MEMORY, REALITY AND THE VALUE OF THE PAST

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ABSTRACT

Memory, Reality and the Value of the Past

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Chair: Professor Arindam Chakrabarti

Memory is philosophically puzzling. It is prone to errors of undetectable deletion and embellishment, and seems too derivative to deserve the status of knowledge. Yet it is the enabling condition for other means of knowing like perceiving, inferring, and testimony. In the first part of this work we show that correct memory is an independent means of knowing the past, directly and non-representationally. Not only does it generate and regenerate knowledge, but it also makes us who and what we are.

As fascinating neuroscientific studies tempt us to take our remembered past as spread out in the brain—a view Henri Bergson had meticulously argued against, hard questions about felt duration, and the role of memory in perception of time and space, remain.

What and where is the past that we happen to recall or forget? Can we call it real without reducing it to the present? Is the past simply what is made of it at present? Could it be permanent yet changeable? These difficult ontological issues are explored in the second part. Since we are directly acquainted with the past which remains ‘back there/then’ inside what stands ‘out here’ now), the past cannot be something extended in an inaccessibly remote space-time. Our epistemically accessible past must stay open to the revisions and transformations by our present and future actions adding to its value. This value-added past is nothing but what it could have been.

From such ontological complexities we are led, in the third part, to axiological questions of moral, aesthetic and spiritual evaluation of the past to which we belong.

Complex argumentation from Classical Indian, Western analytic and Continental philosophical original sources lead this work to a surprising tilt towards a realist panpsychist ontology of the immaterial but objective past. Genuinely tensed “prior” times, transcending actual individual minds, is seen to be embedded in impersonal Consciousness, as Abhinavagupta and Bergson had both concluded. Is this what young Wittgenstein was remembering when he wrote: “Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is your spirit…. the same with the elephant, the fly, the wasp” (Notebooks-1914-1916, p 85e)?
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Why Memory?

Memory is a confounding thing. Philosophical inquiry flourishes through reflexive contemplation on phenomena that puzzle the analytical intellect. Memory is a natural topic from which to start philosophical reflections as it baffles straightforward epistemological categorization. It enables us to know, yet is notoriously unreliable.

It seems that memory is constantly in flux, being added to and subtracted from in order to perform its complex functions at all. Normally, we seem to remember only the 'gist' of things, both colored by and attached to emotions and other drives and habits of the mind. We usually 'hear' both so much more, and so much less, than what was said. Likewise, we know more, and less than the available 3rd person evidence would indicate.

Such 'knowledge' can hardly be called knowledge; yet, it seems fundamental to anything we might more properly call "knowledge". We cannot give much objective justification for taking what we recall to have been true just the way we recall it; but any justification that we give for a belief requires that we have, that is, we possess by having remembered and retained, concepts—including, perhaps, such complex concepts as that of belief and justification.

For the past few decades, the phenomenon called 'false memory syndrome' has raised serious questions about our remembrances and their relations to our expectations and those of others. Recent experimentation has shown that 85% of children will easily incorporate a false past event into their autobiographical memory. The prevalent view has taken this recent experimental evidence to show memory’s tendency toward falsity given the power of the left-brained 'interpreter' to draw narrative lines where there are a multitude of possibilities. (Gazzaniga, 2000)
But significantly, this experimentation also shows that we are formed, so to speak, to take information easily—especially others’ information about the past. Memory is not just our own but requires that we take the testimony of others as true. After all, we know that they also remember (asking how we know this, would start another dissertation!), and we trust such claims and accept that they are true, although we cannot ourselves remember.

Because of this, it seems reasonable that when the experimenter is making up stories about a child’s past and informing the child that such an event happened, that most children should tend to accept these new autobiographical ‘memories’—since others know what happened as well as they do, especially if they were there. And because they are adults, they probably know even better (this is perhaps just unconscious knowledge, or protocol for a child). Whether such implanted remembrance stays without recurrent reminding or subsequent remembering over time is left unexamined by these experiments.¹

Presumably even that real testing experience remains lost to the child’s active remembrance years later. Perhaps it would become a real part of an autobiographical narrative of one’s past only if the child became aware of the dissonance as something traumatic. Maybe the 15% who couldn’t accept the new memory found displeasing the experimenter traumatic and the attempt to ‘embed’ this experience disturbing—and because of this trauma such genuine memory was remembered without any latter reminding.² It is

¹ Many further tests could be run to see what this really means for memory. The 15% of unsusceptible children are perhaps the more telling group for memory-function. Why do they not agree to the new memory and what does this imply? Would the 85% who do take the new memory remember this later if not reminded from time to time, or if this was not triggered again (would their autobiography really “take” to the change)? How much re-iterating remembrance is necessary to “take” a memory as one’s own? What characteristics differentiate the subjects who easily incorporate false-memory and those who don’t?

² To take a personal example of such traumatizing-testing: I remember having an I.Q. test when I was a child; and I seem to remember it only because of its strong emotional valence. Everything I remember seems to ‘surround’ the event as one of frustration at not being able to understand what word the experimenter wanted me to spell. She asked me to spell “wrap”—and I said “which one”? And she said “like gift-wrap, wrap a package” and I could not differentiate this from the other ‘rap’ which I knew to be a word, but could not remember its meaning. From this I seem to remember her expression and the tone of her voice her frustration with me staying stuck on that question and wanting more time. I remember her thinking or saying ‘just put something down’—or I remember her expectations then. From this, I
difficult, if not impossible, to determine what makes us remember some things and forget others. And in our retelling, we can only say so much. But it is clear that our remembering is tenuous and not wholly subject to our control.

We seem threaded to the past by a fine cord whose parts we cannot see unless illumined by present light. But if such a thread binds us back to the past, it also impels us forward. Constrained, yet freely moving on, we are just this real past becoming presently manifest.

Somehow incoherent properties cohere in us. We are past and present—and perhaps partly future. And, we are truly ambivalent in life. We have contradictory feelings and inconsistent beliefs because such feelings and beliefs are not just present but likewise past. We change our minds, our directions, our thoughts about “the facts” and “the past”—we re-interpret willfully and largely as we choose. Occasionally, we are forced to recognize the current choice—and even the determination of our realm of choices—as whimsical in retrospect, just passing fancies, or just then and not now. We live lives within lives. We trespass, but we can repent. We can trespass again. Our actions are both determinate and free; both restricted and with the possibility of creativity.

We mistake falsities as truths, and ignore truths as if they were lies as we interpret not only the past, but ourselves. In extreme cases of self-deception, one does not see or hear what is immediately available to be seen and heard. In lesser cases, one lies to oneself, since one must know the truth in order to lie. Yet it may, in fact, be ‘unknown’ to them that they are lying (hence the deep difficulties) of self-deception. Deception (of others) would have the same problem, except that if I lie to you unbeknownst to myself, then there has been no remember that day, what the room looked like, the building in which it took place, and other events of that day, other times in that building, etc. Had there been no cognitive dissonance, memory of that all-important I.Q. test would remain lost to me. Pain or frustration, like pleasure and the memory of satiation, is just one of many mnemonics, or associations which cause us to remember; and are perhaps the most natural and prevalent. (As Neitzsche commented on the sorry state of man—pain is of the best of mnemonics.)
attempt at deception but only incidental deception. I have deceived you but only because I deceive myself. I have not lied to you in any way but am just ignorant. Self-deception (about one’s past, e.g.), or deception about what has happened more generally, is highly subject to both intentional (known) or unintentional (unknown) trickery.

But if memory is such a permeable faculty, in order to be useful (which we can assume it is since to never accept others’ testimonies of past experience would lead to little learning and highly-reduced actual function), then what does our remembrance tell us about what has passed that we can trust? For one thing, that the past is real, that there is some elapsed time already passed and which must somehow be left behind; and that we did not pop into existence just now. There are parts of the past that we cannot remember but must try to recall, and we can remember what is not currently at our disposal.

Memory is spontaneous to a great degree and not subject to being changed simply by our current desire. There are things we can never forget and things we cannot remember despite our wants. Together, we can remember shared past experiences; and we can remember the same events that we all had immediately forgotten. The past figures as an object of individual and inter-subjective attention; as well as oblivion and recollection. We can forget an event and remember the same thing about that even for the first time consciously—and we can agree on this. There is something which stands outside our own grasp, remaining as it was (or as it were): we can remember that we do not remember all of it; just as when we perceive a solid object, we realize that we are not seeing all of it.

Why the Past?

Critical preoccupation with current situations, or hope and fear about future ones, are always fashionable in the realm of theoretical humanities. Focus on the past is positively unfashionable, except in a historical inquiry, which this dissertation is not. Why then must
we engage with the nature or concept of the past in philosophy? Here, as in the case of memory, opposite pulls of initial intuitions provide the first impetus for a philosophical urge to really inquire.

The past seems most distinctly unreal, not a part of the world which is. It has perished and is no more. Yet, all accomplished happenings are literally in the past, and since such happenings constitute reality, the past seems to be at the heart of the real world. But it is that permeable faculty of memory which gives this self-suspicious but irreplaceable access to only a part of the past; and leads us to believe that the actual past is always much larger than what is recalled.

The memorability of those only-half-recalled events or their remaining knowability is independent of you or me. This indicates that remembrances of such past experiences are neither materially manifest nor spatially extended in the brain (although this may be an essential means of their currently being known to us). If they are not materially stored or manifest in the present, then they are non-local temporarily, and complexly intertwined with memory of other past events. Even "my own past now" is thus not really "my own" alone nor mine just now—but it is part of a real past (perhaps unknowable) that is not just mine and not just now. It is a past of others too, and is always (forever) past.

If it is real, where (or when) is it? It is then, most obviously—but "then is involved with now" and so with conscious perception of change. Hence if time (or past time as the 'fixed' part of time) is real—or its events have passed and facts about them remain true, then there must be some upholding of such memorial-ability outside our consciousness; but not entirely inaccessible from our consciousness.

When we recall the past, we form an image or representation, but even without such current representative tokening, we remember still. It is this underlying current of remembering that keeps going and knowing. It is not, however, due to me, my own
consciousness, or my causal history, parents, ancestors, or even my extended environment that makes this so. The underlying current of remembering that holds the past available supercedes us, our particular being and knowing. It makes time (change and materialization) real. This remembrance, not our own but enabling our own, makes all this possible.

As noted above, current memory experimentation is taken to demonstrate the malleability and real errors of remembrance given the power of the interpreting left brain to supercede the experiential reality of the right brain. Gazzaniga and others assume memory is a function of the brain; and event-memory depends on this interpreting narrative structuring. This accounts for the problems and prevalence of false, or at least mostly-mistaken or largely inaccurate memory, and also the emphasis on narrative remembering as real memory in the literature. But real memory is experiential memory—events as experienced (or “true” memory to follow Bergson and Russell).

In such views like Gazzaniga’s, what is the interpreter interpreting? The “memories” unconceptualized of the right brain? But the right brain “keeps hold” of nothing. So where are those real past experiences which are able to be remembered truthfully or deceptively? Are they “in” me; my brain with its stem; or with all its neurons, synapses, cells and fibers; or, in its activity? Significantly, this activity of remembering isn’t completely present, but takes time.

While current imaging experiments are very interesting, we should expect explicit ‘storytelling’ memory to activate the left-brain, since its activity seems to involve language; but experimenters draw further conclusions. Like narrative theorists, contemporary neuroscientists look at the past which memory shows us—the past here and now—and not untold past beyond. But it is this past, which we can remember—this implicit past we retain and can know that it is most interesting. We cannot ignore the metaphysical problems of a real past, and the ontology of consciousness that remembrance of this real past implies.
Memory shows us that there is a real past that we share, but we cannot wholly know. Thus it shows that there are some truths, viz. what happened then, which are beyond our actual access. Hence, we must be realists; there are realities independent of my or your consciousness. Each of us, individually, is tiny compared to the vastness of the real and growing past which claims us.

In this dissertation we maintain that the parts of the past, which may be both long gone and long-forgotten, remain real (despite, and even because of, their current inaccessibility); and facts about these times remain true in only relative obscurity. Such times remain real, and also subject to being-observed or remembered. They do not however “take up space” but time, as held in degrees of conscious tension. Such perceptions are not limited to our own, and thus remain open to further perceptions despite our own demise. Their remaining gives them a vitality which can only be placed on a greater living whole—both self-subsisting and affective.

Remembrances, and past events themselves, cannot be materially stored. Still, somehow they remain forever, open to being remembered and perceived. One could cautiously agree that some past events can be ‘made’ of memory, or mnemonic-potential—these are just memorable events. Thus we find ourselves falling in step with the general panspsychist line: the very real past is the consciousness (or ‘subconscious’) of Being-itself. It remains, still, and is, still-reverberating.

Along the way, there are arguments and implications for the nature of time more generally. Does an account of a desirable past bring us closer to a cyclic rather than a linear view about direction of time? Values are added to the past events as they are selectively deliberately forgotten, fondly re-experienced, repented, desired to be repeated; such addition makes the past grow, but not “change”. Past events are not undone and do
not really "go away". Through strongly transforming evaluative remembrances, not quite looping, but spiraling back to the past must be possible.

Such re-living can ripple back into the ontological value of what is ordinarily fixed. Such a 'tilt' in time permits ascription of a spiraling topology to time, as the past is returned to in a value-added different form but remains what it always was, and what it could have been or could be. This is not straight idealism, for the mind-independent past has to be there, realist-style, for our aesthetic re-appropriation to build on and transform it. We are free if and when we overcome the compulsion of the past by recognizing its truths and consequences.

Since being-tensed is essential to even a tenseless, or even indexically-dated, series of events as a distinguishable series of events at all (in agreement with McTaggart's suppositions), the reality of past events consists in their potential remembrance. Yet, if our experience is veridical, and the world and our relations are real, the past is real. But since the reality of the past consists in its potential and remaining observability, what is really past and grounding the really present is at root non-physical and inextended.

Although it seems the past is extended in space since light takes time to travel, it can only be a constantly current awareness of that time which sustains its extension. That time, though exceeding our own awareness is reliant on some constantly current awareness. This shows conscious awareness to be the ground of apparent physically-extended being.
Why Comparative?

This project combines an unusual mix of philosophers. The reason for doing this deliberately a-historical amalgamative type of work is to go beyond a single tradition or period while looking at a single set of problems, hoping that the things they say in common and where they differ will lead us to something more interesting than a closed conversation of members (even if opposing) might. It tends to show not only that the philosophical problems are genuine, but that reasoning toward answers can flourish in looking at opposing views and methods and using them in concert.

We begin in this century with Anglo-American philosophers using an analytic approach. We then turn to the debate over memory in several sub-streams of the Indian tradition. While the analytical methodologies are common, the differences here are striking. The former do not question memory-knowledge much, while the latter refuse memory a knowledge-giving status. In the third chapter we combine the discussion of memory in the two traditions using a Bergsonian (and perhaps Wittgensteinian) critique of memory-traces and a Śaiva understanding of traces (sāṁskāra) and memory (smṛti). In the second part on the metaphysics of the past we rely mostly on contemporary analytic discussions, comparing these to some of the debates in Indian philosophy. The significance is to demonstrate that by examining and treating live Anglo-American current debates in detail, very continental and ancient views (re)arise.

In the final part we turn to contemporary debates about changing the past and then to the Yoga and Nyāya Sūtras for a possible interpretation of this. We end with an axiology of the past leading us back to the panpsychist-pluralism (or realism) combining Bergsonian and Śaiva views. The reasons for adopting such a view are many. By this we can make sense of memory as well as time. But we must admit some strange ideas, especially that what is most real is most inevident and that what is real but passing remains ideal. This remaining
'ideality' is the ground for our surrounding 'reality'. The past is always re-completing itself, yet has already been completed. This constant real apriori is the full inspiration of this moving present. Here we might cite the invocation mantra of the Isā Upaniṣad:

\[\text{Aum}\]
\[\text{pūrṇam-adāk pūrṇam-idām pūrnat-pūrṇam-udacyate}\]
\[\text{pūrṇasya pūrṇam-ādiya pūrṇam-eva-avaścyate}^3\]
\[\text{Aum}\]

The recurring word "pūrṇam", here, is best translated with that suggestive English word for the interminably full, "replete". As a whole, I take the quoted invocation—with which the Upanishad both begins and ends—to mean:

That having-been-completed, this is now-completed; out of this-having-been-completed, the completed re-arises.
This-completed, having taken from the having-been-completed, remains thus, having-been-completed.

The fullness of the beginningless a priori past overflows as its continuing completion in every completing moment. It is the infinitude yet completion—literally the abundant fullness of the past that gives the result of this recreation of new presents. The past adds to itself; and we living beings are offering newer presents back to the past world-Self, both becoming and knowing just more (and more) past. Our recognition of this fact; and how we act to become and know this (and that) past are crucial issues philosophically, logically, socially, and personally.

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3 For Sanskrit text see http://is1.mum.edu/vedicreservoir/panishads/fifteen_upanishads_01_isha.pdf ("Menu of Vedic Literature," Maharishi University of Management). The word pūrṇam is quite interesting coming from a root meaning abundance or being entirely full; also the root verb pur meaning to precede or go before; and pr meaning to be active or bring out of. While some might think this is simply an artifact of a language (and a "dead" one at that...), in this work we hope to show this is not a state of having fallen from a whole or a 'myth of beginnings'—but rather of beginninglessness—and that in this, is the infinite power of creation—because of an absolute yet open a priori.

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PART I: EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE PAST

INTRODUCTION

Knowing, Not-knowing, and Remembering the Past

"A man’s memory is all that stands between him and chaos."
--A. L. Korsakoff

"The difference between false memories and true ones is the same as for jewels: it is always the false ones that look the most real, the most brilliant."
--Salvador Dali

What should we think about memory given its indispensability and unreliability?
While our memory grants us continuity, knowledge, and ability; we must also recognize that our remembrances are extremely fallible. Everyday, there are things we remember without conscious thought, other things we tell ourselves that we ‘must remember’, things we have to ‘try to remember’, and countless things we do and must forget—and how odd it would be to count all the things we forget. Realizing mnemonic limitations, we take notes and make records, and we practice and repeat our knowledge and behavior, intentionally and unintentionally engraving our remembrances. We ask others, hoping their remembrance and testimony can support our own; and, mistrusting our own memory at times, we somehow take the other’s memory as corrective or corroborating.

Our awareness of past experiences and events seems both essentially reliable, yet persistently fallible. Our remembrances range from the vividness of enduringly and emotionally re-lived events (usually past traumas or past joys) and the equal ‘brilliance’ and difficulty of ‘false memories’ (imposed and superimposed memories), to our common remembrances of what we were supposed to do next or where we left our keys. And, to learn from our experience and remain socially integrated (non-dogmatic and non-solipsistic), we have to question our own remembrances, and our claim to know, in light of new information
and the differing remembrances of others. We may fill out the gaps in our knowledge and even revise our memory of the past by way of the memories and testimonies of others (whom we may take to be more reliable than ourselves, because of their numbers or expertise, etc.). Like our knowing, our remembering must also be open to revision and correction. But how can this be so? Isn’t the function of memory to preserve our knowledge from the past?

We take our natural remembering for granted. Without this odd openness to times ‘back then’, we would be no one that we ourselves could recognize. Memory is what we live by, in its many forms—material, social, personal, etc. Taking ‘memory’ most generally, if there were no material memory (or repetitive or habit-memory), for example, nothing would retain qualities or persist, nor would anything evolve. If there were no social or personal memory there would be no social or personal experience and so probably no experience at all. And indeed, remembrance is extraordinarily relevant to identity, to the knowledge of identity and differentiation more generally; and so also for possibility of function and interaction. If one loses the ability to remember in a degenerating way (when one has Alzheimer’s, e.g.), it appears to those who still remember that that person has lost everything—the identity of everything and everyone in their environment and even their own identity and past experiences. Though these seem to ‘come back’ at times, randomly and in pieces, dislocated or in a discontinuous way, this sort of loss of mnemonic ability can involve years of suffering without the ability to function effectively or independently.

Our knowing of what’s past is something quite strange and extraordinarily valuable. Yet, it would seem that when we lose all records, monuments, and memories of something there is no hope of their ‘revival’. That past will have vanished—it is at least, not knowable anymore. What do we really know about what could have been or what once-was but is no-longer? Is our remembrance of the past genuine knowledge of the past? If it is, then we should consider whether this knowledge is direct, or indirect, like our inferential knowledge.
Do we know this past directly or by constructed representations or by both? To return to the quotes above from Korsakoff and Dali, are our remembrances a means of knowing true things about the past, saving us from the chaos of constant change—or are our remembrances constructed like man-made jewels—more alluring than the natural ones but of far less worth? Does memory just give us at least partial knowledge of the past or does it offer us something else entirely?

**Questions of Memory**

There are at least six types of philosophical questions concerning remembering:

i) questions concerning the **reliability of memory** as a means of knowledge

ii) questions centering on the **reducibility of memory** to perception, introspection or inference, or testimony

iii) questions about the **conditions and mechanisms** of remembering

iv) questions regarding the **existence** or **nature of the reality of its objects** (past times, events, or experiences)

v) questions concerning the **relations between current and past experiences** involved in remembering

vi) questions involving the **personal and interpersonal functions** of remembering (including the art of remembering)

The first part of this project will examine our **knowledge of the past** (and the first three areas of inquiry regarding memory listed above). The second will examine our understanding of statements about the past and the metaphysics of past time (question four above). In this second part, the related problems of change and identity over time will be addressed as the problems of existence, persistence and tense. The third part will address the value of the past—whether its content remains constant or changes; and our personal and social valuing of the past. In addition, this final part will discuss the value of times past—
vism., the affective, aesthetic, and moral dimensions of the past, addressing roughly the last
questions listed above.

This first chapter of Part 1, the Epistemology of the Past, addresses the reliability and
reducibility of remembering: Is remembering a reliable means of knowing the past? Do we
have direct access to our past experience, or to past events, or does remembering require
mediation by a current representation of that past? Does remembrance provide an
independent way of knowing? Is it reducible to other means of knowing like perception and
inference? Is memory like testimony, perhaps a conduit for knowledge but not a source or
means of knowledge? And, how does the eyewitness testimony of others (a person's current
relating of past events) compare to one's own remembrance of witnessing of past events?

Beginning with Plato, who famously based all episodes of learning (mathesis) on
recollection (anamnesis), Western philosophers have most often assumed that our memory
and remembering gives us knowledge. It is common only for skeptics to deny memory-
knowledge as part of their more general aim of questioning the validity of all knowledge
claims. In the case of memory as distinguished from perception, epistemological questions
have centered on not whether memory gives us knowledge, but how it does so. Is our access
to the past direct and unmediated—or do we only have access to the past as it is mediated by
representations, images and further cognitive processing (e.g. inferring)? These will be the
central questions of the first chapter.

1 Although anamnesis is mentioned in many of Plato's dialogues, it occurs prominently in the Meno and
Phaedo. The words 'Anamnesis' and 'Meno' both are derivative of mneme, or memory. The prefix ana-,
meaning back again, through or upward, may be likened to the prefix re- in English, and implies a
multiplication (growth) of the root. This will relate to anusmarana 'recollection', or the process of
remembering in Indian philosophical contexts—a progressive recall which will be discussed in the third
chapter. The directionality of such memory—aiming forward as a process with direction toward future
action (enactivity) can be separated from memory which is not so directed and is the ground of this possible
re-enactment—as Bergson does. The relation of memory and recollection to the soul (or spirit) is discussed
in Plato's Phaedo and Phaedrus ('Phae-dra' is a compound of 'dusky-act'—like remembrance.)
Within the classical Indian philosophical traditions however, the question of whether remembrance affords us knowledge is explicitly debated. Here, it is generally agreed that memory is not an ordinary independent means of knowledge like perception or inference. But denying that memory (smṛti) is a means of veridical cognition or true knowledge (pramāṇa) seems not only to contradict common human belief and practice, but also to call into question our means for preserving tradition—a preservation which figures essentially in the millennial transmission of philosophical ideas and their development in India. And yet this denial of memory as a means of valid knowledge is a position held by a majority of Indian philosophical schools. For this reason it will be instructive to examine their arguments in some detail in the second chapter.

The third chapter on epistemology will examine the 'how of our remembering'. Here the questions and conclusions of the first two chapters will be sharpened by the third chapter. The questions will be directed toward the memory trace, its nature, and function? Are memory-traces in any form sufficient to 'compose' even ordinary perceptual recognition? How do the mnemonic and the causal relate? To offer a resolution to these epistemological questions we will use Bergson’s analysis of memory and the Kaśmir Śaiva views as outlined by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. The arguments given by these philosophers from such different times and places have many commonalities. These arguments regarding memory and perception will be explicated in order to address these complicated questions concerning knowing of past times.

Pervading these questions regarding our knowledge of the past are issues of definitions and classifications of “memory” and “mnemonic phenomena”, delineations of memory functions, and theoretical distinctions and categorizations of memory systems (which may be philosophical, psychological, biological, neurophysiological, etc.). We will outline some of these distinctions in the first chapter but their significance will become
apparent in the third chapter, which addresses the third question, i.e. the how of remembering. Here, we will begin with some of the philosophical difficulties surrounding our remembering; and then introduce some of the primary distinctions used in contemporary experimental and theoretical psychology between different sorts of remembering. After motivating the problems and just sketching the current state-of-the-art of memory-science, we will turn to the recent philosophical discussions regarding memory.
CHAPTER 1: KNOWING THE PAST

1.1 Our Memory Claims and Memory's Claim on us

Any sort of knowing seems to require recognizing or applying some sort of classification scheme correctly to some items; this requires remembering those (pre-learnt) schemes—even if one is unaware of one's own remembrance as involved in the application. Thus knowing, in general, requires the capacity to remember. However, even though our most basic perceptual knowledge relies on even such unconscious remembering, our consciously-apparent remembering is notoriously unreliable. Not only do we seem to forget the details of most past events, but this seems necessary to remembering any particular thing at all. Our remembering is both consistently fallible and dangerously suggestible. The risks are not only of subtraction and missing content but also of unwitting addition and embellishment. Remembrances seem to be inherently, and even essentially, subject to confusion as memories 'fuse' with one another to become our pasts. Original experiences and their (closer-to-the-time) remembrances, etc., are reformed and apparently overwritten by subsequent recollections. Despite their innocent record-keeping stance, memories turn out to be just as "tricky" as imagination.

These earlier experiences and earlier remembrances are now irrecoverable, though they will have contributed to current remembrances and subsequent experiences. Even the refinement of our conceptual and practical engagement seems subject to this. As knowing

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2 In order to attend to any one thing, many other equally-pressing or evident things must be disregarded. This is true for perceiving anything as particular; and even in order to remember anything in particular, other things, which might have also been remembered must remain 'forgotten'. The importance of forgetting to learning and adaptation has been noted recently by (Bouton, 1994) "forgetting pays when environmental variability becomes more extreme." As well, as demonstrated by (Kuhl, Dudukovic, Kahn, & Wagner, 2007) forgetting offers neural processing benefits, decreasing the cognitive load of decision-making, making it easier to recall what is particularly useful. The crucial importance of forgetting to learning (and so memory) is highlighted in the development of Al and machine learning. Here, an important consideration is the reduction of swamping and information overload—the cost of searching for the knowledge must not outweigh the cost of applying it. (Smyth, 1995)
enacted or acquired in the past is utilized, one’s remembrance of an original experience, or understanding, of a concept or word (procedure, etc.) becomes indistinguishable from its revisions. Changed memories claim to be the same. Memories do not seem to remain in any fixed form, even if conceived as traces or dispositional impressions of past experience. Simply by our successive accessing of this content, its form would seem to be necessarily altered.

In these ways, the possible mistakes of remembering are many: We may “remember” someone else’s experience or personal remembrance as our own, ‘remembering’ that we said something in a conversation, for example, when it was our friend who had said that. Similarly, we may remember a media event (exaggerated, dramatized, fictional or otherwise) as a genuinely remembered past event. It is even possible to mistake a dream for a real memory if such conceptions seem, in some important respects, to cohere with our reality. We may doubt that our remembrance is genuine, and can question ourselves, questioning our memories of things—e.g., “Did that really happen, or was that just a dream?” While we can decide by other means like asking others, making inferences, etc., even after we have concluded that some such ‘remembered’ event never occurred (or that it occurred differently from how we had remembered it to have occurred, or that it was not we who had experienced it, etc.), and thus that our remembrance is not genuine, we may still keep feeling (for some time anyway) that we remember these events.

This unruly nature of memory is further exposed by our common experience of our frequent inability to remember (as well as our inability, sometimes, to stop remembering), and inability to determine whether something is a genuine remembrance.\(^3\) We might have

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\(^3\) So, on the one hand we have too much control over our memories in the sense that we determine them in ways that make them less representative of our past experiences. This control over them is itself an unruly control. But on the other hand, we have too little control over our memories and remembrances and we easily may become fixated, deluded by imaginations, etc. In fact, we know our own past by a fixing of landmarks (time-marks), just to tell the time of our history; and we largely remember by scripts we repeat.
been told about an event so often (or we might have told something so often) that we ourselves believe we remember. We seem to remember, and maybe this just is remembering. How do we distinguish our remembering from just imagining or later inferring? After all, the accuracy of our memory-claims doesn’t necessarily accord with the accuracy of our remembering. What I remember might be true, but I might still be wrong that I genuinely remember it, or I might genuinely remember something originally mis-taken. Just as a memory claim can be true even if it is not a case of genuinely remembering that past event (we might have been told so often, etc.), a memory claim can be false even if it is a case of genuine remembering (the original perception might have been mistaken, perhaps it was misinterpreted at the time, etc).

Instances of this discordance of memories’ claims are common. It may be true, for example, that I saw a clock made of flowers in Alexandria when I was four years old, but my remembering of this clock may have been overlaid by so many re-told stories and re-rememberings of the original clock-experience that my current recall might bear little resemblance to any original experience or any original remembrance. There is no way to determine whether I indeed remember that (object, event, or experience) itself, or I just remember the many stories told, or re-imaginings of that.

Conversely, a current remembering may be true (might be a genuine remembrance) but the original grasp of this experience may have been inaccurate, making the memory a true remembrance, but its remembered-content false. So it may be true, e.g., that I genuinely remember that the clock of flowers was non-functioning, if my original experience of the clock was impressed upon me in this incorrect way—if, say, I failed to notice its motion, or was unaware at the age of four that it was indeed telling time. In such a case remembrance is

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Memory works perfectly to hold and bring back the past, but it is most often only for current purposes, and by current (possibly-defective) intentions and affections.
veridical with respect to past experience, but past experience is erroneous with respect to
events.

Such true-remembering of something actually false can be corrected by inference or
testimony, etc. I can, after all, later infer that there would be no purpose in having a clock in
a public circle without the clock functioning—why make a clock after all? Or, upon
implicitly on learning the reason for clocks, this later awareness may be automatically
overlaid on my remembrance, fitting it seamlessly so that I remember the clock as moving,
and do not remember not remembering it as moving. I might remember the clock of flowers
moving and forget that I ever thought otherwise. This corrected remembering then becomes
false (not genuine) as remembrance, but its content becomes true (thus re-creating the
conditions of our first type of case.)

Memories are immediately duplicitous. Although remembrance requires some sort of
reenactment, or (re)duplication—or a continuation of a particular relational complex (perhaps
with greatly reduced "resolution"—which involves some past experience or activity and its
representations, the past object or event and the past experience of this object or event, are
truly distinct from the remembered and re-imagined experience. Again, the problem is that
the truth or falsity of our memory claims about past events doesn’t necessarily correspond
with the truth and falsity of our claims to remember that past. The correction of mistaken
perception by memory may result in an accurate but not genuine remembering; and the
imputation of (even correct) extraneous content—remembering other or later, testimonies,
inferences and perceptions, etc., as merged with remembrance—can make a true-
remembering a false one.

4 It is also possible that I might originally experience the clock correctly (as moving) but may mistakenly
confuse the original experience with my static re-presentations, or memory-images of the clock, so that my
current remembering has overlaid my original experience of the working clock (and so my veridical
memory of the working clock) and I now remember only (remembering that) the clock itself was not a
working clock. In this case, something once known (experienced and remembered) has been forgotten.
5 See (Von Leyden, 1961) especially, for analysis of this point.
To compound this problem, the only grounds for deciding whether something is genuinely remembered, or whether it is a genuine remembrance—or even correcting one’s own remembrance—involves relying on other remembrances (one’s own or those of others). But in spite of these inevitable uncertainties and distortions, memory seems to make ordinary interaction possible. And, despite its evident deceptiveness and marked duplicity, remembrance seems to be required for any real knowing. In fact, it is hard to say what would (or could) be the case without this highly-suspect self-corroborating activity.

With or without our conscious awareness, what is remembered provides a foundation for our daily activities and serves us (more or less) completely every day. For the purposes of ordinary interaction and as its default working state, remembrance structures our recognitions, informs our perceptions and solidly, or at least inextricably, grounds our inferences. And, there is a sense in which remembered knowledge is just that knowledge which is taken as self-evident—including things ‘known’ without question as well as those taken as already established. Not only does remembered content have an irreducible function in conceptual perception and inferential cognition, remembering is at least a necessary condition for intentional awareness and the experience of duration as such. So, to deny that our remembrances and memory claims provide proper knowledge seems to contradict both ordinary practice and the available evidence.

But any attempt at justification would seem to be as ineffective as any attempt to deny memory’s claims. Just as someone who seeks to justify a memory claim must rely on (unjustified) remembrance, a skeptic who denies the possibility of memory knowledge must remember the possibility in order to deny it. Even the memory-researcher who is testing the memory of another is relying on a base of implicit, and even inexplicit, memories. The validity of memory and its transmission or preservation of warrant across time cannot be
inductively justified in any non-circular way.\textsuperscript{6} Any inference or justification requires memory to ‘connect’ the premises or recognize the evidence as related, just as any conceptual perception requires memory for the determinate application of concepts.\textsuperscript{7} Even non-conceptual perception, if there is such perception, must have the capacity to be subject to self-conscious or continued perception, and to promote conceptual perception; and so, in some way, be both retained and utilized.

But if remembrance cannot be (or be known to be) truthful, then how can we, and why do we, distinguish accurate and inaccurate remembrances? And if reliance on remembrance is necessary for conceptually enriched perceiving (inferring, and even imagining), then how could remembering not be knowing, since knowing anything (even one’s own imaginings) is thereby largely a matter of remembering? And, if remembering is so inextricably involved in all other cognitive activity, how is it distinct—and how is this distinctiveness recognized?

*Remembering* may be a means of *knowing*, and memory claims may constitute *knowledge* but this may not be a function of our claim on memory, as much as it is a function of memory’s claim on us. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, it is trivially true that we are who we are thanks to our memories. We are creatures who depend on remembrance to function. Our remembrances mostly exceed our will and intention. We hardly have the choice not to let memory constitute a very large part of our growing knowledge-store. And while our hold on past experiences is tenuous, memory’s claim on us is ineluctable and unmistakable (even the *objective truth* about ourselves and the world, against which we can

\textsuperscript{6} William Alston argues that this is the case regarding all basic epistemic processes. (Alston, 1986)

\textsuperscript{7} Broad puts this nicely writing that "even when I test the memory-judgment by present perception and not by memory, I presuppose the general validity of my memory-judgments. For I start by inferring that I shall be likely to perceive so-and-so if the event which I claim to remember really happened. And, if the chain of inference be of any length, my guarantee for the conclusion is my memory that the earlier stages of the argument satisfied me. In exactly the same way we may support or refute particular perceptual judgments by argument; but these arguments always presuppose the general validity of perceptual judgments and the validity of certain particular perceptual judgments made by myself or others." (Broad, 1925)
check the claims of memory, is nothing but us and the world as we remember it. With all its holes and frills, tricks and transparency, memory makes that "I"—about which even the ultra-realist *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* says, "I am my world."^8

1.2 Some Preliminary Memory-Distinctions

1.2.1 Remembering That, How and What

One common distinction made by philosophers, cognitive psychologists, and neuroscientists alike, is between different sorts of memory according to the type of content the memory has—or the sort of processing it utilizes: semantic, procedural or episodic. *Semantic,* or propositional memory is said to be memory of facts including verbal or conceptual knowledge (S remembers that P, S remembers that W means M); while *procedural,* or habit memory possession of an ability (or the acquisition, retention, and reenactment of some functional activity or skill); and *episodic,* or event memory is memory of past experiences, occurrences, or objects.

Semantic memory need not be mere recollection of words. C.D. Broad for example, draws this distinction explicitly, saying that "the memory of propositions is something quite different from the memory of mere sentences, on the one hand, and from the memory of events, persons, and places, on the other."^9 (Broad, 1925) Broad goes on to note that such a division is, "of course … quite compatible with the view that there may be intimate relations

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^8 (Wittgenstein, 1981)

^9 For Broad the repetition of sentences, like any string of sounds, is a matter of an ability to reenact a pattern rather than a matter of having any remembered semantic content.
of causal dependence between the various kinds of memory, and that there may be something common and peculiar to them all in virtue of which they are all called "memory."¹⁰

This distinction between semantic, procedural and episodic memory is found in most contemporary psychology textbooks, and is very often taken as basic background conception for current theory and experimentation. It is thought to be supported empirically by brain imaging research demonstrating different neural activities for different types of remembering. This provides some sort of theoretical basis to start with. Some researchers have concluded that remembering an episode or event, uniquely involves the medial temporal lobe.¹¹

This tripartite division of memory parallels a distinction made between different kinds of knowledge: 'knowing that'; 'knowing how'; and 'knowing what'. This parallel is significant since the same issues arise for 'remembering that' remembering how' and 'remembering what', insofar as knowledge involves memory. So the questions of primacy, etc. which have been very much discussed by philosophers could be grafted similarly onto the questions of remembering. In fact, one could say that these are not separate questions at all.

Credit for the now-popular distinction between the first two of these sorts of knowledge, knowing-that and knowing-how goes to Gilbert Ryle. (Ryle, 1945) Knowing-that is said to be propositional or semantic knowledge, knowledge of facts and conceptual relations, and knowing-how, procedural knowledge or skill and ability. While Ryle argues

¹⁰ And it does seem that Broad’s statement is true—that any actual episodic remembrances necessarily involve some sort of meaningful (conceptual) content, and so some degree of semantic remembrance; and that these will, as well, be inextricable from some procedural remembrances.

¹¹ Endel Tulving and Daniel Schacter have performed experiments demonstrating neurophysiological differences corresponding to this distinction between semantic and episodic remembrance. (Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) They have proposed that intensions and extensions are processed by different memory functions. Episodic memory, they say, relates to knowledge of particular past experiences, while semantic memory relates to general knowledge, applicable to different situations. Episodic memory ranges over extensions (particular reference) while semantic memory involves intensions (multiple application).
that knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, it is not uncommon to come across the opposing view, viz., that knowing-how can be understood as a set of knowings-that.\textsuperscript{12}

This thesis has been put forth recently by Stanley and Williamson for example, who argue that this is a false dichotomy and knowing how (procedural knowledge) is just a species of knowing that (propositional knowledge).\textsuperscript{13} Alva Noé has directly countered their claim, suggesting that knowing-how is irreducible and foundational.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, this is a major point of dissention between enactivist and cognitivist positions in cognitive psychology.

Enactivists like Noé, along with logical behaviourists (or externalists) like Ryle, argue that knowing-how is primary and irreducible, while cognitivists give this role to knowing-that. But the same type of questions can be asked regarding the third type of knowing, knowing-what (situational knowledge).

When we know what something is, or what it is like, we have knowledge of the object, event, or experience itself—so this sort of knowing is closely related to issues of qualia, immediacy and directness. Is episodic knowing, or knowing what something is or is like, reducible to propositional (semantic) or procedural (behavioral) knowledge? In other words, are qualia supervenient on material interaction? Are they also epiphenomenal? In recent epistemological debate this question has been explicitly discussed as the question of

\textsuperscript{12} Here we might also consider many other sorts of knowing 'knowing to' for example, which may be considered distinct from 'knowing how to'. This point was made to me by Peter Hershock. This is a significant point, since 'knowing to' involves more than just procedural or habitual learned knowledge but adds a normative and spontaneous element. This and other sorts of possible knowing (like remembering-to, or remembering-for) will be discussed further in the third section of this project on the value of the past and transforming sorts of remembering.

\textsuperscript{13} Contra Ryle, they maintain that it is not the case that knowing how to do something is having an ability, it is having a certain kind of intellectual or propositional knowledge—so there is no 'fundamental distinction' between knowing how and knowing that. (Stanley & Williamson, 2001)

\textsuperscript{14} Noé also says, "It is one thing to admit that there is a distinction between knowing how and knowing that, and another to insist that the distinction can be drawn sharply." (Noé, 2005, p. 289)
whether knowledge expressed by 'knowing wh-' forms (i.e., knowing what, whether, why, who, when, etc.) is reducible to that expressible by 'knowing th-forms'.

In knowledge management and knowledge systems theory, a very different sort of knowing wh-, knowing-whether, has also been proposed as a distinct knowledge operator. Here knowing-whether is taken to be opposed to knowing-that:

The difference between these operators is simple. Saying that an agent knows that a certain event occurred implies that this event indeed occurred, while saying that the agent knows whether an event occurred does not imply that the event occurred... knowing whether $X$ means that either it is known that $X$ occurred or it is known that $X$ did not occur. (Hart, Heifetz, & Samet, 1996, p. 249)

'Knowing whether' is significant, since it seems to open possibility and choice. Knowing whether $X$ is the case or whether $X$ 'is true', e.g. does not imply that $X$ is the case or 'X is true'. In contrast, knowing that $X$ is the case requires that $X$ is the case. Knowing whether $X$ is the case, allows understanding (semantic knowledge) of the event, $X$ without semantic or propositional knowledge (that it is true). So, e.g. one can know whether she went to the party—even if in fact she did not go to the party. So one knows at least an opposition where one condition is the case and the other possibility (remembered as an opposition—e.g. whether she was at the party or not) is also known as not having been the case. Knowing whether $X$ involves knowing what it would be like if $X$ were the case—or if it were not.

These third-type of questions—of what, whether, and who—concern identity, synthesis and disjunction. These questions are fundamental to knowledge. Knowing what it is or is like (or, knowing what it is not, or is not like) does not seem to be reducible to either knowing that it is or is not like something else, nor to procedural abilities. Such 'interrogative-answering' or, indicative knowledge-forms seem both irreducible and primary.

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15 Jonathan Schaffer has recently addressed this exact question, and finds that knowing wh-forms are primary and irreducible forms of knowledge and, that epistemologists have unfairly privileged knowing th-forms. (Schaffer, 2004)
Knowing what it is, or is not, or what it is like or not-like requires some experiential knowing.

1.2.2 Stages, Storage, and Access

Considered as a process, memory is often said to involve at least three different types of cognitive activity: the encoding of information (involving the registering of experience); the retention or dispositional non-erasure of this information or experience; and subsequent (potential or actual) retrieval or reenactment of this information.\(^{16}\) A distinction is drawn in this process between different sorts of retention, or memory-processing systems having different extensions: long-term memory, short-term or working memory, and sometimes sensory (or ekphoric) memory.

These distinctions (long, short, working, sensory) align with, or reflect, the temporal extension (duration) of remembrances. Evidence for these distinctions comes from two sorts of amnesic patients, those with damage to the temporal lobes and hippocampus, who appear to have normal short-term memories but impaired long-term memories; and those with left-hemisphere damage in the perisylvian region, who show short-term, but no long-term memory deficits. (Baddeley, 1976) Sensory or iconic memory is said to last less than a second and occurs upon sensory stimulation. Visual after-images are one species of such sensory memory; audible-echoic memory is another. This sort of memory is required for information to be retained long enough to be perceived. Short-term or working memory involves retention within a few minutes and is thought to serve as a workspace of thought, so to speak, while long-term memory is what we most ordinarily use "memory" to refer to—

\(^{16}\) This distinction is found in most psychology textbooks. Consolidation (as is supposed to occur in deep sleep or by dreaming) might be considered a fourth type of memory related cognitive-activity, or stage of memory processing.
memory for things happening more than a few minutes ago. (Baddeley, Wilson, & Watts, 1995)

Despite widespread acceptance and use of this distinction, its general accuracy has been questioned on the grounds that this is a continuum of one process or action and not a dichotomy of systems, etc. (Melton, 1963) But the more common position is that of Alan Baddeley for example, who supports the idea that long-term and short-term memory involve separate but closely integrated systems. His view is that short-term memory is not a single or unified system, but a complex set of interacting subsystems of ‘working memory’. (Baddeley, 1999)

Recent experimentation has been taken to demonstrate that, what was thought to be an essential distinguishing characteristic of long-term memory formation, i.e. activity of the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe structures, characterizes some short-term remembrances, or working memory, also.17 (Olson, Page, Moore, Chatterjee, & Verfaellie, 2006) Based on these findings, these researchers have proposed that a more useful distinction than that between long-, and short-term, would be between feature memory and conjunction memory. This would distinguish the ability to remember specific things from how they are related.

They say that the crucial element in remembering, or “the critical test of memory”, is whether one can remember conjunctively; so that, as they say, “I can remember what my keys look like, and I can remember where the coffee table is located, but the critical test of my memory is if I can remember that I left my keys on the coffee table.”18 They conclude that the age of the memory (what was above called “temporal extension”, i.e., its long-term

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17 In this study done on amnesic patients with damaged hippocampus and related medial temporal lobe structures, and it was determined that while visual remembrance of an object or of a location alone appears without deficit in short-term or working memory, deficits in the remembrances of amnesic patients to conjoin this information are seen after a delay of only eight seconds, indicating that the hippocampus is equally involved in working-memory for coordinating or conjunctive sorts of knowledge.

18 From a press release on (Olson et al., 2006): (Communications, 2007)
or short-term status) is less important to the hippocampus than is the requirement to form connections between pieces of information to create a coherent episode of memory. It would seem that propositional or semantic knowledge—as actually synthetic and capable of linking information together—is requisitely involved in functional remembering.

Memory-phenomena are also commonly divided into two kinds according to whether they are 'explicit' (or declarative) or 'implicit' (non-declarative). Explicit or declarative remembrance is or can be articulated or codified, and so expressed. Implicit remembrance, in contrast, may operate in an inarticulate or inexpressible form. 'Explicit' or 'implicit' may be taken to qualify different types of retrieval or access, or to indicate the status of memory or knowledge representations. This division may be used to refer to distinct types of processing, involving different systems depending on whether the remembrance is conceived symbolically or conceptually; and again, such a distinction is also used in a parallel way to describe different sorts of knowledge, or of knowing.

The explicit-implicit divide may be established on the basis of conscious awareness or access to remembered content; or, what is more, on whether one is aware of such content as remembrance. Schacter has described this distinction accordingly, noting his preference for 'implicit' over 'unconscious', because of the ambiguities of the latter. He says, "Memory for a recent event can be expressed explicitly, as conscious recollection, or implicitly, as a facilitation of test performance without conscious recollection." (Schacter, 1987, p. 501) So this distinction applies equally to different sorts of memory-testing, and becomes most important in this respect. The neurological correlates of such memories have also been distinguished qualitatively—declarative or explicit memories apparently involve

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19 Alan Baddeley considers this as one functional division of long-term memory and identifies this division one of the primary ways in which long-term memory "has proved to be profitably fractionable into separate components." (Baddeley, 1976)
activity in the medial temporal lobe, and some researchers claim to have found neurological correlates of implicit remembering. (Rugg et al., 1998)

Michael Polany has called such implicit forms of knowing (remembering) *tacit*, describing such processes as involving knowledge of which we are unaware. He has noted the difficulty inherent in tacit knowledge transfer, since holders of such knowledge may not be aware of their knowing, and so may be unable to articulate, describe, or communicate what they know. 20 (Polany, 1983) But while it seems evident that we have implicit knowledge and memory (at least at any given time), some cognitive psychologists have argued against ‘implicit memory’ as a proper theoretical postulate. They argue that while there is neurophysiological evidence for such a distinction, the variety of phenomenon that falls under the categorization of ‘implicit memory’ makes its use suspect. (Willingham & Preuss, 1995)

Others have sought to draw attention to the category of implicit memory arguing e.g., that implicit memory is an underutilized component of psychoanalytic attention. (Rustin & Sekaer, 2004) And, despite Freud’s effort and his centrality to psychoanalytic theory as a whole, this does somehow seem to be the case. In this regard, it is notable that implicit memory may be classified as another kind of memory, on equal footing with three distinct sorts of explicit remembrance (procedural, semantic, and episodic remembrance) but distinct from these. 21 Schacter has devoted most of his work to such implicit remembrance, examining such non-conscious remembrance by means of facilitated test performance, or “priming” effects. Recently, he has considered implicit remembrance as itself procedural,

20 While Polyan is considering implicit knowing and not implicit remembering as such; it seems reasonable that even this process of tacit knowing is equally a process of implicit or tacit remembrance or recognizance.

21 The consideration of implicit memory systems in distinction from semantic, episodic, and procedural systems see, e.g. (Tulving, 1983).
semantic or episodic, based on the findings that the neural correlates of explicit and implicit memory can be dissociated.\(^{22}\)

The more common distinction divides long-term memory as either explicit or implicit. Here, episodic memory and semantic memory are classified as types of explicit memory, while procedural, emotional, and priming memory are classified as types of implicit remembrance.\(^{23}\) But the connection of emotion with episodic memory and priming with procedure makes these latter divisions of implicit memory highly theoretical. Support for a classification identifying implicit memory even apart from procedural memory, can be drawn from the apparent ambiguity of the term ‘explicit’. It seems that forms of knowing and remembering which involve enacting procedure, or even expressly experiencing, could be considered declarative or explicit; while genuinely implicit remembering in contrast, might be considered that which is now forgotten (unknown and not currently enacted) but which could be remembered or enacted in the future.

But what is ‘explicit’ in any given case is not necessarily explicit, and may in fact be indeterminate or underdetermined. So, as these researchers have noted, there are many experimental difficulties regarding implicit remembering. These are complicated by the fact that since declarative or explicit remembering is social and linguistic it has a kind of species-specificity about it—grounded on family-resemblances of interpretive and communicative activities. Because of this, taking episodic and semantic remembering as declarative (and perhaps being limited in our understanding of others’ declarations) we have trouble determining the nature and extent of episodic, as well as semantic, remembrance where an

\(^{22}\) On the dissociation of implicit and explicit memory systems see (Bowers & Schacter, 1990; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Roediger, Craik, & Tulving, 1989; Schacter, 1987, 1989; Schacter & Tulving, 1994). The issue here is whether something which is not-explicitly remembered can be a function of a procedural or episodic or semantic memory-system.

\(^{23}\) See, e.g. (Patty, 1997)
ability to declare is lacking. And since this distinction involves conscious and non-conscious cognitive function (and relates immediately to awareness or lack of awareness) it is closely tied to a division of activity between automatic and voluntary.

1.2.3 Remembering, Here and Now

Memories are sometimes divided on the basis of whether they are of personal experiences or of facts; yet, episodic or experiential remembrances are not and cannot be specified independently from conceptual (semantic) or factual memory, nor in fact, from procedural memory. In experimental cognitive psychology, memory-tests requiring the subject to make a judgment as to whether they remember an object or image, or whether they just know it (or whether they ‘do not remember or know’) reflects such a distinction and so accepts it as marking a genuine difference. But remembering and knowing are not exclusive, nor even mutually entailing, categories. Is the ability to identify current content as deriving from, or being a re-presentation of, some specific event in the past enough to demarcate genuinely remembering from just the familiar feeling of knowing?

It doesn’t seem to be for at least two reasons: i) the accuracy of the recognition doesn’t necessarily depend on the proper localization of the remembrance or the remembered content; and ii) even just having the familiar feeling of simply knowing (and not remembering) requires genuine remembering. Moreover, such remember-know judgments are both opposed to don’t-know judgments. They are also fused with procedural remembering (knowing-how to respond appropriately throughout the memory-test, as well as how to recognize this current presentation to be identifiable as being like a currently past presentation), and so also even know judgments are fused with episodic remembering. As

24 Although this claim has begun to fall into disrepute, especially as more creative experimentation is performed and more detailed data is gathered, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who take this autobiographical element to be a distinguishing element between humans and other species. John Campbell, for example, has recently taken a similar view. (Campbell, 1995)
declarative or explicit, episodic remembrances would seem to be required to be semantic, yet such remembrance also seems to be largely implicit and/or procedural. Tulving has been arguing that episodic memory arises out of the other forms of memory, and is a higher function specifically associated with the ability to cognize particular past events as such. (Tulving, 1999, 2002)

Remembrance of one’s own past experience with its temporally unique events and objects is often considered the paradigm of memory function. In the following discussion of memory knowledge, we will likewise take this sort of remembrance as paradigmatic. The reason for including semantic memory in our discussion here is the same as the reason for classifying semantic and episodic memory as explicit or declarative (or conception-incorporating). Such personal, or autobiographical, memory (knowledge from, or of, one’s own past experience) connects across the semantic-episodic divide (and perhaps other memory-divisions as well). In later chapters, the involvement of other sorts of memory will also be considered.

Such taxonomy of memory will come into play more fully in the third chapter below. A distinction can be drawn between repetitive or habit memory and true remembering. Such repetitive or habit memory is indistinguishable from effect or material repetition, while true remembering points to the opposite direction, viz., immaterial freedom. Moreover this true memory (as lived and living duration) is the more fundamental and more developed having the effect of manifesting habit-memory or material continuation (repetition). This view, which is developed by Bergson and is in accord with the philosophy of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta has significant ramifications for our valuing of the past.
1.3 Immediate or Mediated Awareness of the Past

Modern and contemporary philosophers have spelled out a variety of conditions for remembering. *Representational* theories of memory postulate that our access to past events is mediated by a current representation, while *direct* theories of memory maintain that we have immediate (non-representational or currently presentational) access to the past. This question overlaps that of the memory-trace which is often seen as the 'current representation' of the past, or the memory-image which may arise out of a revived memory-trace. The idea of a 'memory trace' will be addressed more specifically in the third chapter below concerning the storage and retrieval of memory. Here we turn to types of access our remembering gives us to the past—specifically, our own past experience.

1.3.1 *Representational* Theories of Memory

Representational accounts of remembrance are largely motivated by the thought that we cannot be directly related to what we remember since these things do not now exist. When we had unmediated access to the past, it was then present. Our access at this time can only be mediated by something currently present, or something that we may be directly aware of, viz. memory-traces or perhaps memory-images of that event. Accordingly, in representational views we are immediately aware, not of a past event, but of something which does currently exist. Such views seem to be motivated by the more general notion that the connecting of *relata* requires the *relatum* to be contemporaneous with the act of connecting.

Given such a presentness or 'contemporaneousness' qualification of a memory-representation, such accounts have to explain what makes this present image or belief a memory, rather than imagination, perception, or expectation. Hume suggested that memories are distinguished only in being of less 'force and vivacity' than sensations and original perceptions, but of more 'force and vivacity' than imaginations. Locke described
remembrance as the power in the mind to 'revive' ideas with the additional perception annexed to them that it has had them before. Russell proposed that it is the 'feeling of belief' which distinguishes remembering from simply imagining. Broad suggested that remembrance is accompanied by a 'feeling of familiarity', and that we determine the veracity of our remembrance based on an apparent fittingness and absence of fit. But somehow, even as equally current, memory representations are actually and easily distinguished from other current representations. So, in any representational theory of memory, perception and memory must be distinguished—whether by vivacity and force, by recognition of similarity, or by feelings of fitness or lack of fitness accompanying a mental state, or by some other means.

But here, representational views of memory seem to face an apparently undefeatable threat of skepticism. Russell offered his (now) famous five-minute hypothesis to this effect, suggesting that the world could have been created five minutes ago with all of our apparent memories and embedded histories intact (complete with geologic records, etc.) and we could not know the difference. (Russell, 1921, pp. 159-160) So representationalist memory-criteria seem not to require that what is remembered actually occurred. Such remembrances cannot be in error since there is nothing for them to misrepresent; only the belief that these memories objectively referred to a mind-independent reality before that time would be mistaken. The difficulty is compounded by the consideration that these memory-beliefs would in fact be justifiably accurate remembrances, viz. as faithful representations of those beliefs as implanted five minutes ago.

According to Russell, remembered-images are like imagined-images, but are—in the case of remembrances of past experiences and events—accompanied by a feeling of belief that 'this happened.' This (feeling of) belief that such an event happened is, he says, known non-inferentially. Memory-beliefs can be, and are in fact, considered self-evident and their
objects immediately known. Remembering is an intuitive function, he says, and although it may be accompanied by an image, the memory-image is only the present aspect of the memory; belief in the pastness of the event or experience is also required. The feeling of familiarity that these images have—and so likewise, the level of self-evidence and intuitive certainty we accord to our memories—comes in degrees and decreases over time according to Russell. Still, memory forms an indispensable part of our knowledge of the past. While the memory-image (the tokened-content of remembering) is something presently occurring, the object of memory is known to be past: "in memory, the pastness lies, not in the content of what is believed, but in the nature of the belief-feeling." 26

Personal or autobiographical remembering would seem to present its content immediately in the form of an image; and belief in the truthfulness of the image's representation is due to a feeling of familiarity combined with a feeling of belief that "this occurred". Familiarity leads us to trust our memory, and belief in pastness (supplied by context, etc.) enables us to put these in temporal order. Memory and expectation are just two different types of belief-feeling (viz. "this occurred" and "this will occur") Russell writes, noting that perception is likewise accompanied by a feeling that "this is occurring".

In this case, while the image is what is immediately known, belief in the pastness of the event arises in a given context, in combination with the image and feeling of familiarity. But taking a 'belief in pastness' to be more fundamental than a particular image seems to make more sense, since remembrance doesn't seem to require an image, and any real context seems to pre-supposes such beliefs. And, if an image is not necessary for remembrance, then

25 Russell's discussion of memory occurs in (1921, pp. 157-187). On this latter point, the indispensability of memory, see (p. 165); on the variability of self-evidence and intuitive certainty (p. 168); and on belief in pastness and the feeling of pastness see especially (p. 176).
26 See (Russell, 1921, pp. 176, 186)
27 He says that such "images are regarded by us as more or less accurate copies of past occurrences because they come to us with two sorts of feelings: (1) Those that may be called feelings of familiarity; (2) those that may be collected together as feelings giving a sense of pastness. The first lead us to trust our memories, the second to assign places to them in the time-order." (Russell, 1921, pp. 162-163)
two things follow: the image cannot be (all there is to) that remembrance; and belief in the truthfulness of the image's representation also cannot be required. The only remaining element which could be fundamental would be belief in the pastness of an event.

And Russell does say that memory demands two things: an image, and a belief in past existence. (Russell, 1921, p. 186) Later, in his discussion on "General Ideas", he says that we "cannot admit that images should be rejected, or that we should minimize their function in our knowledge of what is remote in time or space." (Russell, 1921, p. 230) The view seems a bit unclear here though, since the content is said to be immediately presented in the form of an image. But if only the belief-feeling that "this occurred" differentiates memory from expectation, then the image (and its immediacy) cannot be the root factor in memory. We have immediately presented images accompanied by feelings of familiarity, but we must also have immediate beliefs about the real pastness of some events.

Russell also says that the content of a memory situation involves an image, a feeling (analogous in respect, he says, to something "real" as opposed to "imaginary"); and also, a relation between the image and the feeling of reality. The content of the image is recognized as familiar and determined as past by something else other than the image. It can only be the above mentioned fundamental (or immediately-given) belief in the event's pastness. So, it would seem that even underlying Russell's representationalist theory lurks some sort of direct theory of memory.

Significantly, "memory" is a success-term for Russell, and true or real memory (experiential memory) is a source of valid knowledge. Also, when he considers memory he is considering it as it is explicitly presented as a current mental phenomenon. Because of

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27 Russell says that this relation is "of the sort expressed when we say that the feeling refers to the image. This content does not contain in itself any time-determination: the time-determination lies in the nature of the belief-feeling, which is that called "remembering" or (better) "recollecting." It is only subsequent reflection upon this reference to the past that makes us realize the distinction between the image and the event recollected. When we have made this distinction, we can say that the image "means" the past event." (Russell, 1921, pp. 186-187)
this, his supposition that memory has a required image (or current presentative content) is reasonable. As will be discussed further in the following chapters, Russell’s views that a memory-image is present while its object or intentional content is past, as well as the distinction between true memory and habit memory, are shared by Henri Bergson.\(^{29}\)

### 1.3.2 Direct Theories of Memory

Thomas Reid has offered a convincing critique of representational theories of memory: If the revival of the representation is supposed to be similar to the original presentation, then remembering requires not only a representation and a feeling of repetition, or reproduction (Locke’s annexed perception that it has had them before), but also some kind of recognition of similarity between representations and past presentations. Yet this feeling that the perception or representation is not new but has been had before is precisely what these accounts were attempting to explain—i.e., the recognized similarity between the present image and the past.\(^{30}\) So such representational theories cannot be complete as they stand.

It is perhaps for this reason that causal theories of memory initially seem promising. If the representation or memory-image just is some trace left behind by the original experience, then the causal connection from that experience to its memory can be explicated as the ground of likeness or similarity. However, even here, the perceived (or recognized) similarity between the image and the past event, i.e., remembering itself is still left unexplained. Neither likeness alone, nor likeness with an added feeling of repetition or familiarity amounts to recognition of this likeness. And, an actual causal connection is not equivalent to a causal re-connection.

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29 This distinction could be described as being between *reflective* and *repetitive* memory. See (Russell, 1921, pp. 165-168) on Bergson’s distinction in (Bergson, (1913) 1991).

30 This argument is along the same lines as that proposed by Vyāsatīrtha of the Dvaita school of Madhvācarya, which will be discussed below.
In contrast to representational theories in general, direct theories of memory deny that represented content is required for knowledge of the past. According to Reid for example, we have immediate knowledge of the past by way of memory. In his view, our senses give us knowledge of things only as they exist at the present moment, while remembering gives us knowledge of things only as they are past. This knowledge of things as they are past is essential to present knowledge. Reid says that if information provided by the senses weren’t preserved by memory, “it would vanish instantly, and leave us as ignorant as if it had never been.” (Reid, 1941 (1785), p. 339)

So, while it may be true that perception gives us knowledge of the present and memory of the past, it is not the case that whatever is immediately known must be present at the time of remembering. In Reid’s account, the real past events are somehow available to be related even though they remain past. So, *relata* are not required to be contemporaneous with the activity of relating. And, even though remembering can be a current activity, of which we may be aware, its object may yet be past.

But since we do not *perceive* events which we are directly acquainted with in our remembering as *happening now*, non-representational theories must explain what past experiences, events, or objects are now such that we might be ‘directly acquainted’ with them. Direct or unmediated awareness might also seem to imply some sort of infallibility, so such theories of memory (like their counterpart direct theories of perception) would be hard put to give an account of error. Our remembering is exceptionally fallible, yet if we are *directly aware* of what is past (beyond the speciously-past), how is it that we get it wrong so often, and even necessarily so?

Under representational accounts this can be explained by the interaction and influence of other representations (the past is mediated, at least, by more of the past), or by the general degradation of memory-traces, or confusion of images etc. So, while
representational accounts of memory face a special problem differentiating memory
representations from other representations (imaginary, inferential, testimonial, etc.), direct
accounts of memory face a special problem in accounting for error. As presentational, such
theories also have to distinguish remembrances from perceptions and explain how we can be
directly acquainted with what no longer exists.

1.4 Knowing Pastness

Broad criticizes direct theories of memory such as Reid's on the ground that the
objective constituent of the memory-situation (what one is supposedly directly aware of when
remembering a past event) is identical with neither all, nor part, of the remembered past
event. (Broad, 1925, pp. 262-263) Broad argues against the view that we perceive primarily
our own past experience when we remember, while knowledge of past events and objects is
derived from that. (Broad, 1925, p. 241) A remembered object is not an object of direct
("intuitive") or sensuous acquaintance, like a perceived object; and perception and memory
must be sharply distinguished along just such lines. Direct acquaintance is perceptual and
immediate, but the same cannot be said of most remembrances. According to Broad, the
importance of the memory-image has been exaggerated—while part of the content of a
memory belief is analogous to the content of perceptual belief, this is not the whole of a
memory belief. 31

We are directly acquainted with objective constituents by means of perception; and
these, Broad says, are regarded as being literally a part of the physical object which we are
said to perceive, but the same cannot be said for a memory situation. 32 So this is at least one
point on which remembrance and perception can be distinguished—memory does not give

31 See (Broad, 1925, pp. 241-250)
32 While perceptual situations definitely identify its objective constituent (content) with a contemporary part of the perceived object, memory situations neither identify the image with the past nor definitively distinguish it. (Broad, 1925, p. 242)
direct acquaintance with physical or external objects. He describes this connection between the objective component and the current situation as "looser" in remembrance than in perception.  

To illustrate this looseness, he cites what he calls a negative memory-situation, in which one retains a sort of negative-knowledge. In such a situation, it is not remembered for example, what color something was, but only some negatively-constrained content is remembered—e.g., that the tie worn by a friend yesterday was not red. (Broad, 1925, p. 245) Broad argues that while all perceptual denials are based upon perceptual affirmations (of determinate characteristics which are incompatible with the characteristic denied) our negative memory-situations demonstrate that there are independent memory-denials, which are not based in this way on corresponding memory-affirmations. So e.g., I can remember the tie was not red without remembering what color it was, but I cannot perceive that it is not red without perceiving some other color. Broad concludes from this that we should suspect that "there may be important differences between positive memory-situations and positive perceptual situations even where they seem most alike." (Broad, 1925, p. 247)

Furlong utilizes such negative memory-situations in the context of arguing that we are not directly acquainted with a representative image, nor with something genuinely past, but with a propositional attitude of belief. His example of a negative-memory situation is of a fence which is remembered as having not as few as three vertical bars but not more than twenty. He asks how one could one be certain of such a remembrance without a current image of the gate. He proposes that we do have unmediated remembrance of the 'look' of

33 "The connexion between the image and the remembered object seems much looser than the connexion between the sensum and the perceived object. In some cases the objective-constituent seems to be merely images of words; and in that case we cannot claim to be in direct contact with a past slice of the history of an object. And, even when the image is visual and is held to resemble a past phase of the remembered object, it is not clear to me that we claim that it is literally a part of the past history of the object. Thus we come here to a point at which the analogy between perceptual situations and perceptual memory-situations begins to fail." (Broad, 1925, pp. 236, On "looseness" see also p. 244)
the gate; but this is neither an image, nor part of the past, but a current propositional attitude of believing or taking for granted. Reviewing Furlong's work, Price has suggested that awareness of the look of the gate need not be propositional and that a generic memory-image might suffice. (Price, 1952, p. 351)

Furlong and Price, like Broad, have rejected direct acquaintance with the past—as Furlong has noted, it is difficult to think that we can have direct acquaintance with something no longer present. (Furlong, 1951, p. 40) Direct acquaintance would seem to imply some sort of contemporaneousness, but how can this criterion to be fulfilled when no present representation (or re-presentation) is admitted. One might even argue that if we are directly acquainted with the past event when we remember, then we would perceive the event. But if we are not directly or immediately acquainted with the past by way of remembering it, then how do we come by our idea of pastness?

Following James (and perhaps Russell), Furlong and Price have both also suggested that our idea of pastness comes directly from our immediate experience of pastness in the specious present—i.e., by way of things just-past. In this specious present, we are somewhat directly and perceptually acquainted with pastness. But Broad argues differently. In his view, the essential factor in the memory situation is the particular feeling which seems to justify the remembered judgment.

There is no doubt that in most memory-situations I judge, not merely that "This happened before", but also that "I have perceived this before"; and that neither of these judgments is inferred from the other or from anything else. (Broad, 1925, pp. 237-238)

An essential part of the content of every memory belief refers to oneself, and one's own past experience. Since there is nothing analogous to this in the content of a perceptual belief, this is another of the distinguishing marks between perception and remembrance. However, this supposition could be questioned. It could be argued that in perceptual
situations as well, we judge similarly, both "This is happening", and "I am perceiving (or I perceive) this now."

Broad maintains that familiarity just means 'pastness' to beings constituted as we are, and this meaning is "primitive" and "unacquired." Such immediate knowledge of pastness is thus taken as part of the event of remembering and not of the content of the remembrance. But this view implies that the event of remembering cannot be purely confined to the present representation—otherwise it would be only equivalent to the content of the remembrance. Since an immediate knowledge of pastness is just part of the current event of remembering with its content, then some of this immediate knowledge must remain apart from what is currently remembered. This would seem to imply that we not only have immediate knowledge of pastness, but of things really past.

Thus it seems that our representationalists need to assume some sort of direct knowledge of the past by way of more than the just-past, plus inference—as our above passage on Russell's representationalist view also seemed to show. And, as Holland noted in critique of Hume's empiricist theory of memory, one cannot distinguish ideas remembered and imagined in the absence of already having an idea of their difference. (Holland, 1954, p. 486)

If pastness or something's having been experienced in the past, is an original meaning of familiarity, the indication of pastness by familiarity is not explicitly a form of inference, nor of perception. It incorporates a cognitive advance involving remembered (immediately but implicitly known and unquestioned) content as well as some current contextualized cue (or call) for remembrance. Even given such a proposal that there is an original immediate indication of pastness by the familiarity according such a representation,

34 Broad notes here, that he takes this terminology from Stout (1931). (Broad, 1925, p. 267)
35 These are things actually remaining past—even if such things are just one's (as of yet) unremembered past experience.
the pastness accorded to such content represented requires recognitive (intentional and
directed) synthesis. This is made explicit in Abhinavagupta’s *Isvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimārsini* (Doctrine of Divine-Recognition) and will be discussed further in the final epistemology chapter (chapter 3) below.

1.4.1 Is Familiarity (or its Absence) Enough?

How do we distinguish similarly-current cognitive experiences? Is an immediate feeling of familiarity enough to distinguish perception from remembrance? Is a feeling of fit or lack of fit enough to separate remembering from imagining? A primitive and unacquired meaning of familiarity does not seem to be enough to differentiate such meaning (pastness) from an inferential conclusion. And, such an account of pastness cannot offer enough to distinguish a given content’s pastness from those exhibiting presentness.

If familiarity were to indicate pastness in such a fundamental and intimate way, then it would seem that many other types of cognition would be mistakenly qualified by pastness. Many perceptions and imaginations would be either conceived as rememberings or as themselves proper remembrances. If familiar, both sorts of cognitions could be subject to proper qualification by ‘pastness.’ But something doesn’t come to be properly qualified by pastness just because it is repeatedly imagined or has otherwise become familiar. Still, something does seem to be qualified by pastness if it is repeatedly perceived. This counterintuitive result that familiarity might be what indicates pastness, *does* seem to be the case in at least two important ways:

i) It does seem that even a speciously present object, or an object currently perceived, is necessarily also a speciously *past* object. This is a very familiar percept and indicates a very immediate pastness—the most recent information being perhaps the *most* familiar. A repeated (or continuous) perception does indicate pastness, since if something is already-perceived then it is, in fact, past.
ii) It does seem that an often imagined object or image becomes what is remembered. Not only do our memory representations re-form our remembrances; these remembrances form experiences and so, new remembrances.

Perhaps familiarity does appropriately distinguish remembrance and provide a criterion by which a current representation is qualified by pastness. Familiarity might help to explain why we perceive slightly removed events and objects (those on whom we have recently "lost our perceptual grasp" in Merleau Ponty’s description) as now past. Continuous perceptions may be currently familiar as speciously present, and also speciously-past (just experienced), but may not be wholly available for direct (perceptual) acquaintance.

It may be by this familiarity or feeling of fit or absence of fit, that we recognize things to be past, but are these two things the same? Does a feeling of familiarity accord with a judgment, or recognition of fit or its absence? It seems that feelings of familiarity and recognition of fit may be distinguished. Episodic or personal remembrances seem to require recognition of fit, while other sorts of remembrance may just involve feelings of familiarity. Also, most perceptions of speciously present (or just now past) events could be considered to have much more fit, but a good deal less familiarity, than most memories.

So recognition of familiarity and fittingness may not necessarily correspond. I may be familiar with something without having any grasp of fit. And I may have a grasp of fit without feelings of familiarity (as in the perception of what is novel against what is familiar). Our direct perception of the speciously-past and the infusion of familiar images (or imaginings) into remembrances supports the idea that familiarity, as an immediate indication of pastness should not be taken as an overly simplistic account of 'pastness'. But, even if we do somehow recognize pastness by feelings of familiarity, Reid’s question remains. How can we recognize what is familiar? A feeling that something is familiar is, after all, a step below recognizing it as such. A tie e.g., can be familiar, without it being that particular tie that I
saw before—it may just be a tie somewhat like another tie I have seen but cannot even “place”. Like a familiar, but unrecognized, face. You might look like someone I once knew; or I might genuinely remember you—but not your name or where we met.

1.4.2 Direct Acquaintance and Perceiving

If genuinely remembering something is an occasion of being directly acquainted with it, and all occasions of directly being acquainted with something are occasions of perception, then it follows that remembering is a case of perceiving. To deny this conclusion and maintain instead that remembering is not a form of perception, one of the premises must be rejected. Either it is not the case that all direct acquaintances are perceptions, or not the case that memory is direct acquaintance. Reid and Russell would agree that not all direct acquaintances are perceptions. It could be argued that those who argue against such direct theories of memory have mistaken the notion that *if something is perceived, then it is an object of direct acquaintance*—for its converse, viz., that *if something is an object of direct acquaintance, then it is perceived*. It may be true that we are directly acquainted with all things we perceive or currently experience, but perhaps we may be directly acquainted with more than what we currently perceive—or maybe we perceive or currently experience more than we can currently know.

1.5 Memory’s Independence

In so far as remembrances are current cognitions involving representations or images, they are like perceptions and imaginations in a most general way. In fact, the neurological correlates of such processes are said to be similar—i.e., remembering a particular item, is neurologically like perceiving that item, or imagining it. With regard to imagery in particular,
...researchers agree that most of the neural processes that underlie like-modality perception are also used in imagery; and imagery, in many ways, can 'stand in' for (re-present, if you will) a perceptual stimulus or situation. Imagery not only engages the motor system, but also affects the body, much as can actual perceptual experience. (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001, p. 642)

If this is the case, it's not hard to see why repeated imaginings can lead to illusory recollections. (See, e.g., Goff & Roediger 3rd, 1998; Gonslaves, P., Gitelman, & Parrish, 2006; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003) In the case of remembrance, this has led researchers to be able to tell based on brain activation what type of object a subject is remembering (word, picture, etc.) and also whether a subject would later remember an item.36

Memory is like perception particularly, in that the information it reveals is revealed as veridical in a default way. We typically only have remembrances of things that happened, just as we typically only perceive things that happen. Also, as with information acquired by perception (as well as good-testimony) remembered information is thought to reliably indicate what is true. Unlike what we imagine, cognitions arising from such sources present information as veridical. In this sense, memories, like perceptions (and perhaps testimonies) have a default-trustworthiness. Something cannot be, or be recognized as a memory, perception, or testimony, unless it is taken as, or supposed to be, true. But, as Broad and Russell both were concerned to emphasize (and Bergson was as well), remembrance is also quite unlike perception.

Most obviously, perceiving seems to be directed at present phenomena while remembering somehow involves past phenomena.37 Also, as Broad noted, negative-knowledge situations are independent of positive-knowledge in remembrance. We may be able to remember what something wasn't without remembering what it was, whereas we cannot perceive what it isn't without perceiving what it is (or at least some positive content).

36 See, e.g., (Brewer, 1998; Buckner, Kelley, & Petersen, 1999; Okado & Stark, 2005; Wagner, 1998)
37 Bergson argues for an inevident concurrent memory of the present perception.
However, contra Broad, such negative-situations do seem to commonly occur in perception. Upon perceiving a figure ahead, e.g. I might perceive that it is not a dog or raccoon, but may not know whether it is a man or a post. In response, Broad might ask whether such perceptual content is really negative in a way analogous to negative-memory situations. Is not-knowing whether this figure is a man or a post like not knowing what color the tie was? As noted above, knowing-whether is different from knowing-what; so not-knowing-whether is likewise distinct from not-knowing what. Is perceiving a non-descript figure like remembering a colorless tie?

Broad might suggest that such perceptual content is positive even if it is indeterminate. But the genuinely positive constituent is the perception of the figure, as in the case of the remembrance of the tie. It is, after all, only the latter portion of this knowing (there was a tie) which offers positive options in perceptual doubt. This allows the negative perceptual knowledge that we do not know if it is either x or y. We see a genuine figure, and propose that it is either a man or a post. But this would seem to be the case in negative-memory situations as well. Some alternative has to be posted by the present cuing to arrive at such (positive) negative-knowing, so that I remember (positively) that it was, and was not red. This latter posting of the "red" option seems to make it that I remember that it was (and what it was), and can now perceive (recall!) that it was not red, and recognize that I do not know what color it was.

Not-remembering-any-color is the genuinely 'negative' part of such a memory situation. But this is not exactly what Broad is referring to. Without remembering any color, we remember that there was a tie, but here, it might have been red—it could have been any color. Remembering that the tie was not red is the negative-remembrance he considers. And here, not only must one still positively remember 'that tie (that was)' to know that one does not remember its color, one must currently consider its red color as opposed to something
else. So there would seem to be a corresponding positive-memory situation as well, viz. that there was a tie. If one says that, in a negative-memory situation I do not have to know that I remember that it was not red until asked, then this implies that I am currently remembering an unlimited amount of such (positive) negative knowledge. (In remembering that tie, I remember it was not red, it was not blue, etc; or I remember that fence did not have 50 slats, it did not have 3 slats, or 200 slats, etc.)

So the negative remembering can only be the positive knowing that that tie was in fact not red, or that fence which had about 15 or 20 slats. Specifically, "I remember it was (it existed)—and it was not red." But remembering what it wasn't in particular ("red" or 'having 50 slats') requires remembering that it was. And what it wasn't in particular is something presently proposed; just as in situations of perceptual doubt (e.g. "Is that a man or a post?"). So, contrary to Broad's analysis, remembrance and perception seem to offer equally negative-situations and similarly positive indeterminate content.

It is often said that our remembering is not restricted to past events. Just as we may remember many sorts of things other than events, we may remember events from any time (though we perhaps only have experiential memory of the past). I can, for example, remember yesterday's meeting, or can remember a meeting occurring now (that I had forgotten and am currently missing) or I can remember tomorrow's meeting. In fact, this latter form of 'remembering the future' is an important motivator for current action—remembering tomorrow's meeting, I may decide to prepare today, for example. Remembering shares this capacity (to indicate other times) with inferring.

Philosophers of the Nyāya persuasion have discussed the classification of inferences on the basis of whether they indicate something true of the past, present, future. They give examples of three associated types of inference regarding the occurrence of rain: rain occurring in the past inferred from perceiving the flooding downstream; rain occurring in the
present known by the sounds of birds calling; and rain in the future being inferred from a gathering of dark clouds or from the preparatory activity of ants. Is it likewise with our remembrances?

Once we open up the possibilities of remembering the present (leading to efficient activity and enjoyment) or remembering the future (leading to preparing, etc.) remembering does seem to involve objects and events from all three times (past, present, and future). But remembrance essentially concerns prior experience. I can’t remember tomorrow’s meeting without previously knowing about tomorrow’s meeting. Similarly, I can’t remember the meeting happening now, unless I knew about it before now—specifically, that it would take place at this time. So the prior knowing involved in remembering links memory to the past. We do not remember just by calling some event to mind, we remember by recognizing that we knew something before. Even remembering the present or future requires keeping track of what’s past.

Also, while inferences and remembrances are alike in their production of knowledge that applies to all three times, inference requisitely involves remembrance, while the converse is not true—remembering does not require any explicit inferring. We do not have to conclude that a past event happened based on the fact that we have some current mental image of this event or that we remember it (though we may present such things as evidence or as testimony for someone else). If we experienced an event and remember, then we know of that without having to infer. Yet, in order to be explicated, an experience registered and somehow preserved must be articulated or codified and made declarative. So, it may be thought that it is from the events of such current explication that the past event is surmised or ‘pieced together’ (‘re-membered’).

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38 See Nyāya Sūtra 1.1.15 and commentary (Bhāṣya) 146.3- 2.1.37 in (Gautama, Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, & Jha, 1984).
1.5.1 Memory and Testimony

Memory and testimony are sometimes discussed together as similarly non-generative—merely preservative—sources of knowledge. Testimony only transmits knowledge while memory just preserves knowledge; but neither can generate any new knowledge. In this respect, they are both typically characterized as derivative means of knowing. The truth-value of their claims depends on that of some more original cognition—either the knowledge of the one testifying, or of an original (perceptual) knowledge of one’s own. Regarding the derivative warrant of testimony, Michael Dummett, e.g., writes that testimony is “not a source, and still less a ground, of knowledge: it is the transmission from one individual to another of knowledge acquired by whatever means.” He goes on to say that the analogy is so close between memory and testimony that one cannot at once accept memory but reject testimony as, as he puts it, “a channel for the transmission of knowledge.” (Dummett, 1993, p. 419)

In this view, coming to know something from testimony requires that the first link be from the purveyor, who must have known—otherwise, it cannot be knowledge for any who derived it ultimately from that purveyor. Remembering has a similar derivative quality. If remembering something is to count as “retaining a knowledge of it,” Dummett says, then it “must have been known when originally witnessed or experienced; if it was derived from a misperception or misapprehension, the memory cannot of course rank as knowledge.” (Dummett, 1994, p. 264)³⁹ If the role of the testimony-speaker is truly analogous to that of the experiencer of the prior perception, then memory may be considered testimony of one’s former self—at least in its preservative function. But how different is transmission from

³⁹ Interestingly, John Campbell argues on the basis of the derivative nature of memory that an antirealist account of the past, like Dummett’s, cannot be maintained. (Dummett’s antirealist views of the past will be discussed in the following part on metaphysics.) But this derivative nature of memory, which Campbell elaborates as a “stepwise” conception, is not simply a matter of warrant. (Campbell’s view will be elaborated in the second epistemology chapter below.)
preservation? Does knowing my knowledge at another time compare well to another’s knowledge becoming mine?

It has been noted explicitly (by Hume and Coady among others) that a great extent of our own personal knowledge—and perhaps all of our social or collectively-held knowledge—is knowledge by testimony only. We have only some experience ourselves, but by means of language, and our remembrance of knowledge acquired from others, we have a great deal of knowledge concerning things that we ourselves have not experienced. Coady notes how easy it is “to appropriate at a very fundamental level what is known by report and what is known by personal observation”. (Coady, 1992, p. 82) He emphasizes that testimony is an important and justified source of knowledge, and more pervasive than we might like to think.

Hume’s account of the reliability of testimony was pragmatic and made on analogy with cause and effect: we have cognizance of constant conjunction, but not of an a priori connection between one event and another. We do not perceive a conjunction between testimony and reality, Hume says, but we are accustomed to find conformity between them. (Hume, 1748/2004, p. 113) But Coady has contested such ‘reductionist’ theories of testimony (like Hume’s), arguing that they are viciously circular in the same way as noted above in the case of attempts to justify remembrance. Hume’s view is viciously circular because:

...the experience upon which our reliance upon testimony as a form of evidence is supposed to rest is itself reliant upon testimony which cannot be reduced in the same way. The very idea of taking seriously someone else's observations, someone else's experience, already requires us to take their testimony (i.e., reports of what they observe) equally seriously. (Coady, 1992, p. 8)

Observation (or an original perceptual report of some kind) can’t be the central part of our justification for testimonial reports, since we have "to take these reports seriously in order to know what their observations are." (Coady, 1992, p. 81) Credit has to be given to
memory and testimony in order to even consider their ordinary (i.e. past) conjunction. But despite epistemological likenesses between memory and testimony, the reliability of testimony has been questioned in a way the reliability of memory has not. Hume's philosophy is a case in point. But, if the value of testimony is just derived from perception and inference, and remembrance is as analogous to testimony (as Dummett suggests), then it seems that the value of memory may also be similarly derived from perception and inference (as strict empiricists, or representationalists might like to hold). But does memory do any more than bring back the past? And is the value of testimony just derived from perception and inference?

Testimonial knowledge would seem to be necessarily explicit or declarative. We can testify to what we have personal knowledge of—both experiential (episodic) and semantic knowledge. The warrant of testimony derives from the knowledge and context of the speaker, so while his judgment can be transmitted, the value of the testimony as known by the one who testifies, cannot be communicated. What the witness experienced is largely unspeakable—she could, or would, testify to all she witnessed, but she cannot. Are there implicit forms of testimony? Do I testify to myself when I remember an event?

In his discussion of testimony Reid has sharply distinguished judgment and testimony, claiming that testimony is essentially social while judgment is not. While in actual practice testimony and judgment are well-involved, as Reid notes, the opposite of true testimony is a lie while the opposite of true judgment is false judgment, or error. "In testimony a man pledges his veracity for what he affirms, so that a false testimony is a lie; but a wrong judgment is not a lie; it is only an error." (Reid, 1941 (1785), p. 413) Both lies and errors misrepresent, but in the case of error or wrong judgment one falls short of the

40 See (Reid, 1941 (1785), pp. 56, 133ff., 245ff.)
intended truth, while in the case of a lie, there is an intended (known) misrepresentation of truth.

If we take the analogy between testimony and memory seriously, we can ask similarly, what is a wrong remembrance—is it more like falling short of intended truth (an error) or more like an intended misrepresentation (a lie)? Is the opposite of true remembrance false or mistaken recognition or recall, or is it habit? If "a man pledges his own veracity" with his testimony, and memory is testimony of our former self, then with our remembrance the veracity of our former self is pledged. So, if I remember wrongly it is a case of self-deception and not just an error. But perhaps it falls short of a lie, even though my testimony is false. Are we morally at fault for forgetting? Surely it is both natural and unintended.

Our remembrance-induced knowledge in any particular case involves some judgment—as do all cases of 'knowing' no matter by what means such knowledge comes about (perception, memory, testimony, etc.). But remembrance (like testimony) goes beyond judgment, and involves more than truth and error. It also involves truthfulness, and an intention toward truth. Memories, like testimonies, may be trustworthy, or they may not. If we take Reid's analysis of the difference between testimony and judgment seriously, this would mean the faultiness of memory is more like self-deception than erroneous judgment. There is not only a misrepresentation of truth, but this involves some sort of intended deception; and one does not need to be aware of the intention to deceive in order to have the intention to deceive.41

41 "Deception" is a complicated concept (and self-deception even more so). While it would seem that linguistic communication is required in order for there to be a lie (an intentional misrepresentation rather than just a mistaken judgment), deception is as well, just a natural tactic of manipulating (prey, predators, situations, etc.). The predator or prey who strives to make his presence unknown, or the monkey who picks bugs off of a deer and places them in his own fur in order to "convince" his friend he needs grooming, may have no conception that this is deception. Only upon "being caught in the act" and receiving social disapprobation could a creature conceive or recognize it as deceptive. These are ordinary
Is my coming to know my own knowledge from another time comparable to another's knowledge becoming mine? Is the transmission of information between individuals similar to the preservation of information within individuals? It seems, e.g. that the former is a case of information crossing space, or changing place from one individual to another; while the latter is information crossing or changing positions in time. When such information-transmission is by way of our own remembrance, it seems that we have no option to trust or not to trust, we are simply reliant—and perhaps this is true in the case of some transmissions by testimony as well. Reid said that this was the case for what is known by perception.

But is remembrance more aptly conceived as one's current testimony to one's past experience, or the retention of past testimony of that experience? This distinction can also be made likening remembrance to perception instead of testimony. Is remembrance a current perception of what is past (as Reid thought) or a current perception of some now past current perception? Do we just retain our own past testimony (of then present or witnessed events)—or do we give current testimony of events witnessed in the past? These two options may be properly indistinguishable in the case of personal remembrance.

1.6 Conclusions: The Uniqueness of Memory

1.6.1 Transmitting Knowledge

Testimonial knowledge, like knowledge obtained by perception or inference, has a quality that is apparently not shared by memory. When something is known by testimonial manipulations of circumstances and only conceived as deception with some theoretical background. But this does not mean it is not deceptive behavior; and if it is intended by the predator or the monkey, though perhaps unaware of this attempted-deception (if others of his kind do not see it as such, e.g.) the intention is no less deceptive for the want of awareness of this intention. One may think one's misrepresentation to be just an error in judgment, when in fact it may have an intentional component. We may be lying to ourselves and other's much more often than we think—wherever conscious awareness or social disapproval of one's intentions is lacking.
transmission, that knowledge may be new, or previously unknown, by the one receiving the transmission. In the case of memory, however, it seems that what is known must requisitely have been known before. In this sense testimonies offer us new knowledge (like perceptions and inferences) while memories only offer old knowledge—and usually in defective or abstract forms.

Even so, testimonial knowledge has been likened with memory just because of the derivative nature of its warrant being a function of a prior experience or state of knowledge (i.e., either knowledge of the speaker, or knowledge from prior experience). The novelty of testimonial knowledge is for the current receiver only; it is not novel for the purveyor. The novelty of memorial knowledge has worn off so to speak: it is only as it was already, i.e., for the perceiver then. But in the case of memory the current 'receiver' just is the original perceiver, so is it not after all, novel for the rememberer—as the perceiver now? Well perhaps it was, but is not anymore (if it were perceived as novel now, Reid's problem would be insurmountable).

However, if novelty is required for knowledge then most of our familiar knowing would be just derivative, now predicated on long-gone original experiences. In such case, even continuous cognitions of an object would involve such derivative knowledge. This problem will be discussed further below; but for now, we can ask—what is this "first link" in the chain of transmission? No one's testimony is even truly their own, if our knowing is largely by means of testimony. Is it the same for memory? Knowing one's own past experience (personal memory) would seem to be just as fundamentally bound up with the memories of others.

Does Reid's distinction help us to distinguish our transmitted judgments from our transmitted testimonials? Complicating this problem, it would seem that even one's non-verbal activities can serve as testimony (of beliefs, etc.). Is it reasonable to think that there is
a distinct-first link in knowledge-transmission, and must just the first purveyor possess knowledge? Is such possessing of knowledge required of every link in the chain of transmission, or of just the receiving link?

1.6.2 Generating Knowledge

Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that the knowledge offered by both testimony and memory are independent of the original warrant, and are genuinely generative sources of knowledge: “A hearer can acquire knowledge that \( p \) from a speaker’s testimony that \( p \) even when the latter themselves fail to believe and hence fail to know that \( p \).” (Lackey, 1999, p. 488) One can acquire knowledge from the ‘transmission’ of testimony without the transmitter having such knowledge. And, to extend this, remembrance may likewise lead one to acquire knowledge which was originally unknown.\(^{42}\)

But no one has doubted that someone might transmit knowledge by saying something they do not themselves believe is true. If we use Reid’s distinction between testimony and judgment, if this speaker is testifying to something (witnessed), then it is true that if the speaker is giving testimony that \( p \). So the speaker must also believe and know that \( p \), even though they might not be aware of their knowledge as such. We may believe something without knowing we believe that, just as we may know something without knowing that we know that.\(^{43}\)

While her argument is complex, and beyond our purview here, it is relevant to note a difficulty with her account: Lackey argues using the assumption that having knowledge requires the knower’s self-assurance that what she has is knowledge. But the knowledgeable speaker, who transmits knowledge, may not recognize their own experience or content of

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\(^{42}\) Lackey takes ‘unknown’ as unjustified—the transmitter’s lack of knowledge is a lack of awareness of knowing.

\(^{43}\) This is the basic problem of the unexamined life—viz., unquestioned presumptions and assumptions.
their transmission as knowledge. However, it still may, in fact, be knowledge. In such a
case, someone testifying knows what they are testifying to, but simply may not know that it is
true.

Since what I testify to may be received by the listener as knowledge in the absence of
my own knowledge (my knowing it is so), it may be true that the hearer may acquire more
knowledge from the testimony than the speaker testifies to, and may take more of his report
to be true than the reporter himself is ready to be sure of. So, e.g., I may give testimony of
my experience of an alien spacecraft, and the FBI may take my testimony as knowledge,
knowing there are such craft and finding my testimony consistent with this knowledge, but I
may doubt my experience and may not consider it knowledge.

Although my belief (seeing that) was originally justified, I am without justification
now (that that was what I saw). There are apparently available defeaters; and according to
Lackey's analysis this is just not-knowing. But I do know now what I saw then; otherwise I
could not give any testimony, nor could I even doubt what I saw unless "what I saw" were
something known. Even doubting my own testimony involves not only any original warrant
for seeing that (by perception) but a current warrant for having seen that (by memory).
Similarly, by remembering a conversation as perceived, e.g. one might unearth ('remember')
novel information regarding that. Remembrance may produce knowledge beyond what was
perceived at that time.

I may remember more about an event than I have ever remembered before, and my
remembrance may give me more information about this event than I had perceived before.
So, it would seem that one can remember more than was originally known. But it is to
neither of these types of generation of knowledge (in others, or in oneself) that Lackey is
referring. Such cases seem to show that remembrance can produce or generate knowledge
beyond the means of explicit transmission or preservation.
The sort of generation Lackey attributes to transmission and remembrance is different. The illustration she gives for the generative capacity of remembrance depends on available defeaters changing in the environment in which the truthfulness of the claim is assessed.\(^4\) (Lackey, 2005, 2007) Whatever knowledge is remembered remains unchanged, and its knowledge-status doesn’t in fact change, but only its status as knowledge changes—i.e., whether it is currently justified (in the absence of available defeaters). In her examples, preserved-knowledge actually begins and remains true.

In the case of testimony, Lackey has argued that the presence of factual defeaters need not be transmitted via testimony; so while the speaker may believe his testimony to be true when it is unjustified (there are factual defeaters of which he is unaware), the hearer (who is aware of these) may know the testimony to be true and to be justified. The hearer may be able to rule out a defeating option that the speaker is unaware of, but which makes his knowledge unjustified. Lackey is concerned largely with the generation of justification by transmission or by memory. But memory, even if largely preservative, seems to be generative in a much more interesting sense than this.

Testimony carries knowledge gained from experience from one person to another as remembrance carries it across time for the same person. Are these just “conduits” for knowledge-transmission in a way distinct from originating sources of knowledge? In Dummett’s view these do not generate any original knowledge since the one testifying already knew, as did the one remembering. But is this view tenable? Surely knowledge is generated at least for the one receiving the transmission. I can learn more from your testimony than is proclaimed by your testimony for example. Should we decide not to consider this transmitted knowledge, since you did not intend such knowledge?

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44 See (Lackey, 2005, 2007); also, for a direct counter to her arguments see (Senor, 2007).
Such knowing gleaned from your testimony may be knowledge achieved by means of your testimony, but unknown to you. But if it is, then my mistaking of your testimony, or misunderstanding it, may also end up being knowledge transmitted by your testimony but unknown to you—and this could not be the case. So, it can only be that you did not give testimony to what I gleaned, even though it was what was received, and perhaps even thought to be testimony.

In other words, what I get from your testimony may be more or less than the knowledge that you put there for transmission, since I may have more or less information. But while what I know from your testimony may be derived from your testimony, it may not be what you testified to. Your testimony might genuinely generate new knowledge since our contextual understanding is different. Likewise I may remember more about an event than just what I perceived then of that event since the context of my understanding now may exceed what it was then.

If remembering and testifying were just conducive to knowledge-sustenance and transmission, they would not be so permeable. Also, if conduits, then there would be no first-link in any chain of either testimony or memory. (The 'link' that would be originally-conducting would not be a link of testimony, nor of memory.) No state of knowing (even perceptual) that the purveyor has—or state of knowing that one had formerly—can be a first link, since such a (prior) state of knowing in both cases involves other chains of testimony and memory (or judgments), and so further prior knowing. The status something has as a first-link is determined as picked out by the end of process itself, i.e. the knowledge arrived at by testimony or memory identifying the source of this in (or as) an original experience.
1.6.3 Self-generating and Re-generating Knowledge

It is commonly accepted that memory and testimony do not, and in fact that they should not, create knowledge but just preserve or re-construct it. But then we have to ask if knowledge is ever created. It cannot be that just some original perception creates knowledge and all other knowledge is derivative. If our inferences generate knowledge they do so only for the one inferring or going over the inferences; so at least knowledge arrived at by inference is new to oneself, like testimony which is new to the hearer, or perception is new to the perceiver.

But memory doesn’t seem to offer such similarly new-knowledge—as noted above, it is precisely not new to oneself. That such content be not-new is part of its being remembrance. What is remembered is necessarily something known-before or previously ascertained. Yet, this criterion cannot apply to something actually remembered (or recalled) since it has to be previously un-remembered or forgotten to be remembered, and if it is forgotten, it is in a sense previously-unknown, or currently known to be unknown before—but also known-before. So, perhaps such content is at least partially-new to the one remembering. And, if we consider the function of social remembering, our memorial beliefs are revived for recall because we believe they may be new for the one to whom we recount them. But in what way does remembrance generate knowledge for the current rememberer?

The preservations of remembrance and the transmissions of testimony as continuations seem naturally to be generating something. But memory is perhaps an even more generative source of knowledge than testimony might be. In some of its functions, memory seems to be auto-generative or self-generating knowledge. It is at least re-generating, and, like testimonial transmission, it continues itself (across persons or times). Such re-generating effects seem to generate knowing even more than they preserve or transmit it.
Is newly-generated (and not just re-generated) knowledge required to be just temporally original, or must its cognitive content also be new? And, if it is such content which must be new, how could remembrance produce this sort of content? Doesn’t the derivative nature of testimony and memory establish that neither the content nor the truth-value of the consequent knowledge (the remembrance or the received testimony) is original?

As a process of encoding, storage, and retrieval, memory can be reduced to a matter of perception, imagination, inference and testimony working together. While perception gives encoding and cues retrieval, imagination holds traces and generates representations; and testimony guarantees an aim at truthfulness, while inference offers a real past. Why should memory be considered independent as a means of knowledge, or even as a distinct form of cognition?

Remembering seems at least phenomenologically distinct from even a conjunction of these other processes. And indeed, even these would not explain the source of the feeling of familiarity—when upon trying to remember we know we have hit upon what we were looking for. Given just a little thought, such feelings of familiarity, or of fit or absence of fit, do seem deeply mysterious. Explaining information transmission appearing as novel or originating (original) may be easier, since such information is transmitted externally or explicitly. Transmissions that appear as familiar or non-novel do not “appear” (though they may yet be apparent); so these are much less examined but the most unclear.

How we retain information and recognize it as rightly recalled seems a harder problem than how we transmit information. We might explain the process of encoding, storage and retrieval in neurophysiological or physicalist terms, but while recognition of that information as from, or about the past might have a neural correlate, such recognition cannot be explained by such a correlate. This is Bergson’s position which will be elaborated below. The activation of neurons cannot be the cause of the remembrance or recognition, but if
anything, its correlate or effect. Perhaps memory is, as Dummett says a conduit for knowledge transmission—still the fact of memory may reveal more than just the past. Remembering may be taken as a counter-class for perceiving on the grounds that the latter is derived from, or is about, present events and experiences, while the former is not about the present but about the absent past. Or it may be taken to be on a par with testimony or inference and not actually a direct or immediate source of knowledge at all. Memory may also be considered a counter-class for knowing, so that what we remember we do not know, and vice versa. Yet, remembering may be considered a very distinctive type of restoration and renewal of knowledge already had. *Remembering* past experience seems to involve remembering (experiencing or knowing) something more than when we just *know* past experience.
CHAPTER 2: REMEMBERING AND NOT-KNOWING THE PAST

2.1 The Classical Indian Debate

Although there is much debate over the genuine means of knowing (pramāṇa), in classical Indian theories of knowledge (pramāṇya-vāda), there is general consensus that memory is not a means of knowing. This is especially interesting for views which hold testimony (or śabda—knowledge from words) as a proper means—and yet, without hesitation, deny memory (smṛti) as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa).

As we have noted in the previous chapter, Michael Dummett has argued that if memory is admitted as valid, then testimony also must be—yet neither are a source nor ground of knowledge. But perhaps we can argue against the Naiyāyika and traditional Advaita Vedānta positions, e.g. which have it that testimony (word of expert or authority) must be a source of knowledge (true knowing) but memory cannot be. These issues seem crucial. After all, how do we divide testimony and memory? Remembering the past could just be like testifying to oneself of something formerly witnessed. If we think that testimony, or simply perception and inference could give us knowledge, while memory on which these other processes depend cannot, then most of our knowing would be denying the very source of their own epistemic value.

2.2 Some Classical Views

Indian philosophical schools have developed a variety of arguments regarding the status of memory as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). These arguments are set out in debate form, patterning details through the commentarial tradition. Given that there is not much that is agreed upon by these various schools of philosophy, any positions which are
commonly upheld are noteworthy. There is, for example, common agreement on the acceptance of *nyāya* (logic or reasoning) as a method of discourse, and there is also some minimal consensus regarding the nature of *smṛti* (remembrance).

Both orthodox and heterodox (*āstika* and *nāstika*) schools agree that memory involves the impression, retention, and revival of *samskāras* (traces); and that these remnants of past actions and experiences are the efficient or effective cause of *samāsāra* (the cycle of life and death or recurrent embodiment). As well (as mentioned above) most schools agree in their rejection of remembrance as either veridical cognition, or as a means of such cognition. This latter widespread agreement regarding memory is especially remarkable. This agreement is both limited and complicated, however. Although traditional views agree that memory may represent (absent) objects or events accurately, non-traditional (Buddhist) views consider remembrance to be intrinsically erroneous; as it is both conceptual and unoriginal.

In these debates, those who would call remembrance veridical knowledge are few. It is commonly noted by scholars that Jaina philosophers recognized memory as a means of veridical knowing; and sometimes, even that only Jain views have accepted *smṛti* as a *pramāṇa* (or that such cognitions may be *pramāṇa* or actually true). But Dvaita Vedāntins, following Madhvācarya, have also argued in favor of remembrance as veridical knowledge and a means of veridical knowing; and the Kaśmir Śaiva doctrine of *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) gives memory even greater status. In the end, this greater status given to remembrance realigns such views with the broader Indian philosophical project. But first let us recount the case against the knowledge-status of memory-claims.

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2.2.1 Against Memory as Pramāṇa

Which sources are accepted as truth-yielding knowledge sources in Indian theories vary from school to school. Available options include perception, inference, linguistic-knowledge ('word'), comparison, non-apprehension, abductive supposition, remembrance, and even history or tradition has been listed as a possible option (though no schools have regarded it thus). According to the Nyāya view for example, the means of valid knowing are four: perception, inference, linguistic-knowledge (including testimony) and comparison (analogical reasoning). Memory is expressly classified as apramā, or non-veridical, along with error and doubt. According to most Buddhist philosophers however, only perceptual and inferential cognitions offer genuine knowledge; and only immediate perceptual knowledge may put us in touch with reality. Conceptual perception and perceptions informed by inferences are considered indirect, and are hence false in the ultimate analysis.

There are three common arguments for the non-knowledge status of remembrance. In all three it is argued that remembrance is lacking some feature that veridical knowing (pramāṇa) requires, viz., independence, novelty, or current (presentative) objects:

1) **Lacking independence**: memory-cognitions lack independence in making an object known and depend essentially on other means of knowing such as perception, inference, or linguistic knowledge.

2) **Lacking presentness**: since the objects of memory-cognitions are absent, i.e., non-existent, memory-cognitions do not offer veridical cognition.

3) **Lacking freshness**: a pramāṇa must reveal an object not-known previously—veridical knowledge must be novel (anadhigatatva); but memory-cognitions only revive what has already been known.

The first type of objection, viz. that memory cognitions lack independence is common to many disputants. It is developed by the Naiyāyika along with the second objection; viz. that the objects of remembrance are absent. The Nyāya argue that veridical cognition must be
presentative while memory may only be representative. The third objection is taken up by the Buddhist philosophers, Advaitins and Mīmāṃsaka who argue that novelty (anadhigatatva, or previous non-ascertainment) is a requirement for a veridical cognition. These three objections against the veridicality of memory propose that memory is lacking something required for genuine knowing—either independence, or a real object, or novelty.

2.2.2 Nyāya’s Exclusion of Smṛti

Nyāya philosophers divide awarenesses or cognitions (jñāna) between those that are presentative (anubhava), and those that are remembered (smṛti). Memory is considered a counter-class for presentative awareness. In order to be a valid or veridical cognition (or pramāṇa jñāna), cognition must be properly-valued, or be "just as the object" is (yathārtha); and it must also be a presentative experience (anubhava). Since remembering is thought to be caused by former impressions or traces (saṃskāra), and only triggered by present apprehensions, etc., memory-cognitions cannot be presentative. Any validity a remembrance might have is derived from the original experience of veridical cognition—from the veridicality (pramāṇa) of the original experience which resulted in the memory-trace. So, memory cognitions do not reveal, or present, current conditions; they are not original experiences, but are only (and at best) repetitions of, or derivations from past experience.

A lack of independence is sometimes viewed as an ineffectual objection against memory, since other means of knowing are also not, strictly-speaking, independent. But memory’s lack of independence is specifically related to an apparent dependence on past perception. Memory cannot offer original access to its object—it is at best derivative. This

46 These first two objections against memory-as-knowledge are very closely related, as is shown in the Nyāya account below. The lack of independence which memory has (requiring other pramāṇa, e.g., perception, inference, etc) is very easily tied to the lack of presentness of its objects. So very quickly become issues involving the nature of the present and the past, and the reality of tense. This will be discussed in the second chapter.
was the basis of Dummett’s denial of memory (and testimony) as a source or ground of knowledge. Memory is (and should be) distinctively unoriginal. But, interestingly, the Naiyāyika philosopher’s exclusion of smṛti (memory) as veridical knowledge (pramāṇa) and as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa) is combined with an acceptance of sabda (testimony) as knowledge.

The arguments against memory-knowledge continue—even if memory is taken as independent with respect to past events as past, the current memory cognition must rely on inference to be recognized as resembling the original perception. Since only presentative cognitions can be occasions of veridical knowing in the Nyāya account, because they are evidently re-presentative (and ideally perfectly representative), no memory awareness may qualify. What is remembered (or represented along with an absence of its currency) is unlike what is perceived (what is presented with currency, symbolic or otherwise); and in the Nyāya view, veridical cognitions require existent or presented objects.

Udayana elaborates this rejection of memory, in the form of a double-bind or destructive dilemma. He argues that if the memory has to represent faithfully the objects as experienced it has to represent them as present, but if it represents the objects as present, then it cannot be a correct presentation of their pastness at the time of recall. So memory cannot be a means of knowledge on analytical grounds. B.K. Matilal has taken Udayana’s objection to indicate that memory involves two veracity-checks and so cannot offer directly presentative valid awareness. (Bimal Krishna Matilal, 1985, p. 208) But the difficulty seems to be deeper; since these checks put opposing constraints on the reproductive awareness. We are left in the position that actually validating by one entails a concurrent invalidation by the other. If it were a matter of “checking veracity” only we could check it one way, so to speak,

47 It will be shown below that this account is deficient; since when we remember we know something slightly more complex: viz., we know what was (once) presently accessed or experienced.
and then the other. But the paradox that Udayana points out is at the heart of the problems surrounding remembrance; and, as the next chapter will make evident, also at the center of the ontological problems of time, identity and change. Memory cannot represent reality as such, nor present the external world directly, since what is held together in remembrance must be differentially present and past (concurrently).

This duality of truthfulness that remembrances have is thus: If a true memory is one which accurately represents past experience, its current time would be presented as the time of the original experience, but this would be incorrect. Yet, if a memory does not represent its content as having this original time of experience, then it cannot be an accurate memory. A memory has to retain its original currency—it must accurately reflect the time of original experience without becoming absorbed by it, so to speak. As will be discussed below, Abhinavagupta and Madhva offer resolutions for this ‘double-bind’ problem. In Gangesa’s Theory of Truth, J.N. Mohanty writes that

... it must be noted that the eagerness to exclude memory is rooted more in the traditional refusal to accept it as a pramāṇa than on any intrinsic defect of memory. Vacaspati almost admits this conventional basis... Udayana... seeks to show that memory is not true, i.e., that it is ayathārtha, on the ground that the remembered past is not now. But in the long run he is forced to confess that even if it is yathārtha it is not independent. (Mohanty, 1992, p. 37)

Mohanty argues that memory is unfairly excluded from pramāṇa status. It is, he says, connected with the refusal (or possibly, he says, insensitiveness) to count historical knowledge as a mode of knowledge sui generis. (Mohanty, 1992, p. 241) In his view, none of the arguments traditionally given for the apramāṇa status of memory is a satisfactory reason for rejecting memory, and connected with this historical knowledge (ātihiyā) as pramāṇa.

He notes that independence is not found in any of the pramāṇas, since they also must depend on other causes, epistemic or non-epistemic. Moreover, he says, the object of memory is the

48 A. Chakrabarti has noted this problem doesn’t arise if propositions are considered truth-bearers instead of cognitions. In the case of propositions, this problem becomes one of the truth-value links between tensed propositions, discussed in chapter 3. (Chakrabarti, 2004)
past experience, and remembrance is independent with respect to that. Also, since remembrance shows the past experience as past, and not as present, he argues that it is faithful to its own object. The content of our memory-cognitions is not merely repetitive. Since memory grasps the past experience and its object as past which is a new determination, knowing the past as past thus involves knowing novel content. Mohanty concludes that although the past can be inferred, the past's original grasp (as itself anubhūti) must be possible through memory.\textsuperscript{49}

\section*{2.3 Second Thoughts and Truth-Classifications}

The involvement of memory in continuing tradition and therefore in all knowledge (śabda) would appear to call into doubt the legitimacy of Nyāya's denial of pramāṇa-status to memory; since without tradition—in this broadest sense—there would be no public or objective knowledge. It seems unlikely however that these great philosophers simply overlooked the importance of the remembered. It is equally unlikely that they were unaware of the involvement of prior experience in the ascertainment of a great deal of valid presentative awareness—including higher-order awareness or cognition of the veracity of a cognition.

The complex involvement of remembering in linguistic knowledge and the importance of remembering for the transmission of testimony cannot be easily missed. Is there something essential at stake in the issue of the pramāṇa status of smṛti? Perhaps there are more subtle implications to the denial of memory as a pramāṇa. There is, as well, another interesting issue that arises, viz., why do such widely divergent epistemologies such

\textsuperscript{49} See, e.g. Mohanty p. 146, 242. "No one seems to have realized that tradition is preserved and continued through memory. I would now like to recognize this element of truth in almost all Indian theorists; refusal to count memory as a pramāṇa. True knowledge is required to be an originary mode of disclosure of its object. Memory, to be sure, is not such an originary mode of disclosure; it is parasitical upon, and is a derived mode of, a past originary cognition. However, one could still want to argue that memory is the originary mode of disclosure of the past qua past." (Mohanty, 1992)
as those of the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsākar philosophers both emphasize the novelty criterion ("prior un-known-ness anadhitgatavā) as a requirement for genuine knowledge?

2.3.1 The Freshness Requirement: Must the content of pramāṇa be 'previously-unascertained'?

From widely diverging epistemologies (and ontologies) Buddhist and Mīmāṃsāka philosophers offer anadhigatatva, or (roughly) 'novelty', as the distinctive criterion of veridical knowing which excludes memory-cognition. Since Buddhists admit the results of some inferences as veridical, although these are like memory cognitions in having conceptual form, there must be another problem with memory cognitions setting them apart from at least useful and somewhat valid fictions. But why should a veridical cognition require previously unascertained content, why should veridical knowledge be a new bit of knowledge, one that is known 'without-(prior)-ascertainment'?

Novelty, or prior non-ascertainment, is closely related to ideas of ignorance (avidya) and unknowing (ajñāna). Something becomes previously-unknown upon being known. Only what is novel (and so previously-unknown) can provide distinction against backdrop of the previously-known. More of just things-known would not provide veridical knowledge, since it would be without difference, and so indistinguishable from the already-known. Only the already-, or previously-unknown, can differentiate what is known to be now, from what has already been known since both are equally known. Moreover since this previous-unknownness must be determinate (which it can be only after being known) there is a sense in which the pastness of the present, its being-known along with the past, provides for the presentness or novelty of the present.

From a Buddhist perspective, only perceptions and inferences offer such novel, or previously-unascertained content. Remembrance can at best re-present previously
ascertained cognition or content. In addition, since conceptual or semantic knowledge is conventional in the Buddhist view, to the extent that remembering is conceptual and semantic it is not even adequately representational (as the cognitions of a Buddha might be).

Remembrance is taken to be inherently conventional; it does not give veridical knowledge since its conceptual and logical structure, in addition to its manner of production, prohibit it from offering access to anything novel or currently arising. Only the particulars existing at any given time may be the objects of even conventional conceptual inferences—and remembrances do not pertain to such current particulars. Only perceptions and some inferences may turn forth veridical cognitions since only these are originally presented.

According to Dharmakīrti e.g., only such novel cognitions (cognitions with novel content) may be pravartaka, or causally motivating. However, Buddhist philosophers agree with the Nyāya conception of memory as essentially caused by the activity of memory-traces (saṁskāra) and also accept complex triggering-(efficiently causal) conditions. In the Tarka-samgraha, the Nyāya philosopher Annambhaṭṭa notes 26 of these coordinate conditions; and the involvement of such conditions must also be accepted by the Buddhist philosopher in the spirit of co-dependent arising, or pratītya-saṁutpāda. What differentiates memory from perception is precisely its reliance upon traces (saṁskāra).

But the condition of prior-non-ascertainment presents a problem for continuing cognition (dhārāvāhika jñāna). If novelty is required, then it seems a great deal of what is stable around us will not classify as truly-known—our continuous cognition won’t count as veridical knowledge. Almost all schools have given accounts of how to account for such cognitions’ status as knowledge, without violating the exclusion of memory. The most evidently available explanation is that such continuous content is still present, or current. Its remaining pastness does not affect the pramāṇa status of the perception. Since the current

50 See (Dunne, 2004, p. 298ff.; Franco, 1997, pp. 63-64)
perception is coextensive with the remembered continuity, the object need not be remembered to be known, it is currently known. In other words, it is one and the same cognition. Since this cognition has new temporal content, this single cognition may count as veridical knowing. This is the Advaita explanation of how our cognition of continuous objects can be veridical even if our remembrance is not.

In the later Advaita view of Dhamarāja’s *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, a persistent cognition of an object is considered unitary cognition as long as it lasts. This is because it is characterized by duration, and also, does not involve multiple cognitions within it. One might object to this account on the grounds that the object (or such content) must be remembered in order to be currently known. Because we can only know such continuing things by remembering, continuous cognition can be veridical only if remembrance is somehow veridical. As Bina Gupta notes, a "solution to this problem gives rise to the issue of the perceptibility of time." (Gupta, Dharmarajadhvarindra, & Sastri, 1991, p. 115) This issue will be discussed in following chapters.

Most Advaitin texts, following the common tradition, do not admit memory as a means of knowledge on the grounds that it does not possess the prerequisite unknownness. Advaita Vedāntin philosophers traditionally admit five or six *pramāṇas*: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), testimony (*śabda*), deductive supposition (*arthāpatti*), comparison (*upamāna*) and, sometimes, cognition of absences (*arupalabdhi*). Dvaita (dualist) Vedāntins like Madhva take only the first three of these as *pramāṇa*, but admit memory under the category of perception. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* is unique in that here Dhamarāja seems to allow that one might legitimately consider memory as a *pramāṇa*. (Madhavananda, 1993, p. 5) By remaining neutral on whether memory may be or become perceptual, this later Advaitin text is unusual.
In the Advaita (non-dualist) Vedantin view, ignorance (avidya) is a positive entity and must be removed by the interaction of the self, mind, and senses. When avidya or unknowingness is removed then events and objects are known (vidya). Remembrance cannot remove ignorance because the avidya of those events and objects remembered has already been removed. Once made known, the very real and positive avidya is cleared—such events exist forever as determinate. They are no longer shrouded in indefiniteness. In this Advaitin conception, memory-cognitions cannot reveal the unknown—the remembered cannot be revealed—anymore than it has already been (and only inasmuch as it has already been).

While our experienced past seems to sink back into ignorance or avidya, this ignorance of our own personal forgetting is not coextensive with cosmic avidya. What is known (vidya) must be previously-unknown, and what can be previously-unknown is only that which precedes an original experience of knowing. So, any remembrance requires the previously-known and not the previously-unknown.

In contrast, Praśastapāda’s early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categorization divides cognition (buddhi) into these two types—unknownness or ignorance (avidya) and knownness or knowledge (vidya)—and includes memory among the latter. (Prasastapadacarya, Jha, & Sridhara, 1982) According to Praśastapāda, memory-cognitions offer vidya, as do perceptions, inferences and intuitions (ārṣa). Sources of avidya cognitions include doubt, error, non-determination, and dreaming. But the Vaiśeṣika system admits only two valid means of knowing: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumitā). Smṛti and ārṣa (or memory and the śabda, or words of a rṣi or seer) are conceived as two additional

51 Śridhara notes in Praśastapada-bhāṣyaṃ that vidya is a cognition which is free from doubt, not-contradicted and determinate, while Vyomaśiva says it is a determination that remains uncontradicted with change in place time and circumstance. Quoted in Nyman (2005, pp. 554-555). See also (Prasastapadacarya et al., 1982).

52 Some interesting uses of ‘yathārtha’ include yathārtha-kā-svāpna is a dream that has come true, a yathārthaka-nāman is an appropriate name, a yathārthaka-jānman is a true (real or just) life. In a general sense, while pramāṇa is a proper measuring, yathārtha is justness—it involves not only what is accurate, but what is appropriate.
instrumental causes of *vidya*, or knowledge. Knowledge obtained through *smṛti* and ārśa may be *yathārtha*, or as the object is, but these are not recognized as independent *pramānas* as they are thought to be reducible (in their *yathārtha* forms) to valid perception and inference as the causes of their original construction or constitution. Thus, while perception is also a necessary condition for any inference, it is not a sufficient condition for inference as a *pramāna*. So perception and inference are *pramānas* in their own right; while memory and testimony, when reliable, are thought to be reducible to these.

Representing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, over a millennium later, Annambhaṭṭa classifies cognitions as either experience (*anubhava*) or memory (*smṛti*). Both experiences and remembrances may be either *yathārtha* or *ayathārtha*. Experiential cognitions (as opposed to remembrances) which are *yathārtha* include doubt, error, and hypothetical supposition. While perception, inference, comparison, and testimony are *yathārtha* forms of cognition (these are the Naiyāyika’s four *pramānas*).

In commentary on such classifications, Udayana says *yathārtha* and *vidya* should be taken as equivalent. In his explication of Annambhaṭṭa, memory is classified as *yathārtha*, along with inference, perception, and intuition. (Doubt, error, non-determination and dream are *ayathārtha* cognitions.) It seems that, like Praśastapāda, Udayana understands *smṛti* as Russell does ‘memory’—i.e., as a success term. Annambhaṭṭa, on the other hand leaves open that remembrances may be ‘not as the object’. Presumably this means that a genuine remembering may be inaccurately representative—and, more significantly, something other than just an erroneous experience.

The established Nyāya position opposes remembrance and experience. But for Praśastapāda, all remembrances are instances of knowing something as such; while for

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53 From Kiraṇāvalī, in *Praśastapāda-bhāsyam* with the commentary *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayanācarya (Jetly, 1971), as quoted in Nyman (2005).
Annambhaṭṭa, remembrance may be ayathārtha, or avidya. In this regard, it may be important to note that Annambhaṭṭa (unlike Udayana and Praśastapāda) does not include non-determination (anadhyavasāya) in forms of ayathārtha experience. Anadhyavasāya, or non-apprehension, (applying to a state of indeterminateness, i.e. a 'mere seeing' ālocanamātra, expressed by 'What is it?') may provide Annambhaṭṭa the 'error' element of real smṛti—enabling genuine remembrances to go wrong without being erroneous anubhava (experience). By merely being, we know that [(3X)X was]. The indeterminacy supplied by our bare existential quantification of pastness perhaps opens the door for erroneous experiences to infiltrate what is real smṛti (as opposed to experience) enabling it to be inaccurate (ayathārtha).

This option is not open for Praśastapāda who places memory on a par with perception, inference, testimony, etc, as a form of vidya, or knowing. Opposing remembrance and (presentative) experience is very different from opposing remembrance to perception or intuition (as equally currently representative). Experience (anubhava) and remembrance (smṛti) are opposed in virtue of the fact that the objects involved in such cognitions are actually different, either present or past—making these two types of cognition actually different (or different in kind and not just degree, as Bergson would say).

2.3.2 Yathārtha, Yathānubhava, and the Properly-Valued

The Naiyāyika argue that if a given memory cognition is yathārtha (as the object is) this cognition would have to be originally pramā. But that is not enough, it has to be yathānubhava (just as the original fresh awareness was) also. And that is where memory suffers from a double bind. Any particular yathārtha-status it has is predicated on the original apprehension's pramā-status. If the memory is as its object is (as yathārtha), the
original cognition established was as its object was (as pramā). Yet, not only does memory not reveal any new information, it does not necessarily or uniformly transmit validity as does proper inference (where the major term is in fact true), etc. Memory has to present its own object as "that was thus" while it is trying to faithfully retain the content of the original apprehension that "this is thus".

Memory, in this manner, is almost necessarily subject to degradation and distortion. Sāṁskāras, the immediate causal condition of recall, are traces of original (experiential but bygone) experience, and this experience itself was originally somewhat of an impression—being influenced by prior habituation and other memory (making sāṁskāra somewhat trace of what was traced). But remembering is required for the pramāṇas of inference, testimony, comparison and even linguistic knowledge. Can memory be "reduced" to these as simply a means of doxastic relation and not be pramāṇa in its own right?

Mohanty argues that memory is the source of an originating mode of disclosure of past events as past. However, while this quality of pastness associated with a memory cognition is what defines it as such, in the Nyāya conception such added pastness does not suffice to restore pramāṇa-status to it, since it is not externally grounded. So, its novel presentative or anubhava, content is only the pastness alone qualifying the cognition—yet there can never be a current intake of this pastness from a direct encounter in a present situation. Mohanty argues that since the memory is faithful to its own object and also that, as a new presentative cognition, it involves knowing a new object. But this new "object", the pastness of the cognition, is not the right sort of object to be the object of a pramāṇa. The object or content of such a cognition is only that the original object of the cognition is not, but (and yet) was. This is not an external content, but a negative quality relating the past experience to the (once-present) cognition as (now-) past.
Against the claim of the lack of independence of memory, Mohanty says that the object of memory is the past experience, and it is independent of any other means of knowledge (other pramōnas) with respect to that. But this is precisely the reason why it cannot be pramā in the Nyāya view. Remembering could not possibly give knowledge since it remains unrelated to the senses organs, including the inner sense, or mind (manas)—and so to any form of perception or present occasion. And, even connected with perception, memory only represents the past for the purposes of perception. So, it is a matter of definition for Naiyāyika (analytically true) that memory is not presentative, and so not pramā. And indeed, this is what Mohanty is objecting to. He says there must be a good reason given for excluding memory and he does not find the reasons given to be good ones.

To add to his worries, for Naiyāyika, “ordinary” recognitional perception, including vyāpti claims serving as the major premise of inference, involve memory as a doxastic connection; and “extraordinary” perception of perception of type and acquired conceptions would seem to involve remembered cognitions—or at the very least the involvement of an awareness of past experience. Memory thus seems to be essentially involved in all determinate and recognitional pramā, and thus an essential element of knowledge and knowing as pramā. So how could it be that memory is not itself considered a valid means of knowledge if it contributes essentially to most if not all instances of valid cognition?

2.4 Recognition and Other Non-Ordinary (alaukika) Perception

Generally speaking, recognition is the basic form of the process of interpreting experience and has the expressive and conceptual form ‘this is that’, e.g., this is Devadatta or ‘this is a pot’. In Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Utpaladeva’s Ṭīvra-Pratyabhijñā, this type of recognitive activity (pratyabhijñā) is recognized to be required for general
perception, i.e., perception that apprehends an object as such.\textsuperscript{54} This sort of mnemonic (or anamnestic) ability is also understood to be the basis of semantic content.

According to the Śaiva view for example, existence (āstitva) depends on illumination by awareness (prakāśa) and such recognitive judgments, or identifications, are considered necessary for object-manifestation. This sort of root recognitive judgment is the basis for the possibility of any conception or interpretation. As will be discussed more fully in later chapters, according to Utpaladeva and Abhinava, such recognition is ultimately indicative of the divine unity of conscious-being as the necessary ground for all perceptive and recognitive judgments—for any doubt and for any willed activity. In the Nyāya view, however, recognition (pratyabhijñā) is a function of alaukika (non-normal or extra-ordinary) forms of perception: sāmānyalaksana and jñānalaksana pratyakṣa.

Sāmānyalaksana perception is described as perception of all members of a class or type, by way of perception of a present thing $x$ and its present type $X$. By this means of perception by perceiving one thing we perceive all things of a similar class. The Nyāya account of sāmānyalaksana perception serves to solve two major philosophical problems: it accounts for universal generalizations and universal concomitance, and for conceptual acquisition or generalization. Since our concepts are not considered abstractions, but concrete universals or embodied types, these are present in the objects themselves, and can be perceived without recognition (as they are with only laukika perception, perhaps here as non-conceptual, or nirvikalpaka) or with generalized recognition (as comes with alaukika abilities). Cognitions of universal concomitance, which are crucially important to the possibility of inference, are themselves pramā, since such awareness (when one is inferring that there is fire on the hill) is provided for by sāmānyalaksana pratyakṣa.

\textsuperscript{54} See (Abhinavagupta, Bhaskarakantha, & Utpala, 1986b; Pandit, 2004)
It is the perceptive cognition of concomitance, and not the remembrance of the concomitance, which justifies and creates their pramā status. This is so, even though remembrance of the concomitance is required for the perceiving of the concomitance as pertaining (e.g., smoky places are fiery places), and so for the resulting cognition (there is fire on this smoky hill). The validity of the concomitance (its presentedness as pramā) is subject to being perceived. In this process of perception, remembering is said to be instrumental in connecting a perception to a past occurrence of that character, resulting in a perception indicating similarity (sāmānyalakṣana).

In the case of recognition of the same object at non-continuous times, remembering is likewise the means of contact between the present perception of this x and its X-ness, and the past X-ness (that x). If the recognition is appropriately predicative of the subject present, it is a form of perception resulting from sense-object contact but conducted by remembering. It is a perception because it is externally grounded by a present this, which is similar to (or the same as) a past that.

Jñānalakṣana, the second type of non-ordinary perception is described as perception of an object by a sense organ, where that object is not a proper object of perception of that sense. The common example given for jñānalakṣana perception is synaesthetic: we may see sandalwood and see it as fragrant. Actually remembering the fragrance of past sandalwood (its smell) is said to be the connecting relation between a present perception of the sandalwood fragrance and a past experience of a sandalwood fragrance. This second type of non-ordinary perception gives us great possibilities for error. I may see that the rope is a snake instead of just a rope. My memory of the snake connects my present seeing of a snakelike-ness and my past experiencing of a snakelike-ness that was a real snake. But presumably jñānalakṣana pratyakṣa is not always error. Because the sandalwood now perceived really shares that fragrance as a type which is present in both cases of sandalwood,
according to the Nyāya view, this imposition of past knowledge on present knowledge is not necessarily error. This is one issue among many that divides Buddhist and Nyāya views.

S. Bhattacharya outlines six types of situations given to explicate the scope of this second type of non-ordinary perception:

i) ordinary recognition—e.g., *This is a jar,* or *He is Devadatta*
ii) higher-order introspective cognition—e.g., the awareness that *I see a jar*
iii) erroneous cognition—(re)cognizing, e.g., *this rope as a snake* by way of recalling *that snake*
iv) mis-attribute or cognitive illusion, leading to mistaken inference—believing a reflected appearance to present a reality, that a crystal is colored, e.g. when it is an object reflected in the crystal which is colored.
v) perception of a present absence (the image or presence of what is missing is conduced by what is remembered)—e.g. *Devadatta is not here now.*
vi) perception of similarity with difference (a remembered thing is compared to something present)—e.g. *this is that Devadatta,* or *this jar is like that jar*—or *this jar is not that jar,* or not *like that jar.*

All of these are considered perceptions since they are attributions regarding a present subject of predication, 'this'. (Bhattacharyya, 2004, pp. 10-14)

Although *jñānalakṣana* is central to the Naiyāyikas explanation of error—providing a non-ordinary operative connection between the sense organ and an object—such perception mediated by remembrance may equally lead to true awareness. Recognition of a present object as none other than the same old past object and the synaesthetic seeing of a fragrant sandalwood paste, offer veridical perceptual knowledge.

The case of perceptive states available to those trained in yoga (*yogaja pratyakṣa*) is also revealing. In this third form of *alaukika* perception, the *yogin* is said to perceive the past or future or present at will. If we may extrapolate from this, past or future events must thus somehow be potentially presentative, although they must also remain past in order to be *pramāṇa.* This *yogaja* experience is regarded as a perceptive state, even if extrasensory and unmediated.
Perceiving past or future events to count as pramā, requires perceiving them as they are, i.e. as past or future. So the yogin who perceives other times by yogaja pratyakṣa must somehow keep track of time—remembering the present time, while perceiving the past or future. But if as the Naiyāyika philosophers hold, to know what is true is to locate or identify that where that is, and past events are really past, how does the yogin perceive these past events in their presence? Does yogaja pratyakṣa somehow offer veridical cognition of their presence (presentness) and their absence (their pastness) simultaneously?

The third form of alaukika perception, yogaja pratyakṣa (perception produced by the methods of yoga) is really ‘extraordinary’. By such perceptions the yogin is said to be able to perceive past and future, and so have pramā jñāna of other times. As a consequence of this view, the past may be an object of a genuinely veridical cognition, and not just by way of a memory-cognition. However, since recognition is involved in most conceptual and higher-order knowledge, the Naiyāyika account of alaukika perception seems to bear a heavy duty. Sāmānyalaksana and jñānalaksana account for recognitive ability and the possibility of error. Such ‘perception’ enables memory-mediated knowledge to become immediate; and the case of super-extraordinary perception (yogaja pratyakṣa) indicates the depths of the Naiyāyika commitment to direct realism.

Examination of the role of remembering in recognitive cognitions as described in Nyāya account of alaukika perception makes it more evident why it is analytically true that remembering cannot be a means of valid presentative knowledge. Since memory and presentative experience (anubhava) are equally forms of cognition or awareness for the Nyāya and pramā is requisitely presentative, smṛti performs as a real counter-class to pramā. Some awareness must not be presentative in order for presentative awareness to be known as valid. This understanding of memory (with its apramā or non-knowing status) gives the Naiyāyika room to consider conceptual knowledge presentative; and, as well, to explain the
possibility and frequency of error, despite their direct realism and their optimism that whatever is real can be known. But un-tethered to a present occasion, or some sort of this, remembrance cannot even re-present since this representation must itself be presented (presentative), or explicicated in recognition.

If smṛti were pramāṇa it would induce a valid state of presented awareness (pramāṇa). In doing so, it could not represent the past as absent, but only as present. Also, if smṛti-jñāna were pramāṇa-jañña then saṃskāra or mnemic traces, as the constitutive cause of such memory-cognitions, would be pramāṇa. But because of the above problem of the memory claim (that its truth value doesn’t accord with its genuineness), such memory-traces cannot be an independent means of knowledge. Any knowledge value they have is derived from the impressed value of the original experience. So, even as a current and correct cognition of pastness (even as yathārtha), remembering cannot itself be either veridical cognition or a means of veridical cognition.

Yet, Nyāya philosophers do not deny that memory may be involved in all valid presentative cognitions. In fact, if it is involved in all valid presentative cognitions, this would seem to indicate its function is not to provide either true or false cognitions, but to provide for the possibility of both knowledge and error. Therefore, Naiyāyika position on memory is not inconsistent. Nothing indicates that remembrance should be classified as a means of knowing, since it is equally a means erroneous cognition, and even states of not-knowing (avidya).

2.5 Memory as Pramāṇa: Making Memory Presentative

The Madhva dualists and the Jain philosophers have argued from the involvement of memory in recognition (and the involvement of recognition in most perceptions) that memory must be considered as knowledge, or presentative and accurate awareness. Both oppose the
Nyāya view, which admits perceptual recognition as knowledge, but not the remembering involved in such recognition. Madhva argues that our inferences are considered valid, but they require remembrance of a concomitance of cause and effect, or reason and demonstration, sign and signified (hetu and sādhya). But since it is not possible that veridical cognition is based on non-veridical cognition, our remembrances must likewise be considered veridical.

In Madhva's analysis it is memory's supposed derivative character (as it is taken, e.g. by Udayana) that has led to the idea that the memory must match a past state of affairs. The presentative awareness, or original experience, is implicitly indicated within the remembering. And, as a remembrance, the awareness is accurate in its inclusion of the pastness of the event. In this way, roughly speaking, Madhva puts the past awareness of the past experience within the present (and presentative) memory. The memory, or the present awareness of the past experience, is a present awareness of a current pastness (or awareness of a real present absence) of a real experience. The memory does not match the past experience as present, but as it is presently, as past, or really absent—as it really is now.

Remembering could be thus taken as a presentative experience (anubhava) of real absents.

Though allowing smṛti to be pramāṇa, the Jaina darsana classifies remembering as a form of mediated-cognition or mediated-knowing (parokṣa jñāna). This is described as non-perceptual knowledge that lacks vivacity and immediacy. Memory is considered a form of mediate-perception because it requires the revival of previous impressions. Hemachandra in particular argues that knowledge is the revelation of an object; and since memory reveals its object by way of saṁskāra, it is a valid means of knowing. The truth or falsity of a remembrance is not dependent on the presence or presentness of that object, but instead its reality. Because the past is real, the remembrance of the past does have a standard for truth or falsity. There is an objective basis for the veracity of memory claims, viz. past events
themselves which are perceived mediately by way of remembrance. Any particular knowing may be defective but this does not show that memory is not a valid means of veridical cognition. Moreover, our actual practice of memory use confirms is status as a means of knowing the world as it is.

2.5.1 Madhva: Memory as Direct Inner-Perception

Although memory is recognized as a valid means of knowledge by both Jaina and Dvaita philosophers, in contrast to the Jain view that memory is mediated, Madhva argues that memory is a form of direct perception. In Madhva’s analysis there are seven sorts of perception associated with the six sense organs (five outward senses plus the inner sense or mind) and also the sākṣīn, or witness consciousness which intuits perception. Memory cognitions arise in direct perception by the mind in contact with the saṃskāras, or traces from former impressions.

In contrast, the prāmāṇyavāda of Naiyāyikas, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas, and Advaitins characterize pramāṇa preemptively to exclude memory—as either requisitely novel (Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā, Advaita) or purely presentative (Nyāya). Madhva holds that only yāthārthya (or correspondence) is necessary for veridical knowing. Recognition (pratyabhijñā) is described as an indivisible act of cognition produced by visual sense and aided by memory-traces. Madhva argues that recognition is neither a simple percept, viz., ‘this’, nor an act of memory, viz., ‘that’, nor is it two separate cognitions, a perception and a memory, nor a compound of ‘mental chemistry’ as the Jain philosophers propose.

Though he denies that novelty or independence are requirements for veridical cognition, Madhva still counters the exclusion of memory on the ground of its merely representational character by noting the novelty offered in a memory-cognition.

Remembrances represent their content originally as past. This novelty of pastness involved
in a remembrance would be enough to enable memory-cognition to offer something previously unknown. Remembrance thus provides an original direct acquaintance.

However, previous unknownness or novelty (anadhigatavatva) cannot be a proper criterion Madhva argues, because it is never seriously maintained that no further knowledge can arise in regard to a previously-known object. (B. N. K. Sharma, 1986, pp. 141-142)

Also, since one cognitive episode of knowing is not opposed to another episode of knowing in any other way, there is nothing that might prohibit further knowledge with regard to a past object. The argument here is that since our knowledge of the past can be contributed to by present knowledge, and still be knowledge of the same past object, novelty cannot be required. A novelty requirement would isolate present knowledge from genuinely linking back to past knowledge.

Madhva also argues that independence is not required for pramāṇa since this would eliminate inference as a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Inference, as Broad so eloquently noted, depends crucially on remembering. And excluding memory as a pramāṇa by definition is unjustified. If remembrance were caused exclusively by memory traces, then these traces could only relate the state of the object as it was experienced (and so not, as it is now, i.e. as past). He resolves this problem by claiming remembering does not just involve reflections or reiterations of traces, but is instead a direct apprehension.

Like Russell, Madhva notes the immediacy of memory and the difference between memory and perception to be in the reference remembrances have to the past, citing the possibility of yogic perception as an exemplification of perception that is sāksātkāra (clear, evident or immediate perception) and non-inferential. Ordinary remembrance of the past is limited by its connecting-links, the saṁskāras or memory traces, in contrast to yogic perception of the past.
Another problem sometimes cited for smṛti as pramā or pramāṇa, is that memory cognitions are inefficacious (nisphalatvam). Since such cognitions provide no new information, they have no real activity or genuine causal effect. Madhva counters such a claim, saying that veridicality is a matter of fact and not of utility (or fruitfulness); but even so, not all instances of memory are without generating effect. Memory is certainly not categorically inefficacious—at the very least, the exercise of memory increases the potency of one’s impressions, or the ability to recall again.

Madhva argues positively that memory is a valid means of knowing since it may be uncontradicted and true (or presentative). It is this which required for yathārtha status. Conformity with past experience, which is most often thought to be the only criterion for the truth-value of a memory, denies the value of a real perception (an occurring memory) in favor of a past experience. The division of experience into anubhāva (presentative) or anubhūti, and smṛti (memorial) itself provides evidence that memory is direct experience or immediate acquaintance in Madhva’s view. Both anubhūti and smṛti are experience, and experience is just an immediate sort of thing.

Remembrance may present that which remains uncontradicted and contains an element of novelty in grasping the object as past (even though prior-unascertained or novelty is not an appropriate criterion of pramā since something new can be known about the already known). There is genuinely something more in a veridical memory cognition than there was in the original experience. Remembrance is more than reiteration—and if it is like reproduction it is the sort that is also a genuinely new production.

2.5.2 Vyāsatīrtha: In Defense of Direct Memory Knowledge

In defense of remembrance as veridical knowing, Vyāsatīrtha of the Dvaita school of Madhvācārya anticipates a series of four objections and replies to the opponent who refuses
The first objection is that remembrance cannot be veridical without being supported by inferences, etc. This is because its claims are about remote now non-existent or absent objects; and remote or absent objects are known by means of inference.

Vyasatirtha’s reply is to note that recognitive perceptions are considered veridical (by the opponent) even though they are without inferential support; and such perceptions also mention a remote absent object as seen before (e.g. “this man is that man”). So this objection, that memory requires inferential support, is inconclusive. The proponent’s positive argument is that since recognitive perception is considered by the opponent to be genuinely veridical, the remembrance conducting this perception should also be veridical.

The second objection is directed against the idea that memory is an inner mental perception, or that memory is direct acquaintance. The argument here is that if past events were perceived by the mind inwardly, like current pleasures and pains, then memory would exceed its object. While inner perception can only be about inner mental states (pleasure, pain, desire, etc) remembering claims to access external things and now past events.

In response to this objection, it is noted that when we apperceive in inner perception (e.g. “I see the ocean” or “I am seeing the ocean”) we include the external object within the content of introspective mental knowledge. Because of this inclusion, it is not the case than inner sense cannot grasp external objects. The proposal is that, as ‘common’, inner sense aided by memory traces can access any past object experienced—inward or external.

The third objection is complex, and is reminiscent of Udayana’s objection. Everyone agrees that the original experience sets a limit on the memory cognition of the experience (object or event). The immediate cause of memory is reactivation of memory-traces which themselves can be traced back to some original experience; yet, remembrance involves an

\(^{55}\) This debate is given in Chakrabarti, (2004).
additional ‘pastness’ since the past time of the event and its witnessing are later increasingly past. This reference to the passage of time is something original that the experience did not contain. So with this recognized lapse of time, the recall exceeds its limit. The Dvaita response to this objection is to recognize this problem to be memory’s virtue.

When one is remembering a past experience or event, etc. the time of the original experience is not taken as the present time—nor is the current time (the time of remembrance) adopted as the time of the past object or content. Since the cessation of the original time is, at the time of the remembrance, a fact, if the recall includes this destruction as part of its content in an implicitly present-tensed manner the proponent asks, then where does it overstep its limits?

The ‘that was’ in recall experience means that the relationship with the original time has passed (changed). Madhva’s position is that the recall should and does not aim to replicate past experience, but to present current experience as both including and excluding past-experience. In this way, remembrance serves as a counter-class to perception for the proponent (Dvaita) as well as the opponent (Naiyāyika). But for philosophers of the Madhvacarya persuasion, it is understood to be prima facie, or direct knowing. We have current and intimate knowledge of a real and changing pastness.

In the fourth and final objection, this ‘novelty’ of remembrance is taken as a defect. Memory-cognition derives from an original experience by means of mnemonic-traces, generally thought to be triggered by many different elements, and requiring a number of auxiliary conditions. But if it is admitted that remembrance is adding elements, then it is not derivative from the original experience and retained saṁskāras alone. Remembrance must have another source (for its content) other than the remaining impressions, and, if so, cannot accurately represent past experience.

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In response to this objection, the assumption that remembrance should only represent or that it is only derivative cognition, is denied. The proponent argues that remembrance is also due to the activity of "its own organ", inner sense or mind—and not memory-traces alone. Introspective awareness and witnessing consciousness (sāksin) enable, or enact this mental perceptual readjustment of tense. This is not detrimental to the value of remembrance, but is in fact the primary value of remembering. The claims of memory (remembrances) should not be understood as simply derivative but instead recognized as having independent status.

### 2.6 Abhinavagupta and the Power (śakti) of Recognition

Although coming from a very different philosophical perspective, Abhinavagupta argues that memories do not mention their own time of occurrence, or that of the original experience as the present time. As a fresh or original experience itself, a remembrance has its own unique self-aware content. So remembrance can be called a correct self-intimation rather than either a conceptual error of the imagination, or a mixed form of perception and inference.

Abhinava anticipates the argument against memory as a form of knowing: a If remembrance is determinate conceptual cognition, its object is itself, now past, and is not touched by such remembrance. Since the direct experience which did manifest this object, also does not exist now, the direct experience also cannot be made manifest by the remembrance. Cognitions are self-manifesting or self-illuminating (immediately known); and one cognition cannot make another cognition manifest. Also, the original experience does not exist at the time of the remembrance. Since there is no manifestation of either the object or the original experience, memory cannot be veridical knowledge. And, of course, if the verdicts of memory are not to be respected as knowledge then there is no need to
postulate an underlying unified permanent self just for the sake of accounting for our honoring memory, and all other linguistic and social practices that are enlivened by memory.

In reply to this objection Abhinava says that a determinate remembrance involves consciousness of an object (unlike deep sleep or unconsciousness). Since remembrance involves consciousness of an object (external content), there is an object illumined. If the object of knowledge were not illumined, the determinate judgment following on this would not efficaciously direct action. Memory would be as good as blind and would not work (as it evidently does) in our ordinary activities. Like Madhva, Abhinava points out that the illumination of an object is not done by memory either by rejecting the time of the original awareness (the source of such remembrance) or by embracing that past time as its own correct time. The appearance of the object is neither subsumed in the original experience nor does it exclude the time of the original experience. If it did either, then the remembering consciousness would assume the form of "this," he says, but it is manifest as 'that'.

The consciousness of the time of the past experience as associated with the object of the prior experience is thus necessary in the remembrance of the object. The consciousness of time determines, or delimits, the object. The consciousness of time associated with the current rememberer is equally involved in the remembrance and that manifest remembering. Abhinava argues that as far as there is a known part and a knowing part (vedya-, vedaka-bhāga) the remembering event introduces the rememberer's own bodily feeling of being in a different time because it involves self-reflexive awareness. It is, he says, by means of this very clear distinction of the time coordinates that appear that even the recall manages to give the character of a fresh self-distinguishing presentation to itself.

Abhinavagupta notes repeatedly (as we have also done here) that all current interactions and transactions depend upon remembrance. Even direct perception is not

56 In commentary (on Utpaladeva's Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā 1.4.2 (IPV))
possible without the conscious unification of earlier and later states (IPV\textsuperscript{57} Jñānādhikāra āhnika 3.6, 4.4). Such a single unified (or diachronic) knower as the subject of distinctions is required in order to detect error in presentative awareness. And, correcting error involves the ability to refer distinct cognitions to the same object; to recognize that contrary impressions cannot be true; and then to judge one to be more correct than the other.

Cognitions from different times must be connected (without one taking another as an object). Awareness of absence, which is involved in the awareness of change, requires both the remembering and the imaginative positing of that which is absent. This involves a real presentation of an absence—and hence a real underlying knowing subject as an agent who is able to represent and recognize. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta make the case that recognition is divine, and memory one of three divine powers. (IPV, Jñānādhikāra, āhnika 3.7) Ultimately, for Abhinava, the remembering and the object remembered (and any knowing and its object known) are validated as true and real in virtue of their ultimate unification with and absorption in the rememberer (knower).

2.6.1 Reflections on Extra-ordinary Perception

If yogic perception is to be distinguished from even a perfect remembering (which cannot perceive past events as presentative but only in absentia), the pastness of the past must be perceived not as in remembering (by perceiving it as an absence) but as a presence of that pastness. As far as the past that we normally remember goes, it is personal—one’s past is one’s own. But the past available to the yogin’s extraordinarily vast perception may not be the uniquely limited past with which we are familiar. And there is no hint in the Nyāya account of alaukika pratyākṣa that the yogin perceives past events by way of the memories of

\textsuperscript{57} (Abhinavagupta, 1938; Abhinavagupta, Bhaskarakantha, & Utpala, 1986a)
others. The Nyāya position is both consistently realist and externalist—the past is a possible object of perception (even if this is truly-extraordinary perception).

The case of yogāja is telling for smṛti since in this form of perception the object of memory, the past, is presented without the involvement of remembering. It may be that remembering continues to play a role in helping the yōgin perceive the past as presentative, and since pramā, as still past (and perhaps as they are, continuing to become further past).

But we can wonder if these considerations on yogic perception and omniscience ultimately force a contradiction in the realistic yet unified views of time offered by Nyāya, or Jain philosophers for whom omniscience in four directions is the ultimate liberation.

The difficulty facing conceptions of yogic perception is that if there is a valid presentative awareness of a past X, the real past X must be cognized as presentative which would seem to be an error. If a past x can be cognized by yogāja pratyakṣa (as immediately perceived) that past X would seem to be mislocated—as occurring presentatively (as x, located in the present) and not as past. So the yōgin if not in error, must then locate events accurately in the past (or future) just as they are made available for perception. Somehow the yōgin can be present to past or future events and perceive in their presence their pastness or futurity. Perhaps this perceived presence of past events (unlike the ordinary remembered absence of past events) is made possible by remembering the present (one’s embodied presence), or by the memory of one’s own personal past.

Regardless of how this is to work, it suffices to say that for Indian views of liberation admitting omniscience or other infinite possible self-extensions that are realist (and so realist about the past or time); the past can be perceived and not just remembered.58 And, if there

58 Even the Buddha remembered his past lives on his way to eliminating all conceptual errors. For the Advaita Vedāntin, who denies the reality of time, the past and our remembrances are ultimately avidyā (beginninglessly ignorant or unknowing) and our experience of pastness and futurity (the passage of time) is illusory or false. For these latter two schools, neither smṛti nor pratyabhijñā (even if it is classified as a form of perception) is a means of knowledge.
are two ways to know the past (by smṛti and by yogaja pratyakṣa) then smṛti could not ever be all there is to a given true cognition, or pramā. If it somehow that were all there were to a given true cognition (in other words, if the content of the smṛti became somehow so complete as to be pramā), then that cognition would be representative of the past (yogaja pratyakṣa) and not representative of the past. So remembering could never be a means of valid knowing.

When the object of smṛti is known without fault by extraordinary perception, it is perceived; when the object of memory (the past) is perceived, the past is not remembered (but the extraordinary yogaja perceiver’s own past or present may still be remembered). So, it seems that the only way to restore the epistemic status (veridicality) to memory amounts to putting it back in the class of perceptions.

Alaukika pratyakṣa in all three of its forms could be considered both transcendental and intuitional perception, since such connecting is made possible by something beyond the present cognition and this is immediate or non-representational. Its conceptual distinctions are genuinely presentative, and as recognitive perception, may be pramā.

2.7 Conclusions: Does Remembering give us Knowledge?

2.7.1 The Revealed and the Remembered

The denial of pramā status to smṛti is a predominant position in Indian philosophical traditions, but such a common denial is not similarly found in Western philosophical traditions. This denial is also put in to sharp relief given the importance of pramā and pramāṇa to the Indian philosophical pursuit, which is literally a prāmāṇyavāda, or discourse on true-knowing. This denial of pramā-status might seem to denigrate the status of the remembered, but in the wider tradition the various things ‘smṛti’ is used to apply to signifies its vital role. Related to this, Gerald Larson has written that part of the denial of
pramāṇa status might be due to the ambiguity in the very notion of smṛti, to its being, in his words, a "portmanteau expression." And, the ambiguity of smṛti is very interesting.

As one would expect, "smṛti" can be used to refer to different sorts of things, i.e. episodic cognition of an individual or a faculty or type of cognition more generally. "Smṛti" is also commonly used for 'mindfulness,' as well as to designate remembered histories.59 But it is especially significant that the whole of Vedic knowledge itself is said to have differing sources, viz. śruti and smṛti. Śruti is that which is heard, or revealed knowledge and knowledge offered by testimony—including the Vedas and Upaniṣads; while smṛti are the historical or recorded remembrances—including the Mahābhārata (Bhagavad Gītā), Puranas, and Āgamas. What is smṛti is taken to include nyāya (reasoning or explanation); and philosophies (or darśanas, Brahma Sūtras, etc.)

This particular use of smṛti to describe texts other than the divinely revealed, including philosophical and moral codices, histories, and devotional and philosophical texts, and even methodology, is often cited as a primary reason for memory's less prestigious status. If such sources are to be of a lower level than the Vedas and Upaniṣads, then they cannot be an independent means of knowing. The truths of such remembered knowing can be accounted for by other means (e.g. perception, testimony, inference, etc.) But, the truths of the Vedas and Upaniṣads are revealed—they must be perceived and not just testimonial (as "remembered" or smṛti-texts might be). Truth is something immediately disclosed or

59 The English 'remember' also has ambiguities interesting etymological connections and is used in all sorts of ways. Most often it is used to refer to retention or retrieval of information or a process involving acquisition in addition to these. 'Memory' can refer to this process, or any of its parts, and even a faculty ('He lost his memory.') And what is remembered can vary from personal experiences and facts, to semantic and procedural knowledge or skills. English even has similar connotations with love, e.g., 'God remembered Noah', and even with mindfulness, or self-possession, e.g., 'He almost overreacted, but then he remembered himself.'
evident; while revelation reveals or makes evident its object, remembrance may not. If the testimony of what is revealed is corrupted it is only by way of the remembrance.\textsuperscript{60}

The importance of this distinction between the cognitive status of \textit{what is heard} (or revealed) and \textit{what is remembered} is indeed important. As has been noted by many, the indications of the \textit{sIruti} texts and the \textit{smr}ti texts differ on points, and the revealed is given precedence over the remembered in such cases. And, it is indeed the case that traditional Indian philosophical views (like Ny\text{\`a}ya) admit testimony but not memory as a means of veridical knowledge. In this regard it may be said that although remembrance may offer accurate information, it only becomes \textit{pram\text{"a}na} as revealed—\textit{testimonial}ly or \textit{perceptually}. It is only the explicated or explicit character of memory that enables it to present veridically.

Besides being of a requisitely lower status than \textit{sIruti}, \textit{smr}ti has other associations and functions which separate it from being \textit{pram\text{"a}na}. In the Bhagavad Gita, for example, \textit{smr}ti is considered one of three powers of the Lord, \textit{j\text{"i}na} and \textit{apohana} (awareness and exclusion) being the other two. Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva take these three powers as central to their exposition. Memory is something other than just conception, or perceptual cognition. Also, and not unrelated to this, \textit{smr}ti (\textit{smara} / \textit{smara\text{"a}}) also has interesting connections with love.\textsuperscript{61} And again, all philosophical traditions agree (except perhaps the Carvaka materialists) that \textit{saIrsk\text{"a}ras}, or impressed dispositions of past activity are the instrumental to remembering, and fundamental to accounts of cyclical rebirth (\textit{saIrsk\text{"a}ra}).

Since the goal of these systems is release from this cyclical suffering caused by karma and \textit{saIrsk\text{"a}ras} (activity and the effects of activity), this agreement is important. If

\textsuperscript{60} As Professor Chakrabarti has described it, "The point here was hermeneutic. In case of a clear conflict between \textit{sIruti} texts and \textit{smr}ti texts, \textit{sIruti} will trump. But, one must also remember that the huge gaps left out by Vedic corpus are supposed to be filled up by \textit{smr}ti. If it is secondary, then it is also complimentary."

\textsuperscript{61} Monier-Williams Dictionary cites the \textit{Ka\text{"a}ha} Upanisad and the poet K\text{"a}lid\text{"a}sa, calling K\text{"a}m\text{"a}deva, the god of desire, or love (comparable to Eros, Venus Cupid, etc.) \textit{"smara}". \textit{"Sm\text{"a}ra"}, as well as \textit{"sm\text{"a}ra"} are not only for remembrance or recollection and the god of love, but also names for the 7th astrological house (ruled by Venus). (Monier-Williams, 1899)
memory is by way of saṁskāras, and it is true that saṁskāras lead to continued suffering and also that ignorance is the cause of continued suffering, then saṁskāras also re-produce ignorance. So there is a deep philosophical reason why these schools agree in denying memory knowledge status. This reason is related to the need for perceptual currency and novelty, but is slightly different: Besides having derivative warrant, memory cognitions are caused by the cause of ignorance and bondage. In other words, such traces are the cause of continued ignorance, so if they are the cause of memory, then memory can’t be like other means of knowing.

_It is important to note that most schools, including Nyāya (though firm in their rejection of smṛti as pramāṇa) give an account of conceptual construction and recognitive ability which explicitly involves memory. Even simple determinate conceptual (savikalpaka) perception such as "this flower is bright yellow" requires some grasp of a concept of yellow; and apprehending something as such, involves memory of some form or other. As the means of connection of present knowing to that which is past, memory has a vitally conducive function for all veridical cognition. It is requisite for the conducting of conceptual or recognitive perception (savikalpaka) and inferential cognition._

_Despite the general position against remembrance, many schools do not reject the possibility of perceiving the past (even if super-extraordinary), nor the possibility of true testimony (revelation) from or about the past. The possibility of esoteric perception of the untimely presentness of past and future as in the Nyāya view e.g., highlights the extent of realism proposed. But since remembering is fundamentally representational, it is not subject to externalist veracity. Although we do not perceive the past when we remember it, bits or aspects of it may yet be available for perception as a form of recognition, or by yogic intuition._
If our own experience is part of this past, we might conceivably (by yogajña pratyakṣa) genuinely perceive our own past experience. (Presumably this would immediately and without inference supplant our remembering of it). Such views open up the possibility that it may be possible to perceive what is past and future, as well as what is present; but just by remembering the past alone—i.e., without proper conduciveness in or as a current occasion, or without revelatory heard status—there cannot be a veridical presentative cognition. Such views eliminate false or recited memory for example, from being truly-perceived remembrance.

Although the underground role of memory in other forms of valid presentative cognitions (e.g. inferences, perceptions, etc.) needs to be discussed at greater depth to do justice to these classical texts, it is at least clear that it is very efficient theoretically to divide even relatively accurate rememberings from valid presentative cognitions. The Naiyāyika maintain their position by understanding recognition as presentative (because externally grounded), and consider remembering as a cognitive function mediating the collocation of past conditions into presentative conditions. Dummett (unwittingly) reflects the Nyāya epistemological spirit well when he writes that memory is not a source or ground but only a conduit for knowledge. Yet the Nyāya accept testimony as more than just a conduit, it is a valid means of knowing since what it offers can be presently-known.

Nyāya philosophers do not give novelty, or pervious non-ascertainment, as a criterion for something to be knowledge (pramā). What disqualifies memory is that it offers only past-knowledge. Unlike the Buddhists and Advaitins, the Naiyāyika are realists about time and the passage of time (the present is distinct in kind from what is past). Yet, the Nyāya view opens the past for perceiving and not just remembering. Their 'conduit' account of remembrance enables them, as direct realists, to explain error and higher-order cognition as well as synaesthetic phenomena. And ultimately, even in the Nyāya view, the vital role of
memory is not ignored. As will be discussed in below, it is the basis of their argument for the
existence of a subsistent self.

2.7.2 The Murky Depths of Memory

The self-evidence of our memory-knowledge is only the very surface of its
murkiness. We don’t consciously know or cognize all that we remember at any one time.
This partial ‘forgetting’ offsets our episodes of remembering and supports them. (See ftnt 2.)
Our remembering is easily suggestible and full of chaotic and practiced associations, but not
easily willed. Our memory seems impenetrable at times, and we cannot always remember
something just because we want. When we are frustrated by the ‘tip of the tongue’
phenomena, it seems that we can ‘trick’ the process and stop trying to remember, and then it
occurs to us, as if unwilled, in the middle of another activity. It is as if after the order sent
out to remember the effort continues thoughtlessly; or in fact, better than with our conscious
effort. Many conditions have to be fulfilled in order to remember, including, e.g., the prior
learning or experience of the thing remembered as well as a presently embodied occasion for
remembering that. And although remembering can be restricted to conscious recall, the real
remembering that we do, like much of our perceiving, does not necessarily involve conscious
awareness or volitional effort.

This non-consciousness or non-volitional character of even our conscious
remembering can be seen most immediately its uncontrollable selectivity and intrusiveness,
as well as its more beneficial consistency, default reliability, and pervasiveness in our
experience. Thoughts about past experience and scattered memories come to mind
automatically, for useful reasons and productive purposes like ordinary action; or for more
arbitrary reasons and not so productive purposes—and sometimes apparently no reasons at
all. We keep track of our memories (even if constantly transformed) somehow during
periods of unconsciousness; and we do not lose them when we sleep (although it has been proposed that we might consolidate them).

And while most things we remember are, at least, temporarily forgotten somehow in order to be remembered, the great majority seem permanently lost—or never-really acquired. Indeed, most of our past experience seems not to be even possible contents of our remembering. Most often our remembrances of our past experience cannot bring back the details of these experiences. Our memories come to us condensed, summarized into facts, or scripts; or are often uselessly vague or confused. It seems that we are lucky to remember just some of what we understood or consciously perceived (the gist of what we heard, or any details at all of what we witnessed).

As well, the experience of the past (or now-passed) time is uncontained by the remembering we have of it. When I am remembering a past experience, the experience is remembered without duration. We may describe the time passed with a measure (e.g., “That took me six months.”), and I remember the length of the time, and may remember the suffering of that time—e.g., “It was an awful time. It was one thing after another and it seemed like it went on forever. It was exhausting”—but I do not remember now the experienced time (the real-time duration) of that suffering.

Those six months are now just a conception, and there is nothing enduring about the thought of enduring six months. Past experience itself (as temporal, or as having a qualitative extension) seems to be irretrievably gone. But if the experience itself is lost—then what is remembered? If it is the content of past experience that is remembered, then how is it that this content of experience doesn’t include time? How has the time of the original content been removed given that this later remembrance is supposed to bear only derivative content, and that the original content was essentially temporally extended?
Remembering is vital to knowing and intending. At a minimum, memory makes recognition possible allowing us to distinguish and consistently uphold distinctions, and so to divide and organize experience and carry out intentional activity. But our memories also divide and separate us as individuals. Each being is unique because of its own past experience, and in being so molded by our experience, we are and continue to be affected by the modalities of our remembrance—in the most general sense—as what has been retained by transmission (and even the rings of a tree or DNA seem to show some level of 'remembering' involved in all vital activity). We are embodied by our own past experience. We know the world by way of knowing our own past experience, and somehow by remembering we come to know our own past experience as our own. But is this past which we each recall having experienced ourselves really real? Is it part of 'now'? Is it part of us personally?

Memory seems irreducibly subjective or personal in that it distinctly makes us who we are. One does not remember what another experienced our episodic memories are apparently unique to our own lives. Yet remembering is fundamentally a sharing—we share memories and adopt the memories of others as our own. In fact, this allobiographical effect (regarding the life of another) might be considered a fundamental or exemplary characteristic of memory. At the most unexpressed level of our remembering, even our own past experiences and judgments are shared with our present experience and involved in our present judgments, and even our own life is the life of an-other. Memory and remembering enable us to retain and share experience, identify other individuals over time, and act consistently to attain non-immediate goals. Just as our remembering and our own memories separate us and divide our experience of the world, remembering brings us together and enables us to comprehend and integrate our experience of the world.
CHAPTER 3: TRACING PAST TIMES AND REMEMBERING TIMES’ BACK

3.1 Traces from the Past: Problems of Memory, Time, and History

One of the most long-standing ideas involved in philosophical accounts of our knowledge of the past is that of the ‘memory-trace’. Though it has taken many different forms, it is both an ancient and contemporary postulate. It is also somewhat of a cross-traditional concept. Most generally, some idea of ‘traces’ is accepted, not only in Western traditions but in Indian philosophical traditions as well. Here, such remnants of past activity, giving a source for memory and enabling habitual activity are ‘saĩskiira’ (translated variously as “habits”, or “traces”), ‘vāsanā’ (present conscious or unconscious of past impressions), or ‘karmāsaya’ (the abiding of morally-laden actions). Even Buddhist philosophers of momentariness have admitted such traces or formations to account for remembrance as well as currently manifest abilities and predilections.\(^\text{62}\)

Our everyday observations, experiences, and interactions in the world seem to give us the idea that the past does leave traces, or impressions—we remember; and we, like the earth around us, bear scars of past experiences. We take such present traces as signs of certain real past events. So such ‘traces’, taken most generally, seem to be such things as are equally in the world, like books and geologic strata, and also in our currently available remembrances. However, memory traces are not things just like scars, or books.

Unlike physical scars or archives, memory-traces are not currently perceived. They are not perceptually-traceable. Their existence, usually, is retrospectively inferred from the fact that a recall was at all possible. In the case of episodic memory traces, similarly, the currently revivable trace may serve as the evidence of prior cause (real past experience) if a

\(^{62}\) The concept ‘trace’ and the use of the word “trace” has a wide scope and, as in Sanskrit also, “saĩskiira” like “smrti” (‘memory’) has many forms, uses, derivations and connotations. I am not intending to make the case that these terms have the same philosophical “technical” meanings in such different contexts. Hopefully the discussion below will indicate their commonalities and distinctions.
demonstration is required. Such traces are often thought to be what enables our knowing of the past as what is not-now, but once-was.

Taken most broadly, a 'trace' is some sort of currently available remnant "left" from prior times in some way, from which we can determine what happened in the past—what past times were like when it was, in fact, then. Such still available leftovers of past activities include a wide range of things: from tree rings, ice cores and rock strata; to books, recordings, monuments and ruins; to bones, scars, and currently embodied conditions themselves. But are these traces the same sorts of things? Surely memory-traces are not physically observable things like tree rings and books, and yet they are somehow currently embodied.

We use the word "trace" generally to refer to any sort of present sources of information or "evidence" about the past. Investigators, e.g. scientific or criminal, use such language everyday to indicate such present remnants—e.g. "There was no trace of a struggle" or "We found a trace of that particle decay."—a trace (or even its absence) is taken as a sign or an indication of past events; and yet, it is an indication of a special sort. A trace can only be understood to be evidence for past events if past events were the original ground for the current existence of such a trace. As well, the trace must be interpreted as such. So, even our ordinary material "traces" and "remnants" of the past involve the really-past—or at least what we are attempting to hypothesize happened "in the (real) past."

3.1.1 Localizing and Distributing Memory-traces

In contemporary neuropsychological studies, two opposing models of memory have been proposed: local and distributed models. Localized models of traces tend to consider a memory trace to be a means of static and permanent serial storage. In the staunchest forms of
such views, each trace is independent and uniquely left behind by every moment of experiencing despite conscious self-awareness or attention. Such traces are somehow “stored” in this static and positional form (as an archive, or data-base, as some have described it) until revived for the reproduction of that experience, or for the needs of current action.

This view is often taken to accord with a representationalist view of memory (by Sutton, e.g.). This involves taking the trace to be a sketchy picture of the past—or something that “brings back the past”, or makes it or keeps it current, by re-presenting it. It accounts for the likeness between the past presentation and current remembrance. Non-representationalist or direct theories of memory would, at first glance, seem not to need traces since there is access to a real past without representation. In fact, however, traces have a place even in direct theories of memory—but here these may be traces of the past itself.63

In contrast to localized models of traces, distributed models of memory take traces as patterns or vectors of activation across the units of a neural network. As described by Sutton, the history of the system is thought to be sedimentary only in connection-weights between units; and so traces

...are not stored statically between experience and remembering, but are piled together or ‘superposed’ as the same set of weights or directional vectors of some sort. In this superposed memory representation traces are not separate; but instead, each contributes to the composite. Proponents of such views insist that the characteristic of particularity remains, and is preserved—至少 until overridden by “canceling characteristics of other traces. (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, p. 193)64

Thus, on a distributed view of memory traces, multiple traces can coexist within the same composite memory trace and can be overridden or somehow cancelled. Such an idea

63 Deferring the problem of traces by taking a direct theory of memory implicates one in problems of time and temporality. There may, however, be a way to reconcile these various conflicts—between direct theorists and indirect memory theorists and between those in favor of mnemonic relation and those in favor of causal or physical trace theories—in the sort of ideas about time and perception given by Bergson and Abhinavagupta.
64 Quoted in Sutton (Sutton, 1998)
seems to lend itself to the immateriality of "traces" as transient patterns of activity lent to future composition—enduring but modifiable (like the rules of grammar perhaps). Their immateriality or transient effects are no reason to deny them continuing presence or substantial content. As Sutton notes, a distributed or more dynamic view of memory-traces gives an affirmative answer to Ludwig Wittgenstein's question: "whether the things stored up may not constantly change their nature."

But we must add, that even here Wittgenstein says *some things are stored up* (though *they* may constantly change *their* nature). We are left without knowing whether this changing nature is all there is to them. But even thinking they change requires knowing them as those things across such change. Describing the distributed view, Sutton writes that the point "is to see brain traces and external traces as parts of temporarily integrated larger systems, used by us so as more successfully to exploit and manipulate information in the environment." (Reading, p. 1113) Presumably, Sutton means our environment of activity—our present and future environment even if this contains information "about the past".

One apparent flaw of such views regarding memory-traces becomes evident in Sutton's above quote. It seems that "temporarily" should be revised to read "temporally integrated larger systems". In this quote we see clearly the tendency to locate the inner as the brain and the outer as external records and memory (data) systems. So, traces, even if distributed, are considered present and so serve as indirect evidence of past events—regardless of whether they are external or internal. And, while it may be the case that all that exists, exists presently (and this is exactly why we need traces); but then we are left with the problem of how a trace re-presents the bygone past without "storing" information or having any retained connection to a real past time.

Remembering, these equalizers of traces rightly recognize, is a process of constructing or at least reconstructing (or putting-back-together) and has many causes and
triggers which affect the content of what is remembered. And, it does seem that our everyday experiences leave us uncertain as to how we have spent large parts of times that are now past, and that it is only through currently available records and traces (the currently accessed memories of others and ourselves) that can we come to know the past—even our own autobiographical past. \(^{65}\) Views of distributed-trace model theorists are well expressed by Andy Clark’s often quoted phrase “Our brains make the world smart, so we can be dumb in peace.” (Clark, 1997, p. 180)

One difficulty with distributed trace theories would seem to be their localization of traces of the past to a restriction to present times—or the spatialization of the trace. If the only past such views find is one embodied in presently available traces, then it would seem these theories would be unable to achieve the sort of distribution required to really ‘bring together’ experience and environment—or as Sutton says, cognition and culture. The boundaries of experience and environment, cognition and culture are unclear. \(^{66}\) But clearly, both cognition and culture involve real past histories (and just not the kind one reads in books, and knows; but ones that were lived and may be remembered and to which one may testify as an “eye-witness”, and so say rightfully, e.g. “I witnessed...”).

The recent trend toward the ‘extended mind’ may be a correct and very useful one, but the extended-mind is distinct from what is perhaps the intended-Mind. \(^{67}\) Even if traces of

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\(^{65}\) Here we should perhaps take just a brief moment grieve for the loss of our mnemonic-power over time (even if just for a moment), with Plato’s dialogue *Phaedrus*, recounting the myth of a King’s distress at the gift of writing given by Thoth.

\(^{66}\) “Culture” in particular is ambiguous and crosses the boundaries from the scientifically describable environmental context including history of the organism and the environment to the organized local self-enculturation of groups of people describable only from the 1st and 2nd person points of view.

\(^{67}\) Terry Horgan and Uriah Kriegal distinguishes the extended mind hypothesis from psychological externalism more generally: Psychological externalism maintains that some mental states individuate partly in terms of factors external to the subject’s head. This is because these mental states individuate in terms of their content, and content externalism suggests that some kinds of content individuate externalistically in this way. The extended mind (EM) hypothesis goes further in claiming that the states themselves, not only the factors in terms of which the contents of the states individuate, are partly external to the subject. (Horgan, 2008, p. 351) For the canonical expression of the view see (Clark & Chalmers, 1988). For a critique see, e.g. (Adams, 2001).
the past remain persistently present in some sense, this does not mean the only traces that are real are present or presentable here and now. The function of the memory-trace is taken to provide a likeness of content diachronically—i.e., providing for the recall of experience that is known, but as past—both as once present and now absent.

This spectrum offered in memory theories regarding trace localization and distribution seems to assume a problematic of physical realization, or spatial extension, of memory. Other views of traces have been put forth, e.g. as 'logical' or 'structural dispositions'. And, indeed the problem of the location or distribution of mnemic traces would seem to be dissolved if they are allowed to be at root immaterial or non-spatial; yet still having substantial effective and affective content. But then their continuing 'content' and dispositional 'storage' would seem to be mysterious—as least as related to more material effects such as current cognitive activity and enactment (viz., actual remembering).

It is easy to think about these different sorts of traces (physical and mnemic) as having the same nature. However, this results in the distribution mnemic traces across space but explains nothing about their temporal importance. In both contemporary philosophy of mind in cognitive sciences there seems to remain a widespread assumption that traces are the sorts of things that can be localized or distributed—viz., something can be placed and dispersed like material goods. And perhaps they can be both localized and distributed but this just deepens the questions about what such 'traces' are—traits e.g., seem to be localized and distributed both. It is unlikely that traces are like ice cores or tree rings, nor that they are entirely distributed—physically or externally—observable either completely "in the world" (distributed) or in the individual being (localized, or materially placed). Equalizing causal traces and mnemic traces, the latter are supposed to be something fundamentally material—extended and currently and externally available.
The claim of distributed models is simply that the distribution of memory ranges over a wide range of materials—external and internal. This has the effect of attributing such different sorts of traces, those presently evident and those presently not-evident, the same sort of existence, persistence and tense. Such fundamentally materialized traces (our currently available evidences), are only like mnemic-traces in a revived or materialized state, or as episodic remembering. Like our currently felt emotions and current remembering, these materialized-, or presently-evidenced-, traces, are things consciously perceived or currently active as present.

One benefit of taking this direction of limiting traces to present time and so trying to equate the mnemic and the physical (and so also time and space) is that in this way we can treat current cognitive activity and current environment equivalently. But understanding these different sorts of traces (a tree ring and "memory-trace") as alike in this presentness seems somewhat hasty. So also, distributed models seem to take mnemic-traces as something entirely present grounded—even if just a current disposition. Surely it was laid down and perhaps practiced, at prior times one says, but its very function is to carry this information forward. It would seem that in our haste to connect present architectures, we but have lost our connection to the realities of our pasts.

Current material records, like tree rings or even currently recalled traces, may (with some triggers, theory, and inference) enable us to learn about past events. And if, as Michael Dummett has proposed, only presently available traces determine the truth value of statements about the past, then whatever statements can be proved by current evidence (or for which there are currently available traces) has truth or falsity. And, if such statements about the past are without current evidence, or no currently available traces can be found, then such statements are without truth and falsity. But this approach seems to confuse the reality of the past with the currently recognizable truth or falsity about statements made about the past.
We will examine Dummett’s discussions in the following chapter; here, it is important just to note the problem of realism and antirealism about the past is intimately related to our understanding and recognition of its remnants.

3.1.2 Dividing Mnemic and Causal Traces

Are psychic or mnemic-traces separable from the effects of past time or past experience itself? Past experiences cannot be changed—but their traces and effects seem to change all the time. It does seem that a ‘trace’ is just what’s evident of the past, so perhaps we cannot rightly limit traces to the present. Otherwise, how does the diachronic awareness of time come about? How do we recognize that this remembrance (or apparently revived trace) is like that event (or its unrevived trace)? It would seem that traces cannot be limited to being current constructions but must include some remnants which remain preserved—even just in order to be genuine re-constructions. These sustaining traces might remain as things different from those current ruins—ones remaining as they were without need for reconstruction, but newly-built—despite our ability, tendency, and even desire, to change their face.

David Lowenthal has written about our constant “changing of the past”, which he takes as our changing of our histories and re-writing of these. The comparisons of descriptions of the past, however is something distinct from the real lived and experienced past which was then, as it is now, beyond complete description. Memory seems to give us our own history as real (and self-evident); but we shouldn’t be deluded into thinking this immediate relation is one of total and complete honesty (current availability). Even our own lived history becomes re-told story, legend and perhaps even myth in the sands of time. It can seem life another life—or a lifetime ago.
Because of this real passage, why should anyone think, like Bergson among others have, that there are traces of all of these personal experiences which remain fixed at their base as 'true memory'. A person knows more of his past experience than is describable, but to say there are traces left by all experience seems to be a waste of ontological space at the very least. And, since we seem to know that we do not even "encode" a small portion of what we experience, why should we not think that only some experiences leave traces—the particularly impressive ones?

3.2 Questioning Memory-traces

Despite (or perhaps even because of) this long standing intuition of traces of some sort and their theoretical usefulness, the very idea of traces has been recently questioned. Some have essentially proposed that traces, if anything, are present neurophysiological re-enactments, or confused reconstructions of ideas, images, and emotions. The radical position is that there is nothing like a memory stored or a trace of past experience impressed. Episodes of remembering are purely constructive and meant only to deal with the current situation (and are drawn from a mass of confused associations, conceptions and composite emotions, etc.); and hence it is always untruthful. But as the Buddhist traditions show us, the presentness of any given episode of remembrance does not conflict with, nor can it dispense with, the idea of traces.

Some have argued against the apparent need for some type of causal connection linking the present experience to the past experience; and if this is the only purpose for the trace, that it is an unnecessary one. Squires, e.g. has presented a convincing exposition showing even that given a causal connection between present and past, nothing has to be explained for something remaining as it is over time. It is a change or novel absence of
something that was, and not a remaining presence of that thing, which has to be explained.68 

(Squires, 1969, p. 196) Norman Malcolm has also argued that retention does not imply storage and there is no need to postulate anything spatially located or physically stored. (Malcolm, 1977)

It is significant to note, however, that these arguments aren’t directed at traces as such, but just their material storage. Both philosophers (Malcolm and Squires) also consider knowing-how to be the root of our knowing: Remembering amounts to ability—dispositional or manifest—but nothing more. But still we can ask how tendencies, abilities, and dispositions can be retained (or, reenacted without any retaining) in a strictly physicalist view? Even a vector of motion is motion for some entity. So, the problem of traces is not just a problem of remembering. This problem cannot be separated from others—specifically, about the nature (or combination) of time and change, and identity and difference.

The distributed or dynamic view of traces seems the most popular (and hence most acceptable and accepted). If traces are "stored" in any sort of way, it is compositely, or ‘superpositionally’—so also somewhat immaterially though considered spatially extended, viz., embodied in the mind and world. Describing such views most innocuously, Sutton writes that “memories are blended, not laid down independently once and for all, and are reconstructed rather than reproduced.” (Sutton, 1998, pp. 303-304) Even this quote allows that there are traces, they are laid down, but not independently (instead, compositely) and that

68 "Stipulating that memory traces should be in the brain or body is an attempt to reflect the fact of continuous possession, the truth that in remembering we exercise capacities which we already have. It is misleading because skills, abilities, and capacities are not inside us like cells, nerves, and muscles. But it is doubly misleading because, even if we accepted the metaphor of the memory as a storehouse containing abilities, it would not follow that in order to retain an ability there needs to be a successive set of states each producing the next. A sack of grain in the granary in January is not operative in producing the same bag of grain in the granary for the rest of the year. Nothing has been produced. And if the fact that there was no change needs an explanation, it is unlikely to refer to states of the bag, but rather to such things as the economic situation. If a memory trace is conceived as a kind of inner causal chain, then facts and skills in memories, like sacks in granaries, colors in curtains, or squeaks in toys, can be kept without a trace.” (Squires, 1969, p. 196)
they are not 'called up' or revived in perfect form but altered in their retrieval. As we will see Bergson would agree. In his view, such traces are re-vivified and made to live again in being brought into action by the exigencies of life. In this process, such compositely-kept experiences ('memories’ or the awareness of spirit of its self—as Abhinavagupta will argue) are directed toward a current purpose so re-constructed into current representations or images. In this special use for the organisms’ material action they are altered.

None of these ideas of distribution, superposition, or dynamism of memory traces speaks against an immaterial archival (and significantly localist) view—and in fact, it may depend on it. The drive of contemporary interdisciplinary memory theories to connect cognition and culture that Sutton notes—or both experience and environment is a good one. But we must note here in passing, that this connection involves things both passed (past) and passing. The dynamic nature of such memory traces requires a flexible diachronicity and a certain amount of unique identity.

3.2.1 What exactly is a Memory-trace?

*An event leaves a trace in the memory: one sometimes imagines this as if it consisted in the events having left a trace, an impression, a consequence, in the nervous system. As if one could say: even the nerves have a memory. But then when someone remembered an event, he would have to infer it from this impression, the trace. Whatever the event does leave behind, it isn't the memory. (Wittgenstein, 1980a, para. 220)*

Wittgenstein's comment on remembering seems at first reading to be against traces, and yet, it may not be exactly what it seems. He begins here with the statement that an event (experience) leaves an impression or trace in the memory, and we imagine it leaves some sort of physical consequence "in the nervous system as if the nerves have memory" (of events). But, if traces are physically remaining effects in the nervous system, then remembrance of such an event could only be an inference from some such currently revived impressions or
patterns derived from this revived trace. Though the event may leave something behind (a trace?) the trace is not the memory.

All we can really conclude from the above quotation is that the impression or trace is neither material—nor is the memory anything "left behind" by the experience. So, even if there are traces (somehow non-material), the memory is more than the trace, and more than a punctuate episodic phenomenon. So nothing here seems to prohibit traces laid down in the past as being substantial, effective and immaterial—even as tendencies or dispositions to act imposed (or implicated) by real past experiences. This may be a currently un-inventoried and perhaps largely unconscious and unexplored remembrance or registering of something immediately experienced 'back-then'.

Our personal pasts, and our own histories of these pasts, again mark the likeness with testimonies and knowledge from others. This sort of unification by language or likeness depends on the veridicality of this sort of unnoticed remembering. For Abhinava, e.g. this unnoticed remembering is worthy of not only recognition but reverence. In its "unnoticed" or "unvalued" state it amounts to having forgotten one's own identity. Like Wittgenstein and Bergson who make very similar points, Abhinava believes that the reality of duration (concrete or lived experience) and the analytic truth of the a priori past evidenced by memory show something transcendently (metaphysically) true.

### 3.3 The Past and its Causal Chains

As noted above, many philosophers have thought that in order to have a personal or episodic remembrance there must be a causal chain leading from the event and its experience to the remembrance. But the idea that such causal theories of memory assume some need for physically causal connections or material traces must be qualified. The need for a causal chain also rests on our thinking about time.
If an experience is had—say, e.g., just now, your (the reader’s) reading of the above Wittgenstein quote, then with a little “thinking back” (given a little time and effort) you can probably remember what it was about generally, what it meant to you, some or all of what it said, or some of the analysis given of it. In fact, if you really want to remember, you might 'trigger' the remembering of the passage by remembering just a part of the analysis, or the first words of the quote. This progressive recall is termed ‘anusmaraṇa’ by the Sanskrit philosophers. And we may prime our own mnemic re-presentation of a past experience by such associative recall (itself a temporal or current process). So the assumption of a some sort of remnant, whether perfectly preserved, found in ruins, able to be re-constructed, or even never seen again, seems to be a natural one.

In the above ordinary experience of reading a passage (without being expected to have to recall it), we ordinarily would say that your reading of the sentences above made an impression on you (or on your memory) or it did not; and that this enables you to recall (more or less) what you read when prompted to recall it, or to revive a pattern evoked when you read it. If you remember the passage, there would seem to be something that stayed with you between the time that you read that and the time that you are reading this, even if it is just a tendency or disposition for reenactment.

But a serious problem surrounds “false memories” (which is thus also evidenced in memory-theory and research more generally). A particular episode of remembering has practically innumerable causes and triggers (as was noted in early Nyāya texts). Whether (and what) one recalls also depends on one’s attitude toward the recollection, and relation and expectation (or situations) of the cuing. When one is prompted for recall, the context of the inquiry (including, e.g. the person asking for the recall) is here in the place of the 2nd person who asks—what happened?) So also the expectations and desires of the 2nd person
will affect the recall of the 1st person (depending on their relation, etc.) who is (or is not) really attempting to give 3rd person knowledge of a real past.

We must consider whether Wittgenstein's point is really that remembering is a constantly current phenomena and no-traces or impressions (no actions or even inner-processes) are required, i.e., if there really is just past experience and a direct relation of remembering to a real extant past. He did say "If I say, rightly, that "I remember it", the most different things can happen, and even merely this: that I say it." (Wittgenstein, 1974, para. 131) I take this to mean no present process is required inwardly in order to remember—as the quotation begins with the supposition that my saying is right—I do in fact remember it. This non-physicalist and experientially direct-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein (which would yet allow traces), is corroborated by another most apparently trace-indicting quote:

...nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought or a particular idea or memory. (Wittgenstein, 1980b, para. 504)

But again we cannot tell for certain. Wittgenstein's clearest complaint in both quotations cited here is the particularity of memories; against their concrete reality as material phenomena and their spatial localization, but not against the existence of some sort of non-physical trace, and direct relation to this as what is really past.

3.3.1 Tracing Past-times Backward

The rings of a tree not only tell the age of the tree, but the weather during the time of its growth, diseases or insect infestations it may have had, knots may even indicate where twigs or branches once grew. The tree's recording of its present experience for the period of time during its life, may even be more accurate than the human's existing over the same period (even if watching the tree intensely throughout this time). Likewise, we may know more from the "autopsy" of a mummy than the greatest physician of the time; but the
mummy, like the tree rings give us records, which can be accessed only through the senses and interpreted.

If something cannot be "played-back", in some sense, it is not a record. And the 'playing back' has a lot to do with who is doing the playing. The tree's record requires processing by the conscious mind of the learned observer. From the present state of the tree, we can infer its past conditions. Taken alone, however, without a theoretical ground for interpretation, the tree's rings or mummies bones do not indicate anything (and neither do books—without an interpreter, and linguistic knowledge, etc.). We take these things as things that remain over time and show effects made during the original time of activity (though recorded history may be altered, of course).

As "made" during the lifetime of the tree or being, these marks are determined by past experiences uniquely though their interpretation requires more. And although they might be traced back, or re-traced back to past events, and re-membered, these traces (books, tree-rings and bones) are where and when the playing is happening—i.e. currently. This involves more than just a present involved in current activity but one of real past events. Such processing relies on an interpreter, theory and so also remembrance.

3.3.2 Sharing Experience: Public and Private

Records are, or may be made, public. We can share and transmit historical records. We can share our memories also, but the memories of our own past experiences are somehow also proprietary. As physical, we may in fact be recordings of our own pasts, and open to public scrutiny far more than we like to think; but our memories as such, seem irreducibly private or at least our past experiences do. Should someone wish to keep private (or to "change" or lie about) all or some of their past experiences, their real lived past experiences would then seem to live and die only with that person. Their experiences would be known of
only in parts—by train of other’s (true) testimony, or stories and tales by people here and there who were with them during some of those experiences. On autopsy, their body and brain will reveal nothing about their past experiences though it can reveal things about their past habits and most recent activities.69

I cannot remember what you have experienced in the same ways as you can, just as you cannot remember what I have experienced even from me my sharing my memories of the experience with you. I can tell you about my past experience, but I cannot give you the memory or make you have it.70 Nor can I express a vivid past experience to compare with how I can ‘relive’ it upon thinking about it. So, although I can share my personal memories with you, the fullness of the memory cannot be shared (just as the original was full beyond description then). And though we all carry visible scars and habits that may be open to public view, the past forming of these current events cannot be read off of my present body in any genuine experiential or qualitative detail. If anyone can, it is only I, who can ‘read’ them in this lived detail off of my present body, only because (if) I experienced the original ‘scarring’ and recognize that ‘this scar’ came from that experience.

People may share memories of an event, or may share a state of mind. If two people are both grieving the loss of a child, for example, they are surely experiencing the same experience in one sense—an experience not shared by those who have not lost a child.71 But one person cannot remember another person’s experience of that same shared experience.

69 And although, as some relatively bad science fiction might have it, we might eventually be able to be interfaced with a computer so that our images could be replayed without our conscious intervention or testimony, it is much more likely that by electrically stimulating the brain we could make a person relive their own memory.
70 This isn’t to say that you can’t take my very good telling of the story as a false memory of your own, but it can never have the full content of my memory—since, if you take it to be your memory in time, it will be understood by you to be your past experience. So, in taking my memory as yours, you would simply be creating a memory, mine is firmly stuck to me.
71 This is not to say that someone who has not lost a child cannot sympathize with one who has—being able to imagine this—as an extension of one’s own experiences of loss. While the loss of a close niece, e.g. is not the loss of a daughter, it is not entirely different either.
We may share a memory of something experienced together, and we can remember the same events, but even if we share such an experience we do not have the same experience of that experience. We remember the same experiences (e.g. "riding that roller-coaster) differently just because we didn't share the same experience of that experience.²

There is a great variety, degree and complexity involved in the idea of 'sharing'.

We may share a past experience in many different senses. We might both have been involved in an event as participants in that event—we shared lunch. We may have both been observers of that event—we were both in the audience of that play. We can even share experiences that we don't recognize that we share (and getting to know or like someone is largely a matter of discovering and having such shared experiences.) And we can share our personal experiences by telling others about those experiences.

Like other currently available records, a tree trunk can be shared. Together, we can look at it; we can all point to it, act on it. We equally see the tree, and can come to know the same record of past time in its dissection. But these records 'look' the same from a multitude of perspectives; we can point to them as records and they indicate what they are records of. We can 'read' the past "off them". We have access to the past here by means of our sense organs, i.e., through our present perceptions; and given the same basic available evidence and theory, we can infer similar past events. Such records are subject to empirical scrutiny, they are public events—present events.

But this does not imply that our public records or accepted inferences are correct or agreed upon by any means. Yet such presently available evidence is, like many of our

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² In contemporary developmental psychology much experimental work is being done on the sharing of memories with children. It is clear that shared memory is clearly a very important type of human memory, and sharing memory a very important function of remembering, and is basic to human knowledge—perhaps even to knowing one's own memories as such. Nonetheless, only so much can be shared, and not the knowledge of the past experience itself—we might say this is knowledge by acquaintance which can't be captured by description. So, here we have used experience of that experience, as a singular shared experience experienced differentially, instead of experience of that "event".
“shared memories” now “recorded history”. As similarly present, we can share this evidence, and our remembrances, and communicate and debate what happened in the past. We might find multiple and even contradicting histories of what happened, but you and I can both equally access these histories. And though we may be “coming from different standpoints” what lies in front of us can be looked at together. While what lays in back of us privately, our own past experience, we seem to have to look at alone.

There is something about the traces of past experience that suggests that the open mind is not like an open book or an accessed hard drive. Yet, a brain slice is surprisingly like the slice of a tree trunk. And so, it may be that, like the tree ring, there are no records ‘stored there’ and so nothing to ‘find there’ without an observer, with good theory and valid inference. Although functional magnetic resonance imaging and algorithms may be able to ‘tell’ the researcher in advance what sort of thing the subject is about to remember, e.g. (what type of pattern their brain is reinstating in order to reproduce this in imagination by remembrance leading to recognition), reading our personal memories off of our brain itself is an entirely separate question. Supposing this to be possible assumes there is some sort of way to make a brain re-enact its states at will and that these are all there is to experience—and these are weighty assumptions indeed.

It seems clear that in order to know what a subject remembers about what he or she is remembering, they will have to ask the subject. Somewhat like the tree, it might be possible to infer the ecological/environmental conditions that brain was subject to, e.g. malnutrition, stress, etc.—like any part of a dead body or skeleton. But this type of material record is not ‘true’ or episodic memory—it may yet be a ‘mnemic phenomenon’, i.e. a form of habit-memory or material memory (memory tending toward repetition).
There thus seem to be at least four major differences between these forms of physicalist or material memory (currently available traces and records) and episodic or autobiographical memory:

1. Physicalist memory involves processing to infer the past from it (as explanatory of the present) while human episodic memory cannot be adduced from present externally observable conditions.

2. Physicalist memory is public in nature and involves no personal reference while human episodic memory has a non-public nature and involves personal reference.

3. Physicalist memory indicates past conditions which can be fully described (the limits of the record) but human episodic memory has experiential depth that can’t be shared fully by description (knowledge by acquaintance).

4. Physicalist memory involves no *qualia* ("what it is like subjectively").

But why should we think that traces which have been laid down by unique experiences change with time and not just with our current dispositions? It even seems that it is just such traces that might *hold* time or experience, or at least preserve or continue it—if material, even if subject to decay (and if immaterial, who knows?). After all, it is the possible currency (remaining or reaching across time) or the diachronic relation between this and that, which enables a representation of a past event, and perhaps even enables knowing other times.

The questions addressed above regarding the directness or indirectness of our remembrance of our past experience and its status as knowledge cuts across this question of traces. For if we have unmediated access to our past experience there would seem to be no need for a trace from this experience to retain what has now-gone (what is past, i.e., that past experience). But then, what would keep that past experience from not just *seeming* present, but *being* present, unless something ‘holds it back’ making it past.

Bergson offers a theory which resolves this tension between the immediacy of past experiences (or 'traces), or their status as directly-available knowledge, as well as giving an
account of the causes of our error-prone remembrance. His position involves a re-
conception of time and materiality which is in accord with much of contemporary
constructivist views of remembrance; and yet he derives far different conclusions. Bergson's
theory is also surprisingly like some of those offered by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in
earlier times, who argued against the conclusions of Buddhist views of momentariness and
the persisting self, also by accepting their premises.

3.4 Memory and the Extended Brain

The brain is part of the body, and equally extended in space. It is a material thing
which we can experience by seeing it. The brain is thus, for Bergson, an “image” as Bergson
uses this technical term, located “somewhere between a representation and an object in
itself”. (Bergson, (1913) 1991) While beginning from this phenomenological standpoint and
giving this in-between kind of description of materiality leaves us caught in a gap, so to
speak; we can at least conclude that this “image” is a present perception of an object (or
aggregation of images); or an object (or image) as seen, or to be seen, as presently extended
in space and apparently changing in time. Such ‘images’ are events and states of affairs as
we perceive them, i.e. as moving events.

The ‘images’ we encounter everyday—what we see, feel and hear, including our
bodies, nervous systems, and brains—are, when looked at, externally available present
images. Other present images, or experienced objects, like what is available to current
perceptions and remembrances are internally (but not purely) present. While the brain may
be divided into innumerable parts, no “inner feeling” or thought would ever be found in such
external things (“images”). But if memory is not subject to material storage or limited to the
present, then what is it? Is it an immaterial condition or conditioning? What would this
mean? Is it also limited to this spatially-extensive present time?
Our inner feelings and thoughts are thus embodied only in happening-events themselves. And, just as a disembodied heart does not beat for long, a disembodied brain does not show activity for long. The only tell-tale heart is the living one—which persists (continues to beat) without our own personal remembrance or desire that it should do so.

3.4.1 Mnemic Causation

Russell offers the idea of mnemic causation to account for the effects of the original experience or perception upon subsequent experience involving remembering. Mnemic phenomena as he defines them are

...those responses of an organism which, so far as hitherto observed facts are concerned, can only be brought under causal laws by including past occurrences in the history of the organism as part of the causes of the present response. (Russell, 1921, p. 78)

As Russell conceives mnemic phenomena, it is not just that past occurrences are part of a causal chain leading to the present event, as causal theories of memory propose (e.g., Martin & Deutscher, 1966), but that in stating the immediate or proximate cause of the present event, some past event(s) must be included.

Russell calls this the persistent influence of past experience on the living organism, and suggests that such "mnemic causation is what led Bergson do deny that there is causation at all in the psychical sphere." (Russell, 1921, pp. 88-89) As an example, Russell gives the smelling smoke, and recollecting having smelled it before. He says the cause of the current recollection ('this smoke smells like that smoke') consists of both the present stimulus and the past experience. The same stimulus will not produce the same recollection in another person who did not share that former experience, even though the former experience left no observable traces in the structure of the brain. (Russell, 1921, pp. 78-79)

73 However as will become clear from the discussion here, Bergson admits material causation in the psychical sphere, just not in the psychical sphere of pure memory.
But, according with the causal maxim "same cause, same effect," Russell says that we cannot regard the present peat-smoke alone as the cause of the recollection, since it does not have the same effect in other cases. So, the cause of the recollection must be both the present smoke (as 'a causal trigger') and the (real) past experience (both this and that). Such a recollection is thus an instance of "mnemic phenomena." Yet what makes this mnemic can only be the real past experience by which the present smoke is recognized as an indicator—even if unconsciously—and so enabled to act as a trigger.

Russell includes as types of mnemic phenomenon: habits, images, associations, nonsensational elements of perceptions, memory-knowledge of past events, and even experience—as something which has lasting effects on the further experience and action of the organism. So, for example, since the stick which has been thrown on the fire and then taken off of it offers no more resistance than before to being thrown on it, it has not experienced the fire, whereas the child, who has been burnt, then fears the fire.

But here, it seems we might criticize Russell—for the stick has experienced the fire—and this may be evidenced upon the second throwing. Depending on the thickness of the stick and how long it was on the fire, things like how quickly it burns on the second throwing are effects of the prior experience. Though the stick cannot demonstrate or know its prior experience (or fear the fire), how the stick appears to be in the present and future (especially the near future), as well as the present, is a result of this experience. The stick also offers less resistance to the fire itself (though not less resistance to being thrown on it, unless it got a lot smaller in the first burning). Presumably this is why Russell sees mnemic phenomena as a species of physical causation instead of considering root physical causation a species of mnemic relation like Bergson. For Russell, there is no memory in the stick (even of the

74 Bergson's work seems to entail the counterclaim that memory-phenomena indicate that this maxim does not hold even at the level of causal or necessary phenomenon. The same cause does not produce the same effect, since each is unique and original. No two causes or effects are the same—though they may be recognized as similar.
lowest most de-tensed or 'materially extensive' sort as Bergson might say) but there is clearly an effect in the stick from the past which, again, may be evidenced.

In Russell's view, we might define one chain of experience (or one biography, he says), as a series of occurrences linked by mnemonic causation. He suggests that it is this characteristic, more than any other, which distinguishes sciences dealing with living organisms from those dealing with purely physical phenomena. The prior experience (or traces left thereby), and not just the incidental cause (or "triggering conditions") must be part of the proximate cause.

3.4.3 The Problem of Crossing Time: A Diachronic Dilemma

As noted above one of the reasons for postulating traces is to maintain some sort of connection (and so to become a link) between present and past experience. But one of the recurrent stumbling-blocks for philosophers seems to be the equation of spatial qualities and temporal qualities. It is not the idea of a unified fabric of space-time which offers any problem, but the postulation of an objective space-time (which is nothing more than Newtonian).

To avoid this, one should also ask what makes these two things, spatial extent and temporal duration, appear two and be one or appear one and be two (depending on how you look at it). What makes this unity and opposition work? Bergson's solution is to separate extension and intension at their limit and conceive pure perception (perception at its very limit) part of the material image and consciousness or pure memory as enabling the duration of actual perception (experience). For Bergson it is the problem of memory that finds the way out for the fly in Wittgenstein's bottle.

As an example of this need for connection between extension and intension evidenced in our experience as combined in the literature with spatial and temporal
confusion, Frank Jackson has made the point that there is a specific difficulty in postulating temporal action at a distance in the case of memory:

> Without continuity, a past event would not only have to leap to the present to cause my memory activity; further, it would somehow have to track my spatiotemporal path, to ensure that it could at any time become causally active as I moved around. Such long-distance tracking of my rememberer by a past event seems unlikely to be direct in any intuitive sense.” (Quoted in Sutton, 1998)

But here, besides the personification of the past event assumed in the passage, the use of the thought of temporal action across space-time is questionable. The idea of a past time event tracking a spatiotemporal path of its experiencer is also somewhat difficult to understand. (How could an event in time recognize its experiencer?) Moreover, there is no possible way to separate time out and leave space-time in—nor vice versa. This is just to say that one cannot take time out (isolate the past event as spatially ground) and then complain that it has to cross time and track a path in space-time. Time can only be treated like space as space-time. And space can only be treated like time as space-time. Neither can be subject to the problems of the other once theoretically isolated from the woven fabric itself. Not without proposing two sorts of time at least—one extended in (with or as) space and one which remains without extension.

### 3.4.4 Where does Perception stop and Memory begin?

In this past century, Dennett and Bergson have both argued (in entirely different ways) that remembering and perceiving are inseparable in practice. If this is the case, and memory is not a means of valid awareness, then it seems that perception could not be either. The basic argument against memory may simply be that it is of course a means of valid awareness (as it requisitely contributes to inferences, perceptions, and semantic knowledge etc., which are immediately known), but on its own, untethered to a perception or an inference, it presents no new knowledge and no presentative awareness. It may be as-
object-is but it cannot be presentative, only representative. But we see that memory is presentative of the past as past. Is it really the case that the object of memory is past, while the object of perception is present? *Memory may offer only copies of past-presences, but originals of present-pasts.*

While this question seems to be easy enough on the surface, it is quite a problem in itself for many reasons. On the surface it seems like we could just ask a cognitive psychologist or experimental researcher. Certainly we can tell when memory centers are inactive and perceptual centers (of the brain) are active. So can't we determine when perception ends and remembering begins? But looking closer these are two different questions—for the question is one, not just of timing, but of conceptual demarcation. There is no consensus that a memory is a weakened perception, like a trace is sometimes thought to be. (See Appendix I on Daniel Dennett on perception and memory: *Dennett and Bergson on the edge of Consciousness and Memory.*)

### 3.5 Bergson: Images, Realities, and the Role of Tension

The distinction between perception and memory is at the core of Bergson's methodology. Ontologically and phenomenologically we experience nothing but the conjunction of these in our actual perceiving or actual remembering. However, Bergson divides perception and memory theoretically, both into pure forms: into *pure perception* and *pure memory.* The perception we experience, actual or concrete (impure) perception, is always extended temporally by the insertion of affection and memory to greater or lesser degrees. This insertion occurs in the interval opened up by the hesitation, or hyphen of the living being as a zone of indetermination, offering choice—and providing for a contraction or tension of hesitation in the pure determinism of material advance. The remembrance that we are aware of having (our tokened-remembering) is always in part perception and so
materialized as present (inner images, representations, and external images like neural activity, etc.).

*Pure perception* is a (hypothesized) wholly present perception as purely material, or at the limit of dis-tension (what is also for Bergson, the infinite relaxation of mind or spirit). Bergson says that pure perception is the experience of the object itself or the experience of matter itself—of necessity and repetition and at the limit, durationless. In his view, the material aggregate of images we experience results from a reflection of our interests and potentialities for action and interaction in the world; but images (or "materials") outrun any possible sum of concrete or actual perceptions on every side. Just so, mind or spirit, Bergson says, outruns the brain on every side. The brain, like our bodily location delimits our perceptions to the one's we can act upon and interact with—the nearby ones. But the spirit is not so located. If any description might work, we should say that experiences are superimposed in spirit instead.

Bergson argues that we are mistakenly accustomed to believe that perceptions and sensations are immaterial—*qualia* or felt things, while memories are material (quanta or unfelt things) because the body of memory, its actuality or status as a present image or representation, is derived from its contribution to the present perception. Memory-images take part in presentness as *images* involved in and contributing to present perceptions. Pure perception, he says, would give only a sketch—not even images. So matter itself, which is supposed to be entirely without affection or duration (perfectly momentary) remains only a hypothesis. The images and materiality we experience is filled in by mnemic suppositions and imaginations. Likewise the causal repetition of material images and their continuity becomes a mnemic function at root.

In Bergson's view perception and memory must be distinct, although we always experience them indistinguishably, since the memory does not lose its virtuality (its' really
having-happened, or its pastness in short) by becoming a present memory-image. After all, perception directs present action toward the future and memory aims at the past. Where the present is marked by spatial extension, then of course memory is not perception, since it has just been defined by evidencing an absence (where once was a presence). This is a virtual but remaining presence; it is not insubstantial though immaterial.

In our ordinary worldly-interactions we know our memories by their images (as perceptions) and our perceptions by their durations or extensity as material sensations (made possible by the power of memory). We experience neither pure perception (materiality), nor pure memory (spirituality). Our body-image offers itself as a center of indeterminacy—a living-hyphen he says—between living and feeling spirit or consciousness (which is free), and inert and momentary causal compunction (which is bound). Our own present perception is spirit mixed with memory-knowledge into activity. This becomes a perception that is in objects themselves, a part, of an aggregate of images. Memory, in contrast has very different relations; for Bergson memory (the reticence or substaining—or sustaining) of a real experienced past is the immaterial ground of all duration. In this way, the reality of Spirit is evidenced by the reality of the living organism which may be extended to include all that appears.

Bergson goes on to say here that the focus of his work, his theory of memory, must be both the theoretic consequence, and the experimental verification, of his theory of pure perception. In sum, when we pass from pure perception to memory, we pass from a hypothesized limit point of instantaneous perception to a real duration of a present extent, to a concrete or actual perception. An actual perception is infused with memory images, and is no longer the perception or experience of matter and necessity, as was the supposed pure perception.
When we pass from pure perception to memory, Bergson says, we abandon matter for spirit because memory holds the absent as present-absently. Without letting go the present, memory also holds the key to the possibility of our recognition of the real unseen sides of things—ultimately, the immaterial presence backing these presents. The experience of duration is the indication of spirit which gives the possibility of choice (exclusion) and free will (knowledge and action).

Bergson is arguing that the function of matter is presentative. Perception is at root 'material' in this way and so, as we are present, our bodies are embedded in this material repetition—a diminution only with no change in content (that is not degradation). Thus perception involves actual presence or activity (time or duration). The brain functions to subtract content from the known-whole that is not relevant to the possible action of the embedded organism. The memory-image is, contrastingly representative, and involves the movement of the present image as the foundation for the possibility of such a representative image. Pure memory (the lived and real-past) is said to be virtual with an immaterial reality involving no images (no matter). Perception and memory are thus different in kind, even when actually combined, since perception is image and memory is not image.

It is the tension provided by consciousness which enables the contraction of the numberless vibrations into (countable) successive durations. The higher the degree of tension of the consciousness, the more such vibrations can be contracted into an experienced duration. The basic function of spirit is thus to virtually retain memory; to realize real duration and to consciously, and/or unconsciously, determine choice. Conscious experience for Bergson thus requires the polarity of spirit and matter, or of mind and matter.

As we have explained his view, unconscious (or uncontracted) spirit is pure memory; whereas unconscious (or uncontracted) matter is pure perception. But, since there is only spirit condensing into material movement by the power of realized-duration—this means that
uncontracted or detensed completely distended matter ('images' which outrun actual perception on every side) is not-different from spirit. Conscious or contracted-spirit is, in this sense, memory progressing into perception, or spirit becoming matter. Conscious or contracted-matter is the power of duration producing active perception incorporating memory to produce moving images and the awareness of one's own duration.

Bergson delineates two different kinds of memory: habit-memory and true-memory. Habit-memory refers to certain automatic behavior in the form of repetitions which coincide with the acquisition of sensori-motor mechanisms and which relate directly to perception. True- or pure-memory is the survival of personal experience, a survival that, for Bergson, is unconscious or virtual. Memory in its virtual or pure state does not take a form but is, and has always been, immaterial.

He graphically represents the relation between pure memory and the moving plane of present perception with the image of an inverted cone symbolizing memory intersecting with a plane symbolizing the activity of material motion. With this image Bergson represents his view of the dynamic process of actual perception or conscious recognition. The top-plane of pure memory or dream is, Bergson says, fixed at its root and its contents unchanging and inert; it is as a base or ground. The pure memory of this virtual plane is not subject to perception, since memory has no form in its virtual condition and so is not perceptible—as what is not material or has no image is imperceptible.

As Daniel Dennett also argues with his multiple-drafts model (See Appendix A), perceptions do not become memories, pure or otherwise. If anything, memories become perceptions. Memories descend down the cone effortlessly (naturally having their own force of 'gravity', so to speak, into the hesitation of the present opened up for the living being by the central nervous system, etc.); and memory supplements the sketch of perception, filling it
in by means of memory-images sketched by the image of the present but colored by the weight of the past.

It is memory, or the self (consciousness-itself) and its contractions and projections as presently perceiving, which serves as the moving mirror dividing into now-back-then and not-just-yet. Such experiences 'traced' by this parallel action of memory in the present moment remain immaterially known as evidence of spirit. Called into present recollection they are formed and transformed into a memory-image useful for action. In Bergson's view we are this living hyphen between a moving plane consisting of points of pure perception and a cone of memory continually pushing this plane forward from the inertia (or saṃskāra) by the additional weight of the past.

Virtual memory makes duration possible. In its 'superpositional' cone-state of pure identity, memory (as the experienced past) inserts itself into the interval or hyphen of the living being, and so progresses from the past into the present perceptivity and activity. Bergson describes this process of actually remembering as one of rotation and contraction. It is a condensation of spirit into matter and involves connecting and projecting. The idea that memories are descending indicates the progressiveness of true memory (autobiographical, personal, or episodic). This progressive movement takes place, according to Bergson, between the extremes of the base of 'pure memory', which is immobile and which Bergson calls contemplation, and the plane where action takes place.

3.5.1 Materializing Memories

In a Bergsonian view, as mnemonic traces are materialized they become localized as an image or representation in the present; and as currently materialized they are distributed across the current environment (or extensively or 'spatially') as well; just like currently-
found ordinary externally available traces of the past (like the pyramids, or the Grand Canyon e.g. and by the written word and personal testimony). Such traces, again are material current phenomena which are extended and have at least a degree of tension, even if just "habit memory" and not "true memory", or traces of a lived past as such. They, as 'pyramids' or 'canyons' e.g. are "condensed" into such concepts by the activity of memory and "projected" as passing-things-in-the-world.

True-memory is experientially known remembrance (fixed at its base of happening by the power of consciousness or spirit (ciśakti) and requires the duration offered by the tension of the living organism, who as Russell rightly noted is a distinctly different sort of 'rememberer' than the tree trunk, or even our own bones (though, again, they seem to "out-live" or at least our-last us materially—but this is a reversed-image of reality).

Retaining knowledge of past experience (the push of the past) is directed and inserted bodily and extended in the present; and, as self-conscious beings we are experiencing the push of the past and pull of the future in the present moment.

A connectionist or distributed view of traces may be correct, and a space-time may be a correct view but it is not anymore just spatial (physically available as a present 'image'). The physical materialization (i.e. current neurophysiological activity accompanying or preceding, even following) remembering are certainly "material" events in time as Bergson would admit. Though still fundamentally 'mnemic', such material phenomena are simply processes that are causally induced and not spontaneous (or tilting—see Axiology chapter 1). Thus they tend toward repetition (matter or materialization and perception) instead of spirit-enabled novelty.

This problem of the conflation of mnemic phenomena with current evidence like tree rings or databases, results from not distinguishing the nature of the tracing. While both sorts of things may be traces, the trace of past activity on the present or the trace of prior position
(as the tendency to return) can be distinguished from a lived-trace (as psychically based and affective), all of which affect present activity, state, or location. Annambhaṭṭa has distinguished "sāṃskāra" on these precisely these three grounds (elastic, inertial, and episodic—or habit—repetition—and remembrance). As we have noted, Bergson separates these on the grounds of true-, and habit-memory including the elastic and inertial within spirit or true-memory.

...to touch the reality of spirit we must place ourselves at the point where an individual consciousness, continuing and retaining the past in a present enriched by it, thus escapes the law of necessity, the law which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in a present which merely repeats it in another form and that all things shall ever be flowing away. When we pass from pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit. (Bergson, (1913) 1991, p. 235)

3.6 Forgetting: Knowing but not Knowing-now

One of the ways in which consciousness indulges in this freedom from material causal necessity is by letting large bits of the past go, by sharpening the boundaries of what is remembered or not-lost (asampramoṣa) with what is erased or permitted to be lost, one can never fully causally explain why (why those?) We cannot underestimate the importance of forgetting to the possibility of remembering.

Without forgetting most all of what we know at any one time, we could not remember, or even think about, anything in particular. But, perhaps this isn’t forgetting exactly, more like ignoring, pushing back or excluding, for the time-being. For if we were called upon to give that information we might easily retrieve it showing precisely that we did not forget—or had not forgotten. Perhaps we should say that at the very least, we know when we remember because we have already experienced having forgotten! (Oh! Now I remember—his name was John.)

75 His divisions seem to offer us a valuable guide to remembrance: The elastic, which returns to an original position, is memory’s conservative function; the inertial is memory’s recurring or repeating impulsive power; and self-conscious recollection reconstruction gives us memory’s generative function.
Forgetting seems to require at least three simultaneous events: i) not-knowing now; ii) having known before; and, iii) possibly coming to knowing again (by remembering or re-learning from testimony, etc.). And, notably, we can only say we have forgotten such things upon remembering them. But can we remember something without having forgotten it?76

One can recall or revive the sounds just heard—say the sound of a bell chiming or a person speaking that we weren't paying full attention to. In such a case we were not aware of having known before but we were aware before (then). We can 'rerun' or recall such 'just-missed' events virtually audibly in our heads for a short lapse of time. Though this is not forgetting in the sense we ordinarily think or use the term, it involves all three aspects above—but only if knowing is taken as experiencing—for we surely experienced what was said, though we might not have noticed at the time.

This phenomenon of the 'revivable sensation' perhaps lends itself to the idea that these traces are the same sorts of traces which we later cannot so easily revive or replay. Such unknown remnants of experiences are what we might think, with Bergson perhaps, lie fixed as one term ('that') in the relation of remembering (that this 'replay', e.g. is from that

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76 Must there be a first time something is remembered, or can a memory remain constantly never having been un-remembered? It seems that the more original the remembering, the most accurate. Such remembrances seems spontaneous to the greatest degree; e.g., we ask ourselves and one another and our remembrance comes on its own, often later. "Was that night the night of our first kiss?" We can both go away unknowing and later each remember that it was, and this remembrance is notably visceral and detailed. And it seems to us like we have evidence to ourselves if we can remember that event as it was experienced. But this experience was not just conceptual but sensual. We re-locate ourselves in that past and re-live it—it is revived even to our senses. Even such original remembering is subject to much error and distortion through interpretation from then or now, but there seems to be something special about remembering something for the first time and not rehearsing it conceptually or verbally in repeated storytelling to oneself or others. And in cases of rehearsal of past-trauma in dreams (in cases of severe post traumatic stress disorders), these memories may be distorted by later evoked emotions such as guilt and increasing trauma from being traumatized now by one’s past, the vividness of the memory, its affective content on us now seems the most accurate when we can still smell that smell, or remember that exact taste. But significantly there is no way to decide such memories' veracity. Does this mean the past can be "known" directly—even if it is 'just' the real-lived past, and not the historically-known past. Here we must say, not that past facts, or any facts, are beyond accurate representation, but that they are beyond final delimitation. We can represent them accurately in many ways and for many distinct purposes and from many distinct perspectives (or given certain presuppositions, e.g., those from language, conceptual or biological structure, etc.)
speaking, or thinking that this memory enacted is made possible by that real experienced
time).

But still it seems clear that there is something undeniably correct about the
constructionist view. Any episode of remembering becomes a literal re-membering—a
piecing together again of events from associated parts and other times and rememberings.
Yet it seems important to recognize that mnemonic traces (with which we piece together what
we remember of the past) are more fundamentally the effect of particular experiences
(experiencing) then they are the direct cause of particular instances of remembering
(experiencing).”

We can agree with Wittgenstein: neither a trace nor the cause of the remembering is
the remembering. A trace is not a memory if a memory is a current cognitive episode or
linking up to a past experience. Only a revived trace or something else might qualify. Yet, if
we consider our memories either “stored” or “transmitted” by means of such traces to be
open to revival or making possible a sense of personal continuity or identity or even likeness
over time, then we should also acknowledge the “trace” is essentially the result of past
experience. Even if we limit a trace to a current dispositional state of a living organism with
no evident physiological indications, this sort of non-evident and non-embodied trace is still
essentially an effect of past experience.

Such an experiential-imprint that is the recording or registering of experience, even if
only evidenced in the present is responsible (at root at least—or generally) for the content of
the current disposition or current episodic remembrance. It is itself evidence of some real
past experience, even if mistakenly related. Perhaps this is in part largely behind Bergson’s

77 As noted clearly by the Nyāya philosophers, the causes of remembering something are many—
innumerable so. And indeed, one of the causes of ‘false memory syndrome’ is thought to be precisely the
conditions and context of recall. The nature and structure of the retrieval processes themselves distort what
is "remembered" as do other present triggers and dispositions, etc. which are perhaps undetectable
(untraceable!)
insistence on the real lived and living duration of memory. Memory is not something that lies stored in our brain, but something more like a current living process occurring alongside perception—like a moving shadow and the event which casts it. And, indeed, our own past is like a growing shadow; and though we do not have to carry it bodily, it follows us nonetheless.

In Abhinavagupta’s Iśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimārśini the case is made that memory is one of three powers of consciousness in itself, along with knowing and excluding. Remembering and forgetting (ignoring, occluding, or excluding) enable action in a very deep and radical ontological way for the Śaiva philosophers and Bergson as well. The direction(s?) of activity and the complexity of motions involved in current experiences (of subject and object) rely on the living being both subject and object—one’s objective aspect (appearance and surface) available to others, but also being subject to being affected by others subjectively and affecting them subjectively.

For Utpaladeva and Abhinava, the powers (śakti) of memory, knowing, and exclusion enable the self’s freedom represented by knowledge and action. Considered ontologically or temporally, these three epistemological powers offer a remaining unified or (concurrence or superimposition) of the past, both division and concurrence in the present, and exclusion of the future. Here we turn to the relation of memory and traces as found in Sanskrit (smṛti and saṃskāra).

3.6.1 Some Conditions for Remembering

In the Vaiśeṣika Sutra of Praśastapāda, Padārthadharma-saṅgraha, it is said that memory (smṛti) is the occasion of a particular form of contact (saṃyojaviśeṣa) between the self
(ātman) and mind (manas), and depends on, or occurs in relation to (apeksā), three auxiliary conditions:78

1. The perception of a mark (liṅga-darśana)
2. Desire (icchā) to remember
3. A process of progressive associative recall (anusmarāṇa), etc (ādi).

These three are called the utvādāḥka or ‘revivers’ and the ‘etc.’ (ādi) here is taken to indicate the possible inclusion of the other causal conditions enumerated by the Nyāya sutra (3.2.44).

In his commentary, on this Nyāya sutra, Vātsyāyana has declared the conditions causally occasioning memory to be innumerable. (Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, & Jha, 1984)

The latter of these three requisite revivers for the occasioning of memory (or the special form of contact between the self and the mind) is anusmarāṇa which is the process of recollection disparate elements or bits by way of associative-recall. “Anusmarāṇa” is said to refer to the process of such recollection as a whole consisting of such re-formed or re-constituted memory-awareness. “Smarāṇa” refers to a more recent recall—or the recollection of a shorter-term memory-awareness which may require less associative recall and reconstruction since more recent events or cognitions and their details may be easier to recall. Thus while “smarāṇa” indicates the process of immediate or recent recollection, “anusmarāṇa” refers to the entire process of having evoked such traces in installments which are individually discrete but associatively collected or unified from a more distant past cognition or event, or longer term memory.

Both smarāṇa and anusmarāṇa (recollection and subsequent recollection) are grounded in an original presentative cognition or anubhava which is originally grounded in perception. The two conditions noted here as requisite to the evocation of a memory-cognition (in addition to the third, anusmarāṇa) are liṅgadarśana, or perception of a mark,

78 See (Prāśastapāda)
and icchā or desire. This desire must be a positive one and not for example an aversion.\(^7^9\) Anusmarana, or the process of progressive associative recall of traces of remembered or past perception or cognitions, relies on the original 'laying-down' of such traces which is said to be dependent on various conditions, i.e. the original clarity or distinctness of the cognition (patvā or sphūta), the repetitive recall or practice of the cognition (ābhasya) or the cherishing (ādara) or valuing of the original cognition. Any of these may be sufficient to incur the development of the original memory trace or sāṃskāra.

3.6.2 Three Types of Sāṃskāra

It is said in the Tarkasāṃgrāha dīpīka by Annambhaṭṭa that sāṃskāra have three varieties: vega ('speed'), bhāvanā ('psychic trace') and sthiti-sthāpaka ('elasticity'). The first, vega, is said to inhere in the four substances (dravya): earth, water, tejas (light/fire), air and manas, or mind. The second, bhāvanā ('psychic trace'), is said to be the condition for the origination of memory-cognition (anubhava-janyā smṛtiḥetuḥ). Here, there is a debate between the earlier and later tradition on whether only presentative cognitions (anubhava) may generate such traces, or whether the memory-cognitions also may further generate more traces. In the Pādārthadharma-Saṃgraha, Praśastapāda says that memory can produce inference, desire and aversion as well as further memory.\(^8^0\) The Tarka-Sāṃgrāha says (xxiv) that bhāvanā exist in the ātman only while the third variety of sāṃskāra, sthiti-sthāpaka or elasticity is said to exist in things made of man-made substances, e.g. a 'mat', etc.

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79 I would like to thank Professor Amita Chattjee and Professor Gangadhar Kar for their paropakāratva and assistance with these Nyāya texts; and of course for that pūrvakāla-tadāvartamāna.
80 The Vaiśeṣika system admits only two pramāṇa, or valid means of knowing: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumitt); while smṛti and ārśa (or memory and the śabda or words of a rṣi, or seer) are conceived as two additional instrumental causes of vidyā or knowledge. Knowledge obtained through smṛti and ārśa may be yathārtha as the object is, but these are not recognized as independent pramāṇas as they are thought to be reducible (in their yathārtha forms) to valid perception and inference as the causes of their original construction or constitution. Thus while perception is also a necessary condition for any inference, it is not a sufficient condition for inference as a pramāṇa, so these two are pramāṇas in their own right while memory and testimony, when reliable, are thought to be reducible to these.
In the English exposition of the *Tarkasāṅgrāha dīpīka* by G.N. Bhattacharyya, he questions the 'inhering' feature that is shared by these varieties of *saṁskāra*—besides their being referents (or śākye) of the term 'saṁskāra' (Bhattacharyya, 1989)\(^8^1\). He writes here that in a more elaborate discussion, it may be debated whether *saṁskāratva* (or having *saṁskāra*) is a genuine (observable) universal or type (jāti) covering these distinct sorts of things or only an appearance—a complex upādhi (*sakhandopādhi* or fragmented set of qualifying limitations).

In all three varieties of *saṁskāra* there is a common quality of inertia or self-continuing movement. The phenomenon may be viewed as the same in all three cases though the substratum may differ between one of the four substances and mind, or self/soul or earthly construction. In all three varieties of *saṁskāra* there is a memory in a sense not confined to memory-cognition but including energy-memory (speed or velocity) and material-memory (elasticity). This view can be seen as compatible with Bergson’s distinction—which Russell also accepted—between true and habit memory. This allows for something nearer repetition, or replication (habit memory) on the imagistic or material side (elasticity or returning to a like form), and something closer to spontaneity or true memory in other sorts of beings (motion in ordinary things like earth fire, water, etc.—and in other beings, psychic or immaterial traces).

But it is significant to note this is a hierarchy of *saṁskāra*—all are forms built on basic reduplication or repetition; while the “higher” *saṁskāras*—of motion and similar (yet distinct repetition), then that of psychic traces as the most distinct from habit or material memory. Nonetheless all of these phenomena of memory in Bergson, as well as

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\(^8^1\) *Saṁskāra* is defined by Apte (Apte, 1970) with a wide variety of meanings ranging from refining and polishing, to education, cultivation, preparation and cooking, to embellishing, consecration and impression, form and mould to operation, influence, idea and conception and any faculty or capacity. There are then listed the perhaps more technical uses of the term in the Sanskrit philosophical tradition: i.e. the effect of work, merit of action, self-preproductive quality or faculty of impression, and one of the 24 qualities recognized by the Vaiśeṣika.
Abhinavagupta, discussed below are taken as signs of the transcendentally and substantially real. This real is not static but nonetheless allows for static representation.

Abhinavagupta takes Utpaladeva's śvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsīni as the basis for commentary and the Buddhist position of momentariness as his opponent (Abhinavagupta, Bhaskarakantha, & Utpala, 1986). Yet Abhinava, like Bergson can accept much of these presentist views while giving the highest reality to something beyond our limited times; and both philosophers argue on the same basis, viz. the ground of mnemonic phenomenon. But these arguments are not about personal continuity, as Locke's arguments were, for my memory does nothing to make me exist—and my existence precedes the working of my own limited remembering capacity. The argument from these philosophers is distinct.

3.7 Standing Still in a Stream of Consciousness: The Kaśmir-Śaiva Buddhist Debate

Even in the non-Veda accepting ("unorthodox") schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy, saṃskāras are accepted. If the Buddhist believes in the impermanence or momentariness of all things and a replacement view of present times then why should they accept a trace of the past? And if they do, such saṃskāras must also exist only momentarily (in continued isolated replacement presents that are somehow like their in-extant predecessors). From a Buddhist perspective, the only means of knowing are perception and inference, and here only certain sorts of inference. Perception is just what knowing is and even any involvement of memory or conceptual demarcation is recognized as a form of construction and imposition, which imports some degree of untruth into perception. So if genuine knowing is non-conceptual why should we bother with traces, after all, whatever they 'tell us' about the past will be conceptualized and so false?

Significantly, this applies to narrative and autobiographical forms of remembrance which we can, on these grounds, distinguish from true- or genuine episodic-memory.
Perhaps non-conceptual memory, knowing the past without distortion, is possible. Bergson and Abhinava both seem to leave this open; and both admit both the reality of the past and the reality of time (understood in an A-series or pure-presentist way). There are things that we know and depend on, i.e. that the present is like and unlike the past in certain respects, and perhaps given momentariness, this is what the pure repetition of *saṁskāras* is to account for.

Interestingly, Abhinava accepts Buddhist views of impermanence and momentariness, even moments of cognition or perception. But he accepts these premises of absolute change to show that its consequences are other than the Buddhist apparently will draw. Though the Buddha himself did not prescribe to discussions about the self, the common thought about Buddhism (and one way to explain egolessness and emptiness) is that there is no substantial self. The self is instead defined as a stream, series, or continuum of moments and *saṁskāras* are ultimately taken to be stored in a kind of storehouse consciousness *ālaya-vijñāna* as *biṣa* (seeds) or dispositions for action. The stream of consciousness we experience is *vijñāna*, or differentiated knowing, and the ultimate or true knowledge is non-conceptual and direct.

Such tenets are like those of Bergson to some extent, since pure perception is, like non-conceptual knowledge—or a hypothesized point where the perceived and the perceiver are conjoined. For Bergson this is a hypothetical point, from the Buddhist philosophers we get the impression this is a proper goal since it is the only true-knowing. Yet, though Bergson like Abhinava agrees to the ontological premises of the Buddhist account of time and memory (or at least, do not disagree), they find that these ontological premises cause epistemological problems. How is memory explained without a knower?

Moreover they both seem to reverse the soteriological goal (or at least approach it from the opposite direction). The prescription for overcoming our conditionings and
limitations and realizing some kind of genuine freedom and highest capacity is not achieved by realizing pure perception but by pure memory. This is because the former has no content (but is a state of infinite de-tension and lowest power of action) while the latter has all the content in the world (a state of the highest tension and so power of action).

The Buddhist philosophers propose that since "I" may be taken to refer just to the whole of all of my bodily and mental formations working in concert with my environment and nothing more, "I" may persist over time, as I do, without there being any substantial "me". I may be a purely material phenomenon—just the currently externally available manifestation of my body and its pattern of electrical and biochemical activity which extends into the environment; or I may be a conglomeration of my current manifest dispositions and nothing more. (The Buddhist is in some ways very much like the distributive theorist regarding memory.)

Since all conceptual construction is mistaken reification in the Buddhist worldview, the present distribution of memory exceeds the stream of embodied consciousness and out into the world. Whatever exists at any present moment exists in-itself, or without conceptual imposition of name (or some restricted identity) and form (outline or shape), and is perceived albeit non-conceptually originally—prior to our known conceptual perception. What is in itself is thus perceived directly, as it is in-itself in its absolute particularity and in distinction. Such particulars are called "svalaṅga", having its own intrinsic characteristics which may or may not be observable, but are prior to conceptualization. Yet, it is argued that only what is present (purely present) exists, or is extant. Svalaṅga are momentarily present, like all that exists; and constitutes veridical perception, as that prior to mental constructions.

Remembrance is no different than other phenomena. Thus it is co-dependently arising from a variety of causes. If this is the case, then the phenomenon of remembering can be explained by the continuity or reduplication of saṁskāra alone. In fact, because of the
Buddhist view of momentariness and this very real transience, and interdependent co-arising, the traces required to maintain the continuity of this series of moments as such are at root, complexly causally interrelated and empty of their own isolable form. Much like the form of saṁskāra described by Annambhaṭṭa above (and identified with Bergson’s habit memory), the trace of past experience is no different from the causal-trace that causes the current and future nature of the stick that has already once been thrown into the fire (to burn more quickly this time, e.g.).

While we might agree with this to some extent, like Bergson and Abhinava we should admit a reversion of Russell’s categorization of mnemonic phenomena as a species of causal phenomena. Perhaps it is the causal which is a version of the mnemonic phenomenon; and, if so, this mnemonic phenomenon tells us something very important about our existential situation and even existence in general.

3.7.1 Remembering by Traces Alone?

In order to critique the view that remembrance can be established by means of traces from such past experiencing alone, Utpaladeva offers seven verses elaborated by Abhinavagupta. The argument in this third chapter of Iśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Visvaṁśini (IPV) is that even if remembering arises out of traces, because current cognition and awareness is self-intimating, no past experience could be illumined in such an episode of remembering. Memory is not intrinsically erroneous, and so conceptual cognition should not be considered erroneous, or made such by its being constructed, since its use is required for our worldly successful interactions—and so its highly constructive (and instructive) nature cannot be denied.

Moreover, remembrance is involved even in the transition of non-conceptual perception into conceptual perception. What enables remembrance must be more than traces.
A trace of a past experience might account for the content of the actual remembrance (in the best-case scenario) but the past experience or its trace must be genuinely linked to the current remembrance and current situation. Both the correction of errors in perception which become evident with further examination, and the apprehension of a particular absence require that there be more than just a trace of a past experience. There must be some non-external or inward link between that past experience and its trace and the present remembrance of that as such.

Utpaladeva says that a given remembrance may be caused by the remnant, or remaining traces of prior (now-absent) experiences—but since such current cognitions are in themselves limited (they are only presently available or presently illumining) they cannot make the prior experience known. Abhinava explicates this saying that much is accepted of the Buddhist’s presentist view, including the ‘pure perception’ point of nirvikalpaka or non-conceptual perception. But while the trace may make the remembrance resemble or represent the past experience, it cannot make the awareness of this similarity possible. What makes possible an accurate recognition involving a concurrent awareness of likeness and difference (‘this is that’)—or qualitative difference in combination with numerical identity—is something other than the trace itself. (See Appendix II for a translation of Abhinava’s introduction to the third chapter and Utpaladeva’s first two verses with commentary.)

Abhinava argues that momentary saṃskāras (which are considered habit-memory or repetition) cannot explain remembrance; and that this remembrance is involved even in the likeness of the world from one moment to the next. Because of his own conceptions of time and so current cognitions, the Buddhist is unable to posit continuity between saṃskāras—or between one cognition, like a current memory, and another cognition, like a past perception. These are momentary, unique particulars, and are known directly.
Utpaladeva questions how memory could become possible after non-conceptual knowledge ends if the experiencer were not accepted as a non-momentarily or diachronically existing entity. (IPV 2:3) In reply, the Buddhist opponent is taken to ask how the self could even help with the recollection of an object once experienced but now past. If the saṁskāra is posited as having the same object as the past experience then the remembrance arises according to the content of the trace and the self is not needed to connect this current remembrance to the past experience.

Moreover, since the self as substantial is supposedly unchanging and the content of remembrance can be accounted for by traces alone, why bother with the one who remembers. Like the one who experiences, the Buddhist opponent maintains that this ‘knower’ is an illusion. It is just a mistaken conception of one’s own identity as something other than current experience. At best, that there is one who experiences (an experiencer, rememberer, etc.) is a linguistic delusion. And with this conclusion, both Bergson and Abhinava would agree to some extent. But it is highly significant for both philosophers that our current and living experiences include real past experiences; and, these do not belong to the current experiencing without the experiencer.

Abhinava, like Bergson, would seem to take the radical but very attractive position that all causal phenomena are mnemically based. For Bergson memory is the basis of mind; it precedes matter and is fundamentally a manifestation of spirit.

Likewise, Abhinavagupta says,

Only if the external and internal objects such as blue and pleasure etc., carried forth by the mouths of the rivers of separate episodes of awareness, all flow and rest in one single great ocean of consciousness which calls itself "I", can they, then, be mutually synthesized and related to each other, otherwise how can unconscious material things, or discrete awareness-episodes of them which remain spatio-temporally limited and insulated inside their own existence, get mutually connected by themselves, because... if the earlier flash of awareness and the later flash of remembering were simply two events separated from one another then
there never would be any recall; hence through memory one unified Knower-Reality is proved. (Abhinavagupta, 1938 VII; 2-5)

3.8 Tulving and Episodic Memory

According to Endel Tulving, although many different kinds of learning and memory exist, episodic memory, or remembering past events, is unique in that it is the only form of memory that involves the past. Only episodic (or 'autobiographical') memories are time-related, involving recollection of past personal experience. Semantic memories, involving only the acquisition, retention and retrieval of facts, are not time-related. The time of their learning—our original present exposure to the fact or event may affect the possible later retrieval, but the complete remembrance of the fact as semantic may not be time-bound, we might say. (Tulving, 1999) In contrast, non-episodic remembering, such as procedural remembering, primarily concerns the present and the future, and in Tulving's view, has nothing to do with the past than any more than any other biological process. And, here again we see distinctions among memory of the present (the reflection or shadow of the moving present) as habit memory pure reduplication at its limit, to memory of the shadow of our own past, a lived and, as yet, still living past; between habit and true memory—or matter and memory.

In Tulving's model, these memory-systems are distinct but *monohierarchical*. Procedural memory is phylogenetically and ontogenetically prior to semantic and episodic memory: "procedural memory contains semantic memory as its single specialized subsystem, and semantic memory, in turn, contains episodic memory as its single specialized subsystem." (Tulving, 1985) In comparison to procedural and semantic types of memory, "the nature of episodic memory is far more complex. It has specifically to do with the ability

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82 Translated in Arindam Chakrabarti: "The Self at Other Times and in Other Bodies: Synthesis of Recognition in Non-Apprehension" (Chakrabarti, 2005).
for a person to travel back in time to re-experience remembered events. In this way, episodic memory links experience of the past, present and future." It is, in his view, only such mental time-travel which enables remembering past experiences or anticipating future experiences.

3.8.1 Chronesthesia, and Consciousness

Tulving has proposed chronesthesia as a capacity, acquired evolutionarily by humans and absent in other animals and human infants which allows them to be continuously aware of the past and the future. He defines chronesthesia as a higher-order process of consciousness that not only allows people to update information critical to surviving and dealing with changes in the environment, and which enables a sense of 'personal time'. This chronesthetic ability, he says, is evident in 'episodic' memories or those that involve the rememberer as a participant. He says that "the episodic record of the past can be "read" by, or is expressed through, a unique form of conscious awareness called "autonoetic" awareness." Only episodic memory involves this form of consciousness.

In contrast to autonoetic consciousness, noetic consciousness corresponds to semantic memory which is general and not event-based; while anoetic consciousness corresponds to procedural memory is without conscious awareness. He proposes that episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness might have given rise to the human ability to be aware of the future. This awareness ("prospective chronesthesia") may play a crucial role in the evolution of human culture and civilization. In Tulving's view, episodic memory is also unique to humans (Tulving, 2002)

Tulving's model has been criticized on several major points: viz. that such a reliance on a semantic / episodic distinction is not defined enough to be directly testable, and that this model only offers categorization not explanation, after all, a label is not a model. (McKoon et al. 1986, etc) And, Tulving is admittedly speculative for an experimental psychologist.
The idea of multiple distinct memory systems has been criticized on the grounds that given the inter-relatedness of the components such systems might be better interpreted as a single system with three distinct processes. (Sherry and Schacter, 1987)

But the criticism leveled here is that the order should be reversed. Explicit memory is too dependent on the subjective reportability and not the subjective effect or experience. There is absolutely no reason to assume episodic memory is less fundamental and habit memory more fundamental. Here we agree with Bergson and Abhinava; as well as those who wish to recognize the emotions and relevance of the experiences of other sentient beings.

Tulving is perhaps best known for introducing the 'remember/know' distinction into us in experimental psychology enabling the involvement of first person reports. Experimentally, one can ask subjects whether they remember something (if it is associated with a specific past event) or simply know (they 'remember' without associating an original event). This type of first-person report, Tulving says, enables us to distinguish between autonoetic and noetic awareness (i.e. memory with or without the re-experiencing the event respectively).

Experimental work has been taken to show that the distinctions in the brain regions involved, as well as electrophysiological features, depend upon whether the memory was rated as "remembered" or "known." As well, in right prefrontal lobe injury cases, the retention of semantic memory may be unaffected while the episodic memory and emotional valence of the memories seems impaired. Tulving concludes that these studies suggest that that the prefrontal and hippocampus brain regions are involved in specifically autonoetic awareness.
3.8.2 Self-Consciousness, Others-Consciousness, and Simulation

In a way quite similar to mind-reading, mental time-travel has been taken to be a common human capacity in the recent psychological and cognitive science literature. We are constantly reading the minds of others, and unbeknownst to us until now, we are also constantly traveling back to the past and into the future. This trend is very exciting, but one has to wonder if somehow the extra-sensory-perception involved in mind-reading and mental time-travel isn’t just a bit of a let down. After all, according to these writers, we are mind-reading and mentally time-traveling all the time—so it is nothing too extra-ordinary, even though it might be extra-sensory (and then again, some propose it might be unique to humans, or perhaps, less anthropocentrically, even species-specific). The capacity for mental simulation is the proposed underlying mechanism for the development of both capacities.

While remembering past experience or consciousness of past objects involves simulating one’s own past self, simulating other selves or minds, enables us to mind-read and understand the beliefs and intentions of others. Simulation is thought to be a form of direct or non-inferential access. At issue between Theory of Mind theorists and Simulation theorists is the question of whether we know other minds inferentially by means of deduction or analogical argument, or immediately and non-inferentially, i.e., unmediated by any ‘theory’ or argument. Similarly, such ‘simulation theorists’ about other times seem to hold that we know other times without inference. Here I will examine the question of the type of argument or reasoning, if any, that one might think simulation involves, i.e., is simulation a form of abductive inference? And if so, what are the grounds for such reasoning.

3.8.3 Commensurability

In December 2005, Science offered a news release: Researchers develop new method for studying ‘mental time travel’. This release concerned the work of Polyn, Norman, and et
al., published as ‘Category-Specific Cortical Activity Precedes Retrieval during Memory
Search.’ In the news release, Polyn said, "Memory retrieval is like revisiting the past; brain
patterns that are long gone can be revived by the memory system." His fellow researcher,
Kenneth Norman said,

When you try to remember something that happened in the past, what you do is try to
reinstate your mental context from that event. If you can get yourself into the mindset that
you were in during the event you’re trying to remember, that will allow you to remember
specific details. The techniques that we used in this study allow us to visualize from moment
to moment how well subjects are recapturing their mindset from the original event. (Polyn,
Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005)

Their experiment involved a functional magnetic resonance imaging study of humans
engaged in memory search during a free recall task. A pattern-classification algorithm was
used to identify patterns of cortical activity associated with the observation of three
categories of pictures: objects, locations, and faces. The appearance of these activity patterns
were tracked using the algorithm during the recall period. Their experimental result is that the
reappearance of a given category’s activity pattern correlates with verbal recalls made from
that category, and precedes the recall event by several seconds. Because the cortical activity
of the original observation (the past) was ‘reinstated’ in the cortical activity just before the
memory report, this enabled the researchers to mind-read their subjects (!) and so ‘know’
what category of object the subject was about to remember. Perhaps we can read the minds
of others similarly, right on their surfaces, before we even know—or even if we don’t think
we know.

But these conclusions involve assuming the re-instatement of the perceptual state
causes the remembrance and that this is not a case of imagination, or an imaginative
perceiving. Also, it is assumed that the desire to remember, e.g. or the cue-for-recall was
not the cause of the remembrance and the brain just a tool for such execution—again
amounting to imagination or construction and matching (which would cause a delay in
processing not resulting from the temporal distance or re-instatement of the past
experiencing). Such experimentation seems to show little that could be considered
definitive about the remembrance of personal past experience as such.

3.8.3 "I remember that."

In John Campbell's analysis, understanding memory demonstratives ("I remember
that man.", e.g.) depends on conscious, or explicit, memory of past objects. He says that it is
this knowledge of reference that causes, and justifies, the use of the introduction and
elimination rules for such terms. Campbell supports a classical realist framework for
describing our understanding of memory demonstratives, arguing that knowledge of reference
is more fundamental than knowledge of procedures of verification or implications of
judgments involving memory demonstratives.

He notes that when a memory is apprehended, there is a non-pictoral shift from just
having a conscious image to remembering that. This possible shift that we may experience
on trying to 'ground' a memory, or remember, results from becoming directly conscious of
the past thing itself as both existent and unique. This direct acquaintance with the past object
is made possible, Campbell says, by our capacity for deep decentering to the real past time.
This past time is that of the corresponding judgment of the perceptual, present-tensed
demonstrative.

Campbell distinguishes deep decentering from surface decentering. In surface
decentering, we may replace a tensed statement with a tenseless one. So 'It was raining
yesterday' may be understood as 'Raining occurs on Monday September 11, 2006.' In other
words, an 'objective' tenseless description can be given. In contrast, with deep decentering,
we perform a type of 'mental time travel' to revisit the time of the original experience. This
revisiting the time of the original experience is a two-stage construction, he says, consisting
of the simulated pretence that it is that past time, and then the consideration of the tensed proposition involving the perceptual demonstrative. He theorizes that it is this temporal decentering which provides the capacity to understand tensed judgments or statements made at times other than the present.

...grasp of the memory demonstrative just consists in deep decentering to the past time, the time at which the past perceptual demonstrative was used. We can think of knowledge of the reference of a memory demonstrative as actually provided by deep decentering to the past time. To understand the memory demonstrative is to simulate the time at which a past perceptual demonstrative could have been used. (Campbell, 2001, p. 181)

Campbell says that it is almost a tautology to say that understanding the truth value links requires the ability for temporal decentering. Memory is a "kind of temporally extended inference," taking one from a judgment made at one time to a judgment made at a later time. We can distinguish two types of skill involved in an understanding of tense: diachronic and synchronic. While memory gives us the grasp of the truth-value links between tensed statements and so involves diachronic aspects of the grasp of tense, decentering, or understanding tensed statements made at different times involves understanding synchronically, or at the same time, statements made at different times.

If temporal decentering is to play the role I am envisaging for it, it is not just that there must be a causal dependence of recollection on prior perception. The content of the recollection has to be commensurable with the content of the prior perception, so that the move from the prior perception to the current recollection can be seen by the subject to be justified. (Campbell, 2001, p. 180)

It is his claim that the capacity for temporal decentering causes and justifies our use of these truth-value links; and that this justification must be available to anyone who grasps a memory demonstrative. It shouldn't require any sort of complicated argument.

In *Past, Space, and Self*, John Campbell argues that self-consciousness requires a certain conceptual structure that is correlative to an ability to use an absolute frame of reference; or an ability to grasp reflectively or discursively the causal structure between events at distinct particular times. For Campbell, this most specifically has to do with
understanding our own past in terms of narrative structure or meaningful pattern. According to Campbell, the ability or fact of conceiving, not only from egoistic or allocentric frames of reference, but from an absolute frame of reference which enables the conceptual use of the first-person as the particular expression of self-consciousness. This conceptual grasp is, in his view essential to self-consciousness, and it is particular to human beings. It enables discussion of persons.

I am proposing a different role for self-consciousness. It can be viewed as setting certain fundamental norms of thought. It is the basis of the demand for causal structure in one's conceptual organization, causal structure that is distinctive of possession of concepts. And it demands a realist view of the past... The fact that a realist view of the past is demanded by self-consciousness does not itself show that realism about the past is correct. This would involve a kind of background idealism... (Campbell, 1995, p. 4)

Campbell argues that the reference of the concept of 'I' should be construed as indexical rather than demonstrative. As a demonstrative "I" would delineate an object as a common cause over a period of time whereas the reference of 'I' is unchanging, or has a constant conceptual role. The reference is determined by a token-reflexive rule and thus its actual use. Our continued use of "I" to refer to ourselves over time demonstrates our knowledge of past experience itself or in-general and perhaps beyond description, though not recognition transcendent. (Campbell, 2002, 2004)

The radical conclusion of Campbell's argument is that realism about the past is presupposed in self-consciousness. And so, reductionist views of the self could appear to conflict with our ordinary realism about the past. Campbell argues this not as an idealistic postulation that since it is presupposed, realism about the past must therefore be correct; but, he says, we should look at it as a methodological principle.

But, nonetheless, we must recognize that realism is required by our ordinary reliance on memory. Antirealism about the past can't account for our reliance on memory and testimony; most essentially, it cannot account for the stepwise conception of memory (viz. that memory in part depends on perception) as the basis of the truth-value links among
inferences, and their normative social function. Antirealism about the past thus not only goes against scientific theory (Campbell notes the entropy of information and the second law of thermodynamics), but it also goes against common use of language (concepts).

He argues that self-consciousness requires not only thinking of oneself as temporally extended, but also requires reflectively of discursively grasping ourselves as causal in two causal dimensions, i.e., one dimension of consisting of our understanding of the causal relation between our earlier states our later states, and another of our understanding of the causal relation between our states and the states around us.

3.9 Epistemological Conclusions

Bergson’s conception of memory as outlined in Matter and Memory overcomes problems of the localization-distribution spectrum like Abhinava’s, by proposing just such a background idealism. In Bergson’s view, the problems of memory-sciences are the result of a misunderstanding of what memory phenomena indicate and what they do. (Bergson, 1913) 1991) Their function is not just to represent a copy the past, and so maintain similarity of content, but memory phenomena indicate a diachronic self and hence a real past.

The function of remembering is not to represent the present as much as it is to be the reflective-grounding of present experience (or to reverbate past experience). Remembering and perceiving (or presentative-knowing) are differently directed processes—each moving away from the other as the present moment is divided by the hyphen of the living organism that has concomitant perception and remembrance. And for Campbell, this past is ontologically or even phylogenetically prior. I do not think that Abhinava and Utpaladeva would disagree with either Bergson or Campbell on these points.

The personally remembered past would thus seem to be the virtual foothold of reality; and the mnemonic more generally the basis of the material manifestation. The past (and
even the a priori past or past-in-general) has an evident ontological precedence for both Bergson and Abhinava. Though neither would reject the transience of things as they appear (both are realists about experienced time) the continuity of this appearance and so the ground of this reality remains to be explained. Both postulate a living now, a real present A-series of time that precludes the unreality of time and so requires the reality (transcendent recognizability) of what once was but is not anymore. The continuance of memory traces beyond currently present manifestation implies a continuing reality for the past. Moreover, it seems to show that some same experiencer must be subject to the past experience (or its trace) as well as the subject who remembers.

Like Abhinavagupta's, Bergson's view begins from a radically empirical and phenomenological standpoint; and while not disagreeing with connectionists or Buddhist stream-theorists, both end with the result that there is an a priori precedence that is to be recognized as all that is; and that this reality is living—knowing and remembering. (And even worthy of reverence and even possibly experiencing.) But it is not exactly a surprise if we have begun with examining the epistemology of the past—our knowing of it—and have ended revealing a knower.

Whether memory gives us knowledge of "the real past" or not, it surely, in an overwhelming majority of cases, gives us the best possible access to what we take to be our personal real past at the time of recalling. Whether this "taking to be the real past" is true or correct, of course, depends heavily upon what we mean by "real past". Is the past "real" after all? Is it even unified and or definitely determined as this question seems to assume? What exactly are the issues involved in the debates between realism and anti-realism about the past? These are questions that we pick up in the next section.
PART II: METAPHYSICS OF THE PAST

INTRODUCTION

What is Past?

Surely we know that past events are real. We know ourselves to have lived through past years months, weeks, days, hours and minutes. We know the past is real because we have experienced past events and we remember them and, still feeling their effects, we are still experiencing them. We also perceive the past as continuous with the present, and experience a continuity of now with the past few minutes. We can distinguish these times or events of these times from those.

We share our experiences of events and, in this way, share past experiences, even though we know and remember them from a different perspective. We tell each other of things that happened this morning—or of what someone said in a past conversation. In fact, we spend most of our talking-time telling each other these things that have happened or that we have experienced. And so we have constant confirmation of the reality of the past by means of such known-continuity and shared remembrance. We also know from experience that once things happen we cannot change them; and that if we observed them, we cannot help but to treat them as if they happened. Having happened, they have become real events—albeit past.

Like our ordinary practice, scientific inquiry is founded on the idea of the reality of the past. Based on present evidence and estimation, for example, we say without hesitation that dinosaurs roamed on this planet 65 million years ago in the crustaceous period; and that Homo sapiens were around on this planet 100,000 years ago. Whether the details are correct, we evidently believe that there was a real time then—a real present, lived by these creatures and our ancestors. Such inquiry relies on a real past and our knowing of this past also since it
is based in the memory and records of the scientist the community making possible the recognition of examples, similarities and differences (both constants and variables).

We also claim to know the conditions of the Earth before life and the state of the universe before the existence of life. We deduce past events and developments and attribute reality to that past time equivalent to the reality of this time. We talk together about such past events (recent and more distant) and we believe that what we think happened really happened because we have all this present evidence, so we know the past is real.

**The Problem of the Reality of the Past—the Past is Past**

But surely, what is past is not there now, the past is now gone. This is just part of being-past. If anything, we can say the past was there then, and this is its reality—a continuing (present) reality which remains fixed or real—i.e., that the past be (there) then. But we don’t experience any sort of continuing present reality like that of a past event that is (or remains) there then but is nowhere now. So past happenings seem to have the odd quality of being there then but not here or there now. Can real events be neither here nor there now (but just here or there then)?

Take a relatively recent well-publicized and so well-known past event, say the events of 9/11. Images of the planes crashing into the WTC were seen around the world—most people were horrified. Such events as tragedies, holocausts and wars are things we cannot forget. They are real past events. These events and their interpretation influence the thoughts of many people in many ways. We all can refer to these events and agree that such things happened. We have present evidence of such events, personal testimonies, records and recordings; and we know that many people feel the effects of these events on their daily lives even now.
But is this now past event there (or anywhere) now? No, it seems if we are clear we should say that if such events are anywhere, they are there then. (Though we should also immediately admit that for many, such events are equally here and now as they struggle daily with the personal impact of these events.) But why should this past happening be anywhere? It has ceased to be, it is over, that is, if we take the passage of time seriously. Does it need to be somewhere (remaining in space-time) in order to be real?

So, what is now past is evidently pragmatically real and affects present actions and evaluations, but are these now past events also metaphysically real? Does what is past remain there then, without an observer even though we observers have passed many years since that event? Does the event of 9/11 remain metaphysically real in any strongly (independent) metaphysical sense?

If the dominant popular scientific view is correct, from some possible distant location dinosaurs could be observed presently roaming on the Earth—though from our location in space-time, this era is history, and will remain so.

The Constancy of the Present Observation and Relativity of Pastness

So, what do we mean by the reality of the past? Do we agree with physicists that the event remains observable from some possible point of view? Is this possible? It would imply for example, that everything we ever do we continue to do always—as viewed from some remote location. But how could last week’s events remain observable from some point of view (or some other location in space-time)? If so, do they retain this observability from some point of view always? Or just in the present time of some observer who can observe our past as present?

Just as we observe distant stars going supernova as present though we calculate the event having happened thousands of years ago, as we see into the past at large distances so
also the reverse holds, that the Earth’s past may be observed directly from some distant place. It follows that planets we observe that are Earth-like, may now have life, for example though we might see nothing of this life there, even if we had the most powerful telescopes since we would be seeing into the past.

To take a nearby example, the closest Earth-like planet that has been found to date is in the Gliese 581 system some 20.5 light years away. If this planet were colonized by some alien beings in the last 20 years, for example, they now could be watching the crash of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in southern Scotland (occurring in 1988) — even though we would see no one on Gliese’s planet now. In the near future, they would be watching Yeltsin’s election in Russia, the first U.S. assault on Iraq, and the Y2K scare surrounding the Millennium. We would be seeing into their past as they would be seeing into ours. This view supposes that there is some now that we can be said to share with that faraway Earth-like planet. Such a now is calculated by the spatial distance. It is a short deduction to a real shared present time of this faraway planet marked by our own present time measures (if we determine that we are seeing light traveling from a distance and that this relationship is reciprocal). In other words, unevidenced, we suppose it is now this same time there too—though we will not “see” this current time happen there until much later.

On Gliese’s Earth-like and newly-colonized planet, unbeknownst to us, live broadcasts of the events on 9/11 will be perceived in about 2021 by our calendar, yet they have already been observed as well, since Gliese’s observers also observe what was presently happening then. But how can this be the case?

These newly-colonizing observers on this distant planet would understand also that the events they presently observe had happened 20.5 years in their past. In our terms of time we can surmise that they would be seeing the tragic Pan American flight as it was unfolding in 1988. But the broadcasts they received would be live — it would be in our real past as
well—or at least of it. They would see those very broadcasts happening then (or those very events if their telescoping-technology were powerful enough). Those future colonizers of Gliese’s planet (which we would not, here and now in 2008, be perceiving—though perhaps already present) would be observing presently (now in 2008) our past (1988) as it was, viz. as it was present.

In this scenario, they are now (in our real time) watching the images of the Pan American crash, but they were also watching then (in our time), because they are (and will be) watching the live broadcasting. The broadcasting is the same, only the location of its observation has changed. In a very important sense, they would be watching with us then, the images on television of the Pan Am crash. We would have been sharing that present (the real experienced past happening there then in 1988) from some 119-120 trillion miles apart.

From here, it is only in our future (2022-28) that they would be watching the events of 9/11 and the unfolding retaliation in Afghanistan, and the subsequent U.S.-British full-scale invasion of Iraq. Given their 20 light-year distance, they cannot “see” these events yet—though they might imagine that they could be about to happen, given previous events. But whenever they see these events it will be those same events and not different events they will be seeing. It will be those present events here as they were then (while they were presently happening). So if they have already happened, they have already been observed and continue to be open to being observed.

So, amazingly, we can also say those beings have already watched the events live with us and shared that present moment—if the present moment or events are unique. But their watching is both in our past—with our own watching of these events—and in our future. How can this be?
An Endless Past?

If there were such other-worldly future observers, then they were already watching with us—though we did not know, and could not, since their observation hasn't happened here but there. And "there" is somewhere in a real future.

So then, we can ask, are they watching the election coverage of 2008 with us now? We can say yes they are but from here, not yet. We share this present coverage—they are presently (in our 2028) watching the coverage of our current events; it is present for them as it is now (and was) for us—though they know it has already happened. (Perhaps they even wonder at our media, and still pray for a good outcome—even though they know it has already been decided, or that it is "really" in the past, or at least already in the bag!) They recognize they are "watching the past unfold", and could say to one another, that what is now happening on Earth is 2028—which they cannot yet see while they are seeing 2008, just as we cannot.

But if they are watching this coverage then they are observing it presently as we are—just not here-now, but there-then. These present images we share span 20.5 years but still are just a set of events happening once—but are not necessarily finished being observed by all possible observers at this present time (here and now).

To take a more this-worldly example, if we both hear a freighter's horn blow a quarter-mile apart, the closer one of us would hear it sooner, but both would experience the horn not only as a present-hearing but also as a present-blowing—and significantly, as it was—there was only one horn blow, with multiple possible times for experiencing this same one blow (and variations depending on the distortions to be found at our location). But surely one might say the sound waves are different—but they are not different sound waves, just different perceiver (receiver) locations and conditions. (We do not hear a copy or echo if we are further away, but the numerically identical original.)
But our Gliese observers have to see or receive these events and images in sequence as we do, so how can these events all be present? How can we share these present events spread apart in time? Are there two isomorphic orders of presences separated by 20.5 years, or even by a few moments, or is there only one set of observable events occurring at any time (with an unlimited set of possible observers)?

If we could exceed the speed of light (or perhaps counteract the pull of darkness!) we could presumably go to Gliese 581’s Earth-like planet and watch the coverage of the Pan Am flight occurring live again as they could. So events, though unique and occurring only once, could be observed twice—so presumably an infinite amount of times. In this sense, past events occur once but remain observable (from other possible locations) perhaps even infinitely.

So, can we justly say past events are metaphysically real because they remain observable from some possible perspective? We experience passing: events happening, situations changing, loved ones dying. We experience the loss of time as it seems to pass away from us leaving our future time decreasing and our past time increasing. But is it possible instead, that whatever has happened continues to be there then, and only we pass? (And so, because of our participation in such always potentially observable events, we—or what we have done at least—never really passes away at all?) Perhaps only present happenings are the only real constituents of time. After all, if we ask what remains over whatever is changing we have left only what is present.¹ And whenever something is observed it is observed as present, or as actually happening (even though it may be observed at different times from different places).

¹ Although, even if one takes such a Buddhist-like process-view, this remaining over changing is complexly present, as will be discussed below.
One of the difficulties with the dominant scientific or four-dimensional, or space-time view is that just as it gives equal reality to past and future as to present time, it also removes present time from the equation as having a distinguishing significance. Such conceptions of time end up with an absolute time (as an empty container) which cannot account for change (what we know as form or appearance) or distinctions between times (what we recognize as content or meaning). Because of this, the question of the reality of the present is really a much deeper question about the nature of present times as opposed to past and future times.

The following section on the metaphysics of the past includes four chapters. The first of these chapters is central and focuses on the issues of realism and antirealism about the past. What makes the statement “dinosaurs roamed the earth 65 million years ago”, a true statement now, if it is true or if it was true then? Is it the past fact that there really were dinosaurs there then, or is it our present evidence for this statement—our observable geological and archeological evidence; or is it other present facts including our thinking, inquiring, and recalling of such evidence? Is our knowledge of the past reducible to available justification or assertability or does the truth-value of such a statement transcend its assertability or its available justification? How do we understand such statements about what is not there now, and find them meaningful?

In this section on the metaphysics of what is past, the intention is to clarify some of what is at stake in the question of the reality of the past and to establish that this issue is absolutely central to other philosophical issues, viz. those of time, identity, and change. The subsequent three chapters of this second section on metaphysics will address these problems of identity and change over time directly. Three related problems of existence, persistence and tense, will be discussed in light of some analyses from Indian philosophical traditions, viz. Buddhist, Nyāya, Grammarian, and Kaśmir Śaiva.
But here we begin with the reality of what is past. The more difficult and deeper
questions of what a "real past" is, or might be—what 'real' means here, and what exactly is
'past', and whether or how it is definite and singular ("the past")—will be explored more
completely after the issue of the reality of the past is broached by means of the recent
realism-antirealism debate.
CHAPTER 4: REALISM AND ANTIREALISM ABOUT THE PAST

4.1 Realism and Antirealism

At first glance, philosophical debates over the reality of the past seem to be a result of the ambiguity of the word "reality" or the concept of 'the past'. Even if we could simply bypass these immediate problems, it might be thought that deciding on such a question faces the larger problem of having no testable consequences. (Even traveling back to the past wouldn't ensure the reality of the past now, but the reality of that present then). And, surely what is past is real in some ways and unreal in others.

Our own past experiences, for example, are certainly real enough in our present experience; and we can and do coherently discuss things-past, that we did not personally observe—like earth-roaming dinosaurs, the migrations of Neanderthals, the rise (and fall) of the Roman Empire, and the meteor that demolished Tunguska. We have presently available evidence for many of these things—including historical 'traces' and geological evidence (skeletons, books, etc.), as well as personal and communal remembrances. Moreover, the discovery of history has become a forensic science with evidence increasingly coming to light with the development of new technologies. Like a cold-case file, even the death of Tutankhamen can be solved. So, the question whether past events like King Tut's death remain in any existential, or ontological sense so to speak, seems at the very least obtuse or, at best, purely academic.

But it is due to deeper difficulties that arguments for or against realism with regard to the past can, and do, take so many different forms. What is at issue can vary immensely depending on what sort of 'past' things one is considering and what kind of 'reality' one is affirming or denying. Even the question of whether past occurrences or actions have any continuing ontological or substantial reality at all seems hopelessly vague (or necessarily
undecidable from our present vantage. These same sorts of remarks apply equally to debates concerning the reality of the future, or the reality of time more generally. To attempt to sort out some of these difficulties we will begin this chapter with (at least) two intuitions regarding what we would call "real".

4.2 Intuitions of what’s ‘Real’

We seem to have two sorts of intuitions about what makes something real. Our first intuition is that something is real if there is a determinate fact of the matter about it. We largely agree on what is real for ordinary purposes. Real things, real events confront us and we perceive and interact with them. These can be pointed to and demonstrated, discussed and shared. We may disagree on the details of events but we can agree there were some events and that those events are under discussion in our disagreement.

Real things can be opposed to what is imaginary, or ideal. We cannot simply conceive of something real to be different and thereby make it so (even though we may have to be able to conceive of something real as different than it is, in order to make it so). Here, we could add a third intuition, viz., that the real is never completely known—there is always more to be observed about it (and this is true for the past as well as for people).²

Real things change things—they change us, creating and re-creating our perceptions. But in some cases we can change real things by putting forth genuine effort. As Frege wrote in his timeless essay The Thought, "The world of the real is a world in which this acts on that, changes it and again experiences reactions itself and is changed by them."³ This leads us to

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² I thank Professor Mary Tiles for bringing attention to this third most important intuition; and for her very helpful comments on this chapter.; and Professor Eliot Deutsch for his valuable suggestions helping to reducing this chapter.

³ Frege continues immediately: "All this is a process in time. We will hardly recognize what is timeless and unchangeable as real." (Frege, 1956, p. 309) Dummet notes that Frege uses the distinction between the actual (wirklich) and the objective to distinguish between concrete objects and abstract ones. Something actual is, Dummet says, "capable of affecting the senses, directly or indirectly." Objective (but non-wirklich) things may also be real—neither fictitious nor subjective—and can be legitimately referred to, but
our second intuition regarding what is real, viz., as that which participates in a causal process of producing effect or activity. Real things are those which affect us, and which we can affect. What is actual (in Frege’s *wirklich* sense), is active. Real things are effective and can be affected.

It is in this second sense that what is past might appear somewhat “unreal”. What is past cannot be presently perceived; it is insensible or now not-actual. (See note 1) As already determined, what has already happened is now fixed, so to speak. Whatever happened (“in the past”) happened in a certain way at a certain time. When it was happening (when it was present) it was active and effective, and so real. Then, it was determinable. But when such happenings are past—when they have already been—we cannot affect them and they have already been effective. Also, any real effectiveness past happenings might have had is also now past. While something past might have been real then—or when it was happening—it can be argued that any efficacy it had was passed (in a present) to another present (and then to another, etc.). Any effects of the past, as current, are by definition present effects and affects—and can only be such. Using such a definition, the causal efficaciousness of what is past is always found in just whatever is present.

So, by this second intuition, real things may be considered just those that are present, or have some sort of active or effective presence. Real things are those which can be not only known (i.e. as already determinate) but also acted on (as still determinable). Yet, if the

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4 One might wish to argue with David Lowenthal, for example, who notes that we are always changing the past—writing history and re-writing history. And like he does one might question our constant drive to change the past. (Lowenthal, 1985) But here, when discussing the reality of the past we are not talking about history per se, or our story about the past, but about past events themselves. Not their representation or symbol but their reality, being or occurrence. It is, as Russell suggested with his “five-minute hypothesis, e.g., perfectly plausible that everything we “know” about the past is false. If it were found that this was true, and we learn of an entirely different past—as in the movie the Matrix, e.g.—the past has not changed: even if our knowledge of it has been overturned entirely. What we thought was past simply never really was.
present can change and be changed, and the future is open to change, the past (being logically other than these two) must be unchanging, unchangeable, and un-open, that is determinate. This, then, leads to a tension: because the past is already determined, it is real; but because it has no future possibility for causal efficacy (for unremembered and unknown parts of the past at least), the past is as such, unreal.

And yet, in a very 'real' sense, whatever we know determinately (whatever we know in fact and/or as fact) is, in fact (actually) past. This is supported theoretically by the idea that if light takes time to travel, then what we perceive visually, especially at great distances, is "actually" past. Extrapolating the distant to the near, what we perceive (as present) would still seem to be slightly "past"—even our own bodily sensations seem subject to this temporal lapse. (Libet's results seem to support this along with other experimental results indicating the backdating of perceived-sensations and the inability to determine order with small temporal lapses.)

As discussed in the introduction to this section, taking this view requires holding a present constant between here and there—imagining a synchronicity (or that there-now and here-now currently have the same time), so that we can say the light which we see (here and now) originated some time in the past (there and then). Moreover, any sort of conceptualization involves synthesis, and this requires that there be something already available for synthesis and some possible means of connection.

Do we determinately-know that which we act on and change? If so, it would seem we are changing the past (if what may be determinately-known is past) all the time. But the inertness of the past—i.e., that what is past as no longer changing or changeable, seems necessary part of its determinability. Is it then the very real-making feature of the past that makes it unreal? Issues of fixity and determinacy will be examined more completely in a
chapter on 'changing the past' in the following third and final section of this work. Here it is important just to note this conundrum of intuitions imbedded in our notion of reality.

4.2.1 The Reality of what is Observable, Unobservable, Observed, and Unobserved

These two senses of "real" correspond to two ways of arguing for the reality of unobservables. We might consider unobservable things real, either because they serve to unify our understanding, or because they are capable of producing effects. So, e.g., while both the unobservably-small and the unobservably-past offer theoretical or conceptual unification for present phenomena, the unobservably-small may be subject to experimentation and manipulation. We can demonstrate the causal efficacy of the very-small.5

One might wish to argue that, as with things unobservably-small, we can demonstrate the continuing causal efficacy of things unobservably-past. We can, after all, identify present effects of past events. Moreover, we can make historical hypotheses, and with such present evidence, we can justifiably say that these past events happened and have had effects. But what we are concerned with here, is not the causal efficacy of now-past events as they were

5 Can we likewise demonstrate the causal efficacy of the unobservably-large or the unobservably-distant (or the very-large or the extremely-distant)? These are hard questions, since it seems that whatever is actually unobservably-distant, or at a distance where there is absolutely no ability to observe, is recognition-transcendent. Are we forced into admitting the possibility of truths which are in principle recognition-transcendent? Do these same difficulties plague the unobservably-past or unobservably small? Aren't we "observing, albeit indirectly, when we (re-)produce the causal efficacy of the unobservably (very)-small and so, observe spin, charge, etc? Perhaps the "unobservably-small" is more accurately represented by things unobservable in principle, e.g. events beneath the planck-scale or by the postulated dimensions 'curled-up' according to string theory—things that cannot be observed or actually demonstrated or shown, i.e. things for which there is no possible empirical prediction. Is the situation of observation the same with the unobservably-distant—indirectly observing past supernovas or postulating a 'Big Bang' and seeking its evidence, for example? These difficult questions of what counts as "observable" will be discussed further below with respect to Dummett's justificationist theory of truth.
present, but with the causal efficacy of the past now (as past—its current or remaining causal efficacy).\(^6\)

Another difference between these two types of unobservable ‘realities’, is that while both the \textit{unobservably-small} and the \textit{wholly-unexperienced and unremembered past} (unobservably-past) require theory for their determinate inference, the \textit{forgotten or unremembered past} (the extremely-past or observably-past, e.g. early-childhood events or our own birth) is also part of our own (observed) past. If we apply this to the small, the extremely-small (which may be subject to empirical verification or falsification) is in effect just observably-small, and not unobservably-small. The extremely-past—observably-past may be currently unobserved but this does not mean it is unobservable—also, there is some unobservable past (unobservably-past in principle, or a limit of observability) of which we are aware.

This is indicated in that we must be, at least not-remembering something before we can actually be said to be remembering it; and we are as well, aware of a mass of past experiences of which we have no recall (and against which certain past items and experiences stand out as things we \textit{can} distinctly recall). In such cases, theory is not required to infer (abductively, or otherwise) the existence or reality of the unremembered and currently unknown past—'knowing' the reality of this (observable) past is then just knowing the present together with only some of the (observed) past. In this way, as discussed in the prior chapter, we have a sort of ‘negative memory situation’ in which we may not remember what

\(^6\) One might argue instead that we do not have to demonstrate the causal efficacy of the past, or rather, that we ourselves are its demonstration. We do, after all, experience the results of our past actions, and so we know immediately that the past is real. We know current situations to be the results of real past situations. Yet, this experienced past is observably-past. We may directly experience the causal efficacy of the observably-past, but not the unobservably-past. At least if we take what is unobservably-past to be that which is past and which is unobservable—and if it is unobservable (not capable of being observed), then it is also unobserved. If it is unobserved, then it is also unexperienced.
it was, but may clearly know what it was like, or what it was not. More will be said on the
unobservably-past below.

We begin here with realist and antirealist positions with regard to the past more
specifically; with some common motivations for such positions, and an exposition of some of
the ways in which these have been expressed in contemporary philosophy.

4.3 Truth-values and Truthmakers: Change and the Unchangeable-past

In Dummett’s analysis, what largely motivates antirealism about the past is the idea
that the truth or falsity of our statements and thoughts about the past should not be beyond
our ability to determine (as they would be if their ‘truth-makers’ rest in the past, beyond our
purview). If instead, what makes such statements and thoughts true or false is recognized to
be in the present—which, after all, seems to exist and be real; rather than in the past, which
does not seem to exist independently of some present, and may not be real—then the content
of such statements and thoughts may be determined; and their truth-value may be decided
based on present evidence. In contrast, if what makes such statements true lies in the past,
then the criteria for deciding the truth-value of these statements may be beyond current
knowledge and so it becomes unclear how the content of such statements may be determined.

G.E.M. Anscombe noted that our motivation for the opposite view, viz. realism about
the past, is largely our impression that the past cannot be changed. (Anscombe, 1981)
Things once done cannot be undone. But she says that since no sense can be given to the
converse statement, viz. that the past can be changed, it is unclear whether this belief (that
the past cannot be changed) is a sufficient basis for belief in the reality of the past.

She argues that if the truth-value of a statement about the past were a matter only of
present criteria or evidence then a change in what counts as present criteria would necessitate
a change in the past. But if we abandon the idea that to give criteria is to give a translation,
then a change in the past does not follow from a change in present criteria. She concludes that while a statement about the past could fail to make sense due to a change in the present, a change in the present cannot change the truth-value of a statement about the past. The criteria for a truth about the past, what makes it true, she says, cannot lie in the present.

Appealing to Wittgenstein, Anscombe maintains that we cannot justify our concept of the past, and our ordinary use of the past tense is just what our concept of the past amounts to. If it is based on anything, she says, it is memory. But whether the question of the reality of the past can be taken as just the question of whether the statement that the past cannot be changed has any sense is debatable. (Butler, e.g., criticizes Anscombe's take on the issue). (Butler, 1956) These deep and problematic issues regarding whether the past can be changed, and so on the nature of the reality of the past will be postponed until the last section of this work, on the axiology of the past. Here we will consider only the issue of realism and antirealism about the past, and postpone discussion of the present (and future) until the following chapter.

4.4 Dummett's Semantic Antirealism

Dummett has given the most extensive construction of antirealism about the past; making the case that realism about entities of a given sort should be construed as adoption of a certain theory of meaning about statements involving such entities, and not as a view about whether such entities exist. The motive, he says, is twofold: in the case of realism about past and future there do not seem to be any objects in question, and to count states of affairs as objects "would be sophistry" (M. Dummett, 1993, p. 465)

Secondly, to take realism versus anti-realism as a debate over putative objects focuses one's attention on the wrong issue. Dummett is convinced throughout the works considered
here, that the real distinction lies between those who accept and those who reject bivalence. Let us try to understand how.

The question is whether a meaningfully determinate statement has a truth-value independently of our capacity to discover it, or whether its truth-value consists just in our ability to recognize it. To put it simply, can truth be recognition transcendent? If it can, then realism would be plausible; but, if it cannot then anti-realism would be plausible. (It might, however, be argued that by finding that the issue of the reality of the past properly concerns its semantic reality, Dummett has already decided that truth cannot be recognition transcendent).

To give an example, according to a justificationist theory, the truth-value of any statement about the past, like say, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C." does not depend on (is not determined by) the name 'Caesar' referring to some person who at some past time was crossing some river, 'the Rubicon', but instead, on our currently available justification or evidence for making this statement. (So, there is no required causal chain from past state of affairs to the truth value of such a present statement.) With a slightly steeper standard, such currently available evidence may supply verification for such claims. But in either justificationist or verificationist forms, the truth-value of a past-tense statement is determined by what is currently evident.

4.4.1 The Timing of Truth-Values

In his original defense of antirealism about the past, Dummett offered a justificationist semantics, modeled on the intuitionist mathematics of Brouwer, and heavily influenced by Wittgenstein. In this conception, statements about the past gain their fluency and functionality solely by their present content. There is no requisite reference to any real
past entities, objects, etc. It is the justifiability of a statement that offers a truth-value for the statement; and the content of a proposition is determined by its manifestation in use.

If justificationism is taken in this way, i.e., to indicate that only facts or realities are current, it offers an eliminative (or at least a reductive) antirealism about the past. The justificationist who is an antirealist about the past believes that truth-value and content are solely a function of what is currently (presently) available—be it events, evidence, records, documents, memory-traces, etc.

But this reductive antirealist must account for the apparent transmission of truthfulness which is not determined by presently available evidence (though it is tied to it). There are apparently necessary relations between statements made at different times, commonly called ‘truth-value links’. So, for example, if, yesterday, the statement “it is raining (here and now)” was true, then it is (or will be) true today that “it was raining (there and then).” Such truth-value links indicate that a past-tense statement (or proposition) is now true iff a corresponding present-tense statement would have been true at some earlier time. Peacocke has taken these sorts of links to be ‘property-identity links’ and argues that such links imply realism about the past. (Peacocke, 2005)

If the truth-value links hold, the statement would also have been true before the evidential traces in the present even existed. To give a slightly altered example, the statement made then “rain is coming” is true or false when it is made (in that present context of utterance—a here and now—in which the rain is or is not coming). It is only justified now by dark clouds massing and may be later verified when the rain has come. But the truth or falsity of the statement precedes its justification or even its consideration. It seems

7 If traces must be revived or re-instated afresh every present and are not ‘held’ does this mean they do not ‘remain’? Isn’t remaining over time enduring, even if as e.g., somehow re-iteratingly present over time (perdurating) yet unevidenced (as if in dispositional storage of some sort). After all, there does appear to be a real gap between the original experience and the re-instatement of the experience as the occasion of remembering.
necessary that if the statement was true then, rain was (already) coming before we said it was, since we had to recognize or infer its coming from the clouds. So, the truth or falsity of the statement may (must) precede the statement, and its verification or falsification.\(^8\)

So, while currently available traces or evidence may truly indicate a past situation; such evidence cannot itself be what makes the statement true or false—if only because a statement about the past indicates that what makes it true, is not something that is actually present. Currently available traces may be the immediate cause of memory, and the present evidence may be the current justification for a truth-value of a statement about the past, but what makes such current representation true is not limited to the present.

It is not a presently activated trace that determines the truth-value of a current representation; even though such a presently activated trace may represent the actual value (or meaningful content) of that representation. What makes a remembrance may be present, as the occasion of remembering (or the tokening of the past-tense statement) is present, but what makes a remembrance true must precede the present remembrance or evidence—a trace must be a trace of something more original.

The current truth value of a claim about the past may, in practice amount to its current justification or verification, but what makes the truth value such may be independent of current justification or verification. For instance, the statement that the Indus-valley civilization made widespread use of metal utensils is not true in virtue of pieces of metal dug out in the 20\(^{th}\) century. (It would have been true regardless of its being stated!)

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8 This relates closely to Bergson’s distinction between the intuition involved in metaphysics and the analysis involved in scientific explication. This is an intuition of duration or motion itself ("integral") and involves differently-directed intention than conceptual or analytical immobility offered by psychology as science (and not open to metaphysics). While it is clear that present evidence including remembrance can make us know the truth value of a statement about the past, it is hard to see what present evidence or remembrance can do to make a statement about what’s past true or false. (This seems to have been Anscombe’s intuition as well.)
4.5 Truth and the Past: A Concession to Realism

Seven years before his recent publication of *Truth and the Past*, Dummett had written that a concession to realism was necessary with regard to the past. A purely justificationist account of meaning implies an untenable antirealist conception of the past which does not faithfully represent the manner in which we ordinarily understand the past tense. To mention one simple difficulty: if the meaning of the token-sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C.E" consists in the way the utterer or the speaker does, would, or will justify or go about confirming the claim it makes, then the content of the sentence would not be in the past—or definitely not in that very past (relative to the speaker and understander’s temporal location) which the sentence undeniably refers to. It may rather be in a present, a future or a possible future. To dramatize the objection, such a sentence might then be reducible (without a residue) to the sentence "I would read Roman History and consider archeological evidence of such and such sort to check whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C.E".

This dramatization of the justificationist theory of meaning brings out another difficulty. After all, the past tense sentence still would remain unreduced in its original (epistemically inaccessible) past tense form, nested inside any rephrasing in terms of accessible justification. The justificationist interpretation thus, does not account for the truth value-links and our understanding of these links. Since the justificationist must concede that understanding statements about the past incorporates a grasp of how statements about the

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9 "I regret that I do not feel able at present to offer a formulation of the necessary qualification; but it surely involves a fairly substantial concession to realism. We must concede that our understanding of statements about the past incorporates, not merely a knowledge of the grounds for asserting them, but a grasp of how they represent reality: how acceptance of them contributes to the picture which we form of the world we inhabit and with which we operate to guide our actions. I am aware that this is intolerably vague. Our acquisition of the concept of the past, and our resulting grasp of the past tense, are from any standpoint, things of which it is exceedingly difficult to give a satisfactory account. To do so must result in a modification, and a deepening, of the way in which a constructivist conception of meaning is presented and defended." (M. Dummett, 1998, pp. 137-138)

10 This seems to fall prey to Wittgenstein’s example (in the context of arguing against a private language) of checking one copy of the morning newspaper with another.
past "represent reality," Dummett argues that the correct account of meaning in such cases is "not along purely justificationist lines." In "acceding to such an account of statements about the past the justificationist will have substantially modified his doctrine." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 68)

4.5.1 Revising Antirealism

Dissatisfied with his earlier conclusion (M. Dummett, 1978) that antirealism with regard to the past was not incoherent, yet not believable, Dummett has recently revised his position. The apparent inevitability of our realistic commitments to the past—"our meaning-commitments to statements about the past"—inspired this revision of his antirealist account. Antirealism with regard to the past is untenable, and even repugnant, he says, because large parts of the past would then have to be admitted as simply vanishing as current evidence dissipates.

The revised position Dummett offers in Truth and the Past (2004) concedes the irreducibility of statements about the past. Here, Dummett accounts for our understanding of statements concerning unobserved past times in terms of a counterfactual analysis. He describes this in two different ways in his discussion however, as 'what one would observe if one were there' and 'what could have been perceived then'. However, these two of Dummett's formulations seem to differ, viz. what 'would have been observed if one were there' (or 'suitably-placed') and what 'could have been observed or perceived then', are two different things—and in more ways than one.

Here, Dummett is immediately concerned with sketching the lines of a justificationist account of truth that corresponds with our use of statements (as true) that are, in some sense, effectively undecidable, specifically, with our use of past tense statements. In answer to his own earlier justificationist's antirealism about the past, Dummett offers a revised semantics
for tensed statements, on analogy with statements about distant places. Admitting that a justificationist must regard such statements as bipartite rather than homogenous, Dummett argues for drawing a distinction between what establishes a statement as true, and what that statement is taken to say. In Dummett’s analysis, this distinction (between what establishes the truth of the statement and the publicly-available meaning of the statement) forces a justificationist theory of meaning and the antirealist who holds it, in a realist direction. Dummett maintains that the justificationist may still "broadly hold to justificationist principles, but will have conceded somewhat to the realist."

According to Dummett’s analysis, it is largely because we can readily frame statements that are not decidable that such a difference exists between the justificationist and truth-conditional theories of meaning. This difference has a substantial effect both on the logical laws accepted by the adherents of the two types of meaning theory, and on their conceptions of reality. In this newer work, he says that while he would still argue for a purely justificationist explanation in the case of quantification over infinite totalities and subjunctive conditional forms (two of the linguistic devices that import undecidability into language), in the case of the past tense, the correct account must be a revised form of justificationism.

This justificationist, according to Dummett, will not repudiate his original principles, and continues to maintain that a statement about the past can be true only in virtue of "an actual or possible direct verification of it"—but will "take a more realist attitude to whether such a direct verification was or could have been carried out." Taking this great step of opening up a past event to a (remaining) possible direct verification of it, Dummett says only that in "doing so, his theory of meaning has been modified so as to approach realism more
closely.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 70) And, although this view has been "revised in a realist direction" the account offered will be "still broadly justificationist in character."11

4.5.2 Accounting for Statements about the Past

Dummett enters into his discussion of tensed statements and the semantic theory appropriate to them by posing the constraint that a theory of meaning must account for use in the broad sense that: it must link up the meaning a sentence has with the practices that a communicative utterer and a competent comprehender of the sentence would normally take to be a successful deployment of that sentence in its home-language. He proposes that the most obvious way to develop such a theory would be "to adopt a theory whose central notion is itself a feature of use—either a justificationist or pragmatist theory." (He says that nothing hangs on the choice between them as they "will come to the same in the end.") His focus is, however on the justificationist theory in which the appropriate conception of truth turns on the notion of our being justified in asserting a statement, where "our" is taken in a "collective and not distributive sense." Dummett emphasizes that it is intrinsic to the use of language, "that we accept the testimony of others: to believe what we are told is the default response. Language binds us into society." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 42)12

As mentioned above, he draws the lines of his justificationist theory using intuitionist theories for mathematical statements as a template.13 He notes that mathematical statements differ from empirical statements however, in that if they are once decidable, they are always

11 He says here that we need to look closely at those cases in which "realism exerts a strong pull, and justificationism appears implausible or repugnant. The past tense is one such topic," he writes, "There are surely others." (2004, p. 70)
12 If we can draw the analogy between testimony and memory as Dummett has suggested (see PT. 1 on memory and testimony) then this implies we accept the justification offered by memory of a real lived and living past seems logical. And, just as language the vehicle of testimony binds us into society, the vehicle of memory binds us into society (whatever this might be.)
13 These differ in that the former applies to the language as a whole, whereas the latter applies only to mathematical statements.
decidable. The means of deciding a range of statements or any other effective mathematical procedure,

...if available at all, is permanently available, (while) the opportunity to decide whether or not an empirical statement holds good may be lost; what can be effectively decided now will no longer be effectively decidable next year. Nor, perhaps, next week.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 42)

Even so, he says, we can gain insight from intuitionist semantics since such theories “specify the meaning of each logical constant by laying down what is to count as a proof of a statement in which it is the principal operator.” (Ibid) Proof in this context, as he defines it, is only having an effective means in principle (even if not possible in practice) for constructing a canonical proof, and not possession of canonical proof. This is what is required to justify asserting a mathematical statement, and what is to be preserved in an intuitively valid argument.

A constructive mathematical proof is one that shows how to prove the conclusion given we can prove the premises. In the empirical case, however, it does not follow that if the premises have been verified the conclusion can be verified—such a statement may no longer be verifiable, even if its premises are verifiable. This will relate to a re-construal of Dummett's revised account below, viz. that a direct canonical means is not being present, but knowing more directly—such that one’s own (past) experience is the direct or canonical means of establishing the truth of a (past-tense) statement (or of knowing the past directly).

Dummett writes that mathematical statements differ from empirical statements in that if such a statement could have been verified then it can still be verified. So the verifiability of an empirical statement is different. All that is required for a justificationist account in the empirical case Dummett argues, is that given verified premises, the conclusion of a valid argument from these premises is such that it "is guaranteed to be such that it could have been
verified, not that we can any longer verify it.”

He writes that this revised account “must come as a relief to anyone attracted to such an account of meaning yet troubled about the reality of the past.”

Again, the problem is a vanishing past. He says, any account of meaning which demands that the truth of statements about the past was determined solely by presently available evidence would have the unpalatable consequence that “large tracts of the past would continually vanish as all traces of them dissipate.” Neither our use, nor our intuitions concerning the reality of the past readily accord with a justificationist account of meaning or truth.

Here, he writes that he had hoped his earlier investigations (M. Dummett, 1978) would enable him to show that antirealism about the past was either incoherent or benign (and if it were shown to be incoherent, it might expose a fallacy in the argument for a justificationist theory of meaning). But instead, the conclusion he reached—that antirealism about the past was neither incoherent, nor believable—was “the most disappointing possible.” He says he has been perplexed by this matter ever since. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 45)

14 Dummett puts emphasis on this point: “We ought not to demand a stricter standard for valid deductive arguments about empirical matters than we do for those about mathematical matters. The difference between the two cases requires us to place a lighter burden on the conclusion for it to be true and hence to be believed....” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 44)

15 He expresses his own relief: “I confess to being in just the position of the thinker inclined to a justificationist theory of meaning but troubled about the reality of the past. I am indeed attracted by a justificationist account of meaning; at the same time, I have long been worried about reconciling the reality of the past with that account.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 45)

16 I do not find it implausible to hold that this consequence does not follow immediately from Dummett’s premise and will come back to this supposition in Dummett’s discussion of in his fifth chapter, the Metaphysics of Time. Here, he continues, “We should be committed to a metaphysical conception according to which nothing exists but the present: the past would be a mere construct out of whatever in the present we treat as being traces of it. We could not so much as think of a statement about the past as having once been true, though now devoid of truth value, save in terms of present evidence that evidence for its truth once existed.” Dummett says, that this conception, although not incoherent, is repugnant. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 44)
4.6 The Problem of the Vanishing Past

We cannot lightly shake off the conviction that what makes a statement about the past true, if it is true, is independent of whether there is now any ground that we have or could discover for asserting it. But if the truth of a proposition consists of its being the case that someone suitably placed could have verified it, or have found a cogent ground for asserting it, then our conviction is vindicated. On this conception of truth, a statement about the past could be true if someone at the relevant time could have verified it, even though all reason for asserting it may have blown away. (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 44-45)

4.6.1 Solving the Problem of the Vanishing Past with Counterfactual Knowing

The truth of a statement thus consists not in what is presently verifiable alone but also "what could have been verified." For any statement about the past, if "someone suitably placed could have verified it, or have found a cogent ground for asserting it, then our conviction is vindicated." Again, this conviction is "that what makes a statement about the past true, if it is true, is independent of whether there is now any ground that we have or could discover for asserting it." But this justificationist, Dummett says, hasn't yet given an account of the acquisition of "a tacit grasp of the notion of truth so conceived":

We have merely argued that, if a justificationist is to allow the validity of constructive deductive arguments—those that provide a means of verifying the conclusion, given a sufficiently detailed verification of the premises—he must admit the capacity of a statement to have been verified as a sufficient condition of its truth. The verification of the premises may not have been sufficiently detailed. Even though the argument may convince us that it must have been possible to verify the conclusion, the time for doing so may have passed....When a constructively valid argument relates to the past, it is possible that we should have a record of its premises having been quite conclusively verified, but that a verification of its conclusion is now forever beyond our reach.

A justificationist theory of meaning must either deny that constructive arguments applying to empirical situations are always valid—specifically those that lie in the past, or admit that "the mere possibility of its having been verified (in an appropriate sense of "possibility") is a sufficient condition for the truth of a statement. He emphasizes that it does

17 Dummett determines his use of "verify," intending it "to cover what falls short of verifying a statement in the strict sense (and)... also possession of grounds sufficiently compelling to warrant asserting the statement. Such grounds would justify the assertion." But, he says, it is not his concern in the present context to make precise this notion of justification. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 45)
not establish that truth is to be identified with the possibility of being, or having been verified. He concludes that a justificationist is thus not yet "entitled to claim that the dilemma about the reality of the past has been resolved," as he still needs to supply "a plausible account" of both our understanding of statements about the past, and of how we come by that understanding. It is this account which is to somehow secure a non-vanishing past. So Dummett turns to the second question, asking how we come by an understanding of statements about what is spatially remote. Here, he says, "a gap appears" between what establishes a statement as true and what it says holds good, or what it is taken to mean.

In an intuitionistic account of mathematical statements, there is nothing analogous to this division between what establishes a statement as true and what it is taken to mean. In the mathematical case, the proof is "simultaneously what is required to establish the statement as true and that of which an assertion warrants the existence." And, he says this is equally so, for many empirical statements (present-tense statements about the here and now) in which there is no apparent gap where the canonical means of establishing the truth of the statement is what the statement says.

This gap becomes apparent with empirical statements about how things are in another place. The most direct way to verify such statement is "to go to that place and observe." In this case, he says, "what verifies a statement is what you would observe if you went there—but this is not what the statement says..." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 50)

4.6.2 The Past and the Far-away

Dummett argues that understanding statements about other places, and past and future times, requires the child to develop a form of mental spatiotemporal grid. This formation, involves that he understand such statements as locating states of affairs and events at points on that spatiotemporal grid:
His grasp of what states of affairs and types of event those are derives from the ability he has acquired to recognize them when he observes them. When they are said to obtain or to have occurred elsewhere, he knows that he would have to go to that place in order to observe them, and thus to establish the truth of what is said. But that is not what he takes what he is told as saying. What it says is that at that particular location on the spatial map is something of a kind he can recognize when he himself is at the right location. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 51)

What an empirical statement about the past or future or other places (non-presented events) says, is that, at that particular location on the grid is "something of a kind he can recognize when he himself is at the right location." This involves understanding what establishes the truth of what is said. Dummett realizes this is a tenuous line he is walking—

The distinction just drawn between what is needed to establish a statement as true and what the statement says needs careful scrutiny. If we adopt it, we take a very decided lurch in the direction of a truth conditional account of meaning, and thus of a realist account of our thought and language....In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 52)

It is the second condition which imports realism about the past. If the justificationist must admit this gap between what is needed in order to establish a statement as true and what that statement says, Dummett asks, does this require adding another component to the justificationist account of meaning to allow for this difference? He answers this question neither affirmatively nor negatively, saying that we need a distinction between the canonical or more direct way to establish a statement as true and the non-canonical and indirect way of doing so:

Just as with mathematical statements, understood intuitionistically, so we need a distinction between the canonical, or more direct way of establishing a statement as true and the legitimate, but indirect, means of doing so. The canonical way of doing so will always be that which corresponds to the composition of the statement and the way the meanings of the words that make it up are given. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 53)

4.7 Evidence for what is not *here* and not *now*

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18 A justificationist theory of meaning which "takes the meaning of a form of statement to be given by what is needed to establish it as true" is here distinguished from that of the radical justificationist who regards what is needed to establish it as true "as being that in virtue of which the statement is true, if it is true."
Dummett offers a substantial account of the understanding of the child (or, at least, our understanding of the understanding of the child). He maintains there is no alternative but to attribute to the child some sort of grasp of the difference between a direct and indirect means of determining the truth of a given statement. We attribute to the child a grasp, doubtless inchoate, he says, of the difference between a direct and indirect way of making sure that something is so:

Why should we credit him with regarding the procedure of taking a journey to a place and observing what is there as no more than an indirect way of establishing the truth of a statement about how things are there?... He must indeed know that (how to determine when he is in a given place and how to observe whether an event of a certain kind is taking place) if he is to be credited with an understanding of statements of that type. But he must also understand that already to be in the place referred to, and to observe what is taking place there, is the only direct way to verify the statement; that it may be true even though such a direct verification of it is not available; and that its truth is capable of being indirectly established. In other words he must have advanced well beyond the point of grasping only statements of the most elementary kind, those that we are able to verify by immediate observations and that are falsified by our failing to make such observations. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 54)

Thus, in Dummett's analysis, when one understands a statement about another place, one understands a composite of things. The first two things we understand contribute to the first part of the bipartite sense of such statements. We must have the capacity to:

i) determine when we are in a given place (or at a certain time)
ii) and observe whether an event of a certain kind is taking place

These abilities presumably enable our understanding of "statements of the most elementary kind...that we are able to verify by immediate observations and...(which) are falsified by our failing to make such observations." This would seem to involve an aspect of showing, or being able to be shown to. In other words, an ability to recognize similarities, make distinctions and identify differences. As well as an ability to recognize what counts as proof or demonstration, and so have some conception of evidential relations.

The next three things are of the second part of the bipartite sense of such statements. Dummett says that we "must also understand" that:
iii) the only direct means of verifying that statement is “already to be in the place referred to, and to observe what is taking place there...”

iv) that such a statement “may be true even though a direct verification of it is not available...”

v) and that “its truth is capable of being indirectly established.”

Statements about things in other places are not falsified by our absence at that place, so (presumably) neither should statements about things in other times be falsified by our absence at that time. Dummett’s view is that these sorts of statements should be understood as counterfactual conditionals. Such statements have consequences framed only in terms of potential: that if one were in that place, he would be able to observe that event. “It therefore follows,” Dummett says, “that any evidence the child may have for the truth of the statement (about non-present spaces or non-present times)—including his traveling to that place and observing the occurrence of that event—must be categorized as indirect.”

According to Dummett, it is this second aspect of the bipartite sense of such a statement in particular that necessitates the concession to realism. The evidence that is recognized as indirect is recognized as such based on a projection of a potential direct verification involving a particular location on the spatiotemporal grid at which something unobserved may obtain. This concedes a form of representing reality that is, interestingly enough, a projection of a possible direct verification. So, it seems to follow as well that its truth is (may also be/remain) capable of being directly established.

Dummett concludes that reflecting on our understanding of statements about what states of affairs obtain, or what events are occurring, in other places forces the justificationist a certain distance in the direction of realism.

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19 Dummett’s use of ‘must’ in the latter three components is interesting and serves to delineate the bipartite conception of understanding effectively undecidable statements. This, I assume is a ‘must’ of logical or practical necessity and not normativity alone. The two imperatives are that to understand such a statement we must understand that it may be true even though direct verification (what seems to amount to direct observation for Dummett), is not available and that we must understand that the truth of such a statement is capable of being indirectly established. Thus as there is canonical proof and constructivist proof, there is direct verification and indirect verification.
4.7.1 Understanding and Intending the Past

Dummett says that his explanation of a child's coming to understand statements about other places has a dual purpose: to show that the justificationist must represent the senses of such statements as bipartite, and to illustrate how the justificationist may concede this without abandoning his general principles.20 Again, this bipartite sense of understanding a statement about what states of affairs obtain, or what events are occurring in other (unobserved) place or times is:

1) knowing—what it is for a state of affairs of the type in question to obtain or an event of the type in question to occur, and
2) knowing—how to locate it on the grid which serves to particularize the place referred to.21

This, he believes, this somewhat resembles the bipartite realist conception that our understanding of a statement, e.g. 'a is F', as constituted by a knowledge of in what having that property consists, along with an understanding of reference to that a. In Dummett's analysis, the child must locate the reference so to speak of that a—or know how to locate it on the grid which serves to particularize the place referred to. The first requirement the justificationist can explain without revision—we can recognize what counts as evidence for accepting or asserting a statement as a measure of direct verification "here and now;" but according to Dummett, his account must also mark the distinction that any evidence "to be gathered by those who are not now in the place referred to" is indirect evidence for the decidability of such statements.22

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20 He is not driven by the need to make this concession to surrender utterly to realism: he can still broadly maintain the justificationist conception of meaning with which he started” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 59)
21 The elements recognized by this dual aspect account of how we understand and what it is to explain such statements thus seems to require one aspect of direct identification or verification and another of indirect identification or verification.
22 "The justificationist may still explain the former constituent—our grasp of the relevant type of state of affairs or event—in terms of our learned ability to recognize that state of affairs as obtaining, or that event as taking place, here and now. But he must relinquish any idea he had that our understanding of statements
The mathematical intuitionist holds that if we are entitled to assert a disjunctive statement then one or the other disjunct must be true, even if we do not know which.

Similarly for any existential statement we are entitled to assert, one of its instances must be true, even if we do not know which. For the intuitionist, the disjunct or instance is true in virtue of having a decision procedure that would yield a proof if applied, but he says, we need not know that it would do so. The condition for the truth of such a mathematical statement thus is only hypothetical. In the ordinary understanding of constructivism, it is not enough that there should in fact be a procedure, we must also know of the procedure, and know that it will terminate with a proof of one of the disjuncts or instances—"we do not need to know that it will yield a proof of the very statement that is true in virtue of it."

But what should a justificationist require for a statement about what is happening at a given place to be true? As we use our language to distribute information among ourselves, as well as from past observers to future descendants, we are entitled, Dummett says, to accept what others tell us on the basis of their observations. So, in his analysis, there is "direct evidence for the truth of a statement that something is occurring at a certain place provided that someone is observing it there." What qualifies as 'direct' or who is meant by of this kind has only one ingredient, rather than two: that it is constituted by a knowledge of what affords a ground for accepting each such statement as a whole. It indeed remains, for him, integral to that understanding that we are able to recognize evidence for accepting it, and moreover, that we know that the most nearly direct grounds for doing so are supplied by going to the place in question and observing how things are, or what is going on, there. But it is also essential to a sound account of our understanding of such statements that any evidence to be gathered by those who are not now in the place referred to must count as indirect." (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 57-58)

23 "That disjunct or that instance would be true in virtue of our possessing a procedure that would in fact, if applied, yield a proof of it: we need not know that it would do so. So the condition for the truth of a mathematical statement, under this conception, would be a hypothetical one. It is that we are in possession of an effective procedure such that, if we were to apply it, we should obtain—should in fact obtain—a proof of that statement. On any constructivist view, however, as we ordinarily understand constructivism, the replacement of what we know by what is so—what in fact holds good—applies only to the outcome of the procedure." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 60)

24 Dummett says that he is inclined to say that when we are concerned to specify the most direct means of establishing that an event of a certain type occurred the use of instruments should count as observation only when this is the only way to observe them, but this, he says, is not germane to the present inquiry.
‘someone’ are, Dummett says, important question, but are not immediately relevant to his discussion.  

“What is relevant,” he says, “is the criterion for the truth of statements about what is happening in a place in which there is no observer, or to which there is none sufficiently close.” He says that the natural thought would be to take the criterion in terms of a conditional, viz. “that if someone were to have been in or sufficiently close to that place at the relevant time, he would have observed an event of that kind.” But while this is enough to vindicate indirect ways of finding out what is happening in places beyond the scope of any observer, it is not enough to vindicate the principle of bivalence for such statements. (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 62-65)

By allowing indirect ways of finding out what is happening beyond the scope of any observer this reformed justificationist position allows that indirect evidence can account for the actual truth-value of statements about the past, but does not show that every statement will be decidable or that every question will be answerable. The assumption of bivalence is plausible, according to Dummett, because the outcome of the decision procedure is unaffected at each step by external factors, but is internally determined (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 63). This is not the case for “the empirical procedure of moving to a place and observing what is taking place there.” The outcome of this procedure in contrast is determined by factors external to it.

To assume that there is a definite truth about what would be observed if there were an observer at a place where in fact there is not is to assume that the world is determinate independently of

25 “Direct evidence for the truth of the statement can consist only in observations made when and where the event is stated to have taken or to take place; more exactly, at whatever time the event could be observed by an observer placed sufficiently close to observe it.” Here, he remarks that a more developed account would not require an observer to be at the very place in question, but only sufficiently close to observe it – and if one wishes to include instruments, this might in fact be not very close at all. Likewise, he says, events at astronomical distances are not concerned with those occurring at the time of the observation but with events occurring previously to it by the time taken by the light to reach the observer. These refinements are needed for adequate account, he admits, but, he says, are not relevant to the questions concerning him here. (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 61-62)
our experience; and this is a realist assumption, not readily defended from justificationist premises. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 63)

4.7.2 Gaps in Reality

According to Dummett, justificationist semantics allows for gaps in reality, which he calls, "questions for which there is no answer containing any truth of the matter one way or another..." These are "like gaps in a fictional world." We may often have indirect justification to say how things are at some unobserved place, but, we are "not entitled to assume that there must always be some true answer to a question about such a matter." 26

A statement that an event is occurring in a place devoid of observers is true if such an event could have been observed had an observer been present. An observer at that place, if he had made the required observations, would either have observed the occurrence of an event of kind K or the nonoccurrence of such an event: so the statement that an event of that kind either did or did not occur there is true. But we do not have a basis to argue that either the statement that such an event occurred or the statement that no such event occurred is true. The validity of a particular case of the law of excluded middle is no safeguard against a gap in reality. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 64)

We are justified in asserting that either an event of a given kind is or it is not taking place here and now, if there is an effective means ("by making the required observations") of deciding whether such an event is taking place or not. We do not need to make these required observations. If we adhere to the principle that logical laws should similarly cover all empirical statements "irrespective of their spatiotemporal reference," then we recognize it as legitimate to assert of any place and time, that at that place and time, an event of that kind either occurred or will occur or it did not or will not; but preserving logical laws does not

26 "If, when asked whether Laertes was left-handed or right-handed, Shakespeare would have had no answer to give, then the question has no answer: there is no truth of the matter. Naturally, there will be many cases in which we have indirect grounds for saying how things are at some place where there is no observer; but on justificationist principles, we are not entitled to assume that there must always be some true answer to a question about such a matter." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 63) But it is unclear whether this question has no answer, or just no true answer. It has at least two answers. We do not know that if we were to time-travel back to Shakespeare and ask him that he would have no answer. He might e.g., consider for a moment and decide "He was certainly left-handed"—or he might say this without any consideration at all. The character's untraced "truths" may remain known by the author.
however implicate semantic theses. 27 We may simply need to adjust, he says, to whatever discomfort we have admitting that truth may not be an attribute of either disjunct, yet that the disjunctive statement might be true. For example, it may be true that ("Either there were tigers in England 10,000 years ago, or there were not" is true) but it may be that neither disjunct—neither "There were tigers in England 10,000 years ago" nor "There were no tigers there then" is true. We can admit the truth of the disjunction (admitting a bivalent realism thus far), but we cannot claim for what has not been decided (or observed—directly or indirectly) that it has.

Dummett does note that direct evidence for the truth of an empirical statement may involve an inferential component. This is on a "scale" he says, from reports of observation to the "other pole of mathematical theorems established by pure deductive reasoning." Most statements lie between these end points, including statements about unobservable conditions. 28

We form judgments about such matters by reasoning in accord with our physical theories from observations "remote from their conclusions," but this is not any kind of metaphysical difference, Dummett argues, but "only difference between what can be established by simple observation and what requires inference." (Some problems with Dummett's account of direct and indirect evidence and the unobservable will be examined in more detail below.)

But there is a genuinely metaphysical disagreement about the effect that the past tense has upon the meaning of a sentence, he says. It is not merely consistent with justificationist theory of meaning to take direct evidence to consist of observations made

27 Dummett argues that the "law of excluded middle, in cases when it holds good of the here and now, must be preserved as applying to the there and then; but we cannot argue, as we did before, from the validity of excluded middle to the semantic thesis of bivalence. We do not need, and have not the right, to maintain that either the statement that an event of the kind K occurred or will occur at the given place and time is determinately true or is determinately false." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 64)
28 Examples Dummett gives are the interior of the sun, supernova, black hole and statements about conditions before any observers. (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 64-65)
from "a suitable distance at the relevant time," but "essential so to take it." Here Dummett cites the need to admit testimonial and shared knowledge. He says, if evidence is to be taken as "in principle available to us collectively," our theory of meaning must be for our common language he says, and not for an idiolect.29

4.7.3 Problems of Direct and Indirect Evidence

It is significant to note, for the arguments of this chapter, that Dummett assumes any evidence we 'have' for an utterance to be evidence at present available. His justificationist theory of truth—even on its revised account, is a presentist account. The only distinguishing mark of present-tensed statements would be that their evidence will be direct, whereas truth of past-tense sentences will have to be taken to consist in availability of indirect—but present—evidence. If the child must recognize present evidence for the truth of a statement about another time as indirect, then it follows that the child must be able to recognize that some present evidence is direct evidence, while other present evidence is only indirect. But how does the child do this, given that lots of present tensed statements are also known to be true on the basis of indirect evidence? This question would seem to force a re-conception of direct and indirect.

Dummett considers statements about other places to be analogous to enquiring into our understanding of statements about other times. The child here must construct a grid, and he says that this must not only be a spatial and a temporal grid but a spatiotemporal grid.

But can we attribute to the child a recognition that present evidence for the truth of a statement concerning another time is indirect? Must he, to have acquired an understanding of the past and future tenses, grasp that what a statement couched in either of those tenses says is not that such evidence exists, but, rather, that that is how things

29 The quote reads, "(I)f the theory is to treat evidence, not as what an individual subject possesses, but as something in principle available to us collectively. We need a theory of meaning for our common language, not for an idiolect. Against this, the antirealist about the past holds that evidence for a statement about a past event can consist only in present memories or presently observable traces of the event. This is the metaphysical controversy we are exploring." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 65)
were or will be at the indicated position on the temporal grid? Does the analogy with his understanding of statements about other places work? (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 65)

It is evident in Dummett's critique of the unreformed justificationist that he divides knowledge between observational, which is directly evident, and testimonial or memorial which is only indirectly evident. Admitting the directly evident as what renders the statement true is what moves the revised version toward realism. The justificationist who does not admit this distinction is forced into "some tumultuous metaphysical waters." and fails to work as a theory of meaning for "our intertranslatable languages" (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 67)

Dummett concedes that we often have indirect evidence for the truth of statements about places where no observers were present. The sound of breaking glass in another empty room could be indirect evidence for "The vase fell and broke over there". Such indirect evidence is related to possible direct evidence in the following way: from the crashing sound we could infer, with some probability, that had there been some observer in the other room they would have directly witnessed the base fall and break. Direct evidence takes the form of an observation made at the time to which the statement refers. Dummett relates this to the fact that the dead remain (actual and could-be) observers and informants; and that we share knowledge collectively.

For all the messages that have been lost, it remains that statements about the past must count as having been directly established, and therefore as true, if someone observed them to be true at the, or an, appropriate past time. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 68)

But at the time, if such observations or evidence were direct they would have had the form of observational present tense statements. The messages Dummett is talking about here are not statements about the past but (present tensed) statements made in the past. Currently, such statements (made by a past observer and left in testimonial record) are also about the past. And even if then they were about the past, they were about the very recently observed past, and not the unobserved past as they are now. These, then are what we may take as
genuine past-tense observation statements as discussed further below—records left by
witnesses in their own words.

To give a brief example, a soldier may leave a record of a battle, with statements
about the battle. These will most probably be a mix of present and past-tensed statements.
"They came up over the ridge, and we charged—but didn't realize they'd come up behind us
as well..." Now we can make statements about that battle and that place and time, based on
these currently indirect testimonial records; and we can assume that direct observations could
have been correlated with these statements. But many, if not most, of our statements about
that battle—could not be confirmed by an observer of that battle, and indeed some of them
are about the then-unobservability of what turned out to have been facts. Not all (directly
observable) truths are observed at the time to which they refer.

Observation as ordinarily conceived is thought to reveal what would have been the case
even if there had been no observation. But this, Dummett says, is "a sophisticated thought"
(M. Dummett, 2004, p. 70). The practice in which the child learns to engage is to treat
observation as disclosing some state of affairs rather than as contributing to creating it. In
fact, a child must learn which features of experience are subjective. We acquire a
conception of independently existing or objective reality only through practice; this practice
of treating reality as objective allows us to acquire that conception. At a later stage we
extend "our childhood distinction between objective and subjective" into a distinction
between how things are independently of being perceived and how we perceive them.

This is a distinction which is far from straightforward, Dummett says. But his revision of
his own justificationist account of the meanings of past-tensed statements consists in bringing
them in tighter connection with objective conditions for maintaining the reality of past

30 "...it is in part by learning these skills that the child forms the conception of an objective environment
independent of his will and of its being observed by him or others, a conception that rounds out the
infantile expectations of repeatable surroundings and familiar experiences he has had since the earliest
stage of life..." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 71)
events, and freeing them from the anti-realistic associations of direct present evidence-dependence. A justificationist, he now says, must accept this revised account of how statements about the past are to be understood "because it is incontrovertibly how we do understand them: antirealism about the past does not faithfully represent the manner in which we in fact understand the past tense." (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 68-69)

4.8 The Vanishing-Past Returns

Luca Moretti has argued that Dummett’s revised view is subject to the same unpalatable consequence which motivated the revision: large tracts of the past are still vanishing. (Moretti, 2007) Memories and other current (and so now necessarily indirect) evidence of the past may dissipate. So, since postulating even counterfactual direct evidence about what has happened requires at least indirect evidence, if there is no current (indirect) evidence then what is past may be completely without any evidence. Accordingly, Dummett hasn’t solved the problem of antirealism about the past for the justificationist.

Moretti’s vanishing-past criticism of Dummett is highly significant, since it is to a large degree what motivated this recent elaboration of his research program (as he calls it in 1992 in "Realism and Anti-realism"). But it is not at all clear that Dummett’s revised view is subject to the problem of the vanishing past. Moretti seems to think that if indirect evidence vanishes then, not only can we no longer suppose there was any direct evidence, but we can no longer suppose any direct evidence was possible.

In the very same passage in which he argues that the vanishing past is an untenable consequence of his original justificationist position (and so must be revised), Dummett ascribes a “shadowy existence” to the past and future, enough to make such statements have potentially determinate truth values. In his later chapter on the metaphysics of time, he says
that an eternalist ("four-dimensionalist") conception of the metaphysics of time is the best possible view, as far as it goes, for his justificationist to hold.

Whatever this 'shadowy existence' (or four-dimensionalist reality) he attributes to the past is, it is at least enough to account for the truth-value links; and Dummett explicitly says that his concession to realism repudiates antirealism about the past. Again, this concession takes the form of a division between what would count as evidence or would make a statement true (what would count as direct evidence), and what a statement says, viz. 'if one were there one would have observed that...'

So, the meaning of a statement in the form, \( x \text{ occurred then} \), is to be distinguished from what makes this statement true. For example, the statement, "The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776", says (means) that one could have observed, in 1776 the signing of the Declaration of Independence, but what makes the statement true or false, what justifies an assertion of the statement, is our indirect evidence of this signing (our current copies, histories, etc.) that indicate that this was subject to direct verification at that time. Likewise the statement that "Homo sapiens walked the earth 100,000 years ago" is similarly indexed to the present and so its justification lies in the present or future, but what makes it true is something past. Dummett's view implies that we recognize the reality of the past by recognizing that our indirect evidence supposes some possible direct evidence. But what is directly evident likewise may lose its available (indirect) evidence.

Dummett has argued that we cannot assume that, even though it is true that had an observer been there then, the observer would have observed that something was or that something was not the case—at a place where there was (or is) no observer, we cannot assume that one or the other disjunct is true. And he apparently does not think his reformed view is subject to a vanishing past problem. But how is his view not subject to this defect?
Dummett remains an antirealist by admitting instead a non-forming (and not a vanishing) of the past. If something was observed, or was directly evident then it would have been, and so could have been, observed. So this having-been-observed of things is enough to ensure (a possible-) observability, even when later, current evidence has dissipated. So, it is not the case that the past vanishes when current evidence dissipates, since whatever was determinately present (whatever would have been directly evident then) does not vanish.

Read this way, Dummett’s justificationist position remains antirealist (at least by his own definition of being non-bivalent) more generally, though not remaining antirealist with regard to the past. This is of central importance and is brought out by Moretti’s criticism. The past does not vanish, if only because whatever “the past” is, it must have been, at one time observable in order to have been determinate and in order to now be decidable (even by means of indirect evidence).

This is why we may suppose that it may be the case that the disjunction (either \( P \) or \( \neg P \)) is true while it is also the case that neither disjunct is true. So it may be the case that, \( \neg P \) and \( \neg (\neg P) \) is true. This is just because, while we may hypothesize an observer, there is (or was) no observer and we cannot assume than the world is determinate without observation. So anything that (actually) is past, had direct evidence, and so not only could have been observed, but either was, or would have been observed. So, to bring in some of the above distinctions regarding the unobservably-past: The observed-past and the observable-past cannot vanish—and the wholly-unobservable-past never was.

Despite this defense of Dummett against Moretti’s claims, there are many problems with Dummett’s account. What ensures realism about the past or the non-vanishing (remaining) that he desires? For example, it is evident that Dummett considers a direct justification to be a matter of current observation and expressed by a present tense statement; but he admits the involvement of deduction and inference, as well as unobservable entities.
on this level of direct evidence. And this distinction between a canonical and non-canonical means of justification (direct and indirect evidence) was the crux of his revision. Yet how can such a distinction be upheld—when is something 'here and now'?

Even the truth of a present-tense statement is not just a matter of currently available evidence. Activities are continuing, after all. We have to see even the directly-evident 'here and now' through time, and even this—what is directly evident or justifiable, immediately involves the past. While this is true even for present-tense observation-statements, if the truth of any genuinely past-tense observation-statement is directly evident or justifiable—and some must be in order for any present-tense observation-statement to be directly evident—then it is necessarily by means of one's own past-observations.

Moreover, what was directly evident before (or what was more directly evident) cannot supply the condition for the truth or falsity of the past-tensed statement, since it was then present. Indirect evidence may not only be sufficient to supply such condition—as Dummett says, by implying the (now-past) presence of direct evidence—but necessary to supplying such condition. A statement about the past, if true, is not true just in virtue of what is present now, nor just in virtue of what was present then. (In fact, it could be argued that semantic realism about the past, i.e. a truth-conditional theory, is subject to this very complaint, contrary to how it appears at first.) Instead, such statements may, and perhaps must, be true in virtue of indirect (later) evidence.

It would seem that Dummett's first criterion required for understanding a past-tense statement, viz. an understanding of what it is for a state of affairs of the type in question to obtain or an event of the type in question to occur, already involves (at the level of direct evidence) indirect evidence. Even for present-tense statements that express what is directly evident (currently observable), indirect evidence is required—as memories, like current records, are considered to be indirect evidence. So there cannot be a difference in kind
between a canonical and non-canonical means of justification. Not only is here and now a matter of what and why, but direct and indirect have a strange relationship, especially with respect to statements about one's own past experience (This strange relationship shows direct and indirect cannot be distinguished by tense.)

Hence there are at least two possible responses to Moretti's complaint that the past continues to vanish. First, since there might always be indirect evidence available in future, we cannot say the past has really vanished. (Dummett seems to make this point considering quantification over infinite totalities.) So, we cannot know there cannot be (further) indirect evidence, so we cannot know the past has vanished—this sort of statement is undecidable. At most, we know just that it is not seen from here. Secondly, we cannot say for certain for any currently meaningful statement that there was, in fact, no direct evidence.

While indirect evidence gives us reason to suppose that direct evidence was possible (that something could have been observed, had an observer been present), the fact that there is currently no indirect evidence does not give us reason to suppose no direct evidence is or was possible. What is now past may be (may have been) observable from some present point of view (as is consistent with the theory of special relativity). In this regard, it might be noted that part of Dummett's motivation in revising his account may be in order to accord with a four-dimensionalist view of time as the dominant scientific view today. However, it is not the case that presentist ontologies are eliminated by special relativity—or at least, any more than eternalist ontologies, though this will not be argued directly here.

4.8.1 When and Where (and Who) is Observing?

The really disastrous problem for Dummett's view—and one which he has expressly avoided—is the temporal "distance" of the observer, or the observer's location relative to what is being observed. It is consideration of this issue that necessitates that indirect and
direct evidence is continuous and cannot be different in kind. (This can be established only on the basis of memory, and only this establishes a real past.) But Dummett's revised position requires that the canonical and non-canonical means of justification be genuinely distinct. Yet, it seems that different temporal distances would allow different understandings (observations) of such past events.

Such observations made from different temporal locations can be about the same event we think, though removed in time from one another. These observations of the same event may be very distinct, and may not be available from other viewpoints but may be equivalently true. Such observations remain true if ever they were true, even if both the original direct evidence and any other indirect evidence, is subsequently unavailable to other observers.

So, what exactly the requirements are for the directness of evidence is unclear—and detrimentally so. When is a current observation made? How far away (in space or time) does one need to be located to accurately observe a financial trend—a photon—breakfast? Where and when is best for observation depends on what is being observed and on what one wishes to say about it. (And, it is only hindsight that can be 20/20!) “Observing” the Big Bang for example, is better today (as indirectly evident) than it would have been if we had been present then and there (observing what was directly evident), and in more ways than one.

It also seems significant to note that using indirect evidence to suppose direct evidence involves other direct evidence—and this is not so easily distinguished from the indirect evidence. So what is directly evident in such a case as observing a past supernova, or the big bang, is either (both) the personally experience of the scientist and the inter-subjectively available observations, along with the collected data and calculations of others. It is only possible to observe such things now and would not have been subject to observation.
then and there—not by us or creatures like those we know and might communicate with anyway. Dummett intentionally passes over these crucial issues, but the *location* of the observer, even if just a remaining (apparently potential) observer, is the essential question. And so the question of an Ideal-Observer cannot be overlooked. What is observed depends not only on what is observable but on the means of observation, and so the capacities of the observer. The event would thus hold more “information” so to speak than any particular observer would (or could) observe.

While an un-revised justificationist view would seem to support this observation, Dummett’s revised view seems to fall prey to it. This takes the form of a restriction to our language community—in allowing testimonial transmission to delimit true facts about the past, with what makes them true lying in the past, as he says, he restricts reality to being determined by beings like us—“those we can communicate with”, rather than beings in general. If one admits reality is decided by the observer then one should naturally admit the possibility of distinct and even non-overlapping observations.

The revised view is intended to repudiate (or allow the repudiation of) antirealism about the past—claiming that while the past may exist, it is still not independent. (Dummett says that his personal view is that the past does not exist—but still concedes both a shadowy reality to it (and supports a four-dimensionalism, if any, metaphysical view.) Any determinate past, like the determinate present, requires an observer. And such an observer, as currently, actually, and diachronically existing, orders a history. An observer of the present who perceives something that is directly evident must have current evidence of the past—must also be an observer of the past.

If direct and indirect evidence are on a continuum, their significant difference cannot be between being currently evident and being evident later. Since, however, Dummett is considering only observation statements, he has assumed the primacy of the present-tense.
(He wishes to admit testimony and it is significant that this is part of the repugnance of antirealism about the past. Testimony is just past-tense observations (now past observation) and the records of now past observers. (In this regard, we may recall Reid on difference between testimony and judgment). But what a past-tense observation statement is exactly is unclear, and largely unexplored, even in discussions which, like Moretti’s, rely on this designation.

Moretti’s example of a past-tense observation-statement is “There was a river here five hundred years ago.” Presumably he uses this example because we naturally imagine that it could have been observed by others like us—since there are people who we know existed then. So, it is a good example of something that “could have been observed”. Taking a slightly different sort of such an “observation-statement”, the statement made now, “There were tigers in England 10,000 years ago”—is this something that could have been observed? Could it have been observed 60,000 BC?

But if, like Dummett (and, as we will see below, Ted Sider), one wants to hold a unified spacetime view, “here” (in “There was a river here”) will not be a sufficient index—as any here is also now. Sider brings up this difficulty of reference to similar or the same place over time in his discussions against presentism. And “five hundred years ago” is clearly indexical to the current time in which the statement is spoken. So, it is not the case that the statement, “There is a river here”, made five hundred years ago is anything that can be specified independently (as a current observation) as Moretti’s discussion assumes.

Does it help to change it to “There is event e (a river) at time t (1507 A.D.) at longitude x, latitude y, (=here)”? Does it help to put it in B-series, or “eternalist” terms? (It is significant to note that such eternalist language requires a second term—e then and there) Since longitude, latitude, and date cannot be observed, this cannot be an observation sentence. A greater problem with such eternalist language (as has been proposed in the
literature) is that such statements would be incompletely true. The river existed before and after 1507—so while it would be true that there was an event there and then, but this there and then still has to be currently delimited for the truth-value to be decided, since the event of the river existed in different ways and in different places over different times, an eternalist language requires (is) omniscience, not just schematic-dating.

Even the statement made now, "There were tigers there then" (which may be a genuine past-tense observation statement—by testimony or one's own past-observation) and the statement "There are tigers here now" made then, are incommensurable statements in a certain respect. How could that particular present tense statement (if made then) be measured then without admitting simultaneously a measuring what is now? In other words, the possibility of being-there would not be enough, since one would also have to have had been here, (in this language community now) to understand such a statement. So, a past tense observation statement has a different reference and additional sense. There are no genuine past-tense observation-statements that are not about one's past observations. And, there is an important sense in which "I saw that man" is a genuine past-tense observation-statement, but even, "There were tigers there then" only masquerades as one.

4.8.2 The Real and the Knowable

According to Dummett's first chapter, truth is an attribute of a token sentence under a particular (maximally determinate) interpretation. What makes this token sentence about the past true, Dummett says lies in the past and its truth is to be explained in terms of what is, or can be, or could have been known or observed. The reality of such events consists in their potential for being objects of determinate experience. In Dummett's view, whatever is real is knowable:
What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true. Reality is the totality of what can be experienced by sentient creatures and what can be known by intelligent ones.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 92)

But if so, then there cannot be "gaps in reality as Dummett says there may be, for the same reason why Moretti's criticisms fall short. If the reality lies in a potentially determinable truth value, and all that is real is knowable, then there cannot be genuine gaps in reality, but only currently evident gaps (or gaps in current knowledge). But reality, as what is knowable, is seamless. What is unknowable, if it exists anywhere, exists outside of reality and not within it.

There is an immediately evident problem for Dummett in that what could have been known or observed then, is greater than what actually happened or what would have been observed then. So, for example, it could have been observed that Ceasar killed Brutus—i.e., if it had been the case that he did. Should we say instead "what could not have been known or observed to have been—or be—otherwise" or perhaps, "what could not have been observed differently"? But, we normally think that things in fact could have been otherwise, and they could have been observed differently. In fact, this is the only remaining contingency of the past—and at the heart of this contingency lies the past's necessary. Is even this contingent fact, that things could have been otherwise, an illusion? Is it just what is present or future that is actually contingent, while what is past is simply necessary (even perhaps, being precisely exactly what is necessary)? After all, since it occurred, it could not and cannot ever be otherwise. Only before such past events were present (i.e. in their own past) such things could have been otherwise. But now they cannot.

This set of issues for Dummett's revised account, revolve around the problem of the holism of the verification context. This implicates a real diachronic separation for the verifier (the real observer). Even the possibility of something's having been observed (ideally) is also really past—just as the object or reference of the past tense statement is past.
The possibility of direct verification without indirect verification is in question. And it might be argued on such grounds that Dummett’s new justificationist-realist account of past tense statements also cannot account for the truth-value links. It may be true that \( S \) is or was at \( t' \) even though there is no available justification for \( S \) being or having been the case at \( t' \). But maybe at \( t^2 \) there could be. This is not entirely dissimilar from Moretti’s criticism in some respects (though reversed)—it is a problem of a newly apparent past. So, it isn’t enough to claim the meaning of a past tense statement is understood as what could have been observed—or even as what would have been directly evident. There are many cases where we understand statements to be true about past times and know these things could \textit{not} have been observed there at that time.

It may seem to make sense to analyze the statement, "\textit{it was the case that} \( p \)" as "\textit{if one were there then they would have observed} \( p \)"—but how is this different from the statement "\textit{if one were there (where \( p \) is) then, \( p \)"? But these seemingly mean different things—it may have been the case that \( p \) even if no one there then would have observed \( p \). That \( p \) was the case may be true even if no one there then could have observed \( p \) (that \( p \) was the case could have still been observable). But the statement made then, i.e. that "\textit{\( p \) is the case}" could not have been true, even if no one there then had observed or had even made the statement then. We often understand things as true, knowing they could not in principle have been observed in any non-tensed way. Verification itself takes time, to put it mildly, and if, for example, one is discussing a 10 year economic trend and making statements that can be evaluated, this is not a simple matter.

\textbf{4.8.3 Reality without Gaps}

If what is real is knowable, it is observable in principle (even if only indirectly) and hence sentences about this reality must be in principle decidable. So there cannot be
"(information-) gaps in reality", though some truth values may not, in fact, be decidable. The truth-value links are inherently diachronic—or really diachronic. And a counterfactual account of the truth of statements about the past which relies on a suitably placed (and so ideal) observer (i.e. direct evidence) relies on this observer having a suitable background (having currently indirect evidence—i.e. past direct evidence). Dummett’s counterfactual formulation cannot account for this diachronic reality since a suitably placed observer carries the place of justification into the place of real action. The suitable context requires presently available contextual experience.

So, evaluating whether there were tigers in England in 60,000 BCE (Carruthers, "Eternal Thoughts") requires a suitably placed observer who must know both the present borders of England at the time of the questioning, how to date back, how to track the borders of England over this period into the past, and to what ‘tiger’ might reasonably apply, taking into account the expectations one who asks as well, perhaps as a base knowledge of species, etc. depending on the situation.

The answers won’t be determinate necessarily. While there may have been a fact of the matter about what was the case, we cannot even say it is true that there either were or were not tigers there then. The answer depends on largely on the context of the question. The past may be actually decided at this point in time, but bivalence (or deciding truth) is a current question, and accords to present statements, even if they are about the past. This has no reflection on the ontological or existential reality of the past.

4.8.4 Deciding Statements about the Past in a Present Context

Statements about the past, in Dummett’s view, are justified if a suitably placed observer could have justifiably assented to the truth of the statement. But the statement must then be taken as present (as directly evident). We might call statements about the present
‘synchronic’ and, for such statements, Dummett’s verificationism would seem to work fine since the context of observation and observer, are co-chronic with the language community. And still, this involves a real past. But, for diachronic statements (including past tense observation statements) which are equally fundamental, we need to change some of his account.

The meaning of the question must adjust in its translation to the past, there is a mapping, not of a spatiotemporal grid with oneself as a point of origin, as Dummett describes, but a translation of content—or diachronic transmission of content. Even admitting a god’s eye view, all we could do would be to hold the borders of England as fixed as possible while simultaneously admitting their temporal change, and hold all species of tigers as fixed rotating back the course of our pocket of the universe to then look and see. Now, is that or is that a tiger? Is it a river? (Is Pluto a planet?) So, we don’t just have to map, but hold our context and add other contexts. The question taken in context of only that past time could have no meaning. In fact, since the central emphasis of intuitionist justification in mathematics is the present request or requirement for a proof. It is likewise the present requirement for justification that determines the context by which the possible past observer must respond. It is the present observer who frames the terms of the question.

It is in the context of the process of justifying that the proof becomes proof. It would appear that for the antirealist of Dummett’s type, the proof that could have been observed would be the same proof as the one requested. So the verification of tiger-type animals in a pre-England area (their potency to result in observation then and there) would seem to exist only as a function of the questioning here and now. Dummett’s modified antirealism would seem to admit a very present-centric version of realism about the past. And, it may be that his particular position—not revised justificationism more generally—collapses into either realism or antirealism. In a response to Christopher Peacocke, Dummett modifies his
position further, unadmittedly becoming a truth-conditional theorist. This isn’t the case, only if, while the meaning of the content of a statement is coming from the present, the justifier’s context, the proof itself for any related content (what is potentially observable then) is temporally remote. But this cannot give canonical-status to direct evidence statements.

The statement that could have been made 60,000 years ago on the land that is now England that, here there are tigers, if true, must be true in virtue of that observer’s context on the justificationist account. But the meaning of this statement would be lost on any observers of that time, but the meaning of the content of here there are tigers, conceived by an antelope or pre-modern man, understood as run or hunt carefully, for such a predator abounds, perhaps would not. And what would count as tiger-like enough might be broadened. But there has been a shift in meaning, which runs deeper than its statement. Even leaving aside such considerations of what meaning, or meaning the same thing is, there is a change of sense over tense. The meaning of a statement can’t simply be a function of the current use of words even given contextual holism, but transferring meaning is the function of communication, and use may exceed manifestation. Meaning is not just a function of sentences, nor of thoughts or propositions, but is a function of experience—of affecting and being affected. Meaning and metaphysics are not just a matter of semantics!

4.9 Revising the Revision (again)

In the end, Dummett’s modified antirealist account doesn’t secure the realism of the past that he seems to desire. If the justification indeed is justifier-sensitive, it is sensitive to both what justifies (viz. the superimposed past) and to whoever does the justifying in the present. The truth-value links will only hold relatively, and this is okay for a verificationist; but the only suitably placed observer who could uphold the links would be one who is located across contexts—or to put it more precisely, who locates and links contexts.
If, as Dummett supposes, the past no longer exists, then the context from which one is to gain meaning is from present observation alone as direct. This is the observation of the witness whose position can't be extricated from the veracity of the information reported—but neither can history be extricated from the witness. He has suggested that we understand statements about the past as true (if true) just as we understand true statements about absent places. If we were there, we would observe such and such happening—and this, he says, is what we take the statement to say.

The important point is that if observational statements are direct or indirect, and understanding their meaning involves the two-step process (understanding what would make it or show it to be true and what the statement says) then only for a certain class of statements does Dummett's modified view avoid the untenable antirealism about the past. What could have been observed is, for one's own past experience, what was observed. So, although Dummett has avoided memory, to which Peacocke rightfully calls our attention. Dummett assumes its stepwise nature as described by Campbell, and as discussed in the previous chapter. This stepwise nature of memory, i.e. that it is dependent upon some more original experience, requires realism about the past according to Campbell.

Dummett wishes to secure realism about the past and so admit the veracity of testimony (and, presumably, memory) by admitting that what makes such claims true really lies in the past. His spatial language is extremely unhelpful here, but he also supports a four-dimensional view of time over any other, with only an epistemic difference between future and past—and so does seem to agree to a spatialized view of time.

In this case, the reality of the past (and the genuine lying in the past of what is past) must be that it was there then and is past now. What is there (lying in the past) is not here or now. It never was here or now unless it was our own past experience. And likewise, what makes statements about the past true (or what lies in the past) will never be here and now.
unless such things have already been here and now.

Dummett maintains that there is only an epistemic difference between past and future and that there is nothing genuinely—ontologically—past about this real past. He leaves this shadowy existence unexplored but it seems that such a past is only real as a personal shadow—our own past. It is only by validating remembrance that Dummett's revised view can succeed to secure the truth-value links. And if these are property identity links, which must be secured by memory, then we might have to admit memory—and so real being—to the ideal observer.

Explaining our understanding of past times on analogy with our knowledge of distant places, he says that we would understand we would already have to be there to observe such things; even our own going there only counts in his view as indirect. So this makes time disanalogous to space in some respect, since we really were already there—in our own personal past. Although Dummett is concerned largely with currently unobserved places and times, remembering our own past observed experience either gives us direct or indirect knowledge—we either immediately perceive the past, or we use the current 'testimony' of our past self by memory, and infer from our present representation that direct evidence could have been observed. But we do not have to. In such a case, we know that it was observed.

In his response to Peacocke's criticisms in Mind (2005), Dummett alters this account even further. Instead of conceiving the meaning of a past-tense statement in terms of the counterfactual about what one would observe if one were there, or 'what could have been perceived', Dummett says that this should be understood to be "the physical light waves, sounds, etc. that could have been observed then." (Michael Dummett, 2005) Dummett stresses that this latter counterfactual is not giving conditions of the meaning of such statements.
It appears that by attempting to overcome Peacocke's objections to his reformed account, in this even more severely reformed account, Dummett wishes to move further than before toward general realism by securing a genuinely observer-independent verification conditions at a non-present time. But one wonders how such severely actual-recognition-transcendent verification-conditions would differ from plain and simple truth-conditions? Dummett appears to move from a counterfactual analysis to a 'factual' analysis, since presumably he thinks there is a fact of the matter as to what physical conditions were available for observation then—there were physical light waves sounds etc. that could have been observed (there was and would have been more direct evidence then). But, if the position is that there is no fact of the matter about what could have been observed then—or, in other words, that what could have been observed is not determinate now, but what could have been observed may have been determinate then, in which case, the view seems to fall to incoherence, since what could have been observed cannot have been determinate, for (to be consistent) if it were, it would have been observed.

4.10 Conclusions about this Shadowy Past

Dummett admits a shadowy existence for the past, but still wishes to hold that there may be no fact of what could have been observed if in fact no observer was present. But again, Dummett seems ambiguous here, for while there may be no fact about what would have been observed where no observer was present, it cannot be that there is no fact about whatever could have been observed—since this is, itself, a fact about it. It is unclear whether his newer form of non-reductive antirealism (giving the past a shadowy existence) is still anti-realism. The consistent antirealist view is that what could have been observed may be determined, but only after the fact. Only what was or would have been observed would have been determinable then. It would seem that Dummett's way of admitting realism about the
past in contrast, must admit realism more generally—but even more problematically, becomes a truth-conditional, if not bivalent, account. Such conclusions are further supported by the fact that Dummett sees his semantic theses as reflected in, or as generating, as he says, a four-dimensional view of time.

In part, I have defended Dummett’s revised account against the problem of a vanishing past by trying to cling onto a more consistent antirealist position. This involved distinguishing genuine past tense observation statements—statements about things observed in the past, and past tense statements more generally. Direct and indirect evidence are at least overlapping in some cases, particularly those of one’s own past experience. This unification of such evidence enables understanding the difference between here and now and there and then—since, in our own case, our personal condition, what was once here and now is now there and then. So we not only need to understand a bipartite sense, we have to understand a unified sense of such evidence. These forms of evidence are not different in kind, and so a real past reality must be admitted, even into a justificationist theory of meaning, as well as into any presentist view of time (as will be shown further below).

However, Dummett’s revisions force us into at least a minimal realism. Here we can conceive one which is not subject to the problems of the vanishing past. This realism imparts a continuing possibility of observation of past events (and so their possible re-presentation as well and their knowability). They have only “vanished from here”. Others appear only visible now from here—and their visibility does not depend on their appearance now and here—but on the real appearance at some other time (a there and then). This implies a continuing openness to affect further observation along with the remaining reality of a present diachronic observer.
CHAPTER 5: THE REALITY OF THE PAST AND THREE RELATED PROBLEMS

5.1 Existence, Persistence and Tense

There are three closely related ontological issues involving time, persistence, and change:

1) When does anything exist?
   Does anything exist only presently? Is anything now real also not-present?

2) How does anything persist?
   Does anything persist over time as it changes, and if so, how?

3) Is anything really tensed?
   Does anything have intrinsic temporal properties, and if so, what?

In noting these three areas, Remko Muis suggests two sorts of responses in each: To the question of existence, presentists maintain that only present things exist, while eternalists argue that things other than present things exist. (Muis, 2005) As to the question of what persists, perdurantists maintain that objects or events persist over time by having temporal parts or stages, whereas endurantists hold that a thing or event which persists over time endures, and at any time at which it exists, all of it exists wholly at that time. The third question, that of tense, concerns whether events properly speaking, admit of tensed (A-series: past, present, future) or only of tenseless (B-series: earlier-later) property-ascriptions. Here, the former view is opposed to the latter in holding that tense is real in some sense—presentness, pastness, and futurity are irreducible or mind-independent properties, qualities, relations, etc. The tenseless view of the B-theorist makes the opposing claim; tense is not an essential part of content, and tensed discourse can be reduced to tenseless discourse.

Most often, arguments for one or another of these positions take the form of reasons for rejecting the opposing viewpoint. For each of these three questions, however, there is at least one additional type of answer. Corresponding to this fact, we might wonder whether there is not a third genuine option to these dynamic (A-type) and static (B-type) conceptions more generally. For our discussion here, it is significant that this third-type of option is not simply a reconstruction or amalgamation of the extreme opposite views, but is distinctly and equally a third
In other words, it does not lie halfway between A and B views, so to speak, but is as equidistant from each of them as they are from each other. This third sort of answer not only sheds light on what is desirable in each of the dichotomous positions, it shows in what sense each is ultimately bound to be insufficient if taken alone (as a pure A-theory or B-theory).

Interestingly enough, once this third view is admitted as a real option (or logical position in the debate), the contrast between A- and B-views become clearly laid out. In the absence of this third-position, the dichotomous positions on these issues, viz. presentism and eternalism, endurance and perdurance, etc. tend to be indistinguishable. In each case such a third-position focuses our attention on the reality of pastness specifically.

However, there are many complex positions one might take on these three issues; and one need not package together presentism with endurance and an A-theory of time—or eternalism with perdurance and a B-theory of time. The possible nuances that have been, or might be taken on any combination of these issues, are largely outside the current purview; there is a tremendous literature of arguments for and against such views. In what follows here, my primary intention is to set the background for an analysis of what this third-sort of answer indicates; and to establish that it is genuinely a third-way of how, as McTaggart said, "positions in time appear to us".

5.1.1 Third-ways

With regard to the question of temporal ontology, the third-position has been expounded as a "growing block" view. With regard to the question of what persists, such a third-position, called "stage" view, has recently been dubbed exdurantism. Debates regarding the question of tense concern the real ordering of things—whether anything is (was, will be) genuinely past, present, and future; or whether things stand only in relations of precedence, and simultaneity or subsequence to one another. This latter debate, taken most recently as being between 'tensers' and 'de-tensers', is easily complicated by linguistic confusions in what are, admittedly (as
arguments about the real existence, mind independence, or irreducibility of tense) highly
linguistic arguments.

In the case of tense, the third-way is less clear than in the other two cases. Since the
word "past" is naturally wedded to a tensed A-series, "a tenseless view of the past" can originally
sound like an oxymoron. But we are, ourselves a combination of tense and tenselessness,
mobility and rest, what changes and what does not. In this regard, William Craig has said that
McTaggart's paradox results from his trying to combine B-series ontology with A-series
ascriptions. The problems here are deep, and Craig argues that a consistent A-series ontology
avoids McTaggart's paradox. Yet a consistent A-series ontology is like a view from nowhere—
and leaves the real living observer out of the equation of change.

Dummett's original semantic antirealist seemed to reduce questions of what exists, and
what persists to the third sorts of questions, questions of (the meaningfulness of) tense. But
issues of tense are deeply interwoven with those of change, and so cannot be separated from
questions of the second type, viz. of what persists (so that it can change). The question of what it
is of the human body which remains while changing from a fetus all the way to an old or even
dead person, turns out to be the question whether a particular body, say the 25 year old body,
exists only when it is that age, or also exists at other times when that-aged body is not present?

With regard to what exists, although his original view seems to presume presentist
ontology, Dummett ends in support of an eternalist view of time's reality. In his chapter on the
metaphysics of time in Truth and the Past, Dummett has sided with a "changing four-
dimensionellism" where what changes is our epistemic relation (M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 73-96 Ch. 5).
But in this sort of view, there is no time for activity and no space for acting.

5.1.2 "The past" and Problems of Persistence and Tense

In one sense, the three 'parts' of time cannot be entirely separated, and each 'part' has its
own set of logical problems and phenomenological complexities. Time does not really have
'parts' as such, after all. With a little reflection, it seems that time itself is not past, present or future, only events (people, things, etc) are past, present and future, and this is relative to whatever is taken as present. So if time is anything, it is significantly ubiquitous—it continues. We are always subject to time (even though we may not be aware of it at the time—when we are in dreamless sleep, e.g.); and conscious awareness makes apparent a continuous novelty. We might think time is nothing if it is not this very fact of change, which continues whether or not we are consciously aware of it.

The phenomenology of time seems to require this dynamic, or tensed, structure of temporal becoming as an important part of a theory of time. Yet we also can, and do, conceive of events in a static or tenseless way. In contemporary discussion these fluid and frozen designations of events have become sides in a debate over whether we can speak of events as being past or present (or future) without considering whether they are prior or subsequent to one another as opposed to prior or subsequent to now—or whether we can consider one event to be earlier than another without considering either event to be past, present, or future. (But it may yet be that something must be present, i.e. simultaneously related.)

Based on this distinction McTaggart had argued that "time is unreal" in two steps: Since time requires change, and the B-series (tenseless) involves no change, the A-series (tensed) must be real if time is real. But contradictory predications cannot be true of something real. Since one and the same event (or object) cannot be both present and past, time (conceived of as an A-and B-series) must be unreal. McTaggart's arguments and the problems they give rise to will be discussed further in the final metaphysics chapter below; and tense will be examined there in some detail. Dummett has analyzed the import of McTaggart's argument to be that there is no complete description of reality, but only a maximal description at any given time, at which time tensed predications will be true. William Craig has taken McTaggart's problem to be analogous to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (as conceived by David Lewis). After looking at the three
questions of existence, persistence, and tense separately, we will see how they are inextricably interwoven issues.

In the following three chapters, the relation of these third-way solutions to issues of the ontological status and nature of the reality of the past will be analyzed. We will begin with existence and the presentism. Are different times just a matter of measurement and likeness rather than independent extent and isolated content? And if so, what holds them together? What divides them? What makes it—or me and you—here-and-now? Our results will be elaborated in conjunction with possible solutions to both problems of growing block theories and problems of endurance views. To put these questions in greater relief, Buddhist and Indian Grammarian views of time will be discussed. Here we will begin with the first issue—the duration of existence—and Dummett’s analysis of the metaphysics of time.

5.2 Past-Times’ Reality

Realism can be thought of as having at least two types of possible claims: about the objective existence or ontological independence (often mind-, or knowledge-independence of something, on the one hand, or irreducibility of something on the other). There are correspondingly different ways in which the reality of the past might be affirmed: One might argue that what is past exists now—e.g. such that we might “travel” there; or that what is past is independent of thought, or that it is not dependent on anything present here-and-now. Alternatively, one could also claim that what is past is irreducible, e.g. to what is present or to what is timeless—or what can be described in present tense, or ‘eternalist’ language.

Similarly, there are two immediately evident ways in which the ontological reality of past time can be denied: Past time can be considered unreal (or not to exist) because time itself is unreal (this is often the claim that time is a mind-dependent illusion of some sort,
thus encompassing the second way to deny the reality of something);\textsuperscript{31} or past time may be considered unreal as opposed to real present (and perhaps future) time. The past, as past, is after all, requisitely absent and so apparently opposed to a real present. So it is easily thought that what is past may be somehow reducible to whatever is present. It does seem that the clearest and most direct denial of the reality of the past is by way of a presentist view.

The terminology and taxonomy here can be confusing. Construed most generally, presentist views maintain that anything which exists is something present, and the only temporal reality is the present time. Past and future events, etc. are at present non-existent. Presentism is often taken to be opposed to eternalism. The eternalist’s view is that now past and future events or objects, events, etc. are as ontologically real as those that are now present. Eternalism is sometimes called four-dimensionalism (but is not to be confused with what have come to be called—due to David Lewis—“perdurantist” views, also sometimes called “four-dimensionalism”).\textsuperscript{32}

Dummett’s original semantic antirealism seemed to reduce questions of the first type, viz. questions of what exists, as well as those of what persists, to the third sorts of questions, questions of tense. But issues of tense are deeply interwoven with those of change, and so cannot be separated from questions of the second type, viz. of what persists. The question of what remains over change is ultimately the question of what really exists; or what is sustained—or sustaining—over this evident changing.

\textsuperscript{31} The unreality of past time may follow from either the unreality of time or the unreality of pastness or real tense—yet the reality of what appears as past time as part of the eternalist position could be seen as admitting pastness to all that is eternal—as always having been. This argument, interpreting the B-series as relations of precedence and the inseparability of the eternalist view from a view involving real pastness, will be explicated further below and evidences the ontological primacy of the past.

\textsuperscript{32} Endurance theories and perdurance theories are related views of objects (or events). Perdurance theorists hold that something is present over time, or persists, on account of having temporal (and spatial) parts; while endurance theorists hold that being present over time is a function of an enduring object, or one which is wholly present at any particular time. A third sort of debate concerns the reality and irreducibility of tense. The role of what is past in each of these issues, and the involvement of the problem of the reality of the past in these three debates will be considered in the following chapters.
With regard to what exists, although Dummett's original view seems to presume presentist ontology, Dummett ends up supporting an eternalist view of time's reality. He says that if any model is appropriate at all, it would be a "changing four-dimensionalism" where what changes is our epistemic relation. (See M. Dummett, 2004, pp. 88-92) But in this sort of view, there is no time for activity and no space for acting.

5.2.1 Existence

Our first issue concerning time's existence could be described as a debate over the real duration (or extension) of whatever exists. Here, we seem to have four basic positions. Presentist (sometimes called 'three-dimensional') views hold that only what is present is real. What is real (present) changes—but only present-things exist. Eternalist views maintain, in contrast, that it is not the case that only what is present is real—past and future things are equally (and perhaps equivalently) real. A third sort of view holds that what is past is real, but what is future is not. (In such views, there is a real difference between real things.)

In contrast to all of these views, but most specifically, in opposition to this third-type of view, is a fourth available position, viz. the unreality of time. To deny the reality of time is one way in which to deny the reality of the past. Here, tense, presentness or pastness, is not considered a real quality, etc. The antirealist about time who admits realism about events says that events we call "past" are real, they are not really past—time is not really tensed. The thesis of the unreality of time says more: its effect is to deny the reality of change. Such a view also entails that being-tensed is illusory.

33 These four basic positions are taken as the most simple logical alternatives. In what follows, these positions (in some of their versions) will be discussed; and also, some alternatives will be proposed; but there are there a myriad of versions of these basic positions which will not be discussed here.
5.3 Dummett on Metaphysical Models of Time

...disagreements about how we understand statements in the past and future tenses reflect, or generate, disagreements about the metaphysics of time.\(^{34}\)

In the fourth chapter of *Truth and the Past*, Dummett gives a brief analysis of various ontological positions with regard to the reality of time. In this chapter he addresses the question of what model of time accords with, or is reflected in or generated by, his revised account. In the end, he aligns his modified antirealism (modified regarding past tense sentences) with the *four-dimensional view of time*.

Though Dummett writes that the past no longer exists (actually), he claims that his revised semantic antirealism "doesn't necessarily conflict with the existence of the past, but only its independence." However, it would seem to be an odd claim to say that what is past has a real independent existence apart from what is present—or apart from any awareness at all, since it does, after all have to exist as past, and not as present. But he does not think his modified antirealism should be aligned with either presentism or the growing-block view.

In Dummett’s analysis, there are four possible positions concerning the reality of past and future: both are real, or neither, or one but not the other. He tests each of these positions against the measure of his revised justificationist account. Here, the focus is on the concordance with our ordinary use of tensed statements, and satisfaction of the truth value links. These four views, Dummett says, are usually expressed as if “present,” “past,” and “future,” were absolute notions. If we represent assignment of the states of reality by the sign ‘X’, then the four possible positions could be charted out as follows:\(^{35}\)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
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\(^{34}\) Italics mine. This is a very interesting disjunction to note. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 73)

\(^{35}\) “X” indicates ‘is real’.

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Under the first model, *only the present is real*. The past was part of reality but no longer exists; while the future does not yet exist but will come into existence and then will be part of reality. What there is continually changes and reality consists of what there is now.

There are two problems with this purely presentist model. The first is well-known: the problem of the durationless present. Such a present can only exist if that which it bounds exists. The second, and more devastating objection Dummett raises, is that this model denies any truth-value to statements about the past or the future. Thanks to truth-links that we accord to statements, from the current truth that I am writing today it should logically follow tomorrow that I wrote yesterday: But if this model were correct, then there can be nothing in reality in virtue of which tomorrow it could be true that I wrote it yesterday. Dummett says that there would be nothing in virtue of which a statement of either type could be true or false, whereas a proposition can be true only if there is something in virtue of which it is true. We must attribute some form of reality either to the past, or to the future, or both.” Such a crude presentism must therefore be rejected.

Under the second model, *the present and future is real, but the past is not*. The future is accessible, Dummett says, we “have only to wait to discover what it holds, which is what it has always held. The past, by contrast, is inaccessible.” He offers two versions of this model. Under the “radical version” of model 2, the past has “vanished utterly”. Under this traceless radical version, a past tense statement may have been true at the time to which it refers, but it is no longer either true or false. Under the contentious version of model 2, in contrast with this radical traceless model of 2, it is acknowledged that the past has left traces including memories which are part of the present and are all that there is of the past—they “constitute” it. Citing John Wheeler, he says that in this model, “the past has no existence
except as it is recorded in the present.” But, Dummett adds, no independent reality. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 74) 36

The proponent of model 2 can maintain the truth value links only if he relativizes the truth of a statement not only to the time of utterance but also the time of evaluation. This proponent says, according to Dummett, “that a statement about what is happening now may be true but may later be correctly judged not to have been true.37 In this conception “reality changes continually, and, with it, the past also changes.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 75) But here, because the past is thought to have no independent existence, this change (that Dummett attributes under this presentist model to the past) must amount to a change of some non-existent but dependent-past.38 Dummett says that the antirealist admits that a statement about what is happening now will render true a statement made in a year’s time about what happened a year before, because the sense of “true” changes with time. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 77)

Dummett says he finds this counterintuitive. He writes that we “should normally assume, however, that such variable assessment is inconsistent: it could not be correct at both times.” We are thus “disposed to object, that the sense of “true” does not change with time, and that the predicate “is true” may be relativized to the time of utterance, but does not need to be further relativized to the time of evaluation. Thus both versions of model are

36 He includes CI Lewis, AJ Ayer and J Lukasiewicz as other well-known proponents of this model.
37 The proponent of model 2 “does not mean what we mean by saying that it is what happened in the past that determines the truth or falsity of our statements about the past; for he uses the phrase “what happened a year ago,” to mean “what year-old events there are present traces of,” which is what, for him, determines a statement about how things were a year ago as true, false, or devoid of truth value. But we mean to oppose “what happened in the past,” as being what renders statements about the past true or false, to present traces of what happened: that, we believe is the metaphysical principle enshrined by the truth value links...” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 77)
38 Mention of a presentist-changing past, is seen again on p. 79, where still concerning presentist models, Dummett writes that in contrast to the future, “to hold that a statement about the past was true, but is now false, would be to say that the past had changed, just because there are no tendencies toward the past. These various features of our common linguistic practice reflect our conception of how time relates to causality, and are hard to reconcile to any version of model (2). They therefore go to substantiate a justificationist acceptance of the reality of the past, in allowing that the evidence that renders a statement about the past true may itself lie in the past.
unacceptable, since such a view does not accord with how we understand tensed statements nor does it adhere to the truth-value links.

As model 2 denies the reality of the past, model 3 denies the reality of the future but they are not strictly analogous. Model 3 can allow statements about the future to have varying degrees of probability, and that they can’t, as yet, be determinately true or false:

The probability of a statement in the future tense is that of its proving to be, of becoming, true at the relevant time; we are accustomed to this from the practice of betting. But the probability of a statement in the past tense can only be the probability of its being now true; if it has no truth value, it can have no probability. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 78)

Model 3 (in which only the future is unreal or non-extant) he says, is not blatantly inconsistent with our use of future tense, though its analogue, the radical traceless version of Model 2, "deprives our use of the past tense of all meaning." Model 3 is the "mirror image" of model 2. The past is part of reality, the future is not. If the future existed, we could know it, since statements about it could be presently true or false in virtue of how it is going to be. (This is just to say "if the future was (already determined, i.e. past), we could know it."

In other words, what is known is the past. But we cannot in principle know the future. We can entertain propositions about the future and can even assign probabilities but even if such a statement has a very high probability, it cannot be knowledge because it could be proven false by events not happening in the predicted way. In contrast the past is part of reality and cannot be determined differently. In this model the passage of time is a "continual growth in the sum total of reality.

Dummett says model 3 is more "palatable" than model 2 since it allows an account of statements in the future tense that is completely in accord with the way in which we use them and understand them. But he argues that the argument for the indefiniteness of the future is
not cogent. The illusion, he says, derives from the idea that the present truth must compel the future action. He argues that the efficacy is actually in the reverse direction, i.e. that "a proposition about what I am going to do is true in virtue of my later action." (The type of example Dummett has chosen here, personal action, is highly significant as will become clearer below.) There is no logical necessity that causation run in the earlier to later direction. That is just the direction of our experience. This is a pervasive fact about reality and, Dummett argues, not a ground for denying substance to what lies in one or other temporal direction from the present moment. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 83) So, in the end, model 3 is subject to an objection strictly analogous to that against model 2.40

The proponent of model 3, Dummett says, may protest that he doesn't think any statement in future tense has determinate truth value.41 Only statements in the present and past tenses have determinate truth value. But such determinacy even about future tense statements is what the truth value link demands.42 Such a proponent could modify model 3 by denying that we have any "genuine future tense" for which the truth value links hold. But which it relates: it must retain that truth value thereafter. If the past did not continue to possess an enduring reality, our statements about it would not all possess the truth values that they fleetingly had at, and soon after, the time to which they related. In that case, the past tense could not bear the sense that we believe ourselves to have conferred upon it. A statement about the past must still be true or false, according to what happened at the time to which it relates and the truth-value it had then. Otherwise the past tense has no substance." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 80)

40 "For the constancy of truth value is as much impugned by the thesis that statements about the future acquire a truth value only at the time to which they relate as by the supposition that statements about the past are deprived of truth value as soon as evidence of their truth or falsity is dissipated. It is what is going to happen in the future that renders our statements about the future true, when they are true. This platitude is embodied in the truth value links, just as was the corresponding platitude concerning statements about the past." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 83)

41 But it would seem that such a proponent might allow that such statements have determinate truth value, but simply not a bivalent or already decided truth value.

42 "...the statement, made a year ago that you would be doing x, e.g. in exactly a year’s time was true: that it was then true, not merely that it would be true in a year’s time. The proponent of model 3 will be forced to hold that it may be correct, at a given time, to assign a truth value to a statement in the future tense made previously but relating to that time. That earlier statement lacked a truth value when it was made; now it has acquired one. Just like the proponent of model 2, the proponent of model 3 has been compelled to regard the truth value of statements in the future tense as needing to be relativized to the time of evaluation, and not just to the time at which they are made. What provides any space for such a dual relativization? Model 3 is open to objections precisely analogous to those we admitted as fatal to model 2. If our argument against model 2 was valid, virtually the same argument must be valid against model 3." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 84)
even if it could be argued that it is not a genuine future tense, the proponent would have to maintain that our use of such a tense is unintelligible, when it is not. So, the fourth model remains our only option.

According to the fourth model, the past and future are not distinct in reality. Here, in Dummett's somewhat vague description, the distinction is just between the direction of causal efficacy and information transfer. So, we designate events as 'future' that we can affect but from which we receive no information, and 'past' those from which we receive information but which we cannot affect. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 86)

But, expressing his qualms Dummett says that a changeless "four-dimensional model" which counts change as the movement of consciousness along a temporal axis would deprive the world of genuine change. Because of this, "the version that restricts change to the movement of our consciousness along the temporal dimension is capricious." It is only an illusion that this sort of version of model 4 is intelligible. "If it is conceded that there is change, there is no ground for such a restriction..." Divested of its changeless form, model 4,

...appears fully consonant with the justificationist understanding of statements about the past and future that has been argued for in this book. On such an understanding, direct evidence for a statement that an observable event took place or will take place at any specific past or future date must consist of an observation made at the time to which it relates (or when such an observation is possible); such a statement is true if such an observation was or could have been, or will be or could be, made. The analogy between past and future tenses is complete. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 89)

In the end, model 4 doesn't readily accord with a justificationist semantics either. Dummett says that if mathematical reality is constituted by the sum total of mathematical assertions proven to be true, then mathematical reality continually "grows." This is significant since it was this, Dummett says, that legitimated Brouwer's introduction of tense into mathematics. If justificationist semantics works on the analogy of intuitionist views of mathematical statements, then just as mathematical reality continually grows, empirical
reality also grows. Thus, if assigning equal reality to past and future implies that neither "grows", then such semantics conflict with a model in which reality constantly and really changes.43

Intuitionistically, there can be no statement that is neither true nor false, since, if we have neither proved nor refuted a statement, the possibility is always open that we may at some time do one or the other. But if the question whether we shall ever do the one or the other had a definite present answer, there would be statements that were neither true nor false, namely, that we should never either prove or refute... It appears to follow that from a justificationist standpoint, empirical reality must likewise constantly change. Not only must the future reveal itself in due time, but to the past itself more must accrue, as we discover new indirect evidence for what happened. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 89)

It is unnecessary to regard the future as wholly indeterminate to repudiate the idea that for any given statement the question of whether we shall ever have grounds for asserting it must have a definite present answer.44 The question of eventual justification involves the unbounded future—quantification over an infinite totality. An intuitionist or a justificationist of Dummett's stripe may hold that for each n, A(n) determinately either holds good or does not without thereby supposing that "For some n, A(n)" is determinately either true or false. Dummett says,

Each statement that an observable event took place at a specific time in the past may be definitely true or false, and yet the proposition that such an event ever took place in the past may not be assumed to be so. And yet no one wishes to argue for a branching past. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 91)

We shouldn't evade this argument by claiming the past is finite, since this is, he says rather nonchalantly, only a matter of calibration. Since the justificationist conception of truth explains truth in terms of what is (or can, be, or could have been) known it is not a detriment that the possibilities are only epistemic.

43 What actually "grows" will be discussed more, but here it is significant to note that a changeless four dimensional model does not have to achieve change by moving consciousness along a temporal axis. Nor does a changing (growing) four-dimensionalism have to admit that events actually grow to admit what is real might grow. (However, there is a way to mediate this problem, discussed below.)
44 "...in intuitionistic logic, it can be assumed that every instance of such a quantification is determinately true or false, without concluding that the same holds good of the quantified statement. We can thus evade the conclusion that there is a trichotomy eventually verified, eventually falsified and forever undecided." (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 90)
Dummett rejects all of the models in the end, including the fourth model in its changed and changing form, asking the question “What picture should we have of the universe as a whole rather than from any point of view within it?” The question is nonsensical, he answers—“there is no such thing as a picture from no point of view. Physical reality consists of objects in the world, the changes they undergo and the paths they trace in space-time.” (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 88) This is quite a realist picture.

5.3.1 The Reality of Future and Past

Dummett admits the reality of the past by moving to model 4 as the only option for his revised justificationist view. But this model, unlike the third model, gives the future equal reality. Here Dummett distinguishes between what is true now and what we know (now?)—but, he says, reality constantly changes. What is observable constantly changes, but the past and the future are equally real. He sees only an epistemic difference between them. And, since reality is just what is observable (and all times are equally real) the past and future must both be changing. But here, it seems that there must be an ontological distinction or difference of some sort—the distinction between affecting and being affected, does after all, seem to involve some ontological difference.

Statements about the future turn out to be true, Dummett says, but the evidence we can have for them will always be such as to render the statement probable, until the event occurs. But it is not evidence, but actions that render the statement more probable. That he had used a first-person case to contradict model 3 views seems significant in this case. So, e.g. that statement that I will be at the party tomorrow is not made more probable just by the

But don’t the paths they trace in space-time form a picture? And even if this picture is unobserved, that does not mean it is unobservable, or that our indirect evidence shouldn’t support the truth or probability of such claims.
current evidence of my being (seen) there at that time. This may make your knowledge more probable, but it doesn’t render the statement more probable.

It is true that the probability of the statement being true increases the more current evidence there is of my being there. But what renders the statement more probable—or true—depends on more than current evidence of being observed at the party; it depends on my activity whether or not I go to the party (and seemingly also whether, when I said that “I will go”, I really intended to go—and whether any unforeseen events arose prohibiting my attendance). Such real activity isn’t present evidence simpliciter (although it will be currently evidenced). What makes the statement true is not just presently or currently evident, but is also intentional and diachronic activity which is continued and may be continuing. What is shocking about Dummett’s position is that even under this almost-realist fourth model he claims that the past and future are equally open to “deliberation”:

...the mere supposition that there is now a truth of the matter about what I am going to do is no reason for me not to deliberate, if I do not know what that truth is... The same holds good for the claim that we cannot affect the past... if I do not know what happened in the past, there is nothing senseless in my doing something to bring it about, or make it more probable if I know a means of doing so. (M. Dummett, 2004, p. 82)

According to Dummett, I may consider or deliberate over what happened in the past, and if I do not know what has happened then there is no reason not to consider acting in a way that might “make it more probable, that some particular thing happened”. (Ibid) In his earlier work, in this regard Dummett suggests perhaps has retrospective prayer in mind.

But there seem to be many problems with this formulation. To begin with, it seems we can consider what could or should have been done even if we know what happened. Moreover whether we know what has happened or not, we cannot make that happening “more probably to have been the case”. Contemplating what should or could have happened has many different sorts of answers. And contemplating what is known of what happened

46 Nor is the statement it will rain tomorrow made more probable by any current evidence taken independently. Current evidence itself cannot lend probability.
(one's own actions, and those of others e.g.) can be useful, but only for future reference. But acting in a way that makes such happening more probable to have happened is useless and somewhat inappropriate. It seems I can only change my future past, and not that past that has already passed.

Yet even in this changing of the future past, I am changing the past. The event in question cannot be differentiated from subsequent events except arbitrarily; in this way our acting now is constantly "changing the past". But here I am, not only changing this, what will be past, but that, what was past. Both the identity and meaning of what is already past is changed by what will be past. Yet acting now to change past events also looks hopeless from here. We cannot change what has already happened—whatever is done is done (just as whatever will be, will be—que sera sera). It will be both present and past. So, how do we combine this realism about the past—that its happenings cannot themselves be changed—with a remaining openness to the counter-effect of further observation and action?

Dummett says that knowing what happened does not prohibit acting in a way that might make such a happening (viz. a past happening) more probably have been the case. But while we can increase (discover or confabulate) evidence for a historical event, and so make a statement about this event more probably true or false, and in this sense, we can make the happening more probably have been the case. But we cannot make the happening happen now, nor can we make it happen differently than it did.  

Dummett has argued that the fourth conception of time is the only logically consistent position, as well as the best-suited model for a justificationist. But it is unclear whether it is the case that only the forth model can accord with the revised justificationist semantics that can account for the truth value links. Each of the models presented here, except the non-

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47 This seems to suggest that scientific method (and perhaps materialism), cannot apply to—or fully explain—original events since it creates a new event in recreating an event. Original events i.e., observed events, as original, are unexplainable by the scientific method of experiment, data collection and computation.
static model of model 4, more or less suffer some fault in Dummett's analysis. So, in solution, he rejects the need to have a "view" or model for time. Perhaps he believes that—just as the question of whether truth is attributable primarily to sentences or propositions offers a choice which, he says, is a false one—so the question of whether reality is attributable to just present or also non-present times is likewise a false one.

5.3.2 Absoluteness in Time

But if we discuss the metaphysics of time attributing to the past, present, and future an absoluteness that "we know they do not have," then perhaps we are not discussing the metaphysics of time at all. Would it even be possible to hold these four models as they are offered here, if we did not take these temporal terms as absolute? Dummett notes that only the fourth model wouldn't need non-absolutizing, but this is because it is already absolute. But Dummett's preferred "changing four-dimensionalism" requires some relativizing. A changing four-dimensional model in which change is not 'of consciousness moving along a temporal axis', but where 'more accrues to the past', and is 'more is revealed of the future'; and where this is yet an epistemological but not an ontological difference, seems to be a difficult if not impossible set of requirements. Perhaps under non-absolute description the models are not so easily distinguishable.

This becomes clear even with respect to model 1, the simple presentist model. The two versions of model 2 (the radical traceless version and the proper traced version) can also apply to this first model. It is, after all, in the present where the traceless and traced models of 2 (and 3) find the truthmakers for the past. But if model 1 has two versions—a traceless radical version and a version in which the traces of past and future are contained in the present, then these models seem less distinct and his analysis a very straightforward, but slightly misleading, one.
Dummett's two arguments against the first model seem particularly unconvincing and incomplete. Considering possible metaphysical conceptions of time involves really considering the nature (notion, as Dummett says), of the present. In his presentation of the four models, the present is tacitly taken as "real," because, I suppose, directly verifiable token sentences under a particular interpretation are taken as basic. But it is unclear what this comes to, especially in light of his first objection to model 1, i.e., the objection of the durationless present. The first argument would thus seem somewhat unconvincing if the proponent of this model understood the present as specious.

The second argument seems unconvincing if the present is taken to enfold the entirety of the past such that all evidently past events remain perpetually present within the substructure of what we take to be the present. The potential counterfactual direct verification of such statements (if we could literally read past facts out of present facts in a directly evidential way) would be enough to hold the truth value links. If this were possible, then such an approach could be used by the second and third models as well.

The objection might be raised that then such statements would be true in virtue of events (still) present and not past events, so as statements about the past, they would in fact be false; but if they were accurate descriptions and the past-tense was taken only to describe the epistemological relation and not the ontological situation, then such a proponent could adhere to the truth-links as we normally understand them. In this respect it would seem that model 1 is not doomed, and might be seen by some as the most consistently justificationist position and that it comes out no different than the revised model 4. (This also brings model 1 closer to both model 2 and 3.)

5.4 Who says Present time Exists?
Sally Haslanger has written that the debate between eternalist and presentist views is the question of \textit{whether only the present exists} (p. 340). While the eternalist holds that non-present entities (times, etc.) might exist, the presentist holds that just what is present exists. So conceived, the debate revolves around the presentist’s positive claim only: either only the present exists (everything that exists is present) or it is not the case that only the present exists (it is not the case that everything that exists is present)—but in either case, the present \textit{does} exist (some things that exist are present). The question is just whether that is all that does.

But equally, the presentist-eternalist debate is over whether the present \textit{even} exists. (This is one thing the growing block theorist helps make clear.) This is because the eternalist who holds that other entities or times exist equally (equally is key here), then has to resort to a real presentism (a lived present, if not just a moving present) in order to distinguish any(thing) present from anything not-present (past or future).

So, the most common criticism of the growing block view, viz. that we would not know now is now, \textit{really} applies to the eternalist since, in such a view, this (now) would not \textit{be} now. In the end nothing could be the same or different \textit{in an eternalist view}. On such a view, both nothing and everything exists presently. But, something like a ‘Dead Past’ defense, as elaborated below can defend against this claim—\textit{if such a view is elaborated as ‘Living Past’ defense instead}. Such an answer to the question of the real present cannot be offered by the Dead and zombie-filled past as argued by Forrest. (Forrest, 2004) The Dead Past Hypothesis gets us nowhere near a living present of the kind he describes as a border (or crossing) in which consciousness takes place. In this regard, as to what presently exists, it will be useful to examine if it might be possible that the present is not a real ‘part’ of time.
5.4.1 Four More Models of Time

Dummett's analysis of the 'metaphysics of time' suggests only these four positions, but there would seem to be more options, some of which have been expressly held. Under this set of additional options, the present is considered not to exist. The reason for considering these options is to shed light on the other options, and on our conceptions of presentness, and of the relation of what is present to time more generally. Dummett's original models and these additional models can be graphed as follows, such that 'X' represents "is real".

5.4.2 Eight (Onto)logical Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Model 3</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>X</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 1a</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model 2a</td>
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<td>Model 3a</td>
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<td>Model 4a</td>
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Models 1-4
Model 1: presentism
Model 2: absent (open)-past three-dimensionalism
Model 3: absent (open)-future three-dimensionalism (growing block universe)
Model 4: eternalism or four-dimensionalism (block universe)

Models 1a-4a:
The α-version indicates the corresponding model with a different status accorded to the reality of the present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1: only the present is real.</td>
<td>Model 1a: reality accorded to none of these.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2: the future is real as is the present, the past is not.</td>
<td>Model 2a: the future is real, there is no present or past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3: the past is real as is the present, the future is not.</td>
<td>Model 3a: the past is real, the present and future are not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 4: past, present and future are equally real.</td>
<td>Model 4a: the future and past are both real, there is not.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These additional models offer four possible forms of present-absence. It is logically possible that the present is unreal or that no present or nothing present really exists.

Presumably, at least, if time is unreal then the present time is also unreal. This gives us at
least Model 1a, the unreality of time—which could be taken in several different ways. Time is unreal but events happen, so while temporal distinctions are unreal, events or happenings, e.g., are real. This model of the unreality of time could be seen as actually quite similar to its logical opposite, eternalist views, or Model 4, in its 'non-absolutist' forms.

In the second model, 'futurism', the future is the only 'real part' of time. In such a model, the reality of the future could be conceived as its potential or capacity for action and efficacy. While the present and the past are unreal because their efficacy and activity is either past, or already present and so no-longer capable of producing effects. Only what has not been has any power. In this view, only statements about the future have a genuine potential of being either true or false. Whatever has the capacity for truth and falsity (e.g., future-tensed sentences) depends on what actually has now the capacity to be the case. Only the future holds such requisite potential. Statements about the past and future have no remaining potential to be true outside of their effect on what might yet be.

'In model 3a, 'pastism', the past exists, but the present and future do not. This is perhaps the most intuitively plausible of the new options; but it has to explain novelty and change. If whatever is past alone exists, and nothing present and future exists, how is it that the present or presence seems to be the essential part of time, and that what is present seems to change? The past would then have to be changing, and to somehow be the essential part of time.

But how could the past have any ontological priority if perceptual experience is phenomenologically fundamental and essentially presently tensed? Here we might say experience (immediate) is without tense and tense must come with some difference and some sameness—with a tension. This idea will be elaborated in the fourth chapter in discussion of Bergson, etc. There, questions of the phenomenology of time and the nature of temporal
experience will be addressed directly. (The nature of the present will be examined more in this chapter below.)

One way in which to conceive all of these additional models is by way of the durationless present. More specifically, if the present is considered as a limit of sorts to the movement of the real past, then change could be accounted for as an internal function of the past by which it creates more of itself or is self-generating. In such a case while the past exists, it exists presently. In the fourth presentless model, both the past and future are real but the present is not. The present may be considered either durationless limit or with duration, but as a gap or absence in the structure of real time or events. This view of time has been debated in Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy (discussed below).

The possibility of the unreality of the present combined with the reality of the past or the future might seem not to be a real possibility, after all, we do think if any part of time is real, the present is real. We think the present tense is foundational in some sense, as we consider the present time, or presence to be the nature of being or time itself. Part of the reason for this is that we think the present time holds temporal becoming in some way. It is the present that changes and change seems, to some at least, essential to time. Another reason for this is the overlap of the idea of presence and that of being or existence generally. But as will be suggested below, pastness may be even more fundamental to being-present (as will be explicated below) than presentness.

One might argue that these are not four additional distinct models of time, but only one. (So, perhaps we have four and not three contours for these questions—to presentism, eternalism, growing block views of what exists, we have the view that time is unreal.) Specifically, if someone believes a real present is essential to real time of any sort, then a model which denies reality to present time denies all time. But perhaps this is not the case. Model 4a in particular, which grants reality to past and future but not to the present, seems to
be a distinct logical possibility from that of the unreality of time, if not a phenomenologically evident one. If, however, the present does not exist, say, not even as a limit defined by the past or future or both—but not at all—and yet, that the past and future do—one will then have to explain the possible (an apparently present) distinction between past and future. This is the situation which the B-theorist seems to be in, since he only has before and after available to him.

What makes statements about the present situation true in these additional α-models is either nothing (our knowledge is illusory if time is unreal); or it lies wholly in the future or in the past or both; but it does not lie in the present itself, since there is no such reality. One of the possible benefits to this type of conception is that it may lead us to re-consider the somewhat intuitive idea that present-tense statements are foundational. Perceiving anything present as significant requires perceiving past things as significant (remembering) and, perhaps even perceiving future things as significant (anticipation). Similarly though we think that perception of the present is foundational, memory (and expectation or imagination) may be required for even this ‘foundational’ present perception. As will be discussed further later in this chapter and in the next chapter, being-present may require a concurrent being-past.

5.5 The Growing Block and its’ Dead Past Defense

Growing block theorists have been fewer in number than either presentists or eternalists, and include Broad (who is also sometimes cited as a presentist) and perhaps Bergson.48 There are many possible nuances to such a view; and whether Bergson’s in particular is a growing block view, e.g., will be examined in the fourth chapter below. The most common objection to growing block views is quite an interesting problem, viz. that

48 See (Bergson, (1913) 1991) (Broad, 1923) Broad is also sometimes cited as a presentist. Bergson is cited by (Bigelow, 1996) as being both anti-presentism and against the idea of the reality of the future. More recently, (Tooley, 1997) has taken this growing block position.
given such an ontology, we would have no reason to think that the time we are experiencing as present now, is indeed the real present moment. See (Bourne, 2002; Braddon-Mitchell, 2004; Forrest, 2004)

Peter Forrest uses a 'dead past' defense against the argument that under a growing block view we would not know now is now. He claims that such skepticism can be overcome since we may hypothesize a dead past, such that, the very vitality of life and consciousness may be supposed to take place only on the border—as a "by-product of the causal frisson that takes place on the borders of being and non-being" (Braddon-Mitchell, 2004, p. 201; Forrest, 2004) Whatever is past subject to "zombiedom". Only those beings on the active border are objectively present and only these are conscious and living.

By this, even if the past remains and continues to be real, a growing block theorist can avoid the skeptical problem of how we could know that we are in the present and not in the past: We can know that we are in a real present since we are conscious and living and such things can only be objectively (actually) present. Mitchell argues that given the theory of Special Relativity, Forrest's Dead Past Hypothesis leads to skepticism about other minds since we could not know that our contemporaries are not in fact past, they may be subject to the same such zombiedom. (Forrest has argued in response that the theory of Special Relativity supports his position.)

Heathwood claims that the Dead Past Hypothesis undercuts the main reason for preferring the growing block theory to presentism. Growing block theories provide truthmakers for statements about the past, as they accept the real existence of past objects and events. But, if growing block theory is combined with Dead Past Hypothesis then the growing block theorist must, in certain cases, resort to some of the "semantic and metaphysical gymnastics" of the presentist to account for the truth of some past-tense statements. His brief argument is presented here. He writes:
“For surely the following statements are true:

(CC) Ceasar was conscious when he crossed the Rubicon
(SA) Socrates was alive when he was sentenced to death.

And one would have thought that (CC) and (SA) are made true in just the way the following are made true:

(CW) Ceasar was wet when he crossed the Rubicon.
(SF) Socrates was fat when he was sentenced to death.

But the Dead Past defence of the Growing Block Theory makes this impossible. Either the first two sentences are false, or if they can be shown to be true they are not made true in the way the final two are made true.” (Heathwood)

Heathwood does not explicate his argument any further, but presumably, the latter two statements regarding wetness and fatness (CW and SF) are made true by past objects, situations and facts; while the first two (under the Dead Past Hypothesis) cannot be—but why not? Is it really the case that CC and SA-type statements (regarding ascribing consciousness and being alive) are made true by only present objects situations and facts?

Predications of consciousness and being alive may only be applicable to present beings, but we can still predicate consciousness to something past—just not as past. Ceasar was present when he crossed the Rubicon and Socrates was present when he was sentenced to death. In fact, this is more fundamental. Ceasar might have been unconscious when he crossed the Rubicon (maybe he was carried), but he was necessarily present; and Socrates might have already taken his life before being sentenced to death, but he was still present (as current subject of the sentencing). Being present, in this sense requires being involved in current activity, and so also, being present (like Ceasar or Socrates) requires having a past. In other words, in order to be present at any time, one has to also be, in some ways, past. This past is not a dead past, but a lived and living one. It was Ceasar or Socrates being-present.
To return to presentist and justificationist issues, it is not just this present (our present now, nor just Cesar’s or Socrates present then) which makes it so, but also that present—our own and Cesar’s or Socrates’ own past experience. The current present, holding the tokened statement or thought, makes it possible for me to presently determine that I—or Socrates—was present (conscious, alive) then. But even if I had died last night, or we had forgotten all about Socrates (or there is no “Socrates”) it could, in principle, be said that whenever we were, we were present. If this is taken redundantly, it is actually false and not a tautology. If it means just whenever we were present we were present—it would seem to be necessarily true, but is not.

Whenever we were can be taken to include the past—we do after all say things like “we were here yesterday”. So, whenever we were, means just whenever we existed and so includes past time, and not just present time. So it is not necessarily true that whenever anything is, it is present. (It is this that rules out both pure presentism and pure eternalism and speaks for a growing block view.) This significantly excludes future time, since whenever we were, never includes any future times.

If the growing block theorist must do some semantic and metaphysical gymnastics, they are much different than those of the straight presentist, since such a theorist has a real past to lean on. If we take “crossing” as an activity, then necessarily because he was active (since he was crossing), it is true that Caesar was conscious when he crossed. Likewise, if we assume that being alive—or being thought to be alive—is necessary for being sentenced to death, then Socrates was alive when he was sentenced to death. Caesar’s consciousness and Socrates’ vitality are not past ‘events’ as such, nor past objects, but are now just as past as Caesar’s wetness and Socrates’ fatness. It may be true that if something is conscious or living then it is present, but it is also may be true that at any times something is conscious or living then it (both is and) was present. So it seems as if Mitchell’s criticism requires a
purely eternalist (or 4-dimensional) view of time, presuming there is no genuine (living) pastness.

5.5.1 Not-taking Present Time for Granted

What can be more palpable and indubitable than the present time? It seems to be the most familiar hence the most real ‘part’ of time. The most-palpable self-refutation threatens any attempted denial such as “Nothing is happening now”, or “Right now, I am not referring to anything by the indexical expression “Now”. Our natural presumption of the reality of present time is justified phenomenologically and perceptually and by language use (e.g. the sense and truth value of present-tense sentences seem primary to other tensed sentences.) Moreover, we seem to live in the present time, we breathe in it—we use it, spend it, and waste it. ‘Now’ seems to be just whenever we are; and, in some ways, the only time we have. So asking if it is possible that present time doesn’t really exist seems to slide quickly to the skeptical suggestion that ‘maybe time is unreal’ (But the thesis that there is no real present time also seems to be implied by theories of relativity and certain forms of four-dimensionalism.)

However, the hypothesis that there is no real present time—can be distinguished from the more general thesis of unreality of time as such. It is possible to take the claim as although no-present time exists as such, other times exist, viz. non-present times. (Perhaps these are past and future times.) Still, that present time is a real part of time seems to be admitted in most contemporary philosophical discussions of time. But considering the possibility that there really is no-present time may shed light on what present time is, or might be—and on the problems of time more generally.

So here we shall be (or have we been already? or, best, let’s say, we are) addressing the possibility that there is no real or extant present time. And, if this no-present thesis is to
be distinguished an antirealist position about time, then are other times, e.g. all real times are past or future times. In other words, no real times are NOWs, all real times are THENs.

Such a No-Present position has been considered explicitly in the ancient Indian Nyāya Sūtras as an anonymous opponent’s position—and is similar to arguments found in Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikā (a slightly later Buddhist text).

5.6 A Classical Indian Debate

In the Nyāya Sūtra, the opposing position is put forth as the hypothesis that there is no present time, because all time can be described by the time fallen and the time (yet) to fall. What we know of an object falling or arrow flying, for example, is where it has been or where it will be going. The path of the object, at any point during its travel, is completely described by the path it has taken and the path it will take. We know any current trajectory by knowing the path already fallen or flown and the impending falling or flying. Other than this past and future, there is no present time to know. Simply put, there is the fallen and the yet to fall but no falling in the absence of these.

![Diagram of leaf falling to the ground or arrow flying](image)

Chapter II (titled "Gatāgata" or 'gone/not-gone' or perhaps 'going-without-going') of Nāgārjuna’s Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikā begins:

\begin{center}
\begin{verbatim}
Gatam na ganyate tadvad agatam naiva ganyate
Gatagatavinirnuktam ganyamānam na ganyate (II.1.)
\end{verbatim}
\end{center}

What has gone is not going; what has not-gone is also not going. Just so, excluding what has gone and has not-gone, what goes is not going.
In the text of the *Nyāya Sūtra*, the possibility of no-present time—or that now is not real time—is brought up in the context of a discussion of inference enabling knowing events of past, present, and future times. Given this context, the thesis that there is no-present is presumably offered as a counter-consideration to the Nyāya exposition of inference as pertaining to all three times independently, or as three sorts of inference—suggesting, e.g. that inference pertains only to past and future events or necessarily involves these. In other words, inference does not give any presentative or direct knowledge. As a Buddhist position, this amounts to the claim that semantic knowledge is derivative as is inference, or tensed knowledge of even what is present.

The Nyāya opposes this no-present position, citing the necessity of present time for perception, ordinary knowledge and language use. Present time is correlated both with actions or activities (like the sun’s rising, a bird’s chirping, or someone’s cooking or eating etc.) and with the being or existence of ordinary objects as constantly or concurrently present, at any moment of time. *For example, this paper or text exists, the sun exists, and you and I exist.*

When things exist, they are present—they literally "stand-out". Activities we experience are known only as present—the paper is resting, the sun is setting, you are sitting, I am talking. These processes have both past paths and future trajectories, but are somehow present activities—such activities and existences are how we divide time in the Nyāya view. In the Nyāya view moments of time are moments of action; present time involves moments of origination, continuation and destruction. This present time has duration, and these moments have duration, even if imperceptible. But, the opponent appears to break up all duration into origination, already happened, and destruction about to happen, leaving nothing in between.
5.6.1 Examining Present Time

The hypothesis at issue in this Classical Indian debate is whether a period of time, associated with the path of an object in motion, specifically, the path of falling, can be divided between the path already fallen and the path yet-to-fall with no remainder. This has direct implications on the spatialization of time; but the text can be read as being about our knowledge of time as well. So, e.g.—we know times and actions that have passed (the observed), and those which are future (observable); so, we remember and expect, and once this is “removed” from our knowledge of what is presently occurring, there would seem to be no more to know.

In other words, if we take out all of what we know about time elapsed and time forthcoming there is nothing left to know. (Apart from remembering the missed pleasure and expecting the respite, perhaps there is no present suffering.) And yet there has to be some difference between what has gone and what is yet to come (or what has not-gone).

The strongest Nyāya counterarguments against the No-Present view are two:

1. Argument from ACTIONS:
   Without present time, there is no time for action. We cannot act yesterday, or act tomorrow. We have to act today. Neither time passed nor time future can hold motion, so to speak. The only “space” for action is this “3rd” segment of time—viz. present times, i.e., times not yet completely past but already begun. In other words, the present is the only practically real part of time. (One may put it this way: the time for deed is time indeed.)

2. Argument from OPPOSITION:
   Past and future cannot be mutually opposing, each must be in opposition to present time. The argument given for this is slightly confusing. It seems to go as follows. If what is past were to be defined as what is not-future and what is future is then just what is not-past, then neither can have any substantial being. For, the essence of each would then depend upon the other, as a negation depends upon that of which it is a negation. It is only because past and present are two distinct opposites of the basic positive present time, that they can maintain their being as well as their contrariety. If the present in between them vanished, they will logically swallow each other and vanish too, leaving no time for any occurrence or change. In other words, either present time is real, or no time is. It is now or never in the Nyāya view!49

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49 This argument seems like a combination of McTaggart’s critique of B-series (tenseless) time as well as his argument against the A-series (or tensed time).
A critical response to these Nyāya arguments might go like this: This present that must exist for the Naiyāyika has to be a present with duration. As such, it includes, at least, some past and possibly also some future time. If, without a present with extent, no past or future can be delineated, then there is some present time which provides for contact and knowledge. A functional presence which accords with grammar, i.e., the present as the time of action 'I am cooking', involves both past and future times and activities—both remembrances and expectations. The Nyāya claim that the paths of time are the paths of action. Some times, i.e., real present times, involve actions (and so also past and future times) and existences. Significantly, as elaborated below present time must be other than past and future time as well. This existence—or something that is present—must be present across time.

But the specious present seems to offer us a problem—it is of different extents for different creatures, and seems relative to the observer. Yet our experienced present duration is also not subject to our personal will—we share this apparently moving present time with one another. It seems that whenever NOW is, it is the same for all of us. And this present time we share—the time we seem to experience together, and in which we do things now seems to provide the space for change. Yet this present time is experienced and immediately so, so also somehow perfectly personal.

5.6.2 Reconsidering the Objection

The objector is not talking about a missing or non-existent specious-present however. He may admit a specious present as just future and past. But suggesting that there is no 3rd stretch of time, a time for activity apart from past and future, also suggests that since there is present time, it must also be unlike time past or time future—something other than what has gone and what is yet to come. Something unlike these—viz. what is neither gone nor not-
gone—and also is not going. (In other words, it is also something other than the past and future conjoined).

The objector proposes that present time is without temporal extent (duration), there is no real present time. In other words, all going (apparent motion) is just what has gone (past motion) or what is about to go (future motion). All present time (motions or rests; or activities or existences) are accounted for as different sets of past and future times. Is it possible that there are no present times?

It does seem that there is no 3rd sort of space (no 3rd path) associated with the present state of the falling arrow. If the present is taken without (in exclusion from) what is past and future, or some trajectory or direction of activity, it would hold no potential difference between before and after. A photograph of a present time, for example, involves no motion—it is just a snapshot of a short period of past time, solidified into an image. But even a snapshot or picture requires some duration of exposure. Without any such duration, there would be no motion, nor rest—no existence really. There would be nothing appearing on the film, so to speak. So is it possible that the objector’s view is plausible, viz. that real present time has no duration or temporal extent, that there is no real present time as such?

We normally think that present time has duration or that it is temporality or duration itself; it is speciously experienced and seems to be the locus of change and action. But present time, taken as a specious time of activities and processes, is both future and past positively. Yet there seems to also be a negative, or unseen, side to the present: present time must also be simultaneously not-past and not-future—or neither past nor future. This is just to agree with the Nyāya argument that the future and the past are each correlative to the present, and not to one another. Past and future are distinguishable only by means of this present which is neither future nor past but must involve future and past.
It seems agreed between the Naiyāyika and his opponent that the present is unlike past or future. In the Nyāya view, present time is the existence of activity—just what is being done by what. Activity is the basis of any measure of anything present. This activity is just what has been done and will be done. It is present by means of the real existence of substances—the leaf that is falling is both past and future (in its path of activity, i.e. its fall or falling); and its falling is neither past nor future (in its presence). How is this possible?

Present time must be complicated. No less complicated than past and future, like them but also unlike them, as they are both like and unlike each other.

Both arguments depend on the equivalence of not-past with future time, and not-future time with past time. So these must be differentiated. But if they are, then there is some 3rd 'time'. Neither elimination nor omni-presence of the present time can offer a full account. Both views (no-presentism and presentism) are open to the charge of contradictory predication as well:

In argument 1, all times are describable as not-past or as not-future—and since past and future are just not-past and not-future, all times can be equivalently described as past or as future.

In argument 2, all time is one time admitting no possible difference—so either no predication is possible, there can be nothing to describe—or any predications are possible with no significance.

5.7 Results and Some Conclusions

Time that is not-past must be divided between time that is future and time that is not-future. Likewise, time that is not-future divided between past and not-past time. Otherwise there is no difference between past and future time, and no possible distinction between past and future times (or events in relations of before and after.) So, While Dummett said McTaggart was assuming real times or events must have a complete description, but tensed descriptions are necessarily incomplete, I find the problem not to be the completeness of the
descriptions but the uniqueness of the descriptions. This seems to show several interesting things about time—or temporal distinctions: If there were no-present times all times would be present (arg. 1); and, if all times are only present times, then this would be one time with no possible differences. And, if it is without any differences—from other times because there are none; and without internal differences—then it is without identity and so such a one time would be no time.

But, we experience differences—and specifically temporal differences—and in a variety of ways. We experience changing things, and we know what is happening now, (at least a little bit of it)—we know some things about the past and some things about the future; and we also seem temporally distinct from one another—present time seems both local and somewhat private too—or at least personally experienced.

5.7.1 The Paradox of Knowing Time

McTaggart began his arguments for the unreality of empirically experienced time noting that time appears to us in both these ways. We experience A-series (presentist) and conceive B-series (eternalist) time—but both sorts of times seem to face similar problems of real contradictory predication, indicating a certain unreality to time and change.

But whether we consider the present durationless, or with relative duration the problem remains: If there is to be a difference in time, e.g. between even two parts of time, between anything at all, there must be a third part of time not divisible solely into past and future. So there is something other than past and future in present time. And this something other is not just something tensed but something tenseless—real present time is both confluence and exclusion. McTaggart himself admitted a really ordered unchanging C-series which admits the realization and appearance of the A-series and B-series.
The above 'antinomies' indicate that present time is both past and future like the Nyāya indicated—or rather the time of action includes time that is both past and future; but the time of existence must be more than past and future. The existence of a presently existing substance was the Nyāya's second way of knowing present time, but this present time may be like the objector said, unreal—it may be past and future, and also neither past nor future.

Some pictures (admittedly spatializing), may (or may not) help illustrate this:
5.7.2 Returning to the Present / No-present Debate

The no-present hypothesis (eternalist) and the presentist hypothesis fall into logical difficulties for the same reason. If we would admit any real time, a real difference between past and future or before and after (in either the A-series or the B-series) then the complex present provides a distinction between past and future, but also combines the past and future.

The Nyāya-opponent seems to be correct in that there is something about present time which is different from both past time—or the time fallen, and future time—the time yet to fall. And the Nyāya seem correct noting that there are two ways we know present time, by action and by existence. (This is similar to McTaggart's A-series and B-series/ presentism and eternalism—or no-presentism) But the problem of present time shows in both cases that present time is not a time like past and future time, yet it is also concurrently completed as just the sum of past and future time.

If only the present is real there is no real changing present (and no real time); if there is no present time, then time is also unreal because past and future cannot be distinguished. If time and change are to be empirically real, some part of time has to be real other than present time. Moreover it won't do that these are just two parts of time (i.e. a B-series—or even three adding simultaneity). Present and past (if chosen as real, or before and after, then and now) must be different sorts of things.

So it seems there must be a 3rd time—a present time of change and reality—but perhaps it is not the specious present or the durationless present alone (A-time or B-time). It divides the past and future by establishing the difference (non-equivalence) between past and the not-future and between future and not-past. In this way, we can take the Nyāya argument from action to heart: there is a space of activity and rest where we know some things change and others remain the same. This present we know by being and action, by perception (and
inference, we perceive—so some objects are present) and make possible language use. In fact, present time doesn't seem to make any room for contact and for existence at all.

Up to this point, the message is this: Temporal distinction requires at least three-poles. Not only is the debate between the only present (3d/presentism theories) and no-present (4d/eternalism theories) missing something—some other series must be real, as McTaggart also concluded. But then this 'part' of time must be like all other parts but also unlike any other part, as the above arguments indicate.

So, it doesn't seem especially consequential whether one decides the present exists speciously as we perceive it, and that is all there is to real time; or that there is no third time between past and future, and so real time is time with no durational present (or, in other words, between presentism and eternalism)—in either case, the present, conceived as just another part of time, is insufficient. *What makes the present makes a difference between before and after or between past and future.* Some things are neither past nor future, but in being so they are both past and future but are also more than described by 'past and future' or 'before and after', 'now and then'.

At once the present is neither past nor future but as perceived in action or existence (being over time) is both past and future. *Does a time which has neither a past nor a future have any temporal extent (or any spatiotemporal extension)?* Perhaps not—it seems this may be an important insight of the opponents view.

In both of these cases, no-present or presentism, nothing is uniquely predicable. If there is only present, everything can be described as all past or all future; if there is no present, all times can be described as all present, so ultimately, also as all past or all future. The problem of contradictory predication (discussed in the chapter on tense) applies equally to B-series time (Past-present only or no-present time) and tensed A-series time, and brings forward the complexity of this 3rd 'sort of time (or atemporal basis for time). A real present
time cannot be nothing but it cannot be a time like past time and future time—if it were, it could be divided with no remainder into past and future time and so also into just either not-future and not-past time.

Past and future are made compatible in the present time (of existence and action), only in the absence of contradiction between the not-future and the not-past. This can only be non-contradictory if what is not-future is more than what is past, and what is not-past is more than what is future. There must be something more than two parts of time, but the third part may be both not future and not past, but also must be time that is not-past and is also not-future.

The Nyāya argue against the spatialization of time, since the present time has past and future times involved—the falling of the leaf consists of its past having falling and future fall. In concord, the opponent claims that spatializing time leaves no present time at all; since there is no 3rd position of a present falling, or fall without past and future; there is no trajectory, motion, change or perceived rest (even no perception or object). Activities are thus associated uniquely with present time which may be like and unlike past and future time (it is complex); it is a real time but, as demonstrated, present time cannot be the only extant base of time; but some time must be present time if time and change are real.

4.8 Philosophical Importance

A-series and B-series (tensed and tenseless/presentist and eternalist) debates in most forms either admit the reality of present time, or support a no-present time (in the form of the B-series/strict-tenselessness). Both avenues are subject to contradictory predication resulting from an inability to account for a real temporal difference. If there is no separation of what is past from what is future—neither predication can apply. Their difference must be
actual—so there are present things and present states of knowledge (the Nyāya are correct), but this does not necessitate there be present time.

So the question remains, is there any '3rd part of time’ that is not the sum of, and does not exclude past or future time, but neither is it just past and future? One difficulty is that a positive present duration, or 3rd part of time’ (or third segment like the past or the future) would be more of the same—viz. just more past or future. With McTaggart, the B-series would be temporal only in light of the changing series of tense—future things becoming past then further past.

But without the complex tensed present dividing these two times (past and future) this is just one time (present). The complex present time is time that is neither before nor after yet it is both before and after. It is not nothing—not one, and not two. McTaggart’s problem remains even for the B-series unless something tangible divides past and future; but maybe it is not some third time simpliciter.

4.8.1 Concluding the Division between Now and Then

If we limit non-future times to being past times, and not-past times to being not-future times, then there is no way to distinguish not-past and not-future times, or past and future times. Not-past and not-future cannot be distinguished solely in terms of future and past times because these are not opposed qualities independently of some time that is both not-past and not future (present eternalist) or some time that is past and future (tensed presentism).

Even having only past and future times we are left with the equation of all future times to all not-past times and all past times to all not-future times—so the set of all times is neither past nor future times. So, either time is unreal because there are not past or future
times in reality, or there are some times that are not-past and also not-future and times that are not-future and also not-past.

The not-past is divisible between the future and not-future without contradiction and the not future divisible between the past and the not past without contradiction but this implies some time that is neither past nor future but is both not-past and not-future concurrently (simultaneously), and that these are different things. This is to say that McTaggart's problem applies even if we consider that there is no present time, but there is some time (or are some times).

It is not a problem of tense, or change, but of temporal distinction of any kind (including that time is tenseless or even time that is considered one without intrinsic distinction). The problem of contradictory ascription is a problem for the reality of any sort of time—of any time-ascription at all. Perhaps this suggests that this problem doesn't offer us two opposing views—like presentism and eternalism, or tensed and tenseless time—where we should expect to determine which may be the more accurate description of the more fundamental qualities of time; but rather that this very real present conundrum is a clue to the genuine riddle of time. As McTaggart himself seemed to understand these sorts of time are the questions and not the answers.

A durationless present time, or an empty present time may be possible but it, like a full or current present time, must admit some potential difference enabled by a real difference between events which have disintegrated and events which haven't yet come to be. This is found in the integral likeness between not-past and not-future in action, and a concurrent difference or differential between past and future in knowledge.

The time when something happens is its now. Experiencing something, knowing anything, could only ever be happening at its 'now', when it happens. For example, you are reading this sentence now. But once this occurs, it will always have occurred then (in that
now); and even now—it is for ever after now-then. Because of this, in any such act, e.g. of praising or being praised, or cursing or being cursed, is both now (currently not back-then) and so also always (thereafter back-then).

Is time (empirical change) unreal because of this contradictory predication left within even an A-series / B-series combination? It depends on whether the incompatibility between "now" and "then" is taken as sacrosanct, and incompatible predicates are taken as sure sign of unreality; or whether from the undeniability of every happened-event being both now-now and then(after)-then, we deduce that now and then are not incompatible after all.

In any case, the past is not reducible to the present. Then is more than just now if now is real. This means also that if what makes now—and all changes that happen now—real involves current(ly) knowing (recognizing, tracking or remembering) the past, then this now requires not just an event-registering consciousness, but self-registering consciousness of events.
CHAPTER 6: PERSISTENCE

6.1 What makes a Sidewalk a Past Sidewalk?

What is an object over time? Let us take an extended useful object, like a sidewalk—one we depend on, use, repair, understand, and explain to our children. We have normative rules about sidewalks: For our safety, we should walk on the sidewalk. You not supposed to ride bicycles on sidewalks in some places (even at your own peril!) But what keeps up a sidewalk—besides concrete? Without getting into Ship-of-Theseus problems, or problems of baldness and “heap-hood”, starting vaguely, without a cutoff point, we might say that a sidewalk is just a past sidewalk when it is wholly overgrown and irretrievable, literally unknowable (the problem of the vanishing past returns even in this problem of persistence). But if it is, then it is no longer a sidewalk, how could it be a past sidewalk? After all, it is just a presently-overgrown sidewalk.

Is it a past sidewalk when it is no longer a sidewalk, just as I am a past being, when I am no longer a being? Perhaps listening to Parmenides’ warnings, we should not mess with being’s non-being, but is it a past flower when it is a pile of dust, or when it is so wilted it is unrecognizable. Perhaps it is still a flower, after all, when it is decomposed or dead. One day, of course it will be chemically decomposed and recomposed—is it then just a past flower and there is no present flower at all? If it is unobservable from any location in spacetime, then there is no flower at any place. What makes it a flower (even a live one now) except its past existence, which remains always observable at (or from) some distant space.

So when is an object past? Can an object be past? Is the sidewalk ever past? We might want to say, e.g. now at 3:30 pm, since walking home from the university at 3:00, that the sidewalk I walked on today between 3 and 3:30 pm is a past sidewalk. But surely this is wrong, the sidewalk has not changed so much—the sidewalk I walked home on (the sidewalk
that would be 'in the past') is just this sidewalk I can now see from my lanai—the same present sidewalk. Is this seeming sameness across time just an illusion of cognition—or of temporal progression? Are there then infinite sidewalks corresponding to infinitely possible perceivable times between 3 and 3:30? What would be the difference between no single sidewalk surviving my metaphysical analysis, and no sidewalk surviving it?

6.1.1 Identity and Change over Time: A Rough Equation

Our second issue, how anything persists, is perhaps the most ancient of the three questions (—or, at least the most persisting, remaining largely unchanged). This problem can be described most simply as the problem of change: How can anything change yet remain the same thing?

As in the other areas of debate, it is often thought that there are two logical alternatives: perdurance and endurance. *Perdurantists* maintain that things persist by having temporal parts or stages. In this sense they have temporal extension on analogy with spatial extension. *Perdurable objects* are thus described as 'four-dimensional'. *Endurantists* hold in contrast, that things persist by being wholly present at any time at which they exist. *Endurant objects* are 'three-dimensional' in this sense. Anything which is a proper part of an enduring object exists wholly at a time that such object exists. One might think of any given object, that either it is genuinely four-dimensional and composed of temporal parts, or genuinely three dimensional and has no temporal parts.⁵⁰

But, as in the other areas, the third-alternative mediates the issue and can be taken to define this debate. In the case of persistence, things may persist by *exduriing*, or having a

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⁵⁰ Famous proponents of three-dimensional objects include Geach, Chisholm, van Inwagen, Mellor, Thomson, Lowe Harsinger, Merricks; four-dimensionalists include Quine, Smart, Perry, Armstrong. Lewis. A third-sort of view in this area, exduriuring or stage view has been taken by Sider, e.g. as a form of four-dimensionalism. Other stage-view theorists include Heller, Le Poidevin. Hawley (2001) offers a thorough survey of this debate.
current stage at any time with real contrasting stages of other times. Things that endure have a present stage at any one time, but with real temporal counterparts. It will be noted that these various positions on the question of persistence incorporate the root word *durare*, meaning "to last, harden." The question here is in what sense things last at all.

It is sometimes held that stage views are just versions of four-dimensionalism, or alternatively of three-dimensionalism, and such versions of stage views will be looked at below. But just like growing block views, such a third-type of view is neither 4-d nor 3-d, yet has the capacity to incorporate both views.

4.6.2 The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

David Lewis's argument for perdurance theory from the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics has been very influential in recent discussions of diachronic change and identity. The problem stems from the application of the principle of Indiscernability of Identicals (Leibniz) to diachronic identity. Craig renders the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics in five steps:

For an object O, time t and property F:

1. O at t is identical with O at t* (assume for reductio)
2. O at t is bent
3. O at t* is not bent
4. If O at t is identical with O at t* then O at t is F iff O at t* is F (Principle of Indistinguishability of Identicals)
5. Therefore, O at t is bent and not bent

By reductio ad absurdum, no object can exist at two times at which it has different intrinsic properties (i.e., shape—the relation of one part of something to the rest of it, e.g.).

51 Sally Haslanger uses the term 'exdurantism' for stage theory. (Haslanger, 2003)
52 See (D. Lewis, 1986, pp. 202-204). This is discussed in (Haslanger, 1989; Hawley, 1998; D. Lewis, 1988; Lowe, 1987; Merricks, 1994).
53 See (Craig, 1998; Merricks, 1999)
54 Shape, as an example of an intrinsic property (e.g., being bent), is quite interesting. Dictionary entries for the word refer mostly to form, outline, and other externally evidenced properties. And while "being bent" or "bentness" may be externally evidenced, what makes this property intrinsic is that it is a relational
Lewis’s solution to the PTI is a perdurantist solution, one of three possible solutions he can see for the problem.

The first possible solution is to deny shapes are intrinsic properties, and say that they are relations which an enduring thing may bear to times. The second is to say that the only intrinsic properties are those a thing has at the present moment. According to this solution, the contradiction arises from a mistaken philosophy of time which assumes present straightness and earlier and later absence of straightness are equally real; but only what is present is real.

Lewis’s preferred solution is to say the different shapes belong to different things, viz. the temporal parts of the changeable, persisting thing. This thing does not endure, but perdures. The contradiction is resolved by claiming that the incompatible intrinsic properties being bent and being not bent are had by distinct temporal parts of a single space-time worm. Lewis argues that temporal part ontology (perdurantism) is the best explanation of the problem of temporary intrinsics. The first and third solutions are distinguishable (and the third correct), he says, not because “the third does away with shape-at-a-time relations”, but because “the first has wrongly done away with shapes as intrinsic properties that can be had simpliciter.” (1988:66) According to Lewis, only four-dimensionalist views can explain
intrinsic change. In his view, this is not a problem concerning identity. Identity is an unproblematic notion: He says:

More important, we should not suppose that we have here any problem about identity. We never have. Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything except itself. There is never any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be. (Lewis 1986)

There is an idea quite similar to Lewis's conception of intrinsic properties and identities in Indian philosophical discussions, i.e. 'svalakaśaṇa'. "Svalakaśaṇa" taken literally means something like 'self-marking'. Whatever is 'svalakaśaṇa,' has the property of being intrinsically self-identical. Svalakaśaṇa can be defined as discrete (momentary or instantaneous) self-defined particularities. In some Buddhist philosophies, svalakaśaṇa are ultimate constituents of reality (for Svaṭantrika philosophers, and for Sāvatṛti or Vaibbhaśīka Buddhists, the ultimately-constituent dharma are svalakaśaṇa). Whatever is 'svalakaśaṇa,' is inherently—or already—characterized.

Regarding svalakaśaṇa, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti held that it is immediately cognized by sense-perception which is the only direct source of knowledge. After this original cognition, we know and cognize by inferring—using concepts and by means of generalizations and measures of similarity. Objects of such subsequent conceptual indirect knowledge are called sūṃśya laksāṇa—or general-, or similarity-marking. (In Dharmakīrti's view, perception and inference are equally valid sources of knowledge, but only perception of svalakaśaṇa is direct knowledge.) The object of immediate perception is, at any moment, the self-defined particular which is ultimate and instantaneous. Such instantaneous particulars (svalakaśaṇa) are causally efficient, entirely distinct, and cannot be named or described. They are immediate, directly known, momentary, and unrepeatable; and, apparently, even as known have no distinct semantic content. The problems and debates
revolving around ‘svaiaksana’ in these Indian debates are very much like the more contemporary debates over “temporary intrinsics”, or temporary intrinsic properties.

Ted Sider has argued for a very similar form of four-dimensionalism with regard to objects, called the stage view. This type of view been dubbed “exdurantism” as of late by Haslanger, and has been developed under this nomenclature, but differently, by Balashov. This exdurantist view has important similarities with some Buddhist philosophies of time and change.

6.1.3 Sider’s Four-Dimensional Stage View

Four-dimensionalism is the doctrine that reality is spread out in time as well as space...objects that are located at multiple regions of space contain parts confined to those regions...so objects...located at multiple regions of time contain parts - temporal parts - that are confined to those regions of time. (Sider, 2000)

In his earlier work, Sider had claimed that his stage view solves various philosophical paradoxes of material constitution and identity. In a more recent article Sider argues for his four-dimensional stage-view from the problem of temporary intrinsics. (Sider, 2000) He notes, with others, that the perdurantist solution seems to violate what Sider calls a "plausible principle about change", viz. that an object that changes shape must itself have a shape simpliciter (See also Hinchliff, 1996, p. 120). If the candle does not have 'its shape', what is it that changes when 'its shape changes'? Sider says that his stage-view offers a way out of this stalemate.

As Sider describes the issue, the perdurantist view is that the continuants of our everyday ontology are to be identified with 'space-time worms', which are "mereological sums of stages from different times". But he proposes a different version of four-dimensionalism, identifying continuants with the stages themselves. Here, temporal predication for objects is taken along the lines of a "temporal version of modal counterpart theory" as set out by David Lewis (1968; 1971). On his "stage-view," he says, a current assertion of "Clinton was
"indiscreet," for example, is true if the (current) referent of 'Clinton'—a stage—has a non-
discreet temporal counterpart in the past. He says this 'temporal counterpart relation is the
same 'genidentity' or 'unity' relation used by the worm theorist to unify the successive stages
of continuing space-time worms. And regarding Sider's example here, we can't help but to
note that Sider is depending on our unnoticed acceptance of the stage being non-discreet as
'indiscreet'! But stages or temporal counterparts must also be. Yet herein lays a problem.

When discussing Lewis's argument (PTI) Sider uses examples only in the first-
person, e.g. "I am now straight-shaped, but will fail to be straight-shaped in the future....(so) I
both am, and am not, straight-shaped." (Sider, 2000, p. 84) He writes:

I myself have the property being straight, for I am a stage, not a space-time worm. The
version of four-dimensionalism that emerges the strongest from the problem of TI then, is not
the worm view but rather the stage view, for unlike the worm view, the stage view allows
both that temporary intrinsics are instantiated *simpliciter*, and that they are instantiated by
ordinary continuants such as persons and candles. (Italics added, Sider, 2000, p. 85)

But failure to acknowledge the theoretical importance of the fact that persons and candles are
not alike is a problem that seems to plague most debates regarding persistence. Persons and
candles are not ordinary continuants in the same way at all.

Only a current being—I, or you, Sider, etc. can actually have a temporal counterpart
tomorrow. Must the 'haver' and the 'had' be there at once for any having relation to be
possible? It does not work to say that this counterpart is had then, for the counterpart is then.
But this one having is future (and when it is, then it will be this). The only way for my
counterpart to remain (be) a counterpart is against a part which is *not just another
counterpart*. Sider's straight B-theory slides into a real exdurantism. The stage view cannot
commit to the four-dimensionalsists nor accept the reducibility of all tensed statements
(although there may be some real "tenseless" time on such a workable stage view, e.g. a dead
past).

Here, he notes that "according to both presentism and the stage view, any current

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continuant has only one shape, but will have others." But there is a problem not made fully apparent by a future-tense formulation—and, it is noteworthy that Sider often uses the future as the opposing tense (to the past counter-parting, or the having had other shapes, for example). Can we say that any current continuant has only one shape, but has had others? Should we say instead just that such a current continuant has only one shape, but has had another (singular)? The plurality of the having seems necessary when considering the past. Sider's work here seems to bring into clearer focus some serious problems for four-dimensional views which try to admit change without tense (like his version of a stage-view). Although stage-theoretic analysis along the lines of non-modal counterpart theory may be controversial, he argues, endurance is consistent with the basic data of persistence and change and must be evaluated on the basis of total theory. His 1996 work had argued that four-dimensional stage view is better than rival accounts. This view is both consistent with intrinsic change but allows that continuants instantiate shape(s), and other temporary intrinsics, simpliciter (as a one-place property).

But in such a four-dimensional stage-theoretic view as Sider’s, not only is the existence of the spatiotemporal object assumed, but it is assumed to have more than one temporal part since it must exist at more than one moment. If it did not, the spatiotemporal object would be nothing more than a single temporal part. But a single temporal part which is just that spatiotemporal object itself would not be a part. This would force the perdurantist or B-theory proponent of stage view into admitting the endurance of some weird entities.

### 6.2 Temporal and Atemporal Parthood

In a smaller article also titled "Four-Dimensionalism," Sider characterizes parthood at a time as: "Necessarily x is a part of y at t iff x and y each exist at t, and x’s temporal part at t is part of y's temporal part at t." (Sider, 1997, p. 200) He says that just as sitting at a time (or
being bent) "is simply taken to involve having a sitting temporal part which is located at that time; having x as a part at a time, is having a temporal part located at that time which contains x's temporal part then, as a part." So the four-dimensionalist can characterize temporal parthood in terms of atemporal parthood. Yet, if this is the case then some of x must exist at some other time than t (and so correspondingly, some part of y must not be part of x).  

Sider's second condition for temporal parthood is that "x's temporal part at t is part of y's temporal part at t." But here, 'x's temporal part at t' must be just exactly whatever it is of x which is (exists) at t. This can be distinguished only with respect to (as less than) x itself (as "part of x"). As x (or y) which exists at t must be more than the part existing at t, it seems that given unrestricted mereological composition, such a view needs an account of mereological decomposition. The b-series collapses into one instantaneous event, and one with no distinct content.

6.2.1 Ouroboros on Stage: An Argument from Time Travel

While worm views would seem to grant an equal existence to (at least) the past of the perduration, which extends like a worm across spacetime, in contrast, stage views of perduration would seem to make the past just that, i.e. past. But what is a stage anyway—especially a past one? A stage must itself 'take time'—a stage is just a stage of time (unless it is an immobile space) and so includes some of the past, but not all of it. Sider uses "four-dimensionalism" to name both views of persistence—worm and stage—arguing for the latter;

55 This is because, in such a case, if x and y are to be distinct (each—and significantly, not both—existing at t) then x's temporal part can only be only part of y's temporal part at that time t.
56 Similarly, y's temporal part at t must be just the part of y existing at t, but which yet has to be distinguished as less than y itself.
57 So, we are left with only two real options: either x and y are distinctly two parts, or they are one and the same part. It is not possible for a part of x to be a part of a part of y, unless x is included in y—and this would entail that it is not just a part of x that is part of y, but all of the parts of x.
but he also defends a tenseless B-theory of time.\textsuperscript{58} But it is evident that such a view relies on the priority of the present to name the counterpart as distinct. Thus stage-view cannot be simply a version of four-dimensionalism. Sider’s defenses of the stage-view are too many to go through in detail. For purposes here, it is sufficient to note that all of his arguments deserve reconsideration taking stage-view not as a four-dimensionalist view, but a genuine third option.

According to the common four-dimensionalist perdurantist view, in which everyday things like objects, people, etc, are temporally extended. Sider rejects such perdurance theory, or “worm view”, arguing for an alternative “stage view” version of four-dimensionalism, in which stages are instantaneous. In his stage account, past-tense claims about the history of such things are made true or false by past counterparts. (The same is true of future-tense claims.) Four-dimensionalists, he says, are not committed to the epistemic or ontic priority of temporal parts over four-dimensional things—nor do they have to give up change any more than modal counterpart theorists abandon contingency. And even if they posit instantaneous stages, they do not have to accept a constant creation \textit{ex nihilo} and instantaneous passing away.

To take just one of Sider’s arguments for the four-dimensionalism of the stage view (though he considers it an argument just for stage-view against three-dimensionalism. Sider uses the supposed possibility of time-travel (to the past) to argue for four-dimensionalism and against presentism. His argument is based on the idea that a purely presentist ontology cannot differentiate between a time traveler and a past counterpart of the traveler. When the traveler has traveled to the past to join his counterpart, and they are together, the presentist

\textsuperscript{58} In his comprehensive book \textit{Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time}, Sider defends this claim that “necessarily, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists”. (Sider, 2001) Here Sider argues again that presentism is untenable, and that a four-dimensionalist stage view does better than perdurance views to explain puzzles of identity and change; but does not use Lewis’s argument for four-dimensional from temporary intrinsics. (Sider, 2001)
cannot say that they are distinct. In contrast, the four-dimensionalist has two distinct stages to account for there being two individuals (stages) present. This is a strange argument really, since the presentist cannot admit that one could go back to the past! But regardless it is interesting—primarily because the four-dimensionalist cannot say they are counterparts!

What makes these two distinct stages is not just their difference but their sameness. Sider does not consider this in his arguments; nor does Hawley when she criticizes these arguments in her review of Sider's work. But the traveler shares the past experience of the past counterpart necessarily, just in order to be the stages of the same whole (even if it is a spacetime worm). Yet, since Sider also argues for unrestricted mereological composition, it does not seem he is entitled to assume such sameness; but he does. As Hawley notes, Sider's use of the first-person in his examples is suspect. She writes that "Sider should desist from using the first-person perspective to bolster the intuition that the possibilities are genuinely distinct."

The possibilities she refers to, are the ones offered in the time-traveling scenario. Specifically, Sider claims that, since there is no way to distinguish the traveler from the counterpart, either could be either one: He writes: "...I (here he means the traveler) am standing while my former self is sitting. But our roles might have been reversed - I might have sat where he sits while he stood where I actually stand. We have here what appear to be two distinct possibilities...The problem is that the three-dimensionalist cannot distinguish these possibilities." (p. 102-3) In contrast to the way Sider sees it (from his unacknowledged first person perspective), the three dimensionalist has only one possibility, that he, the traveler is standing and his past-counterpart—who is not him—is sitting. In contrast the four-dimensionalist has only two counterparts and nothing to say they are counterparts of one another. The four dimensionalist who time travels, would be very confused indeed. Without the continuity of memory he would not recognize that to be his former self.
While it does seem true that an extreme presentist (Replacement-view of time—
creation and destruction only) cannot distinguish these possibilities, this is given an eternalist
presupposition; but a presentist has no reason to think that time travel to the past is possible!
In a presentist ontology one might experience a new present which could somehow involve
counterparts of ourselves, but we could not ever travel to the past (or to visit now past
counterparts). And even a growing block theorist who admits a real changing present (and
fixed past) cannot admit genuine time travel into the past. We may travel into our own past
and we may determine our own past; but we are living while what is completely past is not,
there is no activity in a dead past.

In this respect, it is not only interesting to note (with Hawley) that Sider’s use of first-
person examples makes his case appear more plausible, but to consider deeply why such
eamples do. A person who now exists and an object which now exists may be said to exist
in two different senses. The being of a person (being a person) and the being of an object
(being an object) are two very different sorts of beings. In recognition of this, one may
envisage a more complex sense of being-present (admitting real living pastness). Such a
thickened presentism offers aspects of a growing block view—the real presently existing past
is our own. In this way, we are growing blobs. This view enables us to maintain aspects of
an eternalist view; but a thinned out eternalism where not all things exist at the same time in
the same way.

But such a view is a distinct third option and not an amalgamation of parts of
presentist and eternalist views. This third-way can admit that the B-series—events
tenselessly ordered exist and exist all equally without temporal distinction (in the absence of
such a living past). This third sort of view is distinctly like eternalism in admitting the
equivalent likeness of all that exists in the absence of tensed discrimination (and it can be
consistent in admitting ultimately this might be a single but thereby indistinguishable event,
characterizable only in respect of priority, or pastness). But such a third sort of view of a growing block sort of view admits a real presentism in distinguishing the past as now real, and the future as not yet real, by means of the reality and nature of the present. In contrast to ordinary presentism however, this realized presentism involves the knowable past. Even eternalism admits the reality of what could be "past" (by admitting the constant reality of all events)—but again, it can't account for the reality of pastness.

Our third-sort of answer differentiates before and after, and their concurrent likeness, but not in all cases. The third-way admits the reality of past like B-series, or tenseless views (what we might think of as the becoming set in stone—what is done can't be undone); alongside recognizing the collapse of B-series events into one (indistinct) event in the absence of a measure, which provides even a tenseless ordering of a series on the basis of priority alone. We experience a specious present with duration which must be real; and enables differentiating past and future based on holding the reality of the past stage.

B-series ordering, even if tenseless, requires some coincidence (including difference in identity) or some simultaneity, in order to be more than an indistinguishable event. But, if it involves simultaneity, then a changing four-dimensionalism (B-theory) cannot be distinct from an A-series—and so can only be delimited circularly and infinitely. Any B-series requires an A-series indexical-distinction of—at least—now and not-now (then). This dichotomy, as Dummett addressed, is analogous to that of here and not-here.

But real A-series changing discriminations are neither circular nor infinitely regressive exactly, or rather they are both. They are inclusive and extensive, collapsing, but spiralingly progressive (as caused, perhaps, by something like McTaggart's C-series of perceptions.) And the issue of possessing contradictory determinations remains, even admitting such a looping progression. How can such coiling tension, which still, after all, has contradictory terms offer any identity?
This problem of contradictory intrinsic properties is resolved only by beings with intrinsic diachronic identity. Here we should distinguish temporary intrinsic properties (being bent) from intrinsic temporal properties (having been bent in the past and going to be bent in the future). Temporary intrinsic properties are consistent with a purely perdurantist view. But having intrinsic temporal properties is a different sort of thing. It seems only actually enduring things may have intrinsic temporal properties; and that such properties (having been x in the past) themselves are enduring. But this endurability is not a straight and linear one with exponential levels of re-ascription of A-series designations. With inclusive and loopingly progressive determinations, this version of growth is not exponential but exdurae.

There must be enduring entities under a workable stage-view; yet such a view distinguishes the present as the location of difference between past and future. This third way mediates a presentist and eternalist view (yet being a distinct third option and not an amalgamation). We might call this a 'a growing-blob view,' or a real exduaer. Being present and having a real pastness and potential futurity. This just is being diachroniC, and so extended in time (i.e., having real pastness). This is something, literally and etymologically substantial. Exduaer, the related (third-way) view of objects, may likewise account for distinction of a present stage by noting different sorts of enduring and perduring things. It isn't necessary that all things persist in the same way; and a stage-view theorist can take a much different position on the nature of stages, depending on the sort of entity one is considering.

So, to return to our traveler: We can maintain that the traveler and the past counterpart are different because one has some experiences the other doesn't; but the counterpart has no experiences that the traveler does not share. Thus, even the presentist (if he is a real-present presentist—or growing-stages presentist, and not an instantaneous stage-
presentist—as well as growing-block theorists can account for the difference in the counterparts. The later counterpart has more experiences than the earlier one. Moreover, if someone is really a past counterpart, they must be the same yet distinct. It is this same, shared pastness that makes these counterparts of one another. If the later counterpart is taken as entirely distinct from the earlier counterpart as each simply present, then how could they be real counterparts of one another at all? (They could be taken as such by an external viewer, but many things can be counter-posed without being real counterparts). So stages cannot be discreet.

What stage views can't account for is the absence of knowledge on the part of the traveler that he had visited himself before. He was, after all, already there but did not see himself. This difficulty in the scenario can be addressed by admitting that the counterpart never could experience the traveler in person. This is because he has no difference from the traveler available to him. There is only one available past. There is nothing keeping the counterpart from experiencing the effects of the traveler and his activities however. While, in contrast, it is possible that the traveler might 'see' or experience the counterpart. The traveler can recognize his own distinction from the counterpart (but only at some times, since for some times, he and the counterpart were not-different. So after all, this idea of counterparts applied to even past actualities seems quite different than using it modally. It may be that the past appears to be necessary while the future seems to just be possible, but it is just this sort of conjunction of modality with tense that requires we abandon a straight four-dimensional view.

One difficulty inherent in basing a non-modal counterpart view on a modal analogue is that we have to have some sort of actualism to delimit the counterpart stage as such, and such an actual counterpart stage has to be ontically designated—as a preferred stage. The stage view mistakes the point if modeled modally. One of the central reasons for preferring
four-dimensionalism is greatly diminished if stages are conceived as instantaneous, having only (modal-like) counterparts at other times. Here, we should not overlook the significance of actually having real counterparts; the past is not just possible from here, it is necessary—and the future, or future-counterparts, might in fact, differ in this sense. It seems that what is, actually, must be tensed. That is why in the next chapter we have to get our minds muddled with the intense complications of tense.

**6.3 Persistence, Activity and Time**

*Time, the self of the universe itself, is called activity.*

_Bhartrhari Kālasamuddeśa_

In his science of grammar—*Of Sentences and Words (Vākyapadīya)*, Bhartrhari begins his _Kālasamuddeśa_ noting that the many, like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya philosophers believe that Time is a single substance. He says it is also thought that the dividing factor of activity is time, while the dividing factor (_bhēdikā_) of all that is (sarvasya), is enumeration (_saṁkhyā_). Time is said to be the efficient cause (_nimittākārana_) in the origination, existence, and destruction of beings which possess these qualities (origination and destruction). But then he says that time appears divided by differences resting on alien activities, but no elementary substance can be divided, or not-divided.

Bhartrhari says that the essence, or own-nature, of a substance is neither one nor many, neither dark nor light independently. Time appears sequential and divided only because of the commingling (_saṁsargā_—combination or confusion) of activities. The distinctions of commingled activities are considered its (time's) distinguishing marks. All

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59 Bhartrhari discusses time at length in the third _kānda_ (9.1-9.114), called _Kālasamuddeśa_ ('Exposition of Time'). Even this small part of the voluminous work is a book in itself, and its commentarial details very complex. Opinions vary on Bhartrhari's view of time, and on the correspondence of the commentarial work. Here we will try to stick to some basic statements from Bhartrhari and Hēlārāja about activity and time.
particular orderly activities are temporal. In so far as they manage to exist separately from one another, they are inseparable from time. So at every stage, the operation of time is established; that activity is called time, the self of the universe itself. 60 By time, possessing differences through transformation, growth and decay of all material form—all is seen to exist separately.

Bhartrhari invokes the ancient metaphor of time as the “string-puller” (ṣūtradhāra) of the working world. It regulates the universe through prevention (pratibandha) and permission (abhyanujña) (9.4). This creates sequence for things in the universe enabling different things to appear at different times. Time allows or affords growth and complexity (or the development of order by means of repetition and reflection), and the entropic dissolution of order or its restriction or limitation (hence, the apparent opposition of increasing material disorder, or the degradation of material repletion with respect to order).

Bhartrhari says that if time did not impose and lift suspension, the states would be confused without priority and posteriority. If there were no such putting on and off of prohibition, then there would be confusion in things, which would be thus without sequence (9.5). This would allow no knowledge of things as we have it.

Taking time as ‘ṣūtradhāra’ (the “string-puller/holder”), has significant allusions to three alternative professions: the stage-manager in theatre, the master-builder with his level-assessing string, and the puppeteer! If this great writer, builder, director, and conceiver did not persist perennially, no occasional successive actions and events would be possible or possibly orderable.

6.3.1 Affordances and Restrictions

60 “kāla eva hi viśvātmā vyēpāra iti kathyate” (9.12)
With motions similar to the turnings and agitations of a water-wheel, he says, time is all pervading; driving all parts (kalā) of the material world—hence obtaining the name (kāla) time. Time alone permits the various operations which are suspended by it just as the string of a bird catcher suspends and permits the birds. Helārāja says that tied to a string, the small birds used to catch other birds experience permission and suspension by the releasing and pulling back of a string—but they are tied by this string of time's affordance and limitation, and are not able to fly away like free birds:

In the same way, material things, tied to the string of time, experience forever creation and destruction characterized by expanding and shrinking. And so...the universe, caught in the web of time, is brought forth when its time has come; it exists (for some time) when it has been brought forth; and when it has existed, having done its work, undergoes destruction. (Sharma, 1972, p. 51)

6.3.1.1 Beginnings

The power of time is established as the cause of instigation. Divided by these commingled activities time affects different fixed limits. It is due to association with particulars that the realization of events takes place—here, time becomes the cause of the operation of powers. The timing of origination depends on the operation of such powers. Additionally, Bhartrhari says that the sustenance of an object is also regulated, because it also depends upon the eternal (9.9-10). (Here the eternal or perpetual is taken to be Time.) The restriction of creation and manifestation are dependent on this instigation. Since the existence of created beings is dependent upon the eternal, existence follows the restriction of time.

The permissiveness of time—its affordance for us, is logically dependent upon such restriction (just as, mathematically, the limit provides the definition of a continuous function). From this results time through various commingled activities the origination and promotion of existing beings, and their corresponding suspension, disappearance and
destruction. (Sharma, 1972, pp. 44-49) It is thus a divine power or a power of divine consciousness and not personal consciousness which is a divine 'string puller', both allowing and restricting. Personal consciousness is a reflection of this power of divine consciousness.

Where the power obtains maturity due to relation with a particular, eternal activity is manifest by an act called 'instigation' (prayoga). After it (eternal activity has been manifested) the manifestation of effect (phala, fruitfulness) arises, prompted by genus. But such activities are restrained by the powers of a miraculous course of action according to Bhartrhari, because the operations of the causes are consistent (or possible) in connection with effects; so, e.g. things belonging to a restricted genus generate such things—the genus causes the prompting. In other words the course of cause and effect or constant concomitance can be known and expectation may be justified based on past experience.

Heclaraja says that afterwards, a power called inherency (samavaya) opposed to division (bhedaasya) makes those manifestations of effects as if identical with their material causes.

The permissiveness of time is seen in the power to bring about sequence, making effects be proceeded by causes in constantly concomitant ways. The creation of beings is like this; one's death is an effect of many things but succeeds one's birth which is its ultimate concomitant. Produced substances like our decaying bodies are preceded by causes which make us like our parents (rupatva). (Sharma, 1972, p. 55) Bhartrhari says that we should let what remains of dependencies or of dependents (individual causes and effects, or genera respectively) be the support of these effects. What remains or rests (asraya, having or being a resting place, or which is dwelling or abiding) is perpetual or eternal. By this remaining,

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61 Some meanings (or synonyms) of 'prayoga' include joining forth together, connecting or practice, presenting, undertaking, or position.
62 Here, the power of samavaya makes the division between causes and effects disappear, and so they appear identical. Because of this, some, like Shankhya philosophers, do not admit effect to be distinct from the cause; but, in reality, there is no identity. He explains that this is because the whole, which is the object of the knowledge of an objective unity, is different from the component parts, which are the object of the knowledge of division. Hence, he says, the word 'as if' (iva) is used in Bhartrhari's kārikā).
the existence of the effect is made possible. Existence, like creation is dependent upon something else.

Bhartrhari notes that there would be no purposeful activity, and no temporal duration at all without this support. Without the (continuing) support of a cause, a created thing would suffer destruction immediately after its creation. If so, what is created would be for destruction only and not any purposeful action. It (an existing being) co-existing with commingled elements is to promote (purposeful) actions. Without admitting the existence of such a continuing-causal support, no course of action can be established for created things. Helarāja says that the following definition of existence is arrived at: it means it is the agent of many successive actions after various cooperative factors have been secured. Thus, he says, the permissiveness of time and so existence also, is achieved.

6.3.1.2 Endings

We confront the limitations of time not only facing our own bodily demise but in our everyday progress. Time is a factor of limitation—there is more to say than time allows, and more to do than time permits. (Though we must correspondingly admit that time affords and permits.) Time haunts us and fills us with joy. The passage of time takes things away and gives new things again; and in this play of spontaneity and common constraints, we both win and lose everything. Time is filled with surprises and certainties all along the way. We know time with its openness and its limitation as both a gift and a curse.

According to Bhartrhari, ‘decomposition’ (or entropy) jarā (agedness or decay), is a power of time which obstructs time’s other power, allowance (abhyanyujnā), working toward creation, existence and growth. The limitation or binding of time (pratibandha) that agedness or organic decline (jarā), suspends the power and obstructing arises. The newness or youth, common to animate and inanimate alike, is suspended by this power of decay which hinders
the ability of manifestation of effects to perform those purposeful actions having determinate appearance at another time. For example, certain states like slow intellect and drought etc., which are opposed to strength, are generated in animate and inanimate beings. These are causes of the current state of existence; but all those disappear, whence the self perishes.\(^{63}\) Bhartṛhari then states other reasons for inferring (the reality) of time, asking how an exact discrimination can be possible between two ending activities (which are inherent in separate objects) if there is not a single linking factor.

He says that just as the weight of various substances can be measured in a balance or in a hand, in the same way, the course of activity: "time also, by the employment of its own power experiencing the universal form, measures the series of activities on which diversity has been imposed through the difference of actions..." (9.28 Sharma, 1972, p. 60) That single time, or activity, involves cooperative and coexisting activities just as rice re-forms the water for its growth, absorbing it. Hence, Bhartṛhari says, time obtains the name hāyana (meaning a year, passing, or excluded, also a form of red rice, etc. (9.29).\(^{64}\) Time's consumption is enlivening and transforming.

But if time is established as a single action, how can it have the form of sequence? In order to answer this question Bhartṛhari says that time has an eternal or perpetual (śāśvati) course or motion by means of suspension and permission. Being divided by this, it obtains the form of sequence (9.30). It is by means of this suspension and permission the eternal

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\(^{63}\) Bhartṛhari writes that "Just as by a miraculous course of action everything is created without sequence, bond and abode, so also (by the same miraculous course of action) its (i.e. the being's) self perishes." (9.26 Sharma, 1972, p. 58) Heḷārāja summarizes in commentary: "Thus, creation, existence, and destruction take place by permission and suspension caused by time. It is decided that in all these there is the operation of time which is the self/nature (ātma) of the universe. With respect to this it has been said: "Here (i.e. in this world), at every stage certainly the operation of time is established." (Sharma, 1972, p. 59)

\(^{64}\) (Sharma, 1972, p. 61) Heḷārāja notes that: "When (thus) the single time is established, manifold activities though they coexist with it (i.e. time) go away (from it); therefore, it i.e. time obtains the name—and leaves the activities and therefore is called such." An example a rice grain in the form of seed leaves the coexisting water designated as hāyana, just as rice is favored by coexisting waters so also time favors beings through cooperative activities. Dividedness of time is due to superimposition; whereas undividedness is principal (whether this is unity is questionable, as it is ontologically open).
motion of time is seen in beings. In ever-changing beings it is recurring constantly—something is destroyed and something created. Thus the sequence resting in activity is imposed on time. It does not actually exist there. The principal quality, activity, is the sequence imposed on something else (i.e. on time). Priority and posteriority in prior and posterior being, is also not independent. These are recognized as being superimposed. So also simultaneity, as a quality opposed to sequence, yet still resting in activity, is attributed to time. (Sharma, 1972, p. 62)

According to Bhartrhari, time, though single, obtains division due to the diversity of agents. Even the designation of day and night, evening and morning etc. are taken one after another being superimposed by different activities. He says that the single entity (i.e. Time), having obtained excellence and decline due to the diversity of agents in their actions becomes even (favorable) and uneven (unfavorable). Hellarāja remarks that uneven time is kali yuga—‘even’ or favorable time is time that follows custom and restraint the good custom. Detracting from the good custom is transgressing traditional custom (following customs of Veda and Śmṛti texts). So it would seem that for Bhartrhari, final reality or ultimate ontological reality of the eternal (yet recurring) past is that of good and bad activities. The normative is the basis of this fundamental ontological carving of eternal time.

Bhartrhari gives an analogy: just as a person is called carpenter etc., due to different functions so due to different activities designation like season etc. arise (upajāyate) with regard to the single time. Due to the difference of superimposition of alien activities with regard to a being which possesses the states of both existence and non-existence (the single time) is called beginning (time), functioning (time) and completion (time). But, since in Bhartrhari’s view there is no beginning time or ending time there is only perpetual activity. The observer is required because the nature or essence of anything can neither be decreased
The true nature of something has no capacity to divide or to extend.

(Sharma, 1972, p. 64) The division and extension we see are not of substances themselves but our appearance to these things.

Under this view, the increase of things is caused by external determination (arbitrary comparisons—or relative measures). Hence, it appears that this is slow and this is quick. But, not only is there is no sequence of a non-existing being (for it cannot be differentiated) Bhartrhari says, that which is the true nature of an existing being remains as it is, too—without sequence. Time is delimited by activity (kriyopādhīh, or having action superimposed) and so becomes present, past, and future (bhūta-bhāvīyad-vartamānātāh) (Sharma, 1972, p. 66).

### 6.4 Conclusion: Finished and Unfinished Presents

In Bhartrhari’s very original view, present time (or current persistence) is not marked by existence, but the *incompletion of activity*. While any activity may consist of many activities and may have apparent interruption (and so appear not-in-effect) by other actions, activities are not withdrawn just because their enactment is not currently evident if they are not yet completed. Moreover, any and all activities are intermingled with other activities (9.81). Any present time is only a time of (incompleted) activity or action, including what has been and what is yet to be.

Only that which is capable of producing an effect may thus be taken as being present (or having its own state). The state of present time is just an aggregation of moments given unity but the activity of fabrication. The form of sequential activities is reflected in the intellect and condensed into one cognizance is called the state of the present time or activity

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65 "na hy ātmā kasya cid bhettum pracetum va api sakya"
What we know as ‘past’ and ‘future’ are current and remain present, but assume the form of opposed shelters (viruddhaśraya-rūpatām). (9.101)

This seems to offer us an antirealism about time, but Bhartrhari seems to have a very nuanced position giving a differentiation to past and future, and an ultimate dependence of our understanding of time (involving change and unity with diversity) on the power of condensing into consciousness of the speaker or hearer (actor or observer). Yet he admits a reality to an eternality of pastness and so to the reality of time as a series though the ordering as sequential appearance may be fabricated. The tense structure of grammar like this may be fabricated, a web, and so conventional or convening of ideas or inter-subjective (according to a language game), but tense is to be explained as real albeit phenomenal, and not explained away as illusion.

Bhartrhari says that the three courses (past, present and future) are indeed established as devoid of sequence, just like darkness and light. The sequence results in them with regard to beings. While most commentators and interpreters accord to Bhartrhari a unified view of time, viz. that time is One. He seems to deny it both unity and real diversity saying these are both due to associations with other things that whatever appears does so in this way or that. (9.7) He admits the unification of diverse moments as a power of activity and actions which are ontologically substantial, becoming part of the eternal Time (lessness?)—or real, after completion. In this way he too admits the reality of the past, and also of the present in activity spanning time—or as in-completion (past and present, both tenses which have secondary senses in Bhartrhari’s grammar of tense) as differentiated from un-completed (future). The time entirely un-completed (not-yet begun), the future, has no secondary senses.

He accords to Sanskrit grammar five kinds of past and four kinds of future. The four are parallel in type for both past and future and the fifth kind of past is called secondary
past, or future treated as past. There are also two kinds of present, the primary present and the secondary which is past and future treated as present. So, notably in both cases of the present tense and the past tense, there is a secondary case which treats other tenses as that tense. So, for the past, the secondary past treats future as past; the secondary present treats past or future as present. The future has no secondary case, in which the past is treated as future.

Our language accords with the direction of action, asymmetrical time. The past and the present tense are used in secondary cases and so can simulate other times. The future may be treated as present or as past, but has no possible secondary-sense of its own. And indeed, this duality is noted in 9.54. "Because some (external aspects) are present (while others disappear), the bearer of the external aspects achieves the state of present time as well as the state of past time, simultaneously." (Sharma, 1972, p. 79)

It is this single activity or action, which is divided by the eleven forms of tense. These divisions of time, he says, are fabricated for the clear division of the grammatical operations. Helaraja says that in reality, time is not of so great a number. On account of the distinction of the activities, there has been taught a division of times. (Sharma, 1972, p. 67) Bhartrhari says in 9.38: "Beings, having placed their own state on time, which is received by the intellect, depart from it (i.e. time), (having thus) transferred (their) power there (i.e. to time).” Reflection of that (past in the) form of beings yet to come, is an accurate reflection (as if in a well-polished mirror) arising by Time’s powers only—just as a stream drags along grass, leaves, creepers, etc. so Time, too, lets the properties of those possessing properties (beings) move forward (9.39-40).

Just as where once was a bundle of leaves now passes a creeper—just so, our perceptions (both external and internal) seem to change over time, but the place of the river has not moved though the water has altered what is currently there. Time, which only really
remains, becomes an accumulation or diminution of moments in our ordinary considerations. This is a fabrication or creation of temporal division. The integrity or continuity of time's impulse is differential (or having different rates of passage and locations) based on superimposed conditions. A very helpful passage will be quoted here in which Bhartṛhari compares the real flow of time to the way in which water is made to flow:

The flow of water, through the hole of the tube (nālikā) by means of prevention and permission, is itself the work of Time. Whether the hole is big or small the function of Time is not diversified through contact with it. And yet the essence (of Time) follows it. It is through the play of Time, having many powers, among the objects that it becomes diversified. By bringing about the growth of the bamboo (in a short time) and that of the palm (over a long time), Time becomes diversified, by association with such diversity. The passing-away of objects does not bring about the passing away of Time. The road is not affected by any difference in the movement of the people who walk on it. (Iyer, 1977, pp. 57-59)

The bamboo is, so to speak, a large hole feeling the effects of time rapidly, the palm is the smaller hole in which time's flow is restricted. Bhartṛhari says that the three powers of the single time (or sole-activity) remain firm; and, by contact with them, the visibility and invisibility (darśanādarśane) of existing beings takes place (9.49).

But if time as such is not different from activity, then how can one say 'bhūtā sattā' (or "existence existed")? Bhartṛhari explains that in the usage bhūto ghataḥ (the pot existed or is gone) the pastness refers only to the existence denoted by the verbal root bhū; but in the usage bhūtā sattā’ (or "existence existed") the existence of the existence is said to have become past (through the affix, which is prescribed in the past time). Heḷārāja asks which of the two terms possesses the state of past time in the phrase or thought that 'a pot existed' (bhūto ghataḥ)?

He says that it cannot be the pot, which, as substance, has no direct connection to time. Only activities based on verbal roots like bhū—activities like existing—have direct relation to time which is their instrumental cause. So activity of existence denoted by bhū is made known to have become past. Although this is inherently connected with the substance (pot), there is no direct relation between a substance and time according to Bhartṛhari. Even
in the view that time is distinct from activity, Helārāja says, the relation between time and substance takes place by way of activity.

Because of this, even in the case of ‘bhūtā sattā’ (existence existed), verbally, he says, the existence in the form of activity is different from that in the form of a substance. When there is a relation of an existence denoted by bhum and that denoted by ‘sattā’ the apprehension of the state of the past time of the existence (which is) in the form of a substance (sattā), is through the state of the past time of the existence, denoted by the verbal root (bhum) only. (Sharma, 1972, p. 103)

Helārāja concludes that “there is no logical flaw (inconsistency) in the usage ‘bhūtā sattā’ (existence existed); there is a difference because of its resting upon its dependence, the connection with three-fold time is thereby not impaired. This has been arrived at.” So, on this analogy of grammar, it seems that to say ‘there was a pot’ (but there is no pot now) is to say just that ‘what exists (sattā) was existence (bhūto)’. In other words, ‘that which is past exists’. Past-being is not a contradiction in terms. Immaterial things, like activities may persist.

6.4.1 The Past gives Time its Name

In Bhartṛhari’s view, past and future are said to be of a covering nature with regard to beings. Helārāja notes that past and future are the causes for the enclosing of beings and are courses or segments of a path, “possessing the nature of inertia. For enclosing is the nature of inertia. Here, the powers past, present and future are related epistemologically to sattva, rajas, and tamas. The past and future powers of time cover or conceal, but the power of time called “present” is illuminated by cognizance invoking activity. It is this present-power that
makes the form of beings appear (*uparākāśhini*). Time conceals and reveals by this restriction (covering or limitation) and permission (exposure or openness).\(^6^6\)

In that respect (*tatra*), two of those ways-to-go (segments of paths, *adhvānau*) are of the form of darkness, whereas one of the ways has the status like that of Light. For some, also, the past turns up back again. (9.53)\(^6^7\)

Bhartrāhari sees the point of both the view which accepts the irreversible cumulative ordered-series of the three temporal "ways" (*adhvā*), as well as of the cyclic view of the past recurring back again. Yet, Helaraja says-

Thus, as has been said before, the opposition of the powers of the past and the power of the present remains intact—the past does not, in the total view of the world, ever come back to be the present.

The three powers or three "ways" of Time remain mutually exclusive; though, the first imagery is that of present being illumined to us, the past and future being the concealed or dark part, of an omnitemporal substance (*dharmin*, or quality possessor! one who orders) who is changeless in the nature of its existence, in that it perpetually sheds old properties (*dharma*) and assumes new ones.

This is not a culpable philosophical vacillation but the spirit of descriptive metaphysics. The attraction of the tenseless observer-independent or actionless view of time (as if past), as projecting an illusory appearance of succession cannot be denied. But if we have to give an account of the world as we found it, i.e. as full of actions and events, then the past is the gone and never-to-return dark side of a cumulative Self-World; while the future is the endless front—equally unseen, seen dimly only through wish, will, faith and hope—with the present body being the only illuminated part also darkening at both ends. Bhartrāhari acknowledges that the future does not obstruct the present, but says that the power which is

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\(^6^6\) We might compare this in Abhinava's analysis, to the covering of exclusion (*apohena*) and the revelation achieved by the reflectivity of *sattva* (*smṛti*) and the activity of awareness (*rajās*).

\(^6^7\) Translation of this verse and its commentary is by Professor Arindam Chakrabarti.
called “past” impedes or limits creation. In some ways perhaps, the past comes back again—e.g. knowing recurring patterns leads to coherent knowing and successful acting; but what has actually passed or happened (past action), though remaining a real part of time, never is present—yet it is always past. In other words, the past does recur, perfectly in a sense, as the past remains now (or still) past, so always past again.

In 9.39, Bhārtṛhari says that beings place their own state on time; that this state or form is received by the intellect (prajñāvā), then they depart from Time (so perishing) transferring their powers to the past time. “Objects, after having deposited in Time their particular form determined by Intelligence, after having transferred their powers to it, disappear.” (Iyer, 1977, p. 47)

Helārāja explains that the essence or nature of Time is well-known through the superimpositions of beings through their activities, whose stages are remembered after they have been experienced (once). These beings fabricate the designation ‘past’ with regard to it (i.e. time), they themselves (through their activity) being superimposed (on time). In commentary on this verse, Iyer writes,

The objects preserved in memory are called past objects, and it is they which give the name ‘past’ to the time when they were produced. The objects deposit in eternal Time the form which they had when they were present. They are then said to be remembered. The very fact that things are remembered is a proof of the existence of Time. (Iyer, 1977, p. 47)

Thus there may be veridical knowledge that there was, but is not longer a pot, for example. As Abhinavagupta would endorse later, it is our recognition of absence which enables perception of time, change, and activity; and it is such possible accurate recognition of no-longer-being-there which is remembrance. Memory, likewise, makes known the reality of Time as Spirit. Helārāja concludes that therefore, this (usage) itself (e.g. a pot existed) is

68 Helārāja notes that the power of creation, called “present”, is indeed obstructed by “past”, for there is no rebirth of a dead one. So, a material object, which has fallen in the past-course i.e. in past time), does not appear (again). Here its appearance is taken as its happening. Objects once destroyed by time do not still appear, and people who have died are not reborn over again. (Sharma, 1972, p. 101)
evidence which makes known the existence of Time. If (perpetual or eternal) Time were non-existent, no such usage would be possible. (Sharma, 1972, p. 68)
"Positions in time as they appear to us prima facie are distinguished in two ways." \(^{69}\)

Although McTaggart's work is used as a backdrop against which many lines of contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics are drawn; it is often explicated very briefly. Many expositions review the basic argument only in order to serve as a foil for taking either a tensed or a tenseless view of time. But there are some very interesting observations made in-between these arguments that escape contemporary attention. Most important among these is McTaggart's longer expositions involving a C-series (the source of the appearance of the 'unreal' time)\(^{70}\).

Not only is there a good deal still to be discovered in McTaggart's analysis, what he seems to overlook (perhaps intentionally) is also very interesting, e.g. whether there is any difference between present and past (or future). Also, McTaggart's fundamental observation that we perceive events in both of these apparently contradictory ways—as past, present or future; or in relation to a series of other events, i.e. earlier or later then or simultaneous with—is in need of explanation. And here, we could add the above explicated 'third-way' as another manner of thinking about being in time. What is needed is explanation of how such dynamic and static views of time are combined. How are both (or, these three) positions in time simultaneously, or similarly, plausible? And, why do we perceive or conceive events in time under these different descriptions—is this essential to temporal perception?

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\(^{69}\) This appears in both (McTaggart, 1908, p. 458) and (1927, p. 305).

\(^{70}\) The C-series will only be touched on here; but gives a great deal of insight into McTaggart's considered view. This series allows reading tense as relational, and the C-series provides the term outside of time, which McTaggart said a relational view of tense would require. Unlike the tensed relations of the A-series, and tenseless relations of the B-series, he conceives such C-series to be the real event series. This C-series is atemporal, and yet, this series in combination with the B-series is responsible for the temporal illusion of the changing and contradictory designations of the A-series. In what follows, I will deal with McTaggart's arguments for the unreality of time directly, admitting some of these lesser-known distinctions.
Distinguishing such positions in time is possible only if some non-present things presently exist (and if some things exist which are neither present nor absent). This position will be explained below. It is enough to note here, that the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics and the problem of having contradictory temporal relations (or properties), are deeply related.

7.1 McTaggart, Tense, and Ontology

To take a close-up look at McTaggart's famous argument against the reality of time: A-series distinctions represent events as they are past, present or future. These designations—at least the last two of them—are constantly changing. McTaggart says that events once future become present and then past. In contrast, B-series distinctions remain the same for all events: He says that if an event is ever earlier, or later than another (or others), it will always be. B-series relations are transitive, asymmetrical and unchanging. McTaggart also defines events themselves as unchanging:

The death of Queen Anne is, always was, and always will be, the same event, it was once an event far in the future. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain past, though every moment it becomes further and further past. (The past, therefore, is always changing. If the A series is real at all...) therefore, if there is any change, it must be looked for in the A series, and in the A series alone. (McTaggart, 1927, p. 311)

It is evident in this passage that McTaggart is, to some extent, working with a background conception of a B-series event-ontology. William Craig criticizes McTaggart for trying to combine such a real B-series ontology with with real A-series tensed designations. (Craig, 1998) Even though McTaggart denies that a B-series can exist without an A-series, he is also deeply an eternalist of sorts. This becomes evident in his C-series which is an atemporal (timeless and not just tenseless) ordering which is the source of the apparent A-series ordering.

71 McTaggart sometimes uses "position" here synonymously with "event" and later in the interchanges it with the word "distinction". It belies his underlying spatial conceptions and enables him to evade the question of change occurring in the present.
In his B-series ontology, events are, and always will be, just exactly what they are and do not change. They are tenseless and stand in constant relation to one another, unchanging. It will be argued further below that eternalism, or a B-series ontology of events, must be qualified to be consistent, since otherwise there can be no distinction of any event. Because of this, the only real (or actual) becoming or change in McTaggart's description ought to be just whatever is present, now becoming past (and the past becoming further past). A third-type of view might allow the combination of A- and B-views, and maybe even enable the very distinction of these conflicting views.

McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time (and by implication, the unreality of the past) has two steps. First, he argues that since a B-series admits no change, by definition, and change is essential to time, so an A-series (or A-series distinction) is a necessary condition for a B-series (or B-series distinction). Also, if a B-series is temporal at all, then it must involve an A-series. But events themselves cannot change, and can neither begin nor end, nor merge into one another. He says that if "the characteristics of an event change, then there is certainly change"; but only one class of such characteristics can change: "the determinations of the event in question by means of the A series. (McTaggart, 1927, p. 311)

McTaggart doesn't attempt to define change or locate the nexus of change any more specifically here, stating only that it would "be universally admitted that time involves change" and "there could be no time if nothing changed." (McTaggart, 1927, p. 309) Since neither events themselves, nor the relations of events in the B-series, change, events must somehow change with respect to their A-series determination. He proposes that this change in an event's A-series determination might be thought to be a change in the relational properties of the event, i.e. a change in its degree, of pastness, presentness, or futurity ("Cambridge change"). But since events admit of no internal change, the way in which events change must involve a changing external relation. In order for the relation to change,
the term that is outside of time must be the source of change. But when considering what
determines this relational change, McTaggart begins and finishes his analysis with suspicious
swiftness:

We have come to the conclusion that an A series depends on relations to a term outside the
A series. This term, then, could not itself be in time, and yet must be such that different
relations to it determine the other terms of those relations, as being past, present, or future.
To find such a term would not be easy, and yet such a term must be found, if the A series is
to be real. But there is a more positive difficulty in the way of the reality of the A series.
(McTaggart, 1927, p. 328 italics added)

7.1.1 Vicious Circularity or Infinite Regress

The "more positive difficulty" is that if events can only change with respect to their A-
series distinction every event will have all three determinations unless it is specified that they
have them successively. Since successively means that they must have them in relation to
terms specified by past, present, and future, according to McTaggart, this leaves us with
either circularity or infinite regress; and both, he says, are vicious. Every event is an event
for which all A-series distinctions are necessarily true of it simultaneously; but since past,
present, and future are incompatible determinations, every event must be one but not more
than one. McTaggart states that "this exclusiveness is essential to change and therefore to
time."(McTaggart, 1927, p. 329) These attributions can't be made ontologically compatible
unless they are re-specified in terms of the A-series.

If we accept that there is no B-series without an A-series (and this does seem to be true
when the B-series is understood to be not time itself but a static model of events, since
change is essential to time), we must locate the change within the A-series. These
determinations of events are relational qualities that must apparently change their relation to
"something outside the time series". McTaggart states clearly that the problem is not that the
terms can't be defined without regressive reference to the A-series—but that the events
themselves can't have those progressive determinations, because events don't change. If this
is to be more than a circular argument, to the effect that what is really in time must be changing, but events themselves don’t change, so time (as the changing of events) is unreal, we must explore in more detail how these determinations might admit change.

7.1.2 Dummett’s Take on McTaggart’s Argument: Incomplete Reality

Dummett notes two common but incorrect objections to McTaggart’s argument: viz., that it neglects the obvious properties of token-reflexive expressions (not that dissimilar from Russell’s objection), and that it could be avoided given an object based ontology. (M. Dummett, 1960, pp. 498-499) But McTaggart has no general problem with token-reflexivity, for example, of “you” and “I”, or “here” and “there”. If his argument could be neutralized by the recognition of the temporal indexicality of descriptions of events then, as Dummett notes, he would have had no hesitation in leveling the same charge of incoherence to personal indexicals and spatial indexicals. Since McTaggart opposes space to time in his argument, and the unreality is taken to apply to time in particular (and not space or selves), McTaggart must be intending something else. (M. Dummett, 1960, p. 500)

Dummett takes McTaggart’s argument as an attempt to establish two things: First, that there would be no time if there were no tensed facts of kind A on the ground that time involves change. And second, that the existence of tensed facts involves a contradiction. Here again, guided by grammar, we should say, not “if there exist facts of kind A”, as Dummett does, but “if there are facts of kind A”. It is this independent existence of facts of kind A which is at issue. These facts, tensed facts, are not things that exist. They are things that are (it would almost be better to say, “They are things that take place”), but for the

72 “It is because people suppose that McTaggart can be refuted by some such objection (as ‘that McTaggart’s argument is a sophism based on a blindness to the obvious properties of token-reflexive expressions’) they do not take him very seriously, but I believe that this solution rests on a grave misunderstanding. If it gave a correct account ..., then only stupidity could explain McTaggart’s failure to use a quite analogous argument to show the unreality of space and the unreality of personality.” (M. Dummett, 1960, pp. 499-500)

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distracting allusion to place). In other words they have more than (static) existence (which may be a state); such tensed facts are, they come into being in-deed, which is a state of activity.

Dummett notes that it is because “the analogue of part one does not hold for space or for personality ... the analogue of part two for space or for personality has no force.” Accordingly, he advises we must beware of passing over the first part since it “contains the heart of the argument.” (M. Dummett, 1960, p. 500) So, accordingly, the argument’s first part establishes that what is in time cannot be fully described without token-reflexive expressions.

7.2 Tensed Facts

Dummett says that facts of kind A are those in which temporally token-reflexive expressions enter essentially. In contrast, spatially token-reflexive expressions are not essential to the description of objects in a space—the arrangement of objects in a space can be described although one has no position in that space. (M. Dummett, 1960, p. 500) But whether by this he means that such arrangement can be described even though, or as though, one has no such position in space, or just that one may make no such reference to position is unclear.

Dummett proposes that the first part of McTaggart’s argument might be taken to demonstrate the reality of time in a strong way. After all, it seems to show that tense cannot be reduced to any thing else, or explained away. But if so, he asks, doesn’t the fact that the argument for contradictory temporal predication (or properties) neglects the use of token-reflexive expressions, negate the second part of the argument, viz. against the reality of time?

According to his analysis, the point is that McTaggart takes it for granted that reality must be something of which there exists in principle a complete description. (M. Dummett,
1960, p. 503) It is because what is temporal cannot be completely described without the use of token-reflexive expressions, that if time were real, then there would be no such things as the complete description of reality: he says that, "there would be one, as it were, maximal description of reality in which the statement, "The event M is happening" is figured, others which contained the statement "The event M happened," and yet others which contained "The event M is going to happen."

Dummett says here that he feels very strongly inclined to believe that of anything which is real, there must be a complete—that is, he says, observer-independent—description.73 Hence, since the first part McTaggart’s argument is, he says, certainly correct, the conclusion appears to follow that time is unreal. But this conclusion is self-refuting, he says, in the same sort of way in which (as McTaggart himself points out) the view that evil is an illusion is self-refuting, i.e. if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil. Dummett says that saying time is unreal is just to say that we mistake non-temporal relations for temporal ones. But, he asks, just what does our "apprehension of these relations as temporal" consist in? Which apprehension is McTaggart thinking of—I mean, the apprehension at which time? (M. Dummett, 1960, p. 503)

Even if the world is static and only our apprehension of it changes Dummett says, it doesn’t help to say that we are mistaken about what we think we see, because the fact would remain that we still make different such mistakes at different times. Since McTaggart is implicitly appealing to the belief that there must be a complete description of reality, it is this that must be denied if his conclusion is to be denied. Regardless of McTaggart’s intention,

73 But why should we expect a “description” or drawing out of, literally, to be independent of an observer. The completeness or even complete knowability of something is more likely to be an adequate criterion for anything which is real. An observer-independent description seems itself like an oxymoron—only an observer has anything to describe. Moreover the completeness of the description is problematic if reality (even if completed) remains open to novel or re-creative descriptions.
this shows "that his argument is not the trivial sophism which it at first appears." (M. Dummett, 1960, p. 504)

7.2.1 Russell and McTaggart on What's Hot and What's Not

With regard to the dependence of a tenseless series on tensed series, McTaggart addresses Russell's objection that A-series determinations don't belong to time, except in relation to a knowing subject. A-series determinations may be taken to qualities rather than either properties, or relations: Our memory of M has the quality of presentness while the experience M has the quality of pastness. McTaggart says that in such case, it is not the quality (presentness or pastness) of M which changes: these "qualities are possessed by three distinct events (an anticipation of M, an experience of M and a memory of M)...each of which is in turn future, present and past."

Accounting for this incompatibility of predications results in either a vicious circularity (by assuming the reality of tensed time), or an infinite regress (due to recurrently deferred frameworks). But this passage is significant since it shows the depth of the real problem and gives further insight into McTaggart's ontology. This passage can be taken to show how these two "positions in time...appear prima facie", among other things:

No doubt my anticipation of an experience M, the experience itself, and the memory of the experience are three states which have different qualities. But it is not the future M, the present M, and the past M, which have these three different qualities. The qualities are possessed by three distinct events—the anticipation of M, the experience M itself, and the memory of M, each of which is in turn future, present, and past. Thus this gives no support to the view that changes of the A series are changes of qualities. (McTaggart, 1908, p. 469)

One thing to note about this passage is that it is ungrammatical as it stands. McTaggart says "...it is not the future M, the present M, and the past M, which have these three different qualities." (Italics mine) But if we are to use definite articles with "future M", etc. then we must say (that these are one single M) "which has these three different qualities"
which is what the argument is refuting. Indeed, here, in the case of memory, experience and anticipation, he does seem to be combining different ontologies.

Since "each of these events is in turn future, present, and past", they occur successively, only one at a time. He does not say that "these events are in turn future, present, and past"—which might ultimately imply recurring events or temporal loops. He is assuming a real presentism. But also, here we are said to have "three distinct events" and it is these "three distinct events" which possess the qualities of tense. So, even though it is each of these in turn which is future, present, and past, three related events are simultaneously distinguishable in terms of A-series designations. In fact, we must designate these events simultaneously in terms of A-series designations if they are to be related at all.

It follows from what McTaggart has said that the event of remembering $M$ is future, the event of experiencing $M$ is present, and the event of anticipating $M$ is past. But in order for an anticipation of $M$, an experience of $M$, and a memory of $M$ to be successively past, present and future, this can only be as successively present—three events. But these three events are being taken as of $M$, so also simultaneously (concurrently) past, present and future. Moreover, the anticipating of any $M$ is always past—likewise, the remembering of any (given) event is always future. It is the given event $M$ and constant order of experiencing vs. remembering and anticipating any event, which gives the experience $M$ and the memory or anticipation of $M$, likeness.

This is just the other side of the very problem of contradiction. McTaggart admits we perceive things in a genuinely tensed way, but the point is that we think tense is genuinely real, or mind-independent, but it cannot be. Whether tensed-ness is considered as property, relation, or quality, it cannot be a function of what is mind-independently and irrecucibly real because of this real problem of contradictory qualification.
Russell reduces change to a difference in the truth and falsity of a proposition concerning an entity at the time t, and a proposition concerning the same entity at t'.

According to Russell, there is change, if at time t, a given proposition like "the poker is hot" is true but at the time t' it is not true. McTaggart agrees that if these propositions were respectively true and false then there would be change, but argues that if the A-series is rejected then no proposition like this could be first true then false, since there is no time.

Despite this, McTaggart pokes fun at Russell's propositional rendering of the cooling poker:

It will be noticed that Mr. Russell looks for change, not in the events in the time-series, but in the entity to which those events happen, or of which they are states... (but) it is always quality of the poker at time that it is hot and also always a quality of the poker at time t' that it is not hot. 74

In McTaggart's analysis it is a mistake to say that there is any change in the poker. He argues that events in themselves cannot change, nor—contra Russell—can objects involved in events admit change. The fact that the poker is hot at one point in a series and cold at other points cannot give us any change. Nor can the fact that M is experienced or that M is remembered. He says that no facts about the poker (or an experience) change unless the presentness, pastness, or futurity of the poker (or experience) changes. Change requires A-series (Cambridge) change; any difficulty in regarding the A-series as real is equally a difficulty in the way of regarding time as real.

### 7.3 The Paradox of Tensedness (or Being-tensed)

Tense, which admits change, cannot be mind-independently and irreducibly real, so whatever really exists is not really tensed; but somehow contributes to the appearance that things are tensed. Past, present, and future are, in fact, incompatible determinations. Every event must be one but not more than one, yet every real event has them all. Any real event will thus involve incompatible tense determinations which cannot be made compatible.

74 From "Time" (McTaggart, 1927) reprinted in (Gale, 1968, p. 92), also (Loux & Zimmerman, 2003).
without reference to an A-series. Again, this difficulty arises, not from *defining* tensed terms but because *the nature of the terms* involves a contradiction. Any attempt to remove the contradiction involves the employment of a similar contradiction. In other words, the shifting of A-series designations (change of tense) is in effect irreducible though it cannot be ontologically real of events, objects or relations.\(^{75}\)

Again, the simple response to McTaggart is to say that these are incompatible characteristics when they’re understood to occur simultaneously, but that each term has them successively—yet this way lays a vicious circle or infinite regress (or, at least a thickly spiraling expansion—to be explained below.).\(^{76}\) As the real existence of the A-series involves logical inconsistencies, it must be rejected. And, since the A-series is essential to change and (apparently real) time, change and such time must also be rejected as ultimate realities.

Noting a distinction between use of "is" that is predicative and use that is temporal, McTaggart says we might take “will be” to mean *is true at a moment of future time*, “is” to mean *is true at a moment of present time*, and “has been” to mean *true at a moment of past time*. We could, index truth to time, but this cannot escape the vicious circularity. For, if we say *this present event was future* but *will be past*, we really say nothing more than that it is present in the present, future in the past, and past in the future. (McTaggart, 1908, p. 469)

Defining the terms of the A-series (past, present and future) in terms of the A-series is viciously circular.

But with regard to the indexicalizing of events to times, it is, significantly, not just that *past time* (at which ‘S is p’ was true) that makes it currently true that *S was p*. If we are

\(^{75}\) See (Gale, p 95-96 footnote 5).

\(^{76}\) “The attributions of the A series lead to a contradiction, unless it is specified that they have them successively. This means, as we have seen, that they have them in relation to terms specified as past, present, and future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specified as past, present, and future. And, since this continues infinitely, the first set of terms never escapes from contradiction at all.” P.96
given only a time at which *s is p* was true, and a time at which it was (is) not—these have to be conjoined. In other words, there are more (past) times involved than just that time at which 'S is p' was true. It is the current (real) pastness of the present-tense truth conditions that makes a past-tense statement true.

It is significant that tenses (and tense-ascriptions) are inclusive and collapsing, such that what *is* past now includes what *was* past before, for example. The infinite regress which enables McTaggart's argument to proceed comes from indexically distinguishing levels of description. But, contrary to the brief analysis offered by McTaggart, and the elaboration offered by Dummett, this indexicalizing does not require ascending to additional levels in a naturally exponential way, due to the continuing inclusiveness of tense (combined with its constant disjunctiveness). These re-descriptions do not collapse in a vicious circle of incoherence, since there is progression (real change). To make this clearer, we can build on Dummett's analysis of McTaggart which pursues the infinite regress charge with respect to the indexicality of tense.

Dummett extrapolates from McTaggart's suggestion to render "was future as "future in the past," etc, this gives us nine second-level predicates:

\[
\begin{align*}
past & \rightarrow \text{in the} & past \\
present & \leftarrow \text{in the} & present \\
future & \rightarrow \text{in the} & future
\end{align*}
\]

At the third level, we have twenty-seven predicates...

\[
\begin{align*}
past & \rightarrow \text{in the} & past \\
present & \leftarrow \text{in the} & present \\
future & \rightarrow \text{in the} & future
\end{align*}
\]

And, so on. But, at any level, Dummett says, the three predicates...(below)

\[
\begin{align*}
past & \rightarrow \text{in the present} & \text{in the present} \\
present & \rightarrow \text{in the present} & \text{in the present} \\
future & \rightarrow \text{in the present} & \text{in the present}
\end{align*}
\]
...are equivalent to the first-level predicates "past," "present," and "future." So, if there is a contradiction connected with those first-level predicates, it is not removed by "ascending the hierarchy".

It seems highly significant that what was past (in the past), is included in what is past (presently) and will always (eternally) be included in what is past (in the future). Likewise what will be future (in the future), is equally-future (presently), and always will be future (in the future). At higher levels of description, these designations involve some unchanging portions and some extensive overlapping. Because of this, at the second indexical level, we do not have nine predications, nor at the third twenty-seven, but far fewer.

Combining and iterating the tense-locaters (e.g. future in the past, present in the past, past in the past, etc.) is not like multiplying or squaring numbers. Dummett introduced the combining technique (quoted above) in order to show how, eventually, it does not help defuse the allegation that each event in the tensed A-series acquires contradictory predicates (how, adding "but not at the same time" does not help). To the extent we dispel the contradiction, by a second or third level of tense-qualifiers, we lose the change.

What changes is what is future, present or past, but all of this alteration has to happen only in the present. If we consider what is such that, given any past time, it was past even then, such a past was always unchangingly past, and always will be frozen as earlier than the earliest. Similarly, if we iterate futurity, and consider what is future in the future, that will never arrive in the present, and will always remain the future, after the latest. And even what is present in the present would not change unless some rising tide of a living past swallows it up, and sucks what is future-in-the-present into it. What is present in the present would be an undefined always-present. Thus, combining and iterating tense-qualifiers would hardly help...
us capture the fluid perespectivality of what it is like to be tensed, to be past present and
future, at all.

Because of this redundancy or overlap of tense, we do not really have nine predicates
at the second level (it seems only five are ineliminable, or non-redundant, predicates).

Present in the present
Past in the future - or - past in the present
Future in the past - or - future in the present

If the second of the terms in each disjunction are taken together, we have just exactly
what is present but not-present. So, even in the present we have what is not present.
Moreover the disjunction overlaps in one sense (what is past in the present is also past in the
future), but it is still a genuine disjunction since what is past in the future may be just exactly
what is not past now (everything past which is not now past). Moreover, both what is past in
the future and what is past in the present contain what is past in the past. Likewise, what is
future in the past or future in the present always includes what is future in the future.

These terms are distinguished in each case from one another only because what is
present divides them. But what is present can only divide them if it is itself divided. What is
past in the future (if it is to be distinct from what is past in the past and past in the present)
can only be JUST what is not-past now—likewise, what is future in the past (if different from
what is future in future or in the present) can only be JUST what is not-future now. So not
only are the past and future positively involved in the present as the above statements make
evident; there is an non-evident involvement of what is not-past now and not-future now.
What is present now contains both past and future, but also JUST what is neither past nor
future

This might amount to nothing but just what McTaggart had said, viz. that we are left
with a vicious circularity. The past is in the future, the future in the past, and the present in
the present. But what is past in the future (and not in the present or past) is JUST the present. Likewise what is future in the past specifically (and not future in the present or the future) is JUST what is present. In this way we have a complex present. The terms do not keep expanding. There are only so many real options—the redundancy is not repetition but identity. The tenses are not recast each time, but simply shift.

None of this goes against McTaggart's claims, except to say the vicious circularity is not circular (so it is not vicious (perhaps it is just viscous or thickly flowing!))—and nor is the infinite regress regressive. It does not continually regress because of its above mentioned viscosity or tendency to remain and yet flow. Since such ascriptions—or such series—may be progressive, there is no reason to assume infinitude; in fact, such progress of time may be limited both by some possible terminal future point and by the thickness or "circularity" that ties such a series to tense. This is just to say that the problem of contradictory predications is a genuine problem.

We must dismiss the idea that McTaggart's argument is easily answerable (simply by recognizing the indexicality of A-series ascriptions). The paradox of tense is not a conundrum that holds a mistake or sophistical argument, as Dummett himself notes. The problem of tense is real because we experience real tense. The problem is that we assume that the A-series is real and mind-independent and irreducible, but it cannot be. Real change has to be mind-dependent. If the objective reality of the past presupposes real A-series type change then such objective reality must be mind-dependent.

7.3.1 Change and Real Pastness in the A- and B-Series

If, with McTaggart, we take events as themselves unchanging, and the A-series, admitting change, to be necessary for the B-series, it seems there are any events, some event(s) must be present—not just earlier or later than, but at least before (then) and now. If
there are unchanging events which change with respect to their position in the A-series, there has to be, as McTaggart says, a term outside of (changing) time. However if there is any event that is present, it is the relation between that event as present, and any other event, which changes the degree of the other event’s pastness or futurity. It is not the relations between the two events that changes (this would be B-series time), but the relation of the event to the presentness of present events which changes.

And, it does seem that change occurs in the present in a way that it does not occur in the past, i.e. an event once past is always past but an event once present is not always present, and an event once future is not always future. In this way, present events occur on the horizon between past and future. This ‘event-horizon’ (of the present) is just when and where events become (past). As located, the term outside of time is thus necessarily also “with(in) time.” It is a continuing discontinuity of the present (novelty against familiarity) that provides a “location” from which to view this horizon of events. As a continuous source of discontinuity, being-present is both within-time and outside-of-time; and in this way, can serve as the term McTaggart needs that is itself unchanging but provides that determinations of the A-series continuously change.77

In this sense, a quick read of McTaggart’s argument (in the absence of the C-series) enables one to overlook that what is present is radically different from what is past or from what will be. By expecting to find change in time and not locating it in events themselves, it can only be the presenting of events that change. Although McTaggart states the past is always changing if the A-series is real at all, it is only changing in that it is further past from

77 McTaggart’s dismissal of the possibility of change occurring in the B-series now seems somewhat arbitrary. Events themselves do not change in either series according to McTaggart, but in the A-series he allows that they change their position or determination with regard to their position in the A-series; but he admits this must be to a term outside of time. He doesn’t allow this possibility for the B-series, which could also have a dynamic ‘term outside of time’, having an always-changing determination. By an external relation to ‘now’, e.g. events could change their degree of how much ‘earlier than’ or ‘later than’ one another they are; this would require some comparison or measure (i.e. an observer, etc.)
the present. It is because of this change, the only real change, the distancing and accrual of
the past by way of the constantly changing present that events change.

Given McTaggart's analysis, if there is to be time, it is the present itself which must
admit of change. It is the change in, or of, the present which changes the A-series distinction
events. This term must also be within time however—hence the involvement of a lived and
living past. McTaggart doesn't overtly recognize the dual nature required of this term, i.e.
that it must both be within time and continuous (the present must be continuous at every
point to be a continuous function), but also outside of time or discontinuous (the determinant,
or limit, which defines the A-series and a continuing function).78 If anything is present, time
is not unreal because the A-series determinations are properties of events that change with
respect to presentness (presence, or being present). McTaggart's argument proves not that
time is unreal, but that the reality accorded to time is a function of the reality accorded to a
real present—a complex living present with a real past.

7.3.2 Being-present and Knowing-past

McTaggart begins his analysis with the statement, "all our experience is temporal". He
admits that we necessarily experience events in time as forming both these series. He also
says that we experience only the present. He agrees with Russell that it is only by memory
and inference (expectation) we believe all other events to be part of an A-series. McTaggart
recognized the apparent reality of the A-series and the inability to account for this appearance
without postulating a term outside of time. Although he agrees that we experience a
"specious present", he rejects this conception, as well as the opposing idea of a present that is
a horizon between future and past.

78 Since his intent was to prove the logical incoherence of our experience to prove the reality of the
Absolute Spirit as both immanent and ultimate cause, he doesn't directly examine the way in which the
present might serve this function (partly because of the apparent incoherence of the present as will be
discussed further.)
... nothing, not even the observations themselves, can ever really be in a specious present. For if time is unreal, nothing can be in any present at all, and, if time is real, the present in which things are will not be a specious present. I do not see, therefore, that we treat experience as much more illusory when we say that nothing is ever present at all, than when we say that everything passes through some present which is entirely different from the only present we experience... (McTaggart, 1927, p. 346)

McTaggart argues that the since the specious present varies in length, it cannot serve to ground the A-series. What would be past for one person could still be present for someone else, and “it is not sufficient to consider the A-series designations subjectively.” He also rejects the idea of an absolute present between future and past claiming that we have nothing in our perception which gives us any reason to believe in the latter and, he states, this itself is a version of the unreality of time. He says,

We have come to the conclusion that there is no real...time-series. But it does not follow that when we have experience of a time-series we are not observing a real series....and all that is illusory is the appearance that it is a time-series. Such a series...which is not a time-series, but under certain conditions appears to us to be one -- may be called a C series. (McTaggart, 1927, p. 346)

He proposes a C-series a non-temporal, real timelessness, as the source of the temporal manifestation. This series offers the real location (existence) of an A-series and its tenseless reflection as a B-series. Our perception of the A-series is a reflection of the real C-series. McTaggart says (McTaggart, 1908, p. 464) that “the terms of this C series also form an A-series, and it results that the terms of the C series become a B-series, those which are placed first, in the direction from past to future (then to now), being earlier than those whose places are further in the direction of the future.” He goes on to say that the C series is “as ultimate as the A series”—both are irreducible—and that, it is “only when an A-series, which gives change and direction, is combined with the C series, which gives permanence, that the B series can arise.” (McTaggart, 1908, p. 464) We can understand something of the nature of the C-series somewhat dimly, through our misperception of the B-series and the A-series,

Thus, we have the complex metaphysical situation that we don’t perceive real time, the C-series; we do apparently experience and do really perceive unreal time, the A-series
(and its reflection as a B-series); and real time involves no events and no change. Our
misperception of the C-series as the A-series (and the B-series) cause us to form a conception
of 'time', but time doesn't exist except as the C-series, a-temporally.

He says that while both the tensed A-series and tenseless B-series are equally
essential to time (for either the distinction of past, present and future or earlier and later) the
A-series distinctions are he says "ultimately inexplicable and indefinable (we can only give
events of what is past and future, he says). The tenseless B-series is not ultimate, in
contrast, since the terms of this C-series also form an A-series, which results in the fact that
the terms of the C-series become a B-series. (McTaggart, 1908, p. 463)

There appears to be change in the B-series since events are, in fact, always,
differentially 'earlier than' or 'later than' 'now'. The A-series only differs from the B-series
in that it involves a (constant) present, which is provided in McTaggart's analysis of the C-
series adding permanence to change and the order of event(s). The virtue of any tenseless, or
B-series conception of time (ordered events), however, lies precisely in the fact that it doesn't
change. It is a useful heuristic because it is conceived as static. The B-series enables a
measure of the relation between events; and in this sense is a derivative or "objectified" time.
In McTaggart's analysis the perception of this series of ordered events is the result of a
tensed A-series and C-series in combination. Thus, the positing of the possibility of the
reality of B-series time is unfounded without time's first occurring to 'tensed' diachronic
perceivers as represented by an apparent A-series, and fundamentally a C-series.

Here it is significant to note that the past is taken as the point of origin, as an
(already) ordered series. The direction of change is given by one position in the C series that
is, he says, Present, to the exclusion of all others. He says here that "this characteristic of
presentness should pass along the series in such a way that all positions on the one side of the
Present have been present, and all positions on the other side of it will be present."
In a footnote, he admits that this account is not valid because it is circular, but such circularity is inevitable. His different denotation of "the Present" and positions on one side "having been present" and "positions that will be present" (or willing-be present) is very interesting to note. The only two elements required to constitute a time-series are an A-series and a C-series; and although we can explain how such apparent temporal series arise, we have to ultimately recognize both the A-series and the changeless B-series, as ultimately unreal. Time is created by an ordered and creative series that is at root non-temporal, yet changing.

In McTaggart’s extended view, time in the a-temporal world is made up of selves that are substantial but not material. These selves perceive one another, and these perceptions are the C-series. Each term of the C series either 'includes' or is 'included in' every other and in this way all terms have content in common. (Presumably this allows it to "be" a-temporal.) Without getting engrossed too far in the subtleties of the complex ontological idea that he proposes here, what is of particular note for our discussion is the structure of McTaggart’s proposed C-series. This sort of view resembles a (non-ordinary) stage view with both four-dimensional (B-type), and presentist (A-type), aspects, but distinct from each. McTaggart concludes,

...all that exists is spiritual, that the primary parts in the system of determining correspondence are selves, and that the secondary parts of all grades are perceptions. The selves, then, occupy an unique position in the universe. They, and they alone, are primary parts. And they, and they alone are percipients...the whole content of each self should consist of perceptions only.” (McTaggart, 1908, p. 434)

It is in this way that perceptions can form an infinite (incomplete) series of the type required. He recognizes the continuity of these perceptions, as well as the discreteness or individuality required for them to be ordered. The perception that locates, i.e. a current perception, of the dissimilar selves is necessary to the structure of time taken even a-
temporally. He locates such simultaneous non-conflicting occurrence in the individual selves as the nature of real time.

Since change must be found in the relations or properties of the terms of the A-series, it could be argued that McTaggart fails to locate change where it must occur, given his conception of events, viz. as an effect of the changing of present events. Some present is, however, necessary to the postulation of any A-series. This also occurs on a second level since it is at this present time, here-now that it is being postulated, in this sense, currency is ultimately fundamental, but it is complex.

It is in the nature of any event being present (or possibly present) that it not only be present with other events (alike in this respect) but present to (in opposition to) other events. This means that events can only be present events if there is a being-present who can take events as together and as distinct. It is only in the present that we can attempt to locate the possibility and actuality of change. In this way, the present is essential to time and being-present can be viewed as necessary condition for the possibility of change, and thus as the fundamental condition of the ‘reality’ of the A-series, and time itself. And being-present requires having-been past.

The constant re-determination of events is not a viciously regressive explication but a progressive determination that mirrors the change that is the experience of time. Regress, or progress, involves temporal extension (duration), as does the recognition of change. Because time necessarily involves change (or change is constant to time), this progressive explication of A-series designation, understood properly, does not prove the ontological incoherence of the A-series or the unreality of time. What makes time real is that some things are actually present, and that the present is present to—so some things are really past. The present is necessarily a two-place term, which requires extension and incorporates the relation of presentness.
Being-present defines the relation, and involves both likeness and difference. If we consider what is implied by the present, i.e. that it is a presencing involving *being present to*, the meaning of 'being' becomes important, and implies the reality of the past. (This is Campbell's argument—but later, accepting Bergson and Dummett—we admit a shadowy reality to some parts of the past. Yet the reality of the past by memory, which is not private, is in itself past fully determined (without shadow). As well, the necessary condition for the perception of time is that, *within* that-which-the-present-is-present-to (me or you) there is this structure of continuity and discontinuity. This duality required to locate change will be expressed here both in terms of the continuity and discontinuity of time with the present taken as specious, and of the discontinuity and continuity essential to any *present instant*.

Change is disclosed as the present even if change is considered to be not of objects but a relational change. If it is to ground the A-series, the present must itself have an internal relation of continuity to discontinuity, an internal relation of difference. The only way in which the present could offer such eventuation in the undivided or wholly-continuous moment is in the presence of consciousness. If time were simply continuous there would be no time passing continuously, but only the continuum's presence, which would offer both an unchanging presence and an absence of change. Time could only appear continuous in light of a point discontinuity, some sort of limiting, which is necessary even to define the function as continuous.

By conceiving *the present* as the term outside of time, and *the present* as a *present to*, the changing presentness is the simultaneous presence and occurrence of continuity and discontinuity. Whether we consider the present as an ideal point between what appears past and what appears to be future, or the specious present with duration, in either framework, the present must still presence the possibility of change and the reality of time. There is an irreducible perspective of *being-time*, and so (although McTaggart seems far from this
conclusion) having a real past. This is just to say that the argument that even the B-series, to be a series requires real pastness, and that this is at the heart of the A-series and its change as well.

7.4 Being-past

7.4.1 McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics Revisited

William Lane Craig argues that McTaggart's Paradox is a special case of what Lewis has called the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (PTI), discussed above in Chapter 3 (Persistence)—the very ancient problem of identity over or across time. (Craig, 1998) This problem of diachronic identity is most closely identified with our second-type of question, of persistence, but is perhaps the philosophical fulcrum on which the other two issues (existence and tense) turn. Whether the past exists or not, whether tense is real or not, are issues at bottom connected to the fundamental question whether things can retain their sameness across loss of past properties and gain of present and future properties; hence the centrality of the problem of temporary (and temporal) intrinsic properties.

Attempts to cast McTaggart's Paradox in terms of propositions and their changing truth values are also instances of the PTI, Craig says, since the property of having truth

79 Whitehead proposes that since specious presents vary in temporal spread, from one perspective the whole of reality might be present. With regard to this, Mead (among others, e.g. James, Bergson) in his book, The Philosophy of the Present, objects to the improper use of abstraction as the spatialization of time, what exists essentially as duration. Mead finds that Whitehead's conception of the possible temporal spread of the present seemingly leaves passage but eliminates the reality of past and future, "since the past wouldn't cease to exist and the future would be in the present." In his view, "the essential nature of the present and of existence would have disappeared." The present is only made by the becoming and disappearing. With reference to a Whiteheadian conception of time, Mead emphasizes that "what is analyzed out has its reality in the integration of what is taking place." He states with regard to the priority of the experienced present that, "The permanent character we are interested in is one that abides in existence, and over against which change exists as well" (Mead, 1929, p. 2) Sartre makes a similar point, the present presences being only as it presences the reflection of itself in consciousness as consciousness of, a For-itself. For Sartre, time is only in the transcendence, occurring in the present which is founded in absence. For Mead, however, it is the emergent present which is the focus of change and reality; and the character of the present sheds light on the nature of reality. (Mead, 1929, p. 32) In either framework the present must exhibit this simultaneous structure of continuity and discontinuity (concurrent similarity and difference) in order to account for change. A background of current or living pastness is required.
values, are temporary intrinsic properties of propositions. But, according to Craig, Lewis’s solution to the PTI, with its appeal to an entity’s temporal parts being located at different times, will not work for McTaggart’s Paradox: An event E need not persist over time at all, but could exist only at an instant t.

Craig argues that a purely presentist ontology solves this problem, and so is not vulnerable to McTaggart’s argument’s demonstrating the unreality of time. On a view in which no times overlap in sharing an object O, the PTI cannot even arise. But it is unclear whether his presentism can be distinguished from a pure perdurance view. Craig writes:

For O exists (present tense) only at one time, the present time, and so does not have (present tense) incompatible properties as it would if it existed tenselessly in the B-series with different properties at different times. All the properties O are the ones it presently has and so no contradiction can arise. For even if O undergoes intrinsic change between t and t*, it nonetheless does not have (present tense) incompatible properties. O only has the properties it has presently and these are mutually compatible. (Craig, 1998, pp. 125-126)

But all the properties O (the ones it has presently) does not possibly include hot and cold, as in McTaggart and Russell’s discussions—and yet such incompatible properties could be “temporary intrinsics” that are mutually compatible (but only to multiple, or with the multiplication of, observers). So, e.g., given a very, very cold hand, a cold hand is warm; but given a very hot hand, a hand neither warm nor cold would seem like a cold hand. As an ‘observer’ of this phenomenon, we can say that in this way ‘hotness’ and ‘coldness’ are mutually compatible properties—unlike having a temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit and 100 degrees Celsius, where is a big difference between these properties having nothing to do with being measured. In fact, it is this real difference that allows their measure. Nonetheless, at the same time, the common property of having some degree of heat, motion, or activity, is a property which must be observed to be noted as ‘common’ to both things. The observing (which takes time) makes possible the comparison of such incompatible properties. Are presentness and pastness temporary intrinsic properties? Or is ‘presentness’ anyway? (Since
'pastness' seems more lasting—an intrinsic temporal-property perhaps?) Are they compatible properties because of this?

Craig concludes that McTaggart's paradox only defeats the tense-theorist, who holds, like McTaggart, to a hybrid A-B theory of time, which couples a B-theoretical ontology with objective, non-relational A-determinations. He says that such a theorist,

...runs afoul of the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics in that he cannot explain how E-at-t could at t have had the intrinsic property of presentness and now and at t* have the intrinsic property of pastness and yet remain the same event in the transition from to t* (Craig, 1998, p. 126)

Craig ends in agreement with Le Poidevin's conclusion that presentism is the only way to block the proof for the unreality of time consistently with the assumption of a non-relational past, present, and future. But there are many consequences of this argument. Most obviously, if O only exists at one time, the present time, then how do we know (why would we assume even, as in step 1) that O existed at t? The consistent presentist cannot even say this. In Craig's reading of the presentist take on the PTI, we assume for reductio that a present object O currently (at some time later than t) has the property of having existed at t, and the property of having existed as bent (at t)—and in the end, will conclude that it is not the case that O existed at t, and O exists at t*. But it must be known as having existed as bent (at t).

Craig's argument would seem to imply that when we talk about Caesar having existed e.g., we are talking about a present Caesar (which we are referring to now) that currently has the property of having existed in the past. Even a presentist, stating that O existed at t, or was bent at t, is assuming that there was a time (i.e. t) other than this present time t*, at which O was bent (and at that time it would have been true to say (at t) of O, "O is bent"). And, if all that is admitted is a present, how can we ever leave the past behind—and move from this present to that?

80 See (Poidevin, 1997, 1999)
We know more than just that at \( t \), "\( O \) exists and is bent" is true— or that, at \( t^* \), "\( O \) exists and is straight" is true. We also know it is (the same) \( O \) which existed back then. So, we either conclude that there is one object, \( O \) which exists at two times—viz. past and present; or two distinct objects exist at one (perhaps extended) time. Either \( O \) exists at more than one time or there are two things that are (somehow) both \( O \).

If \( O \)'s bent existence and \( O \)'s straight existence are both construed in a presentist way then why would we separate these two present times? After all, \( O \) exists only at one time, Craig says, the present time. This makes it the case that, either \( t \) and \( t^* \) are not two different times (but just a single time); or we cannot assume that "\( O \) existed" is true if we don't admit that \( O \) has a real past presence independent of \( O \)'s currently present existence. A present pastness, or a present intrinsic property of having been bent at \( t \), e.g., is not enough. But Craig’s problem with Lewis’s perdurantist solution to the PTI was due to the problems posed by an instantaneous event \( E \).

7.4.2 Instantaneous, Simultaneous and Concurrent Events

Now, what could be said about \( E \)? Certainly not "\( E \) happened", since this would require real past existence of some sort, and hence wouldn’t be a pure presentism. While Craig argues that hybrid A-B theorist can’t avoid the paradox while the presentist can—it seems that the presentist can’t avoid a contradiction, but a certain sort of hybrid theorist can. What makes the difference is what was present, or what is currently-past.

Here we are given two present times at which \( O \) existed (or set \( O \) was manifested), and one past time, viz. \( that \) time. While this is not a real ontological problem if presence is taken thickly (as a living or still-passing past) for the very-consistent, knowing these presents differently, knowing that present and this one as two different times, is unexplained. It seems that the very-consistent presentist is just an eternalist.
Craig writes in a footnote that Lewis's dismissal of the presentist solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics seems more playful than serious, since Lewis claims the presentist denies persistence, even though his own definition is that something persists, iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times. Although Lewis alleges that on presentist ontology we must say that we have no past or future, which no one believes. Craig says, "surely on presentism I have a past in the sense that I existed at and lived through times which once were present, and I have a future in that I shall exist and live through times which will be present." (Craig, 1998, p. 127 n7) It is because of this, that he says there must be more substantive reasons to reject the presentist solution.

But here, an essential point is easy to miss. Craig is willing to say that he has a past and a future, but do objects? Perhaps it is only observers who have temporary intrinsic properties (or intrinsic temporal properties). Is it also the case that an object O "has" a past—that O existed at, and endured through, times which were once present? Does an object in itself have a property of being qualified as future or past (or even present)? Can event E "have" a temporal property (even a temporary one like presentness) if E is instantaneous or without duration and, hence, diachronic observability? Is there is something different about Craig (or any other sentient or present-being) or about an activity, like cooking, or falling, or manifesting, which enables the activity, or being, to be present while 'having' an aspect of pastness and futurity remaining with it, while an object cannot?

E.J. Lowe argued in 1987 that there are more than three possible solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsic properties. He proposed another which "squares with common sense far better." His solution is to say that O's shape is to be explained in terms of the changing spatial relations between its constituent parts. "O's shape at any given time is not, then, a relation (not, in particular, a 'disguised' temporal relation), but it does supervene
upon the shapes and spatial relations of its constituents at that time. And as it is with O, so it is more complicatedly with more complex objects like people.” (Lowe, 1987, p. 153)

This may be a regress, he says, but it is not vicious, since the “regress can perfectly well be terminated at a level of fundamental particles, which all have their intrinsic properties unchangeably.” He concludes that modern physics offers a solution to the problem of change which renders Lewis’s temporal parts solution superfluous. “Classical atoms had their shape unchangeably; the fundamental particles of modern physics...don’t of course have shapes at all...though they do have other intrinsic properties (like spin, charge and ‘colour’) unchangeably.” (Lowe, 1987, p. 154) But based on the above critique of Dummett, McTaggart, and Craig, Lowe’s view faces the problems of B-theorists generally, and does not give any solution to the real problem of persistence. The solution requires simultaneous presence and pastness, or real absence, which can only be found in beings-present and not in things that are, perhaps instantaneously, present.

‘Being bent’ and ‘being straight’ are, as proposed in the examples above, temporary intrinsic properties which are not mutually compatible at a time. However, one might consider visual illusions—like a straight stick looking bent in the water—to allow the stick to really ‘have’ the properties of being both bent and straight at the same time. Although most people would admit that what makes this illusion notable is that the stick is not bent really, but is actually straight. But it is straight in comparison to bent—it is really straight though it is looking bent. And, even if we allow such intrinsic properties like ‘being straight’ to be intrinsic or a relation of a thing to itself (or in-itself), or part of a thing to another part of it, the ‘parthood’ and the ‘thingness’ are still dependent on the observer picking out what is to be named as such—the stick that is bent or straight. About this stick, our observations are dual, and are of significantly different sorts; and hence we can admit such mutually
incompatible properties simultaneously—that the stick is bent in the water as we can all see (this illusion); but straight, as we know it to be and can demonstrate to others over time.81

7.5 Towards a Conclusion: Real Pastness

Real pastness is a requisite part of either A-series or B-series ontologies. Presentist and eternalist, tensed and tenseless, endurance and perdurance theorists have to admit their distinction from the third-type of answers. These sorts of answers admit both real difference, and real identity, claiming, e.g. a currently existing pastness, and a real duration, or diachronic identity which is extensive, and enables a real (ex)tension or tensed relation or experience. But, if their views are to be coherently either tensed or tenseless views, they cannot.

The necessary involvement of pastness in any real B-series is due to the failure of the possibility to distinguish events (a series) otherwise. McTaggart admits as much but doesn’t seem to think it a problem. How should what is simultaneous/ eternal be differentiated into two events? The B-series must have extension, in order to offer an order of any kind; but how is this possible? Pastness (or precedence) alone can give the extension required to make A is prior to B, and B prior to C, and A prior to C etc. be true propositions. But, how is A, or anything that is prior to be distinguished? Without a frame of reference provided by a something present knowing real pastness, temporal location collapses into instantaneity (and would ultimately be nothing).

81 And, ultimately our perception of its straightness is fallible observation and also somewhat relative, or a matter of degree—is there a really straight stick? We can say this, i.e., "The stick is really straight." or can exclaim, looking upon a gnarled branch, "That stick is really bent!", but is a stick ever truly "straight" unless it has become a board (like a 2"x4")—and when is something really "bent"? These are just ordinary questions of vagueness, and are often resolved in context. But these formal or geometrical relations may not apply to sticks unless measured. Unmeasured the stick has a shape, but the boundaries of its intrinsic properties of shape are unclear. And, ultimately, though our measures are inductively verifiable and come naturally to us, we can only hope that one sees the same 'bentnesses' we do and we are our correct in our "measuring" of what is indeed straight, and what is bent; and we can only try not to be deceived by perceptual illusions.
The involvement of pastness in presentness (A-series/tense) is due to the failure of even present reference otherwise. In this regard, we analyzed McTaggart's Paradox and the PTI, connecting the problem of identity over time and the reality of tense. Here we decided only some beings can have real and diachronic identity, being simultaneously both present and not present (past). Such being may be said to have intrinsic temporal properties of really having-been-in-the-past and being-in-the-future. Dividing the issue of whatever is present becoming along lines of alteration versus replacement can help make this clear:

When things change, what was one thing (that was present) becomes another; here, either nothing remains of that one thing—in other words, it becomes a different thing, which is also present; or what that one thing actually becomes is past. Either way, we have alteration (with real, or Cambridge change). When, in contrast, we consider replacement, one present thing is replaced by another present thing. In such a case, the thing replaced does not become anything else, say past. One present does not become another; one present replaces another—it takes its place or position. But this position has to be located; specifically, where the other was. Both things are only as present, but these two things are distinct. So, an A-series (presentism) in order to be an A-series must allow or involve a reflection as a B-series (pastism). So, even if a purely presentist stage (replacement) view could account for our knowledge of objects and occurrences as, say, only mistaken conception (by way of memory and imagination, etc.), such a view does not give an account of what remains evident: our knowledge of the apparent alteration of things that are present. The question of whether such alteration is real is secondary to the question of how we can recognize this alteration as such.

7.5.1 Tense and the Partition of Time Reconsidered
These arguments force us to a re-conception of tense and indicate that the real issue is over the past. Eternalism and B-series ontologies can be construed as providing that *everything always exists—or everything always existed*. In this way, for the eternalist, all things already were. This is a completed (dead) and not a living past. This is due to the fact that eternalism cannot admit a present and so cannot distinguish past and future time.

The B-series is a tenseless order that reflects the A-series, so, if there is any real time in a B-series it can only be pastness or priority or precedence (as argued above). Even this, in a B-series, must be marked at least as before and after; or also before-now and now, because the positions of the B-series are not simple. Simultaneity is required, as many discussants of B-series designations have admitted without especial note. But if so, then this is a complex relational (present) time which requires an observer to claim distinct terms as simultaneous or concurrent. This observer contains both what is not-present (past or future experience) and what is present (experience that is distinctly not past and not future).

From a consistent B-perspective, real time is past-time, and whatever is, always was. The past has a priority because the B-theorist has to admit change and the only change he can admit is the instantaneous changing of things from present to past. This instantaneous pastness of all things could be interpreted as an extreme form of alteration. The eternalist admits some things exist, but it cannot give them any future reality, any present duration, or any past distinction. The eternalist universe (past) would be indistinct without an observer, not even something but not quite nothing—yet it might just as well have been.

In a replacement view (a pure presentism), the present does not become past, but one present simply takes the place of another. Yet, here, nothing ever passes away from its position. While the present changes in a presentist and A-series ontology, *nothing exists as past*. What exists simply replaces what exists. And what has been replaced goes nowhere—it either remains invisibly present, or simply has no duration. It does not change but is just in
extant. This sort of view can’t account for our knowledge of the past, and so, cannot address the question of diachronic likeness.

The cup is only present now or whenever, it is not itself also past without my consideration. My own pastness (past experience) can’t be, and isn’t actually, divided from my present consideration. Only a self-conscious being is simultaneously and concurrently both present and past.

Of course, it is easily seen that our ordinary realism about the past extends to the space. We know that the past is real—what we experience as immediately past is just like what is in our peripheral vision. The words you just read, like the sidewalk we just walked on, are things we can look back at and they may remain unchanged. The sentence we just read or the sidewalk we just walked on is with our past activity, we think, also now past. The sidewalk was there when the activity was, and so they must “remain” together it seems. So, as our walking on that is past, the sidewalk we just walked on is past; and when we look back on that sidewalk and it remains as it was before, we confirm that the past is really determinate. But these are very separate things. The sidewalk we look on is not the past sidewalk but the present sidewalk. It is a form of recognition 'this sidewalk there is that sidewalk then—viz., that sidewalk I just walked on.

Our speciously present experience includes past experience, but is this enough to speak for all of reality of past? Perhaps all observed realities but not what might have been, but was not, observed. The above mentioned continuity in our perception gives us the impression that the present is like the past and that space is like time. This perceptual continuity is supported by the above fact that I, or an ordinary being, know (have) both a past and present simultaneously. I currently perceive my present and my past, but external realities are never anything but present. The sidewalk, contrary to how it appears—i.e., extended in space and continuously existing across time, never exists as anything but present.
It is not diachronic and carries no past with it. But, one might say, surely we see the damage on a sidewalk, and in this way it carries its' past in its present—it needs fixed, is torn up, and some day may become nothing more than a memory. And this is just the point, the sidewalk’s current condition, or current absence, is just an effect of currently past presence. In itself, it is never anything more than present but also, in-itself, it is never present. It is not essentially tensed.

This is where the straight B-series supporter is left—things if they exist *always* exist(ed). Changing of tense is mind-dependent at the least. But B-theorist needs pastness because he does not have "always". If the B-series is taken as just relations of precedence, which it can be, then it needs another term to allow for any distinction of events. As has been noted by G.E.M Anscombe, this relation of the B-series is not what it seems.82 It needs two terms, e.g. prior and not-prior, but one must be taken as the index of the other. There must be more terms in order to distinguish the two and measure one against another. This term enables that there be degrees of priority or 'pastness' or 'precedence', measured against some point taken as not-prior (not-prior and not-subsequent, or not-prior and subsequent). 'Before' not only admits of degrees, it requires such measure.83

We have three relations involved in the B-series and the third relation is complex. Moreover the first two relations are not genuinely transitive.

Prior - Precedent - Before - Earlier than  
Vs.  
Posterior - Subsequent - After - Later than  
Vs.  
Point of Origin - Concurrent - Together (measured)-Simultaneous

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82 See (Anscombe, 1981).
83 Tenseless order is intrinsically spatial; which is why eternalism and tenseless theories are taken in concert, even though neither the Special Theory of Relativity nor the theory of an expanding universe speak for or against either presentism or eternalism. But, notably, these views do seem to coalesce well with growing-block (or blob) views, and their related third-ways.
The point of origin must include concurrence because it is neither prior nor posterior. Without the measure of events occurring at the same time, B-series distinctions cannot offer any distinction of events at all, but only an indiscriminate (i.e. not even unified), and indiscriminately-instantaneous (past) event. Now, McTaggart had no need to make certain the B-series events remained distinct (and he, himself admits that events are collapsing and inclusive) since he was not trying to claim any independence for such a series.

The proposition that if something exists then it always exists can only be a tautology on these unworkable straight B-theory views. Taken tenselessly, this statement means only that if \( x \) exists at all (at any time), then \( x \) exists (just like the B-series without any distinction among events). If events are to be distinguishable then the B-theory claim must be stronger. But, if it is taken as meaning if \( x \) exists at any time, then \( x \) will always exist (at that time), then tense is imported into the eternalist view without due acknowledgement of how. If the intended view is that whatever exists (at any time) forever persists (at that time), then this indexing of time—i.e. this time and that time—requires distinction and involves degrees (or a measure) of priority.

### 7.6 Conclusions

Here, it has been argued that the difference and sameness of these views depends on the place of real pastness. The third-type of view admits a determinate past in the case of the growing block, real temporal counterparts in the stage view, and real pastness in the case of tense. It is possible to make sense of these views by properly identifying and separating what has intrinsic temporal properties and what has temporary intrinsic properties.

Aspects of eternalism and the B-theory (and a proper stage view) are still desirable. But a difference in time and space must be admitted. The main motivation for supporting pure perdurantist (four-dimensionalist) B-theories of time is derived from the apparent
dominance of the space-time view among theoretical physicists. But it may be true that all
things are interwoven in a space-time fabric and yet also be true that time is unlike space.

We can take these three questions about what times exist, how things persist, and
whether time is tensed, in many sorts of ways. Likewise, we can divide the debate between
the A-like views (dynamic) and B-like views (static) on different sorts of grounds. So, as to
what exists, we could conceive this debate to concerns the issue of the reality of non-present
entities—are some things that are not present things that currently exist? As to what persists,
we could say this debate concerns the reality of non-changing things (intrinsic properties or
instantaneous temporal parts).

Questions of tense could likewise be conceived conversely to how they ordinarily are,
as an issue divided not over the reality of tense, but over the reality of tenseless entities (their
existence or mind-independence). This not only accords with a shift in the apparent burden
of proof, but also a shift in the central terms at issue: Do non-present entities currently exist?
Does anything have instantaneous temporal parts or counterpart stages (and, if so, what sorts
of things? Is tenselessness (taken with McTaggart, as changelessness) a possible or actual
property or state of anything that exists, if whatever is present is tensed?

Now, we have no reason to think unchanging, non-enduring and non-present
realities—or, in other words, currently unobservable realities, would be mind-dependent. But
on the other hand, if unchanging, instantaneous, absent things exist, perhaps they may do so
just by being mind-dependent; such things might be imaginary (unreal). Are there any
wholly unchanging, fully non-lasting, and entirely non-present entities; and, if so, are they
reducible to ordinary changing, lasting, present things? The problem is they would appear to
be. Such things would not appear to be candidates for mind-independent, since they seem to
have no reality. Because of this problem the debate is returned to the question of the reality
of what is present as opposed to the reality of what is absent.
Yet, why should the reality of what is present be the primary issue. We experience present reality, after all; so our ordinary way of conceiving the issue at best amounts to a denial of the uniqueness of this experience. Taking what is (apparently) present to be at issue, contributes to the seeming irrelevancy of such debates. We can take the issue differently, e.g., as whether temporal parts or instantaneous stages exist (or whether they are mind-independent or irreducible); or whether non-present times really exist; or even whether unchanging entities exist; and, if so, whether they are mind-independent or irreducible. More to the point, we can put these issues in terms of speaking toward the third-type of answers, and ask different questions:

1. **Existence:** Is there anything which is (exists), but which is not neither present nor not-present?

2. **Persistence:** Is there anything which is not either changing or unchanging? Or, that is neither momentary (perduring) nor enduring?

3. **Tense:** Is there anything which is not either tensed or tenseless?

Here such “things” could be both; so more than bivalent, but not indeterminate. So, alternately, the question of realism regarding these things can be put as follows: Does anything which exists, exist both tensed and tenselessly; is anything both subject to change and also not subject to change; or simultaneously momentary and enduring? Is anything concurrently present and past (both here and gone)? We are not asking if there is something other than the present, or other than what is not-present—but whether there is something that is not either, strictly speaking, but both. A further issue (and a perhaps eradicable one because of its reflexivity) is the mind-independence of such things.

Is all of reality (or are all realities) either tensed or not tensed? Is anything either present or not present? It seems important that some things are, in reality or in fact, both; and not just in the way in which a space-time worm might be considered both present and past (as the worm has no real tense, but just extendedness). But there is good reason not to look at
things this way; it is, after all, a bit dizzying and quite a lot more speculative. How would we justify our claims that there really are some present things that are concurrently past; and that this is not true of all present things?
PART III: THE AXIOLOGY OF THE PAST

INTRODUCTION

Passage

We watch our loved ones, and we ourselves, age. The process of one’s own past getting longer is not value-free. There is a profound reason why it evokes “mixed feelings”. Even if we ignore our changing evaluations of the contents of memories, simply the phenomenon of a growing shadow of the times left behind gives us reason for relief and regret, lightness and heaviness of heart, of smiles and sighs. And we feel the effects of our own past experiences, just as we see the effects of past actions on what we find externally present. The current conditions of our living and lived world even seems a testimony to a long past of suffering (undergoing) effects. It seems that there is only motion and change—with a greater or lesser degree of repetition and spontaneity. What is physically changed today remains thus tomorrow. What was once a monument is now a just a ruin. Day turns to night and back again. The earth rotates and revolves tediously around itself and the sun (which rotates and revolves around the galactic center, etc.), only because it has been doing so for a very long time.

Living organisms are subject to birth, material growth, duration, and material decay and death. Entropy rules the materially evident world; though something must prompt both growth and decay, permission and constraint (a little clamping down and a little letting go, as Bhartrhari’s Time-machine kāla-yantra, was supposed to do). Here we can see the natural separation between material growth (ana-) toward organization and material decay (kata-) towards dissolution; and that of the series origin, duration (sequence in itself; past and present) and destruction. While we recognize material entropy and its opposite drive toward
living organic structure and directed development, something must uphold these motions and their differences.¹

But we know from experience that there is no use crying over spilled milk (in contrast to a dead loved one perhaps) and that this too will pass. Whatever is (this) will be forever (that); whatever will be, will be (past). But how can future events look forward to becoming past? How can we experience change and "remember impermanence"?

By "impermanence" could be meant just this: that every thing that gets born, i.e., this living body, being something born, will die. Not only what we see around us lives and dies, such things live only in so far as they end. What we see and feel is motion and rest, passing and persisting, going and staying—of the air and the ocean, against the earth and sky. Even feelings, thoughts, and emotions seem to change; not only as things in the world change, but seemingly on their own—as if being borne or tossed by their inherent gusts or inner waves.

It seems that we must face the fact that all of these various current events (occurring even here and no)—i.e., from this day, to this person, to this thought, every one will be forever past. And, even now, (to you, the reader), these things are that day, that person, and that thought. Even a currently present 3rd party-witness would only share this that-ness of this day. To the 2nd party, it would be this day, your person your thought (i.e. mine).

The universe (Being-) itself is like this, living, imbued with spirit and not material energy. The entropic dissolution of matter (kata-) and building nature of life (ana-) are directed in such an oppositional manner. Having a past history and living future, and experiencing, are based in the self-consciousness of living organisms. These are not self-created, but dependent beings, extended in space, and lent duration in time. They supercede their own existence in their fundamental origin in self-consciousness itself.

¹ Some antonyms for "entropy" include "enthalpy", the thermodynamic potential of a closed system, or "extropy", "negentropy", or "syntropy" of a living system, which is defined "the entropy that it exports to maintain its own entropy low".)
Ana-Kata and the Metabolism of Time

In some sense, time and space seem to be alike—we seem to be located in space as we are located in time; we can only access a bit of the past and the future, as we can only a bit of the immediate space around us. Our motion in space and time and our knowledge is very local—we sense what is immediately around us and must take the time and expend the energy to traverse to another place. We imagine places that we could not get to for long periods of time to exist even now and think that space extends out in all directions, real even if unperceived and likewise, that time extends from its beginning to its end.

This analogical extension of space and time is perhaps the appeal of four-dimensional views of time, and relativity theory has given us a picture and intuitive support for the idea that the present and the past and future (or now and then) are equally real, like here and there. But a place can be returned to while a time cannot. We can substitute or replace an object in a given space, but we cannot substitute or replace an event in a given time. Time really passes. This is our sense of the irrevocability and irretrievability of the past event.

The destructive power of time is most often what we note about time. Real time passes, and the passage of time results in decay, dissolution, and death. Time is the great destroyer; all things succumb to the effects of time. We work against this natural decay with most of our daily effort, but real genuine origination is always behind us, and often beyond memory and intention and action. In contrast, it is the end or the effect that we approach and expect. And, we naturally have more concern for the future than the past. The past seems beyond reach, past time is gone forever (or is truly destroyed / spent time) in a way, but the future is impending, it will be real time, and is absent but potent. Its currency is yet to come. We do not have to relive our painful birth, e.g., but we will have to live our (hopefully painless) death. Dissolution seems to be the defining point of the process, its boundary or limit (e.g., the heat-death of the universe).
Although we often seem to define time by its entropic effects, envisioning time as a biological (conscious, organic) phenomenon, as the biological, or as exhibiting or having (or being) a logic or form-of-life itself, encourages us to look as well at the creativity and conditions for creations and gifts of time. Time, after all, offers birth and life just as it does death, and offers novelty and creativity and growth as much as decay and dissolution. A present is a gift after all, and time cooks for us as much as it devours us! And this creativity and growth as well as novelty is not just the offer of a beginning to balance a bounded end, but a complex beginning that involves a continuingly prior past. It is this consistency that enables the connection or continuity of the whole given duration.

While the organic metaphor is interesting, is there any productive sense in which we can or do take time to be an organism, a being itself—one that really devours, consumes, and produces and re-produces more like itself, a generating and regenerating phenomenon, marked by both its destructive dissolution and its creative resolution, and which itself partakes of life or is living?

As a natural phenomenon temporality should perhaps be considered somewhat more organically, and conscious movements of cognition might offer a promising model. On the model of the metabolism of time, for example: It may be significant that in addition to the three dimensions of space (up-down/right-left/forward-back) and the one dimension of time, the insertion of the next additional dimension accepted by some into the four has been named ‘ana-kata.’ (also vinn/vout-Rucker) While ana and kata are most often translated as up-down, this would be repetitive of the original dimensions. In classical Greek, ana and kata are prefixes that don’t have univocal Latin equivalents—ana has the sense of every, of each, of integration, of resolution or ascent; while kata has the sense of against, thoroughly, according to, or of disintegration, a process of dissolution or lowering. Perhaps resolution and dissolution, or ascent and descent, (Bergson uses this latter set) would be a good translation
of the new fourth dimension.

Although this is taken as a spatial dimension, this kind of 'dimension' might be viewed better on an organic model, as opposed to a strictly static geometric model. As, for example, chemical and biological assimilation and unification toward continuingly integrative and more complex organic wholes is anabolic process, while the breakdown of such structures in dissolution or katabolic process. It is not such an odd thought that the structure of time and the structure or movements of advancing cognitive awareness (consciousness becoming self-consciousness) and biological or evolutionary processes generally might be structurally similar or that the 'advance' of each may inform one another.

In Creative Evolution, Bergson clearly proposes that the material is the inverted movement of consciousness, so where the material indicates the deterministic (habit memory) or the uncontrollable repetition of the past; the conscious development from instinct to intellect, indicates the degree of freedom involved in creation or creative activity (true memory). (Bergson, 1911) Bergson conceives consciousness as the "hyphen" (which both connects and separates) between the past and the present. Consciousness both connects the past and present, and marks their real ontological distinction; it is thus a necessary condition for their difference (and hence for any real "time" as such).

In this sense, consciousness makes the past past. Since without consciousness there are innumerable vibrations, and uncontracted into a definite sequence of duration, these are material, or primarily spatial, and are temporal only to the lowest degree—they have a low degree of tension. The innumerable vibrations themselves, offer durations but their low degree of tension only contracts or condenses a momentary past. The lowest levels of conscious tension are not enough to delay the response to the immediate past, and so are not enough to freely choose the future.
In the sixth section of the Maitri Upaniṣad it says that food is the source of the world and time is the source of food; the source of time is the sun. This is not just because the sun rises and sets, bring about our cyclical sleeping—our days and nights, and our measuring of time—but also because of the continuity of the power of the sun which shines continually.²

*From Time flow forth created things.*
*From Time, too, they advance to growth.*
*In Time, too, they do disappear.*
*Time is a form and formless too.*

In this Upaniṣad it is said that there are two forms of Brahma: That which is prior to the sun (the power of the sun or fire behind duration) is the Timeless (a-kāla), without parts (a-kāla).

But that which begins with the sun is said to be Time which has parts. The form of that which has parts is the year.

"From the year, in truth, are these creatures produced. In the year, verily, after having been produced, do they grow. In the year they disappear. Therefore, this year, is Prajāpati, is Time, is food, is the Brahma-abode, and is Ātman. For thus has it been said:—

*’Tis Time that cooks created things,*
*All things, indeed, in the Great Soul (mahātman).*
*In what, however, Time is cooked—*
*Who knows that, he the Veda knows!*

This embodied Time is the great ocean of creatures. Brahma is the soul (ātman) of the sun.

So, one should reverence the sun as a name of Time. Some say: 'Brahma is the sun.'

Moreover it has been said:—

*The offerer, the enjoyer, the oblation, the sacrificial formula (mantra),*
*The sacrifice, Vishnu, Prajāpati—*
*Every one whatsoever is the Lord (prabhu)², the Witness,*

² "On account of the subtlety of time] this [course of the sun] is the proof (that time passes), for only in this way is time proved. Apart from proof there is no ascertaining of the thing to be proved. However, the thing to be proved [e.g. time] may come to be proved from the fact of its containing parts [e.g. moments, etc.], to the cognizance of the thing itself. ... For thus has it been said:—However many parts of time—through all of them runs yonder [sun]! Whoever reverences Time as Brahma, from him time withdraws afar." See Maitri Upaniṣad (Hume, 1921).

³ Prabhu and its cognate prabhū are very interesting words in this context to associate with the Witnessing 2nd person. The latter is a conjugate of pra (as an indeclinable pra means before; as a prefix pra-, means forth or away; as a noun it may mean alike or resemblant) and bhū/bhū (existing or produced). The former, prabhu (as occurs in this verse) may mean powerful, capable, eternal, or
Who shines in yonder orb?
The infinite Brahma—the eternal, unitary Soul (Atman) of the world and of the individual

n the dissolution of the world He alone remains awake. From that space He, assuredly, awakes this world, which is a mass of thought. It is thought by Him, and in Him it disappears.

His is that shining form which gives heat in yonder sun and which is the brilliant light in a smokeless fire, as also the fire in the stomach which cooks food. For thus has it been said:

'He who is in the fire, and he who is here in the heart, and he who is yonder in the sun—he is one.'

The Value of the Past

Addressing the value of the past naturally involves a phenomenological starting-point which recognizes that the valuing of the past is a current and live-issue. Here the questions aren't of epistemology or metaphysics primarily; they are not of our knowing of the past nor its nature directly, but questions of its actual and possible value. What is the ontological and psychological value of the past and what is the real value of our remembering? These descriptive questions of value are immediately encompassing since 'value' has a relentlessly wide scope. We can begin by noting the very immediate relation of value not only to questions of 'evaluation'; but also to judgment involving some sort of constant measure. Even if purely appreciative, valuing requires criterion, or at least something appreciated.

In this part, we begin with discussion of the ontological value of the past—is the past fixed? Can we change it, promote it or bring it about? Is backward causation possible? This will bring us to the psychological value of remembering, the desirability of the past and our attachments to the repetition of the past, in the second chapter. These issues bring us directly to normative questions in the third chapter. What should our attitude towards our own expanse of past experiences be? How should we value the past we arrive at by justification constant. Prabhu is a "being-apart"; while prabhū adds some sense of being before and of increasing as well. (Monier-Williams, 1899)
and record (histories)? How should we value one another’s real past experiences? Can we really transform the past; can we transform our remembrances; can we transform ourselves?

As an introduction to this very important aspect of the past, I wish to share an old and very-apt, episodic or personal memory in unabashed tribute, and recognition of my indebtedness, to the wisdom of my grandmother. I take the following recollection to be of a real past experience though I find it is unremembered by my living family. It remains a very clear memory, from “once upon a time”, when I was only five...

**Spilling Milk and Fixing It**

I remember my family returning to the United States, after living in the Middle East for two years, to my grandmothers’ house early in the morning—or, at least, after traveling for a very long time. I remember being very tired—peacefully so, and glad to see my grandparents after so long. My brother, who was six, and impatiently thirsty, was reaching to get the milk from the top shelf of the refrigerator on his own. The gallon was full, and he dropped it on the floor. As I watched the milk empty onto the kitchen floor, my brother began to cry. (I seem to remember also feeling his crying—either feeling in perfect sympathy with his frustration, or starting to cry as he cried, I don’t know.)

Then, my grandmother began to fix what had happened. She swiftly picked up the spilling milk, gathered towels, and cleaned the floor in one motion telling us to stop crying and not to worry. And then, as the crying continued and the suffering continued, getting worse with time, she said (with a somewhat impatient, or still patient yet very determinate tone in her voice)—’Now there is no use crying over spilled milk!’ And I can recall the sounding of her voice as she said this; though I cannot describe it, I can still hear it.

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4 I have not given testimony to this event before (there never was occasion) and have only told it to others to see if they remember also upon writing this dissertation. It is not an oft-recited memory, though I have known it constantly since it occurred and it is an event I often remember (think about).
This was a particularly "impressive" sort of experience. I remember recognizing then the depth of what she said. I understood not just what she said was literally true (there was spilled milk and crying going on), but that what she meant was also true. The past cannot be changed and crying over what has happened is useless. It was the crying that was painful.

We could not put the milk back; my brother's unfortunate action had already had an effect. The truth of this claim about the past is just that past experience, which happens and which remains (with my current) past experience cannot be undone.

And yet, I also remember watching as she quickly finished cleaning the floor, and as things became calmer—she literally fixed (corrected) the past. In spite of the truth of the admonition and its depth (that the past cannot be changed or 'undone')—I watched as she changed the past forever. She not only fixed the results of the past-accident. Her actions and words became an integral part of that accident of the spilled milk.

Despite this loneliness of my remembrance, I know this to be a veridical past experience. I know that the event happened independently of the correctness of its description or the continuation of its remembrance. As it is actually remembered by no one but me, and I also know it actually happened. Because of this I also believe that that past event, and all past experience of this event as well, will remain true facts, even if all current remembrance of such past experiences is forgotten—'should auld acquaintance be forgot', they still remain old acquaintances!

Despite its current isolation to my own recollection, I take this memory as one of the most genuine and non-occluded, or clearly impressed sort of remembrances I have. This memory may be mine alone now, as remembered, but the past fact remains the case without any other living participant's remembrance, or even my own. Even unremembered, it remains a past event and remains as it was, i.e. known in the past, even if entirely forgotten.

Here, we take to a minimal realism. The possible observation of events remains open to new
information re-fixing their full meaning. The past is already-determined but these events are open to further action and so may still be fixed. They cannot be undone but they can be re-affected or re-fixed. What is past is real. As it was, it will always be—but this allows for many possible knowings.

Is that past event changed by my current recounting of it here? Can it be genuinely changed in such a way—or is this some sort of Cambridge change (simply perspectival and non-substantial)? Have I made this past event effective again in some real way? Have I added something to the reality of that past event—something that could perhaps be observed by others as a real change in that past? Can I do so by changing the meaning of that past event, increasing its effectiveness or by reversing its deleterious consequences by say, overcoming habitual or material compulsion?

**Aesthetic, Moral, and Effective Valuing**

This final part offers a bridge between the metaphysical problems and the epistemological problems of the past by considering the ontological and psychological valuing of the past and remembrance in chapters one and two respectively. In the final chapter we suggest that, just as we can divide our memory as episodic, semantic and procedural we can consider three corresponding central ways in which the value of what is past can be considered: aesthetically, morally, and practically. This heuristic sketch of an analogy enables us to offer some bridging insights between the epistemological and metaphysical puzzles of the past. The novelty or openness (without prior ascertainment) that the living and lived past suggests is deeply involved with episodic remembrance, and is reflected in the notion of aesthetic evaluation.

Aesthetic experience in particular, like the episodic experiential memory, is more ontologically (and logically) basic than meaning and habit. When, for example, a cat
stretches out in the sunshine, its basic experience of the world at that time is neither semantic nor simply procedural. Like us, it does what it enjoys. One might argue with Kant that this is purely aesthesis or sense-pleasure, but the cat has made a judgment concerning which spot is appropriately-sunny, and perhaps can convince other cat's to join her there. And, while this sort of judgment about where to lay involves some sort of semantic content and some in-bred instinct, habituation, or desire—at root of this experience is precisely that tactile relishing of the world—an appreciation of aesthetic value even if purely physically-oriented. Similarly, aesthetic remembrance of one’s own experience is more basic than semantic and procedural remembrance of the past; and in fact, it will be argued, makes these possible. Since procedural remembrance of the past (habit-memory) is not different in kind from material memory (material repetition) this view involves a metaphysical re-conception (or re-cognition) putting an immaterial power of consciousness at the root of material manifestations.

An origination of matter in mind (memory, or consciousness) involves real living duration which present(s) presence and is fundamentally affective (self-knowing—both knowing and knowable, present and past). Here we come to a panpsychist view that admits the reality of materiality as a function of the projection of remembrance forward. Like both Bergson and Abhinavagupta and his masterful teachers, what appears is recognized to be what is seen and the real materiality of the presence; the reality of the illusion, we might say, is genuine.

To place the episodic, as intrinsically affective, back at the heart of metaphysical (real) value and give past experience and real value back to conscious (felt or lived) experiences, reverses Tulving’s hierarchical evolution of the autonoetic from the noetic and the non-noetic. This gives reality back to experiential consciousness as the experiences of consciousness itself (or of conscious beings themselves); a self-aware living and organically
manifesting being. This returns genuine metaphysical value and objective meaningfulness to subjective awareness or self-consciousness (differently tensed). This sort of affectivity of original experience and direct acquaintance with past experience is open to all sentient experiencers.

The aesthetic of lived past experience can be recognized from a multitude of perspectives. Past experiences and past times 'go' nowhere except out of mind temporarily. There is no-where for what is past to go and no-thing for it to be. It is self-subsisting due to the reality of consciousness (self-consciousness) the power of affecting and being affected, itself. There is no reason to mark the material and insentient as ontologically prior, as well as, phylogenetically prior.

The aesthetic evaluation of the past offers openness to reinterpretation and change in value without requisite loss in meaning over time. Here we can connect the above ideas—the reality of the past (its metaphysical substantiality) and the fluidity of the past (its openness to change and interpretation). We have to admit the reality of change, and so the reality of tensed time; as well as the eternality of real (fixed) past. Yet the past is not fully determined—it remains, incomplete. Whatever will be, will be; and so it will be past. You and I, real observers will be past one day. *This too shall pass.*

This is a confusing set of requirements and fulfillments, so let's begin with a story of a magic ring, sought by a wise King.

King Solomon once searched for a cure against depression. He assembled his wise men together. They meditated for a long time and gave him the following advice: Make yourself a ring and have thereon engraved the words "This too will pass."

- Israel Folklore Archive 126

This origin of this story is untraceable and it has many currently available formulations. It is found both in Hebraic and Arabic Folklore, and has also been told as the story of a wealthy Indian King. The story has also been related (in a somewhat occult way)

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5 (See Noy, Frankel, & Ben-Amos, 2006)
to the symbolism of the Star of David, and the Seal of Solomon—so while the roots of this story go deeper than we now know, its branches are too wide for any one knower to grasp.

This legendary ring, attributed to cure the ills of existential depression, would bear the inscription GZY in Hebrew. The phrase ‘Gam Zeh Yaavor’ is modern Hebrew for ‘This too shall pass’. These letters (gimel, zayin, yud) taken as a verbal root mean “to give” or “repay”. Both the real existential problem (that all things are passing) and its real answer (to give or repay) are held in these three letters. As Wittgenstein noted there are debts which one feels one shall not have paid upon our death. We are indebted originally and forever.

But being reminded of this timeless truth of temporal passage (that this too shall pass) seems to be of solace only to those who are suffering—this "magic ring" will also make the happy man sad. But its meaning can be combined with the exhortation to give or be grateful.

(And also, logically speaking, knowing that this too shall pass does not mean that all things will pass away!) Both to appreciate and to add value to the past is its own reward and is eternal. In his essay, 'My Life', Chekhov wrote of this ring:

King David had a ring with an inscription on it: 'All things pass.' When one is sad those words make one cheerful, and when one is cheerful it makes one sad...this talisman keeps (one) from infatuations. All things pass, life will pass, one wants nothing. Or at least one wants nothing but the sense of freedom, for when anyone is free, he wants nothing, nothing, nothing.” He continues, “If I wanted to order a ring for myself, the inscription I should choose would be: "Nothing passes away." I believe that nothing passes away without leaving a trace, and that every step we take, however small, has significance for our present and our future existence. (Chekhov, 2004, p. 108)

Such rings have been made into a current fashion in Israel today, and are also reputed to have been given to U.S. soldiers in WWI.
CHAPTER 8: FIXING THE PAST

8.1 The Alleged Inflexibility and Determinacy of the Past

We have dealt with philosophical anxieties about the existence of the past. Even if we now concede that the past, as past, exists tenselessly (even if it is gone and so does not exist now) the question remains: Is it fixed or flexible? The kind of commonsense that admonishes us not to cry over spilt milk tells us that the past has truly passed; past events are beyond ‘fixing’ and could not be changed now. Let us first explore what exactly is meant by this alleged fixity of the past.

According to Joseph Diekemper, determinacy is the property of a proposition which admits of a determinate truth-value, while fixity is a function or property of events indicating unalterability. (Diekemper, 2005) Diekemper argues that it is because of the apparent coincidence of these two notions with regard to the temporal necessity of past events that the dilemma seems to be proposed for future contingent propositions. Questioning this symmetrical approach that leads to fatalism (which allowed Dummett to try out the idea of an open past on a par with the popular idea of an open future), he claims that determinacy and fixity need not "go hand in hand". Determinacy is a function of propositions, i.e., their truth-values; while fixity is a function of the un-alterability of events.

Diekemper argues that Dummett’s parallel treatment of the open future and open past is valid only on the assumption that a uniform assignment of determinate truth-values implies a symmetrical conception of time. The refutation of a closed past on the same grounds as the refutation of the fatalist’s argument begs the question against the asymmetry of between past and future. Under Dummett’s analysis, there is an analogy between the logically determinate but unfixed future and the logically determinate but unfixed past.
In Diekemper’s view however, as perhaps in ours, determinacy and fixity are conjoined in the case of past propositions and events; and determinacy and non-fixity in the case of future propositions. But perhaps we should try first to clarify these two notions of determinacy and fixity separately, and then see in what ways they might coincide. We will start with fixity, taken to mean inalterability: What is the status of the statement: *The past cannot possibly be changed*?

This statement might be necessarily true, contingently true, false, or senseless. Some might hold that it is analytically, or necessarily, true that the past cannot be changed; if only because such un-changeability is part of the concept of the past—or just what makes anything ‘past’. The past is the sum of events and states of affairs that have already changed prior to this current moment, and are hence, now beyond (or past-) alteration. Alternatively, any past event that could be changed would thereby become a present event.

The statement would be *contingently true* if, though it is a matter of fact that we cannot, or do not change the past, it might in principle be possible for us to change the past. The past just *happens* to be fixed. If it is *false* that the past cannot be changed then the past *can* be changed, and remains open or indeterminate—or still determinable to some degree. Alternatively, the fixity claim being false, the past must *always* be changing—so it is not contingently false (or true) that the past can’t be changed, it is *necessarily false*. If the present is changing always, and these changes are creating causal ripples on the past, then it would seem that the past also always changes.

The statement would be *senseless* (without content) because either “the past” has no referents (or no reference), or because changing the past is in principle undetectable or indistinguishable from not changing the past. Should we distinguish the modal statement above, “it is not possible that the past be changed” (as Deikemper calls it, this is the PCP: the *principle of the changeless past*), from the statements “the past does not change” or “the past
cannot change”? It is, after all, at a time $t$ that event $e$ cannot be changed; $e$ certainly changes at some times, at least the time during which $e$ occurs in the first place.

### 8.1.1 Fixity and Feasibility

Graham Oddie (1990) argues that 'fixity' is a stronger property than either 'actuality' or 'truth', having a modal force which they do not. He says if an event is *fixed* then its occurrence is "rendered inevitable by what has gone on so far." The first fundamental *principle of fixity* is that the current fixity of any proposition entails the truth of that proposition; but the converse, he says, does not generally hold. There may be different feasible futures which are compatible with actual laws and what has gone on so far—one of which may be the actual future. It may now be true that this is the actual future, even though these events are *not* now fixed. (Oddie, p. 80) Oddie proposes "an action constraint" on fixity, in terms of two principles:

**PFP:** The principle of the fixity of the past: *If $e$ is past at $t$, then $e$ is fixed at $t$.* For any event $e$ and any time $t$, if $e$ is past at $t$, then $e$ cannot be changed at $t$.

**PA:** The principle of action: Actions performed at time $t$ are fixed at $t$. If $e$ happens at $t$, $e$ is fixed at $t$.

But it can easily be seen that this pair of principles generate an internal tension in Oddie’s theory. Here $e$ is fixed (past-tense) at the time it is (happening)—but this leaves no room for action. To take a simple example, when someone is cooking a curry, the action, and hence the event(s), is fixed at that very time (PA); and yet since the cooking is not past at that time, it is still subject to change, and hence changeable. If 'fixed' means unchangeable, changeable actions turn out to be at the same time unchangeable!

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7 The action is not fixed until finished; but when does an activity finish? How do we divide activities except arbitrarily and for conventional purposes by opposing them to other (causally interrelated) activities. The activity of cooking becomes that of eating and is not unrelated to the next activity of cooking, etc...
There is thus some ambiguity in the use of ‘fixed’ in Oddie’s analysis. Perhaps ‘fix’ is used in PA in the sense in which it is used in the instruction “fix me a drink”. Is the fixing, doing, or happening, of an action or event indistinguishable from the fixed action or event? In this way, ‘fixed’ is being used in the principle of action (PA) as the on-going process of determining events and in the principle of permanent fixity (PFP) as the already determined event (if it is fixed at \(t\) that \(e\) occurs at \(t\) then it is fixed at all times later than \(t\) that \(e\) occurs at \(t\)). Could this principle of fixity be restated hypothetically as: If it is fixed at \(t\) that \(e\) occurs at \(t\)—then it is fixed at all times other than \(t\), that \(e\) occurs at \(t\)? While this guarded restatement imports permanent fixity of all events (past, present, and future) if there are any such events, it apparently doesn’t deny occurring.

**8.2 Backwards Causation and Real Contradictions in Nature**

Oddie argues that any interesting thesis of backwards causation must do more than drop the fixity of the past. The theorist must also abandon two principles of permanence: the principle of permanent fixity and the principle of permanent truth. He argues that the only option open to theorists who permit backwards causation is to embrace real contradictions in nature.

But it is possible, he says, to hold a weaker version of the principle of permanent fixity: that fixity entails permanent feasibility. He says that if the occurrence of \(e\) at \(t\) is fixed at \(t'\) then, if \(t''\) is later than \(t'\), the occurrence of \(e\) at \(t\) is feasible at \(t''\) (emphasis mine). We might summarize this principle by saying, once fixed, always feasible. Yet, \(e\) was feasible before \(t\) also, or it wouldn’t have become so actually. Thus, by this principle, events are ‘fixed’ only once and ‘feasible’ always, but ‘actual’ only after the magical fixing. Does this mean that after being fixed once they remain both feasible and actual, but are no longer fixed? Yet it seems that they must also remain fixed to remain (or even ever become) actual.
The second fundamental principle of fixity is that an event is now fixed just in case the nonoccurrence of the event is not now feasible. In other words, an event is now feasible just in case the nonoccurrence of the event is not now fixed. ('If e is not fixed at t then the nonoccurrence of e is feasible at t.') Oddie argues that it only makes sense to claim that the nonoccurrence of the past event e-at-t which is fixed at t' can become feasible again at a later moment t'' if it is feasible at t'' for the nonoccurrence of e-at-t to become fixed—and if that is feasible at t'' then that, he says 'may well be how the world develops.

But is the nonoccurrence of e-at-t feasibly (re-)fixable at t''? If it is, and is the way the world develops, he says then at a moment later than t' the occurrence of e-at-t will no longer be feasible (by second fundamental principle of fixity)—so e-at-t violates permanent feasibility. We must conclude that if this is the case it, would be possible at t''', say, to fix it back and so again changing its feasibility. But here the past continues to be open to change—it is always feasible, as is its nonoccurrence, and therefore never completely fixed.

To deny the fixity of the past is to maintain that there may be more than one feasible past. But for an interesting thesis of backwards causation, one must also embrace the principle of future-to-past efficacy, Oddie says, or future to past causality—viz. that we can or do change the past. Can the future effect (cause) the past? Can what is present or future determine (or decide) that already-past past?

8.2.1 Retro-causality and the Bilking Argument

The idea of retro-causality is that it is possible, by means of a backwards causal link, for a later event to fix an earlier event; the effect (later event) thus being prior in some sense to its cause. Oddie says that this is what is required, in order to have any genuine power over the past. Our normal concept of instrumental efficacy rests on the fact that by making a

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certain cause happen (and hence fixing a cause) one thereby fixes a later effect. (Oddie, 1990, p. 82)

What has come to be known as “the bilking argument” was first introduced by Max Black (Black, 1956). The intent of the argument is to show that there can be no backward causation. The argument is short:

1. Let $B$ be the alleged effect of $A$, and imagine $B$ to be earlier than $A$ (Thus we assume backward causation is possible, viz. that $A$ causes $B$ even though $A$ is later than $B$.)

   [In shorthand: $AcB = (A \text{ causes } B)$ but $BpA = (B \text{ precedes } A)$

2. But whenever $B$ (the earlier event) has occurred it may be possible to intervene and prohibit $A$ from occurring.

3. But to prevent $A$, the cause, would be to present $B$, its effect. If $B$ has already occurred, it is not preventable. Therefore $A$ (the later event) cannot be the cause of $B$, so there can be no backward causation.

Because of this possible intercession of the present, there is the possibility of intervening (distinguishing) between the earlier event (the effect) and the later (cause). But this assumes the very possibility of this sort of intervention. And, perhaps there are some future events we cannot possibly block or prevent from occurring. For example, we cannot stop our own death from occurring (though we might affect its details)—so we can deny the second premise.

There has been considerable debate on the effectiveness of the bilking argument and the validity and the soundness of the concept of backward causation. Dummett and Mellor have argued that this argument trades on the assumption of the fixity of the past. Oddie brings forward another assumption, not unrelated to the fixity of the past, which he says is hidden in the argument offered by the bilking argument (or thought ‘experiment’): that it is assumed that there is just one feasible past (just as the determinist believes there is just one
possible future). Oddie notes that it is the assumption of the asymmetry between past and future fixity that enables the argument to go through.

8.2 Can Time Itself Flow Backward?

In our ordinary conception of causality if AcB then ApB (if A causes B, then A precedes B). This is logically equivalent, and has been presumed empirically indistinguishable, from the perfect reverse BcA and BpA (say A is the dropping of the stone into the water, and B is the rippling waves outward). The bilking argument proposes for reductio that BcA but ApB. In other words, the rippling causes the dropping but the dropping precedes the rippling.

Is this also logically equivalent and empirically indistinguishable to the idea that the dropping causes the rippling, though the rippling precedes the dropping (AcB but BpA)?

8.3 Causal Relations and Temporal Directions

Can we keep the causal order and reverse the temporal order? Can the rippling precede the dropping while the dropping causes the rippling? We can at least logically distinguish these two forms of ordering. It does seem that ideally speaking, it is the rippling that causes the dropping in part, if one wants to see the ripple, then the ripple or at least the idea of the ripple caused the dropping while the dropping preceded the rippling (as it really was). The dropping still causes the pond’s rippling, but the potential of rippling (and, here, the real rippling-thought) precedes the dropping.

If the perfect reverse of our natural condition would be indistinguishable, then it is reasonable to think that these two possibilities offer some sort of reversal also. But would these two possibilities be indistinguishable? It seems so. The experiential aspect (which is
earlier) would come first and so 'entail' that since B (the rippling) is experienced before A but A (the dropping) causes B, this would be a case of 'backward causation' although it is not the causal order that is reversed but the temporal order. However, given logical equivalence and empirical and mathematical indistinguishability, what can be the use of this distinction?

We can reconceive the causal connections outlined in Oddie's version of the bilking argument for the past and our cognition of the past. In the original form of the argument, the later action causes the earlier action: *Stanley's having an éclair on Tuesday has the power to bring about Cassandra's predicting an éclair on Monday.* Using Oddie's precognitive example as one of backward causation, the causing éclair-eating, "bringing about" the earlier cognition is given our usual background of advancing (forward) time. Monday's-knowing precedes Tuesday's-eating.

If we reverse Oddie's scheme, then we have, instead of the claim that A precedes B, but B causes A (ApB, but BcA), the converse claim that B precedes A, but A causes B (BpA but AcB): Instead of Monday's cognition happening before Tuesday's-eating (and the eating yet causing the cognition), we have Tuesday's eating happening before Monday's cognition while the cognition causes the eating. Time is experienced backwards—here, Tuesday comes first and his eating happened first, but was caused by her later knowing. While this seems a bit useless (or just the same thing in reverse), what if it were his own subsequent knowing that caused his earlier choice. If his memory cognition of having chosen the éclair determined his earlier choosing of the éclair—even though he chose the éclair before he 'remembered'.

If Tulving and Campbell, etc., are onto something about our mental time travel and chronesthesic capacities, it seems possible that our later 'memories' might after all somehow determine our prior actions. And to be clear, it is not our present perception of what our future memories will be that causes our present choice. In order to be a case of genuine
causation the later event—here, the cognition of already having chosen—has to actually
determine the choosing.

Given Tulving’s mental time travel thought or Campbell’s deep decentering, Stanley,
trying to decide what to eat, slips unknown to his conscious awareness into the future (his
chronesthesic capacity enables him to simulate his future self) and he remembers having
eaten the éclair, it is a good ‘memory’, so he chooses to eat the éclair. 8 (His future-glimpse
of his future-memory may of course be mistaken, like any memory.) Or perhaps the
memory is distasteful—maybe Stanley is trying to lose the weight he’s gained from his love
of éclairs—and the emotional valence of that remembering, perhaps his regret and frustration
with himself (on remembering those past-éclair-eatings) encourages him to bilk himself and
so abstain from the éclair on Monday and change Tuesday’s past. But can Tuesday’s
remembrance affect Monday’s events, if, as we suppose, remembering isn’t possible until
after the event or experience is past?

As Stanley experiences the situation, he will choose and then can remember his
choice. The causal chain from this later remembrance to today’s choice is not available to
him except retrospectively from the point of view of his later memory. At this point the
causal chain seems to him to run in the other direction, but that is only because of his
temporal direction—he experienced the choosing before remembering even though the
remembering caused the choosing. 9

Now whether this is coherent in any sense is hard to tell. We are inextricably bound
in this very asymmetrical experience of time, dividing past and future epistemologically and
the present ontologically from both. What this line of thinking does do is not only try to
distinguish the order of experience from the order and direction of causation but also to

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8 What makes this a memory and not an imaginary exposition of some sort is that Stanley must imagine the
past, so he must remember having eaten that éclair.
9 He might for example, thought he was “just imagining” things and so didn’t take the stomach pains so
seriously.
separate their functional times. Causes do not have to act in the present—or more precisely, they can act in the present from times other than the present. But if Stanley's memory on Tuesday (for simplicity sake) causes his choosing on Monday, this entails something quite unusual about the existence of at least some particular types of future times.

8.3.1 Bringing About Past Events

Oddie argues that there are two causal chains—one from the choice of the éclair to the precognition (memory) of it; and one from the choice of the macaroon (something else, even a carrot) to the precognition (memory) of that. Oddie argues that it is absurd that Stanley has this ability to break the causal chain by making the cause occur (but the occurrence of the cause, strictly speaking, may not be required).

Oddie says that given a precognition of an éclair, by being able to choose the macaroon, Stanley violates the chain from the precognition to its later cause or, rather from the later cause to the earlier effect. Here, it appears that the precognition wasn't knowledge of the future, but only of one feasible future. Whether éclairs or macaroons are precognized, Stanley has the power, by bringing about the cause of the other effect to break one of the causal connections which underlie the precognitive ability.

But if, as suggested above, Cassandra's precognition is just Stanley's, then Stanley's having an éclair on Tuesday might "bring about" his own prior awareness (on Monday) (remembrance) of his impending éclair-choice. But since Monday usually comes before Tuesday, his cognizing Tuesday's event, happens first on Monday. He knows (suppose he remembers, and does not pre-cognize or imagine) that tomorrow he has an éclair.10 Now,

10 This is plausible if one considers that one may pre-cognize events un-experienced but only remembered experienced events; thus to 'remember' (and not pre-cognize) one's own future would be reasonable since this is one's own (future) experience.
presumably he might have the power to bilk himself, and though knowing he will choose an éclair, he declares his freedom and chooses a macaroon when the time for choosing comes.\textsuperscript{11}

The possibility that he ‘bilk’-himself implies that he can break the causal chain from his later choice of the éclair to the earlier precognition. On Tuesday, if he really manages to choose the macaroon (or carrot) then he was either wrong in his precognition, or he really has changed the past (by changing the real future) as it had been originally determined. But its “original” determination (on Monday) is not its real determination as subject to present activity, as it was (or is being) fixed. Because there is a unity or coherence in this fixing, it is unique and can only be original. When Stanley ‘changed’ the past, if he did, it was by means of current activities.

This changing of the past, like my grandmother’s, and our own every day, is common (though perhaps still somewhat miraculous). We cannot change or undo the past, but we can change or do other things. In doing so we not only change what has been more generally, but also the meaning of what preceded it. Values have to do with the will, emotions and preferences. There is a presupposition that having preferences and volitional and current emotional reactions about matters that are now unalterable is irrational. Whether or not what is past is alterable is crucial for whether we can ‘evaluate the past’—and how we do so.

\textit{8.3.2 Time Traveling and the Unity of the Past}

Say physically traveling backward in time is possible, but not traveling (in any extraordinary way) faster forward. If it were not possible to ‘return’ to the future (except by the ordinary means of aging) to check the effects of one’s actions directly, then we could not know that the past of the original future that was changed. But even more problematically, if

\textsuperscript{11} One question that naturally arises here is that if he chooses to bilk himself and change his future, then might also remember that he had done so (it was a good memory...). Then he just creates a new backward causal chain.
S goes back in time from e3 to e1, then e3 and e2 are future and so indeterminate once e1 is present. In that (returned) present, the memory of e1, 'that (past) event', as it was from e3, does not refer to e1 from e1, now this (present) event.

Even if S goes back in time and changes events from what he remembered these events to be, he would not be changing the past on the presupposition of the unity of the past (somewhat ironically). Because the past is intrinsically unified as its changes (occurring in the present), changes are always a real and original part of it. It would not be possible to change the past because any changing to the past is possible only on the predication of the presence of the past as present, so any past events that can be changed are present events and there is only one possible fixed past.

Oddie argues that if knowability implies fixity (as Dummett has suggested) and all past facts are in principle knowable, then we could never have good evidence to suppose backward causation. The assumption of just one feasible past is the assumption of the direction of temporal order.

8.4 Transformative Value of Tilted Time: Going Beyond the Cyclic Linear Controversies

Values have always been based on beliefs about facts concerning time...our values are transformed by transforming beliefs about time. (Raju, 2003, p. 1)

Richard Sorabji gives an interesting argument to the effect that given a cyclical conception of time, a cause at t1 could produce an effect at t2 which could loop <t3...t0, t0, t1, > and so this effect could be in the causal history of its cause. Raju argues, however, that the 'pictures' of linear and cyclical time we have, are largely incoherent.

He claims that the question of whether time is 'linear' or 'cyclic' is nonsensical since there are incoherencies among the different pictures of time within each of these categories. Different pictures correspond to different logics; so logic must be adapted to empirical
considerations. The usual (bivalent) logic cannot ultimately describe quantum mechanical phenomena, but a logic corresponding to microphysical closed loops in time can. A ‘tilt’ indicates partial anticipation, so that physics with a tilt is non-mechanistic. It takes us from a cyclical view of time into a spiraling one. Time advances with such a tilt which is offers a “direction” or directedness (to speak loosely) which enables a spontaneity offered within patterned bounds, but not pure repetition.

C.K. Raju argues that a tilted model of time implies spontaneity and is better suited to model life (as well as the cosmos) since it admits both memory and spontaneity. Spontaneity differs from chance in creating order instead of destroying it. While chance offers a random disconnected event—spontaneity can use the past to create new order. A tilt in the model of time implies a small universal tendency towards order creation. But spontaneity cannot be mechanized, so this tendency does not contradict the law of entropy. In fact, as Raju claims, such history dependence in a tilted or spiraling model (i.e., having advance) helps explain entropy increase.

Raju claims that Upanishadic ‘spirituality’ is based on the (believed) fact of quasi-cyclic time. Some Indian schools denied the reality of time; and by introducing two levels of reality, empirical and ultimate, opposed Buddhist and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realists about time. Raju also finds cyclic time evidenced in the Bible and concludes that it was later writers like Augustine, who denied cyclical time. The Islamic notion of ontically broken time, where there is an intervention required to connect every ‘cause’ to its ‘effects’ (occasionalism), also denies mundane (linear) causality.

Raju connects the rejection of cyclical time, closed time loops and time travel (since time travel allows closed loops in time) to the motivation to preserve free will. In his own view, however, “spontaneity is the empirical evidence for time travel!” (Raju, 2003, p. 271)
He suggests that we try to rid physics of "the old curse on cyclic time" which has infiltrated since Newton’s time; but replacing linear time by cyclic time is hardly the right solution, since the question whether time is cyclic or linear itself does not make much sense. Belief in exactly two conflicting pictures of time was politically convenient he says, but these categories are defective, "since each incorporates many different pictures of time, and there need be no conflict between individual pictures across categories." In fact, he argues that there are not two competing pictures of time, linear and cyclical, but eleven—four linear, four cyclical, two broken, and one tilted.

The tilted model has the advantage of using both linear and cyclical models. The tilted model recognizes microphysical closed time loops; and admits history dependence and anticipation in opposition (using mixed type equations for both branching and collapse). The additional advantage is that while bivalent logic cannot ultimately describe quantum mechanical phenomenon, but a logic corresponding to microphysical closed loops in time can. (Raju, 2003, p. 297) Raju says that incoherence about time in physics may be resolved through the hypothesis of a 'tilt' in the arrow of time, which "only roughly recovers mundane time." (Raju, 2003, p. 2)

Pure anticipation is the exact time-reverse of pure history-dependence. With history dependence, even complete knowledge of the entire future does not decide a unique past. With anticipation, even complete knowledge of the entire past does not decide a unique future. Anticipatory phenomena are causally inexplicable and would appear spontaneous." (Raju, 2003, p. 305) But a world in which all phenomena were purely anticipatory would be no different from world in which all phenomena were purely history-dependent. Time would run in the opposite direction but there would be no way to tell from within such a world.
History dependence—three distinct past histories merging into the same future under history-dependent time evolution—while past decides future, future cannot decide a unique past. Time Asymmetry of Delay: the collapse of a retarded equation (P. 304)

Anticipation—three distinct future histories merging into the same past under anticipatory time evolution—while future decides past, past cannot decide a unique future. (Viewed from left to right this would seem spontaneous and causally inexplicable). Time Asymmetry of Advance: future branching solutions of an advanced equation. (P. 306)

Tilt and spontaneity—three possible solutions of the equations with a tilt—all three solutions have the same past history and eventually the same future. Thus both past and future may fail to decide a unique intermediate evolution. Hence, with a tilt, neither causal nor purposive explanations are necessarily inadequate, though in a predominantly history dependent context even causal explanations alone may mostly suffice. Mixed-Type Equations: branching and collapse. (P. 307)
If one forcibly attempts causal explanations of future influences, one is led to closed causal chains. But what caused the chain to begin? There can be no causal explanation for the entire chain. Hence also, the beginning of a closed causal chain has no explanation from the past. (Raju, 2003, pp. 306-307)

Electromagnetic waves can be retarded or advanced. *Retarded waves* are like the ripples which spread out when a stone is dropped into a pond. *Advanced waves* are what one would see if one filmed these ripples, and played the film backward.\(^{12}\) Raju says that advanced waves are usually rejected as 'unphysical'; but, "the problem is precisely that there is nothing unphysical about advanced waves: according to current physics they may occur, although they do not seem to." (Raju, 2003, p. 305) He notes that if someone claims this does happen (though rarely), but he has recorded on film a physicist could not refute such a claim.

Popper claimed that a good physicist should be able to tell the end of the film from its beginning. His answer was that there is no way to explain the phenomena without 'coordination from the centre'–(that one has a perfectly circular pond and the stone is dropped at its exact centre so that a perfectly circular divergent ripple is reflected back as a convergent one.) Apart from this the only explanation was to appeal to a 'conspiracy of causes': to produce a convergent ripple by the constructive interference of spontaneously generated wavelets at the pond's boundary would require very 'fine tuning' because of coherence (required for interference). Popper argued that such a conspiracy of causes would have virtually zero probability of occurrence and hence would count as a miracle.

Raju concludes that Popper was right: in absence of causal explanation for a spontaneous event the event can't be mechanically replicated. Yet, he asks, why should every phenomenon be mechanically replicable or capable of causal explanation? And, even Popper admitted that this was a strong argument, so that he was possibly mistaken. (Raju, 2003, p.

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12 One would see ripples spontaneously commencing to converge from the boundary of the pond (and their convergence to the centre of the pond would generate enough energy to throw the stone out of the pond into one's outstretched hand.) p. 304-305
"If the logically impossible is empirically observed, one should abandon the logic in use." (Raju, 2003, p. 273)

Raju asks whether abhorrence of contradiction a cultural, or cosmic thing. It has been established by experiment that a microphysical quantum particle may be at two places at the same time—or be in two states at one time. Considering that time has a non-trivial structure is he says, one way to explain how something may be in two places at the same time. With structured time, in the case of Schrödinger’s cat e.g., that there are two logical cats corresponding to one physical cat at a single instant of time; and that the logical cats exist objectively. What guarantees that (deductive) logic is sacrosanct—that it must precede empirical reality instead of following from it? Or that precisely one logic can be used to describe physical realities? It would seem there are only cultural guarantees.

Relating a change of logic to a change in the picture of time also helps to clarify and re-combine the temporal dichotomy of ‘linear’ vs. ‘cyclic’ time. This dichotomy is embedded in our oppositional thinking about time in science, philosophy, and in our experience itself. This opposition is also reflected in the A-series time (with its re-cycling present) and B-series time (with its unique, linear order). “What is important is this: if aether and action by contact are rejected, then, as a first step, instantaneity has to be replaced by history dependence. Human memory is the simplest example of history dependence.” (Raju, 2003, pp. 302-303)

13 He opposes his structured-time interpretation of quantum mechanics, which differs from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.) (Raju, 2003, p. 277)
14 Yet, we must note here, that while we might talk about microphysical quantum particles as logically-split objectively, this might not be the same for cats. A physical cat exists subjectively also—it is self conscious but is also a temporally-persisting process. If there is a subjective feeling of being both alive and dead (whatever this state might feel like to that cat—it would remain even if contradictory, a single experience of contradiction—perhaps choice. In other words, there is only one physical cat; still numerically one, with two (logical) possibilities existing objectively. In the cat’s experiencable time (logical time) we have split the cat but in the present time (experienced) to the cat—it remains one. So we have really not split the cat (or the particle) but its potential appearing (its logical time is in two states). The cat might remain unconscious of this logical split—or it might suddenly wonder if it is still alive (the possibility of now-being-dead might occur to it).
8.4.1 The Tilt and Life

...a tilt means that there is a universal though rare tendency towards order creation. This tendency competes with the general history-dependent tendency towards entropy creation, and at the present epoch it is the history-dependent processes that dominate. (Raju, 2003, p. 311)

Raju says that living organisms are a good place to look for spontaneous and non-mechanical processes which create order. "A tilt incorporates both memory and spontaneity better suited to model living organisms than Newton's laws adapted to the solar system." According to Schrödinger, order is the characteristic feature of life: "it feeds on negative entropy". Such negentropy (extropy, enthalpy, etc.) is the characteristic of life. Schrödinger invoked chance to explain this order. He emphasized that this was classic chance and not quantum mechanical chance. We are left, according to Raju, with all the problems of reconciling chance with a mechanistic physics. But since a "tilt" is "intrinsically non-mechanistic", there is no such fundamental problem of reconciling physics with the existence of living organisms:

...a microphysical tilt permits only microphysical spontaneity and order creation, while the phrase 'living organisms' suggests human beings who are much larger. Thus, with a tilt one may classify living organisms as precisely those physical entities which can amplify this order creation. (Raju, 2003, p. 313)

Raju finds that there is a difference between spontaneity and (the classical version of) chance in the context of the theory of evolution. As opposed to chance, with spontaneity the origin of life appears as a natural process.

With a tilt, we have two competing tendencies: a tendency for the growth of order, and a tendency for the growth of disorder. While entropy growth dominates, we can expect the growth of order in isolated pockets. Life would originate universally, wherever it is able to survive, regardless of whether this replicates the supposedly fortuitous circumstances on earth. (Raju, 2003, p. 314)

He says that ultimately, the difference between causally inexplicable spontaneity and such a hazy kind of chance is quantitative. Ilya Prigogine has emphasized that in situations

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15 He notes that Newtonian physics fails at three scales: the very small, the middling, and the very large—or the microphysical, the biological, and the cosmological. (Raju, 2003, p. 312)
far from thermodynamic equilibrium; there may be a local tendency for order to increase.\(^\text{16}\)

Moreover, living organisms are open systems which can exchange energy with the environment to maintain a state of order. According to Raju, these are valid but are far too weak since they do not admit the idea of purpose. Why do organisms want to survive, he asks? Just an appeal to natural selection is too simplistic. According to Raju, "a tilt links the present to both past and future." This sort of 'tilted' view seems to match well with our preference for "third-ways" in the Metaphysics sections, since it is not a cycle or a line, but a restricted advance admitting novelty which makes their contrast intelligible.

Purpose is viewed neutrally as a future cause, i.e., as the time-symmetric counterpart of a past cause. He says that we should here try to avoid the mental trap of reverting to naive ideas of the non-existence of past and future, noting that, if one uses the non-existence of the future to eliminate future causes, and non-existence of the past to eliminate past causes, there is no escape from the mechanical paradigm of instantaneity.

Raju says that this "common-sense attitude" involves two considerations: First, an easy-going dismissal of the dogma of causality: an explanation in terms of purpose or motive is preferred, for it is often simpler and easier to comprehend than an explanation in terms of cause. And, second, this seems to reflect the observation that 'purposive' explanations fit only living organisms: a stone does not roll down a hill on purpose. (He says "This restriction to living organisms is quite acceptable with a tilt.") But purposive explanation should not be confused with teleological explanation. (Raju, 2003, p. 315) While purposes are future causes, they are not "final causes" in the pre-ordained, or design sense, since there may be no personal 'plan to achieve an end.'

A tilt means a non-trivial structure of time (hence quantum mechanics) in the very small, and permits purposive explanations in addition to causal ones. In fact Raju says, fully

\(^{16}\) (See e.g., Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Prigogine, 1997; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)
causal explanations are impossible with a tilt. A tilt partly helps to reconcile time in physics (superlinear or reversible/deterministic) time with mundane (branching open-future) time and brings in a true collectivity of causes in addition to a multiplicity of causes.

8.4.2 Causal Loops and Temporal Looping

A partial tilt in time allows an interactive model between perception and memory, or present and past, as interwoven in experience. The distinctions in time between present and past are drawn by the direction of consciousness aimed toward effective worldly and external interaction as well as internal (perhaps lagging) perception of this as the continuation of the material motion (as not an internal affect, but itself a material image, as Bergson suggested). Perceiving is the manifestation or illumination of the current situation as an enduring one enabled by remembrance, exclusion and (self-) awareness, according to Abhinava. For both the spirit or consciousness (indicated by memory) is the source of the spiral (or partial tilt) that aims biological or creative and spiritual evolution forward, and that carries knowledge forward and makes experience possible.

This model of a experience-based realism and minimal panspsychism (the conscious substrate of even material manifestation) offers a conception of the relation of intentional and currently forwardly directed consciousness, and immediate knowledge (true-memory) of past experience which lies at the back of all our current knowing. We can expect the future to become the past and so, deciding now, change the future, and thereby will change the past. I may experience regret having done so, but will do it again—or may regret having done so and not do it again. In the former state I desire to change the past but do not, and in the latter case I do. What separates that past from this one after all? We are indeed left in a superimposition of past experience known as current image imperfectly, but unique in relations together.
8.5 Backward Causation and Knowing It

Confucius and you are both dreams and I who say you are a dream am a dream myself. This is a paradox. Tomorrow a wise man may explain it; that tomorrow will not be for ten-thousand generations. (Chuang Tzu)\(^{17}\)

The profound story by Ursula Le Guinn, *The Lathe of Heaven* opens with this quote and puts Russell’s five-minute hypothesis into startling sci-fi effects. (Le Guin, 2003) In the story the main character, Orr, finds himself dreaming each night of changes in the past (the way the world is) and in the morning finds everyone else’s memory accords with his dream. Only he remembers the way the world was before and only he recognizes this new revised world as the world of his dream. (Only Orr knows the truth of the disjunction!) Everyone else recognizes only one memory of the world but he has multiple memories of its changes and realizes the discontinuity between these past days and those past days, by means of the continuity of his memory. The continuity of his own memory however is one only apparent to him, and offers a discontinuous and shifting past. But the continuity kept by the changing of the memories of others to ‘lose the actually-past past’ and remember only the currently remembered (new past) gives them an apparent continuity but not the real continuity of Orr who retains the old real past and is aware of the new real past.

We meet Orr as a patient who is seeking medication and psychological help for his ‘delusive’ condition, unbelievable even by his own rational mind. His newest doctor however realizes that this patient, the humble and unassuming Orr, really has the power of dreaming actual changes into the world and so affecting the past and present, and changing the present and future. The doctor thinking such a gift could transform the world for good but that it is lost on this humble patient (who wishes only to be freed from the burden of foisting his unintentional imaginings onto reality) harnesses Orr’s ability as his own—

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\(^{17}\) See: Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi’s) ‘Discussion on Making All Things Equal’ (Watson, 1968)
hypnotizing him into dreaming about certain 'externally-cued' changes to 'make the world better'.

The doctor's intentions are good—he wishes only to create an end to racism, war, hunger, overpopulation and disease, etc. After a beautifully told intriguing series of events—as people are made grey (to end racism) and the vivacity of culture is wiped out, aliens come (to give us a common enemy), the human population is largely destroyed (to end overpopulation and hunger)—which result in the virtual collapse of the world, it is dreamt back into its remembered reality by the unassuming Orr (after its final destruction had begun). Orr comes only slowly to realize his doctor's (albeit it good) dangerous intentions and professional indiscretions after losing the woman he loves in a new psychologist-induced reality.

Could we know if we were really changing the past if we change with it—or it changes with us? Would we know? Would a re-fixing ability keep past events from being fixed and really-past? I leave this question here, just recounting this story. Who is it that knows multiple drafts as multiple, and who can recognize the past has changed, if memory changes too?

Had the past been only contingently fixed, then logically it would be possible to go back and change it, though that would perhaps be a sort of 'miracle'. Hume famously argued that the inductive likelihood of the testimony for a miracle being reliable has to outweigh the natural-causal improbability of the event having happened at all, for the miracle-report to be credible.

Given this case, we might say Jesus changed one 'dharma' or property of the accomplished event of that death—viz. the property of never to be succeeded by a living of the same person was taken away and replaced by the property of being succeeded by a
restarting of his life. What was a terminal death was changed subsequently to a death which is a precondition for that resurrection.

In Indian karma theories, analogously, one is said to have no present control over one's past actions, of which nearly all that one is currently experiencing is supposed to be a fall-out. But we are supposed to be free to choose our future, to some extent, by choosing to react in this way rather than that way to the inevitable effects of our past actions. Instead of wrangling about whether the 'way we react' is not an action or experience which is also supposed to be a deterministic effect of the unchangeable past, the elbow-room for moral and spiritual self-betterment left by such a karma theory could be understood in the following way: by assuming the karmic past to be fixed but re-fixable, dead but capable of a miraculous regeneration (which presupposes, rather than precludes, prior ineliminable death).

Most of our present actions as well as reactions, current experiences as well as attitudes are almost entirely determined by habits and circumstances of the past. But some of us, sometimes, can (through the experience of deep repentance or sudden grateful dawning of a new meaning of what was previously an absurd event in our life) attach a genuinely new value to the fixed past. The present act of this value-endowment, almost like Christ's call from outside the tomb, makes our past come alive, and opens up a room for a future re-fixing of the past. A mistake of the past, remaining an irrevocably committed mistake, suddenly starts to shed actually (not just apparently) new transformative light on one's future life. One may even feel thankful one made that mistake, although unless, subsequently, the attitude towards it did not change, the past mistake by itself would not have had the causal agency to the "awakening".

All of this is possible of course because one remains the same Lazarus through the death and the regeneration (which is the unscientific miracle), and one straddles the prior, middle and posterior times, including the time when the middle time's attitude-shifting
impact on the prior time empowers it to bring about a different posterior time than it would have normally brought about. But can one straddle times like that?

We have the assumption that we can’t be at two times at once, but this seems unfounded as it involves a reification of the specious present as a constant unit with changing content. It is clear that different creatures and organisms experience different specious presents—the experience of duration is fundamental to experience of anything at all. Duration or experience is intrinsically diachronic and involves temporal crossing and being-at-neither-time (achronic). We are at many times—but one might argue, surely not still at that past time—for our very now is changing; present experience is changing experience, whereas the experienced past is now irrevocably experienced.

Use is present; the present of the past is, or pans out as (determines), the future. It is not that within the present the past determines the future, but it is the present of the past that determines the future—the present of the past is generative and genitive. Ownership of a sort belongs to the past, and activity is determined by or with or as the present. It is the present (and not the past) that determines the future—but it is not the present of the present (there is no such thing, probably) but the present of the past—the present being a transformation on or of the past. To put this in another way, the present is instrumental to the determination of the future but it is the past that is genitive.

If this is reasonable, then in a hidden (unconscious?) sense, the past is always active by the instrument of the present. Activity is original unique and we have intuitions against eternal repetition, and conceptions of super cyclic time despite its logico-geometrical appeal. Quasi-cyclic time or seasonal advancing and returning time, is naturally beginningless processual time, thus having more intuitive axiological-mathematical appeal.

If one sees the past as active, or as the agent of the present who is continuing and the present is instrument, then as the saniskāras and vāsanās are counteracted in the present, the
past as a continuing activity will be altered. The past will be changed intrinsically in the
changing of the present. The counter effect indicates a possible deep ontological symmetry
in time, but not just reversible cause-effect relation.

This relates to Bergson’s “memory cone” image, and the limit point of the present as
the advancing plane of materiality (or de-tensed mind); and could indicate the ontological
substance of the past in the present; so all is past, but the active part, the present can be
altered in an undetermined (or underdetermined) way. The alteration of this part of the past
is, if the past is a whole, the alteration of the whole past though not all parts of the past. The
past is changed through the mode of the present. The present is changed by the mode of
temporality (of the self).

Faced with a static four-dimensionalism or growing block presentism, is there a
dynamic four-dimensionalism, or growing blob presentism—one that can say all events are
always happening now? Growing-block four-dimensionalist view doesn’t have to grow in a
linear way and the past can remain fluid or partially amorphous (as perhaps a living or
growing-blob view). But then can we still account for the particularity and novelty of the
present? And does this imply observer-relativity of the past as well.

Essentially this is approaching the problem of the spatialization of time as
spatializing requires holding distances static. In a changing environment, this is by unit
measure (limited duration). The fixity of the past involved in many current versions of
presentism and four-dimensionalism seems to require a continuing past, and yet can’t seem to
be successfully combined with both quantum mechanical microphysical theory and relativity
theory coordinately.

18 The well-fitting suggestion of the word “amorphous” to describe this view—replacing the very un-
aesthetic “blob” idea—must be attributed to Professor Peter Hershock.
Does it help to consider the past fluid and the present fixed instead? Is it possible to explain how 'Caesar is still being stabbed' may be true? Or that truly, Caesar is now in fact being-stabbed? Is this so different from saying that Caesar is, now, having-been stabbed? Is there anything wrong with thinking that Caesar is still being-stabbed-then, and is thereby, now still being, then-stabbed. The sense of pastness doesn’t rob the event of its continuity or its continuing activity. When we refer to the past, isn’t it just continuing action we are referring to? If I mention that I had coffee this morning then it is the having of the coffee I am referring to and not my having had the coffee. The pyramids were finished being-built when Caesar ruled but are still (continue to be) being built at the time they were being built. Don’t we think of this as a tautological truth? Events continue to happen at the time at which they happened. (This is reflected in the tendency of the present discussion to find it necessary to include two-levels of time.)

The fixity of the past would seem to require its constant or at least continuous occurrence. Action (the actual activity) continues to occur while the difference in perception of what is present and what is past, or future, is relative, and so, determined in the present as fixed in (or as) the past. The possibility of changing the always changing (acting on the active) is a problem of knowledge (knowing that change as difference) and not of activity, since any change in or to the always changing changes it.

It is through our evaluations, re-evaluations, and devaluations that the ripples of the past keep flowing into and claiming our futures. Our desires call upon and reactivate our real ineliminable pasts. In the next chapter, we shall see how, in an intriguing way, our current desires tend to aim at our past; even as they are directed towards satisfaction to come in the future.
CHAPTER 9: DESIRING THE PAST

9.1 The Directedness of Desiring

We ordinarily think of desiring as primarily present-, and future-directed. Not only do we experience our desires as present phenomena, but also the intentional objects of our desires seem to be either present items, events, and situations or potential future items, events and situations (e.g., that a meeting with a long-lost friend be happening now or that such a meeting will happen next week). But is there any sense in which desiring is commonly and coherently directed toward the past? And if so, does this imply that we can, or do, act to change the past—and not just our present ideas or impressions of the past, but change the past itself? Of course, we sometimes wish to have done things differently in the past (we often regret) but can we really have a genuinely motivating rational desire to change some past events?

It is because we consider desire to be intrinsically associated with action that it seems to privilege the present and to be inherently future-directed. Since the past is ordinarily conceived as just that which we can no longer act upon, past directed desires would seem to be a waste of time—or at least a misconception of time. It does not make much sense to desire now to either go, or not go to a party that happened last week, for the going (or not going) is already gone.\(^{19}\) We may continue to desire that we had gone, or wish that we had not gone, but we do not desire now to go, or not to go last week—even grammar does not seem to allow it, but is it just grammar?

If we could act upon the past, or if past experiences and objects could be subject to present activity, then having desires toward the past might seem more reasonable. But, almost

\(^{19}\) We might even think that a person who did express such real untimely desires was somewhat irrational. And if they acted now on these desires, e.g., trying now to go to a party occurring last week, or now preparing to say something different in response to a conversation ten years ago, we would have no doubt.
by definition, events and objects that are now past are just those that were once effective yet can no longer be affected. Although we may have a continuing or lingering desire that an event happened that did in fact happen, or may desire that an event happened that did not, and we may regret a past experience or revel in a past experience, we don't ordinarily think we currently desire that past experience. Even in cases where we clearly do desire what is past, e.g., a now-past loved one (one who has passed), it is a current presence that we desire. While we may desire a present or future experience to be like a past experience in some respects, we do not think it is the past we desire, but a present or future in some way similar to the past.

But this ordinary view seems to confuse what could happen as a result of our desire with the central intentional content of that desire. As a result of our desire, we might end up meeting with a long-lost friend tomorrow, but the central intentional content of the desire may still be our long-lost friend experienced in the past. Even though it may be true that fulfilling a desire always brings about a new event and never really brings back the past, what is currently desired must be something that is at least characterized by a quality which was experienced before and found desirable. Because this memory of past pleasure plays the crucial role in prompting the desire, the direct intentional content of the desire is the past experience of the property, or the past event of experiencing that property as desirable. In this sense we can, and often do, desire the past.

Yet, even if we admit that the immediate intentional content of the desire is something experienced in the past, how could we really desire what is now past, given that if we did, its pastness, or absence, would be just exactly that which we do not desire? This suggests that if the direct intentional object of our desire is past, then our desires are fundamentally unsatisfiable. The fulfillment conditions of the desire would amount to its
unfulfillment conditions. Doesn’t this show the object of our desire cannot be the past object, since if the central intentional object of even a seemingly present- or future-directed desire is really our past experience, then our desiring intrinsically involves an antithetical aversion to its object?

Drawing on the philosophies of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika (who have opposed ontologies of causation), it will be shown that there is a structural isomorphism between inferring and desiring. Examination of this isomorphism enables us to identify desire’s error and the role of the past more specifically. The purpose here is to explain how the direct intentional object of desire could be past, and by way of this analysis, how the resulting problem of the paradoxical quality (or antithetical nature) of desiring the past can be understood. By means of some of the basic ideas of these philosophical systems, this paradoxical desiring can be seen to be a natural causal condition basic to our existential circumstances—a very real existential tension, the resolution of which might have been precisely what such philosophies meant by ‘liberation’ or ‘cessation of suffering.’

9.1.1 Suffering and Liberation

Among the various Indian philosophical traditions, it is commonly agreed that our present situations and present desires are the result of our past situations and past desires. Experience continues cyclically, or spirally, in repeated death and rebirth, involving an iterated pattern of habituation. Our suffering is causally and naturally continued and

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20 The following example was suggested by Arindam Chakrabarti: Suppose we take “past” to mean: that which is no more, hence not happening (now or afterwards). Now, if we desire a past experience, like my now dead grandmother giving the five-year old me a hug, insofar as I desire that such an event happens, what I desire is that the not-happening be happening, and the dead grandmother lives again to hug me! But that sounds like desiring that the past cease to be the past (that the past be nonexistent)—desiring that the past becomes the present or the future. Surely a dead body’s or a ghost’s embrace is not what I desire (it is not the present grandmother I wish a hug from). On the other hand, if my grandmother comes and says “Look I am not dead, I’m hugging you, and you are not fifty-years old’, that would not be my desire for the past getting satisfied either (even that was not what was desired).

21 See (Feuerstein, 1989; Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakāra, & Jha, 1984; Praśastapāda; Welden, 1913)
extended by our patterns of attachment and aversion, which are a result of improper identification (the misidentification of the subject with its adjuncts, or the power of consciousness with the manifest intellect or material transformation generally). Yet despite the nomological necessity of continuing suffering, it is agreed that freedom from this chronic condition is possible and desirable.

Practicing and habituating a certain form of dispassion is said to be one of the principal means to avoiding future suffering. This clarity or colorlessness (vairāgya) enables true discriminative knowledge to dawn. The dawning of discrimination is thought to counteract the potency of past impressions allowing the causal tendencies of past materiality to be overcome. In the embodied state, this purified awareness is also said to offer expanded powers of perception and cognition (vibhūti or yogā pratyākṣa) including knowledge of other minds, other languages, other times, etc.

9.1.2 Bound desires

From the Yoga Sūtra, we get the beginning of an explication of desire. Here Patañjali says that attachment and aversion are propensity due to pleasure and pain respectively.  

Commenting on this sūtra, Vyāsa explains that the desire to possess pleasure or the means of pleasure (and likewise the repulsion towards or anxiety about pain or means of pain) follow upon the memory of pleasure or memory of pain according to the objects or means thereof. Our desire for or against any particular thing is subsequent to, and rests upon, our recollection of past pleasures and pains associated with such things. Hence any particular episode of desiring (being attracted or averse to something) incorporates a prior cognitive episode involving pleasure or pain.

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22 Yoga Sūtra 2.7-8 (Feuerstein, 1989)
In *Tattvavaiśāradī*, Vācaspati elaborates on this binding of desire to memory noting that when *pleasure* is remembered, our attachment is preceded by the remembrance of the pleasure as a consequence of having enjoyed it, while when pleasure is being enjoyed remembrance of it is unnecessary. However, attachment to the *means of pleasure*—whether remembered or actually present, is necessarily preceded by the remembrance of the pleasure. It is, he says, a matter of course that when a means of pleasure is perceived, it is remembered as a cause of the pleasure of the same class; or it is inferred that it will cause a pleasure similar to what has been before caused by an object of the same class. The means of pleasure is desired because of this connecting incorporation of remembrance in perception. In this way, our desiring is bound to our remembering by our experienced pleasures and pains.

In the *Nyāya Sūtra*, Gotama states that *desire, aversion, etc. are inferential signs for the self.* In the Nyāya view, the six inferential signs (*liṅga*) of the self are pleasure, pain, attachment, aversion, volition and cognition. Of these, volition, attachment and aversion are said to require remembrance of pleasure, pain, or past effect. Vātsyāyana explains that attachment and aversion (desires for and against) are due to anticipation and conviction that such an object is the source of pleasure or pain. Anticipation, he says, arises from the recalling to mind of previously experienced objects. Our present desires incorporate anticipations, which involve remembrances—remembrances indicate previous experience, which supposes a previous body and *prior conviction*. Vātsyāyana notes that pleasure, pain and cognition (the other three inferential signs for the self) may involve prior remembrance, but unlike willing and desiring, they do not require the involvement of memory.

The Naiyāyika philosophers argue that only something permanent is known to have

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23 *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.10 (Gautama et al., 1984)
24 The six signs of the *nitya ātman* (permanent or enduring self) are *sukha* (pleasure/happiness), *dukkha* (pain/suffering), *icchā* (desire/inclination), *dveṣa* (aversion/enmity), *prayātana* (volition/persevering effort), and *jñāna* (awareness/cognition).
25 *Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya* 3.1.26 (Gautama et al., 1984)
desire, aversion etc. Qualifications of the present self—present cognitions, pleasures, and pains—are not sufficient to account for desiring and willing. Since these phenomena involve more than a revival of the impression of a past experience, causal connections alone cannot account for them. Such intentional activities require a conceptual connection, or recognitive synthesis, i.e., one must recognize the object to be of the same kind as has been pleasant or useful before. Even primal or instinctual activities, such as the activity of the newly-born toward sources of food, are said to be expressions of desires prompted by the memory of prior satisfaction. In commentary, Vātsyāyana argues that the only cause that can be indicated by the child’s desire is a continuity of remembrance due to repeated feeding in the past. ⁵⁶

The activity of a newborn is distinguished from the activity of iron toward a magnet on just these grounds. Although both activities are produced by a causal chain and so indicate past or unobservable causes, iron moves toward the magnet without any prior “experience” of its magnetism, while the newborn (experiencing pain) moves toward food because of prior experience of its desirability (remembering pleasure). By this, the newborn recognizes its own pain and its desiring promotes its action. Enacting remembrance (as at least the retention and revival in application of some prior experience—of past satisfaction) provides the distinction between willful and unwilled activity, and so also the criterion of genuine agency.

To summarize the Nyāya argument: the pleasures and pains of a newborn require some form of recognition of pleasure or pain, which can only be accounted for if the newborn recalls (however inchoately) prior experience of pleasure and pain. The willful activity of a newborn (even if ‘instinctive’, e.g., toward food) is caused by the presence of desire, which can be explained only by the remembrance of prior experiences of pleasures and pains. This

⁵⁶ Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya 3.1.20 (Gautama et al., 1984)
requisite prior affectivity and its remembrance are taken to indicate an enduring self having a
consistently prior or beginning-less embodiment.

The major ontological disagreements between the similarly realist and dualist views
of Sāṁkhya and Nyāya, concern the nature of causality and the relation between
consciousness, mind, and agency. Sāṁkhya considers agency (purposeful action) and
intentional cognition both as ‘material’ transformations, even though cognitive consciousness
is due to the simple presence of puruṣa (the person, or the power of self-consciousness) who
does not act. Puruṣa is opposed to constantly-changing prakṛti (material nature) and
undergoes no real transformation. The opposing Naiyāyika view is that agency and cognition
are occurring qualities of the self (ātman) and so the self—although immaterial—is subject to
transformations. Even though each self is permanent and enduring like Sāṁkhya’s puruṣa,
unlike puruṣa, the qualities of the Nyāya ātman are subject to real change and transformation.
In the Sāṁkhya view, all effects preexist in their causes, so there is no real novelty, all
transformation being mere unfoldings of the latent. The Nyāya give arguments in support of
the contrary position, viz., that effects are novel and distinct from their causas.

Because of these ontological divergences the similarities with regard to the binding of
desire to memory seem even more significant. Even though recollection as an episodic
mental event is considered a ‘material’ event by Sāṁkhya, according to both Sāṁkhya and
Nyāya, the coordinate retentiveness of memory is provided by the self, or the witnessing
consciousness itself. And though there is disagreement regarding causality and personal
agency (as well as the corresponding nature and role of the intellect and the mind), there is
agreement regarding the beginning-less connection and confusion of the self with the non-
self (or the misidentification and dislocation of the self and its qualities). In both views, it is
the remembering self that organizes and orders experiences by different measures of pleasure
or pain, and continues them in the form of remnant traces of, or on, the substantial self.
There is also agreement, even if understated, on the importance of memory as the source of desire as well as the ground of liberation from this inherent bondage. If it is a capacity for remembrance that indicates a substantial or subsisting self, and also memory that binds the craving self to its future suffering, then remembering must also hold the key to the shift in epistemological attitude involved in liberating the self.

9.2 The Temporal Mechanics of Continuing Desire

It is a commonplace within Indian philosophical views, including Sāṁkhya and Nyāya, that all pleasures (even if distinct from pains) involve pain and anxiety, if only because of the nature of temporal passage itself. The very appetite which gives pleasures their covetability is of the nature of an anxious anticipation, which is essentially painful. The occurrence of future suffering is determined by past actions and desire; suffering is continued in the constant change of present state as current transformations are recognized as pleasurable or painful from the memory of past pleasures and pains.

In the Nyāya view, pleasure and pain are known by the internal sense, which is atomic and receives impressions from the various external sense organs sequentially but so rapidly so that they appear to be simultaneous. The synthesis of our experience requires pratisandhāna (a linking-back, re-joining or putting-together again), the possibility of which is explained by an enduring self. Such linking-back is said to be evident in the ability to recognize an object across different modes of sensory access and in the ability to recognize an object in the absence of sensory access (so e.g., the light that is seen has the same source as the heat that is, was or will be felt, etc., and even though one may lose one's sight, e.g., one may still have cognitions of the form 'I have seen that before').

In any particular case, desiring or willing involves remembering some past experience or object through the (present) memory of past pain and pleasure. The present self
recollects the past object through the present conditioning (vāsanā) of the impressed trace (saṃskāra) marked on the self by the prior experience of pleasure or pain. What is remembered (or even perceived) is known through the lens of the present atmosphere conditioned by the traces left by past experiences on the self. This remembrance, whether implicit or explicit, promotes the propensity toward repetition or reenactment, which is experienced as attachment or aversion.

The revival of the indication of desirability may, significantly, remain implicit. The remembrance of past-desirability, whether implicit or explicit, promotes the propensity toward repetition or continuance which is experienced as current attachment. The particular remembering determines the directedness or intentionality of current will and attention, and so also the direction and intention of action. The pleasure generated by the past object of experience is incorporated into the present by way of the (implicit or explicit) experience of past impressions.

Although the above schematic separates these cognitive 'steps', the tokening of M and awareness of its desirability are wedded in our ordinary awareness. Any attachment to M (now) must be preceded by M recognized (as desirable). Current objects and situations are recognized as conditioned with desirability categorizations derived from past pleasures and pains. Experiences are known and remembered in correlation with (and often by means of) such attachments. What is actually remembered in any given circumstance is recalled in the service of its present efficacy as grounds for current decision, furthering our desire.

In current experience, this present situation or object M is recognized as being like an object of past experience in some way. Recognition of M as such, involves the explicated memory of its desirability by way of the recognition of pleasure and pain as pervading M generally. By this we decide our action toward or away from M. What is recollected is a coordinate presence of the (now absent) object and the past correlate state, or corresponding
judgment (e.g., 'I have been in an earthquake—it was terrifying.') Desire for or against, thus requires a coordination of a present object with an absent object by way of a now-absent state indicated by a continuing present state (e.g., 'I will pay attention to this broadcast about what to do in an earthquake, since I did not know what to do in that earthquake and I was terrified then! Even now, I remember that earthquake and fear another earthquake.'). This coordinated recognition may take a condensed form in basic object-, or experience-recognition (e.g., 'this motion is undoubtedly an earthquake, because it is like that motion experienced in that earthquake'). Recognition of a current state involves both tokening M ('earthquake') in the present and tracing M through the past self. The present object indicates a similar past object, indicating past experiences of pleasure or pain. Such 'consequences' of our past experiences regularly inform our current desires and activities.

In any current recognition, identification of the object involves remembrance of like-objects; and this remembrance involves the revival of desirability-correlations determined by past pleasures and pains. In the service of our continuing activities, our remembering retains and develops such correlations by re-instating the experiences of pleasure and pain associated with objects and events. Our past experiences are iterated as implicit remnants condition our categorizations and are likewise re-conditioned by these categorizations.

9.2.1 Desiring and Inferring

Like our desires, our inferences involve remembering and are dependent on prior experience, its retention and retrieval or recovery. The knowledge produced through inference is by way of the present application of what has been known before in the form of a recognitive synthesis, where past cognitive impressions are brought forward and fused into the present-knowledge. In the Nyāya view, recognition (pratyabhijña) is a form of perception involving the direct perception of the type in the token—we immediate perceive
the particular, as also general. Present cognitions, generalizations and meaningful relations, are developed from implicit, and largely inexplicit, knowledge.

Such retained knowledge established by the past is explicated in the current perception of type and in the proper application of words and concepts (recognition). But it is only the perception of 'this' in the recognition that 'this is that' (or 'this is one of those') which grants presentative validity to the recognition, enabling it to be considered a valid presentative cognition (pramāṇa). Remembering alone, without the correct recognition of a presented item, is not considered a means of valid knowing. In the perceptive act of recognizing, our remembered knowing and retained knowledge anchored in the past work to make the present explicit. Thus, although remembering is not considered a means of veridical awareness (prāmaṇa) in the Nyāya view, all intentional states, including desiring, believing, etc. require recognition and to this extent incorporate memory. We are fluently aware of our current situation only by means of a concurrent awareness of past situations.

The explicit involvement of memory and past knowing in the process of inferring is structurally isomorphic to that involved in our continuing-desiring. Inferring (anumāṇa) is considered a means of veridical or genuinely presentative knowledge by most schools of Indian philosophy. The classic Nyāya form is regarded as inference-for-others. It is meant to be publicly demonstrable, and consists of five-steps: i) thesis, ii) reason, iii) general principle (with example and perhaps negative example) iv) application, and v) conclusion.

The common case given is an inference of fire on the hill. The five-step inference can be seen as an answer to the question, 'How do you know there is fire on the hill?' Answer:

"There is fire on the hill, because there is smoke on the hill. And (I recall) wherever there is

27 The Nyāya Sūtra vārttika by Uddyotakara recognizes that remembrance is involved in all of the legitimate means of knowing (prāmaṇas). But unlike perceiving and the other prāmaṇas, remembering does not originate from sense-object contact but from mind-self contact. In response to the objection that there might be other prāmaṇas that the Nyāya have not recognized (including memory and tradition) the Nyāya reduce these alternatives back to inference and testimony (anumāṇa and sabda).
smoke there is fire (like in a kitchen, and unlike in a lake). Since the hill has smoke on it, it must have fire on it. Thus it is true that there is fire on the hill."

Unlike this publicly available demonstration, inference-for-oneself requires only the last three steps (general principle, application, and conclusion). Since an inference that does not require demonstration is not being subjected to doubt, no thesis is required and no reason needs to be explicitly tokened—the conjoining of the major, minor, and middle terms, includes the reason (S-M) in the application (S-M-P). Inferring for oneself, one might cognize something like, this smoky-place, being like (past) smoky-places will have fire. The remembrance of concomitance here may be understood only in the recognition of the smoky hill as such (so being a place of fire)—one does not have to consider the claim of the law-like relation (M-P) explicitly or independently.

The vyāpti, or concomitance claim (M-P) is said to be known by a form of non-normal perception (alaukika pratyakṣa) called sāmānyalakṣaṇa, or perception of similarity or universality. In the second step, the remembrance of the pervasion of smoke by fire is recalled or revived. In the explicit tokening of the pervasion or concomitance relation, this smoke is indicated in 'wherever there is smoke' so, properly speaking this is recognition. The application step connects the subject term, the hill as the current location of the properly recognized concomitance relation.

The structural similarity of inferring and desiring is not entirely unexpected as both are cognitive processes. Since our desires (attachments and aversions) are consequent upon our pleasures and pains and the means thereof, our implicit remembering in the form of latent samiskāras (memory traces) becomes explicated in our present desires and aversions through the revival of particular past impressions. In more contemporary terminology, we might take such inexplicit past-desiring in the form of a standing protocol or directive to seek M or avoid M. This is enacted by the presence of M as an object of remembrance, perception, or
imagination.

The cognition of M as qualified by its desirability precedes the recognition of this M here and now. The cognition of *smoke on the hill* already includes its desirability qualifications. (No separate thesis is proposed, and no reason is needed in inference-for-oneself) When the smoke is known on the hill it has already been recognized as fire-pervaded in the inference-for-oneself. Similarly, our desiring is largely a result of unconscious processes structurally isomorphic to inferring. Our present perception incorporates remembered past experience, traced and recognized in the current self-perception, and so relocated in the object or situation here and now. Our apparent locating is a re-locating and our cognizance of concomitances, conscious or unconscious, has claim on us.

But unlike concomitance relations (*vyāpti*) of a good inference, the pervasion of suffering may not hold generally or universally for the object or experience. We automatically remember concomitances of all kinds; when we recognize someone or something some concomitances, or perceptions of likeness, or similarity, are involved. And our classification of experiences and events as pleasurable and painful (good and bad, etc.) appears to be basic, since such conditions are of prime relevance and use in embodied experience. Concomitances of pleasures and pains are like the hooks on which we hang our memories—as Nietzsche noted, pain serves as a powerful mnemonic. It seems that any recognition of an object will involve recognizing the object as intrinsically pleasurable or painful. This promotes survival and is conducive to adaptation, but also clouds our recognition of true pervasion relations. The lack of discriminative awareness results in the continuation of suffering.

Our condition of suffering and cyclical rebirth is considered real and not illusory by the Śāmkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, but our ordinary understanding of this
reality naturally involves many errors. The on-going causal chain of errors leading to unhappy embodiment (and further errors) can be broken only by correcting these mistakes first intellectually and then meditatively. Continuing misidentifications and improper recognitions heighten our delusions and defects, which detract from our knowing reality. Our spiraling habituation is the result of a beginning-less connection and confusion of the self with the non-self. It could be argued that errors exacerbating suffering largely consist in a misunderstanding of the function of remembrance, encouraging mistaken recognition, and resulting in a mislocation or misidentification of the self and its attributes.

9.3 Desire's Error

Like our inferences, our desires are grounded in, and motivated by, predetermined vy āpti-like relations. These are preconditioned relations by which indicating marks (līṅga) are recognized. In the ordinary case of inference, smoke is known as a mark or indicator of fire. Such recognition of smoke as always pervaded by fire enables the proper indication of the current fire; and in this way we may have valid cognizance of the currently unseen. In the case of desire, these invariable concomitances are of the form 'such-and-such objects brought pleasure to me in the past, therefore where there is such-and-such object there must be pleasure'. Because we are motivated by our desires and aversions we are directed by our remembering of past pleasures and pains, which condition all other objects and experiences as well as other pervading relations. Although we are now seeing smoke and not fire, we may run from the mountain because we remember the pain of the previous fire. Our memories of pain are those associated with fire (and not directly with smoke).

Put in terms of steps of the Nyāya inference, the third step of the inference-for-others, and first step of inference-for-oneself, is the revival or recollection, of the vy āpti-relation. The next step is upanaya or parāmarśa, which involves a tri-location or a relocation
of the revived impression into presentative cognition. This is an explicit awareness of the pervasion relation, as exemplified in the case at hand. It involves recognition of past, present and future (e.g., 'this hill has smoke (recall: smoke marks fire) so has fire (expect: going there, there will be fire)'. In the case of continuing desire, remembering the concomitance takes the form of the present recalling of the past pleasure or pain (the revival of the memory traces from past experience) recognized as present pleasure and pain and present desire in contact with the present object of desire.

The application, or relocation of the concomitance, occurs after the (re)cognition of the implicit memory (or dispositional knowing) of the pervasion relation. In the case of desire, it is likewise after the revival of the indication of past experience that it is recognized or relocated in the present object of potential desire. The pain from the past is relocated in the present as indicating and directing the future.

Here, desiring serves as the middle term and, as such, drops out of our 'conclusion', and the current object or experience itself (M), is known as painful or pleasurable. Present desires, like smoky-phenomena, are constantly changing, and can be taken as an indication of something else. Just as the inference of fire is by way of the smoke, the inference of suffering is by way of desire. Both are correlative phenomena, and as markers or indicators can be considered instruments to (re)cognition. Yet unlike the inference of present fire on the mountain, the 'inference' of present suffering pervading the present experience is in error.

By locating (and applying) the proper indications and pervasion-type relations, correct cognition (recognition) may return such 'inferences' back on the implicit past, and so re-define it. Specifically this is the recognizing of the self as pervader of desire, as opposed to past pleasure or pain. Just as smoke is a mark of the fire, desire is mark of the self. If taken (erroneously) to indicate past pleasure or pain, desire is the cause of continuing present suffering. The inference of suffering and the constant change of desire is then the result of
the mistaken correlation between present desires and past pleasures or pains.Implicitly and without recognition, past pleasures and pains are such that they pervade present desires. Our desiring is a process of inferring suffering by means of this misidentification of pervasion and dislocation of past pleasure and pain. By way of such a process, present experiences, objects, etc. are known as pleasurable or painful, instead of being recognized as pervaded by the self-in-itself with pleasure and pain as contingent qualities. The former sort of recognition regenerates past affect, while the latter type of recognition generates clear cognition of the object or experience as it is.

To fix our faulty 'inference'—which, by suffusing our current experience with pleasures and pains from the past, obscures the present situation as much as it clarifies it—we might recognize past objects, experiences, etc. (and so our desires for these types of things) are always pervaded or suffused—but not by pleasure and pain directly but only mediated by the self as real pervader—of the past suffering, as well as the present desiring). Here the aversion or pain may be taken as the phenomenal middle term, so that instead of recognizing something as painful or pain-promising, we recognize something underlying. When desire is known as pervaded by the self-in-itself (not by past pleasures and pains) and so without anticipation or conviction, then the object or experience may be more fully-presented.

In such a case, there may be an inferred cognition, e.g., 'there is fire on the hill here' and a corresponding desire, say, to run. The fire may not be currently painful, but the painfulness of fire is reflected in our current desire or aversion, which always involves some degree of suffering—notable even in a current absence. Our emotional concomitances can also cause us to make errors. The fear of fire may cause us to run from the hill when it was just the lake that had fog. But it may be possible to retain our understanding of the relation of smoke and fire, have proper presentative cognitions of whether it is fire or fog on the mountain, and—while still recognizing that smoke 'means' fire, which has been and is
(always) painful—direct our action without reenacting the suffering of past fires (or too hastily imagining the pleasures of future water).28

Our past experiences undoubtedly pervade our current awareness, but properly inferring, current pleasures and pains indicate prior pleasures and pains, and so indicate stable or continuous experiencing. Here, the present (the current presence) is taken as an inferential mark for an unseen past (a current or present absence), since present experience always requires and involves past experience. Contrary to how it may seem, it may not be a present-awareness that grounds an awareness of the past, but instead, awareness of the past (or past-awareness) that permits present-awareness. Such a view supports a beginning-less conception of temporality, and although temporal experiences seem to have beginnings or repeatedly seem to begin—e.g., in birth, childhood amnesia, or because of constant novelty, no beginning is really possible for an experiencing self.

Since present attractions and aversions are signs or marks of (now) unseen past experience, there is a constant pervasion relation between present signs and unseen correlative associations of objects and experiences with past pleasure and pains (by way of type and desirability categorizations). Such indicating-functions work in desiring analogously to the way in which pervasion relations (vyāpti) are involved in the process of inferring (anumāna), as well as in the recognitive synthesis involved in the perception of concomitances and similarities (sāmānyalakṣāna), and that required for semantic knowledge and verbal testimony (śābda). It is a vyāpti-type relation between a past (now nonexistent

28 It might seem that we can easily do this, but it is not obvious that our attractions and aversions are not essential to our means of knowing. What we remember, and how we remember it, is tightly bound to the emotional valence of the experience. Reforming the correlative structure of desire's concomitance claims would, at this point in our cognitive development, seem to amount to re-structuring our neural pathways, or at least re-organizing our neural patterns. And even if objects or experiences somehow could be illumined dispassionately or colorlessly, should they be? (Is a colorless life worth living? Does it do justice to beauty and truth? Would it even be safe?) Maybe "dispassion" seems off-putting, but the colorlessness of the reflective surface (or the clarity of the light) may enable the coloring of what is reflected, or illumined, to appear more vividly.
object or experience) and an emotional valence (from remaining associations of pleasure or pain) that gives rise to or leads to the propensity or continuing habituating tendencies of desire, attachment, and aversion. The particular impression that is revived in the recognition of the object as desirable or undesirable is based on habituation and past experience.

Remembrance of pleasure and its coordinate object or means, leads to present desires and determines present volitions, ordinarily thought to be present and future directed. The concomitance between the means of pleasure or means of avoidance of pain (or object of pleasure or pain) and the past experienced pleasure or pain, like vyāpti, is known in the form of a universal concomitance. In the case of continuing desire, however, this is easily in error, since the object or means of pleasure and the self-in-itself are both distinct from the pleasure or pain. In clearly-illuminated experience, the self knows itself as diachronically similar, and recognizes that pain and pleasure are qualities of neither the past experience, nor the one who experienced it.

In order to break these associations, tendencies, and habits, which are largely a function of material embodiment (and thus nomological necessity) it is said that a counteractive association must be formed—perhaps of the same experience in recollection without defect. One possible route to correcting desire's error would be in a form of a retroactive causality, or perhaps more accurately, a re-tracting affectivity. Counteracting the compulsion of present attraction and aversion by past experiences remembered as neither painful or pleasurable may somehow overcoming the suffering resulting from unwilled subjection to current pleasures and pains (from past, present, and even future experiences). Such an altered recognition of the past may have a re-tracing effect. Current traces from the past might be more fully recognized, and the outlines of the past clarified or sharpened.

One may object to the idea that desiring and inferring have an analogous epistemic structure, on the ground that this makes all our properly (dispassionate pramāṇa-invoked)
inferences a form of wish-fulfillment. But the question is whether the concomitance is
genuinely universal (and so subject to proper perception or recognition). The past pleasure or
pain really pervades the past experience, but not necessarily the present experience. Desire’s
error amounts to the sustained imputation of pleasure or pain (which are current) on the
diachronic self. The truthfulness of the inferred conclusion or desired consequent as outcome
is a result of the veridicality of the revived and relocated concomitance. Some concomitance
claims involving inferring suffering may be true. An example of such concomitance
(requisitely perceivable in its similarity or universality) might be that whenever there is a
living and evidently-conscious being starving to death, there is pain. Suffering may be
properly recognized as universal in some aspects though suffering may be felt by oneself as a
particular and unique phenomenon.

Here we could consider desire-for-one self and desire-for-others, analogous to the
case of inference. Desire-for-one self can be seen as an unrecognized (or unreflective)
desiring—where the concomitance is not expressly or distinctly considered, but is only
cognized in the application. Unrecognized, such concomitance can easily go astray. But
desire-for-others, like inference-for-others, would be publicly available. The thesis in this
‘inference’ of desiring would be explicitly tokened, the conclusion made explicit, and the
concomitance relation would be independently recognized apart from its application.
Although the primacy and immediacy of the personal or phenomenological aspects of
suffering may lead us to miss the real constant concomitances of suffering, desire-for-others
may allow us to correct our desire-for-one self.

9.3.1 Avoiding Past and Future Suffering

Our ordinary conception of past time is that its events cannot be changed. If the
option of altering a certain range of happenings were open, it does not seem that these
happenings would qualify as past. Past experiences and events have already taken place, or they have already not taken place. But if we can't change or avoid our past sufferings (and our natural desiring for the past) and yet these are causally linked to our present and future suffering, then no real epistemological or ontological liberation would seem to be possible.

Yet Patañjali's Yoga Sūtra maintains (like other projects of liberation, and proponents of free-will more generally) that future suffering can be avoided. But what exactly is involved in this possible alleviation of continuing suffering? Do we need to simply overcome our subjective aversion to past suffering, or do we need to alter our perception of present suffering while the actual suffering continues happening objectively?

The reality of present suffering is surely not something to which we should lose our aversion. In fact, recognizing the true nature of the suffering of others, as well as own suffering, is essential to any real project of liberation. But it seems that we at least have to be averse to continued suffering in order to pursue release, and if any suffering can be avoided it is future suffering. And yet, if present and future attractions and aversions are creations of past pleasurable and painful experience, is it not really past suffering that needs to be overcome? After all, of the memory-related functions of the self, only aversion doesn't seem to be involved in the essential or perfected self. Do we just need to break the current association of the present object with past suffering, or do we need to recognize the object or experience of the past without present suffering?

Is past suffering really now unavoidable? After all, any alleviation of future suffering (any possibility of liberation or genuinely free-action) lies in the possibility of overcoming the lingering presence of past suffering. Impulsions and compulsions which limit freedom result in the reiteration and reenactment, and so the extension, of suffering. Examining memory closely within the Yoga and Nyāya Sūtras seems to indicate that what is required is the absence of aversions, or associations of desirability driven by unrecognized compulsions.
The important twist is that aversion to future suffering—or counter-positively, the desire for freedom—can perhaps be fulfilled only by the objective recognition of past experience in the absence of desire enabled by vairāgya. The real nature of the situation becomes apparent by way of such a clarified view. As one recognizes a known object, but without any conviction or anticipation for pain or pleasure, one comes to know that object indifferently, or without difference from it, even if one has to deal with that object because of continued embodiment.

Where memory has been purified (smṛtiparīśuddhi) the object or experience is remembered uncolored by current revival of past pleasures or pains, yet present experience may be properly illumined by past experiences. The true colors of present experience may then be recognized, and its vivid hues and detailed contours fully appreciated. Maybe in objectifying present suffering by dispassion (vairāgya) future suffering can be avoided by way of the recognition that the present suffering is mediated by past experiences; experiences which are, as past, without any real pain or pleasure.

There would seem to be no mystery as to why Patañjali does not say that past suffering can be avoided since the time for avoiding past suffering has already past. But perhaps any real present or future suffering can be realized to be essentially or already past suffering.29 This would make part of overcoming present suffering an awareness of it as both essentially and forever past. (This alteration of the sense of temporality might somehow enable extensive powers of conscious awareness, perception, inference, etc; so that, for example, the future might be remembered.) If we think of time a bit differently, perhaps the future always holds the possibility of knowing present suffering (and future suffering) as already, and in the end, merely a form of further past suffering and of continuing past-desiring.

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29 Interestingly, our past suffering is now past-suffering (both beyond suffering, and a suffering-from-the-past); and our past experience is now past-experiencing (both beyond experiencing, and an experiencing-of-the-past). Likewise our past desiring (aversion) is now past-desiring (as both beyond desiring, and a desiring-of-the-past).
In order to achieve liberation from the suffering imposed by desire, it is recommended that one cultivate non-attraction and non-aversion with regard to the objects of desire. These objects would seem to include past objects. But how is desire toward the past overcome if the objects and experiences are past? How do we achieve a dispassionate colorlessness toward past experiences now, if such experiences have been already colored by us? Especially when we seem to know these experiences only by way of their colorings!

9.4 Desiring and Changing the Past

Is the ordinary information-connection between past and present reversible? Is it possible to rearrange our attitudes, so that our past experiences are affected by our present experiences? Is it possible for our current determinations to alter the past in any significant way?

In the ordinary sense, we desire the past in that we desire at least the revival, survival or continuance of experience—that current experience is like the past in certain respects (that we continue to live as we had lived before, for example.) Normally the past is seen to be external to the present in the sense that it is now unreachable—it has, after all, passed. Yet even desiring a continuing present is constituted through an experienced past. To continue desiring the past in this common way has the flip side of being attached to the past objects and experiences, and thereby willing the future.

Desiring requires an established conception of past correlation, which involves precognitive synthesis. Our conception of past experiences and events serves as cognitive substructure composing present experiences by way of memory traces revivifying past impressions. The content of the traces is determined by the original experience, which includes the original experience of the past self. If one says, for example, 'I now remember what I had seen,' the self is requisitely diachronic which enables the establishment of the
similarity of the object remembered and seen. The extant referent of the memory is present as the self itself, or as the same as the past self. The self may change its qualitative relations, but not its relation to itself. Changing the former self could thus change its recognitions and remembrances; where 'I have seen M', or 'I have known M', e.g., both I and M might be recognized distinctly where once they were confused by what M was seen or known as, i.e., pleasurable or painful. If our awareness of our present self alters that of the former self, then so also that of the former object or experience. Because of this, it would seem that if the past self were (or is) identical to the present self, then changing the present self would effect a change of the former self. The former self remains (though its experience cannot be perceived, only remembered) because it is not essentially different from the present self.

If our desiring is indeed determined by our past pleasure and pain, perhaps this connection is so tight—a temporal relation that is somehow deeper than a sequential or a causal relation, i.e., not simply material impulsion—that if one alters the present effects (including present pleasure or pain, or desiring, etc.) this might retroactively affect our past impressions and experiences, and really change our past pleasure or pain and our past-desiring. Hence we can conclude that the clarification or purification of memory (smrtipariśuddhi) that Patanjali discusses, involving the proper distinction of word, concept, object and self in the absence of desire; and that this could enable the real retroactive alteration of our previously effective past experience.

11 When one's attention or awareness is impaired by defect, the corresponding impressions of the experience are also thereby impaired. But memory, or what is remembered or retained from a given experience, is not necessarily limited by conscious awareness (as perceived or remembered). This is shown in many types of cases including, e.g., the gaps of deep sleep, being awakened by noise previously woven into a dream, and the 'recall' (or accurate guessing) of blind sight, etc.

31 It might be argued that the clarification of the experience of the former self is not a change in the past experience itself since the experience as understood (the recognition of the experience) is thereby only more accurate or true, but the original experience of the event differs both from the event itself (the experience remembered by the purified memory) and its recognition.
In this analysis, recognition of the self-in-itself enables the past pleasure or pain to be known as the location rather than as substance of the self. In the reconceived 'inference' for the absence of suffering, the self is recognized as pervader and the pleasure or pain is only a particular location. In our ordinary inference of suffering by way of desire, the current location of the concomitant relationship (like the kitchen or the hill) is taken to be the presently qualified self, subject to pleasure and pain and desire as present qualities of the self. The pervader in the original inference is taken to be the process of suffering itself—the pleasure, pain, and desire of the presently qualified self—when the properly recognized pervader is instead (in reality) the self itself. This 'simultaneous'-self, or real pervader, is not limited to the presently qualified self.

Clearly past events don't change just because we remember them differently—these sorts of ideas can lead to dangerous forms of historical relativism, or play into unhealthy revisionist designs. But if we purify the self of its mistaken identity with its qualifications, then the past impression of M, the object or event, may also be changed. But the original event M, and the current memory of M (the current impression of M induced from its trace) are not the same thing, so after all, we have not changed the past. And yet the current memory and the original event may coincide, if memory has been purified in yogic practice. While one might not have changed the past, one may still really change one's own past by truly non-compulsive action. In doing so, perhaps one may become more truthfully acquainted with past events. If the past determines the present, and if present experience can be determined by something other than the original past experience, it isn't so inconceivable that the present now re-determined (e.g., by a more truthful past experience) should re-create

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32 Past events and objects, while they may causally determine the present situation, are not now involved in present events and objects. Past experience, on the other hand, is involved in present experience in a way that past events and objects are not involved in present events and objects. (This does not mean that past objects and events may not be re-presented—as they are enacted e.g., in the natural process of the conditioning of present desires and in distinction from pleasure and pain in liberating activity.)
or re-collect this new (more veridical) recognition of the past—as the true past from which it comes. This might then include the re-determination, but recognized as an original determining factor.\textsuperscript{33}

Hence, even if we can't erase or undo past experience, perhaps we can still change it somehow. It is unclear what undoing would even amount to—if the past determines the present, then (as indicated in these philosophies by the requirement of countervailing saniskāra) the past could only be re-determined. Past impressions are subject to amplification or nullification by present impressions, the potency of past impressions can only be counteracted. As increasingly involved, the past is naturally or ordinarily continuing itself in the productions of the present, but perhaps this natural connection can be re-directed and so used for 'unnatural' or extraordinary countervailing action.

\textbf{9.4.1 Remembering Being-there Then}

The intra-scholastic debates on the relation between cognition, memory, and the self, highlight a place of epistemological, ontological, and axiological convergence. Our knowing, being, and valuing can be directly correlated to our memory, cognition, and volition. These aspects come together in recognition (pratyabhijñā), and the linking-back (pratisandhāna) of cognitive awareness.

Because our continuing attachment and aversion will bring future suffering, and these desires are based upon our remembering of pleasures and pains, memory is of central importance to freedom. In order to be liberated ontologically from the determinacy created by past impressions, one must achieve a practiced state of constraint on the mental modifications—the vṛtti, or fluctuations, arising naturally from continuing past impressions. This constraint, or epistemological liberation, is to be established by right concentration, right

\textsuperscript{33} This change in our own past events would not necessitate an inconsistent change in past events, because the purified memory's past event then comes to recollect what truly had been.
cognition, and right action involving the practice of dispassion or non-impulsedness which enables self-recognition.

In terms of right cognition, proper vyāpta-type relations must be pre-cognitively synthesized and recalled so marks can be appropriately recognized. In the practices of concentration, mindfulness, and expanded awareness, the memory-powers of self are expressly invoked. The tight epistemological and ontological relationship of both Sāmkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika realisms is exhibited in the credence given to the possibility of expanded awareness, and in the consideration of remembrance as a mark of the power of the self (ātman or puruṣa).

Although the self is substantial, it is both immaterial and phenomenologically ubiquitous, and so both non-visible and conceptually indistinguishable. The self is known only as what can be inferred as requisite pervader of the apparent phenomenon of attachment and aversion. As the substance is indicated by its qualities, the diachronically continuous self is indicated by remembrance. The retentiveness and essential synthetic-function of the self is involved at the root of all the prāmaṇas (valid means of knowledge) and so all pramā (veridical cognitions).

Since at the level of the immaterial self, there is no available perception that is not qualified by what is sensible (involving the activities of sense organs, including the mind as the inner sense), regarding the insensible, there is only inference or testimony. But since testimony, or semantic knowledge (śabda) indicates by convention its objects, any description of the self-in-itself as object would be inverted so to speak, since this would be taking pure subjectivity, a requisitely object-empty state as an object (it cannot 'be' an object if it is to 'take' an object). The ubiquitous can only be inferred for oneself, and cannot even be subject to explicit conclusion. What can be explicitly concluded is that memory marks the permanent self or the presence of self-consciousness.
Our attitudes toward our memories and our desires toward the past are deeply involved in liberation and self-recognition. The purification of memory and the diffusion of the potency of past impressions do not amount to 'forgetting' (or 'ignorance'). Impressions are not emptied of their content, but only of their portent. This interpretation respects the realism of Nyāya and Śāmkhya-Yoga systems. Neither experience, nor its subjective and objective aspects, is illusion. Our experiences are not later contradicted since they are 'time-indexed' by a sequential tracing by the self. And even if memory traces or impressions themselves are considered somehow 'material' (as in the Śāmkhya view), the revival of past experience in recognitive perception incorporates knowledge of the past which involves an intuition of the (past experience of the) self. Exercising the proper pervasion relations, one may have uncolored-, or clear-recognition of all that may be remembered or perceived.

Although consistent remembrance is not the ground of the continuity of the self over time, memory is a mark of the self, unrecognized in-itself (ātman or puruṣa). Memory and recognition ground and unite diverse cognitions established by the variety of pramāṇas and so are ineliminable means of knowing. And past experience is not forgotten in self-enlightenment. Being not bound by the past and being absolutely free of the past are two separate things; and it seems that neither Śāmkhya nor Nyāya advocate the possibility of freedom from our past experience, but only from its presently unwilled effects.

9.5 Valuing Freedom

Since our desires are determined by our past impressions and their impulsions, and these desires determine the extent of our future suffering, it is recommended that we cultivate dispassion. A colorless-awareness of our desires is said to rest on the purification or clarification of our memory (and significantly, not our perception). Our naturally erroneous desiring requires correction in order to produce countermanding true impressions, and such
purified remembering may establish the practice of correct knowledge. But desiring is not eliminated. The self is bound by misconception to *samsāra* (transmigration) and spiraling suffering *insofar as* desire is bound to past impressions of pleasure and pain and past judgments of desirability. Liberation can be viewed as freeing our desire, and so also our activity, from bondage to *sanskāra*—or freeing our desire from its bondage to our mistaking memories (past impressions and compulsive transformations indicating pleasure and pain). The purification of memory, and recognition of true concomitance relations, may correct desire’s error.

The ontologies corresponding to philosophies of liberation allow that the karmic chain can be broken, even though it is causally conditioned. Our ordinary un-liberated condition (our continuing suffering) is considered a result of a beginning-less ignorance. This forgetting, or ‘ignor-ance’, even though it is an activity, is a relatively stable state obscuring self-perception. The forgetting of the pervasion of the self-in-itself, that is involved in the ‘inferring’ of suffering takes the form of recognizing *vyāpti*-like correlations of pleasureability and painfulness in place of the self. This type of recognition is necessary for ordinary (future-directed or adaptive) activity. Such suffering-laden recognition may be relatively veridical and may promote valid cognition and appropriate action, but still may not be the whole story.

Turning away from action and toward desireless action (action without anticipation and without aversion) doesn’t have to be viewed as isolating present experience from future

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34 In the Nyāya view, the sequential diversity of cognition and the restricted access to successions of cognitions results from the restriction of the material mind. Because of this limited access on the part of the atomic mind, the entirety of the self’s past impressions are not available for reflection. In the Sāmkhya view, this ignorance (*avidyā*) in the form of darkness or torpor (*tamas*) obstructs the clarity of the intellect and the light of the witness consciousness. In both cases the obstruction of the remembrance is perhaps due to the direction of the mind toward sense-objects intended for immediate physical engagement. In a somewhat Bergsonian way, the indication seems to be that liberating the mind from the senses (through meditation, contemplation, focus, etc.) enhances mind-self contact (in Nyāya) or the clarity or conducive quality of intellect (in Sāmkhya-Yoga) enabling the conscious awareness of beginning-less past impressions, events from all times, and the conscious states of others.
and past experience. It may be seen as connecting the mind to a more complete portion of experience. Identifying or recognizing all that is self (including perhaps other selves) enables the proper recognition of the non-self (including aspects of self that may be non-essential, e.g., pain or aversion, and even difference, enabling recognizing or perceiving the similarity of selves, etc).

Although memory is a sign or mark of personal identity it cannot provide a criterion for personal identity. Psychological continuity is neither available nor necessary in the Naiyāyika view. 35 The foundational qualities of the self are cognition, desire, and will. (And for both Yoga and Nyāya, even God as a particular or special Self, creator or not, retains cognition, desire and volition). The subsisting-self grounds temporal awareness and these three conscious functions reflect this temporal awareness—desire is past-revolving, cognition is present-involving, and volition, future-evolving. Our current intentional states involve their objects under temporal aspects (cognizing is a current awareness of things as present, while desiring is a current awareness of things as past, and willing is a current awareness of things as future).

Contrary to how it may seem, desiring may be primarily a past-directed phenomenon. 36 The deep involvement of memory in desire evidenced in both Nyāya and

35 According to the Naiyāyika, self-conscious awareness is an adventitious characteristic of the self arising only when conditions are favorable.
36 As to whether I have shown that the object of desire is our past experience, or only that past experience has a causal role in creating our present and future desires, it might be argued that here, the causal role is played by the intentional object of the desire as motivating current recognition and action. The original past experience may have caused the trace, but this past experience must be conceived and retained by the current experiencer in order to inform this causal relationship. The content of the past-experience and that of present-, and possible future-experience must be recognized as similar. So, e.g., the desire for ice cream, the cognition of ice cream, and the object of volition, ice cream, are recognized as being about the same object—even though desiring involves past interactions with ice cream, cognizing involves present interactions with ice cream, and willing, our future interactions with ice cream. Past experiences of ice cream are incorporated into present ice cream cognitions and may properly motivate future ice cream volitions only if the intentional content is recognized as appropriately the same. While cognition of present ice cream is determined causally by the presence of ice cream and not one's past experience of ice cream, any recognition of ice cream (cognition of present ice cream as such) is pervaded with past experience. The object of desire, 'ice-cream', directs action by reviving past experiences, as current possibilities, viz.
Yoga philosophies, does not exclude the dependence of volition and cognition upon memory also, but such dependence is also by way of desire. Since our desires are deeply involved in our volitions, and even our cognitions, recognition of desire's error and its connection with our remembrance is especially important. Explicating the 'logical' structure of our desiring using the conceptual resources of such philosophical systems, can help explain how our desiring the past in any particular case, incorporates an aversion to that very past. Since our ordinary past-prompted desires are composed by their intrinsic self-aversion, any satisfaction of desiring can be in name only. We find only fulfillments similar to the past; and any such satisfaction of desire is necessarily incomplete; remaining unfulfilled, our desiring is self-perpetuating.

But like the process of inferring, the process of desiring can be corrected. Desire does not have to be bound by memory—it may also be freed by memory. This close connection of desire and memory demands a re-examination of the role of remembrance in the higher-order desire for moksha (release or freedom from all suffering), as well as in our will to yoga (union, or a quieting down of the wavy mind). Perhaps one can want such things only because one vaguely remembers relishing such freedom and tranquility once upon a time!

what could be done with ice cream, or what could ice cream do? Would ice cream be good? The object of desire becomes the object of volition. Moreover, the causal role in current and future experiences of desiring, suffering, etc., is performed by the (past) self and not particular past pleasures and pains. If that self is diachronically similar to this self, this self may play the primary causal role in one's current recognition and experience of desire, future suffering, etc.
CHAPTER 10: TREASURING THE PAST AND TRANSFORMING REMEMBRANCE

10.1 Remembering the Future and Valuing the Past

Forms of enlightened self-interest encourage us to give ethical justification for an action undertaken now, in terms of the agent or future generations, getting some benefit out of it at a future time. It makes a lot of sense to value the future, even if it is not yet there. But no one can sensibly be asked to prevent past calamities, save resources for the past or work for benefiting or improving the past. Can the past, then, ever be a seat of moral value for us? Can we try to do something about it, or do something for the sake of it, or aspire for it, rationally? Repentance seems to show that we can surely disvalue some parts of the past. And the positive valuation of a glorious past could not be explained away as attributing value only to our current discovery of the past. For that matter, if it is long overdue and too late, the discovery may be negatively valued and regretted, or even celebrated all the more because it remained unsung for so long.

In classical Indian Vedic ethics, there is an idea of congenital debts which suggests an affirmative answer to this provocative question. When a human child is born, it is born with some debt to the ancestors, some debt to the teachers, some debt to the ecological forces (devatā-s), and some debt to society and non-human creatures. Take the first two debts. Unless the line of past ancestors gave birth to, nourished, and brought up a chain of flourishing parents and their children, one would not have been born, and could not have had any moral life at all. Hence, it is thanks to the ancestors—in the causal and normative sense of “thanks to”, that anyone has any ethical duties at all. Unless the past masters created and handed down a repository of knowledge, language, literature, science, and culture, one would not be able to pick up, from early infancy, the rich verbal and emotional culture which makes one a social communicative human being. Thus, the first obligatory duties (in a non-
consequentialist deontological way) of such indebted rational beings is to gratefully acknowledge their debt to the past, even if these debts can never be "paid back" to them—they have to be "paid forward". It becomes one's duty to keep up the memory of one's ancestors and preserve, and if possible, to enrich the stock of knowledge that has been handed down (when enriching could very well take the form of critiquing!).

In case of a child born with a communal memory of forefathers (or foremothers), who have had to bear much suffering, injustice or torture, the past seems to impose special moral duties on the present—duties of reparation, restitution, and above all—non-oblivion. Memory, glorious and shameful, requires keeping and passing on. Do these and other sorts of ethical value of the past have any conceptual connection with the metaphysics of the past that is finally embraced by this dissertation?

Surely, if the past was simply unreal, in the drastic sense of having dropped out of existence, it would be extremely hard to substantiate the statement: "I, now, have duties towards the past (people or events)"—since that would be as absurd as saying "I have duties towards the imaginary people in this fictional narrative". No one can have a moral relationship with sheer non-entities! However fond of Romeo and Juliet we may be, we cannot have debts to them. But we do have debts to Shakespeare.

On the other hand, if the past was so vividly and changeably real as the present or the future, with no fixity at all, then we could simply modify our past and thereby unhook ourselves from any obligations that we might have had or felt. A grandchild of a colonized or enslaved or tortured ancestor could then, by adopting a facile presentism about the past, simply avoid the outrage and escape the obligations by reconstructing a different—or indifferent—present as past.

If we wish to keep the ethical value of the past intact, therefore, we must adopt a certain kind of realism about the past, which respects some elements of our intuition about
the fixedness of the past, without making it morally inert, valueless or oblivion-worthy. Thus, one would, for independent reasons, wish to preserve and promote the ethical (and aesthetic) value of the past, may add extra motivation to adopt the special kind of nuanced (consciousness-immanent, but not justification-transcendent) realist position that we wish to adopt in this dissertation.

10.2 *That Time or Place*

We must, for all sorts of reasons discussed above, admit a minimal realism about the past. What has been done is done. As Patañjali indicated, we cannot prevent past suffering but only future suffering. Our present suffering or joy (our current condition) is an effect of a collection of past happenings. But we also have to admit that the real suffering endured in the past was really experienced. We should remember the suffering of the Holocaust and of the World Wars, etc. But also, there is no real ongoing suffering "in the past"—past suffering is literally past-suffering—it is over for good and forever. If pain hurts in virtue of our wish to be free from pain, then past-pain has got its' sting taken out, since we are already free from it, and hence cannot wish to be free from it anymore.

But we *should* remember that suffering of that past as it was, i.e. currently-experienced. This is the living, meaningful reality of the original. If we remember the Holocaust without being reminded of any suffering, for example, we have not remembered much about it. If we deny the real suffering endured in the past by others or by ourselves, then we cannot truly desire something different, i.e., a decrease in future suffering. Since suffering effects of past actions is a current condition, all that can be prevented is the continuation of suffering, i.e. future suffering. Yet we seem to be forced to recognize not only the continuing pains and pleasures of the past, but the real painful rise and fall of our relations and constant change of our experiences, emotions, and our beliefs. Even current
suffering justifies and causes future suffering. Exactly where is the break in the chain? Would an un-beginning series of dūkkaṇa (suffering) have to be un-endable as well? This was, in a way, the question with which young Siddhartha Gautama sat down to meditate under the Bodhi tree.

10.2.1 Valuing our Inheritance

We treasure the past. We are indebted to the past. The past demands our respect and instigates our current repentance, gratefulness, outrage and other such ethical sentiments. We rationally and (sometimes) justifiably desire a certain kind of past rather than another. We could not give objective grounding to such ethical and evaluative sentiments unless we could modify, transform, and partly even undo certain past events—that is, if what is past could not be acted upon and if consciousness could not causally interact with the past (i.e., when conscious awareness is present but the past that gets changed by this awareness is really and objectively, the past past). We would need to give an ontological status to the past which makes it malleable yet, objectively real, causally tolerant of a current consciousness leaking back into it, and yet metaphysically secure in its tensed position back there as a slice of the self-in-the-world.

As an example, imagine my father, born in a village in Egypt in 1936 (back then). Now, after living in the United States since 1963, he returns to that village for the first time since he left. Neither the village of 1936 nor of 1963 had then the feature of being the city of his return this year. It was just his original birthplace and the place from where he left in 1963. But now, by deciding to return there (with some help from the permissive string-puller “kālā” time), my father has now changed the village-of-1936 into the place of his would be 55 year-later-return. He has not added this property to anyone's past thought, to the mere idea of the past-village, but to the past village itself. He can transform what is past
in many such ways with his decisions, attitudes, and other intentional mental states, as well as through his evaluative—aesthetic and ethical stances.

Naturally, people will object that these are mere Cambridge changes. My dead grandmother's becoming an object of my future child's imagination introduces as little change in my grandmother now, as a longer line drawn next to an untouched line makes the untouched line shorter. These can only be real changes if this village of his return and that village of his birth are the same village. Also changing this village changes the nature of that one because that one is still open to change, being not numerically different (not unconnected). The real past village (that village which is this city)--- become (and remain) the same place only as connected in their difference, and the trait of being the later city of return changes the real position of (the meaning or role of) that original village. In this chapter we will try to explicate the sort of ontology that may make sense of this affectable re-touchable fixity of the past. But the arguments for envisaging such an ontology of the bygone would come mainly from certain axiological insights.

In this third part, we have sought to address the value of the past. In the first chapter we addressed the question of whether admitting that the past can be changed requires admitting backwards causation, and whether fixity (said to be of events themselves) and determinacy (said to be a matter of truth-value) need to be distinguished. There we concluded that while we can bring about the past in its originality as present, and we can promote versions or interpretations of the past as histories, narrative constructions, or ideal-images; we cannot change the past except as part of this (continuing) original work—we can fix new past events, and re-fix the already-past. Because of its completing (un-completed) occurrence, past happenings remain objectively disclosed or unclosed; that is, they remain open to affecting future events and being affected by them—to further determination of meaning and content.
In the second axiology chapter, on desiring the past, we examined our affective intentions and their directions and compulsions. Here we examined the idea that our intentional attitude of desire appears, on the surface, to be present and future directed but since the self that desires has to remember the pleasure that it wishes for, desire has past experience as its actual cause-object (or goal). In contrast, an intentional attitude of desiring the past looks like a pathology but opens one to desiring an original present and future. Yet, if we reverse our desiring we might desire what we do not now remember, or know, i.e., liberation or freedom (creating a real future); instead of rehearsing the by-gone past (by desiring what we do know, transitory pleasure and pain). In this way, instead of re-cultivating the past as present, we might realize an original presence of novel priority.

The lived and living past is one we do not, and cannot speak; but which claims us as its own, and our remembrance determines who we become. As we noted above we belong to the past, but do not "possess" it—it has us more than we have it. But simply not-refusing to be claimed by the past, while choosing how to be shaped by it, our acts of valuation re-work the real past.

Because the real past is an experienced past which remains observable due to its original occurrence, by changing the orientation (or directedness) of our intentional desiring, we can blink ourselves without breaking any causal chains. These do not bind us when they go from the future to the present or past, but might, in fact, free us. The proposal that intention (as a form of remembrance) may work to reverse forward causal linkages does not propose a teleology, but an archaeology, which is evolutionary—forward directed, viz. a re-cognition—yet spontaneous or creative in some regard.

Putting the lessons from these two chapters together we can ask if we can have habits (compulsive activity) from the future to the past—say by remembering a particular future. Here, there would be a confluence of cause and effect as the end is the source of the
beginning. The idea or conception would by an act of backward causation nullify the effects of the motion already begun. Given Libet’s analysis e.g., and the problems of remembrance-selection and (in)habituation, as well as studies of addictive behavior, it seems that sensori-motor action precedes one’s awareness of willing the action. Choosing a different action other than that which the sensori-motor complex has begun to re-enact, would seem to be a form of backward causation. It is a form of remembrance, where the counter-intention is maintained or upheld over time.

The epistemological problems surrounding our knowledge of the past addressed in the first section of this work direct us to the problems of forgetting (exclusion), ignorance (occlusion) and error (delusion). Memory offers us experience and so powers of knowledge and action; but also gives us fertile ground for re-hearsal. We dig up the dead in our remembrance and go over the ground where we have already been. We do this to fight the disappearance of the past. It is, after all, vanishing from here, if not actually vanishing. In fact the vanishing is what makes possible our sustained attention on the currently manifest experience.

In the previous part of this dissertation (on the metaphysics of the past) we determined that past time is real if experienced present time is real. In fact if time is real at all, what is past is also real. Of the “three parts of time” past time is ontologically fundamental to time as it is interwoven in anything’s being present (with or without the same reality accorded to the future). The present cannot stand alone in any sort of replacement stage view without a theatre or play of some sort. The past is metaphysically real and

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Libet’s work (Libet, 2004) suggests that action is begun before awareness of this action is registered; such that if one must exercise free will, this involves counter-acting and already set in motion process. This counteraction must actually reverse—and in a sense, "go back in time milliseconds" to overshadow that already begun event. This is 'extraordinary' in the sense that addictions, e.g. require extraordinary measures to overcome. We can easily 'change our minds' and change our action once started, but to counteract the original action before it happens, one must be able to act backward in time.
ontologically prior to the present because it is necessary to presence—i.e., the possibility of experience.

In the above part on metaphysics it was argued that these past happenings are unique but that they are not limited in their observability (and hence affectability as well as effectiveness) by their limitation to having already been done ("fixed"). They remain open to further effect (re-fixing) because their activity is not necessarily limited by asymmetrical sequence. Events are apparently momentary or made discrete from our own limiting perspective, but are upheld in the nature of reality itself.

The past is as real now as when it happened, though it does not stand out as extant at this time. It is both truly known and actually incorporated as (a hence living) past. And, though this living reality of the past may be beyond our current purview, or may be ordinarily or somewhat recognition-transcendent, we can draw no conclusions about its recognition-transcendent status absolutely or generally. It seems that it is precisely that sort of really present observable, and perhaps observed past, that would be transcendentally-recognizable (and so not recognition-transcendent at all). We should recognize there is more than one suitable place for observation; in fact there are unlimited and non-finite ways of recognizing the original as an original.

This takes this possibility of being observed as something which remains with original occurrences themselves (or occurrence itself as immediately observable) and not with the conditions of a "suitably placed" observer. Moreover, in this minimal realist view, we can alter the past since the real metaphysically-valuable past is experientially based and involves conscious awareness and immanently (intimately) related absolute (or objective) personal being. Here we are also defending the idea that experience is the fundamental ontological unit lasting as non-individual but personal remembrance; and is aesthetic and affective at heart. This is not just an experienced reality—but is all of reality.
The cognitive powers of memory, awareness, and exclusion cannot admit physical reduction. These powers are dependent upon an immaterial conscious substrate admitting continuation and difference and their connection (like the string puller kāla—permitting or enlivening growth and suspending or subjecting to death). These abilities constitute the ability to know, which is the basis of successful worldly interaction, and so is fundamental to even lower creatures. Recognition of this self-consciousness in itself (in oneself) is discernable in these abilities which are truly the gifts of spirit. These are innate abilities of which we creatures are not the source. Even material repetition or causal effect (temporal habituation) cannot be the cause of these cognitive abilities, but only the result (or the means of the result).

While it is beyond this project here to say that Henri Bergson had in mind the same worldview as that proposed by Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva coming from such a far away time and place, some conclusions can be justifiably admitted. These common suppositions allow a great deal of latitude toward current scientific and neuroscientific study. Part of the implicit intent of this work is to show the direction of this compatibility—while not failing to note that currently widespread philosophical and scientific theory (at least in the more popularized versions) haven’t fully considered the implications and preconditions of their findings.

10.3 The Objectivity of Real Manifestation (the Illusion of Insentience) and Real Spirit

Both the Śaiva view and that of Bergson share a basic monism. Since this is panpsychist and experientially based it allows plurality and spontaneity. Experience requires duration which requires a real lived past, which objective time cannot grant (hence the reversibility of causal relations). The A-series of experienced or tensed time is an enduring time. Such time has duration and is made possible by what supports this experience which is
consciousness itself, or more specifically, self-consciousness itself. Here we have a reversion in the evolution of the living being, not out of matter, but out of spirit and back again to spirit.

It is pure self-consciousness which is primary ontologically. Intentional-directed consciousness (forward and backward—both remembering and anticipating) arises out of that in combination with the call for action. The manifestation of spirit as willful intention is then materialized into such action. This enables us to reverse the directedness of episodic procedural and habit memory. It is not the material which first arises following necessary laws, but spirit which binds itself by the powers of memory and forgetfulness (exclusion) and with awareness realizes ignorance (falsity) and knowledge (truth) combined. These powers do not create conceptual delusions necessarily, as a Buddhist philosopher might hold, but rather offer us the possibility for true recognition.

These systems are ultimately realist and even more so, requisitely directly-realist. Ignorance has to be explained as well as the phenomena of false recognition only by realizing that this is not that. Impermanence is absolutely real for all that is perceived is material and all that is material is impermanent. Living bodies—alive without our personal intention—will soon be dead bodies. Only a miracle would return consciousness or life to that body. But remembrance cannot be material but must be veridical. Although our false memories might even look even clearer than our true-memories (what we think we remember might not be what could be remembered), it is the fact of true-memory that gives us insight into immaterial reality. But why does such a view not collapse into maximal realism and maximal panpsychism?

10.3.1 Duration: Experiencing and Being-experienced
As a result of the second section, we realize that the past must be real because immediate remembrance and veridical knowledge of a real past has an unyielding claim on truth. Our past experience is the basis of our remembrance. The basis of our memory claim is an original testimony of our real-past enduring self as witness to an event. And, although such remembrance that we testify to may take the form of currently available words, representations, and images; these must be based in a more immediate form of episodic knowing. This is one which we cannot, like Tulving, deny to animals and other conscious creatures. While such creatures may not have the same concept of a timeline for their individual life or personal narrative (story), to deny them the direct experience of duration and the powers of remembrance (and exclusion), or the awareness to know present experience and to determine action, is unwarranted.

By denying to such creatures choice and free will, we like Descartes, consign them to the role of mechanism, pure material or habit-memory. Such contemporary philosophers may admit similarly degrading our own powers, in that we too are just such complexes of habit-memory and epiphenomenal experience—a matter of knowing how to do and being materially functional, so at least succeeding in not dividing us irrationally from other living beings. But while this physicalist-story may be true in some respects, it may not be the whole story.

If consciousness is epiphenomenal, the epi- in epiphenomenal must be taken not as an afterthought to the habitual or material but its surrounding forethought. Consciousness supercedes the material—it neither follows it nor just track it. We seem to have lost reverence for the very idea of conscious awareness or affectivity—a recognition of the self-knowing of being itself and its intrinsic reality and value as experienced.

We are affected by our material surroundings and environments and with Bergson we will admit that our perception is part of this materiality. For Abhinavagupta this perception
manifests the objects as coherent and individual objects (a unity in diversity). These are really manifest due to conscious awareness of these objects which in themselves, as Bergson would agree, resort to 'numberless vibration'. Our "position" as a confluence of matter and memory, body and mind, externally immediate and internally immediate is one of a boundary condition. We are the combination (the 'hyphen') and provide the separation and connection of extensity and intensiveness.

But in no case are our own individual limited selves the cause of our own being. We are stuck in the material plane as Bergson says, as living organisms we are living images but only differ in degree from the images around us. These also 'live', because they are at root consciousness or spirit at the lowest level of tension—with little available hesitation (choice) from one moment to the next. This un-enduring (and unending) experience is also the lowest level of duration, i.e. insentience, where memory is least enable to infuse itself into perception. This would be the perception of matter itself, if there might be such a thing. Yet this panpsychist view remains minimal because it is dual until the last moment so to speak and always remains plural. Being does turn back upon itself in the form of beings themselves.

Another deep consequence of this theory for both Bergson and Abhinava is spiritual and theological. Spirit is the reality of matter—so mind is not epiphenomenal in the most important sense. Like memory, mind is evidence of a living spirit which persists and takes part in all things. The past is the immanent relation of this living spirit as it is embodied in actual personal and individual experience. In the individuality of our own past lies our own individuality, and in the preservation of real past experience beyond the individual knower; we must admit also a transcendence to this consciousness.

It is beyond my scope and beyond the scope of any limited knower, but even the sum of all perspectives would not amount to *that* perspective—a perspective which does not just
include all perspectives but supercedes them and intercedes for them, giving independent duration. This panspsychism supposes a more real unity at the base of a real plurality of experiences. Because of the preservation of this plurality, even in superimposition, remains a non-solipsistic or minimal (delimited) panspsychism which goes further to admit a real living presence beyond this present experience—a source for living duration itself.

10.3.2 Spontaneity and Repetition—Memory and Matter Revisited

Considering episodic memory as the fundamental experience of consciousness itself, combined with forgetting (exclusion), we have explained the metaphysical value of experience (as living duration or memory). The physical value of the re-presenting images is a function of spirit hyphenating a living tension of conscious material beings materializing or condensing the vibrations around our bodies into images by our perceptions and remembrances (which push them forward). Materialization (the currency of material objects—their presence/appearance) is thus fundamentally a function of mind on the unity of what is. But we are not left with idealism or solipsism or extreme panspychism. Bergson is directly realist about our perceptions—the images we perceive are objectively real and exceed our actual perceptions on all sides. And for Abhinava our ordinary interaction with its reliance on memory is the *explanandum* which cannot be accounted for without the divine, given the continuity and indistinguishable-ness of things in the absence of conscious (actual) perception or situation.38

10.4 Real Pasts not One’s-own

Lived experience has an intrinsic value which is kept or retained in things themselves. We can ask, considering what happens to be original creation and recreation, who is the artist

38 As said in Mohist Logic—“As appearing, so seeing”. These are the encompassing conditions—appearing as object and seeing are not distinct events.
of this continuing original—or the cook of this dish? We, ourselves, are cooked in fact! As individuals or a species—we’re done for someday—we see our own end. We know we are only in part creator and re-creator; but also part creation and recreation. Here, we face the myth of the origin—is there only recreation, and no true creation? Is there no real beginning; but a beginningless limit—giving us, from our perspective in time, an original moment, or big bang (like a visual illusion). There is re-creation and creation at every moment, thus leaving us always with that beginning.

This continuous creation, or constant cooperative re-creation, is recreation, like play, and we are made to play, having to learn rules but being allowed to create rules as well. We are playing a private language game with ourselves that supervenes on these shared—public language games. Even our own private game of understanding the rules of the game are changeable, so we are faced with a problem of recognition—a slow switching problem. We cannot detect our own rule-following and rule-changing because those are the rules we are playing by. Our private language game is shared with our own self though seen only through a glass-darkly. This passing private play is part of the whole interplay and is not entirely private. While you may have no idea what it is like to be me, the more you know about me the more you could imagine it. I am not out of your reach because we share in the knowledge of what it is like to be alive (at least).

10.4.1 How should we Value the Past?

There may be many ways to value the past. We will only try to put together a small analysis of the evaluative structure of past time and experience. The proposal offered here is to relate the aesthetic value of the past to episodic and affective memory, the moral value of the past to semantic memory, and the practical or character-building value of the past to habit or procedural memory. In accordance with these reversals of contemporary popular thinking
about the ontological or logical priority of material manifestation conscious awareness, we can consider how we value the past, and how we value past experience, and remembrance.

Here, we offer some axiological connections between our remembrance and the nature of the reality of the past. What is the nature of this metaphysical reality of the past? How can a real past event be altered? We will argue that the function of memory is not to preserve or retain the past only; when we remember we “keep in mind”. Our memory means more to us than we know. It is whatever our attention is on; whatever we care about; and provides our ability to synthesize ideas. The “work-space” of memory is more than just a studio for the creation of artworks, it is itself an original artwork allowing many sorts of performances—it is part of the play(ing) itself.

10.5 Relevance of the Project: Transforming Memory

Two Buddhist monks came upon a woman stranded on the bank of a swiftly flowing river. Seeing this, one of the monks picked the woman up and carried her across, and the monks continued on their way. But after a while the second monk spoke, chastising him—“Why did you carry that woman? You know our vows forbid that you should have touched her.” To which the other monk replied—“I carried the woman, yes, but I put her down back at the river, but you are still carrying her and haven’t put her down all this time!”

Our remembrances and reconstructions of the past have their moral and political importance in the fact that they are not just backward-looking, but are also forward-facing. What we understand the past to have been and what we recognize it to be in relation to our own personal and interpersonal histories and our communal identifications, gives content to our present awareness of ourselves and others. While we often think that remembering applies only to past events and past experiences, extending the scope of memory to include all that is latent and present in one’s current consciousness promises not only to help us with the epistemological and metaphysical puzzles of the past, but also to bring into focus the distinctly moral and political implications of our remembering.
Are we obligated to remember the past, or should we try to forget it? Do we have a duty to remember some things but not others? Is there a certain mix of memory and oblivion that will make us happy?

We are, on the one hand, tempted to say that some things are better forgotten; that what should be remembered is whatever is accurate and useful for present circumstances and desires. It is sometimes said in this regard that we should let bygones be bygones. It seems true that if we let cause and effect determine our actions, or if we use our past-justifications and past-identities alone to guide us, we will not truly advance. Indeed, if past violence genuinely justifies retaliatory violence, then we are stuck in an inescapable cycle. And it seems that much recent violence—including post-partitioning violence between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israeli conflicts, recent genocide in Rwanda and ethnic retaliations generally—is a result of such an obsessive remembrance of the past. But we cannot just forget the past.

Holocaust survivors and their families, like soldiers who have survived the traumas of war, emphatically insist that we should 'never forget.' Unless we remember the dead, and their sacrifices, we forget ourselves, who we are. We cannot learn from a forgotten past and forgetting may even condemn us to repeating its mistakes. Only the recognition and remembrance of war can bring a desire for peace, and only remembrance of what is lost can give value to what is not. While remembering is inherently dangerous and even inherently faulty, it may be the only means of freeing ourselves from the deleterious effects of the past. How should we negotiate this practical problem?

Transforming the shackles of remembering and habitual reaction into a means of visionary action and liberating self-recognition depends on recognizing that memory is much more than a tenuous link between a passing now and a lost yesterday. Every act of remembering is also an act of self-awareness on the part of the one who remembers. The past
is more than past events and past experiences. An expanded view of memory includes all
that we are capable of coming to know or to recognize—even what does not come to us
through sense experience.

This view of remembering, as primarily a means of self-awareness and not an
independent means of knowledge, enables us to give a sound interpretation to various
spiritual practices. Prayer, "vision", and meditation, for example, involve the 'thickening' of
the linguistically communicated and memorized past (the prayer of the rosary, the
recollection of the image or name of the Buddha, or the self-recognition of Shiva, etc.) into
an actuality of current "religious experience."

Here, we find the basis of memory to be in its affective dimension. Here the
questions are normative and not just descriptive—not just, how do we value memory and past
time, but how should we value them, and why. To approach this schematically, we can
suggest different sorts of approaches to considering the value for the past (past experience) or
of our remembrance: practical, ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual (though clearly this is a
spectrum and no kind of punctuating division):

Practically—Recognizing what tends to be the case; or recognizing the tendencies or
relations of events where determined (necessary or concomitant). 39

Morally—Learning from truth found in the past after it has passed; or enacting truth/acting
truthfully after deriving the past's "lessons".

Historically / Narratively—Knowing about the past that one tends to explicate (this involves
not only politics and sociology, but personal tendencies and re-formations). 40

39 This level involves the emotional as a very extended and embodied function. Like cause and effect one
anger most often leads to another.

40 The insertion of the Historical and Narrative level of valuing the past was suggested by Professor Hunter
McEwan. This level nicely connects the Moral and the Aesthetic with Gazzaniga's problem as explicated
in The Mind's Past and the evident constructions of the interpreting brain who overrides our real past with
a narrative construction including often-told scripts, as we all have and hear from others. Some events have
impressed us in such a way that we retell them over and over. Perhaps we have even lost "touch" with the
real memory. We "discover" history—even our own, covered as it is with its own consequences. Aesthetic
appreciation is meant to bring us back into direct "touch" with the 'artwork' (the lived past) itself—opening

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Aesthetically—Appreciating (and re-appreciating) it as past recognizing the past as it was in an open but un-coercive or non-distorting way. (It speaks volumes for itself.)

Spiritually—Recognizing a unity in such diversity (in the form of inference for oneself); or the coincidence of immanent and transcendental consciousness.

Practical valuing of what’s past includes present habituation and (material) interaction. (All practice, which makes us perfect, after all lies in the past of the performance or action which it is supposed to facilitate.) Whether taken speciously or instantaneously, this sort of reiterated or reenacted memory is at base habit and as we saw above, closely related to our unaware desiring of the past (When failing or bungling in a task, we wish we had done it many times before, we desire to understand what happened—we want a lesson-offering past.)

Ethical valuing of the past includes normative duties toward the past (not wholly unconnected to habit-action). We learn from past experience which enables us to recognize what is currently happening, what its' precedents were and what to expect (what sort of precedent it sets). In this valuing of the past we understand what has happened and remember concomitance and association. Since habitual reactions, like concomitance claims (e.g. of smoke with fire) must be recognized as established material habits; but these effect (and affect) our own action and creation and re-creation of the past. The only way to alter these reactions would seem to involve a top-down (non-habitual) form of backward effect.

When, not intellectually or morally, but at a sensory phenomenal level, we rejoice at being reminded by a friend of something from our past, that could be called an aesthetic appreciation of what we had ‘forgotten’, especially if the recalled content is of no pragmatic or moral value at all. The remembering is enjoyed for the sake of the experience of remembering alone, with the aesthetic wonder ‘How could I have forgotten that?’ Such an
appreciation of a significant gap in our memory could often be the beginning of the possibility of new, but not total recalls. This form of valuation has an intrinsic openness offering the possibility of new dawning of the recognition that there may be truths which are, at least currently, recognition-transcendent. (This again does not imply that they are not transcendentally recognizable.) Moreover, the truth of what happened back then may yet be affected, and while it is fixed, is open and subject to change, just in being known e.g., or fully recognized (even if mis-taken).

Although we cannot undo an event once it is done, we are able not to do it again; but only if we remember. This sort of remembering is complex—it involves more than just practical and moral evaluations, but also aesthetic ones. Here lies the freedom to change the past. In fact, it seems that knowing practical and moral truths depends on the aesthetic accessibility of past experience which gives it openness to personal vision, decision and creation. The memory of making a mistake, say in playing a piece of music e.g., or having “done it perfectly that time” might make one try not to repeat it—either because it was not-right or because it was so right that we feel it should remain that single occurrence—one so beautiful that it could not be done again.

Our aesthetic freedom to change the past also includes freedom to guide our creative choices. I can keep my past actions fresh by resisting the impulse to repeat them. After all, any attempted replication of something genuinely a “work-of-art” can only hope to repeat the past and not create it anew. Hence the aesthetic is closely related to the episodic or experiential in the fact of unique occurrence.

Veridical memory indicates the reality of the past (though not evident). The reality of this past leads us back to the ontological priority of remembrance. Here we are led to the Self in back of oneself or the World in back of itself—what we cannot see. Only the self-conscious allowing division of now and then by its own likeness can ‘make’ time’s passage
apparent. Because the past is ontologically real, if anything is present, and we experience present times, we are led to a minimal panpsychism. The basis of present time is awareness, both upholding the past and excluding the future. Memory and a real past provide a sort of personal-transcendental argument for a self beyond this current self-consciousness.

Here, we are in agreement with both Bergson and the Śaiva philosophers in holding that the basis of material manifestation or image lays in immateriality—and recognition of this is a recognition of the intrinsic value of all things. This is a minimal realism, since the (ontological and metaphysical) value of experience is within the experience itself, and remains, irrespective of the "temporal location" of further observers. Since the observer affects the observed, the remaining observability of past experience evidenced by remembrance leaves it open to further effect.

Memory as a means to identification is not only given the form 'this X is that X', but also offers the possibility of simulation of and identification with others. By this means also this may be recognized to be that (an instance of racial objectification, or of sexual abuse e.g.). Memory provides space for present perception to be enactive and not just active. Memory provides ground for enactive aspect a horizon of intention related to desire and so past associations of pleasures and pains.

Personally-transforming remembering realizes the enactive aspect of remembering, its literal creation of reality in making-current. This is a conducive remembering in that we may keep an image held with one-pointedness before the mind—in remembrance of the Buddha (buddhānusmṛti), or of Christ, e.g. we do X or Y. We may remember the pastimes of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa; just as we remember our fallen comrades. We define our present time with our past experience. Following the Stations of the Cross e.g., or the rosary, we are to remember Christ's experience. Circling Mecca, we perform a different sort of memorialization, a reenactment of the perfect revolutionary motion. This is a tradition
marking a unification of divinity dating back to even before the advent of monotheism among the Arab states.

Our actual memory is a transforming inherently-changing mass. Images are drawn out re-inforced and re-created or re-imagined. But memory is fixed at its base; it is grounded in real past experience. This is imbedded (embodied) in diachronic beings. The past is fact, fixed. Only present cognitions or propositions may be true or false (even if they are about the past or future). That x happened is now true or false—only as presently proposed does it have value (currency). It must be recognized.

10.5.1 The Art of Remembering

Musical performance, as an interpretive activity, has to be understood as relative to the material that is being interpreted. This material may or may not have the determinacy, fixity, and definitiveness of a work. Performative interpretation cannot be identified simply with what performers add to the material being performed. However, if interpretation is the assigning of significance, then in applying certain (theatrical, rhetorical, and biological) significance-endowing metaphors to integrated elements of a musical performance we commit ourselves to thinking of that performance as interpretive. (Thom, 2003)

Is remembering like playing a piece of music—is it an art? Is there a way we can remain faithful to the spirit of the composition in our interpretation?

The work as played or performed can be taken as analogous with the memory (the past experience) which is remembered. The work itself (as an original work) in the case of remembrance is "true-memory"; while the episodic remembrance or current remembering, or playing, would be interpretive. Different works may admit degrees of determinacy, fixity, and definitiveness in the art of remembering. Paul Thom writes that determinacy concerns the content of "that which is performed" (here the "true-memory" is untokened and immediately known). Fixity concerns its vehicle (the memory-image or tokened explicated remembrance); while definitiveness the "type of authority it carries". In the case of
remembrance and the art of remembering (or playing-remembrances) is the real connection
between the image or testified remembrance (as played) and the past experience with its
purely-reflective and so accurate “true-memory” of spirit itself (as re-playable).

When we value the past aesthetically this gives us the freedom to make new originals
which include (do not preclude) the past original. To give an example: Israel
Kamakawiwo‘ole (Izzy) can combine two prior songs: his interpretations of the originals
‘Over the Rainbow’ and ‘What a Wonderful World’, and create a new original. His
‘rendition’ of these originals is itself original and changes the past artwork but revives it in a
new original. The aesthetic valuing of the past offers us more than the opportunity to
evaluate (based on criteria)—but our valuing can be just without criteria for judgment or
evaluation. Being intrinsically valuable as original creation, past originals retain their
affectivity—yet this is open to more than even what was intended by the creator; so the
original also remains open, both to having further effects and to being further affected by
later originals. An original artwork (the song) is created or heard in the mind of the
composer—or collaboratively created by the musicians, each working to complete a new
vision.

Even the first playing of the song (which may contribute to its further composition or
hearing) was interpretive. The aesthetic value of the past—or the original artwork (even
given the centrality of interpretation to even this original experience) is the ground for its
material, practical, or visible value. The past exceeds the manifest present. And the artwork
or original inspires later performances, but is not wholly immune to them. All later
performances of the original composition or interpretations of the artwork become original
performances (artistic recreations) themselves. Original composition involves interpretation,
at minimum re-expression. The aesthetic valuing of the past is thus closely related to our
own valuing and desiring of the past. What role are we playing? What song are we singing—or composing (and so hearing)?

Eliot Deutsch writes that awareness of the incommensurability of pure spontaneity and compelled habituation enables a “genuine masking” of ourselves as personae—as a self-aware creative undertaking. (Deutsch, 1992, p. 24) According to Deutsch, self-consciousness involves an awareness of this surpassing reality and value and so an awareness of the “pretension in all other value schemes”. He says of this masking that it “fits rightly, when there is the detachment and recognition consequent on self, realization”. Here “one is aware that one is not exhausted by one’s presentation. One is aware of the opportunity to be creative of personhood.” But genuine masking, he says, does not hide one’s true self because it is not deceptive. It is, instead, a proper showing of the person in action. (Deutsch, 1992, p. 25)

This person-in-action is an articulation or cultivation (formative expression) created with one’s past experience as the “raw materials” of new meaningful creative expressions. The attitudes we take toward these raw materials, our frame of remembering or frame of reference gives us a “memory gestalt”. But we can transcend these conditionings through their creative and dynamic integration. (Deutsch, 1992, p. 23).

The demand that a radical discontinuity between bound and boundless consciousness, between the temporal and the timeless, makes on us is that we acknowledge its implications and be and act accordingly. And at the same time it affords the opportunity to do so, for it makes fully possible our realizing the contents of experience, the given conditions of our own being, the everyday constraints of nature and society, to be the material with which we must articulate ourselves and our world or be utterly lost to it...we are faced with either creativity or nothingness. (Deutsch, 1992, p. 115)

10.5.2 Rasa, Desirelessness, Ownerless Affect, and the Aesthetic

We must begin by noting the close relation of the aesthetic to a confluence of spontaneity and training which makes inspirational (genuinely creative) performance. The
effect of such original performance is to produce feeling. In Abhinava’s aesthetics he makes much of rasa, the flavor or taste of the original—which is to be enjoyed and appreciated but also felt afresh (and so creative of new originality). Here, the relation of the aesthetic to expression (semantic creativity of habit) and especially feeling (as episodic) is made directly.

Abhinava says that there is a certain sort of rasa-communion, or sharing, of the audience in the performance, play or dance. If the experience is aesthetic it seems to involve forgetting oneself, and perhaps remembering another self—or a self in-itself in mutual (non-individual) enjoyment of the object. There may be ownerless emotions and, likewise, ownerless experiences, which may be open to general experience. Here we see where we are driven to valuing highly and attributing the highest reality to past and present experiences of others, as we attribute reality to one’s own past experiences. Remembering their past as it was, suffered and felt and real is different from learning about it historically. If we remember the event as it was lived we might have the hope of changing the future. As we transform that past, our remembrance transforms us.

The artwork of original experience or stringing of past experiences together is open, thus enabling creative addition and multiple interpretations according to interpreters; and yet having an original maker and design. Its value may be added to genuinely (appreciated) and it may be evaluated as a good or bad artwork. Here we are lead from the affective to the appropriate or fitting—what is right. The moral or ethical value of the past is derived from that original past as both effective and still able to be affected. We recognize the traditional aesthetic, ethical and epistemological forms of beauty, goodness, and truth even if only in imperfect forms, by the experience of ugliness, badness, and falsity. These are equally effective and affective dimensions.

Remembrance does not merely re-produce knowledge, but is a current calling to mind, endowing the appropriate tense-marker on an originally experienced occurring content.
In this way it is truly generative. Even concentration or keeping in mind, is in a way a not losing, (apramōta) remembering, or a reciting. The connections of remembrance with loving and keeping, or holding and treasuring are closely related to our acknowledgment of our debts. Our experience is normatively directed with memory giving options and goals as information immediately available to the conscious mind tends to go back and forth, and change direction constantly.

It seems to follow from Bergson’s analysis (and Abhinava’s as well), that remembering or holding in mind without intention to action allows the manifestation of memory without forward directed function into material enactment. In this way we can prompt the intuition of pure-memory or spirit itself behind our conscious awareness and theoretically increase our ability to know (the truth about then and recognize its appearance now) and to act freely (now and in the future).

10.6 Transforming Remembrance: the Power of and Indications of Memory

Against the backdrop of the recovered memory debate and the problems of ‘false’ memory, we can see how easily wars and conflict arise over the factual content of our memories and what has happened in the past. And, there is a sense in which all wars are memory wars; at least to the extent that war is retaliatory or caused by a series of remembered past events; and deciding questions of the truth or falsity of claims about the past enable current reparation, punishment or retribution. We dispute the truths of the past and also we make the truths of the past—both legitimately (as we act) and even illegitimately (as we ‘spin’ history to promote political goals, e.g.). He who controls history (knowledge,
or information) controls the world. Histories can be rewritten, documents destroyed, civilizations toppled and memories lost.41

Janice Haaken has proposed a new paradigm of “transformative remembering” as a way to mediate the problems of false-memory syndrome and the ultimate un-checkability of the remembered facts. She says that focusing on the facticity about claims of our past experiences, is not conducive to future relations, but ends only in impasse since there is a lack of evidence available to all concerned parties. But some parties might think they do have evidence, i.e. the memory. And denying the experience of another is nothing anyone should want to do. While the recognition of fictional-reconstruction and narrative expression may be useful metaphors for the development of the conscious awareness of oneself and others, genuine remembrances are not fiction and narrative, and should not be taken as such. Though there is no way to check it, such memory is the fact of having had that personal experience. And we make this difference between fiction and reality, narrative construction and real events and people themselves. I may give a narration of my past experience in order to share it publicly, this narration is not the experience, nor is it my conception of myself. As we tell of and learn of others’ “stories” and have shared past experiences, we have a sense of identification with these experiences, and so we conceive fairy-tales, parables, myths, histories and facts. But these hold different sorts of truths.

By recognizing one’s own past experience as such, one may identify with others who have had similar past experience. And indeed, our remembrances—and our senses of self-identification—are often, if not always, political statements. But one does not need to recognize one’s past experiences as true (her claims as factual) to recognize one’s current belief in the truth of the memory-claim. I can withhold judgment on the veridicality of my

41 We are left concepts of the Dark Ages and pre-historical times—and we have no idea, e.g. to whom the ancient Sanskrit, Chinese and Greek philosophers could have been referring to as “the ancients”.
or another’s memory claim and yet, recognize the reality of such experiences and the truthfulness of such remembering as one’s current representations of oneself. But the one who is remembering may naturally, and justifiably, expect more—i.e. that we believe them as well.

Can we reduce our autobiographical memories to stories, or to storytelling? If I tell you of a past experience of mine I am not aiming to tell you a story. I aim to tell you something true or at least truthful. Here we have divided intuitions: On the one hand, it is easy to applaud a creative engagement with the past that is insightful (where openness to revision is perhaps key), with a regulative ideal of truthfulness. The truth of remembering is not objective truth but combination of past experiences, the past awareness of a subject. Our shared experiences give rise to distinct perceptions and remembrances and as far as our experienced pasts go, conflicting truths must be accepted as truthful. But it is not enough to consider it storytelling or creative engagement.

We shouldn’t wish to respond to someone’s claim of past experience (as the object of racism, or sexual abuse e.g.) with the question, ‘did that really happen?’ But we may not believe a story or one’s interpretation of an event, we are left with the idea that it was “real” in the mind of the story teller. But the claim of inter-subjective validity is denied. It seems true that issues of the veracity and factuality of our remembering are often beyond verification, but their current proposition (their present truthfulness) has relevance which goes beyond the relativist claim that, ‘Well, since it was perceived as X, for her, its truth was X’. It is relevant whether it was x (whether she was a racial target or a target of abuse, e.g.). But we not only re-interpret the past, we interpret present perceptions, just as we interpret our relations and interactions with others with others.

One’s testimony is aimed at truthful-telling and so asks for its veracity to be acknowledged by others. Such testimonial claims made in good faith call for belief in their
truth. Still, we can recognize that our personal histories not only require the forgetting of most details and events, our remembrances are usually mistaken—we remember the gist of things and distill what once was fluid time into something of a powdered remnant. We recognize our experience as an instance of \( x \). Can we give up our grasp on the real past uniqueness of experiences and use truthfulness as simply a forward-looking regulative ideal (and not a back-tracking or past-playing-reality)? What prompts this regulative ideal toward truthful remembrance; especially if we shift our paradigm of remembering and admit it's very functional, but extraordinarily-wide scope, and impressively-deep implications?

If someone recovers (uncovers?) the memory of abuse or remembers being abused can we possibly dissuade them of its factuality or the justifiability of its personal-effect? It is this facticity and effect by which the past, literally, matters. And if we deny the expectation of truth for our testimonies, then we will have little to stand on. The regulative ideal of truth in memory is distinctly normative; since our remembrances are unjustifiable or self-justifying to some degree, discerning the errors of our remembrance is difficult. But discerning the truths of remembrance may not be as hard.

10.6.1 Two ways of Transforming Remembering

Transforming remembering is an ambiguous expression. There are at least two senses in which memories or remembrances are transforming. We are transformed by our remembrances and our remembrances are themselves transformed (by other remembrances). We are in a sense in dialogue or a dialogical relationship with our past experiences (as retained). This indicates a diachronic self-awareness or an awareness of oneself as existing across time, in the most general sense of temporal awareness. We transform ourselves and others by our remembering as a putting together again a reconstruction that is not an inference. We do not infer that it is we who had our past
experience on the ground that we remember it. We recognize our past experience as our own within the recognition of our present experience.

Value is something remembered or contained in the present; the axiological aspects of remembering are complex and far-reaching. We are a creation of our remembrances in a way; our present experiences involve re-creations of past experiences. Memory is deeply involved in our enactments; and the past is often re-enacted unknowingly. The recognition of patterns in our lives and the lives of others makes memory basic to all knowing (even basic perceptive content/ recognition) and the possibility of recognizing change as well as self-determined action.

The idea of constantly reconstructing, or dynamic memory traces, like Bergson’s theory of memory, offers a way to steer between storytelling and truthfulness. We can admit the role of interpretation and affect in the basis of truthfulness. We draw the lines of memories when we remember or represent the past. And remembrance projects new images, and so expresses more than just the experiences of a self but the nature of that self. More goes into and comes out of our remembering than the actual past experience.

Remembering is not only about the past facts or past events situations and objects. It enables a self-consciousness-reflective triangulation of a diachronic self and world; making a present or current state of realization (awareness) possible. But remembrance is also deeply about the meaning of experience. Memory is an act of unification. To remember is to call to mind, and to keep in mind. To express love we remember the needs and desires of others, and we may even remember or forget ourselves (when we act inappropriately, e.g.). We identify ourselves and others by remembering another in simulation with oneself. Such simulation and pretence is imaginative projection and self re-creation.

Transforming memory requires communal (interpersonal) simulation. The temporal boundaries of the self can be re-drawn or adjusted and we can renounce or pull back from
(regret) the polluted territory of the past self. This may provide relief, but it seems that the conflict over the truths of the past can indeed benefit from a transformative remembering—as we simulate our past self (and future self) in our remembering (and expecting), and simulate others in everyday interactions. Transformative remembering expands to include the past experiences of others as one’s own—as really one’s own; a making-real or realizing the background, or connection of an entirely similar being.

Thus we find close relations between mindfulness, keeping in mind (concentration) and love. Moreover our desiring the past (our remembrances) leads us astray, causing us to try to materially re-create or get back (retain) past pleasure and suffering. Remembering exceeds this function of reviving the past, and by giving knowledge and choice opens us to remembering a different future.

The past is changed in the present—as the present changes the past is and remains being-changed (like Bergson, here we can admit a memory of the present as the virtual reality of the actual image). In this way overcoming or fixing the past involves changing the future. This future change changes the past if these are not, except arbitrarily, separated (past time and present time are continuous). The past is changeable and real backward causation must be possible (even if non-ordinary). But, even so, it could not appear as if it were causation, but as if it were uncaused or spontaneous—even miraculous at the limit.

Since we cannot take our mind out of our perception of matter, we can, at best, recognize that we ourselves are a composition of true and habit memory. As living material manifestation of the powers of remembering, knowing, and excluding, we are aware of change and identity over time. The power of remembering lies in holding and upholding, allowing genuine differentiation. Self-consciousness provides this requisite support and concurrent measure for the distancing between now and then.
Such true forms of remembrance exceed the recall of what happened, and slide ontologically into reality as it is. What has happened (and even what is happening here and now) exceeds the knowledge of limited individual knowers (and even those who are “here and now”); it transcends what can be demonstrated by this and includes what must be demonstrated as that (since the same thing can be re-demonstrated). This consciousness-based reality is transmitted in the universe itself as the lowest duration of mind (matter) and the highest duration of mind (spirit) meeting as the unified and unique living individual.

Even experiential-ontology can be a form of realism, if it is not strictly individually past but shared as self-conscious observation. There is a unification of experience or coherence of the diversity of experience beyond explication; and a constancy of passed which is ineffable amongst the many stories and histories of what may be true.

Memory is the indication of the reticence of the immaterial reality of conscious awareness and its tendency to build and compose—or put together now and then. Life evolves extending its duration but this is due to the power or directedness of spirit in contrast to the entropic direction of mind at its lowest tension, viz. toward pure necessity and materiality—perfect repetition. This is only a hypothetical point, and all materiality is mind. Thus the view remains panpsychist, even the lowest levels of matter—images with nothing beneath them are mind—not mine or yours but mind nevertheless. The reality of experience gives everyone’s (anyone’s) current state and duration value. It also gives an appropriate weight to the reality of their past experience as lived—effective and affecting—experience, whose action is unending.

The traces of past experience are karmasāya. Like retired or ‘dormant action’ they have not yet outlived their active presence. These traces are first of past experience and of the highest tension—only these enable the contraction vibrations into recognizable and conceptualizable objects (a coherent diversity in a unity of experience). This is held by all
living organisms. The cause of life is however not material but immaterial. Life is only the
manifestation of this consciousness experiencing itself at the lowest degree of tension. Pure
perception without any memory (hypothesis only) would be the absolute detension—the
dissolution of matter. Even material or habituated repetition requires that there be some sort
of re-placement of the past—in which the placement or position, or state, held by one,
delimits or determines the ‘place’ of another.

The connection of place between even a replacement presentism leads to
inconsistencies, the stage view is inadequate without some sort of theatre! (Not to mention
the actors, and audience.) The objective realism of this sort of ontology of experience, i.e.
lived past experience, is made possible by the admission that this personally lived past is not
just individually past but shared. There is a unified experience or coherence of the diversity
of experience and a unification of the past ineffable amongst the many stories and histories of
what may be true.

Here true-episodic remembrance is seen as the fundamental power of remembering.
What has happened exceeds the knowledge of limited individual knowers and is transmitted
in the universe itself as the lowest duration of mind (matter) and the highest duration of mind
(spirit) meet as the “god’s eye view” of the B-series though admitting changeability.

This is a minimal realism as the past remains open to being re-fixed by our possible
effect on it—either miraculously or non-miraculously. We are creators; and even if this is
just re-creation, we are by our remembrance given choices. Our choices can effect past
things in themselves if these do not change with time but we do. This is a minimal
panspsychism because it supports not one all knowing presence immanent in all things, but
gradations and degrees of tension (duration) and distinct abilities of contraction producing a
diversity of knowledge-types and possible perceptions. Past events remain open to being
reconceived. Our memories of these events, genuine or constructed, build our current state.
Consciousness offers memory, knowledge and exclusion—or remembrance, intentional awareness, and ignorance or forgetfulnesse. Between the powers of retention and oblivion there is the state of awareness—the power of consciousness to endure, remember and forget. But, we can also derive the bridging insight (between minimal realism about the past, and some minimal consciousness or spirit-dependence of the past) from value-theoretic ideas. Our value-laden rememberings do not create the real past, but can affect it, perfect it, sometimes, even damage it, and in so doing, we can modify ourselves. For, we are our pasts, and our pasts are re-fixable by our unfixed futures. Memories are our only hopes.
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSIONS

11.1 Facts, Change, and Death

When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do?

In the long run, we are all dead.

- John Maynard Keynes

Though said apart and taken out of context, these two quotations from Keynes are quite interesting considered together. Do "facts" ever really change? And if, in the long run we are all dead, perhaps this is the only real fact that remains. Or, maybe all things are fact in the end—including our own life and death. When could the facts change? How could the fact change after the fact?42

It seems that whatever is fact is always fact; and the bulk of these, are now past-facts which don’t depend on our opinion of them. If it is a fact for example, that Brutus did not kill Caesar, then this is always a fact—even if we ‘know’ only the opposite to be the case—even if we cannot provide direct or indirect proof or demonstrative reference for "Brutus" or "Caesar", or any proof at all. Despite a lack of current representation, the facts remain the same.

Alternatively, perhaps whatever facts are, they are strictly present; and since the present situation is constantly changing, so are the facts. Presumably this is what Keynes had in mind. We have the apparent “fact” that ‘the facts on the ground’ are always changing as situations change. Changing situations are not changing facts though. Under the idea that facts are just present and are constantly changing, there would be no conceivable facts at all.

42 The tense difference in the facts that you are now reading and that you have read is not enough to say that any real facts have changed. But, how about the fact that you went back since then and have now read it twice—has this changed the first fact of your reading? In some ways yes, but the fact of the first reading wasn’t itself changed, but added to.
(And still, this would be a fact—albeit it inconceivable!) In the long run, we are all dead, and hence nothing but past-fact. Once dead (or wholly-past), do the facts still change? When we the earth is dead, and our universe has suffered heat death, are these long-gone facts of what was, no-longer 'facts', or are they still facts, even if just entirely past and irretrievable?

Even present facts, like that I am writing this sentence now—or the present fact that now (a different 'now') you are reading this sentence, are already past-facts. We seem to have no grounds for asserting present facts except other facts—which run quickly into past facts. We know most facts because we knew them yesterday. If it is a fact that I typed that sentence, is it not always a fact that I typed it (as it originally was)? All of the 'times' I have gone back and revised it seem to be somehow joined to that fact but without changing it—perhaps simply overwriting it and making it 'undetectable'. Do our later changes ever change the facts, or just complicate, or 'extend' them in such ways?

It seems that any fact is, and will remain a fact—something we can do nothing to change. If we can change the facts, it is only current facts and / or future facts that we can change by acting now. (E.g., I can change the fact that my house is now a mess by cleaning it—but that it was a mess must stay a fact for this new clean-room fact to be a new fact.) Yet, when we are dead, we cannot change these facts ourselves. Our life and death would certainly seem to be fact and to remain fact (even if, as we are ourselves no-longer, we can no longer call it "past" and no longer have access to any facts—perhaps not even our current fact of 'being dead').

When we are dead, we ourselves, or at least our lives (our living), will be just wholly-past (or timeless) facts; and, when we are dead, there may be no real events we can change. But since there will be remaining (facts about) real past events, the factuality of even our own life is not tied to our current existence. The "facts" Keynes was talking about, the ones we debate and the facts of our lives as we conceive and relate them, are just images of the real
past facts about events as they happened, as they have always happened, and will continue to happen. When we are dead some facts continue, and these facts are not entirely distinct from all those other past-facts, like our living.

But one might say, surely what was the fact, is no-longer the fact—and this just is change (time). It was a fact that G.W. Bush’s father was President, but now it is a fact that he himself is President—so the facts have changed. But the definite article deludes us here, for what is fact now, was not fact then. But what is (true) then is (true) now. The facts do not change. Both Presidencies are true (remaining) facts. We cannot change them now, except by changing the next presidential fact. We certainly have a hand in creating new facts, but we can’t stop or fix the old ones. If it is once true that something was the case, it would seem to always be a fact, or be always forever the case that it was. This past-fact, though it cannot be un-done, is not discontinuous from happening-facts; and is neither in-effective nor without real affect.

Should we really say with Keynes, that our mind changes as the “facts” change? Isn’t it just our relationship with facts that changes, or our perspective on these facts (our knowledge of them) that has changed? Facts clearly can cause changes; but in the end, whatever has been the case seems to be like our own past-life when, and if we are no-longer—i.e. when nothing would remain to be changed and our past-living has become wholly past fact, like a time out-of-time.

In a large part, the difficulty here (and in Dummett’s exposition) seems to be a confusion of the proposition and the sentence in the fact. In a Fregean way, the proposition can maintain its value (real reference and original sense) across meaning shifts in terms— with the inevitable generating and re-generating inter-play of language games. The proposition (or fact) that B did not kill C does not depend on the current use of the terms “B”
and "C". The sentence is locked into its real language game and so its current use and usefulness. The fact (truth) that B did not kill C remains (past) known or unbeknownst to us.

This, however, means propositional truths are necessarily ideal or idealized, and may be legitimately beyond truth-assessment (justification or verification). It also means that most of the real (true propositional) past remains unknown to us. We can only know parts of what is now past-fact, and probably mostly inaccurately—just as we remember only some of our past experiences; and again, probably mostly inaccurately. But perhaps memory is not meant to give us the past accurately but merely a sketch. This does not detract from the reality of that which or what really happened even if we cannot wholly access this information.

Bergson claimed that we had lost the intuition of duration in its analysis. The intuition of duration, involving real past and real present experience combined is similarly beyond description or sentential interpretation (analysis), though it admits of it. If it is a fact that you are reading this sentence, isn't it always a fact that you read it, even if you soon forget? Aren't facts just once-present now-past things—things that we can do nothing about and things independent of our knowledge? Facts are, in this sense, not just 3rd person idealized-descriptions but real events themselves including experiences.

11.1.1 Remembering Impermanence

As he was leaving the temple, one of his disciples said to him, "Look, Teacher! What massive stones! What magnificent buildings!"

"Do you see all these great buildings?" replied Jesus. "Not one stone here will be left on another; every one will be thrown down...

Heaven and earth will pass away, but my words will never pass away. Mark 13: (1,2,28)

43 So, we are here taking a fact as a propositional truth whose value exceeds the many possible resulting sentential truths and falsities.
While the apocalyptic ontology is not especially popular in professional philosophy, let us ask, what would make Jesus’ prediction actually or literally true? It does, after all, seem to be the reverse, some of the stones seem to remain—but real spoken words seem to vanish into thin air.

Suppose this heaven and earth and these buildings are simply places and objects. But they are not at all happenings (which are impermanent and have a beginning, middle, and end—like living beings which possess fluency or connectedness with other happenings). The buildings are material and subject to decay, they are built by the ideas and efforts of people. Heaven and earth span time but are not happenings as such but materializing processes with only arbitrary delimitation. They may be just abstract locations, directions or positions; or suppose they turn out to be, lifeless objects—like our dry bones (though they persist for millions of years while we ourselves seem to perish, becoming again just earth).

Words, in contrast, as spoken are deeds, and also a means of representing knowledge (they may contain truthful content); they are not passing things, but living (and lived-) actions. If those (true) words will never pass away it is because such things (as actions and knowledge) are not like buildings, and the earth—they are not just here now and then gone. Action, as karmic, and dispositional as well as episodic (habitual and compulsive) effects are continued in present action as currently manifest, or manifestable; and what is true in any given case, remains true—both now and then, or always—even if unknown by us. Look at the magnificence of what is materially manifest before our eyes—this is passing. But that cannot pass away. Perhaps that is what is hinted at by the following utterance:

_The river tells no lies, though standing on the shore the dishonest man still hears them._ 44

The sort of phenomenal realism offered by Bergson and Abhinava gives us both the preservation and self-generation of the living past. By way of consciousness, remembering

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44 “Stargate SG-1” episode 5.21 _Meridian_
and excluding, the world becomes active, a play of truths and illusions. The past remains real in its virtual or immaterial fixedness but the malleability of the past is a result of the idea that the fundamental ontological substance of time is meaning-bearing. This is an apparently radical view; but its intent is only to give genuine reality back to personal and lived experience.

The question of whether our remembrances expire with our bodies upon our death depends on the scope we give to "our remembrances". But why must the past 'remain'? In other words, why hold on to the remnant and not just accept the past as it appears to be, dead and gone? Here, we can suggest that the knowability of the past suggests an aesthetic sort of reason: Perhaps as a testament, a testimony, a text, a triptych, or a tune; a creation to be heard, read, enjoyed and interpreted from endlessly new perspectives.

An examination of remembrance (and forgetting) is central not only to any philosophical analysis of consciousness, but psycho-spiritually, the offerings of remembrance may far exceed the function of "bringing back the past". Remembrance gives us more than just knowledge of what is actually past. Memory reaches toward our purposes letting us "keep them in mind" and so enact them. The imperative "Remember!" has all sorts of action-propelling forces that keep us going forward to know more, to do and to be one-way rather than another.

If we want to use our memory to its full effect, besides remembering what happened in the past, what should we remember? Should we keep in mind the horrors of the past as well as its joys? Should we just keep in mind our own interests, goals and desires for the future? Should we remember what we cannot now see, or what might lie behind the visible—the past in general, or the parts of the self left-behind to push us forward? Should we just try to remember the good and the beautiful, or even just the true, even if it seems not
so lovely when remembered? A complete “Art of Memory” would be able to answer such normative questions.

What we actually remember at any given time determines what we will do; and, to some extent, we can control what we “keep in mind”. If, e.g. I remember the call to be or act a certain way, then I am not remembering a past event in the world necessarily, although by such meditations, I can re-identify or re-make myself in the image of another. Not only are we drawn to representations of ourselves (as we draw them) on an aesthetic basis of “what speaks to us”, we learn to recognize such high ideals not by remembering what we once were but recognizing what we might have been or might still be. This gives us an expanded view of the role of memory, not only as recollection, but also as transformative self-knowledge, as well as mindfulness or attentiveness; and quickly leads us into very personal and normative issues.

11.2 Epistemology of Memory: A Stock-taking

In this dissertation, we first examined whether our awareness of the past was a reliable means of knowing. Is our access or knowledge of past happenings direct or does it require mediation by means of images, representations, memory-traces, etc. In case of autobiographical memory, we came up with an interesting result: Such first person token-remembering is presentative of a current absence and re-presentative of a past presence. This duality is reflected in debates regarding the validity, directness and indirectness of remembrance as an independent or original means of knowledge.

In our everyday interactions and conceptual-knowing, we depend on our memory without conscious attention. Remembrance of one type or another is at the least a necessary condition for all veridical judgments and recognitions. But memory representations and images or revived traces of them are current and notoriously unreliable or dubitable. This
makes explicitly truth-claiming or declarative memory more unreliable than inexplicit
undeclared memory which is inescapably relied upon even to make sense of occasional falsity of our perceptions, inferences, memories etc.

After responding to many tough arguments which have been presented to prove that it is not a first class "knowledge-source", we concluded that it is, at least on most occasions, a respectable means of knowing. We must concede at least default trustworthiness to remembrance, like we give to testimony—even if we admit a proneness to distortion, and a vulnerability to error. Memory is not like other means of knowing, but has a wider import. Memory is the basis of the possibility of knowledge and also of error, of choice; of the apprehension of absence hence, of recognition of change.

Besides its independent epistemic status, the role of remembrance in all other means of cognition (perceiving, inferring, linguistic knowledge, etc.), cannot be underemphasized. In ordinary veridical recognition, an accurate perception depends on the accurate reference of the memory demonstrative known as none other than the perceptual demonstrative. This man is that man! Where that man is, or can be described as "the one who...", or identified as "Devadatta".

Although remembering is a form of knowing, sensory knowing at present is arguably perception—whether directed internally or externally. Likewise recognition (this is that man) not only involves the indexical perceived this but also involves a memory demonstrative that man. The identity of this man and that man is coupled by the one who experienced directly that man and this man, but also knows them as the same while knowing the contexts as different. Thus our present perception that we are remembering (as a form of recognizing one's own diachronic identity, e.g.) may be classed, at least in part as perceptual. But while personal remembrance may not be perceptual it may yet involve a real "direct acquaintance" with currently real past experience.
This direct unmediated knowledge of our own past experience as such, indicates a real pastness—a real diachronic identity of consciousness over time. When one remembers past experience there is an inherent connection and recognition (even if implicit) of this experiencer with that one. Remembering a past event is thus a case of knowing oneself (as it is of knowing others)—even if one is unaware of that knowledge. I may not necessarily recognize this self as the same explicitly (so as to be able to declare, e.g. “I am the same person as that child.” Here, I am making myself an object, viz. ‘that child’. Or 'this is that man', or 'this is Devadatta’.45

These apparent contradictions are held together like those of tense ascription, or of then and now, before and after—viz. in the tension of consciousness. (SO this is what it’s like to be walking-set-of-contradictions!) But these contradictions are not false but realized as actually the case. Devadatta is one and many in more than one sense of both terms. In this, reference is made to a unifying identity holding together the diversity of what is currently happening now ('this') and holding apart what has happened already or not yet happened or was but is not-now ('that').

Now we answer the question of access more fully: When we remember, we have immediate and unspeakable knowledge of our own past (to the limit of unconscious unmediated knowledge of those experiences); and also knowledge of this past that we remember (perceive), as well as other shared pasts that we may speak about. This raises further questions regarding memory and its relation to perception. Here we turned to the idea of the 'trace' in its localist or archivist and distributed forms and agreed with Bergson’s conclusions that memories themselves cannot be stored in the brain. Real immaterial

45 Or, craving more generality as Wittgenstein might complain, saying, e.g. ‘these two are one’ or ‘what is one is many’.
consciousness exceeds currently manifest intentional consciousness, and is its essential condition; just as the real past exceeds the real present time and is its foundation.

If we consider current experience to be real, we experience a present time of action, so, as Naiyāyika philosophers, Śaiva philosophers, and Bergson would seem to agree, recognition, and the remembrance involved in current knowing become perceptions as they are inserted in this present time of activity and directed forward. Bergson and the Śaiva philosophers draw the further conclusion that memory is fundamentally intra-personal and yet divine—both an immanent and transcendent power. Memory gives the possibility of action and composition of images, cognitions, perceptions, current manifestation, and presently available materiality.

We concluded that knowledge of one's own past is by way of "direct acquaintance"—having experienced—which is a real past fact; both ontologically real and not dependent upon the actual remembrance of having experienced. Returning back to our past self we turn back to the self itself. We agree with Wittgenstein, memory is not necessarily accompanied by the experience of remembering. According to Bergson, true-remembering would be direct unmediated knowledge of past experience when known without the intention of action

One’s original (perceptual) experience is also direct acquaintance. Somehow, such direct acquaintance with what was the case remains in some sense. The subject of the direct acquaintance is also subject to the experience. Hence also, this subject is object, changed by the encounter. But this must be the same subject as the one subjected. Even if a mnemonic-trace is left as a perfect reflection of perception (as localist and archived, even if immaterially superposed), the experiencing (tracing) is just this changing of the living acquaintance. This does not deny the permanence of the true-tracing (the past experiencing itself as knowable
(perhaps ideally)—or as Russell and Bergson say, the true-memory (the episodic or autobiographical ones) that demarcate real past experiences.

Also, since past experiences leave traces on material organizations, determining future actions, habits and tendencies, such a complex effect on the organism (as combined with other similarly-impressing events) leaves, even such a ‘traced’ experience, largely (or at least always remaining in some way) ineffable and indescribable in completion, although it is not inexpressible in any sense. It is for this reason that we find remembrance independent of the remembering experience and so, ultimately we agree with Broad and Wittgenstein, that the memory-image has been overemphasized.

This also means that the representative function of remembrance, its currency, has been arbitrarily restricted to being revivable at a given time. This is its current manifestation in action, so to speak, but seems to greatly undervalue what memory is, does, and shows. In fact, as Wittgenstein seems to say, no experience of remembrance is required for me to say rightly that I remember. And Anscombe, Russell and Campbell, agree that we get the idea of the past by remembering. There is no onset of remembering—though there may be an onset of explicit recall.

Remembrance is original to our awareness. It would be logically impossible to remember a time when one did not remember. We have a priori knowledge of real past experience. This real past experience is beyond our remembrance and cannot be ‘stored’ materially or spatially-extended, but must offer the possibility of being remembered. Thus, there must be a greater “memory-store” to things-in-themselves.

If memory is cognition and mind-dependent, this implies what appears material is a manifestation of mind. A real past may be remembered by us, but not limited to our own consciousnesses (present or past), indicates the reality of experiential reticence. If self-
consciousness is required for memory we have become panpsychists thinking about memory, and considering the necessary (but qualified) reality of the past.

11.2.1 Mis-taking Memory

As a means of knowledge, our remembrance is justifiably in question as it gives equal possibility for erroneous cognition and false recognition. The source of the difficulty was localized (for our purposes here) in the habitually-motivated means of remembering—its causal conditions being traces and cues both of which are subject to degradation and distortion of even the most reflectively-apt remembrance or potentially observable trace.

In the third epistemology chapter, we analyzed the discussion of traces more directly. Here we concluded that even if memory traces are unique and linked in relations to their time or within a web of event-making, they may be superimposed in their immaterial “storage” (untokened or latent), and made into images and representations by the call to current action and future expectation. Most critiques of traces are due to the idea of materiality rather than particular (archival or uniquely related) localization. The problem is their place in space not their position in time; nor their supposition in general, nor their composition in or as time itself.

It is thus our current representation of the past which cannot be taken as knowledge proper, though a current presentation of the past (a mental time travel so to speak—one’s potentially unmediated knowledge of past experience) might be. The clarity of knowing past experience and the involvement of clarity of knowing mind itself (without intention of action) is involved in freedom and we found both Bergson and Abhinava promoting common ideas with which we agree here: Life is a movement toward unification (increasing knowledge and successful action) what is without life is a movement toward dissolution.
decreasing knowledge and repetitive and habitual action). These correspond to different experiences of tension or duration in the living organism.

In Bergson’s view, living organisms are the evolution of spirit or consciousness extending and contracting in different tensions and so having experiences of different durations, different ways and conditions of knowledge and being in differing situations and called to different actions. Thus causal phenomena are based in mnemonic phenomena—the past must be remembered to be replaced. This is because one thing takes the place of that other and so the place of that other (as prior and definitional) must be assumed.

We returned here, also, to the issues between the direct and representationalist theories of memory by way of traces. Specifically we found that even traces and cues cannot ground (be a sufficient cause of) remembrance. The additional discussion makes the situation out thus: Our current remembering exceeds what our current experience of remembering is. Likewise current images (what could be perceived) outrun what is actually perceived on any side, according to Bergson. The result is a subjective-realism. It is subjective because of the original concession to each realism and idealism, viz. the “image” between the object itself, and a particular perception of that object; but also a form of realism, because the really-lived-past literally both makes, and remakes the present (i.e. the actual perceivable).

Without perception, locating and ‘picking’ out or delimiting a focus from the field, the world would resort to numberless vibrations and would remain (to use Bergson’s term) “uncontracted”. Abhinava would perhaps say that it would be un-illumined, unmanifest or indistinct (aprakṣaṭatva) without the light of consciousness giving its outline or reflecting its form (as identification includes re-identification). We experience the world only with these identifications, and must admit that the hypothesis of numberless vibrations is just that, like pure experience, just hypotheses. But even in-distinctly, these have content which overflows
any manifestation; it is possible images and not just empty vibrations which outrun actual perceptions (possible perceptions outrun actual perceptions). Without some sort of ultimately real contraction or duration, there would be no actual perceivers and nothing perceived.

Hence past experience is real. It exceeds our own consciousnesses but depending on consciousness, remains available by means of direct acquaintance. The past neither "goes" nor has "gone" anywhere. Remaining current in the self Itself, which remains not just across time (like the bones of an organism), but recognizing its endurance; indeed, biding its time, it experiences duration and impermanence. And, unlike bones this identity must not be just diachronically but synchronically available—not just identifiable across time but identifiable with time. Synchronically (Campbell’s deep decentering) and "achronically" we propose that there is timelessness to all experience in its becoming past.

Experimental psychology has largely accepted the ideas put forth by Tulving, derived and developed over the past thirty years. Episodic or autobiographical memory is quickly called ‘autonoetic’—and has been recently specified as "the ability to recall the context of the original encoding." It is said, e.g. that such memory and the self are closely linked and that autobiographical memory "grounds the self by providing coherent narratives organized to elicit a sense of identity across time." (Lemogne et al., 2006, p. 258) Context here includes the time and space (the specificity of the event), sensory-perceptual details, the subjective experience as a whole (i.e., autonoetic consciousness), and the visual experience (or self-perspective). Autonoetic consciousness, they say, is "a sine qua non condition of episodic memory retrieval.

It is defined by a sense of the self in time and the ability to relive subjective experiences from the encoding context by mentally traveling back in time. Self-(field perspective), rather than a perspective in which the subject sees himself engaged in the event as an observer would (observer perspective). (Lemogne et al., 2006, p. 259)

The ability to "travel" back in time has caught on, but where do we travel to when we go "back in time" in this autonoetic way? Certainly not literally light years away to where
the earth was in space-time then—but we seem to leave now. Maybe we just haven’t realized when now is? Here I propose that we can think of the past as what is behind us—in back—but the spatial metaphors are misleading—directing our attention away from the real philosophical issue.

11.3 Selves Not-Onto oneself and Behind Oneself

Past experience is like our bodily back, viz., what we do not see completely since we are facing otherwise. But without a back, I would be just a front, which would not only be very superficial, but inconceivable. Times past are like this, back then and not now or ahead—but they are not separable except arbitrarily. Where does the front of my body end and the back of it begin? I am just one body with both front and back, and what you see of me, whether front or back is just one sided. The ‘other side’ is unseeable. Likewise the past is just what is invisible not just behind us, but our ‘invisible in-side’.

Knowing past experience involves knowing oneself. Remembering does not require experiencing remembering, and the enactment of memory does not require the awareness of the employed memory ‘traces’ or representations. We do not live by narrative construction or historical recreation but ontological (experiential) knowledge. It is this, if anything, that is of real (lasting) metaphysical and aesthetic or felt-value. Moreover, in contrast to the common trend to which Tulving, Campbell, and Dummett all seem to subscribe, it is the view here that this is not a specifically human achievement (and not a result of evolution, although our ability to explicitly reflect with one another about it might be). This sort of awareness of the past by direct acquaintance is common to all living creatures though the ability to conceptualize, recall, image (or imagine) explicitly (experience or re-live, or describe to another) may be quite different.
There seems to be no ground to conclude with certainty, e.g., that a lemur sitting on a rock in the sun and working on cracking and eating a nut isn’t also thinking about a particular past time, say a time from the previous year when her albino child died because he could not keep up. Though she mourned with wailing for as long as she could, she had to leave gradually losing scent of the group. (This death-scene is one I remember from a documentary.) Who is to say she is not missing him—remembering him, or regretting having had to leave his body so soon? Could she not think about this without being able to explicitly express it?

Her remembering or re-imaging of it (her re-living it) is beyond neuroscientific ability to determine. Images of the neural activity of this lemur’s brain could not confirm this for many reasons (including a lack of specificity of particular content of neural regions and the possibility of alternative functionality of these regions, to name just a couple of issues). Localizing episodic memory to a more-fully-developed part in the human brain, like the frontal lobe (instead of the amygdala, e.g.) lends credence to such anthropodominant views.

There are many closely related and confused issues here of explicitness, language, and ability to declare: issues of ontological primacy and phylogenetic diversity, and so also of the relation of this epiphenomenal and seemingly miraculous ability to human consciousness in particular, and to evolutionary directedness; as well as problems of actual and experimental interpretation. These are very difficult issues involving assumptions about language, memory, perception, time and history.

11.3.1 Episodic Memory and Affective (original) Recognition

It seems that episodic memory is tied deeply to feeling; and that it allows the affectivity and recognition of present experience as having meaning; and that this sort of remembering is shared among conscious creatures to a larger degree than we have imagined.
Instinct works on memory, past experience, and veridical knowledge. This says something not only about my recognition, but the likeness of cognition and recognition.

While it is difficult to study hetero-phenomenologically the self-known past without being accused of anthropomorphizing (or what is perhaps more accurately, "de-anthropomorphizing"); and mental time travel spans experience, what has been and will be has been and will be endured, viz. lived past times and livable future times. These are just now and "go" nowhere in space. If anything "goes", it is simply we who do. Past time "goes" nowhere (at least not anywhere that it has not already been). The metaphor of mental time-travel lets us easily miss out on a very important issue—since there is no-where to travel, even given this chronesthesic ability, where, or when, (what?) is the past?

Since these questions of explicitness, declaration, and observability are highly relevant, we can ask whether episodic remembrance should be tied to or so easily labeled as "autobiography"; or to some sort of writing (or overt and translatable) linguistic ability like drawing a narrative; or the ability to make reference onto a grid of space-time coordinates. We noted this very deep problem of accepting a species-specificity of explicit declaration.

It seems that episodic memory—memory for what it was and what it was like—must be prior ontologically to semantic (that it was) and procedural memory (habit). Why should matter or habitual or causal action arise from free or mnemic action? The past is acted by matter, imagined by mind as Bergson said. In this imagination of the past lay its openness and our freedoms of choice, knowledge and activity as well; but this is not to say the past is not real. Past events and experiences have occurred and past actions cannot be undone.

11.4 Some Solutions: Combining Realism and Panpsychism

Bergson argues that memory is not a weakened perception and there is no strict line between the conscious and unconscious. (Dennett also argues for the latter but is ambiguous
about the former, as noted in Appendix I.) Like Nyāya philosophers, Bergson suggests that perception is very distinct from remembrance. As discussed in chapter three, he asks us to consider what perception would be in the absence of memory, i.e., ‘pure perception’ (perception with the most limited duration (utter distension or de-tension). He proposes that in such perception—which we could not and do not experience since our actual perception is memory-laden—there would be no contraction of moments made possible by the two subjective elements which Bergson cites, viz., of true-memory and affect (feeling). These subjective additions contract the tensionless vibrations of the lowest level of consciousness, viz., material habituation as an extensive aggregate of images hypothesized as pure perceptions, into actual perceptions or manifest reality. These two subjective elements, viz., true memory and affect, amount to memory of past experience and recognition of oneself as that past-experimenter.

If we hypothesize perception without memory as a perfectly current event, perceptions can be considered forward-directed activities; and so ultimately ‘material’ involving causal relation and repetition. In our actual perception, the weight of memory pushes these perceptions forward into action as remembrances are inserted into this ‘moving plane of the present’ (moving by the impulse of spirit or the apriori (past)). This gives us knowledge of the present as an experience of duration and affectivity. In Bergson’s bridging view between rationalism and empiricism, externally perceptible objects are images—this paper, your body, this, or that brain. Such things have the lowest degree of duration. These things are re-created by repetition, necessity and habituation. What endures (or exdures) is consciousness or spirit of which memory is its indication.

Bergson gives ontological priority to the past because the past is a matter of memory alone, and yet it is the past memory that pursues present activity. Real past experience (true-memory, or knowing what happened by direct acquaintance) is evidence of spirit enabling the
experience of duration—a real diachronic (or fundamentally achronic) consciousness. This background of any current awareness, known or unknown reflectively, is the cause of the manifestation of current activity.

This view is idealistic but does not fall prey to the solipsism or perspectivalism of idealism since this consciousness upholds the real diversity in its own unity. Like the Śaiva philosophers Bergson offers a complex dualism in monism. Diverse realities are composed of consciousness being pushed into materialization by the weight of duration (past experiences). In the Śaiva view the power of Śiva is Śakti who makes him genuinely two (and so also many). In such a revised epistemology and ontology, the re-conception of dualism is radical. It is neither an anomalous monism nor just a qualified dualism, but pervasive or common and unqualified.

Here, experience is taken to be the source of real metaphysical value. This value is retained by the power of memory which can only be an indication of what is not impermanent. The power of memory (along with consciousness and possible exclusion) makes the duality of our experience possible. The gift of self and other is the grace of spirit coming to know itself as itself, both as subject and object. This is our coming to know taking place in time or as temporal. The consciousness that stands always behind supporting what is manifest stands apart from time.

This reorientation of our ordinary perspective has important consequences. It implies e.g., that while perceptions may be sensori-motor and so material (imagistic) and physically effective, remembrance and affectivity themselves cannot be purely material. As they form part of the present experience they may be currently presented (images) as inward/affective or outward/effective in recognition, and so may provide the continuation of the material or causal. However, untokened or dispositional remembrances, and even past experiences that have been forgotten, have no share in this apparently present materiality.
Memories cannot be subject to material storage; and they cannot be a matter of re-instanting a pattern in current material formation. Such pattern is precisely what is being re-membered, and it is the basis of this re-membrance that is at issue. As Reid made evident, the knowing that one is remembering requires that there is something beyond two disparate tokenings. And, as Abhinava and Madhva emphasized, in the ability to know that this is like that, I do, in fact, remember my own past experience. That we can genuinely refer to the past must be allowed since our knowledge of the past makes current recognition possible.

Would it be mistaken to ask how, or even why, we know our own past experience as our own? Is it just because it is our own? Clearly veridical memory is required, but if remembrance is only a material function when enacted then what is it before such enactment? Is it just a perception? In other words, is memory nothing other than a weakened perception, a trace remaining in the present?

Bergson strongly denies such a claim (like Hume’s) that memory is just a less lively representation. Memory and perception must be admitted to be two parallel functions—it is only this that makes conceptual or regular (‘impure’) perception possible. But this is a great reversal of contemporary views. For Bergson, like Abhinava and Utpaladeva, memory is evidence of something quite extraordinary, but still ubiquitous. For these philosophers it is only memory that makes materialization possible. In these views recognition of the power and meaning of memory amounts to evidence of a unitary spirit or living awareness that unites all things in consistency.

Such views admittedly begin phenomenologically, but also empirically and naturalistically—with the variety of our experience. We are familiar with two sorts of things which are united in our own experience: thought (words or images, representations, dreams, etc.), and apparently material things (like our bodies which give inward private affective sensations and produce externally evident conditions or motions). But the overcoming of a
duality between matter and mind, according to Bergson, and the dualism between materialism and idealism lies in separating matter and mind at their extremes in our experience. We perceive matter and our perceptions figure in a chain of causal actions which are externally evident. The brain is likewise material—an image we perceive extended in space. There is no 'place' in such an externally related currently apparent thing to 'hold' a memory. Thus while our own personal memory seems to be privately our own, it may not be located in our body and it may not belong to us as much as we belong to it. But if memories are not confined to our bodies—since these are limited to currency or having a currently perceived value or evident extension—where are unremembered remembrances? Perhaps they are not anywhere (and are, e.g. non-local). This is fine, but then how does one remember a previously unremembered event?

According to Bergson, one cannot. Perceptions do not 'turn into' memories. All events are remembered events and even at the time they are perceived. This makes remembrance and perception reflections of each other at any current time. Yet, the memory appears to fall back while the perception is directed forward. But there is nothing 'falling back'—our remembrances go nowhere. Since, for Bergson and the Śaiva philosophers, true-memory or self-recognition (respectively) is evidence of a reality which is prior to any manifest object (or subject), this amounts to basing the causal on the mnemonic, and the insentient on the sentient.

But beginning with the epistemology of the past, it is not surprising that our results indicated some sort of common or universally immanent self-consciousness, or genuine knowing, at the root of remembrance and experience. We turned then to questions of metaphysics: what is that reality or existent state of affairs that remembering—and remembering alone—can make us directly aware of? Is it the past as a part of time, or some past events; or just one's own personal past experiences?
We went through many distinct conceptions of reality (and unreality) of the past, and finally concluded with a complex critique of Michael Dummett's increasingly realist modifications of the original anti-realist position he outlined, i.e. that the reality of the past consists in some consciousness's possible awareness of the past. Our uneasy critique of Dummett's justificationist views on the meaning of statements about the past, brought us to the central question which figures so centrally in Abhinavagupta and Bergson: How is the past metaphysically related to our consciousness; or, more specifically, to remembrances of the past or even that unique sense of the past that makes all memories phenomenologically so distinct from perceptions or anticipations?

Certainly, if you are an old-fashioned realist about the past, then memory is at best a 'recorder of the past, and could never be a maker of it. But as we have seen, Bergson argues relentlessly against situating memories in the physical brain or the current mind while keeping the past in the no-longer-there part of the real river of time.

After a critique of a purely semantic problematic of past time, we considered the metaphysics of the past apart from the semantics of the past tense. We examined the central problems of time under the three rubrics of existence, persistence, and tense. Examining existence of the past we concluded that while what is past does not exist now (does not stand-out or is not manifest—unless currently remembered, for example) part of its being 'past' is its occurring then and not now. What keeps it (occurring) is that it is then from now; and since now is tied to here (this current duration), we seem to have the confluence of space and time at our body (mind). We then examined the existence of present: a durationless present versus a time of activity.

A lived-time or real present time requires real presence, and so we sided with the third sorts of views described above, i.e. a growing-blob view admitting a real past (a lived- and living-past). We then turned to persistence. What persists over time must be divided by
time, measured by it, by the duration of other activities duration is an experience of temporal endurance. Perception or experience of any duration (and the conception of experience of persistence) requires memory. What persists without measure of time endures, what outlasts repeatedly out-lasts its-Self—or ex- tends as the real past extends itself presently.

Tense is held both apart and together only by diachronic self sensing its own persistence (the unity of self-consciousness). Spirit is such an invisible in-back of us. To put this in Advaitin terms: as affective (ānanda) a priori or given (sat) and conscious (cit), which is dividing. But, unlike the Brahman of traditional Advaita, there is nothing static or entirely final (or even dynamic directionlessness), but something dynamically directed and open which is divine and living at with us or in us as we live. Spirit or Mind itself—with the powers of including, objectifying (subjectifying), and excluding, is the source of the unconsciously apparent. It is the source of not only life, but material manifestation and real extensive progression (hence real impermanence).

Living beings function as Bergson describes it, as a hesitation in such materiality itself. Such ‘material memory’ borders on pure repetition with the tendency toward entropic dissolution and is the lowest or most distended or detensed level of this spirit. It is visible delimitation. But this spirit is in us as we are in it. Matter and the materialization effected by conscious perception (perception with memory) are based in such immaterial potency which exists undivided and appears with divisions; the tensionless extension of mind contracted by memory. It is here where the possibility of genuinely free action and the power of will resides for both Bergson and Abhinavagupta. It is only in this recognition of the ontological ground of the mnemic ability, and in a philosophical reversal (proceeding from “intuition”) that we can realize our true condition. Philosophically, this overcomes the problem of matter and mind (memory), and does not contradict what we know about memory.
from the evidence of clinical psychology. Such a view can also provide us with an extended view of memory: what it is, what it does, and what it might do.

Should we go all the way with Abhinavagupta's "I remember"-centered idealistic ontology of the past? Should we add a revisionist Bergsonian Panpsychic twist? After all, in both views, present images or manifestations are dependent on the illumination of knowing, including and being aware of what is 'back-then'. Should we admit that this remembrance, my personal remembrance (and so all remembrance and experience now) depends on something greater than my brain—on something not entirely different from any consciousness at all?

To take Bergson's view, memory and effective past experiences subsist, subsiding (etymologically, 'settling below), but not in the matter that makes my body—which is surfaces all the way down. Rather, the matter that makes my body subsides in the remembrance that keeps past experience current, or living. This is what is imperceptible, or the self itself—which is always other to my currently-limited self. The otherness of this a priori experience opens us to re-form ourselves and overcome the habituations driving our cyclical path; recognizing this past as the material for this continuing present as artwork in progress. The tilt in time we have borrowed from C.K Raju indicates the possibility of such spontaneity in a ground of memory founded in repetition with decay. We avoid the pitfalls of linear and cyclical time topologies by recognizing the virtues of both. The past returns always for it has never left but the future remains open given the constraints of the past combined with its lasting looseness or openness to real revision—affecting not only the past as we know it, but the past as it was and will forever be.

46 Like Kant's transcendental Unity of Apperception, Abhinavagupta seems to require a transcendental Unity of memory-possessor and distinguisher—not now, back then—and current cognizer, for any sense of "I think, I see, I touch, I conjecture." to be possible.
Abhinava and Bergson have argued that the past is known only by remembering; and remembering as present representation often leads to error; so memory must be a matter of direct acquaintance with the past (like an ulterior-matter or motive.) Dummett supposes memory to be a matter of images or available representations. But by such realist, yet observability-dependent views of the past (the modality retaining their openness to the generation of further experience, knowledge and action), the problem of error is explained; and the problem of going with either localization or distribution is avoided by a view that recognizes direct acquaintance as a very important fact: We are intimately involved with past experience as a general, or even universal, *a priori*.

Separating the materialized memory or enacting remembrance, as its current value artificially delimits the current value of the memory to what is explicitly available, while such enacted remembrance acts even implicitly as dispositions toward actions (*karmaśaya*). We can surmise that the implicit or intrinsic workings of remembrances (untokened) are com-posing (Gr. ana-) and ordering, while the opposite motion of material extension or distension is toward dissolution (*kata-*), breakdown or loss of information or order. The limit of tenselessness is thus directed toward disunification (de-contraction) or ex-tension.

In this way, the material follows the immaterial as its projection, reflection or cast-shadow, and not vice versa. We see the impermanent and insentient as actual and continuing, but do not see sentience or permanency at all. We see a reversed ontological reality—making sentience the outcome of insentient processes. The real in the unreal (or in the less-real), we can only feel or intuit—we can infer for ourselves but cannot make this inference for others. The continuity and difference appearing to us presently is made possible by a deeper ontological interrelation superceding material manifestation. This ancient wisdom embodied even if darkly, in Plato’s cave may not be just remembered myth.
In both the Śaiva tradition and in Bergson’s work, memory brings us into the most personal and normative questions—questions of freedom, will, morality and responsibility. For the Śaiva philosophers, these center on liberation (as *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*) or freedom from future suffering as described above. We have shown here how our desiring is part of our remembering—the emotions of our memory and the current implementation of this memory are decided by such determined or compulsive desiring. Freedom in these traditions is not something given in a worldly sense; it can only be freedom from suffering which is not to be found in living and dying. Freedom from future suffering is true liberation and it may be realized as one is still living. Even Bergson offers higher levels of duration or tension possible of spirit making more of present reality (known) including reality that may seem past.

We have to conclude that the divisions of time are action-related that these are incorporated in perception and feeling intimately as these are also forward directed sensorimotor activities. Such perceiving and feeling is made possible by something which creates a higher level of duration—the insertion of memory or spirit in the hesitation offered by the living being as a center of indetermination. The choice offered by knowledge of the past is to be valued. It is this that leads us to the aesthetic, moral, and practical value of the past and of remembrance; and to what we can do with our remembrance.

We agree wholeheartedly with Bergson, memory is evidence of spirit because matter cannot contain it. Matter is impermanent, memory is not. But this seems contrary to our experiences and knowledge: It seems to us that bones last millions of years, while we ourselves as living creatures are very lucky to have 100, or even 80 or 60 years. And many creatures live an entire life in much less time. Why should anyone hold, like the Buddhists have, and which is accepted or at least not-contradicted by Abhinava and Bergson (along
with contemporary materialists)—that it is the material which is impermanent and always changing?

It is an issue of the under-girding of the material manifestation as changing or involving a variety of identity. This is immediately related to the recurring and often quickly dismissed paradox of the contradictory predications of tense. This problem recurs within times before now (the past)—for the transitivity of the relation requires differentiation and the definitions of the events are arbitrary. We can only ask how long ago before now? How long gone, meaning how far away from you and/or I, here and now (or there and then)?

Having investigated into the knowledge, reality and value of the past in this long essay, let us wrap up our "net findings" here.

**Net Findings**

1. Memory must be a form of direct acquaintance since it does not require a current image or representation or present tokening. In contrast, any token rememberance requires that the memory-connection supercede what images can be conjured of it. A feeling of likeness or familiarity cannot be the means of recognition of memory as such since to remember is to actually successfully grasp the past object or state or event; whereas, my finding it familiar or feeling it is similar to something I have seen before is a process like walking, not a success like arriving.

2. In Classical Indian philosophy the issue of memory-knowledge is discussed explicitly and memory is generally rejected as a source of knowledge. Memory’s permeability to both false addition and necessary loss seem to show its function is other than to give us knowledge. Yet memory is required for all other means of knowing like perception, testimony, or inference. We side with the few direct theorists of memory in the Indian tradition, and admit that knowing pastness is an unmediated relation.

3. Memory is a reliable source of knowledge despite objections against its reliability based on its lack-of-freshness and public checks on its accuracy. Yet the function of memory is wider than giving us knowledge of our present surroundings. By memory we know that we have forgotten much of our own experience and this real experience, though open to being remembered if it occurred, remains largely lost to our uncontrollable forgetting (which fortunately allows us the present).

4. We have no option but to rely on remembrance, because we ourselves belong to our memories—or are made of them—we are what we retain, recall, and get-used-to. We are
nothing more than this culmination of remembrance: material and habitual, semantic and meaningful and experiential and deeply felt—ingrained as our being.

5. If memory images or some actual present revival or remembrance is not necessary (even as some form of current electrical activity in the brain e.g.) in order for memory not to be lost, we can conclude with Bergson that memories are neither spatial nor physical, nor necessarily local or present (except as part of this present embodiment of memory which is considered the lowest level of mind, i.e. habit memory which is manifest as spatial or material). Matter is just the visible edge of memory.

6. Memory must be considered an independent means of knowing since there is knowledge had by no other means and perception cannot be realized separate from memory (just as we cannot be really separated from our shadow—despite the fact it may be redundant and so obscured at midday). A pure perception would be nonconceptual and provide no knowledge.

7. As an object of genuine knowledge, the past must be real, in the sense that there has to be a past, as past, for us to be able to know it as such.

8. But, calling the past real should not be confused with calling it present or inert; nor inaccessible, vanishing, or lost-forever.

9. This past, knowable but now unknown, exceeds our knowledge but must be something we can be directly acquainted with. We know that there is something knowable exceeding our own ability to know and this is not like knowing another place in time. This past we have apparently lost has gone nowhere: whatever is, then was, and so always will be invisibly behind us—not unreal but far surpassing our apparent selves.

10. Neither the past nor our direct quasi-perceptual apprehension of it can live in the present brain or in any part of this extended material world. The real past of this universe is something like the non-private memory-consciousness of the common-spirit or self—as Bergson and Abhinavagupta have argued.

11. There is a complex relation between the objectivity and reality of the past and its accessibility and vulnerability to consciousness.

12. Insofar as all desires are drenched with remembrance and the self-transforming pleasures and pains of the past, the past is desired and so must be desirable. To treasure the past and let our remembrance transform us (as we must), then, the past has to be irreducibly real as past and gone, yet also available for attaching of new meaning and new value (or disvalue). Such revaluation, reinterpretation, and re-appropriation of the past transforms us now, and if we change, the world changes. (And, we can add, as Wittgenstein says in his Notebooks, when we are dead, the world does not change, but ceases to exist.)

13. In the future, our transformations introduce moral, aesthetic, and material change in the world. But genuine transformation of the past is a spiritual realization through a genuine reformation and un-forgetting of our own past what is in-back of our self as we look to the world. This is quite literally a ‘realization’, or ‘making real’ rendering what we do that is good or beautiful real (and what is bad or ugly as well), by recognizing that they have been
(so) since back-then. We recognize the invisible side of what is apparently real as
groundingly-real—i.e., the unseen value constantly in-back of what is seen.

14. From this knowledge of the past and its remembrance in the widest sense of the term
(including recognition of the real _a priori_ offering this possibility of the present as a gift) we
can transform habit into feeling and turn matter into art. We can open what is immobile and
fixed to transformation and re-creation. We are the reflection of this power of mind and can
create real value spontaneously realizing and making-real not just actual function but
potential form.

15. Memory is not only the basis of the possibility of knowledge but also of choice. It is thus the
ground of conscious awareness, will, and enables intentional action. Memory gives us
knowledge of the past and the art of remembering can not only give us less fallible
knowledge of the past, but can open up the possibility of genuinely altering the value (and
this is the ultimate substance) of the past.

11.4.1 _Specific Lessons learnt from the Epistemological Investigations into Memory_

In the power of memory we find both a necessary and default trustworthiness, which
is the basis of possibility of knowledge but also of error. Memory gives us options; it enables
the apprehension of absence (present change) and so offers us choices. Forgotten experience
or unaware memory (even as just the possibility of remembering some past experience)
indicates that we have direct unmediated knowledge of ourselves. In this, reference is made
to a unifying identity holding _together_ the diversity of what is currently happening now (and
is currently manifest as 'this' and holding _apart_ what has happened already and not yet
happened as 'that'. Following Bhartrhari, we might say that there is a unity of what is lit up,
unhidden by the shrouding power of time, and what is concealed in two incompatible ways
by that shrouding power. Whether ordinary recognition is a veridical perception, depends on
the accurate co-reference of the memory demonstrative and the perceptual demonstrative—
whether this man is that man.\textsuperscript{47} Identifying \textit{this} with \textit{that} is how we get on in life and even our ordinary continuous cognition is split between now and then.\textsuperscript{48}

With Wittgenstein and Anscombe (and perhaps Russell and even Dummett) we hold that memory is not necessarily accompanied by the experience of remembering. I may correctly remember and yet there may be no present activity. Remembrance may be passive, so to speak, or may remain veridical without reenactment. The unseen side of the self is just this time back-then (this diachronic identity and synchronic experience (achronic)).

Examining the epistemology of the past left us finding its basis in the remembering of that which once was, so we turned to address the metaphysics of the past on its own—to consider what antirealism and realism about the past specifically

\textbf{11.4.2 Metaphysical and Ontological Conclusions}

Trying on semantic antirealism about the past with Dummett, we felt the same need for addressing the problems of the illogically-vanishing past, and of our ordinary reliance on the truth-value links for worldly action and interaction. The continued adjusting of the antirealist position left us wondering if the new version was a form of realism disguiseing itself (against-itself) or, with Moretti, whether it was subject to the same original critiques.

But it seems an 'antirealist' sort of view about the past (one rejecting current bivalence-decisions) can avoid the critique of the vanishing past. The observation of the past which reveals it as such, cannot admit its' later-vanishing. Here vanishing thus means only "disappearing from epistemic sight" not dropping out of existence. It is, so to speak, a 'Cambridge-vanishing' only. Yet, if there were no observation and could not be or have

\textsuperscript{47} Memory of that man or Devadatta makes this recognition possible (through traces); but knowing \textit{that} man Devadatta, as such, requires remembering Devadatta (as he was then) as this man.

\textsuperscript{48} Or, between the speciously present with its specious pastness and impending futurity and the call for action made by sensori-motor perception an object knowing and acting in a world of images, one among many.
been, then there is no need for bivalence. The conclusion we reached is that the vanishing of the past from here has no effect on the issue of whether the past might vanish.

Even in our own death, where our past experiences would seem to die with us—just as our remembrance of these events has no effect on their remaining reality, so also the death of our remembering-ability will not un-do the past. We just can’t see London if we’ve gone to Manchester. The past (London) has really vanished, but just from here. No one would sincerely want to hold that London has vanished (unless, like parts of New Orleans, or Burma, or the twin towers, it really had). It is not that the past cannot be altered, but it cannot vanish or be un-done. We must admit other possible observers who may act to genuinely affect this real past time, of which we have no reason to suppose there is a limit.

For such reasons, we adjusted Dummett’s mitigated antirealism from Truth and the Pasta bit. We admitted his changes to ‘what could have been observed’, or ‘what could be observed then’—but left them open to many other times that are ‘now’, which may not have likewise passed ‘then’. We changed this to ‘what could be observed, or what might still be observed’. The observability of the past remains open (though perhaps not to us in all cases of what has passed). Because this observation will affect the past, or will decide the truth value for new statements about the past, such an observation might determine the past; but it will be as present observation. From here, we cannot originally determine that past.

Hence we can agree with Dummett’s rejection of bivalence for statements about the past for many complex reasons having to do with language, understanding and context as well. But from his analysis we can go further to defend it as a form of minimal realism. After all, the observability of something is based on its being a possible object of observation and not it’s having (already) been observed. And, if the past remains observable in principle, it is hence real. It remains open to change only because of the potential effect of the observation on the determination of the event. But this will not contradict the original
determination but continue it in another. Meaning and value are added to the past (which so grows and changes)—not only by 'now' always becoming 'then' (the ordinary adding to the past)—but because the past itself re-generates its value and meaning in connection with new parts of itself. But this also does not necessitate that this potential was not there it that events original occurrence itself.

The observability of what is (or was), is a function of that itself, and not of this here and now. Though it might require some other here and now, this may be at any temporal 'distance' that that observer can affect—i.e. its “present time”. This position is preferably recognized as realism as there is a directly-knowable reality remaining available that is independent of currently limited observation. It is not that meaning must be manifest in use, but manifestable. This remains open to further power of manifestation. Thus, while there are not truths that are recognition-transcendent, there are certainly truths that are recognition transcendent for us here and now as individual knowers. Instead, we might say that such past truths are transcendently-recognizable. What is or has been remains so, though further meaning might be added and novelty created; again however, this does not go against what was originally-so. The meaning of what has been or what already is—and which way it will go—still remains open or not fully determined. The actual potency of the past outweighs any perception we might have of it.

Realism about the past is necessary to realism about any time (especially any present-time), and even to realism more generally—about knowledge, our experience of one another, and our inter-subjectively-known and occupied environment. Realism about the past is also the central dividing issue in issues often considered separate, viz. issues of change and identity over time (or issues of persistence and tense). In addition, the presentist-eternalist debate, though most often considered to concern tense, if taken as a debate over time’s existence (the existence of the present time as different from past or future time) also
fundamentally revolves around the question of past-reality. In these three questions (existence, persistence and tense), the reality of the past is involved as a hybrid-view of e.g., presentism and eternalism (resulting in a growing block); endurance and perdurance (resulting in exdurance or stage view four-dimensionalism); and even in a complex view of being-tensed.

We attempted to show that the issue between presentism and eternalism is over the reality of the past. This is because eternalism can be interpreted as the view that all things are past (the order of events is an order of priority). But this eternalism makes the past static, just as the hybrid growing-block theories do. Yet the past cannot be static or inert because it is involved in any tenable presentism as a lived-past. In other words, the A-series of passing time must be admitted. We also argued that the B-series recognizes an eternal (and perhaps even a continuing series of) priority—even thought of as a changing-four-dimensionalism. Here we might call this more basic ontological position making possible the division of tensed and tenseless, a growing blob view—in which the past is not ‘over there’ but part of the organism that is ‘still here’.

The problem of persistence showed that the contemporary discussion illuminates the problem of persistence but only indirectly. The problem of temporary intrinsics, or change over time, depends on the ‘endurance’ or ‘persistence’ of the individual knowing over time both unity and difference (and so non-persistence). Neither momentary stage-views nor four-dimensional stage views seem to give the theorist what she is looking for. In the former case, knowing there’s a play going on is inexplicable (who could recognize a stage?) And the latter case overlooks the point that the same play is continuing—the past action is not finished and so not inert, nor static, though we might not yet ‘see’ its significance.

In the case of tense a third view has been less clear in the literature and what has been offered by McTaggart (the C-series), is not a hybrid, but makes possible the division
(appearance) of the A-series and B-series—the presence of tensed and tenseless time together. Here we agree with McTaggart that the point of these third-ways should be to provide a difference making possible the separate possibility of knowing time in these ways—or making possible these competing philosophical theories. This dualism of tenseness (or being-tensed) and tenselessness might be admitted to be our form of knowing—the conceptual and immobile, the indexing of the eternal, and the changing mobile reality of flowing time (a real moving now).

The problem of tense and tenseless co-ascription (and contradictory temporal ascription to events) was found to be resolvable, not by admitting the unreality of time but the reality of past experience and past events and actions. This reality is predicated on an original manifestation dependent on prior observation. The only way to account for our experience and for the metaphysical puzzles of past-time is to admit a real past and a difference between past and present. This real past cannot be like the present, yet it cannot be opposite, i.e., be wholly non-fluid and unchanging. It is not just that more is being added to it as we turn our back on each new present set of events, but also the past itself is being changed in what is added. Its meaning is being changed or (re)fixed constantly and its really effective and affective meaning is likewise changing. In this way, as beings that act and seem to have to choose between alternatives (provided by past experience and imagination) we observe the past and affect the past; just as we have made our own pasts by our choices and actions.

11.4.3 Axiological Conclusions

Genuinely changing the past in the sense described above, involves a real backward effect on past action by altering its consequences and having this alter the value of the
Memory is just as much the ability to 'hold in mind' (goal-directing/maintaining) as it is giving us the ability to know the past. In this way what we choose to 'keep in mind' or remember, transforms us. And, knowing or becoming conscious of what we remember not only affects what we know and recognize now, but what we choose to know and try to recognize.

The objective realism of an ontology of experience involves the idea that particular past experiences are not individually past but shared to some extent. There is a unified (synchronic) experience or coherence amongst the diversity of experiencers. Just as there may be a unification of the past, ineffable amongst the many stories and histories of what may be true. This is a minimal realism since the past remains open to being re-fixed by our possible effect on it—either miraculously or non-miraculously. We are creators—even if just by recreation and not creation (or genuine spontaneity), we are by our remembrance given choices. Our choices can effect past things in themselves; and even if these do not change with time, we do.

This sort of light-footed panspsychism supports not one all knowing presence immanent in all things, but gradations and degrees of tension (duration) and distinct abilities of contraction producing a diversity of knowledge-types and possible perceptions. Past events remain open to being reconceived. Our memories of these events, genuine or constructed, build our current state. Consciousness offers memory, knowledge and exclusion (remembrance), intentional awareness and ignorance or forgetfulness. Between the powers of retention and oblivion there is the state of awareness—the power of consciousness to endure, remember and forget.

49 For neurological and experimental for this backward-looping see e.g., (Libet, 2004); also (Raju, 2003) offers and theoretical support.
50 See especially (Gyatso, 1992).
In the spiritual realm, remembrance leads us to the immaterial reality of conscious awareness with its constant urge to build and compose—and put together now and then. Life evolves extending its duration but this is due to the power or directedness of spirit; in contrast to the entropic direction of mind at its lowest tension, viz. toward pure necessity and materiality—perfect repetition. Such a view implicates a panpsychist position; and grounding reality as experienced gives everyone’s (anyone’s) current state and lived duration proper value.

It also gives an appropriate weight to the affective reality of what has been experienced as what is truly effective and affecting, and whose action is unending. The traces of past experience are the embodiment of actions, or karmāśaya. Retired or dormant they have not yet outlived their active presence. These traces are first of past experience immediately and of the highest tension; and only these enable the contraction vibrations into recognizable and conceptualizable objects (a coherent diversity in a unity of experience). Such power, we believe is had by all living organisms. The cause of life is however not material but immaterial. Living beings are only the manifestation of this consciousness experiencing itself at varying degrees of tension.

Pure perception without any memory (like the durationless or pure-present, a hypothesis only) would be absolute de-tension—the dissolution which is matter. Even material or habituated repetition (amounting to currently-apparent spatial extensity) requires there be some sort of re-placement of the past—in which the placement or position, or state, held by one, delimits or determines the ‘place’ of another. The connection of place between even a replacement presentism leads to inconsistencies, and the stage view is inadequate without some sort of theatre! (Not to mention the actors, and audience.) It seems that the experience of duration is made possible by the unity of consciousness or spirit permitting and restraining the experience of activities in time.
11.5 The Past Matters

There is no doubt that the past "matters", both literally and metaphorically. Even one small decision on one ordinary day has innumerable effects. Action is materialized in what is the case from then onward. It is significant that this is true for even what we do not know about the past. Moreover, what we do know about the past admits of multiple perspectives of evaluation and multiple means of interpretation and (re) manifestation.

Certainly some decisions and some uneventfully-passing days will have no measurable effect on continuing events and will go unremembered forever. But we can clearly measure (or at least imagine and remember) the effects certain days have had, and the events or decisions made on those days. We remember such days, of 9/11, of Pearl Harbor, or the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, e.g. and we teach such pivotal events to our children. We remember such pivotal days in our own lives, "the day she left", "the day he died", "the first night I was there", etc. Or, at least we remember testimonies already given and stories told of these unique events, with their causes and consequences. And we know these events to be composed of numerable other crucial events and decisions. Because of this, we also expect an unknown pivotal-ness to more events than we can imagine.

Even one word might change all events that follow; and so one word changes what is the case forevermore (if the world is, say, all that is the case). Nothing is ever the same again; and nothing will ever be the same again. While what has happened is unique, it is entangled with what came before and what follows. The past is at least always being changed by our additions to it. While what is done cannot be undone, this just means that what is done is done, or what is done is—and what is done is just what is the case as it is what has been. It is the past that materializes or matters manifest as what is known as present.
If the world we know is real, time is real and if so, the past is real. But, if the past is unreal, time itself is unreal, since any presence includes its own pastness. Hence past time must be real as presence, at least some of it, we know directly. But such time can only be real if it is the past of a tensed being. If the past is unified by such tension then the present isolation of consciousness is a result, not an illusion of difference, since the difference is real, but a delusion. We have failed to notice something—viz. there is an absence of recognition of identity.

The position taken here proposes a "Dynamic Panpsychic Realism about the Past". The past is real yet dynamic. It is fixed, but open to re-fixing and some of this re-fixing may act as a backward causation—permitting a tilt in time’s process—admitting both linear and cyclical perspectives. There is a real living now of movement which depends on a unity of consciousness or unity of spirit that supercedes our own limited consciousness. Because the past is real, yet mind dependent—and because its reality supercedes the reality of our own individual pasts, this Conscious-Unity itself must be behind such presents. Here we will consider some objections to this Dynamic Panpsychic Realism about the Past.

11.6 Objections and Replies

Objection 1: In spite of its laudable efforts to combine the most valuable insights of Bergson and Dummett, this view ends up being incoherent. To be a Realist about the past one needs to say that, no matter if there is any consciousness or not, the Past, once it has elapsed, would be there, as the past. This is inconsistent with panpsychism, because the bit about "no matter if there is any consciousness or not" would go against panpsychism".

Reply: The characterization of Realism about the past is itself incoherent: If the past, as a genuine A-series past, has to be some consciousness's past, then its knowledge-independent reality could not be put in terms of "no matter if there is any consciousness or not". The problem is with the objector’s conception of what is it to be a Realist. Thinking of realism as a doctrine about what would be observable without an observer is
only possible if we offer a multitude of possible observers. Because what is observable in any situation exceeds what is actually observed by an ordinary observer, there must be some realist ground of observability. Yet this possibility (observability) depends on an observer and some thing in itself unseen.

Objection 2: The changes in the past you are talking about are narrative changes to our stories, and the value we impart to the past only and not changes to the past itself.

Reply: Again, this objection characterizes the past itself as distinct from its value (imparted by anyone). But here we are proposing that the ontological web of creation and creating is recreation and recreating. The value the past has is not closed and the real past is meaning-theoretic at its base. The meaning-theoretic past has also to be real and no one’s perception. These changes can involve real backward effects in time permitting, as Raju notes in his explication, free-will and spontaneity. If you think that this real past is then just the sum total of observed personal histories, this might be getting closer—but this real meaning-theoretic past has also to be beyond anyone’s remembrance, perception or narration. This past these might be ‘the real (lived) past’ but there is a living-past, now, that is not our own. This living-past is presently manifesting as living by this power of what has been.

Objection 3: This is not a view about the past in any special way, but just about the present—it is only dynamic panpsychist realism, period; so, why the dissertation about the past?

Reply: The problem of realism revolves around the problem of the past, as Dummett noted—but it is not just a semantic matter. The problem is ontological. The present cannot exist even given presentism without replacing another. This other must remain in some sense because that was the case before this. The distinction between dynamic panpsychist realism in general and such a realism being about the past is crucial since the former view would collapse into (Yogācāra-type) idealism. The past is what keeps a dynamic panpsychist view a realist view—otherwise there would be nothing but change and all conceptual, and even biological, structure cannot be admitted or explained as valid or real.

Objection 4: Given your replies it would then seem we cannot know the past really, beyond our own past.
Reply: Well, maybe so, but we cannot be solipsists. We must also accept the past’s offered by the true testimonies of others. As for the past we do not have testimony or memory or testimony of memory about—we can only imagine.

Objection 5: If as you have admitted, memory is the basis of error as well as offering opportunity, choice and knowledge, then haven’t you just equated memory with consciousness rather than accepting that remembering is just a function of consciousness?

Reply: We can accept memory is a function of consciousness along with exclusion (forgetting) but only if we understand self-consciousness as fundamental and that this self-consciousness offers the possibility of intentional consciousness. And, the benefit is, if we expand our understanding of memory, so that it is a power not just to know the past, but to affect the past by our concentrated efforts, then we resolve some of the epistemological and metaphysical puzzles of the past and also give an account of centuries of spiritual insights offered by genuine seekers of wisdom. Moreover, it can not only give us hope for the future—it can help us transform ourselves.

Objection 6: Aren’t you really just combining a presentism with eternalism (eternal pastness of anything that is) while admitting both an epistemological differentiation between past and future and an ontological one (so also trying to accept a growing-block view)? Since the past is fixed, but refixed, and the present (and hopefully the future) fixable. Isn’t this combination just incoherent—like trying to have still your cake while having already eaten it?

Reply: Yes (hence the importance of backward causation!)—We cannot change what has happened, but we can alter what is happening and this can affect what has happened drastically, and not just what we think has happened but the past happening itself. If the value of what has happened remains behind this present like an unseen back (perhaps pushing or manifesting presents (and particular presences) as Bergson and Abhinava held, then the value of the past is something that should be realized as part of reality. Now, as unseen and behind-us, remembrance gives us our only access; perception can do no good since internal and external states pass as quickly, yet dispositions and tendencies remain and repeat. With the freedom to know what’s behind us we might spontaneously and creatively begin again.

Objection 7: But the question was really—isn’t this just incoherent? You can’t so easily combine presentism and eternalism and a branching past and future with your ‘dynamically panpsychist realism about the past’.

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Reply: It would seem to be incoherent. The only way out is to admit this behind us remains as always and ever like what is in front of us. It is we who change. We pass. It is only by a consciousness behind this passage that what is can remain. And it is only such a self-conscious consciousness that could admit the freedom to open (and close) both the past and the future—providing roots and branches from both sides in a confluent way.

Objection 8: Well, you shouldn’t so easily equate metaphysical or ontological status with axiological value—this is surely a mistake leading us into the waters of relativism by a very slippery slope. You must believe that just imagining (re-fixing or valuing) the past (or 'what's behind us') makes it so. So, e.g. if you and I both imagine the same thing happening, we make it as if it had happened and we change ourselves by changing our real past experience. We didn’t just imagine ('remember') it happening then, it actually happened.

Reply: No, it never happened, but our imagining and believing it happened; and keeps changing our future as if that had been the past. It becomes the past. We can will it perhaps. This proto-past does remake us and we should be aware of it. Do I think we should imagine new pasts—it depends on what they are and why. But should we rewrite what has happened—no, we should only seek to uncover it, to understand it, to master it, or not to repeat it. But the past remains as it always is and always was and will be. Our imagined past becomes part of that real past as well. This imagined past is then just this real past. We can add to the past and its value (literally, appreciate it)—but we cannot subtract or take away its real value. Just as meaning or value epistemologically central to facts but ontologically prior to events and happenings themselves. This gives us the possibility that it is our currently perceived materially extended world which supervenes on the conscious intended world. But this cannot be my consciousness or your consciousness alone.
APPENDIX A

Dennett and Bergson on the edge of Consciousness and Memory

Bergson’s conception of the levels of contraction of the memory cone, and the oscillation that is conscious recognition occurring between the poles of the pure memory and perception is surprisingly like Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts model in an interesting way, since under both views, conscious perception is a creative work that is formed and informed by the past in non-linear ways. These sorts of views are also upheld by the latest experimental findings on the “timing” and “temporal coding” of conscious experience.

Dennett writes that memory and perception are constructive processes evolving their constructions in time, revising, embellishing, dissolving, changing, and that the “mistake lies in supposing that in addition to these editing processes, there is a privileged process that amounts to the “official” presentation of a canonical version...” He says that his Multiple Drafts Model provides temporal freedom which permits us to explain other initially puzzling, even apparently paradoxical phenomena (like metacontrast masking).

This model holds that the subjective sequence of conscious experience doesn’t always match the objective sequence of the events in the brain that determine the subjective experience:

“Graphically, experienced time can have backwards kinks in it when we map it onto objective time.” (Daniel C. Dennett, 1995) Just as a periscope displaces ‘here’ but there is no real transduction, the subjective sense of ‘now,’ he says, or the observer’s temporal location is fixed by the content of those brain events, and not by their (real, objective) temporal location. The contents of consciousness are thus wholly determined by their relations with action and memory. So, although coming from an entirely different starting point and ending with entirely different conclusions, this is a claim to which Bergson and Abhinava both would, I think, agree.
Responding to Lockwood's statement that 'consciousness is the leading edge of perceptual memory,' Dennett argues that this common conception involves an obvious but rather subtle mistake. (Daniel C. Dennett, 1995)¹ There is another possible configuration for the relation between perception and memory. His elucidation begins with two different given explanations for the visual illusion of meta-contrast:² an Orwellian model in which memory becomes defective (by delusion or error) and a Stalinesque model in which memory is not contaminated, but the content of perception was defective.

In the Orwellian version, the unreported image makes it to the theater of consciousness (perceptual awareness) but the memory of the quickly-superimposing (or 'superpositional') image erases or covers the first. In the Stalinesque version, the unreported image is never an object of perceptual awareness; the perceptual awareness misreports and so the defect occurs before reaching the theater of consciousness (or conscious awareness).

According to Dennett's analysis, the difference in the two stories comes down to when the interference or mis-taking occurs, before or after the supposed 'leading edge' of consciousness.

He offers a third alternative, viz. to change the model of consciousness so that processing in time (presumably he means current awareness or loosely, perception) and memory continue simultaneously. So, the only question that remains is 'whether the

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¹ Dennett remembered Lockwood to have said 'Perception is the leading edge of memory', hence the paper title. It seems to me however, that Dennett is not denying 'consciousness is the leading edge of perceptual memory' (what Lockwood had actually said)—but only that denies that this it is a sharp or well defined edge. Dennett argues more directly it seems, that there is no line, or turning the corner of an event in the world when (not where, nor at which point) it becomes conscious. (Some corner-turnings are reflections, refractions, and transductions. His argument thus seems first directed against the already bludgeoned homunculus and that old worn down Cartesian theater. But there is a thesis about the spatiotemporal connections of perception and memory.

² "A visual illusion known as "metacontrast" or backward masking provides compelling evidence that perception is not instantaneous and that it occurs sequentially in distinct stages. If a solid white target square is displayed for 50 ms in a tachistoscope, switched off, and followed by a 50 ms display of two flanking mask squares, remarkably, subjects report seeing only the two flanking squares: the first square is simply not "seen". (Ramachandran & Cobb, 1995, p. 66)
interference happens relatively early or late. There cannot be two different versions, he says, an Orwellian and Stalinesque to decide between, since there is no finishing line of consciousness where a model is officially presented. On Dennett's alternative model 'there isn't any real boundary in time or space separating processing from memory.' There is no finishing line of unconscious present-processing emerging into the theater of consciousness.

But Dennett advocates his Multiple Drafts conception of consciousness in opposition to a Cartesian Theater conception, and claims that his model has the result that "the time of becoming conscious cannot be precisely defined." Because of this, he says that it follows "that although consciousness is, as tradition would insist, the door into memory, it is not a sharp edge. There isn't any such moment as the instant of the onset of consciousness."

(Dennett, 1995) The mistake he claims that he wishes to expose is that on the micro-scale it is problematic to conceive consciousness as the leading edge of memory in a sharp sense. However these two intentions for his arguments are not as closely-aligned as they might seem.

Contemporary research indicates that the order of subjective (1st and 2nd person meaningful) experience is not necessarily aligned perfectly with that of physical or neural events (seen from 3rd person perspective). Such events are, Dennett says, the 'vehicles' of the content of those experiences. The subjective sequence of conscious experience (as current perception) doesn't need to line up with the objective sequence of neural events (also perceptions—of others). The outcome, he says, is that memory is not a weakened form of perception, nor does it follow perception. However, Dennett's view seems equally subject to Cartesian critique, while Bergson's view of consciousness, while agreeing that perception and memory are co-ordinate and concurrent phenomena, does not fall to this same critique. It

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3 It is unclear if Dennett would equate processing and perception here, and so whether he would lump memory and perception. He does say he is concerned with how memories are "loaded" with the experiences we have.
seems that the more loopy our subjective time, the more an observer is required to determine it as sequence (or sequential).

But all we really seem to have established is something that no one doubts—i.e. that there is no clear line between the conscious and the unconscious. Dennett hasn’t explained why we don’t experience these multiple drafts if they are there, so to speak, and self-luminously so (without need of a Cartesian Observer). Why don’t we experience a scattered and non-continuous perception; or, in other words, what unifies these drafts as being "of" anything in particular?

Bergson would agree with Dennett (and contemporary neuroscientific studies) that 'consciousness is not the leading edge of memory'; but there is consciousness of the unified drafting open to coherent revision can’t be explained without a unifying process. Moreover this is time-limited—or full of nothing but deadlines for these drafts—they thus become more than drafts, but the working version of that time. This sort of 'executor / draft marker' in Bergson is beyond the limits of the individual cogito. But, that Dennett even recognizes the multiple drafts of himself, e.g. requires recognizing his own identity through these differences; and unifying a model (albeit shifting) it is apparently as demonstrated by common successful interactions, coherent though intrinsically open to revision and re-envisioning.

It seems like what Dennett has really done in the resolution of the Orwellian or Stalinesque question has been to attempt to eliminate the tyranny by eliminating the citizenry. So what if there are many "models" presented, there are many models presented—including ones that pass themselves off as "official" and even "relatively official" or even, "dubitably official". If a trace is able to be affected by new information con-joining with this trace superimpositionally, the content of the trace remains though its meaning might be
expanded—and so its relative content as well. So, Dennett does not seem to have resolved the decision between Orwellian and Stalinesque versions, because the question of whether the interference occurs in, or after, the perception is the same as that of whether the interference happens relatively early or late in the process.

To resolve that dichotomy of “early or late in the process”, one must admit that perceptions do not become memories. Consciousness may be “the door” to memory (current remembering) and the edge or line between awareness and unawareness flexible (we can after all learn)—but perception and remembrance are distinct processes. The one process Dennett must be referring to (in the question of “early or late in the process”) is the process observable by the experimenters and not the process of conscious awareness. It is against the apparent continuity and linearity that we conceive the possible re-drafting as a backward-in-time or looping (cyclical) sort of movement. This is “the process” as measurable by our conscious duration comparing the rates of concurrent and distinct activities as such. And yet, the experimenters or observers are experimenting and observing by means of such conscious 1st person awareness—how it seems. Something seems left undone (perhaps we return again to Reid).

Dennett seems to continue to suffer under Cartesianesque (mis-)conceptions. In his view it seems that there is a theatre or a play being drafted, it’s just that there is no central executor, or conscious director—and the spectators just can’t find (or is not) the point of the action. We can admit the theatre is both dark and light and that the spotlight ranges freely; that there is a whole play of apparently disconnected (and yet concurrent) activity taking place on the stage and in the theatre. Novel scenes are constantly (and perhaps even simultaneously) coming to light and shedding light on the previous scenes. The play goes on

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4 Even without conscious awareness, our “models” of the world around us are always employed, even if “unofficial” to a large extent—and so with varying degrees of feasible ‘revisability’.
unstoppably, despite the fact we might want to “rewind” or see the scene again we can only figure it out as it goes along. A play(ing) (or giving a performance) is a once-in-a-lifetime event. Making-meaning of such a vast play(ing) requires remembrance and linkage of the activities involved in the play (even if like Cirque de Soleil they are just without precise meaning (or multiply meaningful) or just evoking or beautiful, awe-inspiring or funny).

So the point of the play’s action (its current meaningfulness) and its point (meaning) as well, cannot be strictly localized or determined at the time of the play(ing). The play occurs with overlapping but distinct actions, and so the attention of the conscious mind (spectator or executor) takes different complexity and non-sequentially related positions. Thus even in such a Multiple Drafts view, there remains a play (with multiple drafts) a theatre where the play appears and possible spectators (slightly unlocalized). Stories are unfolding and drafts are being written of something—what is happening, yet this remains drafted in time though open to revision.

**Bridging Time and Heterophenomenology: the Other is You**

Bergson would certainly agree with Dennett that our actual perception may involve a different structure, temporal or otherwise, than that of apparent material or neural processes. He would also agree that the sketch of perception is filled in by memory in the process of becoming conscious. Moreover, both would seem to hold that the movement of time, the plane of action moving into the future is not dragged by a limit point of a pure present or pure perception.

In Bergson’s radical view, the hypothesized ideal limit is pushed forward by recollective-memory, or what amounts to virtual experience or duration in itself, the spirit. So while Dennett and Bergson end up (and begin) in disparate places, they do seem to agree
that such a limit is only ideal and in fact there is nothing like the present instant. Though clearly, Dennett seems to have a conception of an objective/experiential time dichotomy (without a mediator) which Bergson wouldn't want to share.⁵

Dennett offers 'heterophenomenology' as an explicitly 3rd person approach. The one real process is that which is measurable in externally observable linear time—neural processes. Dennett labels other phenomenological approaches as 'autophenomenology' since they accept the subject's self-reports as being authoritative. Dennett says that his heterophenomenology takes the subject as authoritative about how things seem to them.

The total set of details of heterophenomenology, plus all the data we can gather about concurrent events in the brains of subjects and in the surrounding environment, comprises the total data set for a theory of human consciousness. It leaves out no objective phenomena and no subjective phenomena of consciousness. (Dennett, 2003, p. 20)

Here, we acknowledge the 1st person and 3rd person perspectives, but this heterophenomenology would seem to leave out the interpretation of data and judgment of the subjective witness's certainty, or reliability. Both of which are functions dependent on the second person, who is here both the experimenter and the witnessing diachronic self as a veridical-knower. Thus we can see that a true heterophenomenology admits at least three, possibly four "persons" (with the 2nd person overlapping), even if one is just watching and reporting. The real implication of taking things only as how they seem to the subject is to deny any ontological reality to the phenomenal states of the subject. This has nothing to do with the subject's reliability or certainty—we use reliable subjects generally and ask about

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⁵ Both philosophers do share the pragmatic ground upon which they claim that our conscious experience is determined largely by the interests of action and utility, toward which perception or processing aims. Perhaps the most philosophically significant similarity, however, lies between Bergson's account of recognition as the oscillation between memory and matter that is ordinary perception, and Dennett's non-linear multiple draft account, since on both conceptions the interaction of perception and memory, or cognitive processing general, is thought to be a temporally non-linear (or not-wholly linear) function on a micro-level.
their certainty and take their report of their certainty as 'certain'. We factor in some margin of error.

Dennett intends to combine 3rd person and 1st person perspectives in his "heterophenomenological" view, but ends separating them entirely and defining the topology of the 1st person on the measure of the 3rd. His view is shipwrecked by this division of subjective and objective time, which leaves out the 2nd person's point of view. This is the view of the witness or objective observer as perhaps unnoticed but connecting the two—as 'I' and 'you' (self and other) or even this (me or mine) and that (you or yours). Otherwise we are locked into the solipsism of the homunculus, which amounts to its inability to interact in the play—but only watch the theatre. There must be some duplication of observer and observed in the observing; just as to distinguish 'I' and 'him' or 'her', I must first understand 'me' and 'you'.

Heterophenomenology would thus seem to deny a really valuable sort of phenomenology from its study. Because of the often purely expressive nature of the rendition of this phenomenology (the relation between me and you or me and myself) doesn't fall under the heading of philosophy, is no reason to not admit such a basic 1st- and-2nd person phenomenology into the structure and method and object (subject) of phenomenology. I think Bergson would agree as he prefers a more dialectical phenomenological method.

Bergson would seem to want the basic understanding of Dennett's terms reversed. In his view, consciousness is always in part constituted by memory. The action of the play is located by the spectator's awareness of the past action of the play and her current attention to the observable activity of the play. The 'play' between her memory of the past and the present perceptions is exactly this looping consciousness. Perceptions do not become memories—there is no line of time under which they change form—perceptions change but
into other perceptions. Memories are always memories. So, there is no time of something becoming a memory.

It is important for Bergson's view that perception be recognized as a material function or process (moving images), and clearly this is also the case with Dennett, since he prefers a form of eliminativist material monism. Bergson's monism, in contrast, is advertised as a dualism at first face, but it is a far harder question as to whether Bergson is proposing a non-eliminative spiritualism or conservative (direct realist) mentalism. Memory for Dennett is clearly not however taken as an indication of Spirit; it is taken as unquestioningly material of course. The contrast is Bergson's greatest offer to philosophy—i.e., that memory should enable science to experimentally verify, albeit indirectly and theoretically, the existence of Spirit.

By this difference, Dennett and Bergson offer two distinct ways to apply biological evolutionary theory to consciousness, memory and temporal perception. Dennett's view develops within a mechanistic (computational) paradigm while Bergson's intent is to oppose this very sort of view through appeal to the creativity of evolution. (This is essentially the power of spirit to produce life and its conditions.) These two philosophers, so far apart in their views, agree on a surprising number of details. But, for Bergson, this power of creative-evolution is not stochastic, nor physicalistic (consciousness may evolve materiality but it does not arise from materiality—there is no origin from an image—it is a product only).

This power gives us, as individual conscious beings, the possibility of experiencing, while creating matter's appearance and giving it is sustenance and limiting is duration. This creative impulse at the root of things, is ultimately both biological and divine, and is what Bergson finds the most significant result of a philosophical and psychological examination of remembrance. So, while Dennett, considering the line, or corner, of conscious experience, wishes to emphasize that this is not a point or sharp line (there is no processing finishing-line
where some content bursts into the view of consciousness)\textsuperscript{6}, and Bergson would apparently agree. But Dennett is still subject to Cartesian critique as noted above, while Bergson may escape this new anarchic tyranny (through perhaps a far greater commitment).

For Bergson, the case to be made is clearly stronger: Memory and perception are based on the power of reflection made possible as an oscillation between the call for action and the means of action (memory). The theatre takes place across time; and the time of perception or material (3\textsuperscript{rd} person) images and the time of the memory (1\textsuperscript{st} person) although always mixed are the same time, with different qualities. Moreover, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person is again dependent on the 1\textsuperscript{st} person and 2\textsuperscript{nd} person relation which occurs both diachronically (with oneself) and synchronically (with others).\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Matter and Images}

Since Bergson conceives matter, or the material as 'images', our experience of the material is most fundamentally the experience of heterogeneous images. For Bergson, the crucial point lies in the recognition that matter has no hidden or virtual power behind the images. The more we search the scientific image, still all we have is images—we thus find the brain is likewise such an "image" (extended and observable in space and at the present time); within our body-image, within the image of our surroundings. It is "images" all the

\textsuperscript{6} Dennett’s work is also somewhat unclear on the terms, "consciousness", "processing", "memory" and "perception". He doesn’t indicate whether processing is strictly neural and material (we can assume it is) and so currently present; we can also surmise that memory is being opposed to neural processing as strictly "of the past" though a present event to conscious awareness. He seems to delimit these terms to current manifestations and so assume a Theatre of current awareness. None of these can be usefully limited to such conceptions.

\textsuperscript{7} According to Bergson’s analysis, memory and perception are opposing cognitive directions or processes; but what they indicate is much more—viz., that memory is not perception, so reality and reflected image are distinguished in their temporality, but we have mistaken the real (the past) with its present-image! The indication of this duality experienced as the present duration (with a 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} person phenomenology intrinsic to itself), bridges Dennett’s own sort of 3\textsuperscript{rd} person/ 1\textsuperscript{st} person ‘heterophenomenological’ methodology.
way down and around. There is nothing inside the image however; it is just a reflection and projection of light.

The theory of pure perception is the expression of the nature of the material image and the idea that our materiality locks us in to the heart of the experience of matter, a purely necessary and non-evolute (though not unchanging) materiality. Pure perception may be an ideal limit, but this ideal limit is as given as our own body image is given in the aggregate of images within which we find ourselves at the start, i.e., "at the very heart of matter."

That there is such materiality is taken as a fact—Bergson says that we place ourselves immediately at the heart of things in our own materiality. The characteristic of matter as an "aggregate of images" is shared by pure perception, itself part of this aggregate. Pure perception is immediate, Bergson says, it is absorbed or enclosed in the actual present. Here we will just note the likeness of such pure perception with the conceptions of svalakaṣaṇa (particularity or isolatedness) of the momentary, and nirvikalpa pratyakṣa or pure perception devoid of memory and concept of the Buddhist, Śaiva, and Naiyāyika philosophers.

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8 To Bergson it is apparent is that we isolate our body image as a part of a whole having been first given within the whole material aggregate; and our perception which is of images, purified of the influence of contraction and memory, is pure perception or the experience of the infinite extensity or relaxation of mind—this is matter, an aggregate of images. The brain is, like our own body, a material image composite within a system of material images. Our position is given within this system as a consciousness (or a kind of material tension) creating freedom functioning as a system or transmission—hesitation—reflection and bodily refraction, and making possible the experience of duration and the experience of material embodiment. Perceiving experience as it is naturally articulated is different than perceiving it according to the needs of utility, and it is the former pure perception that reflects without loss the image itself.

9 Pure perception as a limit, is however, an essential limit despite its "ideality"—a limit without which continuity could not be defined. But pure perception is not a past-less point, the pure present carries its past perfectly by repetition—without memory. Bergson says that the past is acted by matter and imagined by mind. According to Bergson, the presence of the material is given, we must hypothesize a "pure perception" or a point of ideal limit at which there is contact, or as phrased above "simultaneity" between matter and mind—otherwise we would be left, in Bergson's view in the realm of memories or of dreams. That our consciousness is tied bodily to the moving plane of action is given as fact.
In pure perception there is no difference, just as there can be no similarity. There is no recognition because there is no remembrance. In actual perception, the presence of the material object is represented and is said to be in the image virtually as part of the whole. Thus the status of this ideal limit does not count against the reality of such 'material perception' because of its' virtual but real support. Materiality tends toward the future, toward its own repetition.

These images that are matter, or the material, involve a purely internal continuity and interaction. Habit-memory, or matter with the lowest level of memory, is subject to material necessity in Bergson's view. Centers of greater tension arise, which enable conscious perception by providing zones of indeterminate activity. Matter or the aggregate of images when fully ('infinitely') extended or relaxed, without being subject to contraction (without being perceived), resorts Bergson says, to "numberless vibration." Bergson finds only a distinction in degree between being and being perceived. This *numberless vibration* is the *esse* minus the *esse percipi*, or without consciousness. It is the state of unconscious perception, pure perception, a proposed limit of perception as a tensionless or unconscious or uncontracted perceptivity (and receptivity). This numberlessness would be uncontracted or unconscious present material experience.

**Misconceptions of the Philosophers and Psychologists**

As Bergson conceives it, it is a mistaken view of perception that has led to the misconceptions of philosophers and psychologists, and has served as a common frontier for realism and idealism and also their apparently insoluble difficulties. Our actual or concrete perception necessarily involves memory-images (impure memories) and our actual memories.
(these memory-images) involve the call of perception opening spaces for hesitation in what would otherwise be just material necessity.¹⁰

Bergson thus presents arguments for two related theses: first, memories can't be stored in matter, and second, perception and memory are different in kind. Perception has its source and goal in action (it is material and subject to the necessary laws of action and reaction) but memory has no material substance of its own. It does not act—it is precisely that which no longer acts; and nor does it does it change, as does the aggregate of images. It thus escapes the realm of the material plane except to the extent that perception opens for the insertion for memory when it is not in a pure state.

Bergson recognizes that it is not possible to substantiate empirically that neural states which accompany perception are not the causes of perception (as epiphenomenalists might have it), nor are they its' duplicate (as representationalists, phenomenalists, interactive dualists or those proposing a mind-body parallelism might have it). Our epistemological position makes it such that it naturally seems that perception is a consequence of our neural states; but there can be no deciding evidence between the hypotheses that neural states create representations or whether they only 'sketch the nascent reactions of our body.' In the case of memory it is, however, different, since memory is the representation of an absent object.

Since our perception of the present object is something of that object itself, the recollection or representation of the absent object must be of a different kind than perception, Bergson argues, since there are no degrees or intermediate stages between presence and

¹⁰ This pure present, or instantaneous perception of matter, is an ideal mathematical point where the subject becomes the object. This proposed point offers us a way to see how theoretically mind is grafted onto matter. (There is no real instantaneousness, pure perception exists only ideally—and whether instantaneity and simultaneity are compatible could be doubted, since simultaneity for Bergson involves flow.) The actuality of this grafting of mind and matter occurs as our body, where there is the apparent confluence of matter and mind. And our body-image along with its present perception and sensation are, as Bergson conceives it, imbedded in the plane of action subject to the movement of material necessity. The cerebral state doesn't produce perception of the present object but continues it. It may prolong and convert into action the memory of it, but it can't produce the recollection.
absence. This is the crux of his argument. The theory of pure perception is a hypothesis that, as a conceptual schematic, enables us to conceive the relatedness of matter and mind.

Memory doesn’t consist in a regression from the present to the past in Bergson’s analysis—but a progression from the past to the present. We start from a virtual state that moves toward the plane of action where our body stands out. The state of the brain continues the memory by giving it a hold on the present by the materiality which it confers on it; but memory in-itself (pure memory) is a spiritual manifestation.

In Bergson’s view, consciousness is the requisite connection between what was and what will be. It is consciousness that provides for the retaining of the past and the anticipation of the future. But for Bergson, this doesn’t concern just the awareness of time; the memory-anticipation nature of consciousness is just the ontological function of any present duration in general. This is the case even at even the ‘lowest’ material levels of consciousness, i.e., apparently unconscious matter.

Such unconscious matter is, he says, subject to necessity and devoid of memory; it has “no more memory than suffices to form the bridge between two of its moments, each of which can be deduced from its antecedent, each of which adds nothing to what the world already contains.” (Bergson, 1920) In contrast, immaterial consciousness is, he says,

…memory with freedom, continuity of creation in a duration in which there is real growth;—a duration which is drawn out, wherein the past is preserved indivisible; a duration which grows like a plant, but like the plant of a fairy tale transforms its leaves and flowers from moment to moment. We may surmise that these two realities, matter and consciousness, are derived from a common source. (Bergson, 1920, p. 23)

Dejà vu, False Recognition, and Memory of the Present

In his very interesting essay, “Memory of the Present and False Recognition”, Bergson makes the case that memory and perception are parallel and distinguished events—
like an object and its mirror image—or a thing and its shadow. Noting that the phenomenon of *déjà vu* is quite distinct from vague feelings of recognition or familiarity in a situation or scene, he says that:

In false recognition the two experiences appear strictly identical, and we feel indeed that no reflection would reduce the identity to a vague resemblance, because we are not simply beholding the 'already seen'; it is much more than that; we are living through again the 'already lived'. (Bergson, 1920, p. 141)

Bergson notes that the sense of *déjà vu* is often described as one in which one seems a stranger to oneself or a spectator, watching events unfold. It involves a sense of 'depersonalization' (taking the term with Bergson from M. Dugas) or what we might describe as some sort of dissociation. While the experience of *déjà vu* is not identical to false recognition it has a certain relation to it. Bergson makes the case that *déjà vu* is best explained as a temporary lapse in what is ordinarily functioning—something that is ordinarily redundant and so unperceived is suddenly perceived—viz. the memory of the present.

The phenomena of *déjà vu* (the present seeming to be 'already seen'), has much in common with the more serious psychological disturbances of 'false recognition' (which Bergson discusses in detail). (Bergson, 1920) The most significant difference between these two phenomena is that the memory of the present which Bergson hypothesizes as the source of the experience of *déjà vu* is not exactly false recognition but true cognition (though Bergson does not say this directly, it follows from his views). The similarities between the two phenomena lie in the fact that both involve a mistaken sense of 'having been there before' in a very specific way: A sense of a pure repetition or complete recurrence of something that has already been. Cases of false recognition involve more than a sense of inevitability, because they do not concern the future (feeling like one already knows what is about to happen but can't put a finger on it), but a presently-lived past.
This sort of memory of the present (known by its appearance as false recognition) is significantly an unlocalized and unlocalizable. It is not related to a specific memory from the past but related to past time *in-general*. Bergson argues that such phenomena need more of an explanation than mistaken association and ordinary mis-recognition. He proposes that our real "memory of the present" is an ordinary function which limits us (in the normal case) from seeing this "side" of the reflection or shadow that is appearing now. This normally-unevident (because a duplicate of perception) memory is the ever-present memory of the present.

For Bergson, there is a constant undistanced reflectiveness between now and then (perception and memory) made possible by consciousness. The phenomenon of false recognition implies the real existence of two images, he says, one which is the reflection of the other. The present moment (experienced duration) acts as a "moving mirror" dividing perception and memory—or image and object. The effect is to push perceptual images forward as a future-directed and memory images back as a past-directed.

As related to cases of false recognition, two things must be explained, viz. why one set of images formed appears to be from the past, and why the illusion lasts or has any continuity. *Déjà vu* is, after all about the repetition of an entire context and state of affairs; we even expect to know what's about to happen. Such phenomena aren't our more ordinary cases of mistaken or false recognition—something more like, "oh, I'm sorry, I thought you were someone else". In *déjà vu* or uncommon (or pathological) cases of false-recognition, there is no mistaken association or mis-remembrance—nor does an appearance of this memory of the present count as a repetition since it concerns the *past in general*. It is not a memory of the past but a reflection of the present thrown back to the past (appearing as if past). Because of this, Bergson concludes that it is clear that perceptions or current experiences do not *become* memories in any sense. Memory is a function that is distinct
from perception. They face in different directions but are connected, like two sides of a coin. But this doesn’t mean there is no trace of the past.

Our experience of lived-duration is just this dividing of every present moment between present perceptions and remembrances. Every present perception has an unseen memorial side. The memory is not subsequent to the perception; so a memory is not a weakened perception. These are entirely distinct (but constantly and concurrently interacting). By separating perception and memory by their directedness—the co-extant perceptual cognition heads forward while its companion reflection heads backward—Bergson offers a revolutionary view of time and self.

This memory of the present, if anything, is a true-memory-trace. Bergson he calls such reflection backward in time "virtual". A state of "pure memory" without perception would thus be a superpositional state of indistinct events, or dream-likenesses in effect (in the present). Although these would be Bergson says, fixed at their base as having reflected real experiencing—an index of their past-time. (Bergson, (1913) 1911) These virtual traces, though dreamlike and indistinct would not be false, but perfectly presentatively true. Their dream-likeness would consist only in their ineffectivity for action, their pure continuity (realized as indistinguishability) or the randomness (indeterminateness) of their relations.

If such a virtual, bodiless image is "called up" or inserted into present action it achieves some determinacy or determinate description. This is from an original that is perhaps beyond determinate description, and which, before and after its "imaging", remains. So, while Bergson would be the first to admit the proximate causes of remembering anything in particular (any image or representational sort of trace) are many and so there is much room for error in our "imaginings"—our access to our past experience is, at root, immediately or intuitionally knowable.
The impetus of Bergson's work on false recognition is to show that memory and perception involve unity in duality—one the back-side and the other the forward-side. Memory and perception are distinct cognitive phenomena. Though all perceptions leave traces, the trace is not other than the perception, but just its "other-side". While we no longer still perceive what is now a past event, that perception remains available to be remembered, even if apparently only shadowy way.

The split between the cognitive directions of action is provided by consciousness as a mirroring of remembrance and perception (the lived past and present). Directions are divided between forward and backward as perception is directed forward toward the future (toward possible actions and interactions), and memory directed backward toward the past (and away from possible action). Time is directed by this split; and the absence of any recognition of the memory of the present does not indicate determinacy (or that the future should be available for remembrance necessarily), but that the spirit lurks with the 'remaining' past—as a wholly-present living reality behind the shadows we cast as past and present images.

APPENDIX B

śvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśini (IPV): Āhinika 3

The following is a translation of Abhinava’s introduction to the third chapter of śvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśini (IPV) with Utpaladeva’s first two verses with commentary:

“In the first two verses it is shown that even if remembering is born from traces, due to the self-intimating nature of cognition (awareness), direct experience is not-illumined in remembrance. Then with the next two verses, the skeptical view of the erroneousness of memory is anticipated. Concluding otherwise by the third, allaying the concern by reductio, which would call all apprehension erroneous. Then he (Utpaladeva) shows how this is made possible on his own view. This is the plan of the chapter—now, the explication.” (Abhinava)

True, but memory-awareness, though arising from the residual traces of prior experience, being self-confined, cannot make the former experience known.
(Utpaladeva)

‘True’ indicates that much is accepted by me after all, beginning from the middle of the opponent’s view. The remainder is shown otherwise. What is not acceptable that will be refuted, thus it is said ‘but’ which indicates this difference. But here, the view is not endorsed that in remembrance the illumination of the object is established by saṁskāra alone. The issue is how without the illumined experience can it be possible remembrance has the form ‘that’, and how without that could there be ordinary conduct depending on desiring? Indeed by experience of this is ascertained as being a means of pleasure and therefore beneficial. Thus due to the saṁskāra of the prior experience explains how memory is not caused by an external object even though it is an awareness of that object (that that object is its object). This is not enough, because remembrance, even though it is of the prior experience, cannot illumine that experience, as it does the object. Experience (awareness/cognition) is self-manifesting and so cannot be illumined by another experience. But it may be objected that the remembrance, because it arises from residual trace has the prior experience also as its object. To this the author replies: (Abhinava)

Experience is self-luminous and cannot be the object of another experience, just as an experience of color cannot be an object of an experience of taste. That remembrance is born from residual trace just makes it similar to direct experience (that past experiencing). But that cannot make the consciousness of this similarity possible.” (Utpaladeva)
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