BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Arthur Davis Woolaway

Arthur Woolaway was born in Honolulu in 1912. A 1932 Punahou School graduate, Woolaway continued his education at Centralia Jr. College in Washington and the University of California.

He worked for Maui Agricultural Company from 1934 to 1948, starting as an office clerk and eventually becoming the cultivation superintendent. In 1948, he began working for Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company, and in 1954 he became the executive assistant to management. He was the assistant to the president for Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 1961 to 1976; the owner and president of Gray Line Hawai'i, Ltd., 1955 to 1978; and treasurer and chairman of the board for Oahu Insurance Specialist, Inc., 1970 to 1981. He became president of Travel & Ground Transportation Services, Inc. in 1979.

A long-time member of the Republican central committee, Woolaway served as the Republican county chairman of Maui. He was a delegate to the Republican national convention in 1952.
Tape No. 17-4-1-88

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Arthur Woolaway (AW)

March 2, 1988

Honolulu, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

Joy Chong: The following is an archive interview with Arthur Woolaway. It took place on March 2, 1988 at the KHET studios. The interviewers were Chris Conybeare and Dan Tuttle.

CC: Starting out, I just wanted to... For the record, it's March 2, and we're talking with Mr. Arthur Woolaway. This is a series of oral history interviews we're doing about the history of Hawaii and Hawaii politics. Mr. Woolaway, I'm glad you could join us today.

AW: Well, I'm glad to be here. I appreciate this very much.

CC: I think to get started, we'll start the way we have with everyone, and if you could tell us a little bit about your background, where you were born and the circumstances of your parents at that time so we get some context for...

AW: Well, my parents—my mother was Scotch, came from Scotland; my father was English—Exeter, England. My dad [Henry James Woolaway] came out here in 1910 to work for the Episcopal Church. He was a painter and a wallpaper hanger. My mother [Betsy Woolaway] followed two years later with my brother [James T.] who was fourteen years older than I, and I was born in Honolulu here (on June 2, 1912). My mother was in her forties (chuckles) when I was born. I lived at 'Iolani School, which was on Beretania and Richards Street. And my mother was also matron of the [St. Andrew's] Priory.

The significant part of my life then was, the school was situated right across the fence of Queen Liliʻuokalani's residence and as a child, I played over there. I used to eat with her. I remember sitting on her armchair and listening to Captain [Henry] Berger and the [Royal] Hawaiian Band. I was there the night she died, and so I feel that I've had the experience or the pleasure of doing something which is real Hawaiian that very few Hawaiians can say they've done.

I was educated at the public schools. I went to Central Grammar. My parents didn't want me to attend 'Iolani. I spent one year at 'Ewa [Elementary School]—I was in the third grade then—when the school, the present school, was open. Then I came back to Central Grammar and in my sixth grade, I went to Lincoln Elementary, which was the first English-speaking [standard] school, situated [near] Thomas Square. After two years, after finishing my seventh grade there, I decided I wanted to go to Punahou. I started becoming very interested in...
athletics. So I went up there one day and asked for a scholarship (chuckles), and they gave me the test, and I had the scholarship. I went for my eighth grade and it took me five years to graduate from high school (in 1932). I was a couple of points behind and I stayed an extra year, which I enjoyed very much, played an extra year of football. But I worked my way through Punahou.

CC: What’d you do? What kind of work?

AW: Well, I carried messages around. I worked in the office during my study period, and whatever they wanted me to do, I did.

CC: I guess probably because of your later connections with the plantation supervisors and things like that, people have an impression that you came from a very wealthy background. From what you’ve just said though, your parents were not really that way, right?

AW: My father, my family is, you would say very poor according to the present standards. My father earned, at the highest salary he made, fifty-five dollars a month. And my mother earned sixty-five dollars. We never did own an automobile. When my father retired at the age of sixty-five, he was blind. We didn’t have any plantation house, we didn’t have plantation hospitals, and we didn’t have any Social Security. But my parents did well; they took care of me and saw that I was educated. By the way, when I finished Punahou, I worked on the steamship *Makawao*. We left Honolulu one night and went to Port Allen, Kaua‘i, and loaded sugar. It took us nine days to get to San Francisco. I worked in the engine room. Later on I would... From there I went on up to Washington, attended the Centralia Junior College. After a year I went down to [the] University of California and I spent time there, but my high school sweetheart [Kathrine]—we eloped—nobody knew.

(Laughter)

AW: Came home, got the devil. I worked checking freight at the [American] President Lines on the docks and I’d be a watch for the Dillingham Building on Sundays. Finally one day, Mr. Harry Baldwin, the senior Baldwin, telephoned me and asked me if I’d like to come down and see him at the A&B [Alexander & Baldwin Company] and I did. He offered me a job. So I went to Maui, the Maui Agricultural Company, on March 9, 1934.

CC: Before that, because of your long involvement with politics, did you get involved in any politics when you were in school or any of that?

AW: No, but I was good at extemporaneous speaking, that’s all I’d say. I was written up in our [school] annual. I used to get up and, you could say, [said] a lot of things maybe I shouldn’t have said. Directing the faculty and the student body to support the baseball team. We won the championship that year because everyone came out. I was sort of a leader that way, that’s all, but I wasn’t in politics.

But when I did go to Maui, did Maui Agricultural work, you know you work from seven in the morning till five in the afternoon, you had one hour lunch, [in] the office those days. I was asked to coach a football team, which I did. A 135-pound football team. I don’t know if you know “Ticky” [Edmund] Vasconcellos who was a very successful coach at Roosevelt. The only football he ever played for was my barefoot team. I also coached track there, the
all-Maui track team, and we did very well in the AAU [Amateur Athletic Union] meets there. We beat everybody including the University [of Hawai‘i]—everybody except the army. I was very active that way because I had to do something. In those days, you know, there was just radio and nothing else. You worked from morning till night and then you got up and started all over again.

But a [Mrs.] Louise Cockett invited me to a precinct meeting in 1934. I joined the Republican party. There was only one party at the time in Hawai‘i, so to speak, on Maui. They elected me to the central committee that very night and I served on the central committee from that time on till I retired, which was about forty years later.

CC: So, in a way, at the beginning, did you look at it as something to do, an activity?

AW: Yeah, just an activity to do. Harry Baldwin was very active in politics. You know, he served in Congress, taking the place [of Delegate] Prince [Jonah] Kūhō [Kalaniana‘ole] when he died. And he served in the territorial senate. There were a lot of other businessmen then in those days [active in politics]. I took over his mantle. “Chu” [Lawrence Alexander] Baldwin was very active, but died very young and that just left me. I liked people and I slid into politics and before you know it, well, I was campaign chairman in my twenties and then they elected me county chairman of Maui. While I was county chairman of Maui, Sam [Samuel Wilder] King was appointed governor of Hawai‘i [in 1953]. He . . .

DT: That was much later, that was much later, right . . .

AW: Much later.

DT: Much later. You’ve jumped a few years.

AW: After the war.

CC: Could we get back and just . . . You were saying some things about conditions and that maybe people hear only one side of the plantation story and maybe you could just . . . You know, what was it like in those days over on the plantation and, I guess, also a little bit about party—you know, what did the Republican party do at election time? Did you have rallies? Did you have . . . You know, just a little sense of what things were like . . .

AW: Let’s take the plantation side. You always hear the negative side of it, the dollar a day, and how badly people were treated and all this and that by the supervisors. Well, to a certain extent that was true. But that was true throughout the world. People came over here to work on a plantation for a dollar a day, that was their base pay. Wages ran anywhere from a $1.00 to a $1.60, $1.85 in the [19]30s to $2.00, maybe more. They had a plantation house. It wasn’t the greatest, but the houses weren’t that great in Honolulu, either, if you want [to] compare it with Maui on the plantations. They had free hospitalization, complete hospitalization. They didn’t pay for their water. They paid a dollar a month for their lights. And when they were retired, got a very nominal sum of maybe fifteen, twenty dollars, [but] they still had their house and their hospitalization.

Sure, it was rough. I mean, it was hard life on a plantation. You worked from sunrise to sunset. We weren’t mechanized in those days. But it was still better than the farm hands were
paid on the continental United States. It was far better than the coal mines of Pennsylvania or
the wool mills of back East, and certainly far better than rice paddies of Japan and China and
the Philippines. Those who came here, stayed here; and they worked hard, they were loyal
people. Now, they weren’t accepted socially as, you know, in the political world, but my
father wasn’t either. My father was Caucasian, but he wasn’t accepted socially because he was
a laborer, right?

Now, the sons of these immigrants were educated in the public schools here, a centralized
school system which was started by the Republican party. And then the war came, and they
took advantage of the educational benefits that they earned during the war [under the G.I. Bill
of Rights]. They got their degrees in law, medicine and everything else, business and that,
and it started a new life out here. Then with the social-economic change which came about
after the war and with the help of the unions—I got to give them credit—a whole new picture
developed. But people weren’t discriminated against because he was Japanese or Chinese,
they discriminated against Haoles, too. You know, there was a certain level, educational
level, everybody sought that level.

CC: What was party politics . . .

AW: Party politics?

CC: Back in those days . . .

AW: All Republican, because [there were] very few Democrats in those days, very few. In fact, I
can remember maybe five I can count on Maui. “Pobs” [Augustine Pombo], “Fat” [Clarence]
Crozier, Charlie [Charles E.] Thompson, (Antone) Cravalho was the postmaster of Pā’ia,
Manuel Asue, you know, [was] the [chairman] of the County of Maui [1947–48]. Hardly any
Democrats running at all. You might have one or two. So you have a long list of Republicans
running all the time. Well then because of that, then you get a checklist of who the boss
wanted or the bosses wanted, or who the politicians running the party politics wanted in
office. And they’d give it to a supervisor, and they tell whoever is voting how to vote.

The ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union] did that same darn
thing, too. But when they took over, why, they took advantage of the younger generation that
had just been educated, and they made a good job of it. Because the trouble when that first
started, there’s too much hate in it. There’s too much hate, and there was no necessity for it.

CC: Did you have campaign rallies and speeches and things like . . .

AW: Oh, we had beautiful rallies. Oh, yeah . . .

CC: What were they like?

AW: Oh, well, I’ll tell you exactly what happened because I used to run them over there. I’d give
each candidate three minutes and no more. If not, he had the gong, not the gong but we, (AW
knocks on table) you know, this. The senators had a couple more minutes, or the chairman of
the board [of supervisors]. After we got through, we put on a show, an entertainment show,
because every one of our candidates could either dance or sing, or tell jokes, and we had a
hell of a good time. Everybody would come, it was—you know. Now, it’s just . . .
CC: It was more of a social outlet as well as . . .

AW: It’s a social outlet, yeah, that’s right, yeah.

DT: You became socially acceptable, I guess, from 1934 on by virtue of your position and your becoming a Republican, why, you became more socially acceptable than your parents had been, is that right?

AW: Oh, by far, by far. Don’t forget I was born at ‘Iolani School, the boys’ school. You know, that wasn’t a rich man’s school, and my mother was matron of Priory, and I was educated in public school. I went to Punahou on scholarship. But when I went to Maui, they came to me and asked me to coach athletics, see. I was not in the social world of Maui, [but] I became friends of the youth there, who later—a lot of them still remember me.

I’ve always been very cordially accepted by the Democrats. I want to say this, when I retired from Alexander & Baldwin (in June 1977), the greatest honor that’s ever been given me, both houses—[Tadao] Beppu was speaker of the house and [David] McClung was president of the senate—invited my wife, Patty, and I—Patty’s passed away three years ago—but they invited us over. On the floor of the house, we were given leis, speeches, and a resolution was passed, commending me on my service to the community as chairman of the Republican party. That’s Democrats. And they did the same thing in the house.

DT: Well, lot of things evened out. You really spanned an era where there were very few Democrats on Maui when you started out.

AW: Oh, yeah.

DT: By the time, twenty years later, you had Democrats becoming the majority of the people and it got even worse from the Republican point of view later on. But then you find that the Democrats are willing to honor you and pay homage to you even though. . . . So a lot of differences of opinion went under the bridge in a hurry, right?

AW: I have no regrets of, you know. . . . [And the] thing wrong with today, there are too many Democrats. I’m not speaking as a Republican. There are so many of them in office and they don’t have the objective that they once had, that [John A.] Burns had, you know? There’s so, so many of them that there are these factions in there and they’re fighting among themselves; they’re not doing what they could do. If you had a more balanced situation in the house or the senate, I think their performance would be better.

DT: You’re also a proponent, then, of the two-party system. A competitive two-party system . . .

AW: I certainly am, yeah, yeah. I’d never join the Democrat party, but I’ll be honest with you, since I’ve been chairman, I’ll vote for the best man now.

DT: Mm mm.

AW: Never thought of doing that any time (chuckles) when I was an active member, but I . . .

DT: We’ll continue.
CC: We got to change tapes.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is tape number two, continuation of interview with Arthur Woolaway.

AW: The big change came about, the ILWU, when Harold Rice and Charlie [Charles] Rice changed parties.

DT: Oh, really? I was going to get into that, ask you about the factions that persisted in the Republican party back in the [19]30s when they were a virtual monopoly on the party situation. Must've had groups that were competing. What were they like in the [19]30s, those factions?

AW: Well, it was more predominant in Honolulu. The factions here. First Republican convention I attended was at the Central Grammar School. Mayor [George F.] Wright was in office then, and he was a very astute politician and a good mayor, and he ran the show. I mean, men like Harry Baldwin and Clarence Cooke, who was president of the Bank of Hawai‘i, and others wanted—I forget the man’s name [Alvah A. Scott], but he was manager at the ‘Aiea plantation [Honolulu Plantation]—‘Aiea was plantation then—to be national committee member. Wright beat ’em all the way through. There were those two factions. Here on Maui, you didn’t have any factions, really. All together, except when the ILWU came into being on Maui right after the war . . . Charlie Rice on Kaua‘i got into some sort of a conflict with the board of directors at Amfac and they gave him his walking papers. He turned Democrat [in 1936]. His brother Harold, who married Harry Baldwin and Frank Baldwin’s sister [Charlotte M. Baldwin]—he was living off plantation money, dividends, and that—he turned Democrat [in 1943]. And the ILWU took advantage of that and they ran him as [territorial] senator on the Democratic ticket together with “Fat” [Clarence] Crozier. And they beat “Chu” [Lawrence Alexander] Baldwin and a gentleman by the name of Sam [Samuel] Sniffen, who worked at Maui Ag [Agricultural Company] in the machine shop for that race. And that really hurt Chu. He didn’t last long after that.

DT: So you began to kind of see the nucleus of a Democratic party developing just out of disaffections to Republicans.

AW: That’s right. Then, of course, all they had to do was talk about the bosses, you know—and the ILWU was good at it—how bad the bosses treated you, and everything else. I remember when Jack Hall [regional director of ILWU] first campaigned over there. His dungarees, broken-up tennis shoes and that, very effective, you know.

DT: And this was in the late [19]30s, was it? Mm hmm?

AW: Yeah.

DT: Early [19]40s?

AW: Yeah.

DT: Before the war?
AW: No, after the war.

DT: Oh, after the war? He didn't do any campaigning . . .

AW: No, wait a minute, yeah, after the war. Well, there was a little before that, but after the war is what had . . .

DT: The breakup with the Rices, however, occurred before the war, right?

AW: Yeah.

DT: Yeah. And what factions existed in Honolulu at that time? Was there dissension between [Joseph] Farrington and Sam [Samuel Wilder] King or . . .

AW: No, Sam King and Joe Farrington were very close.

DT: They were very close at the time . . .

AW: They were very close. Yeah, they worked very closely.

DT: And what about Joe [Joseph] Itagaki and Mary Noonan about in the late [19]30s, the late [19]40s . . .

AW: Joe Itagaki and Mary Noonan were—and O.P. [Oliver P.] Soares. They were [Royal A.] Vitousek, for the Vitousek faction . . .

DT: Vitousek group. And how . . .

AW: Vitousek [speaker of the house, 1931–39] was a strong man. I remember the first time as a young Republican I came down, and how I got there I don’t know, but Vitousek and [Steere] Noda, I guess, [it] was him or one of [the] vice-speakers met in [a] hotel room at the Young Hotel. Vitousek just named all of his committee chairmen, you know, just like that. (AW snaps fingers.) No one ever challenged in those days. The communications weren't what they are today. So, everything was just strong-armed, right?

DT: Vitousek was operating from a Honolulu base, right?

AW: Vitousek was an attorney here and he was an attorney, say, for the Big Five [C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Castle & Cooke Ltd.; American Factors Ltd.; Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; and Theo. H. Davies & Co. Ltd.]—the sugar industry and all the big agencies.

DT: And Mary Noonan and . . .

AW: Mary Noonan was his secretary.

DT: Okay, all right. This is what I want to . . . Uh huh.

AW: And Mary Noonan, when [Randolph] Crossley became chairman of the Republican party [1950–53], she and Crossley were at odds all the time.
DT: That came later in the—after the war.

AW: Later on, yeah.

DT: Just before the war, why, you really had a Vitousek faction and a King-Farrington faction?

AW: That's right.

DT: I see, uh huh. And then the war came?

AW: Yeah, the war came. And by the way, later on, I can tell you, I was asked to go to Washington [D.C.] and meet with Secretary [of the Interior, Frederick] Seaton on that change when Bill [William F.] Quinn became governor. I spent two hours with the secretary so if you want to get into that later I can ... 

DT: We'll get into that, mm hmm. Well, what about the war period? I guess life changed quite a bit and politics ...

AW: Well, it was all suspended, right?

DT: Mm hmm.

AW: And we had martial law.

DT: So things went along very comfortably ...

AW: Very comfortably.

DT: ... during the war except for the tensions of the wartime situation ...


DT: Anything in particular sticks in your mind, politically, about that war period from '41 to '45?

AW: No, except I didn't—I remember Harry Baldwin raising holy hell because they picked up [interned] various Japanese nationals, you know? Bringing down to the plantation and put them behind walls at the old Japanese[-language] school at Pa'ia. Both he and his brother Frank just raised hell about that and that was changed.

DT: So Jack Burns wasn't the only one who was defending persons of Japanese extraction?

AW: No, no. Harry Baldwin did more than anybody ever realized that he did and he did it quietly. For instance, [M.] Nashiwa Bakery. He set up [Minetaro] Nashiwa in that bakery there. All kinds of people he set up in business and never asked for one bit of publicity about it. I kept the cashbook, all his donations. He had three doors to his office, Harry Baldwin did. Every week people would come in, church people, and ask for donations and they'd be given cash. I'd note [it] in the cashbook.

DT: Was he a religious person?
AW: Harry Baldwin? Well yes, they were religious. His father was certainly, H. P. [Henry Perrine] Baldwin.

DT: Uh huh. Right, okay.

AW: Yeah, they were religious, but they were very kind. The Baldwins are very kind people. Very generous . . .

DT: So this was really second-generation missionary families that you’re talking about. Mm hmm.

AW: You know, I hear this about the missionaries coming in and asking you to look up and they’d steal your land. I want to tell you something, people ought to be very thankful that the missionaries came here. Because if they hadn’t come here, somebody else would have been here. And if the United States hadn’t annexed Hawai‘i, somebody else would have annexed it—England. Russia was a—Russian had a fort on Kaua‘i. And, you know, with all the problems you hear about how bad it was, in one generation, two, sons of alien workers from Japan, China, were elected to the Congress of the United States, the United States Senate. Now something had to be good about Hawai‘i. Its educational system, and its people.

DT: I think . . .

AW: No one ever says anything about that. They always—it’s a great political ploy to down the plantation, [put] down the Big Five. Hell, if it wasn’t for them, where would we be today?

DT: Well, you’re saying it, and you’re . . .

CC: You’re saying it well.

DT: . . . given the opportunity . . .

AW: I’m tired of it, I’m tired of it. I’ll tell you something. The only way a person can be a success is work, and not depend on the dole or welfare system. That’s the problem with the United States today. People don’t want to work because they can get more money off of being on welfare than they get [working for] base pay. And then they complain about not getting anywhere. I won’t mention the people I’m thinking about right now. They’ve had all the opportunities before anybody even came here and they’re still not taking advantage of the opportunities. When you take a little girl that comes up from Vietnam at the age of two, and at the age of eight, she wins a national essay contest, the whole United States—if she can do that, why in the hell can’t anybody else who was born and raised here?

CC: Let me ask you something to get sort of into the same vein, and that is that, after the war, obviously some major changes started to happen—the union really was in force in terms of the sugar plantations, and the servicemen started to return. Do you think the Republican party could have done better in opening up to the AJAs [Americans of Japanese ancestry] as they came back?

AW: Without question, yes.

DT: Do you think that was a major mistake that was made?
AW: They didn’t see the foresight. Japanese were all Republicans.

CC: Yeah.

AW: But you know they [the Republicans] didn’t take advantage of it and offer them these jobs and that. You know, it’s still status quo. It wasn’t intentional, it’s just they weren’t thinking about it, you know. Because there’s no difference between a Republican and Democrat as far as caring for people, you know. It’s the same. The Democrats can be just as sour, and tight, and non-giving as any Republican.

CC: Were there discussions in the Republican party about this?

AW: No, no.

CC: I mean, was it not . . .

AW: No, not that I know of. I was just a young [man] in those days. Not that I know of.

CC: But on Maui it might have been different, too, than Honolulu?

AW: Yeah.

DT: You probably got acquainted with Thomas Sakakihara, didn’t you, who was a Republican on the Big Island . . .

AW: Tom is a big supporter of mine, yeah. You know, I served in the [1950] constitutional convention [with him]. And I was elected vice president, with the help of Sam King and Hiram Fong, Tommy Sakakihara and all of that. And I was just a youngster then.

DT: Mm hmm. So after the war, you continued your participation in politics, right?

AW: Yeah.

DT: And what about the Republican party? It sort of stayed the same, didn’t change much, but there were factions developing. Were there factions, such as the Farrington-King faction? Did that develop some time between 1946 and ’52 . . .

AW: Well, Joe [Joseph Farrington] took Sam’s place in Washington. You know, Sam was a delegate [to Congress, 1934–42]. First he served on the board of supervisors, then he was elected delegate. But when World War II came about, he resigned and went back into the navy, and Joe took his place. Both of them were very close to [Senator Robert A.] Taft. They worked together. Then, of course, Mrs. [Elizabeth] Farrington took Joe’s place [upon his death in 1954].

DT: Later, mm hmm. Later.

AW: There really weren’t any real factions at that period of time.

DT: By 1952, they had developed.
AW: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah.

DT: By this time, I remember you went back to the Republican [national] convention, and Joe Farrington was the chairman of the delegation. Samuel Wilder King and you split just about even, didn't you?

AW: Four Eisenhower and four Taft [for the Republican presidential nomination].

DT: Why don't you talk about that for a while?

AW: Well, I was a delegate and Mrs. Woolaway—Kathrine Woolaway then, I lost her in 1966 to cancer—but she was my alternate. We went back there and we were treated very well. Joe Martin [Joseph W. Martin, Jr.] was Speaker of the [U.S.] House and he was chairman of the convention. I remember we sat in the tenth row, aisle seats. Of course, Joe [Farrington] was emphatic about backing [Senator Robert A.] Taft, because Taft was boss man in the [U.S.] Senate. If we were ever going to get statehood, that's where it was going to happen. And Sam was too, but Sam didn't press people. Joe was very—he pushed a lot, and rightfully so. And I believe so that—let's see, there was Sam, Joe Farrington, Hiram Fong, and one other [who] supported Taft, and I was on the [Dwight] Eisenhower side just because Maui wanted it. They elected me and they wanted Eisenhower. But part of the convention.

Governor [Earl] Warren of California had come to Maui and I was his host as chairman of the party. We had a luncheon at the Wailuku Hotel. And then I took him for a ride and I showed him the Kahului developments, it was just beginning, where we were giving land to anyone who wanted to build a house to get them out of the plantation housing. I showed him the plantation hospitals and I emphasized the fact that private enterprise could do that better than the government could.

Well, when we got to the convention, Warren was one of the candidates. And I saw Senator [William F.] Knowland, who was his number one man—Knowland owned the Oakland Tribune at the time and was majority leader of the Senate. And because Governor Warren had come to Maui, I said to Senator Knowland, "Would you like a vote from me on the first ballot? But I'm going to change."

He said, "We'd appreciate it."

And so I told Joe. Joe was all, they were upset. Sam said, "Go ahead," but Joe Farrington was very upset that day.

(Laughter)

AW: So I voted for Warren. And no sooner the vote was over, Minnesota changed, and all hell broke loose. Everybody wanted to get up and change. Joe Martin recognized me very early in that stage of the game because he was very close to Sam King and to Joe [Farrington]. And I changed my vote to Eisenhower. When I got home here, a lot of people wanted to know what happened.

And I was a little critical of Eisenhower at that time, too. He was staying at the Blackstone Hotel. And I remember the Hawai‘i delegation, we walked in and we walked past [John
Foster] Dulles, the Secretary of State designate, and that . . .

DT: John Foster [Dulles].

AW: And then Eisenhower. And we got into his living room there and he came on in, then he started talking about, oh, population and economic factors and this and that. But it was Alaska he was talking about. And Mizuha—you remember Judge [Jack H.] Mizuha?

DT: Mm hmm.

AW: He was the delegate from Kaua‘i, so [he] kept on pitting the general, “Are you going to support statehood? Will you be active in its support?”

And the general was a general, you know. He got very irritated, he flushed, and he said, “Listen here, young man. Don’t you speak to me that way.” He says, “I don’t know where legislation begins in Congress and I don’t know where it ends. I’ll support statehood but that’s it.” God, he didn’t impress me, you know. And I’d met him at church the Sunday before, and he was a very strong-minded man and I’m not criticizing him for it, but as a politician, I thought, “Hey, wait a minute,” you know. “Is this what the hell this country needs?” Of course, when I made that statement when we got back home, I caught holy hell. Who am I to criticize Eisenhower.

DT: Well, it’s a free country, I guess. (Chuckles)

AW: Yeah, it’s a free country.

DT: And that opened up a really big question then, right after 1952. Eisenhower, of course, won the presidency—got the nomination and went on to win. The big question was who was going to be the next governor of Hawai‘i, right?

AW: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. And of course, [Randolph] Crossley made it known that he was going to be it. He knew the [U.S.] attorney general, you know. He [Crossley] represented Stokely Pineapple [Company] out here, he had the Stokely Company on Kaua‘i. I forget the attorney general’s name.

DT: Was it Herb Brownell, per chance?

AW: Brownell, you’re right. So he [Crossley] let it slip that he was going to be it. In the meantime, Harold Kay made a point to meet Eisenhower—he’s on his way, I don’t know where it is, Korea, I guess it was—and asked him if he could be chairman [governor]. And what happened was, Taft and Cordon—you remember Senator [Guy] Cordon from Oregon—and a few others put the pressure on and had Eisenhower take a look at Sam [Wilder King] and they appointed Sam [as governor].

DT: That was the result of the Morningside Conference, I guess, they had at Columbia University, wasn’t it?

AW: That’s right.
DT: At least most history reads that way. They had a peace meeting after the convention and settled a few things. (Chuckles)

AW: That's right, that's right. And I was tapped to be secretary of Hawai‘i, which is the lieutenant governorship now. And I didn't get any encouragement from anybody. My principal boss, Asa Baldwin, said, “Well, you take it, we have a job for you, but we don't promise you anything, you know. We don't know what it'll be.” Only one man, J. Walter Cameron, urged me to accept it. Well, I turned it down. I'm not an attorney, you know. As it worked out, it worked out okay with me. I turned it down and then they tapped Farrant Turner.

DT: Was Farrant Turner tapped because he'd been a military man and to help the Eisenhower people, to make them feel good . . .

AW: Well, it was good because he was the commanding officer of the 442nd [Regimental Combat Team], I believe, right? [Farrant Turner was commander of the 100th Infantry Battalion.]

DT: Mm.

AW: Then later on, well later on, then Sam King asked me if I'd be chairman of the Republican party of Hawai‘i. And I was living on Maui and it was the first time anybody [had] been tapped from the neighbor islands. I was elected at the convention at Farrington High School. Served two years (March 1955-March 1957). But without mentioning names, powerful individuals wanted their own person in.

DT: Ah, we'll have to pause there for a minute and you remember if you want to. (Chuckles)

AW: Yeah, I'll remember.

DT: Okay. We'll pick it up from there.

CC: Yeah, we should talk about it. We'll go change tapes and we'll. . . .

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is a continuation of the Arthur Woolaway interview. This is tape number three.

AW: I remember when [Lawrence] Pricher was appointed president of A&B [Alexander & Baldwin, in 1972]. He said to me one day, “I've been invited over to the boardroom at Castle & Cooke. They want to talk politics, money-raising.” He said, “You'd better come with me.”

So I went up there and the meeting had already started. And there were only two seats, right next to the rostrum where Malcolm [MacNaughton] was standing. And when we sat, [I asked,] “But what is this meeting for, are we to raise funds here for the Republican party or the Democrat party?”

He [MacNaughton] said, “The Republican party, of course.”

I said, “Well, the reason I ask, I see a lot of people around here who also contribute to the Democrat party.” And boy, the silence. (CC chuckles.) Don't forget I was chairman and I
lived all through that. Then they ask you afterwards, "Why the hell did you lose?" you know.

DT: You were about to name somebody’s name before we changed tapes here.

AW: Well, Malcolm [MacNaughton]. And he and I were very good friends, but he ran things, that’s his nature. And he had a man, assistant manager at ‘Ewa ['Ewa Plantation Company], Ed [Edward C.] Bryan—he’s the greatest, very close friend of mine. So I decided to step down against the wishes of people who wanted me there, Sam [Wilder King] and everybody else on Maui. I said, “No, no, I will not be chairman unless I have the full support of the business [community] and everybody in the central committee.” I withdrew. Two years later, they tapped me again, I was elected again. Ed Bryan withdrew and I was elected at (chuckles) Farrington [High School] again (March 1959).

DT: Let’s see, what year did you first become state party chairman, then?

AW: It was in the [19]50s . . .

DT: Was it right after the ’52 election, was it? After . . .

AW: Yeah, I was chairman then . . .

DT: After [Randolph] Crossley resigned or something after losing—I mean after ’54?

AW: Yeah.

DT: After ’54 he resigned. So you must have become chairman, ’54 or ’55, somewhere in there.

AW: That’s right, yeah. And then I stepped out two years, and then came back and I was the last chairman of the territory of Hawai‘i and first chairman of the state. (I was chairman of the Republican Party March 1955-March 1957. Ed Bryan was chairman 1957-1959. I was elected again in March 1959 and served until March 1963. I was succeeded by Ken Nakamura, an attorney.)

DT: Mm hmm, mm hmm. I was going to mention now, we sure pick up a little bit. Would you have any comments on Randy Crossley and Harold Kay as individuals? How did they suddenly fit into the Republican picture after they really hadn’t been factors back in [the] [19]30s or [19]40s, too much?

AW: How did they fit in?

DT: Yeah, how did they fit in . . .

AW: You know, Crossley ran for the house, territorial house, from Kaua‘i; he was elected there.

DT: Mm hmm. That was in the late [19]40s, right?

AW: Crossley was an ambitious man. [Crossley served in the territorial house of representatives, 1943–45, and in the state senate, 1959–64.]
DT: So he was an attorney who came from the Mainland, is that right?

AW: He wasn't an attorney.

DT: He wasn't an attorney, a businessman?

AW: No, businessman.

DT: Okay. Who had come from the Mainland, is that right?

AW: Yeah.

DT: Yeah.

AW: Harold Kay was an attorney.

DT: Okay, okay, you picked me up on that.

AW: You know. . . . Well, you want to dwell on this subject a little more?

DT: Yes, say a little bit more about Randy Crossley and Kay.

AW: Well, Kay (chuckles)—you don't go out to meet the president [of the United States] and say, "I want to be governor of Hawai'i." You know, you don't get by with it. I don't know what Eisenhower thought at the time. But Crossley had that "in" with [Attorney General Herb] Brownell and they worked that very hard, and he really thought he was going to be governor. And I'm glad he wasn't governor, because he--Randy wasn't very tolerant, he's not a very tolerant person, you know. You know, he could blow.

DT: Mmhmm.

AW: And his record speaks for itself. And I think Sam [Wilder King]'s choice was a very good choice. Now when they removed Sam [in 1957], I was invited to Washington and I spent two hours—well, I went up with Bill Quinn, we'd stay at the (sigh) what hotel, I forget. Anyway, we had breakfast together. Bill was scheduled to see [Secretary of the Interior] Seaton and have lunch with him and I was scheduled to see him at four o'clock, but they moved me up to two. And I sat two hours in Secretary Seaton's office. He drinking coffee and me smoking a cigar. I smoke cigars. And I took my coat off, and we were talking about the governorship. He says, "Well, what do you think?"

I said, "Well, you have a number of people you can choose from," and I went through all of them. Betty [Elizabeth] Farrington, Harold Kay, Ben Dillingham, Crossley, and, I believe, Sam King. And I ended up saying that Sam King has Hawaiian blood in him, native Hawaiian. He was elected to the board of supervisors, he served very well on that. He graduated from the Naval Academy, served in World War I. Then the board. Then he was elected the delegate to Congress. He resigned that, went to World War II, and served that with distinction as captain. Very popular. And if you're going to remove him, I think we're going to pay a price for it. I recommend very strongly that you let him resign in his own time, short period of time, gracefully.
And he told me that the man on the hill, meaning Eisenhower, carried more weight on his shoulders than any man in the world and he couldn’t add to that. In other words, the decision was made. And they said to me, “How about you?”

I said, “You’ve got to be kidding. You know damn well you don’t mean what you say.”

“So all right, and would you take the lieutenant governorship [the secretary of Hawai‘i]?”

I said, “No.”

“Why not?”

I said, “For the simple reason, I came up here on behalf of Sam King. How could I go up and look at myself in the mirror? Or face my friends? I’m not that type of a guy.” So they picked Ed Johnston. That’s how Ed [Edward E.] Johnston got it. I was offered it.

**DT:** The Quinn nomination was quite a surprise to you, wasn’t it?

**AW:** Yeah, it was a surprise. Quinn—Betty Farrington pushed him and also, I imagine, the Dillingham faction and others downtown. They thought Sam was too tough with ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union] labor leaders. Sam called me one morning on Maui at HC&S [Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company, ten o’clock, he says, “Can you come down?”

I said, “Yeah, I’ll catch the next plane.”

He says, “Come down and have lunch with me.”

And I did. We were at Washington Place. And Jack [Castroverde], the butler, you remember Jack the butler, was there that evening. He used to be head cook at the Wailuku Hotel. He’d been in prison. But Jack ended up well. He always had a jug of martinis and brought out a box of 1886 cigars. So the governor and I sat down. I said, “What’s the matter?”

He says, “I just walked out of the boardroom of all of the top men in the Big Five, Amfac boardroom.” He says, “I picked up my hat and said, ‘Oh, for God’s sake,’ ” and he walked out. They were putting pressure on him to take it easy on the ILWU. See, he was very critical of the ILWU and he wasn’t popular from that standpoint because business didn’t want to rock the boat; [that] was their first concern, right?

**DT:** This was because of things that had been happening on the Democratic side, too, about communism and the ILWU and that sort of thing, right?

**AW:** Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, that’s one of the reasons that . . . I called Sam right after the meeting [with Seaton]. I went down to Jan Jabulka’s office. He was director of the [Hawai‘i] Statehood Commission then. It was the noon hour and I called the governor at Washington Place and he got on the phone and I said, “Listen, it’s not Farrant Turner [the secretary of Hawai‘i] that they want to replace, it’s you.” And I finally said, “Let me speak to young Sam.” And Sam [Samuel P. King] got on, I said, “Look, they’re after your dad, they’re going to ask for his resignation. You’ve got to get Ed Bryan up here right away.” Ed
was chairman of the [Republican] party then. And he came on up—and this was a Tuesday, by the way, Monday or Tuesday. On Thursday, Seaton called the governor and said, "Governor, the president would like your resignation."

And the governor told me he said, "Aye-aye, sir, you'll have it immediately." And he just moved out. And that was a hell of a way to treat Sam King, I'll tell you that.

DT: So the Big Five that day really had King removed and . . .

AW: I would say so, I would say so. They had to reach Eisenhower, somehow. Somebody had to reach Eisenhower.

DT: Quinn had not been an Eisenhower supporter, particularly, had he? I mean other than just being a nominal Republican.

AW: That's right. Well, the reason he was appointed governor was the pressures Taft and Cordon and others put on him, on Eisenhower.

CC: Do you think Quinn was as surprised as anyone or do you think he knew when he—you said you went with him to Washington.

AW: I went with him. Well, I think when he was calling he would have . . . Quinn was chairman of the fourth district. And we had two districts, the fourth and fifth district. Waikīkī side all the way out [to] Waimānalo. And Quinn hadn't had any experience in politics, except he was a young attorney, good-looking, Catholic, and Seaton told me they could [build] a party out of somebody like him and not Sam the old person, eh? That's why Quinn. But you know when young Sam [P. King] ran . . .

Quinn ran his own show. He didn't want any advice from the party or anybody then. He looks back at it with regret now; I've heard him say that. He had a person by the name of [Howard] Hubbard at Castle & Cooke, who was his right-hand man, and Hubbard said to me one day when I was chairman of the party, "Why don't you guys follow us. You always want to go your own way, do your own things."

I said, "Listen, we're not puppets to the governor. We're here to help him. [If] we have different viewpoints, we're going to tell him."

But Quinn was hard to get to. I used to go up to his office, Hubbard's wife was the secretary and I could never get in. Sam [W. King] was different. Sam said, "Come out to the porch," or he'd just wave to me and, you know, "You come in."

But Quinn was difficult that way. And they even sent [Carl] Eric Reppun up to the hospital to see him [Samuel Wilder King] when he was very, very ill. They asked him not to run. See Sam, when Sam was removed, he ran for the house, territorial house, and he got elected. And now, he's going to run for the governorship, again, right? And he and I and Sam were having lunch at Ciro's at Hotel Street there when he had the attack, and he took him right to the hospital. But Hubbard had Reppun, who was then head of the agricultural department, go up and see him and beg him not to run. Sam wanted Neal Blaisdell to run.
DT: For governor.

AW: For governor. But he'd [Blaisdell] been "promised" [quotation marks added in by AW] a spot on the Bishop Estate at that time.

DT: Which never developed . . .

AW: Never developed. Then he [Blaisdell] ran for the Congress [in 1968] and got licked. But years later, when young Sam [Samuel P. King] ran for governor [in 1970] and Ed Brennan was his campaign manager—Ed Brennan, (AW sighs) he had a lot of campaigns and they were all losses. We were having breakfast, our third breakfast at John Henry [Felix]'s room, right below the La Ronde [restaurant]. Felix would have toast and bacon and coffee for us, and Sam was running for governor. And every meeting, Brennan would get up and tell us how well they were doing. We had about thirty-six people there. Hiram Fong, seasoned politicians, some doctors, some lawyers that have never been in politics before. And after the third time, Quinn was there. When he got through, I said, "Ed Brennan, what the hell are we here for? We're supposed to be a committee, you know, and participate with you and give you advice. But all we do is hear how well you're doing and you open this headquarters and this and that. We're wasting our time."

And Quinn got up and he says, "I agree with Woolaway." He says, "That's exactly how I lost my election to Burns."

DT: This was later on, of course . . .

AW: That was later on, yeah.

DT: In '59, the Republicans tried to hedge their bets, or looking forward to '59 with Bill Quinn, but at the same time, the reaction from the [Sam Wilder] King faction was so great that it sort of—and perhaps even for you—that it tended to split the Republican party.


DT: The first time . . .

AW: . . . by the skin of his teeth. But that continued. It did split the party.

DT: Split the party and that opened up the door to Jack Burns in 1962, right?

AW: And they—the Quinn faction didn't go out and reach the grassroots and build a party and all, you know.

DT: No, because people like Jimmie [James K.] Kealoha had the grassroots, they were in touch with the grassroots. And when he [Quinn] lost Kealoha [a lieutenant governor] in 1962, why, that was sort of the beginning of the end, wasn't it?

AW: That's right. That's an interesting point, I forgot that. I was [the] first chairman to hold a convention off island, off O'ahu. I felt the only way we could reach the grassroots statewide was every other year have a convention on the neighbor islands. The first one was Hilo. And
I was sitting there. And I was asked to. . . . (Pause)

DT: Go ahead.

AW: What's this?

CC: Who is that?

(Noises in background.)

AW: The first convention we held was on the island of Hawai'i. And I got the message that [George] Martin—ILWU, Martin?

DT: Mmhmm.

AW: And [Edward] DeMello, their lobbyists; Judge [Albert M.] Felix, he was a Republican; Jimmie Kealoha, they were all at Felix's house. And we sat in the backyard and we were having a drink, you know. And the purpose for calling me over there, they said, "Woolaway," Martin said, "why don't you, as chairman of the party, support Kealoha to get elected?"

I said, "That's a damn good point. But let me ask you ILWU guys something. What are you going to do for Jimmie Kealoha in the primary? You know damn well"—it was a closed primary—"you know darn well you're not going to lend your efforts there. You're going to split the party. If you really get him nominated, I'd support it, outright maybe, but you know you can't do it." They were very successful in splitting the Republicans and beating Quinn by doing that, by getting Kealoha to run. Kealoha believed them.

DT: You're suggesting that [at] that time they might have been willing to abandon Jack Burns for Jimmie Kealoha?

AW: Nah. That was a ploy. I mean Kealoha bit it.

DT: Okay.

AW: Yeah. No, no, no, no.

CC: Kealoha believed it but you didn’t.

AW: I didn’t believe it. I was a very good friend. I loved Jimmie, you know. He and I were very good friends. The reason Kealoha's nose was out of joint—he was a real grassroot politician. Quinn was a businessman, you know, the attorney and that. And it was hard for them to come together. And Quinn’s supporters didn't want it; they wanted Quinn to be the shining light. When Sam [Wilder King] was governor, and he left Washington Place for any trip, Farrant [Turner] had the use of the whole damn place and the car and the chauffeur and everything; Jimmie didn't. And Jimmie's nose got out of joint. He was a Sam King man anyway, you know. And that stress began to tighten up and got worst, and that's why he ran. But he—ILWU never did support him. They used him to split the party. And they were smart in doing that. I'm not criticizing them for it.
DT: Before we go further into '62 election and what happened there, maybe we should step back just one step and think in terms of statehood for a minute. Your role, your role personally, and the role of the Republican party in obtaining statehood.

AW: Well, I'd been elected outright [to the 1950 constitutional convention]. I ran against two on Maui. I ran against Henriques [AW probably means John E. Pires]. You remember he was in the house [1947-48]? And a John Medeiros from Hāna, and I got over fifty percent of the vote in the primary. And then I go [to] this convention, I was elected [one of] the [four] vice president[s].

There was a vacancy on the [statehood] commission. So I went over to see Governor [Ingram] Stainback, Democrat. I said, "Governor, I'm chairman of the Republican party of Hawai‘i, and I was in the constitutional convention, and I'll tell you, I want to serve on a statehood commission. I'd love to serve with you. I admire you as governor," and all this and that, and he appointed me to the statehood commission. I served on that. The chairman of the statehood commission was Lorrin Thurston [publisher of the Advertiser]. He honored me one day with an editorial, full third of the front page. He wrote me a letter. "Dear exalted ruler, Republican party." I was against using public funds, tax money, to send a delegation of union members to California to their union convention they were having for statehood. And you know, they opened Pandora's box. And he thought being chairman of the commission, he wanted to do everything possible. But I did serve on the statehood commission.

DT: All righty, let's think about that for a moment while we change tape.

JC: Okay, please turn this tape over for tape number four and start at the beginning of the second side.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is tape number four, continuation of interview with Arthur Woolaway.

DT: All right, let's think in terms of statehood and as I recall you were a member of the statehood commission and served in several capacities there, didn't you?

AW: Yeah, and I'm glad that I did. We made several trips to Washington for hearings and we had a lot to say about what Hawai‘i contributed to the country, the war, and everything else. I spoke on land and housing developments. They were very critical about housing out here. It was all leasehold then. And we opened up the Kahului tract and you can see what it's like today. And with Governor [Earl] Warren [of California] out there, then I was able to speak on that. Sam [Wilder] King and Joe [Joseph] Farrington did a great job on that.

You know they give credit to Jack Burns for statehood and rightfully so. He was there and he did a great job with Senator [Lyndon B.] Johnson, who became president. And as I say, rightfully so. But there were a lot of other people that made it possible to have statehood. I mean, it just didn't start then. It started with Houston, Delegate [Victor S.K.] Houston, as a
first move. Sam King certainly worked hard on it. Joe Farrington did. And there were a lot of people who contributed to statehood. And there were those who were against it, too. The Dillingham faction was very much against statehood.

CC: What was their opposition based on? What were they . . .

AW: Economics. Economics. But. . . . (Pause)

CC: They wanted to see things stay the way they were basically?

AW: Yeah, that’s right, basically.

DT: Actually, it turned out the reverse. It stayed for them as well as anybody else, didn’t it?

AW: Yes, yeah, yeah. You know, sometimes people ask me, do you regret having put your efforts in gaining statehood and that we’ve been made a state, I say no. I remember very clearly a delegation from the house and senate went up to San Francisco as a guest of the Standard Oil of California, and I was with them. And one of the chief executive officers there said to me, “Well, you don’t pay taxes do you?”

I said, “What the hell [are] you talking about? That’s the whole thing in a nutshell. We pay the same federal taxes you do and we can’t vote—the delegate has no vote in the Congress—or vote for the president. This is what we’re talking about: equal representation, fair representation.” But a lot of people, prior to statehood, thought we were out in the Philippines someplace, you know. It wasn’t, it wasn’t. . . . They didn’t give us any muscle or strength in the economic picture out here. We were the . . .

DT: Were you on the statehood commission when we actually got statehood? Were you still on it or not?

AW: No, I resigned for some darn reason so that we wouldn’t, I think, bring politics into it. Gee, at the moment, I don’t recall. I resigned for some reason, I don’t know what it was.

DT: Well, no, it’s not terribly important. But you are convinced [that] the Republicans had quite a role to play in obtaining statehood, is that your main point?

AW: Oh yes, oh yes. Oh, very much so. So I mean, if anybody thinks it just came about under Democrat leadership—oh no, no, no.

DT: So you give Bill Quinn his share of . . .

AW: Oh, yes, I give Bill Quinn. . . . Bill Quinn worked hard on that, yeah.

DT: As well as Jack Burns and others.

AW: Oh, yeah, Jack Burns. No, I liked Jack Burns. A lot of people didn’t like him as governor, but Jack had an objective in life that he wanted to accomplish. He wanted to do something for Hawai‘i. He wanted a more fair situation, as far as jobs were concerned, and diversification of the industry out here and everything. And I think he did a great job.
DT: But it stands to reason you weren't too happy in 1962, when he defeated the Republican Bill Quinn.

AW: No, I was chairman [of the party] and the only one [who] spoke, really spoke—took Jack Burns on every week, I did. I did. But we were friends, good friends. He used to call me "Woolaway." And he tapped me to organize Ahahui Koa Anuenue. He called me one day at the office at A&B, said, "What are you doing for lunch, Thursday?"

I said, "Nothing."

He says, "I want you up at Washington Place, I have some businessmen [meeting], maybe thirty of them. You sit right next to me on my right-hand side."

I thought, "Oh, you know. This is going to be great." I didn't know what it was for. And he talked about Ahahui Koa Anuenue and at that luncheon we raised $40,000. Now we raise over $400,000 a year.

And by the way, let me mention one thing. The first year [the] Punahou carnival came into being, they raised $408 to pay for the Oahuan, the annual, and I was chairman. Nineteen thirty-two. Four hundred and eight dollars. This last year, they grossed $1,300,000.

DT: That's in 1988? Early this year.

AW: Yeah, that's right. Look at Ahahui Koa Anuenue.

DT: But be that as it all may, that was [the] last big Republican defeat in 1962 because you achieved a sort of parity with Democrats between '59 and '62. In '62, everything went, a sweep, Democrat.

AW: First [statehood] election [in 1959], we elected the governor and we took control of the senate.

DT: Mmhmm.

CC: Why did your fortunes reverse in '62?

AW: Well, I have to lay it a lot with the Republican senate. They became individuals. And Quinn did. . . . I've got to lay it to the administration, that was his job to build a Republican party, and I guess they failed.

DT: Should Quinn have been more accepting of Jimmie Kealoha or was that a fact . . .

AW: Oh, that was a . . .

DT: Should Quinn have been more accepting of . . .

AW: Yeah, that was a big thing, too. You got a lot of local people that walked away from Quinn.

DT: Because that primary contest really did hurt you, didn't it?
AW: Yeah. You know, the success of an election. . . . I'll tell you why Democrats win all the time, very simple. Especially in this one vote, one man district. You name Republican districts. I don't like it. I don't like the individual districts because it tends to bring race into it, it tends to bring religion into it, it tends to bring business against labor into it. If you're out at Waipahu, you know, all anti-business.

It drives me crazy to think how people think that you should spite business, and then overtax them, and do this and that. You know, they hurt business. And that was the union point at one time. They don't do it anymore. But who the hell pays the damn wages? The business. The more successful a business is, the more they employ. The more wages they pay, the more taxes are paid. You run a business, and what happens? What do you want? The government to. . . . You want a socialized [Socialist] government or some other type of government? They're crazy. The more money a company makes, the more employment. And now they say that, "Tax the corporations." Now you might tax a corporation and hurt the sugar industry because the price of sugar is on a world market. But you go and tax any corporation, increase the tax, what do they do? All they do, they don't pay it. They pass the taxes on and cost to their customers, the taxpayers. And they end up—the poor people pay for the damn taxes. So when you talk about taxing the corporate structure, they're crazy; they don't know what they're talking about. But it's a hell of a good politics, or is that right?

DT: Very interesting. You made your point that you really came to like Jack Burns quite a bit even though you opposed him in '62 for the governorship. You never considered running against him, did you? But in '73, weren't you considering running for governor?

AW: Ah, yes. I was then honorary chairman. And this was November, one year before elections.

DT: Honorary chairman of the Republican party?

AW: Yeah. I think they don't even know that today. Nobody knows who the hell I am. "Wadsy" [Wadsworth] Yee, one of the ranking Republican senators and Hannibal Tavares and I went to the Republican executive committee (of the central committee). Ed Brennan was chairman there. And Wadsy said, "Look, Woolaway will run for governor. And I think we ought to endorse him."

And I said, "Look, I don't expect to win." I'd already gone and seen David Trask, who I knew very well, and a few others, Democrats. They'd say, "Yeah, Woolaway, run." I'd be running against [George] Ariyoshi. Nobody had to tell me I was going to lose. But I wanted to run and have some respect in the elections, see. So okay, some of the big boys met up at the Campbell Estate. My friends were there. Naturally, nobody wanted me. So they chose [Randy] Crossley, you know. So they got Crossley. And I just withdrew. Crossley withdrew—he withdrew too, after he was defeated [for governor].

DT: Was that the convention when they went out to the country to bring him in to accept the nomination?

AW: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

DT: They made a big deal out of it.
AW: A big deal out of it, yeah.

DT: So that was really sort of your last, big, last hurrah in terms of close participation in Hawaiian politics, wasn't it? Your idea you might run for governor?

AW: Yeah. But you know, we forgot one thing. Betty Farrington insisted that I go to a meeting of all the state chairmen. Forty-eight state chairmen? And Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawai'i, territory chairmen. And we met at the Statler Hotel in Washington. I remember this very clearly. The state chairmen sat in a horseshoe. The head table here and the three territorial chairmen sat over here on the side. And they were voting on resolutions. And I got up, I said, "Mr. Chairman, I've got a question." I said, "Are we, three of us, members of this delegation, being here, are we fully---can we vote?"

He said, "Of course."

I said then, "Why the hell don't you ask us for our vote?" And the place came down, you know. As a result of that I was invited to have breakfast with Eisenhower in Denver. I was taken over by plane with the rest of the chairmen. Soon right after that, I was elected vice-chairman of the thirteen western states, the Republican conference of the thirteen western states.

DT: This was in what year, now?

AW: I don't remember. That was years ago.

DT: Yeah, quite a while. But this was before you decided . . .

AW: To run for governor, yeah.

DT: To run for governor. So we're back in the . . .

AW: Yeah, yeah.

CC: This is back before statehood, right? This is back when you're still a territory.

AW: No, no, no, no. Yeah, a territory. You're right. Yeah.

DT: Oh, back in territorial days.

AW: And then after two years, they elected me chairman for three years, you know.

DT: Well, that's very interesting that somebody from Hawai'i at that early stage had an opportunity to be given national recognition and I think that's something which you can be justly proud of and I think all . . .

AW: That's when [Richard M.] Nixon was governor of California.

DT: Governor of California. So that everybody . . .
AW: And he was going to run—he ran against [John F.] Kennedy. And I was chairman of the whole shebang and we had a convention, a big meeting up in Idaho, at the resort there. Yeah, so I mean, I really met a lot of people and had a lot of experience . . .

DT: You’ve had a long and rich political career even though you haven’t held the top office or anything of that sort. You’ve been there when the action was happening and where it was happening. I’ll tell you what I’d like to do now just for fun since you’ve been sort of playing a low-key role since the early [19]70s. I’m going to mention three names and I’d like to have your reaction to them because they are prominent political figures and it’d be nothing personal in this at all. But what’s your reaction to [George] Ariyoshi? He got elected, you didn’t run, and he got elected in ’74.

AW: Well, Ariyoshi’s personality was such that he was quiet, laid back. I’ve always liked Ariyoshi. He was—but I think he did a good job. He wasn’t outgoing to the extent that he could draw people in. He had inherited everything, right? He started having his difficulties when he started changing people in the top jobs, you know, Burns’s people. And he was never that popular, but I always thought he did a good job. I give him credit for one thing. When he was senator, it was his vote that killed the Maryland land bill [in 1963, which was later enacted as the Residential Leasehold Law, allowing lessees to purchase fee title to leasehold lands].

DT: Mmhmm.

AW: And even today, (chuckles) I see [Matsuo] Takabuki or others, and (Bob) Taira. I always go up to him at lunch and I lean over the table and say, “By the way, you remember when I was chairman—and my memory kind of fails me—who the hell was it that pushed that Maryland land bill?” Well, it was Takabuki, it was (Bob), it was [Myron “Pinky”] Thompson, who was an assistant to Burns. Yeah. The whole damn bunch. Bill [William S.] Richardson who was chairman of . . .

DT: The Democratic party.

AW: The Democratic party. He’s a very good friend of mine. And now, you see, they’re just the opposite.

DT: And you’re referring to people that . . .

AW: Three of them are on the Bishop Estate, right [Takabuki, Thompson, and Richardson]? I said, “But you know, that’s what politics wants.”

DT: So, a little bit of a needle about (laughs) . . .

AW: But Ariyoshi, I admire him when he . . . That lone vote of his killed . . .

DT: From the Republican point of view, I guess, and the economic point of view . . .

AW: And I was against it too, at that time.

DT: All right, the next name I’ll mention is Frank Fasi. He was once a Democrat and today he
stands as one of the two or three prominent Republicans who hold an office [as mayor of Honolulu].

AW: I don't believe Frank Fasi's a Republican, but I don't blame him for joining the Republican party. When he was a Democrat he didn't get the support from the Democrats. You might call him a maverick. He's independent. I don't like everything he does, but I admire him for it. He's been successful at it. And I don't think they're going to lick him this time [in the mayoral election in 1988].

DT: Really? Mm hmm.

AW: I think there are too many Democrats running in the first place.

DT: So you don't have any strong reaction. Most people have a strong reaction to Fasi. You have a sort of a neutral feeling, then.

AW: Well, I really---I don't care. I really think he makes a pretty good mayor.

DT: You've been retired from active politics today, I know. [John] Waihee, do you have any impressions of him? In the future, shall we say?

AW: Well, Waihee. I didn't think he was going to [be] governor. But what happened to [Cecil] Heftel put him out in front. I thought Heftel was going to be it, he was the guy to beat. I did help "Andy" [D.G. Anderson, the Republican nominee]. I'm the guy who put [John Henry] Felix in and got him to run as lieutenant governor. We had [Rick] Reed, we had [Ike] Sutton and [Cynthia] Thielen, running. And not one of those, either one of those three, I felt, could really do Anderson any damn good. Felix wanted to see me one morning with George Houghtailing at coffee, the Plaza Club. And he asked me for his support. I'd already told George, "You let me talk about this. Let me talk to him about this." I said, "Felix, when you were a young man, you were working as an organizer for Art [Arthur] Rutledge [head of the Teamsters], a labor boy. And I got you elected secretary to the Republican central committee, a labor man. Because I felt it was necessary to get labor in the party. And a lot of people lost their hair over that. I thought it was a hell of a good move and they should have done it a long time ago." So I said, "You know, I've always had your interests at heart. And I pointed you out for other things in the party." But I said, "In this case, you're not going to make it [as Republican nominee for governor]. If I were you, I'd run as lieutenant governor."

He says, "I've already talked to Anderson but he won't give me anything."

I says, "Why the hell should he? He's not allowed by law to promise you, you know." It's his job. I said, "If Andy promised you anything, I wouldn't vote for him. Because it indicates weakness on Andy's part, promising people something to get elected." I said, "You want me to talk to Andy?"

He says, "Yeah."

I went over to Andy. And Andy says, "I don't want him, he wants too many things."

I said, "That's out of the window. Would you be interested?"
He said, "Yes."

So one day from Felix's office—Felix said, "Okay, I'll run." He said, "Let's have dinner."

I said, "That's good."

He said, "We'll have dinner at the Pacific Club."

I said, "The hell you will have dinner at the Pacific Club. I'm not going up [to] your club there, have dinner, on a deal like this. I'll take you to dinner."

I called Andy, Andy said, "Fine, we'll have dinner down John Dominis."

I (chuckles) said, "The hell you will."

So we went up the country club. We were in the back room in the dark. And we sat there for an hour and they shook hands.

DT: This is O'ahu Country Club?

AW: Yeah.

DT: Mm hmm.

AW: But Andy ran a terrible campaign. God. I didn't get in to sit on his committee till after the primary, the Monday after the primary. It was Saturday. And they welcomed me. And the first thing I said, "Look, my advice to you is get off Ariyoshi's back. He's not running. He's not running against Andy. You're fighting and killing a dead horse. What is Andy going to do?" You know, that continued. And Andy came down to A&B and [Robert] Pfeiffer took him around, meet people. And on the way out at the Merchant Street exit, I said to Andy, "You know, I never see you." He didn't talk to anybody at headquarters at any time. They had him closeted. You couldn't even see him. Nobody could talk to him. And I said, "Well, at least you read the minutes, don't you?"

And he said, "No, I haven't seen them in three weeks." You know.

DT: So it all really added up to defeat. Added up to defeat.

AW: It all added up to defeat, yeah. Andy could have won that election. Now as far as Waihee is concerned—you asked me that question—I think he's doing a good job. You know, you can't please everyone. I think he's doing a good job. And I don't know who you're going to run against him to beat him the next time around.

DT: Well, we appreciate your opinion.

CC: I think that . . .

DT: I think that about wraps it up. We thank you very much for being with us.
CC: We come from 1912 right up to the present, so that's pretty good.

AW: Not bad, huh?

CC: Yeah.

DT: Right. Excellent job.

AW: Thank you.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JT: That is not the end of the interview. We did one more tape and this is tape number five.

DT: There's one thing that we've missed here. Certainly we've been talking a little bit about, off-camera, about polling and that sort of thing. But one big topic that we sort of overlooked and before we finally conclude this, we should give attention to. I think you had played a rather critical role . . .

(Interruption by crew member. Taping stops, then resumes.)

DT: I thought we were finished, but not quite. Let's turn, if we may, to a really, quite a big topic and it was very controversial at the time, the so-called legislative coalition in the house of 1959, just before statehood. I believe you had quite a role to play there, right?

AW: That's right.

DT: In that year, there were twenty-six Democrats elected to the house and eighteen Republicans. No, twenty-three [thirty-three] Democrats, eighteen Republicans.

AW: That's right. In that year, there were twenty-six Democrats elected to the house and eighteen Republicans. No, twenty-three [thirty-three] Democrats, eighteen Republicans.

DT: That adds up, right?

AW: And, we found out that [O. Vincent] Esposito, who was going to name one Republican to any committee—judiciary, county, finance—and as such, we wouldn't even have a second anytime we'd put something on the floor. So I went to see Esposito and the man behind him was Tom Gill. Esposito's already seated in his office and his stationery printed, speaker of the house, and everything else. And he was actually the man of Pacific then, those big meetings all over the place. And I thought if we got statehood, Esposito would be the first governor. He was riding high. And Esposito is an easy guy to talk to, he's very friendly. I said, "Es, you can't do this to the Republican party. You've got to give us proportional representation on the committees." And he'd laugh at it, and about the third time I said, "Now look, Es, I'm telling you. I'll give you fair warning. We're going to fight this." I happened to walk into the ['Iolani] Palace, and Elmer Cravalho was coming down the stairs. He's just a member of the house, he'd been up seeing [Governor] Quinn. I said, "Elmer, you want to be speaker?" And he laughed. I said, "Don't laugh." You see, because Charlie [Charles] Kauhane had come to me, former speaker of the territorial house. Democrat, Republican, Democrat. Very close to the ILWU.

And Charlie said, "Look, Woolaway, I'll get you eight votes, ILWU votes. You tell Sam [Wilder] King if he wants to be speaker he can have it. You can have any chairman of any committee you want, we'll give them to you."
Well, I met with Sam [W. King] and [Yasutaka] Fukushima—he became Senator Fukushima—I admire him, he’s a very strong man—and [J.] Ward Russell was the floor leader, a minority leader of the house, and brought this proposition up. Sam bought it right away. So did Fukushima. Ward was a little kānaliu about it. Anyway, see, we had to sell this to Forbes, Mrs. Forbes [rather than Eureka Forbes, who was not in the 1959 territorial house, AW means Mrs. Flora Hayes], Mrs. [Dorothy] Devereux, young [Ambrose] Rosehill, you know, a lot of young people in there.

And don’t forget the ILWU. In those days there was that question of the red flag there, you know. And you know we used to meet at the Pacific Club, the old Pacific Club, in the cottage and talk about it. One day, what do you think, I had Charlie Kauhane come up. And he was being questioned by Mrs. Devereux, and I was in the back of the people, of the members of the house, and she says, “Well, Harry Bridges was Communist, isn’t he?”

And Charlie says, “Well what are you thinking about, he’s a member of the Republican party.” And he was, see. I got up on the chair. (AW makes sounds.) Calmed it all down. It was, you know, really hot words going around. I took Charlie back to the Young Hotel and I said, “Charlie, you can’t do that with these wahines.” Anyway, Sam held the fort all the way through.

And the [territorial] house was so seated [in 1959], there wasn’t any railing there. Joe [Joseph] Garcia, member of the house from Hawai‘i, sat on the ‘Ewa side makai, last desk, and I always put a chair right next to him because Joe was going to church every morning, Catholic church on Fort Street, and prayed, you know, asking guidance what to do. He was like this, you know, ILWU. And one day he said to me, “Say, Woolaway, don’t sit next to me. They’re going to take our [the representatives’] picture.” [AW was not a member of the house.] And sure enough. Picture came (chuckles) out in the Advertiser, “Fifty-second member of the house,” that was me, you know.

And James Michener, Lorrin Thurston, Chinn Ho would drive me around and beg me to call this thing off [fight for speakership] because the enabling act was coming up before the Congress and we were going to kill statehood. I said, “Hell, they’re not interested in local politics.” Well, anyway, finally, Esposito broke down one night and he cried, and that was the end of it. Wally [Walter] Heen was acting chairman of the house. He gave up and Elmer [Cravalho] was elected speaker, and he was a great speaker. He could speak. I’m sorry he didn’t accept Burns’s term to run with him as lieutenant governor. He would have made a good governor. But he was all business and he was tough. And now, you don’t have that leadership that Elmer provided. Not at all.

DT: That’s very interesting, your view about that. Mm hmm.

AW: Yeah. And that’s how we defeated Esposito and he was all through [in] politics after that.

DT: Yeah, you’re right. That was pretty much end of Esposito’s political career, but it wasn’t the end of Tom Gill’s . . .

CC: Right, I was going to say, and Tom Gill (pause) later challenged Burns . . .

DT: But the Republicans couldn’t quite make hay out of that split, could they?
AW: No, they couldn't make... It's already gone. You see, the labor unions have personal
contacts with the people. The Republican candidates don't. As I said to you, the Republicans
meet the public over the air, on TV, the ads and that. But they lose that—they don't have that
personal touch, that house-to-house campaign that the HGEA [Hawai'i Government
Employees' Association], the ILWU, etc., etc., provides for them. No way. And they
couldn't, even in those days, they couldn't do it. But Gill didn't remain long, did he? He was
so damn obstinate. A good man; he's very intelligent. But very negative, very negative.

CC: That's a theme through a lot of the things you talk about. Do you feel that a number of
politicians have opted to be obstinate and negative and, therefore, done themselves in, is that
a...

AW: Yeah, that's right. I really feel that.

CC: Was that also your assessment of Crossley?

AW: Yes, exactly. You know, my thought in life is very clear, direct. I think the caring of people
and being able to work with people and associate with people is the most important thing in
life. That's it. Some of the candidates that you talk about become individuals and instead of
thinking of the responsibility they have to everybody—the party and the state—they start
thinking about themselves and they work within themselves and they lose it all. You can't do
it that way. You've got to be out there working with people, and doing what you can for
them, and sharing with them, and accepting their help, but letting them share their effort with
you.

CC: Do you think that we're going to see a two-party system revive in Hawai'i?

AW: Never, ever. As long as there's a one-man district, never, ever. And I think that's bad. We
ought to have multiple districts again. On a one-to-one basis, it's bull. You've got to—in
order to get something you've got to promise each individual something, too. It's very costly.
They only represent themselves. They're working within a shell. They're only interested in
getting elected in their district. They're not interested in any other part of the island or the
state.

And it's typical of the Congress of the United States. The congressmen of the United States
that are elected in districts, they'll do anything to please their constituents and get elected.
And that's why we have so much wasted government, so much welfare that's wasted. What is
generally misunderstood, I think, in my viewpoint, is that those [who] need this help, this
welfare, don't get what they should get because it's wasted, given all away for political
reasons, you know, in the broad scope of things. A congressman [is] elected, all he's
interested in is that district; they're not interested in the state as a whole or the nation. There
are damn few statesmen in the Congress of the United States, if any, because of that.

CC: But you see our own state legislature as having a similar problem.

AW: Similar problem. And it's costly and you take—there's so many districts that a Republican
can't get elected in. There's so many Democrats there. It's caused factional disputes among
themselves...
CC: Are they really different anymore? Are there Democrats who think an awful lot like Republicans used to? I mean, within the Democratic party, you can't look at a guy and say, "That's a Democrat, therefore, he believes this, this and this," can you?

AW: There's no difference between a Republican and a Democrat. You try tell me. It's the individual. And of course, if he's elected in a Democrat district like Waipahu [as opposed to] Kāhala, he's going to be thinking a little differently, but their concern with the people would be about the same. But I don't like this one-one district at all. I think it's bad. The council, if we had four men at-large in the council, we'd have far better performances of the councilmen. This one-one is just stupid. They ought to revise that completely.

CC: How about the---we never talked about city government much. Did you want to raise any questions about it, since we have a few minutes left on this cassette . . .

AW: Can I bring up one thing?

DT: By all means.

AW: The convention center?

DT: Mm hmm.

AW: There are two other options nobody talks about. One is [Neal] Blaisdell Center. We could do that, put more parking in it. I've never heard that at all. The other one is, you want economic development for the state, right? Not just one island. We're up to here with traffic and people. What are we going to do with thousands more people coming in here? You know where the convention center could be—it's just a thought—how about the island of Hawai‘i? It's still the state of Hawai‘i, isn't it? They have lots of room over there. Of course, the hotel people here wouldn't like it, but, you know, they can still sell their product. Nobody's thinking about that.

DT: Well, if you think far enough in the future, it's certainly a possibility.

AW: Yeah.

DT: But one thing you . . .

AW: But don't forget who said it first, though.

DT: We're dealing in the future now so, (laughs) you may be held accountable for this prophesy.

AW: Yeah.

DT: One thing that does occur to me though as you mention the possibilities of maybe a remake of the Blaisdell Center, we didn't really spend as much time as we might have on "Rusty" [Neal] Blaisdell. Particularly the reason why after he was mayor, decided not to run there, why he did not get the Bishop Estate trustee post. What happened there? Do you have any insight into that particular situation?
AW: Yeah, I do. 'Cause you know Neal got worried. That was why Sam [Wilder] King appointed him director of department of welfare, gave him that chance again. And Neal as mayor of Honolulu had the support of a lot of Democrats, a good Japanese support. His man [Yoshio] Kunimoto, his engineer, was very instrumental in helping that way. And Neal, as I said, the governor wanted him when he was dying in the hospital, wanted him to run for governor. I think he would have made it.

DT: Mm hmm.

AW: I think he would have made it. But somebody had told him, within his own group, that that possibility was there. And he was very hurt. In his mind, the estimation was a double cross. And then he made the big mistake running for Congress [in 1968] and he was urged to do that by Ed Brennan. Absolutely wrong to have him finish up his political career that way.

DT: Mm hmm. So you really feel that it was . . .

AW: Yeah.

DT: Don't have any idea of what the inner workings there, or why he didn't get the appointment then? Just that it was a double cross.

AW: It was a double cross, yeah. I don't say Burns double-crossed him. But there were those who had other things in mind talking to him and that's how it came about.

DT: So unnamed persons, perhaps, were responsible for that. I believe that's just about the questions in my mind.

CC: Okay, good, yeah.

DT: We thank you so very much, Mr. Woolaway.

AW: Is that right? Don't call me, "Mister." Arthur.

DT: Okay, Art.

(Laughter)

JC: This is really the end of the Arthur Woolaway interview.

END OF INTERVIEW
HAWAIʻI
POLITICAL HISTORY
DOCUMENTATION PROJECT

Volume I

Center for Oral History
Social Science Research Institute
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa

June 1996