THE PROTECT KAHO'OLawe 'OHANA: CULTURAL REVITALIZATION
IN A CONTEMPORARY HAWAIIAN MOVEMENT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS
IN PACIFIC ISLANDS STUDIES
MAY 1982

By
Myra Jean F. Tuggle

Thesis Committee:
Alan Howard, Chairman
C. Fred Blake
Marion Kelly
We certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Pacific Islands Studies.

THESIS COMMITTEE

[Signatures]

Allen Howard
Chairman

Marvin Killo

C. Fred Blake
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I began research on the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana in the fall of 1979, as a fledgling graduate student in search of a thesis topic. Over the following three years, numerous people helped me to get started and, once started, to keep on in spite of delays and distractions.

First of all, I wish to thank the members and supporters of the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana who gave me their time and mana'o, particularly Steven Boggs, Keoni Fairbanks, Kawahine Kamakea, Francis Ka'uhane, Terry Keko'olani, Timothy Lui Kwan, Cynthia Thielan, and Tamara Wong. In the spring of 1980, the O'ahu 'ohana made me feel a part of their 'ohana and to them is a sincere thank you, especially to Michael, Renee, Damien, and Mililani Trask and a very special acknowledgement to Ronnie Daly. Emmett Aluli and Haunani-Kay Trask were indispensible to this project.

Sincere appreciation is extended to Robert Kiste, director of Pacific Islands Studies, for heading me in the right direction at the beginning of my research and to the members of my committee, Alan Howard and C. Fred Blake of the Anthropology Department and Marion Kelly of the Bishop Museum.

I would like to especially acknowledge the assistance and advice of Haunani-Kay Trask, Assistant Professor in American Studies, who put a great deal of effort into critiquing the drafts of my thesis. I had wanted to officially place her on my committee but was unable to because of time constraints.
All projects owe much to the support provided by friends. First, to H. David Tuggle for his help in areas too numerous to list, and to a special friend and 'ohana, I thank Craig "Bo" Kahui.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. HISTORY OF THE PROTECT KAHO'OLAWE 'OHANA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. THE PROTECT KAHO'OLAWE 'OHANA: A HAWAIIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. CULTURAL REVITALIZATION IN A CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The island of Kaho'olawe has been the focus of more than three decades of military bombing and training maneuvers by the U.S. armed forces. Since 1976, it has also been the focus of protest, sometimes volatile, by an activist organization called the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana.* The goal of this loosely organized group of individuals is to stop the bombing of the island and to have the island returned to the people of Hawai'i.

In 1976, the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana emerged from the general milieu of the American 1960s protest and a Hawaiian culture renaissance, which was most visibly manifested in a resurgence of interest in traditional music, dance, and the arts. The confrontational stance of the 'Ohana made them one of the more visible and controversial organizations, among the numerous Hawaiian groups which existed at the time.

In the following five years, the 'Ohana underwent several crises which challenged its existence. It survived, changed but still persistent in its goal of stopping the bombing of the island.

The intent of this thesis is to analyze the nature of the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana, using revitalization and contemporary social

---

*The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana, also called the PKO or the 'Ohana, has incorporated numerous Hawaiian terms into its vocabulary. I have used these words and phrases in this thesis, with English translations (as defined by the PKO) following in parentheses.
movement theories. Revitalization looks at movements as vehicles for rapid cultural change, as a Gestalt shift or "mazeway reformulation" to alleviate cultural stress. Contemporary social movement theory, on the other hand, deals with the organization of movements, with an emphasis on the dynamics of collective behavior.

It is argued that the 'Ohana can be seen as 1) a revitalization movement, directed toward Hawaiians as a cultural group which has been greatly impacted by Westernization, and 2) as a contemporary social movement, directed toward a broad constituency concerned with the politics of land issues. In the context of Hawaiian culture, the 'Ohana is attempting to enhance an awareness and pride in being Hawaiian and, through this consciousness, to enhance a new Hawaiian way of life. In the context of contemporary Hawaiian society, it is involved in issues of land ownership and use, particularly in the limited distribution of power related to the control of land.

In the analysis of the 'Ohana, it became clear that the manifestation of both revitalization and contemporary movement characteristics within one organization created conflicts. These conflicts seem to have been inevitable in the movement's attempts to reconcile the demands of cultivating strong cultural identification with developing support for a broader issue. Thus, a new understanding of the role of cultural revitalization in a modern social movement context also emerged.
Methodology

This thesis examines within a historical framework the ways in which the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana manifested the basic characteristics of social movements (as defined in Wallace 1956; Gerlach and Hine 1970). These characteristics are seen as elements within the movement as a system. Thus, conflicts which occur in the development of each characteristic are interpreted as stimuli for change in the movement as a whole.

The origins and resolutions of these conflicts are examined through an analysis of the 'Ohana from its inception in 1976 to the beginning of 1981 when it signed a consent decree with the U.S. Navy, thereby ending a 4-1/2 year old civil suit.

Data for this study were gathered from three primary sources:

1) interviews with participants in the organization, including active members, members who had withdrawn from active participation, and non-participant supporters;

2) documentary sources, including newspaper and news journal articles, articles in Aloha 'Āina (the 'Ohana newsletter which began in 1978), Na Mana'o Aloha o Kaho'olawe (Ritte and Sawyer 1980), a book written about the illegal landings on the island in 1976 and 1977, and videotapes made by the 'ohana between 1976 and 1978; and

3) participant observation of the O'ahu 'Ohana from February to June 1980 and participation in the February 1980 access to the island; close contact with members of this group
continued until October 1980 and sporadic contact has continued until the present.

The thesis is organized into the following sections.

Chapter 2 presents a general discussion of social movements, establishing the theoretical basis for the data analysis. It includes a description of the natural history approach to movement development, as well as the more recent sociological interest in movement dynamics. Wallace's classic work on revitalization movements (1956) is summarized.

Chapter 3 provides the background and history of the 'Ohana. The social and historical environment which framed the development of the movement is identified in three parallel issues: the rise of ethnic consciousness through the Hawaiian renaissance, the increasing perception of land in Hawai'i as a limited and valuable resource, and the growing protest to military use of the island of Kaho'olawe as a bombing target. The development of the 'Ohana between 1976 and 1981 is presented in the format of movement stages (as delineated by Wallace 1956).

Chapter 4 describes the 'Ohana in terms of its expressions of the basic characteristics of social movements. The movement changed in the first five years of its existence; this chapter outlines the general pattern of changes, analyzed in terms of changes in the basic characteristics.

Chapter 5 focuses on the contradictions in the basic fabric of the organization. These oppositions, and their resultant crises, illustrate the volatile nature of the organization and the resiliency
which the movement exhibits in the face of discord and possible
disintegration. The thesis concludes with an examination of the
implications of these oppositions for the 'Ohana specifically and for
the interrelationship of cultural revitalization and contemporary
social movement theories.
CHAPTER 2
A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction

In any society, there exist standards of behavior for social and political activities which are maintained through a control of power. Social movements are organized attempts to restructure existing standards through a redistribution of power, which can be defined as the ability to control the mobilization of such resources as money, technology, and people. By challenging the distribution of power and expounding the necessity for fundamental changes in the existing order, a movement provides a generating atmosphere whereby such changes may take place.

A movement seeks to redefine standards in light of its own analysis of the relationship among people, power, and resources, and it provides a means by which such changes can occur. That is, in the development of an organization-based struggle for envisioned changes, and in the creation of an ideology to give meaning to the struggle, a movement is, in effect, a new society in microcosm. It is a sample of the new order toward which it is striving.

The Study of Social Movements

Social movements have been studied in the framework of numerous disciplines, including anthropology and sociology. The anthropological literature looks largely at movements as vehicles for rapid cultural change, as a Gestalt shift or "mazeway reformulation" to alleviate cultural stress (e.g. Wallace 1956; Goodenough 1963: 286–292).
Contemporary sociological material, on the other hand, deals with the organization of movements. Its emphasis is on movements as entities which can lend insight to the dynamics of organizational behavior (e.g. Gerlach and Hine 1970). This is not to say that it avoids the issue of change, but that its perspective is oriented toward organizational structure.

Revitalization Movements: An Anthropological Perspective

The anthropological literature deals largely with preliterate groups in colonized areas, focusing on the reactions of indigenous societies to Western contact. A social movement occurs where the indigenous group attempts to restructure its world-view and self-image (the "mazeway," according to Wallace 1956) in the face of social disorientation and loss of efficacious power. This restructuring takes the forms of "movements which profess to revive a traditional culture now fallen into desuetude; movements which profess to import a foreign cultural system; and movements which profess neither revival nor importation, but . . . a future Utopia" (Wallace 1956: 275).

Wallace (1956) uses a processual model of cultural revitalization to explain the occurrence of and variations in social movements. His sample is taken largely from movements which formed prior to the 20th century, primarily the Handsome Lake movement of the Iroquois (1799-1815). He sees revitalization movements as a "special kind of culture change phenomena . . . a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture" (1956: 265). He emphasizes that the end product is a restructuring of
a new cultural system (what he terms a "mazeway reformulation") rather than the innovation of only discrete items.

He sees movements as adaptive mechanisms in culture contact situations, and uses revitalization as an explanation of culture change through the vehicle of movements, particularly as reflections of religious or ideological systems of culture.

He describes the revitalization process as a series of developmental stages, from an initial realization of dissatisfaction, through stages of communication and formalization, to an institutionalization of envisioned changes and a new order. The character of a movement alters throughout this process, as energies are focused, objectives are clarified and redefined, and an ideology and organization are developed. Others (e.g. Blumer 1969; Smelser 1962) have offered similar models.

Stage of Movement Development

There is little agreement on the optimum conditions for the development of any particular movement, although several hypotheses have been presented (e.g. McCormack 1951; Davies 1962; Aberle 1965; Marris 1974). However, by definition, conditions of personal, social, or cultural dissatisfaction must exist. Movements originate out of situations of stress, in a recognition that goals and expectations are not and, more importantly, cannot be met within the existing order of society.

Wallace (1956: 269) describes this as the periods of increased individual stress and cultural distortion. Blumer (1969: 12) calls this a period of social unrest, characterized by random restlessness
and discontent. Efforts for change to alleviate the conditions of stress are individual or an aggregation of unlinked individual actions.

In the next stage, an event, a person, or a group of people serve to coalesce the random efforts. In this early period of initial action and communication, restlessness continues but objectives are honed (Blumer 1969). Wallace (1956: 270) attributes this stage to a prophet, who, after experiencing a vision or revelation of the new order, evangelizes his beliefs, gathering around him a group of sympathetic and enthusiastic followers. Blumer notes that in this stage, "more definite notions emerge as to the cause of their conditions and as to what should be done in the way of social change" (1969: 12).

A period of formalization follows, in which the movement is organized with rules, policies, and tactics. An ideology is developed which provides the conceptual framework on which actions and arguments are based; Wallace notes that "frequently, the action program from here on is effectively administered in large part by a political rather than a religious leadership" (1956: 273). The opposition and issues are clarified. An incipient social hierarchy is developed.

The next stage is an institutionalization of the strategies and structure of the movement, which has crystallized into a fixed organization with a defined hierarchical structure, a leader who is more administrator than prophet, and an ideology which emphasizes strategies to combat the opposition and implement envisioned changes rather than a cultivation of the ideal (Wallace 1956: 275; Blumer 1969: 12).
Wallace calls this an adaptation period; it is a key element in the sample selection for his study. He raises the taxonomic question of the number of stages which must be achieved to qualify as a revitalization movement and, for practical purposes, uses adaptation as the essential definition. That is, movements which progress beyond this stage are sufficiently formalized to consider their success or failure as organized social bodies.

As the whole or large portions of the population accept the ideals of the movement, extensive cultural changes occur and are established as normal. A new cultural state may be said to exist once "cultural transformation has been accomplished and the new cultural system has proved itself viable" (Wallace 1956: 275).

This natural history approach to movements emphasizes a unilinear development ending inevitably with success or failure, which Wallace (1956: 278) describes as a dimension of revitalization movements. He identifies two key variables: 1) realism in predicting the outcome of conflict situations and 2) the amount of opposition. Thus, if an organization cannot successfully predict the consequences of its own moves and those of its opposition, failure is very likely. By the same token, however, if the opposition is small, an organization can be "unrealistic" and still be successful.

He argues that "all organized religions are relics of old revitalization movements" (1956: 268). On the success-failure continuum, then, Christianity and Mohammedanism originated in the revitalization process and are examples of successful movements.
Structure and Dynamics:
A Sociological Perspective

The more recent sociological literature, growing out of interest in the protest movements of the 1960s, delves into the internal dynamics of movements (e.g. McLaughlin 1969; Gerlach and Hine 1970; Zald and McCarthy 1979); that is, as Fireman and Gamson note, not "why people want social change" but rather, "how do they organize, pool resources, and wield them effectively" (1979: 9). The basic premise of changing the existing power structure is understood. Of concern is how that change is to be actuated, i.e. the mobilization of resources, particularly the kinds and manipulation of incentives for movement participation.

This perspective allows an examination of movement structure and the interaction of elements within that structure. Gerlach and Hine (1970), in defining social movements on the basis of five characteristics, establish such a structure for analysis.

These characteristics are:

1) evangelization or recruitment of new converts;
2) breaking away from old patterns and the establishment of a new self-image by new converts;
3) development of an ideology of change which provides a conceptual framework for codifying the values and goals of the movement;
4) development of an organization to implement strategies to attain the envisioned changes seen by the movement;
5) recognition and opposition from the existing order.
These characteristics define a social movement as distinct from a collective, interest group, or organization (Gerlach and Hine 1970). But their expression in any particular movement is largely dependent on the image relationship between the movement and the larger society.

A movement is conceived out of a negative image or interpretation of the existing order. In turn, opposition to a movement is generated by a comparable interpretation of the movement. Thus, image plays a critical role in defining the character of a particular movement, in the kind of people it attracts, the kind of strategies it allows to be employed, and the kind and degree of opposition it produces.

It should be emphasized that an essential aspect of movement character is change. And similarly, a movement's image is in a continual state of reshaping. However, the nature of a movement and its separation from the existing order limit the extent and kind of messages which are disseminated about the movement. Thus, the interpretation of the movement and its goals are filtered through a series of interpreters (e.g. the media) so that the message which ultimately reaches the larger public may not reflect the movement itself.

For example, in 1972, a group of militant American Indians occupied the Bureau of Indian Affairs offices in Washington, D.C. Although many of their demands were legitimate requests for improvement in the BIA system, the media stressed the confrontational and destructive aspects of the takeover. Thus, the image developed by the general public of the motivations and tactics of this group was not derived from the messages of the Indians but rather, from the
interpretation of the occupation by members of the media (Bahr et al 1979: 453).

The significant role played by image needs to be considered in any analysis of movement characteristics and internal dynamics.

Recruitment

Individuals who join a movement are generally predisposed toward movement beliefs before actually knowing of the movement. The movement simply provides a mechanism to express already existing but unformed beliefs (Gerlach and Hine 1970).

The specific motivational factors may include:

1) the social context, in which an individual experiences dissatisfaction with his life through a realization that he is, in some way, deprived of his due;

2) psychological maladjustment, in which certain types of personalities are more likely than others to be drawn into a movement; and

3) the role of ideology, in which the values and goals of a movement provide a framework for the analysis of particular individuals to their particular social environment (McLaughlin 1969: 70; Gerlach and Hine 1970: 79).

However, these factors provide only the material for recruitment. The actual spread of movements is dependent on an evangelization process, in which individuals who experience such social, cultural or psychological disorientation are recruited through the communication of the goals and values of the movement by already committed members.
Methods of recruitment operate at multiple levels; some are effective in engendering active participation and commitment, while others serve to gain sympathy among the broader public. Each functions to reinforce the support network of the movement.

Wide-reaching methods of recruitment serve to introduce the movement ideology to a broad audience. But the transfer of passive support to active participation requires an individual approach to recruitment which transcends ideological arguments. Gerlach and Hine note that:

... appeals through mass media may attract the attention of some individuals, and ... many may be deeply moved by a charismatic evangelist or preacher, but actual recruitment to the movement is a product of the capacity of individual members to persuade others, by means of face-to-face encounters, to accept their beliefs (1970: 89-90).

The emphasis is on existing positive social networks, such as ties of kinship, proximity of residence, and association through employment, as lines of recruitment. Witnessing extends the message of the struggle beyond ideological theorizing to a reality of personal commitment.

The force behind recruitment is charisma, the ability to inspire others to a belief in the movement. Wallace (1956) stresses the role of a single charismatic leader, whose hypnotic power of personal authority inspires devoted obedience. Gerlach and Hine (1970: 90) describe charisma as a transitory capacity to inspire, a power which is transmitted from one member to another, enabling each to work on their own initiative.
Commitment

Movements provide a new context of understanding to fill the vacuum created by a disenchantment with the existing order. Gerlach and Hine (1970: xvii) call this a reformulation of one's identity through a commitment to a new set of ideals. It is precipitated by experiences which produce an altered self-image and may be a real or symbolic break with the past. Wallace describes the commitment process as a literal vision in which "many of the converts undergo a revitalizing personality transformation" (1956: 273).

Commitment is

... manifested as a a) primacy of concern with the belief system of the movement; b) participation in the social organization of the movement; c) some degree of charismatic capacity to influence others; d) willingness to risk social, economic, or political sanctions exercised by opponents of the movement; and e) some degree of behavioral change (Gerlach and Hine 1979: 158)

Long-term commitment is an application of the commitment experiences to everyday behavior as a continual reaffirmation of conviction in the envisioned order.

Thus, a differentiation can be made between those who sympathize with and support the goals of a movement, and those who actively participate in its social and ideological struggles. The latter have integrated their initial acts of commitment into their lifeway model.

However, this integration must be sustained by social reinforcement to ensure its survival. Long-term commitment to a movement requires sacrifice; competing demands between personal needs and the needs of the movement produce stress which may endanger the integrity of the movement. Group support acts as a foundation for the maintenance of
the integrated identity, as well as reinforcing the communal belief system.

Thus, commitment serves not only as a personal expression of change, but as a revitalizing force within the movement. New converts bring a fresh outlook to the movement, a sense of conviction undeterred by the stresses of lengthy participation. Their efforts at recruitment as an expression of their new-found commitment contribute to the spread of the movement; their participation in the social organization and their belief in the movement ideology give fresh impetus to the struggle.

Ideology

Gerlach and Hine state that:

The luxuries of tolerance, relativism, eclecticism, and ambivalence are available to those who accept themselves and their society as given . . . But at points of radical change, when fundamental social innovation or personal transformation of any magnitude is required, there must be an ideological basis for decisive action (1970: 160).

The belief system or ideology provides a holistic rationale for the existence of the movement and the need for fundamental social change. It provides a body of criticisms and condemnation of the existing order and a doctrine for the defense of the movement's activities.

However, this belief system operates at two levels, one in which the values and goals are basic and unchangeable, and one in which disagreements and adaptations are acceptable. The basic body of beliefs are those which are shared by all members; they form the basis for ideological strength among divergent sub-groups or individuals. The
wider body of beliefs is open to variations and interpretations, and provide for ideological diversity, flexibility, and adaptation to specific situations.

Movements adapt to their opposition and to the larger society through the modification of their ideologies. Adaptations in ideology are a sign of maturation and a growing understanding of the relationship between the movement and the existing order; an awareness developing out of varying, internal interpretations of ideological themes.

In his discussion of revitalization movements, Wallace notes:

In most instances, the original doctrine is continuously modified by the prophet, who responds to various criticisms and affirmations by adding to, emphasizing, playing down, and eliminating selected elements of the original vision (1956: 274). This adaptation of the wider body of beliefs, concurrent with the maintenance of the basic values and goals, allows for ideological strength and adaptive flexibility.

Organization

Movement organization is the structural network of a body of individuals joined by a belief in and working toward the actualization of a common ideology. Like societies in general, it is characterized by a division of labor which defines levels of leadership and bodies of followers, and by lines of communication which link factions built on individual loyalties and associations.

Wallace (1956) describes a pyramidal structure for revitalization movements. The hierarchy descends from a prophet, through a level of
devoted disciples, to a larger body of supporters. Gerlach and Hine (1970) argue for a decentralized, segmented, polycephalous network of
linked sub-groups, which are essentially independent but can combine
or divide to form larger or smaller groups.

In both cases, participation in the movement is measured by the
intensity of commitment and therefore, by the extent to which a member
is willing to actively support the activities of the movement. Thus,
it could be argued that both models concur on a structure which centers
on a core group of active members, including one who assumes the
leadership around which exists a wider circle of decreasingly active
to passive supporters.*

Wallace's pyramidal hierarchy of prophet-disciples-followers is
easily transposed to a series of concentric rings; Gerlach and Hine's
model can be seen as a series of such concentric circles, reticulated
through an expanding or contracting network.

Leadership is defined by the interrelated possession of charisma
and commitment. While Wallace sees charisma as stemming from the
ecstatic vision or revelation, Gerlach and Hine tie charisma into the
commitment process. In either case, leadership is characterized by
the power to attract, inspire, and retain a following. Whether that
power comes from a spiritual force, a personal force, or from the
political force of the movement's cause, the leader must be able to

*Zald and Ash (1969: 465) refer to V. I. Lenin's (1929)
description of structure in terms of concentric circles of lessening
commitment and participation.
harness the power and inspire a following which not only supports the movement but actively works for its goals.

The disciples, or core members, are similarly committed and have the potential for assuming leadership. Wallace notes that:

The fundamental element of the vision . . . is the entrance of the visionary into an intense relationship with a supernatural being. This relationship, furthermore, is one in which the prophet accepts the leadership, succor, and dominance of the supernatural. Many followers of a prophet, especially the disciples, also have ecstatic revelatory experiences; but they and all sincere followers who have not had a personal revelation also enter into a parallel relationship to the prophet: as God is to the prophet, so (almost) is the prophet to his followers (1956: 274).

The outer circle of followers is comprised of supporters who 1) have not experienced the act of commitment; 2) have not integrated the commitment process into their lifeway model; or 3) have previously participated actively in the movement and have, for various reasons, "burned out" from the stresses of participation. This group of passive supporters, while outside the core group and not contributing to the actual daily operation of the movement, functions as a sympathetic base in the larger society.

The segments of a movement are tied to each other by bonds of common ideology. Segmentation allows for organizational and ideological growth: in facilitating the spread of the movement across class and cultural boundaries (multi-penetration), preventing effective suppression, minimizing failures by isolating them within independent segments, allowing variation in the design and implementation of envisioned changes (Gerlach and Hine 1970: 71-73).
However, as in any society, there is the potential for dissension or discord. Whether it is generated by internal, factional allegiances or by external factors (e.g. the opposition playing one group against another), the survival of the movement is dependent on the maintenance of effective lines of communication. If segments are genuinely reticulate, if they share a common basic ideology, if they can submerge their differences in the face of opposition when crucial issues are at stake, then the movement has effective power through networking (Gerlach and Hine 1970: 73).

Opposition

Opposition to a social movement is defined as the forces within the existing order which prevent the attainment of the movement's goals. It is manifested in two ways: overtly, as a direct attack against the movement, and covertly, through indirect economic or social sanctions.

Direct opposition is the framework against which a movement operates. In a sense, it defines the movement; it is the antagonist, the barrier against the goals of envisioned change. Thus, its actions can add to or detract from the unity of the movement. That is, strong direct opposition can bring together diverse factions within the movement, which are compelled to work more closely together toward the common goal. In contrast, quiescent opposition allows for ideological controversy; a silent opposition provides no motives for unified attack. Lack of public concern and interest in the goals of the movement have a similar effect on fragmentation.
Although a movement operates at the outer limits of the larger society, its members must continue to function within that society. Thus, they are susceptible to social controls that operate as an indirect form of opposition. They are ephemeral because they are not directed against the movement per se but against individuals or subgroups within the movement.

Sanctions against individuals or groups take the form of pressures from family, friends, and occupational associates, which are not openly attributable to membership in the movement.

For example, Coles describes the lack of support by rural southern blacks for voter registration (in the early 1960s) as a fear of retaliation. Thus, civil rights workers found themselves with no support from those for whom they were working. The effects of this were often manifested in exhaustion, despair, frustration, and rage (Coles 1969: 315-316). Such symptoms challenged their commitment to the movement, adding to already existing competing personal demands.

Revitalization Movements and Contemporary Social Movements

Gerlach and Hine define a successful movement as the point of intersection between personal and social change (1970: xiii). A movement, as a mechanism for social change, creates a consciousness among individuals for the necessity for change. It acts in a systemic progression: a movement, once started, generates change. Whether or not it succeeds in attaining its envisioned goals, it succeeds in creating an awareness of the issues involved by verbalizing those issues, by provoking the opposition to extreme actions, and thereby
compelling individuals to take sides. In this way, it motivates people
to question the existing structure, even if they do not support the
movement itself.

The interrelationship of the five characteristics as elements
within the movement system can be summarized in one word, solidarity;
how it is achieved, how it is maintained, how it functions within the
movement and the larger society.

Solidarity is essential for resource mobilization. It is the
foundation for ameliorating stress which comes from competing demands
between personal needs and the needs of a movement which exists on
the periphery or outside of established social norms. It provides a
sense of belonging, based on a commitment to a new set of values.

The five characteristics function as an incentive structure,
providing the motivations for solidarity. Values and goals of the
movement form a new belief system which supplants the old order. Image
and identity, framed by the opposition and by belief in the ideology,
are reinforced through witnessing and the commitment process.

Conflicts within a movement can be seen as the result of
clashing incentives; wherein the solidarity motivations for one
constituency are at odds with the incentives propelling another group.
Such conflicts may affect a movement's ability to function as a viable
force.

Within the framework of the stage model of movement development,
these conflicts become most evident during the period of adaptation.
Wallace uses this period as the definitional stage in his revitaliza-
tion model. It is during this stage that the idealism of the
revolutionary vision is challenged by the pragmatic concerns of movement survival, i.e. maintaining incentives for participation. What may result is a transformation of the movement's organization or goals to accommodate the resolution of the crisis. As Wallace notes:

This reworking makes the new doctrine more acceptable to special interest groups, may give it a better "fit" to the population's cultural and personality patterns, and may take account of the changes occurring in the general milieu (1956: 275).

Thus, the development of a movement may be checked at any stage of growth, and the resolution of conflicts may result in a number of alternatives: a regression to an earlier stage of development; organizational change (such as increased bureaucratization, factionalization, or mergers with other movements); goal alteration; or the dissolution of the movement. The complexity of possibilities limits the stages of development to a model of movement growth, disregarding the conditions for decay or change which exist simultaneously.

Cultural revitalization can be seen as a basis for solidarity. It provides both an ideology based on the reformulation of a new "mazeway" and a solidarity organization based on belief in the ideology. Its role in a contemporary social movement, however, is predicated on the degree to which the movement can adapt the "mazeway reformulation" to the cultural heterogeneous milieu which exists in a contemporary complex society. Thus, revitalization complements the contemporary social movement perspective: the former looks at the kind of change which is being advocated while the latter provides the structure in which that change can be attained.
The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana is an effort at revitalization in modern Hawai'i. Its development as a movement can be analyzed in terms of the stages of the revitalization model. Its expression of the five characteristics (that is, its expressions of solidarity) is its manifestation as a contemporary social movement. The following chapters examine the PKO's development over a period of five years and changes in its structure during that time.
CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF THE PROTECT KAHO'OLAWE 'OHANA

Introduction

The history of the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana between 1976 and 1981 can be seen as an ebb and flow of action, in which certain events stand out as critical junctures, points at which decisions were made and crises were resolved. These events can be examined in terms of the stages of movement development: individual stress and cultural distortion; initial action and communication; movement formalization; adaptation; and institutionalization.

This chapter presents a description of the movement within this framework. The initial period of social unrest is discussed as the background to the movement itself, that is, as the social context from which the movement emerged. The stages of revitalization are presented in terms of the major events in the development of the 'Ohana.

A General History: The Social Context

Prior to 1976, several parallel and related issues were developing which culminated in the first "invasion" of the island of Kaho'olawe by Hawaiian activists. The first was linked to the social upheaval in America in the 1960s, and specifically to the rise of ethnicity as a conscious form of social power. The second concerned the use and ownership of land in the island state of Hawai'i. The third was the specific issue of the U.S. Navy use of the island of Kaho'olawe for bombing and ground training maneuvers.
Ethnic Protest in America: the 1960s

The decade of the 1960s in American history was a period of social vitality and upheaval. Vietnam War protests, the student movement, hippies, and even the reactionary John Birch Society were manifestations of a general questioning of the social and political status quo. This was the decade of the "war on poverty," "the Great Society," and the fluorescence of the American welfare state, which precipitated rising expectations for economic well-being.

This was also a period of ethnic awakening, in which the social, political, and economic dominance of the "white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant" stereotype and its concomitant negative image of ethnic minorities was challenged by a series of movements which shared a common belief in ethnic pride and self-worth. The first, and progenitor of the others, was the Civil Rights Movement, which was launched in 1955 in an effort to end segregation on Montgomery, Alabama, city buses. It emphasized non-violence, with the use of boycotts, sit-ins, and non-violent reactions in the face of attacks as its primary tactics. Its goal was to gain total acceptance and equality for minorities within American society, that is, an actualization of the American democracy.

The Black Power Movement grew out of disillusionment with the integrationalist doctrines of its predecessor. It was "not the 'We Shall Overcome' effort to climb into the melting pot but the 'Black is Beautiful' effort to climb out" (Loh 1973). It was an assertion of
pride in being black, and a variation of the "separate-but-equal"
tenets of the pre-Civil Rights era. Black Power was instrumental inraising an awareness that assimilation was no longer the only culturalalternative for ethnic minorities.

Black Power was followed by Brown Power, Red Power, and YellowPower, among others. These ethnic movements grew out of attempts tosolidify some kind of identity, a new context of understanding bywhich the events of the 1960s could be interpreted. They were efforts to reestablish standards of belief and behavior, reinterpreted through an ethnic prism. In this manner, they were a basis for groupmobilization, an effective motivator which combined interest with anaffective tie:

Rather than the celebration of ethnicity as a matter of reaffirming one's heritage, family ties, a religious interest, the ethnic identity becomes a rallying point for political assaults upon the barriers to equal opportunities that confront the community (Bahr et al 1979).

Ethnic movements were attempts to alter the existing world view of minorities: as they see themselves, as reflections of how others view them, and as an expression of stereotypes, or expected images. Vander Zanden notes:

In many respects, even good performance is irrelevant insofar as the Negro frequently gets a poor reflection of himself in the behavior of whites, regardless of what he does or what his merits are. Identified by society as a Negro, he, of necessity, so identifies himself (1969: 56-57).

Identities are formed in the context of specific relationships: one's context of understanding evolves from earliest childhood and becomes so structured and integrated that to radically change it would
be to invite psychological disorientation (Marris 1974). Thus, in the context of the 1960s, ethnic movements provided a mechanism to implement an image alteration. They were organized efforts to change the way America as a national entity saw its component parts, and to restructure the power balance in American society to accommodate and recognize the viability of ethnic minorities.

The range of movements was great: ethnic-based organizations which worked toward integration into the established order were counter-balanced by more politically radical groups such as the Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement which saw that alternative as ineffective for bringing about significant change. Militancy stemmed largely from the resistance by the dominant group to effective pluralism.

Counteracting the positive mobilization of ethnic forces was an entropic force which Alter (1976) warned could lead to a balkanization of political interests and cultural life rather than a new and stronger American society. Joined only by a common bond of antagonism toward a white-dominated society, minority groups could look to a glorification of the past, like Rousseau with his "noble savage," and of an internally perceived ethnocentric supremacy, rather than unity and strength in pluralism.

Boulding (1962: 135-139) discusses specialization in the intellectual community of universities which can be useful in illustrating the entropic potential in ethnicity. He argues that, in the complexity of modern knowledge, one is essentially forced to specialize; that is, an individual is forced to limit his expertise to
a specific field when he or she finds it impossible to absorb or even be familiar with the entire range of existing knowledge. In specialization, as structured along academic departmental lines, value systems and languages develop which further exacerbate the divisions. He concludes:

The universe of discourse is crumbling into a multiverse and in one's more depressed moments one looks forward to a time when the progress of science will grind to a standstill in a morass of mutual incomprehensibility. Out of our intellectual pride, we may be building a new Tower of Babel (1962: 139).

Like Alter, Boulding suggests that the assertion of competing and non-communicating components would adversely affect the integrity of the whole.

The Hawaiian Cultural Renaissance

In Hawai'i, a cultural renaissance was occurring within this general time-frame. Beginning as an amorphous interest in Hawaiian arts, it developed from 1970, as native Hawaiians formed a number of organizations oriented toward political, social, and economic issues.

These new organizations differed from the Hawaiian Civic Clubs, which were founded in 1917 by Prince Jonah Kuhio and which by the 1970s emphasized social, cultural, and educational activities. The new groups were motivated by political action, by a perception of the existing condition of the Hawaiian people as less than adequate and less than just.

For example, in the early 1960s, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians made up 18.8 percent of the total State population. But they accounted for 35 to 40 percent of the financially destitute who
received public assistance. They made up 57 percent of the male inmate population and 48 percent of the female inmate population at the State Youth Correctional Facility. They comprised 42 percent of the adult inmate population at the State Correctional Facilities (Ethnic Studies 1974: 2). In 1970, the life expectancy for Hawaiians was 67.62 years, contrasting with the life expectancy for all ethnic groups of 74.20 years (Look 1982: 1).

These few statistics illustrate some of the factors on which a public perception, as well as a negative self-image, of Hawaiians was founded. These perceptions and the conditions on which they were founded generated a dissatisfaction with the existing order and motivated the formation of the politically oriented Hawaiian organizations.

One of the first of these groups was the Hawaiians, a community organization in Waimanalo, O'ahu. Between 1970 and 1974, it grew to 8,000 members throughout the State. Its initial goal of improving the housing situation for Hawaiians (with efforts focused on the Hawaiian Homes Commission) was later broadened to a concern for greater self-determination through the development of economic resources, political power, and a sense of pride in being Hawaiian (Ethnic Studies 1974).

The Hawaiians was followed by several other organizations, with various objectives but a common goal of bettering the conditions of Hawaiians. Although sometimes turning to large-scale public rallies and direct confrontation, they shared a belief in working within the established order, through lobbying with government officials,
By 1975, the viability of Hawaiian ethnicity as an organizing force was being realized.

Land

During this same period, Hawai'i was undergoing major changes in its social and economic setting. Immigration from the United States mainland and from Asia altered the demographic character of the islands: the population in general rose from 632,772 to 769,913 between 1960 and 1970 and to 964,691 in 1980. The proportions among ethnic populations changed (DPED 1981: 13).

Tourism and the military supplanted sugar cane and pineapple as the major powers in the economy. Former agricultural lands, as well as beachfront properties, were rezoned for urban and resort development to meet the demands of the changing economy. Many locally based, agriculturally oriented companies were absorbed by multi-national corporations (cf. Kent 1979: 385-419).

Land in an island environment is a limited and valuable resource. In the rapidly changing social and economic setting of the 1960s and 1970s, it became a profitable commodity as well. The effects of mounting population pressures and the growing primacy of tourism in Hawai'i were made worse by the control of most of the land by very few landowners.

In 1968, major private landowners (those owning more than 1,000 acres) controlled 1,917,560 acres, or 46% of the total land area, in
Hawai'i. The State and federal governments together controlled only 22,924 acres more than these private owners (a total of 1,940,484 acres) (Schmitt 1977: 299). The Bishop Estate, the largest private entity and one based on lands obtained by a Hawaiian ali'i in the Mahele, controlled 369,700 acres (DPED 1981: 166).

The history of changes in land tenure in Hawai'i was the foundation for this domination of land.

Land Tenure in Hawai'i: A Brief Overview

The issues of use and access rights and of land ownership in Hawai'i have their foundation in traditional Hawaiian culture. Land was an integral part of the traditional Hawaiian identity, as defined in 19th century literature (cf. Handy and Handy 1972: 42-43). The native economic system was based largely on agriculture; although land was not owned in any legal sense, there was a real and symbolic bond with the land on which one lived and worked. From an economic perspective, land was the source of life, that is, food. From a symbolic perspective, land was the medium through which one traced ancestral relationships. It symbolized who one was and who one's ancestors were (Pukui et al 1974: 269).

Land tenure was organized into a system of rights to use and access. Land was divided into discrete, relatively self-sufficient units called ahupua'a, which ideally extended from the sea to the mountains, making available a wide variety of resources (Kelly 1956: 20). Revocable rights to resource use were allotted and reallocated from a paramount chief down through a ranked system of lower chiefs to
the commoners. With the succession of a new paramount chief, land rights were redistributed to his followers. Commoners tended to remain outside this redistributive system, in the sense of being permanent tenants with changing landlords (Handy and Handy 1972: 41).

From Western Contact in 1778 through the first half of the 19th century, critical disruptions to the traditional social, political, and economic structure occurred which led to the demise of the land tenure system (cf. Kelly 1956; Kent 1979). It was during this period that crucial demographic changes occurred, that a market economy replaced subsistence agriculture, and that Christian missionization flourished.

A massive depopulation of the Hawaiian people from an estimated 242,200 to 400,000 in 1778 to 84,165 in 1850 (Schmitt 1977: 7, 8) occurred for a number of reasons, of which Kamehameha's wars of unification in the 1790s and disease were probably major factors. Hawaiians enlisting as sailors on foreign trading ships was also an element; estimates range from 200 in 1823 to 4,000 in 1850 (Schmitt 1968: 39).

The population was also shifting from rural areas to growing urban centers. This was due in part to the development of a market economy which gradually supplanted the traditional subsistence system. From the first contact with Westerners, trade was an integral part of the Hawaiian-foreigner interaction. Early exchange was based on barter, but with the beginning of the sandalwood trade in the early 1800s, the use of a standard medium of exchange, sandalwood, was initiated.
Kamehameha, as paramount chief of a united Hawaiian kingdom, held a monopoly on the trade. But with his death in 1819, the lesser chiefs were allowed a portion of the market, and they entered enthusiastically. Even when sandalwood became scarce in the early 1820s, the trade flourished on credit. Thus, by 1826, the national debt, based primarily on this sandalwood trade, was estimated at $200,000 (Kuykendall 1968: 85-92).

During the period of growth in the sandalwood market, the pressure on commoners to neglect subsistence activities for sandalwood collection (on the orders of their chiefs) increased. With the realization of the national debt, commoners were further burdened by a tax to pay the debt. Men were required to pay a certain amount of sandalwood, four Spanish dollars, or a "valuable" commodity of equal value; women were required to furnish a mat of a specified size, a kapa of equal value, or one Spanish dollar (Kuykendall 1968: 92).

Kelly's summary of the causes of depopulation in the district of Ka' u, Hawai'i are applicable to the islands as a whole:

In the customary discussion of the depopulation of the islands, emphasis is usually laid on the role of disease epidemics as natural calamities. However, other factors must be seen as part of the total picture. The disruptions of the subsistence economy of the Hawaiians played a major role. The consequent deteriorated social conditions laid the basis for the devastating effects introduced diseases had among the Hawaiian population. The Kamehameha wars of the 1790s; the increased demands on the people by the chiefs; and the odious sequestration of their land and homes for non-payment of over-burdensome taxes contributed to the social disruption. Increasing amounts of labor utilized in non-food-producing activities contributed directly to the disruption by depleting the food supplies. Compelled by the generally rising requirements of the approaching money economy, the people were driven in ever larger number away from their farms and into the commercial centers (1969: 43).
In addition to these disruptive influences, the introduction of Christianity in 1820 was also a major element in the alteration of Hawaiian culture. Christianity filled a vacuum created by the overthrow of the traditional religion in 1819 and counterbalanced the effects of earlier contact with explorers, traders, and other foreign residents. As Kuykendall notes of the early missionaries:

The grand object of their work was the conversion of the people of Hawaii to Christianity. But while they were interested primarily in the salvation of the souls of the Sandwich Islanders, they had a clear conception of their role as a civilizing agency; and they firmly believed that the highest type of civilization could not be attained except in conjunction with the Christian religion (1968: 101).

He summarizes further:

It must be kept in mind that the missionaries and others who professed an interest in the welfare of the Hawaiian people assumed without question that the pattern of western culture with which they were familiar in America and Europe was superior to the culture of the Hawaiians and that the latter would as a matter of course be happier and better off in every respect if they acquired the foreign culture. But in order to effect that result, the habits of the people would have to be changed and their wants multiplied, and the resources of the country would have to be developed so that there would be products suitable for export, to exchange for useful and desirable goods brought from other countries. The missionaries believed that these changes, in cooperation with the Christian religion, would save the native race from extinction (1968: 171).

Thus, missionaries saw their duty, not simply as evangelism, but as the improvement, i.e. westernization, of the Hawaiian people through education and industry.

The changes brought about by depopulation, by the development of a market economy, and through missionization were manifested in the overturning of the traditional system of land use. When the potential for commercial and agricultural development became apparent in the
1830s and 1840s, Westerners became increasingly dissatisfied with the insecure position they held without fee simple ownership of land; few could justify outlays of capital for business ventures without the security of land titles. At the same time, other foreigners who were concerned about the welfare of the Hawaiian people speculated that land ownership would encourage natives to work harder for their own benefit, and thus stem the tide of the clearly apparent depopulation trend (Kuykendall 1968: 273).

The declaration of rights of 1839 set down for the first time, and the Constitution of 1840 reaffirmed, that land in Hawai'i was owned by the people and chiefs in common, and that the king, as head of the nation, had only the authority of management (Kelly 1956: 126; Kuykendall 1968: 272). A Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles was formed in 1845 to settle claims to land but little could be accomplished until the Mahele of 1848 established a division of ownership between the king and the chiefs. The king further separated his lands into those for himself and his heirs (the Crown lands) and those to be administered by the legislature for the benefit of the government (the Government lands) (Chinen 1958).

In July 1850, a law was enacted authorizing the sale of lands in fee simple to resident aliens. In August 1850, an act authorizing the award of kuleana (those lands actually occupied and improved) to native tenants was established. With the passage of these laws, traditional land tenure gave way to rights of private ownership.

Hawai'i in the 19th century was viewed by Western entrepreneurs as an economic frontier, waiting to be settled and developed. With a
better understanding of the concepts of land ownership, they used the Hawaiian land laws to their advantage in their relatively rapid acquisition of land for economic development. Hawaiians lost their lands through outright sale, gifting, and loan forfeiture, among other reasons.

The formal end to the Hawaiian Kingdom came in 1893 with the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani and the establishment of a provisional government. In 1894, the Republic of Hawai'i was formed under a constitution which expressly provided:

That portion of the public domain heretofore known as crown land is hereby declared to have been heretofore, and now to be, the property of the Hawaiian Government, and to be now free and clear from any trust of or concerning the same, and from all claim of any native whatsoever upon the rents, issues, and profits there-of (in Spaulding 1923: 16).

The Organic Act of 1900, passed by the U.S. Congress to establish the territory of Hawai'i, repeated the same provision.

Thus, at the turn of the century, the United States government acquired a large portion of Hawaiian lands totalling 1.75 million acres of both Crown and Government lands (by then called "public lands") through the annexation of the islands.

In 1920, the U.S. Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act which set aside 213,500 acres of public lands for the purpose of rehabilitating native Hawaiians, defined as those having 50% or more Hawaiian blood (Akinaka and Dunn 1972: 4). Rehabilitation was interpreted in two ways: 1) to return the Hawaiian people to the land, on the premise that they were originally an agricultural people, and 2) to prevent the further decrease in the Hawaiian population. On
this latter point, the number of pure Hawaiians had dropped from approximately 130,000 in 1832 to 22,500 in 1919 at which time the death rate was greater than any other ethnic group in the islands (66th Congress 1920: 2).

John Wise, a Hawaiian legislator and member of the lobbyist group for the rehabilitation measure before Congress, testified that:

The Hawaiian people are a farming people and fishermen, out-of-door people, and when they were frozen out of their lands and driven into the cities they had to live in the cheapest places, tenements. That is one of the big reasons why the Hawaiian people are dying. Now, the only way to save them, I contend, is to take them back to the lands and give them the mode of living that their ancestors were accustomed to and in that way rehabilitate them (66th Congress 1920: 4).

The stated intent of the Act also provided a humanitarian facade to an additional purpose, which was to revise the land laws of the territory. These revisions assured the rich agricultural lands for the large sugar plantations by securing them from the mandate of the homesteading provisions of the 1910 amendments to the Organic Act. This mandate provided for the withdrawal of sugar leases any time 25 or more qualified citizens made an application for homesteads. The 1920 Act exempted lands under sugar cultivation from this withdrawal clause by tying the lease revenues to the rehabilitation program (66th Congress 1920: 8-9; Vause 1962: 110-111).

Through the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, Hawaiians were given an opportunity to return to the land. But the lands that were available to them were largely marginal. The sugar lands, exempted from the withdrawal clause, were also excluded from the lands set aside for the purposes of the Act. In 1975, 80% of the Hawaiian Home lands current
land inventory was designated for agricultural use. However, of these 152,000 acres, 70% was deemed marginal agricultural lands; 55% was identified to have water problems (DHHL 1976: 24).

Since the Act was passed, homesteading has taken the form of primarily houselot leases rather than farms and ranches as originally intended, particularly on O'ahu and in Hilo, Hawai'i (Akinaka and Dunn 1972: 27). In 1975, over 90% of Hawaiian home lands homesteaders occupied urban-designated lands. In its 1976 General Plan, the Department identified housing as its "first priority based on an analysis of existing demographic data and on the current DHHL housing waiting list" (DHHL 1976: 8). Agricultural development was established as the "second priority based on an assessment of the best use of each parcel" (DHHL 1976: 8).

General leases were awarded to non-Hawaiians for farming, ranching, and commercial and industrial use, with the intent of producing revenues for department support. In 1972, these leases encumbered 57% of the Hawaiian home lands (Akinaka and Dunn 1972: Table 2).

Thus, in its interpretation of rehabilitation, the Hawaiian Homes Commission has moved away from returning Hawaiians to the land, instead emphasizing residential development and large-scale leases (mainly to non-Hawaiians) for revenue production.

Thus, while large estates such as the Bishop Estate preserved lands claimed by some Hawaiian chiefs in the 19th century, the larger number of Hawaiians were left landless by the mid-20th century, as evidenced particularly by the concerns of John Wise in his testimony before the U.S. Congress.
Land Issues in Hawai‘i: the 1970s

In 1970, a group called Kokua Kalama organized to resist the eviction of small farmers from Bishop Estate lease land in Kalama Valley, O‘ahu, which was targeted for high-income residential development. It was one of the first of several radically oriented organizations directed toward preserving agricultural and rural lands as an integral part of a "local" identity, drawing on the subsistence heritage of traditional Hawai‘i.*

While they stated that they were not all native Hawaiians, they raised questions which were tied to their interpretation of a Hawaiian way of life; particularly questions concerning land use and land control throughout the State (Ethnic Studies 1974).

Groups such as Kokua Kalama argued that urbanization was encroaching on a rural lifestyle and was a continuation of the "loss of land" that had begun in the mid-1800s. Sometimes aided by students in the University of Hawai‘i Ethnic Studies Program, itself an outgrowth of the Student Movement of the 1960s, these groups fought evictions and other incursions on resource use rights.

One such group was Hui Alaloa, which organized a series of marches in 1975 through Molokai Ranch lands on the west end of that island. They argued that they had traditional rights of access to the beaches

*Another organization with a similar purpose was Hui Malama Aina o Koolau. It was formed by a group of Kahalu‘u kuleana landowners. The integrity of their agricultural lifestyle was threatened by County zoning changes. Unlike Kokua Kalama, the organization operated largely within the mainstream of Hawaiian politics.
on the west end, which were closed to the public by the ranch. They emphasized their rights of use and access as native Hawaiians and based their claims of access on the existence of a Hawaiian trail to the beaches.

By the end of 1975, the issue of land use and ownership was solidly planted in the public's mind. It affected people from all walks of life, from farmers who saw a threat to their livelihood and former plantation workers whose livelihood had been terminated and who had few options other than menial employment in the tourist industry (cf. Smith 1972) to potential homeowners who saw a housing market escalating out of reach.

For native Hawaiians, it was all these problems graphically symbolizing the deterioration of their own culture.

The Military and the Bombing of Kaho'olawe

In 1979, the U.S. military controlled 159,259 acres or approximately 4%, of land in Hawai'i (DPED 1981: 167). On O'ahu, that included much of the rich central plateau between the Wai'anae and Ko'olau ranges and the entire Pearl Harbor, once the site of some of the richest collections of fishponds on the island.

The presence of U.S. military in Hawai'i officially began in 1876 when the Reciprocity Treaty between Hawai'i and the U.S. provided for American use of the estuaries later renamed Pearl Harbor in exchange for favorable concessions in the sugar trade. In 1893, the American Navy was influential in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. Without the presence of the U.S.S. Boston in Honolulu Harbor
and a troop of marines camped near the 'Iolani Palace, the overthrow may not have happened (Kuykendall 1967: 598).

From the time of annexation to the present, the armed forces have acquired substantial land holdings for military bases and air fields. One of the last parcels to be acquired was the island of Kaho'olawe. With the onset of World War II, the U.S. Army subleased a portion, and later the whole, of the island from the McPhee family who held a Territorial government lease for ranching. The sublease continued until 1953 when military control of the island was formalized by Federal Executive Order 10436, signed by President Dwight Eisenhower (EIS Corp. 1979: 2-91).

Since then, under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy, the island has been used as a training ground for combined land, sea, and air attacks, primarily by the Navy and Marines. In 1968, the bombing target zone was restricted to the central portion of the island (Hommon 1980: 7/29).

The history of recent protest to the military use of the island began in the late 1960s. The accidental dropping of a 500 pound bomb in an inhabited area of Maui (in the vicinity of the pig farm owned by the mayor of Maui County and coincidentally on Hawaiian Homes lease land), as well as similar incidents on Ni'ihau and near Miloli'i on Hawai'i (other bombing areas), caused alarm about the hazards of such military training near residential areas. Furthermore, noise and shock waves from the bombing disturbed residents and tourists in the Kīhei-Mākena area of Maui (Nakamura 1978).
These events precipitated expressions of concern from County officials, State legislators, and Congressional delegates. These included Congressional requests (by U.S. Senator Hiram Fong in 1979 and U.S. Representative Patsy Mink in 1975) for a halt to the bombing (LRB 1978: 46, 48), and for studies of alternatives to Kaho'olawe for bombing practice. A legal suit was filed by the Mayor of Maui County and the local chapter of an environmental group to require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the use of the island (EIS Corp. 1979: 2-91).

A proposal to return the island to Hawaiians was also made in 1973 by Charles Maxwell, a leader of ALOHA, a group advocating the payment of reparations to Hawaiians in compensation for U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the monarchy (LRB 1978: 48).

Kaho'olawe: Ethnicity, Land, and Bombing

The separate issues of ethnicity, land, and military use converged on the island of Kaho'olawe. It took the actions of a small group of people to focus and mobilize the various individuals and groups who had voiced their sentiments on issues surrounding the island. The movement which developed brought together a political cause which was broad-based as well as intrinsically Hawaiian.

Long viewed by the general public as little more than a barren rock, Kaho'olawe became the center of a controversy around which individuals with divergent interests identified.
The PKO: History of a Movement in Development

The Beginning

On January 4, 1976, a party of more than 20 people left Mā'alaea Harbor, Maui, enroute to an "invasion" of the island of Kaho'olawe. Coincident with the celebration of the American Bicentennial, their primary intent was to bring attention to the condition of the Hawaiian people, much in the same way that the occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay was planned by American Indian militants. But individual rationales reflected the diversity of interests: members of ALOHA were using the landing as a statement for their organization's goal of reparations from the U.S. government, Maui fishermen were protesting restrictions on fishing in waters off the island, members of Hui Alaloa were interested in the issue of access rights.

Scared off by the U.S. Coast Guard which was alerted to the landing, most of the party returned to Maui. However, nine people, primarily native Hawaiians and one American Indian, managed to land. Although seven were quickly apprehended by the Coast Guard, two members of Hui Alaloa, Emmett Aluli and Walter Ritte, managed to evade capture and stayed on the island for two days (Foster 1976: 3).

This action, and two subsequent landings (one sanctioned by the Navy for religious ceremonies) in the next month, received wide publicity. They generated questions concerning the military use of the island and curiosity about the island and its role as a sacred place in Hawai'i.
From this beginning, the organization known as the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana was eventually formed. It was spearheaded by the three members of Hui Alaloa who were participants in the first landing, Ritte, Aluli, and George Helm.

In the first year, 1976, no one had a clear picture of the organization. The landings had spawned a reaction; they were something to which people responded, and efforts were directed toward defining what that was. An ideology and an organization were developed to channel the energies of supporters and sympathizers. The organization was named the Protect Kaho'olawe Aloha 'Aina Association (Ritte and Sawyer 1980).

The phrase, *aloha ʻāina* (love of the land) encompassed the feelings about the island, the rationale for the landings, and the need to stop the bombing. There were two reputed sources for this phrase. One was from a late 19th century newspaper, *Ke Aloha Aina*, edited by Joseph Kaho'oluhi Nawahi, a strong supporter of Queen Lili'uokalani in the days of the overthrow and the provisional government. The Queen said of him after his death: "He had always been a man who fearlessly advocated the independence of Hawai'i Nei" (in Mookini 1974: xii). The other source was a line from a song about Kaho'olawe, written by Irmgard Aluli, Pilahi Paki, and Inez Ashdown (E. Aluli, pers. comm.).

Alternative strategies were investigated. The Protect Kaho'olawe Fund (PKF, or the Fund), a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, was started to "educate and increase knowledge of Hawaiian people and
general public to the historical, cultural, religious, social significance and importance" of the island (Charter of Incorporation 1976).

Legislative outlets were studied; individual attempts were made to appeal to politicians. A civil suit, Aluli vs. Brown, charged the U.S. Navy with violating the National Environmental Protection Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and Executive Order 11593 (which mandates federal agencies to identify historic properties under their jurisdiction) (LRB 1978: 205).

By the end of the year, however, it was apparent that the U.S. Navy, citing training needs, had no immediate intention of returning the island, in spite of continuing pressures from government officials, the business community, and the general public.

The Fourth Landing

In January 1977, five men, including Ritte, returned to the island. This illegal landing was precipitated by two specific events. First, a State-organized archaeological team had been formed to survey the island; the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana (as the Association became known) had requested that kupuna (elders) and kama'āina witnesses (native-born individuals knowledgeable in the culture of a particular area) accompany the professional archaeologists to culturally verify their findings. The request was refused. Aluli later complained: "It is still the scientists who are controlling and publicizing our past" (in Smith 1977a).
Secondly, a Navy-conducted study estimated the cost of clearing the island of unexploded ordnance at $77 million to $130 million (Star-Bulletin, 1/13/1977: A12). Shortly after this study was released, negotiations between U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye and Castle and Cooke Inc. were revealed. These plans involved the purchase of part of Castle and Cooke lands on Lana'i for park development, using funds which would be targeted for the clean-up (Smith 1977b: 21). The 'Ohana interpreted this arrangement as an avoidance of the basic concept promoted by the movement; that is, that the bombing of the island was sacrilegious. The Honolulu Advertiser reported that "Ritte said Lanai doesn't have the same mana, or spiritual power, as Kahoolawe ... old Hawaiians--and today's activists--consider the island sacred" (1/29/77: A10).

Aluli stated about the new landing:

People are starting to play politics with Kaho'olawe and we decided to go back to the island because of the land deal and the fact that people are losing sight of the Hawaiian issues on Kaho'olawe (Advertiser 1/31/77).

Unlike the first three landings, the goal was to stay on the island until the bombing stopped.

Three of the five men returned within two days to tell their reasons for the landing. Walter Ritte and Richard Sawyer remained on the island for more than a month; two others, Glen Davis and Karl Mowat, went to the island for a brief period but surrendered to authorities and were charged with trespassing (Advertiser 2/10/77: A1). During this period, public interest in the 'Ohana grew, possibly
as a result of the intense coverage by the major newspapers, which carried over 50 articles on the issue (Index 1978: 106).

While Ritte and Sawyer were on the island, George Helm appeared in an unprecedented session of the State House of Representatives. Contrary to the rules of the House, he was allowed on the floor to present an impassioned plea for the return of the island (LRB 1978: 16).

In the previous landings, the presence of protesters on the island had forced the Navy to halt bombing. Thus, the occupations had served to actually stop the bombing as well as to protest Navy control. However, during the fourth landing, the Navy resumed bombing, attesting that they had carried out a full search and that there was no one on the island (Advertiser 2/8/77: Al).

On March 6, Ritte and Sawyer surrendered and the Navy charged them with illegal trespassing. Shortly after, it was reported that George Helm and another 'Ohana supporter, Kimo Mitchell, had disappeared in the channel between Maui and Kaho'olawe following an attempt to make contact with the two protesters.

The details of their disappearance were shrouded in mystery. Helm had been attempting to expose underworld activities and the State's "godfather" figure, and talk of a syndicate-style assassination followed his disappearance, the explanations of which were vague and confusing (cf. Valley Isle 6/15/77: 2-5).

For whatever reasons, his loss was a blow to the organization.
Mid-Year 1977: The Trials

Following the January landing, numerous trials were held in which various 'Ohana members were brought to court on trespassing charges. The proceedings offered a public forum for the 'Ohana. Ritte and Sawyer appeared in court attired in malo (loincloths) and ti leaf head and arm bands (Advertiser 8/6/77: A7). Supporters wore similar dress, as well as gourd helmets similar to those depicted in the etchings of Hawaiian warriors made by late 18th century explorers.

Two defendants, Sam Kealoha and Joyce Kainoa, asserted that the federal court had no jurisdiction over them. Kealoha sought refuge at Pu'uhonua o Honaunau National Park in Kona, claiming the traditional Hawaiian right of refuge at the religious site (Star-Bulletin 5/18/77: E7).

The key issues at the trials were whether the 'Ohana members had intended to violate the Navy's regulation prohibiting entry on Kaho'olawe without prior permission and whether the defendants knew or should have known about the rule (Advertiser 6/23/77: A3). Most of the 'Ohana members were convicted and given suspended sentences, probation, and/or fines, all less than the maximum six months in jail and $500 fine. A condition of probation was agreement not to return to the island without the consent of the court (Advertiser 7/26/77: A4).

Federal Judge Gordon Thompson, Jr. stated that while he had "great empathy" for the defendants, he rejected their defense that they went to the island because of religious and cultural beliefs without intending to violate the Navy regulation. He was quoted:
"That is not the law . . . their motive for entry . . . however laudable . . . is irrelevant for this case" (Advertiser 6/24/77: A3).

Walter Ritte and Richard Sawyer were given the maximum sentence. They had both failed to appear at the July sentencing and had instead returned to the island on another illegal landing (Advertiser 7/26/77: A4). This act, as well as their continuing assertions of their right to go to the island, was apparently the justification for the maximum sentence (Advertiser 8/27/77: A1).

Summer 1977: The Last Landings

A fifth landing was carried out to coincide with the July and August sentencings. The first part of it occurred on July 17 when nine people, including Ritte, Sawyer, and a Time magazine reporter, landed on the island. Support rallies were held on Moloka'i, Hawai'i, and at Mākua Valley on O'ahu ('Ohana 1977a: 3).

The 'Ohana followed this trip with another one in early August involving 14 individuals, including members of protest organizations on O'ahu as well as personally committed people from other islands. Many were moved to go by the results of the July sentencings which they considered harsh ('Ohana 1977a: 3). There was no clear idea of who was participating in this landing until the entire group gathered just prior to leaving Maui for the island.

The mix of personalities and ideologies proved to be incompatible and there were efforts, once on Kaho'olawe, to separate into factions. All were arrested by military search parties within a week.
The O'ahu 'ohana (one of several island-based branches of the PKO; literally, "family") was instrumental in organizing the landing and later in mobilizing a support network to prepare for the imminent trials. It formed a defense committee around a core of eight defendants, with an assessment that:

... based on experience, we could expect no justice in the courts and we had to go on the political offensive and build our strength with our own people, involve more people and educate ourselves and others about what the blocks were to our committed stand of stopping the bombing ('Ohana 1977: 3).

However, unlike the previous cases, the Navy did not press charges on any of the participants and, by doing so, removed any opportunity for a repeat of the public forum at the earlier trials. The 'Ohana defendants claimed that the dismissal of charges was a move to cool down their struggle (Star-Bulletin 1/20/78: D14).

The 1978 Ke'anae Lāhui*

At a Lāhui at Ke'anae, Maui, in early 1978, amid rumors that the movement was approving a Navy-State memorandum of understanding which provided for joint military-civilian use of the island (and therefore provided for continuing bombing), a tense confrontation ensued between factions which resulted in a split in the organization.

---

*Ho'ulu'ulu Lāhui (gathering of a nation) was the name given by kupuna Mary Lee of Moloka'i to the movement's statewide meetings. They were organized gatherings wherein the 'ohana (family, or in this case, organized group) from each island met to ho'oponopono (make things right) the problems of the Hawaiians ('Ohana n.d.).
One group argued for 'Ohana support of the negotiations, one argued for continued political action, and one faction called for an escalation to violent retaliation against the opposition.

Moderates prevailed and a strategy of negotiation was advocated. The faction calling for political activism was perceived as political intellectuals: many of them were college-educated and were oriented toward Marxist-Leninist ideology. They had conceived of the 'Ohana as a revolutionary vanguard, and saw acceptance of joint-use as a failure of the movement to implement real change in the social and political spheres. Throughout their involvement, there was always some confusion as to what they were advocating and, thus, extremist images were played up at the tense meeting.

The outcome of the lāhui was the withdrawal of the radical faction and the reaffirmation of Ritte, who led the joint-use advocates, as leader, spokesperson, and principal negotiator for the 'Ohana.

The EIS Hearings: Spring 1978

Following quickly on this discord, however, was news that hearings would be held to review the draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) submitted by the Navy in accordance with a court ruling in the continuing Aluli vs. Brown civil suit. Seeing this as an opportunity to openly counter the military position on its use of the island, and as a chance to educate the public about its own position, the movement organized a series of workshops in each of the communities in which hearings would be held. Trask summarizes the project:
With less than three weeks notice from the Navy, the PKF, in conjunction with each island's 'ohana, sponsored 8 informational workshops, wrote and distributed hundreds of educational hand-outs, and organized scores of people to come out and testify in song, word, and dance. During the workshops, the public was given an analysis of our Civil Suit, the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the cultural and natural history of Kaho'olawe, and the value of Aloha 'Aina as alternative to rampant exploitation and destruction of the land (1978b: 17).

The response to the workshops was positive: over 1,000 people attended the Navy hearings and testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of stopping the bombing. The EIS report was subsequently found to be deficient and the Navy was compelled to hire an independent consulting firm to redraft it (Trask 1978b: 17).

The workshops served several purposes. They drew people into face-to-face situations with 'Ohana members, where they could hear the goals, values, and premises of the 'Ohana. New contacts were established and mechanisms were set up to organize new 'ohana groups. They provided a source of organizational revitalization through the satisfaction of achieving a goal and gaining a positive response from the public. They served as a coalescing effort by bringing together 'Ohana members from different islands to prepare for the workshops through long, intense hours, the success of which was later measured in terms of the large turnout at the hearings.

The hearings themselves provided a chance for supporters to re-affirm their commitment to the cause through a mechanism similar to evangelical witnessing. They also generated new interest in the issue through the extensive media coverage. Perhaps more important was the kind of coverage, i.e. that which showed the 'Ohana working in
a constructive fashion within the system, countering an institution such as the Navy in an organized and effective manner. Criticisms against the Navy were presented in terms of legal arguments based on the civil suit, in terms of spiritual and historical values based on legendary and archaeological data, and in terms of the concept of aloha 'āina ( 'Ohana 1978). As Trask notes:

Hawaiian land values of conservation and use, rather than exploitation and ownership, represented a positive alternative to Navy destruction. Measured against these values, the bombing of Kaho'olawe was a sacrilege (1978a: 3).

Testimonies allowed for a clarification of the movement ideology. The overthrow of the monarchy and loss of Crown lands to the Republic and later to the U.S. government were restated as integral issues. Allusion to Plymouth Rock, which was made in several testimonies, applied the idea of historically sacred land to an American context. During the hearings, the Navy presented their side of the argument, clarifying their position and thus, clarifying the opposition for the 'Ohana. At the hearing in Kona, the Navy presentation generated opposing testimony from individuals who found the Navy response to questions from the audience as ambivalent and inadequate.

Furthermore, mainstream Hawaiian organizations, while not supporting the 'ohana per se, supported the concept of aloha 'āina and the importance of Kaho'olawe. The Congress of Hawaiian People stated that the roots of the Hawaiian people were on the island; the Maui Hawaiian Civic Club called the island "spiritual," and a representative for Alu Like defined aloha 'āina as the view of land, water, and air as part of the balance between Hawaiians and their gods (EIS transcripts).
The 1978 Moloka'i Lāhui

Late in 1978, however, another confrontation at a lāhui arose, even more divisive than the Ke'anae one because it involved the basic core of the movement. It again focused on Ritte.

He came under attack for advocating meetings with Senator Inouye in which only select 'Ohana representatives would be involved, for preliminarily accepting the memorandum of understanding which was still being discussed by the State and Navy, and for making press statements on 'Ohana activities without its agreement or knowledge.

While the PKO announced its opposition to the memorandum of understanding as "weak and ineffective," Ritte was quoted (in the same news article) as saying:

It is important to call this thing for what it is. It does not meet the goals and objectives of the 'Ohana, which are the stopping of the bombing and eventual return of the island for historical, religious, and cultural heritage.

But it provides something for Kaho'olawe. After all these years of complete neglect and negative things happening on the island, this will provide something positive.

It (the memorandum) doesn't help the movement in any way, but it provides something positive for the island. That's important to me (Advertiser 8/10/78: A3).

Following his own beliefs of what he felt was beneficial for the cause, Ritte had carried out his responsibilities as 'Ohana president as he saw best. He apprently believed that it was possible to deal with the State and, to a lesser extent, with the Navy, without under-mining the integrity of the movement. In his perception, the State was thus a means to an end, rather than a barrier to the envisioned changes. Others, however, saw the State as an integral part of the
system which allowed the bombing to take place and thus, was as much the opposition as the Navy.

Ritte, in speaking on his own behalf, contradicted the precept of consensus, the communal agreement which directed the actions of the group. It appears that his philosophy was one in which decisions made by a few could bind and guide the majority (this is implied in Trask 1978b: 19; although no names are mentioned in the article, the context of which is a philosophical analysis of the state of the 'Ohana in 1978).

The result of the Moloka'i lāhui was the withdrawal of Ritte and a sizeable faction (including many of the early supporters) from active participation in the 'Ohana. It was a disheartening experience for all members, and for almost eight months, the movement went "underground" (B. Kahui, pers. comm.).

This lāhui marks a point of separation where the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana moved from a predominantly spiritually oriented organization to a politically motivated movement. The shift in perception of the State as a potential source of support to a source of opposition implied a different concept of the 'Ohana. Rather than a movement to reawaken Hawaiians to their cultural heritage through Kaho'olawe, it became a movement to change the system, i.e. to make others aware of the potential of Hawaiians as a political force in the established order.
June 1979: The First Access

In the spring of 1979, a motion was filed by 'Ohana attorney Cynthia Thielan to compel Navy compliance with a 1977 order (under the civil suit) for historical sites preservation. Federal Judge William Schwarzer ordered the Navy to grant the 'Ohana access to the island and mandated the Navy to negotiate with the 'Ohana on erosion and goat control and the protection of historical sites (Aloha 'Āina 1981: 8).

June 1979 marked the beginning of what was hoped to be regular and open access to the island of Kaho'olawe. More than one hundred people participated in the first trip to the island. It was a great revitalizing spirit that brought together people from all islands, and from factions which had previously split the group. After three years of struggle, the 'Ohana joined hands in pule (prayer) on the land for which they had fought (Aloha 'Āina 1979).

Monthly accesses continued. However, the number of participants and length of stay were restricted by the Navy in almost continuous, heated negotiations. The spirit of 'ohana flourished on the island but was embattled under the strain of negotiations and strategy discussions within each island-based group.

The accesses were a spiritual retreat from political realities. With the exception of minor confrontations between 'Ohana and accompanying Navy personnel over logistical details, they were a time of "touching the ʻāina," witnessing in the evangelical sense, and experiencing the concept of aloha ʻāina in an insulated atmosphere.
A statement in the 'Ohana newsletter following the first access reads:

There on Kaho'olawe we did catch a glimpse of what our kupuna has (sic) been saying and what we have been talking about: 'OHANA. The real magic of Kaho'olawe was 'ohana and everything that goes along with it, the ALOHA (love), LAULIMA (cooperation), KOKUA (help), LOKAHI (unity), KUPUNA, MAKUA (parents), OPIO (children), the whole experience in one short flash of time. All barriers melted as island rivalries and differences lost their significance as everyone found each other the completeness and strength of the Hawaiian 'Ohana that has gradually been programmed out at the individual level (Aloha 'Āina 1979: 31).

After the summer of 1979, the 'Ohana directed its efforts toward working on the civil suit, reinforcing the network of island groups, and developing its educational program. In the fall, Judge Schwarzer directed the 'Ohana and the Navy to negotiate an out-of-court settlement on the civil suit claims through a Consent Decree and Order (Aloha 'Āina 1981: 8).

Stopping the bombing and, to a greater extent, returning the island to the people of Hawai'i were no longer seen as immediately achievable aims, but rather as long-range goals for which there were innumerable and infinitely small steps to be taken.

As one member wrote after the first access:

We have another chance to organize and a credible opportunity to fundraise, using the values of our kupuna from our treasured past as the driving forces for tomorrow (Aloha 'Āina 1979: 31).

Moloka'ī Lāhui: October 1980

In October 1980, the 'Ohana met on Moloka'ī for a statewide meeting in which the two major concerns were the acceptance or rejection of the court-ordered Consent Decree and the forthcoming
elections for the Board of Trustees for the newly created Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA).

The Consent Decree was the end result of lengthy negotiations between the 'Ohana and the Navy and primarily stipulated the following agreements, as summarized by Thielan:

1) the Navy was required to clear surface ordnance from 10,000 acres (approximately one-third of the island) selected by the 'Ohana;

2) the Navy had to grant access to the island for at least four days a month, ten months of the year; and as ordnance clearance progressed, access provisions were to be re-negotiated;

3) the Navy was required to institute measures to protect the archaeological sites on the island; and

4) the 'Ohana could continue legal action to stop the bombing, using any provision of the law or Constitution other than the laws used in the civil suit, except for the First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (Thielan letter 1980).

There were disagreements over the Consent Decree. Many argued that it was really no different from the joint-use agreement of 1978, that the 'Ohana was essentially agreeing to a continuation of the bombing, and that it was a hollow victory for the years of effort in the civil suit. A spiritually based argument was raised that the Navy had no right to decide when and where a Hawaiian could practice his religion and that the bombing was a continuing sacrilege against a sacred place.

Others, including the 'Ohana lawyers, countered that the civil suit was never intended to stop the bombing and that, given the institutional ties between the judiciary branch of government and the
military, and the nature of the laws on which the civil suit was based, the terms of the Consent Decree were the best which could be expected.

An additional point of discussion at the lāhui was the imminent election in November for the first Board of Trustees to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. The OHA was a newly formed, semi-autonomous State agency created by the 1978 State Constitutional Convention. Some 'Ohana members opposed it because they saw it as a manipulation of the political machine that ran the State government. They believed that the electoral process for the Board could not represent the "real" Hawaiian people (biased as it was toward the numerically dominant urban population).

The major argument in OHA's favor was that this was an opportunity for all Hawaiians to come together, regardless of the details; that the Office, as it was, was the proverbial foot-in-the-door. More importantly, many viewed the Office as the last effective chance that the Hawaiian people would have to control their own welfare.

The resolution of the arguments was an interesting example of the 'Ohana's concept of consensus. At the lāhui, all participants could share their mana'o but only ten members, representing the interests of the different island 'ohana, had voting privileges. During the first two sessions, heated discussions were held on the pros and cons of each issue. The vote was taken on the third day. Six were in favor of the Consent Decree, and four were still opposed. A reversal of this count existed on the OHA issue. A trade-off was negotiated, in which the Consent Decree was accepted in exchange for an agreement to publicly oppose OHA.
While members, many of whom had left before the vote was taken, were shocked and disappointed in hearing the results, the importance of maintaining a united front prevailed and the 'Ohana publicly appeared in opposition to the Office.

Court Settlement and Historical District

The beginning of 1981 marked another point of change for the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana. With the signing of the Consent Decree, the long legal battle was essentially over. During this same period, the island was nominated to and placed on the National Register of Historic Places as an archaeological district, pursuant to a stipulation in the Consent Decree (1980: 9).

Two points were made by these actions: 1) that the 'Ohana had won a victory (whether real or symbolic) through legitimate channels and had some control over the access to and management of the island; and 2) that the island was recognized by others as an important historical and cultural locale:

We have become credible . . . for people like our U.S. Congressional legislators and bureaucrats and our Hawaiian people who are embarrassed by our initial action in protesting. We have put our claims in front of the broader Hawaiian community, either to accept and support our efforts to preserve our culture or to continue to disregard the heritage of the Native Hawaiian. We are in a position now, after having "worked the Courts," . . . to look toward other ways to reach our goal. The 'Ohana stands strong: the bombing will be stopped! (Aloha 'Āina 1981: 8).

The PKO: Success or Failure?

Within the revitalization model of movement development it appears that the PKO grew out of an initial awareness of certain inequities
in modern Hawaiian society, particularly in the perception of Hawaiians and Hawaiian culture. From the initial action of the first illegal landing in 1976, the movement moved rapidly through the stages of popular excitement and formalization in its first 2-1/2 years. It formalized an organization with a defined structure, established roles and responsibilities for leaders and members, and devised strategies to deal with its opposition.

However, from 1978 until the end of the study in 1981, the PKO achieved but never progressed beyond the period of adaptation. Thus, while it would qualify as a revitalization movement in Wallace's taxonomic system, it had not gained any success in the establishment of a new cultural order. What it had achieved was a political step toward stopping the bombing of the island.

The "mazeway reformulation" which Wallace envisioned as the end product of a revitalization movement was certainly not evident in the 'Ohana at the end of 1980. The potential was there but its stand against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs short-circuited any sense of unity among Hawaiians and even within the organization itself. It reflected the existence of basic philosophical inconsistencies which were inherent to the movement, which posed conflicts in need of resolution.

These conflicts served in the past to generate questions, to preclude a routinization of the organization. Whether they will continue to do so, and the movement can maintain its momentum, is a question for the future.
CHAPTER 4

THE PROTECT KAHO'OLAWE 'OHANA: A HAWAIIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Introduction

The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana is an organized attempt to end the bombing of the island of Kaho'olawe by the U.S. Navy. Toward this end is a larger goal of altering the existing perception of native Hawaiians in modern Hawai'i and reinstituting what the PKO sees as a basic Hawaiian value system based on the concepts of aloha 'āina (love of the land) and aloha ka po'ele (love of the people). The political goal of stopping the bombing and the social goal of recreating an awareness and pride in being Hawaiian are conjoined through the island, which is the focus of movement efforts. The island is a tangible symbol of perceived injustices against Hawaiian society and culture.

The movement organization was created in 1976. This chapter outlines the general pattern of changes in the movement between 1976 and 1981, which are analyzed in terms of changes in the five basic characteristics of social movements, as described in Chapter 2.*

Recruitment

The bombing of Kaho'olawe was an issue which attracted a diverse audience. But while it was in itself an appealing issue, recruitment

---

*This chapter is presented in the past tense as the research was concluded in 1981. This should in no way imply that the movement no longer exists, but rather that it may no longer exist in the form described herein. The PKO remains a viable and vigorous movement.
to a movement such as the PKO was moderated by the 'Ohana image, and the willingness of sympathizers to support the organization as well as the cause. Thus, while there was a large potential support group which could be tapped, different mechanisms of recruitment were needed to reach those who merely identified with the issue and those who actually joined the movement, i.e. the difference between support and active participation.

Broad dissemination of information serves to generate awareness about issues and garner preliminary sympathy and support. Actual recruitment entails a face-to-face approach through which the movement is explained to potential members in personal terms (Gerlach and Hine 1979: xvii). In the 'Ohana, there was no concerted, overt effort to win converts; the recruitment process appears to have been a by-product of other objectives.

Support for a cause entails some knowledge of the issues. From this, images are formed, reinforced, or modified. There were three primary mechanisms by which information about Kaho'olawe and the 'Ohana was disseminated. The most effective, wide-reaching, and problematic was the mass media. Others included an education program through the Protect Kaho'olawe Fund and association with other movement organizations or local struggles.

As noted in a previous section, the effectiveness of the mass media as a disseminator of information is hampered by the inherent nature of the institution as an interpretive intermediary for the public. Nonetheless, the press and TV served the 'Ohana as major
vehicles for increasing the public awareness about the island. They informed an audience which the 'Ohana, as a single, small organization, was unlikely to reach.

During the early period of movement development, in 1976 and 1977, there were a total of 324 articles on Kaho'olawe and the 'Ohana, including editorials, commentaries, and letters to the editor, in the two Honolulu daily newspapers. There was extensive coverage in a local news journal, Hawaii Observer, as well as coverage by three Maui county newspapers, Maui News, Maui Sun, and the Valley Isle.

In selecting the Navy as their adversary, in taking a confrontational stance, and in aggressively asserting their cultural heritage as Hawaiians, the 'Ohana labeled itself militant and activist in the pattern of groups such as the American Indian Movement. This image was reinforced by the media to a much greater extent than images projected by the civil suit and PKF activities, which were developing simultaneously.

The more disruptive character of the PKO essentially ended with the last landing and trials in 1977, and the movement assumed a relatively more conservative profile. In 1978, only 67 articles appeared in the Honolulu dailies (Index 1979); in 1979, only 45 articles appeared (Index 1980).

While it may be inaccurate to assume a direct relationship between the type of movement tactics and the extent of media coverage, one can infer that the widespread publicity and publicity-provoking activities of the earlier period, in contrast to the more subdued
activities and coverage of the later period, prolonged the life of the radical-activist image.

As late as 1979, two years after the last illegal landing, a Hawaiian language teacher and member of a Hawaiian civic club told me that the 'Ohana did not represent Hawaiians in general, that it had lost support by breaking the law and being too radical. She contended that the 'Ohana would not achieve anything until it operated within the existing system.

In 1980, an article on aloha 'aina appeared in a newspaper, The Native Hawaiian, which was published primarily for a Hawaiian audience. The author wrote:

I hold that aloha 'aina cannot be defined in terms of Kaho'olawe . . . wearing a malo, kikepa or ti leaf lei . . . trespassing (Hannahs 1980).

Boulding (1962) notes that the image tends to resist change unless consistently challenged by new knowledge. Thus, with lessened media coverage, i.e. lessened information dispersal, the radical-activist image persisted; but with no concomitant action similar to the illegal landings and confrontations to continue to attract and retain a radical following. At the same time, while movement strategies moderated, there was no similar change in image to develop a more conservative network.

This problem was partially alleviated through the movement's education program and its networking structure. Though reaching a smaller audience, this approach allowed direct contact and the potential for immediate follow-through with interested individuals.
Carried out primarily under the auspices of PKF, the 'Ohana sponsored forums and hearings, and gave lectures on request. One of the first and most successful was the series of workshops held in 1978 prior to the Navy hearings on its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), in which more than 1,000 people were mobilized to testify, predominantly against the Navy report.

Presentations were made to high school classes, university seminars, as well as to business groups. One lecture to the Honolulu Businessmen's Association in 1980 resulted in several members of that group participating in an access to the island.

Networking also functions to spread information about the cause. Through this scheme, in which the 'Ohana aided other struggles, it expressed its own existence and ideology, in the context of the other issues. For example, participation in a Nuclear-Free Pacific rally and an Earth Day gathering in 1980 identified the 'Ohana with the issues of these larger movement organizations, thus creating a link for potential recruitment of adherents to those environmental issues.

Support for localized island-based causes acted in much the same way; i.e. in tapping support which was charged by emotional ties to local issues. Examples include 'Ohana support of the Nukoli'i development protest on Kaua'i and the Hilo Airport struggle. The first involved wide-spread community protest against a proposed development, which resulted in an overwhelming referendum vote to rescind the building permit. However, the referendum was overridden on a technicality and construction on the development was allowed to begin.
The occupation of Hilo Airport was carried out to make the public aware of an arrangement between the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, the owner of the land on which the facility was built, and the Department of Transportation, the operator of the facility, in which no compensation was being made for the land lease. The protesters argued that, as native Hawaiians and beneficiaries of Hawaiian Home Lands, they owned the runway and had more right to be there than the Transportation Department, which did not pay any rent. The bombing of Kaho'olawe was included in their list of criticisms (Akaka 1978: 6).

Beyond the broad dissemination of information which reinforces the support base, face-to-face recruitment reinforces the active membership. This type of recruitment is a follow-up on the "priming" carried out through the media, education, and networking. It is essentially the enhancement of informal ties established through those mechanisms.

Such a process was the mainstay of building the 'Ohana membership. Of the 'Ohana members interviewed, all had been introduced to the movement through pre-existing social relationships, e.g. family, friends, and business associates. One example was a family whose involvement began with one participant and, in the course of a year, expanded to include two sisters, a brother, and a sister-in-law. Another member became interested through her doctor, an 'Ohana leader.

In other cases, contacts made during 'Ohana activities were pursued. After the EIS hearings in 1978, several participants were approached to initiate 'Ohana activities within their own groups.

Trask notes:
Indeed, the Big Island is alive with new contacts: Bonnie Case, Damien Trask, and Momi Urbic who are working with the DeLeon brothers to establish an 'Ohana in Waimea; and Pali Wong, and his lovely wife, Haunani Young, who are helping out in the Hilo area. On Oahu, new links were forged between the 'Ohana and several Kamehameha students . . . Because of the hearings, each island's 'Ohana received a much-needed organizational boost (1978: 5).

The limitation with these methods of information dispersal was the circumscribed audience they reached. In numbers alone, there were fewer potential converts, as compared with the earlier period when substantial numbers of interested people responded to the publicity. With the more limited approach to support recruitment, the potential for recruitment of active members was comparably limited, thus, affecting the diversity in membership as well.

Charisma has been identified as an element in the recruitment process; two of the most adept linkages between recruitment for support and recruitment for active participation were George Helm and the island itself. Both retained the charismatic quality which imparts inspiration and eloquence.

Through his music, articulateness, and finally in his death, Helm was an inspiration to those who knew him, heard him, or simply read about him. In several interviews, informants noted that he was the primary motivator for becoming interested in the movement. Later, his death (and essentially, his martyrdom) added a quality to this interest which could be transferred to commitment.

The videotape made of his role in the 'Ohana exhibited this charisma, the strength of his convictions concerning both Kaho'olawe and his Hawaiian heritage. It showed his ability to reach people of
different backgrounds: his tough, "local boy" attitude when talking to Kamehameha School students, as well as his articulate presentations to the State Legislature.

After his death, he remained an inspiration to potential converts and to members. He lived on as a leader in almost mythic proportions, and as a symbol of the ultimate commitment to beliefs.

The island was the center of the movement and a charismatic power in itself. Before the accesses were permitted, it was a tangible goal, an uninhabited island in the midst of overdeveloping sister islands, pristine in a sense, the physically and culturally unattainable. Helm noted in January 1976: "It was incredible to watch the thing (interest in Kaho'olawe) grow . . . we were touched by some force that pushed us into commitment" (in Smith 1976: 18).

Within the accesses from 1979, it became possible for people to experience the island, to let the island speak for itself. It had an evangelical power in its barrenness; the eroded and bombed sections of the island testified graphically to the destruction of land.

A writer in 1928 wrote poetically of the spiritual attraction of the island; it is remarkably similar to the feelings voiced by 'Ohana members:

The dizzying beauty of Kahoolawe's crimson flats set in the fierce blue of sky and sea overcame him. He felt the great cry of the worn island, beautiful to him beyond all the others in their conventional green with the piled clouds above them. Its fierce spirit came up to him. What matter if its beauty had a sinister quality? He felt the vibrations of the years that had passed over it, the echoes of the stories that were whispered about it, and the mighty tragedy of its destruction. He straightened his shoulders and threw up his chin. He would give himself, his youth and his strength
and his effort, as a sort of sacrifice to the gods that had cursed it.

All his life he had been lonely, now he had found something lonelier than himself. He felt closer to Kahoolawe in that instant than he had ever felt to any human being in the twenty-three years of his life (Von Tempski 1928: 31).

The logistical conditions of the accesses added to the atmosphere, and one came away with the desire to share the experience with others. On the access of February 1980, the feelings of group solidarity and the importance of the cause carried far beyond the four days on the island. Most of the 41 participants felt a psychological "high" upon the return to normal life.

The leader of one island group reaffirmed her commitment to the movement and began to actively participate in the organization, including filling a seat on the Fund's board of directors. One participant organized a slide and tape show to present to public school students and public library meetings. Several participants later became involved in the Nukoli'i conflict on Kaua'i, by making public presentations, organizing fundraising projects, and joining in demonstrations. An archaeologist, initially unaware of the details of the movement, came away much impressed and later testified as a professional at public hearings.

Commitment

Commitment to a movement begins with an alteration of the self-image and thus, a change in one's perception of the existing order, i.e. the world view. The new self-image allows for changes in behavior
for a manifestation of disenchantedment with the old order (Gerlach and Hine 1979).

The dominance of Western culture and values in Hawaiian society produced a stereotypic, negative view of Hawaiians. For example, a movie produced by Walt Disney in 1974, *The Castaway Cowboy*, presented an image of Hawaiians who were virtually incapable of learning rudimentary ranching skills and preferred instead to abandon work for the nearest swimming hole. Myths of such Hawaiian images were perpetuated in commercialized ventures.

One 'Ohana member, of Chinese and Hawaiian ethnic background, related how she refused to acknowledge her Hawaiian ethnicity while in public schools. Failing to see any positive role models in her social environment, she identified herself as Chinese. In a recent interview, she argued that the history of Hawaiians, written from a Western point of view, needed to be rewritten by Hawaiians.

The 'Ohana was one mechanism by which Hawaiians could assert their ethnicity. It provided an opportunity for a more visible, assertive, if not heightened, self-image.

For others, the 'Ohana offered a means to verbalize a disenchantedment with the existing order as represented by modern society in Hawai'i. A lack of an effective voice in the political process, a perceived indifference to the public by government planning and land use agencies, and the growth of corporate power in the form of multi-national corporate acquisition of local companies, were suggestive of an increasing alienation of the public from the control of its economic and political environment.
The 'Ohana advocated the preservation of land in its concept of *aloha 'āina*, and expressed this belief in its support of anti-development struggles such as at Nukoli'i, Kaua'i. The appeal was to a grassroots constituency, to people who experienced or faced the possibility of experiencing the loss of effective control of their environment.

Some individuals are attracted to a movement because they see it as filling a personal or social role in their lives. They stay, and become committed, because they see a personal relevance which is manifested in a new identity. Such individuals identified with the 'Ohana as a surrogate family. I would argue that this applied to most people in the 'Ohana, underlying other reasons for joining the movement.

An altered image is an initial step in the commitment process. It is a personal change which is then manifested in a real or symbolic act which essentially severs ties to the old self. The actual threat of sanction has little to do with the degree of one's bridge-burning act. It is the relationship between the image of the past life and the actual break; thus, it is a subjective and personal action.

In the 'Ohana, the illegal landings of the early period provided the most intense and irreversible statement of the new image. The consequences of those acts were wide-spread publicity, through arrest, incarceration, and court appearances. Loss of employment was another possibility. On the fourth landing in 1977, there was also the threat of death when the Navy resumed bombing while Ritte and Sawyer were still on the island.
However, while the landings were the most visible act of commitment, other acts such as participation in organized protests and speeches in public forums also entailed a conscious break with the past.

Long-term commitment, however, was manifested in a willingness to take on responsibilities and to sacrifice personal desires for the benefit of the cause. The operation of the movement was intense: fundraising, negotiations with the State and Navy, planning for accesses and other projects, legal concerns with the civil suit, and making presentations as part of the education program required an intensive outlay of energy. Few were willing or able to make the balance between the needs of the movement and private life. This placed even more pressure on the core membership, who actually carried out the responsibilities.

The pressures of long-term commitment were alleviated through group reinforcement of the new identity. The role of the 'Ohana as a surrogate family was functional in this aspect, by providing an extended support network. As in all families, there were internal rivalries and dissension but the group formed a context in which conflicts could be resolved.

 Ideology

The stated goals of the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana were to stop the bombing of Kaho'olawe and to have the island returned to the people of Hawai'i. They were interpreted and activated through the underlying philosophy of aloha 'āina and aloha ka po'e, which was
interpreted from Hawaiian values and customs formally codified in the 19th century (after Western contact) and reformulated in a modern context.

Drawing on beliefs about the relationship between people and their environment, this philosophy held that all land, and the surrounding air and water, were sacred. Land was the source of identity, in the sense that it was where ancestors were buried and spirits resided, as well as the source of subsistence. As one 'Ohana member said, "One cannot eat concrete buildings or asphalt paving." Land embodied the spiritual essence of person and culture.

Kaho'olawe was argued to be especially sacred because it held several ties of significance related to birth. The point of land, Kealaikahiki—the Way to Kahiki—located at the west end of the island, was said to be the legendary point of departure for Polynesian explorers voyaging south, and conversely, the landfall for the Hawaiian Islands. The shape of the island was likened to a fetus, thus representing birth. The original name of the island was said to be Kohe Mālamalama o Kanaloa—the Shining Vagina of Kanaloa. Helm summarized the island's significance: it is "the point of entry into Hawai'i's womb of plenty, the end of the hazardous journey from the old life and the threshold of the new" (in Smith 1976: 18).

This symbolism encompassed a passion for the rebirth of pride in being Hawaiian and the advocacy of Hawaiian values such as aloha 'āina and aloha ka po'e, which contrasted with what the 'Ohana interpreted as the Western values of destruction and exploitation of land. In a sense, then, the 'Ohana, as one part of a Hawaiian renaissance, was
attempting to redefine what it meant to be Hawaiian in Hawai'i. Its foundation was ethnicity, in spite of its attraction to and recruitment of members of other ethnic backgrounds.

Expanding from this basic concept was the inherent right of Hawaiians to the lands of Hawai'i, as the lands of their ancestors; not so much as owners as in the sense of stewards. One spokesperson talked of the rise of a Hawaiian nation, growing out of a coalition of anti-development groups; a Hawaiian nation born of a common adherence to a philosophy based on love and respect for the land and each other (H. Trask, pers. comm.).

The 'Ohana operated ideally on the style of the extended family, or as kupuna Emma de Fries labeled it, an "extended family with a cause" (LRB 1978: 67). Basic to this concept were 1) the importance of kupuna as a link with the past and a source of knowledge founded on experience, and 2) the importance of consensus in decision-making.

The value of experience over structured education was somewhat devalued in the modern complex society. In traditional Hawai'i, knowledge was transmitted orally. After Western contact, with exposure to a wider world society, the written word became dominant and the history of Hawai'i was influenced greatly by non-Hawaiians.

In a refutation of this direction, and perhaps symbolic of the refutation of Western values in general, the 'Ohana searched kupuna as critical ties to a Hawaiian heritage. The PKO emphasized the kupuna as primary repositories of knowledge, both Western and Hawaiian (LRB 1978: 69). That the kupuna grew up in a world already much altered from the pristine Hawaiian state was understood, but their
experience derived from an earlier period than the troubled present, as well as from the memories of parents and grandparents who lived in an earlier century.

The 'Ohana incorporated kupuna into its philosophical structure by describing land as kupuna. As noted in one issue of Aloha 'Āina: "Protect the 'Āina in righteousness as she is the kupuna of our ancestors" (1979: 2). The concept of land as a "source" was again reiterated.

Basic to the 'Ohana ideal was consensus in the decision-making process. Everyone had an opportunity to present their ideas on the operation of the movement, e.g. direction, tactics, and policies. Termed "mana'o (idea) sharing," this allowed for the airing of disagreements and the resolution of differences. However, in terms of the public and the opposition, it was essential that such disagreements be only internally verbalized. For the movement to be strong, there had to be a united front.

Thus, once a decision was made by the body, it bound all members, who nonetheless were aware of differences in ideas. This philosophy of decision-making was ultimately based on respect for opposing views, and although it did not always work in reality, the 'Ohana managed to present a united front during most of its existence.

Another aspect of consensus is the de-emphasis on the autonomy of leadership. Ideally, decisions were made by the whole organization; no one had the right to make critical decisions or have regulatory powers without general agreement. This was especially the case with policy decisions.
For example, at the Kona lāhui in the summer of 1978, the Maui representative suggested an eight-member team for negotiations with the State. He had already picked those whom he thought would be qualified. However,

Maui's plan was received with mixed feelings. That he had gone ahead and put a lot of time and thought into it and that the men he had chosen were strong in their feelings for the freeing of Kaho'olawe and their ability to represent the 'Ohana was not questioned. But the plan was essentially the work of one man, and had not been discussed by or supported by the 'Ohana as a whole (Godfrey 1978: 2).

The ideology of the 'Ohana in 1981 was a reflection of the movement's growth. Over five years, this body of beliefs developed out of an initial perception that the bombing of the island was wrong and from the ideological contributions of a changing membership and leader cadre, as well as from responses to oppositional arguments.

Related to the aims of Hui Alaloa, the first illegal landing was motivated by an interest in native Hawaiian claims to land and other resources. But it spurred intense activity and excitement which required an ideological focus, i.e. a conceptual framework to define and defend the movement's actions and to attack the Navy's position. Aloha 'āina became that framework.

The premise was simple: Kaho'olawe was a symbol of what had gone wrong in Hawai'i. Land was out of the control of the Hawaiian people; it was being destroyed. The Navy had no right to use it, and did not really need it. In a larger context, urbanization was rampant on Oahu and threatening on the other islands. There was no real recognition of a native Hawaiian heritage.
And the inaccuracies of the Kaho'olawe image were revealed:
Kaho'olawe was not a dead, barren rock, as most believed it to be. It
was, first of all, an island and not a rock. It was vegetated. It was
possible to traverse the island without stepping on live ordnance
(Smith 1976: 18). Most importantly, it was covered in archaeological
sites, the diversity of which implied a substantial occupation.
Hawaiians had lived, farmed, and worshipped there (LRB 1978: 39). Like
the land itself which was being destroyed, the archaeological sites
represented a culture which in the eyes of the 'Ohana was virtually
lost.

Aloha 'Āina, as a conscious effort to define their actions, pro-
vided a "historically-based" framework. It was essential to tie the
movement to Hawaiian values and kupuna provided a link with the past.
Although many older Hawaiians viewed the movement with skepticism or
distaste, especially regarding the illegal landings, some offered their
help through interpretations of place names and through oral histories
related to the island and to growing up in a changing Hawai'i. They
also gave testimonies and presentations in public forums.

At the EIS hearings on the island of Hawai'i in 1978, a Hawaiian
woman from Miloli'i voiced her pride in the young Hawaiians at the
meeting. She stated: "I am proud for what you are doing, and as I
said, if those of us that are 40 years or older, if we take a little
time to join you, give us time" (J. Kaupu 1978: 7).

When the 'Ohana first started, it was a means of expressing a
pride in being Hawaiian in a militant fashion which appealed to those
individuals who saw little satisfaction in expressing their
Hawaiianess through more conventional means. The 'Ohana provided a reinforcing environment that stimulated the sense of identity. Kaho'olawe as the focus of the movement and the continuing opposition by the Navy fostered what Blumer (1969: 15) describes as "esprit de corps."

However, as the 'Ohana matured and the Navy's opposition similarly matured, the cause and the strategies focused more centrally on specific issues to achieve a sense of immediate, accomplishable objectives. The momentum of the movement was channeled and the sense of identity became an underlying factor, a motivator, and a resource which ran beneath the surface currents of the political game.

Strategies

Strategies, those actions carried out to achieve movement goals and objectives and to actualize movement values, can be defined as two opposing, if complementary, alternatives, confrontation and negotiation. Both options co-existed in 'Ohana ideology, one generally more dominant at any one time.

Coles writes of the choice of strategies by movements in general:

Much of their more fearless and vigorous protest occurs in this first period, a time of both innocence and denial, where much isn't known and much that is slowly perceived can still be blotted out or pushed aside (1969: 324).

Confrontation, challenging the system through aggressive and often intransigent actions, characterized the 'Ohana in its early days. Used generally in response to what were perceived as inequitable actions on the part of the established order, illegal landings on the island and demonstrations were effective tactics to stop the bombing
and to mobilize an excited support network. Dressing in *malo*, *kikepa* (sarong), and gourd helmets, in the austere and institutional surroundings of the U.S. Federal Court, was vigorous assertion of native rights and heritage.

Confrontations were highly public affairs and served to keep the issue of the bombing alive, as well as to coalesce identity within the movement by emphasizing the distinction between "us" and "them."

As Trask notes:

Because active demonstration generates *Lokahi* (unity) among participants, commitment to our struggle is reinforced by challenging the system . . . Beyond the definite political impact of cultural assertion, such activity may be a way to invigorate the 'Ohana when inevitable stress has taken its toll. The feeling of "doing something" is nowhere more likely than in the process of doing something (1978b: 18).

After the last illegal landing and trials in 1977, demonstrations were carried out with more specifically defined objectives, tying other struggles, such as at Hilo Airport, to the Kaho'olawe issue.

The occupation of Hilo Airport was intended to make public the arrangement between the Departments of Hawaiian Home Lands and Transportation whereby the latter had the use of the former's land at no charge. But criticisms included the Bishop Estate sale of some of their land holdings, the high Hawaiian representation in the state prisons, as well as the bombing of Kaho'olawe. The occupation ended with a confrontation between National Guard forces and the protesters. The protesters were arrested, as were members of the press who were covering the story (Lee 1978: 11).

A sign-holding and leaflet-passing campaign held in 1980 on a downtown Honolulu street corner contrasted with the more volatile
demonstrations of earlier years. Held to coincide with a series of international training maneuvers on and around Kaho'olawe (called RIMPAC by the Navy), the protest focused specifically on that issue. It was a controlled affair, with participants cognizant of the rights of passing motorists and pedestrians to accept or reject the proffered material.

A strategy of negotiation, i.e. working within the existing system and showing a willingness to compromise, albeit up to a point, began from the very initiation of the movement and was used consistently throughout the existence of the 'Ohana (although it was overshadowed by the more visible activities of confrontation). From early in 1976, alternatives to illegal landings were being searched and some, like the civil suit and the Protect Kaho'olawe Fund, were implemented. A political resolution, through established channels, was also investigated.

With the realization after the fourth landing that occupations would no longer serve to halt military maneuvers, and after the traumas of two deaths and numerous arrests, an organization was developed to direct policies and tactics. The strategy was to bring island groups under an umbrella structure, unify diversity, and thus, reinforce the cause. In a sense, this was the real codification of 'ohana and consensus, and an abrupt divergence from confrontation.

Thus, even at the height of 'Ohana aggression in 1977, in the fourth and fifth landings and at the summer trials, a strategy of negotiation was being implemented.
The first test of the viability of consensus came with planned U.S. Senate sub-committee hearings to be held in Washington, D.C. Invited by U.S. Senator Inouye, the 'Ohana needed a position statement in response to proposals which had been submitted by both Inouye and the Navy.

The 'Ohana discussed the options of continuing their demand for a halt to all bombing on the island or working with or through Inouye, who had proposed the use of explosive ordnance at alternative sites in Hawai'i. Arguments for and against these alternatives were heated, and exacerbated by personal enmity and philosophical differences. The final decision was to request a six-month moratorium to the bombing, during which a joint committee of civilians and congressmen could study the situation (Smith 1977b: 25).

The change to a strategy of negotiation has involved an alteration in the perception of the State's role in the issue. While this will be dealt with more thoroughly in the section on opposition, it should be noted here that in the early days of the 'Ohana, the State was seen as a viable mechanism for the goals and objectives of the organization. At a lāhui in Kona in June 1978, during a discussion on alternative strategies, the role of the political action committee was primarily defined as lobbying for the State to take a position on Kaho'olawe, after which a move would be made in the U.S. Congress for a resolution to the issue (Godfrey 1978: 16). In later actions, the State was viewed as more adversary than aid.

The civil suit and the Fund were two primary alternatives to confrontation. Initiated in February 1976 by the founders of the
movement, the civil suit was presented as a vehicle for education and a legal attack against alleged illegal activities of the Navy. In a retrospective, Aluli and Mowat (1978) wrote that its goal was "that justice be given the 'aina, that the values that are Hawaiian be recognized, and that the bombing be stopped for an undefined and indefinite period of time."

Much of the 'Ohana's efforts, especially from 1978 to the end of 1980, were directed toward the successful conclusion of the suit. Even after the final ruling and acceptance of a Consent Decree between the Navy and the 'Ohana, the civil suit continued as a tool to monitor Navy activities.

The Fund was organized primarily for educational purposes and acts as a granting agency but it figures in the development of strategies in its control of donations and grants. For example, in 1978, three grant applications were submitted to various foundations, one dealing with the press and with an educational focus, one financing the continuation of the civil suit, and one financing political organizing. Only the civil suit proposal was funded, by the San Francisco-based Shalan Foundation (H. Trask, pers. comm.).

The realization that the stated goals were a long way from attainment may have tempered the assertive and potentially explosive character of the movement. The effective use of a strategy of negotiation gradually subsumed the alternative of confrontation. With the successes through the civil suit, especially the EIS ruling in
1977 and the Consent Decree ruling in 1979, the need for aggressive attacks waned. But the struggle was not ended and thus, that option was never abandoned.

Aloha 'āina and aloha ka po'e developed out of unformed feelings, focused on a single place, and were later formalized as the essence of a neo-Hawaiian value system: land was not real estate, but something which was inseparably interwoven into a new concept of life and consciousness.

The ideal values of the movement, then, were based on a respect for the land and for each other. These were manifested in the structure of the movement as an extended family, with due respect to kupuna as repositories of knowledge and with decision-making based on consensus.

Organization

The basic organizational structure of the PKO consisted of a small group of committed members, who carried most of the responsibilities of developing strategies and implementing policies and plans. The core group was supported somewhat tenuously by a larger body of sympathizers, those who agreed in principle with the aims and values of the movement but who had neither the time nor the inclination to participate actively. Although criticized by some members as a shadow constituency, these sympathizers served a function as a body of resources with the potential for mobilization for specific purposes.

The leadership (exemplified by the core membership), networking through the island-based 'ohana, and the PKF were the primary
components of the organizational structure of the movement. The core group generally consisted of representatives from each island, around whom smaller island-based 'ohana groups operated. The PKF acted as a communication and coordinating framework.

The intensity which was required of participation and commitment in the core group resulted in a relatively rapid turnover in leaders and levels of activity. Each participant carried a personal view of the 'Ohana and its ideology; change in leadership meant that there was often a change in direction or emphasis in strategy, which in turn affected the direction the movement took.

Basic island geography defined the relationships among island-based 'ohana and between the island groups and the statewide movement. It posed problems for communication between and among groups, which were resolved through different mechanisms, such as the lāhui, conference calls, and a newsletter. The statewide meetings were especially important as a vehicle for discussion and the resolution of differences.

The Fund was limited in its function to educational endeavors and as the administrative arm for grants. Its relationship with the PKO, as the action arm of the movement, was defined by the limitations of its status and by the control of funds for non-political activities.

Leadership

Leadership in the movement was attained through a willingness to dedicate an enormous amount of time and effort at a sacrifice of
personal goals and needs outside of the movement. At the same time, there had to be an acceptance of trust by the members of the core group, and to a lesser extent, by the larger body of followers. There must be a recognition on their part of the leader's commitment.

Leadership was balanced by an understanding of the nature of consensus politics; that is, that no leader could speak for the whole body without its explicit consent, and that a conceptual or emotional equality with all members existed. In other words, one could lose power by pushing too hard. Ritte's resignation as 'Ohana president in 1978 was an example. Having taken the initiative to negotiate with the State, he was challenged for having taken liberties with his role.

Longevity endows a quality to leadership. Because of the turnover in 'Ohana leadership and membership throughout its history, Aluli held a key position; his commitment to the cause was reflected by the continuity of his involvement. His key role was recognized by the general public through his appearances as a spokesperson, by potential supporters of the movement, and by 'Ohana members who witnessed his participation in numerous aspects of 'Ohana and Fund activities. Following Ritte's resignation, a nomination was made:

"We propose, motion, and second that Emmett Aluli become the new Ohana spokesperson, being the only most recognized Ohana member besides Walter" (Kona 'Ohana 1978).

In the early period of the movement, up to the fourth landing, leadership fell on the triad composed of Helm, Aluli, and Ritte. Each pursued their own tactics, searching for an appropriate and successful strategy, but united in a common cause. Aluli investigated
legal action, initiating (with others) the civil suit against the Navy. Ritte pursued legislative alternatives and believed that action, i.e. going to the island, was a viable means of stopping the bombing. Helm believed that a foundation for action was essential. He and two others formed the Protect Kaho'olawe Fund. Like Ritte, he also cultivated political alternatives.

In the period between the fourth landing in 1977 and the Moloka'i lāhui in 1978, the leadership fragmented. With Helm missing at sea and Ritte briefly in jail, the triad dissolved and dissension, especially over strategies, became acute.

With his death, Helm became an eloquent martyr. His thoughts, or interpretations of those thoughts, were used as support for opposing opinions. He was present in spirit and a space was left for his mana'o, but that mana'o was subject to interpretation and, in the eyes of some 'Ohana members, subject to exploitation.

After Ritte's resignation, Aluli was left as sole heir to the original triad. But, from that point, leadership became more intimately intertwined with the organizational structure, and consensus became a more significant factor in decision-making. Leaders of the island-based 'ohana took on more responsibilities, as the movement turned toward developing and reinforcing the island network.

The effect of changing leadership was to steer the 'Ohana along different trajectories. The perception of the organization held by Ritte, as well as the strategies which he advocated, were superceded
by the philosophies of leaders who followed. In a sense, the character of the movement was guided through significant alterations by a changing leadership.

Networking

The 'Ohana developed rapidly out of the actions of a few people. Like the need for an ideology, the need for organization was quickly evident to the leaders of the early 'Ohana. From as early as 1977, the necessity for semi-autonomous groups on each of the islands was evident: 1) for coordination purposes with other groups in the State, and 2) to continue local action, in maintaining a sense of movement progress and success.

The initial spontaneous momentum was replaced by a structural organization. At one of the first statewide meetings in 1977, committees were formed to deal with different aspects of the struggle: Konohiki (finance and funds); Hana pono (action and projects); Kalai Aina (political action); Ho'o Na'auao (education and research); and Olelo Kuka (information and communications ('Ohana n.d.). The organization was a response to a growing awareness of the need for money and positive media coverage.

By this time, the realization of the long road was evident and concern developed for the perpetuation of forward momentum. In addition, the arrests and charges of trespassing which were lodged against 'Ohana members foresaw legal expenses. The initial rationalization of the difficulties gave way to a recognition of real and immediate needs of the movement.
Networking was formalized after the lāhui in 1978, with representatives selected by each island-based 'ohana (Kona 'Ohana 1978: 1). Similar to the leadership of the movement in general, the leaders of the island-based 'ohana were dedicated to stopping the bombing, as well as to applying the concept of aloha 'āina to specific local issues.

For example, the Hilo Airport demonstrations in 1978 were led by members of the 'Ohana; on a list of demands presented to the State, stopping the bombing was second. In a public statement Moani Akaka, a leader of the Hilo 'ohana, said:

Sacred Kaho'olawe and our historical and religious sites continue to be bombed, as Bishop Estate Trustees allow our few remaining landholdings to be sold to the highest bidder, while 87% of the prison population remains Hawaiian. These and other social, economic problems facing Hawaiians today, including religious freedom, forced us to be on that runway; we are after all, owners of that runway as beneficiaries of Hawaiian Home Lands (1978: 6).

Networking allowed a flexibility in the design and implementation of the movement's broader goals and in the tactical interpretation of aloha 'āina. In addition, it allowed for a local identification with the movement. That is, by focusing on local issues, it provided a closer identification with land problems, more so than the issue of Kaho'olawe.

For example, in Kona, a group of people, primarily native Hawaiians, developed a camp of grass houses, which they named Kukailimoku Village, on beachfront property owned by Hilton Head Corporation of South Carolina. They argued that the area was actually within the high water setback line and therefore was on State land as
defined by law, and that the developer was required to provide access
to what the villagers described as a local fishing area (Godfrey 197).

Another example of local adaptation to the aloha 'āina concept
was a protest against a resort development on the West End of Moloka'i.
It was seen as an unnecessary project which would set a precedent for
other development on the island and would threaten the rural character
in which many residents took pride (Sawyer 1978: 9).

On Maui, in a major case which was financially supported by the
PKF, the 'Ohana organized a protest against the condemnation of
243,438 acres in Kipahulu Valley by the National Park Service, as
part of a planned expansion of Haleakala National Park. The 'Ohana
argued that the condemnation was an encroachment on native Hawaiian
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights, which would be restricted under
the rules of the Park Service. In addition, several large non-
Hawaiian landholders retained possession of prime beachfront parcels
as part of land exchanges (Gibson et al 1978: 15).

While the local struggles maintained a sense of immediate
urgency in the movement, a major part of the logistical and strategic
operations of the whole movement were carried out by the Moloka'i
and O'ahu 'ohana. Each played key roles, sometimes complementary but
often overlapping and in conflict.

Moloka'i was the heart of the 'Ohana: it was on this island that
Hui Alaloa was formed; many of the core members, including Aluli and
Ritte, were from or lived on Moloka'i. The lifestyle was the
epitome of the rural character expounded by the grassroots activists.
A popular phrase was "Maui no ka 'oi, but Moloka'i mo bettah"
(Maui's the best but Moloka'i is better). The Protect Kaho'olawe Fund functioned out of Moloka'i, as did the Aloha 'Āina newsletter.

In sharp contrast to the rural environment of Moloka'i, O'ahu was the epitome of urbanization and uncontrolled development. However, it was also the seat of the State government and the home base of the Navy Third Fleet, as well as the location of the offices of the 'Ohana lawyers, the center of media operations, and the source of the largest body of human resources. For example, after Ritte's resignation, Haunani-Kay Trask, a leader of the O'ahu 'ohana, was given the role of spokesperson for the PKO, primarily because she was based on O'ahu (H. Trask, pers. comm.). One of the most successful and profitable fundraising efforts was a concert held on the Bishop Museum grounds on O'ahu in 1979.

Mechanisms for Making Networking Operable

Island geography posed problems for networking, for communication among and coordination of the separate island groups. While the island-based 'ohana allowed for flexibility, a unified front was necessary for the success of the movement as a whole. To facilitate communication and coordination, the 'Ohana developed several mechanisms.

First and foremost was the Protect Kaho'olawe Fund, the brain-child of George Helm. It was organized in 1976 to promote the education of Hawaiian people to the significance of Kaho'olawe and by extension, to promote the concept of aloha 'Āina. It was the educational and administrative arm of the movement. Each of the island
'ohana was represented on the Fund's Board of Directors, and, in most cases, these representatives were the leaders of their respective groups.

In 1977, the Fund sponsored the Aloha 'Aina Land Use Project on Maui, Moloka'i, and Lana'i through a grant from the Hawaii Committee for the Humanities. In eight community meetings, discussions were held on the concept of aloha 'āina and its specific application to local land problems, such as kuleana land rights, beach access, water rights, and adverse possession. Kupuna were asked to talk on their perception of aloha 'āina.

In 1978, the Fund, with two other Hawaiian organizations (Ho'ala Kanawai and Alu Like), co-sponsored meetings in 17 communities to discuss reparations and public lands. Ties were made between these issues and Kaho'olawe:

Just as the Navy and others have said that as U.S. citizens we must drop any cultural land rights as Hawaiian peoples, the Reparations settlement demands the same thing (in return for a monetary settlement) (Hall 1978: 18).

A major and continuing project of the Fund was the Aloha 'Āina, a periodic newsletter which served as a communication mechanism and as an education project. Operated by the Hui Alaloa 'ohana on Moloka'i, it was directed toward explaining the aloha 'āina concept and bringing readers up-to-date on the activities of the island 'ohana. The first issue was published in June 1978.

The Fund was also responsible for organizing the periodic statewide meetings, the lāhui, which were essential for maintaining open lines of communication within the network.
Opposition

There are two features of opposition to a social movement: there is the opposition as defined by the members of the movement and there is the recognition of the movement as a legitimate antagonist by the perceived opposition.

As a social movement attempting to bring about changes in the existing order, the 'Ohana saw several obstacles to its envisioned changes. At a specific level, the U.S. Navy was the direct and most immediately obvious antagonist. The 'Ohana's goal was the removal of the military presence on Kaho'olawe and, in a larger context, in the State. The Navy, in response, was attempting to preserve its control over the island.

In the larger social scheme, the 'Ohana saw the existing social and political network in the State as a hindrance to the development of a viable, multi-ethnic pluralism in which Hawaiians would have a responsible place. In this context, the opposition included the State government, as represented by the administration of Governor George Ariyoshi, as well as those who perpetuated the existing order, which included continuing patterns of expensive private housing and resort development to the detriment of those with no land.

Opposition also appeared in the form of indirect controls through sanctions against individuals within the movement. This type of social control through non-authorities, e.g. family, friends, and employers, affected the movement at a personal level. The subtlety of such controls became most apparent in the recruitment and commitment processes.
The U.S. Navy

In selecting a site for a protest occupation, planners for the first landing discussed several options, all of them military installations. The military in Hawai'i represented American colonialism and Western chauvinism. In choosing Kaho'olawe, the 'Ohana chose the Navy as their primary target of protest.

Until ordered by the court ruling in 1979, the Navy had not negotiated directly with the 'Ohana, thus implying a refusal to acknowledge them as a legitimate organization. Moreover, it consciously protected its control over the island and its right to be there through a public relations program directed toward the public rather than against the 'Ohana (Lind 1978b). It argued in general terms for national defense and the absolute need for Kaho'olawe in the absence of any reasonable alternative sites (EIS Corp. 1979).

The Navy's justification for use of the island was said to include:

1) that the island was essential for training troops in the Pacific;
2) troop training was essential for national security;
3) there was no reasonable substitute for Kaho'olawe;
4) therefore, the island was essential for national defense (Smith 1976:21).

Navy public relations emphasized the necessity of Kaho'olawe for military preparedness. It strived to enhance its public image,
reinforcing its public affairs program whenever it perceived a threat to its use of the island (Lind 1978b: 5).

In the Vietnam War and post-War atmosphere, anti-military attitudes were exacerbated, especially in Maui county, by the bombing of Kaho'olawe. Opposition by the mayor of the county, the County Council, and the Maui chapter of Life of the Land were countered by Navy presentations and invitations to businessmen and government officials for tours on Navy ships which began to stop at Maui harbors (Lind 1978b: 5).

In 1974, when the U.S. Congress was considering a halt to the bombing, it was claimed by an 'Ohana supporter that the Navy's reaction was to temporarily modify its bombing activities to make them more politically acceptable (Lind 1978b: 5).

The Navy's Kaho'olawe Project Officer indicated that the increase in training activities on Kaho'olawe was tied to the build-up of the Marine Brigade stationed at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station (O'ahu) between 1975 and 1978 (Profilet 1978: 4). Although there was no direct evidence, it could be conjectured that this was related to the threat of military confrontation in the Middle East (which was within the sphere of the Navy's Third Fleet) and elsewhere. The argument for military preparedness and national defense may have appeared rational in the face of the takeover of the American Embassy in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980.

The swing in international politics placed greater burdens on the movement to justify its continued attacks on the Navy, especially in light of concessions which the Navy made, e.g. allowing accesses to
the island and funding the archaeological survey of the island. To the
'Ohana, these were concessions which were hard-bought by their own
actions; to the public, however, it could have been viewed as an
accommodation on the part of the Navy.

The refusal of the Navy to openly acknowledge the 'Ohana as a
legitimate group (Godfrey 1978: 2) both helped and hindered the
movement's goals. The Navy's refusal to negotiate with the 'Ohana
cut off strategic alternatives and the actual success of the stated
goals. But by not recognizing the PKO, the Navy reinforced the
'Ohana's convictions about their cause, i.e. that the Navy did not
recognize the rights of the Hawaiian people to the perpetuation of
their culture and the practice of their religion. By continuing the
bombing, the Navy was desecrating a religious site, with the full
knowledge of its significance.

The Navy played up the military role in the State's economy. The
commander of the Third Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Samuel Gravely, Jr.,
was quoted as saying:

The military in Hawaii is a billion-dollar-a-year business. A significant part of that business is generated because Navy and Marine forces are here to train and Kahoolawe is a prime training site (in Time 1977: 32).

The implication was that the loss of Kaho'olawe would be the beginning of the end of the military presence in Hawai'i, precipitating a major vacuum in the State's economy. One woman explained to a legislative study team:

The future of our kids is at stake. What will you be taking away from us by the return of Kaho'olawe? What about the loss of jobs? They said they'll move out! Pearl Harbor is important to us, we can't afford to lose it (in LRB 1978: 174).
This argument found widespread adherents in civilian employees (as well as their friends and relatives) of the military. It affected them at a basic level; the threat of unemployment for the sake of an uninhabited island which many viewed in the popular stereotype of the "barren rock" was hardly conceivable, much less supportable.

After the 1979 court ruling, the Navy negotiated directly with the 'Ohana, but their resistance to the 'Ohana was manifested in a reluctant acceptance of the Consent Decree, and a close adherence to the rules of the order. They continued to withhold acknowledgement of the 'Ohana as a legitimate and legal partner in the management of the island. The court-ruled Consent Decree, signed in December 1980, specified the 'Ohana as a steward of the island (Consent Decree 1980: 2). However, in meetings held in January 1981 on the management of the island as a national historic district, the 'Ohana was not included; the meeting involved State historic sites specialists, National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation staff members, and Navy personnel.

The Courts

Although the Consent Decree was won through the courts, the courts were still viewed as part of the same system in which the Navy operated. Therefore, in terms of long-range goals, including the eventual return of the island, the legal system was not seen as a viable alternative but rather as simply a vehicle for interim measures.

During the trials in the summer of 1977, 'Ohana defendants were told by Federal Judge Gordon Thompson, Jr. that "going there and
standing trial . . . that won't accomplish a great deal." He advised political action, "putting the Navy to the proof" that they still needed the island for bombing. He stated: "The politics are in Washington" (Advertiser 2/24/77: A3).

Aluli later interpreted Judge Thompson's sentencing of Ritte and Sawyer in 1977 as inconsistent with Federal Judge Dick Yin Wong's ruling in the civil suit, where he ruled that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Protection Act and Executive Order 11593, but did not issue an injunction to stop the bombing while studies were carried out. Aluli complained that "they were all found guilty . . . but the Navy doesn't have to suffer for it" (Advertiser 9/16/77: A7).

The State and Existing Mechanisms for Democratic Participation

The State government, represented by the present administration, developed as a perceived opposition by the 'Ohana. In the first year and a half of the movement, politicians were approached for their assistance in the cause; conventional political mechanisms and the legislative process were seen as viable alternatives for an end to the bombing. However, movement members were disillusioned by 1978 and this was most evident in the internal dissension of that year.

Almost every year since 1976 saw the introduction of resolutions by the State Legislature in support of the 'Ohana and calling for an end to the bombing. In 1976 and 1977, at the height of movement activity and media coverage, investigations by the Hawaii Congressional team, including on-site visits to the island, were carried out. U.S. Senator Inouye arranged meetings in Washington, D.C. with members
of the Armed Forces Sub-committee of the U.S. Senate. At the 1978 State Constitutional Convention, attempts to report a substantive amendment on Kaho'olawe and aloha ʻāina out of the Hawaiian Affairs committee were thwarted and only a resolution was passed.

The 'Ohana interpreted such support as verbal and of little substance. Resolutions had no legal power. They were recommendations, for which support generally holds no threats to political life. Thus, a politician could sign a resolution as a political move to enhance an image with a concerned public, with no actual commitment to an issue. Similarly, voiced concern for an issue is far different from substantive action. Therefore, years of verbalized interest, with no visible signs of concomitant action, was interpreted as indifference or possibly actual opposition.

Thus, in late 1978, a critique of Inouye's involvement in the Kaho'olawe issue appeared in the Aloha ʻĀina. Inouye was seen as vetbally supporting the return of the island (he had, in fact, initiated Congressional action in 1974 to accomplish this) but, in the 'Ohana's view, had done little to carry this out. As a powerful figure in Washington, he appeared to some members of the 'Ohana as a key figure in the issue. However, in the absence of any substantive actions, his role was interpreted as a "stumbling block" rather than a "stepping stone." That is, 'Ohana members saw him with a national constituency and with political ambitions at a national level and therefore, unwilling to endanger that, particularly for a local issue (Lind 1978a: 6; Advertiser 5/18/78: A3).
As the mechanisms of conventional politics appeared to fail them, disaffection for that alternative grew.

In July 1978, it was reported to 'Ohana members that the State was willing to discuss Kaho'olawe with them, although the Navy would not. However, the State was also negotiating separately with the Navy, in meetings which culminated in a memorandum of understanding in which the State acknowledged the military's need to bomb the island (Memorandum of Understanding 1978).

At the same time, the State Legislature completed a study of the issue (LRB 1978). It concluded that "the Navy has not presented sufficient data to uphold their claim to the entire island of Kaho'olawe for military use" (LRB 1978: 231). Among 38 recommendations were those to:

1) open a portion of the island for joint use on a limited and controlled basis;

2) use kama'āina witnesses (native-born persons familiar with Hawaiian culture and lifestyle) as resource persons for archaeological and historical work on the island; and

3) recognize Kaho'olawe as one of the symbols of the Hawaiian renaissance and a key to the roots of Hawai'i.

A review of the study by an 'Ohana member noted the absence of "recommendation 39" calling for a cessation of the bombing (Ritte 1978).

At an individual level, legislators and state personnel were seen as potential supporters. However, as an entity, the State was seen as an existing authority in need of fundamental changes in philosophy concerning land and the Hawaiian people. It was seen as an integral
part of the system which allowed the bombing to take place and, thus, was as much the opposition as the Navy.

This view, however, was the result of an evolution in perspective, in which the State changed from a source of support to a source of opposition. The administration was seen as representative of the authority which consistently blocked attempts at resolving the Kaho'olawe issue, as well as controlled the rate of urbanization and resort development in the islands and the betterment of Hawaiians. The 'Ohana saw such state agencies as Land and Natural Resources, Hawaiian Home Lands, and the Land Use Commission as either ineffective, incompetent, or in association with those who would see to the destruction of land and Hawaiian culture.

In the case of Sand Island, where a planned State Park came in conflict with a settlement of people who had set up a shoreline fishing community, the argument was made that the park was encroaching on a settlement which represented a Hawaiian lifestyle. The Department of Land and Natural Resources employees, mounted on bulldozers to raze the settlement, were seen as destroyers of a remnant of Hawaiian culture.

In the Hilo Airport conflict, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands was criticized for not asserting its rights to compensation for lands used by the Transportation Department for the airport. Again, the State was viewed as taking advantage of Hawaiians. In this case, the lands which were intended for the use of Hawaiians were being used for the general public at no compensation to the beneficiaries.
The epitome of this view is the opposition to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. In a press statement released prior to the 1980 OHA election, the 'Ohana stated:

We protest the State's record in dealing with Native Hawaiian land issues, including the State's support of OHA. Neither OHA nor the State's record are consistent with the real needs of Native Hawaiians. These needs begin with the right of Hawaiians to live on their land. But State policy has been to evict Hawaiians . . . to abuse Hawaiian Homes Lands . . . and to support military abuse of lands. The State has encouraged resort development and urbanization, and gives no priority to the preservation of historic sites. The 'Ohana has supported all these struggles, including those against resort development.

Politically, we believe that OHA is part of the present State government, and as such, cannot guarantee Native Hawaiians any favorable treatment ('Ohana press release 11/6/80).

Indirect Opposition

Opposition to a movement can be any body that seriously challenges the self-image of the movement, its values and goals. This includes a wide range of groups and individuals who are not in positions of decision-making or authority.

Challenges to the movement came in the form of personal sanctions from family, friends, or employers against individuals in the 'Ohana. A lack of general interest in the PKO was a threat to the support base of the movement. Dealing with an indifferent public could be more of a challenge than dealing with an antagonistic one.

Some Hawaiians voiced opposition to the movement from early in its existence. The Hawaiian Civic Clubs Association was reported to support the military (Advertiser 2/5/77: A3); some members disagreed with the 'Ohana's methods and premises. In June 1978, a 70-year-old
part-Hawaiian woman placed an advertisement in the Honolulu Advertiser (6/16/78) supporting the military use of the island. She disliked the 'Ohana's methods and considered the "affected dress of ancient Hawaiians" as an "insult, degrading to us." She called the spiritual renewal on the island "phony" and said that everyone should be Christian.

Support for the military also came from Hawaiians testifying at hearings on the legislative study, in which loyalty to the United States was advocated (LRB 1978).

There was disagreement on the sacredness of the island itself. Charles Kenn, over 70 years old and a specialist in Hawaiiana at Kamehameha Schools, testified at the Ritte-Sawyer trial that the island was not sacred. He attributed the aloha 'āina philosophy to political beliefs originating in the late 19th century through a political party and newspaper of that name (Advertiser 8/27/77: A1).

There was also opposition from individuals who believed that fighting for Kaho'olawe was a waste of time, especially when there were more apparent and urgent pressures on the other inhabited islands. One 'Ohana leader said at a lāhui in 1977: "Hawaiians tend to only react when things are in their own backyard" (in Smith 1977: 19).

The PKO: A Contemporary Social Movement

In spite of alterations in certain aspects, the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana clearly expressed the basic characteristics of a social movement as defined by Gerlach and Hine (1970). These alterations can be generally described as a reduction in visible intensity. That is,
in the five years following its inception, the 'Ohana became more publicly subdued, shifting from a highly visible profile which involved illegal activities, strong, verbalized cultural assertion, and confrontation to a more subdued profile which emphasized establishing a firm network of island-based 'ohana, an undercurrent of Hawaiian pride in the movement, and a strategy of negotiation.

The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana can be characterized as a movement of shifting balances. The following chapter discusses the nature of the PKO in this context.
CHAPTER 5

CULTURAL REVITALIZATION IN A CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana is a case study of an attempt at cultural revitalization in a contemporary setting. It is an organization which incorporates revivalistic tendencies of revitalization into a broad, issue-based structure of a contemporary social movement. As such, it exists as a duality, with an appeal to two distinct constituencies: to Hawaiians as a cultural group and to a much larger audience who sees broader social issues beyond ethnic-cultural enhancement.

This duality generates conflicts. The development of the Kaho'olawe movement was the result of a series of such conflicts which were made inevitable by contradictions in the basic fabric of the organization:

1) in the nature of its struggle for power;
2) in its philosophical analysis of ideologies based on spirituality and political reality; and
3) in its self-image within a particularly defined social hierarchy.

These contradictions are a reflection of the movement's dual roles in Hawaiian society and culture. The identification of the conflicts, and the contradictions which they represent, can lend insight to the role of cultural revitalization in a modern social movement context.
The Struggle for Power

The struggle for power is defined as the conflict relationship between those who control power within the existing social order and the character of the movement seeking to redistribute the power. At one end of the spectrum is the struggle between a colonizing force and an indigenous cultural system, e.g. as in a culture-contact, colonial situation. The external force imposes its political and social values on the indigenous group. Members of the indigenous group respond through a movement to reacquire the power which has been lost.

At the other extreme is an internally developed power struggle wherein a minority subgroup is at conflict with the larger system out of which it emerged. Unlike the colonial situation in which the struggle is for the reacquisition of power which has been relinquished to an external force, this internally developed situation concerns the acquisition of as yet unmanifested power.

The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana can be seen as a struggle in both directions. The federal government (as represented by the U.S. Navy) was viewed as a colonial force which imposed a foreign system of political and social order on the Hawaiian people through its critical involvement in the overthrow of the monarchy and the subsequent acquisition of the islands as a territory.

This idea was reflected in the 'Ohana's interpretation of the existing value system in Hawai'i. That is, they perceived that value system as being Western and contrary to the traditional Hawaiian ideology, especially as it related to land. The belief was that there was a rich and viable culture prior to Western Contact, which
subsequently degenerated under the influences of the Contact environment, e.g. missionization, a shift to a market economy, and massive depopulation. This cultural deterioration culminated in the ultimate loss, that of land.

The struggle for power, in this case, was for the reacquisition of authority over land, for its own sake and as representative of culture. As related to Kaho'olawe specifically, the struggle was for the reacquisition of control over what had become military reservation. It was a reassertion of Hawaiian culture and the assertion of a new Hawaiian nation. As one 'Ohana spokesperson told me: "If the Hawaiians can get their land back, the Hawaiian lifestyle can be re-established and Hawaiian culture can become relevant. Hawaiians don't have culture if they don't have land." Thus, land equals culture.

As an internally developed power struggle, the 'Ohana appealed to a broad constituency which saw the issue as a lack of an effective voice in decision-making on State and local land policies. The government, developers, and major landowners were viewed as brokers who withheld effective power from the public. Those people saw an inability to bring about effective change through established channels. The struggle in this sense was to acquire rightful power as members of a democratic society.

In many instances, these struggles worked in concert, allowing an expression of both Hawaiian ethnic/cultural goals as well as political aims for a more general constituency. However, conflicts arose when cultural-specific goals dominated movement strategies.
The movement's assertions of "Hawaiian lands for Hawaiians" generate several questions. What of 'Ohana supporters of other ethnic backgrounds? How do non-Hawaiians in general fit into the social scheme of the envisioned order? For the organization itself, does this position antagonize a subgroup of the movement or alienate a potential support group? Is this the balkanization of which Alter warned?

Hawai'i is a multi-ethnic community, and a viable part of the American and world communities. It is also isolated and self-defined by a vast ocean. This insularity provides a cohesive identity for all Hawai'i residents: Hawai'i is a part of the United States but it is also a distinct and unique part.

Taken at this level, the Navy, in and of itself, is an easily defined antagonist because it is a separate and distinguishable entity in Hawai'i. The United States, on the other hand, is the sum of American consciousness and identity. The idea of the federal government as a colonizing force is foreign to many Hawai'i residents, including Hawaiians who identify themselves first as Americans and second as natives of the islands.

Spirituality versus Political Reality

Ash (1972: 1-11) defines the difference between prepolitical and political movements in terms of their understanding of the structure of society. Prepolitical movements analyze the social order in non-secular terms. They use spiritual symbolism to interpret the social order; this, in turn, necessitates spiritual methods of changing the social order. Political movements, on the other hand, utilize a
secular analysis of the social order, in combining goals of ideological change with social structural change.

The Paliau Movement of the Admiralty Islands is an example of one movement which expressed both types of analysis. The Movement aspect, led by and focused on the individual, Paliau, advocated a program of comprehensive social, economic, and political changes for cultural transformation. The Cult aspect, in comparison, focused on the powers of the supernatural, and rejected the programmatic concerns and secular tactics of the Movement. It was characterized by the destruction of property, individual or mass seizures, and the experience of direct communication with Jesus or the dead (Schwartz 1962).

In terms of this analysis, the 'Ohana justification for actions was largely spiritual, e.g. that a sacred place was being desecrated. However, the social context of the struggle was political. Thus, while the foundation of the movement was couched in spiritualism, the very nature of the issue was political.

As Trask noted:

Religious ritual was an integral part of 'Ohana activity . . . there was a clear understanding that the meaning of 'Ohana as family entailed belief in some higher, more inclusive state of community . . . and Aloha 'Aina, love of the land, and Aloha ka Po'e, love of the people, flowed from a belief in the inherent worth of all earthly inhabitants (1980: 33).

However, she added that the 'Ohana had not yet accepted its political responsibility; that the spiritualism of the early period was not enough to carry the movement through the tenuous realities of the political world (Trask 1978: 18). She asked what the purpose of the movement was--to be a social movement (in the sense of being
spiritually oriented) or to be a political movement. Her contention was that success of the goals was dependent on a conscious realization of choice.

This opposition between spiritualism and politics was basic to many of the conflicts which plagued the 'Ohana, especially in the development and implementation of strategies. As Trask said:

In cultural terms, I would like to suggest that these problems involve moving from mana'o-sharing to outlining a clear political position (1978: 18).

For example, the phrase "mālama the 'Āina" was often used by 'Ohana members to mean "taking care of the land." However, conflicts arose in the interpretation of the phrase. To some, mālama meant stopping the bombing and revegetating the island, i.e. making it grow again. To others, mālama meant fighting the political struggles to stop the bombing, e.g. through demonstrations, writing, and speeches; in other words, the figurative battle. Resentments emerged when one faction saw the other as losing the essence of the issue, regardless of the fact that the essence was in the interpretation.

Social Hierarchy

The creation of an internal social hierarchy is common in the organization of a movement. It involves members' images of the movement within the hierarchy of the existing order and how they identify themselves in a status system within the movement. The ranking is defined in various ways, among which are level of education, type of employment (e.g. blue-collar as opposed to management) place of residence, and personal behavior.
With the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana, this resulted in a dichotomy between two factions, identified as intellectuals and grassroots. The intellectuals were characterized by professional occupation, college education (or association with a university), urban residence, and, to some extent, identification with a particular political ideology.

Grassroots connoted the qualities of rural, poor, and non-academic, which carried a positive aura in the 'Ohana. These qualities implied a close tie to the self-sufficient, subsistence economic base, i.e. an actual tie to the land, which was an idealization of the Hawaiian cultural system. Further, as one 'Ohana member noted: the neighbor islands, i.e. rural areas, had more to lose than urban Honolulu, in that rural areas had been less contaminated by Westernization.

A columnist for the Hawaii Tribune-Herald verbalized this dichotomy in describing the participants at the EIS hearing in Hilo in 1978:

These Hawaiians on the whole represented rural people and working people, the ones who have not made their mark in the modern multicultural world. Those who testified did not on the whole represent the educated, the professional people, and others who think of themselves as Americans of Hawaiian ancestry rather than as Hawaiians illegally forced to become Americans and very anti-military (Baldwin 1978).

This dichotomy was manifested in personal conflicts in self-image and in interpersonal relationships, i.e. the sense of belonging within the organization as well as one's place in the movement's social order. An intellectual could move into and adopt the lifestyle of a rural area but there would always be the sense of being transplanted, both
by the individual and by others viewing his or her actions. This was reflected in the apologies offered by a member of the 'Ohana, a professional, for not being Hawaiian enough to know Hawaiian songs or how to dance the hula.

**Conclusion: Cultural Revitalization in a Contemporary Setting**

The Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana altered considerably in the five years after its inception; while most changes occurred gradually, the major crises took place in 1978 at the Ke'anae and Moloka'i lāhui. Before then, the emphasis of the movement was strongly spiritual. The island served as both symbol and issue; stopping the bombing and return of the island were the goals of the organization. The 'Ohana was a renewal of pride in being Hawaiian. There was a belief within the movement that the "system" was inherently good and that working with the State government to ensure the return of the island was a viable approach.

However, after the lāhui of 1978, with the withdrawal of Ritte's faction, the character of the movement changed. If it was a movement of cultural realization before that time, it became a more clearly defined social and political movement after that. One 'Ohana member said in 1980 that the issue of Hawaiianness was understood by members who had been involved for a long period of time; that it was an underlying motivator and that the real issues of conflict were political.
With the outcome of the civil suit in late 1980, and with a concomitant realization of continuing struggle, Kaho'olawe alone was no longer the central issue. It became symbolic, and the issues diversified under the broader goal of *aloha 'āina*. An analogy of a wheel was related to me: *aloha 'āina* was the wheel, Kaho'olawe was the center, and other related issues were the spokes.

That this diversification occurred was the result of the interplay of differing beliefs within the movement of what the 'Ohana stood for and what its goals were. This interplay was reflected in the differing perceptions of the island itself.

To some 'Ohana members, the island was literally a sacred place, interpreted from the legendary literature, ethnohistory, and archaeology. Asked what the island would be used for after its return, these members responded with cultural or spiritual overtones, e.g. a cultural-religious center, a national shrine, or a *pu'uhonua* (place of refuge). One member expressed concern about the accesses: he thought they should be opportunities to plant, to take care of the island in the sense of revegetating it. He thought that there was too much effort put into what he termed "sightseeing."

Others saw the island as truly symbolic, and literal only in the sense of being a tangible example of the destruction. Some of them would have argued that the "sightseeing tours" served a purpose in enabling people to see the destruction, as well as the beauty, of the 'āina.

The distinctions between these interpretations of the island reflect an ambiguity in self-image. If solidarity is essential for
resource mobilization, this ambiguity was the crux of a mobilization problem for the 'Ohana. And the inability of the movement to progress beyond the stage of adaptation (in Wallace's scheme of revitalization) can be attributed to this problem.

The 'Ohana was stalled in an adaptive mode, attempting to decipher its identity, goals, and strategies. Confusion stemmed from defining its basis for solidarity, in essence what it meant to be Hawaiian.

After 200 years of Western influence, the traditional culture of Hawai'i remained as only references in 19th century books and generations-removed memories. While strong elements of it survived in rural areas, it was subsumed generally by the multi-ethnic, Western-oriented culture of Hawai'i as an American state.

In attempting to develop a neo-Hawaiian identity, cultural identification had to share time with other social and ethnic affiliations. Self-identification as a colonized people was a relatively new image in terms of the post-Contact history of Hawai'i. It had to compete with a historically stronger image as American citizens, as part of the larger multi-ethnic community.

The conflicts in identification were further exacerbated by the needs of the movement itself as an organization to attract and sustain supporters. People as mobilizable resources are critical to the functioning of a viable movement; the core group of members may be actively working for the movement, but without a base of support there may be little success for their efforts.
Thus, a balance must be struck where incentives for member participation and maintenance do not become negative incentives for a support constituency. Fervent cries for the rise of a Hawaiian nation or simply the re-creation of a Hawaiian religious ceremony were inherently separatist in nature; that is, it delineated a boundary between those with an inherent right to participate and those with none.

The question posed in this thesis is the role of cultural revitalization in a contemporary social movement. Based on the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana, it would seem that cultural revitalization can be an effective force in the mobilization of resources, but its use is subject to some critical limitations.

Revitalization provides an ideological structure for solidarity, based on cultural identity; that is, an identification with a particular set of cultural values. It provides goal-oriented incentives in its intent to restructure society in revivalistic forms.

However, when Wallace described revitalization, he was using examples from groups that were not exceptionally altered from their pre-Contact states. Attempts to revive indigenous cultural forms were not hampered by significant losses of cultural memory. In the case of the 'Ohana, attempts to reinstate Hawaiian cultural traits and values were restricted by over 200 years of foreign impositions and native accommodations.

As a mobilizing force, then, revitalization for the 'Ohana was generated by an idealization of traditional culture; in this sense,
it was Wallace's visionary revelation transmitted by his charismatic leader. Revivalism in this case literally a re-creation from a base of essentially 19th to early 20th century documentation.

While the idealism of tradition is an emotional force which can coalesce factions, pragmatic concerns for organization necessitate rational actions. Thus, in the long run, revitalization loses its effectiveness in compromises that have to be made in the growth of movement organizations, in the development of specific strategies and tactics, in alterations to goals, and changes in opposition. Revitalization functions in a contemporary context only when the ideology is broad enough so as not to alienate potential support. When affective lines are obscured by conflicting affiliations and interpretations, revitalization can become a divisive factor.

Revitalization in a modern setting is like history; they are both interpretations of the past in which there is no truth per se but rather visions of interpretation. In a complex, modern society, far removed from real or romanticized traditions, on what basis will re-creation be made, particularly when the political viability of a movement is at stake?

Cultural revitalization requires some understanding of what a culture was originally, what its present role is, and where it will be in the envisioned order. In the heterogeneous milieu of modern society, that is a monumental requisite. It is inevitable then, that contradictions are the essence of cultural revitalization in a contemporary social movement.
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude with a statement on the larger social context of the Protect Kaho'olawe 'Ohana. The controversies which surrounded many of the 'Ohana's activities placed it largely outside of the mainstream of Hawaiian society and culture. But, while it was itself limited to a relatively small and fluctuating constituency, it provided throughout its existence a forum in which the larger social body could react within socially acceptable bounds.

It was called many things in its history: militants, radicals, the hope for a new Hawaiian nation. But its functional role was, as one supporter noted, a "mark of contradiction."

This role allowed issues and criticisms to be raised which might not otherwise have been raised. It allowed a flexibility in strategies not permitted members of the establishment.

This was perhaps the ultimate contradiction. Remaining outside the established order would necessitate a goal of fundamental changes to the basic structure of the existing order to actualize cultural revitalization. But to join the establishment would be an acceptance of the multi-ethnic social milieu and limit the mechanisms available for achieving change.

In openly opposing the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, a body which many viewed as the final opportunity for Hawaiians to assert themselves, the PKO presented themselves as proponents of radical change; i.e. that a place within the existing system was not enough. In other words, they rejected a role which they saw as a small part of a large power structure, for which there might be some authority but no real power.
The 'Ohana chose the path of contradiction. Its ability to continue successfully along that path depends on its ability to balance the fine edge between maintaining the integrity of its cultural beliefs and maintaining a viable organization to attain its goals.
REFERENCES


______. n.d. Houluulu La Hui (Gathering of a Nation). Typescript.


