BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Daniel W. Tuttle, 60, political scientist

"Quite frankly, I would not list statehood as one of Burns's great accomplishments. As a matter of fact, I think he was slightly above the role of bit player in the achievement of statehood. Don't get the idea that I'm selling John A. Burns short. I think he's a giant of a figure on the Hawai'i political scene... I think Jack Burns was in favor of statehood. I certainly wouldn't diminish that at all..."

Dan Tuttle was born in Quincy, Illinois in 1925. After attending public schools in Quincy, he graduated in 1945 from Illinois College. He earned his M.A. in public administration in 1947 from the University of Minnesota where he would later receive his Ph.D. in 1964.

He accepted a position at the University of Hawai'i in 1950 after a three-year teaching stint at the University of Wyoming.

Since arriving in the Islands, Tuttle has been intimately involved in the subjects of political parties and public administration, and is an expert observer of local politics.
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ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Daniel Tuttle (DT)

October 15, 1985

Wailupe, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: Okay, Dan, can we start by having you tell us little bit about your background and eventually working up to when and why you came to Hawai'i?

DT: Is this really necessary? (Laughs)

WN: Briefly.

DT: Briefly, huh? Born in Illinois, in Quincy, Illinois, in 1925. Grew up in a town of about 40,000. Quincy, Illinois is located just about twenty-five, thirty miles north of Hannibal, Missouri, which has a certain Hawai'i connection because Mark Twain came to Hawai'i and had some comments to make about the place, you'll recall. But back in those days when I was in Illinois, I had no idea of ever coming to Hawai'i. Went to public schools in Quincy and graduated from the high school there and went over to college, at Illinois College which is located at Jacksonville, Illinois. That's a college, a small, liberal arts school. While they have about 1,000 students today, back in the time I was there, the place almost went out of business because of the war situation. But the college was started by the so-called Yale Band. A group of people came out from Yale and started the college back in 1829. So it's a good, substantial liberal arts school. I went around the clock to school. Because after the draft board said that I couldn't help win World War II for the country, I went around the clock. After two years and three months there, I had a diploma so I packed my bags and went up to University of Minnesota to graduate school and spent a couple calendar years up there, once again going around the clock, working night and day, you might say, and served as a graduate assistant and teaching assistant at the University of Minnesota. And moved to the state of Wyoming in Laramie and taught at the University of Wyoming for three years from 1947 to 1950.

Round about 1949 I had long cups of coffee with book salesmen that would come through Laramie. Now, Laramie's rather high, up in the air, and it's cold. The book salesmen when they would come, they had nothing to do in this town. Laramie was a town of about 20,000
in those days. And so, they'd often come out to the house, and we'd give them something to eat. One of the book salesmen was an avid bridge player, so Elsie and I learned how to play bridge. This, the result of this one book salesman. One fellow said, "You got to get out of this country." He'd been trying to get me to write a textbook, which was very premature since I have yet to write a textbook. But at any rate, he says, "I'm gonna write down here that you're interested in a job someplace else and I'm gonna put it in our newsletter." This was Prentice-Hall. It so happened that in those days, the only book company that had a representative in Hawai'i was Prentice-Hall. That happened to fall in the hands of Dr. Allan Saunders here at the University of Hawai'i. They suddenly had a need develop for a person in political parties and public administration. And so, (it) was very welcome in the spring of--fairly late in the (academic) year (to think of Hawai'i). I was (therefore) recruited in 1950. After exchange of a little bit of correspondence, why, this happened. So, it was all the result of a cup of coffee with a book salesman, I guess you would say, that I ever came to Hawai'i. If you want to know more than that, why, you'll have to take me back with your own questions now.

WN: That's okay.

CC: What was your first impression moving here from that Mainland experience? Really different?

DT: Politically, in many ways, there were similarities. The climate was quite different. I think that goes without saying. So your first impression stepping off the plane was it's very hot and it's very humid, but also quite a relief not have to worry about shoveling snow and slipping and sliding on the ice. Politically, it was similar to the extent that in Wyoming you had the Union Pacific Railroad running along the southern part of the state which had a lot of depressed areas. Because they were mostly sons and daughters--who had been my students coming back from the war--of coal miners and railroad workers. So, they were comparable to what eventually became the development of the Democratic party here in Hawai'i. Comparable to your plantation workers, the sons and daughters of plantation workers who were going into colleges and universities as a result of the G.I. Bill of Rights over here. They were doing the same thing in Wyoming right after the war.

The northern part of the state was more ranch country and oil country, some other minerals, and they were the more affluent ones. They tended to be the Republicans. So, they would be comparable to what was generally labeled here in Hawai'i by 1950 (as) the Big Five and the people associated with them. Hawai'i was heavily Republican when we arrived, and by and large, Wyoming had been dominated by the Republican party, also. There were national factors that enter into it in both places, really, but you may not want to go into that.

So, it was an exciting place to come to, I would say, for a political scientist, this being my basic profession. I looked forward to---well,
I thought statehood was just around the corner. I was aware of the fact that they'd held a constitutional convention here just a few months before we arrived. And so, it was sort of exciting to be moving to a place and, hopefully, be a part of the forty-ninth state. And, of course, it turned out to be the fiftieth state, but that's a small difference. It was still an exciting period.

WN: That 1950 con-con, what do you remember about it, or . . .

DT: Don't remember reading anything much about the constitutional convention because as I indicated, I missed it. I did spend quite a bit of time talking about what had happened in it, mainly because when I first arrived in Hawai'i, I was half-time with the Legislative Reference Bureau and half-time with the Department of Government, as it was known as in those days, now the Political Science Department. So, I spent a lot of time talking with Bob Dodge who was the principal staff person for the constitutional convention. He was the one who was responsible really for developing quite an extensive manual of procedures in other states. The result was, the basic Hawai'i constitution was really modern and up-to-date. It incorporated a lot of what you'll find in other state constitutions, but it avoided a lot of the mistakes that the other states had made over the previous 160 years or whatnot that had gone before. So, we talked a lot about that. As I recall, there was a plebiscite, a special election to approve that constitutional document during the fall after I arrived. So, statehood was very much on people's minds as we arrived in Hawai'i.

WN: Related to that 1950 con-con, in talking to George Lehleitner, he was talking about the Tennessee Plan and how Tennessee got into the union. He said that you were pretty instrumental in doing some of the research. Do you want to tell us something about that?

DT: Well, instrumental by accident again, I guess, or by coincidence. Here I was, arriving with my family, my wife and one small child. Actually, my wife came about six weeks later because the child was born on August 28, our oldest child, a daughter, Kay. So, she came six weeks later. So, I went to work at the Legislative Reference Bureau. I taught a couple of classes and (worked at) the reference bureau [at the same time]. My first (bureau) assignment was to go through the revised laws of the territory of Hawai'i and stamp, update, the revised laws from the session laws. Now, this was make-work, really, for a new staff member. Dr. [Robert] Kamins (acting director) had already arrived. He'd been here a couple of years. Norman Meller was on leave. Dr. Norman---well, he wasn't Dr. Norman Meller at that time. He was back getting his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago.

My second assignment came to me. (Kamins) said, "Would you be interested in doing a little work on statehood? I have a request for you to do a little bit of research on states that held elections prior to their admission into the union and elected representatives and senators and sent them back to Washington." Well, I was rather excited to do this. It was a logical sort of thing for a newcomer
to do because it involved a lot of library research. You didn't have to know how to pronounce all the names and spell all the names that were in the laws of Hawai'i right at the outset. So, I set to work doing that. That resulted in a little publication. I think it's entitled, *State Elections Held Prior to Admittance into the Union*. As I recall, and I hope my dating is correct, I went to work on this in the fall of 1950, and I believe it was published in 1951.

Now, I've tried to do a little research on where this request came from, and it's escaped all of us. I know I've conferred with, I think it's Dr. John Whitehead out of the University of Alaska. He's tried to track it down. He's talked and been in correspondence with Dr. Kamins. We both checked with the Legislative Reference Bureau, and they destroyed their files, their back files on where these requests came from. Actually, they're supposed to be kept confidential anyway, but maybe archivally they could at least tell us generally where the request came from. But apparently, no one seems to know. My recollection, my best recollection, is that the request was probably a verbal request made by the Statehood Commission (to) Dr. Kamins. He was searching, probably, still for something that he could put his new staff member to work on. And I was the logical person. So, I know I did a lot of digging in our library.

This volume came out and was widely distributed in Hawai'i, but it found its way to a few other places, other libraries, around the country. Then my first meeting, I think, with George Lehleitner came as a result of this falling into his hands. He got excited about it. Tennessee was probably the best example, the firmest example, of states that elected senators and representatives and sent them down to Washington as lobbyists saying, pounding the table, "We want in. We deserve to be in." The term "Tennessee Plan," I don't know whether I used it. I'd have to check, and I haven't checked the publication whether I actually used it in that publication or not. Where I got it, I can't rightly tell you correctly. It's probably one of those things that are lost. At any rate, this was seized upon by George Lehleitner. My first meeting with him, as I recall, I think he came into the office and he was all excited about it. He took the publication, and I was saying, well, there were certain things that I still needed to check on, but I didn't have the library resources.

"Oh, I'll take care of that. I'll just make a request of the Library of Congress."

So, I think, if my facts are correct, he was able, through the offices of Russell Long--senator, relatively new senator, out of the state of Louisiana which was Lehleitner's home base--he was able to have some follow-up research done by the Library of Congress. (Of) course, there's a whole story of what happened after that with Lehleitner. Many, many people, of course, contributed to Hawai'i's statehood. They number from hundreds into the thousands of people who were for statehood and did one thing or another. (They) went down to Bishop Street and signed a scroll out on the street and (had) all sorts of "celebrations."
But if one were to really single out any one person that got statehood for Hawai‘i, albeit a circuitous route via Alaska, it was George Lehleitner. In my book, he’s the true hero. He’s a very modest gentleman, however, and of course, I think he tends to exaggerate, for example, the role one such as myself would play. So I did it on assignment. It was a part of my job. But it was a fun part of the job. And I suppose, in my own way, after I switched out of the Legislative Reference Bureau, and as we went from the years of 1951, '52 onto 1959 when we ultimately got statehood, I sold myself on the plan. So I was something of a lobbyist for sending people off to Washington, too.

CC: You know, you mentioned that a lot of people were involved with statehood. And of course, after the fact, a lot of people tend to take credit for their involvement. The Statehood Commission, however, we’ve heard various points of view about whether they were really for statehood or not. What was your assessment of that group? What was their role in all of this?

DT: I would have to believe that they were very sincere. I couldn’t attribute any lack of sincerity to Samuel Wilder King or to a Joseph Farrington or a Nils Tavares who was, probably, the Statehood [Commission] chairman that I got to know the best. They were very conservative minded and they were also very politically minded. The Republicans out here wanted statehood to be achieved by Republicans. But by 1954 Eisenhower lost control of the Congress, as I recall. One house or the other, maybe both houses, slipped from Republican control, and maybe their interest dwindled a little bit because they were waiting till they could give credit to the Republicans.

CC: But you felt they were still genuinely interested in statehood?

DT: I think so. There were some who vacillated. There (were) about 5 percent of the Hawai‘i public that were lukewarm towards statehood. As we go along chronologically here in our discussion, we may want to make reference to the fact there was a Commonwealth party that tried to steer a middle course. But in terms of outright opposition, the best known outright opposition that I recall to statehood probably came from Walter Dillingham. He was consistent. His son Ben vacillated. He was both for it and against it at various times.

WN: What about Joe Farrington? Let’s get a little specific. What do you think his role was in the statehood movement?

DT: Well, I would say that it was fairly significant, maybe not as effectual as the Honolulu Star-Bulletin would have had you believe. But he was our delegate to Congress. He was a gentleman. He was always very polite. He was always very proper. He was nice to me as a relative newcomer. Nicer to me than some of the Democrats, for example, that later became maybe somewhat closer friends than I ever was of Joe Farrington. But I got better acquainted with him, I think it was, at the Republican National Convention in 1952. National conventions, I might parenthetically say, was one of my hobbies.
So, I tried to make it a point to go to political conventions on the national level. So, from 1948 until 1964, I believe it was, I was consistently at the national political conventions. Only one or two of them in that period did I miss. Farrington and the Hawai'i delegation in both political parties, I think, were genuinely interested in attaining statehood. But they weren't willing to go much beyond the first major step, and that was drafting the constitution of 1950, which I've indicated already was really an outstanding document for its day and it probably remains an outstanding state constitution. It would be a better constitution as we sit here this moment if we had not cluttered it up with a lot of amendments both in 1968 and in '78.

CC: So, actually, your assessment of the political circumstances in Hawai'i upon your and immediately after your arrival was that while there was a large conservative element with the Republican party, that there was a progressive kind of situation developing at least.

DT: Oh, yes. The idea that the Republican party was devoid of anything progressive or doing anything worthwhile for Hawai'i was really a little bit of .... Well, things get magnified as you look back on them historically. The Republican party here in Hawai'i had kept up with quite a bit of the New Deal legislation. Passed the Little Wagner Act as a case in point. Quite a bit of the New Deal type legislation found its way into the territorial laws of Hawai'i via the Republican party. Now, in other ways, they were very conservative, very Neanderthal. They didn't want political power to slip from their grasp, and they could see this happening if they opened up voting rolls, if they welcomed new people to their party. So that Dan Inouye, quite correctly, tells you the story, tells all Hawai'i the story, how he went and tried to join the Republican party and there was no place in the inn, so to speak. They said, "Well, the places are all full." So he turned to the Democratic party. And Jack Burns was around, along with others, to recruit him into the Democratic party.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: There's a tendency to view political parties as THE Republicans, THE Democrats, and yet there (are) usually different factions and tendencies within them. What were some of the currents and discussions that were going on in the Republican party at the time?

DT: The Republican party was a fairly closed party. As I indicated, Dan Inouye tried to get in, couldn't get in. So, I wasn't all that privy to what was going on in the Republican party. And of course, a lot of their internal disputes were not published in the newspapers because both of your newspapers were heavily Republican at the time. But I do know there was a split in the Republican party between the so-called Farrington faction and the Sam King faction. This did not help matters at any rate. There was probably a third faction which might be even more liberal faction which was sort of independent. And I can't tell you precisely how Randy Crossley fit into either
the Farrington faction or the King faction. But at any rate, when Eisenhower was elected president, as you probably learned from other people, it was felt that somebody like Randy Crossley or another chap (Harold Kay) whose name slips my mind right at the moment--maybe it'll come to me--would be the Eisenhower appointee as governor of Hawai'i. This didn't develop. A Taft supporter and the more conservative wing of the Republican party in Hawai'i got their way. That's how Samuel Wilder King got to be appointed governor. He became a part of the so-called Morningside compromise between Eisenhower and Taft. And so Taft got the privilege of naming the governor of Hawai'i.

But to the best of my knowledge, when it comes to the statehood question, both factions were in favor of statehood but they weren't above letting, let's say, petty politics maybe impede the process a little bit because they wanted to be the ones who would be there and get credit for it. But I would be sticking my neck way out to allege that among the principal movers and shakers in the Republican party per se, that they were trying to sabotage statehood or anything of that sort. I'm sure some who were quite active in the Republican party, who contributed heavily to the Republican party, some of your big corporation executives, were afraid that power would slip away from them and that with statehood it would let...

Well, the big fear as we moved into the '54 election, and you heard this a great deal in the wake of the '54 election, was the Japanese would take over because by this time your AJA population was your largest group. Now, most of them were not voting back in '50, '51, '52, '53. (Many) of them became enfranchised as a result of the passage of the McCarran Act. This enabled a lot of them to come on. Well, after the passage of the McCarran Act, I think, because some members--and I'm not quoting names because I can't remember them, except Walter Dillingham's name as a case in point--they became a little bit more fearful that statehood would really shake the power structures of Hawai'i just too much.

CC: What were the Democrats doing? What was...

DT: Well, the Democrats were in complete disarray. They had a big internal party split over the issue of Communism in 1950 in their state convention. You had the walkout and the stand-pat groups. Don't ask me to precisely identify those. I've identified those in an article that you can refer to and read. At any rate, they were at great odds one with another. One group was alleging that the other group had been infiltrated with Communists and Communist sympathizers. So they threw them out of the [Democratic] party, in essence. Rapprochement, however, was right around the corner for the Democrats. And in 1952 they were able to patch things up. Part of the process of patching things up, an anti-Communist, ex-marine captain I think he was, by the name of Frank Fasi got elected Democratic National Committeeman. And John A. Burns, who had been more attuned to the ILWU and had better lines of communication with those who were alleged to be Communists, became state chairman of the party. So that just illustrates part of the accommodation that took place at the Democratic convention of 1952.
So to sum it up, both political parties had their own factions. The Democratic factionalism was much more widely publicized as I've indicated because as of that day, both newspapers were heavily Republican. So you didn't get such close reporting of any friction in the Republican party, but you got every line, chapter and verse of all of the bad things and the Communist allegations pro and con that were happening in the Democratic party.

WN: What about the role of John Burns in achieving statehood for Hawai'i?

DT: Oh, there are so many things that we could say, pluses and minuses about this very complex figure of John A. Burns. Quite frankly, I would not list statehood as one of Burns's great accomplishments. As a matter of fact, I think he was slightly above the role of bit player in the achievement of statehood. Don't get the idea that I'm selling John A. Burns short. I think he's a giant of a figure on the Hawai'i political scene. I gradually came to have more and more respect for the man, and our friendship grew with the years. To this day, I still miss having Jack Burns around because he was quite a fellow in his own way. But we're not talking about the personality and the background of John A. Burns at this moment, we're trying to focus, as I understand it, more on statehood.

I think Jack Burns was in favor of statehood. I certainly wouldn't diminish that at all, and he deserves a great deal of credit in coming back after having been elected delegate to Congress in 1956. He had to come back in 1958 and campaign for office and tell the people that Alaska either was in or was getting in—I guess, was in—and that statehood for Hawai'i was still around the corner. Well, this was quite a tough role to have to play. He was able to get reelected in '58, even though he hadn't attained statehood for Hawai'i. Well, it's out of this that the notion developed, I think, as Democrats love to tell the story, that John A. Burns developed this strategy of getting statehood for Alaska first and then Hawai'i is certain to follow. Well, all logic would tell you that this is not the way it really happened. The background of the story about how that strategy was developed ties in with the George Lehleitner story. I don't know whether you want to get into that now or not.

WN: Yeah. That's.

DT: Want to go to that? Well, I recall vividly, and I have written this down, although it's in an unpublished document, that I was back at the Democratic National Convention in the city of Chicago in 1956 bunking with Bob Dodge. I was just an observer. I wasn't a delegate, I wasn't even covering it for television. I decided to have breakfast all by myself 'cause Dodge who was already off or gotten in late, was still sleeping. So I wandered into the big dining room at the Sheraton Towers, and there was one little table of people sitting over there. Bob Bartlett was there from Alaska, [William] Egan was there from Alaska. There were people whose names I can't recall from the District of Columbia. These were the territories that normally caucused together. They weren't all there. They were having breakfast together, and
Jack Burns and George Lehleitner (were present). And when I wandered in, as I recall, it probably was Jack Burns who said, "Hey, Dan, come on over and sit down and have breakfast with us." Well, this was a nice invitation for a college teacher. So I went over and sat down.

I was a listener obviously. They were talking hot and heavy about political strategies for statehood and this sort of thing. The delegates, the people who were actually involved in the convention, gradually wandered away from the breakfast table and that ultimately left George Lehleitner and Dan Tuttle. Neither one of us had any responsibilities in connection with the convention. He began to be quite critical of Jack Burns, saying, "This fellow even if he gets elected delegate"--you see, this was in the summertime before Jack was elected in '56--"even if he becomes delegate to Congress, we're not going to get anywhere because he's not willing to do anything new or different. Hawai'i's not willing to take the risk. There's somehow not the pizzazz to want to get and go out and fight for statehood. I'm fighting for statehood and I've been fighting for it for a long time. And I'm going to take my resources. I'm going to take the Tennessee Plan, Dan, all the work"--and of course, he was being flattering in those days at the time--"all the good work that you did, all the work we had done at the Library of Congress, and I think things are under way in Alaska. I think they're going to elect their congressman and their two senators and send them down to Washington. And if we can achieve that"--and it was still an "if" as I recall at this time, although he probably knew more; I think things were more in place than I realized--"then statehood will follow for Hawai'i."

Well, I remonstrated. I said, "Don't desert us now. Things can happen. Maybe Hawai'i won't get in." I know I tried to defend Jack Burns as well as I could.

He says, "The guy, he's just always waiting around for a handout" is the way he put it. "He always goes hat in hand to people."

I tried to explain that Jack Burns was not a wealthy person and he knew Hawai'i very well, and he knew just how much people would do, how much they were willing to risk. What I didn't know or didn't realize as much in those days that Jack Burns was more of a conservative than he was a liberal Democrat. Because, you see, this is one of the many facets of Jack Burns. All the while he was maintaining close ties with the ILWU as a case in point, he was going to Mass as a very conservative Catholic person every day of the week in early mornings. So this figure of Jack Burns, as I say, is tremendously complex. I just wonder if any biographer is ever going to fully capture all of the many ramifications of Jack Burns.

At any rate, back to the story. Lehleitner says, "Well, I don't care what you say, I'm going to go to Alaska."

I think history is now fairly clear. At least this was my first
real tip-off that Hawai‘i had had it. We were not going to become the forty-ninth state, that if we were lucky we would become the fiftieth state, that Lehleitner was going to sell Alaska. They were going to follow through on the Tennessee Plan. And of course, the way it worked out, they did go ahead with the election of their congressman and their two senators. They sent them down to Washington. They lobbied for a while. Statehood did come to Alaska. And thank goodness, in due time, it came to Hawai‘i.

CC: The Democrats and others are fond of saying that Burns basically worked out a deal with Lyndon Johnson that led to this strategy, and that it was Lyndon who kind of masterminded some of these things. Based on your analysis as a political scientist of the times and of Mr. Johnson and that whole Southern group of people in Washington, do you think that's accurate? Do you think Lyndon Johnson was a real friend of statehood?

DT: Well, I think he was in favor of statehood, but he kanaluaed several key votes as I recall. And I think George Lehleitner may recall it about the same way that I did. He was not numbered among our great friends of statehood. I think this came along later. Now, if you talk about John A. Burns's role in getting Lyndon Johnson sold on the establishment of the East-West Center, I would say "Amen." I think Jack Burns was responsible for that. But in terms of Lyndon Johnson being the great strategist for statehood, no. I think we had finer friends in the South, Russell Long being one.

Knowing what George Lehleitner has told me subsequently, I thought at the outset that Russell Long was probably one who was a fairly close friend of Jack Burns and who therefore became a friend of statehood. But I think the more accurate version of that story is that Russell Long was responding to one of his own fairly wealthy constituents, George Lehleitner, who engineered his coming to Hawai‘i, and then Jack Burns was among those who helped sell Russell Long on statehood for Hawai‘i but that the magic hand behind all of this Russell Long friendship was George Lehleitner.

Now, we had other good friends from the South, but I don't think they were particularly close associates of Jack Burns. However, I was not with Jack Burns back in Washington, so I can't tell you this firsthand at all. These would include such people as Spessard Holland, whom as I recall we did a telephone interview with him at the University of Hawai‘i, and I can recall his friendship. Estes Kefauver was a friend of statehood and I can recall doing a telephone interview at the University of Hawai‘i with him. Actually, Millard Purdy did those for us. They were class demonstrations of telephone interviews in those days. So, I know that they were friends. I think George Smathers who did have some association with Frank Fasi was a fair friend of statehood. But I couldn't tell you, as a matter of fact, how he actually voted when we got right down to it because he would have been one of those who was quite concerned about the Communist argument against statehood. You see, there were a number of developing arguments against statehood.
CC: Maybe you could sum those up.

DT: Such as the Communist argument, the noncontiguity argument, the ethnic argument, and, oh, the political party argument. Hawai‘i was generally equated, even as late as the time we got statehood, as a Republican territory, even though we had gone heavily Democratic starting in 1954. It was generally felt that Alaska was Democratic and so therefore if the two should be brought in together, they would balance one another off. Well, there was a quick flip and turnaround, and for many years thereafter, I guess the Republicans must have felt "had" because Hawai‘i became--after 1959 and the Quinn breakthrough there for the Republican party--Hawai‘i became very Democratic and top heavily Democratic, and Alaska stayed Democratic for a goodly number of years, although in more recent years it has gone Republican as I recall.

CC: How serious was this Red Scare argument and what really fueled it? What was the...

DT: Oh, it was serious, and I don't think there's any question but what some of the leadership, the people who were in the ILWU and some who were in the Democratic party, had toyed with the ideas of Communism. I think they were probably more theoretical Communists then anything else, but life was pretty grim on the plantations. They didn't seem to be making much headway against what Jack Burns would call the Republican hegemony. It's only natural that you look around and see if there's some way out. So, I have no doubt that some people who have denied it, perhaps even under oath, had some affinity for Communism.

I know we got quite excited and quite worried about some of the implications of the Joe McCarthy Communist era scare at the University of Hawai‘i when they proposed a loyalty oath for all public employees including schoolteachers. We fought the loyalty oath tooth and toenail. Stayed up all nights preparing documents, arguments against it. But the loyalty oath and the elaborate questionnaires to be required of all public employees, that law did pass the Territorial Legislature. That shows you the intensity of the argument. Oren Long, a Democrat, albeit a fairly conservative Democrat, ended up signing the law. I can recall his telling Norm Meller and me down at the Armed Services Y why he was going to sign the law. And of course, I felt like crawling under the table at the time because here a Democrat was going to sign this loyalty oath law. And he says, "I'll promise you one thing, though, as long as I'm governor, and I suspect as long as anybody else is governor, nobody's ever going to be prosecuted under the law." He says, "We just got to ride along with the times. I'm not going to do the skyrocket act. I'm not going to be caught short politically like a Claude Pepper is caught short." Pepper had been dumped because of his stand on the issue of Communism. I think it's the same Claude Pepper who's still the spokesman for the senior citizens, if I'm not mistaken, to this day.
And if you hark back to the '54 election, Communism was still a major issue in that '54 election with the Republicans alleging that the Democrats were Communists (or) soft on Communism. In the now rather famous so-called 'Āina Haina debate where Samuel P. King, the current federal judge, was the chairman of the Republican party (at) the time, the (Republicans) charged into 'Āina Haina School out here (at a rally) and one of their major allegations was that the Democrats running for office in '54, their platform was friendly to the Communist party and had sections of the Communist party (dogma) in it. To make a long story short, Dan Inouye took exception to this and threw away his speech and scribbled down on one knee a couple or three notes to himself. And probably the first time that any person of Japanese extraction or perhaps of any non-Haole extraction, or non-Caucasian extraction maybe I better say, really cussed off a Haole in public. He really took on Samuel P. King, the son of the then governor, and said, "I left one arm in (Europe) fighting Fascism and Nazism, and if you Republicans want me to leave the other arm in Asia fighting Communism, I'll be delighted to do so. But don't call us Democrats Pinks and Reds." Well, a tape recording of portions of that debate still exists, so you can refer to other sources for that.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

END OF SIDE ONE
keep our tax monies at home." But the other side of the coin would be, you'd have to be going to Washington to beg government help because you might well be left out of a lot of government programs.

CC: Was the commonwealth movement at all serious? I mean, did you really see any...

DT: They were serious, I think, the people who were involved. Another one that sticks in my mind that was [for] commonwealth status was Helene Hale and as I recall, an attorney by the name of Bob Hogan was also involved in the Commonwealth party. They attracted a small following. It strikes me that it's possible that Hy Greenstein may have toyed with commonwealth status, too. He was another Honolulu attorney. But my memory's a little bit cloudy on that one and I don't want to do a disservice to an individual. Just put a question mark behind that one. But when it came to--well, I think Willie Crozier may have run under the commonwealth ticket on one occasion. They attracted what you might call a fringe element of the Democratic party to the commonwealth cause. They never polled enough at the polls to... I don't think they would qualify as a political party under current laws. In other words, it was 5, 10 percent at the most, maybe even less than that. So, (the) commonwealth idea might have been a fallback compromise. I would have no reason to question the sincerity of the people who thought of this as a viable alternative. But their views were not widely accepted.

CC: Was there any movement in the native Hawaiian community that's comparable to some that we have today that would have argued against statehood on the basis of Hawaiian sovereignty or those kinds of undercurrents?

DT: They may have been present. They may have been present, but if they were present you certainly didn't hear much about it. And they certainly didn't show up at the polls. And of course, all the people of Hawaiian extraction were citizens and had been for years and years. They weren't in the category of those who could be naturalized under the McCarran Act such as the AJAs and the people from China and so forth, the Oriental extraction people. They must have voted for statehood because if you look at that statehood vote, once we got statehood, it carried by a margin of nineteen or twenty to one. So, that leaves you about 5 percent. So, an awful lot of people of Hawaiian extraction favored statehood. And the types of arguments that you hear today on behalf of Hawaiians being robbed of their heritage and put down, and so on and so forth, were not present in the same way. They've gotten re-educated. They weren't present back yesterday the way they are today. I think they had common allegiances or common feelings, I think, with the persons of Japanese extraction, and persons of Chinese extraction, persons of Korean extraction, and so forth, that they had been put down by the Haoles. So, these were sort of all merged.

But most of the feeling was one of upbeat. "We fought a war, a
world war, and many of us had contributed to this, and it's really up to us to show that we are just as American as anybody else in this country. And we can do it." So the feeling of the '50s was contributory, was positive, it was upbeat. Although the incumbent Republican party resisted it simply because they were in office, a person like Hebden Porteus was candid enough after the election of '54 to sit down with me at breakfast, or maybe it was lunch, and say, "We deserved what we got." He was the only one to survive on this island of the Republicans in the '54 election. Of course, he was a little bit different Republican because he was the son of a university professor. So, while he was tied in with the Big Five, he wasn't Big Five heritage.

So, the feelings of persons of Hawaiian extraction were sort of merged with all of the other have-nots, let's say, of the time, and it was primarily economic, and political, and social, really all the way across the board. So the Hawaiians were not making—as I remember the history of it—they were not making any special cases or anything of that sort, although there were a goodly number of persons of Hawaiian extraction who more and more came to the Democratic party. Keep in mind that as of about 1950, a majority of your persons of Hawaiian extraction were probably to be found in the Republican party. A part of the real problems of the Hawaiians of that day and up to this day was the fact they let themselves—well, you can look at it two ways—let themselves be used or they wanted the easy road to power and they would join the winning side, so to speak, and hope that things would fall their way. Whereas, persons of other backgrounds were more aggressive, I suppose, and they would get in there and scratch and say, as I say, this upbeat note. "It's positive, we can do it. We're just as smart if not smarter." The Dan Inouyes, the Sparky Matsunagas, the Patsy Minks, the Hiram Fongs, if you will, and persons of Chinese extraction (were) younger. They would feel they could do it. And Filipino extraction. It wasn't long before we had some young people, such as an Alfred Laureta for example, who were running and getting prominent posts as Filipino extraction people.

CC: Jack Burns was involved with a lot of those people prior to 1954 and evidently had some abilities as an organizer and a person to pull some things together. At least, a number of those people all credit his role. How was he viewed at the time?

DT: As a man about town, not necessarily one who was likely to succeed. He had gone broke in couple of businesses. He was sort of living from hand to mouth. He'd had a liquor store, I believe, over in Kailua, but didn't do all that well. I know he turned to Frank Fasi, among others, to pay his expenses when he went back to national party meetings. But Jack Burns was an inspirer. He was a New Deal Democrat. At least he'd been inspired by this. He was a true believer in what he subsequently came to call the destiny of Hawai'i's people. He was a catalyst. He was an encourager. Now I know a lot of people and maybe history will record that he was a great organizer. In my book, Jack Burns was one of the world's worst organizers. He
was a shy person. He was not a person to step to the front of any group. He liked to meet in little coffee klatch situations. He liked to have breakfast with his boys and gals, and mostly his boys. He had a little group of people such as Bill Richardson, [Matsuo] "Matsy" Takabuki, and several others that he met with. He would inspire—well, Dan Aoki would number among that group, (and) Mike Tokunaga. Most of the basic hardcore organizing work, grassroots work for Jack Burns as a candidate, was done by Dan Aoki and Mike Tokunaga.

CC: He was more of an inspirational figure?

DT: He was an inspirational figure. He was, as I say, a true believer in the Hawai‘i that he had come to know and love in Kalihi. He was willing to accept people the way they really are. He was not trying to remake them like a schoolteacher would do or a college (chuckles) professor would do. He accepted them at face value, and he loved these people. He'd grown up in Kalihi as a transplant to Hawai‘i at a very early age. So, he qualified really as a kama‘aina. He'd grown up with these people and he became, well, a father figure to them. And so, this is one of those very positive pluses that you would put behind Jack Burns's name. He would not turn his back on these people, come what may. They could do anything, all sorts of things wrong, and he would make excuses for them. He would not turn his back on the ILWU, even when the ILWU would get themselves in trouble and him in trouble. Even when he was pictured on the front page with Communist figures, he would still not go back on his association with the ILWU. As I say, for a person to take this politically and still go to Mass every morning, given the tensions and the forces at work at that time, that was quite remarkable. So Burns would not be one that you would necessarily [say] would succeed, but through sheer persistence and through the inspiration and through the press of all of the things that these other people were doing... Keep in mind you had some mighty talented people. Dan Inouye, Patsy Mink, we could tick off all of their names who were in there running for public office. And you had a Bob Dodge and you had a Frank Fasi. All of these people were contributing to the rise of the Democratic party... Tom Gill and the Gill forces. Even though they were at odds with one another, they had a basic unity there.

I can recall that on one occasion, and I don't know whether we have time to talk about this or not, but I can recall having breakfast with Jack Burns at Washington Place. He was bemoaning some of the things that Tom Gill had done and Frank Fasi had done. I said, "Governor, really, I'm getting a little bit tired of hearing about all this sort of stuff." I said, "Let's face it. After all you've been through with these two characters, you really love them."

He sort of grumped and turned away. Then he turned back. Then he says, "Oh, Dan," he says, "you're right. But let's not let it get around."

(Laughter)
DT: So there was this basic unity that when the chips were down, they
would come together. They would fight like cats and dogs. And Jack
Burns was in there. I think when the true picture of Jack Burns
emerges, I would weight it toward the positive side. But on two
things I would not rate him highly. One, as an organizer of the
Democratic party because Patsy Mink or a Tom Gill could run circles,
or a Dan Inouye or Mike Tokunaga, would run circles around him. And
the same would be true of statehood. But as an inspirer, as a person
who was always there, he would come in. The shy Jack Burns would be
in the corner of a gathering of Democrats. They'd get into a big
tangle, he would come in and untangle it. He would come in and say,
"Now, look people, we got to do this together. We've got to work
together." He liked people. He accepted them as they were and he
liked people. Some of you may have even seen this in the latter
days of the Burns administration. People that you wouldn't expect
(Burns to know) Jack Burns (would) show up at a funeral or something
of that sort, here striding across the funeral home's parking lot
would be a lonely figure sneaking in the back to pay his respects
to the family. Maybe a person who you figured was probably an
enemy of Jack Burns--a political enemy, that is. Here was Jack
Burns caring enough, take his own time to come to the funeral.

CC: For all his inspiration, he lost to Bill Quinn that first election
for governor. Why?

DT: Well, this involves a multiplicity of factors, one factor of which
there was a lot of tension and build-up in Washington, D.C. about
who was to take credit for statehood. And Bill Quinn somehow got
more credit than Jack Burns did, although it was common knowledge
that whoever was delegate to Congress when we got statehood would
become the first governor of Hawai'i. But Bill Quinn managed to
steal some of the limelight back in Washington, D.C. at the time,
you'll recall. And Jack Burns waged a miserable campaign. He was
too busy in Washington to come back and campaign at all. Then when
he did come back, he campaigned out of a massage parlor table, a
table in the massage parlor. You can go back and check the records
of the newspaper. He slipped into town to sign his nomination papers
and the newspaper photographers and reporters caught him at this
massage parlor on Hotel Street. It's not the heart of Hotel Street.
That massage parlor was located up by the Rapid Transit barns, (I
believe) and so, here's Jack Burns being interviewed about his
aspirations for governor.

I think Burns probably is also recorded someplace that maybe he would
have preferred to have run for the U.S. Senate or run for something
other than governor, but everybody, once we got statehood, tried to
get into the act. Dan Inouye declared, Frank Fasi declared, Bill Heen
declared, Oren Long declared (for the U.S. Senate), and so on and so
forth. Before he'd turned around, the Democrats had, well, Bill Heen
and Frank Fasi. They had Oren Long and several other people all
declare for the U.S. Senate. Dan Inouye was encouraged to go back and
run for the U.S. House because he also wanted to run for the U.S. Senate.
That left Patsy Mink who had already announced for the U.S. House.
And so, they ended up in a tough primary, one with another. Dan Inouye winning, of course, when they had no particular reason to run against one another. But Patsy was stubborn enough. She'd staked out her claim to the House, and she didn't much like to have Jack Burns asking Dan Inouye to come back and run against her in the primary. So this (showed their) little bit of greed, confusion, lack of organization.

That left Jack Burns hanging out here running for governor. As I say, they didn't have the best balanced ticket in the world the way it turned out. Bill Quinn had—he was a very appealing person. He could sing the wedding song beautifully. He has a beautiful voice. He was a good actor. He was able to handle television such as it existed at the time. He got a victory, in part, perhaps, claiming credit for statehood. Certainly, Jack Burns had as much claim to statehood and attaining statehood as Bill Quinn did. I don't think you could say that Bill Quinn did any more than Jack Burns. And vice versa . . .

CC: Was the Democratic revolution a revolution?

DT: You mean, in the . . .

CC: Some look at it now and say, "You know, things didn't really change all that much. We just changed parties and . . ."?

DT: Oh, things changed a great deal from 1954--actually, some of the change was in the works before '54--'52 to '62 and up to about 1966, things changed in amazing ways. It would take us another hour here to go into the many, many changes which took place in the wake of the Democratic election of '54, which sort of stands as a symbol. But yes, it was a bloodless peaceful revolution. Make no mistake about that. Think of all the wealthy people you have now of non-Caucasian extraction. Gives you some idea of—people you'd like to have their income—how successful (they were). Things have been turned around in an economic sense. You wouldn't have found that. You could have counted the number of wealthy non-Caucasian people back in early 1950s on one hand or at the most two hands. Today, they're all over the place. That's in an economic sense. Look at it in a political sense. You don't find many Republicans any longer. In other words, recent Democratic sweeps have been just almost across the board.

Well, things are likely to change, and politics, like everything else, do run in cycles. But tremendous political changes and social changes too, although I'm beginning to worry about some of the (recent) social changes. I think it was easier for people to become melded into Hawaiian society if they arrived during the decade of the '50s and the '60s, rather than their coming in the decade of the '70s or the '80s. And I'm talking about people who come here from the Far East as well as people who come here from the Mainland. I think, socially, they're able to meet one another at work and they're able to coexist. But in terms of sitting on the floor together, having saimin, chop suey, that sort of thing, I'm not sure that that's
happening or it's happening as easily or as much as it should. But on all three fronts--socio, economic, political--it was a revolution all right. Now, everything may not have worked out all right, the way that it was intended. And we can look back and say, "Well, maybe not so much has changed after all," but I would suggest that it's simply because we're running into another cycle here in the mid-1980s.

CC: Excellent.

WN: Thank you.

CC: That's it.

WN: Wow, wish we could keep going. (Chuckles)

CC: Well, we could, but we got to edit this [for television].

END OF INTERVIEW