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A military coup d'etat on May 16, 1961 toppled the Second Republic of Korea that had been jubilantly inaugurated only nine months earlier. The regime of Premier John M. Chang, an heir to the bloody "Student Uprising" that had overthrown the twelve-year old First Republic of President Syngman Rhee, disintegrated as the night riders of the "Military Revolution" rushed into the South Korean capital. The virtually bloodless coup, the very first military take-over in modern Korea, was personally commanded by then Major General Chung Hee Park, who, since December 17, 1963, has been the general-turned-president of the Third Republic.

As the revolutionary army of about 5,000, spearheaded by tanks, crossed the Han River bridge into Seoul, they encountered the half-hearted resistance of two companies of military police. Only seven military policemen were wounded as the coup forces quickly overpowered the feeble opposition. This was the extent of the armed resistance mustered up in its defense by the government of the Second Republic, which supposedly commanded one of the world's largest standing armies.

The inglorious demise of the Chang government was more than the fall of an impotent regime. It spelled the death of a myth that had been assiduously maintained for thirteen years, namely, that South Korea was a democratic republic. Ever since the Republic of Korea was established under the sponsorship of the United States and the United Nations in 1948, it was the position of the United States that there existed a "democratic Korea under a representative form of government." Whereas it had been hoped that Korea would be a "beacon light of democracy in the Far East," it had now joined the ranks of many emergent nations, from Egypt to Vietnam, in which the political role of the military has become decisive. The military coup signaled the beginning of the military-dominated period in Korea, although most of "Korean intellectuals educated in, or strongly influenced by the West" still "cherish the values of
Western style democracy."6

Before the coup, the known position of the American Embassy in Seoul was that the Chang regime was the manifestation of democratic political development in South Korea. In fact, the Washington envoys of the Chang government heatedly demanded that the United States immediately use the American armed forces stationed in Korea to quell the "insurrectionists" and resurrect the duly constituted "democratic" Chang regime.7 However, Washington was quickly faced with the fait accompli of a methodically planned and neatly executed military take-over.

The highest ranking Americans then in Korea, General Carter B. Magruder of the United Nations Command and Mr. Marshall Green, the charge d'affaires of the American Embassy, strongly voiced their complete support for the already ousted Chang regime, and called on the Korean troops to see that control was handed back to the lawful government. But the State Department was evasive,8 and the coup leaders rapidly consolidated their position. The prestige and influence of the United States -- which had suffered casualties of 157,530 including 33,629 battle deaths during the Korean War, and which had spent nearly six billion dollars9 for military and economic assistance to Korea -- had reached its lowest ebb in Korea immediately after the coup.

Many factors contributed to the creation of an environment in which the legally constituted government could crumble under a putsch. Arguments still continue as to the motivations of the "revolutionary leaders," most of whom are tight-mouthed soldiers by training, or as to the "causes of the revolution."10 Only a few major factors or problems which appear to have contributed most to the first successful coup are briefly discussed, since they indicate the nature as well as the built-in limitations of political upheavals in Korea. Unless these problems have disappeared as a consequence of the coup, they would be likely to beset any government of Korea for the foreseeable future.

The first factor was that recognized and recognizable political leaders proved incapable of governing the re-emerging nation to the general satisfaction of the governed. Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, scores of political and administrative leaders emerged before the expectant public. Most of them disappeared from the scene as quickly as they appeared. Many were linked with certain catastrophic failures, which were not rare in the infant republic, or with messy scandals. Some
of the potential leaders, such as Kim Ku, Song Chin-u, and Chang Tok-su -- heroes of Korean national independence movements\textsuperscript{11} -- fell victim to political assassinations even before they could be tested in the labyrinth of administration. Still others were kidnapped by the North Koreans as they overran all of South Korea with the exception of two major cities in the very first phase of the Korean War.

The instability and exasperation that must have been felt among the ruling elite, and the public's disillusionment, were most graphically reflected in the frequency of turn-overs among the cabinet ministers. In the government of President Rhee, the mean tenure of ministers was twenty-two months, while it was only six months in the regime of Premier Chang.\textsuperscript{12} In both governments, Home Affairs Ministers who controlled the police force of the country were most frequently ousted; their average tenure being seven months in the Rhee regime and less than two months in the Chang cabinet.

A whole generation of leaders took part in the dizzying game of musical chairs. Again in terms of cabinet ministers, in the nine-month life span of Premier Chang's cabinet, a total of seventy-four ministers headed the thirteen ministries at various times. In an eight-year period between 1952 and 1960 under President Rhee, there were three-hundred-eleven cabinet appointments for the thirteen cabinet posts. It was a vicious circle; ministers were replaced in quick succession because they did not "deliver the goods" quickly enough, yet they could not do so because they hardly had enough time to learn their tasks.

The bankruptcy of leadership was complete, and so was the people's disillusionment in the ruling elite. It was probably natural that the disenchantment was more keenly felt by the officer corps of the army who had physically borne the burden of the defense of the republic.

The second major factor that contributed to the atmosphere that culminated in the coup was the desperate economic situation in South Korea. Per capita annual income was only about $105 in the last years of the Rhee regime. As the Rhee regime was overthrown, the people tended to expect that their daily life would somehow be improved. After all, many politicians had led them to believe that the root of all the political and economic evils in South Korea was the autocracy of Rhee and his Liberal Party.

A great majority of the Korean people looked to the Chang
government for certain magic cures for their economic ills. At
the request of the Secretariat of the State Affairs Council
(cabinet), eight universities conducted an opinion survey in
November, 1960. The survey groups questioned 3,000 South Koreans
in various provinces about, among other things, their "most ur­
gent requests to the government." Leading items in the responses
were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relief measures for the unemployed</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price stabilization</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of price of farm products</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance of usurious loans to farmers and fishermen</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime control and maintenance of order</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitable taxation</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of medium and small businesses</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution of housing problems</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, over 70 per cent of South Koreans surveyed named the
solution of economic problems among their "most urgent requests
to the government."

This fact could have been interpreted in a number of ways,
including the obvious one that the great majority of the Korean
public were primarily concerned about economic problems and,
therefore, they would support a government that would best
solve these problems. It was probably significant that only
3.7 per cent of the same group of Koreans surveyed unreservedly
expressed the support for the Chang government, while 51.5 per
cent said they would wait and see. As it turned out, the eco­
nomic ills in the divided and underdeveloped country were more
deep-seated than most Koreans and their government appeared to
realize.

The rate of unemployment in 1960 was 24 per cent, while
the average retail prices in Seoul had continued to sky-rocket
as the following table would indicate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1955=100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>122.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>151.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>146.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>152.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Monthly Statistics*, Bank of Korea
The battle-cry of the Democratic Party against the Rhee regime — "We can't make a living; so let's change." — could now be turned against the ruling Democratic Party and the Chang government. The great majority of Koreans had very little to lose economically, no matter what happened to the regime.

The third major factor was the emergence of the armed forces as the most powerful and effective organization in the nation, in the absolute or relative sense. Since the Korean War, the Korean armed forces were never really demobilized. The military situation in the Far East and in the divided country itself, necessitated a huge standing army, which, at its peak, was said to be the world's fourth largest standing army in terms of sheer numbers — surpassed only by the armies of Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In the name of the defense of freedom, South Korea had become an armed camp.

By contrast, most organizations in the nation were embryonic or anemic. For a brief period, there appeared some hope that a two-party system might emerge in the political arena, but it proved to be illusory. President Rhee's Liberal Party evaporated with his ouster. The Democratic Party, major opposition party during the Rhee period, revealed internal weaknesses when it became the ruling party, splitting into bitterly feuding factions, and giving rise to the New Democratic Party opposing the Democratic Party.

This, of course, was not the first time that the Korean people had experienced exasperation with political organizations. The political scene of South Korea had been replete with parties, "patriotic," "social," para-military, and numerous other groupings. In the two-hundred-member First National Assembly that met from June, 1948 to May, 1950, for example, there were originally forty-eight "parties and social organizations" represented by one or more Assemblymen. The total number of various organizations, which had run candidates but failed to elect any, far exceeded forty-eight.

All these groups had contributed little to political stability in Korea; instead, it became apparent that many of them had selfish goals and sometimes fraudulent designs. These organizations were too often tools of ambitious politicos eager to advance their political fortunes by any means, be it bribery, malicious slander, or terrorism.

The army, meanwhile, had remained more or less aloof from
the seemingly endless melee among the parties and countless other organizations. As all other organizations failed the people, the army — with its overwhelming physical power, its discipline, and its record of service to the defense of the nation — stood out.

The fourth major factor that contributed to the success of the coup was an increased political awareness within the officer corps. For years, the military appeared to accept the general pattern of civilian supremacy — following the example of its mentor, the military of the United States. This pattern was not challenged when the constitutional commander-in-chief was self-confident and forceful. The strong-willed President, Rhee, commanded at least the grudging respect of army generals. The shrewd President knew how to keep the generals in their places by carefully timed and screened promotions, retirements, and consignment of some of the more ambitious ones to honorific diplomatic assignments abroad.

Since the conclusion of the Korean armistice in July, 1953, the huge standing army had faced a prolonged period of relative inactivity. The officer corps of the Korean army was suddenly freed from the gruelling daily challenges of the Korean War. Political upheavals abroad and within Korea must have come to their attention. Among the events which probably stirred the imagination of Korean officers were the uprisings in Egypt led by the Society of Free Officers leading to the assumption of the Egyptian presidency in 1956 by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser; the emergence of General Ne Win as the strongman of Burma in 1958, and the seizure of political power by General Ayub Khan of Pakistan in 1958.

These developments abroad coincided with a period of disorder at home — brazen riggings of elections in which the top echelon of the Korean military was deeply involved; the gradual breakdown of military discipline from the top down, and the complete breakdown of civilian leadership. These stimuli came also at a time when many of the military officers were receiving college level education both in Korea and in the United States. Their attention was beginning to be focused on political problems.  

Then the Student Uprising of April, 1960 cracked the thin veneer of order covering the nation's profound socio-economic and political disarray. Characteristically, President Rhee de-
clared martial law, but the army under the Martial Law Commander, Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, showed no inclination to shoot at demonstrating students. In fact, the army seemed to maintain "neutrality" between the Rhee regime and the demonstrators. With the very life of the Rhee administration trembling in the balance, this inaction by the army constituted a political decision by the military command. The significance of the role of the military in bringing about the ouster of the Rhee regime was not lost on the officer corps.

With Rhee out, hopeless divisions rendered civilian politicians bewildered and incapable of governing a nation in turmoil. Conditions were now ripe for the armed forces to intervene in the political sphere.

Thus, the coup of 1961 was a violent manifestation of agonies of political and economic underdevelopment in a re-emerging Asian nation. The rule by decrees of the military junta, grandiosely named the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, was to reflect drastic readjustment of the "republican" superstructure to existing realities of underdevelopment.

It is evident, however, that the above four major factors or problems which led to the first coup are not of the kind that would be eradicated by mere decrees or "purification" measures of a military-dominated regime. They have been deep-rooted in Korean politics.

The problem of establishing a satisfactory leadership and government still persists. The magnitude of this problem becomes overwhelming when one appreciates the nature and limitation of the so-called "main force of the revolution" which had engineered the coup, occupied many key positions in the military junta, and still holds dominant sway over the Third Republic.

The nucleus of the revolutionary forces was originally formed by a small group of army officers who were lieutenant colonels in 1961. They were members of the class of 1949, or the "eighth graduating class" of the Korean Military Academy, who had constituted "the most discontented layer" in the hierarchical structure of the Korean armed forces. They were sandwiched between general-rank officers, many of whom had enjoyed numerous and substantial privileges in the "republican" Korea, and company-rank officers, the work-horses of the officer corps, who had to be largely preoccupied with daily chores.

What these lieutenant colonels initially decided to launch
in May, 1960, was a "military purification movement" within the armed services with the apparent limited objective of dislodging from the military hierarchy some "corrupt and inefficient" generals who were the immediately visible targets of daily criticism by field and company-rank officers.

On September 10, 1960, soon after the establishment of the Chang regime in August, eleven lieutenant colonels attempted in vain to visit the Defense Minister and recommend to him their "purification" measures. Instead of a meeting with the Defense Minister, the officers were taken to the Provost Marshal's office and severely reprimanded. That very night, these and a few other indignant young officers unanimously resolved to execute the coup.21 The time-bomb had started to tick.

These "Young Turks" gradually gained the support of some generals who had been reputed to be dissatisfied with conditions in the armed services and in the nation as a whole. With the entrance of Maj. Gen. Chung Hee Park into active leadership of the revolutionary movement, the coup group secured the support of some 250 officers. They were to constitute the new military elite of the country on the morrow of the military take-over that was realized some seven months after the resolution among the lieutenant colonels to topple the Chang government.

It was improbable, therefore, that the revolutionary officers had well-defined sets of policies either in September, 1960, or at the time of the coup after several months of clandestine preparations for the uprising. The confusing and often conflicting stands and statements of various factions of the ruling military group regarding the problem of restoring normalcy in the political arena seemed to betray a lack of long-range political objectives. On the day of the coup, it was declared in the "Revolutionary Pledges" that:

As soldiers, after we have completed our mission, we shall restore the government to honest and conscientious civilians, and return to our proper military duties. As citizens, we shall dedicate ourselves . . . to the construction of a solid foundation for a new and truly democratic republic.22

For nearly two years following the coup, there was no defin-
ite indication of how the soldiers would restore the government to "honest and conscientious civilians." On February 18, 1963, General Park issued a statement that he would not run in the presidential election proposed for sometime in the second half of 1963 as a step toward the restoration of civilian government. In fact, he took a solemn public oath to that effect on February 27. Less than three weeks later, on March 16, however, he proposed that military rule be extended for four years. He reversed himself again on April 8 and 10 when he stated that a civilian government would be established before the end of 1963.23

General Park then resigned from active military service on August 30 and accepted the presidential nomination of the Democratic Republican Party on the following day. The presidential election was held on October 15, 1963 -- just a month and a half after General Park himself became an "honest and conscientious" civilian. Out of the 10,081,200 total valid ballots cast, Park won the presidency by a plurality of 156,023 votes, or a mere 1.55 per cent.

In addition to the lack of well thought-out political objectives there was also evidence of conflicting views and power struggles within the ruling military group. For instance, Gen. Chang To-yong, the original chairman of the junta was purged and publicly humiliated in July, 1961. Gen. Kim Tong-ha of the marine corps, which provided crack units at the time of the coup, was charged with plotting a coup against the military junta, and was imprisoned in September, 1963, after his resignation from the junta in January. Gen. Song Yo-chan, prime minister and defense minister of the cabinet under the junta, was purged in August, 1963. At least nine cases of "counter-revolutionary plots" were detected and announced by the regime during the two and a half years of the junta's rule.24

In fact, during the tense months of 1963 when controversies raged within the military groups about how to restore civilian government, there were indications that feuding factions in the ruling groups were preparing to mobilize armed units for a possible showdown.25 One faction insisted on participating in the "civilian" government, while the second believed that the military should be faithful to its own pledge of returning to proper military duties.

Through each of these purges and controversies, the group of officers who had been united in their common goal of toppling
the Chang government divided and subdivided — along the lines of various approaches to problems, of the various branches of services in the armed forces, of geographical and regional loyalties, and on the basis of personalities. The presidential candidacy of General Park constituted a victory for the "Kim-Hong-Kil line" — advocated by Kim Chong-pil, Hong Chong-chol, and Kil Jae-ho of the class of 1949 of the Military Academy.

This was a victory for the hard-boiled, "resolute faction" of the revolutionaries, but in the process, the esprit de corps among the officers who participated in the coup was probably lost. Much of the support that the military junta had initially enjoyed was dissipated. It is probably significant that in the presidential election General Park failed to carry the Kangwon Province through which runs the military demarcation line and which hence has a large concentration of military personnel among its voters.

All these factors point to difficulties for President Park. That his administration cannot count on the unswerving support of the armed forces is suggested by the fact that at least five of the nine "counter revolutionary" plots mentioned above were led by military officers. The very strength of the military and the heightened political consciousness of the officer corps, two of the major factors which contributed to the successful coup, are now no sources of comfort to the Park regime.

Given these circumstances, a virtue of President Park's leadership has been that he has exercised "common sense and moderation." It is, of course, undeniable that the generals and colonels are novices in the art of governing a nation and that this fact also contributed to the common sense approach of Park's leadership.

In the economic sphere, the military regime had promised a major breakthrough in economic growth. The Five Year Economic Development Plan of 1962-1966, launched with fanfare shortly after the 1961 coup, had the ambitious goal of increasing the gross national product by 40.7 per cent, an average annual increase of 7.1 per cent. In view of the fact that the gross national product had increased only 5.2 per cent in 1959, and 2.1 per cent in 1960, the plan at best had more "the nature of an aspiration than a precise economic document." Many agree that the five year plan was an outgrowth of a scheme — with politically inspired figures — that was drawn up by the Chang
POST-COUP KOREA ON A TREADMILL

regime.

To finance the enormous investment required for the plan, the regime relied on United States aid and private donations to the extent of 42 per cent of the total, on government and private borrowings from abroad to the extent of 16 per cent. More than one half of the required investment, therefore, depended on sources over which the Korean government had little control.

While the plan relied so heavily on foreign -- particularly American -- resources, economic assistance from a United States increasingly concerned with dollar drains decreased as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millions of dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>244.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>170.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>194.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>154.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hapdong Nyongam, 1965

In an obvious attempt to mobilize domestic capital for the five year plan, the junta hastily enacted a currency reform on June 9, 1962. A freeze on bank deposits brought many medium and small sized businesses to a grinding halt. The junta had to relax its freeze eleven days later, on June 20, to get the economy moving again. Early in July the junta abandoned the freeze entirely. Meanwhile, the losses resulting from economic stagnation and impairment of confidence in the banks was said to be far greater than the total frozen deposits obtained.

Because it was still committed to the five year plan under these circumstances, the government decided to print more money. From 1961 to 1963, the currency in circulation in South Korea increased by 70.2 per cent and this situation inevitably created an inflationary spiral. These moves have had an adverse effect on the livelihood of the great majority of the people, as the following average annual wholesale indexes in Seoul would indicate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1960=100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>123.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>149.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>164.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hapdong Nyongam, 1965
In conclusion, it seems evident that no genuine solutions have been found in post-coup Korea to any of the four major problems which led to the coup. Thus the nation labors on a treadmill. It is true that the government of President Park has maintained a semblance of order in South Korea, although for a period of fifty-six days, June 3 to July 29, 1964, it required the imposition of martial law enforced by four divisions of troops in the capital area.

It appears probable that the 620,000-man armed forces will continue to play a decisive political role in post-coup Korea. Now that a Pandora's box was blown open by the coup, the role of the military will be volcanic until an efficiently functioning government is constructed under a satisfactory leadership and the economic condition is appreciably improved in South Korea, despite the fast growing population that has been increasing at the annual rate of 2.9 per cent.

NOTES


3 Ibid.


POST-COUP KOREA ON A TREADMILL


7 Personal interviews, June, 1961.


15 Reeve, *op. cit.*, p. 139.


20 Kang In-sop, "Yuksa palgi seng" [The Eighth Graduating Class of the Military Academy], *Shin Donga* (September, 1964), pp. 178-9.

21 "Military Purification Movement Leads to 1961 May Revolution," *Korean Report*, Vol. II, No. 4 (May, 1962), p. 10. Kang, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-1. The eleven officers were: Kim Chong-pil, Kim Hyong-uk, Kim Dong-hwan, Oh Chi-song, Kil Jae-ho, Yi Taekgyun, Ok Chang-ho, Sok Chong-son, Kim Tal-hun, Sok Chang-hi, and Shin Yun-chang. All of these officers played significant roles in the coup and since. The first three have been called the "Three Kims of the Military Revolution." Kim Chong-pil was the first director of the powerful Central Intelligence Agency, master-minded the organization of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, and is now a member of the National Assembly. Kim Hyong-uk was a member of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and presently is the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Kim Dong-hwan was the Korean Minister to the United States shortly after the coup and currently is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the National Assembly.

22 Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, *loc. cit.* This was the last of six pledges.


24 Kang, *op. cit.*, p. 188.


MUHAMMAD YAMIN:  
THE CHIEF ARCHITECT OF INDONESIA'S  
MANIFEST DESTINY  

Garth N. Jones

Introduction

Muhammad Yamin passed away on October 17, 1962. His ghost is now very much part of political Indonesia. Professionally, he was a historian, poet, philosopher, and revolutionist par excellence. In life, he was ambitious, at times ruthless, and nearly always temperamental; a difficult man to live with under the best circumstances. Motivated by opportunism, he never joined a political party. He was regarded as a Murba-sympathizing non-party parliamentarian. Some went further and said that he was an "undercover" Murba representative. 1

His long political career was hectic. Under the Dutch colonial period and subsequently independence, he was frequently in and out of prison. One time he would be in power and the next out. Indonesian political life has been so for the last forty years, and Yamin was very much a part of it.

He was a solidarity maker, creator and manipulator of slogans and symbols, whose stature as a rational ideologue was second only to that of Soekarno. His products represent a popular mixture of Eastern and Western philosophy, but never in a neat blend.

As most revolutionists, if not all, he was a dreamer. Reality was hard for him to accept or even to know. He studiously investigated the myths of grandeur of the Sriwidjidja and Madjapahit periods.

In them he found the seeds of Indonesia's "renewed greatness." He admired Gadjah Mada, the great Prime Minister at the time of the pinnacle of greatness of the Madjapahit Kingdom. His admirers even saw a striking resemblance of his profile with that of Gadjah Mada! Could Yamin be reincarnated Gadjah Mada? If Yamin believed that he was Gadjah Mada personified, then certainly he believed that Soekarno was King Hayam Wuruk. Over the years both of them have often acted in these roles. Although Yamin
MUHAMMAD YAMIN

was never Prime Minister, he did occupy many high level positions such as the last one he held as Chairman of the National Planning Council with the rank of Minister.²

Illustrative of his role as a "solidarity maker" was that the voluminous eight-year plan drafted in 1960 was divided into eight books, seventeen volumes, and 1,945 paragraphs. This symbolized August 17, 1945, the date of Indonesia's Proclamation of Independence.³

Yamin over the years has provided Soekarno with the intellectual food for political action. Strange that political observers have not given more attention to this relationship. All one needs to read to gain an early insight into this relationship is the proceedings of the two bodies established under the Japanese occupation to frame an Indonesian constitution: the Badan Penjelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesian - BPKO (Body for the Investigation of Indonesian Independence) and the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan - PPKI (Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence).⁴ Two examples from these proceedings may be useful to illustrate this point.⁵

On May 29, 1945, Yamin delivered a long speech on the five basic principles that ought to be incorporated into the future constitution. These were: (1) nationalism (peri kebangsaan), (2) humanism (peri kemanusiaan), (3) belief in God (peri ketuhanan), (4) sovereignty of the people (peri kerakjatan), and (5) social justice (kesedjâhteraan rakjat).⁶ Soekarno, three days later on June 1st, redressed these five principles in his now famous extemporaneous speeches called Pantjasila, which now constitutes part of the basic philosophy of the Indonesian State.⁷

In such a tightly knit body it is, of course, difficult to isolate those persons who are responsible for certain ideas and concepts. One thing is certain: Yamin first publicly expounded the five basic principles of the Indonesian State.

During this same Conference, Yamin elaborated in lengthy and involved terms on what should be the territorial boundaries of the future Indonesia. Soekarno entirely endorsed at that Conference Yamin's position.⁸ Yamin had the dreams; Soekarno the charisma to translate these dreams into the "body politic" (reality).

In this article one of Yamin's dreams as to what should constitute the territorial boundaries of Indonesia will be investigated. This is a relatively easy task, in many ways, because
Yamin just a few years before his death brought together his ideas on this subject.9

The Territory of the Indonesian Fatherland

Yamin was a romanticist. He turned to myth as the source of the Indonesian fatherland. All other evidences were skillfully arranged to substantiate this myth. The sovereign territorial boundaries of the Indonesian fatherland (*Nusantara*) were clearly spelled out in the panegyric paean, *Nagarakertagama*, written by the Prapanca, the poet laureate of the court of the Madjapahit Kingdom, in 1367.10 The sovereign territory of Indonesia must consist of the eight regions designated in the poem *Nagarakertagama*, which has become the regional inheritance of the Indonesian nation (people).

In one of Yamin's principal works he cites the poem both in the script of ancient Javanese (*Bahasa Kawai*) and in the script of romanized Javanese (*Huruf Rumawi*). From these two versions, he digests the regional boundaries of the fatherland, the birthright of Indonesia. The fatherland consists of eight major regions, each having from two to twenty sub-regions. These regions are Java, Sumatra, Borneo, the Malayan peninsula, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Celebes, the Moluccas Islands, and New Guinea.11

Furthermore, at one place in his writings Yamin specifically states in geographical terms what are the boundaries of Indonesia's territorial heritage. These are longitude 95 to 141 degrees and latitude 7 degrees north to 11 degrees south.12 These boundaries so Yamin states, "are according to the concept of history." The Indonesian revolution will not be completed until all of the territories within these boundaries are united under "one house." The task of young Indonesians is to "give new blood in carrying out this policy."13 Although Yamin does not use in the English or the Indonesian languages the expression "Manifest Destiny," his position can be interpreted in no other terms.

It should be stressed that in Yamin's mind the eight territories justifiably constitute the Indonesian state, and not some form of "Greater Indonesia" (*Indonesia Raja*). Yamin's concept of Greater Indonesia was more within the dimensions of the Austronesian language area. Although he never definitely
spells out what constitutes Indonesia Raja, he indicates that all of the Philippines and "the islands inhabited by the Papuans" (New Guinea and islands adjacent thereto, i.e. Melanesia) comprise this territory. Yamin never writes much on the Philippines within Indonesia Raja. On Melanesia, however, he writes considerably.

Apparently the Indonesian Nationalists, and Yamin being no exception, over the years have respected the political position of the Philippines. While this was not the situation when Soekarno in the first session of the BPKI was talking about some form of "Pan Indonesia," he stated that the Philippines was already independent and "we must respect the sovereignty of the Philippines..." Yamin apparently accepted this same general position. However, like most of the leading Indonesian Nationalists, Yamin believed that the Philippines should be convinced to join Indonesia politically, and that it was inevitable that this would "occur within the Twentieth Century."

The Melanesian area was another subject. During the first session of the BPKI this constituted a matter of heated debate between Yamin and Hatta. Hatta felt that Yamin's position "smacked" of imperialism, and, if Indonesia claimed Melanesia, why not all of Polynesia as well? Hatta was not willing to accept the German concept of kultur und boden as advanced by Yamin, or anyone else for that matter.

By the late 1950's Yamin's position may have slightly mellowed. He speaks more in the terms of control only over West New Guinea (Irian Barat). His version of the territories described in the poem Nagarakertagama divided New Guinea into two regions: Onin (West New Guinea) and Seran (South New Guinea). He rests his case largely on historical claims and relationships with these two regions rather than on common culture and race. In sum, his position was identical to that of the Indonesian government. East New Guinea could justifiably be interpreted as under Australian sovereignty. This was obviously somewhat different from his 1945 position when he stated that all of New Guinea belonged to the territorial heritage of Indonesia. In geopolitical terms, it was not important, so Yamin felt, that Indonesia control all of New Guinea. With control over West New Guinea, Indonesia had a gateway to the Pacific Ocean and "the entire archipelago of the eight regions could be united from Asia to the Pacific Ocean."
Evidences to Substantiate the Claim of the Indonesian Fatherland

Yamin brings together, from diverse sources, considerable evidence to substantiate his claim as to the territory of the Indonesian fatherland. He uses such substantiating evidence as de jure and de facto international law, geopolitics, jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship, dangers of foreign enclaves, and ancient and contemporary history.

If Yamin has any framework of reference for marshalling his diverse evidences it is that of geopolitics as expounded by German scholars and political leaders during the 1920's and the 1930's. As previously noted, Hatta attacked Yamin at the first session of the BPKI for thinking within the terms of German imperialistic policy. Yamin never denied this accusation. As will be subsequently shown, Yamin builds his case on almost the identical precepts of the German "geopolitcists."20

In true romantic and geopolitic fashion, Yamin starts and constructs most of his claim around important historical incidents in the growth and development of Indonesian nationalism. He initiates his claim by discussing the significance of the "Oath of Indonesia" (or Oath of the Youth) and key words in the National Anthem, "Indonesian Raja," which were the products of the Second Youth Conference held in October 1928 and at which he was an active participant. The Oath reads:

We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, are of one nation (bangsa), the Indonesian nation.
We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, are of one country (bertanah air), the country (tumpah darah) of Indonesia.
We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, have one language, the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia).21

Yamin places great emphasis upon the two expressions, bertanah air and tumpah darah, roughly translated "country", of the second sentence of the "Oath". He uses the English word, "homeland" to express the meaning of these two expressions.22

Other Indonesian writers have translated these Indonesian expressions as fatherland or motherland. Nevertheless, the meaning of these expressions is quite the same, which is obviously much more than just "country."
Yamin then notes eleven different expressions found in the National Anthem concerning the Indonesian fatherland. While these indicate what was the intent of the nationalist leaders, so Yamin states, it is necessary to turn to more official sources as to the territory of the Indonesian fatherland. In his mind, the best single official source is the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945. The Preamble, as an official statement, in the fourth paragraph reads: "Further, to establish a Government for the Indonesian State which protects the whole Indonesian People and the entire Indonesian fatherland." Thus, two aspects are involved as to the territory of Indonesia: (1) the whole Indonesian People (Bangsa) and (2) the entire Indonesian fatherland (tumpah darah).

To gain an official interpretation of the meaning of these two aspects, it is necessary, Yamin states, to turn to national pronouncements. For this purpose he provides three points of reference:

1. The national interpretation of the term Indonesia as found in the documents of the Proclamation of Independence and the Constitution of 1945.

2. The national interpretation of the term Indonesian fatherland (tumpah darah) as found in the words of the Preamble of the Constitution.

3. The national interpretation of the purpose of the political policy of the struggle for an independent Indonesia, i.e., "the independent Indonesia formed under the Republic of Indonesia." While Yamin may regard these three items as points of reference, he certainly does not effectively use them as such. One has to wade through pages of complicated Bahasa Indonesian to learn what he is trying to put across. In short, he is attempting to prove how the Indonesian nationalistic movement is methodically and systematically reconstructing Nusantara. He divides the recent political history of this movement into three periods: (1) the pre-revolutionary period, approximately 1925 to August 17, 1945; (2) the consolidation period of the revolution and independence, 1945 to 1960; and (3) the renewed revolu-
The Pre-Revolutionary Period: 1925-45

The meaning of Indonesia and the extent of her territory, so Yamin states, was clear during the pre-revolutionary period. The term Indonesia had a precise meaning in international scientific literature. It was first coined by an English scholar, Richardson Logan, in 1859. Later, a German scholar, A. Bastian, made the term well-known in his book entitled: *Indonesien order die Inseln des Malayischen Archipels*, 1889.

In the Twentieth Century, Indonesian Nationalist leaders used the term Indonesia in their official publications and in the names of their associations and political parties. The term was well accepted throughout the archipelago by 1928, Yamin says, when the "Oath of the Youth," or the "Oath of Indonesia Raja," was formulated which may be simply summed up as: one Indonesian language, one Indonesian people, and one Indonesian country (fatherland). This concept, since the Proclamation of Independence, "has been officially incorporated into the Constitution and into the language of all of the laws of the government."

In sum, Yamin expounded that the Proclamation of Independence is the important document to gain an understanding as to the meaning of the term Indonesia. The Proclamation repeats the word Indonesia three times: *Kemerdekaan Indonesia* once and *Bangsa Indonesia* twice. The act of proclaiming Indonesian independence was the affirmation of the decision of the meeting of the BPKI on July 11, 1945, that the territory of the Republic of Indonesia would include the eight regions of *Nusantara*. The Constitution of 1945 incorporates this decision within the official policy of the new Indonesian State.

The Consolidation Period of the Revolution and Independence: 1945-60

The question of the territorial boundaries, so Yamin goes on, became a vital issue with the formation of the independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. The intent of the struggle of the people, Yamin repeats, was to establish an Indonesian State commensurate with the boundaries of the father-
MUHAMMAD YAMIN

land. Indonesians from all of the fatherland joined together in the struggle for independence. Yamin specifically names the territories of Malaya, North Borneo, New Guinea, and Timor. In their minds, the "Proclamation" included all of the Indonesian people within the fatherland of Nusantara. The purpose of the struggle for them, from 1945 to 1950, was to achieve this objective. Yamin then says that the decision to confine the Republic of Indonesia only to the territory governed by the former Netherlands East Indies was a temporary one. This was dictated by the political expedients of the times. In other words, the first stage in rebuilding the Indonesian nation was to consolidate the regions now within the former Netherlands East Indies. After this was accomplished, then it becomes necessary to incorporate the remaining regions within the Indonesian State. Under no circumstances must the Indonesian fatherland include enclaves which are either under foreign rule or independent. Without any explanation, but certainly thinking in the terms of geopolitics, he gives the examples of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Period of Renewed Revolution: 1960 to date

Yamin agreed with the "words of Bung Karno in 1960" that: "The Revolution is not yet finished." These words to Yamin meant a renewal of the struggle to establish a unified fatherland. The task is to now integrate those territories which were carved out of the fatherland over a 550-year period, from the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 to 1945, by colonial powers. This is "now the policy of the Republic of Indonesia," and this task "will give new blood to Indonesian nationalism."

To pinpoint that this is now the official policy, Yamin gives much attention to the unilateral action of the Indonesian government where, by "Government Declaration" in 1957, which was subsequently enacted into law in 1960, the entire Indonesian archipelago, measured from straight base lines connecting twelve miles from the outermost points of the islands, was covered within the territorial sovereignty of Indonesia. This law, along with Soekarno's statement that the revolution was not finished, so Yamin states, certainly "rejected the temporary position that the boundaries of Indonesia would only be the same as those of the former Netherlands East Indies."
Jones

Action Program for Nation Building

As an activist, Yamin could not help but to give advice as to how to execute a program for nation building within his territorial designs. Such a program must be built around efforts that are directed toward "anti-imperialism," "anti-colonialism," and "anti-feudalism." Since the objective of "one family" is sought, it must also be directed against "anti-federalism." The national objective should be based upon the concept of "unitarism with autonomy." He then generally suggests how to deal with the several regions outside the present territorial jurisdiction of Indonesia. They should be united by action endeavors in cultural exchange and rejuvenation, economic cooperation, and "a knowledge of the social justice of the Indonesia's governmental system." In short, Yamin's action program amounts to no more than imperialism, with special emphasis on the cultural aspects, as interpreted and applied under Djakarta leadership. In this regard, he turns to the example of China's strong concern for its overseas communities and the manner in which these communities respect their homeland. Indonesians, so he believed, wherever they may be, should also behave in the same manner. This means that Indonesian national leaders should not forget the 40,000 Indonesians now living in the Dutch colony of Surinam on the South American continent! These persons, too, "must be brought within the Indonesian group (nationality) within the Twentieth Century."31

In final note, Yamin believed that all he has expounded would be accomplished within the Twentieth Century. He concludes his thinking upon this matter by using the English language to stress the point that all of the Indonesian fatherland will be united under law relating to: that definite portion on the surface of the globe.32

General Conclusions

Yamin's concept of Indonesia's Manifest Destiny is very much alive in political Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The Djakarta government appears to be following the course of history as skillfully conceived by Yamin and eloquently articulated by Soekarno. The masses on the island of Java seem particularly willing to bear the burden of historical determinism. To many,
it is a sacred trust and mission: one that is directed toward "anti-imperialism," "anti-colonialism," and "anti-feudalism," whatever these slogans may mean.

Indonesia's Manifest Destiny seems to have four territorial dimensions. **First** is the establishment of a sovereign state over the territories of the former Netherlands East Indies. This phase was accomplished when West New Guinea was placed under Indonesian sovereignty in 1963. **Second** is the unification of the fatherland, the eight regional territories of Nusantara. According to Yamin, this became the official policy of the Indonesian government in 1960. Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Malaysia fits well within this phase of history. **Third** is the establishment of some form of Indonesian Raja. The territories here include approximately those of the Austronesian language area. While Yamin passed away before the concept of Maphilindo was given international pronouncement, the efforts to join the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia into some form of regional organization certainly fits within his scheme of building Indonesia Raja. **Fourth** is the formation of a union of states in Southeast Asia under Indonesian hegemony. This appears at this time to be especially the aspiration of Soekarno.

Although there has been strong opposition in Indonesia concerning Yamin's concepts of Indonesia's Manifest Destiny, this appears to have been largely swept aside. Soekarno and his followers have skillfully manipulated internal forces and aspirations toward the end of building a powerful nation headquartered on Java which would dominate most of Southeast Asia. Malaysia, backed by Great Britain and several member of the Commonwealth, represents a strong threat to the aspirations of Indonesia's Manifest Destiny.

In sum, political thinkers and world statesmen may say that nationalism is antiquated, and even dead. In Indonesia it is just flowering. When will Indonesian nationalism run its course? This is a difficult question to ponder, let alone answer. However, one thing appears certain at this stage of Indonesian political history. Nationalism is the most dynamic force today in political Indonesia. Yamin has been one of its principal designers. In regard to its territorial boundaries, he is unquestionably the chief architect of Indonesia's Manifest Destiny. And what may be the outcome of this facet is a story
that remains yet to be told.

NOTES

1 This is the nationalist communist party or nationalist proletarian party. See George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), 313-19.

2 Besides his position as Chairman of the National Planning Council, at the time of his death Yamin was the Indonesian Deputy Chief Minister in Charge of Special Affairs, Ministry of Information. He was previously, among other assignments, adviser to the Republic of Indonesia delegation at the Round-Table Conference in the Hague in 1949. After the formation of the Unitary Government, he became Minister of Justice in 1951-52, Minister of Education in 1953-56, Minister of State in 1957, and a member of the National Council in 1958. This information was secured from Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 12-19, 1963, pp. 190-3.

3 It should be stressed that this action to the Indonesian mind, much imbued with mysticism, means more than simple numbers commemorating an important date. Involved is the most propitious way to relate to certain supernatural forces to assure success of the venture. For more details in a general sense see Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," World Politics 16(October, 1963), pp. 79-97, and Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

4 The BPKI was established by proclamation of the Japanese military on March 1, 1945. The membership of the body was announced on April 29, 1945, and subsequently consisted of sixty-six Indonesian members. It held two plenary sessions: May 28 to June 1 and July 10-17. In addition, the BPKI appointed a subcommittee which drafted the Preamble of the Constitu-
tion, later known as the Djakarta Charter (June 21, 1945). This body drafted the Constitution of 1945 and laid down the main outlines of the new Indonesian state. The first session was largely devoted to speeches and the second to writing the constitution.

The PPKI is the successor body to the BPKI. At the time of its creation on August 8, 1945, by the Japanese military authorities, the BPKI was formally disbanded. The body held its first meeting on August 18, 1945, where it assumed the responsibility of Indonesia's independence. It adopted essentially the draft constitution of the BPKI and elected Soekarno President and Hatta Vice-President of the new republic.

The entire proceedings of the BPKI and the PPKI have never been published. The following three volumes edited by Mr. Hajdi Muhammad Yamin represent the best single source and are considered rather complete. This article draws heavily upon those three sources: Naskah Persiapan-Undang Dasar, 1945, Djilid I (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja 1959); Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia (Djakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959); Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar, 1945, Djilid II (Djakarta: Jajasan Preapantja, 1959).

For Soekarno's speech in English see The Birth of Pantjasila; An outline of the Five Principles of the Indonesian State (Djakarta: Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1958).

This is discussed in my article, "Soekarno's Early Views upon the Territorial Boundaries of Indonesia," Australian Outlook 18 (April, 1964), pp. 30-39.

See the references under footnote number five for Yamin's three, latest published works which all have sections dealing with this subject.

Until recently, it was accepted by Orientalists that the Madjapahit Kingdom at the pinnacle of its power spread over a large part of the Indonesian archipelago. Research of late reveals that much of the old Javanese writings on this subject

11 The entire list of the names of the territories of Nusantara as prepared by Yamin is found in Appendix One.

12 Yamin, *Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar...*, 396. When quotation marks are used this signifies that the writer has translated the statements. There will be no attempt made to document each remark according to a specific page number. However, references will be sufficiently frequent so that the person interested in the source can readily find it.


14 Yamin also said and wrote on much the formation of some type union of states in South Asia (*Ikatan Negara-Negara Selatan.*). He included in this "union" Indonesia, Burma, Siam, Malaya, Vietnam, Philippines, Madagascar, and the Polynesian Islands. Some have interpreted this to be the territorial boundaries for Greater Indonesia. In this regard see particularly *Indonesian Intentions Toward Malaysia*, issued by the Malaysian Embassy, Washington D.C. (Kuala Lumpur: Penchatak Kerajaan, 1964), pp. 1-5. However, the writings of Yamin are rather clear on this point. Greater Indonesia fits more the confines of the Austronesian language area. Beyond this there is also an area of common interests which Indonesia, as defined in Yamin's terms, should establish a hegemony. This is the area which would be *Ikatan Negara-Negara Selatan* (Union of Southern Nations or States).

15 Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Djilid I ...*, p. 205. Also this is discussed in Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 35.


17 For a convenient summary, including most of the leading references on this subject, see Herbert Feith, *The Decline of*
MUHAMMAD YAMIN


18 Yamin, Pembahasan Undang-Undang Dasar..., p. 401.

19 Unquestionably, Hatta represented a minority position. He eloquently and pointedly noted the weaknesses of the Yamin-Soekarno position with its racialist overtones. "This," he said, "is a most dangerous view because we have seen the result of the imperialistic policy pursued by the Germans which sprang from unrestrained passion culminating in the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the end the Germans suffered for their greed. We must persuade our youth to think realistically, to do away with uncontrolled passion, and, instead, to convert their passion to the constructive effort in the development of the country. . . . Let us live within our country—Let us not encourage our own youth toward imperialism." This is a translation found in Indonesian Intentions Towards Malaysia, ..., pp. 2-3. The Indonesian version is found in Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar, 1945, ..., pp. 201-204.

20 It should be recalled that geopolitics was a popular subject in the 1930's. Yamin, educated in the Dutch tradition and with a command of the German language, was undoubtedly well versed in this subject. This is evident throughout all of his political writings, although he seldom makes any specific references to the subject of geopolitics. His extreme left wing political leanings and associations with known Communists probably accounts for his restricted use of the terminology and little direct reference to the subject. He was too shrewd of a politician to be branded as a person with Fascistic mentality.

21 This is the common translation of the "Oath of the Youth." However, the Indonesian word bamgsa has several meanings: people, nationality, or nation. Nevertheless, the Indonesians interpret this Oath to mean one people, one fatherland, and one language. For more details in popular Indonesian terms see Illustrations of the Revolution Indonesian (Djakarta: Republic of Indonesia, 1954), pp. 40-42.
22 Yamin spelled the word home-land in this way. See his *Pemahasan Undang-Undang Dasar*..., p. 392.

23 These roughly translated "native country," "fatherland," "eminent country," "wealthy country," "country of our ancestors," "pure country," "sacred country," "radiant country," "a country we love," and "her islands, sea and land."

As an interesting sidelight, Yamin was on a special committee in 1944 which revised some of the verses of *Indonesia Raja*. See *Illustrations of the Revolution*..., p. 40.

24 This is my translation. For a comparison of all three of Indonesia's constitutions see Garth N. Jones, *A Comparison of Indonesia's Three Constitutions* (Jogjakarta: Balai Latihan and Penjelidikan Tata Usaha Pembangunan Lembaga Masjarkat dan Negara, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1960).


26 Yamin does not use these headings *per se*. His outline, relating to historical periods has been slightly modified to fit more within the purpose of this article.

27 This decision is discussed in Jones, *op. cit*. The meeting Yamin refers to voted upon three proposals as to the territorial boundaries of Indonesia. These were:

1. The former territory of the Netherlands East Indies, and the territories of North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Portuguese Timor, Malaya, New Guinea, and surrounding islands . . 39 votes
2. The former territory of Netherlands East Indies . . 19 votes
3. The former territory of Netherlands East Indies . . 6 votes

64 votes

Two votes were blank and another for a different plan. This accounts for the 67 votes of the delegation.

28 It should be stressed that Indonesia has asserted time after time that its territorial aspirations included only the territorial area once governed by the Netherlands East Indies' Government. Both the 1949 and the 1950 Constitutions provided
that the boundaries of the state shall consist only of this territory. The Constitution of 1949, in article 2, spells out in detail the territories of the nation. The Constitution of 1950, in article 2, only says that the "Republic of Indonesia comprises the whole territory of Indonesia."

Yamin never mentions what is probably the real reason. Soekarno at the opening session of the PPKI on August 18, 1945, said that he told General Terauchi that in spite of the BPKI's claim to territories outside of Dutch colonial territory, he would be content with the territory of the former Netherlands East Indies. See Professor A. G. Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah Singkat Berdirinya Negara Republic Indonesia* (Surbaja: N. V. Pustaka Indonesia, 1958), pp. 35-6.

The 1960 law which Yamin refers to is *Peraturan Pemerintah Undang-Undang*, No. 4/1960.

This item is now being investigated by myself and Dr. Carl Q. Christol of the Department of Political Science, University of Southern California. A draft article has been prepared: "Politicization of Indonesia's Claim of Territorial Seas."


The italicized part is that used by Yamin including the misspelled word, "surfase". See *ibid.*, p. 427.
**APPENDIX ONE**

**WILAJAH NUSANTARA**
(Territory of Musantara)

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<tr>
<th>Daerah</th>
<th>I: Seluruh Djawa (All of Java):</th>
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<td>Djawa</td>
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<td>Madura</td>
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<td>Galiyao (Kangean)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Daerah</th>
<th>II: Seluruh pulau Sumatera (All of Sumatra):</th>
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<td>Lawas (Padang Lawas, Gajo Luas)</td>
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<td>Lamuri (Atjeh Tiga Segi)</td>
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<td>Barus</td>
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<tr>
<th>Daerah</th>
<th>III: Seluruh pulau Kalimantan (Tandjungnegara) (All of the Island of Borneo):</th>
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<td>Kapuas</td>
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<td>Samput</td>
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<td>Sedu (Sedang di Serawak)</td>
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<td>Kadangdangan (Kendangwangan)</td>
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<td>Tirem (Peniraman)</td>
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<td>Solot (Solok, Sulu)</td>
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<td>Tabalong (Amutai)</td>
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<td>Lawai (Muara Labai)</td>
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<td>Landak</td>
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<td>Sedu (Serawak)</td>
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<td>Kalka Saludung</td>
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<td>Tandjung Kutai</td>
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<td>Tandjungpuri</td>
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32
MUHAMMAD YAMIN

Daerah IV: Seluruh Semenandjung Melaju
(All of the Malaya Peninsula):

Pahang                       Hudjungmedini (Djohor)
Lengkaksuka (Kedah)          Saimwang (Semang)
Kelantan                     Terangganau
Nacor (Ligor)                Pakamuar (Pekan Muar)
Dungun (di Terangganau)       Tumasik (Singapura)
Sanghyang Hudjung             Kelang (Kedah, Negeri Sembilan)
Keda                         Djere (Djering, Petani)
Kandjap (Singkep)            Miran (Karimun)

Daerah V: Disebelah Timur Djawa, Seluruh Nusa Tenggara
(Next to East Java, all of the Lesser Sundas):

Bali                          Bedulu
Lawagadjah (Lilowan, Negara)  Gurun (Nusa Penj'da)
Dompo (Sumbawa)               Taliwang (Sumbawa)
Sanghyang Api (Gunung Api, Sengeang)  Sapi (Sumbawa)
Hutan (Sumbawa)               Bhima
Gurun (Gorong)                Geram
Saksak (Lombok Timur)         Lombok Mirah (Lombok Barat)
Timur                         Sumba

Daerah VI: Seluruh Sulawesi (All of the Celebes):

Bantajan (Bonthain)          Luwuk (Luwu)
Udamakatraja (Talaud)        Makasar
Butun (Buton)                 Banggawi (Banggai)
Kunir (P. Kunjit)            Galiyao
Selaja (Saleier)             Solot (Solor)

Daerah VII: Seluruh Maluku (All of the Moluccasses):

Muar (Kei)                    Wandan (Banda)
Ambon                        Maluku (Ternate)
Jones

Daerah VIII: Seluruh Irian Barat (All of New Guinea):

Onin (Irian Barat) Seran (Irian Selatan)

THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF SUBSISTENCE FARMERS: A PRELIMINARY REVIEW

A. T. Mosher

This paper was prepared for the opening session of the Conference on Subsistence and Peasant Economics held at the East-West Center, Honolulu, from February 28, 1965 - March 6, 1965.

I have always had great admiration for Woodrow Wilson. Nevertheless, I would like to begin this afternoon by quoting from a critical essay about him. There is nothing particularly in common between Woodrow Wilson and subsistence agriculture, but there may be a useful lesson for us as we start this conference in some remarks made about President Wilson by Walter Weyl in his essay "Prophet and Politician."

This faith of Mr. Wilson in his Fourteen Points, unexplained and unelaborated, was due to the invincible abstractness of his mind. He seems to see the world in abstractions. To him railroad cars are not railroad cars but a gray, generalized thing called Transportation; people are not men and women, corporeal, gross, very human beings, but Humanity -- Humanity very much in the abstract...."

We are met here, so the announcement of our Conference states, to discuss "subsistence economics." This is a combination of two abstractions. Most of the prepared papers we have in hand, from which to launch our discussion, carry assigned titles phrased largely in abstract nouns. These abstractions are useful, but the purpose of the Agricultural Development Council in calling this Conference will not be achieved unless we can get behind them to the people whom they both represent and tend to conceal.

The Agricultural Development Council is concerned primarily
about the economic and human problems of agricultural development in Asia. Most of the farmers of Asia among whom this agricultural development would have to take place are subsistence farmers. Their farming is carried on more to provide food for the family, or for the village community or tribe, than it is for sale to an outside market. If this situation continues, very little agricultural development can occur, and the levels of living of the people on these farms cannot rise. For agricultural development to take place it is essential among several other necessities, that farms become less and less subsistence, and more and more commercial, producing increasingly for the market. In order that we or others can help that to happen, it is essential that we learn more about what motivates subsistence farmers at the present time, and what new influences can be brought to bear to help them move toward greater commercialization of their farming.

This is why the Council has joined with the East-West Center in sponsoring this Conference.

Who, specifically, is it that we have in mind when we speak of the subsistence farmer?

He is the farmer just north of Lake Victoria in Uganda, who has the use of all the land he may want to cultivate, whose staple food is bananas, who cultivates an area about twice the size that is necessary to feed his family in a year of favorable weather as protection against the occasional poor harvest. If the weather is good and the harvest plentiful, he leaves half of the crop to rot in the field because he has no market for it.

He is the elderly college professor in the Philippines who all of his life has grown rice on his home farm, utilizing hired labor, to meet his own family needs for their staple food and to supply the families of his married children living in towns and cities, so that they need not be dependent for food on an uncertain market.

He is the farmer on the Ganges Plain of India who grows food primarily for his own family and to exchange in kind for the services of the village carpenter, potter, barber, and other artisans. He sells any surplus that may remain after these needs have been met for cash, to meet the costs of basic living necessities not produced in the locality, perhaps to pay rent, and hopefully to make a payment on his indebtedness. He would like to expand his farm but cannot because of the pressure of population.
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He is the farmer in the northern part of the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil who operates a self-sufficient farm much like those of early colonial America, growing his own food, cutting his own timber, making his own implements, building his own house, and selling each year a few pigs that have their own built-in transportation for the twenty-mile trip to the nearest market.

In New Guinea, he is a member of an isolated tribe, cutting the trees and the brush from a few plots of land in order to cultivate a crop for a few years and then moving on to clear another site as the fertility of the plots he has been cultivating gradually diminishes.

Obviously, subsistence farmers are not a homogeneous group. They differ widely in the amount and fertility of the land they have available, in the crops they grow, in whether or not they have any other employment. They differ as to the economic setting in which they live, and in the kind of general over-all human culture on which they are a part. What they have in common is that they still think of their farming operations largely in terms of providing for family needs through their own production; even though they may sell a minor portion of their products to others.

This is not to say that they do not think of costs and returns. But in addition to, or perhaps in some cases instead of, cash costs, they may have a different kind of costs in mind to which they do not attach a cash value. To them, a "cost" may be arduous work or leisure or ceremonial foregone, or the pain of appearing to be different in a community of long standing and practically static traditions, or the ridicule that the failure of a new technique would bring down upon them. The returns they consider certainly include the utility of each product to the family, whether or not it has cash value in the market. The certainty of having rice, or wheat, or corn, when the family needs it, is frequently a part of the "returns" that subsistence farmers take into account. One of the tasks of our conference will be to examine the nature of these "perceived" costs and returns for subsistence farmers.

Classifying as subsistence farmers those who sell for cash or barter less than 50% of the production of their farms, no one really knows with precision just how many such farmers there are in the world. In 1936, Whittlesey estimated that subsistence
farming, together with hunting and fishing, supported about 60% of mankind, or 1.6 billion people. In 1948, the Woytinskys estimated that 55% of mankind lived in economies in which subsistence farmers predominated. This would be 1.4 billion people. To that number would have been added subsistence farmers in economies where they are a minority of the total population. To this must also be added the effect of the rapid rate of population growth in recent years.

Second, what is the problem with which we are trying to grapple? The problem, simply stated is this: How can subsistence farmers be encouraged and helped in making their farms less and less subsistence farms and more and more commercial.

This does not always involve making small farms larger.

Small subsistence farms vary all the way from those that sell practically nothing, to those that sell almost 50% of their products (by the definition that we have adopted for this conference). A farmer can progress along this line, continuously selling more and more of his products as he increases the productivity of his farm. Many farmers in Japan and Taiwan have moved out of the subsistence category entirely, and have become highly commercial without any appreciable increase in the size of their farms.

Whether or not small farms can expand into larger and larger ones, depends on the local situation. If additional arable land, not now in farms, is available, or if some farmers can secure employment in the towns, then the farms of the remaining farmers can increase in size. However, there are many localities and even large regions where this cannot happen. A rapid rate of population growth, and lack of industrialization sufficiently rapid to provide enough off-farm employment to allow some of those people who are now farm operators to move to jobs in the city, will keep as many people as are now in agriculture on farms for a long time to come, and farms will remain small.

What can happen is that farms, large or small, can increase in productivity, becoming more and more commercial and more and more rewarding to their operators in the process. It is this process of moving into greater productivity, out of subsistence into increasingly commercial agriculture, whether or not the sizes of the farms change, that we are to discuss in this conference.

Third, why are we interested?
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There are some among us, call us the "sof-hearted" if you like, who are concerned about this problem because of the plight of the hundreds of millions of people who are involved. These families dependent on subsistence agriculture did not choose to be born where they were. They are not responsible for the resource endowment, or lack of it, of their countries. They did not create the existing population pressure of the regions where they live, although they may be contributing to that of the future. Some of them are reaching out for a better level of living than they now have. The rest of them are being, and will continue to be, squeezed into tighter and tighter corners by the more productive and more advantaged persons among whom they live. They deserve a better break. They deserve to participate in any economic advance their societies may achieve.

There are others among us, call us the "hard-headed" if you will, who say "Not so fast. One does not wish greater productivity into existence. Resources are scarce. They must be applied where they will do the most good and that is not in subsistence agriculture. These subsistence farmers are an anachronism in the modern world. Resources spent trying to help them are money down the drain. Economic growth must come first, and should be stimulated at the points at which it can come most easily. It may be regrettable, but it is true, that the greatest returns per dollar spent in agriculture are achieved by expanding the opportunities of those who are already commercial farmers. Even if you are interested in the plight of the subsistence farmer and his family, the sensible thing to do is to push industrialization and give greater facility to commercial farmers, and gradually the growth of the whole economy will raise the level of living of those who are now subsistence farmers more than will any attempt to help them directly."

Without disparaging too many of these judgments of the hard-headed, some of which are sound, some of which are at least half true, we might remind ourselves that hard-headedness does not always connote intelligence, or the word "block-head" would not be in our vocabulary.

Economic growth is basic. Without it no amount of income redistribution, no sentimental concern for the underdog, can have much effect. The basic problem is to increase the size of the pie, not to change the shares into which it is sliced. Industrialization is important. Both the material goods for a
rising level of living and employment opportunities for an increasing population depend on it. Even agricultural development itself is dependent on the availability of industrial products such as fertilizers, implements, pesticides, and new sources of power.

But the converse is also true. The health of industries is dependent on a productive agriculture, partly to feed the cities, and partly as a market for manufactured goods. The faster those now engaged in subsistence agriculture increase their productivity and move more and more into commercial operation of their farms the greater the demand for industrial goods will be and the faster the total economy can grow.

So there are these two quite different bases of interest in this problem, one growing out of immediate concern for the welfare of the people involved -- subsistence farmers and their families -- and the other hard-hitting emphasis on total economic growth in a society and the optimum allocation of resources to that end. While I have outlined the two as though they are espoused by different groups of people, most of us, in fact, represent a composite of the two. It is only in the proportions in which we combine them that we differ.

Each approach has its value; each can serve the other. It is no good being concerned about the plight of persons unless we can devise valid and efficient ways of helping them, and a dispassionate analytical approach can be helpful in this. There is no point in being coldly analytical unless one's conclusions are sound; to this end, when approaching the problems of subsistence farmers it is important to take into account their possible contributions to, as well as their dependence on, general economic growth.

Moreover, the revolutionary days through which we are living certainly demonstrate that the human spirit cannot wholly be contained; second class citizens don't stay put; the time lag between rising levels of living in one part of a society and those in another cannot be too long, no matter what the results of an analysis of optimum measures for economic growth may be, without an explosion.

Next, what are our tools for the work of the coming days?

Most prominently they will be the tools of analysis of our several academic disciplines. They will be the tools of the economist, developed to probe man's activities in producing, ex-
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coming, and consuming goods and services. They will be the tools of the anthropologist, developed to help uncover and explain the fabric of the total way of life of a particular group of people. They will be the tools of the sociologist, fashioned to reveal the ways in which special groups of people organize themselves and interact with other groups within the society.

At the same time as we use these tools we shall be re-examining their relevance to the problem before us. For to the extent that economics deals with production and consumption on the assumption of exchange in the market, and of a specialization of economic function among members of a society, there may be some question as to how far different ones of its tools of analysis are relevant to the problem of achieving those changes in the life of a people that first bring them into the market out of a largely self-sufficient mode of economic life. To the extent that anthropology seeks to encompass the whole life of a people and to stress the interdependence among all of its facets, there may be some lack of complete fit between its dominant preoccupations and the issues of what most wholesomely, or least disastrously, rends this fabric and introduces some of the disharmonies and conflicts that are an inevitable part of economic growth and progress. To the extent that the tools of sociology examine the functioning of established social groupings they may not be adequate to help us discover how new organized groups of people coalesce around new interests. And for all of us, schooled increasingly to expect and to honor statistical distributions of phenomena, how do we catch the important impact of deviant behavior at the end of a distribution in the direction of commercialization, or of innovation, or of invention? These are basic in any understanding of progress.

I don't want to deprecate our tools. They are powerful instruments and we can use many of them. But is it not true that each of them is like a powerful searchlight, gaining much of its focus by abstracting from many features of the everyday workaday world of the complex human beings and societies we need to understand? And can we be sure that in the process of using such sharply-focussed searchlights we are not in danger of leaving unilluminated quite significant parts of that common life in between, or underneath, the aspects that our searchlights reach?

Charles Morgan, in his novel, The Fountain, puts into the
diary of one of his characters these words:

"A peasant seems stupid to townsmen because, when making a decision, he so often refuses to be guided even by reasonable argument addressed to that decision. But he is not stupid; he is wise. He rejects the particular argument because it bears too closely on the subject to be decided. It is new, raw, human, fallible. He prefers to submit each question, however small, to the sum of his experience and tradition."3

What I am suggesting is that in our attempts to understand the subsistence farmer, the peasant, we may need ourselves to become more like him, in the characteristic Morgan here describes — that it is quite possible that our several tools of analysis may be like the townsman's arguments; too narrowly pertinent to a particular point and not sufficiently cognizant of the total humanity of the man — that what we need is something including, but beyond, what we normally call an "interdisciplinary approach." For it is not at all certain that, taken collectively, these formal tools of our several disciplines reveal the configuration of the whole problem. There may be inter-related aspects of what we need to understand for which the only integrator available to us is the human mind, as suffused by empathy and intuition as it is informed by insights from scientific observation.

It is for this reason that I hope that while we use our conventional analytical tools for all they are worth, we not exaggerate their value, and not shirk from tackling this problem in our capacity as the whole persons we are.

Finally, what can we hope to accomplish as a result of our conference? This is hard to predict.

I do hope we will have two questions in mind as we proceed. First, are the measures required to help subsistence farmers increase in productivity different in kind from those needed by commercial farmers, or is a difference in relative emphasis all that is required? Second, can we distinguish between those characteristics of subsistence farmers that are critical, from the standpoint of causality, to movement into greater productivity and more commercial operation of their farms, on the one hand, and those characteristics that are merely associated with...
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subsistence agriculture or with movement out of it, on the other.

As for the first question, we know that there are five essentials for growth in agricultural productivity anywhere.

One is transportation. Agriculture, basically, depends on utilizing solar energy, through the process of photosynthesis in the leaves of plants. It must always remain "spread out" to utilize sunlight where it falls. Unlike most other industries agriculture cannot be concentrated near its ultimate customers or near existing transportation facilities; you can't just choose to locate all farms where there already are railway sidings. Transportation facilities of one kind or another must reach to each farm.

The second essential is markets for farm products and a marketing system to get them where they are wanted. Little development is possible within wholly subsistence agriculture for the needs of the farm family for food and fiber are strictly limited. For agriculture to develop farmers must be able to sell to others, at home or abroad. To this end, three things are necessary; someone, somewhere, who wants to use the farmer's product; a marketing system to get the product from the farmer to the consumer; and confidence of the farmer in this marketing system.

Third, agricultural development requires the discovery, or invention, or development, largely through formal research, of more efficient techniques for utilizing solar energy through the life processes of plants, and of plant products through the life processes of livestock. This involves modifying the genetic form of plants and animals, developing new supplements to chemical elements present in the soil through fertilizers, evolving effective means of controlling pests and diseases, developing new implements and power resources to accomplish improved techniques of cultivation and husbandry, and putting each of these new techniques to the test of comparative costs and returns from the standpoint of the farm business as a whole.

Fourth, the farmer must have access to the supplies and equipment needed to put these new techniques, evolved by research, into operation on his farm. These fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, and implements must be sound technically, priced so that they are profitable to use, dependable in quality and available precisely when needed.

Finally, the farmer must have adequate incentives to cause
him to adopt the new practice or practices. Foremost among these is remunerative price relationships; relationships between the prices he can count on getting for his products and the prices he must pay for the supplies and equipment he must buy and use in order to get the increased production. Another powerful incentive is the share of the harvest that the farm operator can himself retain. This is where the prevailing system of land ownership and terms of tenancy have an important effect. Still another is the size of the increment in production that a new technique, or group of techniques, can promise.

These requirements for agricultural development are basic, anytime, anywhere; transportation, markets, new technology, production, supplies and equipment, and incentives.

Are there any basic additional requirements to get almost wholly subsistence farms and farmers moving along the road toward greater commercialization? Or is the case simply that where agriculture is already partially met? Is extending these same facilities to additional farmers all that is necessary to revolutionize subsistence agriculture?

No matter whether agriculture is subsistence or commercial, there are several additional activities or services that can accelerate the process of development: general education, the training of agricultural technicians, and education of the urban elite (who influence governmental policies affecting agriculture) about the need for and the requirements for, agricultural development.

Another important accelerator is facilities for providing production credit to farmers, credit to purchase the additional inputs that could substantially increase agricultural production.

A third accelerator of agricultural development is voluntary farmer associations of various types; cooperative societies, 4-H clubs, farmers clubs, community construction projects, etc. These have two advantages. One is that they can get tasks accomplished which individual farmers, operating alone, cannot achieve. And by involving group discussion of new ideas, and ad hoc organization around a specific interest, they can affect the local climate of public opinion within which the individual farmer must live and work. In addition, they can shift the social organization of the locality away from groups based largely on birth, or on the needs of a largely static society, toward groups and prestige based on developmental activities.
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Is it only in the relative importance or is it in the form of these accelerators that it makes a difference how far farmers are along the continuum from subsistence to commercial agriculture?

The second question I hope we can keep in mind is also important: can we distinguish between those characteristics of subsistence farmers that are crucial, in a causative sense, to the move toward greater productivity and those that are associated with subsistence farming but not really critical, either positively or negatively, from the standpoint of economic growth?

It is obvious from the papers with which we begin that the total number of characteristics of subsistence farming to be discussed here is great. In some cases, those who wrote the papers have already stated, or implied, the ones they believe to be critical. In other cases, they have not.

We could spend an interesting week together, sharing each other's insights about subsistence farmers and come out of the exercise each with a more comprehensive catalog of factors associated with subsistence farming, but without making the distinction I am asking for here. I hope we shall not stop there but go on trying to determine which characteristics of subsistence farmers, or changes in which characteristics or influences on, them could make the critical difference in moving into more commercial farming.

It is also possible that among those factors that are responsible for change some can be influenced directly while others may emerge indirectly or unobtrusively within a matrix we do not completely understand.

In Edward Arlington Robinson's poem, Tristram, her father says to Isolt of Brittany:

"Wisdom was never learned at any knee,
Not even a father's.
Wisdom is like a dawn that comes up slowly
Out of an unknown ocean."

Some of the operative factors in moving farmers from subsistence to economic-mindedness may be like that. It may not be possible to influence them directly, nor may it be important to try to do so. They may emerge of themselves out of the flux that can be created by influencing other factors. It would be
immensely helpful if we could distinguish between factors that need to be manipulated, those that are operative but derivative, and those that are merely resultant.

May I come back, in closing, to the essay about Woodrow Wilson?

At a later point in the essay, its author states:

"...Mr. Wilson apparently did not see that his Fourteen Points were not an explicit programme but were something less and infinitely more -- a splendid but vague summary of decades of thought.... the thought of this world, derived from the long perceived needs of millions of ordinary men and women. Having stated his philosophy, Mr. Wilson refrained from taking the next step of working out a plan of action. He went into the jungle with a map of the world but without a compass...."

I think we may each reasonably expect to come out of this conference with a far better map of the world of subsistence agriculture, subsistence economics, subsistence behavior than we have had before. But let us also try to come out of it with a better compass, with some more effective operational tools for helping subsistence farmers move into greater productivity, into more commercially-oriented production.

While keeping our attention throughout the conference primarily on this one factor of increasing the "economic-mindedness" of subsistence farmers, if you like, I assume we shall keep it in mind that this seldom becomes absolute, in any person, nor would we want it to. After all, academic economists are not particularly noted for complete personal absorption in accumulating wealth; many have much broader interests. Sociologists are not always keen each to find himself in the middle range of every distribution; once in a while one of them likes to be alone, and sometimes even to sing. Anthropologists seldom pride themselves on complete conformity to the values and traditions of the culture in which each was born; quite the contrary. Subsistence farmers and their families, commercial farmers and theirs, are much more than cultivators. They are not a gray abstraction called Humanity; they are men and women with hopes and fears, capacities and creativity. What we can aspire to com-
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tribute to, through our efforts here, is to improve their opportunities, through greater agricultural productivity, to do some of the many, many different things they may choose to want to do.

To the East-West Center, the Agricultural Development Council wishes to express its gratitude for its cooperation in sponsoring this conference. To all of you who are participants in the conference, thank you for taking the time to prepare for and to participate in it and welcome to a week of work. Let us hope that the outcome of the conference may be such that some of the millions of those who today are subsistence farmers around the world will sooner or later have reason to be glad that we are meeting here this week.

NOTES


2 W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production, Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, p. 419.

BOOK REVIEWS


Delicately, yet realistically, the intricacies of family life in India at the turn of the nineteenth century are explored in this novel. Tagore's psychological appreciation of the ebb and flow of feeling between human beings brings vividly alive his characters. His story deals with the web of emotion and action woven chiefly by Rajlaskshmi the matriarch, who seeks to remain first in her married son's affections; Binodini, the young widow who is brought to the home to distract the son from his wife; and Mahendra, the pliant son. These people together with the others in the novel Tagore makes both Indian and universal.

Though published originally in 1902, Binodini is completely modern in so far as characterization is concerned. The sound psychological motivation of each person produces a startling reality. We see these human beings in constant interaction which seems without goal because it is based on immediate gratification rather than a search for permanency. The result is that the three chief characters, refusing the moral responsibilities of their positions, bring the family to a tragic end.

The plot is a simple one. It is a familiar one. Yet Tagore has managed to use simplicity and familiarity so honestly that they represent truth and life rather than stereotyped situation.

It is not plot, however, with which the reader lingers. Theme it is which impels the attention. Perhaps the most striking theme in this novel is the awful role Chance assumes when individuals refuse to examine their egos and to face everyday facts. In addition, there appears the destructive force of love when it is lightly used. As one character remarks, "Love severed from the hard realities of life is like a plucked flower in splendid isolation; its limited sap cannot sustain it for long." Interestingly, even Asha, the innocent wife, contributes to the debacle because she fails to heed the warning in her husband's remark "a modern girl must be modern."
Combined with these universal themes is a specific Indian one which appraises the unhappy and, to Tagore, socially destructive role of the widow in Indian society. Young, beautiful, passionate, Binodini refuses to believe with society that her life must be over because her young husband is dead. Through her eyes we see her situation so strongly that she emerges as the heroine of the novel, to be pitied rather than condemned.

The only flaws in this novel lie in the awkwardness of the translation, for which the translator apologizes, and the unnecessary footnotes which accompany the first part of the text. These are, of course, of small matter once one becomes absorbed in Tagore's earnest and appealing plea for social change.

1 Tagore originally used Binodini (the name of the heroine) as the title. Later he changed it to Chokher Bali (lit. 'Eyesore') which was used for its first publication. The translator returned to the original because of its aptness.

Mrs. Virginia N. Kennedy
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The book under review is the introductory volume to the series, Language and Culture of Rennell and Bellona Islands, Elbert (University of Hawaii), whose interest primarily was language and folklore collected many secular tales. On the other hand, Monbert (University of Copenhagen), concerned himself with what the traditions revealed about the culture, particularly religious experiences before the adoption of Christianity. The painstaking, detailed, and fully documented research done by each has been smoothed into a stimulating and readable work.

The series promises to provide something for everyone whose interests may touch on Polynesia. The authors relate their field experiences and give the cultural, geographical, and social background of the islands accompanied by maps, photographs, and figures. Since the English translation is given in columns parallel to the original texts, a section is devoted to language and to translating techniques. The biographies of the informants
and genealogies are followed by 236 texts with variants and footnotes. The traditions are arranged in the following order: gods and culture heroes, immigration to the islands, the formation of settlements and clans, secular stories, and conversion to Christianity.

On the whole the volume mostly covers the texts and the basically ethnographic translations into English. The result does not make for smooth reading in English but it succeeds in retaining fidelity of message and of style.

Although sketchy, this volume is well-organized and substantial and it incorporates an enormous amount of fresh material. While the series is intended for specialists, From the Two Canoes is not beyond the scope or enjoyment of less advanced students.

Elizabeth S. Moody
East-West Center


According to its publishers, this book is a region by region study of the main features of the Uttar Pradesh land reform legislation, "of the lags and frictions in its implementation, and of its immediate and anticipated effects on land owners, tenants, and agricultural workers, as well as on the rural economy as a whole." The research on which the book is based took place between June 1960 and May 1961, and covered eighty-one sample villages, involving over 14,000 households and 51,000 acres of land.

Anyone who is seeking a critical evaluation of land reform policies in this part of India will be disappointed if he consults Messrs. Singh and Misra's study. This publication contains a great amount of carefully prepared statistical data, but comparatively little discussion and interpretation. Statistics intrude into the text so much in places that reading it becomes excessively tedious. Other parts of the book, for example, the section on compensation, are written prescriptively as if they are direct quotations from one of the Acts, although they are not cited as such.

Although there is much material concerning family expenditure on items like improvements to land and the purchase of
new bullocks both before and after the abolition of the *Zamindari*

system, no details are given of gross per capita, or family, in-
come during these periods. The social and economic effects of
land reform upon the individual small farmer are not generally
interpreted and discussed.

As a resource book, this study has much to offer. It
would seem to have the character of a Government of India
Departmental Report, however, rather than a book intended for
publication overseas. The East-West Center Press has streng-
thened this impression by designing a dust jacket which features
a map showing the states of Jammu and Kashmir as integral parts
of India. If the Press is dedicated to the promotion of inter-
national understanding, such *faux pas* surely should be avoided.

The publishers are also at fault for having failed to edit
the book adequately. A work published in an English-speaking
country for English-speaking readers should be free from gram-
matical and idiomatic errors. This one is not. Non-English
constructions and vocabulary usages appear in the authors' in-
troduction and in the text. Such errors could have been elimi-
nated completely if the publishers had taken the trouble to
read the manuscript carefully before sending it to the printers.

The lack of a final chapter in which the results of the
land reform program are analysed and discussed in relation to
the whole economic and social structure of the state is disap-
pointing, but perhaps symbolises the authors' tendency to list
facts and objectives without subjecting them to critical
scrutiny. A bibliography could well have been included; regret-
ably references to other works can be found only in citations
scattered through the text of the report.

This book may be useful for the specialist who is willing
to interpret the data for himself. It is unlikely to hold the
interest of the general reader.

Richard A. Benton
East-West Center

*A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic.* By Milton
321 pp. $7.00.

The study under review examines historically the evolution
of foreign policy and diplomacy in a developing society. The
author has chosen as his starting point the establishment of the
Republic of the Philippines in 1946, and traces Philippine relations with other nations until 1961. He sees a basic concern with the preservation of national security, the achievement of full sovereignty and the maintenance of complete independence as the characteristics of Philippine foreign policy since 1946.

These arms have led to an emphasis of military ties with the United States and political alignment to the west, an expansion of commercial relations with the non-Communist world, and a strengthening of ties with Asian nations. Traditional links with both Spain and the United States, together with cultural and racial ties with their South East Asian neighbors provide the Philippines with a unique setting within which to orient relations with other states, and have assisted the development of a truly independent foreign policy.

Dr. Meyer stresses the remarkable uniformity of the approach to foreign affairs by successive Philippine Governments, but points out that changing local and international conditions have also influenced Philippine diplomacy.

In a country with a long tradition of centralized authority and where the President is easily the principal formulator and executor of foreign policy, it is worthwhile noting the study's insightful treatment of the chief executive's interaction with various interest groups. Perhaps this process might be studied further by other students of Philippine foreign policy.

It may be added, however, that since the study seeks an inquiry into "the origins and development of Philippine diplomacy," it might have been helpful to have also treated the first Philippine Republic headed by President Emilio Aguinaldo.

There are various reasons mentioned in the study's preface as to why a Filipino has not as yet attempted a comprehensive survey of the field. Perhaps, one should look into the socio-cultural values prevailing in Philippine society to provide some of the other reasons. On the other hand, the growing amount of literature on politics and administration in the Philippines -- which includes some studies by Filipino scholars on other facets of Philippine foreign relations -- as well as the increasing interest in public and international affairs may well provide the proper setting for further inquiry into the field.

However, considering the still meager amount of literature on Philippine foreign policy, A Diplomatic History of The Philippine Republic contributes significantly to the study of Philippine national development. The book should be of special
value to the student and practitioner of foreign policy.

Nestor M. Nisperos
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In this small book of seventy-three pages, Professor Nakayama has sought to identify and discuss some of the basic factors responsible for the phenomenal growth of Japan's economy since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. His major concern is an analysis of the contribution made by such significant elements of Japanese society as the Emperor's overall political influence, feudalism, family ties, and paternalism in business relations.

The new Regime not only provided political stability and administrative efficiency but also initiated a series of steps which laid the basis for the subsequent modernization of Japanese economy. This included the setting up of certain key industries by the State, the opening up of Japan to foreigners, the exposure of Japanese scholars and technicians to the knowledge and skills of the outside world and emphasis on educating the people. But this process of reform and progress hardly touched the core of the Japanese social system. Nakayama emphasizes this point and asserts that although the Japanese Industrial Revolution may have been sparked off by the constant pressure of the threat of a foreign invasion, it was the peculiar character of Japanese society which helped sustain a steady tempo of accelerated growth. He highlights the proposition that in this process the best of the traditions of feudalism were "exploited" to the full. Also, it was the deep-rooted loyalty of the individual to the family and to the State that provided the attitude and habits of discipline and hard work which ensured contentment with meagre wages and a low rate of consumption. The latter led to a constant supply of surplus capital for investment in worthwhile economic pursuits.

While the book clearly brings out the happy relationship of a tradition-bound society with the overall process of industrial growth, it hardly mentions the stresses and strains which must have accompanied the process. It also says very little as to how Japan's performance could be taken as a model by other devel-
oping countries. Observations on these two points would certainly add to the value of Professor Nakayama's treatise under review.

Another point which the book fails to bring out fully is the conclusion that exploitation of the characteristics of the traditional society in Japan has reached a saturation point, and with the Post-war Reforms pertaining to political and economic systems and the Trade Unions, Japan faces an extremely uncertain future. "In the present situation," says the author, "anything could happen. Nationalism, reactionism and radicalism...." No doubt Japan is politically and socially in a state of transition but the subject demands a searching analysis of the various factors, internal and exogenous, before any valid conclusions about the future contribution of the various characteristics of the traditional society can be reached. This could well be the subject-matter of a separate study and research.

The book is well-written, neatly printed and is small enough to attract the attention of all those interested in an understanding of the nature of the phenomenal rise of Japan as one of the leading industrial powers of the world and how the various elements of a non-modern society helped provide the basis for this remarkable achievement.

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East-West Center Review is one outgrowth of the programs of the East-West Center Grantees' Association, an organization of all East-West Center students in the Institute for Student Interchange division of the Center. Most students in this division of the Center are graduate students working for Master's degrees and come from some thirty-five different countries.

The scope of East-West Center Review is the exploration of cross-cultural contacts. This emphasis follows closely the scope of the Center as a whole, although the Review is not meant to stand for any other organization than the East-West Center Grantees' Association.

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