(some in their entirety) that Cogan used to enhance her memoir.

Although the “we” in We Fought the Navy and Won is at times unclear as to whether it refers primarily to Chamorros or outsiders in far-off Washington, Cogan drives home the important point that a battle was waged, and the subsequent victory constitutes an important part of understanding the complex and multifaceted past of one of the last remaining colonies in the world today.

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The selection of a new prime minister in Solomon Islands on 18 April 2006 should have been a routine exercise. It came after the seventh national elections since independence and was the final stage in an electoral process that was, by then, very well established. The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was still in the country and, after nearly three years, had restored law and order and made a lot of progress in reviving government services following the serious breakdown that took place during the “ethnic tension” from 1998 to 2003. By 2006, no one was expecting anything other than a properly constituted transfer of power. Ultimately that did happen, but not in the way anticipated and not before the most serious and destructive riots in Solomon Islands history.

The riots broke out when it was announced to the crowd waiting outside Parliament House that the new prime minister was Snyder Rini, a returning member and former deputy prime minister in the outgoing Kemakeza government. There had been a strong mood for change at the election, and disbelief when the old government was reinstated. That night and on the following day Honiara was set ablaze as rioting continued out of control. The main target was property owned by ethnic Chinese; Chinatown was almost completely destroyed and numerous other businesses and homes were attacked and burned. It was not until reinforcements were brought in from Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji that order was restored. Rini faced a motion of no confidence at the first sitting of Parliament, and he resigned before that could take place. Another prime ministerial ballot was held, and this time, one of Rini’s opponents, Manasseh Sogavare, was successful. He also happened to be a fierce critic of RAMSI.

This book is one of the first to try to provide some explanation for the riots in 2006. It arises out of a conference that was called soon afterwards, in Canberra on 5 May 2006, by the State Society and Governance in Melanesia program and the Pacific Centre of the Australian National University. The authors of the book’s ten chapters come from within and outside Solomon Islands. Most of them are
longtime observers of Solomon Island politics and were either recent visitors to the country or in the country when the rioting took place.

After Sinclair Dinnen’s introductory chapter, which lays out the book’s larger theme of the long-term process of state and nation building, the best chapters are those that concentrate specifically on the 2006 election and its destructive aftermath. They are, for the most part, highly critical of the direction taken by national elections and, in particular, by what contributor Jon Fraenkel describes as a “deeply flawed prime ministerial selection process” (175). The trends are, by now, well established: a proliferation of candidates standing for election; a first-past-the-post system that allows candidates to win seats with relatively small percentages of the vote; weak political parties; a high number of independents with fluid allegiances; and poor outcomes for women standing for election. In addition there is widespread and pervasive corruption, now infesting every level of politics and every stage of the political process. This book leaves little doubt that politics in Solomon Islands is so deeply corrupt and heavily compromised that the wider electorate is being deceived and betrayed by the political elite as they scramble for the spoils being offered to them. The worst corruption is that connected to the two largest export industries, logging and fishing. Updating the accumulating evidence on this in their chapters, Clive Moore and Transform Aqorau link it much more closely to relatively recent Asian interests than to the older, more established Chinese community.

Every part of the electoral cycle is subject to corruption, but one occasion is especially blatant: the lead-up to the prime ministerial ballot in the national Parliament. The 2006 experience is covered in greater or lesser detail by Moore, Fraenkel, Matthew Allen, Sam Alasia, and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka: newly elected members splitting into three camps, each located in a different Chinese-owned hotel in Honiara, with intense bargaining and negotiating taking place day and night as the different camps tried to entice members away from their rivals, and the final outcome completely uncertain until the ballot took place in Parliament. As Allen says, what this means now is that “election outcomes are essentially indeterminable from the voter’s perspective” (40). For Kabutaulaka, it means that the Westminster system, as adopted and developed by Solomon Islands, is failing the country as it is not meeting a major principle of the system, majority rule (104). It becomes clear that the electoral system is not doing what it is meant to do, which is to produce a representative government. Little wonder that the Honiara crowd was so restive on 18 April 2006.

Three chapters in the book cover other issues. Mary-Louise O’Callaghan looks at the achievements of RAMSI and the lessons that have been learned from the events of 2006 by the regional assistance mission. Ian Scales looks at the little-known efforts by Western Province to advance the case for federal government during the crisis years between 1998 and 2003, and its success in almost achieving this goal since then. And Jaap Timmer writes about a different kind of political resistance to central government
that has been flourishing in North Malaita—an evangelical Christian movement known as the Deep Sea Canoe Movement.

This book has been overtaken by more recent political events (the downfall of the Sogavare government in late 2007 and the formation of a new government under Derek Sikua); however, it is still essential reading for Solomon Islanders and for all those with an interest in Solomon Islands political history. There is a clear message here for political reform, and at least two contributors, Kabutaulaka and Aqorau, provide suggestions as to the kind of reforms that are necessary. As Kabutaulaka says at the conclusion of his chapter, there should be “changes to the political process to ensure that it produces representative government. Failure to do this will risk politics pouring out into the streets in violent ways such as those we saw in April 2006” (113).

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This work by Davianna Pōmaika‘i McGregor is a beautiful and recuperative act of love consummated over the last several decades by her study of four cultural kīpuka, or “center[s] of spiritual power” (8), on three Hawaiian islands. The kua‘aina (people of the land) living there understood themselves to be part of the natural order. The first child conceived by Wākea, the Sky Father, and his daughter was a deformed fetus that, after burial, sprouted as kalo (taro). The second child of the couple was the progenitor of the Hawaiian people. Significantly, kalo, the principal food of the Hawaiian people, was an ancestor, requiring respectful treatment. The Hawaiian people’s knowledge of their natural world and their respect for it was reflected in their farming, fishing, and gathering practices; they could read ocean currents, waves, and depths; they knew what could be found and when in different areas of reef; which and where inshore fish could be taken; when it was right to take them and when not to. Similarly, with the plant kingdom they knew when and how to plant, harvest, gather, and preserve. They honored and cared for the land as a companion.

This centuries-long way of life for Hawaiians was abruptly altered by the intrusion of the West, disastrously marked by its microbes and the more insidious concepts and practices of its capitalism, including private property and large-scale, mono-crop agriculture. In 1804, for instance, the death toll among Hawaiians from infectious diseases was estimated at as high as 50 percent (30). While property ownership became possible for Hawaiians as well as the foreigners among them, along with landownership came taxation. Many of the people on the land could not afford to buy the land, might not know how to register a claim awarded under the 1848 Māhele (land redistribution), or could