THE DEMOCRACY OF EXCELLENCE
Dr. Thomas H. Hamilton's breadth of interests enables him to speak with warmth and understanding to students, parents, educators, scholars, legislators, poets, artists, musicians, and citizens at large concerning their stake in higher education. His discerning views are frequently enlivened by a humorous approach that recognizes the occasional absurdity of human affairs. Dr. Hamilton writes against a background which includes State University of New York, which he headed from 1959 to 1963, and the University of Hawaii, of which he now is president.

The addresses presented in this volume were delivered over a five-year period between 1959 and 1964 at such widely separated localities as New York City, Honolulu, and Karachi. The divisions of continued on back flap
the book are indicative of the issues which came under particularly close scrutiny during a period when higher education was being tested in a variety of ways. They deal with the learning process, communication and human rights, the dimensions of knowledge, the relationship of higher education to the state, and international responsibilities.

Dr. Hamilton has traveled widely throughout North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, participating in special missions to the Philippines, South Vietnam, Okinawa, Israel, the Rhodesias, and Nyasaland. His international interests are reflected by his association with the African Liaison Committee and the Commission on International Education of the American Council on Education.

Dr. Hamilton was born August 4, 1914, in Marion, Indiana. He received a bachelor's degree in political science at DePauw University and advanced degrees at the University of Chicago. Before joining the University of Hawaii, he held teaching and administrative positions at the University of Chicago, Chatham College, Lawrence College, and Michigan State University, where he served as vice-president for academic affairs.
The democracy of excellence

A collection of addresses

THOMAS HALE HAMILTON

PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

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HONOLULU, HAWAII, 1965
For
Ginny, Nan, and Tim

A magnificent family, the members of which conspire to maintain the illusion that the author is its head
THE PAGES THAT FOLLOW include seventeen public addresses which I have made over the past five years. If the collection has value, I think it rests in the recording of some of the matters that concerned one public university president as he tried to practice his craft in two very different states, New York and Hawaii. Those concerns were—and are—diverse. For the sake of this volume, the presentations have been grouped under five major headings: The Learning Individual, Man and Society, The Nature of Higher Education, Higher Education and the State, and Beyond the Borders of the State. These categories certainly are not definitive, nor do they precisely delineate the variations in treatment.

It might be of some help, then, to describe pertinent circumstances that surround certain of the presentations. The address from which the title of this collection comes sprang from my concern about
those persons who would limit the opportunity for education as well as those who mistake uniformity for equality. The installation ceremonies in New York offered me a very visible platform from which to condemn both houses.

In the same way, my first months in Hawaii gave me the central impression that there was widespread enthusiasm for developing an institution of first quality; but I was not sure that there was an equally widespread understanding of what such an enthusiasm required if implemented. Hence "A City Drenched with Light," my inaugural address at the University of Hawaii.

"To Live the Life You Earn" is nothing more than an attempt to get a group of high school seniors thinking about what a university can and cannot do. And it attempts, however inadequately, to avoid the "guidance" clichés which by repetition tend to make seventeen-year-olds suspicious of all such counseling. Some mischief was involved in the Burning Straw piece. Even teachers of English expect a university president to talk about rising enrollments, not poetry. And some nostalgia creeps into the DePauw commencement address. It was an anniversary year, and I fancy it shows. Considerable thought went into both the timing and platform for the address on freedom of discussion. The message needed to be delivered at a time when there was no issue, and it needed to be presented before an audience which had no professional commitment to the point of view.

Even with an understanding for some of the
background that surrounds the presentations, I must admit that I view the publications of public addresses with some skepticism, particularly when they are the work of a university president. His responsibilities sometimes limit the scope of his remarks. The pressure of administrative duties frequently deprives him of the time for the scholarship which his position implies. His "wisdom" needs scrutiny, his pontification a challenge.

For such scrutiny, for the sources of ideas, and for suggestions and assistance with each of the speeches included herein, I am at a loss to know where to start my acknowledgments and where to stop. But I should like to mention as particularly important John Wilson, who was my assistant both at Michigan State University and at State University of New York. He now serves as associate director of the Honors College at Michigan State University. John and I worked closely together over a number of years, and I have come to value and acknowledge with gratitude both his ideas and his friendship. Dr. Stanley Idzerda, director of the Honors College at Michigan State University, also has contributed to my thinking, particularly about the nature of the modern state university.

As for help from my colleagues here at the University of Hawaii, it would be difficult to contain the list. I shall list none rather than omit some. But I would pay special tribute to both my secretary in New York, Margaret O'Connor, and my secretary in Hawaii, Nobu Masuda, who managed the prep-
aration of these manuscripts as effectively as they have managed my life.

I suppose, too, I should extend a word of appreciation to my family in acknowledgment of the time I was not available while writing, traveling, or delivering these addresses. But the Dedication is theirs, and I do not want to spoil them.

THOMAS H. HAMILTON

Honolulu
October 1964
Acknowledgement

I wish to acknowledge the courtesy of those who have granted permission to reprint addresses which have been published previously under their auspices: to the Corning Glass Works Foundation for "To Live the Life You Earn"; to Dr. William E. Kerstetter, president of DePauw University, for "In the Process of Learning"; to Dr. Irwin Palmer, president of New York State English Council, for "The Scent of Burning Straw," which was published in The English Record; to Dr. Samuel B. Gould, president of State University of New York, for "The Lasting Relevance of the Arts," "The Democracy of Excellence," "The Constructive State," and "Research and the Commonwealth"; to Dr. John J. Meng, president of Hunter College, for "The Dimensions of Knowledge"; to Mr. Lester Ingalls of the Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York for "The Problem of a Professional Premise"; and to Mr. Frank Smothers,
director of Publications, the Council of State Governments, for "A Citizen Views the Legislature."


I am deeply indebted to the above—as well as to Club 15, the Honolulu Rotary Club, the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, and the United States Information Center at Karachi—for the opportunity they gave me to speak from their platforms.

T.H.H.
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THE LEARNING INDIVIDUAL
IN THESE DAYS of burgeoning student populations and rising costs, students and educators alike have been predominantly concerned with *how*. How, ask the educators, are we to provide the minimum expansion in our present facilities to accommodate the rising tide of students which is about to flood in on us? And the students ask the equally legitimate question, how are we to find the financial resources required to meet the costs?

Now these are perfectly appropriate questions, especially in a democracy which is pledged to extend equal opportunity to all who merit it; and they are questions which have not, as yet, been answered completely. They will have to be asked again, I am certain; and our best thinking will have to be devoted to their solution. But, with your indulgence, I should like to lay aside the vexing *how* of our problem to concentrate upon the antecedent question of *why*. If, as individuals and a society, we are to
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make sacrifices in the name of higher education, we should be perfectly clear as to why we are doing so. And it seems to me this is especially important to you young people. Before you decide whether to continue your formal study, you should have a reasonably precise notion of your own aspirations and talents, and, more than this, a proper understanding of the role collegiate education is capable of playing in helping you to achieve those aspirations.

I suppose I might begin by stating unequivocally that collegiate education is not endowed with magic properties; it does not carry with it a guarantee of either future success or happiness. It is possible, of course, to put together an imposing list of distinguished men and women who have become prominent, perhaps because of it. College presidents, as a rule, are very fond of this way of thinking, especially when they are trying their best to persuade someone of the true value of their particular institutions. William and Mary, for example, could claim to have shaped Thomas Jefferson; Dartmouth can point with pride to Daniel Webster; and Harvard has been the temporary home of both Emerson and T. S. Eliot, to name but two. But it is important to remember that an equally impressive list could be drawn of those who never sat in a college classroom. Such a list would include George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Abraham Lincoln, among the statesmen; and to our roster of creative artists we would have to add Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, and Ernest Hemingway. A number of
others enrolled, and then departed for one reason or another. As a matter of fact, James Fenimore Cooper was invited to leave Yale (to put it delicately), supposedly for discharging a keg of gunpowder in his room; and the poet Shelley was unceremoniously escorted from Oxford University for setting off an explosion of an entirely different kind. I might add that this fact does not prevent Oxford from claiming Shelley as a favorite son today, though she is a little red-faced in doing so.

I would suppose that one could extract a moral from all this. Perhaps it might be that if you must ignite a keg of gunpowder, be certain to do it in someone else's room. But, more seriously, I want you to realize that formal higher education is no wonder-worker; it cannot and will not promise the personal fulfillment which is, after all, the responsibility of the individual student. It is one way, and I think it is a good way, but it is not the only way to achieve one's aspirations. Genius has the habit of flowering no matter how informally it may be cultivated.

But we are left with the question of why young people volunteer to undergo the rigors of a college education. Henry Adams wondered about this a good many years ago, and he received an unabashed answer when he asked the question of a student of his. "Sir," was the reply, "the degree of Harvard College means money to me in Chicago." And so, I suppose, it does. If we cannot be altogether happy
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with the young man’s motive, at least we can praise his candor.

But why should we be unhappy with this reply? There is abundant evidence, after all, which proves that the majority of students, in Henry Adams’ day as well as in our own, consider vocational or professional preparation as the overriding reason for college attendance. And it is equally true that our colleges offer hundreds of courses designed to satisfy this end. But I would suggest to you that we are, or ought to be, disappointed with this point of view because it equates life with a bank balance. It indicates that the student is thinking of only one fragment of the sum total of man’s humanity. It leaves out whole areas of human experience and concentrates its attention upon the important but truncated and narrow view of “man as producer.” It concerns itself with earning a living but not with living the life we earn.

Life is a good deal more complicated than this, and we are selling ourselves short when we do not realize it. I would ask you for a moment to think of how you will divide each day of your life when you leave school. Clearly one-third of your time, unless you are night owls, will have to be devoted to sleep. This is the biology of life, and we cannot very well avoid giving it eight hours each day—at least not for very long. A second eight hours, give or take a coffee-break, will likewise have to be devoted to work, and I mean work of the kind which will compensate you extrinsically, which will provide you
and your dependents with food and clothing and the other necessities without which existence is impossible. This leaves a final third which is essentially uncommitted. During this time we are free to exercise our bodies and our minds as we choose, to read and to write, to converse with friends, to exercise our responsibilities as citizens and parents, and to sharpen our aesthetic and moral sensibilities. These are activities which are desirable intrinsically, activities which have a meaning and an end in themselves. They provide us, not with bread or rest, but with pleasure and enjoyment. They are distinctly human activities, and their exercise can and should result in two sorts of human excellence: those private excellences by which a man perfects his own nature, and those public excellences which can be translated into the performance of his political duty, the excellence of man in relation to society.

I think that, when we grasp these distinctions, we can begin at least to give some order to our existence, and especially some order to that experience about which you are all thinking—a college education. I think it can be said that the purpose of education is to help students to live their own lives, and this must include, not only earning the life, but living it once it has been earned. You need not be ashamed of the vocational motive which lurks in the back of your mind. To prepare yourselves to play meaningful and productive lives in the economy of our society is a legitimate and essential end, and it is firmly bedded in the university tradition. To
document this point, I need only recall for you that our oldest and most respected institutions had, as their initial mandate, the preparation of young men to enter the ministry and the learned professions. As Brubacher and Rudy put it, "The desire for a literate, college-trained clergy was probably the most important single factor explaining the founding of the colonial colleges." I would merely add that, if it were desirable to devote the resources of a college to professional preparation in the seventeenth century, it is even more important today. Since that time, we have experienced an industrial and scientific revolution which, in fact, is still in process; and we have seen the spread of democratic ideals over much of the Western World. In the America of today, there are few of us who can qualify as members of a leisure class, very few indeed who can avoid the compulsion to work. Subsistence, by and large, is earned in this country, and the nature of our economy demands that much of this work be performed on a highly complex level of abstraction. We owe it both to ourselves and to society to develop those skills which will allow us to do something of value, and to do it well. I see no reason why anyone should apologize for what is an inevitable and vital aspiration.

But what I mean to bring your attention to is simply this: to concentrate entirely upon the vocational is to misuse the experience of college and to misuse the gift of life. Colleges are sustained by society, not to supply drones for a hive, but in recognition of a cardinal truth about human beings. When
all is said and done, man's mind is his greatest gift, and by its nature it hungers to know. When man seeks knowledge, when he strives to make of experience and theory a harmonious whole, he is fulfilling his true nature. Life, then, is not only doing, but knowing as well. A college is nothing more and nothing less than a community of scholars, a community of men and women, young and old, living together and bound by a common commitment to find things out. Each member of this community, in his own way and subject to the limitations of his own discipline, is seeking, learning, inquiring, using intellect, senses, and intuition in the pursuit of knowledge. This is the kind of community you propose to join.

But, before you make your final decision, you might sensibly ask, knowledge of what? And, instead of replying directly, I would call upon two men who thought wisely and well, to supply the answer. Socrates gave us the cryptic and deceptively complex command: "Know thyself." Years later, what Socrates implied was made more explicit by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant when he said, "Be sure to study the great diversity of human nature." Wiser counsel I cannot share. Make man your study, man in relation to his own inner aspirations, man in the context of society, and man in relation to the world and to his Creator. And do not be deceived by the apparent simplicity of this mandate. The eminent Scottish critic and philos-
opher, W. Macneile Dixon, gives us some idea of what you are in for:

"The most troublesome thing in the world is the individual man. If anything is in evidence, he is in evidence, and the varieties of this creature are without end. Many are the races and many the temperaments. Who will enumerate them? There are vehement and hot-headed men, selfless and conciliatory men. There are sybarites and ascetics, dreamers and bustling active men of affairs, clever and stupid, worldly and religious, mockers and mystics, pugnacious, loyal, cunning, treacherous, cheerful and melancholy men. There are eagles among them, tigers, doves, and serpents. . . . The mighty Hegel, who twirled the universe round his finger, found history much more difficult to handle, for it consists of the doings of innumerable, unique, obstinate individuals."

And Mr. Dixon might have added "wonderful" to his string of adjectives. Study, then, to build bridges, or to extract tonsils, or to hire salesmen. Society needs bridges and salesmen, and has little use for tonsils. But never forget that before, and after, and during the time you are an engineer or doctor, you are also a human being, and are thus fated to find things out, about yourself and the world in which you live. It is this realization which alone can bring you the happiness and fulfillment you deserve.

And it is in the fulfillment of the individual that a democratic society rests its hopes for success. If
it is to succeed, if it is to become a good and wise society, it must inevitably depend upon the goodness and wisdom of the individuals who are its members. In this sense, a democratic society is perfectly consonant with the inherent demands of human nature. Each requires the seeking after knowledge; each depends upon wisdom for its continuance and prosperity.

In conclusion, I would again remind you that a college cannot mysteriously confer upon you the wisdom you seek. The best it can do is to lay the foundation for a lifetime of learning, to inculcate the habits of mind, the breadth of interest, and the expansion of spirit which, when continued and enriched, can result in a life truly worth living.
In the process of learning

I MUST CONFESS that I have had the devil's own time in putting together the remarks which follow. And my difficulty chiefly arose, not from a lack of themes (which is unusual) but, in fact, from an embarrassment of riches.

My first thought was that inasmuch as on June 15, twenty-five years ago, I sat through a similar ceremony as a graduating student of this institution, it might be well for me to try to recollect my feelings on that morning in 1936. And I experienced no difficulty in doing this. I was sleepy. And it is just possible that there are in the audience today some of my contemporaries who know why I was in need of sleep. If such be the case, I should like now to propose an agreement. If you won't tell, I won't.

Next I thought of telling you something of the rich intellectual experience which DePauw afforded me. To speak only of those no longer here, my mind ranged to Frances Tilden, who first taught me that
literature, in addition to being form and feeling, was often social comment as well . . . and, perhaps more important, demonstrated for me that the truly great teacher need not fret about such things as class attendance and grading on a curve. And I recalled the discipline of Ernest Smith, who might, indeed, be now unhappy that I have joined the ranks of administrators, but who—back in my student days when I showed no degenerate tendencies which portended my present profession—bent every effort to make me think, at least fitfully, as a scientist. The project was well nigh too much for both of us. Then there was Lizgar Eckardt, who taught the whole of the history of philosophy as a sort of prelude to the theory of self-energism which he advocated, and who thoroughly baffled a nineteen-year-old mind by pointing out that the Tao was essentially disorder within which was found order.

But to reminisce in this fashion, though pleasant, is likely to mislead you. By no means were all of the experiences I had here intellectual. There were the formation of friendships, the living with men whose backgrounds and personalities differed sharply from mine; and perhaps it will suffice to point out to the graduating class that your generation did not invent moonlight. And it would only be fair to observe that not all of my responses to intellectual stimuli were always appropriate. I recall a professor who, in trying to teach me something of the history of Europe, reprimanded me after class one day because I was paying more attention to a young
lady who sat to my left than I was to Europe. My only defense was that the young lady was in so much better shape than Europe was.

Finally, in thinking of today, I abandoned all of these approaches, and determined that I would try to do something truly revolutionary—that I would try to talk to the graduating students. This, commencement speakers almost never do. The businessman called upon for this task frequently looks upon the occasion as an opportunity to impress the faculty. This is particularly true if he was relatively unsuccessful in doing so when he was an undergraduate. Such addresses usually are larded—and I use the word advisedly—with quotations from the most academically respectable sources. The politician, on an occasion such as this, wants, of course, to avoid controversy and attract voters, and the devisor of foreign policy sees the commencement address as an almost ideal occasion for the release of a trial balloon. And thus, the graduating students get talked over and not to, but, since they are accustomed to arbitrary and sometimes meaningless graduation requirements, they have come to look upon the commencement address as the last of these experiences to be endured before their degree is finally awarded.

Perhaps even more revolutionary than directing a commencement address at the students, I am going to try to communicate what it is that I think I have learned in the past twenty-five years. When I undertook this kind of self-analysis, the results were more than a bit discouraging, for this quarter of a century
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seems to have done more to puzzle than enlighten me. But some things do emerge.

What have I learned these past twenty-five years? Not a great deal, I fear, for experience has taught (as it is apt to do) that much of what I thought I knew is really false. And perhaps in coming to recognize this, one lesson has emerged—that for wisdom, unlearning is as important as learning, a thought which long ago occurred to Socrates.

In 1936, if memory serves me, man appeared to me naturally good, corrupted only by the social institutions he had created; and the paradox of corrupting institutions being created out of natural goodness escaped my unsophisticated and undisciplined mind. My fellow men, and I, now appear to me to be neither naturally good nor naturally evil, but naturally both. Saint and sinner, hero and coward, honest man and thief—all are bound together in us as part and parcel of the essentially tragic human condition.

My twenty-one-year-old sense of optimism about myself and the world has faded, over the years, into cautious hope. I now see no pattern in history which points inevitably towards progress, but it seems at least possible that we may be able to translate the tragic condition of the individual into some hope in the social realm, if catastrophe does not overtake us in the meantime.

And time has taught that, to deal even moderately intelligently with our world, one cannot elevate provincial mores to the level of moral absolutes. As
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I have come to know, even slightly, the peoples of Southeast Asia, it has become increasingly clear that the way I think and what I think are due in large measure to the fact that I was born where I was, of the family I was, and in a particular culture, rather than having been the son of an Okinawan peasant, a Filipino landowner, or a Vietnamese civil servant. And it has become clear that, at least in regard to many areas of the world, the important thing is not so much to try to determine which of our ideas are superior, but rather to recognize the nature of our differences and to take these differences into account.

Time has also brought home that there is much in our life to which the only rational response is laughter. You and I, and all of us, frequently cut a ridiculous figure. And laughing at oneself is the best assurance of maintaining perspective that I know. In fact, I would suggest that, if your vocation sometimes prohibits your laughing in public, do not deny yourself the right of private laughter. It is the best of treatment for the pompous, the stupid, and even a few knaves.

All this implies some change that twenty-five years have brought. Is nothing the same as it was in June of 1936? Yes, on that June morning I was convinced, due largely to the impact of DePauw, that the great hope of humankind was education. I still hold firm to that proposition.

And, increasingly, I am convinced that the kind of education which is most vital to us as a society
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is that generally known as liberal, that which liberates the human mind from the provincialism which attachment to time and place always imposes. It does not concern me one whit if you who are graduating are possessed of no technical skills which are immediately marketable. It _would_ concern me if you knew nothing about the natural world and the ways in which science can and cannot develop reliable knowledge about it, or if you are ignorant of the nature of human behavior, both from an historical and analytical point of view, or if you are insensitive to the magnificent insights, in their own way as reliable as those provided by the natural sciences, which are the product of the poet, the painter, and the musician.

As a nation we shall survive if there be not one among you who at this point has ever seen a high speed computer. We shall _not_ survive if there are not at least a few among you who have pursued, within the limits of your ability and experience, advanced mathematics to that frontier where knowledge and ignorance presently border.

Our technology will still develop if none of you is now capable of designing a machine. It will not, however, unless among you there are some who now know something about solid-state physics and want, very much, to know more.

The world neither expects nor awaits the great American novel from the pen of any of you within the next few years. But the literary scene will prove barren some years hence—and so, indeed, will your
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personal lives—if there are not graduating seniors here who know a great deal about style, form, plot, and character.

Why have the years led me to give this particular emphasis to my faith in education? Certainly it is not because of any negative attitude toward technology or application. I am quite aware that ours is a technological society and that our society depends in large measure for its prosperity and survival on the presence of trained technologists. But this fact can and does mislead as we try to see its implications for education, particularly undergraduate education.

We must not permit ourselves to forget that a man is a man before he is an engineer, a lawyer, or a physician, and that from this truth flow two principles. First, he should be primarily concerned with that education which is most essentially human, that which develops the truly unique human capacity for rational behavior. Second, a man in a free society is also a citizen before he is an engineer, a lawyer, or a physician, and he should be educated in such a way as to help him to make wise decisions about the society which he helps to govern.

Even if one begins with a primary concern for what the mature, professional practitioner should be able to do, the answer remains the same. The evidence now abounds that the professions are becoming more and more concerned with the liberal education of the neophyte, and more and more insistent that he attain knowledge of the first principles of the in-
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tellectual disciplines relevant to the profession he chooses to enter. Our need is less for engineers who know how to handle hardware, and more for men thoroughly disciplined in the natural sciences and mathematics. We need no more young newspapermen schooled in the tricks of the trade; we do need journalists of integrity with enough knowledge of the world to understand it, if only partially. We need no more teachers whose only talent is glibness about pedagogical technique; we do need teachers with an understanding of how students learn and what they ought to learn.

All of this emphasizes, I think, why this institution and others like it, both private and public, are so important. For here one finds a dedication to these principles, and I am proud to number my Alma Mater among those so committed.

You who are graduating are, of course, not educated—nor is anyone in this assembly, for the educated man concept is illusory. The best one can hope for is a man in the process of learning, a process which stops only when life stops. But however true this may be, you can still rejoice in having attended an institution where your learning has been facilitated—which is to say, where you have learned how truly little you really know.

For the purpose of this institution is to produce disciplined, knowledgeable, and inquiring minds, and these are the attributes which will keep us free and keep us strong.
I AM PARTICULARLY FOND of a remark once made by Stephen Crane. Having been asked to render a critical evaluation of a work of art, he replied in this simple and honest way: "My judgment in the case is not worth burning straw, but I give it as portentously as if Kingdoms toppled while awaiting it under anxious skies."

When I first came across this sentence, it occurred to me that, had he lived to a riper age and acquired the necessary discoloration, Crane would have made a marvelous university president. I am fast discovering that nothing is more helpful to that office than the ability to propagate the illusion of omniscience behind a rhetorical smokescreen. But I also learned long ago that this is a trying business and one fraught with dangers. There are occasions when the rhetoric goes stale and the illusion falls mercilessly away. This is such an occasion, for I know very well that the mantle of my office is a poor thing indeed when
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compared with the richness of the experience you have, not only of literature, but of young people, and how to introduce one to the other.

But I am going to run whatever risks there are in hopes that you won’t mind the scent of burning straw—and I warn you that it may get rather pungent. I want to talk about poetry, and for two reasons. First of all, I like it; and, while I have not studied it systematically, I like to talk about it. But second, in this scientific age I believe that it deserves to be talked about more than ever; that it is important and that we, and especially our young people, are in some danger of forgetting this.

Now let me assure you that, when I refer to the importance of poetry, I am not anxious to do so in utilitarian terms. I think this is a mistake that is too often made by literature’s best friends. Having noted the success of the chemist and physicist in defending their disciplines, the English teacher is tempted to copy their stance and promote literature as useful, as a tool to the teaching of communications skill. It is true, but irrelevant, to argue that the study of Shakespeare prepares a man to draft a better business letter and, therefore, increases his chances of landing a good job. As John Ciardi observed in the Saturday Review, “One may as well argue that surgical training is important because it prepares a man to do a better job of carving his Christmas goose. It does, but who cares?”

No, poetry is important because it represents a way of discovering truths, as searching and as fruit-
ful as man has worked out for himself. It perennially deals with the very stuff of humankind, with the large and small, the profound and seemingly trifling. Its scope is limited only in so far as humanity itself is limited, for man is always its subject—man loving, hating, thinking, and feeling his way through the world. In a real sense, the good poem awakens in its reader what his humanity had already told him, but in his confusion he had forgotten or distorted past recognition. This is what Edmund Wilson had in mind when he referred to the poetic response as the "shock of recognition." If the poet differs from the rest of us he does so chiefly because he remembers his humanity more clearly than we; he stays close to life and will not be distracted from what it tells him. Because of this, he has a reverence for both life and man... he knows, better than we, what it means to be alive and what it ought to mean. And he reminds us that you can tell as much about a man by his reaction to a clear, spring night as by the study of his liver. Perhaps even more. And this is precisely why the poet is important, and why it is important that our young people learn to appreciate what he tries to do.

Now at this point I think I will surprise you by saying that I believe the secondary schools, or at least their English departments, have recognized poetry's real importance and have made solid efforts to introduce it to their students. I know this is not a popular judgment, for during the past few years we have grown accustomed to hearing exactly the
opposite. The chorus of critics has been expanded considerably, so that now it includes not only the college English professor, but engineers, natural scientists, and, indeed, even admirals. They remind us that we have entered an age of vulgar literacy which marks its students with a conspicuous innocence of grammatical correctness and an absolute ignorance of the sensitive and precise use of language which is poetry. And this lamentable state of affairs, they conclude, is clearly the responsibility of the secondary teacher.

To answer this charge, I would have to observe, first of all, that I have seen in my time too many high school seniors who know poetry and appreciate its discrete way of defining the truth of things to conclude that it is being universally mismanaged in pre-college curricula. But I will say this: the number of such students is not large and, at least from my experience, I would suggest that they are more often women than men and, not surprisingly, they are usually declared literature majors before they enroll as freshmen. The question, then, becomes: why do not more students reveal this affection and competence in literary matters? Why, especially, are so many of our young science and engineering students not only ignorant of, but contemptuous of the poet and his way of seeing the world and recording his vision?

Now there are many answers which can be and have been given to this question, the easiest and least accurate of which is to point a quivering finger
at the secondary English teacher. One can also blame the unique and overpowering sloth of our current crop of young people, the apathy of parents, or, indeed, the anti-spiritual, goods-gathering nature of modern society. To round things off, it is the accepted thing to fling a curse or two at television and the comic book. I have at one time or another heard all of these things mentioned, either singly or in conjunction, and with more or less relevance. But I have yet to hear what strikes me as the most reasonable answer of all, and that is that poetry itself is responsible.

Let me try to explain what I have in mind. As I have hinted earlier, poetry, even more than the other arts, depends for its success upon shared experience. The creative impulse, which causes a poem to be made, arises from the emotional and intellectual reaction of a sensitive person to some aspect of human experience—whether that reaction issue in a hymn of joy or a cry of anguish—and the work of the poet is to condense and order his perception of experience into permanent form so that it can be apprehended and judged by the reader. But what I would emphasize is that it cannot be so perceived or apprehended—the "shock of recognition" cannot conceivably be transmitted—unless the reader has some sounding board against which to test its authenticity, and that sounding board must necessarily be a similar experience on the part of the reader. More than anything else, then, poetry is a mature art, and demands maturity of those who would understand it. Without
this, there is little possibility of our helping students to erect anything like a meaningful aesthetic value system... that is to say, the ability to judge between the good poem and the bad, the true and the false.

It seems to me that this is a fundamental problem connected with the teaching of literature which is only seldom recognized. Certainly it is a problem which our colleagues in mathematics and the sciences do not have to face in precisely the same form. To be sure, the chemist requires a "shared experience" in order to make Lavoisier meaningful to his students, but it is one which he can arrange with the tubes and burners of the laboratory. And he has the additional advantage which arises out of the cumulative, rational nature of his discipline. Relying upon the step-by-step progression which has characterized the development of the sciences, he can, with some precision, fix the level of difficulty of his presentation to match the capabilities of his students. But the teacher of Shakespeare, who wishes to quicken his students to the mystery of love, the joy of parenthood, or the pain and wastefulness of death, has a problem of a different kind. His is a non-cumulative, essentially nonrational discipline which, by its nature, will not easily order itself into codified levels of difficulty. You cannot quantify love or death, nor can an experience of these things be artificially provided. Poetry's laboratory is and must remain the human heart and spirit.

What this implies in effect is that the meaning of a poem to a young person must necessarily be
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partial. It is well, then, that we recognize that he will come away from the experience which is the poem not wholly able to say that this is the way things truly are. But if he has been taught to detect consistency and sincerity, if he knows how to follow the drift of a poem on its own terms, then he should, at least, be able to say that this is the way things probably are, that this is the way they ought to be. In short, he will have intimations of the truth of the poem which a later reading will confirm; he will realize that, if he does not now feel this way about the experience, then this is the way he will feel, or ought to feel about it. And, most important, it will be clear to him that poetry represents not only knowledge, but a way of knowing, a way of seeing man and the world. He will gain respect for the subjective or intuitive as an eternally valid way of discovering truth.

But I am convinced in my own mind that the ability to distinguish between the poem as meaning, and poetry as reflecting a discrete way of viewing things, is the most difficult problem facing the young student. And it cannot be left to his own ingenuity, for when it is, he is bound to look upon the poetic as competing with and in conflict with the scientific. He will balance objectivity against subjectivity, the scientist against the poet. And at his level of understanding and experience he will declare himself for the reality which his eye apprehends and verifies. He will trust his eye but not his half-formed heart. Unless he can be made to realize that man has
learned to approach truth in both ways, and that these are not in conflict but rather are complementary, each with its own values and limitations, then he will quickly learn to be not only bored with his poem but contemptuous of its maker. And a rich mode of thought will be closed to him, probably forever. His heart will likely remain half-formed.

Our first duty in the classroom, then, is to expose our students to poetry's possibilities and to equip them with the respect, perception, and skills which will allow them to realize these possibilities in the years to come. Before all else, they must come to know something about how a poem works. By this I mean that the poet should be represented as he truly is... as a sensitive, virile craftsman of his chosen art. I really believe that this is the rock upon which most of our young men, the engineers and scientists, founder. Their intellectual heroes, during their late teens, are men who have a genius for putting complicated things together, men who have concrete objectives... a bridge, a skyscraper, or perhaps a mathematics formula... and who know how to solve the problems of their craft. And they come to literature believing that the poet is a lonely, mystical creature, wind-blown, frail, and decidedly odd. In their imaginations, they place him beneath the arms of a towering oak, under dark and foreboding skies, waiting... with a quill in one hand and a rose in the other... for the inspiration which presumably will come with the next flash of lightning.

Without a doubt this is the wildly romantic
misconception with which we start and it must be corrected at the very outset. If we are to make the poet understandable to our students we must remove him from the craggy mountaintop and put him to work at a desk. We should not spend too much time marveling at the fact that Keats wrote a sonnet in a few hours after midnight, but rather take that sonnet apart and show our students how it has been welded together. I do not share the conviction that poetry is so fragile and finely spun as to disintegrate when it is analyzed. One look at the poet's work sheet will indicate that he doesn't share it either. Nor do I believe that discussions of form, proportion, and structure are necessarily dull. Metaphor, rhyme, assonance, alliteration, the nuances of construction, the precision, economy, and beauty of language—these are the elements which go into the making of a poem, and they must be understood, not as abstractions, but rather as the concrete tools which the poet uses in the exercise of his craft.

And finally, when we have finished, the elements will come back together again and the poem's meaning and its method will be fused and fixed—it will be whole and entire. And the student will at last look upon the poet as one who truly understands. As W. M. Dixon notes, "He will know that it is not to science or philosophy that the poet owes his understanding but to his profounder appreciation of the strange situation in which we find ourselves, to his sense of the pitiful estate of man who, with all the forces of nature proclaiming an alien creed, still
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holds to his intuitions, who knows and knows well that he cannot support himself otherwise than by clinging to his passion for justice, his trust in the affections of the heart, his love of the lovely, his lonely struggle for the best.” And he will appreciate that it is to the poet’s exploration of human nature and not to the scientist’s search of the material world that we must look if we are to come to some understanding of our most pressing problems. These problems, like poetry, are rooted, not in the world, but in the mind and heart of man. And in the years ahead they will be solved, I have hope, not if we exalt science at the expense of poetry, but only when both are recognized as complementary, edifying, and very human activities. And this is the task of the teacher of English. I cannot think of one more important.
The lasting relevance of the arts

I AM VERY PLEASED to have been invited by the College to share in its traditionally distinguished Festival of the Arts. I would, with your indulgence, point to it as an ornament in the University's total program.

But is it really an ornament? Regrettably, many people would have us think so, for they look upon efforts of this kind as appropriate so long as they do not greatly intrude upon what is considered to be the main business of the college. Administrators are not immune to this narrow view for, you see, an arts festival has no credits attached to it; students and faculty and members of the community come freely to it, without benefit of classroom schedules or assigned student hours. There are no faculty loads to analyze, adjust, or complain about. It cannot, in short, be tabulated by a registrar and thus it tends to fall outside the well-worn groove of Academia and becomes, in the minds of some, an edifying
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interlude, fittingly arranged to welcome the new life of the spring; but an interlude nonetheless.

This attitude toward the arts is prevalent in our society, and I do not believe it is too hard to account for this fact. In the first instance, art has always and unashamedly declared that one of its major ends is to give pleasure. Its ability to widen our sensibilities and improve our minds has always taken a second place, notwithstanding the fact that this has varied from time to time depending on the starchiness which any particular society might have had in its collective collar. But regardless of emphasis, there has always been this brash, proud, hedonistic element, and, of course, this troubles those of us whose vestigial puritanism cannot sort out the difference between the sensuous and the sensual.

In defending the arts we must be aware of this problem but we cannot allow it to warp our judgment. The fact of the matter is that the arts do give pleasure and they do this as much as they do anything else. If this is hedonism, then we had better learn to live with it. It does art no good if its defenders pander to the bias of those who assume delight is the devil's own invention by attempting to pass off the pleasure-giving aspect as merely the sugar coating of what, after all, is a pretty strong dose of improving moral instruction.

What bothers me most about this view, however, is the sanction it tends to give to the implied and erroneous notion that learning is one thing and art quite another; that the former must inevitably be
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accompanied by discomfort, if not pain, and the latter, designed as it is to give pleasure, cannot, except covertly, enlighten us as well. This notion sets up a false antithesis which has obvious implications for an unwary college or university. Art is categorized as all emotion and no intellect; and mathematics, for example, becomes all intellect and no feeling. And, insofar as the college exists to foster intellect, art can justifiably be shortchanged. Its manifold possibilities (both intellectual and intuitive) can be overlooked as we periodically skim the lovely froth of delight from it, reserving our major energies for the supposedly ponderous work of intellect which we assume to be the main business of the college.

Now this view does justice neither to mathematics on the one hand nor to the fine arts on the other. If I can believe my "mathematical" friends (and I think I can), there is a pleasure that can be obtained from both, and it is a pleasure strikingly similar in its origin. There is a delight which they uniformly bestow, a delight which arises from the contemplation of symmetry, and which accompanies any successful effort to perceive an order in that which, to less sensitive eyes, appears chaotic and formless. Far from being antithetical, the arts of both poet and mathematician are wondrously complementary. They appeal to the senses, but in different ways and in different proportions, and they share a dependence upon both intellect and imagination. We can as properly speak of an elegant equation as an elegant
sonnet. We cannot easily banish one from the mainstream of the college without pondering the role of the other.

There is another reason, too, for the tendency to assign the arts—and festivals which celebrate them—to a secondary, if not peripheral role in the total program of a college or university. The fact of the matter is that too few of us have troubled to understand the arts in their intuitive and intellectual fullness and, as a consequence, they have increasingly removed themselves from the narrow range of our comprehension. Why Modigliani should combine the innocence of primitive African art with the vertical extravaganza of the gothic, we cannot fathom, much less appreciate. Nor do we fully comprehend music which does not, like "My Fair Lady," leave us with a tune to whistle on our way from the concert hall. The purposeful dissonance of a Stravinsky does not readily reveal, to untrained ears, its contribution to an overarching conception; and it is decidedly not susceptible to tuneful whistling. Similarly, many of us undelightfully stumble through Eliot's "Waste Land" out of a perverted sense of cultural duty, but few are able to confess, in private, that it has given pleasure, and fewer still that it has made us more sharply aware of the exigencies of the human condition.

Thus having in the first instance not bothered to recognize that art constitutes more than sensory titillation, that some of its deepest pleasures are intellectual in character, we now discover that without
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this fundamental perception its powers to engage our senses in a direct way is proportionately impoverished. I do not mean to suggest by this that a comprehension of the increasingly subjective element in modern (post-Freudian) art is dependent entirely upon intellect. But if the intellectual base is not perceived at all, then our senses can be but partially engaged and our pleasure little more than superficial. In effect, you cannot pleasurably come to modern art without some knowledge of how it got to be where it is, and those of us who have been deprived of this underpinning are tossed and turned on the surface of what sounds or appears to us as anti-art—chaotic, formless, dissonant, and unlovely. We have seemingly been abandoned either by our senses or our artists; but, in fact, we have abandoned both by negating intellect.

I would mention still another factor which tends to relegate the arts to the decidedly secondary role they have in our society, which tends to make many of us very insecure and uncomfortable when brought face to face with them. If the truth be known, too many of us are no longer very sure of ourselves. As I have said, for the most part, we have no one to blame but ourselves, for we have not been uniformly willing to make the effort to meet the demands which great art must make upon us. But art itself must also share a measure of responsibility, for it has not been entirely successful in guarding its portals against the claims of pretenders. The trouble began, if not earlier, with Dadaism, which was taken
far too seriously by those of us who should have known better. We asked, in effect, "Do they really mean this?" And we answered our own question by meekly supposing that indeed they must. And ever since we have been timidly, but approvingly, smiling upon what was no more than a colossal and wonderfully ironic joke.

Shaken a little, we continue to approve, without really knowing why, the now numerous anti-art hoaxes which have been tramping into respectable salons on the coattails of legitimate abstractionism. Not infrequently today we are asked to consider as art the fruits of sheer accident. A mobile flown from Geneva might be seriously cracked and battered en route and yet be received, in its imperfection, with enthusiasm by the artist who made it. Paintings have been critically acclaimed as great art even though they were made by themselves, not by the artist who, as it turns out, merely threw oil upon the upper reaches of his canvas and watched it trickle into a pattern determined, not by the mind of man, but solely by the texture of the surface on which it oozed.

Before I am pigeonholed as a hopelessly reactionary outsider, let me be the first to acknowledge that accident can produce some lovely things upon which to gaze. But we must insist, even indeed as we hang them, that we are not looking upon art or receiving the pleasure which only art can bestow. On the contrary, we are dealing with accident. Art is, unlike nature, man made. It is the conscious, disciplined ordering of what a sensitive, imaginative,
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and skillful human being has perceived. I will not refuse accident a place in this process. But it can be but a small place and it must inevitably be seized upon and shaped to work toward the ultimately conscious end which the artist has set out to achieve.

To make my point perfectly clear, I would say, too, that this conscious end need not be glaringly obvious; in fact, it probably cannot be. Even the trained observer cannot be expected to perceive exactly what the artist has intended to convey, or to be emotionally moved in a wholly predictable fashion. The language of the arts is not a precise language; in fact, its power to communicate is in part measured by its capacity to stimulate and engage the uniquely individual experience of the observer. But it is a language informed by mind. Subjective and connotative though it be, it is a human invention and it is put to work by men who have a vision of reality which they hope to share.

But to return to my point, mindless accident has been too often uncritically admitted into the halls of art, and this has consequently confused and embarrassed us. It is not art, but anti-art; and insofar as that distinction has been blurred, to that extent has art been guilty of alienating a public which would like to understand what it is and what it can be.

Regrettably, many of us now think we are wise and are determined to be taken in no more. This means, in effect, that we have retreated in confusion from intellect. Those works of art which fall outside
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the representational, the tuneful, or the unmodulated iambic pentameter have become suspect. And we are thus impoverished. The most banal rhymes are preferred to the richness of a Wallace Stevens because they require less effort; Wagner comes storming back to cast Bartok and Hindemith into an undeserved shadow; and we turn our backs upon Jackson Pollock, convinced that Grandma Moses is infinitely closer to the real thing.

This is regrettable, as I have said, for not only does it close off rich avenues of experience for each of us as individuals, but it also puts a heavy hand upon the kind of experimentation without which the arts would soon become repetitive and sterile. College and university presidents cannot be totally absolved on this count, though there is little excuse for this. Like their colleagues in other fields they, too, are sometimes confused by the panorama of the modern arts and, as a consequence, tend to bifurcate their professional lives. Their attitude toward innovation and experiment in the sciences is only rarely transferred to the fine and performing arts. They want no new and bold concepts which may invite the unknowing outrage of an influential alumnus. They prefer to have no questions raised which require explanations of the kind which they themselves feel powerless to offer. As I have said, this is not true of all of my colleagues or even most of them. It is, however, true of none of them, so far as I know, when the natural or social sciences are concerned. There is a broad consensus that we are on solid
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ground with these disciplines, and no college president would encourage the biologist or physicist who reveals little interest in anything save rehashing what he learned in graduate school twenty years before. Platforms are purposefully arranged for the exposition of new scientific ideas; visiting scientists, bearing new discoveries, are brought to the campus to be listened to by rapt, if small, audiences. Science is unthinkable without experimentation and consequent change.

But it is far rarer when this same kind of institutional encouragement is given to innovation in the arts. For a combination of reasons, only some of which I have mentioned, artistic experimentation strikes too many of us as irresponsible adult play. Concerned lest we make fools of ourselves, worried by the questions which inevitably are raised by a departure from the orthodox, we tend to inhibit the arts in the few small ways open to us.

And so they have tended to become more and more isolated from the main currents of our lives. To the extent that our institutions of higher learning have, through timidity or apathy, encouraged this tendency, to that same extent must they be blamed for failing in one of their cardinal responsibilities.

I am exceedingly pleased that no such timidity or apathy exists on this campus. Here the arts are pervasive and vital; they are given a sanction and importance commensurate with the importance they have for our lives. They are anything but ornamental, dusted off with the coming of spring to fill
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an open and peripheral space on the college calendar.

By recognizing the integral relationship of the arts to the other elements of its academic program, this College has, in effect, reminded us that while man is a social and a biological animal, he is a solitary soul as well. He can attempt to define what he is in terms of the community in which he lives, the corporation to which he gives his labor, or the country club at which he obtains his leisure. And as society becomes more complex, and as a consequence more organized, he can more and more appropriately (or so it seems) seek his definition of himself in a social context.

But however much more he succumbs to the necessity of sharing his life with others and finding some of its meaning in the sharing, he still keeps inviolate (and must) his solitary, private life. He comes into the world alone and he must, with no sharing, leave it in the same fashion. The anger he feels on the playground of his elementary school is an intensely private emotion which, of course, he will attempt to convey to his antagonists. But its roots lie tangled in the deep rich soil of his being. Similarly, when he first falls in love and later looks upon the child he has fathered, he experiences a private emotion which, for all the familial closeness of these occasions, cannot be fully shared with anyone else. Indeed, he can scarcely share it with himself. His whole life long, to the very last minute of his breathing, is an asymmetrical, intricately designed tapestry of longing and fear, of love and hate,
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of anger and joy—of reaching out and drawing back, of engaging with others and then removing, once again, to the innermost recess of private being and private thought. Our social or biological selves, however important a place they may seem to have in the fabric of our lives, are clearly subservient to the private selves which, however frequently violated, can only be destroyed by death. And we can never understand ourselves in any full sense until we have reached and comprehended that inner core.

It is to this striving that the arts, each in its own way, make their lasting and incomparable contribution. They will not answer to the tests of currency if by that term we refer to the specific problems of our particular age. They will tell us little about how to disarm or how to solve our farm problem. But by dealing directly with man in his complexity and with what might be called the enduring problems of humankind, they provide the fundamental understanding upon which our temporal solutions must be erected. They are, therefore, abidingly relevant and important.

And, as this Festival has shown, they are delightful, too.
MAN AND SOCIETY
IN THIS WORLD OF IMPERFECT MEN and even more imperfect social institutions, one cannot but be impressed at how often people end up doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. I am sure that you can cite as many examples of this as I can—and, if you don’t think you can, let me ask you to recall how many times you have found yourself in the college library on Saturday night, not so much in the interests of learning as due to the fact that you called too late to get a date. If this hasn’t happened to you at least once, then I must admit that undergraduate life has indeed changed over the last twenty-five years.

With this thought in mind, and, perhaps more to the point, I have also been impressed from time to time at the failure of leaders in mass communications to understand precisely why their work is important, and thus, why they themselves are important.

Of course, if we look closely at some of our large
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urban newspapers, it is hard to avoid the impression that at least a few journalists have decided that to titillate and to amuse are more important than to analyze and discuss. But with these I am not very much concerned. They are not right, for whatever the reason; and they are not, as a consequence, very important either to society or themselves.

Dismissing this minority, I should like to turn to responsible journalism and, if you will bear with me for a few moments, tell you why I think any profession which deals with communications is vitally important and one of the most essentially human activities in which we can engage.

In Cardinal Newman’s masterful book *The Idea of a University* the author calls attention to a remark made by a Mr. Davison of Oxford University when the liberal education programs of that university were called into question. In stating the purpose of liberal education, Mr. Davison said, “[The] faculty which we would have encouraged, is simply that of speaking good sense in English, without fee or reward, in common conversation... [Some] will smile when we lay some stress upon it; but in reality it is no such trifle as they imagine. Look into the huts of savages, and *see*, for there is *nothing* to listen to, the dismal blank of their stupid hours of silence; their professional avocations of war and hunting are over; and, having nothing to do, they have nothing to say.”

It seems to me that Davison’s remark manages to say a number of things in a very short space. For
example, he implies the concept that liberal education is concerned with learning for its own sake and not for monetary gain ("without fee or reward"). He also implies that the real purpose of education is to help people to make "good sense in English." This is, I think, a more profound statement than its simplicity would have us believe. Perhaps it can be understood better if we look at it from the other side. The opposite of sense is, of course, nonsense, and there is a fair share of the latter in the world without education contributing to more of it. The purpose of education, then, is to make sense out of nonsense insofar as it can. More than this, however, it is to help people, not only to make good sense for themselves, but to communicate it to others. With this important qualification, Mr. Davison has advanced his thought considerably. What he is implying here seems to belie the notion that education—or rather, its product, good sense—exists solely for its own sake. In fact, it cannot, for what the author clearly perceives is that man cannot be man, would not be man, unless he is able to figure out ways to arrive at knowledge and other ways to share it with his fellow man. The animal in the cave—the mute savage—is what he is, simply because he cannot figure out a way to say anything. He may have something to say, but he can’t say it. Insofar as he fails to communicate with his fellows, he is more or less a savage, more a brute animal and less a human being.

What I am suggesting is that, of all the ways one
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can differentiate between human beings and other organisms, one of the most important is the ability to communicate. Let me try to demonstrate what I mean.

In the largest sense of the term, all organisms "know" something; that is to say, all organisms are capable of apprehending something of the environment in which they live. This is an important point, I think, and one we human beings like to overlook. We shouldn't underestimate what other organisms can do. The plant, for example, "knows" (in my especially large sense of that term) up from down, or at least its roots do. It also "knows" that water is wet and that water is a good thing for its growth. And I dare say that we could conclude that the plant "knows" a good deal of complex chemistry. It "knows" these things, but it cannot pass on this knowledge to anything else, except insofar as it genetically alters itself to accommodate the newly won knowledge. And this takes hundreds of thousands of years.

And, of course, the same thing can be said of animals. There are, though, some important differences. The animal is not stuck in the ground like the plant; it can move around in the world, and the more it moves the more it learns. Compared with the banana tree, the orangutan is quite a knowledgeable creature.

And so the orangutan "knows" a whole lot more than the banana tree. Even more important, it can communicate a whole lot more. It is not entirely
dependent upon the processes of evolution to transmit what it has learned of the world. For example, it learns that it has enemies, and it can communicate this knowledge to its fellows. It will do this—not unlike some men I know—by jumping up and down on its hind legs while screaming at the top of its lungs. Thus the orangutan transmits certain information about his individual state of mind; he communicates a generalized emotional tone throughout the band so that all within hearing distance will come to have a similar attitude toward a certain set of circumstances.

As I have just intimated, men can do this and are sometimes content to do little more. But they can do more, infinitely more; for the very crucial difference between man and the beast is the invention of language. While the human being can use to good purpose the animal method of transmitting emotion, he can also, through the use of language, transmit his knowledge of objective and subjective reality. By agreeing upon a certain complex set of symbols which stand for things, man can manipulate those things without once moving out of his armchair. And, most important, he can pass on to his children the knowledge he has gained. What this means is that man has created for himself an intellectual snowball; by finding things out he has something to communicate, and by communicating he adds to his ability to find things out. He is the only creature on earth who can do both these things. And by doing them he makes himself human.
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It should be clear, then, that society, properly considered, is nothing more than a group of human beings exercising their essential humanity—that is to say, a group of men and women working together to find things out, both for themselves and for those who are to follow them. A society of men is a community learning together. It is upon man's ability to communicate that the human dialogue depends; and it is upon the human dialogue that civilization depends. Let the human dialogue stop, and civilization stops; let the dialogue concern itself, not with sense but with nonsense, and civilization is that much corrupted.

Thus, it is within this particular context that I would ask you to view the work and importance of modern journalism, whether it be on the college campus or in the largest metropolitan center. This context may strike you as being somewhat grandiose, somewhat inflated for the nature of your day-to-day assignments. But I would suggest, on the contrary, that it is not so much grandiose as fundamental. Our society today is characterized essentially by the vastness and complexity of the knowledge it has learned, and the power and intricacy of its means of communicating that knowledge. While man used to depend upon painfully etched parchment and the town crier, he now has the world's news deposited on his doorstep. The person who assumes the responsibility for assimilating this knowledge and communicating it to his fellows is, in effect, dealing with the process that makes civilization possible—
that makes man human.

Such being the case, it is not surprising that State University of New York, as well as other universities, actively encourages students to engage in the practice of communication. The university, above all other social institutions, is primarily interested in improving upon and expanding the human dialogue, in discovering, preserving, and transmitting the knowledge which is man's vocation. So long as campus publications contribute to this process, so long as they understand the implications and responsibilities of their role, then they deserve the encouragement and support of the university community. This is proper and should be easily understood.

But let me speak frankly. No university should take an interest in supporting student newspapers, for example, simply because they provide the box score of the last basketball game, information as to the next dance, or gossip about who is going steadily—or wobbly—with whom. Student publications have to be looked upon as an out-of-class means of achieving precisely the same objectives as are achieved in the class. In other words, intellectual excellence—the primary purpose of the university—must also become the primary purpose of all aspects of the campus press; and the special facet of excellence with which student publications must be concerned is that relating to the improvement of the ability to communicate, not only with clarity, but with responsibility, integrity, and relevance.
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Many of the discussions which student editors have about their responsibilities miss the point; for, unless a campus publication can be judged, in one way or another, as having a share in the learning process, then it becomes extremely difficult for the university to defend it, let alone encourage it. I have seen—and I am sure you have, too—student newspapers which apparently set about to imitate the very worst aspects of the daily press, instead of the best. I have been exposed to a few which seem to have as their primary objective a glorification of the trivial, a purposeful preoccupation with nonsense as opposed to good sense.

But, happily, such preoccupations seem to me to be rapidly declining. There is observable, I believe, a heightened sense of responsibility on the part of student editors and staffs to deal with important matters, to see the smaller world of which they write in relation to the larger world in which they must live, and to write of these matters with more grace, more thought, and more candor.

If, when you return from this conference, your colleagues should ask what you expect of them, I would suggest that your editorial policy be fashioned after these attributes: that it reflect the wisdom of the remark made by Mr. Davison, the Oxford don, whom I quoted earlier: "[The] faculty which we would have encouraged is simply that of speaking good sense in English, without fee or reward. . . . [Some] will smile when we lay some stress upon it; but in reality it is no such trifle as they imagine."
IT WAS TWENTY-TWO YEARS AGO that I first became a college administrator. Except for three years of naval duty, I have been at it ever since. As I look back the career has not been very distinguished, nor do I have many contributions of which to be proud; but I have survived, and in my profession survival means a great deal. I suppose I survived by following a few facetious rules one doesn't find in most textbooks on university administration. One of them I have adapted from that great scholar, Satchel Paige, to the effect that you should never look back over your shoulder because someone's sure to be gaining on you! Another comes from Calvin Coolidge, via Sam Rayburn, who pointed out that he never had to explain something he didn't say.

And while other university presidents have been able to put together some mighty pretty sounding phrases about educational leadership and how they
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practice it, I've been forced to settle for, "whenever I see a spark I throw gasoline on it."

And I fear I've been a disappointment to the profession because I could never come up with a list of principles of university administration. So I still operate on the assumption that once you've identified a good man, be sure to keep out of his way.

But another very good rule is never to answer a question which no one asked you. And this is the rule I am going to break today. No topic was assigned me, and I could easily have spent the day weaving together three clichés and quotations, and made us all reasonably happy. I choose instead of talk about the nature of a university and freedom of discussion.

I do so at this time because at the moment there is no pressing controversy before the community. Unfortunately, statements on this matter usually appear at the height of controversy, when calmness and objectivity are very hard to come by. Universities frequently complain that they are misunderstood by the larger community on this issue. To some extent this is true, and to a considerable degree it is the fault of the universities for not stating clearly their position. It has been my experience that rational men of good will can and do see the nature of the problem when it is explored in a reasonable manner.

A good university is certain to be almost always under criticism. And basically this is true because it exists for paradoxical ends. As I have said before,
“it is inevitable that universities should occupy an ambivalent place in a society even though that society creates, supports, and at times praises them. A university is established by a society to insure that the values to which that social order subscribes are perpetuated; there is, in effect, an orthodoxy at stake. And yet, in its rarer moments, society also acknowledges that it is equally important to examine and, indeed, to modify that orthodoxy. Thus the university is mandated to question the value system which it is also supposed to preserve. Problems inevitably arise, however, from the fact that the whole society does not uniformly subscribe to both these ends. There are always some to whom it appears that the university ought to be preserving instead of questioning. And to others the reverse is true. This is why universities are so often misunderstood by the society which sustains them.”

This misunderstanding manifests itself in many ways, but I suppose never more dramatically than it does over the question of who should and should not be permitted to appear on the platform of a university campus.

I would make it clear from the outset that both the University of Hawaii and I have a fundamental need for the continuation of the democratic system of government and a healthy, free enterprise economy. Without these two, neither the University nor I could do our work or prosper.

It must be recognized, too, that only the naive would deny that there are individuals and groups
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in our society which would subvert our free institutions. They can be found to both the right and the left. And were they to control, no freedom of discussion would be permitted me or the University. My willingness to extend such freedom to them is due in essence to the fact that my reading of history convinces me of the strength of our system. But the same history does not so assure them, and their only recourse is the suppression of those who disagree.

I should like to observe, too, that no one has a "natural right" to appear on a university platform. The purpose of a university is education, and unless a speaker or performer contributes to educational or cultural ends, then the university has every right to refuse a platform to him.

But it is the very nature of the educational process, and particularly in certain fields, that students must be exposed to conflicting points of view and encouraged to reason their way through these. If they do not have this opportunity during the formal educational process, then as adults they will be sitting ducks for the extremists of both the right and left.

Thus, the first criterion which needs to be applied for the appearance of a speaker or a performer is: does his appearance contribute in one way or another to the educational purposes of the institution? Frequently those who will agree with this criterion, however, say that no partisan should be permitted to present his views, but only those who are neutral and completely "objective." This is
analogous to saying that students in a school of medicine should never observe anything but individuals who have no health problems, or a businessman should ignore the conduct of his competitors who at times succeed, at other times go bankrupt. But in the educational process it is frequently necessary to see and hear someone who has a partisan point of view, for again in adult life the student constantly will be exposed to partisan efforts of various sorts to influence him.

Thus, a university, having determined that, generally speaking, some educational end is served and that the speaker or performer has been invited to appear by a recognized faculty or student group, then the university is not true to its nature if it tries to prevent such appearances. Quite naturally its platform cannot be abused by its use to incite to an overthrow of the government by force and violence. And if this were to occur, the university would be quite right in stopping the address or performance. This, if I have read the court cases correctly, is precisely what the Supreme Court has held.

And I fear that the university must itself determine what the proper educational ends are and appropriate means for their attainment. In so doing it will make errors, all human institutions do, but experience indicates that it will make fewer errors than if the judgment rests in the hands of others.

Even if this were not the proper policy for a university, an alternative would be, as far as I can see, impossible to administer. Suppose, for the
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moment, that we are agreed that the university should not ever permit on its campus extremists of either the right or the left. It might be fairly easy then, in the application of this policy, to prohibit the appearance of Sir Oswald Mosley, the British Fascist, or Herbert Aptheker of the American Communist Party, for both bear labels. But then one would have to move the next step toward the center. Do we prohibit Robert Welch and Norman Thomas from speaking, for both of these would be considered extremists in some quarters?

And one could continue this inward movement until he would find himself debating the question as to whether Barry Goldwater and Hubert Humphrey did not also occupy positions too far to the right and left of the mythical middle.

And if one were to limit the range of opinion students may hear, then it follows that one must also check the books they can read. So out go the writings of Marx and Hitler. But what about the poetry of Ezra Pound, who during World War II broadcast for the Italian Fascists? And must students be denied the joys of reading *Pygmalion* because Shaw was a Fabian Socialist, even though one might allow a student to see *My Fair Lady*, made from the play, on the theory it had been diluted by music.

Obviously, such a policy is unworkable, and a university would cease to be one if it tried to follow such a line. This is true of Harvard, of Yale, of Chicago; it applies also to the University of Hawaii.

On occasions I have heard it said that the right
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to present varying points of view is appropriate for a private university such as Harvard, but not for one supported by the state. But the taxpayer who takes such a position is guaranteeing that the very university which his tax dollars help to support will never rise above mediocrity, for such a policy denies the presence of the very principle which has made Harvard a great university—its staunch defense of freedom of inquiry and discussion.

Thus, a university's only possible posture is to demand that the criterion of an educational purpose being served is present, that the speaker has been invited by a duly recognized faculty or student group, and that he does not use the university platform to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States. A university has the further obligation to make certain that over time students are exposed in one way or another to all of the points of view relating to our society.

And freedom really is of a piece and cannot be carved into sections, some of which we support, others which we ignore. As a university must have certain freedoms to attain its instituted ends, so must business, labor, the professions, etc. Our task is one of mutual understanding and support.

A university is only a part of the society, and what has been said above relates only to the university's role. But as a citizen I cannot help but be concerned about attempts in the larger society to limit discussion.

I have great faith in our people. They will not
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be stampeded. Our way of life is based on the assumption of free discussion, and over the years it has proved to be valid.

The issue is not a new one. On June 14, 1643, the British Parliament issued an order that no book could be printed without its approval. The following year John Milton wrote in reply what has become a classic, the Areopagitica. The essence of his argument is contained in these words.

"And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing."

This I believe.
The myth of inferiority

From time to time over the past twenty years, I have found myself with the obligation to address an audience of one kind or another. And I must confess to you that not always, or even often, have I met with anything like unqualified success. Invariably, the difficulty in these matters is to match audience interest (one can never hope for enthusiasm) with the speaker's competence. In almost every instance in the past, the selection of those few topics in which I pretend to have some competence has doomed me to twenty uncomfortable minutes of restless foot-shuffling, nervous but bored throat-clearing, and various other acknowledged indications of unqualified apathy. Tonight the elements of the problem remain unchanged, but I find that they have been turned around the other way. Assured, perhaps for the first time in my life, of audience interest and indeed enthusiasm, I find, alas, that my assigned topic is one in which I have little scholarly com-
petence. And, even more disturbing, I am fully aware that tonight I cannot even pretend to be an expert. All of which proves that, if a one-eyed man wants to be king, he ought to know enough to confine his pronouncements to the valley of the blind. Such, I fear, must be the philosophy of that contemporary, sophistic circuit rider, the university president. I would plead, however, that, in spite of my lack of competence, my deep concern for the matter here to be discussed, as well as the sense of urgency and disquietude with which I view contemporary developments, warrants my speaking out.

But, having developed my caveat in all seriousness, I would proceed to my assignment which, I gather, is to define the reason for our having come together for this Conference/Workshop; to document, so far as I can, the dimensions of the problem which intergroup relations pose for our time. That it is an overwhelming, potentially dangerous problem scarcely needs repeating in a year which has witnessed rioting and bloodshed in South Africa; when the Middle East has, once again, groaned with the tension between Israeli and Arab; when, perhaps for the first time, England, the seat of a multicultural commonwealth, has been forced to examine its conscience over what the press has chosen to call "the Jamaican problem"; and when, finally, the Congress in our own country has been called upon to debate and delineate the basic rights which govern, or ought to govern, the affairs of a democratic society.

It would appear, even from this brief sketch,
that the major dimensions of our problem can easily be suggested in geographic terms. And this internationalist view has a certain usefulness, inasmuch as it clearly shows how very small our world is today, and how one community's problem or one nation's problem inextricably belongs to all of us. It used to be (and I have no doubt of this) that tensions among different cultural groups, though just as real and violent as today's, were conveniently confined within the boundaries of the community in which they arose. This is no longer possible. The dirty linen of bigotry and ignorance is now hung on a line which spans the globe.

The real question which should be uppermost in the minds of all intelligent citizens is whether the world community can resolve the cultural, racial, and religious tensions without an extension of the already present violence. Those who fail to realize this and blindly persist in following discredited and irrational policies, whether they live in South Africa or the United States, contribute as certainly to the potential for worldwide conflict as though they propagandized for class warfare.

But the really significant thing, it seems to me, is not that intercultural misunderstanding has been raised to a foreign-policy level by the miracles of modern communication, but rather that it still exists and, in all likelihood, exists because of an age-old propensity in man to prefer the simple when only the complex will do.

Let me try to explain what I have in mind. Long
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before psychology reached the eminence it has now earned, everyone was aware that one of the fundamental needs of the human personality is for security. As Albert Levi has phrased it, "to feel secure in the pursuit of a calling through the knowledge that one uniquely performs a task and is irreplaceable, to feel secure within the family in the knowledge that one loves and is loved according to a stable model of affection, to feel secure within the order of society by a clear recognition of one's station and its duties as fixed, and of one's historic place in the continuity of the generations, are the greatest satisfactions of the individual man. Such security is man's only safe anchorage in the turbulent stream of time."

Now, corresponding to this psychic or emotional need for security is the equally compelling need for intellectual security. Man's greatest gift, his vastly enlarged cranium, has instructed him in the brute facts and contingencies of existence—in its uncertainties and its dangers. As a result of this, he has invariably felt called upon to supply answers to the questions which baffle him and make him anxious; and the lessons of history dispose one to believe that the anxiety is often so great as to make acceptable even the most ludicrously simple explanations. We deceive ourselves; we construct and willingly embrace convenient myths, merely to avoid the pain of uncertainty.

Not surprisingly, the most striking examples of man's mythmaking response to anxiety can be found in primitive societies. Scapegoating is a practice as
old as man and can be found in the records of societies from nearly every part of the world. Its popularity can be accounted for by its usefulness and its simplicity. In a very concrete way it explains the malefactions of natural phenomena—an extended dry season, an earthquake, or the flooding of a cropland—by locating these in a selected member of society and, subsequently, purging the evil by destroying its supposed carrier. This is wonderfully simple and attractive; it nicely explains the wind and weather without the expense of hard thinking and patient investigation. It is not, unfortunately, the habit of primitive societies alone.

And so it is, and has been, with that most complex of all phenomena, the human character: the enigma of the body, mind, and motive of other men. This is without question the hardest of all things to understand; and man has, consequently, attached himself, with noticeable relief, to the easy explanation. Frightened by the unusual, he prefers to hide behind the skirts of the known and the familiar. Etymology gives us our most obvious clue to this tribal, egocentric process. The Latin "barbarus," which originally meant "strange," quickly came to mean "inferior" or "uncivilized." The process here is direct. The stranger, either outside the walls of the city or the walls of the mind, is most easily accounted for, not as someone different, but as someone subnormally different. Because it is the simplest, perhaps this is the most reassuring explanation a society can formulate for itself. The effort required to
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understand and learn from other people need never be made, for "barbarians," obviously, have nothing to teach and are, consequently, not worth a moment's bother.

But this absurdly simple, blatantly provincial egocentrism—though by no means extinct in the twentieth century—is not strong enough to withstand the assaults of more sophisticated minds. In trying to understand his neighbor, experience has compelled man to construct more extensive and somewhat more subtle categories of classification. And so, for nearly two thousand years, in one guise or another, the human mind has been seduced into subscribing to the myth of physiognomy, that curious pseudoscience which purports to assess the worth and wonder of man by consulting his outward features. On the surface, physiognomy gives great promise of exactness and logic. Based upon analogical reasoning, it would have us suppose that the person with a slender, hooked nose is of a noble but grasping character. *Why?* Because his nose resembles an eagle's beak, and everyone knows that an eagle is both noble and grasping. Likewise, those of us with thick, bulbous noses must rest uneasily in the knowledge that we resemble wolves and wild dogs, and are, thus, irascible and quickly provoked. Now, of course, the nose is not the only index to the soul, as any self-respecting physiognomist will tell you; and, as a consequence, the exercise of this self-styled science demands a careful balancing and canceling out of each of the traits suggested by the

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curl of the lip, the shape of the chin, and the slant of the eye, to name but a few of the more prominent indices.

We are inclined to laugh at this kind of thing in 1960. As a matter of fact, some of you might judge it unfair of me to resurrect the curiosities of past ages to make my point. Let me assure you that this is not a curiosity of an age long past. Physiognomic claims, while easy to scotch, are desperately hard to kill, and the twentieth century, in spite of overpowering evidence to the contrary, has witnessed tome after tome which seeks to predict human behavior, especially criminal behavior, by analyzing the shape and structure of outward appearance. And I call this to your attention, not because it has direct significance for our concern with intercultural misunderstanding, but because, once again, it betrays man's persistent effort to simplify the complex, to resort to mythmaking in order to remove the threat to security which the inexplicable always poses.

It would seem to me that intergroup tensions are very closely related to this propensity in man. The strange, the different, the exceptional, the extracultural are suspect. They are not easily understood. Rigorous, objective analysis is never easy. It is far simpler to construct a myth, and simpler still to subscribe to one already constructed. Hitler knew this and, contrary to the well-known and scientifically established fact that the blood of all human beings is, in every important respect, the same, he commissioned the construction of a blood-myth
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which led to the murder of millions of human beings. And so we had, and continue to have, a world embroiled in conflict totally unrelated to reality; a dream world marked by cruelty and suffering.

As I mentioned earlier, a few years ago these were provincial concerns. Isolated, the village exercised its own mythmaking function; it burned its witches and called down rain and let the rest of the world go by. But now the provincial has taken on a regional significance; the regional has been expanded to include the nation; and in the shrinking community which is now the world, no nation stands apart from others. We are all of us involved, individually and professionally, in the crime of bigotry which infests humankind.

It seems self-evident to me that the university, as a social institution, has both an obligation and an opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the solution of this problem. In this context, it is well to recall that the university, while rooted in the society it seeks to serve, is also apart from it. While it recognizes an allegiance to the state which supports it, it embraces a higher allegiance to knowledge and truth. And it is this higher allegiance which empowers and obliges the university to criticize society, to rectify its errors, and formulate its possibilities. If it be content merely to sanction orthodoxies and consecrate platitudes, it misses its calling and prostitutes its purpose.

It is important here, I think, to recognize that the university, by its very nature, cannot do every-
thing equally well. It can encourage, but it cannot make its students embrace with love and sympathy the members of another cultural group. Other social institutions quite probably will meet with greater success than the university in dealing with certain dimensions of the problem. But in the realm of its primary concern, the intellectual, there is much that it can and must do.

First of all, it can serve as an example to the rest of society. In its selection of faculty and admission of students it has an obligation to demonstrate its commitment to rationality by opening its halls to all who share this commitment and promise to profit from it, regardless of race, color, or creed.

More explicitly, if it is powerless to exorcise antipathy, it can and must exorcise the myths upon which that antipathy is invariably based. In its reverence for logic and truth, it must so define the facts of race, of genetics, of anthropology and sociology as to undercut forever, in the minds of its students, the provincialism which fosters error. This is its explicit instructional obligation.

But implicitly (and perhaps more important), in all that it does—from analyzing a sonnet sequence to smashing an atom—it must teach, by example, that complex things cannot be understood without thought, effort, and reflection. Its students must be taught to distrust simplicity, to recognize that rational conduct is a unique attribute of man, and that its exercise is man's only guarantee of remaining human; that true understanding, while it eventually
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engages the emotions, must first be erected upon the solid ground of knowledge.

I would suggest, in closing, that there is one final thing which the university, by its very nature, can contribute to the field of intergroup relations. As a purposeful receptacle for the wisdom of the past and a storehouse for the accomplishments of the finest minds and noblest souls that have graced this earth, the university can explore and illumine, in art, literature, history, and philosophy, the essential dignity of the human person. And as Harry Golden has reminded us, "The field of honor in human relations is won only by the dignity of the human spirit."

If the university can do these things and do them well, it will be true to its own nature, even as it contributes to the foundation of the good society.
Equality as a principle

Let the record show with some clarity that I am conscious of the fact that I am here miscast. For I have been asked to lay aside the administrative toga and address myself to a matter of significance. Simply by being here and addressing myself to a question which should be left to scholars, I violate that section of the university president’s code which holds that all his public utterances shall be couched in large generalizations and about small matters.

More years ago than I like to recall I was a student of political theory, and later had the audacity to teach a college course in that field. During this experience I became interested in the American political and social tradition. I should like to talk briefly about what has always seemed to me the most important, most puzzling, most difficult of the values associated with that tradition.

Of course, there are many other values in that tradition worthy of study—liberty, the rights of men,
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and majority rule, to name but a few. But I would take the position that at least in one important sense these ideas are derivative, that establishing their validity inevitably raises a prior question, and this prior question is concerned with the demonstrability of the value of equality.

It would appear that recognition of the centrality of the doctrine of equality in the American tradition has had a most uneven history. As a matter of fact, there is some difficulty in determining precisely how controlling the doctrine was even to the writers of the Declaration of Independence. Relatively little attention is given to it in Carl Becker's excellent book, *The Declaration of Independence*. And this is, perhaps, as it should be, for the prominence given to equality as an ethical and political ideal perceptively diminishes through the successive drafts of the Declaration. The condemnation of the slave trade disappears altogether at the request of the gentlemen from South Carolina and Georgia with, apparently, the tacit concurrence of those whom Jefferson calls "Our Northern brethren" who, he says, "... felt a little tender under those censures; for tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been pretty considerable carriers of them to others."

Similarly, an earlier draft specifically makes men's rights flow from "equal creation" rather than the Creator's endowment. But perhaps it is not wise to place too much emphasis on what may, indeed, at least in the latter instance, have been nothing more
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than an attempt to improve the literary quality of the document.

In the nineteenth century—again recognizing that I am generalizing, with all of the attendant dangers in that process—primary emphasis seems to have been given to the concept of individual freedom, to the notion that, within certain limits, the individual is at liberty to do as he pleases in pursuing his self-determined ends. It was, if you will, a kind of dedication to Bentham's utilitarianism which emphasized that, if each man were free to pursue his own happiness, then social good would inevitably be served, although, as will be later noted, there is even in utilitarianism a rationale for the doctrine of equality.

As late as 1936 an American educator, William F. Russell, could write, "Liberty and equality have always been locked in a struggle of life and death." As Becker has put it, "The chief task of conservative thought in Europe was . . . to discredit Rousseau and the Social Contract, just as the task of conservative thought in America was to discredit Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence."

But when one begins to question why a man should be free, why he should have certain rights guaranteed, why at election time each vote should count as one, why each man is entitled to certain rights before the law, then it becomes apparent that, in order to establish these values, one must assent to the prior assumption that each citizen is equal to every other.
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Now, the doctrine of equality is in many ways a difficult one to defend because, at the observable level, it is so patently untrue. Men are not very much alike, and certainly are not equal in size, in intelligence, in comeliness, in wit, in grace. To the empiricist, inequality appears to be a more substantial doctrine than its opposite number.

The difficulty, of course, is that, while a democratic society cannot live without the doctrine of equality, rational man has difficulty living with it. If the political process is to accord the same rights to individuals, then logic demands that it rationalize an element of sameness which will justify the according of equal rights. Similarly, if justice is the equal treatment of equals, one must discover a shared characteristic among men sufficiently plausible to provide an intellectual base to substantiate a minimum of identical treatment.

It is, of course, true that over the years the doctrine of equality has been a most difficult one with which we as a society have had to cope. The fact that it is a necessary presupposition to our way of life irritates many of us even when we refuse to recognize the source of our irritation. Without question, it created something of a problem for the fathers of our nation. The switch in emphasis from the Declaration of Independence to the federal Constitution constitutes a long journey even though but thirteen years in point of time.

As T. V. Smith has pointed out, "Equality as a group claim to be made good against a foreign and
opposing group is one problem; equality as a principle of reconstruction within the group, quite another.”

At the popular level our inclination is to claim the doctrine of equality as being primarily American in origin. I need not emphasize that such a contention has little validity, for most of the elements of the doctrine were formulated in ancient Athens. As Crane Brinton has reminded us: “To Athenians of the fifth century... equality meant almost what it does to the modern age. This truth has been somewhat obscured by four factors: the fragmentary character of our sources for political theory prior to Plato and Aristotle; the prestige of these latter thinkers, both of whom denied human equality in its more obvious senses; the existence of slavery at Athens; and, finally, the credit given the partially valid generalization that true individualism, the best foundation for egalitarian ideas, did not arise in Greece until the Hellenistic age.”

Keeping Brinton’s thesis in mind, let us listen to the following: “Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; ... advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not
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hindered by the obscurity of his condition.”

Such a speech has a remarkably contemporary ring, but it is from Pericles’ “Funeral Oration.”

So far as the American doctrine of equality is concerned, it is clear that it was strongly imbedded in a system of philosophy postulated upon a state of nature. T. V. Smith has observed, “The equality of men, upon which Hobbes and Locke fundamentally agreed, was integrally and indissolubly tied up with the conception of a state of nature from which men passed into government by mutual agreement.” Both Hobbes and Locke avoided the trap of insisting that a state of nature actually existed in time, but rather embraced the theory as a necessary psychological postulate.

It was Locke, of course, who most strongly influenced Jefferson. Had Jefferson followed Hobbes, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for him to have articulated a defense of equality in terms of certain inalienable rights. Locke, unlike Hobbes, did not sacrifice equality in the contract, and it was Locke who served as Jefferson’s model.

Some have been concerned about the term “created,” which, interestingly enough, appears in the Declaration but not in support of the same sentiment expressed in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. To be sure, the term should not, in this context, be interpreted in the same way as in the phrase, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; but this should not lead us to assume that the eighteenth century theory of natural rights
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denied the Divinity; on the contrary, the will of God was revealed in nature. The question to which Locke had to respond was, what sort of political compact would men agree to if they acted according to their God-given nature.

So much for the antecedents of the doctrine of equality as found in the Declaration of Independence. In point of fact, if one ponders the first eight words of this document, further analysis becomes largely irrelevant. But to do this, and act on the implication, would force one to a consideration of the nature of a self-evident truth. And for this I have neither time, intention, nor competence. It may be, too, that we have, historically, burdened the Declaration with infinitely more analysis than its purpose will allow. This becomes a particularly apt conclusion if one accepts the premise advanced by John C. Miller and others that its essential purpose was to stamp out the growing Tory menace and to rationalize an act already accomplished.

But the centrality of the equality problem has been sufficiently obvious so that the discussion has continued. The logic which satisfied the eighteenth century, based on the postulate of a state of nature, has not proved uniformly satisfying to nineteenth and twentieth century minds. Thus, over the past hundred years we have seen advanced various arguments, both old and new, as to the validity of the statement of human equality. In the interest of brevity, I shall but enumerate some of these arguments as propositions.
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It has not been uncommon to support the doctrine of equality on the basis of a belief in man’s immortal soul. This belief, in effect, renders all men equal in the eyes of God. As you will recognize, however, metaphysical equality need have no very direct political or social implications. That is to say, it is perfectly consistent within this precept to foster the grossest social and political inequality in this world by relegating the requirements of equality to the next. The feudalism of the Middle Ages clearly demonstrates how easily these apparent paradoxes can be reconciled.

That men possess a basic similarity has also been testified to by those who defend the doctrine of equality through a theory of uniqueness. Men are equal because they belong to a species which is unique. This argument has had at least two facets. There are those who would defend the doctrine on the basis of man’s unique rationality. While originally a Stoic position, this approach has also been adopted by later philosophers, notably Kant, who held that the uniqueness of the species primarily rests in the fact that men are moral beings and therefore infinite. In their infinity lies their uniqueness and in their uniqueness lies their claim to equality.

The utilitarians also had to come to grips with this doctrine and did so by resorting to psychology, asserting that all men share a common susceptibility to the pleasure-pain principle and, therefore, each must count for one and no more than one.

Undoubtedly the most significant nineteenth
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century view relating to the concept of equality, and the position which ultimately attracted the greatest number of adherents, was that which postulated that equality was not a fact but an ideal; that, while it could not be empirically demonstrated that all men were naturally equal in any respect, they ought to be treated as if they were, particularly in three connections: before the law, in access to the suffrage, and in social opportunity.

The twentieth century, too, has introduced a new approach (although it contains old elements) in what might be called the pragmatic-functional. In essence, this view suggests that since the results are better if men are treated as though they were equal, it is therefore true that they are. This position has been well summarized by T. V. Smith in the following terms: "The truth of any assertion regarding dynamic individuals depends partly upon the results of the assertion itself. The claim that individuals are equal is true if it functions truly; and this will be determined by the efficiency with which the claim promotes the major good of the situation that motivates the claim. This looking to the fruits of the claim for its truth-value is here called 'functional equality.' . . . We have already seen some reasons, and shall yet see more, for believing that even in early America those who used the term 'equality' had vaguely glimpsed the fact that its truth-value lay ahead, in the consequences of their asserting it."

I am sure that you recognize that I have not done what I set out to do (nor did I really hope to),
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which was to establish to the satisfaction of all the truth of the proposition that men are equal in some distinct way. This does not disappoint me, for in the nature of the matter which we are discussing, approximate proof is all that can be expected. I would suggest, however, particularly when one combines the theory of rational uniqueness with that of functional equality, that the concept of equality has been sufficiently established as to warrant acting upon it.

But, in assuming the truth of the doctrine, we have yet to consider its usefulness as a principle of social reconstruction.

In this light, one can either be very proud or very unhappy with the record which our young society has made. To be optimistic for a moment, we have certainly achieved substantial progress toward the nineteenth century concept of equality before the law, equality of access to the suffrage, and equality of opportunity. And, while the distinctively American interpretation of the doctrine never postulated absolute economic equality, it has always been recognized that the presence of great economic imbalance is not conducive to the health of a democratic society. In this connection, over a period of time, it would appear that we have markedly enlarged our middle income groups. But, having said this, we should immediately point out that in many parts of the nation, affecting large numbers of our citizens, we have not achieved equality before the law or equality in access to suffrage or equality of oppor-
Our failure in this regard, while to a degree concentrated in the southern United States, is still, to some extent, prevalent in all sections of the nation, and this is especially true of our failure to provide equal opportunity to learn.

In spite of these caveats, there are many who maintain that we nevertheless have made great progress. This is partially true of course, but I would guess that it is less than convincing in some quarters of the globe.

Under the force of dynamic change, notably in the so-called developing nations, there is, perhaps unfortunately, little concern for historical perspective. The extent of our progress, as measured against the closed, hierarchical society of the early eighteenth century, is less impressive to those nations than the fact that in contemporary America there are still great gaps between our ideals and our performance. While we have an inherent and controlling obligation to remove the existing semblance of inequality in our society, we certainly could justify doing so simply in terms of the impact this would have on our image throughout the world.

I think we must become deeply concerned about one notable characteristic of the social change that has taken place since World War II. In the nineteenth century, as new democratic governments came into being in nations previously governed by tyranny, the symbols which frequently moved indigenous leaders to act—which, in effect, sparked the change—were those that had been developed in revolution-
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ary America by our own founding fathers. In what might be called the developing nations of that period the Declaration of Independence was a moving force, consciously referred to as a great doctrine which outlined the nature of democratic government.

But this, I think, has not been so true in the twentieth century, and certainly since World War II. The revolutions of our day have been moved, I believe, more by Marxist ideology, whether explicitly or implicitly, than by the ideology of the United States. As a great force interested in the common man, in the development of the common good based upon a fundamental recognition of the equality of all, we seem in the eyes of many to have grown old and tired, unable or unwilling to make the doctrine work in our own land and, therefore, setting small example. On the contrary, our diplomacy has, from time to time, placed us uncomfortably on the side of those who seem to stand in opposition to the very values which we purport to hold.

While the causes of this shift are many and complex, I should like to suggest one in closing. Is it possible that we have become too sophisticated, in the bad sense of that term, for our own good? In this connection, I should like to quote from an excellent syllabus which was developed for a seminar on the American political tradition held some three years ago. The author of this syllabus observes that "the analysis of politics has turned in a direction completely alien, to all appearances, to that of the
early American past. Instead of the terms ‘rights,’ ‘equality,’ ‘law,’ ‘freedom,’ we find ‘influence,’ ‘power,’ ‘elite,’ ‘legitimacy,’ ‘class.’” These latter terms, I would contend, whatever may be their analytical value—and I recognize it is considerable—are not the terms that incite men in devotion to a cause. Is it possible that our social sciences have become too descriptive, too reluctant to deal with values? Is our ideology less effective in the contemporary world than it was in the nineteenth century because, relatively speaking, we have devoted less and less attention to it while the Marxists have devoted more and more to theirs?

Of course, in a free society and within a tradition of academic freedom it is important that we not attempt to marshal the forces of scholarship ostensibly to serve a national purpose. This, to my mind, would mark the end of free scholarship. But I cannot help but wish that more of our young social scientists would once again turn their energies to the normative rather than the descriptive, to the value system by which we live, not only in terms of trying to analyze its logic, its consistency, its origin, but also with regard to its implications for action and the techniques by which action can effectively implement values. Quoting again from the syllabus, “It is plain, however, that piety is not a sufficient ground for sustaining the American political tradition in the present world.” An approach which stops solely with an abstract concern for values will be of little help.
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Perhaps the time has come for us to re-examine the doctrine of equality in terms that are meaningful in these times. And more effective action might well be taken to assure that our domestic actions square with our premises. But, most difficult of all, we must convince ourselves and others that, if men are equal, their equality can no more properly be limited by national boundaries and ideologies than by condition of color or religious convictions. Such an approach will mean, I believe, extraordinary changes not only in national policy, but in the law which governs international conduct. It is an approach that may make very uncomfortable those of us who now hold ourselves, in Orwell's phrase, "more equal than others"; but a recognition of the validity of the proposition and a willingness to act on it is, I am sure, a necessary condition to the exercise of ideological leadership in a troubled world.
Too often those who address themselves to problems relating to education forget or are unaware of the centrality of Sir Ernest Barker's remarkable insight when he said, "the theory of education is essentially a part of political theory." In this remark the eminent English political scientist capsuled the ideas of every significant educational theorist from Plato and St. Augustine to the present. To all these thinkers, the state is an educational society, the social organization whose foremost goal is to prepare its members for the roles it conceives they should fill. Ultimately, its educational fare will be determined by its conception of the nature of man.

Thus, in a democratic society it is imperative that those given responsibility in any way for the direction of the educational enterprise thoroughly understand and relate their own activities to the premises, to the assumptions, to the conception of humankind by which that democratic society lives.
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For the public university man, such understanding and commitment are particularly important. He must be aware that the state university is not a parasite, is not an agent, is not an organization which has a monopoly on truth and can dominate society, but that the relationship between the university and the rest of a pluralistic society is symbiotic. He must know that the health of the university and the health of society are being weighed in the same balance.

Yet it is not enough for such an understanding to be sought only by the professionals who are engaged in the learning process. It is the nature of a democracy that these insights must be shared by an ever-increasing number of our citizens. And one is not happy with the evidence that appears from time to time that the meaning of our kind of society has escaped the ken and commitment of a good many in places both low and high.

Part of the difficulty arises, I think, from the fact that the central proposition of a democracy is, in truth, a paradox. Ours is a social order which must simultaneously be concerned with the many and the one, variety within unity, the individual and the aggregate, the majority and the minority. It would not be too much to say, in fact, that the function of a democratic state is to provide equal opportunity for men to become unequal in socially desirable ways without denying the basic social and political equality of any citizen.

Such an understanding of our society has never been meaningful to two groups of extremists who
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apparently cannot commit themselves to the central paradox. One of these, whom I shall label the uniformitarians, has seen its principal development since the times of Andrew Jackson; the other, the neo-aristocrats, we have had with us from the beginning of our history.

Not until late adolescence, if then, do most of us learn that the United States, as a place, a people, and a body of institutions and ideals, was founded not in unanimity but in discord. In the eighteenth century, democracy, as a political and ethical ideal, was not the bright and hopeful abstraction we think of today. Edmund Burke, who was no fool, called it "the most shameless thing in the world"; before him, Samuel Johnson had referred to its advocates as "levelers," and by that he meant that they leveled down and not up.

That there should be men who would advance such a position two hundred years ago should not surprise us very much. Behind the idea of natural inequality there was, and is, a long and imposing intellectual history. For centuries the Western World had accepted the concept of the universe as a great, vertical chain of being, composed of an infinite number of links, ranged in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents through every possible level to the most elevated angelic hosts, each link differing from its connections by the least possible degree of difference. It was a view of the world which did not number social mobility among its virtues, for everyone was seen to have been
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assigned a place by Providence in the total structure, and everyone was expected to remain in place. There were higher places and lower places, all assigned by Providence and all incapable of alteration.

The Judeo-Christian tradition, of course, modified this conception to a considerable degree. Most fundamentally, it altered the pagan notion of First Cause and insisted upon an essential equality for all men before a living God. But this was a metaphysical equality; in the temporal order, station or social status remained unchanged. After all, society was not considered the creation of man, and man could not, therefore, tinker with it with immunity. If he did, if he allowed himself to question the legitimacy of the aristocratic hierarchy, he committed not only treason against the state but an impiety against Providence as well. A sin of this kind had manifold significance: it invited anarchy in the social world, upheavals in the natural world, and damnation in the world of the eternal soul. The terrible storm which punishes and purifies King Lear might be considered the convulsion in the natural world directly brought about by his unlawful manipulation of a divinely sanctioned order.

When we understand the vast implications of this intellectual tradition, we should not be too surprised to find democracy unpopular in certain quarters in the eighteenth century. We are surprised, though, to find similar sentiments expressed in post-revolutionary America. If the revolution did nothing else, it most certainly scrapped the chain of being and
the hereditary aristocracy which that theory held together. And yet, even among the Founding Fathers we can find evidence that the old view was still held, however much it may have been garbed in new clothing. Alexander Hamilton, for all his genius and patriotism, was one of its most influential advocates. He was expressing the ideas of a substantial portion of the leaders of revolutionary America when he wrote: "All communities divide themselves into the few and many. The first are rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people. . . . The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. . . . Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change they therefore will ever maintain good government."

While Hamilton was opening the window to readmit the aristocracy which had been thrown out the front door, others were busy trying to rationalize concentrated wealth by expounding the blessings of inequality. The eminent Boston jurist Judge Peter Thacher had this to say:

"The diversity of poverty and riches is the order of Providence. Why are not all the flowers of the field equally beautiful and fragrant? Why are not all the fruits of the earth equally rich and wholesome? And why towers the oak in grandeur to heaven, while the shrub at its base is trodden under feet?"
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And to the words of the statesman and of the jurist we could add those of the clergy, for the Reverend Hubbard Winslow found "that there should be an inequality in the conditions of men, as there is in all the other works of Providence, is clearly a wise and benevolent ordinance of heaven."

What all of this amounts to, of course, is a slightly modified restatement of the old rationale. Providence was still made out to be the advocate of inequality; wealth was translated to mean intelligence, and poverty was equated with ignorance; the well-born were to rule and the common man was to accept his commonness as a necessary condition of the scheme of things.

A democratic society can accept none of these assumptions, nor is there evidence that they have validity. "In general, it is worth remembering," as the *Trustee Digest* of Penn State has reminded us, "that Immanuel Kant's father was a saddlemaker, . . . Haydn's a servant, Thorstein Veblen's a carpenter, Theodore Dreiser's a shiftless odd-job man, and George Bernard Shaw's a poor clerk and a chronic drunkard." On the other hand, we should recall that "the son of Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, who grew up in the very best intellectual society, produced nothing but a few illegitimate children; and the carefully trained son of that paragon of elegance, Lord Chesterfield, was forever tripping over his sword, scratching, yawning out loud, or wiping his mouth on the tablecloth."
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In spite of evidence of this kind—and it could be compounded many times over—there are still men in our society, and sometimes men of great power, who by indirection behave as though they believe in the doctrine of inequality, who speak as though they feel the Declaration of Independence expresses an unfortunate ideal, and that ahead should lie a path which denies equality of opportunity in favor of aristocratic privilege based on the possession of material goods. These people constitute a genuine danger to the free and pluralistic life which we as a nation have chosen for ourselves.

When men of this persuasion control, there follows with certainty a limitation of opportunity. In education this position manifests itself in several, related propositions: that the benefits of education are solely individual; that, therefore, the total cost of education should be borne by the individual receiving it; and that, finally, education, particularly at the higher level, should be limited to the sons and daughters of those wealthy enough to pay the total bill. Should these men, who are very much among us, carry the day, I would have no hope for the success of the unfinished social and political experiment which this Republic of ours represents.

But if I fear these unreconstructed neo-aristocrats, I fear equally those who place themselves on the other end of the spectrum. Perhaps the first group is easier to deal with because their identity with a discredited social philosophy is so abundantly clear. But the second group is well inten-
tioned; they fervently espouse the democratic credo of equality. I fear them only because, in their zeal, they have perverted the very doctrine they espouse. They have so completely confused the essential meaning of equality as to make it appear diametrically opposed to the concept of quality. They seem to hold that it is a democracy's obligation to extend sameness of opportunity to all, regardless of individual differences in attainment, or merit, or distinction, or diligence. A democracy of excellence becomes in their hands a contradiction of terms, impossible of attainment and unpatriotic in aspiration.

It must be made clear that the confusion of the concept of opportunity according to merit with the idea of political and social egalitarianism is an intermixing of two related but distinct provinces of the democratic credo. If it be allowed to continue, it can only result in an anti-intellectualism inimical to the welfare of our society. It will, indeed, level us downward.

Although lip service is now being paid to intellectual eminence in every quarter of America, there are still far too many responsible people who continue to use such terms as "egghead," "highbrow," and "ivory tower" with deprecatory connotations. Despite the piety of the recently converted and the ardor of the general public's sudden love affair with its schools and colleges, there still exists a strong suspicion of learning in our society. Too many of our youngsters, and in fact our adults as well, feel that while it is desirable and proper to
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work for eminence in the fields of athletics, or business, or social relations, it is not quite so desirable to work for distinction of mind. This attitude was perhaps most succinctly phrased in a recent address by a prominent business executive. Speaking in a university community, of all places, this executive stated that it is really a waste of money to educate the intelligent since they make such poor leaders. With fractured logic, the thesis was defended by citing a number of successful men in our society who either had undistinguished academic records in college or who did not attend college at all.

It would seem to me that so long as such sentiments are alive in certain sectors of American society, just so long must those of us interested in the nation’s well-being speak out against them. We must repeat again and again that it is not un-American to have ideas, it is not dangerous to think, it is not undemocratic to be intelligent beyond one’s fellows! What I am saying is, of course, that the idea of America, properly understood, has within it an inherent desire and need for trained intelligence, that it is an essential part of our tradition to have a democracy of excellence. There is no reason to feel that the democratic ideal and intellectual distinction are necessarily at odds, one with the other.

When these uniformitarians take over an educational enterprise, a different set of propositions is advanced. Now it is held that all students must have identical opportunities and identical treatment without regard for differences in talent and the will
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to achieve. Sometimes I sense an almost spiteful determination to see that excellence does not emerge, that the social order be perpetually colored the dull gray of mediocrity.

These two groups, then, the neo-aristocrats on the one hand and the uniformitarians on the other, must be identified for what they are—opponents of true democratic values. Should either group come to dominate our society and our education, I doubt that we shall prosper or indeed survive, for a democratic society can justify its existence only insofar as it encourages distinctiveness. It is one of our proudest hopes that education can help to produce citizens for whom distinction of mind is natural and normal, a number of young people who believe in and practice social and political equality, yet who are intellectual and cultural leaders. Social and political equality is not so much an end in itself as a necessary condition for the full exercise of individuality, for the development of a fuller freedom to sense, to enjoy, and to create the finest in life.

To make democracy work in the twentieth century, America will have to increase both the number and proportion of its truly educated citizenry, and develop an even more extensive leadership of intelligent men and women than we now have. They will have to be thinkers, educated human beings imbued with moral vigor, and not at all ashamed of having advanced intellectually to the limits of their abilities, regardless of the fact that these limits
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may be beyond those of their political and social equals.

We must, then, rededicate ourselves to the Jeffersonian faith that education can help any person, regardless of socioeconomic background, to live beyond the ordinary, to aspire to excellence in life, to recognize worth when he sees it, and to emulate it insofar as he can. The goal of life in a democracy is the realization of one's capacities and aspirations; the obligation of a democracy is to see that no deserving person fails of this realization for lack of opportunity.

To this idea of America, then, I pledge State University of New York: that no young citizen of this State shall be denied a collegiate educational opportunity, consistent with his talent and diligence, because of any conditions attendant upon his birth; that no young citizen of this State shall be denied the opportunity to demonstrate that he is better blessed with brains, with creative ability, and with energy than his fellows. It would seem to me that in this way the University can best contribute to the creation and maintenance of the democracy of excellence.
THE NATURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
The dimensions of knowledge

Ours is a time when it is everyone’s good fortune to know all there is to know about American higher education—or, more particularly, all there is to know about what is wrong with American higher education. This, of course, is both good and bad. You would be surprised, for example, how this omniscience enlivens my train trips. I have yet to sit next to an amateur. In fact, I have come to believe that the New York Central won’t sell you a ticket to Albany unless you have three hours’ worth of opinions on how to fix things up in our colleges. And, inasmuch as I don’t often travel in this academic costume, I am quite amazed at how unerringly these experts find me out. For a while I was pleased to think that my wisdom-reeking, deliberative demeanor was the tip-off; and then, alas, my secretary reminded me that my briefcase carries the University seal. I have since traded it in on a sample case, and now travel in comparative isolation.
But, more seriously, however individually uncomfortable this widespread concern might occasionally make us, it should be a cause for delight, not scorn. It indicates a nearly unanimous recognition by our citizens that the most important institution in our society, or in any society, is that institution which provides the facilities for both young and old to learn. It is clear that all of us are finally becoming aware of how certain it is that, in the long run, our chances of building a good society, of maintaining prosperity, and even of survival itself, are directly dependent on the quality of the educational system we fashion and support.

In our frenetic contemporary concern with higher education—particularly public higher education—there is no small measure of confusion about what a college or university is, why it isn't something else, and how all this relates to the society which fosters it. It is all too easy to dismiss this confusion with lofty disdain, to judge it the result of journalistic dog-paddling in what are, after all, deep, but pretty clear waters. And yet the waters are deep, and while it may be heretical to say so, the dog-paddling is not entirely confined to the popular press or the New York Central.

What I would like to suggest is that confusion of this kind, and within limits, is not altogether to be lamented. In fact, it may well be unavoidable. Part of the problem arises, I am sure, from the fact that the really good college or university lives in a perpetual state of tension. Unlike most institutions,
it is not firmly fixed in time, but rather derives strength from the past and depends for its viability upon its concern for the future even as it comes to terms with the present. It preserves and it discards. It is in society and helps to shape it and it is separate from society and is shaped by it. And each day of its corporate life it is called upon to exercise judgment as to the precise nature of this ambivalence. In many ways the good university is a perfect example of institutionalized schizophrenia. Confusion as to what it is and what it should do at any given time is perhaps a necessary condition of its nature.

Now I have, I know you will recognize, overstated the case simply to make my point. Confusion need not, in fact, cannot be enshrined (even if we cover it with ivy) if we mean to get anywhere. What I am suggesting is that it cannot be completely dissipated for very long at any one time or in any one society. We are not used to thinking about our colleges and universities in this way. Ambivalence is hard to understand and harder still to live with. There is a real temptation to postulate, with the help of Newman and others, a deathless university ideal, an articulated, unequivocal university tradition against which we can measure our own efforts. And the result of this tendency is the comfortable ability to judge contemporary institutions of higher learning as they fulfill or fail to fulfill what we regard as the necessary criteria of university corporateness —criteria which have been, within the university tradition, preserved and handed down from the long
reach of ages past. This is, of course, tenable so far as it goes. It recognizes that the university, at its best, exists apart from society and helps to condition the social ethos in which it exists. But it does not adequately recognize that the university is also in society and, therefore, is the reflection and embodiment of a tradition only insofar as the society of which it is a part reflects and embodies a tradition. All of which merely says this: that conservative though it be, the university must change as society changes. We cannot speak of a deathless university ideal any more than we can speak of a deathless social order. As society evolves, so must the university, being certain, as it does, that the valid elements of tradition are preserved, that rapid change, in its very rapidity, does not destroy more than it creates.

With this thought in mind, then, I should like to take a few moments to explore the major demarcations of the evolution of which I speak. My only thought in so doing is not to startle with novelty, but rather to apply a corrective to the notion that we can judge the contemporary American college or university in terms of another time and place.

Perhaps the most sensible point from which to start is with the remark made by the eminent English political scientist, Sir Ernest Barker, and which I am fond of quoting. Sir Ernest defined the nature of formal education when he said, "The theory of education is essentially a part of political theory." In this remark he was capsuling the ideas of every great social philosopher from Plato to the present.
day. To all these theorists the state is conceived as an educational society, the social organization, the foremost objective of which is to fashion its members for the roles it presumes they should fulfill.

It follows from this that the level, the extensive-ness, and the quality of education depend in large measure upon a particular society's definition of man and his essential nature. In the slave society tolerated by Plato and Aristotle, all free citizens shared a similar view of the purposes of learning; since slaves did the work, education was exclusively the servant of contemplation and self-knowledge. This suggests the first articulated dimension of knowledge—"Knowledge is Virtue"—and, while it is still valid today, it fits the Greek society from which it came very well indeed.

The Christian civilization which succeeded the Greco-Roman world, of course, retained many Judaic elements and embraced much that was good from its classical heritage. But there were necessarily major alterations. At his best the Christian recognizes no distinctions between slave and free; all men are to achieve their freedom and manifest their God-given potential. The "Parable of the Talents" marks this alteration very clearly indeed. Moreover, the Judeo-Christian view held labor to be holy: "To labor is to pray" and "work is love made visible" are mottoes with a realizable potency only in a society with a distinct Judeo-Christian orientation.

However, these distinctions did not make them-
selves immediately felt in the medieval, Christian university. The medieval university was in many ways “Greek”; it reflected, as Ortega y Gasset once commented, a society “dedicated to the intellect.” Its emphasis was upon rationality, abstraction, and idealization. It manifested the truth of the dictum, “Knowledge is Virtue.” But at the same time each student was granted a degree to do some specific work in the world—the church, law, medicine, or teaching. All students knew that “Knowledge is Virtue,” but they were also aware of St. Augustine’s warning: “No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his ease the service due to his neighbor.” Here was a hint of a dimension later to come: that “Knowledge is Responsibility.”

At the close of the Middle Ages, the development of the printing press could have provided opportunities for a considerable expansion of education beyond the simple demands of literacy and ciphering. However, we are still dealing with a rigidly hierarchical society, a society which could countenance in practice the distinction between slave and free even while it professed a metaphysical equality. Not unlike the Greek society which it revered, Renaissance Europe believed that education was for gentlemen who neither soiled their hands nor engaged in trade. These gentlemen formed the apex of society; they governed it and enjoyed its fruits; and they were educated to do both. With the exceptions of the Church, the Law, and the Army, one was not to be educated for any work in
the world. This was the province, if not of the slave, then of the vast majority of men who by virtue of their birth lay outside the comfortable wraps of a privileged aristocracy. University practice and social organization were thus in harmony. Discord was sounded only when social organization was held up to the ethical ideal which it was supposed to represent.

In 1541 there was an interesting exchange between the Commissioners of Canterbury and Archbishop Cranmer. The whole thing started when the Commissioners had decided that it was "meet for the ploughman's son to go to the plough, and the artificer's son to ply the trade of his parent's vocation; and the gentlemen's children are meet to have the knowledge of government and rule in the Commonwealth."

This brand of self-satisfied pontificating (which in slightly altered diction we are still on occasion wont to hear) nettled the good archbishop, who thus carefully replied, "Utterly to exclude the ploughman's son and the poor man's son from the benefits of learning, is as much as to say that Almighty God should not be at liberty to bestow His gifts of grace upon any person . . . who giveth His gifts . . . unto all kinds and states of people indifferently."

Needless to add, the opinions of Cranmer did not gain wide acceptance. Until very recently, most ploughmen's sons who made their mark in the world did so without benefit of a university education. Higher learning was supposed to be "liberal," and
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a liberal education was, by definition, only for free men. And the man in the trammels of his trade could not possibly be considered free. As he converted the power of his animals or his own brute muscle into a long day's work, he had no time for leisure or for contemplation. These were the perquisites of the well born and well fed.

It was inevitable that the restless intellectual probing of the late Renaissance should discover another, totally new dimension of knowledge. That knowledge could be converted into power occurred first, I think, to Francis Bacon, and his phrase—"Knowledge is Power"—still echoes through the oratory of countless commencement exercises. However, in his own time, Sir Francis had about as much impact on education as had Cranmer. Nor did he enjoy any more success than Leonardo, who had argued fruitlessly that a painter could be a gentleman even if he worked with his hands, or than Galileo, whose fellow academics had refused to leave their university precincts to look through his telescope.

It was only with the democratic and technological revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the purpose and extensiveness of higher education began to assume forms we recognize today. Montesquieu believed that the central principle of a republic is education. During the French Revolution many of his avid students translated this into the slogan, "All careers must be open to talent," a slogan that spelled out for all Europe the power of
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“Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.”

Another keen student of Montesquieu was Thomas Jefferson. To the Socratic idea that “Knowledge is Virtue” and Bacon’s understanding of the power of knowledge, Jefferson added still another dimension in these often quoted words: “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization,” he pointed out, “it expects what never was and never will be.” In effect, Jefferson tells us that “Knowledge is Freedom.”

We now know—and we have been a long time learning—that democracy will survive, and may even prosper, only when the common man is educated to develop some uncommon qualities. He has to learn what his heritage of freedom is, and what its sources are; he has to develop the ability and understanding to participate in the decisions that affect him. When only a small minority is educated to perform these functions, as substitutes for the majority, then democracy can be nothing more than an ugly and tasteless charade. When opportunity is restricted to the well-to-do, the common man is forced to lament with Steinbeck’s monarch, Pippin IV: “You didn’t want a King. You wanted a Patsy.”

How much education does it take to develop these uncommon qualities? In the somewhat simpler society of the nineteenth century it was thought that everyone needed a common-school education. And even this modest idea was adopted only after a long struggle with those who held that education was either a personal advantage you purchased or
charity you received. In fact, the earliest public school laws in America were often patterned after the Poor Laws of Elizabethan times, and in some states compulsory education laws were not enacted until the twentieth century.

Notwithstanding, even during colonial days and the early republic, education did receive public support. Though the strong tradition of "private" higher education is peculiar to the United States, Harvard was supported by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts up to the early years of the nineteenth century, and Dartmouth and Yale were "land-grant" colleges under the Morrill Act for many years after the Civil War—as M.I.T. and Cornell still are.

After the Civil War, public colleges and universities increased markedly in number. This growth was due to the belated recognition that the country was growing faster in size and complexity than its system of higher education. It was, in effect, a delayed response to something the Germans realized in their efforts to regenerate the German states after their defeats in the Napoleonic Wars: that the most profitable capital investment any nation can make is its investment in higher education. The increasing complexity of industrial technology not only demanded a better educated public, but that technology depended for its very advances upon the university.

From the very outset, the public colleges and universities in the United States differed from their private counterparts insofar as they felt that the university should be responsive to all the needs of society.
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which fell within their competence.

Society needs lawyers and doctors and ministers, but it also needs agronomists, accountants, and engineers. Nor are these needs susceptible to dogmatic definition. The root of the problem of fixed definition lies, as a recent Rockefeller Brothers Fund publication reminds us, in “the constant pressure of an ever more complex society against the total capacity of its people.” Every complex human activity that is capable of abstraction and idealization can and should become the proper concern of the public college or university. Jefferson was aware that Knowledge is Freedom, but he also knew that Knowledge is Power. He was certain that the University of Virginia was based upon “the illimitable freedom of the human mind to explore and expose every subject susceptible to its contemplation.” This can mean scientific horticulture as well as botany, the design of jet engines as well as thermodynamics.

The graduate of the public college knows that the health of society and the health of the college are being weighed together, because the relationship between the two is symbiotic, not parasitic. The public college is not a drain upon the public weal; the student’s and society’s benefits from higher learning are inextricably intertwined, and in a democracy one might well judge society’s to be the greater.

It is true, of course, that the apparent goals of most of our young people who go on to college seem narrowly vocational. I am not convinced that this is totally to be lamented or that the public college
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should nervously attempt to hide the vocational orientation of its students. I am reminded that a minister is honored when he is told that his calling is a "vocation." However, the first task of the public institution of higher learning should be to help the student realize that his true vocation is knowledge. He should be led to discover for himself that Knowledge is Virtue, that education is in part a temporary and partial withdrawal from life to study what life is all about. Plato's assertion that "the noblest of all studies is the study of what man should be and what he should pursue" has lost none of its cogency over the years.

The second obligation of the public university is to develop in the student an awareness that Knowledge is Power, that the world's work must be done, and that man will benefit only if the resources of science are applied to technology, and these in turn to the betterment of society.

Third, the student must be encouraged to discover that the principle of a republic is education, that, indeed, Knowledge is Freedom. He must realize that, in a certain sense, the religion of democracy is education, that education prevents the brutalization of democracy in the same way that theology prevents religion from becoming superstition.

Finally, the public university must teach that Knowledge is Responsibility. No man's intelligence can genuinely substitute for another man's ignorance. If higher education helps a human being to realize what life is, how to use his power and how to be free,
then it follows that it must be made available to all who can rightly avail themselves of it, without regard for financial, racial, or religious distinctions.

These four dimensions of knowledge, then—virtue, power, freedom, and responsibility—represent, in abstract, the evolution of the university ideal, from its earliest beginnings to the present day, from the rigidly hierarchical societies of time past to the free and open society which we now seek to foster and preserve. Each, in its own right, was conditioned by a particular epoch’s view of the human condition, and in its successive adoption was subject to redefinition in terms of man’s changing concept of himself and his world. I would suggest that together they give us a framework of principles against which, and only against which, we can judge institutions of higher learning in contemporary America.

However, to spell out these principles and to acknowledge their separate origins does not dispel the tension which I identified earlier as a necessary condition of the academic community. Within the framework which they establish, priorities must be assigned; the nagging and often bewildering questions of what to preserve and what to discard, of deciding between the deathless and the dead, are with us always and must be dealt with. Decisions, in every instance, must be marked by a reverence for the past, an abiding concern for the future, and that measure of wisdom required by the contingencies of the present. For less than this we dare not ask; for more we dare not hope.
The problem of a professional premise

You must recognize that my position today is somewhat paradoxical, for I am simultaneously blessed and damned—damned in that I have been in Albany too short a time to be competent to speak with any expertise about the problems of higher education in the State of New York, especially in this company; blessed, however, because this short residence shrouds me with a kind of innocence which I am sure none of you would want to violate at this early date.

It would be presumptuous and premature for me to try to discuss what I believe the role of State University is, or should be, in New York, or how we might better work out our common problems. And, in any case, I doubt that this is the proper forum for such a discussion.

Having made this determination, however, I was left without a topic. As a consequence, I found myself trying to arrive at something which might be of interest to my audience. But this has long since
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proved on my part to be a futile activity. I seem to have a rare faculty for selecting topics about which the enthusiasm of my audience is almost nil. Therefore, I finally decided to talk about something which is of interest to me. So far as I can see, there is no point in both of us being bored.

It seems to me that in this day of rapid social, intellectual, and technological change all of us have need of clearly articulated standards of value to lend order and meaning to our lives. And this need, while essentially an individual matter, has application as well to the separate professions, including our own. Our professional lives, ideally, should be governed by a basic, seminal principle, a kind of philosophical Prime Mover which gives impetus and direction to all of our thinking and activities. Faced as we are with rising enrollments, limited resources, and insatiable public demands, the need for this professional absolute is greater, perhaps, than ever before.

I can best illustrate what I have in mind by referring to the other learned professions. When one is admitted to the bar, for example, he immediately and ever after is able to make reference to the fundamental principle of due process, to the grand idea that every human being, regardless of station or circumstance, has certain legal rights and privileges which can be neither circumscribed nor compromised. Due process, the guarantor of political and social equity, stands at the center of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and, as a consequence, the individual attorney and the structure of the entire judicial

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system are reinforced and guided by this overarching ideal.

Likewise, the doctor of medicine, by sharing in his profession's basic commitment, has reference to an even more fundamental first principle, the irrefutable notion that life is preferable to death. This is the postulate upon which all of the health sciences are based. The storms of compassion might rage fiercely in the individual surgeon's heart, euthanasian temptations might be prompted by his capacity for mercy, and yet his brain and his skill and his oath support him in the work of repairing the damaged body, of preserving the spark of life until it is extinguished in spite of his best efforts.

Now those of us in education have a basic premise too, perhaps so basic as to subsume all the others. In stating it I do not claim inventiveness or discovery; it is as old as man, and was, and is, the motivating force behind the establishment of the earliest formal schools of ancient times, the great medieval universities, and the vast and complex network of educational institutions we find in modern America. The premise, of course, is that knowledge is always preferable to ignorance, that truth is always preferable to error. This is the principle under which we all labor. This is our professional absolute.

In spite of the fact that there is no novelty in this statement, it raises some serious questions. Two of these I shall not try to discuss today, for the problems of the knowledge of evil and the qualitative aspects
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of knowledge stretch in dimension beyond my talent and my time.

For all of that, our endorsement of the premise cannot be given blindly; it has many implications which we must both understand and face. I think I first became aware of some of these implications during a conversation I had with a former colleague. In the course of our talk together I mentioned that, in the abstract, the university must reconcile itself to the unpalatable notion that a great part of the time it is teaching error, that with the best will in the world it unwittingly espouses not right, but wrong, not truth, but falsehood. The look of horror which immediately registered on my colleague's face made me feel almost ashamed. I had apparently uttered, quite off the cuff, an apostasy of the first magnitude. It was obvious that I had been written off as a heretic in the groves of Academe, of dubious value to the institution I then served, and an unqualified danger to the cause of all higher education. I was judged thenceforth a public relations liability, which is, I suppose, the straw that breaks the academician's back.

But you must believe me when I say that my remark was made in all candor, that I had no idea that some of us had so misconceived our activities as to assume that their result is invariably truth. I had made it in recognition of the limitations of human understanding and the paradoxical nature of the university, the nature which requires the university to conserve the old even while it discovers the
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new. It is this dual commitment which is responsible for the tension one can sense on the campus truly alive. It is responsible, too, for our reputation as being associated with the most conservative and yet the most revolutionary institution in society, and both at the same time.

The new and the old are seldom compatible. They clash, and clash most often on a university campus. And the resultant battle is usually as long as it is bloody. If in the end the new wins, it then becomes the old. It entrenches itself for the battle which almost always will follow.

The result of this "logos-cide" is obvious. For a time, while the battle rages, the university, with all the weight of its tradition and solemnity, teaches error, whether it be the astronomy of Ptolemy, the theory of ether, or the diabolical character of Richard III. And when the old is finally put down, there is a good chance that its successor, bright and shiny and contemporary—MODERN, if you will—will turn out to be still another error.

Most recently the length of battle has been drastically shortened. Now the new comes tumbling over the old with such rapidity that it has conditioned us to quick and easy surrender. The onslaught is too persistent, too overwhelming. And while this is helpful, insofar as it reduces the years or months during which we teach a single error, it is less so in that the new more quickly becomes the old and is discarded. The fruits of learning wither even as we reach out to touch them. This is especially
so in the areas of science, or at least more obviously and dramatically so. It has been estimated that all we now know has completely invalidated the hypotheses and theorems which appeared in our textbooks just twenty years ago. What this means, in effect, is that all practicing scientists today, excepting the very young, are working in a context in large measure unrelated to that which was taught them in their university days. If we can refer to the last few years as characterized by an explosion of knowledge, we must not forget the other side of the coin. There has necessarily been also, an accompanying explosion of ignorance and falsehood. And of the two, if they could be separated, the latter is more combustible.

But all we have learned from this is that in its commitment to the basic premise—that truth is preferable to error—the university exposes its fallibility. This should promote a proper humility, perhaps remove some of the starch from our occasional pontifical stance. It might even allow us to read the following lines of Mr. T. S. Eliot with more sensitivity and understanding than we might have done when they were first published:

... There is, it seems to us,
At best, only a limited value
In the knowledge derived from experience.
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,
For the pattern is new in every moment
And every moment is a new and shocking
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Valuation of all we have been. We are only undeceived
Of that which, deceiving, could no longer harm.

... Do not let me hear
Of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly,
Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of possession,
Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God.
The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.

The lesson of humility of which Mr. Eliot speaks
is perhaps one we can well learn. It may, in fact, be
difficult for us, for we like to refer to our institutions
as citadels of truth and knowledge, and a worried
public is today looking to us, at least at one level,
for the panacea to all our national troubles, real and
imagined. It may be that honesty will require that
we reject the garland, that we rigidly define our
responsibility and the limits of our competence, and
resist the temptation to lapse into rhapsodic eulogies
when we speak of ourselves.

But have we really questioned the validity of our
premise? Is it something to which we can, like the
doctor or the lawyer, devote our best energies? I
would affirm that it is. But, if we are to make a
legitimate and binding commitment, it is important
that we clarify our terms. We must know what we
mean by knowledge and know what we mean by
truth, and whether or not we are opposing error
with Truth, or whether we are, in fact, opposing
one kind of truth, one kind of knowledge to other
and equally valid truths.

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I suppose what we have done is to bring our subject to the threshold of epistemology, and you must forgive me if I hesitate to cross it. After urging humility, it would be more than presumptuous of me to try to effect a synthesis of man's conclusions relative to the faithfulness with which human knowledge truly reflects the nature of the real or actual. The subject is vast and is above both the level of the reader's patience and my professional competence.

For all of that, I would venture to say that man is a unique creature in his faculty of self-consciousness, and that this faculty leads him inevitably to a desire to find out who he is, where he came from, and where he is going. In short, one of the primary results of self-consciousness seems to be metaphysical anxiety, and the solvent for this anxiety has traditionally been found in the search for knowledge.

But knowledge in this sense is a broad concept and is understood to include both the results of sense perception and cognition, and the results of intuition; of the rational or empirical, and the spiritual or transcendent, the phenomenal and the noumenal. Yet Western man, in spite of the oriental source of his religious faith, has almost invariably defined knowledge in terms of logic and rational propositions. After a longer or shorter struggle, worship in the West has almost always become Theology: witness Maimonides for the Jews, St. Thomas or Calvin for the Christians. And it is not too much to say that this tendency to put all of our eggs in the rational basket is so much a part of our culture.
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that today we are likely to think of the rational as empirical and as entirely opposed to the intuitive. The intuitive, as a result, stands in danger of being discredited; we tend to speak of it, not as the non-rational, but as the irrational, with all the nasty connotations of that term.

Conditioned by the successes of modern science, we tend, as I have said, to trust implicitly in the infallibility of the empirical. We have forgotten and have let society forget that the truths of science are partial and, more often than not, exceedingly temporal. On the other hand, we have not sufficiently stressed either to society or to our students that there are other ways of knowing, if equally fallible, certainly equally valid. There are the truths of the poet and philosopher as well as the truths of the laboratory, the way of the inner as well as the outer experience. We owe it to our students to point out that the empiricist has little to tell us of honor, of heroism, of beauty, of benevolence. And I do not hesitate to suggest that an understanding of these is more important to us today than anything the physical sciences might tell us.

In returning to our basic premise, then, I would suggest that we can, indeed, openly commit ourselves to the preference of truth over error, at least so long as we understand that, discouragingly often, we shall end up with the one when we think we have the other; that we realize we are thereby committing ourselves to what might well be beyond our powers to achieve or to control. But this thought does not

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depress me. I am inclined to think that I would be more depressed with final and complete understanding, that is, if the search were over and done with. For to his search for understanding belongs whatever dignity the human being possesses. And that we are ourselves involved in the search and are helping others to share in its adventures, is all that we dare claim for ourselves—and more than enough it is, too.
A city drenched with light

Gratitude needs to be expressed to all who have worked so hard to make this day and this week a success. My special appreciation is extended to the members of the drama department, for they, I think, have best caught the spirit of the occasion. I urge those of you who have not done so to attend their singularly appropriate performance of Oh Dad, Poor Dad, Mamma's Hung You in the Closet and I'm Feelin' So Sad. I must confess to a certain relief that the department passed by the opportunity to present Long Day's Journey Into Night.

One, of course, does not assume the duties of a university president lightly. It is a position, under the very best of conditions, fraught with a fair number of frustrations, a host of dilemmas, constant paradoxes, and, it often seems, but pitifully few successes.

Unfortunately, society seems to expect a great deal of the university president. These expectations
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recently were expressed with both style and wit by John Gardner, President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York: "The university president is expected to be kindly with the students, patient with the alumni, irreproachable with the faculty, irresistible to the legislators, and awe-inspiring to the general public."

Then he continues with a sentence from which I have never taken much comfort: "It is an impossible job."

Now I am sure that I cannot meet all of these requirements, nor even one of them perfectly. So I shall have to be what I am, a professional who will try to muster enough stamina to get through until next Tuesday and enough vision to see a little beyond Wednesday. If this be good enough, fine; if not, let us paraphrase Shakespeare by saying, "Men have died, and worms have eaten them, but not for a university presidency."

Since I arrived in Hawaii, a number of citizens have been willing to give me the benefit of their views on various matters, large and small. And for all of this I have been grateful. I have been conscious of the number of times this counsel has concluded with the statement, "Hawaii wants one of the world's great universities." And one or two have held that we should settle for nothing but the world's greatest university.

Now such advice is not quite so novel as one might suppose. It has been some years since a university president was inaugurated with the admoni-
tion that he should bend his every effort to bring forth an institution of marked mediocrity. But I do wonder whether all who have expressed this goal are fully aware of its implications. I am reminded that, when told of a man who excused himself by saying, "After all, I'm only human," Dylan Thomas retorted, "But deep down inside himself he really doubted it."

Part of the difficulty arises, I suppose, from the debasement of language which we have suffered in recent years. In some quarters what is really but an adequate product is described as great; if it has the slightest elegance it is magnificent. There must be a kind of Gresham's law for language as there is for currency.

But assuming that we mean what we say, how does a university become great or, for that matter, even good? It requires, I think, the presence of five factors: resources, the proper environment, time, knowledge of the special nature of a university, and a sense of purposiveness within the university itself.

When one considers these factors one is impressed by the extent to which such reflection indicates the necessity for mutuality of concern on the part of both the university and the larger society of which it is a part. For while some seem to be primarily the responsibility of the university and others the responsibility of other segments of society, the sense of mutuality is the thing which penetrates. Surely only a good society can produce a good university, and, contrariwise, to postulate the former without
assuming the presence of the latter is misleading.

The resource factor is, I think, the easiest to comprehend, although sometimes very difficult to come by—but one must face up to the fact that the higher learning is very costly.

Not quite at random, I selected three American state universities which I consider of first quality. Whether they are great or not is a moot question, but in my opinion they are among the best we have; and incidentally, I have been in this profession long enough not to be so foolish as to name them! Originally, I included here a fairly elaborate analysis of the resources available to these three institutions, but this is no day for me to play the numbers game or, indeed, for you to consume a diet of statistics. Let it only be said that without any increase in number of students, our total budget would need to be doubled if the resources of our University were to equal the least affluent of these three. This is true in spite of the fact that the State of Hawaii in recent years has made a far greater effort than ever before to support its university.

No one could hold seriously that the quality of an institution can be judged solely by resources available related to its enrollment. But a relationship there is, for in the long run less than average effort produces less than average results and never excellence. If this be a part of the price of greatness, are we willing to pay it? And can we pay it? Interestingly enough, if the University properly plays its role, I am not too concerned about the willingness
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of the community. This I think is present. Our economic ability to do so is another matter, one to which I have given some thought and to which I shall return.

I said that the second factor necessary for excellence relates to the environment. Much of this the university itself has to create. Institutions, as individuals, tend to play the roles they cast for themselves, and a great institution always must exhibit competence and poise and maturity and self-respect. But the environment of the larger community of which the university is but a part also is a conditioning element.

There must be present a society which at least in the main is sufficiently mature to pay no homage to small words, to small deeds, to small men. While it must glory in the distinctiveness of human beings and delight in the creativity which results in a society which not only permits but encourages one man to differ from the other, it must strive to settle no issues of import on any basis other than principle. It must, without denying the importance of the emotional and the spiritual, have a high regard for rationality as the primary faculty by which we can comprehend man’s essentially tragic condition.

And then there is the factor of time. It is paradoxically true that an excess of virtue may produce a vice. And this is sometimes true in our American attitude toward time. So eager are we, and properly so, to correct errors, to make progress, that we sometimes forget that some growth simply demands time.
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A plant gains no health and vigor if it is pulled from the ground periodically so that the condition of its roots may be noted. A university, in particular, does not achieve excellence overnight. Recall that while many of the American universities which we now revere came into being in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as late as the latter part of the nineteenth they were characterized by Dean Andrew West of Princeton as mainly institutions “with some anticipations of university studies toward the end of the course.”

There is of course a danger here. If brash and imprudent impatience is a danger, complacency is equally so. Between Scylla and Charybdis the wise must steer.

The community desiring excellence in its higher learning must know a great deal about the special nature of a university. A university is the most perplexing, frustrating, difficult, and wonderful social institution devised by man. And it is all of these things because it exists for paradoxical ends. It is inevitable that universities should occupy an ambivalent place in a society even though that society creates, supports, and at times praises them. A university is established by a society to insure that the values to which that social order subscribes are perpetuated; there is, in effect, an orthodoxy at stake. And yet, in its rarer moments society also acknowledges that it is equally important to examine and, indeed, to modify that orthodoxy. Thus the university is mandated to question the value system which
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it is also supposed to preserve. Problems inevitably arise, however, from the fact that the whole society does not uniformly subscribe to both these ends. There are always some to whom it appears that the university ought to be preserving instead of questioning. And to others the reverse is true. This is why universities are so often misunderstood by the society which sustains them. This is why a public university is not like any other agency of government and cannot be so regarded if it is to achieve the excellence of its nature. And the proper treatment of a university cannot await universal agreement that it has achieved excellence, for the former is a prior and necessary condition of the latter.

The only proper stance for a university as it faces the paradox of its nature is the fundamental premise of the vocation of scholarship: that truth is always preferable to error. This does not mean that at all times the university can be confident it possesses the truth. A little humility here would help. With the best of intentions, universities have, with all their solemnity and tradition, taught error, whether it be the astronomy of Ptolemy or the theory of ether. But the validity of the premise is not by such facts disproved.

Finally, it seems to me that no good university can exist unless it contains within itself a sense of purposiveness which is shared by all who make up the university community. It must know its nature, it must know its purposes, it must know the needed means, and it must have a plan which relates means.
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to its purposes. The possibilities of planning can,
of course, be overemphasized. What physics depart­
ment chairman in 1940 could have foretold his need
for a reactor and an accelerator just ten years later?
But the university must develop the general sense
of direction related to time and means. If it does
not, others will do the job, and understandably so.

Keeping all these matters firmly in mind is per­
haps most difficult in an institution such as this. This
is the people's university. Being such, it must be
both responsible to the society of which it is a part
and responsive to the needs of the peoples of that
society. But this does not mean that it should sway
with each new gust of the wind of public opinion.
At times it will best serve the people by saying "no."
And it need not be too concerned at the criticism
which then ensues. One of the remarkable things
about good universities is that their record of sur­
vival is far better than that of the particular societies
which first established them.

These remarks may seem sobering. They were
meant to be. It does no good for either you or me to
underestimate the magnitude of the task with which
we jointly are confronted. And yet I am not pes­
simistic. Given determination, we can, I think, by
combining the assets of the State with federal assist­
ance, and a great increase in private giving, muster
the resources necessary. Time is always available
for wise use, use which avoids both imprudence and
complacency. I shall use my influence, as others
have and will, to see that the university exhibits
poise and maturity and self-respect. We can hope with some confidence that the proper nature of a university becomes increasingly clear, and that concern with purpose and means will be a first order of business at the University.

It is important that this be done. Given a society, such as ours, dedicated to human dignity and the equality of men, a society which must remain free and open, safe and productive, there exists no better investment than a university of quality. For it is a great university which can make of our society what Athens was in the eyes of Socrates. Maxwell Anderson described that vision in these words, which I have quoted before, which I shall quote again, and with which I close:

Athens has always seemed to me a sort of mad miracle of a city, flashing out in all directions, a great city for no discoverable reason. But now I see that Athens is driven and made miraculous by the same urge that has sent me searching your streets! It is the Athenian search for truth, the Athenian hunger for facts, the endless curiosity of the Athenian mind, that has made Athens unlike any other city. This is a city drenched with light—the light of frank and restless inquiry—and this light has flooded every corner of our lives: our courts, our theaters, our athletic games, our markets—even the open architecture of the temples of our gods! This has been our genius—a genius for light. ... Shut out the light and close our minds and we shall be like a million cities of the past that came up out of mud, and worshiped darkness a little while, and went back, forgotten, into darkness!
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE STATE
WE have come together today to dedicate a building. Stated thus without benefit of rhetorical flourishes, this simple fact does not seem particularly remarkable. But a building has been raised, and we are here to reflect upon the good purposes it is destined to serve.

However, we may not be fully aware of the significance of what we do. Having come to dedicate brick and mortar, we may stay to apply a much needed corrective to a long-standing notion of the nature of man and of the society he has fashioned for himself.

The notion to which I refer is essentially Hobbesian and, to most of us, extremely unattractive. Almost no one here is apt to take comfort in the thought that he is nasty, brutish, and self-seeking, and that the state exists, and must exist, only to keep similar brutes from bashing in each other’s brain pans. Such a negative judgment of government,
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based as it is upon the proposition that man is inherently violent and requires restraint, has been in and out of favor since the seventeenth century. It barely survived the Leibnitzian optimism of the eighteenth century, and was able to hold its own against the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer only by way of the particular perversion it suffered at the hands of Karl Marx.

But in our own time it has had a pervasive regeneration, for reasons not difficult to find. Our century has not been conspicuously marked with optimism. It has been a violent time, scarred with war and economic upheaval. The proportion of any modern nation’s budget devoted to military might is evidence enough to support the general notion that the resources of any state must necessarily be devoted to the negative, corrective purposes envisaged by Thomas Hobbes. And repellent though this concept must be to us, man’s nature seems to be sufficiently brutal to require that all modern societies provide themselves with a sizable domestic police force to protect their citizens, one from the other; thus, we imprison and guard the felon. Even in the healing arts and sciences, we must devote great energy to corrective purposes. We house and restrain the mentally ill. We devise ways to remove the diseased member and still permit the organism to survive. In fact it would appear obvious that in no small measure the modern state is necessarily concerned with the repression, restraint, and correction of violence and its fruits.
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But this is not the whole story—either of man or of the public machinery he has devised. In the face of this kind of evidence, you may judge me incurably romantic, because I see in what we do today a totally different view of the human condition and the democratic government which, in part, reflects that condition. Man destroys, it is true, but he also builds. Government must necessarily repress, but it also constructs. And today we celebrate a physical manifestation of this latter category of action. We celebrate the active support of the state in the most wondrously optimistic activity of man—the acquisition and extension of learning.

I would go further to suggest that not only is this support constructive, but it is the most productive of any enterprise in which the state can engage. This is a concept of education which, at this point in time, is not yet widely shared. We all feel vaguely that education is a "good thing," and some of us have even decided that it may have a utility which, if it cannot be measured precisely, is nonetheless real. But productivity we have long associated with the factors of land, labor, and capital. Yet it is fast becoming apparent that our culture, both material and nonmaterial, is primarily dependent, not just upon capital investment, but upon investment in human beings. We must now become accustomed to looking beyond the development of new machines to see to the development of the human mind that will produce these new machines. Improved human beings, in other words, are a prior condition for improved
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capital facilities, and improved human beings will result only from educational opportunities that are both more extensive and of higher quality than those provided in the past.

I can well understand the enthusiasm of those concerned with animal husbandry—the teachers, the students, the researchers, the practitioners—as they view these fine facilities. But I am inclined to see the meaning of this occasion in a broader context. Once again, at the decision of the elected representatives of its citizens, New York State has committed resources through its State University not to the perfection of instruments of violence, not to the restraint of the antisocial, not to the correction of existing malignancies—but to a faith in man's rationality, to the improvement of human beings, to the taking of still another step toward the "good society."
Research and the commonwealth

THE FACT THAT THE PUBLIC, through its representa­
tives, should choose to invest four million dollars to
facilitate research does not strike most of us as either
novel or inappropriate, and I would agree that it is
neither. However, in this day of expanding govern­
mental services—when the demands for highways
and hospitals and a host of other things mount—
there are, indeed, some who would question its wis­
dom. These people might even concede that research
is important, but they would have us believe that it
can be more suitably fostered by private citizens,
either individually or through philanthropic founda­
tions. And, of course, the arguments which can be
marshalled in support of this position are numerous.

The first of these is characterized by a kind of
arch-conservatism. It says, in effect, that “it never
used to be done this way and so why start now?”
And this point of view is both right and wrong; it
is wrong in the light of the fact that this Experiment
Station in Geneva has represented the research interests of the State of New York for nearly eighty years and that the land-grant colleges and universities are about to celebrate the hundredth birthday of the legislation which brought them into being. But it is right when you look down the much longer corridor of recorded history. In fact, it can be said that prior to the foundation of public universities there was no such thing as public support for the creative research scientist. For centuries he was left to his own devices, to cadge a shilling or a mark where he might find it and to let out the tentacles of his inquiring mind so long and so far as his imagination and his money would allow. Asking questions with the hope of finding answers was a luxurious pastime before the nineteenth century. If a poor man had an idea which he felt compelled to explore, he was forced to watch it wither before his eyes, unless he could somehow attract the favor of a wealthy patron. Research was necessarily the province of the man of means and could be conducted only in those hours of the day which an independent income set aside as free. Newton's researches were made largely in his own home, and Sir Robert Boyle investigated the elasticity of gases, not just because he possessed an inquiring mind, but because he possessed a sizable estate to go along with it. To look at an earlier age, I think it would be safe to say that had it not been for the court of Florence, Galileo's name would be unknown to us today.

Of course, the Renaissance concept of patronage
was a grand and glorious thing, and it is directly responsible for much that we cherish in our cultural tradition. Based upon a love of man and a legitimate pride in man’s creative ability, it fostered the experiments of scientists just as it encouraged the poet’s sonnets and the madrigals of the court musician. But it was necessarily sporadic and inconsistent. It belonged to an age long past and it fitted the graceful, aristocratic temper of that age very well.

But our world is a far different thing in many respects, and can no longer stand patiently by in hopes that a truly creative mind will, through blessed accident, come by the means to support its exploration of the unknown and unguessed. It is the nature of science that the answer to a question asked tends to generate, in geometrical fashion, still other questions and other problems. And at this point in time, after a century of prolific scientific activity, our world is filled to overflowing with problems challenging to the mind of man and whose solution will, it is hoped, redound to the general welfare. This very building which today we dedicate will be utilized by men devoted to the solution of one of the world’s pressing problems, the problem of food supply for growing numbers of human beings. I would maintain that we have neither the leisure nor the heartlessness to forsake a systematic and well-supported investigation of this subject on the off-chance that it will be supported in another way.

Now my imaginary antagonist would probably concede all this, but he would point out that I had
missed his meaning. He would grant that the machinery and support of basic and applied research were far too important and too expensive to be left to the unsystematic efforts of individual men—he would acknowledge that hospitals would be little more than rest homes without the remarkable findings of medical research, and that our national posture in the world would be disappointingly different than it is if the secrets of the atom had remained undisclosed. But he would point out that the great resources of our private enterprise system can achieve this systematic approach, and he would direct my attention to the millions of research dollars that annually are invested by our industrial and business firms. Of course, this truth would stagger me.

Being a ruthless fellow, he would doubtless follow this up by asking if the public universities did not have enough to do in this day and age simply in discharging their teaching responsibilities. And I would have to admit that it appears that they have more than enough to do. Why, then, should the public university spend public funds on research which industry can do equally well? While there are a number of answers to this question, perhaps the most important one is that if and when the universities stop doing research, they simultaneously stop being universities. It is a misguided notion that would isolate teaching what is known from finding out what is not. As Whitehead has reminded us, knowledge or truth cannot be thought of as an inert thing, a static mass of meaning which is susceptible
to a single process of ingestion. The professor who attempts to live his academic life off the fat of his doctoral thesis soon finds both his students and himself subsisting on a substandard intellectual diet. The university community, and all who belong to it, must share a commitment to preserve and profess what is known, to discover the new at the same time, and to bring order and coherence to both. If it is nothing else, the university is a microcosm of the learning society, and this means that its devotion to learning must be shared by students and faculty. Without research, a university ceases to be a university.

It has been observed by C. A. Elvehjem, too, that whereas the basic motive behind successful industry is, quite properly, to provide service for a profit, the basic motive of the university is to discover and test the truth of things. The implications of this difference are far-reaching. Industry has concluded that at least three to five years are required before there are dividends from any one research project. On top of this, it is estimated that only one project in eight is ever considered successful. The important thing here is not that this ratio may act as a deterrent to industrial research as such, but rather in the particular definition which industry must give to success. The success of such a research project must necessarily be measured in terms of the market value of the product to be affected. The project cannot be so judged until its expense has been covered by the profits realized from its implementation. On the other hand, the university seldom takes note of the
percentage of experiments that fail to turn out in the way they thought they would. As a matter of fact, negative results are often considered as important as positive results, for in either case the end of the university has been served—knowledge has been gained; the idea is true or it is false. In the lexicon of the university, profit is knowledge.

I believe it is axiomatic not only that the universities must do research, but that they are the best places in which the best research can be done. It is in the university that one should most likely find the atmosphere of freedom so essential to the inquiring mind. Here is an institution which recognizes the power and nobility of ideas and which, as a consequence, orders its values in such a way as to give first priority to truth for its own sake. In this sense, it is our society's counterpart to the private patron of the sixteenth century. To it come men and women who have recognized that it is more ennobling, more essential to their deepest need, to accumulate knowledge than amass material goods; who ask for little beyond freedom to try out their thinking, and the encouragement of their fellow citizens.

Today, in dedicating this facility, we are, in effect, bearing concrete testimony to the keen interest which the citizens of this state have manifested in research. We would be less than forthright if we did not recognize that the public which raised this building and which will support its tenants has done so with the expectation of material benefits to itself. And there will be benefits, of a scope and nature
which, though hard to predict, will without doubt extend beyond the borders of this state to reach the farthest corners of the world.

But I shall persist in the belief that, by and large, the members of our society have higher motives for their support; that each of us, however haltingly, recognizes that the most distinctively human characteristic of man is his capacity to add to the store of knowledge which is his inheritance; that a generation fails of its human promise when it merely conserves the old. The questions we ask of life, the large and the small, the profound and the elemental, are asked by everyone of us. We mislead ourselves when we suppose that only the professional is curious. We all question and formulate answers with varying degrees of success, and this is precisely the reason why each individual man has assigned to his collective embodiment—the state—the obligation to assist and support those who give most promise of arriving at the truth of things. It is, thus, through the research agency of the state, the public university, that each citizen is permitted to share in the process of discovery which is his human right and necessity.

I cannot but conclude that this is rationale enough for the investment we see before us; for it is an investment, not just in brick and mortar, but in hope and faith in the seemingly unlimited capacity of man to find things out about himself and his world. Human beings only rarely have a more ennobling purpose; the state, seldom a more solemn and fruitful responsibility.
A citizen views the legislature

It would be a little naive not to note that the particular citizen who has been selected to speak on the topic, “A Citizen Views the Legislature,” is a citizen who early in 1964 will be viewed in turn with care by one legislature. Fortunately, I am able to speak on this subject, retain my integrity, and hopefully my position, largely because in general I think that state legislatures perform better than they usually are given credit for doing.

My own interest in the legislative process is of long standing. When I was around six, my father used to take me to Indianapolis, Indiana, where as president of the Indiana Fireman’s Association he was heading a lobby to secure legislation providing for both a two-platoon system and a pension plan. While I would not recommend it for others, I must confess that I knew something of the legislative functions of the Claypool Hotel at an age when I should have been learning to string beads.
When I reached college there was an opportunity to study politics somewhat more scientifically, and at twenty-six I was naive and presumptuous enough to think I was qualified to offer a college course in the legislative process. Fortunately, my education was to be continued, and in Michigan, Senator Elmer Porter, the second toughest chairman of a finance committee I ever met, taught me more at times than I really wanted to know. In New York, Senator Walter Mahoney and Assemblyman Joe Carlino made certain that my further education was not neglected. And I should like to take this opportunity to send word back to the Mainland that I am now enrolled in a postgraduate course taught by Professors Doi, Takahashi, Cravalho, Miyake and seventy-two other dedicated faculty members.

So today I shall try to speak of a citizen's view of legislatures in general rather than to concentrate on any particular one. Hopefully, then, my remarks will be meaningful to a somewhat greater number. But even if this is not true, there is another good reason for this approach. My mother tried desperately not to raise any foolish children.

I suppose I should start out, in any consideration of legislatures, by noting that one of the reasons they are misunderstood is that legislators are politicians, and in the United States we have very little understanding of the nature of politics or politicians. Let me admit at the outset that, of course, there are lazy politicians and legislators, there are ineffective politicians and legislators, and on occasion there is even

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da dishonest politician and legislator. But let me also observe that I could make the same statement about university presidents and be equally correct and in about the same proportion of the cases. I am not trying to "gild refined gold, . . . paint the lily [nor] throw perfume on the violet," but neither am I going to endorse the ideas of those who are unable or unwilling to try to understand the political process and the politician's contribution to a good society.

I suppose the late T. V. Smith, himself no mean politician as well as a philosopher and poet, put it rather well when he said, in more or less these words: The politician is the unbeatified saint who keeps the true saints from slitting each others' throats. What he meant, of course, was that ours is a pluralistic society and this is basic to its health. In such a situation you have many single-purpose interests at work which would in effect like to convert society to a single point of view. These are the men who are commonly known as men of principle, particularly by those who share their point of view. Now, out of all this welter of strongly motivated organizations and individuals, each seeking the furtherance of a particular end, there must emerge some kind of a way by means of which society can get on with its business and make at least reasonable progress toward the goals which it has postulated. And it is the resolution of these conflicting single-purpose interests which becomes the politician's task. And so this inevitably makes of him, in one way or another, a compromiser, and as anyone knows—even though it
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isn't true—to compromise one's principles is bad. But someone has to do the job, for the only alternative to it being done this way is by the imposition of the will of a single group. This in the long run means the securing of adherence through the use of or the threat of violence. No one would contend that our politicians do this task perfectly, just as no one would contend seriously, I think, that our form of government is perfect. It is only the best that man has been able to devise so far. I would hope that throughout our nation there could come to be a greater understanding of the political process and the politician, but since these things seem inevitably to proceed very slowly, I would guess that we shall have to live for a long time with the definition that a statesman is a dead politician.

And, of course, much of this compromising, resolving function of the politician inevitably carries over into the work of legislatures. I can tell you that the Hawaii legislature last session did not give the University of Hawaii enough money. I can also predict with certainty that from my point of view they will not give us enough next session, or the next, or the next. And this is a distinction I share with every department head of state government in Hawaii. And at the same time, I am sure that there are individuals and groups in this state who are certain that the legislature gave us all too much money! And this happens in state after state.

I was fortunate enough to be asked last January to speak at the Pre-Legislative Conference spon-
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sored by our Hawaii legislature, and I would like to quote a passage from those remarks: "Legislators and governors must be concerned with all social needs, not just the educational. Roads must be built, the public must be protected from violence, the aged must be cared for, the unemployed sustained while they are being retrained, the taxpayer must not be burdened beyond the point where his economic health is really impaired, the economy must be promoted. One could go on and on—the list seems well-nigh endless. In short, legislators and governors constantly face the most difficult of tasks—that of reconciling unlimited demands with limited resources."

But there also is another side to the coin that is the legislator's task. Sometimes, rather than having to reconcile clearly defined and strongly backed but conflicting programs, he must instead, with the aid of professionals and the executive branch, make a program out of what are frequently only well-meaning expressions of social and economic piety. It would be hard to find a citizen in Hawaii who is not in favor of economic development, but giving life to a program which will in effect make progress toward this end is quite different from making speeches in its favor.

But to respect politicians and legislatures and recognize the difficulty of their task is not to deny that they could perform better than they do. And to some observations in this vein I now turn my attention. It seems important that this be done, for
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improvement of the effectiveness of state government, including the work of state legislatures, is of high priority. There are frequent laments about the last half-century having witnessed the transfer of power from the state capitol to Washington. Some of this has been the inevitable result of our changing society, but some, I am convinced, is a product of the ineptitude of state governments in dealing well with the problems quite within their capacity. One need not be a states' righter to observe how foolish it is to clog the national legislature with questions better settled at the local level.

And while the effectiveness of all of state government needs attention, this is particularly true of state legislatures. I would hope that before this conference settles down to a discussion of means, it might devote some time to a consideration of ends. What is the place of the legislature in the democratic process? Surely it is the route of easiest access between the individual citizen and his government. It is the part of government where imagination and creativity can or should have free rein. At one time, it seems to me, state legislatures were the centers for experimentation. And from certain of these experiments national policy sometimes emerged. I would simply leave with you the question, "Are our state legislatures in 1963 the center of imagination, creativity, and experimentation in our total governmental picture?"

But to turn to particulars, I should say that it seems to me that all legislatures that I have ob-
served apply too strictly the rule of parsimony to themselves. This is first obvious when it comes to the matter of staff. I have never seen a legislative assembly that I considered to be adequately staffed to cope with the problems it must meet. While there are notable exceptions on this point, many of the staff employed by legislatures are not of the quality that they should be. This lack of adequate professional help has a number of unfortunate consequences. The technical reports prepared for state government either go unused by legislative bodies or are accepted or rejected without proper evaluation. It means that of necessity many important and highly technical matters receive legislative treatment without adequate knowledge. This weakness, I think, will become more pronounced, rather than less so, as time goes on; for as our society increases in complexity, and it certainly will, the problems to be faced by legislatures will become increasingly difficult.

The staff shortage is evident not only in connection with the work of committees, but with that of parties, too. If there is to be meaningful discussion of important public issues, then the vital partisan debate of those issues should be informed by knowledge and understanding. This means, I think, that both the majority and the minority parties need the services of professional staff and facilities. I should like to make it clear that I am speaking here of a different kind of professional than I was before. The professional who advises a legislative committee on tax
matters should be nonpartisan and analytical. The partisan professional, on the other hand, must be just that. It is his task to develop the rhetoric for the advancement of partisan policy position. One of the greatest mistakes made by legislatures is to try to combine these two functions in a single individual. The Second Hoover Commission came up with the intriguing suggestion that we should develop a political career service. Experimentation with this idea at the state level has interesting possibilities.

I think the rule of parsimony is also incorrectly applied to the compensation received by legislators for two reasons. First, the role played by legislators is socially worth more than it ordinarily costs, and whether we like it or not one of the ways in which our society recognizes worth is by the amount of money paid for the task performed. But there is another result. Inevitably, legislative salaries relate themselves directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, to the salaries paid in the executive and administrative branch of government. The evidence abounds that if we are to procure for state service, particularly at the top levels, individuals having the competencies to administer and lead large and complex technical organizations, we are going to have to increase the compensation that can be offered. For those of you interested in this phase of the problem, I would refer you to the excellent salary study done some two years ago in New York by John Corson. And, as you know, a study of this
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same problem has just been completed on the federal level by a panel headed by Clarence Randall. It contains the recommendation that congressmen's salaries be increased to $35,000 a year. If this figure seems high, I would note that an informant has told me that a Miss Tempest Storm is paid $2,500 for a one-week engagement. I am willing to stipulate that she is more attractive than you are, but a society which has permitted such disparities needs to take a look at its sense of priorities.

A second weakness of legislatures seems to me to be the failure to devote enough attention to the in-service education of their members. To be sure, this conference is a step in this direction, as are the prelegislative conferences held in this and other states. But the effort still seems to me to be inadequate in terms of the ends to be accomplished. Special attention ought to be given to providing in-service educational opportunities for the newly elected member of a legislature. But in addition, there needs to be opportunity for study which is unrelated to an immediate demand for action on a particular bill. Seminars relating to the structure of a state's economy, tax policy, public finance, welfare, higher education, and a host of other topics could be arranged and would, I think, be helpful.

This in-service education function is bound to become more, rather than less, difficult. You already are confronted with the implications of science for your state, but this is only the start. In the last few years we have witnessed, for example, a fantastic
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breakthrough in the biological sciences in the cracking of the genetic code. All of us who deal with research are anticipating others in the biological sciences which may have a greater impact on society than did the developments in physics during the last forty years. With the public policy aspects of these developments, our legislators must educate themselves to deal wisely.

Or, to come to a more immediate matter, the application of science and technology to our productive system has produced a situation in which it seems likely that, in spite of a steady if varying increase in our gross national product, full employment may from this point forward be a goal impossible of attainment.

Third, I think it is possible that some politicians who are legislators have not fully assessed the nature of some of the changes in our society. With increase in educational opportunities and the rapidly expanding techniques of mass communication, I think our electorate is becoming more and more issue-oriented, and the politics of the future will be on a far less personal basis than it was in the past. I recognize that this varies from area to area, and that, at the most, I am identifying a trend rather than a fully achieved situation. Many years ago Jim Farley became aware of this, and pointed out that he could build a very effective national political party without any patronage whatsoever. I must note, indeed, that this was a proposition on which he never acted, but his utterance does indicate to me

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that he was well ahead of his time in being aware of the changes taking place within the electorate. It seems to me that the significance of more legislators recognizing this change in relation to the work of a legislature is that fewer local and personal bills would be introduced over a period of time.

Fourth, I think the time has come for a more serious and sustained consideration of the duplication of legislative effort caused by bicameralism. It may well be that the cause of unicameralism is not justified or at least not politically feasible. But there seem to me to be measures short of this which merit consideration. Among these are better agreement of a division of labor between the houses, joint committee hearings, and joint staff efforts. Certainly the present mode of operation is in many states wasteful of the time and efforts of the legislators, the staff, and administrative officials.

This by no means concludes the items which I should like to discuss if time permitted. I am concerned, as you must be, about such matters as the desirability of streamlining committee systems, the doubtful wisdom of time limitation on the length of sessions, the role of the legislature in relation to the executive and the importance of a strong executive to the legislature itself, the nature of policy formation as contrasted with its implementation, the uses and abuses of the expert, and the impact of the actions of state legislatures on the nation and the world, to name but a few. But I shall now act on the advice of a Hoosier politician who, not adverse
to an occasional Sunday preaching assignment, once told me, "Son, there are no souls saved after the first thirty minutes."

Much of what I have said relates back to the fact that state legislatures are social institutions which must try desperately to keep abreast of the most rapidly changing society which man has ever known, the pace of which change is sure to accelerate rather than slacken. The evidence for this rate of change abounds. We are doubling our store of knowledge each fifteen years. Of all the scientists and engineers who ever lived on this earth, ninety per cent are still alive, as are ninety-nine per cent of the engineering technicians. One could go on and on.

All of this has caused some observers to conclude that man has set in motion forces which are now out of his control, and that his one sure destiny is extinction. Recognizing the sobering realities on which such conclusions are based, and knowing full well the lack of basis for easy optimism, I nevertheless cannot concur, preferring to echo the words of the anthropologist La Barre with which I conclude.

For if man merely fears the Promethean fire "stolen" from heaven, he remains the cringing ritualist and worshiper. Man need not worship Fire, or any other aspect of the physical universe. If he learns to respect the nature of fire as a behavior independent of his own will, but one which can be used by him without guilt or fear, then in time he may become the scientist and the civilized man. ... What is demanded of us is an awareness without
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alarm of our nature and its predicaments. The nature of human nature needs only to be respected.

In our new knowledge and power over the atom we wait, it would seem, some new morning for mankind. But at this instant in human history it is already three minutes to midnight. That all our world-views are colored by our human problems and needs, we must all finally admit. But that we struggle manfully with these problems and needs is at least an animal dignity we might all strive to achieve. A billion other worlds may turn, without end and without meaning, in the cold cosmic night. But on this one earth, at least, now live animals able to become even a little like gods, having knowledge of good and evil.
BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE STATE
Toward east-west synthesis

When one is younger he sometimes muses as to the relative importance of the grandeur of an idea on the one hand and its implementation on the other. Since most of the young have not as yet faced the difficulties involved when one bears the burden of responsibilities for the institutional implementation of an idea, they tend to become enamored of abstraction and to dismiss as petty detail the solving of the question of how one makes an idea affect behavior. On the other hand, sometimes the more experienced among us grow cynical about the great ideas and become engrossed with technical ways of improving efficiency while giving little thought to the ends for which the machinery is designed. You and I both know organizations which are very effective in achieving absolutely worthless ends. And who is not aware of excellent intellectual concepts which consistently have failed because no one as yet has designed the means of achievement.
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As is true in most cases, both of these extreme positions are invalid. Prudent men realize that nothing but a great idea is worth striving to attain, but prudent men also are unwilling to underestimate the hard, time- and patience-consuming effort which must go into seeing that the idea makes a difference in the affairs of men.

I have started off in this vein, for I think one must keep these two problems—that of ends and that of means—fixed firmly in mind if he is to comprehend the mission and present status of a very young institution: The Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, referred to usually as the East-West Center, a project financed by the national government of the United States and operated in cooperation with the University of Hawaii. Let us first examine the idea.

Hawaii, the fiftieth state of the United States, lies almost mid-point in the Pacific between the massive continents of Asia and North and South America. It is on the edge of that vast area of the Pacific in which are contained the many islands of Oceania. And the ethnic and cultural origins of its citizens are as unusual as its geographic location, for Hawaii is the only truly multicultural state in the United States. From North and South America, primarily, but also from Europe, had come Caucasians—known in Hawaii as haoles—bringing with them both the vices and virtues of the Western tradition. And, primarily from Japan and China, but in fact from almost all of Asia, came the ancestors of a majority
of the present-day citizenry of Hawaii. The society which emerged was not always good. There were injustices, there were instances of exploitation. It does no good to deny this. But in a comparatively short time, as such things go in the affairs of men, there has emerged a society characterized by respect for others, equality of opportunity, and a lack of discrimination. The situation is not perfect on all these heads, for perfection I do not expect to see this side of Heaven—assuming of course I make it—but at least it is the best I have witnessed.

There needed to be one more ingredient before the grand idea could emerge, and this came into being when early in this century there was established an institution of higher learning which from the beginning and increasingly so has had a deep concern for the intellectual and cultural life of Asia.

Now the ingredients were present: a society located physically almost halfway between the two great land masses of the Americas and Asia, a multicultural-racial-ethnic citizenry which had learned how to live in peace and justice, and a strong intellectual and cultural interest in the magnificent tradition of the civilizations of the East.

The idea itself emerged at two levels, which I shall designate as the modest and the adventurous. The modest goal was to make of Hawaii a bridge, if you will, across which those of East and West could travel the route to mutual understanding. I shall be happy if in my lifetime this modest goal can be achieved, for I have been too long charged
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with responsibility for institutional implementation to be unrealistic about the difficulties involved in achieving even this so-called modest objective.

But intellectually I am intrigued by the adventurous idea. Some have hoped that there could emerge in Hawaii not a compromise between, nor an eclecticism based upon, but a true synthesis of the intellectual and cultural traditions of the East and West. It is a powerful idea, and one worth clinging to, but also, I am sure, one which will be slow of implementation.

No one really knows by whom this idea was first voiced. I have read an address by one of my predecessors written some thirty years ago in which he expresses the concept almost in its present-day form, and in all likelihood he was not the first to do so. Many of the faculty of the University of Hawaii had long had this dream. The man who is now our governor, John A. Burns, long ago saw, appreciated and endorsed the idea.

There is an interesting characteristic of the process of social change in that there seems to be observable a point at which the transformation of an idea into institutional implementation takes place. Ordinarily it comes at that time when a person of status within a society publicly endorses the concept. In the present instance this came about on April 15, 1959, when the then majority leader of the United States Senate, later vice president and now president of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, endorsed the idea in a public address and urged the establish-
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ment of a center in Hawaii to promote the mutual understanding of which I have spoken. Other members of our national legislature became interested. Congressman Rooney of New York was among the earliest and has retained that interest.

Thus in 1960 this East-West Center became a reality and the difficult process of implementation began.

Now as to the machinery which has been developed in about three years to achieve these objectives. For a physical plant, six rather attractive buildings have been built and are in use. These include two dormitories, an administration and food service building, one classroom building, a building for the Institute of Advanced Projects, and a theatre-auditorium.

There are three principal programs. Undoubtedly the most widely known of these is that of student interchange. Each year three hundred fellowships are awarded, two hundred of which go to students from Asia primarily for study at the graduate level in the University of Hawaii. If the student performs satisfactorily, the fellowship extends for a second year. During this second year the fellows from Asia are given an opportunity to study on the Mainland United States and those from the United States a similar chance to study in Asia. Normally it is possible for a student to complete work for a master's degree in this period.

The second program, which is administered by the Institute of Advanced Projects, involves bring-
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ing to Hawaii for a year: thirty senior specialists. These are scholars who are well established in their respective academic disciplines, and they come both from the nations of Asia and the United States. For a year they pursue, in concert with their peers, the research in which their proficiency is established.

The third program has to do with technical interchange. Here practitioners in such fields as public health, public administration, and agricultural extension are assembled in Hawaii or elsewhere for shorter periods of intensive training of an applied nature.

As to the present enrollment in these programs, we now have 531 students studying for advanced degrees on scholarships. There are thirty senior specialists in residence and throughout the year approximately three hundred will participate in the technical program.

I would not have you believe from this brief recital of the background and programs of the East-West Center that we are not aware that we have made and are making errors—some of them very great. Omniscience we do not have, but I take comfort from the final paragraph of an editorial written by Norman Cousins and published in the March 21, 1964, issue of the Saturday Review:

"The East-West Center at Honolulu is, of course, not the only educational institution with a world point of view or with the potentiality for becoming a world university. But it is in an excellent position—geographically, philosophically, educationally—to
make powerful strides in that direction. It deserves to be encouraged, supported, and enlarged."

One final word. In my opinion, too many programs involving the interchange of persons are based on what I would call the romantic fallacy. This fallacy is that mere proximity produces affection. Anyone who seriously believes this can never have ridden on a New York subway during the rush hour. It is not the Center's function to cause citizens coming from different cultures to love one another, but to enable them to understand one another. And the greatest contribution an educational institution can make toward developing this understanding is through the function of knowing as opposed to feeling and willing.
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You must have been startled by the enormity of the subject assigned to me. It startled me less than it would have some years ago because university presidents seem to get absolutely ridiculous speaking assignments in terms of their very limited competence. Frequently, I get a telephone call with a breathless invitation to speak tomorrow night at seven-thirty on the topic of “Education for the Space Age” or “Democracy at the Crossroads” or “Whither America.” These invitations usually arrive at the time when my checkbook is out of balance, when I’m frustrated by the fact that I cannot provide effective counsel for the future of my son’s education, and somewhat embarrassed that I do not understand my daughter’s fourth-grade homework.

But I am happy to say that recently a friend shared with me a passage which he credited to Gertrude Stein which has clarified the whole matter.
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Education is thought about and as it is thought about it is being done. It is being done in the way it is thought about, which is not true of almost anything. Almost anything is not done in the way it is thought about but education is. It is done in the way it is thought about and that is the reason so much of it is done in New England and Switzerland. There is an extraordinary amount of it done in New England and Switzerland.

In New England they have done it—they do it—they will do it and they do it in every way in which education can be thought about.

I find education everywhere and in New England it is everywhere, it is thought about everywhere in America everywhere but only in New England is it done as much as it is thought about. And that is saying a very great deal. They do it so much in New England that they even do it more than it is thought about.

So much then for clarification.

I have been requested to address myself to the topic of the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific. As most speakers do, but few admit, the first thing I am going to do is to change my topic. This is not really true, for I still intend to address myself to this general area, but as I tried to cope with it, I found the range so broad that it was difficult to find a handle. In short, I needed a tripod on which to mount my camera before swinging it around the Pacific Basin. And, of course, the Hawaiian tripod with which I am the most familiar is the University of Hawaii.

This is neither as unwise a procedure nor as provincial as some might suspect. A little over two
months ago I returned from the most recent of my visits to Asia, and I was impressed again, as I always am, with not only the crying demand for education in the whole of the Pacific Area, but the fact that whatever the short-range solutions may be, most of the problems which plague this area must, in the long run, be answered through education. If there were time, I might recount some of these difficulties, such as the uneven quality of medical education throughout the area, the fact that, while higher education is emerging and developing rapidly in Asia, some of it seems almost irrelevant to the needs of the nations sponsoring it, and that these nations are miles from providing equality of educational opportunity. So the University of Hawaii, as the American university closest to most of these places, seems not a bad platform from which I can, for a few moments, gaze to the West and ponder what I see.

It will be understood, too, I am sure—and I will be excused for taking the position—that to me the University of Hawaii is in many ways the most interesting of all state universities. Consider, if you will, the setting in which it is located. Hawaii is the most southern of the fifty states, all of it lying in the same latitude as Mexico, with its capital—Honolulu—at almost precisely the same latitude as Mexico City. It is located almost midway between the great land masses of North and South America and the continent of Asia.

It is a state known for many things. The spirit of Aloha, to be sure, has been somewhat abused
through commercialization, but still exists as a real force. The climate is magnificent, with temperatures ranging from approximately sixty to eighty degrees the year round. And the land is in many places as indulgent as the climate, so that large areas are covered with lovely green growth and beautiful flowers. Yet there are also deserts and sheer, stark cliffs and acres of recent lava flow, and at times the violent beauty of an active volcano. But probably the most interesting thing about Hawaii and its University is not its land or its climate or its location, but rather its people, for this is the only truly multi-cultural state in the United States.

While this is not the place for a detailing of the history of this State, the islands probably were first discovered by the Western World in 1778. Since that time, for a variety of reasons, many different ethnic, cultural, and racial groups have migrated to these shores, stayed, and prospered. Their descendants have become the citizens of modern-day Hawaii, the only state in the Union which before statehood was successively a monarchy, an independent republic, and a territory of the United States.

From the standpoint of ethnic background, the two largest groups are those of Japanese ancestry and the Caucasians, each representing roughly a third of the population. The Filipino nationality group accounts for eleven per cent of the population; the Chinese six per cent; and the Hawaiian another nineteen per cent, although the percentage of Hawaiians unmixed with other groups is small.
But such statistics as these are misleading, for the fastest growing proportion of the population consists of those who can claim a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds—the Cosmopolitans. At present, approximately forty per cent of the marriages taking place in Hawaii involve the crossing over of these ethnic, cultural, and racial lines. Between thirty-five and forty per cent of the babies now born in Hawaii are of mixed parentage.

Much has been written of the way in which these races and nationality groups relate peaceably one to another. And much of what has been written is, if not nonsense, at least superficial. To understand in any depth race relations in Hawaii one would need to appreciate the importance of such factors as these: the spirit of Aloha itself (the Islands' greatest legacy from the Hawaiians); the original contact between the natives and whites in the field of trade; the doctrinal support given by the Christian missionaries to an already established tendency for peaceful coexistence; the rise and decline of the old plantation system; the impact of the military and World War II; the effect of reduction over time of the differences in economic status and educational background between the various racial groups; the sudden spread of unionization; and the implications of the fact that no ethnic strain constitutes a clear majority of the population. For this, of course, there is not time, but certainly it is naive to assume that the relations between these various groups are perfect; they are not. But it is true that these relations are in Hawaii
the best that I have found, and cordial relations are taken for granted. Here, far more than in most places, it is a man's diligence, ability, and personality that count, not the racial group from which he sprang. We have, as a matter of fact, in Hawaii reached a point where we feel sufficiently secure on this matter so that it can now be freely talked about, and is even a source of humor. Hawaii, indeed, is one of the few places within the United States where dialect humor has not disappeared.

It is natural that this multicultural society should have a multicultural state university, and this it does, for all of these racial and ethnic elements in the population are represented in both our student body and our faculty. This diversity also manifests itself in our Board of Regents, where one finds Haoles (the local term for Caucasians), Hapa-Haoles (primarily Caucasian but with some other mixture of ancestral background—in this case, Hawaiian), Japanese, Chinese, and Hawaiian. And certainly there is no other American university which dismisses classes to honor Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole and King Kamehameha.

But the unusual feature about the University of Hawaii which is of particular relevance to my topic is that as far as I know it is the only American university which explicitly recognizes that it has not only an obligation to serve the state which supports it, but also an obligation to serve an extensive region of the world, specifically the Pacific Basin and Asia. There are some rather simple manifestations of this.
I know, for example, that state university presidents ordinarily must be extremely cautious about using state funds to send faculty and administrative officers outside the mainland United States. Yet a rather large proportion of the travel requests which I approve are for travel to Asia or one of the Pacific islands. And the state fiscal officers would not think of objecting to these, for they recognize that it is as important for us on occasion to have a faculty member in Tokyo as it is to have one visiting Boulder, Colorado, important as the latter may be.

Undoubtedly there are several explanations for this phenomenon. The location of the State and the nature of our population I have alluded to. In addition, of course, there are economic factors at work. Hawaii, as you know, has a rather narrow economic base, and one which both public and private enterprise is trying to broaden. And in the Pacific Basin and on its rim we see opportunities for economic development within our state of a kind simply not available to the other states. For example, there is now well advanced a plan for an International Trade Zone which would provide among other things a transshipment point for goods being shipped between Asia and North America. Similarly we rely very heavily on our tourist industry, which continues to grow, and it is estimated that much of the future growth within this industry will be brought about by tourists from Asia. As an example of this, since the easing of currency restrictions in Japan, we are
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experiencing a marked increase of tourist business from that nation.

But there is another reason over and above our location, our population, and our economic interest. Some years ago there began to develop the idea that Hawaii might serve as the instrument for drawing closer together intellectually and culturally the civilizations of the East and the civilizations of the West.

This then is the general milieu within which the University of Hawaii tries to deal with the Pacific and Asia. Part of the work is done through the East-West Center. The East-West Center, as I suppose most of you know, is largely a federally financed project operated in cooperation with the University of Hawaii. However, by no means all of the University's activities in the Pacific and Asia are implemented through the East-West Center. Recently there concluded on the campus a six-week East-West Philosophers' Conference, in which thirty-five distinguished philosophers representing both Asia and the West met, delivered papers, had discussions, seminars, and the like. From the West came representatives not only from the United States, but from the United Kingdom and France as well. The Asian philosophers came from Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan. It has been a fascinating experience to observe some of the head-on collisions between Aristotelian and the Zen Buddhist. The money for this, incidentally—and it is a very expensive project—
is donated by some of the businessmen of Honolulu.

As one would well surmise, we also are confining our overseas programs to what may loosely be called the Pacific Basin. In addition to work in the Trust Territory, we are working in a number of other islands in the Pacific, in Thailand, in both East and West Pakistan, and in the Indian Ocean. I feel reasonably sure, too, that I head the University which extends farthest to the west, for we have a branch offering extension courses on Kwajalein.

We have also had rather good luck in training Peace Corps workers for Asia. We now hold an annual contract with the Peace Corps for this activity, and are training primarily for Thailand and the Philippines, although we have also trained groups for North Borneo and Sarawak. These trainees receive their academic training in Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, and then for three weeks they are taken to our transitional training site, which is in the beautiful although well-nigh inaccessible Waipio Valley. Here we have reproduced in great detail a simulation of the culture in which they are apt. to live and work. We have built a number of Filipino nepa huts as well as some typical Thai houses. Here is where the students live and train for three weeks. There are no screens, no running water, and the facilities are both outdoors and crude. We have even installed a rice paddy, which is worked with caribou. Most of the trainees find this a highly useful experience. It is also known to the staff as the “moment of truth.”
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In the time interval between the training of Peace Corps volunteers, we have just begun a short course for the training of business executives who are being sent to Asia. Thus far we have trained two groups of executives being sent to Mindanao. It appears that this is proving sufficiently successful so that it will expand in the future.

As one would well imagine, this concern for the Pacific Basin and Asia has had considerable impact on the curriculum of the University of Hawaii, as well as on the number of students enrolled in various courses. The range of offerings in the languages of Asia and the Pacific is extensive, including Chinese, Hawaiian, Hindi, Indonesian, Japanese, Javanese, Korean, Pali, Sanskrit, Tagalog, and Thai. Some twelve hundred students currently are studying one or more of these. There are more students studying Japanese at the University of Hawaii than at all other American institutions of higher learning combined.

But our concern with this region of the world has impact on programs beyond simply those of the languages. There is hardly a department in which regional emphasis is not apparent. Course offerings include Field Archeology in Oceania; Art of Asia Minor, India, and Southeast Asia; six courses dealing with the Civilizations of the East; Music of Asia; Oriental Drama and Theatre; fifteen courses concerned with Oriental Philosophy; Economic Development of East Asia; Geography of the Pacific Islands; to cite a few. A complete list would be very
long indeed. Nor have the natural sciences remained uninfluenced. Again, because of our location, our Pacific Biomedical Research Center as well as the Department of Genetics is giving great emphasis to research in comparative human genetics.

It seems to me that the Pacific Basin and its western rim present to the United States, in fact to all of the Western World, a new frontier, the greatest challenge of our time, as well as the greatest opportunity. Among other things, it seems clear that the decisions which will affect the course of mankind will be made in this area of the world within the next half century.

I need not emphasize, I am sure, that the complexities here are fantastic. But it is not only morally and politically right to establish the proper rapport with this area of the world, but as far as we are concerned it is also good economics. If science and technology can be applied in this region, and particularly if they can be applied without disrupting and ruining the indigenous cultures, the world’s wealth will be increased many fold, and from this increased prosperity both the nations of Asia as well as of the West will profit.

But before such things can come about, we must abandon what has become a sterile approach in our relations with these nations. Too often our assistance programs have been based on two factors: the idea that through such a system we can increase the strength of our team in the Cold War, and a kind of patronizing attitude of assisting benighted incom-
petents through charitable activities. Neither of these is an adequate base, and, to the extent they are still held, they must be abandoned.

Some of the more advanced Asian countries, indeed, have much to give to us. Japan, for example, has a great deal to teach us about all sorts of things—running from the development of transistors to rural development. And the return from the educational programs of American universities certainly can be equally rewarding, not only by virtue of our faculty doing research there and learning from living there, but by actually engaging in mutually rewarding projects. For example, Keio University in Tokyo is working with us on the problems of language teaching. Scientists from the University of Tokyo and those from other scientific institutions in Asia are working very closely with the University of Hawaii on problems of seismology, tsunami, and oceanography. We are cooperating with Kasetsart University in Thailand, which is working with us on agriculture as we are with them. And there is in the process of formation an Association of Scholarly Publishers in Asian countries, cooperating through us with American scholarly publishers.

What I am really proposing, I suppose, is that we now have an opportunity to extend the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education idea across the world’s largest body of water. But WICHE would never have developed except for the mutuality of interest of the states involved. And this is what we should try to develop in the Pacific Basin and Asia.
To be a part of this effort is a very exciting experience, and I am pleased that I have been fortunate enough to be put in the center of it. Perhaps we have an opportunity of being for the United States, in the words of the late Sir Peter Buck, director of Honolulu's Bishop Museum, "The Vikings of the Sunrise."