for the people to get involved in political activities in order to solve contemporary social problems. More importantly, it called for the preferential option for the poor – a principle that guides the efforts of many church-affiliated Philippine NGOs to date.

The encyclical also called on the Catholics to carefully weight the options between different ideologies. However, it criticized capitalism for breeding the above-mentioned social injustices. For some, this indicated the Catholic Church’s softening its opposition against socialism.

d. Justice in the World (1971). This document denounced the structural injustices that constrain freedom and oppress humanity. It made the observation that those who suffer from injustice are generally those who cannot speak against it. Given this, it expressed that the church must facilitate the liberation of the people from this situation. It must denounce injustice and speak on behalf of the suffering people. Interestingly, the document likewise contended that it is not the church’s duty to offer concrete solutions. It role is limited to promoting the dignity and rights of each human being. The encyclical also contended that the Catholic Church is not bound to any particular political, economic or social system while at the same time, criticized capitalism for causing the imbalance between the wealthy and the poor in the modern world. For some, this signaled a softening of the Catholic Church’s stand on socialism.


25. Credit unions are voluntary organizations of friends and neighbors who agreed to pool their savings together to make loans to one another at low interest rates in order to solve their money problems. They answer a particular felt need; i.e., loan at low interest rate. They also protect the poor from victimization by greedy loan sharks or usurers. Credit unionism also requires people to get organized. In so doing, it provides means for people to have a more active voice in dealing with both public and private agencies. More importantly, credit unionism is ideologically neutral. It thus fits well to the Catholic Church’s idea that society should be restructured through democratic dialogue and not through revolutionary means. See Fabros, 1988: 92 and 109.

26. The Episcopal Commission and NASSA eventually merged into the National Secretariat of Social Action, Justice and Peace in 1969. The integration of “justice and peace” concern signaled NASSA’s integration of social justice efforts to its community development work. It also signaled NASSA’s adoption of the structural analysis as framework for understanding and addressing the root causes of social problems in the country. See Fabros, 1988: 160-164. See also Alegre, 1996a: 8-9.

27. NASSA was set up as a private institution with defined organizational structure. As such, it has a dual character of being both as religious organization and a private institution. Given this, it could actually be considered as the first formally organized church-based NGO.

28. Influenced by Paolo Freire’s model of popular education, some colleges and universities made community immersions part of the social science, social works and theology courses. A., a former
student activist and a pioneer NGO worker, told this researcher that she got into the student movement after her community immersion in Tondo which was part of the requirements of her theology class. It was through this that she became exposed to the conditions of the urban squatters and got involved in community organizing. After completing the immersion program, she continued working in the community, together with other members of the student Catholic action group in her university, as a volunteer. Based on this researcher's informal inquiries, her experiences were, more or less, representative of the career pattern of many student activists during the 1960s who eventually became pioneers of the NGO movement.

29. One of the factors that gave rise to the widespread protests during the 1960s, particularly among the Philippine middle class, was the disillusionment of college graduates who, despite their education, were unable to find suitable jobs. See Roman Dubsky, *Technocracy and Development in the Philippines*, Quezon City: U.P. Press, 1993, 52-53.

30. Claro M. Recto was a legislator known for his consistent opposition to American intervention in Philippine affairs. He was also a staunch advocate of the nationalization of the heavy manufacturing industries and protecting them from foreign competition.

31. It was actually during this period that the rivalry between the natdem comprised of the more militant and communist-oriented groups and the socdem comprised of the moderate cause-oriented socialist groups started. The influence of this schism on the trajectory of the Philippine civil society movement is evident even up to the present.

32. Participation in these activities, however, was primarily the initiatives of the local FFF chapters and was not sanctioned by the federation's national leadership. In fact, these strained the relationship between the FFF national leadership and the local FFF chapters.

33. The urban poor sector was comprised of slum dwellers and squatters lured to the cities by the employment opportunities that opened up as a result of the industrialization policies of the 1950s and those who were pushed out of the rural areas as a result of the mechanization of commercial agriculture in the 1960s. In the Greater Manila Area, the influx of migrants led to the mushrooming of slum and squatter communities. The heaviest concentration of the migrant slum dwellers was in Tondo, Manila where poor migrants preferred to stay because of its proximity to the piers and open markets where employment were available to unskilled laborers. For a more detailed discussion of the urban poor problem in Greater Manila Area un the 1960s, see Leandro A. Viloria, *Manila, Aprodicio A. Laquian (ed.), Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development*, Toronto: Intermet, 1971, 135-150.

34. The leaders and members of PECCO were the first community organizers in the country. Herbert White, a colleague of Saul Alinsky, trained them on the practice of community organizing and lobbying. This will be discussed more extensively in the next chapters. For further discussion on this, however, see Alegre, 1996: 9-10; Jurgette A. Honculada, *Case Study: ZOTO and the Twice­told Story of Philippine Community Organizing*, *Kasarinlan: Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fourth Quarter, 1985: 13-24.

35. Interview with M., a first generation NGO leader. According to her, PECCO also attempted to get the academic social scientists to work collaboratively with the field-based social workers in developing applied research methods that could be used both as a tool for data gathering and conscientization of the urban poor. These came to be known later as participatory action research (PAR). This was influenced by Paolo Freire's concept of pedagogy of the oppressed.

36. PBSP was not the first initiative of the business community to engage in socially oriented initiatives. As noted earlier, some private individuals and business corporations established philanthropic organizations to address the needs of their workers during the post-war era. They likewise participated in the efforts to make election peaceful through the NAMFREL. In the early
1970s, however, amidst the widespread social discontent of the grassroots sectors, the businessmen deemed it more effective to pool their resources and embark on a concerted and more systematic approach to poverty alleviation. They set aside 1 percent of their net income before taxes to support an organized, professional and sustained poverty alleviation program for the marginalized Filipinos. See http://www.pbsp.org.ph, n.d., n.p.
CHAPTER 5 – THE RISE OF PHILIPPINE NGOs (1972-1986)

Up until the 1970s, the nascent Philippine civil society was comprised on the one hand, of middle class-based civil and volunteer associations, which collaborate closely with the state and the grassroots-based unions and social movements that were primarily held suspect and at times, rendered illegal by the state. In the early 1970s, however, the economic crisis and the inability of the Philippine government to effect social reforms led these two strands of civil society groups to unite in waging a widespread protest movement against the state. As the state responded to this with military and police actions, violence and riots erupted. On September 21, 1972, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos and the military declared Martial Law and ushered in an era of dictatorship. While this initially weakened the civil society, it eventually led the various voluntary associations and grassroots movements to formally organize themselves, establish tactical alliances and work together. This chapter discusses the political, social and economic developments that transpired during this period and the changes these brought in the orientation, composition and characteristics of the Philippine civil society.

The Suppression and Outlawing of Civil Society (1972-1977)

With the signing of Presidential Decree 1081, Pres. Marcos placed the whole Philippines under Martial Law. Civil rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from unlawful arrest were suspended. All newspapers, magazines, radio and television facilities were closed except those controlled by the Marcoses and their allies. A midnight curfew was imposed throughout the nation to control movements of people. The Congress and Senate were padlocked and kept under guard by the military to
prevent the legislators from convening and deliberating on the legality of the presidential announcement.

The military takeover was strategically timed during the weekend to ensure that oppositionists (i.e., the dissenting elites, the middle class social activists and the organized grassroots movements) would not be able to mobilize a protest movement. Around 30,000 to 50,000 critics of the Marcos administration were initially detained. Although most of them were eventually released, around 6,000 remained incarcerated until 1975 (Timberman: 1991, 77).

With the systematic clampdown on all oppositions, and the arrest, torture and “salvaging”1 of suspected oppositionists, all legal efforts to organize the citizenry, particularly the grassroots sectors, were halted (Alegre: 1996a: 11). Only the Catholic Church was left intact and only because it adopted a position of “critical collaboration” with the state (Tiglao: 1988, 59). Thus, many of the well-known social activists and leaders of the organized grassroots movements were left with no option but to join the underground ideological parties to wage an armed struggle against the dictatorship (Constantino-David, 1997: 28). Taking advantage of the political opportunities and challenges, the CPP founded the National Democratic Front (NDF), a “popular front” of communist-leaning groups opposed to the Marcos regime in April 1973. The NDF took charge of organizing, propaganda work and the penetration of non-communist organizations including some voluntary organizations supported by the Catholic Church (Timbermann: 89).2

By contrast, the moderate socdem groups affiliated with the Catholic Church initially adopted a wait and see attitude. They carefully observed if the regime was serious in its reformist statements or not (Tiglao: 63). However, the increase in human rights abuses and
continuing persecution eventually compelled them to engage in organized underground struggle against the authoritarian regime as well. By May 1973, the \textit{Nagkakaisang Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas} or Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP) was formed. It set up its urban-based armed wing, the \textit{Sandigan}, in 1976 (Tiglao: 63).\footnote{The party had around 200 members and a mass base of 5,000 recruited mainly from the ranks of the FFW ((PDSP, 1983; Dejillas: 1994: 42).}

With the above ground opposition movements silenced, Pres. Marcos embarked on efforts to legitimize his dictatorial regime. Almost simultaneous to the declaration of Martial Law, he issued Presidential Decree 27 declaring the whole country as a land reform area. This not only allowed him to neutralize the landed elites whose influence in the Congress shaped the economic policies of the country, but also won for him the support of leftwing peasant groups like the MASAKA.\footnote{This initially appeased the Catholic Church and its affiliate union organizations such as the FFF.}

To win the support of the business elites, the second major source of support for the moderate (i.e., non-communist) protest movements, Pres. Marcos ordered raids on the urban poor areas believed to be the refuge of criminals and communist subversives. Furthermore, he also imposed a total strike ban and set up a system whereby representatives of the industrial sector, a government-controlled labor arbitration center, and the Ministry of Labor discuss yearly increase in minimum wages instead (Tiglao: 28). More importantly, he brought in technocrats into the government to provide advise on how to undertake national planning and to serve as active reformers of government’s development administration practices.\footnote{Given the favorable international trade conditions, Pres. Marcos also significantly increased the state’s economic role by nationalizing several major commercial enterprises. Given the favorable international trade conditions, Pres. Marcos also significantly increased the state’s economic role by nationalizing several major commercial enterprises.}. Given the favorable international trade conditions, Pres. Marcos also significantly increased the state’s economic role by nationalizing several major commercial enterprises.
environment at the time, these benefited the urban middle class and the traditional elites. Thus, they initially capitulated to martial rule.

To minimize opposition, the Marcos administration also attempted to control the activities of the middle class-based civil and voluntary associations by literally cutting off their financial support and mass base while simultaneously co-opting the grassroots-based groups. It cut the shares of proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes allocated to prominent rural service delivery agencies like the PRRM. In 1976, it imposed a one percent tax on business profits for the establishment of a government-controlled Community Fund—a move intended to curb the flow of funds to corporate foundations like the PBSP.

According to Clarke (1998: 62–63), the government also initially excluded these groups from participating in government-initiated programs and opted instead to develop barrio councils, citizen assemblies, barrio associations and cooperatives. It made membership in the *Samahang Nayon* (Community Assembly) mandatory for farmers seeking to be included as beneficiaries of the land reform program. Its intention was not only to build a mass base support for the state, but also to undermine the independent rural cooperatives.

The combination of military repression, cordial relations with the Catholic Church, alliance building with the business elites, and the deprivation of financial support and access to mass base prevented the emergence of strong opposition efforts against the state. These kept the protest movements at bay for a year. However, as the state intensified military operations in the urban and rural communities suspected of harboring “revolutionaries”, the people turned to the Catholic Church for help, leaving the clergy with no recourse but to raise concern about human rights violations.
The local Catholic priest found himself ministering not only to the spiritual needs of his community but more and more, to their temporal needs. When villagers were abused they went to their parish priests. When husbands disappeared or were arrested, the wives and children went to the parish priests (Benigno Aquino as quoted by Timberman: 101).

This strained the “critical collaboration” between the Catholic Church and the state. The military and paramilitary units arrested, detained and at times murdered nuns and priests critical of the Martial Law regime. They also raided seminaries and convents suspected of hiding subversives and oppositionists. In 1973, the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) set up the Task Force Detainees (TFD) to monitor and document human rights abuses, disseminate information about these, and provide support to political detainees and their families (Timberman: 102; Tiglao: 59). Other civil and voluntary organizations under the ambit of the Church followed suit.

In addition to human rights violations, the Catholic Church also became alarmed with the displacement and exploitation of the grassroots sectors under the state-sponsored modernization and export-oriented industrialization policies. These prompted the priests, nuns and lay workers to intensify the organization of Basic Christian Communities or BCCs (Tiglao: 60). Amidst the suppression of the freedom of assembly and of the press, the BCCs served as alternative public spheres where organized grassroots sectors articulated their grievances against the state and come up with self-help solutions. In turn, they attracted socially conscious professionals – lawyers, doctors, social scientists and social workers – who wished to continue their struggle for social change without having to join the underground ideological parties.

The non-ideological social activists were not the only ones drawn by the Catholic Church’s initiatives to address the needs of the victims of human rights abuses and those
displaced by the state’s modernization projects, however. Members of the underground ideological parties such as the NDF and the PDSP also joined the Catholic social action centers and the church-supported civil and volunteer organizations because they provided the underground ideological parties the legal organizational structures to pursue their anti-dictatorship struggle.

**Illustration 1 – Motivations for Entry to NGO Work (Pioneer NGO Workers)**

| It is not NGO work per se that we entered. NGO became a consequence of our involvement in the movement. And that movement was broadly defined at that time as a movement against the dictator; a movement for change. |
| D - A first generation NGO worker |

| It was already beginning within the Church – the perspective that there should be more. There was also the Theology of Liberation... It was a period of rethinking – creating new spaces and new paradigms—which was happening worldwide... The sociopolitical environment was Martial Law, not EDSA... The people who dropped out of school because they had to go into activism first went underground, and later emerged and went into NGO work. |
| K - A first generation NGO worker |

| There were only two choices then: to go underground or go into NGO work. Those who went into the NGOs were often looked down upon by those underground. Nevertheless, I felt then that I could do more if I went into social development work and thus decided to set up an NGO. |
| G - A first generation NGO worker |

| During Martial Law, there was a notion that all those who had the heart should go up to the hills. I worked for a year in the urban sector. My colleagues were wiped out. I was always the only one left. I was also caught and tortured, but I managed to escape. |
| P - A first generation NGO worker |

Focus group discussions on the question “What Factors Led My Entry into NGO Work?” participated by three generations of NGO workers.

**Source:** Joint PHILDARRA-PHILSSA Workshop on Nurturing Commitments to Social Development Proceedings, 31 July-August 1995: 7-11.

In turn, the influx of socially conscious and committed volunteer workers allowed the Catholic social action centers and the church-supported voluntary organizations to expand their awareness building and grassroots organizing efforts. For example, in addition to Tondo, PECCO was able to expand its organizing activities to other urban poor communities like the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, Cagayan de Oro and Butuan and in rural communities like Infanta, Bicol, Bukidnon, Lanao and Southern Leyte (Alegre: 1996a:
121

12). The NASSA, on the other hand, was able to intensify it efforts to cater to the needs of the “poor, deprived and oppressed” of the Philippine society by setting up regional counterpart social action centers namely, the LUSSA in Luzon, VISSA in the Visayas, and MISSA in Mindano (Ibid., 13).

Under the protection of the Catholic Church, social activists test out various ways of continuing their struggle against state repression. Some organized protest actions within the confines of the academe where dissent was relatively tolerated to create an impression of “academic freedom”. Some universities such as the University of the Philippines and the Ateneo de Manila University accommodated them under their community outreach and extension offices. In the absence of a legally permitted public sphere, these extension offices served as alternative venues for articulating and mobilizing protests actions and as vehicles for recruiting students into the underground ideological parties.

Others set up service delivery organizations that specialized in popular education, community organizing and advocacy of social agenda like agrarian and aquatic reform, rural development, trade union rights, and rights of indigenous peoples (Alegre: 1996a, 4). Many of these service delivery organizations started out as programs or units of church-based voluntary organizations that later on sought autonomy from the Catholic Church institution so they could pursue particular political and ideological agenda. However, they continued to be influenced by the principles of liberation theology influence.

While the middle class social activists found the vehicles to continue their social involvement in the church-supported voluntary associations, in the academe and in service delivery organizations, grassroots leaders and rural community organizers concentrated on the strengthening of independent cooperatives (Alegre: 1996a: 16; Constantino-David,
In 1977, five regional cooperative centers set up the National Association of Training Centers on Cooperatives (NATCCO) as a common front against government regulation (Alegre: 1996a, 16).

The inhospitable political climate for civil society efforts during the initial years of the Martial Law era likewise made the social activists and grassroots leaders realize the need to establish some form of unity in dealing with the state. Among these initiatives were the trainings undertaken by PECCO where the natdems and the socdems, the Protestants and the Catholics, the academics and the community organizers learned the basic principles of community organizing. The initiatives to work together were not confined to the groups dominated by church-based activists, however. Non-political groups such as the corporate foundations likewise saw this as a critical step for unity. In December 1972, ten foundations came together to form the Association of Foundation (AF). Together with PBSP, the AF assumed a “critical collaboration mode” in dealing with the Marcos regime. As national networks, the AF and PBSP dialogued with the government to advance the interests of its members and its constituents (e.g., campaign for tax-exemption, lobby against legislation meant to regulate foundations, etc.). In later years these non-ideological groups became conduits of government funds to groups adjudged by the government as subversives.

Given these, it could be deduced that the suppression of public expression of dissent and protest activities did not silence the opposition to the state. Rather, it merely facilitated the establishment of the links between the legally recognized church-based voluntary organizations and the outlawed ideological parties. The former served as abeyance organizations that sustained the underground ideological parties during the time of repression. They functioned as legal fronts of the revolutionary movements, recruiting
members and serving as conduits of resources for the latter. This arrangement became possible because the social activists who worked above ground with the church-based voluntary organizations maintained their links with the underground ideological parties either as contact persons and/or as community organizers. Consequently, however, this imbued the community organizing efforts of the church-based voluntary organizations with a Marxist tone - a dramatic reversal of their anti-communist efforts in the 1950s (Constantino-David: 28).

The imposition of an authoritarian government also changed the characteristics of the Philippine civil society as a whole. Prior to Martial Law, the efforts of the Philippine civil society were focused on sectoral issues and directed against specific factions of the elites (e.g., the landlords and manufacturing entrepreneurs). During the Martial Law period, however, their efforts became directed towards the agencies of the state notably, the military. Furthermore, the middle class civil and voluntary organizations, which used to work closely with the state, became pronouncedly antagonistic to it. Corollary to this, they also became more open to the use of revolutionary means of social change.

Secondly, since all oppositionists were categorized and equally persecuted as “communist subversives”, social activists affiliated with various ideological groups, including those who were non-aligned politically, were compelled to cooperate with each other in their struggle against the Marcos dictatorial regime. The establishment of national networks such as the AF and the NATTCO as well as the PECCO trainings and community organizing efforts were examples of these attempts at joint engagements. These made their tools for social analysis (i.e., Marxist ideas, structural analysis), goals (i.e., protection of human rights, protection of the grassroots sectors against exploitation and displacement due
to modernization programs of the government, and the toppling the Marcos dictatorship) and tactics (i.e., community organizing, armed struggle) markedly similar. Nonetheless, ideological differences persisted and periodically led to competition and factionalism among them.

Thirdly, since many of the church-based voluntary organizations were legal fronts of the underground movements, they had to operate under close state surveillance. This made them creative in framing their popular education and community organizing efforts within programs that were acceptable to the state such as relief and welfare services to disaster victims, charity work, pastoral services, appropriate technologies, preventive health, propagation of indigenous health practices (e.g., herbal medicine and acupuncture), cooperative development and/or socio-economic assistance to the disadvantaged sectors. The incorporation of these programs to social activism led to the adoption of social development as part of their voluntary work.

Lastly, since the Marcos administration literally cut these voluntary organizations’ access to government funding, they had to tap support from foreign sources. Organizations engaged in activities critical of the government such as the Task Force Detainee, on the other hand, had to establish links with international humanitarian agencies to generate public support and protect itself and its clients from military reprisals. Initially these links were established through the interventions of the Catholic Church. This started the institutional relationship between the voluntary organizations and the international donor institutions, which eventually led to the recognition of the latter as alternative service delivery structures.
Cause-Oriented Groups and the Service Delivery NGOs (1978-1983)

From 1972 to 1977, lack of support and the tight state control over the public sphere kept the underground resistance movements in check. The increase in the state’s involvement in the market, however, had dire consequences for the economy as it involved the nationalization of some industries, the granting of concessions to and bailing out of the businesses of Marcos’ favorite crony capitalists, all of which were financed through heavy external borrowings (de Dios, 1988: 88-104). Prior to 1978 when the world economic conditions were more favorable, the non-crony businessmen did not mind because they were not affected. However, the increase in international lending rates and the imposition of stricter World Bank-IMF lending conditions to the Philippines starting 1978 bore down on non-crony businesses. As the effects of these international developments intensified, the business community was forced to seek government reforms. In 1982, the influential Makati Business Club – an association of the top 1,000 Philippine corporations – appealed to Pres. Marcos to foster an environment of honesty, integrity, peace, and greater confidence in the government; to curb military abuse and government corruption; a stop to red tape, graft and corruption, and cronyism; to define and pull-out government involvement from private sector concerns and business; to remove the lopsided competition from government; and to protect the media in its crusade against injustice and curtailment of human freedom (de Dios: 102-104). Their appeal was responded to by threats of prosecution for acts of destabilization. This strained the relationship of the Marcos regime with the business community.

Even earlier than this, the technocrats who initially had a considerable hand in economic planning also found themselves marginalized in the Marcos administration.
Hand in hand with the enlarged role of the government in the economy came the politicization and corruption of economic decision-making. The roots of this can be traced back to the demise of the power of the “technocrats” which some say was signaled by Imelda Marcos’ successful sacking of the Executive Secretary... The result was that “having freed his technocrats from interference by members of the Congress he (Marcos) permitted his kinsmen and cronies to interfere instead (Timberman: 107).

Although many of the disgruntled technocrats stayed in the government, some left to join the ranks of the anti-dictatorship movement.9

These had consequences on the Philippine economy. By the early 1980s, corruption, cronyism and economic mismanagement took their toll on the standard of living of the average Filipino. The real earnings of salaried employees dropped to 93 percent of their 1972 earnings while those of the wageworkers dropped to 87 percent. Along with declining real incomes came a worsening distribution of income. Census figures showed that the poorest 60 percent of all Filipino households received 25 percent of the nation’s total income in 1971. By 1979, their share of national income had shrunk to only 22 per cent. The rich had become richer while the poor, poorer (Timberman: p. 113). The impact of the widening social inequality was especially felt in the rural areas where government's agricultural policies and infrastructure programs led to the displacement and impoverishment of the already poor farmers and indigenous people (de Dios: p. 122). These, coupled with the increased militarization in the countryside, caused the rapid expansion of mass-based support to the CPP-NPA.

At the time when the weaknesses of Martial Law were becoming evident, pressure from the international community compelled Pres. Marcos to prove that his leadership was legitimate and that the country was on its way towards political normalization. Thus, in 1978, he called for the election and convening of an Interim
Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly). To give a semblance of electoral democracy, he allowed the traditional political opposition parties to participate in the election. Some of the traditional political parties like the Liberal Party and opposition groups like the Civil Liberties Union denounced the election as a useless exercise and campaigned instead for a boycott. However, some opposition groups like the Lakas ng Bayan or LABAN (People Power) headed by the incarcerated Benigno Aquino and a few small groups in Visayas and Mindanao opted to participate to at least be heard and rouse the people’s sentiments and awareness. The limited open public space given to the legal opposition provided opportunity for the people to express their pent-up protest against the dictatorship. On the evening of April 6, 1978, Manila was rocked by a massive noise barrage expressing their support for the LABAN party (de Dios: 70).

Until then, the only open and large-scale resistance to the dictatorship had been put up by the armed underground movements... whose operations were predominantly in the countrysides. The noise barrage... not only added a new locus to the resistance but also succeeded in enlisting open support from the hitherto unorganized majority of the middle classes, apart from the underground urban mass organizations (Ibid., 71).

With limited campaign time and virtually no access to mass media, LABAN lost in the election. However, the manipulation of the election results to ensure that victory of the Marcos controlled Kilusang Bagong Lipunan or KBL (Movement for a New Society) convinced even the most moderate elements of society that drastic action was in order. Immediately after the election, a peaceful march participated by 500 people was held to protest the fraudulent election. The protest was broken up and hundreds of participants, among them prominent opposition leaders, were arrested.
However, the international pressure on the Marcos administration to normalize the political situation in the Philippines had intensified. Assistance from the United States and the World Bank-IMF were pegged on addressing human rights concerns, curbing corruption in the government and the restoration of democratic institutions like the election. Again, yielding to international pressure, Pres. Marcos allowed the election of local officials to be held in 1980. In 1981, he lifted Martial Law but maintained a tight reign over political activities, with the military having the power to indefinitely arrest and detain suspected “subversives”. Despite strict limits on freedom of expression, however, the anti-dictatorship protesters took advantage of the minimum opening of the democratic space.

These further affected the social involvement of the Catholic Church. Prior to 1978, the church was divided in its position vis-à-vis the Marcos administration with the conservatives strongly arguing for the church not to get involved in political concerns. In 1978, however, harassments united the moderates and the leftists groups within the Catholic Church against the Marcos administration. Pastoral letters and statements calling for the end of martial law were issued individually and collectively by the CBCP. By 1982, Cardinal Sin described the Church’s relationship with the Marcos government to be “more critical than collaborative” (Timberman: 103).

These contributed to the expansion of the “legally acknowledged” Philippine civil society as well as encouraged the innovativeness of the groups within it. First, in light of the displacement and rapid deterioration of the socio-economic conditions of various grassroots sectors, church-based and/or school-based community organizers and social activists of specific professional education and skills intensified the setting up of social development
agencies and the development of socio-economic programs in their respective institutions that would cater to the needs of particular grassroots clientele. For example, the displacement of tribal communities and settlers in the face of environmentally destructive projects of the Marcos administration such as the Chico River Dam, the Cellophil factory in Abra, the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, the Kawasaki Sintering Plant in Cagayan de Oro, and the Copper Smelter Plant in Batangas stimulated the creation of numerous social development agencies that deal with indigenous people’s rights like the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference (MSPC) and environmental protection like the Philippine Federation for Environmental Concerns (PFEC) (Alegre: 1996a, 18). Sector-based agencies such as the Workers’ College (WC), Forum for Rural Concerns (FRC), Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education (EILER) and Community Extension and Research for Development (CERD), on the other hand, were set up to assist in the revival of the trade unions and peasant-based movements that were suppressed when Martial Law was declared (Ibid.). These social development agencies were led and managed by social activists with specialized backgrounds on environmental science, agriculture, fishery development and community development.

As modernization and militarization resulted to increased incidences of human rights abuses, cause-oriented groups likewise proliferated. For example, the exploitation of women factory workers, the increase of sex workers amidst the promotion of tourism industry and the rape and torture of women political detainees led to the formation of or resuscitation of women’s movement organizations like the Concerned Women of the Philippines (CWP) in 1978, the Women’s Center for Trade Unionists in 1982, PILIPINA in 1981 and KALAYAAN in 1983 (Raquiza, 1997: 175). Increase in the incidences of arrests, tortures,
salvaging and _hamleting_ on the other hand, led to the emergence of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI) and the Medical Action Group (MAG), an association of concerned doctors, nurses and health professionals. Alongside the Task Force Detainee, which continued to investigate and document human rights abuses, these cause-oriented groups provided legal and medical assistance to the victims of military atrocities. Furthermore, these cause-oriented groups also engaged in public awareness campaigns and networked with international human rights agencies for lobbying support. It was initially through the efforts of these cause-oriented groups in human rights protection that the Philippine civil society got the attention of the international community.

During the period also, the practice of the Marcos administration to manipulate information to depict a rosy picture of the country’s socio-economic conditions resulted to widespread distrust of government-generated development reports. To address the dearth of credible sources of information on the socio-economic status of the country, alternative research institutions like the _Ibon_ Databank and Alternative Forum for Research were set up by concerned economists and political scientists to cull and analyze socio-economic information from different sources and come up with national situation analysis independent from the state. The studies conducted by these alternative research institutions exposed the inconsistencies in government reports, policies and performances as well as the anomalies and corruption committed by the Marcos administration. Advocacy groups such as the Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection (CACP), on the other hand, disseminated such information to the public (Alegre: 1996a, 18).
The proliferation and diversification of the social development agencies and cause-oriented groups within the context of a constrained public sphere, on the other hand, stimulated experimentation in terms of approaches and tools for grassroots work. Thus, participatory action research, popular education, alternative medicine and appropriate technology became part of the civil society’s repertoire of community interventions. More importantly however, community organizing, which had become a regular feature of the Philippine civil society programs, was subjected to new interpretations and approaches that were context and purpose-specific. These, in turn, contributed to the emergence of a grassroots-oriented and targeted development approach that was uniquely associated with the NGOs and which was effective in directly addressing the needs of the grassroots sectors.

Since the social development agencies and cause-oriented groups protect and immediately address their needs, they were able to establish closer relationships with the grassroots sectors and facilitated the setting up of people’s organizations (POs). Through community organizing, they were able to facilitate qualitative increase in the organized mass movements (Alegre: 1996a,17). Networking efforts, on the other hand, facilitated the forging of alliances and PO federations along sectoral lines (i.e., labor, peasants, women, youths, etc.). By the time that open protests erupted in 1983, POs were already federated, mobilized and ready for action.

Meanwhile, documentations of the Marcos regime’s human rights abuses and systematic international propaganda work by the political oppositionists and cause-oriented groups resulted to the massive inflow of foreign funds for development work during this period (Ibid.). Initially, support came primarily from European-based Catholic and Protestant voluntary organizations, which channeled funds through the Catholic and
Protestant churches that then allocated such to the social development agencies, cause-oriented groups and POs. By late 1970s, reports of government corruption as well as the ineffectiveness of the Philippine government in disbursing official development assistance (ODA) prompted some foreign governments and bilateral agencies, particularly those that were from Europe, to channel aid to social development agencies and private voluntary organizations through co-financing agencies (Clarke: 111). Dutch aid to the Philippines amounting to $7 to $8 million, for example, were channeled almost exclusively through CEBEMO, ICCO and SNV which, as earlier noted, used the church institutions as fund conduits to civil society groups (Ibid.). Even the USAID engaged in co-financing projects with private philanthropic organizations and business-supported voluntary organizations like the PBSP. At this point, therefore, the social development agencies became acknowledged as legitimate alternatives to the Philippine government agencies as service delivery structures. The international development agencies applied the generic term “NGOs” to refer to these social development agencies and private voluntary organizations.

With this, the social development agencies (a.k.a., NGOs) carved a niche for themselves in development work that was distinct from the social justice initiatives of the Catholic Church and the propaganda efforts of the underground revolutionary movements. Nonetheless, the NGOs were still dependent on these social institutions for manpower and logistical support. Moreover, their goals and objectives were still anchored on the tenets of liberation theology (i.e., propagating faith that does justice) and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies (i.e., mobilizing the oppressed classes against the landlords and capitalists). In the struggle for the anti-dictatorship, the NGOs thus remained as social action arms of the Catholic Church and/or as legal fronts of the revolutionary movements. Concretely, these
links were manifested by the Catholic Church channeling foreign funds to the NGOs, and the later consequently funneling substantial portions of such to the revolutionary movements. For example, it was contended that CPP cadres in NGOs submitted funding proposals to overseas donors in the latter part of the 1970s while in 1980, regular “taxation” of NGOs was introduced by the CPP-NPA (Clarke: 116).

As the number and types of NGOs proliferated, community organizers and social activists explored banding together for purposes of lobbying, advocacy and even sharing of experiences and ideas. One of the early results of NGO networking was the establishment of Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources (PHILDHRRA). Established in 1978 by representatives of different NGOs nationwide, PHILDHRRA was conceptualized as a national network that would facilitate dialogue and mutual assistance among NGOs. It also aimed to pursue advocacy and public awareness building of grassroots concerns that cut across NGOs (Liamzon, 1988: 109-111). Aside from PHILDHRRA, however, regional and provincial networks were also set up to facilitate unity among like-minded NGOs. Parallel networks of POs were likewise created like the Philippine Assistance for Rural and Urban Development (PARUD), which facilitated all forms of support for their programs and forged solidarity linkages abroad (Alegre: 1996a, 21). Despite the pursuit of unified fronts, however, the NGOs, cause-oriented groups and POs comprising the Philippine civil society remained divided in terms of ideological bent.

In summary, the organizational expressions of Philippine civil society during the period of 1978-1983 took the forms of middle class led and managed social development agencies and cause-oriented groups that directly addressed the socio-economic problems and concerns created by increased militarization and modernization policies of the
Marcos administration. They proliferated because of the limited opening of the public sphere afforded by the controlled restoration of democratic institutions like the elections in 1978 as well as the “lifting” of Martial Law in 1981 at the behest of the international community. The latter, however, were influenced by the public information campaigns conducted by cause-oriented groups, notably those engaged in human rights protection.

With the proliferation and diversification of programs of social development agencies and cause-oriented groups, new approaches to development administration emerged. Notable among these was community organizing which allowed greater participation of the grassroots sectors in the development process and facilitated effective service delivery and program implementation. This, in turn, caught the attention of foreign governments and international development agencies, which at the time were becoming frustrated with the corrupt and inept performance of the Philippine government agencies in implementing official development assistance. By the early 1980s, therefore, these international organizations opted to tap these agents of civil society as alternative service delivery structures. Simultaneously, they also used the term “NGOs” to refer particularly to these social development agencies and private voluntary organizations. In so doing, they did not only formally acknowledge the social development NGOs as legitimate development agents. They also facilitated the emergence of the NGO sector.

This also distinguished the NGOs from church-based civil and voluntary organizations and the revolutionary movements even though they remained significantly influenced by the Catholic Church and the revolutionary movements, and at the core of the anti-dictatorship movement. Nonetheless, signs that they were already recognizing their strength as a separate sector of civil society could already be discerned from their
efforts to establish networks aimed at strengthening their positions vis-à-vis the state and international development agencies.

At this period also, the influence of the NGOs on the grassroots, notably the POs, became more pronounced. With the NGOs responsible for organizing, training and funding PO activities, there was no doubt that the NGO community hold some power over the POs and could thus mobilize them for action. This would become crucial in 1983 when the anti-dictatorship movement began to defy the Marcos administration and initiate efforts to demand the restoration of democracy in the country.

The NGOs as a “Middle” Force (1983-1986)

On August 21, 1983, Benigno Aquino, political archrival of Pres. Marcos was shot by an unidentified killer right at the airport after he arrived from the U.S. In days that followed, the urban Filipinos, notably the middle class professionals, expressed their outrage and placed the responsibility for the crime to the Marcos administration. On September 14, the first anti-Marcos rally was held at the Makati business district, followed by a rally on September 21 – the anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law – at Liwasang Bonifacio. Big crowds of middle class professionals and businessmen who normally abhorred popular rallies were in attendance (Timberman: 127; Diokno: 1988, 141). Thereafter, a series of anti-dictatorship mobilizations were held until it culminated in the People Power Revolution of February 1986.
Illustration 2. Motivations for Entry to NGO Work (Successor Generation of NGO Workers)

I was a... a banking and finance graduate... But in the financial organization that I joined, I was different... There was (sic) some pressure not to get involved, but I maintained my links, providing financial support... When Ninoy (Benigno Aquino) was killed, something was stirred deep within me and I was asking myself, “How could this happen?” At that time, many things were happening in Mindanao... I chose then to return to development work... Many of us who went into the corporate sector would return to the movement. I went to NGO work in 1983.

- P, a second generation NGO worker

I used to join socially oriented organizations. It was a whole package—with retreat, education and organizing component. During our retreat, at the height of EDSA, we burned our diplomas. All of us entered social development work.

- A, second generation NGO

Focus group discussions on the question “What Factors Led My Entry into NGO Work?” participated by three generations of NGO workers.


Aquino’s death convinced the Catholic Church hierarchy of the need to actively call for the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship (Casper, 1995: 79). Cardinal Sin underscored that the political role of the church as a galvanizing force behind those in sympathy with the principles symbolized by Aquino’s death was something that Pres. Marcos had to contend with (Sacerdoti as cited by Casper: 82). He was also explicit that efforts towards re-democratization must rest on the lay people (i.e., the organized sectors) and that they must be non-violent. Despite throwing support to the anti-dictatorship movement, however, it still offered national reconciliation to the Pres. Marcos and his supporters.

Fearing the possibility of a bloody revolution, the business sector followed up Cardinal Sin’s call for national reconciliation, which Pres. Marcos rejected. Instead, he warned the “executives in coat and tie” (referring to the Makati businessmen) and the clergy bourgeois that the regime would not let them get away with their destabilization acts (Diokno, 1988: 142). The threat made the businessmen lean further towards the anti-
dictatorship movement. In the succeeding days, the usually apolitical Makati financial
district became a venue for rallies and forums where the socio-economic and political
crisis in the country were discussed.

The display of public outrage likewise prompted the reactivation of the elite-
based traditional political opposition parties immobilized by the arrests and detention of
leading political figures. In 1984, despite disunity among themselves and the rampant
vote buying, intimidation, fraud and delayed vote count tactics by the ruling KBL party,
the opposition parties won a total of 61 out of 183 seats (Timberman: 130-131).14

Aquino's death opened the floodgate of protests against the Marcos dictatorship.
The political unrest, in turn, exacerbated the economic crisis that the country was already
facing. Foreign banks refused to renew short term financing due to “capital flight”
triggered by fear of political turmoil and the loss of confidence in the government due to
the publicized corruption of the Marcos family and their cronies. As a result, economic
situation worsened. In 1985, roughly 64 percent of the Filipinos lived below poverty line.
Worse, the gap between the rich and the poor, which was already wide to begin with
further widened, with the lowest 20% of households receiving 6 percent of the total
income earned and the highest 20% receiving over 53% of the total income earned
(Celoza, 1997:127). With the economic crisis at hand, the political unrest got worse.

The consequent economic crisis made the CPP-NPA’s presence at the grassroots
level stronger. By 1985, the CPP-NPA boasted of having more than 20,000 cadres,
16,500 full-time guerillas and 6,000 revolutionary mass organizations. It also had
influence over 350 factories, 300 schools and 8,000 barangays throughout the country
(Timberman: 136-137).
Amidst the political and economic crisis that it triggered, however, the most crucial development that the Aquino assassination produced was the consolidation of the cause-oriented sector – the middle force - that provided the balance between the traditional elite politicians and the grassroots based revolutionaries. Although it shared the anti-dictatorship sentiment with the traditional politicians and the revolutionaries, the emergent cause-oriented sector was generally centrist in orientation. They subscribed to active non-violence approach to social change and their principal strategy for confronting the dictatorship was pressure politics.\(^{15}\)

As discussed earlier, cause-oriented groups, together with the social development NGOs, were already addressing human rights and socio-economic issues as early as 1978. With the Aquino assassination, however, these cause-oriented groups and NGOs realized the urgency of uniting all opposition forces into a unified front against the Marcos dictatorship. With this in mind, they formed themselves into alliances and coalitions. The primary cause-oriented organizations (i.e., the cause-oriented groups and NGOs) continued with their non-political social development programs while the coalitions and alliances that they formed engaged in overtly political anti-dictatorship networking and advocacy work. The combination of social development and political advocacy efforts ensured organizational support (i.e., manpower and logistics) and mass base to the anti-dictatorship movement. The social development NGOs particularly were responsible for stepping up community organizing efforts to build the mass base for the protest mobilizations and campaigns. They also facilitated the forging of regional and national federations and alliances of POs (Alegre: 1996a, 22). Many also provided the logistical resources behind numerous mass mobilizations (Ibid.). Others that had strong
ties with international agencies undertook advocacy and public information campaigns on the anti-dictatorship movements abroad.

Those with access to enormous capital base like the corporate and family foundations and those with ties to the government served as funding agencies or fund conduits for smaller NGOs that were undertaking socio-political organizing efforts at the grassroots level. This arrangement proved to be strategic since it enabled the NGO sector to maintain collaborative relationship with the government in providing the needed services of the grassroots sectors while simultaneously engaging it in conflict. Moreover, it allowed them to escape intimidation and harassment from the government while undertaking grassroots organizing and popular education efforts, particularly from the military. Lastly, it enabled them to recruit government employees into the anti-dictatorship movement and harness government resources and logistics for their mass mobilization efforts.\[16\] Combining social development efforts and political advocacy, in turn, allowed the social development NGOs to wield influence over the POs while at the same time, manipulate the state.

With the NGOs becoming more upfront regarding their anti-dictatorship sentiments, their efforts likewise became broader and sophisticated in scope. Human rights groups, for example, expanded their clientele to include other groups such as the indigenous people, the urban poor, labor and women. These paved the way for the setting up of alternative law groups like the PILIPINA Legal Resource Center (LRC) that caters to victims of domestic violence, SALIGAN that caters to urban poor victims of illegal eviction, BATAS and SALAG (Alegre: 1996a, 22-23). As scopes of work expanded, the professionalization of social development work likewise started.
Coalition building was likewise pursued to promote a stronger opposition to
the state. Among the first cause-oriented coalition groups to be formed after Aquino’s
death was the Justice for Aquino, Justice For All (JAJA). JAJA was a loose non-
partisan coalition of individuals and organizations from various sectors, parties and
movements that capitalized on the assassination of Aquino to promote awareness on the
issues of social injustice and lack of freedom in the country. It provided the politicized
middle class professionals the initial structure by which to get involved in organized
actions against the Marcos dictatorship.

Realizing that the anti-dictatorship movements were comprised of groups with
various political and ideological orientations, attempts were made to bring the divergent
anti-dictatorship groups together. The earliest of these attempts was the Kongreso ng
Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL) or the Congress of the Filipino People. The Congress,
attended by sectoral and regional representatives of the various cause-oriented groups,
social movements and political parties, sought to affirm the continuation of the Marcos
Resign movement and identify alternative leaders of a united anti-dictatorship movement.
However, KOMPIL failed to unite the various opposition groups who held irreconcilable
positions regarding the issue of participating in the Batasang Pambansa (National
Assembly) election. At the end of the KOMPIL Congress, the delegates were divided into
those who decided to boycott the election and those who opted to participate in it.

As mentioned earlier, while the cause-oriented groups and NGOs that comprised
these coalitions were distinct from the church and the competing revolutionary
movements, they were not completely independent from them. Their ideological and
strategic leanings were, thus, reflective of those held by these two institutions, which
were historically in conflict with each other. The KOMPIL incident merely deepened the cleavages that were already existent among these groups.

Nonetheless, forging a unified front was crucial in light of the scheduled local and presidential elections in 1986 and 1987, the possibility of Marcos declaring a military junta, and the failure of the traditional political parties to come up with a consensus candidate for the presidency. In light of these, another attempt was made to forge a coalition among the anti-dictatorship forces. On March 20, 1985, fifty-nine persons of different persuasions and from various sectors laid the groundwork for the formation of a new coalition party, the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or BAYAN (New Democratic Alliance).

BAYAN’s major functions are to unify and consolidate the leadership of popular organizations... and to adopt a broad and comprehensive strategy for a struggle that will integrate all forms of non-violent political action: That strategy will be based on new politics:...a politics that does not wait for elections to air the people’s grievances and press their demands;... their aspirations for an authentic popular, pluralist democracy, real and effective sovereignty, a just and humane society that cares equally for all and offers all a better life, and true national unity, a unity of all social sectors and classes, a unity of the people more than that of the politicians (BAYAN Primer as quoted by Diokno: 158).

Unlike the earlier coalitions, BAYAN had more pronounced decision-making process and operational procedures. Consensus was presumed when two-thirds of its members voted for or against a decision. Once reached, decisions were binding for all members of the alliance under the principle of “unified command”. Tasks were divided to committees where ideas could be carefully mapped out in the spirit of healthy compromise. However, even these safeguards failed to promote unity among the competing anti-dictatorship groups. During the first BAYAN Congress, squabbles for control and leadership of the coalition erupted among the delegates. Charges of NDF
groups attempting to establish control led the delegates of the other groups (i.e., the socdems, the liberal democrats and the non-aligned sectors) to leave the coalition. Days later, they formed a new alliance, the Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA) or Nation United in Ideal and Goals. BANDILA, which was predominantly socdem in terms of membership, had a pronounced centrist orientation and a bias towards active non-violence. Reminiscent of the social action groups of the 1930s, BANDILA stressed the stewardship concept of private property, especially its use in the broader context of common good of all citizens (Ibid., p. 161). The BAYAN-BANDILA rift further polarized the already divided anti-dictatorship forces. This rift was highlighted by the symbols used in the protest actions – red for BAYAN, yellow for BANDILA. This became particularly pronounced during the Snap Presidential Election of 1986.

On November 1985, amidst pressure exerted by the U.S. and the international community to prove the legitimacy of his rule, Marcos announced the holding of a Snap Presidential Election in 1986. This caught all the legal opposition forces – the traditional politicians and the cause-oriented groups - by surprise. Given the failed attempts at unification and the lack of candidate with the capacity to unite all opposition forces, the cause-oriented groups could not decide whether to participate in the election or not, as well as to who would be pitted against Pres. Marcos in the presidential race. BAYAN eventually opted to boycott the event. BANDILA, on the other hand, openly declared its support to the candidacy of Cory Aquino (Nemenzo-Almendral, 1988: 194). The rift was mirrored in the community organizing efforts of the NGOs affiliated to the two coalitions. The cause-oriented groups with ties to the socdem movement plunged headlong into electoral organizing and mobilization (e.g., pulong bayan or community
meetings) for Cory Aquino’s candidacy (Alegre: 1996a, 24). Those affiliated with BAYAN campaigned for the boycott of the presidential election.

Expectedly, the Marcos supporters and the members of the administration party did everything ranging from discrediting the NAMFREL as an independent watchdog to disenfranchisement of voters, threats, intimidations and ballot box snatching. However, all of these were anticipated and addressed by the cause-oriented groups. When Marcos and his supporters attempted to get themselves installed by fast tracking their proclamation by the National Assembly, the cause-oriented groups mobilized an alternative “people’s victory rally” at Rizal Park where the anomalies in the counting of ballots were denounced, Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel proclaimed as the real election winners and a civil disobedience and boycott of crony businesses were launched. When a coup plot by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) was uncovered, prompting those involved to holed themselves in the two military camps in EDSA, the cause-oriented groups under BANDILA were the first to troop to the area to protect the rebel soldiers. Within a few hours, urban population, many of them urban professionals, trooped to EDSA to take part in what is now known as the People-Powered Revolution. The cause-oriented groups marshaled the unorganized public, enlisted volunteers, orchestrated the food brigades, held programs, masses and prayer rallies during the one-week vigil. They were also among those who danced on the streets when on February 26, Marcos fled the country and Aquino was installed as President. Conspicuously absent among the ranks of the cause-oriented groups were those affiliated with BAYAN-natdem.

From the above, it was evident that the Aquino assassination in 1983 facilitated growth, consolidation and strengthening of the Philippine civil society. First, the political
and economic crisis it brought enabled the Philippine civil society groups to regain the support of the business sector and the traditional politicians, which were lost during the Martial Law period. At the same time, the state’s persecution of the clergy compelled the Catholic Church to call for the end of the dictatorship and the restoration of democratic space. These emboldened the groups within the Philippine civil society to assert their claims to the public sphere and harness such to exert pressure on the state for reforms.

The Aquino assassination likewise outraged and politicized the normally non-involved middle class professionals thereby making them prone to join existing cause-oriented groups and/or set up their own associations in order to participate in the organized anti-dictatorship movements. This expanded the constituencies of the Philippine civil society. Simultaneously, it opened the cause-oriented groups and the NGOs to the politically non-aligned middle class, making it more centrist and non-violent in orientation – a development which the Catholic Church welcomed and encouraged.

As the cause-oriented groups and NGOs became more distinct from the leftist ideological groups and the traditional political opposition parties, they became equated to a “middle force” that mediates between the traditional political parties and the revolutionary movements. This “middle force” forwarded an alternative to traditional politics and revolution as means to promote social change. They promoted reconciliation, active non-violence and pressure politics. Although these initiatives initially failed, they nonetheless indicated the efforts of cause-oriented groups to test out some social roles for themselves in the arena of an inclusive civil society.
On the other hand, while the cause-oriented coalitions dealt with anti-dictatorship efforts, the NGOs pursued their social developmental efforts separately. In so doing, they were able to harness resources and support coming from the government, the international donor institutions and corporate donors to provide effective services to their grassroots clients. This enabled them to mobilize the cooperation of the grassroots. By the time that the Snap Election was held, the NGOs had already set up PO federations and alliances as mass base for the anti-dictatorship movements. At the height of the protest period of 1983-1986, therefore, the NGOs did not only assume the roles of mediators between the contending groups within the anti-dictatorship movement, they also established themselves as the link between the other social change agents and the mobilized grassroots.

For the highlights of the nature and characteristics of the Philippine civil society during the authoritarian period, see Appendix 4.2.

Conclusion

From the above, it could be gleaned that amidst repression, the Philippine civil society during the authoritarian regime became institutionalized. While before, civil society groups were merely informal and associational, voluntary efforts after the declaration of Martial Law assumed a more structured form. Middle class activism was undertaken within the formal structures of the church to avoid state surveillance. Awareness building and community organizing, for example, had to be undertaken alongside service programs deemed politically “safe” by government. Moreover, they were undertaken with funding support from international funding institutions.
From an inclusive point of view, the two class-based strands were still evident. However, unlike in previous times when only the grassroots-based groups were equated with the revolutionary movements, both middle class-based voluntary organizations and the POs were suspected of being communist subversives or having links to the underground ideological parties after Martial Law was declared. Indeed, many of the church-based voluntary organizations were linked with the ideological parties. In fact, many of them served as legal fronts for the latter thereby imbuing the civil society with a leftist slant.

Towards the end of the authoritarian regime, however, an exclusive sector – the “middle force” - comprised of cause-oriented groups and NGOs emerged. This sector is comprised of politically non-aligned middle class professionals who sought to mediate between the ideological parties and the traditional political parties. The sector emphasized reconciliation, active non-violence and pressure politics as means for promoting social change. Moreover, its strategies are more professional rather than political in orientation. For such reasons, it drew support from the Catholic Church.

Next to the ideological parties, the support of the Catholic Church was another critical factor that shaped the nature of the Philippine civil society. The Catholic Church provided alternative public spheres (i.e., the BCCs) where the grassroots sectors could articulate their issues and concerns against the state during the height of the Martial Law period. They were also responsible for creating voluntary organizations that monitored human rights abuses, called attention to militarization and raised concerns regarding the displacement of grassroots communities. More importantly, the Catholic Church provided safe havens for social activists desiring to continue their resistance to the
dictatorship above ground. As the public sphere gradually opened for the Philippine
civil society, the Catholic Church likewise served as conduits of assistance from and/or as
endorsers of the cause-oriented groups and NGOs to the international donor institutions.
It was through Church support also that the “middle” force came to influence the anti-
dictatorship movement. The Church leaders also provided moral guidance and counsel to
the leaders of the opposition groups. In view of this, the Catholic social teachings on
social justice permeated the goals and strategies of the anti-dictatorship movement.

Towards the end of the dictatorship, the business community likewise became a
major source of support to the cause-oriented groups. For example, with the
encouragement of the business sector, previously apolitical middle class professionals
joined organized protest efforts and rallies at the heart of the Makati business district.
More importantly, the business sector provided the logistical and financial support for the
socio-economic programs that served as entry points of the cause-oriented groups and
NGOs in mobilizing the grassroots communities for the anti-dictatorship mobilizations.

Nonetheless, the state remained the single most important factor that shaped the
characteristics and nature of the Philippine civil society. By declaring Martial Law, Pres.
Marcos promoted the fusion of the legally acknowledged civil society groups and the
revolutionary movements. Moreover, his militarization and modernization policies united
the two strands of the civil society in its antagonism towards the state. As a result of the
marginalization of the grassroots sectors, the latter became more willing to participate in
community organizing efforts of the NGOs and consequently, more prone to the
recruitment of the revolutionary movements. Lastly, by antagonizing the business sector
and the Catholic Church as well as by marginalizing the technocrats within the
bureaucracy, the state encouraged the participation of the otherwise apolitical middle class professionals into the anti-dictatorship movement. Thus, although the imposition of the authoritarian regime initially constricted the public sphere, it eventually broadened and strengthened the constituencies of the Philippine civil society.

Although the characteristics of the Philippine civil society during the dictatorial regime changed significantly, some of its earlier identified normative characteristics endured. Among these was the concern for social injustice, which included human rights abuses and the marginalization of particular grassroots sectors such as the women, indigenous people, etc.

Corollary to this, the focus of antagonism of the civil society groups had shifted towards the state and those associated with it. Before, the groups comprising the Philippine civil society were antagonistic to the state because it was affiliated with a particular social class. During the authoritarian period, antagonism towards particular social groups was more a result of the latter's association with the state and its leaders.

The Philippine civil society at this period also maintained its pluralism. In fact, to avoid state repression, voluntary organizations focused on the needs of non-class sectors of the grassroots (i.e., the women, children, indigenous people, etc.) while generally retaining their ideological class biases. Due to the plurality of the interests of its members, however, the Philippine civil society remained divided despite their common stand against the dictatorship. Because of this, it could not come up with a unified stand against the dictatorial regime. Nonetheless, attempts to mediate the competing groups within the Philippine civil society indicated that the cause-oriented sector was attempting to carve out a role in the civil society arena as mediators.
Simultaneously, because of the support of the Catholic Church and the confidence of the international donor institutions and the business corporations, the NGOs were tapped as service delivery providers, and consequently, as conduits of fund assistance to the grassroots sectors. Their access to resources needed by the grassroots sector and their community organizing skills, in turn, enabled the NGOs to influence the actions of the POs. During the height of the protest movement, the NGOs thus became the main recruiters of mass bases for the anti-dictatorship mobilizations. During the presidential campaign period, the civil disobedience call, and the People-Power Revolution of 1986, they were responsible for the mobilization of the grassroots in support of Aquino. The succeeding 1983-1986 protests period, therefore, saw the rise of the social development NGOs as power brokers. In the succeeding democratization period, they would further harness this strategic role as development intermediaries.
ENDNOTES

1. "Salvaging" is the term used to refer to cases when someone arrested by the military disappear and later found killed. The term was coined as bodies were found in garbage dumps where scavengers were literally salvaging scraps. See Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1997, 81.

2. Prior to Martial Law, the NPA armed guerillas numbered only around 1,000. Initially, the crackdown on progressive groups slowed down the recruitment of the CPP-NPA. By 1976, the party membership grew to 3,000. In 1977, recruitment shoot up because of the following reasons:
   a. The closure of all legal avenues of political dissent;
   b. The decline in government efficacy and legitimacy on both the national and local levels;
   c. The deterioration of the economy in 1979;
   d. The increase in human rights abuses, particularly by the military; and
   e. The increased political and military sophistication and effectiveness of the communists.
Moreover, the CPP-NPA promised that a democratic coalition government that would include all anti-dictatorship groups under the NDF would be set up should Marcos be booted out of power. Active recruitment at the grassroots level likewise helped. By 1980, CPP membership reached a total of 8,000 cadres and 3,500 armed guerilla operatives. The number of guerillas further doubled to 6,000 in 1982. See David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1991, 88-89 and 114-116.

3. According to PDSP cadres interviewed by this researcher, there was a conscious effort on the part of the socìems to match the moves of the natìems to mobilize support for the resistance movement. Thus, while they did not really say that the move to organize PDSP and its military arm was in response to the organization of the NDF, it is presumed that this is also one of the major motivations for such.

4. The Malayang Samahang Magsasaka (MASAKA), which was founded by CLO union leader, Felixberto Olalia, has a total membership of 90,000. It was the largest peasant association in the country up until 1972. MASAKA capitulated to the co-optation of the Marcos administration in exchange for the release of its imprisoned leaders and for some degree of freedom to exist under the martial law regime. For details, see Jenny Franco, Philippine Electoral Politics and the Peasant-Based Civic Movements in the 1980s, PPI, Rural Development Studies, Volume 10, No. 2, May 1994: 19. See also Leopoldo J. Dejillas, Trade Union Behavior in the Philippines: 1946-1990, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994, 38.

5. Technocrats refer to young (mostly less than 35 years of age) economists and managerial technicians with overseas graduate trainings (usually from top American universities, particularly Harvard and MIT) who were familiar with the modernization approaches to development preferred by the World Bank and the IMF. They came mostly from the upper middle class families. They were mostly professional managers who emphasized a "rational-productivity perspective over the routinized "legal-rational" function of the administrative civil service. They believed that politics is a dirty game, wasteful and irrational and that only technology could accelerate economic development. Although they perceived themselves as ideologically neutral, they had a bias towards capitalism. Socially, the technocrats were only marginally identified with either the landed or entrepreneurial classes. Their main source of power is their access and influence on the state’s policy-making functions. For more detailed discussions of the characteristics and roles of the technocrats in government, see Roman Dubsky, Technocracy and Development in the Philippines, Quezon City: U.P. Press, 1993. See also Amado Doronilla, The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines: 1946-1972, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992, 133-138.
6. The more progressive members of the AF, however, exerted influence over the network to assume more development-oriented and pro-active networking activities later on. During the intensification of the anti-dictatorship struggle from 1978-1986, the AF and PBSP networks became critical source of financial support for many of the grassroots-based social development NGOs. See Alegre: 1996a, 16.

7. The concept of *social movement abeyance organizations* had been used by Verta Taylor to account for the continuity of social movements even during periods of non-receptive political environment. According to Taylor, during periods when a movement loses support, alternative structures emerge to absorb surplus of people and channel their efforts into other forms of activism. It enabled the cadre of activists to create or find a niche for themselves during inhospitable times. See Verta Taylor, *Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance*, Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (eds.), *Social Movements: Readings on the Emergence, Mobilization and Dynamics*, California: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1997, 409-420.

8. In fact, the Catholic Church initially served as the conduit of funds coming from European and North American funding agencies like CEBEMO (Netherlands), NOVIB (Netherlands), ICCO (Netherlands), MISEREOR (Germany) and Oxfam (Britain). See Gerard Clarke, *The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 110-113.

9. Among the well-known technocrats who left the Marcos administration and joined the anti-dictatorship movement were Horacio Morales, Jr., vice-president of the Development Academy of the Philippines who later became the chairman of the National Democratic Front (NDF) and Vicente Paterno, Minister of Trade and Industry, who became identified with the NAMFREL. However, most of those who left the government to join the civil organizations engaged in anti-dictatorship movement were middle managers and officers.


11. “Hamleting” is the term used when people suspected of giving food and housing to armed rebels are forced to evacuate their communities and stay in designated areas where they are kept under strict military surveillance. Anyone – children and animals included – found in the evacuated sites (declared as no man’s land) are shot on sight. This practice was rampant in the rural areas, particularly in Mindanao, where the support for the underground revolutionary movement was strong.

12. In later years, the term “social development NGOs” was used to distinguish the NGOs involved in socio-economic projects with support from international donor institutions.

13. The change in the church position vis-à-vis the state was embodied in the three pastoral letters as follows:
   a. “A Dialogue for Peace”, released after the CBCP withdrew from the Church-Military Liaison Committee, criticized the Marcos regime for choosing economic development programs that erode the position of the poor rather than aid them. Given this, the Catholic Church announced that it would play a more aggressive role in taking a preferential option for the poor, but that it would so in a way that was ideologically neutral and non-violent.
b. "Message to the People of God", condemned and called for the withdrawal of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) that authorized arrests without release on bail for security reasons.

c. "Statement on Reconciliation Today", released after Aquino's assassination, warned that the condition of the country has gotten worse and reconciliation was needed more than ever. The pastoral letter, nonetheless, listed political reforms that must be implemented immediately to facilitate the reconciliation: respect of human and political rights, freedom to dissent, a return to the values of "justice, truth, freedom, and love", and an end to election irregularities, a return of military loyalty to the Filipino people, and the end of violence from revolutionaries.


14. After the assassination of Benigno Aquino, three traditional political parties namely, the Liberal Party, the United Democratic Opposition or UNIDO, Partido Demokratiko Pilipino or PDP and Lakas ng Bayan or LABAN attempted to come up with a consensus position pertaining to participation in the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) election. However, personal interests and ideological leanings marred their attempt. Instead, it resulted to a division among those who opted to boycott the election (e.g., the Liberal Party) and those who participated in it (e.g., the UNIDO and PDP-Laban).

15. Pressure politics was a term coined by Sen. Jose K. Diokno, a leading Filipino civil libertarian, to refer to mass actions and other peaceful means of protest intended to exert organized popular might or influence to Marcos and those around him. For more details on how cause-oriented groups differed from the traditional political parties and revolutionary movements, see Ma. Serena I. Diokno, Unity and Struggle, Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (eds.), Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People Power, Metro Manila: Conspectus. 1988, 134-136.

16. Based on first-hand knowledge of the researcher, PBSP, for example, was doing community organizing and training for the Local Resource Management Project of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) in four of the poorest provinces and municipalities of the country while it was actively involved in the anti-dictatorship protest activities and with NAMFREL during 1983-1986. In their capacity as trainers of the provincial and municipal government staffs, they were able to enjoin them to join the anti-dictatorship movement on personal capacities. The International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), on the other hand, was conducting political education sessions with the client beneficiaries of the same project. When harassed by the military, they relied on NEDA to vouch that these sessions were merely part of the beneficiary organizing component of the project.

17. In 1984, the Coalition of Organizations for the Restoration of Democracy or CORD replaced JAJA as the grand alliance of the anti-dictatorship movements. Its structure and membership were the same, however.
CHAPTER 6 – THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE NGOs AS INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS (1986-PRESENT)

With the Marcoses gone, the Philippines entered an era of re-democratization. After having to contend with alternative public spaces such as the BCCs, academic forums and church-sponsored seminar-trainings, the organized citizenry were finally able to openly articulate their sentiments and participate in the policy discussions. In view of their long years of struggling against repression and emboldened by their success in booting out a dictator, the groups comprising the civil society emerged as assertive but nonetheless divided players in Philippine re-democratization. With the dictatorship gone and the threats on their existence removed, the NGOs and POs that represented the bulk of the civil society groups embarked on a process of institution building in order to mainstream their participation in the state’s development administration process. The NGOs specifically, underwent a process of transformation from activists to intermediary organizations mediating between the grassroots-based POs on the one hand, and the formal social institutions such as the state, the international funding institutions, the political parties and the business sector on the other.

This chapter identifies the political, social and economic developments that contributed to the present predisposition, constituency and nature of the Philippine civil society. It highlights the various factors that facilitated the transformation of the NGOs into development intermediaries, the changes that these produced among the NGOs themselves and the effects of such on the NGOs’ relationship with the people’s organizations (POs).
The Emergence of the “Social Development” Industry (1986-1992)

With the assumption of Cory Aquino as president, representatives of the various groups that made up the anti-dictatorship coalition were appointed to cabinet positions or to the commission tasked with drafting a new constitution. Among them were the leaders of the cause-oriented groups and NGOs who actively campaigned for her presidency. The staunch commitment of Pres. Aquino to the restoration of democracy in the country, as well as the representation of the cause-oriented groups in the executive and legislative branches of the post-dictatorship government ensured that participation in the civil society was institutionalized. This was made explicit in the provisions of the 1986 Philippine Constitution.¹

Two years after the 1986 “people power” revolution, however, the organizations of farmers, workers, students and the urban poor already lost the unity and militancy, which they exhibited during the final years of the Marcos regime (O’Brien, 1990: 26). Thus, involvement in development administration was largely left to the NGOs. In fact, in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 1987-1992 that embodied the Aquino administration’s development thrusts and objectives, it was the NGOs that were mandated as follows:

Specifically, ...non-government organizations (NGOs)... shall take the lead in undertaking and sustaining programs and projects aimed at improving the socio-economic situation, ...in enhancing the relationship between the government and its citizens by encouraging people to take part in development programs and by directing government support to the most needy to ensure effectiveness and impact...This could take the form of economic organization of marginal sectors of the population as well as training of community groups..., advocacy role in raising issues and in helping identify solutions relevant to the problems of the poor. NGOs can also help in further strengthening the delivery mechanism to
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For its part, the Aquino government relied on the NGOs for assistance because of their abilities to mobilize grassroots for collective action and their credibility to deliver social services at the local communities. Moreover, foreign funding institutions had become wary of government corruption during the Marcos era that they wanted the NGOs involved in the programming and disbursement of official development assistance (ODA). Deferring to the pressures from these foreign funding institutions, NEDA adopted Board Resolution No. 2 in 1989 formalizing the participation of the NGOs in development administration and setting up the mechanisms by which they could avail of ODA funds. By 1990, 18 government departments and 5 specialized government agencies established NGO Liaison Desks (NEDA, 1992: 232-235). At the local level NGO involvement in development administration was facilitated by the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). The LGC devolved the authority, assets, accountabilities and responsibilities for providing basic services and facilities and for resource mobilization from national government agencies to the local government units. It also gave the NGOs and POs substantial roles in local governance.

While these were happening, the Catholic Church, on the other hand, was reducing its involvement in the civil society. With the Marcos dictatorship gone, it began to withdraw from its participation in partisan politics and also, to rid its ranks of the influence of the revolutionaries, notably those of the NDF-CPP-NPA (Casper, 1995: 153-154). On the other hand, some cause-oriented groups, particularly those espousing women’s rights, distanced themselves from the Catholic Church because of the latter’s moral crusades against family planning which they found limiting in terms of addressing
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issues related to women’s health, sexuality and reproductive rights (Constantino-David, 1997: 48).

Meanwhile, the position of the NDF-CPP-NPA to boycott the 1986 election politically marginalized the party and disillusioned many of its supporters. It also aggravated the already brewing tension between the NDF-affiliated NGOs and the CPP due to the latter’s refusal to give the former autonomy in undertaking community organizing efforts. The tension was exacerbated by the summary execution and demotion of around 600 NPA cadres in Mindanao and Quezon suspected of being deep penetration agents (DPAs) in 1985-1987 (Timberman: 305-306). Many of those affected were NGOs workers (Clarke: 115). As a result, some groups left the NDF and reconstituted themselves as popular democrats (*popdems*). They re-established themselves in PRRM and some locally based NGOs (Alegre: 26).

Parallel conflicts over strategies and tactics, competition for funding, sectoral and geographical bases also occurred at a lesser degree among the *socdems*. This resulted to its fragmentation into the PDSP, the *Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas* or Workshop for a Socialist Philippines (Pandayan) and *Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa* (BISIG) or the Alliance for the Advancement of Socialist Thought and Action. The fragmentation of the two major ideological parties contributed to the weakening of the close ties between them and the civil society groups (i.e., the NGOs and POs).

The above developments significantly affected the civil society during the initial years of re-democratization. First, the ratification of the new constitution that guarantees civil rights led to the restoration of the democratic space. This encouraged the people to
speak out and get socially and politically involved. With the state institutionally and operationally encouraging popular participation in policy-making and governance, the citizenry – particularly the middle class professionals who were politicized during the EDSA Revolution - were encouraged to organize themselves and to take active parts in state affairs. Many of them eventually decided to join existing NGOs and/or set up their own NGOs (See Illustration 3). As indicated earlier in Table 1, this resulted to the exponential increase of non-stock and non-profit entities from 1986 whose interests, areas and lines of work were as diverse as they were numerous.

Illustration 3. Motivations for Entry to NGO Work (Third Generations of NGO Workers)

For me, it was really a call of the times...because of the situation in '85, '86, '87 and right after EDSA, despite the clarity of the call, there were only few who responded...In 1985, '86, '87, political involvement was at a height.
- E, A third generation NGO worker

...after 1986, the call for social development work was strong. If you do not have a spiritual calling, you do not have to enter the seminary. You can join the NGO movement.
- AV, A third generation NGO worker

Focus group discussions on the question “What Factors Led My Entry into NGO Work?” participated by three generations of NGO workers.


However, the breadth of democratic space was uneven. It was broader in the urban areas due to access to media and facility for mobilizations. At the same time, access to such was also limited to the upper and middle classes because the poor were too preoccupied with problems of survival to get involved in public discussions of state policies and programs (Nemenzo, 1988: 236). Thus, many of the NGOs that emerged during this period were middle-class led or managed.

Second, the institutional recognition and access to state resources accorded to the civil society by the Aquino administration legitimized the NGOs and POs as key players
in development administration. These attracted the politicians in search of patronage machinery, out-of-work technocrats who saw such as opportunities to make money out of consultancy contracts under the ODA programs, businessmen in need of tax shelters, and landowners who wanted to undercut social reforms under the guise of altruism and developmentalism to set up their own versions of NGOs (i.e., the COME N’GOs or the fly by night NGOs and the BINGOs or business oriented NGOs). Government technocrats, on the other hand, saw that the NGOs have more flexibility and priority in terms of fund administration. Because of this, they too set up NGO-like program structures controlled by government agencies (i.e., the GRINGOs or government-run NGOs). These newcomers in the NGO bandwagon were sarcastically referred to as the “mutant NGOs” or MUNGOs. Although they added to the plurality and vibrancy of the Philippine civil society, the MUNGOs posed competition to the cause- and socially oriented NGOs for accreditation as legitimate representatives of the civil society and for access to fund resources. MUNGOs actually outnumbered the cause- and socially oriented NGOs (Constantino-David, 1998: 26 and 30).

The competition thus compelled the social development NGOs to redefine their “genuine” identity in light of the opportunities and challenges imposed by the new socio-political situation (Moreno, 1999: 40). To address the situation, the social development NGOs intensified their efforts to forge unity through networks and coalitions. NGOs that were already part of existing networks like PHILDRRA and linked with big NGOs like PBSP worked to strengthen their ties. Those who were not yet part of existing networks formed new ones such as the Council for People’s Development (CPD) and the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA). Others formed
coalitions based on issue or sector specific concerns or consortia (Alegre: 28-29). These networks and coalitions provided venues for confidence and friendship building, information sharing, coordination of program efforts and forging of common understanding and stand on social issues among NGO workers (Constantino-David, 1997: 31). Through these coalitions and networks, NGO workers likewise sought to transcended their rivalries and differences.

One of the crucial outcomes of coalition building was the creation of fund management mechanisms to promote resource mobilization and ensure that official development assistance (ODA) was allocated to deserving social development NGOs. The earliest forms of such mechanisms were the Philippine-Canada Human Resource Development Program (PC-HRD) and Development Initiatives for Women’s Alternatives and Transformative Action (DIWATA). With the PC-HRD experience, the social development NGOs saw the benefits of building a coalition of NGO networks. In 1990, ten of the largest NGO networks and coalitions representing 1,500 NGOs nationwide launched the Caucus of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO). Through the CODE-NGO, NGOs belonging to different ideological spectrum forged a common vision based on consensus and respect of differences. Common activities (e.g., training programs, sharing of experiences and expertise and formation of area/sectoral/issue-based consortia), assistance in fund accessing, and international advocacy were undertaken for purposes of minimizing NGO competition for political and ideological dominance of the civil society arena, funding and mass base (Constantino-David: 31 and 33-34).

The establishment of NGO coalitions likewise signaled the scaling up of the NGO’s development efforts both in terms of scope and clientele. During the Marcos
dictatorship, professionalization was not possible because of frequent raids, arrests, and military harassment that rendered civil society efforts insecure and transient. With the change in the political climate, however, some NGO leaders saw the need to look beyond community organizing and service delivery efforts that were traditionally associated with the NGOs. They envisioned the creation of a new service industry - the social development industry – to bring in more of the population from the margins of society into the mainstream of development (Garilao, 1987: 116). Some NGOs began to assume strategic long-term catalytic functions of facilitating the development of other organizations to undertake self-help efforts through capacity building, mediating between the POs and the formal institutions and powerful individuals, and advocacy for social change. In other words, they began to function as development intermediaries (ANGOC, 1987: 163-164; Garilao, 1987).

As development intermediaries, the NGOs needed to establish their credibility as development experts and upscale their operations.

NGOs working on a small scale in a few villages with people who have few options may not be questioned regarding their technical competence... But when NGOs position themselves to be systems catalysts, their technical weaknesses become more apparent. Some of the most important of the organizations with which they work will be large, influential, and staffed by highly credentialed professionals... Having the technical capability to obtain the respect of those who control relevant technologies... is basic... (Nonetheless,) the technical competence of NGO staff must be balanced with appropriate social, political, and managerial skills and should be grounded in the methods, approaches and values of ... development professionalism (Korten, 1987:155).

It demanded the professionalization of NGO operations.¹¹

The professionalization of NGO work was epitomized by the ratification of the Covenant on Philippine Development during the first national congress of CODE-NGO on December 1991 (Constantino-David, 1997: 31-32). The Covenant embodied the
principles and responsibilities, goals and commitments, and the code of conduct that social development NGOs should abide by. The code of conduct particularly, was intended to set the standards of NGO development work and solidify the ranks of NGO workers.

This professionalization of social development work is partly a step to protect the integrity of development agencies and to police their ranks; however, it also underlies a dequalification process that perceptibly deskills other development actors. This simply means that the SDOs (i.e., the social development NGOs) mark off the areas of specialization they claim for themselves. They promote a standard of qualification for development work that they see and belief as appropriate and that they feel they can live up to and thus pass qualification (Gregorio-Medel, 1993: 76).

Aside from professionalization, the NGOs likewise developed strategic competence or the ability to position resources to achieve objectives within a complex and dynamic setting. The NGOs continued to facilitate the setting up of parallel networks of sectoral and multi-sectoral POs, which they had started during the 1984 Snap Presidential Election. These networks took on the tasks of active lobbying and advocacy for specific issues and consequently, enabled the NGOs to concentrate on social development work. Among the PO coalitions that emerged with support from the NGOs were the Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR), the National Coalition for Fisheries and Aquatic Reform (NACFAR), the Labor Advisory Consultative Committee (LACC) and the National Coalition of Urban Poor Organizations (NACUPO) which later gave way to the Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULR-TF). Jointly, these PO networks and the NGOs actively lobbied and advocated for sector-specific legislations like the Comprehensive Land Reform Program (CARP), Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), etc. (Alegre: 27).
As the NGOs increasingly engaged in social development professionally, they also opened new fields and acquired new competencies. In the spate of disasters in the period of 1990 to 1992 (e.g., the Baguio earthquake in 1990 and Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991, etc.), many NGOs developed integrated disaster management approaches that combined relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. Similarly, in consideration of the growing concern for the rapid deterioration of natural resources, some NGOs embarked on the search for new technologies, lifestyles and paradigms while others worked to promote community-based natural resource management programs. Others like *Tulay sa Pag-unlad, Inc.* (TSPI) or Bridge to Progress, pioneered microfinance. As pioneers in new fields of development work, these NGOs eventually became the trainers, consultants and financial intermediaries for both the POs and partners of the government in implementing foreign-funded development programs.

Third, the NGOs likewise adjusted their strategies and tactics to respond to the initiatives undertaken by the state. For example, in consideration of the enforcement of the Local Government Code of 1991, national networks like CODE-NGO undertook parallel efforts to localize coordination of NGO efforts. Four networks – the MINCODE, VISNET, Bicol Caucus and Region I CODE - were established to coordinate NGO efforts at the regional level (Constantino-David, 1997: 32). Through these networks, they were able to maximize participation in all policy-deliberating forums that the state opened up for civil society participation. The regionalization and localization of the NGO coalitions likewise allowed the formulation of social development agenda that reflected both the vision of the national networks and the specific nuances of particular regions and localities.
Last in the efforts of the NGOs to strategically maximize their roles as development intermediaries were their attempts to influence legislation through participation in the electoral process. These were prompted by the notion that the country’s problems could only be resolved by actions from the elective offices of government. Encouraged by their success in mass mobilization during the 1986 People Power Revolution, the NGOs thought that electoral process was a viable option for the civil society to get new political players into the political arena that was traditionally dominated by the political elites. A study of the experiences of NGOs and POs in the 1987, 1988 and 1989 congressional, local and barangay elections in four cities (Clamor, 1993) had, in fact, yielded that the NGOs and POs had the capacity to deliver votes at the barangay level. Moreover, NGO and PO participation in the poll exercises also helped in focusing the electoral campaigns to issues, programs and platforms instead of personalities and political intrigues. Furthermore, in the localities where the candidates supported by NGOs and POs had won, local conditions improved due to stronger collaboration between the civil society and the local government units. However, the NGOs failed to influence votes at the provincial and national levels as the compromises that needed to be made with other power brokers became more complicated and difficult the higher the level of government office sought. They thus failed to convert their social power to political power.

From the above, it could be gleaned that to sustain their roles as development intermediaries, the NGOs engaged both in the pioneering of new fields and in the professionalization of NGO work. These facilitated the entry of other middle class professionals (e.g. administrators, scientists, etc.) into the civil society and social
development work, while at the same time limiting access of other groups to such, particularly the grassroots sectors. With the NGOs performing intermediary functions, the Filipino middle class found in them the organizational means to establish hegemony over the civil society and to influence social change.

It was noted that the political orientation of the NGOs, particularly their view of the state shifted during this period. During the Marcos dictatorship, the NGOs espoused an antagonistic attitude towards the government. With the Aquino administration, however, they became more open and tolerant of it. However, being more attuned to the conception of a civil society that balances the power of the state, the NGOs and POs maintained a critical view towards the state. The civil society groups at this point, therefore, became pronouncedly centrist and developmental in orientation.


The end of Pres. Aquino’s term was marked by a synchronized national and local election. For those in the civil society, the 1992 election was a time to test their abilities to translate their mass bases into electoral votes. Unfortunately, they failed miserably. At the national level, the NGOs were divided not only on their stand on whether to participate in the election or not. Those who opted to participate, on the other hand, were divided between those who supported a presidential candidate that promised change in the system (e.g., Jovito Salonga of the Liberal Party) and those who voted for a candidate who had a better chance of winning against candidates connected to the Marcoses (e.g., Fidel Ramos of Lakas-NUCD). Nonetheless, some NGOs and POs were able to get some municipal mayors and counselors elected in local offices.
Despite these, the NGOs and POs were able to introduce a new dimension to electoral politics. At the local level particularly, NGOs and POs who participated actively in the political process were able to shift the focus of the electoral campaigns away from the usual mudslinging and personal attacks on rival candidates towards the discussion of social concerns like housing. On the other hand, the efforts of the non-partisan NGOs aligned to the church to educate the grassroots on responsible voting and to ensure the conduct of a clean and honest election increased the credibility of election as vehicle for effecting change in state leadership. These indicated that while the NGOs and POs could still not muster a “civil society vote”, they were able to put their capacity for pressure politics to secure promises of social reform from the traditional politicians. Of course, the implementation of these campaign promises was another matter.

In the end, Ramos won the presidency with only a slim plurality of vote of 24%. Since he did not have an overwhelming mandate from the populace, he had to exert efforts to widen his post-election political base and enhance his legitimacy. This significantly shaped his leadership style and administrative strategies to the benefit of the civil society. For one, Pres. Ramos harnessed the consultative process and consensus building as strategies to generate support for his program of government, notably, that of the Philippines 2000. These consultations culminated to national summits where various sectors, mostly coming from the ranks of the NGOs and POs, participated (Brillantes, 1997: 24). Out of these summits, the Ramos administration drew up the government’s social reform agenda (SRA).

Adopted on June 17, 1994, the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) was drawn from a wide range of consultative processes that underscored the partnership between government and non-government sectors in influencing the country’s development thrusts... This Government-Basic Sector partnership is aimed... at
putting the marginalized basic sectors back in the center of human development...In sum, the SRA is an effort to enter the lives of these ordinary people and ensure that they achieve a quality of life that gives them dignity, hope and the power of choice (SRC, 1998: 590).

To underscore the state’s commitment to the SRA, Pres. Ramos promulgated Executive Order No. 203 in September 1994 creating the Social Reform Council (SRC). The SRC was composed of the heads of the various line agencies and the representatives of the basic sectors.

Like its predecessor, the Ramos administration also made efforts to substantially involve the NGOs in development administration. In fact, it had shifted the responsibilities for poverty alleviation to the NGOs while limiting the role of government to facilitation (i.e., policy-making, service delivery and public education and role modeling) (Ibid., 5-4). The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 1993-1998 indicated that the NGOs were tasked with:

1. Initiating and undertaking economic activities;
2. Assistance in the monitoring and evaluation of government program implementation, service delivery and disposition of public funds; and,
3. Expansion of social responsibilities and proactively conveying to the government the people’s aspirations and interests (NEDA, 1992: 7).

The Ramos administration also encouraged a tripartite arrangement among the NGOs, POs and the government in the implementation of the SRA and sustainable development. Aside from these, Pres. Ramos followed Pres. Aquino’s strategy of appointing NGO personalities to head the agencies where the lobby for social reforms were intense such as, the departments of agrarian reform, health, and, environment and natural resources (Alegre: 38). These enabled the NGOs and POs to get mainstreamed in state affairs and their involvement in development administration further institutionalized.
Complementing these, more ODA grant funds were channeled to the NGOs by foreign funding institutions even as the overall volume of ODA had been decreasing over the years (Table 2). However, the nature of ODA funds available to the NGOs changed. During the authoritarian period and the early re-democratization period, funds channeled to the NGOs were mostly grants. As shown on Table 3, they increasingly took the form of contractual funds by the mid-1990s.\(^{19}\) (Gonzales, 1998: 83-84).

Table 2 and 3 about here

As started earlier, the Catholic Church continued to assume a relatively low political profile during the Ramos administration partly, because it felt that the political situation in the country had normalized and also, because Pres. Ramos did not challenge its position much except on the issues of family planning (Carroll SJ, 1999: 52) and the amendment of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, except for its support in the lobbying and advocacy efforts of the NGOs and POs in the repeal of Presidential Decree 772 that criminalized squatting, the anti-charter change and the lobby against the death penalty, the Catholic Church was relatively silent during this period. It merely provided direct support to NGOs affiliated to it (e.g., the social action centers and apostolic institutions) but even this was substantially reduced.

Unlike the Catholic Church that consciously decided to distance itself from the civil society, however, the influence of the ideological revolutionary parties, particularly the NDF-CPP-NPA, on the NGOs and POs waned as a consequence of the worsening internal conflicts within its ranks, as exemplified by the fragmentation of the NDF-CPP-
## Table 2 - Total Official Development Assistance Commitments of Selected Donors and NGO Share of Funds, 1986-1998, in US $ Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>126.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>% to Total</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>382.93%</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>72.4</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>72.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% to Total</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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<td>3957.14%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
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<td>118.6</td>
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<td>175</td>
<td>174.1</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>154.1</td>
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<td>51.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>91.43%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>77.34%</td>
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<td>61.73%</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>15.4</td>
<td>57.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO Share</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>101.38%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>226.29%</td>
<td>338.31%</td>
<td>98.09%</td>
<td>74.88%</td>
<td>126.20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.3</td>
<td>170.1</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>225.3</td>
<td>284.2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>223.2</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>177.1</td>
<td>169.1</td>
<td>2001.1</td>
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<td>Tot. NGO Sh</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>296.5</td>
<td>241.8</td>
<td>265.9</td>
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<td>182.6</td>
<td>213.6</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>104.33%</td>
<td>138.17%</td>
<td>134.43%</td>
<td>117.97%</td>
<td>140.46%</td>
<td>120.61%</td>
<td>98.11%</td>
<td>81.44%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>GOP Agency</th>
<th>ODA Funding</th>
<th>NGO Components</th>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Street Children Nutrition and Education, Child Labor Project</td>
<td>DILG</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>Conduits of project assistance to beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Pasig River Rehabilitation Project</td>
<td>DOLE</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>Training on prevention of child labor exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Agrarian Reform Project</td>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Mobilize river bank barangays in clean-up activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Farm Integrated Animal Health and Production</td>
<td>DA</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Conduct of community organization of beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Natural Resources Management Program</td>
<td>DOF/ DENR</td>
<td>121.66</td>
<td>Establishment of cost-recovery schemes of project and provides support to para-veterinarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIDS Surveillance and Education Project</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Information, education and communication activities on HIV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated Family Planning and Maternal Health Governance and Local Democracy</td>
<td>DOH</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Social marketing of contraceptives, policy reform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LGUs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Strengthening of participation in local governance, networking with the league of local government units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Entrepreneur Support</td>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Capability building services</td>
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<td>WB/IBRD</td>
<td>Conservation of Priority Protected Areas (IPAS)</td>
<td>NIPA, Inc.</td>
<td>14.15</td>
<td>Biodiversity protection and resource management program in selected sites in cooperation with local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Second NGO Micro-Credit Project</td>
<td>DTI</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>Direct borrowers and fund intermediaries to intended beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Income Upland Communities Project</td>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Community organizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forestry Sector Project</td>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Community organizing, information campaign and overseeing the early phases of program implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NPA into the “reaffirmists” (RA) and the “rejectionists (RJ) factions. The split led the NDF-affiliated cause-oriented groups to splinter along the lines of the RA and RJ factions (Clarke: 117). The RA faction’s condemnation of the efforts of the church-based NGOs to push for the peace talks between the NDF and the Ramos administration, and its admonition of the communist cadres for endangering revolutionary movement by maintaining their links with NGO activists aggravated the already strained relationship between the NDF-CPP-NPA and their legal NGO fronts (Ibid). This led the latter to sever their ties with the former.

Since many of the NGOs and POs drew ideological inspiration from the communist movement, the formal announcement of the RA-RJ factions in 1993 left a number of NGO networks, coalitions and base groups in a state of ideological flux. For example, the Labor Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC), a coalition of major labor union federations advocating for labor rights, virtually ceased to exist in light of the splintering of the KMU (Rocamora, 1993: 2). CPAR, on the other hand, lost its momentum in agrarian reform advocacy and eventually disbanded since the question on the viability of the people’s war - anchored primarily on the participation of the peasantry - weakened the premise of peasant organizing (Lopa, 1995: 69). By 1994, CPD resigned from CODE-NGO over the consensus of the less politically inclined members of the coalition to adopt a non-violent and democratic process of development. Echoing the RA view, CPD believed and insisted that armed conflict should be part of development work (Constantino-David, 1997: 35-36). The Ecumenical Center for Development (ECD) followed in 1995 (Rocamora as cited by Moreno, 1999: 43). The withdrawal of CPD and ECD reduced the political power blocs in the NGO coalition (Ibid.). While these initially
set back the civil society’s lobbying and advocacy efforts for social reforms, these developments freed the Philippine civil society from the influence of the ideological parties.

The thrust towards an autonomous civil society was further hastened by the incidents that transpired during the Manila People’s Forum. The Manila People’s Forum was supposed to be the civil society’s counterpart to the APEC Summit that was held in Manila in 1996. It was organized so that the Philippine civil society groups (e.g., cause-oriented groups, social development NGOs and POs) could come up with a Treaty of Cooperation that would embody the basic agreements on how they would engage the state on the issues of sustainable development and globalization. During the forum, however, the NGO sector sensed that the cause-oriented groups belonging to the RA-RJ factions were using the forum as a venue for their ideological debates. They also felt that they were being pushed to the periphery of the discussions and their participation being limited only to concerns on sustainable development (Constantino-David, 1997: 46). Frustrated, the NGO participants withdrew from the forum. Instead, they held the Asia-Pacific Sustainable Development Initiative (APSUD) where they formulated a framework on sustainable government – the Philippine Agenda 21 (PA 21) - that they used to engage the government in a critical debate (Ibid.). PA 21 embodied provisions for the enforcement of a strong environmental impact assessment system, environmental management measures using market-based instruments and the promotion of community-based natural resource management strategies. The APSUD scored victory when the Ramos administration adopted PA 21 as the basis of the government’s sustainable development framework and created the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development
(PCSD) to facilitate its operationalization. APSUD represented the NGOs’ assertion of their autonomy from the ideological movements, particularly in terms of engaging the state.

Again, these developments led to changes in the nature of the Philippine civil society. First of all, the humbling experience in the electoral arena made the NGOs and POs realize that electoral politics remained to be the home ground of political clans, bosses, machines, as well as increasingly, important media-personalities (Tornquist: 39). However, it also underscored their capacities to influence the nature of politics at the local level. In line with this, the NGOs decided to focus their attention on the local elections where chances for victories were greater. In 1992, a curious mix of former guerillas, academics, trade unionists, social democrats peasant leaders, popdems, and professionals formed the Akbayan Citizen’s Action Party, a partisan electoral party that aimed to challenge and confront the political elites in local electoral contests and provide competent local leadership was formed (Gutierrez, 1998: 6-7). Like the other NGO and PO coalitions, Akbayan represented an effort of the Filipino middle classes to set aside ideological interests in pursuit of common goals and in the interest of advancing alternative politics (Ibid., 6; Rocamora, 1998: 9). Reflecting its roots on the democratic movements, Akbayan sought to start from the grounds up by focusing on the identification and formation of candidates who could be fielded for local positions in 1998. As an indication its pragmatic approach to politics, however, it recruited ambitious young professionals and business people who were tired of old-style politics but were not members of the organized base of the democratic movements as members and possible electoral candidates (Rocamora, 1998: 9).
Simultaneously, the NGOs also embarked on a lobby for electoral reforms that would increase the chances of these alternative electoral parties to win in the succeeding elections. Under the Consortia on Electoral Reforms (CER), some NGOs campaigned and lobbied for the modernization of the voting system and the enforcement of Article VI of the Constitution providing for the election of 20% of the total numbers of the House of Representatives through the party list system. As a result of the CER lobby, the Party List Systems Act (Republic Act 7941) was signed into law in 1995 (CERCA as quoted by PESC-KSP, 1998: 1). Although R.A. 7941 had its limits, the Philippine civil society saw it as an opportunity to encourage the emergence of new types of political parties, which over time could acquire the strength to challenge the traditional political parties controlled by the elites (Rocamora, 1998: 9).

While some attempted to gain access to the state machinery through the electoral process, some NGOs seized the openings given by the Ramos administration to participate in development administration despite their suspicions of Pres. Ramos and their fears of co-optation by the state. These indicated a significant shift in the way that the civil society viewed and related with the state. During the Marcos era, they were antagonistic and confrontational towards the state. This changed a bit during the Aquino administration as the NGOs adopted an open but still critical view of the state. Under the Ramos administration, however, the NGOs were more tolerant and willing to enter into critical collaboration with the various representatives and offices of the state. This was because the state encouraged dialogues and consultations, and because closer NGO-government interaction enabled them to better understand the limits of the bureaucracy.
Having learned that the state is not a monolithic institution with units having different and at times, even competing stand on social issues, the NGOs and POs adjusted their strategies of engaging it. In consideration of the LGC, for example, they shifted their advocacy campaigns from the national to the local arena. The CODE-NGO, PHILDHRRA and the other NGO coalitions regionalized their operations and sought accreditation as members of the regional policy-making bodies. Individual NGOs did the same at the local levels. In the same manner, while the NGOs continued to lobby for the promulgation of generic social reform laws at the legislature, they also began to give more attention to the enforcement of these laws. After the passage of the CARL and the breakdown of CPAR, for example, PHILDHRRA and its member NGOs and POs shifted their attention to agrarian reform communities (ARCs). In the same manner, after getting the UDHA passed and P.D. 772 repealed, the ULR-TF concentrated on lobbying for the enforcement of these laws at the city level. The NGOs likewise learned to negotiate and compromise – a different approach from the principled demand for comprehensive reforms that they employed when they were still influenced by the ideological movements. They realized that instead of being co-opted, these made them more effective as intermediary organizations and gave them more influence as mainstream players in development administration.

On the other hand, active participation in government-sponsored consultative summits and dialogues allowed the civil society the chance to lobby for social reforms and to air their critiques of the government’s development programs. These also gained the NGOs representation in national policy-making or advisory bodies such as the SRC, the PCSD and the Legislative-Executive Development and Advisory Council (LEDAC).
Some NGOs were even invited to participate in international summits such as the Environmental Summit held in Rio de Janiero and the Women's Conference in Beijing. Through these, the civil society was able to get the Ramos administration, at least, even just on paper, to give priority to the social reform (SRA) and to sustainable development (PA 21). With these concerns incorporated in the program of government, the civil society was able to hold the state accountable for the delivery of these programs.

Working with the state also made the NGOs more pragmatic in their approach to social development. Involvement in development administration, on the other hand, changed the NGOs' organizational structures and ways of proceedings. As NGOs were increasingly tapped as professional public service contractors, they became more driven by the donor market demand rather than by their social missions per se. As contractors, the NGOs had to work within a limited time frame, under a rigid structure, and often with little or no involvement in overall program management or policy decision-making (Gonzales: 94).

Also, with the ODA decreasing over the years, funding agencies preferred to concentrate funding on medium and large NGOs with established track records of achieving broader ground level impact (Alegre: 43) and institutional abilities to manage and implement development programs that the government and the more conventional contractors were unable to provide (Gonzales: 78-79). This created pressure to the small-sized and relatively unorganized NGOs to upscale operations and find their special niches in social development. This, in turn, pushed the NGOs further into professionalization (Alegre: 42). To attract and keep talented professionals, many of the NGOs
institutionalized social security benefits for NGO workers, offered attractive salary scales and provided career development incentives to their employees (Ibid.).

The scopes of NGO work during this period likewise continued to diversify. Unlike before, however, the diversification of NGO work was more reflective of the interests of the foreign funding institutions and the concerns of the government during the period. This, in turn, led to the inclusion of highly specialized and technical fields into the repertoire of NGO’s social development work. For example, programs on environmental management, violence against women (VAW), reproductive rights, gay rights and the AIDS were added to the usual community organizing and advocacy efforts of existing NGOs. New NGOs were also created to specialize on these issues. At the same time, the opening of new arenas for advocacy required different lobbying and information dissemination techniques. These led to the establishment of NGOs that dealt with upgrading the communications and institutional technologies available to the civil society. These developments facilitated the recruitment of highly skilled and highly specialized professionals into the NGOs’ social development work.

Lastly, the contractual or co-financing arrangements preferred under the ODA imposed restrictions on the fund disbursements of the NGOs. In most cases, these also required that the NGOs provide counterpart funds for administrative costs. However, only the big NGOs (BINGOs) and/or the NGO coalitions have the organizational capabilities for these. As such, they were able to monopolize access to ODA funds. To spread the opportunities to medium or small scale NGOs, however, these BINGOs (and the NGO coalitions) served as funding intermediaries and/or sub-contracted program works to medium or small sized NGOs. The latter, in turn, performed the same functions
for the POs. These intermediary arrangements further institutionalized the leadership roles of the NGOs in the civil society.

Decreasing volume of funds available, the demand for technical specialization and the requirement for counterpart funds to avail of ODA funding, coupled by the inherent fear of the NGOs of less than partnership status in development administration provided the motivations for most NGOs to aspire for self-sustainability. As such, many NGOs likewise explored revenue generation options during this period. These included setting up of endowment funds, developing investment portfolios much like the traditional business firms, engaging in business ventures such as renting out of facilities, acting as marketing agents for POs that produced/manufacture agricultural and other products, offering training and consultancy services and for those with the necessary expertise, engaging in micro-finance ventures (Aldaba, Velasco and Garde, 1996: 61). The concern for self-sustainability, on the other hand, pushed the NGOs to establish closer relationship with the business sector, not so much to ask grants and donations, but to explore profit-making ventures.

Mainstreaming of NGO work in the practice of development administration led to the establishment of academic programs that cater primarily to NGO workers. NGO workers and academics likewise held joint forums to facilitate information sharing and theory building. On occasions, these led to the formation of NGO-academic consortia such as the Upland NGO Assistance Council (UNAC) which is comprised of NGOs and academic institutions that pilots an upland development project and the Urban Research Consortium (URC) which matched academic researches with the priority research needs of the urban poor communities (Constantino-David, 1997: 46-47). The collaboration
between the NGOs and the academe promoted discussions of alternative frameworks that could replace the outdated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideological models, the bridging of scientific knowledge and technologies and local culture, and the exploration of new modes of teaching (e.g., the use of structured learning experience) and research methodologies (e.g., participatory research methods). Since these required the abilities to communicate knowledge and information on both academic and popular terms that only professional social development workers could do, this contributed in firmly establishing social development work as a highly specialized and exclusive career option for middle class professionals. With these, the distinctions between the NGOs and POs became more pronounced.

The process of NGO organizational transformation was as tension-filled as their separation from the ideological movements. Although professionalization was intended to improve the abilities of the NGOs to deal with the state and consequently, to address the needs of their grassroots partners, it initially caused confusion and triggered conflicts among NGO workers. First of all, the very premise of NGO work was to explore alternative ways of doing service for the poor sectors of society (Aldaba, 1993: 19). As such, questions arose when they had to meet outputs set by funding agencies and/or their government partners, particularly when this meant undermining the community organizing and people empowerment processes. Second, many of the professionals who opted to work for NGOs did so because they were attracted by their autonomy and flexibility (Ibid.). As such, they were uncomfortable with the increasing bureaucratization of the NGOs, especially since they believed that it was the rigidity of the state bureaucracy that caused many of the social problems in the country in the first place.
Third, having been trained on Freire’s conscientization process, NGO workers placed more emphasis on experiential learning. They drew pride on their involvement in the revolutionary movements at some point, as well as the wisdom and knowledge they gathered from actual field experiences. Given these, many of them disdained the formal and detached approaches of the technocrats and the academics to social problems. Except for NGO leaders and managers who could see the urgency of adjusting to the needs of the times, therefore, most NGO workers were resistant to professionalization and to the changes in field strategies. Their negative responses to professionalization were exacerbated by their perception that they were being eased out from their work by credentialed professionals who were not as experienced as they were. Fourth, up until this time, NGOs were operating on small-scale and informal basis under a high sense of community spirit. When NGOs professionalized and upscaled their operations, however, the interaction among NGO workers became less personal. The lack of personal interaction increased competition (i.e., “turfing”) among the NGO workers.

Lastly, since the NGOs had very strong traditions of championing social justice such as fair wages, greater social equity for the basic sectors, etc., the trend towards professionalization made the NGO workers aware that they themselves were not getting their share of social justice. These led to the clamor for consistency between what they were preaching to their PO partners and what they were practicing in their own organizations. With limited resources available for administrative expenses, however, most NGOs were unable to meet the demands of their empowered workers. In some occasion, these led to confrontations between the managers and the rank and file staff. Thus, although being mainstreamed in development administration opened opportunities
for the NGOs to strategically influence the state and to address the needs of their grassroots partners, it likewise triggered internal organizational tensions. In fact, during the mid-1990s when NGO professionalization was at its height, many NGOs went through a phase of internal upheavals, demoralization and mass staff resignations. To address the situation, counseling, staff formation and career pathing were consciously integrated into the human resource development strategies of many NGOs, primarily with support from NGO coalitions like CODE-NGO and PHILSSA. It also led to the establishment of organizations like CO-Train and later on, the CO-Multiversity that specialized in the retooling and sustaining the morale of the various generations of NGO workers.

Tensions were not contained within the individual NGOs themselves, however. Inter-NGO conflicts that started from the previous period persisted. This time, however, conflicts ensued not so much because of ideological differences, but because of stiffer competition for fund resources and target clientele and on occasions, differences in political strategies (Franco, 2002:11). In some cases, conflicts were also inter-generational. Successor generations of NGO workers felt that the pioneer generations were constraining their initiatives and imposing their ideas and values on them. Moreover, they also felt that the pioneers were not mentoring them enough. The pioneers, on the other hand, felt that the younger generations of NGO workers did not have the passion and the commitment that social development work required. Moreover, they also felt that in the same way that they carved niches for the NGOs in social development work, the successor generation needed to do the same.
Illustration 4 – Inter-generational Reflections on Tensions and Conflicts Produced by Mainstreaming and Professionalization

First Generation NGO Workers:

Comparison of the Characteristics of the Different Successor Generations of NGO Workers:

K: There is a personality type (of NGO workers): dogged determination, stubbornness, lakas ng loob (strength of character)… You do not find as much of this in the generations which went into the already set-up NGO (p. 11)’s.

During those periods (the 1960s-1970s and the 1983-1986), the people who had the pioneering spirit were also those who not only had technical skills but were also very much involved in the marginalized sectors… Now we have people who are getting involved because it is a job… The leading lights of the pioneering generation immersed themselves in mass organizing but not the present generation. You cannot bring them to do community organizing because they lack experience so their route to NGO work is technical (p. 14).

MI: The challenge of the younger generation now is to set up business and provide employment (p. 11). The charism of the younger generation is primarily economic… They also have a different definition of politics (pp. 14).

LC: I have been with the NGO a very long time… I feel frustrated because, looking at my co-workers now, I wonder why they had not been able to imbibe this commitment which I began some years back (pp. 16-17).

P: The generation of NGO workers today is concerned with security. Some of them would complain, “We are working for the security of workers yet we ourselves are not secure.” (p. 18).

G: The struggle is our life… These new staffs, however, look at NGO work as separate from their personal life. When they get home, they forget all about it because it is seen only as employment – an 8 to 5 thing (p. 22).

Views Concerning Professionalization and the Changes in Organizational Nature of NGOs:

K: This concern about upgrading salaries and setting up longevity pay. Are these efforts killing volunteerism and contributing to the problem of successor generation? Many of those from the older generation were forced into professionalization not because we wanted it but because it was the demand of the younger generation.

D: It is a push and pull things. This move towards professionalizing began partly out of the desire to systematize work. And when we started that, the reaction of the younger ones was “That is okay, but this is what we want”.

Views Concerning Internal Organizational Tensions within the NGOs:

D: We put in the elements of democratic participation (in professionalization), which is the worst combination if you do not nurture it within the context of community caring. What happened was democratic participation had become the tool for making decisions regarding salaries and benefits the power of which, is spread out into the organization (p. 21).

Somehow, we failed as a role model in some parts. We thought we were able to leave behind as a legacy the collective caring experience. Apparently, that we were not able to do. What became much more important to them was “Our rights, our democratic participation. We have a right to that money. We have a right to be stable” (p. 21).
Cont.

**Second Generation NGO Workers:**

Comparison of the Characteristics of the Different Generations of NGO Workers:

MA: The pioneers are already preoccupied with international activities, thus forgetting/setting aside base-NGO work (p. 44)

J: The successor generation has leadership/passion. They are activists but they are not rah-rah-rah. There is a system. It’s clear that each other has his/her own focus (p. 45).

S: (Responding to question of what are the equivalent traits of second generation NGO workers could compare to track records and traits developed out of experience of Martial Law) Are these equivalent to the risk that came to us when we were asked to produce an 8-page document in 20 hours? “Produce this document or else. you’ll lose this much.” (p. 45).

Views on Professionalization and the Changes in the Organizational Nature of NGOs:

C: Different kind of leaders are evolving – before visionaries; now managers (p. 43).

S: We feel that they (the pioneers) tend to impose on us some of their methods of work/approaches.

Views Concerning Internal Organizational Tensions within the NGOs:

T: We cannot gain support from our Board. Sometimes our perspective clash with theirs (p. 42).

J: The transfer of vision – developing character- was done but why does it not happen now? (p. 44)

A: We always hear the phrase “we have to go back to the basics”. From their roots (basic organizing, protest movement), the successor generation is confronted with the ideals of the protest movement. That is why the pioneers and successor generation experience conflicts, especially in terms of strategy (p. 45).

**Third Generation NGO Workers:**

Comparison of the Characteristics of the Different Generations of NGO Workers:

LT: We have different experiences but some of us see the political orientation of the pioneers and immediate successors to be strong (p. 52)... It is clear that we have different political orientation. The pioneers knew who their enemy was. In the generation of the immediate successors, crisis in the movement arose (p. 53).

LM: There are individual differences in every generation because we belong to different classes... What they say about NGO workers before is that they belonged to the middle class (p. 54).

Views on Professionalization and the Changes in the Organizational Nature of NGOs:

MO: Things changed in the time of the immediate successors... Despite the immediate successors’ desire to continue their cause, we cannot because we are largely dependent on international support. We have to consider funding... There was a shift... from political to more concrete orientation – economic (p. 53). I have seen and talked to a lot of people who left social development work... There is a question of sustainability and viability of NGO work (p. 57).
Despite the opening of venues for involvement, maybe politically it is more democratic, but poverty is still there. Politically there are some changes, but economically, the situation is still the same—value deterioration, environmental deterioration (p. 54).

In the process of professionalization, even economic consideration is taken up. We think of sustainability. The reason why there are a lot of the immediate successors leaving their job is that their needs are not being attended to (p. 55).

Now, there is a need to organize the things that were left by the pioneers. The direction of NGO work is not that clear to us now, especially after the February Revolution (of 1986) (p. 56).

Views Concerning Internal Organizational Tensions within the NGOs:

AV: I have a friend belonging to the generation of the immediate successors. He quit his job because of the competition between him and his companions. They have different motivations. For him, it was spiritual, and for his companions, it was political (p. 59).

LM: For others, the rift is not really within the organization, but through their networking work (p. 59).


The professionalization and mainstreaming of NGO operations into the practice of development administration likewise affected the NGOs’ relationship with the POs. For one, the delineation between the two civil society groups that started to become obvious during the Aquino administration became more pronounced during this period. Since the NGOs served as conduits of resources from foreign funding institutions and the government to the grassroots, incidences of conflicts ensued between the NGOs and their partner POs over access to resources. In a study conducted by Aldaba (1993) among four relatively strong and autonomous POs, he identified four tension points in the partnership of NGOs and POs: (a) access and share in funding, (b) overlapping functions, (c) the tendencies of the NGOs to intervene in the decision-making process of the POs, and, (d) the issue of PO autonomy.

In summary, the Philippine civil society during the Ramos administration can be characterized as follows. First, in a continuing trend that started during the Aquino administration, the Philippine civil society during this period became more diverse and
more plural in terms of number and types of organizations that comprise it. However, even though its membership grew in number, it also became relatively exclusive. While before, it included the outlawed revolutionary movements, the weakening of the influence of the ideological parties on the NGOs and POs led to their marginalization from the mainstream Philippine civil society. The entry of highly specialized and highly skilled professionals, as well as the establishment of standards for NGO work, on the other hand, made the civil society primarily a domain of the Filipino middle classes.

These led to the de-prioritization of politics in favor of more socio-economic approach to social change. However, this did not mean that the civil society became devoid of politics altogether. Rather, political efforts shifted from the “parliaments of the streets” to the electoral arena. Unfortunately, the NGOs and POs were not very successful on this undertaking. Nonetheless, some NGOs and POs were able to harness their capacities for pressure politics in changing the focus of electoral campaigns towards the discussion of critical social issues.

This, on the other hand, was due to the mainstreaming of the NGOs into the field of development administration. As the state and the funding institutions increasingly depended on them to provide the mediating links to the grassroots, the NGOs began to realize and harness their strategic advantage as development intermediaries, particularly in terms of influencing the state to adopt social reforms. For one, the NGOs took measures to consolidate their strategic position as “development brokers” by establishing networks and coalitions that would enable them to present a unified front to the state and the international funding institutions. This also allowed them to ward off threats from
other groups entering the civil society arena to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the Ramos administration.

The decrease in the volume of ODA funds, as well as the changes in the nature of ODA funding release mechanisms from grants to service contracts, on the other hand, further compelled the NGOs to upscale their operations and achieve self-sufficiency by maximizing their competitive advantage over the other members of the civil society. These enabled the NGOs to effectively negotiate with the institutional actors in the other domains of social practice, control the allocation of resources to the other civil society groups and consequently, maintain hegemony in the civil society. Coalition building particularly enabled them to promote the homogenization of their social consciousness and visions. However, their abilities to do this were intermittently threatened by the inherent conflicts among themselves on the basis of their different ideological orientations and later on, the inter-generational differences. These, in turn, caused setbacks in their lobbying and advocacy effort as a sector.

The NGOs were likewise compelled to professionalize their ranks and diversify their program interventions in light of the new challenges posed by the open policy of the Ramos administration to the civil society. This facilitated the entry of highly skilled and highly technical professionals into the NGO work further closing social development as a career to other civil society groups, notably, the grassroots sectors.

As the NGOs consolidate their positions as development intermediaries, therefore, their distinctions from the POs as civil society agents became more and more pronounced. The POs were relegated into the roles of beneficiaries while the NGOs
became the “catalysts of development”. This resulted to tensions among the NGOs and POs.

Realizing that their strategic advantage in the development administration field rests on their relationship with the POs, the NGO sought to maintain their links with the latter. However, some POs already began to clamor for bigger shares in the development resources and for greater autonomy in decision-making indicating that the POs were becoming resentful of the differences of their interests to those of the middle class dominated NGOs. This sentiment would play a significant role in the civil society and state dynamics during the succeeding Estrada-Arroyo Administration.

Civil Society vs. “Civil-ized” Society (1997-Present)

One of the biggest accomplishments of the Ramos administration was the improvement of the economic condition of the Philippines. Under the supervision of Pres. Ramos, the country managed to post a respectable growth rate that averaged at 5 percent annually (Karaos, 1998: 8). This resulted to the steady decline of poverty incidence throughout his term, from 39.9% in 1991, to 35.7% in 1994, and 32.1% in 1997 (Raquiza, 1997; NSO: n.d.). Partly because of this, the civil society was relatively less critical and more collaborative in its dealing with the state during the first years of the Ramos administration.

However, the growth of the Philippine economy was halted by the financial crisis that hit the Asian market in the mid-1990s. This was further aggravated by the drought in Mindanao due to the El Nino phenomenon, which impacted negatively on the country’s agricultural sector. By 1997, the peso depreciated to 50% of its value in 1996, slowing down the increase in the GNP to 2.5% (Tuano, 1998: 5). This resulted to the closure and
downsizing of many corporate enterprises. Within one year’s time, unemployment rate increased from 10.4% in 1997 to 13.3% in 1998 thereby weakening the demands for goods and services (Ibid.). Thus, as the country was preparing for the election of the new president, an economic crisis was also looming on the horizon.

Given this, the NGOs felt that the next president must have the political will, the competence and the credibility in the international community to cushion the basic sectors from the impact of the looming crisis. Unfortunately, they perceived that Joseph Estrada, who did not have any of these qualities, could become the next president because of his popularity among the grassroots sectors. However, even they themselves were divided in their choices of candidates to support.24

Because of and despite of these, the NGOs were more eager to test out the viability of the party list system as a mechanism for getting popular representatives into the elite-dominated Congress. The NGOs saw this as a logical option to apply pressure politics and push the incoming administration to address social reform issues.

As it is now, it may not make a difference who gets elected President in 1998; whoever he or she will be, the new President will have no clear party platform to which all party-members are committed. He or she will therefore have to work out his or her own program and then sell it to the legislature – by means of pork barrel allocations and all the rest. The consequence will be the usual gridlock and stalemate, and lack of consistent policy or clear direction in the stormy years ahead…. In the long run, genuine political parties may develop from the coming together of members of peasant organizations, labor groups, urban poor groups and church-related groups (Carroll SJ, 1997: 5).

With this in mind, the civil society; i.e., the NGOs and POs, organized themselves into parties and sectoral groups to vie for party list representation in Congress. In the eagerness to test out the system, 123 parties filed for accreditation for the party list election. However, the 1997 party list election merely confirmed that the electoral
process was not yet a viable way for the civil society to gain access to the state’s corridors of power. Only 13 out of the 123 party list candidates were able to meet the required votes to get representation. Of these, only one group, the Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), got two seats (See Table 4) (Gonzales and Nicolas, n.d.: n.p.).

Table 4 about here

As expected, Joseph Estrada won the presidency by a landslide. Having failed to get a critical number of party list representatives in Congress, the NGOs shifted its focus towards lobbying and advocacy for the continuation of the social reform agenda. Immediately after Pres. Estrada was sworn into office, the NGOs and POs recommended a “manageable” agenda for the Estrada administration that basically called for the continuation and strengthening of the social, political and economic reforms of the previous administration.

Following the steps taken by his predecessors, Pres. Estrada appeased the civil society by appointing leading NGO personalities to departments and key agencies that were critical in addressing poverty concerns namely, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). He likewise created a National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) that would oversee the continuation of the implementation of the SRA started during Pres. Ramos term. Moreover, Pres. Estrada unveiled his administration’s plan to reduce poverty incidence further to 20 percent by the year 2004 by prioritizing agriculture and food security. In
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Organization/Coalition</th>
<th>Total Votes Garnered</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Votes Garnered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC)</td>
<td>503,487</td>
<td>5.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Alyansa ng Bayanihan ng Magsasaka Manggagawang Bukid at Manginingisda (ABA - Peasants)</td>
<td>321,646</td>
<td>3.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ALAGAD (Partido ng Maralitang Tagalungsod (Urban Poor)</td>
<td>312,500</td>
<td>3.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sectoral Party of Veterans Foundation of the Philippines (VFP)</td>
<td>304,902</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Progressive Movement of Devolution of Initiatives Political Party (PROMDI - Satellite Political Party)</td>
<td>255,184</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanap-buhay at Kaunlaran (AKO - Urban Poor)</td>
<td>239,042</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. National Federation of Small Coconut Farmers Organization (SCFO - Coconut Farmers)</td>
<td>238,303</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ABANSE Pinay! (Women's Party)</td>
<td>235,548</td>
<td>2.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Akbayan! (Citizens' Action Party)</td>
<td>232,376</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. BUTIL (Luzon Farmers' Party)</td>
<td>215,643</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SANLAKAS (Labor Party)</td>
<td>194,617</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Cooperative NATCCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO)</td>
<td>189,802</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

contrast to the Ramos administration that stressed global competitiveness and liberalization, the Estrada administration chose to build its development strategy on addressing more basic deficiencies in production at the grassroots level (Karaos, 1999: 15-16). Given these, the NGOs and POs opted to adopt a “wait and see” stance towards the Estrada administration. In less than a year, however, disaffection with the Estrada administration had set in among the civil society groups.

In 1999, Pres. Estrada attempted to initiate the process of amending the 1987 Constitution by initiating the Constitutional Correction for Development (CONCORD) in order to allow foreigners to own land in the Philippines. This antagonized not only the civil society but also the Catholic Church. A demonstration sponsored by NGO coalitions and the Catholic Church groups were held at the Makati business district on August 1999 denouncing the CONCORD. This came amidst rumors of a government-initiated boycott against the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, a broadsheet newspaper, which was also the Estrada administration’s strongest media critic (*Ibid.*).

In addition to these, it was becoming evident that the Estrada administration could not fulfill its campaign promises. For one, the civil society noted that instead of dealing with the problem of food security at the policy level, the Estrada administration adopted palliative measures such as the provision of basic commodities at subsidized prices through accredited NFA stores (*Erap Sari-Sari Stores*) and rolling stores (*Jeep ni Erap*) (Karaos: 18). The implementation of agrarian reform, on the other hand, was at its slowest since 1998. The Estrada administration likewise failed to follow through on its promise for socialized mass housing for the urban poor. The Community Mortgage Program was suspended due to bureaucratic backlogs even as the strong lobby from real
estate developers forced the Presidential Assistant for Housing who came from the NGO sector to resign amidst controversies (Racelis: 2000). Even the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), which the Estrada administration created to provide the necessary focus, direction and synergy to its pro-poor initiatives had not been spared of controversies (Tordesillas, May 1999: 34). Immediately after its creation, Pres. Estrada created an interim executive committee to take over its functions. Under the new committee, Estrada replaced the 14 NAPC representatives chosen by the grassroots sectors themselves with his appointees (Ibid., 35). This fueled the rivalries among the PO federations and divided the basic sectors. The Lingap para sa Mahirap (Care for the Poor), the Estrada administration’s banner anti-poverty program, on the other hand, sowed confusion as it sought to identify and target 100 poorest households in a province as beneficiaries. Since the choice of the beneficiaries of the program was left to the local government officials, it became a source of corruption and patronage politics (Ricardo as cited by ICSI: 1999: 15). The failure of the Estrada administration to deliver on its campaign promises was all the more made glaring by the effects of the financial crisis that hit the country during this period.

For the NGOs, however, the most alarming development during the Estrada administration was the return to power of the Marcos cronies and the emergence of a new circle of businessmen and power brokers who were in the thick of Estrada’s campaign for presidency (Ibid.). These power brokers had personal access to the President and were able to influence policy decisions, many of which were reached in secrecy (Doronilla as cited by ICSI: 1999: 12). These lend the Cabinet as a key arena for articulating interests and rationally examining issues useless and prone to infighting (Ibid., 13).
Interestingly, the NGOs and POs did not address these immediately and were, in fact, initially cautious in criticizing the Estrada administration. There were three reasons for this. First, the NGOs were optimistic that with some of their colleagues from the civil society occupying strategic positions in the government, they could work together to lobby for a more coherent and effective state administration. However, these individuals have not cohered – possibly due to ideological and strategic differences - nor took the lead to craft and push for a reform agenda thereby clearing the way for political rent-seekers and cronies (Ricardo as cited by ICSI: 14). Secondly, the partnerships between the local government units and NGOs were flourishing and bringing improvements in the lives of the grassroots at the community level (Racelis: 2000). Because of this, many NGOs were not keen on what was happening at the national level. More importantly, many NGOs were cautious about harping on the indiscretions of Pres. Estrada as they were concerned that doing would strain their relationship with their partner POs. Up to the time that Pres. Estrada’s involvement in illegal gambling became public, his popularity among the grassroots sectors remained high.

By late 1999, however, the scandals involving the Office of the President had reached a level that the Catholic Church and the middle classes found to be “immoral”. By the year 2000, the Catholic Church began to openly criticize the Estrada administration. Encouraged by the resurgence of the church’s involvement in partisan politics, the civil society began its move to demand the resignation of Pres. Estrada. On February 2000, a “silent majority” from the middle-class cause-oriented groups initiated a campaign against cronyism, corruption and nepotism nebulously referred to as the “Erap Resign! Movement”. By October 2000, amidst the disclosure of President Estrada’s links
to an organized syndicate operating illegal gambling, 13 NGOs and POs filed an impeachment case against the president in Congress for reneging in his campaign promises, dereliction of duties, mishandling the affairs of the state and causing political, economic and social instability (Conde, 2000: n.p.).

Mass movements, rallies and marches sponsored by the Catholic Church and the NGO coalitions in various parts of the country clamoring for Pres. Estrada to resign or go on leave ensued thereafter. On October 18, 2000, in a form reminiscent of the anti-Marcos rallies in the 1980s, the Makati business district was filled with protesters from the ranks of the Catholic Church, the legal left and the rightist groups clamoring for the ouster of Pres. Estrada. KOMPIL II was launched thereafter, with 250 organizations, coalitions and networks participating (KOMPIL II, 2000) with the battle cry of “Resignation, Impeachment or Ouster (RIO)”. Mass actions, street protests, non-payment of taxes, boycott of family/crony companies and movies associated with Pres. Estrada and intensive nationwide campaign for RIO followed (Ibid.).

As it was in 1986, however, it was the unexpected response of the public to the impeachment hearings that impelled the people to troop to EDSA to force the resignation of Pres. Estrada. Starting January 17, 2001, members of NGO and PO coalitions in partnership with the networks of Catholic organizations in Metro Manila, held a vigil in EDSA. Parallel vigils were held in various places nationwide. By January 20, 2001, Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was proclaimed president and Pres. Estrada was escorted out of Malacanang.

With Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo taking over the presidency, the NGO representatives, particularly those closely associated with KOMPIL II-CODE-NGO bloc
were appointed to critical government posts like the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor and the Civil Service Commission. This ensured that inputs from the civil society were integrated into the Arroyo administration’s program of government, as was made evident by Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo’s emphasis on poverty reduction in most of her speeches.

For the May 2001 synchronized legislative and local government election, Pres. Arroyo endorsed the CODE-NGO People Power Coalition representatives to the senate. Of these, however, only one was elected. In the party list election, only the alternative political parties like Bayan Muna! and Akbayan were able to succeed in getting into Congress. The sectoral parties did not fare as well despite massive voter’s education campaign by the NGOs (See Table 5). As before, this merely confirmed that mass bases are not convertible to actual electoral votes.

Table 5 about here

Less than a year later, some civil society groups such as the People’s Consultative Assembly (PCA), Sanlakas and BAYAN were once again strongly expressing discontent with the Arroyo administration’s policies concerning national security and the state’s handling of the court proceedings against the deposed Pres. Estrada, albeit, with opposite stand on the issues. Meanwhile, the CODE-NGO, which represents around 3,000 of the centrist-socdem NGOs while critical, affirmed the openness of the Arroyo administration to civil society participation as manifested by her encouragement of sectoral and regional consultations in the preparation of her administration’s program of government (CODE-
Table 5 - Leading Party List Groups
COMELEC Canvass Report
As of August 19, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Organization/Coalition</th>
<th>Total Votes Garnered</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Votes Garnered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bayan Muna! (BAYAN)</td>
<td>1,708,252</td>
<td>11.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mamamayang Ayaw sa Droga (MAD, disqualified)</td>
<td>1,515,682</td>
<td>10.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC)</td>
<td>801,921</td>
<td>5.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Veterans Federation Party (VFP)</td>
<td>580,771</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Abag Promdi (PROMDI, satellite party)</td>
<td>422,430</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC, satellite party)</td>
<td>385,151</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Akbayan Citizens' Action Party</td>
<td>377,850</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Luzon Farmers' Party (BUTIL, sectoral party)</td>
<td>330,282</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Lakas-NUCD-UMDP</td>
<td>329,093</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC)</td>
<td>323,810</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NGO, 2001: 2-3). At first glance, these seem to be a mere continuation of the recurring tendencies of the Philippine civil society groups to converge at crucial moments of confronting the state only to splinter thereafter when the immediate threat is gone to pursue particular interests. However, it is interesting to note that the coalition of social development NGOs, which is primarily the centrist and reform-oriented block of the middle class-dominated civil society, opted to continue supporting and working closely with the state. This became more interesting when viewed within the context of the most recent developments in the NGO sector itself.

While the political struggle with the Estrada administration was going on, many of the NGO coalitions were simultaneously institutionalizing mechanisms that would preserve the integrity of the NGOs and protect the standards of social development work. In 1998, six of the largest NGO coalitions set up the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC). On January 1998, PCNC got the Department of Finance to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with it to evaluate applications from donation recipient institutions to receive non-taxable donations from corporate or private entities.32 The accreditation process was justified as a measure for the NGOs to police their own ranks and control the allocation of financial resources channeled to the NGOs instead of the state having to do so. This ensures that organizations that would receive donations are legitimate and that these would be used for purposes that they are intended for. However, the accreditation process also indirectly pressured those who are not part of these coalitions to become members of such. However, membership to these organizations required satisfaction of various requirements such as proven track records, government registration, submission of financial statements, etc. that many small NGOs and
grassroots-based POs barely have. The process, therefore, automatically disqualified them as recipients of direct donations from corporate and private entities.

Aside from the accreditation system, NGO leaders (representing civil society) also actively sought out partnerships with the business sector. On February 26, 2000, for example, a tri-sectoral conference on “Partnerships for Governance and Development” was held wherein representatives of the NGO coalitions, business leaders and World Bank representatives met to discuss a 10-point agenda on how to improve governance and the life of the Filipinos in general that were later on presented to Pres. Estrada. Among the areas of concerns raised in the conference were the improvement of the educational system, asset reform, and better regulatory mechanisms (Mission, 2000: n.p.).

The initiatives to consolidate and strengthen the position of the NGO sector continue up to the present. In consideration of the declining funding support to NGO operations amidst the diversification and increasing scopes of NGO social development work, the NGOs could no longer rely on external fund sources to sustain its operations. The sector has to look for alternative ways to sustain itself. One way is to engage in corporate-like profit making ventures. With this in mind, the CODE-NGO participated and won in a bidding for the auction of the 10-year government zero-coupon bonds in partnership with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) on March 2001. This became known as the Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates or the PEACe Bonds. The purpose behind the PEACe Bonds was for CODE-NGO to raise P1 billion from the capital market as a source of fund. CODE-NGO earned P1.48 billion instead, which it allocated to activities intended to promote the sustainability of its networks members and to a trust fund intended to finance NGO programs that could create impact.
on the lives of the poor (Songco, 2002). While this initiative is intended to promote the long-term sustainability of the NGOs, it opened debates among the various groups within the Philippine civil society on the limits of its relationship with the state, as well as that of its engagement in profit-making ventures drew criticism from various civil society groups. The Action for Economic Reform (AER), for example, condemned the PEACE Bonds transactions as a case of impermissible rent seeking that set back the entire civil society struggle (Franco, 2002: 17). Others, on the other hand, saw nothing wrong with the transactions as it merely indicated the rare speculative acumen of NGO coalition leaders (Jimenez-David, February 1, 2002; Monsod, January 5, 2002). CODE-NGO maintained its argument that the transactions were undertaken under conditions of transparency.

As these were transpiring during the transition period between the Estrada administration and Arroyo administration, intra-civil society relations were changing along the process. As indicated by the PEACE Bond issue, it seemed that the social development NGOs were becoming separated from other cause-oriented groups, even as their partnership with the government is becoming stronger.

Indications are also strong that the relationship between the NGOs and the POs were becoming strained, with the latter beginning to assert their independence from the former. As mentioned earlier, Pres. Estrada enjoyed the support of the grassroots despite charges of immorality, cronyism and corruption against him and the people close to him. In fact, the social approval rating of Pres. Estrada remained high amidst the scandals and controversies involving him and his cronies up until incriminating evidences against him could no longer be denied. Even then, however, the poor continued to rally for him,
especially as he visited urban poor communities to distribute land titles to urban poor residents who had long been lobbying for such. These swayed even some POs closely associated with the NGOs critical of Pres. Estrada into supporting him. At the height of the EDSA uprising last January 2001, in fact, many of these PO members participated in mass mobilizations initiated by Pres. Estrada’s supporters.

On the last week of April 2001, a group of pro-Estrada loyalist groups led by the People’s Movement Against Poverty (PMAP) vandalized the EDSA Shrine and attacked Malacanang upon the instigation of pro-Estrada politicians. They called this the EDSA 3. Those involved in the January EDSA mobilization (EDSA 2) dismissed the brief rebellion as a cheap attempt of the pro-Estrada politicians to instrumentalize “people power”. They also labeled PMAP as an “uncivil” society. There were those, however, who argued that EDSA 3 merely provided the venue, albeit a misguided one, for the poor to vent out their legitimate frustrations against the elite-dominated state that rarely listens and never makes itself accountable to them, but instead serves to maintain their political exclusion, social marginalization and chronic poverty (Franco, 2002: 6). Regardless of whether PMAP was an “uncivil” society and EDSA 3 was a “fake” people power revolt or not, they indicated that the concerns of the grassroots sectors had not been addressed either by the government or the middle class-based NGOs. It likewise confirmed that even though the NGOs had been their partners in lobbying for social reforms, they did not share the interests and sentiments of the middle class. More importantly, it indicated that the middle class NGOs had not completely established their hegemony over the POs and on the civil society as a whole.
How the civil society would be shaped by the Arroyo administration is yet to unfold. Nonetheless, some trends are already discernible. For one, unlike the previous periods wherein the activities of the civil society were heavily influenced by the support—or lack of it—from other institutions like the Catholic Church, the ideological movements and the state, it appeared that at the present period, the civil society—particularly the NGOs—had increasingly been taking pro-active steps to shape its own political and economic milieu. In prior times, NGO activities were mere expressions of how the Catholic Church and the ideological movements viewed and dealt with the state. Over the last years, however, the NGOs had been taking their own initiatives in dealing with the state, the business sector and the international funding institutions. The most crucial expression of the NGO sector’s assertion of autonomy was its effort to mobilize support from various sectors to pressure Pres. Estrada to step down from office as exemplified by KOMPIL II.

Also, unlike in previous period wherein the concern of the NGOs were to professionalize their ranks and upscale their operations in order to take advantage of the opportunities being opened to them by the state and the foreign funding institutions, their concerns at present had shifted to the consolidation of their ranks and the strengthening of their strategic position by establishing critical partnerships with the business sector and the foreign funding institutions, and ensuring their long-term sustainability. These were expressed by the establishment a self-appointed accreditation body (i.e., the PCNC) and their engagement in corporate like profit-seeking ventures (i.e., the PEACe Bonds). In addition to these, the NGO sector had also repeatedly attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to legitimize their access to power through the electoral process. All of these seemed to
point to the bid of the Filipino middle class to extend their influence beyond the development administration arena into the broader socio-economic and political arena.

However, recent events indicated that the NGO hegemony in the civil society is now being threatened by the growing awareness of the grassroots sectors that their lives had not improved. In view of this, the grassroots are now beginning to express their disappointments, using the strategies that they learned from their NGO partners namely, mass mobilization and pressure politics, to get recognized and demand their shares in the distribution of resources and power. At present, however, the antipathy of the grassroots is still primarily directed against the state although some PO leaders were already expressing resentment over the NGOs' control of their access to development funds and interventions in their organizations. How these would affect the NGO-PO relations in the long run, however, remains to be seen.

For a summary of the nature and characteristics of the Philippine civil society during the re-democratization period, please refer to Appendix 4.3.

Conclusion

The Philippine civil society during the period of re-democratization became further institutionalized as NGOs and POs assumed more formal organizational characteristics in order to become mainstreamed into the development administration field. In fact, the NGOs had already become a sector, which dominates a specific field namely, social development. It was able to do so by virtue of their strategic position as development intermediaries. In so doing, they have also made the civil society more exclusive to middle class-based NGOs.
Unlike the previous periods when its growth and development were primarily shaped by the Catholic Church and the ideological parties, the Philippine civil society has also come to its own during the re-democratization period. This was not so much a choice for the civil society groups, but a consequence of internal developments within these two institutions. On one hand, the Catholic Church distanced itself from the civil society because it felt that with the unholy dictatorship gone, it no longer had the moral responsibility to engage in partisan politics. More importantly, it had to rid itself of forces that contradicted its own existence namely, the "godless" communists. Nonetheless, it still lends intermittent support to the civil society and provides inspiration to the NGOs and POs particularly in the lobbying and advocacy of issues that are consistent with its social teachings. It also remained one of the major partners of the civil society in countervailing the powers of those who control the state. On the other hand, the ideological parties lost a great deal of its influence over the civil society because of the internal struggles among its members.

In contrast to the waning influence of the Catholic Church and the ideological parties over the civil society, the influence of the state and the international funding institutions over the NGOs and POs has grown during the re-democratization period. For one, the willingness of the state to involve the members of the civil society in various aspects of nation building enabled the NGOs and POs to discover a niche in social development. This was re-enforced by the preference of the international funding agencies for the NGOs to implement ODA as service providers and conduits of community assistance. This changed the nature of NGO work. From socio-political advocacy and awareness building, NGO work shifted to social development.
As ODA got increasingly channeled to the NGOs, however, it attracted businessmen and politicians to join the civil society bandwagon by setting up their own pseudo-NGOs. On the other hand, well-meaning government technocrats saw such as a way to cut through the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures as NGOs were given more flexibility by the government. The entry of these new players in the civil society led to its further diversification and pluralism. In response, the cause-oriented NGOs responded by consolidating their efforts and adopting measures to protect the integrity of their work. They established standards of works and ethics, as well as mechanisms for accreditation and fund allocation. They also encouraged organizational development and institutionalization of standard systems and procedures.

Corollary to these, they also professionalized ranks. Simultaneously, they also diversified the scopes of their operations to include highly specialized fields such as environmental science, gender and development, communications and information technology. These promoted the entry of highly skilled, and technologically oriented middle class professionals into NGO work, thereby entrenching middle class control over the civil society and closing social development work from the grassroots sectors. These further re-enforced their organizational distinctions from the POs.

Professionalization created internal tensions among the NGO workers as some felt that they were being eased out of their work by new entrants who were more credentialed but who did not share their experiences of working in the communities and their social movement traditions. These led many NGOs into organizational crisis, compelling the leaders of the NGO movement to adopt human resource mechanisms to reorient their workers and prepare them to cope with the changes in the nature of NGO work. Tensions
obtaining from these changes in the nature of NGO work were not limited internally to individual NGOs alone, however. Conflicts among NGOs also ensued because of ideological differences, competition for resources, geographical areas of influence and mass bases were highlighted by the need to respond to the opening opportunities provided by the state and the international funding institutions.

To address these, the NGOs embarked on coalition building among themselves. In the coalitions, differences were transcended through the introduction of common activities, coordination of efforts and even regulation of resource allocations. The coalitions likewise served as mechanisms by which to deal with common adversaries and to negotiate with the state. In process, the NGOs were able to promote homogenization of consciousness and interests. Through these, they were able to gain and maintain their hegemony over the other groups in the civil society.

As the state and the international funding institutions increasingly turn to the NGOs as development intermediaries, the nature of NGO operations itself also changed. For one, their operations became driven more by the needs and requirements of funding institutions instead of social mission. They also became more conscious of the need to maintain self-sustainability. As the NGOs begin to address their organizational concerns, the POs began to raise questions concerning their access and control of resources, decision-making and autonomy. The increasing awareness of the grassroots that their living conditions had not changed now poses a threat to the hegemony of the middle class-based NGOs on the civil society as a whole.

On a normative level, gaining autonomy from the Catholic Church and the ideological parties allowed the NGOs to explore and develop their own visions of a just,
equitable and democratic society; their own strategies (e.g., grassroots empowerment and pressure politics); and, tactics (e.g., community organizing, participatory decision-making, coalition building and advocacy). Having been freed from the fetters of leftist ideologies, the civil society became more centrist in orientation. While before, civil society activists were wary of capitalism they became increasingly open to participate in the market economy provided that safety nets and regulative mechanisms are set in place. They had also become more open to partnership with the business community, as well as with the international funding institutions like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, etc., albeit, within the premise of principled cooperation. Lastly, while before the civil society was ideological absolute in their demands for structural change, they now came to accept incremental and phased introduction of reforms. Corollary to these, they had also adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the state, in contrast to the adversarial and antagonistic stance they had during the Martial Law period.
ENDNOTES

1. For details, see Article II (Statement of Principles), Sec. 23; Article III (Bill of Rights), Sec. 4; Article VI (Legislative Department), Sec. 5 (I); Article XIII (Role and Rights of People’s Organizations), Sec. 15; and, Article XIII, Sec. 16 in Jose N. Nolledo (ed.), The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines with Highlights of the New Constitution, Manila: National Bookstore Inc.

2. After February 1986, institutional sources insisted on making the participation of NGOs in programming and fund utilization a condition for new pledges of official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippines. Among them were the World Bank, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Japanese Government represented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). This conditionality was due to the disillusionment of the funding agencies over the ineffectiveness of the Marcos administration in implementing poverty alleviation programs and their perception of the relative effectiveness of the NGOs in delivering basic services to the grassroots sectors. It was also due to the recognition of the significant role that the NGOs played in the people power movement that brought Cory Aquino to power. See Raul Gonzales, Official Development Assistance in the Philippines, 1986-1996, Quezon City: CODE-NGO, 1998, 62. See also CODE-NGO, Trends in Official Development Assistance for Philippine NGOs, Quezon City: n.d., 21-22.

3. NEDA Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1987 identified two ways by which NGOs could avail of ODA funding namely, the responsive and contractual funding arrangements. Under the responsive arrangement, the donor and/or the government agencies finance activities that the NGOs initiated themselves together with the local communities. On the other hand, under the contractual arrangement, donor and/or the government agencies make arrangements for the NGOs to carry out pre-determined activities. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see CODE-NGO, Trends in Official Development Assistance for Philippine NGOs: A Follow-Up Study, Manila: n.d.

4. The Local Government Code of 1991, as an instrument of people’s participation in governance: (1) requires all national agencies to conduct periodic consultation with local government units, NGOs and POs and other sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented (Chapter 1, Sec. 1); (2) mandates the local government units to promote the establishment and operation of NGOs/POs as active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy (Chapter 4, Sec. 34); (3) allows the local government units to enter into joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements with POs/NGOs for the delivery of basic services, capability building, livelihood projects and to develop local enterprises designed to improve local productivity and income, diversify agriculture and promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people (Chapter 4, Sec. 35); and, (4) allows the local government units, through its local chief executive and with concurrence of the local council to provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to tap POs and NGOs for the implementation of socially-oriented, economic, environmental and cultural projects (Chapter 4, Sec. 36). See ESCAP, 1998: 63.

5. It was also argued that the improvement in the capability to engage in development work contributed to the conflicts within the NDF-CPP-NPA coalition. As the NGOs’ social development capabilities developed, there was a strong tendency for them to resist “guidance” from the party. This was further exacerbated by the formation of NGO coalitions, particularly the CODE-NGO, which served as alternative locus of deliberating political issues and strategies. For details, see, J. Eliseo Rocamora, Philippine Progressive NGOs in Transition: The New Political Terrain of NGO Development Work, PSSC, Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 41, No. 1-4, Quezon City: January-December, 1993, 8.
6. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is estimated that only 75% of the total number of non-stock entities are "real" NGOs engaged in welfare- and cause-oriented activities. Of these, only 2,000 to 5,000 are "genuine" social development NGOs.

7. The Council for People’s Development (CPD) is a federation comprised of 28 sectoral and regional networks on NGOs and POs. It was formed in 1986 to synchronize the diverse socio-economic development efforts of various groups in different areas of the country at the national level. For more details see CPD, People’s Development Agenda, Quezon City: 1990.

8. The Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA) is a network formed in 1988 by urban-based NGOs as a counterpart of PHILDHRRA in the urban areas. Its purpose was to provide support services, assist in resource accessing, advocacy and linkages to NGOs operating in urban communities, particularly those working in the areas of urban housing, gender and development and health and nutrition.

9. Among the consortia that emerged during this period were the following: (a) the Network of Labor Institutes (NLI); (b) Philippine Development NGOs for International Concerns (PHILINK); (c) Sustainable Agriculture Coalition; (d) the Convergence for Community-Centered Area Development (CONVERGENCE), a consortium of 17 NGOs engaged in integrated area development with links to PRRM; (e) the NGO Council for Cooperative Development (NGO-CCD); (f) the Foundation of Community Organizers for Community Empowerment (FORCE); (g) the Green Forum Philippines, a coalition of 155 NGOs, POs and the Catholic Church established in 1989 to promote equitable and environmentally sustainable development; (h) the National Peace Conference, a coalition of peace advocates; and, (i) the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a coalition of individuals and groups who advocate repudiation of foreign loans and state restraint from foreign borrowings.

10. The ten major national networks that came together to deliberate on the PC-HRD were the Association of Foundations (AF), Council for People’s Development (CPD), Ecumenical Center for Development (ECD), National Council of Social Development Foundations (NCSDF), National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), National Association of Training Centers of Cooperatives (NATTCO), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PHILDHRRA), and the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA).

11. To a certain extent, NGO professionalization was also facilitated by the stricter monitoring and evaluation requirements and the demands for measurable gains in socio-economic projects imposed by foreign funding institutions who were concerned with the alleged diversion of funds by some NGOs from their intended uses towards the underground movements. The need to adhere to implementation guidelines and accounting procedures forced the NGOs to hire professional accountants and institutionalize training programs to make up for their staffs’ lack of skills in documentation work. For more discussions on this topic, see J. Eliseo Rocamora, The New Political Terrain of NGO Development Work, Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 41, No. 1-4: January-December, 1993: 3. See also Virginia A. Miralao and Ma. Cynthia B. Bautista, Standard Evaluation Methodologies and NGO Projects. Ibid.: 32.

13. Among those who pioneered alternative lifestyles and technologies were OTRADEV and
INNOTECH while those who focused on community-based natural resource management
included CERD, Tambuyog, etc.

14. Reflective of the non-partisan position taken by the Catholic Church after the 1986 People Power
Revolution, the groups that were actively engaged in voters’ education and in monitoring of the
1992 elections were the NAMFREL, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPC-
RV), Voters’ Organization-Training-Education towards Clean, Authentic and Responsible
Elections (VOTE-CARE), NASSA and Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan or the Church for the
Service of the Nation (SLB). See Francisco F. Claver, SJ, Non-Partisan but Active in ICSI.
Intersect, Vol. 6, No. 6, Quezon City: June 1992, 8-9.

15. According to some PDSP cadres whom this researcher informally interviewed, they opted to
support Ramos instead of the other presidential candidate because he among the non-traditional
candidates, he was “winnable”. Pandayan, BISIG and the popdem groups (i.e., the Movement for
Popular Democracy composed primarily of PRRM and affiliated NGOs) supported Salonga. See
Olle Tornquist, Democratic Empowerment and Democratization of Politics, Kasarinlan; 

16. Philippines 2000 is the Ramos administration’s strategy for national development that aimed to
bring the country to the status of newly industrializing country (NIC) by the year 2000. It had a
two-pronged complementary approach to economic growth and development: (a) global
excellence and competitiveness and (b) people empowerment. See Alexander P. Aguirre,
Executive Direction and Coordination, Jose V. Abueva, Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler and Ma. Oliva
Z. Domingo (eds.), The Ramos Presidency and Administration: Records and Legacy (1992-

17. Among the major summits conducted by the Ramos administration were the following:
a) Multi-Sectoral People’s Summit and People Empowerment Caucus on the Social Reform
Agenda (SRA). On this summit, eight priority legislative agenda were identified: (1)
national unity, justice, peace and security, (2) human resources and employment
generation, (3) infrastructure support and energy development, (4) closing the fiscal gap,
(5) investment mobilization and leveling of the playing field in development, (6)
environmental conservation and sustainable development, (7) agro-industrial
development and food security and (8) energizing of the bureaucracy.
b) Poverty Alleviation Summits where the National Action Agenda and a Poverty
Alleviation Plan were adopted.
c) National Development Summit on Pole Vaulting and National Consultative Conference
on Socio-Economic Development wherein the socio-economic development strategy to
stimulate the economy was explained and reviewed.
d) National Economic Summit during which the assessment of the economic situation, the
measures that were taken to stabilize such and what needed to be done were presented to
representatives of the different sectors of society.
e) Various Summits/Workshops and Consultations on a wide range of issues such as the El
Nino, electoral reforms, peace and order, the Mindanao concern, employment and labor
productivity, maritime safety, housing capital markets development, population,
industrial peace, food, water, flood, sports, small and medium enterprise development,
drug abuse, etc. For more details, see Alexander P. Aguirre. Executive Direction and
Coordination in Jose V. Abueva, Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler and Ma. Oliva Z. Domingo

18. Among the development programs implemented under the tripartite arrangements were the
agrarian reform projects, the integrated protected areas project and the community mortgage
program. The Tripartite Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (TriPARRD) is
a program initiated by PHILDHRRA that sought the collaboration of NGOs, POs, and the government in implementing agrarian reform by helping farmer groups increase their land productivity, have efficient access to market and to other income-generating opportunities.


Lastly, the community mortgage program (CMP) is a complementary program to the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) that gives urban poor associations were given the chance to purchase the lots that they had been occupying by availing of a socialized collective housing loan from the government-owned National Home Mortgage and Financing Corporation (NHMFC). The NGOs either serve as originator (i.e., guarantors) or facilitate the association’s linkage with one.

19. Contractual ODA funding arrangements for NGOs include: (a) fees for subcontracting with government-administered ODA programs and (b) direct contracts with ODA-supported programs of the Philippine government. See Raul Gonzales, Official Development Assistance in the Philippines, 1986-1996, Quezon City: CODE-NGO, 1998, 93.

20. The "reaffirmists" or RAs referred to the group that affirmed their commitment to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist-Mao-Tse-Tung thought, the continuation of the pursuit of people’s war as a means to promote social change and leadership of Jose Ma. Sison while the "rejectionists" or RJs referred to the group that was clamoring for the rethinking of the CPP framework in light of the developments at the global (i.e., the collapse of socialism, the rise of “market socialism” in China and Vietnam) and the national level (i.e., the opening of democratic space, the emergence of mass-based movements and the relative improvement in the economy during the said period) and the change in party strategies to include the accommodation of politico-military tactics and negotiated political settlement with the state. For more discussion on this debate, see J. Eliseo Rocamora, Philippine Progressive NGOs in Transition: The New Political Terrain of NGO Development Work in PSSC, Philippine Sociological Review. Vol. 41, No. 1-4. Quezon City: January-December, 1993, 1-18. See also Gerard Clarke, The Politics of NGOs in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, 113-118.

21. An extreme example of this was the case of the Agency for Development Educational Service (ACES) Foundation. ACES Foundation was one of the NGOs that emerged from the split of PECCO in the 1970s. It was among the NGOs who pioneered community organizing as an approach to people empowerment. ACES Foundation was dissolved amidst the conflict that ensued between its management and staff over non-payment of benefits. The following are the insights of its board of directors over the situation:
In the experience of ACES, in the process of professionalization, we have lost the sense of community, the sense of caring for each other. It became a job where you are looking towards fulfilling your tasks rather than enjoying doing work together. It was just forgotten or set aside...
We needed to have all these systems such that there were no time for nurturing the spirit of caring because we had so many things to do.
- K, ACES Board Member

In ACES, ...the board was only an advisory body; it was the general assembly that decides. Given that, the organization was theirs. It was no longer ours... The organization thrived on democratic participation, but in the process, we failed to nurture a sense of collectivity within the organization. Thus, we are now in a situation where there are only three people left in the agency... My dilemma concerns how much space should be given to each other... My question regarding all that happened is, where is the middle ground?
- D, ACES founder and Board Member


ACES' closure was observed closely by many NGOs undergoing professionalization because at the time, many NGOs were, more or less, going through similar organizational experience. Its experience triggered debates within the NGO sectors as to what extent NGO staff should be allowed to participate in decision-making. It also raised the question as to whether or not NGO workers should unionize.

22. A common joke among POs and NGOs was that POs were politically empowered, but NGOs became economically empowered. This reflected a realistic perception among the POs that a large chunk of funds for social development projects are being used to subsidize the operation of the NGOs particularly the salaries and allowances of their staff instead of going to POs. According to the POs, they should be getting a bigger share, if not all of them, since it was because of them that the NGOs had their projects anyway. See Fernando T. Aldaba, The Role of NGOs in Philippine Transformation, CSP/PA, Philippine Politics and Society, January 1993, 46-47.

23. Ideally, the NGOs were supposed to phase out their assistance to their partner POs when the latter begins to exhibit the ability to manage their own affairs. However, since the NGOs' organizational survival depends on having programs for the grassroots that could be funded by an external funding institution, some NGOs are reluctant to phase out their assistance to the POs even though the latter are already capable of surviving on their own. In the same manner, POs had become dependent on the NGOs for the sustenance of their activities that they also do not want the NGOs to terminate their assistance.

24. Some NGOs had, in fact, supported Estrada’s presidential campaign, on strength of populist campaign promises, Erap para sa Mahirap (Erap, as Estrada was popularly called, for the Poor) and in consideration of his track record as city mayor.

25. According the implementing guideline for the Party List System Act, a party list group is entitled to a seat if it gets 2% of the total party list votes cast. Each additional 2% gains an additional seat of up to a maximum of 3 seats. See Ira Cecilia Gonzales and Sandra Nicolas, Finally, A Democratic Congress?, http://www.peoplespower/advocacy, n.d.: n.p.

27. These included the stock exchange manipulations of his cronies, the diversion of the funds from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from its regular beneficiaries to the First Family’s pet projects, the payoffs from illegal gambling, the reports of scams in the alleged payment of ransoms for the hostages of the bandit group Abu Sayaff and the exposures of excessive lifestyles of Estrada’s mistresses.

28. Among the complainants were GOMBURZA, Konsensyang Pilipino, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Kilusang Mayo Uno, BAYAN, Concerned Women of the Philippines, National Peace Conference, Kairos, BISIG, Padayon, PANDAYAN, PDSP, and the Servants of the Holy Spirit.

29. There were four identified major coalition players in the ouster of Pres. Estrada – BAYAN, SANLAKAS, Council of Philippine Affairs (COPA) and KOMPIL II (CODE-NGO: April 27, 2001, 5).

30. The vigils were likewise encouraged by rumors that some factions in the military was poised to establish a military junta if the civil society and the Catholic Church could not mobilize a crowd of one million people in EDSA. The fear of another martial law compelled the NGOs and their partner POs to troop to EDSA on the day that the military declared their withdrawal of support to Pres. Estrada. This researcher was among those who received news about this compromise agreement and was on site during the unfolding of EDSA 2.

31. According to some sources, the PCA was disillusioned because their representatives did not get any significant posts in the government. They were likewise flirting with the idea of having a military junta. BAYAN and Sanlakas, on the other hand, were disappointed over Pres. Arroyo’s pro-American stand.


33. Of late, the PEACE Bonds had become a subject of controversy as some senators accused the CODE-NGO chairman of having used her family affiliation with the DOF Secretary to influence the bidding process for the bonds. The accusations opened debates in the Philippine civil society concerning the limits of its relationship with the state, as well as that of its engagement in profit-making ventures.

34. In the effort to win the support of the poor, Pres. Estrada distributed land titles covering 17 hectares of prime park area to the urban poor who are squatting in North Triangle, Quezon City. The titles eventually turned out to be fakes. See Federico D. Pascual, Jr., Postscript: Lim Won’t Find Eraps Name on the Land Titles, Philippine Star, http://www.manilamail.com November 2, 2000: n.p.

35. From informal interactions with some leaders of the urban poor POs, this researcher learned that the families of these leaders divide themselves into those who would represent their POs in EDSA, together with their partner NGOs, and those who would go to the rallies of Estrada’s supporters in Malacanang. They resort to this arrangement because on one hand, they did not want to offend their NGO organizers. On the other hand, they needed the P500 and meals promised by those who organized the pro-Estrada rallies. Others joined the pro-Estrada rallies because they believed that if they did so, they would be able to get land titles as well. Many NGO community organizers who joined the People’s March to Malacanang the day that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn to office also told stories of how they came face to face with some of members of their partner POs among the group of Erap supporters who tried to prevent the marchers from crossing the Mendiola Bridge in front of Malacanang.
CHAPTER 7 – AN NGO IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL ORDER (ISO)

The previous chapters discussed how the Philippine civil society evolved as a consequence of the institutional, social, political and economic developments that took place in the country over time. In general, they described how the organizational, relational and normative characteristics of the various civil society groups changed as they responded to these external factors. But how were these experienced by individual civil organizations, particularly that of the NGOs? What internal dynamics did these trigger within these NGOs?

Using the Institute of Social Order (ISO) – the oldest NGO in the country - as a case study, this chapter explores the organizational changes that an NGO goes through as it transforms from a social movement organization into a full-pledged development intermediary institution.

The Institute of Social Order (ISO) is a social institution under the ambit of the Philippine Province of the Society of Jesus. Its mission was to promote justice that services the Christian faith through:

1. The empowerment of the basic sectors of the Philippine society through promotion of their rights and articulation of their interests;

2. The transformation of unjust social structures of power in the country; and


It was founded in 1947 as a clearinghouse of ideas on social change (Ocampo SJ, 1995: 8). Since then, it has been at the core of the moderate and reform-oriented strand of the Philippine civil society. Its programs reflected the social problematiques at particular junctures in Philippine history. As such, the organizational experiences that ISO and its
partner POs went through mirrored the unfolding dynamics in the Philippine civil society arena as a whole.

*Sowing the Seeds of Catholic Social Action: The Social Justice Crusade*

While the ISO was formally set up only in 1947, the seminal ideas that led to its foundation dated back to 1931 when the Archbishop of Manila noted that *Quadragesimo Anno* (The Reconstruction of Social Order) could be applied to the Philippines because “traces of communism have been found in Manila and in the provinces” (Fabros, 1988: 17). At that time, communist influence was already taking roots among the labor unions and the peasant organizations in the country, particularly in the Central Luzon area.

Taking this as a challenge, the Jesuits founded the La Ignaciana Retreat House in 1932 to conduct joint recollections for professionals, businessmen, white-collar workers and manual laborers (*Ibid.*). The joint recollections were intended as venues for the businessmen to get to know their workers on a personal level so they would be compelled to treat them more humanely. They presumed that this would deprive the communists of their basis for recruitment and thus prevent communism from spreading among the grassroots sectors.

To complement the retreats and the recollections, the Jesuits also conceived of a propaganda and enlightenment project that

aimed to instruct the workingmen of safe and “sane” social principles…This propaganda work, which was also called a plan to organize workingmen, was…meant to counteract communism in the Philippines (*Ibid.*, 18).

To implement this project, Fr. Joseph A Mulry, SJ, an American Jesuit, founded the Bellarmine Evidence Guild in 1932 from among the students – scions of the elites and upcoming government bureaucrats - of the Ateneo de Manila. It veered away from the traditional charity-giving types of assistance to the poor. Instead, it provided a venue
where young men learned the principles of social justice and charity (Weiss SJ: 1990, 301). The Bellarminos went on lecture tours to the plazas of Manila, to the neighboring towns, and even to the provinces to discuss with ordinary people, in their own language, their social problems and the social doctrines of the Church (Fabros: 19). During the open forums that followed the lectures on the Catholic religion, problems concerning property distribution and the relationship between tenants and landlords were discussed (Weiss SJ: 304). It was based on these that the Bellarminos got the idea of persuading the landlords to transfer land ownership to their tenants in exchange for just compensation (Fabros: 26). In turn, the tenants were to be educated about thrift, diligence, and proper soil cultivation prior to land transfer (Weiss SJ: 304).

Following the path of the Bellarmine Evidence Guild, the Philippine Catholic Church launched a social justice crusade in 1936 to undertake, among others, a counter-propaganda amongst the working class in the native dialects of the districts where social unrest was being fomented by revolutionary and atheistic programs and periodicals (Mulry SJ as cited by Fabros: 19). The Ateneo later on established the Chesterton Evidence Guild in 1937 to bring the crusade to Manila’s secular universities. Extending the Bellarminos’ notion of peasant proprietorship, the Chestertonians envisioned a social reconstruction plan that involved a transfer of ownership from the landowners to the peasants under a reasonable compensation scheme. To facilitate the implementation of this plan, the Chestertonians were to educate farmers on the responsibilities of ownership by serving as model farmers. The crucial step for this scheme to work, however, was to persuade the landowners to cooperate by appealing to their Catholic sense. Along this line, the Chestertonians launched a radio program, Catholic Hour, in 1939. In the radio program,
they discussed the social injustices occurring in rural Philippines within the context of
the Catholic social encyclicals, *Quadragisimo Anno* and *Rerum Novarum* (The Condition of
Labor) (Carroll SJ, 1995: n.p.). The Chestertonians also pursued counter-propaganda
against communism and socialism through the mass media (i.e., radio, press and platforms).

Although these promoted social awareness among the young elites and the middle
class professionals, the social justice crusaders failed to reach the peasants and the workers
because PKP’s influence on the trade unions was already well entrenched (Fabros: 27). The
Chestertonians also failed to persuade the landowners to cooperate with their peasant
proprietorship concept as the latter refused to give up their hold to land. They were,
nonetheless, able to persuade Pres. Quezon to adopt this as a strategy for his Social Justice
Program. In 1939, the Philippine Commonwealth government granted 2,400 hectares of
land in Tagum, Davao to five volunteers from the Ateneo so they could demonstrate the
viability of peasant proprietorship. Unfortunately, World War II erupted even before they
were able to begin the project (*Ibid.,* 27).

**Taking Roots: The Era of Trade Unionism**

After World War II, the Philippine Catholic Church was in disarray that it took two
years before it was able to resume an active role in the Philippine civil society. By then the
communist influence had spread in the countryside through the PKP and the Huks. As
military action in the countryside intensified, the PKP shifted its organizing efforts in the
factories in Manila. By 1945, the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) was established
as the legal arm of the PKP (Constantino and Constantino: 1978, 215).

Around that time, Jesuits all over the world had been establishing social
apostolate centers to translate the papal social encyclicals (i.e., *Quadragisimo Anno* and
Rerum Novarum) into concrete social action programs. In the Philippines, the task fell on Fr. Walter Hogan, SJ (Fabros: 31). Together with his former student Juan Tan, Fr. Hogan mingled with the stevedores (cargo handlers) in Manila South Harbor where labor unions were dominated by competing groups of communist-oriented unions, government-controlled labor unions and racketeers (Ibid.). They met and befriended the union leaders, attended their union meetings, interviewed employees and joined the workers at the picket lines as they attempted to understand the problems and sentiments of the laborers. Whenever possible, they discussed the social teachings of the church within the context of the laborers’ struggles (Fabros: 31). Since priests attending union meetings, court hearings and strikes were novel during those days, Fr. Hogan got invited to speak in many civic organizations dominated by the elites such as the Rotary, Lion and Jaycees Club where his lectures were met with enthusiasm (Ibid.) However, while the employers applauded his speeches about workers’ rights and their duties towards society, the businessmen were slow in instituting reforms when these involved their own workers (Fabros: 31; Tan, 1990: 443).

Realizing that immersion and giving talks were not leading to improvements in labor-management relations, Fr. Hogan and Tan came up with the idea of establishing a social institution that would integrate the efforts of the La Ignaciana Retreat House and the social action guilds in promoting better working conditions for the laborers. Thus, in 1947, Fr. Hogan and Mr. Tan founded the Institute of Social Order. Its mission was to bring together people in the position to restructure society - the government officials, management, labor groups, professionals, diocesan, and regular clergies and seminarians – to discuss and explore ideas on social order within the context of the Catholic Church’s social teachings (LIAC-ISO, n.d.: 2). With the help of student volunteers from the Ateneo
Social Order Club – the successor of the Bellarmine and Chesterton Social Action Guilds - the ISO initially offered seminars and night classes on trade unionism for workers, Catholic social encyclicals and public speaking (*Ibid.*; Ducheaneau, 1990: 443).

As more Jesuits got assigned to the institution, it offered formal labor education programs to both management and workers alike, assisted in labor dispute arbitration and provided advisory assistance to social organizations and institutes. By 1949, the labor-management school was formally recognized by the Archdiocese of Manila.

*Labor Union Organizing and the Federation of Free Workers (FFW)*

Up until the early 1950s, the ISO’s labor-management courses attracted few students from both the labor and the management sectors. Given this, Fr. Hogan and Tan thought that the only way to introduce Christian principles into the labor movement was to plunge into the union scene itself (Carroll SJ, 1991: 21). At that time, the Fr. Hogan and Tan were assisting some small unions of 20-30 workers. Among them was the Philippine Airlines Employees Union (PALEU) whose founders were former students of the ISO. When the union went on strike, Fr. Hogan and Tan got embroiled in a celebrated conflict between the PAL management and the strikers. 2 It was during the PAL strike that Fr. Hogan and Tan decided to set up the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). On June 15, 1950, FFW was formally organized with Tan as president (Fabros: 38).

FFW’s trade union organizing efforts took off when the CLO was outlawed in 1951 as part of the government’s policy of repressing the activities of the communist-dominated and revolutionary-inspired unions, and encouraging government-organized and controlled trade unions and federations such as the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Dejillas, 1994: 37 and 41). The FFW refused to be part of these government-led federations. Instead,
they constantly attacked them as racketeers and company unions, gaining them the ire of
the Labor Secretary who branded them as communists (Wurfel as cited by Dejillas: 42). The
controversy that this steered made FFW popular enough among the labor unions that they
were able to take over the vacuum in labor union leadership that resulted with the demise of
the CLO. From 300 member unions in 1950, the FFW membership grew to 10,000 in 1952.
Its popularity was further enhanced by its success in getting the Magna Carta of Labor or the
Industrial Peace Act of 1953 and the Minimum Wage Law passed in the legislature. The
Magna Carta of Labor gave legal rights to the laborers to unionize and bargain collectively
for just wages (R.A. No. 875 sections, 3, 4, 11-15).

Initially, the Catholic Church supported the FFW's efforts. The Archdiocese of
Manila provided regular subsidy for its operations and defended it from itinerant
businessmen (Fabros: 39 and 50). However, its support to the strikes at the Dominican-
operated University of Santo Tomas (UST) and the La Loma Cemetery operated by the
Archdiocese of Manila in 1956 antagonized the Catholic Church hierarchy.

Being FFW's organizer and trainer implicated ISO on the controversy as well. On
August 1956, Fr. Hogan was forbidden from preaching, writing articles for publication and
giving public conferences, including broadcasts over the radio, on social issues outside the
confines of the ISO. Leaders and sympathizers of the FFW, on the other hand, were banned
from conducting labor-management classes within the ISO (Ibid., 74). The Jesuit director of
the ISO was also replaced. Consequently, ISO's programs were reoriented towards less
volatile concerns.
Although the living conditions of the rural peasants were worse than the urban laborers, the Catholic Church did not address the agrarian question until the mid-1950. This was because the peasants were harder to organize since they were scattered throughout the country (Ibid., 41). Moreover, the communists’ influence among the peasants was already well entrenched in view of the long and strong organizational presence of the PKM and the Huk in the rural areas, particularly in Central Luzon.

ISO’s involvement with the peasant sector started through the initiative of Jeremias Montemayor, a law graduate from the Ateneo. Realizing that the peasants did not have a leader to guide them except Luis Taruc and Mariano Balgos of the Huk and the PKM, he thought of organizing and leading an alternative peasant organization that was non-violent in orientation and premised on the Catholic social teachings. Since he did know anything about the principles of trade union organizing, he asked Fr. Hogan’s advise on how to go about it.

At that time, the combined military and community development strategies of Ramon Magsaysay had already weakened the peasant-based communist movement. Moreover, Huk leader Luis Taruc had just surrendered to the government. Taking advantage of the vacuum in peasant leadership, Montemayor and another ISO lecturer Fernando Esguerra, founded the Federation of Free Farmers in 1953 (Po, 1977: 57). Unlike the FFW, the FFF maintained a close working relationship with the government (Ibid., 57). In fact, the Magsaysay administration provided it with monetary subsidy of P1,000 per month to help pay for its lawyers and to defray travel and other expenses (Fabros: 46). FFF also maintained its links with the Catholic Church as it tapped the parish priests as chaplains and
advisers (Cater as cited by Po: 60). Priests advised and guided the FFF leaders in matters of organization, leadership training in the rural areas, political policies especially those involving moral principles, and economic projects such as credit unions, farm management and cooperatives. They also served as the FFF’s emissaries to the landlords, helping to provide the assurance that they were not communists (Fabros: 50).

Initially, the ISO provided the FFF guidance on the moral reformation of the peasants and funds for its community visits. In turn, the FFF became a center for the exposure of the ISO students and the members of the Ateneo Social Order Club to the peasant sector. In 1956, ISO facilitated the expansion of FFF to Negros Occidental through the initiatives of Fr. Hector Mauri, SJ. Fr. Mauri persuaded the leaders of the communist affiliated Federacion de los Obreros Filipinas that was earlier outlawed by the Magsaysay administration to join them (Bulatao, 1971a: 11; McCoy, 1984: 115). On January 1957, the Department of Labor officially appointed the FFF to represent the dumaans (permanent hacienda workers) in ensuring that the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1952 were implemented. The FFF handled the sugarcane workers’ complaints regarding anomalies in the distribution of their shares. By July 1957, however, the Department of Labor withdrew FFF’s appointment under pressure from the hacienda owners who accused the federation of being a communist front (Bulatao, 1971a: 11). With this, Fr. Mauri and the FFF began their four-year campaign to unionize the hacienda workers using tactics ranging from conciliatory to confrontational (e.g. strikes and setting fire to tinder-dry sugar cane). Their efforts were met by harassment from the police and the plantation guards (McCoy: 117).

With the haciendas becoming dangerous for them to operate in 1958, Fr. Mauri and the FFF organizers shifted their attention to the sacadas (seasonal sugar workers) from
Antique, persuading them to fight for their rights and challenging them to demand justice for their families. Despite their efforts, however, they were only able to persuade 750 out of the 20,000 sacadas in Negros to go home to Antique to protest the injustice they were experiencing in the haciendas (Bulatao, 1971a: 11-12; McCoy: 117). Realizing that their efforts were not working, Fr. Mauri tried to appeal to the sense of Catholicism of the hacienda owners to no avail. In a last ditch to demand justice for the sugarcane workers, Fr. Mauri and the FFF launched their final wave of strikes in 1961.

They began in desperation and ended in violence. Demanding minimum wage and union recognition, FFF branches on eleven major haciendas planned to shutdown the mill by blockading 600 cane cars. Met with violence and mass arrests, the strikes soon collapsed. Fires were set on a number of haciendas and several were burned to the ground (McCoy: 117-118).

Like the UST and La Lorna strike, this resulted to the Catholic Church’s withdrawal of support to the FFF. It also contributed further to the confrontation between the ISO and the Catholic Church hierarchy.

The above indicated five trends in the emergence and growth of the ISO as a voluntary association. First of all, the founding of the ISO was part of the Philippine Catholic Church’ – more specifically, the Jesuits’ – response to the Vatican’s challenge to meet the social problems that were fueling the growth of communism and socialism worldwide. It was an effort to translate the Catholic principles governing social justice into concrete programs of actions to address the pressing social problems in the country namely, poverty, social inequality and the exploitation of the labor and the peasant sectors.

Secondly, since it was primarily founded on the premise of developing ways and means to combat communism, its program strategies and activities were primarily shaped by the extent of communist influence among the grassroots sectors. For example, the initial
focus on the workers as targets of its efforts was strategic given that the CLO’s influence of the labor unions was not yet as strong compared to PKM influence among the peasants. Its entry into the labor sector was further facilitated by the state’s suppression of the communist-influenced labor federations in the 1950s. Moreover, the labor sector was accessible and easier to penetrate because they were concentrated in the industrial sites of Manila. The same strategy was applied in connection with the organizing of the peasant sector in the mid-1950s. The FFF was founded at the time when the communist-influenced peasant movement suffered substantially from the success of Magsaysay’s anti-communist military and community development strategies.

Thirdly, it was also noted that ISO’s efforts were not intended to change the existing relationship between the elites and the poor grassroots. They were generally conciliatory in nature and geared primarily towards convincing the elites to treat their tenants and workers more kindly (i.e., to become generous patrons). They were also geared towards values reorientation (through retreats and recollections) and information dissemination (trainings and publications).

Fourthly, the ISO operated informally. The ISO staff provided guidance, training and supervision, but they relied primarily on volunteers and part-time workers to do the work of concretizing the Catholic Church’s social justice principles. For this, it tapped the student-based organization such as the Ateneo Social Order Club that was comprised primarily of the scions of the Filipino economic and political elites. This strategy was four-pronged. First, it sensitized these future businessmen and government leaders to the plight of the workers and the peasants. Second, it increased the chances of its success in advocating social reforms, as these volunteers were familiar with those who control the economic
resources and those who promulgate the laws. Moreover, given their educational background, they could articulate and argue the concerns of the workers and peasants more persuasively with the elites and the state bureaucrats. Lastly, these student-volunteers were highly familiar on the Catholic social teachings.

Corollary to the above, ISO’s efforts were geared primarily towards facilitating the emergence of autonomous sector-based associations that shared their Christian and non-communist ideals. These were assured by the fact that the leaders of these organizations came from the ranks of its volunteer workers – lawyers, teachers, and religious – who came from families of landlords and business entrepreneurs. They volunteered to partner with the ISO in organizing the trade federations not so much as to empower the workers and the peasants but to lead them and/or get them to accept their Christian democratic values. However, their main motive was to dissuade them from embracing communism as such threaten their social positions.

First Blossoms: Experimenting on New Strategies of Propagating Faith that Does Justice

By the 1960s, it was evident that the government’s policies on economic growth and social reform were unable to address the social inequality between the rich and the poor. Rather, they contributed to further impoverishment of the Filipino masses, notably the rural poor. These caused the resurgence of mass unrests that had been relatively pacified in the 1950s. Simultaneously, the views of the Catholic Church concerning social issues were also rapidly changing. This was reflected in the encyclical, Mater et Magistra issued by the Pope John XXIII in 1961, which emphasized the prioritization of the rural areas (Collantes OSB, n.d.: n.p.).
Credit Cooperativism

As pointed out in Chapter 4, the Philippine Catholic Church saw the concept of credit cooperativism as a concrete approach for applying the new Catholic social teachings into action. For the ISO, this presented an opportunity to repair the rift with the Archdiocese of Manila caused by the UST and the La Loma Cemetery strikes. Around that time, a leader of the Rover Scouts from San Dionisio, Paranaque attended a Workers' Education session at the U.P. where credit cooperativism was one of the topics discussed. The Rover Scout leader got interested in the topic because it seemed to be a solution to the problems of his community. He and a labor leader who happened to be a student at the ISO later talked to Fr. Hogan about the possibility of ISO assisting them on this undertaking. Fr. Hogan referred them to ISO director Fr. Gaston Duchesneau SJ who agreed to help them set up the credit union provided they attend formal seminars on credit cooperativism at the ISO. Fifty youths enlisted for the seminar that ran for eight consecutive evenings. Twenty-eight of them founded the San Dionisio Credit Cooperative Union.

In 1961, the San Dionisio Credit Cooperative Union (SDCCU) was organized with an initial capital of P 328. Initially, the Cooperative Administration Office was reluctant to register the cooperative because it was community-based. To get the accreditation, the ISO made an agreement with the Cooperative Administration Office that it would organize the community, continue the conduct of seminars on credit unionism and, if they succeed, assist the government in setting up community-based credit unions. The SDCCU emerged as one of the most successful credit cooperative unions in the country to date.

Inspired by the success of the SDCCU, the ISO expanded its program on credit unionism to various groups in Manila, Bulacan, Laguna and the far-flung communities of
Jala-jala and Talim Islands in Rizal Province (LIAC-ISO, n.d.: 3). It assisted in the organizing of credit unions in other barrios in Paranaque such as the La Huerta, Don Galo, Tambo and Baclaran (Allanigue as cited by Krononalyst, Inc.: 30). To address the increasing request for training, ISO deputized the leaders of the SDCCU as trainers. The success of the SDCCU generated interest in grassroots organizing among the Catholic Church institutions in the country. In 1962, the Knights of Columbus (KC) picked up credit union organizing as one of its programs. It set up a community service committee specifically to organize credit unions nationwide. On the same year, Cardinal Santos founded the Asian Social Institute (ASI) to duplicate the work of the ISO (Fabros: 94).

Trainings of Social Action Directors and Staff

ISO’s effort to translate Catholic Social Teachings into concrete terms through credit cooperativism was overtaken by the spreading protest movements among the students and the marginalized sectors of society. Even the Philippine Church was not spared of the protests as Catholic youth groups picketed the Archbishop’s Residence demanding for deeper social involvement and social concern for the poor from the Catholic Church (Ibid.). At about the same time, the Vatican issued three documents criticizing capitalism and expressing a softening stance towards socialism. These developments led to the setting up of social action centers in many parishes in the country.

As more diocesan directors were appointed and diocesan secretariats were established, the need to train priests and laymen and to professionalize social action activities became urgent (Ibid., 118). To respond to this need, the Philippine Catholic Church hierarchy directed the ISO to conduct training programs for priests and laymen in 1967-1968. These trainings focused strongly on credit unionism, Catholic social teaching,
group dynamics and Philippine social structure (Carroll SJ, 1998: 115). Since the lectures tackled the national socio-economic and political situations in the country to underscore the relevance of these topics however, the seminars became venues for critiquing and exploring options for social change.

*Integrating Community Development with Peasant Organizing*

In 1969, Fr. Arsenio Jesena SJ wrote an article about the multiple layers of exploitation of the *sacadas* in Negros. The article triggered a renewed public interest on the plight of the sugarcane workers. The Catholic Church explored various strategies and projects that ranged from palliative measures (e.g., the diocese acting as contractors for the *sacadas*, providing free legal aid, etc.) to revolution. Amidst the revival of the Church's interest in the plight of the sugarcane workers, Fr. Mauri of the ISO, Ed Tejada of NUSP, Fr. Luis Jalandoni of the FFF and Fr. Ed Saguinsin, a diocesan priest, formed the National Federation of Sugarcane Workers Federation (NSFW). The NSFW organized the *dumaans* in the lowland sugarcane plantations along the lines of social democratic strategy.

Instead of plunging into the usual rounds of pickets and petition, the NSFW leaders decided that all members would have to be “conscientized” through a five-day self-awareness seminar. Led by priests, nuns and Catholic lay workers, these sessions tried to make workers aware of their human potential and break the servility ingrained in them by *hacienda* life. By observing participants carefully, the religious took care to select leaders with both potential for growth and certain moral qualities ((McCoy: 137).

Unlike the FFF, the NSFW integrated the principles of community development with union organizing. It set up several livelihood projects such as fishing and community-based handicrafts to reduce the dependency of the sugarcane workers on the *hacienda* owners. Despite careful preparations and less confrontational tactics, however, the NSFW met violent resistance from the *hacenderos* who employed harassment, death threats and
salvaging to intimidate the union leaders. The harassment escalated with the declaration of Martial Law in 1972. The NSFW leaders and members became targeted for arrests, leading many of those actively involved in it to go underground. Because of this, the NDF-CPP-NPA was able to infiltrate the NSFW triggering a split within its ranks into the moderates who wanted the federation to continue exploring peaceful measures like alternative means of livelihoods and the radicals who believed that revolutionary measures were the only viable alternatives for improving the lives of the sugarcane workers. Eventually, the NSFW succumbed to the influence of the NDF-CPP-NPA.

Professionalizing Community Organizing: The Case of PECCO and ZOTO

In Manila meanwhile, the influx of rural migrants searching for work and better livelihood opportunities led to the mushrooming of squatters’ communities particularly in areas near the piers and open markets like Tondo, Manila where employment opportunities were available to unskilled laborers. In 1963, a major demolition took place at the Tondo Foreshoreland. The inhabitants were transported to distant rural sites like Sapang Palay where there were no livelihood opportunities (Carroll SJ, 1998: 117). Having no means to subsist on the relocation areas, the Tondo squatters returned only to find out that their previous residence parcelled off to land speculators, political protégés and the police. These impelled the squatters to organize themselves into the Council for Tondo Foreshoreland Community Organization (CTFCO). Threatened by another demolition in 1968, the CTFCO mobilized a march to Malacanang to express their opposition. However, their protest failed due to the betrayal of their leaders.

Fr. Dennis Murphy SJ, who had been in the area organizing credit cooperative unions under the ISO, witnessed this and thought that the CTFO required a better
organizing theory and more effective organizing skills. Part of this effort was the exposure of priests and laymen to the communities. It was in one of these exposure trips that Fr. Dennis Murphy, SJ got to know about the efforts and failures of the CTFCO. In view of this, he began to consider Saul Alinsky's work in Chicago as a possible model for rehabilitating the CTFCO. Together with Protestant Pastors Rev. Henry Aguilan and Rev. Richard Poethig, they arranged for Presbyterian minister Herbert White to come to Manila to conduct a seminar on Alinsky's conflict confrontation model of community organizing. An urban poor desk was set up by the ISO to facilitate the training. This became ISO's initial involvement with the urban poor and in the practice of community organizing.

Rev. White's first seminar involved twenty leaders of the defunct CTFCO whom he intensively trained in non-political strategies of building community organizations. As an outcome of the training, the Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) was established in 1970 (Carroll SJ, 1998: 117). Simultaneous with the setting up of ZOTO, Fr. Murphy and Fr. Blanco of the ISO urban poor desk founded the Philippine Ecumenical Committee for Community Organization (PECCO) in collaboration with the Asian Committee for People's Organization, an association of Catholic and Protestant church groups promoting community organizing in Asian countries (Carroll SJ, 1998: 134-135). Its purpose was to backstop the community organizing in Zone One, Tondo. Later on, 64 leaders and members from 20 organizations in seven communities covered by ZOTO invited the PECCO to undertake for them a two-year training program on Alinsky-style community organizing. Under the two-year program, PECCO developed a community organizing process that was obviously confrontational but non-violent.
It was anarchic in a sense of not overthrowing anything but separating itself from the structure, looking at power but not attacking the whole power system.\textsuperscript{12}

PECCO did not only assisted the Tondo dwellers in organizing themselves, they also professionalized the conduct of community organizing (CO).

PECCO brought together people committed to the NDF, including the best and brightest of a generation of student activists ready to tackle community organizing; and people committed to grassroots organizing...including church religious and lay workers dissatisfied, if not disenchanted, with church social action (Honculada, 1984: 15).

Amidst the ideological affiliations of its first crop of community organizers, the PECCO Board insisted that they maintain a separate identity from the ideological groups. The community organizers (COs) were instructed not to give lectures on Marxist analysis.

Under PECCO’s guidance, ZOTO was able to undertake successful mobilizations and scored victories that gained them public recognition and legitimacy. For example, it was able to dialogue with Pope Paul VI and ask his blessing for its struggle despite efforts of both the government and the Philippine Catholic Church hierarchy to prevent it. Encouraged by their success, the ZOTO followed through with unconventional mass mobilization tactics that forced a stalemate with the government that was intent on evicting the Tondo residents to pave the way for a harbor development in the area that would be funded by the German Government and the World Bank. ZOTO picketed the German Embassy and held negotiations with the World Bank. They eventually persuaded the two agencies not to assist in the harbor and industrial plans until a housing and relocation solution acceptable to the people had been worked out. Out of this compromise agreement came the proposals to reclaim Dagat-dagatan as a relocation site and to
promote an on-site upgrading program for Tondo. The Dagat-dagatan Project was the first extensive in-city relocation projects implemented in Asia (Murphy: 1993, 6).

PECCO’s community organizing trainings ended in 1972. However, its administrative and coordination functions expanded as a number of centers affiliated to it increased both in and outside Manila. By then, Martial Law had been imposed prompting a number of social activists linked to NDF to seek refuge among the social action centers of the church, including those affiliated with PECCO. This caused division among those who wanted the PECCO to uphold its non-aligned status and those who wanted to subsume the organization under the umbrella of the NDF. Unable to resolve the deepening ideological differences among its ranks, the PECCO Board dissolves the organization in 1976 (Carroll SJ, 1998: 120). With PECCO’s dissolution, ZOTO gravitated towards the NDF (Mendoza: 1995, 19). It became heavily involved in mobilizations over national concerns inviting repression in the form of mass arrests from 1977 onwards. Its leaders were jailed or forced into hiding. The rest of the members became confused and alienated by the fact that ZOTO had become a front for an underground organization. Many lost interest and left the organization (Ibid.). The ISO nonetheless continued to assist some of ZOTO’s member organizations.

Four features thus described the ISO’s social initiatives during this period. As it was in prior times, ISO programs were shaped by the Jesuits’ interpretation of the Vatican’s social encyclicals particularly as they apply to problems of poverty, social inequality and oppression of the poor. ISO’s programs during the 1960s provided the experimental cases by which the church’s social teachings were tested. Like the changing tenor of the Catholic social encyclicals, the ISO programs started out as relatively non-
political (e.g., trainings on credit cooperativism), and gradually became more
conflict-oriented and confrontational (e.g., peasant and urban poor organizing). Corollary
to this, ISO’s community organizing process that combined Freire’s conscientization
approach (used substantially in the organizing of NSFW in Negros), Alinsky’ conflict
confrontation model of community organizing (used by PECCO/ZOTO), and the Marxist
revolutionary ideology evolved and eventually became a trademark of civil society
initiatives during the Martial Law period.

Unlike in prior times when the object of its social involvement was to convince
the elites to take care of their workers (e.g., tenants and workers), ISO’s efforts during the
1960s were geared towards organizing the grassroots to take care of themselves, short of
advocating violence. Additionally, ISO’s organizing efforts also became increasing
directed against the state, which was perceived to be favoring the elites over the
grassroots sectors. The anti-state tone was particularly pronounced in the case of ZOTO.

Secondly, ISO’s pursuit of the social democratic strategy in organizing the NSFW
in Negros and its willingness to initially accommodate the ideological groups as partners
in the PECCO were reflective of the church’s softening stance towards socialism.
However, this inadvertently lent the ISO’s training and community organizing efforts
vulnerable to ideological influences as indicated by the eventual take over of the
grassroots associations organized by NSFW and PECCO by the NDF.

Thirdly, while the ISO staff remained primarily Jesuit, it began to tap volunteers
outside the Ateneo de Manila. This broadened the base of social activists involved in its
programs. However, it also facilitated the entry of ideologues into the organization
thereby politicizing it. This, in turn, primed the organization to play the role of a legal front organization during the Martial Law era.

Lastly, even though ISO still operated through middle-class based voluntary organizations at this time, it also began to deal more directly with the grassroots. For example, PECCO dealt with ZOTO on a relatively equal basis because the Alinsky community organizing principle demanded respect of the decisions of the people. In fact, it was ZOTO itself that decided to involve PECCO in their social movement. The relatively equal footing by which they worked together enabled the church-based groups and the grassroots movement organizations to forge partnerships that persisted until the Marcos dictatorship. The PECCO-ZOTO partnership was thus not only representative of the merging of the “legal” and illegal social movements, it was also a symbol of the collaboration between the middle-class based and grassroots based civil society.

*Thriving on Stony Grounds: Catholic Social Action Under the Dictatorship*

On September 21, 1972, Pres. Marcos declared Martial Law. The FFF leadership supported the Marcos administration in exchange for more substantial involvement in the latter’s *Samahang Nayon* program and agrarian reform. However, many of the people involved with ISO’s partner organizations such as the NSFW, the PECCO and the ZOTO were harassed, jailed and tortured pushing the more radical of them to go underground.

Initially, the Catholic Church took on a position of “critical collaboration” even though the clergy were divided into those who were bitterly opposed to Pres. Marcos and Martial Law on the one hand, and those who, if not supportive of it, preferred to uphold the separation of the church and the state by not getting involved. Since even the Jesuits were initially divided on the issue, the ISO was affected.
Issues were not that clear in 1975. The bishops haven’t came out clearly with any position... There was no third alternative. Some of the people we had in the program ended up in the far left.\textsuperscript{15}

By 1994, however, the Jesuits worldwide declared its mission of “\textit{witnessing to justice and service to the poor}”.\textsuperscript{16} This prompted the Philippine Jesuits to examine and restructure its ministries to better pursue this mission. Some of the Jesuit institutes were merged and integrated to better address the spiritual, political, economic and social needs of the poor and to bring about greater cooperation with other organizations – ecclesial and non-ecclesial, Catholic and non-Catholic (LIAC: n.d., n.p.). Thus, the ISO was subsumed under an expanded La Ignaciana Apostolic Center (LIAC).\textsuperscript{17} Additional offices were intermittently created and additional Jesuit priests were assigned to head them.\textsuperscript{18}

LIAC would bring about greater cooperation among the apostolates of the Society of Jesus with the Church in the Philippines, particularly those organized by the Hierarchy and the religious orders of men and women... (It would also) integrate the ministries of the Jesuit Philippine Province, particularly the ISO, towards the work of justice and service of faith. It is a structure that is flexible, ready to meet the new challenge and opportunities given to the Church today (\textit{Ibid.}).

The change in its organizational character was aptly symbolized by its transfer from Padre Faura where it was linked exclusively to the elitist Ateneo de Manila to Sta. Ana where it shared a building with the most militant sectors of the Catholic church institutions such as the Justice and Peace Commission of the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP), the Church Labor Center (CLC), the Christian Organization for Rehabilitation and Liberation (CORAL) for the Urban Poor, etc.

Ideally, LIAC was supposed to promote some sort of an integrative rationality to the social involvement of the Jesuits. Instead, it became a structure where all anti-Marcos and
anti-Martial law initiatives were accommodated. These programs, while funded by LIAC through funds coming from church-based donor organizations such as Miseror, operated independently with minimum supervision from the LIAC Jesuit director.

In LIAC, there was no coordination among different programs. The meeting with the director was for reporting purposes only, not for strategic direction.19

LIAC continued to offer courses on Catholic social teachings, community organizing, leadership training, and Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) to social action directors and staffs. These trainings were designed to be re-echoed on field by those who attended it. However, restrictions imposed by the Marcos administration prevented its trainees from implementing what they learned. Social action centers had difficulties recruiting staff and volunteers because the people were afraid of being suspected as communist cadres. For the most part, however, the resistance came from the local Catholic dioceses who felt that the concept of basic Christian communities as taught by LIAC were not in the realm of the religious but rather, the responsibility of the local government (LIAC, 1975-1976). Taking these into consideration, LIAC reformulated the program into the Faith and Justice Orientation Program that catered directly to organized basic sectors (i.e., the urban poor, workers and peasants). This gave birth to another program, the Basic Ecclesial Communities Program, LIAC’s version of the BCC, which focused on the formation and education of individuals on issues of social injustice. In conjunction with the “faith and justice” seminars, LIAC also continued the publication of newsletters (i.e., The Signs of the Times) and monographs (i.e., the Human Society Series). For the most part, the publications dealt primarily with the Catholic social teachings.
These programs provided the legitimate venues for discussing anti-dictatorship concerns. As such, they became popular among social activists in search of means to air their dissent against the dictatorship. As the people and groups who were trained and organized by the ISO increased and its network of volunteers and partners grew, it attracted people from the underground ideological parties. These, and the relatively critical discussions of social realities in its publications, drew the attention of the military. Thus, throughout most of the 1970s, LIAC was under the surveillance of the military and the police.

Meanwhile, at the Ateneo de Manila University compound in Quezon City, some Jesuits and Ateneo scholars who were part of the socdem group became concerned that the NDF was becoming the only viable alternative to the Martial Law. Their fear was fueled by the observation that the NDF had successfully infiltrated many church-based social institutions, some of which were even housed at the LIAC. The infiltration of PECCO and ZOTO all the more indicated that there was a need to develop an alternative ideology that would, in a sense, marry a form of socialism and the Christian social teachings. To address the situation, they conceptualized democratic socialism within the context of Philippine setting (termed Authentic Humanism) and founded the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP) on May 1973. PDSP propagated the concept of democratic socialism and organized among the students’ organizations throughout the country. These students’ organizations, in turn, provided the volunteer workers for LIAC’s programs thereby making it easier for PDSP to harness the LIAC as its legal front.
This development dovetailed with the new thrust of LIAC to engage in direct organizing efforts. With PECCO’s demise, the former ISO urban poor desk directly assumed the tasks of organizing in the Tondo area. It also expanded its coverage to other areas around Manila such as Malabon, Navotas, Quezon City and Pasay. In addition to the urban poor desk, LIAC also set up of the Small Bureau for Small Fishermen (SBSF), the Farmers’ Service Bureau (FSB) and the Workers Assistance Office (WAO).22 As community organizing required people to stay on extended basis at the communities and in the factories, LIAC had to hire full-time extension officers cum organizers. These full-time extension workers were recruited from the PDSP-affiliated students’ organizations.

When they (i.e., the students) graduated or needed volunteer work, they go to LIAC. Through referral and experiences they acquired from volunteering at the LIAC, they were able to link the democratic socialist view and social development work.23 By the end of the 1970s, around 60-70 percent of the LIAC staffs were comprised of lay people. Only the heads of the units and the director were Jesuit priests.24 With the influx of these extension workers into the LIAC, PDSP ideology was interwoven albeit, in an indirect way, with the activities of the institution, particularly in community organizing.

It provided the unifying thread by which the different LIAC programs were integrated.

The only thing that tied the programs together was the political concern. That’s our common ground. Without that, LIAC’s program initiatives would not make any sense.25

Officially, however, LIAC did not acknowledge its direct involvement with PDSP.

There was no way LIAC or any legal institution could go into ideological politics especially during Martial Law. We have an official position… That should be behind the language… In the field, we had an interface… the understanding was that LIAC would organize the people. Ideological work was to be done by “friends”, and the “friend” was PDSP…26
With the PDSP cadres positioned within the LIAC, however, it was able to incorporate its propaganda activities (e.g., meetings, orientations, recruitment, information dissemination, etc.) into the institution’s regular programs. By the time that the anti-dictatorship movement escalated with the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983, practically all the sector-based organizations assisted by LIAC were already incorporated in the network of PDSP.

These had implications on the nature of organizing work that LIAC was doing. Basically, the goal of the anti-dictatorship movements at that point – PDSP included – was to build a groundswell of protests to pressure Pres. Marcos to relinquish power at the soonest time possible. This necessitated a widespread awareness building campaign and a fast tracked community organizing strategy. To respond to such challenge, most cause-oriented groups and NGOs resorted to “sweep method” of organizing and alliance building for particular ideological groups. For LIAC, this task was undertaken by PDSP cadres who, at the time, were also its community organizers and extension workers.

The Farmers Service Bureau (FSB) and the Kalipunan ng Samahang Magsasaka (KASAMA) or the Federation of Peasant Organizations

After the FFF declared its support to the Marcos administration and the NSFW became affiliated with the NDF, the LIAC did not have any direct involvement with the peasant sector. To address this, it set up a Farmers’ Service Bureau (FSB) to organize the Filipino peasantry towards effective participation in the collective struggle for social transformation in 1979 (LIAC: 6). Student volunteers from U.P. and Ateneo assisted them (Aldaba: 39).
The LIAC-FSB undertook the conscientization, education, mobilization and organization of the peasants. Initially, it targeted to organize the peasants in Southern Luzon by using the Basic Christian Community (BCC) approach. They failed because they could not concretely establish the link between the BCCs and the resolution of the peasants’ problems. Moreover, 27 of the farmers from Tagaytay and Laguna were apprehended and jailed by the military in light of the LIAC-FSB’s link with the PDSP. This set back its organizing efforts. In view of this, LIAC-FSB concentrated on organizing the workers in the sugarcane plantations of Batangas (Ibid., 39). On December 1984, with a core of 28 farmer-members, it launched the Kalipunan ng Samahang Magsasaka (KASAMA) or the Federation of Peasant Organizations. The federation aimed to address the issues faced by the sugarcane farmers such as crop sharing and land ownership.

LIAC as a whole provided funding support to KASAMA while it was still in process of formally registering itself as a PO. The LIAC-FSB served as its secretariat while at the same time preparing replacements to assume its staff’s work. It had, in fact, prepared a proposal in behalf of KASAMA, which LIAC endorsed to MISEREOR for funding. When the proposal was approved and funds were released, KASAMA declared its independence from LIAC. The FSB phased out of LIAC and become the full-time secretariat of the KASAMA.

*The Workers’ Assistance Office (WAO) and the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW)*

Simultaneous with the creation of FSB, LIAC also formed the Workers’ Assistance Office (WAO) to organize labor unions. LIAC-WAO’s primary purpose was to revitalize the trade union movement so that the workers could participate in the democratic transformation of society. Its creation was also partly motivated by the closure of the
Workers' College that the Center for Community Services (CCS) of the Ateneo was operating in the 1980s. The LIAC-WAO continued the Workers' College seminars on labor unionism. It also assisted workers from Malabon, Pasig and Marikina, Rizal in organizing unions, which they referred to either the FFW or the Federation of Democratic Trade Union (FDTU) for affiliation.

The exigencies of the time also compelled LIAC-WAO to engage in area alliance and federation building. This was facilitated in 1984, when the leader of the Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) or Confederation of Filipino Workers requested the LIAC-WAO to revitalize the federation. As it was in the case of the FSB and KASAMA, WAO eventually phased out of LIAC to become integrated into the KAMAPI. Later on, KAMAPI merged with another workers’ federation, the National Union of Garments’ Textile Cordage Industries (GATCORD) to form the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW) (Ibid.).

By mid-1980s, the assassination of Benigno Aquino triggered the escalation of the anti-Marcos protest movements. To promote wider awareness building in the labor sector and to promote a unified labor front, the UFW, together with the Workers’ College of the CCS founded the Lakas Mangagawa (Workers’ Strength) Labor Center (LMLC). The LMLC represented a conglomeration of 10 socdem affiliated trade union federations that took active part in the anti-Marcos mass mobilizations from 1983 to 1986. It was the Christian democratic groups’ answer to the NDF-influenced Kilusang Mayo Uno (May 1 Movement) and the government-leaning Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).

With the expansion of ISO into LIAC, it entered into a phase of transformation from a social movement association into a voluntary organization. This organizational
development was prompted by the efforts of the Jesuits to accommodate the initiatives of its partner volunteer associations and social activists whose activities were curtailed under Martial Law. In as much as the Marcos administration was initially cautious of antagonizing the Catholic Church, the LIAC seminars and publications served as the legal venues where middle class social activists were able to express their sentiments about the dictatorship. On the other hand, the BCCs and the grassroots organizations it helped to set up provided the venues by which anti-dictatorship sentiment was nurtured at the grassroots level. These controlled public spheres promoted discussions and exploration of options on how to fight the dictatorship. Thus, they attracted the members of the underground ideological parties. This consequently lent it vulnerability to military repression. Instead of curtailing its activities, however, it merely made the LIAC management and staff to more systematic in exploring ways of legally pursuing anti-dictatorship efforts.

Related to this, LIAC attracted people from competing outlawed revolutionary movements in search of legal fronts and abeyance organizations. The competition was resolved only when the PDSP cadres, through its network of student organizations, penetrated the organization by getting the students involved initially as volunteers and later on, hired as LIAC staffs. Through this, PDSP was able to establish ideological hegemony over the organization by using the democratic socialist principle as basis for integrating LIAC’s otherwise autonomous and unrelated programs. They were able to do this first of all, because the LIAC structure was relatively flexible and its Jesuit leadership tolerated it. This, on the other hand, was because the democratic socialist ideology complemented, if not concretized, the Jesuit’s faith and justice thrust.
Third, in order to rationalize the different initiatives undertaken by the groups that it had subsumed under its wing and to assist them in generating funding support, it had to convert them into program units with full-time staff. Although these units were independent of each other and even of LIAC itself, the fact that they were incorporated under one organization already indicated the beginning of some semblance of a structure. It could thus be said that the LIAC had began to assume a formal "NGO" identity.

Fourth, the exigencies of the Martial Law era necessitated that middle class-based NGOs work closely with the grassroots sectors if they were to build the groundswell to topple the dictatorship as soon as possible. They needed to sensitize the grassroots about the abuses of the Marcos administration, allay their fears and enjoin them to take collective measures to oppose them and eventually, link them together with and as networks of anti-dictatorship movements. For LIAC, this implied the creation of special units such as the urban poor desk, the FSB and the WAO. Through these units, the LIAC provided the hub connecting the grassroots into the whole network of anti-dictatorship movement.

Fifth, like in prior periods, LIAC created autonomous organizations that address the needs of particular sectors of society. Unlike before however, the people's organizations (POs) that LIAC helped to set up had distinct grassroots leadership and membership. LIAC was able to maintain influence on these POs nonetheless by inserting the getting its entire program units designated as secretariats.

Last of all, in the same way that the transformation of the ISO into LIAC signaled its engagement in direct community organizing, it likewise marked LIAC's exercise of intermediary roles. As it promoted the autonomy of KASAMA and UFW from LIAC, it also acted as their guarantor to both the funding institutions and the government. LIAC also
provided continuing capability building and training to the PO leaders throughout their partnership. In addition, it became their mediating link to the PDSP. These mediating roles enabled the LIAC to tap on these POs for mass base during the anti-dictatorship mobilizations, the presidential campaign for Cory Aquino and the 1986 People Power Revolution.

**The Flowering of Anti-Dictatorship Movements: LIAC during the EDSA Revolution**

With the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983, the LIAC found itself at the heart of anti-dictatorship activities due to its staffs’ involvement with the PDSP. The protest period that began in 1983 up to 1986 was the height of LIAC’s involvement in ideological and partisan politics. For one, its urban poor, peasant and labor desks were heavily involved in the mobilization of participants to the *lakbayans* organized by JAJA and CORD. Simultaneously, LIAC also intensified its sectoral federation and alliance building to fast track mobilization for the anti-dictatorship movement. The farmers’ desk that succeeded the FSB, for example, organized the *Lakas ng Magsasakang Pilipino* (LMP) or the (Strength of the Filipino Peasants), which had presence in Central Luzon (Bataan and Nueva Ecija), Southern Luzon (Cavite, Tagaytay and Batangas) and Western Visayas. The LMP later on became one of the core groups that formed the lobby group, Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR) in 1987. As it was with the LIAC-FSB, the desk eventually became the secretariat of the LMP. The labor desk that succeeded LIAC-WAO, on the other hand, continued to assist the UFW, which at this point expanded its coverage to Zamboanga, Cagayan de Oro and Davao.

In addition to these, new units were created to accommodate practically all efforts directed to critique or mobilize opposition to the dictatorship. In 1983, for example, the
Kamag-aral (classmate) Program became an affiliate unit of LIAC. It conducted basic social orientation, leadership seminars, and organizing assistance for the students in the Manila university belt area for purposes of getting them involved in Catholic social action. It also linked the students’ organizations to a unified front of anti-dictatorship movements within the network of the PDSP. As before, LIAC provided logistical and financial support to these POs until they were able to generate funding support on their own. It also provided trainings to their leaders to ensure that they had the capabilities to run their organizations.

By 1985, LIAC was mobilizing its partner POs to campaign and vote for Mrs. Corazon Aquino as president. During the Snap Election, the LIAC staffs watched and monitored the counting of ballots together with their partner POs. At the time of the 1986 People Power Revolution, they were among those who provided the manpower for the vigil in front of Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo.

Gleaning and Replanting: Reorganization and Transfer to Ateneo de Manila Campus

After the 1986 People Power Revolution, civil society groups shifted their efforts from protest actions toward the re-establishment of the democratic institutions. Organizing a broad grassroots base thus became less urgent. However, the re-opening of the public sphere unleashed various socio-political forces such as the Marcos loyalist groups and Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) that were eager to explore their agenda and compete for public sympathy. On the other hand, the NDF-CPP-NPA, the strongest group that could pose challenge to these forces was itself afflicted with organizational crisis that resulted from its non-participation in the 1986 People Power Revolution. The socdems themselves had been disagreeing over preferred strategies and tactics of confronting the emergent social realities of the post-dictatorship era. Meanwhile, bulk of the POs that provided the mass base for the
EDSA Revolution had withdrawn from public sphere, half-expecting that their partner NGOs would assume responsibilities for lobbying for social and economic reforms needed to improve their lives. These created the needs for venues for discussing and clarifying social issues as well as for exploring alternatives ways of sustaining public interest and participation in the democratization process. On a more positive note, the Aquino administration adopted an open policy for NGOs and instituted processes and venues for civil society participation in governance and development administration.

Like the other NGOs at the time, LIAC was affected by these developments. First, with the national social, political and economic situation slowly beginning to stabilize, some of its program units were either no longer needed, or other NGOs that could better address them had emerged. Thus, by the 1990s, LIAC abolished its auxiliary desks. It also reverted back to the practice of tapping other NGOs to do community organizing and instead, focused on network/alliance building. For example, it tapped the Institute of the Urban Poor (IUP) and the Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor (FDUP) to organize the urban poor organizations in Pasay, Antipolo, Malabon and Quezon City while it concentrated on coalition building. Together with its partner NGOs and urban poor federations, it founded the Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULR-TF) in 1991. The ULR-TF lobbied for the passage of the Urban Development and Housing Act that was signed into law in 1992. ISO served as the coalition’s treasurer. At the labor front, LIAC allowed the UFW to undertake labor organizing in Northern Luzon, Bulacan (Valenzuela), Rizal and Metro Manila while it took charge of establishing area alliances. In 1990, it entered into partnership with an NGO that specialized in peasant organizing, the Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (CARRD), to promote federation building among peasant
organizations. Although it was not directly engaged in community organizing, LIAC maintained influence over its partner NGOs and PO federations because their heads were former LIAC staffs, or their secretariats were comprised of former LIAC units. Moreover, all of these organizations were linked to PDSP through the LIAC.

LIAC, nonetheless, sustained its direct involvement with the youth sector because it recognized that the students comprised a large segment of the country’s population with potentials to be organized. Moreover, it was interested in the values formation of the students as future leaders of the country (ISO, 1995: n.p.). When the Kamag-aral Program ended in 1986, LIAC opened a Students/Youth Desk to continue its work. This desk organized the Youth for the Advancement of Peace and Justice (YAPJ) and eventually, the Democratic Socialist Union (DSU) as alternatives to the NDF-influenced League of Filipino Students (LFS). It was through the YAPJ/DSU that LIAC recruited its second generation of community organizers.

YAPJ was able to get somebody to run for the Central Student Council of the UST. It was through it that I got invited to a leadership training held in Batangas in 1980. That was my first involvement with LIAC. After that, I was invited to the different trainings. In a way, I became the student volunteer organizer in UST… When I was about to graduate in 1989, I was invited to join the Farmers’ Desk, which at that time was tapped by Lakas ng Magsasakang Pilipino (The Strength of Filipino Farmers) as secretariat. So, I did organizing work for both students and farmers desks although I was not a LIAC employee.

At that time, the ideological rivalry between the socdem and the NDF had intensified, with the PDSP and the NDF competing for mass bases at the factories and the communities. In line with this, PDSP orchestrated LIAC’s program areas and activities to towards competing with the NDF. For example, Rizal, Batangas, Bataan, Nueva Ecija and Northern Luzon were identified as LIAC program sites because of NDF presence in these
areas. Through LIAC, PDSP organized POs in these areas to countervail the influence of
the NDF. The rivalry affected the relationship between LIAC and the NDF-associated
NASSA. Being the secretariat of the social action centers throughout the country, NASSA
was the coordinating agency of MISEREOR, the association of German Bishop that was the
major source of support of Church-based social action programs, in the Philippines. As
such, all program proposals submitted to MISEREOR required its endorsement. According
to some sources, there was a point when NASSA held the submission of program proposals
of LIAC to MISEREOR because of its association with PDSP. In response, the LIAC
management went directly to MISEREOR, sought and got an exemption from NASSA’s
endorsement by pointing out the preferences of latter for groups with particular ideological
bias. This became one of the factors that triggered the investigation of NASSA’s Board36
thereby further exacerbated the tensions between the PDSP and the NDF.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Church’s call for distancing from partisan politics, the
concern for the increasing rift between the staffs of the Jesuit social and the educational
apostolate institutions, and the more practical issue of allocating the dwindling Jesuit
manpower to its various apostolic institutions prompted the Jesuits to envision a closer
integration of their social and educational apostolic institutions for purposes of promoting
systematic, coordinated and pragmatic interaction among them. To promote this vision, they
embarked on the development of a “social development center” within the campus of the
Ateneo de Manila University in Quezon City (San Juan, 1993: 39-41). The reorganization of
the Jesuit Philippine Province led to the split of LIAC into two groups namely, the social
apostolate that upheld its mission of carrying out faith that does justice by facilitating the
change in social structure and social order in society and the socio-pastoral apostolate that
interpreted the “faith-justice” mission as promoting basic ecclesial communities and active non-violence. The latter remained in the office at Sta. Ana while the social apostolate transferred to the Ateneo campus and was reconstituted into the Institute of Social Order (ISO) in 1990.37

The move from Sta. Ana to the Ateneo Campus in Quezon City was a turning point in the organizational evolution of the ISO as an NGO. It started ISO’s odyssey towards professionalization and institution building. First, the extension workers of the sectoral organizing programs of LIAC were absorbed as permanent staffs of the ISO. Then on October 1990, the ISO held an Institute-wide visioning and planning exercise to set its course for the future. In the said exercise, a three-year program planning cycle and a monitoring and evaluation system were institutionalized as standard operating procedure of the Institute.

Secondly, the conscious process of separating ISO from the PDSP was initiated. In the vision-setting exercise, the Jesuits reiterated that the primary mission of the Institute was the propagation of faith that does justice, which was different from the democratic socialist vision of the PDSP.38 ISO’s community organizing effort was also delineated from PDSP’s mass base building and political propaganda efforts. Furthermore, it was clarified that ISO’s community organizing approach was not limited to political empowerment, but included other concerns such as poverty alleviation, social and spiritual development. Despite these, the ISO persisted in organizing the urban poor, the peasants, the workers and the students along political lines until the end of 1991 because the programs were still coordinated and implemented by PDSP cadres. Lastly, the ISO began to identify new sectors as target clients. In 1990, women organizing became an auxiliary activity to its sector organizing
programs in response to the request of two of its partner POs, the UFW and KASAMA for assistance in getting their women-members more substantively involved in their organizational activities.

Basically, this phase was the start of the transition of the ISO from a social action/activist organization to a social development agency. This shift was shaped by the dynamics going on in its external environment. Like the other NGOs, ISO was caught between the tug-of-war between the Catholic Church and the underground ideological movements. As a church institution, ISO was under pressure to withdraw from political participation and focus more on the socio-pastoral aspect of its work. However, in as much as majority of its staff were members of an ideological party, its political activities persisted until 1994.

At this point also, ISO found itself contending not so much with the state but with other contentious groups in the civil society, particularly the NDF-affiliated NGOs. As discussed earlier, this affected the community organizing efforts of ISO because program areas were identified on the basis of how PDSP could countervail NDF influence among the grassroots sectors.

*The Pruning: ISO’s Early Years as a Professional Social Development Agency*

With the 1992 presidential election, the institutionalization of democracy in the country was confirmed. The consultative nature of the Ramos administration and his policy of substantially involving the NGOs in state administration posed a different challenge for the Philippine civil society namely, that of becoming effective development partners and intermediaries to the grassroots sectors. Alongside these national developments, the ISO
reoriented itself into a full-pledged social development and development intermediary organization.

The move was facilitated by three factors. First, two of its labor union organizers were gunned down by the NPAs inside the ISO compound while attending a labor union conference in 1991. This further confirmed the earlier conviction of the ISO leadership that the ISO staff should separate political activities from their work at the ISO. Secondly, Mt. Pinatubo erupted in 1991 creating a need for an institution to coordinate the relief and disaster operations of the Jesuit institutions. Since ISO was the Jesuit’s banner social institution, it was assigned this task. This brought ISO into contact with non-church funding institutions. It also provided the opportunity for the institution to play the role of a resource conduit. As a result, its fund sources diversified compelling it to systematize its financial management system. Lastly, the Jesuits assigned a full-time director to the Institute with the mandate to professionalize it and promote its integration with the other Jesuit social apostolate institutions through the Society of Jesus Social Apostolate (SJSA) network (Orara SJ, 1993: 6).

These further facilitated the internal organizational changes within the institution. First, an attempt to formulate a strategic framework that would tie the efforts of the ISO together and clarify its contributions to the SJSA’s faith and justice mission was conducted (Orara SJ, 1993: 3-4). A three-level strategy for responding to the social problems at the time was conceived. In calamity and emergency situations, such as the case of the lahar-infested Zambales area, ISO would respond initially by providing welfare and relief services, gradually moving towards disaster preparedness and eventually, rehabilitation. In areas where the problems were more socio-economic in
nature, such as the case of the urban poor and the coastal communities, the ISO was to undertake more integrated development management approach that included resources management, human settlements and livelihood development. In situations when the issue involved unequal power relations as in the case of the women, it was to enable the marginalized sectors to participate in the decision-making processes through awareness building organizing and advocacy efforts (Ibid.). These indicated the shift in the focus of ISO’s efforts from political mobilization towards development administration, and from issue-based organizing to program-based organizing.

Secondly, in recognition of the possibility of reduction of grants in the future, the institution included organizational self-sustainability as one of its major goals and pursued revenue generation efforts. It insisted the same with its partner POs. It no longer provided dole-outs to its clients but rather, extend loans to them as initial capital fund for their income-generation projects. It also began to charge interest rates for these loans.

Thirdly, to facilitate the withdrawal of the ISO from partisan politics, its director asked PDSP to dissuade its cadres from tapping the ISO for its political recruitment and propaganda work. Given that PDSP officers headed most of ISO’s programs, this triggered the first wave of staff resignation at the ISO.

Despite these, the programs of the institution, for the most part, remained unchanged until 1994. This was because funding from MISEREOR and other church-based funding institutions were still allocated for the implementation of community organizing programs covering the urban poor, the peasants, the workers and the students. Also, the old staffs did not know how to go about the new strategic direction and persisted in implementing the program the way that they knew how – politically oriented and geared towards promoting
the social democratic vision. Over the years, however, the area coverage and scopes of
ISO's organizing efforts were scaled down. From 1992-1993, ISO continued to focus on
federation and alliance building. However, it reduced the number of federations it was
supporting. By 1994, the ISO changed its organizing strategies. From a “sweep” organizing
strategy that focused assistance on core people with leadership potentials, it shifted to
“solid” organizing that included the conscientization of all members of the community in the
period. This was in line with the trend in the NGO sector at the time of going back to the
communities to consolidate their influence at the grassroots level.

Also, while ISO still predominantly emphasized the political empowerment of its
partner POs, it began to limit the number of POs that it was assisting and worked to address
their socio-economic needs. In the cities, it focused its efforts in assisting specific urban
poor associations to avail of the community mortgage program of the government (ISO,
1995: n.p.). At the labor sector, it focused its assistance on two area labor alliances namely,
the Northern Luzon Labor Alliance (NLLA) in Baguio/Benguet, the Bukluran ng mga
Manggagawa ng Lungsod Quezon (BUKLURAN) and the Alyansa ng mga Manggagawa ng
Tanay (ALAMAT) or the Alliance of Tanay Workers (Ibid.). It assisted the two labor area
alliances in forming multi-purpose cooperatives. Thereafter, it extended loans to both
organizations so they could engage in rice trading and establish cooperative stores that could
augment their low wages. It also terminated its peasant organizing program and
concentrated instead on assisting a federation of fisher folks, the Bigkis Bisig ng mga
Mangingisda ng Bataan (BBMB) or the United Fishermen Front of Bataan in converting
their federation into a multi-purpose cooperative. In 1993, it assisted the cooperative in
accessing a P450,000 red tide calamity fund from CARRD, which its local chapters used for implementing livelihood projects.

Since other NGOs had already emerged to take on national advocacy of specific reform issues, the ISO terminated its electoral advocacy development and communications desks. It also terminated its youth organizing program because the students seemed to have lost their militancy after the People Power Revolution and had proven difficult to organize. In lieu of these programs, the ISO set up an Institutional Technology Development Unit to develop new programs and technologies for assisting the grassroots sectors. The goal of the unit was to search for ISO’s cutting edge in social development as it was becoming clear at this time that competition among NGOs for funding was becoming quite stiff.

However, these changes led to conflicts between the director and the program staffs of the institution. Since the latter saw that they could no longer pursue their political agenda within the ISO, many opted to leave the institution.

The Pinatubo Disaster Response Program

Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption in 1991 exposed the non-readiness of both the government and the private voluntary organizations to handle emergency situations. Even the network of church-based NGOs did not know how to effectively coordinate the receipt and distribution of relief goods to the disaster victims, which lend it to anomalies and irregularities. This was true even among the Jesuit institutions themselves. To address the situation, the Jesuits designated the ISO to coordinate the collection of relief goods coming from Jesuit-based institutions and to link up with the social action centers in Zambales and Pampanga to facilitate the delivery and distribution of these relief goods. Because of its involvement on this activity, the German Doctors, Inc. tapped the institution as a conduit of relief goods
under a food-for-work program for Zambales. The partnership continued even after the situation in the area stabilized. In 1994, the ISO launched its Pinatubo Disaster Management Program with a grant from the German Doctors, Inc. One of the components of the program was a micro-enterprise project that aimed to provide alternative livelihood opportunities for those resource bases were destroyed by lahar. Under this component, the ISO implemented its first micro-enterprise project. It lent P150,000 to a local fishers’ federation for an interest rate of 12 percent per annum to implement a bangus (milkfish) fry trading business. Lack of technological knowledge and experience in implementing a micro-enterprise project as well as lack of cooperation from the local government unit caused it to fail. Nonetheless, it initiated the recruitment of staffs with technical backgrounds into the institution. It likewise compelled the ISO to rethink its relationship with the local government.

The Nagkakaisang Kababaihan ng Western Batangas (KABABAIHAN)

In an earlier period, ISO conducted gender awareness seminars for the women-members of KASAMA in response to the latter’s request to get the women more substantially involved in its activities. As a consequence of these seminars, the women peasants that KASAMA decided to set up a separate women’s organization with a distinct identity. ISO assisted them to organize the Nagkakaisang Kababaihan ng Western Batangas or KABABAIHAN, leading to its implementation of a Gender-Based Integrated Development Program. Under the program, the ISO facilitated the organizing of the KABABAIHAN federation with 12 community-based chapters. The implementation of the program likewise compelled the ISO to hire staffs with specialized training on gender issues.

The ISO also provided trainings to the leaders of the federation in the areas of gender analysis, organizational development and project proposal making. They also
oriented the federation members on the laws and legal processes involved in filing cases concerning violence against women (VAW) and assisted them in establishing links the local government units for assistance in their program. Learning from its experiences in Zambales, the ISO worked collaboratively with the local government units of Batangas. As a result of these efforts, municipal women crisis centers were established in three municipalities of Batangas. Since the KABABAIHAN members were trained by the ISO in dealing with VAW, they were hired as extension workers by the municipal governments. Instead of being co-opted by the latter, however, the crisis center became the recruitment grounds of KABABAIHAN. Moreover, the link with the local government allowed them to access government resources for their projects.

Four features thus distinguished this phase of ISO’s evolution. Like the other church-based voluntary organizations, ISO adopted a centrist and non-aligned approach to social change after the authoritarian regime. In line with the Jesuits’ decision to rid ISO of ideologues and to dissociate the institution from ideological politics, ISO reoriented its programs towards social development. In so doing, it had to explore fields where it could specialize and excel.

As part of this process, the ISO also gradually shifted its strategy from political empowerment towards addressing the socio-economic needs of the grassroots. It likewise reoriented its program focus away from national issues towards more community-based concerns. This was accompanied by ISO’s increasing assumption of development intermediary roles such as serving as conduits of funds coming from donor institutions, acting as lending institutions, mediating between competing groups and representing the POs in negotiations with government agencies.
Thirdly, as the ISO adopted new programs, it recruited new staffs with specialized skills and knowledge. However, since the PDSP cadres were strategically placed at the ISO and since its partner NGOs and POs were part of the PDSP network, it took some time before the new program strategies were accepted and implemented on field. Moreover, it generated conflicts within the organization as the change was resisted by majority of the staff. This led to a rash of resignations that left some programs without any manpower. This, on the other hand, enabled the ISO to facilitate the professionalization of its staffs.

Lastly, during this period, ISO also began to diversify its sources of support. In terms of funding, it began to tap sources other than MISEREOR and the church-based funding institutions. Institutionally, it also began to explore links with government agencies such as the National Housing Authority and the local government units (e.g., the CMP for the urban poor groups) and other NGOs (e.g., the LRFW for the women groups) for support of its partner POs’ projects.

**Grafting Ideological Politics with Social Development: The ISO in Organizational Crisis**

The waves of resignations of staffs with links to the PDSP in 1994 allowed the ISO to recruit professional staffs that were politically non-aligned, or at least, not aligned to PDSP. Many were former government technocrats with experience in implementing economic development projects. In 1995, the ISO staff was a mix of political activists, economists and business graduates. The representation of different perspectives allowed the institution to explore issues and generated new project strategies. For example, the institute came to realize that the labor situation in the country had gotten complicated. The Philippines had the most militant labor force and the highest per capita labor cost in Asia. However, as its neighboring countries offered cheaper and more docile laborers that many
multinational companies transferred their factories and left many Filipino workers unemployed. As such, bad conditions in the work, or for that matter, just compensation became the least of the workers problem. Unemployed, the workers joined the informal sector in engaging in petty trades and micro-businesses to survive causing the sector to swelling. The formal labor unions nonetheless were ambivalent in allowing them to join their ranks either as members or as allies in their lobbying efforts because they were technically petty capitalists and not laborers.

Taking these concerns into consideration, the ISO focused on the organization of the informal labor as part of its labor program instead. For its 1994-1996 program cycle, the ISO assisted four informal labor sub-sectors – garments home workers, market vendors, tricycle drivers and small fishers - from Tanay, Rizal in organizing themselves into multi-purpose cooperatives. To start them up, ISO provided these informal sector cooperatives technical trainings on project proposal making, feasibility analysis, enterprise development and financial management. Thereafter, the ISO assisted them in registering their organizations with the Cooperatives Development Authority and lent them initial start-up capital at a rate of 12 percent per annum. ISO likewise facilitated the establishment of an area alliance of informal workers, the *Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawang Impormal ng Tanay* (KAMIT) or the Society of Tanay Informal Workers.

Initially, the ISO attempted to mediate the coalition building between the informal and formal labor sector by linking KAMIT with ALAMAT. At that point, however, ALAMAT was already weakened by the closure of the businesses where its member trade unions were based. Seeing that the formal-informal labor link was no longer possible, the ISO instead linked KAMIT with other informal workers' federations. In 1997, KAMIT,
together with the federations of ambulant vendors from Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro formed a national coalition of informal sector organizations, the Kalipunan ng Maraming Tinig ng mga Manggagawang Impormal (KATINIG) or the Confederation of the Many Voices of the Informal Sector. ISO, together with the National Peace Coalition (NPC), provided financial and logistical support to KATINIG in its initial years of organizations. The confederation had since then been lobbying for security of tenure of ambulant vendors and street traders.

ISO likewise developed a concern for the rapid depletion of the country’s natural resources, both because the fishers that it was assisting were beginning to be affected by the impact of environmental degradation and because it appeared that most fund donors were interested in environmental projects. As such, it decided to use environmental issues as entry points for resuscitating the Mariveles-based POs affiliated with BBMB. ISO organized these POs to pressure the municipal government into using its mandate under the 1991 Local Government Code to promulgate a local ordinance that would regulate the incursion of commercial fishers into the municipal waters. Along this line, ISO also facilitated the formation of a voluntary bantay dagat (fish warden) group affiliated with the BBMB that would assist the municipal government to enforce the ordinance. It then made representations with the Philippine Coast Guard to get these fish wardens deputized to patrol the municipal waters and apprehend illegal fishers. Since the initiative addressed their livelihood concerns, they drew widespread support from the fisher folks.

On the other hand, ISO was able to pressure the municipal government to support the program because the fisher folks comprised a big voting population. Moreover, the municipal government saw prospects for generating revenues from the fines that they can
collect from itinerant commercial fishers. The program generated a new model for
NGO-PO-government partnership. The success of the program generated interest from
BFAR and the Department of Agriculture that they had awarded a patrol boat to the
*bantay dagat* group. The BBMB Chairman, on the other hand, became one of the
representatives of the fisher folks in the SRC formed by the Ramos administration to
oversee the SRA. For the ISO, however, these developments represented a shift of
program focus from livelihood development to a more holistic sustainable resource
management practice. It also marked a change in its relationship with the government
from being confrontational towards critical collaboration.

In Zambales meanwhile, the Religious of Good Shepherd (RGS) sisters requested
ISO to assist a mixed group of Aetas (indigenous people) and lowland farmers from San
Felipe who were resettled in the upland community of Brgy. Banicaguing. The upland
farmers were recipients of a twenty-year lease agreement from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to reforest 16 hectares of grasslands. ISO
secured a grant from the German Doctors, Inc. to implement a community-based upland
farming project in the area. It organized the farmers into the Balincaguing Upland
Farmers’ Association (BUFA) and provided them with technical assistance in sustainable
upland agriculture, forest farm management and livestock development. ISO also lent the
organization seed capital funds to implement a community-based forest farm, a vegetable
production project and a carabao dispersal project. The last two were intended as loans to
individuals wishing to augment their income. In 1998, a forest fire hit the area burning
the forest trees being tended by the upland farmers. This prompted the ISO to organize a
*bantay gubat* (forest warden) group as part of the BUFA. To train and deputize the
farmers in fire protection, the ISO established links with the local DENR office. As it was in the case of the fisher folks, ISO shifted its organizing focus to sustainable natural resource management.

The 1992-1994 period thus represented ISO’s expanded search for its niche in social development in the areas of gender and development (which was developed earlier), micro-enterprise development for the informal sector, and environmental protection. The three programs had ISO assume more intermediary functions of either channeling resources to its partner POs or facilitating their access to links, information and resources that would enable them to strengthen their organizations and/or improve their living conditions. They also required that ISO interact and collaborate closely with the municipal government units and concerned line agencies.

ISO’s search for its niche was not a smooth process, however. As these required exploring new ways of doing things, it generated dissent among its staffs with links to PDSP. For example, the decision to support the organization of KABABA/HAN separate from KASAMA resulted to debates as to whether ISO should prioritize gender concerns over class concerns. On the other hand, the shift of ISO’s assistance from formal to informal labor caused conflicts to erupt between the ideologues among the staff and the ISO director. Since the labor and peasant federations were the recruiting grounds of PDSP, the shift of program support meant that PDSP no longer have influence over the ISO and its POs. Moreover, with the change in program emphasis, they could no longer justify the use of program funds for PDSP’s political propaganda efforts.

In addition to these, the staffs did not know how to go about organizing the informal sector and women, nor did they have any knowledge and skills in micro-
enterprise development and/or natural resources management. Thus, they felt threatened by the entry of staffs with expertise on these areas. This led to conflicts between the ideologues and the new group of skilled professionals that came on board.

The internal conflicts among the various groups in the institution spilled over the institute's partner POs as the ideologue staffs enjoined the latter to join in their internal power struggle. In 1997, for example, the KAPISANAN, a federation of urban poor associations from Antipolo, trooped to the ISO office to demand the removal of the coordinator of the urban poor program unit and the reinstatement of a community organizer that resigned earlier due to conflict with the former. The same situation applied later to the labor program when KAMIT refused to work with ISO over the termination of a community organizer for fund mismanagement. These incidences, for the most part, held program activities in abeyance.

As it was with other Philippine NGOs during this period, therefore, 1994-1997 was a period of exploring strengths, dealing with weaknesses and searching for a niche in social development for the ISO. It also represented the completion of its cutting of ties with the ideological parties as well as its secularization. It also implied the shift of power from a more politicized group within the organization towards those who were more centrist and developmental in orientation. These, in turn, triggered internal conflicts that plunged the organization into crisis.

With the resignation of the ideologue staffs, however, the institution was able to promote full-scale professionalization by hiring only college graduates with general knowledge on development management and specialized skills on micro-enterprise development, natural resource management and gender analysis. Corollary to these, the
period also marked the end of ISO’s political involvement and the beginning of its involvement in development administration and local governance.

Reseeding: ISO in Contemporary Times

As the internal organizational dynamics stabilized, the ISO was able to work on its mainstreaming in the development administration arena. Given that poverty and environmental degradation were the two main concerns of the Social Reform Agenda and the Philippine Agenda 21 that both the Ramos administration and the civil society groups had agreed upon, the ISO focused its programs on these two issues. In 1997, it launched its Social Transformation and Grassroots Empowerment (STAGE) Program, which adopted the sustainable integrated area development (SIAD) strategy in the context of the faith-justice mission of the Jesuits. The STAGE Program focused on the fisher folks and the upland farmers adjudged to be the poorest of the Filipino poor. It identified the Panukulan Island in Quezon and the municipalities of Mercedes and Vinzons in Camarines Norte because they had the high incidence of poverty among its fishers and upland farmers’ population.

The STAGE Program incorporated the learning experiences of the ISO in community organizing and in implementing a natural resources management program. For one, it adopted a solid organizing techniques that targeted communities instead of sectors and families instead of individuals. Secondly, the program promoted the collaboration with the local government units and local church institutions. In connection with this, the program had components dealing with the organizational development of these institutions and with the establishment of links between them and the POs. They were geared towards making the local government and local churches the allies, rather than adversaries, of the grassroots sectors in pressuring the national government to address local needs. Thirdly, the
program also encouraged self-reliance among the grassroots sectors. As such, it enjoined
the POs to put up their own local counterparts to fund their own programs.

Natural resource management was a highly scientific and technical field. ISO itself
did not have the technical capabilities to undertake sophisticated resource ecological
assessment techniques. To build its capabilities and gain access to equipments required for
such, ISO established links with academic research institutions such as the Ateneo
Environmental Science Program, the U.P. Marine Science Institute, Silliman University and
the U.P. Los Banos College of Agriculture and College of Forestry. It also tapped foreign
volunteers to train its staff in the conduct of marine surveys and aquaculture and college
students to assist in its field researchers. The new program thrust also required ISO to join
networks of environmental NGOs that were lobbying for more environment friendly
legislations. However, most environmental NGOs were UP-based and were closely
affiliated with the NDF groups. In the communities, the ISO were also compelled to deal
with, and at times, work among the NPAs. The tactical cooperation with the NDF-affiliated
institutions and groups alienated the institution from the socdem groups. However,
interactions with these organizations confirmed ISO’s non-ideological and non-aligned
political status and its complete adoption of social development as an ideology.

Like the other NGOs, the ISO was also affected by the reduction in foreign grants
allocated to the Philippines. From the period of 1997 to 2001, MISEREOR reduced its grants
to the institution by 25 percent. The same was true with German Doctors, Inc. In line with
this, the ISO intensified its revenue-generation efforts by engaging in training and
consultancy services with private foundations and government agencies. However, similar
schemes were also being adopted by other NGOs, placing the ISO in direct competition with them.

The concern for self-sustainability further affected the organization and the programs of the ISO. In 1998, for example, ISO created a training unit that offered training services to government and private organizations in the areas of Catholic social teachings, gender and development, community-based coastal resource management and project development. Unlike the earlier training programs of the ISO that were offered for free to the grassroots sectors, the current training programs were geared primarily for development professionals and NGO workers seeking to acquire hands-on skills on these areas. They were also intended to generate revenues for the institution. In 2001, the ISO likewise competed and won a consultancy with BFAR to undertake coastal resource management in the municipalities along the coasts of San Miguel Bay in Camarines Norte. To implement the project, it had to create a program unit with contractual staffs that exceeded the total number of the ISO staff.

In sum, therefore, it could be said that the ISO had found its niche in the field of social development. It had specialized on community-based natural resource management, mixing community organizing with the highly technical field of environmental protection. To do this, however, it had to recruit and retrain its staff in highly technical fields such as ecological management, marine biology, etc. In process, it totally dispelled itself of its former political character and acquired a more professional identity. This, in turn, enabled it to effectively work with both the government and the ideological groups in the communities for the interest of the POs that it is assisting.
The present period also marked the functioning of the ISO as a professional development intermediary organization. As a development intermediary, it coordinates the link among various stakeholders in natural resource management, including that of brokering resources from funding institutions. It is as such that it was mainstreamed in the field of development administration.

As intermediary organization, the ISO was able to access resources from various sources. However, it also lent it more prone to the reduction of ODA grants in the recent years and placed it in competition with the rest of the social development NGOs. These, in turn, prompted it to work more vigorously for self-sustainability, which it also attempts to inculcate among its partner POs. As it gets more mainstreamed in development administration, however, it began to increasingly assume the impersonal character of a bureaucratic institution and less of the associational feature of a civil society organization.

Conclusion

On the whole, ISO’s evolution mirrored the organizational, relational and normative changes that civil society organizations went through over the years. On a normative level, ISO maintained its emphasis on social justice as basis of its programs and activities. This was in light of its strong link with the Society of Jesus. However, its interpretation of what comprised social justice and how it should be promoted have changed over the years. In 1931, the La Ignaciana Retreat House and the Catholic social action guilds interpreted social justice to mean getting the elites to be more humane in their treatment of their tenants and/or workers. It was also interpreted to mean giving the tenants the opportunities to purchase the land that they till. In 1940s, the ISO took this to mean enabling the workers and the peasants
to negotiate for reasonable wages and better work conditions and for equitable
distribution of harvests, respectively through organized efforts. In both contexts, social
justice was equated to social reform, which was believed to be the best way to prevent the
grassroots from being converted into communism.

By the 1960s, however, ISO’s notion of social justice became more radical as the
Catholic Church in general softened its stand towards socialism. It not involved the
organization of the grassroots sectors – which by then included not only the peasants and the
workers, but also the urban poor – to negotiate for better compensation and work conditions,
but also for the rights to basic needs and access to government services. Moreover, it
recognized the right of the oppressed to engage in organized protest actions to assert their
demands. With this, ISO and its partner organizations became more open to work with the
communists. Its willingness to work with the communists increased when Martial Law was
declared in 1972. At this time its definition of social justice became broader and included all
anti-Marcos and anti-Martial Law efforts. By mid-1970s up to 1986, the ISO, then known as
LIAC, served as a legal front for the PDSP, an underground ideological party. With this, it’s
definition of social justice had expanded once again to include not only engaging in protest
action, but also supporting a social revolution against the state, peacefully if possible
without precluding the use of force if necessary.

When the Marcos dictatorship ended in 1986, its definition of social justice once
again changed. In view of the restoration of democracy, social justice began to be equated
with enabling the organized grassroots sectors to participate meaningfully in decision-
making. Thus, efforts were exerted to promote alliance building among the POs for
purposes of representation and lobbying for social reform. With these in place by the 1990s,
the thrust of ISO’s social justice work turned to economic empowerment and later on, to sustainable natural resource management. With the expansion of the scope of social justice work, ISO found even the democratic socialist framework limiting. As such, it began to adopt the concept of social development.

The ISO likewise changed organizationally. It started in the 1930s as a project that sought to make the relationship between the businessmen and the workers more humane so that the latter would not be swayed into communism. It expanded into a social movement—the Catholic social action movement—that aimed to educate the poor and to persuade the landlords and the businessmen to redistribute productive resources to the poor in exchange for fair compensation. Realizing that the elites would not give up their control of resources easily, the ISO was set up as a labor-management center where ideas on how to facilitate a just process of social change can be deliberated. It also served as a coordinating center where volunteers associations comprised of middle class students and professional were trained and oriented on the Catholic vision of social justice. These volunteer associations organized the first of the non-communist trade unions in the country. The ISO continued to harness volunteer associations up to the 1960s in propagating initiatives such as the credit unions aimed at addressing the specific needs of the poor and the marginalized and in promoting people empowerment through community organizing.

By mid-1970s, however, strict surveillance from the state compelled it to create program structures within which to subsume the activities of its partner volunteer associations and to protect the social activists from arrest and harassment of the military. It thus had to set up some sort of an organizational structure within which these initiatives could be tied. With the change in its name from ISO to LIAC, it also began to operate like a
formal voluntary organization. Simultaneously it also served as a legal front for the underground anti-dictatorship movement. LIAC continued to operate as such until the 1990s when, amidst the new requirements of its clientele and the challenge to mainstream its efforts, the ISO professionalized its operations and established a defined organizational structure and institutionalized operational systems and procedures.

Corollary to these, ISO’s operational strategies likewise changed over time. In 1931, the forerunners of the ISO used retreats, recollections, public forums and the media to advocate for social reforms that were premised on the Catholic social teachings. This changed in the 1940s when the ISO shifted initially into providing trainings to the laborers and later on, organizing trade unions and trade federations. By immersing themselves into the labor movement and later on, into the peasant movement, the ISO was able to draw support from the grassroots sectors and wean them away from the communist-influenced trade unions. The ISO, in turn maintained its influence on these labor and peasant federations since their leadership came from its roster of volunteers and lecturers. Their efforts were enhanced further by the relative success of the government in its anti-communist campaigns and the success of its partner trade unions in lobbying for legislations that addressed the concerns of the labor and peasant sectors. However, their organizing strategies failed when they antagonized the Catholic Church hierarchy by unionizing within the church institutions.

As the Catholic Church hierarchy censured the ISO for its labor organizing efforts, it then shifted to a non-threatening strategy of organizing credit cooperatives. Under this strategy, the ISO was not only able to pacify the Catholic Church hierarchy it was also able to pilot a community-based program that was adopted nationwide. However, the socio-
political condition had turned for the worse prompting yet another change in ISO’s strategy – community organizing for purposes of grassroots empowerment. In mid-1960s, it pilot-tested Freire’s conscientization approach among the sugar workers in Negros and Alinsky’s conflict confrontation model among the urban poor in Tondo. These efforts initiated the use of community organizing (CO) as a signature effort of the Philippine NGOs.

With the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, ISO (a.k.a., LIAC) combined training, publication and BEC formation as means to facilitate the discussion of social issues and the exploration of possible courses of actions on how to deal with Martial Law. In so doing, it was able to contribute in sustaining the anti-dictatorship movement alive. Nonetheless, this also lent it open to influences of the underground ideological movements and to repression by the military.

Towards the 1980s, it began to become more pro-active in its involvement in the anti-dictatorship movement under the influence of the PDSP, an underground ideological party. As such, it embarked on “sweep” organizing of the urban poor, peasants and laborers into national federations and alliances that provided the manpower for rallies and other mass mobilizations. By 1986, LIAC-ISO was able to mobilize the grassroots sectors to participate in the campaign for Corazon Aquino’s presidency, in the monitoring of the elections later on, and in the 1986 People Power Revolution.

When democracy was restored in 1986, LIAC-ISO reverted back into solid organizing, adding on an economic dimension into its programs and eventually, adopting a more holistic social development approach towards the 1990s. As it engaged in social development, however, the organization increasingly assumed development intermediary
functions of serving as fund conduits to its partner POs, serving as their guarantors to funding agencies and the government, and even mediating between the POs and the other social institutions, including the ideological parties.

Corollary to the changes in its organizational characteristics and program strategies, ISO’s manpower changed from volunteers to full-time contractual personnel to permanent staffs. As these changes occurred, the characteristics of the staffs also changed. From 1931-1960, the volunteers of the ISO comprised of the students of the Ateneo who were predominantly, the sons of the economic and political elites. Most of them were law, business and philosophy students. As such, their predisposition was primarily towards social reform that would not necessarily require radical changes in the status quo. By the 1960s, however, ISO’s base of volunteer organizations expanded to include the student organizations of other universities, including the University of the Philippines. This likewise extended the recruitment of volunteers to the sons and daughters of the middle classes. Most who got involved were social science majors whose courses required immersions in the poor communities within and outside Manila. Many of them were student activists and members of either the natdem or socdem ideological groups who were predisposed towards radical changes.

In the 1970s when the Marcos administration cracked down on those who were critical of the Martial Law, many of these student volunteers sought refuge in LIAC as directly hired community organizers. They were trained in the Alinsky and Freire models of community organizing and were deeply immersed among the grassroots. Also, practically everyone was a PDSP member. Thus, when ISO decided to cut its ties with PDSP in 1992, many of the PDSP affiliated staffs resigned. From thereon, the ISO hired professionals,
some of whom even came from the government sector. These new recruits further promoted the professionalization of the institution and supported its non-aligned political stand.

In terms of funding, ISO’s operations were largely subsidized by the Jesuit Philippine Province up until 1974. This was because the activities of its volunteers were shouldered by their respective organizations. On the other hand, the organizations that it created such as the FFW, FFF, the NSFW and the PECCO were able to generate their own funds. With Martial Law, however, the capabilities of its partner organizations were curtailed compelling the LIAC to assume the responsibility for fund generation. From 1974 up to the present, therefore, LIAC-ISO’s main source of support was MISEREOR although other European church-based groups occasionally give it some funding support. As ISO explored other programs in the 1990s, however, it began to also tap support from non-church organizations. It also engaged in revenue generating activities such as offering consultancy and training services, operating a conference and dorm facilities and investing in trusts and securities. All of these were reflective of its bid for financial sustainability and of its main-streaming in the practice of development administration.

The above changes in the nature and organizational characteristics of the ISO over the years nonetheless were influenced by the actions of the Catholic Church, the ideological parties particularly PDSP, and the state. Since ISO is a Church-based organization, its program thrusts were primarily reflective of how the Philippine Catholic Church interpreted and concretized the social encyclicals released by the Vatican in the context of the Philippine social realities. This is largely reflected by its emphasis on social justice, which basically mirrored the Catholic social teachings. It is also reflected on the way that LIAC-
ISO related with the state and the ideological parties, which, more or less, were consistent with how the Catholic Church dealt with the two institutions.

Another external factor that significantly shaped ISO’s programs over the years was the communist movement. As mentioned earlier, the underlying objective of ISO’s training and community organizing program was to provide an alternative to communism as a means to promote social change. From 1930s to the 1960s, this was very explicit. The Bellarmine and Chesterton Evidence Guilds in the 1930s, the FFW and FFF in the 1940s to the 1950s were all founded by the ISO to compete with the communist party for influence over the restive labor and peasant sectors. By the 1960s, however, the delineation between the two became blurred as the ISO – like the other church-based groups – became more open to socialism and initiated joint efforts with the communist groups (i.e., through the organization of the NSFW and the PECCO/ZOTO). Through close coordination with the communist groups, the ISO began to share common strategies (i.e., community organizing) with the latter. It also began to share the latter’s antagonism towards the state.

With the declaration of Martial Law, the ISO itself became part of the antidictatorship movement as it provided haven to social activists who were compelled to join the communists underground. Very much like the other Philippine NGOs during the period, LIAC became the legal front of an ideological party namely, the PDSP. Through networks of peasant, labor and students federations organized by LIAC, the PDSP participated in protest rallies and campaigned for Cory Aquino’s presidency. These networks of PO federations were also among the manpower that made the 1986 EDSA Revolution possible.

With the Marcos dictatorship gone, LIAC got embroiled in the competition between the NDF and PDSP for ideological influence over the organized grassroots, leading to the
murder of two of LIAC’s extension workers. This facilitated the distancing of the ISO from ideological politics by the 1990s. The dissociation process, nonetheless, led to a series of conflicts involving the LIAC holdover staff who espoused the PDSP social democratic ideology and the newly recruited professional staff who sought a more non-aligned social development approach to social change.

Unlike other civil society groups, the efforts of LIAC-ISO from the very start were intended to influence and not respond to state policies. In the 1930s, the Chestertonians, for example, persuaded the Quezon administration to consider the adoption of a peasant proprietorship and corporatist state as policies. In the 1950s, the FFW pushed for the adoption of a Magna Carta for Labor that legalized the rights of the labor sector to collective bargaining. In the 1960s, the PECCO and ZOTO pushed even the Marcos dictatorship to provide on site relocation to the urban poor in Tondo. ISO’s pro-active stance continues even up to the presence as it taps and harnesses the legislations and venues created by the state for civil society participation. To date, the ISO works in close collaboration with the municipal government and line agencies in the enforcement and implementation of social reform legislations that had been passed since 1986. It likewise taps these agencies to lobby for further social reforms from the national government.
ENDNOTES

1. One of the predominant racketeering practices at the waterfront during those days was the *cabo* (union boss) system. The *cabos* were assigned by the *estevedores*’ (cargo handlers) unions to cover cargo handling in particular areas of the Manila South Harbor. Under the *cabo* system, the *estevedores* who did not belong to any union or did not know any *cabo* had very little chance of getting work. On the other hand, the *cabos* use their power of hiring and firing to abuse the *estevedores*. A common practice was to deduct portion of the latter’s pay as their commission. The system is complicated by the rivalries among the unions in terms of territory, ethnicity and seniority thereby making unionism in the docks very volatile and at times, risky.

2. The strike became famous because of an incident involving PAL owner, Don Andres Soriano and Fr. Hogan. According to witnesses to the strike, Soriano approached the picket line and began to verbally abuse and intimidate the workers. When Fr. Hogan, who was at the picket line at the time, saw this, he took a placard from one of the strikers and stood directly in front of a surprised Soriano. Adding color to the situation was the fact that the sons of the company’s board members were there carrying placards alongside the strikers. The young men were members of the Social Order Club of the Ateneo to which Fr. Hogan served as spiritual advisers.

3. Krononalyst Inc.’s Interview with Mr. Montemayor, FFF.


5. This was the adult counterpart of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines during that era. The members of the Rovers Scouts in San Dionisio, Paranaque at that time comprised of the elites and middle class professionals who wanted to engage in community development activities that go beyond construction of waiting shed and cleaning of the beach front.

6. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with Mr. Servando Garcia, one of the founders of San Dionisio Credit Cooperative Union on June 4, 1997. According to Mr. Garcia, many of the community residents at that time were borrowing from Indian moneylenders under the usurious term of 20% daily interest to generate capital for their sideline businesses to augment their family income.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. These were the *Pacem in Terris*, Gaudium et Spes and Populorum Progressio, all of which were drafted during the Vatican II Council of 1961-1965.

11. The Alinsky’s community organizing model was based primarily on the experiences of the black urban communities in the Chicago. The model is premised on the principle that community actions must emanate from the people themselves and should address issues that were of immediate concerns to them. It justified the morality of the poor engaging in non-violent confrontational actions as long as these could maximize their opportunities of getting what they want. For organizers, it stressed the importance of experiencing the life situations of the people they were assisting and of acceptance as part of the community. See Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, New York: Random House, 1971.
Interview with a former PECCO Board Member.

Honculada also indicated that the pullout of its workers and consultants facilitated the dissolution of PECCO. Also, according to a PECCO Board Member, the decision to pull out was shaped by many factors. First, many of them were concerned by the observation that the left was taking over the communities that they had organized at the Tondo Foreshore. Also, they felt that it was becoming dangerous for their COs to work in Tondo as some of them were getting picked up for questioning. See Jurgette A. Honculada, *Case Study: ZOTO and the Twice-told Story of Philippine Community Organizing*. Third World Study. *Kasarinlan: Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fourth Quarter, 1985: 18.

Its president, Trinidad Herrera, was arrested, tortured and raped in 1976. She was released only upon the pressure exerted by international human rights groups on the Marcos administration.

Interview with Fr. John J. Carroll SJ.

This thrust was reflected in both the 31st and 32nd General Congregation documents of the Society of Jesus.

Those interviewed all indicated that at that time, the term ISO was amorphously associated to the labor training programs and eventually, to the Faith-Justice training programs of LIAC.

Interestingly, the Jesuit priests assigned to LIAC were the staunchest critics of Martial Law.

Focus group discussion (FGD) conducted with the ISO team leaders October 1995 to assess the strengths and weaknesses of ISO’s community organizing strategy.

According to LIAC Jesuit staff and lay volunteers who were interviewed, well-known NDF personalities used to stay and give lectures at the ISO even when they were underground. Thus, the ISO came to gain its reputation as the “hangout” (haven) of the social activists.

According to the Jesuits and lay staffs of LIAC, military intelligence installed a surveillance camera opposite the main entrance of its office to monitor the activities within the compound and to find out who comes in and out of the premises. In addition, military officers dressed as ice cream vendors also lurked outside its walls. Interestingly, the LIAC staff knew these and played along with the charade. Interestingly, individuals belonging to the underground movement were able to come in and out of the building to use the offices for their meetings and other activities.

Krononalyist Inc. interview with Ms. Luz Almazan, former staff of LIAC-WAO. According to Ms. Almazan, the creation of FSB and WAO was to address LIAC’s lack of programs for the workers and the peasants. It should be noted that the banning of FFW leaders from lecturing at the ISO compelled its leaders to seek a separate identity from the latter. Thereafter, ISO’s labor program had died a natural death. On the other hand, many of the LIAC staffs were opposed to the Marcos dictatorship. Thus, when FFF declared its support to the Marcos’ administration, the LIAC staff dissociated themselves from it. NSFW, on the other hand, affiliated itself with the NDF.

Interview with a former director of the ISO as corroborated by former LIAC extension workers.

Interview with a former director of the ISO.

Focus group discussion (FGD) conducted with the ISO team leaders October 1995 to assess the strengths and weaknesses of ISO’s community organizing strategy.
26. Interview with a former director of the ISO.

27. The term “sweep organizing” refers to the strategy of using common issues to agitate already organized groups and motivate them to organize together. From these different groups, core individuals with leadership potentials were identified to form and lead federations or alliances, which then were put in charge of recruiting other organized groups. This was in contrast to “solid organizing” that start with individual consciousness raising and the organization of relatively unorganized grassroots sectors. See Liza L. Lim, Organizing for Community Empowerment in the 90s, ICSI, Intersect, Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1995: 11.

28. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with Mr. Oscar Castillo, former head of the Farmers’ Service Bureau and former Chairman of KASAMA. According to Mr. Castillo, the families of the jailed farmers blamed the FSB for the incident and refused to cooperate with them.

29. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with Ms. Luz Almazan, former staff of WAO and ISO’s Labor Desk.

30. Informal discussions with former LIAC staff.

31. The colleges and universities that the Kamag-aral was able to penetrate and conduct students’ organizing were the Philippine School of Business and Administration (PSBA), the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) and the University of Santo Tomas. Krononalyst, Inc. interviews with the former staffs of LIAC’s Students Desk.

32. Interviews with the ISO staff and informal discussions with the PO representatives. According to them, the urban poor associations and federations organized by LIAC were among those who were with the priests and nuns during the week of the EDSA 1986 People Power Revolution.

33. The Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (CARRD) was an NGO founded by former staff of LIAC’s Farmers Service Bureau after they left the KASAMA.

34. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a former staff of the LIAC’s Students Desk who was later assigned to the Farmers’ Desk.

35. To a certain extent, this was also made possible by the vacuum in LIAC leadership as its Jesuit director got sick in 1986 and no replacement was appointed until 1989. Instead, a Jesuit officer-in-charge was appointed on part-time basis with the day-to-day supervision of program operations delegated to a lay administrator. Per informal discussions with the LIAC staff, they were under the impression that they were given the autonomy to implement the program the way they see fit provided that they maintained the “faith and justice” aspect of their work.

36. Focus groups discussions with former LIAC staff in conjunction with the assessment of ISO community organizing strategies held October 1995.

37. Interview with a former director of the ISO. Also, from this researcher’s informal discussions with both Jesuit and lay staff of the LIAC, it was learned that prior to the reorganization of LIAC, the interpretation of its “faith and justice” mission had been a subject of arguments between the Jesuits on the one hand and the lay extension workers on the other. The lay people interpreted that social justice work should take precedence over that of propagating faith. They also thought that the latter should be the responsibility solely of the Jesuits. The Jesuits, on the other hand, felt that propagating faith should take precedence over social and political agenda. Thus among the LIAC staff, it was common to delineate themselves as the “faith” people (i.e., the Jesuits) whose offices were on the second floor and the “justice” people (i.e., the lay extension workers) on the ground.
38. Earlier than this, a memo cautioning the ISO staff from getting involved in politics was drafted. However, there was no confirmation that the memo was circulated among the staff.

39. Informal discussions with ISO staff and other conference participants who witnessed the incident. The incident was motivated by the PDSP-NDF rivalry since the two men were former leaders of NDF-influenced POs.

40. Under the food-for-work arrangement, relief goods were distributed to lahar victims in exchange for services such as construction of resettlement houses, road repair, etc. This arrangement was conceived in view of the findings of the program staff that the Aetas, the indigenous people from Zambales, refused to avail of dole out goods without at least symbolically paying or working for them.

41. During the 1990s, the fishers of Bataan and Cavite had suffered from the effects of “red tide” that made shellfish poisonous and inedible. Moreover, they had reported reduced fish catch due to recurrent oil spills from the tankers of the nearby Philippine National Oil Company and the competition from commercial fishers from Metro Manila that used environmentally destructive fishing gears.

42. This will be further explored in Chapter 9.

43. Accounts of these incidences were embodied in confidential personnel management files of the ISO.

44. The Sustainable Integrated Area Development (SIAD) approach was developed by the civil society groups that also conceptualized the Philippine Agenda 21 (PA 21).
CHAPTER 8 – THE ISO AS AN ARENA OF CONFLICT

Chapter 7 discussed the changes in the nature and character of ISO as it evolved from a social movement into a development intermediary organization. It also identified the external factors that facilitated these changes. This chapter looks into the dynamics that these changes triggered among the different actors within the organization. It also identifies the critical actors that shaped the directions, programs, and nature of the institution. Lastly, it examines how decisions about directions and program priorities were reached, paying particular attention at how influence and power were negotiated by these actors.

Volunteers for Social Action

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the people involved with the ISO changed over the years. At the beginning, the forerunners of the ISO were comprised of American Jesuits who sought to concretize the anti-communist social teachings of the Catholic Church. They were also convinced that this could only be attained if the source of discontent, namely poverty and oppressive working conditions could be eliminated. Since their exposure and the Catholic social teachings were limited to the conditions of the industrial workers on the West, the initial programs that they designed were intended for the industrialists and their workers. The La Ignaciana Retreat House, for example, was set up to facilitate the interaction and bonding of the two sectors through retreats and recollections. Initially, they thought that they could persuade the businessmen to be more humane in their treatment of their workers by appealing to their sense of Catholic moral values. This effort grew into a social action crusade wherein students of the Ateneo were organized into social action guilds (i.e., the Bellarmine and Chesterton Evidence Guilds) that went around to
share the Catholic social teachings and oriented themselves with the social situation of the poor. The Jesuits provided the guiding principles while the students flesh them out in terms of concrete ideas about social reforms (peasant proprietorship) and information dissemination projects (radio program, publications, public meetings). Since they shared the same purpose (i.e., preventing the growth of communism), the Jesuits and the students were able to work harmoniously together on an informal basis, without having to set up an organization or defining specific roles and responsibilities. They operated as a social movement.

Even when the ISO was formally organized in 1947, it was a small homogeneous group (initially comprised of two people and eventually growing to eight Jesuit personnel) that no formal organizational structure was needed. It functioned on an inspirational basis. It relied on the Ateneo students - through the Ateneo Social Order Club - to undertake the direct implementation of its trainings and to do the organizing work for them on voluntary basis. However, no formal arrangements existed between the ISO and the Ateneo Social Order Club. For the most part, the Jesuit staffs provided guidance and direction and handled some training sessions of the ISO, while the student-volunteers undertook the nitty-gritty tasks of union organizing.

Fr. Hogan talked to us about the social teachings of the church and the need to create a just society in the Philippines... He suggested that we organize some kind of a club that would... put to practice some of the social teachings that we were studying. So we organized the Social Order Club... We eventually went into organizing unions... and to inquiring into the conditions of the tenants in Central Luzon. The unions that were eventually set up in the waterfront, its initial members were students. They were members of the club (i.e., Social Order Club).

The next stage was to help begin some reforms in the waterfront... Fr. Hogan told me he talked to the head of the Associated Shipping Association... They would open up a payroll office... Fr. Hogan told me there was this window of opportunity
to begin the reforms, could I be the paymaster? ... Later on, we organized the Associated Workers' Union.

It was through this similar type of arrangements that the FFW and the FFF emerged in the 1950s. Unlike the Social Order Club, however, the FFW and FFF were set up to recruit membership from the laborers and the peasants. However, since there was a prevailing notion that these sectors needed leadership, the ISO-trained students (whom at that point had graduated to become professionals) assumed key positions in these organizations. For example, Juan Tan, one of the founders of the ISO was elected as president of the FFW. Other members of the Social Order Club joined him as officers of the federation (Fabros: 38). Fr. Hogan served as their adviser. They functioned autonomously from the ISO, maintaining their links to it only by serving as its part-time lecturers.

On the other hand, the ISO came to be instrumental in forming the FFF because its leader, Jeremias Montemayor sought advice and guidance of the ISO on how to organize a peasant union. He did so because he heard of ISO’s role in organizing the FFW.

I came to realize that they (i.e., the peasants) lacked leaders. The only leaders who went to them were communist leaders or communist-inspired leaders like Ka Luis Taruc... So I decided to become their leader ... Then I thought they should be organized... I thought the priest I could approach was Fr. Hogan... So I went to him and convinced him to visit the first unit... It was he who said, "Why don’t you call yourselves Federation of Free Farmers?" ... Fr. Hogan, although very sympathetic, felt working with the peasantry was not in accordance with his phase of preparation so I requested for a real adviser and Fr. Mauri, who was just expelled from Red China was assigned to us... Fr. Mauri apparently appreciated the importance of working with the peasantry, but he also had his own focus and that was the sacadas of Negros.

The ISO staffs then worked with the FFF in coming up with their program for assisting the peasant and got involved themselves in setting up FFF chapters in the provinces. Fr. Mauri, an ISO staff assigned as chaplain of the FFF, wrote an analysis of the peasant problems in

The social problem is viewed primarily as an injustice. The solution therefore lies in the restoration of just relations between tenants and landlords and becomes the moral obligation of leaders and Christians… On the other hand, justice is a legal question. The peasants should have the same rights as landlords and other groups under the law (Montemayor as cited by Po: 59).

He then assisted in the establishment of the Negros chapter of the FFF.

Although ISO did not have a direct involvement in actual union organizing efforts, the Catholic Church held it accountable for the activities of the FFW and FFF because they drew inspirations and ideas from it. Thus, when the two alternative unions went against the interest of the Catholic Church in the case of the UST and Negros strikes, the ISO was blamed for it. Church support to the ISO was withdrawn and the federation leaders were banned from the ISO. Thus, the interaction between these trade union federations and the ISO were significantly reduced, prompting the former to pursue their efforts independently. Eventually, even the inspirational and moral links of the ISO to the FFW and FFF was severed.

Amidst the controversies that the FFW and FFF stirred within the Catholic Church, the leadership of the ISO changed in the 1960s. Although it also continued its labor education seminars, they were no longer designed specifically for the members of labor unions affiliated with FFW. Rather, they were opened to all labor unions. Moreover, the ISO no longer assigned specific Jesuits to work closely with the labor federations. This reduced the inspirational content of ISO’s assistance to the labor unions.

Consequently, the ISO shifted to credit cooperativism. Credit union organizing became the focus of its 10-month training program. With the success of the San Dionisio
Credit Cooperative Union (SDCCU) as a community-based credit union organizing, demands for formal trainings and on-site assistance increased. Since ISO’s Jesuit manpower was limited, various ways of meeting the demand were explored. For example, the duration of the trainings were reduced from 10 months to 3 months so the Jesuits could set up cooperatives around the country when they were not teaching. In addition, leaders of the SDCCU were deputized to handle the trainings in credit union organizing. Like the FFW and FFF leaders, the SDCCU leaders were involved with ISO on part-time basis and only on particular activities. Unlike the FFW and FFF leaders, however, who were closely guided by the Jesuits, there was no close interaction among SDCCU leaders and the Jesuit staffs.

Later on, the Catholic Church hierarchy tapped the ISO to train social action center directors and staffs. Through these trainings, the ISO promoted its ideas on social justice and facilitated the implementation of concrete social action programs nationwide. As before, however, the involvement of the ISO’s Jesuit staffs was on the level of providing concepts and ideas. They had no direct hand in the actual implementation of these programs.

*Extension Workers for Community Organizing*

In the course of conducting seminars and field visits, however, the Jesuits developed different interests, which they explored when they were not teaching at the ISO. This started their actual involvement on program implementation. Fr. Dennis Murphy SJ, for example, got interested in assisting the urban poor and went on to facilitate the organization of the PECCO together with Fr. Jose Blanco, SJ. These initiatives developed into programs that were under the ISO, but operating autonomously with assistance from different volunteer associations. Eventually these programs became organized as independent voluntary
organizations themselves that facilitated the formation of grassroots-based people’s organizations (POs).

Unlike in previous period when the ISO only tapped volunteers from the Ateneo student organizations, ISO’s partners on these programs were comprised of volunteer priests and nuns from various congregations and dioceses, student activists and grassroots leaders with different intentions and interests. They were no longer homogenous in terms of social class and status compositions. Before, the student volunteers were mostly sons of the Filipino elites who were anti-communists. By the 1960s, they included middle class men and women from other colleges and universities such as the University of the Philippines affiliated to various ideological groups, particularly the natdems and socdems. These student volunteers worked with voluntary organizations that ISO helped to set up such as the PECCO, where they learned new skills in community organizing. They brought Marxism and Maoism into these voluntary organizations. Consequently, these volunteers used the skills they learned from these voluntary organizations to propagate the communist and socialist ideologies. They eventually harnessed these voluntary organizations in the recruitment of the people’s organizations into the revolutionary movement.

Although their exposure to similar trainings somehow made their social analysis and community organizing approaches relatively similar, the differences in ideological leanings among the volunteers translated into differences in purpose (i.e., fomenting class war vs. addressing particular social issue such as access to land, better wages and working conditions, etc.), strategies (i.e., revolution vs. reform) and tactics (i.e., organizing on broader national issues vis-à-vis organizing based on sectoral interests). These caused conflicts among the volunteers themselves, which intensified as the voluntary organizations
were subjected to military harassment and intimidations during Martial Law. The Board of PECCO, for example, opted to dissolve the organization when it failed to curb the influence of the NDF within the organization. The *socdems* and the non-aligned personnel organized different NGOs instead to continue its community organizing efforts among the grassroots sector, albeit within the contexts of their own ideological leanings. ISO as the original organizer was left to continue assistance to the grassroots organizations that were affected by the split.

This affected their partner POs adversely. In the case of ZOTO, for example, it veered towards the NDF when PECCO was dissolved, making it prone to military harassment. Scared and confused, many of its member POs withdrew from the alliance. When ISO was reconstituted into the LIAC, its urban poor desk took on the task of reviving and reorganizing these POs.

The reconstitution of the ISO as the La Ignaciana Apostolic Center (LIAC) in 1974 led to changes in the personnel composition of the institution. First, the number of Jesuits assigned to the LIAC increased as the work of *propagating faith that does justice* broadened to include spiritual, social and political services to the poor. These Jesuits had diverse interests, which they pursued under LIAC either as part of the institution’s training and publication initiatives or as concrete sectoral organizing and auxiliary programs.

The Jesuits have various ideas. Actually, we (i.e., the lay people) used to joke that since there were 10 Jesuits within the apostolic center, they also represented 10 different opinions on how to implement LIAC’s faith-justice thrust... They have different interpretations and expressed these in various program activities. When Fr. (Benigno) Mayo SJ (the director) came into the ISO, he tried to give a little sense of rationality on how the apostolic center operated but it was difficult to tie the Jesuit efforts together.
Since majority of the Jesuits assigned to LIAC were Marcos oppositionists, this facilitated the process of getting the anti-dictatorship initiatives subsumed as LIAC programs.

As LIAC accommodate these initiatives as its own programs, it also hired the volunteers from its previous partner volunteer organizations as contractual extension workers as well as some leaders of the POs that it organized. Its purpose was not so much as to provide security of tenure to the volunteers, but rather to minimize the possibility of them being harassed, arrested and detained by the military. Its intention was to “legalize” their activities.

( Employment) contracts? We never talked about it. In my case, … I didn’t even read mine. Didn’t even give a hoot as to what was written there. I signed it with my eyes closed. In our batch, we were there because we believe in a cause… It was only… the apostolic center (i.e., LIAC) who were hospitable to the kind of things we wanted to do… That’s what matters, as far as we were concerned. Prior to 1986-EDSA, it was scary to work for NGOs. There were very few NGOs. For us, working with LIAC was a source of pride because it was one of the original NGOs that persisted in working against the dictatorship despite harassment.5

Some of the extension workers recruited by LIAC were student leaders forced to drop out of school because they were tagged by the military as subversives. Others were student leaders who were detained for some time and upon release, chose to work as community organizers.

I was among the marchers that were arrested with Sen. (Lorenzo) Tanada, but I was able to escape. I got employed with Workers College of the Ateneo, providing legal assistance to the workers. Then, there was this opening at LIAC… I was offered a job, so I transferred. I was doing the same thing - legal assistance for workers. That was 1978-1979.6

To coordinate LIAC’s sectoral efforts, a program administrator was appointed to take care of the day-to-day program management.
Working for programs under the LIAC allowed the social activists to continue their anti-dictatorship efforts.

Only the Church provided the comfort to young people involved in revolution – whether armed or unarmed. It was the Church who provided the “cover”… On our part, we were lucky the Jesuits were very supportive of people like us who were involved in the anti-Marcos struggle during that time… Now, when it comes to pay, we were not concerned about that. We have other things to be concerned about.

In providing a safe haven for social activists, LIAC unwittingly facilitated the entry of ideologues into the institution. LIAC became a “hang out” of social activists from the different spectrum of the anti-dictatorship movements. Eventually, however, PDSP members were able to consolidate their influence over the institution by getting their student members to volunteer and eventually absorbed by LIAC as extension workers. Since the Jesuit leadership was not too concerned about the details of how the sectoral programs were implemented, the lay extension workers were able to make the PDSP’s democratic socialist principle (i.e., Authentic Humanism) the unarticulated unifying thread that integrated the different program units of the LIAC.

The style of leadership at the LIAC was a mix of participatory and “godfather” (i.e., patronage) approach. We were like different families with an overall father figure… But everyone knew that apart from what we were doing (i.e. LIAC’s program activities), we were also doing something else… underground activities… That was okay with Father… as long as the “faith-justice” work was there.

Thus, PDSP’s concept of authentic humanism9 became integrated in the trainings conducted by the ISO. They became the premise for organizing the urban poor, the laborers and the peasants that were being organized by the LIAC. Since the PDSP was also deeply engaged in the anti-dictatorship efforts, the conviction that Marcos needed to be removed also became an unspoken goal of LIAC’s organizing efforts. Strategically, this implied the conscientization and mobilization of the grassroots to participate actively in the protest
movements against the Marcos administration. To do this, the different units of the LIAC – the urban poor desk, the FSB and the WAO – embarked on an effort to organize and consolidate the urban poor, peasants and the workers into mass bases for the protest movements. To ensure that the federation would imbibe the democratic socialist principle, the staffs of the FSB and the WAO resigned from LIAC and inserted themselves into the POs that they organized as secretariats. Through these staffs, the federations were able to secure the logistical support from LIAC for their operations. These staffs likewise facilitated LIAC’s endorsement of their programs to MISEREOR for funding.

For purposes of maintaining LIAC’s identity as a non-partisan organization, at least from the point of view of the state, division of labor was practiced between the LIAC and PDSP. This was undertaken, however, through the phased assumption of dual roles by the LIAC staffs. Officially, the LIAC program units – which were comprised primarily of PDSP cadres - undertook the task of sector organizing. They used the social issues confronting these sectors; i.e., demolitions, insecurity of land tenure, unfair labor practices, as entry points for PO formation. As the grassroots sectors became organized, however, these issues were connected to the broader political issue of the Marcos dictatorship. At this point, the LIAC staffs assumed their roles as PDSP cadres. PDSP’s democratic principles were introduced and the PO leaders were recruited into the party. The conscientization process of the POs then took the form of getting them incorporated into the party’s anti-dictatorship networks. Thus, at the height of the anti-Marcos protest movement from 1983-1986, practically all POs and federations organized by the LIAC participated under the network of the PDSP. Although LIAC provided the logistical support to their participation in these
mobilizations, particularly in the *lakbayans* (protest caravans), its role in the mobilizations was underplayed.

While the extension workers were not concerned about security of tenure, the office-based personnel (i.e., the administrative staffs and service workers) who were comprised mostly of urban poor recruited from the POs assisted by the LIAC raised issues regarding their employment status. Having gotten exposed to labor rights and union organizing through the labor seminars being conducted by the institution, they attempted to organize a union themselves within the LIAC. The extension workers supported them not out of concern about security of tenure, but because they wanted more substantive roles in decision-making.

There was clamor for participation in decision-making because only the director knew what was happening. The decision-making process, particularly when it comes to administrative concerns, rest on the Jesuit director.

(Since there was a lay administrative officer), there was a conflict as to which decision-making process would be followed when it comes to personnel administration – the decision of the lay supervisor or that of the Jesuits. The lay people believed that although the concerns of the lay people would be considered, the decision would ultimately rest on the Jesuits. Thus, to protect the lay from the Jesuits, employment contracts were drawn. 10

The attempt at collective action among the staff antagonized the Jesuits. Dependent on Jesuit both for employment (in the case of the office-based staffs) and support for their anti-dictatorship efforts (in the case of the extension workers), the initiative to unionize eventually fizzled out. Since the actual execution of decisions rest on the extension workers, however, they nonetheless managed to find ways to incorporate their political agenda into program implementation. During the height of the anti-Marcos movements
between 1983-1986, for example, the LIAC was heavily subsidizing the logistics for the participation of its partner POs in the nationwide mass mobilizations.

After democracy was restored in 1986, LIAC de-prioritized community organizing in favor of strengthening its partner PO federations so they could participate in the national coalitions advocating for social reforms such as the Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR) for agrarian reform and the Urban Land Reform-Task Force (ULR-TF) for urban housing and development. Through these, LIAC facilitated the participation of its partner POs in the democratic space that the Aquino Administration had opened. Since its program staffs served as conveners or officers of these coalitions, the LIAC provided some form of logistical support to these coalitions such as providing office and meeting space and at times, funding some of their activities.

By this time, the influence of PDSP within LIAC was consolidated as its leaders and cadres were also the heads of the institution’s key program units. With the state becoming relatively open to the participation of the NGOs and the POs in governance and the development process, the rivalries among the ideological groups intensified. PDSP, for one, sought to take advantage of the crisis within the NDF by competing with it for areas of influence and mass base. In connection with this, it influenced the identification of LIAC’s program areas. Deliberately, the LIAC program staffs chose to expand its operations to areas where NDF presence was strong such as Bataan and Nueva Ecija with the intent of organizing POs that would compete with those organized by NDF-affiliated NGOs. Moreover, they set up alternative organizations to compete with the NDF-controlled sectoral alliances and federations. The Students’ Desk, for example, organized students around the University Belt area. It established the Youth for the Advancement of Peace and Justice
(YAPJ) and eventually, the Democratic Socialist Union (DSU) as alternatives to the NDF-influenced League of Filipino Students (LFS). The Labor Desk, on the other hand, joined forced with the other socdem groups to found the LMLC as a counter-organization to the NDF-influenced KMU and the state-leaning TUCP. As discussed in the previous chapter, the competition with the NDF intensified to the point that two of its extension officer was murdered right at its office building while attending a labor conference.

However, while the lay extension workers saw the 1986 People Power Revolution as an opportunity to enhance their political involvement (under the PDSP), some of the Jesuits connected with LIAC began to explore the spiritual significance of the event, using it as a starting point for promoting pastoral work (i.e., the establishment of basic Christian communities) and spiritual formation (e.g., conducting seminars on active non-violence). With the dictatorship gone and democratic institutions restored, the Jesuits believed that the next step was the development and propagation of values needed to preserve the victories won during the 1986 People Power Revolution. As such, some of them became concerned that under the sectoral programs of the LIAC, political agenda was increasingly taking precedence over the “faith-justice” mission. This triggered a debate concerning the interpretation of what LIAC’s mission of “propagating faith that does justice” meant between the lay extension workers on the one hand, and the Jesuits on the other. For the lay extension workers,

Faith that seeks justice... simply meant serving the poor. It meant promoting social change that protect their interests. Of course, the motivations for doing this could only be rooted in one’s belief in Christ since this was what was stated in the Bible.
Among the Jesuits, on the other hand, this implied

Going to the poor to promote new awareness, new thoughts and fresh actions. You go to the poor and you conscientize, evangelize and organize. Basically with conscientization, you have to be aware that there is a situation where you are the other brother. Next, you must be aware that if you go together, you can do something yourselves... Evangelization is that start of conscientization. That is the will of God, the symbol of Jesus. Then we organize ourselves into little communities... where the upper and lower classes are in dialogue. They share goodness and goods. This was what we were trying to do at the LIAC. 13

Towards the 1990s, the differences in the interpretation of the "faith-justice" mission within the context of re-democratization divided the LIAC staff into those who were working on the more secular sectoral organizing programs (i.e., the ideologues who were mostly lay extension workers) and those who were engaged in pastoral and socio-spiritual efforts (i.e., the Jesuits). Among the LIAC workers, the rift was jokingly summed up as the rivalry between the people of "faith" (i.e., the Jesuits) on the second floor and the people of "justice" (i.e., the lay extension workers) on the ground floor of the LIAC office. The Jesuits, on the other hand, interpreted this as the lay extension workers’ assertion that the Jesuits should concentrate on their spiritual and pastoral duties and leave the political empowerment of the people to them. This debate became one of the factors that led to the reorganization of the LIAC into the ISO and the separation of the social from the socio-pastoral apostolate.

Professionals for Social Development

Within the Society of Jesus, meanwhile, concern for dwindling Jesuit manpower prompted the exploration of how to promote effective ways of supervision and coordination among the various Jesuit institutions. At the same time, the education apostolate envisioned the setting up of a "social development center" where systematic,
coordinated and pragmatic interaction among its social development institutions could be facilitated. This dovetailed with the vision of the LIAC director to build a complex where its different program units could be housed. In 1990, the Institute of Social Order complex was built alongside the Social Development Center of the Ateneo. By 1991, the social apostolate transferred to the Ateneo signaling its official separation from the socio-pastoral apostolate. The transfer also facilitated the dissolution of the LIAC and the reconstitution of the social apostolate, which adopted its old name, the Institute of Social Order (ISO). With the dissolution of the LIAC, majority of the contractual staffs were terminated and re-hired as employees of the ISO.

Unlike in the previous ISO and LIAC where Jesuits were involved in the supervision of ISO’s programs, the only Jesuit left at the “new” ISO was the new director who was responsible only for direction-setting and the religious aspects of the work, and overall financial administration. However, he was assigned only on part-time basis to the institution. Day-to-day operations were left to the assistant director who used to be the administrative officer when they were still at the LIAC. At the same time, however, the Jesuits set the course towards the professionalization. Moreover, they made it known that they wanted the ISO to begin distancing itself from ideological politics.

The approach of Father... was very scientific, professional, mature and logical. He promoted a modern attitude within the ISO. Of course, there were good and bad sides to this... But overall, the changes were what I would have done if I would be the manager of the institution.54

Prior to the move to Ateneo, the ISO conducted an Institute-wide visioning and planning exercise to set its course for the future. During the said activity, the ISO affirmed the continuation of its sectoral organizing programs. However, it expanded the
scopes of community organizing from political education, conscientization and mobilization to include poverty alleviation and values formation. The emphasis of the activity, nonetheless, was on the internal aspects of organization building, primarily the institutionalization of standards operating procedures such as the three-year planning cycle and a monitoring and evaluation procedure.

The transfer from a cramped office in a blighted area of Manila to an expansive university campus, made the changes in the ways of proceedings of the institution all the more glaring and adjustments difficult for ISO’s program staffs. In a succeeding workshop that explored the concerns of the staffs about the changes, the difficulty was expressed as the fear of being co-opted by the “first world culture” (i.e., elitism) of the Ateneo community (ISO, 1996: Annex B-5, 6). Initially, the program staffs continued with their previous ways of conducting community organizing along the line of the democratic socialist ideology. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this changed when two of its extension officers were gunned down. Thereafter, the ISO staffs were strongly cautioned by the Jesuits about their political involvements.

In 1992, a full-time Jesuit director with leaning towards social development was appointed to directly manage and supervise the day-to-day operations of the ISO. At the time, many NGOs were already embarking on the professionalization of their organizations to more effectively deal with the state. The new director followed the general trend. Among the first things he did was to establish and organizational structure defining the roles and responsibilities of the different units of the institution. He created new offices administrative offices – the Human Resource Development Office which was responsible for personnel management, staff development and pastoral formation and the
Finance Office that would be responsible for records keeping and financial transactions of the institution. He also created an Institutional Technology Development (ITD) Unit to assume the task of developing program proposals for the institution. Since the ISO Complex also had a dormitory and a conference hall, a Services unit was also created to take charge of these facilities, primarily as a revenue generation center. He then pulled together all the program units into one Programs Division.

Corollary to these, new systems and procedures, particularly in the areas of personnel and financial administration were instituted. Added to this, a monitoring and evaluation system was also installed upon suggestion of ISO’s funding institution, MISEREOR. To implement these, new staffs were recruited, particularly for the administrative units and the ITD unit, using professional standards and criteria. As such, compared to the staffs absorbed from the LIAC who were a mix of college graduates and dropouts and with predominantly social science backgrounds, the new staffs were mostly college graduates in economics, business, and management fields. Most were also non-aligned politically. Two competing cliques emerged as a consequence to these – that of the program field staffs comprised of former extension workers from LIAC who were affiliated with PDSP and the office-based professionals who were newly recruited for the administrative and ITD units. Among these cliques, the program field staffs and the office-based professional staffs were constantly embroiled in conflict with each other. Conspicuously absent in these new groupings were the Jesuits, who at the time were reduced to only the director and the services supervisor.

Basically, the office-based professionals assisted the director in instituting systems and procedures intended to systematize and promote better check and balance in
ISO’s program operations such as planning, monitoring and evaluation system, performance evaluation and a system of fund requests and liquidations. However, these encroached on the flexibility and autonomy of the field-based community organizers.

At the LIAC, they were not required to show documentation of what they were doing on field. Reports were verbal. Moreover, since they were all field based, they were not required to report to office. When they moved to the Ateneo, the issue of monitoring and evaluation cropped up. The programs staff resisted it. On one hand, the professional staffs argued that check and balance was needed to ensure that the ISO programs were actually addressing the needs of its grassroots while at the same time, assuring its future self-sustainability. They were also concerned about the growing reputation of the ISO being merely an organizing arm of the PDSP, which kept the other NGOs aligned to other political parties from collaborating with it. On the part of the staff, on the other hand, the resistance towards professionalization was not simply an issue of loss of flexibility, however. Rather, they believed that the basis by which their professionalism and performance were assessed were not suitable to the type of work that they do. For one, since their main goal was to facilitate the conscientization and empowerment of the grassroots, they could not possibly quantify them into a measurable output. Moreover, when on field, they work until midnight and at times, even on weekends, without over time. They thus felt it justifiable not to report to office regularly. More importantly, they felt that what they lacked in professional credentials were made up for by their years of immersion and familiarity with the communities that they were working with. Fully oriented on the Freire and Alinsky model of community organizing, they believed that these were something that classroom education could not impart. In addition, the new staffs did not share their experience of being jailed, tortured and
harassed by the military, which for them was a sign of a true community organizer and NGO worker.\textsuperscript{17}

The push for instituting systems and procedures that curb the autonomy of field-based program staffs created tensions and conflict between them, on the one hand, and the professional staffs and the director, on the other. The tension was exacerbated by the implications these had on the propaganda work that were being undertaken by the field based program staffs for the PDSP. With the systems of check and balance in place, it became more difficult to incorporate PDSP-related activities into the regular ISO field activities. The terminal evaluation of the Students Desk attested to this as follows:

The duality of roles and functions made it difficult to delineate the activities of the staff as Democratic Socialist Union (DSU – an affiliate of the PDSP) members and implementers of the ISO Students Program. Given this circumstance, sentiments that ISO resources were being exploited to advance the political agenda of the DSU cannot be avoided (ISO, 1995: 198).

In order to enforce the dissociation of the ISO from PDSP, representation was made by the director to the leaders of the PDSP to request the PDSP-affiliated staffs to stop using ISO for the party’s organizing and propaganda work.\textsuperscript{18} Given all these, the assistant director resigned, followed by the heads and staffs of the different program units of the ISO. As a consequence, three units namely, the Students Program, the Advocacy and Electoral Unit and the Development Communication Unit, were left without any staffs and eventually closed. The Labor Program and the Women’s Program were left without a unit head.

Based on HRD report, there were 19 resignations/terminations for the said period. This was equivalent to 76% of the total number of resignations/terminations for program cycle 1992-1994 (ISO, 1995: 9).
The vacuum created by this first wave of staff resignations set back the implementation of ISO’s sectoral programs.

As the ISO recruited new staffs to fill in the vacancies, however, non-aligned professionals, as well as community organizers affiliated with other ideological parties were able to gain entry into the organization. This further caused tensions among the program units. The unit that was most affected was the Labor Program where the staffs were divided between the PDSP-affiliated staffs and the newly recruited staffs. They clashed over the tactics and strategies that would be employed to address the needs of the labor unions they were assisting. On one hand, the PDSP staffs pushed for the maintenance of assistance to the old labor federations they were assisting because these federations were sources of support for the party. On the other hand, the new staffs pushed for assisting new labor unions. The debates escalated into personal conflicts among the team members, which, in turn, turned into rivalries in terms of enlisting the loyalties of ISO’s partner unions. Despite the director’s threat to close the program, the conflicts between the two cliques went unresolved until the two new staffs were terminated in 1996.

The Women Program, while less affected was likewise set back by debates between the PDSP-affiliated staffs pushing for peasant issues to be the main focus of the women organizing efforts and the new staffs arguing that since the peasant women wanted to establish their identity, they should prioritize gender issues first. The issue was resolved with the director’s decision to support the peasant women’s desire to establish a separate PO, the KABABAIHAN.
Meanwhile, opportunities to open a new program cropped up as the Jesuit Province assigned ISO to coordinate the collection and distribution of relief goods to the victims of lahar flows in Zambales and later on, as German Doctors, Inc. agreed to support the Pinatubo Disaster Response Program (PDRP). Designing this program facilitated the conceptualization of the three-pronged social development strategy of the ISO discussed in Chapter 7. At the same time, this was a sole program that was managed by a politically non-aligned professional staff. As such, it was the only program with clear social development orientation. Because of this, the director promoted it as a model program of the institution. This made the staffs of the other sectoral program feel marginalized.

The already existing tension triggered by systematization and professionalization of ISO’s operations was aggravated by the subsequent changes in directors during the period of 1994-1995. When the director completed his term in 1994, another Jesuit who pushed the professionalization process further took his place. He died before he was able to clarify his program strategies with the staff. With his death, a lay director was appointed, starting the period of full secularization of the ISO. The lay director continued the thrust towards the professionalization initiated by her predecessor. Upon advise of the Jesuit Father Provincial, a Board of Trustees was constituted to set the thrust and provide policy directions to the institution. The Board was comprised of three Jesuits and two lay representatives appointed by the Father Provincial, a representative of the ISO rank and file. The director serves as ex-officio member. To determine the status of ISO’s operations, the director instructed the ITD unit to conduct an assessment of all aspects of the institution’s efforts. The evaluation led to a confrontation between the ITD staffs and the program staffs over the criteria and process of the assessment. Following the arguments raised earlier against monitoring and evaluation,
the program staffs contended that their work were process-oriented and should be evaluated as such. In addition, they also contended that when the programs were started, no set criteria for evaluation were agreed upon in the first place. Despite resistance, the assessment was pushed through.

Based on the evaluation, while the federations that ISO supported were relatively strong, most of them no longer have the mass base to back them up. Most of the local PO membership and chapters were either inactive or dead. Neither did ISO’s assistance address the real needs of the community (ISO: 1995, 12-13). More importantly, the evaluation yielded that despite formal agreement with the former director that political/ideological affiliation would not interfere with the ISO’s work, the PDSP-affiliated staffs of the ISO continued to use the ISO programs to pursue their political agenda.

There was resistance from the program implementers to give up federation building/alliance building as an approach… (because) most of the staffs’ exposure to organizing was limited to establishing networks of grassroots organizations to propagate alternative politics and democratic socialist principles (ISO, 1996: 9)

The evaluation exacerbated the conflict between the professional staffs and the PDSP affiliated program staffs, pushing the ISO into a state of organizational crisis.

To address the conflict, a one-month Organizational Development Workshop was held to get the various groups within the institution to clarify confusions and reach compromises on how to work together. During the workshops, the existence of the two competing cliques – the “pro-management” group comprised of office-based staffs that shared similar academic background and work experience as the director and the influential “informal group” comprised primarily of program field staffs – was acknowledged (Emmaus, 1995: 9-10). The latter consisted of former LIAC extension officers, newly
recruited community organizers who were, more or less, similar in ideological and/or political affiliations. They perceived the director and the office-based staffs to be a technocratic, academic, unappreciative of the community organizing process and too intrusive in program implementation. These constrained their personal freedom and space for creativity (ISO, 1996: 1, 4-5). Its members also felt that the “pro-management” group did not understand the “culture of the ISO”.

On the other hand, the “pro-management” group who preferred a more structured and orderly office environment argued that the “informal group” was inconsistent in their demands and insecure about the institutionalization of systems and procedures, particularly, those relating to accountability and authority (Ibid.). They also saw the “ISO culture” referred to by the informal group as a “culture of resistance to change”. Despite their differences in terms of work ethics and styles, however, the two groups agreed on the vision-mission and goals of the institution.

During the seminar, it also became clear that the issue at stake was that of hegemony over the institution. In a meeting wherein the follow-on activities for the workshop were being discussed, the “informal group” asked the director to acknowledge a parallel informal leadership structure within the organization (i.e., that of the PDSP clique). To reduce tension, they proposed that an arrangement be made wherein the informal leaders would be made part of the decision-making process of the institution. The suggestion was turned down, with the director insisting that decision-making would follow the organizational structure agreed upon and approved by the BOT. In the months that followed, the “informal group” attempted to demonstrate their influence by agitating ISO’s partner POs to get involved in the internal conflict of the ISO. POs wrote petition letters and trooped to the ISO
office demanding dialogue with the director and the Board. At one point, an urban poor PO held a picket in front of the ISO demanding for the removal of staffs affiliated with the “pro-management” group and the reinstatement of an ISO staff who resigned from the ISO in light of the conflict between the two factions. In all of these incidences, the PO activities invoked the Board’s sense of “social justice”.

These detracted the ISO from its program goals and objective. To address the situation, the Board’s affirmed the professionalization policies of the ISO. Realizing that they no longer had the hegemony within the institution, a second wave of former LIAC staffs resigned from the institute, further reducing the number of ideologues within the organization. Their resignations, and the entry of more professionals into the Program Division for the period of 1996-1997, allowed the institution to reorient the programs from more politically motivated community organizing efforts to more social development-oriented undertakings. Within this period, the ISO began to engage in micro-enterprise development and environmental management projects, primarily through the initiatives of the newly recruited professional staffs. The institution likewise began to adopt a more solid organizing strategy while it de-emphasized federation building. Nonetheless, it was largely isolated by the other NGOs affiliated with the socdems that labeled it a “corporate” NGO.

The entry of the new staffs likewise led to the shifting of alliances within the institution as some of the remaining ideologues allied themselves with the ITD group. In 1997, disagreements over the participation of the ISO in the mass mobilization against the Charter Change proposed by Pres. Ramos divided the institution once again. The remaining ideologues within the institution saw this as an opportunity to exercise their skills in mass mobilization. They allied themselves with the majority of the ITD group in lobbying for the
full-scale participation of the ISO in the anti-Charter Change movement. On the other hand, the administrative units, as well as some programs staff, thought that the financial requirements such entail would be a drain in the institution’s resources. Conflict arose as the former conducted activities and committed resources without proper consultations with the appropriate units involved. The conflict intensified and spilled over other administrative concerns. In November 1997, they filed charges with the Board against the director for suspending some staffs for disruption of office activities. They claimed that she overextended her authority. In response, a petition to disregard the complaint was filed by a group comprised primarily of the administrative units, some programs and services staffs. In November 1997, they filed charges with the Board against the director for suspending some staffs for disruption of office activities. They claimed that she overextended her authority. In response, a petition to disregard the complaint was filed by a group comprised primarily of the administrative units, some programs and services staffs. The Board decided in favor of the director. By December 1997, the director terminated the contracts of those involved with the incident for loss of confidence.

The termination of these staffs completed the purging of the ideologues from the institution and completed the professionalization of the institution. By 1998, only three community organizers were non-college graduates. The rest were graduates of community development, social works and development management. Majority of them were non-aligned politically. With this, the programs division became, more or less, homogeneous in composition and in orientation. As the internal organizational environment stabilized, ISO shifted its attention towards mainstreaming itself into the development administration process. It proceeded to identify natural resource management and gender and development as its niche in social development. By 1997, the institution synthesized its learning experiences from the implementation of previous projects and designed the Social Transformation and Grassroots Empowerment (STAGE) Program, adopting a sustainable integrated area development, which used natural resource management as entry point for
community organizing. To enhance the staffs’ technical capabilities, the ISO sponsored trainings on coastal and upland resource management for the staffs. By 2000, the ISO program staffs were skilled enough on this area that they were being tapped as resource speakers on the subject. Encouraged by this, the ISO established a training and education unit to further promote the mainstreaming of ISO’s program strategies. With the ideologue image dispelled with the resignations of the PDSP-affiliated staffs, the ISO was able to establish strategic alliances with the environmental NGOs affiliated with the NDF. It was also able to relate with the revolutionary groups in the communities while at the same time maintain good relationship with the local government units.

Conclusion

From the above, three trends were evident. Organizationally, the institution had evolved from being a mere public space for promoting interaction between the businessmen and laborers into a social movement (i.e., the social action crusade) that sought to prevent communism from spreading among the grassroots sectors through the advocacy of social reform. In 1947, it began to assume a formal organizational identity initially as a labor-management school and later on as a grassroots organizer. At the time of Martial Law, it became further institutionalized, in order to provide legal identities to the different expressions of the anti-dictatorship movement. Eventually, it became a legal front for the underground movement. With the re-democratization, the ISO became a full-pledged, legally acknowledged NGO. During its transformation, the ISO likewise evolved from an organization that was fully within the control and heavily subsidized by the Catholic Church to a secular institution that generates its own resources and pursuing mainstream social development functions. During the course of its evolution also, the
ISO began to adopt more bureaucratic characteristics such as a structured organization and set policies and procedures. Corollary to this, its orientation likewise changed from being process-oriented towards being output oriented.

Related to the changing nature of its organizational structure, the composition of the people involved in it likewise changed. During its early years (1930s to 1950s), the forerunners of the ISO were comprised of Jesuits who provided inspiration and guidance to student-based organizations from the Ateneo de Manila. From these student-based organization, it recruited volunteers who took on the actual tasks of public information, training and eventually, organizing the grassroots sectors. These students were mostly sons of the elites. Owing to their class backgrounds, these student-volunteers were primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo.

By the 1960s, the base of ISO’s volunteer core expanded to include other religious institutions and secular colleges in Manila such as the University of the Philippines. This brought in volunteers of more middle class backgrounds into the ISO who were exposed to communist and socialist ideas and were thus more open to social change. Simultaneously also, ISO began exploring other ways of promoting social justice such as direct community organizing which allowed it to interact closely with the grassroots sectors. This, on the other hand, enabled some leaders of the grassroots sectors to join the middle class social activists as volunteers working for social change.

When Martial Law was declared, these groups were repressed by the state. To protect the volunteer workers, the ISO, which at this point had been reconstituted as the LIAC, created sectoral programs and absorbed them as extension workers. Since they no longer had the ability to generate their own funds, LIAC undertook the role of generating
funds for them, thereby beginning its role as intermediary organization. Under the
protection of the LIAC, the social activists were able to continue their anti-dictatorship
efforts. Eventually, however, extension workers belonging to one ideological group, the
PDSP, was able to establish itself within LIAC. Taking advantage of the openness of the
Jesuit leadership to its anti-Marcos efforts and the lack of a formally stated strategy to
unify the programs of the LIAC, the PDSP was able to make the democratic socialist
principle the unifying thread that integrated the LIAC programs together. In so doing, the
LIAC extension workers were able to mobilize the grassroots and integrate them into the
anti-dictatorship networks of the PDSP. This continued until the Marcos dictatorship was
topped and even until the early years of the re-democratization era.

The entry of the lay extension workers into the LIAC, however, diversified the
groups within the institutions. On one hand, there were the Jesuits who were concerned
with the promotion of Catholic social teachings and on the other hand, there were social
activists who were concerned with promoting societal change. During the Martial Law
era, the differences between them were not so pronounced. With the common enemy –
the Marcos dictatorship – gone, however, the differences in terms of objectives surfaced,
dividing the institution into the “faith” group and the “justice” group pushing for different
sets of agenda. The division facilitated the separation of the social apostolate and the
socio-pastoral apostolate of the Jesuits. The separation led to the dissolution of the LIAC
and the reconstitution of the social apostolate into the ISO, which was transferred to the
Ateneo de Manila campus in Quezon City.

The transfer, nonetheless, signaled the transformation of the ISO into a
professional social development institution. With the reorganization of the ISO, the new
Jesuit leadership pushed for the professionalization and systematization of ISO's operation. This led to the conversion of the contractual extension workers into permanent staffs. Thereafter, professionals were recruited into the organizations to facilitate the changes in operations and to promote a more developmental approach to program implementation. Lastly, the process of distancing from partisan politics was initiated by making the distinction between political propaganda work and ISO's community organizing efforts.

These developments resulted to the conversion of the ISO into an arena of conflict between the ideologues who comprised of the old program staffs from the LIAC and the newly recruited politically non-aligned professionals. On one hand, the former were asserting the maintenance of the previous arrangement wherein the programs were given the flexibility and autonomy in field operations. On the other hand, the latter were asserting that systems of check and balance must be institutionalized for more effective operations. The struggle between the two groups intensified further when the Jesuits deferred the leadership of the ISO to a lay director who pushed the professionalization of the organization further. The factions were transformed into the “pro-management” group comprised of the administrative and the ITD staffs and an informal group comprised of ISO's program field staffs struggling for the control of ISO's decision-making process. The conflict led to organizational crisis within the ISO, which held program implementation in abeyance. To assert their influence on ISO's operations, the program field staffs used their influence among the ISO's partner POs to pressure the ISO's leadership to reckon with them by invoking ISO's social justice mission. The “pro-management” group, on the other hand, found its allies with its Board. With BOT’s
affirmation of the support of the professionalization thrust, however, the efforts of the program field staffs to reclaim their influence over the organization failed. As the last of the ideologues resigned, the process of professionalization of the institution was completed. With this, the ISO fully reoriented its efforts towards a politically non-aligned process of social development. As a non-aligned social development institution, it was able to position itself better as a development intermediary that could work with groups aligned with other ideological parties as well as with the local government units.

Lastly, within the course of the organizational transformation of the ISO, it was also clear that its emphasis had changed from moral reform, to socio-political reform, to economic empowerment and of late, holistic development. These changes corresponded to the shifts in the groups of people that were involved in the implementation of its programs. During the earlier times when the Jesuits were the dominant influencing groups within the organizations, the emphasis was on promoting change of heart among the elites to become more concerned with their tenants and workers. At the time when the institution allowed the middle class social activists access to the organization, the focus of its programs shifted towards the social and political empowerment of the grassroots sector. With entry of professional development workers into the institution during the re-democratization period, the focus of the institution shifted towards social development.
ENDNOTES

1. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with Mr. Vicente Jayme, former president of the Social Order Club and the union organizer.

2. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with Mr. Jeremias Montemayor, founder and president of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF).

3. Unfortunately, it was difficult to get the actual numbers of Jesuit and non-Jesuit staffs of the LIAC due to two reasons. First, because of threats of arrests and harassments, the institution deliberately did not record the names of the people who work there. Secondly, most of the records that existed were destroyed when the LIAC Office burned in 1991. Thus, this researcher had to rely on personal accounts of LIAC staffs interviewed for this study. Their accounts, on the other hand, were inconsistent. They tended to confuse the LIAC staffs with those of the other offices housed in the same building. This, in turn, was due to the close integration of the LIAC activities with these offices.

4. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a former LIAC-FSB staff.

5. Ibid.

6. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a former LIAC – WAO staff.

7. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a former LIAC – FSB staff.

8. Ibid.

9. The concept of authentic humanism presupposed that people are created in the image and likeness of God. As such, people’s well being - not profit or power - must be the main goal of any social change. Structures and processes that promote otherwise were considered unjust and must be transformed.

10. Interview with a former director and some LIAC staffs. Decision regarding this was documented in a minutes of meeting concerning the issue.

11. Interview with a former director of the ISO.

12. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a former LIAC – FSB staff.

13. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with a Jesuit assigned at the pastoral desk of LIAC.

14. Krononalyst, Inc. interview with the former assistant director of ISO.

15. This was confirmed by this researcher’s meeting with the MISEREOR representative in her capacity as ISO staff in 1994. According to the MISEREOR representative they did encouraged the ISO to adopt some form of monitoring and evaluation system to determine the impact of its programs.

16. Interview with a former ISO director.

17. Focus group discussions with ISO community organizers who used to be extension workers at the LIAC.
18. Interview with a former ISO director.

19. As pointed out earlier, one of the reasons why middle class professionals joined NGOs was because they offered flexibility and autonomy in work habits. The imposition of systems and procedures constrain such freedoms.

20. The complaint was embodied in a confidential letter to the Board of Trustees petitioning the censure, if not the termination of the director.

21. Documents regarding the incidents behind this were are kept at the ISO HRD Office.
CHAPTER 9 – THE ISO-PO PARTNERSHIP: A CASE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
MAKING CIVIL SOCIETY

In Chapter 7, the external factors that facilitated the organizational transformation of an NGO – the ISO – over the years had been explored. Chapter 8, on the other hand, noted the changes in the composition of the people involved in the institution, as well as the internal dynamics that were happening as the ISO was undergoing changes. But how did these affected the partnership between an individual NGO and the grassroots-based people’s organizations (POs)? How did these impacted on the process of empowerment of the grassroots sector? How did the NGOs’ mediating roles affect the participation of the grassroots sector in government’s policy-making and development program implementation? This chapter aimed to explore the following questions by examining the changes in the nature and dynamics of relationship of the ISO with the POs that it had organized over the years.

The Grassroots Sectors as Passive Acceptors of Ideas

As noted in the last two chapters, the forerunners of the ISO were primarily concerned with preventing the spread of communism among the grassroots than they were with promoting the welfare of the latter. As discussed in earlier chapters, the Jesuits founded the La Ignaciana Retreat House and consequently, formed the Ateneo social action guilds (i.e., the Bellarmine and Chesterton Evidence Guilds) to promote greater awareness among the elites about the plight of the peasants and the workers in the hope that they would feel more compassionate and treat them better. However, the efforts of these forerunners of the ISO to reach out to these poor sectors were limited to the conduct
of public lectures on Catholic social teachings during which, they allowed the people to discuss their living condition and express their sentiments. Out of these discussions, the members of these social action guilds formed their strategies on how the conditions of the poor could be alleviated, which they disseminated to the public through the radio and publications. For example, a dialogue in a radio drama *Brothers in Blood*, aired by the Chesterton Evidence Guild outlined their peasant proprietorship plan as follows:

*Cortes: All right, Antonio, let's sum up the whole plan. We (hacenderos) help the tenants to acquire the land, purchase seed and fertilizer for them. They pay on the installment plan, payments being made whenever the harvest is gathered. These installment payments should enable them to pay a fair price for the land, plus the interest, plus the cost of seed and fertilizer. Then these same people are obliged to raise some subsidiary crop and to keep pigs or poultry or something in that line. In addition, we are to give them a chance to work on other land at a fixed price in order that in this way, they may have enough money with which to purchase what they need.*

*Antonio: That's the idea.*

*Santos: Then we shall endeavor to persuade the government to pass laws which will ensure the payment of their installment, which will provide special punishment for agitators inciting, urging or advising people to violate their contracts for the land, and finally, which will make it impossible for those who are creditors from taking more than half of the money that a debtor earns in a year outside of his payment on his land.*


Using the same media, the social justice crusaders likewise expressed their anti-communist sentiments as follows:
Roa: Excuse me, Antonio, just how does the plan of Abad Santos (Pedro Abad Santos, one of the founders of the PKP) differ so radically from your own?

Antonio: In about everything of real importance? What does he want? Power. For whom? For whom? For his union and for himself. Does he want the people to get anything?

Roa: Well, he wants them to get the land, doesn’t he?

Antonio: Of course not. That’s the last thing he wants! He wants the people to get deeper into the control of the Socialist Party. He wants them to be sunk once and for all in a system of political slavery. He wants people to get nothing. And the Socialist unions to get everything... What a perfect introduction to the Socialistic or Communist State...

Antonio: The Socialists and Communists are not working for an idea; they are working for an idea; they are not working for the Filipino people; they are working for the masters of Moscow, the leaders of Communism; they are not working for peace; they are working for revolution. They will talk of helping the people, but they will act for themselves, their own interest, their own power.


Despite their access to mass media, however, they were unable to gain followers from the grassroots sectors because they failed to translate their ideas into concrete social reform program. For one, they were unable to convince the landowners to go along with them. Secondly, in sharp contrast with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) that was formed by peasant and labor union leaders themselves and had very close affiliation with the grassroots sectors, the interaction of the social justice crusaders with the grassroots sectors were limited to public forums where they listened to the grassroots talk about their difficulties. Despite their good intentions, they considered the grassroots sectors as passive actors whose role were merely to accept their ideas and their altruism. In fact, they even believed that the peasants were actually lazy and irresponsible. This was
evident in their emphasis on the education of the grassroots, particularly the peasants, especially those who had developed the habits of gambling, indolence and squandering, on the responsibilities of ownership prior to being considered beneficiaries of social reform (Ibid., 26). Given these, there was no partnership forged between the social justice crusaders and the grassroots sectors. The peasants and the laborers opted instead to maintain links with the PKP.

Despite this, the public information campaign initiated by the social justice crusaders provided Quezon’s commonwealth government with an alternative way of dealing with the peasant unrest aside from a military solution. Quezon’s Social Justice program was actually premised on the idea of peasant proprietorship advanced by the social action guilds involved in the social justice crusade.

*Relationship between the Leaders and the Led*

ISO was formed in 1947 under the premise of reviving the anti-communist movement started in the 1930s. Unlike its predecessors, the founders of the ISO – Fr. Hogan and Mr. Tan – duly acknowledged that the peasant and the labor sectors were already organized into relatively strong communist-influenced trade unions. For such reason, their efforts were primarily focused on promoting alternative ideas (i.e., the labor-management dialogues and arbitration process) and creating alternative organizations that could compete with the communist influenced trade unions. Initially, the ISO focused on the labor sector. The founders of the ISO went beyond public forums and dialogues with the workers. Together with the student volunteers from the Ateneo, they immersed themselves among the workers. They hanged out with them, befriended them, and at times, worked with them. They attempted to promote a version of trade unionism through
trainings and the mass media (e.g., radio program, publications, talks and public lectures). However, these proved ineffective in drawing the labor leaders. This compelled them to set up alternative unions and eventually, the FFW. The process by which the trade unions were organized, nonetheless, still reflected the prevailing perception of the ISO volunteers that there were no qualified leaders among the workers, or at least, they were not capable enough to deal with the Department of Labor and the other established unions. They were concerned that those who emerged as leaders were engaging in racketeering and exploiting their co-workers. More importantly, they knew that the government equated trade unions whose leaders came from the ranks of the grassroots with the communist party. As such, the ISO volunteers initially assumed leadership positions in the unions. In the case of the *arrastres* and *stevedores* at the Manila South Harbor, for example,

The students were... doing union organizing... The unions that eventually came into the waterfront, the initial members were also students, members also of the club (i.e., the Ateneo Social Order Club) because, at the time, ... the Secretary of Labor... had favored the *Union Obreros de Stevedores Filipinas* (UOEF) which was the union at that time in the waterfront... Therefore any attempt to dislodge the union would be opposed... So, it was important that when we register the union, none of the names would be recognized. Otherwise... they would probably hold it or delay the registration.²

They (i.e., the Social Order Club) set up a union (the Associated Workers’ Union) and registered it. Actually, the Ateneo Board registered it because Jose Figueras (the Secretary of the Department of Labor)... would not register a *bona fide* labor union. The Ateneo Board said they are doing it as a school exercise. Figueras laughed and signed the papers. (Later on)... Roberto Oca (who became the president of AWU) and his *arrastre* people joined the union.³

However, conflicts ensued between the real labor leaders, and the ISO staffs and the FFW volunteers over the management of the union. The ISO/FFW volunteer group opposed the manner by which Oca engaged in the same *cabo* system that led them to established
AWU in the first place (see discussion about the cabo system in Chapter 7). Thus, they run against him in the election. Since Oca was more familiar with the laborers, he won the election. His group eventually seceded from the FFW.

Oca wanted to follow the old practices. We were for reform. And of course, it's a very tempting thing. There's a lot of money involved there... Oca also wanted reforms, I guess, but only up to a certain level. But... there were some basic differences between his policies and the policies of FFW. When we had an election for the presidency of the AWU, I was asked to run against Oca. Nothing happened. For one thing, I did not know how to speak Tagalog. Secondly, Oca was closer to the people because he was the one who faced them. I knew all the leaders because I helped to hire them... but in the end, I lost the election. 4

Similar pattern was also evident in the organization of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). Montemayor felt that the peasants needed an alternative to the communist-influenced leaders so he took on the task it upon himself to lead them.

(After the defeat of the HMB in 1952), a leadership vacuum had been created among the peasantry. Someone had to fill in the vacuum. Our farmers could not do it themselves. They were still desperately poor. Most of them had no education whatsoever. On top of that they were utterly confused and disillusioned. Realizing this, we organized the FFF to fill the leadership vacuum. No one else was doing it except the communists, and if we failed to fill in the vacuum, the communists would lead again. So we beat them to it, we appointed ourselves (Montemayor as quoted by Po, 1977: 62).

FFF’s leaders were comprised primarily of lawyers from landlord families who, at times, become impatient with the “slowness and backwardness of the peasants” (Ibid.). This causes tensions between the leaders and the peasant-members. Despite this, Montemayor was able to command the respect and loyalty of the peasants because of his populist leadership (Ibid.), at least until the 1960s when FFF’s rank and files were radicalized through the influence of the church-based volunteers (Franco: 19).

Both the FFW and the FFF were able to promote the interests of the laborers and the peasants in the area of legislative reforms. However, like their predecessors they
presumed that these grassroots sectors were incapable of pursuing collective action effectively because they lacked the proper values orientation and education. As such, the ISO staffs and volunteers assumed the leadership of these trade federations while they educated the grassroots on trade unionism and inculcated among them the Catholic social teachings. As leaders, they assumed the representation of the interests of these sectors with the government and the elites. They also adopted top-down styles of management wherein decision-making was centralized on the leadership. The relationship between the ISO and the trade federations, therefore, could still be considered a patron-client relationship wherein ISO-inspired volunteers, who were mostly comprised of the sons of the Filipino elites, assumed the role of self-appointed leaders. The laborers and peasants allowed themselves to be led but unwillingly, as demonstrated by the tensions and conflicts that arose between them and their leaders.

**Organizing Communities for Power**

After being censured by the Catholic Church, the succeeding efforts of the ISO became more community-based. Moreover, its programs – particularly those focused on the urban poor – became more beneficiary-driven. For example, the idea of setting up of a community-based credit cooperative union in San Dionisio, Paranaque did not come from the ISO. It was the idea of a community-based group of civic-minded individuals, the Rover Scouts, who were looking for a program that would go beyond the usual community beautification campaigns and would alleviate poverty. Having heard the idea of credit cooperativism, they felt it was something that could adopt to address the prevalent need for capital with low interest rate by the poor in their community. So they requested the ISO, through Fr. Hogan, to assist them set up the cooperative. Initially, the
government discouraged them because a community-based credit union was unheard of at the time.

Credit unions before were under the company labor unions. But no credit union had been set up in the community ever. The government does not encourage it. They want them within the institutions because they would be easy to monitor and control. To be allowed to continue with their efforts, they (i.e., the leaders of SDCCU and the ISO staffs) made an agreement with the cooperative bureau that if the latter permit them to pursue organizing the credit union, the ISO would continue to conduct seminars for the community members. If San Dionisio would be successful as a community-based credit union, they would assist the government in propagating the idea. That was what actually challenged the people from San Dionisio and Fr. Ducheneau (ISO). The Rover Scouts wanted to prove that it could be done in a community provided that the community is organized. 5

As the SDCCU proved that it could make a community-based credit union work, the ISO used it as a model for its trainings on credit cooperativism. Because of these trainings, the Catholic Church tapped the ISO to train the social action directors and staffs of the dioceses throughout the country in Catholic social teachings and credit cooperativism. The ISO, in turn, involved the SDCCU leaders in these undertakings as trainers. The arrangement between the ISO and SDCCU became mutually beneficial for both organizations.

Although the context was different, similar patterns could be discerned in the case of the Tondo urban poor. As discussed in Chapters 7, there was already an existing urban poor organization in Zone One, Tondo (i.e., the CTFCO) that was lobbying against forcible eviction of squatters residing in the area. Fr. Dennis Murphy, SJ of the ISO only became interested in strengthening the organization because of its repeated failure due to weak leadership. In coordination with the protestant pastors based in the area, he facilitated the training of the urban poor on the tactics of negotiations with the government using the Alinsky model of conflict confrontation. The training, which was
organized by ISO's urban poor desk, were attended jointly by religious and middle class students from various colleges and universities from Manila who volunteered to become community organizers and 64 urban poor leaders of 20 urban poor association from Tondo, Manila. Out of such efforts emerged two organizations, the Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) composed of the urban poor and the Philippine Ecumenical Committee for Community Organization (PECCO) comprised of the middle class volunteers who were trained to become professional community organizers.

The joint training itself defined the relationship between the urban poor and the community organizers as that of equal learners and partners negotiating for a share of power with the state. This was because the principles of the Alinsky model emphasized on the centrality of the people's role in decision-making, particularly in aspects that concern their lives.

1. People generally act on the basis of self-interest;
2. People move from simple, concrete short-term and personal issues to more complex, abstract, long-term and systematic issues over time;
3. The Establishment reacts in ways that give people the opportunity to become angry and militant;
4. Tactics against the powerful should be within the experience of the powerless and outside the experience of the powerful; and,
5. Through the organizing process, people make their own decisions (Hollnsteiner as quoted by Carroll SJ, 1998: 117).

It was in the spirit of these principles that the ZOTO asked the PECCO to assist them in their struggle for security of land tenure, access to housing and basic services.

Unlike their predecessors, the middle class volunteers who worked with PECCO acknowledged the knowledge acquired by the urban poor from experience; their abilities to self-organize, identify their needs, and work for their own interests. They left the decision-
making process to the grassroots organizations and merely acted as facilitators in the
process of consensus building. They also extended assistance only in so far as the ZOTO
requested them to do so. They also allowed them to negotiate and represent themselves with
government. In other words, they merely facilitated ZOTO’s organization and
empowerment. As one of the Board member of PECCO recounted:

I got to know many of the people in the Tondo Foreshore who were in the squatters’
part of the community. I wrote about their organization... At one point, however, the
leaders... came to me saying, “you know, you are always writing about us... and we
appreciate your articles, but why don’t you work more closely with us (instead) as
our resource person for our initiatives”?... My interpretation... was that they were
saying, while we appreciate your orientation (as a professional researcher), not only
do we want you to put that more directly in our service, we want you to allow us to
represent ourselves to the authorities...

Since then, I would... bring my students to Tondo... not just for exposure... They
(i.e., the students) go only if they have something to offer.... At that time... they
(i.e., the ZOTO people) discovered that they didn’t know what their resources was...
They didn’t have the basic information to carry through the mobilization that they
won. So I got the students to go there to design questionnaires. They got some of the
young people (high school graduates) to take the students around... It was very
unorthodox... The people know (what they want). (All they need is for us to) help
them organize themselves.6

The equal status given to them by the volunteers made the ZOTO leaders became more
confident in exploring creative ways to advance their cause.

Like the SDCCU, the experiences of PECCO and ZOTO indicated a shift in the
relationship between the ISO and its affiliate organizations, and the POs represented by
ZOTO. In contrast with the case of FFW and FFF wherein the ISO-affiliated volunteers
appointed themselves as leaders of the grassroots, ISO facilitated the setting up of as a
separate entity that worked side by side with the organized grassroots. The relationship
between the PECCO and the ZOTO took the form of an equal partnership between two
independent organizations. This, in turn, allowed specialization in terms of tasks between
them. On one hand, the ZOTO independently mapped out their activities and decided on matters that concerned them. PECCO merely backstopped their efforts by assisting them in community organizing, training and research. On the other hand, PECCO was able to pilot-test models of community organizing, training and participatory research techniques and trained the middle class social activists on community organizing. These PECCO trained community organizers later became the pool of professional NGO community organizers. Like the case of SDCCU, therefore, both were able to benefit mutually from the partnership. Furthermore, unlike in earlier times when the elite volunteers viewed the grassroots sectors as indolent and incapable of acting on their own without their guidance and leadership, the PECCO volunteers respected the knowledge acquired by grassroots through experience and acknowledged their abilities to undertake collective actions, with appropriate guidance and assistance.

Martial Law changed these, however, as members of the ideological revolutionary movements took refuge in PECCO. Driven by the goal of overthrowing the Marcos dictatorship, the more radical of the volunteers pushed for more centralized decision-making in lieu of the more consensus building process of decision-making. When PECCO succumbed to the internal conflict that this generated among its volunteers, ZOTO was drawn into the NDF. As a front organization, they were compelled to subsume their lobbying efforts for land security and access to basic services to the broader effort of promoting a people’s war. Moreover, they were compelled to submit to centralized decision-making at the expense of their participatory decision-making process. This began the process of ZOTO’s decline.
Engagement in mobilizations and political campaigns were the main preoccupation of the organization even as it dwindled in depth, breadth, and relevance to the basic interests and welfare of its constituents... making them feel bystanders to ZOTO's political inanities. The ideological position and national issues of ZOTO had started to adopt were unclear to many of its members. Capability building and creative methods of organizing were relegated to the backseat as it received direction from outside the organization (Mendoza, 1995: 15).

**Building Sectoral Federations as Mass Bases for the Anti-Dictatorship Movements**

The declaration of Martial Law caused set backs in community organizing as mass assemblies were closely monitored and suppressed. Fortunately, the ISO was one of the few church-based institutions that were allowed to continue its training and education activities. Initially, the ISO concentrated on the training of social action centers on Catholic social teachings and cooperative development. However, as the Jesuits worldwide adopted a more explicit thrust to promote a Catholic faith that promotes justice, preaching without concrete action did not seem to be enough, particularly within the context of a repressive regime. Thus, to accommodate different initiatives to concretize the Catholic social teachings on social justice, the ISO was reconstituted into the La Ignaciana Apostolic Center (LIAC). LIAC provided a haven for Martial Law oppositionists whom it absorbed as extension workers for purposes of legitimizing their anti-dictatorship activities. It served as an umbrella organization wherein anti-dictatorship efforts were subsumed as the institution’s programs. Because of the composition of its extension workers, the LIAC consequently became involved in the anti-dictatorship activities of an ideological party, the PDSP. It was in the context of building mass base for the PDSP that the LIAC undertook its community organizing efforts at the grassroots level.

Given the context, LIAC’s community organizing programs were very different from the earlier initiatives of the ISO. For one, LIAC directly took on the responsibility for
community organizing itself instead of tapping volunteer organizations to do this task. Unlike in the case of ZOTO where an organized people’s organization (PO) was already existent, the LIAC staffs had to facilitate the formation of the POs themselves. This gave them the flexibility to explore various strategies for community organizing. The Farmers Service Bureau (FSB), for example, initially organized the farmers of Southern Tagalog into basic Christian communities (BCCs). When the strategy failed, they focused their efforts on particular sector (i.e., the sugar workers), concentrated on a limited area (Batangas) and shifted into issue-based organizing (Aldaba, 1993: 39). Secondly, in view of the broader political goal of building mass-based for the anti-dictatorship movement, LIAC’s community organizing went beyond merely organizing POs into building sectoral federations whose objectives extended beyond the immediate alleviation of poverty of the grassroots sectors and included structural changes. In the case of FSB, for example, it promoted the establishment of the KASAMA, a federation of sugar cane workers of Batangas, whose major goals included: the rationalization of agrarian relations in the area towards the formulation and implementation of a genuine agrarian reform program; conversion of share tenancy system to leasehold and reduction in land rental; and broadening and strengthening the union through organizing and training of members and leaders (Ibid., 40). Corollary to this, LIAC’s community organizing efforts were designed to complement PDSP’s anti-dictatorship movement by providing the mass base for the latter. Thus, underlying the community organizing efforts undertaken by the LIAC staffs was the integration of the federation into the network of the PDSP.

In keeping with the tenets of the Alinsky model of community organizing, however, LIAC’s extension workers recognized the autonomy of the POs as grassroots organizations
and the rights of the grassroots to elect leaders from among their ranks. Instead of usurping leadership, therefore, they opted to influence the federation by volunteering to administer the federation for the peasants. The FSB spinned off from the LIAC and integrated itself into the KASAMA as its secretariat (Ibid.). It prepared program proposals for the federation and made an arrangement with the LIAC management to support the organization until it was able to generate its own funds. LIAC maintained influence over the federation because it served not only as its source of logistical support, but also as its guarantor to the funding institution, MISEREOR, and to the government.

By 1984, we had set up the core organization (of KASAMA) with 28 committed members. We held a Congress and registered the federation. At about the same time, LIAC was also redefining its structures and strategies. So, we at the Farmers Service Bureau, there were four of us, we volunteered to serve as secretariat of KASAMA. Part of our agreement with LIAC was that it would support us (i.e., KASAMA and the secretariat) until 1985. After that, we made a proposal for a federation that would be endorsed by Fr. Mayo (to MISEREOR for support).

At that time, KASAMA was already doing independent efforts even though its secretariat was still being supported by the LIAC. In 1986, our proposal was approved making it easier for us to organize. That was when we fully separated organizationally from the LIAC and changed our relationship with it into a partnership.7

However, since the LIAC leadership was not that keen on field operations, it was PDSP that exerted influence over the federation and harnessed its support to the anti-dictatorship movement.

The Workers’ Assistance Office (WAO) adopted similar strategy with regards to the labor unions. WAO likewise integrated itself the Union of Filipino Workers (UFW) as the latter’s secretariat. The only difference was that WAO’s organizing efforts were limited to the level of area labor alliances since the labor unions were already organized. The UFW itself assumed the tasks of union organizing. However, since it was being supported by the
LIAC, the LIAC extension workers were able to influence the UFW to adopt the democratic socialist ideals and to join the mass base of its anti-dictatorship movement.

In contrast with ISO’s relationship with FFW and FFF, therefore, LIAC’s involvement with KASAMA and UFW could be characterized as that of an administrative partnership wherein the POs maintained their organizational autonomy while the LIAC staffs orchestrate their activities by acting as their PO administrators. Under such arrangement, LIAC (and PDSP) was able to exert influence over the POs with the least tension. The POs maintained “ownership” of their organization and as such felt empowered, but at the same time, the LIAC extension workers were able to mobilize the POs as mass bases for PDSP’s anti-dictatorship efforts. This, in turn, allowed the latter to position itself at the core of the anti-dictatorship movement during the 1986 People Power Revolution.

“Contractualizing” NGO-PO Partnership for Social Development

In view of its affiliation with the PDSP, LIAC’s relationship with the POs during the early years of re-democratization was primarily defined by ideological politics. From 1986 to 1992, the focus of LIAC’s (and later on, ISO’s) community organizing efforts was on building PO federations to support the broader multi-sectoral lobbying initiatives for agrarian reform (LMP), and urban land reform and housing (ULR-TF) and fishery development (BBMB). In 1992, it shifted towards mobilizing support for the presidential candidate of Fidel Ramos and towards endorsing local candidates at the municipal level. To facilitate federation building, the ISO adopted a strategy of “sweep organizing” wherein core individuals with leadership potentials were identified to form and lead federations and alliances. These federations were charged with recruiting POs and ensuring that resources were pooled together for the common good (Lim, 1995: 11). It was presumed that through
this, the federation could facilitate the building of consensus of interests among the grassroots and bring them to the level of national coalitions for lobbying. Indeed, the evaluation of ISO programs conducted in 1995 yielded that

Such strategy proved most effective, specifically in pushing for sectoral issues and initiatives... The strategy was also able to produce effective leaders at the federation level who can articulate the interest of their respective sector (ISO, 1995: 12).

For example, ISO’s partner urban poor federations, the *UMASAPA* of Pasay, Metro Manila actively took part in the lobbying and advocacy for security of tenure and housing for the urban poor. It was one of the founding members of the Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULR-TF), which was at the forefront of the lobbying efforts that led to the passage of the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992. At the municipal level, local politicians sought the endorsement of ISO’s partner federations. The federations maximized this opportunity by getting the candidates to sign covenants that they would address poverty and social reform issues when they get elected.

Unfortunately, the same evaluation that pointed out the strength of the ISO partner federations indicated that their member POs at the community level had become either inactive or no longer existent. The membership fallout rates of the federations were also relatively high (see Table 9.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Total PO Membership</th>
<th>Active Local Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women - <em>KABABAIHAN</em> (Batangas)</td>
<td>16 (199 members)</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor - <em>ALAMAT</em> (Tanay)</td>
<td>7 (490 members)</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Poor - <em>KAPISANAN</em> (Antipolo)</td>
<td>2 (71 members)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <em>UMASAPA</em> (Pasay)</td>
<td>18 (760 members)</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherfolks - <em>BBMB</em> (Bataan)</td>
<td>15 (228 members)</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was found out that since the federation officers were preoccupied with national and local advocacy efforts, they neglected the needs of their PO members for services and capability building. As a result, collection of membership dues from the PO members and participation in federation activities among PO members were relatively low. Thus, the more active the federations were in multi-sectoral coalitions and with PDSP’s political activities, the more they relied on the ISO for administrative and logistical support. In addition to this, the focus of trainings and exposure to multi-sectoral activities led to a gap in terms of capabilities between the federation leaders and the PO members. This, in turn, resulted to inequality in terms of opportunities for the organized poor.

Recognizing these, the ISO management revised its community organizing strategy in 1993 into that of solid organizing that focused on social development (Lim: 11). Under this strategy, access to trainings and capability building were brought down to the PO level. Recognizing that the PO members were constrained from participating in organized efforts due to economic constraints, the ISO incorporated livelihood development as part of its grassroots assistance. As discussed earlier, ISO’s programs for the lahar victims in Zambales and the setting up of multi-purpose cooperatives affiliated to the labor federations NLLA and ALAMAT were part of this thrust. Through this, the ISO attempted to broaden the partnership not only to the federations, but also to the local POs. Moreover, it expanded the coverage of ISO’s organizing assistance to include not only political advocacy but also other aspects of social development such as economic empowerment, gender equality and sustainable development.
Corollary to this, ISO likewise defined its role as that of a mediating structure whose function is simply to promote the atmosphere and open opportunities for the grassroots and the POs to effect changes in their social environment (Orara SJ, 1993: 6). ISO’s role was limited to that of being “provider” of methodologies, technologies, education and philosophies to the grassroots communities (Lim: 10). The POs were considered as its clients.

Under this arrangement, it was presumed that the POs, as the organized representatives of the grassroots sectors, have set goals and have identified the knowledge, skills and values they needed to acquire to achieve them. It was under this context that they enter into partnership with the ISO to facilitate their organizational development and to assist them in developing their abilities to pursue their interests as sectors. The terms of this partnership were mutually determined and set forth in a multi-year plan agreed upon by the ISO and the POs.

Since ISO was supposed to be merely an intermediary organization, its grassroots sectors was limited to only three years, which corresponded to the duration of its program grants from MISEREOR. Within this time period, the POs were supposed to achieve viability and self-reliance as organizations. This arrangement necessitated that the ISO develop a framework of organizational development by which to assess the growth and development of the POs and to monitor and evaluate ISO’s effectiveness on assisting the grassroots. It also required the ISO staffs to have the appropriate knowledge and skills to impart to the POs. As such, it had to recruit professional staffs and at the same time “retool” (i.e., train) its existing staffs on organizational development, program management and administration, and other technical skills. This type of program relationship dovetailed with
professionalization and systematization of operations that the ISO was pursuing during this period. As discussed in Chapter 8, however, these led to tensions between the newly recruited professional staffs and the former extension officers of the LIAC who were not used to structured ways of doing fieldwork, which reverberated at the grassroots level as the ISO staffs rallied the POs to their side in attempting to pressure the ISO leadership to revert back to the old practices of the LIAC.

The arrangement likewise required a phase out scheme wherein the ISO gradually withdraw its assistance from the POs and allowed the POs to increasingly assume responsibilities for their efforts. This, on the other hand, necessitated the establishment of working relationships with the local government units and other local institutions that could provide the technical assistance and funding support in lieu of the ISO.

In the case of the peasant women of Batangas, for example, the ISO made an agreement with the women members of KASAMA to assist them organize the Nagkakaisang Kababaihan ng Batangas (KABABAIHAN) as a federation. Part of the agreement was for the ISO to train the federation leaders as community organizers so they could assume responsibilities for setting up their local chapters in the communities. The ISO Women Program supervised the federation on this undertaking. In addition to this, the ISO trained the federation leaders on how to conduct gender sensitivity sessions, paralegal skills on how to deal with violence against women (VAW) and technical skills such as program development, bookkeeping, etc. ISO also supervised the KABABAIHAN as they echoed these trainings to their local chapters. In addition to these, the ISO also assisted the federation and its chapters to set up projects that were addressed not only to provide the women alternative sources of income, but also to reduce their multiple burdens. ISO
provided loans to the *KABABAIHAN* to set up a community laundry program\(^8\), a community-based day-care center and cooperative stores. To prepare them for its eventual phase out, ISO also facilitated the establishment of links between the *KABABAIHAN* federation and its local chapters, the local government units and local feminist organizations.

For example,

> The setting up of a community day care center was a very complicated process. But since it was important for the women, they were able to secure support and funds for it. First, they solicited support from the community and the municipality of Calaca... The office of the mayor provided tables and desks for the center. Through the assistance of ISO, three teachings were trained on how to manage the day-care center... For now, the *KABABAIHAN* chapter and the ISO are working on the accreditation of the center with DSWD. If this is approved, the DSWD would pay for the salaries of the day-care teachers (ISO, 1997: 6).

Through this, the *KABABAIHAN* became acknowledged as a critical stakeholder in the municipal decision-making process in the town of Tuy, Balayan and Calaca. In process, it was able to push for the setting up of municipal women crisis centers in these towns. To support the *KABABAIHAN* livelihood projects, ISO linked the federation with NGOs who were funding livelihood projects such as the LRFW as well as to government units that had windows for such like the Bureau of Rural Workers. Out of its experience from these undertakings, the ISO was able to design a model for gender empowerment, which it packaged as a training program that it offers to NGO workers and the religious community.

In Tanay, on the other hand, ISO organized the informal sectors into multi-purpose cooperatives to implement micro-enterprises such as garment sewing, micro lending and rice training. Within the three-year program cycle, it trained these cooperatives on program development and micro-finance. It likewise lent these organizations the initial capital to start up their micro-enterprises. To prepare for its phase out, the ISO endorsed the programs of
these POs to micro-finance NGOs such as the Ecumenical Church Loan Fund-Philippines (ECLOF-Philippines) and government institutions that catered to micro-enterprises such as the BRW. The ISO likewise served as their guarantor to these organizations. It also facilitated the federation of these cooperatives into Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawang Impormal ng Tanay (KAMIT) which, in turn, was linked to other networks of informal sectors to form the national coalition, the Kalipunan ng Maraming Tinig ng mga Manggagawang Impormal (KATINIG).

In the case of the fisher folks from Bataan, on the other hand, the ISO assisted in the organization of a bantay dagat (fish warden) group comprised of volunteer fishermen that would patrol and apprehend illegal fishers in the coastal waters of Mariveles. To promote the sustainability of the organization, the ISO brokered an agreement between the local PO members of BBMB from Mariveles and the municipal government to promulgate a municipal ordinance setting the penalties for illegal fishing in its municipal waters. Part of the ordinance was the allocation of 25% of the fines collected by the municipality for the operations of the bantay dagat. Since the partnership proved successful, the bantay dagat group was later on integrated into the municipal government office entitling its volunteers to regular stipends. Simultaneously, representatives of the BBMB were also acknowledged as the civil society representative in the municipality’s municipal development council.

Like any other coastal municipalities, the municipality of Mariveles, Bataan experiences problems brought about by use of destructive fishing methods such as dynamite fishing and over fishing by commercial fishers coming from Malabon and Navotas. Because of this, the fisher folks became impoverished while the rich capitalists benefit from the extraction of marine resources. To respond to this problem, ... an agreement was forged among the small fishers, the ISO, the Philippine National Police, the Coast Guard, the local government unit of Mariveles, BFAR and Maritime Command in enforcing Executive Order 240 to form the Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Council. Through this, the
responsibilities of the different stakeholders in natural resource management were identified and established... This multi-sectoral partnership... is expected to facilitate the organizing, strengthening, training and mobilization for the adoption of a resolution/ordinance concerning the protection of marine resources of Mariveles.\textsuperscript{9}

On the part of the ISO, brokering this partnership enabled it to pilot-test a model for local government-PO-NGO partnership. The model was packaged into a program proposed to MISEREOR for program cycle 1998-2000.

In all of these situations, the partnership between the ISO and the POs were premised on a contractual relationship between a service provider (i.e., the ISO) and a client (i.e., the POs) wherein the roles and responsibilities of both parties as well as the duration of the partnership were established. Under this condition, the ISO staffs no longer designated themselves as leaders or deliverers of the grassroots sectors. Rather, they presented themselves as professionals with services to offer. They recognized the POs as stakeholders in development and provide them with assistance in maximizing such roles. However, they retained influence over the PO activities by serving as their technical advisers and consultants. Under this arrangement, the ISO was likewise able to position itself as an intermediary organization that broker the partnership and relationship between the POs on the one hand, and the local institutions on the other. As intermediaries, however, the ISO was able to appropriate the learning from these experiences, translate them into program models, which they use to generate funds for its future operations. Moreover, it harnessed these experiences to mainstream itself in the development administration process as social development experts.

As before, this type of relationship generated conflicts between the ISO and its partner POs. For one, having been used to the traditional practice of NGOs subsidizing their
operations, the practice, for example, of charging interest rates for loans made the POs that the ISO was exploiting them. In the case of the Tanay informal sector cooperative, for example, they felt that it ran counter to the charitable mandate of the church. Secondly, the awareness that the program experiences were being documented and packaged by the ISO as program proposals made the POs feel that ISO was using them to promote its own institutional sustainability. Thirdly, the time bound, goal oriented premise of the ISO-PO partnership was initially resisted by the POs because they reminded them of the impersonal bureaucratic procedures of the government. PO resistance to the new terms of partnership were further re-enforced by the agitation of the ISO program staffs who themselves were resisting the professionalization of the institution. Thus until 1998, the ISO program staffs and some of ISO’s partner POs joined forces in exerting pressure to ISO’s leadership to revert back to the old practice of community organizing adopted by the LIAC.

**ISO as a Full-Pledged Development Intermediary Institution**

By 1998, the professionalization of the ISO was completed. Its preoccupation was to mainstream its efforts into the development administration process. Under this context, it had institutionalized the contractual partnership with the POs in pursuit of social development. In its Social Transformation and Grassroots Empowerment (STAGE) Program, ISO’s organizational assistance to the grassroots sectors was geared towards the maximization of the latter’s abilities to lobby their interests as stakeholders in the development process. While before, the premise of community organizing was to confront and demand government action on the concerns of the grassroots sectors, the STAGE program sought to generate support of the government by providing them the assistance required to do their tasks. For ISO, this implied assisting the local government units improve
their capabilities to do their jobs as well while simultaneously organizing the grassroots
to exert pressure on the government. Thus, ISO's clientele expanded to include not only the
POs, but the local government units as well. This very well thrust the institution into a
mediating role among these development stakeholders.

The local government should be able to formulate and implement local policies
reflective of the needs of its constituents, and to maximize the utilization of natural
resources found in its territorial boundaries... (It) should also be able to harness the
active participation of the marginalized sectors in its operations.

ISO has been actively advocating the establishment of a principled partnership with
government. The institute, as a result of several endeavors, was able to shift from
confrontational stance to a collaborative one when dealing with the state apparatus... Principles partnership is being aware of ...each party's strengths and limitations, and
looking for creative avenues to resolve issues (Rosal, 1997: n.p.).

ISO's mediating role is exemplified by its coastal resource management program in
Panukulan, Quezon where it adopted the establishment of LGU-PO partnership as its core
strategy. In the process of developing the program, the ISO coastal resource management
program unit identified illegal fishing as a major problem in the area.

For generations, the ocean has been the lifeblood of (Panukulan), feeding more than
10,000 people and providing jobs for most of the population. Unsustainable and
unmitigated resource extraction, however, broke this chain of utilization. Soon
enough, people started feeling the impact of ceaseless dynamite and cyanide fishing
activities (ISO-QIRD, 1997, n.p.)

Dialogue with the municipal government indicated that the latter wanted to address the
problem but they did not have the capacity to do so. With a police force of less than 5
people, the lack of municipal trial court to handle cases of violations, and no funds to
provide for alternative livelihood to illegal fishers, it was impossible for them to address the
problem (Ibid.). Thus, the ISO program unit opted to develop a two-pronged program of
capacitating the municipal government while simultaneously organizing the POs to participate in its decision-making process.

We chose to develop professional relationship (with them) instead of a confrontational one... We initiated a series of dialogue with the local officials on the nature of the community-based coastal resource management program and the problems of the community... PO members also started voicing their opinions on drugs, gambling, illegal fishing on general assemblies... The complex process of governing became an exercise of democracy... The local government unit acts in favor of the majority decision *(Ibid.)*.

To promote the partnership, the ISO conducted joint trainings on community-based coastal resource management between the municipal government and the POs. Thereafter, the ISO assisted in the development of a seaweed culture program that was operated as a joint partnership between the municipality and the POs. The municipal government leased a portion of the seaweed farm to the POs in order to generate funds, while the POs grew and marketed the seaweeds. The ISO facilitated the negotiations for the partnership.

Simultaneously, the ISO likewise facilitated the linkage of the municipal government to line agencies that could assist them in funding infrastructure projects that were complimentary to the POs’ livelihood programs. Under such partnership, the municipal government and the POs both benefited. Again, for its part, the ISO was able to showcase the experience as model of its social development programs. As a result, it was able to win a grant award from the Ford Corporation for best practices in community-based coastal resources management.

Similar principle was applied by the ISO in Camarines Norte where it experimented on establishing partnership between the POs and a local NGO. ISO entered into an agreement with the Camarines Norte Socio-Pastoral Action Center Foundation, Inc. (SPACFI) to implement a program in the municipalities of Vinzons and Mercedes. Under the terms of the agreement, the ISO trained the staffs of the SPACFI in the technical aspects
of community-based coastal resources management so the latter could assume the responsibilities for organizing the grassroots under the supervision of the ISO program staffs. Under the program, the ISO facilitated the establishment of a marine sanctuary in San Miguel Bay, which was within the territory of Mercedes. It was also able to assist the SPACFI in getting a contract with the municipal government of Vinzons for a mangrove reforestation program. Out of the public interest generated by the program, the ISO itself was able to win a bid for the implementation of an ADB funded coastal resource management program for the whole province of Camarines Norte. This, on the other hand, generated antagonism from its local NGO partner who felt that as an outsider from their locality, the ISO should not compete with them for funding opportunities. They charged that the ISO was perpetuating the “imperialism of the Manila-based NGOs”.

In general, the POs welcomed ISO’s intermediary efforts because they benefited from the alternative income opportunities and the increased participation in the decision-making process. Likewise, the municipal government was appreciative of the assistance. However, ISO’s intermediation generated conflict with the locally based NGOs because it undermined the latter’s influence over the grassroots sectors and deprived them of funding opportunities.

Conclusion

From the above, it could be gleaned that the relationship between the ISO and the POs it helped to create changed over the years. When Catholic social action movement was just beginning, the forerunners of the ISO saw the grassroots sectors as ignorant and passive social agents that could be swayed by misguided communists. To prevent that from happening, they embarked on public information programs to “enlighten” them. At the same
time, they also educated the elites to treat their tenants and workers more fairly. Nonetheless, the interaction between the social justice crusaders and the grassroots sectors were minimal. As such, no partnership had evolved between them. The grassroots remained closer to the communist movement.

When ISO was formally constituted in 1947, the influence of the communist movement on the peasant and labor sectors was already relatively strong. Thus, the founders of the ISO saw the need to establish alternative organizations espousing the Catholic social teachings as counterweights to the communist movement. Doing this, however, required that they get to know the issues and problems experienced by the grassroots sectors first hand and to be part of the solution to such. Thus, they immersed themselves into the labor and peasant movements. Nonetheless, the ISO founders and volunteers maintained the notion that the grassroots sectors lacked the proper values orientation and education needed to represent themselves to both the elites and the state. Thus, they appointed themselves as leaders of the peasant and labor federations that they created. In process, tensions and conflicts with the genuine grassroots leaders ensued.

In the 1960s, ISO’s organizing became more community-based as the grassroots sectors themselves took the initiatives to ask the institution what assistance they needed. This development was facilitated by the emphasis of the Catholic social teachings on organizing the poor to address their poverty. Since the premise of community organizing rests on the empowerment of the poor to address their own problems, the relationship between the ISO and its partner voluntary organizations, and the organized grassroots became relatively equal. Moreover, the grassroots organizations represented themselves and mapped out their own strategies. The ISO and its partner voluntary organizations merely
assumed supporting roles to the POs. With the declaration of Martial Law, however, the ideological revolutionary movements sought refuge on the ISO and its partner voluntary organizations and pushed for a more centralized decision-making process to pursue anti-dictatorship initiatives. Thus, during the Martial Law era, the POs were compelled to submit to centralized decision-making at the expense of their participatory decision-making process. However, demoralization became high among the POs as the members felt that they could no longer identify with the activities of their own organizations.

During this period, ISO (a.k.a., LIAC) tried to preserve the identity of the POs by allowing them to elect their own leaders. However, the LIAC staffs inserted themselves as secretariats and assuming the tasks of managing the POs. Under this "administrative partnership", the LIAC and its underground ally, the PDSP, were able to influence the POs and tap them as mass base for the anti-dictatorship movement without necessarily making the grassroots feel that they were dis-empowered. With the advent of the re-democratization period, however, the need to mobilize the grassroots in lobbying for social reforms necessitated the building of grassroots federations that could represent the grassroots interest. However, this led to the weakening of the local POs and promoted the dependency of the grassroots federations on the LIAC for logistical and funding support. To address these concerns, it redirected its assistance to the local POs.

At about the same time, LIAC once again reverted back to its old name signaling its effort to professionalize its ranks to prepare itself for assuming yet another goal namely, social development. This promoted a different kind of partnership between the ISO and the local POs. Under this new relationship, the ISO assumed the role of a professional service provider while the POs became its clients. Under such relationship, the role of the POs as
stakeholders in development was recognized. ISO’s role was to enable the POs to maximize their participation in the decision-making process, and to ensure that they were able to advance the interests of their sectors.

ISO maintained influence over the POs as technical advisers and consultants. Under this arrangement, the ISO was likewise able to position itself as an intermediary organization that broker the partnership and relationship between the POs on the one hand, and the local institutions on the other. As an intermediary organization, the ISO was able to mainstream itself in the development administration process as social development experts.

These changes in the relationship between the ISO and its partner POs, in turn, defined the participation of the grassroots sector in government’s policy-making and development program implementation. During the early period of the social action movement until the 1950s, the ISO and its partner volunteer organizations took on the tasks of representing the interests of the grassroots sectors with the state. The social justice crusaders, for example, were responsible for convincing Pres. Quezon to pursue a social justice program while the FFW was responsible for lobbying for the Magna Carta of Labor in 1953. In both situations, only the perspectives of the ISO and its partner voluntary organizations were considered, as the grassroots sectors were not consulted. This changed in the 1960s. The SDCCU, for example, provided community-based credit union trainings to government personnel. The ZOTO, on the other hand, was able to push the Marcos administration to adopt on-site relocation instead of eviction and resettlement as a way of handling the urban squatting problems of Metro Manila by adopting conflict confrontation methods of dealing with the state. However, as grassroots became too vigilant in their lobbying for social reforms, they also became the targets of repression during the Martial
Law period. During the early years of re-democratization, the politicized grassroots sectors took part in the lobbying for social reforms in congress and the senate using the same conflict confrontation model of dealing with the state.

However, involvement in national advocacy efforts resulted to the weakening of their mass bases compelling the ISO to focus its assistance on the local POs. This, in turn, led to more the localization of the POs’ lobbying efforts. ISO’s emphasis on social development likewise changed the nature of the POs action towards the government. While before it was antagonistic towards the government, they now assumed a more critical yet dialogic and collaborative stance toward the local government units. This, in turn, facilitated the alliance of the POs and the local government units in pressuring the national line agencies to be more responsive to community needs.

The changing nature of the ISO-PO partnership and its consequent effects on their dealings with the state were not isolated. Rather, they illustrate the evolving nature of NGO-PO relationship in the Philippines as a whole as many NGOs evolve into professional development intermediary organizations. For a summary of the changes in the organizational characteristics and roles of the ISO over the years, see Appendix 5.
1. The phrase "civil society making civil society" was borrowed from the title of the compilation of articles on NGO-PO relations, which were discussed in a conference on Philippine Democracy Agenda held in 1997. See Miriam Coronel-Ferrer (ed.), *Civil Society Making Civil Society*, Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997.

2. Krononaysist, Inc. interview with a student volunteer who organized the Associated Workers' Union (AWU) in Manila South Harbor in the 1950s.

3. Interview with Fr. John J. Carroll SJ, who was then spiritual director of the Ateneo Social Order Club.

4. Krononaysist, Inc. interview with the president of the Ateneo Social Order Club, who was also one of those who became an officer of the AWU.

5. Krononaysist, Inc. interview with Mr. Servando Garcia, one of the founders of San Dionisio Credit Cooperative Union.

6. Interview with a PECCO Board member.

7. Krononaysist, Inc. interview with a former LIAC FSB staff. The staff eventually became the Chairman of KASAMA.

8. Under this program, the women rented out washing machines to the women in the community so they could reduce the time they spend on washing clothes and pursue other activities.

9. Excerpt of a report (translated) of the PO members and LGUs of Bataan as reported in ISO. *Daluyan*. April 2000. n.p.
CHAPTER 10. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters, this dissertation traced the historical evolution of the Philippine civil society from the Spanish period up to the present. It looked into the changing organizational characteristics of the civil society groups that operate within this realm as they adapt to the changes in the institutional, social, political and economic conditions in the country over time. In particular, it examined the reasons why some of these groups, notably, the social development NGOs, became development intermediary organizations and how this alters the nature of the Philippine civil society as a whole. It also examined how these affected the democratic consolidation process in the country.

Using the Institute of Social Order (ISO) as a case study, the dissertation also examined the internal dynamics that transpire within an NGO as it went through organizational changes over time. It highlighted the changes in the composition of the NGO staffs, and the competition among them for control of the organization and the determination of its program policies and strategies. It also determined how this affected the NGO’s relationship with its partner POs. In so doing, it illustrated how the developments in the broader civil society shape the evolution of an informal “voluntary” organization into a professional intermediary NGO.

The following are the summary of findings and the conclusions of this study:

**Nature and Characteristics of the Evolving Philippine Civil Society**

Earlier, the study defined the civil society as the realm of self-organized, autonomous groups and social movements situated between the households, the market and the state, which derives its power from its capacity for collective action. Given this
definition, it could be gleaned from the discussions above that the Philippine civil society is not a recent phenomenon. As early as the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, informal, voluntary, self-supporting groups that were in discourse with the state were already existent. These groups provided the venues for the natives to come together to discuss their common situations and to discourse with the colonial state. Thus, while they might not yet constitute the civil society, their efforts could be considered as pioneer initiatives to carve out this realm. Such initiatives became more intense in the late 1800s when the Europe-based ilustrados exposed to the ideas of the Enlightenment set up intellectual circles and propaganda organizations and publicly denounced the abuses of the Spanish colonial period, and demanded equal opportunities for the natives, particularly in terms of participating in colonial administration. However, the Philippine civil society officially came into existence only during the American period when the American colonial administration duly recognized and encouraged the setting up of civil associations in the Philippines to promote the ideals of democracy. Since then, the Philippine civil society has gone through periods of expansion, contraction and resurgence. It expanded during times when the Philippine government was tolerant of organized citizens’ efforts. It became vibrant when the state encouraged citizens’ organizations to become actively involved in development administration and governance.

It is interesting to note that the Philippine civil society managed to remain in existence and even expanded, despite the significantly reduced public sphere, during periods when the state literally suppressed the existence of civil associations and social movements. This was the case during the time of the Japanese Occupation from 1941 to 1946 and the Marcos dictatorship period from 1972 to 1986. This, nonetheless, was made possible only by the support and encouragement provided by the Catholic Church, complemented by the
strong ties of the civil society groups with the underground ideological parties. In fact, it was during these periods that the commitment to shared norms and value such as social justice, plurality, solidarity, toleration, generalized social trust, voluntarism, and civility became stronger among them. These made them distinct from the other social institutions and gave them separate identities from the feared and hated state. Moreover, adherence to these norms and values became the driving force that united them in their struggle against the state.

From the discussions, it also became evident that from the very beginning, the associational life of the Filipino natives was determined by their status in the colony (i.e., as indios, mestizos, or Spanish) as well as their social classes (i.e., peasants, laborantes, and ilustrados). Corollary to this, the civil society groups that emerged in the Philippines over time were also divided along status/class-based strands.

**The Elite- and Middle Class-Based “Voluntary” Organizations**

The first strand consists of associations and organizations founded by civic minded and socially conscious segments of the elites and the middle class. Their forerunners were the mutual aid associations and philanthropic organizations founded by the emerging Filipino bourgeoisie to legitimize their social positions in the eyes of the Spanish colonial administrators and the Spanish friars. They later gave way to the intellectual circles and socio-political associations of the Europe-based Filipino intellectuals who drew inspiration from the civil society groups that emerged in Europe during this period. These groups initiated the first organized efforts to openly engage the colonial state in the public sphere. While critical of the Spanish colonial administration, these groups did not initially intend to overthrow the colonial state. Rather, they were advocating social equality and the
opportunity to participate in governance. These efforts were met with repression by the Spanish colonial state. As such, the members of these groups eventually threw their support to the grassroots-based revolutionary movement.

During the American colonial era, local chapters of American civic associations, the trade- and profession-based associations and the Catholic social action guilds supplanted the intellectual circles. These *civic and professional associations* were encouraged, if not actually subsidized, by the commonwealth government. In complementation with the institutionalization of public education in the country, they served as vehicles for promoting the American version of democratic ideals among the Filipinos, particularly among the Filipino elites and the emerging middle class professionals. They provided the venues for discussing national issues and state policies. For a large part, however, they remained inaccessible to the grassroots sectors, which had to create venues to discuss their grievances and to resort to extra-legal means to draw the state’s attention to their needs.

During World War II, the Japanese banned all private-initiated civil associations and replaced them with state-sponsored *public service organizations*. Thus, this particular strand of civil society groups ceased to exist. After the Japanese occupation, however, four types of *volunteer associations* re-emerged namely, (1) the apolitical and conservative welfare and philanthropic organizations, (2) the church-based charitable institutions, (3) the middle-class led trade unions and (4) the government supported service-delivery organizations. Although these volunteer associations were led by the elites, their management and constituencies comprised of service professionals – religious, lawyers, teachers and social workers. Unlike their predecessors whose efforts
were focused on creating public spaces where citizens can discuss issues and state policies that affect their lives, these volunteer associations provided social services to the grassroots as part of their repertoire of activities. This included provision of relief and welfare services, educating them and providing them with assistance in dealing with the agencies of the state. Since these activities complemented the efforts of the government, most of them received subsidies from the government even though they were privately initiated. However, since they equally received support from the Catholic Church and the private business sector, they were able to maintain their autonomy from the state. They were thus able to take active roles in lobbying for the legislation of social reform policies. Nonetheless, although they promoted the organization of the grassroots sectors, they have not opened the realm of civil society to grassroots participation. Rather, they assumed the task of representing the interests of the grassroots sectors in the public sphere and acting as their advocates.

In the 1960s when the Philippine government proved unable to address the needs of the general public, a new crop of voluntary organizations that were critical of all formal social institutions emerged. These voluntary organizations were set up primarily by the Catholic Church to concretize the teachings on social justice that came out of Vatican II. They were mostly led by the religious and operated by volunteers comprised of academic-based professionals (e.g., university professors and social science researchers) and student activists who were exploring ways of promoting social change. These voluntary organizations went beyond service delivery and engaged in organizing the grassroots sectors into self-help POs. By organizing the grassroots sectors, they made them part of the civil society. More than this, they provided the technical and moral support to the POs so they
could assume the role of making the state accountable for its programs and policies. During this period, therefore, the realm of civil society expanded.

When organized oppositions were outlawed by the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s, the Philippine civil society contracted as organized efforts to make the state accountable to its constituencies were curtailed. Nonetheless, voluntary organizations continued to organize the grassroots and to provide safe venues for people to discuss national issues and explore ways of dealing with the repressive state, albeit under close military surveillance. Since these organizations were the only legitimate venues for organizing opposition to the dictatorial regime, the underground communist and socialist revolutionary parties used them as legal front organizations. As front organizations, they served as abeyance organizations that kept the anti-dictatorship movement alive amidst state repression. While this blurred the boundaries between the civil society and the political community, it made the boundaries of the civil society and the state more defined. Furthermore, it also made the civil society more antagonistic towards the state.

As legal front organizations, the voluntary organizations assumed formal organizational identities to prove that they were operating within the legal bounds permitted by the state. They began to be known generically as NGOs. Also, they took on new types of activities such as service provision to the community, in addition to their advocacy efforts. Since their capabilities to mobilize support were severely constrained, they had to rely heavily on the subsidy of the Catholic Church, which themselves generated support from international philanthropic organizations. This also brought the NGOs closer to the Catholic Church.

Interestingly, these developments facilitated the development and the strengthening
of shared norms and values among the community organizers, particularly that of volunteerism, social justice and democratic participation. Thus, while the organizational and relational boundaries between what are considered the realm of “civil society” and those of the other domains of social practice had become fuzzy, its normative boundaries became more consolidated.

Toward the latter years of the Marcos dictatorship, the membership-base of the middle-class NGOs expanded to include the businessmen, the corporate professionals and the government technocrats outraged by the human rights abuses of the military and corruption in the government. This paved the way to the emergence of cause-oriented groups that dealt with these social justice issues. Together with their partner POs, they became the prime movers of the anti-dictatorship movement that culminated in the 1986 People Power Revolution. Through this, their roles as vanguards of democracy had been publicly acknowledged and the Philippine civil society, formally recognized.

With the restoration of the democratic public space during the re-democratization period, and the government adopting a policy of involving the civil society in development administration, the NGOs in particular was institutionalized as a sector. They also became closer to the government both in terms of institutional relationship and organizational characteristics. Consequently, these also changed the organizational characteristics of the NGOs. First, as the government increasingly tapped the NGOs as partners and service contractors for the implementation of its development programs, individuals operating in the other realms of social practice – the businessmen, former government technocrats and politicians - set up NGOs for revenue generation purposes and for building political machineries. This resulted to the diversification of the groups belonging to this particular
strand of civil society. Secondly, to compete against these newly organized “mutant NGOs” (MUNGOs), the cause-oriented NGOs professionalized and reoriented their programs towards social development. This, in turn, changed the nature of activities of the NGOs. In addition to providing the public space, mobilizing and bringing the grassroots into the arena of policy-making, they began to increasingly engage in intermediary roles of providing development services to the grassroots sectors and mediating between the grassroots sectors and the funding agencies and the government.

The Grassroots-Based People’s Movements and Associations

People’s movements and associations also emerged at the grassroots level parallel to the middle class-based civil and voluntary associations. Since these grassroots-based groups were organized primarily as responses to the abuses and/or neglect of the state, they were often antagonistic and at times, rebellious towards it. For such reason, they were also outlawed and had to operate outside the realm of the legally acknowledged civil society. For example, grassroots-based secret societies existed in the 16th century as base organizations for the resistance movements. The groups eventually consolidated into the 1986 independence movement against the Spanish colonial government.

During the American era, the grassroots sectors created their own trade unions to advance their interests since they did not have ready access to the state-supported civic associations. Although they leaned towards socialism and/or communism, they initially were not intended as instruments for waging revolution against the state, but as means to participate in the formally acknowledged public space. Since the colonial state outlawed these groups and denied their members the access to the public sphere, however, they resorted to extra-legal activities instead.
In the 1950s, volunteer associations like the ISO established and/or sponsored labor and trade unions. The lobbying efforts of these middle class-led trade unions resulted to the legislation of state laws and policies addressing the needs of the peasants and the laborers. However, even though these organizations enabled the grassroots sectors to lobby for land reform and the rights of the laborers to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, they remained subordinated to the elites and middle classes who appropriated the leadership of these trade unions.

In the 1960s, grassroots-based and self-help POs that were focused on addressing particular issues affecting their members’ lives emerged. The leaders of these self-help grassroots organizations came from their ranks. Their efforts were also focused on addressing issues that have direct bearing on their members’ lives. With assistance from the church-based voluntary organizations, these self-help POs participated in the public sphere, negotiated with the state authorities for access to basic services, and pressured the legislature to adopt responsive policies within legally acceptable boundaries. In other words, they engaged in activities associated with the civil society.

During the Marcos dictatorship, the POs were subjected to state repression like their middle class counterparts. Since they were more vulnerable, many POs sought the protection and support of church-based NGOs, initiating a dependency relationship between them and the latter. Their partnership with the NGOs became the basis for their recruitment into the networks of the outlawed anti-dictatorship movement. They provided the mass base to the rallies and demonstrations that culminated in the 1986 People Power Revolution.
During the re-democratization period, the POs deemed that participation in the political arena was no longer urgent and focused more on addressing their members’ social and economic concerns. However, this pushed them into the periphery of the civil society movement while simultaneously promoting the role of the NGOs as facilitators of the democratization process. Since the NGOs were also the providers of basic services to the grassroots sectors, the POs rely on them to articulate their needs for basic services with the state and the international funding institutions. Because of this, these social institutions tapped the NGOs as conduits of community assistance. This, in turn, further strengthened the dependency relationship between the NGOs and POs that started during the Marcos dictatorship. It promoted what Hudock called “democracy by proxy” as representation of grassroots interests, as well as participation in decision-making, were appropriated by the NGOs while the POs became relegated into mere beneficiaries.

Nonetheless, the recognition of PO representation at the local decision-making venues, and the Philippine government’s policy of prioritizing organized groups as beneficiaries of its poverty alleviation programs encouraged the POs to participate in organizational development and skills education programs being offered by their partner NGOs. These, in turn, strengthened the POs organizationally, with their leaders gaining more knowledge and confidence to articulate and to represent their sectors’ interests.

In recent years, the POs began to clamor for more organizational autonomy and for bigger shares in the distribution of resources provided by the state and the international funding institutions. They also began to pursue interests that diverged from their partner POs, thereby making the realm of civil society more pluralistic and more vibrant.
In contrast with the middle class-based voluntary organizations, the grassroots-based people's organizations and social movements were more consistent in terms of their goals. From the very start, the motivation of this particular strand of civil society to engage in collective action was to improve their socio-economic conditions. It is in pursuit of this that they sought to participate in the legally acknowledged public sphere and if necessary, to engage in activities that fall outside the realm of such. The same motive shaped their willingness to cooperate with or to distance themselves from the middle class-based NGOs over time.

External Factors that Shaped the Evolution of the Philippine Civil Society

The emergence and the changing nature and organizational characteristics of the Philippine civil society was primarily shaped by the following: (a) the changing nature of the Catholic Church’s social involvement, (b) the developments in the ideological party politics, (c) changing social class composition of the people involved in the civil society, (d) the socio-economic and political situations of the grassroots sectors and (e) the state’s response to civil society initiatives. The interplay of these factors facilitated the expansion and contraction of the civil society over time. It likewise resulted to the redefinition of the composition of the groups that comprise the civil society institutionally, relationally and normatively.

Catholic Social Involvement

From the accounts of the historical evolution of the Philippine civil society, it was evident that the Catholic Church played a significantly role in its emergence and evolution although its influence was more evident among the elite- and middle class based voluntary associations. For one, it was the efforts of the Philippine Catholic Church
to concretize the Catholic social teachings on social justice that led to the establishment of the various generations of ‘voluntary’ organizations that sought to open the public space to the grassroots and to address the social and economic concerns of the poor and marginalized sectors in the country starting from the American period. Because of this, the purposes and programs of these organizations mirrored the changes in the Catholic Church’s conception and responses to social justice. In the 1930s, social action guilds were set up by the Philippine Catholic Church to launch a counter-propaganda program against communism. The social action guilds started the social justice crusade aimed at persuading the elites to look after their tenants and their workers so they would not be swayed to join communist-influenced organizations. In the 1940s, alternatives to the communist-influenced trade unions were established. When the Catholic Church issued the Vatican II documents, which embodied its criticisms of the excesses of capitalism, and its call for the organization of the grassroots to assert their human rights, the Philippine Catholic Church facilitated the setting up of social action centers throughout the country. The social action centers promoted community organizing and assisted in the setting up of community-based POs and basic Christian communities that enabled the grassroots sectors to articulate their needs and negotiate with the state and other social actors to get them. Reflective of the church’s softening stance towards communism and the qualified adoption of socialist principles, these volunteer associations opened their doors to social activists of all ideological backgrounds to volunteer their services and learn the principles of community organizing.

During the Martial Law period, the Catholic Church likewise sustained the Philippine civil society by providing venues for discussing socio-political issues and
exploring possible solutions for such. It likewise provided refuge to social activists harassed and threatened by arrest and torture by the military and enabled them to pursue their anti-dictatorship activities by creating voluntary organizations or subsuming their activities under the programs of existing church institutions like the ISO. Since the abilities of these voluntary organizations to mobilize resources were curtailed by the state, the Catholic Church also provided the resources and the links to international communities required to sustain their efforts. The Catholic Church started the tradition of mediating between the civil society and the formal institutions namely, the international funding agencies, the business sector and occasionally, the government – a practice that was later on assumed by the NGOs in relation with the POs and the formal social institutions.

Under the unwitting protection of the Catholic Church, they became legal fronts for the underground ideological movements. With the Catholic Church’s involvement in partisan politics towards the latter years of the Marcos dictatorship, cause-oriented and voluntary associations increased in number, thereby strengthening the anti-dictatorship movement. The role of the church in facilitating the 1986 People Power Revolution is widely acknowledged by social scientists and the social activists alike.

According to Herbert’s (1998), religion contributed to the growth of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America in four ways. First, it provided the institutional space within which, various forms of opposition to the state were organized. Second, it provided the symbolic resources to oppose or subvert state-imposed modernization ideas. Thirdly, it functioned as an international and ideological connection with the international order that stretched beyond the state. Lastly, it functioned as an
intellectual force from which opposition thinking and identities were self-consciously constructed. The role assumed by the Philippine Catholic Church in the emergence and growth of the Philippine civil society is consistent with his contentions. Unlike its European and Latin American counterparts, however, it was noted that the influence of the Catholic Church on the civil society decreased during the democratic consolidation period because of its deliberate withdrawal from partisan politics. Since the church’s political involvement was undertaken through the NGOs, this also implied the gradual withdrawal of its institutional support to the latter. This promoted the NGOs’ pursuit of self-sustainability. In most cases also, professionalization and the institutionalization of systems of check and balance became the means by which the Catholic Church facilitated the de-politicization of church-based NGOs like the ISO. Despite these, however, the church’s social teachings on social justice continue to serve as the basis for promoting the shared norms and values that identify the NGOs part of the civil society.

*Ideological Politics*

The Catholic Church shaped the norms that defined the identity of the NGOs as part of civil society. However, it was the ideological parties that significantly influenced the institutional relationship of the civil society (i.e., the NGOs and POs) with the state and the other social institutions in the other domains of social practice. As discussed in the earlier chapters, the establishment and the recruitment efforts of the communist party among the grassroots sectors provided the compelling motivations for the Catholic Church to establish voluntary associations that educated and organized the grassroots sectors against communism, and engaged in the advocacy of reforms on the state’s social and economic policies from the 1930s up to the 1960s.
In the 1970s, however, military repression compelled the alliance between the ideological parties and the Catholic Church to sustain the anti-dictatorship movement. Such alliance resulted to the conversion of the church-based voluntary organizations into legal fronts for the ideological movements, resulting to the integration of communist and socialist ideals on the civil society discourse, and lending the NGOs and POs antagonistic towards the state.

Nonetheless, the abilities of the ideological parties to harness the civil society groups in their struggle against the state were undermined by the rivalries among them over strategies of engaging the state and the control of the civil society groups. These rivalries led to the fragmentation and crisis of the ideological parties, compelling the NGOs to consolidate themselves into a “middle force” with an identity, norms and values, strategies, and organizational structures separate from the ideological parties. In harnessing their institutional relationship with, and normative influence over the POs, the NGOs were able to establish hegemony within the Philippine civil society.

**The Social Class Dimension of Civil Society**

The evolution of the Philippine civil society is also significantly affected by the entry of different groups of middle class professionals into the voluntary sector at various historical junctures. Consistent with the western historical conception of such, the Philippine civil society has been the domain of the local bourgeoisie and increasingly, the Filipino middle class. Early forms of civic and voluntary associations were dominated by the Filipino elites who used such organizations initially to get the Spanish colonial administrators and Catholic friars to legitimize their social position and later on, assert their demands for participation in governance. They were joined later on by lower level
white-collar workers who were instrumental in establishing the link between the elite-led civic associations and the grassroots-based movements and secret societies. Starting from the American era, however, different cohorts of Filipino middle class professionals gained access to civic and voluntary associations, and used these to enhance their social positions and participate in the public sphere. They actualized and propagated their ideals and aspirations through these voluntary organizations. In the 1930s, sons of the emerging business and government bureaucrats, with guidance from the Catholic Church, set up the social action guilds, which were relatively conservative in dealing with the state while critical of the social injustice committed by the elites against their tenants and workers. These groups were also more concerned with preserving the status quo against the communists. In the mid-1940s, service workers - volunteer lawyers, educators and religious - nurturing the vision of saving the grassroots from the influence of communism set up alternative trade unions and peasant organizations. They assumed leadership of these organizations and adopted a policy of dialogue and consensual resolution of conflicts between the elites and the grassroots sectors. They also collaborated with the state in its anti-communist efforts. In the 1960s, the intellectuals - politicized students and social service professionals - in search of alternatives ways of addressing the social problems trained as professional community organizers and worked side by side with the marginalized sectors. They began the tradition of people empowerment as a trademark of NGO work in the country. Because of their close ties with the ideological parties, these volunteers were antagonistic towards the state. In fact, they mobilized the grassroots sector for such purposes. They were instrumental in converting the voluntary organizations into legal front for the revolutionary movements.
The assassination of Benigno Aquino and the exposure of the corruption of the Marcos administration, on the other hand, facilitated the entry of business managers and administrators, and government technocrats in the civil society as early as the 1980s. They participated actively in the anti-dictatorship movement. After the dictatorship, these new crop of social activists joined or set up their own NGOs. They were joined later on by other highly skilled technocrats from the sciences and technological fields. The entry of these professionals changed the nature of NGO work. From political advocacy, their focus shifted to political organizing and eventually, to social development. As the base of middle class professionals involved in NGO work expanded and diversified, however, closure mechanisms such as professional standards and accreditation processes were established to make it an exclusive career option for the Filipino middle classes. This, on the other hand, promoted the hegemony of the middle class-led NGOs in the civil society.

Interestingly, although the middle class-led NGOs ensured their dominance over the civil society, they also simultaneously facilitated the inclusion of the grassroots-based movements and POs into the realm of civil society. Initially, they merely provided opportunities for the grassroots sectors to get their concerns discussed in the public sphere. Over the years, however, they organized and mobilized them to participate in mass mobilizations against the state. At present, they have established partnerships with the POs in efforts to engage the state and the other social institutions. In process, therefore, they also facilitated the expansion and strengthening of the Philippine civil society.
Socio-Economic and Political Conditions of the Grassroots Sectors

From the very start, poverty, social inequality and social injustice were the motivating factors for the grassroots to organize themselves and periodically engage in sporadic fits of resistance as early as the Spanish period. The potential for a class-based revolution that these conditions created, on the other hand, compelled the socially conscious elites and middle class professionals to search for alternative ways to get the grassroots interests deliberated and considered by the state. They were supported by the Catholic Church, which was also concerned with promoting its teachings on social justice and preventing communism from taking roots among the grassroots sectors.

The very premise of the NGOs undertaking intermediary roles rests on this. From the discussions above, it could be gleaned that historically, the NGOs and their predecessors had been pushing for greater access to political power, economic opportunities and productive resources for the grassroots sectors. In process, they were able to generate the support of the latter, through their POs, in their own efforts to position themselves strategically vis-à-vis the state and the elites. Since they had the capability to mobilize the grassroots sectors, the state relied on them for assistance in order to pacify the restive masses. This, on the other hand, provided them access to state resources intended for poverty alleviation.

State Responses

Since the relevance of civil society is premised on its ability to countervail the powers of the state, the developments in the realm of civil society could best be understood vis-à-vis the responses of the state to pressing social issues and concerns. In the Philippines, state’s responses to the two strands of civil society groups varied. The
grassroots-based movements and POs emerged and evolved due to the indifference and, at worse, oppressiveness of the state and its agents to the grassroots sectors. Because of these, the grassroots-based movements and POs had also been consistently prone towards rebelliousness and wont to adopt ideologies that promote structural change. The state, in turn, responded to these by outlawing the grassroots-based groups and criminalizing their efforts to participate in the public sphere. As the grassroots-based POs became formally included in the realm of civil society through the efforts of the middle class-based voluntary organizations and the NGOs starting from the 1960s, however, the state likewise recognized their participation in the public sphere and acknowledged their demands for government attention. The existence and activities of the POs were legitimated by their partnerships with the NGOs.

By contrast, the state’s responses to the middle class-based voluntary organizations were generally positive – at worse indifferent, and at best, accommodating. For such reason, this strand of Philippine civil society was also generally supportive and cooperative towards the state. Despite the indifference of the Spanish colonial state, for example, the philanthropic organizations assisted the colonial government in providing relief and welfare assistance to its constituencies during time of calamities because their founders – the Filipino elites – were seeking acknowledgement of their social status from the colonial administrators and their agents. The intellectual circles and propaganda organizations emerged only due to the persistent refusal of the Spanish colonial state to acknowledge their status and grant the local elites participation in governance. But even at that, they had not advocated the overthrow of the colonial state until the latter moved to harass and suppress them.
In similar fashion, the American colonial government’s support and encouragement promoted the proliferation of civic associations that were subservient to the government. While they provided venues for discussions of national policies, these civil associations hardly provided the check and balance on state powers. The first of the civil associations that dared to assume such role were the social action guilds, followed by the middle class-led trade unions. However, even these did not critically engage the state. Rather, they persuaded the leaders of the state to incorporate their ideas of social reform into its existing program by harping on the social discontent that was brewing among the grassroots sectors.

It was only in the 1960s, amidst the failure of the state to curb corruption and address the worsening socio-economic problems in the country that the middle class-based voluntary organizations became actively involved in the mobilization against the state in partnership with the grassroots-based POs. During this period, majority of the groups operating within the realm of the civil society adopted an antagonistic stance towards the state. In response, the Marcos administration suspended the people’s freedom of expression and assembly, which led to the contraction of the legally acknowledged civil society. This, nonetheless, also resulted to the fusion of civil society groups and the ideological parties operating outside the realm of civil society. Under this arrangement, the organizational structures and normative underpinnings of the Philippine civil society were sustained through the influence of the church.

During the re-democratization period, the state encouraged the civil society groups, particularly the NGOs, to participate in the government’s development administration programs. This provided the NGOs access to resources from international
funding institutions for their grassroots efforts. In response, the NGOs adopted a stance of critical collaboration towards the state. This triggered the shift in the NGOs’ strategies from political organizing towards social development. This, in turn, facilitated the process of professionalization among many NGOs. As the NGO’s involvement in government was further institutionalized, the NGOs reverted to the practice of its predecessors of critically collaborating with the state.

There were those who argued that this indicated co-optation and at worse, incorporation of the civil society into the machineries of state. From the above, however, it was noted that collaborative relationship already existed between the middle class-based voluntary associations and the government from the very beginning. Nonetheless, this did not prevent the former from criticizing state programs and policies nor from taking opposite positions vis-à-vis the state concerning social issues. In fact, it was only during the dictatorship that this relationship had been, to a large extent, severed. Even during the Martial Law era, however, some NGOs maintained working relationship with the government in order to tap resources from such and make them available to other groups who were not in good terms with the state.

Secondly, it was also noted that over the years, these organizations were able to exert some degree of influence over the social policies of the state. This was evident in the Social Justice Program of Pres. Quezon in the 1930s, the anti-insurgency program of the Magsaysay administration in the 1950s, and even the Social Reform Agenda and PA 21 of the Ramos administration in the 1990s. By contrast, the influence of the state on the efforts and activities of the NGOs and POs were minimal. As pointed out by social scientists, the role of the Philippine civil society was not so much of balancing the power
of a “strong state”, but rather, pressuring it to take a stronger stance against the opposition of the powerful business interests and the local political bosses (Carroll SJ: 1998).

Implications of the Transformation from Social Activist to a Development Intermediary Organization: The ISO Experience

It was argued earlier that the developments in the Philippine civil society are mirrored by the experiences of individual NGOs. This was true in the case of the oldest NGO in the country, the Institute of Social Order (ISO). ISO was initially created to concretize the Catholic social teachings on social justice as well as to address the increasing influence of communism at the grassroots level. In its pursuit of this goal, however, it facilitated the creation of public spaces that served as venues where various groups of people articulate and discuss public issues, as well as the mobilization of middle class-based volunteer associations and grassroots organizations. In the early years, its forerunners harnessed retreats and recollections for the businessmen and the workers to interact and bond together under the atmosphere of prayers. The premise was that if they get to dialogue, then it is possible for the former to be more humane in their treatment of the workers. It later on facilitated the emergence of the social action guilds that conducted public forums and anti-communist propaganda, as well as lobbied with the government to promote social reforms.

When ISO was formally established in 1947, it resumed its efforts to inspire and guide volunteers to mix and work with the trade unions with the intent of finding out ways and means to draw them away from communism. It drew volunteers from the student-members of the Ateneo Social Order Club to undertaken union organizing and
labor-management trainings. These resulted to the setting up of alternative trade unions and federations that served as Christian counterweights to the communist-influenced PKM and CLO. During the 1960s when the Catholic Church was promoting community development, the ISO facilitated the creation of voluntary organizations like the PECCO, which pioneered community organizing as a way of promoting people empowerment. Up until this time, the ISO maintained its informal associational character and operated only through a network of partner voluntary organizations.

This changed upon the declaration of Martial Law as the state subjected its network of voluntary associations and their volunteer workers to harassment. The ISO, which was reconstituted into the La Ignaciana Apostolic Center (LIAC), was compelled to subsume the organizing and education efforts of its partner voluntary organizations to establish their legitimacy. It also had to hire the volunteers as workers to keep them from being harassed and arrested by the military. Moreover, it also assumed responsibility for looking for funding support for these programs since the voluntary organizations were curtailed from raising their own means of supporting their efforts. These facilitated its transformation from an informal associational entity into a formally constituted NGO. In addition to this, however, these also led the LIAC to assume the role of being a legal front for the underground ideological party, the PDSP. As a result, it was placed under military surveillance. However, this only compelled it to be more creative in camouflaging its programs into forms tolerated by the state.

Like the other organizations that served as front organizations for the underground movement, LIAC undertook the dual role of organizing the grassroots sectors to address their specific concerns, while simultaneously linking them to the
broader anti-dictatorship movement. Its extension workers likewise performed the
dual function of being community organizers and PDSP cadre on field. Through this, the
LIAC became instrumental in mobilizing the grassroots sectors as part of the network of
anti-dictatorship movement under the wing of the PDSP.

When the Marcos dictatorship ended in 1986, LIAC was among the NGOs
affected by the crisis of the ideological political parties, leading its Jesuit leaders to
decide to cut LIAC’s ties with PDSP. Simultaneous with the distancing from ideological
politics, LIAC was reconstituted again into the ISO, signaling the change of strategy of
the institution from political organizing to social development. Part of this shift of
strategy was becoming an intermediary organization. This is part of its bid to join the
other NGOs in the effort to harness the opportunities provided by the Philippine
government to become involved in the development administration process. With this,
ISO likewise entered a phase of professionalization and bureaucratization.

This led to internal conflicts within the organization as competition for hegemony
and control of program implementation ensued between the ideologue staffs who were
struggling to assert the influence of the ideological party on the organization, and the
politically non-aligned professional staffs who were hired to promote the mainstreaming
of the organization into development administration. The conflict spilled over its partner
POs, which in view of the changed terms of support provided by the ISO were also
raising concern regarding ISO’s control of funding resources. Over time, however, the
professional staffs were able to establish control of the organization and pursue the
mainstreaming of the ISO into development administration. With this, ISO joined the
other NGOs who declared themselves as non-aligned “middle force” in the Philippine society.

**NGO-PO Partnership**

As indicated in the discussion of the historical evolution of the Philippine civil society and further illustrated by the experiences of the ISO, the partnership between the NGOs and POs has evolved over time. During its nascent stages, the two strands of Philippine civil society did not have any established relationship at all. They proceeded in parallel direction because the elites and middle classes did not recognize the grassroots’ capacity to lead because of their lack of education. This view of the grassroots persisted even until the 1930s when it became clear that the labor and peasants had highly organized, but communist-influenced trade unions.

Even with this recognition, however, groups like the ISO and its partner volunteer associations were set up to educate the grassroots sectors on how to take advantage of social reform measures being proposed on their behalf. In the 1940s, the ISO set up alternative trade unions with grassroots members. However, their leaderships were comprised of middle class professionals. Under such arrangement, a patron-client relationship, not a partnership, was established between the middle class volunteers and the grassroots because decision-making process was centralized on the former.

This changed in the 1960s when, in light of the change in the Catholic social teachings, the voluntary associations began to recognize the capabilities of the grassroots to pursue their own interests, if organized and given appropriate trainings. Under such premise, an equal partnership between the voluntary associations and the POs became possible, as illustrated by the PECCO-ZOTO partnership. Under this arrangement, the
voluntary associations were able to develop skills in community organizing, while the POs learned to harness their skills in negotiating with the agencies of the state.

During Martial Law, however, issue-based organizing that recognized the freedom of the grassroots sectors to determine their own priorities was de-prioritized in favor of mobilizing for the broader concern over militarization and dictatorship. Equal partnership between the cause-oriented groups/voluntary organizations and the POs was replaced by an administrative partnership wherein the former provided the latter with logistical support while it encouraged them to provide the mass base for the anti-dictatorship movement. Implicit in this arrangement was the understanding that once the dictatorship is gone, the issues and concerns of the grassroots would be addressed. Under such arrangement, however, the NGO-PO relationship took the form of dependency.

When the dictatorship ended, the NGOs began to realize that they needed to address the developmental concerns of the grassroots as a whole if they were to actually empower them. This was re-enforced by the observation that pressing livelihood concerns were preventing the grassroots from meaningfully participating in the public space that just became open for them.

Simultaneously, the government and international funding institutions had also made available to the NGOs funding resources for their community work. However, the utilization of these funds was subject to the completion of specific target outputs at particular schedules. To respond to these requirements, the NGOs began to adopt contractual arrangements with their grassroots partners. They set performance benchmarks and outputs for their assistance to the grassroots. They likewise began to take their development intermediary roles more seriously, putting in resources only on
activities such as livelihood development and capability building which would generate impact and promote long-term sustainability to the grassroots organizations. As the funding available for the NGOs became limited, contractual relationship between NGOs and POs became further institutionalized. Moreover, the NGOs began to expand their intermediary roles to include harnessing the resources of local institutions to achieve social change. They began to broker resources and power among these different stakeholders.

Assumption of “brokering” role, nonetheless, indicated that the NGOs were attempting to strategically insert themselves to position of influence in society by maximizing their roles in development administration. As development brokers, they could invoke their partnership with the grassroots sectors to exert pressure to the state and ensure that their concerns, and those of the grassroots, are addressed. However, years of organizing, education and training had empowered the grassroots sectors to the point that they were capable of asserting themselves, not only to the state but also to their partner NGOs. Over the last few years, the clamor for autonomy in decision-making, for self-representation and greater access to resources among the POs had gotten stronger.

To maintain hegemony over the civil society, the NGOs thus resorted to opening new scopes of development work and new areas of competencies by which to justify their relationship with the grassroots organizations even as they relinquish responsibilities and authorities to the grassroots sectors in terms of community organizing. In doing so, the NGOs also expanded and diversified their own ranks.

On a positive note, this expanded and diversified the conventional civil society and strengthened the grassroots organizations thereby strengthening the entire civil
society by itself in terms of exerting pressure on the state. This was amply
demonstrated by the EDSA 2 mobilizations that prompted the resignation of Pres.
Estrada. On a negative note, however, the grassroots organizations, which have learned
the art of mass mobilizations and pressure politics well enough from the conventional
civil society groups began to use such to assert themselves. Unfortunately, while they
have learned the tactics of pressure politics well, they had not yet imbibed the ethics of
democracy in similar fashion. Thus, despite the middle class’ self-serving motivations to
position themselves as forces to reckon with the in the Philippine society, they
nonetheless still face the challenge of promoting norms and values (i.e., the Christian
principles of social justice) that could facilitate the development of civility among the
Filipino citizenry as a whole. Becoming intermediary organizations could very well be a
means by which they could face this challenge.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1

INTERVIEW GUIDE
(For Key Informants on the History of the NGO Movement in the Philippines)

Questions

1. In your own perception, how would you characterize the history of the NGO movement in the Philippines? What are its significant transition points/period? What triggered these turning points?

2. How are these shaped by:
   a. the government policies and programs towards the civil society
   b. the social and political activities and teachings of the Catholic church
   c. the support of international donor institutions
   d. the academe’s social involvement
   e. the activities of the electoral political parties
   f. the internal issues and conflict among the different ideological parties in the country

3. Over the years, the NGOs have become preoccupied with the professionalization of social development work. Based on your experience in your own organization, did these affect:
   a. the internal organizational structures and systems of individual NGOs
   b. the orientation of the NGO workers
   c. the types and nature of the services/programs which your NGO engage in
   d. the services/assistance you provide to your partner people’s organizations
   e. your interaction with the grassroots sector

4. What changes did these create in the way NGOs deal with:
   a. the government (the local government units and national line agencies)
   b. the prospective donor/funding institutions
   c. other NGOs
   d. partner people’s organizations

5. It has been argued that the NGOs have emerged to become development intermediary organizations that link formal state and international donor institutions with the loosely organized people’s organizations. Some think that this places the NGOs in strategic positions as development “brokers”. Is this a good or bad development? In what ways are they good or bad? Are there dangers that NGOs would use such position for their organizational advantages?
6. Social development workers recognized different generations of NGO workers. In your opinion, how many generations are there? How do you distinguish these different categories of NGO workers? Compare and contrast them with each other in terms of:
   a. educational background – college, high school, elementary
   b. areas of specialization – social services, science and technology, management and administration, vocational, etc.
   c. economic status
   d. family background – from family of activists, businessmen, government bureaucrats, politicians, etc.
   e. political affiliations and orientation – social democrat, national democrat, popular democrat, liberal democrat, etc.
   f. motivations for joining the ISO

7. Can these different generations of social development workers be generally classified as middle class workers? Why or why not?

8. Do the changes in the nature of NGO workers affect the nature of NGO work? How?

9. Are there areas of tensions and conflict among different generations of NGO workers? What are the particular examples of these? How are these resolved?

10. Are the grassroots sectors privy to these tensions? How are these tensions and conflict perceived by the grassroots sectors? How do they respond to these?

11. Do these affect the relationship between NGOs and POs? How?

12. Based on your observation, how do the changes in the nature of NGO operations affect the grassroots people’s movements?

13. In the long-term, how do you think this would affect (a) poverty, (b) grassroots participation in the development administration process, (c) the democratization of the development administration process, and (d) nation building?
Appendix 2

INTERVIEW/FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE
(For Key ISO Management and Personnel)

Themes

1. **Personal Views on the Evolution of the Institute**
   a. When did you first get involved with the ISO (date and socio-historical context)? On what capacity?
   b. What were the goals of the organization then?
   c. Who were its major clients then? Why were these clients chosen? Who were your partner people’s organizations then? How would you assess ISO’s relationship with them?
   d. What were the program strategies of ISO then?
   e. How big was ISO then? How was it structured organizationally?
   f. Describe the leaders of ISO then. The rank and file staff.
   g. Who were its major funders and supporters? How was ISO’s working relationship with them?
   h. What government agencies did ISO closely interact with then? How was ISO’s working relationship with them?
   i. How about the church? Being a Jesuit institution, to what church groups was the ISO affiliated with? How was ISO’s relationship with these groups?
   j. Was ISO affiliated with political and/or ideological parties back then? Which ones? How would you describe ISO’s relationship with these political and/or ideological parties?
   k. To what NGO and civil society networks and alliances were ISO affiliated/connected with? How would you describe ISO’s relationship with these groups?
   l. Based on your observation, what were the significant changes that transpired in the ISO over the years in terms of: (a) organizational VMG, program strategies, organizational structure and personnel composition, (b) external supporters and partners and (c) clientele. What prompted these changes? What effects do they have in ISO’s capacities to address the needs of the poor and marginalized sectors of society?

2. **External Factors Influencing ISO’s Organizational Transformation**
   a. Identify and describe the significant international and national socio-economic and political events that you remember had affected the ISO’s operations significantly. How did these affect the ISO?
   b. Identify the government policies and programs that you remember had affected the goals, objectives and projects of the ISO significantly. How did the ISO respond to these developments?
c. What significant developments within the Society of Jesus and the Philippine Catholic church have affected ISO's operations? How did ISO fit into the social and political positions taken by the Philippine Catholic church over the years?

d. What developments in the policies and orientations of international donor institutions and official development agencies towards the NGOs affected the ISO? In what ways?

e. What developments in electoral and ideological politics affected the ISO operations? In what ways?

f. How about the academe? How was the ISO affected by the social involvement of its sister Jesuit institution, the Ateneo de Manila University?

g. How about the NGO community as a whole? How did the shifting alliances in the NGO movement affect the ISO’s operations?

3. Internal Organizational Dynamics

a. Personnel

1) How would you characterize the ISO staff during your time in terms of:
   (a) educational background – college, high school or elementary graduates
   (b) specialization/interest – social services, science and technology, management and administration, vocational, etc.
   (c) economic status
   (d) family background – from family of activists, businessmen, government bureaucrats, politicians, etc.
   (e) political affiliations and orientation – social democrat, national democrat, popular democrat, liberal democrat, etc.
   (f) motivations for joining the ISO

   Were there significant changes in personnel since you were at the ISO? How would you characterize these changes? Is it possible to periodize these changes? How?

2) Did these, in any way, affect the nature of operations of the ISO? How?

3) Are particular areas of conflict among different generations of ISO staff? Can you cite particular examples of these? How are these resolved?

b. Groupings and Cliques

1) Are there observable cliques and competing groups within the organization? How are these cliques organized? What are tension points and issues among them? How are these tensions managed/resolved?

2) How do these affect the setting of the ISO’s goals and strategies? The implementation of programs?
4. **Community Responses**
   a. In your perception, how did ISO’s partner people’s organizations respond to the changes in the organization’s goals, objectives and strategies?
   b. How do these affected, in turn, the relationship of the ISO with its partner POs?
   c. Were the ISO’s partner POs privy to the internal tensions among the different cliques within the ISO? How did these affect the ISO-PO partnership?
Appendix 3

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE
(For Leaders and Officers of ISO’s Partner People’s Organizations)

Themes

1. **Organizational Status of the People’s Organization**
   a. Description of the organization
      1. Vision-Mission-Goals
      2. Organizational Structure
      3. Programs and Projects – What are the current activities of your people’s organization?
      4. Systems and Policies
      5. Recruitment - When did you join the organization? Why did you join the Organization
      6. Membership Status - How many are the total membership? How many are active? How many are non-active?
   b. Did your organization undergo some changes over the years? What are these? What triggered them?

2. **Assessment of ISO Assistance to the People’s Organization**
   a. Describe the social, economic and political situation of your sector prior to ISO interventions. Identify your sector’s problems and concerns.
   b. When did ISO come to your community?
   c. What are ISO’s program assistance? What are the major activities which you took part of? What are the effects of these in your lives? What recommendations do you have to improve these?
   d. What do you think are the roles of ISO community organizers in your community? Do you think they are fulfilling these roles? How? Do you have recommendations on what the ISO community organizers should do to further assist you?

3. **Tension Points in the Relationship between the ISO and the people’s organization**
   a. Do you experience any problems in terms of your working relationship with the ISO? What are these?
   b. What are the causes of these tensions? Can these be addressed? How?

4. Overall, how do you assess ISO’s program intervention in your community? Is it facilitating or hindering your PO’s organizational growth? Does it assist in your empowerment? Does it help in improving your living condition?
Appendix 4.1 - Summary of Changes in the Nature and Characteristics of the Philippine Civil Society
By Historical Period - Pre-Authoritarian Era (16th Century to 1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Spanish Period</strong> (16th Century-1898)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abuses of Spanish friars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rise of the Filipino bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enlightenment period in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>American Period</strong> (1898-1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Transplantation of American democratic institutions through government legislations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Development of class consciousness among the peasants and workers due to the oppressive practices of the local elites, particularly, the land owners</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rise of white collar professionals (bureaucrats)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Introduction of the communist/socialist ideology in the country</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Re-emergence of the Catholic Church with very strong anti-communist sentiments</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Japanese Occup. Period</strong> (1941-1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Japanese-American War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Abolition of all public and private institutions and replacement with Japanese controlled associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Post-War Era</strong> (1946-1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Granting of Philippine independence by the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Bell Trade Act of 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Total destruction of the country followed by a brief period of economic recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The rise of the manufacturing entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Broadening of the Filipino white collar professional class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Widespread poverty and stiff income inequality between the rich and poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- High rate of in-migration to the urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Spread of communism in Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social justice as theme of Catholic social involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Pre-Martial Law Era</strong> (1961-1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International trade deficit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic crisis that led to worsening poverty conditions and social inequality</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Competition between the land-owning/exporter elites vs. the manufacturing entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rise of nationalism influenced by the worldwide protest against U.S. interventionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Radicalization of the Catholic Church (Vatican II)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Success of communist movement in Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government scandals involving graft and corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite-Based</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Church supported mutual aid societies and philanthropic associations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Socio-political propaganda groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grassroots Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- secret societies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- revivalist movements</td>
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<td>- independence movements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Membership</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-Political Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ilustrados (sons of the wealthy mestizos schooled in Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolution ary Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- laborantes and indias</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Goals</strong></td>
<td><strong>Socio-Political Assocs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- equal rights for the natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- social reform that would allow the <em>ilustrados</em> to be involved in colonial administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Revolutionary Movements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- freedom from friar abuses, abolition of forced labor and independence from Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Civic Clubs and Voluntary Associations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- social prestige or acceptance to the elite circles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- countervail the spread of communism through social reform and corporatism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sectoral Trade Unions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- improved working conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- independence from the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Voluntary Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- liberation from the Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- maintain peace and order in the communities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- promote equitable share in the distribution of farm products</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hybrid Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- community organizers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- comprised of former student activists, priests, nuns, religious and revolutionaries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Revolutionary Movement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- former social activists</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Grassroots organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- peasants, workers, urban poor organized and trained by community organizers</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Voluntary Organizations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Liberty and welfare services to the poor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Post-war reconstruction</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Counter the spread of communism among the grassroots</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Illegal Social Movements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Huk militias from the peasant and labor classes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Revolutionary Movements</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Oppose U.S. intervention-ism, feudalism &amp; capitalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Strategies and Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-Political Assocs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- propaganda and lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for socio-political reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- rebellion/revolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sectoral Trade Unions</td>
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<td>5. Source of Support</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- family, friends and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>sympathizers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Features</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Organizational Structure</td>
<td>Socio-Political Assocs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- voluntary and informal with set process for choosing leadership and membership discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- voluntary and informal with elaborate rituals for recruitment and set process for election of leaders, and membership policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Relationship with Other Social Agents and Institutions</td>
<td>Gradually merged into the revolutionary movement, the Katipunan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grassroots movements
- church organizations
- membership dues

Voluntary Organizations
- formal membership and leadership structures, rules and regulations
- voluntary, state-sanctioned

Illegal Social Movements
- informal militias
- voluntary, outlawed by the state
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>- <em>Katipunan</em> eventually split into two factions due to leadership issues</td>
<td>- Catholic social action guilds antagonistic towards the PKL towards the PKP</td>
<td>- No formal interaction with the trade unions although the church held joint retreats/recollections between managers and laborers</td>
<td>- &quot;Civil&quot; organizations have joint projects (e.g. the NAMFREL)</td>
<td>- Links with the revolutionary movements exist due to the common memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. With the State</td>
<td><em>Socio-Political Assoc.</em></td>
<td><em>Civic and Voluntary Assoc.</em></td>
<td>- antagonistic</td>
<td><em>Voluntary Organizations</em></td>
<td>- Relationship with the grassroots groups ranged from dependency to mutual cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- critical/antagonistic but amenable to negotiations</td>
<td>- bureaucrats are members of civic associations</td>
<td></td>
<td>- state sponsored civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Revolutionary Movements</em></td>
<td>- state supportive of civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td>- collaborative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- antagonistic</td>
<td>- collaborative</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>&quot;Illegal&quot; Social Movements</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Sectoral Trade Unions</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>- antagonistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- indirectly antagonistic; focus of antagonism were the elites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Role in Democratization/Development</td>
<td>- Promoted questioning of and eventual resistance to colonial rule</td>
<td><em>Civic &amp; Voluntary Assoc.</em></td>
<td>- Provided venues for grassroots participation and equitable distribution of productive resources</td>
<td><em>Voluntary Organizations</em></td>
<td>- Antagonistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- vehicles for promoting concept of democracy and anti-communism</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Reconstruction and provision of social services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Sectoral Trade Unions</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>&quot;Illegal&quot; Social Movements</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- improved working conditions for peasants/laborers</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Bringing grievances to public attention</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 4.2 - Summary of Changes in the Nature and Characteristics of the Philippine Civil Society

#### By Historical Period - Authoritarian Era (1972-1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. External Influencing Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Nature of Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Church-based voluntary and social action groups served as legal fronts and abeyance organizations for the underground movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Auxiliary offices in academic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cause-oriented groups (legal assistance, feminist groups, environmental grps., etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Social development agencies as the first NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coalitions of cause-oriented groups and NGOs demanding justice for Aquino and the dismantling of the Marcos dictatorship (JAJA, KOMPIL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>|                      | B. Nature and Characteristics of Civil Society                                                                                                 |
|                      | 1. Nature of Organizations                                                                                                                     |
|                      | <strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong>                                                                                                     |
|                      | - Rise of authoritarian states in Asia                                                                                                          |
|                      | - Declaration of Martial Law (Aug. 21, 1972)                                                                                                    |
|                      | - Improved economy due to boom in export                                                                                                        |
|                      | - Collaboration of the businessmen with the Marcos administration                                                                               |
|                      | - Foreign borrowings to finance government development projects                                                                               |
|                      | - Rise of the govt. technocrats (economists)                                                                                                    |
|                      | - Marginalization of some poor groups as a result of government modernization programs                                                         |
|                      | - Critical collaboration policy by the Church; radicalization of the rank and file clergy                                                       |
|                      | <strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong>                                                                                                     |
|                      | - Pressure from international community to desist from human rights violation and to lift martial law                                           |
|                      | - Government interventions in the market economy in favor of Marcos cronies                                                                    |
|                      | - Graft and corruption                                                                                                                         |
|                      | - Economic crisis due to stricter imposition of WB-IMF lending conditions                                                                       |
|                      | - Marginalization of the technocrats in development administration                                                                            |
|                      | - Withdrawal of support of businessmen from the Marcos administration                                                                           |
|                      | - Deterioration of church-state relationship                                                                                                |
|                      | - Increased public support of the underground revolutionary movements                                                                        |
|                      | <strong>Middle Class-Based Legal Organizations</strong>                                                                                                     |
|                      | - Assassination of Benigno Aquino                                                                                                               |
|                      | - Media expose of Marcos ill-gotten wealth and government anomalies                                                                            |
|                      | - International pressure to restore the democratic process (e.g., elections)                                                                     |
|                      | - Political and economic crisis                                                                                                                  |
|                      | - Politicization of the military                                                                                                                 |
|                      | - Businessmen support of the protest movement                                                                                                   |
|                      | - Radicalization of the white collar professionals                                                                                               |
|                      | - Open criticism of the Catholic Church of the Marcos dictatorship                                                                             |
|                      | - Increased strength of the revolutionary movements                                                                                            |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                | Middle Class-Based Illegal Organizations                                                    | Middle Class-Based Illegal Organizations                                        | BAYAN, BANDILA, etc.                                                           |
|                                | - NDF-CPP-NPA (communist revolutionaries)                                                     | - NDF-CPP-NPA (rural mass base)                                                  | - election watchdogs (NAMFRFL)                                                 |
|                                | - PDSP-Sandigan (social democrats)                                                           | - PDSP-Sandigan (urban mass base)                                                 | Grassroots-Based Groups                                                        |
|                                | Grassroots-Based Groups                                                                     | Grassroots-Based Groups                                                           | - Federation of POs                                                            |
|                                | - Basic Christian Communities                                                               | - People's Organizations (POs)                                                    | Cause-Oriented Groups                                                          |
|                                | - Cooperatives as grassroots-based groups                                                    |                                                                                 | - Primarily middle class organizers but grassroots mass-base                  |
|                                | Voluntary Organizations (Legal Front Organizations)                                          |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | - Middle class social activists seeking legal ways to continue their social justice work as |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | community organizers                                                                        |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | - Cadres of underground revolutionary movements organizing communities at the guise of      |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | church and charitable works                                                                  |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | Grassroots Organizations                                                                     |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |
|                                | - Grassroots leaders opposing marginalization and human rights abuses (mostly urban poor,   |                                                                                 |                                                                                 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>peasants)</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Goals</td>
<td>- Sustain resistance movements during time of repression&lt;br&gt;- Check military abuses&lt;br&gt;- Protect communities from being marginalized by development projects of government</td>
<td>- Strengthen the resistance movements against martial law&lt;br&gt;- Check military abuses&lt;br&gt;- Restoration of civil rights and protection of communities from marginalization</td>
<td>- To topple the Marcos dictatorship&lt;br&gt;<strong>Cause-Oriented Groups</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Natdem groups</strong>: boycott the election&lt;br&gt;<strong>Socdem groups</strong>: participate in the election&lt;br&gt;- establish a unified coalition that would mount mass protest against the dictatorship&lt;br&gt;- demonstrations, prayer rallies, &quot;run for democracy&quot;, protest caravans, civil disobedience, boycott of crony corporations, etc.&lt;br&gt;- &quot;sweeping&quot; organizing (i.e., federation building)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Features</strong></td>
<td>- To prevent arrest of members, organizations are informal and loose, with minimum documentations of transactions as possible - Revolutionary movements operating under the shadow of church-based and grassroots org'ns.</td>
<td>- Informal, loose, with minimum documentations of transactions as possible although organ'll structure had to be set in place to legitimize existence with international partners/donors - Revolutionary movements operating under the shadow of church-based and grassroots org'ns.</td>
<td>- Informal, loose and flexible systems for membership recruitment. - Emphasis on mobilizing large mass-base instead of establishing tight organizations - No clear boundaries between the revolutionary movements and the &quot;civil&quot; society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agents and Institutions</strong></td>
<td>- Close links with the Catholic Church and the academe for protection and funding support - Coalitions and networks of groups working on similar issues (e.g. PECCO, NATTCO) - Close working relationship with the grassroots groups, thereby blurring distinctions between civil society groups - Legal appendages/recruiting agents of the revolutionary movements</td>
<td>- Sustained links with Catholic Church - Established relationship with international NGOs - Close working relationship between NGOs and POs - NGOs continued to serve as legal fronts and sources of support for the revolutionary movements</td>
<td>- Coalition of groups of various ideological leanings although this is marred by suspicion and competition for control among rival ideological movements. Resulted to the collapse of the anti-dictatorship unified fronts - NGOs fully subsidizing PO participation in the mass mobilization, which promoted dependency relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. With other Civil Society Groups</strong></td>
<td>- Antagonistic</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Generally antagonistic, but with some NGOs having working relationship with select govt. agencies on poverty alleviation projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. With the State</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Generally antagonistic, with the civil society poised to topple the Marcos dictatorship</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>D. Role in Democratization/Development</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Provided the public sphere where the grassroots can discuss and air their grievances against the state</td>
<td>- Maximized the limited public sphere to discuss and air public grievance against the state and lobby for the restoration of civil rights and democracy</td>
<td>- Forced the expansion and opening of the public sphere to express dissent against the Marcos dictatorship and to pressure Pres. Marcos to step down from power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 4.3 - Summary of Changes in the Nature and Characteristics of the Philippine Civil Society

**By Historical Period - Re-Democratization Era (1986-Present)**

|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **A. External Influencing Factors** | - 1986 "Freedom" Constitution  
- Widespread poverty and government's bankruptcy, coupled with the public's high expectations of social reform  
- Series of coup d'etat  
- Increase in ODA but with foreign funding institution preferring NGOs as conduits  
- Catholic Church's retreat from partisan politics  
- Looming crisis in the NDF-CPP-NPA | - Synchronized National and Local Elections  
- Election of a pluralist president who adopted consultative style of administration  
- Boom in export market, which reduced unemployment, improved poverty situation, albeit, with worsened social inequality  
- Social Reform Agenda  
- Rio Summit, WTO/APEC Summit, PA 21  
- Decline in ODA level with a large portion allocated to the NGOs; change in the nature of NGOs' ODA allocation from grants to contractual funds  
- Continuing reduction of church subsidy to the civil society  
- Fragmentation of the NDF-CPP-NPA | - Synchronized National and Local Election with the party list system  
- Election of a popular but corrupt president  
- Asian financial crisis that caused massive unemployment and led to aggravation of poverty conditions among the grassroots sector  
- Gross inefficiency and lack of direction in the government  
- Collapse of the stock market in view of manipulation by the crony businessmen  
- Re-entry of the business sector and the Catholic Church into partisan politics  
- Estrada impeachment case/EDSA 2  
- Appointment of Macapagal-Arroyo as president |
| **B. Nature and Characteristics of Civil Society** |  
1. Nature of Organizations | - NGO/PO Coalitions (CODE-NGO, CPAR)  
*Elite-Led* - corporate foundations and philanthropic organizations, "mutant" NGOs | - Strengthened and relatively ideologically autonomous NGO and PO coalitions  
- alternative political parties (*Akbayan*) | - Alternative political parties/Party list  
- Autonomous NGO coalitions with relatively strong secretariats |

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**Legend:**
- **Post-EDSA (Aquino Administration Period (1986-1992))**
- **Consolidation Period (Ramos Administration Period (1992-1997))**
- **Setback Period (Estrada-Arroyo Administration Period (1997-Present))**
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<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Middle-Class Led</td>
<td>Middle-Class Led</td>
<td>- Coalition of anti-Estrada NGO and cause-oriented coalitions (KOMPIL II)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- social development NGOs</td>
<td>- foundations established under joint efforts with the state (e.g., PFE)</td>
<td>- NGOs and POs : same as previous period</td>
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<td>- cause oriented groups</td>
<td>- POs and PO federations</td>
<td>- same composition as previous periods except that they are highly politicized</td>
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<td>Grassroots-Led</td>
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<td>- POs and PO federations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- NGOs - middle class professionals comprised of former social activists/cadres, community organizers, former government technocrats and conscientious business sector employees)</td>
<td>- NGOs - highly skilled and highly specialized middle class professionals in the scientific, information and gender studies fields</td>
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<td>- POs - grassroots leaders and middle class community organizers who serve as PO secretariat</td>
<td>- POs - grassroots leaders who had years of training and experiences in community organizing and advocacy</td>
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<td>2. Membership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Middle-Class Led</td>
<td>Coalitions - influence government policies</td>
<td>Coalitions - gain access and influence government policies through the electoral process</td>
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<td>- HGOs - highly skilled and highly specialized middle class professionals in the scientific, information and gender studies fields</td>
<td>- gain access to state office through the electoral process</td>
<td>- strengthen autonomy and self-sustainability in light of declining ODA funds</td>
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<td>- POs - grassroots leaders who had years of training and experiences in community organizing and advocacy</td>
<td>- NGO's - influence implementation of gov't dev't programs at the local level to make them responsive to grassroots needs</td>
<td>- NGO's - organizational sustainability</td>
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<td>- POs - grassroots leaders who had years of training and experiences in community organizing and advocacy</td>
<td>- build solid mass base in light of failure in delivering electoral votes</td>
<td>- promote values re-orientation among the grassroots in light of the election of many morally questionable but popular candidates to office</td>
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<td>- POs - grassroots leaders who had years of training and experiences in community organizing and advocacy</td>
<td>- build solid mass base in light of failure in delivering electoral votes</td>
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<td>3. Goals</td>
<td>Coalitions - promote unity among NGOs and/ or POs for advocacy purposes</td>
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<td>- securing integrity of social development profession</td>
<td>- gain access to state office through the electoral process</td>
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<td>- resource mobilization</td>
<td>- NGO's - influence implementation of gov't dev't programs at the local level to make them responsive to grassroots needs</td>
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<td>Elite-Led Org'ns - tax shelter, access to ODA resources, avoidance of government procedures, political machinery</td>
<td>- build solid mass base in light of failure in delivering electoral votes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Middle-Class Led - promotion of social reform, social justice and social development</td>
<td>- build solid mass base in light of failure in delivering electoral votes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Features</td>
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<td>Post-EDSA (Aquino Administration Period (1986-1992))</td>
<td><strong>Grassroots-Led</strong> - alleviation of poverty, improvement of conditions of the grassroots, access to resources</td>
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<td>Consolidation Period (Ramos Administration Period (1992-1997))</td>
<td><strong>Grassroots Org's</strong> - alleviation of poverty, improvement of conditions of the grassroots, access to resources, organizational sustainability, relative autonomy from the NGOs</td>
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<td>Setback Period (Estrada-Arroyo Administration Period (1997-Present))</td>
<td>- identification and building up of alternative political leaders, <strong>Grassroots Org's</strong> - alleviation of poverty, improvement of conditions of the grassroots, access to resources, organizational sustainability, relative autonomy from the NGOs, <strong>Coalitions</strong> - setting up of an accreditation council to grant approval for NGOs to avail of donations from private sources, - setting up of trust funds and revenue generation schemes to support member-NGOs, - orchestration and coordination of political lobbying and advocacy efforts (KOMPIL 2), - establishment of partnership with the business sector and international development organizations such as the WB and ADB, <strong>NGOs</strong> - same as previous period, - values re-orientation as part of capability building assistance to POs, - intensified revenue-generation</td>
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**4. Strategies and Activities**

**Activities**

**NGO Coalitions** - coordination of efforts, establishing funding mechanisms, promoting code of conduct, - establishment of regional/local networks, - electoral participation/lobbying, **NGOs** - development intermediary functions, critical engagement with government, professionalization, upscaling of operations, diversification of scopes of social development work, - electoral education/support of candidates, **POs** - federation building, advocacy efforts in partnership with the NGOs, - electoral participation/lobbying, **NGOs** - serving as fund intermediaries for the small and medium-sized NGOs, - regionalization, - participation in government-sponsored and international summits, - monitoring and evaluation of SRA and PA 21, - electoral reform advocacy, **NGOs** - fund conduits for the POs, - further professionalization, institutionalization of social security benefits for their staff, revenue-generation for self-sustainability, establishing niche in social dev't, - localization of program implementation, **POs** - federation building, advocacy and income generation measures, - linking with the local government units, - localization of program implementation, - values re-orientation as part of capability building assistance to POs, - intensified revenue-generation
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<td>5. Source of Support</td>
<td><strong>NGO Coalitions</strong> - NGO membership dues, ODA</td>
<td><strong>NGO Coalitions</strong> - NGO membership dues, ODA, consultancy services</td>
<td><strong>POs</strong> - pursuit of greater autonomy in terms of linking with the local government units, and revenue generation</td>
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<td><strong>NGOs</strong> - international funding institutions, ODA, government</td>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong> - international funding institutions, ODA, consultancy services, other revenue generating activities (e.g., micro-lending)</td>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong> - NGO membership dues, service fees, ODA, revenue-generation</td>
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<td><strong>POs</strong> - NGOs, membership dues</td>
<td><strong>POs</strong> - NGOs, membership dues, revenue generating activities (e.g., livelihood projects)</td>
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<td>6. Organizational Structure</td>
<td><strong>- Formal organizational structures with HRD and finance offices, monitoring and evaluation systems</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Formal organizational structures, with social security benefits for the staff, research and technology development units</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Formal organizational structures, with units specializing in specific tasks, including the promotion of the organization, program proposal packaging, etc.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>- Duly registered with SEC and other accreditation offices</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Institutionalized career pathing as part of org'l development in view of internal staff conflicts</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Self-accrediting and self-regulating agencies to ensure standards of NGO work and to ensure funds are allocated to duly recognized NGOs</strong></td>
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<td>C. Relationship with Other Social Agents and Institutions</td>
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| 1. With other Civil Society Group                                         | - Coalitions existent among NGOs and POs although suspicion, competition and tensions along ideological lines still exist  
- Less dependence on the Catholic Church for support; increasing support coming directly from int'l voluntary grps and funding agencies  
- Distancing from the underground ideological movements due to the internal organizational problems  
- NGOs increasingly performing mediation functions between the state and the POs | - Strengthened coalitions among NGOs due to relative autonomy from the ideological groups  
- Minimum support from the Catholic Church but increased links with international NGOs and funding agencies  
- Elaborate system of intermediary relations between the NGO coalitions, the NGOs and the POs | - Strengthened links among NGOs through the coalitions  
- Initiation of partnerships with the private business corporations  
- Equal partnership with the Catholic Church in advocacy activities  
- Cracks in the NGO-PO partnership with the latter already asserting its autonomy from the NGOs |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
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<td>- NGOs promoting institutionalization of popular representation in decision-making bodies of the state</td>
<td>- Representation of the marginalized sectors in the policy consultations with the state</td>
<td>- Countervailing the powers of the state through pressure politics</td>
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<td>- Civil society in general providing check and balance to the government by assuming monitoring and evaluation of development programs</td>
<td>- Policy advocacy both at the local and national level, on both legislative and executive offices of the state</td>
<td>- Facilitating the emergence of alternative electoral parties</td>
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<td>- NGOs entry into development administration as development intermediaries</td>
<td>- Civil society monitoring the social reform performance and commitment to sustainable development of the state</td>
<td>- NGOs mainstreamed in the practice of development administration as intermediaries</td>
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<td>- NGOs mainstreamed in the practice of monitoring and evaluation of development</td>
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<td>- POs now asserting equal participation in governance and development administration</td>
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- NGOs promoting institutionalization of popular representation in decision-making bodies of the state
- Civil society in general providing check and balance to the government by assuming monitoring and evaluation of development programs
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- Representation of the marginalized sectors in the policy consultations with the state
- Policy advocacy both at the local and national level, on both legislative and executive offices of the state
- Civil society monitoring the social reform performance and commitment to sustainable development of the state
- NGOs mainstreamed in the practice of development administration as intermediaries
- Countervailing the powers of the state through pressure politics
- Facilitating the emergence of alternative electoral parties
- NGOs mainstreamed in the practice of development administration as intermediaries, now seeking influence in the electoral process
- POs now asserting equal participation in governance and development administration
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