A DECOLONIAL ARCHIVE: THE HISTORICAL SPACE OF ASIAN SETTLER POLITICS
IN A TIME OF HAWAIIAN NATIONHOOD

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We certify that we have read this dissertation and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
For Richard Shigemitsu
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ABSTRACT

The decolonial archive is a theoretical apparatus for approaching structures that alternately invest Asian settlers in an American-Hawai‘i, tense against U.S. hegemony, and recuperate those tensions into attachments to America.

I task this archive with creating a place of pausing. Outside of the prescriptive and diagnostic temporalities that are usual to politics, this locale paces un-thinking intimate attachments to colonial orders. Here, “un-thinking” hosts a double valence. As an adjective, it describes those attachments as unconscious directives of hegemony in everyday movements. As a verb, it acts on those attachments in material things that are inclusive, and in excess, of thought. Things like inheriting a family name, “everyday life,” and feelings have political and economic rhythms that suffuse relationships to the colonial state (government, U.S. militaries, juridical institutions) and society (plantation owning elites, the health sector, academia, and the faith community).

To access the micrological textured of colonization, I’ve looked to the intimate paper-trails that my own family-names generate into one of Hawai‘i’s defining colonial institutions, the Territorial-era (1900-1959) plantation. These plantation communities were crucial arenas of the labor organizing, wartime economic expansion, patriotism and consumer socialization that contributed to the emergence of a new multiracial local ruling class in a post-Statehood epoch (1959). Their political and economic enfranchisement, gauged in increased property ownership, professional employment and public office-holding, has been adorned with liberatory signs of racial justice. But this format assumes only political-economic investments secure Asian settler
allegiance to Hawai‘i’s U.S. occupation. To stop the translation of this history (acceleration of multiculturalism under globalization) into that evidence (proofs of American capitalism’s capacity to incorporate difference), I archive Asian settlers colonialism in new capillary forms of power that target affect, feeling, sensation and memory. My use of the decolonial archive derails kinship’s commitments to heteronormative conventions, while exploiting genealogy’s idiomatic kinship with reproductive familiality to turn a (hetero)normative narrative of existential continuity into a narrative of political accountability to a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i.
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PREFACE

"The remaking of history involves a negotiation with the structures that have produced the individual as agent of history"
- Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

This dissertation does not claim my family as a privileged representative of Asian settlement in Hawai‘i. It does not claim that Asian settler historicity is important because it produced me. It does not claim, diagnose, prescribe, or even plainly describe. I wrote this dissertation for a different reason. I wrote this dissertation because I didn’t know how to feel about Hawai‘i. Or rather, I didn’t know how to feel about wanting the justice of a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i at the same time as loving the home that we, my non-Hawaiian family and I, have made here.

The Hawai‘i of my affections is pieced together from my pride in seeing the names of my grandfather in public records of labor organizing leadership, my memories of family reunions in Kahuku that spilled out from the house into the driveway, yard and neighbor’s yard, the networks of friends and playmates I’ve accumulated across the beaches and breaks, and the visceral delights of white styrofoam ice-chests full of five-spiced boiled peanuts, poi and tako poke that accompanied the relatives who visited us in Maryland. It is also produced as a haven from feelings of racial minority ostracism in the middle-class enclaves of the U.S. suburbs that are also part of my childhood nostalgia.

On Hawai‘i’s contested terrain, such sentimental claims to home are never out of the orbit of decolonizing struggles for land and against cultural genocide. In this political constellation, they seem trivial and trivializing. So, I know that my love is probably a bad idea.
But insofar as ideals can be approached generically, as forms that magnetize affects in order to keep us engrossed in, for example, managing ambivalence about our love-objects, they also identify the modes of misrecognition through which settler claims to belonging function are made to tense against Hawaiian decolonization. This dissertation shows that wanting to belong, alleviating that want, and projecting those movements into political transformation can sidetrack each other into creating circuits that remain only emotively engaged by displacing my desire to manage a feeling about home, family, and decolonial justice onto a different structure of the political. Seeing how my memories, genealogies and affections are not only my own, I come to know and name them in the double valence of colonial complicity. That is, the feeling that I am not quite right with history locates the historicity of that feeling with me, too.

The decolonial archive offers guidelines for feeling out a place for my squirming sense of belonging and unbelonging by deprivatizing personal properties into objects of knowledge about the systems that make them into evidence of ownership. The point, in every case, is to turn this evidence against an easy equation between feeling-good and shifts in a political structure of feeling.
INTRODUCTION

I begin by noticing that we don’t always know when we are looking at colonization.

Vis-à-vis the U.S., Hawai’i is alternately, an American state, a sovereign nation under U.S. occupation, and a colony of the U.S. Contemporary reassertions of Hawaiian nationhood call attention to the plays of power that determine Hawai’i’s variably-national states. Situated on this complicated discursive terrain, Asian “Americans” must create new political identities to negotiate Hawai’i’s interwoven tangle of contingently national spaces. I’m working out a theory that places a premium on the ways that, especially national, identities exceed - the categories that preexist their analysis. Focusing on analysis itself, I propose archiving as a modality of decolonizing knowledge.

In this sense, the decolonial archive is a project of political theory. It structures information retrieval within the caution that mapping the present always already has a hand in constituting it. Rather than a limit to knowledge, that caution marks a capacity to respond to “the very question of the future, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow” (Derrida 1995:36). This structure builds from the inter-related claims that 1) decolonizing history is an aesthetic political enactment; 2) academic and activist strategies of decolonization are sometimes each other’s limit case; and finally, that 3) the presumption that we can know the present, and even more, effect how we know our present. Such claims are founded on a historical impropriety that broadly affiliates with cultural theory’s project of getting a grip on past moments as a certain way of knowing our present. I’m suggesting that the politics of decolonizing knowledge lies in showing how something can be made to be true.
Since the late 1960s, Hawaiian activists have put Hawai‘i histories and politics into narratives of colonization (Trask 1987; Nakata 1999). These narratives refract U.S. minority anti-racist claims to civil rights into colonial categories of analysis - national sovereignty, indigenous concepts of land tenure, contests over ceded lands,\(^2\) opposition to racist blood quantum censuses, and the categorical error of using American juridical institutions to remediate the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i. This discursive and analytical shift calls Asian settlers to revise their presence to those pasts as well. Hawaiian studies professor and political activist, Haunani—Kay Trask, describes the scenario:

Asians and haole\(^3\) have been thrown into a cauldron of defensive actions by our nationalist struggle. Either they must justify their continued benefit from Hawaiian subjugation, thus serving as support for that subjugation, or they must repudiate American hegemony and work with the Hawaiian nationalist movement (Trask 2000:30). Put simply, late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) century Asian labor migrants to Hawai‘i did not “immigrate” to a U.S. state, but settled in a colony that remains under U.S. occupation, but this political identity does not only describe a historical or sociological fact (Trask 2000; Kosasa 2004).

Trask’s call to action cogently sets radical idioms of agency into the currency of national liberation in Hawai‘i: the settler-agent takes sides with Hawaiians and repudiates American hegemony. Her point is not to re-consolidate original national groups, but rather to constitute political agency as something that emerges in epochal forms that can be taken up now. Politics most fundamentally concerns the regimes of visibility through subjects emerge as having a part in the political world. Rendered this way, the political importantly includes, but is not limited to, the distribution of rights and resources, as well as the ways that unequal systems of distribution came to be perpetuated in the first place.
Historically, I’m reaching towards the World War II era of a rural sugar plantation in O’ahu, Kahuku, a plantation community in rural O’ahu. My historical data consists of oral histories, plantation housing maps, letters, meeting minutes, company ledgers, and other documentation from Territorial-era (1900-1959) Kahuku. At that time, U.S. martial law froze wages and worker occupational, and therefore residential, mobility, successive waves of, mostly Asian, migrant workers were learning to gel class interests into organized labor, and a resident white elite, popularly known as the “Big Five,” dominated the political, economic and social life of the colony. My project affirms Hawaiian decolonization from the loci of those who inherit a, once exclusively, white Euro-American settler class that expanded a colonial franchise to second-generation (nisei) Asian “Americans.” This history transmits visions, tensions and affects that a decolonial archive situates between present political uses of plantation-worker heritage and Hawaiian decolonization. Taken together, I theorize interactions between that history and this present as Asian settler colonialism.

Broadly, Asian settler colonialism is the future of past practices of land theft and political control through which descendants of transnational contract laborers moved into middle class American-ness. Not having arrived as settler-conquerors, Asian settlers emerge as colonial agents over a multiple generations. The axis of my investigation into Asian settler colonial complicity pivots on the intergenerational nature of this emergence. Plantation, and post-plantation, Kahuku is something like a hometown for my mother’s side of our family. I track an Asian settler colonial genealogy through this lineage.
Colonial politics and history

"I cannot write the history of the future, and I am also rather clumsy at foreseeing the past. However, I would like to grasp what is happening right now, because these days nothing is finished and the dice are still being rolled"
- Michel Foucault.

Thinking-politically means thinking-historically. Historically, however, thinking is sometimes discontinuous with politics. To paraphrase another important thinker of the politics of history, Walter Benjamin, politics attains a "primacy" over history at the threshold of historical consciousness (Benjamin 2003:388). Consciousness of historicity becomes a "structure of awakening" that allows for the eruption of the political (Benjamin 2003:389). This dissertation structures the political in this way, as an awakening to the historical forms of force and authority that suffuse ongoing processes taking shape in Hawai‘i’s decolonization.

Embrouled in something similar to Foucault’s conundrum, those who seek the justice of a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i wrestle with the disjointed temporality of decolonization. That is, in advancing possibilities that cannot be anticipated in advance of decolonization, they advance a politics out of history. Such politics cannot operate within genres of prescription (a history of the future) and diagnosis (an inventory of the present), because these twinned forms depend on teleology to characterize colonization’s pathological mechanisms. For settler colonial societies authorizing the present as having-awakened from the past is paramount. Authorities must present themselves as now different from the producer of historical injustices in the “now-time” of Hawaiian nationhood.

While asserting the primacy of a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i, my approaches to Hawaiian self-determination, indigeneity, and nationhood are largely restricted to their life as political things.
Politically, decolonization does not locate what Hawaiian historical injustice rectified will look like at the backside of an originary moment of colonial contact. In this sense, indigeneity refers to more than the presumed privilege of who was here first. First contacts are historically significant, but a politics of indigeneity concerns how asserting indigenous peoples to have a part disrupts a non-indigenous order. Denuded of its relationship to the dynamics of power that consolidate indigenous-identities, indigenous histories can either get entangled with origins and timeless immobility; or, they can fall prey to a nonsensical view of Hawaiians as the first-wave of immigrants to America. Neither is this sense of the political restricted only to legal registers. Definitions built out from international legal recognition of indigenous peoples can bring visibility to historically violated nationhood (territory, rights to resources and governance).

Yet, decolonizing Hawai‘i may not work out only from legal categories. Jon Osorio identifies the uncertain panacea of legal subjecthood as a historically duplicitous political ally for Hawaiians (Osorio 2001). As scholars of Native Pacific Island studies have pointed out, a specialized literacy in international legal-ese may risk misrecognizing a multitude of decolonizing vocabularies outside of juridical spheres.

Others call for re-examining the wisdom of basing claims to historical injustice on the same indigenous status that may cause them to disinherit their legal standing as citizens of a Hawaiian nation-state. Advocating the reinstatement of a Hawaiian State, they robustly contest Hawai‘i American nationality by citing historical and legal precedents that recognize the Kingdom of Hawai‘i as a sovereign nation-state within international law. In a climate of current conservative legal attacks on Hawaiian entitlements, constituting a Hawaiian juridical subject in a
(international) constitutive outside to the U.S. is a particularly shrewd legal strategy. New Rightists oppose what they term Hawaiian institutions of “racial preferences” and “special rights,” against which Hawaiians’ claim extra-U.S. legal status. Minority equality-talk takes on new life in a new Right campaign for a “race-blind” America. They now align with New Right legal attacks on Hawaiian “racial preferences.” This amalgam of arguments attempts to corral decolonial justice into the mere extension of an American franchise to Hawaiians as minority citizens. My approach, namely, the decolonial archive, is informed by these presentations of a Hawaiian-Hawai'i. Contextualized by the productive difference between history and politics, a decolonial archive can turn a world, experience and a feeling towards the political.

Politically, pushing Hawaiian claims against outside of American, as opposed to international, legal domains seeks to “re-constitute a critique of U.S.-Hawaiian relationships as a critique of U.S. foreign policy” (Shapiro 2002:28). Political theoriest, Michael J. Shapiro, observes that “[t]his discursive gesture radically reorients the spatial predicates of the issue...Native claims are profoundly political, not just because they address a polity, but because they force ‘a moment in which a part that has had no part asserts itself’” (Shapiro 2002:40).

Insofar as knowing and naming Hawai'i’s colonization brings mechanisms through which things like Hawaiian desires for independence into historical frames, they participate in Jacques Rancière’s concept of the political. They shift what can be seen as having a part in the political at all. Rancière’s definition of the political is embedded in Shapiro’s passage. Elsewhere Rancière elaborates; “politics is an ‘aesthetic affair’ because politics is not the exercise of power or the struggle for power. It is the configuration of a specific world, a specific form of experience in
which some things appear to be political objects, some questions political issues or
arguments, and some agents political subjects” (Rancière 2003:6). Approaching Hawaiian
indigeneity as an aesthetic political enactment underscores its deployments of native rights,
indigeneity and nation-state life as a political identity. Aesthetic politics here concerns how
assertions of Hawaiian nationhood, even those made by settler subjects, are seen to be political.
At stake is not a mere nominalism, but the entire spatiotemporal schema through which the
political can be registered. History and national identity are amongst this range of political
spatiotemporalities.

National identity normally cuts citizens out from their other identity-markers: territorial
birth, reproductive kinship, spoken oaths, and other cultural practices. In this sense, U.S.
colonization has an aesthetic political dimension; its colonial power organizes immediate,
everyday practices of interpersonal relationships into identities, ideals and meanings to turn them
towards the political. An aesthetic politics emphasizes these “cuts” in identification as a
discursive, sensorial, and material process through which a range of existences are brought out of
abstraction. Here, aesthetic analyses of the operation between sense and meaning opens the
opacity of the intimately personal forms of material experience into nation-affiliated forms. This
accords with genealogy’s “indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events”
(Foucault 1980 -b:139). Disrupting the presumed clarities of discrete taxonomies, “[g]enealogy is
gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary” (Foucault 1980 -b:139). Trading clarity for patience
with the grayness, we can better attend to what we feel to be without history. In particular, I want
to muddle the natural-seeming relations between nation, blood and belonging.
Theorists of Asian settler colonialism, Karen Kosasa and Stan Tomita, articulate Asian American-ness as a debt accrued by reciting history as a particular identity-narrative.

To tell the story of immigration and democracy is to obscure an “other” history in which Asian immigrants were involved in the creation of a colonial paradise at the expense of indigenous peoples (Kosasa and Tomita 2000). The story of American “immigration and democracy” is a drama of hard work, heroically assertive patriotism, and hard won struggles against American racism that ultimately redeems a progressively improved American capitalism. Having suffered under white planter overseers, served in the U.S. military, organized against racist labor exploitation, and, especially, studied-hard to enter tertiary and professional educational institutions, American-intended Asian immigrants identify with a history of becoming recognized as the subject of social injustice.

Kosasa and Tomita’s project of un-obscuring an “other” history” seeks to re-narrate Asian Americans’ shift from colonial subjection to enfranchisement as an escalating complicity in Hawaiian dispossession. In alignment with this project, I further specify that this identity’s colonial complicity concerns its redemption by and of an American-Hawai‘i as agent of that recognition. Decolonizing this history, therefore, means unraveling the complicity between American identity and Asian settler imaginations of justice.

A genealogy of Asian settler political subjects

A Hawaiian-Hawai‘i is political insofar as it brings Hawaiian’s non-part into political visibility. Building on this political animus, a decolonial archive specifies how we can see Asian settler political subjectivities. Asian settlers’ emergence as political subjects is a two-fold account of good timing and a canny climb up class structures. Timed to a transition from a U.S.-centric industrial agricultural political economy to neoliberal globalization, Asian settler settlers emerge
as political subjects in two moments that map onto a shift from subjection to white colonial capitalism into shareholders of colonial systems re-formed by economic globalization. The first moment involves their antiracist resistance to a haole-dominated plantation oligarchies and transformations of capitalist processes during Hawai‘i’s Territorial-era; and the second happens when the first history re-erupts in ways that Asian settlers figure as stoppages to a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i.

Crucially, the second moment and the first constitute a historical dynamic of complicity between capital and liberal multiculturalism. This dynamic structures entry-points for Asian settlers to access political power in an American-Hawai‘i. These otherwise abstract processes materialize in a cluster of pasts, memories, identities, and trajectories that constitute Asian settler relationships to a certain set of practices, discourses and things that maintain Hawai‘i as an American entity. Thus, to name this re-emergence into political subjecthood “Asian settler colonialism,” we also need to elaborate mechanisms whereby legacies of resistance, familial kinship, community-loyalty and hopes for upward mobility get recruited and exploited in a partnership between neoliberal capital and colonial power. I examine these things in an archive of memories, affects, architecture, and other afterlives of Kahuku’s Territorial-era plantation.

Asian settlement in Hawai‘i begins with the approximately 300,000 plantation laborers who arrived between 1850 and 1920 (Takaki 1989:132). At that time, Hawai‘i’s ruling system of oligarchic State monopoly capitalism installed the legal, interpersonal and socioeconomic infrastructures necessary for a plantation mono-economy. This included legislation that institutionalized private land ownership and transnational contract labor migration, mostly from
rural, non-industrialized regions of China, Japan, Korea and later, the Philippines. With a system of privatized land tenure and labor importation in place, sugar and pineapple plantations proliferated. By the turn of the 20th century, planters, commercial owners of affiliated transportation and processing industries and their political allies formed a white resident governing assemblage popularly referred to as the “Big Five.” While this elite remains a powerful force in Hawai‘i, the mixed race and class composition of an upwardly mobile local ruling class complicates a whites-only analysis of settler colonialism.

This raced class transition had local and global sources. Locally, the historically dominant Republicans (composed of mostly haole elites and Hawaiians) were displaced by a contingent of disproportionately Territory-born Asians and Democrats, who won a majority of elected offices during Hawai‘i’s “Democratic Revolution” of 1954. In 1959, Hawai‘i’s Statehood, which was widely celebrated as an elevation from second-class U.S. citizenship for all residents, further enfranchised these Asian Democrats. Race marks this ‘revolution,’ both in the deposing of Republican (composed of mostly haole elites and Hawaiians) dominance and in bringing Territory-born Asians into elected office. Fifty years prior, a haole-Hawaiian Republican coalition in the Territorial legislature of 1903 passed the Citizenship Labor Act in order to prevent Asians from public employment, including holding elected office (Iwata 2003:208). From the early 20th century into the early 1930s, haole and Hawaiian political parties allied over racist anxieties that a growing “alien” Asian voting bloc would control Hawai‘i. These anxieties were realized as Territory-born Asians increasingly took on the features of a
settler community – marrying, having children, seeking employment away from the isolated rural plantations, and formed a significant voting bloc by the late 1920s and early 1930s.\textsuperscript{27}

In the 1930s through the 1950s,\textsuperscript{28} local Asians and Hawaiians allied in opposition to white racism and exploitation by foreign capital. This period of progressive social governance gave rise to a rhetoric of “racially egalitarian power sharing,” which came to legitimate a “land and power” system of land development profiteering and political domination (Trask 2000:3). The colonial utility of the egalitarian valences of “power-sharing” suggests the presence of progressive social governance even while it roots a system of land development profiteering and political control (Trask 2000:3).

Amidst increasing enmeshment in economic globalization in the 1970s, the “Big Five” dominated political economy transitioned into a relatively more multi-chromatic local ruling class. Race and ethnicity (and increasingly, gender) ceased to be exclusive qualifications for entrance into Hawai‘i’s newly corporatized political economy. Asian settler elevation within Hawai‘i’s racial hierarchy was thus funded by globalizing capital, alongside a pervasive ethos of citizen entitlement, demanded especially by nonwhite veterans returning from World War II.\textsuperscript{29} While the composite of Asian ascendancy is the progressive disenfranchisement of Hawaiians,\textsuperscript{30} the dynamic is not best understood as a dialectical symmetry between a largely Asian settler class enfranchisement and Hawaiian dispossession. Rather, we might focus on the ways that modes and histories of resistance become vehicles for an updated U.S. neoliberal hegemony.

In a context of globalization, this raced-social transgression is at a product of a white sociopolitical elite’s compromised position vis-à-vis foreign capital (Kent 1983). Hawai‘i’s
Statehood-story, widely heralded as elevation from second-class citizenship for Hawai‘i’s population (which, of course, included many Hawaiians), also belongs to this genre of late capital’s social dynamics. Seen as a historical instance of capitalism’s capacity to fund social transgression, Asian settlers’ class mobility marks a breach opened by the updating of U.S. hegemony in alignment with neoliberal global capital (particularly from post-World War II through the 1980s).

Doubtless, bringing this history of Hawaiian dispossession to popular awareness is crucial to decolonizing Hawai‘i. What is less certain is how this record of wrongs can attend to events, pasts, feelings, and affects that uncertainly register with national identities and therefore fall out of a settler colonial framework. Put only in an accounting model of debt and expense, we fail to see the not-inevitably national discourses that shape Asian settler identifications with America. I’m pointing to the affective and aspirational modalities through which “America” coordinates with capitalist processes to organize political identifications, which the largely political-economic format of debt and expense does not address. As a supplement to ongoing historical, legal and cultural projects, an archive of colonial complicity seeks the decolonial potential of knowing history differently.

The decolonial archive

As a form of knowledge, colonization coordinates different forms of political visibility, and the capacities attached to them. Gayatri Spivak suggests two registers of decolonizing history: information retrieval to restore a balance of knowledge and “securing this restoration’s effectiveness to transform consciousness” (Spivak 1991). Decolonizing history is thus a two-step
- seizing knowledge structures and maintaining the integrity of those structures such that their seizure can awaken a historical consciousness of colonial power.

In this structure of coming to consciousness, we cannot presume to know how encounters, events and things will shake loose from attempts to know them. To see colonial power, we need to see History’s “hold of the past over contemporary realities” (Dirlik 2002a:429). Alternative histories call attention to colonial injustice as the justice of the excluded. But, this call stops short of politicizing the ongoing play of the present on the past, and thus capitulates to “an obliviousness to the reconfiguration of past legacies by contemporary restructurizations of power – especially changes in the practices of capitalism and the nation-state that have already called forth a reconsideration of the colonial past” (Dirlik 2002a:429). How has the history of the colonized been anticipated, and already integrated, into colonizing practices?

To see how we have not-seen colonization, Arif Dirlik suggests that, rather than writing Other histories, the decolonization project should “oppose a hegemony of History” (Dirlik 2002b:84). If history, and especially the history of Hawai‘i’s U.S. occupation, is only a progressive struggle for hegemony, we see “a single drama” emerging from its “play of dominations” (Foucault 1980-b:150). Archives may diversify these plays.

Today, Hawai‘i State administrators plan to celebrate fifty-years of American statehood in 2009. Parallel preparations by Hawaiian activists to present a history of Hawai‘i’s non-U.S. nationality will be present to that celebration. Against the State’s affirmation of Hawai‘i’s progressive Americanization, Hawaiians assert a more complex relationship between the U.S. and
Hawai‘i. The juxtaposition of these events suggests an uneasy truce over the beleaguered state of Hawai‘i’s national identity.

Hawai‘i’s public archives register the 1893 Overthrow and its aftermath in concrete forms of land titles, government reports of wrongdoing, and legal documentation. These effectively tense against the usual pattern means of reasoning away the constitutive violence of the colonial state’s founding, which is to deny the legitimacy of historically existences of native political organization. Natives never constituted a nation, such reasoning goes, therefore, neither Hawai‘i’s annexation to the U.S. (1898) nor the imposition of Statehood (1959) violated national sovereignty. However, the well-documented existence of Hawaiian nationhood in public, private and memoried archives disallows such reasons. Different strategies reconcile Hawai‘i as an American entity.

Achilles Mbembe connects these strategies to the archive’s political functions; “[t]he constitutive violence of the state rests, in the end, on the possibility, which can never be dismissed, of refusing to recognize (or to settle) one or another debt. This violence is defined in contrast to the very essence of the archive since the denial of the archive is equivalent to, *stricto sensu*, a denial of debt” (Mbembe 2002:23). We can get more specific about the form and content of this debt and its denial. In view of the meticulously archived evidence that belies any legal or social sanction of Hawai‘i’s-U.S. occupation, I argue that U.S. state injustice persists by denying an archive of feelings.

Phrased within a pervasive American politics of justice and equality, the presumed goodness of those here and now in a (American) community in Hawai‘i itself becomes a resource
for trumping a violent colonial past. Tropes of reconciliation, healing and optimism for a "better" America condition a communal inattention to that violence. Opposing U.S. colonization, therefore, has an aesthetic political dimension; it means to make colonial power apparent in a U.S. political culture that organizes immediate, everyday practices of interpersonal relationships into an axis of political argumentation. I'll suggest that liberal traditions that gave rise to juridico-legal modes of remediation for minority suffering now come to align with New Right legal attacks on Hawaiians. While this modality has a much longer history (reaching back well into the 18th century), it has renewed implications for negotiating decolonization within American politics today.

I propose the decolonial archive as a form whose other-ness to History may better coordinate spaces of knowledge production with colonial power's shifting and contingent dynamics. The appellation "decolonial" is somewhat optimistic. More than a synonym for oppression in general, colonization is the coordination of multiple forms of domination that secure Hawai'i as an American entity. "Decolonial," in this usage, describes a hopeful effect of producing knowledge functions as an optic onto colonial manifestations at different levels of a lifeworld. I archive seven forms of Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i: the restructuring of Hawai'i's political economies by neoliberal financial capital, reproductive heteronormative kinship, the domestic architecture of homes and home-ownership, Fordist to Postfordist transitions in political media and affect, the cultural encoding of antiracist labor struggles into legacies of justice achieved under U.S. capitalism (i.e. memories of having-been subjects of social justice), the wide-ranging politicization of especially worker-memories and heritages in
alignment with new Right discourses (i.e. memories of having-been subjects of social injustice), and the anxieties and critical energies mobilized in response to Hawaiian challenges to a local Asian America in Hawai‘i.

The aesthetic politics of the decolonial archive

Political economy is an underlying mode of explanation in this dissertation, however, the politics of systemic explanations pivot on my use the archive’s methodology. Its narrative of class mobility and capital systematizes a structure against which we can discern the “play” of new-ness in no-less determining and material cultural, affective, and discursive forms. To recognize the “exteriority of events,” eccentricities must be arranged alongside systems in ways that differentiate them from usual systemic products (Foucault 1980 -b:146). Foundation and structure can be the conditions under which singularity achieves meaning within analytical categories already in place. This is a crucial function of the archive as an aesthetic political technology.

Anachronism, in other words, is the risk inbuilt to the project. Here, anachronism is not a knowledge error, but rather indicates a commitment to keeping open the multiple dimensions of knowledge production that induce the political. In Lauren Berlant’s words, “historicizing critical questions means understanding the inevitable activity of anachronism in keeping histories signifying, open, vital, and productive” (Berlant 1998a:110). Being “open” is not a politically vacuous comportment, but rather commits to entitling those who fall outside of a given regime of intelligibility. This collection of people, identified as the demos, sites the limits of any given political order. Rancière locates their political qualification in Platonic philosophy; it is “the qualification of the un-qualified” (Rancière 2007:562). Insofar as the decolonial project is to
unsettle colonization, "this weird power of the un-qualified may provide us with the only form of
government that deserves the qualification of being a 'political' government" (Rancière
2007:562). The decolonial archive strives toward the anarchic principle of this "weird power" as
a resource for critiquing systems of qualification, and more modestly, to see how those systems
put together qualifications for political subjectivity. I'm slotting the archive between two
diverging logics that Rancière identifies in modern critical projects. On the one hand, they
affirmed the capacity of the oppressed (the un-qualified) and on the other, they sought to unmask
the "omnipotence of the machine of domination" (Rancière 2007:565). The archive lets us better
see, not the truth behind the reality, but the immanence of truth in falsity – in what appears
natural and inevitable.

I task the decolonial archive with creating a place of pausing. Outside of the prescriptive
and diagnostic temporalities that are usual to politics, this locale paces un-thinking intimate
attachments to colonial orders. Here, "un-thinking" hosts a double valence. As an adjective, it
describes those attachments as unconscious directives of hegemony in everyday movements.37 As
a verb, it acts on those attachments in material things that are inclusive, and in excess, of thought.
Things like inheriting a family name, "everyday life," and feelings have political and economic
rhythms that suffuse relationships to the colonial state (government, U.S. militaries, juridical
institutions) and society (plantation owning elites, the health sector, academia, and the faith
community). Bringing together analytical frames of feminist, queer, indigenous, post-national,
Asian American, literary-cultural and Hawaiian studies, I theorize political structures that
alternately invest Asian settlers in an American-Hawai‘i, tense against U.S. hegemony, and recuperate those tensions into attachments to America.

I’m referring to attachments to a U.S. colonial symbolic order that identify Asian settlers as political subjects. As political subjects, an Asian settler ruling class should be differentiated from a transnational labor migrant class, which is a poor target for political critique in any case. This is the difference; political subjects access a symbolic order whereas cheap-labor are merely “child makers.” Rancière points out that “‘proletarian’... was an old Roman juridical category, meaning ‘those who make children’: those who are no more than children makers, men who are entrapped in the domestic world of production and reproduction, and thereby excluded from the symbolic order of the political community” (Rancière 2007:564). This earlier usage is useful in specifying that the politics of the nineteenth century emergence of the proletarian lies in his dis-identification with a merely-worker identity. Likewise, Asian settlers dis-identified with being “cheap labor” create a political legacy, which is now a colonial legacy. Thus, any discussion of historical accountability must build from settler complicity in this latter, political, form.

Intergenerational plantation workers and then their descendents describe a group that transformed from being proletarian “children-makers” into political subjects. In a sense similar to the “child-maker,” if settlers are seen only as plodding economic actors, we fail to look at political attachments, their dreams, aspirations and feelings. How can we compile past events, habits and happenstances as components of the past of our desires to change the present? To dis-identify with settler colonial legacies, we need to detach from their things and create new ones.
During the Territorial-era, Hawai‘i’s plantation communities were crucial arenas of the labor organizing, wartime economic expansion, patriotic pedagogies and consumer socialization that contributed to the emergence of a new multiracial (especially Japanese and Chinese) local ruling class in a post-Statehood epoch (1959). How do Territorial-era plantation exploitation, resistance and community become colonial legacies? How does long-term affection form around what might be more honestly portrayed as a community tied together by imperatives of capitalist accumulation? And, how can those affects and memories avoid complicity with State-making projects? In this series of queries, I’m pointing out that desires, affects and sensations have political and economic rhythms. They form the micrological texture of colonization.

Unchained from only a political-economic format that assumes only investments in “land and power” secure Asian settler allegiance to Hawai‘i’s U.S. occupation, my decolonial archive also destabilizes the frameworks through which we approach power, history, culture and especially the limits of U.S. justice (Cooper and Daws 1985). For instance, neoliberal rhetorics adorn Hawai‘i’s Asian, especially Japanese, political and economic enfranchisement (increased property ownership, professional employment and election into public office) with the liberatory signs of racial justice. Operating under the ideal of equal opportunity, this acceleration of multiculturalism under globalization gets rendered into proofs of American capitalism’s capacity to incorporate difference. Thus, to stop the translation of this history (acceleration of multiculturalism under globalization) into that evidence (the ideal of equal opportunity), we need to supplement an archive Asian settlers colonialism with an analysis of the new dynamics of subjection that have developed through the changing codes of neoliberalism. Translated
otherwise, we see an increasingly neoliberal American cultural politics that borrows extensively from an institutional memory of liberal formats for equality, democracy, racial justice and meritocracy to develop and disseminate new agendas (Brown 2003:23f).

Contributions and debts to critical literature on Asian settler colonialism

Algeria’s settler colonial problem cannot be resolved through by differentiating between individual good and bad settler conduct — Jean-Paul Sartre

In the last decade, a new body of critical scholarship on Asian settler colonialism has emerged to set Hawai‘i’s reclaimed non-American identity to work on the historical accountabilities of Asian settlers to Hawai‘i’s colonial present. Much of this scholarship appeared in a monograph volume of Amerasia, “Whose vision?: Asian settler colonialism in Hawai‘i” (Fujikane and Okamura 2000). Our common ground is a commitment to the predicament of politically engaged scholarship, an affirmative orientation towards Hawaiian decolonization, and the ways that Asian settlers are differently present to a U.S.-occupied Hawai‘i. This also means that we share the term “Asian settler colonialism,” which seemingly clear-cuts cultural and historical complexity into native and settler identities. What seems to be blunt can also be understood as a way of adding a further dimension; it grapples with what it means to set to knowledge production to work within a colonial moment. Simplicity is here better understood as a political tactic than a lack of analysis.

The implicit advisory is that the colonial situation is too sensitive for the slipperiness of a concept of colonization not only tied to land and political rights might bring. Such advice proceeds from a well-considered advisory to take seriously the materiality of knowledge-production under a colonial order. Too often, complexity becomes an alibi for failing to turn
decolonization into effective forms of institutional transformation and remuneration, thus materializing only paper apologies, “cheap grace” and well-intended sentiments of regret. In the face of liberal multicultural discourses that threaten to corral it within an elusively ideal concept-metaphor for citizen-equality, restricting the definition of decolonization to land rights and self-governance is a well-considered tactic.

Insofar as my approach sometimes breaks with cautions against too-much complexity, I’m embarking on a side-project to direct redistributions. I’m locating Asian settler colonialism with a more general disrepair in the juridical, social, and cultural apparatus through which we conceive our attachments, obligations and responsibilities to a political community. This formulation of Asian settler identity forms a figure for thinking about political subjectivity not constituted in the name of being the subject of injustice.

As a constitutive outside to Hawaiian anti-colonial nationhood, Asian settler supporters challenge liberal models of social justice that seek remediation for socially injured groups. Settler supporters grapple with the conundrum of acting-politically without impinging on Hawaiian political self-determination. That is, as settlers, they cannot oppose Hawai‘i’s U.S. occupation by speaking as the subject of social injustice. The admonition to “[s]upport us [Hawaiians], do not become us” cautions against taking the wrong position within a model of U.S. juridico-political remediation of identity-based social subordination. But, failure to fully interrogate the historicity of the right-ness and wrong-ness of positions resolves into the ferreting out of “good and bad settlers” that Jean-Paul Sartre has warned against. Too much depends on the seemingly inchoate heroic interior of the settler who champions decolonization.
These parameters call them to create new political positions from which to oppose U.S. hegemony, not to inhabit an already formed one. Pursuing an aesthetic concept of decolonization, I interrogate the critical limits of a model that makes political subjectivity coextensive with social injury, and the political possibilities of an affirmatively historicized decolonizing subjectivity in the disjointed, transgenerational forms of Asian settler colonialism. That work begins from where we are.

I will explain by beginning again.

**Not-yet political subjects**

Former State of Hawai‘i Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) Trustee, Manu Boyd, illustrates the politically ambivalent position that non-Hawaiian, mostly Asian, “cheap immigrant labor” inhabit in Hawai‘i’s history. The pejorative valence of “cheap” may be an indictment of capitalist labor exploitation, but the syntax of the statement does not locate immigrant laborers as victims who are wholly innocent of colonial injustice.

From the vast districts of Ka‘u and Hamakua on Hawai‘i to the dusty plains of Kekaha of Kaua‘i, our [Hawaiians’] islands were transformed from subsistence crops to plantations where cheap immigrant labor generated profits for non-native businessmen. As Boyd suggests, agricultural capital’s transformation of Hawaiian lands is an important facet of Hawai‘i’s colonization. Instead of re-reading this process into a history of whites-only political and economic domination, I consider it alongside new analyses that rewrite Hawai‘i’s colonization as an Asian settler enterprise. This approach frames the present as a problem of Asian settler colonialism and thus seeks the forms of agency Asian settlers can access. Boyd’s version of colonial history elides the question that catalyzes this dissertation; how are Asian settlers complicit with, and therefore capable of responding to, Hawai‘i’s colonization?
Complicity, the usual term for siding out of self-interest, bears unpacking in this context. Gayatri Spivak’s de-emotive concept of complicity distances it from condemnations that incite guilt and blame and rather pushes us to think of complicity as a condition of possibility for righting wrongs. Spivak usefully points out that the etymologically specified meaning of complicity is not only active collaboration, but an arrangement of things that are “folded or woven together.”48 Teasing apart this weave, I archive Hawai‘i’s settler colonial present as a political moment in order to see “when doing what matters” (emphasis mine (Berlant 2002a:77)).

A genealogy of colonial complicity accounts for systems of exploitation that exist within and through mechanisms; “which we must acknowledge in order to act” (Spivak 1999a:370, n79). The concept of an enabling complicity offers a way of approaching Asian settler historical complicity, as well as opposition and resistance, as historical “bedrock” for a wider spectrum of approaches to decolonization (Mamdani 1996:201; (Mamdani qtd.) Spivak 1999b:60). Archiving more and different colonial complicities also thereby expands the range of entry points into what can be recognized as decolonizing work. As I tighten this analytical focus, we can see the micrological texture of colonial complicity in acts, events and affects that don’t look particularly harmful. In this same move, however, the presence of an aware, knowing, seeing and intending agent in these acts, events and affects seems questionable. How is agency exercised in nostalgia, being part of a family, trying to be okay, or just playing around? Such un-thinking acts harbor plays of radical-alterity, even and especially in the way that they are folded-within a deeply political colonial context.
Chapter outlines

In chapter one, I exploit genealogy’s idiomatic kinship between reproductive familiality and history to conceptualize a process of inheriting a nation’s historical injustices. I begin with the query; how does one take responsibility, politically, for what has been done in one’s name?

Historical injustices are definitively distant from their time of reckoning; genealogy serves as a conceptual vehicle to carry them into the present. It charts “the complex course of descent to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion” (Foucault 1980 -b:146). My family-name is tethered to genealogies of reproductive kinship. This name generates a paper trail, which I track into Hawai‘i’s colonial history. I hope to derail the usual commitments of kinship’s conventions for inheriting “that which has been done in one’s name” towards a concept of inheriting-critically (Derrida 2001). Doing so, I argue, places small steps towards the ways that a (hetero)normative narrative of existential continuity can be turned towards political accountability to a Hawaiian Hawai‘i.

From the vantage of the Asian settler community, political relationship to the U.S. and Hawai‘i has precisely been a denaturing series of nationality-transfers. The malleability of nationality is evident in a record of transferred nationalities from Asian nations (particularly Japan, China, the Philippines and Korea) to the U.S. as immigrants, then through Americanization campaigns during World War I and II, and then to affirming a reinstated Hawaiian political entity. Situated by the sensibilities of decolonial politics and biopolitical technologies of family management, I consider structures that naturalize reproductive kinship into a component of a nation’s historical present. The historical “flesh” of complicity between Asian
settlers and U.S. hegemony might be missed in a political analysis that finely hones opposition against a figural-“America.”

Detaching Asians from an “American” identity traverses how that figure forms in feelings, desires and the embodiments that are supposed to be the basis of political personhood. To track national identity in these capillary operations of colonization, I turn to Benedict Anderson’s genealogy of nation that are not just formal categories, but “cultural artefacts of a particular kind” (Anderson 1991:4). As singular historical configurations of cultural genres of authority, nations authorize identities through their singular capacity to “command such profound emotional legitimacy” (Anderson 1991:4). Working from the nation’s command over the legitimacy of emotions, I locate this dimension of its authority in the synthesis of kinship’s attachments to national identity. In this relay, an American polity is united by the common orientations to a nation that authorizes certain interpretation of felt-sensations – emotions – into evidence of attachments to a community. This chapter explores how reproductive kinship is part of an apparatus of insertion, which Lauren Berlant has called “national sentimentalism.”

In “An Architecture of Decolonization,” my claims speak directly to two existing fields: political analyses of the historical accountability of Asians settlers for Hawaiian colonization and community ethnographies of Territorial-era (1900-1959) Kahuku, a plantation town in rural O‘ahu. I focus on the 1930-50s, a most active period of labor organizing in Hawai‘i. But, I also make broader theoretical assertions about intersections between knowledge production and decolonization.
In one sense, I'm contributing data in a positivistic model of ethnographic community history of Kahuku. I've conducted oral history interviews, which supplement a larger collection of oral histories of active members of Kahuku's plantation-era (1890-1971) community, which I happened upon a while rummaging through the archives at Brigham Young University-Hawai‘i. These included several dozen taped oral interviews, transcripts, editorialized versions of these life histories, extensive biographical information of each interviewee, and a final manuscript made ready for publication by Dr. Kenneth Baldridge, *When the company town shuts down* (Baldridge 1992).

Shining the academic spotlight on the “everyday” lives of Kahuku’s community has a complex relationship to a political critique of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. The politics of community memoir lies in enfranchising those who “have not been considered legitimate subjects of history.” By contrast, my project is to *undo* the enfranchisement of an Asian settler figure by setting to work on the historical sites of his upward mobility. Discovering this precedent my project – as a community history – led me to consider the political nature of my own inquiry. How would my findings further unanswered questions - as opposed to filling a gap in knowledge? As a genre of knowledge product, the decolonial archive situates the locus of my engagement with the political. Archives are political because they redistribute positions through the productive work of mediation—interpreting, creating, contextualizing, and framing emblems of pasts. This usage challenges the presumed positivism of the archive’s project, which I emphasize in this second chapter.
Retroactively reading Asian settler historicity over and against an account of progressive (Asian) Americanization enacts a historico-aesthetics. By “historico-aesthetics,” I’m referring to the ways that histories are put together by determining which pasts are to be absented, transmitted and foregrounded; “[a] montage of fragments thus creates an illusion of totality and continuity” (Mbembe 2002:21). As a data structure of the past, the archive inventories the components that cohere promises, sensations and wishes into archivable consistencies by structuring the distance from their time. Therefore, I discuss the plantation’s built environment and domestic architecture as an aesthetic political modality. I engage the sense of emancipation that private property – as a vexed item from worker wish lists - promises. Again, the archive is the space for that engagement. These operations involve an architectural approach to politics. As Achilles Mbembe observes, “the archive has neither status nor power without an architectural dimension” (Mbembe 2002:19).

“In this way, just like the architectural process, the time woven together by the archive is the product of a composition. This time has a political dimension resulting from the alchemy of the archive: it is supposed to belong to everyone. The community of time, the feeling according to which we would all be heirs to a time over which we might exercise the rights of collective ownership: this is the imaginary that the archive seeks to disseminate” (Mbembe 2002:21).

Mbembe’s concept of the archive’s architecture articulates with temporality that coheres communities like the one that populates imaginaries of Kahuku’s plantation days. Houses, “home,” and home-ownership are crucial aesthetic modalities through which those community-attachments are synthesized. Approached as aesthetic political operations, these syntheses can be archived from the marketing of single-family home ownership to provide texts of mass sensorial processing that come to physically colonize Hawai’i.
New critical histories of Asian settler colonialism dis-situate contemporary, as well as historical Asian American patriotism. To archive this newly situated desire to repudiate American hegemony, my third chapter considers that desire within a political genealogy of Asian settler emotions. This genealogy attends to the emotive, sensorial and aesthetic forms that set the political and cultural context for opposition to U.S. colonial occupation.

In 1943, U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt’s addressed the famous lines, “Americanism is in the heart and mind,” to those *nisei* who had volunteered for combat in World War II; and, specifically to ameliorate concerns that Hawai‘i-Japanese posed a threat to him during his visit to Hawai‘i.\(^5\) The proclamation of a race and ancestry-transcendent American identity has been a ruling postulate of liberal definition claims to racial equality.\(^6\) Yet, the slippery terms of this postulate of American equality have also had ambivalent consequences for Asian settler political investments in an American Hawai‘i. The danger lies in misrecognizing how non-political, or differently political, forms *become* political instruments in a moment cross-hatched with contexts of U.S. colonial occupation and neoliberal capitalism. Condensed into a form that seemingly hosts only national resonances, Watanabe’s essay entextualizes nationality as a bundle of attachments to an identity, and consequently, the history that gives that identity coherence.

By telescoping a nisei “smart girl citizen” from Hawai‘i’s 1940s oratorical circuit, I track the political emergence of Americanizing Asians amidst an American-era branded global democracy, Hawai‘i’s formal Americanization in Statehood and the domesticating rituals of public education.\(^7\) In 1946, Chiyoko Watanabe, a Kahuku high school student, won a series of Territory-wide oratorical essay contests. Watanabe is a recognizable case of the politically
conservative “model minority.” I use this figure, and the political analysis she engenders, to track Asian settler patriotism’s role in commerce over territorial and political control of Hawai‘i.

The dated-ness of her flat-footed patriotism and whole-hearted civic affirmations marks a distance from the present modalities of America’s neoliberal hegemony. Yet, we cannot dispense with patriotism as a relic of a past era. I argue that this very distance now becomes a political technology for maintaining a colonizing upward redistribution of resources and control over lands, resources and rights.

The query animating chapter four, “Useable Legacies of Worker Resistance,” is, how do histories of antiracist worker resistance encounter renewed struggles for Hawaiian decolonization? I approach this encounter by revisiting plantation-era Kahuku as a node in the genealogy of Asian settler political agency in Hawai‘i. Revisited with a new awareness of decolonial exigencies, Asian settler labor resistances may fund political energies basis for a new relationship between antiracism, class struggle and decolonization. “Resistance,” however, does not have only affirmative valences. More so than a genealogy of the transformation of abstract concepts, this chapter questions the integrity of concepts of resistance, agency and complicity. Questions of historical agency and resistance are answerable to historical actualizations most of all.

Drawing the mid-twentieth century scene of “leaving the plantation” into a relationship with decolonial agendas, historical processes of upward class mobility come into a depoliticizing celebration of a multicultural Hawai‘i. Racial equality and emancipation from plantation labor transform into textual-encoded conservative impulses towards a “colorblind” justice and the
identification of upward class mobility as class-justice realized. Colonial complicity’s forms are thus not only land development capital and U.S. military monies, but also the affirmative meanings given to these institutions within a story of liberation from plantation oppression. Addressing transformations in the affirmative meaning of resistance amounts to tracking a feeling.

To track the production of feelings, I parse a dense narrative of American-becoming. This means lining up the steps by which emancipative sensations attached to experiences of structural change, how those experiences get interpreted into names of feelings, how those feelings collectivize attachment, and finally, the political calculus that reinvests the rhetoric, forms and emblems of class into a U.S.-occupied Hawai‘i.

Chapter five, “Memory Acts: The New Politics of Hawai‘i’s Plantation Heritage,” builds on these explorations into affects of justice from racism overcome, faith in an America that rewards “hard work” and a heritage of community togetherness cluster into a plot of oppression unjustly endured and then redeemed by American justice. Historied -feelings thicken colonial complicity by installing attachments to American identities.

As a genre of the personal, memory-practices do not place direct political claims. But, this very distance from the political allows reweaving their relationship into an occasion for a different kind of politics. Put otherwise, the play of memory cordons off a space apart from the temporality of struggle. To recover this space, I posit personal memory as a mode of Hawai‘i’s multicultural heritage-making and then situate this relationship within the rhythms of post-Fordist affect. I approach a political intimacy between memory and history as a colonizing technology.
abated by new Right discourses. Certain plantation memories become political technologies for preserving a settler social history; and, in so doing also, also “disturbs what was previously considered immobile” (Foucault 1980 -b:147). Politics here concerns the production of the past as a sensorial structure of memory.

Specifically, this chapter considers how informal practices of plantation memories, memorials and heritage-making institutions that root Asian settlers’ in an American history of Hawai‘i congeal with the new Right’s contests to abolish Hawaiian historical entitlements. In her discussion of critical responses to the prominence of political messages in Hawaiian artistic production, Karen Kosasa laments; “Worse still, indigenous critics are chided for their failure to acknowledge the complexities of the interactions between colonized and colonizer, the possible complicities of the former and the ambivalences of the latter, for instance” (Kosasa 2002:285). In chapter six, “What’s Left of Asian America?”, I align with Kosasa’s sense that the political is immanent to putatively non-political things in a colonial context. However, what we should notice here is that both the charge that Hawaiians participate in colonial systems and Kosasa’s refutation of that charge preserve a value-coding of complicity that forecloses complicity as a usable space. “[T]o decode the scandal of colonialism,” as Spivak calls us to do, means reconfiguring the historical space of complicity as the enabling capacity of Asian settler decolonizing subjectivity (Spivak 1997:477). This chapter meditates on the complicity of what we feel to be the histories and hopes that hold our allegiance to justice, even and especially, the ways Asian settlers can be agents of decolonizing justice. Here, the scandal involves tensions at the overlapping boundaries of activist and academic engagements with decolonization.
Hawaiian nationhood incites "the most profound of Asian American anxieties: the indigenous challenge to Asian American claims to America" (Fujikane 2005:83). Much must be made of this anxiety because it sits a point of friction between Asian, especially Japanese, American identities and U.S. hegemony in Hawai‘i.61 Fleshing these anxieties, and other felt-modalities such as desire, aspirations and guilt, carries history into a scene of "speaking truth to power" falls flat when acts don’t feel like they’ve displaced power (Brown 2002:369). The counter to this dramatic failure may be to resituate the radical gestalt of repudiating American hegemony from an ethical theater into a decolonial archive.

To be decolonizing subjects, Asian settlers need political identities that are not authorized only by America. In this sense, they must move on Frantz Fanon’s advice to the architects of Algerian independence; new subjectivities birthed in the decolonizing struggle will be the “form and content” of the nation.62 He cautioned against the idea that the nationalist cause ought to be won by any means, lest the newly independent nation face moral condemnation from Western nations.63 How Asian settlers affirm decolonizing forms and content in the colonized meantime will matter. In their oblique position vis-à-vis the Hawaiian nation, Asian settlers’ very departure from America’s usual pattern of remediating social injustice by identifying socially-injured subjects can contribute to Hawai‘i’s struggle to not be American.

Struggling to birth these new subjectivities, we are called to learn new vocabularies that push out from a colonized-Hawai‘i’s sparse categories of political identities. Through this new literacy, we can become alive to the sense of emancipation that invests decolonization with audacious promise.
CHAPTER ONE

ARCHIVES, REPRODUCTIVE KINSHIP, GENEALOGY

In November 1894, Japanese laborers on the Kahuku plantation went on strike to protest the beating of a worker by a ruthless luna. Setting off on a 38-mile trek from Kahuku to Honolulu, more than 200 strikers walked all day and all night. Slipping and sliding on Nuuanu [sic] Pali trails on wooden clogs or in their bare feet in the darkness and rain, the weary marchers reached Honolulu about midnight. In the morning, they presented their grievances to Goro Narita, Japanese charge d'affaires to the Hawaiian Republic. As a reward for their efforts, they were arrested by the police, fined $5 each and forced to walk back to the Kahuku Plantation.64

This mute scene of nineteenth-century plantation labor exploitation and frustrated struggles to access justice from either municipal or international officials inspires indignation.65

The language employed to describe this event suggests fomenting revolution: “strike,” “protest,” “all day and all night,” a ruthless “overseer” and the suffering implicit in a seventy-six mile hike accomplished in substandard footwear. Having surpassed this era of white settler colonialism in Hawai'i, American-acculturated, citizen descendents of an Asian settler community that was subject to Goro Narita can confirm our distance from their suffering. Seen from a present moment, that era is animated with the momentum of imminent social transformation. We know they were going somewhere because, supposedly, that is where we are, now.

In what follows, I archive an Asian settler decolonizing subject in a relay between historical oppression and present identifications with that history. Competing avatars of political subjectivity condense from efforts to recuperate experiences of early plantation laborers as evidence of progress under U.S. capitalism, or becoming historically responsible for the role of
these laborers' legacies in colonizing Hawai'i. In my discussion, I attend to the ways a burden travels over generations in a most usual paradigm - heteronormative reproductive familial kinship.

While by no means politically quiescent (as the epigraph suggests), early Asian contract laborers cannot be put into the same ledger of accountability for Asian settler colonialism as a present day professionalized middle class. By displacing this competition onto the intersection between the modern nation-state reproductive kinship, I broaden the context of responsibility to include things that "we have not done individually ourselves," but are nevertheless part of our heritage (Derrida 2001:35-66). How does reproductive kinship figure as the connective tissue to a colonial injustice? And, how are these connections conserved as commitments to particular versions of a social history? In what follows, I describe the politics of inheriting pasts of collective class transformation not as a progressive political awakening, but rather as a genealogy of shifting interpretations of acts that resemble each other. Reproductive kinship offers form to a mixed bag of practices that include things like habit and unthinking. A decolonial archive that expands concepts of kin-inheritance may thus let us see how to critically reckon with our "moral luck" (Nagel 1979:26).

This chapter asks; where does the Kahuku laborers' doubled thirty-eight mile trek fall in a decolonizing history of Hawai'i? How is the history of Kahuku's settlement nested within the colonial patterns of incestuous land deals and fuzzy partnerships between commercial and governmental agents that we now call Asian settler colonialism? And, how can we make these histories mark our distance from 1894 not only as progress? I next attend to another weary-
worker walking episode to suggest a different kind of political subjectivity produced by traversing a pathway between past and present plantation Kahuku.

ITEM #1157

"Item #1157: Kahuku community should be educated in learning to follow traffic rules by using a proper place to walk on highway"
- Kahuku Central Safety Committee Meeting (1946).

On March 12, 2004, Thelma Shigemitsu was walking alone along the Kahuku stretch of Kamehameha highway. She seemed oblivious to the car crawling slowly behind her in which my mother and I tried to follow her meanderings between the narrow median and right traffic lane.

Her head nodded thoughtfully over the houses, all facing the road that bisected the town.

I think, at the time, I witnessed her taking a leave of absence from herself. It was odd to see this woman, whose body was perpetually connected to shopping bags or bent in attention to other’s appetites – her husband, her children, and their spouses and children – wandering forward, weightless. Instead, as she moved, her body performed the experience of memory’s reconnections to the landscape. Thelma remembered Kahuku to me through stories ordered by the landmarks as they came into view. “Obasan’s house was just over here, by a big mango tree... or maybe little ways over”, she said as she weaved over boundaries implied by fading highway paint and dried out flowerbeds.

Their significances are embedded in a vernacular invisible to me. It was the disjuncture between the animation of her stories and the stark presence of the space before me that struck me most. The house-yard that held the hundred family reunion attendees, 1st avenue crowded with playmates during after school hours, and my 84 year-old grandmother in a slip-dress climbing a mulberry tree to sit on the rooftop at night. All I can see are modest lawns, simple houses, and an
empty lot that they assure me was the commercial center of the town, and a dirt road made
impassable by overgrowth.

Kahukutown municipal governance was synonymous with planter authority. Their
prescriptions for public safety, such as proper walking comportments alongside the highway,
were but one facet of a tightly conjoined realm of planter control. As a political system, this
control engendered certain kinds of subjects and ways of claiming that subjectivity. A few
months after the Safety Committee released this statute, an news item appeared, “Residents Ask
Kahuku Footpath.” “A total of 161 persons – ‘taxpayers, voters, citizens, and parents’,,” submitted
a petition, which asserted “many people, including ‘hundreds of children,’ go to the hospital,
church, stores, and theater daily.” In the name of the children, this group of pedestrian-residents
articulate demands by drawing in a multitude of healthcare-seeking, church-going, commodity
consuming, tax-paying, voting, child-valuing, parenting practices that are “paradigmatically
trivialized as “lifestyle” (Berlant and Warner 1998:325).

A deeply problematic and political world is constellated by this seemingly simple public
demand for a sidewalk. Structural coercion, in Berlant and Warner’s analysis, directs national
heteronormativity from a normalizing script of, especially sexual, practices embedded the
everyday. Acts less commonly recognized as public signs of a sexual culture include: “paying
taxes, being disgusted, philandering, bequeathing, celebrating a holiday, investing for the future,
teaching, disposing of a corpse, carrying wallet photos, buying economy size, being nepotistic,
running for president, divorcing, or owning anything “His” or Hers” (Berlant and Warner
1998:319). I address the patriarchal, colonial, and capitalist structures of heteronormative familial,
citizenly, residential cultures as part of my decolonial archive. These are among authorities
challenged in Shigemitsu’s walk along the highway.

My affectively inflected narration means to imbue this scene with the generous, perhaps
more sentimental, valences of familial kinship; Shigemitsu is my grandmother. A certain
transgression of her grandmotherly-identity is also on this scene. This transgression marks an
other kind of political agency in Shigemitsu’s failure to comply with Item #1157 that is not
merely a traffic violation. Her remembering-self involvement does not comport with an aware,
intending actor of opportunism or resistance. Their blunted, efficient form strain against the
unsaid of Thelma Shigemitsu’s seemingly prosaic act of (badly) traversing the highway. Her
affective attachments to a past Kahuku enter my decolonial archive along two dimensions:
reproductive kinship (as an institution of property inheritance and a structure of feeling for
community, nation and family) and their departure from the usual script of heteronormative
networks of obligation, care, futurity, and identity self-extension through blood. Asian settler
reproduction, and perhaps also departures from its usual forms, has relationships to a precarious
politics of U.S. settler colonialism that orients their political meanings.

People who know her commented that her biggest fear of getting older would be to lose
her identity as a caregiver. As an older sister, wife, five-time mother, eight-time grandmother and
even as a four-time great-grandmother, taking care of people is tightly linked to her sense of
identity. For perhaps the first time in my adult-sentient-life, she was not a reproductive laborer.
This at once threatened what I’ve known as the basis for our relationship and urged me to house
this identity-departure in a place patient with their uncertain meanings.
Though linked to them, Thelma Shigemitsu's claims to a Kahuku-home on colonized grounds sit at a remove from State heritage-making projects or pronouncements that any part of Hawai‘i belongs to “everyone.” Placed in its careful contexts, a decolonial archive guards against too-quickly recruiting her affects, and mine, into a colonial apparatus of aggressive sentimentality in which one’s deep feelings attests to the validity of claims to belonging.

As an apparatus for carrying an organized remembrance for a society, archives can provide the space for subjectivities to gestate, fantasy, and its many guises in memory, hope, and dreaming, can also re-orient a seemingly established sense of being in history. Slowing-down the ambitions of analysis may allow us to denaturalize seemingly opaque processes of feeling through which identities attach to certain versions of history. Insofar as they suggest a respite from reproductive identity, her feelings for this “plantation life” history may bear much meaning for the kind of political community that can bring about a decolonized Hawai‘i. Unmoored from reproductive labor and filial obligation, how might feelings re-produce one’s historicity in ways that disengage from seemingly immobile political identities? Shigemitsu acted this way in the course of remembering something; she took a momentary departure from who she is now by re-narrating who she was then. Bringing this observation to my project, I wonder whether re-constituting feelings for our pasts can serve as vehicles for becoming-responsible for Asian settler colonial historicity across generations.

Opening ‘Home’ to History

Peering into Kahukutown’s archives, I’m looking for textual traces that give form to historical complicity with enfranchisement in what must be recognized as a colonial order today.
This means navigating Hawai‘i-historied processes of colonial injustice as "part of the concept of heritage" (Derrida 2001:35f). As a means of navigating this heritage, the decolonial archive merges familial affiliations, drawn from brief references in public and private archives, into constellations of decolonial agency.73

Archived fragments that bear these family names guides my trek through assorted material traces more usually classified by their institutional utility: Hawai‘i Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) housing reports, industrial relations analyses, Kahuku Sugar Company payment ledgers, and oral histories of Territorial era Kahukutown.74 My excavations from these public records yield an account of my own historicity as part of the multiple modes of Hawai‘i’s colonization.75 Multiplying our view of colonialism’s modalities of transmission also suggests a variety of entry points into the decolonial project.

I’m foregrounding familial kinship, by aligning this account along names inherited from Kahukuan kin-relations—Shigemitsu, Sanjume, Okawa, Yoshikawa, amongst others. Several generations of my mother’s family resided, worked, and continue to return to childhood homes in Kahuku. They were labor union chairmen, maids, company supervisors, car mechanics, children, valedictorians, and adultering wives. Following his reading of Milan Kundera’s Ignorance (2003), Michael J. Shapiro articulates the cogent query that guides my thinking here; “how do particular moments of home open out into history” (Shapiro 2006)? Reproductive kinship is tightly bound to “home;” both are supposed to mean the most to and about us. Opening home “hinges” on moments that cast light on this insularity as the threading together of an experience of selfhood from memory and biological existence, and social reproduction.
The modern forms particular to kin-relation networks figure politically, historically. That is, their politics emerges when we see that historically, things like motherhood, family values, home, organizations of oikos, generations of residence in a place, nation, and even sensation are discontinuous discourses. These conventional primers of kin-identity overlap with the institutions of capital and the liberal state; namely, property inheritance and patriotic reverence for military-death sacrifices rendered in the name of the next generation. Read otherwise, these texts of conservation practices can rather be used to emphasize their un-necessity. Multiple genealogical apparatuses, not only familial lineages, translate experience into a matter of kin-identity. Pushing this configuration a bit further, I suggest that kinship mimics the rhythms of sociohistorical awareness. Such mimicry can be a guide for political awareness if it thoroughly interrogates the weave of power in the production of historical being.

**Accounting for colonization**

Insofar as historical responsibility concerns whether one had opportunities to act (or have acted), the plantation worker trekkers must be excised from the site-ing and writing of accountability. As themselves labor-vehicles for transforming Hawai‘i’s natural resources and investment capital into sugar capital, they could not access rights within that political economic and legal structure. But this does not mean that they did not have a relationship to colonization.

Initially, Hawai‘i’s settler colonialists were a resident elite composed of the descendants of American and British missionaries that had arrived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Later, bridging the 19th and 20th centuries, successive waves of Asian laborers migrated to Hawai‘i to work on white owned plantations. These migrant-laborers may be complicit with
Asian settler colonialism, but in a different way than a mid-to-late twentieth century professionalized middle class. Complicity with white colonial capital takes different valences in the historical forms of Asian settler colonialism that I discuss — as the enforced docility of the migrant laborer, organized labor’s fiery demands for home ownership, and patriotic assertions of equal citizenship by military veterans returning from World War II. These varied guises host forms of political agency, the variety of which must attenuate a demand to decolonize history.

Construing complicity as a structural condition allows us to think about its myriad forms structurally. As historically disenfranchised racial minorities, Asian settler class processes present a particularly complex case. While not outside of capital, settlers’ “surplus”-ness marks an off-center relation to processes that differently invests them in capitalism. Re-articulating Asian settler colonialism as enfolded into the main scene of capitalist exploitation, we can better approach how what began as a critical position gets incorporated into colonial power. Asian settler colonialism’s social mobility and its complicity with capital and the state is the condition of historical agency.

Roderick Ferguson undoes the seeming paradox of the agency of the oppressed in ways that help to think through how the “justice” of raced-class mobility, as capitalism’s ability to fund social transgression, might be considered alongside Hawai’i’s colonization. One can be both an agent and a critic of capital because power is activated in the constitution of agency rather than the abolition of it (Ferguson 2005:95). Marx observed that capital is unmoored from any natural limit, which can sometimes fund complicities between capital and social change. The instabilities of capitalism systematize the transgression of social order, even if only to broaden and deepen
exploitation in the end. Capital’s production of “surplus populations” Ferguson explains, “provided the contexts out of which non-heteronormative racial formations emerged” and creates these “surplus populations [as] the locations for possible critiques of state and capital” (Ferguson 2004:15).

Using this uneven configuration of state and capitalist power, agents “overcome the rulers through their own rules” (Foucault 1984a:85-6). Decolonial subjects are those “who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them” (Foucault 1984a:85-6). As I’ve been arguing, however, the material structures of colonial complicity, however, are not restricted to institutions of the nation-state and finance capital.

The active intention of this “seizing” subject carries into a model of decolonization that foregrounds a historical debt to social justice. Left in this model, decolonial agency becomes the composite of selfish opportunism. Having profited from Hawaiian dispossession, Asian settlers repay that debt by giving over bounty taken by Asian settler “opportunists.” In this account of colonialism as capitalist exploitation, rectifying historical injustice remains within an idiom of capital exchange between private owners. While redistribution is most fundamental to decolonization, I’m turning to some of the processes that obstruct that basic goal.

The problem is that the search for decolonial agency risks transforming into a too-thin characterological inquiry into selfless and self-interested settlers. The inward-turning gestalt of what Berlant has called America’s “therapy culture” banks on this configuration (Berlant 2001b:49). Recovering agency from Asian settler historical complicity must reckon with
discourses tightly striated by capitalist categorizations of self-interest and selflessness. Cultured through the “overvaluation of a certain mode of self-reflective personhood,” signs of complex interiority supposedly define an aesthetic structure of political agency in opposition to a merely myopic opportunism (Berlant 2002a:73). To re-historicize Asian settler agency as something other than this wrong-headed opportunism, we must work at rectitude as convention, and conventionality as the regulation of a colonial order.

An “accident of birth”: Transgenerational responsibility

Having arrived in Hawai‘i in 1887, my grandmother’s grandmother is the first “settler” to condition my presence to this writing. Her generation cannot bear the “burden of transnationality,” which is more appropriately put to “whichever generation arrives on the threshold of tertiary education” (Spivak 1996a:252). The politics of decolonizing history concerns the forms that tell us how we are located in the present. Family lineage is one such map. Interwoven by the “banal link of fertility,” it is a regulative social text that maps varied insertions into class alliances, fantasies of state recognition and, hopefully, “figures accountable to historical formations” (Spivak 2003:81). In other words, kinship narrates what is singular and cannot be predetermined in structures of historical continuity.

Functioning over the gap between being and intention, natality is the “automatic” interruption of ongoing social processes; the (re)production of the capacity to begin again and thus a condition of freedom (Vatter 2006:153). This profoundly material freedom also outlines what it means to be accountable to the conditions of birth. In other words, kinship is a technology with the capacity to collect things and their discursive materiality into a narrative structure of
historical continuity. This capacity marks the political particularity of natality. It also sites the emancipatory possibilities presented at birth’s definitive new beginnings massages the possibility of not capitulating to the national commitment of kinship’s ur-narrative. New-ness may shake loose from the compulsions that conventionalize kinship-identity.

Mahmood Mandani has suggested that, “[t]he unanticipable fall into time,” can form the shifting bedrock... upon which to base one’s quest for remnants of ‘responsibility’ in what is precisely not liberal” (Mamdani 1996:201; (Mamdani qtd.) Spivak 1999b:60). That is, birth does not easily comport with the intending condition of the liberal subject. Taking responsibility for having “fallen” into time thus means wrestling with the limits of liberal conceptions of the political. Similarly, Hannah Arendt argues that the close kinship between political action and the bonds of family concerns their capacity to begin anew (Arendt 1958:247). However, whereas she posited the political as a way of divorcing natality from familial structures, I retrieve the singular condition of natality as the condition of possibility for re-appropriating kinship’s generational continuity as an account of historical responsibility.

Spivak phrases the conundrum posited by a non-liberal concept of responsibility; “how to contaminate this austere landscape ['the singular/universal [which] remains a perennial moral dilemma'] with the unevenness of grouped persons without falling into the abstraction of collective rights” (emphasis in original (Spivak 1999b:60))? To “contaminate” a political field inhabited by only rights-bearing individuals, I turn to kin-identity. Placed alongside public records, an insistently un-private kinship network may be used to recover birth’s “accident” as social responsibility.
As a record of “accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations,” Foucault’s concept of the genealogy is well suited to kinship’s illiberal conditions (Foucault 1984a:81). Retrofitting what we now call Asian settler colonialism onto these contingent formations may let us see how our present existences “are merely the current episodes in a series of subjugations” (Foucault 1980-b:148). Colonialism can thus be diffracted over a temporally contingent, cluster of things that come together sometimes. Otherwise unruly things - transgenerational inheritance, blood, tradition, family recipes, social meanings of biological reproduction, social reproduction itself, and their micrological manifestations in desires, habits, and affects are organized by colonial power into a lifeworld-complex. Colonial power is carried through the usual institutions that maintain colonialism: private property, militaried masculinities, environmentally unsustainable consumption, American law, tiered healthcare, and therefore tiered physical disability. It is also embodied as emotions, feelings and sensations. Familial practices tend to fall outside of accounts of colonialism schematized from a more usually political-public, but I’m arguing that even how we feel about family should be part of accounts of colonization.

A family name "carries the memory...[of] things we have not done ourselves" (Derrida 2001:35†). It is this model of individual doing that this account of Asian settler colonialism challenges. I next play out how an archiving kinship’s colonial complicity as an aesthetic political operation addresses this possibility. My forays find a system in Foucault’s expansive archive and moors to the authority of Derrida’s archon (Foucault 1994:160).
Aesthetic politics of kinship’s archive

Kinship’s “flesh and blood” patrilineality compels a certain way of reading experience into a historied-identity. Here, history is an aesthetic structure that selectively presents past experiences into stories of intergenerationality. At the cusp between experience and identity, a decolonial archive’s traffick in memory, public record and institutions can organize an informed selection. Convention, in Rancière’s terms, is an aesthetic regime because it governs how and what can be made visible (Rancière 2004a). The problem of decolonial agency, and therefore an approach to that problem, is at once more complicated than not seeing one’s position correctly and precisely a problem with how one senses that position.

As an interpretive historical frame, colonialism denotes not just a period of history or a political status, but also a materially consequential operation of discourse. History can be colonizing or decolonizing because it is always riddled with the power of interpretation; the archive achieves a decolonial function by adopting this power. To decolonize history thus treads precariously between redirecting those frames against their consequences and a destabilizing interrogation of historical authority.

Politics breaks out over experience’s assertion to being a privileged form of evidence. Presumed to be a transparent relation with physical things, experience does not have to go outside itself to constitute what it is (Laclau 1997:301). This presumption is a relay between self-evidence and constitution of selves, which thereby shapes how subjects have experiences; and further, how that experience is processed into historical knowledge. Varied forms of “clarifying” experience are thus interpretations of sensation into social meaning. These operations, too, are
aesthetic political enactments. In this sense, a decolonial archive “works” through these aesthetic labors.

Joan Scott usefully moves historical explanation towards an interrogation of the structures that constitute historical evidence. To engage the literary dimension of archived pasts demands an expanded reading practice, which does “not assume a direct correspondence between words and things nor confine itself to single meanings, nor aim for the resolution of contradiction” (Scott 1992:34). The archive admits the materiality of discourse by entextualizing past utterances, events and documents in forms that are variously sensitive to the complexity of temporal being. This complexity is not only an asymptotic distance between the past “as it actually was” and present contexts of reading, but also the ways that this distance is traversed.

The archive’s authority to systematize documents sites a compromise between singularity and the systemization necessary to enunciate singularity. Here, the concept-metaphor for organizing an archive as discourse is metonymy. Hayden White suggests that metonymy is the condition of representational coherence. Discourse’s form, “taken in its totality as an image of some reality,” locates events “as atomic parts of a molar whole or as possible occurrences within a perceivable totality” (White 1978:122). Metonymy recasts knowing as something more than filling in the blanks and telling the whole story. As an endeavor that consists in collecting parts, archiving abets spinning out singularity into maps of sets of things.

The archon and the author of experience are always writing an address to a future. Simultaneous with the moment of their inscription, “[e]vents, objects, acts, meanings... as well as intentions themselves” mark an intending orientation to a future receiver (Spivak 1980:32).
Archived texts arrive for us as messages sent out across limits that intention does not cross fully intact. These messages may be useful for thinking the historicity of Asian settler colonialism from a past writing subject's intention and thus as a resource for rewriting that history. While it is impossible to reconstitute intentions, and the fully-intending subject that effects those intentions, in the course of situating that impossibility we demarcate the limits of reading that intention. These limits form something like a structure of transmission through which past others communicate with the present.

The "irreducibly structural" difference of an archive's authority to systematize documentations of the past from personal memory is complicated by Foucault's recognition that even structural differences are historically variable (Foucault 1980a; Spivak 1980:32). Archival technologies thus participate within a knowledge economy, where value is vectored by a politics of knowledge — an interpretive struggle. By emphasizing the interpretive frames implicit in the ways records are systematized, Foucault situates the political within a historied episteme that does not remain unsullied by conditions that engendered the investigation. Refocusing on the interpretive frames through which records of events become historical knowledge dis-engages from contests over true-r narratives. He develops the relation between archived inventorying and historical explanation into his genealogical method.

Without suggesting that sensations exist unchanged in some historical ether, archives attempt "material documentation of discourses [that] entextualize the aura of a past milieu" (Foucault 1972:128). Emboldened by Foucault's radical methods, my investigation configures the archive as an entextualizing technology for reading historical, social, and political meanings from
intimate sites of subjectivity. The archive's citations create a context to read personhood as a historical text. Put otherwise, Foucault radically de-personalizes a host of, especially discursive enactments of selfhood to turn them into something other than evidence of a self. The point is that the archive's ordered disinterest can serve as a corrective to kinship's tendency to turn history into the story of personal uniqueness. Archives emphasize kinship's formalism in a way that can show up these tendencies as political coercions.

The disinterested comportment of the aesthetic, Kant reminds us, conditions a feeling for something beyond self-interest. An aesthetic comportment resonates with the archive's "proper" dispersion, where propriety suggests a capacity to regard one's position within a political field disinterestedly. This aesthetic dis-interestedness thus marks a sensorial awareness that does not refer only back to a private meaning, while recognizing that a subject is present to sensation. In a post-Kantian reading, the aesthetic is in play in the encounter between materiality and its synthesis into sense by a sense-ing subject. As an aesthetic configuration, kinship can thus be a vehicle for social responsibility.

More than a default social identity, the collectivizing capacity of familial kinship's normal meanings make it possible to transform kinship into an instrument of political responsibility. Specifically, the political potency of heteronormative kinship houses forms that invest intimacy's promises of emotional fulfillment into exploitative forms of authority. Familial kinship's categories of ethnicity, inheritance and citizen-generations synchronize with the accounts of capital (dis)accumulation, state recognition and, obviously, genealogy. Re-phrasing kin-attachments as modes of transmission for colonial practices makes them into records of
responsibility. In this sense, kinship tethers subjects to agency as a possibility of having been
differently, historically.

Archiving Feelings

Foucault takes anxiety as itself a text that tells us how we are inserted as knowing
subjects into history. While guided by “my [Foucault’s] taste, my pleasure, an emotion, laughter,
surprise, a certain fright or some other feeling” (Foucault 1979:76), his “rule- and game-based”
investigative method is far from whimsical. He explores the play of emotions in “Lives of
Infamous Men” (1994)/“The life of infamous men” (1979), which he described as “a mood-
based and purely subjective book” (Foucault 1994:159). His study is “a rule- and game-based
book, the book of a little obsession that found its system,” which he based on an archive of the
final words of condemned men drawn from the period between 1660-1760 (Foucault 1994)/
(Foucault 1979). By affirming the intimacy of the investigator with her research trajectory,
Foucault re-approaches questions that an impersonal model of inquiry was meant to solve.
Namely, by approaching feelings and affect as a form of knowledge, rather than a contaminant of
pure truth, he suggests how to open another dimension of “home” to history.

“History,” Foucault writes, “is the concrete body of a development, with its moments of
intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells” (Foucault 1980 -
b:145). Foucault’s anthropomorphic characterizations of history seem to traffick dangerously
away from a concrete history. This danger, however, is better located with the ways “experience”
names the slippery attempts to fix meaning at an originating event.92 This relates to Derrida’s
archival fever, the attempt to “possess things by possessing their origins” (Derrida 1995:36). By
contrast, Foucault points to experience as history’s ambivalent embodiment and the play of power through which these things get collected as evidence of a certain history.

Accounting for emotive and embodied experiences opens out perceived restrictions of the ‘merely personal’ to history. Bodies are an index of the apparatuses through which we feel we know something about who we are as historical subjects. Capillary power thus manifests in the “most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles” (Foucault 1980 -b:139-40). In order to make this power visible, Foucault posits a genealogical method that focuses on the “singularity of events” that come to constitute particular histories.

Emotions and feelings are themselves historical, and when attributed to history, they serve to highlight complex imbrications between singularity and systemic predicates. That is, how we know ourselves as historical subjects is intimately related to how history is indexed in experience and how that index authorizes our knowledge of history. Memory is another name for this circuit between sensation, experience and knowledge.

“The custodian of truth”

At the most basic level of physical endurance, literary approaches to pastness are conditioned by physical science’s technologies. Understood this way, the archive may be physical sciences’ paradigmatic case of intermingling the metaphorical with the literal. Its system of authentication is itself a discursive formation of a regime that orders truth by privileging physical contact, live-ness and immediate appearance. Sensations thicken colonial
complicity along apparatuses that re-install sensations and feeling as immediate and natural. Such apparatuses are also at play in the archive’s authority.

Physicality, sensation, and the meanings tethered to them, are central to the power of archives to authenticate communions with graphemes of the past. However, the notion that this power comes from the documents themselves is “fiction... it really comes from (the train to the distant city, the call number, the bundle opened, the dust), so that then, and only then, you can present yourself as moved and dictated to by those sources, telling a story the way it has to be told” (Steedman 2001:1176). In the archive, history is met as a physical relation between physical things; and this meeting achieves meaning through a certain social script. More than a generic data structure, the archive is itself a historical artifact of a “specific passion for the past” (Rancière 1994:63). Pierre Nora specifies this passion; the ascendancy of archival modes of recording histories is a “particularly contemporary fear that the past will disappear” combined with uncertainty about the future (Nora 1989:13). Nora writes; “[m]odern memory is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image” (Nora 1989:13). Archives are part of the relay formed by the physicality of desires and “passions” for past-ness.

I’m underlining the immanence of affect in archives, and the production of knowledge generally. To do so, I turn to Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever (1995), which foregrounds feeling and desire in his approach to archives and archiving. Subjective feeling and the archive, as a knowledge-product, are not exclusive. By emphasizing their intersections, Derrida tracks the constitution of authority - how certain authorities are authorized. An authority that is attenuated to
what might otherwise seem to be insignificant source materials "demands relentless erudition," specifically a depth of knowledge that can place these materials (Foucault 1980-b:140). This emphasis on placement resonates with Derrida's approach to the archive.

From Derrida, I take the point that the archive claims a particular kind of authority under which it "houses" discourses, things and potentials. That is, archives also zone an authority to gather together a past into a certain system; "[t]he authority of the author is there [in the archive] matched by the control of the archon, the official custodian of truth" (Spivak 1999a:205). As a place for things placed under an archon's proper authority, power resides with the ambiguous definition of the proper. "Archive" derives from the Greek arkheion, the domicile of the archons, who were superior magistrates; "The archons are first of all the documents' guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security of what is deposited, but are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives" (Derrida 1995:2).

"Archontic power" thus names authority over the interpretive processes of classification, identification and exclusion.

The Foucaultian archival endeavor is also to "maintain passing events in their proper dispersion" (Foucault 1984a:81). He exploits the archive's privileged claim to past actualities by mooring his project to a privileged form of verifying past existences - the archive's record of dates, maps, notarized records, transcriptions. This does not require reinstalling history with the "weight of authoritative explanation," but rather recognizes variance in systems of authorities. Here, propriety is a function of a meticulous filing system for not only material documents, but "systems of statements (whether events or things)" (Foucault 1972:128). While drawing on the
archive's standard of verifiability, the archive's literary and political facets conspire to perform
veracity as itself a consequence of a temporally contingent regime of power.

The proper, in Foucault's conception of it, also concerns the rules that govern those
systems, which introduces power (as the authority to impose those rules) into the concept of the
archive. Propriety, differently defined, may authorize a space for re-ordering events against the
colonization of history. To re-order propriety does not dispense with historical facticity, but rather
redouble demands to situate being in something at once more than timeless essences without
unmooring from the material. This becomes clear in his insistence on a certain measure of
verifiability: "I was determined that these texts always be in a relation or, rather, in the greatest
possible number of relations to reality" (Foucault 1994:160).

Asian settler fantasies

"To be in fantasy is to live 'as if'
- Denise Riley

"For it is in the moments when the real world wavers and seems to reel into mere
appearance, more than in the slow accumulation of day-to-day experiences, that
it becomes possible to form a judgment about the world" (Rancière 1989:19).

Fantasy's "as if" mode may be more appropriate to the complicated movements that push
subjects into acts of agency as they exist historically - in the shadow of a wished-for future.

Formally, fantasy is a mechanism that describes how social meanings may get put together over
and against historical evidence and socioeconomic logics (Scott 2001:288). Approached in
fantasy's social space of production, kinship is not inevitably inscribed into its normal roles of
property inheritance and jus soli citizenship. Below, I recount how these queered forms of
reproductive kinship change the context for its relationship to (settler colonial) nation-state
fantasies.
Overburdened with hegemonies of heterosexuality and patriarchy, reproductive kinship seems a questionable frame for a critical analysis. Too often, sentimentalized familial values get backlogged onto politically conservative histories of “everyday people.” Challenging hegemonic forms of the everyday-ness and “people” of this history means critically engaging memories, habits and emotions as identity-attachments. Sequestered a privileged place within identity-narratives, they attach us to the story of the American national imaginary.

Kinship and generationality configure personal forms into an intrinsic relation between historical continuity and a practical everyday (Berlant 1991:20). Allied with kinship’s privileged relationship with the physical and natural, states can likewise commit citizens to a natural history of the present. They work together to form a powerful apparatus that Berlant calls the “national symbolic”. This apparatus translates abstract political forms (nations, sovereignty, states, flags, slogans, etc.) into “a mirror and a source for nationality itself” (Berlant 1998c:174). While formally a fantasy of collective identity, its very fantastic form allows it to exert a widened scope of control. The national symbolic serves up a “official story about what the nation means, and how it works” (Berlant 1991:11). Nations all have stories, but the *symbolic* feature of this concept gestures to the ways that biopower mobilizes affect and personhood. Noting her debts to Nietzsche, Berlan describes the “mnemotechnique – a form or technology of collective identity that harnesses individual and popular fantasy by creating juridically legitimate public memories” (Berlant 1991:8).

Likewise, the experience of being part of a family is not best understood as a condition of what a subject says or does (no one chooses their family), but the spaces they inhabit, the systems
through which their existences can be documented and the compulsion to read relationships in a certain way. The point is that a high degree of literacy in the pedagogies of American citizenship is needed to narrate over the gap between felt-experience and a common "national fantasy."100

The training for this national literacy proceeds from formal and cultural institutions such as public education, citizenship tests, watching television, scheduled events (holidays, museums, the pledge of allegiance, etc) amongst others. Most often, national citizenship is installed in the meaning and matter of one's physical manifestation—citizenship by birthplace and blood. In Reproducing the State, Jacqueline Stevens argues that the capacity of the nation to narrate birth poaches on the terrain of reproductive kinship through convergent institutions of jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship (Stevens 1999). Citizens recite their naturalizing birth within a geographical and political boundary as a protocol of citizenship (Berlant 1991:20). As a consequence of collaborating with this natural-ness, heteronormative reproductive kinship's affects, loyalties and evidence collaborate with tend to be opaque to interrogation.

Narratives of national continuity thus densely entwine heterosexual kinship and territoriality.101 As a foundation for "a certain fantasy of state and nation," heterosexual kinship is embedded by the material rights conferred by the state's overlapping duties to patriarchy and private property (Butler 2002:249). Heteronormative kinship takes on a symbolic function in this fantasy. Through the symbolic, State recognition obtains a complex and regulative relationship to patriarchal kin-continuity. The modern state knits together family, patriarchal authority, national fantasy and disciplinary, especially pedagogical, power into a tight cluster.102 The modern state borrows these forms of authority from the nation, gender and the family for its task of managing
identities, people, goods, services, and behavior, amongst its others governance techniques. These complicit forms of authority offer a conceptual frame for a politics of kinship.

Within cautions that commitments to kin-identity shore up citizenly allegiance to a colonial state toxicities, heteronormative kinship also identifies a potent point of access into colonialism's power dynamics. Reproductive kinship's narrative of embodied historical continuity draws on the aggressive currency of state recognition. Butler schematizes the dynamic; "the appeal to the state is at once an appeal to a fantasy already institutionalized by the state, and a leave-taking from existing social complexity in the hope of becoming 'socially coherent' at last" (Butler 2002:243). For marginalized groups, the appeal of institutional recognition is often taken from relief from the experience of being a social contradiction. This desire for relief is not only evidence of unjust social pain. Read retroactively (after recognition is achieved), histories of this desire can also be recuperated as hope-redeemed. The history of having been redeemed by America drives persistent identification with the institutions, feelings and "progress" of being. Here, progress identified as Asian enfranchisement is further specified in middle-class forms: home ownership, professional degrees and consumer goods as well as elected office, all of which are meant to attest to the nation's improved capacity to recognize injustice. This chain of significations is a circuit of Asian settler colonialism.

If present enfranchisement is understood as the fulfillment of the promise of justice under U.S. capitalism, today's enfranchised subject renews her faith in U.S. capital's promise-keeping (Spivak 1999a:199). The desire to recall this scene may indicate mourning for an experience of living with a particular futurity (Brown 2005:106). Here, fantasy is a desire for the present to
mean being present to the fulfillment of past promises. That is, insofar as success has been achieved through colonial institutions, decolonizing history means detaching those appeals from “achievement;” an alternative to which must somehow address or subsume its deep attachments between pleasure, justice and identity.

Karen Kosasa usefully articulates how a desire for a public, and a “sense of belonging” exists in an encounter between Asian settlers and the work of a contemporary Hawaiian visual artist; “If we are serious in our efforts to dismantle colonialism, then we must unflinchingly consider the messages and visions sent by those who were and are colonized, even when profoundly unsettling” (Kosasa 2002:286). Kosasa’s analysis codes sensations into a meaningful embodiment of a colonial moment. When Asian settlers flinch, how do they name a disruption in a certain cluster of historical, political and cultural discourses, events, and images?

Building from an archive of appeals to sentimental figures of home, family, “honest” labor and intimately suffered racism that riddle Hawai‘i’s history of Asian upward class mobility, decolonizing subjects wrestle something new from the usual success story. To become a decolonizing subject thus means detaching feeling-pedagogies from the usual American-affirmative institutions: education, the state, the family and tradition. “An inheritance,” Jacques Derrida writes, “is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing” (Derrida 1994b:16). Thus, historical responsibility may be gauged as the ability to (re)synthesize that inheritance.

Queer commentary on the constipated heteronormative script for the familial within nation-states is helpful for thinking about Asian settler decolonizing subjectivities in the overlap
between the normal and the fantastic. Both animated by “a sense of belonging to a discourse world that only partly exists yet,” they “aspire to create publics, publics that can afford sex and intimacy in sustained, unchastening ways; publics that can comprehend their own differences of privilege and struggle; publics whose abstract spaces can also be lived in, remembered, hoped for” (Berlant and Warner 1995:344). Insofar as unsettled-feelings mark belonging to publics that do not yet exist, they are not unrelated to queer attempts to reconfigure kinship’s traditional collective.

Kinship’s non-normal political fantasy might be to shake a present contradictory existence loose from the colonial state. That kind of loosening would work at the state’s role in organizing optimism for social transformation as the overlap between fantasy and objective structures; as Berlant observes, “the dreamwork of normalcy is the realism of fantasy” (Berlant 2000b:11). Feelings can be contexts for fantasies; and, those fantasies can take the form of “good” models of sons, daughters, wives, mothers and fathers in normative comportments (filiality, industrious housekeeping, monogamy, etc.), and thus from the institutions of social value that underpin that goodness.106

Sensations are rooted in a historical experience. This rooting is also a track whereby sensations are given the names of feelings, such as optimism, security, and love of nation. In this way, historied feelings name latent conservative impulses in Asian settler narratives, which reconfirm an upwardly class mobile patriot as the proper subject of social justice. I’m building a cautionary case against the settler opportunist, who is also, in a different way, a placeholder for political agency. Insofar as it refuses to endlessly refer Asian settler complicity to an effect of
haole domination, identifying the “settler opportunist” historically is useful in assigning political accountability (Kosasa 2004:278-9). Problematic in a colonial present, the settler opportunist is a kind of person who seizes “opportunity” in recognizably colonial forms like land speculation, single-family home ownership, and elected office. A genealogy of this actors’ inclinations, conventions, compulsions and pedagogies may open the identity of opportunism into a more capacious concept of historical agency. Archiving opens identity into singular forms by disaggregating identity-components.

Aleatory Kinships

We might look to the aleatory dimension of settlers’ daily lifeworlds to disturb their recruitment into the business of maintaining an American Hawai‘i in scenes such as Thelma Shigemitsu’s meanderings.107 When kin-identity gets filled with a patriarchy-defined identity for stepdaughters, wives, mothers, grandmothers, and great grandmothers, we call for feminist consciousness-raising about exploited reproductive labors like nurturing, childcare, and shopping. Against the presumption that awareness and agency are always copresent, I’m working with a concept of “self-interruption” that Berlant used to discuss eating, the act of feeding oneself, which she calls as the “agency of self-maintenance” (Berlant 2007b:777).

As an inherited placement of respite from unbelonging, kinship’s habits and traditions can feel like respite from the harrowing demand of self-assertions and social protocols. Seeking respite suggests coping rather than conscious resistance, but it is precisely this automated point in the process that we might target as kinship’s particular mode of agency. It acts as a placeholder for ways of un-thinking, which may be the most capacious mode of reproducing colonialism in
everyday life. This kind of agency “merges will and repetition to produce something not uncomplicated or amnesiac, but something that as yet has no content” (Berlant 2002a:85-6). I’m pushing Berlant’s concept to characterize kinship’s reproductive mode as a creative space that might be filled with something other than normative tales of inevitable familial inheritance on one hand, or a modernity’s “heroized” attitude towards history (Foucault 1984b:40). Like “value” itself, whose “form is a possibility for grasping, without content” (Spivak 1993a:62-3), agency can be conceived as a placeholder for describing different ways subject access and utilize political structures.108

Berlant’s subject of social injustice is the over-eating, undernourished, obese, tired-to-the-bone, worker of capitalist exploitation. While mindful that reproductive labor is also a part of capitalism’s system of structural injustice, I’m not calling to educate this laborer about how to direct her energies. In order to get a sense of my meaning, substitute “meandering along the highway” for “eating” while reading the following passage:

“Eating is a form of ballast against wearing out; but it is also a counterdissipation in that, like other small pleasures, it can produce an experience of self-abeyance, of floating sideways. In this view it’s not synonymous with agency in the tactical or effectual sense dedicated to self-negation or self-extension, but self-suspension” (Berlant 2007b:778-9). Berlant describes her model of agency as “small vacations from the will itself” and “sites of episodic intermissions from personality;” “it’s a relief” (Berlant 2007b:779). These sites, vacations and affects make pleasure into venues for making the point of everything vague. And making-vague is necessary to jar a history of an unrelenting march towards middle-classness into a narrative of colonial complicity. This walk along the highway was striking because for once, I
did not see “my grandmother” in a scene of “activity towards reproducing life...to making it or oneself better” (ibid).

Of what use can un-mobilized awareness to a decolonization struggle defined by the return of rights and land? Tightening the focus onto her aleatory activity, I suggest that it allows us to see the complexity of where we are, for a moment. Berlant suggests this is the proper comportment for the “encounter with objects of knowledge that are really scenes we can barely get our eyes around” (Berlant 2007c). To want to get a critical vantage on a moment is also to desire to get beyond it. Taken within the trajectory of decolonization, this desire animates a set of practices that ought to be evaluated for their effects. Encountering the desire to move beyond this impasse may call for a certain mode of impassivity—“dedramatizing the performance of critical and political judgment” (Berlant 2007c:434).

Like eating, being “lost in thought” resembles, but is not identical to, involuntary or unconscious activity. Being in a moment that is not towards something admits the fact that you don’t know where you’re going—if you’re going anywhere at all. But, keeping the future undisclosed is also a way of keeping it open. This open-ness is not vacuous, it sites the possibility of letting something else gestate in the places where we’ve put blood, nation, kinship, inheritance, and family values.
CHAPTER TWO

KAHUKU’S ARCHITECTURE OF DECOLONIZATION

A common culture was in the air

"Kahuku is dominated by the massive presence of the sugar mill, which sits just off Kamehameha highway at the north end of town, like a huge militant god watching sternly over his regimented worshippers. The mill’s towering stack can be seen for miles, a focal point for the area, and its shrill whistle pierces the air with monotonous regularity: signaling the start of the work day at seven am, lunch at eleven, back to work at 11:30, and quitting time at 3:30. If the company has to cancel work because of bad weather, or for some other reason, the whistle so informs the town at eight o’clock the night before, and again at five in the morning."

- "Kahuku, Company Town, Nears Change" (Hostetler 1968).

Commenting on the architectural geography of company towns in the American South, Margaret Crawford writes that "the basis for a common worker culture was in the air" (Crawford 1992:147). Likewise, structures that visibly stratified class factions offered a rich and palpable vocabulary of cultural referents – the common sense “in the air” of Kahukutown.

From the time of its incorporation in 1890 until it closed in 1971, the Kahuku Sugar Company dominated local governance, held a near monopoly on private enterprise and commerce, and of course the economic lifeworld of Kahukutown. Its uniform socioeconomic rationale, common to industrial plantation capital’s corporate structure, takes the tactile shape of
the plantation’s environs. This world was concretized in the physical structures of the town - surfaces of the buildings, work schedules and the agricultural landscape bear imprints of the town’s rigid class hierarchy. I count these structures amongst texts of the plantation’s particular forms of domination, and the resistances they engendered.

Hawai‘i’s Territorial plantation houses architectural texts that allow me to describe the collective formation of historical subjects that will become the past critically approached as Asian settler colonialism. Having been successful at “leaving the plantation,” certain felt-sensations are installed as subjective forms that are recognized as political emancipation. The trappings that shape a trajectory of emancipation from white planter authority are also vehicles of Asian settler colonialism.

Tensed against the impersonality of architecture, feelings of political emancipation derived from upward mobility become something less inchoate. I’m also proposing plantation architecture as a text from which we can read historical subjects as “structural effects.” Signs of these historical subjectivities survive in circuits of reproductive kinship, property inheritance, biopolitical records of state populations, a cultural heritage of worker resistance, and the built environment.

“Sold out from under her”

Campbell Estate’s lease on Kahuku land ended in November 2006. Many former plantation workers, and their descendants live in former plantation housing, leased to them at below market rates, including my grandaunt’s home. The State of Hawai‘i may condemn two-hundred acres of lands belonging to Kahuku Village and Kahuku Golf Course in order to retain
housing for these long-time residents (Lo 2006:7). The children of Litsu Shigemitsu, my
gandraunt, tell me that her parcel has already been “sold out from under her” and that together,
they are “unfortunate victims” of “the march of progress” (Sanjume 2004). 111

In the search for historical subjects, we are not looking for those wholly victimized by
white patriarchal coercions nor autonomous authors of colonial hegemony. Rather, authorship
and victimage are produced within a common aesthetic structure that “folds together” subjects
into a historical discursive formation. 112 Understood as subjective syntheses of space and time, the
aesthetic is one way of naming the structures of authorship. 113 This aesthetic synthesis becomes
colonial when it cohabitates with a capitalist organization of land tenure, expectations of
precarious “home,” and an imperial order of governance most of all.

The explanatory capacity of a narrative of faceless economic expansion is made into a
total account of this situation. Such capaciousness has been the story of land capitalization in
Kahuku since its settlement in the early nineteenth century. Importantly, this narrative is
unsurprising to people who grew up in this settlement. By being unsurprised Litsu Shigemitsu
demonstrates her literacy in the discourses of neoliberal capital.

I’m asking how broad economic juggernaut-abstractions devolve into reasonable
explanations that people like Litsu Shigemitsu weave into their daily lifeworlds. In this
configuration, settler colonial complicity concerns the capacity to comprehend this reason.
Reasonable-ness, which in this case is Campbell Estate’s reason for land development, underlies
the invisible disrepair of concepts like home ownership, land title and lease-holding – the
operative terms of territorial colonization. Land thrives as something to be owned, invested,
exchanged, privatized and developed. A decolonial archive disperses these arrangements of land entitlement into material forms (discourses of social justice, ownership rights, and feeling entitled) that mediate their contingent and limited relevance to the present.

Corporate agricultural monopolies have turned towards real estate development for housing and tourist resorts in a neoliberal global economy. Yet, these shifts have not translated into the reformulation of plantation-era worker labor unionization into comparable forms of resistance to capital. Rather than only resistance to labor under capitalism, Kahuku's new economies of tourism, niche agriculture, and service work at a nearby Turtle Bay Resort have produced comportments of equivocal compliance and modest hopes for community survival. Even as the Campbell Estate closes in on their leasehold-lands, Kahukutown residents still find affection for community histories organized under the Big Five, of which the Campbell's were a major part. Wanting more than these truces with capitalism may be identical to desires for emancipation from a colonized Hawai'i. This possible alignment is worth working towards.

"At least we had our homes"

The James Campbell Estate was the landowner and the Kahuku Sugar Company was the landlord on the worker's housing leases. Kahuku plantation workers did not own their homes or the land beneath them. Disqualified from home ownership, their relationship to Kahukutown drew affective terms of investment from a heavily sentimental community togetherness. During the plantation era, property monopoly on homes and store-bought commodities meant that company managers had an omnipresent tool for disciplining worker behavior. Threats of eviction and the ability to hold workers hostage to their "family responsibilities" were part of that coercive
discipline. This historical insecurity pushes toward equations between security, home and futurity that solidify in Asian settler colonial investments in Hawai‘i’s U.S. occupation— not only in terms of capitalist private property, but also personal futurity, family and community empowerment.

The plantation was thus not only a place of commonality, but “a series of fortified enclaves, social spaces differentiated by both their physical barriers and modes of surveillance” (Shapiro 2000). Company authority suffused the built environment of the plantation town - the household and housing camps, the schedule of the working day, producing gendered, racial and sexual stratifications. Insofar as these technologies of subordination, and the resistances they engendered, contribute to a historical structure of political agency, I’m placing them next to the new meanings that they have taken on in a post-plantation era.

After the sugar company closed, the Kahuku Housing Corporation could trade its cultural capital as an archetypal plantation town in a small tourist economy and a subsidized housing arrangement under the heading of historic preservation. Seiko “Shirley” Shiroma, a former Kahuku plantation worker, union officer and company supervisor described the closing of Kahuku Sugar plantation in 1972.

One thing was striking. Nobody wanted to move. We all have a really deep attachment to the community and the rural lifestyle. The other important factor was the inexpensive housing. Where else could they find housing for $30 a month? Likewise, Angel Ramos, also a former Kahuku company employee and a contemporary community archivist of Kahuku’s plantation era, recalls his response when the company closed in 1971. He was “not sad...because we all go down the same hole together... and we had our houses” (Ramos 2004). Kahukutown’s singular coping strategies are abetted by a mode of community attachment that pivots on property ownership.
The economic expediency of aligning affective attachments with an agenda of procuring lower housing rents does not falsify the former. Rather, this alignment demonstrates that the difference marking the authenticity of affect from economic interest is mutually constitutive.

Really being attached to Kahuku-community and having a low-income, after all, converge over a post-plantation economy. Crucially, the persistence of sentimental memories of Kahuku's plantation community does not evict an awareness of structural exploitation. My approach to the politics of the historic plantation community amidst Hawaiian decolonization comports with this economic and affective two-step.

Systemic inequality belies grammatical enactments of worker "community." Planter doctrines that urge worker to have "pride in your homes" were an attempt to cover a contradiction between the company's need for regularized labor and worker disenfranchisement. The tensions within this discourse dogged my grammar as I interviewed Mistu Sanjume, my mother's cousin who grew up in Kahuku during the 1940s-1960s. Grammar would intrude into my questions about the layout of homes, company spaces, barbershops, the USO dance hall and the mill. Bent over sketches of blocks and streets, I would ask, "Was Uncle Harry's house located on the first or third street in Walkerville"? Rather than addressing what I thought to be the point of my inquiry, she focused on my mistaken phrasing over property ownership titles; "It was not Uncle Harry's house. The company owned it". She fluidly recounted with great affection childhood scenes of yard games, obasan's cooking, and picking wild fruit in the green hills above Kahukutown, but repeatedly corrected my slippages. During our discussion, she corrected me three times when I suggested that Harry 'got' or 'owned' or 'had' a house. Repeatedly she
stressed, “it was rented to him by the plantation” (Sanjume 2004). While affirming her affective investments, Sanjume’s patient corrections foreground a critical awareness of the contradictions of a company pedagogy that teaches workers to invest in their homes.

Not-being homeowners made material the gap between the economic security of property ownership and the superficiality of home-feelings. This is a structural basis for home ownership’s attachment to safety and security that exceeds the “mere” affection of sentimentality. At the same time, the valorization of home’s privacies is recruited into planter needs for a stable reserve of labor.

We could say that home-feelings are built up around invasive and coercive planter tactics. But Sanjume’s insistent awareness does not suggest this. My point is that a formal correspondence between structural disenfranchisement and the personal truces that are made with that structure cannot be staged in a political analysis that locates agency only in political and economic structures. In a decolonial archive, felt affections meet with built environments to form a social text of colonial complicity. Reading the trajectories of that text involves the ways home-ownership is brought into the scope of plantation worker’s priorities.

A “new type of man”

Framed by Fordist discourses that spatialized subjectivity into places of work, privacy, leisure, and familial intimacy, home ownership could promise political freedom. Fordism was symbolically initiated in 1914, when Henry Ford formulated the eight-hour day for workers at his automobile processing plant in Michigan. Ford’s most important innovation, linking mass production to mass consumption, meant more than balancing overall totals of supply and demand
produced as consumable products and sites for rebellion (Lefebvre and Levich 1987:8-9). The tension between them articulates subject-producing processes that deeply invest the home. In "Americanism and Fordism" (1971), Antonio Gramsci discusses a "new type of man" characterized by a "specific mode of living and of thinking, and feeling life" that could adapt to Ford's new methods of work (Gramsci 1971:296-7). Gramsci crucially perceived that Fordism materialized changed environments that wrought new "types" of worker-subjects.

The image of the plantation town's mechanized work regime as an integrated organism resonates with Ford's infamously totalizing program of worker control. By integrating workers as consumers as well as producers, Fordism closed the economic circuit of their lifeworlds. This program demanded not only overhauling industrial production, but also a "new type of man". Produced alongside the impersonal milieu of the factory, the home becomes a privileged locus of personhood for these new modern men. The utilitarian aesthetics of Fordism's "new type" must be part of an archive of worker resistance in Hawai'i. This new-type introduces a "whole new [modern] aesthetic," which brought together political, cultural, and economic lifeworlds by playing off of the difference between the workplace and a domestic physical interior. Far from places of "organized passivity," homes have been pivotal sites of struggle for plantation workers - both in formal demands placed to their employers and struggles for privacy (Lefebvre and Levich 1987:10).

Post World War II political economic reorganizations plot the past life of this private-person in Hawai'i. As in other U.S. agricultural industries, Kahuku Sugar Company, with the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA), launched campaigns for worker retention. No longer reliant only on the direct coercions, planter retention campaigns to deflect workers from leaving be read as archives of “new modern men” in plantation-era worker personhood.

Industrial relations strategists stressed a new era beyond paternalism, the modern technological advancements in agriculture, the contrasting impersonality of city life, and called upon parallel war-effort campaigns to inflect plantation work as a patriotic duty. Planter efforts to retain workers also included institutionalizing collective bargaining, increased transparency, improving general working conditions. Without dismissing these important gains for labor, we need to interrogate the terms of social advancement that workers and employers came to agree on. These terms were the common ground on which a desire to leave, and the manipulation of that desire might converse. My angle of entry into this desire concerns the ways a worker’s “private happiness” is immanent to the plantation town’s domestic architecture. I next outline a way of reading that configuration.

Sensation, architecture, aesthetics

Approached aesthetically, the plantation community is something more than congealed economic coercions and low rent. By working within an architectural register, the scope of my inquiry can include sensation, experience, and tactility that processed attachments, construction and interpretations of the built environment. Specifically, we can approach the tight replays between feelings, single-family homes, and evidence of emancipation from the plantation. To approach feeling-emancipated, I frame feelings as something readable in pedagogical structures of knowledge-transmission, and plantation environs as such structures. Further, to learn to feel
emancipated, proper, or even normal, requires a kind of training in which one interprets particular sensations as feelings and that feelings are signs of knowledge. Political literacy, in this context, concerns the ability to read sensations as evidence and value. I argue that these personal instructions can be read in the impersonal mediums of architecture.

Architecture impersonally habituates subjects. Walter Benjamin wrote: "Architecture has always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction. The laws of its reception are most instructive... Buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception – or rather, by touch and sight... Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by habit. As regards architecture, habit determines to a large extent even optical reception" (Benjamin 1936:18). With Benjamin, I approach the tactile environment of Kahuku as a means of making-in-common.

Through its plantation-era and into the 1980s, home mail delivery was inexistent in Kahuku. Instead, people would visit the centrally located post office, often several times daily. The collective structure of mail collection, that the 'Kahuku Only' slot was the most trafficked, and the frequency of their visits (Santiago Ramos said he stopped by the post office “three or four times a day”) suggest a vivacious life of correspondence, local dialogue, and public life.

Enacted through communal habituation rather than contemplation, the built environment imparts sensorial, rather than formal, knowledge. Intertwining sensuous and sense-making experience, these subjects are processed from a material lifeworld that can thereby be read as a text of the aesthetic pedagogies. The aesthetic is thus a potential dimension of processes that structure experience into common meanings. This becomes a political process insofar as it seeps
into channels of sense, sensation and seeing that, at a most fundamental level, condition the possibility for the agency of awareness. Such an awareness is not determined autonomously, but is synthesized at the interface between sensation and imagination, “our very ability to reshape our existence in terms of images presupposes our a prior susceptibility to the image in general” (Cheah 2002:459). I work at this sensorial susceptibility as it relates to the domestic architecture of the plantation.

Rancière writes that “politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about the it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties or spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière 2004b:13). “Aesthetic politics”, therefore, works at the cusp between sensations and sense, which “determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience” (Rancière 2004b:13). Sensorial experience delimits politics as aesthetic operations, but, aesthetic syntheses are also thereby vehicles for “overcoming” those limits. In the language of political philosophy, being gives way to becoming.128 Some elucidation of my use of philosophical concepts to engage the aesthetic is needed here.

Aesthetic syntheses happen in encounters with the sensation of material as something external to the mind’s terms, even as the mind is used to overcome that gap in knowledge. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests how the sublime surpasses what seem to be limits in experience. The sublime names a sensuous experience of finitude that does not find paralysis at its limits; “the sublime prepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest” (Kant 1951:108). The tactile and ideological dimensions of sensation are thus re-ordered. Through the transgression of the cusp between subordination of sensation to ideas in
the sublime, the imagination "thus acquires an extension and a might greater than it sacrifices" (Kant 1951:109).

Positing sensation as an aesthetic register seems opposed to Kant's elaborations, in which faculties of aesthetic judgment are distinctly opposed to dumb sensuousness. Deleuze, however, argues that Kant's systematic separation between imagination and ideas breaks down under closer examination because both are sited on a systemic instability (Deleuze 1978b). The aesthetic is the name given to the comprehension of a space and time that is itself a production of space and time. After the sublime experience, the "horizon of knowledge will have been traversed by something that came from elsewhere" (Deleuze 1978a:9). The alterity of sensuous existence, "something from elsewhere," intrudes on Kant's disinterested subject. At the sublime limits of the imagination the concepts that it has synthesized to determine an understanding "stutter."

Aesthetic comprehension is the ground of their re-synthesis; "both the thing to be measured and the unit of measure" (Deleuze 1978a). An imagination, therefore, does not produce representative images, but is rather a faculty through which we experience a space and time. The biopolitical modalities through which colonization happens reach to this fundamental level of spatiotemporal synthesis. As an architectural mode of political engagement, the decolonial archive turns this facet of visceral intelligence towards our analysis.

Tactile environments structure sensorial vocabularies that thereby have at least two registers: architecture and discourse. Both can be read as texts of historical subjectivities. Disparate conciliatory, coercive, celebratory, pedagogical, and advisory discourses discipline the built environment's pedagogical structure of knowledge-transmission. "Absorbed" through
“tactile appropriation,” sensations of habituation are at once felt subjectively and objectively readable in architecture’s mass media (Benjamin 1968b:240). This twinned feature – habitat and mass communication, text and social lesson – marks both domestic edifices and workplace architectures.

While historical labor unionization and anti-settler colonialism both involve a critique of class relations, the emphasis on worker home-ownership limits collaborations with decolonization’s radical critique of private property. We are talking, then, about the socializing capaciousness of a historiography that attaches feelings and meanings of emancipation to changes in a plantation political economy. To undo the tight alignment between capitalist private property and forms recognized as political progress, I archive trajectories that brought worker home-ownership into the scope of Hawai‘i’s corporate union priorities.

In 1946, Hawai‘i’s sugar workers went on strike, demanding that the Kahuku Sugar Company, and the overarching Hawaiian Sugar Planter’s Association, abolish the perquisite system and raise wages. A post-paternalist relation meant greater transparency in workplace governance, cooperation with labor unions, and an increased social welfare role for other institutions military, commercial, and community organizations, such as churches and civic groups. Independent from the company town’s collectivized payments of utilities and rent, workers were individually entrusted to demonstrate appropriate consumption behaviors in spending their perquisite-supplemented family wage. A newly organized mode of mass consumption linked worker individuality to consumer choice. Workers might cynically be said to have been “freed” to spend their individual income on utilities and welfare services. Indeed, in
the 1940s, industrial relations analysts encouraged employers to divest from "welfare activities" as part of a "paternalistic phase in our evolution". Architectural changes in worker housing are records of these shifting strategies. Read within this historical trajectory, we can better understand how the modern home became the centerpiece of the HSPA's worker-retention campaign.

By locating a concept of emancipation in the control of the space inside a boundary between home and work, these workers identified with liberal idioms of individualism. In the vocabulary of "the classical liberal values of privacy and autonomy of the individual," the successful abolition of perquisites meant worker emancipation from systems of capricious planter "benevolence" (Rupert 1995:125). The struggle against perquisites was not understood only as "a dollar and cents calculation," but an extension of worker resentment towards planter paternalism. Anti-perquisite arguments framed the company's collectivized payment system as a kind of "heavy-handed meddling of their employer in their "private" lives."
Starch and women’s starring role in consumer capitalism

The bluntly impersonal items of worker wish lists (increased wages, perquisite control, pay scale transparency) are the more usual enunciations of class desire. Plantation workers’ demanded workplace transparency and work’s strict divestment from a private sphere. Framed by discourses of worker autonomy, the privately owned home could promise political agency. To inherit these demands as legacies of resistance, however, we must create contexts to understand what made their forms resistant at the time, and then reframe the claim to emancipation and resistance with something other than individuated private properties.

Turning to a site just off-center from the scene of union strikes, I’m attempting to hone an analytical tool from Kahuku’s domestic architecture. Pointing to the gender-delimited horizon of domestic privacy, I am drawing a line between the subscription to a mode of figuring history, a
normalized scene of domesticity, and a way of approaching the aesthetic patrimonies of Asian settler colonialism.\textsuperscript{137}

Entered into a decolonial archive, architecture’s medium of mass acculturation provides a text sensitive to Kahukutown’s domestic subjectivities. Homeownership, heteronormative familial arrangements, property inheritance, neighborhoods, utility provision infrastructures, labor divisions within and beyond the household intersect Kahuku’s domestic architecture with settler colonialism. The linkage between architecture and domesticity is a sensory-temporal synthesis as well. Architecture mass “mediates” meaning through an unconscious and repeated usage, which comports with housework’s robotized repetition of cleaning, maintenance and reproduction as well as the singular affections of nurturing work (Hayden 2002).

A history focused on women, as opposed to domestic architecture, may simply reconstruct the deeply patriarchal emergence of women’s roles as consumers of Fordist mass production. At the same time, figuring this gendered woman-consumer only as an unwaged occupational role ignores an aesthetic structure of experience. To attend to such experience, we must “‘supplant the typically patriarchal concerns of the historical novel – the taking of lands, or the births, battles and deaths of Great Men’ – with the scene of ‘one woman asking another for her underwear’” (Walker 1983:356; Berlant 1993:211-12). Figured from the exchange between these anecdotal women, domestic architecture is a privileged formative site of class subjectivity.

Yet, spinning out this underwear-exchange scene into a method of history-making “from below,” Lauren Berlant cautions, may participate in a conservative technique of privatizing experience in order to delink experience from political analysis. A “strategy of inversion,
represented in its elevation of female experience over great patriarchal events,” meets with some
success in claiming the violated subjectivity of women (Berlant 1993:232). But this success is
ultimately limited within a “model of personal and national identity,” that becomes a “fairy tale
[that] embraces America for providing the Afro-American nation with the right and opportunity
to own land, to participate in the free market, and to profit from it” (Berlant 1993:232).

Brought to Kahuku, the come-from-below narrative of the worker who escapes the
plantation similarly risks becoming a claim to raced emancipation under American capitalism.
The gendered composite of the underwear-exchange is little seen in a Hawai’i’s history
dominated by the “typically patriarchal concerns” of haole “Big Five” industrialists, even as it is
most deeply imprinted with the value of that emancipation.

I next cull an event of domestic architectural change from my archive of Kahukutown. In
1948, Harry Shigemitsu became a purchasing agent for the Kahuku sugar company (Shigemitsu
2004a). With this move into management, he began wearing long-sleeved shirts to work
everyday. This was before the advent of blended fabrics; thus, properly laundering his 100%
cotton shirts meant the added labor of regular starching. Ironing was done on Tuesdays (Sanjune
2004). His mother, Tsuuyo Shigemitsu, and her daughters thereby found their ironing and
laundering load significantly increased. Materialized from Tsuuyo’s vantage, raced-labor and
employer collaboration meant the burdening of unwaged domestic labor in a class-wide trend
towards white-collar employment. While aware of the public significance of her son’s changed
employment status, her labor was present to this change as an increased need for homemade
starch, an appreciation for the of store-bought convenience products and the type of social
education associated with them.

Opportunities for training in housewifely-ness abound in Kahukutown’s community
circulars. Public health campaigns, factory league sports teams, group insurance plans and
programs for women such as child-care classes, mother’s clubs, and domestic science courses,
were venues for instruction in middle-class values, habits and aspirations (Crawford 1992:153).

In October 1946, the Kahukuan announced that “Make your house a home” would be the theme
of the 1946-47 East Oahu University Home Demonstration Club Program.” Repeated
announcements of such gatherings called on women “interested” in activities like home
furnishings, food preparation, organizing similar clubs, nutrition, hospitality and better
homemaking.

Colonial complicity does not fall on one side of a gender divide. Intimate, personal
privacies are privileged attachments to those properties as much as overarching public
institutions. Privatized spaces (home, family, feelings) have public architectures (houses,
registered documents, work schedules). As appendages of colonial capitalism, subscription to
middle-class sexual cultures, shifting discourses of consumer culture, desires for home-
ownership, and the mass mediations of architecture are middle terms in the articulation of Asian
settler histories with Hawai‘i’s colonization. Rather than “balance” representations between
events of Great Men or underwear-concerned women, the attempt is to productively complicate
the presumed spatial coherence of power. In this restricted sense, I’m working from a middle
ground.
At once a subordinated story and the main character in a plot of postwar social change, women's culture is a ubiquitous attendant to the production of Asian settler middle class-ness. Under Fordist mass consumer capitalism, the housewife-d home promised fulfillment in an ideal American middle class lifeworld. In turn, the idealized home iconizes gender, sexual, and political dimensions of a subject who could work over gaps between this promise and its devolution on day-to-day life. The home-maker was the focal point of an industrial circuit that supported the modern dream home.

Beyond her prominent role in Fordist consumer capitalism, the modern woman has gendered concepts of social transformations since the end of World War II in America. Her good virtue and romantic promises of happiness ever after have been a sign of proper class mannerisms the target market for mass commodity production, and the ethical object of U.S. racial imperialism. The last item brings together discourses of Hawai‘i’s colonization with post-Fordist capital and that exceeds my present discussion, but bear importantly on Hawai‘i’s U.S. history. Colonization at a double remove

Asian settlers’ class mobility is claimed as a sign of racial progress through U.S. capital. This signage is fractured from the vantage of decolonization. I’m coordinating these frames of analysis of this fracture from the domestic architecture of the Territorial-era plantation. The domestic is a way of categorizing the built environment, social institutions, bodily comportments and activities organized from the home. In relation to Asian settler colonialism, domestic architecture describes Hawai‘i’s “colonization by privacy”: private property, single-family
homes, gated community developments, bedrooms, a culture of isolated housework, and personal hygiene.  

At another level, densely scripted materials of the home further order an assortment of structures. The waged working-day structures the schedule of day-care, preparations for the coming work-day, and maintenance of femininity. The plantation’s outhouses further figure into the architecture of this last item. Before the ILWU stepped in during the 1930s, sewage was rudimentary in plantation towns. Pointedly, about three-quarters into the main camp toward the ocean in Kahuku, there was a place called Wilson Avenue. It was lined up with these outhouses; “so most of the ladies, they don’t go during the daytime. They went at night” (Shigemitsu 2004b). We should think about the energy involved in planning to defecate only at night, as well as the social stakes that compel these acts. In light of this feminine labor expenditure, Henry Baldwin’s introduction of individual toilets after 1926 draws gender-identity, private personhood, and plantation paternalism into a practical complicity. Defecating in the privacy of one’s plantation-owned home at any time of the day be a good thing for someone who wants to keep their bodily functions unseen, lives by society’s schedule and is willing to accept this from a plantation manager. All of these things order a “domestic architecture” of labor, love and identity that asymmetrically fell to women.  

In a strict sense, the “colonization” of privacy by an invading public sphere inaccurately gives the name of a political claim to a cultural process. However, my usage does not confusedly claim that plantation communities were “colonized,” but rather that Kahuku’s domestic architecture houses modalities of U.S. colonization. The emphasis is not on flattening the
violation of Hawaiian nationhood into a general claim to historical oppression but in teasing out how capitalist modes of exploitation broaden and deepen colonization.

Asian settler colonialism builds on, but is not reducible to, the home-figure of American imperial imaginaries. With Amy Kaplan, I note how the domestic sphere functions as a colonial instrument for playing out shifting borders of class, sexuality, and race. Domesticity provided the space for imagining the home as an “anchor, a feminine counterforce to the male activity of territorial conquest” (Kaplan 1998:583). Kaplan converges with other feminist postcolonial scholarship that describes the home’s role as a theater for American imperialism in the negotiation over boundaries between the colonial nation and the foreign-ness of the colony. At this intersection, feminine meaning gets embedded in the domestic home’s particular role in colonization. Kahuku’s domestic architecture replays idealized feminine domesticity into home ownership at a double remove from the more public colonial institutions.

From bachelor dormitory to dream homes

Although the sugar company’ had blanket authority over the town, it did not cut through the community uniformly. Embedding domestic enclaves into worker “homes” created a space subject to different modes of surveillance than the factory or fields. I’m suggesting that the architectural progression from dormitory, to housing camp, to “dream” home narrates changing strategies of surveillance and sociological topographies. By contrast with the housing camp, “the individual plantation house” marks the domicile of modern subjects (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:335). Yet, the reorganization of physical structures into detached home also rearranged work, reproduction and privacy.
A review of the racialized, worker-grade topography of Hawai'i's plantation towns provides some context here. Workers were housed in "camps", which were stratified by occupational status, race and ethnicity. The Main Camp, populated by mostly by non-supervisory level Japanese plantation workers, abutted the bachelor's quarters. Both structures were located centrally in Kahukutown. The bachelor's dormitory reflected Kahuku Sugar Company's earlier approach to labor as a regularized commodity and an unmarried male class of person. Later planter approaches towards worker housing shifted towards the construction of detached, single-family houses, rather than row houses or dormitory apartments (Buckley 1997:85). These architectural shifts indicate the company's promotion of a stable, married worker-family. Family ties, too, were integrated into planter strategies for negotiating with labor, especially with the increasing power of unions. Investing workers in their homes is a common strategy of labor "gentling" on the plantation and beyond. Retracing this zoning of intimate meaning may tell us something about an aesthetic mode of community that continues to nestle family, sexuality, and authority into private property rights.

The Kahuku Central Safety Committee, composed mostly of plantation supervisors, held a hearing on March 18, 1941. The meeting's minutes record a dialogue in which home garden violations were entertained as legitimate safety concerns. At this hearing, the "community" (who were not identified individually in the minutes) complained; "children from Main Camp pick flowers from yards of bachelor's quarters without their permission (spoils the flowers)" (1941:5). The committee replied, "We are very sorry we cannot help you in this matter. A Bachelor's house is his home and his permission must be gotten before flowers are picked" (1941:5). The
relationship between horticultural concerns and these bachelors' uneasiness signals a kind of person for whom a home's violation is directly tied to community safety. While affirming the bachelor's attachment of proprietary rights to his home, below, the Kahuku Central Safety Committee restricts those rights to sentiment and superficial modifications. Mitsu Sanjume rightly notes the distance of that mode of proprietorship practices from the securities of home ownership above.

The minutes of Kahuku community clubs record company managers who admonished workers to demonstrate "pride in their homes and community" (1939). The review of camp housing was a regular item on the agenda of the Kahuku Representative Club; "Now we go to our homes and yards... You should see Camp 5. The [sic] have plenty of different variety of flowers around their yard and pretty well arranged too" (1939). In the following year, a Kahuku Sugar Company assistant manager identified only as Mr. Dunn announced; "Flower contest is on. I want you to keep your flower garden to look beautiful [sic] at all times" (1940). In the idiomatically austere plantation town, his flower-growing directive seems idiosyncratic.

Far from unique to Kahuku, home beautification discourses adhere to the underlying utilitarian rationale by which the plantation town is put together. In her study of U.S. Southern plantation company town planning strategies during the first half of the 20th century, Margaret Crawford observes; "The house functioned as an object of particular attention. Workers were encouraged to identify with their house as a home rather than as simply part of their wage. Mills distributed flower seeds and shrubs, then held contests for the most beautiful garden" (Crawford... \[\text{Page 85}\]
Flower contests and home ownership are manifest practices of an aesthetic pedagogy of community pride taught under the auspices of idealized feminine domesticity.

Housing camp flower contests, community safety meetings, and house-garden contests would seem to be orchestrated only as paternalist planter strategies of worker management. Yet, workers were not unaware of the structural limitation of these modes of community. Therefore, their participation must signal something other than a struggle for hegemony. I'm pointing to pleasures taken alongside and through events most-definitive of colonial capitalism. The point of camp-housing beautification was the inculcation of middle-class morals, and the consequent production of settled-laborers, but Kahuku residents were not affectively attached to their labor-value for the Company. They reserved affections for "home," family and community-pride. Here, heteronormative sexuality is an axis of complicity between plantation workers and a hegemonic political culture.

The Kahuku Safety Committee's seemingly tautological reference, "a man’s house is his home," landscapes gender into plantation architecture. The redoubling of house into home works over the bachelor’s transient and utilitarian existence for the plantation. Redoubling means putting the same object in two contexts to merge their meanings. The house is run together from two expressions; “a man’s house is his castle,” and, “a house is a home”. A house-castle signals sovereignty conferred by property rights. The house-home is a nurturing shelter, defined by its isolation from the harsh exploitations of the public world. Both concepts inform a gendered imagination of proper personhood that infused proper practices of upward mobility.
“A housing dream come true”

“Whoever speaks of housing must also speak of home”
- Dolores Hayden,156 (Hayden 2002:81)

Since the late 1940s, American builders have used the single-family home as the model for mass-produced housing, and American buyers have held onto its potent promises (Hayden 2002:143). To understand the move from more collective housing arrangements such as dormitories and housing camps towards the relative luxury of private homes progress, the move must be contextualized within the rise of mass consumer ideologies. These ideologies advance the consumption of commodities as “an aesthetic solution to the complexities of social relations” (Berlant 1999:212). The home held a starring role in mass consumer capitalism’s achievement-image of the American dream. Dolores Hayden reminds us that home ownership, specifically the privatized horizon of the American Dream home, crystallized a series of negotiations, truces, and struggles over how socioeconomic reproduction would be organized over instabilities engendered by transitions toward ramped-up Fordist industrialism, and then to post-industrialism.

The spectrum of the private home’s political trajectories suggests a widened scope of approaches to decolonization. The dream home is an “architectural response” to continuing questions about changing relationships between gender, family, labor, and traditional domesticity (Hayden 2002:85). Home ownership enforces guidelines for the kind of living arrangements that can be sustained by society: the couple-form, dual income mortgages, and heterosexual lifestyles. Living beyond the normalcy proposed by the single-family home risks transgressing the narrow confines of ‘tight housing markets’. Deviants from the single-family home’s constellation of living and working (especially uncoupled economic modes of being, single parents, fixed-income
elderly, and the un/deremployed) are threatened with concrete forms of social insecurity (Hayden 2002:59).

The privately owned home clusters what would otherwise be incoherent — security, safety, shelter, and sentiment into a crucial site of collaboration between capital and labor. In 1931, President Hoover’s Commission on Home Building and Home Ownership endorsed single family home ownership as a long term strategic response to Depression era economic instability (Hayden 2002:50). Noting that Americans “never sing songs about a pile of rent receipts,” Hoover linked home ownership and happiness (Hayden 2002:51). This linkage was crucial to a political economy that relies on a stable pool of waged labor. The attraction of the American dream house created a way of motivating people who could not afford to buy their homes outright to take out long-term mortgages. Enrolling in long-term debt was not undersubscribed by labor. Three-quarters of the AFL-CIO membership ‘owned’ homes on long term mortgages by the late 1970s (Hayden 2002:54).

Once geohistorically alien to Hawai‘i’s cultural gravities, the mass-produced, single-family home has become embedded as the ideal solution to not only housing insecurity, but also the concrete evidence of one’s compromises with capitalism. HSPA worker-retention strategies adapted the dream home to the plantation’s need to retain low-waged workers. Campaigns that addressed worker desire for single-family homes provide textual evidence of this desire. This campaign was only marginally successful. Workers did, after all, leave the plantation. Neither patriotic imperatives nor repackaging the meaning of work, rural life and home entirely undid desires to the leave plantation. However I recuperate them for use in my decolonial archive.
In “A housing dream come true” (1946), a Honolulu based magazine reported that Alexander & Baldwin’s Industrial Service Bureau was energetically drawing up plans to “revolutionize rural life” through their new vision of the plantation (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:333). A historical snapshot of worker personhood can be read in copy writing aimed at “farsighted individuals” - those who would choose to stay in the revamped plantation towns, which have all of “the things people move into town to find” (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:333). Central to this revolution would be the modernizing force of the private home.

The social and commercial dimension of the town would also be renovated to complement the modern individual’s lifeworld. “Life,” the imagineers of this reinvented plantation town conclude, “will be amazingly complete” (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:334). The totalizing register of Fordist social engineering resonates in the discursive modalities through which architects understood the worker-retention campaign as a social engineering project. Engineered total transformation, however, also keyed to a discursive trajectory of escape from plantation exploitation as a realization of historical change.

Worker’s shifting roles as consumers as well as producers are implied by this new town’s emphasis on venues for consumption. While still present, civic institutions do not figure as main attractions; “[t]he big stores will be improved, there will be a better movie theater, a good pool hall, a good drug store, maybe with juke boxes. Churches, schools, and community centers will of course be included” (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:334).“Bigger and newly improved,” the new life of the plantation town mimics the promises of mass media.
Missing from the picture of modern society offered by Hawaiian Sugar Planter Association (HSPA) human resource managers and civil engineers are public childcare, healthcare, and communal cafeterias or kitchens. Cooking, bathing, eating and washing were activities restricted to the inhabitants of the single-family dwelling, rather than acted out communally. Domestic work is structured as a private and isolated undertaking for women. Such an individuated arrangement can be contrasted with the scene of communal strike-kitchens organized in the 1946 and 1959 ILWU labor strikes.\textsuperscript{157}

Experiences of deprivation, and the recollection of those experiences as a class narrative, dramatize plentitude as a remediation of social injustice. Head-to-toe sleeping arrangements between siblings and cousins mean that bedrooms were not often zoned for individual privacy (Sanjume 2004). Even where the plantation’s single family home housed creative responses to the exigencies of extended kin networks (such as eldercare, child-care and labor strikes) and relative poverty, this kind of improper usage, however, can easily be recuperated in a progressive register, as a temporary hardship endured but surpassed. Gaining one’s own bedroom becomes a sign of progress within a historical dynamic that inclines inhabitants toward private, especially sexually private, personhood.

For HSPA’s planners, “to revolutionize” meant drawing the aesthetic currency of domesticity into a covenant between workers and management. A new detached plantation home “will cause delight to anyone moving into it” (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:335).\textsuperscript{158} For what kind of person can such a built environment produce pleasure? Feeling delighted, having privacy, and being proper are spatial practices that are recorded in this architecture. Privacy and personhood
coincide spatially in this zoning of delight in the being the kind of person who lives in this home.

A uniquely desocializing vehicle, the single-family home’s promises of private personhood were central to an aesthetic of modern living. Signs of private personhood were anchored all over the single-family home, not only in the zoning of housewife-ly activities, but the spaces of permissible sexual beings. Separate children’s sleeping spaces implicitly cordoned them away from parental sex. Dream homes are blueprints of a particularly modern reformulation sexuality, privacy, and propriety. These structures are “structures” of middle-class personhood that come to enfold Asian settlers with Hawai‘i’s colonial occupation.

**Ms. Pollynose: architecture and humiliation**

Communal bathhouse architecture contrasts a kind of person prior to the one who delights in the dream home’s reservoirs of privacy. Like the bedroom, the single-family home’s detached bathing facilities zone the “delight”-ed pedagogical subject of plantation worker-retention campaign. In both the built environment is used to impart lessons in sexuality’s privileged relationship to proper personhood. Kahuku’s bathhouse architecture also offers texts of the formation of a sexually humiliate-able person who could desire the privacies of the privately-owned home. Bodies, sexual meaning, and personhood get organized differently through the edifice’s actual changing shape.

Henry P. Baldwin, a plantation manager, married a Ms. O’Neill in the 1920s. She had been a Kahuku schoolteacher and some of her students took note of “a hump on her nose,” and so referred to her as “Ms. Pollynose.” When Mrs. Baldwin found out that the Japanese were “bathing mixed” she had a fence constructed between the men and the women’s side.”
(Shigemitsu 2004b). As stipulated by their contracts, Japanese workers were provided with a *furo*, the Japanese term for a community bathhouse. In Kahukutown, the bathhouse became a regular feature in the Japanese and Filipino camps. The *furo* was a traditional community space, no more organized by sexual expression than other daily reproductive activities. Tom Shigemitsu remembers; “The fence was only about three feet high, so you could see, *(laughs).* That wasn’t enough, so afterwards they increased the height to about six feet. And then they divided the hot into half, and the cold water into the other half. Oh, these damn haoles, you know?” (Shigemitsu 2004b).

Shigemitsu imparts as sense of to fallible white authority to Mrs. Baldwin’s *furo* partition in two discourses. In the most literal terms, she fails to control the built environment. The sexual logic of the fence also draws on a discourse that presumes a certain relationship between physical bodies and political personhood. This discourse is played out against even Mrs. Baldwin, whose mis-shapen nose could be brought to mean something inappropriate about her authority. Baldwin’s fence can thus be read as an exchange in which she attempts to inculcate middle class pieties over and against the cultural differences of Kahuku workers and they selectively redeploy them.

Sexualizing the *furo* is part of an education in certain liberal ideals of political subjectship and civic life. These ideals uphold a restricted sense of publicity, the parameters of which do not order only sexual comportment, but a regime of normal social practices. For instance, the proper also bears on economic forms. Meeting minutes of a Kahuku *Quezon* (Filipino) community meeting in 1941 reprimanded “girls selling underpants in camp for less than plantation store
because this is not the proper way to spend money". The context and phrasing of this reprimand leaves unclear whether the impropriety concerns undercutting the plantation store's prices or the girls' unlicensed entrepreneurship. Both cases, however, underscore an aesthetic schema of proper boundaries that eroticize Baldwin's fence.

Baldwin's *furo* fence manifests a pedagogical tool of middle class formation through the physical organization of space. Embedded in this architectural vehicle, these pedagogies in class comportment are aesthetic. The mode is aesthetic because it organizes how bodies can be visible. Bodies and the built environment are configured into middle class cultural codes of impropriety that make sexuality bear on multiple sites: privacy, property, propriety, bodies and personhood. Here, the improper has a usual relationship to sexual and corporeal comportment. Whether bathing or fucking, this pedagogy that teaches that private personhood is sexuality and it is coextensive with the body at all times. As a venue of (a)sexual expression, the *furo* is improper by virtue of a concept that binds private sexuality to human distinctiveness.

Understood this way, the fence offers a mode of instruction— an "education of the viscera" whose lesson is sexual humiliation (Berlant 2002b:163). Literacy imparted viscerally involves sensorial processes (seeing) that are supposed to be evidence of a classed sensibility, specifically that of the private self. The communal baring of bodies contradicts this lesson. "Personhood," Berlant observes, "is defined by its vulnerability to humiliation." I'm further pointing out that being insensate to humiliation signals improper personhood in contrast to the person who has her sexuality by virtue of her capacity to be humiliated.
Asserting that workers were taught these codes does not mean that their operation of them is evidence of indoctrination. Agency is predicated on literacy in discursive structures that enables participation in a political order along certain given rules. In this way, the inculcation of middle class sexual shame worked alongside codes through which workers claimed equal personhood. This complicity suggests how both the partitioned furo and the campaign towards single-family homes were not taken up as an emblem of racist plantation discipline. In this way, Baldwin’s fence subscribed to the same private model of political personhood as the worker-home-owner.

However, the sexual has a qualitatively privileged relationship to agency. My argument has been that decolonizing political agency must work at the ways that interiorizing sexual conventions into private personhood desocializes visceral sensations.\textsuperscript{163} Recovering the bemusement of plantation workers at the authoritative actions of this white woman of the planter class might let us glimpse a moment in which bodies were not yet burdened with privatized sexualities. Archiving such forms not-inevitably aligned with colonialism targets colonizing actors in their capacities to have enacted historical positions differently. Beyond assigning blame, this historical capacity is integral to formulating an ethico-political response to historical injustice.\textsuperscript{164} It explores subjective experiences of pasts that come to bear on the present and how the present can be re-ordered by reading them back onto a different history.
CHAPTER THREE

"HAWAI'I FOR HUMANITY": ARCHIVING POLITICAL SPEECH FORMS

“I welcomed into our Union... a new sovereign state, Hawai‘i. Peopled by all the races of the earth... [t]hese peoples are of every creed and color, yet they live together in neighborly friendliness”
- U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1959 Address to the Indian Parliament.165

“Hawai‘i does not claim it has achieved the goal of ‘love thy neighbor as thyself,’ but we are striving for it and the rest of the world can see [sic] from our experiments that all men can live in tolerance and in peace”
- Chiyoko Watanabe “All Men are Created Equal” (1946:157).
My mother's cousin's husband's aunt

Chiyoko Watanabe was in her junior year at Kahuku high school when she presented her first-place winning oratory at the Hawai'i Junior Chamber of Commerce (HJCC) Territorial finals in Hilo, Hawai'i. This speech is among many with similarly platitudinous titles. On March 8, 1945, her Victory in Europe Day essay, "He died for his country," was published by the Kahukuan. Later that year, she won the Kahuku High School finals for the Aloha Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) elocution contest on the topic of "Japan and
Democracy” with “The Cause for which We Fought” on December 6, 1945. Finally, she delivers “All Men are Created Equal” in response to the HJCC contest prompt, “Hawai‘i’s place in the future of the Pacific.” After 1946, Watanabe’s oratorical career falls out of the record.

The Honolulu-Star Bulletin reproduced portions of Watanabe’s prize-winning essay: “The world can take a lesson from Hawai‘i that races of all people can live harmoniously and in peace… ‘Hawai‘i does not claim it has achieved the goal of ‘love thy neighbor as thyself,’ she said, “but we are striving for it and the rest of the world can see [sic] from our experiments’ that all men can live in tolerance and in peace’… ‘Hawai‘i’s formula for racial tolerance,’ the winner declared, “lies in its schools’” (1946) Even in just this sparse citation, Watanabe employs a host of signifiers that mark her historical, cultural, and class locus. References to a Judeo-Christian Commandment, idioms of experimentation, and platitudes of racial tolerance identify her presence to a post-World War II America that is at once assertive and uncertain about emerging as a world leader, the strongly Christian leanings of an American-born generation of Japanese in Hawai‘i, and Hawai‘i’s symbolic importance as a raced metonym of America. Since the 1920s, celebrating Hawai‘i’s racial diversity has been a particularly American national pastime. Historically, this multicultural celebration is fleshed in the ILWU’s interracial rallying cry of “brothers under the skin,” Roosevelt’s famous ‘Americanism is in the heart and mind’ speech, and Watanabe’s “Hawai‘i for Humanity” and “All men are created equal” oratories. Watanabe’s essay thus ‘wins’ under conditions felicitous her call to domestic racial harmony.

Certainly the components of the constellation listed above are not equally weighted in their world historical fame. In this orbit, Watanabe’s oratories also allow us to manage an otherwise definitively diffuse hegemony. By placing Watanabe’s speech alongside Eisenhower’s
imposing public figure, I mean to stage an uneasy confrontation between public and familial
history. The drama is not one of the overshadowing of interpersonal relationships by public
history, but rather the uncanniness of the ways that global and historical figures populate the
social imaginaries of her rural Kahuku town. I'm not point to her as a metaphorical mouthpiece
for U.S. imperialism, but rather to the ways that an ideology of imperialism empowers her
articulations. 171

Her essays belong to the cordial ceremonies of patriotic Americanism that pervade
Hawai'i's wartime plantation life: victory essays, military parades, elocution contests, boy and
girl scout blackout patrols, war bond sales drives, USO jubilees and Hawai'i's collective "over
the top" war effort, "more war bonds were bought by Hawai'i residents than any American state
or Territory (Allen 1950:274-80). Beyond fiscal investments in a national future, the plantation
community constituted vibrant publics for civic organizations like the "I Own a Bond Club,"
which sponsored "Buy War Bonds" essay contests (Allen 1950:275). Calls to "back the attack"
were met with eager civil efforts to donate blood, collect scrap metal, accommodate black-out
schedules, and plant victory gardens. Watanabe's first-place prize was a ten-dollar war bond.

The patriotic ferocity of these practices cannot be read only as evidence of a facile
endorsement of America. The scene is transected by the structural racism of the plantation
company, the Territorial government, and U.S. martial law during World War II. All of these
things and practices mark out dimensions of our historical present: my kinship, the wartime
plantation milieu of amplified civic participation and the authority of the Territorial government
and the Company. I'm archiving Watanabe's unabashed patriotism *then* as part of our present in order to think about the colonial forms of Asian American historicity in Hawai‘i.

Watanabe is not incidentally my mother’s cousin’s husband’s aunt. Alongside what must be a cringing-response to her formulation of a multicultural Hawai‘i, this distant familial kinship is also part of my decolonial archive. Again, my point is not to abject Watanabe, but to show how our relationship to her situates our capacities to contribute to decolonizing projects.

"Yes, yes" today?

"It is always easier to proclaim rejection than actually to reject"

- Frantz Fanon

Haunani—Kay Trask has described the predicament of settlers in a decolonizing Hawai‘i;

"Asians and haole have been thrown into a cauldron of defensive actions by our nationalist struggle... they must repudiate American hegemony and work with the Hawaiian nationalist movement" (Trask 2000:30). Telescoped from a present-day “cauldron,” Watanabe’s facile multiculturalism and patriotism sounds like the very kind of defensiveness that Trask denounces. Trask’s settler-who-repudiates American hegemony and supports Hawaiian political struggles does so under conditions that have shifted from Watanabe’s scene of speaking. While carrying a different currency in the twenty-first century, Watanabe’s speeches in the mid-1940s use a political vocabulary that remains part of the rhetorical assemblage of settler colonialism today.

I attend to the ways that the decolonial demand to support Hawaiians and repudiate American hegemony is troubled by a scarcity of strategic locations to ‘speak’ from. In what follows, I trace out the forms of “speaking” in 1946 into what now gets recognized as Asian
settler colonialism. Specifically, how have the forms of political repudiation and support shifted between the statements of Watanabe and Trask?

Theorizing Asian settler historical complicity means reckoning with Watanabe’s legacy as it now infects grammars of political belonging. We cringe at her essays today, yet we cannot dispense with Watanabe’s uncritical patriotism as only a relic of a past era. Although direct professions of patriotism now get restricted playing time, uncritical celebrations of Hawai’i’s militarized popular culture continue presently. As I will argue, this shift does not indicate the slipping grasp of “America” nationalism, but rather demands a more nuanced understanding of U.S. hegemony’s diverse processes. Our cringing-urge to reject this history tells us something about how we now-imagine the efficacy of political-speaking.

We need to revisit the thesis that American-branded things, like Watanabe’s oratories, have a direct relationship to American hegemony. As a student oratorical performance, Watanabe’s speech lies in the distance between the performance of a conscious actor and the, often de-dramatized, structures and systems that carry the implications of that performance. I worry at these relays between parts and signs of wholes in order to open space for doing more than rejecting Americanizing Asian wartime patriotism as naïve.

Disavowing her essays as only a sign of having “taken the wrong side” un-usefully denies how her rhetorics are drawn from World War II patriotism, variants of liberal cultural pluralism, U.S. presidential speeches, Americanizing civic and public education projects in Hawai’i, the U.S.’s foreign relations with newly decolonizing nations in Asia and Africa, arguments for and against Hawai’i’s Statehood, and the plantations’ constricted context for social mobility. These
multiple layers of mediation constellate a prehistory of the present dis-situation of Asian settlers
in a decolonizing Hawai‘i.

Entering Watanabe’s pledges of U.S. allegiance into an archive of Asian settler territorial
and political control, we can better theorize how Asian settler colonialism keyed to U.S.
hegemony at a particular moment, in which a capacity to take a nation’s “side” inhered to a
particularly imagined public. The attempt is to incite questions about Asian settler historical
complicity with a certain moment in which America was banking on an appearance of racial
equality as evidence of the possibility of global justice under U.S. capitalism. Examined with
attention to its retrospective meaning, we can coordinate a repudiation of her “yes” to America
with a critical analysis of the changed scenes of political speech.

“No-no” to America

Trask’s demand for Asians in “America” to repudiate America has a historical precedent
in the eponymous “No-No boy” of John Okada’s novel. Briefly, Japanese American internees
during WWII were forced to respond to a questionnaire that asked if they would forswear Japan
and serve in the U.S. armed forces. The “No-no” boy declined both. Without trivializing the
material legacies of these loyalty pledges, I’m pointing out that their Yes and No-speak is a
temporally situated form of intention. The infamous “No-No Boy”, like Watanabe’s pledges of
U.S. allegiance, was a capacious figure that flourished under American wartime nationalism and a
Fordist sociopolitical regime. Situated here, the ‘no-no’ boy cannot now directly model
repudiation in today’s neoliberal capitalist culture. We must notice that one no longer takes sides
by answering questionnaires.
Political speech, phrased as a problem of conveying intention, is bracketed into the binary format of "yes or no." This stripped down political vocabulary is the language of things like loyalty oaths, citizenship exams and military enlistments. Yet, an account of "yeses" in does not thereby record of colonial complicity in flatly transparent intentions. Here, the political has more to do with the model through which agency is located. We might find this supplement by reading the ways this binary code condenses intention and speech from complex cultural and historical cross-hatchings.

Both speaking in the binary code of patriotism, the historical composite of the "No-no" boy is the avatar of an avid "Yes, yes" - the Americanizing Asian. More than opposing each other, they have a common morphology that coordinates with a particular national time-space – the milieu of the liberal welfare state and the ideological eve of the Cold War. The wholly national bearing of this yes/no-speak can be historically situated in a trajectory of scholarship as well as a political economy. As David Thelen points out, the presumption that the nation should organize history is a rather recent development. Understood as historical artifacts of a certain period, U.S. nation-state-centric narratives are departure points for a transnational analysis that seeks "to recover lines of inquiry that were submerged during the high tide of professionalization and the nation-state [roughly between 1900 and 1970]" (Thelen 1999:971).

The dates he uses to bookend "the high era of American national history" are significant (Ibid). In 1900, U.S. industrialism was well on its way towards Fordism, and the 1970s mark the onset of post-Fordism. The transition from Fordism to post-Fordism involved structural shifts from industrial to post-industrial production, mass consumerism to service-oriented economies,
Cold War to global geopolitics, and, most relevantly, U.S. welfare statism to neoliberalism.

During a Fordist era, the U.S. welfare state’s nationalized structure of regulation primarily consisted in spreading the benefits of Fordist production through social programs. These immense regulatory responsibilities birthed a new concept the state’s public obligations, which were thus tethered to the state’s high level of involvement in economic structures (Medovoi 2005:164-5).

Much was invested in this “yes yes.” Amidst American xenophobia and suspicions of Japanese American espionage, it is perhaps unsurprising that many Asians in Hawai‘i subscribed to Americanizing campaigns. I’m told that all the Watanabe “girls” were very smart. Very smart Asian girls were the poster children of the eager embrace of Americanization campaigns in Hawai‘i. These “smart girls” and soldiers corporealize a ferocious “yes, yes” to the patriotic principles that their speeches formally profess. Writing during World War II, the flat-footed patriotism of Watanabe’s essay identifies her as a pedagogical subject of the Americanizing campaigns current during the Territorial plantation-era.
Taking Watanabe and Trask’s respective statements as emblems of a historical and political divide, I next contrast the nation-state of their political moments. The U.S. state’s Fordist to post-Fordist political and economic transition is key here as well. By situating them on either side of that cusp, we can see how the acts of agency have changed alongside shifting roles of the U.S. nation-state. These changes have multiple authors and effects, whose interplay I attempt to constellate through Watanabe’s oratorical essays. The primary point is that the nation-state’s reconfigured role under post-Fordism means repudiating of U.S. hegemony cannot carry only national currencies.
A particular political economic environment could sustain an ideological binary between an American “world of light” against an Axis totalitarian “world of darkness” (Rupert 2000:20). In his discussion of Frank Capra’s *Why we fight: a prelude to war* (1943), Mark Rupert articulates relationships between government, economic production and the value of a certain kind of worker’s family sphere that loaded Capra’s rationale for engaging the war. The upshot of “why we fight” is to insulate the world of light, emblematized in the patriarchal family of the American worker, from invasive and impersonal totalitarian state systems (Rupert 2000).

The transition from Fordism to post-Fordism involved structural shifts in industrial to post-industrial production, from mass consumerism to service-oriented economies, Cold War to globalization international politics, and most crucially, from a welfare state to a neoliberal one. Fordist modes of production comport with the welfare state’s national structure of regulation. During the former period, the state had immense regulatory responsibilities as a consequence of Fordist capitalism, which thereby invested the nation with the burden of legitimating state power (Medovoi 2005:164-5). The U.S. welfare state was tasked with spreading the benefits of Fordist production through social programs. Under post-Fordism and neoliberal capitalism, the state changed from its “big” national role in regulating social production under Fordism to a more stripped-down, economic facilitator. This does not mean that the state power has diminished, but rather that its forms of authority employ different codes of legitimacy. This nation-state has not “withered away” in globalization, but has rather retained its authority by reconfiguring its role vis-à-vis global capital.
Neoliberalism’s economic guise finds a role for in U.S. state financial globalization as an indispensable protector of private property, corporate access to world markets, brokering survival strategies for an increasingly diverse multinational working class and otherwise making the world safe for capital, the increasing participation of a working class. However, a U.S. state stripped down to its role in facilitating capital is not thereby rendered innocent of ideology. Medovoi describes the scenario; “It is obviously not the case that national imaginaries have withered away. Rather, I would argue that the national imaginary is... a ruined ‘ideology’, still ideologically potent, yet failing to provide a map of post-Fordism through which people might effectively negotiate the gaps between their desires and interests. The state, though increasingly disarticulated from the national imaginary, nonetheless remains a territorial institution. It therefore continues to produce political if not cultural space” (Medovoi 2005:171). In the disjoining of the economic, political and cultural, American politics has become an acrobatic endeavor to maintain an imagination of a (minimally fractured) national public.

New Right onslaughts against Hawaiian historical claims to nationhood push Asian settler histories of struggles for racial justice, the liberal predicates of those struggles, and the lengthy record of Statehood debates that were polarized by postwar political climates over questions of U.S. racism. These discursive convergences thread what Hawai‘i Statehood meant for “racial equality” into an archive of specifically Asian settler colonial complicity.

Statehood, a “vehicle for Asian ascendancy”

Statehood held a special place for Asian settlers. Their collaboration was secured in systems through which they could amass capital and were at least rhetorically contiguous with the
project of proving a Hawai‘i administered by nonwhite authorities could be fit for Statehood (Trask 2000:2). Official histories record Hawai‘i Asian advancement through other vehicles as well: multicultural public schooling and government, effective labor union activism, hard work (as agricultural laborers, studying hard, and military sacrifices, civic duties), and military valor.\(^{189}\)

For Japanese settlers in particular, this political ascendance was funded by cashing in his military service (in racially segregated 442\(^{nd}\) and 100\(^{th}\) Battalions) for membership in a local ruling class (Mackey 1995). These historic pledges of U.S. allegiance also embroil historical resistances into ambivalent legacies for today’s Hawai‘i. These factored decisively in ameliorating anxieties over Japanese inscrutability and thus the success of Hawai‘i’s interracial labor union movement.\(^{199}\)

Focusing on Territory-born Japanese, historian Franklin Odo follows a highly relevant query, “why and how U.S. society at large saw fit to elevate the nisei” (Odo 2004:266). Odo’s historicization of ‘elevation’ in the Varsity Victory Volunteers (VVV)\(^{191}\) charts a crucial dimension of the relationship between race and class mobility. “And that story,” Odo specifies, “is largely built around the history of World War II Hawai‘i” (Odo 2004:266). The VVV exemplifies the selective processes of upward mobility that emplace Asian settlers in a colonial order.

Amidst the flurry of wartime civic activity, the VVV were model citizens in support of the U.S. war effort. Composed of mostly University of Hawai‘i students, who were expelled from the Hawai‘i Territorial Guard after Pearl Harbor was attacked, the VVV petitioned for a chance “...to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever service you may see fit to use us” (Okihiro 1991:250).\(^{192}\) Such professions of patriotism
"became a metaphor for exemplary behavior for any victimized minority and the starting point of a generalized ethnic myth to be used in transcending racism" (Odo 2004:182). The VVV men's atypicality suggests the class-stratified availability of this metaphor. Far from representative of the largely agriculturally employed and Buddhist Japanese settler community, they were American born, Japanese, university educated, mostly Christian, and male middle class. As Odo surmises; the VVV is a product of a collaboration between the nisei, Hawai'i's military government, the FBI, and local haole - a "brilliant vision," which would transform these Hawai'i Japanese "from victims to models" (Odo 2004:219). Members of this group were able to take advantage of the GI Bill, and were prominent participants in the "bloodless revolution" of 1954. This is a genealogy of the "model minority" myth in Hawai'i.

A laboratory of U.S. imperialism

Although we seem to have forgotten the fact, the annexation of Hawai'i was intimately related to the racial question in the United States; in the strategy of annexation one can see, in retrospect, the shadow of a larger strategy... Hawai'i was also the laboratory in which the formula for American expansionism - the outward expression of our domestic racial imperialism - was first worked out”

- Carey McWilliams

Watanabe’s audience exceeds the 400 people that the Honolulu Star-Bulletin reports to have been in that high school auditorium (1946). As the Cold War expanded through the next decades, so would an increasingly global audience for Hawai'i-U.S. relations. Her Asian-ness, literacy in U.S. citizenship and patriotic comportment were telescoped into questions of U.S.
capitalism's ability to manage the nonwhite peoples of the world. By 1959, these factors also
brought Hawai‘i Statehood into the center of attention.

In Watanabe’s era, venues for speaking up were often actual speeches. Here, who speaks,
the forum in which that message is recognized, and the formal mechanisms through which speech
is enacted. In telegraphic, short-answer form: Asian settlers were saying ‘Yes’ to Hawai‘i
statehood, the forum was a terrain of ideological struggle (established through contests with
totalitarianism and gearing up for the Cold War) and the State’s prominent role in social as well
as economic regulation within Fordism.

We can see this difference at play in the U.S. Congressional record of arguments made
for and against Hawai‘i’s inclusion in the U.S. Hawai‘i Statehood meant recognizing a
population dominated numerically by nonwhites not only as citizen-subjects, but also as
governing administrators. U.S. Congressional records report that opponents to Hawaiian
Statehood questioned whether “multiracialism was a positive social development” or a threat to
the maintenance of raced sexual boundaries of U.S. identity (Scott-Smith 2004:260). Opposition
to Statehood largely expressed anxieties over contamination “by Asiatics and other nonwhites,
Communist influences, and potential pro-civil rights delegates to Washington” (Bell 1984:137).
Countering contamination anxieties thus required a way of rendering these differences benign.

Posited as a non-overlapping grid of individuals, liberalism’s political imaginary
provided a discursive solution to these contamination anxieties. Organized into an ideal, infinitely
expansive model, Hawai‘i’s racial otherness would not impinge on an established racial order. In
1943, President F.D. Roosevelt famously iconized this liberal spatial imaginary in Americanism’s
"heart and mind," against "race and ancestry." This image of contained racial difference converged with declining state regulation of social welfare to abet an imagination of multicultural community. Put otherwise, political economic structures held analogues in social imaginations. I'm suggesting that the nation-state's spatial solutions to racial anxieties bore different efficacies under historical and geopolitical conditions. Situated at the twilight of the New Deal, the state's decreased role in social welfare meant that state authority could increasingly be imagined in a role that did not bear directly on, and therefore could not compel the transgression of, the racial and sexual boundaries of the heteronormative family. Katrina Irving describes the discursive strategies of containment; "to the extent that their national ramifications were corralled within the private sphere – endowed immigrants with a starring role in the pluralists' national or "transnational" ideology" (Irving 2000:93). The liberal multicultural political agenda constructed the spatial predicates for discourses in which the overlapping psychic and domestic space of the raced-immigrant home "figured once more as conservative, tradition-bound, family-oriented, and fecund" (Irving 2000:93). These conservative endowments also made raced-foreignness seem safe.

Geopolitical issues created an opening for liberal discourses of race. In a climate polarized against totalitarian atrocities, "Americanism rested on toleration of diversity and equality for all" as a counterpoint to "racism [which] was the enemy’s philosophy" (Foner 1998:237). Statehood discourse, located between the professed anti-imperialism of Roosevelt and the Truman doctrine, played out contradictions between ideals of American democracy and the reality of the U.S. dependencies (Heefner 2005:551).
Emerging as a world power after World War II, the U.S. needed a way to “define our [American] nation as a non-imperial world power in the age of decolonization” (Klein 2003:9)? Prospects for newly decolonized Asian and African nations under U.S. global leadership looked grim in light of racial oppression “at home” in the US. Here, Hawai'i seemed the “perfect riposte for communist ‘Little Rock’ propaganda,” which deeply questioned America’s capacity to extend democracy to nonwhites (Scott-Smith 2004:270). An image of harmonious domestic race relations could massage the contradictions of the implicitly imperial aspirations of the U.S. towards world leadership. In the proofs of this picture, national difference slips into “race and ancestry” and America’s nonwhite and immigrant subjects figure as the “guarantee” of equality (Arendt 1954a). Populated by “people from all over the world,” Hawai'i was made into a hopeful mirror of an American version of global harmony by making race a proxy for national origin. The slippage between race and ancestry from national difference marks the erasure of indigenous priority in the equalizing thrust of the assertion that all Americans are immigrants. Immigrant difference stands in for the intention of the immigrant, which wills an alchemy that distills mere race (as nation of origin) and ancestry into “hearts and minds.”

International attention to Hawai'i, as an exemplar of "American-styled" (Heefner 2005:561) freedom, was instrumental to pro-Statehood arguments. Statehood was meant to showcase the universality of American freedom, specifically in America’s ability to manage racial difference. Located in a nascent Cold War, American democracy’s needed-makeover would also recruit the “hearts and minds” of non-aligned nations to ‘free world’ capitalism in seeming contrast to Soviet insularity.
Having gestured towards the stakes of Hawai‘i's multiculturalism, I next return to the scene of Watanabe’s oratories in 1946. Watanabe’s patriotic essays archive Asian settler complicity with the “achievement” of Hawai‘i Statehood. Agency radiates outward towards a larger structure in which her “voice” is staged. Watanabe’s oratories abstract a formula for racial tolerance from Hawai‘i’s ‘experiment’ in multiracial settler colonialism. This relates to the experimental idiom of her “formula,” which stresses the weighing of possibilities. The rhetorical terms articulate an “if – then” argument, if racial equality, “then” U.S. capitalist justice. As a testing ground of forms of governance, the laboratory metaphor also indicates a sense that a U.S. capitalist order was not inevitable; it had yet to “prove” itself. Thus, as “laboratory”-proof, Hawai‘i was rendered into a text that could forecast the viability of a U.S. styled “free” world.

“He died for his country”

“To maintain power among the people – indeed, to maintain ‘the people’ - America must maintain a presence as accessible and intimate as the familial name and tradition” – Lauren Berlant

Turning first to the broad outlines of that text, in the political-cultural milieu of 1946, Watanabe’s speech-expressions of her “heart and mind,” could mean something about an America that both had a direct hand in regulating social welfare and needed an international public relations campaign to work over the contradictory role of being a global, yet non-imperial, superpower. Statehood fit the strategic interests of U.S. national defense (specifically, the U.S. military’s designs for a Pacific Command) and commercial groups that desired free trade relations with the U.S. Discursively, just as important is the identification of Statehood as the
achievement of racial elevation from second-class citizenship, which thus commits these accounts into evidence of a functional American democracy.

Singularly situated by uncertainties about governance in an atomic age, Hawai‘i Statehood took on an evidentiary role in the U.S. democracy’s fitness to lead the post-World War II geopolitical “one-world.”213 In the U.S. culturo-political economy of that era, Watanabe’s “Hawai‘i for humanity” could factor into the fitness of a Territory for Statehood and U.S. capitalism for global ascendancy. The incorporation of Hawai‘i’s nonwhite majority affirmed that the U.S. that had transcended squeamishness at fraternization with nonwhites.214 Hawai‘i’s multichromatic image figured importantly in this imagination of a U.S. styled free world.

“Hawai‘i for humanity” and “All men are created equal” are handles for a hegemonic discourse about race, authority, education, and nation. Beyond a cringing from Watanabe’s unabashed U.S. allegiance, we should mark the ways that the precariousness of a historical moment allowed her, as a smart nisei girl in Hawai‘i, a measure of political speech. Watanabe assembled a position from which she could meaningfully say “Yes” to America in her VE Day speech by drawing on several discourses.215

The story is first of all a parable about America’s debts to militaried-death. In accordance with conventions of sentimental discourse and the prevailing sentiment amongst AJAs at the time, Hugh must be surprised by Japanese military aggression in Pearl Harbor. Hugh, like the rest of America, is an archetypal “infantile citizen,” coextensive with American national innocents.216 Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull articulate the politics of Watanabe’s narrative structure; “The story starts here: no linkages to previous events or practices are made, no complex
beginnings are recognized in global political economies. In the beginning was The Attack. All else follows, with offensive vices (theirs) and defensive virtues (ours) firms fixed in place” (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:122). “The planes dived down at the ships... Seeing this, he [Hugh] shivered for he had never thought that a thing like this could ever happen to this islands [sic]... What a ghastly sight. He imagined the pilot facing his forced death” (Kahukuan Vol.1, no.13 May 24, 1945).

A patriotic and outraged Hugh enlists in the 442nd combat battalion, where he dies appropriately in heroic combat. Hugh’s Japanese mother is catheted with patriotic feeling through sentimental language. Wordless, she is still part of performance of an American tradition of heroic motherhood. After receiving a letter with news of her son’s death (on Christmas Eve); “Not a tear was in his mother’s eyes then, for she was proud of her son, proud because he had given his life for a great country and a great cause” (Kahukuan Vol.1, no.13 May 24, 1945).

As a metonym of the death of American innocence, Hugh's sacrifice installs a trajectory of reverence for all time. Watanabe prophesizes; “He shall not be forgotten even when the war is over and when Victory is ours we the people in the United States wish to say – “Thank you, Hugh,...Thank you, Again and Again”. Grandiose gratitude to a brother-soldier amps up the reified timelessness of the nation. This formula of military sacrifice and timeless American-ness comes to "colonize" a space in a future Hawai‘i. On O‘ahu, the most densely populated island, 22.4 percent of the land remains under U.S. military occupation (Kajihiro 2007). While, Watanabe’s oratory does not have a certain or direct relationship to the realization of this
militarized Hawai‘i, her stories operated in and through dominant discourses that maintain Hawai‘i as a U.S. settler colony.

A soldier’s family

To inventory the nation’s passages into intimate spaces means also listing discursive components of personhood’s domestic interiority. The family household-capsule is supposed to mean something formative about this interior. In my reading, Chiyoko Watanabe’s VE Day speech, “He died for his country” (1946), presents a parable that stages the upward class mobility of a Japanese plantation laborer from the platform of familial domesticity, intimacy, and psyche for inclusion into a constellation of American community. Her plantation worker-turned-soldier accesses a transcendent America by dying in service to the U.S. military. This narrative does the work of publicizing the domestic interior of Hawai‘i Japanese family life, and most crucially a soldier-son national orientation, by making it into a transparent portrait of psychological motivations.

Although technically a U.S. citizen, Watanabe could affirmatively figure her non-U.S. nation-of-origin immigrant lineage in an American agenda of postwar world leadership.218 Americanism sets out a terrain on which race and ancestry are metonyms of national differences in the same move that it announces the possibility of their harmonization under U.S. rule.

Watanabe’s oratorical messages also resonate with the oscillations of early 20th century debates over public education and psychoanalysis. The goals of psychoanalysis and Americanizing education were formulated within the parameters of U.S. agendas. Increased immigration and the
U.S.'s newly global role provoked questions about the limits and constitution of an American political community. How can we know these others?

In response, Watanabe articulates with a liberal universalist paradigm that was current in intellectual debates of the 1940s (King 2004:314). In this paradigm, race is coextensive with cultural and biological institutions: religion, family, environment, region, and culture. This Rooseveltian "America" was also built upon the faith that racial difference could be domesticated by way of transcendence. Accordingly, anti-racist work consisted in the stripping away, or transcendence, of these particulars. The institutional enactments of stripping away consisted in the usual social work: education, welfare and a burgeoning discipline of psychoanalytic therapy.

American psychoanalysis developed into a profession contemporaneously with Roosevelt's Americanism and early American liberalism. Both purported to render race and ancestry into readable forms. Yet, the process of rendering transparent pivots on formulating race as inchoate and opaque in the first place. An earlier strain of liberal pluralists departed likewise from models of assimilation to a homogenized America. Rather than focusing on cultural production or moral improvement, a pre World War I "industrial democracy" focused on reorganizing political economy. Later, between the World Wars, Progressives, who increasingly called themselves liberals, refocused on a white American ideal, freed from the complications of race. As a means of investigating psychic interiority, psychoanalysis found new vocations that were entangled with the need to quiet labor struggles and American democracy's attempt to define itself against totalitarian societies. Like Americanism, it posits a human interior independent of race and ancestry. Attention to interior life (often termed the ego in psychology)
linked psychological health to an American liberal pluralist vision of civic nationalism that would replace social control. These analytics spatialized psychic identity in ways that bear heavily on gender.

For the *nisei* daughter, “joining the war effort” meant findings openings that figured their specifically feminized access to public visibility as progressive and patriotic. Watanabe adopts a sisterly locus of enunciation, thus adhering to the recognizable aesthetic patrimony of respectable womanhood that would allow her to be at once a public speaker and properly feminine.

Is this a day to rejoice? To mourn? Some of you have the possibility of receiving a telegram from brother, a relative, or a loved one in the service stating “coming Home” or “I’ll be seeing you”. I have no brothers in the army – but I can safely say I see your brother after so many years of worrying and anticipating.

These historical trajectories site Watanabe’s narrative of psychological interiors. Psychical interiority must be narrated because it is a most intimate domain of the private, a story that spatializes “the limit of what we can know” (Berlant 2000b:10). Her use of feminine and domestic codes to constellate a Nisei soldier’s psychological interiority negotiates with these knowledge-limits. The domestic and the feminine are parallel discourses that work through the tensions housed in the concept of the private interior. Each are “the place of the heterogeneity that cannot be entertained in the sphere of abstract and universal reason,” but can thereby manage their proximity to interiority as a claim to being closer to “feminine knowledge” (Buck 1998:295). Watanabe’s portrait of the psychological interiority of the Nisei male soldier trades on tensions that inhere to imposing a categorically improper transparency to translate a normal, unthreatening homeworld. She accesses public interlocutorship and the hegemonic narrative of
Japanese American loyalty through a sibling relationship, which is actually absent for her. The double remove lets her invoke sentimental kin relations while mitigating the suspected un-American-ness of Asian familial ties.

The intense scrutiny of the public education of American born children of immigrant parentage was partly a response to anxieties over the greater influence that the immigrant mother was presumed to have over the moral development of American children. Katrina Irving identifies a discourse of "racial domestication," which attempted to resolve the ambivalent figure of immigrant mothers (Irving 2000:93). Americanizers' anxieties "rendered the alien mother a figure of particular pathos" (Irving 2000:73). Her potent sphere of influence in the immigrant household was seen as a competitor for the limited, because impersonal, capacity of public institutions to inculcate American values. Falling out of the network of public institutions through which American ideals could be programmatically transmitted, this home was "the place in which a retrogressive culture would issue in a dysfunctional family. The logic informing this project was "thoroughly sentimental" (Irving 2000:72). "The public instructor is only a dry instrument," whereas mother’s love is a much more potent implement (Buck 1998:301).

In an attempt to ameliorate such anxieties, Watanabe narrates a seamless transition between an archetypical Hawai‘i Japanese family lifeworld and public spaces.

Wake up son, wake up or you’ll be late for school” called his mother about 45 years of ages [sic] and rather plum [sic] with round cheeks was busy preparing breakfast.... She did not speak English because English wasn’t stressed. Hugh went into the kitchen and had his breakfast, then off to school he went on the plantation truck. At 8:00 o’clock the bell rang. All students were in their respective rooms according to their grades. There was heard from every room – ‘I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America’ (Kahukuan Vol.1, no.13 May 24, 1945).
Here, Hugh’s mother is held at a distance from his circuit through public institutions. Her alien influence is muted by her inertia towards learning English and her encapsulation within a housewifely role. Yet her recognizably ‘motherlike’ physical characteristics are more than a strategy of containment, they are also a crucial part of Watanabe’s performance of the loyal Nisei-citizen-male’s psychical interiority.

Orating Kahuku into a World Historical Imagination

“The orator, in fact, uses words to go back beyond words, and to do it successfully he must have an audience, which, while being lifted, lifts him also”


Essay and elocution contests, lectures, student government, and service programs were vehicles for inculcating cultural literacy in U.S. civic knowledge, which consisted in the principles of government, patriotic histories of the national, and the English language. The unabashed patriotic mandate inbuilt to the educational oratory genre, and rituals of Americanization generally, formed a fertile field for Watanabe’s oratory. The orator mediates between un-worded inchoate desires and a public. Their translation into public translation is presumed measurable in their degree of conformity to the categories of the oratorical judge’s evaluation sheet. *Oratorical excellence is gauged from a correlation between calculated bodily comportment and the internal logic of an argument.*

In oratory’s ideal form, “two souls thrills together,” by transcending the gap between voice and intelligibility, embodiment and speech (Leigh 1927:7). The fantasy of the oratorical mode shares a liberal fantasy of transcending embodiment, practiced in a face-to-face meeting of
those bodies. As an explicit pantomime of mutual understanding, it tacitly acknowledges that the revelatory scene is cordoned in a practice space. The parameters of student oratory, that is, are bounded by prescriptions for political comportment. To be heard in this space, Watanabe’s assent, indeed all political voice, is oriented to, in this case, pedagogical authority that brackets intention.

Public education mediates her accountabilities to the ideas she espouses and her location as a student. As a ritual of public education, Watanabe’s oratory should not be directly received as political expression, but should rather be refracted through her position as a student. “He died” is an entry in an oratorical competition, and thus, her agency foremost concerns her formal exercises in performance, comportment and intonation. They are practice runs for citizenly, adult speech. How do we account for her as not-yet the ideal liberal fully-formed political person she is training to become?

Hannah Arendt cautions that moving educational models into the political collapses the authority of the former into the fascisms of the latter. The classroom is under authoritarian rule, and therefore cannot be a community of equals. A political society can house such authoritarian spaces, the space and duration of education marks the threshold of political participation as it emerges from a pedagogical relationship that happens between people who are potentially, but not yet, equals (Arendt 1954b). In this ideal form, the classroom is a training ground - a prepolitical formative sphere sheltered from “the harsh light of publicity” (Arendt 1954a). The distinction between the political and educational spaces breaks down in the examples under
analysis, but the point is transplanting classroom grammars into political speech, as in the student oratory, mediates categorically improper movements between pedagogical and political spaces.

Pedagogical themes riddle Watanabe’s text (“the world can take a lesson... the formula... lies in its schools”). The discursive penchant for drawing proof of Hawai‘i’s model multicultural-ness was often drawn from Territorial classrooms has a political dimension. An illusion of racial harmony drawn from Hawai‘i classrooms relies heavily on a clumsy analogy between multichromatic image of global cosmopolitanism. Arendt might suggest that the illusoriness devolves from a clumsy analogy that uses an authoritarian space, the classroom, as an example of social harmony. In other words, the deck is stacked. Harmonizing racial differences must mean coercive impositions by the educator. Thus, models of equality taken from the classroom are only the proof of harmony under compulsion.

Hedged bets over individual intention, psychological interiority, and the transparency of speech invest the image and meanings of Watanabe’s “yes”-girl with agency. They structure a larger theater for her oratorical address as a “Yes” to America from the non-white world. My reading of her text aims to gain some sense of what was common between her scene of speech and the multiple factors constellated towards Hawaiian Statehood. This may look suspiciously like merely cementing a history already in place.

But, then again, the project is one of reading Asian settlers into hegemonic history. Seen as rhetorical processes, Watanabe’s oratorical platitudes diffract into several issues that concern how Statehood came to signify U.S. goodwill towards newly decolonized nations, even while it cemented Hawai‘i into colonial subordination. The trademark of a platitude is a logic held
together by hegemony. In this sense, platitudes are the condensed appearance of hegemony. “Hawai‘i for Humanity” is thus a shorthand of hegemony’s “common sense.” Proximal to hegemony, “common sense” often describes a knowledge-object that is incloquently attached to a meaning. In other words, that which is commonly thought isn’t necessarily simple and apparent.

Situated amidst the discontinuous agendas of student oratorical contests, racial assimilationism, and U.S. imperialism, Watanabe’s oratory is a multivalent political phenomenon. On the ideological terrain of Cold War struggles, nationalistic postures could directly characterize political and economic programs. Saying “yes” to America meant assenting to share in the bounty of rationalized capitalism. Such postures of support - banners of racial equality, patriotic affirmations, and abstract commitments to freedom - become different instruments after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and a New Right’s consolidation. Today, refusing to assimilate U.S. prescriptions for patriotic citizenly comportment may not be the most effective repudiation of U.S. hegemony. Having noted that Asian American patriotism in a World War II era looked, sounded, and therefore meant something different in 1946, I’ve argued that repudiations of U.S. hegemony today have likewise altered forms.

After World War I, historians notice a shift in American higher education from a “machine for the elite to a meritocracy” (Berlant 1997a). In part, this shift was a response to a nationwide recruitment of educational institutions, and, conversely, public education’s proofs that it could inculcate American ways into a future Asian-ed Hawai‘i. We can inductively discern something like the coordinates of an Americanizing pedagogy in what she has been rewarded for saying. American public education was a major instrument for advancing these agendas. This
institution is also Watanabe's primary structure for accessing subjectship in the move that Spivak recognizes as "institutionally validated action" of an agent (Spivak, Lyons et al. 2004:213). Within this institutional structure of speaking, Watanabe's oratory is evidence of agency because she has the literacy required to access those structures. Further, we might mark her agency in her pursuit of a particular kind of pleasure produced through politicalproclamations.

Narrative digressions from a formulaic plot of civilian to military-patriot mark

Watanabe's awareness that her story's has a marginal relationship to a mainland American's public imagination. For instance, she describes the soon-to-be military casualty, Hugh, on his graduation day. "[Hugh] wore a white suit with a maroon tie because it was their class color. This was the first time he had worn a coat. It was not because of poverty but because a sport suit was not the ordinary costume in Hawaii." Her experience of marginality makes her both familiar with "the ordinary costume in Hawai'i" and Kahuku High School's class colors; and, more significantly for my arguments about her agency, aware of their un-worldliness. The world-public is thus constituted as the composite of her specific unmarkings of geography, culture and class difference from a working-class rural Hawai'i locus. Her awareness of Kahuku's marginality can be considered a somewhat attenuated sign of agency. Knowing one is marginal does not displace marginality - this is the compound bind of assigning agency to the assimilating Asian. Insofar as her social imagination shares in that era's trove of public images, discourses, and feelings, Watanabe's agency lies in an ability to enter a network of identifications across temporal, geographical and cultural difference.

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Insofar as oratorical articulation involves pleasure, we might also mark a malleable, intending form of agency in her participation. Pleasure and play comport with the aleatory attachments to hegemony that I’ve been seeking. Subjects remain engrossed in hegemonic relationships and practices not only through coercion, but by not noticing power in repeating forms of their participation. Foucault, in his analyses of sexuality’s role in power systems, has said that; "[t]he rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures" (Foucault 1990:157). Foucault’s pronouncement has been critiqued as utopian; it does not adequately locate the hiatus from social structures within which bodies and pleasures find the autonomy of agency. Sexuality, as a catchall for futurity, adolescence, and corporeal meaning, amongst others, is on the scene of Watanabe’s oratorical performance. But, I’m talking specifically about a pleasure linked to a structure of being an articulating subject. This is a structure that is still with us; and, as Wendy Brown observes, diserves leftist political strategy.

Watanabe’s pleasure in articulating her oratory can be seen to be continuous with present scenes of repudiating-colonization if we recognize how “[t]he political sphere has long been a space for cultivating emotions to which we aspire” (Berlant 2005b:209). Insofar as we’re seeking pleasures in our eagerness to denounce her American banalities, we may locate our complicity in the pleasures that Watanabe found in speaking to her contest judges. Pinpointing this restricted measure of her agency is important because they tell us about how certain modalities of political speaking have stopped working. Housed in a decolonial archive, Watanabe’s pleasuring-productions - her oratorical essays - arrive for us as messages about the historicity of our
imaginations of political subjectivity. Reading the past of these imaginaries and pleasures as past thereby produces the present. I’m talking about retooling the historicity of our desires to be political agents.

The radical gestalt of repudiating American hegemony feels to be an ethical theater in which subjects claim roles as agents of, or against, social justice. Wendy Brown underlines that a scene of speaking is not identical to political action, but concerns the way that this scenario is linked to political effects. The drama of the scene falls flat when acts don’t feel like they’ve displaced powers; and, worse, “they generate a kind of political pessimism about truth generally” (Brown 2002:369). I’ve suggested displacing that scene onto the historical heterogeneity of forms that have accumulated political pessimism from ‘scenes of speaking truth to power.‘ We can hold Watanabe accountable for participating in U.S. colonization because, at that time, the Asian-ed, female, student, Hawai‘i-locus of “Hawai‘i for Humanity” could be a locus of hegemonic projection. Denouncing that project now requires a different approach than speaking, and perhaps a different truth.

In today’s de-funded public sphere, the public-making dimensions of the patriotic civic culture in which Watanabe’s speech participated might be something to be retooled rather than repudiated. The problem is a political personhood that is not particularly public because it is most meaningful in its intimate spaces. National legitimacy now depends less on Watanabe’s civic sensibilities than the state’s assurances of economic competitiveness and a stripped down code of survival for regularized spheres of normal intimacy (Berlant 2000a). How then, does one repudiate an America that it has delegated its hegemonies to dispersed and ubiquitous
"institutions of intimacy"? American law's vocabularies of injustice harbor the terms that politicize intimacies, affects and feelings into institutions: injury, oppression, and suffering crimes beyond hyperbole. The move to reduce political being to this particular kind of juridical existence constricts the forms through which subjects, addressed by Trask's imperative, can repudiate "America." Under what conditions, now and then, can speaking politically repudiate something as dispersed as this U.S. hegemony?

While we can cut through the opacity of feelings by making them identical with activity, this cutting neglects the political efficacy of that configuration of feeling, opacity, and identity. Rooted in an American political history of liberal sentimental protest, political emotions, aspirations and pessimisms may need to be reformulated for a new context that has found new uses for them.
CHAPTER FOUR

USEABLE LEGACIES OF WORKER RESISTANCE

Loud and serene the whistles blow,
Time for the sugar worker to show,
His patience to begin a day's toil,
Working hard while tilling the soil.

"My long night's rest is through,
Comes again a day that's new,
Yet with my perseverance[sic] to do
The work, I'll not hesitate as do a few.
My children, five of them, and
My wife so loving and kind."
All these the sugar worker bears in mind
So he rises as the whistles end.

On his way he whistles happily,
In the fields he hums a song,
"I'm as happy as can be."
'Cause to him, the day doesn't seem long.

Loud and serene the whistles blow,
Time for the sugar worker to end
His toils for the whole day through
With his wife and children the rest
of the day he'll spend"


Life in the colony is endlessly complex and sometimes surprisingly gentle. Literally, gentling means making tame or docile, or raising from the common. The subtle valences of gentling aptly describe colonial power that does not operate only in modalities of felt-oppression and coercion. My point is that, in certain ways, plantation worker communities and the plantation owners share pro-worker values and imaginations.

Colonial orders are put together not only around resistance and domination but also love, justice, pleasure, and freedom. To approach such affirmative modes as recruitment into
hegemony, this chapter subjects the desires for radical social transformation to the mapping apparatus of the decolonial archive. In what follows, I attempt to parse the complicity over a hard-worker-figure that enfolds organized labor-resistance, planter interests in worker-docility, Asian settler colonialism and new Right discourses. The worker of Augustin’s poem reappear in certain conservative versions of anti-racist labor organizations in Hawai‘i and as a constellating figure in new Right imagination of an American public constituted from worker-families.

As described by the editors of The Kahukuan, Augustin’s poem was “written...in recognition of the patience and perseverance of the sugar plantation workers.” Her plodding, patient, happy, family-ridden worker figures centrally in planter pedagogies that seek to retain cheap, docile agricultural labor. The Kahukuan, like many of the plantation’s outlets for social life, was tightly annexed to the Kahuku Sugar Company. Calls to a certain image of worker morality get repeated in planter agendas through “work appreciation” high school coursework (Wightman 1939), labor-day parades, and things like Augustin’s celebratory portrait of the sugar worker. Jacques Rancière identifies “the historical ruses of proletarian ideology” in discourses and images of heroic workers; they kept workers in their place as workers by celebrating that place. As a ruse, he notes that “the troublesome thing was that this worker discourse never functioned so well when it was doing so in the logic of others or for their profit” (Rancière 1989:xxx1).

Yet, the socioeconomic agenda of plantation capital does not overdetermine the significance of Augustin’s literary endeavor. She draws on images of fullness, safety and “home” for workers-as-workers, which site a political ambivalence inbuilt to the affective dimensions of
worker identifications. How does the appeal of this image sit the colonial complicity of plantation workers with plantation capital and settler colonialism, then and now? I argue that "not feeling-bad" about worker-identities marks the moorings of Asian settler histories of labor resistance and complicity in new Right discourses, and their deployment in legal attacks on Hawaiian trusts and entitlements.

While we can locate the false-tone of happiness in Augustin's worker with the plantation's structural coercions, the appeal of this "falseness" carries through even after worker collectives leave the plantation. The decline of plantation systems is primarily an economic shift, but I attend to the subjective terms through which workers were "freed" from the plantation. I archive worker discourses into a history of Asian settler colonialism in order to revisit forms presumed to signal worker's emancipation.

Historically, Asian settler political activism has been most visible as the successes of labor unionization and post-World War II struggles against second-class U.S. citizenship. Today, the locus of Asian settler radicalism resides at a critical interface with Hawaiian decolonization. Yet, the track between historical Territorial era plantation worker resistances and Asian settler support for decolonization does not resolve into a continuous line. In fact, I find their paths to be criss-crossed - histories of worker resistance to racism and exploitation come to abet Asian settler claims to an American Hawaiʻi. An Asian settler middle class formed at the cusp of a historical shift from subjection to white colonial capitalism (under the precarious status of disenfranchised contract laborers and compulsory agricultural workers during wartime martial law) to shareholders of these systems.
Asian, especially Japanese, political and economic enfranchisement in Hawai‘i is supposedly evidence of racial equality under American capitalism, achieved through struggles against American racism. The challenge is to re-narrate this shift from historical subjection to enfranchisement as Asian settler colonialism. Retelling this story must work at how it simultaneously redeems American capital’s capacity to incorporate difference. Phrased as a narrative project, my attentions to plantation worker-discourses seek to differentiate between legacies usable for decolonization from those recruited into new Right conservative projects.

To read worker’s statements into colonial complicities and resistances we must ask, how do these stories call us to look at the present in relation to this past? Can we use them to shift our reading practices of Asian settler ‘success stories’ into their problematic relationship to Hawai‘i’s contested nationality today? Specifically, I’m deploying an aesthetic political analysis onto statements culled from oral histories, archived plantation newsletters, and Kahuku Sugar Company records.

Women’s Nights of Labor

For Rancière, an aesthetic political event transgresses the boundaries between “those who think and those who work with their hands” (Rancière 1989:13). In Nights of Labor (1989), he locates such a transgression with the worker-poets of the July Revolution who did not only write poetry and valorize their identity as workers, but uses necessary labor-time, the night that they were supposed to use to reproduce their bodies for the next day’s work, in order to paint, write and dream. The aesthetic political potential of this act of theft is to disturb the order of things through “[the worker’s] passions for another world” (Rancière 1989:20).
"The Sugar Worker" has no such passions. His "long night's rest" firmly situates him in the place of the industrious worker. Augustin's poem is thus part of the "parade of images depicting the grandeur and decadence of the worker myth" (Rancière 1989:11). Yet, within the schedule demarcated for industrial labor, the aesthetic politics of Augustin's endeavor to write poetry is difficult to evaluate. Of her work, we know only that she was a wife, which may belong to a Platonic genre of worker-poet personhood that Rancière criticizes for displacing the political. Inbuilt to the worker-poet is an a duplicitous order of labor that allows thinkers "to keep their place and keep the shoemaker in his" (Rancière 1989:14). But wives are not shoemakers and insofar as she has put herself in "the poet's corner" (the subsection of The Kahukuan), there may be more passion for moving out of her place than we can read from the content of her poem.

I'm gesturing to these possible aspirations to be other than a (home)-worker because this sites the paradox that Rancière targets in a history of Asian settler worker opposition, resistance and complicity. Workers valorized their identity as workers, and turned that self-value towards labor rights, leaving the plantation and other egalitarian projects. At this point, we cannot read these tensions between identification with work and worker-emancipation from Augustin. To further elaborate the ambivalence of aesthetic political forms, I next turn to contests over the bango as an aesthetic political event.

*The Bango: "87 Jap*"

Plantation administrators assigned workers numbers called bango – the Japanese word for "number." Historians have called the widely resented bango system "the hallmark of planter imprudence and racism" (Takaki 1993:256). Former Kahuku plantation worker, Tom Shigemitsu,
recalls the *bango* with vehemence; “I used to go every month to get my father’s paycheck and hand this guy, Christopherson, an aluminum disk stamped Kahuku Plantation Company, with my father’s number, number eighty-seven. And I give the aluminum disk to this office manager and he call out, “87 Jap.” I been hearing that words every since I was in fourth grade. So I didn’t like him” (Shigemitsu 2004b:21). Shigemitsu’s sentiment resonates with the comments of other workers; Ronald Takaki reproduces one articulation, “I wanted my name, not the number” (Takaki 1993:255).

The *bango* system, and the demise of white plantation authority generally, has been a centrifugal symbol of emancipation in Hawai‘i. However, signs endemic to the plantation’s material culture, such as the *bango*, now take meanings within discursive structure that figures experience, identity, and social justice from each other in ways that have become problematic. Worker resentment of the *bango* system was articulated as a demand for a kind of individual personhood that no longer hosts the same kind of resistant trajectories that it did then.

However, this does not mean doing away with the *bango* as an artifact unusable for the present. By contrast with “The Sugar Worker,” contests over the *bango* were an aesthetic political enactment that challenged the ways structures of visibility in the workplace - the ways that workers are visible as workers (Rancière, Blechman et al. 2005). They agitated against the *bango*’s systemic non-recognition of their personhood. In the language of Rancière, protests against the *bango* attest to the presence of an aesthetic politics because it concerned a redistribution of what could be visible as having a political claim. The *bango* institutionalized a racist order in which workers are labor commodities rather than worker personhood. Discussing
the working class of nineteenth century France, Rancière interprets a similar set of demands. “To be treated as ‘men’ was therefore a gesture of defiance and refusal aimed at the bourgeois and the core of a repressive discourse of working-class morality directed at other workers” (Reid 1989:xxiii). The resentment against the bango also gave rise to such a demand, which we cannot only understand as residue from bourgeois liberal individualism. This emblem drew affects (of resentment) into a political demand for “a name- not a number” and, thus, engendered a new awareness of plantation racism.

The tactile material of the bango brought together feelings (resentment and emancipation) and a personal name into a historical aesthetic of political personhood that resonates beyond the era in which it was protested. Seen from today’s colonial order, individual personhood leans toward a depoliticizing liberalism, rather than an anti-racist stance. Workplace niceties like names formed as capitalism abandoned Fordist hierarchies for more network-shaped organizations of labor. Yet, the political limits to the bango-emancipated worker do not manifest only as he becomes distant from his time.

Not all workers were equally eligible to utilize discourses of worker-personhood. Tom Shigemitsu offered this story about a man named Sumizawa, who was the Japanese helper for Okumoto, who was the driver of the “honeywagon”; he said, “[t]his Sumizawa old man, he eat the orange, he ate only the rind. And the inside, he give it to the kids, but no kids would take it. They say, oh, he works honeywagon – so the kids wouldn’t take it” (Shigemitsu 2004b).

Plantations used to have outhouses called “honey-houses.” The workers who would collect the refuse everyday worked the “honeywagon”; “Japanese man was driver and his helper was
Japanese man” (ibid). Refusing to eat fruit that was contaminated by a honey-wagon worker’s touch, even the kids knew how to register their disgust in a hegemonic circuit of signs for identifying people who toil in proximity to bodily-refuse as a limit to discourses of respectable-work. This disgust marks complicity with an aesthetic, sexualized regime that identifies certain kinds of work, bodies and comportments of those who will be more readily assimilated into a new capital-friendly aesthetic of worker-autonomy. It is these kinds of limits that mark Asian settler colonial complicity.

Un-narrating “leaving the plantation” as emancipation

To read the “plantation,” I presume that textual existences metonymize the lifeworld of Territorial era Kahuku. Metonymy marks a placeholder for an existence whose whole story is only suggested by the archive’s record. In addressing the reader of metonymized texts as metonymy, we imbue that reader with the capacity to work over an ignorance of the “whole picture.” This synthesis happens in the ways that the scene of “leaving the plantation” is made meaningful for a subject literate in the interpretation of sensations into feelings such as emancipation. Changing a feeling, of course, is not identical to changing history. The strategy is rather to calibrate our frame of analysis towards a narrative that dislodges the structures through which enfranchisement in U.S. capitalism could be at once personally and collectively experienced as emancipation. Put otherwise, re-narrating Asian settler colonialism into history must also mean learning the terms of the lessons that wrote them into a future not yet put together around tourism and associated land development economies.
Re-narration is predicated on first recognizing history as a malleable narrative in the first place that malleability tenses against a hegemonic history's pedagogical vehicles. Ordering is a means of clarifying experiences, the byproduct of which are lessons consolidated from the meaning attached to particular events. These instructions can be called aesthetic pedagogies insofar as they teach us to recognize social in/justice in events, things and sensations. And, while the literacies of subjects who make these meanings from texts, events and sensations are highly variable, I can outline a training program that teaches subjects to read their felt-experiences as metonyms of objective historical processes insofar as they converge. This pedagogy is the legacy of having left the plantation that I want to render usable for decolonizing complicity.

Retroactively narrated into a progressive story of worker empowerment and class ascendancy, avenues for escape are imprinted with a sense of possibility that must have felt like the realization of equal opportunity, racial equality, and meritocratic justice. Through these narratives, the post-plantation Asian settler experiences himself as the central actor in a drama of emancipation from the stultifying plantation atmosphere. Critical scholarship on Asian settler colonialism attempts to displace him from this role by re-identifying the emancipated-worker who reaps the desserts of historical labor oppression (land and derivative development profits) as an agent of Asian settler colonialism.

Historically, this agent animates an Asian settler history underwritten by a concept of racial equality and identified with shifts in the racial composition of Hawai‘i state administrators and the migration of industrial agriculture workers. Until the late 1950s, a near synonymous race and class alignment characterized Hawai‘i’s social and political structure of political and
economic power. These alignments were largely a legacy of planter strategies of labor control.\textsuperscript{246}

It is worthwhile to revisit the political implications these structural shifts before approaching the ways their meanings were interiorized as progress.

"Leaving the plantation" thus refers to class-wide escape a racist system of labor exploitation, which resulted in historic shifts in Hawai‘i’s social landscape of work, race and class. The G.I. Bill’s financial assistance for education, the end of U.S. martial law, labor unionization, and resentment against planter paternalism were the main means and motivations for leaving.\textsuperscript{249} However, the racialized subject of resistance to plantation exploitation cannot now model decolonial Asian settler agency. Class mobile vehicles of professional education, higher wages in Hawai‘i’s military defense and tourist industries, and Hawai‘i State government elected offices are also foundational institutions of settler colonialism.

Further, a vocabulary of worker emancipation is critically received for its implicit claims to U.S. civil rights. Whereas anti-racist justice was capacious against elite haole planters, and foreign exploitation, it fails to target Hawaiians’ inter-national relation to U.S. governments. (Mis)-identifying Hawaiians as U.S. racial minorities has become a potent instrument for making their claims to national violation inadmissible for U.S. courts.\textsuperscript{250} Linking this vocabulary to Asian settler decolonial political resistances thus means reformulating the meanings of social, especially racial justice.

**Oppressive equality: an American aesthetics of feeling**

Hawai‘i’s public archives register the 1893 Overthrow and its aftermath in the concrete forms of land titles, government reports of wrongdoing, and legal documentation. These
effectively tense against the usual pattern means of reasoning away from the constitutive violence
of the colonial state’s founding, which is to deny the legitimate historical existence of native
political organizations. Natives never constituted a nation, such reasoning goes, therefore, neither
Hawai‘i’s annexation to the U.S. (1898) nor the imposition of Statehood (1959) violated national
sovereignty. However, different strategies reconcile Hawai‘i as an American entity. The well-
documented existence of Hawaiian nationhood in public, private and memoried archives would
seem to reason against that narrative. But this would misrecognize colonial power as something
consistent, coherent and unified.

Tropes of reconciliation, healing and optimism for a “better” America condition a
collective inattention to that violence. Forms that feel natural and inevitable lack the sensations of
“injustice,” which is supposed to feel troubling. Phrased within a pervasive American politics of
justice and equality, the presumed goodness of a community here and now in a (American)
Hawai‘i itself becomes a resource for trumping a violent colonial past. Hawai‘i State Governor,
George Ariyoshi, recruits this resource in his wary affirmation of Native Hawaiian sovereignty.
He cautions that “the rest of the people in Hawai‘i today, who are not native Hawaiians, are also
deserving of a place under the sun” (Ariyoshi 1997:175). Abstracted from the limit case of
historical difference, Ariyoshi’s political language of deserving advocates a political community
of “people in Hawai‘i” held together by “the equality of fairy tales” (Rancière 2003:14).

In 1993, U.S. president William Clinton signed what has become popularly known as the
“Apology Bill,” which recognizes U.S complicity with the aftermath of the historical violation of
Hawai‘i’s nationhood. In 1893, a white settler ruling class, composed of descendants of
eighteenth and nineteenth century American and British missionaries forcibly deposed Hawai‘i’s then reigning monarch, Queen Lili‘uokalani. Despite Clinton’s attempt to heal historical injuries within the realm of officious recognitions, Hawaiians continue to struggle for the restoration of nearly two million acres of land and the reinstatement a self-determined governing body.

The indifference of Clinton’s talk-therapy to the kind of institutional responses Hawaiians demand underscores the play of the political in setting the parameters of discourse. Hawaiian political struggles differently articulate decolonization, indigeneity, and political identity in ways that work with and against American political discourses. Approaching colonization’s concrete forms in Clinton’s Apology as aesthetic operations does not exile power from analysis, but rather emphasizes that aesthetic technologies are political. This may shed light on the ease through which American colonial violence is explicitly recognized in Clinton’s apology. Clinton’s “apology” explicitly renders Hawai‘i’s historical injustices into a form that can be “healed” through talk-therapy. Rhetorically, the significance of historical state violence slips from view in order to rather emphasize the healing powers of American community. Yet, the problem is not resolved by opposing feelings with objective structures. Rather, this points to the ways that social justice is imagined as the remediation of feelings.

Liberal traditions that gave rise to juridico-legal modes of remediation for minority-suffering now come to align with New Right legal attacks on Hawaiians. While this modality has a much longer history (reaching back well into the 18th century), it has renewed implications for negotiating decolonization within American politics today. I suggest that Asian settler
colonialism is a shifting alliance in which Hawai'i's multicultural plantation-worker heritage has become a cipher for new conservative impulses that erupt against Hawaiian decolonization.

Asian settler complicity with U.S. hegemony concerns the ways that equality, racial justice and "America" get recuperated into New Right political imaginations. Hawaiian self-determination is imagined as the particular pathology of an immodest "specialness," which takes its moral tone from a narrowed concept of the normal. Hawaiian historical entitlements are vulnerable to epithets of anti-democracy, and even racism, because they mark out in-equality. Objective measures of oppression, such as race and gender historically used to mark out minorities, come to be seen as barriers to equal access to America's good community. Liberal demands for "equality for all" have been commandeered to challenge Hawaiian rights to historical entitlements and political self-determination. The challenge involves negotiating a post-liberal milieu with liberal personhood's battered vehicle of political identity. By post-liberal, I refer to the ways that liberal pluralism's "practical logics of space" have been superseded by New Right spatialities (Patton 1996-7:3-4). The very immateriality of ideal liberal space renders equality and difference thinkable within an infinitely partitionable political field.59 Once aimed at proliferating spaces for diverse cultural identities, American liberal pluralism now offers a language for repressive tolerance. Liberal politics offers protected social spaces for subordinated identity-groups, whose very claims to identity simultaneously located the pressure of flawed social systems.

Liberal legalism posited an ideal, infinitely divisible political space within which non-overbearing differences could accommodate each other. New Right politics reorients the
spatialities of this historically liberal political imagination. By inverting this imaginary, New Rightists argue that a civil rights “proliferation of spaces...had been the cause of economic and political unviability of those who call themselves minorities” (Patton 1995:224-5). Seizing upon liberalism’s insulated grid of identity-spaces, New Right rhetoric renders political inequalities into a problem of proper privacies. Hawaiian challenges, however, cannot thereby confront that privatized definition of equality by asking for inequality. Thus, it might be more cogent to say that American politics’ identity spaces, reconfigured as a “mono-spatial structure encompassing the new right’s crypto-theocratic idea of the United States,” are not structurally coherent with the kind of political demands Hawaiians place for land and self-determination (Patton 1995:224).

American legalism provides the apparatus through which Hawaiian claims are made to negotiate in currencies of suffering to find their counterparts in compassionate justice. A metaphorical dialectic between Hawaiian disenfranchisement and Asian settler merits of deserving American justice matches up here as well. Having arrived on the promise of American economic opportunity (as laborers contracted to the plantations), they endured the racism of white planters, escaped through hard work, studying hard, and heroic military sacrifices in World War I and II. This subject has all the elements that mark the deserving subject of liberal fantasies of national empathy. Replaying this formula has become the guilty pleasure of Asian America.
Industrial relations and ‘local’ culture


The resistant trajectories of Hawai‘i’s worker pasts have been under-read. Citing Kahukutown archives, I will suggest a more complex itinerary for the forms that we recognize as social justice. The usual story tracks the profound suffering of first generation contract laborer into the profoundly capacious interracial labor organization during the age of the CIO, who then gets befuddled by the cronyism of electoral politics and betrays any vestiges of imaginations of radical class transformation.
This point of departure extends from my discussion of kin-identity as a historical account of complicity. My granduncle was Harry Shigemitsu, the Kahuku ILWU local 145-4 chairman in 1945. I was surprised to learn that "Wild" Harry Shigemitsu lived in Walkerville, a housing camp reserved for company supervisors. Shigemitsu had earned a "wild" reputation from his brash opposition to Kahuku plantation officials as a vocal community resident, a Democrat, a voter registrar and, of course, as a labor organizer. Querying his sister about his residence, she remarked mildly that he lived in the supervisor's camp because he worked as a supervisor. In later years, "on [the] condition of not doing any more union activity," the Kahuku sugar company had offered Harry Shigemitsu a position as a purchasing agent in 1948 (Shigemitsu 2004a).

Shigemitsu's move into the company's managerial tier wasn't only the animation of middle class aspirations. If he rejected the company's offer, he would have to consider the possible eviction of his seven children, his elderly parents, and his ability to feed and shelter the children of his brother, Richard Shigemitsu, my mother's father (Sanjume 2004). Kinship thus marks my locus of tertiary-level education and dissertation writing, as an indirect effect of Shigemitsu's compromise.

Workers were not unaware of plantation manager strategies of co-opting especially more active workers and unionists; "they take the union leader out from the union and give him a good job on the plantation" (Shigemitsu 2004b). Acquiescing to these coercive tactics generated a surprising lack of controversy. Unusually copacetic relations between Hawai'i labor unionists and their employers similarly struck industrial relations analyst Bernard W. Stern. For many, moving from the Hawai'i union office into company supervisory or negotiator positions "is just a higher
rung on the economic ladder” (Stern 1983:469). He defers to Hawai‘i union officials who rationalize this complicity; “We [would] rather deal with local people who know and understand our situation than with some mainland haoles who don’t know what it’s all about” (Stern 1983:469). Stern speculates that this benign “local attitude” to individual “getting ahead” takes its terms from a history of racial oppression singular to Hawai‘i’s worker culture.266

The local attitude Stern examines betrays a systemic commitment to industrial democracy to a depoliticized subscription to middle class values and an insular cronyism.267 Privileging a narrowed imagination of “what it’s all about,” local culture functions as a cipher for conservative politics. The crucial question thus concerns how a historical formation of “local” political resistance becomes divorced from a past moment, and then takes on conservative functions. What happens at this intersection between a social movement aimed at making institutions of class difference (waged labor) transparent and the production of an opaque cultural milieu? Here, the “local” has become an instrument for a hopeful insertion of a singular (cultural) kind of person into an economic juggernaut towards an eventual resolution on the ground of liberal capital.

Local culture organizes a variant of cultural nationalism, a movement in Hawai‘i’s literary community, an affective literacy in anti-haole and anti-foreign capital sentiments and a populist aesthetics and a vestigial byproduct of plantation worker’s resistance.268 In the 1970-80s, Hawai‘i’s local knowledge carried the legacy of collective resistance to land development, labor exploitation by haole resident elites and foreign investors, racism and cultural genocide. Local knowledge privileges familiarity with a particular form of the putative everyday. This form – the knowledge of a local milieu - offers another organizing framework to understand the changed
conditions of labor, race, class and gender of today's colonized everyday in Hawai'i. An
“everyday life,” Lauren Berlant writes, is “a space of time, a domain generated by personal and
institutional practices” (Berlant 2000b:10). Attending to the institutions, times and spaces that
make a local milieu meaningful as the consistency of everyday life may help to thus search out
the kind of person that were the historical agents that bring us our present. Against the opaque
assemblage of “local culture,” I contrast other emblems of worker resistance that took issue
precisely with transparency – of the workplace, worker payscales, perquisites and other structures
that targeted the visible environment.

“Snooper stool pigeons”

Prior to World War II, oppression in Kahukutown looked like haole overseers,
clandestine talk of unions in the Togo theater, racial housing camp divisions, school grades
truncated at elementary levels, eviction threats, and “feudal” tributes to plantation officials
(Schwartz 2003). Without transparent public governance, managerial control operated through
special favors and clandestine circuits of “stool pigeon spies”.269 Tom Shigemitsu, a former
resident and worker in Kahukutown, recounts this practice:270

When [Henry] Baldwin became manager [he was Kahuku plantation’s manager from
1926 through the 1930s]... He didn’t cater to these stool pigeons. Some people would
bring gifts, chickens, drinks, or something like that. He said, I don’t want, you go and go
feed your family. I’m the manager; I’m making many times more money than you. So
you take this and go feed your family (Shigemitsu 2004b).
Shigemitsu’s story articulates a critique of stool pigeons with an affirmation of Baldwin’s
willingness to contravene social convention (Shigemitsu 2004b).271 As we talk of recovering
worker resistance (to stool pigeons), we must also account for not-so-resistant dimensions.
Delving into Kahukutown archives and oral histories, I next excavate the “stool pigeon” - an anachronistic caricature of improper political personhood similar to the settler opportunist. The stool pigeon is a ubiquitous denizen in an archive of worker, especially labor union, culture in Territorial-era Hawai‘i. Positioned within a decolonial archive, I approximate the shape of worker resistance in the inverted outlines of this figure. In turn, we can see how these historically resistant-shapes come to inhabit the also improper settler opportunist.

Labor union discourses offer a critical vantage on Baldwin’s concern for worker’s families, which resonates with the “planter paternalism” that was pointedly declaimed in Hawai‘i’s 1946 sugar strike. However, Shigemitsu does not enunciate this critique, and rather leaves Baldwin’s acts open to other interpretations. His straightforward recognition of economic disparity comports aesthetically with the utilitarian sensibilities shared between planters and organized labor. This kinship is repeated structurally in the plantation’s economic rationale for being and organized labor’s issues of wage system transparency.

Departing from these formal similarities, Shigemitsu offers an image of Henry Baldwin; “he [Baldwin] was tricky, you know. All dressed in white, every morning. He had that railroad factory hat and stayed across from the tool-house where the workers gathered in the morning before they went to work. He stayed on the little bit of slope, looking at the gathering of the laborers. One time they say one of the dogs the Filipinos used to take to the fields, he had these leather leggings, the dog sniff around and they take a pee on him” (Shigemitsu 2004b).
Far from uncritical admiration, Shigemitsu’s narrative highlights a moment in which Baldwin is denuded of abstract white power by emphasizing his personal embodiment; he cannot control a dog even if he can lord his authority over the “gathered” laborers. Narrating a scene entails molding disparate details from multiply layered trajectories into a coherent picture. Shigemitsu imparts this coherence, gluing things like stool pigeons, white attire, the railroad factory hat, and leather leggings into the components of a picture of class hierarchy and populist justice. The sense of the scene is a smug, elevated monitoring whiteness drawn in contrast to brown working masses. Placed against the stool pigeons’ conspicuously subordinate comportment, the lack of personal dignity, specifically the dignity of resistance to white authority, marks the difference of an “upright” worker’s political subjectivity.

Foucault’s analyses have explanatory capacities here. He reasoned that modes of oppression determine their reciprocal forms of resistance that are relevant here. Although born in the Territory, Asian plantation workers were disallowed from voting for Democratic candidates, or indeed, often from voting at all. Where oppression is materialized as intimidation at the ballot box, electoral victories come to mean emancipation. Such emblems of plantation oppression persist in social histories of community that have outlasted the Territorial Big-Five economy. This suite of signs is set to work when Hawai‘i historian, Tom Coffman cites George Ariyoshi’s election as the first non-white U.S. governor of Hawai‘i as “the personification of a dream come true” (Coffman 1973:95). Only in a particular aesthetic knowledge structure could he personify the main motors of that emancipatory social change: the International Longshore and Warehouse
workers Union (ILWU), Hawai‘i Democrats, and even, to a degree uncomfortable for Ariyoshi, organized Communism.276

The pejorative valences of the stool pigeons resonate over the temporal gap between plantation oppression and settler colonialism in indictments of the "settler opportunist" (Kosasa 2004:278-9). Both caricature a failure of political vision, the short-sighted offense that maintains a circuit between capital accumulation and political corruption. Between these two moments, we might search out the aesthetic structures of transmission that enable a re-interpretation of stool pigeon-ish acts into something other than myopic interest in individual gain. While the extra turkey slipped to the plantation manager was current in the Territorial era, settler opportunists engaged insider trading through the land hui.277 By aligning the stool pigeon and the opportunist, I'm coming at colonial complicity as the transmission of a certain aesthetic of personhood. This kind of legacy demands reading practices that attend to form.

"Aloha for All": The 1ST non-Hawaiian OHA Trustee

"Politically and legally," writes legal scholar, Anthony Moran, "coming to terms with the indigenous has meant a new complexity and ambiguity about constitutional liberal-democratic arrangements. The liberal-democratic nation-state as model for community is based on the notion of indivisible sovereignty and uniform political rights for all citizens" (Moran 2002:1017). Building on this model, New Right arguments cohere new versions of nation, race and justice that embed juridical assertions of Hawaiians' non-U.S. citizenship with pejorative meanings.

The pejorative valence of Hawaiian special-ness shares an American history with criticisms of civil rights movements, notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and women's
Historically used to protest the suffering of subordinated minorities, liberal sentimental rhetoric inscribes legal meaning onto feelings. Hawaiian political claims to categorical exclusion from U.S. state jurisdiction is not coextensive with a New Right’s vilification of “big government”. Rather, we can find them in a push past liberal-radical uses of law that tend to reduce the complexity of social subordination into signs of felt-suffering and then enters those signs into a calculation distorted by repaired feelings.279

Hawai’i’s colonization involves this political interface between indigeneity and the modern liberal U.S. nation-state.280 Creating contexts for contests, indigeneity enables “the widespread critique of the homogenizing, assimilationist concept of modernity and fears that the liberal state cannot fill the needs of the citizenry or successfully administer diverse populations” (Miller 2003:208). My approach to Hawaiian decolonization finds the legal subject of these contests as a historical condition generated from a culture of courting a U.S. juridiciary. How does the collaboration between liberal rhetorics of felt-injury and remediation constitute a misfit between Hawaiian decolonization and an American legal culture?

Decolonization and de-occupation arguments assert Hawai’i’s non-American legal status and thus their exteriority to the framework of U.S. civil rights. They build on Hawai’i’s extra-U.S. legal status cut to the question of the applicability of the U.S. constitution, the status of historical injustice and the political amnesia that structures New Right challenges. On this slippery terrain, the struggle to move Hawaiian nationhood claims into international, rather than U.S., legal venues of adjudication is a most canny strategy.281 However, I argue that asserting the formal exceptionalness of Hawaiians from U.S. domestic law bears other questions about the
reparative capacity of U.S. juridical remediation, and that those forms should be inventoried. Such an argument is not an opposition, but a place of pausing in which we can strategize with emancipatory implications and against those that carry the disrepairs of American political cultures.282

The “Coalition for a Race Blind America”283 is amongst many other New Right think tanks that have been active in nationwide struggles against affirmative action.284 Heralded by Rice vs. Cayetano (2000), this coalition has engaged a set of interlinked legal challenges to Hawaiian institutions of “racial preferences” and “special rights” in Hawai‘i State and U.S. federal court systems285. Under the auspices the Fourteenth Amendment, “colorblindness” becomes a variant of equality286. “The equality of fairy tales” (Rancière 2003:14) in Rancière’s phrasing, finds real world currency in New Right discourses of colorblind justice.287 Without explicitly naming its genealogy, the “Coalition for a Race Blind America” does not merely forget a U.S. imperial history in Hawai‘i, but rather pits that history against another historical discourse: the simultaneous, and contradictory, assertions of democracy and imperialism during the interwar through post World War II in which America needed to demonstrate itself to be non-ideological to differentiate itself from Stalinist-totalitarianism, rework its national identification with isolationism, and somehow narrate its rise to global power as a democratic enterprise (Klein 2003:9). In the course of this collective self-reformation, America adopted a purportedly non-ideological, unbiased identity, accessibly to the “hearts and minds” of anyone without regard to ethnic, ancestral or geopolitical specificity.288 These discourses are thus given a new life in New Right rhetorics of equality, which thereby retains America as a universally “good” space.
When amenable to New Right legal activists, U.S. juridical apparatuses follow the prescription that race should not be recognized in the hegemony of Western law. Prior to his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia articulated this concept of race in his argument against affirmative action, which “is based upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than individual worth and individual need” (Scalia 1979:153-4). Individuality has thus come to be incompatible with race, by disarticulating race from structural injustice.

Freddy Rice, the plaintiff in Rice vs. Cayetano (2000), was heavily sponsored by this coalition. Rice contested Hawaiian-only participation in the election of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustees as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, which disallows voting restrictions that refer to color, race or condition of servitude. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately declared the Hawaiian-only voting qualification unconstitutional, which compromised even the restricted measure of Hawaiian political self-determination afforded by OHA, a Hawai‘i State agency. A later lawsuit also cited the Equal Protection Clause, Earl Arakaki et al. vs. Lingle (2006). A multiracial group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of U.S. federal funding for programs that specifically target Hawaiians. Here, race is made to merely equal skin color. This equation underpins “Aloha for all,” the political slogan for a movement associated with Arakaki et al (2006). Pushing for the elimination of state agencies and programs that service Hawaiians, “Aloha for all” advocates position themselves against institutions that “divide people according to race, [and] send a message to Hawaiian people that they cannot be successful or make it on their own”. Rather than calling this a convenient amnesia, it is more productive to
notice how the language deployed to decry Hawaiian trusts and entitlements as “special” racial privileges has a history.\textsuperscript{296}

In the fallout from the \textit{Rice} decision, Charles Ota, a Japanese settler, was elected to serve as the first non-Hawaiian OHA trustee. Listed among Ota’s qualifications for office is his Purple Heart and combat medal for military service in the 442\textsuperscript{nd}, his tenure in the State Land Use Commission, his role in founding the Bank of Maui, and experience as a University of Hawai‘i regent (appointed by the Hawai‘i State governor). The article announcing Ota’s candidacy queried: “Is that sufficient enough to earn your vote?”\textsuperscript{292} This index of political entitlement is fundamental to not only settler colonial institutions but also collaborations between New Right and neoliberal cultural politics. His list of qualifications runs together liberal American civic sensibilities and an emphasis on capitalist financial savvy that characterizes “good leadership” in an increasingly neoliberal world. With assets amounting to $9.56 million,\textsuperscript{293} Ota’s business investments in real estate, tourism and other ventures attest to his capacity to contribute a “business and government background” to OHA.\textsuperscript{294} Further, set in Hawai‘i’s context, this neoliberal index of value has a neocolonial function as well. Dynamic compromises between liberal codes of political legitimacy and Hawai‘i’s historical formations of raced social justice make Ota, a Japanese American, a prime candidate for an elected officialdom over “Hawaiian Affairs.”

Critical questions about whether American patriotism and financial management skills are affirmative or negative indices of sufficiency to represent Hawaiian interests are conspicuously absent. Also unasked are queries into the limits placed on OHA’s obligations to
consider Hawaiian governance apart from U.S. interests by its status as a U.S. state institution.

The suggestion that this biography qualifies Ota for Hawaiian leadership suggests the histories that teach us that the U.S. military and capitalist investment (especially in land development and tourism) have opposed Hawaiian decolonization must be re-learned.

Contemporary political discourse should be reinscribed with reminders of friction between the U.S. and Hawaiians: political corruption at the level of State legislators, U.S. military unilateralism in decisions made “in the interest of national defense,” and environmental destruction that results from a tourism-based economy. Yet, the problem is not rectified by filling a gap in knowledge. Ota’s entrance into a “racially” homogenous institution, his “public” service and the fifty-years of “work” that brought him his wealth can be tracked into historical discourses of social justice. Specifically, the International Longshore and Warehouse Worker’s inter-racial labor union successful challenged to a white corporate monopoly (the “Big Five”) and the persistence of that mobilization in contests to Hawai‘i’s “second-class citizenship” as a U.S. territory – later celebrating its U.S. Statehood in 1959. The fractured and contested nature of Ota’s “public” and the “work” his business-making has wrought get cloaked by their resonances with the sense of emancipation, justice and righteous resistance carried from such histories.

Social justice’s meanings are recognized from these historied forms, which become a pool of overlapping and contradictory lessons with equally unpredictable effects. The decolonial contest thus involves not only recognizing Ota’s profitable businesses and U.S. military and civil service as settler colonization, but in further elucidating the colonial dimensions of our literacies in social justice that let us read them any other way.
Revisiting the politics of plantation feelings

Speaking to an assembly of the Kahuku Filipino community in 1939, Anatolio Luzon reasons that “the Plantation Bosses are very nice” because they “promoted us to white men job [sic]” (1939). Thus, he advises that “it is bad for us Filipinos to exercise this jealousy, if any of our countrymen are promoted to a responsibility [sic] job, we are to be proud that the officials of the Plantation trust us to hold such a good job” (1939). Filipino migrant laborers arrived to Hawai'i under contracts that specified employment in “cultivating, cut cane, we read that carefully. We didn’t read that we are going to be a luna [overseer], police, officeboy or timekeeper, all of this such a good job are not in our contracts”. Therefore, “let us forget what has been past throw away your ill feeling, let us be all friends again” (1939). 

Shigemitsu’s Baldwin was contemporaneous with the Luzon’s “nice” plantation white-man boss. Based on the arguments he puts forth, Luzon could figure as Shigemitsu’s stool pigeon. The stool pigeon’s subordinate comportment caricatures, and in so doing critiques, an interpretation of historical existence. I next consider that interpretation on its own terms.

Ostensibly, Luzon is providing a defense for the plantation’s racist employment hierarchy. For Luzon, legal contracts provide a racial structure for sociopolitical inequalities. Rather than a muddle of feudal ingratiations, justice in Luzon’s plantation community pivots on fetishizing the contract. By contrast, a discourse of planter paternalism recognized personal and piecemeal negotiations, as well as the labor contracts themselves, as structures of worker-oppression.

Whereas labor rhetorical counters Luzon’s resolution through feelings as beside the point, I’m more concerned with the link between throwing away feelings and forgetting the past. Two
discussions will engage this statement. First, how might Luzon’s attempt to settle labor disputes in terms of feelings be politicized without only negating his analysis? Can we recover something other than his failure to diagnose planter exploitation? This leads to a second question; how do “mere feelings” come to haunt the ways that claims to social injustice must be based on social injuries?

Luzon’s language of feelings is not political along the same logics that would later put “felt suffering” into an automatic diagnosis of structural failing. Injustice is not the name he gives to racism and classism, but rather the diminutive comportment of someone who expects too little. By abstracting himself from exploitative historical and political contexts, Luzon can become the liberal individual that enters contracts. This is at once a political claim to equal personhood and his subjugation to an oppressive hegemony.296

Seemingly autonomous affects linger around remembrances of Hawai‘i’s plantation community, but these sensations involve more than private experiences. Subjects experience putatively private feeling as evidence of private personhood. The capacity to organize a subject across time does not mean that this subject is ahistorical but rather that this capacity is organized historically. Another way to put it is that sensation makes subjectivities happen in the gaps between the tactile and ideological dimensions of existence. True political transformation “overthrows the power of ‘active’ understanding over ‘passive’ sensuousness” (Rancière 2004c:13). Seen this way, agency is not as slips out from history, but is rather historical singularity manifest.297 Sensation both matters to, and is the matter of, aesthetic politics.
While immured by sensation, experience is not thereby hermetically sealed within the physical ‘being’ in a moment. Working towards a “new partition of sensuousness” involves constituting oneself as an aesthetic subject (Rancière, Blechman et al. 2005:293). Michael J. Shapiro puts this mechanism pithily; “knowledge derived from sensation remains coextensive with the communicative because it is based on dimensions of bodies that emerge from interpretive struggles” (Shapiro 1993b:82). Emphasizing struggle as a modality of interpretation allows us to re-frame the political as the way truth is produced from sensation. Framed as an interpretive struggle over the meaning of sensation, agency is a version of emotional literacy. Approach impersonally, authentic, autonomous responses on the scene of plantation pasts – such as resentment - diffract into material conjunctures, forms, genres, and conventions and events that instruct recognition of personhood. Identifying the political role of feeling-pedagogies reframes what seem to be uniquely personal expressions within the possibility to act outside of those lessons. I’m locating the disrepair at the heart of a desire for social justice that imagines justice in terms that don’t cut to material redistribution or structural change.

To contest something at once as diffuse and intimate as oppression it seems entirely appropriate to speak in deeply personal idioms of feeling. Feelings, especially painful feelings, figure centrally in liberal protests, which are keyed to an individual who adversely experiences society. Yet, to unpack this kind of politics, we need to a theory of political subject-making that pivots on an ability to monitor sensations and translate them into social meanings. What calculus can ingest viscerally intimate experiences and ideals and delinks them from evidence of social contradiction?
Put together over a discourse of liberal humanism and social protest, the invocation of plantation suffering rehearses a script through which worker’s can call attention to their claims to social justice. Subjugated subjects do not inhabit these injured identities as in a legal shell-game. Deeply sited suffering-feeling draws a line under justice as the remediation of society’s subordination of specific identities. American cultured political subjectivity seems synonymous with true-to-oneselfness – a kind of fealty to an authentic emotional core. That seeming-ness has a history, which, insofar as it conditions a capacity to enact political intention, is also an act of agency.299

Felt-trauma of society’s failings supposedly symptomatize the unruly bad social somethings that law is meant to repair. In this sense, Berlant observes that the modal citizen is now a trauma-effect, rather than a “complex subject with rights, needs, reciprocal obligations to the state and society, conflicting self-interests, or prospects for happiness in realms beyond the juridical” (Berlant 2000a:54). Berlant elsewhere calls her the “subject of true feeling” (Berlant 2000a:55). Feelings are physical emanations that denote processes of social subject-making. They must be denotative because they are definitively ineloquent. “[T]he most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable of all” (Arendt 1958:50). The private definitively marks “the limit of what we can know” (Berlant 2000b:10). By siting evidence of social suffering in limits that are definitively inarticulate, the political comes to mean belaboring the cusp between of personal experience.
Playing Grounds

My thinking has moved through many iterations to get to this point: a genealogy of Asian settler decolonial agency that links to worker resistance cannot be framed within a contest for hegemony. We need an interpretative apparatus sensitive to how drama colors associations between things like “voting democratic,” denigrating “stool pigeons,” resenting the bango, and the selflessness of Asian settler demands to decolonize Hawai‘i.

Historically, post-World War II decolonization used vocabularies of national liberation and anti-colonial opposition. In this context, wholesale rejection seems an appropriate comportment to the patriotic forms of Asian settlers’ enfranchisement - capital accumulation through land development, combat and civil service to the U.S. military, and elected office into a Hawai‘i State. However, opposition is a limited guide to understanding how Asian settlers can act as agents of decolonization. This is because the same economic, national, kinship, imaginative and structures of feeling that invest Asian settlers in American identities locate their colonial complicity and potential decolonial agency. The point is not to re-consolidate original national groups, but rather to specify the epochal forms that emerge as political agency; that is, those acts that constitute detachment and reattachment to national histories and identities. Recognizing the forms through which new historical identities can be enacted requires much historical space and cultural depth.

Detachment from the American moorings of these past events, memories, institutions and especially identities is a necessary and difficult signal of support for Hawaiian decolonization. The difficulty lies in retaining the nation as a crucial area of study, while opening new terms to
understand traffic between nations that are not organized only by the nation. By creating space for a nuanced sensitivity to the experiences previously narrated as American, structures of agency for repudiation or support can be mined from moments in those who arrived in Hawai‘i as “immigrant” laborers, answered wartime loyalty questionnaires during World War II, profited from land development and affirmed to Hawaiian claims against U.S. injustice. An extra-U.S. historical frame is needed to locate points of detachment; where past events, memories and, especially, people, could find their American moorings, and then tie them to something else. By understanding the political as an effect of its differentiation from the “non-political” (such as memory, personal, experience, feelings, fantasy and that catchall category, the private), we can approach this process of branding these “moorings” as American. The aesthetic names this concept of the political because it works at the cusp between sensation and sense; it is the operation through which empirical experiences of space and temporality ground being. Insofar as the aesthetic synthesizes space and time, it also orders political visibility and legibility. The practice of decolonizing history means recognizing the complicity of, even and especially, what we feel to be the justice, histories and hopes that define us. This, I’m arguing, is the very feature that makes feelings that ride with emancipation and social justice a provocation to decolonial agency.

From my treatment of Territorial era worker resistance, I’ve shown that such desires are not comprehensively described as demands for an equal opportunity to access the ease of middle-class living. Approach as beginnings towards an unclear purpose, plantation worker re-memorization may open to surprising interpretations that re-diagnose Asian settler historical
agency as something more complicated and ubiquitous than "settler opportunism." The "singularity of desire" must be interrogated in terms that allow for historical subjects who thought beyond, or perhaps short of, a desire for hegemony (Shapiro 1993a:285). Condemning the whole jumble of thing that constitute plantation legacies on the basis of this narrowly framed instrument short-circuits desire into its manifestations as hegemony.

Justice means not only equalizing opportunity for enfranchisement, but the further possibility of desires "in-different" to the franchise (Vatter 2004:41). In-difference describes "the agency of no-rule," which does not pre-exist itself. That is, agency is not achieved only within an existing hegemony, but exceeds that order as "the power of disseminated beginnings" (Vatter 2004:41). Diversifying the histories through which we come into desires for social justice pushes those desires into legacies usable for decolonization.
CHAPTER FIVE

MEMORY ACTS: THE NEW POLITICS OF HAWAI'I'S PLANTATION HERITAGE

Asians – particularly the Japanese – like to harken back to the oppressions of the plantation era, although few Japanese in Hawai'i today actually worked on the plantations during the Territory (1900-1959). But at the threshold of a new century, it is the resilience of settler ideology which facilitates and justifies non-Native hegemony: “immigrants” who have struggled so hard and for so long deserve political and economic supremacy. Haunani-Kay Trask.304

Renewed assertions of Hawaiian nationhood demand that Asian “Americans” in Hawai'i re-evaluate their history as a “settler ideology” that Hawaiian studies professor, Haunani-Kay Trask, describes above. Having earned enfranchisement in Hawai'i’s post-plantation American capitalism, raced-labor immigrants, and their descendants, supposedly can be at peace with their piece of a U.S. occupied Hawai'i. As an ideology, the diffuse roots of a plantation narrative of historical resistance to Euro-American exploitation extend into historied-feelings of entitlement, emancipation and merely belonging that further get reworked into political tools. Hawai'i’s Territorial-era (1900-1959) plantation worker has been the crucial icon of this ideology.

Once a potent banner of resistance to a white planter oligarchy, especially in the 1930-1950s, the collectivity organized by that resistance reaches a limit in today’s plebiscites on Hawai'i’s U.S. occupation.305 This limit happens at an intersection with American political discourses306 that newly exploit the trappings of community configured from a gender and racially delimited, communion of union-organized “brothers under the skin”307 into a celebratory cause
for forgetting histories of Hawaiian’s dispossessed nationhood. How do past-experiences of plantation oppression get routed into affirmations of post-plantation colonialism? To distill the different political stakes of these histories, I’m proposing a descriptive project attenuated to the complicities generated by struggles for emancipation.

Hawaiian studies professor and activist, Haunani-Kay Trask presents us with a strong statement of Asian settler culpability that I approach obliquely. The object of her indictment not only U.S. hegemony writ large, but how it takes form in things like “false nostalgia” (Trask 1999: 169). What kind of politics amplifies what seem to be merely personal memories into ideological claims? And, how do they synthesize an ideological justification for enfranchisement in a colonizing America?

I’m tackling ‘harkening back’ as the problem of a social collective that persists in remembering their experiences in a way that we don’t want them to – at least, not anymore. It’s a weird question, but it is configured to subjects who are awkwardly complicit with a colonial order that doesn’t seem to have a clear place for them. I’m reminded of Jacques Rancière’s query to the French political intelligensia who were writing the history of revolutionary workers; “Is it possible that the quest for the true word compels us to shush so many people” (Rancière 1989:11)?

Partly, of course, this is because I’m attending to people who are not supposed to be speaking on the ground of Hawaiian political self-determination. Reasonably, “‘Native’ sovereignty is impossible when non-Natives determine the process” (Trask 2000:10). As a supplement to that reason, the story that these post-plantation-oppression people are retelling is
highly problematic. Hard-work, suffering and struggle against white racism subscribes to a "settler ideology" that ultimately redeems the possibility of justice under U.S. capitalism. This is what they're saying, and shushing them seems a most correct political desire under the circumstances.

They, of course, are non-Hawaiian descendents of, mostly Asian, plantation laborers who persist in recounting a rather traumatic history of exploitation, resistance and upward mobility against and through a viciously racist capitalist hierarchy. Less certain are the circumstances that they are speaking under. This chapter is a descriptive project. I'm describing another dimension of Hawai'i's occupation by American political culture in the publicized psychic space of a complicit Asian settler subject. A new narrative is needed to re-weave Asian settler pasts into Hawai'i's political present. How do the genres of the personal bracket nostalgia in a "non-political" space – whatever that means? In the attribution of colonial agency to this remembering-subject, how are we recovering that space? How does a history of having successfully struggled against colonial capitalism's subordinations get recruited into proof of that system's progress? To counter this recruitment, we need to situate these struggles within Hawai'i's shifting historical landscape of work and social justice. How would remembering that past of white planter oppression differently translate into different political commitments to Hawaiian decolonization?

Without discounting the significance of plantation worker insurrection, they also instantiate ways that capitalism's changing configurations can fund social transgression. "Overcoming" subordination to a white planter oligopoly happens in a breach opened by when Hawai'i's agricultural economy was transitioning towards other kind of capital. In a post-
planted era, a New Hawai‘i’s new industries - U.S. defense industry contract work, tourism and land development- continues the recognizable patterns of colonization - trivializing caricatures of Hawaiian cultural media, environmental destruction and finance capital’s systems of local resource extortion. Grating against the plantation’s racial hierarchy, a mixed-race working class greeted the globalizing political economy of a New Hawai‘i as emancipation from racist labor exploitation. As must as anti-racist resistance, we see a process in which racialized class-mobility partners with capitalism under the auspices of multicultural liberalism. Enabled by partnership, a new mixed-race ruling class can then “enter the [political and economic] corridors of white power” (Kosasa 2004:278-9). As the avatar of this new class, the Asian “settler opportunist” capitalizes on patriotic hubris and a distorted rhetoric of middle class racial equality to gain elected office, and then proceeds towards the usual path of political corruption through backdoor deals on land development schemes (Kosasa 2004:278-9). Condemning a subject on the basis of this narrowly framed opportunism short-circuits desire into the hegemony of a certain conception of the self. Defined as the “self” interested in capital accumulation, the settler opportunist is abstracted from history. The term functions as an epithet for colonial capitalism rather than a historical subject. Put otherwise, such a subject can only be a placeholder for political agency. In such an approach, agency falls out of the traffic between long-term affections for plantation pasts and a demand to retrofit decolonial agendas onto history.

Decolonizing history means rectifying a record of political economic and territorial dispossession most of all. But categorical analyses of capital, land, government, and law must be more than supplemented with the more unruly vectors of colonization. The “land and power”
motivations of settler opportunism don’t tell us much about how updated modes of colonization enlist desires for social transformation, memories of being the subject of historical justice, and optimistic equations between oppression and redemption (Cooper and Daws 1985). Such analyses give short shrift to a diversity of desires and strivings for better, different lives that structure political economic modalities.

“Hana Hana Days”

Fourteen years after the Kahuku sugar mill closed in 1971, 308 former workers, supervisors, and others from the community put together a reunion program they called “Hana Hana Days” (Kahuku Plantation Reunion Committee 1985). The program included a fashion show, “Pilipino” cooking demonstration, the Filipino String Orchestra, storytelling, remarks from former managers, group singing, and exhibitions of photographs from personal and company collections, which commemorate roughly seven decades of community life centered around the Kahuku Sugar Company. The reunion took place in several areas of the, then inoperative, Kahuku Sugar Mill. Attendees circulated through the Mill’s machine shop, museum and theater to view exhibits, photographs and a slide show until they were called together around the main stage for the invocation. Lunch was a bento, provided to each invited attendee and their guest. Kahuku shares this combination of activities, foods, and format with other remembrances of plantation community. I’m suggesting that we should attend to how reunions around Hawai‘i’s plantation pasts call people to have their memories, and especially the memories that seem most to belong only to them.
Cutting across the good and the bad in a plantation heritage are the opaque and singular
intimacies of community, family and personal experiences. For instance, although U.S. martial
law kept workers on the plantation at substandard wages, the U.S. military is not only
remembered this way. The mauka side of Kahukutown was dominated by the Kahuku Training
Area, which includes an area full of guava and mountain apples known to that era’s residents as
Green Valley. Although access to the Valley was restricted to military personnel, my
granduncle, Kenichi Sanjume, had an “army friend” who had a key (Sanjume 2004). This kind of
resonance between friendships, childhood and mountain apple colors plantation remembrances of
structural oppression under martial law.

Historical scarcity is also an opportunity to illustrate the largesse of beloved family
members in otherwise small acts. Sanjume, remembered her great-grandfather, Oji-chan Eto, who
had a prodigious garden in Kahuku that “grew everything... but he gave them away, he didn’t sell
or trade them” (Sanjume 2004). Yet, in the same minute that she recounts Eto’s generosity, she
maps the racial structures that condition his capacity to give them away. The Filipino housing
camps did not have backyards. Instead, they had communal plots that were on the way to
Walkerville, a subdivision for supervisors, which is where Eto planted his garden, at the house of
his son, Harry Shigemitsu.

This seemingly straightforwardly racist division of food-resources and occupational
status is inflected with at least three kinds of subjects. Filipinos did not receive supervisory
positions nor private-garden plots. On the other hand, the plantation management offered Harry
Shigemitsu the supervisory position as a way of detaching him from the ILWU; he had twice-
been elected as a union chairman. With seven children, two aging parents and a high probability that he would have lost his plantation housing, Shigemitsu had much compelling him to work for the plantation. Living conditions, even for a supervisor’s family, was Spartan. In response to my anemic query (“So, what was Kahuku like?”), my mother’s cousin, Mitsu Sanjume, offered a rich sketch of her childhood-Kahuku (late 1940-50s). Their house had seven kids and one bathroom. Bed-space was so limited that her brother, Earle, had to sleep in a crib well into his “toddler-age.” But, school lunch was ten cents, the food was good, and after school they played in their yard with the Kim’s and Kapana’s kids (Sanjume 2004). These memories attach feelings to past experiences of community that complicate efforts to rewrite history only as a colonial debt. Yet, this settler society is undeniably a part of Hawai‘i’s colonizing process.

In Trask’s analysis, Things like the “Hana hana days” reunion are politicized by an updated ideology of American colonization. As ideology, diffuse roots of plantation experiences in historied-feelings of entitlement, emancipation, resistance to Euro-American exploitation and merely belonging get reworked into political tools. A canny strategy is needed to negotiate an American political, and especially legal, culture that harbors categories of blame and blamelessness compel claimants to produce themselves as victims, or, conversely, intensely culpable for the wrongs wrought.

Memories of the good plantation community mark “moments of oppressive optimism in normal national culture” (Berlant 1997b:13). In these moments, “utopian desires are being tapped and translated into conservative worldviews” (Berlant 1997b:13). Tapping and translating desires are aesthetic political functions; they are “matter[s] of sensory experience, a form of partition of
the perceptible" (Rancière 2004b). Rancière’s concept of the political emphasizes the sensorial; “politics is first of all a sphere of appearance” (Rancière 2004b). To see the present as evidence of progress from a certain past, plantation histories function as an optic. In the same move, “harken[ing] back” asserts a collective insensitivity to a history of Hawaiian displacement. I’m pointing to the political imprints of shifting affective practices that order sensation into historical oppression (not)experienced into justifications for colonial complicity.

State heritage-making

“Hawai‘i is a land of immigrants, beginning with the first Polynesian settlers”
Dora Jacroux Chang,
Acting Manager of Hawai‘i Immigrant Heritage Preservation Center.

Although the Kahuku Plantation Reunion Committee may understand the object they commemorate as a self-referential event, their memorial retrieves a deeply political American pageant of overcoming and redemption. The back-story to “Hana hana days” sets its stakes in optimistic stories of workers’ social mobility. Parables of plantation oppression retrofit middle class American-ness of the present as the “just desserts” accrued from hard work, the successful inculcation of the pedagogies of citizenship, and overcome the elements of U.S. capitalism that identified them as disloyal saboteurs or labor drones (Trask 2000).

While many Hawaiians also have plantation memories, they must now have them differently. The usual story of the plantation consists in successive waves of immigrant-workers that leave the plantation in similar succession. Above, Chang extends the immigrant paradigm of plantation work to incorporate not just Hawaiians, but Hawai‘i’s land. Cutting across differences
between Hawaiians and settlers histories, this extension accomplishes a community form by
excising Hawai‘i’s historical, political and cultural eccentricity to the U.S. from the story. Now
animated by a New Right politics that purports to act on behalf of a suffering worker, this
heretofore-liberal fantasy of race and gender-blind American justice takes on new meaning in
Hawaiian decolonization.

In pasts organized by the plantation, Hawai‘i’s “people” are particularly a working
people. The look and feel of this plantation worker-community smuggles narratives of
emancipation-within-U.S. capitalism through a (Asian) worker-figure’s monopoly on an index of
entitlement. In the struggle to be Hawai‘i’s iconic worker, the deck is stacked towards Asian
settlers’ historical identities – as a transnational contract laborer, a toiler in the plantation’s
factories and fields, and the rank and file of 1950s labor unions. Here, Trask’s “settler ideology”
puts pressure on Hawaiian decolonial arguments to conform to a meritocratic language that
defines the most deserving subject of social justice (Trask 2000:4). A settler ideology’s founding
fiction of Hawai‘i’s multicultural community formation, in which “everyone is deserving of the
same treatment because everyone is an immigrant” (Trask 1992: 256-7), now finds fertile ground
in the New Right’s legal attacks on Hawaiian trusts and entitlements. Arguing that Hawaiian
historical entitlements are “special privileges,” New Rightists rather push for a “colorblind” index
of deserving figured from the delimited archetype of an American worker.

Hawai‘i State politicians often exploit the political utility of the worker-community form
in order to unite a polity over the contradictions of historical colonization. By mobilizing a
certain version of historical events, and the shifting currencies of community and privacy,
Hawai'i State representatives secure a sense that attachments to a community that indexes justice to worker suffering are also attachments to an American community in Hawai'i. This is the rhetorical relay between U.S. new Right cultural politics of feeling and Hawai'i's colonial administrators.

In his 1969 State of the State of Hawai'i address, Governor John A. Burns' portrait of the "people of Hawai'i" attempts to unify these "people" through common experiences of plantation racism. He urged those who "know full well what I mean" to celebrate overcoming a "social and psychological handicap," by which he meant the feelings of inferiority engendered by plantation racism. The conservation of Hawai'i's colonial order is abetted by the articulation between plantation experiences and State-heritage-making projects. Burns calls a collective into being—a "people of Hawai'i"—by addressing that call to the plantation as the unifying referent of modern Hawai'i's heritage. But, the modalities of this unification do not place formal demands to verify belonging. Heritage unifies Hawai'i's "people" by making the appeal of the historic progress of the plantation-worker into a form of belonging. Common experiences that come to be known as having overcome suffering glues together Burns' "people" over the political gap of Hawai'i's violated nationhood. Burns' people are those who have an interiorized relationship to the progress promised by a community united in the feeling of overcoming the "handicaps" of oppression.

Dissecting the transformation of that handicap-as-feeling into a social attachment requires a political vocabulary attenuated by particular technologies used to cohere this community.

Well-versed in this story of overcoming, post-plantation workers can narrate pasts of racist labor exploitation into an experience of faith in American social justice redeemed. This
history of resistance is used to attach justice to processes by which home ownership, upward class
mobility (of themselves and others), and sexual privacy are achieved and are further linked to
feelings of security, enfranchisement, and emancipation. Disinheritng this legacy of
“overcoming” plantation handicaps must work at the incorporation of these personal dimensions
into politics.

Work Experience

I next consider the specifically American genealogy of “false nostalgia” (Trask 1999:169). Having not actually suffered, “false nostalgia” can only be a confused political reaction that attempts to appropriate the identity of the proper subject of social justice.

Appropriately, the form of Burns’ community is utopic. Formally “no-place,” a community united by a diffusive and stereoscopic plantation heritage derives from recognizing one’s presence in relation to a social history. As illustrated in Burns’ attempt, political collectivizing is a process of attaching an endogenous-seeming experience to the actual structures a community presumes to be in-common. As utopia, a heritage-relation resists mapping as a historical artifact, but submits to an analysis attentive to its forms: memories, imagination, fantasy, desires for social transformation and especially pleasure. These forms are further indicated in Haunani-Kay Trask’s seemingly pedestrian observation that “Asian…. settlers like to harken back,” which thereby puts a politics to pleasure and names this a trajectory of Asian settler colonialism (emphasis mine (Trask 2000:4)). In her view, pleasure devolves from a desire to have been publicly present to a certain history, which places the present as the just-desserts of unjust suffering.
Our analyses coordinate around the observation that feelings figure as connective tissue to these historical scenarios. However, I depart from Trask’s analysis over the ways that personal experiences house an ambivalence that slips outside of “actual” events. Indicting “falsity” is necessary as the limit case to a structure of knowledge, but it is also a limited way of approaching how falseness comes to bear on that structure. Stepping back a bit, we must notice that separating those who “actually worked on the plantations” from those who merely identify with an ethnic heritage is itself located within a problematic rhetoric that puts experiences into claims to structural injustice (Trask 2000:4).

Workers on the historical plantation have all the recognizable elements of social oppressions remediable by the U.S.: suffering under white racist overseers, earnestly hard-working Americanizing students, and heroic military sacrifices in World War I and II. Parsing an “image” of the worker as rights-claimant inventories the components of this apparatus: sensations of experience, the naming of those sensations as injury-suffered, and an instituted circuit of legal remediation for injuries. Feelings are not abstract actors in legal apparatuses. An individual’s felt sensations become vectors for “the pain of social inequality” (Berlant 2004:1). Burns’ plantation heritage hosts these images of social justice in subjects of racist labor exploitation. This image is replayed in private venues as a desire for a relationship to a particular history, but is also the political dimension of identity. As I’ve been arguing, this alignment of feelings and political identifications needs more elaboration.

Pleasure taken in harkening to the oppressions of a plantation era is a new modality of colonization produced at an intersection with a particularly American configuration of political
community. Pleasure and pain are channeled into that community through atomistic attachments that give those sensations social meaning. These are the very sensations embedded within what might feel to be direct connections between personal experience and, how that experience is made meaningful as something that commits us to a certain version of history.

Considered within a political economy that trades personal suffering for rights-claims, “false nostalgia” is a collapsing identification with oppression by proxy. However, we can approach the memories of things not actually experienced as something other than fictive distractions from the “real” scene of political action. Instead of locating the problem only with collective Asian settler disingenuousness, we must consider how it happens as a consequence of a disrepaired American cultural politics.

Feminist, queer, anti-racist and abolitionist struggles are part of the genealogy of a discourse that helped to engender a legal calculus of injury in which pain counts politically (Berlant 2000a:55). This formula for converting suffering into identity claims to legal rights and material redistribution has been constructed over a history of social protest – suffragists, abolitionists, and U.S. minority civil rights activists. Historically liberal, the emotive mode of identifying social injury places the predicates for the New Right discourse of conservative compassion. Empathy and compassion are the modal counterparts to social suffering. “Political sentimentality” names the presumption that feelings can make a community proximal to social justice (Berlant 2002b:163).

Insofar as plantation remembrances value and are valued in these discourses, their putatively non-political sites are trafficked into an intersection where a new Right cultural politics
occupies Hawai‘i. Seemingly innocuous appeals to a common heritage now attain virulence beyond Burns’ banal politician’s rhetoric. In New Right discourses, Hawaiian entitlements are not stop-gap measures in apology for the 1893 Overthrow, but rather stoppages to America’s historic promises of meritocratic justice. Histories of Hawai‘i’s settlement, plantation memorials and memories, and Hawaiian sovereignty struggles take on new meanings in (neo)conservative discourses of compassion for workers.

The historico-aesthetics of this “worker” thematically installs components of New Right values, American hegemony, and a meritocratic logic (which pervades early Asian American civil rights claims based on arguments that “we built America”) into Hawai‘i’s social history. Past pursuits of racial equality get mis-remembered and then drawn into the New Right’s images of justice as justice for a rigorously normal American worker’s intimate lifeworld. Dispersing these receptive grounds may allow us to re-cluster Hawai‘i’s plantation pasts into structures of decolonial agency.

Berlant traces out the genealogy that brings the worker into a starring role in a New Right plot of economic crisis. The worker is the overtaxed and underemployed figure in a landscape of an overlarge state and the “loss of jobs” to the global South (Berlant 2004:2). Restoratives for worker-suffering thus draw a direct line from his private life to tax cuts and welfare-to-work programs (Berlant 2004:2). Rejecting the welfare state of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, the compassionate conservative rewrites state obligations by relocating “the template of justice” from historical collectives of specific groups to individuals (Berlant 2004:2). Templates of the welfare state’s family-waged icons of intimacy are retained without a welfare state endowed with
regulative capacity to provide that wage.326 Reversing the liberal welfare state’s assumptions about public obligations, the New Right articulates a particular fiction of America as a “good society” whose very goods is better secured outside of the State’s invasive policies, rights and laws (Berlant 2004:2). Increasingly, State protection comes to mean brokering in pledges of safety for the worker’s intimate attachments. This relationship to the state has a specifically economic form. This state must protect the “economic sovereignty” of workers – a protection which becomes “the amassing of corporate wealth on the theory that such wealth will produce investments that make the jobs that workers need to maintain their zones of intimacy” (Berlant 2004:3).

Workers, community, and privacy are thus amplified and distorted in New Right discourses that have come to trouble Hawaiian decolonization in more ways than a focus on equal rights can address. They are unaddressed, in part, because the compassionate conservative’s imagination of U.S. political community is itself diffuse; “[n]o longer valuing personhood as something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a public good only in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private worlds” (Berlant 1997b:4-5). The compassionate conservative “reprograms the equation of liberal-radical social struggle” between personal experiences and collective conditions into cause for further barricading workers in the safety of their private spheres, away from an intrusive public (Berlant 2000a:55).

Seen as always deeper and more singular than their location in impersonal public structures, people’s real lives are inhabited in a “live fantasy” of these simultaneous look-alike
zones (Berlant 1997b:8). This fantasy is the utopia-mode of a political community that is attached through virtual spaces – televisions, mass communication media, imagination and optimism (Berlant 2000a:43). Living alone, together, in regularized family zones, serialized “private” spheres constitute the national public. In contrast to historical concepts of privacy as harbors for qualitatively different dimensions of a person, this telecommunicative public shames those who have supposedly improper private personhoods.127

Drawing on liberal logics of social injury, Burns reasons that racist oppression handicaps subjects by imparting “feelings of inferiority”. This translation of experiences of social injury into the possibility of political remediation is the particular “alchemy” of the privileged “image of the person who could conjure rights” (Goldberg-Hiller 2006:16). The incoherence of these magics is matched by American law’s limited software for addressing the systemic inequalities that proliferate from capital’s likewise incoherent forms of exploitation. At the heart of the difficulty is a configuration of feeling deeply embedded in the “spaces posited by or through identity” (Patton 1995:227). Identity “posits” a space by locating social suffering in individuals. This distorted configuration compounds the significance of “acts and identities performed in the intimate domains of the quotidian” as signs of political belonging (Berlant 2005b:2). We thus need to specify how feeling-acts and identities enter the political.

Affections retrofitted onto history

In his study of company towns on the U.S. continent, architectural geographer John Garner notes that former workers “had no long-term affection for the place in which they lived and worked” (Garner 1992:5). This disaffection is a political analysis. Garner’s company towns
had "well designed houses, parks, schools, libraries, and meeting halls, all set within an attractive landscape, ... equally exceptional were the social programs that extended to the families of employees" (Garner 1992:4). An "architectural and economic success," the company town's model environment was buoyed by company profits in a seeming synchronicity of capital and labor (Garner 1992:5). He surmises that former residents' lack of affective attachments testify to the political failures of towns – their near total subjection to company rule.

Historically, workers in Hawai'i's Territorial-era Kahukutown (1900-1959) were not attached to plantations by amorphous affects either. Acutely unsentimental labor contracts and martial law during World War II bound them to compulsory agricultural labor. Given their historical and morphological similarities, it seems reasonable to extend Garner's analysis to Kahukutown. He neatly keys affective disenchantment to widespread disenfranchisement from local governance and property ownership. However, Kahukutown sharply diverges from Garner's equation between historical oppression and present disaffection.

Hawai'i's departure from the trend Garner observes might devolve from the emphasis Hawai'i planters placed on settling workers into families. As early as 1886, plantation managers encouraged increased immigration of women and men with families under the presumption that family obligations would prohibit workers from leaving the plantation (Takaki 1993:250-1). The company thus strategized certain familial structures of commitment to retain workers. Some workers re-invented familial support networks in response to planter exploitation of these commitments. Tom Shigemitsu, another former Kahuku plantation worker and ILWU activist, recounts the way his family negotiated company threats to themselves and their elderly parents,
wives, and children, who also lived in Kahuku company housing. To safeguard at least one male wage and their house Tom Shigemitsu initially abstained from union activity; “they [his union-organizer brothers, Harry and Richard] didn’t want me to be too active in the union [ILWU]. Because he and your grandfather [Richard] were really active and they might go to jail. And if they go to jail – nobody outside except me to take care of the family. So they tell me stay outside” (Shigemitsu 2004b:21).

Actually brought together through common subjection to white capital’s economic imperatives, such celebratory remembrances of the plantation community have proved impervious to debunking. Such resilience indicates that the political function of remembered sentiments lies outside of a contest over historical facticity. Likewise, I argue that the political form of “harken[ing] back” is better seen as an experience generated from a post-Fordist present, rather than within only a contest of oppression. To analyze the politics of Territorial-era plantation memories and memorials, we must attend to their fantastic and discursive forms in the acrobatic temporality of psyche-space as things that move from material sociopolitical regimes.

In this sense, “to harken back” is not a claim to an historical artifact. Crucially, it becomes a political event in the guise of the personal.329 Singular, memoried-experiences are molded into testament to worker progress by corralling them into “a public attitude” that is drawn up into a collective heritage.330 The politics of formally non-political memorials like “Hana Hana days” are constituted in a “passage from the personal to the collective” (Grunebaum-Ralph 2001:199). The formal properties of the personal function to privatize what might otherwise underline experiences as encounters with oppressive political structures. At the interpretive
interface between experience and sensation, "America" inserts itself to create an identity as an agent of justice - the social remediator of felt-pain. Overidentification with past trauma, "keeping the wound open" (Hirsch 1999:16), results when the trajectory that binds felt-experiences, justice and the U.S. state is sustained. Outside of this binding, how else can we describe the agency of remembering?

Remembering becomes political in a context cross-hatched by Hawaiian decolonization and what Lauren Berlant calls "post-Fordist affect" - the new affective practices engendered in a contemporary capitalist culture - that lead her to ask; "[h]ow do fantasy-practice clusters... become the grounds for political and social conservatism" (Berlant 2007a:278)? Deeply conservative plots recur in "plantation stories;" usually bringing us up to date with reports about a daughter or granddaughter in tertiary educational institutions on the U.S. continent. These narratives become an engine of Asian settler colonialism via a remembering-subject whose experiences attest to a partnership between emancipation from racist planter exploitation and the justice of socioeconomic "progress" achieved under American capitalism. Increasingly, the confirmation of the present as progress from the past is harder to come by for a U.S. "middle class". I'm suggesting this sense of scarcity is itself a context for the politics of harkening.

Remembering plantation pasts strives to make the present normal - or at least to not feel responsible for the ways that the present isn't good for Hawaiians. Yet, while striving to be normal is a political activity, it isn't everywhere identical to authoring a norm. Learning a norm, and then applying it to one's singular "everyday" indicates the presence of a kind of agency, but not of the same order as capitalism, the State, militaries, or mass media. Failing to "dream big" is
not best understood as a characterological flaw, but rather a consequence of a myopic political culture.334

Modest hopes for leasehold-homes secured by state preservation programs, the opportunism of corrupt political land-dealings, and that career aspirations will be realized in one’s progeny are instances of “cruel optimism” – optimism for normalcy serves as both protection against trauma and a stoppage to desires for a transformation of a norm. For those without control over the material conditions of their lives, the everyday sites a sphere of agency restricted to genres of fantasy and an optimism that wards off debilitating despair.335 Lauren Berlant cautions that these optimisms are not politically equal. The difference in kind is also a difference of degree. The politics of the everyday thus poses the problem of identifying what kind of power is wielded by striving to be normal.

She offers an explanation of a “cruel” mechanism in which people remain in an optimistic trajectory towards some hoped-for-thing – “a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” (Berlant 2006:21). The privatized horizons of home-ownership, companionate marriages of convenience, and having ‘just enough to eat’ are examples of such compromises. Locating this toxicity within an archive of decolonization puts a history to what might otherwise only be received as a failure of political will. That is, the archive counters the depoliticization of the reticence to realize Hawaiian self-determination by bringing those things marked as personal into a genealogy of political personhood.

Constricted political imaginations are a toxic context for decolonization’s idioms of revolutionary change. Berlant articulates these constrictions in the following scenario; “[t]he
conventional fantasy that a revolutionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning towards a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects” (Berlant 2006:31). Personal or group preference is not precisely political agency – yet it seems to mimic sovereignty’s form. This “something like agency” may better approximate the political location of the pleasure of those who harken back. Shortly, the bare minimum of optimism for getting something a little better in normally disrepaired systems blackmails subjects to reinvest in those systems because the experience of losing that optimism would be shattering. In order to put a politics to their mutely-memoried acts, we need to consider a psychoanalysis of political affect.

Memory studies and psychoanalysis parse personal interiority into analyzable components, which can be further displaced onto political problems of collective organization. This displacement can be more than a categorical error if we attend to the singular play of formally interpersonal processes that get transposed into political meanings. Capitalist culture produces this interior, and thus sets up turning “inward,” remembering, and harkening back as a move towards respite, desire and pleasure.

Politically, we can place the production of subjects with only optimism to lose as a consequence of the renewed vigor of neoliberal capitalist exploitation. A perceived absent fullness, (capitalism’s social alienation) conditions the value of the supposedly non-alienated community, at once assigning it a value and placing it outside of commodity exchange (Laclau 1997:303). Capital shapes freedom as that which is lacking in capital’s commodities, an escape from economic coercion. Singularities in culture, feelings, the good life, community, personal
memory are coded as priceless forms, by marking personhood in their distance from a, thereby impersonal, capitalist value system. I'm pointing to the ways that the premium placed on pricelessness happens through deeply non-trivial forms of history, political economy and desire that, in turn, embed the political virulence of plantation memories.

Understood as a structural effect of late capitalism, things like the plantation "way of life" can be tracked into new patterns and forms of labor exploitation and economy. Hana hana days finds value for singular affections for the plantation community by apprehending what seems to be their distance from capital's impersonality. Cultural geographer, John Brinckerhoff Jackson re-describes the landscape of rural community-togetherness as "a process by which grass is converted into beef, nitrogen into wheat, dollars into gasoline and back into dollars" (Jackson 1997:104). Jackson's portrait suggests how an aesthetic can order meaning in the service of capital. His agricultural machine-image disturbs the romantic discourse of agrarian pastoralism.

Romance and realism are parallel, constituting their identities from their perceived opposition to each other, and then get directed into specific forms of exploitation. Reading plantation pastoralism as merely a misread node in an economic mechanism thus parses romance's constitutive process of misrecognizing its object. This understanding affirms romance's singular form, without creating an alibi for its historical complicity. As such, this industrial imagery is meant to be a realist corrective to romance's variety of concealed capitalist exploitation. Part of the problem concerns the wholly personal relationships we are supposed to have to experiences of social identities. Ensconced in a personal world of unique meanings, retelling the experiences of suffering of racism and planter exploitation "provide privatized
images of class struggle" (Berlant 1993:218). Dispersed experiences get drawn together into an image of the plantation community, but one that is encouraged not to stake its claims outside of itself.

Pleasure and hardship are run together homeopathically in worker-community remembrances. The embattled sense of this scene commonly rhymes with a mitigating sense of "being in it together;" the affective 'core' of community-togetherness. Surviving into the present, this core is the matter of memory that makes one's pleasure personal and self referential (Berlant 2001a:433). Here, personalized accesses to plantation pasts can expunge the political, and the impersonal categories of class relations, as something alienating to the immediate intimacy of memory. The counterstrategy cannot approach the processes of exteriorizing the political from the private by trivializing personal pleasures as political utilities. What might otherwise here be a convergent critique of class relations under capital stumbles into the space bracketed by psychical temporality. The psyche serves as a crucial venue for approaching Asian settler attachments to colonizing systems. In psychical space, memories and pleasures synthesized from oppression (even if it isn't experienced as such) get reformulated in the uncertain relations of Asian settlers to Hawaiian claims to U.S. injustice.

Something like agency

Hawai'i's Territorial plantation towns would seem to be poor places to look for historical agents. Workers were vulnerable to a panoptic company authority that seeped through capillaries extended beyond the factory and fields into homes. Ever attendant threats of eviction, imprisonment, blacklists, fines, and deportation foreclosed anything like a democratic public
realm, and therefore, the possibility of reading archived records of worker-utterances outside of that coercive atmosphere. For instance, T.G.S. Walker, the Kahuku plantation manager between 1928-1940, refused to allow workers to transfer to other plantations and retained a “network of spies” amongst those in his employ (Baldridge 1992:14, 125-30). Asian settler colonial complicity is rather located in the mediations of this milieu into a heritage— the afterlife of the plantation.

Memories, and their tight binding to subjective experience, serve as a repeatable mode of asserting authority over the story of one’s historical formation. Claims to experience are part of a process whereby singular pasts become metonyms of a collective heritage. The reciprocities between experience and memory’s synthetic capacities allow spillages over borders between historical documentation and aesthetic creation. Political accountability for creating an American history in Hawai’i is somewhere in this spillage. Taking cues from Gayatri Spivak, I understand agency as not simply the capacity to remake history, but also to recognize structures that underwrite that capacity. I’m suggesting that the lessons through which Hawai’i plantation laborers attached material forms, feelings and rhetorics to emancipation survive as evidence of historical agency, where agency is, at minimum, literacy in those lessons.

Revisited plantation pasts can be read by someone as a sign of emancipation under American justice only if she is literate in an aesthetic pedagogy that puts feeling-free together from sensations, whiteness, power and social change. Feeling-emancipated requires that one interpret material shifts and historical processes as signs of Burns’ inferior feelings-overcome. His narrative of Hawai’i’s people is also a lesson that their pasts carry the substance of a heritage.
Long-term community affections, the worker-figure they re-unite around today, a politicized privacy that entwines truth, experience and memory and especially a political economy of reduced expectations structure the politics of this kind of feeling.

The discourses, institutions and histories that constitute overcoming organize "transformational environments" in which subjects re-learn to attach sensation to new objects like love and nation (Berlant 1999:224). But, a transformative environment can be a romantic relationship, a reunion or a military tribunal – anything that offers the reciprocity necessary to confirm that a change has occurred. I’m suggesting that the pedagogies that teach us to recognize social justice’s forms are political. These are the lessons that attach material forms, feelings and rhetorics to emancipation, oppression and resistance. This concept of literacy, as retroactive attachments, offers a way into understanding “false nostalgia” as a kind of agency.

Marianne Hirsch’s concept of postmemory suggests an approach attenuated to an identity that happens across a generational gap in experience. Postmemory,” Hirsch writes, “is not an identity position, but a space of remembrance more broadly available through cultural and public, and not merely individual and personal, acts of remembrance, identification, and projection” (Hirsch 1999:8). Like Trask’s “false nostalgia,” postmemory takes form in “a generation that didn’t have the experience that it is nevertheless been shaped by... a postmemory” (Hirsch 2006:32). Rather than indicting its falsity, we can theorize the politics that proliferates when desire for a memory is carried across a gap in generations and experience.

Memories harbor the political in experience’s claim to the authenticity of physical sensation; it “is the place from which memory speaks its truth, or performs its truth-effect”
False-ness, here, does not point to the memory’s failures, but rather its synthetic capacities. Synthesizing a relationship to something outside of experience indicates the operations of the aesthetical. In this sense, having been shaped by experiences and events that one has not had describes the general condition of historical being. All memories are affective sensed, which is precisely that which makes them memorable and immediate to present experience (Bal, Crewe et al. 1999:viii). But memory is an activity, not merely a condition of being: “memory is active and it is situated in the present” (Bal, Crewe et al. 1999:viii). An activity continuously happening after the fact, memory’s syntheses of the past are copiloted by present significances.

Psychoanalysis’ concept of “deferred reaction,” or nachträglich, describes processes through which the consciousness of a material present is constituted in the form of memory-traces that are “subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances – to a re-transcription” (Freud qtd. in (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973:112)). A deferred reaction is a synthetic operation in which “consciousness constitutes its own past, constantly subjecting its meaning to revision in conformity with its ‘project’” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973:112). Put into this process of constituting a consciousness, we can attend to plantation memories as specifically personal projects, rather than only in their disingenuous social dimensions. Hirsch outlines an evaluative framework for these personal projects; “[i]f they [the images] cut and wound, do they enable memory, mourning, and working through? Or is their repetition an effect of melancholic replay, appropriative identification” (Hirsch 2001:8)? Hirsch’s query intersects with the political critique of the recall of plantation oppressions as disingenuous attempts to appropriate the identity.
of the subject of social injustice. Within the caution that history cannot be presumed to mimic psychoanalytic processes, the distance between "working through," or mourning, and melancholic appropriation can be used to evaluate different receptive contexts for historical oppression (Hirsch 1999:16). The "work" of "working through" involves "self-reflexivity... the determination of responsibility, some amount of distance" (Hirsch 1999:16). That distance sites the agency of remembering-subjects, who activate memories that they may not have actually experienced. In other words, we can bring post-memory's work, which consists in "representation, projection, and creation," to bear on the politics of "false nostalgia" by further elucidating the trajectory of that work (Hirsch 2001:9). This concept of agency is not an innate personal power, but an interface with hegemony's guide to how to interprets sensation.

Working through the interface between experiential knowledge, aesthetic synthesis and politics must discipline fantasy, especially fantasies of identity, into proper places. Formally "outside" of public History, postmemory's aesthetic structures of transmission work at the deep complicity between the political and the aesthetic. Further distinguished by "aesthetic structures of transmission", Hirsch's postmemory produces an alternative to "false nostalgia" that may more selectively engage aesthetical capacities of recontextualization without substituting aesthetical forms for political analysis. Recognizing the aesthetic and psychical apparatuses through which memory's syntheses operate might intervene in the capacity of the private to shelter discredited optimism for interpersonal resolutions to Hawai'i's U.S. occupation.
Recollection

My analysis has zig-zagged over creative memory-work and their recruitment into a New
Right affective milieu to describe their political grip on Hawai‘i’s plantation pasts. This “grip”
devolves from a specifically U.S. juridical aesthetic that licenses felt-suffering to claim to
evidence of society’s structural disrepairs. Seen within a newly conservatism, this historically
liberal-progressive justice-discourse renders memories, desires and experience into intensely
political sites. When memories and experiences of plantation oppressions enter these discourses,
they get engulfed as politicized intimacies. This is a paradox in which they are supposed to
transcend the merely political and yet serve as butwarks against new political analyses, such as
decolonization. The tensions I’ve outlined between a plantation-worker heritage and Hawaiian
decolonization illustrates the need to theorize the modalities through which American politics
occupies Hawai‘i.

I suggest these movements mean that we have to be very specific about what we mean by
agency. Plantation memorializing is a synthetic activity of hegemonic projection, investment and
therefore, of aesthetic creation as well. As an aesthetic structure, pleasure produced from a
(post)memory has consistencies at once more tenuous and more pliable than historical facticity.
These qualities distance “false nostalgia” from political claims to juridical remediative actions.
But understood as an aesthetic capacity to romance the plantation community, or to synthesize
justifications of “just desserts,” postmemory may be only something like agency.

Re-uniting over the plantation recognizes having left in the first place. This movement is
experienced as the pleasure of being present to promised rewards of a, now stagnant, American
dream of upward mobility. Specifically, it recognizes an optimistic attachment to a promise that "things are going to get better," which gets confirmed insofar as the present can be inventoried as the arrival of better things. Put otherwise, pleasure produced by re-membering an optimistic self, or at least a self on the way to something, holds together a historical narrative, the social license to recognize one's self in that story, and a sensorial apparatus that interprets social recognition into pleasure-sensations. In this restricted sense, memories can colonize Hawai'i history with optimism for America.

Vigilant monitoring of processes by which experience, feeling and sensation achieve social meanings may locate possible ploys for condensing agency away from recuperation into this new Right cultural politics. A decolonial archive host a venue for this vigilance. Spread out in its space of time, we can turn the political dimension of this jumble of feelings, empirical events, and memoried-experiences towards the range of our vision.
CHAPTER SIX

WHAT'S LEFT OF ASIAN AMERICA?: DECOLONIZING JUSTICE

Political Futurity, Identity and Justice

What we are talking about here is the hardest problem, of understanding the difficulty of unlearning attachments to regimes of injustice. Justice itself is a technology of deferral or patience that keeps people engrossed politically, when they are, in the ongoing drama of optimism and disappointment—Lauren Berlant.341

I'm going to talk about attachments to justice that animate settler efforts to reconcile with a Hawaiian-Hawai'i. Ensnared in a repeating play of optimism and disappointment, our political affects remain engaged with learning to recognize ourselves in this "ongoing drama". But, reading identities into this script won't necessarily guide us towards a decolonized Hawai'i. This is the difference between becoming authors of our feelings and "having a world" (Berlant 2007a:297).

Amongst other things, political identities are also temporal contexts. Haunani-Kay Trask lays out the conundrum in stark terms; she twins a negative declaration that identity is "not a problem for Native Hawaiians" with an affirmation that identity as a central problem settlers (Trask 2000:30). Being a settler identifies people as a problem.342 By contrast, being Hawaiian in Hawai'i identifies a separate set of people and problems.343 Colonial temporality constellates these identities around the problem of ongoing injustice. I concur with Trask's differential dismissal of identity-problems and go on to map that difference onto their loci in Hawai'i's colonial temporality. This chapter focuses on the role of time in the identity-work that Asian settlers engage as decolonizing subjects.
Without displacing the crucial difference between authoring feelings and "having a world," I suggest that these two projects may not be discontinuous in a colonial temporality (Berlant 2007a:297). Indeed, the entire premise of decolonization reckons with what it means to work from compromised terms. At play in these compromises is the necessary sorting out of structures that reproduce allegiances to systems of colonial oppression, "which we must acknowledge in order to act" (Spivak 1999a:370, n79). Feelings, especially the authorial presumption of owning emotions separately, individually, are part of that structure. Condensed from the politically compromised grounds of Asian settler historicity, feelings may be nascent glimmerings of decolonial collectivity that animates strivings to "have a world."

Emotional-temporality animates our desires for the justice of decolonization. In a decolonial archive, desires to be the agent of justice appear as mechanisms that emplace felt-injury in proximity to social injustice. This order of operations has a distinctly American liberal genealogy, which has been reconfigured by new conservative agendas. Formally, the political disrepair seems to be one of misdirected energies and politicized distractions. But, extracting ourselves from these forms to get down to the 'real scene of politics' may mean again misrecognize the technologies of patience and deferral that politicize optimism, disappointment, drama, misdirection and distracted-ness. I'm reiterating that they are desires. In a time of wanting, movements, especially those that don't get us closer to political objectives, are part of this "drama of ongoing optimism and disappointment."

The point is not to get control of this drama, and thus author our feelings, but to rather see how participating in this play keeps us engaged in well-intended, but un-efficacious, projects.
After offering an illustration of deferral as a political technology in the context of Hawaiian indigenous claims, I shift back to discuss how temporality politicizes an Asian settler identity-locus.

The authors of the 1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) acknowledge five main purposes for the Commission, one of which is: "preventing alienation of the fee title to the lands set aside under this Act so that these lands will always be held in trust for continued use by native Hawaiians in perpetuity." Citing the Act's classification of "Hawaiians" by fifty-percent or more blood quantum, Haunani-Kay Trask points to an effect unlisted with the HHCA's five purposes. She writes, "Imposed systems of identification are instituted to separate our people from our lands and from each other in perpetuity...the white people who created our classification hoped that Hawaiians of 50 percent or more blood quantum would eventually die out, thus leaving our lands and revenues not to Hawaiians of less than 50 percent blood but to the state and federal governments" (Trask 1993:135). Obligations to Hawaiians extended into perpetuity, Trask cannily notes, are linked to identification-technologies that bet on the eradication of fifty-percent blood quantum Hawaiians.

Here, Trask's criticisms target a synchronicity between the justice of the HHCA's professed function of setting aside Hawaiian land for safe-keeping in perpetuity and the Act's racist blood quantum in as a political use of deferral. The HHCA's identity classification-scheme and its specifically temporal purpose (to hold lands "in trust") abet each other to promote a politics of frustrated deferral.
Demurring from policy analysis, I’m pointing to the HHCA to focus on its futurity as a political technology. As a perpetual horizon, some fuzzy sense of projection through time orients practices of Hawaiian identification (especially towards nation-ness), the role of institutions and trustees, and most relevantly to my project, the work that defines decolonizing subjectivities in the meantime.

Insofar as identity is a problem for settlers, the political imagination on which we set to work on identity must be problematized as well. Jettisoning the shell game that “identity politics” has come to mean can be plotted as a canny rejection of American political culture’s inward movements. But such an evasive maneuver is unavailable to Asian settlers. Not-identifying is now coextensive with the discursive terrain of new Right “colorblindness,” which is itself drawn from a liberal imagination of individual identity-spaces. Especially at its intersection with multiculturalism, liberalism has also posited that the social is best organized into individuated spheres that do not bear upon each other. While this concept capaciously underlies criticisms of social structures that unequally bear on different kinds of subjects, it also underlies the idea that interdependence threatens assimilation. “Anti-assimilation slides into liberal individualism;” Shane Phelan observes, “rather than offering an articulation of social justice, the speaker demands a world without judgment, without contest, without politics” (Phelan 2001:109). Refusing to identify as a settler is complicit with deracinating new Right discourses along this “slide.”

In the seemingly contradictory position of enabling an other’s self-determination, Asian settler political subjects are singularly compelled to address a limited political position of those who do not speak in the name of being the victim. This conundrum is not a bad place to be. The
scarcity of positions may provoke a search for a new politics that commits to the “dissipation” of identity (Foucault 1984a:95). Archiving Asian settler identities disaggregates identity into components that may be addressed through a politics different from that of identity-politics. The decolonial archive’s work of disaggregation takes time.

“Too busy”: decolonizing in the meanwhile

Asian settler decolonizing subjects enter the temporal dynamics of decolonization disjointedly. As settlers, their part in the future Hawaiian-Hawai‘i is difficultly imagined because it cannot be determined in advance of the reinstatement of Hawaiian control over land, rights and resources. That is, settlers cannot define their role in a Native future without encroaching on the order of determinations that gives decolonization meaning. Yet, political work doesn’t traffic only in definitions and determinations, especially in a new Right colonized meantime. Too quickly dismissing grey areas as politically inexpedient, irrelevant or too categorically messy fails to see how grey-ness is also a form through which Asian settlers histories are present to Hawaiian de/colonization.

Gayatri Spivak likens political practice to housework; “And who doesn’t know this [that political practice is like housework]? Except political theorists who are opining from the academy with theological solutions once and for all. I mean, political practice is more complex than housework, but, to take the example of the metaphorical arena, it involves the same persistent effort” (Spivak, Hutnyk et al. 1990:41). Practicing politics in this housework-modality better comports with forms available to Asian settler decolonizing subjects. I next read a softened
concept of political identity from Karen Kosasa and Stanley Tomita’s efforts to politicize the
difference between Asian settlers and Hawaiians.

Kosasa and Stanley Tomita emphasize “...that only Hawaiians can fully understand the
destruction of their culture; as settlers we have been too busy benefiting from colonial practices”
[emphasis mine (Kosasa and Tomita 2000:xii)]. Being “too busy” is a political habitus insofar as
it describes a competition for resources of time, labor and attention. Kosasa illustrates this
competition with an example from her classroom. “One [student] summed up the position of the
class when he addressed two Native Hawaiian classmates by saying “I think what you are doing
is good (in regards to sovereignty) and I support you in your efforts. But I’m busy trying to
understand my own ethnic identity” (Kosasa 2002:50). Cogently, Kosasa assesses his alibi as a
problem of time; “the student...was too busy trying to understand his ethnicity to educate himself
about the Hawaiian sovereignty movement” (Kosasa 2002:51). Undoing this sense of time’s
scarcity - being too busy- suggests that decolonization is a shift in sensorium. A decolonial
archive may be a palliative to the sense that our time is too full and the problem of colonization
too immediate.

Archiving brackets an analytic space for practicing at a remove from the political.348

Those brackets are temporal as well as categorical, they emphasize things that are not-always and
not-yet political. I’m suggesting that the work of re-imagining roles for those not-(directly)-a-part
of Hawaiian sovereignty struggles may be honed by an archival optic. The animating energy for
this work towards a new kind of political subjectivity is easily short-circuited - “too quickly”
given the names of identity-positions that haven’t worked. I’m marking danger in this rush to name at an intersection with a new Right’s newly virulent discursive-savvy.

The American worker figure of new Right class imaginaries

Challenges to Hawaiian claims to historical injustice proceed from new Right legal activists, and the neoliberal socioeconomic and discursive circuits within which they operate. Critiques of Asian settler colonialism, including those that oppose new Right attacks on Hawaiian trusts and entitlements, share a genealogy of liberalism with this new Right. Vigilance against the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i must be extended to challenge a New Right’s post-liberal politics, even and especially they are underwritten by historically liberal concepts.

Partly, this common ground ensnarls the desire to be decolonizing subjects in a relay between liberal empathy and new Right reconfigurations of political feeling. In what follows, I track this interplay between new Right politics and stoppages to settler decolonization. Via new Right reroute-ings, desires for decolonial justice are frustrated by American-historied, feeling-ed forms of liberal discourses, concepts and modalities through in which we attempt to act. A critical analysis of the political potency of newly privatized modalities locates critical sites for negotiating with and against these new Right discourses.

Official outlets of U.S. justice address Hawaiian colonial injustice by identifying the authenticity of those who having “suffered” (as opposed to having a different political relationship to historical injustice). This translation into social injuries is the blackmail of healing by incorporation into America. “Injury” positions claimants in a particular way. To be worthy of the nation’s political compassion, one must author one’s self as a victim whose victimhood can
be remediated by the State. The new relevance of feelings indicates an intersection between colonial power and a new Right's political imaginary. New Right discourses newly politicize values, feelings, affects and optimisms into attachments to settler colonial regimes. A notorious form for facilitating misrecognitions, sentimental political rhetoric jumbles terms like empathy and selfless-ness into political feelings.

Support for Hawaiian self-determination thus involves a canny negotiation of U.S. legal culture. Outside of new Right calls to conservative “compassion” and volunteerism, this negotiation interrogates the ways that liberal conceptions of space that underpin juridical spheres of American politics re-emerge in new Right discourses of equality and privacy. Depoliticizing discourses of altruism, charity and (conservative) compassion depend on a too-thin characterological model that leaves aside questions about of how these impulses emerge from history. Likewise, a settler colonial regime of injustice exists in and through virulent, personal and felt attachments to children, futurity, community, and even hopes for bringing that regime to justice. The point is not to extract ourselves from attachments to things we value, but rather to see precisely how colonial power animates those attachments.

While critical of the political function of feelings, efforts to understand Asian settler colonialism’s discursive practices must do more than disavow sentimentality. By posing the question of whether the concept-metaphor of injury is too much invested in a model of justice as healing personal pain, I also query what we ask for when we ask for justice for others. Here, being a decolonizing subject means working to re-imagine forms of acting politically that do not operate in the name of being the subject of social injury.
Keyed to a U.S. hegemony that is constantly being destabilized and reformed, an agent’s putative interior is fractured over the transience of forms that mean politically. Alongside liberal spaces of identity politics, anarchived settler-identity emerges in particularly problematic alignments with conservative agendas. One prominent moral-figure of this complicity is the American worker; and, more fundamentally political imagination in which such a figure can hold meaning about the justice of a colonial order.

Asian settler upward class mobility is buoyed by the logic of just desserts, “because we worked for it,” which tenses against Hawaiian articulations that “it was stolen from us.” Politically, the tension involves the redistribution of “it” is land, rights and resources, but also an apparatus that plays out value meted out to “work” against that of theft. Aligned by their common rhetoric of “hard work,” both Asian settler colonialism and new Right ideologies recruit “working” as a privileged characteristic of the deserving subject of American social justice in order to explain present inequality and historical dispossession. This character bridges Asian settler colonialism with new Right discourses of compassion for workers.

Below, Elaine Hadley’s genealogy of the neoconservative “cult of character” offers two things to my discussion. First, it situates the disciplined will to repudiate an American Hawai‘i as the difference from neoconservatives’ class hierarchy. Using a similar liberal version of volition, the decolonizing settler borrows her vigilant disavowal from a homeopathic dose of liberal character. Second, Hadley shows how claims made on the basis of marginalization can obscure inequality by redefining equality as equal-access. The supposedly “universal desire to join the
club of respectability” is presumed to attest to the likewise universal relevance of character (Hadley 1997:15).

The concept of character arose as a political instrument for shaping a class stratum in Victorian liberalism’s political imaginaries. Hadley explains that power functions through spatial rearrangement. Neoconservative discourse replaces vertical hierarchies and the infinitely ideal horizontal classifications, common to U.S. liberal civil rights arguments, with a model of center and margins (Hadley 1997:9). Freed from the weight of vertical oppression, subjects can rather de-marginize themselves by clustering towards a center. The difference between marginal and centered subjects is framed by their internal drive – a question of character. Building out from this Victorian liberal model, neoconservatives produced a class-divorced notion of political subjectship. The neoconservative “romance with Victorian England’s class system” specifically desires the inequities it perpetrated and the proprietary logic by which social classes were located in that system of inequity (Hadley 1997:9). “Character” thus signals the proximity of class struggle.

This “cult of character” provided a model for neoconservative rhetoric that celebrates “equal access” without letting go of class hierarchies (Hadley 1997:9). Such rhetoric has found many applications. In an American racial imagination, the conservative “model minority” of Asian American culture, figures as proof that success under capitalism was based on “merit” and volition. Framed by this discourse, Asian American “success” locates the plight of poor African Americans as a problem of unequal character rather than the structural inequalities of U.S.
capitalism. The hard working, Asian, immigrant figure has served as a cipher for this self-possessed and disciplined subject.

Instead of offering universal access to a thereby democratic mainstream, character “should instead be recognized as one of the many property- and in turn class-based moral designations designed for and in part by the lower middle and working classes, a designation, moreover, that keeps these folks productively alienable but yet firmly within their class” (Hadley 1997:17). Class becomes a question of essential character, rather than a consequence of social structures. Belying the inclusive rhetoric of equal access and consent is a dis-acknowledged class structure, “whose constituents are constrained not only in terms of labor mobility, but moral mobility as well” (Hadley 1997:17). Moral dimensions qualify a subject for upwardly mobility; a movement regulated by imparting values of punctuality, industriousness, which add “an insidious form of coercion to an identity already confined to her relation to production” (Hadley 1997:17).

The liberal subject is taught to identify her agency in her capacity to recognize and overcome her sensations by demonstrating her capacity to think rationally. Synthesizing sense out of ‘mere’ sensation draws on an aesthetic pedagogy, her knowledge of which is supposed to bear evidence of her cultivated personhood. This Enlightenment subject is thus provided with aesthetic solutions – accomplished by creating the self as a space of transcending social complexity. Personhood is the crucial node of operation in this politics. The search for signs of personal truths in feelings, and the idea that truth can be found in personhood in the first place, arises from Enlightenment philosophy. Liberal personhood’s training program teaches how to read their viscerality as “authentic responses” (Berlant 2000b:14). Instead of thinking structurally
about experience and emotions, liberal individuals code agency as their capacity to be autonomous from the corrupt and impersonal sociopolitical world.

In an Enlightenment paradigm of coming to consciousness, emancipated liberal individuals learn to cultivate their responses that establish their autonomy from the dominating structures of the world. Much is made to depend on minds and moral interiors in a model of Asian settler decolonizing subjectivity that is drawn from this paradigm. Deeply sited motors of agency are left in opaque categories of self, which have economic and political existences. However, they take their form as selves in those things that are meant to mean the most about us - feelings, kin-attachments, spiritual and sexual lives, and the values that define social justice.

Critical histories of Asian settler colonialism selectively adopt terms from this Enlightenment culture’s cult of authentic liberal personhood.354

Children are our future: the haole mother incident355

After delivering a lecture at the University of California at Irvine, Haunani-Kay Trask recounts one response; “a haole woman who had married a Hawaiian and has three hapa kids got up and cried and went on and on... and said, “well, my children are part Hawaiian so what am I supposed to do, put them on the plane and just stay here?” I said, “Lady, I’m not talking about you. I’m talking about the 6.5 million tourists who come each year” (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:241-2). In the fallout from this incident, Trask says, “...we did not have a conversation”.

Instead, what ensued was “a massive audience attack...group hysteria. People could not address what I had just said about American colonialism. All they could think about was their own lives, petty and small as they must be” (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:241-2)! Trask’s interviewer, Cynthia
Franklin, cogently observes that this non-conversation works as "a diversion from the issues to how you make people feel" (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:242). I concur with Franklin's cogent observation, and therefore want to further address how feelings become effective political diversions.

As I elaborate in a latter section, the shrinkage of the post-1960s American public realm certainly has a relationship to the ways that so much come to seem to depend on these "petty" lives. In this shrunken environment, the stakes of "political feeling" get ratcheted up; so much gets staked— including meanings of social justice — on these "petty and small" spheres. Shortly, we might rather see the political rage catalyzed by the mother's tears as a frustrated desire for a blueprint of right-action "embedded in the horizon of ethico-political fantasy" (Berlant 2005b:2). This frustration indicates contradictions wrought by a New Right's tightened epistemic grip on the intimate sources and spaces of identity of existence.

Sentimentality's intolerance of political contradiction in our most intimate attachments directs the audience's aggressive cacophony. This comports with the ways that Trask brings us this incident; she understands it as an example of "[p]eople's eagerness to 'identify' with your pain" (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:241-2). More specifically, it illustrates the repercussions of stymied-eagerness. Assuaging the felt-trauma of living out the contradictions of settler colonialism cannot form the horizon of decolonization. Yet, the audience's failure to draw a direct line between their "own lives" and the injustice of American colonialism itself points to an important contradiction: the presumed identity between feeling-good and justice. This contradiction locates the limits of liberal empathy at a new Right's rendering of it into liberal-
radical unfeeling. Justice-realized is mistakenly sought out in forms of social remediation that aim to make sufferers "feel good." The mistake lies in assuming that the feeling form can be transmitted into evidence of structural inequality. Whereas trauma feels shocking and immediate, "structural subordination is not a surprise to the subjects who experience it, and the pain of subordination is ordinary life" (Berlant 2000a:58). Pain and humiliation are modalities through which one "has" their personhood. Within the doctrines of what it is to be human, feelings names evidence of intimate experiences of social suffering. These discourses compel claimants to utilize a discourse of "political feeling" that understands "an effect of the promotion of pain capacity as the ground of the human as such" (Berlant 2005a:51).

The problem concerns a false equation between "the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with a general project of democracy" (Berlant 1998d:656). This national rhetoric appeals to the sentimental logic that proximity to justice is judged by its demonstration of proper empathic feelings. Citizens' are encouraged to understand that the depth of their feelings attest to their personal and moral complexity.

American histories of social protest traffick religion, family, and how we really feel from intimate spheres into a lopsided model of political community have been build up from a "metacultural ideal of liberal empathy" (Berlant 1998d:655). Discourses of liberal personhood idealize agency in someone who can think structurally about social inequality and empathize with those unequally subjected to society's democratic failings. However, new Right discourses hijack liberal conceptions of social justice to ambiguate the relationship between "feeling right" and repairing structural subordinations (Berlant 2005b:2). The discursive operation reinvents
liberalism's traditional toolkit of public and structural solutions to social injustice as harbors for the stigma of an unfeeling response to social pain. Consequently, the same discourse that establishes individual "autonomy from the dominant political world... disables his capacity to think impersonally or structurally about the relation between his affects and his destiny within regimes of hegemonic practice" (Berlant 2000b:14). These dynamics are at play in the audience's dissatisfaction with Trask's political analysis of colonization, on the one hand, and their willingness to focus on the mother's tears, on the other.

**Christian charity, political activism and "cheap grace"**

Pressed for guidance about how the Hawai'i Council of Churches can now support Hawaiians as a non-Hawaiian entity that has historically disenfranchised Hawaiians, Trask's advice is unequivocally practical; "When somebody once said to me, 'Well, what can I do? I can't give you anything,' I [Trask] said, 'You don't know that. Let me ask you. Do you own a house? Give it to me. Sign it over to me. Do you have a car? I got all these Hawaiians that are taking the bus from Waimanalo. Give it to me, and I'll give it to them. There's lots you could do, but you just want to cry and tell me that you feel badly for me. I don't need that. I don't need your feelings. I need two million acres of land that were stolen at the overthrow. Are you a lawyer? We need lawyers to defend Hawaiian prisoners who can't mount a defense'"(Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:242).

Direct forms of political action may be a canny counter to a depoliticizing liberal multicultural mode of assimilating Hawaiians into the apparatuses of American minority rights-claiming. As I've discussed, attempts to massage Hawaiian claims into a plea for U.S. minority
rights is categorically inappropriate on the basis of mistaken national jurisdiction. Before proceeding to read this statement, I pause to locate the angles through which this dissertation engages the political problem of Hawaiian dispossession. Coordinating a challenge to colonization must underscore how politics is encountered where we work as knowledge producers. In the realm of public discourse, this encounter concerns new Right appropriation of the language of multiculturalism as “colorblindness,” its renewed interest in regulating academic paradigms that fail to be “balanced.”

Insofar as decolonizing history can be called a politically engaged practice of academic knowledge production, it is prudent to caution against appearing to put historical analyses in service to activist modalities. As Gayatri Spivak observes; “[w]e cannot exchange as “truth,” in the currency of the university, what might be immediate needs for identitarian collectivities… If academic and “revolutionary” practices do not bring each other to productive crisis, the power of the script has clearly passed elsewhere” (Spivak 1993a:53). Activist work, broadly schematized, responds to immediate crises from a playbook of strategies in ready-to-hand idioms: “…consciousness raising: rights, resistance, nationalism, identity spliced on to literacy and numeracy” (Spivak 2005:100).

Nor is strategy the exclusive to the domain of the activist. All practices “strategize” from historical and institutional settings, which for academics are processes inbuilt to disciplinarity. Politically-engaged scholarship, therefore, is a kind of two-stepping that recognizes the change opened by on-the-ground activist, even while it critiques – pointing to the limits of discursive forms as themselves material dimensions of the problem. Within the academic lens of critique, we
can notice that discursive counters to “cheap grace” may be limited by the same personalizing political mode that reads a program of settler support consisting in donating cars, land and money into volunteerist responses to compassionate conservatism’s calls for “healing” social pain through individual private acts. Well-intended acts aimed at rectifying colonial inequalities look less like a pointed disrespect for colonial capitalist organizations of private property than charity. Without belittling the necessity of material redistribution, political prescriptions for individual acts mimic some features of new Right discourses of Christian charity and volunteerism.

Hannah Arendt’s distinctions between Christian charity and publicity cut to the disrepairs of the Political Space of the New Right U.S. Community. Charity is a toxic form of community relations that New Rightists have channeled into a substitute for social welfare programs of material redistribution.367 “[R]uled by the principle of charity and nothing else,” this Christian model of community is handicapped in its capacity to address structural interdependence founded on the world in the here and now (Arendt 1958:49). The Christian community is utopic, ideally located in the final horizon, life after death; “the main Christian principle of worldlessness is admirably fit to carry a group of essentially worldless people through the world… provided only if it is understood that the world itself is doomed…” (Arendt 1958:49). The love-principle narrates the transcendence of a people united by a feeling of disaffiliation with “the common world and felt themselves no longer related and separated by it” (Arendt 1958:48). Held together by the “bonds of charity,” such a Christian model of community “is incapable of founding a public realm of its own” (Arendt 1958:49). The structured incapacity for a public constitutes a model of political community similar to that of a new Right’s America serialized private spheres.
I'm noting that this resemblance because it contributes to a dominant U.S. imagination of political personhood. "No longer valuing personhood as something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a public good only in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private worlds" (Berlant 1997b:4-5). Berlant is pointing to an invaginated configuration in which "public good" refers only to the good-ness of a national people, whose public interactions largely take place in the register of imagination. Sheltered from the invasive orchestrations of the State, the private is the dream-space of safety for opaque and private intimacies. Mostly, new Right rhetoric secures this private-version of intimacy from scenarios proposed by the rigorously normal welfare state’s family of the family wage (Berlant 2004:2). This installation of heteronormativity is part of a wider project of depublicizing liberalism’s concepts of social obligations.

Compassionate conservatives argue that dismantling state socioeconomic obligations, such as welfare institutions, policies and laws shores up the capacity of local volunteerist responses to remediate social inequality. Whereas the expansive welfare state acted on institution of laws and programs, the mechanisms of the "compassionately conservative state" lie in a technology of "shrinkage" (Berlant 2004:2). Theorizing these technologies in the smaller pieces of their everyday operations may open up these shrunken political spaces.

Accomplished alongside the production of an imagination in which governmental structures do not make direct demands on private individuals, heteronormative icons of intimacy build a "live fantasy" of look-alike intimate zones (Berlant 1997b:4-5). Berlant calls this "public intimacy," a concept that she distinguishes from the 18th century development of an "intimate
sphere of domesticity” described by Jürgen Habermas (Berlant 1998b:3). Habermas’ intimate sphere grounded “a sense of self which became a sense of citizenship only when it was abstracted and alienated in the nondomestic public sphere of liberal capitalist culture” (Berlant 1997b:4-5). The true and uncalculating self of Habermas’ private man is founded on his difference from his public façade. By contrast, “public intimacy” collapses the distance between a national public and an individual’s immediate experience, the effect of which is to jumble social justice and individual felt-injury.  

New Rightists now respond to these subjective effects, but invert the nature of social subordination. Promises of social remediation in local acts of fellowship leaves this configuration of emotion manumitted into politics intact (Berlant 2000a). Volunteerism judges citizens’ charitable impulses as more effective, and more deeply satisfying than the encumbered, the moral hazards and impersonal structures of public-sector welfare.  

In tandem with arguments for welfare privatization, the moral hazard of impersonal “handouts” is contrasted with volunteerism’s forms of giving, which are supposed to feel better and to indicate the presence of a loving community. Claims to social injury are rhetorically stigmatized as “‘victim politics,’ a phrase that deliberately suppresses the complexity, ambivalence, and incoherence of social antagonism in the everyday life of contemporary citizenship” (Berlant 1997b:7). In the name of empowering, rather than enabling victimhood, they galvanize social goodness as something dependent on “people” rather than politics. This New Right posits an anti-state collective that can heal itself outside of the liberal state’s legal regulation of the environment (Patton 1996-7:3-4). “[A]lternative models,” Berlant notes, “for
example, those that do not track power in terms of its subjective effects – can seem inhuman, hollow, and irrelevant to the ways people experience optimism and powerlessness in ordinary life” (Berlant 1998d:655). Taking a position on this minefield means looking at how a configuration of political feeling in decolonizing subjects in Hawai‘i may reinstall a focus on an individual’s right-actions.

**Getting right with history**

“[O]ne must avoid good conscience at all costs”
- (Derrida 1994a:19).

In the haole mother’s appeal to Trask for advice –‘what am I supposed to do?’

Melodrama and tragedy amplify the misconceptions of a political fantasy that identifies feeling-right with political solutions. As I’ve noted, the sentimental terms of motherhood shuttles colonialism’s meanings into moral outrage at the threatened separation of a mother from her children and distorts a political focus on the drama of legal and territorial dispossession. I’m revisiting this fantasy’s jumbled translation of interpersonal truces into remedies for social healing because it works by forgetting that practice is indispensable to politics. Here, a desire for good conscience coordinates with a dangerous ignorance of political uses of temporality. Good conscience’ belongs to a genre of governmental and social agendas that misconceive the contingent nature of the political.

The mother asks for reassurances from Trask that would exonerate her from “merely” political categories of analysis. While marking the play of new Right and colonizing discourses in the mother’s query, we cannot dismiss her optimism as a mere character flaw - her sense that she is not powerless to “get right” with history. This optimism draws on a liberal model of individual agency, in which decolonization feels to be a call to locate one’s agentive role in ethical theater of
historical justice. The radical gestalt of misfired desires to ‘get right’ with history, however, problematically plays out a scenario of victims, aggressors and the State as an exonerating agent of recognition.\textsuperscript{37} Insofar as decolonizing discourses utilize liberal modalities, they form dangerous complicity with a new Right politicization of feeling in categories of blame and blamelessness that compel claimants to produce themselves as victims in a competition of oppressions, or, conversely, intensely culpable for the wrongs wrought.

The fantasy of being right with history, and its attendant desire for good conscience, is not precisely the target of Derrida’s admonishment. To want justice, or at least to not want to be unjust, is different from creating structures for assurances that one is uncontaminated by political responsibility.\textsuperscript{32} Certainly, if we constellate decolonization only in terms of this mother’s conundrum, we fail to see how it is a symptom of a dis-eased political discourse. Cultured through the "overvaluation of a certain mode of self-reflective personhood," liberal discourses allow signs of complex interiority to supposedly define an aesthetic structure of personhood in opposition to a merely myopic self-interest (Berlant 2002:73). Centralizing this interior complexity invites a model of political agency that risks hanging politics on a too-thin characterological personal goodness. This danger lies with a trivializing desire to be “on the right side of history” (Miller 2003:39). My tactic has been to interrogate this desire for rectitude without dismissing its political purchase. I’ll return to argue that Asian settler decolonial activity done in the meanwhile will go some ways toward challenging that political discourse, if not good-conscience.
Berlant articulates a new trajectory for inquiry; "[h]ow to deprivatize politics without merely demonizing the fantasy state liberalism proposes" (Berlant 1998d:655)? To deprivatize the mother’s predicament as a mother, we would have to detach the imagination of good-mother identities and rather emphasize the predicament as a contradiction brought about by settler colonization. These capillary ties are tenacious; undoing them will require political persistence.

New Right identity politics and opposition to Asian settler colonialism

"Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self or the positive foundation of the self" – Michel Foucault.373

Theorist of Asian settler colonialism, Eiko Kosasa, uses a rich metaphor to describe the work of “fair minded Japanese settlers interested in social justice” (Kosasa 2004:viii-ix). They “can work to dismantle this imperialist nation thereby leaving a space for the Hawaiian nation to reconstitute itself” (emphasis mine (Kosasa 2004:viii-ix)). The most immediate application of Kosasa’s “leaving a space” is literal. Land, as territory, coincides with the most crucial demands for a land-base. At the same time, decolonization’s discursive morphologies of absence, such as in a “dissipation” of an American identity374 and “leaving a space” for Hawaiian self-governance, are discontinuous with the concept of vacated physical territory.375

Conceptualizing decolonization as leaving a space presumes that colonization is only a spatial operation. This sovereign political premise shares ground, literally and conceptually, with what I’ve been calling a new Right’s taxonomy in which different ways of being belong to particular spaces: public, commercial, domestic homes, hearts, bedrooms, war zones and neighborhoods. I’m pointing to their discursive affinities not to indicate their convergent
horizons, but rather to highlight that their non-alignment is obscured by their common ground with liberal imaginations of identity spaces. I'm expanding Kosasa's concept-metaphor of negative-space in order to keep it separate from a conservative notion of identity as belonging to someplace in order to not-think of the contingency inbuilt to political being.

For instance, fair-mindedness describes an activity even as it supposedly identifies a kind of political person. As a self-possessed individual who steels herself against her capitalism-defined self-interest, the fair-minded settler figure has a liberal genealogy. But, located in a genealogy, autonomous personhood is sacrificed to a diversified structure of social embeddedness. Fair-mindedness is not a character-trait, but a conjuncture of certain “technologies of self” (Foucault 1993:221). Self-ness is a cipher for “the historical correlation of the technology [of self-ness] built in our history” (Foucault 1993:222-3). Foucault’s notion of “self” trafficks in two kinds of power networks: sovereignty and biopower. They can be roughly differentiated: sovereign power permits people to live or die, whereas biopower can let die, but more usually focuses on regulating life. By rephrasing the self as a technology, he likewise re-outlines the conundrum of identity politics; “the problem is to change those technologies” (Foucault 1993:222-3).

“The purpose of history, guided by genealogy,” Foucault writes; “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation” (Foucault 1984a:95). Dissipating identity is not identical to being selfless because, historically, the latter has been written into an ethico-political drama that identifies the heroism of certain Asian Americans. By contrast, a
dissipated identity aims to shake loose from history so that other things may coalesce there. In this way, dissipating identity can “leave a space” for a Hawaiian-Hawai‘i.

Historically, there are substantive precedents for figures of unselfish Asian settler comportments. An aggressive selflessness pervades sentimental memories and narratives of the Territorial era plantation community. Selflessness as the guarantor of willful sincerity can be read from documented utterances of the ferocious U.S. patriotism-against-all-odds of “Americans of Japanese Ancestry” (AJAs) during World War II to the absent center of decolonial politics. Mothers, military men, and hard-working fathers and brothers “sacrifice” for their children, nation, and ancestors. Even the Asian settler who criticizes her “own” community is lauded for her capacity to think past self-interest.

Seen as continuous with these figures of Asian settler political subjectivity, I’m cautioning against identifying decolonizing subjects only in those who abandon self-interest. Those who remain complicit with a colonial system may merely found a foil for the kind of person who stands against colonial domination. Put otherwise, positioning oneself as against Asian settler colonialism draws up identity-coherence from selflessness. So, the decolonizing settler subject remains within the model of personal goodness. Politically, this configures the personal into a reified and intensely endowed venue for “recognizing culpability for history and for social relations” (Brown 2002:371). Instead, identity should be “dissipated;” to clear space for the uncertain and persistent work of unpacking selflessness’ sentimentally burdened concept of self-sacrifice (Foucault 1980 -b:146).
The political contradictions of settler-identities are not solved through concept-metaphors of dissipation or dissolving. However, disaggregating identity into genealogical components gives us more ways of approaching those problems. Rather than positing identity as a static problem, the decolonial archive uses the Foucauldian tactic of ‘leaving power no place to hide,’ even and especially in what we believe to be most good and natural. By denuding power into its varied forms, we develop a more nuanced analysis of colonial culpability.

Kahuku Girl Scouts, Lion’s club, public school librarians

Territorial-era Kahuku is difficulty located in colonial history. Settler community-building seems asymptotic to historical Hawaiian dispossession, but nevertheless grounds a political relationship between Asian settlers and discourses of social justice. This photo was shuffled in with a Kahuku Girl Scout troop records from 1948-9. I’m engrossed with this banal,
saccharine, do-gooder image of Girl Scouts, public school librarians and the Lion's Club. Its aggressive innocence has a relationship to Hawai'i's colonization that has less to do with apathies to the horrors of genocide and the ritual thefts of capitalism, and more to do with optimism built up around what we assume to be goodness of children, community and our power to work towards them in a practical everyday.

Previously, during the interwar period, the Kahuku Boy Scouts were recruited into the war effort as a “Means of getting the People “Black-out conscious.” In 1939, 4th District Oahu Civil Defense secretary, Max Suzuki, released a memo reporting that plantation managers had appointed Boy Scout Troop #38 for black-out patrol duty; and, “[s]couts have full authority to report whose lights were left burning during the Black-out period.” In the vein of the “Spies” in George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), there is something quietly vicious about children who extend plantation and government surveillance, even and especially because they are put in service to the good of the community. The ploy is not just putting forth of a ‘good’ façade for the ‘bad’ impacts of colonial violence, which would misrecognize power as something that can be identified in its effects, rather than as a productive process.

In this chapter, I’ve departed from my Kahuku archive to deal directly with rose-colored optics as a kind of political literacy in sentimentality. Bodies, affects and histories of plantation Kahuku haunt contemporary intersections between new Right and settler colonial discourses as “political feelings,” felt-attachments to a set of institutions, ideologies and communities. Appropriately, my readings of colonial power in plantation pleasures, memories and legacies have been phrased by new Right reconfigurations of American liberal traditions. These readings
are supplemented with critical approaches to the heightened political sensitivities of the colonial context to cultural and artistic productions.\textsuperscript{380}

Yet, the colonial moment is not so unbearably sensitive that there is not some room for play within the micrological dimensions of colonial power. Such small movements include, but are not restricted to, the interpersonal, individual, and even sentiment-motivated acts. I've discussed how these can become alibis for not-engaging structural critique, while allowing that these big and little moves can contribute to decolonization in some way. Charitable donations, re-allocating classroom and studying time to Hawai'i's history of colonization, and identifying as a settler in Hawai'i can be located in that range. A decolonial archive, however, stretches the range of political acts in a different way. It locates these political acts in a time of emotions.\textsuperscript{381}

As many theorists of modernity have discussed, sentimental discourses appeared during the industrializing nineteenth-century as a counterpoint to the clockwork, machinic time of the factory and the dominant, impersonal, and depersonalizing world.\textsuperscript{382} Home, mother-nurturing, mourning, romantic-love and romantic-idealism have all had their turn as havens from a heartless world. A respite from the time of capital has thus been central to the attractions of a sentimental focus on feelings. This historicity of emotions does not inevitably tie all political talk of feelings to liberal projects, nor their disrepairs.

Throughout this dissertation, I've made much of feelings as political vehicles. I've considered their manifestation in varied structures of historical transmission such as reproductive kinship, the plantation's domestic architecture of upward class mobility, wartime Asian
Americanization, legacies of worker resistance, a multicultural plantation-centric heritage and desires to inhabit liberal models of political personhood.

I’m better at beginnings. So, we’ll find our front at the back. As I began, my point is that we don’t always know when we are looking at colonization. And, this is especially the case when we are looking to encounter colonial power in local, affective, eventful, site-specific, singularities, and aesthetic forms. Colonization’s regulative exertions of power are not always recognizable as sovereign enactments. Sometimes regulation is self-regulation – habit, preference, laziness, and sometimes it feels good. I’m distinguishing these styles of power in order to reconsider what we recognize as political resistance now, and in the past. Asian settlers, and the American middle class in general, have passed through the 1950-1990s period of unprecedented U.S. economic expansion. In this era of depreciating home-values, the class lines drawn between Asian settler accumulation and Hawaiian dispossession take on fuzzier shapes. This is a milieu marked by idioms of survival, safety, belt-tightening, and more modest range of political practices and desires.

Pushing aside the dramatic break from history signaled by the Enlightenment individual’s “heroic” comportments, I’m addressing Asian settlers political subjects in this attenuated register (Foucault 1984b). A slowed down frame of reference to that ubiquitous and stereoscopic sphere that gets called “everyday life” might better comport with power exerted in biopolitical modalities. Optimism, a promise of a secure future, having children, teaching children, investing in an institutional trust, and recognizing one’s self in a historical identity or a political drama are part of the materiality of colonial discourse and practice.
In “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” Lauren Berlant asks, what might it mean to think of their practical agency as “activity exercised within spaces of ordinariness that does not always or even usually follow the literalizing logic of visible effectuality, bourgeois dramas, and lifelong accumulation or fashioning” (Berlant 2007b:758)? This query encourages rethinking the liberal predicates of agency that insist on a heroic, intending, self-building subject as the historical engine of social transformation. Her implicit critique creates a space for considering histories of investment in liberalism’s offerings of personal autonomy and a democracy defined as legal protections in their effective relationships to biopolitical coercion. How has the scene shifted from wanting-more towards wanting to not be worse?

Berlant’s “lateral agency” describes political activity attenuated by post-Fordism’s reduced expectations and constricted opportunities for class mobility (Berlant 2007a). Instead of moving up, getting beyond or getting ahead, the lateral agent moves sideways. Berlant describes these movements as asserting “practical sovereignty;” “…practical sovereignty would be better understood not to take the mimetic or referred shape of state or individual sovereignty but a shape made by mediating conditions of zoning, labor, consumption, and governmentality, as well as unconscious and explicit desires not to be an inflated ego deploying and manifesting power” (Berlant 2007b:757). We may fail to recognize participation in colonization simply because we didn’t intend it, or perhaps because we didn’t feel like we were present to our participation. Examining unintended, and perhaps nowhere-going, activity as a cluster of political acts cuts closer to certain unacknowledged practices that maintain Hawai‘i’s as a settler colony. A
decolonial archive offers the temporal means to know and name these maintenance practices, and to ferociously set to work on their undoing.

In 1898, 1.4 million acres of lands were “ceded” to the U.S. federal government upon annexation and then to the State of Hawai’i in 1959, when Hawai’i became an American state (by a process that violated International law, see (Kauanui 2005:4) Another 180,000 acres is currently held in trust by the State of Hawai’i under the Department of Hawaiian Homelands. See (Trask 1987:151)

In contemporary vernacular, “haole” refers to whites in Hawai’i. I do not italicize Hawaiian words in recognition of Hawai’i as the space from which I write.

The “Big Five” major commercial interests in Hawai’i were: American Factors (AmFac), Alexander and Baldwin, Theo. H. Davies, Castle and Cooke, and C. Brewer.

The sociopolitical difference between Hawai’i Asians and Asian Americans is central to Jonathan Okamura’s argument that “there are no Asian Americans in Hawai’i.” Okamura notices that an oppressive image of Hawai’i as a multicultural paradise emerges from the presumption that race and ethnicity function similarly in Hawai’i and the U.S (Okamura 1994b; Okamura 1994a).

This quotation of Foucault is drawn from “The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt,” see (Afary and Anderson 2005:220).

Wendy Brown’s Politics Out of History explores this promise in terms of Jacques Derrida’s “spectral messianicity” in ways relevant to the present discussion; see (Brown 2001).

Walter Benjamin’s phrase “now-time,” or Jetztzeit, emphasizes the historicity of the political and its difference from a progressive history; see (Benjamin 1968a).

The elision of the difference between academic essentialisms, which inhere to the construction of an object of knowledge, and the political currencies that determine forms of resistance, has been at the crux of misguided applications of cultural construction theories to Hawaiian cultural politics. I am obliquely referring to two related debates. The first concerns whether Native Pacific peoples “invent culture” for political purposes; see (Keesing 1989; Trask 1991). The second arena concerns whether Native Hawaiian culture is politicized by its insertion into the colonial context or if Native Hawaiians construct cultural claims for purposes of political interest. Trask emphasizes that identity is not an organizing axis for Hawaiian political struggles, thus refusing the repressive tolerance of a liberal multiculturalist shell game of cultural identity allotments. Her specific negative declaration also denounces the framework of indigenous claims to sovereignty as “invented cultures” or historical revisionism - cultural claims constructed to advance political exigencies. Jeffrey Tobin presents an overview of relevant exchanges between Jocelyn Linnekin and Trask; see (Linnekin 1990; Linnekin and Foyer 1990; Trask 1990; Tobin 1994).

The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (1921) is one example of the political significance of first contact, which is usually dated to 1778. “That is when the Hawaiian islands discovered Captain Cook, lost in the Pacific Ocean” (Testimony of Michael Kahikina, Joint Hearing before the Committee on Indian Affairs United States Senate and the Committee on Resources United States House of Representatives, August 29, 2000, Honolulu, Hawai’i. Serial No. 106-98, Part 2, p. 98; cited in (Goldberg-Hiller 2003:172)).

This view is asserted in the introduction to a popular text on the history of Japanese in Hawai’i; see (Kotani 1985).

Thus, “simply defining indigenousness as existing only in the period from, say, 1492 to the present, as does the report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues in its effort to connect indigenousness and European colonialism” (Miller 2003:58).
I'm referring to work on the cultural politics of Hawaiian diaspora; see (Kauanui 1998; Halualani 2002; Hall 2005).

For an articulation of the former argument, see (Sai 2003:4-5; Sai 2007). J. Kehaulani Kauananui discusses the relationship between diasporic and Hawai‘i resident Hawaiians in (Kauanui 1998).

The term “indigenous” is tied to international rights would directly address items on Hawai‘i’s decolonial agenda. The 2006 draft of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples “would guarantee “auto-determination” for indigenous peoples, giving them the right to reclaim traditional territory and refuse military activity upon traditional lands” (Larocque 2006).


For a discussion of conservative uses of legal, as opposed to historical tropes and idioms, in arguments against Hawaiian trusts and entitlements, see (Shapiro 2002).

For instance, Noenoe Silva recently brought attention to petitions attesting to Hawaiian desires for national independence and resistance to annexation. Silva’s meticulous archival work has greatly contributed to this project. She has uncovered petitions against Hawai‘i’s 1897 Annexation, see (Silva 1998).

The coercive factors impelling Asian labor migration to Hawai‘i make it a particularly weak instance of settler agency. But it forms the back-story that contextualizes U.S. immigration as an implicit affirmation of a better life in America. This stronger instance redirects the emphasis onto the structures that distill intention (to the U.S.) into readable forms of affirmations for receiving countries. Bonnie Honig discusses the politics of the immigrant’s intending-comportment; see (Honig 1998; Honig 2001).

Although the orthodox Marxist concept of state monopoly capitalism is limited in its application to neoliberalism, it has morphological similarities with Hawai‘i’s Territorial era government. My observations are informed by Nicol Poulantzas discussion of Marxist theories of the state; see (Poulantzas 2006).

The primary bills were: the Act to Abolish the Disabilities of Aliens to Acquire and Convey Land in Fee Simple, which allowed foreigners to purchase land (also known as the “Kuleana Act”) and An Act for the Governance of Masters and Servants, which established the wage-labor system (Kosasa 2004:61).

Between 1870 and 1930, the total acreage under cultivation increased from 8,500 to 251,544 acres (Beechert 1985:178).

The Republican Party, constituted by increasingly marginalized Hawaiians and haole elites, dominated the early political life of the Territory of Hawai‘i. Unlike the Asian and Portuguese laborer populations, who were disqualified from voting through discriminatory statutes against naturalization and foreign birthplaces, a politically active community of Hawaiians outnumbered the haole vote by more than three to one (Stannard 2005:69). In exchange for Hawaiian leadership “friendlier” to haole Republican interests, Hawaiians were appointed to fill most civil service positions (Stannard 2005:70). At the turn of the twentieth century, haole and Hawaiian political parties allied over racist anxieties that a growing “alien” Asian voting bloc would control Hawai‘i. These anxieties were realized as Territory-born Asians took on features of a settler community - marrying, having children, seeking employment away from the isolated rural plantations, and became a significant voting population by the 1930s.

In 1960, Democratic legislators were disproportionately Japanese (67%), attorneys (63%) and veterans of the 442nd or 100th battalions during WWll (39%) (Cooper and Daws 42-43).

George Cooper and Gavan Daws’ Land and Power in Hawai‘i (1985) is foundational to attempts to theorize the conditions, implications and mechanisms of class mobility in modern Hawai‘i. They find widespread abuse of political prerogatives at the underside of largely celebratory narrative of political
change. After this "revolution," many Asian settler Democrats were well positioned in political and commercial fields to partner with Republican landowners to capitalize on post World War II land development and building frenzy (Cooper and Daws 1985:3-7; Tamura 2002:28).

26 Haole were a demographic minority of the voting population, although they held key positions in the Territorial government and commerce. Anxieties over the emerging majority of Hawai‘i’s Asian, particularly Japanese, voting population brought together Hawaiian and haole Republicans (Stannard 2005:70). The inclusion of both English and Hawaiian as official languages in the early 20th century indicates Hawaiian political presence. Also, Michael J. Shapiro has addressed the manipulation of voting qualifications to discarnate “Asiatic” political enfranchisement; see (Burgess and Dole 1936; Shapiro 2002).

27 Under the so-called Cable Act of 1922, American women forfeited their U.S. citizenship if they married foreign men. In 1923, “an elite U.S. citizen Nisei gave a piece of information to the patriotic, anti-Japanese American Legion which eventually led to the citizenship nullification and unemployment of four Nisei women married to issei men” (Iwata 2003:145).

28 David Stannard comments on the epochal rise and fall of these political alliances in Hawai‘i; “corruption is a disease that afflicts liberals as much as it does anyone else. But there is no denying that what happened in the islands during the course of just twenty years, from the 1930s to the 1950s, was an astonishing reversal. In terms of the speed and totality of changed ethnic fortunes and political ideology, it may be unrivaled in American history” (Stannard 2005:3). Labor unionization played a huge role in the progress Stannard commends: increased wages, the eradication of a paternalism perquisite system, job security, and the muscle that accrues to collective bargaining. Their successes are largely attributed to interracial unity, achieved by “overcoming” racial antagonisms to form political solidarities over class struggle.

29 The “land and power” explanation treats race as a subordinate clause of a capitalist consolidation of political and economic power. These two factors channeled Hawai‘i Democrats towards land development profits. First, many were connected with a new entrepreneurial class of Asian settler developers and financiers (e.g. Clarence Ching, K.J. Luke, Hung Wo Ching, Chinn, and Joseph R. Paolo). Secondly, these elected officials “had their hands on the levers of control by which government approved or disapproved much that had to do with development” (Cooper and Daws 1985:46). These historians created an important document that cross-lists the names land development investors, real estate lawyers, and other affiliated entrepreneurs with members of a Democrat dominated post-war political structure during the period between 1954 through the 1980s (Cooper and Daws 1985:12). Taking a different tact, I focus on race as central to Hawaiian Statehood as a timely geopolitical discourse discourse that attaches racial equality to justice and justice to Asian settler elevation from “second-class citizenship” to State representatives.

30 Keanu Sai cites international law to argue that Hawai‘i is not a colony, nor a U.S. state, but is rather an independent nation suffering U.S. occupation (Trask 2000). Implications of these precarious terms for Asian settler relationships to Native Hawaiian self determination are discussed in (Fujikane 2000) (Kauanui 2005:4).

31 Dirlik argues that today, the defunct space of socialism as an alternative to global capital is more likely to be claimed by “alternative modernities”; “[t]hey point not to the past but, taking a detour through the past, to an alternative future” (Dirlik 2005:6). Alternative modernities claim to have emerged from colonialism/civilization in some shape that is historically and culturally different from global modernity. Yet what constitutes the ‘alternative-ness’ of these modernities are most often their historical and cultural difference from a globally ascendant Euro-West. Thus, Dirlik is skeptical of these arguments, pointing out that the historical and cultural differences invoked by alternative modernities are subject to the disintegrative forces of the development processes that constitute their “alternative” entrance into modernity.
Designated a non-self governing territory by the United Nations in 1946, Hawai‘i was entitled to a plebiscite to determine whether or not to pursue U.S. statehood. In 1959, Hawai‘i became an American state by a process that violated International law; see (Kauanui 2005:4).

Lisa Duggan locates concept of political equality as a “central innovation” in the U.S. Constitution, which effectively divided economy and politics from private spheres; “...the removal of property considerations from voting requirements allowed for a more complete (rhetorical) separation of the economy, understood as primarily private, from the public, democratically accountable (to white men, in theory) state” (Duggan 2003:5). Karl Marx also railed against this concept of political inequality in “On the Jewish Question,” (Marx 2001).

Comparative literary scholars have been particularly adept at recognizing a special relationship between nineteenth century American sentimental narratives and the American political cultures of protest; see (Berlant 1998d; Patton 1998; Klein 2003:145-55).

“Settler” is a term that I will continue to elaborate throughout the dissertation. Put simply, in Hawai‘i, settlers are non-Hawaiians, which includes immigrants and ethnic groups who arrived post-Western contact (1778 to the present).

Warren Montag is among a set of postmodern Marxist who have elaborated on the politics of Louis Althusser’s aleatory materialism; see (Montag 1996).

Elizabeth Freeman calls attention to the “pause” as in her reading of Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History; “the pause does not signal an interval between one thing and another; it is itself a thing, analytically and experientially available, that reveals the ligaments binding the past and the present... the pause create a ‘configuration [...] pregnant with tensions’ between a heretofore misrecognized or lost element of the past and something occurring right now and, crucially, in a temporally relationship other than causality” (emphasis Freeman’s, Benjamin qtd. in (Freeman 2008:51)). Likewise, my decolonial archive operates the “pause” as a political technology.

Becoming a historical figure indicates entrance into a political symbolic order. Noel Kent refers to the ethnic, racial and national dynamics of “golden men” – a class contingent of post-1954, especially Japanese and Chinese; see (Kent 1989a).

Gayatri Spivak points out that the reason that the referent “Asian America” has meant Japanese and Chinese in America has much to do with the Americanization of Asia. That is, the imagination of Asia as an “East Asian” region is a product of U.S. political economy and cultural formations; see (Spivak 2008:223-7).

Dating from at least the 1970s, neoliberalism refers to western societies that began to develop forms of governance that could respond to the more flexible, increasingly extra-national, economic flows. Since World War II, tourism, and infrastructural and land development generally, has edged out industrial agriculture as the primary economic engine in Hawai‘i. Labor markets have likewise shifted as a result of a decline in agricultural capital, and increased mechanization, towards service sectors and construction industries.

The quote is drawn from Sartre’s essay “Le Colonialisme est un système” (1956).

For relevant critical analyses of this issue of Amerasia; see (Luangphinith 2006) and (Takagi 1999).

Haunani-Kay Trask discussed the concept of “cheap grace” as a way of admonishing the Truth and Reconciliation group of the United Church of Christ to contribute monies, and not just apologize for their role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy 242 (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004).

I’m referring to Candace Fujikane’s observation that: “Asian settler scholars confuse indigenous struggles for nationhood with settler struggles for equalities, and in so doing, such academic projects
exploit indigenous sovereignty issues in order to further settler self-interests and our own political dominance” (Fujikane 2000:xx).

45 I agree that the nation is a problematic political form for thinking difference into hierarchies, exclusions and especially futurities. But this outside of new political subjectivities is also a product. I’m saying that we cannot unreservedly think in advance of what can be produced in the name of the nation. So, I’m also saying that thinking, as a material political practice, may be discontinuous in the temporalities of decolonization. Basically, sometimes one thing comes before another.

46 Simply put, “‘Native’ sovereignty is impossible when non-Natives determine the process” (Trask 2000:10).

47 Boyd’s account resonates with those of other activists who locate a Hawaiian socioeconomic history over and against Hawai’i’s plantation-era. He cites 1997 ‘Ilio’ulaokalani rally speaker, Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele; “Sugar came, sugar is gone, and we (Native Hawaiians) are still here!” Boyd builds on this statement; “But we Hawaiians, perhaps one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse populations on earth, are still here” (Boyd 1998). This extension across ethnicity and culture marks the modern nation-making modality of Boyd’s Hawai’i.

48 Gayatri Spivak elaborated on the etymology of complicity from the Latin complicare, “to fold together.”

49 Built over patterns that have emerged over the past 150 years in the United States, it is historically located as “a modal shift from the rational to the emotional in U.S. political rhetoric, initiated in the 1830s” (Berlant 2005a:75, note 11). Elsewhere, she describes “national sentimentality” as “a liberal rhetoric of promise historically entitled in the United States, which avows that a nation can best be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy” (Berlant 2000a:44).

50 These are housed as the Kenneth Baldridge Oral History Collection at Brigham Young University—Hawai’i Archives in Lai’i, Hawai’i

51 I borrow this phrasing from Antoinette Burton. Whereas I’m discussing my own archival endeavors, she uses it to describe a project in which such a group writes their own history; see (Burton 2005).

52 More unsettling were three letters from various publishers who rejecting the manuscript in which that research had been compiled. The editor affirms When the Company’s value to an additive project of scholarly knowledge, and thus goes on to suggest that “a university press, particularly in Indiana, which in some ways is free from the commercial considerations we contend with, would give the manuscript a home” (Zadrozny 1993). In the last dated letter, the publishers explicitly cite limitations of commercial markets and are thus “not persuaded that we [Twayne Publishers] can successfully publish and market the book”. He goes on to suggest that “a university press, particularly in Indiana, which in some ways is free from the commercial considerations we contend with, would give the manuscript a home” (Zadrozny 1993).

53 Baldridge argues that the Kahuku community itself can constitute such a consumer public. Citing an upcoming community centennial reunion (which I later discuss in chapter five on “Hana Hana Days”), he predicts that “several hundred copies should go immediately” (Baldridge 1990). The paper trail ends here. Having heard the enthusiasm of Kahuku residents for such a project, others interested in Hawai’i’s historic preservation, and noting the success of similar community history projects, I venture that the commercial viability of Baldridge’s manuscript may is sound. Similar projects have been compiled and published; for example, see (Ruby 2005) and (Yamamoto, Sylva et al. 2005).
I draw this model from Rancière, for whom knowledge is always about an ensemble of knowledges and a
distribution of positions associated with those knowledges. The point is to transgress that distribution – to
make knowing matter, politically; see (Rancière 2006:3).

In a letter to Henry Stimson offering “full approval” for the organization of a combat team of “loyal
American citizens of Japanese descent,” Roosevelt writes, “The principle on which this country was
founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart;
Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race and ancestry” (Hosokawa 1982:212). Later, while on
an inspection tour of Honolulu’s military bases in 1944, staff officers advised Roosevelt against allowing
Nisei soldiers into his publicity photos “... on the distant possibility that a fanatic might attempt to
assassinate him. Roosevelt quickly dismissed such fears and asked that any Nisei be photographed with
him along with other soldiers” (Hosokawa 1982).

Cultural pluralists, such as Carey McWilliams, and more recent race theorists, like Paul Gilroy, work
from this postulate; see (McWilliams 1964; Gilroy 2000).

Berlant’s “smart girl” of the post-Reagan era figures an ideology and a feeling about the inherent
innocence, goodness and transformational potential of American community(Berlant 1997b:39).

In that chapter, I suggest how Asian model-ness plays in U.S. geopolitical imaginations. The 1960 debut
of the “model minority” is entwined with these discursive formations. The work of Sucheng Chang, Harry
Kitano, and Roger Daniels works to debunk this model minority myth by emphasizing the myth’s
inaccuracy and maintenance of class inequities (Chan 1991; Kitano and Daniels 1995). By contrast, David
Palumbo-Liu observes that the relative fitness of an Asian racial minority for model-status has a semiotic
component in an American racial imagination. Asians are more readily abstracted than Black Americans;
an “exotic east lends itself to certain mystifications, whereas the history of slavery in America, while
certainly secured in part by ideological imaginings, has nonetheless embedded blacks more concretely and
determinedly in the material” (Palumbo-Liu 1999:87). Asian-ness possesses a morphological affinity for
figuration, and thus model-status. The white psyche may ground the terms of this comparison between
Black traumatic histories of slavery and exotic Asian-ed figures.

“Leaving the plantation” is a commonly used term to describe upward class mobility from the 1940s; see
(Rohrer 2006:2-8).

As I discuss in that chapter, “post-Fordist affect” is Lauren Berlant’s concept; see (Berlant 2007a).

Franklin Odo observes that Japanese ethnic celebrations in Hawai’i have had two objectives. First is the
stated purpose of paying tribute to “issei pioneers,” and secondly, the “careful planning of the events and
symbols of the centennial so that the generation of ethnic pride in the Japanese relationships between the
Japanese Americans and others, especially Native Hawaiians and haoles, both of whom are becoming more
important as the demography shifts and economic and political changes increase the vulnerability of the
Japanese Americans who have become relatively successful” (Odo 1985:9). He draws these objectives
from contrasting statements by two spokespeople for the 1985 “Centennial Year of Japanese Immigration
to Hawaii.”

Fanon’s concept is discussed in (Gibson 1999:341).

Fanon writes; “In a war of liberation, the colonized people must win, but they must do so cleanly,
without ‘barbarity’. [...] If it does not wish to be morally condemned by the 'Western nations', an
underdeveloped nation is obliged to practice fair play [...]” (Edwards 2002:110).

See (Kotani 1985:43).

Bound by private contracts, strikes by these plantation laborers were illegal. These workers welcomed the
Organic Act (1900), which effective annexed Hawai’i, because it also ended the contract labor system
Early labor organization amongst Japanese communities exemplified the priority of race over class verticality. Frederick Kinzaburo Makino, a Honolulu drugstore owner, chaired a meeting in December 1908 during which forty Japanese intellectuals and community leaders decided to establish the Higher Wage Association (Zokyu Kisci Kai) (Kotani 1985:39-41). The organizers of a Japanese plantation strike in1909 were not themselves plantation workers, but rather merchants, newspaper editors and clerks, who founded the Higher Wage Association. Of eleven arrested for leading the strike, four were identified as the "major" agitators. All four were based in Honolulu: Frederick Makino (a druggist), Motoyuki Negoro (a law clerk), Yokichi Tasaka (who wrote for the radical Nippu Jiji Japanese language newspaper) and Yasutaro Soga (the editor of Nippu Jiji) (Kotani 1985:39-41).

Today’s Japanese settler community descends from three major waves of labor migrants (Kotani 1985) The second (Kanyaku-Imin) and third series (jiyu-imin) of Japanese labor migrants constitute the bulk of this population. The first group of Japanese plantation workers (the Gannenmono, “the people of the first year of the Meiji Era”) arrived in 1868, although without the consent of the newly formed Meiji government. (Kosasa 2004:n91, 142). The kanyaku Imin, or “government contract migrants” series refers to twenty-six ships that brought 29,069 contract laborers from Japan to Hawai‘i between February 8, 1885 and June 15, 1894 (Okihiro 1991:25). During the 1894-1908 jiyu-imin, “free-migrant” period, 125,000 Japanese laborers came to Hawai‘i under private emigration firms (Okihiro 1991:27).

By contrast, Eiko Kosasa finds Asian settler labor history embedded in a colonial economy “from the start;” “…contract laborers enabled white sugar planters to become wealthy in a settler system based on exploitation of the Native people, their lands, and culture” (Kosasa 2004:63). 68

In 1846, the "Great Mahele" transformed Kahuku land into privatizable property. In 1890, the Kahuku Sugar Plantation was incorporated through an arrangement of interlocking directorates, ownerships and subleases that was the hallmark of a “Big Five” haole settler business and political monopoly model. Dillingham leased Kahuku land from Campbell, but then subleased it to William R. Castle (who established Ewa Plantation) and James Castle, who then took over Kahuku Plantation. In 1902, Samuel T. Alexander and Henry P. Baldwin (whose Alexander and Baldwin Company continues to be a major corporate business in Hawai‘i today) took over from Castle as agents of Kahuku Plantation (Baldridge 1992:xx-xxvii).


“I’ve addressed the colonial complicity of art and cultural institutions elsewhere; see (Isaki 2007). Marxism offers another antecedent of this impropriety. Gayatri Spivak suggests that Marx’s class agent of Aufhebung was made possible, “by virtue of breaking mere philosophy open by re-constellating it in the sphere of political economy - “confusing” philosophy with “history” - and pursuing the question of difference into the narrative of history” (Spivak 1999a:90).

Familiar names formed a legend that guided my excursions into archives at the Bishop Museum, the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the Brigham Young University of Hawai‘i, the Hawai‘i State archives, International Longshore and Warehouse worker’s Union (ILWU), and the family reunion memory-factory. Specifically, the documents are Hawai‘i Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) ledgers, oral histories from...
Kahukutown residents, *The Kahuksan* (a community circular sponsored by the Kahuku Sugar Company in the 1940-50s), Kahuku Sugar Company employee manuals, and ILWU meeting minutes, correspondence between plantation managers and military officials, and paraphernalia of a Kahukutown reunion. Most of the oral histories that I use are the tapes and transcripts of Kenneth Baldridge's research for the unpublished *When the Company Town Closed Down*, which I accessed through the Brigham Young University of Hawai'i Archives in Laie, Hawai'i (Baldridge 1992).

75 The term “excavation” is drawn from Spivak's description of a way of writing history that can be answerable (because self-reflexive) to the ways it constructs its object of knowledge (Spivak 1999a:198).

“The excavation, retrieval, and celebration of the historical individual, the effort of bringing her within accessibility, is written within that double bind at which we begin. But a just world must entail normalization; the promise of justice must attend not only to the seduction of power, but also to the anguish that knowledge must suppress difference as well as difference, that a fully just world is impossible, forever deferred and different from our projections, the undecidable in the face of which we must risk the decision that we can hear the other” 199 (Spivak 1999a).

Excavation works at the limits of producing knowledge of the past as an account of the present, remaining mindful of the necessity of such an accounting for social justice.

76 Commodity export of sugar and pineapple drove Hawai'i's settler colonial economy in the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century. Whereas twenty sugar plantations were in operation in 1875, sixty-three existed in 1880. Two legal acts facilitated transnational labor migration, mostly from Asia, to Hawai'i. Under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, plantation owners could export their sugar to the U.S. tariff-free. Also, the passage of the 1850 U.S. Master and Servants Act stepped up sugar planter lobbying efforts to meet “island labor shortages” by providing for foreign contract labor (mostly Japanese) to be brought to Hawai'i (Coman 1903). After an initial proliferation, Mollett describes increased plantation consolidation and capital investment. By 1957 only twenty-seven plantations existed, but the average land acreage size increased 20-fold and physical capital investment per plantation increased almost 28-fold (Mollett 1961:28).

77 Capital is not necessarily for or against social differences, but exploits them in the short run and erodes them in the end (Brown 2005:106). Roderick Ferguson’s queer of color approach to Marx’s historical materialism discusses the tensions between social hierarchy and capitalism (Ferguson 2004:5). Economic upward mobility is not inaccurately taken to be a sign of a certain brand of racial hierarchy overcome. Reading this sign depends on categories of class that conceal the materiality of race, gender, and sexuality (Ferguson 2004:5).

78 The relevant passage from Marx follows: “[capitalist production can by no means content itself with the quantity of disposable labour-power which the natural increase of population yields. It requires for its unrestricted activity an industrial reserve army which is independent of these natural limits] (788, italics are Ferguson's)” 16 (Ferguson 2004).

79 An orthodox Marxist narrative of historical agency will find these concepts lacking. Inheritance is described as a vestigial appendage of a bypassed feudalism, which thereby disqualifies its contribution towards authentic transformations in modes of production. As Jacqueline Stevens points out, Marx’s historical materialism dismissed intergenerational inheritance as a significant vehicle for capital accumulation (Stevens 1999:34). She comments, ‘Marx seems to think it necessary to trivialize capital accumulation through families because this is a dynamic Marx had pigeon-holed as strictly “feudal”’ (Stevens 1999:35).

Joan Scott usefully differentiates aesthetic structures from the analytical instruments that process them into knowledge — “the reproduction and transmission of knowledge said to be arrived at through experience” and the “analysis of the production of that knowledge itself” (Scott 1992:37).

I am paraphrasing Judith Butler; “Is kinship always already heterosexual” (Butler 2002)?

I borrow “selective presentism” from Jonathan Arac; he historicizes present postmodern literary debates by working out a particular bearing that the 1950s had on the 1930s. These pasts are formative of a present that is imprinted with “the impasses of American critical thinking [that] would not be worked through until we had gotten ourselves straight with the thirties” (Arac 2003:196).

Notwithstanding Keanu Sai’s important excavations of legal contests against Hawai’i’s status as colony, the socioeconomic impacts of its occupation by a belligerent nation, namely the U.S., can be understood as a problem of colonization. He explains: “the colonial/post-colonial framework, within its strict juridical context and only as it applies to Hawai’i, is predicated on an assumption that the Hawaiian Kingdom, as an independent State in the 19th century was overthrown... From a juridical historiography, there is extensive literature that argues the Hawaiian nation, which was called the Hawaiian Kingdom, was an established State in the 19th century, and not an indigenous group of people... In addition, there is considerable evidence that the United States did no acquire legal title over the Hawaiian Islands, whether as its colonial possession or its protectorate, and is illegally occupying the entire territorial dominion of the Hawaiian Kingdom in violation of its right to self-determination since 1898” (Sai 2003:4-5).

Against their implied binaristic account, we might point out that the present has not resolved into paradise for everyone “involved.” Nor are those who remained “uninvolved” unafflicted by the political conundrums of not-being Hawaiian amidst a crucial moment for Hawaiian sovereignty. Not everyone involved was of Asian ancestry, and not all those of Asian ancestries are equally implicated in settler colonialism. But settler colonialism is not only described in terms of demography. For further critiques of the bluntness of binaries in this case, see (Takagi 2004).

Hayden White’s “fictions of factual representation” engages the ways that historians and imaginative writers construct truths; see (White 1978).

The resonance between literary fiction and archived materials is most relevant here, but digresses from my primary argument. Both presuppose a particular framing as textual objects, and thus, the interpretative distance between the senders and readers. Graphematicity, written sign-ification, conditions the alterity implicit in the structure of communication, the non-identity of sender and receiver; “[i]f both sender and receiver were entirely present when the mark was inscribed, and if they were thus present to themselves — since, by hypothesis, being present and being present-to-oneself are here the same, how could they even be distinguished from each other” (Derrida quoted in (Spivak 1980:32)). After Spivak’s reading, the distance becomes a placeholder for “graphematic intentionality,” that is not unified but nevertheless “resolutely leaves its track at every intended origin or goal” (Spivak 1980:34). Graphematic intentionality allows the intention of will and desire to have substance.

“Events, objects, acts, meanings... as well as intentions themselves,” Spivak writes, “might well be the effects of a desire precisely to have a self-identical intention that can produce interpretations. This is a limit that no concept of simple intention can cross, for such a desire cannot be thought in terms of a fully intending subject. It remains irreducibly structural. Yet, even as intention is situated within such limits, Derrida insists that it is these very limits, demarcating intention, that produce it, and allow it to function as such” (Spivak 1980:32).

My concept of “personhood” draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of distinction, to bring how one sees into a relationship with experience. Pushing past Thorstein Veblen’s work on conspicuous consumption at turn of the twentieth century, Bourdieu notices that dominant classes are differentiated from subordinate
ones not only through particular signs of good taste, but an “aesthetic habit of mind” (Bourdieu 1984). Distinction thus concerns the capacity to put particular signs into a constellation of meanings that bear out a person’s individuality.

90 Kant’s “disinterested self” refers to the subject of aesthetic judgment’s ability to “regard things without regard for their utility” (Elliott 1992:297). The political dimension of this aesthetic comportment appears historically in “those not directly involved” in the French Revolution:

We are here concerned only with the attitude of the onlookers as it reveals itself in public while the drama of great political changes is taking place: for they openly express universal yet disinterested sympathy for one set of protagonists against their adversaries, even at the risk that their partiality could be of great disadvantage to themselves (Kant 1991:182).

Aesthetical dis-interest, while not the same as morality, “is still a disposition that greatly promotes or at least prepares the way for morality” (Kant 1964:109). Without subscribing to a universal morality, Kant’s schema usefully suggests how an aesthetic and political resonance “promotes the sensibility of the mind of moral feeling” in these “onlookers” (Kant 1951:39).

91 I elaborate on Gilles Deleuze’s post-Kantian renderings of Critique of Judgment in a later chapter; see (Deleuze 1978b).

92 Scott sets out from E.P. Thompson’s “mistake” in The Making of the English Working Class (1966), which was to theorize an experience of identity presumed to pre-exist the production of its analysis. His “experience” presumed the interaction between structural materiality and the psychological, whereas Scott questions a problematic essential unity attributed to a social being that exists prior to insertion into political categories (Scott 1992:29-30). To retrace the agent of ASC as someone historically variable, I must also invoke a “non-foundationalist history...to call into question its [experience’s] originary status in historical explanation” (Scott 1992:37). A “non-foundationalist history,” Scott elaborates, “therefore, must call into question its [experience’s] originary status in historical explanation” (Scott 1992:37).

93 The play of emotions in historical record also provokes Foucault’s investigations in “The life of infamous men” (Foucault 1994)(Foucault 1979). Foucault avows that his research was directed by “my taste, my pleasure, an emotion, laughter, surprise, a certain fright or some other feeling” (Foucault 1979:76). At the same time, Foucault radically de-personalizes these subjective signs to turn them into something other than evidence of the truth of a self.

94 The HVAC system of the Library of Congress’s archive maintain materials in a constant space temperature of 50°F (plus or minus 2.5°) and a constant relative humidity level of 30% (plus or minus 5%) (Enos, Donato et al. 2005:50).

95 The theory of entropy holds that the universe slides into chaos slower at lower temperatures. Congruent with this theory, the humidity, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system supports the material endurance of archived things. In cold storage, materials marked with the coherence of a past recede more slowly from the present. We might point to the serendipity of this configuration to make strange the idea that the archive’s physical relation between physical things can materialize a relationship to historicity (Bailkin 2005:87). This privileged relationship does not derail my investigation so much as situate it along a feature of its ideological terrain.

96 The belief that artifacts yield privileged paths of access to other times and places – that is, that the knowledge gleaned from objects is objective occurs at a formative moment of classic liberalism (Bailkin 2005:87). Pierre Nora similarly temporalizes this order of authenticating knowledge as something ubiquitous in modern life (Nora 1989:13). Anxieties over “losing the past” are among the emotions and bodies inscribed within the duration of a specific modern regime.
97 Archives zone an authority to gather together a past into a certain system. "The authority of the author is there [in the archive] matched by the control of the archon, the official custodian of truth" (Spivak 1999a:205). "Archive" derives from the Greek arkhēion, the domicile of the archōn, who were superior magistrates; "The archons are first of all the documents' guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security of what is deposited, but are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives" (Derrida 1995:2). "Archontic power" thus names authority over the interpretive processes of classification, identification and exclusion.

98 "By this word, I do not mean the mass of texts gathered together at a given period... I mean the set of rules at a given period and for a given society" 59 (Foucault 1991b). These rules determine the limits and forms of what can be said, conserved, constituted as memory, reactivated (from "discourses of previous epochs or of foreign cultures") and appropriated for political use 60 (Foucault 1991b).

99 The "politics of the ordinary" informs my thinking here; see (Dumm 1999).

100 "National fantasy" is another analytic that I cull from Berlant's playbook; see (Berlant 1991).

101 Berlant describes three kinds of attachments underlie kinship's particular relation to the natural and the literal. Cultural, corporeal, and sociopolitical substances congeal into a political mode that Lauren Berlant affiliates with what she calls the "National Symbolic." It is a "tangled cluster" of the juridical, territorial (jus soli), genetic (jus sanguinis), linguistic, and experiential spaces that come to define our habitation of the political space of the nation (Berlant 1991:4-5).

102 Shane Phelan reminds us that America's founding fathers articulated political factions as class identifications. She cites James Madison, who finds the modern state in a managerial capacity, "[t]he most common and durable source of factions... has been the various [sic] and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society... The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation" qtd in (Phelan 1995:338). Class identity and a mandate for the modern state are here mutually constitutive; managing competing classes that capitalism's systemic inequality produces is the primary index of modern state fit-ness. Yet, Phelan disputes whether the durability of factions provides an equally reliable system of identification. Re-examining the concept of "interest," reconfigures the space of identity into a politics. Class identities and interests overlap in a network in which "most of us will find ourselves in positions of internal conflict" (Phelan 1995:338). "Internal conflict" describes an irresolute identity, whose irresolution is felt most acutely in the modern state's attempt to pin down factions to better integrate them into its system of management. The state cannot "do its job" without accurate categories of identity, or at least categories that people will identify with.

103 The "art of government" means drawing upon a model of patriarchal authority, but is not reducible to it (Foucault 1991a:92). Foucault's historical evidence cites the synchronicity between changing forms in either sphere. Sovereign patriarchal authorities directly managed the economy of the family, whereas the modern state is tasked with the modification of forms of authority taken from the home into strategies for managing a population. These strategies develop in and through the traffic between the territories of family and state(Ferguson 2005:90).

104 I'm thinking of "racist love," which happens when a marginalized group falsely claims a racial identity on the premise that such a reductive misrecognition is still more than none; see (Hall 2005).

105 Aligned with the exteriority of U.S. geopolitics, Hawai'i Asian's racially marked class ascendancy has been put into proofs of capitalism's justice. Victor Bascara argues that Asian America figures centrally in discourses of U.S. empire, understood as the attempt to cohere "a will to legitimize the alignment of difference, to turn differences of gendered racialization and economic disparity into an opportunity to demonstrate better living through late capitalism" (Bascara 2006:xvii).
The literature on queer domesticities is extensive. I’m thinking here of Laura Kipnis, Shane Phelan, and Roderick Ferguson — although they by no means exhaust the scholarly projects of queering domesticities (Kipnis 1998; Phelan 2001; Ferguson 2004).

Alcatory, or “playful,” elements of the event are most relevantly discussed amongst scholars of Althusser and cultural marxists; see (Montag 1996), (Laclau 1997), (Negri 1996).

The full quote follows: “We cannot grasp value as such; its form is a possibility for grasping, without content. But if we position ourselves as identities in terms of links in a chain of a value-coding as if they were persons and things, and go on to ground our practice on that positioning, we become part of the problem in the ways I am describing” 62-3 (Spivak 1993a).

Photocopied from the Hawai‘i State Archives, Album #19-13.

Timothy Mitchell describes the state as a “structural effect,” which means that “we should examine it not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures exist” (Mitchell 1999:89). Likewise, I argue that plantation architecture exist through practices that determine the effects of its existence.

Personal communication with Litsu Okawa. Haleiwa, Hawai‘i, January 1, 2006.

Colonial complicity describes a historical and social relation, rather than a value judgment. Gayatri Spivak points out that the etymologically specified meaning of complicity is “folded or woven together”. She deploys this concept onto the field of political analyses by stressing that they must “emphasize our complicity, which we must acknowledge in order to act” (Spivak 1999a:370, n79). Spivak elaborated the etymology of complicity from the Latin complicare, “to fold together”. University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, Department of English “ENGL-785: Narratives of the Politics of Multiple Cultures”. Spring 2003.

Although they work out of Schiller’s Aesthetic Education more so than the Benjamin text I refer to here, Lyotard and Rancière guide this discussion of aesthetic subjectivity; see (Lyotard 1990; Rancière 2004b).

Turtle Bay Resort, in Kahuku, O‘ahu, is a property of Benchmark Hospitality International, which owns a worldwide network of resorts, hotels and conference centers. Benchmark is based in The Woodlands, Texas.

Modes of survival and preservation characterize Kahuku’s post-plantation existence; see Kahuku, survival of a plantation town (1988) and “Kahuku, Preservation of a Plucky Plantation Town” (Pitzer 1977).

Historians cite planter strategies of “divide and rule” to explain racially striated plantation housing camps as modes of disenabling labor organization. However, Ronald Takaki points out that many planters deliberately integrated camps in order to create a more “wholesome” plantation community (Takaki 1989:157). Thus, the formation of segregated camps may simply reflect a process of building new housing camps for each successive wave of workers from different national origins as they arrived, rather than a consciously designed planter policy.

Shiroma was promoted to supervisory rank in the Kahuku sugar company in 1964 (1964).

Through an agreement between the landowner, Joseph Campbell Estates, the Kahuku Sugar Company and a Kahuku community association, rents on Kahuku’s housing units were placed with an affordable range. Under a lease that expired in 2006, rents were originally placed between $15 to $75 a month, with 84 per cent of the homes under $40’ (Pitzer 1977:43).

Walkerville was built for plantation “supervisors,” a general terms for those employed in the administrative offices rather than in the factory or fields in 1937-8 (Shiroma 2004).

“Uncle Harry” is Harry Shigemitsu, my granduncle, a former ILWU local chairman for Kahuku, and later a Kahuku sugar company supervisor.
David Harvey credits Antonio Gramsci for first discerning the totalizing changes that Fordism demands: "a new system of reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour control, and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized modernist, and populist democratic society" (Harvey 1992:126).

Beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), successive Congressional legislation drastically restricted Asian labor immigration. After the 1908 Gentlemen’s Agreement and the 1924 Immigration Act, sugar planters realized that they would have to turn to domestic sources of labor. An expanding territorial-born Asian population and increased mechanization could calibrate to sugar industry labor needs, if this Asian population could be persuaded to take up agricultural work. Eileen Tamura has cataloged the multifaceted discourses surrounding campaigns to retain Territory born Asians in agricultural labor on Hawai‘i plantations. Territorial government officials, politically conservative members of Hawai‘i’s Asian community, University researchers, industry businessmen and of course the planters themselves aligned in favor of channeling youth into plantation work. Some forms of their “multipronged effort” were Reverend Takie Okumura’s annual New Americans Conference (1927-1941), a Governor’s Advisory Committee on Education, a campaign to limit high school enrollment by charging tuition, and increased support for vocational education in the public schools (Tamura 1994:128). Kahuku company agents also introduced “work appreciation courses” into public high school curricula to showcase the technological advancement and educational dynamism of the plantation industry (Wightman 1939).

The civilian government was reinstated in Hawai‘i in 1944 and the war ended in 1945. Especially during WWII, the U.S. military was integrated into multiple levels of Kahukutown. In terms of propinquity, the Kahuku Army Air Field (part of the Kahuku Training Camp and Area) was just northwest of Kahuku High School. Not only geographically proximate, the convergence of sugar planter (embodied in the HSPA) commercial interest grated against the demands of the ferociously total demands of “the war effort.” In a report prepared by the HSPA, Kahuku Sugar Company manager James N. Orrick’s (1940-45) offer to grant blanket access to U.S. military authorities was later cited as evidence against charges that the HSPA failed to provide adequate support. In a letter to Lieutenant General C.D. Herron, Commanding, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T.H. dated November 8, 1940, Orrick writes “I wonder if, during these strenuous times, it would be of any help to you and your staff to have for maneuvering purposes, a blanket okeh [sic] covering the use of the roads and lands under our control. If so, I will be glad to have it forwarded immediately” Exhibit “C” (Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association 1945).

The HSPA’s use of Orrick’s letter as evidence of colonial capital’s patriotism marks an intersection between commercial and U.S. imperial interests in making Hawai‘i an American state. After the US Congress passed the 1934 Jones-Costigan Sugar Act, which would treat sugar from Hawai‘i as a foreign import by imposing quotas, the HSPA changed their position on Statehood (Whitehead 1999:309). On the one hand, that the HSPA needed to make a case for its patriotism suggests that it was in doubt. Planter employment of Asian, particularly Japanese, laborers was often at the crux of this doubt. American progressives criticized planter maintenance of a population of alien/Asian laborers because it deprived white American settlers from work in Hawai‘i and jeopardized the national security. Fortune Magazine (“Hawaii: Sugar Covered Fort” 1940, p78) also cites the reluctance of HSPA members redirect sugar and pineapple lands to diversified agriculture, which would have been used to feed the military stationed there (Whitehead 1999:317).

“Leaving the plantation” was weighted with absconding from responsibilities to “agriculture, which must feed the nation” (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:333). The “good” of Hawai‘i and the U.S. nation, and not incidentally, the plantation company, depended on the agricultural worker (Wightman 1939).
In *The Poetics of Space* (1958), Gaston Bachelard advanced a similar equation of domestic space as “the topography of our intimate being”; see (Bachelard 1969:xxxvi).

I'm indicating Kant's philosophical elaborations of the aesthetic judgment as a definitively impersonal, dis-interested mode of apprehending sensations (Kant 1951). In *The Critique of Judgment*, Kant suggests how the sublime surpasses what seem to be limits in experience. The sublime names a sensuous experience of finitude that does not find paralysis at its limits; “the sublime prepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest” (Kant 1951:108). The tactile and ideological dimensions of sensation are thus re-ordered. Through the transgression of the cusp between subordination of sensation to ideas in the sublime, the imagination “thus acquires an extension and a might greater than it sacrifices” (Kant 1951:109). Positing sensation as an aesthetic registers seems opposed to Kant’s philosophical elaborations, in which faculties of aesthetic judgment are distinctly opposed to dumb sensuousness. Deleuze, however, argues that Kant's systematic separation between imagination and ideas breaks down under closer examination because both are sited on a systemic instability (Deleuze 1978b).

Philosophical theories of being and becoming are famously expounded by Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze. The latter's rendering of “becoming” as conditioned by the Kantian sublime, however, more directly informs my discussion; see (Deleuze 2003).

Hawai‘i unions also widely subscribe to individual home ownership. On April 22, 1994, the Hawai‘i Government Employee’s Association (HGEA) agreed to break their own strike in order to staff the state Bureau of Conveyance. The Bureau records home sales and other real estate transactions. HGEA union spokespeople averred that they never intended to obstruct the pending real estate deals of their own members or the greater public. “April 22: The history of today” Honolulu Advertiser. Hawai‘i Section B1. Saturday April 22, 2006.

In 1946, thirty-three plantations entered a 125-day strike. Shortly, the perquisite system meant that the plantation would take the costs of utilities, medical care, and rent directly from worker's wages. Their terms for returning to work were a sixty-five cent minimum wage, a forty-hour work week, and the conversion of the perquisite system into direct wages from which workers would then pay out costs for utilities individually. The HSPA assessed the perquisite worth to be fifteen cents an hour, whereas another study gauged them at eight cents. Disparities between assessments concern a contest over the degree of success the strike had in increasing worker's economic position.

I'm referring to Marx's usage in relation to the freeing of serfs from feudalism into capitalism.

In the mid-20th century, Hawai‘i unionist demands to abolish paternalistic relations may have simply pre-empted post-welfare industrial relations strategies. Rummaging through Kahuku Sugar Company's training files, I came across John Iglehart's outline for a more progressive approach to human resource development that moved away from “the paternalistic phase of our evolution” (Iglehart 1941). A more developed industrial relations program eradicated the company's collective venues for daycare, utility provision, and recreational and athletic activities. The case for transforming the perquisite into regular wages is arithmetically fuzzy. Translated into the language of job insecurity and the instability of utility costs, abolishing the perquisite system now seems to some former Kahuku labor unionists a pyrrhic victory (Shiroma 2004).

C.B. Macpherson is well-recognized for his political theory of possessive individualism; see (Macpherson 1962).

Mark Rupert notes the complicity between worker resistance to company paternalism and an emancipative individuality, which was defined in opposition to this paternalistic milieu. Applying their
literacy in liberal discourses, industrial Fordist workers could articulate their “resentment” towards “the heavy-handed meddling of their employer in their “private” lives” (Rupert 1995:125).

For a programmatic outline of the 1946 ILWU victory, which included the abolition of perquisites, see (Reinecke 1946).

Photocopied from the Hawai‘i State Archives. Statehood Commission photo, n.d. #1075.

There is a vast literature that directs attention to the domestic as a text of settler colonialism; see (Rodriguez 1994; Stoler 1995; Kaplan 1998; Stoler 2001).

136 Photocopied from the Hawai‘i State Archives. Statehood Commission photo, n.d. #1075.

137 There is a vast literature that directs attention to the domestic as a text of settler colonialism; see (Rodriguez 1994; Stoler 1995; Kaplan 1998; Stoler 2001).


139 Apparently, the homemakers of the neighborhoods were interested because on November 14, 1946 another call was put out to homemakers; “Homemakers to organize.” The Kahukuan. Vol. II No. 50 November 14, 1946. p2, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa Hawaiian Collection, Accessed: 01/21/2005. Also The Kahukuan. Vol. II No. 50 November 14, 1946, p2, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa Hawaiian Collection, Accessed: 01/21/2005.

140 In U.S. cultural and legal histories, privacy is a privileged theoretical space that gets formalized as a category of law and a condition of property (Berlant 1998c:176).

141 In the post-World War I era, Rosie the Riveter was famously evacuated from her newly public role in industrial defense work, returning war veterans were urged to return to their male-breadwinner roles, and the re-domesticated housewife became a domestic target market for consumer goods.

142 T.J. Jackson Lears’ writing is considered canonical in a much-developed cultural history of U.S. consumerism. Against a theory of mass-culture out only into the service of industrial capital, he argued that consumption could as often indicate“imaginative participation in a world of exotic, sensuous experience...perhaps even a fait and fitful dream of personal transformation;” see (Lears 1994:63). Scholars disagree about the relationship between consumption and social transformation, rather locating change in the transition from employer ownership to managerial corporate enterprises, marketing strategies, and the nature of these markets, consumers and strategies themselves. For a detailed review of these debates, see (Steigerwald 2006).

143 In schematic terms, Fordist capitalism articulated industrial mass production with mass consumerism. This capitalist relation was structurally complicit with a liberal state that took an active role in regulating the national market; see (Rupert 1995). Post-Fordism thus denotes a transformed mode of capitalism in which the nation uncouples from its direct role in political economy.

144 Gendered social scripts have an eloquent relationship with U.S. imperialist narratives of justice. In other words, imperial projects articulate themselves through by gendering of justice. Lauren Berlant gestures to historical examples of U.S. “imperial publicity” that link to Gayatri Spivak’s “tableau of white men saving brown women from brown men in the colonial context” (Berlant 2002b:154). Ann Laura Stoler, too, argues that the colonies were a place where the discourses and values of proper femininity were in a formative process of construction, as well as an instrument of colonialism’s regulations (Stoler 1995). “Cultural competencies” and “sexual prescriptions” were continually altered in attempts to maximize profit and stabilize colonial rule (Stoler 1995:113).

145 I borrow this phrasing from Svetlana Boym; see (Boym 2000).

146 Waste-water was often piped into streams. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) hadn’t consulted the city and county government when building their towns. Former Hawai‘i labor union journalist, Phil Mayer, credits unions, namely the ILWU, is credited with making Territorial authorities aware of responsibilities to workers; (Mayer 2004).
The outhouse was also part of a raced structure of labor. Tom Shigemitsu remembers: “From the beginning of the plantation had those outhouses. Used to call them honeyhouse. And they used to collect everyday, called it honeywagon. Japanese man was driver and his helper was Japanese man. So, the Filipinos used to say ‘Filipinos kukae, Japanese hapai.’ Way back, when all the Japanese all retired or something, the Filipinos took over, the Japanese used to say, ‘Oh, Japanese kukae, Filipinos hapai’” (Shigemitsu 2004b).

Tom Shigemitsu’s response to my question about the usual doings of workers after the work day ended offers a good example of domestic architecture; “well, they went home and did their chores, the ladies did their washing and cooking and prepare for next days lunch. And if they had babies, they got up early and then filled the babies’ milk bottle. How many bottles, I don’t know. They had the nursery from the time the parents went to work and from the time the parents quit work and picked them up. At least 6 bottles of milk. And those days they didn’t have baby food. All they had was Gale Borden’s condensed milk. They punched two holes one opposite the other in the top. And they blow the milk out, certain amount into the bottle. And then they poured hot water in the bottle for the baby for the rest of the day” (Shigemitsu 2004b).

The racial composition of the Bachelor’s tenants shifted with successive waves of laborers from different, mostly Asian nations (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Puerto Rican and Filipino). Beginning in the 1850s, the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural society advised planters to import “coolie labor.” Devoid of personhood, these workers were addressed as pieces of plantation machinery. For example, in a letter dated July 2, 1890, the Davies Company ordered bonemeal, canvas, Japanese laborers, macaroni and a Chinaman (Takaki 1983:23).

Moon-Kie Jung attributes the greater emphasis on Americanization within Japanese than Filipino laborer populations in part to two circumstances; “…having immigrated earlier and with a higher proportion of women, the Japanese were fast becoming a second generation and consequently a citizen population, while the more recently arrived and more male Filipino population continued to be disenfranchised” (Jung 1999:373). Okihiro notes that women constituted 31 percent of all Japanese in Hawaii in 1910, 42 percent in 1920, and 46 percent in 1930. This gender parity accrued over time and through differential immigration stipulations; in 1890 women were only 19 percent of the Japanese population, slowly increasing to 21 percent in 1896 and 22 percent in 1900 (Okihiro 1991:58, 185). Nisei could vote by the outbreak of WWII, the Hawaii Organic Act having been passed in 1900. This Act secured voting and office holding rights without property holding qualifications, but denied naturalization to Asian immigrants (nearly 60 percent of the population at the time of annexation) (Okihiro 1991:13).

Utilitarian philosophy, “the greatest good for the greatest number,” holds a particularly architectural resonance. One of its subscribers, Jeremy Bentham, developed a Panopticon as solution to the dual “problem” of discipline and poverty amongst Britain’s urban poor in the 1780s. Hayden discusses this as an example of “minimum existence” housing (Hayden 2002:156).

Company flower contests are part of an ideological constellation of home, gender, a natural order and flowers. Decorative house gardens fronting the physical edifice formed a “spatial envelope” for the domestic haven. Encapsulating the home with organic greenery reinforced the ideology that brought together women’s natural, biologically determined roles and their placement within the home (Hayden 2002:88).

Historically, the concept of the family as a nurturing environment of satisfying, mutually enhancing relationships was not articulated until the 1920s (D’Emilio 1998:469).

See (Hayden 2002:81).
Collective organizations of this kind, behind the ILWU's picket lines, may also refer back to the communal architecture of the plantation town. The 'paternalistic' system had originally been devised as an enticement to retain workers. In the late 1920s, managers offered free housing and medical care, improved sanitation, inexpensive milk, free garden plots, infant care for working mothers, supervised playgrounds for children, baseball leagues, and English classes (Tamura 1994:139). In so doing, they may have engendered the community structures through which union mobilization could proliferate. A casualty of CIO anti-communist purges, the radical labor unionism of the ILWU is another historical site whose potential remains unrealized.

As further detailed in the article, the new plantation home "...has three bedrooms and none is smaller than twelve-by-twelve. There is a large living room and a large dinette. The kitchen and bathroom are also generous in dimensions, and the equipment is of the best. The bathrooms have separate showers and tubs, and the plumbing fixtures are of extra good quality. For each house there is a garage and an outside laundry" (Paradise of the Pacific 1946:335).

Baldwin's marriage to Ms. O'Neill was not unusual; "the department of public instruction was a marriage brokerage, in those days, because there was no female to get married to for these young haole men that were coming up. So most of the wives of these plantation officials were ex-school teachers" (Shigemitsu 2004b).

Proper social persons relate to each other in ways distinct from property relations. "Things," property to be owned, are precisely not people. At this level of abstraction, proper sexual comportments become some of the historical forms that emerge as institutions of private property. For a more elaborate articulation of liberal middle class sexuality and the logic of private ownership, see (Mehta 1999; Bailkin 2005).

Meeting minutes of the Quezon club meeting July 17, 1941. Brigham Young University of Hawai'i archives, accessed February 6, 2004.

I'm drawing on Berlant's discussion of humiliation's relationship to authentic personhood; see (Berlant 2002a:79).

Foucault theorizes modern sexuality as "techniques of self" that broaden corporeality such that sexual impropriety can mean an ignorance of how the self is written onto the self's sites; see (Foucault 1990).

Mark Sanders' genealogy of complicity with apartheid illustrates the coevalness of "the act of affirming one's complicity in order to assume responsibility for what is done in one's name without simply distancing oneself from the deed" and intellectual responses to ethico-political events, like decolonization (Sanders 2002:4).


Watanabe first appears in Hawai'i newspaper archives in 1945. The Kahukuian, the Kahuku sugar company community circular reports that she won the Kahuku High School Oratorical Contest with her speech, "Hawai'i for Humanity". The Honolulu Star-Bulletin excerpted this essay in its report of Watanabe's last recorded win.

Watanabe's participation was reported in the following newspaper articles: "Education of Japs vital task, says prize prep speech" Honolulu Advertiser 12/11/45 p2, c6; "Farrington student, Robert Masuda, wins D.A.R. Speech contest" Honolulu Star-Bulletin 12/11/1945 p11, c.4; "11 Prep Students to compete Sunday for Oratory Title" Honolulu Star-Bulletin 12/8/1945 p4, c3.

Kahuku is Watanabe's hometown.

This celebration has had ambiguous political consequences. Whereas multiculturalism on the U.S. mainland challenged a regime of individualism, "multiculturalism in Hawai'i represents an argument for stability and continuation of the status quo rather than for substantial change in the current structure of race
and ethnic relations" (Okamura 1994a:283). Reconsidering those sociological factors deemed proof of harmony – intermarriage rates, class stratification, and historical racial antagonism - Jonathan Okamura debunks this model as an “illusion” (Okamura 1994a:283). This emphasis on categories of race and ethnicity parallels a consistent inattention to history or socio-economic inequities, which enabled “...the view of Hawai‘i as an egalitarian model of ethnic relations” (Okamura 1994a:276). Okamura thus argues that rather than describing a demographic configuration, the Hawai‘i-multicultural model was an attempt to articulate conservative interests in Hawai‘i through a modernizing discourse of cosmopolitanism (Okamura 1994a:276).

170 Coordinating the “big” geopolitical markers at the end of the war presents some context for Watanabe’s essays. The German Fuehrer Doenitz surrendered Germany on 6th of May 1945. The first oratorical contest was reviewed in The Kahuku‘an on March 15, 1945. Watanabe’s second speech was occasioned by Victory in Europe Day, May 11, 1945. The atomic bombs were detonated in Hiroshima on the 6th of August. A third speech contest, sponsored by the Aloha Chapter of the Daughters of the Revolution (Aloha DAR) this time, was held on November 7, 1945, thirteen days prior to the beginning of the Nuremberg trials.

171 Here I’m referring to Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation, which he explains: “the theory of articulation asks how an ideology discovers its subject rather than how the subject thinks the necessary and inevitable thoughts which belong to it; it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position” (Hall and Grossberg 1986:53).

172 See (Fanon 1963:219).

173 Albert Memmi’s “settler-who-refuses” inspires my phrasing; see (Memmi 1967).

174 Antonio Gramsci first deployed a general theory of hegemony as non-violent, but coercive, control by ideological means. But he further specified that a historical absence of “sedimented parasitical relations” rendered America especially vulnerable to hegemony’s management. “Since there preliminary conditions existed, already rendered rational by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalize production and labour by a skillful combination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries” (Gramsci 1971:285).

175 An exhaustive catalog of these forms would be an excessive project of situating and resituating that ends up substituting scrupulous accounting for argument. So, I sacrifice some scrupulousness to the license allotted to authorship.

176 U.S. military personnel enjoy a higher level of discounted prices, tax-breaks and holiday celebrations in Hawai‘i than most other U.S. states; see (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999).

177 Political referents and tropes derived from decolonization’s past finds their renewed currency in historical analyses of Hawai‘i. Derivative discourse, here, does indicates the pejorative valences Partha Chatterjee finds in Benedict Anderson’s analyses of Third world nationalisms (Chatterjee 1995:11). To review briefly, Chatterjee asks whether Third World national decolonization is fated to reproduce the “modular” artifacts that became European nationalisms (Anderson 1991:4). “Non-European colonial countries” must a conform to a certain modern morphology as the minimum requirement for political recognition (Chatterjee 1995:10). Chatterjee develops this critical approach to the nation-form as the problem of finding an outside to the ambit of bourgeois-rationalist thought (Chatterjee 1995:11). This morphology may be reformulated in strategies of intervention, but neither should it be uncritically reproduced in its enactment. Hawaiian decolonization faces a further iteration of the dilemma.
U.S. domestic race relations take on global significance over periods of increased immigration, World Wars I & II, and the Cold War. Many scholars describe an enabling relationship between image-oriented impulse in U.S. foreign policy and advances toward racial equality, particularly in the domain of civil rights; see (Lauren 1988) (McWilliams 1951; Lasch 1978; Von Eschen 1997; Dudziak 2000; Trask 2000:30; Mirel 2002; Geary 2003; Scott-Smith 2004; Stannard 2005). Exemplary is Mary Dudziak’s connection between the desegregation of public schools in the U.S. South to “Cold War imperatives” (Dudziak 2000).

Jack Kawano, a founding organizer of the ILWU in Hawai‘i during the 1930-1950s, reasons that his U.S. patriotism is conditioned by his training as a Japanese national subject; he cites his “upbringing as a Japanese to respect their country – I think that is why I had some strong feeling [sic] when I grew up as an American to love my country” (Kawano 1975:12). Kawano is infamous for having testified against supposedly communist-affiliated ILWU officers, those who had been his closest labor allies against Big Five corporations in Hawai‘i.

Historically, Okada’s novel, “No-no Boy” provided an inaugural figure of resistance for Asian American studies. However, the “no-no” seems to be taken up as a “not-until;” that is, not until the U.S. makes good on its promise of civil rights. In Hawai‘i, especially in the 1930-50s, the ‘not-until’ comportment energized coalitions of Asian and Hawaiians who enacted many progressive reforms under the rubric of liberal pluralist ideals of equality in education, abortion rights, anti-racist housing and hiring practices, etc. But today, the decolonial basis of Hawaiian claims are, again, formally exhorbitant to the U.S. horizon of “not until”.

In February 1943, WRA [War Relocation Authority] officials, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, devised a disastrous application for leave clearance for persons eighteen years and older. Responses to a of questions would determine whether one was eligible for early resettlement to unrestricted areas of the country or for military service,. The questionnaire was fatally flawed, as evidenced by the two most troubling inquiries. Question 27 asked Nisei men behind barbed wire and under armed guard whether they would be willing to serve in combat duty for the United States armed forced wherever ordered. Question 28, in asking Japanese Americans to forswear allegiance to the emperor of Japan, assumed that Nisei had indeed been loyal to Japan. For Issei, an affirmative answer would effectively render them stateless, since they were ineligible for U.S. citizenship. The confusion and anxiety surrounding the questionnaire created havoc in many families and resulted in qualified answers, no responses, and answer motivated by desires far more complex than a mere test of one's loyalty or disloyalty to the United States” (Yoo 2000:103-4).

Informed by Antonio Gramsci, Mark Rupert describes Fordist capitalism as not only the articulation of social institutions with industrial mass production, but also the ways this circuit organized “social self-understandings” (Rupert 2000:24). Crucial to my argument, a liberal state had an active role in regulating the national market within Fordist systems; see (Rupert 1995). Post-Fordism thus denotes a transformed mode of capitalism in which the nation uncouples from its direct role in political economy.

The Keynesian welfare state was legitimate insofar as it could ensure a living wage for all, remediate social inequalities through legislative and juridical means, and basically spread the benefits of Fordism over the entirety of its citizens; see (Harvey 1992:139)

Although the Paradise of the Pacific reports that the Honolulu Star-Bulletin first organized an appendage of the national oratorical contest for Hawai‘i students in 1928, the Aloha Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution (the Aloha DAR hereafter) had earlier initiated its own patriotism themed essay and speech contests in 1914-15. The absorption process of Americanism was not simply a product of coercion by the sponsoring institutions. In 1937, the Aloha DAR reports: “To the surprise of the committee promoting the project [of sponsoring essay contests], it was ascertained that Oriental children apparently
took a keener interest in the contests than did those children of Revolutionary or Colonial descent" (Mesick 1937). Watanabe is a later version of these keenly interested Oriental children.

The Keynesian welfare state was legitimate insofar as it could ensure a living wage for all, remediate social inequalities through legislative and juridical means, and basically spread the benefits of Fordism over the entirety of its citizens. I draw this definition from David Harvey, see (Harvey 1992:139).

Locating a "retooled" regulatory role for the post-Fordist state, Medovoi then turns to the question; "does post-Fordism also rely on any unique ideological formations comparable to the national narrative that enabled Fordism" (Medovoi 2005:168)? Yes. In contrast to assertions of a post-ideological neoliberal state, Medovoi points out that the idea of being beyond ideology is an ideology of inevitability, specifically the inevitability of globalization (Medovoi 2005:169). An ideology of inevitability stresses a limitless capacity for exchange, abstracted from the hegemony of a national culture that will call itself such.

In their discussion of military semiotics in Hawai'i Ferguson and Turnbull characterize local Japanese as grandly adopting a paradigm of American identity that transcends race and ancestry (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:159).

Jung's claim that Japanese "proof" of US loyalty was a significant enabling ILWU interracial alliances is of particular import here: "...their disproportionate sacrifice and effort during World War II, Hawai'i's Japanese laid to rest the racially rooted, hegemonic prewar doubts of their "Americanism"" (Jung 1999). Carey McWilliams' "Brothers under the skin" was the slogan of opposition to racism that rallied an era of interracial labor activism. This slogan made explicit the ILWU's interracial strategy, which succeeded not by simply subsuming race to class solidarity, but by addressing existing unequal racial configurations (Jung 2003; Schwartz 2003). ILWU organizers made equal racial representation a prerequisite to labor official elections and conducted labor meetings in several languages. Interracial coalitional politics is widely credited as the winning strategy of the 1946 sugar strike (on O'ahu sugar plantations), the 1959 dock strike, and Asian minorities' election into State administration (McWilliams 1964; Conybeare 1986; Jung 2003; Schwartz 2003).

The Nisei adopted the VVV appellation themselves, the US military designated them the Corps of Engineers Auxiliary, civilian laborers to the 34th Combat Engineers Regiment at Schofield Barracks (Okihiro 1991:250).

In 1942, Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons dismissed 317 Japanese volunteers in the Hawai'i Territorial Guard because of "skepticism of Nisei loyalty" (Okihiro 1991:250). These volunteers protested their dismissal and were subsequently offered positions in the labor battalion that would become known as the VVV.

AJA labor corps may also have been part of a strategy of mitigating social unrest. Hawai'i sociologist Andrew Lind, warned of "growing discouragement" amongst Hawai'i Japanese caused by "the rising tide of suspicion and discrimination" (Lind 1946: 133; qtd. on (Kotani 1985:102)). Lind emphasized that "loyalty was present," and so, finding a venue for displaying that loyalty was the next course of action. To counteract these feelings, Hawai'i Japanese men "had to be channeled into a program of active participation in the war effort" (Ibid).

Historically, the emphasis on an American identity amongst Japanese settlers in Hawai'i arose in response to suspicions of their disloyalty to the U.S. and collaboration with the Pearl Harbor attacks in 1941. In early 1943 with the call for army volunteers, the abbreviation "AJA" for "Americans of Japanese Ancestry" was popularized in the press and accepted by the Nisei themselves as a preferred term to refer to
the second generation. At Camp Shelby, the soldiers from Hawaii referred to themselves as the “AJAs” and to the Mainland Japanese Americans as the “Nisei” (Kotani 1985:104).

195 These identity-dimensions further suggest the VVV’s subscription to “Americanism”. Mark Rupert concisely defines Americanism as “a world-view and self-understanding which powerfully combines elements of liberalism, masculinism, Christianity, nativism, and racism long present in the popular common sense of US citizens” (Rupert 2000:19).

196 Eileen Tamura also emphasizes the atypicality of the VVV cohort: university educated, middle class, male and Christian. Matriculation through high school, much less university education, was rare amongst Hawai‘i Japanese of the time (Tamura 1994).

197 Arguing in sync with other cultural pluralists, McWilliams advocates for Hawaiian statehood “to demonstrate to the world that peoples of diverse racial and national origins, of different backgrounds, and many cultures, can live and work together in a modern democracy. As a nation of nations we alone are in a position to exercise real political leadership. At the same time, however, the divisive forces that have brought disaster to the world also threaten our national unity. Our unique position constitutes both our strength and our weakness. If we fail in the world, we fail at home; if we fail at home, we are not likely to succeed in the world (McWilliams 1951:13).

198 Beginning in 1921, Hawaiian Statehood was proposed in forty-nine bills before it was approved in 1959. The status of Hawai‘i as a U.S. state is highly contested. Designated a non-self governing territory by the United Nations in 1946, Hawai‘i was entitled to a plebiscite under the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 742 in which integration (statehood) would have been one choice amongst others: free association, commonwealth, or independence (Trask 2000:19). This referendum, conducted by the internal colonial government of Hawai‘i, occurred in violation of the due process of international human rights law. Thus Hawai‘i became a U.S. state in 1959, in violation of international law (Kauanui 2005:4). Also invoking international law, Keanu Sai argues that as an occupied nation, rather than a colony, Hawai‘i was not eligible for statehood in the first place (Sai 2004). For another contest to the perception that Statehood was widely supposed, see (Kelly 1999).

199 Hawai‘i’s population was “dominated” by nonwhites not only numerically, as voting-citizens, but also as governing administrators. In the vocabulary of anti-colonialism, conferring Statehood on Hawai‘i was also meant nonwhite fitness for self-governance (Bascara 2006:2).

200 Of course, factors other than these also made Hawai‘i Statehood viable in 1959. An interplay between political compromises with Alaskan Statehood, political ideologies and Cold War military strategy all apply here (Bell 1984; Kelly 1999; Scott-Smith 2004). Kosasa also points to a relationship between America’s Cold War bid for global hegemony and Hawai‘i Statehood (Kosasa 2004:114). Rather than a “magnanimous American offer to grant full citizen rights to the island’s population...statehood ensured that American imperialist power maintained its grip over the north Pacific as Cold War tensions grew” (Kosasa 2004:115). Doubtless, Hawai‘i’s utility for U.S. military strategies figured in the case for statehood. This convergence of U.S. military interests with Statehood’s “vehicle of Asian ascendency” is another component of ASC. But I’m attempting to triangulate “personhood” in a specific historical space as something more than tactical interests.

201 In a letter to Henry Stimson offering “full approval” for the organization of a combat team of “loyal American citizens of Japanese descent,” Roosevelt writes, “The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race and ancestry” (Hosokawa 1982:212). Nisei in Hawai‘i has occasion to see a demonstration of Roosevelt’s Americanism. While on an inspection tour of Honolulu’s military bases in 1944, staff officers advised Roosevelt against allowing Nisei soldiers into his
publicity photos "... on the distant possibility that a fanatic might attempt to assassinate him. Roosevelt quickly dismissed such fears and asked that any Nisei be photographed with him along with other soldiers" (Hosokawa 1982).

202 The full quote reads; "Washington and London were finding it ever more difficult to explain why lives must be sacrificed so that they would not be dominated by Tokyo and Berlin, while the United States and United Kingdom continued to maintain racialized systems of oppression at home and abroad" (Horne 1999:453).

203 'Little Rock,' refers to the nine Black students who attempted to attend Little Rock Central high school after the Little Rock school board voted for the racial integration of their school system in 1957. The 'Little Rock Nine' were caught between the Governor of Arkansas Orval Faubus, who called up the Arkansas National Guard to prevent them from entering the high school and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who deployed part of the 101st Airborne Division to enable their attendance. After a year of enduring racial hatreds, Little Rock simply closed its public schools to evade the issue of racial integration altogether.

204 This racial imagination of Hawaii'i is notably forgetful of the Massie Case (1931), in which Thalia Massie, a white naval officer's wife, accused five non-white men in Hawaii'i of raping her. Tellingly, this case continues to re-emerges in scholarship on Hawaii'i's social history and race relations.

205 Such a conflation can be read in the 1924 Nation of Origins Act. According to this Act, immigrants could be admitted in proportion to the number of those already resident in the U.S. Intended to preserve "the symmetry of the nation," it works around a contradiction specific to a modern U.S. national identity that defines citizenship by parentage and acts signaling acquired national competence (Palumbo-Liu 1999; Li 2004:107).

206 Indigenous politics radically undermines faith in U.S. justice based on its claim to found a radically new equality. Arendt's description is useful here. American justice consists in the evidence that "a new order can be founded, and what is more, founded with full consciousness of a historical continuum, for the phrase "New World" gains its meaning from the Old World" (Arendt 1954a:3). The basis of this "Novus Ordo Seclorum, A New Order of the World" is determined by its medium, "the motto printed on every dollar bill" (Arendt 1954a:2).

207 Although Eisenhower maintained his support for Hawaii'i Statehood throughout his Presidency, the tenor of his rhetoric shifted after 1955 - the year that the African-Asian Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. For the first time, newly decolonized nations announced their international presence as sovereign political entities. In his 1956 State of the Union message, he addressed Hawaii'i in an idiom of exemplarity "Statehood, supported by the repeatedly expressed desire of the islands' people and by our traditions, would be a shining example of the American way to the entire earth" (Eisenhower 1956).

208 Gerald Horne usefully articulates a link between domestic and U.S. foreign policy; "Washington and London were finding it ever more difficult to explain why lives must be sacrificed so that they would not be dominated by Tokyo and Berlin, while the United States and United Kingdom continued to maintain racialized systems of oppression at home and abroad" (Horne 1999:453).

209 Varied positions for and against Hawaiian Statehood in other national discourses exceed my discussion here. However, certain utterances from the archive gesture towards this variety. A 1949 article in the Honolulu Advertiser recalled the "latest known Kremlin line on the Statehood question" from a "Soviet newspaper [that] charged that the statehood campaign was actually fostered by Wall Street interests to give big business a stronger hold over the Hawaiian economy than is possible under the territorial form of government" (1949).

210 Spivak's discussion of the figure of woman in exchange analysis informs this way of reading inductively. "My point is, of course, that through all of these heterogenous examples of territoriality and the
communal mode of power, the figure of the woman, moving from clan to clan, and family to family as daughter/sister and wife/mother, syntaxes patriarchal continuity even as she is herself drained of proper identity. In this particular area, the continuity of community or history, for subaltern and historian alike, is produced on (I intend the copulative metaphor — philosophically and sexually) the dissimulation of her discontinuity, on the repeated emptying of her meaning as instrument” (Spivak 1988:31).

Ideologically, the laboratory metaphor keys to the kind of applied science that was hegemonic in Hawai‘i’s era of industrializing agriculture. Rhetorically linked to Americanism, industrialism opposed conservative Southern Agrarianism; see (Twelve_Southerners 2003:10).

“See (Berlant 1993:214).

William Brigance discusses the role that public education should take up in order to respond to the exigencies of one-world governance (Brigance 1946).

Carey McWilliams prophesizes the impact of Hawai‘i Statehood on a U.S. racial imagination; “where a nation makes the mistake of attempting to fraternize racially with the peoples it conquers, the imperial relation cannot long be maintained” (McWilliams 1951:170).

Victory in Europe Day is May 8, 1945.

Berlant elaborates her concept of the “infantile citizen” in (Berlant 1997b).

President Abraham Lincoln was supposed to have offered this role to a bereaved mother, Mrs. Bixby, whose five sons were killed in the Civil War; “The solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.” Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull note that this "spartan platitude" is engraved on a memorial statue at Punchbowl National Cemetery in Honolulu (Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:127).

"Immigrant intention" was important in the renovation of U.S. identity, but my larger point is that it cannot be divorced from the forms through which intention could be signalled (Honig 1998; Honig 2001).

In “The protean character of American Liberalism” (1994), Gary Gerstle observes oscillations in American liberal discourses concerning relative emphases on race and culture. In the early twentieth century, Progressivist thought addressed itself to programs of “moral renewal” that would underlie a new American nationalism. However a split developed between right and left-leaning Progressives. Spokespeople from the former group, such as Theodore Roosevelt and William Jennings Bryan, advocated a coercive melting-pot Americanization that would dissolve “primordial” ties to ethnic cultures in the interest of an implicitly superior American identity. By contrast, the latter strain, especially in the work of Randolph Bourne and Horace Kallen, would articulate Old World heritages as “treasures” to be celebrated by way of an American cultural pluralism. Progressive intellectuals, who increasingly called themselves "liberals," initially affirmed soviet-style, extra-parliamentary forms of direct democracy. However, “the violent excesses of nationalist passions” encountered in World War I and the Russian Revolution led both currents to reformulate their approaches to culture, conceptualized as a function of race and ethnicity (Gerstle 1994:1054). Thus, in the 1920s, American intellectuals turned away from cultural politics and towards the advancement of “civilization” through the economic realm (Gerstle 1994:1055). “Industrial democracy” became the “new nationalism,” a way of addressing the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of U.S. society.

The pointed aversion of a racially demarcated culture as an analytical “factor” is evident in the virtual absence of raced immigrants in sites chosen for social science research during the 1920-30s. Not only in academic research and artistic movement, the Anglo-Saxon, muscular iconography of American labor unions, popular during this period and beyond, also belied the cultural and racial composition of the working class. As indicators of this aversion, Gerstle cites popular studies of small town America such as Charles Beard and Mary Beard’s The Rise of American Civilization (1927), Dorothea Lange’s Depression

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era photographic portraits, and Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd's *Middletown* (1929). Studies such as these defined membership in an American "folk" culture in a pastoral ideal that marginalized nonwhite race and ethnicity in 1930s discourse.

221 Introduced into the language of political theory in 1907 by American sociologist Edward Ross, the term "social control" described the assurance that greater and decentralized autonomy would not lead to social dysfunction (Zaretsky 2000:333).

222 Zaretsky periodizes social control theses, originating in 1890-1914, came into the mainstream during 1919-1939, and made its compromise with the Keynesian welfare state from 1945-1976.

223 "Especially for many young Nisei women, the war imposed new alternatives and lifestyles [by volunteering services at the Salvation Army, the YWCA, the Red Cross or the USO or recruitment into the Women's Army Corps (WAC)] which their Issei parents in years previous would have stubbornly suppressed. Taken out of the home and put into school, factory, assembly line, or professional job, the Nisei woman began a pattern of independent employment which exposed her to many forces outside of the ethnic community...Nisei women were even recruited into the armed services during World War II. In October 1944, the Women's Army Corps (WAC) sought Island enlistments. Eventually fifty-nine women were recruited into the WACs, twenty-six of them Nisei. In January 1945, they left Hawai'i for training and eventually served on the mainland, in Africa, Europe, and Asia.

224 Watanabe, Chiyoko. Kahuku High School "He died for his country" *Kahukuan* Vol.1, no. 12 5/11/1945

225 In 1929, the kidnapping and murder of a prominent haole businessman's son, George Gill Jamieson, by Myles Fukunaga is a historical antecedent to widespread interest in Hawai'i Japanese psychological interiority. Widely evaluated by psychiatric professionals as insane, Fukunaga nevertheless was convicted of murder and hung (Kotani 1985:71-7).

226 The conflict between mothers and social institutions, such as public education, reflected wider concerns with the expansion of welfare state apparatuses into the household. Since the New Deal era, organizations like the Works Progress Administration were instruments of this expansion, providing relief work for teachers, nurses, child caregivers and others. Michael Denning discusses these changes in household, work and sex roles during the 1930-40s; see (Denning 1998:30-2).

227 See (Leigh 1927:7).

228 Civic education in speech patterns had a particular utility for Hawai'i's "students of Oriental descent," especially for a second-generation student population that often spoke an Asian language at home (Friederich and Wilcox 1953:75).

229 Training guides promote oratorical facility as a social project; "But what of the man who...thinks thoughts which he cannot share with his fellows and feels emotions which he cannot express adequately enough to be understood by those whose sympathy he needs and desires? ... He can be taught to express himself, to communicate with the people with whom he associates" (Friederich and Wilcox 1953:3).

230 Arendt's concept of the political is deeply sited in a liberal imagination. For her, political freedom means participation in public affairs uncoerced by social need or authority. Against a political community, the normative classroom is structured by authoritarianism. The scene of education, between old and young, teacher and student, know-er and learn-er, is authoritarian (Arendt 1954b).

231 In formulating racial harmony from Hawai'i's schools, Watanabe concurs with George F. Zoolk, then president of the American Council on Education. In his letter dated December 1945, "To the members of the 1943 House Holdover Committee of the Hawaiian Legislature," Zoolk writes:

"... Few communities offer such a challenge to education leadership as the Hawaiian Islands because nowhere else will be found an amalgamation of so many diverse races, living, working, playing together — and, most important, going to school together. The photograph which is the
frontispiece of this book shows eighteen different nationalities represented in one small group of students from one high school in Honolulu. Handsome, healthy, poised, intelligent, they are living evidence that the schools of Hawai‘i are doing a good job of educating for citizenship and for living in "one world"... President [American Council on Education]" (Draper and Hayden 1946v).

The Hawai‘i legislature prefaced their 1946 report on secondary education in the Territory with his letter along with a photo taken from Honolulu’s McKinley High School. The photo caption reads “this is as cosmopolitan a group as any that can be found on earth” (Draper and Hayden 1946:v).

232 Alan Lipietz’s “peripheral Fordism” is relevant here; see (Lipietz 1987).

233 In the 1930s through the 1950s a political alliance developed between Hawai‘i Asians and Hawaiians. Under a liberal rubric of racial equality, they enacted progressive reforms in education, abortion rights, anti-racist housing and hiring practices (Stannard 2005:421-2).

234 For example, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin coordinates an index of value for oratorical recital and citizenship in the equation, “Youthful Orators – Good Americans” (1948).

235 Jonathan Okamura’s argument that “there are no Asian Americans in Hawai‘i” is relevant here. Okamura notices that an oppressive image of Hawai‘i as a multicultural paradise emerges from the presumption that race and ethnicity function similarly in Hawai‘i and the U.S (Okamura 1994b; Okamura 1994a).


237 The dynamic I am describing between Watanabe’s presentation of this domestic interior and her intimate relationship with it has affinities with W.E.B. DuBois’ “double consciousness...this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (DuBois 1995). Tomo Hattori discusses assimilating Asians in this way; see (Hattori 1999).

238 See (Butler 1999).

239 Wendy Brown links this pessimism to the ambiguous results of experiments in Third World national liberation and socialist autonomy, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Stalinist atrocities, and the excesses of China’s “cultural revolution” (Brown 2002:368-9). While noting that the socialist Left remains vigorous in places like South America; in the U.S., “cultural politics, identity politics, the politics of cultural diversity, new social movement politics, or the politics of new social antagonisms is widely considered to have taken over [it’s] ground” (Brown 2002:369). More “splintered” and perhaps modest in their goals, these new kinds of politics are replacing the millenarian redemptive project with attention to multiple sites and modalities of political transformation. The “fate of the desire for total critique and total transformation, the impulse to wholly indict the structures of the present and stake all on the absolute justice of a radically transformed future” remains unaddressed in this account (Brown 2002:370). This thwarted desire, she argues, takes form in political pessimism.

240 In the 1970s, western societies began to develop forms of governance that could respond to the more flexible, increasingly extra-national, economic modes of what has been called neoliberalism. These neoliberal environs carry the institutional memory of an earlier milieu. While disseminating new codes of legitimacy, neoliberalism also borrows extensively from liberal democracy’s forms of legitimacy (Brown 2003:23f).

241 Lauren Berlant brings out this point; see (Berlant 1997a).


243 Seri Luangphinith discusses “home” as a settler aesthetic in Hawai‘i; see (Luangphinith 2006).
Marx usefully outlines the difference between such enfranchisement as “merely political,” rather than human, emancipation. In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx warned against being “deceived” by a merely political emancipation constrained by the separation of “public and private man” (Marx 2001:54). Shortly, this separation means that communal and reproductive social life is put under erasure in order to abstract a political community of equals (Marx 2001:51). Simultaneously imperceptible and perceptible, capitalist social relation reaches perception only as a relation between owners; “it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx 1909:164-5). By contrast, real human emancipation is a collective endeavor defined in opposition to alienation (defined as a social condition engendered by capital’s abstraction). For “human emancipation [to] be completed,” this separation must be obliterated; “man must recognize his own forces as social forces, organize them, and thus no longer separate social forces from himself in the form of political forces” (Marx 2001:64).

244 The United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842 employed a precedent for the bango system. The commanding officer, Navy Lieutenant Charles Wilkes recalls that native Hawaiians were designated by a tin disk, “painted of different colours, so that the wearers might be known to us and mustered without having recourse to their names or asking any questions” (Wilkes 1845: qtd in Ferguson and Turnbull 1999:14).

245 Although no name is associated with this quote, Takaki credits the Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, *Waialua and Haleiwa: the People tell their story* (Honolulu, 1977), vol.8, p.149; (Ethnic studies oral history project 1977:149).

246 Education was hoped to push Asian settler progeny beyond unskilled labors. Lillian Symes, writing in *Harper’s Magazine* in 1922, observes as much; “[the Issei] will half-starve himself, if necessary, to send his children to high school... He does not want them to come back to the plantation; for he knows from observation that Americans do not perform hard and dirty labor” (quoted in Tamura 1994:139).

247 World War II U.S. martial law bound Hawai’i’s agricultural workers to work at wages below those of ‘free’ workers and prohibited their employment in more lucrative defense jobs. For the duration of the war, between 1941 and 1945, labor unions, including the International Longshoremens and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) agreed to a no-strike pledge in solidarity with the national war effort. Union membership had gradually increased to 10,000 just before the Pearl Harbor attack. After the war, the ILWU dramatic increased to forty-thousand members in Hawai’i by 1947 (Allen 1950:377). Between 1938 and 1943, the National Labor Relations Board reports the organization of 21 unions in Hawai’i, but would certify 108 unions between 1944-1947 (Allen 1950:377).

248 Judy Rohrer has discussed the *Rice v. Cayetano* (2000) case as emblematic of the ways that “Western law renders indigenous claims inarticulable by racializing native peoples” (Rohrer 2006:1). She cites J. Kehaulani Kaunani, who diagnoses the problem as a shortcoming of “the discursive apparatus of liberal citizenship, equality and ‘race’ [which] cannot address issues of collective inheritance and native title” (Rohrer 2006:23). As I have been arguing, this legal ineloquence around race can be understood within a larger New Right process of hijacking a juridical apparatus configured by liberal protest.

249 Designated a non-self governing territory by the United Nations in 1946, Hawai’i was entitled to a plebiscite to determine whether or not to pursue U.S. statehood. In 1959, Hawai’i became an American state by a process that violated International law; see (Kauanui 2005:4).
Lisa Duggan locates concept of political equality as a “central innovation” in the U.S. Constitution, which effectively divided economy and politics from private spheres; “…the removal of property considerations from voting requirements allowed for a more complete (rhetorical) separation of the economy, understood as primarily private, from the public, democratically accountable (to white men, in theory) state” (Duggan 2003:5). Karl Marx also railed against this concept of political inequality in “On the Jewish Question,” (Marx 2001).

He served three consecutive terms as governor of Hawai‘i, from 1974-1986. Since 1893, U.S. assaults on the Hawaiian nation have persisted. A fraudulent Joint Resolution of Annexation was imposed in 1898; and, it became a U.S. state in 1959 in violation of international protocols. President Grover Cleveland formally recognized the illegality of these actions in an address to the U.S. Congress on December 18,1893.

The designation of Hawai‘i as an independent nation-state, colony and a U.S. state is highly contested. Due process was ignored by a vote conducted by the internal colonial government of Hawai‘i and Hawai‘i became as U.S. state in 1959, in violation of international law (Trask 2000). Keanu Sai also cites international law to argue that Hawai‘i is not a colony, nor a U.S. state, but is rather an independent nation suffering U.S. occupation (Sai 2004).


Comparative literary scholars have been particularly adept at recognizing a special relationship between nineteenth century American sentimental narratives and the American political cultures of protest; see (Berlant 1998d; Patton 1998; Klein 2003:145-55).

Jon Goldberg-Hiller suggests how this abstract space is enacted into law; “[c]ivil rights law has long developed through analogy, an abstraction that dissociates the sociology of intersectionality in order to build a basis for inclusion and ‘equality’” (Goldberg-Hiller 2006:8).

From her research on Australia, Jen Ang writes that “multiculturalism is the equivalent of a mode of nationalism designed to manage diversity within the nation’s borders” (Ang 2000:xx).


This was the case with Thomas Shigemitsu’s brother, Harry. “Harry Shigemitsu was the first elected union leader (unit chairman) on the plantation. He used to make fiery speeches against the bosses. Today, he is PTA [plantation tenant’s association] chairman, elected by the same people he used to call names” Krauss, Bob. “In one car” Honolulu Advertiser Feb 12 1955.

Walkerville was built for plantation “supervisors,” a general term for those employed in the administrative offices rather than in the factory or fields in 1937-8 (Shiroma 2004).

Relevant here is Jacques Rancière’s warning against “the parade of images depicting the grandeur and decadence of the worker myth: nostalgic artisans, proud of their fine work and defending a culture of worker’s brain and brawn against the big industry that enslaves and frees; militants brought up in the school of the factory… later planed by the new disciplines into waxen figures on whose natural wrinkles are inscribed the thoughts of their masters about labor, hygiene, and family” (Rancière 1989:11).

The structure of kin-complicity is further complicated here; Richard Shigemitsu’s absence was, in part, due to his labor activities and reported communist affiliations.

In Stern’s usage, “local” denotes a historically produced locale rather than an insular provincialism: In appraising these attitudes, it must be borne in mind that Hawai‘i, especially since statehood, has been a
highly mobile society in which many of the sons and daughters of plantation workers moved into positions of leadership in government, the professions, business, finance, and education...What effect all of this may have on the class consciousness of Hawaiian workers will be left for other scholars to explore" (Stern 1983:469).

Local solidarity might be understood as a particularly neoliberal manifestation that postdates the overly bureaucratic "business unionism" that Mark Rupert argues was the institutional form of a death knell for a more radical industrial unionism in the 1930s and 40s. "Tendencies toward this officially sanctioned business unionism damned and diverted the more solidaristic currents within the early industrial union movement" 28 (Rupert 2000).

John Rosa and David Stannard identify the origin of local identity with the 1931 Massie case; Eric Chock maps the development of local literature in Hawai'i and Noel Kent suggests a trajectory for local identity as a lever in State politics; see (Rosa 2000), (Stannard 2005), (Chock 1996), (Kent 1989b).

In Kahuku, many remember T.G.S. Walker's management of the plantation as particularly patriotic and paternalistic; retaining a "network of spies" to better scrutinize the community (Baldrige 1992:14, 125-30). Walker was Kahuku plantation's manager between 1928-1940. There is some speculation that he was forced to resign because he refused to dismiss 100-200 plantation employees. T.G.S. Walker was the plantation manager between 1928-40; later succeeded by James N. Orrick [1940-45], C.E.S. Burns [1945-?], E.B. Holroyde, James F. Bud Morgan, Fred Trotter [until 1967] and finally Clarence D. Christopherson [1967-72] (Baldrige 1992:14).

Shigemitsu is describing a characteristic practice of conduct and obligation of plantation hierarchy. Plantation worker families would give gifts, as well as "places of honor and warm cordiality" in important functions in the community (such as, "a birth ceremony, a wedding, a funeral, the celebrations of anniversaries of the various racial clubs") to the manager and high ranking company officials (Ikeda 1951:15).

Shigemitsu's 'snooper stool pigeon' has a historical existence outside of this story. The "stool pigeon" was a common pejorative term for a traitorous informant amongst Hawai'i unionists and plantation laborers. On the U.S. continent, the stool pigeon was most conspicuous in the Congressional House's Committee on Un-American Activities and the Hollywood blacklists of the 1950s.

Kahuku plantation town held the integration of ideological and spatial features in common with other sugar company towns, which likewise "combined worker management, crop and machinery surveillance, and ostentatious displays of landowning benevolence" (Bunn 1996:40). Taken together, they describe the coercions of planter paternalism.

Anti-paternalism was a rallying slogan during the sugar worker strike organized by the ILWU in 1946. Specifically targeted was a perquisite system in which plantation administrators collected payment for housing and utilities from worker wages.

As an incorporated U.S. territory, all men born in Hawai'i were citizens and thus eligible to vote. Yet, historian David Stannard observes that Hawai'i Japanese, as an ethnic group, were notably absent at the polls up through the end of the 1920s. Twenty-six percent of eligible Chinese and haoles, and thirty-eight percent of Hawaiians were registered to vote, but less than six percent of eligible Japanese participated (Stannard 2005:77). Stannard accounts for this disparity from the "depth and degree" to which the experience of planter's informal strategies of intimidation enforced timid voting behaviors (Stannard 2005:76). The contrast between their formal eligibility and their absence at the polls highlights the other barriers that made polling stations notorious examples of planter coercion. Planters, via their overseers often compelled workers to endorse a slate of acceptable (usually Republican) candidates, and monitored worker acquiescence at the ballot box and voting booth. Former plantation workers recount the precision of
this scrutiny; "Inside the [voting] booth, the pencil for marking the ballot hung from a string tied over the Republican side of the ballot. From the outside of the booth the lunas could see if the string moved away from the Republican column -- and if it did, there would be consequences. Workers had lost their jobs and their homes for displaying Democratic inclinations" (Stannard 2005:76).

Historian Franklin Odo similarly argues that experiences of plantation oppression inform the political logics of nisei in the state of Hawai'i from the 1950s onwards (Odo 1992).

For accounts of Hawai'i's "new politics" during 1960-1980; see (Cooper and Daws 1985), (Coffman 1973), (Kotani 1985), (Iwata 2003), and (Ariyoshi 1997).

Cooper and Daws' land and power analysis of modern Hawai'i discusses the political history of the land *hui*; see (Cooper and Daws 1985).

See (Goldberg-Hiller 2006). Also, Jonathan Okamura also observes that racial equality and non-discrimination in neoconservative discourse are framed by concerns with individual rights rather than rectifying society wide disparities; see (Okamura 2002:126).

Reformist and abolitionist activists appealed to the viscera of an American public, emphasizing the ways structural inequality was experienced as suffering; "the project here was to make visceral the injustice that Native American and African slave occupants of the United States were exiled from the national promise of emancipation, a condition that the Constitution ought to be experienced subjectively by all (who counted) as men" (Berlant 2005a:75, note II). To make personal injury directly politically meaningful, as the injuring effect of social policies, required a sentimental mode of legal visibility.

Speaking to Australia's nation-formation vis-à-vis Aboriginal claims, Alan Lawson notices that the emergence of the settler is precisely opposed to the indigenous; he writes "the national is what replaces the indigenous and in so doing conceals its participation in colonization by nominating a new colonized subject – the settler – in a nonnative nation" (Lawson 1995:30). Colonialism thus works as a discourse, interpellating subjects such that they can be incorporated into its political system (Lawson 1995:24).

The main sites of action for procuring juridico-political recognition of Hawai'i's independence from the U.S. have been international and regional fora, particularly the United Nations. A report by Hector Gros Espíell, U.N. Rapporteur to the Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities "concluded that, under international law, self-determination is a right of peoples and not minorities" (Trask 2000:15). The recognition of self-determination as a human right emerged in the post-WWII context of decolonization in article I of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Equal opportunity, racial equality, a living wage, meritocracy, liberal education, and American democracy belong to civil rights for U.S. minority groups, whereas Hawaiian arguments for U.S. de-occupation exceed U.S. jurisdiction.

Elizabeth Freeman discusses the pause as a political technology; "the pause provides an antidote both to the traditional historicist models of progress that Sade also repudiated and to the "revolutionary" ideology of a complete break from the past that Sade celebrated" (Freeman 2008:51).

The Coalition provided financial support for the prosecutors in the *Rice* and *Arakaki* cases in 2000.

J. Kehaulani Kauanui identifies the new Right organizations active in these legal attacks: The Campaign for a Color-Blind America, Robert Bork, Americans against Discrimination and Preferences, the United States Justice Foundation, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the New York Civil Rights Coalition, and the Pacific Legal Foundation (Kauanui 2005:8).

The work of Sucheng Chang, Harry Kitano, and Roger Daniels works to debunk this model minority myth by emphasizing the myth's inaccuracy and maintenance of class inequities (Chan 1991; Kitano and Daniels 1995). By contrast, Asian settler politics emphasizes the consequences of Asian class ascendancy in Hawai‘i, however uneven and restricted it may be.

Rancière differentiates his aesthetic politics from an ethics of recognition (which draws on Hegel’s master and slave dialectic). An aesthetic politics deals with the structures of a political community, rather than individual recognition. He writes, “I fear that, by setting the issue in terms of recognition, we make it a matter of individual suffering... It is not the same thing as the idea of framing a sensory visibility of equality (Rancière, Blechman et al. 2005:295).

Lionel Trilling, a literary scholar writing in this era, articulated this kind of America in his The Liberal Imagination, “[American artists] contain within themselves, it may be said, the very essence of the culture and the sign of this is they do not submit to serve the ends of any one ideological group or tendency” (Trilling 1950:9).


The double edge between meritocracy and historically devolved social subordination is not unique to Hawai‘i. This rhetorical dynamic appears in critical responses to civil rights movements (particularly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and women’s suffrage as “special rights.” See Jon Goldberg Hiller’s discussion of parallel uses of “special rights” rhetoric in legal cases brought against Hawaiian entitlements and same-sex marriage (Goldberg-Hiller 2002).

The 442nd is a Japanese American battalion that fought in World War II.

Clayton Hee, an OHA trustee himself, wrote this endorsement; Honolulu Advertiser, November 2, 2000; Opinion Section, p. 14.


The occasion for Luzon’s speech may also explain his deeply compliant comportment. On June 30, 1939, Isabelo Giron recorded the minutes of the Kahuku Representative Club. This record describes the eviction of Anatalio Luzon, bango #596, and his wife, from Kahuku’s housing camp two. For the most part, it appears that their eviction was a result of complaints against Mrs. Luzon. Alfonso Damasco called Mrs. Luzon a “trouble making woman” who told “some men that I [Damasco] was promoted from second ditchmen to first ditchmen, President and camp boss because I was a cocksucker” (1939). If the plantation would lend him a truck, and the workers helped to load his things, Luzon’s promised to leave “with no hard feeling”.

Upon being evicted from Kahuku worker housing camp two in 1939, Anatalio Luzon, bango #596, articulated these racial “feelings of inferiority” with a kind of racial solidarity described as a “local attitude”. His testimony was recorded by Isabelo Giron on June 30, 1939; “it is bad for us Filipinos to exercise this jealousy, if any of our countrymen are promoted to a responsibility job, we are to be proud that the officials of the Plantation trust us to hold such a good job”. Luzon reasons that the terms of their immigration to Hawai‘i specified labor in “cultivating, cut cane, we read that carefully. We didn’t read that we are going to be a luna, police, officeboy or timekeeper, all of this such a good job are not in our contracts”. Therefore, “the Plantation Bosses are very nice of them to promoted us to white men job...so let us forget what has been past throw away your ill feeling, let us be all friends again” (1939).
Contesting Schiller's assessment of the French Revolution's failures, Rancière writes: "The Revolution remained true to the traditional opposition between a class of the mind and a class caught in sensation (Rancière 2004c:13).

In The Critique of Judgment, Kant attends to the relationship between sensation and intelligibility. The sublime names a sensuous experience of finitude that does not find paralysis at its limits; "the sublime prepares us to esteem something highly even in opposition to our own (sensible) interest" (Kant 1951:108). The tactile and ideological dimensions of sensation are re-ordered. Through the transgression of the cusp between subordination of sensation to ideas in the sublime, the imagination "thus acquires an extension and a might greater than it sacrifices" (Kant 1951:109).

Lauren Berlant discusses this configuration of subjects as constituted within contemporary American political rhetoric, specifically around the 2004 U.S. presidential elections: she writes, "In the contemporary political world the vernacular is rooted in emotional authenticity, fealty to oneself, projected generally" 18 (Berlant 2005b:18).

Especially transnational feminist scholarship has been crucial to articulating colonization's myriad effects on gender, labor, culture, international orders and diaspora in an era of globalization (Shohat 1998) (Lee and Shibusawa 2005).

Akira Iriye's careful account of culture, nation and internationalization suggests how recovering referents from nationalized pasts entails new attentions to political identification as a transfer of nationality; see (Iriye 1989).

I'm investigating how the terms of class mobility get imagined as social emancipation in the "(capitalist and monocultural) discursive regularities" of leaving the plantation (Berlant 1999:208). Discourses of planter paternalism are examples of aesthetic pedagogies that aligned middle class aspirations with consumer practices. Brought towards a new era of post-Fordist consumerism and an economic shift from agriculture towards global tourism, these discourses became instructions for reading these shifts as signs of a functional American meritocracy.

Settler opportunism refers to election into State offices, land development investment, and a general sanction of acts that would open the "corridors of white power" to these Asian settler opportunists (Kosasa 2004:278-9). This understanding shares much with Marxist renderings of opportunism. Opportunism, in Györg Lukács' reading of Marx, particularly ensnares workers struggling on the trade union front. The danger lies in mistaking the desires of an existing worker-consciousness for the class consciousness of the proletariat (Lukács 1976:74). Class conscious proletariats struggle against the wage system, whereas the former are "fighting the effects, but not with the causes of those effects" (Lukács 1976:73).

Since the 1970s, activist struggles against land development identified themselves as a collective of "locals" against white elite and foreign capitalists. This limit formed when a Native Hawaiian "renaissance" took up the vocabulary of decolonization (Trask 1987). Together with a new lexicon of de-occupation, these frameworks have increasingly elucidated the histories and politics that separate Hawaiian nationhood from U.S. minority rights, see (Sai 2004).

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harold F. Rice vs Benjamin J. Cayetano, 528 US 495 (2000) is perhaps the most representative of the race (blind) logic underpinning New Right legal challenges.

This was the ILWU's rallying slogan during the 1946 Sugar strike, which emphasized opposition to planter efforts to "divide and conquer" workers by exacerbating historical ethnic and racial antagonisms.

The Kahuku Sugar Plantation was incorporated in 1890 and closed in 1971(Baldridge 1992:xx-xxvii).

Hana, a Hawaiian word, is awkwardly translated into "work." Referring to activity in a more general sense, hana points beyond the meritocratic and moral economies of rewards and deprivations that burden its
Preserving a "plantation heritage" is part of the institutional mandate of organizations like the Kahuku Village Association, the Hawai'i Plantation Village, and the Hawai'i Japanese Cultural Center (www.hawaiiplantationvillage.org; Pitzer 1977). In the name of historic preservation, these organizations have also been bulwarks against resort and housing development and retaining subsidized housing for former workers. Hawai'i's Plantation Village (also called the Waipahu Cultural Garden Park) formally showcases "the lifestyles and experiences of Hawai'i's plantation workers" through dioramas, docent tours, artifact collection and informal sessions for discussions with former plantation workers.

In "Telling our roots in the sugar plantation," Gaku Kinoshita points out that "work is more than just a means of earning money; it is a way of living or a value of life" (Kinoshita 2002:11). Kinoshita finds three themes in the plantation story genre: overcoming hardship, opposition to inequality, and an escape from the plantation (Kinoshita 2002:9).

The Kahuku Training Area (8,216 acres) is on the northern end of the Ko'olau mountains. In 1999, the Army bought it fee-simple from Campbell Estate for $23.5 million dollars.

In relation to the U.S., Hawai'i is alternatively a nation under U.S. occupation, a colony and a U.S. state. Designated a non-self governing territory by the United Nations in 1946, Hawai'i was entitled to a plebiscite under the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 742 in which integration (statehood) would have been one choice amongst others: free association, commonwealth, or independence (Trask 2000:19). Due process of human rights law was ignored by a referendum conducted by the internal colonial government of Hawai'i. Thus Hawai'i became as U.S. state in 1959, in violation of international law (Kauanui 2005:4). Keanu Sai also uses international law to argue that Hawai'i is neither a colony nor a U.S. state. Rather Hawai'i is an independent nation suffering U.S. occupation; see (Sai 2004).

This quote is taken from Chang's introduction to The Japanese in Hawai'i: A Century of Struggle; see (Odo and Sinoto 1985:11).

Early nineteenth-century Asian migrants were identified as labor-commodities on planter invoices; see (Takaki 1983). Suspicions of disloyalty were central to American Anti-Japanese sentiments, especially after the bombing of Pearl Harbor; see (Okihiro 1991). These historical caricatures identified Asian workers as non-political subjects; neither labor commodities nor unpatriots can be reliable citizens.

Meritocracy, as I use it here, is an index of social value that metes out advantages on the basis of ability rather than inherited privilege or prejudice.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harold F. Rice vs Benjamin J. Cayetano, 528 US 495 (2000) is perhaps the most representative of the race (blind) logic underpinning New Right legal challenges.

The rhetoric of former Hawai'i Governor George Ariyoshi, exemplifies an attempt to temper a lukewarm, but formally supportive, position on Hawaiian sovereignty with the language of meritocratic community. He reminds readers of his political memoirs that "the rest of the people in Hawai'i today, who are not native Hawaiians, are also deserving of a place under the sun" (Ariyoshi 1997:175). Specifically forgetful of the historical conditions that differently bring "the rest of the people" to Hawai'i, Ariyoshi's statement anticipates the "race blind" logic that enters neoconservative juridical activist discourse in 2000.

This New Right cultural politics of feeling is akin to the "silence...the unconscious, which bourgeois culture has mythicized" that led Raymond Williams to propose the counter-tactic of "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977:131). In contrast to an apparent base-superstructure, which privileges the real as the reality of capitalist exploitation, Williams' structures recognize feelings as themselves immanent, real, and structured. The revelation of real exploitation cannot happen without creating contexts for recognizing how feelings are structured.
Throughout the 1980s, a left-leaning agenda of resistance in Hawai'i was articulated around the split between U.S. mainlander and Hawai'i local or between local (nonwhite) and haole. “It was not until much later in the decade that many Hawaiians would begin to distinguish themselves as “natives” while perceiving other immigrants, both whites and Asians, as “non-natives” (Trask 1987:146). While emphasizing the thorniness of its political context, Trask does not dismiss the entire project of local literature. Her own poetical works and affirmative reviews of Richard Hamasaki and other local fiction writers attest to this; see (Trask 1999). Debates over local literature address this thorniness as “neocolonial” complicity; see in particular (Sumida 1991; Chock 1996; Fujikane 1997). Here, Trask is addressing specific debates over Hawai'i's “local” literature. For an analysis of the aesthetic politics of the Asian settler colonialism paradigm, see (Luangphinith 2006). Dana Takagi also approaches the politics of this paradigm, but from a sociological rather than a literary discipline; see (Takagi 2004).

Kathleen Sullivan elaborates a trajectory of proponents of women's rights arguments that increasingly draw on abstractions of liberal equality and rely on a model of protective legislation; see (Sullivan 2007b).

Initially, political membership was recognized in a "classic Constitutional liberal model;" national subjects were abstract legal persons, whose subjection to the law disregarded anything specific about her (Berlant 2000a:44). Labor union, feminist, and abolitionist social movements of the nineteenth-century evolved a second model in which their identities marked their unequal subordination to social structures. Later, civil rights and feminist activists argued that “structural exclusion is a violent impact on someone who experiences that violence intimately” (Berlant 2000a:44). Legal reparations were thus "a system of remedy for those who could mark themselves as a minority situated outside the social, political, or economic mainstream" (Patton 1995:224-5). Whereas these civil rights debates focused on mechanisms of recognition and compensation for groups that suffered systemic inequality, New Rightists question the nature of obligations and rights (Patton 1995:225).

This logic was applied in campaigns for Hawai'i's Statehood in 1959. Widely publicized as an elevation from second-class citizenship at the time, scholars now re-evaluate the legality and political impacts of the move from Territory status to Statehood on Hawaiian independence. In "the vocabulary of anti-colonialism", Statehood recognized the fitness of population dominated numerically by nonwhites (at the inauguration of Statehood most Asian settlers had been born in the Territory and were therefore already able to vote) for self-governance (Bascara 2006:2). A Hawai'i state administered by nonwhite authorities thus "reform[ed] the colonial system so that the corridors of white political power would be open to them [Asian settlers]" (Kosasa 2004:278-9). This horizon becomes the future meaning of the "leaving the plantation" narrative.

The family wage drew on the social aesthetic of a normalized male-headed household, thus structurally embedding masculinity as the function of the wage earner's place in the family (Melosh 1991:83). The institutional dimension of this aesthetic proceeded from U.S. New Deal-era art. Artists rendered a portrait of the worker's family life alongside a new image of labor as gender-appropriate, heroism rather than innately oppressive. Labor union's arguments for higher (family) wages thus drew a model of agency from a scenario in which the labor earnings of a male-headed household would have to be sufficient to support children, and the wife and mother who would support them with her unpaid domestic labor (Fraser 1994:591).

Berlant distinguishes the grammars of a contemporary "public intimacy" from the 18th century "intimate sphere of domesticity" described by Jürgen Habermas (Berlant 1998b:3). Habermas' intimate sphere grounded "a sense of self which became a sense of citizenship only when it was abstracted and alienated in the nondomestic public sphere of liberal capitalist culture" (Berlant 1997b:4-5). "Public intimacy" refers members to understand their feelings as simultaneous belief; "the belief that the version of experience they
see digested on-screen is composed of their own, the public's own, simultaneous, spontaneous, identical, and fully fleshed-out sensations in response to events deemed clearly worthy of noticing in a particular way" (Berlant 2005a:53).

328 For the duration of the war, Hawai'i's agricultural workers were bound to plantation work at wages below those of 'free' workers. Between 1941 and 1945, labor unions, particularly the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) agreed to a no-strike pledge in solidarity with the national war effort. Union membership had gradually increased to 10,000 just before the Pearl Harbor attack. After the war, the ILWU dramatically increased to forty-thousand members in Hawai'i by 1947 (Allen 1950:377). Between 1938 and 1943, the National Labor Relations Board reports the organization of 21 unions in Hawai'i, but would certify 108 unions between 1944-1947 (Allen 1950:377).

329 In his work on postcolonial landscapes, David Bunn cannily observes that the "rhetoric of the picturesque can be a mode of argumentation" (Bunn 1996:41). A picture constellates a certain order of forms, thereby tacitly organizes how one is, or is not, seen to belong to that order. Elsewhere, Bunn makes elaborates his claim; "[l]andscape is the genre that marks the emergence of a public attitude claiming to be a private reverie... to naturalize a particular type of public subject" (Bunn 2002:141). Deploying Bunn's insight, we can read the political in the way that things purported to be 'private reveries' manipulate a distance from publicity to naturalize the pasts they assert.

330 High rates of employment, the familiarity of U.S. mainland defense workers that came to Hawai'i with unionization, widespread resentment against compulsory service under martial law, and the extension of collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers under the "Little Wagner" Act are widely cited by labor historians as factors that contributed to the postwar success of unionization both on the waterfront and the plantation (Beecher! 1985:23). The Wagner Act (1935) established the U.S. National Labor Relations Board, effectively legislating the right to strike and bargain collectively to workers in the private sector. The "Little" Wagner Act (1944), also known as the Hawai'i Employment Relations Act, extended this right to agricultural workers.

331 I'm describing something akin to Wendy Brown's discussion of ressentiment in minority groups' "wounded attachments" to the state, which she presents in (Brown 1995) and then revises in (Brown 2001). She cautions against political struggles oriented around "wounded" identities because they may fetishize the wound as itself emblematic of that identity; see (Brown 1995).

332 My informal conversations with many still resident in Kahuku followed this trajectory; documented examples are available in Baldridge; see (Baldridge 1992).

333 MSNBC.com Technology correspondent, Bob Sullivan reports, "Life is harder now, experts say;" see (Sullivan 2007a). Middle-class downward mobility has yet to achieve a heroic narrative for a current generation that has been conditioned to the optimistic life stories of their parents.

334 For example, when social reformers in times and places other than twentieth-century America put their political agendas into tactile form, "they designed model towns to express these desires, not model homes" (Hayden 2002:34). The single-family home signals the cruelty of constricting political imaginations in ways that might not be experienced as a bad feeling.

335 Similarly, Berlant notices that "[w]hat links these zones conceptually is no longer the American Dream of social mobility as such but faith, faith in the highly symbolized, relatively immobile structures of intimate attachment from the family and the nation to God... The problem of social interdependence is no longer deemed structural but located in the faith that binds to itself a visible, lived-in community" (Berlant 2004:3).

336 Frederic Jameson discusses the ways that finance capital render things like pleasure and culture intelligible; see (Jameson 2003).
For example, Jackson might identify a similar aesthetic at work in portrayals of the plantation's racially striated housing camps as dioramas of liberal multiculturalism. In Jackson's lexicon, the same camps that house imported Asian labor testify to exported U.S. imperialism. Successive waves of transnational labor migration during the Territorial era (1898-1959) get romance into the multicultural plantation community; for historical sources see (Daws 1968; Takaki 1989).

Hirsch developed postmemory to address the cultural politics of Holocaust survivors' experiences by their descendants and the "belated nature of traumatic memory itself" (Hirsch 2001:11-2). Specifically, Hirsch's aesthetic structures are family portraiture, still photographs that move a rich visual conversation between contemporary artists and documents of the Holocaust. Thus, the term "postmemory" is specific to her project of conveying temporal and qualitative differences from survivor memory (Hirsch 2001:9). In relation to my discussion, her concept usefully addresses memories of experiences one has not had as something other than lies.

Both Hirsch and Eiko Kosasa approach family photographs as "aesthetic structure of transmission" for the "myth of the family" and colonizing Asian settler "ideological images" respectively; see (Hirsch 2006:33) and (Kosasa 2000).

The findings of such an inventory depends on how betterment is measured - in relative wages (worse), the price of consumer items (better) or happiness-indexes (not as good as Sweden). For a discussion of the first two indices, see "Americanism, Fordism and Hegemony" in (Rupert 2000). Happiness-indexes include a range of quantifying qualitative research compilations; for instance, the World Happiness Database and Eric Weiner's *The Geography of Bliss* (2008) Twelve Publishers.

Although she is speaking to a cinematic presentation of post-Fordist affect, her articulation of the relationship between justice, detachment and affect is also the form of the problem I'm engaging; see (Berlant 2007a:256).

My phrasing of the problem draws from Cornel West's differentiation between black people as a problem and a "problem people;" see (West 1999:103).

Here, Trask's specific denial of Hawaiian struggles as identity-problems suggests the relevance of "strategic essentialism". Gayatri Spivak, who is credited with formulating this concept, uses it to specify a politics that demands that one speak from cultural or ethnic grounds, which must be rigorously distinguished from decolonizing struggles as an "economic principle of identification through separation" (Spivak 1996b:200). On the one hand are strategic, catachrestic declarations of political unity ("[t]he political claims over which battles are being fought are to nationhood, sovereignty, citizenship, secularism") in response to specific policies of exploitation, and on the other are claims to ethnic or cultural identity (Spivak 1993a:13). Whether an assertion about essence is strategic is highly dependent on the economy within which that utterance is situated. I think that she later reconsiders strategic essentialism because it can be taken too aphoristically - without regard for the multiple political currencies of identity that makes it strategic in the first place. This 'speaking from one's own grounds' describes US legal discursive formations, the implications of which I discuss in relation to Asian settlers and Hawaiians.

See page 5, Act of July 9, 1921, c 42, 42 Stat 108.

The HHCA controlled approximately 200,000 acres of land that had been ceded to the U.S. Hawai'i State and set aside for Hawaiian homesteading. Crucially, this blood quantum became the legal standard of Hawaiian identity in federal and state policy. By contrast to this emphasis on bloodline, Trask cites concepts of "cultural patrimony to the next generation" that animated the founding of institutions such as the Lili'uokalani Trust for Children's Fund (Trask, Franklin et al. 2004:234).
These moves are continuous with the New Right’s privatization of a welfare state. In the context of a 
dismantled social safety net and shrunk public sphere, privacy, intimacy and liberal models that locate 
resources for agency in an interiorized personhood have been raided by an American new Right’s 
 politicization of feeling.

In Haunani-KayTrask’s terse phrasing: “In principle and in practice... Native sovereignty is impossible 
when non-Natives determine the process” (Trask 2000:10). To practice this principle in the emphasis on an 
“other history,” we need to specify who does the emphasizing. Eiko Kosasa asserts that the task “is to leave 
a space for the Hawaiian nation to reconstitute itself” (Kosasa 2004:viii-ix). Similar approaches direct 
Asian settler activists to “support of Native struggles” (Trask 1993); “foregrounding Native Nationalism” 
(Fujikane 2003), and keeping “out own communities [of Japanese settlers in Hawai’i] in check” 
(Yoshinaga and Kosasa 2000).

I intend this “bracketing” in a sense similar to the ways that authority in Arendt’s classroom allows for 
pedagogical space to be a training ground, a prepolitical formative sphere sheltered from “the harsh light of 
publicity” (Arendt 1954a).

Berlant’s description of the love’s hermeneuticism guides my thinking here. She renders love into an 
interpretive process - it has meaning as a sensation that distills into names for “a whole constellation of 
things that one wants to experience extremely” (Berlant 2001a:448). “Too quickly,” she argues, “a picture 
is put on this vague cluster” (Ibid).

Aligned with a process that Berlant identifies as the “privatization of citizenship,” liberal culture embeds 
evidence of social injury into personal pain. New Right rhetoric has had the effect of “stigmatizing” claims 
to social injury into “victim politics,” a phrase that deliberately suppresses the complexity, ambivalence, 
and incoherence of social antagonism in the everyday life of contemporary citizenship’ (Berlant 1997b:7). 
While this rhetoric explicitly disavows the salience of sentiment, feelings come into the history of its 
politics in more ways that it addresses. The 1993 U.S. Apology Resolution to Native Hawaiians Act, which 
addresses the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai’i, is an exemplary product of this political mode 
(US Public Law 103-150, 28 November 1993). The Act at once officially recognizes public accountability, 
but the apology unfolds on a political field that finds slips out from assurances of structural transformation. 
Instead, a depth of feeling, signaled by Congressional “deep regret” and a humbled Presidential 
comportment of contrition is meant to guarantee good faith in a future carriage of justice (Berlant 2005b). 
The 1893 overthrow exhibited a mistake in judgment, rather than a contradiction in the U.S. government’s 
relationship to Hawai’i.

Post-national analyses drawn especially from Asian American and American studies, inform my 
thinking on the limits of the imagination that configures this racial proof. Working to imagine 
immigrant/settler figures as something other, post-national scholarship rather inclines towards 
psychoanalytical, diasporic, transnational, and especially queer approaches in work by Tomo Hattori, Amy 
Kaplan, David Leiwei Li and Roderick Ferguson; see (Hattori 1999; Kaplan 2002; Li 2003; Ferguson 2004).

Social demographer William Peterson first used the term "model minority" in his 1960 New York Times 
Magazine article, "Success Story: Japanese American Style". Later that year, the US News and World 
Report would describe Chinese Americans as model minorities as well. Citing Japanese family values and 
strong work ethic, Peterson later elaborated his analyses to conclude that their fitness for citizenship 
exceeds that of even “native born whites” (Peterson 1966). The preface to his book Japanese Americans; 
Oppression and Success (1971) was entitled, “The Anomaly of Japanese Americans.” Petersen writes, “not 
only are Japanese Americans better than any other segment of American society, including native whites
[sic] of native parents, but they have realized this remarkable progress by their own almost unaided effort . . . " (Peterson 1966).

153 Lauren Berlant discusses this relationship between politics, aesthetics and Enlightenment pedagogies; see (Berlant 2000b).

154 We might start by noting that liberal culture is itself imprinted on an imperial history. Historically, a specifically liberal brand of imperialism arose through a purposeful neglect of the significance of territory (Bailkin 2005:83). While the very immateriality of ideal liberal space renders equality and difference thinkable within an infinitely partitioned political field, it has also sidestepped material claims to land. In this imagination, claims to social remediation build out the argument that differently located identities bear the pressure of flawed social systems unequally. Liberal pluralist social justice, therefore, means assuring that society does not produce unequal burdens for those identified as minorities. Evidence of inequality telescopes the suffering of the individual, who can claims rights linked to social knowledge based on her authentic personhood.

155 In contemporary vernacular, “haole” refers to white European and Americans in Hawai‘i. I do not italicize Hawaiian words in recognition of the space from which I write.

156 I enjoy Lauren Berlant’s description of this system; “[b]iopower operates when a hegemonic bloc organizes the reproduction of life in ways that allow political crises to be cast as conditions of specific bodies and their competence at maintaining health or other conditions of social belonging” (Berlant 2007b:765).

157 Drawing on patterns that have emerged over the past 150 years in the United States, Berlant introduces “national sentimentality” - a modal shift from the rational to the emotional in U.S. political rhetoric, initiated in the 1830s (Berlant 2005a:75, note II).

158 I’m cribbing this point from Lauren Berlant’s analysis of John Kerry’s unsuccessful presidential campaign; see (Berlant 2005b).

159 “Personhood,” Berlant observes, “is defined by its vulnerability to humiliation” (Berlant 1998d:654). Humiliation’s relationship to authentic personhood is also briefly addressed in (Berlant 2002a:79)

160 Shame, more often than humiliation, has been discussed as a dimension of the political. Both comport with an American mode of “feeling political;” see (Sedgwick and Frank 1995; Probyn 2004; Berlant 2005b).

161 The relationship with “less fortunate others” has been crucial to an American mode of political community, “citizens can meet across death and disaster in a way that is personal and impersonal” (Berlant 2002b:163). In the traditional hermeneutic of U.S. sentimental politics, compassion is evidence of an “emotionally literate” person’s proper orientation to unjust suffering (Berlant 2002b:163). Through this most intimate evidence – how one feels – a person is encouraged to locate themselves within a script of proper compassionate responses.

162 Historically, the individual subject was also a post World War II response to the absurdity of wars, genocide, and fascism. Foucault’s genealogy of the modern individual subject is instructive here; see (Foucault 1993).

163 Elsewhere, Trask has specified that practical forms of support might take the form of auxiliary advocacy groups that advocate for (but not in the name of) Hawaiians such as “Local Japanese Women for Justice;” see (Yoshinaga and Kosas. 2000). She also specifies that the programs of Ka Lahui best represent what she hopes for a Hawaiian sovereignty oriented-political organization (Trask 2000).

164 Malini Schueller identifies these dynamics as a “multicultural imperialism” that infects academia in two new ways – the Right’s appropriation of liberal multiculturalism and the very paradigms of academic knowledge; see (Schueller 2007).
Other critics have also questioned whether histories of Asian settlement might be something more than an account of charges against a U.S. colonizing monolith. Dana Takagi has recently taken issue with a perceived failure to discuss the “changing historical, sociopolitical, and cultural relationships between Locals and Native Hawaiians” (Takagi 2004:281). The “unintended consequences” of insisting on the separateness of Asian locals and Natives, she argues, collapse the differences between Asian settler groups, and deflect attention from the historicity of white colonialists (Takagi 2004:275-6). These are cutting critiques that Takagi distills into the question; “[d]oes history matter as much as politics in historical materialism” (Takagi 2004:281)? By way of formulating a response to Takagi’s query, we have to specify the politics of this history.

I draw this understanding for disciplinary knowledge formation from Jacques Rancière, who argues that a “discipline, in effect, is not first of all the definition of a set of methods appropriate to a certain domain or a certain type of object. It is first the very constitution of this object as an object of thought, the demonstration of a certain idea of knowledge – in other words, a certain idea of the rapport between knowledge and a distribution of positions” (Rancière 2006). Using Rancière’s language, Asian settler colonialism makes agency, as historical and political accountability, “thinkable” (ibid).

The community of Arendt’s Christian families is put together like the New Right America I’m describing; “The unpolitical, non-public character of the Christian community was early defined in the demand that it should form a corpus, a “body,” whose members were to be related to each other like brothers of the same family. The structure of communal life was modeled on the relationships between the members of a family because these were known to be non-political and even antipolitical. A public realm had never come into being between the members of a family, and it was therefore not likely to develop from Christian community life if this life was ruled by the principle of charity and nothing else” (Arendt 1958:49).

Berlant makes this point about serialized protected social spaces by reading the rhetorics of transnational capital; “It exhorts citizens to understand that the “bottom line” of national life is neither democracy nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes not unreasonable claims on resources of control over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a life together flexibly in response to the market-world’s caprice” (Berlant 2000a:43).

Barbara Ehrenreich’s excellent report on welfare privatization emphasizes the role of conservative morality; see (Ehrenreich 1997).

The nation is not only the overarching political category of community, but also a historical event. Berlant points out that the development of American nationalism differs from other instances of national formation because the U.S.’s “political facticity as a nation preceded the development of a shared culture among the citizens themselves,” (Berlant 1991:29). To be ‘nationalistic’ in America had yet to find forms for the pageantry and accoutrements of patriotic tradition. Thus, it was not until 1824, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the U.S. republic, that “the nation became officially a referent with a history, and nationalist rhetoric was congealed via parades, spectacles, oratory, and other confirmatory expressions of collective public emotion” (Berlant 2005a:75, note II).

This argument roughly affiliates with Wendy Brown’s; see (Brown 1995).

My thinking is informed by Spivak’s “insist[ence] that (the thinking of) responsibility is also (a thinking of) contamination responsibility;” see (Spivak 1994:23).

See (Foucault 1993:222-3).

Foucault asserts that the point of a genealogy of the self is to “dissipate” identity (Foucault 1984a:95). The space that Asian settlers can “leave” (legal rights to private property) is doubly bracketed from Hawaiian genealogical and cultural understandings of land, which are epistemic gaps that cannot assuredly
be recovered through classroom time. This does not mean not allocating time and resources to teaching and learning the forms and content of Hawaiian knowledge, but these projects are asymptotic to the negative space required for Hawaiian political self-determination, which lies outside of the occupying force of America, the injured subject of U.S. juridical discourses and political cultures, and on actual land.

376 This is a highly schematic overview of Foucault’s system, most elaborated in *Society Must Be Defended*; see (Foucault 2003).


379 “Political feeling” is Lauren Berlant’s concept; see (Berlant 2005b).

380 I’m thinking of Karen Kosasa’s attention to art pedagogies and the vigorous debates over the politics of “local” literature in Hawai‘i; see (Kosasa 2001) (Chang 1996; Chock 1996).

381 I borrow this phrase from Elizabeth Freeman’s excellent meditations on queered historicities; see (Freeman 2008).

382 Walter Benjamin made this point most intriguingly by connection sensation, aesthetics and technology; see (Benjamin 1936).

383 For instance, the Overthrow of the Kingdom is an event that bears crucial implications for Hawaiian political systems, but its idioms of sovereign acts do not find easy application in other recognizable consequences of colonization: diabetes, high blood pressure, and the slow attrition of traditional fishing and gathering sites. Rights for access to traditional gathering and fishing grounds have been a crucial dimension of contemporary Hawaiian decolonization struggles; see (Kamahele 2000).
LITERATURE CITED


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