Chinese Muslims in Colonial and Postcolonial Indonesia

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SYNOPSIS
This paper is a historical survey of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. The author reviews Chinese migration to the Indonesian archipelago in the pre-colonial era, the forces that stimulated conversion to Islam, and the hybrid cultures that emerged from this process. The effects of the colonial and post-colonial periods on this process are also examined. Finally, the author focuses on the role of post-colonial organizations in challenging, defending and/or asserting new historical, Islamic and Chinese identities.

Introduction
When asked in 1979, Junus Jahja, a prominent Chinese Muslim leader, who was born and had lived for long in Indonesia, expressed his self-identity as: “I am a Muslim, an Indonesian, and a Chinese.” This personal statement illustrates not only how an individual can simultaneously be Muslim, nationalist, and Chinese, but also raises an important question relating to the studies of Diaspora: How did Chinese Muslims identify themselves in Indonesia, during the colonial and post-colonial periods? This article seeks to examine what it meant to be a Chinese Muslim in Indonesia. It mainly argues that many Chinese Muslims in Indonesia were hardly “diasporic” because they felt that conversion to Islam was the way of assimilating to local Indonesian culture. Here I would coin the term “post-diasporic experience” to refer to the situation where Chinese Muslims were born in Indonesia and thought of new boundary identification beyond their homeland and sought to assimilate with the “local.” “Post-diasporic Chinese” also means that they wanted to challenge or counter the “diasporic Chinese” identity. “Identities,” in plural form, implies that Chinese who converted to Islam had different and changing identities according to changing circumstances.

This paper begins with an historical survey of Chinese Muslims from the Dutch colonial era and then discusses Chinese Muslim identities in post-independence Indonesia by focusing on some Chinese Muslim individuals and organizations.

The Experience of Chinese Muslims in the Dutch Colonial Era
Southeast Asia has been among the most attractive destinations for Chinese to migrate and to live. There have been a variety of reasons why Chinese left their homes: political, religious, economic, or a combination of all. Nearly all the “overseas Chinese” were not from the Han center of China, but from the peripheral regions of Fujian and Guangdong. But most of the Chinese in Southeast Asia decided to settle in the new countries. This migration pattern affected the ways in
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which Chinese expressed their identities in the host countries.

In the pre-World War II era, prior to Indonesia’s independence in 1945, many of the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies came to identify themselves with their homeland, China. These Chinese were later called Totok (originally meant ‘full-blooded’). Totok Chinese were apparently “diaporic” in the sense that they still had strong attachment to their homeland. However, the Peranakan Chinese, who had lived in the Netherlands East Indies for a long time, had lost much of their Chinese culture and no longer spoke Chinese, and could thus be regarded as post-diaporic Chinese. Many mixed marriages had taken place, and the Peranakan had become part of their local society. But because the colonial state and society put much emphasis on the concept of ‘race,’ the Indonesian people were not “free” and the Indonesian nation was experiencing a flood of new Chinese immigration, hence Chinese communities were split along racial and political lines. A Chinese figure, Tjoet Bou San, for example, was orientated toward China and believed that the only road open to the Chinese was that of “Chinese nationalism.” Kwee Hing Tjiat, on the other hand, put forward the idea of “total assimilation” with native Indonesians. However, before World War II, Indonesian nationalism was still weak among many of the Chinese. The idea of Indonesian nationalism did not gain strength among the Chinese until Indonesian independence in 1945. In short, during the colonial period, two general types of Chinese had been discerned in Indonesia: the “pure-blood Chinese” (Totok) and “half-blood Chinese” (Peranakan), but the Totok gained greater supports. Consequently, debates among these groups took place.

However, the Peranakan had actually existed long before Indonesian independence in 1945. Assimilation had long taken place. Some historical evidences show that there had been significant numbers of Muslim Chinese individuals before World War II. French historians, Denys Lombard and Claudine Salomon, for example, have drawn our attention to some historical evidence which shows that the Chinese had been able to assimilate to Indonesian local culture since the fifteenth century. The Chinese Muslim named Ma Huan, who accompanied Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho, 1371-1433), also known by the name of Sam Po on his series of expeditions to the South Seas/Indian Ocean (1405-1433), reported at the time of their passage through East Java that the population was already made up of three groups of people: natives, Muslims (Huihu), and Chinese (Tangren, many of whom were Muslims). Ma Huan reported that the natives had tousled hair and bare feet and worshiped ghosts; the Muslims were foreign (mostly Indian and Arab) traders that wore clean dress and ate good food. According to Ma Huan, the Chinese came during the Tang Dynasty era (627-906 C.E) from the cities of Guangdong, Changchou, Chuan-chou and others.

In China itself, Muslim communities had existed at Canton as far back as the 9th century or earlier and Muslim merchants played a crucial role in coastal towns of China, such as Canton and Quanzhou in the 13th and 14th centuries. These Chinese merchants had commercial and cultural contacts with people in Champa and Java. Chinese Muslims in the 9th century fled to Southeast Asia because of political chaos in China. Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Persians in Canton had to leave their homeland and find new settlements. Many of them went to Java. A Javanese historian, Slamet Muljana, used these stories and other evidence (such as documents found in two temples: Klinteng Sam Po Kong in Semarang and Klinteng Talang in Sirebon) to suggest that the Chinese themselves also participated in the Islamization of Java. A controversial book, a Javanese text, called Serat Dermagandul, considered some of the Muslim missionaries/saints in Java (reals) to be of Chinese origin (Peranakan). The well-known Portuguese traveler Tomé Pires observed that the Javanese used to have contacts with the Chinese and that Islam had been widespread among the cosmopolitan population of the coastal areas, made up of Chinese, Arabs, Gujaratis, Bengalis, and other nationalities. Hence, when the Dutch came in the 16th century, many Chinese already lived in the archipelago. Moreover, many of them had been Muslim and played a crucial role in the Islamization of Java and other islands in the archipelago.

From the end of the 16th century, the account of the first Dutch fleet makes it clear that one must distinguish “pure-blood Chinese”, Totok, that is, those remaining loyal to their ancestral religion and region, from those who have lived here for a long time and who have adopted the Mohammedan faith. Edmund Scott (1603-5) had a report on these two kinds of Chinese: “The Chineses (sic) are very craftic (sic) people in trad-
ing, using all kind of cosoning (sic) and deceit which may possible be devised. They have no pride in them, nor will refuse any labour, except they turne (sic) Javans (as many of them doe when they have done a murther (sic) or some other villancic (sic)).

Another Dutch report in 1617 stated that, according to the Javanesse themselves, he uses as his counsel nothing but greedy, false thieves: shaven Chinese. At Makassar (Sulawesi), a local chronicle alludes to a family descended from a Chinese Muslim and says of his origins as follows:

They were two brothers, originating from the land of the Hsiu-hai (that is Muslims come from China), the elder was called Panlaoetia, the younger Laitji, both of them had left their country after disappointments. They had boarded boats and migrated towards Cirebon in Java. There Laitji married the daughter of the Tumenggung (high-ranking administrative officer) of Batang (to the east of Pekalongan), after which they shared their fortune and Panlaoetia asked his younger brother for permission to continue his voyage in the direction of the east as far as Makassar and up to the land of Sanrabone. There he stayed and sought to earn a living by all means possible.

While the previous centuries had scattered historical evidence the eighteenth century had more sources on the existence of Chinese Muslims. Thomas Horsfield (1848) wrote on the Chinese Muslims who exploited the tin mines at Bangka as follows:

Several families, the names of the heads of which are recorded by the inhabitants of Minto (Muntok), formed the first stock of colonization; the chief of these was the father-in-law of Raden Lumbu (i.e. Sultan Badr al-Din); they were of Chinese descent, but their ancestors for several generations had embraced the Mahomedan (sic)... the physiognomy of the present generation evidently indicates their Chinese derivation...

It was a habit of the Sultans of Palembang to marry one of the daughters of these worthy people of Muntok. For Palembang, Sumatera, Storm van’s Gravesande reported that the Chinese who converted to Islam “distinguish themselves, like elsewhere, by their dress, their morals, and their religion, but more than anywhere else in the Indies, they were attracted to local dress, and it has resulted in a large number of them becoming Muslims in the course of time; many of the Palembangese have, moreover, in the past, like today, married Chinese. Most of these Chinese women are of Muslim religion.”

For Java, there are more examples of Muslims of Chinese origin. Lombard and Salmon talk about the family of Surabaya who converted to Islam and assimilated into the surrounding Javanese society to the point of “forgetting” their origin. For Semarang, Java, there was a report suggesting the existence of kampung Peranakan (local-born Chinese village):

As the Parnakkangs (sic) have become Mohammedans or are by birth, they live more in the style of the country than in the Chinese way. Their job is generally fishing and the navy, hiring themselves out of sailors or skippers of entire vessels...they are whiter than the normal to be Javanese but not as white as the Chinese. They marry Javanese women; this results in mixed blood which becomes less so from generation to generation.

The increasing Peranakan Muslim community merged into or mixed with the local Indonesian societies from the second half of the 19th century onwards. For example, a fair number of Chinese Muslims participated in local anti-colonial wars. Raden Prawiro allied with a Chinese Muslim named Boengseng in an uprising in 1839 against the Dutch. Boengseng spoke native and Arabic languages and concealed himself under an Arab costume. Another case concerns Ibu Melati, a shaman of Chinese origin, who helped an uprising in Tangerang in 1924. Another demonstration of Chinese participation in nationalist movements was when different youth organizations proclaimed The Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) on 28 October 1928. Although no Chinese organization was involved, a young Chinese Peranakan named Johan Muhammad Chai, a delegation from the Young Islamiten Bond, signed the Oath. Other Chinese, who were non-Muslims, were also present in the meeting.

The early part of the twentieth century also witnessed an increasing movement of Islamic propagation (dakwah) by Chinese Muslims. In Sulawesi, there was Ong Kie Ho, the founder of an Islamic Party. In Medan, Haji Yap A Siong (d.1984), alias Haji Abdussomad, born in Canton at the end of the 19th century, propagated Islam in Medan, Sumatera and in 1936 founded the Muslim Chinese Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa). The Muslim Chinese Union, according to a local newspaper dated November 3, 1936, received land to be used as a center of Islamic propagation. In 1938, it is reported, the union’s membership totaled 4,800 people in Pa-
lembang, and 9,500 in Jakarta. The Indonesian Islamic Chinese Party published a magazine called Wasi-
lah (Medium), issued on 1936 for the first time with
Tjoa Goan Lian and Tan Kim Peng as chief-editors. In
Makassar, Liem Kie Chic founded another party, The
Indonesian Islamic Chinese Party (Partai Tong-
hoa Islam Indonesia) which was aimed at increasing
the prestige of Chinese Indonesians through
Islamization.

It is worth discussing the belief that Chinese Muslims
contributed little to nationalist movements during the
colonial era. It has been argued that such Islamic or-
ganizations as the Sarekat Islam (Union of Islam) wer
founded in 1912 to attack, rather than accommodate,
Chinese interests. Leo Suryadinata, for example, ar-
gued that the Sarekat Islam aimed to protect their
business interests against Chinese competition. He
believed that it was anti-Chinese, and never appealed
to the Peranakan Chinese. Chinese Muslims in
coastal areas in East Java, for example, were said to
hold the position as regent (bupati) under the VOC
system.

Thus, the colonial era witnessed a gradual growth in
the numbers of Chinese Muslims; some had been Mus-
lim before coming to Indonesia, but many converted
to Islam during their stay in the country. After they be-
came Muslim, they participated in religious movements
in different local areas.

Hybrid Cultures, Diverse Religiosities

In different places, the Chinese Peranakan Muslims
developed “hybrid cultures,” combining local, Islamic/Arabic, and Chinese attributes or elements.
These were made possible largely because the Dutch
colonial state did not seem to have prohibited Chinese
cultural expressions. The Chinese shaped the archi-
tectural culture of the mosque (masjid). Many mosques
had architecture, décor or furnishings by Chinese arti-
sans. For example, the old mosques in Jepara and in
Maluku showed a circular door in the style of the
gardens of Suzhou. Other mosques had pulpits (minbar)
whose décor, adorned with gilded wood, revealed the
styles of the Cantonese cabinet-makers. In Ban-
ten, the Pacinan Mosque (Mesjid Pecinan), which re-
mained in 1902, had a European minaret and Chinese
ornaments. Another mosque, Mesjid Jami Angke in
Jakarta, had some Chinese ornaments on its gate and
ropes like that of Chinese temple (keleteng). Traditional drums called bedag, a percussion instrument for
calling prayers, could also be found there. To hang the
drums on part of mosque building might be a Chinese
architectural influence. This practice has been adopted
outside the Chinese Muslim community in Java and
other parts of Indonesia.

Apart from the mosques, one also finds a large num-
ber of sacred tombs attributed to Muslims of Chinese
origin. For example, in a mosque in Angke district, a
Muslim tombstone was found with a Chinese inscription. A tomb which dated back to 1792 near the Mosque
of Kebon Jeruk, used Chinese and Arabic words, with
dragons and other Chinese ornaments. Many of the
holy tombs were built in an Islamic style, with a stele at
the two extremities, but some have kept the Chinese
model in the form of a tumulus.

Chinese Muslims also contributed to local literary
development. Their Chinese origins can only be traced
if the authors reveal it themselves in the introduction
or in the course of the work. The use of reading rooms
(taman bacaan) – attested to in China under the Tang
Dynasty (618-907) – was found in the Indonesian archi-
ipelago, in towns such as Palembang and Jakarta. We
also know of the famous copyist, Ching Sa’id Allah
Muhammad, who transcribed a great number of manu-
scripts while employed at the secretarial office at Bata-
via in the second half of the 19th century.

By the colonial era, Chinese Muslims had demonstra-
ted a variety of religious orientations too. As ex-
pressed in the local literature, three tendencies of the
Chinese Muslims during the nineteenth century can be
identified: Kejawen or Javanese mysticism, Islamic
orthodoxy, and political militancy. The first tendency,
Javanese mysticism, was represented by Sera Tawawuf
or “mystical treatise” which claimed to teach some
knowledge of Islamic religion (bah kauroeh agami
Islam), but adopted Javanese ideas. Another work in
this Javanese mystic line was a poem called Sair Ilmoe
Sedjati dan Sair Nasehat or a “Poem about the True
Knowledge and Poem of Admonition” re-edited in 1921
by Tan Khoen Swie at Kediri, East Java and attributed
to Kyai Kiem Mas (1834-96). Kyai Keim Mas was a
member of the great Han family and a convert to Islam,
but he endorsed a type of Javanese syncretism.

The second tendency was Islamic orthodoxy, repre-
sented by the work entitled Sair Tjoko dan Petjoen or
“Poem on the Ghost Festival and Boat Races Festival”, containing technical Hokkien terms, but also critical statements of perceived “Chinese superstition.” The anonymous author, who was a Chinese Peranakan converted to Islam, described different great festivals of the Javanese community: first, the Ghost Festival (the Avalorambana of the Buddhists, usually called Pesta rebuton or Tjioko in Java); second, that of the boat races or Petjoen (Pecun), which are to commemorate the death of the famous poet and loyal minister Qu Yuan (B.C. 332-295); finally, that of the Chinese New Year of Capgome. The author criticized the “superstitious Chinese” and the “unscrupulous Muslims” who came together in the festivals. The author, for example, lamented seeing his fellow Muslims hurl themselves at the offerings exposed on the scaffolding to snatch them (tjioko, literally “to scramble for the offerings made to the ghosts”):

Here they are united, these insane Muslims
Swallowing their saliva and shaking their heads….
They also gobble down Chinese food,
There are lots of vegetables and pork…
And if there is alcohol in a bowl,
They waste no time in lapping it up…
The Muslim women gather,
All against the Sengke and the Peranakan,
What aberrant morals!
By the riverbanks, they all eat together…
The Chinese eat, the others gorge themselves,
The Chinese bathe, the others paddle,
The Chinese celebrate their New Year, and they get drunk….43

The third tendency of Chinese Muslim orientation was the political, as exemplified by the work of the Sair Serkat Islam or “Poem on the Sarekat Islam”, published at Batavia by Kho Tjeng Bie in 1913. Sarekat Islam was an Islamic organization established by Islamic traders and landlords in 1912 to strengthen Muslim economic and political networks and to break the Chinese commercial monopoly. Making repeated references to Muslim faith (Bismillahi ioe permoeakan kalam or “in the name of God, such is the beginning”), the text “Poem on the Sarekat Islam” was addressed to a converted Peranakan public and makes an apology on behalf of Sarekat Islam which had just come into existence. However, the following text indicates a criticism of the perception that Sarekat Islam was aimed at challenging or attacking the Chinese.44 It implies that the author might be one of the members of the Sarekat Islam or at least was sympathetic with the organization.

And still at Keputran [district of Surabaya] in Java,
The natives fought with the Chinese,
Several have lost their lives,
And the Sarekat lost face.
The Muslim nation
Has suffered for decades,
Throughout the country and in the heart of the villages,
It is as if one was being tortured.
Many have told
At the time of the events in Semarang,
That the Sarekat Islam had clearly said
That they were going to attack the Chinese.
All these mad words,
It is to be hoped that you do not listen to them.45

Apart from such local literature, Chinese Muslims had also translated the Arabic Koran into Chinese language since the seventeenth century. But the Chinese translations didn’t appear until 1932 by Wang Wenthing, then in 1943 by Liu Tjin-piao, again in 1946 by Wang Tjing-tjai and in 1947 by Yang Tjung-ming.46 These translations show how some attempts at translating religious books had been made to bridge the gap between Chinese converts and their religious scriptures.

Thus, by the early twentieth century, there had been different orientations among the Chinese Peranakan Muslims; some of them tended to be more consciously religious (“orthodox”) than others (“syncretic” or “hybrid”), but some were more political in tone. Such diversity in religiosity indicated that Chinese Muslims had assimilated to the local cultures in a variety of ways. Related to religious orientations was language, an issue we shall discuss in the following paragraphs.

Most Chinese Muslims from the nineteenth century onwards used Malay language, rather than Chinese or Arabic language. The Chinese Muslims – as part of the Peranakan - were characterized by a loss of competence in Chinese languages and the adoption of the lingua franca (Malay) as well as the regional/local languages (such as Javanese). As Ellen Rafferty pointed out, the Chinese Peranakan learned to speak languages that were useful and accessible to them, and they chose as their home language the most advantageous one. Generally speaking, the majority of Peranakan did not maintain their original language, for only the elite were able to hire tutors from China.47 The elite continued attachment to their homeland and its culture, and were in a strong economic position as intermediaries between the higher-level European
economy and the lower level Indonesian one. For the elite, only after 1875 did Hokkien-language schools became popular in Indonesia, and 217 such schools were operating in Java and Madura by 1899. Dutch-Chinese schools (HCS) were established in 1908. However, among the graduates from HCS were Chinese who later converted to Islam in the postcolonial period. However, most of the Chinese Peranakan did not have the chance to learn Chinese or Dutch. Instead, they spoke Malay or a local language.

The Commissie voor de Volksleer (Balai Pustaka), which emerged from the Office of Native Affairs, was established to further spread Romanized Malay (rumi) among the inhabitants of the Indies, following up on the vigorous activities of the rumi presses under Eurasians and Chinese Peranakan from 1856. Chinese Peranakan had learned the Malay language, and it was through this knowledge of Malay that some of them converted to Islam. Thus, Malay language became the language of local Islam in the Netherlands East Indies. In the following, we shall address the perceptions of outsiders toward Chinese Muslims during the colonial era.

Dutch Perceptions of Chinese Muslims

Dutch officials usually called Chinese Muslims “geschooren Chineezen” (shaved Chinese with a pigtail, orang-orang Tionghoa kazeran). In Banten, West Java, Chinese Muslims were commonly bald-headed with a pigtail. They also wore local dress and sometimes had a local name. The Dutch called them also “getorkende Chineezen” (the Chinese who have changed). These terms, however, later underwent a shift in connotation. Geschooren Chineezen came to mean “the Chinese who have just come with pigtail on their heads,” and Chinese Muslims came to be called Peranakan. The Peranakan later referred to a person whose mother was a local woman but whose father was Chinese. In Sumenep, Madura, there were some 40 Chinese Muslims called Peranakan. They lived local life, using local name and wearing local dress. The Dutch officials initially regarded them as the natives, but later on classified them as Chinese.

In terms of civil status, the Dutch colonials created three racial categories: Europeans (Dutch), Foreign Orientals (mainly Chinese, also Arabs), and Natives (Inlanders). Each group was governed by different laws and had different rights. The local Chinese were considered to be “native” for legal purposes, such as when a Muslim married a Chinese woman, and subject to local courts, but considered as “non-natives” when the Chinese, for example, intended to own farmland. In Batavia, the Chinese were required to pay higher taxes than the native population. If the Chinese became Muslims, they were looked upon and treated in the same way as natives. In 1755, however, the Dutch specified that Chinese Muslims would be required to continue paying taxes and they would not be given freedom to travel. In Banten, for example, conversion to Islam did not immediately reflect on societal status: they still had to pay higher tax and only the children of these Chinese converts would legally be native or local. These regulations, as Dutch scholar Karel Steenbrink argued, were issued to keep the Chinese from becoming Muslims.

Although many Chinese (including the government of China) felt that they were being discriminated against by the Dutch colonial government, the Dutch still viewed the Chinese as being higher in status than the natives. Chinese were seen as “hard workers” and the natives as “lazy.” For example, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the founder of the Dutch colony in Batavia, enthused, “there are no other people who can serve us better than the Chinese.” Coen sought to get Chinese immigrants and sent expeditionary parties to kidnap Chinese from the Chinese mainland.

Thus, generally speaking, the Dutch viewed the Chinese Muslims as a group between the Chinese (foreign orientals) and the Muslim natives (inlanders). The Dutch sometimes regarded them as Chinese so that they could impose higher taxes on them, but in other times they could view the Chinese Muslims as simply “natives.” The Dutch racial distinction contributed to the tense relationships between the Chinese and the natives in later periods. But now, we will consider the attitudes of fellow Chinese toward Chinese converts.

Non-Muslim Chinese Perceptions of Chinese Muslims

In many cases, Dutch attitudes toward Chinese and natives on the one hand, and the actual conversion of some Chinese to Islam on the other, caused tension among the Chinese populations. Thus, the Totok Chinese who remained loyal to the traditions of their an-
cestors in China looked unfavorably upon the holy tombs (kramat), which they called shengmu and saw as a sign of merging into a foreign society (ru fan). As Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon suggested, most of these holy tombs were in an Islamic style, “with a stele at the two extremes, but a few kept the Chinese model in the form of a tumulus.” The development of collective ancestral temples and funeral associations in significant numbers led Chinese communities to stop the Islamization process. In addition, the rules of the association in Surabaya in 1863 by the Peranakan Chinese of Fujian were aimed to regulate the question of marriages and funerals in the heart of their community, to warn members against the cults of Muslim tombs in which the Chinese took part, as well as against the se-lamatan, or religious meal and communal feast, another practice which became equally common in certain Peranakan circles. Moreover, Chinese overseas nationalists during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also sought to “re-sinicize” the Peranakan, and to prevent other Chinese immigrants from being converts.

In the colonial society, Islam was commonly associated with a lower socio-economic group and hence not attractive to many Chinese. The Chinese convert, Abdul Karim Oey (Oei Tjeng Hien), whom we shall discuss again below, told the story of his conversion during the colonial period. Oey was born in Padang, Sumatera in 1905, and converted to Islam in 1930. When he proclaimed his new religion, the chief and the community around him in Bengkulu mocked him severely and boycotted his activities. Even his father stopped acknowledging him as his son. His father once said, “You are a well-to-do person, from a good family, why do you enter Melayu? They wear bad and ugly dresses.”

In fact, many Chinese who were poor converted to Islam. Yet, the Chinese converts not only came from poor families; some of them were part of the elite. Tjan Toe Some, a Sinologue, and Tjan Tjoe Siem, a scholar of Islamic and Javanese culture, from Solo, were born Muslims. They studied at Leiden University before World War II. Both were descendants of Chinese Muslims who had come to the archipelago before 1800. Among these Chinese who had lived for generations on Java was a Chinese Muslim family who aided Prince Diponegoro during the Java war (1825-1830) and due to their support, Prince Diponegoro granted them land in Solo.

Hamka, a Islamic leader of the Muhammadiyah organization from Padang, knew some Chinese Muslims before the independence period, including two Chinese Muslims who he met in the early 1930s. As Hamka became a teacher of Islam in Ujung Pandang between 1931-34, he met Tonghao converts. He remembered the two Muslims of Chinese origin named Baba Kasim and Baba Bidol. Baba Kasim was well known for his ownership of a publishing company which received orders from the government. Baba Bidol (Abdullah) was an elderly man who had good connections with the Bugis people. For Hamka, their conversion to Islam increased, rather than reduced their prestige. Hamka admitted that during the colonial era, for a Chinese individual to be a Muslim meant to downgrade his or herself to an “inlander,” i.e. native, since Chinese in general were regarded as higher in status than the natives. But for Islamic leaders such as Hamka, Chinese converts were just as Islamic and nationalist as other Muslims and Indonesians.

Thus, the Dutch and the Chinese viewed Chinese Muslims unfavorably. During the colonial period, conversion to Islam for Chinese was viewed as downgrading one’s social status. Yet, as we shall see in the postcolonial era, evidence exists which suggests that Islamic leaders viewed Chinese converts to Islam more favorably and positively than in earlier periods. Also, more Chinese Muslim organizations and figures became increasingly assimilated to Indonesia and became vocal in expressing their identities and pursuing their specific interests.

The Experience in Postcolonial Era

The postcolonial period witnessed more Chinese gradually converting to Islam. Many Chinese attempted to make some historical reference to the past, to the history of Zheng He as a Muslim traveler and perhaps a preacher in Indonesia in the 15th century. The postcolonial Chinese Muslims attempted to assert their historical participation in both nationalism and the Islamization of the country. They emphasized that there existed not only Chinese who converted to Islam but also Chinese who had been Muslims before coming to Indonesia and had preached Islam there. Some have said: “The conversion of Chinese to Islam today is
simply to bring back the history; “Chinese are one group of the Indonesian Muslim ancestors;” “The Chinese played a very important role in the Islamization of Indonesians.” It becomes apparent that Chinese Muslims attempted to legitimize their historical presence and “indigenousness” within the on-going tensions between the local and the non-local in post-colonial Indonesia. The tensions can be discerned in various Chinese figures and associations that developed in the postcolonial era.

**Abdul Karim Oey and the Chinese Muslim Association (PITI)**

One of the prominent Chinese Muslim figures in postcolonial Indonesia is Abdul Karim Oey (originally named Oey Tjeng Hien). Oey Tjeng Hien (1905-1988) was a second generation Chinese Indonesian. His parents came from Fujian (Hokkien) Province in southern China and had migrated to Indonesia in the mid-nineteenth century. Oey’s father was a merchant and sent him to HCS, a Dutch school for Chinese children, and consequently Oey became an Adventist Christian, although he never actually practiced Christianity, as he admitted later. He went into business in Bengkulu. He said that his “Chinese soul” and the influence of the Minangkabau (Padang) made him want to leave home and become a merchant. His work often took him to Jakarta. Oey acknowledged that at first he became a Buddhist and Confucian. Then he converted to Christianity. Oey said that Adventist Christianity did not bring him peace. He felt that “the light of God began to illuminate his soul.” He felt drawn to Islam and began to study the religion. He converted to Islam at the age of 25. Since his religious knowledge was still lacking, he studied Islam with a teacher named Fikir Daud.

After becoming a Muslim, Oey’s relationship with his family was becoming more distant. On the other hand, his relationship with the local Muslims became closer, especially with the Sumatran people in the area he was born. He was able to persuade his father to convert as well. He became a preacher when he felt that his understanding of Islam was sufficient. For example, when someone wanted to give Oey a zakat (a religious alms/donation), he responded: “I am not a muallaf (new convert entitled to zakat); I am a Muslim preacher. I consider myself as a leader. I am well-to-do and certain in my belief in Islam. A Muallaf still has to be convinced. It would be better to give the zakat to someone with a greater claim, a poor person who belongs to one of the eight groups entitled zakat.”

Oey’s identities changed according to political circumstances. Oey founded a branch of the Muhammadiyah organization (established in 1912) in Bintuhan. Then he moved to Bengkulu as Muhammadiyah’s consul. He was close to President Soekarno while in exile. Oey remained active in the Muhammadiyah during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945). When Japan surrendered, and the Masyumi Party was founded, Oey became party chief in Bengkulu. When the Dutch initiated military action in 1948, Oey and some other figures became guerrilla fighters. Then, he moved to Jakarta and became a member of Majelis Tanwir (Council) of Muhammadiyah (1952-1973). Oey was head of the Muhammadiyah Economic Council (1964-1973). Apart from his entrepreneurial activities with other Chinese, he also sat on the Masyumi Party Council (1957-1960). When Masyumi debated the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), he sided with the anti-communists because he felt PKI was anti-Islamic. When Soekarno dissolved the Masyumi Party, Oey founded the Organization of Chinese Muslims of Indonesia (PITI).

Oey and other Chinese Muslims saw that one of the ways of asserting Islamic and national identity was through the creation of associations. PITI was and is still the most prominent one. The Muslim Chinese Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa) and The Chinese Muslim Union (Persatuan Tionghoa Muslim), which were established before independence, merged into a new organization called Indonesian Chinese Islamic Union (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, PITI) on July 6, 1963. This organization had many branches. One of its branches was in Jogjakarta, where Islamic propagation among the Chinese was undertaken through weekly and monthly Islamic studies. In 1971, PITI claimed that its members had reached 100,000 Chinese Muslims, predominantly in Pontianak and Medan. They said that some of the reasons reasons for Chinese conversion were self-awareness, love, and economic difficulty, among others. A PITI activist said that Tionghoa Muslims should find Islam easy to observe and should not be shy and hide from showing Islamic identity. M. Abnar Romli wondered why other Chinese should be overwhelmed by those Chinese converting to Islam. He believed that the Chinese played a crucial historical role in Islamization and
therefore no one should be surprised by the fact that the number of Chinese converting to Islam had now increased. 

In 1972, this organization changed its name into The Union of Imam, Tautid, and Islam (Persatuan Imam Tauhid Islam), still using the same abbreviation, PITI, but without using Chinese terms. The shift in the name of organization showed a shift in identity due to changing circumstances. The leaders of PITI claimed that by dissolving the old organization (with the term Tionghoa) they wanted to allay doubts about the Islamic character of the Chinese Muslims for all parties. They believed that Chinese Islam was not unlike native Islam. They also said that this change was to ease the process of Chinese assimilating to the native Muslim norms. According to one of its leaders, Junus Jahja, the change occurred as a response to criticisms against the exclusively racial notion that the old PITI title retained. Yet, in practice, despite the change, Chinese and non-Chinese had known before World War II that PITI was a unique organization which aimed to promote Islam among Indonesian Chinese. 

It is worth noting that before group leaders changed the name, they saw that the use of the term Tionghoa had its pros and cons. Some non-Chinese figures, such as Hamka, Rasyidi, Mukhlis Rosi, and Lejen Sudirman contended that the word Tionghoa had its own attractiveness. However, according to Tempo magazine, in some regions, such as Aceh, Sukabumi, Cirebon, and Medan, Chinese came to religious meetings in abundance, but in other regions such as Solo, the term Tionghoa made Chinese individuals worry about the old Baperki, a Chinese organization which aimed to re-sinicize the Peranakan and to promote Chinese nationalism. For the Chinese in Solo, PITI with a new name (without Tionghoa) was more beneficial and attractive. Yet, according to Abdul Karim Oey, the new name PITI without Tionghoa did not receive the expected support and sympathy it had received previously from the Chinese themselves.

Nonetheless, the number of members gradually increased. In 1988, Junus Jahja estimated that there were some 50 Chinese Muslim preachers in Indonesia and some 50,000 Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. The preachers included the young Burnadi (Tjhia Sin Hak) and Alifuddin El Islamy (Sim Song Thian). Burnadi was 32 years old that year and had converted to Islam at the age of 18 before going to high school. He came to Java and studied at the Islamic boarding school (pesantren) Gontor in East Java for seven years. Burnadi continued his studies at the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel in Surabaya. Alifuddin was another preacher who graduated from IAIN in Palembang, Sumatera. Of course, Islamic leaders tended to welcome the conversion of Chinese to Islam and the increased in numbers of Chinese preachers. The Islamic leader Hamka, for example, noted about Abdul Karim Oey, “He was a Muslim and a son of Indonesia...who was fostered, nurtured, and became a true Indonesian nationalist.” Thus, Chinese Muslims became increasingly assimilated to the local culture.

After Oey’s death in 1988, to maintain the goal of Islamization among the Chinese, the followers of Abdul Karim Oey established The Foundation of Haji Abdul Karim Oey on 9 April 1991. To include Oey after the Islamic terms Abdul Karim (thus, Abdul Karim Oey) in the name of the foundation was intentional; it was again to facilitate rapprochement between the ethnic Chinese and the Muslims. It was also used to attract new converts and to allow new converts to learn Islam together with other Chinese. The Mosque of “Lautze” was built at Pecinan (Chinatown) in Jakarta. Younger Chinese were now involved. H.M. Syafi’i Antonio from an Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat, for example, headed the Business Contacts of Haji Abdul Karim Oey.

Some Indonesians asked why Chinese Muslims maintained, rather than dissolved, PITI as an “exclusive” Chinese Muslim organization. In an article in 1987, Junus Jahja tried to answer the question. He observed that the majority of Chinese in Indonesia who converted to Islam intended to be engaged in the Islamic community without overtly expressing their ethnicity. The so-called “Chinese problem” should have ended with conversion to Islam. To show one’s Chinese identity would undo the “smooth” assimilation process that had already taken place. Junus Jahja believed that by becoming Muslim an ethnic Chinese in Indonesia had automatically become “totally assimilated to or mixed with the community without any trace.” Although Islam allows a person to assert his or her ethnic or racial identity, the actual fact is that Muslim Chinese preferred to mix with the community so that they could act and be treated just like others. However, Junus Jahja went on to argue, there was a tendency for new con-
verts to want to go along first with their fellow converts. They still needed some kind of communal identity. They had known that PTI was an organization of such Chinese Muslims. If a Chinese Indonesian wanted to become Muslim, he or she could come to PTI and be among other Chinese Muslims. Therefore, Junus argued, PTI was and remains necessary for Chinese Muslims seeking guidance and protection. PTI was like an Islamic research center whose specialization was Chinese studies. Along with such Islamic organizations as Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912), Nahdlatul Ulama (1926), Al-Irsyad, Ittihadul Muballighin, and others, PTI had the religious duty to propagate Islam among the some 5 million Chinese then living throughout Indonesia.79

Along with PTI, there was another association called the Universal Blessing Foundation, Yayasan Rahmat Semesta, established on 22 June 1979, which was aimed at facilitating financial support for the program aimed at assimilating Tionghoa to Islam. This foundation, like others, made references to the history of Islam in Indonesia (Zheng He/Sam Po as pious Muslim, Raden Patah as founder of the Demak Kingdom, and Chinese Muslim Generals such as Soekarno’s ministers). They also believed that Islam was the religion of the ancestors of Indonesians and was rooted in Indonesia. They would use various means of dissemination of Islam, including the film entitled “The Message,” TV, radio, the press, books, brochures, and pamphlets.80

The above description about Abdul Karim Oey and his association (PTI) indicates that Chinese Muslims after independence began to perceive themselves as both “nationalist” and “Islamic”, although their Chinese identity remained intact. Chinese Muslim assimilationist movements cannot be separated from wider assimilationist movements in the country which included Chinese from different religions too. One such assimilationist movement was Bakom, the Communicative Body of Understanding of National Unity.

Communicative Body for the National Unity (BAKOM-PKB)

Based on the 1928 Youth Oath (one country, one nation, one language: Indonesia), some 30 Chinese leaders held a meeting in Ambarawa on January 15, 1961. They formulated The Charter of Assimilation. According to this group, assimilation has a general and specific definition. The common definition of assimilation is a process of assimilating groups who have different mental attitude, customs, and cultural expressions to a meaningful sociological unity in one nation, Indonesia. The specific definition of assimilation in relation to the descendants of Tionghoa is the acceptance of the descendents of Tionghoa by the local people so that a distinct Chinese identity no longer exists.

Since 1966, the assimilation was becoming a normal order of life, either through spontaneous assimilation of the millions of Chinese who converted to Christianity, or assimilation stimulated by the government which undertook measures to eliminate the separate Chinese “identity.” This included the suppression of Chinese schools; interdiction of using the term Tionghoa and obligation of utilizing Cina, an Indonesized term for China; very strict limitation of all cultural manifestations of Chineseness (and prohibition of all the religious festivals outside the temples); obligation of choosing an “Indonesian” name. Even the ancient Chinese architecture was challenged to the extent that typically Chinese structures started to disappear.81

Within this context, K. Sindrunatha, a Christian, the chief of Communicative Body for the Appreciation of National Unity (BAKOM-PKB) welcomed the conversion of some Tionghoa people to Islam as well as to other religions. He argued that the assimilation of the Tionghoa people should take place in all fields: political, legal, social, cultural, etc. The terms prihumi (local) and non-prihumi (non-local) should disappear from everyday life. Assimilation could be done through churches, mosques, and so forth. Assimilation could mean an adaptation to a religion adhered to by the local people based on individual faith. Sindrunata said that Islam is a good religion, and it teaches solidarity because all Muslims are brothers. Thus, in Solo, a Tionghoa should assimilate to Javanese, in Parahyangan, he should assimilate to Sundanese, in Minahasa to Kawanua, etc.82

Although BAKOM-PKB was not exclusively a religious organization, and it did not intend to give privilege to one religion over another, it celebrated different religious holidays with other institutions. One of the religious holidays that BAKOM-PKB held was the Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday (Maulid Nabi), together with PTI in 1980. Thus, BAKOM-PKB was an organization that could also accommodate the needs of some Chinese Muslims.83
BAKOM-PKB had its own journal called Pembauran (Assimilation), providing a voice for Chinese problems and grievances. Stuart William Greif argued that to counter-balance the predominantly Roman Catholic nature of the leadership of young, successful, and professional Chinese Indonesians, Pembauran stressed the desirability of Islamizing the Chinese as a final step in assimilation.\(^\text{84}\) It published a book entitled “Assimilation and Islam” (Asimilasi dan Islam) in 1981, which compiled a number of reports and articles on the issue of Islam and assimilation.\(^\text{85}\)

Bakom encouraged assimilation by way of changing Chinese names to local names. This practice was also encouraged, if not required, by the government. Soekarno’s government issued decree Number 4/1961 regarding the changing and adding of family names. The decree stated that an Indonesian citizen could only change or add his or her name by asking permission from the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice had the right to reject the change if the name proposed contradicted customary law. Soeharto, then the cabinet president, reasserted the right to change names, by issuing a decree on 27 December 1966 on a similar matter, but more specifically on Chinese naming. The decree stated that an Indonesian citizen who uses a personal or familiar Chinese name who wants to replace his or her name with a commonly used Indonesian name, can express his or her will in a written letter to the local regents. It stated that the names chosen should not violate any local customary law.\(^\text{86}\) Consequently, some Chinese did change their Chinese names. Thus, Ateng Kho Tjeng Lie became Ateng Suripto, Tja Dj Siong became Darma Sutjiadi, Tjan Hok Soei became Harry Tjan Silalahi, etc.\(^\text{87}\) One of those Chinese who changed their names and became a prominent figure after Abdul Karim Oey was Junus Jahja.

One of the Chinese who changed his name even before converting to Islam was Lauw Chuan Tho, born in 1927 in Batavia/Jakarta. His father, Lau Lok Soei, was the head of a Chinese community in Jatinegara, Jakarta. His mother, Oci Ay Nio, came from Central Java and played a Javanese musical instrument (gamelan). Lauw’s parents sent him to HCS, a school for Chinese children and then to MULO during the Japanese occupation. After graduating from AMS (high school), Lauw went to the Netherlands to pursue an economic degree and graduated in 1959. Lauw learned Indonesian language autodidactically and managed to show that he was among the few Chinese who spoke Indonesian at that time in the Netherlands. There, in 1952, Lauw initiated the abolition of an Ethnic Chinese organization called Chung Hua Hui because, as he saw it, the organization was exclusive while Indonesia had just gained independence in 1945. Instead, Lauw joined an Indonesian Student Association (Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia) in the Netherlands. When he returned to Indonesia, Lauw actively engaged in movements against Baperki, an organization based on Chinese ethnicity/nationalism, founded in 1954. Then, Lauw and others signed Charter of Assimilation (Assimilation Statement) in 1961. He became a member of Assimilation Committee, then of the Communicative Body for Understanding of National Unity (BAKOM), and a few other assimilation organizations.\(^\text{88}\)

Tempo Magazine in its July 14th 1979 edition, reported the story of how Lauw Chuan Tho adopted an Islamic name, Junus Jahja, before he became a Muslim. He was not really sure about why he chose that name. He converted to Islam at the age of 52 at the Mosque of Al-Azhar, Jakarta. He met with Muljadi Djiojomartono, the Minister of Social Affairs during President Soekarno’s era and a major Muhammadiyah figure, who was his classmate in the Netherlands. When he declared his new religion, some Chinese doubted his seriousness. People wondered if he converted to Islam merely for the purpose of assimilation. Junus Jahja refuted that accusation and argued that he converted to Islam because he was interested in the Islamic idea of brotherhood, not simply because he wanted to assimilate with Indonesian culture. He added that there had been many Muslims in China and that the Prophet Muhammad was reported to have urged Muslims to seek knowledge even in China.\(^\text{89}\)

When asked in 1979, Junus Jahja replied that he was a Muslim, an Indonesian, and a Tionghoa descendent. He said he did not want to deny his “Chineseness” and “Islamicess.” He stressed that all Muslims are brothers. He said, “I also believe that to be a Muslim is to love his country, and in Islam, the love for country is part of the faith (hubbul wanat min al-iman).”\(^\text{90}\) Having changed his name to Junus Jahja in 1962 and then converting to Islam in 1979, he made his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1980. Jahja was recruited to be a board member of the Indonesian Council for Islamic Clerics (Ma'jelds Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1980 and remained in

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that position until 1990. He was also an activist of the Muhammadiyah. He believed that Muhammadiyah would provide religious and economic service to Muslims, without discrimination. He agreed with what George Kahin of Cornell University had said about the organization, namely that Muhammadiyah was founded on modernist Islamic ideas and had a broad range of social services: clinics, poverty relief, orphanages, publishing, libraries, and schools. 91

Junus Jahja was involved in what he called “social engineering” to improve the economy of Islamic community and at the same time to seek for rapprochement between the Chinese businessmen and the grass root local community. In 1992, he was on the advisory board of the Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals (ICMB).92 Furthermore, he was a prolific writer on the Chinese question and assimilation in Indonesia. His works included “Racial Line is Old-fashioned: Toward Assimilation” published in 1983, and “New Hope for Chinese Descents” in 1984.93 As for his ideas on “total assimilation,” the following statement he made is worth quoting:

...by embracing Islam young ethnic Chinese experienced that immediately they are fully accepted as fellow-Muslims and compatriots by the people at large who are 90 percent Muslims. All kinds of hostility and controversy as an inheritance of the past disappear. They are heartily welcomed now and totally assimilated into the community. So they have at last a permanent ‘place in the sun’. This is exactly what ethnic Chinese are so looking and longing for.94

Junus Jahja observed that some Chinese Muslims remained “lonely Muslims.” When local Muslims celebrated the Islamic Holiday of Idul Fitr with their families and neighbors, many Chinese Muslims did not have fellow Chinese Muslims in their family or neighborhood. There were still “lonely Muslims” because their wife or husband or neighbor was not Muslim. Junus Jahja therefore suggested that the new converts can celebrate the holiday with the greater Muslim family as brothers or adopted children so that they no longer experienced loneliness. Junus Jahja himself claimed that he never felt lonely as a Muslim because he had had many local colleagues and friends, non-Muslim and Muslim, Chinese and non-Chinese.95

Jahja’s idea of assimilation would not be comprehensive. Hasan Widjaja sustained an Indonesian Islam in the sense that the preaching of Islam and nationalism became inseparable. He called the attempt “patriotic Islamization.”96

Another important figure in the Chinese Muslim circles is Masagung (Tjiu Wie Tay) who was born in Batavia in 1927. He is the founder of the large publishing company Gunung Agung. He took the local name Masagung in 1962. He had close connections with then President Soekarno, and his companies included the publishing company Haji Masagung.97 With support from Soekarno, Haji Masagung established Sedayu Foundation (Yayasan Sedayu) in Jakarta in 1966. His businesses also included Gunung Agung, Sari Agung, Inti Idayu Press, Jaya Mandarin Agung, and Ayumas Gunung Agung.98

In the 1970s, when he approaching the age of 50 and had reached the peak of his success, Masagung experienced a kind of crisis of conscience. He came across Mrs. Tien Fuad Muntaco, an expert in hypnotism and telepathy, and Masagung fell under her spiritual influence and decided to convert to Islam (before, he had adopted Hinduism) and established the Foundation of Clear Path (Jayasaan Jalan Terang) aimed at financing the construction of a mosque, a hospital, and a museum of the Nine Saints (Wali Sanga). Masagung also participated in the preaching of Islam in diverse mosques in Jakarta. Masagung purposefully chose assimilation.99 President Soeharto was glad to hear that more Chinese, including Masagung, became Muslim because their conversion would make assimilation into the Indonesian population easier.100

Hembing Wijayakusuma was another prominent Chinese Muslim, one who possessed a unique skill: acupuncture. Hembing Wijayakusuma was born in 1940 in Medan, Sumatra. His mother helped the guerrilla fighters against the Dutch colonial regime. The majority of the natives at Pasar Belakang, Medan, where he lived, were Muslim. Hembing learned Islam from a local Islamic teacher. He was taught how to practice Chinese medicine from his early years by his grandfather, but he read books from a variety of sources as well, such as the writings of Thomas Alva Edison, Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein, and other inventors. He studied at the Chinese Medicine Institute in Hong Kong and after graduating he taught at the University of Sumatera Utama and then moved to Jakarta. Hembing became actively involved in health
activities as well as Islamic activities; he believed that Islam taught a healthy life. Chinese acupuncturists greatly influenced his knowledge and skills. Regarding his Chinese identity, he acknowledged that he was of Chinese descent. He felt that assimilation among the Chinese population was still a big problem, but he believed Islam recognized all ethnicities without discrimination. Although Hembing himself was a Muslim, he did not believe that everyone should follow his path. To assimilate into Indonesian society, Chinese did not need to become Muslim. His inclusive understanding of Islam was different from that of his fellow Chinese Muslims such as Abdul Karim Oey and Junus Jahja. For Hembing, Indonesia was a multicultural and multi-religious nation, so there was no obligation for Chinese to become Muslim simply to assimilate in Indonesia, but instead Indonesians should recognize all ethnic groups without discrimination. In this regard, Hembing was also influenced by his understanding of the historical figure Zheng He, the 15th century sailor and a delegate of the Ming Dynasty to the Indonesian archipelago. He wrote, “The main goal of Zheng He’s sailing was to introduce Islam to the Chinese and the natives in the archipelago. But Zheng He never imposed Islam on the natives. He respected the religions of the natives. In Tiongkok, Zheng He respected Buddha, Confucianism, and others.”

Instead of promoting Islam for all Chinese, Hembing Wijayakusuma promoted the pluralist ideology of Pancasila, the five pillars of state ideology, which recognizes belief in one God, humanity, national unity, democracy based on representative government, and social justice. Hembing interpreted the first pillar, belief in one God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) in reference to Chinese thought. He said that Tai Chi Chuan is derived from uchi which means emptiness. From uchi comes Tai Chi. The existence of emptiness is before Yin-Yang and the symbol of Tai Chi is Ying-Yang, the balanced forces of night and day, positive and negative, male and female, etc.

Hembing noted that assimilation had taken place in Indonesia for centuries. He pointed to the stories by Zheng He’s companions who came and wrote about the 15th century Javanese community they encountered. He also mentioned other historical evidence indicating the harmonious relations between the Chinese and the natives. In 1998, Hembing supported the policy issued by President B.J. Habibie to remove the distinction between pribumi and non-pribumi and to promote fair and just treatment for all.

The tragedy of May 12-14, 1998, in which many Chinese were victimized in Jakarta and other cities in Indonesia, was a shock for many Chinese people in the country because the distinction was reinforced again between pribumi (local, indigenous) and non-pribumi (non-local). The Chinese were treated very severely in these riots. Hembing contended that these riots should be a lesson that the people who live in Indonesia should be tolerant and should recognize the Indonesian slogan “diversity in unity” (Bhineka Tunggal Ika). By his involvement in cross-religious and cross-ethnic activities, Hembing intended to accommodate different Indonesians regardless of race and religion.

Another Chinese convert was a female badminton national player, Verawati Fajrin, who converted to Islam in 1979 and went to Mecca on the pilgrimage, coordinated by the Islamic Brotherhood Foundation and Indonesian Council of Clerics (MUI). The head of MUI Hasan Basri welcomed her conversion to Islam. “By becoming a Muslim,” Hasan Basri said, “Verawati no longer belongs to her race or origin, but she is now in one Islamic brotherhood.”

Some Reasons for Chinese Conversion to Islam

The Siauw Giap, a Sinologue at Leiden recorded his prediction for the relationship between Islam and Chinese in Indonesia in 1965:

When the legacies from the colonial past, which tend to impair group relations in contemporary Indonesia will be wholly removed and an economic development takes place which affords a fair share to both ethnic Chinese and Indonesians, it is impossible that Islam will again attract Chinese converts and the parallel in the history of religions in Thailand and Java be restored.

The Siauw Giap claimed that Chinese became Muslim merely because of political situations. In fact, there were different reasons why the Chinese converted to Islam.

According to a research carried out in 1984 by Keun Won-Jang in Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, most of the Chinese who converted to Islam did so because they were motivated by the wish to free themselves from the status of being non-pribumi (non-
Another factor was political: the search for security. They became Muslim because they wanted to be safe from tensions caused by perceptions of ethnic differences. For example, after the anti-Chinese riots in Surakarta which spread to several towns in 1980, many Chinese converted to Islam. Apart from the political factor, there was also a religious factor. Many converted to Islam because of its teachings, but this conversion usually happened in the elite circles. Another reason was marriage: if a young Chinese man wishes to marry a Muslim girl, he has to first convert to Islam.\(^{107}\) In some cases, Chinese men who wished to marry an Indonesian woman could do so by the "nominal" adoption of Islam. One could become a Muslim by pronouncing the Shahadah (confession of faith), and by circumcision which is considered a crucial symbol of conversion. Full religious assimilation could come later, after formal conversion.\(^{106}\)

Yet, a purely religious reason cannot be marginalized. An example of a religious reason is evident when a Chinese convert said, "In mosques, there is no Chinese, no Javanese, no poor, no rich; everybody is the same, bowing their body to one God, and sitting equally.\(^{109}\) Anti-discriminatory elements in Islamic teaching are believed to be appealing to some Chinese. For these Chinese, conversion to Islam was not simply nominal.

After converting to Islam, some Chinese still maintained at least a few Chinese characteristics. One of the reasons why some Chinese Muslims could not completely eliminate their "ethnic" identity was the belief that their new religion recognized descent-based identifications (such as ethnicity), as well as territory-based identifications (such as nationalism). Thus, at least for some of the postcolonial Chinese Muslim figures, it was possible and desirable to be Chinese, to be Muslim, and to be Indonesian at the same time. For them, ethnicity, religion, and nationalism were not incompatible.

**Chinese Muslims in Post-Soeharto Era**

Since the downfall of the former President Suharto in 1998, a political shift has occurred in Indonesia, and restrictions on Chinese culture have begun to lift. In 1999, President Habibie published his biography with a Chinese translation, aimed at bridging the gap between Indonesia and China.\(^{110}\) Since 1999, Chinese Indonesians have begun to openly celebrate the Chinese New Year or *Imlek*, and shopping malls are decked out in red and gold lanterns every New Year. Chinese-language newspapers have hit the streets and Metro television, owned by a *Peranakan* Chinese, Surya Poloh, broadcasts the news several times a day in *Putonghua*, a Chinese language. Several Chinese political parties have been founded: the Indonesia Diversity Party (PBI), the *Tionghoa* Reform Party (Parti), the Indonesian Assimilation Party (Parpindo).\(^{111}\) A group of Chinese-Indonesian professionals also launched a private think tank called the Center for National Affairs (Elkasa) aimed at developing pluralism, human rights and democracy.\(^{112}\) In 2000, former President Abdurrahman Wahid lifted the legal ban on Confucianism with Decree No. 6 on Chinese religion, belief, and cultures.\(^{113}\) In 2001, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, represented by the Minister of Religious Affairs, issued Decree no. 13, stipulating that the Lunar Chinese New Year, or *Imlek*, was a national holiday.\(^{114}\)

How have Chinese Muslims responded to the Indonesian government’s relaxation of restrictions on Chinese culture, and the Chinese cultural revival that has resulted as a consequence? One of the responses to this question was given by Junus Jahja. He welcomed the retraction of restrictions against the Chinese in general. He felt that the cries and complaints among the *Peranakan* Chinese about the government’s discrimination against the Chinese population cannot be simply be seen from only a Chinese point of view. Many indigenous groups have also experienced the same discrimination. For example, Junus Jahja, argued:

> The exclusive housing of the Chinese community will pose no problem if the indigenous group could afford to buy the same housing following the redistribution of economic resources. On the other hand, Chinese-Indonesians will gain proper access to political institutions to voice their aspirations. Therefore, both groups are actually practicing discrimination in terms of resources under control. The government has a very important role in the discrimination through political and economic policies. Lingering discriminative practices will only create tension between the groups in our society.\(^{115}\)

Perceptions and attitudes of other Chinese Muslims, who now number more than 50,000, (if we believe the popular estimation), remain to be examined. But it is fair to say that this point that Chinese who converted to Islam are still at a crossroads, because on the one hand
their conversion is welcomed by the government and the majority Muslim population, but on the other hand, they are beginning to have more space for public cultural expression.

Conclusions

Chinese Muslims have become part of the local population since the pre-colonial period. Some had converted to Islam before their arrival in the archipelago, but most did not convert until they became “local.” Thus, Islam was considered primarily as part of local, rather than world, religion. After Indonesian independence in 1945, a growing number of migrants and their children had chosen to identify with the land where they lived, to become like other “Indonesians.” In the context of world history, it was only after World War II, when further migration had been cut off and Chinese migrants around the world were there to stay, that Chinese identities appropriate to pluralist nationalist politics began to be negotiated, usually in some sort of “hybrid” formulation such as Chinese-Indonesian (called *Peranakan*). Such identities were predicated on the idea that it is possible to be Chinese and still be part of a national community. And among these Chinese, one means of assimilating to the local or national community has been to adopt the religion of the majority: Islam.

According to Adam McKeown, the emergence of Chinese minorities within a new national community is best approached from an “ethnic” rather than a “diasporic” perspective. He argues that the “ethnic” perspective is an area in which identity and meaning of being Chinese is most strongly formed by local social relations, where “Chineseness” becomes a heritage, a political status, or merely a color of skin. Thus, some Chinese Muslims retained part of their Chinese names, while adopting new ones. Some Chinese Muslims became interested in knowing more about the fifteenth-century-Chinese Muslim figure, Zheng He. Most of these Chinese were also merchants as well as practicing preachers. As Abdul Karim Oey said, his “Chinese soul” made him leave his home in Padang and become a merchant. The label *Tionghoa Keturunan*, or “Chinese descendant”, even after conversion to Islam and claims of assimilation, remains in common parlance. These all seem to suggest that a Chinese person who embraced Islam could never forget that he or she is of Chinese descent, and the people around them still tend to look at him or her as “Chinese.”

However, Chinese Muslims in modern Indonesia can be viewed as being “post-diasporic” for a number of reasons. In the Chinese Diaspora, China became the core, and the host land was the periphery. In the post-diaspora, it was the reverse: the host land or their adopted country was the core and China became the periphery. In the Diaspora, the Chinese tended to look back to the Chinese past, whereas in post-diaspora, the Chinese tended to see themselves in and for the present and perhaps the future. In addition, in the Diaspora, Chinese populations had a strong connection with or attachment to the homeland, the Chinese past, ancestors, etc. However, in post-diaspora they tended to have a weak attachment to the homeland. Thus, Chinese Muslims who were born in Indonesia spoke Malay/Indonesian and/or other local languages such as Javanese or Sundanese, behaved according to local customs and wore local dress. A number of Chinese Muslims who were active in associations also tended to challenge and counter others’ perceptions that they were still Chinese, not “pure Indonesians” or not “pure Islamic.” This “post-diasporic consciousness” becomes no less ambiguous and dilemmatic than the “diasporic one.”

The case of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia provides us with some insights on the question of multiple coexisting identities of nationalism, religion and ethnicity within the context of diaspora and post-diaspora. It also supports the notion that identity is socially constructed, and it is constructed not only by external circumstances but also by individuals or groups themselves. The expressions of “Chinese-ness,” “Islamic-ness,” and “Indonesian-ness” are revealed in different contexts, but suggest that there is a keener sense of the nuances of multiple identities and an enhancement of individual and communal self-consciousness within constantly changing circumstances.
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Berita Pers, May 29, 1982

Merdeka, June 11, 1982


End Note


2 The word “diaspora” is derived from the Greek verb speireo (to sow) and the preposition dia (over). As Robin Cohen suggests, diaspora has different meanings, but in general, all diasporic communities settled outside their own lands and territories, acknowledge that the “old country” - a notion often buried deep in language, religion, custom - always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), ix; James Clifford, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (London & Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.244-77.

3 Although no one really knows the exact number and percentage of Chinese in Indonesia, an estimate is often used. According to the 1930 population census, the number of Chinese was 1,233,000, constituting 2.03 % of the total population of 59,138,067 (Central Kantoor voor de Statistiek, 1934). Later, according to the 2000 population census, the number of the ethnic Chinese (from 11 provinces out of 30 provinces) was 1,738,936 or 0.86 % of the total population of 201,092,238. If the number of foreign ethnic Chinese is included, the percentage increases to 0.91 %. If all provinces are included, the number falls between 1.5 and 2 % in 2000. Self-identification was used in the 2000 census. Thus, more Chinese today might have not identified themselves as “ethnic Chinese” anymore, as they had assumed the identity of other Indonesian ethnic groups. As for the Chinese Muslims, there is no exact figure either. A Chinese Muslim leader, Junus Jahja, estimated the number of Chinese Muslim falling about 1.5 % (around 40,000 – 50,000) of the total Chinese in Indonesia. Another Chinese Muslim, Haji Yap Abdulshomad claimed in 1980 that he had shaken the hands of no less than 145,000 Muslims of Chinese origin. Others mentioned 100,000 Chinese Muslims. No exact number can be known. It is likely, however, that in the 2000 census, Chinese Muslims no longer identify themselves as ethnic Chinese, but as another local ethnic group. See “Table Ethnic Group Composition: Indonesia, 1930 and 2000”, in Leo Suryadinata et all, Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp.12, 74; “Orang Islam Keturunan Cina: Sebuah Laporan,” Tempo, August 23, 1980.


10 These terms however underwent changes as well during the colonial era. For further discussion see, for example, Mason C. Hoadley, “Javanese, Peranakan and Chinese elites…. “, pp.503-17.
11 Ma Huan was said to speak Arabic and to be a secretary and spokesperson to Zheng He. Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa di Indonesia (Semarang: Penerbit Tunjuran Sari, 1979) pp.9-10; Adhy Sukirti, Pujangga Ma Huan (Surabaya: Pustaka Karya, 1962) in Umar Hasyim, Islam bukan Penghalang Pengagiatenggaraan Orang-orang Tionghoa (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 1987), p.43.
13 Quoted in Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoadi Indonesia, p. 13.
15 The question of whether or not some or all the nine saints (wali sanga) in Java were of Chinese origin is a controversial one. Some historians, like Denys Lombard and Sartono Kartodirdjo doubted the existence of the documents in the two temples Krenteng in Semarang and that in Cirebon, and therefore rejected the idea that all saints were Chinese Peranakan. What has been less controversial, however, is the argument that one saint, Raden Fatah, the founder of Demak Kingdom (15-17th c) was a son of a Javanese Prabu Brawijaya and a Chinese wife. See G.W.J. Drewes, “The Struggle between Javanese and Islam as Illustrated by the Serat Dermagandu”, “Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van Nederlandsch-Indië), CXXII, 3 (1966), p.311, 364; H.J. De Graaf & TH.G.TH. Pigeaud, Kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Java: Peralihan dari Majapahit ke Mataram, trans. Grafitipers & KITLV (Jakarta: PT Tepring, 1985), pp.37-80.
19 Ibid., p.185.
20 Ibid., pp.186-7.
21 Ibid., p.187.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p.188.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p.189.
28 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), pp.50-3-4.
29 This fact was mentioned by Ridwan Saidi, then a board member of the Unity and Development Party (PPP), on an interview with Merdeka, 20 April 1982. There were also non-Muslim Chinese who promoted Indonesian nationalism. For example, in the newspaper Mata Hari, Semarang, on 1 August 1934, Kwee Hing Tijat proposed his idea of Poetra Indonesia (Son of Indonesia) for Chinese Peranakan. Other Indonesian nationalists were Liem Koen Hian, Injo Beng Goat, Tjoa Sik Len, PK Ojong, and Soe Hok Gie. See Junus Jahya, Catatan Seorang WN: Kenangan, Renungan & Harapan (Jakarta: Yayasan Tunas Bangsa, 1988), p.9.
30 Apart from Johan Muhammad Chai, other Chinese were present in the Youth Oath Meeting: Daed Budiman Kwee Thiam Hong, Ong Khai Siang, Jong Liaw Tjoan Hok, and Tjo Jin Kwie. See Hembing Wijayakusuma, “Warga TionghoaAnak Bangsa”, Suar; May 1999, p.7 in Siti Nafisah, Prof Hembing: Pemenang The Star of Asia Award (Jakarta: Prestasi Insan Indonesia, 2000), p.296.
31 Ibid.
32 Kwee Keu Beng, “Het Cultureele Leven Den Chineezen In Nederlandsch- Indie”, Koloniale Studien, 1936, no.5-6, p.82.
34 Leo Suryadinata’s suggestion is in need of a critical analysis. At this point, I would suggest that there was at least one Chinese Muslim who joined the Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) on October 28, 1928. Presumably there were Chinese Muslims who had assimilated into the local community and fought the Dutch in different areas. However, further research is needed to focus more on the role of Chinese-Muslim Indonesians in anti-colonial movements. For Leo Suryadinata’s opinion about this issue, see “Pre-war Indonesian Nationalism and the Peranakan Chinese”, in his The Chinese Minority in Indonesia; Seven Papers (Singapore: Chopmen Enterprises, 1978), p.64.
37 Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoadi Indonesia, p. 32.
38 Ibid., p.38.
40 Amen Budiman, ibid., p.38.
Chinese Muslims in Colonial and Postcolonial Indonesia


The Sarekat Islam was formed in 1912 by Islamic traders and landlords. According to Leo Suryadinata, it was aimed at breaking the local Chinese commercial monopoly. Islam was used as a vehicle to mobilize the indigenous masses in Java and later in the Outer Islands. The distinction between the Javanese (huni-patera) and bangsa Cina (Chinese) was made, the latter being considered alien as well as “infidel.” The conflict between the two ethnic groups occurred in the early twentieth century. But Leo’s argument can be debated because the text reveals that there were some criticisms against the notion that the organization was aimed to attack Chinese in the first place. In other words, there might have been Chinese members of this organization during that time. This issue, however, requires further research. Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, p.15; Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Singapore, Kuala Lumpur & Jakarta: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.142-185.


Harian Abadi, 27 October 1970 in Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tiongkhoi Indonesia p.47.


However, as Wang Gungwu pointed out, rather than loyal to a specific power or to their places of settlements, they were loyal to thriving entrepots and profitable arrangements, not caring much whether the British, French, Portuguese, Malays, Dutch, or Indians were in charge of the political superstructure. This lack of commitment to local political life in the places to which the Chinese migrated was linked to the practice of sojourn as rather than settling. See Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Diaspora (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), pp.170-1; Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.86.


Quoted ibid.


Salmon, “Ancestral Halls...”, in ibid., footnote 36, p.204.

To enter Melayu, mask Melayu, means to convert to Islam. Amen Budiman, Masyarakat Islam Tiongkhoi Indonesia, p.60.


Lies Gan was a member of the family and told this story. Tempo, 23 August 1980; Junus Jahja, Islam di Mata WNI, p.56.


Further research about how local Muslims viewed the Chinese who converted to Islam during the colonial period is necessary. Leo Suryadinata, a scholar of the Chinese question, claimed that “Islamic leaders, in general, considered the local Chinese as aliens, different from the ‘sons of the soil.’” The term bangsa was used in a racial sense. The indigenous population (in this case, the Javanese), was a bangsa different from other bangsa (such as the local Chinese and Dutch). Leo Suryadinata, however, did not provide adequate historical evidence to support his thesis. See Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China, 3rd edition (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1992), p.17.


ibid., pp.107-8.
Muhamad Ali

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ibid.


Aman Badiman, Masyarakat Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, p.43.


ibid., p.220.


index (lampiran) 1, Da ‘wah dan Asimilasi, pp. 50-55


Mendeke, June 11, 1982


Berita Buana, October 22, 1981.


ibid.


Siti Nafsiah, Prof. Hembing: Pemenang the Star of Asia Award pp. 15, 156.


ibid., p.190

ibid., p. 294-6.


ibid., p.66.


