Military Professionalism in Asia

CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES

Edited by

Muthiah Alagappa

EAST-WEST CENTER

Military Professionalism in Asia

CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES

Edited by

Muthiah Alagappa

EAST-WEST CENTER

© 2001 by the East-West Center. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Military professionalism in Asia : conceptual and empirical perspectives / edited by Muthiah Alagappa.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-86638-196-1 (pbk.)

1. Asia--Armed Forces. 2. Asia--Armed Forces--Officers. 3. Asia--Armed Forces--Non-commissioned officers. I. Alagappa, Muthiah.

UA830 .M56 2001

355.3'095--dc21

2001033064

Publications Sales Office
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601
Email: ewcbooks@EastWestCenter.org
Tel.: (808) 944-7145
Fax: (808) 944-7376
Website: www.EastWestCenter.org

CONTENTS

Preface v

Contributors vii

1. Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Perspective 1
Muthiah Alagappa

2. India: Military Professionalism of a First-World Army 19
Major General (Retired) Dipankar Banerjee

3. Japan: Completing Military Professionalism 35
Major General Noboru Yamaguchi

4. South Korea: From "New Professionalism" to "Old Professionalism" 47
Min Yong Lee

5. Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism 61
General Sun Chin-ming

6. Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads 77
Surachart Bamrungsuk

7. Indonesia: Redefining Military Professionalism 93
J. Kristiadi

8. China: From Revolutionary Tool to Professional Military 111
You Ji

9. Vietnam: The Many Roles of the VPA 137
Carlyle A. Thayer

10. Pakistan: Professionalism of an Interventionist Military 151
Samina Ahmed

11. Burma: The "New Professionalism" of the Tatmadaw 163
Tin Maung Maung Than

12. Military Professionalism in Asia: Ascendance of the Old Professionalism 179
Muthiah Alagappa

Index 215

Related Publications 229

The changing nature of civil-military relations in Asia has been the focus of a multiyear project at the East-West Center from 1998 through 2001. Seeking to illuminate the relationship between the soldier and the state in 16 Asian countries, the project, entitled "The State and the Soldier in Asia: Investigating Change and Continuity in Civil-Military Relations," explores ongoing changes and anticipates future trajectories in this relationship. Specifically, it investigates the following key questions: What is the relationship between the military and the other institutions of the state—particularly the containers of political power? Has this relationship changed over the years? If so, how and why? And, finally, what is the anticipated trajectory of civil-military relations in Asia?

The major product of this project is a book: *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*. Published by Stanford University Press, it will appear in the summer of 2001. In addition to the book, the project has resulted in several East-West Center publications: four Occasional Papers, one AsiaPacific Issues paper, and this volume: *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*. (See the back of this book for a list of these works.)

Military professionalism has been an influential though controversial concept in the study of civil-military relations. Although it did feature in *Coercion and Governance*, military professionalism was one of several factors examined in explaining change and continuity in Asian civil-military relations. The express focus of this volume is the concept and practice of military professionalism in Asia. Apart from offering a conceptual perspective, the following chapters explore the conception, practice, evolution, and consequences of military professionalism in 10 Asian countries. Our primary purpose here is to investigate military professionalism from the perspective of the practitioners of the art in Asia. Most of the chapters have been contributed by serving or retired military officers as well as scholars working in military institutions. For readers interested in explanation, I strongly urge them to read *Coercion and Governance*. Indeed, the present volume should be viewed as a companion to that book and can profitably be read in conjunction with it.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank several persons: the authors for their contribution, Harold Trinkunas and James Mulvenon for reviewing the

papers, Laura Moriyama and Lillian Shimoda for their secretarial services, Ann Takayesu for preparing the manuscript for publication, Don Yoder for his copy-editing, Yoshi Amae for his research assistance, and Elisa Johnston and Carol Wong for overseeing publication. Thanks are also due to the Smith-Richardson Foundation and the Ford Foundation for their financial support for the project. It has been my pleasure to work with all of them.

Muthiah Alagappa
March 2001

Samina Ahmed is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Previously she was an international relations consultant for the Asia Foundation, Islamabad and senior research analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad. She received her Ph.D. from Australian National University. Her research interests include nuclear proliferation, South Asian regional security, ethnic conflict, and civil-military relations in South and Southwest Asia.

Muthiah Alagappa is senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu and director of its Washington Office. At the time of directing this project he was the Center's director of studies. He received his Ph.D. in international affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international politics in the Asia Pacific, regional institutions, and comparative politics in Asia with a focus on political legitimacy, human rights, democracy, civil society, and civil-military relations.

Surachart Bamrungsuk is associate professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He teaches Thai national security and defense policy at Chulalongkorn University and is also a guest lecturer at various military institutions in the Royal Thai Armed Forces. His research is mainly on the Thai military and defense policy.

Dipankar Banerjee was a major general in the Indian Army. He holds two postgraduate degrees in political science and defense studies: an M.A. from Mysore University and an M.Sc. from Madras University. He is executive director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, based at Sri Lanka. Previously he was codirector, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi and deputy director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. His research interests include security issues in South Asia, cooperative security, and disarmament issues.

J. Kristiadi is deputy executive director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. His research interests include domestic politics, civil-military relations, political institutions, and voting behavior in Indonesia.

Min Yong Lee is a colonel in the ROK Army and professor of international relations at the Korea Military Academy. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland at College Park. His research interests include cooperative security regimes in East Asia, and military professionalism in North and South Korea.

Sun Chin-ming was a general in the Republic of China Army. He is now senior instructor at the Institute of Military Science, National Defense University and chairman, Society for Defense Studies in Taiwan. He has served as platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, and division commanding general. His research interests include military affairs and cross-strait relations.

Tin Maung Maung Than is a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Previously he was head of branch, Research Policy Direction Board, Government of Myanmar. He received his Ph.D. in politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His research interests are democratization, civil-military relations, and developmental issues in the Third World, especially in Myanmar.

Carlyle A. Thayer is currently a faculty member of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu on leave from the Australian Defence Force Academy, where he is professor of politics. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Australian National University and an M.A. in Southeast Asia studies from Yale. He specializes in issues involving Vietnam.

Noboru Yamaguchi, a major general in the Ground Self-Defense Force, is currently serving as defense and military attaché to the embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. Prior to that he was deputy chief of the Defense Planning Division, Ground Staff Office, assistant chief of staff for operations, 11th Division Headquarters (Sapporo), and chief, Arms Control Section, Plans and Policy

Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff Office, within the Defense Agency. He received his M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University.

You Ji is senior lecturer in international relations at the School of Political Science, University of New South Wales. Formerly he was a lecturer in political science at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Australian National University. His research interests include Chinese politics, military modernization, and East Asian security.

1

Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Perspective

Muthiah Alagappa

Military professionalism is an influential but controversial concept in the study of civil-military relations. First defined by Samuel Huntington in 1957, the explanatory power of the concept has been a subject of continuing contention in the academic community.[1] Most scholars now agree that Huntington has overemphasized the effects of professionalism.[2] In fact, a recent overview of the field has called for the abandonment of the study of the connection between the military's professionalism and the expansion of its political role.[3] Nevertheless the concept and its presumed consequences continue to hold sway in policy circles and military establishments in the West and in the democratizing countries of the developing world including those in Asia. Even those who dispute the concept's explanatory power advocate professionalization of the military as a key guideline to be followed by democratizers and indeed posit it as a key measure in the consolidation of democracy. This introductory chapter reviews the diverse definitions of military professionalism, outlines its relationship to civilian control, and surveys the claims and contentions in the academic community over the concept's explanatory import.

DEFINING AND PROBLEMATIZING MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Although Huntington's explanatory proposition has been challenged, his definition of the concept has been widely accepted. He cites three characteristics—expertise, responsibility, and corporateness—that distinguish a profession from a vocation.[4] According to Huntington, the professional person is "an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor." Professional knowledge comprises two parts: a broad education, which is imparted by the general institutions of learning in society, and specialized knowledge and skills that are given by the institutions of the profession itself. The development of such knowledge and skill requires not only institutions of research and education but continuous interaction between theory and practice. Professional expertise is acquired only through "prolonged education and experience." Unlike

"ordinary skill or craft," professional knowledge and skill have universal application. Drawing on Harold Lasswell, Huntington asserts that the peculiar skill of the military officer is "the direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence." This "extraordinarily complex intellectual skill" demands comprehensive and continuous research, education, and training. To develop the high order of expertise required, military officers must devote their working life almost exclusively to this purpose. The "management of violence" skill of the military is universal in that it is "not affected by changes in time or location." Military officers throughout the world are united by the "possession of a common professional skill."

The second characteristic of a professional is social responsibility. He or she performs a service that is "essential to the functioning of society." The client of the professional is the society. Material reward is not the primary consideration in the conduct of the professional's duties. The higher calling inherent in social responsibility "distinguishes the professional man from other experts with only intellectual skills." Insofar as the military officer is concerned, the primary responsibility is the protection of society and state. This motivation—along with a code of ethics grounded in custom and tradition rather than financial compensation—constitute the driving force of the military officer's conduct and set the military professional apart from a mercenary.

The third distinguishing characteristic of a profession is corporateness—that is, unity and consciousness among members that they belong to a distinct body which has formal standards of professional competence and, moreover, the authority and means to enforce them. Military officers belong to such a distinct body that comprises not just the formal armed bureaucratic units but also a vast complex of "associations, schools, journals, custom, and tradition." With their own principles, structure, and institutions, the armed forces establish and enforce professional standards and codes of behavior. Entrance to the military is restricted to personnel with appropriate educational and health qualifications; career advancement hinges on acquiring established standards of knowledge, training, and experience; officers' conduct must conform to established norms and rules; deviations are punished and may even lead to discharge; and the highly valued attributes of honor, courage, and service to country are rewarded through awards and recognition that usually do not carry a monetary value. It is not the satisfaction of any one of these three criteria but the combination of expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness that makes military officership a professional calling. As Huntington notes, no profession meets all three criteria without qualification. This is also the case with the military profession.

The only substantive challenge to Huntington's definition has come from Alfred Stepan, who seeks to contrast his "new" professionalism with the "old" professionalism of Huntington.[5] Stepan does not question the social responsibility and corporateness aspects of the definition. His challenge focuses on the management of violence—a skill that is claimed by Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and others as the special and only function of the military—and the associated claim that the complexity of this skill requires military officers to devote all their time to learning and practicing it, making it impossible for them to develop competence in other areas. According to Stepan, the military officer's scope of professional action is not limited to the management of violence. Military officers in developing countries (and in some developed countries) have acquired "highly interrelated political and military skills."[6] The concern with subversion and internal security—and the assessment that such threats cannot be dealt with solely through the application of violence—has led militaries in Latin America and elsewhere to conclude that military officers must be equipped with a broad range of expertise including political, social, and economic affairs. Instead of increasing skill differentiation and making these skills incompatible, the "new" professionalism inculcates the belief that there is a fundamental relationship between the military and other spheres. Stepan proceeds to argue that the new professionalism politicizes the military, leading to its role expansion.

Huntington, too, has concluded that in a situation of domestic war, political and military roles and means become indistinguishable.[7] The change from international to domestic war, he says, may have a drastic effect on the attitude of military officers toward government—making them less amenable to objective civilian control. Equating military professionalism with objective civilian control and claiming that objective civilian control is impossible during an internal war, Huntington implies that military professionalism is unattainable in a situation of domestic conflict. Rather than accept this conclusion, Stepan formulates the concept of a new professionalism focused on internal security and national development.

Although widely accepted and used uncritically by policymakers and scholars (including some contributors to this volume), these two formulations rest on four assumptions that should be critically examined:

- First: the military's management of violence skill excludes the application of violence in the internal security role.
- Second: objective civilian control is unattainable in a condition of internal war.

- Third: military involvement in the internal security role must necessarily go beyond the management of violence to include political, social, and economic functions.
- And fourth: it is useful to have two conceptions of military professionalism—one focused on external security and the other on internal security and national development.

In regard to the first two assumptions, there is no objective rationale for limiting the application of violence to the international realm and, moreover, not all military deployment in the internal security role is incompatible with objective civilian control. In the abstract, the modern state is supposed to be internally pacified. Internal use of force is attenuated, indirect, and primarily aimed at maintaining law and order. Such use of force is a police function. The unrestrained use of force is confined to the anarchic international realm. In practice, however, very few states are internally pacified. Until recently even the United Kingdom was confronted with a serious internal political problem that required massive deployment of the military. Deployment of the military in the internal security role has been routine practice in many developing countries and in some developed countries as well. The crucial consideration is not the scope of military action (external or internal application of violence) but the legitimacy of the incumbent government, its jurisdiction over the military, and the state's capacity to oversee military action in the domestic or international arena.[8] So long as the civilian authority is legitimate and accountable and has the authority and means to control the institutions of state coercion, there is no logical reason for excluding the application of violence function from the internal domain. In practice the extension of this function to the internal domain has not always had the consequences posited by Huntington. The military's role in the 1948–1960 emergency in Malaya, the anti-Huk counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines, the British government's response to the Northern Ireland problem, the ongoing actions against ethnic rebellion in Kashmir and the northeastern states in India—all are illustrative of this claim. Only in the extreme case of all-out civil war that engulfs the whole country, as in pre-1949 China, may military deployment in the internal security role be incompatible with objective civilian control. Huntington's contention that objective civilian control and military deployment in domestic situations are incompatible appears to rest more on definitional fiat than on logic or empirical evidence.

The next two assumptions pertain to Stepan's alternative formulation of a new professionalism. Although it is indisputable that internal security problems

have political, economic, social, and military dimensions, it does not follow that the military is the proper agency to address all these aspects. The multiple dimensions of the problem call for different agencies of government to act in a concerted manner, not for the military to develop expertise in all these areas. Although the military may be asked by the civilian authority to undertake certain socioeconomic tasks, especially in rural and remote areas, this is different from the military itself assuming this responsibility. There is no logical reason why the military's involvement in internal security must necessarily lead to a broadening of its expertise and its role. Often the new professionalism is an ideology deployed by militaries to justify usurpation of political power and role expansion. The expansion and contraction of roles are key issues in the study of civil-military relations. They are better highlighted by a definition that limits the military to its proper function in the management of violence than by one that broadens the military's expertise and scope to include all aspects of governance.

Turning now to the final claim, many countries simultaneously confront internal and international threats but most have only one military establishment to deal with both varieties. Some countries have paramilitary units to deal with internal threats, but this arrangement has not precluded military involvement. If there is only one military establishment that undertakes both functions, it makes little sense to have two conceptions of military professionalism, one focused on external security and the other on internal security. Although Stepan's concept has descriptive and analytical value, Huntington's definition broadened to include the application of violence in the internal arena under the control of a legitimate government is the more useful concept in ascertaining military professionalism and deviations from it. Further, the "old" and "new" adjectives are confusing. For example, one might argue that Stepan's "old" professionalism is now becoming the normative ideal in Asia while his "new" professionalism is in fact becoming the "old" professionalism reflecting the past behavior of Asian militaries. Our preference for Huntington's definition, however, does not extend to his presumed consequences of military professionalism.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

Huntington defines civilian control of the military as "government control of the military" and his criterion of civilian control is "the extent to which...the armed forces as a whole respond to the direction of the civilian leaders of government."[9] The term "civilian control" has been the subject of much discussion. Timothy Colton rejects the term "control" because in his view it implies antagonistic

relations between sharply bounded institutions and forces analysts to think in dichotomous terms.[10] Because of the gradations in Soviet party-military relations, the subject of his inquiry, he prefers the term "participation." While recognizing the usefulness of the term "civilian control," Felipe Aguero contends that subjective civilian control is inappropriate to the task of his inquiry (democratization) and maintains that the connection between professionalism and objective civilian control posited by Huntington does not always hold true.[11] He prefers the term "civilian supremacy," which he defines as "the ability of a civilian, democratically elected, government to conduct general policy without interference from the military, to define the goals and general organization of national defense, to formulate and conduct defense policy, and to monitor the implementation of military policy." This definition of civilian supremacy, as Aguero acknowledges, is essentially the same as the definition of civilian control advanced by Claude Welch. Arguing that civilian control is a matter of degree, that all armed forces participate in politics in some fashion, and that civilian control is a set of relationships, Welch takes the cue from Huntington and states that civilian control is a matter of "setting limits within which members of the armed forces, and the military as an institution, accept the government's definition of appropriate areas of responsibility."[12]

Although these three terms—participation, control, and supremacy—have been advanced as competing alternatives, each is quite distinct and has its own relevance for the study of civil-military relations. "Participation" is useful for the reasons cited by Colton, but it does not obviate the need for the term "control," which indicates who defines the framework for such participation. There is greater overlap between "control" and "supremacy" and, contrary to Aguero, both terms may be defined and operationalized to convey gradations in civil-military relations. Thus although it is possible to argue that supremacy is distinct from control, the two terms are used interchangeably in this study because of the overlap in common usage.

Huntington identifies two types of civilian control—subjective and objective—that differ on how the military order relates to society, on the relationship between the military officer corps and other elite groups, and on the relationship between military commanders and civilian political leadership.[13] In *subjective* civilian control, the military mirrors society and there is "identity of thought and outlook between civilian and military groups." Sharing in the dominant values of society, the military leadership "participates actively in government" and obeys the government "because it agrees with the orders." In subjective control, there is no clear divide between military and society and indeed the military is

Table 1. Relating Civilian Control to Military Professionalism

Professionalism Characteristic	Objective Civilian Control	Subjective Civilian Control
Expertise	Highly specialized management of violence skill; military role sharply differentiated from other social and political roles	Military role not sharply differentiated from other groups; military and political roles indistinguishable
Social responsibility	Military's client is the state and society; its responsibility is to defend them from external aggression; it is a tool of state policy	Military's allegiance is to a specific form of government, social class, or ethnic group; its responsibility is to defend privileged position and rights of that government or group against other groups in society; as participant and tool in power struggle among different civilian groups, military has an internal focus
Corporateness	Sharp line between military and society; politically and socially isolated from society, military is a distinct group with its own value system and organization	No clear divide between military and society; military is not a distinct group set apart from society; it reflects dominant values and divisions in society

presumed to reflect society. Civilian control in a totalitarian society differs from that in a democratic society. Thus subjective control can come in many forms. *Objective* civilian control, as posited by Huntington, is the direct opposite of subjective control. The military does not mirror society, it is indifferent to the values and conflicts in society, it does not participate in government except as a tool of state policy, and military leaders obey the government "not because they agree with its policies [or believe in the goals of the war], but simply because it is their duty to obey [and fight successfully for whatever ends the government wishes to pursue]." There is a clear divide between civilian and military spheres and, according to Huntington, there is only one universal form of objective control. Table 1 relates these two types of civilian control to the three characteristics of military professionalism.

A further distinction between subjective and objective control can be made on the basis of the distribution of power between civilian and military

groups. The fundamental issue in civilian control is the maximization of civilian power and the minimization of military power. In subjective civilian control, the primary focus is on the maximization of the power of a certain civilian group vis-à-vis other groups in society. As the military is an integral part of the group seeking to dominate state power, subjective control does not necessarily imply minimization of military power. Objective control, by contrast, is focused explicitly on reducing military power—but only to the point where the integrity of the military profession and the military security of the nation are not undermined. According to Huntington, the interests of the military profession drive the demand for objective control whereas the demand for subjective control is driven by the imperative of a particular civilian group to maximize its power and dominate the state.

Subjective and objective civilian control are useful as ideal types. In practice, civilian control is likely to feature elements of both types although one may predominate. In Malaysia and Sri Lanka, for example, civilian control, for the most part, is of the subjective control type rooted in ethnic considerations. The militaries in both countries have an implicit or explicit role in protecting the dominant position of the Malay and Sinhala communities. But within this subjective control framework, civilian control of the military exhibits certain features of objective civilian control. The focus is on reducing military power vis-à-vis the civilian leadership and limiting the military to the security function and the management of violence. The militaries in these two countries are distinct bodies with their own professional standards and expectations, and they obey the orders of the government in power. It is important to observe such nuances and not force analysis into false dichotomies.

A major shortcoming of the typology advanced by Huntington relates to objective civilian control. He contends that under objective civilian control the military is indifferent to the values of society. This position, however, clashes with his claim that the client of a professional military is the society and that the social responsibility of the military professional is to protect that society. Values are an integral part of society, and protection of society entails defense of a specific value system. Unless the military is a mercenary organization, the protection of a set of values entails a commitment to them. Although the military may be above political competition among different groups vying for state power and espousing different priorities, this is not the same as being indifferent to the dominant social values. Moreover, the military's isolation from society to enhance its organization and operational effectiveness is not the same as being divorced from society. Huntington tends to conflate the two and, in the process,

inadvertently erases an important difference between the military professional and a mercenary.

A second shortcoming is the near impossibility of distinguishing objective control from democratic civilian control. Although he seeks to differentiate the two, objective civilian control as noted by Huntington himself has "only been achieved to any real degree in Europe, the British Commonwealth and the United States."[14] He goes on to cite approvingly the claim by Gaetano Mosca and Karl Mannheim that the passive acquiescence of large military institutions to governmental direction and control many well be one of the distinguishing features of Western civilization. The subjective Fascist control of the military in Germany—a European country—during the Hitler era and the passive acquiescence of a large military establishment to government control in a developing Asian country like India are examples that run counter to the civilization argument. A more accurate claim would be that objective civilian control has only been achieved in liberal democratic countries. This statement is in line with my contention that it is virtually impossible to distinguish objective control from democratic civilian control. If this contention is correct, then the value of distinguishing between subjective and objective control diminishes. Given the plural forms of subjective control and the conflation of objective and democratic civilian control, it may be more illuminating to label civilian control by its specific form: Leninist Party control, ethnic control, democratic control, monarchic control, and so forth. A final shortcoming of Huntington's typology, as we shall see, pertains to the connection posited among military professionalism, objective control, and the military's political orientation.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Among the numerous arguments that have been advanced to explain the politicization of the officer corps and military intervention or nonintervention in politics, five propositions are pertinent here. Two relate to the skill component of professionalism; the third relates to the element of corporateness; the fourth pertains to the continuous threat of war and the rise of the specialist on violence; and the fifth proposition relates to the military's mission and roles.

Skill Differentiation and Political Orientation

Two propositions connect the skill of the military profession with the military's political orientation and the potential for its role expansion. Huntington says that

professional militaries are apolitical and keep out of politics. Stepan says the "new professionalism" politicizes the military and encourages role expansion.

The first thesis advanced by Huntington has been most influential—especially among policymakers. Seeking to explain the political orientation of the officer corps in terms of its degree of professionalism, Huntington asserts that a highly professional military is apolitical, concentrates on strategic matters, and leaves political decisions to civilian authorities.[15] He advances two interconnected reasons why a highly professional military would be apolitical. First, he says, by "confining the military to a restricted sphere," professionalization "renders it politically sterile and neutral" and minimizes its political power. Fully consumed by the education, training, and operational requirements to master the management of violence, the professional military officer does not have the time to develop competence in other areas. It is the perceived potential of professionalism to reduce the military's political power and make it an apolitical institution that informs Huntington's emphasis on professionalization as a key goal for democratization.[16] The second reason put forth in support of his thesis is that the highly complex nature of political and military skills—and the ensuing skill differentiation—make it impossible to switch roles. Where skill differentiation has occurred, he says, "one man [cannot] hope to exercise both callings." In countries where skill differentiation has not occurred, "no autonomous military profession exists."

Huntington's thesis has been hotly contested in the academic community. But as Stepan has observed, many critics have not read Huntington's works carefully and simply reproduce criticisms that have become fairly stereotypical in the literature. Nevertheless, there is a key shortcoming in Huntington's thesis. It is unclear from his exposé whether the development of professionalism reduces the military's political power or whether professionalism is an outgrowth of a reduction in the military's political power. In other words: is professionalism a cause or a consequence of a reduction in the military's political power? At one point Huntington asserts that the necessary condition for "objective civilian control is the existence of an autonomous military profession recognized as having a special responsibility for the military security of the state."[17] That is: military professionalism is a prior condition for objective control to take hold. But in identifying the condition for maximizing military professionalism, he posits a certain distribution of power as the precondition for the emergence of an autonomous military profession. Huntington states: "It is that distribution of power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among members of the officer

corps."[18] If professionalization does indeed reduce the military's political power, then his apolitical thesis and the related guideline for democratizers make sense. For this to hold, however, it must be demonstrated why and how military professionalization leads to a reduction in the political power of the military. If, on the other hand, professionalism is the outcome of a certain distribution of power, then the focus on professionalization as a means to reduce the military's power is misplaced. It is the factors affecting the distribution of power between civilian and military groups—and how they may be mobilized in support of the duly constituted civilian authority—that should command our attention.

A second criticism relates to the claim that mastery of the military skill is so consuming that officers cannot develop other skills and this prevents their politicization. While there is little doubt that the management of violence in the contemporary era requires considerable intelligence, effort, and time, it does not follow that military officers cannot develop skills in other areas of governance including politics. As demonstrated by the experiences of Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Charles DeGaulle, one does not have to spend a lifetime developing political skills for high office. My point is simply this: while it may be difficult, it is not impossible for military officers to develop competence beyond their military skill. Military and political skills may have different imperatives and demands, but it does not follow that they are entirely incompatible. Further, not all officers need to develop competence in more than one skill. Even more important, as Huntington himself observes in a later study, politicization is a function of the nature of society, not the attributes of a particular profession or group.[19] In a praetorian society, all groups including the military are politicized.

Moreover, insofar as expertise is concerned, assessment of professionalism must turn on mastery of the skill itself, not skill differentiation. Physicians are professionals because they have attained a certain level of proficiency in the art or science of medicine, not because their skill has become differentiated from others. Specialization indeed makes a skill distinct, but this cannot be the criterion for assessment of professionalism. Military officers should be considered professional because they have become proficient in the management of violence, not because their skill has become differentiated from the skills of other role players in the state.

Shifting the basis for assessment of professionalism from skill differentiation to mastery of a certain skill also eliminates the tautology charge that is frequently leveled against Huntington's thesis. By stating that an autonomous military profession does not exist in countries where skill differentiation has not occurred and that professional militaries do not become politicized, Huntington

is ruling out by definitional fiat both professionalism on the basis of proficiency and the possibility that professional militaries may also be political. Further, the outcomes to be explained—politicization and intervention—are also the evidence for explanation. Although he does not say so, the logical extension of Huntington's proposition is that the military's disengagement from politics after it has intervened would hinge on the development of professionalism. Although the tension between the military's governing role and its management of violence role is important, it is difficult to argue that this tension must lead to the military's disengagement from politics. Often the military's exit from politics and its restriction to a defined sphere are outcomes of a change in the distribution of power against the military. The primary drivers of such a shift in the distribution of power are changes in the government's political legitimacy, in the level of economic development, in state capacity, and in the international normative and material structures—not changes in the level of military professionalism.

Shifting the basis for assessment of professionalism from skill differentiation to proficiency in the skill itself resolves part of the circularity problem, but it also negates Huntington's primary proposition. Indeed, there is no inevitable link between military professionalism and expansion of the military's political role. A professional military may be apolitical or political. As illustrated by the case studies in this volume, there are several examples in Asia where the military is professional—in that it has developed a high level of competence in the management of violence—but this has not prevented it from intruding into the political domain. While there is no causal logic that requires a professional military to be apolitical, inculcation of the belief in the military (and in the society at large) that a professional military should be apolitical often contributes to the military's depoliticization. Here the driver is the power of a certain idea of civil-military relations (as opposed to the complexity of the skill and skill differentiation) that becomes an integral part of military professionalism. Combined with a shift in the distribution of power that often causes the military's exit from power, the normative ideal can reorient the military, enhance civilian power, and foster civilian control of the military. It is in this context that Huntington's advocacy for a professional military in democratizing countries makes sense.

The second proposition connecting military skill and political orientation is that of Stepan. In contrast to Huntington's thesis that a professional military is apolitical, Stepan claims that the new professionalism politicizes the military and contributes to its role expansion. Noting the simultaneous increase in professionalism and politicization of the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries—and contending that this is part of a wider phenomenon—Stepan develops an alternative

formulation of professionalism focused on internal security and national development. The broad expertise required to deal with internal security problems narrows the skill differentiation between the military and political elite, leading to the belief that there is "a fundamental interrelationship between the two spheres, with the military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic problems owing to its greater technical and professional skills in dealing with internal security issues."[20] In the process the new professional, according to Stepan, becomes highly politicized, leading "inevitably to some degree of role expansion." The extent of role expansion, however, is a function of the legitimacy of the civilian government. The weaker the civilian government, the greater the military's role expansion and vice versa.

Though frequently interpreted as such, Stepan's formulation of a new professionalism and his thesis are not antithetical to those advanced by Huntington. The new professionalism and its presumed consequences are in fact one version of Huntington's subjective control. Huntington says that professionalism as defined by him is impossible in situations of domestic conflict, that the military is politicized in situations where the government's legitimacy is challenged, and that under subjective civilian control political and military skills and roles are interchangeable. The new professionalism concept is useful, however, in highlighting a point made earlier: a high degree of military professionalism does not preclude politicization. As for the proposition that the new professionalism politicizes the military and leads to its role expansion, earlier I argued that the military's internal security role need not lead to these consequences. As we have seen, there are many examples where the military has engaged in the internal security role without becoming politicized. The key—as Stepan notes but does not accord due weight—is the legitimacy of civilian government and its capacity to determine and oversee the use of state coercion in maintaining the internal and international security of the state. Though the ideology of a new professionalism may lend itself to military role expansion, there is no inevitable link between the two.

Corporateness and Political Orientation

The third proposition, advanced by Bengt Abrahamsson and Amos Perlmutter, links the corporateness of military professionalism and the military's political orientation.[21] The thesis is this: success in professionalization breeds corporate interest—and the better defined these interests become, the greater the chance they may lead to civil-military conflict if they collide with civilian interests. The military's propensity to intervene in politics and policy formulation is linked to

its corporate and bureaucratic roles as opposed to its expertise role. According to this argument, the corporate orientation of the modern military determines its political behavior and a high degree of corporatism is correlated with military praetorianism.[22] The military, accordingly, will intervene to protect its corporate interests—including control over recruitment, doctrine, training, promotions, salaries, and arms procurement. In this scheme, a weak civilian government accommodates the military's interests and demands in order to prevent a coup.

The corporate interest proposition, unlike Huntington's professionalism thesis, does not suffer a circularity problem. Addressing the corporate concerns of the military is an important consideration in civil-military relations, especially during periods of transition to civilian rule. Nevertheless, corporate interest is a subsystemic factor that is hardly a necessary or sufficient cause for military intervention. At best, in Samuel E. Finer's terminology, it may constitute a push factor.[23] Only in a very few cases like the 1999 Pakistan coup is corporate interest likely to be the primary driving force. When it does spur intervention, this intervention is likely to be reactive and defensive—to protect the military's institutional autonomy and prerogatives—and short lived.[24] Once the situation has been corrected and jurisdictional boundaries have been established, the military is likely to return power to civilians. For more extensive military domination of the state and politics, the military project must go beyond the demands of corporate interest.

Military Mission and Roles

The final two propositions link military intervention and nonintervention to continuous threat of war and the military's mission and roles. One hypothesis holds that the continuous threat of war blurs the civil-military distinction and leads to the military's political ascendance. This garrison state hypothesis was advanced by Lasswell as the antithesis of the civilian (democratic) state.[25] Positing a continuous threat of war and emphasizing the technological revolution, Lasswell argued that the specialists on violence are in the ascendant and will come to dominate the political stage. In his view, the civilian state (that is, democracy) is not viable "under conditions of chronic war and threat of war or violent revolution." C. Wright Mills maintained that the United States was engaged in a permanent war economy—and argued that a centralization of power by a homogeneous elite comprising political, corporate, and military leaders (the military-industrial complex) would subvert democracy.[26] Kurt Lang claims that with the growing salience of science and technology in national security, the distinction between strategy and policy and between military and civilian entities

has become blurred in the advanced industrialized countries.[27] Strategy is intricately connected to policy. And as the military component in foreign policy gains ground, so too does the weight attached to the counsel of soldiers—leading to the rise of the garrison state. All three argue that rather than constituting a restraint, military professionalism provides the impetus for expansion of military influence in the context of a continuous threat.

More than 50 years have elapsed, but the garrison state has not come to pass in the advanced industrialized democracies. The militaries in these countries continue to be subordinate to civilian authority. Lasswell and others ignored the vitality of democratic ideas and the checks and balances instituted by democratic institutions in these countries. As Aaron Friedberg has observed, in the case of the United States the fragmented nature of the American political system—especially the separation of powers among the different branches of government—and the pervasive antistatist ideology with the concomitant interest in limiting state power prevented the development of a stronger, more centralized state like that posited by the proponents of the garrison state hypothesis.[28]

The final proposition is that the specific mission of the nation's military has a major impact on civil-military relations. There is disagreement, however, over which mission is conducive to civilian or military control. Michael Desch argues that international combat missions are the "most conducive to healthy patterns of civil-military relations [by which he means the democratic model], whereas nonmilitary, internal missions often engender various pathologies."[29] Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner argue the contrary: they cite the absence of large-scale interstate conflict as one of the key reasons explaining the retreat from military rule in Latin American countries.[30] Still others posit a connection between the military's internal security role, the erosion of democracy, and the political ascendance of the military.[31]

Evidence can be found to support as well as contradict the propositions related to the military's mission and roles. The military did dominate politics in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand that were confronted with acute international threats. This is still the case in Pakistan. The presence of an acute international threat has not always led to the military's political ascendance, however, as illustrated by the experience of India and, to a lesser degree, that of Singapore. Further, despite the continuation of grave international threats to state survival, the militaries in South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand (1973) were compelled to disengage from politics. Finally, the military has intervened in politics in countries like Burma and the Philippines that do not confront major international threats to security. There is no clear link, therefore, between grave

external threats and the military's political ascendance. In some cases, external threats have enhanced the power of the military; in others they have not. Evidence can also be found to support or contradict the posited connections between the military's internal security role and its political ascendance. As pointed out earlier, however, the key is not whether the military's role is internal or external but who holds the power to make decisions. There is little prospect of military role expansion if the civilian government has the authority and capacity to define and redefine that role.

But if permissive conditions prevail, the potential for military role expansion is greater in the internal than in the international role. In the internal role the military is deployed within the country—giving it an opportunity to build organizational, administrative, and economic structures, resources, and capacity that can more readily be deployed to increase its power to the detriment of other state institutions. Moreover, the military's involvement in internal security and socioeconomic roles demystifies government, exposes the weaknesses of civilian leaders and institutions, and enhances the military's confidence in its ability to govern. It is more difficult, though not impossible, to translate the assets of the military's international role (external defense as well as deployment in foreign countries in an occupational, peacekeeping, or developmental role) into power and authority at home—which is the key to civil-military relations. The military's political salience is greatest when the political legitimacy of the civilian government is weak and coercion plays a crucial role both in domestic governance and in safeguarding the country's international security, as for example in Pakistan.

Although the experience of the advanced industrialized democracies over the last five decades refutes the garrison state hypothesis (and none of the other propositions is conclusive), this set of explanations focused on the threat of war and the military's mission and roles serves a useful purpose: it highlights, if only indirectly, the functional connection between coercion (the primary endowment of the military) and the internal and international consolidation of the nation-state—as well as its implication for civil-military relations. Elsewhere I have argued that shifts in the weight of coercion in governance constitute the crucial variable in explaining change in civil-military relations.[32] Having defined military professionalism and examined the types of civilian control as well as the posited connections between military professionalism and the military's political orientation, we can now proceed to an empirical exploration of these issues in 10 Asian countries as viewed from the perspective of their military establishments.

ENDNOTES

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

2 David Pion-Berlin, *Through the Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).

3 Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999):211–241.

4 The ensuing discussion of professionalism is drawn from Huntington, *Soldier and State.*

5 Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

6 Ibid.

7 Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 29–32.

8 Muthiah Alagappa, "Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, "Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America," *Armed Forces & Society* 26(3)(2000):413–436.

9 Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, eds., *Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 380.

10 Timothy J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 62–63.

11 Felipe Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 19.

12 Claude E. Welch, ed., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), pp. 1–3.

13 The discussion in this section is based on Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military."

14 Ibid., p. 383.

15 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 84.

16 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

17 Huntington, "Civilian Control of the Military," p. 383.

18 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 83.

19 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

20 Stepan, "The New Professionalism."

21 Bengt Abrahamson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

22 Perlmutter, *Military and Politics*, p. xvi.

23 Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Penguin, 1976).

24 Pion-Berlin, *Through the Corridors of Power.*

25 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology* 46 (1941): 455–468; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

26 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

27 Kurt Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), p. 117.

28 Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 5–6.

29 Michael Desch, "Threat Environment and Military Missions," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 12–13.

30 Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations*, p. xvi.

31 Stepan, "The New Professionalism"; Sumit Ganguly, "From Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil Power," in Charles H. Kennedy and David J. Louischer, eds., *Civil-Military Interaction in Asia and Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 1991); Desch, "Threat Environment."

32 Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance.*

2

India: Military Professionalism of a First-World Army

Major General (Retired) Dipankar Banerjee

The Indian military has been unique among the armies in the developing world in several ways.[1] It has not launched a military coup, for example, or ever attempted to usurp civilian power—even when its relative pay, power, and influence in civil society declined sharply after independence in 1947 or when faulty political-strategic decisions and political interference in the conduct of military affairs led to major military setbacks. When democracy was actually replaced by emergency in 1975 for two years, it was through a constitutional coup rather than a military putsch. The armed forces have remained scrupulously neutral over the last 50-plus years of the country's independence. During the last decade when failures in governance led to the military's increasing involvement in maintaining law and order under trying conditions, especially in the Punjab, Northeast India, and Jammu and Kashmir, the army has steadfastly remained apolitical and true to its profession. Even frequent calls to aid civil authorities in natural calamities have not distracted it from its primary professional responsibilities.

In a sense India has had a First World military, even as the nation has remained part of the Third World. This is as much a matter of ethos, outlook, and professionalism as it is a question of maintaining a strict attitude of neutrality and distance from civil political affairs. Why has this been so? For an answer one must turn to Samuel Huntington's classic theory of military professionalism. Huntington argues that a professional military is "politically sterile and neutral"—concentrating on military strategic matters and leaving political decisions (affairs of governance in today's words) to civilian authorities. This, he contends, allows the desirable condition of "civilian control" over the military. Others have suggested that the term "civilian supremacy" should be used to define this condition. In the Indian situation, as we shall see, it has more often been "civilian control"—and yet it has worked.

In India, as in many developing countries, in matters determining civil-military relations it is the army that is overwhelmingly more important. All through the period since independence, the Indian Army has constituted about 80 percent of the strength of the total armed force. Its interface with the civilian administration continues to be more intense. In the final analysis, in matters

affecting governance and maintenance of law and order it is only the army that is usually involved. Besides, the very nature of their respective operational tasks makes the navy and the air force more professional, as defined by Huntington, forcing them to spend more time on military training—especially where there is a large inventory of conventional weapon systems to maintain. Our main focus here, therefore, will be on the army and its characteristics.

For at least the last 200 years, the Indian Army has been an all-volunteer force. Potential officers from all services undergo long and intense training before being commissioned.[2] Soldiers train for a year before enlistment in the ranks. There is nearly a lifelong career for all in uniform.[3] Indeed, there is enough to do in fighting numerous low-scale and high-intensity conflicts, within the country and outside, to keep the army engaged in military tasks. Throughout this period there is constant training in courses, in the barracks, and in the field to hone one's skills. All through service life and even after retirement there is a strong corporate attachment to one's unit, one's regiment, and the corps.[4] Consequently, the military is competent and takes pride in concentrating purely on professional matters defined according to its own perception. It has had a strong corporate identity expressed in terms of regimental affiliation and esprit de corps that continues to be carefully nurtured even today. A sense of responsibility and focus in accomplishing its primary role have kept it fully occupied in the tasks at hand and aloof from politics.

This approach of pure professionalism and nonintervention in civil administration and political affairs has held so far. Indeed, it has been a consistent phenomenon despite a series of stresses:

- Failures in political-strategic direction at the highest level, leading to a military debacle in 1962
- Major disaffection in a large segment of the army due to political-religious factors in the early 1980s in the Punjab[5]
- Weak governments, changing sometimes almost annually over the last two decades, unable to provide direction and guidance during periods of growing internal instability
- Increasing technological influences on warfare and nuclear weaponization calling for greater military input into strategic decision making, yet being denied a meaningful role in national security decision making[6]
- A faulty and ineffective organizational structure at the highest level of government, which according to the military impedes rational decision making in routine defense affairs[7]

- Unfortunate civilian intervention in military command at the highest level in recent years, leading to disaffection in the higher echelons[8]

Despite these severe stresses, the Indian military's professionalism has been sustained. Here I wish to analyze the reasons for this. After examining how professionalism has been interpreted in the Indian Army over the years and how it has evolved, I will point out future challenges to the system and prognosticate on likely developments.

BACKGROUND

To understand the Indian military, a little historic background is necessary. Certainly its professionalism is unique in the developing world in its continuity and long duration. Moreover, the army's ethos and approach to professionalism have remained unchanged for over half a century after independence. Finally, its relation to civil authority as laid down during the British era has largely continued to this day.

The British Indian Army had a history of 90 years before India became independent.[9] For another hundred years and more earlier, it was an army of the British East India Company, with all the trappings of a regular army.[10] Since 1857 the army has been based entirely on British regimental traditions for very clear political reasons. As the concept of nationhood was nonexistent in colonial India, the soldiers had to be provided a sound reason for going to battle. For what were they being asked to risk life and limb? Regular pay was new and welcome, but not quite enough.

The ethos that was deliberately nurtured in the army was that of the village community, and the principle inculcated was loyalty. Not only was the Indian village a cohesive unit going back several millennia, but almost all soldiers then belonged to a village and had been recruited from one. Later recruitment was restricted to an even narrower base—to what came to be known as the "martial races," on whose loyalty the colonial masters had great faith.[11] Loyalty was based on the village clan, adhering generally to religion and caste, though quite often it was deliberate policy to have each subunit of a different class or caste in a single unit for balance. Loyalty then focused on the regiment. The regiment formed the basis of military existence apart from serving the more practical purpose of organizing the forces. With its sense of honor, tradition, and custom it duplicated village life. Even though there were many minor changes over the years till independence, especially in name and nomenclature, regimental traditions sent down deep roots.

The Indian Army fought World War I and II and many campaigns in Asia and Africa over the last two centuries, but not from any sense of loyalty to the throne of England or to the Viceroy of India. As a sense of nationalism was lacking, there was no notion of ensuring Indian security and enhancing national interests. The motivation was primarily allegiance to the regiment. It was the desire not to "let the side down," a sentiment not easy to describe, that really encompassed the contours of professionalism. This was the basis of the army's corporate identity and remains so largely today.

The Indian Army played no role in the nation's independence movement. The freedom struggle was essentially a political movement led by a nearly monolithic political party and, later, much of what today would be described as civil society. But neither was the army the main force that attempted to suppress the movement for independence. That was the responsibility of the provincial police forces. The army was called out often enough, it is true, but for a very limited role and purely in "aid to civil authority" when the police forces proved inadequate to quell civil disorder and communal clashes. Here again the operational procedure was elaborate and ritualistic. The forces operated under the overall control of a civilian magistrate. When the situation got out of control, it was "handed over" by the magistrate to the military commander, in writing, on a prescribed form. Minimum force was used to deal with the situation, and immediately after dispersing the mob the army handed control back to the civil police and the magistrate, a signed statement was obtained, and the army promptly withdrew to barracks. These barracks were located almost always outside the city in a cantonment with its own separate municipal administration.[12] This policy ensured both physical and psychological distance between the army and the rest of the population and from civil politics. This tradition of keeping aloof from the civil administration continued after independence, but it has eroded with the passage of time. Owing to population pressure the cantonments have become geographically a part of the city, though the administrative arrangements remain distinct and separate.

A deliberate effect was made to strengthen corporate identity by continuing with British traditions—a central focus of the first Indian Army chief, General (later Field Marshal) Cariappa. Regiments remained intact, dress and service customs were strengthened along old traditional lines, and dinner nights were rigidly enforced for all bachelor officers in the officers' mess, four times a week.[13] This happened even as the British forces left India and most British officers of Indian regiments returned to England. The army demobilized from about 2 million soldiers in World War II, ceded roughly one-third of its subsequent strength to Pakistan, and shrank to about 280,000 soldiers.[14] Suddenly its role had reversed

from defending the empire to national defense—fairly dramatic changes at a time when continuity and a sense of identity were indeed as vital as professionalism. Both were cultivated as a matter of policy.

A number of major changes were introduced at higher levels. The three service chiefs were made equal, reducing the army's preeminence, and all were now under a civilian defense minister. The military chiefs gave up their title of commanders in chief and were now merely chiefs of staff of their respective services from 1955. In effect, though, the chiefs functioned as and had the responsibility of a commander in chief. In purely military matters the chief's powers were still largely supreme and undisputed and today are greater than what is enjoyed by many other heads of service in a democracy.

The Indian armed forces opted to remain out of the governmental system. They were content to function more as a separate entity—a department of the government rather than a part of it. This arrangement has a long history beginning with the controversy between Viceroy Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchener, the commander in chief, going back to the early years of the twentieth century. Kitchener won that debate and the government in London supported him and relieved Curzon. Over the years, however, the Indian bureaucracy has had the last word and asserted itself quietly and almost surreptitiously. The powers of the chief and those of the Army Headquarters were steadily whittled away. The chief had very little advisory role and no authority over policy decisions at any level. Routine governmental functions or policies affecting national security were all the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense under a totally civilian bureaucracy. Civilian control over the military became bureaucratic control over the armed forces. This bureaucracy consisted entirely of generalist administrators. Decisions on national strategy, threat assessment, equipment procurement, research and development—all were kept outside the realm of the defense forces and with very little participation from them.

The significance of this development has not been sufficiently appreciated. The army has always complained of being left to the mercy of the civil bureaucrats in comparison to whom the army's power and prestige have steadily declined. Yet there was a flip side to this situation as well. In reality the military was also shielded from the turbulence of politics, with the Defense Ministry providing a very useful cushion. Senior military officers in the line of duty have rarely had to deal with politicians. Nor have they been tempted severely by outside opportunities or been tampered with by external influences. Parliamentary questions are handled entirely by the Defense Ministry (though based on military input). The Parliamentary Committee on Defense is briefed by the defense

secretary, but seldom by senior military officers. Over the years a healthy tradition has developed that keeps the military at all levels and ranks insulated and at a safe distance from politicians and the political system.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIAN ARMY

It is important to understand the broad characteristics of the Indian Army in order to comprehend its ethos. From a base strength of around 280,000 soldiers in 1947, the manpower ceiling was raised (after the conflict with China in 1962) in 1964 to 825,000 to be implemented over the next five years.[15] Since mid-1980s this ceiling has gradually increased and today the army's strength is around a million.[16] The early strength of a little over a quarter of a million was large enough for a future buildup yet sufficiently small to allow close interactions and control over the military. Army units regularly rotate around the country dividing their service between operational and peace tenures. There is no permanent attachment to a region or a location. Thus there have never been any regional loyalties, though sometimes the soldiers in a regiment may well come from a particular part of the country.

The caste system in India, going back over a millennium before Christianity, also played a role in fostering professionalism within the military. The system sanctified the role of various groups in society and enjoined on them a certain duty. It gave the warrior caste a vocation that was to last not merely for life but indeed for generations. In recent years this policy has been replicated in the career offered to the armed forces. A soldier or an officer joins for a full career for life. Even where this was not always possible and conditions of service called for early retirement, some sort of pension would attempt to cover the basic costs of living. Until recently the soldier could always fall back on his family and land. The officer too would probably have returned to his village—but now more probably to a flat in a military housing estate acquired during his career, a place where he could still depend on the military for social and material support. Often the next generation would join the father's regiment, and marriages too would be within the armed forces. Thus the military has always been seen as more than a career in India. As a form of government service in a society where this was seen to provide stability, it brought with it prestige and an assured income that agriculture was increasingly unable to provide. But a career in the army was seen as something more: a lifelong vocation.[17]

Recruitment to the ranks was thus attractive and hence had to be evenly distributed. Since the 1960s the Indian Army has followed a carefully developed

system of enlistment based on the recruitable male population (RMP) of a province, which also coincided with a recruiting zone. Annual recruiting quotas would be based on the RMP percentage of a province and allotted to each recruiting office around the country.[18] This practice has avoided arbitrariness and to an extent removed political interference in recruitment.[19] Soldiery is thus spread out more evenly throughout the country than ever before in India, removing narrow parochialism. All soldiers train for 44 weeks at regimental centers. A strong sense of regimental identity is deliberately inculcated at every stage of this training.

Entry into the officer corps is based entirely on merit—one of the few areas in government service in independent India where there is no affirmative action in favor of various historically deprived sections of the population. Selection is based on a series of competitive examinations. The armed forces always complain that they do not get the best material as volunteers for their officer corps. Nevertheless, on average there are perhaps 50 applicants for each vacancy. Unlike armed forces in the West, India has always had joint training for all three services at many levels. This policy has helped develop a sense of corporate identity that cuts across regiments and encompasses the entire officer corps of all three services.

The Indian Army is underofficered. Indeed, the officer corps is barely 3.6 percent of the overall strength—at any one time it is below 35,000 for an army of a million. The bulk of the lower jobs are performed by a different category of junior commissioned officers akin to the warrant officers of other armies. This comparatively small number, as well as long and frequent training in military institutions, has led to a close bonding within the officer corps and the development of an esprit de corps based on personal friendships and loyalties, quite unique among large armies.

The Indian Army has always followed an elaborate system of officer training. Not only are there numerous courses, but today each officer may attend a three-month professional course every year away from his unit while on regimental service. The courses are intense: they train an officer in every aspect of soldiering and inculcate a high degree of professional competence. At the time of his commissioning, the credo of the officer corps is drummed into every single officer at the Indian Military Academy. This is a message first delivered by Brigadier (later Field Marshal) Sir Philip Chetwode, the academy's then commandant, in an address to the officer cadets at the first graduation parade in 1932. It remains inscribed in golden letters at the Chetwode (Main) Hall of the academy through which each officer marches out at the time of his commissioning. It represents what an officer is expected to strive for throughout his life and career:

> The Safety, Honour and Welfare of your Country come first always and every time. The Honour, Welfare and Comfort of the Men you command come next. Your own Ease, Comfort and Safety come last always and every time.[20]

DEFINING PROFESSIONALISM

How does the army define professionalism in India? To understand the army's concept, consider the commitments of the Indian Army after independence. The war in Kashmir started barely two months after independence—even as the army itself was being reestablished and demobilized and heavily engaged in the traumatic consequences of the country's partition. An intense low-level conventional war lasted in Jammu and Kashmir for the next 15 months. Its end in January 1949, under a UN Security Council resolution, only froze the troops in place along a long "cease-fire line." Since then, for the next half-century and more, roughly one-fifth to one-fourth of the Indian Army has been deployed in that province.[21] Combined with other commitments in combat, such as the insurgencies in Northeast India since 1956 and a large deployment in the high Himalayas opposite Tibet since 1960, it has been one continuous war or warlike situation for the Indian Army. This situation has consistently demanded a high state of operational readiness and has led to not-so-infrequent tension and conflict. As an observer has noted: "The Indian Government has laid down clear roles for the Army...'primarily to defend India against external aggressions; secondly, to assist the government, when asked to give such assistance, in order to enable it to carry out its functions.'"[22]

The Indian Army has fought four wars since 1947: the first, in 1947–1949, in Jammu and Kashmir; the second, in 1962, against China; the third, in 1971, to liberate Bangladesh; and the fourth, in mid-1999, in Kargil. The war in Kargil led to a cumulative death toll of over a thousand soldiers on both sides and meets the criterion of war as defined in recent times.[23] In addition there have been numerous other skirmishes and engagements. The campaign against the Razakars or irregulars in Hyderabad in 1948 and the liberation of Goa in 1961 are two earlier examples, though both were achieved with negligible casualties. The other traumatic engagement was as a peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. Fifteen years of comparative peacetime soldiering was shattered by this experience. The army was not entirely prepared either strategically or psychologically. It was the wrong war, at the wrong place, for the wrong reasons, and it failed on all counts. Four divisions of the army were involved, for much of the period, in political and diplomatic mire. There was no clear political direction

or aim. The army went in to maintain peace and ended up fighting against the side it was meant to protect. Ultimately the army withdrew under political pressure from the Sri Lankan government at whose behest it had gone there in the first place. The Indian Army suffered about 1,100 soldiers killed and some 3,000 wounded.

External aggression is clear enough, but there are numerous internal instabilities. These are caused by many factors. Ethnic separatism first surfaced in the 1950s in Nagaland, in the eastern state of Assam, and later in many other parts of that ethnically diverse region. Only one was an independence movement. Others were attempts at securing government attention for development and greater local autonomy; still others were political factional struggles with ethnic and religious overtones. A few were ideological with communist connections. All the more serious ones always came to the army—to be dealt with first militarily, to break the brunt of insurgency, and settled later through negotiations with the insurgents. In all cases agreements were reached within the bounds of the constitution, but not all of them held. Quite often the army would be both fighter and negotiator—and often enough, when peace failed, went back to deal with the same situation yet again. The training and leadership of the army always ensured that the situations were brought under control without unacceptable loss. Morale held and unit cohesion was disturbed on only a few occasions. Since the government knew the situation could be handled by the military, seldom was there a serious attempt at finding a political solution. Hence the situation often repeated itself. The most serious crisis the army faced was the one in the Punjab, which lasted all through the 1980s and kept the civil authorities and a large part of the army fully engaged. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the police, however, who were better trained and prepared than elsewhere in the country.[24]

The one refrain that runs through all this is the constant engagement in operations: regular patrolling along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir or in the Himalayas against the Chinese at high altitudes; curbing internal insurgencies in the jungles of Northeast India; or fighting militants in the wheat fields and villages of the Punjab. Even when the army is in a peace station for a short while, much of its time is spent in collective training exercises or in field firing ranges far from home. Back in barracks, there is always the need to look up the internal security operating procedure and prepare to deal with any internal breakdown of law and order or to assist the civil authorities in countering the effects of natural calamities.

There has never been any overt need to spell out professionalism beyond this context. It is merely interpreted as the need "to do one's job." Fortunately

almost all of these jobs have been of a direct military nature. Each officer normally has a span of about two years in command at various levels. His future promotion and advancement in the army depend on how he performs during this period.[25] Whether in adverse conditions of low-level or high-intensity conflict or in peacetime soldiering in barracks, standards are exacting and seldom relaxed. Each attempts to outdo his peers and keep his unit in constant readiness—all the time trying to the best of his ability, to maintain high professional standards.

An Officer and His Training

This preparation is reflected most in the training an officer undergoes throughout his service. A four-month-long young officers' course follows four years of training at the military academies. This is followed by five to six years in his respective unit. For a combat officer, it means being with his battalion in two or three different locations around the country—about half to two-thirds of which will be in a conflict zone where he will need to be on a high state of alert and often go without leave for long stretches either patrolling the line of control in the hills or mountains or in counterinsurgency operations in the northeast or in Jammu and Kashmir. Young officers are so few that the strain on the available number is always heavy. Risks to life are high. Indeed, the Indian Army has always prided itself on the high percentage of officers in the overall casualty ratio in combat.[26]

A short stint in a peace station may present an opportunity to marry. But soon enough it will be back to a field area once again. Although there will be opportunities to go to a peace station and to a course of instruction at infrequent intervals, usually the routine is one of service in difficult areas often separated from one's family. In the numerous courses the Indian Army runs for its officers, he will learn the intricacies of command of a subunit or a unit or some technical aspect of soldiering—a welcome though short break from the strains of constant soldiering. Some 80 percent of the officer corps will attempt to further their career by trying to qualify for the Staff College Course that separates the boys from the men.[27] Competition is again tough and only one in three is likely to qualify.

The Staff Course is a year's duration. Located in the south of India, it hosts some 400 officers at a time and has officers from 10 to 15 foreign countries attending. Officers of all three services are trained here and about half the course will follow a joint curriculum. It is the first opportunity for officers to reflect on their service and career and learn the intricacies of their profession. The course's content is intense and mostly military: learning the art of planning and coordinating the conduct of battle, rather than command functions. In the Indian Army these two tasks are separated and taught at different institutions. This course presents

the first opportunity for an officer to learn defense policy and strategy and national security issues through lectures on a wide variety of topics. The curriculum includes staff duties, organizations, operations of war, logistics, and a variety of war exercises. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on technique and staff support in the conduct of war.[28]

Later there are many other opportunities for career enhancement through a number of other senior-level courses. Two major courses will come the officer's way after some 22 years of service: a yearlong higher-command course for operational-level training at the corps level and a parallel management course for training future logisticians of the services. National security is first taught at the National Defense College, for brigadiers, after 28 years of service, barely a few years before retirement. This course brings together civilians and foreign military officers to discuss national security strategy and policymaking.

RMA and Nuclear Decision Making

The Indian armed forces represent a curious blend of many features. Though infantry-oriented, as its operational commitments in high-altitude and low-intensity operations will testify, its large size also enables specialization at many levels. In keeping with the rapidly growing civilian information technology (IT) sector in the country, military institutions have pioneered computer-aided decision-making and command and control functions. But true ventures into revolutionary technologies are yet in their infancy in line with other developing countries, particularly in Asia. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), a fairly large setup under the Defense Ministry, is responsible for most of the programs related to the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Its priority, however, continues to be to develop advanced conventional systems replacing costly imports. The military's role is restricted to developing General Staff qualitative requirements for the DRDO and assisting in guiding the projects. Relations are not always the most amicable. The defense forces often complain about the slow pace of design and development for indigenized production. The DRDO is not happy with the services' early decisions to acquire from abroad equipment they think could have been developed at home. Given the country's advanced IT base and the officer corps' high education level, it seems likely that once a decision is made to take the path of the RMA and commensurate resources are available, the Indian Armed Forces will be able to adjust fairly rapidly. The issue is one of funds and priority.

The nuclear question is a prime example of where the Indian military stands in national decision making at the highest echelons of defense planning.

The military has always been out of the loop. The prime minister makes all decisions with the advice of the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The DRDO came into the picture at a later stage to coordinate activities connected with other developments and to plan and coordinate the test explosions. Even in subsequent planning—whether of nuclear strategy, command and control, command authority, force levels, or other issues—the services have remained largely outside the decision-making circle.

How will this arrangement impact on military professionalism and civil-military relations? It is simply an extension of the earlier policy of keeping the military at arm's length on decisions affecting higher levels of national security. While this policy is appropriate in a democracy, the military's remaining outside the loop is unusual. As a consequence the services feel left out and may express their unhappiness in different ways. Interservice rivalry on nuclear weapons command and control, as well as strategic planning responsibilities, is exploited by the civil bureaucracy. Indeed, this rivalry has stymied the establishment of a joint command structure in the military: each service by and large goes its own way. The longest-serving chief holds the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointment in addition to his main responsibility as head of his own service. He has no staff.

WINDS OF CHANGE

Remarkably little has changed in the ethos, character, and attitude of the Indian Army in over 50 years. Yet Indian society has undergone a major transformation. A new generation of officers and soldiers has joined the ranks with their own aspirations and in an environment quite different from the past. A few trends on the horizon are beginning to put a strain on the system, however, and may alter the way the military approaches professionalism in the future and, consequently, its impact on civil-military relations. Among these trends, the following are paramount:

- The intensity of proxy warfare in Jammu and Kashmir and other low-intensity conflicts elsewhere has imposed a heavy strain on the armed forces. Conditions of combat are severe; no end seems in sight; casualties mount by the day. The army readily agrees that such problems can only be resolved through a political process. It has no illusion of a "military victory." Yet the lack of progress is galling. While I do not for a moment wish to suggest that the army may not be able to bear the strain much longer,

this issue may be a major divisive factor. It is increasingly being seen that only one sector of society is bearing the brunt of the consequence of government policy.

- The war in Kargil was the first TV war in India and also the first national war. It came at a moment when there was a caretaker government at the center and the country was in an election mode. Politics was in the air and all parties used the patriotic potential of the war to the hilt. The numerous TV channels in India found in it a godsend to fill the airwaves. For the first time in independent India, the war was fought in the living rooms and the army became genuine heroes in a country desperately seeking heroes. The military's image has been changed forever. It now enjoys a status much higher than any other component of society. Where will this lead in the future?
- Nuclear weapons are a reality in India's security planning today. Scientists may still be entrusted with nuclear strategic planning, weapon development, and even custody, but they can hardly be tasked to operate them. Clearly the military will have to be brought into the decision-making loop—with all this portends for the military's role in security and strategic planning at large and its voice in governance.
- Under these conditions, the present structure of the Ministry of Defense cannot hold. Military expertise will have to be incorporated within it—weakening perhaps for the first time the nonexpert civilian control over national military decision making and allowing service officers a direct role in it. This will bring the military directly in contact with the civilian government establishment and the political process.
- The new ruling political party's policy in the center is a clear departure from the earlier Congress Party's aim of keeping the military at arm's length. The Bharatiya Janata Party believes in "national strength" and the military's role in it. It looks for military solutions to many of the country's internal security problems. It is even keen to allot the military an expanded role. What this role might be and how it will fit in with bureaucratic control is difficult to see. But if the present government lasts a full five-year tenure until 2004, there are likely to be key changes in the military's role in the future.

The Indian military is possibly the third largest in the world and its army is the second biggest. It is a complex entity. Yet there is a certain predictability in its behavior and conduct. Its long tradition, its set ways, its continuing ethos and strong sense of attachment to regiment and corps give it a true corporate

identity—an identity based on an approach to life that is centered on the military profession. The military itself defines professionalism as maintaining a sense of pride or "*izzat*," dedication to the regiment, being worth one's salt, and keeping the faith. The question is: how long will these values prevail in a rapidly changing civil society entering the twenty-first century?

ENDNOTES

1 It is among the few in the developing world with a continuous and unbroken history going back at least 200 years. It also policed the British Empire from the Middle East to China in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. It played a major part in World War I and II in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

2 For most this training lasts four years—three years at the National Defense Academy, where cadets of all three services train together and develop a lifelong friendship and camaraderie. The last year is spent at academies special to each service. All officers today are graduates, and many acquire postgraduate qualifications later in service, especially in technical branches.

3 A soldier in the lowest rank serves a little less than 20 years. Enlisted service can reach 32 years at the highest rank. Officers retire between 52 and 60 years of age depending on rank.

4 Intense regimental pride is a typical characteristic of the army even today. Indeed, an officer considers the regiment his second home and retains his links even after retirement through regular reunions.

5 The army was tasked to vacate the holiest Sikh shrine at Amritsar in June 1984, which had been taken over and fortified by a religious priest. The resultant operation led to the destruction of some holy areas, which spurred a spontaneous mutiny and desertions by Sikh soldiers. See Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour* (New Delhi: Viking-Penguin, 1993), pp. 506–507.

6 A prominent example is nuclear weapon decision making and development, in which the army was left totally out of the loop. See George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

7 The 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan in northern Jammu and Kashmir led to a detailed independent inquiry that exposed the weaknesses in external intelligence—which is entirely under civilian control and for which the army later had to pay a heavy price.

8 The most recent intervention to shake the country was the dismissal of the naval chief on 31 December 1998 by the government under unpleasant circumstances and without any clear allegations.

9 Several accounts exist of this period. Perhaps the best in this genre is the one by a distinguished Indian general and former vice-chief of the Army Staff, Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour*.

10 Actually, the first unit of the British East India Company's army may be said to have been formed in 1683 in the Bombay (today's Mumbai) presidency, though some Indian state forces claim an even earlier ancestry. See Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour*, p. 4.

11 These races were, for example, the Sikhs, the Muslims of the Punjab and Northwest Frontier, the Gurkhas, and certain other hill tribes of northern India. People from the plains—and especially from the areas first colonized by the British, such as

Bombay (Mumbai), Madras (Chennai), and Calcutta—were excluded even though these were the same troops that actually conquered the country for Britain.

12 Numerous cantonment towns still adjoin larger cities, or have been encompassed within them, but manage to maintain their distinct identity, providing the army a certain refuge and distance from the rest of society. Civic services are administered by a cantonment board headed by the military commander.

13 The field marshal remained true to this tradition. Some three decades later he still dined every night, often alone, in his village home in South India, in a formal dinner jacket observing all the right mess etiquette, sometimes with visiting military officers sharing his table

14 Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour*, pp. 446–447.

15 Ibid., p. 487.

16 Details of this and other defense information are available from the Annual Defense Report released by the government of India every year, usually at the end of February or early March.

17 In the highly competitive recruitment to the ranks, parental service is considered a distinct advantage. Among the officer corps, as well, numbers of second- and third-generation officers are growing in the 1990s after increases in pay and perks and better service conditions.

18 There is enormous demand for enrollment, not least because of high unemployment. After the Kargil War in mid-1999, for example, when recruitment was thrown open, some 20 young men died when police opened fire to control the crowd during a recruiting rally.

19 There are exceptions. As many units are still based on caste and class, recruitment to these is determined by demand.

20 Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour*, p. 525.

21 This would be in the region of 250,000 soldiers in the whole province—not the much larger figure often quoted. The army has other major commitments elsewhere and there is need for peacetime rotation.

22 Major K.C. Praval, *Indian Army After Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), p. 133.

23 The Indian Army had 467 soldiers killed and about 3,000 wounded. *Jane's Weekly* defines a war as an armed conflict that has a cumulative total of over 1,000 dead in a calendar year.

24 Some 16 percent of the army is still enrolled from the Punjab, and it was also the most likely place of combat with Pakistan apart from Jammu and Kashmir—hence the military's reluctance to play a major role there.

25 Promotion boards put greater emphasis on command reports than annual performance reports obtained while in comparably easier jobs (such as staff positions or teaching assignments). Promotion boards consist entirely of military officers, but their decision may be overruled by the Defense Ministry. In recent years favoritism has been practiced and political influence has sometimes changed the decision.

26 Typically in the Kargil War in 1999 it was near 10 percent, though the proportion of officers in a battalion was only 2 percent.

27 The Indian Defense Services Staff College is located in Wellington, Nilgiris, South India, at an altitude of 6,000 feet. The old British Indian Army Staff College, located at a climatically similar location at Quetta in Baluchistan, went to the Pakistan army.

28 The author has taught twice at the Staff College: as a member of the Directing Staff (as a lieutenant colonel) and as Chief Instructor, Army (as a major general).

3

Japan: Completing Military Professionalism

Major General Noboru Yamaguchi

According to Samuel Huntington, the officer corps of the Japanese imperial military once held great political power but a low standard of professionalism.[1] Fifty-five years have passed since the end of World War II, which completely destroyed the organization of the imperial army and navy, as well as their traditions. It was then, in the 1950s, that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were born as the new military establishment in Japan. One of the central themes of Japan's post-World War II defense policy has been strict civilian control over the military. The government of Japan has repeatedly expressed this theme: "Painfully aware of the regrettable state of affairs that had prevailed in this country until the end of World War II, Japan has adopted systems of uncompromising civilian control that are entirely different from those that existed under the former Constitution, so that the JSDF should be established and operated in accordance with the will of the people."[2] Largely because of past experiences in which the military held overwhelming political power, today's soldiers, sailors, and airmen are strictly prohibited from involving themselves in political activities.

Huntington asserts that healthy military professionalism forms the basis of civilian control over the military.[3] In this context, the JSDF has enjoyed the generally high education level of the Japanese and their diligence in promoting professionalism.[4] While the JSDF has had some hard times in recruiting service personnel because of its all-volunteer system, it has enjoyed a large number of applicants who are determined to devote their professional careers to the JSDF. The Japanese preference for permanent employment, known as Japan's "lifetime employment system," may have particularly affected the nature of the JSDF, where service members, including enlisted personnel, tend to serve for a long time. This tendency helps the JSDF to keep trained personnel, promotes members' loyalty to the organization, and thus helps to form a cohesive group of professionals. Yet the bitter military-political experience of World War II may have gone too far in its fervor to establish a healthy and constructive relationship between the political leadership and military officers today. Lawmakers and military leaders alike used to be reluctant to interact with each other. Relations seem to have improved in recent years as a new set of political and military

requirements emerged with the end of the Cold War. Yet it is still worthwhile asking about the current status of the relationship and where it should go in the future. The following sections, focusing on the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), summarize the nature of the Japanese officer corps and examine its professionalism from the perspective of expertise, corporateness, and responsibilities.

COMPOSITION OF THE OFFICER CORPS

Of the approximately 150,000 personnel in the GSDF, some 24,000 make up the officer corps. Officers are put into three major groups—A, B, and C—based on their commission. The A Group consists of approximately 9,000 National Defense Academy (NDA) and college graduates. Each year, in addition to the 200 or so NDA graduates, 100 college graduates are selected as officer candidates after passing the examination. They are commissioned after a one-year training period. The B Group is made up of about 10,000 officers commissioned from young noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Usually they have spent 7 to 12 years in the military working in the enlisted ranks as privates and NCOs before being commissioned. Some 4,000 officers make up the C Group. These officers have been promoted to second lieutenant from the senior NCO or warrant officer ranks.[5]

The ultimate rank to which an officer may aspire differs from one group to another. Most A Group officers make lieutenant colonel; a little less than half of them make colonel or higher, based on their duty record and their performance during training courses. B Group officers, whose careers are usually shorter than those of the A Group, expect to end their careers as captains or majors; a few exceptions make full colonel. The careers of C Group officers are even shorter because they have usually spent more than 20 years in service before being commissioned. Most of them retire as first lieutenants; a few make captain.

The nature of Japanese society reflects on the lives of military officers in two particular aspects. In the first place, Japan's "lifetime employment system" expects people to spend their entire professional career with one organization. The JSDF is no exception: more than 80 percent of A Group officers remain in the JSDF until their retirement age, which varies between 53 and 60 depending on their final rank.[6] The other pertinent aspect is the impact that a person's academic record has on his career. In Japan, a person's education prior to employment generally matters a great deal. Graduates from reputable universities are more likely to fill top management positions in both private and public sectors. In other words, a better education means a greater chance for promotion. This rule applies to most, if not all, aspects of an JSDF officer's career management. Thus

the A Group, whose officers are all college graduates, has better opportunities for promotion than other groups. Graduating from the NDA or passing the JSDF officer candidate examination after graduation from university almost guarantees at least a 30-year career and at least promotion to lieutenant colonel.

Those who do not receive a college education, despite their grouping as B or C officers, do have the same opportunities after being commissioned. In fact, 6 percent of JSDF officers are junior high graduates and 45 percent are senior high graduates.[7] An observer notes: "Half of the officers in the JSDF, even those who are managers of an organization, are selected from groups who have been unable to receive a college education. In the JSDF, anyone, regardless of their educational level, can be promoted if they make a concerted effort. The JSDF is an organization where discrimination based on prior education is far more moderate when compared to Japanese society as a whole; and it is one perfectly equipped with its own education system."[8] In fact, although their promotion rate is slower than that of A Group officers, some of them make colonel and take higher positions such as regimental commander—a rank, indeed, that half of the A Group officers will not make. Commission and promotion in the JSDF are based on the results of a fair competition involving duty records, examinations, and education received after joining the military.

EDUCATION AND PROMOTION

Huntington has observed: "The intellectual content of the military profession requires the modern officer to devote about one-third of his professional life to formal schooling, probably a higher ratio of educational time to practice time than in any other profession."[9] Indeed, there are a number of opportunities for officers' education in the GSDF. They normally include Officer Candidate School (6 months), Basic Course (3–6 months), Advanced Course (6–10 months), several courses for military occupational specialties (3–10 months for various MOSs), language training courses (6–12 months), Command and General Staff College (24 months), and senior officers' education (12 months). In addition, there are several opportunities for nonmilitary education such as graduate school and on-the-job training at private enterprises. In the author's case, some eight years in all were devoted to education in the 27 years of his military career, beginning after his graduation from the National Defense Academy.

Education is closely related to promotion. Apart from performance within a unit, an officer's promotion is based on accomplishment in the courses regarded as important for one's career. For a junior officer, records at Officer Candidate

School, as well as the Basic and Advanced Officers Courses, have a significant impact on his promotion prospects. Command and General Staff College (CGS) is crucial for a field grade or higher rank. Each year 80 students are selected by a comprehensive examination that includes a two-day written examination and a weeklong series of interviews. Applicants (usually captains and junior majors) must first pass written examinations on tactics, military history, and regulations in order to be eligible for the interviews. During the CGS series of interviews, senior colonels test applicants on their attitudes toward duty as well as their comprehension of tactics, training methodologies, and military regulations. Students of the CGS study for two years to learn the skills required for commanders and staff officers in higher commands and to gain the knowledge and expertise necessary to manage large organizations such as divisions. CGS graduates form a group of officers who are eligible for tougher and more promising assignments. Usually they are rotated from staff assignments at higher headquarters to various command posts. In general, most of those who are promoted to senior colonel and higher are CGS graduates.

EXPERTISE

Until recently, the JSDF had never been tested in a combat situation. Thus there was no hard evidence to measure its ability to accomplish missions or gauge the expertise of its officer corps as "managers of violence." In recent years, however, the JSDF has been tested through various peacetime missions, including disaster relief operations, UN peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian relief operations abroad. Since 1992, the JSDF has participated in various UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Golan Heights, and Honduras. Contingents of the JSDF have performed well in such missions as exemplified by the operation in the Golan Heights: "Their efficient performance of duties and the high morale and strict discipline of their men have been highly appreciated by the commanding officer of the UNDOF and other countries involved in the peacekeeping operations in the area."[10]

The amount of education that officers receive may be one of the most meaningful indexes to measure the GSDF's efforts to advance the expertise of its officer corps. In this context, military education in Japan is fairly intensive—particularly when we look at A Group officers. The Basic Course and Advanced Course, which are provided by branch schools, are mandatory for all officers after graduation from Officer Candidate School. An average of 18 months is devoted to

mandatory schooling during the first five years of an officer's career. A typical company grade officer may take additional opportunities for schooling, including several courses for specific military occupational specialties, a language training course, and schooling at foreign military schools and domestic or foreign universities. Approximately 50 out of 300 classmates have opportunities to study at graduate schools for advanced degrees; more than 70 are sent abroad to attend foreign military schools or civilian universities. Several dozen officers are sent for on-the-job training at private enterprises or think tanks for one or two years. In addition, a number of junior officers are loaned to other ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Cabinet Office. While they work for their respective government offices, they learn a great deal about bureaucratic procedures, which may become important for later assignments at higher JSDF headquarters.

The GSDF's Command and General Staff College, as noted, has an examination to select 80 students out of 300 A Group and younger B Group officers. Since captains and young majors applying for college must prove their comprehension of tactics, military regulations, military history, and training skills at the written and oral examinations, they study these subjects for years before even starting school. This process enhances the knowledge of most younger officers on professional subjects. Such knowledge is further expanded by the two-year schooling on such practical applications as map maneuvers, case studies, and a series of tactical exercises.

Recent developments in Japan's security environment have called for changes in the fundamental attitude of the JSDF:

- In the Cold War period, the GSDF tried to maintain deterrence by demonstrating its readiness and strength. In a sense, even a "paper tiger" might have been effective in this regard. The GSDF today, however, is expected to contribute to the nation through its peacetime activities in UN peacekeeping operations, disaster relief operations, and humanitarian relief operations. The people will strictly evaluate the results of such operations.[11]
- Peacetime missions in the post–Cold War era vary in their nature and tend to be more complicated, if not tougher, than deterring aggression. Not only are the rules of engagement extremely delicate, but close coordination with other militaries and civilian organizations is required in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief. In this era, military expertise may have a broader meaning than simply managing violence. The GSDF, therefore, has been struggling to train its officers to match the newly emerging

requirements. Since 1992, when the JSDF sent peacekeepers to Cambodia for the first time, language training courses have increased their number of trainees. Officers are sent to European countries for peacekeeping training every year. Training for fighting against low-intensity threats has also been emphasized. Moreover, the GSDF recently increased the number of officers sent to universities to study political science and international relations. These young soldier-scholars are expected to work in an international arena, a role that calls for a sound understanding of political-military affairs.

CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS

There is an official organization for all GSDF officers. In fact, the Shushin-kai association publishes a monthly magazine for the officer corps and has subordinate organizations at many GSDF camps and units.[12] The corporate character of the GSDF, however, can often be found in subgroups, namely in branches and classes, rather than in the formal organization of the officer corps. Branch schools—the Combined Arms School, Aviation School, and Engineering School, for example—are the center of cohesion for each of the branches of service. They publish professional periodicals on tactics, training techniques, military history, and weapon technologies. They also host seminars and conferences for their branch officer corps. Through such activities, officers are encouraged to enhance their abilities to employ units and train troops. Another factor that makes the identity of the officer corps less distinctive is the three pathways to commissioning. There are obvious differences among the A, B, and C groups. The typical commission ages differ from the early twenties for Group A to the thirties for Group B and the forties for Group C. Since prior education and speed of promotion vary, officers' interests generally differ from group to group. Because of the homogeneous nature of each group and the differences between groups, officers tend to stick to officers in their group. Therefore, informal bands of classmates are preferred rather than formal organizations such as the regimental/camp branches of the Shushin-kai.

More important, company-level units tend to have the most cohesive nature when all the officers, NCOs, and privates are included. GSDF regulations particularly emphasize the importance of an officer's role in promoting cohesion at the company level. At this level commanders are expected to promote cohesion within their units by dealing directly with their troops and leading them. Officers leading a unit are strongly encouraged to promote cohesion by sharing

the hardships and joys with their enlisted people. General Tsuneo Isoshima, chief of staff, GSDF, defined the GSDF as follows: "In the GSDF, especially in field units, there is relatively little distinction between officers and enlisted people. They, regardless of rank, sit together for meals in the field, for example. This atmosphere makes the GSDF cohesive. Whenever I visited any of the units to which I used to be assigned, I was welcomed by former colleague officers and enlisted people and invited for a drink or two."[13] In fact, this may be a reflection of Japanese society at large, where people within the same organization tend to stick together and avoid distinctions between social classes.

The "lifetime employment system" also has had an impact on the GSDF in terms of its cohesion. Because lifetime employment is standard in Japanese society, soldiers, regardless of rank, tend to think they will devote their entire professional career to the GSDF once they join the service. Thus most enlisted people try hard to become noncommissioned officers or commissioned officers. In 1997, the GSDF recruited approximately 10,200 enlisted personnel. Of these, some 2,400 were selected as NCO candidates when they entered the service and are guaranteed to be promoted to NCO within six years. The number of those who applied for NCO candidate positions is more than 30 times what the GSDF needed. Meanwhile there were only three times more applicants for non-NCO candidate positions.[14] This is a reflection of the preference for lifetime employment. Non-NCO candidates also work hard to pass the NCO examination after serving two or three years in the GSDF. In short, a soldier in many cases means a lifetime soldier. This sentiment lies beneath many soldiers' loyalty to the organization and thus supports unit cohesion.

Armies in the modern world employ highly sophisticated weapon systems and therefore require soldiers with longer experience and more training. Along with the GSDF's lifetime employment, this leads to a higher proportion of NCOs with a relatively high average age. Some 59 percent of the GSDF's total strength is NCOs, while 25 percent is privates—a fairly high ratio in comparison with the U.S. Army, which has a force of 38 percent NCOs and 46 percent privates.[15] In the GSDF the average age is as high as 41 for officers, 37 for NCOs, and 22 for privates.[16] In addition, more than half the officers are selected from NCOs as B and C Group officers. They, in a sense, stand between the enlisted people and the A Group officers and thus help the GSDF form a seamless hierarchy from privates through NCOs to officers. An esprit de corps exists in the GSDF as a whole, therefore, not just in the officer corps.

OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES

Regardless of rank, all JSDF members have a set of legal obligations. They must: respect and follow the constitution; obey all laws and regulations; maintain strict discipline; refrain from involvement in political activities; and conduct missions whatever the danger involved.[17] The objective of these obligations is to meet the Japanese people's expectations of the JSDF. Moreover, all officers must take the following oath when they are commissioned:

> Being honored to be commissioned as an officer, I shall recognize the importance of duty; make every effort to promote my morals and earn the skills necessary for an officer; take the initiative to set an example to fellow soldiers in accomplishing missions; and thus become the core of solidarity of the unit.[18]

In summary, JSDF officers are responsible to the nation and obliged to promote cohesion in the unit, enhance their military expertise, avoid being politicized, and devote themselves to the country. Early in each officer's career he is strongly encouraged to be ready to assume three types of responsibility at any time: leader, instructor, and staff officer. These responsibilities are essential to executing missions and training troops at lower command echelons. The higher an officer is promoted, the more emphasis will be placed on his skills for organizing and equipping the force, planning, and executing military plans. Officers assigned to higher headquarters are highly motivated to take such responsibilities.

From the viewpoint of the military's functions in a country, officers have three universal roles: representing the country's security interests, providing political leaders with military advice, and executing the missions discussed earlier. The JSDF—joint staff and service staff officers (service headquarters) in particular—has functioned as the representative for security interests. Joint and service chiefs have opportunities to express their concerns to members of the National Security Council.[19] Officers assigned to service staff offices work hard to convince budget authorities of the importance of defense and the urgent need for defense budgeting.

In terms of offering military advice to the political leadership and executing missions, the Japanese system has two notable characteristics. First, the chairman of the Joint Staff Council does not play an important role in these functions. Second, the prime minister, who has command authority over the JSDF in representing the cabinet, is not prescribed by law to receive military advice.[20] Service chiefs have the legal responsibility to assist the minister for defense as supreme

professional adviser and execute the minister's orders to the respective services.[21] But while the JSDF law describes the chairman as the highest-ranking officer in the JSDF with the responsibility of presiding over the Joint Staff Council, it does not give him the responsibility of advising the political leadership. Rather, the Joint Staff Council as an entity is charged with assisting the defense minister in joint planning, coordinating among services, and so on.[22] Notably, the service chiefs and the Joint Staff Council are responsible only to the minister for defense; there is no standing system authorized by law for the prime minister to be assigned a military assistant.

Recent developments suggest, however, that military advice is being taken increasingly by political leaders. The political leadership kept its distance from the military in the past. At the same time, due to fears of politicization, uniformed officers had been reluctant to have direct contact with Diet members until quite recently. In fact, there used be a regulation in the Defense Agency prohibiting uniformed organizations from making direct contact with the Diet (as well as other ministries and agencies) and assigning civilian portions of the agency as contact points with those outside the military. This rule was abolished in 1998 due to the urgent need for serious debate over the security issues emerging among political leaders. Today politicians are willing to talk to men on the ground with expertise in military affairs, particularly peacetime missions such as UN peacekeeping operations. It is well known, for example, that former Prime Minister Hashimoto preferred to receive intelligence briefings from Director of Defense Intelligence Headquarters Lieutenant General Kunimi. Although joint chiefs and service chiefs enjoy greater opportunities today to meet with political leaders informally, a more formal structure may need to be established so that the political leadership receives military advice regularly.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Huntington pointed out that the ideal officer for the Japanese in the past "was a warrior—a fighter engaging in violence himself rather than a manager directing the employment of violence by others"—and his weakness was his "failing to remain master of combat, as European officers do."[23] This tradition may still survive in Japanese society, and perhaps in the JSDF. As directed by JSDF regulations, excellence in leading men is a virtue for an officer, and an excellent warrior may set an example for subordinate soldiers.

The question is whether today's officers remain masters of combat—or, in a broader sense, if they remain efficient in fulfilling the requirements for today's

military. As we have seen, the JSDF has been trying to promote expertise through education and rotating assignments. The JSDF is also trying to broaden officers' expertise. Officers are strongly encouraged to be ready for conducting various missions: peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief operations abroad, missions to assist the nation's efforts to recover from natural or man-made disasters, and missions dealing with low-intensity threats such as terrorism. They are also expected to be flexible and creative in pursuing the national efforts, to transform the military in order to match the future strategic and operational environment, and to catch up with today's rapid technological advance. If this trend continues, the expertise of the Japanese officer corps, as an executing piece of machinery, will remain high—a far cry from Huntington's description of the imperial military.

One potential problem, however, is the corporate character of the officer corps. The identity of the officer corps remains unclear. Since Japanese society prefers equality and does not like to see distinctions made between social classes, establishing a clear identity for the officer corps is a challenging task. As we have seen, officers are divided into A, B, and C groups. This division works positively to fill the gap between enlisted personnel and officers and to promote the GSDF's esprit de corps as a whole. Further promotion of expertise among officers, however, may distinguish the officer corps as a subject for loyalty and pride. If the officer corps is successful in demonstrating its expertise, the public may become aware of the importance and efficiency of the officers—and this recognition may nurture a cohesive body of professional officers. Thus the officer corps may become prominent in society and distinguish itself in the military as a cohesive group of professionals rather than a class of society.

The next question may be whether or not the officer corps can act as military advisers to the political leadership. It is fair to claim that civilian control over the military has been extremely successful in Japan since the establishment of the JSDF—particularly in avoiding the military's politicization. This success has been possible because the JSDF has kept a low profile. This low profile, however, has restrained both the military and society from seriously interacting with each other and has resulted in the people's ignorance of military affairs. Under proper civilian control, the military is supposed to achieve political goals based on the people's will. Without proper interaction between the military and society, this dynamic cannot work. As Huntington points out, the officer corps has an important role in representing the nation's security interests, providing the political leadership with professional advice, and accomplishing missions in order to achieve political objectives.[24] To play these roles effectively, the officer

corps must be trusted and respected by society. And for this, both the military and society in Japan must be held responsible.

ENDNOTES

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1985), p. 96.

2 Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1998*, p. 70; originally published by the Defense Agency in June 1998 in Japanese and translated into English by the *Japan Times*.

3 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 83.

4 According to *Education in Japan 2000*, published by Ministry of Education, Sports, and Culture, 97 percent of Japanese young people attend high school while 45 percent attended universities in 1998. According to the Personnel Department, Ground Staff Office, JDA, one out of every 10 newly recruited privates of the GSDF has a bachelor's degree while about 90 percent of JSDF enlisted personnel have a high school or higher education.

5 In addition to these three groups, there are two other small groups of officers including medical doctors/dentists and nurses numbering some 1,500 in all.

6 According to the Personnel Department of the Ground Staff Office, the rate of early retirement of A Group officers is less than 1 percent per year throughout 30 to 35 years of their career. The retirement ages are 53 for lieutenant colonel or below and 55 for colonel.

7 *Handbook for Defense 1999* (Tokyo: Asagumo Newspaper, 1999), p. 208.

8 Hajime Araki, *A School Named the SDF* (Tokyo: Namiki Shobo, 1999), p. 173.

9 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 13.

10 Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1998*, p. 152.

11 General Tsuneo Isoshima, chief of staff, GSDF, made these comments in an interview for *Securitarian* (January 2000), the Defense Agency's official magazine.

12 Shushin-kai (literally, the association for improving individuals' morals and abilities) was established to promote friendship among members and strengthen solidarity and mutual confidence as officers of the GSDF. The chief of staff is the dean of this association.

13 General Isoshima.

14 *Handbook for Defense 1999*, pp. 194–198.

15 "Distribution of Active Duty Forces by Service, Rank, Sex, and Ethnic Group," by U.S. Army Headquarters.

16 According to the Personnel Department, Ground Staff Office, JDA, out of some 148,600 GSDF members, 23,300 were officers (average age 41), 87,500 were warrant officers and NCOs (average age 37), and 37,700 (average age 22) were privates as of October 1997.

17 Regulation for Implementing the JSDF Law, Article 39.

18 Ibid., Article 42.

19 According to the Law to Establish the National Security Council (Article 7), the NSC chairman can summon relevant nonmember ministers, the chairman of the Joint Staff Council, and others to the council and let them express their observations. The chairman regularly attends the meetings of the NSC, and service chiefs have been invited in recent years.

20 Noboru Yamaguchi, "A Study of Military and Politics: From Vietnam to the Gulf," *Chuokoron August 1991*, pp. 107–108.

21 Self-Defense Force Law, Article 9.

22 Ibid., Article 27.

23 Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp. 126–127.

24 Ibid., p. 72.

4

South Korea: From "New Professionalism" to "Old Professionalism"

Min Yong Lee

The concept of military professionalism has two connotations. The old professionalism was introduced by Western scholars to confine the military to garrisons as a way of sustaining civil supremacy over the military. From this perspective the military is one of many social groups that is expected to play a committed role in a differentiated society. Insofar as its basic mission is concerned, the military should not go beyond responding to external military threats. To this end, the military is expected to be professionalized and institutionalized with civilian control.[1] Therefore, discussions have concentrated on methods to control the military.

The new professionalism, a response to such Western orientations, envisions the military as having a comprehensive role in various fields of national development. This perspective expands the role of the military to respond to both external and internal threats. Especially where the nation is underdeveloped, the military is expected to step up to the front line of political power and carry out "a sacred mission" to save the country from a national crisis.[2] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, military officers in many developing countries rushed to the political arena to fulfill such obligations. Regardless of their impact on overall national development, the concept of a new professionalism offered a valuable insight for studies on civil-military relations in most developing countries.

The launching of the Sixth Republic in February 1988 marked a turning point in the political democratization of South Korea. The civil-military relationship, long considered a taboo subject, emerged as a dominant topic of debate. Indeed, there were acute differences in perception between the military and civilian sectors. These differences in perception appeared in discussions concerning the military's role in national development over the last three decades. The military argued that it had made great contributions to national development with its active involvement in the social sector. It defended its actions with reference to numerous positive results: an outstanding rate of economic development, an enhanced posture of military defense, and at least a satisfactory degree of sociopolitical stability. The opposite perception, maintained mostly by the civilian sector, contended that the penetration of military culture into the social sector had

caused the nation to develop in undesirable directions. Civilians mentioned, for example, violations of human rights, military dictatorship in politics, and uneven economic development in which too few benefited from the growth of national prosperity.[3]

This debate never reached a conclusion, but it did revive the old professionalism and brought about a shared consensus that the new professionalism was no longer a desirable model for South Korea. The old professionalism, thereafter, has been successfully consolidated into various fields along with political democratization. Since the end of the Sixth Republic, civilian politicians have taken over political power and the military's position has been confined to garrisons. Two factors contributed to the military's return to the barracks. First of all, public demonstrations took place in the late 1980s to realize a political democracy by pushing military politicians out of the political arena. And second, the military started to lose confidence in its ability to influence national development. The Sixth Republic, initiated in the late 1980s, promised to proceed toward political democracy. Although presidential power was still held by a politician with a military background, South Korean society started to move toward democratization in every social sector. These developments persuaded the military to recognize the validity of the old professionalism as a viable alternative. Since then the old professionalism's institutionalization has seemed satisfactory, though it is too early to conclude that the military is completely free from its preoccupation with the new professionalism.

South Korea began its modern history with the old professionalism introduced by American forces stationed in Korea. This tradition lasted some 15 years through the First and Second Republics that were dominated by civilian political leaders. The military revolution of 1961, however, replaced this Western tradition with the new professionalism, which was to direct civil-military relations in South Korea for the next 30 years or so.

South Korea has struggled to stabilize civil-military relations through the old professionalism. Although a few may still defend the new professionalism, especially for developing countries, a predominant number consider it outdated and improper. Experts and scholars in South Korea agree that the new professionalism might be an alternative platform in the process of modernization, but the final direction, they say, should be based on the old professionalism. The South Korean military today has no objection to this viewpoint. Indeed, it shows a strong tendency toward the old professionalism as a future-oriented value.

ORIGINS OF THE OLD PROFESSIONALISM

In 1945, South Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial empire, but its political sovereignty was not attained until 1948. For the interim years from 1945 to 1948, the United States established the American Military Government to control the South Korean territory. In 1946, the American Military Government established the Korean Constabulary Reserve, which numbered around 25,000 soldiers with the mission to support police forces. The American Military Government also created the English Language Training Course to teach basic English military expressions to military officers, most of whom had served with the Chinese or Japanese military.[4]

When the First Republic was launched in 1948, South Korea began building its own regular armed forces, growing to about 100,000 by 1950. American forces remained in South Korea as advisers, however, and helped the South Korean military to simulate American institutions. Without any experience of modernization, South Korea's military had to adopt, without much modification, the American military system and tradition. The mission of the military was clearly stated in the constitution as the prosecution of national defense activities.[5] During the Korean War,[6] military forces were rapidly expanded up to the one million level to counter North Korea's aggression. South Korea's military was far from constituting a formally organized force, however. Rather, it was a rapidly mobilized force to fight against North Korea under the direct command of UN forces. After the end of the Korean War, the military became an influential group in society simply because it predominated in terms of size, westernization, education, and so forth. No other social group could match the military with respect to a fairly administered career service. Although civilian politicians were able to control the military, the military's potential power began to grow with the deepening of political instability. When public demonstrations against the government started to grow in number and intensity in the mid-1950s, the military at times played a decisive role in coping with political crisis.

Insofar as professionalization is concerned, the military was at a primitive stage—it was a force that was mobilized rather than professional. Education and training for military purposes could not be undertaken without American assistance and in any case were pursued only at elementary levels. Military officers were recruited by a voluntary system, but career officers were not properly paid.[7] The low level of professionalization created numerous problems. Corruption, for example, was so pervasive in the military that American advisers were obliged to look the other way unless it produced serious side effects.[8]

Although the military showed a primitive level of expertise, it did maintain a strong sense of duty to its mission. There was no question of the military's courage in the Korean War and other tests. The military was preoccupied, however, by civil supremacy. This condition seems acceptable in the eyes of Westerners, but serious problems emerged when civilian politicians took advantage of the military for political purposes. Former President Syngman Rhee and other politicians treated the military as their personal agents. The military corps was subject, for example, to demands for political fundraising and illegal voting. For a symbolic case of political interference, consider the fact that the position of army chief of staff changed 14 times between 1948 and 1961. In a few cases military leaders resisted such political interference, but in most cases they failed.[9]

Civilian power over the military began to weaken in the late 1950s when the public moved against the political dictatorship of President Rhee. General Hyo Chan Song, then army chief of staff, tried to situate the military in a neutral position, free from political manipulation, and purged a number of high-ranking officers known for their corruption or factionalism.[10] When the nationwide revolution against the political regime erupted in 1960, the military maintained a neutral position between the people and the political regime, sometimes rejecting the government's orders and directions.

The military's professionalization during the First Republic was primitive at best. As a basic principle it tried to maintain the old professionalism. And although it seemed at times that the old professionalism might work in developing countries like South Korea, it failed to take root in South Korea's context.

RISE OF THE NEW PROFESSIONALISM

When the civilian dictatorship was toppled in 1960, the Second Republic took its place. Although the Second Republic was based on democratic principles, the political system swung wildly out of control in the face of rising demands from the people. This problem derived from the system's asymmetric nature. Although the political system was built on democratic institutions, its capacity fell short of coping with challenges from the social sector. In the eyes of military officers, political stability was more important than the realization of political democracy. They emphasized stability as a prerequisite for a functioning political democracy. Moreover, military officers had little confidence in civilian politicians, believing they were both incompetent and corrupt. The military coup of 1961 took place for all these reasons, which were clearly stated in its revolutionary pledge.[11]

The new military developed its rationale further by arguing that political instability was attributable to an excessive imitation of Western-style political democracy. Although the military believed in the ideology of liberal democracy, it maintained that such an ideology could be implemented in different ways according to the circumstances of each country. This position was formalized by former President Chung-hee Park in the presidential election of 1963.[12] He consistently held this position during his years in political power (1963–1979). These reasons also furnished a rationale for the military officers' usurpation of political power in 1980 when the assassination of President Park created a political vacuum. In short, the military politicians shared the credo that a system of political democracy functions best through the realization of a strong government. Under this credo, the military expanded its role and mission corresponding to the new professionalism. The military penetrated national dimensions far beyond the area of national defense.[13]

Military professionalization developed steadily after the military took political power. Among other measures, the military government expelled a significant number of high-ranking officers for reasons of corruption or politicization. Chung-hee Park, a two-star general, held political power with strong support from a dozen colonels. This new faction dared to involve itself in the political arena well beyond the military domain. They considered the professionalization of the military for several reasons. For one thing, the military corps had no reason to participate in the political arena any longer, as the military revolt had already realized its political and military objectives. The revolutionary military leaders also recognized that they needed to control the military corps in a new fashion. What they envisioned was a military better equipped with professionalism in military matters and political subordination in the public arena. Military professionalization, they suggested, should proceed in such a way as to serve national developments in various fields.[14]

The management of military affairs was institutionalized, and officers' pay was significantly raised. Officers began to be managed as career professionals in terms of both education and occupation. Regular officers with a college education took active positions in the military, and they were well trained to maintain values including social service, honor, political neutrality, and commitment to national defense. The National Defense University had a curriculum involving economics, politics, national development, and the broad terms of the army's role in world strategy and national security.[15] It was assumed that military officers should play a more comprehensive role in national development, not to mention national defense.

That the new professionalism became a dominant concept between 1961 and 1987 is evident on two counts. First, the military maintained a wide range of political influence in terms of elite recruitments. And second, the military culture penetrated the country's social and political dimensions. With respect to the first aspect, retired generals came to the national assembly and the government as major actors with political influence. In 1963, for example, about 18 percent of the parliament's members consisted of retired generals, and they constituted 38 percent of the leading party's parliamentary members. Retired generals comprised about 30 percent of government ministers until the 1980s.[16] Moreover, military officers were sent to serve in the bureaucracy. Under this policy, academy graduates were selected to join the government organization after five years' service in the military.[17]

As for the second aspect, the military culture began to penetrate all social sectors. The decision-making process was prompt but superficial. Discussion of policy objectives was not permitted. Executing national goals had the highest priority. Neither demonstrations nor opposition to the political system was allowed for security reasons. The military approach was perceived as an effective and rational style for countries at an early stage of modernization.[18] This sort of military culture resulted in a firm authoritarian political system called "Yu Sin"—the Fourth Republic.[19] When faced with serious civil demonstrations, the military often resorted to harsh suppression.

THE OLD PROFESSIONALISM REVIVED

Since the late 1980s the military has been reorganized to satisfy the conditions for the old professionalism. The Sixth Republic was still headed by a military leader, President Tae-woo Roh, a retired four-star general. A president elected by democratic means, Roh embarked on comprehensive measures to let the military return to the old professionalism. Officers at a high level sometimes complained about these measures, however, and resented the criticisms from civilian sectors. In the summer of 1988, at a ceremony inaugurating a new army chief of staff, the outgoing chief General Hee-doo Park, revealed displeasure in his farewell address by saying that the military's conservative position in political and national security matters must not be equated with an antidemocratic point of view. He went on to say that the military has played an essential role in securing the freedom, democracy, and prosperity that South Koreans enjoy today.[20]

The Sixth Republic forced the military to abide by the political neutrality clause in the constitution—one of the results of the civil strife of June 1987.[21] When the people rose up against the political regime, demanding a complete

replacement, the ruling party decided to accept these demands and promised a wide range of political democratization. A new constitution, expected to function for the Sixth Republic, was enacted by national referendum. It was the first time in South Korea's history that the amendment of a constitution was agreed upon between the ruling party and the opposition. Most civilian politicians were still afraid of the military's political influence, however, and insisted upon the enforcement of civilian control over the military. Thus both sides agreed, finally, to include the political neutrality clause in the new constitution.

The military leaders understood they would have to reorient the military in a new direction that met the conditions for the old professionalism. The new principles were to include political neutrality, military professionalism, and the expertise required for military security.[22] This environment provided the military with a strong motivation to change its basic foundations in a campaign called "the recreation of the military."[23] Soon after, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) initiated reforms to transform the parallel command structure of the three branches (army, navy, and air force) into an integrated operational command system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[24] In the process of the restructuring, however, many criticisms emerged regarding the likelihood of military intervention in political affairs owing to the centralized military power of the JCS. As a result, the power of the JCS has been diffused in significant terms. In the past, the JCS had been out of the command system, having served in a subordinate capacity to the minister. In gaining the power of operational command over the armed forces, the JCS was now expected to observe several conditions—for example, it must receive permission from the minister of national defense when it wants to move combat troops in peacetime.[25] Civilian politicians were clearly afraid of any revival of military intervention in politics.

In 1994, the defense objectives were revised in order to deal with comprehensive threats in the future.[26] In civil-military terms, this revision reflects the military's efforts to concentrate its mission on the security function alone. Under the Kim Young-sam regime, the first civilian presidency after almost 30 years of political control by military leaders, globalization assumed a primary position in national policymaking. To promote this doctrine in national defense, the MND proceeded with three major tasks: to foster a powerful first-rate armed forces, to develop external and internal military relationships in preparation for the twenty-first century and the Korean unification era, and to fulfill the military's responsibility to strengthen the nation's competitiveness.[27] It was supposed that beyond the basic duty of safeguarding national territory, the military could contribute to society by providing technological manpower and helping the private

sector to develop defense science and technology. These efforts were expected to have a positive effect on the government's globalization policy.

Since the Kim Dae-jung government, launched in early 1998, the military has undertaken ambitious programs to restructure itself in order to create a more advanced armed forces. A campaign called "the military for the people" has been introduced, and a committee for military reform was created in April 1998.[28] The basic direction for reform is to build an "armed forces smaller in size but stronger in power"—a force with professionalized standing personnel, informed and highly trained troops equipped with advanced weapon systems, and more efficient management in economic terms. Currently the Ministry of National Defense has selected 58 reform tasks to meet the following three goals: a small-sized standing army fully equipped with advanced defense capability; an information-and-science-oriented army equipped with high-tech weapons; and an economical army managed rationally and efficiently.[29]

The current government has focused on the civilianization of the military. Military service has been defined as a commitment to state and society and to cultivating citizens for a democratic society.[30] The slogan "a good soldier is a good citizen" is considered a future-oriented value for the military, thereby steering civil-military relations in a positive direction. One noteworthy policy has been the expanding role of civilian experts in defense policymaking. The MND first introduced this idea in the 1980s, and it has now expanded to cover 37 civilian experts working in 12 specialized areas.

Since the late 1980s, the military has deepened professionalization in several areas. The level of expertise has steadily advanced. By this time, the military's education system had already been institutionalized for career officers. No officers need go abroad to learn essential skills or knowledge. Although officers still go abroad, it is to engage in military diplomacy. In line with the new expansion of women's role in the country, military academies have admitted female applicants since 1997. Moreover, in 1996 the military initiated a plan to improve its personnel management. The core of the plan is to integrate the training and utilization of military manpower. Formerly each branch of service failed to develop their potentials.[31] Recently, however, the focus has been on training for improving joint and combined combat capability, real-time training, and technology-intensive education and training in order to foster military specialists, effective combat soldiers, democratic citizens, and elite units. The system is classified into school education and unit training.[32]

So far as servicemen's welfare is concerned, the MND recognizes there must be more investment in this regard. To this end, the MND has upgraded pay

and allowances to match the level of public corporations by 1997 and that of private conglomerates by 2000.[33] Moreover, comprehensive measures have been introduced to promote servicemen's welfare by providing financial remuneration to compensate for disadvantages caused by the nature of military service.

As for its contribution to society, the military has played an active role by making the most of its manpower and technological resources—especially in times of national disaster. In response to government policy toward environmental protection, the military established the Department of Environment in 1995, and each branch headquarters of the armed forces has an exclusive unit to deal with the environment.[34] To some extent this was a response to public concern, because most military units are stationed near water sources or natural ecosystems.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The conceptual model of a new professionalism dominated civil-military relations in South Korea for the first 30 years. South Korea started out with an idea of Western-style professionalism, introduced by the American military, but it failed to work and simply left a few vestiges of instruction and experience. From American advisers Korean military leaders learned how to organize and control the military. As time went by, however, they became subject to manipulation by civilian politicians and were unable to maintain an autonomous position vis-à-vis political power.

The military of the 1950s considered its task to be the prosecution of national defense functions according to American tradition. Military officers lacked expertise, however, and were not adequately educated to head armed forces. Although military leaders had gained a little experience through previous service in the Japanese and Chinese military, their backgrounds were not so useful in the new environment shaped by the American military—a situation that often created serious problems for the military's efforts to maintain group cohesion. Professionalization of the military was at a primitive stage just sufficient to sustain a superficial identity. Nevertheless, the military was fairly good at executing its missions regarding national defense, as it demonstrated in the Korean War period.

The new professionalism replaced the old when the military revolt of 1961 proclaimed the moral obligations of rebuilding the military and indeed the state itself. New military leaders invoked nationalist sentiments for directing political order and national development. They participated in various aspects of society,

and the military approach was considered an advanced and effective way to modernize the state. According to these leaders, the military has to play a comprehensive role in both national defense and national development. Internal security threats were considered especially dangerous to national security.

Under the paradigm of new professionalism, the military began to promote professionalization actively. Officers were properly educated and better paid. Military units showed a strong motivation for group cohesion. The main direction of military professionalization, however, focused on strengthening South Korea's self-defense capabilities. This doctrine contributed much to the enhancement of military professionalism in terms of mission-oriented spirit and the obligation of social service, although the military was not sufficiently professionalized in terms of welfare.

In 1979 when a political vacuum was created after the assassination of President Park, other military leaders stepped up to regain political power. Mostly graduates of the military academy with a firm belief in the guidelines of the new professionalism, they headed politics and undertook professionalization of the military at the same time. Yet they seemed to realize that the military was no longer capable of directing political order and guiding national development. And as pressure from the political and civil societies began to grow, military leaders were obliged to follow democratic processes. South Korea's first democratic turnover of political power occurred in 1988.

Since then, the old professionalism has regained supremacy. Civilian politicians have dismissed military politicians from the military and expelled them from the political arena. The military has turned to reform and restructuring. Military leaders believe that reform should follow the dual principles of militarization and civilianization. Both principles are conducive, they think, to deepening military professionalism. Professional officers are now highly educated to perform more specialized jobs. They are fairly paid compared to other public servants. A significant problem, however, is found in their service environment. Since security conditions have not improved, they work in battlefield areas for most of their career. Whatever the security conditions, military leaders recognize that professionalization must be improved to meet a future security environment in an information and scientific age—as in other advanced countries.

For over 10 years now the military has embraced the old professionalism. Today South Korea experiences no conflict in terms of civil-military relations. Without social turbulence or imminent security threats on the horizon, the military is not likely to violate the constitutional order. After all, South Korean society enjoys an advanced level of economic well-being and a civil culture shaped

by people's awareness of citizenship. Even so, these efforts to encourage the military to embrace the old professionalism must continue. If they are successful, the military will be much less likely to interfere in civilian politics.

ENDNOTES

1 For the concept of the old professionalism see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 80–89; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glenco: Free Press, 1960), pp. 418–440.

2 On the new professionalism see Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), p. 248.

3 The differences in perceptions are well analyzed in the following article: Jong-Chun Baek and Min Yong Lee, "Civil-Military Relations in Korea: Issues and Alternatives," *Pacific Focus* 4(2)(Fall 1989):35–36.

4 The entering class consisted of 60 cadets, mostly Korean career officers who had served in China or Japan. There were a few career military personnel who had served in the nationalist military created for the independence movement in Manchuria. Most of them did not want to participate in the Military Language School, however, because it did not represent the nationalist movement. See Ministry of National Defense, *Hanguk Jeunjaengsa* (History of the Korean War), 1:258.

5 In the constitution of the First Republic, the basic direction of defense policies was to fulfill requirements for national defense purposes only. See Research Institute of Military Defense History, *Gukbang Jeungchaek Byunchunsa* (History of Defense Policy), p. 32.

6 The Korean War started on 25 June 1950 when North Korea suddenly engaged in a full-scale attack against South Korea. The war lasted for three years, and the armistice agreement between UN forces and North Korea was signed on 27 July 1953. Since then the two Koreas have distrusted each other.

7 Around 1952, the monthly salary for a three-star general was no more than $8 and soldiers received 50 cents. See Dong-Hee Lee, *Mingun Guangyeron* (Studies of Civil-Military Relations) (Seoul: Il-Jo-gak, 1993), p. 279.

8 There are two basic problems in the South Korean military: factionalism and corruption. The two are intertwined in many cases. The Korean War magnified the mistakes of inexperienced officers, and corruption added to the constant need for a protective cloak for factional leaders. For details see Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 346–350.

9 In 1952, the former army chief of staff, Gen. Jong-Chan Lee, rejected an order to mobilize military forces for political purposes. In his directive he stated that no attempts to intervene in politics could be allowed. This action was considered an exceptional case. See Kang Seung Jae, *Cham Gunin Lee Jong-Chan* (General Jong-Chan Lee as a Truthful Soldier) (Seoul: Dong-A, 1986), pp. 76–77.

10 Henderson, *Politics of the Vortex*, p. 355.

11 General Chang Doo-Young stated in his proclamation to soldiers that the military rose up against civilian politicians for their corruption and incompetence. See Choi Chang-Guoy, *Hanguk Doklip Samsipnyunsa* (History of Korea's 30 Years of Independence) (Seoul: Sung Moon Gak, 1976), p. 45.

12 General Park retired from the military to participate in the election for the first presidency of the Third Republic. He stressed strong leadership, economic development, and political stability in maintaining the doctrine of South Korean democracy. See the Democratic Republican Party, *Minju Gonghwadangsa* (History of the Democratic Republican Party 1963–1973), pp. 103–104.

13 From the very beginning of the coup the revolutionary militaries maintained a basic orientation identical to the model of new professionalism. In the oath of 21 May 1961 they emphasized the efforts to strengthen national power, develop the national economy, preserve national independence and freedom, strengthen ties with friendly countries, overcome the national crisis, and eliminate corruption and social evils. All these efforts were pledged on the basis of the "patriotic spirit of the glorious armed forces." For a detailed description see Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 102–103.

14 For a detailed explanation see Dong-Hee Lee, *Mingun Guangyeron*, pp. 288–292.

15 Ibid., pp. 291–292.

16 For an analysis of the recruitment of retired generals into the social sector see Doo-Seung Hong, *Hanguk Gundaeye Sawhehak* (Sociology of the Korean Military) (Seoul: Nanam, 1993), pp. 62–63.

17 This idea was meant to meet two expectations. One was to solve the promotion bottleneck in the military. Regular officers could not be guaranteed the rank of colonel. The other expectation was to change the environment of the corrupt public service. Ibid., pp. 64–65.

18 According to the report published by the Ministry of National Defense, the military of the 1960s was the organization best suited to guide national management and introduce efficiency, a scientific outlook, administrative techniques, and so on. See Ministry of National Defense, *Gukga Baljeungua Gunye Yukhal* (National Development and the Role of the Military), pp. 150–151.

19 "Yu Sin" means a revival of national identity in a modern context. The Yu Sin system introduced a more authoritative political approach.

20 *Newspaper for Soldiers*, a daily paper published by the Ministry of Defense, 13 June 1988. His arguments were a reaction to criticism leveled against the military by civilian politicians during presidential and parliamentary elections.

21 The constitution states that the military is responsible for security and the defense of the nation's territory and that its political neutrality is guaranteed. This statement is included in the fifth clause of the constitution. This constitution, enacted in 1987, is still in effect despite changes of political regime.

22 The army chief of staff, Gen. Jong-Gu Lee, and the minister of national defense, Sang Hoon Lee, suggested these principles to military officials in their directives. See *Chosun Daily Newspaper*, 2 and 8 February 1990.

23 The campaign aimed at attaining the self-realization of national defense, the creation of a new image to revive people's confidence, and concentration of the military's basic mission on defense expertise. See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1989*, p. 20.

24 The purpose of the restructuring was to create a framework for the exercise of an integrated combat capability and the efficient allocation of defense resources. See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1992–1993*, p. 118.

25 Other conditions are suggested to limit the power of the JCS. Mainly they focus on avoiding the abuse of JCS power in terms of operational command. See Sang Chul Lee, *Gunsa Haengjeungbub* (Administrative Law of Military Affairs) (Seoul: Gyung Sae Won, 1997), pp. 81–86.

26 The essence of defense is expressed as defending the nation against external military threats and aggression, supporting the peaceful unification of Korea, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.

Formerly the goals were "to defend the nation from armed aggression by potential adversaries, support the nation's effort for peaceful unification, and contribute to the security and peace of the region." The main difference is in the recognition of threats: the new objectives broaden the sources and types of threat. See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1995–1996*, p. 16.

27 Ibid., p. 208.

28 The committee was built to aid the minister of national defense in planning, executing, and evaluating all reform policies. The committee works in combination with military and civilian experts in organization. See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1998*, p. 166.

29 Ibid., pp. 239–240.

30 For example, the Ministry of National Defense has published a textbook to teach soldiers military values and spirit. The book emphasizes the military's role in terms of both national defense and cultivation of citizenship within the military. See *The Basic Textbook for Education of Soldiers*, published in Korean by the Ministry of National Defense in 1998.

31 Under this plan professional manpower is divided into two types, special and technical, for the utmost utilization of professional manpower based on the job characteristics for each type of employment. See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1995–1996*, pp. 174–175.

32 Ibid., pp. 175–176.

33 This effort was made to counter a newly developing problem: junior officers were becoming less competitive in their recruitment stage because the military corps had lost people's confidence and the profession was no longer popular among youngsters. This problem was caused in part by reforms directed by civilian politicians in the early 1990s. The former army chief of staff, Gen. Il-Guy Doo, admitted to such a problem in a 1997 seminar conducted by Army Headquarters. See *21segi Gungùa Byunyoung Saengwhal Baljeun* [The Military of the 21st Century and the Reform of Military Barracks], p. 3.

34 See Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1995–1996*, p. 210.

5

Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism

General Sun Chin-ming

According to a report on the security situation in the Taiwan strait presented by the U.S. Department of Defense to the U.S. Congress on 1 February 1999, the extent of professionalized troops in the ROC armed forces is pretty high. Even so, ROC's chief of the general staff, Gen. Tang Yiau-ming, urges the armed forces to invest considerable effort in troop professionalization and specialization. In his speech during the ceremony celebrating Teachers Day on 28 September 2000, General Tang once more urged the armed forces to move toward the goal of professionalization and specialization. General Tang's message suggests that so far the military's efforts in this regard have been insufficient. Clearly, then, there is some difference between the U.S. and ROC assessments of the military's progress toward professionalization. Perhaps this gap is due to their differing viewpoint. Here I propose we adopt more objective criteria to analyze the progress of the ROC armed forces' professionalization.

THE MEANINGS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

It is true that the term "profession" is abstract. It is hard for us to measure it quantitatively. Although one may have certain criteria for measurement, the criteria must be universally accepted. Fortunately, many scholars and experts have provided fairly objective views and criteria for analysis. Indeed, some of their research regarding the implications of military professionalism can be used as a reliable basis of assessment.

In the book titled *The Professions*, published in 1993, Saunders and Wilson defined the term in this way: "A profession is a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art founded upon it."[1] Others have defined a profession as "any body of persons using a common technique who form an association the purpose of which is to test competence in the technique by means of examination."[2] In the former definition, the profession is seen as a vocation; in the latter, the profession is seen as a group of people with specialized technique.

According to Ernest Greenwood's observation, "a profession can be characterized by authority, a systematic body of theory, sanction of the community, a regulative code of ethics, and the professional culture." Moreover, Robert Storey insists that "there are three basic ideas in a true profession: (a) education or pursuit of a particular learned art; (b) organization of the profession; (c) knowledge and a spirit of the profession."[3] Other scholars such as Bengt Abrahamson have defined the profession as "an occupation whose members (a) possess a high degree of specialized theoretical knowledge, plus certain methods and devices for the application of this knowledge in their daily practice, (b) are expected to carry out their tasks with due attention to certain ethical rules, and (c) are held together by a high degree of corporateness stemming from the common training and collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods."[4]

Samuel Huntington used a special paradigm called professionalism to specify the profession—which included a sense of social responsibility as well as corporateness in specialized knowledge and expertise. In Huntington's paradigm, expertise is defined as follows: "The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. His expertise is acquired only by prolonged education and experience. It is the basis of objective standards of professional competence for separating the professional from laymen and measuring the relative competence of members of the profession."[5] He regards corporateness in these terms: "The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility."[6]

As for military professionalism, some scholars contend that "the uniqueness of the military profession is summed up by its purpose." Such a purpose, they say, represents "management of violence in the service of the state." Donald Bletz has noted that "the military professional is defined simply as the career officer who devotes himself to the expertise, responsibility, and corporateness of the profession of arms."[7] Morris Janowitz adds that the military's professionalism clearly means "that the conduct of warfare is given over to men who have committed themselves to a career of service, men who are recognized for their 'expertise' in the means of warfare."[8] And, finally, Huntington believed that "the duties of the military officer include: (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat."[9]

In light of these definitions of profession and military professionalism, we may generalize the following points:

- "Profession" means a group of people with specific knowledge, skill, and attitudes in a specialized field of human endeavor. We can call these people experts; such a group can be said to have corporateness. They are, unlike laymen, professional in their undertakings.
- "Military professionals" refers to those officers or personnel involved in the work of military preparedness using operations-related knowledge and skill. The work of preparedness includes organizing, equipping, and training the military force as well as planning military activities and directing operations in and out of combat.
- Since the work of military preparedness is "management of violence in the service of the state," it is highly sensitive and very dangerous. Moreover, because the nation's survival depends on this preparedness, the military profession has more dimensions than any other. In other words, other than having specialized knowledge and skill, the military profession needs a code of ethics, sense of responsibility, corporateness, and esprit de corps. This is called military professionalism.
- Having summarized the viewpoints of scholars and offered my personal understanding, I would like to present the following points to serve as an index for assessing the ROC's military professionalization: Do officers and personnel have sufficient knowledge and skill? Are the training and education effectively conducted? Is the military code of ethics well observed? Does the military have a high sense of responsibility, corporateness, and esprit de corps?

Generally speaking, an overall look at the ROC's armed forces may impress an observer with the professionalism of its officers and troops—in particular, during the time of President Chiang Kai-shek. In 1924 it was Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. Sun Yat-sen who built the very first national defense force for the Republic of China. Although the troops were poorly equipped, the officers had been well trained in Japan's military officers school and a number of elite officers had graduated either from the late Ching dynasty's military officers school (Jiang Wu Xie Tang) or from the early republic's military officers school (Pao Ding). Thus Chiang Kai-shek was able to build a revolutionary force of well-trained and highly disciplined men willing to sacrifice all for the revolution. Such a spirit prevailed among both the officers and the soldiers of the revolutionary force. This is what we called Hwang Pu spirit. With this spirit the revolutionary force triumphed time after time over the warlords' troops during the northern battles, though severely outnumbered, and eventually won the respect of the entire Chinese people.

During the Japanese invasion between 1937 and 1945, the ROC's military force often suffered heavy casualties. Compared with the enemy's troops, ours were inferior in training and equipment. But fully encouraged by the common cause of resisting the invasion and protecting the motherland, every soldier was willing to sacrifice for the country. Therefore, the troops were well disciplined and had a profound sense of obedience and corporateness. In other words, our troops had a very good esprit de corps and waged a lengthy war of attrition against the Japanese. Though inferior in training and equipment, our defense force was under outstanding leaders who understood strategy and tactics. Thus despite Japan's fierce offensive, we managed to inflict heavy blows on the enemy, held their offensive momentum in check, and stood firm for eight years till Japan's surrender. In this period, owing to the massive expansion of our forces, training and professionalization could not catch up with the level attained during the wars against the warlords. Even so, in all respects, the defense force was still fairly professional.

Once the war against the Japanese invasion ended, our armed forces began to demobilize. But such a rapid and massive demobilization of troops within such a short period of time generated a great impact on the military's morale. Moreover, the military's efforts at learning specialized knowledge, practicing specialized skill, and introducing the professional education and training essential to military preparedness were all either delayed or suspended. Worst of all, the Chinese Communists' continuous infiltration and sabotage in our armed forces resulted in a serious setback in the military's sense of responsibility, corporateness, and esprit de corps. Eventually, our armed forces lost several decisive battles during the civil war with the Communist troops and retreated with the government to Taiwan. At this point the professionalization of the armed forces was disturbingly low.

In Taiwan, President Chiang Kai-shek and his generals finally got a chance to review the shortcomings of the military force. It was a difficult time but also the best time for all military personnel, from top to bottom, to conduct a painstaking and thorough restructuring effort. To learn from the strengths of others, we even recruited retired Japanese and German generals and officers to introduce their military training lessons and teach us the operation of exercises. Later came the massive wave of U.S. military advisers. This group provided comprehensive and effective assistance to our armed forces in organizational establishment, development of doctrines, training, procurement of weapons and equipment, as well as recruitment. The military academy along with the naval and air force academies expanded from two years to four years and offered more attractive

features to high school graduates. In this period, all military personnel felt they were entrusted with the sacred mission of liberating the compatriots in mainland China behind the Communist iron curtain. Their morale, sense of responsibility, corporateness, and esprit de corps were extraordinarily high.

After the early 1960s, all training but no actual fighting made it hard for the troops to maintain such high morale. In time, President Chiang Kai-shek grew old and weak, thus gradually relaxing the supervision of military training. These factors, combined with others, eventually weakened the professionalization of the armed forces. Accordingly, given these impacts, I regret to say that the armed forces of today are not as professional as during the 1950s and 1960s. I would like to cite some examples to support my views.

General Yin Chung-wen, who first served as director of the Military Intelligence Bureau and later became the director of the National Security Bureau, told his close friend Gen. Mo Sheng-tung that he did not fully understand the military until he had left it. These words come directly from General Mo, a close friend of mine. Moreover, one of our former chiefs of the General Staff once asked "What's the Second Artillery?" during a briefing. Another close friend of mine, General Yeh, used to do live interviews about military issues on TV but later refused to be interviewed. He had run out of military knowledge. All he ever had was a general understanding of military affairs and nothing more. When it came to in-depth views on military issues, he could no longer answer the questions.

In recent years many units, facing loud complaints from legislators and the media, have reduced a lot of dangerous training or even omitted it. In 1998, for example, an ROTC officer who has since retired from the military told me that during his one-year service on Matsu Island his company never conducted live-fire training on 60 mortars. Moreover, he told me that his company commander did not even know how to zero in with a rifle. Recently the reinvestigation into the death of naval Capt. Yin Ching-feng—which involved naval officers and top admirals who probably received illegal kickbacks from arms dealers—suggests that the armed forces have fallen short in collective discipline. Former Vice-Minister Gen. Chao Chih-yuan once pointed out that "our armed forces no longer know who to fight for and why." All these examples indicate that our armed forces have indeed encountered severe problems in professionalization.

FACTORS HINDERING PROFESSIONALIZATION

The reasons for the deterioration of professionalism in the ROC's armed forces can be summarized as follows.

Insufficient Training

First of all, during the early days when the troops moved to Taiwan, most of the grassroot officers, especially in the army, were deficient either in basic military knowledge or in specialized knowledge. This was due to the dire need for junior officers when our defense force was quickly expanded in size during the war against the Japanese invasion. Because the training of these young officers, most of whom were college students, took only a few months, it was insufficient to prepare a qualified officer. In time these officers constituted the mainstay of the officers corps of the armed forces. Some of them even made their way to the top, assuming the responsibility of planning and directing military preparedness. With limited military knowledge, they knew only how to follow orders and routine procedures in conducting combat missions and battlefield techniques. As for tactics and strategy, they were almost blank. Not only were they unable to anticipate the kind of war that would be fought in the future, but they were incapable of working out the explicit rules of engagement and standard operating procedures in conducting such a future war should it occur—let alone nailing down a readiness plan for the armed forces. Accordingly, the work of military preparedness was flawed.

Later in 1954, the army academy along with the naval and air force academies expanded the academic system to four years and stipulated that qualified students must be high school graduates. But influenced by the traditional notion that "a good boy never enters the military" and the idea that the military was the executor of the white horror (McCarthyism) rule and the hindrance of democratization, most Taiwanese families refused to let their young boys join the military. Accordingly, young men were reluctant to enter the military academies and the annual number of students recruited was insufficient. Taking the army academy, for instance, the total number of students entering between 1958 and 1960 amounted to only 500. Although quite a few of these students scored high on the entrance examination, the rest could not manage to pass the general entrance exam for civilian universities. The situation did not improve in the following years. Given their limited background of basic science and limited learning capability, most of these students appeared incapable of absorbing new knowledge and thinking creatively. Consequently, their interest in new knowledge and academic research was relatively low. As these officers later became senior cadres for the officer corps, the army's efforts in introducing specialized knowledge and professionalization were surely affected.

Rigid Thinking

Second, owing to the conservativeness and isolation of the troops, along with a tight political grip under Presidents Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, military personnel dared not have any close contact with foreign military personnel for they could be labeled as conspirators. Most of the time, not even a newspaper or periodical was allowed to be read. Military education was based on rigid and doctrinaire materials. For example, President Chiang Kai-shek's important addresses were all collected and printed in book form as directives. The collections had to be read like the Bible and obeyed like an imperial decree. All personnel had to follow these directives without exception, in words and deeds, thus leaving no room for creativity.

Owing to its conservativeness and isolation, the military laid much emphasis on propaganda and slogans. Slogans were seen everywhere in the barracks. We had to chant them out loud before starting work. For example: "Practice Hwang Pu spirit," "Swear loyalty to the supreme leader," "Exert the courage to fight enemies 10 or 100 times greater in number," "Do not fear death and difficulties." For indoctrination of core beliefs and psychological warfare, the slogans might be helpful. But as we chanted them over and over, the activities would turn to mere routine and lose their effectiveness.

The former president (1981–1986) of the Armed Forces University (now the National Defense University), Gen. Chiang Wei-kuo (President Chiang Kai-shek's second son), used to be very proud of having compiled a book titled *The Field Strategy* with the assistance of his predecessor, Gen. Yu Po-chuan. General Chiang placed great emphasis on this book. He even made it a required course for students of the AFU. In fact, every student officer had to recite the exact definition of the strategy written down by General Yu, word for word, or he would not get a high score in that course.

A former president of the AFU (1988–1990) and chief of the General Staff, Gen. Lo Pen-li, used to demand that all AFU instructors and students recite a manual titled "Guidelines for the ROC Armed Forces Commanders," which was compiled and printed under Hau Pei-tsun's directive. Not only were they asked to recite the manual article by article, but they had to take tests on it regularly. Their grades were included in their personnel files for promotion reference.

Such stories are examples of using doctrinaire materials to serve as knowledge. Living in a closed military society and influenced by such indoctrination, the personnel of the ROC's armed forces could no longer escape their confinement. Eventually, most of them turned rigid in their thinking and became less and less creative. Accordingly, what they learned was quite limited. Compared to

today's increasingly comprehensive military knowledge, these limited materials are no longer adequate for officers to conduct their daily routine missions—one of the major factors contributing to the setback in our military professionalism.

Impact of Political Warfare

Third, the political warfare system was introduced by Chiang Ching-kuo when the armed forces moved to Taiwan. During the years on the mainland, the political work covered only civil affairs, propaganda, media, and entertainment. Later, as the troops moved to Taiwan, supervision of officers and counterintelligence were included in the political work. Eventually political warfare developed into the so-called six categories: psychological warfare, crowd warfare, thinking warfare, stratagem warfare, organizational warfare, and propaganda warfare. To cultivate cadres for conducting such operations, an academy specializing in political warfare was established. This academy later became the Political Warfare Academy. Eventually the political warfare officers formed an independent group. Although they are supposed to follow the military cadres' command, they are actually responsible for supervising military cadres. Responsible for the loyalty of all personnel, their reports concern the military cadres' careers.

Although political warfare officers insist that the system is designed to facilitate the conduct of military operations, "subjugating the enemy without an actual fight" is quite different from the focus of the military which is "waging decisive battles, and the notion of preventing a war by waging it." Since the political warfare officers control the military through their loyalty reports, many military people depend on their favor. Accordingly, most military personnel try to please political warfare officers and dare not be too progressive in military affairs. In time, therefore, military people have suffered a loss in the advancement of military thinking. Without a doubt, this has caused a great setback in military professionalization.

In recent years, with the increasingly open trend in our society and the military, the nature of political warfare work has gradually shifted from control oriented to service oriented. Moreover, it appears that the political warfare system has suffered a loss in its influence and control while the military people seem to have gained influence—thus paving the way for a more professionalized armed forces. Such a change has been not sufficient, however, for effective professionalization.

Erosion of the Core Doctrine

Fourth, the core doctrine has gradually faded away. During the first two decades after the armed forces moved to Taiwan in 1949, President Chiang Kai-shek was

determined to recover the mainland. Everyone was willing to follow him and fight for the liberation of their mainland compatriots. In this period, the core doctrine was: "Every effort for the recovery of mainland China, every effort for victory." Accordingly, the personnel were all very serious in their training. The military's professionalization was high.

As the Chinese Communists strengthened their grip of power and their military strength grew, however, our people and troops gradually recognized the impossibility of recovering the mainland by force. We then turned to pursue the reunification of China by political means. During President Chiang Ching-kuo's time, the opposition became very active. They advocated Taiwan's independence and emphasized that they would not accept an "immigrant" government. During this period the government under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, while working hard to advance the nation's economic development, also strove to hold onto its political power. Anticommunism, anti-independence, and China's reunification were the three main focuses. Accordingly, such an insistence on these "Three Principles of the People" became the core doctrine for the armed forces and spelled out what they would fight for.

After Lee Teng-hui took over the presidency, many of his words and policies began to create doubts among ROC loyalists. They doubted Lee's commitment to reunification, for example, suggesting that he superficially supported reunification but clandestinely supported independence. This notion had a serious impact on the core thinking of the troops, especially the top brass generals, who were prepared to fight for reunification. Now they were no longer sure whether they should fight for reunification or for independence. They felt hesitant and vulnerable. Accordingly, their efforts to achieve military readiness were not as serious as before.

Although he himself lacked a military background, President Lee Teng-hui was not prepared to fully entrust military authority to Gen. Hau Pei-tsun, then chief of the General Staff.[10] Perhaps he intended to consolidate his political power or to pursue the goal of superficial support for reunification but clandestine support for independence. Eventually he removed General Hau in order to prevent his opposition. In the meantime, President Lee tried to woo Hau's followers. President Lee's approach was to award an important position to Gen. Chiang Chung-ling, whose attitude was quite different from Hau's.[11] With the help of Gen. Chiang Chung-ling, President Lee was able to recruit top brass followers and establish connections in the military. For instance, while he advocated streamlining the military, he continued to promote many generals. Compared with President Chiang Kai-shek and President Chiang Ching-kuo, President Lee promoted roughly the same number of generals. In 1993, in fact, the number was

even greater. Even so, the anti-Lee sentiment in the military persisted—for most of them were unwilling to endorse Lee's superficial support for reunification but clandestine support for independence. Consequently, the military's ethical code, corporateness, and esprit de corps gradually deteriorated. Most military officers were not loyal to Lee. President Lee, however, ignored such a fact. He believed that as long as the troops listened to him and did not oppose or bother him, he could live with it.

In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected as the tenth president of the ROC. By and large, he has followed President Lee's course by adopting a conciliatory policy and wooing the military. In fact, President Chen's policy is even more conciliatory than his predecessor's in order to keep the troops cooperative. Under the circumstances, many military officers are going with the flow in society. After all, most of them have gained what they want in terms of promotion and remuneration. But can we still call such troops a professional force?

Formality, Hypocrisy, and Administrative Burdens

Fifth is the impact of formality, hypocrisy, and administrative burdens. The Chinese are a face-loving people who sometimes emphasize formality too much. Since most of the Chinese have been farmers for a long time, they are perhaps less practical and efficient than people in industrialized countries. Eventually, great formality has prevailed among the Chinese people. In practice, most of our people have overemphasized pageantry in order to save face. Such customs have deeply affected the military. Indeed, favoring formality over reality surely hinders the military's progress toward professionalization.

In addition to the formality, hypocrisy is another factor that undermines professionalization. President Chiang Kai-shek himself did not like hypocrisy at all. But his subordinate generals, fearful of his awe-inspiring appearance, dared not utter a word of truth that might anger him. Sometimes they even told him lies and engaged in hypocrisy to make him happy. Such behavior was even more common during President Chiang Kai-shek's later years. Sometime during 1959, President Chiang Kai-shek once asked the three commanders in chief about launching an offensive to recover the mainland. Gen. Wang Shu-min, the air force's commander in chief, and Adm. Liu Guang-kai, the navy's commander in chief, both answered "no problem." In fact, neither of them had much confidence in such an operation. The Chinese Communists with Soviet military assistance had strengthened their military power considerably.

In 1961, the armed forces conducted an exercise, code-named "Shiang Yang," which simulated an attack on the mainland. On the last day of the exercise, a

simulated decisive battle was launched in Tainan and President Chiang observed the entire operation. As a young lieutenant just graduated from the academy, I too witnessed the battle because I was serving as an escort officer for VIPs. The battle looked more like a movie than an actual exercise. But President Chiang felt very satisfied. Influenced perhaps by that typical exercise, almost all the following exercises were movie-like.

President Chiang Ching-kuo shifted the focus from recovery of the mainland by force to national economic construction. As for the military, he was more concerned about the troops' loyalty, honesty, and incorruptibility. The rest of the military affairs did not interest him very much. He held the chief of the General Staff and the service commanders in chief responsible for their specific missions. The movie-like exercises became much less frequent. But later the hypocrisy reappeared during President Lee's tenure. Part of the problem was that President Lee did not know the military and was easily fooled. Another reason might be that since he was intent on consolidating political power, he did not demand too much of the military. Also, the troops were less eager to pledge allegiance to President Lee than to President Chiang Kai-shek. For they believed that President Lee superficially supported reunification but clandestinely supported independence. Accordingly, many of the personnel acted in a perfunctory or even frivolous manner. It was not surprising, therefore, that scandals such as the death of Capt. Yin Ching-feng, linked to arms sales' kickbacks, occurred during President Lee's term.

In 1994, some time before President Lee visited the United States, the armed forces conducted several exercises focusing on repelling enemy landings, counterinfiltration, and countersabotage. Obviously, these exercises were all movie-like. For the participating tanks and personnel were already positioned for the exercise. They were supposed to launch the attack from an assembled area against the enemy. This was a one-sided scenario. It appeared that the enemy either lacked alertness or did not have a counterattack capability. All they could do was wait there like sitting ducks. In 1999, during the "Han Kwang 15" exercise, the armed forces conducted a static force demonstration that pleased no one but outsiders. When we questioned their true combat capability, nobody was willing to vouch for it.

In September, during the "Han Kwang 16" exercise, one of the courses was "antiairborne warfare." The course was conducted by mobilized reserve units using bulldozers to set up large piles of trash and garbage as barricades against airborne troopers. The piles included abandoned cars, motorcycles, furniture, and the like. President Chen observed such an exercise. But professional military people could see right through its entertaining aspects. They knew the enemy's

airborne operations would not give us much warning or else they might lose their effectiveness. How, then, could our troops find so many bulldozers and so much garbage to set up barricades in so short a time—while under enemy attack? Such questions were not the concern of President Chen or the general public. All our troops did was to make those piles look good enough—an exercise in hypocrisy. How could you call such troops a professional force?

Administrative burdens often contributed to the hindrance of the military's professionalization. Originally the soldier's major duties were to protect the country and the people: "The military is there for war, and to win the war." To protect country and people, soldiers are required to be capable enough to win the war. To win the war, the military is to focus all its time and effort on preparedness—including the attainment of military knowledge, the development of doctrines, the acquisition of weapons and equipment, the training of personnel, the cultivation of esprit de corps, and more. Since the 1970s, however, the armed forces no longer accept the policy of recovering the mainland by force. So long as Taiwan does not declare its independence, the PRC has pledged not to resort to military force against Taiwan. It seemed the threat of war was gradually lessening. Accordingly, the armed forces' devotion to preparedness was not as serious as before. Moreover, the daily burden of administrative affairs began to increase. Indeed, our top brass generals and officers were all busy in such daily routine affairs as meetings, reviewing subordinate units, and participating in weddings and funerals. General Lo Pen-li, former chief of the General Staff (1996–1998), once urged that cadres should reduce their participation in weddings, funerals, and social functions. Not many people would listen, however, because he could not exempt himself from these activities.

COMPARING THE THREE SERVICES' PROFESSIONALIZATION

All three services have had their routine administrative burdens and examples of hypocrisy. All have been hurt by the factors cited in the preceding section. But air force personnel have conducted their aircraft maintenance and training seriously. Every day pilots have to conduct flight training and air patrol missions. Not only might any mistake in maintenance or training lead to the failure of the aircraft, but the planes must be ready to meet an enemy air attack at any time. In fact, our aircraft combat patrols have been well conducted—a tribute, perhaps, to the air force's sound traditions of maintenance and training.

Compared with the air force, it seems that the navy has fallen short in performance. Recently there have been several accidents including ship collisions,

ships running aground, and boiler compartment fires. Not only that but the murder of Capt. Yin Ching-feng, the suicide of Maj. Gen. Lee Kai, and corruption scandals involving arms sales have unleashed serious problems of discipline in the navy. The reason for the navy's discipline problems, I think, can be traced back to its lack of tradition. In the early years, the navy cadres came from several factions.[12] During the sea battles with the Chinese Communists, they met defeat more often than victory. The air force, by contrast, triumphed often in the war against the Japanese and later during battles against the Chinese Communists. And the army's ground troops won several significant battles against the warlords and the Japanese. One cannot help noting that air force officers all come from the air force academy while army officers all come from the Hwang Pu Military Academy.

Although the army has had a good tradition, discipline, and esprit de corps, only the troops stationed on offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu, close to the enemy, still remain high in morale and training effectiveness. As for the troops on Taiwan, the units have been undermanned (approximately 70 percent of the level required). Accordingly, most of the training has been merely a formality. Only during major exercises, will the participating units be manned with sufficient personnel and conduct serious training. In short, then, I would rank the air force's combat capability first, the navy's second, and the army's third in terms of professionalization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a retired senior military officer, I have deep feelings toward the ROC's armed forces. Therefore I would inevitably be critical of their performance. Here I would like to offer some suggestions on how our military can achieve a higher degree of professionalism.

- Strengthen the democratic education of our personnel. Military officers in particular need to recognize the true meaning of democracy. We will also have to give up personal ideology—recognizing that it is the nation and the people we serve, not a certain political party or a certain individual. We must obey the leader elected by the people according to the constitution, regardless of who he is or what policy his government adopts. So long as there is a leader, we must follow him. This is the ethics code of the military. A force without such a code cannot be considered a professional force.

- Enhance the soldier's sense of responsibility and sense of honor. The five creeds of the ROC military are devotion to "The Three Principles of the People," to the leader, to the country, to duty, and to honor. Among these five, we have put particular emphasis on the first three elements but not enough on duty and honor. In fact, "The Three Principles" and the leader may change. If we adhere to fixed principles without any modification and pledge our allegiance to another leader, our confidence will be shaken because of the contradiction of principles. Principles and leaders, the product of dictatorship, are no longer suitable in a democratic society. As everyone knows, the creed of the U.S. armed forces is devotion to country, duty, and honor. Duty and honor do not change with time. Personnel with a sense of duty and honor will be able to fully exploit their potential and in turn fulfill their responsibilities. Our military should improve in this area in order to become an even more professional force. We should cultivate the sense of honor and duty among our cadres and soldiers.
- Thoroughly restructure the political warfare system in the armed forces. Currently, all the military officers, including political warfare officers, think it has become essential to revolutionize our political warfare system. Indeed, we have adopted certain measures. We have eliminated the Kuomintang department in our military, for example, and have focused on the welfare and psychological health of our soldiers. But local and partial modifications are not sufficient to improve the present system. To eliminate the system's influence on our entire military and make our armed forces more professional, we must totally restructure our political warfare system. The tasks should include: (1) incorporating the development of political warfare officers into the three services and eliminating political warfare as a separate and isolated system; (2) ensuring that the control and supervision unit is independent from the political warfare system; (3) returning personnel affairs to the concerned units, returning intelligence affairs to intelligence units, and returning all affairs involving education, training, and operations to operational units; and (4) restricting political warfare work to public affairs, entertainment, soldiers' welfare, and civilian affairs.
- Downsize the organization and the troops. At this moment, the troops number 400,000. "Restructuring Plan II" will further cut certain organizations and reduce the number of troops. According to the publicized plan, however, the downsizing of our military structure does not appear thorough enough. The number of troops could be further reduced by 30,000 to 40,000. The current military is big but not very solid. Most of the time we still run

short of grassroot officers, which will cripple those grassroot units' administrtion and training capability. Our military once chanted the slogan "small but elite." In my opinion, 250,000 to 260,000 men is sufficient. Thus there still is room for cutting and downsizing organizations and troop levels.

- Overcome all the obstacles to professionalism by giving up undue formality and abandoning the practice of using doctrinaire materials. We need less stress on slogans and more on reality. Above all, we have to eliminate certain tasks that have nothing to do with building up our military capabilities. Focusing on military professionalism with all our might is of the utmost importance.

ENDNOTES

1 See A.M. Carr Saunders and P.A. Wilson, *The Professions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 287 and 295.

2 Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, *Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life* (University Park, Md.: Social Science Press, 1965), p. 201.

3 See Robert G. Storey, *Professional* (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont College, 1958), p. 5. See also Coates and Pellegrin, *Military Sociology*, p. 201.

4 See Bengt Abrahamson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), p. 15.

5 See Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 8.

6 Ibid., p. 10.

7 See Donald Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 6.

8 See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 6.

9 See Huntington, *Soldier and State*, p. 11.

10 Hau Pei-tsun is a career military officer. He graduated from the military academy in 1938, majoring in artillery. He has served as chief aide-de-camp to President Chiang kai-shek, army commander in chief, chief of the General Staff, minister of national defense, and premier. With a tough style of leadership, he has been labeled a military strongman with a tough stand against independence. Worried about Hau's interference with politics, President Lee Teng-hui appointed him defense minister, and later premier, in order to neutralize his military authority and position. Eventually, President Lee had Hau removed from the premiership through the influence of the legislature and public opinion.

11 Hau graduated from the military academy in 1938; Chiang, four years later. Hau had already become chief of the General Staff when Chiang served as the army's commander in chief. With his cautious and conservative approach, Chiang was not Hau's favorite general at all; conversely, Chiang did not like Hau's arbitrary style of leadership. Chiang's appointment as commander in chief did not come about through Hau's recommendation. It was President Chiang Ching-kuo's direct appointment.

12 Before the end of the war against the Japanese (before 1945), our navy had four officers schools: Ching Dao Naval Academy, Naval Torpedo Officers School, Yen Tai Naval School, and Fu Zhou Ma Wei Naval School. Accordingly, naval officers found it hard to cooperate because of their diverse origins. Their esprit de corps cannot compare with that of the army and the air force.

6

Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads

Surachart Bamrungsuk

Professional soldiers do not stage coups.
—Air Chief Marshal Voranat Apicharee,
supreme commander after the 1992 incident

"Military professionalism" is the core concept of the study of military intervention in politics. The major debate was originally laid down by Samuel Huntington. His book *The Soldier and the State* argues that professionalism is the decisive factor in keeping the military out of politics.[1] Professionalization makes the military a full-time job. That is, the military's task—organizing, planning, training, and fighting—takes a full commitment. Thus the greater the professionalism, the more the officer corps is involved in its own tasks and the less it is involved in politics. Huntington maintains that the logical consequence is for the officer corps to be nonpoliticized—in other words to be "professional soldiers." This definition is accepted by most of the Thai people. Accordingly, civil-military relations in Thailand are generally characterized as "good" or "bad." Good civil-military relations exist when the military stays strictly within the barracks; bad relations occur when the military strays outside its professional realm. As a result, military professionalism is equivalent to noninvolvement in politics.[2] Many Thais also hope that one of the most difficult obstacles to consolidating democracy—the intervention of the military in politics—can be overcome.

The Thai officer corps had been fully involved in politics from the 1932 revolution. Indeed, the political transition of 1973 was the first time the military was forced to withdraw from politics. The military's involvement in Thai politics went up and down after that period. But not until the 1992 democratic transition did the military's return to the barracks really occur. The age of military involvement in Thai politics had come to an end.[3] Today the Thai officer corps is regarded as becoming more "professional" according to Huntington's concept. That is to say, the military will be less and less involved in politics and devote themselves more and more to military affairs. Clearly this is the direction of the Thai military in the twenty-first century. Thus Thailand has made visible progress in recent years toward disengaging the military from politics. Military

leaders have learned through their experience in power that many economic, social, and political problems have no easy solution and cannot be solved by means of military intervention. More important, they recognize that the demands of political involvement have undermined the military as an institution.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The long period of absolute monarchy in Thailand was brought to an end on 24 June 1932 by a group of army officers and civil servants.[4] Ever since the transition to constitutional monarchy in that year, Thai politics had been regulated by a series of military interventions. The struggle to control the government was exercised by coup. As in many developing countries in the postcolonial period, military coup became the rule rather than an exception. In every case the military had defied the government or used violence to overthrow it.

The first coup in the postwar period came in November 1947. But the most important coup occurred in October 1958 when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat abrogated the constitution. Almost simultaneously, many other countries experienced an outburst of military revolt. As the *Times* commented: "It has been a good year for generals." For Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s, the military's political activity was persistent; in fact, the military was the decisive factor in the political system. Because of its political involvement, the Thai military outgrew its sense of professionalism. Thus Thailand was always cited as a case where the government was repeatedly subjected to the interference of the armed forces. Certainly the Thai military was not liberal in the Western sense that strictly subordinates the armed forces to the civilians.

But after the 1973 uprising the military, for the first time, was forced to withdraw from politics. It managed to come back in 1976, however, and there was again a coup in 1977. The 1977 coup was especially interesting. The new military government was markedly more liberal than its predecessors. The period, however, was characterized by a high level of communist threat—a threat to the country's national survival and to the military institution itself. Surprisingly, the armed forces agreed that the best strategy for winning its campaign against communism was to open politics. Ultimately, the government declared its victory over the Communist Party of Thailand in 1983.

The internal warfare with the communists was essential to the transformation of the Thai military. In the 1980s, the Thai armed forces adopted a new political-military doctrine: the military had to maintain its role in politics in order to build up democracy and eliminate the basic conditions of revolutionary

war. Moreover, the doctrine encouraged the officer corps to develop a consciousness that "the military belongs to the people" and must always act (or refrain from acting) in accordance with the people's needs. The military leader at that time, Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, went even further by stating that the army would seek the consent of the people before launching a coup. Clearly the Thai military in this period was adopting the "new professionalism." An internal security doctrine guided the officer corps not only to fight the communists but to resolve all the country's problems as well. As a result, the military had total responsibility for maintaining the nation's peace, security, and progress. But besides an internal threat, the country also faced external aggression from the presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. The Vietnamese occupied Cambodia in 1979, but they finally withdrew their forces a decade later. This marked the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.

The new professionalism of the Thai officers then faced a new condition: the end of the Cold War itself challenged the military's political role. As Harold Lasswell contended, the military's influence would be greatest in a threatening international environment. Thus the end of the Cold War has made it easier, not harder, for civilians to exert control over the military. Besides, democratization had begun to take root in Thai society. Although there was a coup again in 1991, ultimately the military was forced out of politics by the uprising in 1992. The military's withdrawal from politics in 1992 was more serious because the uprising caused a major political defeat for the armed forces. The process of redemocratization had returned, prompting a redefinition of the military's role in society.

CHANGING CONTEXT

For the military, the period following the end of the Cold War and the 1992 democratic transition was a radical change because different combinations of external and internal threats in the past had shaped the military's role and mission and hence the pattern of civil-military relations. The results of both incidents forced the Thai officer corps to rethink its role and mission in a new environment. Although the military has a duty to protect the nation, this does not mean they are superior to other institutions in the post-Cold War era. It means the military has no legitimacy to intervene as it did in the past. Some may argue that it is necessary for the military to intervene in time of crisis because "the army is the only organization that can solve the national problems."[5] But it is a risky business for the military as an institution to get involved in politics again. The experience in 1992 was a good lesson. Finding a new role and mission for the Thai professional

soldiers was not easy, since they had long been involved in politics. Many of them agree, however, as stated in a Thai white paper, that they have a duty "to maintain a democratic system."[6] That is to say, they have to be professional soldiers in a democratic country.

With this development, the Thai military in the first decade of the twenty-first century is moving toward becoming more professional soldiers. Although there is no formal mechanism to resolve conflict between the military and the government, the armed forces are aware that their reliance on political intervention is no longer acceptable. Besides, in the post-1992 political arena, the legal power of the military has been reduced. For example, the government moved decisively to revise all major laws giving extra powers to the military in a crisis situation, such as revision of the Government Administration in a Crisis Situation Act of 1952, revision of the Martial Law Act of 1954, abolition of the Internal Security Act of 1976, and a procedural change in the use of the armed forces in riot control. Using military forces for riot control, as in other democratic countries, now requires authorization from the cabinet. This mission was passed to the Police Department. As a result, the Capital Peacekeeping Command, which had been a major instrument to control Bangkok's security since 1976, came to an end.[7] The armed forces has now become a "state instrument," not a state in itself. As a consequence, noninvolvement in politics has become a guiding principle of the Thai officer corps. A book of the Supreme Command, *Democracy in Thailand*, assures the public on this point:

> The military has stated its position clearly that it will not get involved with politics....It will always protect democracy, which has the king as the head of state, as well as safeguard national independence and sovereignty.[8]

An incident in 1993 turned out to be a test case of Thai professionalism. During the first Chuan government, which came to power after the September 1992 elections, the cabinet allowed eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates to visit Thailand. Their objective was to demand that the Burmese military government, the SLORC, release Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese democratic leader and 1991 Nobel laureate. Their visit became a source of conflict between the government and the military in Thailand.[9] General Wimol Wongvanich, then chief of the army, was the first to voice his disagreement. It was understandable that the Thai army did not agree with the visit—after all, they wanted a smooth relationship with the Burmese military. Moreover, one of the Nobel laureates was the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, who was strongly opposed by the Chinese. It was understood, moreover, that the Thai army wanted to keep its

"special relationship" with the Chinese because of the uncertainty of war and peace in Cambodia and their past assistance to Thailand during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Nevertheless, its voice of disagreement did not lead to a confrontation as in the past—in the devaluation crisis of 1984, for example. The military simply sent a message of disagreement to the government. But when the cabinet announced its decision, the army stopped speaking. This was a good sign for Thai democratization. The military could voice its opinion so long as it did not threaten to overthrow the government. And the military agreed to stop voicing its opposition when the cabinet made its final decision—indicating a certain degree of civilian control over the military as well as military professionalism.

Besides, the 1992 transition came at the same time as the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, which was marked by the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. As a result, there was no longer a major threat to Thai national security. The military in the post-Cold War era had no major enemy to fight; neither internal nor external threats exist any longer. The relationship between Thailand and Vietnam—severely threatened when the Vietnamese forces occupied Cambodia in the 1980s—had been normalized. As the world was moving toward more democratic societies, the military needed to adjust its role and mission in the new security environment. It also was widely accepted that a turn to authoritarianism was no longer feasible. Thus the military's role in politics had declined significantly. The military admitted that "the adjustment of the armed forces is to make the soldiers more professional."[10] It further emphasized that the army's objective at this time was "to make the soldiers become more democratic."[11] Many questions remain, however, as the Thai professional soldiers confront a changing world. The new democratic regime, for its part, faces the challenge of drastically reforming civil-military relations. The new regime's success will depend on how well it can deal with these problems.[12]

PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

While its political role has been reduced, the military still plays a crucial role in development. During the anticommunist war, the military's role in development was justifiable. It not only aimed at winning the "hearts and minds" of people in rural areas, but it also aimed to reduce the root cause of the war—that is, to improve the living conditions of the people. By the end of the anticommunist war, the army was involved in major development projects in every region of the country, including the Royal Development Project.[13] The development role was also supported by the king. He suggested that "combat" and "development" had

to be carried out simultaneously. As he stated in December 1995: "Soldiers have another duty which is equally important, that is, performing relief and development work that will bring prosperity and happiness to the country and the people."[14]

Moreover, the military's development role is based on the constitution. Every constitution since 1974 has authorized the military's role in development in a chapter on the directive principles of state policies: "The armed forces shall be employed for maintaining the security of the state and for national development."[15] Although the anticommunist war was over, a military role in development programs was still seen as necessary to maintain national security. Development became a major sociopolitical activity of the army in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, every chief of the army since 1990 has emphasized this role and declared that soldiers have a duty to improve the living conditions of the people.[16] The military has to "participate in solving economic and social problems with the aim of reducing opportunity and income inequality, and lessening social conflict."[17] The military's basic explanation is this: if this condition is improved, it will strengthen national security. Many military leaders view their future role in development as follows:

> These roles will be increased in the future because the Royal Thai Armed Forces has available the units and resources that are able to support these activities. The Royal Thai Armed Forces can provide support to national development in many ways. If sufficient budget is allocated, these units will be able to contribute greatly to national development.[18]

In fact, the military's role in development is not a controversial issue in Thai politics in the 2000s. Many Thais agree that professional soldiers have another duty in peacetime: improving the well-being of the people.[19] Their future role in development will be expanded to cover other areas such as halting drug trafficking, protecting natural resources and the environment, and providing disaster relief. These new roles will be more acceptable in the future because of the increasing social problems, especially drugs.

PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

The military's role in national defense is another important aspect of Thai professionalism in the post-Cold War era. The strategic environment has totally changed since the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, however. The Thai defense planners now live in a new world. Although there has been no immediate threat to national security in this era, the military is still concerned

with its modernization program.[20] In the 1990s, for example, every military service planned to acquire new weapon systems: 101 main battle tanks and new assault rifles for the army, two submarines for the navy, one squadron of F-18s for the air force, and a military satellite for the Ministry of Defense. The total arms budget proposed for 1996 was estimated at about 50.7 billion baht (about US$2 billion).[21]

These proposals had to get the approval of the cabinet. Some of them become a source of scandal in Thai politics. For example, it was alleged by a Swedish peace organization that during the 1995 election Kockums (the Swedish submarine company) gave money to a party that later became a main party in the coalition government.[22] Prime Minister Banharn denied the charge.[23] The issue also could be used to support a no-confidence vote by the opposition parties. But because of the economic crisis that began in July 1997, some arms acquisition programs have had to be delayed or even canceled—as in the decision to return the F-18s to the U.S. Navy. Military modernization, which was based on purchasing new equipment, became more difficult. The economic crisis has forced the Thai professional soldiers to rethink their military capabilities in the future.[24]

Moreover, procurement problems have become more complicated in the election-based democratic system because the financial support of political parties may come from the arms trade (not illegal weapon smuggling but the conventional international arms market). In this situation, any arms purchased by the Thai military are eyed as providing benefits for someone or some political parties—usually the ruling parties at the time the decision is made. Thus arms purchases may become a political issue. Opposition parties will raise the issue in parliament and publicize it in order to score political points and possibly use it as ammunition in a no-confidence debate.

Certainly there has been a change in the political dimensions surrounding the arms trade. Decisions on arms acquisitions used to be restricted to high-ranking officers or those involved in the procurement process. This was due to the strong military influence in Thai politics and the weak parliamentary system. Even the media showed little interest in the issue. Criticism of arms procurements was therefore limited to people in a small circle and confined to terms of technology and strategy of which civilians had neither much knowledge nor interest. Arms purchases were treated as an "internal affair" of the military that society at large did not need to know about. But as Thai society has become more open, the "internal affairs" of the military have been brought to public attention and widely debated. The purchase of the first F-16s by the air force in the early 1980s marked the public's first participation in this previously exclusive domain

of the military. Public participation in this case can be seen as an indicator of the democratization of the Thai political system.

CIVILIAN CONTROL AND PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS

In Thailand, many people seem to have believed that with a civilian elected as prime minister, the capacity to control the military would occur without an explicit strategy. Even after the 1992 uprising there was no serious debate about how to control the military democratically. There was only a government investigation of the military's role in the uprising.[25] The public demand aimed only at removing the responsible senior officers rather than restructuring the army democratically.

The 1992 uprising was an important lesson for the military. The cost of using force in politics is high, and the military, as an institution, had to pay. The uprising also confirmed that military rule or military-supported government was no longer acceptable. The pressures against the military were both internal and external. As Gen. Wimol Wongvanich, the army chief after the uprising, said: "The people do not have faith in the army."[26] Military leaders now realized that the army must build a new image to win back the people's support. Furthermore the military accepted that, due to international developments in the post-Cold War era, Thailand had to become a democratic country. A return to authoritarianism would face great international pressure.[27] As a result, military leaders like Gen. Mongkol Amporn-pisit (supreme commander) and Gen. Cheta Thana-Charo (chief of the army) decided they would rather take their chances by accepting an elected regime. Many expected a coup during the economic crisis, but it did not happen. So far we can conclude that future developments in civil-military relations will depend in large part on the action of military leaders.

Moreover, it is accepted that Thailand is now in the information age and information about the use of force in politics would be transmitted globally. Today it is impossible to control information and media flows, and censorship has become less effective. As the military experienced in the 1992 uprising, the democratic opposition used modern communication equipment such as mobile phones and fax machines to mobilize the people to report about the massacre. The military found it very difficult to control information in an age of "electronic political rallies."[28] As General Wimol warned the military: "The present world is in the information age, which has a rapid flow of information. Thus, it is impossible to close people's eyes and ears.... In this age, even the drop of a pin will be heard all over the world."[29]

More important, a crucial development in civil-military relations emerged before the end of 1997. A new constitution was promulgated in October and a civilian defense minister came to power in November. Not only did the 1997 constitution lay down a new framework for Thai politics, but the second civilian defense minister in Thai political history represents a clear sign of a new relationship. The concept of civilian control of the military had become a reality. Although this concept is still weak in Thai society, the emergence of a civilian politician in this position has forced many officers to think about their notion of professionalism. Military professionalism now has a correlation with the acceptance of civilian supremacy. Indeed, with the development of representative democracy in the country, having a civilian defense minister is no longer unusual. Whether the Thai officer corps is happy with this new direction is not the question. As professional soldiers, they must learn to live with it.

Moreover, military intervention in politics during the Cold War was justified on the basis of threats to national security. The military perceived itself as the prime institution protecting national security—which put this institution in a superior status to civilian organizations. Besides, the definition of national security had a wide range of meanings; its scope was unrestricted. The result was an ideology of national security that tended to lead the military toward role expansion, especially in the political sphere. Today, however, the military has no political justification. From an international perspective, the decline of military power in policymaking can be seen clearly following the end of the Cold War. The military's mission has changed and its role in politics is now limited. Direct intervention of the military has become less and less acceptable. Thai professional soldiers, therefore, have become less and less involved in politics.

SUSTAINED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Before the economic crisis, Thailand had experienced a high level of economic growth. Economic growth gave more opportunity for businessmen to participate in politics directly. More important, economic development has ensured the failure of almost all the subsequent coup attempts. In the past, the businessmen were behind the scenes giving support, especially financial support, to political candidates. But after the 1992 elections they came out openly as candidates or members of political parties. Their participation is viewed positively as balancing the military's role in politics. It is hoped, too, that their political role will make Thailand a more pluralistic society in the twenty-first century.

Structurally, economic factors constrain the role of the military. This does not mean that the military will not intervene when a country achieves a certain level of economic growth.[30] It means, as Huntington believes, that developing countries which attain a certain threshold in levels of income and education will enter a "zone of transition." As a result, they have a likelihood of becoming democratic. For countries in this zone, including Thailand, leaders have considerable room to guide their countries toward democracy.[31] There is no guarantee, however. In fact, economic development may have a positive impact on coups. The movement toward democracy is based on an expanding middle class and emerging business groups.[32] Thus democratization is a product of civil society growing through economic development. The answer to the question why the coup attempts have failed, therefore, lies primarily with each country's level of economic development and modernization.

Thailand in the 1990s confirmed this thesis. With participation from the urban middle classes and business groups after the 1992 uprising, many observers came to believe that these will be main social forces of democracy.[33] Besides, Thailand is becoming more urbanized and more industrialized. As a result, the role of business groups and the urban middle class has become increasingly important. As we have seen after 1992, for example, some business groups were very active in trying to introduce "better" politics. One observer suggested that "their newfound political assertiveness arises because they now find themselves—to adopt a military analogy—actually commanding troops."[34] Certainly their power vis-à-vis the military is undeniable. It comes as no surprise to see that members of business groups now indicate they wish to take an active role in the country's political future.

Since the modern economy has become more complex, the military can no longer justify its claim that it alone knows how to run the country. And claiming that military rule is needed in order to maintain national security is no longer acceptable. Even though Thailand has been in an economic crisis since 1997, a military coup is not regarded as a solution. Thus no one denies that the middle class and the business organizations will become more influential and balance the role of the military in the future of Thai politics.

PROFESSIONALISM AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Thailand's economic situation has deteriorated sharply since June 1997. In response to the crisis, the Thai government has announced a series of austerity measures to control national spending—including some that have had a direct impact on the

military's weapon acquisition plans such as the suspension of costly arms purchases. The armed forces now face the challenge of how to adjust to the situation. Even in normal times it is hard to persuade the public to support defense spending. Now with the country facing a financial crisis it is even harder to convince these people in a "bankrupted capitalist economy" to care more about the military.

When the country was threatened by the Communist Party of Thailand and Vietnamese troops were present in Cambodia, military security was of prime importance. It was also regarded as the core of national as well as economic security. The Thai armed forces thus had a legitimate right to maintain high levels of defense spending as well as to strengthen their arsenal. After that period, however, much of the military equipment fell into obsolescence, leaving the military unprepared for the possible wars envisaged by the country's policymakers. This state of affairs triggered an import of arms that could be seen to be justified and was acknowledged as such by the public.

On a number of occasions, the military said it was buying modern arms technology to protect the national economy—a way of garnering public support. Military leaders and governments involved in the acquisition process may still believe that this argument appeals to the public, which places great importance on economic issues, but in reality this is no longer the case. Instead, the current economic conditions have made the armed forces a target of public criticism from businessmen, the urban middle class, and the media. Military leaders may find it difficult to understand this situation. While the rising sensitivity about economic affairs should be conducive to greater arms acquisitions in order to protect the country's economic interests, public sentiment has become very negative. As a result, the military's arms requests receive almost no support—only criticism that they are squandering the national budget.

The military's lack of understanding was sometimes revealed by its cynical remarks. One army officer said that if the military did not get the arms it wanted, the country could face the same fate as Kuwait. Whether or not he was serious, his words found little support among the public. They could not see the parallel between Thailand and Kuwait. If Thailand faces a foreign invasion as in the case of the oil-rich Arab state, which country is Iraq? In the past Vietnam might have fit this role, but Vietnam no longer poses any real threat to Thailand. Even with the problems in Thailand's relations with Burma, many people believe these could be better solved through vigorous diplomatic means. Through the use of this tool, Thailand's position would be enhanced and lift it from its status as underdog vis-à-vis its neighbors since the possession of weapons would not in fact increase Thailand's bargaining power in negotiations.

Thailand's current economic crisis, therefore, has reduced the prospect of public support for military spending and arms acquisitions. More important, the factors that formerly permitted the military to buy new weapons are irrelevant today. If the country survives the financial crisis, however, it will experience a new environment—especially new economic and political conditions. This environment will clearly impose a constraint on authoritarianism and may strengthen the democratic consolidation process. Nevertheless, we cannot assume that Thailand's civil-military relations will become smoother. Nor can we rule out the possibility of military intervention in politics. The basic problems in civil-military relations have not been resolved—for instance, the military's role has not been redefined for the new security era. There is no institutional compromise to cope with the conflict between civilians and the military. More important, there is no strategy to empower civil society as well as political society in the process of democratic consolidation.

As the country approaches 2010, the Thai economy at a macro level will become much more developed. If the country can maintain economic growth at a certain level in the post-financial crisis era, the role of elected government, including the civilian defense minister, will be very influential in politics. Moreover, if the regional situation remains stable the country will not get involved in any major conflict for the next five to 10 years. Importantly, there is no likelihood of insurgency warfare in the rural areas. The role of the military in national security will shrink. Therefore, the main problems will fall on the shoulders of civilian politicians. These actors will have to develop themselves, however, in order to consolidate democracy. If political society cannot create an informed and authoritative institution concerning military affairs, the democratic concept of civil-military relations will be very difficult to institutionalize in Thailand. Certainly these factors will have a significant impact on civil-military relations in the next decade. While today there are more constraints on military intervention, civilian weaknesses remain more or less the same. The mission that challenges the Thai democratic movement in the first decade of this new century is to eliminate such weaknesses in order to make democratic soldiers and democratic consolidation a reality.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Despite these new trends, the problem of how to control the military remains. From the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, the military's role has shifted from domination to subordination. Yet the Thai parliament has not taken any steps to

empower itself as an informed and authoritative force in military affairs. Both houses have an "Armed Forces Committee," but they are not institutionalized. Moreover, neither house has a technical capacity in military and security affairs. As a result, they lack competence to debate military affairs. Indeed, military affairs are not debated in the legislative branch. So far the Thai parliament has not played a powerful role in helping to establish democratic civil-military relations. This problem also reflects the fact that national security and military affairs are not widely debated in civil society. Thailand has failed to incorporate knowledge of military and security affairs in its political forums. Political society has a duty to create a model of democratic professionalism that will reduce the military's autonomy and prerogatives. This duty requires technical capacity on the part of civil society, however, which means that a new model of the democratic and professional soldier is not yet in place in Thailand.

Clearly for Thailand, the capacity of civil society and parliament to control the military is still limited. This situation makes democratic consolidation over the military more difficult. And it will be easier for those who advocate military intervention to organize a coup coalition—a condition that might allow direct military intervention to resume in Thai society again. To avoid another such intervention, Thailand's democratic leadership will have to play a crucial role in creating a model of the democratic soldier and a democratic doctrine of national defense that offers a positive alternative for the officer corps. As a result, civilian governments in Thailand cannot take it for granted that military intervention will never take place again. Although since the 1992 uprising and the end of the Cold War there have been positive factors contributing to a democratic-professional military, the weaknesses of civil society as well as political society in general remain major obstacles to the task of consolidating democracy. For this reason, a democratic strategy toward the military will be a necessary condition for creating professional soldiers in Thailand. As Alfred Stepan warns us:

> A passive executive who abdicates responsibility would probably mean that any initial effort in the newly democratic regime to "reprofessionalize" the military would be militarily led. A purely negative executive who devotes all his efforts to eliminating military prerogatives, but neglects to play a leadership role in attempting to formulate and implement an alternative model of civil-military relations, would probably be locked in dangerous conflicts with the military.[35]

ENDNOTES

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

2 This general belief can be seen in many comments in the Thai press.

3 For more details see Surachart Bamrungsuk, "From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and Politics in Thailand, 1973–1992" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1999); Surachart Bamrungsuk, "Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand's Regional Outlook," in David R. Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 187–205.

4 There are many Thai books about the historical development of the military and politics in Thailand. For an English version see John L.S. Girling, *Thailand: Society and Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Barbara L. Lefoer, Thailand: *A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989).

5 Quoted from the Royal Thai Army, *The Army in Forty Years* (Bangkok: O.S. Printing, 1995), p. 218 (in Thai).

6 Ministry of Defense, *The Defense of Thailand 1994* (Bangkok: Strategic Research Institute, 1994), p. 21.

7 For further details see Royal Thai Army, *Army in Forty Years*, p. 234.

8 Supreme Command, *Democracy in Thailand* (Bangkok: Supreme Command, n.d.), p. 35.

9 For the story of the visit by eight Nobel laureates to Thailand see "Peace Mission: Everybody Wins" and "Peace Mission May Have Soured Govt-Military Ties," *Bangkok Post*, 21 February 1993, pp. 17 and 20.

10 See Royal Thai Army, *Army in Forty Years*, p. 235.

11 Ibid., p. 236.

12 See this evaluation in Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 3–11.

13 For details see Royal Thai Army, *Army in Forty Years*, pp. 192–194.

14 Ministry of Defense, *The Defense of Thailand 1996* (Bangkok: Strategic Research Institute, 1996), p. 33.

15 The words have remained more or less the same in every constitution including the new one in 1997.

16 See details in Royal Thai Army, *Army in Forty Years*.

17 Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Thailand 1996*, p. 33.

18 Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Thailand 1994*, p. 68.

19 Supreme Command, *Democracy in Thailand*, p. 32.

20 See Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Thailand 1996*, pp. 35–41; and Royal Thai Army, *Army in Forty Years*, pp. 235–239.

21 For details see "The Armed Forces' Budget of 96," *Matichon Daily Newspaper*, 18 September 1995 (in Thai). For more details see "Hot Arms—50,000 Million Baht in Chaovalit's Hands," *Matichon Weekly Magazine*, 29 October 1995, p. 2 (in Thai).

22 For details see the documents in the appendixes in Surachart Bamrungsuk, *Submarine: The Expansion of Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific* (Bangkok: Kob-fai, 1996) (in Thai).

23 Prime minister's statement on the submarine acquisition of the Royal Thai Navy, 4 December 1995, in Surachart, *Submarine*.

24 Surachart Bamrungsuk, *Re-engineering the Military: Proposals to Thai Armed Forces Toward the 21st Century* (Bangkok: Kirk

University Press, 1997) (in Thai); and Surachart Bamrungsuk, *Thailand, the US, and F-18: Thoughts for Future Arms Procurement* (Bangkok: Kor Pon, 1998) (in Thai).

25 Investigation Report of the Military Role on 17–20 May 1992 (confidential) (in Thai).

26 General Wimol Wongvanich's statement, 16 October 1992. (He was chief of the army after the 1992 incident.)

27 For details see Surachart Bamrungsuk, *The Military and Thai Politics in the Next Century* (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2000) (in Thai); and Surachart Bamrungsuk, *The Military and Thai Democracy: From October 14, 1973, to Present and Future* (Bangkok: Kirk University Press, 1997) (in Thai).

28 Disathat Rojanalak, "Technology Feature of Preparations," in *Catalyst for Change* (Bangkok: Bangkok Post, 1992), p. 61.

29 See General Wimol's statement.

30 For the current debates on economic development and democracy see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

31 Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984):193–218.

32 Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961); Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," p. 9.

33 For examples see the chapter on "Towards Civil Society," in Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, *Thailand: Economy and Politics* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 367; and Supapohn Kanwerayothin, "The Middle Class: Obeying Call of Conscience to Seek Change," in *Catalyst for Change*, pp. 70–72.

34 Peter Ungphakorn, "Business Vows It Must Not Happen Again," in *Catalyst for Change*, p. 75.

35 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 139.

7

Indonesia: Redefining Military Professionalism

J. Kristiadi

The authoritarian regime that dominated Indonesia for more than three decades has been toppled by a wave of reforms. A transitional period has begun, which hopefully will support the democratic process and lead to political stability. The most important events in this process have been the general election in June 1999, which is considered the most democratic election in Indonesian history, and the equally democratic election of the president and vice-president. The transition has been characterized by freedom of speech, which can now be expressed in public forums and the mass media.

The transition process, filled with much uncertainty, faces many challenges. Political repression during the past 30 years not only damaged the national economy but crippled every democratic political institution. The political agenda for the immediate future will be very full indeed. One of the key items in this agenda is the reform of the armed forces. This reform is absolutely essential to the democratic process, since the military as an institution has been the main supporter of authoritarian government. Historically it has perceived itself as a kind of national guardian, although it developed this role not as a protector of the nation but as a formidable guardian of the national authorities. The territorial nature of the military organization enabled it to control the political activities of the Indonesian people and deprive them of their political rights. One consequence of military involvement in political affairs in support of the Suharto regime is a loss of its historic legitimacy, which has weakened its ability to play an independent political role. Not surprisingly, strong public pressure has arisen during the transition process, calling for a professional military that is consistent with national aspirations for democracy.

To develop such professionalism, many problems must be overcome. Here I want to examine these problems in the context of the current political transition and the discourse on military professionalism. To place the subject in a historical context, I consider the evolution of professionalism in Indonesia's armed forces in three stages: from independence in 1945 to the beginning of the New Order administration in 1967; from 1967 to the early 1990s; and from the early

1990s to May 1998. Then we shall look at the reforms that have taken place and the issues that remain to be solved in the future.

MODELS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

To understand the subject of military professionalism, it is useful to begin by tracing the relationship between civilians and the military. According to Western academic theory, civil supremacy is the sine qua non of a professional military force. Samuel Huntington has argued that the military can be professional only if it does not interfere in political affairs.[1] He defines three ingredients of professionalism: expert ability, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to fellow practitioners. Based on this definition, the modern army is a profession—that is, its expertise is the management of violence, its social responsibility lies in its duty to the country, and its corporate loyalty is embedded in the powerful corporate organization of the armed forces. Huntington's argument—the greater the technical capability, the higher the degree of professionalism and the fewer the chances to be involved in politics—developed into a theory stressing that "only politicians should be concerned with political matters." Based on this concept, a higher level of professionalism can be achieved by the military only if it is isolated from politics. Huntington adds that a highly professional corps of officers will stand ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group that secures legitimate authority within the state. An officer corps is professional only to the extent that it is loyal to the military ideal. Thus the armed forces will be obedient servants of the state—and civilian control will be ensured—only if the officer corps is motivated by military ideals.

This argument stresses a clear distinction between civilians and the military in a government. The two institutions are mutually exclusive, and the military operates within a restricted zone. The military is called a professional organization because it has a unique task that requires special skills to protect the country. In this regard, the people are the client of the military and the relationship is comparable to that between a client and a consultant. This concept of the civilian-military relationship—called the "old military professionalism" by Alfred Stepan —has been subjected to much criticism because the definition is too abstract and indeed is contrary to actual practice, especially where the military's role in developing countries is concerned. S.E. Finer,[2] among others,[3] has pointed out that many highly professional officer corps have intervened in politics. The German and Japanese corps were notable in this regard.

The weakness of Huntington's model, originally developed in the 1950s, is obvious: it would be useless to make a counterargument that such corps cannot

be described as fully professional. He therefore modified his model in the late 1960s to explain the significant role of the military in developing countries. His *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) argues that the military can in fact intervene in politics—but only in the presence of political instability and decay stemming from politicization of social forces and the absence of institutionalized political parties.[4] Huntington found that the classical model of the professional soldier emerges when a civilian coalition gains supremacy with electoral support and establishes electoral authority over the military. Soldiers, with their professional knowledge and expertise, then become the sole and supreme protector of the state in their military function, and the military establishment, which is a corporate unit, maintains this relationship.

The limitations of the "old professionalism" concept forced scholars to develop a new theory: the "new professionalism." In addition to Alfred Stepan, South Americans have been the main proponents of the concept of "the new professionalism of internal security and national development." This theory maintains that since the main threat to the nation is internal, the military must be concerned with domestic political problems more than with external defense. The main source of data for this theory has been South America. Prime examples are Peru and Brazil, although Stepan includes the case of Indonesia as the predictable outcome of the new paradigm.[5]

The new professionalism of internal security and national development led almost inevitably to an expansion of the military's role.[6] The degree to which this role was expanded, however, was affected by variables stemming from the political system as a whole in addition to those associated with the military subsystem. The weaker the civilian government's legitimacy and ability to preside over a peaceful process of development, the greater the tendency of the new professionalism to assume control of the government and impose its own views of development. As Stepan observes, the old professionalism (external security) and the new professionalism (internal security and national development) share many characteristics in common. But in substance and consequences, the two forms of professionalism are distinct.

THE MILITARY'S ROLE FROM 1945 TO THE NEW ORDER

Following the August 1945 declaration of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, the volunteer force for the defense of the fatherland (Pembela Tanah Air, or PETA) was demobilized and disarmed. The newly independent government did not have an army to protect the country—either from external threat, such as the return

of Dutch and Allied troops, or from internal threats. The government relied on a militia: a voluntary force based on the idea that the younger generation of Indonesians could fill the vacuum left by the absence of an army. But the militia was undisciplined, untrained, short of weapons, and sometimes unable to get along with the national leader, Sukarno. At that time, even the national leadership did not want to form a national army, fearing that the creation of such a force would provoke a strong reaction from the Japanese (who still occupied the country) and the Western Allies. The older generation, moreover, said that since it was not yet possible to establish a powerful army it would be better to pursue the struggle through diplomacy.[7]

Samuel Finer stresses that the modern army is usually far more highly organized than any other entity within the state.[8] In addition to this political advantage, the military often, though not always, has a certain emotional association and thus enjoys politically important moral prestige. Indonesia's military in 1945, however, assumed a form that was far from Finer's description of a modern army characterized by a centralized command, a hierarchy, discipline, intercommunications, esprit de corps, and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.[9]

The political problem that emerged after independence became the biggest problem in developing the modern military. The problem was rooted in the politics and ideology of the individual militia forces, which were oriented toward their main parties, and it became more obvious after the government's November 1945 declaration, which supported the emergence of political parties. As A. Yahya Muhaimin has indicated,[10] these armed young men and militia-type armies unified and began to link themselves to civilian politics. At the time of independence, the militias with the most influence were the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, or Pesindo, which was affiliated with the Socialist Party), the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or PNI), the Hizbullahs (which were organized under the influence of the Masyumi Party), and the militia affiliated with the Communist Party. These militia forces meant much to Indonesians while the country was confronted by Dutch troops. But once the People's National Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, or TKR) was established as the official military force, the militias became a nuisance.

The creation of the modern Indonesian armed forces had political dimensions that derived from the guerrilla warfare waged by the Indonesian people against the Dutch and Japanese colonialists. For such warfare to be effective, the armed forces needed a good relationship with the people and had to win their sympathy and support. Thus the armed forces gained moral and logistical support from the people and seemed successful. Although Dutch forces held the urban

areas, the militias won the countryside. One of the central aspects of this warfare was the division of the national territory into defensive areas called *wehrkreise*.[11] Each of these areas had its own military structure, and each had both military and civilian authorities.

These historical circumstances contributed to the ideology of the military: that a professional force, with its skills as a modern armed force, must carry out a sacred trust of defending the country from both external and internal threats. An example of a very militant individual was Gen. A.H. Nasution, who was obsessed with the idea that the military should be given the freedom to participate in governance. In a speech for the inauguration of the Armed Forces Academy, he declared that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or ABRI) must always take part in developing the country. If they were excluded, he said, they would swell up like a volcano and might erupt at any moment.[12] Nasution subsequently stressed that the position of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) was unlike that of a Western country: they were not merely a tool to be used by the civilian authorities, although they would not establish a military regime to exercise political power. Instead, the armed forces would act as a social force—a people's force that marches hand in hand with other forces of the people.[13] Not surprisingly, in 1952 Nasution was accused of planning a coup d'état.

This controversial case was triggered by the military's dissatisfaction with parliament, which in Nasution's opinion had interfered too much in military affairs. His address at the academy—known today as the "Middle Way Speech"—resulted in a political compromise: the presence of the military in the national governing council without invoking martial law. With Nasution's "middle way," it was possible for the military to play a political role without resorting to martial law because the military had earned its legitimacy through membership in the National Council.

The history of Indonesia's military cannot be separated from the country's prolonged political conflicts. The conflict among President Sukarno, the armed forces, and the Indonesian Communist Party reached its highest point during the period from the early 1960s to the events that began on 30 September 1965 (the Indonesian Communist Party movement, known as the rebellion of G-30S). These events can be interpreted in historic terms: during the first two decades of independence, military professionalism evolved to give soldiers not only the task of defending the country from external threat but also the responsibility to maintain domestic peace and promote national development. The growing intensity of political interventions by the military during these two decades is strikingly



Figure 1. Stages of military involvement in Indonesian politics: 1945–1967.
Source: Sundhaussen, *Road to Power*, p. 248.

illustrated in Figure 1. A study by Ulf Sundhaussen uses a checklist of causes of military intervention compiled from various theories about civil-military relations.[14] It then analyzes the expansion of the army's functions into nonmilitary fields in terms of its commitment to economic modernization and the defense of its corporate interests against infringement by civilians. These were the factors that created the disposition to intervene in the political arena and led first to the systemic failure of the "revolutionary" period, then to the liberal-democratic interlude, and finally to the guided-democracy period that provided the opportunity for the military to intervene. This approach, however, has its limitations. It does not, for example, explain why it took more than two decades of clashes between the military and civilian elites before the army took over the government.

Ideological and personal values provide a counterbalance to this theory. Until 1966, these values were the brakes applied to the army's latent tendencies to extend its political influence to a position of complete dominance over the state. The values derived from elements of traditional culture in the political

orientations of Javanese commanders, the legalistic inclinations of Nasution, and considerations of "what is best" in the national interest.

THE MILITARY IN THE NEW ORDER ERA

The success of the armed forces in crushing the 1965 rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party, together with the declining credibility of the political parties, presented a good opportunity for the military to emerge as the major political force. A document issued by President Sukarno in March 1966 gave Suharto executive powers to take the actions necessary to restore order and security in Indonesia. This document (known by its acronym SUPERSEMAR, for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, or Letter of Instruction of 11 March) enabled Suharto to carry out political consolidation. His first step was to provide a constitutional base, legitimation, and a stronger rationale for the military's role in politics. The Second Armed Forces Conference, held in Bandung in August 1966, produced the doctrine known as Three Sacred Efforts (Tri Ubaya Sakti), which provides the military with a high level of political legitimacy. This doctrine also supported Nasution's "middle way." In November 1966 the doctrine took final form and was renamed Four Missions, One Sacred Creed (Darma Eka Karma). It developed and expanded the concept of the "dual functions" of the armed forces.

To consolidate the armed forces' role in both the military and the political arenas, the doctrine was subsequently refined and reinforced by the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakya, or MPR) and by amendment to the constitution. The intention was to provide the armed forces with a legal basis for political domination. Meanwhile, to achieve political legitimacy, the armed forces formed a pseudopolitical party called Golkar (literally the "Functional Group"). The armed forces have used this political machine as a tool for more than 30 years and, through it, have gained political legitimacy. This military dominance had the appearance of being based not only on corporate interests and ideology but also on the belief that Indonesia will become a great country only if it is led by the armed forces. This element of faith has a strong historical background in its own right. In ancient Java, all the kings of Mataram were warriors and experts in battle and warfare. In a doctoral thesis on these ancient traditions, Peter Britton stresses that the concept of political dominance by the Indonesian armed forces is deeply influenced by Javanese culture.[15]

In light of the difficult tasks they will face, such as acting as guardians of political stability and national security and ensuring national development goals, the selection and training of officer cadets is tightly controlled. As shown in

Table 1. Number of Applicants vs. Actual Graduates of Armed Forces Academy: 1972–1995

Class	Academic year	Number of applicants	Target for graduation	Actual graduates	Graduates as percentage of applicants
1	1972/73	10,546	600	566	5.37
2	1973/74	9,743	612	314	3.22
3	1974/75	7,021	350	267	3.80
4	1975/76	6,322	350	278	4.40
5	1976/77	6,057	350	281	4.64
6	1977/78	6,297	385	385	6.11
7	1978/79	7,938	400	203	2.56
8	1979/80				
	first group	2,366	455	196	8.28
	second group	4,919	455	261	5.31
9	1980/81	9,336	455	527	5.64
10	1981/82	13,001	600	593	4.56
11	1982/83	16,509	600	552	3.34
12	1983/84	23,414	651	672	2.87
13	1984/85	23,380	672	672	2.87
14	1985/86	22,124	672	672	3.04
15	1986/87	29,226	672	660	2.26
16	1987/88	27,247	672	672	2.47
17	1988/89	27,272	672	672	2.46
18	1989/90	27,339	697	693	2.53
19	1990/91	24,948	697	756	3.03
20	1991/92	24,260	755	800	3.30
21	1992/93	26,682	755	804	3.01
22	1993/94	19,740	950	959	4.86
23	1994/95	19,695	1,000	988	5.02
				Average:	3.96

Source: Commando Headquarters of the Armed Forces Academy, Jakarta.

Table 1, the graduates of the Armed Forces Academy represent slightly less than 4 percent, on average, of the number of applicants from 1972 to 1995. Nonetheless, new problems were emerging from this tight selection process—most commonly, cases of bribery and using inside connections. These symptoms are understandable considering that most people think that acceptance by the academy is a guarantee of a cadet's future. This perception is reinforced by the fact that so many high-level positions in the government have been filled by military officers, as shown in Table 2.

To prepare officers for nonmilitary duties and particularly for high-ranking government positions, the military academy incorporated into its curriculum a broad range of subjects. These included politics and social studies. Also included

Table 2. Proportion of ABRI Members in Development Cabinets and Governorships: 1969–1998

Period	No. of people	Military status	Percentage of total
Cabinet members			
1969–1973	8	all active	29.63
1974–1978	6	all active	23.08
1979–1983	15	14 active, 1 retired	41.18
1984–1988	17	4 active, 13 retired	9.76
1989–1993	14	4 active, 10 retired	9.52
1994–1998	10	4 active, 6 retired 9.52	
Governors			
1969–1973	19		73.08
1974–1978	20		76.92
1979–1983	16		59.26
1984–1988	14		51.85
1989–1993	12		44.44

is the history of the armed forces' experience in the era before independence, with emphasis on the close relationship between the armed forces and the people at that time. Cadets were prepared, therefore, not only to lead troops but also to serve at various levels as leaders of the country.

The curriculum for the first class in 1970 comprised only 49 percent military knowledge; the remainder consisted of 27 percent social sciences and language and 24 percent mathematics.[16] These proportions were changed respectively to 64 percent, 22 percent, and 14 percent for the second class, and the curriculum remained largely unchanged from that time until 1990. Cadets were required to include one of the following areas in their studies: state administration, international affairs, governance, sociology, or management. An intensive nonmilitary curriculum—including ideology, politics (both domestic and international), history, and economics—was provided in the Armed Forces Staff and Command College.[17] This higher-level college devoted 10 percent of its time to social and political studies; but the curriculum for the 1999–2000 academic year eliminated these studies almost entirely, except for international politics.

The intensive involvement of the Indonesian military in politics undermined its professionalism in terms of military capability. Instead, it became a political instrument of authoritarian rule. The power holder of centralized government undermined military professionalism by recruiting and promoting merely on the basis of personal likes and dislikes. Thus the officers worked hard

to gain access to the center of power—or, more precisely, to have access to Suharto and his family.

After a long time in power, and especially in his fifth term, the president became more and more isolated from his own inner circle. The high-ranking officers who held important posts were young compared with Suharto, who belonged to the "1945 generation" involved in Indonesia's independence struggle. Thus Suharto preferred to get information from his son-in-law, Prabowo, rather than from other sources. These factors caused a dramatic decline in the professionalism of Indonesia's military, especially during the 1990s.

The hierarchy of the armed forces should in theory be based on merit. Religious affiliation, socioeconomic background, or similar criteria should not be taken into account when evaluating and promoting officers. Everyone in the armed forces should have an equal opportunity to compete for a higher-ranking position so long as the appropriate criteria and qualifications are met. This system was damaged when Suharto began to intervene in it at the beginning of the 1990s. Established mechanisms for evaluating high-ranking officers, such as the Council for Promotion to Senior Rank (the Wanjati), were bypassed as though they were a mere formality. Politically ambitious officers could take an easier route up the ladder of promotion by building a good relationship with the president or members of his family. After serving for three to five years at Cendana, the presidential residence in Jakarta, as an adjutant to the president or in the presidential guard, an officer could expect a soaring career with promotions to strategic positions in the military as well as the civilian bureaucracy. The president increasingly promoted officers who acted as loyal guardians of his power. Professionalism was replaced by favoritism. The results were evident: in the 1990s, all the top officers were from Suharto's inner circle, cynically known as graduates of the "University of Cendana."

The selection process that emerged was not aimed at producing independent, responsible, and professional military leaders. Instead, it tended to produce officers loyal to the president. It inevitably fragmented the upper ranks of the army. Those who had access to the president wielded power and influence over the entire military organization. There were undoubtedly bright officers with potential who consciously declined to follow these rules of the game, but they had no chance of promotion. The selection process also went completely against the army's supposedly nationalist orientation by including religious and other affiliations in the promotion criteria.

THE CURRENT DISCOURSE

Thirty years of political dominance by the military have taught Indonesians a bitter lesson: political intervention by the military results in extraordinary arbitrariness. The most damaging consequences are the crippling of political institutions, especially the party system, and the extinguishing of civil rights through repression by the military. Given this bitter experience, the concept of military professionalism in the postreform period must rule out the possibility of political interference. But formalizing this postreform professionalism is not going to be easy considering the formidable threats to the nation, which are important variables in determining the role of the military.

Public discourse on threats to Indonesia's sovereignty is based on the perception that any threat would come from the air or the sea. An analysis of these perceptions, based on interviews with senior officials and military officers, both retired and on active service, is provided by Alan Dupont,[18] who argues that strengthening the navy and the air force is an integral part of increasing the professionalism of the armed forces. Given the geopolitical features of Indonesia, he outlines five potential threats to the country:

- First, a major conventional military attack would aim at occupying either all or part of Indonesia. Such an attack is highly unlikely in the present security environment, because it would exceed the resources of almost all the world's countries.
- Second, a limited strike against Indonesian territory or into its territorial waters could result from a dispute with an adjacent state involving, for example, an unresolved boundary line or contested resources. Several bilateral disputes with ASEAN neighbors have the potential to lead to hostilities—most notably the dispute with Malaysia over the ownership of Sipadan Island and Ligitan Island and disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over seabed boundaries. Also, the Indonesian armed forces' long-standing suspicion of China has been reinforced in recent years by Beijing's growing assertiveness and incipient great-power status, which creates the perception that China will increasingly challenge Indonesia's strategic interests, especially in the area around Indonesia's Natuna Islands.
- Third, Indonesia's national security assessments tend to regard foreign support for dissidents, separatists, or extremist groups in Indonesia as the most likely form of external threat—that is, outside interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs for political, strategic, or ideological reasons.

- Fourth, a conflict between two other countries might spill over into Indonesian territory or affect Indonesia's security interests. The area of greatest concern at present is the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Tensions in this disputed territory could erupt into hostilities between China and one or more of the ASEAN claimants. There is widespread belief in Indonesia's defense and security community that China's policy in the Spratlys is one of calculated ambiguity aimed at maximizing China's strategic and economic position in the South China Sea.
- Finally, Dupont points out that the threat to security could take a nonmilitary form. Among the most commonly cited possibilities are environmental pollution, movements of illegal workers, smuggling by sea or overland, and pirates in the Strait of Malacca.

Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, who is chief of the territorial staff and a military scholar, argues that the democratization process is a future challenge to the state, from a security and defense perspective, and contends that this challenge is inseparable from national interests and perceived threats. He outlines four areas of concern: (1) threats against any aspect of community life that have a direct impact on state security; (2) threats of invasion, infiltration, or separatism and the resulting consequences for the nation's defensive capabilities; (3) threats of riots, crimes, and breaches of public order, law enforcement, and civil order; and (4) threats of wars and natural disasters and their impact on the protection of the public.[19] A retired naval scholar, Rear Admiral Wahyono, cites three categories of threats: to the nation, to the government, and to individuals.[20] Threats to the nation can take the form of territorial invasion, external attack, or internal revolution such as separatism. He argues that such threats should be the responsibility of the armed forces, whereas threats to the government or individuals should be the responsibility of the police.

Wahyono proposes a reorganization of Indonesia's armed forces by establishing three lines of defense. The first would be the front line at the boundaries of Indonesian sea and air space based on its exclusive economic zone. The second is the line defined by the country's territorial waters. And the third is the line dividing the entire archipelago into five large islands (Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua) and three island clusters (Riau and Natuna, Bali and Nusatenggara, and Maluku). The first and second lines would be the responsibility of the navy and the air force; the third line would be the responsibility of the army. He suggests several alternatives for the territorial command structure. The first alternative assumes that the territorial apparatus has duties that involve it

in a command function vis-à-vis the community. In this case, legislative support must provide a legal basis through which the territorial apparatus is given authority for its outreach efforts into the community; there should be a division of authority between the regional government, the police, and the territorial apparatus. The second alternative assumes that the territorial command structure would be eliminated entirely and that all of the military's duties involving community outreach would be turned over to the regional government and police. The third alternative assumes that the territorial command structure would be retained but its main function would be to prepare the local army to defend the region from all forms of threat.

MILITARY REFORMS

The army's role is reverting to its basic function as a defensive force. Domestic security affairs, which have been the responsibility of the army for several decades, will be transferred to law enforcement institutions. In April 2000 the commanders of Indonesia's armed forces held a conference and formulated a new definition for the army's role.[21] Under the new plan, the main duty of the armed forces is to eliminate any aggression that could destroy the state's sovereignty and territory and to support the state domestically and internationally. The military's functions in carrying out these duties were outlined as follows:

- Take measures to prevent enemy aggression.
- Train people to defend the country.
- Serve the state in law enforcement .
- Assist the police, especially in antiterrorist duties, and overcome all armed revolt.
- Assist other government agencies in strengthening national defense and national unity, in dealing with natural disasters, and in training nonmilitary personnel for national defense purposes.
- Carry out international missions to maintain world peace.

Internal steps to be taken by the armed forces, in order to develop its capability to prevent external threats, include the following:

- Separate the police forces from the armed forces (which was done in April 1999).

- Eliminate sociopolitical affairs councils—beginning with the central government and continuing down to the local level.
- Convert sociopolitical staff into territorial staff.
- Eliminate the armed forces' assistant of labor, its assistant of public safety and order, and its employee development organization.
- Retire any member of the armed forces who secures a position in government (or require resignation from the government position if the person wishes to remain in the armed forces).
- Break the relationship between the armed forces and Golkar and maintain a distance from other political parties.
- Remain neutral in general elections.
- Eliminate the armed forces from the national and local legislatures.
- The reduction in the number of military members in the legislatures will begin at the national level with the House of Representatives (where the armed forces' share is 8 percent) and continue down to the district area (where the share is 10 percent). By the year 2004, neither the House of Representatives nor the local legislatures will have any members who are actively serving in the armed forces.

Although important steps have already been taken to increase military professionalism, other actions still need to be pursued—especially in the matter of military intelligence and inadequate budgets.

Military Intelligence

Reorganizing the military intelligence system is a must. Past experience shows that military power is used by an authoritarian regime for purposes of political supremacy and that the regime uses the intelligence network not only to analyze foreign military intelligence but also to operate within the domestic society. Military intelligence is an essential feature of military operations, of course, aimed at detecting every activity of the enemy and enabling the armed forces to operate in enemy territory. A commander uses intelligence to take the initiative to attack, to disrupt enemy aggression, or to conduct safety-measure operations. Extending military intelligence to civil society, however, involves a change of interpretation: who are the state's enemies? For intelligence in the strictly military sense, the enemy is the military personnel who pose a danger to the country. But for intelligence that extends into civil society, any individual or group of people whose opinions differ from those of the government becomes the enemy. Indonesia's military intelligence was turned

in this direction to support the authorities, resulting in a symbiotic relationship between the two.

Under the political structure of the future, the armed forces must be the arm of a legitimate and accountable government that is in charge of protecting national sovereignty. Intelligence operations in civil society, however, should be carried out by law enforcement officers operating under constitutional controls. This division of responsibilities will clearly demarcate the domain of military intelligence and foreign infiltration into Indonesian territory, such as infiltration by ships or aircraft, whether military or civilian.

Military intelligence should not be concerned with problems of society. The military does not have the authority to make judgments about domestic safety within Indonesia. Its authority is limited to making judgments about the defensive and offensive capabilities of foreign countries and reporting its findings to the commander in chief of the armed forces and the president. Decisions about multidimensional problems and threats cannot be borne by the military alone. The whole nation must be involved when such threats arise. In a democratic political system, intelligence cannot be invested solely in the military on the grounds that the armed forces are responsible for the nation's sovereignty. Thus aside from maintaining a tight system for recruiting and maintaining intelligence personnel, the armed forces must return to the essence of their primary professional duties.

The Military Budget

The second important step is to overcome the problem of insufficient budgets for the armed forces. This problem is complicated by the low pay that military personnel receive. According to internal research carried out by the military in July 1999, the lowest-ranking soldier receives only 590,000 rupiah per month in actual take-home pay. (This amount was nearly US$74 at the prevailing exchange rate of 8,000 rupiah per US$1.00 but has subsequently fallen even lower.) According to a survey made by the Indonesian army, however, the minimum subsistence that the lowest-ranking soldier should receive is 1,017,000 rupiah (US$127 at the 8,000:1 exchange rate).

Several conclusions emerge from the survey. First, taking into consideration minimum costs for food and other basic needs, social welfare, and deductions from gross pay, the current take-home pay meets only 58 percent of the subsistence needs of the lowest-paid, unmarried soldier (only 41 percent if the soldier is married). Actual pay for a corporal meets only 29 percent of his subsistence needs—assuming that he has a wife, one child in primary school, and one child

in secondary school. The equivalent for the lowest-ranking officer is 34 percent (assuming two children in high school).

To make ends meet, these soldiers and officers must earn other income. It is not easy for them to find good side jobs because they lack education and expertise apart from military skills. Therefore, they may have to accept any work they can find—even in undesirable activities such as debt collection, organized prostitution, organized gambling, and drug trafficking. Officers, by contrast, may use the powers they wield in their military capacities to make ends meet—for example, by obtaining money in situations of unfair competition. Such activities and side jobs can drastically damage the professionalism of the military. The only solution is to ensure adequate pay and allowances.

Summary of Measures Needed

To improve the professionalism of the armed forces, then, several steps must be taken:

- Revise Law No. 2 of 1982 (UU Nomor 2 Tahun 1982) concerning national security and defense. It should become an ordinance concerning national defense as a basis for a national defense act.
- Revise the armed forces' doctrine (the three sacred efforts and one sacred creed) to a doctrine that provides guidance for the armed forces in developing defensive systems and their role as the defensive instrument of the people.
- Revise the ordinance concerning the police in order to uphold the principle that the law is supreme and to ensure the independence of law enforcement.
- Revise the election ordinance and require military personnel to retire if they want to become public officials.
- Revise the educational system and curriculum of the armed forces in order to bring them in line with the role and doctrine of defense against an external military threat. The system should include knowledge about the impact of globalization and its meaning for society, especially in terms of democratization and human rights.
- Improve the salaries and welfare of soldiers to compensate for the off-budget income they currently have to seek elsewhere.
- Dismantle all military business groups. All revenues and expenditures related to defense and security will then be reflected in the national budget of the armed forces.
- Decentralize the territorial system and delegate more authority to the regional and district levels.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The professionalism of the Indonesian armed forces has been formed through a long historical experience. As a revolutionary army, the Indonesian military had to win the people's sympathy in the guerrilla war against colonialism. This relationship was very important, for only by uniting with the people could the struggling army gain the logistical support and protection it needed from the people. Therefore, in building its professionalism the armed forces began by developing their political skills, particularly their ability to mobilize the people to fight against the colonialists. These historical circumstances led the Indonesian military to develop its own ideology, which it perceived as a sacred task of defending the nation. This ideology then became the major factor leading the military to dominate the country's political life.

This political role began to fade, however, as Suharto became more and more dominant in Indonesia's political life in the late 1980s. From that time onward, the armed forces came under Suharto's control. He interfered deeply in the recruitment and promotion process, replacing the established mechanisms by a system of personal likes and dislikes, ensuring that only those who were close to the president could secure promotion to important positions. As a consequence, the professionalism of the armed forces declined precipitously, all because these mechanisms ceased to operate on the principle of meritocracy.

From the perspective of politics, the people have passed through a period of great change. Today efforts are being made to replace the authoritarian system of the past three decades with a democratic system. One of the central items in the current agenda is to develop a military professionalism that will no longer interfere in political matters. The declining self-confidence within the military—brought about by domestic and international pressure for human rights and other pressures from the people—has left the armed forces with no choice but to bow to popular demand. Control is now in the hands of the people, which means that civilians can build political institutions to promote economic development, ensure national security, maintain public order, and bolster democracy. Any inability among the civilian authorities and the people to build democratic institutions, however, could provide the military with a chance to return to power. Such an occurrence would mean that the transitional process to achieve a better democracy has failed.

ENDNOTES

1 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

2 Samuel Edward Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

3 Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origin, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47–65.

4 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Fredericksburg, Va.: Book Crafters, 1968).

5 Stepan, "The New Professionalism," pp. 244–245.

6 Ibid., pp. 247–248.

7 Nugroho Notosusanto, ed., *Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwi Fungsi ABRI* (Warrior and Soldier: Implementation and Conceptions of the Dual Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces) (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1982), p. 37.

8 Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p. 10.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

10 A. Yahya Muhaimin, *Perkembangan Militer Dalam Politik di Indonesia 1945–1966* (Military Development in Politics in Indonesia 1945–1966) (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1982), p. 31.

11 See Notosusanto, *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, pp. 56–57.

12 Ibid., p. 169.

13 Abdul Haris Nasution, "Dwi Fungsi ABRI: Pada Mulanya dan Kini" (Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: At First and Now), *Prisma* 12 (December 1980):41.

14 Ulf Sundhaussen, *Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 266–271.

15 Peter Britton, *Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer di Indonesia 1970-an: Perspektif Tradisi Jawa dan Barat* (Military Professionalism in Indonesia: Javanese and Western Tradition in the Army Ideology to the 1970s) (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996).

16 Military Academy, Commando Headquarters, *Markas Komando Akabri: Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Buku II* (History of the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy: Book II) (Jakarta: Military Academy, Commando Headquarters, 1993), pp. 38–39.

17 Ibid., p. 171.

18 Alan Dupont, "Indonesian Defence Strategy and Security: Time for a Rethinking?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 18(3)(1996): 275–297.

19 Agus Widjojo, "National Administrative Reform Towards Strengthening National Unity: Strategic Defence Perspective," *Strategic Review* (January–March 2000):7.

20 Sk. Wahyono, "Reform of the Armed Forces," Strategic Review (January–March 2000):37–38.

21 *Kompas*, 22 April 2000, p. 6.

8

China: From Revolutionary Tool to Professional Military

You Ji

The Chinese military is undergoing enormous change. It is definitely modernizing. In the meantime the level of professionalism and war preparedness has been constantly on the rise. All this has affected the military's relations with civilian authority, which rests in the hands of the Communist Party. This chapter describes the evolutionary process in the following terms: from protecting revolution to serving national interests. In a way this evolution has in the last 50 years recorded a profound transition of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on several fronts. In its relations with the party, the PLA has slowly moved beyond the stage defined as symbiosis. In its path of development it has transformed itself from a semirevolutionary, semiprofessional army into a true professional military. Accordingly, in terms of its overriding functions it is gradually shifting its emphasis from domestic politics to external missions. As China is poised to move into the post-Jiang era, these changes will accelerate and become even more visible in the years to come.

A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY

In modern societies there are two types of civil-military relations. In democracies the military is under objective control, which is based on a foundation of two pillars. First, objective control promotes professionalism as a distinct value in the military. Professionalism regulates soldiers' political ambitions and governs their behavior. Second, objective control promotes an institutionalized process to restrict the actions of generals within a legitimate range. Under objective control the armed forces have a simple function: guarding the nation against external threats.[1] This liberal model makes the military more a client of the state than a tool of a political party or leader.

In authoritarian countries, by contrast, the armed forces have a much wider range of missions. There the emergence of independent nationhood has paralleled the rise of military power. The soldiers have always had revolutionary ambitions and ideological ferment. And this tradition has fostered a strong tendency for the military to intervene in domestic politics. Often the armed forces

are under a different kind of civilian control: the subjective control under which the military displays its loyalty to one particular political leader. Revolutionary goals, political/ideological preferences, and national interests become blurred in the minds of generals who see their duties as ranging from domestic politics to international pursuits.[2]

China's civil-military relations fall largely in the second category. This has a deep historical origin. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded the army and established effective control mechanisms to assure that soldiers stayed loyal to the CCP and the revolution. In fact the PLA has not disappointed the party in this regard. During the 28 years of armed struggle for survival and national power, the CCP and PLA fought hand in hand. Together they created a symbiotic relationship: one's demise was the death of the other.[3] Even after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the PLA has come to the rescue of the party several times, most recently during the clampdown on the Tiananmen rebellion in 1989—in sharp contrast to the Red Army's behavior in the USSR in 1991.

Yet the history of the PRC has also shown clear signs of this symbiotic relationship losing its power on both sides. Survival was no longer a pressing issue when the PRC came into being. As the new state consolidated and adapted to a peaceful environment, the soldiers' revolutionary zeal was gradually replaced by professional concerns. Accordingly the civil-military relationship characterized as wartime symbiosis underwent a major change and is now centered on common interests. What makes the CCP/PLA relations so close in peacetime is their common interest in preserving their privileged position in the country's politics. Indeed this may keep them together for a long time, until the day comes when the military feels that protecting a deeply corrupt political party may be a liability. It may then adopt a more independent position. This process of divorce between civilian and military authorities happened in almost all the Chinese dynasties in their last days. It happened in most transforming communist societies as well. The most likely outcome from this development may be that the military survives the decay of the party and remains the main institution of power in the new political system. Taiwan's recent experience has demonstrated the possibility of this development on the mainland. On Taiwan the Nationalist military (Guojun) continues to serve the new government as a key political player although its founder lost control of the government.[4]

Yet the PLA is no longer the only key interest group in the political system, though it is still the most powerful one. Other groups have emerged and entrenched. The bureaucracy, for instance, now wields enormous power in running state affairs. Under this new power arrangement, the corporate identity of

the PLA is highlighted rather than reduced. With its irreplaceable function in society, the PLA's space for improving its professionalism is constantly being enlarged. Today modernization and regularization have become the primary concern of the officers and men, although revolution is still the prevailing rhetoric. Never before has the PLA been driven by what guides the Western military in seeking perfect professionalism—defined as "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness." But what exactly has happened in CCP/PLA relations in the course of 50 years of the PRC? A comparison of different eras proves very informative.

From Strongman to Institutionalized Leadership

One clear indication of the PLA's deepening professionalization has been its elimination of personal control by strongmen. The historical legacy of the CCP and the PLA allowed the military to be placed under personal control in the Mao and Deng eras. The object of loyalty of the armed forces was not the nation, the state, or even the party but one particular individual. Personal control, a type of civil-military relations of the genre of subjective control, can be defined as the ability of one political leader to impose his own preferences on the military without prior consultation. This imposition resulted in the bitter lessons of the Cultural Revolution when Mao forced factional politics upon the PLA.[5] Indeed, when politics enters the armed forces the military becomes politicized and fragmented, gravely undermining national security.

Deng, however, realized the danger to the country's political stability and the PLA's professionalization. He believed that personal control may be a necessary evil at a time when there had to be an overriding authority to push forward a controversial reform. This can best be seen from his acquiescence in 1992 to Yang Baibing's slogan of "Baojia Huhang"—meaning that the PLA had the mission of protecting Deng's reforms. This was the PLA's most serious military interference in the country's domestic politics in the reform era. Deng borrowed Yang's support to dictate his personal opinion to the first-line party leadership in a way not too different from Mao's involving the PLA in the party's factional infighting in 1966.[6] But Deng was also aware that he would be the last person in the party capable of exercising personal control over the PLA. And he recognized that personal control was an unhealthy style of civil-military relations and its foundation had to be eliminated. Consciously or unconsciously he actually campaigned for a kind of objective control to avoid any vacuum of civilian control over the military in his last years. He made efforts to establish institutionalized civilian authority over the PLA. To this end he dismissed the Yang brothers, who were the representatives of politically ambitious officers in the military and

might form a second power center vis-à-vis Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), even though they were Deng's best friends. In this way Deng placed national interests above his personal feelings—a great historical service to the long-term stability of the PRC. More important, he tried to enhance the institutional authority of the post of the CMC chairman in the hands of a civilian leader. First, he retained all his institutional power for his successor—including the final say as to personnel appointments and control over the nuclear button. Second, he promoted a number of professionally minded generals to key posts in the military. These generals had no political ambition and were not interested in ideological dispute. Third, Deng endorsed the new CMC's idea of shifting the PLA's national defense strategy from his own mission of "fighting a people's war under modern conditions" to "fighting a regional war under high-tech conditions," a shift that helped unify the strategic thinking of the whole PLA.[7]

In the meantime, with Deng's backing, Jiang strengthened the management process over the PLA by the post-Deng civilian leadership. The key measure in this regard was to establish clearer lines of power and responsibility in the chairman of the CMC as commander in chief. There is now a specifically defined outline of what decisions the chairman can make personally and what he must discuss in meetings of the CMC and the Politburo's Standing Committee. The latter meetings are important in that the guiding principle for decision making there is collective leadership. Not only has this prevented the possibility of another strongman emerging vis-à-vis the military, but civilian authority over the generals is institutionalized. To further regularize the rules of the game, now there are clear provisions regarding what policymaking power should be held by the civilian leadership and what by the military.[8]

Progress in China's effort to institutionalize civil-military relations in the post-Deng era can be traced to the effort of both party and PLA leaders to establish regulations governing the bilateral interactions. In the first place, safeguards have been worked out to inhibit civilian and military leaders from involving themselves in areas that are not their responsibility. In the past this phenomenon was the catalyst for the formation of party factions and political/military alliances. In the last decade there have been no signs of party leaders trying to penetrate the military in their personal power maneuvers and vice versa. As the military is effectively insulated from civilian politics, the PLA high command is able to maintain a great degree of autonomy in running its own affairs. As a result, unity in the top brass has reached a level unseen since the late 1950s.

Moreover, both party and military leaders cooperate to prevent their involvement in any activity that would escalate intraparty policy debates into

factional strife. A series of codes of conduct have been implemented for consensus building—including extensive consultation, debate in the party/PLA forums, and decisions that take into consideration all stakeholders. Efforts have been made, as well, to limit the possibility of disputes between civilian and military leaders getting out of control. Specifically, there is a stricter division of power between civil and military matters. Basically PLA leaders distance themselves from interfering with nonmilitary decisions and civilian leaders are forbidden to intrude into military administration. On issues of national security, the Politburo is the locus of decision-making power with the participation of PLA top commanders. In addition, there are closer channels of communication between relevant government departments in the fields of foreign and defense affairs. Leadership groups composed of both civilian and military leaders have been set up to coordinate China's international pursuits.[9] Such groups should do much to avoid repetition of the PLA's international pursuits (such as weapon sales) that failed to get clearance from the relevant civilian authorities.

The Military's Changing Role in Politics

As pointed out by Harry Harding, the military's role in the country's politics has been an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, the PLA possesses an impressive array of resources with which to influence national policy. On the other hand, the PLA has never seriously challenged the civilian leadership on major policies, even those related to national defense.[10] On the contrary it has been ordered to act against its own interests. A typical example was the party's deliberate policy to reduce the military budget in the 1980s. Deng asked the military to exercise patience with such a policy even though it gravely undermined the PLA's modernization efforts.[11] In another example the PLA was ordered to give up the bulk of its industrial and commercial interests in 1998—a measure that eliminated a substantial proportion of the PLA's extrabudgetary income and thus adversely affected the standards of living of numerous service men and women. Generally speaking, the civilian authorities have done an impressive job in maintaining a fine balance between providing the PLA a privileged position in the country's governing process and placing constraints on the PLA's exercise of political influence.

Three factors may help to explain this paradox. The first is historical but no longer holds much validity now.[12] For a long time the PLA was fragmented due to its organizational makeup. Composed of a few relatively independent field armies, the PLA was unable to develop a complete corporate entity campaigning for an undivided interest in politics. Moreover, the civilian leaders often adopted

a divide-and-rule strategy by pitting one group of senior officers against another in party politics. Therefore, generals from different service origins were constantly involved in the party's power struggle.[13] Since the PLA could not speak to civilian leaders with a concerted voice, its influence was greatly curtailed.

The second factor limiting the PLA's political influence is institutional. The ultimate sign of the party's effective control over the military is its power to appoint a civilian as commander in chief. The military may have some influence over the field of candidates but has no veto power over this vital issue that so concerns its well-being. From the outset the party established a complete set of controlling institutions within the military: the network of party committees and political departments charged with personnel management, discipline reinforcement, ideological indoctrination, internal security, welfare, and recreational activities. Party functionaries are active officers with military ranks equal to the commanders. This is the foundation for the "double commander in chief system" (*shuangzhangzhi*) in the PLA. This web of institutional controls has been quite effective, providing a bridge for party leaders to intrude into PLA affairs.

The third factor is cultural. Throughout Chinese history, civilian control over the military had been the rule and military intervention had always been strongly denounced. Although military involvement in politics did take place from time to time, it occurred mostly when the central government was on the verge of collapse or there was no effective civilian government at all. Since ancient times, military men had always been under powerful cultural pressure to obey the civilian leadership, particularly the emperors. In school, for example, they learned that a soldier must not even think of usurping political power with a gun. In the last century the army took advantage of a nation in chaos and became the most powerful institution in China. When peace and stability gradually returned—and especially when China embarked on a path of deradicalization in the late 1970s—this cultural tradition of civilian supremacy over the soldiers was restored. This is one of the reasons why Jiang, a civilian with no military experience whatsoever, has been able to command the battle-seasoned PLA with relative ease.

Despite the constraints, the PLA is still the most awesome political institution in the PRC. And it pursues its political and corporate interest powerfully. It draws strength and influence from three basic resources. First, it is a large and disciplined organization controlling lethal weapons. Its internal structure and its corporate firmness are a lot more cohesive than any other political and social organization in the country. As in other countries, the numerical, organizational, economic, and coercive weight of the military make it a force no one can dis-

miss.[14] The PLA's second resource is its command of a high level of legitimacy among the population. Until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the PLA was thought by the population as the best army China had ever seen. It helped restore order in a country that had suffered over a century of chaos. It lifted China's international status as a great regional power by fighting a stalemate with the United States in Korea. It participated actively in the country's economic construction. And it contributed to natural disaster relief in a way that no other social organization could rival. Mao's call to "learn from the PLA" was genuinely answered by the people in the 1960s. The Cultural Revolution gravely tarnished the PLA's image, however, as it was involved in the party's infighting and was used as an instrument of class struggle. Although the PLA worked hard to repair the damage during the Deng era, it suffered another major setback in 1989. For a while, people no longer believed that the PLA was a people's army. Today, 10 years after June the Fourth, the PLA's public image and standing have reached new heights. During the 1990s the PLA was involved in numerous disaster relief efforts: earthquakes, forest fires, and more. Its battle against the 1998 massive flooding across the country moved many TV watchers, as they saw over a hundred PLA generals and more than 500,000 soldiers working on the riverbanks day and night to save ordinary people. Certainly the population resents the level of corruption and the privileges of the PLA. On balance, though, the PLA is still respected, especially in the countryside, and is regarded as an indispensable force for maintaining social order. This public support does give the PLA an advantage in its interactions with other political institutions in the country.

The PLA's third resource of power is institutional, resting on the politically independent status of the CMC. The CMC wields power with a high level of autonomy. Officially it enjoys the same rank with the State Council and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. In the party's hierarchical chain, it is under the Politburo. In actuality, however, it operates largely outside the Politburo's reach. This has been a long tradition that can be traced to the era of Mao who deliberately separated the government system and the military system under the formula of *zhengzhijiu yi zheng, junwei yi jun*: the Politburo's realm is state affairs and the CMC's is military affairs. To a large extent Deng too inherited this tradition. The CMC reported its affairs only to him throughout the 1980s. Following his two predecessors, as we have seen, Jiang Zemin has made efforts to prevent his Politburo colleagues from involvement in CMC affairs. The CMC has created its own autonomous power center and enjoys the final say on matters ranging from personnel to legal issues, from commercial to cultural. If political power comes from the barrel of a gun, whoever controls the gun through

control over the CMC becomes the nation's ultimate ruler. The rise of Jiang in the party is due largely to the fact that he has been accepted by the PLA as undisputed CMC chair. As a result, the two centers of the party and the PLA are well coordinated under Jiang as party boss and commander in chief.

From the changes listed here we can see the PLA was transformed gradually from a revolutionary army with great ideological ferment to a professional military increasingly depoliticized, conscious more of national security issues, and inclined less to get involved in intraparty factional activities. Now the PLA has acquired a cohesive corporate identity. Its corporate interest is best protected when there are no outside intrusions. As the stage of symbiosis fades into history, the PLA's new identity affects its relations with the party. This can be seen from an analysis of the PLA's efforts of professionalization.

THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CORPORATE IDENTITY

The PLA has been a professional military all along, even though it has taken many other missions regarded as nonmilitary by standard Western definitions. Could a nonprofessional military have fought a stalemate with the powerful U.S. Army in the Korea War in the early 1950s? For a long time the PLA has been called a revolutionary professional army—similar in nature to the Israeli armed forces. What has changed in the last two decades in the Chinese military is that the notion of being a revolutionary army is fading rapidly but the sign of being a full professional organization is becoming more and more clear. This can be seen from the following aspects.

Changing Ideological Foundations

One major characteristic of CCP/PLA relations before the Dengist reform was the strong ideological tendency of the armed forces. Ideological control was an integral part of party control over the PLA. Therefore, the PLA became class-based and an ideological model for the society. Since the 1980s, the PRC's ideological foundation has gradually shifted toward nationalism.[15] This has had a profound impact on civil-military relations. First, ideology is seen to be too abstract to the modernization efforts of the PLA, as an ideologically inclined military rejects professionalism as the primary goal of the armed forces. Second, it is easier for the party and the PLA to find common ground in nationalism. When the PLA is no longer required to serve the narrow purposes of the working class, it can embrace a wider definition of national interests and is thus more readily accepted by the population, which has become increasingly cynical about the

communist ideology. And third, when party/military relations are guided by common national goals rather than ideological correctness, there is less need for the party to indoctrinate the soldiers forcefully. Soldiers learn patriotism themselves. The bilateral relations thus become easier to maintain.

Externally the process of de-ideologizing the PLA has further highlighted the new identity of the PLA as a guardian of national interests rather than a revolutionary tool. This can be seen in its support of the party leadership's decision to remove the ideological position as the guideline for conducting foreign relations. Since the founding of the PRC the PLA has been involved in nine wars. These wars can be roughly categorized into two groups: wars fought for ideological reasons and wars fought to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Certainly there are cases in the second category that were also colored by ideology. Most of the actions were taken in the 1950s and 1960s; in the 1990s no war was recorded. This downward trend underscores two important facts. First, after China gave up treating other nations with ideological prejudice the reason to go to war was significantly reduced. And second, even though China has always adopted a nonnegotiable approach toward sovereignty and territorial issues, it realized in the 1980s that as a responsible international player it should always place peaceful settlement of disputes above military threats, which are to be used only as a last resort for protecting national interests.[16] Indeed, China made more concessions than its counterparts in border negotiations. Contrary to the claim that China has an expansionist agenda, one can plainly see that the Chinese map is smaller today than it was in 1949.

Dropping ideology as the foundation of foreign and defense policy serves the PLA well. It was the primary victim in various wars fought along ideological lines. It paid a heavy price in achieving a stalemate with the United States in the Korean War, for example, and almost received a surgical nuclear strike from the USSR in 1969. Abandoning ideology has given the PLA much needed space for tackling its major problem: outdated equipment. Rid of its identity as a revolutionary tool, it has had to construct a new identity and a new mission. This is why the PLA now sees itself as the guardian of national interests. This mission is not necessarily more peaceful, but it gives the PLA the drive to enhance its professional pursuits and organizational cohesion.

New Strategic Guidelines

One key measure for gauging a professional military is its defense strategy. Since 1949 the PLA has altered its defense strategy several times—from following Mao's people's war doctrine to taking the revolution in military affairs (RMA) as

the guide for modernization. With this evolutionary process it has gradually shifted from its status as a tool of revolution, required by the people's war principle, to the guardian of national security dictated by the RMA type of warfare, which emphasizes the external missions of the armed forces. Indeed, the object of RMA war cannot be the domestic enemy. The PLA's embracing of RMA has provided a timely guideline for it to improve its new national defense strategy, both in theory and in practice. Now PLA generals are trying to translate the concepts of RMA into their professional war preparation: more than ever they have been convinced that winning a high-tech war depends on hardware superiority, sound tactics, and a suitable force structure. In 1993 the CMC put forward a new national defense strategy as a guide for the PLA's modernization The current campaign of adopting RMA in the Chinese military will further improve this new strategy and address its doctrinal defects.[17]

First, the new strategy stresses the necessity of forward defense, as it recognizes that in a high-tech war the enemy can launch precision strikes from a long distance—a key theme of RMA.[18] Expanding the military's defense depth may not stop the enemy's long-range attack. Yet if the enemy can be effectively engaged at the outer defense line of the country, the PLA may at least cause greater human losses to the enemy and secure precious early warning moments for the defensive side.

Second, the high-tech defense strategy is largely an offensive-oriented strategy reflecting the PLA's shifting emphasis toward the active versus the defensive side of war preparation. The PLA was quick to learn from the Gulf War that high-tech wars will not be fought along fixed defense lines. Trench warfare will be rare. Accordingly China's post-Cold War military guideline has changed from *yifang weizhu fangfan jiehe* (defense as overall posture, offense as the supplement) to *linghuo fanying gong fang jiehe* (adroit response based on a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities). Offense is now understood as gaining supremacy in information warfare: the evolving high-tech hardware is highly biased toward a fast offensive strike because technological innovation has increasingly blurred the boundaries between offensive and defensive weaponry.

Third, the strategy is forward leaning. Its high-tech focus aims mainly at defense against strategic concerns—namely the major military powers. At the same time the strategy is flexible in principle, catering to different scenarios, from major wars to small-scale border conflicts. This is the PLA's response to the country's changing security environment in the post-Cold War era. The new strategy is also forward looking as it is geared to preparation for action in the new century. Thus it prescribes concrete measures for weapon programs, force

organization, campaign tactics, and research priorities—measures that do not aim at equipping the PLA just for the next few years but at the frontiers of high-tech breakthroughs some decades from now.[19]

What is the significance of this new military thinking to the professionalization of the PLA? Simply put, it has set a new direction of development for its future. Without a sound strategic theoretical framework, even if the PLA acquires sophisticated weaponry in the new century it cannot be used scientifically to realize its full potential.[20] Right guidelines, essential high-tech "toys," and foresight mean that the PLA today is much more open and pragmatic.

Creating an Elite Officer Corps

Today the military leadership has no more than 10 people who joined the party before the founding of the PRC. And they will all depart the scene in less than three years. Soon the PLA as a glorious army with a revolutionary tradition will be a thing of the past. This will certainly facilitate its efforts of professionalization. Already the majority of top officeholders are highly educated technocrats with no personal experience of revolution. While this learning process highlights their sense of scientific knowledge, it also reduces their spirit of radicalism. As a result they are less likely to ally with each other to form factions along political and ideological lines. Such a tendency can be seen more clearly at the lower levels in the PLA. Now 600,000 officers, or 90 percent of the whole officer corps, have higher education qualifications, 20,000 officers have a master's degree, and more than 4,000 officers have doctoral degrees. This new makeup of the PLA signals a clear line of departure from its recent history.[21] Sooner rather than later we will see the PLA further depoliticized and de-ideologized.

The fundamental change has gone much deeper than the organizational makeup of the officer corps. There are many other indicators of professionalization as a result of the change of the guard. The PLA high command has substantially reformed the military's training and education. Officers need to go through an extended period of relearning to meet the new requirements of war in the new era. Now all military officers have to study new technology, handle computers, and become familiar with the targeted enemy forces. Promotion is closely tied to their study efforts. One of the assessment criteria is the amount and quality of their published material both in academic journals and in internal policy debate. For instance, an indispensable step for promotion into senior posts is a period of intensive study in the special course for generals in the PLA's National Defense University.[22] It is said that the CMC chairman and vice-chairmen all read the students' graduation theses in order to discover talented successors.

Wang Zhuxu's promotion serves as a telling example of the emerging elite nature of the PLA officer corps. In the early 1990s he was commander in chief of the 14th Army Group when he joined the special course for generals. He wrote a graduation thesis titled "The Strategic Path of Yunnan," which argues that if there is a war on China's coast, China's strategic path through the Pacific will be blocked. This would seriously affect China's economy because more than two-thirds of China's exports and imports travel this route. He then suggests that China should prepare early to establish an alternative strategic path—in his opinion, from Yunnan through Burma to get to the Indian Ocean. His thesis caught the attention of General Zhang Zhen, the third most senior military leader in China, who passed it on to Jiang Zemin. Jiang too gave it high praise. He said that Wang Zhuxu was exactly the kind of personnel we needed for military modernization: personnel with broad strategic vision. Later Wang was promoted to the post of commander in chief of a military region. In fact almost all the current top officeholders have an impressive list of publications. This has lifted the PLA's level of professionalism to new heights.

Military Reforms

The rise of professionalism in the PLA is also the result of a series of far-reaching reforms the Chinese military has implemented since the 1980s: a major overhaul of the PLA's headquarters (changing it from three headquarters to four by adding the General Department of Equipment); a substantial reform of the logistical system (to creating a united service supply system); a large-scale reduction of the force level of 1.5 million men, mainly from the ground force; and some far-reaching restructuring efforts to the four services. All this has been done under two guiding principles. The first is to effect two fundamental shifts in the PLA's mentality: the shift from an emphasis on physical manpower to hardware/software quality and the shift from a development model of relying on inputs to that of maximizing outputs.[23] The second guiding principle is that all military modernization efforts should serve one goal: to win the next war against powerful enemies. This requires the whole armed forces to learn in earnest how to fight a high-tech war against certain opponents.[24] Related to this is a major force redeployment to cater for the strategic shift in China's military security focus. Geographically, the country's defense priority is being shifted from the land borders of *sanbei* (northern, northeastern, and northwestern China) to coastal China; politically, the preparation for war is being shifted from armed conflict involving regional territorial disputes to high-tech and RMA warfare of mass destruction. According to Gen. Qian Guolang, commander in chief of the Shenyang Area

Military Command, Jiang Zemin issued the order in 1999 that the entire PLA should step up preparations for military struggle to cope with a major military threat.[25]

So far as promoting military professionalism is concerned, two more reforms are crucial. The first reform is to establish a better division of labor among the various services. The Armed Police was created in the 1980s to handle the first-line domestic duties, including maintaining law and order and social stability. Garrison forces are to take care of the second line: supporting the Armed Police when there are major social disturbances. The elite units (specialized services and group armies) are earmarked for dealing with external threats. This is an effective reform measure giving the combat troops more time for training, better funding, and less need for involvement in domestic politics. The political significance of this reform is a lesson the CCP leadership learned in 1989—that is, the elite troops should be spared from carrying out any more dirty jobs of clearing the streets as they were ordered to do in Tiananmen Square, which so badly tarnished the PLA's image as a people's army. Certainly this new division of labor has contributed to the PLA's professionalization.

The second key reform was to delink the bulk of PLA business interests from its force structure in 1998. In the 1980s the PLA set up large numbers of firms. The idea was to generate as much extrabudgetary income as possible to supplement the shortfall in the state's military allocation. Since then the PLA had set up thousands of factories, firms, hotels, and farms and become what some people called a business army. This business expansion within the armed forces not only seriously undermined the professional efficiency of the PLA but also served as a hotbed for corruption. The reform was welcomed by the top generals and the civilian leaders who concluded that if the PLA continued to engage in business, China's military modernization would go nowhere. Because of this civilian/military joint effort, within half a year most of the economic enterprises were removed from the PLA—one of the success stories of military reform in post-Mao China.

GIVE-AND-TAKE BETWEEN PARTY AND MILITARY

The PLA's interaction with the party leadership has been remarkably smooth in the last decade or so. On the one hand, the institutional control of the party over the military has been quite effective. In a way Deng's presence until 1997 gave the civilian leadership a vital period of consolidation. On the other hand, the party's effective control is realized only when it abides by certain unwritten rules

of the game in the new era of civil-military relations. The most important rule is give-and-take—namely, the military has basically received what it needs in its modernization efforts and thus it is willing to grant support to civilian leaders, especially to Jiang, in their effort to govern the nation. Yet in the evolutionary process there has been a tilt in the balance of power. At the beginning, Jiang was eager to fulfill the military's demands. As he consolidated his power, somewhere in 1995 and 1996, the PLA willingly followed Jiang's command, which meant the CCP's institutional control was consolidated in the second half of the 1990s.[26]

Jiang Zemin's Command

When I first suggested that Jiang had a fairly good chance of establishing full authority over the PLA in 1990, nobody in the West took my argument seriously.[27] The strongest objection was that Jiang had no prior experience in the armed forces. But Jiang's relations with the PLA have brought a new dimension to our study of China's succession politics, which is currently being institutionalized. Does Jiang's example also provide a clue for analyzing Hu Jintao's future with the PLA?[28] It is likely Hu will have the same experience with the PLA as Jiang does—largely because the importance of personality has been replaced by institutional authority, though political skills are still a decisive factor, more so in an authoritarian system than in a democracy.

The PLA has never challenged Jiang's position as commander in chief, although complaints were heard. This is due to a number of factors. First, Jiang was Deng's personal choice. People should not underestimate the constraining power of the historical phenomenon of *tegu* (entrusting close followers with the mission of protecting the successor) that can be brought to bear on top generals. Certainly such traditional influence is a slippery concept to measure, as seen from Hua Guofeng's example. Nevertheless, the two most powerful generals in the PLA, Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, faithfully upheld Deng's will at the crucial early stage of Jiang's accession.

Second, Jiang's institutional power may have played an important role. A CMC chair's powerful authority rests on the principle that the CMC exercises commander responsibility. In contrast to the party's organizational principle of collective leadership for the civilian sector, the chair of the CMC, as commander in chief, has unchallenged personal power over top brass appointments, troop deployments, and budget allocations. For instance, promotions of senior officers above the divisional level are not valid until signed by the CMC chair. The movement of troops is very strictly controlled. Without the seal of the CMC chair, any transfer of units of a certain scale can be blocked by the PLA's logistical departments,

civilian transport systems, and local government. These institutional mechanisms make it relatively easy for the CMC chair to gain personal authority and build up his own following.

Third, Jiang has been accepted by the PLA due to his extraordinary efforts to convince PLA soldiers that he is one of them. This has helped Jiang to pass the invisible attitude test imposed upon him by the PLA in 1989 when he became commander in chief. As soon as he assumed office he appeared as someone who cared very much. He began by making efforts to improve the living standards of the rank-and-file officers who based their commitment to Jiang on his contribution to their well-being. Indeed, in his first five years as commander in chief he increased the basic salary three separate times for officers and men.[29] He has paid numerous visits to the PLA's basic units, talking to soldiers, having dinner with them, and promising to improve their living conditions.[30] For instance, the 1995 military housing reform allowed massive sales of houses to senior officers at a discount and awarded a handsome living space to active servicemen at the regimental level and above. This policy has attracted a warm response from the officers through whom Jiang exercises his military leadership.

Fourth, Jiang's most important action to win PLA support at the beginning was his vigorous campaign for enlarging military spending on behalf of the PLA. In his first speech to the CMC conference as its chair in 1989, he emphasized that economic development and defense modernization were equally important.[31] This informed the PLA that its commander in chief was trying hard to safeguard military interests. In a way, Deng unconsciously gave Jiang a lot of support. The decade of Deng's command over the PLA was marked by his suppression of the military's interests for the sake of economic reform. Deng could manage this relatively easily due to his huge personal authority over the soldiers. In fact there were many critical voices against him among the generals (except for those in the Second Field Army), but they were sidelined.[32] Jiang did not have this luxury. He had to take a proactive approach to the matter.[33] Although the military is never satisfied with the budget it receives, the double-digit growth of the military allocation does distinguish two distinct periods: Jiang's leadership in the 1990s and that of Deng/Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. Jiang has been careful to avoid a repetition of the situation in which Zhao was made a scapegoat by emphasizing Deng's instruction: *jundui yaorennai* (the PLA must restrain itself from demanding money). In 1991 when Jiang addressed the all armed forces conference on the Gulf War, he further specified the concept of "double emphases": the PLA must receive a budget increase in line with the growth of the national economy.[34] This idea was incorporated in the National Defense Law of 1997. At the same time,

Jiang has been said to favor the PLA as much as possible when the State Council handles civil-military disputes.

Fifth, Jiang's political skills have helped him establish himself with the military. The first challenge to him as commander in chief when he took over from Deng was a serious one: he had no power base in the military. He overcame this obstacle by going along with the mainstream groupings in the PLA. At the time there were three main groups: generals of Deng's Second Field Army; the Yang brothers; and other military elders who did not belong to the first two groups (represented by Yang Dezhi, Hong Xuezhi, Xiao Ke, and Zhang Zhen). Jiang made sure that he coordinated with them all rather than supporting one of them. When Deng made his position known, Jiang followed Deng's preference. It was during this period that he developed good relations with Wang Ruilin, Deng's secretary and a current member of the CMC. After the removal of Yang Baibing, the main power center in the PLA was occupied by Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen with whom Jiang had enjoyed good working relations all along. The secret of his success was that Jiang gave only broad policy guidance instead of detailed instructions. The leadership was based on positive support. This was clearly reflected by his handling of appointments. Although Liu and Zhang had no political ambitions and formed no factions, they did promote a number of senior officers they liked. Jiang never vetoed these promotion proposals. For once their mentor retired, they would look for a new one and he would be the only candidate. It was a better option to take over Liu's and Zhang's following rather than trying to create his own, as he knew few people in the PLA. Among these we can list men like You Xigui, Xing Shizhong, and Shi Yunsheng who are particularly loyal to Jiang.

Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian are the successors of Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. Jiang has worked hard to develop sound political relations with them. When Liu and Zhang Zhen were about to retire, there was a question whether Chi or Zhang Wannian should be ranked ahead of the other. Jiang cleverly asked them to decide for themselves. Since Chi and Zhang were countrymen and joined the same troop of Xu Shiyou about the same time in the mid-1940s, they have formed a good brotherly relationship, as Shandong countrymen often do. Although Chi had held senior positions much longer than Zhang, Chi made a voluntary retreat by saying that the PLA's tradition was to let the person in charge of military affairs head the political affairs.[35] As for Zhang, he was quite grateful to Jiang. In 1996 Zhang was criticized by PLA elders for spending too much public money on his house. It was Jiang who covered for him at the crucial time when candidates to replace Liu and Zhang Zhen were being selected. Indeed, when Jiang gained the firm support of the first-line leadership in the CMC, his

job of consolidation became much easier, paving the way for his current position of final authority in the PLA.[36]

In the ongoing process of the military leadership succession, Jiang continues to take the reign-but-not-rule approach. That is to say, he reserves to himself the final say on appointments to key posts but gives the task of selecting and ranking candidates to Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, and Wang Ruilin. Guo Boxiong (executive deputy chief of staff) and Xu Zehou (executive deputy director of the General Political Department) were therefore promoted in 1999. Jiang has also invented a make-everyone-happy method for retiring senior officers—basically by promoting them to three-star generals. In fact, most of the 60 lieutenant generals promoted to general during Jiang's term as CMC chairman were promoted for retirement or semiretirement. Jiang's benevolent rulership in the PLA has won him general praise from servicemen in contrast to his relatively low rating among civilians.

Despite the positive interactions between Jiang and the top brass, one implicit reason for the PLA's acceptance of Jiang may be due exactly to his weak personal authority compared to Mao and Deng. It is relatively easy to give positive support. The test of authority comes when the two sides encounter sharp policy differences. While Jiang's predecessors could have their way with the PLA when such differences emerged, Jiang has always tried to avoid them. For the first time in many years, the PLA has freed itself from a type of control that can damage its key interests. It will not ask for another Mao or Deng to sit on it. Therefore Jiang's weakness in China's elite politics is a blessing for the PLA's search for autonomy over its own affairs. The simple truth is this: if Jiang is nice to the PLA, and if the PLA does not want to grab power itself, why should it reject Jiang who is caring and protective? His replacement may not be so benevolent.

The War or Peace Debate

The PLA's reduced involvement in the country's domestic politics has, as mentioned earlier, reduced the policy platforms where the civilian and military leaders do not share identical views. This is especially true in the economic field. The PLA does not have any serious disagreement with the market-oriented reforms, although it believes that with money in command there are new challenges to the maintenance of its corporate cohesion.[37] In the political field the PLA's firm support may have been behind Jiang's rather hard response to Falungong in 1999. This is a recent example of the party and military sharing vital interests for the monopoly of power. In terms of military policies, the PLA has had a high level of autonomy in military administration, and the party's interference has been

minimal since 1990. Sometimes the party denies a specific military request for weapon development, such as the party's veto over the PLA's request to build an aircraft carrier, but on the whole the CCP has tried to meet the military's need to upgrade hardware because this is part of the give-and-take relations. In any case, a powerful army helps the party to consolidate its power.

But in the area of foreign policy and defense policy there is discernible discord between the two—mostly related to how to respond to events in Sino-U.S. and cross-Strait relations. The mainstream civilian leadership is now composed of Jiang and Zhu Rongji, who are more pro-West than both their predecessors (and, perhaps, their successors). They were trained in Western-style universities in the 1940s. Although strong nationalism propelled them to join the revolution, both men had an unfulfilled dream of studying in the United States. And their world outlook is broader than the perspective of those who will comprise the core of the fourth-generation leadership, which received a communist education in the 1950s and 1960s. They know China today has the best chance in many centuries to become economically rich and militarily powerful. Except for foreign involvement in the Taiwan Strait, the military threat to China is at a minimum. The world situation is in the main peaceful and likely to remain so for a long time. The domestic situation is fairly stable, as well, thanks to political restrictions and economic growth. Thus China's security should be enhanced by promoting a course of world peace.[38] The only thing that might torpedo China's rise is an early war with Taiwan.

This is why the party leaders have decided that the foundation for China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era should be nonconfrontational toward the West. And the bottom line for this policy guideline is to handle the Western challenge cleverly in order to create a stable international environment for China's economic take-off. This is the key principle Deng laid down for his successors.[39] Following this principle, Jiang always adopts a long-term perspective in handling acute conflicts with the West. Even if the quarrels involve matters of Chinese sovereignty—the West's weapon sales to Taiwan for example—Jiang would leave room for compromise later for the sake of maintaining at least a workable relationship for economic considerations. The exception to this was China's policy toward NATO's war in Kosovo.[40]

At times this may present a problem for the military. But so far the PLA has not challenged Jiang's soft foreign policy tone. As we have seen, the PLA has become increasingly externally oriented and noninterventionist toward intraparty politics. This makes the job of civilian control over the armed forces a lot easier for the post-Deng leaders—quite contrary to many analysts' predictions—

which again shows that a static view on China can fool even experts. Certainly no one dismisses the fact that the PLA still wields enormous political influence, especially at a time of succession, another round of which is around the comer. Yet the PLA chooses to use that influence prudently and selectively. On the whole its weight has been most clearly felt in China's foreign and defense policies. This is a key political role played by the PLA, but it does not fall outside the standard purview of military professionalism regarded as legitimate by Western countries.

For some time the PLA has been prevented from taking a tough attitude toward international politics. It tolerated the suppression of its budget increase for a decade in the 1980s. Reacting to the civilian request, the military pledged that it would not use force to settle the South China Sea problem when other claimants continued to occupy disputed islets in 1993. It supported Jiang's peace initiative toward Taiwan in 1995, embodied in his eight-point emphasis that "Chinese do not fight Chinese," despite its full awareness that such an olive branch would not work. When its nuclear program for upgrading land and sea-based long-range nuclear missiles was at a crucial stage of development, it accepted the civilian leaders' decision that China should stop nuclear testing in 1997. And, finally, at the order of the party it let go its vast economic and commercial machine in 1998. Of course all this was not done without a certain amount of disgruntlement. Yet the fact that the PLA has swallowed what was imposed upon it indicates that it is conscious of the international trend toward peace and tries its best to go along with it. Another major reason for the PLA to accept Jiang's nonconfrontational diplomacy is its current transitional difficulties in its weapons research and development. Large numbers of new high-tech weapon designs have just passed laboratory testing and a few more years are needed before they can be deployed. The top commanders know this is not the time to take action.[41]

The post-Deng civilian leadership does not disagree with the PLA's perception of external threats to China's national interests. Discord arises when the two sides debate how to handle the threat. This concerns the timing for a major counteroffensive, its intensity, and the way to retreat from such a clash. Generally speaking, the military would like to see a hardline reaction to challenges to China's sovereignty—including the threat of military force. The civilian leadership, by contrast, would consider more dimensions before it reaches a decision: the economic consequences, the international outcry, and the long-term effect on national interests. This discord is more technical than fundamental at this stage. And the civilian leaders have been successful in convincing PLA generals that

when China's military is not ready for a major action against Western powers, it is in the PLA's best interests not to be dragged into a war prematurely. The question is: how long will the PLA continue to buy this argument if it does not receive a firm commitment from civilian leaders to address the problem of military backwardness? The debate between a soft versus hardline response to a Western threat may escalate to a new political height that changes the direction of national development. In fact, recent world events such as the enhanced U.S.-Japan military alliance, Lee Teng-hui's "two-state" thesis, NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and Chen Shuibian's election as president of Taiwan have placed the civilian and military leadership at a crossroads. Where will they go in the new century?

This means that the PLA will not always take whatever is imposed upon it by civilian leaders at any cost. As the guardian of national interests it will have to raise its voice when it thinks the civilian leadership compromises too much. This is most vividly reflected in the PLA's attitude toward Taiwan. The PLA's missile firing in 1995–1996 carried a clear message to the Taiwan leadership: do not force our hand. Yet at the time Jiang was still under the illusion that the two sides could work out something peacefully. After Lee Teng-hui's U.S. visit in May 1995, Jiang was under pressure from PLA generals and state security personnel to revise the "one center, two basic points" guideline set by Deng for China's modernization. The military sought to add to Deng's "one center" (economics) another center—namely, safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which may mean a major military buildup. Indeed Deng Xiaoping once did say to PLA leaders that the PLA should see protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity as the state's primary task.[42] This statement provided PLA generals with a powerful weapon to demand a high level of preparedness.

The Politburo's Beidaihe conference in August 1995 put an end to the debate, for a while, and upheld Deng's nonconfrontational diplomatic principle after Jiang persuaded the participants that it was not time to confront the West.[43] The same Beidaihe conference in 1999, however, came to a new conclusion: NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy exposed the bottom line of the West's policy toward China. The choice between peace and war was no longer in Beijing's hand. The civilian leaders, as pointed out by senior PLA officers, timely and resolutely decided to enhance the intensity of military modernization. The party center promised that the PLA should acquire capabilities of winning a high-tech war with a major military power as quickly as possible. Obviously this would dictate a substantial increase in the national defense budget. Although the party's central task is still designated as promoting economic development, the

civilian leaders' position in handling the contradiction between economic construction and military modernization has tilted toward what the PLA has stood for all along.[44] The consequences in such a policy direction are profound. China's leaders have now dropped Deng's assertion that major wars can be avoided. Their new assessment of the world order has been the most pessimistic outlook since the beginning of the 1980s. Jiang has stated repeatedly that the negative new trends in international politics have imposed great urgency on China's military and technological modernization. While economics is still in command, more national resources will be devoted to a military buildup.[45]

Despite his supportive remarks on a quickened military buildup, Jiang has been reluctant to move China in a direction that can be interpreted as hawkish. Whenever major international events threaten China's national interests, he stresses the hawkish side of the policy. But whenever the tension is eased, he retreats from his commitment to war preparation. And the same is true of Zhu Rongji as well. We must be cautious in interpreting his tough talk at the news conference in April 2000 when he addressed the question of Taiwan's presidential election. Taiwan is an area where China's civilian and military leadership may differ in their policy emphasis for a long time to come. For instance, the PLA argues that the direction of Taiwan's next move is clear. Peace is possible only if China tolerates Taiwan's independence. In this sense war is being imposed upon China rather than China seeking it. Therefore, national reunification cannot happen without a timetable.[46] Yet the civilian leaders have not given up the idea of peaceful reunification altogether. And they see the military's role in resolving the Taiwan crisis more in the light of its deterrence than its actual use. A timetable is simply not an option, even though the 1999 white paper threatens a war against Taiwan if it puts off negotiations indefinitely. To Jiang and his colleagues, the prospects of war are visible but not imminent. China could still have a lengthy period of time for economic construction and military modernization. The view of war tomorrow is dangerous, as it will disrupt China's long-term strategic plan. Jumping into preparations for an early war would only make the enemy happy.[47]

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

We do see a trend of change in China's party/army relations. The passing of the first- and second-generation party and military leaders has reduced the scope of the military's intervention in domestic politics. Increasingly the PLA presents itself as a separate entity with distinctive identity, corporate spirit, and interests.

Professionalism, as embodied in the slogan of winning the next major high-tech war, has been set as the ultimate goal for military modernization. All this has made it possible for the PLA to transform itself from the tool of revolution to the guardian of national security. The PLA has no quarrel with the party's command over the guns. Party control is seen as legitimate because the party was the founder of the PLA in the first place. More important, the military sees benefits in protecting the party, with which it shares vital interests. This has given rise to a relationship of give and take. If we view this relationship in the long term, however, we may discern cracks. The military as a highly professionalized organization will very likely outlive the CCP, which may either collapse if it cannot curtail its internal corruption or lose office to a new political party if fundamental political reform is introduced. Therefore the current party/military relationship is in a transition that will be long in duration.

The interaction between the military and the party's third-generation leadership is particularly indicative of the shared ties of give and take. In the last decade the military finally got rid of the strongmen's personal control. As a result it has achieved a much higher level of autonomy over its own affairs. This is actually the most important reason for the PLA to accept Jiang Zemin, who has never posed a threat to the PLA's vital interests. So far as civilian leaders are concerned, they will have to rely more on institutional power than personal authority to command the guns. The rules of the game are clearer than before. As a result, party/PLA relations are easier to manage. But again in the long run this trend will facilitate a grand divorce between the party and the military in the form of a depoliticized and state-run military.

Yet this new progress does not preclude the possibility that the military will take a hardline attitude in matters of national security. The focus on professionalization may divert the eyes of officers and men away from domestic concerns. The top mission of securing China's national interests may make the PLA's external functions seem aggressive. Especially when the PLA is eager to defend the nation's territorial integrity, it may be viewed as saber rattling. This is exactly the case of the Taiwan problem. The PLA will not initiate any action across the Taiwan Strait without a reason because this would not serve the interests of China and the PLA. Especially with the question of Taiwan, the choice between peace and war is no longer in the hands of the CCP leadership. Here the PLA may differ with its civilian commanders over an estimate of the geostrategic situation. Both sides may agree that more efforts have to be made to empower the military. Both sides may even agree that war is inevitable. But while the civilian leadership sees the possibility of prolonging the peace and recognizes the benefits of placing

butter before guns, the military calculates its capability in a worst-case scenario and therefore demands more inputs. So far there has not been a serious rift, but at a time of crisis this may change. Eventually the civilian leadership will have to go along with the military, probably with the fourth generation of the party core, because it does not dare to carry the blame of betraying national interests. In the future, therefore, we may see a Chinese military that becomes more assertive when assuming external missions.

ENDNOTES

1 See, for instance, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1957).

2 Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1988).

3 There is large body of literature on China's civil-military relations, although the bulk of it has become obsolete. For recent publications see Jeremy Paltiel, "PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition," *China Quarterly* 143(September 1995); David Shambaugh, "China's Post-Deng Military Leadership," in James Lilly and David Shambaugh, eds., *China's Military Faces the Future* (Boulder: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

4 Ellis Joffe first raised this issue of "a separate army" in his 1993 article "The PLA and the Succession Question," in Richard Yang, ed., *China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993* (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1993), p. 150.

5 See various chapters in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

6 For more on this see You Ji, "Struggle for the Post-Deng Supremacy," in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shu-ki, eds., *China Review 1996* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1996), pp. 1–28.

7 For a detailed analysis see You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin/I.B. Tauris, 1999), chap. 2.

8 Liu Yicang and Ku Guisheng, *Youzhong guo tese de guofang jianshe lilun* (Characteristics of China's National Defense Theory) (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1993), p. 216.

9 See Michael Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).

10 Harry Harding, "The PLA as a Political Interest Group," in Victa Falkenheim, ed., *Chinese Politics from Mao to Deng* (New York: Paragon House, 1987), pp. 213–214.

11 For a detailed analysis of the budget cut see Shaoguang Wang, "Estimating China's Defence Expenditure: Some Evidence from Chinese Sources," *China Quarterly* 147(September 1996); for its political consequences see You Ji, "Leadership by 'Lines': China's Unresolved Succession," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), 39(January 1990).

12 Michael Swaine elaborated this point in his book *The Military and Political Succession in China* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

13 Harding, "PLA as a Political Interest Group."

14 Ibid.

15 See, for instance, Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

16 Yao Yanjin and Liu Jixian, *Deng Xiaoping xinshiqi junshi lilun yanjiu* (Study of Deng Xiaoping's Military Theory in the New Era) (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science, 1994), pp. 71–76.

17 For a detailed analysis of the PLA and RMA see You Ji, "Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 21(3)(December 1999):325–345.

18 Guo Yongjun, "Fangkong zuozhan ying shuli quanquyu zhengti fangkong de sixian" (Air Defense Should Be Guided by the Theory of Area and Integrated Defense), *Junshi xueshu* 11(1995):47–49.

19 Tao Bojun, "Dangde sandai lingdao jiti yu keji qianjun" (The Party's Three-Generation Leadership and Strengthening the Armed Forces Through Technological Breakthroughs), *China Military Science* 3(1997):65–73.

20 Xie Dajun, "Qiantan zhishi jingji jiqi dui junshi gemin de yingxiang yu tiaozhan" (Influence and Challenge of the Information Economy to RMA), *Journal of PLA National Defense University* 1(January 1999):27.

21 Wu Jianhua, "Wojun zhonggaoji nianqin zhihui ganbu baiyang de kaocha yu jishi" (Review of Promoting Young Senior Officers in Our Army and Its Lessons), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 1(2000):51.

22 This class admits students at the level of army commanders. Each year about 50 promising young major generals are enrolled in the course.

23 Wang Ke, "Dali tuidonc, houqin gaige tigao junshi iin-gii xiaoyi" (Make a Big Effort to Push Logistical Reform and Improve Military Economic Efficiency), *China Military Science* 2(2000):10.

24 Fang Zhongxian, "Mianxiang xinshiji quanmian jiaqian he gaijing jundui sixiang zhengzhi jianshe" (Facing the New Century, Comprehensively Enhance and Improve the PLA's Political and Ideological Work), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 2(2000):18.

25 Qian Guolang, "Quanmian luoshi silingbu jianshe gangyao gaobiaozun zahao siling jiguan jianshe" (Comprehensively Implementing the Guideline for the Headquarters Building and Doing a Good Job in Improving the Work of Headquarters), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 6(2000):4.

26 In these two years there was a sudden upsurge of articles in PLA publications praising Jiang's military leadership. Jiang also had many opportunities to review the three services, a privilege reserved to the commander in chief. Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang never had such an opportunity. See Huang Yao, *Lu Ruiqing dajiang* (Senior General Lu Ruiqing) (Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi chubanshe, 1994), p. 338.

27 See my article, "Jiang Zemin's Formal and Informal Sources of Power and China's Elite Politics After June 4," *China Information* 5(2)(1991):1–22.

28 Hu is a civilian figure and Jiang's deputy both in the party center and in the CMC (the first vice-chair). He is also vice-president of the state. The arrangement for him to take over has been under way for some time.

29 On 5 August 1995, for instance, Jiang wrote on the report of chief of general staff Fu Quanyou: "I endorse your advocacy that [the headquarters] must help to improve the well-being of soldiers at the grassroots level and do a good job for them in terms of logistical supply." See Cui Yaozhong, "Wennuan gongcheng zhai pianchui" (The Sending Warmth Project at the Borders), *Renmin ribao*, 5 August 1995.

30 *Zhonghua yingcai* (China's Talents), Beijing, August 1995, pp. 4–11.

31 Wu Xiuyong and Lie Jingdong, "Jianchi xietiao fazhan si Jiang Zemin guofang zhanlie lilun de zhongyao teshe" (Upholding Coordinated Development Is a Key Element of Jiang Zemin's Theory), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 5(2000):8.

32 Some generals indirectly criticize Deng's policy of reducing the military budget. See, for instance, Qian Diqian, "Production Must Serve Military Training," *Junshi jingjixue* (Military Economics) 2(1989):21. Qian was a former vice-president of the PLA National Defense University. Moreover, they expressed discontent about Deng's promoting his followers to key command posts in the PLA.

33 For instance, Jiang told top PLA officers in the 1995 all-armed-forces conference of political affairs that he always tried to persuade the National People's Congress to agree to a larger military allocation in the annual state budget. However, he continued to say, it was difficult for him to press the matter when so many PLA corruption cases were being exposed. Oral source from the PLA during my fieldwork trip in Beijing in January 1996.

34 Wu Xiuyong and Liu Jingdong, "Jianchi xietiao fazhan," p. 8.

35 Oral information from a superior of both Chi and Zhang in Shangdong in the mid-1940s. For a detailed description of Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian see You Ji's contribution to Colin Mackerras, ed., *Dictionary of the Politics of the People's Republic of China* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 60–61, 63–64, and 243–244.

36 Oral information from a senior officer in the PLA.

37 Zhao Kemin, "Duixin shiqi wojun sixiang, zhengzhi gongzuo shijian de huigu yu sikao" (Reassessing and Reflecting on Our Army's Ideological and Political Work in the New Era), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 10(1999):22–25.

38 Meng Xiangqing, "Jiang Zemin's anquanguan chetan" (Initial Study on Jiang Zemin's Theory of Security), *Journal of Foreign Affairs College* 2(1999):38–42.

39 Qu Xing, "Shilun dongou jiupian he suliang jieti hou de zhongguo duiwai zhengce" (China's Foreign Policy Since the Radical Changes in Eastern Europe and the Disintegration of the USSR), *Journal of Foreign Affairs College* 4(1994):19–22.

40 Elsewhere I have made a detailed analysis on this exception; see You Ji, "The China Challenge in the New Millennium," paper presented at the Conference Strategic Update, Parliament House, Canberra, 27 September 1999.

41 You Ji, *Armed Forces of China*, chap. 3.

42 Peng Guangqian, Yao Youzhi, and others, *Deng Xiaoping zhanlie sixianglun* (Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thoughts) (Beijing: PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1994), p. 109.

43 See You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Making Sense of the Crisis Across the Taiwan Strait* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 77–98.

44 Peng Rixuan, Ying Lin, and Li Tao, "Zhongguo jundui xiandaihua jianshe huigu yu zhanwang" (Review and Forecast of the Chinese Military Modernization), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 5(2000):9.

45 Ibid.

46 Wu Xiuyong and Liu Jingdong, "Jianchi xietiao fazhan," p. 12.

47 Zhao Zuncai, "Congrong jiayu fuzai jiumian de chenggong shijian" (A Successful Case of Handling a Complicated Situation following NATO's Bombing of the Chinese Embassy), *Journal of the PLA National Defense University* 9(1999):30–33.

9

Vietnam: The Many Roles of the VPA

Carlyle A. Thayer

The Vietnamese armed forces are collectively known as Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, or the Vietnam People's Army (VPA). The VPA is composed of three types of forces: main force and reserves; local forces; and militia and self-defense forces. As the name Vietnam People's Army implies, and as Vietnamese national defense strategy dictates, the armed forces form the core of an "all-people's national defense" system rooted in Vietnamese tradition. The role of the main force is to engage in mobile warfare; the local, militia, and self-defense forces engage in dispersed combat, or guerrilla war, in support of the main force units.[1] In the words of Dao Dinh Luyen, then chief of the General Staff: "The foundation of the all-people's national defense and people's war is strong defense areas and a strong main force mobile corps [*binh doan*], for the traditions of Vietnam's people's war lie in the close combination of two modes: local people's war and war fought by main force corps."[2] This chapter focuses on professionalism in the VPA's main forces.

As a result of the historical evolution of the VPA during the colonial period, the VPA's concept of military professionalism (*nghe nghiep quan su*) has always included mastery of traditional military art, political-ideological indoctrination, and modernization (or becoming a "regular and modern army"). Traditional military art refers to the "tactics of peoples' warfare....These are the tactics of using a small force to fight a larger one, and using rudimentary equipment to defeat an enemy with more sophisticated equipment."[3] Traditional military art also includes deception, camouflage, close-in fighting, mobility, and the adaptation of lessons learned in recent combat to the practical realities of Vietnam.

The second component of professionalism—political-ideological indoctrination—refers to the seminal role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in troop education and indoctrination and the leadership role of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) over the VPA. Virtually all Vietnamese communist military writers stress that the army must be absolutely loyal to the party.[4] Indeed, it was revolutionary activists who formed and exercised political control over communist Vietnam's first military units.[5]

In 1982, in the aftermath of the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979 and in light of Vietnam's experience in Cambodia, Vietnam replaced the system of political officers with the one-commander system. This measure proved impractical after a few years, however, and a new modified system of political officers was instituted.[6] Party control over the military is exercised directly by the Politburo through the Central Military Party Committee (Dang Uy Quan Su Trung Uong, or CMPC) and the General Political Department. The CMPC is composed of military and civilian members of the VCP Central Committee with responsibility for defense and security issues. It is headed by the party secretary general. The General Political Department oversees a system of party organs led by political officers at all levels.

According to Le Kha Phieu, then head of the VPA's General Political Department, "[T]oday, the basic theme in building the army politically is to solidify the class nature of the army, [and] use Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the ideological foundation of both the party and the army."[7] Vietnam's armed forces, for example, formed on 22 December 1944, were initially called the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army (Doi Viet Nam Tuyen Truyen Giai Phong Quan),[8] clearly indicating the importance of political agitation in the army's mission.

The third component of professionalism—becoming a regular and modern army—includes keeping up with technological change and incorporating it in the VPA's force structure. Professionalism in this context refers to the coordinated use of "rudimentary, relatively modern, and modern weapons and equipment" and the development of an indigenous national defense industry.[9] In the 1950s, after the Chinese Communists won their civil war and made contact with Vietnamese forces, they provided assistance that helped transform a largely guerrilla army into a semiconventional one comprised of independent regiments and divisions equipped with heavy artillery and self-propelled antiaircraft weapons. It was only in February 1951 that Vietnam's armed forces were renamed the Vietnam People's Army. Becoming a "regular and modern army" in this context meant learning how to master the technologies associated with air defense and gunnery, alongside communications, logistics, and maintenance, as well as the incorporation of these new skills and weapons into the VPA's force structure. The development of division-sized units necessitated developing the organizational skills to deploy large formations and the appropriate strategy, operational doctrine, and tactics to launch combined operations in coordination with local and militia forces. The modernization of the VPA at this time owed much to China's assistance, including access to its military academies in southern China.

After partition in 1954, becoming a "regular and modern army" meant downsizing and restructuring the VPA along conventional lines. Specialized corps and services, such as the navy and air force, were created. In the 1950s standard uniforms, insignia, and a rank structure were introduced. Military training became formalized in a system of schools, institutes, and academies. The Naval Technology Commanding Officers School , for example, was established in 1955. Originally a primary and secondary school for future naval officers, it graduated 6,000 personnel in the period up to 1993. Vietnamese officers also went abroad, to China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, for education and training.

In the 1960s, when the Vietnam War escalated to include an air war over North Vietnam, becoming a "regular and modern army" meant acquiring the skills and developing the organizational structures to create an effective antiaircraft defense system (employing radar, radar-controlled guns, surface-to-air missiles, and a fighter defense force) and a coastal defense force. In 1968 the Soviet Union overtook China as Vietnam's main supplier of military weaponry. Moscow provided Hanoi with a modern antiaircraft defense system including surface-to-air missiles, MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet aircraft, light bombers, and fast-attack naval craft. In the 1970s, after further escalation, modernization meant the development of corps-sized units (*binh doan*) and the employment of combined operations (armor and infantry). In the 1980s, during the Cambodian conflict, the Vietnamese navy was progressively modernized as it took delivery of five frigates, numerous fast-patrol craft armed with surface-to-surface missiles, and other specialized craft.[10]

Finally, from the late 1980s up to the present, becoming a "regular and modern army" has meant developing the technology and skills to maintain, repair, and refurbish high-tech weaponry provided by the Soviet Union before its demise and the acquisition of selected new platforms and weapon systems such as surface-to-surface missiles, Su-27 Flanker aircraft, and *Tarantul*-class corvettes. Since 1992 stress has been placed on developing a national defense industry to support force modernization. In light of the Gulf War and NATO bombing of Kosovo, Vietnam is intently studying the "revolution in military affairs"—primarily, but not exclusively, the new information technology—with a view to incorporating selected aspects into its current force structure.

THE VPA'S CHANGING ROLES AND MISSIONS

The Vietnam People's Army has been almost continually at war since it was founded in 1946. For example, the VPA fought an eight-year Resistance War

against the French from 1946 until 1954. Most of the next decade was relatively peaceful. The VPA's role changed from that of expelling the French (with the secondary task of economic production) to defending the fatherland. It was during this period that the VPA took on a more conventional shape with greater standardization among units. The military was reduced in size, and military personnel were seconded to state and administrative posts. More training time was given over to military arts and technical studies in line with the new mission of defending the country.[11] The military's role in economic production, as we shall see, was also expanded.

The VPA was also involved in covert assistance to the revolutionary forces in the south from 1959. This commitment steadily escalated until the fourth quarter of 1964 when regular main force units were introduced into South Vietnam. This period of relative peace in North Vietnam was shattered by the Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964 and the onset of a sustained air war over North Vietnam in February 1965 (Operation Rolling Thunder). The VPA was fully engaged in combat for the decade 1965–1975. Reunification ushered in another period of relative peace. In October 1976, for example, a VPA General Directorate for Economic Development was created to oversee the involvement of military units in economic reconstruction tasks in four main sectors: agriculture, industry, communications and transport, and capital construction. The VPA's role in economic construction was cut short, however, by the growing conflict with Cambodia that erupted into a border war in 1977. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and China's attack on Vietnam in 1979, ushered in yet another decade of warfare (1979–1989).

In 1987, following the December 1986 Sixth National Party Congress that adopted the policy of renovation (*doi moi*), the Politburo approved a "strategic readjustment" plan for the VPA.[12] VPA forces were withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos and the main forces were slashed in half over the next several years. From 1992, Vietnam has embarked on a program of force modernization that has included the development of a national defense industry and the modest acquisition of new technologies, weapon systems, and platforms from abroad. The VPA navy was assigned a major new role of surveillance over Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and protection of offshore oil rigs and occupied features.

According to the minister of national defense at the time, Doan Khue, "the army's three functions have been to fight, work, and produce."[13] In other words, from its very origins the VPA has been assigned more than just a combat role. In the 1940s and 1950s guerrilla units grew their own food, assisted the local population in agricultural and other tasks, and produced weapons and goods. The

VPA's role in the area of "working and producing" has evolved in each historical period. In the years after partition, the VPA was given responsibility for running state farms in North Vietnam. After reunification, the VPA was given an expanded role in maintaining order and internal security, economic reconstruction, and production of limited amounts of agricultural and industrial items.

In December 1976, at the Fourth National Party Congress, the VPA was assigned two major tasks: defense of the fatherland and participation in economic construction. In 1982, the Fifth National Party Congress reinforced this commitment. The VPA was now assigned "two strategic tasks"—building socialism and defending the fatherland. These tasks were reiterated most recently in 1996 at the Eighth National Party Congress.[14] The VPA's role in commercial production was codified in law in March 1989 when military-run enterprises were put on the same footing as civilian state-owned enterprises. There have been other role changes. In 1992, for example, the VPA was explicitly given responsibility for defending the "socialist regime" as distinct from its mission of defending the fatherland. In late 1998 the minister of national defense, Pham Van Tra, called for the setting up of special economic defense zones (*khu kinh te-quoc phong*, or KT-QP). Each military region was called upon to establish one or two such zones to promote economic activity and national defense. By the end of the following year thirteen zones had been set up in strategic areas along the borders with China, Laos, and Cambodia. The VPA is now heavily engaged in socioeconomic development, including the eradication of poverty and illiteracy. In the past decade, therefore, the VPA has been assigned five roles: national defense, national security, standardization, modernization, and economic construction. The following sections discuss each of these roles.

National Defense

The VPA has prime responsibility for the defense of Vietnam. This includes Vietnam's borders, landmass, air space, island territories, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. Vietnam's defense doctrine is one of "all-people's national defense." This involves assigning responsibility for the defense of Vietnam's natural geographic regions to the three levels of forces (main, local, and militia) and integrating these forces with the reserves and local population. Each city and town, as well as each enterprise, factory, or commune, is required to draw up a defense plan and implement it in times of hostilities. Mobile forces are to be deployed against invading forces according to predetermined strategic plans.

National Security

The VPA has been given responsibility to assist the Public Security Forces with maintaining internal order and stability. In 1992, with the adoption of a new state constitution, the VPA was charged with a new role: defending the socialist regime. In the post-Cold War era, Vietnamese officials have declared that Vietnam is the target of "the strategy of peaceful evolution" by outside imperialist or hostile forces.[15] The VPA is expected to deal with acts of sabotage, rioting, subversion, and violence including armed uprisings and rebellion.

Standardization

The VPA is charged with the duty of introducing common standards and practices throughout Vietnam. At its most basic level, standardization involves drawing up and implementing uniform regulations concerning room and board, daily routine, dress code, discipline, military protocol, troop management, and training programs. In recent years emphasis has been placed on getting military personnel to wear the same uniforms and insignia suitable for their service.[16]

Beginning in 1989 a series of overlapping campaigns was launched to improve the professionalism of the VPA by bringing various military units (regiments, brigades, and divisions) up to national standards. The first campaign was a six-year effort "to build totally strong regiments." This was followed in 1992 by a three-year movement "to build totally strong brigades and divisions" and in 1993 by a movement to build the regular army. In late 1995 Vietnam conducted a review of the campaign to build a regular army and concluded that as a result "violation of discipline was considerably reduced".[17]

Modernization

The VPA is expected to keep abreast of advances in modern technology in order to devise policies to incorporate relevant technologies into the force structure and develop methods of countering technology that poses a threat to Vietnam's national security. For example, an Institute of Military Technology was established in October 1966 as a research and army training center for postgraduates.[18] One of its tasks was to develop countermeasures against U.S. weapon systems.

Economic Construction

The army has been continually involved in economic production activities—either for its own consumption or as a contribution to the socioeconomic development of the local community or the nation as a whole since its founding. In the early years of the VPA, guerrilla forces grew their own food and manufactured

modest amounts of rudimentary and semimodern weapons. The VPA's role in economic production and construction has expanded after each of the major conflicts in which it has been engaged: the Resistance War against the French (1946–1954), the Vietnam War against the United States (1965–1975), and the Cambodian conflict (1978–1989). Since 1975, for example, VPA units have been involved in building Vietnam's communications infrastructure including road, rail, water, air transport, and telecommunication facilities. In the 1980s the VPA owned and operated over 300 enterprises, but reforms and restructuring have reduced this number to just under 200.[19] These army-run enterprises produce goods of direct use to the military as well as for the commercial market. At present, economic production activities include joint ventures between army-owned enterprises and foreign partners. Finally, the VPA is in charge of Vietnam's national defense industries. According to the current minister of national defense: "As an army we have to see the protection of the fatherland as our core duty, but the duty of national construction must not be taken lightly. The army has the responsibility to participate directly in socioeconomic development."[20] This project includes combating illiteracy and reducing poverty in remote areas as part of the system of economic defense zones.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Since its inception the VPA has placed a great deal of stress on the practical nature of education and training and the role of political indoctrination. For example, the very first military course to be offered to military cadets was conducted in September 1945 by Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap. The syllabus "derived from the courses previously developed to fight the Japanese."[21] Truong Chinh lectured on the "international situation at the end of the war as well as the current role of the Vietnamese Revolution." Pham Van Dong presented instruction in the "ethics of the revolution." Vo Nguyen Giap provided practical training in the principles of guerrilla warfare. During the two-week course, afternoons were devoted to "military drill followed by rifle and bayonet practice, as well as grenade-throwing, followed by lessons in section and platoon tactics."[22] The changing roles of the VPA, especially in the contemporary period, have resulted in a restructuring of the army's educational institutions and defense curriculum to meet the challenges of peacetime and the revolution in information technology. Since 1989 Vietnam has "renovated" (reformed) the content and organizational methods of basic training to make it relevant to combat.[23] In 1990 Vietnam reformed the system of military education—a step that resulted

in the consolidation and development of a system of national, regional, and provincial-level military institutions involved in education and training.[24] In 1991, for example, the Naval Technology Commanding Officers School introduced courses at university and postgraduate levels. It was renamed the Navy Academy in 1993.

Following the Central Committee's third plenum (June 1992), a concerted attempt has been undertaken to make the VPA's educational programs uniform across the country. In addition, the military system of education was standardized and incorporated into the national education system through the cooperative efforts of the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Education and Training.[25]

Training for officers in the main force takes place at officer candidate schools with programs varying in length from four to six years depending on the area of specialization and the uniformed service (army, navy, air force). There is a system of specialized institutes to deal with the needs of combat arms (artillery and infantry), logistics, and specialized services (cryptology and chemical warfare, for example). At the apex is the National Defense Academy (Hoc Vien Quoc Phong). In addition, a national defense curriculum has been designed and introduced into the civilian educational system as part of the "all-people's national defense" system.

The National Defense Academy was founded by Decree 188 in December 1994. Created from the High-Level Military Officers' Academy (Hoc Vien Quan Su Cap Cao), the new academy was given the responsibility for training high-ranking military officers (combat and staff) and providing instruction in national defense to senior party and state officials, including cadres assigned to mass organizations and scientific research institutes. The basic course runs for two years. A visiting foreign delegation has reported that the curriculum includes the study of operational art and tactics involving large formations (37 percent); social sciences and humanities (27 percent); defense and military history (15 percent); domestic affairs including party and state policy (10 percent); foreign languages (6 percent); and international strategy (5 percent). The academy was initially placed under the direct control of the government (*truc thuoc chinh phu*) and management by the Ministry of National Defense.

Political education (ideological indoctrination) is still accorded a relatively important role at all levels of military education and training. According to the chief of staff at the time: "A top-priority task is to provide political and ideological education to cadres and combatants to enhance their political background."[26] A Political Officers School was first established in January 1976 (Truong Si Quan

Chinh Tri). Later renamed the Political-Military Officers School (Truong Si Quan Chinh Tri-Quan Su), this was the basic training institute for political officers and cadres. In 1996 the Political-Military Officers School was merged with the Political-Military Institute (Hoc Vien Chinh Tri-Quan Su).[27] The new institute has responsibility for training political cadres from platoon to tactical campaign level, frontline cadres who already possess a high level of education, army command and technical cadres, and researchers and educators with advanced degrees. The new institute was also given responsibility for training faculty for the military officer school system, as well as military journalists and legal cadres.

The "threat of peaceful evolution" is a theme that continually runs through Vietnam's military literature.[28] In the view of military commentators, Vietnam is threatened by unnamed external hostile forces in combination with internal reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries. The domestic situation is exacerbated by the negative side effects of the market economy. Vietnamese military commentators attack the proposition that the armed forces should be kept out of politics or "depoliticized." In response to the "threat of peaceful evolution," Vietnamese political and military leaders call for an intensification of political-ideological indoctrination.[29] They stress the importance of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

The renewed stress on political-ideological indoctrination in peacetime has resulted in a major overhaul of the traditional military curriculum. For example, the number of subjects offered by the Political-Military Officers School has been expanded from 10 to nearly 30. New subjects have been added to the military curriculum: Ho Chi Minh Thought; ethics and religion; psychology; aesthetics, literature, and art; ethnology; the state and law; computer science; economic management; population, environment, and development; and foreign languages (Chinese and English). There is now a greater stress on the social sciences and humanities. For example, officers are expected to improve their knowledge of a wide range of subjects including economics, biology, Vietnamese literature, national history, Vietnamese geography and culture, science and technology, and the party's and state's lines and policies.[30]

In December 1999 the sixth session of the Tenth Legislature of the National Assembly adopted a new law on VPA officers.[31] This new law, which came into effect on 1 April 2000, is the most important recent development in the professionalization of the Vietnam People's Army. It specifies the educational requirements for officer entry into the VPA and further specifies continued education and training requirements, age and time in grade, and the requirements for promotion from one rank to another. To remain in uniform after the year 2000, all

officers must obtain a university degree or its equivalent. Regimental and divisional commanders are required to earn postgraduate degrees in specialized fields such as politics.

Younger members of the VPA can now expect greater upward mobility and improved prospects for promotion and assignment. In other words, there is now a clear career path for promotion within each service. Officers who fail to meet the selection criteria for promotion to the next rank within a designated time period will be retired. For those pursuing a command and staff career, for example, an officer must first become a corps commander before qualifying for military region deputy commander. Only commanders of military regions can become deputy chiefs on the General Staff. Moreover, as the new law is implemented it will eliminate the bloated rank structure at senior levels. For example, the number of officers holding the rank of general has been limited to 150 (down from a high of 400 during the Vietnam War). Commanders of military regions will hold the rank of lieutenant general, while the highest rank of general (*dai tuong*) is reserved for the minister of national defense, the chief of the General Staff, and the head of the General Political Directorate.

Officers are now required to attend military schools whose requirements for admission have been raised to reflect a greater emphasis on formal education. (There are other provisions for promotion from the ranks or during combat.) Officers must attend a military school for each rank they aspire to. Battalion commanders must attend one of the regional infantry officers schools. Regimental commanders must attend the Da Lat Military Academy. Divisional commanders must attend the National Military Academy in Son Tay. At the senior level, military officers are required to attend the Ho Chi Minh National Political Academy in Hanoi.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

For over five and a half decades military professionalism in the Vietnam People's Army has included mastery of three main components: traditional military art, political-ideological affairs, and technological modernization and standardization. Because the VPA has been nearly continuously at war, training and education have developed in a more or less ad hoc fashion with emphasis on practical experience over formal instruction. After each major conflict, however, efforts were pursued to make the VPA more professional by standardizing its force structure and system of formal education and training. In the current period, when the outbreak of conventional war is considered a low possibility, a major attempt is

being made to professionalize the officer corps through a web of laws, regulations, and rules. Formal educational requirements have now been made compulsory for the first time. The curriculum at command and staff colleges (and higher) has been expanded to include a wealth of new subjects in the social sciences, humanities, sciences, and technology. Even so, the role of political-ideological indoctrination has not lost its salience.

Since 1987, the size of the standing army has been reduced two-thirds from a peak of 1.2 million. Nevertheless the VPA force structure still consists of three tiers: main force and reserves; local forces; and militia and self-defense forces. Vietnam has renamed its traditional "people's war" defense doctrine as an "all-people's national defense." This doctrine is defensive in nature and is designed to combine the strength of regular and modern mobile main force units with local forces and the militia. In other words, "all-people's national defense" includes a marriage of traditional military art (as it has evolved) with modern warfare.

The Vietnam People's Army is tasked with fulfilling five main roles: national defense, internal security, standardization, modernization, and economic production. These roles have naturally evolved over time. National defense has now been extended to the maritime domain. The army's role in internal security has been extended from suppressing domestic rebellion to defending the socialist regime. The role of standardization now includes a greater legal character and a much more conventional force structure for the main force units. The role of modernization has been constrained by Vietnam's poverty. Although plans have been laid to develop an indigenous national defense industry, it will be decades before Vietnam can hope to manufacture weapons and platforms that are world class. Vietnam has had to be very selective in acquiring modern equipment from abroad. Recent acquisitions point to naval and air modernization designed to develop a credible deterrent force for deployment in the South China Sea. Finally, the VPA's role in economic production has been expanded over the decades to include construction and reconstruction activities and commercial activities at present.

In the late 1970s when Vietnam created a General Directorate for Economic Development there was some debate within military circles that the army's involvement in economic construction tasks would degrade its combat potential. Curiously there was only a faint echo of that debate in the 1990s when Vietnam resolved to embark on a program of force modernization. But there has been no move to divest the VPA of commercial state enterprises under its control along the lines of reforms being carried out in China. In the present period there appears to be a consensus among Vietnam's political elite that both political-ideological

indoctrination and involvement in economic production are a legitimate part of the VPA's overall mission and do not detract from its military professionalism.

ENDNOTES

The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

1 *Vietnam: Consolidating National Defense, Safeguarding the Homeland* (Hanoi: Ministry of Defense, 1998), pp. 44–57.

2 Dao Dinh Luyen, "On the Occasion of President Ho Chi Minh's 104th Birthday (19-5-1890–19-5-1994)—Ho Chi Minh Thoughts Guide Our Renovation in the National Defense Field," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, May 1994, in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report* 94-145, 28 July 1994, p. 100. Cited hereafter as FBIS-EAS.

3 Doan Khue, "Continuing to Renovate National Defense Process in Order to Contribute to Safeguarding National Independence and Sovereignty and Maintaining Political Stability in Support of National Construction and Development," *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 24 November 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-243, 21 December 1993, p. 69.

4 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Take a New Step to Build a Revolutionary, Regular, Seasoned, and Modern Army Step by Step to Meet the Requirements of the Cause of National Defense and Construction," *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 20 December 1993, in FBIS-EAS-94-003, 5 January 1995, p. 42.

5 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 238–239.

6 Dang Vu Hiep, "Ve Cuoc Van Dong Xay Dung, Chinh Don Dang," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, April 1999, pp. 24–28. The reinstitution of a system of political officers followed the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe.

7 Le Kha Phieu, "Political Construction as a Basic Lesson of Our Army's 50 Years of Maturing and Winning Victories," *Tap Chi Cong San*, December 1994, in FBIS-EAS-95-037, 24 February 1995, p. 80.

8 Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Quan Doi, Thuoc Tong Cuc Chinh Tri, *Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam* (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1977), p. 116.

9 Doan Khue, "Our Army Will Always Be an Army of the People That Fights for the People," *Tap Chi Cong San*, December 1994, in FBIS-EAS-95-037, 24 February 1995, p. 77.

10 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Force Modernization: The Case of the Vietnam People's Army," *Contemporary South East Asia* 19(1)(June 1997):2.

11 Thayer, "Vietnam," p. 236.

12 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Strategic Readjustment," in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth, eds., *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities, and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 185–201.

13 Doan Khue, "Our Army," p. 75.

14 Pham Van Tra, interviewed by Pham Minh Chau, *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 13 October 1997, in FBIS-EAS-97-293, 20 October 1997, Internet version.

15 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnamese Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the Threat of Peaceful Evolution," in Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer, eds., *Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 13–17.

16 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Take a New Step," p. 43.

17 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Xay Dung Don Vi Vung Manh Toan Dien, Doi Moi Giao Duc, Huan Luyen, Xay Dung Quan Doi Chinh Quy—Ket Qua, Kinh Nghiem Va Phuong Huong Toi," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, January 1996, pp. 1–6. Guidance for the campaign to build the regular army was issued by the CMPC Standing Committee [Directive 37] and the VPA General Staff [Directive 85].

18 Le Hao, "Military Technical Institute, Then and Now," *Nhan Dan Chu Nhat*, 8 October 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-006, 12 December 1995, Internet version.

19 Carlyle A. Thayer, "Marching Orders," *Vietnam Business Journal* 6(4)(July/August 1998):56–57; and Thayer, "The Economic and Commercial Roles of the Vietnam People's Army," *Asian Perspective* 24(2)(2000): 87–120.

20 Pham Van Tra, interviewed by Pham Minh Chau, *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 13 October 1997.

21 Bui Tin, *Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), p. 4.

22 Ibid.

23 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Take a New Step," p. 42.

24 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Xay Dung Don Vi Vung Manh Toan Dien," p. 82. And see the chronology in Trung Tam Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Bo Quoc Phong, *Tu Dien Bach Khoa Quan Su Vietnam* (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1996), pp. 970–1007.

25 Doan Khue, "Continuing to Renovate," p. 68; Dao Dinh Luyen, "On the Occasion of President Ho Chi Minh's 104th Birthday," p. 101; and Board of Editors, "Continue to Renovate the Thinking on the Task of Defending the Fatherland—Issues and Solutions," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, January 1994, in FBIS-EAS-94-088, 6 May 1994, p. 44.

26 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Take a New Step," p. 42.

27 Nguyen Van Du, "Hai Muoi Nam Phan Dau, Truong Thanh Cua Mot Trung Tam Dao Tao Can Bo Chinh Tri Cap Phan Doi," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, January 1996, pp. 57–60.

28 Dao Dinh Luyen, "Take a New Step," p. 41; Doan Khue, "Continuing to Renovate," p. 67; Vu Phuc, "Poliltical-Military Institute Combines Civilian Proselyting with Building a Secure, Strong Area," *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 5 October 1994, in FBIS-EAS-94-242, 16 December 1994, p. 74; Le Hong Quang, "Day Manh Cong Tac Ly Luan Tu Tuong Trong Quan Doi Dau Tranh Phong Chong 'Dien Bien Hoa Binh,'" *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, January 1997, pp. 31–33; and Le Van Dung, "Thang Loi Vi Dai Cua Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Va Su Nghiep Bao Ve To Quoc Xay Dung Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam Hien Nay," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, April 1999, pp. 9–11 and 5.

29 Le Huu Nghia, "Giao Duc Ly Luan Chinh Tri, Tu Tuong Cho Can Bo, Dang Vien—Mot Noi Dung Then Chot Trong Cong Tac Xay Dung Dang Hien Nay," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, July 1999, pp. 9–11 and 28.

30 Doan Khue, "Our Army," p. 78; Le Kha Phieu, "Nang Cao Hon Nua Chat Luong Cong Tac Chinh Tri—Tu Tuong Trong Luc Luong Vu Trang Hien Nay," *Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan*, April 1997, p. 5.

31 "Luat Si Quan Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam," *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 14 January 2000, p. 3.

10

Pakistan: Professionalism of an Interventionist Military

Samina Ahmed

For most of its existence, Pakistan has been under direct military rule or military-dominated governments. The military's perceptions of professionalism and the roles and missions contained in that definition shape civil-military relations in Pakistan. Pakistani military leaders claim that their primary mission is combat: the external defense of the state. External security is therefore projected as the military's main role. But the military's perceptions of professionalism also include internal missions and roles. Although the norms of military subordination to civil authority are formally embodied in the 1971 constitution, Pakistan's military leaders have chosen to ignore these constitutional curbs on their functioning. Indeed, successive military rulers have even claimed constitutional authority for their political roles and missions.[1]

Seeing the armed forces as the only organized and disciplined entity in the state and thus the sole guarantor of Pakistan's survival, the military justifies its internal role on the grounds of the threats posed by inept civilian governments to Pakistan's security and stability. Following every coup d'état, military leaders claim that the armed forces were thrust into a political role by default.[2] This definition of professionalism, which blurs the distinction between military and nonmilitary domains, is then internalized by an officer corps politicized by its exposure to domestic politics.

There is both continuity and change in the Pakistani military's perceptions of professionalism. With each successive intervention, the Pakistani armed forces assume new nonmilitary missions, with all their attendant political and economic benefits. The assumption of these alternative missions is also justified on the grounds of security. It is claimed that a reluctant military takes on internal missions and roles in the absence of effective civilian institutions and that this role expansion strengthens the security of the Pakistani state. Thus there is a constant shift in Pakistan's military doctrine from an emphasis on external to internal security missions. At the same time, the military's definition of security is expanded to include noncombat missions and roles that are unrelated to national security.

PROFESSIONAL ROLES AND MISSIONS

The Pakistani military sees external defense as its primary mission. In the military's perspective, this requires a military role in defense policymaking. For all of Pakistan's existence, the high command has retained control over defense policy. It is claimed that the military alone possesses the professional competence to identify and implement the necessary measures to protect Pakistan against external threats in an uncertain regional climate. Pakistan's independence in 1947 was accompanied by disputes over assets and territory with India. Pakistan's differences with India, including the dispute over Kashmir, have resulted in three wars as well as several near-war situations. All three wars were initiated and conducted by the military high command with minimal input from the political leadership.

While the senior military leadership conducts internal evaluations of military doctrine and policy, including operational decisions taken during wartime, the lessons learned are not disseminated within the institution to enhance the military's combat capabilities.[3] Although the Pakistani high command failed to achieve its intended military and political objectives in the 1948 and 1965 wars, both campaigns are depicted as major victories against a militarily superior adversary.[4] In 1971, the Pakistani state was dismembered following a civil war in its east wing and Indian military intervention. Despite its humiliating defeat in the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the military continues to portray itself as the sole barrier against a hostile, expansionist India.[5]

Military leaders believe that the demands of national security also necessitate their involvement in foreign policymaking. The military therefore resists civilian guidance over foreign policy, particularly in areas of special concern, even during those periods when Pakistan has an elected government. Apart from relations with neighboring India and Afghanistan, the Pakistani military high command dictates policy toward all the major powers including the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union. While foreign policy objectives are meant to underwrite Pakistani security, the manner in which they are pursued serves the military's corporate interests.[6] The military was instrumental, for instance, in forging a formal alliance with the United States in the 1950s.[7] The military and economic aid that resulted from Pakistan's entry into security pacts with the United States helped the military high command to expand the armed forces—strengthening its domestic standing versus political rivals in the state. In 1958, the military high command took over direct control of the state, supplanting the political leadership.

Since a long history of conflict with India has shaped the Pakistani military's perceptions of external security,[8] the military adopts aggressive, interventionist policies toward its main regional rival, enhancing bilateral tensions. The ever-present Indian threat and the requirements of military professionalism are then cited as the reason for a constant increase in defense expenditure at the cost of socioeconomic development. Military professionalism, it is stressed, requires access to modern equipment and technology so that Pakistan's army is suitably equipped and trained for combat missions in a hostile external environment.[9]

Moreover, the military defines its primary mission of security broadly in order to legitimize its frequent interventions. Particular stress is placed on the threats posed to national security by an inept and self-serving civilian political leadership.[10] The military's propensity to intervene has its roots in Pakistan's history. Facing multiple internal and external challenges in newly independent Pakistan and unfamiliar with defense and national security affairs, the ruling Muslim League granted complete autonomy to the military institution. During the first decade of independence, the military acquired a political role, as well, sharing power with the civil bureaucracy at the cost of the political leadership. Describing the status of the first Pakistani army commander in chief, Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, a senior military official states: "All power in the army and indeed all those powers that a government wields over an army were in the hands of one man."[11] In October 1958, Ayub Khan dismissed the civilian government and imposed martial law, declaring that the armed forces had "kept strictly away from politics" but were forced to impose military rule "with great reluctance" and "with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country," a situation "brought about by self-seekers who, in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal reasons."[12]

Similar justifications were made by subsequent military rulers. In 1969, for instance, the army chief, Gen. Yahya Khan, emphasized that the armed forces "have no political ambitions" but were forced to take over power to "save the country from utter disaster" as a result of political agitation and violence.[13] Following the 1997 coup, the chief martial law administrator and army chief, Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, claimed: "I was fearing a civil war. Had it taken place, there would have been so much killing that we cannot even imagine it."[14] Justifying the October 1999 coup, Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharaaf declared that the armed forces "could not stand by as spectators when the integrity, sovereignty and unity of the country [were] being compromised." He added: "It is our duty to live up to the expectations and trust reposed by the nation and no

one can deter us from safeguarding the people from exploitation by vested interests."[15]

Military leaders claim that the demands of external defense are not being ignored by military regimes since martial law duties are not undertaken at the cost of military professionalism. During Pakistan's first military regime, the former deputy chief martial law administrator and army chief, Gen. Mohammad Musa, claimed:

> I was fully conscious of the fact, despite the Army's commitments under Martial Law, that my most important function was to ensure that the land forces were ready to play their role effectively in the defense of the country against external threats, especially the threat posed by India. Therefore, besides trying to attain the highest possible standard of professional efficiency, every effort had to be made to keep the Army uncontaminated by political or other influences.[16]

General Pervez Musharaaf, in fact, justified the October 1999 coup on the grounds of military professionalism:

> It's not by design that the army steps in. It's because of the government's own misdoing. [The military is] the only organized, credible force to stabilize the situation. As to why the army thinks it is the savior, you can go back to our training. It is based on developing patriotism, developing character. And more than that, a sense of group relationship, where a person sacrifices for the benefit of the group. And then as we progress in the army, this becomes ingrained in us.[17]

Just as Pakistan's military leadership justifies its interventions on the grounds of national security, similar justifications are used to legitimize the military's aversion to civilian supervision. Even during periods of democratic rule, the Pakistan military refuses to accept the authority of civilian institutions and organizations such as parliament or defense ministries. In the military's perception, the military leadership alone is professionally equipped to formulate and implement institutional policy on a whole range of issues. These issues include strategic planning, force structure, budgets, arms procurement, recruitment, promotions and postings, military training, and professional education. Civilians, it is claimed, are not professionally competent to understand the requirements of military doctrine, force posture, or training—while civilian intervention in issues such as promotions adversely affects the military's internal cohesion, undermining its professional competence as a combat force.

Any civilian threat to the military's internal autonomy is dealt with swiftly. After the restoration of democracy in 1988, for instance, military chiefs removed three elected governments and finally conducted a coup d'état in 1999 since successive prime ministers were perceived as threats to the military's institutional

interests. The military's actions are justified on the grounds of national security —including the threat posed by the civilian leadership to the cohesion of the military institution.[18] In his first address after the October 1999 coup, Army Chief Musharaaf accused the Nawaz Sharif government of attempting to "interfere with the armed forces—the last remaining viable institution"—to "politicize the army, destabilize it, and to create dissension within its ranks."[19]

While the military rejects civilian control over its internal functioning, it constantly expands its own noncombat missions—justifying its encroachments into the civilian sphere on national security grounds. Since Pakistan's independence, the armed forces have frequently participated in internal operations against ethnic, regional, and religious elements, often taking over the roles and responsibilities of civilian agencies such as the police or the judiciary. These internal operations reinforce the military's contempt for civilian political leaders, parties, and organizations. Generations of military officers assigned to internal security duties increasingly perceive domestic threats as the main source of Pakistani insecurity.

The military also perceives a close link between external and internal threats, believing that India exploits Pakistan's internal divisions to undermine its security. In an address to the Special Services Group, for instance, General Musharaaf emphasized that the adversary was using all its machinations to harm Pakistan. He then reassured his audience: "But our armed forces, by virtue of their unity, strength and operational readiness, have the ability to counter internal and external threats" and would "steer the motherland out of her present impasse."[20] The military must therefore counter both an external and a broadly defined internal threat. This definition of military professionalism is then projected through the curricula of military training schools and academies, in articles in military professional journals, and in the speeches and statements of senior military leaders.[21]

Professional training for military officers includes the acquisition of educational skills for a wide range of noncombat missions and roles. Social sciences are taught at military academies and training centers. Officers are also sent to civilian universities for postgraduate education in subjects such as political science, strategic studies, history, and psychology. As a result, the number of postgraduates in the armed forces is growing. Higher education reinforces the military's perception that the armed forces are not only capable of defending the country against internal and external threats but can govern the state more effectively than a less educated, inexperienced and inept civilian leadership.[22] Moreover, repeated military intervention denies the civilian leadership any

exposure to defense issues—reinforcing the military's charge that civilians lack the professional competence to deal with national security affairs.

The military also participates in internal missions that are unrelated to national defense. Since independence, the military has undertaken humanitarian and developmental missions such as conducting disaster relief and building roads, bridges, and dams. Since the first martial law government, but particularly since the Zia regime of the 1980s, there has been a constant expansion of the military's involvement in economic activities such as industrial production, banking, insurance, and transport. The military claims that its commercial operations serve the welfare of armed forces personnel since many are run by military foundations such as the army's Fauji Foundation, the air force's Shaheen Foundation, and the navy's Bahria Foundation. National development benefits, as well, since the military either meets a gap in civilian resources or is more efficient than its civilian counterparts.[23] In the perceptions of the military, Pakistan's economy is "sinking in quicksand and apparently there is no solution in sight. The armed forces as the most organized group in the country are probably the only instrument which can and should accept the challenge, irrespective of how their role is redefined."[24]

It is also claimed that the military's professionalism is not hindered by its nonpolitical roles since they are not conducted at the cost of military training. Nevertheless, the military's involvement in a host of noncombat activities—ranging from conducting the national census to managing public-sector corporations—has raised concerns about their impact on military professionalism. This debate has received a new impetus since the October 1999 coup since almost all civilian agencies and departments of government are headed by military personnel under the Musharaaf regime.

INTERNAL CONTESTATION

When the Musharaaf regime took power in October 1999, it claimed that it would restore law and order, revive Pakistan's fast-sinking economy, institute a process of fiscal accountability, resolve internal tensions, and strengthen Pakistan's external security by reducing tensions with India. The regime has failed, however, to meet any of its stated objectives. Heightened tensions with India increase the threat of an all-out war at a time when Pakistan stands diplomatically isolated because of the military's backing of anti-Indian militants in Kashmir and support for the extremist Islamic Taliban faction in Afghanistan.[25] The economy continues to decline and the accountability process lacks credibility since it excludes the armed forces from its purview. While acts of terrorism deprive citizens of

security, the presence of a Punjabi-dominated military regime heightens perceptions of alienation and deprivation among minority communities, contributing to political polarization along ethnic, regional, and sectarian lines.

Even as the military regime's internal legitimacy is eroding, a leaked top-secret document—the Hamoodur Rahman Commission (Supplementary) Report on the 1971 India-Pakistan war—has revived the domestic debate on the adverse professional implications of the military's internal missions and role. Analyzing the causes of Pakistan's military defeat in 1971, the report concludes that the military's involvement in politics undermined its professional competence to fight wars.[26] The conclusions of the Hamoodur Rahman Report have also contributed to a vigorous internal debate on the military's inability to govern effectively and in a just and fair manner.[27] An influential civilian observer discussing the report's findings states:

> The ultimate protection of state interests lies in the efficient functioning of appropriate institutions. Such institutions evolve out of people's collective experience and cannot be crafted by an executive however benign, holy or wise it may be. The military has no training for this purpose; it is only trained for an immediate assault on a target.[28]

It is significant that the report was leaked at a time when the Musharaaf regime is attempting to systematically disenfranchise the civilian political leadership through its accountability process.[29] At the same time, the regime hopes to gain domestic legitimacy and contain internal dissent through a "devolution" of power plan. Ostensibly meant to redistribute socioeconomic and political power through the creation of local governments, the proposed devolution scheme is rejected by all major political parties as a ploy by the regime to perpetuate its rule through chosen civilian allies who would be dependent upon it for their political survival. As a result, the political leadership has started closing ranks against the regime by emphasizing the military's institutional inability to perform internal missions and roles.[30] Should the regime fail to meet its pledge to restore civilian rule in October 2002, the internal debate on the military's noncombat missions and roles is likely to become far more acrimonious.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

So long as criticism of the military's noncombat role and missions emanates from outside the military institution, the officer corps is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, to rethink its long-standing perceptions of professionalism. Judging by its past performance, the Pakistani military is far more likely to close

ranks in the face of challenges to its self-perceived internal and external missions and roles. The military's rejection of civilian questioning of its professional scope or professional competence has roots in its interventionist past.

Since Pakistan's inception, the military has successfully forced its civilian political rivals to accept its political dominance—either by overthrowing civilian governments or through pressure and blackmail. The absence of functioning democratic institutions and a vibrant civil society and the resultant failure of civilian politicians to resist military intervention encourages military leaders to continuously expand the military's internal and external missions and roles, legitimizing this expansion on the grounds of military professionalism. These justifications are internalized by an officer corps whose direct exposure to politics reinforces their contempt for civilian political leaders and strengthens their belief that the military alone can protect the state from internal or external threats.

When the military's legitimacy is questioned—either because of its institutional inability to perform wide-ranging internal missions and goals or because of a failure to perform its primary function of external defense—it is perceived as a threat to the military's corporate interests. In such cases, the military either prolongs its rule through repression or ostensibly withdraws to the barracks, choosing to dictate foreign and domestic policies from behind the scenes. Since every military intervention and subsequent withdrawal also results in an inevitable decline in its internal legitimacy, the military leadership closes ranks and refuses to accept any criticism of its professional competence or its self-defined professional missions and roles. Questioned about his regime's inability to meet its stated targets at the end of its first year, Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharaaf, claims: "The malaise is so profound, the cancer is so deep-rooted, that all areas of governance, all areas of economy, all institutions need to be addressed." He concludes: "I have an agenda and my agenda is Pakistan. I would like to fulfill that agenda."[31]

ENDNOTES

1 The armed forces are required to swear allegiance to the constitution and, according to Article 6, any attempt to abrogate or subvert the constitution by the use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means "shall be regarded an act of high treason." Article 245 also places clear limits on the military's internal role, making it subservient to civilian authority and power, stating that the function of the military is to "defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so" by the federal government.

See Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976), pp. 263–264.

2 Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958–1982* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1983), p. 128.

3 According to a senior military official, during the 1965 war the "compilation of units' war diaries" was stopped "perhaps to avoid accuracy in subsequent historical records." Following the war, "Service Headquarters carried out superficial postwar analyses" and units "asked to report lessons learnt during the conflict...were naturally averse to putting anything in writing which might be taken as being critical of GHQ, or present higher command in a poor light." See Lt. Gen. M. Attiqur Rehman, *Our Defense Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role* (London: White Lion, 1976), pp. 16, 38–39.

4 General Musa, for instance, then army commander in chief, claims that the Pakistan army succeeded in 1965 in preventing India from achieving its aim, "mainly to break our forces." See Gen. Mohammad Musa, *Jawan to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier* (Karachi: East & West, 1984), p. 137.

5 According to a military official, India remains Pakistan's "No. 1 Enemy...we should be always mentally and physically prepared to meet the Indians in the battle field." See Col. Syed Iftikhar Ahmed, *Essays on Pakistan* (Lahore: Alpha Bravo, 1983), p. 119.

6 According to a former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, the armed forces have "been able to effectively control the allocation of their share of the Federal budget. Any meaningful discussion in the National Assembly has been taboo and politicians...have been persuaded to leave the whole subject of defense to the so called 'specialists' in uniform." He added: "With the foreign policy that Pakistan has pursued, there has not been much room for maneuver." See Khan, *Generals in Politics*, p. 183.

7 According to his biographer, Pakistan Army C-in-C Mohammad Ayub Khan was primarily responsible for negotiating the defense pacts with the United States. See Mohammad Ahmad, *My Chief* (Lahore: Longmans, 1960), pp. 75–76.

8 Perceptions of the Indian threat are deeply ingrained as a result of military training. At the Army Command and Staff College in Quetta, for instance, a training manual stresses that India's hostile intentions toward Pakistan should be taken as a given in evaluating "India's relentless drive towards big-power status and regional hegemony through careful orchestration of political, economic, psychological and military means." See Command and Staff College, Quetta, Staff Course, *India's Military System*; cited in Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 78.

9 Justifying a constant increase in defense expenditure, Field Marshal Ayub Khan stressed: "More than ever before, our Armed Forces must enhance their effectiveness and remain at a high level of readiness to secure our rights, to deter, and if necessary, to defeat aggression...till such time as we find ourselves in a friendly and healthier environment, where all disputes could be settled by peaceful means." Quoted in Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 160–161.

10 Questioned by the media about Pakistan's defense preparedness months before taking power, commander in chief of the Pakistan Army Gen. Ayub Khan retorted: "Do you not worry about the defense of the country. That is my business. Attend to your leaders who are wrecking the country. Do not talk about external dangers. The real danger is within the country. Cannot you see it?" See Ahmad, *My Chief*, pp. 102–103.

11 Rehman, *Our Defense Cause*, p. 27.

12 General Ayub Khan's first broadcast to the nation, 8 October 1958; see Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan*, app. C, pp. 313–317.

13 General A.M. Yahya Khan's first broadcast to the nation, 26 March 1969; ibid., app. F, pp. 326–328.

14 Press conference by Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, chief of army staff and chief martial law administrator, 14 July 1977 (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 23.

15 Bureau Report, "Basic Human Rights Being Ensured, Says Chief Executive," *Dawn*, 25 April 2000.

16 Musa, *Jawan to General*, p. 135.

17 Zahid Hussain and Farah Durrani, "Interview: People's Aspirations Are So High That Sometimes I Shudder to Think of It—General Pervez Musharaf," *Newsline*, November 1999, p. 26.

18 Supporting Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's decision to impose martial law in the 1977 coup, for instance, former Army Chief Gen. Mohammad Musa declared: "There is no political ambition, but the army gets infected by its environment, by the chaos, by the instability. All these politicians...are third rate, they are useless." Musa telephoned Zia after the coup and told him: "You have saved the country—well done, and you've saved the army!" Quoted in Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, p. 127.

19 Amir Mir, "The Army Strikes Back," *Newsline*, October 1999, pp. 32–33.

20 Associated Press of Pakistan, "Adversary Using All Means to Harm Pakistan, Says CE," *Dawn*, 15 October 2000.

21 Writing in the Pakistan army's professional magazine, a senior officer stresses: "Pakistan remains a house divided against itself. If Pakistanis are unable to resolve their own domestic troubles, and particularly the fundamental question of national unity, the temptation to outsiders to meddle in the country's internal affairs may be uncontrollable." See Maj. Gen. Asad Durrani, "Total Security—A Concept for Pakistan," *Pakistan Defense Review* 1(1)(June 1989):11.

22 Writing at a time when an elected government was in power after the dismissal of two of its elected predecessors by the military leadership, an officer despairs: "True democracy has still to evolve in Pakistan. The opposition in the parliament is convinced that their main role is to destabilize the incumbent government and to seize power, indifferent as to what happens to the economy and the internal stability of the country....The Army has stepped in to temporize till such time a new political order steps in to make another beginning." See Col. Muhammad Yahya Effendi, "The World of the Secret Services: Intelligence, Espionage, and Special Operations," *Pakistan Defense Review* 7(1)(Summer 1995): 27–28.

23 The Ayub regime's second five-year plan for the national economy stressed: "The important relationship between civilian and military uses of manpower should be carefully explored...in order to insure the best possible use of the manpower pool. ... In an industrializing society with meager resources, all such overlapping interests should be utilized." See Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 170.

24 Wing Cmdr. Muhammad Irshad, "Strong Economy with a Strong Force," *Defense Journal*, April 1998, p. 45.

25 Imtiaz Alam, "What the General Should Say," *News*, 13 August 2000.

26 The report finds that "the involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and civil administration had a highly corrupting influence; seriously detracting from the professional duties of the army and affecting the quality of training which officers could impart to their units and formations, for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for this purpose, and many of them also lost the inclination to do so." Text of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission (Supplementary) Report in *Dawn*, 14 August 2000.

27 Discussing the military operations of the Yahya regime against the political opposition in the East Wing in 1970 and 1971, the report concludes: "No amount of provocation...could justify retaliation by a

disciplined army against its own people. The Pakistan army was called upon to operate in Pakistani territory and could not, therefore, be permitted to behave as if it was dealing with external aggression or operating on enemy soil" and recommends "effective action to punish those responsible for the commission of these alleged excesses and atrocities."

28 I.A. Rehman, "The Truth That Matters: The Hamoodur Rahman Commission's Findings Underline the Perils of Military Rule," *Newsline*, September 2000, p. 46.

29 Heading Pakistan's two major political parties, the Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party respectively, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is serving a life sentence on hijacking charges related to the 12 October coup while former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, facing several charges of corruption in Pakistani courts, remains in self-exile.

30 Rejecting the devolution plan, a political leader stresses: "It is the task of elected governments and representatives to chose whatever system they deem fit for the masses. The army is entrusted with the task of protecting our borders." See Shahzada Zulfiqar, "Elections on Non-Party Basis Will Fan Hatred and Lead to Bloodshed—Sardar Akhtar Mengal (BNP)," *Newsline*, September 2000.

31 Hasan Ali Shahzeb, "You Cannot Expect Miracles in 11 Months," *Newsline*, October 2000, p. 22.

II

Burma: The "New Professionalism" of the Tatmadaw

Tin Maung Maung Than

> We will be loyal to the state and the people.
> We will be loyal to the fallen comrades.
> We will conscientiously obey the orders and responsibilities given by our superiors.
> We vow to sacrifice our lives for our country, our people, and our Tatmadaw.[1]

If military professionalism is interpreted in the Huntingtonian sense as the "decisive factor in keeping the soldier out of politics,"[2] it is at odds with the characteristics of the Myanmar armed forces or Tatmadaw (literally "royal military"). Instead, the kind of professionalism exhibited by the Tatmadaw resembles Alfred Stepan's "new professionalism" rather than the "old professionalism" of traditional Western armed forces.[3] In fact, as delineated in the next section, the Tatmadaw's adoption of a "dual function" role predated by nearly a decade the Indonesian New Order's articulation of the *dwifungsi* concept.[4]

The genealogy of the Tatmadaw can be traced back to the national struggle for independence. Its founding members were first and foremost nationalists of socialist persuasion rather than classic professional soldiers.[5] As the most powerful and enduring institution in independent Myanmar, it has played a dominant role in shaping the political contours of the Myanmar state and has developed a praetorian ethos. Its penchant for perceiving stark dichotomies in critical issues as well as the natural affinity toward unity, order, stability, and conformity have been reinforced by the seemingly chaotic and meandering path of democratic evolution in the first decade of Myanmar's independence. As such, it has conceived its role as safeguarding the state not only from those committed to threaten Myanmar militarily but also from the folly of the politicians. Consequently, the first-generation military leadership who made their mark during the antifascist revolution against the Japanese had fashioned a military tradition extending beyond national defense requirements and bordering on the political.

This inculcation of the multifunction nation-building concept within the Myanmar military, which incorporates both the security and the public welfare dimensions, has enabled it to assume a corporate identity as the guarantor as well as the embodiment of state authority. This concept asserts that the Tatmadaw is not only an instrument but also a determinant of state power. Thus Myanmar's

military, led by the "antifascist generation," has been engaged in the broader affairs of the state since independence from Britain was achieved on 4 January 1948. The Myanmar armed forces have taken over the reins of power three times in over five decades leading to the year 2000 and have ruled Myanmar directly for almost half that period.[6] Following the collapse of the socialist order in 1988, the military is yet again at the helm of the ship of state. This time around, a new generation of military leaders in the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) are endeavoring to institute a new political order while at the same time attempting a smooth transition from a closed *dirigiste* economic system to an open market economy.

In its 55 years of existence,[7] the Tatmadaw has been continuously subjected to a baptism of fire in armed conflict with a variety of separatist and communist insurrections as well as remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) army that had fled to the Thai-Myanmar border after losing control of China to the Chinese Communist Party.[8] This experience has reinforced the two ingredients of military professionalism cited by Samuel Huntington as "expertness" and "corporate loyalty" in the postindependent Myanmar armed forces.[9]

THE TATMADAW'S EXPANDING ROLE

Since its early formative years, constantly invoking the legend of its noble origin and victorious campaigns against the imperialists and fascists, the Tatmadaw "retrospectively assumed" a self-defined status as "the state's first formateur and guide," claiming to be the only untainted institution forming the bulwark of independence and sovereignty.[10] Due to the civil war and the added threat of KMT intrusion, the military also assumed administrative functions as well as civic duties in areas beyond the central government's administrative reach or where martial law was in force. In fact, in the 1950s "many of the highest decisions of state...were cleared with the top military leadership."[11] But the "military elite accepted, for reasons of expediency as well as conviction, that the military should be subservient to" civilian rule.[12]

In the mid-1950s, top military leaders decided that the armed forces should have a unifying and guiding ideology. First the "National Ideology" as embodied in the Union Constitution of 1947 was restated and adopted at the Defense Services Conference (of commanding officers) on 21 October 1958. Subsequently, the military began to formulate its role in national politics.[13] Thus the second phase was introduced in 1959 to define the role and attitude of the defense services in terms of "national objectives"—that is, "peace and the rule of law,"

"democracy," and the establishment of a socialist economy in a descending order of priority.[14]

In the decade following independence, the military attempted to fashion an ideology by identifying its goals with that of the socialist state. Its leadership's disenchantment with the politicians turned to contempt as the state appeared to have deviated from what was believed to be the appropriate path toward a stable, orderly, affluent, and equitable society. Finally the military elite staged a coup, in March 1962, in the name of the Revolutionary Council chaired by the Tatmadaw's commander in chief, Gen. Ne Win.

The underlying concept in the Revolutionary Council's attempt to restructure state and society according to its own interpretation of socialism, unique to Burma, seems to be the idea of *taw-hlan-yei* (revolution) in a manner distinct from the previous "dominant notions of Burmese politics." The council "sought to emphasize the idea of revolution itself as the key to the country's problems of unity, stability, and equity."[15] The revolutionary soldiers formed a cadre party called the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) to lead the state after the Revolutionary Council relinquished power to the "people." Thus the ruling elite shed its military image in April 1972 when Gen. Ne Win and 20 other senior military officers, who were holding important party and cabinet posts, relinquished their military rank as a prelude to the socialist constitution of 1974 that established a one-party state with a unicameral parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) whose representatives were chosen in quadrennial elections.

This measure seemed to signal the withdrawal of the military from the political power center. Though devoid of a formal political role, the military's role in governance remained undiminished, however. In fact, the political leadership was fashioned from a select group of military leaders or co-opted civilians led by retired General Ne Win. Though formally subscribing to the BSPP's political role, even the party organization within the armed forces was structured to ensure that the chain of command was not compromised. There were no political commissars, and the military party organizations reflected the command hierarchy with commanders invariably elected to top party posts at all levels. Moreover, the military served as a reservoir of human resources for the party and the state apparatus.[16]

When the BSPP government, weakened by a legitimacy crisis precipitated by economic and political failures, was confronted with extensive mass dissent in August 1988, law and order broke down. Professing to restore law and order and restructure the economy and political system into more open and pluralistic forms, the Tatmadaw took over state power in September 1988 by forming the

State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with top military commanders. When the military junta rejuvenated itself by transforming SLORC into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, the foregoing premises of military domination in Myanmar remained intact and the Tatmadaw's role expansion entered a new phase with emphasis on all-round national development.[17] The guiding principles for the role of the Tatmadaw formulated by SLORC continue to be upheld by the SPDC. The "Belief and Resolution of the Tatmadaw" are the same as the "national causes" enunciated by the junta: nondisintegration of the union; nondisintegration of national solidarity; and perpetuation of national sovereignty. Under these premises, claiming to possess "the singular attribute of having been born of the people, for the sake of the people," the Tatmadaw is currently engaged in a variety of tasks that go beyond traditional military duties.[18] The most significant of these "nation-building" tasks are identified as: road, communication, and other infrastructure construction; drug eradication; and running economic enterprises.[19]

The most politically significant mission of the Myanmar armed forces is their role in the new constitution being formulated under the auspices of the ruling junta. The National Convention, entrusted with the task of coordinating and laying down the basic principles for the new constitution, commenced on 9 January 1993 and had not concluded by 1 January 2001. One of the six convention objectives enunciated by the military-led steering committee called for the military's participation "in the national political leadership role of the future state." The basic principles, thus far established, envisage an executive presidency to be elected by an electoral college with the requirement for the "national leader" to possess vast experience in "politics, administration, and economic and defense matters." One-quarter of the seats in the legislative bodies would be reserved for military personnel to be nominated by the commander in chief (C-in-C). There would be complete autonomy for the military. Military officers would be assigned (by the C-in-C) to executive positions in the administrative hierarchy down to the district level. Moreover, there would be a statutory right for the supreme commander to assume state power in case of a national emergency where force, "disturbances, and violence" are used to usurp state power or there is danger of disintegration of the union, breach of national solidarity, or loss of national sovereignty.[20] These constitutional provisions would legitimize the military's leading role in politics and governance for the foreseeable future and marginalize the role of politicians and political parties in a corporatist state—despite the adoption of multiparty democratic procedures.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND STATE BUILDING

Presently Myanmar, which became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1997, has no apparent adversaries and enjoys a peaceful regional environment. As in the past, Myanmar has astutely used its neutral foreign policy and friendly relations with virtually all states in the international system to its advantage and has avoided involvement in regional rivalries. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War international situation is viewed by Myanmar's military leaders as anarchic and uncertain. The United States, the only remaining superpower, is seen as a hegemon whose advocacy of human rights and liberal democracy threatens the security stability of Myanmar.[21]

Although there has not been any official statement on threat perceptions or defense strategy, the conduct of Myanmar's external relations and the military's defense posture indicate deep concerns over internal order and border security. Nevertheless, the need for a credible deterrence against external aggression seems to have been increasingly recognized in recent years. Thus the Tatmadaw has established the following set of guidelines:

- Principal Duties of the Tatmadaw:
  Protect the state.
  Pursue and persevere in military training.
  Perpetually serve the interest of the people.
  Both the first and the third duty may be interpreted broadly to empower intervention in domains beyond traditional defense.

- Objective of the Tatmadaw:
  To become a modern, powerful, capable, and efficient armed force.

- Duties Pertaining to the Building of the Tatmadaw:
  Training
  Administration
  Welfare
  Morale
  To fulfill the stated objective of becoming a modern, powerful, capable, and efficient military, attempts to enhance the Tatmadaw's professionalism have been undertaken in the last decade. As the following sections explain, organizational development, recruitment, training, doctrinal evolution, and force modernization may be seen in this light.

Organizational Development

The postindependence defense services were established initially as a tri-service force with the naval and air arms given equal status despite the army's dominance in terms of sheer manpower and capability. The British regimental system was adopted by the fledgling army, and the embryonic air and naval elements also followed the British organizational pattern. The first-generation officer corps of the army became embroiled in the power struggle between socialist and communist factions within the national front that was formed in 1945 to liberate the country from Japanese occupation. Finally, on 18 August 1948, nearly one-third of the units mutinied and joined the communist rebels. After the ethnic Kayin (Karen) mutiny of 1949, senior Kayin officers, though apparently loyal, were relieved of their commands. Thereafter, nationalist officers of socialist persuasion assumed key positions with important consequences culminating in the coup of 1962.[22]

Following the reorganization of the War Office into the Ministry of Defense in early 1952, the three services were integrated under a unified command. The navy and air force chiefs became vice-chiefs of staff under the defense services chief of staff. The army, navy, and air force were redesignated as Tatmadaw (Kyi), Tatmadaw (Yay), and Tatmadaw (Lay) on 2 November 1955.[23] In May 1989, the designation of each of the three service chiefs (army, navy, and air force) was changed from "vice-chief of staff" to "commander in chief" of the respective service while the overall (supreme) commander's designation was changed from "chief of staff, Defense Services" to "commander in chief of Defense Services." The chairman of the ruling junta assumed the unprecedented rank of senior general (perhaps equivalent to a five-star general in the U.S. military) in May 1990 and a rank-upgrading exercise was carried out across the board—ostensibly to parallel the rank structure practiced internationally.[24] In 1993, another promotion exercise occurred in which the commanders of the navy and air force together with the two junta secretaries and 10 junta members were each conferred the rank of lieutenant general. The positions of deputy commander of a regional command and commander of an air base were also upgraded to brigadier rank. These measures may be seen as part of an ongoing exercise of self-renewal among the top ranks of the armed forces, a process that is not unusual for a military establishment.

There is no evidence of interservice rivalry, and the army's preeminence has been accepted by all parties. The absence of external threats as well as resource constraints have resulted in the other services assuming a supporting role for the army in an overwhelmingly inward-oriented military force commanded by a

succession of army generals (seven in all). Except for the very first commander in chief, who is a Kayin national, all others are Bamar (Burman). Since the advent of the Revolutionary Council, the defense portfolio in the cabinet has been held either concurrently by the chief or (as in the 1985–1988 period) by the ex-chief of the armed forces. Moreover, in the Revolutionary Council period the defense portfolio was held by the junta leader and the same pattern can be seen in the SLORC and the SPDC era.

The Tatmadaw has undergone considerable expansion in strength over the last 50 years. In fact, the army has grown from 10 battalions in 1949 to 422 in 1988. The decade after 1988 saw the greatest expansion: in this period the army's size increased from around 180,000 to over 400,000, while the navy and air force roughly doubled their strength to some 15,000 each.[25] By the year 2000, Myanmar's army comprised 12 regional commands, 14 military operations commands, at least three regional control commands, and 10 light infantry divisions (roughly equivalent to a Western brigade)—all of which have combat infantry units under their control. Support units such as armor, artillery, signals, intelligence, supplies and transport, combat engineers, garrison engineers, medical and provost units, as well as defense industries, are controlled by directorates in the Defense Ministry with smaller units assigned to regional commands. It was reported that the ratio of combat infantry battalions to support units was around 2 to 1 in the late 1990s instead of a "desirable" 1 to 3 ratio.[26]

The navy has five naval regions (commands) and several forward bases on islands in the Indian Ocean as well as an operational tactical flotilla. They are supported by specialized units for shipyards, maintenance and engineering, signals, radar, intelligence and security, medicine, oceanography, and naval equipment and ordnance. The air force operates eight airbases, at least five of them with operational squadrons of helicopters, transports, interceptors, fighters, and trainer/light attack aircraft. There are also specialized units for intelligence and security, radar and air traffic control, maintenance and engineering, aerial mapping, and air weaponry.[27]

The establishment of the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) headed by Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt (Secretary 1 of the ruling junta) in 1993 was a landmark in the military's role expansion into state building and national affairs. Formed with a core of officers selected from the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), it appears to play a significant role as a policy-oriented think tank for the junta and a channel for intervention in a wide range of endeavors: pursuing paleontological research on the origin of primates in Myanmar; conducting national and international seminars and conferences on far-ranging topics that include

international relations, globalization, archaeology, economic and human resources development, and ethnic relations; refuting allegations of human rights violations, religious persecution, and forced labor; publishing the achievements of the military government as well as works related to Myanmar culture and traditions; and sending representatives to international forums and multilateral dialogue sessions. It is widely believed that the OSS is instrumental in the government's countermeasures against the Internet war being waged by the political opposition. It probably contributes to the strategizing of the military's role in Myanmar's sociopolitical and external affairs.

Recruitment, Training, and Doctrinal Evolution

The Tatmadaw has always been a volunteer force. Although an act for conscription was legislated in March 1959, it has never been used; the only exception is the medical profession whereby doctors have been selected, since independence, to do national service for three years.[28] Able-bodied individuals who do not have criminal records may join the army at recruitment centers in major towns and cities. Other combat and support units recruit service personnel according to their specific requirements. The navy and air force conduct their own recruitment drives at times.

Institutions for the basic training of officers, noncommissioned officers, and other ranks were instituted right after independence.[29] Advanced training institutions for command and staff, administration, and tactics as well as specialized training schools for technical and service-related tasks have evolved over the years in line with technological and organizational development of the armed forces. By the late 1990s, major training establishments were operating under the overall supervision of the armed forces chief of training (a major general) and the director of military training (a brigadier). For leadership training, there are the National Defense College (NDC) and the Command and General Staff College; for operations and combat training, there are the Army Combat Training School (officers) and Joint Operations and Airborne Training School; and for officer training there are the Defense Services Academy (DSA) and the Officers Training School (OTS).

Among these establishments, the highest level of leadership training is being provided by the NDC in Yangon. Though established in 1958 it was only in March 1994, when the first core course was opened for senior officers (colonel and above), that it began to function regularly. Its objective is to impart analytical skills and knowledge that will allow trainees to consider political, military, economic, and administrative perspectives in conducting the affairs of the state. It

had trained nearly 100 officers in three batches by August 1999. A wide range of topics—the national economy, national resources, international affairs, strategic studies, military science and technology, and management—are covered in the one-year course. English-language training and computer techniques are also taught. Seminars, discussions, and team exercises are combined with individual and group studies. The program culminates in a dissertation for each trainee, who receives a masters degree on successful completion. The emphasis seems to be on training potential leaders with all-round capabilities.[30] Male recruits are commissioned through four training avenues: cadets recruited by the DSA (all three services); graduates applying to the OTS (army only); medical and engineering graduates inducted through a short Young Officer Course (YOC; for non-combat arms); and cadets recruited by the Under-Officer Training Program, or Teza (mainly army).

The prestigious DSA offers a three-year degree course for unmarried youths who are successful in a gruelling series of academic (mathematics and English), physical, and psychological tests. The candidate's age must be between 16 and 18, and he must have passed the tenth grade. The same qualifications apply for those aspiring to be under-officers. Both are recruited in a combined exercise that requires the candidate to state his preference. The examiners then decide whether the candidate is suitable for one or the other. Currently situated in Pyin Oo Lwin (some 42 miles north of Mandalay), the DSA reportedly has the capacity to accommodate a thousand cadets per batch.[31] It not only teaches military subjects but also offers university-level arts, sciences, and computer subjects as electives leading to a bachelor's degree for successful candidates. Established in February 1955, the DSA was a constituent body of the national university system but now has the autonomy to confer its own degrees.

The Teza cadet has to undergo 27 months of practical and academic training as well as nine months of combat experience as an under-officer to qualify for his commission. The OTS is reserved for graduate applicants and those who are chosen from within the ranks. Its duration is less than a year. Currently situated in Bahtoo, it was first established in 1948 and has mainly catered to the army, though in the past it trained officers who were taken up by the other services. Its main emphasis is on military knowledge and junior-level leadership training. The YOC is the shortest course, lasting only about four months, and the least demanding of all officer training courses.

There are technical and vocational training institutions, as well, such as the Defense Services Technological University (DSTU) and the Defense Services Institute of Medicine (DSIM), which combine specialized professional training

with officer cadet training. Successful trainees attain their commission at the end of the course while at the same time earning a professional degree. Those who graduate from the Military Technological College (MTC) are expected to serve as warrant officers and are eligible to apply for their commission after several years. Other army establishments—such as the training depot, administrative training school, communication and electronics training school, and schools of education—are meant for in-service training in specialized skills and upgrading of general education. Training institutions run by the navy and the air force provide in-service training for their own personnel in order to impart essential training for sailing and flying as well as to enhance their capabilities in work-related tasks.

All these training facilities are constrained by the lack of hard currency and limited access to modern training technology. Indeed, the former has affected the latter due to inadequate funds for procuring books and journals, acquiring training infrastructure and equipment, and securing fuel and ordnance for field exercises and operational maneuvers. From the 1950s to the 1970s, a small number of Myanmar cadets were sent to military academies in England, India, and Australia while field grade officers attended training institutions abroad—for example, staff colleges in neighboring countries, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army School for Rangers. Specialized training in intelligence, signals, armor, artillery, and oceanography, as well as weapons and equipment training, have also been sought abroad, often in conjunction with the procurement of weapon platforms and ancillary equipment.[32]

Training, defense posture, and doctrines are all interrelated. Although the Tatmadaw's prevailing doctrine has never been publicized, it can be discerned from occasional pronouncements by military leaders and the conduct of military operations against the enemies of the state. Throughout the first four decades of Myanmar's independence, the armed forces were continually engaged in military operations against ideological and ethnic insurgencies. Given the continual military threat posed by domestic rebellion, Myanmar's armed forces had been, until recently, largely geared toward counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This posture was reflected in an infantry-heavy army dominating the force structure. Following the acquisition of new weapons in the early 1990s, however, additional infantry, artillery, armor, signals, antiaircraft, and various support units (engineering, medical, transport, provost, intelligence) were raised together with new fighter squadrons and naval units. These efforts may be seen as attempts to significantly raise the capacity of the Myanmar armed forces to fight a conventional war. Although doctrinal implications are not clear at this juncture, the pattern of acquisitions and pronouncements suggests that Myanmar's current military

leaders are attempting to supplement the COIN orientation with a strategic vision that incorporates elements of conventional warfare in the post-Cold War setting.[33] This reorientation is borne out by reports that corps-level exercises involving all three services were secretly carried out in the second half of the 1990s. Though Myanmar does not have a strategic reserve, the people's militia, the police force, the Red Cross, and fire brigades, as well as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (a government-sponsored organization with 12 million members), have been considered as auxiliary elements of the Tatmadaw in the context of the people's war concept.[34] Consequently, current doctrine seems to envisage a phase of strategic denial against conventional external attack that would be followed up by a people's war against intruders.

Force Modernization

Myanmar's armed forces have relied on external sources for the supply of major weapons and sophisticated equipment; though a limited capability for manufacturing small arms, munitions, small vessels, and basic equipment has been built up since the early 1950s.

Myanmar's practice of observing strict neutrality during the Cold War foreclosed the option of obtaining military aid from the superpowers and their allies. Hence up to the advent of SLORC, Myanmar relied on its own meager resources to procure weapons and equipment, mainly from the West.[35] Severe resource constraints imposed by foreign exchange shortages and the exigencies of continuous COIN operations, as well as resource allocation priorities driven by socialist aspirations, prevented the Myanmar armed forces from embarking upon any substantive force modernization program during the first four decades of independent nationhood.[36] Myanmar's armed forces had to make do with armaments and equipment based on the technologies of the 1950s and the 1960s. In the 1990s, however, the third constraint dissipated while the second became less pronounced. Though the foreign exchange shortage continued, it was somewhat eased by the open-door economic policy of the military government. Moreover, the PRC was willing to supply relatively modern armaments, ostensibly on favorable terms, and the military rulers seized the opportunity to redress the huge shortfall in conventional warfare capacity.

After the military coup of 1988, the military government vigorously sought to acquire not only small arms and ammunition but also major armaments from abroad despite a Western arms embargo. The most significant move was the 1990 deal with the PRC involving weapons and military equipment worth an estimated US$1.2 billion. Another agreement with the PRC to supply additional

weapons and equipment worth US$400 million was reported in 1994.[37] Taken at face value, such deals struck between 1988 and 1994 seem to have expanded the capability of Myanmar's armed forces considerably. The arms and equipment procured after 1988 from foreign sources can be classified in three ways.[38] The first category involves the acquisition of similar or improved versions of current equipment—either to replace obsolete equipment or to supplement existing stock. This type of procurement, comprising ammunition, light or crew-served weapons, and transport equipment, was essentially aimed at building up the military's war stocks.

The second category comprises armaments that represent a substantial upgrading in terms of force multiplication and enhanced capability. It comprises more modern versions of armored personnel carriers, heavy tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weaponry, air defense radar, naval vessels, jet fighters, helicopters, and transport aircraft. Their procurement, in contrast to that of the first category, was not a short-term, COIN-oriented measure. Together with the weapons in the third category, this effort constituted an attempt to equip the armed forces for conventional warfare. As such, these weapons and equipment represent a vast improvement over the pre-1988 inventory in terms of technical specifications and firepower.

The third category includes new classes of weapons hitherto absent in Myanmar's inventory: multiple rocket launchers (MRL), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), modern missile warships, supersonic fighters, air-to-air missiles (AAM), four-engine transports, electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment, and night vision equipment from China and Singapore. This category includes long-range telecommunication facilities and modern signaling equipment with a high degree of security—a significant improvement over the previously rudimentary command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions of the armed forces. The introduction of computers for data processing and data communications in the 1990s is also a big step forward with broad implications in the areas of C4I (C3I plus computers) and logistics for the Tatmadaw. In addition to imports of armaments, there have also been attempts to develop a new generation of light weapons, vehicles, and naval craft locally. Moreover, production of all types of mortar bombs, rifle grenades, hand grenades, and small-arms ammunition has, in all likelihood, been stepped up. Similarly new variants of military trucks, four-wheel-drive utility vehicles, and light armored vehicles have also entered service after 1988.

Thus Myanmar's modernization drive appears to have equipped the armed forces to undertake operations that require higher capabilities than the traditional

COIN warfare. Together with the reorganization of the armed forces command structure and expansion of operational units, this modernization indicates a hitherto unparalleled effort during the last dozen years to make up for lost time in enhancing Myanmar's military capability with positive implications for a higher degree of military professionalism.

WHITHER TATMADAW?

Though the terms "professionalism" and "professionalization" cannot be found in the vocabulary of the Tatmadaw leaders, there is no doubt they are recognized as a necessary underpinning of the armed forces. Apparently, military professionalism alone is regarded as insufficient to allow the Tatmadaw to carry out its principal duties of safeguarding the Myanmar state and serving the interests of Myanmar citizens. Instead, today's Tatmadaw leaders seem to believe that the three principal "national causes" require fashioning a new political order in line with their own interpretation of Myanmar's historical experiences in nation building. Hence a political configuration that would institutionalize the military's role in "national politics" as a solution to the problem of dysfunctional "party politics" is earnestly being sought.

The military dimension of the Tatmadaw's nation-building duties has been strengthened through organizational changes, expansion of the order of battle, and force modernization with corresponding doctrinal orientation toward transforming a battle-tested, infantry-heavy COIN outfit to a modern military machine capable of conducting conventional warfare (supplemented by a people's war strategy). There is an indication of a siege mentality precipitated by the West's strident championing of "democracy and human rights" and its interventionist stance exemplified by the coalition strategy in the Desert Storm campaign.[39] To Myanmar's military leaders, the expansion of the armed forces and acquisition of weapons and equipment were "long overdue, and simply reflected the normal maturation and development of a defense force."[40]

Given these efforts to build a modern armed force, there arises the question of how effective these measures are in terms of capability. According to Andrew Selth, there are still problems and constraints regarding organization and management, logistics, training, technology transfer and support, and operational doctrine—which means that recent "additions to order of battle do not automatically translate into improvements in military capabilities."[41] All in all, though Myanmar's armed forces still lack the capability for "power projection" beyond its borders, there is no doubt the military has emerged from the strictures of

COIN force structure and its capacities are improving steadily with time. Whether Myanmar can build a strong and capable Tatmadaw with a high degree of military professionalism depends not only on the country's ability to achieve sustained economic growth but also on the absorption capacity of the military itself as well as the willingness of suppliers to cater for its needs. The fact that the military's human resources are stretched by its active pursuit of a significant role in governance and the management of Myanmar's socioeconomic and political affairs means that it will continue to play a dual role long after its counterparts in Indonesia have abandoned *dwifungsi* and moved toward Western-style military professionalism.

ENDNOTES

1 The oath of allegiance recited daily by Tatmadaw personnel; see Nawrahta, *Destiny of the Nation* (Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1995), p. 7.

2 S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1988), p. 20.

3 The "new professionalism" emphasizes internal security, a politicized military, and unrestricted scope of military role expansion as opposed to the external security, political neutrality, and restricted scope under civilian control that feature prominently in the "old professionalism." See Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Amos Perlmutter and V.P. Bennett, eds., *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 283.

4 See, for example, Jun Honna, *Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition: A Comparative Perspective on Indonesia's Dual Function and Latin American National Security Doctrines*, Discussion Paper 22, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (Canberra: ANU, 1999), pp. 3–5.

5 See, for example, Dorothy H. Guyot, "The Burmese Independence Army: A Political Movement in Military Garb," in Josef Silverstein, ed., *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), pp. 51–65. For the military's own perception see Ba Than, *The Roots of Revolution: A Brief History of the Defence Services of the Union of Burma and the Ideals for Which They Stand* (Yangon: Director of Information, 1962). As such, the role expansion of the Myanmar military followed an evolutionary path that differed from the pattern exhibited by Latin American military institutions considered by Stepan. Like the Indonesian military, the Tatmadaw's "political commitment is not primarily derived from professional concern" (Honna, Military Doctrines, p. 10).

6 The three occasions were in 1958 (caretaker government from October 1958 to April 1960), in 1962 (Revolutionary Council from March 1962 to March 1974), and in 1988 (SLORC from September 1988 to November 1997 and SPDC thereafter).

7 The starting point for marking the anniversary of the Tatmadaw is designated as 27 March 1945 when the Myanmar armed forces officially launched the antifascist uprising against the Japanese (Nawrahta, *Destiny of the Nation*, p. 6).

8 For accounts of the civil war see Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Books, 1991), pp. 44–54, 71–87, 106–122, 125–154. For the official view see the following Government of Burma publications: *Burma and the Insurrections* (Yangon: Ministry of Information, 1949); KNDO Insurrection (Yangon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1949); *Is It a People's Liberation? A Short Survey of Communist Insurrection in Burma* (Yangon: Ministry of Information, 1952). See also Maung Maung, *Grim War Against KMT* (Yangon: n.p., 1953).

9 Finer, *Man on Horseback*, p. 20.

10 Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Burma* (London: C. Hurst, 1987), p. 13.

11 Richard Butwell, "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma," in Robert K. Sakai, ed., *Studies in Asia* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 75.

12 Taylor, *State in Burma*, p. 15.

13 Ministry of Defense, *The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services*, 3rd ed. (Yangon: Ministry of Defense, 1960), pp. 4–6.

14 Ibid., pp. 13–14, 18, 40.

15 Robert H. Taylor, "Burmese Concepts of Revolution," in Mark Hobart and Robert H. Taylor, eds., *Context, Meaning, and Power in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1986), pp. 79–92.

16 Important executive positions in the party were dominated by ex-military personnel. Senior staff officers, directors of support services, regional military commanders, and selected unit commanders were Pyithu Hluttaw representatives. A high proportion of military representation could be found in the central organs of state power as well as in significant positions within the hierarchy of (elected) administrative bodies. It was common practice to appoint senior military officers as top officials in the ministries, state organizations, and the police, a practice that was widely replicated down the line for junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Active and retired military personnel maintained an extensive network in the party and state superstructure. See, for example, Taylor, *State in Burma*, pp. 316–321.

17 Lt. Col. Hla Min, *Political Situation of Myanmar and Its Role in the Region*, 17th ed. (Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 58–59.

18 Col. Thein Swe, "Human Resources Development in Nation Building: The Role of the Armed Forces," in *Human Resources Development and Nation Building in Myanmar* (Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 63.

19 Ibid., pp. 67–69.

20 Speech on 2 September 1994 by Chief Justice U Aung Toe at the National Convention; see *New Light of Myanmar*, 3 September 1994.

21 Hla Min, *Political Situation*, pp. 58–59.

22 Tatmadaw Thar Thutaythi Tit Oo, *1948 Khu Hnit Mha 1988 Khu Hnit Atwin Hpyat Than Llar Thaw Myanma Thamaing Ahkyin Hnint Tatmadaw Ghanda* (Brief History of Myanmar and the Role of the Tatmadaw Between 1948 and 1988), vol. 2 (Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1990), pp. 259–262.

23 Defense Services Historical Museum and Archives, *Tatmadaw Thamaing* (History of the Armed Forces), vol. 4: 1948–1962 (Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1996), pp. 110–111, 187.

24 See *Working People's Daily*, 11 May 1989. The regional commanders were given two-star rank, while those commanding the light infantry divisions and regional naval headquarters were upgraded to brigadier (one-star) rank.

25 See Defense Services Historical Museum and Archives, *Tatmadaw Thamaing* (History of the Armed Forces), vol. 5: 1962–1974 and vol. 6: 1974–1988 (Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1997–1998); Maung Aung Myoe, "Building the Tatmadaw: The Organisational Development of the Armed

Forces in Myanmar, 1948–98," SDSC Working Paper 327 (Canberra: ANU, 1998); and Mya Win, *Tatmadaw Gaungzaung Myar Thamaing Ahkyin* (Brief History of Armed Forces Leaders) (Yangon: News and Periodicals Enterprise, 1992). Since 1988 the number of general officers (brigadier and above) has also increased from less than 20 to around 100.

26 Maung Aung Myoe, "Building the Tatmadaw," pp. 30–31.

27 Ibid., pp. 28, 56; Ministry of Defense, "Vol. 5," pp. 289–290; Ministry of Defense, "Vol. 6," pp. 302–305, 323.

28 See, for example, Moshe Lissak, *Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), p. 156; and see Maung Aung Myoe, "Building the Tatmadaw," pp. 18–19.

29 Most of the first-generation commanders of the Tatmadaw underwent training in the Japanese-run military schools in Myanmar. A group of nationalist officers were sent to the Japanese military academy in Tokyo and became senior commanders in the army and air force after independence. Four batches of officers went to the Mingladon Officer Cadet School manned mainly by Japanese instructors.

30 Personal communications in Yangon (December 1999).

31 Maung Aung Myoe, "Building the Tatmadaw," pp. 16–17.

32 For example, it was reported that 60 officers were sent to foreign countries between 1974 and 1988 for naval training. See Ministry of Defense, "Vol. 6," p. 308.

33 Of course, there ought to be a link between "the structural side of the military postures" and pronouncements in the form of "the operational and strategic art and planning of warfare together with its precondition: the related threat scenarios." See Peer Helmar Lange, "Understanding Military Doctrine," in Laszlo Valki, ed., *Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 2. This link is apparently missing in Myanmar.

34 Maung Aung Myoe, "Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar: A Historical Perspective," SDSC Working Paper 39 (Canberra: ANU, 1999), pp. 15–16.

35 Andrew Selth, *Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, no. 113 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1996), pp. 14–15.

36 Robert H. Taylor, "Burma: Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception," in Chin Kin Wah, ed., *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 252, 266, 277.

37 See, for example, the report by Yindee Lercharoenchok in *Nation*, 27 November 1990; see also Bertil Lintner's report in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 3 December 1994, p. 1.

38 Sources used for this assessment are: Desmond Ball, *Burma's Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from 1941 to Cyber Warfare* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998); Selth, *Transforming the Tatmadaw*; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1999–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and *Tatmadaw Lay Golden Anniversary Commemorative Annual Magazine* (Yangon), December 1997, pp. 30–43.

39 Selth, *Transforming the Tatmadaw*, pp. 136–141.

40 Ibid., p. 143.

41 Ibid., p. 153.

12

Military Professionalism in Asia: Ascendance of the Old Professionalism

Muthiah Alagappa

This concluding chapter advances three propositions. First, military professionalism as defined by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz is on the rise in Asia.[1] Of the 10 countries investigated in this study, military professionalism in independent India and post–World War II Japan has continuously approximated Huntington's model. In South Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser degree in Thailand and Indonesia, military professionalism is being redefined and cultivated along Huntingtonian lines. Military professionalism in China, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Burma continues to exhibit features of the "new professionalism" as defined by Alfred Stepan.[2] Even in these countries, especially in China, the emphasis increasingly is on the management of violence and the military is becoming a distinct institution with its own identity, values, and standards.

My second proposition is that the rise of the old professionalism is explained by the change in the distribution of power against the armed forces, which compels and facilitates the development of a professional and apolitical military. The growth of widely accepted political systems and institutions for the acquisition and exercise of state power, as well as sustained economic growth and dramatic changes in the post-Cold War international material and normative structure, collectively have reduced the role of coercion in governance and tilted the distribution of power against the military, subjecting it to greater regulation by civilian authority. The role of Asian militaries is being redefined. Increasingly they are confined to the management of violence function under civilian direction.

My third proposition is that the military's apolitical orientation is not a consequence of the development of military professionalism, as posited by Huntington, but an outcome of change in the distribution of power in favor of the democratically elected civilian political leadership. Such change and the crisis it precipitates typically lead to the military's exit from politics and the limitation of its role to the security arena under civilian direction. Once the apolitical ethos is codified as a crucial aspect of military professionalism, however, the development of professionalism reinforces the military's apolitical orientation.

But military professionalism is not the key variable that initiates the apolitical ethos. The rest of this chapter elaborates these three propositions.

RISE OF THE OLD PROFESSIONALISM

The growing prominence of the old professionalism in Asia is best illustrated through the changes that have been occurring in the three characteristics of military professionalism: expertise, corporateness, and social responsibility.

Expertise

Though always important, the management of violence is now the central focus of most Asian militaries. This is evident from the role redefinition of several militaries that has elevated their deterrence and combat roles and downgraded the nonmilitary roles—leading in some cases to total disengagement from the latter roles, to the creation of a separate force to undertake the law and order function, to changes in military doctrine and strategy, and to the reorganization and retraining measures that have been instituted to upgrade the combat effectiveness of military personnel.

In India and Japan, the role of the military and the education and training of the military officer have always emphasized the management of violence. Since independence, the Indian armed forces have been continuously engaged in external defense of the country against threats from Pakistan and China as well as dealing with internal insurgencies in Punjab, Kashmir, and northeastern India. The Indian armed forces have also participated in several UN peacekeeping missions and undertaken a major peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka. Although the "aid to civil power" role of the Indian military has been on the upsurge in the last couple of decades, it has not led to political involvement or the assumption of socioeconomic developmental roles by the military except on an ad hoc basis to help civilian authorities cope with natural disasters and like developments. In Japan, the combat role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has been constrained by the peace constitution, which renounces war and the right of state belligerency, and the accompanying interpretation that Japan has only the right of self-defense. The primary role of the JSDF, established in 1954, is to ensure the defense of Japan in the context of the U.S.–Japan security treaty. With the emergence of Japan as the world's second-largest economy and in the context of a changing international security environment, the JSDF is beginning to assume greater responsibility for the defense of Japan and to play a larger role in maintaining peace and security in the Asia Pacific.

These roles have accentuated the JSDF's management of violence function. Beginning in 1992, the JSDF too has participated in UN peacekeeping operations. To carry out this role effectively, it has begun to develop expertise in international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations as well as domestic relief in times of natural disasters. Like its Indian counterpart, the JSDF has no political or socioeconomic role. But unlike the Indian armed forces, it also has no aid to civil power role. The defense doctrines and strategies of the Indian and Japanese armed forces as well as their organization and rigorous training regimens are all geared primarily to develop the management of violence expertise of the officer corps. Their organization and training are influenced in part (much more in the case of Japan than India) by their international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief roles as well, leading to a broadening of the military officer's expertise.

In South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, external defense has become the military's primary function. In these countries the military has disengaged or is in the process of disengaging from its political and other non-security roles. The basic role of the South Korean armed forces is to safeguard the state from the threat posed by North Korea. It no longer has political and internal security responsibilities. Although it may contribute indirectly to economic growth through human resource and defense science and technology development, it has no explicit economic responsibility. Under Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, the ROK armed forces have embarked on an ambitious restructuring program with the goal of transforming itself into a small, modern, high-tech military institution equipped with advanced weapon systems. The already comprehensive and rigorous military education and training system is being developed further to enhance the technological as well as the joint and combined combat capabilities of military officers.

In Taiwan, too, the primary role of the military is now external defense. Active-duty military officers can no longer hold political office, and political parties have been barred from operating within the military. With the dissolution of the Taiwan Garrison Command in 1992, the military's penetration and socialization role in society has ended. Internal security is now the responsibility of the police force, which has become a separate institution. With regard to the issue of commercial enterprises, including the media owned by the military, a gradual process is under way to divest them. The emphasis now is on upgrading the combat capability of the Republic of China (ROC) armed forces—which, because of the focus on internal control during the Kuomintang (KMT) era as well as the difficulty of acquiring military hardware and the lack of combat experience and

adequate training, was neglected during the martial law era.[3] The primary concern since 1988 has been to make the ROC armed forces a credible force to deter the People's Republic of China (PRC) threat and, if deterrence fails, to defend Taiwan. In the context of this reorientation, the management of violence has become the central focus and primary criterion for career advancement of the military officer.

A similar role redefinition is occurring in Thailand but more gradually. The Thai military has begun to focus on the external defense function, but it still plays an informal political role and has a formal (constitution-sanctioned) developmental role as well. Substantial progress has been made in removing the military from the formal structures of political domination. The new constitution promulgated in 1997 bars active-duty military officers from holding cabinet positions and from becoming members of the senate. Military personnel wishing to participate in politics now must retire from active service. While supporting the passage of the new constitution, however, the military also worked hard to exclude a clause that would have made military coups illegal. The military is still an important political player behind the scenes. Similarly, although military jurisdiction in making foreign policy and security policy has become more circumscribed, it still plays a key role—for example, the military is still the lead institution in relations with Burma, Cambodia, and Laos. But despite its informal power and role, the military has come to accept that its domination of politics is now an anachronism in Thailand and that it must operate within a democratic framework.

In the economic arena, Thailand's new constitution confers a developmental role on the military. But unlike earlier eras when the military undertook major economic development projects, the new role is limited to such issues as protecting the environment and natural resources, countering drug trafficking, and providing disaster relief. With democratization and the termination of communist insurgency, the military's internal security role has undergone substantial change. Maintaining law and order, including riot control, is now the responsibility of the police force. The Capital Peacekeeping Command, a key military organization for security in Bangkok since 1976, has been abolished. Today the military's primary role is external defense—although with the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the termination of the Cold War, there is no real external threat to Thailand. Nevertheless, the military has embarked on a major modernization program to replace old equipment and upgrade its conventional capability. The financial crisis that engulfed Thailand in 1997 and revelation of corruption in military procurement have slowed the modernization program, but the goal of upgrading the military's combat capability remains.

Indonesia is still in an early stage of redefining the military's role. Following the ouster of President Suharto in May 1998, there was widespread consensus in the political and civil societies that the military's sociopolitical role should be terminated in favor of external defense. Even the military, then very much on the defensive, came around to this point of view. Several previously unthinkable steps have been undertaken to dislodge the military from its dominant political position. Active-duty military officers have been barred from holding political and administrative positions in government. The military's allotted seats in parliament have been reduced from 75 to 38—and this allocation will end by the next election (scheduled for 2004). However, its representatives in the *Majlis Perwakilan Rakyat* (MPR) will continue until 2008. The military's role in internal security has been reduced as well. Internal security is now the responsibility of the police force, which has been removed from the military chain of command. In practice, however, the police force has been unable to deal with internal security—especially in places like Ambon, Maluku, Aceh, Kalimantan, and West Papua. Civilian authorities have little control in these areas, and the military continues to be the key force in dealing with such situations.

Little progress has been made in divesting the military's commercial enterprises and reorienting the military toward external defense. The latter function has not made much headway due to the absence of clear political and strategic direction, the military's continued involvement in internal security, and a shortage of funds. The military is still on the defensive. But with the support of nationalist political parties like Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Perjuangan), which fear the disintegration of Indonesia, the military's conservative elements have begun to regroup and resist presidential control and direction on certain issues including the management of internal security and military promotions and appointments. This does not imply that the military's role redefinition has been reversed or even halted. It is highly unlikely that its sociopolitical role can be reinstituted. There is still considerable support for terminating that role and reorienting the military to the external defense function. Realizing this goal, however, means overcoming several formidable challenges.

The militaries in China and Vietnam are still committed to multiple roles including ensuring the security of their respective regimes, maintaining law and order, and contributing to economic development. Nevertheless the security role—especially the external defense function—of these militaries is becoming more prominent. Certainly this is the case in the PRC. After a slow start in the 1980s, the role reorientation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has moved

ahead rather swiftly in the 1990s. The PLA is in the process of divesting its commercial ventures and has no substantive socioeconomic role other than undertaking relief work in the context of natural disasters—floods, earthquakes, forest fires. Although it still has a domestic role in defending the dominant political position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in the party leadership succession, especially when the process is characterized by factional struggle, this role has not featured prominently in the last decade. The PLA continues to have an internal security role, as well, but as an institution of last resort. The People's Armed Police is now responsible for the law and order function, and the garrison forces provide the immediate backup. The main forces are earmarked for external defense of the country, which has become the primary role of the PLA.

The PLA's overriding goal since the early 1990s has been to prepare to fight and win a high-technology war with a powerful enemy in the early decades of the twenty-first century. In pursuit of this goal, the PLA has developed a new doctrine, is modernizing its nuclear and conventional force structure, is actively acquiring high technology, and is developing a highly educated and trained officer corps. The new doctrine adopted in 1993 is a radical departure from the earlier notion of "fighting a people's war under modern conditions." The new doctrine stresses active defense—including forward defense to engage the enemy as far forward as possible to minimize the damage to Chinese people and territory—and entails the development of defensive and offensive capabilities against a technologically sophisticated enemy. Modernization, especially the acquisition of advanced hardware and software, has become the catchword of the PLA. As part of the modernization program, military training and education have been substantially reformed and promotion to senior ranks is now linked to educational qualifications. More than 90 percent of the officer corps have tertiary education, about 20,000 officers hold a master's degree, and over 4,000 hold doctoral degrees. The PLA has also reorganized substantially. Its headquarters has been revamped, and far-reaching structural reforms have been instituted in all four services. Moreover, a substantial downsizing program is under way. The thrust of all these efforts is to develop a highly professional and capable military that can defend the PRC as well as promote its foreign policy objectives. Insofar as the expertise of the military officer is concerned, the focus is on upgrading the management of violence skill to enable the military to fight and win a high-tech war.

Modernization with a view to upgrading its deterrent and combat capability is a high priority for the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA), as well. But unlike the PLA, the VPA continues to be committed to all of its multiple roles. Renewed emphasis was accorded in the 1990s to the internal security role (which includes

protecting the socialist regime from the threat of peaceful evolution) and the economic construction role. The VPA's definition of military professionalism includes mastery of the traditional military art (tactics of people's warfare), political-ideological indoctrination, and modernization (becoming a modern army with an emphasis on external defense). The VPA has designated forces to undertake the local defense and economic construction roles. The primary task of the main force is mobile warfare. Here it is pertinent to observe that the VPA has been almost continually at war since its founding in 1946—first against the French, then against the Americans, and in the 1980s against the Chinese and Thais.

Liberation from colonial rule, unification of South and North Vietnam, protection of the unified country from external threat, promotion of the foreign policy objectives of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)—these have been the primary tasks of the VPA. The management of violence has been central to all these tasks. In fact, there has been a continuous effort to upgrade this skill. In the 1990s this has taken the form of upgrading the VPA's technological capability, acquiring selected new advanced weapon systems, and studying the consequences of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). Concurrently, there has been a reform of military education and training including a restructuring of the army's educational institutions and defense curriculum. The new system—comprising an officer candidate school to train young officers, service institutes to provide special-to-arm or service training, and a National Defense Academy for training high-level military officers combined with the requirement that all officers must now acquire tertiary qualification—is indicative of the comprehensive and continuous education that is deemed necessary to make the military officer competent in his profession. Modernization and standardization are key goals of the VPA, though progress in modernization has been hampered by limited funds.

Unlike the other militaries discussed here, the Pakistani and Burmese armed forces control the political helm. The Pakistani military claims that external defense is its primary function. In practice, however, its mission has been defined broadly to include internal security and development. The wide-ranging roles of the Pakistani military stem from the broad definition of national security that it has invoked to justify its usurpation of political power. A broad definition of national security—and a claim that only the military can guarantee the continued survival of the nation-state—have also been deployed by the Burmese military to legitimize its total domination of the state and justify its political, administrative, economic, internal security, foreign policy, and external defense roles. Military professionalism as practiced in Pakistan and Burma closely approximates the "new professionalism" defined by Stepan. This does not mean

that the management of violence is unimportant to these militaries. In fact this skill is highly regarded, especially in the Pakistani military, which has continuously perceived an acute threat from neighboring India. Pakistan allocates a relatively high percentage of its GNP for defense, is continuing to acquire advanced weapon systems, is developing indigenous nuclear and missile capabilities at great cost, and has a comprehensive education and training program for its officers—all aimed at boosting its deterrent and combat capability vis-à-vis India. Despite claims to the contrary, however, external defense is not the sole or even the primary goal of the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military and, to an even greater extent, the Burmese military have become deeply involved in the political governance and administration of their respective countries. It appears highly unlikely that these two militaries will revert anytime soon to a purely defense function.

Except for Pakistan and Burma, defense against external threats has become the primary role of Asia's militaries. This is evident from their modernization and reorganization plans, the military capabilities being developed, and the ongoing reforms of the military education and training systems. There is little doubt that the primary focus of the military officer's education and training is the direction, operation, and control of human organizations whose primary function is the application of violence. As advances in technology have made deterrence and combat much more complicated, many Asian militaries, deeply sensitive to the consequences of U.S. technological superiority and the ease with which Iraq was vanquished, are making a systematic and concerted effort to upgrade the military-technological expertise of their officers and men. The revolution in military affairs—and their weakness in this regard—have further accentuated the effort of countries like China and India to upgrade their technological capability and training. The management of violence function of Asian militaries, however, is not limited to the international arena. The Indian, Thai, Indonesian, Chinese, and Vietnamese armed forces all have internal security responsibilities that require the application of violence. This is a departure from Huntington's formulation. But as I argued in Chapter 1, it is not the domain but the jurisdiction that matters. There is no logical reason to exclude the application of violence from the domestic arena. The key is that internal deployment of the military must be under the control of legitimate civilian authority. And this is increasingly the case in Asia.

Corporateness

The growing prominence of the external defense function and the increasing complexity of war and the management of violence skill are making Asian militaries

more specialized and more distinct. The increasing distinctiveness of Asian militaries can also be traced to the growing unity, cohesiveness, and esprit de corps of the armed forces, the decline in military domination of politics (and corresponding rise in civilian control of the military), and the increasing complexity and differentiation of state and society brought about largely by sustained economic growth. Collectively these developments have created a more distinctive institution with highly specialized skills—setting the military apart from the other bureaucratic institutions of the state and from political and civil society organizations. With the decline in military domination of politics, relations among the military, the state, and society have been redefined. As well, the military's participation in governance (including political participation) and its interaction with political and civil societies are increasingly subject to formal regulation by constitutional provisions and legislation.

Under ultimate civilian jurisdiction, many Asian militaries are in the midst of constructing principles, rules, and procedures for management of military institutional matters. Formal standards of behavior and competence are being specified with the necessary mechanisms and authority to enforce them. Increasingly, entry into the officer corps hinges on satisfying certain educational requirements. Career advancement is contingent on meeting established standards of knowledge, training, and experience—often through the satisfaction of specified periods of service in rank, success in promotion examinations, and selection by duly constituted boards. Terms of service including retirement are formally specified. Bureaucratic institutions, rules, and procedures are replacing political and personal influence in the management of military institutional affairs.

Although many Asian militaries are moving in the direction suggested here, the degree of corporateness still spans a wide spectrum. All along, the Indian and Japanese militaries have had distinct roles, identities, and esprit de corps that set them apart from the other institutions of the state as well as from political and civil societies. For reasons outlined in the respective chapters, members of both militaries are conscious of their membership in a distinct entity. Constitutional provisions and specific legislation—as well as customs that forbid political involvement and nurture an apolitical tradition—have strictly regulated the military's role in governance and interaction with society. Operating under ultimate civilian jurisdiction, these two militaries have considerable autonomy in the management of institutional matters—although in the Indian case the highly intrusive micromanagement by the civilian bureaucracy has produced civil-military friction. Codes of behavior, military jurisprudence, and terms of service,

including enlistment, career advancement, and termination, are all spelled out and applied uniformly across the armed forces.

Movement of the South Korean and Taiwanese militaries in this direction is more recent. Nevertheless, they appear to have made substantial headway in developing distinctive identities. The KMT/military nexus in Taiwan has been severed. The loyalty of the ROC armed forces is now directed to the democratic state, and it functions under the control of the government in power. Military interaction with the new democratic state and society in Taiwan and South Korea is now regulated through constitutional provisions and legislation. And although still not devoid of political interference and factional considerations, especially in South Korea, both militaries have substantial autonomy in managing institutional matters within the powers delegated by civilian authority.

Following their respective revolutions in 1932 and 1945–1949, the militaries in Thailand and Indonesia, through a series of purges and reforms that eliminated rival personalities and factions, were eventually transformed from faction-ridden, ragtag organizations into unified and cohesive armed forces. Their self-perceived roles in guarding the unity and integrity of their respective countries—combined with the prestige and socioeconomic benefits that accrued to service personnel from the military's dominant political position—contributed to a strong sense among its members of belonging to an elite institution with special responsibility to the nation. A strong corporate identity was forged by the Thai and even more so by the Indonesian armed forces. The concern in regard to both these countries, therefore, is not the development of corporate consciousness and identity but the construction of a democratic pattern of relationship among the military, the state, and society, the reduction and eventual termination of the military's sense of ownership of the state and its entitlement to special privileges, as well as the development of structures, rules, and procedures for managing the affairs of the armed forces in an impersonal manner under ultimate civilian jurisdiction.

Although the Thai military still has informal political power, substantial headway has been made in the formal exclusion of the Thai military from politics and in the regulation of its interaction with the political and administrative institutions of the state, as well as with society. Several measures have been taken to promote democratic civilian control of the military at the highest levels and to regulate military institutional matters. The appointment of a civilian defense minister, integration of the armed forces through a unified command structure, alteration in the basis for promotion from entitlement to institutional need and merit, reduction in the number of generals in the armed forces, and

institution of parliamentary and civilian bureaucratic oversight of military budget and arms procurement are among the measures that have been taken. Though not always successful, such measures indicate the direction in which the control and management of the Thai armed forces are likely to proceed.

Less headway has been made in Indonesia. The deep military entrenchment in all levels of government during the Suharto era, the weakness of democratic civilian authority, and the deteriorating internal security situation have made the separation of the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI) from state and society—and the termination of its claim on the state—much more difficult. Moreover, the lack of clear political direction, the reemergence of conservative leadership within the military, the continued involvement of the military in managing internal security, the breakdown in the military chain of command (combined with the inability or unwillingness of the military hierarchy to exercise control over ground troops), insufficient military budget, and low morale have all inhibited military reform and stalled even the limited measures that have been initiated to put the management of the TNI on a more professional footing.

In China and, to a lesser degree, in Vietnam the military, though still under the control of the communist party, is emerging as a distinct institution. The idiosyncratic and ideological foundations that underscored party/military relations in China have become diluted or irrelevant. With the passing of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, exercise of civilian authority over the military is increasingly contingent on the positions held in the party or the state and the material rewards that the leaders can dispense. On the ideological front, the several challenges to Marxism-Leninism have undermined a key basis for PLA subordination to the CCP. Nationalism and instrumental considerations (mutual survival), not moral and intellectual considerations, now inform military subordination to party, which has become much more conditional.[4] Civilian leaders can no longer take the military's subordination and political support for granted. They now have to build support within the military as well as cater to its needs while simultaneously seeking to control it. Concurrently the military's profile in high-level party committees has declined—presently it has no representation in the Politburo Standing Committee. Further, present-day military leaders do not have the stature or political skills to dominate the party. Contemporary Chinese political and military leaders have become more specialized in their vocation. Party/military interaction has become more institutionalized and bureaucratic; today the military makes its input through committees. The net consequence of these developments is that the military is emerging as a distinct institution quite separate from the party.

The PLA's primary focus is now on modernization and regularization. The modernization program seeks to upgrade the deterrent and combat capabilities of the PLA and elevate the management of violence skill of PLA officers and men. Regularization measures are targeted at developing institutions and procedures for developing and enforcing standards of behavior and competence throughout the PLA.

In Vietnam, party and military still have a symbiotic relationship. The VCP has been relatively more successful than the CCP in renewing its ideological legitimacy, and the VPA has rallied behind the party to perpetuate one-party rule. Unlike the PLA, the VPA's political profile in the 1990s became more prominent with military leaders holding key positions in the VCP. Moreover, political education (ideological indoctrination) that stresses the importance of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in countering the "threat of peaceful evolution" is still an important component of military education and training in Vietnam. While the foregoing developments sustain the VPA's political orientation and make for a close party/military relationship, the modernization and standardization goals are pulling the VPA in the direction of a more professional force. Earlier we noted the modernization aspects and their consequences. Insofar as standardization is concerned, the VPA is introducing common standards and practices throughout Vietnam. It is drawing up and enforcing uniform regulations for room and board, daily routine, dress code, discipline, military protocol, troop management, and training programs. In December 1999, the National Assembly adopted a new law on VPA officers. The measure specifies the education requirements for officer recruitment and the conditions for promotion including age, time in grade, and further education and training. There is now a clear career path. Officers who fail to meet the criteria for promotion within a specified time frame will be retired. This is a significant development in the professionalization of the VPA.

The Pakistani and Burmese militaries—for reasons not far different from those that apply to the Thai and Indonesian militaries—have developed into unified and cohesive institutions with a strong corporate identity. Military personnel are conscious they belong to an elite institution that dominates the state or has a dominant position in the politics of the country. Membership in the armed forces confers special privileges—immunity from prosecution under civilian law, access to consumer goods at reduced prices, medical benefits, and many other perks that are not available to other government servants and ordinary citizens. In this sense the military is a distinct institution. Because of its total domination of the state, however, the military has in fact become the state, especially in

Burma. Other institutions of the state barely exist, and there is no clear divide between political, administrative, and military spheres and institutions. From this perspective, the military is not distinct from other state institutions. In regard to the management of military institutional affairs, the Pakistani military has a fairly well defined set of rules and procedures that govern officer recruitment, career advancement, conduct of officers and soldiers, and so forth. From the perspective of these criteria, the Pakistani military is a professional organization.

When measured against the features of corporateness, the current picture is somewhat mixed. Nonetheless there is sufficient evidence to indicate that most Asian militaries are moving toward a more distinct and apolitical (or less political) institution that is developing standards of behavior, knowledge, and competence focused on the management of violence. The Indian, Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese militaries satisfy many of the criteria of corporateness: there is a clear distinction between civilian and military spheres; the military is a distinct apolitical institution; and military institutional matters are regulated in an impersonal manner through specified rules and procedures. The distinction between civilian and military spheres is becoming clearer in Thailand and China, as well, and, to a lesser degree, in Indonesia and Vietnam. Nonetheless, there still are substantial overlaps. The militaries in these countries still have formal (China and Vietnam) or informal (Thailand) political roles and the military in Indonesia might well reintervene in politics. Military institutional matters in all these countries but Indonesia are increasingly regulated in the Weberian mode. This is also the case in Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, in Burma. In these two countries, however, the militaries are highly political and there is no clear divide among military, political, and administrative spheres.

Responsibility

The third characteristic of military professionalism is responsibility. Huntington cites three features of responsibility: the client of the military professional is the society; the military professional performs a service—protection of state and society—that is essential to the survival and functioning of society; and a higher calling in the service of nation and country (that extends to the sacrifice of life), not material reward, informs the behavior of the military professional. Here too the current picture in Asia is mixed, but the trend appears to be in the direction outlined by Huntington.

The client of the Indian and Japanese militaries is clearly the society. Operating under the control of democratically elected governments, both militaries are highly regarded by the public and viewed as performing an essential

service in protecting the country and advancing national interests. The several wars with Pakistan and China, especially the nationally televised Kargil war in 1999, boosted the public image and prestige of the Indian armed forces. The JSDF was not always regarded highly. In fact, as a consequence of the disastrous outcome of World War II, the Japanese state and the JSDF were deeply distrusted by the Japanese society. The legitimacy of the JSDF was weak, and strong measures were instituted to keep it under "uncompromising civilian control" and severely limit its role. Over the years, the JSDF has become more legitimate. Its public image has become more positive. A substantial segment of Japanese society has begun to accept it as an essential institution. And its role, especially after the termination of the Cold War, has expanded.

Until the democratic transitions in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia, the client of the militaries in these countries was not their respective societies but specific regimes and individuals. In South Korea it was the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan; in Taiwan it was the KMT governments; in Thailand it was the military or military-led governments; in Indonesia it was the Suharto regime (of which the military was an integral part). Though the role of the ROK and ROC armed forces in external defense was valued, the two militaries were viewed by the public at large as repressive instruments of authoritarian governments whose legitimacy was increasingly challenged. In the aftermath of democratic transition and with increasing civilian control and redefinition of the military's role, the armed forces in these two countries have become national institutions with responsibility to protect the whole society, not just a segment of it. Public perception of these armed forces has turned positive and their role in defending their country from grave external threats is highly valued by society.

Public perception of the military and its role has fluctuated in Thailand. It was decidedly negative, however, in the wake of the 1992 incident when the military, seeking to regain its political dominance, opened fire on pro-democracy protesters killing 52 people with another 167 listed as missing. Similarly, public perception of the Indonesian military became increasingly negative in the 1990s when it was perceived as a tool to perpetuate the corrupt and repressive Suharto regime. Following the 1992 incident, the Thai military has, for the most part, withdrawn from politics and military officers increasingly accept that they have to be professional soldiers in a democratic country. According to a Thai Supreme Command document, the primary duty of the military now is to "protect democracy with the king as the head of state and to safeguard national independence and sovereignty." The democratic state and society are emerging as the clients

of the Thai military. But in the absence of an imminent external threat—and the military's reluctance to submit to full democratic civilian control—public perception of the military and its role is still characterized by ambivalence.

In Indonesia, an elected government is now at the political helm. Yet for reasons outlined earlier, the military's loyalty and responsibility to the state and society are still in question. The TNI leaders claim that their primary duty is to safeguard Indonesia from external threats and have pledged to obey the democratically elected government. Practice has not always matched the rhetoric, however. The military might reintervene in politics to protect its corporate interests, as well as those of its political allies, and possibly even to impose its own vision on the state and society. Public perception of the TNI and its role is sharply divided. The sectors of society that seek redress for past and present military abuses, as well as those committed to terminating the military's sociopolitical role, still view the TNI, especially its senior leadership, in a negative light. Yet others who fear the disintegration of Indonesia and view the TNI as the only institution that can hold the country together are becoming more supportive.

In China and Vietnam, the master and client of the PLA and the VPA are the CCP and VCP respectively. Both militaries have the responsibility to protect the communist systems and the hegemonic position of their respective communist parties. To the extent that the system and party are accepted by the public as legitimate and serving the public interest, the military's responsibility to uphold the party's dominant position could be interpreted as serving society. But when the party's preeminent position is challenged and the military intervenes on behalf of the party, as in China in 1989, it is difficult to argue that the military is performing an essential service for the society. It is in fact serving the interest of one specific group while suppressing the interests of others. The military then becomes a partisan force. The image of the PLA was substantially tarred as a consequence of its role in suppressing the Tiananmen pro-democracy protests. Through a decade of participation in disaster relief work, especially during the massive floods of 1998, the positive image of the PLA has been restored although its rampant corruption and special privileges are resented in society. On balance the PLA is considered essential for maintaining sociopolitical order and protecting the unity and integrity of China.

In Pakistan and Burma, the militaries act to uphold their dominant position in the state and society and to preserve their special prerogatives. Although the Pakistani military is viewed by some sections of society as vital to the security of Pakistan and for maintaining domestic stability and order, there is also much opposition to its continued domination of politics. While the Pakistani military

may legitimately claim, at least in part, that it is serving the public interest, the Burmese military can make no such assertion. It terrorizes the very people it claims to protect. The society is the victim, not the client, of the military. The sole purpose of the military is to perpetuate its hold on power.

On the count of professional calling, Asian militaries score less well. A desire to serve the nation was indeed a significant factor in the choice of a military career during the anticolonial struggle and early postindependence eras. In time, however, other considerations—including the opportunity for upward social mobility and job stability and a chance for senior leaders to enrich themselves through legal and illegal means—became key factors. Corruption, smuggling, drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, and like activities are endemic in many Asian militaries. Military procurement is beset by corruption in several countries. The South Korean, Taiwanese, Thai, Chinese, and Vietnamese militaries are all making efforts to curb such activities. They have developed codes of ethics, instituted transparency and accountability measures, attempted to divest the business enterprises of their militaries, and dealt harshly with officers who have abused their power. The outcomes have been mixed. The Indian and especially the Japanese militaries appear to be relatively free of corruption. A military career is becoming less attractive in several countries—due in part to poor compensation and high casualty rates among young officers as well as the increasing availability of more lucrative jobs in the growing private sector. Japan is an exception. Because of the JSDF's lifelong employment system and poor job prospects in other sectors, a military career is becoming more attractive in Japan. The increasing prominence of material considerations and the declining attractiveness of a military career are not limited to Asia but represent part of a more widespread phenomenon.

In summary, then, one can see that the rise of the old professionalism in Asia is most pronounced in the matter of expertise. Indeed, a systematic effort is under way in most Asian militaries to upgrade the managerial, technological, and combat skills of military officers to enable them to carry out their external defense role effectively. Some militaries continue to be involved in the internal security role—but increasingly under the direction of civilian governments that are legitimate and accountable to their citizens. Military science is becoming a distinct branch of knowledge, the mastery of which requires prolonged education and training not only in military institutions but in civilian institutions of higher learning as well. Journals and associations concerned with military affairs are becoming more common in Asia. As for the other two characteristics, corporateness and responsibility, the current picture is mixed but the evidence indicates a trend toward the features cited by Huntington. Overall, we can say that military

professionalism in Asia is shifting from Stepan's "new professionalism" toward the "old professionalism" defined by Huntington.

EXPLAINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN ASIA

Huntington attributes the nineteenth-century rise of military professionalism in Europe and the United States to four conditions.[5] The first relates to specialization, division of labor, and the impossibility for one person to be an expert in more than one skill. Huntington contends that the development of technology, onset of industrialization, growth of population, and rise of urbanization contributed to functional specialization and division of labor. The growing complexity of war created a demand for specialists to coordinate the many arms and services that made up the large armies and navies. As it was impossible for the military officer to master the management of violence as well as the art of politics and statecraft or the use of force to maintain internal order, the function of the military professional became distinct from that of a politician or policeman. The second condition for the growth of professionalism was the rise of the nation-state, which created the need for a permanent military organization and the resources to fund it. The need arose from the competition among nation-states and the huge losses anticipated from defeat in war. Maintaining a large standing army required considerable financial resources and a highly developed bureaucracy—both of which developed along with the centralization of authority in the emerging nation-state.

The third factor underlying the rise of military professionalism in Europe and America, according to Huntington, was the rise of democratic ideals and parties. With the rise of democracy, the ideal of representation clashed with the aristocratic ideal and in time replaced it, contributing to the democratization of the officer corps. The conflicts between the two ideals also created a stalemate favorable to the development of an independent officer corps free from the influence of competing political forces. Isolated from politics, the military could develop into a professional force. The fourth and final condition for the development of military professionalism in the West was the existence of a single legitimate authority over the military forces. Positing that professionalism is difficult to achieve in a condition of internal political conflict, especially over the title to rule, Huntington argues that the development of professionalism requires the removal of party strife and political conflict from the military and the establishment of a single locus of authority. Political influence can then be

channeled through formal institutions of government. Huntington maintains that such a constitutional situation prevailed in Prussia, which he credits as having the "distinction of originating the professional officer."

A somewhat similar set of factors helps to explain the development of military professionalism in Asia, although Asia's domestic and international circumstances are substantially different from those that prevailed in nineteenth-century Europe. The development of military professionalism in Asia in the twentieth century closely paralleled the birth and evolution of the modern Asian nation-state. Weak nations and states, political competition without rules, the absence of strong, legitimate governments, politicized and faction-ridden militaries and their deployment in the internal security role, and the rise of authoritarian political systems with the military as a key if not the central pillar of government—all these elements contributed to the development of the new professionalism in several Asian countries after independence. But in time—with increasing consolidation of the nation-state, rise of democratic regimes, development of a more cohesive armed forces whose primary role was in external defense, and growing sophistication and complexity of warfare—features of the old professionalism became more prominent. Let us examine these two propositions in greater detail.

Explaining Asia's New Professionalism

Although many Asian countries have very long histories (in a number of cases they preceded the countries of Europe by hundreds if not thousands of years), their emergence as modern nation-states is relatively recent. In nine of the 10 countries investigated in this study, the formal transition to a modern nation-state occurred only in the twentieth century, mostly in the post–World War II era: Thailand in 1932, India in 1947, Pakistan in 1947, Burma in 1948, South Korea in 1948, China in 1949, Taiwan in 1949, Indonesia in 1949, and Vietnam in 1954. Only the transition in Japan dates back to the nineteenth century. In Europe the nation-state was forged over a relatively long period through a series of wars that entailed the mobilization of national resources and bureaucratic development.[6] In Asia, except for Japan, the formal transition to modern nation-state came about rather abruptly with the termination of the colonial era. At birth the Asian countries were neither cohesive nations nor modern states. In fact, given the absence of key attributes like monopoly over the use of force and compulsory jurisdiction, they belonged to the category of weak states. The construction of nation and state in Asia commenced in large part only after the emergence of Asian countries as formal sovereign entities. In many ways the nation-state formation process in Asia was the inverse of that in Europe.

Postindependence Asian leaders were confronted with several major tasks: forming nations out of the "multiethnic territorialisms" they inherited from colonial rule; building the executive, legislative, judicial, administrative, law enforcement, and military arms of the new states; restructuring and developing national economies that were almost totally dependent on the metropolitan powers; and constructing new political systems and institutions for the acquisition and exercise of state power. The nation-building and political regime construction projects created tension and conflict in most countries. Nation building generated conflicts over national identity—not only in the political heartland among groups espousing competing bases for defining and constructing the new nation but also between the *Staatsvolk* who constituted the political center and the indigenous minority communities at the periphery, which for various reasons rejected the nation-building project and demanded autonomy or separate statehood.

Conflict over national identity led to the partition of British India in 1947, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 (leading to the creation of Bangladesh), the absorption of South Vietnam by North Vietnam in 1975, and most recently the independence of East Timor from Indonesian control in 1999. The armed struggle being waged by Muslim Kashmiri movements and several insurgent groups in northeastern India, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Muslim groups in southern Thailand, the Moros in the Philippines, minority communities in Burma, the West Papua and Acehnese independence movements in Indonesia, the Tibetans (unarmed thus far) and the northwestern Muslims in China—all are informed by considerations of identity. Identity is a key element as well in the periodic religious and racial tensions in India and Malaysia, the ongoing racial and religious conflicts in Indonesia, and the tension among the different ethnic groups that make up Pakistan. National identity is also a crucial factor in the ongoing international conflicts between North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan.

Internal conflict also arose over the type of political system. Colonial rule destroyed or marginalized traditional political systems and structures, which in any case were irrelevant in the postindependence era. The normative framework and the associated institutions for the acquisition and exercise of state power in nearly all Asian countries had to be constructed anew. Here too there were competing ideologies that divided the Asian political elites during the struggle for independence and after. In many Asian countries, the democratic systems instituted upon independence were not widely accepted. Only a few among the elite were committed to democratic ideals. Several key political actors remained

outside the democratic framework and worked to undermine the system. Those who were part of the system did not always abide by its rules. Often they resorted to extraconstitutional means to secure power. Democratic systems in Asia were unstable. Frequent changes in government and an inability to perform discredited the democratic system, contributing to its eventual displacement by authoritarian and communist systems.

In several cases, groups that did not succeed to state power resorted to armed struggle to overthrow the incumbent government and redefine the ideological basis for governance and the management of the economy. National ideological competition was exacerbated by the global ideological competition during the Cold War. In the early postindependence phase, communist parties and movements in China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and Burma, with the support of the former Soviet bloc, engaged in armed struggles to capture political power from an assortment of noncommunist governments that were supported in varying degrees by the United States. The communists were successful in China in 1949, in North Vietnam in 1954, and later in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975. The other communist struggles gradually lost momentum and were eventually terminated. This, however, was not the end of the ideological struggle. A second round of ideological contestation began in the 1970s when groups demanding greater political participation and democratization challenged authoritarian and communist governments.

Shifting to the international domain, the nascent Asian states—China, Taiwan, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia—were also subject in varying intensities to external threats to their survival. Such threats were exacerbated in several cases by the Cold War overlay, especially in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The emergence of sovereign states also introduced a competitive dimension to international politics in Asia. But because of the Cold War overlay and the limited resources available to the newly independent states, this competition did not become indigenous and intense until the 1980s.

The key point to note here is that in the early postindependence era many Asian countries did not have strong, legitimate governments and were confronted with acute internal challenges and threats—and in some cases by severe external threats as well. This had three major consequences. First, there was no single locus of authority. Competition without rules among the various groups vying for state power made for political instability. Seeking to enhance their power and entrench themselves in office, incumbents frequently drew the military into the political arena. Second, the armed forces in most countries were not cohesive,

disciplined institutions that were well trained and equipped. Most Asian armed forces were created out of the diverse guerrilla forces that took part in the anti-colonial struggle. Nearly all of them were faction-ridden, tied to various political parties or groups, or had political agendas of their own. Their training, organization, and equipment were mostly geared for the internal security role. Their strategy for dealing with external threats was often rooted in the unconventional doctrines of people's war and territorial defense.

And third, the demands of internal and international security and the need to maintain the loyalty of the armed forces resulted in a disproportionate allocation of the state's limited revenues to the military. Combined with the lack of legitimate political authority, the military's rapid buildup and its growing internal political and security roles altered the distribution of power in favor of the military—leading to the emergence of military regimes in Thailand, Pakistan, Burma, and South Korea as well as military-backed authoritarian regimes in Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The militaries in these countries took on political, developmental, and security roles that required the military officer to develop broad-based expertise. Developing strong corporate consciousness and identity, the military's primary responsibility in these countries was to ensure its privileged position in the state and society and protect the incumbent regime. Often the military was a partisan force serving the interests of one segment of society at the expense of others. For the most part, military professionalism in Thailand from 1932 through 1992, the Philippines from 1972 to 1986, in South Korea from 1961 through 1987, in Taiwan from 1949 until 1988, and Indonesia from the mid-1950s through 1998 displayed the characteristics of the new professionalism. In Pakistan and Burma, this has continued to be the case from the late 1950s through to the present time.

In China and Vietnam, the political legitimacy of the civilian leadership was not at issue. The leadership of the CCP and the VCP that successfully prosecuted the wars of national liberation enjoyed enormous moral authority. As the party and state machinery in China and North Vietnam were relatively weak at the outset, the more developed militaries, especially the PLA, controlled local government in large parts of China and both militaries undertook political, civil, and socioeconomic functions. But because the PLA and the VPA were creations of their respective communist parties—and given the firm belief in the principle of central party control by the dual-role elite that dominated the military hierarchy—the military in China and Vietnam remained subordinate to the party. And the CCP and the VCP quickly developed the capacity and mechanisms for administering their respective countries.

Despite the presence of a single locus of authority and more cohesive armed forces, military professionalism in these two countries belonged to the category of the new professionalism. The reasons for this are rooted in the nature of the communist political system and the roles of the PLA and the VPA. The norm in the communist state is not an apolitical military but a distinctly political institution that is committed to protecting the communist state and upholding the supreme position of the party. As observed earlier, the PLA and the VPA had a symbiotic relationship with their respective communist parties: they were loyal to them and controlled by them. The PLA had political and internal security roles as witnessed during the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen incident. The PLA and the VPA were both deeply involved in the socioeconomic reconstruction of their countries in the aftermath of their victorious revolutions. The VPA's socioeconomic role became even more prominent after the unification of Vietnam in the mid-1970s. In the security arena, the doctrine of people's war, which the VPA and PLA had successfully employed in prosecuting their wars of national liberation, formed a crucial part of their strategy for dealing with external threats. The military officer in these two countries was expected to become an expert not only in the art of guerrilla and conventional warfare but also in political, ideological, and local government affairs. The officer's responsibility was to safeguard the hegemonic position of the party. The military, at least in the higher echelons, was not a distinct institution. Many top leaders simultaneously occupied positions in the party, the military, and the state.

Among the countries investigated in this study, the old professionalism was characteristic only in India. Why was this the case? Both the political leadership and the Indian National Congress (INC)—which had waged a long, nonviolent struggle against colonial rule and had governed India in the first decades after independence—were highly legitimate. The INC acquired state power through competitive elections. The Indian state, which inherited the institutions of British India, was relatively strong. It was able to exercise authority over most of the country. As a result, there was a single locus of authority through which political influence could be channeled. The military, for its part, was a cohesive and relatively well trained and equipped institution. It had not participated in the nationalist struggle against British rule, however. Thus its credentials were somewhat tarnished because it was an ex-British institution. Given the military's status and the Indian political leadership's unease with strong armies, the postindependence Indian government took several measures to curb the army's power and bring the military under firm civilian control. As in the other countries, the Indian army did have an internal security role, which over

the years became more pronounced, but this role has always been executed under civilian control.

The normative structure and the material balance of power in India were clearly in favor of democratic governance and weighted strongly against the military. This situation has not altered substantially over the years. Isolated from politics, the Indian military has continued to develop as a professional institution—reinforced by the apolitical ethos it inherited from the British days. Subjecting itself to civilian jurisdiction, the Indian military's primary duty has been to ensure the security of the country. The primary expertise of the military officer is in the management of violence in the internal security and external defense roles. His responsibility is to safeguard the nation-state as directed by the elected government. His loyalty is not to a specific government but to his regiment, corps, and service and through them to the government in power. And, subject to civilian jurisdiction, the military profession in India manages its institutional affairs in accordance with well-established rules that are enforced across all services and units of the armed forces. A combination of circumstances—flowing primarily from the existence of a relatively strong and specialized state and legitimate political authority—contributed to the development of the old professionalism in India.

The old professionalism developed in postoccupation Japan, as well, but it was limited in a number of ways. Postwar military professionalism in Japan was conditioned almost entirely by the peace constitution and the public's deep distrust of the Japanese state and the military. In the wake of the disastrous consequences of World War II for Japan, which in large part was attributed to the Japanese imperial army, several constitutional, legal, political, and institutional measures were put in place to ensure "uncompromising civilian control." The material and ideational balance of power weighed very heavily against the JSDF. The military was not just isolated from politics as in other democratic societies; it was deliberately "colonized" and suppressed by other institutions of the state. Its legitimacy under challenge, in several ways the JSDF was an outcast in society. As political leaders did not want to interact with the military, military leaders were prevented from carrying out their responsibility function effectively. The peculiar nature of civil-military relations also inhibited the full development of the military officer's management of violence function as well as the development of the JSDF's corporate consciousness and identity.

In sum, then, the new professionalism as it developed in Thailand, Pakistan, Burma, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia was primarily a function of three forces: the shift in the distribution of power in favor of the military brought

about by the collapse of the democratic political systems instituted in these countries at independence; the politicization of faction-ridden militaries; and the military's rapid buildup to bolster the position of incumbent leaders as well as undertake internal security and developmental roles. In some cases the rapid buildup was also due to external threats. In China and Vietnam, the development of the new professionalism was much more a function of the communist system and the role it assigned to the military. In India and Japan, the distribution of power clearly favored the democratic governments. The states in these two countries were relatively highly developed, the political systems for the acquisition and exercise of state power were widely accepted, and the militaries were cohesive institutions isolated from the political arena. In time these conditions emerged in other Asian countries, as well, leading to the rise of the old professionalism.

Explaining the Growth of the Old Professionalism

In South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia, the distribution of power and the normative ideals relating to governance were substantially altered by the interaction of three factors: the waning legitimacy of authoritarian governments, sustained high growth economic development, and the termination of the Cold War. The change in the distribution of power and in the political ideals contributed to democratization and the military's exit from politics. The military was compelled to redefine its role with a much greater focus on the external defense function under the direction of civilian authority. With increasing specialization, differentiation among state institutions became imperative—and as a consequence the military became more narrowly focused and distinct as an institution. Concurrently the growing complexity of the management of violence skill—in the context of a dramatically altered Asia Pacific security environment and the far-reaching changes in military technology—made its mastery much more demanding. To become proficient in this skill, military officers must devote much of their career to education and training. These developments dramatically altered their expertise, their responsibility, and the profession's level of corporateness.

The waning legitimacy of military (and military-backed) governments flowed from a fundamental weakness: their unwillingness and inability to share power and construct a widely acceptable competitive political framework for the acquisition and exercise of state power. Often military and autocratic rulers sought to construct pseudo-participatory systems to perpetuate their own hold on state power through the emasculation of political parties and restriction of

political competition. Their emphasis on stability, order, and efficiency—and more broadly the techno-administrative approach to governance, as well as the belief that they know what is best for the people—invariably cut military governments off from the societies they governed. Unwilling to accommodate changes in the society under its domination, especially on matters affecting political governance, the military, even if its initial intervention had public support, alienated the political and civil societies. Without checks and balances, military governments became the captive of a small group that increasingly failed to differentiate between private, corporate, and public interest. Massive corruption became endemic. Opposition to military governments mounted. Labeling any and all opposition as subversive and detrimental to stability and development, military governments sought to crush it through coercive means. The net effect was that government became even more coercion-intensive. Increasing reliance on force, however, further undermined the military's title to rule, setting in train a downward spiral.

This has been the experience in South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia.[7] Unlike the 1961 coup that was accepted as almost inevitable by the South Korean public, the several Park-led governments under the Yushin constitution in the 1970s and especially Chun Doo-hwan's seizure of power in 1980 were not widely accepted. From the outset, Chun's government faced a grave and persistent legitimacy problem rooted in the brutal suppression of the democratic movement in Kwangju.[8] To consolidate his position, Chun promulgated a new constitution that paralleled the Yushin constitution in several respects: it severely curtailed political competition, for example, and guaranteed Chun's election as president. He also deployed military and intelligence agencies to intimidate and control opposition groups in political and civil society as well as within the military. Such a system was widely contested by the banned opposition parties—which coalesced into a single party with the lifting of the ban on former politicians in 1985. Challenging the legitimacy of the Chun government and the constitution, which they claimed advantaged his party unfairly, the opposition demanded constitutional reform before the next election, due in 1988.[9]

As the government had a clear majority in the National Assembly, the battle for constitutional reform was waged in the streets and on campus grounds. Faced with mounting pressure from the political opposition and civil society, as well as from the United States, in February 1986 the Chun government decided that the constitution would be revised. The ruling and opposition parties, however, deadlocked over the nature and extent of revision. With continuing stalemate and a split in the opposition (between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung),

in April 1987 Chun decided to suspend constitutional revision and announced that the next presidential election would be held under the highly unpopular 1981 constitution. This decision was met with universal disapproval—precipitating massive antigovernment protests and violence that further escalated after 10 June when Chun formally nominated Roh Tae-woo as the ruling party's presidential candidate. In the ensuing clashes one student died and hundreds were injured. Although initially Chun considered imposing martial law, he feared the specter of civil war and hence indicated his willingness to resume negotiations on constitutional reform. The situation was defused only when Roh Tae-woo accepted all of the opposition demands and agreed to a speedy review of the constitution.

As in South Korea, military and military-backed governments in Thailand and Indonesia were unwilling to construct inclusive political frameworks that would allow genuine competition for political power. Suharto, for example, devised and manipulated the *pancasila* democracy system in Indonesia with a view to concentrating power in his own hands. Ultimately such efforts failed to gain public acceptance. In Thailand, the military and political parties shared power in a quasi-democratic framework from 1980 through 1988. Such power sharing became increasingly untenable, however, in light of the growing tension between the public's demand for an elected prime minister (and more broadly for greater democracy) and the military's unwillingness to accept a reduction in its power and prerogatives enshrined in the quasi-democratic framework. As public opposition to military and military-backed autocratic rule began to mount, governments invariably responded by becoming more repressive. Increased reliance on coercion, however, only discredited governments further and bolstered the political opposition. The key asset of the military—coercion—increasingly became less relevant and quite frequently counterproductive in political as well as in other areas of governance.

Military governments in South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia often sought to justify the restrictive political framework as well as compensate for their political shortcoming by emphasizing economic development, security, and stability. But these were not a durable basis for political legitimacy. Insofar as economic development is concerned, both success and failure undermined military governments. In the case of South Korea, the Park governments in the 1960s and the Chun government in the 1980s performed remarkably well with respect to economic development. In the 1960s Park successfully reoriented the South Korean economy away from import substitution to export-led industrialization; in the 1970s he instituted policies to shift the economy from low-value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing to high-value-added, capital-intensive production for

export. The Chun government for its part instituted economic liberalization and stabilization policies which, in combination with a favorable international economic environment, promoted rapid growth of the South Korean economy.

Between 1967 and 1987, South Korea's economy grew at an annual average rate of 7 percent—transforming South Korea from an underdeveloped low-income economy to a newly industrializing economy with a per capita income of $3,000. While initially it bolstered the legitimacy of Park's autocratic rule, in time this rapid economic development and increasing dependence on the world market generated sociopolitical changes in South Korea as well as international pressure that empowered the society at large and altered the distribution of power between the state and society. Both the old political opposition and the new social forces challenged the monopolization of power by the ex-military presidents and their factions in the military.

Successful economic development had similar consequences in Thailand. Sustained rapid economic growth under the Sarit and Thanom-Praphat governments in the late 1950s and through the 1960s generated new social groups (students, industrial labor movements, farmers' associations) that protested against political stagnation as well as the increasing socioeconomic gap between the urban rich and rural poor.[10] The extraordinary mobilization of the new social groups in 1973 and the military's violent response eventually led to the collapse of the military government. The Indonesian economy, too, experienced sustained high growth rates. From 1965 to 1980 it grew at an annual average of 7 percent and from 1980 to 1990 at 5.5 percent—with beneficial consequences for poverty alleviation, education, and infrastructure development.[11] Initially such growth bolstered the authority of Suharto. In time, however, the growing disparity in income distribution and the massive corruption of his family's activities undermined the legitimacy of the Suharto government.[12] The gap between growth and equity as well as that between monopolization of power by Suharto and the military and the growing public demand for political participation—combined with increased military repression to contain and punish opposition forces that were frequently labeled as subversive—further discredited the government. The final stroke that led to the collapse of the Suharto government was delivered by the 1997 financial crisis, which hit Indonesia especially hard.

Security and stability worked against military governments as well. As the security situation improved, the military's rationale lost its relevance. The public became cynical with the continued deployment of security to justify the repressive politics and policies of military governments. In the case of South Korea, for example, while there was acknowledgment of the threat from North

Korea, beginning in the late 1970s it was clear that South Korea had become the stronger party in the conflict, that the international situation was in its favor, and that the overall security situation in the Korean peninsula had stabilized. Continued use of the security rationale in this altered context was viewed skeptically by the South Korean public, which increasingly was convinced that the threat was being manipulated to serve the interests of the incumbent government. Similarly, in post-1965 Indonesia the military's commitment to restore stability and order was welcomed by large segments of the public. But continued punitive action in the name of security and stability alienated the public in Java and the outer islands—especially in the outlying regions of Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua—increasing resentment against the Suharto government and the military.

Apart from their inability to accommodate political change that led to tension and conflict with political and civil societies, military governments also confronted problems with the military as an institution. To consolidate their position and to prevent countercoups, military rulers held onto or appointed loyalists, cronies, or politically inconsequential officers to key senior positions. They also developed counterbalancing factions, patronage networks, and extensive surveillance and intimidation mechanisms. Despite these measures, they were not always able to command the loyalty of the armed forces. Withdrawal of military support was a key factor in the collapse of military governments in Thailand (1973) and Indonesia (1998).

Concurrent with the foregoing domestic developments, the international context underwent dramatic change too. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites—as well as the success of the export-led market economies of East and Southeast Asia and the dramatic recovery and growth of the U.S. economy—highlighted the bankruptcy of the political and economic models of socialism and the ascendance of capitalism and democracy. The emergence of the United States as the sole global power and its promotion, with European backing, of democracy, human rights, and capitalism dramatically altered the material and normative structures of the international system. These structures and the policies of the Western powers were inimical to military coups and governments. Through incentives and sanctions the West advocated democratic development, which bolstered domestic pro-democratic forces. Because of its crucial economic and security connections, the United States had an enormous impact on developments in South Korea, in Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, in Thailand.

Thus a combination of domestic and international developments culminated in major confrontations and public uprisings that delegitimated military and

military-backed rulers in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, compelling them to initiate reforms or hand over power to civilian leaders. In Taiwan, too, there was a transition from a military-backed authoritarian regime to a democratic one. But in Taiwan, unlike the other countries, the transition followed a "transactional" path with negotiations between the ruling KMT party and the opposition forces.[13] The reasons for this different path have been discussed at length elsewhere.[14] Here it suffices to note that some of the factors that applied to regime change in other countries—like the sociopolitical consequences of sustained economic development, improvement in the security situation, public cynicism over the deployment of security to serve the parochial interests of the incumbent rulers, massive corruption, and change in the international context—were of consequence in Taiwan as well.

Waning legitimacy, mounting demands for political participation, declining salience of coercion (the military's key asset) in governance, sustained economic development, an altered international context—such forces empowered political and civil societies, reduced the power and influence of authoritarian governments, and compelled the military to exit politics and concentrate on security. Focus on the security function has been fostered as well by the military's increasing distinctiveness and cohesiveness, by the concern in some segments of the military that the nonmilitary roles have undermined combat effectiveness, by the intensifying strategic competition in the Asia Pacific environment, and by the shift to high-technology warfare.

As noted earlier, the militaries in South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand were faction-ridden, ill-trained, and ill-equipped. Competition among different factions was a major element in the coups and countercoups in these countries. In time, through a series of measures including purges, reorganization, streamlined command structure, and other reforms instituted to ensure control of the military by the authoritarian leadership, the military became a more unified entity, better trained, and better equipped. Factionalism did not disappear altogether, of course, and competition among the senior ranks for the favor of the supreme leader created new divides. But compared to the earlier period, the armed forces of these countries had become much more integrated and cohesive. In the process, they developed a strong corporate consciousness and identity and became distinct. And segments of the military that had been engaged in internal and external security roles became more proficient in the management of violence.

Believing that the noncombat roles (and the accompanying abuse of power and corruption among officers having dual roles) undermined combat effectiveness, some officers in combat units increasingly argued the case for greater

emphasis on military professionalism—a code word for reducing the military's political and socioeconomic roles and devoting more attention to security. This concern acquired added impetus with the dramatic change in the Asia Pacific strategic environment brought about by the region's dynamic economic growth for over two decades—along with the termination of the Cold War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, the ascendance of China, and the reemergence among Asian countries of historical animosities and new apprehensions leading to increased strategic competition among them. The Cold War security architecture that had maintained order and stability became less relevant. Much greater emphasis has been placed on developing national military strength. Many states now have the resources to develop quite sophisticated military capabilities that have become urgent in light of the increasing role of high technology in the conduct of warfare. For many Asian countries, the technological superiority enjoyed by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War and the ease with which it defeated Iraq drove home the need to develop a high-tech capability. The disproportionate advantage enjoyed by the United States in the so-called revolution in military affairs has further reinforced the perceived need in the major Asian countries to modernize. Modernizing the armed forces with an emphasis on external defense and mastering the management of violence are high priorities in South Korea, in Taiwan, and, to a lesser degree, in Thailand. For reasons advanced earlier in the chapter, the shift in Indonesia is still very tentative.

In China, although the communist ideology has been severely tarnished, the CCP continues to be the dominant political force. Nationalism, economic performance, and deployment of state coercion are now the foundations for its continued monopoly of power. Based on the considerations of nationalism and mutual interest, the PLA continues to be loyal to the CCP. Within this framework, however, the PLA has become a more distinct entity and its focus now is largely on external defense. The military officer is becoming more professional in the matter of expertise and corporateness. The reasons cited for the rise of the old professionalism in South Korea and Taiwan also apply to China. Beijing's participation in international political and economic institutions, sustained economic growth for over two decades, and the CCP's need to respond to public welfare demands have made for a more complex and differentiated set of state institutions. Specialized institutions have been developed to manage the different functions of government. This has resulted in a dwindling of the military's nonmilitary roles. While the PLA still has influence in policymaking on selected issues in foreign policy, here too its influence would appear to be on the wane. Its primary focus is

now in the security arena. The strategic developments in the Asia Pacific, the shift to high-technology warfare, and Beijing's aspiration to a befitting international status have also necessitated this focus. These considerations inform the PLA's emphasis on modernization, regularization, and the management of violence. Although features of the old professionalism are also on the rise in Vietnam, it is more muted. The difference between China and Vietnam can be explained by the continuing symbiotic relationship between the VCP and the VPA, Vietnam's much slower and halting economic growth, and the VPA's expanded role in internal politics.

In India and Japan, the normative ideals and balance of power are still clearly in favor of the democratically elected government and the militaries continue to be isolated from the political arena. Although the Indian military has become more involved in internal security and has administrative responsibilities in troubled provinces—and although the relationship between the military and the civilian bureaucracy has become more tension prone—no fundamental change has occurred in the relationship of the military to the state or in regard to the expertise, responsibility, and corporateness of the military officer. In fact, in light of the recent Kargil war, which has considerably boosted the prestige of the Indian armed forces, as well as the changes in the regional strategic environment noted earlier, New Delhi has articulated the need to beef up India's conventional and nuclear capabilities and upgrade the management of violence skill of the military officer.

In Japan, the relationship between the military and the state is becoming more normal in the sense that it is moving to a pattern which is characteristic of other democratic states. Public mistrust of the JSDF has declined. It is now viewed as a legitimate state institution. With the JSDF assuming increasing responsibility for the defense of Japan and for regional peace and security, there is much greater emphasis on the management of violence skill. Changes in public attitude and institutional design have also made it possible for senior military officers to interact more directly with political leaders on policy matters, enabling them to better discharge their responsibility function.

Among the countries investigated in this study, the new professionalism is still firmly rooted only in Pakistan and Burma. In these two countries, especially in Burma, the balance of power still strongly favors the military government, which brutally suppresses all dissidents. Burma's self-imposed international isolation, the diplomatic support of China and the ASEAN countries for the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime, exclusive military control of state resources, the absence of market-led economic development, the elimination

of any and all domestic opposition—such factors explain the absence of alternative power centers and the military's continued total domination of the state. In Pakistan, political development has been thwarted by the dominant position of the military. Matters have been made worse by the inept and corrupt behavior of civilian political leaders and parties that periodically accede to power. The economy has faltered and Pakistan has been on the verge of bankruptcy on a number of occasions. In Pakistan the state has become weaker over the years. The forces that altered the distribution of power in favor of civilians in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia have been absent in Pakistan and especially in Burma. In the absence of alternative power centers, the military's exit from politics will have to be initiated by the military itself. Certainly there is no evidence of this in Burma. In Pakistan, the military has relinquished control of the political helm on a number of occasions (1971–1977, 1988–1999), but it has always retained a guardian role with veto power over civilian governments. It has also retained the prerogatives it acquired during military rule. The militaries in both these countries continue to be politicized. It is difficult for the old professionalism to develop in these circumstances. What, then, is the connection between military professionalism and the military's political orientation?

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Does the development of military professionalism create an apolitical orientation? Or is depoliticization of the military a prerequisite for the development of military professionalism? Stated alternatively: is military professionalism the cause or consequence of an apolitical military? As observed in Chapter 1, Samuel Huntington is not clear on this issue. At one point he asserts that reduction in the military's political power and its isolation from politics is a necessary condition for the development of military professionalism. But he also says that the development of military professionalism is necessary for an apolitical orientation. Over the years he has emphasized the second proposition, which informs his prescriptions for consolidating democratic civilian control over the military.

The cases investigated in this study clearly support our claim that changes in the distribution of power against the military and the military's isolation from politics are necessary conditions for the emergence and development of a professional and apolitical military. Although the Indian military inherited the British tradition, this was not the crucial factor that perpetuated its apolitical orientation. The Pakistani military too inherited the British tradition—and the American tradition was the basis for the design and development of the ROK

military—but both these militaries discarded their apolitical orientation. The persistence of the Indian military's apolitical orientation has much to do with the distribution of power in favor of the democratically elected civilian authority, the unified nature of the Indian military, and its continued isolation from politics. Such was the case in Japan, as well, where the distribution of power was strongly weighted in favor of democratic governance. And the JSDF was not just isolated but almost completely divorced from the political arena.

The transition from the new professionalism to the old in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia began only when the military's power vis-à-vis the political and civil societies as well as other state institutions started to weaken. The development of the old professionalism gained much vigor in the aftermath of the military's eventual exit from politics. The level of old professionalism attained in these countries since the military's exit has been influenced by the extent to which the civilian authorities have been able to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis their militaries and also by the degree to which the military has been isolated from politics and subjected to political direction by a single locus of authority. Development of the old professionalism is most advanced in South Korea and Taiwan, where these conditions prevail, and less so in Thailand and Indonesia.

There is no instance in Asia where development of the old professionalism was the primary factor in forcing the military to exit politics. That the military's involvement in politics and economic development had a detrimental effect on its combat effectiveness was certainly a concern in some quarters in the Philippine and Indonesian armed forces. Such concerns in the Philippines led to formation of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), which played a key role in the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos. This concern was not the driving force, however, in compelling the military's exit from politics in that country. In Indonesia, although reform-minded officers advocated restricting *dwifungsi* (dual role), no military officer of any standing called for the abrogation of the military's sociopolitical role.

Once the military has been compelled to exit politics, however, the belief that political involvement is antithetical to military professionalism helps shape the normative structure in the military and in society at large. If this idea takes root, then the development of a military professionalism that eschews politics can contribute to the strengthening of the military's apolitical orientation. This appears to be occurring in South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. "Good military professionalism" in Thailand, for example, is now equated with noninvolvement in politics. In Indonesia, too, civilian groups are advocating the development of a

military professionalism that would exclude the military's political involvement and terminate the TNI's sociopolitical role. But the development of military professionalism is only a subsidiary factor in promoting the military's apolitical orientation and democratic civilian control. Much more important are measures to empower political and civil societies and strengthen the state's democratic institutions in order to tilt the distribution of power permanently in favor of the civilian authority. This finding, which is the basis for my final proposition, has important policy implications. The point here is not to belittle efforts to promote military professionalism and other measures focused on controlling the military, but to put them in proper perspective.

In conclusion, the old professionalism that is on the rise in Asia is still tentative in several countries, especially Thailand and Indonesia, while the new professionalism is still strongly rooted in Pakistan and Burma. To accelerate and consolidate the transition from new professionalism to old professionalism, it is crucial to mobilize domestic and international pro-democracy forces: to permanently alter the balance of power in favor of democratic forces and institutions, to isolate the military from politics, to terminate its nonsecurity roles, and to focus its attention on discharging its security role under civilian direction. Altering the power balance in favor of democratic governance entails strengthening the legitimacy, capacity, and roles of civilian institutions, sustaining economic development, and reducing the salience of coercion in governance. These elements hinge on forging political agreement regarding the basis of the nation-state and the system of political domination, making economic growth a key priority, as well as developing policies and processes to address political and social problems. The role of coercion in governance should be limited and indirect; it should be viewed as the ultimate sanction, not the first recourse. When coercion is deployed in the internal security role, it should be limited to purposes of state and carefully controlled to prevent abuse of state power and to ensure oversight by civilian authority that is itself legitimate and accountable to the citizens of the state.

ENDNOTES

1 On military professionalism see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

2 On the "new professionalism" see Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of

Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

3 See the discussion in Chapter 5 of this volume.

4 See James Mulvenon, "China: Conditional Compliance," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

5 The ensuing discussion draws on Huntington, *Soldier and State*, pp. 30–39.

6 On state formation in Europe see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and the European States AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992).

7 The following discussion of political change in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Taiwan draws extensively on my discussion in chapter 18 of *Coercion and Governance*.

8 See Kim Yung-myung, "Pattern of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea," in R.J. May and Viberto Selochan, eds., *The Military and Democracy in the Asia Pacific* (London: Hurst, 1997).

9 See Han Sung-joo and Yung-chul Park, "South Korea: Democratization at Last," in James Morley, ed., *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

10 See David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, *Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981).

11 John Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 284–288.

12 Mochtar Pabottingi, "Indonesia: Historicizing the New Order's Legitimacy Dilemma," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

13 Cheng Tun-jen, "Taiwan in Democratic Transition," in James Morley, ed., *Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

14 Ibid.; Andrew Nathan, *China's Transition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Abrahamsson, Bengt, 13, 62
Afghanistan, 152, 156
Aguero, Felipe, 6
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). *See* Indonesian military
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 167, 209
Aung San Suu Kyi, 80
Ayub Khan, Mohammad, 153, 159n. 7, n. 9, n. 10

Bangladesh, 26
Banharn, Silpa-archa, 83
Bharatiya Janata Party, 31
Bhutto, Benazir, 161n. 29
Bletz, Donald, 62
Brazil, 12–13, 95
British East India Company, 21, 32n. 10
British Indian Army, 21–22
Britton, Peter, 99
BSPP. *See* Burma Socialist Program Party
Burma: constitutions, 165; 166; Defense Ministry, 169; economic system, 164, 165; foreign policy, 167, 173; history, 163–164; internal conflicts, 164, 170, 172–173; international protests, 80; military governments, 164, 168, 176n. 6, 177n. 16; 209–210; relations with China, 209; relations with Thailand, 80, 87, 182; Revolutionary Council, 165, 169; socialist governments, 165; State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 80, 165–166, 169, 173–174, 176n. 6; State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 164, 166, 169, 176n. 6, 209–210. *See also* Tatmadaw
Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), 165, 177n. 16

Cambodia, 79, 81, 87, 140
Cariappa, K. M., 22, 33n. 13
CCP. *See* Chinese Communist Party
Chao Chih-yuan, 65
Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, 79
Chen Shui-bian, 70, 71, 72, 130
Cheta Thana-Charo, 84
Chetwode, Sir Philip, 25–26
Chi Haotian, 126, 127
Chiang Ching-kuo, 67, 68, 69, 71
Chiang Chung-ling, 69, 75n. 11
Chiang Kai-shek, 63, 65, 67, 68–69, 70–71
Chiang Wei-kuo, 67
China: arms sold to Burma, 173–174; Belgrade embassy bombing, 130; bureaucracy, 112; civil-military relations, 112–116; Cultural Revolution, 113, 117; defense policy, 123, 128, 129–131; Falungong, 127; foreign policy, 128, 129, 130, 131; market-oriented reforms, 127; military assistance to Vietnam, 138; nationalist military, 63–64; nuclear testing, 129; police, 123, 184; Politburo, 114, 115, 117, 130; public attitudes toward military, 117, 118–119, 193; relations with Burma, 209; relations with Indonesia, 103, 104; relations with Taiwan, 72, 128,

129, 130, 131, 132, 182; relations with Thailand, 80–81; relations with United States, 128; Tiananmen rebellion, 112, 117, 123, 193; wars, 26, 64, 140. *See also* People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): dominance, 208; future prospects, 132–133; infiltration of nationalist military, 64; rule of China, 69. *See also* People's Liberation Army/Communist Party relations
Chun Doo-hwan, 192, 203, 205
civilian control: in China, 113–115, 116, 123–125, 127–131, 132; compatibility with internal security role of military, 3–4, 186; definitions, 5–6; democratic, 9, 188–189; forms, 9; in India, 9, 19, 31, 32n. 8, 200–201; in Japan, 35, 44–45, 201; lack of in Pakistan, 153, 154–156, 158, 210; in Malaysia, 8; objective, 3–4, 6–8, 9, 111; relationship to professionalism, 7, 47, 111, 195–196; in South Korea, 53, 192; in Sri Lanka, 8; subjective, 6–8, 13, 112, 113; in Taiwan, 188, 192; in Thailand, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88–89, 188–189
civilian governments. *See* civil-military relations; democracy
civilian supremacy, 6. *See also* civilian control
civil-military relations: in authoritarian regimes, 111–112, 192, 199; in Burma, 164, 165; changes in distribution of power, 12, 179, 201–202, 210–211, 212; changes in roles, 5, 16; in China, 112–116; corporate concerns of military, 14; in democracies, 9, 111; distribution of power, 7–8, 10–11, 199; effects of military's mission, 15–16; in India, 19–21, 22, 23–24, 209; in Indonesia, 97, 189, 191; isolation of military, 8–9, 10, 94; in Japan, 35–36, 42–43, 44–45, 209; legitimacy of civilian government, 13; in Pakistan, 151, 153, 154–156, 158, 158n. 1, 210; in South Korea, 47–48, 50, 54, 56–57; in Taiwan, 69–71, 75n. 10, 112; in Thailand, 77, 84–85, 87–88; in Vietnam, 137–138, 185, 189, 190, 191, 199, 209. *See also* civilian control; People's Liberation Army/Communist Party relations
civil wars, 3, 4, 197. *See also* internal security role
coercion in governance, 13, 16, 212
Cold War, 198; end of, 79, 81, 120, 206, 208
Colton, Timothy J., 5–6
communist parties, 198. *See also* Chinese Communist Party (CCP); Vietnam Communist Party (VCP)
Communist Party (Indonesia), 96, 97, 99
Communist Party of Thailand, 78, 87
communist states: military roles, 200, 202. *See also* China; Vietnam
Congress Party, 31, 200
corporateness: as characteristic of military professionalism, 2; definition, 2, 62; increase in, 186–187; of Indian military, 20, 22, 25, 31–32, 187–188, 191, 201; of Indonesian military, 188; of Japanese military, 40–41, 44, 187–188, 191, 201; of Pakistan

military, 190–191; of People's Liberation Army, 112–113, 116, 118; relationship to politicization, 13–14; of South Korean military, 56, 188, 191; of Taiwanese military, 188, 191; of Tatmadaw, 163, 190–191; of Thai military, 188
corruption: attempts to curb, 194; in China, 117, 123, 135n. 33, 193, 194; extent of, 203; in Indonesia, 100, 205; in Pakistan, 210; in South Korea, 49, 50, 51, 57n. 8, 194; in Taiwan, 65, 71, 73, 194; in Thailand, 182, 194; in Vietnam, 194
Curzon, George, Lord, 23

Dalai Lama, 80
Dao Dinh Luyen, 137
defense. *See* national defense role
DeGaulle, Charles, 11
democracy: acceptance in Asia, 197–198, 206; civilian control of military, 9, 188–189; civil-military relations in, 111; in India, 31, 200, 201; in Indonesia, 93, 104, 109, 193, 205; institutions, 15; promotion by Western countries, 206; relationship to economic growth, 86; relationship to professionalism, 195, 202, 212; in South Korea, 48, 52–53, 56; in Taiwan, 73, 207; in Thailand, 79, 84, 86, 88, 182, 192, 205; training in principles of, 73; in United States, 15
Deng Xiaoping, 123, 124, 130; relations with PLA, 113–114, 115, 117, 125, 126
Desch, Michael, 15
developing countries: economic growth and democratization, 86; new professionalism in, 47; political involvement of military, 94–95
Diamond, Larry, 15
Doan Khue, 140
Dupont, Alan, 103, 104

economic development: growth in Asia, 206; in Indonesia, 205; under military governments, 204–205; relationship to democracy, 86; role of Thai military, 81–82, 182. *See also* socioeconomic tasks of military
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 11
ethics, 2, 194. *See also* corruption
ethnic groups: insurgencies, 27, 172, 197; maintained in power by military, 8, 9
Europe: military professionalism, 195–196; nation-states, 196; promotion of democracy, 206; resistance to colonialism of, 96–97, 109, 139–140
expertise: definition, 1–2, 62; internal security tasks, 13; management of violence, 2, 3, 11; in military professionalism, 1–2, 11–12, 180–186, 194–195; in new professionalism, 3, 199; in peacekeeping missions, 39–40; political skills, 11; specialization, 195. *See also* training, military

Falungong, 127
Finer, Samuel E., 14, 94, 96
France, 139–140
Friedberg, Aaron L., 15
Germany, 9
Goa, 26

Golkar party, 99, 106
Greenwood, Ernest, 62
Gulf War, 120, 125, 208
Guo Boxiong, 127

Harding, Harry, 115
Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 43
Hau Pei-tsun, 67, 69, 75n. 10, n. 11
Hizbullahs (Indonesia), 96
Ho Chi Minh, 143
Ho Chi Minh Thought, 138, 145, 190
Hong Xuezhi, 126
Hu Jintao, 124, 134n. 28
Hua Guofeng, 124
Huntington, Samuel P.: apolitical militaries, 9–12, 19, 77, 94; civilian control, 3, 5, 6, 8–9, 13; conditions for professionalism, 195; definition of professionalism, 1–2, 5, 62, 179; democracy in developing countries, 86; duties of officers, 62; Japanese military, 35, 43, 44; management of violence skill, 3; military intervention in politics, 95, 210; officer education, 37; responsibility of military, 191
Hyderabad, 26
Hyo Chan Song, 50

INC. *See* Indian National Congress
India: British rule, 21–22; bureaucracy, 23–24; caste system, 21, 24; Defense Ministry, 23–24, 29, 31; democracy in, 31, 200, 201; independence, 22–23; internal conflicts, 27; martial races, 21, 32–33n. 11; nuclear weapons, 29–30, 31; parliament, 23–24; police, 27; Punjab, 20, 27, 33n. 24; social change, 30; wars, 26. *See also* India/Pakistan conflicts
Indian Army, 19–20
Indian military: air force, 20; cantonments, 22, 33n. 12; careers, 20, 24, 28–29, 32n. 3, 33n. 25; civilian control, 9, 19, 31, 32n. 8, 200–201; corporateness, 20, 22, 25, 31–32, 187–188, 191, 201; expertise, 201; history, 21–23, 32n. 1, n. 10; information technology, 29; internal security role, 22, 200–201; issues, 30–31; lack of involvement in nuclear weapons decisions, 29–30, 31; missions, 180; modernization, 29, 186; navy, 20, 32n. 8; officers, 25–26, 28–29; organization, 23, 30; peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka, 26–27; political neutrality, 19, 23–24; professionalism, 20, 26, 27–28, 32, 200–201, 202; public image, 31, 192; recruitment, 21, 24–25, 33n. 18; regimental loyalty, 21, 22, 32n. 4; relations with civilian governments, 19–21, 22, 23–24, 209; size, 24, 31; social responsibility, 191–192, 201; stresses, 20–21; traditions, 22; training, 20, 25, 28–29, 32n. 2
Indian Military Academy, 25–26
Indian National Congress (INC), 31, 200
India/Pakistan conflicts, 153, 155, 186; Kargil War, 26, 31, 32n. 7, 33n. 23, n. 24, n. 26, 192, 209; Kashmir, 26, 27, 30, 152, 156; wars, 152, 157, 159n. 4
Indonesia: constitution, 99; culture, 99; economic development, 205; foreign relations, 103–104; guerrilla war against colonialism, 96–97, 109;

independence, 95; parliament, 97, 106, 183; police, 183; political parties, 96, 183; rebellion (1965), 97, 99; Suharto regime, 93, 204, 205, 206; transition to democracy, 93, 104, 109, 193, 205
Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia; TNI). *See* Indonesian military
Indonesian Communist Party, 96, 97, 99
Indonesian military: air force, 103, 104; Armed Forces Academy, 100–101; budget, 107–108; business enterprises, 108; corporateness, 188; corruption, 100; doctrines, 97, 99, 108; factionalism, 207; Golkar party, 99, 106; government positions held, 100; history, 95–99, 109; intelligence system, 106–107; internal security role, 183; militias, 96–97; navy, 103, 104; officers, 99–101; police forces, 105; political involvement, 96, 97–98, 99, 101–102, 103, 109, 183, 199, 211–212; political neutrality, 106, 108, 183, 193; professionalism, 93, 101–102, 103, 106–108, 199, 201–202; public image, 193, 206; reforms, 93, 104–108; relations with politicians, 97, 189, 191; salaries, 107–108; social responsibility, 192, 193; socioeconomic roles, 97, 98; Suharto's influence on promotions, 102, 109; support of authoritarian governments, 93, 101–102, 192; training, 99–101, 108; values, 98–99
Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia; PNI), 96
Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia; Pesindo), 96
information technology, 29, 84, 174
internal security role: in Burma, 167, 172–173; in China, 184; compatibility with civilian control, 3–4, 186; ethnic insurgencies, 27, 172, 197; expanded role of military, 47; expertise, 13; in India, 22, 200–201; in Indonesia, 183; in new professionalism, 3–4, 47; in Pakistan, 155, 156, 160–161n. 27; of police, 4; relationship to politicization, 13, 16, 95; in Vietnam, 142, 147, 184–185
Isoshima, Tsuneo, 41

Jammu and Kashmir, 26, 27, 30–31, 152, 156, 197
Janowitz, Morris, 3, 62, 179
Japan: colonies, 96, 163; constitution, 180, 201; Defense Ministry, 42–43; Diet, 43; imperial military, 35, 43; public attitudes toward military, 191, 192, 201, 209; war with China, 64
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF): careers, 35, 36, 37, 37–38, 41; civilian control, 35, 44–45, 201; corporateness, 40–41, 44, 187–188, 191, 201; educational backgrounds, 36–37, 45n. 4; expertise, 39–40, 43–44; Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), 36–37, 39–40, 44; legal responsibilities, 42; missions, 38, 39–40, 44, 180–181; National Defense Academy, 36, 37; officers, 36–40, 43–44; peacekeeping missions, 38, 39–40, 43, 181; professionalism, 35, 201, 202, 209; prohibition of

political activities, 35, 42, 201; public attitudes toward, 191, 192, 201, 209; recruitment, 41; relations with politicians, 35–36, 42–43, 44–45, 209; social responsibility, 191–192, 209; training, 36, 37–40
Jiang Zemin: background, 128; as Central Military Commission chair, 114, 117, 118, 124–125; defense policy, 123, 131; foreign policy, 128, 129, 130; influence, 118; officer promotions, 122; relations with PLA, 116, 124–127, 132, 135n. 33
JSDF. *See* Japanese Self-Defense Forces

Kargil War, 26, 31, 32n. 7, 33n. 23, n. 26, 192, 209
Kashmir, 26, 27, 30–31, 152, 156, 197
Khin Nyunt, 169
Kim Dae-jung, 54, 181, 203
Kim Young-sam, 53, 181, 203
Kitchener, Horatio, Lord, 23
Kockums, 83
Korea. *See* North Korea; South Korea
Korean Constabulary Reserve, 49
Korean War, 49, 50, 57n. 6, 117, 118, 119
Kosovo, 128
Kunimi, Lieutenant General, 43
Kuwait, 87

Lang, Kurt, 14
Lasswell, Harold D., 2, 14, 15, 79
Latin America: political involvement of militaries, 12–13, 15, 95
Le Kha Phieu, 138
Lee Kai, 73
Lee Teng-hui, 69–70, 71, 75n. 10, 130
Liu Guang-kai, 70
Liu Huaqing, 124, 126
Lo Pen-li, 67, 72

MacArthur, Douglas, 11
Malaysia, 8, 103
management of violence: as purpose of military, 62, 63, 180; skills, 2, 3, 11
Mannheim, Karl, 9
Mao Zedong, 113, 117, 119
Marcos, Ferdinand, 211
Marxism-Leninism, 137, 138, 145, 190
Masyumi Party, 96
military: institutions, 2. *See also* civilian control; civil-military relations; internal security role; training, military
military governments: of Burma, 164, 165–166, 168, 173–174, 176n. 6, 177n. 16, 209–210; economic development, 204–205; of Pakistan, 14, 151, 153–157; of South Korea, 49, 55, 192, 203–206; of Thailand, 78, 192, 204, 205, 206; weaknesses, 202–203, 206–207. *See also* political involvement of military
military professionalism: corporateness, 2, 62, 186–191; definitions, 62, 63; effects of changes in distribution of power, 12, 179, 201–202, 210–211, 212; expertise, 1–2, 11–12, 62, 180–186, 194–195; explanations for rise in, 195–196, 202–210, 211; factors in increasing, 212; Huntington's definition, 1–2, 5, 62, 179; increase in Asia, 179, 194–195, 196, 207–209; as justification for military rule, 154–155, 158; relationship to

civilian control, 7, 47, 111, 195–196; social responsibility, 2, 8, 191–194. *See also* new professionalism
Mills, C. Wright, 14
Mo Sheng-tung, 65
Mongkol Amporn-pisit, 84
Mosca, Gaetano, 9
Muhaimin, A. Yahya, 96
Musa, Mohammad, 154, 159n. 4, 160n. 18
Musharaaf, Pervez, 153–154, 155, 156–157, 158
Muslim League, 153, 161n. 29
Myanmar. *See* Burma; Tatmadaw

Nasution, A.H., 97, 99
national defense role: importance, 186; of Pakistan military, 152, 153, 154; of People's Liberation Army, 120; political involvement and, 14–15; of South Korean military, 53; of Taiwanese military, 181–182; of Thai military, 82–84, 87; of Vietnam People's Army, 141, 147
nation-states, 195, 196–198
NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Ne Win, 165
Netherlands, 96–97
new professionalism: in Asia, 179, 183–186, 196–200, 201–202; assumptions, 3–5; in Burma, 163–164, 209–210; in China, 199–200, 202; definition, 3; internal security role, 3–4, 47; in Pakistan, 151, 156, 185–186, 191, 199, 201–202, 209; political involvement, 3, 10, 13, 95; roles of military, 47; in South Korea, 47–48, 50–52, 55–56, 58n. 13; transition to old professionalism, 212
Nobel Peace Prize laureates, 80
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 128, 130
North Korea, 49, 205–206. *See also* Korean War
nuclear weapons: Chinese tests, 129; Indian, 29–30, 31

old professionalism. *See* military professionalism

Pakistan: civilian governments, 155, 161n. 29, 210; civil-military relations, 151, 153, 154–156, 158, 158n. 1, 210; constitution, 151, 158n. 1; economy, 156, 210; foreign policy, 152; independence, 22, 152; military governments, 14, 151, 153–157; political parties, 161n. 29. *See also* India/Pakistan conflicts
Pakistan military: budget, 153, 159n. 6, 186; corporateness, 190–191; coups, 14, 151, 152, 160n. 18; defense role, 152, 153, 154; foreign policy involvement, 152; history, 153; internal security role, 155, 156, 160–161n. 27; justification of political intervention, 151, 153–155, 158, 160n. 22; lack of civilian control, 153, 154–156, 158, 210; political involvement, 153, 185, 199; public image, 193–194; roles, 151, 152, 158n. 1, 185, 193; socioeconomic roles, 156; training, 155, 159n. 8; U.S. aid, 152; wartime records, 159n. 3; weapons, 186
Pakistan military, professionalism: debate on, 156; effects of economic

activities, 156; effects of political involvement on competence, 157, 160n. 26; in future, 157–158; military's perception of, 151, 153; new, 151, 156, 185–186, 191, 199, 201–202, 209; used to justify military rule, 154–155, 158
Pakistan People's Party, 161n. 29
Park Chung-hee, 51, 58n. 12, 192, 204
Park Hee-doo, 52
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Perjuangan), 183
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), 96
peacekeeping forces: Indian, 26–27; Japanese, 38, 39–40, 43, 181
Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo; Indonesian Socialist Youth), 96
People's Liberation Army (PLA): budget, 115, 125, 129; business enterprises, 115, 123, 129, 184; corporateness, 112–113, 116, 118; corruption, 117, 123, 135n. 33, 193, 194; defense of national interests, 118, 119, 132; future roles, 131–133; history, 113–115; internal security role, 184; leadership, 114, 116, 121, 126–127, 189; modernization, 115, 120, 122, 130–131, 184, 186, 190; national defense role, 118, 120; National Defense University, 121, 134n. 22; nationalism, 118–119; officers, 121–122; organization, 115, 116; political influence, 129; political involvement, 115–116; power, 116–118; public attitudes toward, 117, 118–119, 193; reforms, 122–123; roles, 120, 183–184, 193, 208–209; salaries, 125; socioeconomic roles, 117, 193; strategic thinking, 114, 119–121, 130, 132–133, 184; strength, 70, 122; training, 121–122, 184; wars, 117, 118, 119; weapons, 129
People's Liberation Army (PLA), professionalism: goals, 184; increase in, 111, 113, 114, 118–123, 132, 208–209; new, 199–200, 202
People's Liberation Army/Communist Party relations: budgets, 115, 130; Central Military Commission (CMC), 114, 117–118, 120, 121, 124–125; civilian control of military, 113–115, 116, 123–125, 127–131, 132; current, 208; evolution, 111, 112–113, 118–119, 199; in future, 131–133; history, 113–116; ideological control, 116, 118–119; party institutions within PLA, 116; in recent years, 123–131, 184, 189–190, 191
People's National Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat; TKR). *See* Indonesian military
People's Republic of China (PRC). *See* China
Perjuangan (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), 183
Perlmutter, Amos, 13
Peru, 12–13, 95
Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth), 96
Pham Van Dong, 143
Pham Van Tra, 141
Philippines: dispute with Indonesia, 103; military involvement in politics, 15, 199, 211; military professionalism, 199; Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), 211
Phumiphon Adunyadot, King of Thailand, 81–82

PLA. *See* People's Liberation Army
Plattner, Marc F., 15
police: in China, 123, 184; in India, 27; in Indonesia, 105, 183; internal security function, 4; in Thailand, 182
political involvement of military: in authoritarian regimes, 111–112, 192, 199; in Burma, 164–166, 199; in China, 115–116; decline in, 202–203; in developing countries, 94–95; explanations, 9–13, 15–16, 198–199; in Indonesia, 96, 97–98, 99, 101–102, 103, 109, 183, 211–212; justifications, 5, 85, 151, 153–155, 158, 160n. 22; in Latin America, 12–13, 15, 95; in new professionalism, 3, 10, 13, 95; in Pakistan, 153, 185, 199; in Philippines, 15, 199, 211; relationship to corporateness, 13–14; relationship to internal security role, 13, 16; relationship to professionalism, 9–13, 77, 154–155, 158, 210–212; role expansion, 3–4, 16, 47; skills needed, 11; in South Korea, 49, 50–51, 55–56, 199; in Taiwan, 199; in Thailand, 77–79, 84, 191, 199; threats of war and, 14–15; in Vietnam, 145, 200. See also military governments
Prabowo, 102
professionalism: definitions, 61–63. *See also* military professionalism; new professionalism
Prussia, 196

Qian Guolang, 122–123
Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam. *See* Vietnam People's Army

Republic of China (ROC). *See* Taiwan
Republic of Korea. *See* South Korea
revolution in military affairs (RMA), 208; in China, 119–120, 186; in India, 29, 186; in Vietnam, 139, 185
Rhee Syngman, 50
RMA. *See* revolution in military affairs
ROC (Republic of China). *See* Taiwan
Roh Tae-woo, 52, 204
ROK (Republic of Korea). *See* South Korea
Royal Thai Armed Forces. *See* Thai military

Sarit Thanarat, 78
Saunders, A. M. Carr, 61
Selth, Andrew, 175
Sharif, Nawaz, 155, 161n. 29
Shi Yunsheng, 126
Shushin-kai association, 40, 45n. 12
Singapore, 15
SLORC. *See* State Law and Order Restoration Council
Socialist Party (Indonesia), 96
social responsibility: definition, 2; of Indian military, 191–192, 201; of Indonesian military, 192, 193; of Japanese military, 191–192, 209; in military professionalism, 2, 191; of South Korean military, 53–54, 55, 192; of Taiwanese military, 73, 192; of Thai military, 192–193; values protected by military, 8
socioeconomic tasks of military, 5, 16; in China, 117, 193; humanitarian missions, 19, 117, 156, 193; in Indonesia, 97, 98; in Pakistan, 156;

in Vietnam, 141, 142–143, 147–148, 200
South America. *See* Latin America
South Korea: American Military Government, 49, 55; authoritarian political culture, 52, 203–204; bureaucracy, 52; civil-military relations, 47–48, 50, 54, 56–57; constitutions, 49, 52–53, 58n. 21, 203; democratization, 48, 52–53, 56; economic development, 204–205; military governments, 192, 203–206; Ministry of National Defense, 53, 54–55, 59n. 30; parliament, 52; politicians from military backgrounds, 52; relations with North Korea, 205–206
South Korean military: American influence, 49, 55; civilian control, 53, 192; corporateness, 56, 188, 191; corruption, 49, 50, 51, 57n. 8, 194; coups, 50, 51, 57n. 11, 203; defense objectives, 53, 58–59n. 26, 205–206; expertise, 53, 54; factionalism, 50, 57n. 8, 207; history, 49–50; mission, 49, 50, 53, 55, 181; modernization, 181, 208; National Defense University, 51; new professionalism, 47–48, 50–52, 55–56, 58n. 13; officers, 49, 51, 54, 57n. 7; political involvement, 49, 50–51, 55–56, 199; political neutrality, 48, 52–53; professionalism, 199, 201–202; public image, 192, 206; recruitment, 59n. 33; reforms, 53, 54–55, 56, 58n. 25; relations with politicians, 50, 54, 56–57; revival of old professionalism, 48, 52–55, 56–57, 181; social responsibility, 53–54, 55, 192; training, 49, 51, 54, 57n. 4, 59n. 30; women in, 54
South Vietnam. *See* Vietnam
Soviet Union, 112, 139
SPDC. *See* State Peace and Development Council
Sri Lanka, 8, 26–27
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 80, 165–166, 169, 173–174, 176n. 6
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 164, 166, 169, 176n. 6, 209–210
Stepan, Alfred, 3, 4–5, 10, 12–13, 89, 94, 163, 179
Storey, Robert G., 62
Suharto: corruption in regime, 205; downfall, 93, 205, 206; intervention in military promotions, 102; military support of, 93, 192; political system, 204; relations with military, 99, 109
Sukarno, 95, 96, 97, 99
Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 183
Sun Yat-sen, 63
Sundhaussen, Ulf, 98

Taiwan: democratization, 207; independence movement, 69; public attitudes toward military, 66, 192; relations with China, 72, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 182
Taiwanese military: administration, 72; air force, 64–65, 72; American advisers, 64; civilian control, 188, 192; conservativeness and isolation, 67–68; core doctrine, 68–70, 182; corporateness, 188, 191; corruption, 65, 71, 73, 194; economic

activities, 181; exercises, 70–72; expertise, 65, 66; factionalism, 73, 76n. 12; factors hindering profes 75; history, 63–65; hypocrisy, 70–72; modernization, 208; national defense role, 181–182; National Defense University, 67; navy, 64–65, 72–73, 76n. 12; officers, 63, 66; political involvement, 199; political warfare system, 68, 74; professionalism, 61, 63, 64–65, 68, 72–73, 199, 201–202; public attitudes toward, 66, 192; reforms, 73–75; relations with politicians, 69–71, 75n. 10, 112; rigid thinking, 67–68; size, 74–75; slogans, 67, 75; social responsibility, 73, 192; training, 63, 64–65, 66, 67, 73
Tang Yiau-ming, 61
Tatmadaw: air force, 169, 170, 172; corporateness, 163, 190–191; counterinsurgency operations, 172–173; Defense Services Academy (DSA), 170, 171; defense strategy, 167, 172–173; economic activities, 166; future of, 175–176; history, 163– 166, 168, 176n. 7; ideology, 164– 165; internal security role, 167, 172–173; leadership, 168–169; modernization, 173–175; National Defense College, 170–171; navy, 169, 170, 172; Officers Training School (OTS), 170, 171; organization, 168– 170; political involvement, 164– 166, 199; professionalism, 163–164, 167–175, 185–186, 199, 201–202, 209–210; recruitment, 170; relations with civilian governments, 164, 165; relations with society, 194; roles, 163–164, 169–170, 176, 193; size, 169; training, 170–172; weapons, 172, 173–174
technology. *See* revolution in military affairs; weapons
Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR; People's National Army). *See* Indonesian military
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI; Indonesian Armed Forces). *See* Indonesian military
Thailand: businessmen in politics, 85, 86; civil-military relations, 77, 84–85, 87–88; Communist Party, 78, 87; constitutions, 85, 182; Defense Ministry, 83; democratization, 79, 84, 86, 88, 182, 192, 205; economic crisis, 83, 86–88, 182; economic development, 85–86, 88, 205; foreign relations, 80–81, 87, 182; military governments, 78, 192, 204, 205, 206; obstacles to democratization, 77; parliament, 88–89; police, 182
Thai military: arms purchases, 83, 87–88; civilian control, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88–89, 188–189; corporateness, 188; corruption, 182, 194; coups, 78, 79; disengagement from politics, 77–78, 79–80, 85, 182, 188; doctrine, 78–79; economic development role, 81–82, 182; effects of economic crisis, 86–88; factionalism, 207; future roles, 88–89, 182; legal power, 80; mission, 79–80, 85, 87, 181; modernization, 83, 182, 208; national defense role, 82–84, 87; political involvement, 77–79, 84, 191, 199; professionalism, 77, 80–81, 85,

199, 201–202; public image, 192; social responsibility, 192–193
TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat). *See* Indonesian military
TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). *See* Indonesian military
training, military: in Burma, 170–172; in China, 121–122, 184; Huntington on, 37; increased focus on, 186; in India, 20, 25, 28–29, 32n. 2; in Indonesia, 99–101, 108; in Japan, 36, 37–40; in Pakistan, 155, 159n. 8; in South Korea, 49, 51, 54, 57n. 4, 59n. 30; in Taiwan, 63, 64–65, 66, 67, 73; in Vietnam, 139, 142, 143–146, 147, 185, 190
Truong Chinh, 143

United Nations: peacekeeping forces, 38, 39. *See also* Korean War
United States: Gulf War, 120, 125, 208; military advisers in Taiwan, 64; military government of Korea, 49, 55; military-industrial complex, 14; political system, 15; promotion of democracy, 206; relations with Asian countries, 128, 152, 198; Vietnam War, 139, 140
U.S. Army, 41
U.S. Department of Defense, 61
United States military: professionalism, 195–196; responsibilities, 74
U.S. Navy, 83

values: of Indonesian military, 98–99; of societies, 8
VCP. *See* Vietnam Communist Party
Vietnam: defense industry, 138, 140, 143, 147; dispute with Indonesia, 103; invasion of Cambodia, 79, 81, 87, 140; relations with Thailand, 81, 87; wars, 139–140
Vietnam Communist Party (VCP): Central Committee, 138; relations with VPA, 137–138, 185, 189, 190, 191, 199, 209
Vietnam People's Army (VPA; Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam): Chinese assistance, 138; corruption, 194; defense strategy, 137, 141, 147, 200; economic activities, 140–141, 142–143, 147–148; expertise, 138, 139, 146, 185; history, 138–140; ideological indoctrination, 137, 138, 143, 144–145, 147–148, 190; internal security role, 142, 147, 184–185; laws on, 145–146, 190; modernization, 140, 142, 147, 184; national defense role, 141, 147; navy, 139, 140, 144; officers, 144, 145–146; political involvement, 145, 200; political officers, 138, 144–145, 148n. 6; professionalism, 137–139, 142, 145–147, 185, 190, 199–200, 202; relations with VCP, 137–138, 185, 189, 190, 191, 199, 209; roles, 139–143, 147–148, 183, 184–185, 193; size, 147; socioeconomic roles, 141, 142–143, 147–148, 200; standardization, 142, 147, 190; training, 139, 142, 143–146, 147, 185, 190; weapons, 138, 139, 140, 142
Vietnam War, 139, 140
violence. *See* management of violence
Vo Nguyen Giap, 143
VPA. See Vietnam People's Army

Wahyono, Rear Admiral, 104
Wang Ruilin, 126, 127
Wang Shu-min, 70
Wang Zhuxu, 122
weapons technology, 120, 208. *See also* revolution in military affairs
Welch, Claude E., 6
Widjojo, Agus, 104
Wilson, P. A., 61
Wimol Wongvanich, 80, 84
women: in South Korean military, 54
World War II, 22, 64

Xiao Ke, 126
Xing Shizhong, 126
Xu Zehou, 127

Yahya Khan, A. M., 153, 160–161n. 27
Yang Baibing, 113, 126
Yang brothers, 113–114, 126
Yang Dezhi, 126
Yeh, General, 65
Yin Ching-feng, 65, 71, 73
Yin Chung-wen, 65
You Xigui, 126
Yu Po-chuan, 67

Zhang Wannian, 126, 127
Zhang Zhen, 122, 124, 126
Zhao Ziyang, 125
Zhu Rongji, 128, 131
Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, 153, 156, 160n. 18

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Ensuring Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Asia, by Harold A. Trinkunas. East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security Series, No. 1, October 1999, 29 pp.

The Armed Forces and Internal Security in Asia: Preventing the Abuse of Power, by Kit Collier. East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security Series, No. 2, December 1999, 23pp.

Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of Asia's Socialist Soldiers, by Andrew Scobell. East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security Series, No. 3, January 2000, 27 pp.

Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian Military, by Dewi Fortuna Anwar. East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security Series, No. 4, February 2001, 44 pp.

Dysfunctional Democracy and the Dirty War in Sri Lanka, by Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake. East-West Center AsiaPacific Issues Paper, No. 52, May 2001, 8 pp.

Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Forthcoming from Stanford University Press, August 2001.

Publications Sales Office
East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601
Email: ewcbooks@EastWestCenter.org
Tel.: (808) 944-7145
Fax: (808) 944-7376
Website: www.EastWestCenter.org

Military professionalism is an influential but controversial concept in the study of civil-military relations. Investigating the conception, practice, evolution, and consequences of military professionalism in ten Asian countries, this study advances three propositions. First, old military professionalism is on the rise in Asia. Even in countries that exhibit features of new professionalism, management of violence is becoming the central function of military establishments. Second, the rise of old professionalism is explained by the reduced role of coercion in governance and the shift in the distribution of power against the military. These developments compel and facilitate the development of a professional and apolitical military. Third, the apolitical orientation of the military is not a consequence of the development of military professionalism but an outcome of a change in the distribution of power in favor of political and civil society. Such change has typically led to military exit from politics and the limitation of its role to the security arena.

The ten Asian countries investigated in this study are India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Burma. Contributors to the volume are largely serving or retired military officers as well as scholars working in military institutions. Authoritative introductory and concluding chapters by Muthiah Alagappa provide a contextualizing and interpretive framework for the empirical studies.

Muthiah Alagappa is senior fellow at the East-West Center and editor of Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific, a book series published by Stanford University Press. His research has focused on international politics and security, regional institutions, and political change in Asia. His publications include *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,* and *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia,* all published by Stanford University Press.

EAST-WEST CENTER
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96848-1601
www.EastWestCenter.org

ISBN 0-86638-196-1