BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr.

Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. was born in Quincy, Illinois February 25, 1925. After attending public schools in Quincy, he graduated in 1945 from Illinois College. He earned his M.A. in public administration in 1947 from the University of Minnesota where he would later receive his Ph.D. in 1964.

He accepted a position at the University of Hawai‘i in 1950 after a three-year teaching stint at the University of Wyoming.

A long-time political observer, Tuttle has worked as an election night political analyst and political columnist. He is currently executive director of the Hawai‘i Education Association (HEA).
Joy Chong: The following is an interview with Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. It took place on June 21, 1990 at the HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association] office in Honolulu. The interviewers were Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto and Warren Nishimoto. This is session number one, videotape number one.

MK: Okay. Tape number one with Mr. Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr., on June 21, 1990. Maybe we can start today’s interview by having you tell us when and where you were born.

DT: I was born in Quincy, Illinois, February 25, 1925. And, probably the only way you would ever have heard of Quincy, Illinois is if you (can) remember the Burlington route these days or (the) Burlington Northern [Railroad]. It used to be known as CB&Q, and that stood for Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. Quincy, at one time, was bigger than Chicago, but that’s about the time (1820s) the missionaries arrived in Hawai‘i, and then everything started to bypass Quincy, and went to Chicago, railroad routes, lake travel, (and) so forth. Quincy was basically a river town. The railroads went north to Burlington, Iowa, and south to St. Louis, and then, when airplanes came in, they went everyplace except Quincy, although there is a (small) airport there today.

MK: And back when you were a boy, what kind of town was Quincy in terms of its politics?

DT: It was a town of about 40,000 (and), still is, just about the same today. The town was generally Democratic, and the county, Adams County, was generally Republican. So as a whole, it tended to be Republican or Democratic depending upon the time. (However), beginning in 1932, when I was about seven years of age, (the town) became very heavily Democratic. (Of course), the town politics was interesting at the time when I was there because (although) the Democrats controlled—(at first, there was) a limitation on the terms of mayor, so it went from (a) liquor distributor (Republican) to a tavern keeper (Democrat) and back again because (in 1933) Prohibition (was repealed). So the Democrats took over (in 1932) and the liquor industry was riding high, and so (this regardless of party) literally controlled the town (for a decade or more).

MK: And your own parents? Who were they and how were they involved in politics, if any?

DT: My parents were not really involved in politics at all. My father [Daniel Webster Tuttle] was
a postal clerk which was a nice job for him because he was hard of hearing from the time he’d been a little boy. He could hear over the old canceling machines in that day. And, of course, he was covered by rules and regulations of the federal government (Hatch Act) which prohibited (one) from taking part in politics. So, he wouldn’t even let my mother drive people to the polls. She would have liked to have driven people to the polls because she could make ten or fifteen dollars a day from doing that.

My mother [Nellie Blanche Hampton Tuttle] was interested in public affairs, interested in politics and very much interested in education. But she said she was an independent in part because her maiden name was Hampton, although she never knew her father (who was killed accidentally prior to her birth. Hampton was a) very Southern name, and of course, they were very Democratic, capital D. But by the same token, I guess, because she was married to my father who had Republican (family) tendencies, why, she had Republican tendencies also. But from time to time she would fluctuate, and then she’d end up saying, “Well, I’m going to vote for the (best) man.” And to the best of my knowledge, neither my father nor mother ever told specifically—how they voted. So it was strictly a (family) secret ballot.

MK: And I think you mentioned that your grandfather on your father’s side was a political candidate?

DT: Oh, very much so. Very much so. His name was George Tuttle, and he operated out of Kirksville, (Taylor), and Sedalia, Missouri. He was a farmer, and at one time, a fairly wealthy farmer. And, he was also a county politician in Adair County (Kirksville), Missouri. So he, at one time or another, was a county treasurer, county auditor, and county assessor. These were normally either two-year or four-year elective positions at the county (level). And so he was, for many years, in the county courthouse. I remember visiting there as just a toddler really, and looking out the window of the courthouse and seeing the Graf Zeppelin sail by, which was quite a(n event) in those days. He continued on in office until just a few years before his death in the (early) [19]50s. One of his children, a twin, ran for county treasurer, a couple years after he left the courthouse, and managed to win the office. So she was one of the pioneering women county officeholders in that area. She held that office, getting elected every four years, until she retired. She’s the only member (of) my father’s family that’s still living.

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

MK: Okay. You know, having a grandfather in politics and having an aunt in politics, did they somehow influence your interest in politics?

DT: Probably so. I didn’t (often) visit my grandfather. He lived about 100 miles away from us, Kirksville being about that distance from Quincy. But I did visit him on occasion and on two or three (of these) occasions, I can remember his taking me down to what would be the equivalent of a party rally in Kirksville, Missouri. In other words, there was a train station, and the candidates would normally (arrive at) the train station. And I remember holding his hand and going down to watch whoever the candidate was. It was an exciting time, of course. There were (always) flags, (and) a band. But this didn’t happen very often, maybe twice or three times. But my aunt, of course, had nothing to do with it because she was too young, at that time, herself. She was not that much older than I am, and she didn’t get into politics really until having worked for her father. She took over after he passed away.
MK: And with your grandfather in politics, did you follow how he did in elections?

DT: I don’t have any recollection really before 1932, but a lot of things jumped into focus in that 1932 election because he was involved, as I recall, and I believe as a Republican, he managed to survive that FDR [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] landslide. But I remember very vividly listening to the election returns on election night between [Herbert C.] Hoover and FDR on an old Atwater-Kent radio. And while I didn’t understand all the implications, one thing does stick in my mind, perhaps reinforced by later years, was the fact that FDR was quite a (radio) orator. In sharp contrast, Herbert Hoover, (seemed like) a “dud.”

(Laughter)

WN: What were election returns like in ’32, if you remember? I mean, what was communicated to you?

DT: Well, the running totals, and how each state was “going.” And you had a person such as H.V. (Kalten Lorra), of later political fame, but he was there in ’32 announcing these results. And if (there) happened to be a storm going on, we had a lot of static on the radio because we didn’t have FM in those days. But it was an exciting time. This Atwater-Kent happened to have a big speaker on it, and this helped my father to hear, too. And so I found it an exciting time, and there (was) always the next day’s newspaper with all these election statistics in it.

MK: Were your parents close observers of these political races, and did they discuss them with you?

DT: Probably, because as an only child and being rather talkative, I’m sure (that) whatever I found interesting, I was (always telling) them about (it). As a youngster, not until I was much older did I communicate very well with my father because of his hearing condition, but I communicated a great deal, of course, with my mother. She was interested and later on, as the years ticked off, she was always there to help me get to some political function. I can’t really account for it other than that my grandfather being interested in politics and (my early interest in) statistic(s). And, my mother had, maybe, not all that much zest for politics, but she had a lot of zest for education. And as some people really do, she always had some sort of attachment to the heroes of history, shall we say, and that (spurs interest in) politics, too.

MK: And you’ve mentioned that sometimes, your mother would take you to these political rallies or speeches. You can maybe tell us about some of the ones that you remember.

DT: Well, I’m sure that in 1936, she took me down to the [Quincy Senior] High School auditorium. By this time, what was I—eleven years old, to hear Alfred [M.] Landon who happened to campaign in my hometown. And I was attracted to Alf Landon because he had a (Kansas) sunflower as a symbol of his (presidential) campaign. I hadn’t heard too many good things about FDR around the house, quite frankly, and so I was interested in Landon.

But by the same token, I wasn’t that partisan in those days. I think it was in the same year that I went down to the high school auditorium, once again I believe my mother took me, and that’s when I had my—to me was a “famous” encounter, with Edward J. Kelly who was then mayor of Chicago. On that occasion, I listened to what he had to say, and decided I didn’t like what he said, because I’d read about their stealing votes in Chicago, voting cemetery lots,
(et cetera). Of course, this was one of FDR's (publicized) "machines" around the country. So I proceeded to go up on the stage afterward, as (a few) other people did, and told him to his face. I didn't like what he was doing, stealing votes up there. And, he suddenly frightened me to death because he was a very imposing gentleman. He grabbed me by the shoulder, pulled me to the back of the stage. Shoved me into a chair, sat down on the chair, and said, "I don't know, maybe you might be right, but there's more than one way of looking at these political things, young man." And he says, "I like you though because you tell me what you think."

So he pulled out of his pocket a little campaign brochure, it was about that big (two-by-three inches), and one side of it was blank. It was filled with cartoons, of course, pro-Democratic, capital D, Democratic cartoons. And on his knee, he wrote out, "To the man who disagrees. Edward J. Kelly." Handed it to me, and said, "Hang on to that, young man, this might be worth something some day," and then he sort of (shook my hand), hit me on the side of the head, and walked back and started shaking hands with (the other) people. I kept that (booklet) until we closed up my parents' (home), and somehow, that artifact got away from me. I still wish I had it, because having read a great deal more about the Kelly-Nash machine, it's sort of a badge of honor to me. It would be a badge of honor, if I had that to prove to people that I had disagreed with Edward J. Kelly (chuckles) of the Kelly-Nash machine.

WN: How did FDR do in Illinois?

DT: (He) did very well, as he did most places. And I'm quite certain, I don't know the details, but I'm quite certain he carried Adams County (and) Quincy, Illinois, too, particularly the town.

MK: And did you ever get to see FDR?

DT: No. (This is) one of my great regrets. He came to Hannibal, Missouri on one occasion (dedication of a new Mississippi River bridge) when I was growing up, and I tried to cajole, particularly my mother because she was driving a car from 1928, (into going). My father could never get away from the post office, but for some reason or another, she couldn't take me down to Hannibal (about thirty miles). I don't think it was political bias that she wanted to keep me away, but something, I don't remember what it was, (kept us from going). At any rate, we didn't get to the town to see FDR. (Some) years later, she did go with me. I think it was one of my first driving experiences down twenty miles (or so) to Hannibal, Missouri, and I got to see Wendell [L.] Willkie (in 1940), and I still have some photographs that I took, having rented a camera. I cajoled her into renting a camera, because we didn't take one. And so, we rented a camera from a drugstore, and I took these pictures of Wendell Willkie.

WN: You were in where, I guess, downstate Illinois or central Illinois, Quincy, right?

DT: Mm hmm, (western Illinois).

WN: Now, I was wondering, you're so close to Missouri, and you know, closer to Missouri than you were to Chicago, right. And so I was wondering, did the ruralness of the area, was it—did you identify more, did the politicians in that area identify more with the downstate, Kentucky, Cincinnati, Missouri area, more than the upstate?

DT: Yes, Missouri (and) downstate Illinois. (Downstate Illinois), over the years, (has normally been) Republican. Chicago (and, of course, Missouri) have been traditionally Democratic.
And for that, and (for) other reasons, (any) downstaters would ("read") Chicago out of Illinois and vice versa. So there’s even been some talk, sometimes serious, of (dividing) the state (into two), which could happen. (However), I don’t think anybody’s seriously considering it today.

I should go back to (the) 1936 campaign because having done some polling later on, particularly here in Hawai‘i, I remember quite vividly “voting” in 1936 as an eleven-year-old, seven or eight times, maybe more, I don’t know, (exactly), because the old Literary Digest poll in that year was tied in with a subscription campaign. It was also tied in with license registrations, (lists), telephone numbers, and they mailed (ballots out to almost) everybody (with autos and telephones). So, we still had a car, two cars actually, in 1936. The telephone was out, (because) that was too expensive for the depression period. But we did subscribe to the Literary Digest. So these cards kept coming in to renew the subscription, and as an eleven-year-old, I kept filling them out. So I voted at least seven or eight times. Now, that helps to explain why the Literary Digest went out of business. Their poll, which had 12 or 13 million ballots in it (as I recall), predicted very badly—and you can check it in your library to this day—that Alf Landon was going to win the presidency by a landslide. (Chuckles) It turns out FDR won, of course, (and) carried all but two states that year.

MK: And you were responsible for seven or eight of those votes.

DT: (Yes), I guess I have to confess be(ing) responsible for helping (utilize) those cards.

(Laughter)

MK: You know, I was wondering, for an eleven-year-old, I find it unusual that you were so interested in following elections and voting in a poll. What motivated you to do this?

DT: I really don’t know. I can’t tell you except that it was just as exciting to me as baseball. And baseball in those days was terribly exciting to me. There were times during the depression (when) we didn’t have a radio, but you could find me right after school or at recess time (at) elementary school listening to a radio broadcast. So that I could remember very vividly, the ’34 World Series, for example. So what was I—nine years old at the time, not on our radio, but listening after school—underneath, outside of (a) house (window)—to the radio. And, of course, it wasn’t just baseball. I was following boxing, too. There was a fellow by the name of Joe Louis that came along, you may remember, in due time, not to mention Jack Dempsey and [Jack] Sharkey and the (in)famous Max Baer, the invincible Nazi (according to Adolph Hitler), you know.

MK: You know, Warren mentioned earlier that in sports, competition is really the key. In election, you have, of course, the competitive factor. Would you find that to be the attraction for you?

DT: I suppose so, I guess I would have to admit to that even though, I guess, as years go along, I (have) tried to downplay it, and not to let it show, shall we say. (Chuckles) But I think the give-and-take adds spice to life, and there (are) winners and there (are) losers. (Also) I think (competition) helps you get adjusted to life because you recognize you can’t win ’em all, and you’ve got to know how to lose as well as you know how to win. And I think that applies in politics and (in) baseball and boxing or (most sport contests).
MK: Shall we end here for this tape?

WN: Yeah.

MK: Okay.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number two.

MK: Tape number two with Dan Tuttle. Now, we were talking about your youth in Quincy, Illinois, and I was wondering, what schools did you attend in Quincy?

DT: (I) attended public schools, it (wouldn't) mean anything, I don't think, to people over here in Hawai'i, but I went to Madison School, which at the time, was K [kindergarten] through [grade] nine. And then, before I got to ninth grade, they created a junior high school which was located adjacent to the public high school. (Thus) I went down to junior high school, and then stayed essentially in the same locale, right in the center of town, (to) Quincy Senior High School. I graduated from both of those places. I still have an M, it's the only sports award I ever received in my life. I got a letter for playing midget basketball. It's a big, red M. (Chuckles) That artifact (does) survive.

MK: And did you participate in, say, school politics?

DT: Of course. (Chuckles)

MK: Tell us what happened.

DT: Well, not too much happened in junior high school, as I recall, but by the time we got into high school, we had elections for class president, of course. I guess most high schools have (these). By this time, I had been reading about political machines or organization(s). You know, if it's yours, it's an organization, if it's somebody else's, it's a machine. So we set up an arrangement whereby we—(about four or five of us fellows)—I'm sorry to say no gals, but then that would have been a little bit before the time, I guess—set up a slate. So we had, in essence, a party slate. I ran for junior class president (and) subjugated myself, (too). Rather than to run for senior class president, which of course, was a big prize, I promised (this) group of people that if they would support me for junior class president, I would support one of them (the last vote getter) for senior class president. And believe it or not, (I) got elected junior class president. It wasn't as meaningful as I (had) hoped it would be because we weren't supposed to do anything in the minds of educators (of) that day, and I believed in doing something, so I was always getting myself into hot water, wanting to do this or that. Of course, the teacher(s) would say, "No, no, no. You can't do this." (Alas!)

But at any rate, the fellow who got the most votes (for another office), ran for senior class president (and won). This sticks in my mind because it (was) a big political lesson for me, I think, at that stage. I had to campaign hard for him. He was really (a) sort of glamour boy, played on the basketball team, played in the band, (a very) nice fellow and did all sorts of other things. (However), he wasn't really as well known as I was, (since I was) always opening my mouth. (Yet) we worked very hard, and I remember just before the polls closed,
I pulled in a dentist's son to come in and vote for Bill, (let) that be his name. And lo and behold, he won, but by a margin of one vote. And it was there that I had learned a value of a single vote. To this day, I do not know whether he voted for himself because he kept insisting to me that he couldn't bring himself to vote for himself. And of course, my argument was, "You shouldn't be running then, if you're not going to vote for yourself." He (has) visited here in Hawai'i, about three or four years ago, and I was on the verge of asking him, I even may have asked him whether he voted for himself, and it didn't help me at all because I think he says, "I don't remember."

(Laughter)

DT: But at any rate, he won. And I think he had probably a more productive tenure as senior class president than I did (as a junior). But believe it or not, I still have, in (some) of the artifacts that did survive, I still have some of our campaign cards, which are comparable (to regular), believe it or not. I had a little camera, (that) wasn't very much. It was a cereal-box camera, and it took small, (very) small pictures. We mounted these small pictures on a mimeograph(ed) card and gave 'em away. Now this was very comparable to Patsy [T.] Mink, here in Hawai'i (in 1956). Her first (campaign) cards. I remember one of our students at the University [of Hawai'i], Marilyn Voss and some of her friends, made some little cards, handmade cards for Patsy when she ran the first time, and had a little lei of (fake) mink surrounding that card. At any rate, we had great fun with these two elections that I remember in high school.

MK: So how did you run as a student candidate? What did you do?

DT: I'd really have to consult the cards, I guess, to find out what we promised, but we had a platform, and we pushed that platform, and . . . (I'm) afraid my memory doesn't extend to be able to tell you what the platform was for the class of '43. (Chuckles)

WN: Was there any politician that you emulated at all, at that time?

DT: Well, probably if there's anybody in that particular period that I emulated, it might well be Wendell Willkie because Wendell Willkie was a pretty fair to middling orator. He had a global concept, which I think we would approve of today, with a "one world" (theme). He certainly was in favor of the United Nations when it came along. And he had some real catchy slogans, too. I can remember one, "Only the productive are strong, and only the strong are free." (Chuckles) And he did a nice job of campaigning. Under the circumstances, if the war (World War II) had not still been going on, (he) probably would have been elected president. So I suppose, if there's any one candidate, why, it might well have been Wendell Willkie.

But by this time, (however), I was beginning to, I think, have more appreciation for FDR. By the time I left college, I think I had been pulled back pretty much to midstream between the two political parties. Graduate school probably caused me to focus more upon being an observer of politics, I think, than anything else.

MK: You know, before we leave your high school days, I was wondering if at that time, you had any interest in writing as a journalist or columnist?
DT: Yes, come to think about it. It's not anything, I suppose, to brag about, but I won three or four or five essay contests my junior and senior year. The American Legion was having essay contests and other groups. I know I won (several) but I wasn't so much interested in winning the money. I was interested in getting my views across, so I suppose there you have the kernel of it all. I remember one essay contest (and it was) the state contest. I'd survived all the regional (and) local ones, and it came down to a matter of two or three words (at the state level). I was disqualified because I had two or three too many words. So the people who did the judging came back with these consoling words, "You would have won, but it was too long. Here (are) fifteen dollars out of our own pockets," or whatever it was. So, yes, I was interested in writing. No question about that. Later on, I did have a column in the college newspaper.

MK: But in high school, were you active in the school newspaper?

DT: Not really, but one of my very close friends who is still practicing medicine in California, was the editor of the school newspaper. So I was always telling him how to do it, probably, which he promptly forgot, and rightly so, because he was a very skilled fellow. Actually, he wrote for the local newspaper as well as edited the school newspaper, as was often the case in those days. (Later, he) became a physician, and so he knew how to do it well by himself. He didn't need any help from yours truly.

MK: And, also, while you were in high school, we had World War II occurring. How did World War II affect you and your family?

DT: Well, in the first place, you were concerned about the country. The second place, no question about it, I (soon became) of prime draft age (1943). And, I suppose, I was almost on the verge of being a conscientious objector, but not really, because (I) felt it was a very moral war as (did) most people (during) World War II. (So one was) concerned about what was happening. I followed the war, just like I would a baseball game. I remember having maps, from the *Chicago Tribune*, of Europe, and I had pins which I would stick in and I would follow the troop movements. And I read anything I could lay my hands on about the war. Of course, radio was a big thing in that day, so I always listened to radio very, very carefully, (even shortwave radio).

When it came time to turn eighteen, which was your draft age, I tried to get a jump on it all, and I applied to Kenyon College out in Gambier, Ohio, to get into a meteorology corps. This was in 1942, when I was seventeen. They turned me down because of my eyes. And, that discouraged me a lot, so then there was the question of waiting out the draft. Since I had enough credits in high school to graduate in January of '43, I took off for Illinois College over in Jacksonville, seventy miles away, and figured (that), if I could get in at least a term of college, I might not just be the lowest infantryman in the ranks, and maybe (could) do something more. I was really a pretty expert typist, but in World War II, most people who were expert typists ended up carrying rifles, and the people who couldn't type at all ended up typing, you know. But I didn't know those things (well) at that time. At any rate, I got in one semester of college before I got drafted. I did get drafted, and duly went up to Peoria, Illinois, endured all the indignities of the draft (exam). And then, within (eight) hours I knew that they—the government—was consistent. Although I wasn't too happy about it at the time, they said, "No, you can't serve at all, your eyes aren't good enough," and I was a bit underweight, too, at that time. So then I determined to go round the clock to college, and did
MK: You know, you mentioned that you were, at one time, considering maybe being a CO [conscientious objector]. On what grounds would you have applied for one?

DT: You know, I didn’t really have any grounds, religious grounds. The particular religious group that I had joined at that time was a gung-ho, shoot-'em-up type of institution.

(Laughter)

DT: Which is true. They fired---you laugh Warren, but they fired the minister in my church because he was something of a conscientious objector, and he wouldn’t preach sermons glorifying World War II. And so they got rid of him, which upset me no little. As a matter of fact, he wrote me a letter of recommendation for meteorology school, but did so with great reservations because he felt this was really pushing him. But I explained my reasons that I thought I could serve the country and I wouldn’t have to kill anybody. So if I had chosen the CO route, it would have been on the basis, “I don’t want to kill anybody. This is an important war, but I don’t want to (kill)—I’d rather be killed than to kill.” And I still feel pretty much that way. I just value human life too much, and I think small d democracy values human life that much. At any rate, the government solved the problem for me. By mandate, I was 4-F, like it or not. Even though (as a 4-F) you were pretty much ostracized in those days, I really didn’t find any kindred spirits until I got to graduate school (University of Minnesota) where I encountered some, in the latter (months) of the war, I encountered some conscientious objectors.

MK: You know, when you started at Illinois College, you went for two years, around the clock, what were you majoring in?

DT: What else? History and political science. (Laughs) (It was) mostly history because they didn’t (have much political science). It was a liberal arts school, so the emphasis was heavy upon history. But the particular history professor that I had the most was a University of Chicago Ph.D. He emphasized politics a great deal, (and) was a great admirer of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Even though the college was pretty much (a) follow(er of) the party of downstate Illinois. (By this most of) the college administrators, I learned (later), were (very) avid Republicans.

MK: And while you were in college, you got involved with the newspaper and a radio program. Maybe you can tell us about that.

DT: The newspaper of the college (was very small). The college was decimated by the war, of course, there weren’t many people around. (I also) got involved with a radio program. (A few fellows and ASTP students) organized a softball team, (a) sort of under-the-table softball team, so we competed in the city league. And interestingly enough, one of the people I met at Illinois College, who was interested in public affairs (and) later became an editor in Illinois, was a fellow by the name Jimmy Johnston, whose older brother, (also a) graduate of the college, later became secretary of Hawai‘i under (Governor) Bill [William F.] Quinn.

I also got acquainted with quite a few graduates of the college who went on into politics. (For example, there was) a fellow by the name of Paul Findley, who represented for perhaps
twenty years, western Illinois in the U.S. House of Representatives. (The school) was a college—it had been started by (men) known as “Yale band,” coming out from Yale [University], had been started in central Illinois in 1829. Except for a misstep, Abraham Lincoln would have gone to Illinois College, but he didn’t. It was most unfortunate for the college because that would have been better than William Jennings Bryan, (who did attend the college) because after all, Abe Lincoln got elected (U.S. president), and all William Jennings Bryan had to show for (his efforts were) three unsuccessful attempts at the presidency. Bryan’s initials are still carved in the bricks of one of the buildings. And you might know, I got mine just as close as I could to his, but I’m afraid I didn’t put enough muscle behind (the effort), and I think mine have (been) washed away by the weather.

WN: Did the fact that Illinois College was not too far from Springfield have anything to do with your decision to go to that school or get involved in political science?

DT: Not really, although it was nice. I mean, you had good contact with the state capitol. But I went to Illinois College, just quick-like, to get myself better prepared for the draft, quite frankly. And it was a relatively inexpensive school; it still is. (It has long been a) high quality school; they had a chapter of Phi Beta Kappa starting out in the [19]30s, so they had really pretty high standards. I felt very comfortable going there. And I’ll tell you this much, I did a heap of growing up in two years at that college. I still don’t drink like I found out they drank. (The school was) about 70 percent (a) men’s college, 70:30 ratio. (So) you (can) imagine (my) moving in (mid-year, in) January in 1943. The college probably (still) had about 600 students (about 500 male) at that time. Before the semester was “out,” they were down to something like seventy-five students. So, you can understand why you would have a lot of drunkenness, (chuckles) which I mentioned, and all sorts of high jinks because, you know, eat, drink and be merry because tomorrow we die. This was the (now understandable) attitude of the young men there.

WN: Demographically, who attended that school?

DT: People from all around the country, but they had a hefty component from Chicago (and downstate Illinois), normally, even though much of the component from Chicago tended to have Catholic ties, (and) the school had Protestant ties. So, by this time, the school really (became) nondenominational. And if there (was) any religion around the school, you sure didn’t know it in January 1943 (chuckles). Other people that (attended) were from Podunk center, Illinois (or other states). Not only Quincy in Illinois but also Woodhouse or Winchester, see, these are towns that you’ve never heard of.

You mentioned the newspaper, this was a student newspaper. If you go back and check it, which I suppose you could in the Jacksonville library or in the college archives, you would find that Tuttle, at that time, was writing with a somewhat, still, anti-FDR bias, in part because I think it got under the skin of my history professor. I also wrote, and you’ll really smile at this, those of you who remember how I still (would) like to be smoking (since I was) almost a chain smoker for many years, one unforgettable column, (a) satirical column about smoking, which really upset the campus because in the war(time), everybody smoked. (However, the column) I wrote (was) a (fiery) anti-smoking column. (As a result, I entered) the doghouse.

You mentioned a radio program. This had political implications, I suppose, because we were
always talking about public affairs of the day. It started out as a fifteen-minute program (and) ended up as a half-hour program. I tried to get it introduced as a project of the International Relations Club, again advised by (my) history professor. He would hear none of it. Students weren’t supposed to do things like that. So, I looked around, found five or six people that would go along with me. (I) had a friend who played the Hawaiian electric [i.e., steel] guitar, among other things, and country western music on the local radio station. He knew the management. We got the radio time, we organized a program, and after one year, the college wanted to take it over. We promptly told them, we wanted to (continue) with it (as an independent student project).

They said, “Well, we’re going to run it.” (You) see, everybody always wants to run your life, (if you’re a student.)

(So) we said, “Okay, you can have the radio program, but we’re not going to do it for you.” They backed off. The school ended up sponsoring (our independent) radio program for a year. (Yet) I (still) got my sweet revenge. One time, in introducing the panel, doing a commercial for the college, I (inadvertently) referred to “the thirty books” in the Illinois College Library.

(Laughter)

DT: I was promptly reprimanded by (an) English professor (who called), you can be sure.

MK: Okay, we have to end here.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number three.

MK: Tape number three with Dan Tuttle. You were just telling us about the radio program. Maybe you can repeat what you’ve just told us off tape.

DT: Well, at that time, and perhaps it still applies, college and universities often (felt) that you should only participate in their pat (established) programs. And being, I suppose, something of an iconoclast, I felt that there were certain things you could do on your own. So in this particular instance, in Jacksonville, Illinois, which is a town of about 20,000, had been a soda jerk at a local drug store where “everybody” gathered on Saturday evenings. We had bank presidents, bank presidents’ wives, the factory owners and so forth coming in there. And so you get—well, at least I got—very well acquainted with people in the town and the faculty over at MacMurray College. And we (students) had enough, if you want to call it that, “clout,” to get time on the radio. The college had not shown any initiative to (have a program), so we sort of pulled out that (influence) and the radio program remained our own. (This meant that) the college sponsored us, and as I (have said), the program survived for two or three years after I left the college.
I still have one program in which Dr. George Green, who later became a dentist—he wasn’t a
doctor then—but he’s the one who played the electric guitar, (found a fellow who could make)
one of these old Wilcox-Gay recordings. (This record) still survives, (and) I (have) transferred
(it) to audiotape. I (also) have an old transcription copy of (a program), which I tried (as an
idea) to introduce into the [Harold E.] Stassen presidential campaign in 1948, believe it or
not. So this transcription was specially cut for listening by the Stassen forces in 1948. (They
didn’t like the idea much, even though it would have been an audio version of one of their
campaign techniques.)

You may say, well, this has no Hawai‘i connections, not related to Hawai‘i at all. Well,
George Green, the fellow who was co-founder of Youth Radio Forum—which is what we
called the radio program—before he got drafted, joined the navy, became a naval dentist,
(and) a tour of duty in Hawai‘i back in (the) early 1950s. (After) four years out here, went
back to the Mainland, and then ultimately retired in Hawai‘i, (where he) lived for about
fifteen years until just before the death of his wife. He’s now located in the Bay area in
California. So after all, there was a Hawai‘i connection, because George Green followed us,
in his own way, out to Hawai‘i.

MK: You know that radio program that you had, it was a public affairs program?

DT: That’s right. They gave us the time. Until the college sponsored it, at which time, the college
had the privilege of paying for the (public service) time. (This, of course, made) the radio
station happy.

MK: So like, what type of topics did you choose to focus in on?

DT: Oh, I can remember a whole host of topics. Of course, we talked a lot about topics related to
the war, war strategy, and (the various) programs of the New Deal. And, I remember we had
some academic topics, too, like how can you farm without plowing too deeply in the Middle
West. In other words, in the dust bowl, which was still vivid in people’s memories, how can
you do, sort of dry-weather farming. So we would have a program on that. We used the
people from MacMurray College faculty, faculty members from Illinois College, and
increasingly, (leaders) from the community.

I remember we had the local high school principal on our very first program, which was a
fifteen-minute program. I wish we had a tape of that because it was really (akin) to a tragedy.
Because here you had, I think it was about three or four of us with the principal. And the
program went like this. Correct name, believe it or not. His name was Blodgett. So the
program went, “Mr. Blodgett, what about this?” He’d answer. (Then, it went), “Mr.
Blodgett, Mr. Blodgett,” there was no give-and-take among the panel at all. (Chuckles) But
gradually, (we) “kids” got acquainted (with) the medium, and so we would exchange views,
one with the other. And, it was good fun.

MK: You know, later on when you came to the islands, you eventually got involved in local radio,
as a commentator later on, but were you like a commentator on things in that public affairs
program that you ran?

DT: No, I moderated. George Green appeared occasionally on it, but he was primarily the
technical assistant. He did all the work around the radio station to prepare for it. And of
course, radio, in its own way, is a wonderful medium. And then we had regular panelists from Illinois College and occasional guest panelists if somebody couldn’t make it. As I (have said), it survived for three or four, at least, maybe five years.

MK: Okay. And so you were at Illinois College for two years. Then you went to the University of Minnesota. In the first place, why Minnesota and not elsewhere?

DT: Because I could get the best fellowship there. (Chuckles) I applied, I suppose, all sorts of places. I might well have gone to law school, but as I think I’ve already indicated, my family was of very modest means, my father being a postal clerk. So I felt that I should get as much help to the best education as possible. (At that time) Minnesota had probably one of the top ten political science faculties in the country. They offered me an assistantship, which wasn’t really a scholarship or anything of that sort. But the assistantship which I got the first year at Minnesota was in the field of public administration, which was a bit apart from (my) Illinois College work. But at any rate, that assistantship got me a job whereby every day of the week for most of one year, I went over to the state capitol building in St. Paul and did research on (their former) department of administrative management, which was an experimental administrative agency set up by the Spellman Fund, an offshoot of the Rockefeller Foundation. And so it was really a good experience because I got well acquainted with some of the people over at the state house in St. Paul. And, of course, I also was able to sleep part of the day away because it was quite a long streetcar ride between the campus in Minneapolis and the state capitol over in St. Paul.

I didn’t realize at the time, but I guess even as I made the decision to go up to the University of Minnesota, things were happening in Minnesota in the political field. One was Harold [E.] Stassen, who most people have forgotten today, but who holds the record for having run for the presidency the most times (chuckles). And they had another somewhat younger person than Harold Stassen, by the name of Hubert [H.] Humphrey. (Humphrey) was beginning to cut a circle in political headlines around the country. Although at the time I was there, he (had) never held national office.

So, Minneapolis seemed to offer a lot of promise. I went up there with high hopes, and was not disappointed. One of the things which I should mention, all the way along the line, was (that) the Minnesota faculty turned out to be excellent in political science. They really cared about students, they spent time with students. They were indeed your friends. And this was my good fortune all the way along the line from kindergarten teacher, a Miss Wall, by name. (Chuckles) I can remember most all of their names to this day, all the way through intermediate school, junior high school, high school, college, (and) graduate school. (My) debt (is always) there, to (those incredible), wonderful teachers. I can recall only one or two (who) were “foul balls” because they didn’t quite know what they were doing. But even those that (were not very impressive) were (also) your good friends.

MK: You know at Minnesota, in the poli sci department, was there a prevailing philosophy or leaning among the profs?

DT: You had a difficult time telling who (or what the major professors favored). But the younger professors were beginning to get committed. The most popular candidate or most popular politician on campus was undoubtedly Hubert Humphrey. But Joe Ball, who was a Republican (U.S.) Senator at that time from Minnesota, had his following. And, of course, you had your
Stassen people. (Gradually), most people on campus (became) Hubert Humphrey people. They remained that way for years. I remember, I always seemed to be out of step with the rest of society (chuckles), (that) for some strange reason, I (ended) up with the Stassen forces, in part because I wanted to do a dissertation on national convention delegates. Stassen was (beginning to) fight for national convention delegates (in 1947). He was a person who had a chance to go into the (1948) convention with (a substantial number of) delegates.

Meanwhile, the Humphrey people were trying to get their man elected mayor of Minneapolis. But one other thing disturbed me, (many) were at odds with one another in the DFL party, in this Democratic Farmer Labor party. They were at odds with one another because at that time, Hubert Humphrey had one big mission in life—hang on to your hats—and that was to get rid of the Communists (from) the Democratic party. Well, in the process of doing that, a couple of our graduate students ended up being accused of being Communists. I knew (that) they were not. The Humphrey people literally sent one of my good friends to the state hospital because of their accusations against him. He wasn't (any) more of a Communist than the man in the moon, or I. So with this much friction, even though I had aloha for a lot of the Humphrey people, I just didn't want to get involved. I pitched horseshoes with Art Naftalin, who later became Democratic mayor of Minneapolis. And there were certain other people on campus who were (very) close to Hubert Humphrey.

WN: Where along the political spectrum were these people? For example, Stassen and Naftalin?

DT: Well, Naftalin, at the time I left Minnesota, was just starting to teach at the University of Minnesota. Then he later went on to become, I guess, an assistant to Hubert Humphrey, and then later, mayor of Minneapolis. And, I think he ended up on the faculty of the University of Minnesota. (Thus, the) later faculty became much more committed politically, (than) a William Anderson or Lloyd Short, (or) Quigley, all of whom were writers in the field of political science. (Those people) never really let you know from their classes as to who they favored; they weren't out on a political stump. I did go out as a graduate assistant and participated quite actively in the (early) Stassen campaign (for president).

MK: And in what form did you participate?

DT: Well, in one form, I participated in Republican open forums, which was a (campaign) device used by the Stassen campaigners. (A) fellow by the name of Hal Maclntire out of Minneapolis headed up the effort. These were to be discussion groups held in people's homes. Occasionally, we'd broadcast over the radio or there was some talk of this. So I tried to interest them in our radio program approach to use for the Stassen campaign in '48. Now, keep in mind, this was back in the period '45 to '47 that I was in Minneapolis. So I participated in several of these open forums, and if you'll check the morgue (of daily newspapers, you'll find evidence of this. For example), the day after my professor had told me that I was too much of a "greasy grind" and should get acquainted with the community, my picture appeared in the (Sunday news)paper with (a) Republican open forum (chuckles) (group. This story described) what these Republican open forums were all about. He called me in (on) Monday and (said), "You know, sometimes professors make mistakes, and I guess, I made a big one last Friday, (chuckles) when I chided you for not getting acquainted with something other than the books." And we laughed about it, and that was the end of that.

I also, of course, mentioned getting interested in delegate files for the Stassen campaign.
Some of my explorations included chats with a young fellow who was then (handling) public relations for General Mills, a fellow by the name of Abbott Washburn. He was very kind to me, and very helpful. We actually had some grandiose plans of things that we (could) do for the Stassen campaign—until he found out how old I was. And he had told them, he thought I was twenty-seven or twenty-eight. As it turned out, I was twenty, twenty-one. And so that (quickly) killed this off. However, in the process, in trying to generate support for this, I had the fun of going down to south St. Paul, and having a long chat with Elmer Ryan, who was his law partner. (A) crusty sort of a man. When he read the letter from my professor, William Anderson, his response was—he flipped it back to me, and (said), “Writes a good letter, doesn’t he?”

(Laughter)

DT: He was of some help, and if I’d have been older, I think they would have utilized my services. But in that day and age (at twenty-one), you were just too young. I also remember going and trying to solicit the support of another Stassen backer. He lived in St. Paul, had a big mansion there on Summit Avenue, and I boldly went up and had a brief chat with him. (I) thought he was a pretty dull, stuffed-shirted (type of) person. In retrospect, that was Warren Burger . . .

(Laughter)

DT: . . . who later became Chief Justice of the [United States] Supreme Court. And, I think if you read anything about him—I still think there are some people that would agree that he was (at times) much of a “stiff, stuffed shirt.”

MK: You know, I was wondering, did you ever meet Harold Stassen? And what was his attraction?

DT: (Chuckles) Harold Stassen was attractive because he was a very liberal Republican. And he was not a rich person, and he offered me hope for the Republican party as an alternative to FDR. Ironically, my wife [“Elsie” Eleanor Smith Tuttle] kids me about this, she met Harold Stassen along the way. Guess where? In Jacksonville, Illinois, after I had left. I was up in Minneapolis, I never had the chance to ever meet Harold Stassen. However, this Abbott Washburn that I mentioned did get a political payoff from Harold Stassen and his work for Stassen because Stassen backed [Dwight D.] Eisenhower (in 1952), as you may recall. Abbott Washburn out of Minneapolis became head of the Voice of America (or Radio Free Europe, I’m uncertain), with rank of ambassador (some years) after the war, and was later, I think, appointed by [Richard M.] Nixon to be a federal (communications) commissioner. And so he transferred from being a PR man for an industrial company (General Mills), to a politician, if you will. I had the pleasure, about two years ago, of being in D.C., (and I) looked him up in the phone book. Tried to see if he’d remember me; he did. He was very cordial, and Elsie and I went over and had breakfast with him and his second wife. We recounted some of the days back when Harold Stassen was a viable candidate for president. He, incidentally at the time we were there, was most interested in this recent—this current year, (the Eisenhower) centennial (year).

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

MK: You know earlier, you mentioned that because of your age, being twenty, twenty-one, you
were turned down and not taken that seriously. How did that affect you?

DT: Well, it was a setback. I never got those delegate files even though I was in Philadelphia. I knew the fellow in charge of the delegate files, (too). He was an insurance man, Coffey, I think, was his name. To the best of my knowledge, those files were transferred to Philadelphia into Harold Stassen's house. And the last I heard about them, they were in Harold Stassen's attic in Philadelphia. He became president of University of Pennsylvania, you may recall. So, they were in the president's house up in the attic, but I couldn't get access to them. Before long, I was in Hawai'i. From the time of the '48 election, it was only two years until Elsie and I were in Hawai'i.

MK: I guess we can stop here.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

J most: These are the following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number four.

MK: Tape number four, interview with Dan Tuttle. Maybe we can back up a little, and we're talking about your days at Minnesota, and your attending some Communist [party] meetings. Maybe you can tell us about why you were doing that.

DT: Well, we got to communism pretty rapidly here. There were other interesting things that I think we can mention. But yes, you're correct. I did go to one or possibly two Communist [party] meetings. There was a big, fairly large—not in the best part of town—Communist bookstore in Minneapolis, at the time. And one of my closest friends was a political theorist. Well, he was more interested in things like communism, socialism (than I). He did a master's thesis at the University of Kansas on Abraham Lincoln and Marxism (contained) in Abraham Lincoln's philosophy. So he was really interested in socialism and communism (and) I went with him (to a meeting). A fairly large gathering, I would say maybe up to 500 people, were there. "The House I Live In" was a song which they repeated sang. There were tables (for) Lenin, Marx, their writings, "the (Communist) bibles", you might say. (They had) all sorts of other Communist literature (as giveaways), which I duly took home to my room and studied. (They were) sort of demagogic in nature. In other words, there was a real "rah, rah, rah" sort of (approach). Of course, the thought crossed your mind that (such reading) might be held against you, but it was not yet the age of [Joseph R.] McCarthy. And, we just fought a war for freedom of thoughts, so why not go (and read)? So I went. The biggest shock to me, I may have mentioned to you before, was when this fellow that I went to these Communist meetings with, visited Hawai'i—probably fifteen years ago. (He) came over here, and spent a semester in research, (and) much to my great surprise was virtually a right-wing Republican.

(Laughter)

DT: And that shows you how times change, and how people change. But that was one of the more interesting things, I guess, that I did in Minneapolis, particularly after we (later) lived through the era of McCarthy. One person I failed to mention (who) was at Minnesota at the time and in the political science department working directly on his Ph.D., was a conscientious objector. I (have) had great (and) high respect for him because he was an excellent student. And, I do mean excellent. (He) was also participating in the health experiments related to World War II. We know about the Germans having done those experiments. Well, we did
them in the United States on some of our own COs. (Thus), he would be sitting in tubs of cold ice water, and enduring all sorts of other experiments at the University of Minnesota med school, while studying for his degree. (He) ended up as an attorney, in Washington D.C., (and) as the (major) attorney for the American Political Science Association. And that was (probably) his pro bono type of work. His (major) work, (I gather) was for big corporations in D.C. He (worked) very (closely with) Hubert Humphrey. That person was Max Kampelman.

Now, to complete the story, I saw Max about two years ago when he very generously gave (Elsie and me) about a half-an-hour of (his) time when he was still ambassador, the rank of ambassador, (heading up) the (U.S.) arms talks with the Soviet Union. And much to my surprise, he no longer seems to be an ardent Hubert Humphrey person, but (had) received his appointment from Ronald [W.] Reagan, of all people. (He) was a very close associate of (Jean Kirkpatrick), a gal who’s being considered for ambassador to the UN, (a) very skilled (lady). (Max remains) an able, skilled person, who’s now probably in his (early) seventies (in 1990). (He’s) somewhat older than I am, but he remains just as sharp and as able as ever. It was interesting to see him (operating) as a special ambassador in D.C.

WN: Oh, we were talking about Hubert Humphrey a little bit, and you know, does it surprise you that somebody, with a liberal label like Humphrey, had to resort to that kind of politics? (Referring to his purge of alleged Communists.)

DT: It disturbed me at the time. Then I suppose all our politicians, I’ve come to find out, have feet of clay. And one of those clay feet usually involves—you (tend) to do what is popular at the time. If it’s good politics, you do it at the time because you have to stay (politically) alive. At that time (1945–47), the main thing, the Democratic Farmer Labor party in [Minnesota] had to prove was that they were just as good Americans as the Republicans were and that they were purging the DFL of all Communist associations. And so the Humphrey people, anxious to win the mayorship of Minneapolis, were getting rid of these people, and they had to make examples of certain people. I didn’t like it then; I don’t like it today. I don’t say it in any way to detract from Hubert Humphrey because I think he—if you balance these things all out—I think Hubert Humphrey was a great man who certainly talked a lot faster than I’m talking today. Once you’ve got him started (talking), you could never turn him off. The same was true of Art Naftalin, incidentally. They were both great talkers. Hubert Humphrey, of course, visited here several times. I had one occasion to have breakfast with him here (in Honolulu), in company with George Chaplin. And he was able to laugh and kid about being on opposite sides of the fence back (in Minnesota where) he didn’t even know, (I believe), that I existed.

WN: Was that a matter of public record, I guess, what he did when he ran later on for president? Did that ever come up at all?

DT: Strangely enough, it never really surfaced because after all, unless you put it in today’s context, weren’t those people who fought Communists really true-blue Americans? Could you ever fault him for having fought the Communists when they were a threat, you see? (Context is important in politics.)


DT: Well, let me tell you about Nixon. (WN chuckles) When he came to the University of
Wyoming and made a speech in which he graphically—when he was running for the [U.S. House] (from California), I guess, in '48, when he graphically opened his mouth, and pointed to presumably Whittaker Chambers’ mouth, with all of his oratorical ability, what he had done to fight communism. Well, I’m sorry, he was sickening (to me) at the time, quite frankly. I think, in view of what’s (happened since), it also illustrates (a portion of) one of those sad chapters in American political history.

WN: One more question . . .

DT: But I’m getting ahead of all of that.

WN: Yeah, one more question about the Communists. Did attending the two meetings that you said that you attended, did that ever get back to you in your political career during the McCarthy era or later?

DT: It could have. As a matter of fact, I thought it might well end (early) my tenure at the University of Hawai‘i because over the opposition of many of us (faculty members) in the early [19]50s here in Hawai‘i, the legislature did pass a loyalty oath and a loyalty questionnaire (requirement). And, by this time, we were really and truly in the McCarthy era. I was afraid not to list this fact that I had attended these meetings in Minneapolis. And so I did, but it worked out the way Governor [Oren E.] Long, who signed those bills, said it would. (The oath and questionnaire) was too much for anybody to read, here in Hawai‘i. And so nothing ever came of (those laws). So, I don’t know of anybody that really held it against me in any way that I’d attended these meetings. Certainly, in Wyoming, if it had been known—because I had a rather stormy career there—I could have (been) hurt, and hurt a great deal. But, I didn’t go around broadcasting it. I mean after all, I just went to a couple meetings, like anybody else (might). And, it was a free country. Wyoming didn’t have a loyalty oath or loyalty questionnaire. It was not likely to (hurt) in Hawai‘i, once I arrived, because Allan Saunders was chairman of the government department here [at the University of Hawai‘i]. I don’t think Allan Saunders would ever hold it against anybody for going to any meeting of any sort of any type because he, of all people, was interested in curiosity and the freedom of the human spirit, shall we say.

MK: You know, when you were still back in Minnesota, did you ever come in contact with people from Hawai‘i? Students or otherwise.

DT: I had a lot of contact with Hattie Kawahara who was not an AJA [American of Japanese Ancestry] from Hawai‘i, but from California. She later went on to teach (political science) at Wayne State [University]. (She) got her Ph.D. out of Minnesota. She (was) a real nice gal. I tried to locate Hattie when I was visiting Detroit about five years ago, but nobody seemed to have ever heard of her, so I’ve lost track of her completely. I also had a little bit of contact (with Hawai‘i students via Hattie), but I (can’t now) name anybody from Hawai‘i that I had contact with (then).

By my second year at Minnesota, I had spent an awful lot of time with a young fellow from the Philippines, Gus Resurreccion, Augusto Resurreccion. He would go to the international relations club, and he ran into contact with the Hawaiians. So I would, every now and then, get acquainted with (a few of) them. But through Gus, I did get (well) acquainted with a Filipino community in St. Paul, Minnesota. You may say, why would there be a Filipino
community in St. Paul, Minnesota? Well, I don’t think I need to draw you pictures. They were the maids and the houseboys for those people (living on Summit Avenue), like Warren [E.] Burger. (Chuckles) (However), they were wonderful people. We’d go out to the lakes outside of Minneapolis, and they would bring long rice and fish and (a large) Filipino menu (of food. Most) of them were very able people. There was a bit of a division between some of the people in Minneapolis of Filipino extraction who were the houseboys and the maids and the young doctors who were studying in Mayo Clinic, south of Minneapolis. The young doctors would come up (for weekends or holidays). And, of course, as I guess we’d say in Hawai‘i, they had real class (a better education) as opposed to some of the others.

Gus was, of course, something of an aristocrat from the Philippines. I should write a novel about Gus because he was wonderful. He could quote Shakespeare faultlessly—go on and on and on. He could speak Spanish. He could speak Tagalog. He lived in his own dream world. Of course, he later got thrown out of the country for trying to deal in war surplus equipment. But that’s incidental (here), and there are stories that I could tell you about Gus and how he got to stay with one of the most prestigious legal families in Minneapolis. They wanted a houseboy, (but) he wouldn’t (or couldn’t wash) dishes. He wouldn’t pick up a dust cloth, you know. The lady at the house had hoped for his help, but she became so infatuated with Augusto Resurreccion, or Gus, that he stayed on, (and) I doubt if he (ever) paid rent. He wrecked their car a couple of times. They paid for it, or their insurance did. And of course, Gus was always buying overshoes because he’d leave them one night, out under a tree, and the snows would come and the shoes (would) disappear. Come spring, he’d find seven or eight pairs of overshoes. So as I say, this is—excuse me—this is a story in itself. I don’t think it has any political implications.

(Laughter)

DT: It didn’t affect my political interests or what I’ve done in Hawai‘i, except perhaps, to give me some early training in how to deal with somebody from the Philippines. And my formula then, still is today is, what’s the difference? We’re all the same, and let’s just have fun together. And so I did waste a lot of time with Gus in this sense. He loved to go to movies—not one in a day, but two or three. So, I would go with this fellow and sit through three movies when I should have been doing my homework. (Chuckles) But that’s the way Gus operated. He later became assistant or deputy, I guess, tourist director. He does have some distant relatives here in Hawai‘i. The last I saw of Gus was, he visited here around the middle [19]50s, and we were just leaving (for the Mainland the next day). I do have an audiotape of Gus singing—he loved to sing, too—some Filipino songs. I don’t know whether Gus is still alive today or not. He had a tough case of tuberculosis, and he tried to recover by (living) at (a) resort area in the Philippines. (Actually), he served as director of that resort for quite a time, which is a government job.

MK: Well, I guess we can leave Gus and get you to . . .

DT: About time.

(Laughter)

DT: Tried everywhere. Jobs were plentiful, so I had the opportunity to go to [University of] Alabama, to [University of] Mississippi, to Hamilton College, to Michigan State [University], among others, to Texas A&M [University], to [University of] Texas, (and), to [University of] Wyoming. I finally decided to go to Wyoming because I remembered Horace Greeley (who) said, "Go west young man, go west." (This may have been) an old tired and worn cliché, but (a) relatively young person was becoming (the) new chairman of political science at Wyoming, Burt Wengert by name, who later ended up as chairman of the department of the University of Oregon. And he was excited about building a completely new political science department (at Wyoming). The people of Minnesota seemed to know him or know of him. He had some theological training in St. Louis, Missouri, and had later decided not to become a minister but to become a political scientist. So he was something of an idealist in the field. And I think it paid (me) a few more dollars to go to Wyoming more than to go to Hamilton College. Now, Hamilton College, as you know, is a rather prestigious liberal arts school in New York. I've often wondered and pondered what a difference it would have made in (my) life if we'd gone to Hamilton College instead of going to Wyoming.

MK: And when you got to Wyoming, you apparently got into some trouble because of your activities there?

DT: Well, nothing devastating or anything of that sort. It was a very pleasant three years. Once again, I found politics (interesting), and (there was) plenty of it. I got well acquainted with a lot of World War II vets, most of whom were two or three years older than I was. Keep in mind, when (Elsie and) I moved to Wyoming, I was twenty-two years of age. So I stepped into the room with these hardened veterans. And (some of) these were the sons and some of the daughters of the coal miners along the Union Pacific Railroad in (southern) Wyoming. They were ardent Democrats. I got acquainted with some of them the hard way, like one fellow whose name was Basil Androkopoulos, who was also along the Southern Pacific. His father pressed hats in Cheyenne. So I mangled his (Greek) name a couple times (when taking attendance), so in disgust, he said to this young instructor, "Call me Smith." And so he remains Smith to this day. (Chuckles) He's a stockbroker in Billings, Montana. So it was really a very pleasant association with (him and) the (other) students. I thoroughly enjoyed the students (at Wyoming).

For a while, I advised both political party clubs on campus, a Democratic club, and a Republican club. That eventually became something of a conflict of interest. But there (were) also presidential campaigns going on, and of course, I was interested in national conventions. This gave me the opportunity to get acquainted with—Laramie's very close to Cheyenne, fifty miles to the West—students who had fathers in politics over in Cheyenne. And of course, there was a '48 presidential campaign, which was a little bit akin to the presidential campaign of '36, in as much as the (opinion) polls (were largely) wrong.

MK: Maybe we can stop here and then go to the next (tape).

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 17-68-1-90; SIDE ONE
JC: This is videotape number five of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is the end of session number one.

MK: Okay, tape number five with Dan Tuttle. I believe we were up into 1948 and the [Harry S] Truman campaign.

DT: The Truman campaign was really very interesting because everybody figured that Tom [Thomas E.] Dewey was a shoo-in. When Dewey came to Cheyenne, I went over to Cheyenne, (but) didn't get to meet Tom Dewey, like Stassen. To the best of my knowledge, (I never met) Tom Dewey. But I did ride on the bus between the hotel and the auditorium in Cheyenne with (his) backers (from Buffalo N.Y.) Now, there was a political machine in Buffalo, but it was a GOP [Grand Old Party] machine. I rode with the Dewey backers (including the alleged "boss") to the auditorium, and I got a lot of insight into how the Dewey people were conducting their campaign. Of course, I got all of the Dewey point-of-view, but it reinforced my notion that Dewey was going to win, and (that) Harry Truman was going to be an also-ran. What's more, Harry Truman, over the radio, sounded flat as a pancake. It was only when he got out to meet the people at the railroad stations, (et cetera), that he gained any popularity at all. That did not deter my students and these G.l. vets, who were all (for) Harry Truman. And they stuck with Harry Truman, and, as you might expect, since they had a poker game (or whatever with their fellow students) they'd bet practically all of their money on Harry Truman. Well, the morning after that election was gangbusters. (Chuckles) They were so (excited) and so inebriated, (they drank their whiskey straight in Wyoming), that quite frankly, we didn't have (a) class. Why bother with it? I was more interested in how they were so knowledgeable and how stupid college professors were to believe in the Gallup poll at that time. So, this gives you some little notion of how much fun politics was in Wyoming.

I mentioned the Dewey campaign, (however), I had a lot of contact with Frank Barrett because his son was on campus, and Frank Barrett was a Republican United States senator from Wyoming. I had one of Tracy McCracken's sons in my class. I knew his older brother, too. And you say, well, who (was) Tracy McCracken? Well, he published nine out of the ten (daily) newspapers in Wyoming.

MK: Wow.

DT: Tracy McCracken as a Democrat, at least, had that monopoly. (Incidentally), he cast the votes for Wyoming in 1960, the votes that put Jack [John F.] Kennedy across as a nominee of the Democratic party in Los Angeles. In 1952, out here in Hawai'i, I couldn't get any tickets to the national conventions. And this had been my academic hobby. (However), I'd had my difficulties with Tracy McCracken because he was also a member of the board of regents of the University of Wyoming, a powerful man. But I couldn't get any tickets, (so) I called up Tracy McCracken in desperation to get tickets. He was (also) a national committeeman for Wyoming. He said, "You're in Hawai'i now, why are you asking me for tickets?"

I said, "Well, after all, I knew your two sons, you know, one of 'em was in (my) class. And I'm still a professor; (hopefully what I'm doing is) still worthwhile."

And, without any idea (as to where I was) he says, "Okay, Tuttle. You think you're so smart. I got two prime tickets, I've been offered $200 apiece for these." (A lot of money in '48.) "If you'll get over here within five minutes, I'll give you these tickets."
I said, “Thank you sir, I’ll be right there.” It so happened, I had the good fortune to be in the old Stevens Hotel, right across (the street) from the (Blackstone) Hotel. All I had to do was walk out of the (Stevens) Hotel, walk across the street and up to his suite, and surprise him. He gave me the tickets. (He) made good on his word, and had a few cryptic things to say about his ideas of what a university was about, (vis-à-vis) my ideas about (a university). But we agreed to disagree, and so I got into the convention even though the Hawai’i people, at the time, wouldn’t give me any consideration at all. We’ll talk about that maybe later.

I learned in Wyoming, for example, that the university, a state university, was heavily involved in politics, (more than I had realized). I (also) learned, among other things, much to my sorrow, that the school paid football players for everything they did on the football field, except for making a touchdown. I had the unenviable experience of seeing money trade hands. I also discovered, among other things, that college presidents are not immune from (these antics), and (that) they take things known as “kickbacks” from contractors, architects, and so forth, meanwhile, hiding behind, I suppose, academic freedom. And some of your basketball players, for example, at Wyoming, had been semi-pros with oil companies of that day (who) sponsored semi-pro teams. (Even these fellows) became very disgusted (when) they (found that the school paid them) money—they felt cheapened by this. They thought they should play for free. So, they were ready to sign affidavits about (activities of) the basketball coach and the president, who was (also) participating in (these) rather questionable affairs. At any rate, it was an education (for me) in itself, and, if you will, a political education.

I got a little bit more involved in politics in 1950, in the spring of 1950, because one of my friends over in Rock Springs, (Wyoming), one of these G.I. students, said, “My good friend from Rock Springs, Rudy Anselmi wants to run for governor and he needs a running mate.” He said, “Who can we find to run with him for (the) U.S. Congress, one seat (being allotted to) Wyoming?”

I said, “Well,” (Mac Nimmo), was his name, (who) later became sheriff of Greenriver (County. He) had only one eye, but he became sheriff. I said, “Why it’s logical to me that Dr. Gale McGee of the history department would be a good candidate for U.S. House. Let’s ask him.” So off we (went) to the coffee shop in the student union.

And yes, Gale McGee, said, “I am interested.” (McGee) was a very fine speaker. And I can remember his words after that, he says, “Yes, I’d be interested. But what I’m really interested in, is becoming United States Senator from Wyoming.”

At any rate, Elsie and I made a couple wild trips (to Rock Springs, wild) because McGee drove about ninety miles an hour to Rock Springs to (confer) with Rudy Anselmi. Well, (in the end), Rudy Anselmi (did run) for governor. A fellow from Casper in the Democratic party campaigned against him on the basis of his race and his religion, believe it or not, (and said he would at their state convention. In response), Anselmi made one of the finest political speeches I’ve ever heard about just that topic. At any rate, the fellow from Casper had the (Wyoming) oil money behind him. He defeated Anselmi. McGee, perhaps wisely, decided not to run (in 1950). But lo and behold, in 1958, he ran for the United States Senate. (I learned of this as we were) doing election night returns (in Honolulu), and on the teletype machine came across the word that Gale McGee had become the Democratic winner in the state of Wyoming for the United States Senate. McGee served there for, I think it was, three terms until he, himself, was defeated. He still lives in D.C. And guess what he’s engaged in?
Lobbying (chuckles) and political consultation. (However), just before coming to Hawai‘i, Elsie and I were, as I say, very much involved in getting McGee into this race. One of the things that held McGee back (in 1950) was (the fact that) he had a tough case of diabetes, and he (also) felt that he should collect a little more money and get his health in a little better shape. (By 1958, he had done those things.)

(Affairs) in Wyoming (did get) a little bit tougher for me, too, because (the) political science chairman that I (had) mentioned, got into a fight with the board of regents. It was a very noble cause, I can assure you. But he resigned because of this (disagreement). The president had told him he would submit certain appointments to the board of regents and then went back on his word, and so Wengert (resigned and abruptly) took off for the University of Oregon. My being the low man on the totem pole, he couldn't take a whole stable of people with him, so I got left (behind) in Wyoming. That (situation) sort of complicated (the) picture for me.

But to lead into Hawai‘i from Wyoming, one of the things that was really a pleasure to do (was to entertain text)book salesmen (who) would come to Wyoming, (with its) cold (nights). Often, I would bring a book salesman home to coffee (or dinner). I (of course, also) had coffee with them at the student union. One fellow (in particular) would come and play bridge with us until three o'clock in the morning. (However), the fellow from Prentice-Hall, who had been bugging me to write a book about Wyoming politics—and maybe I should have—said, “(You've) got to get out of this place. All they're interested in is football teams and buildings.” (Since) I agreed, he says, “Well, let me put your name in our personnel sheet (that is) sent out to all of our Prentice-Hall (representatives).”

I said, “Okay.” (And) we talked (a bit) more about it. This was sometime in 1949, at the time when things were (beginning to) not look too good for the Tuttle household, quite frankly. (Then, in April or May of 1950), we (got) a letter out of thin air from a Dr. Allan [F.] Saunders, saying “We need somebody (in Hawai‘i) for (our) Legislative Reference Bureau, and somebody to talk about political parties to our students. Would you be interested?” Now, (Saunders) had (had a) meeting. He had talked with the only publisher who had an office in Honolulu, at the time. (This was) Prentice-Hall, (who) had an office because they had a lot of tax services which they sold to businessmen, in addition to (textbooks sold to) University of Hawai‘i (students. Thus my availability) came into Saunders' hands, and Saunders needed somebody, so he wrote to me. (Thus), just by sheer accident, we arrived in Hawai‘i (in 1950).

WN: Do you regret at all, going to Wyoming?

DT: No. Although I never learned to drink my whiskey straight. One has to view it, if you’re in the academic field, (as) you have to view any experience, as being a part of your education. And it was very much that. I got acquainted, certainly, with the point-of-view of the coal miners, and not the coal miners’ daughters, but the coal miners’ sons, primarily. I (also) got acquainted with how things operate around a state university. Perhaps, that was not all to the good, because it certainly didn’t enhance my career in any way. At that stage, I think I made up my mind (about) certain things in the academic world that I would do and things that I wouldn’t do. I (came not to) care what they did to me, or what happened. I suppose that plagued me until the time I carried the last book out of the University of Hawai‘i. (However), I’m comfortable with it, and the friends that I made in Wyoming may not be enduring in the
sense that we keep in touch, but there's a certain bond there at anytime we meet.

I did talk to McGee a couple years ago in Washington, D.C., and, (although) we didn't have (a) chance to meet, he says (that) he's writing a book about his career now. And I said, "Well, now you better darn mention this meeting between (you, Nimmo,) and myself, getting you involved (in politics) or I'm going to disown you." And he promised me he'd send me an autographed copy, but as of the present day, I haven't received anything.

(Laughter)

WN: I think we talked earlier—when we interviewed you last time, you talked about some of the similarities between Wyoming politics and Hawai'i politics. And what causes you to make a statement like that? What was Hawai'i politics like in the [19]40s?

DT: Hawai'i politics or Wyoming politics?

WN: Well . . .

DT: Both, you mean, probably?

WN: Yeah, yeah.

DT: Well, Wyoming, the southern part of the state, was made up of mostly Italian extraction or immigrant people. You had Polish people, Italian people, (Mexican people), and so forth, who were working in the coal mines. Their only hope of getting out was through the G.I. Bill of Rights because (otherwise) the (young people) were stuck in the coal mines. The northern part of the state where the cattle (and the) oil (were) located, was the more wealthy part of the state. (These) became Republican, and they wanted to call the shots. You had your dichotomy between the rich and the affluent, and the downtrodden, if you will, (those) who were just fighting and waiting for the chance (to improve). Like this (fellow) Rudy Anselmi, he's a big hero in my book and always will be. Rudy just passed away two or three years ago. He would just lay it on the line. "I'm not going to apologize for my race or my religion." He happened to be of Italian extraction, of course, and he happened to be Catholic. And this competitor of his, (in 1948 was from) Casper, Protestant, of course, and White Anglo-Saxon.

(As for) Hawai'i—I don't think I need to draw a diagram for you—by the time we got to the early [19]50s, you had (a) group of young people who, through the G.I. Bill of Rights, saw their way (to improve). They were interested in politics and in participating in politics, and they were up against, as Jack Burns would say, a hegemony of (older) people who were affluent, who'd had most of the luxuries of life, people who were not necessarily bad people, but they were thoughtless people. (These) could not understand the plight of the people who had worked here on the plantations, Chinese people who by this time, had small businesses. (The "rulers") couldn't understand (other) points of view. This was the situation you found in Hawai'i. As a political scientist, gee, I was in seventh heaven, because, here was everything not only (to observe but) also you could, and it actually happened, literally grow up with the situation. It wasn't my destiny, to borrow another Jack Burns expression, to grow up with the young fellows in Wyoming, but it was my destiny to grow up with the situation in Hawai'i. If I give you a choice between Wyoming and Hawai'i, I think, you'd (agree) (chuckles), ninety-nine times out of a hundred, you'll say, "You were the luckiest guy around, Dan
Tuttle." We were (in Hawai'i and we stayed).

WN: Were you aware of the similarities before you came?

DT: No. We knew where Hawai'i was, give me credit for that.

(Laughter)

DT: And give my wife credit for that, (too). And many people still think (Hawai'i is) in the Caribbean [emphasis on second syllable] or Caribbean [emphasis on third syllable], take your choice. We knew where Hawai'i was, we knew what the principal crops were. But the one thing that made it exciting for a political scientist, and that was (that), I felt, Hawai'i was on the verge of statehood. And so that was a big attraction. "It's going to be fun to go from a territory to a state, and what better place for a political scientist." And that's the way it (actually) happened. And (in) addition to that, I had the fun—it (was) just fun for myself—of working on a study about the Tennessee plan which, I'm quite confident, to this day, was one of the primary reasons why Hawai'i got statehood as soon as it did. Not that this was the only factor, we'll probably talk about this later. I guess we've talked about some of it on that earlier tape.

WN: What did Allan Saunders tell you about Hawai'i?

DT: Well, he told me a lot, but not in the sense of setting me down and saying, "Here it is, Dan." Saunders' technique was instantly to take me places. So he was sort of—we were brothers under the skin. Like I wanted to take Gus Resurreccion to go where the action (was) in Minneapolis, (Saunders) wanted to take me where the action was. (Thus), in the fall (of 1950, the first) six weeks, I'm not even sure my wife had arrived in Hawai'i yet, Allan Saunders had me at party rallies. And it's at one of these party rallies that, I think maybe I've told you before, that I first met Jack Burns. Allan Saunders simply took me up, and said, "I want you (to) meet this fellow." He says, "He may not impress you so much, but I have a hunch that this fellow is going to be fairly prominent in Hawaiian politics. Wouldn't you like to meet him?"

I said, "Of course."

And so Jack Burns and I started talking. And we remained good friends—although not necessarily political collaborators or anything of that sort—until about a year before his death, (when) I lost touch with him (due to his ill health).

MK: Maybe we can continue on the next tape.

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: The following is a continuation of the Daniel Tuttle, Jr. interview. This is the beginning of session number two, it begins with tape number six. The interview took place on June 27, 1990. The interviewers were Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto and Warren Nishimoto. And the interview took place at the HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association] office in Honolulu.

MK: Tape number six, session number two with Mr. Dan Tuttle, on June 28 . . .

WN: Seventh.

MK: . . . (chuckles) 27, 1990. Okay, maybe we can start today’s interview with your marriage to Elsie.

DT: Well, thank you for picking her up because (chuckles) I neglected to mention her. In 1947, we were married, on the 28th of June, believe it or not. Today’s the—we almost got the anniversary date—the 27th, of course, tomorrow being the 28th. And, of course, she did accompany me to Hawai‘i. I think we just finished talking about how we happened to come to Hawai‘i on the other tape. She actually came to Hawai‘i about six weeks after I did because our daughter was born just a week or ten days before I left Laramie, Wyoming. So she waited for a while to come, and I did a little (house) painting before she arrived. Our first quarters were in army barracks on Rock Road at the University [of Hawai‘i]. (They were) sort of hidden from Bilger Hall which, (of course), wasn’t Bilger Hall in those days. (The barracks were) hidden from Bilger Hall by the napier grass.

MK: And that was faculty housing?

DT: That was faculty housing, in part. There were a few sort of single-family houses over in the Eckart Road, Correa Road area, where the East-West Center is now located. That was (a) sort of upper-class, high-class (neighborhood). (It) was (occupied by) full professors (and) associate professors in 1950, and we were in the assistant professor/graduate assistant/instructor category (with) one or two exceptions. Dr. Saunders, being chairman of the (government) department, (and his wife were) living right there on Rock Road, so we felt a little bit better about all this.

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)
MK: Okay, I think I was asking a question (about), who were some of your associates there. (on) Rock Road?

DT: Oh my goodness. There were the Kirkpatricks, Arthur Kirkpatrick and his wife Nora. Bob [Robert B.] Stauffer from the government department, and his wife Jo Ann (were there). Within a few months, there was a Donald Bell (and) his wife. Jack Digman (and) his wife (lived there) for a brief period. Richard Alm from the education department (and his wife, Julia were there). Jud Ihrig and his wife (were) from the chemistry department. I mentioned Saunders already. Very briefly, Jake Stalker and his wife (were also there). She left after about six weeks I think. She didn’t seem to like Hawai‘i. (Jake) moved off of Rock Road as a single person. And I’m probably leaving some people out, although in the Rock Road community (there) was also a graduate assistant in our (government) department, Enid Beaumont and her husband. This year, she is going to be inaugurated as president of the American Society for Public Administration. She’s done very well, taught for a number of years, and is located in Washington, D.C. now. There was quite a variety of people. And, interestingly enough, most of these people at the University of Hawai‘i stayed for most of their career. I think Bob Stauffer, that I mentioned, just retired this year from the university.

MK: And I noticed a lot of these men did get involved in politics or political research and . . .

DT: Oh, very much so. I imagine we’ll be talking pretty soon about some of the faculty huis that we have on campus. We set up a regular factory for producing testimony for the legislature when it came to the loyalty oath and loyalty questionnaires.

MK: You know, I was wondering, since you folks were living in very close quarters, did you people get together and talk politics, socially?

DT: Oh, we had lot of socializing. As a matter of fact, you could hear most everything that happened in the neighborhood because there were no window glasses. There were simply screens and shutters, and we didn’t even have shutters (in some places). When we had heavy showers, mauka showers—you know, the proverbial showers—we just mopped up the living room floor. That’s all. When a baby cried, everybody knew that your baby was crying. We got together quite often, of course. We bought an early TV set, for example, in January 1953. The stations had just gone on the air. We were ostracized for a while because you were intellectually inferior if you admitted that you watched TV in those days.

(Laughter)

WN: It’s still the case today.

DT: There may be some of that still around. But we persisted. And then when certain things started to be brought in on film that were of interest, for example—I think we had the Queen Elizabeth of England (coronation) brought in (on) film. (Soon) we had standing-room-only audiences for certain things that appeared on television.

MK: Well, anyway, I guess we can get into the subject of TV later, but I guess we can go back to our original scheme of—let’s see, we were planning to discuss Jack Burns. Maybe we can pick up from there.
DT: Now, I’m not sure whether I mentioned Jack Burns on the earlier tape at all, but I do recall very vividly that Allan Saunders wanted me to get acquainted with grassroots politics as rapidly as possible. He took me around, I think, even before we purchased an old 1936 Chevrolet car. He took me to party rallies, and I can recall vividly—it must have been sometime in October (1950), it may have even been before Elsie arrived, that he took me to Aliʻiōlani School. This was a Democratic party rally. And he says, “Dan, come over here. I want you to meet one (special) gentleman.” He says, “I may be wrong, but I kind of think he’s going to be real important in Hawaiian politics.” And so he introduced me to Jack Burns, who was his usual terse self, but very friendly (and) very nice. We had a couple mutual friends, I think (from) Wyoming, where I’d just been. So, I talked with him very briefly on that occasion. But, there began a friendship which continued on until Jack became too sick, really, to have any chats. I, (of course), lost touch with Burns during the last year of his life. (However), in-between time we (had many conversations). There were, (of course), some high points and low points. Sometimes we would disagree very violently. Other times, we would agree. I suppose, on balance, we were in agreement much more than we were in disagreement.

MK: I was wondering, did Allan Saunders ever tell you why he thought this man would make a mark?

DT: Not really, not really, except he was interested in him, and I guess he enjoyed (Burns’) persistence. Jack had already run for delegate to Congress and been roundly defeated. He was defeated terribly, very badly (in 1948). Saunders was (always interested in) the underdog. I (also) think Saunders sympathized with Burns and the Burns cause. Saunders had quite a few contacts with the ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union] which meant that he was under suspicion from time to time. And so, he was intrigued, I think, by Jack Burns, in large part because of the Burns persistence (and his ILWU ties). I think Saunders also sensed, and in part knew, that I was somewhat attracted to the underdog, too. But in terms of Burns—I mean, in terms of Saunders being prophetic, as he was indeed, I don’t know how to account for that except maybe he was a trained political scientist, and a good observer. (Chuckles)

WN: I was wondering, when you came to Hawai‘i from Wyoming, did you have that definite idea that you were going to be studying Hawai‘i politics here?

DT: Well, this was really—it turned out to be my primary interest in the field of political science. Of course I mentioned, I think, the attraction of statehood for Hawai‘i. My secondary interest was in the field of public administration. This (was) also a matter of interest (because) in becoming a new state you have to construct an entire(ly) new administration. Now, this didn’t come until 1959, but I had visions of it happening. Well, like so many people, “Hawai‘i statehood is just around the corner,” you see.

WN: So you didn’t come with the idea of, maybe, just coming here and being a teacher, but then your research interest continuing to be Wyoming or somewhere else?

DT: My research interests were basically in national political convention delegates, which after (many) years, finally became my doctoral dissertation, but it had to wait for computers to catch up with it. That again is sort of a story in itself. Here I was with all sorts of information about national political convention delegates going all the way back to 1944. I didn’t actually
complete that dissertation—maybe I shouldn’t confess to this—until 1964. But how do you
tabulate and make into a meaningful dissertation, some 5,000 or 6,000 questionnaires, which
are forty items in length, without computers? So finally, the University [of Hawai‘i] got
enough (registration) computer material so that sometime about 1962, '63, when the Shon
twins, who worked in the registrar’s office, were able to give me pretty good computer run(s)
on these questionnaires, (I was able to complete the dissertation).

My interest was basically political parties and political behavior, public opinion, and polling. I
pioneered a class in public opinion and propaganda at the University of Wyoming, and a little
bit later, about the mid [19]50s, was also able to introduce that class to Hawai‘i. Then, we’ll
probably touch upon this later, subsequently (I) did a lot of polling here in Hawai‘i. But I had
no master plan. I’ve never had a master plan, in terms of where I want to be at a certain
time. I just sort of figured it would happen, and a lot of interesting things and fun things have
happened.

MK: And we know that when you got here, you were employed as a teacher at the university in the
government [later known as political science] department?

DT: Half time, government department, and half time, Legislative Reference Bureau. Dr.
[Norman] Meller, who was then the director of the bureau, was on the Mainland working on
his Ph.D. at University of Chicago. Bob [Robert M.] Kamins, Dr. Kamins, was the acting
director. I was hired by (Dr.) Allan Saunders, who was chairman of the political science
department, and Dr. Kamins. They had a very nice and easy relationship. Our offices (LRB)
were located in the old library, (the one) before the Sinclair Library. Most of my teaching
was done in Crawford Hall. Very rapidly, I found out, within a couple of years, that this was
really two jobs, (chuckles) and each one required full time. Ultimately, I did transfer out of
the Legislative Reference Bureau, and devoted my full time to teaching.

MK: And at that time, the Legislative Reference Bureau was part of the university?

DT: Very much so, yes, it was part of the university. We would transfer typewriters, some
equipment and everything down to shacks which they had erected on the grounds of ('Iolani)
Palace. And, so we had a special [legislative] session in the fall of '50 to handle the
constitutional convention work that year, and then the regular session in '51. I think I had a
reduced [teaching] load in the spring. In other words, I think I had only one class, or maybe I
didn’t have any classes in the spring. I had two classes in the fall of '50. And then in the
spring in '51, I was full time Legislative Reference Bureau during the [legislative] session.
We (staff) would then go down (from campus), sometimes sharing the ride, to the ['Iolani]
Palace. That [was a] fairly demanding session, (as) I recall, the session of 1951.

MK: Maybe you can tell us some of the important things that occurred during that session.

DT: Well, probably the most important thing, and it was a very time-consuming operation—maybe
technically, an LRB employee shouldn’t have gotten so involved in it—but I joined in the
faculty fight against the loyalty oath and the loyalty questionnaires, which were proposed by
the Republican majority at that time. (Lawmakers) ultimately ended up passing this loyalty
oath and questionnaires. We spent long hours, sometimes, virtually all night, collectively
preparing testimony, gathering evidence to fight these sorts of things because we felt they
were basically impinging upon our academic freedom, and upon our rights as citizens. I know
I labored very long and hard, once they actually passed, as to whether Governor Long would sign the loyalty oath or the loyalty questionnaire [bill]. However, I was somewhat comforted by the attitude of Governor Oren Long, who ultimately decided that he would sign this. And he announced this, I think even before he announced (it) to anybody else, to Norm Meller and yours truly, who were having lunch at the Armed Services Y [YMCA]. He came and sat down. This is what happened. In those days, the governor would actually walk in to the Armed Services Y, which was close to Washington Place and have lunch with anybody he knew. Well both of us were acquainted with Oren Long. And he says, “I’m going to sign it.” He says, “You know why?”

And I said, “No, you’re not going to do this, you can’t do this. You know, I’ve been counting on the gubernatorial veto.”

“Well,” he says, “I’m going to sign it.” He said because, in reading the papers, you know what happened in the 1950 elections (to) [U.S.] Senator Claude Pepper. This liberal senator from Florida had been defeated [by George Smathers, who accused Pepper of being “soft on communism”]. He says, “I’d be cutting my own political throat if I didn’t sign it. But I assure you, as long as I’m around, nothing’s going to be done. Unless I miss my guess, they’re going to collect so much paper, we won’t even know where to put it, and nothing’s going to happen as a result.” And lo and behold, Oren Long was right. A couple (of) little episodes resulted from those bills, but actually, by and large, they were forgotten. Now, the Claude Pepper that I’m talking about may be of interest to you because he just recently passed away. He recovered his political career by running for the U.S. House of Representatives [in 1962] and came to be known as the “senior citizens’ representative” in Washington, D.C. [While in Congress, Representative Pepper was a fierce defender of Social Security and other issues of concern to the nation’s elderly population.] (He was) about ninety years of age, I think, when he passed away.

MK: I was wondering, you know, since there’s so many of you professors working for the LRB, doing work for legislators, and you were testifying against the loyalty oath, why is it with these close ties and your testimonies and, in essence, your lobbying, it got through?

DT: Well, the Legislative Reference Bureau was one thing, and Norm Meller ran a very clean shop, and I’m not sure he was too happy with the fact that I was participating with my other faculty members in doing this. I was not on the front lines of this fight against these bills. The person(s), by and large, who (were) carrying ball, was Allan Saunders, at that time, or a person such as Robert Gray Dodge, who had just left the university and the LRB, and had gone into private practice with Bill [William H.] Heen and Ernie [Ernest] Kai. These people were carrying the ball. I was something of a small cog in this whole machinery of fighting these bills. Oh, I should mention, Tom Murphy for example, fought very hard. He (has) just recently passed away. Dr. Thomas Murphy was in the history department. And he happened to be chairman or president of the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] chapter on campus.

But now, one thing I should correct you on, and that is, there weren’t a lot of us at the LRB. There were only a few people. There was Dr. Meller, there was Dr. Kamins, there was yours truly, and Hideto Kono in those early years, plus some secretaries. And we did everything, really, just about everything that the LRB does today with staff. We had filing cards. Instead of having computers, we had file cards so that we produced weekly status tables and indices.
of all the bills in the legislature. Now, of course, the territorial legislature wasn’t churning out as many bills in those days, as they do today.

MK: Okay, maybe we can stop here.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number seven.

MK: Tape number seven with Mr. Dan Tuttle. I think we’re just getting into a discussion of the LRB, and I was wondering, what were your duties and who were the people that you serviced?

DT: (Our staff) serviced mostly Democrats because the Republicans were the majority, and they had all the legislative attorneys tied up. And, for some strange reason, they still got first claim on the AG’s [attorney general’s] office even though it was held by Democrats. The Democrats who had been governors were very accommodating to the Republican majority, even though they were appointed by Democratic presidents. And they weren’t of great help to the emerging younger Democrats on the scene. (As a result), I got to know the Democrats in the territorial legislature a lot better than the Republicans. These were people such as Manuel [S.] Henriques from Kaua‘i. A person such as Herb [Herbert K. H.] Lee from O‘ahu. Tom [T.] Okino, from the Big Island. Bill [William H.] Heen, from O‘ahu. (He was a senior partner of) Bob [Robert Gray] Dodge. (Dodge) became a very good friend of mine.

(I should mention) [William H.] “Doc” Hill, of course. We got to know him. He was a Republican. (There was, I believe), a fellow by the name of Bill [William J.] Nobriga, who was quite a fancy dresser. I remember very vividly, however, one Republican in the house of representatives, and that was Thomas [T.] Sakakihara, who walked with a cane as a result of some injuries he received, I think, while being interned in World War II. And Tommy Sakakihara was, I (believe), majority leader at the time, in the territorial house. He would stalk back and forth in his very peremptory fashion, as a Republican. He was a sight to behold because he was very feisty, small, feisty, and (had) his high-pitched voice. He really cut quite a figure. Of course, there was (also) Charlie [Charles E.] Kauhane who later became prominent when the Democrats became the majority. (There was also) Eugene [S.] Capellas, who was a Republican, but may have had certain Democratic tendencies, although he would have been the first to have denied it (then.) His son is now active on the Big Island, still. Not in politics, but in educational politics. This son, Larry [Laurence J.] Capellas, among others in the Capellas family, is a very ardent Democat today.

MK: You know, you just went down a very long list of legislators. I was wondering if you can kind of elaborate a little bit more on some of these men?

DT: Oh, I may elaborate too much. For example, Tom Okino, I still remember, striding into the Legislative Reference Bureau offices which was a green, army barracks shack, often twirling his Phi Beta Kappa key. (He) was a senator (from) the Big Island. Nobriga, I’ve already mentioned, (there were) no aloha shirts for Nobriga in those days. Certainly, Nobriga was one of the “fancy Dan” dressers. He always came in “dressed to kill,” in very heavy sports coat(s), or suit coats. I don’t know how he ever managed to remain cool in Hawai‘i, dressed that way.
I remember working at great lengths on the bill or bills relating to the state park system, which was a special interest of Atherton Richards, who was an iconoclastic member of the [Bernice Pauahi] Bishop Estate trustees. The person who was introducing the bills for Atherton Richards was Herb Lee. I had the responsibility of trying to do some of the drafting, the legislative drafting. This was quite an experience because Atherton Richards would often take time to (talk to) this young fellow from the Mainland and brief him on some of the problems about land in Hawai‘i. Together with Andy [Andrew W.] Lind at the University of Hawai‘i, he probably impressed upon me, not well enough, I suppose, that land was really the key to understanding everything in Hawai‘i, (there) being (a) small quantity of land and so many people chasing it. If I’d really taken it to heart and been a businessman, I suppose, I would have borrowed as much money as I could and bought as much land as I could in Hawai‘i. In which case, I might have been a fairly wealthy person today, if I had listened to an Andy Lind or to Atherton Richards.

On the lighter side, you had Manuel Henriques [territorial representative from Kaua‘i], who later on—not so much in the ‘50, ‘51, ‘52 period, but certainly after ’54, even though he was a Democrat—got left out by the Young Turk Democrats who came in because he was sort of viewed as a mixed-up lightweight. He couldn’t communicate too well, but I remember Manuel Henriques with a very soft spot in my heart. I’ve forgotten what the bill was, but for some reason, I got the responsibility to explain a certain bill that had been drafted by the LRB before a committee which was meeting in the center of the [Iolani Palace] throne room, now mind you, in the house of representatives. (At any rate), here was Tuttle, fresh from the Mainland, sitting down with a bunch of representatives—it may have been the joint committee, I’ve forgotten—but at any rate, one of the persons who was there was Manuel Henriques. Well, I knew most everybody better than I knew Manuel Henriques. He kept asking me questions; question after question. (Alas), I could not understand his English. Well, how can you respond and explain the bill when you can’t understand the fellow’s English? So I would say, “Sir, would you please repeat that? Would you repeat it slowly?” Then, somebody else around (the table) would translate, (someone) who had a little better command of the English language, for me. This went on for an hour. Meanwhile, you know, (not yet) dressed (for Hawai‘i), I was perspiring all over because there I was, flunking my assignment. I couldn’t really focus on what I was supposed to do. (Chuckles)

But then what happened? The meeting’s pau, and finally I can relax a little bit. Guess who was there, following me around (the throne room? Representative Henriques) put his arm around me, and said, “You okay. I like you. You nice to me, I nice to you.” And really, what he (had been) doing was sort of giving me an initiation ceremony in the (Hawai‘i) house of representatives. So I have this certain affinity. Henriques’s wife worked for him, a little bit of nepotism there in those days. But his wife was (wonderful). Anything I wanted, everything was beautiful from that day forward. For some reason or another, he liked the way I had taken his (questions) or (had) responded. I had been as polite as I possibly could; after all, I was dredging down deep to do the best job I could. (As a result), I was well rewarded by Manuel Henriques.

As I say, he was sort of left out of things, even as I think many of his colleagues didn’t appreciate what he was doing to me on that day. (However), when he was left out, he always had a ukulele ['ukulele] around, and the Portuguese ancestry came out, I guess. That’s where the ukulele ['ukulele] (originally) came from, wasn’t it, more or less. Manuel Henriques didn’t (seem to) mind the fact that the Democrats (left him alone.) Whether he was in the
minority or the majority he was left alone. He could often be found sitting in the throne room playing his ukulele ['ukulele] (noon hours or late in the day). I would sit down, and didn't have to talk story, (one) just listen(ed). He did a beautiful job. That (sort of thing) helped make life in the Legislative Reference Bureau—which was really quite a workout because we were really overworked—a little bit more palatable.

MK: So the way it worked was that the legislators would have some idea or a bill in mind and they would come to you to have it drafted?

DT: That's right. We would draft it, and normally your work would probably be looked over by either Kamins or Meller. But in any event now, we normally got to see it before it went out because Norm Meller was also an attorney. Actually, he didn't have a Ph.D. in those days. He got his Ph.D. at (some period) in the mid [19]50s [1955]. But he was an attorney, even at the time when he arrived in Hawai'i back in '46 or '47.

MK: You know, remembering back to those days, with the Republicans in charge, and you're drafting bills mostly for Democrats, can you remember any of your bills that survived?

DT: My recollection is probably not any of them. But I do remember that Henriques and Noboru Miyake were the champion (introducers)—I think I got this right. I'm not sure about Miyake, I think Henriques, too. They were champion bill introducers even though (Henriques was) in the minority. One of my assignments at the beginning of every session was to take all of the bills which had been introduced by somebody who had been defeated for the legislature, and put them in draft form, as if it had been introduced by Henriques or Miyake. They were, (indeed), the champion introducers. This was a steady practice on their part. They could go back to their constituents and say, "We introduced 125 bills," or whatever it was. Not a bad technique, they remained fairly successful. I think Noboru Miyake, Senator Miyake, just passed away a couple of years ago.

WN: Would you say that one of your jobs was to articulate the bills? In other words, talk to a representative or senator . . .

DT: Oh, you (often) talk(ed) with them extensively.

WN: What they want . . .

DT: You mostly listened. Then you tried to put in legal language and proper legislative form, their ideas, and then send it back to them. When you got their ideas "straight," then you would try to draft it in final form for approval by Dr. Meller and then it would be introduced. Actually, the quality of bills—and this was, I think, a tribute to Norm Meller, back in those days—(was) far superior to what it is today, (even) with all the help they have (today), with all the computers (and that) sort of thing. One question you always asked in those days—if it involved administration at all—is this capable of (effective) administration? Now I think Dr. Meller—I don't think we've ever talked about this, but I certainly admired his ability to say, "Now, this is too complicated. This is going to be too difficult to administer. See if you can't get the representative or the senator to change his mind a little bit about this."

Today, I think we have a lot of legislation which is passed without any appreciation whatsoever (as to) how it's ever going to be implemented or administered. And so even
though Norm Meller never really articulated this to me, I think it was always in the back of his mind. It shows how valuable the LRB, at that time, was to the state [territory] of Hawai‘i and (to) the legislature.

MK: And back in those days, you know, I'm wondering, what sorts of backgrounds did most of the legislators come from? Now days, we have a large number of men who come from the legal field. How about back then?

DT: They were heavy on the legal side at that stage, too. There were some who were like district court practitioners, as they're known as, like Manuel Henriques. [Henriques was second district magistrate of Kapa‘a, Kaua‘i.] But there were others who had Phi Beta Kappa keys—I have mentioned (this before)—like Tom Okino was an attorney. You had Bill Heen who was an attorney, had Heb [D. Hebden] Porteus who was an attorney. You had Doc Hill who was a businessman. They were not as well schooled as today's legislature on balance as a group. (However), they were, in my judgement, probably better educated than today's group of legislators. It's a combination of formal education and practical experience. They were also probably more thoughtful in those days, even the Republicans. Certainly, as the young Democrats came along, you had a tremendous amount of idealism, plus a lot of these new, young people coming in by '54, who were attorneys, (e.g.), Masato Doi, Dan [Daniel K.] Inouye. Ultimately, a couple years later, Patsy [T.] Mink. A couple years later, Tom [Thomas P.] Gill. Most of these young people were attorneys. And certainly well educated. You didn't have any Ph.D.'s at that time, but today, I think we have, two, three, or maybe even four.

WN: In the early [19]50s, prior to 1954, what was the difference between a Republican and a Democrat in Hawai‘i?

DT: Well, the Republicans were establishment. They were Merchant Street, they were (the) Big Five. And while, perhaps, this was overdone, Dillingham was a key support(er). I think they were subservient to Walter [F.] Dillingham, too, who was, technically, not Big Five. But the Republicans were for whatever the establishment. (However), the Republicans were liberal to the extent that a lot of legislation they enacted in the [19]30s, was a replica of New Deal legislation. And in their own minds, I think, they thought they were really, fairly liberal Republicans. In a political sense and in an educational sense, they were fairly liberal. But when it came to a commercial, economic sense, the dollars and cents of Merchant Street, the plantation, the shipping industry and so forth, they were very conservative. They weren't out giving even dimes away like a Rockefeller would do. They were very straitlaced. Whereas the young Democrats, as they came along, were idealistic, (and) they wanted a new order. They wanted the bloodless revolution, which they ultimately got in '54. Of course, these young people got a lot of support from some of the old-time Democrats like a Herb Lee, or even a Charlie Kauhane, in his own way, or (an) Ernie Kai. Some of these people had been in the legislature. They were really cheering on the young Democrats.

WN: I can see, though, in '54, it became a lot— the difference between the two parties became a lot stronger.

DT: Yes, it was . . .

WN: Whereas prior to '54, I was just wondering if it was a little more fuzzy in terms of . . .
Oh, it was fuzzier to the extent that people—the Democrats (were discouraged). They had been licked so often. They (had) never won an election, let’s face it, on a territory-wide basis (or one) with implications for territory government. (Prior to 1954) they were so reconciled, they were (largely) content to eat the crumbs that dropped off of the rich man’s table. They were sort of—if you want to call them Uncle Toms—they were sort of accommodating Democrats. Even a strong personality such as a Bill Heen or, certainly, an Oren Long (were soft-spoken). Oren Long was a very accommodating, mild-mannered educator who learned how to exist, co-exist, let us say, with the Republicans, even though as an old Tennessee Democrat, he disagreed. (Thus), when the young Demos came in (to power), this (became obvious)—they (spoke up, they) wanted their place in the sun. This was a free country. They had a right to vote. Of course, the McCarran Act helped them out a lot, because when Congress passed the McCarran Act, it enabled their parents to get naturalized and (be added to) the voting rolls. Young Democrats had a new constituency then, not only of people who’d been voting in Hawai‘i, but they had all of the fathers and mothers who suddenly (had been) able to get naturalized. It was only natural that ’54 was going to come. Whether it was ’54, or ’56, or whatnot. You just knew it was going to come. It came somewhat suddenly, actually. (So suddenly) that it surprised virtually everybody, most assuredly the Republicans.

WN: When were you aware that ’54 was going to come? Were you totally surprised election night? Or when did you really see something happening?

DT: I was surprised, like everyone else, I think, or virtually everybody else with the magnitude of it. I (had) thought there would be some Democratic gains in ’54. Getting a little ahead of the story here, but I thought in ’54, that there was a good chance that both Burns and Fasi would win their respective (contests). Burns running for delegate (to Congress) and Fasi running for mayor. I had not anticipated there would be such a legislative sweep, however. I don’t think most of the candidates, the young Democratic candidates, expected to win. They thought if they got one or two (“wins” in) each district here on O‘ahu, where there were ten being elected, that they would have made some progress. Later, as I began to examine the ’52 election results more carefully than I did at the time, if (one) were to go back after the fact and examine the ’52 and ’50 election results, you could have known that ’54 was going to happen. But I didn’t do that, and so in all honesty, I was surprised (as much as) everybody else. When that ’54 election result hit, there was great consternation, I can assure you. We’ll get to that when we get right down to the actual ’54 election itself.

MK: Okay.

END OF SIDE ONE
DT: There weren't any giant breakthroughs, but among other things, Oren Long appointed Sakae Takahashi, who was a young attorney, a little bit older than most of your younger Democrats, to be (the) treasurer of the territory. He started doing some significant work, insurance (reform) bills, and that sort of thing, and later could be(come) sort of a father figure to the younger Democrats in the 1954 election. Then there was Matsy [Matsuo] Takabuki, who as a young attorney came back from the war—(he) had some of his education before World War II and the rest of it right afterward—(and) got elected to the (City and County of Honolulu) Board of Supervisors. I almost said city council—the board of supervisors, here on O'ahu. Matsy Takabuki did take part in some of these huis that led up, in particular, to the '54 election. (Huis were) groups of young Democrats (who got) together with some of the older people, with some of the university faculty members, that sort of thing. You could also—but it becomes almost too technical to talk about in this fashion—go back to see the gains the Democrats had made in '52, (and in) '50, precinct by precinct. You (could have seen) that they were significant gains, (even though) they didn't add up to victory.

MK: How come?

DT: Because, see, we weren't electing a governor, we were electing senators or representatives (or councilpersons). These were occurring in the various house and senatorial districts, but (gains) didn't, as I say, add up to victory. By '54, with an enlarged electorate, (and) thanks to the McCarran Act (that) we mentioned earlier, you had a lot more votes for Democrats. Not enough to win (in 1952. However, in) '54, they went over the top, and they went over the top in a big way.

MK: You know, with that Walter McCarran Act, and more of the first-generation Japanese getting their citizenship, how much of an enlargement in the votership could you attribute to that?

DT: I don't have the figures in front of me, and I wouldn't maintain my memory's all that good, but I think that the bulk of the jump by '54 was a result—not of in-migration of any sort really—of these enlarged voting rolls, particularly among your AJA [Americans of Japanese Ancestry] population.

MK: Were you aware of any concerted effort on the part of the Democrats to get this vote out?

DT: By '54, there were really fairly substantial efforts (to get out the vote), and the Democrats really mounted a campaign which, in a sense, was ahead of its time. As we get into talking about this pre-1954 period, we had a lot of resources which sort of came their way from the Mainland. Some of us had participated in (fairly recent) Mainland campaigns. One person in particular I know, was Walter Johnson, who had been a (key) participant in the '52 campaign of Adlai [E.] Stevenson from the word go. He'd been (a leader of) the draft Adlai Stevenson movement. He came out here in the summer of '53. He was writing a little book on how ("they") nominated Adlai Stevenson, which I think you'll find in the library to this day. He came in and talked to my (UH) political parties class. (He) did a beautiful job; (his talk was) better than his book. His lecture's still on tape at the University [of Hawai'i] library. Walter Johnson later came to the university as a faculty member. I think, (he) served until his retirement. Walter Johnson, I think, because of my twisting his arm, (went) to (several) meetings of the young Democrats. He talked extensively with them about how they had proceeded to nominate Adlai Stevenson in '52 and (about) some of his experiences in Chicago politics. As a result of Walter Johnson, I know the coffee hour (was born in Hawai'i). Walter
Johnson should be given credit for the coffee hour, which I think still exists to this day, even though it’s probably outmoded, now. You just can’t reach enough people this way. But, it certainly worked for the (Hawai‘i) Democrats. To an extent, I think he also encouraged them to—because he saw that they were a talented group of people, even in ’53, when he was here—challenge the Republicans to a debate. That worked (heavily) to the Democrats’ advantage in ’54. My guess would be that Walter Johnson, at the time he was here, attended six or seven Democratic meetings. I can recall that he went to, oh, I think, a meeting at Washington Intermediate School, where I think, the entire county committee was. So, the Walter Johnson influence, to my way of thinking—I may be terribly wrong—meant a lot to the Democrats.

WN: Was the coffee hour kind of thing, a Mainland thing or was it ...

DT: Yes, yes. To the best of my knowledge, it had never been used in Hawai‘i. But Walter Johnson introduced it. The young Democrats and the Democratic county committee, in particular, in ’54 were using it. And most assuredly, Frank [F.] Fasi, (chuckles) was using it in ’54.

MK: How about going door to door? Was that a common practice back then, or something new?

DT: That had been a fairly common practice. The door to door, insofar as it could be done, the signs in people’s yards, before the Outdoor Circle rid us of all things like that, and the party rally, which was a great community festival, (were common. At a rally), each candidate would be given three minutes. (Organizers) had a bell which they would ring. You were up on a little platform. In the early stages of the campaign, at least in the primary, and even down to the general (election), because Hawai‘i is that warm, the parents would come out with their youngsters dressed for bed in their pajamas and their furry slippers. Some of the mothers would come out in robes, and the fathers might be dressed a little bit better. (The crowd would) have some shave ice, maybe have a little something more to eat, a meat stick, and listen to the dulcet tones of their politicians. This was (repeated) throughout the state. Today, essentially, these party rallies are gone. It’s too bad. They’re still held. I think they have a final [Democratic] party rally in Hilo where the practice continues, and I think (there is) one over on Kaua‘i. (However), that’s about it for the party rally.

MK: You know, now days, we have a heavy emphasis on media, the print and the TV and radios. How about back then?

DT: Radio was a factor, I think it was a principal factor. I think we were talking about that yesterday in some context. In 1952, I remember over KGU radio, Willard K. Bassett ripped Neal [S.] Blaisdell stem to stern, and really took the [Honolulu mayoral] election out of Neal’s hands, and gave it—let it remain—in Johnny [John H.] Wilson’s hands. (They) used the radio because people listened to radio.

TV was just around the corner. TV (arrived) in December ’52, (and) January ’53. By the time (one) got to ’54, nobody (much) was (yet) using it, except Frank Fasi. He got acquainted with it early. His first television broadcast was a half-hour speech, a stand-up speech, attacking (Governor) Samuel Wilder King. There may be an audiotape of it, but no visual tape, no videotape of it. It was the world’s worst telecast. It looked like a Johnny Carson (chuckles) comic routine of today, because the camera caught Frank Fasi right about the chin, so you
saw mostly the bottom part of Frank's nose and his chin coming out. He was whaling away, extemporizing, no cue cards or anything of the sort, about Samuel Wilder King. Frank comes out and says, "How do you think I did?" I said it was terrible, it was a disaster. (Of course), he went back to the drawing board, and today, I think, Frank Fasi is probably as polished a television politician as you'll find anywhere in the country, bar none. So media (has been) a factor. It was also a factor on the neighbor islands. There were radio stations there. You would have a little bit of use of it (there), but not extensive. The only time I remember where it was a decisive (early) factor on O'ahu, really, was in '52, (the) Wilson and Blaisdell (race for mayor).

MK: How about the papers? You know, you have both papers in Honolulu being owned by Republicans.

DT: (The newspapers) were Republican, no question about that. The [Honolulu] Advertiser was radical Republican. They'd find a Communist under every rock. They were very much in the hands of the Big Five. This was Dillingham, Lorrin [P.] Thurston (country). Ray [Raymond S.] Coll was the (aged) editor, who was simply a vassal, I mean, a feudal vassal of the big lords up on top. The [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin was decidedly Republican, but it was less radical than the [Honolulu] Advertiser. Riley [H.] Allen was the editor. Joe [Joseph R.] Farrington, of course, an active politician, was the publisher. Riley, however, for all of his proclivities and his stuffed shirtedness and all (the other things) you can talk about, was an old Bull Moose Republican. He never actually let you forget this. And, he never forgot it either. There was a very soft spot (in) Riley Allen's heart. So much so, with Riley Allen, as I say, for all of his (idiosyncrasies), people around town had (affection for him). Bob [Robert W.] Sevey and yours truly, on election nights, as long as Riley Allen lived, we made sure that Riley Allen was with us on election night because he enjoyed it (so much). He'd done this as a public service for the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin (for many years). [A. A.] "Bud" Smyser still refers to this, to this day. They collected the election returns as a newspaper. It wasn't a state (sponsored or funded) collection; they did it themselves. And Riley Allen would enjoy doing this. Later on, as we may explore, he was willing to share his radio microphone (in 1958) with yours truly as a youngster coming along, and it seemed only proper that a Sevey and a Tuttle should share our microphone(s) with him. (We did so), as I say, (until) probably six months of his death.

He always had some punch and comment. I'll stick this in right now because I happen to remember it. Statehood (election) night, he just utterly amazed me. We were doing election returns. The primary was (our) vote on statehood (I believe). This was '59. And, without any returns (in), he announced that statehood carried away by a margin of thirteen to one, I think it was, it might have been nineteen to one, we'd have to check the record. But (his guess) was right on the nose. To this day, I don't know how he hit it. But he announced it. There was not one single return in (at) the old printing plant of the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin where we were doing (those) returns. I just about fell (through the floor). Here I was trying to give a "scientific prediction," you see (and) here was this old editor announcing, this is the way it is. He got lucky, I guess. So, pardon me for sticking that in, but (I remain amazed).

MK: I know that in '52, you had more contact with Riley Allen?

DT: Oh, yes. This was (well) before (we did) election night returns. Riley got wind of the fact (that) I (had) made a speech or something—as a new person in town, (as I was) wont to do in
those days—about presidential primaries. Of course, that tied in with (my interest in) the national convention delegates. So, I was really (primed; I) had the latest information on presidential primaries and the history of presidential primaries.

(Now), Riley Allen was a member of a very elite group which exists to this day, the Social Science Association of Hawai‘i. Riley Allen wanted to pick my brain, and help him with his (association’s) paper. Well, as it turns out, I did a paper for Riley Allen, and Riley Allen translated it, and put it in Riley Allen. He delivered this paper at La Pietra, Walter Dillingham’s (home which hosted the) Social Science Association. (Members) dressed in tuxedos, believe it or not. Now, this was in Waikīkī, (of course), just overlooking Waikīkī. Riley Allen was (not) a very generous person, he didn’t pay me anything or offer me anything. I, (of course), didn’t particularly want anything, I was happy to be able to do something for the editor. (However), he did invite me to come to (this) Social Science Association (meeting) to hear him deliver his paper. He got special dispensation. You couldn’t invite, and maybe (even) to this day, you can’t invite any guests (who live) here on the islands. (However), if you are a foreigner, in other words, somebody traveling from the Mainland or from a foreign country, you can have that person as a guest. (However, Riley) got special permission to (take) me as a guest.

Well, I had my own little game which I played with Riley Allen because things had been happening on campus, we knew what we didn’t have (on campus). My main mission was to get Riley Allen—he was going to pick me up, offered to pick me up, and he did—to come and pick me up at (the barracks on) Rock Road so he would know where faculty lived. (I wanted him to have) some perception of our needs at the university. We must have talked for at least five minutes (as I tried) to give him directions to get (to) Rock Road. Finally he says, “If you want to come, I’ll pick you up at Bachman Hall, okay?”

Finally I gave in, I said, “Yes, sir.” So I duly dressed up, (but) not in a tux. I did have a good (Mainland) dark suit. I put this heavy (woolen) dark suit on, walked along the napier grass, all the way to Bachman Hall, and Riley Allen, hale and hearty, picked me up and drove me to La Pietra. I dutifully sat there, listened to that program, which was very much like the old debating societies of Yale, like they had (and still have) at Yale. I’m sure there’s a direct line to this. I had occasion to attend, I think, the Social Science Association one or two more times. The latest was about ten years ago. I sufficiently shook them up (with my speech, *Quo Vadis Hawai‘i*), so that the thought never crossed their minds, I’m sure, of ever inviting Tuttle to be a member of the Social Science Association.

The university president, of course, is automatically a member of the Social Science Association. The head of (a) Big Five firm is automatically (a member) of the association. Well, bank (executives) like a Walter [A.] Dods, [Jr.] today, is a member of the (association). It doesn’t matter whether they know anything about social science or care anything about association. It’s a gentleman’s club. They’re probably admitting women now, but for certain they didn’t have any women back in 1952.

At any rate, my association with Riley Allen (was—but first), one other Riley Allen story, if I may toss it in here. We got pretty well acquainted as a result of this (experience together). He (was) a gentleman, and he was very much interested in presidential primaries. I’m sure that paper is still in the files of the Social Science Association. So, I said to Riley Allen, “You know, I might be interested in writing a column for you someday.”
“Hmm, no way. Even if you knew enough to write a column about Hawaiian politics, I couldn’t pay you what it’s worth. ’Cause I get these syndicated columnists for seven or eight dollars a throw. And you’d be insulted if I offered to pay you less than that.”

So I dutifully (tucked) my tail between my legs, and walked away from him. Ironically, about seven years (after this encounter), a new editor hit town—been here for about a year—and did indeed invite me to write a column. We’ll talk about that later, probably. (Chuckles)

MK: Okay.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

MK: Tape number nine with Mr. Dan Tuttle, session three—session two, I’m sorry. Earlier, you mentioned that you were pretty intent on having Riley Allen see the conditions of faculty on the UH campus, and I’m wondering why?

DT: Well, we needed everything. For example, we needed a little better, we felt, a little better housing, because as I said earlier, when it rained, it would rain all over our living room. It would (have been) nice to at least have some window glasses, even though they were army barracks. We had difficulty in wet season drying clothes. You could dry them a little bit underneath some of the houses. It took you a while to save up enough money to buy an electric washer, you know. A dryer was something sort of out of the question. We weren’t asking for any luxurious mansions, but the university had no faculty housing at all except these barracks and a few single-family houses on Correa Road.

But when it came (to) the classroom, I don’t suppose we had more than a couple of old film projectors on campus. Certainly, we didn’t have anything in the government department (with which) to show films. When tape recorders came in, (the University couldn’t afford them). I know, I bought a Wilcox-Gay machine for a couple hundred dollars—which was a lot of money in those days—out of my own pocket, and started taping politicians. We had big classes, introductory classes were uniformly held in the chemistry building, or what (is) now Bilger Hall. Later on, things became---(well, they) didn’t improve any. (Later), they were holding classes in the Varsity Theater, as some of you may recall. This, we didn’t feel was good education because some of your better education is at the introductory level, whether it be in a college or university or in grammar school. Kindergarten and first grade (are) very important to the development of an individual. So it was, we felt, with introductory courses in government or history or whatnot. I could go on and regale you with all the things we didn’t have. We did have, I think, at that time, an unusually dedicated staff, and interestingly enough, a staff that contributed far more to the University of Hawai‘i than has ever been recognized, at least up to this date.

For example, just one comes to my mind. He got his master’s, I think, at the UH and then later returned (with a Ph.D. That) fellow (is) Walt [Walter R.] Steiger. He’s a physicist. Walt Steiger is a man who, (knowing) that telescopes were important to astronomy, (felt) that Hawai‘i was especially suited to telescopes and astronomy over on the Big Island, up on top of the mountains. Well, gradually, they’re beginning to pay a little bit of attention. I noticed, (recently) in some of the films, (some attention) is (given to) Walter Steiger. It is very gratifying to me to see that recognition given. Back in those days, was anybody paying attention to him; really, not at all. I know some of (staffs’) dreams because I used to try to
gather votes (while) trying to reorganize the faculty senate. Person(s) like a Horace [F.] Clay, who I think is very valuable to Hawai‘i, or (a) Walter Steiger, they were all (taken for granted). They weren’t as political minded as I was. More often than not, I’d get their signature on a petition for this or that. But in order to do that, I would listen to a lot of their dreams about what the University of Hawai‘i could become. In a sense, the faculty was (made up) of dreamers. (Thud), I very badly wanted Riley Allen to come and see what we needed because I felt we could become a really fine university, because we had a staff (that could perform). It was a teaching, (more than) a research staff. We weren’t bringing in millions of dollars, but we were, I think, on the whole, very, very well qualified for that time. We were interested in the students, we were interested in the University of Hawai‘i. Somehow, along the way, we’ve lost (that value of) that (sort of thing). More about this later.

WN: Did you see the university situation as a political situation?

DT: Of course. It’s a state university. In my book, it belonged to who(m)? The people. Then, and in spite of the fact that some people may disagree with me, it belongs just as much to the people today, as it did then. But try to tell some of our contemporary (academicians) or politicians that.

MK: So, in what form did your politicking take place?

DT: You mean . . .

MK: The UH politics, the UH faculty senate or lobbying the leg [legislature]?

DT: Well, there was a university side of it trying to (have influence), faculty senate used to be just associate and full professors. The instructors and assistant professors had no voice in it. At that time, we had a lot of (women) teaching in the English department, speech department. They weren’t about to give—even consider giving them tenure. They were on a year-to-year basis. (Seldom) on a three-year contract or five-year contract. There were all sorts of things we needed to do to democratize, with a small d, the university. By the same token, we had to fight for salary increases and benefits and additional funds for the University of Hawai‘i.

So beginning in these early [19]50s periods, one of the first things we did on campus was to get everybody together and join up with (the) HGEA [Hawai‘i Government Employees Association], or (the Hawai‘i Education Association). Charlie [Charles R.] Kendall (and) James [R.] McDonough were (the) executive directors of these two groups. (Persons) such as myself joined both of them. (I) became a member at that time, in whatever (early year that) it was. I’m still a member of both of them. These were the principal public service employee lobby groups at the time. In addition to that, we lobbied inside of (both these) groups to get their attention.

We also went down, many of us, to the territorial legislature. This was how we got the beginnings of the East-West Center, (namely) the first Asian study operations and a school for diplomats. These were (largely) the “babies” of Jake Stalker. Jake Stalker (history department) was certainly one of our lobbyists down there. Later (he) tried to do a little work (directly) inside of the legislature (1958?). (UH also) got a public affairs program in the government department. Lobbying for the college of education, for example—I think, (you’ve) talked with him previously about some of (the things)—(was) Dr. Hubert [V.] Everly
who had started out teaching in the [19]30s on the Big Island. He was the one person who was most prominent in lobbying for things for the faculty down in the legislature. There were, (of course), other people. There was a Bob [Robert W.] Clopton, in the college of education, there was (also) a Bob Martin. Robert Martin later did some fine work in Southeast Asia and central Asia for the college of education. These people would not only debate (politics) fiercely in campus housing, but they would (also) go down to the legislature and meet with (politicians).

MK: How heavily were you involved?

DT: Well, after I left the Legislative Reference Bureau, I was very heavily involved. Not in a partisan sense, but in the fight for things for the campus and the University of Hawai‘i. This became, with many of us, almost an obsession. We thought we had something here which was really great, and we couldn’t (hold back). We didn’t say we’re gonna become excellent, but (believed that) the virtue was in the doing. We wanted the wherewithal to do (worthwhile things). So, we fought for (these). There was also this question of getting ourselves in shape to become a state. You see, this was a second obsession, I guess you would say. After the ’54 revolution which brought so many people in the government, (several) problem(s) (threatened) statehood. There were still allegations (that) the Democrats were Communists. Another cry, after the ’54 election was, better back off because the Japanese[-Americans] had taken over [government]. (It was) not unlike the (recent) cry—only it was a lot fiercer, and more furious in those days—(about) the Japanese [nationals] buying up land in Hawai‘i. Hawai‘i (has) come to live through these cycles, and thank goodness, even though sometimes (one) despair(ed), we’ve been able to overcome them and live through them. That’s why one has to be optimistic about these islands.

MK: You know, going back to that so-called first obsession of making the university a better place, where did the UH administration stand in all this? What were they doing?

DT: (Sighs) They were blindly in subservience to the territorial government. And until 1954 hit, that meant they went along with Republicans. Gregg [M.] Sinclair, who had been president of the university for quite a few years [1942–55] before I arrived, would never really cross the powers that be, even though he would probably walk into the Legislative Reference Bureau where nobody much was listening, I think, and (proudly) proclaim, “I’m a Democrat.” (He) cheer(ed) for the Democrats, particularly in a presidential election year. I often wondered, (whether) this help(ed) the university at all because word about this—even though it wasn’t done out in broad daylight—got around, and I think it probably affected what we got at the university until ’54. Then, things didn’t magically turn around for the university until about ’57. (This was) because, even though the Democrats tried to do a number of things in all sorts of areas, there was a Republican governor by this time, Samuel Wilder King, who vetoed a lot of what we might call progressive bills, which were passed by the young Democrats.

MK: And we’re talking a lot about ’54 now, but let’s see, as we move toward ’54, I’m wondering, were you aware of any of these meetings that Burns, the Burns faction and some other Democrats were having? You mentioned some earlier, the young Democrats.

DT: In ’51 and ’52, we were beginning to become aware of the fact that for various reasons, there was no love lost between a Frank Fasi and a Jack Burns, mainly because of the Communist
issue. Then, there was a successor to the old Heen machine or Heen organization, a fellow by
the name of Tom Gill, Thomas Ponce Gill, who came along, and became sort of a third
force. (Gill) was, in one sense, close to the Burns faction, closer, I think, ideologically to the
Burns faction. As a matter of fact, he was probably more liberal than a Burns, as it turned
out. But then there was Burns in the middle and Frank Fasi, at the time, certainly (was)
on the conservative or right-wing of the Democratic party. Because after all, Frank Fasi was a
macho marine from World War II. He fought for this country, and he wasn’t going to have
any truck with Communists. He had grave doubts about some of those people who were
alleged Communists. At the same time, he had his own thing going. He would (surprisingly)
spend long hours talking with somebody like a Bob McElrath down in Joe [Joseph] Itagaki’s shop at Kewalo Basin.

MK: And for yourself, you knew Fasi back then.

DT: Yes, I got acquainted with Frank Fasi in 1951. We had much contact until early 1959. So,
there are eight years, and really, that’s sort of a story in itself. I got acquainted with Frank
Fasi because we had a fairly active chapter of the American Society (for) Public
Administration [ASPA], which met on the second floor of Itagaki’s place down in Kewalo
Basin, (Kewalo Inn). We always had some gofer things for a young staff member to do, and I
was a young member of ASPA. (Thus) I was invited to introduce a fellow who had already
been invited to ASPA, a fellow by the name of Frank Fasi. I was given the honor of
introducing Frank Fasi. So, I met Frank Fasi. He bought the lunch because he was fairly
wealthy, at that time, and we met at the Alexander [Young] Hotel, which was Frank Fasi’s
way of doing business. We had a very pleasant conversation; he shared a lot of his ambitions
with me. I immediately, not only at that one session, but from the outset, I became curious
and interested (in) him. He had (some) aspects of a Gale McGee about his personality. He
could speak well; he handled himself well. He was a fighter for the underdog. I got
acquainted with his reasons for getting into politics here in 1950. I felt he had a lot to offer
Hawai’i, a lot of talent. So I became intrigued. He asked me to introduce him as a “glorified
junk man.” I did, except I, when I introduced him, I forgot the “glorified.” (Chuckles) So I
introduced him to the local chapter of the American Society of Public Administration as a
“junk man.” Well, Frank didn’t cross me off on his list. We had succeeding meetings, and
early, somewhere along the line, Frank Fasi asked me to help him.

So I said, “Okay, Frank.” But this wasn’t very burdensome at the time. I said, “Fine. Any
aspiring politician needs to have somebody around who(m) he can trust, who doesn’t want
something. If you want me, I’ll be that person. But if at any time you don’t want me around,
all you have to do is say so. I won’t oppose you at that election, but thereafter, I’m on my
own, I can do as I please.” What more can he have than that?

So Frank Fasi said, “That’s fair enough to me.”

I said, “Okay, I’ll do everything I can for you.”

There was a (benefit of sorts) for Tuttle, too. I could, as a result of doing this—even though I
wouldn’t be paid, I wouldn’t even get free lunches or anything of that sort—I would at least
have an opportunity to be close into a major campaign for something. That was attractive to
a young political scientist. I already got acquainted with campaigning in Wyoming, and even a
little bit earlier in Minnesota. Here was that chance (in Hawai’i). I didn’t realize at that time
that I was going to sort of put myself in Siberia in the minds of quite a few other people in Hawaiian politics. Some of that remains to this day, although most of it now, how many years later, has subsided, and I’m fine.

WN: What are the drawbacks for a young political scientist to get into partisan politics?

DT: What are the drawbacks?

WN: Mmhmm.

DT: Well, you’re labeled. All of your colleagues say you’re out to get a better job, or get a prestige job. That’s about the worst of it. The better part of it is, you don’t have to be stuck in your office all the time, reading more and more books. You’re able to get out of the ivory tower, and you’re able to get acquainted with an awful lot of people. That’s what the ’54 campaign did for me. And sort of by nature, I really—whether (one) know(s) it or not, or whether they like it or not, I just basically like people. For some reason, I can remember names and (some unknown) people (became) “big heroes” to me, out of that campaign experience of ’54. There were some things, of course, that happened before ’54. Frank Fasi jumped the gun on me in ’52. I left him in Chicago at the national convention and said—had to wake him up, he (was asleep)—(Fasi was) the hardest guy in the world to wake up—before I left, “Okay Frank, you’re not going to run for mayor, right?”

(He replied, sleepily), “No, I’m not going to run.”

“You sure? Okay. Not going to run.” I said, “Okay.” Later, I ended up teaching (that fall) because I ran out of money on the Mainland—(I) was trying to finish up my dissertation (as) I already mentioned, and I ended up teaching at Stephens College (in Columbia, Missouri). I got to follow the national campaign on radio. I got to see Alben Barkley (in Columbia), after attending both political conventions. (However), would you believe, that back in Honolulu, Frank Fasi still sticks with his notion that he’s not going to run for mayor. He (then) takes off for a meeting of the Democratic national committee, to which he got elected in ’52. The plane gets turned back with engine problems. When Frank lands back at Honolulu International Airport, he boldly announces (that) it’s God’s will that he’s gotta run for mayor for Honolulu. (Thus), in 1952, he stays home, (and), he runs against Johnny Wilson. I learned about it some weeks later, I think maybe I received one or two letters from Frank Fasi, but other than that, he was too busy back home campaigning. Frank runs for mayor; he runs a good race. He wasn’t about to win, but he ran close enough. Held his first talkathon, incidentally, when I wasn’t around. But he decides, “This is what I’m destined to do, I’ve gotta run for mayor again in ’54.” And therein begins the “big story” (of Fasi in ’54).
MK: This is tape number ten, session two, with Dan Tuttle. I think we had just started getting into your relationship with Frank Fasi, and moving towards 1954. And I really want you to sort of discuss the relationship that you had with Frank Fasi, which was not purely political, but also one of friendship, back in those days.

DT: Well, as I indicated earlier, this started sometime in 1951, probably the fall of '51, and continued until '59. It became a very close relationship. Frank was anxious to run. In '52, he ran a good race, I was not here. Came back (in early 1952). Everything thereafter was an effort really between Frank Fasi and yours truly to try to mount a campaign which would result in victory in '54. Victory almost arrived. It should have arrived. That election should have been won, but for a variety of reasons, which we may discuss later, Frank (lost).

We had a small child at the time, so I couldn't get out very much without leaving my wife. Our daughter was born in 1950 in Wyoming, just before we arrived in Hawai'i. By say, '53, when a lot of the preplanning for the '54 campaign came along, our daughter was three years old. She came to think of Frank Fasi as an uncle, virtually. Frank had a growing family of three or four, even at that time. By this time, we had moved, in '53, into the Eckart Road house on campus, where the East-West Center is located [today]. Frank would come by our house four or five times a week, he literally camped on our doorstep (every evening). We talked politics. So from my point of view, all of Frank Fasi's early education about politics and political campaigns came from yours truly, supplemented by help from Walter Johnson, and occasionally from other people (on campus). He would sit in some other (campus) meetings about politics, (but not many). I was sitting in with the rest of the faculty in the Democratic hui on campus, and meeting with Frank Fasi the rest of the time. So I was a marked person in with the Democrat faculty hui. (However), I wasn't excluded. They were willing to admit me. Oftentimes, I would be arguing points with Jack Burns sitting on the floor of, say, Donald McGuire's living room, on Eckart Road. (Thus), I both heard what people were saying about Fasi, and knew what Fasi was up against, I also knew what Fasi was thinking. So I was in a fairly superior position, you might say.

We developed, in the course of 1953 and early '54, a campaign that actually started about the middle of August ('54). The primary was just a month (October) before the (November) general. We developed, I think, one of the better political campaigns that's probably ever been held, if I may say so myself, here in Hawai'i (even though) it was a losing effort. Fasi, on occasions when he used to kid me, and he can be pretty rough when he's kidding, "Ah, you're a born loser, Dan. You're never going to get over this. I'll get over it." Well he's right. I'm still talking about it, sitting here with you. He's sitting down in Honolulu Hale today, having been mayor (now) for how many years, he's thinking about the next move, maybe running for governor this year. (Chuckles) That shows you the difference between, I guess, an Adlai Stevenson, say, an egghead politician or one who's interested in politics, and a successful—at least up to a point—a successful politician such as Frank Fasi.

MK: You know, you were like a confidant and advisor to Fasi. What kind of advice did you give him back in those days?

DT: Really, everything from soup to nuts. (Some) little things that come to your mind. Don't ever get into a fight with the newspaper, if you can avoid it. And by all means, don't ever get into a fight with all of them. But by the same token, you have to know how to deal with newspapers and with the media. Frank heard some of those things, and he didn't hear others.
For example, like getting into a fight with the newspaper agency, (HNA [Hawai‘i Newspaper Agency], years) later, was sheer suicide for him. As long as you had two (competing) newspapers and some developing TV stations, it was okay. I passed (a) story along to him (about doing) battle with (a) newspaper, at least up to a point because you get extra publicity that way. I told (him) about the character in St. Louis running for public office who plunked down solid cash in front of a good Democrat (editor) and said, “Give me so many dollars worth of hell.” Because you see, (he wanted to get) something percolating in the public relations arena. We went into (other) things. (I gave him a good) political handbook, I forgot the author, now, but it’s a very good one, still good (reading) to this day, (a) national handbook. If he didn’t read (these things), I would pass along to him what I was reading. By the time ’54 came along, we had a real good campaign plan, and we implemented it so that—it (became) “the first of its kind” (in Hawai‘i).

However, there were a lot of other things, unless you want to follow Frank Fasi (here), all the way to the (present). I think I should call your attention that by ’53, most of the Hawai‘i vets who’d be going to law school were back from law school. People such as Dan [Daniel K.] Inouye, Tom [Thomas P.] Gill, (Spark) [M.] Matsunaga, Masato Doi, George [R.] Ariyoshi over in the fifth district, and so forth. I’d been teaching my classes as usual at the university, and I got acquainted with (other) people, students such as (student body presidents) Shunichi Kimura or Ralph Aoki; (or) a Charlie [Charles R.] Kendall, who, believe it or not, I have to pause and tell you that Charlie Kendall enrolled in (the fall of) 1950 in my public personnel class. I thought, “Gee, this was commemorable that a lobbyist would come and listen to what I have to say.” (However), I don’t think Charlie was interested in what the young instructor had to say about public personnel administration. I later concluded, he wanted to get a line on what this person was saying, and (where) he (stood) for his own political purposes, which he used from time to time, sometimes, against me, and sometimes, maybe in a helpful fashion. He dropped out of class (early), and this is what sort of alerted me to what he was possibly doing when he (suddenly) had to attend a Mainland conference. He never finished the course. He got an incomplete, and I guess, (later) it got converted to some (other grade). I don’t think Charlie Kendall cared.

There were, (of course), other people like Kenn(eth) Chong, who was one of our most celebrated students on campus. (I thought he) would become a governor, quite frankly, of Hawai‘i one day. Kenneth hasn’t done that, but he did become an attorney. He went to both Yale and Harvard. He had every honor (that) the University of Hawai‘i (could) bestow upon him. He did a (classroom) paper, for example, in the 1954 campaign about Jim [James W.] Lovell, which is (still) on file at the university. (There was) Ed [Edwin S.N.] Wong, who later became—I guess, (a leader at) A&B [Alexander & Baldwin], T.C. Yim, who ran for the legislature, Dorothy [I.] Kohashi, and Peter [S.] Iha, who served in the legislature, and (many other) people such as (these).

Of course, in the spring of 1954—and we’re almost there (now in this discussion)—the Democrats held their (state) convention, once again, at McKinley [High School], and reelected Jack Burns as state chairman, but they almost impeached Frank Fasi as Democratic national committeeman. Frank had allegedly said in ’52, when he got elected, he would not run against Johnny Wilson, but he did. So they tried to impeach him, but they finally decided to give up and decided not to do it. The Democrats revised their rule(s) that year, and guess who? The intellectual of the crowd, the person who (had) set up the “everyman” committee, as it was known as, her own political hui, a Patsy Mink, was (made) chairman of the rules.
committee.

And it was that very same year, in early '54, (when) I was attending these meetings (as an observer), in part because of Fasi, in part because of my (general) interest, (that) Dan Inouye got into a violent precinct battle with Frank Serrao. (It was, I believe), the old fifth (of) the fourth, I guess, (held) in Crawford Hall, in the evening. Frank Serrao had Danny outnumbered. (It appeared that) Dan was going to lose. Fortunately, Dan had family (living close by). They had a recess, and (Dan) brought in family, all of Danny's relatives that he could muster. They managed to fend off the challenge of Frank Serrao, who had been secretary of Hawai'i under Oren Long. I hope my memory is still working correctly. Frank Serrao's (fight) didn't help Frank (Fasi's) relations with Inouye. Frank Serrao, who'd been something of a conservative Oren Long-type Democrat, was friendly to Frank Fasi. Ernie Heen, who (was) tied in with the young Tom Gill, and [Richard] Kageyama were about the only Democrats who, when the chips were down in the general election of '54, supported Frank Fasi. You see, so many things were going on. And this was the exciting part about '54.

In that same spring of '54, the O'ahu Democrats got together at old Linekona School. It was (in) a little better shape (then until recently). They just refurnished it recently. It was a hot, termites flying, sort of night. That auditorium at old Linekona School was packed to the gills. I got stuck outside with Dan [Daniel T.] Aoki and Mike Tokunaga (and others of their crowd). Inside, Tom Gill (was running for chairman), and Dorothy Kohashi (was) running (for) secretary. (After a heated battle), they got elected to head up the [O'ahu] Democratic county committee. The unprintable things that a Dan Aoki and Mike Tokunaga had to say about all of what was going on inside, I won't repeat here. (However), these were two (of the most) able henchmen of Jack Burns. They were his organizers. They did what Jack Burns today is given credit for, organizing the Democratic party. Because the party goes, largely on behalf of Jack Burns, were these two young, still young vets, really serious, and just didn't quite have enough votes to keep control of the Democratic county committee.

WN: Who was challenging Tom Gill?

DT: The Burns forces. With Dan Aoki. Dan Aoki's (forces) had all of their people inside. They were simply—they had runners from—on the steps at Linekona School, so that our conversations would get interrupted from time to time.

WN: Was there any particular candidate that they put up?

DT: (Yes, but) I cannot (remember to) tell you. Quite frankly, I'd have to go run to the newspapers. I wish I could (remember, but) I can't.

WN: Was it a surprise that Tom Gill won?

DT: It was a close fight. And it was visualized as that, but most people, I think, felt that Jack Burns (as state chairman, his forces), would probably survive—because Tom Gill was really pretty young. But here again is where—I think we've discussed this, maybe on other occasions—there was an underground force in the Democratic party of those days. It didn't surface until years later when it got prominent on the Mainland. An awful lot of women who knew how to talk (got together). I suppose we'd want to put them down (and say), “gossip,” but men gossip even more in politics than women, (believe it or not). We'll let that be a
matter of record. These behind-the-scenes gals could come up with quite a few votes in something like the O'ahu [Democratic] County Committee. So (one shouldn't have sold) a Dorothy Kohashi short. Tom Gill got the prominence of being the chairman of the county committee, but Dorothy was in there (behind the scenes) helping, and Tom was one who was willing to recognize women, probably more so than in the Burns faction, at the time, because (it) was made up of the Gls, (heavily) Gls. AJAs [American of Japanese Ancestry], by way of background were not, let's put it this way, were not among the first to elevate women.

Women and their preconceived roles, I (still) think this has changed, as all America has changed, and why shouldn't it? (It should have happened earlier.)

MK: You know earlier, going back a bit, you mentioned a campaign plan that you had for Fasi when he ran. What form did it take?

DT: You want to get back to Fasi or you want to still stay on (Democrats)? The Fasi campaign was one geared to an individual to win a given race. The Tom Gill, and some of Tom Gill's lieutenants such as a Dorothy Kohashi or a [C.] Duke Cahill—Ernie Heen, of course, and Johnny [John K.] Akau. They were geared more to "party." They were wanting to capture the entire territorial party because (now) they had [control of] the county committee.

WN: Where did the Fasi camp stand in terms of a Democratic county committee? The O'ahu county committee, I mean.

DT: Well, to this extent, Fasi and Gill did meet prior to the general election after Fasi's win in the primary. And they ended up all of their meetings, at which I was present, agreeing to disagree. And my influence to try to get Frank to be a little more compromising, didn't work. But at the same time, Frank was the one who was out there beating the bushes for votes and (meeting) the people. He had a public to (appeal) to, whereas Tom Gill was not, at that time, appealing to the public. Also, Frank Fasi thought that Tom Gill was an inferior person when it came to meeting the public. He felt that Tom would never succeed, and Jack Burns felt something the same way, but don't ever think that Burns and Fasi would agree (even) upon this. They just felt that Tom Gill, by the way of personality, (did "have it." ) So Tom Gill was tied in with party, as party (but not the Burns definition).

Meanwhile, the faculty group coming in, people such as a Tom Murphy or a Bob Clopton, or a Bob Stauffer or a Jake Stalker, Don McGuire, who later moved to [Washington,] D.C., Arthur [L.] Kirkpatrick, Bob Martin, out of the college of education, Don [Donald W.] Bell in economics, sometimes Allan Saunders, Ed [W. Edgar] Vinacke, who later went to the University of Buffalo, these were people who were working, and very heavily involved with Tom Gill. And you'll find, still, some remnants of the faculty who (will) still be campaigning for Tom Gill's son [Gary Gill] in the city council to this day. I think you (will) still find this aloha for Tom Gill and Gill's progeny on the Mānoa campus. There's good reason for that—and I salute it because just to serve (as a) footnote—in one session, Tom Gill talked all the house of representatives, (Democrats), into giving all of their pork to the University of Hawai'i because he felt the need so (great). So you can see, in turn, how the University of Hawai'i would (or should feel toward) Tom Gill.

My own involvement with Tom Gill in later campaigns was off again and on again. We always had basic disagreements about his timing. For example, his going off and running for the U.S. House of Representatives, when I felt his heart and soul, if you want to borrow
Waihee's slogan now, was here in Hawai'i, and that he really wanted to become (an officeholder) in (state) politics. He didn't (really, I felt), want to spend his time in D.C. (However), he (digresses) and runs that race (for Congress) and wins [in 1962]. Then when he gets there, winning goes to his head and he runs (next) for the U.S. Senate [in 1964]. (He) gets clobbered, (defeated), then comes back and tries to start all over again (in state and local politics). Well, this is where (my) basic disagreement existed with Gill. At least with Fasi, you knew where he stood (most of the time). He was either going to run or he wasn't going to run. If he decided to run, he went all out. And if he decided not to run, which was seldom, of course, why, it's all the same. He didn't bother to work for anybody else very much. Frank is not one who (wanted or) wants to help other people. And, therein lies the soft underbelly (weakness) of a Frank Fasi.

WN: On the ideological scale, were Burns, Gill and Fasi pretty much similar?

DT: Yes and no. And I think we'll probably have to come back (to this). If you'll remember that, we'll come back at that another time. One thing I want to work right at this point is, that when I got heavily involved in '53 and '54, my students were also very heavily involved in '54. They were doing campaign workbooks, papers in essence. I had no contact with them, vis-à-vis the Fasi—actually, one of them campaigned for Neal Blaisdell. I didn't see their work (until December). We never talked about (their work in detail) until after the election was over. (The) notebook (about Blaisdell's campaign) is in the university (UH) library, to the best of my knowledge, to this day.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number eleven and end of session two.

MK: Tape number eleven, session two, with Dan Tuttle. We have some follow-up questions to the things we talked about. We were talking about faculty and politics, and I wanted to know if these faculty groups served as brain trust for Democratic candidates like Gill, Burns, Fasi, and how the faculty divided up?

DT: That (did) happen. There was only one faculty member who (said), "Somebody's gotta represent (the) Republicans, and I'm going to do it. Because we gotta keep in touch with both parties." That was Don [Donald D.] Johnson in the history department. I think Don would want me to say that, because (it) seem(s) like I'm about the only person who remembers that (happening). Among the Democrats, of course, people did sort of divide up. Tom Gill had his special person, some of which overlapped with the Burns forces. Shelley [M.] Mark, for example, was always a very good friend of Tom Gill (as well as of Burns). From time to time, I would sit in with Tom Gill (forces). Let me see. Don McGuire, for example, was very friendly with Gill. Norm Meller became friendly—even though, much of the time, we felt he was a Republican—(with) Gill. Nora Kirkpatrick, the wife of Arthur Kirkpatrick (worked) with Tom Gill. Don Bell's wife worked—I guess, for money, and, maybe some of the time for love—for Tom Gill.

Meanwhile, Jack Burns had a group which (initially) include(d) people like a Stalker, up to a point, a Stauffer, a Bob Clopton, and a Donald McGuire who was in the ag[riculture] department. Donald McGuire got so heavily involved with Jack Burns and the Democratic
party (that he made headlines). You (can) check back in (the) newspapers (and you'll find) there's (at least one banner) headline about McGuire. McGuire takes on, or (disagrees with) Sam King, Governor King. As a result of that one headline, Don McGuire almost got fired. I think he felt a little bit under the gun until he left Hawai'i and, later, went to National Science Foundation. You see, some of our early faculty members got pulled away. Something of the same thing may have happened to an Ed Vinacke, who was also rather close to the governor. (However), McGuire did not get fired. Paul [S.] Bachman who was (Dean of Faculty), would say, "Don't do it again. But if you're going to do this again, give me the courtesy of letting me know in advance so that I know what to say to the press when they come after me." Later on, as he ran for governor the second time around, Jack Burns had a more elaborate brain trust, if you will, with people (such) as Ralph [M.] Miwa, my colleague of yesteryear in political science (and) [Fujio] "Fudge" Matsuda, who later became [State] transportation director and president of the university. Quite a few other faculty members (were involved). I'm trying to think of some of the others. These were two of the more prominent ones.

MK: Wasn't there once a faculty member who did run for a party office, but during the course of the election process for that party office, because of some sort of irregularities in his past, Tadao Beppu became the substitute candidate? I can't remember if it was for the O'ahu county chairmanship or for something else, but there was . . .

DT: Well, it could have been Ralph Miwa.

MK: McGuire?

DT: Well, McGuire was—I've forgotten what year Don left. He left before—right around statehood or shortly after. Beppu, now you're getting into real details of Democratic party organization. You have to give me some (other) clue(s) as to the name of the person.

MK: I think I'll have to check my notes. I remember . . .

DT: Yeah, check—I don't really know. I'm sure I knew the person, but I just can't recall who would have run (and they settled on Beppu).

MK: And you know, going back to the earlier question, how about Fasi? Did he have faculty in his group, other than yourself?

DT: Well, he had some friends among the faculty. Interestingly enough, I think Don Johnson and Frank always had a pretty decent relationship, even after Don, I think, actually campaigned for pay for Hiram [L.] Fong, believe it or not. Tom Murphy had kind words to say for Frank Fasi, in part because they (were) both from Connecticut, I think. (As was Johnson.) They both had their roots in Connecticut. (Another history professor, Art Marder, who was nominally, but not actively, a Republican, always had kind words for Frank. (He) made contributions to his campaign, back as far as '54, (I think). There were others who told me that they voted for Frank and they sort of liked him, but they had great reservations because of what other people were saying about Frank. So people would come up to me, and (have) always (been a Democrat. Sometimes) they'd say, "Well, I voted for Frank, just because of you."

And I said, "Now wait a minute. That's no good reason to vote for Frank Fasi. If you don't
like Frank Fasi, (don't vote for him. I'm not a factor)."

I can name you several people who would say that, I'm not going to toss their names in right at the moment. Keep in mind, these were real vicious battles in those days. I mean, you know, hook, line and sinker into one another. You (did, however, have) a veneer of niceness and pleasantness, and nobody really took (himself) all that seriously. Well, to illustrate ("niceness," here is) a Jack Burns story, (much), much later. (I was) sitting, having breakfast with Jack towards the end of his career. He was still governor, and I got weary of him saying bad things about Frank Fasi and Tom Gill. And I said, "Governor, knock it off. You've been through so much with these two guys that you really love them, don't you?"

He turned away from me, a long pause, pursed his lips, came back (and said), "Yeah, Dan, you're probably right. But let's not let the word get around."

(Laughter)

DT: This sort of illustrates, I think, the way in which you debated (those) things. Sure it was a fight for power, and a fight for position. From Jack Burns' point of view, Frank Fasi was just a little bit too big for his britches and was (always) trying to push the years. If he'd just wait in line, give Jack his chance first, then (he, Fasi, could) come along. This was particularly evident with Tom Gill. Burns told me himself, personally, that if Tom Gill would just be a good boy, he'(d) be(com)e governor after (him). (Of course), Tom Gill would not (or could not) be a good boy. As a result, understandably, you can well understand why Jack in finality sort of crossed him off. Yet, even though he firmly crossed off Tom Gill, and he firmly crossed off Frank Fasi, Jack Burns was a type of person, who down deep, really had some affection for them. And I sensed it back on that occasion, and in essence, he confirmed it. "But let's not let it get around." In other words, "This is something between (you and) me."

This illustrates something about a Jack Burns who signed every letter I think he ever wrote, "May the good Lord be with you, and bless you, (and) keep you." I'm paraphrasing only, but he always had this reference to the deity. He was a Catholic, who, in his own way, in his own mortal way, tried to practice what he preached (even) as he trudged off to early morning mass, probably every day of his (adult) life. These were all combatants, but yet they were—when the chips were down—they were really "good people." The politician of today (could) learn well from some of these (early) gives and takes, you know.

MK: I think Warren had a question about Burns, Gill and Fasi? Similarities and differences.

WN: We're talking about ideal, you know, ideologically speaking, how similar and different were they?

DT: Well, their backgrounds were different. Jack Burns was an army brat, [born] on the Mainland, came here, but grew up in Hawai'i, in Kalihi. Frank Fasi grew up in Connecticut. They had chips on their shoulders, both of them, but one was a Hartford, Connecticut chip, and Jack Burns' was a Kalihi chip, you see. So never the twain shall meet. Jack Burns was, on the surface, left[ist] because of (his) association with the ILWU. Ultimately, if you follow his career, he (was really very conservative and) became much more conservative. Frank Fasi was a semi-Republican, back even in the early [19]50s, except for one thing. He was a devoted fighter for the underdog. He was a New Deal Democrat. He'd lived through the [Great] Depression in Hartford, Connecticut. His father had been an ice man. Frank had to
sell used books to get himself into college and through college. So, Frank was always this New Deal Democrat. But at the same time, there was all of his [U.S.] Marine Corps experience, and all of the Communist flack at the time. (Thus), he was very conservative against Jack Burns who was meeting with (and supported by), the ILWU people. (Burns) never would turn his back on them. But certainly, I don’t think anybody, even a Frank Fasi, would accuse Jack Burns of being a Communist. (Yet the) newspapers and (others), as people misspok[e] in the heat of the moment, would accuse Jack of being, not a Communist or not a red, but a common expression of that day, (a) “pinko,” easy on communism, or pink associates or “he won’t turn his back on them.”

So there were these differences, but even when all that is said and done, there was (also a) difference in age. So here was Gill and Fasi, not being at the heels of Jack Burns who was much more of a scheming, ambitious politician than any of us realized. Certainly much more than I realized in the early [19]50s as I talked with him, Jack (could) be very deceptive. He was kindly, he was not a great organizer, but he was an assimilator. He’d always sort of be in the corner (of a room from which) he’d step in to try to settle disputes. Jack Burns’ tenacity was later proven. So you know that he was, in his own way, just as ambitious as a Frank Fasi. But it came out different. (Perhaps it was) an age differential, plus the different types of “chips” (on shoulders), which I’ve already tried to describe.

WN: Was there room for a third party in those days? Was there any talk of a possibility?

DT: Yes. But it didn’t really surface until, as we approached statehood. Then we came into a Commonwealth party which had a person like, what’s his name? Greenstein, Hy [Hyman M.] Greenstein, who surfaced as a Commonwealther, Helene Hale from the Big Island (was also) a Commonwealther. They were Frank Fasi-type Democrats. They’d probably both object to (this), but this illustrates (it). Hy Greenstein supplied the office, the campaign headquarters for Frank Fasi in ’54. Yet, he comes out as a Commonwealther in whatever it was—’56 or ’58, (and) probably in ’59.

WN: But was the Democratic party able to accommodate all three, you think?

DT: They did a pretty good job. The Democrats did an awfully good job of accommodating all of these diverse points of view. But it finally became a bit of a liability to Frank Fasi, as he (saw) it, so he finally (much later) makes the jump to the Republican party, fairly late in his career, whereas the thought had crossed his mind after ’54 because of the many things which had been said against him. The Republican party (then), they had Neal Blaisdell and Hiram Fong in those days, and that’s about all. Hiram Fong became prominent and stayed prominent even longer than Neal Blaisdell. But those were about the only two, so there was (early) room in the Republican party for Frank. (However), Frank could not bring himself to making that break until fairly late in his career.

MK: You know, you mentioned earlier that Frank Fasi was for the underdog. I know that a lot of people say that, well, he has sort of milked his image as being someone for the underdog. In those days, how sincere was Frank Fasi as being a fighter for the underdog, in your estimation. Is it. . . .

DT: You can’t tell. You can’t tell. I can’t ever tell. I don’t think about your motives or my motives. I’m not even sure that I know my motives. You may know more about my motives
than I do, but I don't think you'll ever know them for certain. So there's always a contradiction with Frank Fasi. Even as he was fighting for the underdog, even as he was plugging New Deal programs, trying to get them applied to Hawai'i, was like a Bill Nobriga, dressed to the hilt. Finest suits that you could find. Ties, flashy cameras, European cameras, (a) Leica. He had one stolen once down at Kewalo Inn when he parked in the alley there. What was he driving in 1952, '53, '54? A beautiful black Cadillac. And you couldn't help but feel this aura of this successful politician coming along. He lived very frugally, but he had to have these flashy accoutrements. And somehow, that didn't quite tie in. But then you stop to realize that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, sitting up at Hyde Park with all of the luxuries of the Roosevelt family, was still the big fighter for the underdog. Or, take the Kennedys. So, maybe Frank wasn't that contradictory after all, (do) you (understand the contradictions).

MK: You know, some people have said that Fasi is a man for Fasi more than he's Fasi for the little people. What's your . . .

DT: Find me a politician that isn't for himself. It just matters how much you hide it, how much it's subverted. Once again, I guess, I have to come back and say well, do those people (or anyone) really know Frank Fasi's true motives? Aren't they trying to set themselves up as something of a god to judge a Frank Fasi? To this day, I can't judge how much is a corny politician, how much is a wild person who does things thoughtlessly. How much is that Frank Fasi or how much is he really out to help people? How much does he believe Joyce's [i.e., Joyce Fasi, Frank Fasi's wife] more conservative, fundamental religion these days? I can't judge that. I give them all, (politicians), the benefit of the doubt right down to the last wire, shall we say.

And even then, we've had some politicians who have spent time in jail. We had a mayor of Kaua'i who was actually serving as mayor in jail. I have a tape of him the day after he finally got defeated. If you listen to that tape, well, this guy was just ("all caring"), I mean, he had the best of all motives. And somehow, his troubles with the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] sort of faded away. I wish maybe I could answer your question, but I just know that Frank Fasi is a beautiful study in contradictions. But by the same token, so was Jack Burns. So was Johnny Wilson. Johnny Wilson, he didn't give scratch for his own wife. They had a public fiasco, (argument), about an alto and soprano. Doing what? (It also) centered on the Royal Hawaiian Band. Johnny Wilson fought this longtime battle with [Ingram M.] Stainback over where the puka [i.e., tunnel] would go through the Pali. (Motive?) I better rest my case and let you ask the next question.

(Laughter)

MK: You have one?

WN: Was there polling done in the '54 election?

DT: Yes. Not by yours truly, however. The polling (firm) which was set up in about 1947, '48, you'll find it in the newspapers. His name slips me at the moment, (Bob Craig). I can tell you who his wife (is). His wife was (re)married to (Peter) McLachlan, who (is) a grandfather (chuckles) of (the local) sportscaster on Channel 2 now [Bob Hogue]. At any rate, there was polling. It was published in the newspaper. It was fairly primitive and not very accurate, but it was done primarily for Republicans, and he was still doing polling for Hiram Fong into the
early [19]60s.

MK: Okay.

WN: Why don't we stop it here.

MK: Shall we end here, then?

WN: Yeah.

MK: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: The following is an interview with Daniel Tuttle, Jr. This is session number three, it starts with [video]tape number twelve. It took place on November 29, 1990. The interviewers were Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto and Warren Nishimoto. The interview took place at the HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association] office. Videotape number twelve.

MK: [This is] an interview with Mr. Daniel W. Tuttle on November 29, third session, tape number twelve. And I guess we can continue our interview by talking about polling. At that time, you mentioned some names. I think we’re going to carry on with that.

DT: Yes, I’ve forgotten, Michiko. At the last session we came to a point where we were incidentally talking about polls, I believe, and I mentioned that certainly I was not the pioneer of polling in Hawai‘i, but rather that a gentleman by the name of Bob [Robert S.] Craig and a partner, whose name was Bergman, I believe—I’ve forgotten the first name—really, to the best of my knowledge, pioneered polling in Hawai‘i. These were published from time to time in the newspapers. They weren’t all that accurate, quite frankly. At that time and to this day, I don’t quite approve of their type of polling, but they were in there. They were pioneering it. Their firm, I believe, if you trace it to the present time, would be the SMS polling firm (of) today in Hawai‘i. It was really the “Craig firm,” (but they had a corporate name, I believe). [Robert S. Craig Associates.] They’ve gone through several different ownerships and metamorphoses, so my apologies for not being able to remember (their names) the last time.

MK: And when you were talking about polling in those days, what was the general methodology used, locally?

DT: The methodologies that they used was really a form of area polling based upon census tracts. That will take you random samples out of census tracts and getting your sample that way. It was a form of area probability polling. That was the popular thing then. It later was replaced, in terms of popular polls, by the so-called telephone poll today, which is really a complete, supposedly random, type of operation. Our type of polling, as we may get to later, was a quite different type. And to this day, I feel it was much more suitable to the Hawai‘i scene, or to any scene for that matter, but it was (a special type) of an adaptation to be used (in) the Hawai‘i situation.

MK: And you were saying that polling in those days were not that accurate. Like how far off were
they? Would they totally name the wrong person or be off by large percentage points?

DT: Sometimes they were. The political (aspect of a poll) was seldom published back in the late [19]40s and early [19]50s, as I recall. They published mostly economic polls, so that you had no validating situation. In validating situations, they were doing this for candidates behind the scenes, and mostly for Republican candidates because the Republicans were the only ones who could afford it. They were known to—well, by direct statement to me later, I found this out later, they would be very accommodating to their clients. In other words, they would give their client information (that) they wanted. They made adjustments regardless of what they found in the field. It, to my way of thinking at that time and today, was rather unethical.

MK: And you were saying that mostly Republicans used the polling so Republicans polled their strengths against other Republicans, primarily?

DT: The Republicans would hire people, (Republicans) like Hiram [L.] Fong or Ben [Benjamin F.] Dillingham [II]. I know that these two Republicans utilized Bob Craig's services. They could afford it. Obviously, the Democrats back in the [19]50s could not. I remember on one occasion I turned down a goodly number of political jobs from Ben Dillingham. This was back '58, '59 period, to jump ahead in time a little bit. He was in the hospital for something so I had to go down to Queen's Hospital to meet with him. And much to my surprise, there was Bob Craig. We had a chat, and we remained friends, but I didn't (ever) work for Ben Dillingham.

MK: I guess we can, you know, move on to the 1954 Fasi campaign and your involvement.

DT: I was trying to read my notes here just a little bit before we started this discussion and it made me feel tired all over again. I don't think I've ever gone through a period of time where I was any tireder or worked any harder and became so tired as I did during the summer and fall of 1954. I became very heavily involved. I think I mentioned (earlier) the (informal) agreement that I had with Frank Fasi. "You need somebody around whom you can trust who doesn't want anything." So, I worked for Fasi without a penny changing hands. He may have bought me a few lunches and dinners, but I paid for him some of the time, myself. (It was) just a matter of courtesy. So it was in that way that I went into his campaign. I literally became campaign manager for Frank, without portfolio. He would never admit that I was his campaign manager. Frank didn't like to make such acquaintance(s). All of this (happened) while I had not only my twelve hours of regular teaching at the University [of Hawaiʻi], but (also) had a night extension course. (Extra work at UH) help(ed) balance the budget in those days. Then, one of our professors had to go to the Mainland, and I took over his class for a period of time. (Thus), I was teaching eighteen hours and sometimes even twenty-one hours and trying to manage Frank's campaign. Well, there were periods; I (remember) one period (when) I went for seventy-two hours without taking my clothes off. I couldn't do that today. (Chuckles)

You say, well, what about your poor students at the university? I don't think I ever missed a class. However, I assigned a lot of field projects to them. My political parties class, I remember, I assigned them—they picked their candidates, Republicans and Democrats, including one (I mentioned) who had Blaisdell. They worked in that campaign as volunteer(s), and they did not turn in their papers until after the election was over. I didn't discuss what Fasi was doing. (It) wouldn't have been nice to do that—and they didn't discuss their
campaigns. We talked about other things; in other words, about Mainland campaigns and techniques and that sort of thing. In addition, I had students in the big Government 150 classes, at the time, doing precinct reports so that there must be a hundred or more precinct reports from students covering what the Democrats were doing in the precinct meetings leading up to the elections of '54. All of which I think (was) very interesting and thank goodness, to the best of my knowledge, they survived. At least I turned (these reports) over to the UH library and hopefully (they) will someday (be) processed and kept. Of course, there (was some) duplication. Sometimes there’d be two or three students writing a report on a given precinct (or candidate). They didn’t submit their work until after the election.

But as for the (mayoral) campaign itself, we started out about the middle of August—about the fifteenth of August—to really get serious. Frank was given his headquarters by Hy Greenstein, an attorney at the time, who always wore a green tie and dressed in a white suit. He gave Frank the lower showroom of what used to have been Schuman Carriage [Company]. It was very conveniently located to Washington Place so that that campaign headquarters (voices), when Frank would do talkathons and put up public address systems, carried over loud and clear to Samuel Wilder King, a Republican who was then governor of Hawai‘i. So, we started August 15, and this continued on down to the general election day because Frank was able to win the primary. Remember he (ran) in '52 and lost in the primary. This time it was a rerun with Johnny Wilson (and he won the primary).

This is where I really gained a lot of my political experience so far as Hawai‘i is concerned, it (was) also a very interesting public administration “test” because if you are an administrator in a political campaign, you can’t hire or fire anybody. (Any)body you fire, they (can) walk across the street (to the opposition) and do you great damage. It’s really a question of mobilizing people and keeping people cheered up and. . . . (There was a) fellow by the name of Smitty. I finally remembered his name, (John B.) Smith, I think it was, worked for (the) Honolulu Paper Company, and he served as sort of a shop manager for (Fasi) headquarters. He could cheer anybody up at any time of day or night. There were times when he wanted to take leave from his job at Honolulu Paper—to show you the climate of the times—to work on Fasi’s campaign. Honolulu Paper said, “We’re not going to let you do that. If you work for Fasi, you’re fired.” Well, it’s to Fasi’s credit—once he did become mayor years later—he did find, at least for a period of two to three years, a job for Smitty, who was married to a Hawaiian gal. They had a family and they had a real struggle just to make ends meet and to make a living. This fellow was a real campaign hero (to me) because he had such a nice touch with his fellow human beings.

MK: And in those days, who were the main campaign people who worked with you?

DT: Frank didn’t have very many. He had me as sort of a general campaign manager, and he had (a few) powerful friends in the community. A person such as Dave [David A.] Benz who had been the warhorse in the Democratic party. He wasn’t so old, but he’d been around for quite a while and preceded Fasi into local politics. (Also), a fellow who hailed originally, I think, from the Big Island, a fellow by the name of Foreman Thompson, who helped on PR. He was not a member, however, of the Vance Fawcett public relations agency [Fawcett-McDermott Associates, Inc.] (so far as I know). And Fasi brought Vance Fawcett in (as a paid PR person). Vance Fawcett had just opened his public relations office, and I think Frank was one of his first clients here. Mrs. [Suzanne F.] Fawcett even helped out to answer telephones and that sort of thing in the Fasi headquarters.
Another fellow who probably had greater depth in the community—his family were all Republicans—was Bob [Robert M.] Rothwell, who had a lot of ability. He was a lawyer. His father, (Guy Nelson Rothwell), had been (a well known architect and) sailor around town.

Bob Rothwell, in particular, helped me to keep this volatile, talented, young Frank Fasi under some semblance of control. At one point, Bob Rothwell even went to Neal Blaisdell—this was in the general campaign—and said, “All of these rumors that are running around town about Frank Fasi, if you can prove them to me, I’ll quit and I’ll come and campaign for you, and I’ll actually denounce Frank. I’ll (even) go on the radio and say that he is an agent of Henry Kaiser and his campaign (is) being financed by Henry [J.] Kaiser (if this is true).” It so happened, you see, just that one rumor stemmed from the fact that Vance Fawcett on the Mainland—he came here from Willow Run, Michigan, I believe it was, where they’d been manufacturing Kaiser automobiles—had handled public relations for Kaiser automobiles—had handled public relations for Kaiser automobiles.

(Remember), Henry Kaiser had moved into Hawai‘i about the same time. The (company) wanted to get rid of him out of the automobile factory (because) he was “over the hill.” (This) was (when) Henry Kaiser (was just) beginning his Hawaiian adventures; Vance Fawcett handling what little PR he had initially here. And, here was Vance Fawcett working for Fasi. Well, per se, there you have a basis for a rumor. (However), to the best of my knowledge, I don’t think Henry Kaiser ever contributed a dime to the Fasi campaign. If he did, I don’t know about it.

MK: You know, obviously if you’re going to hire a PR firm, you need money. In those days, how did Frank Fasi finance his campaign?

DT: He paid Vance Fawcett, (I believe), usually 10 percent for any buying of TV, radio, or newspaper space. Other than that, I don’t think there was any retainer involved. Frank raised his money. I think the total campaign cost—primary and general—cost somewhere between $50[,000] and $60,000, of which Fasi ended up the campaign with a $30[,000] or $35,000 debt which didn’t make him particularly happy. (However), Frank (had) made a small fortune, before he ran for office, in the house-moving, surplus-property business, so he could afford to pay out the $30[,000] to $35,000 himself. It was sort of nice to have a (Democratic) candidate at that time who, if something was needed in a campaign, e.g., an extra half hour of TV, which you could buy in those days, or a new newspaper ad, (who could afford them). Frank might pause for a minute but say, “Oh, go ahead. Spend it. We spent this much, we might as well go ahead.” (As a result), Frank used the media, (multi-media), more than any individual candidate, I think, had ever used the media (in Hawai‘i). An exception might be) all of the sort of influential publicity that somebody like [Joseph R.] Farrington received because he owned the newspaper.

MK: The money that he had contributed to him [Fasi] came from what sources?

DT: Well, calabashes, from coffee hours, from people who would—after a speech—would get thrilled by this dapper, young Fasi, and they would hand him a few bills. Twenty-dollar bills, ten-dollar bills. I took quite a few of the contributions (at) the rear door of the old Schuman Carriage [Company, Ltd.].—the headquarters—(from) people who did not want to be seen supporting this “radical, unknown quantity,” you might say, in Hawaiian politics. And, these were all types of people. A lot of former police officers (and firemen). There was one, he was a disgruntled (fireman) from the time out of the Wilson administration. His wife came down, volunteered a lot of her time. He would go out and put up signs on telephone poles. At that time, you could still do that sort of thing.
MK: And at that time . . .

DT: This way---he managed to raise $20,000 to $30,000 this way. Small contributions. I don’t think he received anything more than a thousand dollars. [David A.] Benz, of course, could afford to give him discounted services, but Foreman gave him some money. Foreman Thompson was fairly well established as a PR person. At that time, Frank was in his early thirties, keep in mind, and Dave Benz was probably in his late thirties or early forties. Dave Benz, of course, is still with us to this day, retired. I should add that Benz, at that time, was sort of the chief honcho for Tongg Publishing [Company, Inc.]. So you see, Benz was well connected.

I think the thing that I remember a lot, in addition to the dynamics of the campaign, which you may want to get into, (is that) my interest sort of centered upon what can we do to get this man elected. Technically, how can we set up his campaign. Even though we ultimately lost that general election, biased as I am, I think it (was) technically one of the finest campaigns that’s ever been conducted in Hawai‘i, quite frankly, in terms of using and doing new things. For example, we did a lot of general direct mailing. Frank made heavy use of radio, including the talkathon which he had pioneered out here in 1952 when I was (on the Mainland). In addition to that, he supplemented it with television for a couple hours during that twenty-four-hour period when he was on the air (radio). This was a simulcast of a political campaign. He did (TV) voice-over, three-minute bits. We found a volunteer who could use his movie camera. Frank was wealthy enough (so that) he had a movie camera—16mm movie camera. We would send this fellow, who was a typewriter repairman, (out to take pictures), I can’t remember his name. He would go out and take pictures of traffic pileups and all (of) that sort of thing. He would bring those to the TV studios, they would process them with the rest of their film. They would throw it on the air, and Frank—by this time, (he) was well enough acquainted with television—would run the 16 mm film and he would narrate this, voice-over, on the air. This was done just prior to the six o’clock news. (It) was tremendously effective. He’d just sit on the edge of the table and look at the monitor and narrate the stuff. It was a pleasure to have a candidate who was that knowledgeable (and versatile).

We did shopping center polls, and we tried to publish the results. That became a fiasco because we didn’t have enough campaigners to get results. I finally talked Foreman Thompson out of doing this because we were misleading people, or in great danger of misleading people. We didn’t, (however), insist that it was accurate. We simply called it a shopping center poll. All that it told people was this is how people reacted to a given issue at Foodland or Times. There weren’t (as) many shopping centers as today. Even then, we didn’t have much—Frank never really had much of a campaign organization. To this day, he doesn’t have much of a campaign organization except (now) the people who are on the payroll in city hall. He can get them to turn out because their jobs are on the line. You take that away from Fasi, (and there is) not (that) much there.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is videotape number thirteen, continuation of Dan Tuttle interview session number three.

MK: Tape number thirteen with Dan Tuttle. We were talking about the Fasi campaign and the
various methods used to get support and your last statement dealt with his supporters, so we can continue from there.

DT: Well, he didn’t have (many campaigners) in the field, as I said. (He did have) the people who were around headquarters and worked in headquarters. It (might) amount to maybe as many as fifty or seventy-five at peak times.

(Going) ahead with some of these techniques, which makes me still consider it to be a technically very fine campaign, we tried to bring in as many volunteers as we could, let them use their home telephones to make telephone calls on behalf of Frank during the campaign and to get out the vote (on) both primary and general election days, by giving them a script and having them call people. (We would) give them pages out of the telephone book—to make these telephone calls (and have them) say, “This is Fasi headquarters calling. Please remember to vote. Saturday is primary day. Next Tuesday is general election day.” And we were able to buy from the Hawaiian Telephone Company, these street directory telephone books so we could know which precincts we were making these calls in. We also knew which were Frank’s strong precincts and weak precincts from ’52, and particularly the primary in ’54. We could (make) these get-out-the-vote calls to his strong precincts. Forget the ones where he’s weak. Let (the weak ones) forget (to) vote, that’s fine with us.

We also started using coffee hours (which I mentioned earlier). The credit for the Hawai‘i coffee hours, which persist to this day, really goes to Dr. Walter Johnson who was visiting here from the University of Chicago. He had been a member of the original draft Stevenson campaign in the city of Chicago. He told how effective the coffee hours were there. So Frank started holding coffee hours. He’d travel all over the island. Of course, we had a few technical problems. The office manager, when we first started out, would schedule him for ‘Ewa Beach and half an hour later he was supposed to be out in Kuli‘ou‘ou. We didn’t have any freeways in those days. The freeway was just barely starting, so Frank would arrive an hour or an hour and a half late and that caused him some problems. Walter Johnson also (went with me) to visit (other) O‘ahu campaign committees. He talked about coffee hours and various other campaign (techniques) not only to Frank but to the other Democrats. Well, the other Democrats, a few of them started holding coffee hours—that’s about all that they did, because the other candidates, most of them, were really afraid of television. (TV) was a new medium, it arrived in Hawai‘i in ’53, here it was ’54. Frank had the resources and the (courage), if you want to put it that way, to just (go) on and just start talking in front of the camera. Frank’s first telecast was terrible, (as I mentioned). (However), he improved, and he would make full use of television and these other techniques (in ’54 which) the others did not. The radio talkathon, I’ve already mentioned, and the simulcast, which was used for the first time (were other techniques).

Walter Johnson also mentioned, and we were able to implement, the use of robot typewriters. Now this, in 1990, sounds a little bit strange but if you’re doing mass mailings, (in 1954) you used a series of robot typewriters—(an) IBM electric gang—sort of like (series of typewriters). These were all connected together and so you had a little machine which was like a player-piano roll, and you’d put that player-piano roll on and it would type the letter. All you’d have to do was go to the three or four typewriters that you had ganged together and type in the name and address and then the letter would be (typed). Well, we did a lot of this so we were able to personalize these. Frank Fasi signed them, personally, himself. To the best of my knowledge, nobody else (did this). We were able, through the local IBM office, to
do this.

We did some specialized mailings. In other words, we had access—as everybody did—to a list of women voters in various precincts. We'd send out special letters addressed to women. We did not, I hasten to add, send out special mailings to persons of Japanese extraction or any other type of specialized mailing, but we did do it for women because we felt that Frank had problems with women voters. We knew it, except Frank didn't (recognize) it. He was a dapper young man. He could never visualize why the women didn't vote for him, 80 or 90 percent (of them). The women were always holding back, and they were particularly susceptible to all the rumors, some of which revolved around Frank's personal life.

I should also mention that another thing we did was a first trial run, in public, of our election night crew projecting election returns. We did that in the primary, and no one would believe us because we said Frank was going to win. Sandy [Sanford] Zalburg was standing in the corner. Sandy, I think, is probably the only person who remembers this. He kept coming up and saying, "But Frank's not ahead. You say he's going to win?"

"Yeah, yeah, yeah."

Well, what we had, we had some old adding machines, and I had a map. Where I found the time to do this, I do not know. We had the record, Republican and Democratic as well as any personal figures, all charted on every precinct for O'ahu. We started projecting these returns. And, I better give some credits here. Don Bell, now deceased, who was in the economics department at the university, George [A.L.] Yuen who was later public health director and long-time head of the Board of Water Supply, (and) an accountant and later (a) judge, Dick Yin Wong. These were the people who helped me project returns in Fasi's headquarters. We knew, for example, by about nine or ten o'clock in the evening that Frank had lost the general election. And I remember kneeling down (in) the old Schuman Carriage [Company, Ltd.] building, kneeling at Frank's knees and saying, "You might as well concede, it's all up."

"No, no, no. That's what you think. Okay, you're probably right but let's let him sweat a little. He (Blaisdell) doesn't know it." Frank did not concede until (about) three or four o'clock in the morning. (However), we knew it, and we knew (the projection system) would work. We were able, (then), when the call came, by coincidence—we'll talk about this later—to go on the air on the radio in '58. We were fairly confident that we wouldn't be misleading anybody. Thank goodness all the years we did this (some thirty years), I don't believe we ever really misled anybody, and I'm very grateful for that because it (could have) happen(ed), as some of our recent (Mainland) incidents indicate.

The bottom line, I suppose, in politics and any campaign is, do you win or do you lose? Although Frank defeated Wilson in the primary, (it was) thanks to one big precinct in Kailua. Kailua was all one precinct. Wilson (had) made a disparaging remark about the people of Kailua because the Wilson Tunnel was in the process of being built. It had caved in, three or four people [workers] lost their lives, and of course, Frank was not above saying this was all Wilson's fault that these people got killed. Well obviously, it wasn't quite true. Wilson made some remark about Frank (who) happened to be living in Kailua at the time and so (this made it worse). Wilson made—I forgot exactly what the remark was—but you can read about it in the morgue at the newspaper. At any rate, Frank won his first (major) election, really, in the
primary of '54, but he lost in the general to Blaisdell. Most of the Wilson people in the Democratic party backed Neal Blaisdell. Therein lies another story, and you may have some questions about that. I should mention one thing, for example, that among the many things we did . . .

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

DT: Foreman Thompson was able to produce a four-page pamphlet which was the size of *Life* magazine. And one of *Life*’s features, at that time—you can check it in the library—was to have a man of the week. So who was man of the week (in this brochure)? Even down to the page numbers, we had this (replica). This was all worked out. Frank was there, there are copies of it, (I trust), in the UH library. We had all of these to mail to every voter, and you folded them in half and so you had sort of a half-sized (large) envelope. This was (to be) bulk mailing, so we checked with the post office department. They said, “Well, in order for this to reach people by Monday before the election, you’re going to have to get these in the mail by Tuesday or Wednesday.” We had about half of them done. This was done out in Frank’s shop out in Kalihi. (It) was a highly secret thing, of course. You don’t want anybody to know about this. So, these were all arranged. People were stuffing the envelopes (there). About one o’clock in the morning, I discovered that people were sealing these, (but) it was (to be) bulk mail. At that time, you could not seal (bulk mail. Thus), we had to unseal half of whatever it was—80,000—of these things. As it turns out, we worked throughout the night, things got in the mail as scheduled, and people started receiving these on Thursday, Friday.

This gave the Blaisdell people opportunity to hit back. And, they did a beautiful job of hitting back. You can check in the newspapers how they did hit back. We used a picture of Jennie Wilson with Frank Fasi. There was a picture of Mits [Mitsuyuki] Kido with Frank Fasi, and Kido was not particularly supporting Frank. We did not bother, and we probably should have, to get people to sign releases on these. But at any rate, the Blaisdell forces hit back with a big statement in the newspapers—who were happy to print that sort of thing—(about) Jennie Wilson saying Frank Fasi tricked her into this. They had hit back beautifully, and Mits Kido said, “I didn’t authorize (use of) my picture either.” Of course this looked exactly like *Life* magazine. They said, “What’s more, it’s not (from) *Life*. Check with your next *Life* magazine, it’s not going to be in there. This is trickery. This is the treacherous Frank Fasi.” And of course, all the rumors that surrounded Frank, all of these other things flashed into people’s minds.

In any event, it ended up as a fairly close election. I think it was about 2300 votes separating them. Something like 51, 51.5 percent for Blaisdell. Incidentally, Blaisdell was afraid, really, to use television. When he did use television it was very poor. Maybe not quite as poor as Hiram Fong’s first telecast, but it was pretty poor. He’d been a former coach, but for some reason or another, Frank could never get Neal Blaisdell angry at him. This probably might have helped Frank if he could have actually gotten Neal Blaisdell to lose his temper, because Neal was inclined to do that. Fred Hemmings, in the recent election, demonstrated some of these same volatile characteristics that Neal Blaisdell had.

MK: So you were saying [during the break] that the ILWU supported . . .

DT: Wilson.
MK: ... Wilson [in the 1954 mayoral primary election]. And when it came to Fasi against Blaisdell, the ILWU supported Blaisdell ... 

DT: That's right.

MK: ... rather than supporting Fasi.

DT: They supported Blaisdell just like they did later to (Frank) in the '59 [U.S.] Senate race (when they supported [Republican Hiram L.] Fong for the U.S. Senate). The ILWU had been consistently supporting Democrats, of course, but here they were supporting a Republican, Blaisdell. When the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin did get around to printing this on election day—the first edition was out about one o'clock in the afternoon—people around headquarters, we started getting these out to the various precincts, particularly, the strong Fasi precincts. (We) had people hold them up because people were voting at parks and various other places. We couldn't get enough newspapers to get out to all the precincts because we had to get people to go around and pick them up off the streets, in boxes on the street. The [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin would not sell us any of their extra newspapers (at the plant). If we could've picked up a couple of hundred, you see, down at the printing plant, which was only a couple of blocks away, we'd have been in good shape. (However), we had to pick them up off the street.

After we got them out there, it was a good try, but people didn't really believe it. They said this must be a faked headline by Frank and, you see, there was some reason to believe this because of that Life magazine story which had obviously been "faked." So this didn't help Fasi in the final analysis at all. There were several (such efforts) that went awry. For example, the lack of ILWU support (didn't help).

WN: You talked about crossover. Why don't you talk about that a little bit.

DT: Frank had actually, in the campaign, encouraged (all) people to vote for Fasi. And, we encouraged anybody—Republican, Democrat, or independent—to vote (for him). At that time, we had a semi-open primary. The ballot was divided into, I think, three parts in the primary. You could vote—you had to vote party on one ballot—the same party—but on the other ballot, for example, territorial level, you would vote (another) way. You could switch over. A Republican could vote in the Democratic primary for mayor and maybe council, and then switch back (to Republican) on the third ballot. We actually published a pamphlet, which again is at the UH library, telling people how they could vote, (telling) Republicans how they could vote in, say, the territorial (primary) and (then) come over—cross over, if you will—to the Democratic primary at the county level and vote) for Fasi. Now, it wasn't really a crossover, (but) it was a semi-open primary (and complicated).

Well, I guess the bottom line is and what you're asking is, did the Republicans en masse do this? The answer is probably no, but a significant number of them did "cross over" and they (went) back to (voting Republican in the general). Now, what I'm saying again, to repeat, is that a lot of Republicans—I (may have) phrased it wrong—probably did do over and vote for Fasi in the primary. A large proportion of them stuck with Frank in the general. (However), enough of them went back, you see, to the Republican party (to hurt Fasi in the general). Now, I think this will make sense if you look at Fasi's entire career. He had enough support from Republicans—from even the 1952 election plus '54—to (encourage) him to (become a
Republican), something which he had (seriously) considered (doing) after '54. So that today you have Fasi as mayor. (It) seems incredible that he's still there—and he's there not as a Democrat but as a Republican. (Did) that old "crossover" lead to (this)? I don't know, you figure it out.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number fourteen, session number three.

MK: Tape number fourteen with Dan Tuttle. And I think in the last tape we had talked about Frank Fasi and the ILWU. And I was wondering, given the fact that during that campaign and previous to that, the ILWU was attacking Fasi, Fasi was attacking the ILWU, did he really think the ILWU would support him against Neal Blaisdell?

DT: He was very hopeful, and I think really thought that they might. (They didn't fully back Wilson.) Frank was a very brash young politician, not very experienced as he is today. He has quite an ego, then and today, and he thought that he (had) finally convinced these people that at heart he was basically a union person. Even though he disagreed with them about their stand on communism, (he hoped that) they would see the "light" and (that) they would come to their hero, Frank Fasi, who had in many ways tried to model himself after FDR who of course, was a rich, debonair politician, very glib of tongue, as was Fasi. Fasi really believed (he was a) union person, (and that) they (should) support him.

What's more, he spent an awful lot of time in the old Kewalo Inn. The shop of Mary Noonan. This was a restaurant where Ward Warehouse is today. Joe Itagaki and Mary Noonan (were owners). He [Fasi] spent a lot of time there with Bob [Robert E.] McElrath who had been preaching (the) ILWU approach to politics, which was not Fasi's approach. Fasi had, himself, fifteen minutes of (radio) time, just like Bob McElrath. (There was also) a third (radio) force (which) involved, the old *Imua*, right-wing Republican organization, going on all of the time. Even though they were tearing one another apart (over) the air, like "pros" that they figured they both were, Fasi would meet with Bob McElrath at Mary Noonan's place. Sit there and McElrath would have a few drinks. Fasi, who never drank much, would have a little bit of wine or ginger ale or whatnot, and they would go on hour after hour after hour. Frank always felt that he was convincing McElrath of his virtues. Quite frankly, what was happening, Frank was letting McElrath know about half (or more) of his (political) secrets. Frank, in those days, did not know when to open his mouth and when not to, and he still doesn't. (However), I think he really thought that they would not do this horrible thing of going over and support (Blaisdell or later Fong). (However), he became aware of it in the last couple of weeks before the general election campaign. He began telling people, "This is what they're doing to me. The ILWU is really supporting Blaisdell." That's why it was important for the newspapers to publish this, but they wouldn't and didn't until election day itself.

But if you want to go ahead to the '59 campaign against Hiram Fong [for the U.S. Senate],
Frank, I think, was really (very) disappointed that he did not get ILWU support over Hiram Fong. It went to Hiram Fong, mainly because of reasons I'll give you when we get to that point. I'll just mention one of them. He'd played an awful lot of poker in the legislature with the senators, many of whom had ILWU backing and the ILWU boys would sit in on these poker games. (He thought they'd support him over Fong.)

Frank, once he got elected to something, I saw much less of him, even before we came to a parting of the ways. This was in the period between the election of '58, the session of '59, and his subsequent decision to run for the [U.S.] Senate (which) end(ed) up (having him) face Hiram Fong in the general election.

MK: Before we get into that period, you know, earlier you mentioned that Fasi had some strong precincts. Kailua would be one where he lived. Where else did he have his strength?

DT: Kalihi, where his business was located. Even before, I think, he ran for mayor, he'd been president of the Kalihi Businessman's Association. He had (considerable) strengths in Kalihi. He also, for reasons I guess you can understand, the people who felt really downtrodden—persons of Hawaiian and Filipino extraction but particularly Filipino. This was apart from ILWU camps. He had strength (with these two groups) because they liked a fighter. He (was) for "the underdog." Frank still carries on this (verbal) characteristic. He's always fighting for people that need his help. He is the big savior. So, okay, you asked about precincts, Nānākulī area and Waimānalo area and the area leading up to Punchbowl, (Papakōlea). These were heavy—at that time at any rate—heavy pockets of Hawaiian extraction. Plus, as I said, (many) Filipinos.

WN: Talking about Hawaiian pockets or Hawaiian areas of support, you know, Mayor Wilson was a very popular part-Hawaiian candidate, Neal Blaisdell was very popular. Here's Frank Fasi, a Haole, running against two very popular part-Hawaiians. What was the strategy there?

DT: Well, when he ran against Wilson, I don't think that he got his heavy support (from Hawaiian areas) in that particular election. Most of what I've been saying has been post-Johnny Wilson (commentary). Johnny Wilson had his areas of strength. Interestingly enough, however, they were not so much located in Nānākulī area or Waimānalo area, although Wilson (did poll) strongly there. (You) see, this was Frank when he was a Democrat (running) against Wilson. Johnny Wilson's strong areas were Kuli‘ou‘ou, where Frank didn't (poll well). You can check the record. He did nothing against Wilson. I can remember going out there to coffee hours that Frank had in Kuli‘ou‘ou. (It was) one big precinct. Wilson held on to (Kuli‘ou‘ou and Kāne‘ohe) even in the face of Fasi's challenge. If a Johnny Wilson were to have ever opposed Fasi again, you can rest assured that most of (these) Hawaiian area(s) would have gone to Wilson. (However), Fasi would still have retained some of his strength in places like Nānākulī and Waimānalo.

MK: We were talking about primarily the Fasi campaign, but what was the campaign that Wilson ran against Fasi?

DT: Wilson really should not have run for office again. As he went around to party rallies (in) his own campaign, he was on oxygen all of the time in his limousine, except for when he'd mount the platform and make a real short speech, which most people were accustomed to (hearing). He didn't try to talk issues like the new, young Democrats, of which Fasi was one.
So Wilson would put in his perfunctory appearances and, then, go back to his oxygen tank in the limousine. Fasi could take no great pleasure in having defeated Johnny Wilson because Johnny Wilson really should have retired. If Fasi doesn’t watch out, he’s going to end up in some campaign in the future where he’s going to be in Johnny Wilson’s shoes. Hopefully (Frank will) have the good grace to get out (of politics) before that happens to him. Wilson was a very colorful figure and a very powerful figure. Aunt Jennie, of course, stood in very good stead when it came to campaigns.

Frank made some grave mistakes in the campaign that we couldn’t talk him out of. He should have made several tours through city hall. (However), he took the position, “I’m not going to do that. I don’t think it’s right. I don’t think (that) you should campaign, (even though) there’s no law against it.” But he says, “I think that sort of campaigning should be outlawed.” And so he never did it. He also suffered (several) “bad breaks.”

(I) could mention other things that happened in the dynamics of the campaign. Neal Blaisdell had circulated a mimeographed legal-sized sheet, a copy of which should (still) be in the UH library, which listed Blaisdell’s qualifications on one side (of the sheet and) the Fasi qualifications on the other. Well, among all of those things, it said Neal Blaisdell’s qualifications in the public service (included): (the) legislature, public health director, so forth; Frank Fasi: (a) “question mark.” Fasi gets up at one of the party rallies and says, “Look at this sheet that they’re distributing, this smear sheet. I suppose (that) I haven’t done anything for the public, (that) I have no public service. I’ll have you know I served for three years,” or whatever it was, “in the U.S. Marine Corps. And, you know it because much of that time was (spent) right here in Hawai’i.” Okay, the (reporter) from the [Honolulu] Advertiser went back and wrote a story. The headline writer served the interest of that day very well, and the cause of Neal Blaisdell. (It) said, “Fasi Terms Blaisdell War Slacker.”

Now, once again if you’ll read the newspapers carefully, the [Honolulu] Advertiser did publish their regrets (on one of) the back pages in a little small column. Might have been on the second page. (It might have) been on the front page, but it was very, very small. They published their regrets for this headline. Well, people were walking out of Fasi’s headquarters the next day. “We don’t want to work for a candidate who calls his opponent (a) ‘war slacker!’” Because, if you’ll remember—and some people will—Neal Blaisdell had not served in the armed forces of the United States. He couldn’t. He had a bad case of tuberculosis and spent his time in Lē‘ahi [Hospital] for a year or so. We spent at least two lunches with Frank, long lunches (and) we said, “Okay now the [Honolulu] Advertiser has apologized. Do not, do not mention that again!” (Yet), after two big arguments like this, Fasi goes on television the next night and holds up (the paper, and said), “You people have seen this smear sheet,” and he goes over the whole (episode) again. Talk about (political mistakes). I mean, this (sort of thing) drives you up the wall. (It gave the episode more publicity, even though the newspaper had misquoted Fasi.)

Frank even, during that campaign, wanted to bring his dog on television—live television, no taping. Richard Nixon had pulled his chestnuts out of the fire with a little dog, Checkers (TV speech in 1952). “No, Frank. You can’t do that!” (I insisted). Another thing, he wanted to make a parachute jump out in the pineapple fields someplace. “Hey, Frank, have you ever jumped out of an airplane with a parachute?”

“No. Don’t (you) think I can?”
“Yeah, we know you can Frank, but just don’t do that. You might end up in the hospital; you might break your leg.”

“So much the better!” (says Frank). “We’d put a radio-microphone (into the hospital), and I would campaign from my hospital bed!”

Well, we talked him out of that one, but when it came to this smear sheet story, he literally, the last ten days of the campaign spent his time defending himself. Well, okay, you don’t make visits in city hall, you spend the last two weeks defending yourself—and all you were doing (was) publicizing this because this mimeographed sheet had only gone to maybe 10,000 or 15,000 people, and there were a lot more voters than that. Frank still comes (close) in (the election), within 2400 votes. This is why it’s a campaign which ought to have been won. I still think it was technically a very fine campaign. But, once again, the bottom line (was), he lost.

MK: I’m wondering about your role in the campaign. You know, Fasi had his own ideas of what should be done and you, apparently, had ideas that were not always in agreement with his. How did you two work together? I mean, it just seems odd . . .

DT: We had some real (disagreements), but we didn’t actually come to a parting-of-the-ways until ’59, five years later.

MK: You mentioned that you would go over his scripts. Besides going over his scripts, did you do any writing for him?

DT: Occasionally, but he was a lot better if he would just talk from notes, really. In my own mind, I think I did, I remember, his kick-off dinner speeches, and they were not any particular success. So if I (ever) visualize(d) myself a great speech writer for a major candidate, it was mostly in my head, (I suppose). I don’t think it ever worked out that well, because I had my own style, and my style (was) not necessarily Frank Fasi(’s). Now, if you’re a good speech writer you will follow that person’s style, and I just could never quite do this.

WN: Was there any concerted attempt to try to get the Japanese American vote? I mean, I can imagine even back then it was a significant group.

DT: Oh, it was increasingly significant because of the McCarran Act and so forth. The older generation people were beginning to come on the rolls, and of course, this helped the young people, particularly AJA [Americans of Japanese Ancestry] extraction, get elected in ’54.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is videotape number fifteen, session three with Dan Tuttle.

MK: Tape number fifteen with Dan Tuttle. And we were just talking about Fasi’s campaign. And in your description of it, it seems as though you utilized a lot of media and high-tech for those days. And you also stated that in terms of supporters coming into the headquarters, there were just fifty, seventy-five, not a whole mass; not like what the Jack Burns people could corral for a weekend or anything. And so I’m wondering, how does Fasi’s campaign
compare with say, Cec [Cecil] Heftel’s, which was also something of that sort in later years?

DT: That was very shrewd of you to make such a comparison because I think there’s great validity to that. In other words, here would be an early edition of Heftel’s campaign, and here again, Heftel came close [in the 1986 race for governor] but he didn’t quite make it because he didn’t have (enough) foot soldier(s). In order to have foot soldiers, you’ve got to value people, you’ve got to value them over a period of years, you’ve got to feed them, entertain them, be a nice guy to them, never lose your temper with them. You do this campaign after campaign, such as a Jack Burns. Finally, it caught fire, and he was hardly able to lose after a certain point. But Frank has this uncanny ability; he never knows who his real friends are. He doesn’t know to this day, I’m (certain). As I’ll say later I’m sure, I’ve had little (or) no contact with Frank since 1959. Even to this day, I consider myself a friend of Frank Fasi. For all of his limitations, for all of his faults—I have my faults, too. (However), I still like Frank Fasi because I think he had a tremendous lot of potential in the political field. If he had played his cards right, if he had done a little bit less pushing and shoving, and was less ambitious and cared more about people, he could have been maybe not a Dan Inouye, but awfully close to it. Because I think Hawai‘i will accept a person who was willing to do that. You don’t have to be born here at all, as some people think you do. And, Frank’s still getting elected, believe it or not, as mayor but not as governor. He’ll never—I don’t think he’ll ever (be elected to anything other than) mayor. Frank, really very early, after lots of setbacks, he found his pot at the end of the rainbow, his dream of becoming mayor of [the City and County] Honolulu. And, he’s still there today. He holds the record for being (Honolulu) mayor for the longest period of time, exceeding Johnny Wilson, I think, by now. He’ll go down in history as that but it will not be part of history that he (was) a governor or (a) United States senator or anything of that sort.

MK: And you know I noticed in your campaign—Fasi’s campaign—you’ve got heavy use of media, things that became very commonplace later on. Did this set a precedent? Did other campaigns, soon after that, pick up on the use of the media?

DT: Oh, yes. Gradually, it came to a point where about four years later—I think I’ve still got it on tape in the university library—I moderated a series of forums from the ['Iolani] Palace—from one of the temporary offices on the (Diamond Head) side of the palace—of Democrats in the [territorial] house of representatives when Elmer Cravalho was Speaker. We did a weekly series. They would (invite four or five) members of the house (to) appear and talk about certain topics each week. Gradually, more of them started using media, even Jack Burns. So a little bit later, you find Jack Burns, in order to retain his position—after being scared to death by Tom Gill, com(ing) up with (the) “Catch a Wave” (campaign). He (had) the finest in television production for a film, the “Catch a Wave” film. In terms of politicians, Frank really pioneered this whole (media) business of hype (in Hawai‘i). I was (an early) part of it, and, as I look at it today, I feel that I don’t know whether to be proud of this or whether I should apologize, you know. Because this business of television, radio, advertising, and all of the (related) costs is sort of an albatross around the neck of good, I think, democratic politics. But then, I was only such a small player. Just give me (1) percent of the responsibility and leave the other 99 percent for the other people who have maybe done the same thing.

WN: Would it be a safe statement to say that the same people who supported and voted for Blaisdell in ’54 were the same people that carried the Democrats to victory that year? Is that a safe generalization?
DT: (Not entirely), there were a lot of Republicans in there who voted for Neal Blaisdell, and there were a lot more Republicans [in Hawai'i] in those days than there are today. They voted for him. But the Wilson people—Aunty Jennie [K. Wilson] I presume included—and so forth, most of the Democrats who won probably because they’d lost their erstwhile hero Johnny Wilson, voted for Neal Blaisdell. Where Fasi’s votes came from, you’re amazed that he got as many votes as he did. Where did they ever come from, you see. But there was attached to Fasi this underdog spirit, and he epitomized it.

WN: I’m wondering at what point did you foresee or know about the Democratic sweep in ’54? In other words, you know when it came to strategy, for example, was there an attempt to forge some kind of a Democratic unity kind of thing with Fasi and Burns and Inouye?

DT: Oh, yes. Unity was (often talked about). (However, this) cast of characters (was) constantly quarreling. Gill with Burns, Fasi with both Burns and Gill. The Heens were factors, (too). Yet, who was trying to say (that) you’ve got to unify—I think I’ve already mentioned this. You’ve got to have a sharp, crisp platform, you’ve got to discuss the issues. Robert Gray Dodge trying to drive this home every time that he could, except for Frank, who had to do his own thing, and he’s done his own thing ever since, whether I was around (him) or not. The rest of the Democrats coalesced. Probably the most beautiful representation of this (unity) was the time that they had been trying to stress the issues. They had been, (in 1954), trying to get the Republicans to debate the issues. The Democrats had (wanted) to debate (the issues) in ‘Aina Haina, and the Republicans had refused. (However), in the middle of this Democratic party rally at ‘Aina Haina [Elementary] School, Sam P. King, Hiram Fong, (and) I think Wilfred [C.] Tsukiyama, and [D.] Hebden Porteus, suddenly showed up. The (Republicans) really ganged up on the (Democrats). Dan Inouye got so angry at what Sam King said, that he threw away his few notes, scribbled down a few things, and then “took off.” (It was) probably the first time that a person of AJA extraction has ever “cussed off” a Haole Republican in public. Well, the newspapers and the Republicans denied that this ever happened the next day. (Said that) this was a minor sort of thing. The Democrats simply played the tape once more over radio station KIKI. This was a big contributor, I think, to the (’54) campaign. But unity, debate the issues, this was the central theme and long live Bob Dodge (who stressed this of Democrats). Tom Gill was involved, and a lot of the university faculty whose names, some of whom I’ve mentioned earlier, were involved in setting this up, (unity). So the secret to it was, you give (the) people some things that they can hang their hats on, get them to work together, they begin to like it. You’ve got a little taste of this “unity” in the modern context of almost forty years, thirty-six years later, in the recent (U.S. Senate) campaign for Danny [Daniel K.] Akaka. Akaka had to have it, (unity). Personally, he was (“behind”) to Pat [Patricia] Saiki (in the race) but if the Democrats—[John D.] Waihee and the so-called Democratic establishment—would come to his rescue well, he was told this—he knew this—he would win.

JC: And that’s the end of videotape number fifteen. We ran out of tape at that point so they’re going to continue the discussion on the next tape.

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview session number [four]. This is videotape number sixteen.

WN: Tape sixteen with Daniel Tuttle. Why don’t we just pick up what you were—the points that you were making.

DT: Oh, even as the Democrats really turned out in ’54, they got out the vote and they swept the platter almost clean except for Burns and Fasi who probably “knocked one another out.” [In 1954, Burns lost the race for delegate to Congress to Republican Elizabeth Farrington; Fasi was defeated by Neal S. Blaisdell for mayor of Honolulu.] I don’t think they ever really did it again until the “Catch a Wave” [gubernatorial] campaign for Jack Burns which was spurred on by media. And that’s been a long time ago. I didn’t think they could really do as well (again). I knew they could do quite a few things, but I didn’t think they could do as well as they did in this year of 1990 when they finally got themselves pulled together and, somehow, got (enough) people out to elect Danny Akaka [U.S. senator]. The reason why I guess this worked is there were too many prominent groups and too many prominent Democrats that literally had their reputations, their political reputations, at stake. If they couldn’t get Akaka elected, they (would be considered to be) in pretty bad shape.

Now, for a while, I thought that Waihee might be, he might have been lukewarm. Maybe Danny Akaka was sort of a sacrificial lamb, that they didn’t have anybody else really groomed, and that maybe some of these fellows really wanted the seat four years from now when Sparky’s [Spark M. Matsunaga] term is up. This may still be the script. In other words, Akaka may have made some sort of a commitment to bow out after four years. Time will tell. I’m not alleging this, I don’t know this, but it’s one of those (things). You put up a lot of question marks, and you wait and see what happens when you’re trying to analyze a political scene. [As of October 1996, U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka was still in office.]

WN: But in ’54 was there that urgency that there was in 1990 to portray Fasi as a Democrat? I mean, were you giving that kind of advice prior to the election to Fasi like . . .

DT: Giving advice . . .

WN: Well, in terms of a unity kind of slate?
DT: Oh, I was trying, believe it or not, even as I (had) made my own little commitment to Fasi, even though I thought he was a really wonderful candidate—he was, compared to a lot of the other fellows, but I was trying to get him to cooperate with a Tom Gill, who was also pretty smart, pretty sharp (fellow), and to work with a Dan Inouye and a Maggie [Margaret A.] Inouye and a Masato Doi. There (was) no reason for Frank (not to compete). Frank could have done all (of his) things and still (have) been a part of (the Democratic) operation.

I was amazed with the [O'ahu] County [Democratic] Committee and Frank Fasi. They were not friendly to Frank, but Frank could have made them feel very good if he had given them 100 percent of what they wanted. He could have gone along 100 percent with them (and) still done his own thing, and I think he’d have been elected. (However), I could not convince him of that. There were certain points—“Just do one thing for me,” Frank would say. “Let me do this.” And they would say no. And he would say, “Okay, (DT pounds fist on table) that’s it. I’ve had it!” And he’d walk out of the room, and I’d be trailing along behind him.

Now, how I managed to maintain good relations with these people, many of them, I don’t really know. In a sense, I was in the doghouse (with some) for many years. In some quarters, I’m still in the doghouse for having supported Frank Fasi in ‘54 or perhaps as late as ’58. [Nineteen] fifty-nine was, (of course), a different story.

Even with Jack Burns who, of course, was the big protag(onist)—(by this) I mean, Frank Fasi probably picked on Jack Burns more than anybody else as a stupid, not-knowing, ungrateful person—that was Frank Fasi’s characterization of him. Jack and I really didn’t have much (to talk about), in a personal sense, until 1960. Jack was smart enough, I think, to recognize that when (my) break (with Fasi) came, I was completely at sea. So, Jack and I talked things over in the (Biltmore Hotel) window, overlooking [John F.] Kennedy’s arrival in Los Angeles (where) he got the nomination. Jack and I, in essence, sort of buried the hatchet (on that occasion).

By this time, of course, Jack had run for governor and lost [to William F. Quinn] in (‘59). We jok(ed) about such things as (his) count(ing) heavily on the AJAs [Americans of Japanese Ancestry] and the ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union], and I used to argue with him against this, (saying), “You’ve got to have (more than these).” He (finally) realized (this) in ’59, (when) the AJAs and the ILWU put together still (couldn’t win) it for him. He had to have the Ernest Heens, the Dave McClungs, and the Tom Gills, and so forth, with him.

(Burns and I) joked about a few (such) things and from 1960 on, even though Jack and I never had (close ties). Later on, (I’ll) tell you, I turned Jack Burns down (in 1962) to work for him, but even after this, we always had good rapport and I was always welcome at any time with a phone call (to Washington Place). Periodically, (until) he became very ill, three or four times a year, we would meet at breakfast (after he returned from mass).

And out of this (panorama of) great things that happened, this wonderful, exciting thing that got started (for Democrats) in ’54, Jack Burns, if not the paramount figure, is certainly among the top three political figures, I think, in Hawai’i political history. He was a giant in his own (right). (He) stumble(d), (was) not so brilliant, (was) not a college-educated person, but he had an awful lot of those things that any politician needs, (common sense and a sense of mission). Unfortunately—this we’ve discussed maybe before—Hawai’i may remember him
for quite different reasons (than those things). In other words, "He got statehood, he got the East-West Center, et cetera," (most say. However), lot of that's a bunch of bunk and baloney, but as a person and as a political figure and as a person who, from the corner of the room, knew how to lead gently and to urge and encourage and nurture, (he was great). Here was the magic of a Jack Burns. (I'll say) more about (this) later.

WN: Who were the other two? You said, "Top three. He was one of the top three."

DT: Oh, now you're really going to press me. In terms of their contributions, even though he never really served (in office), maybe he wouldn't fall in the top three, but Bob Dodge rates awfully high because he was behind so much of what got started in '54. As a relative newcomer—he, I think, arrived in Hawai‘i about '47 or '48, about two or three years before I did—he had the magic touch. He could get along with people even though he couldn't get elected himself.

I suppose you would have to include a Tom Gill, certainly as a sort of a giant of a figure, but with more feet of clay, I'd say, than Jack Burns. I think we should probably throw in a Republican there and, I don't know, Hiram Fong was an inviting person, and I don't know, I might have to flip a coin between Joe [Joseph R.] Farrington and Hiram Fong. You're hitting me on the spur of the moment, and if I thought about it, well, maybe the next time we sit down together, ask me that again. I may come up with a different answer. (Laughs)

WN: No, you said, "One of three," so I thought you already had your three already picked (laughs) . . .

DT: No, (nothing was) prearranged. This was not prearranged.

(Laughter)

WN: Sorry. (Laughs)

DT: I don't even have it in my notes here. Let me tell, if I may, if I'm not going to confuse you too much, you people are supposed to ask the questions but, when I reflect upon '54, a few things vividly come into my mind, and I think they sort of stand (out), these symbols in my mind, maybe not in somebody else's mind, about the '54 election.

I'd been up all night (at the) '54 (election)—keep in mind Frank Fasi had lost but the (general) news was great—(to remember it well I have the) copy that still exists, (of Fasi's concession speech), dictated extemporaneously, to (the winner), Neal Blaisdell. I still have (an old phono, electrical transcription), disc of that among my favorite collections (perhaps in the UH Hamilton Library now).

(The morning after the election), I wandered down (King Street) and ran into—guess who—Masato Doi. In the block there by the Hawaiian Electric [Company], there was a little restaurant, and Masato Doi and I had breakfast together. He'd gotten elected. Phi Beta Kappa key, well-trained attorney, and the essence of his remark(s) was, "Dan, what am I going to do?" (He had been elected to the territorial house of representatives).

And I said, "What do you mean, what are you going to do?"
He says, “This job doesn’t pay anything. I just looked (the salary) up last night.” He says, “I’ve got a family coming along. I’ve spent every penny I got in this campaign, but I didn’t expect to win. I thought I could get back to the practice of law. How am I going to be a responsible legislator and do this?”

And about all that I could think to say was, “Hey, man, don’t worry. Don’t get afraid now. You’ve come through so much to this point. Be happy. Enjoy it. It’s going to work out great!”

And it worked out pretty well for Judge Doi even though he (later) lost a mayor campaign, on one occasion. Masato’s a very fine person.

I always remember that this sort of symbolized the attitude of the Democrats who didn’t realize that this would happen all of a sudden as it did. Because they had stuck together, because they campaigned together, because they campaigned on the issues à la Adlai Stevenson, they could actually put (victory) together. The Republicans had finally had the rug pulled out from under them.

Okay. Story number two. Remember, I had told you that I’d had students working in various campaigns. Well, one student—I’d almost give you her name, but I might be wrong so I won’t do that—but she prepared a nice, (long) notebook which, again, is on file, I hope, in the library, on Hebden Porteus’ (campaign). To illustrate that both parties had nice guys in them, I get this (post-election) call from Hebden Porteus—who(m) I didn’t really know all that well, his father [Stanley Porteus] (had) been (a) professor at the University of Hawai‘i—(who) called me up and says, “Dan, come and have lunch with me at the Pacific Club.” Ooh, (I thought), you know, what’s he want to see this guy, Tuttle, who campaigned for Frank Fasi? This Republican, Porteus, who had survived the Democratic blitz (said), “Will you have lunch with me?”

So I said, “Thank you very much.” Went (to the Pacific Club) and you know what he wanted? He wanted me to know—(remember), I’m a teacher—that he had not fully completed his biographical questionnaire which each student had for the candidate—for his candidate or her candidate—and that he had left blank his age. He wouldn’t tell me his age. He said, “I just don’t do that, (but I don’t want you to downgrade the students because of this).”

It so happens that he had gotten elected—I don’t know, maybe he’d just been twenty-one or twenty-two—(very) young, (so) he wouldn’t tell his age. He didn’t want this to reflect on the grade (of) this student intern—this was an intern who had been campaigning with him. Now that ranks pretty high, in my book, to have a busy politician, who had just (barely) survived, (take the trouble to remark this)!

Then, of course, he threw in a few other things in the course of our luncheon. “I’m the luckiest guy in the world. I don’t deserve to be here. The rest of the guys [i.e., Republicans] got what they deserve. I should have [got] what they got, too, because I was too proud, I was arrogant, I was obsessed with power.”

So here, somehow, was this college professor’s son suddenly coming back to earth, you see. From that point on, Hebden Porteus was a different sort of person (to me). I observed him carefully in the legislature. He went on to become (a) senator, as well as having been a
representative, (and) served for, oh, maybe ten years or more, I guess. [Porteus served in the territorial house, 1940–58; and the state senate 1958–70.] His whole attitude as he made speeches on the floor of the legislature was entirely different. So, the Democrats, and the AJAs who’d sort of led the way, played a significant role in the education, for example, of an awful lot of Republicans, including Hebden Porteus.

(I say this) because he used to be—oh, in '51 when I was at Legislative Reference Bureau and I’d listen to a lot of debates in slack time—(very arrogant, and) if there was anybody I would have ever loved to have defeated in that legislature, it was Hebden Porteus. He was, (I repeat), arrogant, he knew it all, and, of course, he had this strange Australian accent. If there was anybody I would (have) wanted to have defeated, (it was Porteus. However), gradually, (I came) to like Heb Porteus. And to this day, I find him an interesting person. Get him started on politics, (and) he talks too much, the same way I do, (I guess). He had literally lived politics throughout most of his career, and I hope he’ll talk to us in this oral history project before it’s pau. (Note: Alas, he refused!)

There was one other thing that—talk about stories—shows you how politics gets tied in with academics. After the '54 election, there were, oh, howls of agony and protest, particularly in Mānoa Valley the way it was constituted in those days. This was a Republican stronghold—Nu‘uanu Valley, Mānoa Valley, so forth. “AJAs have taken over! Japan has won after all!” Consternation, I mean some people panicked. There were charges of bloc voting, (that) people, (AJAs), had gone to the polls and voted only for persons of Japanese extraction. Academically this posed a challenge to a few people such as myself who’d been interested in politics. We started exploring.

The arguments were also being used—guess what—by people who were against statehood. “We can’t have this happening, we can’t let Hawai‘i become a state if this sort of thing is happening.” So, (students and I) started trying to study bloc voting. There had been one earlier study in '48, '49, where a group of social scientists at the university, (e.g.), Bernhard Hormann, Andy Lind, Norman Meller, Allan Saunders, and the young fellow who was a principal observer whose name I still cannot remember but I will find out before we finish these off. I’ll give you that person’s name (because) he deserves a lot of credit. They did a study by sending people—not on an exit poll—but these were paper ballots, and so they sent crews to about twenty precincts, I guess. As the (ballots) were called off, (counted), they would replicate the ballot. These got all stacked up and then they were put on IBM cards and a rough run of these was made, one. (They produced) a three-page document which I hope is in the UH library, property of the Hawaiian [and Pacific] collection. If not, there should be a copy in my files, if not in my files at the university, in my files still at home. That (study) tended to indicate that as of '48, there was no bloc voting.

But, okay, here it was in '54. So by being real nice to the secretary of Hawai‘i who (gave permission to sample the ballots, stored in the old [Honolulu] Armory). Now, there was nothing in Hawai‘i law that said (that) before the ballots, the paper ballots, were destroyed, that they could not be used for research purposes. So we had enough student funds—funds were in very short supply—we sent these crews of students down (to the Honolulu Armory). They got class credit for some of their time—and they pulled (out) the actual ballots, a 20 percent sample, from throughout O‘ahu, took them out of (their) pouches, put them into our own envelopes labeled by precinct, and had them transported up to UH.
I mean, what more could you ask as a researcher in politics than this? (Especially) since our only proviso was that when we were *pau* with them, they’d be destroyed. These were the ballots which were used by [John M.] Digman and yours truly in one study we were able to do on bloc voting which was an application of multiple factorial analysis, whereby we were able to show that ethnic bloc voting would be a tertiary (or secondary) factor rather than a primary factor.

We were out of money. (However), Digman had some money from the psychology department, so he was able to give me a hand on this. I had hopes, because the IBM cards still existed from this '48 study, (that) we could put the two (studies) together and really have a nice product. (Then), a horrible thing “happened on the way to the forum.” (The ballots) were stored in wooden chests. They were stored in the basement of Hawai‘i Hall. Chuck [Charles A.] Engman and [William M.] Wachter (were in charge of property) administration. Chuck Engman was the fellow that had to break the sad news. Nice sort of guy, used to smoke a cigar, walked around campus like he owned the place, but he was a nice sort of guy. He called me up and said, “We gotta move your ballots, Dan.”

And I said, “Okay, just let me know where they’re going to be. Be careful. Do not take the ballots out of the envelopes; just move them the way they are.”

Two or three months later—I think he’d been sitting in the corner pondering what to say to me—I get a call from Chuck Engman saying, “Dan, I got bad news. You’d better sit down.” And I couldn’t (because I) was out in the hallway of Crawford Hall.

And I said, “What went wrong?”

He said, “Well, (the) janitors, maintenance guys who moved your ballots—they moved ‘em, they’re moved.” I forgot where he said they were. “But, they were in pretty bad shape,” he said. “The envelopes were torn, some of them, so to make prettier stacks, they took ‘em all out of the envelopes.”

Without going into detail, (this) completely destroyed (the study). Because, you see, you (needed to) relate (the precinct) voting pattern to census tract data. So the entire study went down the drain. Only the ballots that Digman had used, (a sample of the whole by district, as I recall), ever got put on IBM cards to be processed. If we had (had) more money, this might not have happened.

The ballots from the earlier [1948] study—I still can’t remember this fellow’s name, the social scientist at the university prior to my time—(were) on IBM cards, but the key, the code, was missing. It could have been reconstructed. This was something I was able to salvage when they literally threw out the Romanzo Adams library prior to [the establishment of the] Social Science Research Institute. (In turn, these) was turned over to Arthur Park and (the) lieutenant governor when Tom Gill was lieutenant governor [1966–70] (for safekeeping). They were turned over to them for, ultimately, somebody doing (another) study on bloc voting. Now, if you’ll check the record on election results for a period of time during Tom Gill’s administration, maybe for one or two years thereafter, they did start publishing bloc voting statistics in the (state’s) election returns (volumes).

WN: Okay, why don’t we stop right here.
(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is the last tape of session [four] with Dan Tuttle. This is tape number seventeen.

MK: Tape number seventeen with Dan Tuttle. I think we're going to be continuing with your remembrances of early social science research and politics.

DT: Well, obviously our research efforts sort of fell to earth in a hurry, and I really didn't get back to that (effort) until we started doing some polling, at first at the university, (1959), and later in the community. Some of that (material) should have been converted into some more bloc voting studies. I'm convinced that there is very little (accurate information available). (However), to this day, I'm convinced that there is not (much)—there's some, but not a (major) amount of—bloc voting, as illustrated in the recent election. Who's the city councilman that gets elected in Mō'ili'iili? Help me, if you can.

WN: Mō'ili'iili?

DT: Chinese extraction . . .

WN: Leigh Wai Doo.

DT: Leigh Wai Doo gets elected from still pretty heavy concentration of Japanese extraction AJA persons, you see. And you can just have illustration after illustration, and even the exit polls of KGMB, recently, show that, who got the bulk of the AJA vote? Danny Akaka. Not Pat Saiki.

In terms of research, so much should have been done. I should have done a lot more than I did. Other people should have done more, and there's so much more. You (have) a great future in the Social Science Research Institute, I can assure you.

But at least one thing I'm proud of: I (mostly used) my own money, 'cause the university didn't have it or wouldn't spend it or whatnot. I bought a tape recorder, an old Wilcox-Gay recorder in '51, and start(ed taping) with a speech that Oren Long made to (the Hawai'i Chapter of the) American Society (for) Public Administration—guess where—in Kewalo Inn, Joe Itagaki, Mary Noonan's (restaurant). That was the first recorded speech I have of any (Hawai‘i) politician. This (taping) continued on until about ten years ago. Once again, all of that is in file with UH library.

We may want to come back to '54 but, if I have your permission, I'll just continue and talk a little bit more about Frank Fasi and finish. Our relationship lasted from—(it) started out in '51. We've already talked at great length about the '54 campaign. It continued until the early stages of his campaign for the United States Senate in '59. Frank reacted, I felt, more than he should, (with) volatility. He took his (1954) defeat with a fair amount of aplomb. He regretted the $30,000 or so that he personally lost, and people didn't hold dinners for you after the fact to pay off your debts. Frank assumed this (loss) himself.

He talked at great length about going to law school, picked my brain about what law schools would be best. Could he do it? He had a brother, Salvador, who became a lawyer, I think,
and so Frank had this aspiration. Quite frankly, I encouraged it, to a degree. But, he couldn’t make up his mind what to do. He was restive, (grew a beard). He decided he’d stay out of politics for a while, which you didn’t really believe. (In short), you couldn’t predict what he would do.

All of a sudden, I first learned about this in January of ’55. We had what we call a “visiting fireman,” a professor—one of my closer-relationship professors from University of Minnesota, the head of the public administration center there—stopped by Hawai‘i on his way to the Philippines. Minnesota had a project there. So (my wife and I) invited some people from Minnesota. I’ve forgotten who all was there, but Dr. Short was at our place on Eckart Road, and Bob Krauss was there who has Minnesota ties and (was) writing for the Honolulu Advertiser. Gardiner Jones, now deceased, who wrote for both the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin and the [Honolulu] Advertiser, ended up working for the med school at the university, was there. Unannounced and not really invited (was) Frank Francis Fasi, sporting a newly grown beard. This was his way of reacting to his defeat. If you’ve ever been in a gathering with Frank Fasi, he dominates the gathering. I think Dr. Short left shaking his head about my associates in Hawai‘i, because Dr. Short was a very upright, about six-foot-two, starched white shirt, (and), of course, (a suit coat).

Bob Krauss showed up in short pants even in that day, because (at that time), he was one of the “wild and crazy guys” going around the island doing all sorts of crazy things. Gardiner Jones—if you’ve ever been in conversation with him—he wanted to be the center of attention, and (then), here was Frank Fasi. So poor Dr. Short, as I say, I’m sure he never (quite figured it out). Something happened to his opinion of Dan Tuttle, (I fear).

Not so much known to me (then), but it gradually became (better) known that (Frank’s) family problems were growing. He pondered, as I’ve already indicated, a divorce. After the divorce, he married Joyce [Kono], and I ended up, as I think I’ve already indicated, as best man. (The wedding) was down in front of the beach (in front of)—the ceremony was performed by (him)—Judge [Ingram M.] Stainback’s house. Elsie was standing by. She didn’t have any particular role, but, of course, I had this prestigious role of being (the) best man.

Quite frankly, by this time, because Frank didn’t hang on to friends very well, I was probably about the only candidate to be best man (laughs). Some people would say I was the only stupid one to stand up for him. I had no qualms about it at all. I liked Frank, I like Frank to this day, and I’d stand up with him again.

At any rate, gradually Frank came out of his state of depression, I guess you would say. He could always busy himself in his businesses. [Nineteen] fifty-six, no, he didn’t run, but we maintained contact. He would still drop by the house. But after the marriage to Joyce, Frank no longer came by five or six nights out of the week to the Tuttle household. After they got married—I’ve forgotten the precise year, (May 25, 1958), but I didn’t see Frank that much. However, (later) 1958, Frank did get in touch with me again and say, “I’m going to run for the (territorial) senate.” It was a multi-member district over there (at that time). Patsy Mink was in the same district [fifth senatorial district], if my memory’s correct. And lo and behold, he won. [Besides Fasi, elected senators from the fifth district were Patsy Takemoto Mink, George R. Ariyoshi, Sakae Takahashi and Wilfred C. Tsukiyama.]
Well, during this campaign, I made the only public political speech I ever made in Hawai‘i. I’d been Mr. Anonymous in the ’54 campaign. I didn’t mention that. I was lucky. The newspaper only mentioned my name once in ’54. In all the things that I did, they were nice to me. They didn’t get me into trouble with the university. So, I made this one televised speech (in 1958) for Frank Fasi. It wasn’t very good, but, okay, I made it, and gave him my blessing. Not because of that speech, but because of the multi-member district, Frank could win. He was running in one of his stronghold areas. He won.

Then, he came out with Matt [Matthew] Esposito, who’d been another name, incidentally, in his ’54 campaign, (a) former insurance man who was “Mr. Jolly.” Nice guy, Matt was, but Matt later couldn’t stay out of certain difficulties. (Frank) and Matt came out (to the house) after the election, about two weeks after the election, and Frank says, “Dan, I need somebody to be my administrative assistant, and if anybody deserves it, you do. Why don’t you do it?”

I said, “No, Frank, remember our basic agreement was, I didn’t want anything. And I really don’t. I’ve been around the legislature. It’s an awful lot of work, and I (don’t) need (it). I’m a schoolteacher.”

“Well, do you have anybody to recommend?”

And, if my memory’s correct, I recommended Hiroshi Oshiro who’d been a graduate assistant in the government department (at UH). I think Hiroshi took the job and served (in the) one session that Frank was in the senate. I was around that session quite a bit, but (I) stayed out of his hair. At least, I had a place to get a cup of coffee. (It was) a little more friendly than maybe some of the other places, but I never really had more than passing contact with Hiroshi. The only substantial contact, from the time that I even remember recommending him, that I’ve had (with) Hiroshi (was) when I (got) called to jury duty, and he end(ed) up as (the) judge. Therein lies another story which I won’t tell you (laughs) about now, at any rate.

Suffice it to say that Frank Fasi’s career as a legislator was just about as volatile, I think, as the campaign because, not only did Frank continue to introduce sort of offbeat bills, but he wasn’t bashful about making speeches in the senate. He did develop a poker-playing buddy(y) in one of the Democratic senators. It’s from that that he got the notion that he was going to be a big political figure in Hawai‘i, that he could get the ILWU support the next time around.

I came to the conclusion that Frank Fasi was not a legislative type. He doesn’t have the personality. (He’s not a) being to sit for long hours in committee and discuss. He would consider (that) to be waste time. He doesn’t have the patience. If he’s built for any political office, it would be for an executive office rather than for the legislature. At any rate, without going into details, nothing that Frank did that I recall is very distinguished in that ’58 session. With the advent of statehood, believe it or not, (a) lot of new jobs opened up and right there among the pack—and there was quite a pack of them—was Frank Fasi. He decided to run for the (United States) Senate [in 1959].

A lot of other Democrats including Bill [William H.] Heen, Bob Dodge’s law partner, as a case in point, (decided to run, too). Hiram Fong decided to go on the Republican side, and I asked Frank, since we were still close friends and buddies of sorts, I guess you’d say, if he still wanted me (around). I said, “What do you want to do, ’54 all over again, only better?”
And he says, "More than that, '54 all over again, but let's win!"

So I said, "Okay, I think it can be done, but you're going to have to pay attention to certain things, Frank."

"Well, well, yeah, okay, okay."

The spring and summer campaign(s) got off to a very slow start. Then the pace picked up quite a bit, and Fasi, of course, in the primary for seat A for the United States Senate faced Bill Heen. (Thereafter), follow(ed) the (handbook). About three or four weeks before the primary, Dorothy Kohashi had been working on trying to get a dinner, a kick-off dinner, prepared for Frank, and things weren't going very well. I had close contact with Dorothy, of course, and I said, "I've been trying to get together with Frank, and he (doesn't seem to) want to see me."

One night, I was sitting at home working, probably grading papers or something, (and) I (got a) call from Frank. "Hey, I got a press release. I want you take it over to the [Honolulu] Advertiser." He was sitting three blocks away from the [Honolulu] Advertiser. (However), I said, "Frank, I got problems. I don't have a car, but, okay, I remember, I can get Hannah Esposito"—Esposito's first wife—"(to babysit), and Matt will take me down."

Matt was that type of person, "Sure, I'll take you, Dan."

He takes me down, and Frank read over the—I (had) drafted the press release on the typewriter at home, took it (with me, only) three or four paragraphs. I've forgotten what the issue was. Frank read it, said, "Fine."

I said, "Frank, hey, nobody (is) around. . . ." There wasn't even anybody in the (outer) office. I said, "We gotta have a talk, 'cause I think we've got problems. Let's sit down and talk."

"Oh, take that press release out. Go deliver it."

And I said, "Frank, the deadline over there isn't till midnight. Let's talk. Matt's not hurrying to get away." Matt would gladly (have stayed) outside. He didn't have to be in with Frank and me. He'd been accustomed to this in the past from '54. I said, "Frank, I'm serious. Let's talk."

Frank says, "Hey, you heard me. I said, 'Get out of here.'"

I was standing, and he was sitting at his desk. I said, "Frank, if you say that one more time—I'm serious—you say that one more time, and I have had it with you." I said, "(It is) pretty serious, you better think about it carefully."

"You heard me. Get out of here!"

I stood there for a few minutes. Tears were rolling down my cheeks, I'm not ashamed to admit it. I said, "Ok, Frank, that's it."
I said, "Matt, let's go." He took me by the [Honolulu] Advertiser and press building, I dropped (the release) off for the morning newspaper, went home. I think my files would still have a copy of my letter. I turned in my key (and) anything else that I had related to headquarters, and that was that.

As I've told you, Joyce (later repeatedly) said, "Frank, why don't you apologize?" Of course, (Elsie and I) had some (continuing) contact with Joyce. (Frank, of course, didn't apologize.) Frank tells everybody (to this day) that I didn't like a speech he made (and quit). Well, I didn't like a couple of speeches he (had) made because Hiram Fong was—and Heen—both were getting the better of him. But for technical reasons, Heen lost [in the primary to Fasi]. It's not really accurate what he tells people, that I walked out on him because of his speech. I just felt that if he wouldn't discuss his own campaign with his own self-interest involved, in a quiet moment, why should I waste any more time on the guy?

Frank and I have not had a serious political discussion since that day, whatever day it was, in early 1959 (campaign).

WN: What did you want to talk to him about?

DT: Everything from "soup to nuts" in the campaign. He was (in) a disaster area. He didn't really win the primary, he lost it. Really, all he did was make a big issue out of Heen's age. And then, when it came to the (general), he didn't lose badly, but he lost [to Fong] by about a 53/47 margin, which is quite a bit. Incidentally, when we started doing public opinion poll(s at UH), that's still the only race that we ended up on the wrong side. We had, believe it or not, we had Fasi winning. (It was) published in the (newspapers, he was winning) by some very narrow margin, (but) Fong won. In large part, (this was) because all of our polling was done on O'ahu, (and) it should have adjusted (to this reality). My system should have worked, but the ILWU came in so strongly for Fong, (a Republican), that it fouled us up. At any rate, we haven't tried to hide (this "mistake"). We missed it plain and simple. I wish some other people who (have) missed (races in) polls, by a lot more than that, would admit the same. So...

WN: So who took your place?

DT: Frank. Who else?

(Laughter)

DT: Well, really, Frank still runs his own shop, I think. Now maybe Gina, his daughter. Anyway, his daughter who worked with him since he's been mayor apparently (has) serve(d) as administrative assistant.

I don't think he (has) ever, I'm not sure that Frank (has) ever appointed what you would call a (true) campaign manager. [D.G.] "Andy" Anderson probably comes the closest to it. Since yours truly left or disappeared or whatnot, Andy Anderson's probably the only person who's able to put (a) bridle (on) this bronco. That seems to be about Andy's big claim to fame. He can't get elected (mayor) himself, but apparently he has something about him that he can somehow, up to a point, control Frank Fasi. I say, only up to a point, because Frank is quite
literally uncontrollable.

Now, that maybe closes (or) sort of highlights my association with Frank Francis. You probably have a bunch of questions. I'd better let you get some words in here.

MK: You know, in that [United States] Senate campaign, did you use the same techniques that you had utilized earlier?

DT: No, he had headquarters, and we were all geared up to do many of the same things that we did in '54. However, it wasn't working. He had, by this time, accumulated from his tenure in the [territorial] senate, some hanger-oners, and I can mention some. Alice Bright was one of them, one fellow's name I can't recall, Peter [S.] Iha who was a former student. I had no objections to these people. Alice Bright, whatever her name is (now), she's since married and I can't remember her additional name—they are all friends of mine. They weren't doing anything. We had no Smitty, (John B. Smith). We did have Dorothy Kohashi who had not really been a vital part of the '54 campaign. She was trying valiantly to set (up) this dinner and it wasn't working. And this is one of the first big things (in a campaign). You want to kick off the campaign "right," you've got to have a crowd. I don't know what they did after I (left—after) I said I'd had it. I meant (that) I had (had) it, and (so) I disappeared and, as I say, ("disappeared") to this day, except for casual contact . . .

WN: It's a U.S. Senate [race]. You have to involve the neighbor islands as well. So he's never had to do that before.

DT: No, and he really didn't have any (appreciable support) on the neighbor islands. That was pretty much ILWU territory. As I say, he thought he was going to get the support (of) the ILWU (that) had backed him over Heen (in the primary). (However), all his poker-playing buddies, (and so-called ILWU) friends deserted him like crazy (in the general).

After all, Hiram had been in the legislature. Hiram became both Mr. Republican/Mr. Democrat, and while Hiram was a disaster when it came to TV, the grassroots troops were there for Hiram Fong. (The ILWU had known him a long time), and they turned out very well (for him).

So, once again, Frank, with half of the campaign he had in '54, still got 47 percent of the votes statewide, (impressive but not enough).

END OF INTERVIEW
Tape No. 17-72-4A-90

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr. (DT)

December 10, 1990

Honolulu, O‘ahu

BY: Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto (MK)

Joy Chong: The following is session number four[A] with Dan Tuttle, Jr., begins with tape number eighteen, and it took place on December 10, 1990 at the HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association] office. The interviewer was Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto.

MK: Interview with Mr. Daniel W. Tuttle on December 10, and this is videotape number eighteen.

And I guess we can pick up today’s session with Fasi’s race against Fong.

DT: It ended up, as I may have observed earlier, really pretty close. My recollection was that Fong won with about 53 percent of the vote and Fasi with 47 percent. Of course, our first community polling experiment occurred that summer, and it’s the only race, believe it or not that we missed, you can find that in the newspaper morgue. (The poll) had predicted a narrow victory for Fasi. At any rate, our poll was five percentage points off which was one point beyond our plus or minus four (estimated margin of error), which was rather embarrassing. (However), we haven’t tried to hide the fact, even to this day. (Of) course, it’s also embarrassing when you say or suggest, at any rate, that Fasi was the likely winner when Fong came out ahead.

MK: You know, in that particular race, the ILWU supported Fang. But in the primary, they supported Fasi, and I’m wondering if you know anything about what went on to make that happen.

DT: I think it was a part of (ILWU) strategy. They felt that Heen was a little bit old. He was seventy-plus. That’s before Reagan’s day, you see. Fasi had begun to emphasize Heen’s age, and did so quite successfully. I don’t think that they conceived that Fong would be back at an early date, but they came in (strong) after the primary and decided that they didn’t really trust this guy, Fasi, really at all. So they decided to throw their support behind Fong.

I don’t know, did I mention earlier—stop me if I did—that the newspapers wouldn’t (fully) admit of this until the election day itself? But once again, it was sort of a repeat of the Blaisdell race against Fasi.

But I was not a part of this Fasi campaign in ’59 except for the (very) early portion of it. At any rate, Fong got it, but that—(the ILWU)—accounts for the fact that our poll, I think, if
you want an alibi for missing it. (The ILWU strength was on the neighbor islands) we did all of our polling on O'ahu. Well, according to my theory of polling, (results) still should have been accurate. (However), with the ILWU supporting a Republican, it introduced (two) new factors which, quite frankly, I think, accounts for our being wrong. I should have known that, (these things), but I didn't, so we missed.

MK: And in those days, what was the nature of the ILWU's support for a candidate? What would they do?

DT: Well, they didn't hold signs, but they did distribute marked [mock] ballots outside of the polling places. So within, let's say, fifty or seventy-five feet which, I think was the [legal] distance in that time, they would give people marked ballots for the people that they supported. They also distributed these to their members in advance. Now, in (the) '54 race, they did this right on the day or a little bit before. (In) '59, I think they were doing this some two or three days before. At any rate, even in '59, they were distributing these marked ballots so that the not-so-literate member of the ILWU would know exactly how to vote. They also passed the word of mouth, and, of course, this was especially helpful on the neighbor islands. The ILWU support was beginning to dwindle on O'ahu, the early stages of this. On the neighbor islands, the ILWU was very strong and, once again, I suggest if you consult those election returns, Fong walked away with "the bacon" on all of the neighbor islands.

MK: And I know that you weren't that close to Fasi by that time, but how did the defeat affect Fasi?

DT: Fasi took it better than he did in '54. In '54 he was sort of devastated. As I mentioned, he wanted to go to law school, he grew the beard, that sort of thing. But by '59, he knew he could get elected to something. He'd been elected to the territorial senate [in 1958]. His brother Sal blamed me personally for Frank's loss in '59 because I had, quote, "deserted him" when he needed me the most. But Fasi took it pretty well, and, as I recall, by '62 he was back running for United States House of Representatives. He lost that race, too, incidentally. So Frank had learned to get up off the floor and didn't take it all that seriously.

MK: And in 1960, he also ran for mayor of the City and County of Honolulu.

DT: That's right. I almost forgot that (laughs) he really did get up off the floor. I was thinking of his race for the U.S. House. Yes, he did run against Dodge, or Dodge ran against him—that's the way Fasi would put it—and this, for me, was something of a personal tragedy of sorts because, even though I was no longer working for Frank, I still had a lot of aloha for him and affection, and, in a certain sense, I do to this day. (However), Bob Dodge was a particular hero to me and should be to all of the Democrats because Bob had done so much for the Democrats back in the early [19]50s, particularly in '52, '54. As a matter of fact, Bob Dodge did the manual for the con-con [constitutional convention] in 1950. He was the principal draftsman, if you will, of the hope chest constitution which is still the (Hawaii) constitution, for all intents and purposes. He'd also played a principal role in drafting the '52 and '54 Democratic platforms, (at the) McKinley [High School] auditorium. In '56, the convention didn't amount to much, but Bob—I was
actually in Jack Burns' office in '56 when Bob plunked down the '56 Democratic platform and said, "Here, Jack, here's your platform." This would be the spring of '56. In other words, (it) pretty much went through that way because it was a little bit of a rework of (the) '52 and '54 (platforms). (I have mentioned this earlier.)

So, Bob decided to run. However, Bob overestimated his popularity. The Democrats weren't that fond of him because he'd never run for public office before, he (tried to) campaign from his law office, (and) he didn't even open a campaign headquarters. He did make public appearances at party rallies which had begun, by that time, to dwindle to practically nothing. He didn't collect any large amounts of money. As a matter of fact, we (KGMB) visited him on the television show that we were doing. The film still survives, and so, at the university library you'll be able to see Bob Dodge as a campaigner. (However), those films were taken in his office.

There's no question that, in that race, Bob Dodge was the superior candidate, but he ran, of course, (a poor) second to Frank Fasi in the primary. Bob Dodge, for example, had been one of the early persons interested in the National Municipal League, so far as Hawai'i was concerned. He had been the vice chairman of the first charter commission for Honolulu and (had) "broken a lot of ground" there because he was the most knowledgeable person on that first Honolulu charter commission. Well, he thought the publicity that had been generated from that charter commission would also help. He'd been an attorney for the legislature, too.

(However), it didn't add up (at) the polls because, by this time, Fasi had run, well, he'd run (a) local race in '50, he'd run in ('52 and in) '54. He'd run for [territorial] senate and got elected in '58, he'd run for the United States Senate statewide in '59. (So) by '60, Bob Dodge was literally "licked" from the start. There was nothing that anyone could do about it except to wish him well.

MK: Did you participate in his [Dodge's] campaign?

DT: Only to this extent: we ran into one another out in Kāhala just opposite the shopping center one day, and he was in his (convertible). He liked to drive automobiles, Bob Dodge. He loved 'em. He had (another) open convertible at the time, and he stopped, said, "Get in."

I rode with him for a block or two. And I tried (to help)—I said, "Here, you gotta do certain things, Bob." (Lots more campaigning would have helped.)

And he says, "Well, I'm not gonna to do 'em. That's not the way I'm gonna campaign."

And I said, "Well, if you don't do some of these things, you're doomed to defeat." And, as I recall, I pulled a ten-dollar bill out of my pocket which was quite a bit of money for me in those days. I didn't even ask him for a receipt, I just said, "Here, Bob, you have my aloha."

And then later, I did interview him for this television presentation, and that's about it. In other words, he had no formal campaign organization. He never asked me to help him. I'm not going to tell you how I voted. (Laughs)

MK: And I noticed that when we read about him, he's usually portrayed as the intellectual, the brains for the Democratic party. And I'm wondering, why did he get into the politicking side
of it?

**DT:** Well, if you're interested in politics and you study it, somewhere along the line, you get the itch to do it, too. I would suggest (that) in '60 Bob Dodge got the itch to do it too, and as I say, he (had) received considerable publicity about the charter commission. He felt very strongly (about getting) involv(ed) (in) government. He was actually in favor of a city manager plan for Honolulu, and he thought by becoming mayor he could institute a city manager plan and bow out himself as mayor.

I'm not sure Bob would ever (have gone) on record as having said that, but I think I know him well enough to know that he (felt it). Don't get the impression that he was a stodgy, uninteresting sort of intellectual. He looked like Jack Kennedy, quite frankly. He used to take stairways two or three steps at a time. He had a good sense of humor. He was just a fun fellow to be around (and very vital).

As a matter of fact, one of his problems was, Bob ended up smoking too much—I should (not be one to) talk about the smoking. Unfortunately, I guess the smoking ultimately (killed him) because . . . . I had lunch with Bob when he celebrated his sixtieth birthday, and, as I say, it was a pretty pleasant and lively conversation, of course. Bob didn't want to talk about the past. He wanted to talk about the future, and some of the things that he would do and how well he was feeling on his sixtieth birthday. Couple (or) three years later, I couldn't reach him, and I never did get to see him again, till he died. He kept it a very close secret in his office, kept it a very close secret that, actually, he was dying of throat cancer. (I have missed Bob.)

**MK:** I guess we can go back to 1954 then. And we really didn't start our discussion of that year, but that's when the Democrats really swept the elections.

**DT:** Well, '54 was an amazing year. I saw it close up really from the Fasi headquarters, but from the big picture. It was amazing how well the young Democrats, largely young AJAs, stuck to their script, which was supplied for them, interestingly enough, by Bob Dodge.

In other words, that platform, if you'll consult it, was a very concise document. There were four or five, six at most, major points. This was the Dodge theory, (keep it simple), and the young Democrats, most of whom had college educations or professional degrees—several of them had Phi Beta Kappa keys, (tried to do this). I know Masato Doi did, (but) I can remember him twirling his Phi Beta Kappa key while campaigning because they wore suit coats in those days, (sometimes) even a vest. Only (a few) knew it was a Phi Beta Kappa key; the general public didn't. But these people followed this script to a "T," they campaigned on issues, you see, and they (kept it simple and) challenged the Republicans again and again to debate with them.

And this approach really paid off, to them. I don't think I've talked about the ʻĀina Haina debate before, but the Democrats had invited the Republicans, actually had a couple meetings with them, to try to arrange a debate out at ʻĀina Haina [School]. But the negotiations broke up.

The Democrats set things up out at ʻĀina Haina School, which was a fairly new school, with Republican (leader) names (posted on) empty chairs. They were going to have a debate
against the Republicans (but didn’t expect them). There were only couple dozen people there, so I have been told. I wasn’t there, actually, myself—close to it, but not actually there. (However), I was listening to it on the radio, as I recall, in Fasi headquarters. They’d just started the proceedings, (when) all of a sudden, Republican(s) showed up. Sam [Samuel P.] King, now a judge, a retired judge, Hiram Fong, (and) Hebden Porteus showed up. (Also), I think Wilfred Tsukiyama showed up. They took over the microphone, “We’re going to moderate this debate.” And, over the objections of Tom Gill who was there (as a) Democrat(ic) (moderator), they did “take it over.”

(However), a young Dan Inouye was throwing his notes aside. He was (writing with) one hand on his knee, and he decided he was going to rebut what Samuel P. King had said because Samuel P. King was alleging that the Democrats were soft on Communists, (that) they were pink(s), (and) so on. Dan Inouye didn’t like this at all, he got up and made his “real” oratorical debut and said, “We’re willing to debate, but this is going beyond the balance of decency. Don’t you dare call us (Democrats) Communists. I left one arm in Europe fighting fascism, and I’ll leave the other arm in Asia fighting communism, but don’t come here and call us pinks or Communists.”

Well, this was broadcast on radio station KIKI, which was the “cheapest” (rates) radio station in town. The press, which was Republican at the time, denied that this had really ever happened in their inimitable way. If you check the newspapers, I think there was an ad run by the Democrats that “this will be rebroadcast on radio station KIKI,” and this was done.

It was very evident that, quite frankly, Sam P. King, in particular, made a complete fool of himself because after (recognizing) Dan Inouye’s injury, he mentioned something about the fact that he had a glass eye, which, as I recall, (was) not a (war-related) injury. But, for some reason, this came out in his trying to hit back at Dan Inouye. This (exchange) contributed, I think, rather significantly to the Democratic win in ’54. What’s more, I think it’s significant for Hawai’i political history. To the best of my knowledge, it’s the first time in public, at least over media, that a non-Haole argued viciously and vigorously with a Caucasian, (recognizing that) Sam P. King is part-Hawaiian. At least in terms of the Democratic eyes, (King) was one of the spokesmen for the Republican overlords. (A audio)tape of that—I should indicate—encounter does exist (at the UH library).

MK: So looking back on 1954, you would maybe attribute the Democrats’ wins to their standing on issues and . . .

DT: And their vigorous campaigning. They were young, vital, and well-versed, very skilled, very knowledgeable. Anybody who cared at all about government at that time would (have to) say they were the most qualified (and) vote for them.

Now, a lot of people started talking about bloc voting among the AJAs (in 1954). People in Mānoa Valley, which was heavily Caucasian at the time, were devastated. They thought the world was going to come to an end.

People of AJA extraction were saying, “I didn’t realize what I was doing. Sure, I voted mostly for Japanese people.”

And I said, “Crying out loud, why worry about that? Some of the rest of us voted the same
way. Why? Because they were the most qualified." The record will show that they were indeed a very well-qualified group—for the first time among Democrats—a very well-qualified group of people.

As a result of this election, there was so much consternation that a lot of people felt that this would adversely harm Hawai‘i's chances of achieving statehood. That gave us an opportunity to start doing some bloc voting studies, and I don't know whether we've talked about this already or whether we should talk about it in the future.

MK: I guess we can talk about it in the next tape.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number nineteen, session number four[A].

MK: Okay. Videotape number nineteen with Mr. Daniel Tuttle. And I think we're picking up with bloc voting.

DT: Well, let me say first that I think the whole community was in a state of shock (because of the '54 results). Mānoa Valley illustrated (this and served) as an illustration of the type of public that was in shock. (However), to counter that, there were large segments of (Hawai‘i that had) new hope. In other words, "Now we have a chance. Things are going to change." There was "light" at the end of the tunnel, and this included the University of Hawai‘i. We were going to get a lot more appropriations, things were going to get better.

In terms of the bloc voting, I had started a class in public opinion propaganda, I think that very year, either '53 or '54. We had started (by) do(ing) some campus polls. But, that was about it. In terms of the bloc voting studies—I thought I talked about this before, but—we were able to get the actual ballots from '54. Students went down (to the Armory), and we got a sizable sample, about a 20 percent sample (of actual ballots). I think I talked about this earlier.

MK: I think we did.

DT: We did one study which (contradicted) the idea that there was ethnic bloc voting. This was a factor analysis study in which the principle investigator was not yours truly, but was (Dr.) John [M.] Digman out of the psych [psychology] department. To this day, there is (still) no evidence that we have a lot of ethnic or racial bloc voting. Now, I realize (that)—this sounds like I'm talking against the beliefs (held) throughout Hawai‘i, but I have yet to be shown any study or any proof that this is the case.

For example, a few years after 1954, Ben Dillingham ran against Dan Inouye, (recall), and even in the heaviest of Caucasian precincts out in Wai‘alae-Kāhala, Dan Inouye defeated Dillingham. I think this was in (the) '62 race for the U.S. Senate. I think it was Dan Inouye's first [U.S.] Senate race.

There'd been all sorts of allegations. Well, certainly this was used against statehood. We'd hope we would have a study which would match these arguments, or sort of negate these
arguments, but the study to end all studies, let us say, never took place. The one study that I
mentioned is the only one. And the rest of the (potential) results got destroyed.

MK: Okay, and I think we can go on to what was happening on the UH campus with the faculty.

DT: Well, (the) faculty had entered politics. I believe we talked about that before. Most of the
faculty, maybe forty, fifty people, became Democrats, (with) only a few mugwumps like
yours truly. Don [Donald] Johnson in the history department became a Republican. After '54,
of course, why, more people decided to enter politics, and so several hundreds of faculty
members joined either HGEA [Hawai‘i Government Employees Association], which was a
large public employee union, or HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association], which was the large
teacher, university union. Some of us joined both.

Now this was (the result) of (a) big mass meeting which (was) held in the old chemistry
building or what’s now Bilger Hall where Charlie Kendall, sort of a patron saint of the
HGEA, came out to address the faculty, and James MacDonald from HEA. The faculty
decided we’d better really get rather heavily involved. So they did.

MK: And what form did that involvement take?

DT: Well, for most of them, like any other public, they paid their dues (laughs). They would go
down to the legislature. Occasionally some of them would testify, but the forty or fifty that I
mentioned would be there at precinct meetings and at party conventions. And certainly one of
the more successful lobbyists for the university faculty was Dr. Hubert [V.] Everly from the
College of Education. He had ties with the Hawai‘i Education Association.

Charlie Kendall didn’t want many people from the rank and file to talk for him before the
legislature. He was a very overwhelming figure. It [HGEA] was a sort of an authoritarian
type of employee union at that time, and there’s no question that Charlie Kendall was very
effective. He was a very robust person, very candid, he could drink his whiskey
straight—almost, at any rate—down at Kewalo [Inn]. He kept close ties with all (segments) of
the community, and I still sort of enjoy reflecting upon the fact in my first class in public
administration at the university, one of my students was Charlie Kendall. He only stayed until
about the end of October or middle of November. He dropped out of class because he said he
had to go to a conference. I never had a chance to check with him, but I think, quite frankly,
he came up to the university to check me out, to see what sort of “critter” this new instructor
was going to be. He was that interested in keeping his lines open to the legislature and to
politicians in general.

MK: You know, nowadays the HGEA has a political action committee. UHPA [University of
Hawai‘i Professional Assembly] has a political action committee and . . .

DT: That’s right.

MK: . . . these unions are heavily involved in endorsing candidates. Back in those days, how
heavily were these two unions, the HGEA and HEA, involved in politics?

DT: HGEA, I don’t know whether they were formally endorsing or not, but my recollection is
yes. My recollection is also yes for HEA. Now, it may not have been quite as penetrating
action as you’ll notice today, but, in terms of getting out the vote and people voting the union line or, as I (should) say the “association” lines, I would suggest that they were voting along those lines more in keeping with the endorsement than they do today. It was quite clear to both the members of HGEA and HEA, which (are) really rank-and-file public, that their future, their destiny, if you will, rested with the young Democrats with a capital D.

Charlie Kendall was a sort of an instructor to his union. He was it. He had the knowledge. He had a very interesting sort of approach. He would always bring in an outside expert at the critical moment to appear before the legislature, “This person is the world’s greatest.” And the person would, of course, pretty much confirm what Charlie Kendall had been saying. They also had a technique, even in those days, of bringing in people from the neighbor islands, from all over the state, and making calls on legislators. To this day, this is a part of the technique of the HGEA or the UPW [United Public Workers] or HEA.

MK: So, if you were to kind of measure the clout that these two unions had, did they have clout with legislators back then?

DT: They had a lot of clout, but not to the extent of the ILWU. At that time, the ILWU was still “it,” but the HGEA was big enough so that by the time you got to about 1970s, late [19]60s, early [19]70s, the ILWU was hoping to take over the public service field because—they would deny this, I’m sure—but they were out there hoping that this could have happened. Their grip on the plantations was slipping, and they hadn’t been able to get all the access to the hotels, (and) the tourist industry that they wanted to. If they could get the public service unions, this would be a feather in their (the ILWU’s) cap. It never quite happened because collective bargaining came too soon, and therein lies another story which we’ll talk about later.

MK: And you know, with the Democrats coming in ’54, the professors at the university getting involved in politics through the unions, how many of their dreams for, or hopes for the university did they think they’d really get realized?

DT: Ultimately quite a few. However, the ’55 session was a disaster for the young Democrats. New, fresh, vital, they jumped into it. They passed a lot of education bills, land reform bills and so forth, only to be stymied on two counts. One, the Speaker of the house of representatives was Charlie [Charles] Kauhane, who gave ’em all sorts of difficulties, and the governor, thanks to Eisenhower being president, the fact that we were still a territory, Samuel Wilder King proceeded to veto something (like) thirty (or more) bills. Now, this was really a big problem in paradise, no question about that. Charlie Kauhane was even so vicious as (to) hurl charges of “Diet!” and other unmentionable items at the young AJA (Democrats). He stole the clock out of the session. I’m sure you’ve heard other people recount this. It was not a very pretty scene.

But the young Democrats in the legislature ultimately prevailed because, by the 1957(-58) session(s), you had a new Republican governor, (William F. Quinn) who was a more liberal Republican, and they passed the bills (to him) including a tax reform bill, which wasn’t all that liberal. At any rate, when they passed their so-called more liberal tax bill, why, Governor Quinn signed that as well as most (other) things. Money started to flow into the UH in particular, (and) also into the DOE [Department of Education]. So the young Democrats were able (finally) to realize some gains, and happiness began to settle in.
We do have a couple of accounts of that '55 session, one of which was written by Dr. Robert [M.] Kamins of the Legislative Reference Bureau and (one by yours truly).

MK: And going back to Charlie Kauhane, I know that he hurled a lot of ethnic slurs in that particular session. Was he anti-Japanese prior to that session, or was he just reacting to all these Democratic politicians, new, young Democrats who happened to be Japanese?

DT: I don't know. They were taking the play away from him, but knowing Charlie, I'm not sure that he was so racist or racial as you would charge it. I mean, those comments shouldn't have ever been made, but I think he was reacting more to the fact that the Young Turks were taking the action away from him, and Charlie was really (in) sort of his prime. His wife was (also) very active and (for a long time) had been with the Democratic party. (Charlie had) been a fixture in the legislature as a part of the minority Democrats, so he obviously wanted his "place in the sun." However, the young Democrats were (very) akamai as opposed to Charlie Kauhane who was something of an old-fashioned politician. They took the action away from him. Charlie didn't like this. So, it (was) only human, I think. You put yourself in his shoes, or myself in his shoes. We might well, if we were political activists, we might well react in the same way.

So he says, "You kids, settle back. Take my leadership." They weren't about to because, Charlie had not been—he hadn't bothered to campaign based upon the new platforms, he didn't have much rapport with a Bob Dodge (and the Democratic platform), that sort of thing.

Charlie Kauhane later, maybe we should just add as a footnote, was defeated. He then attempted to come back as a Republican, and not too successfully. So he's retired, and I think still living, (the) last I heard, but I may be wrong.

MK: I didn't know that.

DT: I've just forgotten.

MK: And I was wondering what the public reaction was to this '55 session.

DT: Well, the public reaction was one of, "The Democrats didn't do it." So that was embarrassing. It had to go through another election. At the same time, the newspapers finally began to print some of this stuff. One reporter, Millard Purdy, came up, as I recall, with a full-page description of what the Democrats had attempted to do, and how they'd been frustrated. Purdy almost lost his job. He almost got demoted to the sports desk. At any rate, that was there in the newspaper for people to read, that the Democrats had really done their best from the legislative point of view to make good on their ('54) platform. (As a result, voters then) gave (them) another chance, and by '57 session, after the '56 election, Democrats felt a measure of success.

After that '55 session, however, I should mention one thing which will always stick in my memory. (It's) something of a tribute to Spark Matsunaga, and this is recorded in the newspapers. Sparky got up and made a fairly extensive speech, saying, "Politics is so dirty. Given what's happened (in) this session, I want to have no part of it. I want to get out; it's just not worth it because I have higher principles than this." Some other people tried to talk him out of it, and, after he cooled off a little bit, he thought better of it. So he continued on,
and he('s) had a rather successful political career, I think, to put it mildly.

MK: You know, in reading some of the other interviews, I think two interviewees said that maybe it was a blessing that Kauhane acted the way he did, and that all their measures were vetoed by the governor because, as they look back, much of their legislation was flawed. What would you say to that?

DT: (Sighs) Well, I'm not so sure that it was that flawed. It was hastily put together. But they had some good people there. It was certainly flawed in the mind of Samuel Wilder King. (Yet), they did have Tom Gill, as I recall, working as a senate attorney; I believe Patsy Mink was (also) working as a senate attorney, and they still had the Legislative Reference Bureau. I wasn't there, but the [Legislative] Reference Bureau was there to do, I think, a reasonably good job. So I think the idea that it was flawed, well, you'd have to prove it to me point by point. But, even as I take that position, I don't think it was perfect. Compared to the sloppy legislation which is passed today in our legislature, as of 1988 or 1990, let us say, I think it was probably pretty darn good legislation.

MK: Okay. I think we can go on to 1956 and Jack Burns' run for the delegateship [i.e., delegate to Congress].

DT: It was, really, the most important thing, I think, that happened in '56 besides the Democrats in the legislature getting reelected. Burns ran again for delegate, and this time, he defeated Elizabeth [P.] Farrington pretty handily. But, keep in mind, Frank Fasi was a good boy and didn't run. He (had been) there to sort of knock Jack Burns out. And, even though he was no great friend of Jack Burns—he didn't go out and campaign for him very hard—he (did) go along with Jack Burns as a candidate (in 1956). So Jack Burns was able to win. And (Democrats) increased their power, as I've already mentioned, in the legislature. (As a result), Jack Burns goes off to Washington as our delegate, and started a career which lasted until 1959 when statehood was achieved.

MK: And so you would attribute Burns' success in '56 to Fasi not getting involved?

DT: Well, that's one factor. In any election, there are all sorts of factors. One is that this was Jack's third race for delegate, and so he had a bigger public. Secondly, you knew the Democrats could win by this time. In '54, you didn't know that.

Going further, I think Jack Burns matured, and he was a quick learner in politics. He had a sort of poise (and) later developed pretty much of a grandfather image. Without much education, without all the college work and the accoutrements of today's politician, Jack Burns had an awful lot of common sense. And he was also raiding Allan Saunders' (library) at the university, his library. All during this period between ('52) and '56, in addition to the reading he'd done earlier, Jack Burns was further equipping himself as a self-taught political practitioner. By '56, he was able to show a better image. He was no longer the quiet, the shy, not quite as much (the) stand-in-the-corner person as he was back in the early [19]50s.

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number twenty, session [five], which took place on December 10, 1990.

DT: By 1953, after returning from leave in '52, which I spent on the Mainland, I ended up teaching at Stephens College for a semester, I decided that instead of two half-time jobs, I (really) had two full-time jobs, one at the Legislative Reference Bureau and one with the [University of Hawai'i] Department of Government. I asked to transfer to (the) government (department), since I still visualized myself as a teacher. Also, quite frankly, I wanted a little more political freedom, because if you were in the LRB, you didn't want to get too (involved with) politics. This sort of freed me up so I could do what I did in '54.

By '54, I was in the [University of Hawai'i] Department of Government, and in terms of political participation, I had the blessings of the department chairman, Allan Saunders, who was pretty much of a liberal person and an activist. (However), after '54—I did get involved heavily in '54, my direct political participation was less intense. In other words, I have never, since that time, devoted all of my energies to any one political campaign and neither have I made a political speech for anyone, other than Frank Fasi. I mentioned (that I did this) in early ('58).

I had a little bit of direct participation again in Fasi's senate campaign for the territorial senate. Other than that, I devoted a little more time to teaching and some night classes, which you had (to have) in those days in order to balance the (family) budget.

I was able to start my class in public opinion and propaganda, and we (began) doing campus polls. These were reproduced, or the results were given in Ka Leo [O Hawai'i, University of Hawai'i newspaper], but I could never get the young people to go out to the community. They were frightened. This was not something which had ever been done on a direct house-to-house basis. In other words, our polls were not based upon telephone polls or upon some backup postal card (effort), but the approach of polling that I wanted to experiment with, quite frankly, had to do with secret ballot, direct house-to-house contact. We were able to have that contact on campus, but I couldn't get them to go into polling (of the community). I was able to finally do that in '59, when we got statehood. That gave the young people a lot more confidence that this was their community, and they were able to approach the community.
We were able to organize the faculty senate during this period, and by that I mean we were able to get younger faculty members into the senate. The assistant professors and the instructors were given seats. And ultimately, even some of this distinction was dropped. Prior to this time, the faculty senate had been the province of the [full] professors and the associate professors. So . . .

MK: So that gave you more of a say, then, in university matters.

DT: That's right.

MK: Going back to your class in public opinion and propaganda, I'm wondering if any of your graduates did engage in this type of work, later, in local campaigns?

DT: In local campaigns, quite a few of them did. I think some of your SMS people, at various times, (also) engaged in some commercial polling. I know on a non-commercial basis, Arthur Park got involved. Later, Milton Goto got involved with me, that sort of thing.

MK: And they were all graduates of your classes.

DT: They had been in the class, (yes). (The) first time that the class actually went into the community to do polling was in the summer of '59. That was a class of fourteen people. They did three community polls. They paid for their own oil and gas; I paid for (only) a little bit of it. The (major) crew leader was a Bill [William N.] McIntire. So, we had polls in '59. We did another community poll in 1960, where we had a little bit of luck this time. We had a close race between President Kennedy and Richard Nixon. (In that race, we indicated a Kennedy victory by a narrow margin. After a recount, this actually happened. Then, we did a final poll from the university in 1961. However, the university would not give me any support for doing this sort of thing. Rather, they frowned upon it. They were afraid we'd get sued, but they didn't want to provide any liability insurance. We had no funds for doing it. Even though I tried to get them to set up a polling operation on campus, they said "No way." Well, I figured (some of) this was an imposition upon students (and their resources). The December '61 poll, which was published in the newspapers, indicated that Burns was way ahead [in the race for governor against incumbent Quinn]. (After that), we suspended the poll, and McIntire and I did a final paper, which is included in the proceedings of the Hawai‘i Academy of Sciences, which was not social science, but all sciences. We delivered that (paper) at the old PRI building in Makiki. (Then, we) sort of hung it up. Later polls were done by former students such as I mentioned. Arthur Park did them for Tom Gill, and some other people (did the same).

Then, from the period 1973 until 1981, roughly a seven-year period, with Milton Goto, who had been a student in earlier years, we did some commercial polling under the rubric of Public Affairs Advisory Services. Once again, we had uncanny success. We were within plus or minus 2.3 (percentage points) in all validating situations, in all of our polls. Except for that one experience, back in '59 with the Fasi-Fong [U.S. Senate] race, we were always inside of our plus or minus four (estimate), except the record will show—and these records should be still in the (chuckles) university library—we were way off in the race on Kaua‘i, in the [Eduardo] Malapit race of about (1978). . . . His (second) race, I think, against the current mayor of Kaua‘i. It showed that he was going to be defeated. This was when they were having a big argument over the hotel that was going to be located (outside Līhu‘e). Our last
poll showed that Malapit would be defeated. But, because of a lot of factors which—since this was a commercial operation—which we helped to generate, the entire (Kaua‘i) legislative delegation came out strongly on behalf of Malapit, asked all their people to go Malapit all of a sudden, and so Malapit was able to win. If you want to count that in our polling, sure we missed it, but this was akin to just what happened in the ’90 election on behalf of Dan Akaka. There was an all-out Democratic effort for him throughout the state. So it was on Kaua‘i that year. There was an all-out effort on behalf of Malapit. So he won the primary. Not by much, but he defeated the current mayor.

That is a précis of all of our interest in polling. It all started out from campus polling back in ’54, ’55, ’56, ’57. Our first community polls out of the university were done in the summer of ’59 with the statehood primary and the statehood general election.

MK: Okay, as I look at this outline, we’re down to 1957, December. And the outline says, “A bombshell hit me in December, 1957.” (DT chuckles) This, I don’t know anything about, so...

DT: Well, this is a sort of a regrettable situation. The reason I put it in is to show that the degrees of freedom that one had hoped for and thought that one had within the university, to participate in politics as long as it was done judiciously and reasonably (were limited). The university was no great paradise for this. I’d had a lot of degrees of freedom in ’54, in campaigning for Fasi, although there had been some criticism with this. (However), all of a sudden—and I was able to figure this out only in later years. I’d been busy on campus with campus politics and I thought at first that this was “it,” that I was speaking up in the faculty senate more than ever before. [Nineteen] fifty-seven had not been, necessarily, a big political year, except down in the session, which I’ve already discussed, the Democratic legislation (that) was passing. All of a sudden, one afternoon, unknown to me, a few members of the government department dropped by in faculty housing out (on) Eckart Road, (and) visited my wife with a strange message, “Hey, Dan’s cracking up! Don’t you think he ought to go see a psychiatrist? (Don’t) you think he should accept medical assistance?”

And Elsie says, “I don’t know what you’re talking about!” And then, she had enough presence of mind, she said, “Go talk, have your talk with Dan!”

They said, “No, no.”

(She) said, “Well, why don’t you talk with him!” And so, they dutifully left, because they couldn’t get any help out of Elsie to get me in to see a psychiatrist.

When I heard about this, I was angry, to say the least. I met with the person in the government department that I suspected had probably been the generator of this, and I said, “What am I doing wrong? Why do you think I’m cracking up? Why should I go to see a doctor for some mental illness?”

And he said, “Well, you’re really all tied up with this Gallas case.”

And I said, “I’m just one of a whole bunch of people.” This is really led by Harriet (Holt) Joesting, who had been working with Nesta Gallas, and had been a former employee of Arthur Akina over in territorial civil service. I said, “There are plenty of other people to keep
this going." I also told (him) I didn't appreciate bringing my wife into this, whatever I'd been doing, whatever I was guilty of. Why should they bring my wife into it—particularly since she was pregnant at the time, with our third child. So, I just abruptly dropped out of the Gallas case, affair. Interestingly enough, no one (in the department) ever brought it up again. There was one local member of the government department who, to his credit, refused to go along with (this episode), saying he didn't see any basis for doing something like this at all.

In retrospect, however, I think probably what happened was that this Gallas case was very sensitive to a man I've already mentioned, Charlie Kendall, in the Hawai'i Government Employees Association. He had taken at least two members of the— as I recall, it was a three-member civil service commission—back to the Mainland on one of his visits with "experts," and he had wined and dined them and gotten them to agree that they would fire Nesta Gallas when they got home, which they did. Well, if anybody was going to try to help out and keep Nesta Gallas in her job—it would be (the) group of people (supporting Gallas). One way to get back at this group of people, was to get at Tuttle, who was then a (civil service) state employee. At that time Charlie Kendall was big enough to throw the fright of daylight into the more orthodox members of the government department. This was really a vicious battle between the two, (Nesta Gallas and Charlie Kendall). Nesta Gallas ultimately took her case to court, and I believe, won a judgment of some sort. She had been a former employee of Arthur Akina in territorial civil service. And they differed—she was a sort of go-by-the-book sort of person, whereas Arthur Akina came from a political family and he was willing to "ride with the punch" on behalf of the Governor Quinn forces. Also, Nesta (Gallas) had more in common with the new, young Democrats; Arthur Akina was tied in, still, with the Republicans. Well, they would write letters, "Dear Mrs. Gallas," "Dear Mr. Akina." And they would not speak to one another, that's how far this went. Well, I may be wrong, but my feeling was that (Kendall, et cetera), wanted to get me out of (supporting Gallas), and that (the department members) had been frightened into doing this by Charlie Kendall.

At any rate, I think the record, at this time, in 1990, will show that I wasn't cracking up. I've done election-night returns, I've done all sorts of things (since). I've continued to teach classes without ever going to see a psychiatrist. (However), the implications for the university (were thought-provoking). I think that (such) pressures did exist, but (thankfully) they did not become overwhelming, so that I remained on at the university for almost ten years after that. No one ever mention(ed) (this) again. Quite frankly, I hope those people that approached Elsie, and at least the one that I talked to, were a little bit ashamed of themselves.

MK: Did any other members of your faculty ever approach you on any other matter, in terms of your political involvement?

DT: Well no, (not really). The only place where some people felt that maybe I had suffered was (that) I (was) one of the few people that continued on as an assistant professor for about eleven or twelve years. Compared to today's rapid promotions, I [am] sure (that I was) "stuck" in rank for a long time. (However), I could still pay the bills, and I've never been a great one for rank or anything of that sort. And up until 1964, they could (and did) always use against me (the fact that) I didn't have a Ph.D. degree. Of course, that makes you the great whipping boy of all the Ph.D.'s around, (saying) that you're not going to make it, (that) you're not going to take the time, (et cetera). All that sort of nonsense that goes into this sort of thing. I felt it all, but at least I think I got the last laugh on (them). I did finish off (the) degree, (chuckles) in due time, (1964), even though my lines of communication were about
5,000 miles long.

MK: Okay. And I guess we can move on to 1958, then.

DT: Mm, by all means. Nineteen fifty-eight, I think the spirits of the university faculty were high and increasing. We had a lot of morale. We brought in to the University of Hawai‘i, throughout the [19]50s, up to this point, an awful lot of people who were very young (and) they were well equipped. They really got caught up in this whole thing of what Jack Burns would call “destiny.” There was snack-bar talk, and I should memorialize here (chuckles) that old army-green snack bar that they had at the university. (It) was an old army barracks type of thing, (put) right in front of what’s now the campus center. And there was great snack-bar talk of a possible U.S. service academy for peace. You wonder where the Matsunaga idea of a peace academy comes from, well, I would suggest that it comes right out of the old snack bar. There was talk of training in Asian history. There was talk of foreign languages and training in diplomacy. I was particularly interested, given my field of political science or government, I was especially interested in training programs, intern programs for political parties, for public administration. Dr. Meller had considerable interest in an intern program for training people in the legislature. However, a training center for public administration and a master’s degree in public administration got shot down by a majority of the people in the government department. Something which I regret because I think we should have had and could have had a training center and a master’s program in public administration back in the late 1950s. The idea, however, has remained alive. It got shot down over and over again because of internal politics. But today, in 1990, I think they have the money to actually (and) finally set up a master’s program in public administration.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is videotape number twenty-one, the last of session number [five] with Dan Tuttle.

MK: Tape number twenty-one with Dan Tuttle. And, I guess we’re going on with the 1958 election.

DT: Well, the 1958 territorial election really confirmed all of the Democratic gains, I would suggest. Jack Burns was reelected as delegate to Congress. And mirabile dictu of all things, after reapportionment had occurred just before this, Frank Francis Fasi got elected to the territorial senate. Meanwhile, the morale of faculty increased as funding for the future seemed more and more secure. The legislature didn’t have to worry too much about vetoes (from Governor Quinn and) that sort of thing.

By this time, I got—well, I said was immersed to a degree in the fairly simple Fasi campaign for 1958. But some other interesting things for a student of government had occurred. We had a very vital League of Women Voters at the time. Ruth [D.] Miho, the wife of [Reverend] Paul [K.] Miho of (Atherton) House fame, and the Miho family that’s been active in politics, was active in the League of Women Voters. Marion [G.] Saunders, the wife of Dr. Allan Saunders at the university (was also active). That’s a little bit before, I think, Mary George’s time, I’m not sure that she’d hit Hawai‘i yet. But people of the Mary George type, far too many of them for me to even remember, they had really gone out to get something accomplished on (the) municipal level; this was sort of their sphere of activity in those days.
They centered upon two things, (a) home rule charter for Honolulu and a new Honolulu jail. (They ultimately got both of these things.)

The old Honolulu jail, at that time, was a bunch of sheet metal in Iwilei. All you had to do to get out of jail was literally (to) walk out. You might have to crawl over a piece of sheet metal to get out, (but) it was no jail at all, really. (At the same time), Honolulu had been growing. We had a few crime problems around, (although) they weren't as bad as they are today. At any rate, believe it or not, with a friendly legislature, these two things got accomplished by the Democrats, (by) the young Democrats in the legislature, with, of course, the urging and the testimony of the League of Women Voters. Of course, Dr. Saunders, who had a lot of former students who had suddenly shown up—students at the UH in the [19]40s, not to mention those in the [19]50s, but in the [19]40s—they were now in the legislature. If you'll check the record, one of the early members of the League of Women Voters of Honolulu was Allan Saunders (who insisted on equal rights). His wife was engaged in the League of Women Voters, somebody like Paul Miho's wife, Ruth Miho, was active. They were sort of counselors to our young Democrats. The young Democrats accepted them as such. And they thought, "Why not?" And so, the charter (bill) got enacted. We immediately went into having a whole [Honolulu] Charter Commission (go to work). The Hālawa jail started getting built.

I remember devoting a lot of time to testifying in front of the Honolulu Charter Commission. I mentioned Bob Dodge was there as vice chairman, Ballard Atherton of Hawaiian Telephone [Company] was there (as chairman), and was a very fair-minded sort of spokesman of business. He was a little bit offbeat of the usual Atherton stereotype. I remember on one occasion, I was not able to testify before the commission, still living on Eckart Road. When he found out, (that is when) Ballard Atherton found out that I could not come down and deliver the testimony. He says, "I don't agree with you Dan." And I've forgotten, for the life of me I can't remember what the issue was about. But he says, "I do not agree with you Dan, but I think it ought to be in the record. May I drop by your house, and I'll take it down to the commission myself." Now here was the chairman of the [Honolulu] Charter Commission, and so here was this fellow who disagreed with what I was saying, coming out to the house. And he did. (He) came out (to the house and I) handed it to him, (and) thanked him. I went ahead to my class, or whatever commitment that I had. He read it into the record. There were others who served on—[Suyeki] Okumura, who was very much tied in with (the) [Makiki Christian] Church, is it? I'm not . . .

MK: Okumura.

DT: Okumura, okay. You know him, okay. All right, he was a member of the commission. Tom Murphy of the UH history department was a member. Eureka [B.] Forbes, (a GOP stalwart), was on that commission. Well, here was a fairly well-balanced commission. I'm sorry I can't remember all their names, because they were all good troupers, and it was a pleasure to (work with them). I might have (had) a little bit of influence with this group.

After the charter got (drafted), we had to develop a citizens' committee for the charter. (It had to be adopted by the voters.) We were probably over our heads, but Marion Saunders and yours truly went to work (to set up the committee). As I recall, we got George [S. W.] Hong, who's now a fairly big corporate (chuckles) attorney around town to, I think, serve as one of the co-chairs, (I believe). A fellow ("Moe" [Maurice M.] Lipton) that had an auction house [Lipton's World Art & Auction Gallery] had an employee by the name of Bob Roberts. He
donated a place down on King Street, in midtown Honolulu. It's about where the Hawai'i National Bank was located for a while; it's now been torn down. At any rate, they were selling sort of wholesale shoes in the back; Bob Roberts was (there all the time). We had the front (area available) for (the) citizens for the charter commission. We published some brochures, and, at least, we generated (whatever) amount of public interest there was. The Honolulu charter was ultimately adopted. For a political scientist, once again, here was action politics, and this was a big thrill. I think it was a worthwhile cause and, at least, we still have a measure of home rule in Honolulu. In the wake of this, home rule ultimately came later to each of the neighbor islands.

So that's what was so much fun about the 1958 election period because I think the charter was finally adopted in '58, I may be wrong, but I think I'm right.

MK: But in those days, when a charter was to be adopted, did you go item by item when the people went to make their decisions?

DT: No, that [Honolulu] Charter Commission had the good judgment (to) mak(e) it as a package, so there was no confusion (chuckles), which we later had about doing this or doing that. As I recall, it was simply, "Are you for it or are you against it?" We pretty much had that same situation in 1970. . . . Let's see, the second go-around, I guess, which (started) in late 1968, (when) I had the fun of serving on the commission myself. That is today's current charter, because the next time around, ten years later, (it) got hung up, had some of the same problems we had in constitutional amendments, with having this whole list of how do you vote, and if you vote for the entire package, or you vote with an exception or two, (and was defeated by the voters). Fortunately, that first charter commission (had) a good crew; the charter passed with considerable ease.

MK: Now, as we have the election of '58, looking at the notes here, it talks about confusion over results. And this I'm not sure what this is about . . .

DT: Well, the confusion—the results, at that time, still, although television had come to Hawai'i in '53, election returns were not broadcast over television. They were (broadcast) over radio (in 1958) and, really about only two radio stations were doing this. KGMB, radio was the principal conduit, and KGU probably did some. (KGMB returns were) presided over by the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin editor by the name of Riley Allen. Riley would go on and on, reading numbers. He only mentioned (numbers, not) percentages. (It was done by) precinct(s), the "fifth of the fourth votes," (et cetera, also) partial returns, so many votes for A, B, C, D. Well, there was a young person who had been a student in my class (talking with Allen) and the Fasis, and Kohashis, and Tuttle(s) couldn't figure out what was happening, sitting out at our house, which by this time was in upper 'Āina Haina. Charley Parmiter was working with Riley and was, (as I've said), a former student. I made an appointment (later) to meet him, (Parmiter), at (The) Wisteria (Restaurant) and say, "Charley, let me show you how it can be done. Here is how we can project election returns. You can tell people exactly who is ahead, who is likely to win, in the space of half an hour to an hour." I knew we could do it because, (as I think I mentioned earlier, we had sort of "dry-labbed" this in the '54 Fasi campaign. Sandy [Sanford] Zalburg is probably the only person [who] remembers we did (this), except for George Yuen that I mentioned had worked with us, that sort of thing. I went (on) with Charley Parmiter, (and) he says, "Dan, I don't understand what you're talking about! I want to be a sports reporter. And I'm going to tell the old man to invite you down to
work in the general election of '58."

Well, this system of projecting election returns—no computers involved—involved a lot of homework (about) past precinct results and percentages from each of the precincts on O'ahu and from the neighbor islands. But, believe it or not, in due time I got a very formal, precise letter from Riley Allen, saying, "I'd like to invite you, and the Kohashis, and anybody else that's within reason (who) would like to come down, we'll make space for you. We will pay you the same amount as we will one who calls in a result from a precinct." (However, my "crew") didn't care about the money. We wanted to show what could be done. (This included) Mr. Lawrence [S.] Kohashi, (who) was one of the early AJA CPAs, Bob Inouye, (who) was an accountant who worked in his office, (and) Dorothy Kohashi, (who) had a lot of depth knowledge, because she had been (a) county (secretary) of the Democratic party as early as '54. We went down and (went) "on the air" in '58. Things worked out very well (for) us. Now this was before the networks were projecting election returns. They didn't have their computers hooked up (as yet), and to the best of my knowledge, no one on any national basis at all was doing any of these early predictions (as to) who would win. We were so successful that we were invited back when the '59 elections came. Then, we continued doing that, election after election, until either '84 or '86.

MK: You know, in those early years, that particular '58, were there any races that you missed?

DT: On election night?

MK: Uh huh, were there . . .

DT: Thank goodness, thank all the powers that be, we, to the best of my knowledge, we never misled anyone. Our big night came in the election of '59, when Jack Burns took the early lead, and we said Bill Quinn would be the first [elected] governor of [the state of] Hawai‘i. The sponsor of the program, (the) Pineapple Research Institute headed by Joyce [O.] Roberts. He worked for PRI (as their executive), said, "Dan, you gotta quit saying this, think of the sponsor."

And I said, "I don't care about the sponsor. I'm more concerned about my reputation."

Well, we were doing this in a goldfish bowl, obviously. He says, "The town is rocking. You know, you gotta quit doing this." But, finally the results came along, (and) told that Quinn took the lead.

And to this day, Bill Quinn or Mrs. [Nancy W.] Quinn, if I meet them in the supermarket—particularly Mrs. Quinn—will say, "Gee, Dan, I remember the night when you really saved our lives!"

Well, we didn't save anybody's life, obviously. We just gave them early insight into who was going to win. Well, I mention this because, in terms of all the political involvement, this added to my other duties, because it took a lot of time. No one ever realized how much—when we (were) still using paper ballots—how much time and effort went into preparation(s) for one of these broadcasts. But that's how the label got started that Dan Tuttle has a "crystal ball." Over and over again, I tried to shake this label—no way. I mean, once something (like this) gets started, (watch out). If you want publicity or you want notoriety, do
something like that, because I got plenty of it. Of course, that sort of tied in with the polls which we had going on. So, if you talk about being well known in the community without being engaged in politics, gee, I had it (for a while). (Chuckles)

MK: You know, with that kind of notoriety, did politicians seek you out? To help them make decisions on whether or not to enter one particular race or another?

DT: Well, they tried. And actually, I sort of withdrew myself, once we had the polls. Not so much election night, because the votes were already in on election night. But as a result of the published polls out of the university, I did my best to withdraw. I tried to make these (generally) available. When we did our last poll, I explained this in great length to Jack Burns, (and) congratulated him on being the next governor of Hawai‘i. This was a poll done in December ’61. (Then), I went down to Washington Place, even with Bob Craig, who was still there, doing polls for the Republicans (present). I explained it to the Quinn forces, and I remember very distinctly Bill Quinn saying, “Well, I don’t (question) what you’re doing, but, I don’t believe what you say. I think your poll (is) wrong. But assuming—I guess you think it’s right, what would you suggest I do?”

And I said, “If I were you, Governor, I would go out and I would campaign to the hilt.” He didn’t believe me this time, you see, while we were doing polls. (However), he really should have believed us, I think. (Nevertheless), it was a really exciting time.

We were (also) sought out in this sense. I can recall the phone ringing at two, three, and four o’clock in the morning. People saying, “Is it true what we read in the newspaper? Are you saying this? Yes, do you think this is what’s going to happen?”

I would respond to this, “You have everything that I have to say in the newspaper.” These people were obviously people in bars, talking with their friendly neighbors and making, shall we say, very friendly bets. (MK chuckles) I know, you asked for the ramifications of this. The politicians didn’t seek you out so much as other people would, like our very able pediatrician, at the time, was always interested in this. Later, I discovered that he was quite a (gambler) himself. And so, this is how I felt it. Of course, by this time, given (the fact that), quite literally I had grown up with the people who took office in ’54, well, it was probably the most fun period of my life. Because when you take ’58, when we did the first projections, (the) ’59 elections, and then add to that the chance to go back with media to the national political conventions, why, this (was) probably the happiest, political time of Tuttle’s life.

MK: Okay, shall we end here, then?

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: The following is session number five with Dan Tuttle. It begins with tape number twenty-two and it was taped on December 12, 1990. The interviewers were Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto and Warren Nishimoto.
Okay, this is session five with Dan Tuttle, tape number twenty-two on December 12, 1990. And I guess we can pick up with, let’s see, election night 1958, primary night ’58.

Okay, I think I ought to mention that ’58 election was really quite exciting. I (have) described a situation whereby we suddenly found ourselves on the air, on the radio, with Riley Allen of the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin, thanks to an assist from Charley Parmiter. (This) general election night was a lot of fun, it worked out very well. I can vividly recall, among those persons sitting in with our broadcast (group) was Betty [Elizabeth P.] Farrington. She was second-guessing me at about every turn, as we would try to project election returns. Roger [H.] Coryell was sort of the emcee—the radio announcer, the anchor I guess you could call it, if you want to think of those terms in radio. Riley Allen was there, as one would expect, as publisher, I mean as the editor of the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin. Several other people (were) around. I mentioned Joyce Roberts, I remember him more vividly, not in ’58 but in ’59, (since) the Pineapple [Research Institute] normally sponsored election nights.

I remember the ’58 election night because it was on that occasion that I got my sign-off for all of our subsequent election night broadcasts. That (was), that, “We owe as much to the losers as we do to the winners, because they’ve given us a choice. As long as you have that choice, democracy is secure.” Well, this came to my mind—I don’t know where I heard it or read it, I’m sure I didn’t dream it up, but at any rate, it just popped into my mind. (As) Farrant Turner (came into the old [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin news plant)—I had chatted with him throughout the campaign. His chances were pretty dismal, running for delegate to Congress. He had a very fine reputation, however, (especially) among the fellows who had been in the military, because he was a military man himself—when he came in, he and his wife, I told him that, and a tear or two streamed down the old, tough soldier’s face. I thought, well if it means that much, saying just that to Farrant Turner, maybe it’s worth reminding everybody, that we owe a lot to the losers, as well as the winners. Because “everybody” celebra(te)s after an election, you know how it is, (and) “everybody” forgets the loser, “Who’s that person?”

There were a lot of other things happening (at that election), because we elected, well, for the first time, an enlarged legislature. The legislature had increased to seventy-six members, from what had been earlier, I guess if my memory’s correct, forty. O’ahu now had a majority in the legislature, whereas under territorial status, before this reapportionment, the neighbor islands had a two-thirds majority in each house. So, great things were beginning to happen, even in 1958. Of course, the greatest of all events came the following year in ’59, with (the advent of) statehood.

Who were the proponents behind the reapportionment?

As I recall, I believe, the person who filed the lawsuit was an attorney by the name of John [F.] Dyer. (He) had filed suit, and this was even before the days of one-man, one-vote, because of misapportionment. So what they did after this court case—and I can’t discuss the details of this because I didn’t follow it that carefully [Dyer vs. Kazuhisa Abe, 1955]. (In effect), we really adopted the standby or hope chest constitution, this segment of it, the properly apportioned legislature, in advance of statehood. When statehood came, there was not much difference. Of course, some seats were opened up, so we actually opened the doors to a lot of new seats in the legislature and to a lot of new candidates. As I’ve tried to remember these, and talk about these people, I talk in terms of the class of ’54 and the class of ’58-’59. And of course, now in our legislature, I believe they’re all gone. I don’t believe
there's really any of them around. Certainly as (to) the class of '54, Stanley Hara was the last member of that class to serve in the legislature, and if I'm not mistaken, I think they're (virtually) all gone from '58-'59.

MK: Oh, I think maybe there's one exception, maybe Senator [Mamoru] Yamasaki.

DT: He was—yeah, okay, okay. Yeah, all right, he may be it. He may be the new Stanley Hara, shall we say. (Chuckles)

WN: So there weren't—this reapportionment drive, did it have anything to do with O'ahu legislators lobbying for something like that? To get greater representation . . .

DT: Oh, yes. I'm not saying it's just one attorney, but his name is on, I think, the lawsuit. There were all sorts of people who said, "This is wrong, it should be changed." But this was not the age or the period or the era where people were picketing the legislature because of misapportionment. [Prior to reapportionment, twenty-seven of the forty legislators represented the neighbor islands.] There were people, a lot of people saying this. Nobody much did anything about it until the lawsuit was filed. Then when it came out successfully, something had to be done. Hawai'i was not too anxious to move (on this), but we did move, and we had the enlarged legislature in '58. I'm sorry I can't remember any more of the dynamics, except I do know that those of us, I'm sure, who were teaching government at the time could wax eloquent about how terrible this (had been). We weren't the only area, as a territory, that was (reapportioning). Illinois couldn't even get a constitutional amendment passed because it was so difficult to amend the constitution and you couldn't change the legislature unless it was done constitutionally. (Such situations) ultimately led to the one-man, one-vote decision of the United States Supreme Court.

MK: You know, before we get to the new faces of 1958, I wonder if you could, maybe discuss how political dynamics were affected by this new reapportionment.

DT: Well, more people (got) involved; (there was) more interest. We had some single-member districts, (and) some multi-member districts, which I felt was a very satisfactory solution. Jack Burns differed, and I can remember arguing violently on the floor with Jack about this. He favored a single-member district (plan), which we have now, thanks to the same Samuel P. King, as a federal judge, who had debated with Dan Inouye out at the 'Āina Haina debate. More people, by this time of course, had become naturalized citizens. (A) fairly large population of babies were growing up, and so politically, Hawai'i really came alive in '58. By the time we got to '59, the town was ready to celebrate indeed. This is illustrated by the fact—I may refer to this later—by the fact that the turnout at the '59 statehood election was, I think, 94.7 percent of the registered voters. If you look at it now, (that) seems to be almost incredible. (However), this shows you how lively politics was, and, for a person trained in political science, this was seventh heaven.

MK: And then, in the legislature itself, you know, with more O'ahu representatives than neighbor island representatives, how did it affect the way the neighbor island representatives . . .

DT: Well, the presiding officers suddenly became—I haven't been teaching this for a number of years—I think that now, you would say, their leadership really comes (mostly) from O'ahu. The neighbor islands are there simply out of force of habit, almost. (Now), this minority of
neighbor island (legislators) must coalesce with a certain faction of O‘ahu in an attempt to get anything. Otherwise, they would be frozen out completely. (Of course it would be shortsighted to “freeze out” your neighbor island people (entirely). Now that they’re in the minority, it (could) be very easy to happen, and it could be rather catastrophic if this were to happen in an island state as Hawai‘i.

I have great affection for the personnel in ’54, (the) class of ’54 (with so many) young Democrats, because they were the Dan Inouyes, the Sparky Matsunagas, the Anna Kahanamokus. You can just go on and on, (the) Stanley Haras, (the) Elmer Cravalho(s), that sort of thing. I have similar affection for the class of ’58–’59. I think we had a sort of second wave of new people jumping in to fill in these new seats. Donald [D. H.] Ching comes to my mind. I’ve forgotten whether John [T.] Ushijima was—I think he was ’54, but he might have even been ’59. [John T. Ushijima was first elected in 1959 as a state senator from the Big Island.]

MK: Tom Gill.

DT: Tom Gill, Patsy Mink, by this time, I guess, had jumped into the fray. She didn’t run the first time, in ’54, so she (ran) in ’56. She moved subsequently, somewhere (chuckles) along (the line) from the house to the senate. [Mink moved to the senate in 1958, after serving one house term.] That, of course, opened up another house seat. So these were all very idealistic and very capable people. There were any number of Phi Beta Kappa keys, as I mentioned. Masato Doi came to my mind, I think, when we chatted last. And so they were (a talented bunch of people); it was an exciting time.

MK: Maybe we can go through some of these new faces. Like Tom Gill, what were your impressions of him, when he became a legislator in ’58?

DT: He had worked for a long time, in the house of representatives, as a house attorney, I believe. [Gill was territorial senate attorney in 1955, and administrative assistant to the house Speaker in 1957.] He went to work right away to try to get something done on land reform. I can recall going down any number of nights to the old [‘Iolani] Palace, where Tom Gill was hard at work on some proposed land legislation, and trying to lend a hand. He’d call me (or) sometimes I’d go down and just find Tom there by himself. He (had been O‘ahu Democratic) county chairman back in 1954; he got elected at the old Linekona School, when he and Dorothy Kohashi sort of took over the O‘ahu county committee. He was very close to the Teamsters union, with Art Rutledge, (and to) the hotel workers. He developed a sort of an underdog, a chip-on-your-shoulder lingo, almost a union lingo. He didn’t have the world’s greatest personality, that’s for darned sure. But, (he was) very akamai, and he was one of the intellectual leaders, I guess you would say, of the young Democrats.

MK: You know, later on, Tom Gill aspires to executive office, rather than a legislative position. Was he more an executive than a legislator or a legislator more than an executive?

DT: In many ways, I think he was probably more of a legislator, but he was trained well enough, and talented enough, (so) he could shift gears, from one to the other. I think Tom Gill had that capacity (to make shifts), but he did not have the capacity to wait. He was impatient, almost like a Frank Fasi. He wanted (action and speed). I (often) differed with him, (for example), he ran for the wrong offices most of the time. He may have waited too long even
to run for the (state) legislature. When he decided to run for lieutenant governor, I mean, (when he decided to run) for the House of Representatives in Washington D.C. [in 1962], I felt that he was trained in Hawai'i government, territorial and state government, (and that) he should stay home. He would not do it any other way, he had to run for the U.S. House. (Thus), he runs for the U.S. House. Stays there one term, and, horror of horrors, he (promptly) runs for United States Senate [in 1964]. Gets licked. Then, when he's back home, he develops interest in state administrative offices (and) runs for lieutenant governor [in 1966]. (He) gets elected. He could and should have become the third (state) governor of Hawai'i. Jack Burns would have supported him if he'd had been, quote, “a good boy,” been a (helpful) lieutenant governor. He was the logical choice because Jack recognized that he was well educated, very akamai, a local boy that had made good, and so forth. (However), war (soon) broke out between Burns and Gill, because of old factionalism within the Democratic party, once they'd barely gotten elected, which occurred, I guess, in 1966. Now we're jumping ahead here, when we talk about Tom Gill.

When all was said and done, Tom Gill made many contributions to Hawai'i politics during this entire period. Some of them are well known because of the offices he held, and others of them are not so well known because of the spadework he did as an attorney in the legislature. To come back to it, his lack of ability in getting elected probably stems from his personality. He could—well, my wife, to this day, I'm quite sure she voted for Tom because she recognizes that he was a very talented person, but I don't think she ever really got to like Tom very well because if he'd come up to us, he'd never speak to her, he'd speak to me, shake my hand, and act like she was never there. Well, I don't think it's just my wife, but other people would recognize this (fault, too). He was also sarcastic and, in later years, even became pretty cynical. Not that I blame him, there's plenty to get cynical about in politics. Certainly, he deserves a place in the history of what happened politically in Hawai'i in this period after World War II. That answer your question? (Laughs)

MK: You know, you had mentioned that Burns would probably have been happy if he [Gill] had become the next governor, as long as he was, quote, unquote, “a good boy.” What makes you think that?

DT: (Burns) told me. I asked him. Because I became something of a bridge between the two, particularly after the Fasi episode got washed out of my hair or their hair and their mind(s). Jack Burns and I were able to bury the hatchet in 1960. So I was quite interested because this is a battle we'll want to talk about when we get to, say, 1966, I believe it was. Jack Burns did not want Tom Gill on the ticket, but Tom Gill got on the ticket and they were stuck with one another. So Gill was lieutenant governor and Burns was governor. The question was, now that they've gotten all this fighting out of their system, my feeling was these two guys have got to get along. It was my estimation that, “Let's do everything we can to get along.” What I tried to do was to tell Tom Gill, (as) nicely as I could, “Bide your time, get along with Jack. He's no devil, he's no pariah. He's got a lot of skills which don't necessarily come as a result of going to a college or university." Jack had those skills, and was very dedicated to “destiny,” as Jack would phrase it. He believed in Hawai'i's people. His first cabinet showed that he made sure that all groups that he could represent in his cabinet were represented. Pretty darn good cabinet, (too). Tom would not stand still. Tom had to play his own thing and in the long run, I guess Tom probably suffered the most as a result of this. It doesn't diminish Tom Gill in my mind at all, but he could've done better, put it that way.
MK: I think another new face in '58 was David [C.] McClung.

DT: David McClung came from Michigan, he was not a local boy. He'd been a labor leader, AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations], and went to, as I recall, the law school at the University of Michigan, which has a pretty darn good reputation. Dave roughly belonged in the Heen-Gill-Fasi, if you want to include (all of these), factions, as opposed to Burns. He again, was a pretty brilliant sort of fellow and had a lot of good ideas. Ultimately, (he) became president of the (state) senate. As a matter of fact, I had a lot of dealings (with him) when I was here at the Hawai'i Educational Association, twenty to twenty-five years ago. I found that he was very straightforward. I could always trust him, (and I) hope he felt that he could trust me. I'll have stories to tell about him as of 1966-71 period, later on. His only (deep-seated) problem was (alcohol). He was able to bury the hatchet with Jack Burns, but then he tried to build a sauna bath down in the new state capitol. (Laughs) The newspapers got a hold of (his idea), and they spread pictures of (a) sauna bath and this (episode) really did Dave McClung in, politically, that is. Not too many years after (this) he prematurely got sick and passed away, which was a tragedy. I think Dave would have done even more good things for the state of Hawai'i, had it not been for (his early death).

MK: Okay, we can stop there.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview, this is videotape number twenty-three, session number five.

MK: Okay, tape number twenty-three, with Dan Tuttle. I think we're just talking about David McClung, and maybe we can continue with him, how he got into politics as a malihini from the Mainland and his ties with the unions . . .

DT: Well, he was, you know, he was an attorney, he was tied in, back in Michigan, with the AFL-CIO. One of his first jobs was with, I think, (the) United Auto Workers. This was an old tie to the CIO unions, although United Auto Workers later departed from them. He didn’t belong to the old American Federation of Labor, you see they were separate at one time in our (earlier) history. He didn’t belong to that faction. He came over here, got in closely with the Gill faction, the Heen faction, (and) the Art Rutledge group. And Art Rutledge had ties, both with the Teamsters union, Jimmy Hoffa and his union, and with the AFL-CIO, but not necessarily with the auto workers. Art Rutledge's hotel workers went with (the) AFL-CIO, whereas I think at the time Dave McClung arrived, UAW was out of everything, they were on their own. Dave McClung had a master's degree as well as a law degree. At that stage, he was the best-educated member of the Hawai'i legislature when he ran, and he'd been around for a while before he ran for office.

Oh, one big problem, I suppose, with Dave McClung, and one I guess should be candid, when we're talking on (this) occasion, he had a propensity to drink. When he'd assume (tense) levels of "responsibility" I have seen Dave inebriated. When he ran for higher office, I think as he did on one occasion or two, this question was brought up to me. All I could think of, and it certainly applied to Dave McClung, Abraham Lincoln had to deal with a question about Ulysses S. Grant. "Tell me what brand he drinks, so I can send some to the
rest of my generals," said Abraham Lincoln. My feeling about Dave McClung was, compared to some of his colleagues in the legislature, find out what brand Dave drinks and let's give it to some of his friends or enemies, because they'd be better for it (chuckles) you see. He was that type of person. I don't know whether it hastened his death a lot, but it certainly didn't help. Dave could function better than any other individual I know, under the influence of liquor. He never really (totally) lost it. I'd never seen him publicly embarrass anybody. There (were) times, oh, even at four or five o'clock in the morning, later when I was with HEA, I would be talking with Dave, and he would be candidly telling me, "Look, I promised you this and then on one occasion I promised you this bill would pass, and I tell you, Dan, it ain't gonna make it. Will you settle for a resolution?"

Of course you would. Here was a guy who had literally exhausted himself, really, on behalf of the public in trying to get agreement on legislation. In order to keep going, he'd drunk some. I can't be critical, or very critical, of anybody that does that.

MK: We know that David McClung was very close to Tom Gill and, we were talking about the union ties between these two men, maybe you can talk about that.

DT: Well, Tom Gill became something like a son, a political son, to Art Rutledge. And Art Rutledge visualized him really as sort of (a) son. Dave McClung was never that close to Art Rutledge, but Dave McClung had his own group. Carl Guntert is a name that comes to my mind, (a prominent) AFL-CIO functionar(y). UAW, of course, was no (special) force in Hawai'i, we don't build automobiles here. (However), the entire AFL(-CIO) group at the time. . . . I'm trying to remember even some of the younger people that moved in (was). Dave McClung became visualized as sort of a patron—I want to say patron saint, but at any rate, he was one of the (major) boys among the AFL-CIO firmament. I think he had great ties with the people who worked down at the airport (and with) all of the unions that were servicing the various airlines out there. Well, here again, you had Dave McClung making his own history of sorts, (with) Gill. One of the reasons why Jack Burns lost in '59, as he ran for governor, was the fact that people such as Dave McClung and Tom Gill were—they weren't out there opposing him—sitting on their hands. You see, Burns' ties were with a different union, the ILWU. The ILWU did not have very much aloha for the Teamsters or the AFL-CIO and, of course, a certain amount of competition, as tourism grew, developed between the ILWU and the hotel workers for organizing the tourist industry.

MK: You know, another new person who came in was John [C.] Lanham. Now he's a judge, but he started back in '58.

DT: John Lanham is one that you could really raise a question of, "How did this happen?" As I recall, he was from the South, had a southern accent. [Lanham was born in South Carolina.] Nice-looking chap, very friendly person, but not (an) agile mind, even though I think later he became a judge. He did not have the agile mind of a McClung or a Gill. But he was able. He came from the 'Ewa end of O'ahu, as I recall. He was just a genuinely nice person and good-looking. (He) wasn't particularly tall, but he was tall enough so that he could command respect. He was, interestingly enough, more closely tied to the union, (ILWU), and the Burns group. (However), I can't really explain how a Haole of his background could so endear himself to areas which were largely ILWU and union controlled, except for the fact that he ideologically believed in them and it was nice to be able to back a Caucasian, let us say, so far as the ILWU was concerned. He had ILWU support, got along with the Burns faction
very well, (and) ultimately, (to repeat), became a judge. I haven't seen John for a long time. (I do believe he died. John) always had very nice personal relations, he was just a “sweet guy,” without being syrupy sweet, put it that way. He’d always lay it on the line, and the legislature profited from him.

MK: Then, another new person was Howard [Y.] Miyake. He served for a very long time, starting in '58.

DT: Hmm, Howard Miyake did pass away not too long ago, I know, and this was really too bad. I don’t know all that much about Howard’s background, but he was generally a good party member without being closely tied in with any faction. If he were to be tied with any faction, it would be, I think with—you would call him a really thinking member of the Burns group. I have particular aloha for Howard, maybe for a very selfish reason. When I was here at HEA before, they were trying to kill (the public service) collective bargaining bill, believe it or not, some of the other unions (were). The person who alerted me, right here on this phone, at this same desk. I get a call out of thin air from Howard Miyake saying, “Hey, we got this meeting, how come you’re not here, Dan?” And he, as a member of the house leadership, and Tadao Beppu, who was Speaker were being accused of trying to kill collective bargaining. You see, (a) reverse sort of action (on tactic). And he says, “Why don’t you come down?” (I hadn’t been invited!)

Why, I made it down there in ten or fifteen minutes, got up there, (before the leadership union meeting) and I said, “I can’t see what you guys are arguing about, (Mr.) Speaker. The majority floor leader”—who (was) Miyake, I believe at the time—“tells me that (you’re) in favor of collective bargaining. I take (his and the Speaker’s) word for it, I think the house will pass this. I suggest, gentlemen, that we all go home.” Interestingly enough, the other union leaders—the public service union leaders—(the) ILWU was there, too, (left with me). For some strange reason, they’d never behaved like this before with me, and, (for once) they (chuckles) did what I suggested, we all got up and left. And this was... This (straightforwardness) on the part of Miyake and a fellow (legislator), Stuart [T.K.] Ho, (who) was a member of the legislature at the time. (Later), Stuart Ho came across (to me)—I was over in Dave McClung's outer office when the collective bargaining bill cleared the house—he came over to tell me personally that this event had occurred, and that the house leadership had indeed made good on (their) word that (the bill) would pass, that the allegations of the other union leaders were false. Well, Stuart Ho got out of politics not too long after that. (I don’t know exactly why), perhaps in part because maybe he just felt he didn’t have to endure all (of the) machinations that go on in a legislative assembly.

MK: Okay. And there are also two other men connected with the unions that came in '58. Senator Mamoru Yamasaki and Representative [Yoshito] Takamine.

DT: I never really got to know Takamine very well, except the fact that he was sort of a synonym for the ILWU. The same was also true of Yamasaki, but Yamasaki had a little bit more of a connection and tie with “the partisans.” I didn’t get that well acquainted with your neighbor island legislators, particularly in the [19]50s and into the early [19]60s because—unless I met them at national convention time—I didn’t get to see them. I couldn’t afford to go to the neighbor islands, so I couldn’t afford to get, really, that much acquainted with them. As I recall, I did get somewhat better acquainted (with Yamasaki). I think Yamasaki was a delegate to the Democratic national convention of ‘64. Maybe ‘60, maybe it was ‘60. I was able to get
acquainted with him. I remember this because I used to mix him up with another legislator, whose name maybe you can help me with, I can't quite come out with it now. It's very similar to Yamasaki's name. Anyway, they were both there, and so as I recall, Yamasaki was a delegate. But I think it was the '60 convention. Of course, Yama has become, now, a person of high seniority, and as you mentioned earlier, he probably is the last member of the class of '58-'59. He was (also) an older member of the '58-'59, I think his years actually are greater in number, than let's say a Donald [D. H.] Ching's, or (a) Howard Miyake.

MK: Well, now you've mentioned Donald Ching. Maybe you can talk about him back in '58.

DT: Well, Donald Ching was able, once again. See, these were all very able people. He was not a powerful legislator, but he was always there, he was a good Democrat. He was somewhat between factions. In other words he was not that closely tied in, but he would be what you might call sort of an independent Burns person. If the chips were down, why Don would usually go along that way. He was, once again, he was a thinking legislator. Not that they all aren't, but some have more to contribute, let's say, than others. On a scale of zero to ten, let us say, you (might) put Donald Ching in maybe the five or six category. Maybe, on occasion, (a) seven.

There (were) also, rather prominent people, sort of in the old, oh, (the) middle district areas, before you get out into the country, (on) the 'Ewa side of Honolulu proper. You had people like (a) Duke [T.] Kawasaki. His name finally came to me, who's (later) worked closely with, of all people, with Frank Fasi. (He) became quite a power in the state senate. He started out as, really, believe it or not, a Mink Democrat. (Laughs) In other words, he was one of Patsy Mink's early supporters, as a woman, and later he ran for public office [beginning in 1966]. As I recall, he was living in Kalihi when he first started running. Elsie and I went out there (because) we were invited to his kick-off party, and kick-offs in those days for the legislature was not at any particular place, it was right in his home. He had lots to eat, and all of his close friends and associates from the area (were) there. It was sort of fun for a college teacher and his wife to be invited. Duke, for example, was a great photographer. He still sends his own pictures, his own photographs out (at Christmastime). Beyond that, Duke went to music school [Schillinger Institute] in the city of [Boston]. He's a very fine musician and still enjoys talking music. Duke and I used to "waste time" around the legislature, maybe waste his time, talking about stereo equipment because that used to be the big thing for leisure-time activity here.

MK: So back in those days, Duke Kawasaki would be characterized as a liberal Democrat?

DT: Well, I think they (all) were. There were very few conservative Democrats in the legislature. Some, I guess, were a little bit more conservative than the other, but they either had strong union ties, particularly from the neighbor islands, (or no close ties). It's only in recent years, would you say, that some of them demonstrated more conservative tendencies, if you want to call Jack Burns a conservative Democrat, let's say, as opposed to Patsy Mink or Tom Gill, which you could do, why then, like a Kawasaki would probably fall into. . . . Well, Duke, I think he proved himself to be a very pragmatic politician, as is illustrated by the fact that he's (now) working for Frank Fasi. Now some of these idealists became more practical, some of them more than others. Duke Kawasaki became very practical. On the other hand, you still have a Patsy Mink, who's trying to find a pot at the end of the rainbow, or at least tries to keep her eyes on the stars. Patsy Mink is still, in 1990, as over against 1954, fresh out of the
University of Chicago, she's still trying to save the world. And, God bless her, we need people like that in politics. On the other hand, you have some of her colleagues of that day, and Duke Kawasaki would be one, who is so well adjusted with the world, that he no longer is trying to fight those battles, and has demonstrated from time to time a little bit of authoritarian tendencies. I know there were occasions when I was a little bit worried about Duke Kawasaki, the way he was issuing orders to his staff like he was some sort of the crown prince. Somehow or another it didn't quite (fit) with the (idealistic) young fellow who started out running for the legislature, whenever it was, in the class of '58-'59. I think he was one of those. [Kawasaki was first elected to the state senate in 1966.]

MK: Shall we stop here?

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number twenty-four, session number five.

WN: Okay, tape number twenty-four with Dan Tuttle.

We were talking earlier about, within the Democratic party, were there terms such as “liberal” and “conservative” used within the party?

DT: They were not all that much used, as I recall, in Hawai‘i at that time. More likely (the term was) “New Dealer,” or if “liberal” was used, that was quickly replaced by the Republicans saying (that Democrats were) left-wingers, or they’re communists, or soft on communism, or they’re pinkos, or something like that. Anybody who was in the Democratic party at all, in the words of the Republicans of that day, were all ultra-liberals and much “worse” even than that. As time went by, if liberalism means anything at all, a Patsy Mink would to this day remain liberal as compared, let’s say, to a John Burns who, once he became governor, found that he had to become a little bit more conservative for the sake of building—he wouldn’t like this—his “own hegemony” (chuckles) because he always bemoaned the Republican machine. Of course, out of (the) Jack Burns (group), along with others, came a new type of machine which would be, (according to Burns), “hegemony.” (It was, of course), one of Jack’s favorite words (to describe Republicans).

WN: So where would you classify Jack Burns within the left-to-right spectrum?

DT: Now, I would classify him pretty much as a middle-of-the-road(er) with certain conservative tendencies, and with certain liberal tendencies. (The liberalism) emanated (often) from the positions of the ILWU.

WN: (Laughs) That’s a nice statement.

DT: Most of all, (Burns) became a pragmatist. One of the things that surprised me—I don’t think that most people in Hawai‘i to this day recognize that one of the first things Jack Burns did, and I’m speaking in symbols now, he walked across the street to Merchant Street and made his peace with the kingmakers of yesteryear in the Republican party. (Also), Jack Burns signed the public service collective bargaining bill very, very reluctantly, he almost had. He
was not too gung ho, as I think you and I have discussed before, (even) about statehood. He got along better in the Congress of the United States as a delegate to Congress, and, later on, with representatives and senators from the deep South. So, Jack Burns, it turns out, was no flaming liberal. He was pragmatic. He had certain reservations and his great claim to fame, I still say—if you want me to I can elaborate on this sometime down the road—his great claim to fame was the fact that he was able to do business with, and match his “faith,” let’s say, with the “faith” of the ILWU, some of whom were admittedly (Communists), I’m quite convinced of that. Jack Burns, being a practicing Catholic, communism was anathema to the Catholic church. Of course, he would never turn his back on (the ILWU), but he tried by example to show them that “My way is better than your way.” He didn’t try to proselytize them. He always stood up for them because he seemed to understand what was in their minds about what they needed, (about) their aspirations and their goals, even though he couldn’t go along with their pie-in-the-sky communism. He went to mass, it seems like, virtually every day he was alive. If you’d go to breakfast with Jack Burns, you would normally arrive before he got back from mass because he walked down the street (to) his Catholic church (which was nearby).

This, to me, is (the) greatness of a John A. Burns. He was pretty well constructed as an individual. What he might’ve done, if he’d have gone on to college and university, (but), for crying out loud, (it might) have ruined him. Because (Jack) had great and good common sense, he had great feeling for people, he didn’t try to remake people. He met them on their own terms, and by his own example, I think, tried to teach them something. Every letter I think he ever signed was, “May the Almighty be with you and yours,” or something to that effect. Was all of this an act? Well, you can say that, I mean, the cynical person about politicians would say that. (However), knowing Jack, I can’t believe that. I don’t know how much he meant, I’m not Catholic myself, but I kind of have a great deal of aloha for a person who would be that faithful to his church and to his religious beliefs. I think this came to be appreciated by persons of all religious faiths across the state. People with no religious background at all, communism was pretty atheistic at certain periods in time, who had Buddhist backgrounds (or) other non-Christian backgrounds, I think they came to respect Jack Burns for his own religious beliefs. I think he taught something, you see, along the way.

MK: You know, with the 1954 election and the 1958 election, you’ve got all of these new faces, and you’ve got Jack Burns, and I was just wondering about the relationship of these new faces with what some people term “the old guard.”

DT: I already talked about, I think, the difficulty they had with the old guard, (especially) Charlie Kauhane, starting in the ’55 session. They still had some problems, but there was room, after they got over the “Kauhane thing” and after they got over the “old guard” of Samuel Wilder King’s (Grand Old Party) vetoes, (several of the young Democrats) got along pretty well with Bill Quinn, even as governor. Quite a (lot) of their programs survived. They could exist with a Herbert K. H. Lee (Democrat), they could exist with a Bill Heen (Democrat), (and) they could exist with an Oren Long (Democrat). Obviously these people (became) sort of patron saints of the Democratic party, (and) were included (within) their ’59 ticket. The only thing is, (they) didn’t quite get balanced out right and this backfired on them. They couldn’t quite achieve everything they wanted until 1962 when things sort of fell into place (and Burns was elected governor). They (did have) a rocky road with the (Democrats’) old guard (at first, but this) was pretty well surmounted after they got through the ’55 session. They couldn’t quite bring together all their factions in the Democratic party, and they fought like cats and dogs.
MK: Maybe you can talk here about Esposito.

DT: Esposito was an attorney, Italian background. He had depth, roots, I think he was born in Hawai‘i, l’m just not certain about where he was born. [Esposito was born in New Haven, Connecticut but attended the University of Hawai‘i.] His father had been a very prominent person as a developer. Esposito was a true believer. He was the “Billy Graham” of the Democratic party. He could orate beautiful. He was steeped in the New Deal tradition of FOR, as were many of your Democrats. Even Frank Fasi is a New Dealer of sorts today. Esposito was not one who could (always) go along with Jack Burns, who was so patient with the ILWU and the alleged Communists. (Then), Esposito had the rug pulled out from him a number of times. As they would say, “Well, that’s Vince.” But he was a liberal in the sense of the FDR tradition, certainly far from being a Republican of any sort. And he was older. He was, my guess is at least ten years, ten or twelve years older than even a Tom Gill at the time. [Esposito was born in 1914; Gill, 1922.] He had seniority on Gill, and it looked like the combination of Esposito and Gill would organize (the) new, reapportioned legislature. It didn’t work out that way, and part of it was because (Espo and Tom) would not compromise. They (seemingly) lacked (the) ability to compromise, which for example, a Jack Burns had. (Esposito) was not quite enough of a pragmatist; (he couldn’t combine) both your true believers and your people who (could) compromise. I suppose in the long run, most of the spoils goes to the compromisers and then you have a question for you or for me, as to whether this is what you or I can go along with. Some people will compromise for the sake of future fame; another will say, “I’m not interested in future fame, I’ve got to stick with my principles.” Well, Espo was a “principled,” in quotes, politician, not that the others aren’t, but he was in quotes, a “principled politician.” So was Tom Gill, and of course they were egged on by a young turk of sorts (named)—a person of tremendous talent, coming out of the University of Hawai‘i—a still-young Jake Stalker. (Stalker) was not only (something of) a scholar who’d gone to the University of Wisconsin, had a Ph.D. even as he arrived at Hawai‘i, (but) was (also) very glib. He had a radio program back in the [19]50s sponsored by the telephone company. Stalker was something of an “engineer” of the Esposito-Gill victory in ’59.

Also, joining in the group was something of an unlikely person, (who) had had (a) fellowship, had worked back (on) the Mainland. He’d gone to school (on) the Mainland. That (person) was (Dr.) Richard [H.] Kosaki. He had (received) a (D.C.) post-graduate fellowship and he
had know-how that young Esposito felt would be essential to the workings of this new (and enlarged), and what turned out to be the last, territorial legislature (that was) getting ready for statehood. I think other people who were present at those meetings are (more able) to address how this all happened, but (at any rate), Cravalho was the beneficiary of (these) remnant Republicans (joining in a coalition) with a minority, really, of Democrats. A larger group of Democrats stuck with Esposito and Gill.

MK: You know, I know that Gill continued on in politics, but for Esposito, once he was iced out that year, he never quite, you know, recovered.

DT: No. He was iced out in particular because Elmer Cravalho decided that Gill was worth preserving. And that Kosaki was worth preserving. That Espo was too much, let’s say, the evangelist, too much the dreamer, he couldn’t be pragmatic, (he) couldn’t be brought down to earth, and so Elmer determined to preserve these two. He continued to utilize Gill’s skills in that ’59 session, and as long as Gill stayed around. He also continued Kosaki in his role as sort of an administrative assistant to the entire house. You may say, “How do you know this?” Well, Elmer told me this himself in the Biltmore. We roomed together in 1960 at a national convention and he told me in detail. My question to him was, “How come you hung on to Gill? He’s the more potent of the two, he may rise up and give you trouble in the future.”

“So be it,” says Elmer, “he’s got it, I like the way he operates, and Kosaki is a good workman, he’s not going to make waves anywhere along the line. He’s a local boy. We’ve got to have more people like that in politics. So, you know Dan, you ought to know these things. Why do I have to tell you, you know? You’re a college professor.” This is sort of the way that Elmer would proceed. But, here was Elmer, a former public school teacher himself, lecturing me. We didn’t often see one another, you know. There were two or three occasions when we had some in-depth discussions. We were away from home, and so, it was probably the most elucidating period I ever had with Elmer Cravalho, (be)cause Elmer’s well known for keeping his cards very close to his chest.

MK: Did he talk about any pressures on him to keep Gill, or was it his sole decision?

DT: Well, as Elmer phrased it as only Elmer can, it was his decision. Of course, it was another way of appeasing the defeated people. You couldn’t throw out all of them, or you’d end up, they’d ultimately rise up and do you in. Elmer was smart enough, I think, and, I’m reading something into this now, was smart enough, I think, to say, “I’ve got to look down the road, and I want to preserve the best because I’m going to need their cooperation in order to accomplish anything myself.” Elmer Cravalho proved himself to be very practical.

MK: You know, that was his first year as Speaker and he continued as Speaker for many years after that [1959–67]. What are your thoughts on Elmer Cravalho?

DT: Elmer has to be viewed, I think, although he never held high office, I guess the highest office was mayor of Maui, if you want to ignore the fact he was Speaker. He deserves his place in history. He’s a giant. He contributed a great deal to Burns’ career. He supplied the New Hawai‘i Program for Jack Burns. When Jack Burns’ administration, ’63, ’64, ’65 period, was faltering, Elmer stepped in with a legislative program. Jack Burns would get up and address the legislature in his state of the state address, talk only about destiny and dreams, but have
nothing practical. So, who had to pull a Democratic program together again, à la '54. This was, see, a decade later after the '54 period, so he [Cravalho] had to pull together a program for Democrats, which he duly labeled—he owes me a little debt 'cause he picked up a phrase out of one of my columns—the New Hawai'i Program. He sold it as such, and Jack Burns adopted it, and pretty soon Jack Burns was talking about the New Hawai'i Program. (As a result), in 1966 [election], and again in 1970 [election], Jack Burns still had things to talk about. This Cravalho magic—I'm not too sure that I was happy about the way he controlled the house—but he had his agenda, and Hawai'i owes him a lot. He was able to control the house because he was a single person. He was not a party boy or anything of that sort. In a very practical way, he "had something" on practically every member of the house in the legislature. In other words, "You better go along with me 'cause I remember what you did. I remember where you were, how you made a fool (of yourself)—do you want to tell people about this?" Elmer was not above that sort of thing.

MK: Just stop here? Okay.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is videotape number twenty-five.

MK: Why don't you—go on, elaborate on what you were planning to do.

DT: Oh well, the legislative session of '59, prior to statehood—in spite of all these battles among the Democrats, it was a pretty productive session, at least for the university, because during that session, after the battles of the coalition were over, we suddenly learned that the East-West Center had become a reality through the Mutual Assistance Pact. That enabled Jake, John Stalker, even though he'd been seemingly defeated, to get his bill through for training for (the) diplomatic corps and training in Asian Studies. (It also) enabled the government department to get our internship programs in parties, administration, and legislature passed. I ended up, once these became reality, handling the parties and the administrative interns, and Norm Meller out of (the) government department handled the legislative interns. This was really fortuitous. Then, of course, when we got statehood, as sort of a bonus, why, this was sort of nirvana. Everything had happened. (We and Hawai'i were) in great shape.

MK: You know, before we get into statehood, maybe we can go back a little bit and maybe you can tell us something about the state of the Republican party back in those late [19]50s. [Nineteen] fifty-four they did badly, '58 more Democrats are coming in, they have a Republican territorial governor, of course, but what was the status of the Republicans?

DT: Well, the Republicans still had a pretty strong organization. Bill Quinn was able, useful, (and) could sing the "Hawaiian Wedding Song" very well. He was an amateur actor, and came from a good, sort of blue-blood family out of St. Louis, Missouri. He'd gone to Harvard Law School. So it was a natural for him to run for governor. The Republicans were optimistic. However, there was still this feeling in virtually every quarter, that Jack Burns could have any job that he wanted, you know. When it came to setting up the ticket, Burns completely lost control of all these ambitious people, both old guard and new guard, and before he turned around, seats were all filled up. The only thing left for him to do was to run for governor, which I don't think he had wanted to do. As a matter of fact, he told me himself and I think he's told other people the same thing, that he would (have) preferred to have gone back to
Washington. On the other hand, I don't think he was all that disturbed about this because it was a lot easier for his wife [Beatrice M. Burns] to function, being in a wheelchair, here in Hawai‘i than it would (have) been to continue on in Washington D.C., with the unfriendly climate back there. In a certain sense, I guess, you feel sorry for Jack. He was stuck, he couldn't run for either (U.S.) Senate seat because they had plenty of Democrats running for (these) and so he ended up running for governor.

The Republicans, as I say, I don't think they anticipated winning control of the state senate. I think this happened on the coattails of Bill Quinn, and to a certain extent maybe on the coattails of Hiram Fong, aided and abetted a little bit by getting some ILWU support, at least Fong did.

MK: You know, you mentioned Quinn. It's a surprise to me that someone who ran for only one elective office before he became governor and lost that office, and became territorial governor and became the first elected state governor and I'm wondering, do you know anything about how Quinn got into those positions?

DT: He was prominent among that wing of Republicans that had not been a Bob [Senator Robert A.] Taft (supporter). In other words, Bill Quinn was a liberal Republican. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower had paid deference to Bob Taft and let him name [Hawai‘i’s] governor after the '52 election. Now, after the '56 election, Eisenhower had no further debt to Bob Taft, and with other people. There were certain groups of Republicans here clamoring for a change. Among all the people that got called to Eisenhower's attention was (the fact that) this guy Quinn's got something to offer. It wasn't a bad decision. It wasn't all that bad, and so, I think that Governor Quinn has described this development on a chronological basis. I have no reason to question this really at all. They thought this was a way of rebuilding the Republican party with a new look in Hawai‘i. It worked in '59 when the last territorial governor became the first state governor [Quinn], and he was able to get his lieutenant governor [James K. Kealoha] along with him. Hiram Fong, the bonus with ILWU assistance, (was added), so the Republicans had every chance to succeed if Bill Quinn had any depth in Hawaiian politics. Bill Quinn had moved here as (an addition to) a wealthy law firm. His only acquaintance with grass-roots politics had come out of campaigning, I guess, in the whole fourth district for the (territorial) senate. He'd done very well (be)cause, (in part), he went house to house. Let's say he was an attractive guy. (However), he didn't know how to deal, didn't begin to know how to deal with a Jimmie Kealoha. He didn't understand the importance of a mid-Honolulu district, the Kalihi area, and he didn't take time to do that. A lot of his appointments were—they weren't (such) bad appointments, but they didn't include anybody who knew much about Hawai‘i, (at) the grass roots, if you want to call it that, the hoi polloi. There's nothing to back up Bill Quinn that would tie in, in any way, with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Hawai‘i's people, something like maybe 70 percent. That was not just persons of Asiatic extraction, but that included some non-establishment Caucasians, too.

It didn't work out well in the long run (for Quinn) and the campaign of Kealoha against Quinn [in the 1962 Republican primary election for governor] really, really did him in. It was a bitter blow, and I don't think Quinn can understand Jimmie Kealoha to this day. But, golly, of all the politicians I've ever met, including those in Hawai‘i, the one with the most charm, (is) Jimmie Kealoha. Don't talk about issues, don't talk about programs, don't talk about statistics, (or) anything of that sort. (However), just for a genuinely nice guy, with his warm smile, and... Did I tell you this story about Jimmie Kealoha? In recent times, just a couple
years before his death I ran into him out at the airport. I was going to the Big Island for some reason. We chit-chatted a little while, we got loaded on the plane. Didn't see them again. I was the last one off the plane because I was in no big hurry and let everybody else go, and I wandered off with my briefcase, came down the escalator at Hilo, (and) guess who was at the bottom of the escalator? Jimmie Kealoha and his wife, "Dan, do you have a ride?" It illustrates not only (his) personality, but in the Hawai'i sense, old-style politics, neighbor island politics, here was a consummate politician. He had no reason, I was (a) nobody (even though) we'd been friends in the past. This (occurred) somewhere in the mid-[19]80s, or maybe early [19]80s. Our last contact may have been, you know, twenty years before. That we greeted one another like best friends, (was genuine people politics). Jimmie Kealoha also aspired to higher office, he had ambitions, too, because he even took speech lessons. I can tell you the speech teachers at the university that arranged to (help) Jimmie Kealoha improve. Well, it didn't help him win the Republican primary against Bill Quinn, but after that primary was over, who had depth contact on the Democratic side, with the grass roots (supporters) of Jack Burns. (Burns) overlapped with Kealoha on the Big Island the same way that Burns overlapped, in terms of support, with Neal Blaisdell here (on) O'ahu. In a certain sense, it was a "native son(s)" versus the new arrivals, too. (Burns, of course, was not born in Hawai'i but had grown up here.)

Did Kealoha help Quinn quite a bit in the '59 election? As lieutenant governor?

Oh yes. Not only in the sense of generalities (but in) shaking hands and charming people. I'm not kidding you, here was a charmer.

You know, when you read about [19]50s politics, they always say that it's in the [19]50s that issues, platforms, those things became very important. But right now you've talked about a man of the old-style politics, you know, personality, charm. So by statehood, how much of old-style politics is still being played? How much of it was more issue-oriented type of politics?

Jack Burns, he couldn't develop his own administrative program. Elmer Cravalho did it for him. Here was a merger of old-style and new-style, here was a coming of age, of a merger, really, of the new Republican ascendancy, even on the Mainland, and (as) over against the New Deal. Now even FDR knew this was going to happen. He tried to groom Harold Stassen on the Republican side to succeed him 'cause he figured the worm would turn. So he wanted somebody of a Harold Stassen's more liberal (persuasion)—he hadn't quite contemplated a Dwight Eisenhower, for example, who ended up (as president). You see, even this was a victory of sorts because Bob Taft didn't quite make it, but ... You had the issue-oriented people, (of course), if you want a Mainland counterpart, read the oratory of Adlai Stevenson. Here was an issue politician, here was a thinking politician. And, okay, Eisenhower wasn't all that bad, he could think, he could put programs together, he'd been a victorious general. This (Stevenson and Eisenhower) gave us probably, what I think we can easily say, was the last great presidential campaigns, (those) of '52 and '56.

We'd been a part of this picture only in terms of national conventions until we became a state. After we became a state, we became a part of this total big picture. So, if Hawai'i is more conservative today, look at what's been happening on the Mainland and see that the ocean has been shrinking, that the water levels are lower, and that the Mainland and Hawai'i have
moved closer together. (All of) which makes the cries of today for Hawaiian sovereignty seem almost totally out of character and a bit ridiculous, but, okay, it’s reality. It’s one of the issues, one of the big issues we’re going to have to deal with one way or another in the future whether we like it or not. (However), Hawai‘i and the Mainland, their politics (and) our politics (are) more conservative today. Why not? We had Reagan on the Mainland, didn’t we? Then a Bush.

MK: Okay. Shall we go on to statehood now, then, or . . .

DT: Statehood, in many ways— I think my views have already been given to you, not in this series of talks, but elsewhere. I give Jack Burns great credit for the East-West Center. He was there, he told me that this came about as a result of his talk (with Baker). Bobby Baker picked him up on the street in a limousine, and Jack Burns broached the idea of an East-West Center [a.k.a., Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, Inc.], which could be traced back to the old talks of the Peace Academy (at) the old snack bar on UH campus. He sold Bobby Baker on the idea. Bobby Baker saw potential for it, and (Burns) saw potential for his (1959) campaign for governor. [President] Lyndon [B.] Johnson went along with it and I think Jack Burns deserves great credit for having, virtually single-handedly through his influence with Lyndon Johnson, (originated) the East-West Center. Burns, of course), help(ed) (Johnson) after [Burns’] defeat in ’59, (toward) his presidential aspirations. It all came together.

Statehood is another matter and, let’s say I’ve talked about that. There’s some evidence, which I think Bill Quinn indicates, that Jack Burns, in certain respects, was actually against statehood. I never quite felt that way personally. I felt Jack was for it, but he was giving lip service, he wasn’t doing very much. There were certain things, like when it came to issue politics, Jack really couldn’t convert these ideas and issues into action. He had to have an Elmer Cravalho to help him. In terms of statehood, in order to get statehood, (Burns) pretty much had to take orders from others. He had to campaign for delegate [to Congress] in ’58, having Alaska coming in first. Well, he didn’t develop (any) strategy (for statehood). I think it developed through George [H.] Lehleitner and the Alaska connection, use of the Tennessee Plan, that sort of thing. But Jack Burns deserves (some) credit. He was the guy on the firing line that had to campaign (for) statehood for Alaska but not yet for Hawai‘i. He did it. He won. He remained firm. And so he deserves his (share of) credit. (However), I don’t consider that he was the man who got statehood for Hawai‘i because—as I think others have indicated, some of the newspaper people—virtually everybody was in favor of statehood and there were so many contributors to the statehood cause. From my own particular observation, of course I think if you have to give a “lion share,” which maybe we shouldn’t to anybody, give it to George Lehleitner, the true believer in Hawai‘i out of Louisiana, rather than (to) any politician. But, by the same token, a Lehleitner has been telling people, and me included, “Hey Dan, don’t worry about things like that. That’s the stock in trade of the politicians, they’re the ones that deserve the credit. Forget about me.”

WN: Jack Burns running in ’59 for governor against Quinn—did the Republicans use that against him, the fact that, as delegate, he let Alaska go first?

DT: Yes, but it didn’t work. Burns had enough (people) contact, enough rapport. They pointed it out. But Jack says, “Hey, be patient, people. I got Alaska in, Hawai‘i’s going to follow. Don’t worry.” And people believed him. It was difficult, that’s why I give him so much
credit. He had to fend off these Republican attacks.

WN: There must have been a tremendous amount of partisan politicking on who would get credit for statehood. I mean, here you have a Republican governor, Quinn, and then you have a Democratic delegate to Congress. You know, it must have been tremendous.

DT: Well, people out of the old Republican camp (felt) very much left out of things. When you give Jack Burns the sole credit for (statehood), that leaves out the publisher of the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin of yesteryear, [Joseph R.] Farrington. That leaves out a Bill Quinn. That leaves out a Samuel Wilder King, who certainly, I think, was in favor of statehood. That leaves out a [C.] Nils Tavares, who was chairman of the [Hawai'i] Statehood Commission for so many years. (That) leaves out a Gregg [M.] Sinclair, who was a Democrat, [who] was for statehood. You leave out so many people, so I think politically, the guys who like to take credit—or ought to be given credit according to George Lehleitner—this is going to go on for years. I suspect that this is going to be a massive historical argument. In a certain sense, I guess I find myself engaged in part of this argument. From my own point of view, I like to think I'd like to keep the record straight. I think Jack Burns was a giant of a figure and perhaps the dominant figure of this century in Hawaiian politics, but I don't think, factually, he was the "big getter of statehood."

MK: Okay.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: The following is videotape number twenty-six, continuation of interview with Dan Tuttle.

WN: Tape twenty-six with Dan Tuttle.

Let's talk about the statehood election of '59. Hawai'i had just gotten statehood and now we're talking about finally getting an elected governor and [two U.S.] senators and [one U.S. House of Representatives member].

DT: That was probably the election to end all elections. It came at you very suddenly. You had a primary and a general in the summer of a year when normally (an election is) in the fall, not that it makes that much difference in Hawai'i, but (the election) was sort of out of cycle. Every Tom, Dick, and Harry wanted to run. Burns, who was still in Washington, helped to defeat himself by staying in Washington because (he said that) he had to do his duty as delegate to Congress even though there was no longer any territory; it had (become) a state. Burns lost, really lost control. Democrats, in the process, became disoriented. The Republicans, of course, had become disoriented earlier after '54 and '56, so this was sort of a (turnabout). We're still talking party, and we had a competitive two-party system. (This was the) brief period we've had one in Hawai'i. There (was) an awful lot of personalities involved so that you had people running against people. We ended up in that election, in reality, (by) having Patsy Mink running against Dan Inouye. Patsy had filed for the House (of Representatives), and Danny was supposed to run for the Senate. (However), Burns decided
that this (shouldn’t happen because) what was happening on the (entire) legislative (ticket). So, he talked Danny into going back to the House (race), and politely, to the best of my knowledge, asked Patsy Mink to withdraw. Well, that’s not the way Patsy Mink was built. She had filed, and, I’ll be doggone, she was going to run. One of the last conversations I had with Jack Burns (showed) that Jack was still referring to her as “that girl.” With affection, but still feeling, “Why did she have to be so stubborn?” you see. (Then), you had a contest like (one of the U.S.) Senate seat(s). A Fasi running against, really, a patriarch of (the Democrats). He was in his early seventies at the time. (I’m speaking of) Judge Heen, Bill Heen. So the Democrats, and as I recall, Oren Long had some competition, too, I’ve forgotten just who it was. The big race, of course, was really—the big prize—the governorship. The two Senate seats, the House seat even, those were sort of second-rate. Now, they rank higher on the ballot, they rank higher in the nation, but this was (Hawai’i’s) first time (as a state). This was our statehood election. So the governorship became the big thing, and, from a Democratic point of view, it became sort of a nightmare.

MK: You know, when we look over the names, you know, we’ve got like, Fong, Tsukiyama, Quinn, Kealoha on the Republican side. We’ve got Fasi, Long, Inouye, Burns. Were there conscious efforts on the part of both parties to kind of deal with it on a racial basis?

DT: Certainly there was in Burns’ mind because this was (a) part of his political strategy. And don’t sell the Republicans short at that time (either). They had considerable know-how left over, and I think they knew pretty well what they were doing. Certainly, Bill Quinn had been appointed territorial governor to strengthen the party, and he was a logical person to run for governor. I think both of (the parties) really wanted an ethnically balanced slate, but the people who had been left out of the Democratic ticket were all of the non-AJAs and non-Haoles. At least the Republicans had a Kealoha in there who could represent the Hawaiian extraction. I don’t like to see things happen this way. I’m not sure that they’re terribly necessary, but then in the long run maybe a Jack Burns, or anybody like him, who says we should have an ethnically balanced ticket (is correct). Why not? It’s hard to make a decent argument against it. Even though talents may vary, they may not be the most talented, but if they can function, and function well, why not pass these jobs around? After all, we’ve got to make this thing called small d democracy work, and that’s one of the ways in which everybody wants his own place in the sun and his own group to have a place in the sun. In a nation such as ours, there’s a place for everybody, so let’s do it. If that’s a part of your political strategy, then that’s okay with me. I get a little bit excited and disturbed about bloc voting on an ethnic basis or talking ethnicity in a campaign, that sort of thing, because I sort of think that we’re talking about their ability to do things, their talents, which overwhelm considerations such as color or religion and that sort of thing.

MK: Also it was in that race that I think we had Sparky [Spark M.] Matsunaga running against Mits [Mitsuyuki] Kido. [Kido defeated Matsunaga in the Democratic primary election for lieutenant governor in 1959.]

DT: (Yes), we had a number of people. I think Richard Kageyama was even there running for office. Of course, Mits Kido was something of an elder statesman. He was (of) the old school, a former schoolteacher. And, a brash young upstart like Sparky Matsunaga, who had once sworn off politics, you remember, back in the (legislative) session of ’55, here he was running against (Kido). He tried to upstage Kido whenever he could. He tried to appear in pictures with Jack Burns. It was a wild donnybrook. Fasi, I think, could have won if he had
been more realistic, if he had developed a campaign, even comparable to '54. Maybe I'm prejudiced there, you know, 'cause I had thought for a period that I might be developing a Fasi campaign along the lines of '54. At any rate, it did not develop and maybe one of the reasons why he wouldn't talk to me was, it wasn't about to develop along those lines.

The [1959] Burns campaign was a real dilly, because Jack stayed in Washington. When he came back to even file for office—I'll never forget this—the newspapers did an interview with him. Where? On a massage table. Then he gets back on the plane and goes right back to D.C. It's almost like he wanted to commit suicide, politically. He couldn't get with it. Well, this is a difficult campaign to begin with and so all the magic that accrued to him of having been there when we got statehood, what everybody was saying that whoever was our delegate when we got statehood could have any office he wanted, it wasn't going to develop along those lines.

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Well, we believe(d) what we've done. We (were) proud of our work, but, (I also said that) we'll go back and we'll do another poll.

I had to go back to my class and say, "We're going to do another one (poll)." We go out and get a thousand more people in our shoe boxes, that sort of thing. It still show(ed) that Bill Quinn is going to win, 55, 56 percent of the vote. He won with less than that, of course, because things did close up. (However), when Herman [T. F.] Lum, who was chairman of the Democratic campaign committee, read our polls, he said, "Hey Dan, come down to the Armed Services (YMCA) and let's talk down there." He asked me, "Do you believe this?"

"(Yes.)"

"Is this what's going to happen? Are we going to lose?"

"(Yes.) Unless you really pull off a miracle of some sort."

JC: Dan, excuse me. Could we stop for a second? We're having a ___________. Okay. Stand by, Dan.

DT: Okay.

JC: Okay, anytime.

DT: All of this made Herman very sad, and he said, "Well, we'll do what we can." And the word went out to all the Democrats, "We've got to back Jack." Herman tried, did (do) everything that he could. With two more weeks it probably would've worked, but
Bill Quinn had the Second Mahele program going, which was [J.] Akuhead Pupule’s—Hal Lewis’ big deal. This (seemed to) look good (to voters). Why not a second mahele? These were big newspaper ads, full spread. You can go back and look at them in the newspaper morgue. Meanwhile Jack simply pursed his lips and kept on plugging away, plugging away. (Democrats) hoped to pull it out, but (Burns) didn’t seem to get excited. A couple of days before the election I went into Democratic headquarters, which was down on King Street, as I recall, and a fellow whom they just introduced me to, from the Democratic Congressional Committee.

He said, “Oh, you’re Dan Tuttle, the guy that has this poll in the newspaper. You’re the only (fellow) that seems to know what’s going on around here.”

I said, “What do you mean?”

He says, “It might make you feel a bit better if you’ll follow me up to the [Alexander] Young Hotel, and I’ll let you see something.”

Well, I can’t remember this gentleman’s name. We went up the street a couple blocks to the Alexander Young Hotel and went into his hotel room, and he threw down (a) poll taken in May, as I recall. Now this was July, I think, or late June, early July. And this was a Lou Harris poll. It had been done by a fellow by the name of Kraft, who later set up shop himself. (The) copy of that poll, he did end up giving it to me.

I said, “Can I have a copy of this?”

He said, “That’s my only copy. I’m leaving tomorrow, you can have it. It’s all. . . . The gig’s up. Burns has lost.”

Of course, in that report, it said that the margin that Quinn had over Burns was sufficiently large that it could not possibly be made up. (That’s a) paraphrase of their phrasing. So I retained that old poll report, and hopefully it will show up in the University [of Hawai‘i] archives one of these days. (I gave it to them.) It made me feel good, you know. I thought, “Gee, maybe. . . .” I was ready to believe that we had made some massive mistake in our polling. (However), our poll had showed Quinn the probable winner, here was a confirming poll. When the election was all over, (of course), Quinn had won [by over 4,000 votes]. As I had mentioned earlier, (Quinn) was happy with Dan Tuttle because we said (on election night, again) he was going to win even though Burns had the early lead. Jack Burns, (of course), was not the happy man, and (he) went into a bit of a funk, as he was known to do. I think I’ll sort of gloss over that period.

There were all sorts of second-guessings about things among Democrats. The Fasi people were unhappy, of course. Oren Long was sort of visualized as over-the-hill. Inouye was going to go to Washington, and that was a real bright spot for him (but he’d be out of the state). Mits Kido, of course, was (essentially retired) as a result of Burns’ loss.

Jack Burns was the one who (really) took it hard. No longer could he go back to D.C. He was the former chairman of the party. All that he had been working for was lost, and he took this (poorly). He was always so self-deprecating, sort of, and always (appeared to) shove away the crown. (However), I don’t think any of us realized how deep-seated was the
ambition of one, John A. Burns. He was (rather) shy in public; he was (the type) of a fellow who would move out of (a) corner, (as I have mentioned earlier), to solve party difficulties. I think some of that ambition is illustrated by this story. During the Quinn inaugural, (as) people were picking up chairs, I ran into Jack Burns. Of course, I just had to tell him, “Gee, Jack, I’m really sorry.”

He suddenly grabbed me by the collar and pulled back his right fist and said, “This wouldn’t have been this way if it hadn’t been for people like you.”

I said, “Jack, what gives? I didn’t oppose you in any way. Sure, we did the poll, but it didn’t tell anything different from what you (already) knew yourself.”

He didn’t hit me, other than just grab me by the collar. It didn’t matter. We were good friends, so (I tried to understand). Then I tried to figure out this episode. (Once again), Fasi and Burns had been running in the same election and they helped to knock one another out. Because Frank couldn’t say a kind word about Jack, Jack couldn’t bring himself to say a kind word about Fasi. Given all the other factors, maybe by coincidence, here was (another) case where they knocked one another out.

It was a sad time for Jack Burns. He didn’t have a job. He ended up getting a job as a Western regional director, of sorts, for the Lyndon Johnson campaign of 1960 for the presidency. Jack, who’d never been too happy, I guess, about my associations with Frank Fasi, and then the fact that these polls occurred, and people don’t like a loser anyway. It was a real sorry time for him, and in retrospect I have a lot more sympathy for Jack than I had at the time. Initially, I was kind of angry that this guy was about ready to slug me, at least I thought he was, and he’s bigger than I was. But, in retrospect, golly, if that helped him one little bit to get rid of some of his tensions, I contributed quite a bit, you know. I really shouldn’t have felt ill, even for a moment or two, (toward) Jack Burns.

MK: Shall we . . .

DT: You want to still talk about ‘59 or you want to move it along because . . .

MK: Let’s see. Shall we . . .

WN: Yeah. That’s what I was thinking.

MK: Maybe we’ll stop here. Let’s stop here.

WN: Try to end starting a new . . .

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is a new session, it’s the second session, number five. I miscounted, so it’s like 5b and it took place on December 13, 1990. Tape number twenty-seven.

MK: Okay, tape number twenty-seven with Dan Tuttle. Okay, I think at the end of the last interview we were talking about Jack Burns and we were going on to your encounter with
George Chaplin.

DT: Well, the encounter with [Honolulu Advertiser editor] George Chaplin wasn't all that big a thing, really, but we had, off and on, debated politics. George was fairly new to the community and a new and exciting editor. Of course, I had been in contact with him because our polls in '59 had gone—the break had gone first to the [Honolulu] Advertiser, and then to the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin. Whenever we did polls, (that was) one of the ground rules (that) I developed once I found out they were interested, (first one, then the other state newspaper). I (had) some contact with George Chaplin, (and), of course, had quite a bit of contact (for many years) with Burns, who made his first race for the governorship. (While in Chaplin's office)—George Chaplin was smoking one of his cigars—he used to smoke a lot of cigars, we got into one whale of an argument because the [Honolulu] Advertiser had backed—if you'll check the record, I believe I'm correct—had backed Quinn. He had argued that Burns was a total, I mean, a total incompetent. In turn, I had said that while I wasn't exactly a Burns loyalist, or anything of that sort, that I thought he had a lot of talent and, although he lacked a college education, he was a quite a leader. I felt (he) would've made a good governor. I wasn't necessarily downplaying Quinn at all, but as a result, after we'd gone on for maybe an hour or so, which was a long time to be in an editor's office, he said, "I don't agree with you, Dan, but why don't you write some of this down? I'll print it." A couple minutes later I got up and tried to excuse myself. "No, no, no," he says, "sit down." We went on for another fifteen minutes. I thought he was trying to get rid of me, which might not have been a bad idea given the amount of time I'd been there. About six weeks later, much to my surprise, he called up and said, "Where's that material you were going to send me?"

I said, "Quite frankly, I thought you were trying to ease me out of your office. I haven't (prepared) any material." But I said, "If you're really serious about my writing a column, I would be interested, but you're going to have to write (to) the [University of Hawai'i] Board of Regents. I want their permission to do this because otherwise I'll be out in the street. I'll lose my job about the second column because it's dangerous," given the state of politics at that time to write such a column. I thought again that (that) might be the end of it, but Chaplin followed through, (and) wrote the letter. I forwarded it to the board of regents. They duly approved of it and so the first of November, (1959), I started writing a weekly column for the [Honolulu] Advertiser. Chaplin really dressed it up because the [Honolulu] Advertiser was hurting in those days. If anything, it would help the [Honolulu] Advertiser, (he hoped and thought). This first column was duly dressed up with a Harry Lyons cartoon, and it made quite a splash. As this developed, of course, everybody on campus thought I was suddenly getting rich, but actually he started out paying me ten dollars a week for that column. (This) bothered me a little bit because one of the university professors who had moved into town, a former state department (employee), I've forgotten his name, I knew was writing a column on international politics for the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin and they were paying him fifty dollars a week. That didn't bother me. I (reasoned because) I visualized this was a public service, out of the university. It was, (of course), a state university, and I did very much want to see two newspapers remaining in Honolulu.

(Chaplin) raised my "salary" to fifteen dollars, and there was a period in the [19]80s when they actually paid me fifty dollars for one year for each column, every other week. Later they cut it back to thirty-five dollars. But, interesting enough, this column lasted till '66 when I left the university and came here to (the Hawai'i Education Association). Then, once again,
when I was detached from any possible conflict, I wrote a column from '81 to about '88, I think. I've forgotten. I think it ceased publication in January of '88. (During two years, during this time, I was paid "nothing.") There began a big friendship (and) I still consider George Chaplin to be a very good friend and a good luncheon partner. He's fun to argue with. I just wish he would continue that because in later years, he doesn't seem to have the zest to have these arguments (that he once had). Well, he's had more things to protect, so he's become a little bit of the elite class in Honolulu as opposed to the hoi polloi. That's (probably) what happened there. At any rate, this (experience) certainly got me involved (further) with politics and politicians.

MK: You know, in those years that you were writing your column, did the newspaper at any point try to censor any of your columns, or express displeasure about anything that you'd written?

DT: Yes, (but only because) this was an unusual column. I should have perhaps explained that Chaplin, in the process of getting (me) to agree to (write), didn't give me much money but he gave me complete freedom. No editing whatsoever, not one word, unless perhaps it might have been a comma or something like that, a typographical thing. That's (freedom) which newspapers don't even give to a syndicated columnist. They'll cut the end of it or even leave it out of the newspaper. Two episodes arose in my first stint with the [Honolulu] Advertiser, one of which I remember. I said some rather unkind things about the Honolulu Development Council or something—it was a planning organization headed by a gentleman who's now retired but I can't think of his name. But at any rate, on the board of directors for this new development council was a fellow by the name of Morley [L.] Theaker. I took this development council—it was a planning group for Honolulu—to great task, and George Chaplin said, "I can't print this."

I said, "Why not?"

"It's going to hurt Theaker's feelings."

I said, "Oh, he's not that thin-skinned. Doing something political, he ought to be able to take it."

"Well Dan, you've got to understand, the newspaper. Sears, Roebuck, [& Company] (is) one of our biggest advertisers, (Theaker headed Sears), and, if they were to pull their advertising over this, (my newspaper would) be in great trouble."

I said, "Well, I don't want to get you in trouble but I think it ought to run."

So we argued again, and we both slept on it, and agreed to meet again. Next day, I didn't have to (meet). He called me up and said, "You don't have to worry about it, Dan, I'll print it. 'Cause I hope I'm wrong," and sort of chuckled and that was it. The column ran. I'm still trying to think of the man's name, (not Theaker). He objected. He called me down to his (HDC) office, the executive director of this group, and—he's name started with L and I can't think of any more than that—and so, I had to debate this with him. Of course, we left with the same opinions still, but at least we got it out in the open. (Fortunately), Sears Roebuck did not pull their advertising.

There was one other time when we "slept on it," and once again, he printed it. Nothing
happened until about a year (ago). We may have to embargo this whole, all these discussions because of this, in part, but I think it may be important in terms of future Hawaiian politics. He objected to a column that I wrote, which did not get printed. And I could not talk him out of this one because it heavily involved Henry [H.] Peters. (I was) very critical of Peters serving in (two) roles—as trustee of the Bishop Estate and in the legislature. George Chaplin said that this would incur the wrath, without doubt, of publisher [Thurston] Twigg-Smith, who was developing the property around the [Honolulu] Advertiser, which the Bishop Estate was also interested in, and (Chaplin) figured he just might lose his job. He didn’t want to retire quite (yet), and he wanted to still have good relations, even in retirement, with the [Honolulu] Advertiser. He just couldn’t let this type of thing pass.

I said, “In a way, it’s the truth. Let’s print it.”

“No way.”

I said, “Isn’t it the truth?”

“Well yes, but . . . .” And then he said, “I can’t print it. We’ve done this a long time, we’ve been friends a long time. It’s a matter of personal privilege, Dan. Couldn’t you just make this one exception?”

I pondered it and decided that maybe my views were still important enough in the [19]80s to continue on, and so I withdrew the column (out of deference to Chaplin). It’s in my files along with a note, detailing essentially what I’ve told you here. I think it was a sort of a form of newspaper censorship. But at the same time, here’s a column that had gone on for twelve years, and these special circumstances (arose), and would be (rather foolish) to commit suicide, you might say, over this. I can still debate this (issue). I don’t know whether I did “right or wrong.” But at any rate, the column continued on for, I think, approximately a year afterward until George Chaplin did retire. Then, much to my surprise—maybe it shouldn’t have been—I got a cold letter (from the [Honolulu] Advertiser) saying, “Thank you for all your work, but we’re not going to need your column any longer.” Citing of all things that (the column) was too expensive for them to (publish).

I followed this up with a phone call to both Chaplin and to [John] Griffin, and said, “Hey, it’s gone on this long and money’s never been this big a factor. I’ll do it for nothing (again).” Which I had done earlier. I had done it for one or two whole years in history for absolutely no payment whatsoever. (Griffin) politely informed me, which really helps your ego, that they didn’t need it any longer. (Chaplin was retired.) I should indicate that there were other factors probably in the background of that, and that was the fact that (the new editor) [Gerry] Keir and I had differed—not on a matter of friendship—but on polling techniques. He was very much sold on the telephone poll, on the type of arrangement they worked out with SMS, (and) I (felt) very strongly that [these] techniques are erroneous, mistaken, they are (often) (in)correct. (The SMS) record is very poor, in my judgment. They’ve “missed” elections (invalidating situations, by 10 or 15 percentage points. . . . Advertising it, as they do on the front pages, the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin is doing the same thing now, a different poll (but using the) same techniques. (It’s even) misleading if you headline (a poll) on the front page day after day in an election: that makes it a factor in the campaign, (I believe). If it’s just a poll carried on page four, five, seven, or eight, or whatsoever, it’s (probably) no (major) factor. So we differed, but maybe that wasn’t a factor. At any rate. . . . John Griffin was the one
who wrote the letter to me, of course. It was not Gerry Keir. But then, Griffin is (now) editorial page editor. I talked to John Griffin, and he seemed rather pained. I didn't pursue that discussion very far because John's a former student, and (I'd) put him on the spot. John and I have not talked about it since.

So there was another one of Tuttle's adventures in the field of politics. Maybe the important thing is not how it all came to an end, because anything always comes to an end. Those deadlines even every two weeks (or once a month) get rather burdensome. I felt it (had) a service of the university, really, and thought it was worthwhile, but maybe I was kidding myself. At any rate, over the twelve (plus) years, at least (the column) became a part of the Hawai'i political scene in its own small way. There were times when I think it did have an influence, as I've mentioned, I think it has an influence on Elmer Cravalho. He named the New Hawai'i Program just as one case (in) point. There were other instances that I may mention later on, in terms of my contact with Chaplin. I felt that I did have a role to play. (One) had to do with qualifications for future presidents of the University of Hawai'i, which in essence, I was able to speak behind the scenes through George Chaplin, (1961) who was still relatively new to Hawai'i.

MK: You know, earlier you mentioned that you had differences with Gerry Keir about the polling techniques and about polling being a factor in elections. I was wondering, what do you see as the role of polling in politics?

DT: I think there’s a role for polling in politics. It enables, particularly legislators, I think, to keep up with public opinion, to know what they’re up against as leaders in the community. I don’t think (polls are) there for them to follow blindly, (but) I (do) think there’s a role for an accurate poll in the field. I do not think they are front-page news. I think they’re page-five news or editorial-page news. They’re an advisory to everybody, here’s the way things stand. The only real excuse for conducting campaign polls is (that) close to an election you have a really fine validating situation for your techniques. I think you should validate, but quite frankly, as I’ve dealt with these over the years, I’m thinking that your polls conducted close to an election should probably be used simply as background material so that you can show that your results are accurate on the other issues. The legislature going into session, for example, should know how people stand on a whole variety of issues. If they’re worth their salt. However, it seems to me they should say, “Okay, what I favor makes only 30 percent in the poll, I’ve got a big job. I’ve got a selling job to do.” And go out and do it.

Walter Lippmann worried about this in (his) volume which appeared right after World War II, saying that politicians are frightened, intimidated people, and mentioned media and polls as one example. He was a nationally syndicated columnist, (a) political scientist. In terms of what’s happened since that book appeared, I believe in the (late) [19]40s or early [19]50s, I think he’s right. I think increasingly our politicians are frightened and intimidated, perhaps, (in part) by polls, (in part) by “the hype people,” and I think this constitutes one of our big problems in democracy for the future. I may be wrong. I’m sorry, I don’t mean to digress.

WN: So you feel that the value of polls, really, are just for issues which normally wouldn’t be pollied upon. I mean, for example, an election, you’re eventually going to find out who wins or who loses, but as how people stand on an issue, that’s where you see the value of . . .

DT: I think that’s where the real value (is). Of course, in a very mundane sense, they are
valuable to a political campaign if you keep them quiet, and I think any candidate
should. (These would) not (be) published polls. You know how to conduct your
campaign, but invariably, even your candidates as they do this, will try to release
(poll results) in order to do something (else, e.g.), to get money. For example, Tom
Gill had a very accurate poll when he ran against Jack Burns a little bit later here in
the [19]60s, and one of his big mistakes, I think, was in releasing (his early) poll
(results) to the press. I gave him one devil of a time about this. I said, “Tom, why’d
you do this?” Arthur Park was there. He’d be a witness.

“I had to,” (says Gill).

I said, “What do you mean you had to?”

“I had to, to raise money. I had to show people that I was a viable candidate.” (Gill) said,
“Are you going to find me the money?” Of course, that’s a nice stopper for you. So you can
see (the) other point of view. Now, from a candidate’s point of view, sometimes they need
evidence to convince the people who supply the money that they are viable.

WN: So today polls are criticized for helping to influence elections. At that time when you were
doing polls, that didn’t come into . . .

DT: I don’t think so . . .

WN: . . . account.

DT: . . . although I can sort of criticize myself, I suppose a little bit. We did the polling for
student purposes and for research purposes to check out these different polling techniques. I
don’t think you want me to go into the technicalities of my special polling techniques. They
ended up on the front page, (one time each), I must admit. Both the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin
and the [Honolulu] Advertiser stuck them on the front page, but without the charts and graphs
(and) without all the promotion, (as) they’ve been doing, say, in the last ten, twelve years.
Back in that time, (1960s) the polling that had been done in Hawai‘i had been very inaccurate.
Most people didn’t believe it, and when they read the poll in the newspaper they were just
waiting, ready to pounce on us (laughs), let’s say, because we were (certain to be) wrong.
Well, thank goodness, except for “one miss,” they proved to be (right). I’m still surprised at
how accurate they were. We didn’t mislead anybody (at all) on election nights (either). I don’t
think (polls) were really a (major) factor in the election, but (they) could’ve been.

MK: Okay. Stop here.

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number twenty-eight.

MK: Tape number twenty-eight with Dan Tuttle.

Okay, we had just finished our discussion of polling, I believe. And I guess we can go on to late 1959 and your idea for [a convention] handbook.

DT: Well, in late 1959, the election was over—the summertime elections—and after I started writing the column, I started thinking about one of my old loves and that was (the) national political convention. The reason for that was not just because I wanted to, necessarily, do a handbook or anything of that sort but I wanted to collect a little money so I could finish my doctoral dissertation which was about national political conventions and their behavior. I (had) collected data on national convention delegates from '44, '48 and '52 and it's an awful lot of data (to sort) before the days of computers. I felt that I should be getting on (with the project) because I was constantly being heckled on campus, "When are you going to finish that dissertation?" There were times when I had to correct people when I was out in public, "No, no, no. I'm not Dr. Tuttle, I don't have a [Ph.D.] degree," because if anybody even inadvertently called you Dr. Tuttle, or something like that on media, I would get calls from the university people that I was misrepresenting things and I didn't appreciate that sort of heckling.

At any rate, I approached Bill Pope of Holst & Male, [Inc.] that I'd gotten acquainted with through the citizens committee to sell the city charter that I think I mentioned earlier. Bill Pope was an interesting sort of fellow and we got along very well. I thought (it would be nice to have) an excellent television guide because in '52, conventions became quite an object of interest to national television, even more so (later). We were approaching the conventions of '60. The third time (conventions would be) on national television. I thought of it as a type of World Series booklet they used to have—Gillette used to have it—for (the) World Series. Why not have a guide to this political circus? I had a lot of data about past political conventions gathered together for the dissertation, as well as some behavioral data coming from all my questionnaires.

Well, in the spring, sometime around about March, (Bill Pope) called me up and said, "Come
down to the office, we don’t have enough national contacts really to big advertisers such as Gillette or Palmolive, or somebody like that. We don’t have enough contacts to sell the convention handbook idea. However, I do have somebody interested in covering for local TV, our delegates to the national convention.” This (would be) our first presidential election. (Of course), we’d sent delegates to the national convention since we (became) a territory, but never had we had a presidential election here. He said, “Would you be interested in going to each of the conventions? We’ll send one of our people with you, to each (one) of them. But, we can’t pay you any salary, (just expenses). This (was) going to be an expensive package for that day, $20,000 or $30,000 to cover both conventions.”

Well, you could imagine my reaction, I was excited and delighted. “When do we leave?” was sort of my reaction. We went on from there to cover the Los Angeles Democratic convention in 1960 and the Republican convention (of that year) in Chicago.

MK: In those days was it unusual to have local coverage of a national convention?

DT: I think so, yes. I don’t think many places were doing it and the only reason why Hawai’i was interested in doing it, I think, was (that) it was their first presidential election. I almost made one big “booboo” (on the air) and forgot to just change the name of (Bishop Bank)—now I forgot what the old name of the first—FHB now, it is, but it was First Hawaiian Bank. The name was changed [from Bishop Bank] to . . .


DT: First National or something, anyway I almost said the wrong name. At any rate, they were one of the sponsors, so it was a big sponsor here locally. It was one of the banks.

WN: So, you’re not talking about live coverage though, right? You didn’t have live then.

DT: No, we are talking about tape, (videotape was relatively new). In 1960, believe it or not, we did all of our broadcast(s) from big, bulky cameras in fixed position(s). We had none of this walking around. There might have been one or two— the networks might have had one or two—what we call camcorders or handi-cams. We did it from fixed positions, so that we did (some) broadcast(s) normally from the front of the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles. Then, we had a fixed position at the [Los Angeles] Sports Arena for the camera, sort of (on) the edges of the arena. In Chicago, we did fixed broadcast from WGN studios in Chicago, from the Conrad Hilton Hotel, and from the old Stockyards Arena in Chicago.

MK: And when you covered those conventions, what exactly was your role, an interviewer, an analyst?

DT: Essentially, an interviewer and discussion of the implications of what they were doing, most particularly to illustrate their role. Of course, in the Hawai’i delegation of the Democratic party, you had a certain group of people that were strong for Lyndon Johnson in ‘60; you had (the) next larger contingent who were interested in Adlai Stevenson; and you had the brave souls, one-and-a-half votes for Jack Kennedy, who was still relatively new so far as Hawai’i was concerned. His brother had been out here, but he hadn’t picked up any votes. Patsy Mink, as I recall, was the big person pushing for Adlai Stevenson; Jack Burns, of course, and
his entourage, was for Lyndon Johnson; and the Kennedy people were Dolores Martin and her husband [Watters O. Martin]. Dolores had the one vote—or half a vote, I guess it was—and the one vote went to what’s his name? The fellow that we weren’t able to interview on the Big Island. He (was) a postmaster, (or a) postal employee (in Hilo). Anyway, (he was) a Hilo delegate, and he was always present. He always decked himself out with (souvenir) things on his cap, and so forth. At any rate there (was) one-and-a-half votes for Jack Kennedy. That name (still) doesn’t come to (me). Of course, this type of coverage brought me into a lot closer contact with the delegates. You get to know people a lot better if you sit around hotel lobbies and talk about (current events). If you’re on a bus with them, on the bus riding with the delegates, why, you’re able to know a lot more about them. This (trip) was very pleasurable. In ’64, maybe I’m getting ahead of the game, we did the same thing but when Roger Coryell went with me, we did this with sound on film. We had a lot more mobility; we could actually get out onto the floor (of the convention). We had some rather exciting adventures on the floor of the national political convention. (However), it was still fun in 1960.

WN: In ’64, like Roger Coryell was a professional, in terms of broadcast journalism.

DT: Oh, yes.

WN: In ’60 were you by yourself?

DT: I was totally by myself in terms of media, and I did my share of shaking, I can assure you (of) that. I can recall the first stand-up broadcast I did in front of the Biltmore. Bill [William F.] Richardson (and I), we still joke about this, I put Bill down in the gutter on the street. The camera was on the back of the truck. I put my arm around Bill just to steady myself (on the sidewalk). I had my microphone tucked in against my body which is what you’re supposed to do to prevent the shakes, and I had my arm around Bill and things were going reasonably well. (Then), a “character” put out his cigar on my arm over Richardson’s shoulder (laughs) which hurt. Not only was I shaking but I almost felt like I was on fire. That was the same broadcast where, as we panned the space in front of the Biltmore, they had a Bank of America sign. And, I said, “You can see the Bank of America sign,” but we were broadcasting for—and I almost said the wrong bank name. That’s how I happened to make that (near mistake).

(Laughter)

WN: Were you influenced at all by any of the national political journalists like Edward R. Murrow?

DT: No. I did, (however), meet [Walter] Cronkite once. Now Bob [Robert W.] Sevey, of course, was a longtime friend of Cronkite. Roger Coryell knew Cronkite in ’64 but not in ’60. But in ’60 and again in ’64, except for that one meeting with Cronkite, (I didn’t meet any national announcers). People like Murrow, I think, were still probably operating in ’60 (and) Cronkite and all the others. I remember (in) particular [Chet] Huntley [and David] Brinkley, I think they were (also) operating in ’64. I saw them (in 1960), they were staying at the same hotel, but I really had no contact with them. Roger Coryell and I got pretty well acquainted with the (CBS) news director (in 1964), whose name once again escapes me, who had some Hawai’i ties. He was very nice to us, in terms of letting us on and off the floor. The networks, of
course, controlled the (general) picture. It (was) very unusual in '60 to (be providing) any local coverage. In '64 (such coverage) started picking up.

It’s interesting that in 1968, local stations decided that they wanted to reward their own employees and that’s understandable. Because I was an amateur, they wanted to reward their own employees and so they started to send their own people, much to my chagrin. I would still like to have been there in '68 when they had the big walk-outs (in Chicago) and all the problems but I had determined that I would not spend any more of the family fortune to go back to national conventions. I’d done this, you see. I’ve been to the conventions well before the '60. I started going to conventions in '48, again in '52, again in '56. So, when we did the coverage of '60, it was on the pretext, (at least, that) I knew what I was doing. (However), I had never been there (before) as a press person, but I knew (many of) the little tricks of the trade. For example, if you’re in the Conrad Hilton or (any) big hotel, the first thing you do is you look for the fire escape and the fire exits so that you can get up and down (at will). The elevator (would) never get (you there). You just wait and wait and wait because (the elevators) are jam-packed. All those tricks of the trade, I had pretty well (in hand), I think. I knew pretty much what I was doing, (I hope).

MK: You mentioned that the conventions gave you an opportunity to get to know more of Hawai'i’s politicians. I was wondering if you can share whatever you kind of got from those conventions, in terms of contacts with politicians.

DT: Oh, there was so much, like there’s [Seichi] “Shadow” Hirai who made all the arrangements for the Democrats to go to the conventions. Of course, most of your prominent politicians were there—I mentioned Dolores Martin, Elmer Cravalho, who had been a national committeeeman before. (Elmer is) now, I think, still a national committeeeman of the Democratic party in office and out of office. We had neighbor island delegates which enabled you to—oh, you’d pick up little episodes that mean a lot to you in retrospect. Aguiars from Kaua‘i were there (as delegates) with their daughter. An older gentleman who was enjoying the muumuus [mu'umu'us] that they had on (in the elevator) turned out to be Ed Pauley, the oil man from California who for a time owned Coconut Island over here. There (was) another occasion when I was with Bob Sevey—Bob Sevey, we were competitors. We always ended up as competitors at the national conventions, but, of course, we (had worked together in Hawai‘i and) were good friends so we were palling around together all the time. So on (one) occasion, I was in an elevator with Bob Sevey, and he had an animated chat with this person like they were old friends. (The fellow) had on a big (cowboy) hat. I felt rather stupid, but I said, “Bob who was that? He seems a little bit familiar.”

He says, “Where have you been? Don’t you even know Gene Autry?”

(Laughter)

DT: (Thus, at) national conventions, not only do you meet new people or at least see (new) people, but you get well acquainted with the delegates. I mentioned the Aguiars from Kaua‘i who might not otherwise figure in political history at all. But, I think (they are on) one of the convention tape(s), (I gave to UH).

I think I should tell you probably about maybe the (major) highlight of my practical active
political career. (This) occurred in 1960 when I was with By Feldman. I used to get quite a
goodly number of guests in Los Angeles to meet with the Hawai‘i delegates and be interviewed with them. On the Tuesday before Kennedy was nominated—JFK was nominated on Wednesday—we had talked with Teddy [Edward M.] Kennedy as our guest. By Feldman, not knowing (exactly) what he was doing simply sent back (a) wire (about a) tape (we had put a)board (the) airplane. “We have Kennedy,” (he said). (KHVH) immediately jumped to the conclusion that it was John Kennedy and not Teddy Kennedy, so they actually promoted (it in Hawai‘i) that way. Inadvertently, I bailed By Feldman out by giving him one miserable time (when) we learned that Jack Kennedy would meet with the Hawai‘i delegation in his suite the following day on Wednesday, which turned out to be the day of his nomination, (at) about noon.

I said, “We gotta get that on tape.”

“No way,” said By Feldman. “Who do you think we are? We (won’t be able to) do the principal candidate for the presidency.”

I said, “Oh, we can. You can do it. You can do it.” By Feldman, who happens to be part [American] Indian, has a (bit of) fierce temper, too. (We argued.)

Blankety-blank. Finally he said, “So-and-so Tuttle, go on to bed. I don’t want to hear any more about this.” He said, “Be down there tomorrow at noon. Down in the Kennedy reception room.” So, I showed up at a little before noon, and there was Dolores Martin with a nice red carnation lei to present to the candidate Kennedy. After all, he was her hero. There was Dolores, (but) no camera. No By Feldman. We were going to do a broadcast with Dolores saying, “Here’s (the) lei which I will shortly (be) present(ing) to the candidate.”

So I said, “Dolores, something is wrong, let’s go back upstairs.” Kennedy was staying on the ninth floor and the Hawai‘i delegation, I believe, was on the tenth floor. I hope I don’t have that mixed up. I can easily be corrected because the tape of this somehow survived.

We went up, and we got off the elevator. There was By Feldman. He grabbed me by the arm and says, “We got him, we got him.”

I says, “Got what?”

And lo and behold, what my fellow newsman (had done)—and this is a great tribute to him—he had managed to steal cable—in conjunction with KTLA in Los Angeles (that) was doing the taping for us—he had managed to steal cable from CBS and got the camera on(to) a service elevator (and into the hallway). All of this (was) against hotel regulations, (actually) fire regulations. (We) weren’t supposed to have a camera in the aisle. There we were. Suddenly we had this big camera. Now, they were big cameras in those days, on a (large) tripod. By Feldman goes off into the outer office of Kennedy and turned the corner going into the Kennedy suite when suddenly, some big fellow shoved him (and our camera) back. He got shoved out into the hallway. By Feldman had gone in, you see, (where he) got Kennedy to agree to come out and shake hands with the delegates as they were leaving before our cameras. There we were, all set to go and KTLA kept bugging the person with the communication system for us to go on the air.
I kept saying, "No, no, no, no," because I remembered just one thing, at that time, (and that) was (that) political meetings never end on time. So, there, ten minutes often becomes fifteen or twenty.

They kept saying, "We're gonna lose our taping time, we're gonna lose our taping time." I kept putting them off and finally we were on the air, (and) the door to the suite was still closed. There I was. Talk about being "hung out to dry." There I was. So, for five minutes (I had to talk). It seemed like an eternity, (because) nothing happened. Finally, a crack of the door open and Jack Kennedy did come out. (He shook) hands with the entire Hawai‘i delegation. Thank goodness, I knew them well enough so that I could tell who he was shaking hands with (and narrate). KTLA asked for permission, when they saw what was happening, to "live" this to the Los Angeles area. Once again, (this was) in violation of agreement because Kennedy people said, "We'll do this because it's delayed going to Hawai‘i, but we are not giving any photographs on the day he's nominated." But, it went live to L.A. (They) finally got the word across (to me)—it took them awhile. Finally (I) said, "This is (also) going live to the L.A. audience."

Jack Kennedy, on that occasion, promised to come to Hawai‘i to campaign, which he never did, but at any rate, we got Kennedy so that By Feldman could call Honolulu and tell them that we indeed had Jack Kennedy, this time. The tape was on its way. They had three or four lawsuits in the wake of that (episode). But, in the process of that telephone call back (to Honolulu), I indicated that, "This fellow just might become president of the United States. Will you please have somebody do a kinescope of this," which Bill Pope did. That (was the) only way this (moment) has survived. . . . He did do the kinescope and three or four months later, after the election was over, he said, "Dan, this might be valuable sometime. We didn't pay you any salary. The bank says that they are not interested in having this so here is the kinescope"). The film is in the Hamilton Library now (and a couple of) videotapes have been made of this. Let's say, it was probably my most exciting moment in covering politicians in action.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview, this is videotape number twenty-nine.

MK: Tape number twenty-nine with Dan Tuttle.

I think we can continue with the 1960 convention.

DT: I think it suffices to say that Jack Kennedy was duly nominated later that day and he appeared (before the convention). Actually the state, where I formerly taught, put him over the top. Wyoming gave him the votes that he needed and he later did make an appearance before the cameras that night at the sports arena and (informally) accepted the nomination. There were other very interesting things and exciting things that I had to do along with covering the conventions for television.

I originally (earlier) talked with [Y.] Baron Goto at the University [of Hawai‘i] campus, and he says, "Dan, if that falls through," he says—(Goto was) a nice gentleman, a (prominent) fellow at the university. He says, "We'll send you out of our ag extension funds." He says,
“You can help us and get people to understand our first presidential election.” When the arrangement was actually firmed up with Channel 4 and Bill Pope, and so forth, I told Baron Goto. And he said, “(Fine, but) wouldn’t you like to take my camera?” He says, “Okay, (so) we don’t have to put up (any) money (to send you), Dan,” but he says, “I’ll loan you my camera if you’ll come and talk, when you get back, to a couple of our ag extension (groups).” So, he loaned me his Leica camera. And, I don’t know whether any of you are photographic buffs, but a Leica is a pretty nice camera. As a result, I ended up with a couple (good) hundred slides from the 1960 conventions.

The 1960 coverage of the Republican convention wasn’t all that exciting but we did have. . . . I remember one interview that we did in particular in the Conrad Hilton [Hotel] with a senator from (Oregon)—[Mark O.] Hatfield, who was, I think, then governor of Oregon before he became a senator. Bill Quinn (did most of the) interview. I also remember our broadcast out of the studio at WGN, which just about drove me wild. We had the entire Hawai‘i delegation there in the studios of WGN-TV. I (had) been accustomed to just “flying by the seat of the pants,” (so to speak), one “take,” do it, get off of it. We must have had a half a dozen or more “takes.” Every time (the tape got rolling), something was technically wrong, and they’d shut us down. (It) took us seemingly forever (to do that show). At any rate, all of (a) sudden the national conventions were even more fun than they’d been (during) my first experience with the national convention back in ’48, when you remember one of my heroes back in ’48 was Harold [E.] Stassen. He lost the [Republican] nomination (that year) in Philadelphia (to Tom [Thomas E.] Dewey).

MK: Okay. I believe that when you—you also did a poll in Hawai‘i on the election.

DT: We did, once again in 1960, we did polls. This time it was a fall election, of course. The classes did a nice job, and we had only one problem. Every poll we did showed that the presidential race was nip and tuck. We had John F. Kennedy a very narrow winner, something like 50.5 percent, and you can check this out of the newspapers—I’ve forgotten precisely what it was. I don’t want to repeat myself, but it was an interesting poll. We had all of the candidates who were running. The big highlight of ’60 was, (of course), the presidential race and the race for electoral votes. We had already elected a governor; there was no [U.S.] Senate race; (and) no [U.S.] House race. (We) probably had a mayor’s race and that sort of thing. But the campaign out here was interesting. [Richard M.] Nixon visited Hawai‘i. I didn’t get to see him—for my family did—but I didn’t get to see him. I’d seen him, of course, and taken Leica pictures of him campaigning on the streets of Chicago. Jack Kennedy, as I mentioned earlier, did promise to come (to Hawai‘i) on our film but he never bothered to show up (prior to the election). That ended the election (of 1960, almost). In 1960 the Hawai‘i voter turnout was almost as impressive, 94.5 or [94.]6 or [94.]7, (maybe more) impressive (than) it was in 1958, or ’59. When we got down to election night coverage, which was the first time on TV, it was Sevey and Tuttle this time—not the earlier cast of characters that I mentioned. I kept giving the edge to Kennedy, but it was very close, saying anybody could win. I couldn’t call it (at) 7:30 like we were accustomed to (doing), and I still kept giving the edge to Kennedy.

When we signed off, Nixon was ahead, and the only decent thing that I said, I think, that night, was, “Well, Bob, it may be a long time before we know who the real winner is.” Little did I know that the narrow Nixon win of 100-plus votes, as I recall, (would lead) to a recount of our first presidential election here in Hawai‘i.
JC: Can we stop ___________.

(Taping interrupted, then resumes.)

DT: When the unofficial totals came in with Nixon the winner, I took a close look at the early precinct results and noticed that the figures just didn’t add up for a whole variety of precincts. In my post-election column at the time, I think I called attention to this. At any rate, I (also) called the Democrats’ attention to this, and the Republicans knew also. I think the [Honolulu] Star-Bulletin (knew), but it (was mostly) the [Honolulu] Advertiser since I was still writing a column for them, of course. They actually did an editorial on Dan Tuttle’s objections, a small editorial, to the totals. Guess who took up the cudgel? Bob Dodge. (Robert) Dodge did a masterful job. We had a total statewide recount, all of which took place in Judge [Ronald B.] Jamieson’s court in the old judiciary building. (The judge) went at it very slowly because he took only the most suspect precincts and had them recounted. Then, (he) took the next tier, so forth. It (finally) got to a point where Judge Jamieson said, “We got to have a total recount.” We did. And mirabile dictu, Kennedy came out the winner. This lasted until just a day or two before Christmas of 1960. (It came) just in time so that the votes could be cast properly in the electoral college and (duly) announced in the House of Representatives.

Dodge’s strategy was truly outstanding, the way he handled his case. As he tells it, his greatest inspiration came while he was sitting on (a) bar stool on a break during the recount. He has written this down, and it is included in my (Vignettes of Hawaiian Politics, (1974) which, (in essence) is non-published. It’s simply in my files. The University [of Hawai‘i] Press said that they were not interested in such little trivialities a few years back. So, it remains unpublished. (However), Bob Dodge, in his own inimitable way, describes that recount, as I recall. To me, it was a remarkable lesson in politics because both political parties participated. Volunteers, no-paid persons, (worked) day after day after day auditing all of these paper ballots. Of course, there was Bob Dodge. The attorney general, as I recall, was there most of the time representing the state of Hawai‘i, which had certified, or initially certified, Nixon as the winner. Of course, Bill Quinn was still the governor so they were interested in having Nixon (win) the vote.

MK: How was the recount actually done? By both parties, or a League of Women Voters, or . . .

DT: This was done by the judge. With volunteers representing both parties and any other volunteers that would come in. I think the League of Women Voters were undoubtedly there. This was actually done by one person reading it off, another person doing the count. They would do a pre-opened bag by bag, very methodically. This went on, as I said, for day after day. I know I spent a lot of time down there. Whenever I wasn’t in class, I would go down and watch this recount.

I can vividly remember Bill Richardson coming by and saying, “Hey Dan, what are you doing here?”

All I could think of to say (was to) quip, “Hey, man, I’m here to make sure that the poll and the prediction (on) election night turns out right.” He appreciated that, because he was a Democrat, you see, and he wanted the vote to go to Kennedy. Even though, of course, Richardson had been a Burns Democrat at the convention and had backed Lyndon Johnson. (Of course), at this time, the two were tied together. Much to the surprise, I might add, of
Jack Burns who had, the day before this happened at the convention, (had) said (that there was) no way this (would) ever happen. So this came (and), well, it was a nice surprise for Jack because after losing [the 1959 election for governor], okay.

I might add, too, that Jack Burns and I, at that '60 Democratic convention, managed to “bury the hatchet” in the (hotel) window as Kennedy was arriving at the Biltmore Hotel. We had our feet up on the window (sills) of the hotel room or the reception room of the local Democrats. We were able to laugh about a lot of things that we had previously argued about on campus, and even during the '59 election. So, we (again) became friends of sorts and from that moment on, we were able to speak (more) easily to one another. You remember, I was afraid he was going to hit me on the ['Iolani] Palace grounds in '59. Here we were in '60. We came to an understanding and that understanding lasted until the last time I saw him, before he became too ill—as governor—to have any fun talking to anybody.

MK: Okay. And then on the local scene, I guess we can go to the legislature of that period.

DT: Well, the Democratic program was still languishing when we got to '61. This was because then we had a Democratic house of representatives and (a) Republican state senate. However, there was a lot of consternation in Democratic ranks. They wanted to sweep the platter clean, you might say, so there was a big interest in Burns. We were still doing polling at the university, so in December, having turned down offers from both parties to do polls for them. The university (had) made no provision to (support) our polls. (As a result), I had no way to accept a contract for one or jointly from both, or anything of that sort.

So I said, “We’ll do one more poll, the way it’s been done (in the past) and then we’re gonna put it to rest.” After that, McIntire and I delivered a paper before the local academy of science, and that was “it” as far as the (so-called) UH poll (was concerned). Our last poll, (then), in December showed that Jack Burns would easily defeat Quinn in 1962. After that poll was taken—I explained this to Burns and (to) the Democrats. Bill Quinn invited me down to Washington Place, where I was literally heckled as I presented this poll (to him) because his boys were telling him that he was certain to be reelected.

MK: What did you explain to them about the poll?

DT: The technique(s) (employed), how it was done, what the percentage figure(s) (were). I even took some audiovisual aids; in other words, I had some charts that I took down—rear-view projection things—that I took down to Washington Place. By the time I got out of there, I felt very lonely. I thought, gee, once again they figured we were wrong, you know. Bob [Robert S.] Craig was there, who had been an earlier pollster, and he was telling Quinn he was gonna win. Roger Coryell was there, but on this occasion, as press secretary to Quinn.

I remember standing out (in) front (of Washington Place), after my explanation to Bill Quinn, talking with Roger Coryell and Roger saying, “Hey, you can shoot straight with (me), Dan.” See, they had all sorts of suspicions, “Is this really likely to happen?”

And I said, ”Yes, unless the governor does what I suggested he do, even then he’ll probably lose.”

Bill Quinn—inside, (earlier) said, “All my advisors tell me that I’m easily (going to) win
reelection. I don’t believe your poll, but let’s assume that it’s accurate. What would you suggest that I do?”

And I said, “Governor, I would take it seriously and I would go for broke.” Which he didn’t really do.

MK: In your polling, besides asking, “Who do you think will be the next governor or who was your choice of governor,” did you kind of poll them on the strengths or weaknesses of each candidate?

DT: This was mostly a trial heat type of (poll). Only later in our polling we started doing what today would be taken for granted—I think at that time we would use key adjectives. In other words—see, this is a secret ballot, so it had to be self-responding. So we would (use key adjectives). There was some insight as to what were their strengths and weaknesses. Certainly so far as Quinn was concerned the Second Mahele was an albatross around his neck, and there was evidence that from the Big Island (and the) strength of Jimmie Kealoha, (that) he was being hurt badly on the neighbor islands. Of course, Burns had his normal strengths on the Big Island. But Jack Burns, I don’t think, (even he) really believed me. I ran into Jack Burns on campus. He would stroll around in his “straight-back” way on campus, and I remember sitting on the steps of Hawai‘i Hall looking out toward the mountains, which is a nice restful place, the breezes come through there. Jack came across (the lawn when) he saw me and so he started walking up and I stood up—this was January, I think.

I said, “Congratulations, Governor.”

“Humph. You really did believe this? Humph?”

“Believe it?” I said, “Sure.”

“Okay.”

That later led to his calling me up and our having lunch at The Wisteria (early) in ’62. He said, “Okay, put up or shut up, Tuttle. If you think I’m gonna be your next governor, come join my team.”

And I said, “I’m not gonna do you any good, politically, and you don’t need it. You’re gonna be the governor, you don’t need me.”

“Well, you can help.”

I said, “How?”

“Well, I don’t know quite yet but come join my team. Got a lot of cabinet posts to fill and that sort of thing, if you’re right.”

I said, “Okay, Governor, I will think about it.” I said, “We’ll meet one month from today.” Which we did, once again at The Wisteria. And I said, “Jack, I am a teacher. And I plan to remain a teacher and I get a lot of enjoyment out of that. You don’t need me.”
And he said, “Well, I’m disappointed, sort of.”

I said, “Okay, I’m sorry.” But I said, “I will give you a pledge, not totally unlike the one that Frank Fasi had. Once you’re governor, you are OUR governor, and all you have to do is (to) pick up the phone and call me. I’ll be available day or night, and I’ll be happy to come down and talk with you (and help as possible).”

Interestingly enough, although this never happened on any emergency basis, anywhere from two to three times a year I would get a call. Maybe at eleven o’clock at night. He’d say, “Hey, boss,” which (was) his sort of byword to an awful lot of people, not just me, “what do you think about so-and-so?” Or, “Can you find such-and-such to help me?” He was nice enough, so that at least once a year—and sometimes twice—I’d be invited down to breakfast (at) Washington Place. This continued on, well past my (HEA) days. About a year after that, his medicine (started) suddenly cropping up on his breakfast table. (Breakfast) was always good fun, but as I said, you always had to wait around for him to arrive. I got well acquainted with the kitchen help at Washington Place. See, there were nice, casual, fun days with the governor of Hawai‘i.

MK: Okay shall we stop here?

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number thirty.

MK: Okay, tape number thirty with Dan Tuttle.

I think we are going to start with the Quinn administration [1959–62]. We can find out what he did with the executive branch.

DT: I think Bill Quinn, as a political figure of governor presiding over the state, deserves a lot more credit than, I think, people have ever been willing to give him, including the Democrats. Getting the new state executive branch organized (was a tall order). This (sometimes became) quite a legal battle—something that’s not very dramatic, but it needs to be done, it (had) to be done. (This) gave flesh and blood to the old hope chest constitution, which is now the state constitution. Quinn was always (an) able (person, but) he did have a fiery temper, (which) he was (usually) able to control very well. Most of the time he was sort of a “Hawaiian Wedding Song,” light-hearted gentleman. I think he deserves a lot of credit for (organizing state government. However), I don’t think you’re interested in the details of that. Some of it was controversial, some of it was not.

The only place where he really misfired was in the [State] Department of Social Services. This was probably not due so much to this restructuring or the structuring of the department. He appointed Mary Noonan as director of social welfare or social services. Sometime prior in the [19]60s or ’61, I guess it was, Mary Noonan, who was sort of a conservative Republican who wanted to throw away the key on people, got into a bitter battle with Joe Harper, who
was the warden of the [O'ahu] Prison. Now Joe Harper was a very uncommon sort of mild-mannered gentleman of a person. You just wouldn't believe that he could be the warden of a state prison. He was interested in people. He was interested in society as a whole. One of his good friends was Morris [G.] Fox, who was a social worker in the same department [State Department of Social Services], but not in the prison. He was a church-going person. (Joe was a) great contributor (to society) in a very quiet manner. His manner was somewhat akin to that of Oren Long, who was also very mild-mannered and low key.

But Mary Noonan—I don't remember all the details of this, but Mary Noonan fired Joe Harper, which a lot of people felt was unjustified. She did it on the spur of the moment. Thereafter followed long (legislative) hearings, which are hopefully still on the record someplace. They had them taped at the time. (They were) long hearings in the house of representatives, which pitted largely the still Young Turks in the legislature against [Ray V.] Belnap who replaced Joe Harper [as head of the corrections division]. (This) fellow by the name of Belnap, who had been a former marine, was a tough guy out of Southern California—I think it was Southern California. I sat through all these hearings—they (went) on long hours (until) midnight, (or even) past midnight. Tom Gill, all these young attorneys in the Democrats' house were suddenly prosecuting attorneys, and they were "going out to get" Belnap. (They were) trying to get the truth. They (finally) put people under oath; this was no powder-puff sort of investigation. They put people under oath. And, I sat still and didn't say anything in my column until I heard the testimony of Morris Fox, who was the top civil servant in the department. (This was a) big department, apart from the prison. He started giving the inside story, under oath.

When we had Morry Fox's testimony on the record, I urged publicly in no uncertain terms that Bill Quinn fire Mary Noonan. (DT sighs) Bill Quinn had been angry up in Chicago at the Republican convention over another thing, and so he really hit the ceiling. It suffices, I think, here, for the sake of brevity, (to say) that in due time, Bill Quinn (did have) to fire Mary Noonan. Evidently (enough) occurred so that Bill Quinn felt that Mary Noonan was a liability.

Then there was the Second Mahele, which became a factor in the '62 campaign because the Democrats kept saying, "Where is it? What is it? This is not a land distribution thing. This is not land reform." They ran big ads. By this time, Bill Quinn had really had it. There were other episodes that came along in the campaign. For example, Bill Quinn kept challenging Jack Burns to a series of debates. They decided that Jack Burns was not much of a public speaker, (that) he couldn't sing the "[Hawaiian] Wedding Song" if he tried. They decided to get him into a series of debates, and he would obviously show his ignorance. He was still viewed, in many circles, as something of a bumpkin. Well, I had popped in on occasion and (had) seen, through the glass windows, that all of these things were being discussed and planned on behalf of Quinn in George Chaplin's office (chuckles). As the campaign progressed, I had a bit of empathy and sympathy for Jack Burns. I felt (that he might) not be the world's best choice for governor, but he could do a decent job. His heart was in the right place and that sort of thing—politically, that is.

Bob [Robert G.] Alderman, who had been brought in (for) the first time (as a) public relations man (to) help Jack Burns and the Democrats, (was often seen around Honolulu). (He) was brought in from the West Coast, California (I believe). He'd been a Republican and (had) worked for Republican candidates, (interestingly enough).
That didn't bother Jack Burns, "I need somebody to help me." So (Alderman became) a one-man PR team for Jack Burns [1962-66]. I got well acquainted with Bob Alderman and saw him periodically until he left (Hawai'i). He was virtually blind when he left (the islands).

(Alderman was) a really nice gentleman, and he kept saying, "We gotta have these debates, what are we gonna do?"

And I said, "Aah, don't worry about this. Go one time, Jack Burns will do okay. One time only. Don't get in two or three or four (debates)." Finally Burns agreed, mirabile dictu, to a one-time debate. So the Quinn-Burns—this was the Quinn-Burns debate, not the Burns-Quinn debate because they agreed that the governor's name had to be first, (took place) on KGMB. This debate was duly scheduled, and everybody (in Hawai'i) was anticipating this. You see, this was in the wake of the (1960) Nixon-Kennedy debates. There was a lot of interest in this. These were genuine, real debates. You didn't have any press people sitting around asking laundered questions, or anything of that sort. Interestingly enough, I ended up as a moderator of that debate (chuckles).

You may recall my kidding with [A. A.] "Bud" Smyser, he wrote a column about that debate and said, "There were three scared guys on television." And he was quite correct. Bud Smyser had often been wrong, but he was very right about that. We posed for a picture (afterwards). I don't know whatever happened to it, but we posed for a picture (and) Jack Burns put his arm around me. I was in between the two of them.

And he (said afterward), "I didn't believe anybody's heart could beat that fast, (Dan)."

**MK:** You know, who determined the format of that debate? And how did you get involved?

**DT:** It was done by managers for the two candidates, myself, and Joe [Joseph] Herold. He was the general manager of KGMB at the time. (Herold had been) an engineer who was running a TV station. He was a tough, hard-bitten sort of guy, and he could bang their heads together. So there (were) some problems here and there, but the details were not all that bad. 'Cause Quinn wanted to debate very much, (believing) he would "clobber" Burns. Burns was (sort of) resigned, "I gotta do this, otherwise it's gonna hurt me a lot. Because people would say I was chicken, that I couldn't stand up to Quinn," that sort of thing. There was every good reason for both sides that they had to have a debate. I was a little bit surprised that Quinn would agree to have me. (However), Bill Quinn remembered that when I was in public and when the chips were down, I would be fair. That I had been fair to him back when I said he was going to win, you see—his wife [Nancy W. Quinn] still remembered this. So they both accepted me.

I developed a great dislike for political debates on that occasion, looking at it from the inside. Okay, I was terribly nervous and would be the first one to admit it, but when Bill Quinn walked in first and grabbed ahold of a lectern—and he's a very (ruddy) sort of person—just long streaks of white (appeared) in his red hands; his knuckles were just white. He was not himself, really.

Jack Burns sauntered in a little bit later. (The) studios were (deserted)—they had only one other person, the timekeeper and sort of floor director who was watching, monitoring time. Jack Burns stood there ramrod straight but the lectern (chuckles) started to sway.
At that point, I thought, "Oh my golly, if I make a mistake, what's going to happen?" As a matter of fact, no mistakes were made, thank goodness, but the time was such that it ended up being about a fifty-minute debate because we didn't have time to do the last cycle, and (the TV station) didn't want to run over(time). I had to call it off at a certain point and ask them to give their closing statements about eight or ten minutes short. Now that debate, to the best of my knowledge, does not—it was done live—did not survive (on videotape). I do not believe. If I'm not mistaken, the audio portion of that debate survives in my collection at the university.

MK: And it's my understanding that the candidates asked questions of each other.

DT: Oh yes, very much so. That's right. The format called for that and then they get a rebuttal. Ask a question, answer, rebuttal, question, answer, rebuttal, turnabout. And ending up with a final statement from each one. It's very much the same format as the Kennedy-Nixon debates. Where they got (the idea) of having the press into it, I think, was largely because the press suddenly decided that they could publicize their own business that way.

WN: As far as you know, was it pretty much unanimous in the Quinn camp that Quinn should go through with this debate? I mean, were they really the aggressors . . .

DT: Oh yes, they were the aggressors, they wanted three or four debates. Because Quinn was so glib and Burns was so "stupid," if you want to put it that way. But the upshot of the debate—and I guess I didn't close that off—Jack Burns in his own inevitable way, stayed roughly even with Quinn. If you would've scored the debate as you might at the university, a university debate, Quinn might well have won. (However), he did not overshadow Jack Burns at all. And Jack Burns, grim faced with a little smile just on a rare occasion, his sort of terse answers, and the fact that his hair was getting greyer or whiter, created (a) sort of a grandfather image which later stood him in great stead, of course, as he went through election after election.

WN: In retrospect, was that unusual for the incumbent to call for the debate on the challenger?

DT: Yes, I think so. I think it's still unusual. By this time, Bill Quinn was beginning to realize—see, I talked to him in January at Washington Place—that he had problems. We were now getting down toward November [1962]. He was getting a little bit worried.

WN: I would imagine the things like the Second Mahele, you know, which would be fair game for the Democrats . . .

DT: That was devastating, that was devastating. As I (have said), the Democrats really rallied around. I think we talked about some of the grass roots (efforts) of this campaign last time. The Democrats, the Heen faction, even the Fasi faction—if there is such a thing as that—(all rallied). There was great Democratic unity. It was one of the, I think, three high points of Democratic unity. [Nineteen] fifty-four being one, '62 would be another, and the final one would probably be on behalf of Dan Akaka, this year of 1990.

MK: When we did our interview with Mike Tokunaga, I think he mentioned that their strategy with the debate was that Burns just had to draw. I mean, if the debate ended up even, that would be a victory for Burns.
DT: That's right, that's right, that's right.

WN: Did we talk about the analysis of this election and why—what is your analysis of what happened to voters' minds, you know, going from a narrow Quinn victory in '59 to an overwhelming Burns victory in '62. How do you analyze that election?

DT: Well, it is still a small unified state. Jimmie Kealoha unabashedly supported Burns. In other words, he had opposed Quinn in the [Republican] primary. Our poll had shown that the bulk of those votes would go to Burns, Kealoha votes would go to Burns. So there was that. There was (the) Noonan-Harper affair. (Also), people didn't appreciate really what Bill Quinn had done in organizing the administrative branch. I should mention that LBJ came out here as vice-president and campaigned for Jack Burns.

In other words, all of (a) sudden even the toughest, hardcore Gill people and McClung people were saying, "We can't really get it all put together unless we elect Jack Burns. We don't particularly care for him," this and that and so forth, "but it is still better than having Bill Quinn there." (As a result), they really turned out.

I want to add a footnote. When Lyndon Johnson was here, he made a speech at the Kaiser [Hawaiian Village Hotel] dome. Big Democratic gathering. And the gal who was the director that night—I remember this very vividly—she was out in the truck. 'Cause I was on the fringes trying to take pictures and do other things. The gal who directed that was a gal by the name of Mary Lou, (a) female director, which was something a bit unusual in television studios in 1962. She married Bob [Robert L.] Barker who was [news director, Hawai' i Broadcasting System]. I think they are since divorced, but at any rate she had the tough job of trying to present the vice president of the United States in a proper format. She did a nice job.

MK: You know, if I could go back a little bit, we've mentioned Jimmie Kealoha and his split with Governor Quinn. I'm wondering if you have any insights as to why that split occurred between Quinn and Kealoha?

DT: They had little or nothing in common. Bill Quinn, as I tried to explain, I think last time here, had (little) feel for grass-roots politics. He was (still) the Mainlander who sat down with the rest of the people only on occasion. This was nothing against Bill Quinn, he just never had a chance. He moved into (a) wealthy law firm. It wasn't like being a member of the faculty without a Ph.D. degree sitting around on the floor with these people. He had none of this. Kealoha, on the other hand, I don't think he would have known the first thing about putting together an executive branch (for a) first state. Quinn, as an attorney, had that know-how. (However), I would repeat, Kealoha's personality was such that—(well, it was) tremendous.

MK: Okay, shall we end here?

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: This is tape number thirty-one with Dan Tuttle.

MK: This is tape number thirty-one and we can continue where we left off.
DT: Well, '62 was really the capstone to the electoral revolt that took place in '54. As such, it was really quite an exciting time. So the period from '59 to '62, these were just jam-packed years that need to be, probably, researched and re-researched because, in a conversation such as this one can't begin to capture all the many things that were happening on so many fronts. Because politics is not just a few people sitting down at a table, at least it wasn't in those days. This was (a) competitive two-party system. For once Hawai'i had that. Because they had that, why, everybody had a little bit of a role to play. I could not be every place at one time—no one person could—so it's gonna take an awful lot of differing slants to really (re)capture this for the future.

As a footnote, we did have a couple of (debates), the Inouye-Dillingham debate [in 1962], as I recall, for the United States Senate which (wasn't) quite as dramatic (as the Quinn-Burns affair). I moderated (this) one, I think, on KGMB, and, as I recall, Bob Kamins moderated the one on Channel 4. Dan Inouye, in essence, really just made mincemeat of Ben [Benjamin F.] Dillingham II, the person who had ended up opposing statehood, for example, and here we (had) statehood. He was running for the United States Senate. (There were) little asides (as) this big-hearted, nice sort of guy (Ben Dillingham got) so “tied up” with this (debate), that during a break in (the) debate, I recall him (saying to me, sometimes) even when Danny was talking, “How am I doing? How am I doing?” you know.

“Hey, get back there, man,” (I'd whisper).

Ben Dillingham was sort of an unusual personality. Here was this sort of an overgrown kid, rich fellow, debating Dan Inouye. I remember distinctly we were looking at some (KGMB) tapes (where) Dillingham was picturing Dan Inouye as Matson's little errand boy.

And I said, “Ben, (are) you really gonna use that?”

“Oh yes, that's what my people tell me to do.”

I said, “Nobody in the world is gonna believe that Dan Inouye is just an errand boy for Matson Navigation Company.”

“They're not?”

I said, “No way.”

He could not understand. (Thus), Ben Dillingham was a sort of a Bill Quinn (type) who had even less understanding. Bill Quinn had a degree of flexibility. He tried, I think, as hard as he could to understand the Hawai'i political scene. Ben Dillingham, given his background, his father [Walter F. Dillingham], the La Pietra (image), the paternalism of the Dillinghams, (never really got to know the true Hawai'i). At least, (however), he made a contribution. You know, we had a race, we had competition, which we don't have some of these days (now) in Hawai'i. He was standing up for his views as he saw (them), and was trying to fulfill his father's desire that he be the politician in the family, just like a Jack Kennedy turned out to be the politician ultimately in the Kennedy family. Even as a loser, I think, (Ben) made a contribution. He did indeed give people (a) choice. But when you look at those election results in that race, Dan Inouye—talk about racial bloc voting and so forth—Dan Inouye carried even the heaviest Wai'alae-Kāhala precincts. In other words, the Republican (and
MK: Okay. And I guess '62 was the big year for the Democrats, right? After '54, I think '62 really stands out.

DT: I think so. I may be wrong and other people may see it differently, but to me, in their victory, everybody in the Democratic party was happy. Even though they knew that Jack Burns had certain weaknesses, people who saw them as weaknesses determined that they would and could do something about (them). The young people in the house of representatives and also some in the senate, they determined that they would fill in these pukas, and they made Jack Burns into a real political hero. In other words, it just wasn't all Jack Burns and his personality. Once again, this involves a lot of people, and they were contributors—heavy contributors—to the Burns image and also to the Burns legend.

I can’t predict how (the legend) is going to turn out, whether it will be based upon the facts of what happened or whether it’s going to be based upon some of the fiction which we know has already developed around the personality of Jack Burns. Out of intense emotions that lead up to political revolt, you see, you’ll also develop certain heroes and villains. Blacks and white(s), dark shadows and light shadows. Life is not either black or white, it’s really a mixture. Politics, in particular, is a mixture of fact and fiction, right and wrong, emotions, lack of emotions, that sort of thing. I can’t predict how history will show up but I do know one thing, Jack Burns rightly deserves and richly eventually deserves to probably be remembered as (a) giant of Hawaiian politics in his period. I hope it’s (an honor given) for the right reasons. At the moment, it appears to me that (it is) more based upon fiction. I like the factual Jack Burns that I knew with all of this strengths and all of his weaknesses because he was that type of person. I think he had weaknesses, maybe weaknesses that we don’t even know about, in terms of the public arena. Because in all of these people that I have been talking about—these actors on this political stage—except for a little bit of insight into Frank Fasi’s family, I did not know any family relationships of many of these candidates. Of Burns, or Ching, or Cravalho, or Kealoha, or of Bill Quinn, or the Farringtons. I never had such entrée really.

MK: And as you look back on that '62 campaign, who do you see as the main players who engineered Burns’ victory and what did they play up? What were the key things that made Burns a winner that year?

DT: Well, Jack talked about the things that he normally would talk about. He talked about in '59, the destiny, his belief in people, that Hawai‘i was a great melting pot. And he made good on this. His cabinet (became) a good replica of the people of Hawai‘i, and it was a pretty darn good cabinet. I think Bob Alderman was a factor. I think the visit of Lyndon Johnson, which illustrated his [Burns’] friendship with Lyndon Johnson, was a factor. I think the work of Tom Gill and Dave McClung and Walter [M.] Heen, who was an actor on the stage—now Judge Heen—I guess. Some of the Heen relatives, ’cause the Heen (family) was large. Of course they [Heens] had a lot of political connections. So, it was a Democratic unity effort. Jack Burns finally had to admit, as he did, that he was only partially right when he wanted to base the Democratic party on AJAs and the ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union]. He had to admit that he’d have to do more than just (to) organize them, that he needed the Heens (and) the other [ethnic] groups, which make Hawai‘i what it is.
MK: But how did he corral those minority groups to support him in '62? What did he offer?

DT: He didn't offer very much. As a matter of fact, I was quite angry—if you talk about behind­the-scenes politics—I was very angry at the Heens and the McClungs and the Gills. "Why didn't you get a guarantee of three or four cabinet officers? Tell (Burns) what you want." But maybe they were right in the long run. They gave that support to Jack Burns, not liking him all that much, but they literally gave it away. They did not drive any hard political bargains, to the best of my knowledge.

MK: What would motivate the Gills and the Heens to do that?

DT: Their program. Their issue program. They wanted to complete their sweep of Hawai'i. They wanted to be kings of the hill. They wanted to do as much as they could to get their '54 program into action. There (was) a tremendous amount of idealism. Okay, maybe they were naive, but gee, you love them for it. If we had a little more of that today, I think (Hawai'i and our nation) would be better off. It didn't last all that long, as I mentioned. Some of them ended up becoming reasonably wealthy as a result of this political revolution. Why not? They've been governed by wealthy people before so if some of them got wealthy, why, I guess turnabout's fair play.

MK: And then as for the Republican party, with the exception of, say, Hiram Fong and Neal Blaisdell, what was there in '62?

DT: On the Republican side?

MK: Yes.

DT: There was Bill Quinn, of course, who lost. Kealoha by this time was in essence a Democrat. That's about all they had. They haven't had much since—other than Hiram Fong. As a matter of fact, when [President George] Bush visits out here, who gets to ride in the car with Bush? It's still Hiram Fong, right?

(Laughter)

DT: This is really—put it in perspective—is really a tragedy. We do need that two-party system. Here I am propagandizing, I mean I have a bug on this—and we do need a competitive two-party system to really bring out the issues, to bring out the weak points of the opposition. They're always there. There's no one group that always has all the strong points, that's always on the side of righteousness. (To) borrow somebody's—Pamela Young's mixed plate (label, a mixed-plate) situation (is what) you have in politics.

WN: I know this has been documented before, but I just want to get your views as to Burns' choice of his running mate, Bill Richardson. Do you know the circumstances behind it or . . .

DT: I think so. Bill Richardson had been—I think he'd been chairman of the [state Democratic] party [central committee]. He had been very prominent in making arrangements for Jack Burns. He was an attorney. He'd gone to University of Cincinnati Law School. He wasn't a giant among attorneys. He was (merely) a workman-like attorney. He later moved from that position over to the court system, and became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court [in 1966].
So, once again, he may not have been the brightest light, but he served well and faithfully in that position. You know the Democrats used to have a saying, and it's not just a Hawai'i saying, (I) also (heard it in) Wyoming—Bill Richardson had carried “a lot of wood and water” to help the Burns camp. He'd always been faithful to Jack, and in addition to that, Jack—maybe this is a minor footnote—Jack was “handicapped” I suppose and maybe helped a bit by his wife being an invalid and in a wheelchair. Bill Richardson’s wife, Amy [Corinne Ching Richardson], was charming. (Amy was a) charming hostess and she (was) very (able). She was, in addition to being charming—I say that not just because she could become a fashion plate—nice, she was always well groomed, she was a genuinely cordial and nice person. I know that first hand because, while I didn’t get to know families all that well, I know on several occasions I was in the Richardson household. (These) were large gatherings, it wasn’t a family gathering or anything of that sort. She was very nice (to all). I don’t know if that answers your question completely or not, but at least it covered some of the (aspects).

There were other things that I could mention if you want me to, going a little bit beyond what perhaps we have on paper here. It was in ’62 that I ended up doing a weekly television show on Channel 13 for KTRG. Now it has different call letters today. This (station) was Dave [David] Watumull’s “plaything,” you might say, located down in Waikīkī. This, again, I felt, was a public service. He did pay me, I don’t know, ten or fifteen dollars a broadcast, so it was a little bit of pay for a college teacher. I was able to set it up. (They) had just one camera—it had to focus itself (by remote control). You worked with one camera all the time. (We) didn’t have much of an audience but we did one great public service, I think. We interviewed—on one occasion, (for example), it took us four or five hours on TV to (do) all the candidates for the school advisory council. There were a lot of candidates. I thought it would never end, (the) broadcast, (that is). At any rate, this (program) only lasted six months. Hardy [C.] Hutchinson, who was sort of a political man about town, had arranged this between Dave Watumull and yours truly. Quite frankly I didn’t endear myself to Dave Watumull because at the end of an hour, that was (the length of the show, Watumull would want to continue). The program was over as far as I was concerned. I'd been around the professions enough to know it’s not very professional to continue on for fifteen or twenty minutes more. (However), Dave Watumull would be back in his (home) and then he would order me to continue the program because he was enjoying it.

Well, one night I arrived—about the sixth month—and I had a different set of guests (than I had arranged). He knew that I would not stand for this. The (show) guests happened to be embarrassing (because) they were all my friends including the minister of Central Union, Tom [Thomas L.] Crosby, was one of the four guests that night. I told them the circumstance that I hadn’t invited them as guests, but here they were. We (had) had an intermediary, a fellow who was station manager, (who) invit(ed) guests for me. (This time) he took Dave Watumull’s orders as over against my suggested guests.

I said, “I’ll do the program.” (So), I did the program and said, “That’s the last one, Dave.” So we parted company. (However), this (had been) fun. It also gave me a little more acquaintance with media. It gave me a chance to get acquainted with people who were not only interested in politics but, believe it or not, there are things in public affairs beyond politics that are important to the lives of people. We would have ministers, on occasion, or we would have a discussion of some legal problem with attorneys. (However), I do not believe that we had any call-ins on that. I do not think so.
In those days, who were the other men and women involved in public affairs programming on TV?

We were always pretty well served, (by) mostly newscaster(s). There was not much (other) programming on TV. We had had a lot of people involved in radio. And, of course, our press corps during this period of the [19]50s and into the [19]60s was tremendous. I don’t know whether I can name them all. (There was) Brian [L.] Casey, you may (also) know [Tsuneko] “Scoops” Casey, (who was his wife), Al [Allen L.] Goodfader was here, Gardiner [B.] Jones was around as a reporter. In the very early period, [A. A.] “Bud” Smyser was (present as a reporter and) in the very early period (of) the [19]50s, (Thurston) Twigg-Smith was there, believe it or not, as a reporter.

On TV we had newscasters such as Wayne Collins—I’m trying to remember some of those people. Wayne Collins was blessed with a photographic memory. He could do a newscast—he’d read over the copy and he’d do a newscast without a TelePrompTer, (an entire) half-hour, straight into the camera. (He did an) amazing job. (Collins) later served in Bill Quinn’s cabinet, (then) got disgusted with politics. He loved the outdoors, so to the best of my knowledge, he’s still in Arizona in some sort of wildlife conservation (work). He’s one of the early ecologists (really) interested in the environment.

Bob Sevey, of course, (and) Mason [L.] Altiery (were) around. Mason Altiery originally had a (cohort) who was an awfully nice fellow, Dean Buchanan. Another name, Dick [Richard L.] Whitcomb, (KGMB), came into the picture a little bit later, but he was there. These people were very congenial. I don’t know, we really don’t have (many left). Bud Smyser (is) probably, one of the remnants of the press corps. But we had three or four people covering politics in those days for each newspaper. Now the [Honolulu] Advertiser was very weak (as a newspaper) in the late [19]50s and early [19]60s. That’s probably why I ended up as a columnist because George Chaplin wanted me, (to help circulation). Nobody here probably can remember, George Chaplin also ran cheesecake on the front page to (help) the [Honolulu] Advertiser.

(Laughter)

So (Chaplin) went from A to Z. He had cheesecake on the front page, and Tuttle, for (what)ever he was worth, op-ed part of the time, at any rate.

Okay, shall we end here, then?

END OF INTERVIEW
Joy Chong: The following is a continuation of the Daniel Tuttle, Jr. interview. This is the beginning of session number [eight]. It took place on January 24, 1991, at the HEA [Hawai‘i Education Association] office. The interviewer is Michiko Kodama-Nishimoto and Warren Nishimoto. This is videotape number thirty-two.

MK: This is an interview with Daniel Webster Tuttle on January 24, 1991 and this is tape number thirty-two, session number [eight].
And I guess today we’ll continue with 1962 and your involvement with KGMB.

DT: All right, '62 was really a tremendous political year for Hawai‘i and it was probably the busiest year of my life—take all the years put together—because so many things were happening. I think I’ve already mentioned that I was trying to do a series of weekly shows for Channel 13 and Dave Watumull. But also, prior to the elections of '62, I agreed to set up a series of six shows on KGMB Channel 9. We entitled it “Politics in Paradise” and Bob Barker, who later, I think, went to [Hawai‘i] Public Television, worked with me. These were three (shows) before the primary; three before the general election. They were (half-hour) weekly shows and as far as I (remember) these were taped in advance. (However), to the best of my knowledge, they (have been) erased or otherwise disposed of (chuckles). I do believe the audio format survived—mainly because I made sure I had a record of what we’d said—and these (have) been given to the University [of Hawai‘i], like so many other things (that I’ve mentioned).

MK: And in those six shows, did you interview politicians on the air?

DT: Some of it was a wrap-up. Some of it was... We had a lot of breakaways, breakaways with shots of campaign headquarters of the various candidates. I don’t remember in great detail what we did. The presidential years sort of stick in my mind (and) loom larger. We probably caught all the major candidates in their campaign stances. Of course, back in those days, on election nights the candidates all converged (while awaiting) election returns. On election night you caught practically everybody. You got pretty well acquainted with the candidates when you did things like that. It was a lot of fun.

MK: And then in '63 you continued doing some shows, but this time on radio.
DT: Yes. While we were on the topic of media, in early '63 in the session, the Democrats decided that they wanted to keep their success of '62 going, and probably what they needed was some continual sort of publicity, so ... . I've forgotten who made the exact contacts, but at any rate, probably Elmer Cravalho, who was Speaker at the time. They wanted a series of radio shows, and so the Democrats in the house bought the time. I think they paid for it. As I recall, every Saturday morning I would go down to the house of representatives. They were still meeting in the [ʻIolani] Palace; offices off on the portico. As I recall, we'd have four members of the house, often with one member of the minority and three of the majority. We would try to update the public on what had happened in the house that week. I think this was good public relations for the Democrats. I think it was good for the state, beyond partisan politics. It was good public service, and so ... I didn't get paid a penny, or anything of that sort. You know, you did things like that just for the thrill of it. And once again, so far as I know, probably all of these have been lost, except for the few that I recorded off the air. It's possible that the house of representatives still have these. I've forgotten just how many weeks they went on, but all during the session. There (were surely) ten or twelve of these by the time we had finished. As I looked over my collection of stuff, I think maybe there were three or four that are in my collection that I had recorded off the air after these were done.

WN: When you look at TV today, now it's considered the major media, the major medium of communication. Back in '62 was TV considered the major medium in terms of campaigning, or getting public information like this, out?

DT: Yes, it had come to be so. Because, you remember the debate that I referred to earlier, the Quinn-Burns debate, the Dillingham-Inouye debates in '62. (By) the time we got to '62, TV was really the medium of communication. Radio was still important, even as I think radio is important today because it goes with you wherever you want to go. I still think that, even in campaigning, radio can be very effective. It's not comprehensive, as it once was, in terms of covering the spectrum, unless you buy out all the stations. Today, of course, (it's TV), it just kept growing. . . . TV (is) now the monster that controls practically everything and certainly overwhelms political campaigns. (However), back in those days, (1962), you had access to fairly large chunks of time, both TV or radio. These broadcasts, I think, were half-hour broadcasts on radio with members of the house. But a half-hour program for a major candidate, such as Inouye or Burns or Quinn, was not unusual at all. Gill, came to use Fasi's format on talkathons. (As a result), Gill had at least two, or maybe three radio talkathons (in his various campaigns). He did not use TV, as Fasi did, in conjunction with them.

WN: Was there a big gap, or big difference, between radio and TV then, as it is today?

DT: Well, it was sort of pretty much merged because I think we were still in the age when KGMB had a radio outlet. Channel 2 (KHON) had a radio outlet in KGU, and Channel 4 had a radio outlet in terms of KHVH. They (all) later got split apart.

WN: Was getting a show on radio as good as getting it on TV, then?

DT: No, but it was still worthwhile. I don't know how many people picked us up in the broadcast with the house of representatives, but probably 4[,]000 or 5,000. At least it was members of the house, and the house was doing something. They appeared as something of a unified group of people, which, alas, (doesn't) appear that way today. I think it (simulcasts) would still be a good technique to be used to this day, quite frankly. But no one seems to be
interested.

In any event, the Democratic sweep in 1962 was the year for Democrats, to underline that. It was probably second only to 1954 because Democrats came into control of the entire sweep of Hawai‘i’s state government. They didn’t get it in ’54 due to the fact we were still a territory. Here in ’62, everything was Democratic, and the Democrats were in the position to put up or shut up (laughs). They were fortunate in having a very strong, very thoughtful leader in Speaker Cravalho as head of the house of representatives, (who), as the years went by, became a tower of strength for Governor Burns.

MK: You know, we’ve interviewed other legislators and they’ve always talked about Elmer Cravalho and his iron hand, and how he kept the members in line. What do you know about his method of quote, unquote, control . . .

DT: His method was quite effective, and also—I thought we talked about this before—it was almost ruthless. He’s a single (unmarried) person. He didn’t waste any of his time. He didn’t go out to all the night spots. The other members of the house did. He knew where people were, what “crimes” they had committed—I’d put that crimes in quotes—in other words, he maintained his control, in large part, ‘cause he had a “little something” on practically every member of the house. If they’d get out of line, (he could say), “Hey, buddy, if you don’t want this to be known, you’re going to come along with me.” In other words, Elmer was not above using a little bit of intimidation or a little bit of threats. His mission, however, was usually very pure, and seemingly worthwhile. So it’s difficult to criticize him too much. However, if I had been a member of the house at that time with him, I’m quite certain I would have resented some of his authoritarian rule. Since he did make so much sense, (his leadership was worthwhile). For a while, he had Tom Gill with him because they had patched up things. I think we’ve already talked about (this).

I think maybe I should make one (other) comment, which I don’t think we’ve touched upon, and that is that Burns came up with a remarkably representative cabinet after his election, in the early part of ’63. He included, I think, every major, and even some of our minor, ethnic groups. He was able to find, which had been one of his themes, outstanding talent in each one of our groups. So if you examine that cabinet in detail, which we don’t have time to do here, (today), I think you would find that here (was) a fellow without a college education, who wasn’t supposed to succeed as governor, wasn’t even supposed to be governor, (who) did a pretty darn good job of coming up with a cabinet. To illustrate, (Fujio “Fudge”) Matsuda as head of [State Department of] Transportation, Shelley [M.] Mark as head of [State Department of Planning and] Economic Development, Edna [T.] Taufaasau as head of [State Department of] Personnel [Services]. You can see the different ethnic extractions illustrated right there. This was really the highlight . . . . Burns, initially, after his election, looked very good.

MK: You mentioned Edna Taufaasau. Didn’t she run into difficulties later?

DT: There may have been some difficulties, but I don’t think they were that serious, although she had switched from becoming a federal civil servant to a political head of the (State) Department [of Personnel Services]. I think she got into a little bit of difficulties with that. I don’t remember the details. However, I would say to this day, that Hawai‘i has yet to develop a (really sound) civil service system. We go through
the motions of it, but I think most anybody around town would agree that, if you know (someone), you have a friend, or cousin, or whatnot, this would probably be better than passing (an) exam. You may have to pass the exam, but if you have difficulty passing the exam, you turn around (and) you may find that it’s been declassified (so that) it’s no longer under civil service (laughs), and you get the job anyway. Edna, I think, ran into some difficulties as a civil service professional in dealing with the political demands of the office. Arthur Akina had had some of the same sort of difficulties back even in territorial (days), and then later in state days, as he dealt with his political governors. Under the state constitution, the director of civil service was made a political appointee. Whereas, under territorial status, the commission was the head of the department. While the commissioners (then) were political, the director was at least one step removed from politics.

MK: I guess we can move on to ’63 then and discuss your UH poll.

DT: Well, in the spring of ’63 things did settle down, thank goodness, a little bit, although we had these forums in the house of representatives, these radio forums, going. In the spring of ’63, becoming weary of doing the polling at the university, finding no interest on the part of the university in our so-called university poll, Bill McIntire, who had been graduate assistant in the political science department, and I decided to lay the poll to rest. So we gave away all of our secrets and gave a paper at the Hawai‘i Academy of Science. Everybody who had been curious about how our crystal ball had been working, and how all of this “magic” had been (working, found it) all laid out there in the paper. It’s still in the records of the Hawai‘i Academy of Science. But no one paid too much attention to that. They were still interested in all “the magic,” the fact that we had been correct in the polls. (None of the) professional pollsters, even in that day, or to this day, have paid any attention to the way in which we, quite frankly, got very accurate results. It (was) an expensive form of polling. It’s sort of ironic that, you (had) all the pressure you were under to get accurate results in those days. Today, they don’t care whether they’re accurate or not. No one pays too much attention to the techniques which are being used by pollsters around town today. You would think that they would. They didn’t back in ’63, and they don’t to this day. So it’s one of those little ironic things that happen in life.

Later on in ’63, I think it was, well, maybe going into the summer, late spring or summer, (Fujio “Fudge”) Matsuda, (head of) the department of transportation approached me about doing a poll about an inter-island ferry, which was a hot topic in those days; some people may remember that. So I agreed to supervise an opinion poll using our techniques; at least that much attention was paid to what we had done. Together with Tom Yamashita, we set up a poll for the department of transportation, hired people through the department of transportation, and I think I actually got paid for this. I think they paid me something like $2,000 to supervise this, and of course, paid for their own personnel. I almost got into a political hornet’s nest because Matsuda took our results, read the first page, and proceeded to issue a press release, which was very, very upsetting to Senator John [J.] Hulten, who was the great proponent of the inter-island ferry. Hulten got upset, and so I had to go to Matsuda and get a rejoinder from him, in effect, telling Hulten (via) the form of a press release, which (still wasn’t) given any prominence at all, that further (depth) study of the report said that it was a mixed bag, that it was not all one way, and (that) it was not (an) anti-inter-island ferry (poll in intent or results) (chuckles). Hulten was fit to be tied. Here was an internal Democratic quarrel, (in) which I was the center. I’m not sure if Matsuda ever fully forgave
me for this (requirement that he quote the poll results correctly). (Chuckles) But it was very necessary. As an engineer, he was not (fully aware of) his job in the department of transportation. He was not sensitive to what other people in government were thinking or (to) public opinion. (Nevertheless), I certainly would have to applaud him for at least turning to the public and trying to get an accurate gauge of public sentiment about this issue.

WN: So you're saying that public sentiment was against the inter-island ferry?

DT: No, it was a mixed bag. They were accepting of it, quite excited about it, but they had a lot of questions. The poll, as I recall it—it should be in the public record to this day—(did not give a) clear-cut (answer) one way or the other. In other words, you (had a) sort of fifty-fifty situation. For some reason, Fudge got the notion that since it wasn’t all-out ferry, that this was sort of a vote against the ferry on the part of the public. That’s the way that I remembered it. (This might be) subject to correction, but, at least (it is) in the records. Somebody can come along and correct (laughs) my recollection of it.

MK: So did that public opinion survey hurt John Hulten’s efforts, or, because it was a mixed bag, didn’t go either way?

DT: My feeling is that a month afterward people didn’t pay any attention to it. In other words, I think somebody who would want to be critical of me would feel that I was being too conscientious, overly conscientious, overly fastidious, in even putting Matsuda on the spot. But the reason why I had to do that was, (that results needed to be reported accurately. I knew Hulten as) an old war-horse for the Democrats, (and the results) just crushed (him). When he said, “What about—is this going to be the way it is, Dan?” I (had to say), “No, you have to read here on page ten, twelve, fourteen.”

He said, “Well then, why did Fudge (report it) that (other way), see?”

I said, “Well, you have to understand, Fudge probably didn’t read it (all).”

(Hulten) was very anxious that the record be set straight and that everybody read the report before they reach their judgment. You can understand it. So, wanting to be completely fair, I went and confronted Fudge Matsuda. He was nice enough—he didn’t like it—but he was nice enough to go along (and make the correction).

MK: Shall we stop here?

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number thirty-three.

MK: Tape number thirty-three with Dan Tuttle.

I think we can pick up with your doctoral dissertation.

DT: Well, most of '63, as I reflect upon some of these years, was very uninteresting (laughs) in
terms of local politics, because I finally decided that now that I had computer assistance at the University [of Hawai‘i], (I could) finally (get) a printout on the study that I had begun way back in the [19]40s, (and could) finish up my doctoral dissertation which I proceeded to do. I went back to Minneapolis, (University of Minnesota), around Thanksgiving time of ’63 and “jumped through the hoops” and turned in (my) dissertation, which as you would suspect, was on the personality of national political conventions. (It) didn’t make much of a “splash” by this time. It was born before its time because a number of other things had happened on the Mainland about national conventions. If I’d had been able to have gotten it out and published in the [19]40s, I think it would have been (considered) a (truly) pioneering study about the makeup of national conventions. As it turned out, it (became) a very uneventful sort of thing.

Probably the thing that sticks in my mind the most was that I was in the bindery in Dinkeytown, (laughs) in Minneapolis, close to the University [of Minnesota] campus, in a book bindery, when all of the sudden, I said, “Hey, what’s that? Listen to that!” There were three or four people there, the proprietor of a little downstairs store close to the University of Minnesota. This was the first announcement that John F. Kennedy had been shot. It was ironic, (that) apparently the shots came from a book bindery and I happened to be in a book bindery (laughs) in Minneapolis, so it sticks in my mind. I quietly got out of town. I was leaving that day. Being interested in public affairs, I got on the train. I had happened to arrange to take a train to Seattle (and) the University of Washington. I had some friends there in the department of political science that I wanted to see. I did have a small transistor radio, but it didn’t pick up radio stations very well along the way inside the train. At every station when (the train) stopped, I’d get out with my transistor radio to try to catch up on the latest news. By the time I left Minneapolis, there was still no word as to whether it had been a conspiracy, or whether there would be a follow-up, (or what). There were rumors of (an) attempted assassination of Johnson, all that sort of thing. Otherwise, that’s about it for ’63, I think (laughs).

MK: You know, I was curious, back in those days, was there a lot of pressure on someone without a Ph.D. to complete his Ph.D., to keep your employment with the UH?

DT: (Not a lot). No pressure in terms of keeping your employment. I think they were still willing to accept that you could do a fairly credible (teaching) job with a master’s degree, which was pretty well illustrated by Ralph [S.] Kuykendall, who still has (the) definitive history of Hawai‘i. (He) had only a master’s degree in history. But, there were pressures that you felt, embarrassments, people would call you doctor and you’d have to say, “Please, no.”

(Laughter)

DT: This would keep you on edge, and then, as I know, there was. . . . The talk in the department was, “Ah, Tuttle’s never going to do it. He’s never going to finish up his degree,” you know. That type of talk (became) fighting words to yours truly. They would say this without realizing that I had something like 8,000 30-item questionnaires to hand tabulate without (any) computers. I started doing it, and then finally (said), “Crying out loud, why didn’t somebody tell me this?” It’s to the credit, I guess, of the department that they realized I was the stubborn type and (that) it was worthwhile doing. I still think it was worthwhile doing. What’s more, I had a lot of fun with it. You’ll recall, I mentioned (that) earlier, in Minneapolis, because I got (well)-acquainted with a lot of people in the Stassen campaign. I
MK: (Laughs) And then I guess we could go to '64 and we can talk about the radio productions.

DT: Well, '64 got off to an early start because of what we had done in 1960 on Channel 4. KGMB became interested in (doing much the same in '64). By this time, a fellow by the name of Joe Herold was the general manager of KGMB(-TV). (Dan Sheridan) Reed was there. Bob Sevey had known what I'd done. Although in '64, Bob Sevey had been at KGMB and left. He'd been the general manager at the time, and then he left, I think, and went back to (Channel) 4. Essentially, Reed talk(ed) Joe Herold into this. So, it was determined that KGMB would do these broadcasts about Hawai'i’s delegates. So I agreed to do it (as) a series, I guess it was thirty or more radio and TV productions for KGMB radio, KGMB TV, covering the role of our delegates. Roger Coryell and I went to San Francisco and to Atlantic City. This time we used sound on film, rather than videotaping, as we had done in '60.

Believe it or not, except for a couple breakdowns, sound on film was much better because we could not only get on the floor of the conventions, but we could do things that nobody else was doing. For example, Joe Herold, I can still hear him laughing at me, and poking fun at me. On one occasion, we had a long line of Hawai'i delegates seated. (Film of) this does survive, believe it or not. I suddenly took it upon myself to crawl on the floor of the national convention and go down that entire aisle asking Hawai'i delegates for their reaction to what was happening on the floor at the time. Well, Joe Herold says, “Hey, you’re just a character from the University [of Hawai'i]. What are you doing crawling around on the floor of the national convention?”

I said, “Well, the story was there.”

Another thing that sticks in my mind was, (Coryell and I) were kidding around with Tom Gill at Atlantic City. He was invited to—he was running, let’s see, again, '64 for [U.S.] Senator, I guess it was—to give the pledge of allegiance to the flag. So we were kidding with Tom, and Roger Coryell says, “Just as sure as I’m standing here, Tom, you’re going to leave out ‘under God.’”

Tom says, “Aah, nah.”

“Under God” had just been added in the pledge of allegiance, if you recall. So it was new in our pledge of allegiance. Before the entire national birthday celebration for Lyndon Johnson in Atlantic City—and that’s a big convention arena, I guess the biggest one we’ve ever had—Tom Gill gets up there, and what does he proceed to do? With Roger Coryell standing on a chair and my propping him up so that he could use his heavy sound on film camera, Tom Gill (did) precisely that. He (forgot) “under God.”

(Laughter)
DT: (Gill) completely (lost the rhythm) and Roger Coryell says, “He did it! He did it!” and
wattles down on my shoulder. I was able—he’s bigger than I am—but I was able to catch
him a little bit. Once again, for a political scientist this was a lot of fun. Thank goodness, out
of these, most of these, about 60 percent of what we did in these broadcasts survived. Dan
Reed—after Joe Herold (had left). Cec [Cecil] Heftel bought the station. Before he (also) left
KGMB, loaded the films into the trunk of his car, because he says, “They’re going to be
destroyed, Dan.” Brought them out to my house, and, in due time, I gave them to the
University [of Hawai‘i]. We now have videotapes made off of this film, which is still in
pretty good shape. It’s been taken care of by (the) Hamilton Library. We had to ship the film
back by (air). We had to (go to) the airport every night and drop off the film at San Francisco
and again at Atlantic City, which had (just) a small airport. But San Francisco airport was a
pretty big one. So we had to battle a lot of traffic, and we would do this at three or four
o’clock in the morning. Roger had the airplane schedules, so we’d take them out to get them
directly on the flight, get them back (to Honolulu). The radio material which I did—I would
do a fifteen-minute radio broadcast each day from San Francisco or Atlantic City—had to be
sent down the telephone wires. We did this in what may not have been (a) 100 percent legal
form. Roger had clips, which he would take off the headset of the telephone, clip them to the
telephone line. I would tape them (with) the tape recorder. Then, we would play this tape
onto the telephone and send it down the line, which worked beautifully in most instances.
Except—I guess I have to tell you this—Roger Coryell, being very conscious, had duly been
patient with me. I had taped this radio program about three o’clock in the morning, so about
four o’clock he was sending it down the line here to KGMB radio. But, we both fell asleep.
Finally, about an hour or two later, Roger Coryell wakes up to the fact, “Sir, are you still on
the line? Sir, is there anybody on the line?”

(Laughter)

DT: Neither one of us ever inquired about how much KGMB radio had to pay for that one going
down the line.

One other instance, which maybe I shouldn’t take the time to tell, but there’s one thing that
you do not want to happen, and that is to have somebody “break you up” on the air. One
night, I don’t know what Roger said (that was) funny. He broke me up when I was reading
(my commentary) into (the) tape machine (in 1967). Now, this was just sitting on the bed,
reading it into a tape machine. No trouble, Roger had his kicks, (and) he puts it back on
“start.” I start up again. We get about to that same point, and I break out in furious laughter.
It probably took us two hours that evening to get a decent broadcast out of me because I
could not control myself. We were just sufficiently tired that any time you (got into) or (at)
about that period, why, there it would be. It illustrates we had fun, (but) we did have a little
bit of a problem. Tom Gill managed to break me up, too, (while I was doing) sound on film
in Atlantic City (in 1964). It illustrates, too, something that I thought was important at the
time and I think the TV stations felt was important, to bring actual delegates from Hawai‘i to
the public, what they were doing, what they weren’t doing, whether they were tending to
business, whether they were having fun, or whether they were just (“goofing off”). It also
illustrates that if you don’t take things too seriously you can have an awful lot of fun, (too, at
conventions), just as a person.

After 1964, the pros took over, and no longer did they have room for an amateur. Joe [F.]
Konno, I think, who worked with [Hawai‘i] Public Television later, was with Bob Sevey in
'64. In other words, Channel 4 (people) were our competitors. That didn't bother us too much. We ate together most of the time. When our camera, our battery pack broke down at one critical time, Sevey and Konno had already done their filming for the night, and they loaned us their battery pack. We were able to send our material down (the line to Hawai'i). Otherwise we wouldn't have had any broadcast for KGMB, which illustrates that people in the right setting, if you have the right people, they can be awfully nice.

MK: You know, prior to '64, were there other TV and radio stations in Hawai'i interested in the national convention?

DT: Oh no. See, the first one—quite frankly, we had pioneered this in '60 when we did it (at) (KHVH Channel 4). I did it with Holst & Male, [Inc.] for (KHVH). By '64, KGMB [Channel] 9 wanted to do it. I agreed, since I'd been with 9 all the way along (with) the election (night broadcasts). Sevey being over there, they decided they wanted to do the same thing. The people who have tied me together with Sevey like we (were) some sort of great union, or something of that sort (anyway). This was not the case. We were good friends, we were also good friends out of (sometime) competition, too.

WN: I'm wondering, in '64, on the Democratic side, was the Hawai'i delegation pretty much supporting Lyndon Johnson?

DT: Mm hmm, yes, yes.

WN: Was there any talk about Johnson's role in statehood? Was there any link between Johnson's role in securing statehood and their support for Johnson?

DT: Well, there was---yes, there was feelings for Johnson because he had finally come around as supporting statehood for Hawai'i. He was also, by this time, recognized as a person who had backed the East-West Center. Dan Inouye, of course, was very close to him. (They) had been in the Senate (together). And, after all, he was president of the United States. There really wasn't very much difficulty there. Biggest difficulty the Democrats faced was, we got stuck in the St. Lo Motel in Atlantic City, and Atlantic City is no prize as a resort town. If you compare it to Hawai'i, it doesn't really exist (laughs). (To) the people on the East Coast, it's a big resort area, of course. These were just regular (motel) rooms that we had, nothing commodious about them at all. It was just bare minimum; (and the) governor (was in one like) everybody else. The governor was stuck. He (did have just another room as) a reception room. A lot of our comments revolved around the difficulties of having a state delegation exist in the St. Lo Motel. If we interviewed the governor or interviewed Bob [Robert C.] Oshiro, who was chairman of the Democratic party at the time, why you did it (on an outdoor balcony). (Once), they were sitting on canvas chair(s) and Roger Coryell was leaning over the balcony to get his pictures (framed properly). (Laughs) We would proceed (in this manner).

WN: Now what about on GOP side, was it pretty unanimous for Barry Goldwater?

DT: The Hawai'i delegation was split, as I recall.

WN: Who were some of the . . .

DT: Oh, now you've really got to press my memory. Well, Libby [Elizabeth R.] Kellerman,
whom I think we've interviewed for this series, was (the) national committeewoman. She, of course, was very much (for) Barry Goldwater. Ben Dillingham, I think, was very much Barry Goldwater. (However), somebody like a [John E.] “Stu” Milligan—who, as I recall, was there—was, as I recall, either a Scranton or a Rockefeller delegate. It was a split (delegation in a minor way). I'm just not going to try to quote you (off-hand) what the (Hawai‘i or the) final vote was, but it was a first-ballot nomination, so it didn't matter too much.

We did have some thrills there, no question about that. We got (William) Miller, the vice presidential candidate, on the streets of San Francisco at about ten o'clock at night coming out of (a) reception. Roger, of course—we had a (flood) light, a lamp, along with the camera. So, we were able to interview him. We were able to have a fairly extensive interview with Nelson Rockefeller down in his hotel suite, (Palace Hotel). We (also) got Barry Goldwater, not personally, but some action shots of him (at his hotel). Poor Roger got crushed in the crowds that were always there.

WN: Was there a liberal wing of the GOP?

DT: Oh yes, very much so. Oh yes, yeah.

WN: They would have tended to go for Rockefeller?

DT: Ah, yes. They would go for Rockefeller or Scranton. Scranton was very much in the scene (even though) Rockefeller had pretty much ruled himself out. As I recall, later, Rockefeller tried to come back in '68. (In) '64, if my memory serves me correctly, the baby (was) arriving at the wrong time. He had divorced, you remember, married Happy and they had a child. (The child was) poorly timed for political purposes, and so they were giving Rockefeller a hard time about this. (As a result), Rockefeller had a very relaxed time with us in San Francisco. It was a (very) decent interview.

WN: So Stu Milligan was part of the . . .

DT: Stu Milligan, he was a part of the . . . He would be pretty much, and as I think he was running for the (U.S.) House of Representatives that year. He (was) an indicator of a liberal wing. [D. G.] “Andy” Anderson—I'd forgotten, I don't think he was there—but Andy Anderson, at that time, would have been in the liberal wing of the Republican party.

MK: Should we stop here?

WN: Stop here.

MK: Okay.

END OF SIDE ONE

SIDE TWO

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle inter[view] . . .
WN: ... thirty-four with Dan Tuttle.

Let's talk about the 1964 election locally.

DT: [Nineteen] sixty-four was an off year, an off-(state) year, but I guess the big race was—and I hope I have this right—was Tom Gill's deciding to run for the United States Senate, having been a congressman for a couple of years [1962-64], and trying to unseat Hiram Fong, who had been initially elected, right after statehood, to the United States Senate. You know, I had taken the position—I had sat in some meetings with the Gill people—and I'd taken the position that it was too soon for Gill to try to move up, that this was premature, and he was taking on a lot to challenge Hiram Fong. Hiram Fong had a lot of grass-root support. He had waged a good campaign, even though he (had been) "terrible" on television. (However), he had taken some lessons. They tried to help coach him on TV, and so he was fairly secure. But, Gill decided this was his destiny. I had felt that Tom Gill's entire career had been devoted to Hawai'i and (that) he would be better (off) staying at home. Just a personal thought, I had really been very cool to his ever running for [U.S.] Congress in the first place. But okay, he was an able guy, and he wanted to (run), and okay, he did. He wasn't going to listen to me or anybody else. So he was going to run. Fong, as I say, was well ensconced in the seat, and he had a lot of money. He had a person-to-person technique that he used. You have a friend—sort of a chain letter type of thing—you go to ten friends and get them to sign up, and they take a petition, they go to ten other friends. He was working this (approach) very well, and the Democrats weren't all that happy.

There was a Burns faction, and there was one member of the Burns faction that thought if anybody was going to go to the United States Senate (who) could beat Hiram Fong, it was he. And so, [Nadao] "Najo" Yoshinaga decided he was going to run for the [U.S.] Senate. Well, in a sense this was a bit of a tragedy. The Democrats split their forces right there. They opened up some old wounds that had existed for some time, and I guess they opened them up for good between Gill and Burns. But Najo was very serious about this, and he'd been a leader. He moved from Maui to O'ahu, and been prominent in Democratic party politics for a long time, particularly from the neighbor islands. He was determined to go (to Washington). As I say, I felt this was a developing tragedy for the Democratic party (and their) point of view. I really got well acquainted with Najo's feeling, because one day, in a rather poignant moment, Najo said, "I don't know why you still say Gill is the guy to (run), you know. You tell me that he probably should've still (been) working here in Hawai'i, and yet you tell me that my chances aren't that good."

I said, "Well, again, I don't have a poll, but I don't think (your chances) are going to be that good," because Najo was not that well enough known at the time.

He says, "I've got every right. I'm just as important to this state as Dan Inouye. I want my place in the sun. If Danny can do it, I can do it. And why should it always be—" you see a little bit of internal jealousies creeping in, (a) little bit of a problem with aspiration levels. And Najo says, "I want to be able to tell my grandchildren that I was a part of this and that we did it. And I've always dreamed of being in Washington D.C."

All you could do was wish (him) well, and regret the fact that here were two of (the state's) talented people who carried a lot of wood and water for the Democrats (coming) up against one another. Well, to make a long story short, Najo did lose [in the primary election], and
lost rather heavily because his neighbor island support was nothing compared to Tom Gill's support on O'ahu. Gill had been more active in party politics, not in legislative politics, but in party politics.

WN: Did John Burns openly come out for Yoshinaga?

DT: I don't think he came out openly and made any speeches, that wasn't Burns' style. There was no question about it, Burns' support went to Yoshinaga. There would be no question. (It did not) hurt Gill in the Democratic primary, but it would hurt Gill in the general election. Because the Burns support, not having supported Gill in the primary, the tacit support would go to Hiram Fong. Burns was not all that disturbed about having a Hiram Fong in the United States Senate. (It would) be nice if he could have had Najo there, he would have preferred that. (However), if he couldn't, then it would be okay for Fong. Well, Fong did even better than most people had thought, (and) certainly surprised yours truly. He came up with a bunch of beautiful television ads, and so now you begin to see that television was coming (into its own). Bob [Robert G.] Alderman had helped Jack Burns get elected in '62. By '64, Hiram Fong had—I think the Fawcett[-McDermott Associates, Inc.] agency had the Fong account. They also had a young fellow, an old coffee partner of mine from the snack bar days at the university, a fellow by the name of Dougherty, Bill [William] Dougherty. (He had) spent a little bit of time, I think, with KHET, public broadcasting, later. (However), at that time he was working with the Fawcett[-McDermott] agency, and he came up with a bunch of beautifully done, very soft (ads). (They used) an 'ukulele and a little ditty about the absentee congressman from Hawai'i. They took Gill's voting record—he'd missed, not a lot of votes, but what votes he'd had missed on the floor of the House of Representatives—(and) they (wrapped) it all up so (that) he was the absentee congressman. Based upon this, Gill was a little bit late in replying, and when he replied it looked like he was denying everything. So Hiram Fong walked away with (the election).

WN: Plus Fong's voting record was in 90 percentile, if I remember.

DT: You mean . . .

WN: When you compare the voting records between . . .

DT: Well, he had a higher voting record on the floor. One was a House (vote), of course, and one (was) a Senate (vote), which is sort of like comparing this with that. At any rate, they had a factual basis, so that it wasn't pure nonsense. Dougherty—and if indeed it was, at least to the best of my knowledge, it was his idea—did a beautiful job on that (series of ads). Remember, too, that Fong had also gotten—which is another little sidebar story, which I forgot about—(in) '64, (himself) nominated for president of the United States in San Francisco. (This was) the Barry [M.] Goldwater convention, (and) Hiram Fong from Hawai'i (was also nominated).

WN: Favorite son.

DT: This was a little bit of a ploy, which I happened to be a party to. And interestingly enough, another one of our politicians placed his name in nomination, Toshi [Toshio] Anzai (from Maui). Which reminds me of another story, because right after he'd made the nominating speech—now this was on the floor of the Cow Palace outside of San Francisco—we sat down
to relax on the concourse. They had some indoor-outdoor carpeting laid (there). So there was Toshi Anzai and the gal from (Kaua'i) who would second the nomination, and a couple (of) other people from Hawai'i, sitting there. Of course, (we had) our shoes off. Man, did we ever get scolded. (A) security guard came along and (scolded) us, “You don’t do things like this!” (he said).

We said, “Look, don’t be too angry.” We got up, we were polite, you know. At least we knew we were on the Mainland and not in Hawai'i anymore, but . . .

(Laughter)

DT: So Hiram Fong got a lot of percentage out of this because he had a certain amount of exposure, national television. And, because I was there as an amateur press person, I had made certain that CBS knew of his intention before anybody else did. So Roger Mudd got to Hiram Fong on the floor of the convention (laughs). This (news) broke early in the day, way before the nominating speeches were made. So Hiram got some publicity out of that, (too). So it all factored into what was probably the most exciting (Hawai'i) campaign of '64. Of course, it’s sort of a footnote, but (it’s) still true that Lyndon Johnson handily carried Hawai'i against Barry Goldwater.

WN: That’s right. I think, if I remember correctly, Fong’s slogan for that year was “Hawai'i's Favorite Son.”

DT: Mm hmm, yeah. Link to the convention, that’s right.

WN: . . . as a link or favorite son.

DT: Well, another little story, on the East-West Center. I got myself into a real peck of trouble, which probably illustrates some of my campus problems. I very blithely, in a forum we had at the East-West Center—of course, I was fresh back from the conventions—upset about three quarters of the audience that night meeting in Jefferson Hall (laughs) when I said that in my judgment neither Barry Goldwater nor Lyndon Johnson (was) fit to become president of the United States.

(Laughter)

DT: Well, needless to say, the crowd was all 110 percent Lyndon Johnson, being Hawai'i, because of (his) connection with Hawai'i, and the right-wing views of Barry Goldwater. Well, quite frankly, even (on) this date, (as of) 1991, I still stand by my statement (laughs). I don’t think that either one was fit to become president, although one of them did.

MK: I guess we can move on to the campus, then.

DT: Well, after the excitement of '64, I had some things to think about, personally, and shouldn’t really bring too much of my own personal problems, let us say, into these conversations. (However, these) had political implications (for that) day. I don’t know how profound they were, or anything of that sort, but at any rate, there were political implications in them. I had some rather serious things to think about, because while I’d been having all this fun in ‘62, ‘63, ‘64—and believe me, I think I’d been doing a good job in my classes because I had a lot
to talk about, in current events, at any rate. I became very (thoughtful) about a lot of developing problems in the political science department, and in the university. I had begun to think that maybe I just didn’t want to be a part of all of (these things). It was that serious to me personally. Right or wrong, they were that serious. I was concerned about a number of things, and I won’t be able to mention them all here, but I know I had two legal-sized tablets, I mean pages, (which listed) about eighteen or twenty concerns of mine about the university. Some of them had to do with the political science department, which had been renamed from the old government department, and about the university in general.

Let me just mention, (very) rapidly, a few of the things. I was very concerned about a lot of new staff that was coming into the University of Hawai‘i, thanks to our new affluence, thanks to the [state] capitol being Democrat(ic). (They were paid almost double.) The attitude of the new staff was almost entirely self-centered; they were not interested in Hawai‘i and what Hawai‘i might be doing as a state. They wanted to teach (only) the (so-called) behavioral side of political science. In other words, anything which had happened before the last five or ten years was old stuff, and you shouldn’t even refer to Woodrow Wilson, that sort of thing. In other words, it was behaviorism plus. The attitude of our older staff, who had been my colleagues for fifteen years here in Hawai‘i, was, “Maybe they’re right. We’re not going to argue this with them, we’re going to turn it over to them.” And I wasn’t about to turn anything over to any one or two personalities. Most of all (which) I found upsetting was that there was no respect for my point of view. I might respect what they were doing in their classes, but they were downplaying and poo-pooing anything that I might be doing in mine, or even anything that a Meller or Saunders might be doing. I was concerned about this new attitude, which I still puzzle about. I can’t figure it out. It seemed to hit political science, you know, a little bit more than some of the other departments. History department was probably never hit as hard, but sociology, politics, psychology departments, I think they all felt this (to a degree).

Then we had hired—and here comes some of the politics in—we had hired a replacement for Ralph [M.] Miwa, who, after the ’62 elections, had gone to [Washington], D.C. with Dan Inouye and the United States Senate. Ralph Miwa had recommended a young man from the Library of Congress of [Washington], D.C., who had a Ph.D. out of the University of Chicago. While Ralph indicated that he [i.e., the candidate] had certain liabilities, which later became very noticeable here, he nevertheless recommended Oliver [M.] Lee. However, the university told Ralph Miwa that at the end of two years, he [Miwa] had to come back to the university or resign. I did not feel that way. I felt Ralph should remain on because he was working in his field, not in some other field, that he was an asset to the political science department, and let him stay there. Let Ralph make up his own schedule. But they read the riot act (to him). So Ralph, ultimately, had to consider coming back.

Meanwhile, at the end of the first year of Miwa’s two-year leave, there was a movement in the department to fire Oliver Lee. This was mostly among the international relations field, which was Oliver Lee’s department, and comparative government. Well, I took a position in the department that I would go along with (the) international relations people, but (that) we brought him out here and we shouldn’t bring him out for one year and say, “Pack your bags.” We should give him a second one-year terminal contract. After a lot of debate, I won the first round, and the department decided to keep Oliver Lee. Allan Saunders wrote the letter, which should still be in UH files, giving Oliver Lee a one-year terminal contract.
By the time we get to end of ’64 or early ’65, it became evident that those same people that wanted Oliver Lee to be fired, wanted to give him tenure; not only keep him, but give him tenure! I said, “Why? What made you change your mind?” Nobody could give me an answer. I said, “This is no way to run the ship.” And so I objected.

Also, as a part of this new staff versus old staff, they wanted to introduce the so-called “new political science” into basic introductory courses. Well, I was very much wedded to the pragmatic approach—to the old civics approach, if you will—to our introductory courses. And I would try to jazz (it) up with as many stories as I could tell to try to keep (students) interest(ed). A lot of people weren’t (much) interested in political science, basically. They decided they would turn [the teaching of] the basic courses over to graduate assistants, who had none of the background to do this sort of thing. I objected to that. Dick [Richard H.] Kosaki, always a peacemaker, helped me over a couple of battles within the department by saying, “Well, you do this, and I’ll do that. We’ll work it out, Dan,” which was awfully nice of Dick.

Also, we were paying our new staff more—we were bringing (them) in, $2[,000] or $3,000 above (the top of) our own (listing). Not me, in particular, because I was still an associate professor, and just recently made that a little bit before I got the Ph.D. in ’61. I was still about three years into the associate professor bracket. But we were paying them $3[,000] or $4,000 more than Meller or Saunders! And they had (longtime) credentials (and service), they had Ph.D’s, (and) so did Meller, so did (Stauffer) no question about them. Saunders had his Ph.D. long before he arrived in Hawai’i. Meller got his within three or four years after he arrived. We were paying these new people all that extra money.

And we had other problems, included among them—I’m trying to just mention a few of them—we’d had a woman, who, I thought was an (able and a) fine instructor, and (for) reasons which didn’t make any sense to me, they got rid of her. No one was willing at that time to consider having a woman on the (permanent) staff. Well, this was just the early edge, you see. My otherwise liberal colleagues, who not having . . . Her name was Ann something, I’m sorry, I can’t remember her last name.

Okay. So much for the political science department. I was also concerned about this university-wide payment of lots of (extra) money to new staff, very little to old staff members. We were setting up program after program after program in all sorts of esoteric fields, you might say, and not really staffing well and considering the established disciplines. Well, I was not opposed to change but I felt that let’s not do it all overnight, let’s take our time. There was a big push on, under [University of Hawai’i president] Tom [Thomas H.] Hamilton, to emphasize research, at the expense of teaching. Everything would go to research because it would be a money-maker. So this is where we got the “bottom-line approach” at the University of Hawai’i. To me, that was not, should not be our biggest concern. Our biggest concern should be our students and the community here. It’s later (been) called soft-money people, I mean soft-money funds. So we had a lot of people on staff who were not given regular benefits, because they were on so-called soft money. There was also, I felt, a lack of concern at the university as a whole about the community and our students. The doors were being locked for the sake of research. No time to spend with students. They were home doing their so-called research, faculty was.

We had a new establishment in the social science field, (SSRI) [Social Science Research
Institute] which had been an exciting development for a lot of us. Instead of building (SSRI) upon a base within the social sciences, they built it over the destruction of the sociology department’s Romanzo Adams’ library. Andy [Andrew W.] Lind, one of our senior and best published professors, actually had been in my office after I came back after the (conventions) of ’64, and broke down and cried about what they’d been doing to “his baby,” which had been the establishment of this library. We weren’t giving tenure, we weren’t giving very good salaries to instructors and assistant professors. Yes, we had instructors in those days. The behavior of (the) new Arts and Sciences dean was, I felt, totally unacceptable, and perhaps I shouldn’t have said so. I’d been on the committee to select the new person. Hamilton had given me enough consideration to think about (it) overnight. But (Todd Furniss) got hired. (In fine), I felt (that) there was a lack of integrity on the part of many of the new entering staff members.

MK: Stop right here.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

JC: The following is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is videotape number thirty-five.

MK: Tape number thirty-five with Dan Tuttle.

We’ve discussed the problems that you noticed at the university, and as a result of those problems, what happened?

DT: January, 1965, after having had a long chat the day before with Bob [Robert B.] Stauffer and Oliver Lee, and in another chat with Bob Stauffer about Oliver Lee and some of the things they were (saying) about Saunders, (I made as) an appeal (to them) to show more (genuine) respect (for) Allan Saunders. With all these things (and more) cluttering up my mind at the time, I just decided to resign, and so I did. I gave a letter to the president, took carbons to Meller, who was then [department] chairman, took a courtesy letter to Dr. Saunders, and resigned. I indicated I wouldn’t leave the university until the first of September the following year, in ’66. This left about eighteen months. I purposely left about eighteen months, hoping that somebody would pay attention to my concerns. And they did. The University of Hawai’i did not accept my resignation until, I think, late January or early February of ’66. They let it set on the table for about one year. Hamilton had Bob Kamins accept my resignation for the administration when he was down in Florida, because Hamilton, from the outset, was very worried that this would become (a) cause célèbre, become a political issue. After all, I knew virtually every politician in the state (at that time). They knew how much I had been involved with them and how strongly I felt about the university. So Hamilton, who was very worried about his own neck, was quite concerned. Well, initially in our (first) meeting, I assured him that I was not going to debate this with him in public, that I wasn’t going around asking for any sympathy, that I had no intention of entering into a popularity contest with him. For the simple reason, I said, “(I’ll probably) lose. Please pay attention to me and do something about these things.” I had my two sheets of concerns.

To make a (very) long story short, the final session I had with Hamilton, he was saying, “Please change your mind, Dan, stay. How much more money do you want?”
And I kept saying, "It's not money. It's just (procedures). Given what I've done, I can't accept any more money and be honest about this."

He finally said, after looking away (at the wallpaper) in Dan's Den here on Ke'eaumoku (Street), he said, "I don't understand what you're talking about, Dan."

I said, "Well, I'm sorry, Mr. President. All I can do is apologize if you can't understand this." And finally, I said, "Mr. President, you've got to understand that this is even going to involve you."

And, he turned away and looked (again) at the wallpaper over there, and turned back and made a very remarkable statement. He says, "Dan, how long? How long?"

At that point I became flippant. I said, "I don't know. I'm no prophet, but a year or two, maybe three." We finished our dessert and left, and that was the last. They (shortly thereafter) accepted my resignation.

I also met with (Wytze) Gorter, who was then [dean] of the graduate school. He seemed to be sympathetic, but said, "You have to understand, I've only been here about a year, Dan, and I can't do anything to help you."

So I said, "Okay, fine."

Lots of sympathy from the faculty, of course. "If I weren't so near to retirement, I would join you, but..." The only person that seriously considered resigning—and I certainly didn't ask for this—was Ralph Miwa, who considered briefly resigning, (then decided against it). If you're interested, this set him off on a new course in his career at the University of Hawai'i.

But then, to bring in the political side of it, Eddie [Edward H.] Nakamura and Najo Yoshinaga wanted very badly to meet with me, at the urging of Hideki Nakamura, no relation to Eddie. And, Hideki, an unusual sort of person, who was concerned about the university, as such, and my attachment to it, said, "You've just got to meet with them." So, I met with Nakamura and Yoshinaga. In other words, if anybody asked me, I would tell them what was on my mind. If they didn't ask, I didn't push myself on them. Eddie Nakamura and Najo Yoshinaga, we (met) in the senate (chambers) of the old ['Iolani] Palace. (At the end, they said), "Quite frankly, Dan, everything's going so well at the university. Tom Hamilton's a great president. We don't know what you're talking about."

So all I did was repeat myself. "I'm sorry I can't make you understand. That's my responsibility, (and I failed), so goodbye."

(Later), Jack Burns hailed me from the ['Iolani] Palace, up (on the) second floor (balcony), and said, "Hey, boss, come on upstairs." And when I got upstairs, he says, "I understand you're quitting the university. I want to know why."

I said, "Okay, Jack, if you really want to know, but keep in mind, now, you're (the) governor and I'm an employee of the university."

"Humph. What's on your mind?"
I said, “Well, if you want to go back into your office and ask me that, as governor, I’ll tell you. But just two guys meeting up here on the porch, I’m not going to tell you.”

Jack didn’t walk into his desk. He just sort of grunted (again). And, to the best of my knowledge, Burns never really knew what was on my mind. I don’t know why. We just didn’t talk (about it again).

Of course, three years later, Hamilton was out because of the Oliver Lee affair, as it developed. (That) “did him in.” There were other reactions, of course, reactions (by) Bob Sevey and Wayne Collins—who did something most unusual, and I suppose I’ll always be grateful for this—they called attention to the fact that I had not made any big deal out of this, but that they sincerely regretted I might well have to leave Hawai‘i. And if at all possible, they hoped I wouldn’t (leave). Well, Sevey was an anchor on one station, Wayne Collins on the other. And then, the person who probably caused me to really decide to stay in Hawai‘i if I possibly could, was Sandy [Sanford] Zalburg, who had been standing in the corner back when we first projected election returns, back in the ’54 campaign. Sandy was (the) very soft-spoken, city editor of the [Honolulu]Advertiser. He just shook his head, (catching) me going out of the [Honolulu]Advertiser one day. We walked downstairs together. He says, “Dan, you just can’t think of leaving Hawai‘i. You’ve got your roots so deep here, and you know so many people, they know you, and you’ve been involved, and it’s just not good for Hawai‘i. And I don’t think it’s going to be good for you, so please think about it.” Well, because it came from somebody that I respected, like Sandy Zalburg, who had a real good agile pen, done a great job with the [Honolulu]Advertiser, I did give it serious consideration. (It) may have opened some (of the) questions up in (my) mind (at) this time . . .

WN: You know, Dan, you were at the prime of your academic life. You were what? You were not even forty yet at the time?

DT: That’s right, just about forty years, were the halcyon years, you know. Those were really good years.

WN: Very young by academic standards. You had some grievances with the university. What went through your mind? I mean, did you really—were you trying to make a statement, or were you really intent on resigning and leaving Hawai‘i?

DT: I thought I had one chance, maybe two chances out of a hundred of getting Hamilton and other people to listen to me. I felt the University of Hawai‘i was worth fighting for, because it belonged to the people of the state of Hawai‘i. I feel that way about any public university. Quite frankly, I felt the people of Hawai‘i were beginning to get shortchanged. Here we had fought for years to get more funds. The politicians had stuck out their necks and given more to the University of Hawai‘i, and the academicians were flubbing the dub, they were messing it all up. I felt this was close to a high crime, a misdemeanor. But at the same time, I didn’t think I was—I didn’t have enough ego to believe that I could win a battle with Tom Hamilton. I felt that this was a battle I had to win behind the scenes. I didn’t think it should have properly (been) a political issue. I could’ve made it, I think, a political issue of some magnitude. But purposely, I did not. I think along the edges I was hoping that people would recognize that I had done this, to try to, in quotes, save the university. Not many people did, though. So, (it) suffice(s) to say that when my time was up, my time was up. Thank goodness I had a couple of good friends (who) helped me move all the junk out of my office in
Crawford Hall. (Laughs)

WN: Now you were a political scientist. You just completed your Ph.D. Realistically, what were your options from that point on?

DT: Realistically, my options were to find a job on the Mainland, because there was nothing that I particularly aspired to (other than teaching). People did mention a few open jobs, including the executive secretaryship, later the executive directorship, believe it or not, at the Hawai‘i Education Association. As I recall, my response when this was (first) mentioned to me, down and around the ['Iolani] Palace, was “Oh, I’m not really a lobbyist.” That was my response. However, miracles, I suppose, do happen. In February, I mean, in January of ’66, about the time they were accepting (my) resignation, why, my friend Hubert [V.] Everly, Dr. Everly, dean of the [University of Hawai‘i] College of Education, said, “Dan, you ought to seriously consider (the) HEA job,” he says, “I think you might find it intriguing.” He was interested enough to take me to lunch and tell me all these things.

I said, “Well, Hugh, I need to know more about the organization.”

He supplied me with a stack of material about yea high. I read it over, and so—(to) make a long story short again—I did turn in an application, and said, “I think you’re right, Hugh, it might be worthwhile.” And on my birthday in ’66, the situation suddenly turned around after an interview with the board of trustees, board of directors of HEA. They offered me the job. It (was) nice to have a job, whereas in a few months I wouldn’t have one. I understand, I think it was by (a) one-vote (margin), quite frankly, because they’d had a horrible time trying to find anybody. So I guess I got the job by virtue of one vote. (However), it gave me a new perspective on life. It did use some of my skills, and so, miracles do happen, I suppose. Charlie [Charles A.] Moore, one of my old coffee partners in the (UH) philosophy department—he has a claim to fame himself, over at the snack bar, I guess it was—said, “Dan, I don’t understand this, you take a stand for a principle and you’re supposed to lose, but for some reason you land on your feet. How come?”

All I could say was, “Charlie, I don’t know, but I’ll tell you a year or two from now whether it was luck or something else.” At any rate, that opened up a new chapter in my life, plus the fact that it brought me into context with all of these people that I had met entirely in an academic role, and in a sort of amateur media role. It suddenly brought me into context with many of these people, in my role as a lobbyist for the teachers of the state. HEA, at that time, was not a union, but it was the equivalent of a union, and we represented everybody from kindergarten teachers, and even educational assistants, all the way up to graduate school teachers at the university. (The shift had been a traumatic experience.)

WN: Did Elsie have any say in the decision . . .

DT: Oh yes, of course. She’s the only one that was consulted, really. My daughter, at the time, knew about it, too, because she was about sixteen years old. The boys were a little bit young for this type of thing, but it was a tough time for them. I remember in January of ’66, before the HEA job showed up, and, I guess, just after they’d accepted my resignation, I did a dastardly thing. I went out and bought our first color television set (laughs) just to sort of raise the morale of the family.
WN: But it was a raise in pay, though, for yourself?

DT: Oh, it was a raise in pay, (yes). My salary at the university at the time was about $12,000. The HEA job, with the same fringe benefits, paid me $20,000 a year, so the (twist) of fortunes. As Charlie Moore said, you know, “What more can you ask?” But again, I hope you recognize when I tell, recount the story, it wasn’t all that much of a celebration or that much of a pleasure, because I really fought, in my own way, on my own terms, I guess, a battle that I was terribly interested in, and I had hoped somehow to win. But when people like a Tom Hamilton or Eddie Nakamura, Nadao Yoshinaga tell me, “We can’t understand what you’re talking about,” it doesn’t make you too happy. In a sense, I think, now maybe they realize that maybe I did know a little bit about what I was talking about. Maybe if they’d had thought a little bit more about it, they might have understood, too. But it wasn’t to be, and at any rate, I was alive to fight again (laughs). There were other things, of course, that happened in 1966 besides this.

MK: You know, I know that you were, you know, involved in polling, and sometimes you were consulted by people. Did you ever look at that as an option as a full-time job?

DT: Not as a full-time job, but polling I did look (at) as an option, obviously later in about—let’s see, what would it have been about '71 or '72, and we did do some polling, which turned out not to be all that successful. (However), it was good while it lasted, it was seven-and-a-half years. In terms of a consultant, no, because consultants want you to . . . Somehow you have to sell your soul to the devil for whoever you’re consulting. You have to take their side, and I was never one to want to sell my soul. In other words, to be tied in with somebody securely. Not that I was always right, goodness knows. You can never be sure that you’re right or wrong, or anything of that sort. All you can do is to hope that you have the good grace to be reasonably right. There’s always another side to whatever the question is. Maybe I was totally wrong about the University of Hawai‘i, but certainly I thought I was right at the time. As we sit here in 1991, I still think—not 100 percent, but I still think I was about 85 or 90 percent right. So, if the occasion were there to do it over again, whatever the risk, I think I would do it.

MK: You were saying that in '66 there were a lot of other things going on.

DT: Well, we had an election again (laughs). This was '66, and this was the second time around for Jack Burns. He and the Democrats, as I say, were busy trying to make good on their promises to the people of Hawai‘i. It was somewhere in this period that Elmer Cravalho announced his New Hawai‘i Program, which really gave Burns a platform to run on and talk about, because Burns was drifting. After the first year or so, he was completely drifting for lack of a program. And so, he had a talking point, and the Democrats had complete control. They never were completely in control of themselves, I guess, and maybe that was one of their virtues. There was always somebody to challenge the establishment within the Democratic party, and so Tom Gill decided in '66 that he wanted to be lieutenant governor. He lost [to Fong in 1964] for the [U.S.] Senate. He would come back, essentially, to the Tuttle point of view of years earlier, and stay with state government. He decided to run for lieutenant governor. The only problem was that Jack Burns decided that, having had a little bit of problem with lieutenant governors, that he would like to have his good friend, Kenny [Kenneth F.] Brown, who was a wealthy architect and a respected person; (an) awfully nice gentleman, no question about that. Jack had gotten acquainted with him on the golf course,
and he liked Kenny, and he wanted Kenny Brown to be (a) candidate for lieutenant governor. The only problem was, Kenny Brown wasn't that well known. He'd been a (state) senator for a little while. There was no talking either Tom Gill out of (the race), (nor) Kenny Brown. I had considerable depth contact with Tom Gill over the years, as I think I've alluded to. I didn't know Kenny Brown that well, except as a person in politics, but certainly he wasn't an old warhorse of the Democratic party. Apparently, what had happened, my two good friends who were never happy with one another, Burns and Gill. . . . Burns, apparently, had told Kenny Brown he ought to get together with Dan Tuttle, see what I thought about his running.

(Elsie and I) were invited to the Brown household—Elsie went with me—and they were very cordial to us, Kenny and his wife. I had to give him the sad news. I said, "I don't have a poll, but I think you're not going to win."

“Well, I’ve got to do this for Jack.”

I said, “Well, if you want to do this for Jack—Jack wants you, obviously—and you’re willing to make the sacrifice, by all means, do it. (However), you’re a novice. (For a) statewide office, Tom Gill is so strong on O‘ahu that even if you pick up the Burns vote on the neighbor islands, you’re not going to make it."

He thanked me, and (did so) rather sadly. To Kenny Brown’s credit, if I meet him (today), he’ll still allude to the fact that, “Thanks for shooting straight with me, Dan.” (He has said this several times) after he had run and lost.

There were other things that I did before I left the university, which maybe we should mention, and then we can chronologically move right along.

WN: Okay.

MK: Okay.

END OF SIDE TWO

TAPE NO. 17-81-8-91; SIDE ONE

JC: This is a continuation of the Dan Tuttle interview. This is the last tape in session six. This is videotape number thirty-six.

MK: Tape number thirty-six with Dan Tuttle.

I guess we can pick it up with the 1966 gubernatorial race with Gill coming in as lieutenant governor.

DT: Well, Gill won, of course, in the primary, and the governor was not happy about that result. He learned about the results, as I recall, while he was down at our antipode—I guess that’s the way (one) pronounce(s) it—in Africa, in Botswana. He did not react kindly, to underline it. He flew back to Los Angeles, and then stayed there. (He)
stayed there, and stayed there. Now the primaries were close to the general election in those days, just a month apart. Finally, the Democrats were getting a little bit frantic. Kenny Brown was no strain, you know, he was fine. (He) later served Burns as a dollar-a-year man. (For) the Democrats, things got so desperate, (that) they flew Matsy [Matsuo] Takabuki—I think, for certain Matsy and maybe another person or two—to Los Angeles to get Jack Burns to even come back to campaign for himself. He'd always been sort of a reluctant campaigner, even back in '59. I think we discussed that. When he came back, slipped into town, slipped out of town, got caught on a massage parlor table, that sort of thing.

Well, they finally got Jack to come back, so he boarded a plane and came back, grim faced, stony faced, as he was called. (He) came down the (airplane) stairs, with television cameras (turning on), out at the airport. Tom Gill, of course, (was) there to greet him. This was going to be the great unity occasion. Then Gill puts out his hand and Burns ignores it and walks away. Made some very trite comment. I'm sure we probably still have film clips of this available in somebody's archives. They finally affect a little bit of a unity. This refusal to shake hands just about did them in, but they managed to scrape out a victory in spite of (it) all. They had an assist or two along the way, some good breaks in the campaign, which I (am) not really prepared to talk about, I think, at this particular moment. At any rate, in spite of this, the Democratic strength, by this time, was sufficiently strong—so that they could withstand (even) this type of a disruption.

Out of it came, what should have come, a very strong combination for Democrats, Burns and Gill, both akamai, both (of them political) veterans. I put the question at breakfast one day after (all of) this had happened, to Governor Burns, and I said, “Now I know you and Tom have had your problems, but you’ve been through a lot together.” I said, “If he’s a good boy, won’t you accept him? He’s a logical person to succeed you.” Burns was pretty certain to have three terms, although at that time the two-term limit had been (enacted), but Burns was grandfathered in (office), so he could have a third term.

And Burns became very serious, and says, “I don’t think there’s any question about it,” he says, “Tom Gill is probably the most intelligent one in our midst these days.” I would have filed an exception to that. I think Bob Dodge would have ranked up there with Tom Gill, but at any rate, Dodge was not a big contender. And he says, “If Tom is willing to show that he can cooperate, and we can work together to get things done, then yes, Dan, that’s a logical thing to expect.” (However), he added something ominous, “I don’t think it’s going to happen.”

And believe it or not, it didn’t happen. Burns (tried) to give him a couple of jobs to do, which Tom (reluctantly) did, but Tom was always in “hot water” with the governor, and vice versa. They seldom would ever take it upon one another to walk across the aisle, so to speak, on the second floor of the palace. Of course, shortly thereafter, they did move into the state capitol [building], but the vibes were not there. Tom Gill, I think from the time he became lieutenant governor, was determined he was going to run for governor. He didn’t want it to be handed to him by Jack Burns. And of course, a lot of Jack Burns’ boys certainly didn’t want Tom Gill. So, the refusal to shake hands was probably (a) pretty true representation, (except) the Democratic strength was enough to let them repair the damage (in 1966).

One thing that happened, I might add—I think I’ve already mentioned it—is that (emerging)
through this period, in essence, was a new Democratic platform, not one prepared by Bob Dodge in convention but one dynamically put together in the house of representatives by (the) very agile, former schoolteacher, Elmer Cravalho. And Burns did a pretty good job of taking it, and using it, (and) talking about it. He was not a great speech maker, but he had that to go along with his "destiny of the people of Hawai‘i," his belief in all ethnic groups, all factions of Hawai‘i, his having represented all of these groups in his cabinet. In short, Jack Burns was a "true believer," and so this showed through. He'd also, by this time, his hair was a little bit grayer and a little bit whiter, develop(ed) something of a "father image." Tom Gill had his own group to work with. Also, there were people behind the scenes. In other words, when the chips were really down to win that election, (Democrats did work together. As usual), I had former students who were out there working on the hustings and doing some polling for them.

The Burns people did put up the money to send Gill people out into Gill district areas to say, "Look, Jack is all right. Vote for Jack. He's a local boy. He's one of us." You see, because Jack Burns was not strictly a local boy. Tom Gill was. So, in certain areas of town where Tom Gill was very strong, particularly in the Makiki-Mānoa area, and going over into Nu‘uanu, the old Heen strongholds, Bill and Ernie Heen strongholds, which were (also) Tom Gill’s, the Gill people, led by Arthur Park and some other people, among others, (Milton Goto), Arlene Lee, (et cetera), they went house-to-house, spreading the word, "Vote for Jack. Remember, these two people are tied together. Don’t be afraid to vote for Jack just because his name is at the top. If you don’t vote for Jack, Tom Gill doesn’t get in office."

WN: Was there a realistic belief that Gill supporters were going to cross over and vote for Randy [Randolph A.] Crossley?

DT: There was danger of that. You never know.

WN: Did you think that?

DT: I thought it was a possibility. So, quite frankly, I encouraged Arthur and Milton, and so forth, if they needed (Burns) to buy some food for (their people, to use it). That’s the way politics worked at that time, maybe to a degree (still) does. They needed some money to buy food. Gill didn’t have the money in his campaign coffers because the two top people were barely speaking. But, if Matsy Takabuki and Bob Oshiro and others would supply the money, the Gill people would go house-to-house, and then they’d be given nice food afterward. (They could be) assured that this was very legitimate. And so, in a sense, Tom Gill’s people helped save Burns. Randy Crossley had a lot of money to put in that campaign. (And), Randy was very serious. See, he had wanted to be governor of Hawai‘i way, way back at the time Samuel Wilder King was appointed. (Earlier), Crossley had been chairman of the Republican party in the [territory].

WN: Was there a thought that maybe, if Crossley won, Gill would have an easier chance of beating Crossley in ’70? Did that thought ever come up, instead of trying to beat Burns in ’70?

DT: It’s possible it did in some people’s minds. I don’t recall it being much discussed, or anything of that sort. The Democrats, see, they had this love-hate relationship inside. They didn’t want too much good to happen to Burns, or to Gill, depending upon whose side you’re on, but they didn’t want anything terribly bad to happen (to them).
Keep in mind, the Gill people had actually worked to get Burns elected the first time. After they had sort of sat it out in '59, they came back in '62 and the Dave McClungs, the Tom Gills, the Donald Chings, and so forth, the old Heen group, they went all out for Jack in '62. So, here they were in '66, with Gill wanting his little place in the sun. And there was a certain group who felt that the Burns group (didn't) want to let anybody else into the tent. They don't want anybody else to get his nose into (the tent). They were willing to accept their support. One of their mistakes, I think, in terms of practical politics, the Gill people made in '62 was not saying, "We want three cabinet seats," or whatnot, you see. (However), they gave Jack their support without any conditions, to the best of my knowledge. So they felt that they had a right to the lieutenant governor spot, won in an open primary. But Burns wouldn't accept it, you see. Here was one of Jack's stubborn sides. He was a very human John A. Burns, who, sort of like a crybaby, wasn't going to accept this guy that his own party had decided to give him as a running mate. "I'm governor, I'm going to have to pick my lieutenant governor." It's almost like George Bush saying, "I'm not going to eat broccoli," you know, "after all, I'm president of the United States, why should I have to?" you know.

Anyway, the Democrats managed to win in spite of (the difficulties), which illustrates, I guess, the depth of Republican despair and the fact that things were really going one step lower for the Republican party. As we think about it, that was '66. (Here in) '91, the Republicans' fortunes haven't improved any, and probably even gone downhill (more).

WN: Plus, I think Crossley—I think that was the year Crossley selected George [H.] Mills as his running mate?

DT: Yes, and Dr. Mills was a very nice person, and they had a fairly strong team. Now, Dr. Mills was no great shakes (as a politician). Keep in mind, too, the Randy Crossley you're talking about is (living) well in advance of his savings-and-loan debacles, his bankruptcy, questions raised about (other things). (In fine), Randy Crossley was a prominent person. He was not beloved even within Republican ranks, but he was probably the Republicans' last best hope, you might say. I think—I don't have the election returns here—but I think you'll find that those returns were fairly close.

WN: Very close.

DT: And so it was a squeaker.

Meanwhile, by this time, by the time we hit that '66 election, I had started to get acquainted with my new job at the Hawai'i Education Association. I think we may want to talk about this a little bit later, and you may have some questions before we do. (Do) you want to intersperse anything else here about '66?

If not, let me just mention a few of these things, because I don't want to dwell too long on this. Some of it, I guess, becomes very personal, and probably, in the long run, doesn't have that (many) implications. There are some things, I think, that (did) have long-range implications for Hawai'i government. The most important of which, I think, was collective bargaining, which ultimately passed in 1970, about a year in advance of my leaving HEA. And in a sense, collective bargaining is something that I know the in-depth story of how it
came to be. It wasn’t supposed to happen quite as soon as it happened, but here at HEA we were able—again, a streak of luck—to get it adopted. (However), my first big trauma here at HEA in 1966, if I’m to ignore the fact that during the first board meeting, the roof collapsed on an overhang outside the front of our office and damaged the car—about three cars of our board of directors, which was very upsetting to a freshman executive director.

(This) first big issue came along as the young Democrats, it was now an elective school board, and here was a chance for the ILWU [International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union] and the Democrats to really do something about education, k[kindergarten] through [grade] twelve, and they (were) determined, they were sick and tired of the young people being “tracked” into vocational education, (and) not given the chance to go on to college. Well, anybody who’d been around Hawai‘i and in (the field of) education who had any feelings at all was in complete sympathy with the ILWU and with the Democrats. By the same token, here I was caught in the middle because a goodly portion of my (HEA) membership were teaching in the vocational education area. The way it came out in the press, at any rate, was that the [state] Board of Education, led by Ed Honda and Doc (Richard E.) Ando, and so forth, “We’re going to wipe out vocational education, make everything (and) everybody into a college prep student.”

Well, this really wasn’t what they had in mind, so what I had to do was try to get together with these people on the board and convince them to go easy, don’t wipe out vocational education, and to tell the vocational education people, “Look, there’s light on the horizon. You may be out of a job, possibly, in high school in vocational education, but there’s going to be another job for you someplace else,” because about this time, Richard Kosaki at the university (was working hard) to get the community colleges established. “You (will) have a spot there to teach.” Believe it or not, I think I issued a press release or two at the time, and we managed to surmount this difficulty. Our members didn’t give me a hard time. Actually, quite frankly, I straddled the fence, you see, in a way. By and large, the members of the school board did prevail and the idea was to make sure that there was finally, at long last, equality of opportunity for everyone in the state of Hawai‘i to aspire to a college education and, if he possibly could cut the mustard, to get that college education and get ahead. (Community colleges were rapidly established.)

The thing that I was most grateful for was (that) the school board, as it was then constituted—at that time it was a partisan board and it was controlled by the capital D Democrats by a substantial margin—had a very cooperative attitude. I know what I considered to be one of the biggest victories, not necessarily for me as executive secretary of HEA, but I felt the biggest victory for understanding among everybody in the field was my ability, thank goodness for their cooperation, to talk Ed Honda and Dr. Ando into giving organizations a seat for discussion purposes at board meetings. We did this over lunch. (At lunch) Ed Honda shot back in his inimitable way, “You mean you have us out here to lunch, and you think just because you want a seat at the board of education. . . . ” He says, “What about these other groups?”

I said, “Oh, of course, they get a seat, too, as long as they’re representing anybody in the teaching field.” I said, “I’m not asking for a seat for myself, I’m asking for a seat for our people out in the field. And if they’re represented by HGEA [Hawai‘i Government Employees Association], HGEA gets a seat, American Federation of Teachers gets a seat, (et cetera).”
Well, it was a little bit like taking candy from a baby, I suppose. But, when they found out that I really meant this, they said, "It makes sense. We'll give it to you." So HGEA, American Federation of Teachers (and HEA were able to send discussion) representatives. The only thing that I knew that they didn't know too well was that if you sat at a board of education (meeting), you had to do your homework. This didn't hurt us as an organization, at least from my perspective, it didn't seem to hurt because we were willing to do our homework. This gave us one leg ahead of the game. So, I was always "sticking my nose into board business." By this time, Dick Ando was in the chair, and since most of the time he felt (that) I was making sense, I had as much right to speak as any board member. Gradually, little by little, nothing dramatic, (it all) helped. It helped, I would suggest, to pave the way, ultimately, for collective bargaining.

Well, there were a couple of other things that we should talk about, perhaps next time, in a little greater depth. (There is) not much more, because my "political career," my dealing directly with politicians, ended within two or three years after I left HEA. (However), those final years at HEA includ(ed) the coming of collective bargaining, we'll try to cover (that) briefly.

WN: You left HEA in 1971?

DT: I left HEA (on August 31), 1971, and this in itself was a story. Once again, I crept away in the summer of '71 without any fanfare at all, because it was very important that (my leaving) not become a public big fiasco, because collective bargaining was very tenuous in those early years. That's a story in itself. I don't have time to go into it now, but it is, I think, a story worth telling because it did, after a fashion, have (many) political implications.

WN: Okay.

MK: Okay.

END OF INTERVIEW
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