Lemko linguistic identity: Contested pluralities

Michael Hornsby
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

In their efforts to organize as a recognized minority within the Polish state, the Lemkos have faced a number of obstacles, both internal and external to the community. This article explores three aspects of self-representation of the Lemko community - group membership, victimhood and “speakerhood” – and examines how these representations are contested on a number of levels.

1. Introduction. Poland, contrary to popular discourses both within and outside the country, is historically a multilingual and multiethnic state, comprising just under half a million citizens who identify as a member of a minority group, or 1.23% of the total population of Poland (Łodziński 2005: 94–95). These minorities include Silesians, Germans, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Roma, Lemkos, Lithuanians, Kashubs, Russians, Slovaks, Jews, Tatars, Czechs, Armenians, and Karaims (Jasiewicz 2011: 738). Other groups also exist, though lack official recognition, such as the inhabitants of Wilamowice, a town in the south of Poland where speakers of a distinct Germanic variety are still to be found, and which is undergoing revitalization efforts at a grassroots level (Hornsby, in press). Expressions of minority culture were severely hampered by the pre-1989 socialist regime in Poland, and after this date many minorities found new cultural and ideological spaces in which to signal their differences from the prevailing majority culture. Even before the demise of socialism, however, signs were emerging that the cultural homogeneity of modern Poland was less monolithic than it seemed to be. Since the fall of socialism, ethnic diversity (especially in Poland’s borderlands with Germany, Belarus, and Ukraine) has been more openly acknowledged (Hann 1998: 844). This article examines one such minority – the Lemkos – who have been able to benefit from the liberalization of a number of political and cultural spaces in Poland since 1989, and explores how expressions of identity, particularly linguistic identity, can be contested within their own community and more widely within Polish society as a whole. The creation of “new spaces” for minorities to express themselves results from the tensions which exist between “idealized” monolingual nation states and supranational structures and processes (Heller 1999: 339), further leading to the “uniformization of communicative practice” (Heller 2002: 8), which concurrently and conflictingly has “hybridity as a hallmark” (Heller 2000: 10).

2. Historical background and current situation. The Lemkos are a distinct ethnic group from the southeast region of Poland, traditionally from the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains (near the Ukrainian border), called Lemkovyna in Lemko, or Lemkowszczyzna in Polish. In the interwar period, both the Poles and the neighboring Ukrainians tried to get the Lemko to identify with Polish or Ukrainian nationalist
causes, but with little success. In 1944, Poland and the Soviet Union agreed upon a series of population transfers that saw Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians and Rusyns (Lemkos) transferred to the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus. Although these transfers were supposedly voluntary, there was strong pressure to move. Near the end of the war, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) sent some of its members to fight in the Lemko region. Whilst few of the Lemkos actively supported the UPA, the new Polish authorities did not see it that way and the Lemkos were perceived as Ukrainian sympathizers. Operation Vistula (Akcja Wisła) ensued as a result. In the spring and summer of 1947 the entire region was depopulated, and the Lemko population was resettled throughout the northern and western territories of Poland. This has resulted in large scale assimilation of the Lemko population into wider Polish society. Aside from the issue of assimilation, there are also major splits within the community, which pose difficult barriers to rebuilding a strong ethnic identity. The most contentious issue dividing the Lemkos is that of religion, one of the main tenets of their identity. While many of the Lemko are Orthodox, considerable numbers of them had converted to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and this can often manifest in different identifications within the Lemko community, with some members identifying more as “Rusyn” (Orthodox) and others as “Ukrainian” (Greek Catholic). During the socialist era, this conflict was submerged due to the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, but it has now resurfaced in the post-1989 period (Laun 1999).

As a result of these divisions, it is difficult to enumerate how many Lemkos there are in Poland today. I have discussed elsewhere (Hornsby 2015) how reports on the number of Lemkos, and of Lemko speakers, can fluctuate between over 5,000 to 11,000 persons, and how classifying who exactly is Lemko can be problematic. This can be at least partly explained by the fact that many of the Lemkos, who are loyal to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, are also pro-Ukrainian and identify themselves with the larger Ukrainian community. In contrast, the Orthodox members of Lemko society usually see their identity as being part of a larger Slavonic or Carpatho-Rusyn group and state their ethnicity as Lemko or Rusyn. As Magocsi notes, there is nothing new in a Lemko/Rusyn presence in the Carpathians, which “can be traced as far as the ninth and perhaps even the fifth and sixth centuries. What is new is their status as a nationality” (Magocsi 2009: 6, my emphasis). This article examines this comparatively new status, or recognition, from a number of points of representation: who counts as Lemko, how Lemko as “victim” counts as an identity marker and how the Lemko language confers not only “speakerhood” but also group membership.

3. REPRESENTATIONS. The languages of representation within the Lemko community are very often structured around master tropes such as inclusivity, victimization, and standardization. Inclusivity here implies who can be considered a Lemko and who cannot and which ethnonym (“Lemko”, “Rusyn” or indeed a hyphenated identity) is applicable. The theme of victimization implies a shared (recent) history and events in the 20th century which can be considered to have shaped current Lemko identities are examined below. As far as standardization is concerned, a common cultural heritage among Lemkos appears to being shaped in different “hybrid” formats which nevertheless often conform to transnational trends. However, despite their global applicability, languages of representation do not necessarily imply commensurability at the local level. Thus local conditions sometimes produce very different results for this post-Communist, newly-emergent minority than it does for other minorities in Western Europe, despite the common rhetoric shared with the same minorities. These languages of representation are examined in turn and are

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then examined in terms of acts of self-identification among the Lemkos who participated in the research for the present article.

3.1. INCLUSIVITY: WHO IS IN, WHO IS OUT. Lemkos are sometimes described as “Rusyns” from a political perspective. The Rusyn national movement which emerged in post-1989 central and eastern Europe uses the term “Rusyn” to encompass all East Slavs in the Transcarpathian areas of Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and further afield among self-identified groups in Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and Croatia, and with an emerging ethnic awareness among groups in the Czech Republic and Moldova (Baptie 2011: 9-10). The political movement includes those who identify with the ethnonym “Lemko”. The term “Ruthenian” is occasionally encountered principally in non-specialist writings on present-day Rusyn (for example, in English language reports of the Euromosaic program. There are, then, different narratives present (both within the Lemko community and also outside it) over the question of who is a Lemko. As I have noted elsewhere (Hornsby 2015), the increasing tendency among the Lemkos is to identify as Lemko tout court, but with a minority opting for a Rusyn or a Ukrainian identity, but increasingly with a hybrid sense of being Lemko, as in the term “Polish Lemko”.

However, we should again be wary of taking census returns and the results of surveys at face value. During fieldwork undertaken in 2012 and 2013, participants talked in much more flexible terms about how they had to make a choice of their identity as Lemkos, and the trend appeared to be toward a hyphenated identity. However, some hyphenations appear to be more acceptable than others. The current diasporic nature of much of the Lemko population in Poland lends itself to hybridity out of necessity, and research participants reveal varying attitudes to the changing nature of what it means to be a Lemko in 21st century Poland:

(1) Extract 1

It is all mixed up in our community. This means that all of us, even within one family, depending on individual circumstances, and the direction they take, can feel either more or less Ukrainian or Lemko. I, for example, have a Ukrainian husband from Pidlashsha. I obtained a degree in the Ukrainian language, I know Ukrainian history, I feel a connection with Ukraine. I have a lot of family there. I can therefore say that I feel Lemko above all. But what sort of Lemko? I would say I am a Ukrainian Lemko. [Research participant 1 (RP1). My translation.]

Thus, marriage seems to be the deciding factor in this particular case – a Ukrainian husband means that RP1, born in Poland, feels more in tune with a Ukrainian orientation and describes herself as a Ukrainian Lemko. Marriage is not always an indicator of ethnic orientation, however, and another research participant (RP2), the sister of RP1, echoes the sentiment that “it is all mixed up” since her own husband’s ethnicity is not a decisive factor in the expression of her individual identity:

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1 Lemko speakers were engaged in “ethnographic conversations” and semi-structured interviews in western and south-eastern Poland in three separate stages: 1. September 2012 (5 participants, in the age range 20–70; 2 F, 3 M; 4 born in Poland, 1 in the Ukraine; 2 students, 2 Orthodox priests, 1 retired); 2. March 2013 (2 participants, F, 40s, born in Poland, civil servants); and 3. July 2013 (4 participants, 3 late teens [2F, 1M], 1 in his 40s, all born in Poland, 3 students, 1 cultural activist). All interviews were conducted in Ukrainian, with the respondents given the option of replying in Lemko, which they all did. The data used for the present article were drawn from a selected number of research participants, as detailed in the appendix.
(2) Extract 2

I have a Polish husband and we have a child, and we had our son christened in the Orthodox Church. We were married in the Orthodox Church and we attend services [there]. Tradition is the most important thing for me… I would say that I am above all a Lemko. I wouldn’t say I am Polish even though I have a Polish husband. (RP2. My translation.)

There therefore appears to be some boundaries in place which prevent Lemko identity being too fluid. Tradition in the form of religious adherence attracts more allegiance than does any sense of conforming to the majority (and her husband’s) identity. As RP1 pointed out during the interview:

(3) Extract 3

My sister has a Polish husband but she wouldn’t say she is Polish. I for example have a Ukrainian husband [and] I can identify as a Ukrainian Lemko. This means that we Lemkos feel closer to Ukrainians than to Poles. (RP1. My translation)

Something prevents Lemkos identifying as Polish Lemkos, it would appear, at least in the narrative of these two participants. This is despite the census returns indicating some 36% of the 11,000 self-identified Lemkos in Poland considering themselves to be Polish Lemko. According to RP1, this is something she has never heard mentioned in her own milieu:

(4) Extract 4

In the environment in which I function among Lemkos in the mountain regions, I don’t know a single person who would describe themselves as “Polish Lemko”. I don’t know if there has been any sociological research which looked at Lower Silesia. Perhaps they say “Polish Lemko” [there]. There might have been greater assimilation there (…) Among the group where I spent my childhood and my teenage years, in the traditional Lemko area, I don’t know a single person who would say that. There were either Lemko-Lemkos or Ukrainian-Lemkos. (RP1. My translation)

So why the apparent increase in this hybrid identity, despite its contested nature? As Omoniyi (2006: 20) points out, “one’s identity isn’t simply chosen from an array of possibilities over the others which are discarded; there is on the contrary a cluster of co-present identities but with varying degrees of salience. The latter depends on the most preferred presentation of self in a given moment”. Thus, when faced with an official document such as a census, Lemkos face a “moment of identification” (Omoniyi 2006: 21) when “verbal and non-verbal communicative codes (…) are deployed to flag up an image of self or perspectives of it”. Given the history of the stigmatization – on all sides – of Lemkos after World War II (“Many Poles made no distinction between Ukrainians and Lemkos, regarding both as traitors and fascist collaborators. Furthermore, being Lemko brought an individual into conflict with the Ukrainian community, whose leadership, like that of Warsaw, assumed the viewpoint that Lemkos are Ukrainians and should identify themselves as such”, Mihalasky 2009: 66), the unease at public declarations of Lemko identification will still be in the memory of some Lemkos and will have been transmitted in part to the younger generation. Identifying with Polish-Lemko hybridity will presumably go some way to assuaging this sense of unease.
3.2. Victimization. A sense of unease does indeed pervade the Lemko community and the Lemkos as “victims” is a trope that emerges both within and from outside the speech community. The defining moment for many Lemkos is “Operation Vistula” (Akcja Wisła) which was carried out in 1947 as an act of reprisal, or so the Lemkos claim, against Ukrainian nationalists (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) who had collaborated with the Nazis in an attempt to secure independence for the Ukraine during World War II. Victimization as “a social object” is part of a wider lexicon that is “learned, used and represented” and is implemented by diverse actors when articulating their claims (Jeffery & Candea 2006: 287). As Ballinger (2003: 129–30) points out, “the end of the Cold War has revitalized and transformed the language of victimhood and ‘genocide’ (…) The powerful moral capital attached to the charge of genocide has nonetheless paradoxically made for the term’s increasingly broad application by groups (…) claiming past persecution.” In the case of the Lemkos, commentators (e.g. Snyder 1999, Subtelny 2001, i.a.) have described the deportations of “Operation Vistula” as “ethnic cleansing”. Weight is sometimes added to the claim by references to the use of Jaworzno (a sub-camp of the Auschwitz complex) for the detention of civilians during the Operation Vistula deportation campaign. As Trzeszczyńska (2013: 441) has pointed out, the Lemkos’ “collective memory is filled with references to the end of WW2 and [the] post-war period which redefined the meaning of being (…) Lemko. I consider their commemorative efforts as [a] peculiar cultural practice which demands [a] deep anthropological analysis.”

For many Lemkos, any accusation of “collaboration” and the collective punishment visited upon them by the Communist authorities was disproportionate to their actual involvement. Current narratives about this event are infused, not unreasonably, with a sense of injustice and the momentum for public recognition of this injustice seems to be gathering pace. When a joint declaration was issued in 2007 by the presidents of Poland (Kaczyński) and of the Ukraine (Yushchenko) condemning the above operation as a violation of human rights,2 the blame was firmly laid at the door of a “totalitarian communist regime” (winowajcą tej operacji był totalitarny reżim komunistyczny).3 It is interesting to note, however, that in this statement issued by the two countries, there is no mention of Lemkos as co-victims with the Ukrainians who were deported, thus seemingly continuing the Communist regime’s practice of conflating Lemkos with Ukrainians (see Mihalasky 2009: 66, cited above).

Transnationally, there are clear signs that the recognition of this act is illegitimate and therefore constitutes victimization. Recent publications sustain the victimization narrative, not just in Poland and the Ukraine, but further afield, such as the USA. The Polish researcher Trzeszczyńska (2013) notes that “the displacements of the Lemko population are undoubtedly the most important turning point which define the post-war history and the modern fate of the members of the group. The Lemkos themselves, together with historians, treat 1944–1947 as a moment in history that forever changed them as a community” (Trzeszczyńska 2013: 76, my translation). The American researcher Reilly (2013) documents, more individualistically, “a personal narrative, but at the same time it represents the experiences of many families from southeastern Poland who were considered to be part of the Ukrainian minority” (Reilly 2013: 8). And the Ukrainian author Shcherba (2011) writes of the “harsh deportation of Ukrainians from their native ethnic lands (…) [and] the terrible atrocities which were suffered by Ukrainians during deportation” (Shcherba 2011: 9, my translation). Note that the transnational nature of the recognition of vic-

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timization does not imply any sort of commonality – the Polish researcher attempts to distance herself from the events through her stated research aim of “the impact of [an] anthropologist who tries to investigate the traumatic past of an ethnic group which suffered [at the hands of] the nation which the researcher represents” (Trzeszczyńska 2013: 443); the Ukrainian writer adopts a nationalistic stance in upholding the cause of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as the “only (...) political force [which] acted on behalf of genuine national liberation of the Ukrainian nation and the integrity of its lands in an independent state” (Shcherba 2011: 9, my translation); and Reilly (2013), from an American and personal perspective, recounts her own family history, since one of her research participants was her own maternal grandmother. Thus, “victimization” as a recurrent trope connected to the Lemkos is played out on very different levels and means very different things for both members of the Lemko community and outside commentators. If, as Trzeszczyńska (2013: 443) considers, there is a “heterogeneous nature [to the] collective memory of the Lemkos”, this appears to be the case among commentators outside the community as well.

However, this sense of unease does not remain at just a historical, community-wide level. As Majewicz & Wicherkiewicz (1998) note, attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians and Lemkos was often hostile after the deportations, with children of Ukrainian/Lemko origin being harassed in schools, and the status of the Ukrainian/Lemko language(s) being considered lower than that of Polish even in places inhabited predominantly by Ukrainians/Lemkos. Fieldwork has revealed that adult participants had experienced such attitudes and less than favorable treatment in their childhood. RP1 reports that when growing up in a traditional Lemko area, her school would schedule very important tests, or recreational excursions on major Orthodox holidays, which would cause considerable inconvenience for herself and her family. Such inconvenience can, of course, be viewed subjectively. Interestingly, however, for the first time in 2013, Polish universities issued declarations that teachers should exercise tolerance and flexibility with students wishing to celebrate Orthodox Christmas on 7th January (suggesting that such flexibility was not always apparent in the past).4

The Lemko language has also come under scrutiny from public officials, revealing a discourse that seeks to delegitimize its presence in public spaces. In December 2012, the town library in Gorlice (near the traditional Lemko-speaking area) issued a greeting card wishing the inhabitants of the town a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year in Polish and in Lemko. This was commented upon by local councilor Augustyn Mróz (Chairman of the Board of Education and Culture), who questioned the “legality” of including a text in Lemko, since Polish was the official language of the Polish state. Furthermore, he questioned the use of Lemko in preference to “English, French (...) or I don’t know, why not Hebrew?” (http://www.gorlice24.pl (10 December, 2015), my translation). The subtext seems to indicate that Lemko in Gorlice is as foreign – and thus has no place – as English, French or Hebrew (notwithstanding the historic presence of a continuous Jewish community in Gorlice for centuries until the Second World War, let alone the inappropriateness of a Christian festival being commemorated in greeting cards in a Jewish liturgical language). This “othering” of the Lemko language, and consequently of Lemko themselves, seems to indicate a prevalent lack of comfort with difference and diversity since as

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4 For example, one faculty at Warsaw University issued the following statement: “In accordance with the letter of the Dean no. WLS-44/54/2012 of 14 December 2012, January 7, 2013 is a day off from classes due to Orthodox Christmas” (Zgodnie z pismem Dziekana nr WLS-44/54/2012 z 14 grudnia 2012 r. dzień 7 stycznia 2013 r. jest dniem wolnym od zajęć w związku z prawosławnymi Świątami Bożego Narodzenia).
Janicki has pointed out [an] “essentialist mindset is still widely present in Polish society” (Janicki 2003: 273). Interestingly, RP1 made the point, during the interview, of comparing the situation of Lemkos with other, equally less favorably regarded minorities in Poland, such as the Jews. She noted that she had to be cautious over who she was open with about being Lemko, comparing her situation to Poles who had openly identified as Jewish, who then found anti-Semitic graffiti on their exterior walls or a rock thrown through their window. This also reminded her of talking Lemko to her grandmother in public, and her grandmother asking her not to, recalling, for her, past times when using Lemko in the public domain could provoke open hostility. Thus, the language of “victimhood” as employed by Lemkos is commensurable at certain local levels (perhaps because of a certain sense of solidarity with particular minorities) but not at others (such as the inappropriate, in Lemko eyes, conflagration of Lemko culture with Ukrainian national aspirations).

3.3. STANDARDIZATION: BUILDING “A” LEMKO LANGUAGE. What language(s) do Lemkos speak? It is noteworthy that the titles of grammars and related items refer not to “variants” but to “language” in those areas/countries where attempts at standardization of the Rusyn/Lemko language have been undertaken. It is possible therefore to analyze Rusyn as a single pluricentric language, or a collection of languages. Baptie (2011: 8) has documented the official names for each Rusyn variant which are: русиньский язьк (rusin’skyj jazyk, “Rusyn language”) in Slovakia; лемківський язьк (lemkivskij jazyk, “Lemko language”) in Poland; русинський язьк (rusins’kyj jazyk, “Rusyn language”) in one scheme proposed for Transcarpathian Ukraine and руски язьк (ruski jazik, “Rusyn language”) in Serbia and Croatia (Vojvodina and Srem).

Even the very attempt to standardize the language appears to cause tension. It is first of all recognized by some speakers that there is a need for a standard Lemko language:

(5) Extract 5

It would be better if they spoke standard Lemko, but even here in the parish, there’s no “standard language” and some people came from Brzoza and they now live here in the parish in Ługi and they speak in their own way and some of their words are their own individual words and that’s how they speak. But the people who came from the east part of the Lemko territory, they use other words, they have different names for some things, they build their sentences differently – there’s simply a difference. (RP3. My translation)

However, when attempts are put in place to produce speakers of standard Lemko, this can be seen as “unnatural”:

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5 It should be pointed out that Councilor Augustyn Mróz was relieved of his position as Chairman of the Board of Education and Culture on 25th January 2013 (http://www.gorlice24.pl/, 10 December, 2015).
(6) Extract 6

We know of a young woman who studied Lemko in Kraków and she got married to a man from [the traditional Lemko area] and [I was told that] she would correct her husband’s family’s language, that of his parents, of his grandparents, [telling them], “You speak [Lemko] badly.” Because she knew better, she had studied at university. Because she knows the “new” Lemko speech. And they, the grandparents, don’t know it. It’s funny because you can’t create an artificial language at the university or in a small circle. Language develops naturally and we should let it do so. (RP1. My translation)

Thus, what we are dealing with here is an over-arching ideology of standard language which is becoming evident amongst younger speakers and which was previously less evident among the Lemko speech community. I would argue that this ideology is borrowed from the majority community, where Polish as a standard language is heavily promoted, due to historical attempts to eradicate the language and culture but also, as previously noted, Janicki’s assessment of the Polish mindset as “essentialist” (2003: 273). Language change and standardization is particularly fraught among minority languages, since the speakers are aware of its endangered situation and that attempts in revitalization efforts to make a language uniform for the purposes of teaching and learning can in fact been perceived as breaking down the last vestiges of tradition. One research participant sees the process of change in Lemko as a loss:

(7) Extract 7

Our grandmothers speak lovely Lemko, very nice. One of them has lived in the same place all her life, without shops, without schools, without television, without radio, she speaks a variety (of Lemko) as it was always spoken. When the second grandmother speaks Polish, you can hear that she’s not Polish (…) when we listen to our grandmothers speak, the Lemkos have [the sound] /y/ (…) our parents know this sound, but I don’t hear them use it. And we don’t use it at all. (RP1. My translation.)

4. Cool to be Lemko? Lemko “authentication”. Culture is becoming increasingly a consumer commodity, to be bought, sold, and exchanged in the new economy. Annual Lemko folk and cultural festivals called Vatra (the Hearth) have been held in a different Carpathian village every year. Thousands from both Poland and Ukraine have returned to their “homeland” in celebration of these festivals and the revived culture has sparked the curiosity of younger Lemko generations wanting to learn about their ancestral heritage. But it has to be modern, if it is to be attractive to younger generations. As Maher (2005: 195) claims: “Cultural essentialism and ethnic orthodoxy are out (…) Metroethnicity is in”. And to be modern, it has to be “metroethnic” or hybrid, as I understand it in a Lemko context. Tropes identified earlier in this article are apparent in acts of Lemko “authentication” and are discussed below, particularly in terms of where such tropes are intermingled with hybrid practices associated with “metroethnicity”.

Lemko festivals aimed at the preservation of the culture are engaged in creating the culture in new forms, forms which are acceptable to the younger generations of Lemkos. Bands such as Lemko Tower and Lemon prove popular among young Lemkos as a result, but while they are based on traditional Lemko music, they also exhibit “glocalized” features
which mark them as different from traditional forms, but which are shared more generally with other musical forms. For example, *Lemko Tower* is described, in its own publicity, as a band that was formed “to respond to a need in young Lemkos’ hearts, whose grandparents had been forced to western Poland because of the Vistula Action” (Lemko Tower 2012, my translation). Having thus established its credentials as “authentic”, the band plays the hybrid card: “LT gives you music that will not quite remind you about our grandparents but will show you the happiness and energy of young Lemkos who have returned to their roots” (Lemko Tower 2012, my translation). “Not quite remind” suggests that they consider their own music to be progressive, familiar, and yet different at the same time, following wider trends of modernization in folk music elsewhere and linked in with the growing popularity of world music. In a similar way, the text which accompanies one of the CDs produced by the folk ensemble *Kyczera* states, “Young people in Kyczera sing the songs as they feel and understand them in their own way. Perhaps they sing differently from their forebears but it’s hard to sing in the same way so far away from their beloved mountains” (Kyczera 2011, my translation). The (dis)continuity discourse is thus once again emphasized in metroethnic terms, in that these and other cultural practices emerge from specific, local contexts of interaction, while accommodating both fixity and fluidity in output (Otsuji & Pennycook 2009).

The festival *Świat pod Kiczera* ("The world welcomed by Kyczera") has been organized for the past eighteen years by Lemkos interested in establishing networks with other minorities elsewhere in the world, and it takes place annually in the western Polish town of Legnica, one of the destinations for deportees after the Vistula Operation. This appears to be part of a trend of solidarity with other minorities, of learning from other minorities how to be a minority, but also in learning how to take pride in your local culture in a glocalized fashion. Lemkos’ songs and dances can thus take their place on stage next to performers from around the world and in the words of the festival organizer, Jerzy S, the world will “get to know Lemko culture so that it can be recognized as one of the cultures of the world” (http://www.malopolskie.tv (10 December, 2015), my translation). Such festivals build on the tropes discussed earlier, in that both inclusivity and victimization are part of the festivals’ discourse. Raising the profile of Lemkos in the world in order to be recognized and counted as a minority in their own right appears to be one aim. Another aim, which arose when interviewing the organizer individually, appears to be the refusal of victimization:

*When I studied in the Ukraine, I was told by Ukrainians: “Don’t expect us or anyone else to save Lemko for you – only you Lemkos can save your language, your culture, your dances and songs. You will never dance Ukrainian dances better than Ukrainians and we Ukrainians will not dance Lemko dances better than you Lemkos.” I have kept this in mind since my student days in Drohobych. We should preserve our parents’ heritage here in Western Poland.* (Jerzy Starzyński, RP4. My translation).

The Lemko community is thus still in the process of adjusting and adapting firstly to post-war and then to post-Communist conditions through discursive means of constructing post-modern identities. Constructing a “minority” identity which mirrors other minority identities elsewhere, finding a voice which recognizes a past where Lemkos were victims but is beginning to reject victimhood in the 21st century, where inclusivity can simultaneously be encompassing or rejecting, with a whole myriad of combinations and permutations in-between, dependent on individual responses, indicates that the main tech-
nique for this construction of identity is largely based on authentication, that is the ways individual assert themselves as “real”, in comparison to other individuals or groups (Bucholtz & Hall (2007). Being “real” thus means having one foot in the past and the other in the present – a passing nod to essentialism is inherent in the discourse of what it means to be a Lemko (with references to ancestry, a homeland and “authentic” (i.e. non-standard) language). Thus, apparent subject (or self-) positioning appears to be an important component of the identity negotiation that takes place among some Lemkos in an effort to negotiate the “self” and the status quo (Doosje et a. 2002, Oakes 2001, Rosenblum & Travis 2006, Schmitt et al. 2003, Turner 1999, Wallace 2001). Identifying as “Lemko” can lead Rusyns in Poland to self-define as members of their heritage language and culture group. On the other, they can also, simultaneously, consider themselves different from their heritage language community and position themselves within the mainstream culture.

Different research participants interviewed for the present article displayed affiliations and different connections to their heritage community and Wallace (2001) describes several types of subject positioning based on self-identification within heritage and mainstream cultures. Of these, two are most applicable to the Lemko situation, I would argue. The majority appeared (RPs 1, 2, 3, and 4 for example) to fit within his home base/visitor’s base model, where minority language speakers consider one culture (mainstream or that of the minority language) as the home base in which they are most comfortable operating. The other culture becomes a frequently visited environment in which the attachment to cultural practices, including language, is not as strong as in the home base cultural environment. Most significantly for the younger research participant interviewed for the present article, the life on the border model, where minority language speakers position themselves on the edge of the two cultures, sometimes creating a border culture, appears to be the one he most engaged in. This is a challenging process of identity negotiation, since such speakers “exist” on the edge (of the community and of standardized language practices) and are required to engage in, or feel the need for, a balancing act. One of the ways this is manifest, though often not concurrently within the same sub-group or individual, is by a focus on “creative linguistic conditions across space and borders of culture, history and politics” (Otsuji & Pennycook 2010: 244). “Authentic” language can be discursively indexed, by RPI and others, as non-standard, dialectal Lemko as spoken by the previous generation, but a “hybrid” variety is also seen as representing the current (and possibly the future, but contested) form of Lemko among younger people:

(8) Extract 8

All the time I hear polonized Lemko from my friends and the people around me (. . .) My grandparents correct me frequently because I am not very good at Lemko. When I speak to my grandfather I have to think before I say anything in order for him not to correct me! (RP5. My translation).

The Lemko language does appear to be changing, at least to this research participant, but he appears unhappy with the changes, since he also reported, “I want to speak the same way as my grandfather spoke 50 years ago.” He displays an ideology of “historical authenticity” in that anything from the past must be acceptable whereas present linguistic practices are not, such as the polonized, hybrid variety he mentions. The implications of such a hybrid variety lie outside the scope of the present article, but do indicate an area of sociolinguistic research that needs to be addressed not just within the Lemko community but further afield among minorities elsewhere. Whether such metrolingual practices are seen as “cool” or conversely as “inauthentic” by members of particular speech communities
is a pressing question for minority language policy makers, activists, speakers and/or users alike. See Hornsby (2015) for more details on this phenomenon.

5. Conclusion – Local manifestations of global representations. This article has aimed to explore a number of global languages of representation within the Lemko community in Poland today. Inclusivity, victimization and standardization are themes that are to be found and are well represented among minorities elsewhere but being inclusive in a Lemko sense can mean something very different to being inclusive in another minority language community. The Lemko community has fault-lines running through it in ways that are not imaginable in some other minorities – being a Lemko speaker does not necessarily imply a cohesive identity based on religion, territory or even the very label used to identify the language that is spoken, but rather a multiplicity of identities that can contradict and clash with the ideologies of other members of the speech community and with majority language speakers as well. Indeed, it might be argued that the term “speech community” is less usefully applied to Lemkos than to other linguistic minorities, since the primary identification might be drawn from a religious, geographical or political stance by people who also happen to be speakers of Lemko. As Trzeszczyńska (2013: 443) has pointed out, Lemkos consist of “competitive communities of memory, which are only connected by the ethnonym, cultural heritage and events once lived.” This statement is without doubt true, but needs to be nuanced in terms of contestation – Lemkos do indeed share a common name (in Poland anyway), a common cultural heritage and a common history, but how their representations are increasingly “glocalized” – while following global trends of cultural and historical commodification and hybrid language practices, the Lemkos nevertheless seem to be able to creatively mingle such trends with local conditions to their advantage. The problem arises over their acceptability to the members of the Lemko community themselves and resolving such tensions would appear to be the major challenge the community faces in the 21st century.

References


Lemko linguistic identity: Contested pluralities


Michael Hornsby
mhornsby@wa.amu.edu.pl

**APPENDIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RP</th>
<th>M/F</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Where and when interviewed</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Lublin, March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Lublin, March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Strzelce Krajeńskie, September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>Legnica, July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Legnica, July 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1**: Research participants for the present article