CHAPTER TEN
EXCLUSION, DEPRESSION 1930S TO THE VIBORA STRIKE


THE EXCLUSION MOVEMENT

The other development which affected Hawaii Filipinos was the movement to exclude Filipinos from the United States in general. This movement was a result of the emergence of groups of Filipinos on the West Coast and the economic depression.

Unlike the Filipino population in Hawaii, the Filipino population on the West Coast states was a recent development, dating merely to the second half of the 1920s. In California, where the vast majority of them were concentrated, there were merely 2,674 Filipinos in 1920. Over the next five years, Filipinos arrived in California, mainly from Hawaii. They came individually; by this time, there were no longer agents for western farms and factories willing to risk the substantial penalties for recruiting in Hawaii. In 1923, for example, of the 2426 Filipinos who arrived in California, merely 9% came from Manila directly whereas 84.6% came from Honolulu. This proportion held all throughout the years to 1925, especially during the strikes on the Hawaii plantations.

With the implementation of the national origins quota system, however, the Japanese, upon which the farms and orchards depended on for migrant workers and domestic workers, were no longer eligible to come. To fill the gap, Filipinos began to come in large numbers. The number of Filipinos in California jumped from 2,674 in 1920 to 30,000 in 1930. The migration stream from Manila increased substantially starting in 1923 when 2,426 came, compared to an annual average of 618 between 1920 and 1922. In the next seven years, an average of 4,177 came annually from the Philippines, with the largest number arriving in 1929 at 5,795. &California Department of Industrial Relations, Report, in Star Bulletin, April 23, 1930& In that peak year, almost an equal percentage, at 45 per cent, came from Manila as from Honolulu. All in all, for the whole decade 56% arrived from Hawaii, 35% from the Philippines directly, and 5% from other ports like Hongkong, Shanghai and Yokohama. &California Department of Industrial Relations, Report, in Star Bulletin, April 23, 1930& They were a predominantly adult male population, because they had to pay their own passage and they had no sure employment when they arrived on the West Coast.

Those who came directly from Manila sought a goal which had been awakened by American colonization of the Philippines: the importance of education to social and economic mobility. Under Spain, education was available only to a privileged few, the study emphasized religion mainly, and most of the pupils learned enough Spanish merely to recite prayers, so that at the end of the Spanish period, literacy in the Philippines was merely between 5 and 8% &Agoncillo, p. 424& As Americans established a comprehensive public school system, literacy increased to 49.2% by 1918 and further to 65% by 1935. In 1938, only 41% of the children between 6 and 16 were in school, and only 5% of the Philippine population actually went beyond the intermediate school. &Agoncillo, p. 407& The ones coming to the United States were the more educationally ambitious, therefore, seeking a high school diploma and a college degree.

California and the western states offered the opportunity to be a self-supporting student. The most available work, however, was migrant work, which took them away from their studies. Filipinos ended up in
migrant work---describe this, as birds of passage. In migrant work, they earned more; in the asparagus fields, where they comprised four fifths of the harvesters in 1930, they earned daily wages of $2.50 to $5.

&California Department of Industrial Relations, Report, in Star Bulletin, April 23, 1930& A few sought opportunities in the cities and hoped to
become "schoolboys" by finding hotel, restaurant, and domestic jobs which would allow them to attend night school. In these jobs, however, they had to be more tractable, accept lower wages, and put up with longer hours, poorer board and worse lodging facilities than whites and other workers. Their wages were generally higher than those on the Hawaii plantations, averaging monthly earnings of $66.68 with room and board to $73.82 without room and board.

DETAIL HERE THE PROCESS OF FILIPINO MIGRATION TO CALIFORNIA FROM HAWAII.

Table: Filipinos Leaving Hawaii for the Coast
Source: HSPA

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<th>Year</th>
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(Note: by 1930, however, the LA Steamship Co. had discontinued steerage facilities from Hawaii, so movement of Filipinos to Mainland inconsequential & Advertiser, December 6, 1930; there was no steerage business on Matson Line between San Francisco and Honolulu; there was also no steerage on the Dollar Line on the Honolulu-San Francisco leg of its voyages as the space was used to transport Hawaii products. & Lasker, pp. 214-15, 385)

There was a price to pay for higher wages, though, in the form of harsher discrimination. As they became visible after 1927, they found themselves the object of discriminatory laws, violence and hostility, like the Chinese and the Japanese before them. They were not allowed to own land--

An appellate court in California held that a white woman could not be legally the wife of a Filipino, and she couldn't, therefore, be excused from testifying against him on ground of marriage; further court decisions in California ruled that Filipinos belonged to the Mongol race, and thus illegal under the civil code for white woman to marry a Mongol. & Star Bulletin, June 9, September 9, 1926; Advertiser, June 9, 1926 & Follow up the Roldan case here and the antimiscegenation law in the western states. Others prohibited land ownership, etc. see Bulosan.

Riots by white workers against the Filipinos began in the orchard and hop fields of the Washington's Yakima valley in the fall of 1927, and spread throughout the West Coast during the next two years. The riots
became more frequent as the depression deepened in 1930. Vigilantes raided and burned Filipino camps in many rural communities in Oregon, Washington, California, and even in Florida. The depression fomented violence worldwide; on March 6, 1930, the Star Bulletin headlined a story about riots among the unemployed in ten major US cities as well as in London, Hamburg, Paris and other European cities.

A particular incident, the Watsonville riot in 1930, drew the loudest protest among the Filipinos. For months before the riot, the small rural community had seen incidents of white mobs wrecking Filipino homes and severely beating up their occupants, as well as 600 whites storming a cabaret where white girls had been hired as dancing partners for Filipino farm workers, and despite some arrests, none had been persecuted. One night in January 1930 a group of white men approached a ranch bunkhouse and shot into it. The Filipino occupants fled in darkness but upon returning they discovered Fermin Tobera, 22, dead, a bullet lodged in his heart. &Star Bulletin, January 23, 24, 1930& Filipinos everywhere regarded Tobera's death as a symbol of the brutality and inhumane treatment Filipinos received in America. In Honolulu, when the ship carrying his body to Manila passed by, thousands of Filipinos held a demonstration and drew up resolutions protesting the West Coast riots. The violence against Filipinos on the West Coast continued unabated throughout the depression years.&Star Bulletin, February 10, 1930&

Tobera's death prompted Philippine secretary of commerce and communication Filemon Perez to order labor director Herminigildo Cruz to suspend the HSPA recruiting permit and withhold approval of Babbitt's request to acquire a new general license covering all Philippine provinces so as to extend labor recruiting all throughout the various islands, pending the outcome of investigations on labor conditions in Hawaii and California. The investigation, however, consisted merely of Perez requesting information from Cayetano Ligot, Governor Judd of Hawaii and Governor Young of California. &Advertiser, March 4,6,9, 1930& Furthermore, the order to cancel did not stop the HSPA from processing Filipinos who came at their own will and expense to Hawaii; at this time the HSPA was not engaged in active recruitment because of the depression. Butler and Babbitt held frequent conferences with Cruz and Perez during the California riots. &Advertiser, March 5, 1930& Publicly, Cruz stated that many Philippine plantations, especially those on Tarlac, had been unable to obtain sufficient laborers because of the drain to Hawaii. &Advertiser, March 5, 1930& Furthermore, his investigation showed that the HSPA enjoyed a monopoly in labor recruiting in the Philippines and the need for something like the payment of a bonus upon fulfillment of the contract, payable to laborer upon his return to the Philippines as an incentive for him to return.&Lasker, p. 211& Nonetheless, he approved the HSPA license, without any change at all except one prohibiting recruitment in Tarlac; he justified the approval by saying that the Hawaii plantation work was training for the Filipinos in the Philippine sugar fields; that returning workers would improve conditions in the Philippine sugar industry in that they would demand similar conditions of work as in Hawaii. &Advertiser, March 10, 1930&
THE WELCH EXCLUSION BILL

The increased presence of Filipinos in California also led organized labor to call for the exclusion of Filipinos from the United States. In 1927 the California State Federation of Labor and the American Federation of Labor adopted resolutions calling for congressional action to exclude Filipinos, as did the Allied Culinary Workers and the Beverage Dispensers of San Francisco the following year. &BIA 5999, BIA Memo: Emigration of Filipinos Laborers to Hawaii or the US, January 5, 1932; Advertiser, November 28, 1927& In response, two California representatives, Richard J. Welsh in the House and Hiram Johnson in the Senate, introduced in 1928 a bill declaring Filipinos aliens and excluding them from the United States. &Star Bulletin, December 6, 1928& They reintroduced the bill in 1929, this time allowing Hawaii to be exempted from Filipino exclusion, but congressman Albert Johnson of Washington also introduced a more drastic bill seeking to suspend all immigration from the Philippines to the United States and Hawaii for five years. &Star Bulletin, January 19, 1929& Over the next five years, the two bills, as well as many versions of them, were introduced in congress.

The opponents of the exclusion bills pointed out the contradiction inherent in the way the bills, with their tariff and immigration provisions, treated the Philippines as a foreign country while the United States continued to hold on to it. &Advertiser, May 27, 1928& They exposed blatant unequal privileges enjoyed by Filipinos and Americans: Americans in the Philippines enjoyed many privileges, such as homesteading, engaging in coastal trade, acquiring citizenship by residing in the Philippines for five years, purchasing agricultural lands, exploiting and owning mineral lands, practicing law if licensed previously in the United States, and others which the Filipinos in Hawaii and the United States did not enjoy reciprocally. &Judge Manual Camus, Memo on rights of citizenship and aliens in the Philippines, Institute of Pacific Relations, Philippine Council, in Conrado Benitez to Charles Loomis, Institute of Pacific Relations, March 20, 1934, IPR Papers, UH Library& In the Philippines, the exclusion bills, by violating equal treatment of people owing allegiance to American flag and ignoring the fundamental right of an individual to move freely from one territory to another under the American flag, gave the Filipinos their strongest arguments for obtaining independence, stating to the US congress that the only way to restrict the movement of Filipinos to America would be to grant the Philippines independence. &Star Bulletin, November 29, 1930&

The exclusion advocates saw Hawaii as merely a backdoor for Filipino immigration to the West Coast and the HSPA's agreement with the Filipino recruits as a form of illegal contract labor. &Star Bulletin, November 28, 1930; Advertiser, December 28, 1930&. In actual fact, after 1930 few Filipinos were able to leave Hawaii for the West Coast because of the depression and the difficulty of securing passage. By this time, LA Steamship Co. had discontinued steerage facilities from Hawaii, and both Matson Line and the Dollar Line ships carried no steerage passengers between San Francisco and Honolulu because they used the space to transport Hawaii products. &Advertiser, December 6, 1930; Lasker, pp. 214-15, 385&
The Hawaii sugar and pineapple planters argued for an exemption for Hawaii, pointing out that with Filipino labor comprising 80% of the field laborers on their plantations, excluding them would create an economic depression in Hawaii. &Advertiser, November 26, 1930& In asking for the exemption, the planters had to portray the Filipinos in the best possible light. They described them as quiet, orderly, sober, good workers, and emphasized the advantages of their importation: they did not create a second generation problem because they returned to their homeland, in occupying the low jobs they helped advance previous comers, they were consumers, they contribute to taxable values but did not control public expenditures or hold political power, they had a low birth rate, and being at their prime they were not a burden on relief, education, or hospitalization. The planters also resurrected the old arguments to show that the Filipinos benefitted as well from the importation: the Filipino laborers ended up healthier in the sanitary environment of the camps, more prosperous upon their return, and more politically responsible after having been exposed to the efficient government in Hawaii. &Welch Hearing, pp. 272-73&. At the annual meeting of the HSPA in 1930, A.W.T. Bottomley gave a somber presidential address which painted the exclusion laws as the destruction of Hawaii, especially at a time when the price of sugar had plunged to new lows. He predicted an ensuing low tax collection, with many adverse effects on employment and government services. He denied that the Filipinos were cheap labor because they were paid comparable wages as on mainland, nor did they displace citizens because the HSPA did not assist anyone coming to Hawaii without making sure there was a job opening for that person. &A.W.T. Bottomley, presidential address, 50th annual meeting, November 17-21, 1930, Proceedings, pp. 8-24; Star Bulletin, Nov. 17, 1930; Advertiser, Nov. 18, 1930&
The planters' positive portrayal of the Filipinos, however, suffered a setback because of the 1932 Ala Moana Massie case in which four Polynesian and oriental youth were accused of raping the wife of a naval lieutenant. The Massie case caused furor all over the United States and led many mainland newspapers to issue editorials, with strong racist overtones, attacking the Polynesians and the Japanese, as well as the Filipinos as among the races making the beautiful islands barbaric.

&Editorials reproduced in Star Bulletin, February 1, 1932&. As a result, the Department of Justice sent assistant US attorney general Seth Richardson to investigate Hawaii's crime situation. Richardson concluded that while there was no organized crime or crime wave in Hawaii, there was laxity in the administration of law enforcement agencies. He also recommended that the importation of Filipinos be stopped or their recruitment be supervised by federal officials. &Advertiser, April 5, 10, 1932; Star Bulletin, April 6, 8, 1932&. Alarmed by the recommendation, the planters threatened to recruit Puerto Ricans to replace the Filipinos. &John W. Waldron, presidential Address, 52nd Annual Meeting, HSPA, Dec. 7, 1932, in Proceedings, pp. 17, 20. The address is on pp. 6-23&

The exclusion bills gained popular support in Hawaii because the suffering and anxiety created by the economic depression called for a scapegoat. The depression's effects became evident in early 1930, as construction and shipping activities declined, and its full impact was felt in 1932. The pineapple growers were hardest hit, throwing thousands out of work. The sugar planters did not lay off workers en mass but they cut back on acreage and reduced the hours of work offered. The plantations continued to be attacked for employing children instead of adults. In 1935 the former welfare worker at Waialua plantation for 16 years charged that the plantation refused jobs to 200 male applicants, many with starving families, yet it gave jobs on Saturdays of school year, and on summer, to 400 schoolchildren for weeding. Yet Waialua paid 18% dividends on its stock in 1935 and distributed 50% stock dividends. He asserted that this situation, of exploiting children, many under 12, for very low pay, was true of almost all plantations, as well as the practice of paying huge dividends during the depressions, and yet not raising base pay, providing decent homes, pension; instead mere deserts like athletics, socials, musicals, motion pictures, etc. &Henry A. Rudin, in Voice of Labor, August 17, 1936&
The Democrats capitalized on the fears and suffering; in 1930 Lincoln "Link" L.L. McCandless again ran for delegate to congress, a position he had unsuccessfully sought for two decades against Kuhio Kalanianaloa, the planters' candidate, solely on a platform of stopping the importation of Filipinos. McCandless found such a large support for his position that Victor Houston, his opponent, and Governor Lawrence Judd did not debate him on the issue. The popularity of his position was indicated by his strong showing (19,568 to Houston's 22,187) in the election, and the same issue enabled him to win the election two years later, at age 72. McCandless found the strongest support for Filipino exclusion among the Hawaiians and the Japanese. All the major Japanese newspapers, the Nippu Jiji, the Hochi, Shimpo, the Mainichi, came out with vehement editorials for exclusion. In an editorial reminiscent of the attack against the Japanese two decades earlier, the Nippu Jiji portrayed the Filipinos as a serious menace to the people of Hawaii because they crowded out citizen labor in the cities after leaving the plantations. &Nippu Jiji, editorial, November 18, 1930, AH& The Hochi stated that Filipino laborers "must live, just as cancer cells must live, so they prey on the rest of the body of society, diverting material that is necessary for our economic life and for the proper functioning of all the other organs." It painted a picture of Hawaii children crying from hunger because the Filipinos got the jobs, hoarded millions of dollars and sent remittances to Philippines. &Hawaii Hochi, November 18, 1930, AH& The Japanese newspapers advocated that should a labor shortage develop as a result of the Filipino exclusion, the planters should get their replacement from Japan. &Hawaii Hochi, editorial, April 30, 1930&
The exclusion bill debate in Hawaii also raised the old issue of how the youth was to be educated and employed. The planters had always favored the importation of cheap labor rather than employment of citizen labor, claiming that few of the younger generation wished plantation employment, preferring easier ways of life and better rewards than their immigrant fathers. &E.D. Tenney, in Advertiser, March 18, 1922& In their desire to employ tractable laborers, the planters had always attacked Hawaii's educational system for training the youth, especially those of Oriental ancestry, to be unfit for agriculture and industry. In 1925, John Hind centered his presidential message at the HSPA annual meeting to an attack on the schools for giving the students a false sense of superiority and advocated no public schooling beyond the sixth grade because it produced people who considered manual labor as beneath them. &John Hind, presidential address, 44th annual meeting, HSPA, Nov. 16-20, 1925, pp.12-13. Address is on p. 7-18 of Proceedings.& In 1928 the planters initiated a back-to-the-soil movement directed at the Japanese youth, led by Methodist ministers Takie Okumura and John P. Erdman in New American Conference youth. &Advertiser, August 7, 1928& The movement failed: the youth was not interested because of low wages, plantations kept them at bottom, their advanced education, their not jive with importation of cheap labor, and where there were profitable enjoyable work elsewhere.
The planters' attack on the educational system continued during the depression years. The sugar industry's position was buttressed by the report which Charles A. Prosser submitted for his survey in 1930 of the educational system. The report reflected the prejudices of Hawaii's industrial leaders, emphasized the vocational mission of the schools, and to limit enrollment, expenditures and opportunities in the public educational system. Lawrence Fuchs, Hawaii Pono, pp. 293-294. Its recommendations would have cut out opportunities for the nonhaoles in Hawaii. C.A. Prosser, in a talk to the chamber of commerce in Honolulu said he would like to see employers agree not to hire Filipinos if services of other persons were available; so as to provide jobs for youth leaving local schools. He said the Filipinos were leaving the plantations to come to the city. Star Bulletin, December 4, 1930. He also urged the native born youth to the back-to-the soil movement, and the adjustment of the industry and education to that purpose. Star Bulletin, December 11, 1930. In 1932, Frank Atherton, in his presidential address at the HSPA meeting, again attacked the public educational system for its failure to keep the youth on the farm, as a way of diffusing the momentum against Filipino importation of cheap labor. Frank Atherton, presidential address, 51st Annual Meeting, HSPA, December 7-10, 1931. Proceedings, pp. 8-19.

Critics of the sugar industry, charging that the plantation interests desired to deny proper education to the youth, and to use the schools merely as training ground for plantation workers, saw proof in the Smith-Hughes Act, classes in vocational agriculture were conducted in conjunction with the plantations; each class worked 2 days a week in plantation fields and spent 3 days a week in the classroom. Instead of blaming the schools, critics of the HSPA argued that the native born would work on the plantations if the planters stopped importing cheap labor, and improved working and living conditions on the plantations. Nippu Jiji, editorial, April 4, 1930; Sam Horner, Voice of Labor, May 16, 1936, p.3.

The planters countered that the islands had insufficient labor to take up the slack if Filipinos were barred, especially because Hawaii was so isolated and had no neighboring states from which to draw labor. The sugar and pineapple plantations needed six thousand new field laborers each year to replace death, retirement, departures, and resignations; only 2,800 of the 8,000 young men entering the labor force were available for agriculture or trades or mechanical jobs, and very few wished to work as field laborers. Frank C. Atherton, presidential address, 51st Annual meeting, HSPA, Dec. 7-9, 1931, Proceedings, p. 12-13. This is on pp. 8-19 of proceedings; E.W. Green, Employment of Citizen Labor in Sugar Plantations," 1932 HSPA annual meeting, proceedings, pp. 101-108; these are on p. 102, 106. The HSPA, however, did not entertain at all an ingenious proposal by Vicente Villamin, a Filipino lawyer in New York city, who suggested that the HSPA get plantation laborers from the Pacific Coast rather than from the Philippines. Advertiser, April 14, 1930; Star Bulletin, May 8, 1930. Assuming that Filipinos would want to go back to plantations, given its lower wages and higher cost of living, and harder work, despite their unemployment and the race riots against them on the mainland and their temporary seasonal work and oversupply of labor. However, obviously these Filipinos were not longer the tractable laborers that the HSPA wanted.
The HSPA did two things as the recession deepened. First it opened a citizen's employment bureau and it also curtailed shipment of Filipino laborers.

To forestall criticism that the sugar industry preferred cheap imported labor to citizen labor, the HSPA on December 1, 1930 set up an employment office in Honolulu to accommodate those desiring to work on the plantations. &Butler, talk before Territorial Senate, April 13, 1933, BIA 5999& As a result, the number of citizens on the sugar plantation labor force increased to 17.6% of the labor force in January 1933 and to 31.5% by September 30, 1936. &H.A. Walker, presidential Address, 56th HSPA meeting, December 7-10, 1936, p. 11& The increase in citizen employment coincided with the stopping of Filipino arrival to Hawaii. As early as July, 1931, the HSPA had sharply curtailed the importation of Filipinos and instituted propaganda in the Philippines warning Filipinos not to come to Hawaii unless the Manila HSPA office told them there were jobs. By August 1931 the HSPA also limited the number of men coming to Hawaii to merely 50 per boat each two weeks, plus the relatives of plantation laborers. The following month, it was reduced further to merely 25 per boat plus relatives, just to keep the movement alive. In February 1932 the HSPA discontinued bringing in Filipino laborers except for returning vacationist and wives and children already here, and that not one had come since February 1932. However, the Japanese steamship companies continued to bring in men. &Butler, talk before Territorial Senate, April 13, 1933, in Advertiser, April 14, 1933; Also, Butler to Houston, November 28, 1932, Houston Papers, AH& W.H. Babbitt, the manager of the Manila office, told the US bureau of insular affairs that it was closing all recruiting stations in the Phil. (Vigan, Laoag, Cebu) with the exception of the Manila central office, as HSPA no longer needing laborers. &Star Bulletin, June 16, 1933&
THE UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN HAWAII:

FOLLOW A CHRONOLOGY, HERE, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DEPRESSION, HSPA DENY ANY UNEMPLOYMENT. THEN AS DEPRESSION DEEPENED, TAOK ORGANIZED THE UNEMPLOYED HAPAI BALOTAN MOVEMENT. HSPA RESPONDED, BY REPATRIATING AND ALSO BY ROUNding UP VAGRANTS.

The Filipinos became the scapegoat for the depression, with the general belief that because they drifted from the plantations, they took away jobs and caused the general unemployment in Honolulu. Butler to Judd, July 27, 1931, Judd papers, AH. Yet the census figures showed the belief to be without any basis at all. Not true; census showed large increase in population of 24,000 but only 1300 in city were Filipinos. Butler to Judd, July 27, 1931, AH. The population of Honolulu increased from 51,113 (an increase of 30.1% from previous decade) to 80,815 (up 58.1% from previous decade) and to 132,967 (up 64.5% from previous decade). Lind, Island Community, table 32, p. 299. The Filipino population in Honolulu went from 1920 to 1930: GET DATA FOR THIS. They comprised merely ___ of the city's population. Furthermore, the increase in jobs in the city was generally in those which the Filipinos could not take advantage of: GET DATA FOR THIS.

The other charge was the presence of unemployed Filipinos in the city. Wishing to keep the Philippines open to future recruitments and to absolve itself of charges of having brought in surplus labor, the HSPA denied all throughout the depression that there was a general unemployment among the Filipinos in Hawaii. When in December 1930, sugar and pineapple plantations stopped work and reduced hours, many Filipinos drifted to Honolulu. Cayetano Ligot, however, denied that these were unemployed Filipinos, claiming that they were merely "at rest or on vacation" rather than unemployed. Advertiser, December 30, 1930. In 1931, some four thousand Filipinos lost their jobs when the market for pineapple collapsed. By 1933, a general hardship because of the depression, as construction workers, government workers and pineapple workers filled the rolls of those on government relief. The sugar plantations did not layoff any laborers but they reduced wages by 10% and by June 1, 1932, had abolished the turnout bonus. They also cut down on the hours worked and abandoned marginally productive sugar lands. Because of the depression, many Filipinos left the plantations and broke their contract after 1932. In 1937 Varona negotiated a contract made available between December 1937 and June 30, 1938, in which the worker who had served less than ten years on a plantation was eligible to earn a free return passage by working for an additional five years; three years for those whose service totalled ten years or more.

The HSPA insistently disclaimed any Filipino unemployment. Its assertion that in 1933 only 3% of those on government relief were Filipinos did not indicate the actual rate of Filipino unemployment because as non-citizens, Filipinos were generally ineligible for relief. Advertiser, April 14, 1933. In 1934, the governor's Unemployment Commission registration showed a high unemployment among Filipinos, which the HSPA did not dispute any longer but denied that the unemployed Filipinos had been discharged from the plantations, that they were "not really very good men or not really desirous of work", and that many on the rolls had left the territory or had since been employed. J.K. Butler
to BIA, May 24, 1933, BIA 5999&
The Filipinos themselves, however, claimed that they comprised more than half the estimated 10,000 unemployed in the territory, many of them invisible because they were in the rural areas, such as in the Kona coffee farms, where there were no jobs at all. &Felipe R. Acantiloda to Manager, HACO, November 11, 1932, HACO& They depicted their plight to be one of desperation. They asserted that the majority of the three thousand unemployed Filipinos in Honolulu in 1932 faced starvation, disease and death, and that unlike in the past, they could not depend on the assistance of their fellows because the plantations had initiated a rotating layoff of Filipinos from November to February and assigned others to part time work. &Hawaii Hochi May 17, 1932; AH& Among the suffering were 90% of the Filipino World War I veterans in Honolulu, many with wives and children to support, as well as Pearl Harbor Navy yard workers who were dismissed from their jobs because of a new law allowing eligibility for citizenship only to those who had served in the navy, and not in the army. &Pedro M. Esqueras to Editor, Star Bulletin, December 10, 1931&
The leader of the Filipino movement to call attention to the Filipino plight was Epifanio Taok. Epifanio Taok was originally in Maui, Visayan, and in a strike on Maui in 1925 he suffered beatings by a Filipino special policeman; he became chief of the Filipino strike leaders at that strike. &Advertiser, February 26, 1925& He was active in Honolulu, but he was not yet labor oriented. In 1931 Taok organized the Unemployed Filipinos of Hawaii, a voluntary organization of unemployed, destitute and indigent Filipinos. nd he was the chairman, Miguel Todoc was the Vice Chairman, Isidro Edillo the secretary.

In 1932, they applied for a permit from the board of supervisors to hold a Honolulu parade to call attention to their plight but Ligot succeeded in having Governor Judd and Mayor Fred Wright revoke the permit, warned the unemployed to be more diplomatic in their actions, that a parade would hurt the feelings of HSPA officials and diminish chances of getting any help from HSPA, that the parade would make the government enforce more strictly the citizen worker clause in anger, lessening the chances of Filipinos finding employment on the plantations. &Hawaii Hochi, March 17, 1932, AH& All throughout the depression years, he continued to deny there were many Filipinos unemployed, in his reports to his Manila superiors, even though official figures belied his claim. The Filipinos went ahead, anyway, meeting at Aala Park, appealed to HSPA and territorial officials to find a way to help them or send them back. However, Ligot stopped them from marching to the territorial legislature for fear that it might antagonize the HSPA. &Hawaii Hochi, April 8, 1932, AH&

They continued to hold marches, including to the social service bureau to demand some way to be returned to the Philippines. &Hawaii Hochi, April 8, 1932, AH& This was continued in the next two years as the Hapai Balotan Repatriation Plan, under the Filipino Labor Union, Taok as president. Taok blamed the HSPA for the unemployment and miserable condition of the Filipinos in Hawaii; of flooding Hawaii with excess labor. In 1933 FLU held several demonstrations, asking that those unable to get jobs be sent back by the HSPA to the Philippines.

Taok pointed out that Quezon, the president of the Philippines senate, in a speech November 22, 1933, said that the Philippine government would not relieve Hawaii Filipinos of their suffering and miserable conditions, and that the Philippines was large enough for Filipinos and there was no starvation, so the Filipinos should go home. The FLU concluded that "that means it is up to us to help ourselves here." &FLU Circular Leaflet, 1933, HSPA Archives&
Demonstrations continued by the Hapai Balotan movement with banners reading "We are the unemployed Filipinos. We demand jobs, food, or return to our homes. We demand justice." "We do not want to become a public charge or community menace. Send us back home. HSPA is responsible for Filipinos in Hawaii." They were angry at the HSPA and Ligot for misrepresenting the number of indigent Filipinos. They also complained that unemployed citizens were given 4 days work a week at $2 a day while Filipinos were given 2 days a week at $1 a day (on the plantations?)

The depression deepened. The Filipinos were being replaced by citizen labor on the plantations. The unemployed Filipinos did not get much assistance from the social service bureau, whose funds were not enough even for unemployed citizens. &Hawaii Hochi May 17, 1932; AH& Thus, the Filipinos were in a bad situation; they were unable to get hired, or to get aid because they were not US citizens. As non-citizens they could not get employed in the various new deal relief projects (CWA, PWA, NRA and other government agencies, complained the Filipinos, discriminated against them), and under organic act of the territory of Hawaii they could not work in federal, territorial, city/county jobs.
Butler claimed that it could take care of its own indigent by repatriating them.

At a parade of 300 Filipino unemployed in June 1933, Butler challenged all bonafide unemployed Filipinos desiring to return to the Philippines to report at the HSPA immigration office and would be given free passage by the HSPA. Butler made the challenge, expecting only a handful to show up, according to his belief that there were not that many unemployed and indigent in Hawaii. However, 150 of these Filipinos, among them 15 women and 24 children, took up his challenge and left for Manila on board President Pierce. Embarrassed by the presence of indigent Filipinos in Honolulu, the HSPA continued to assist the return of these indigents, as well as the ill and mentally incapacitated so that it eventually returned some 3,500 between 1931 and the start of the war. &Lind, Island Community, p. 208&

In 1934, faced with mounting criticism about unemployed Filipinos in Hawaii, especially in Honolulu, the HSPA felt embarrassed. The police started a drive to round up Filipino vagrants, former plantation laborers, and two Filipino policemen, Juan Oxiles and Roland Sagum, plus William Clark, were detailed to this work &Hawaii Hochi, March 13, 1934, Poindexter Papers, AH; Cadiente interview, Ewa Plantation, August 28, 1981& Manlapit wrote Roosevelt so, to complain, saying that this was done to support the contention of the HSPA that there was no unemployment in Hawaii, and that those rounded up were actively seeking employment but were charged as vagrants and sent to the Philippines. &Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934 in BIA 227& also Quezonian Papers-

Other indigent Filipinos were returned at federal expense through the Dickstein repatriation act, which was introduced in early 1933 to provide for return to Philippines of unemployed Filipino residents in the continental US at federal expense, to enable them to travel in military transport; Filipinos not aliens, deportable, and hence the act was not an authority to deport. Each Filipino given assistance for fares and meals, and it expired December 1, 1936, but it was extended year after year. &Star Bulletin, Feb. 8, 12, 1936& Delegate L.L. McCandless succeeded in having Hawaii included in the provision to repatriate the unemployed and indigent, getting the house immigration committee to reverse itself. &Advertiser, May 12, 1933& In 1939, it was amended so that Filipinos in Hawaii would qualify even though they were not indigent, but now with Philippine commonwealth, and they were aliens, they were now like deported, and could return only as immigrants within the quota. &Delegate King to W.G. Strench, director, INS Honolulu office, July 28, 1939, King Papers, AH; Star Bulletin, August 5, November 17, 1939& Many of these were not indigent, carrying some savings home but they didn’t know they were accepting charity and they said they were assisted by the HSPA through which they applied for it. &Hawaii Sentinel, May 30, 1940, HSPA archives&

The HSPA continued to pay the return passage of the Filipinos who had completed their contract, and those who were incapacitated at work. The decline among the Filipinos on the labor force could be seen in the statistics.
The number of Filipinos in Hawaii declined. In fact, between 1932 and 1936, a total of 2016 Filipinos arrived in Hawaii but in the same time period, 20,492 or ten times more, left for the Philippines. Among the males, in the same time period, 1603 arrived but 15,374 returned.

List of Arrivals and Departures of Filipinos, 1932-36, in S.W. King Papers, delegate, ND, Archives of Hawaii.

The HSPA’s desire to secure an exemption for Hawaii in the various exclusion bills brought about problems. The exemption would place the islands on a special status, one not accorded other American states and territories. The Democrats under McCandless led the attack against such a special status, for fear that it could lead congress to justify discriminating against Hawaii’s products and its people. This was especially true with a crucial issue like a tariff on Hawaiian sugar because of the island’s access to cheap foreign labor, which domestic growers did not have. This argument made even Houston and Farrington to oppose the HSPA stand on Hawaii’s exemption, arguing that the planters were shortsighted in asking for Hawaii’s exemption.

Houston to Farrington, ed. of Star Bulletin, May 23, 1930, Houston Papers, AH & Farrington agreed, although he opposed restriction on the general principle that it was directed against a people enjoying the protection of the American flag and its administration.

Houston to V. Houston, Feb. 11, 1932, Houston Papers, AH & The threat was effective enough for Houston to conform to the planters’ wishes. The HSPA made some gestures about this threat by sending Montague Lord, the assistant HSPA Manila office chief, to Puerto Rico in order to investigate the labor pool available for recruitment, although no actual recruitment was carried out. &Advertiser, November 29, December 6, 1930; Star Bulletin, December 5, 1930&. In fact, the HSPA was playing on the fear of Puerto Rican recruitment, a fear in Hawaii, of not liking them; the planters also had a low opinion of the Puerto Ricans, an opinion they considered having been validated by the 1922 recruitment which merely brought at great expense people of low efficiency, low health standards, people who readily left left for California and "contributed a greater number of welfare recipients, furnish the worst criminals on record, and many were mentally defective people." &Butler to Patrick J. Hurley, secretary of war, October 14, 1931&

The HSPA position on the exclusion bills became complicated by the pressure from domestic sugar growers to pass a discriminatory tariff or a maximum quota on foreign sugar, such as the Timberlake Bill which would
have placed a limit of 500,000 tons of sugar imports from the Philippines annually. Hawaii's delegate Houston, backed the sugar limit on the Philippines, as duty free sugar constituted unfair and injurious competition for domestic sugar. &Advertiser, Jan. 19, 1929& The Philippines argued for free trade privileges, the country being under the American flag, but demanded independence and a reciprocal tariff in the Philippines against US products if the US passed the tariff and other trade limitations against the Philippines. These issues placed the HSPA in a narrow fence. It was imperialistic in its attitudes that the Filipinos were not capable of self-governance, and that independence would amount to "national destruction and the wrecking of industrial and social development" achieved so far. & Butler to Patrick J. Hurley, sec. of war, October 14, 1931, in Governor. Papers, AH& However, it could not openly oppose independence without incurring the wrath of Filipino officials who could close the door on labor recruitment; in fact, Houston's stand on a tariff against Philippine sugar aroused considerable resentment in Manila and blamed the HSPA for the position. If they did not support the Philippine tariff, the planters would find themselves at odds with the domestic American sugar growers. A similar dilemma was in pineapple; Hawaii’s pineapple growers wished delegate Houston some tariff to protect them from Philippine competition, especially because the Philippine growers did not pay federal taxes like the Hawaiian planters, had lower transportation costs because they were not compelled to use American vessels; so they would like to exclude Philippine products but not Filipino labor. &Taliba, November 29, 1930--don’t know which archive&

These issues of exclusion, independence and tariff were finally put together as a package in the Hare Hawkins Cutting Bill in early 1932. The bill provided for eventual Philippine independence after a ten-year transitional government. It also provided for an immigration quota of 50 persons a year, including Hawaii, and for this reason the planters opposed it until Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas sponsored an amendment allowing Filipino laborers to be brought to Hawaii if approved by the department of interior, and now HSPA favored the Hare Hawkins Cutting bill. &Star Bulletin, December 9-12, 1932&. F.D. Roosevelt signed the bill into law but the Philippines rejected it in a plebiscite because of its provision for a non-reciprocal tariff on Philippine products and for operating American military installations in the Philippines.

In the Tydings-McDuffie Act these two provisions were left out for negotiations, and so the Philippine plebiscite approved it, effective May 1, 1934. A ten year commonwealth government was set up, with Quezon elected president for six years; with restricted commonwealth powers, such as US could intervene in Phil, its foreign affairs under supervision and control by US, the US supreme court to review decisions of the commonwealth court, and commonwealth president’s actions subject to review and approval by Washington, and acts affecting currency, coinage, imports, exports and immigration required approval of US president.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Philippines was now considered a separate country with an immigration quota of 50 annually; the Filipinos were now aliens; non-U.S. citizens from Philippines in Hawaii were not admissible anymore to the continental United States unless they had been admitted under immigration visa (stopped movement of Filipinos. 
to mainland) and now Filipinos were subject to deportation, as aliens. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Labor, Subject: Application of Immigration Laws to Citizens of Philippine Islands, May 11, 1934, AH& The Filipinos now required a passport and visa to come to Hawaii; the first ones, bearing Philippine passport numbers 1, 2 and 3 were Teodoro, Lilia and Concepcion Velez who were visiting Hawaii relatives and came June 1, on the President Coolidge. &Star Bulletin, May 7, 1934&

In effect, the Tydings McDuffie Act effectively stopped Filipino immigration to Hawaii and the United States. But the planters got their wish; the act contained a special provision that if the secretary of interior certified a labor shortage, the planters could bring in additional labor.

Immediately, however, this special provision worked against the planters, in the form of the 1934 Jones Costigan amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Before 1934 the income of domestic beet and cane sugar growers declined steadily for three years because of surplus world sugar stock and low prices; wages paid field labor fell to low levels, and there were complaints that young children were performing strenuous work in the fields. To solve these problems, congress in 1934 passed the Jones Costigan Act, which tried to balance the sugar consumption and the supply; the secretary of agriculture estimated the US consumption and then allocated portion of the market to American producing areas. The allocation increased mainland grower’s share at the expense of foreign producers; originally, the Jones Costigan act provided no benefit payments and quota for Hawaii, charges were made that Hawaii was a low cost area because of its access to cheap oriental labor, and the absence of standards like the 8 hour day, agricultural wage prices, child labor, etc. But eventually, Hawaii was placed in the foreign grower category, given a quota, though it was 8 to 10% less than its market share the year before. The mainland producers were given fixed quota, a sure share of the market; Hawaii shared the remaining portion of the market with Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other foreign producers. The planters sued for equal treatment but they lost the suit.

Thus under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the contracts between the plantations and the secretary of agriculture, whereby the sec. determine and fix the minimum wages, hours of work, time and method of payment, and also adjudicate labor and contract disputes. The planters agreed not to raise more cane than allotted, and accepted the standard child labor provisions and abide by the secretary’s ruling on labor hours and wages; the secretary would pay in return the plantations an amount equal to not less than 90% of the taxes collected while the contract was enforced. (compliance payments). This was a time, 1934 on, when the HSPA became very defensive, and they sounded combative, being assaulted by everyone, including the federal government, and labor, and now the compliance provisions of the Jones Costigan act. Because of the quota system, cane lands in Hawaii were taken out of production; by 1940, some 240000 acres had been taken out of cane production, and by 1944, 10% of sugar lands were abandoned.

Pani ka puka--close the loophole, in the Tydings McDuffie act; in the 1934 and 1936 campaign the Hawaii democrats used this slogan though
it did not help much. Ironically, it was a Democrat president, F.D. Roosevelt who vetoed the bill by Sam King. As a result of the Jones Costigan act, Delegate Sam King offered a bill to remove the provisions of the Tydings McDuffie Act permitting Filipinos to enter the territory at the discretion of the secretary of the interior; such provision not being needed now as sugar quotas were in effect, Filipinos returning to their homeland and no need to import; and the provision merely being used by opponents of equal treatment to Hawaii. The HSPA did not oppose King's resolution. \&Star Bulletin, June 19, 1937\& It passed congress but F.D. Roosevelt vetoed it as the bill might offend the Filipinos. \&Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum of Disapproval, August 25, 1937, in BIA 227\&.
Pablo Manlapit was in prison for the 1924 strike. He did not have a hard time in prison, as he was a trustee, in charge of the storeroom, but his family suffered. The Social Services Bureau did not help his wife and 4 children; although some support came from a mainland organization (Communist Party?). The Social Services Bureau did not help his wife, she turned over her four children to juvenile court and had been supported by the Kalihi Catholic Orphanage as well as a little contribution from friends. His friends, however, were denied the right to see him. &Hawaii Hochi, editorial, March 9, 1927, reprinted in Filipinos Fight for Justice, pp. 76-80&

The Communist Party attempted to use him by sending a small donation for personal necessities. Also, the International Labor Defense, a group of Communist lawyers who provided legal assistance to labor radicals, visited him in prison and tried to help him. James P. Cannon, a member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party sent him $5, Manlapit sent a thank you note, which the Communist Party published in its magazine, the Labor Defender. As a result of this letter, rumors of Manlapit’s ties with Communism circulated in Hawaii. &DeWitt Paper, n.p. citing Manlapit to James P. Cannon, October 11, 1925, in Labor Defender, January 1926; Maximo C. Manzon, The Strange Case of the Filipinos in the United States (New York, 1938), passim.&

Manlapit’s minimum sentence expired in January 1927 and his good behavior as well as practice of parole led his friends to expect a parole for him. None came immediately however, until early March when Governor Farrington paroled Manlapit on the condition that he leave for the Philippines and remain away from Hawaii forever. His wife, however, did not want to go to the Philippines with her children because the islands are "a strange land and a strange people" to them. Neither she nor her
children desire to be separated from her husband and their father, she said. Manlapit’s parole of March 11 was revoked when he refused to leave for the Philippines.

Mrs Manlapit complained, in a petition to the house of representatives, of harassment, that J.W. Waldron, chairman of the Oahu prison board "has made repeated threats to me and my children that if we did not agree to go to the Philippines with my husband, Mr. Manlapit, that he would be kept in jail for the rest of his 10-year sentence." Norman K. Lyman presented her petition to the house of representatives. His maximum sentence was due to expire in 1932. &Advertiser, March 13, 1927& The house investigated and found the wording "never to return" in paroles illegal, but ruled that there was no coercion in granting the parole, that the board had jurisdiction over him until the last day of the 10 years of his maximum sentence. &Advertiser, March 15, 1927&

Manlapit’s friends continued to work on his behalf. George Wright and Epifanio Taok sought to raise funds to hire a good lawyer for him but Butler warned the plantations of such an effort, alerting them especially to the collection of funds in the guise of asking for contributions for Rizal’s day. &Butler to All Plantations, May 13, 1927. HACO&

Mr. Pittman, Manlapit’s attorney, charged that Manlapit was a victim of a frame-up by the HSPA. He pointed out the interlinked relationships among those who decided Manlapit’s fate: Governor Wallace R. Farrington was the vice-president and general manager of Star Bulletin, whose president and chief stockholder was Frank Atherton, an official of Castle and Cooke, a Vice President of Amfac, and president of the HSPA in 1926. The members of the Board of Prison Inspector (two of the three) were tied to plantation interests as well. Its chairman, John W. Waldron, was a trustee of the HSPA, served on the board of several plantations, and represented the sugar interest in Washington. An influential member, Herbert M. Dowsett, was the son of J.M. Dowsett, a sugar agent and treasurer of Waianae Plantation Company, while another member, Samuel W. Robley, had been employed by a sugar factor. &Honolulu Bee, May 19, 1927 in 644, reel 6; reprinted in Filipinos Fight For Justice, pp. 87-90&

In July, 1927 the prison board finally voted to give Manlapit his parole, and even agreed to allow Manlapit to remain in Hawaii and start a business in order to earn a living. When the parole papers reached Farrington, however, he stipulated in his own handwriting: "paroled forthwith on condition he leave the territory," despite the fact that a few weeks before he had signed regulations disallowing paroled prisoners from leaving the territory without without permission from the Board of Prison Inspector. Manlapit accepted the parole though bitterly disappointed at Farrington’s condition, criticizing it as "unjust discrimination and unfair prejudice." Even the Advertiser agreed that Farrington’s conditions indeed created the public impression that Manlapit was treated unjustly, that unfair parole conditions were forced upon him, and objected to Farrington’s action because it made Manlapit a martyr and increased his influence. &Advertiser, July 29, 1927& There was
some indication of sympathy that Manlapit had been treated unfairly. The editorial of July 4, 1927 of the Hawaii Sunday News, a big island newspaper: &reprinted in Filipinos Fight for Justice, pp. 93-95& pointed out that Manlapit, whom it described as between a crook interested in lining his pocket with strike funds and an idealistic man fighting for equal rights for all, was entitled to the same consideration as any man and asked for a square deal for him.

The HSPA offered to pay Manlapit's fare to the Philippines but he preferred to go to California. His request to be released so he could prepare for his departure was denied, however. &Advertiser, July 29, 1927& He left Hawaii alone on August 13, 1927, his friends raised enough money only to cover his own fare but not enough to allow his family to leave with him. He planned to establish himself in business on the coast and send for his family later. &Advertiser, August 3, 1927& Escorted under guard to the ship and heavily decked in leis from his friends who came to bid him farewell, he vowed to return to Hawaii as soon as possible and warned of "the dangerous folly of allowing the institutions of government to come under the control of ruthless, soulless industrial machines, as has happened in Hawaii." Still defiant, he claimed to have been railroaded to prison for trying to secure justice and a square deal for his countrymen. He said the sugar planters still hated and feared him and under their instructions the governor of Hawaii ordered him to leave the islands. &Advertiser, August 14, 1927&

Because his status as a paroled convict made it difficult to obtain a good employment in Los Angeles, Manlapit he applied for pardon in 1928, and several times after that, but they were all denied. &Advertiser, September 23, 1931& He was able to get temporary, less remunerative jobs. He worked in the All American Anti-Imperialist League's campaign for Philippine Independence. He became the circulation manager of a shortlived Filipino newspaper, the Los Angeles Observer, and joined a failed new Filipino motion picture corporation. &Obituary, Advertiser, April 16, 1969&. He was appointed by Hilario Moncado to be the head of the labor department of the Filipino Federation of America in 1928 but two weeks later, Moncado dismissed him, claiming that he had placed Manlapit in the position merely to expose him as a faker and impostor to his fellow Filipinos. &Major James I. Muir, Office of Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Department, to Gen. Creed F. Cox, BIA, in BIA 5999& His inability to secure steady employment resulted in the suffering of his family; his wife and children worked in Hawaii but they barely made enough for their needs. &Filipinos Fight for Justice, pp. 98-103&

Manlapit sought to earn money also by recruiting Hawaii Filipinos to California. In 1928 he issued a circular inviting Hawaii Filipinos to come to California, where orchard workers earned between $3.50 and $6.50 a day, compared to $1 in Hawaii, and where asparagus harvesters could earn as much as $8 for nine hours of work a day. Manlapit offered to meet the arriving Filipinos at the Los Angeles docks and assist them in obtaining employment. &Manlapit Circular, HSPA Archives." Butler circulated the circular to the various plantations, Butler to Broadbent, May 29, 1928, GFA& Three years later, with the depression throwing some
seven thousand Filipinos out of work, with more likely to become so in the winter, and arousing the antagonism of organized labor, ex-servicemen and others affected by the depression, Manlapit as chairman of the Filipino Community of Los Angeles he asked Hawaii authorities to warn Hawaii Filipinos not to come to Los Angeles; A mass meeting on October 4, 1931 among the Filipinos of different organizations adopted the resolution to inform the Philippine Bureau of Labor to inform Philippine municipalities of the true condition of Filipinos in America and prevent influx. &P. Manlapit to Judd, Oct. 7, 1931, Judd Papers, AH&

Meanwhile, Manlapit also continued his activities as a labor organizer. The time was right for someone to organize the Filipinos in California. The exclusion movement had made them band together against white hostility and to ask for better wages. A few months after his arrival, Manlapit urged two hundred farm workers at a meeting in Stockton to form the Filipino Labor Union, a theme he repeated in his address to Filipinos during the next five years in California. He also published Ang Bantay (The Sentinel) in 1929-1931, a weekly, exposing the corrupt practices of Filipino labor contractors and promoting agricultural unionization. &DeWitt paper,n.p., citing Emory S. Bogardus, "The Filipino Press in the United States," Sociology and Social Research, vol. 19, 1934, p. 67& The Filipino labor leaders, who had followed closely his union organizing activities in Hawaii and had occasionally sought his advice, were receptive to his message. In 1933, they finally established the Filipino Labor Union, which carried out a successful strike in the Salinas lettuce fields in 1934. &DeWitt paper, n.d.& It was Manlapit's legacy in California.

Manlapit was the object of close surveillance by the HSPA. He was also followed by the Los Angeles Police Department's Red Squad because he had received money from the International Labor Defense while in prison. Furthermore, he gave a labor day speech in 1927 at a conference sponsored by the International Labor Defense committee of the Community Party, a speech which described the plight of the Filipino plantation workers in Hawaii and was well-suited to the Communist propagandists. &Lawrence A. Lawcock, "Filipino Students in the United States and the Philippine Independence Movement, 1900-1935" Unpublished doctoral dissertation, UC Berkeley, 1975), p. 233.& The police picked him up for questioning on February 23, 1928 as he was about to address a large meeting of the All-American Anti-Imperialist League. They claimed to have found in his possession some correspondence between him and Communist leaders detailing his role in a plot to make Filipino communists in the United States, Hawaii, the Philippines, China and Japan subject to a single organization under direct orders from Moscow. &Advertiser, February 25, 1928; Los Angeles Times, February 25, 1928& They prepared three charges against him: for planning to induce seven thousand Filipinos in the United States Navy join the Communist Party, for planning a strike in late March of ten thousand asparagus pickers in California, and for attempting to undermine the Filipino Federation of America. After fourteen hours, the charges were dropped and he was released.

Six months before Manlapit completed his full sentence in February
1932, he asked Governor Lawrence Judd for full pardon, pointing out that he had not violated the terms of his parole. He informed Judd that he wished to return to the Philippines at once to pursue a political career, so the was important in restoring his civil rights; without it, he would be forced to return to Hawaii and work for the restoration of his civil rights. The Board of Prisons, regarding this as a veiled threat, refused unanimously his request. &Advertiser, Sept. 23, 1931& Unable to obtain his pardon, he returned to Hawaii on April 29, 1932.

MANLAPIT’S RETURN

The Filipinos welcomed back Manlapit at Aala Park for Sunday, May 8, 1932 at a mass rally organized by Epifanio Taok, the president of the Unemployed Filipinos of Hawaii. Taok called Manlapit the "acknowledged Savior of the oppressed and unfortunate Filipinos in Hawaii and planned the meeting to allow the Filipinos an opportunity to hear Manlapit, "talk about his experiences, the ordeal of his family for seven years, and his plans upon his return" but he also included in the agenda a preliminary discussion of organizing the Filipino Labor Union.. &Handbill, May 8, 1932, HSPA Archives& The union was actually organized a few weeks later, at a mass meeting held on June 19, 1932 to celebrate the birthday of Jose Rizal at Aala Park. &Handbill, June 19, 1932, HSPA Archives& At that meeting, Epifanio Taok was elected president and Antonio Fagel the secretary of the Filipino Labor Union. Antonio Fagel had worked with Manlapit in California and had followed the labor leader to Hawaii.

In the next few months, Manlapit, Taok and Fagel went to the various plantations to sign up members to the Filipino Labor Union. They visited the plantations on Oahu and the big island in July, on Maui in August, and on Kauai in late October and early November. The HSPA carefully monitored the movement of Manlapit, collected handbills and announcements of the meetings, and kept track of the proceedings at each plantation. &Handbills, HSPA Archives& Manlapit was unquestionably the draw card at these meetings; the handbills carried his picture and the notation in Ilocano: "Here he comes, the one you have been waiting for. We can see his face again, we can hear his voice again." The agenda at each meeting consisted of three main topics: the fulfillment of the work contract with the plantations, the demand to recall Cayetano Ligot, and the organization of the Filipino Labor Union. Manlapit, the featured speaker, shared the platform with Fagel who spoke in Ilocano and English, as did Teodoro G. Biano, the editor of the Filipino Chronicle and the president of the Progressive Ilocano Organization. Although president of the Filipino Labor Union, Taok was a less eloquent speaker and gave his place to his lieutenant, Isidro Edillo, the secretary of the Unemployed Filipinos of Hawaii, who gave his address in a Visayan language.

It was a volatile time on the plantations, especially on Oahu. The plantations had reduced wages and hours of work because of the depression. They had cancelled the turnout bonus in 1932; on the big island, they reduced the daily wage from $1 to 55¢ a day. Several plantations dismissed Filipino laborers in order to reduce their laborforce. As a result of all these, there occurred in mid-1933 a series of strikes on the Oahu plantations.
On May 19, 1933 500 Filipinos at Ewa plantation walked out when the plantation without notice cut their wages. On June 13 some 300 Filipinos at Waimanalo plantation also walked out to protest wage reduction and the dismissal of the three Filipino laborers who had allegedly threatened a luna. Threatened by Cayetano Ligot that they would be sued by the plantation, the Waimanalo strikers returned to work but walked out again, adding to their demands the immediate recall of Ligot, whom they claimed had deceived them. On June 26, 600 Filipinos at Waialua plantation walked out to protest the dismissal of a Filipino Luna; another 200 Filipinos closed down the mill at Aeia plantation to protest the dismissal of three mill workers. Ligot was not successful in convincing these to return to work immediately. &Star Bulletin, June 23, 26, 28, 1933; Epifanio Taok to John E. Russell, HSPA President, June 24, 1933, in 644 reel 6; Manlapit to Governor General Frank Murphy, June 29, 1933, in 644, reel 6. &

HSPA secretary John K. Butler and the plantation managers blamed Manlapit and the Filipino Labor Union leaders for these walkouts. &Star Bulletin, June 23, 1933& Manlapit, however, called attention to the testimony in the territorial legislature of the president of C. Brewer & Co, Richard Cooke, that Hawaiian unemployed citizens were given two dollars a day jobs four days a week whereas Filipinos were given a dollar a day jobs two days a week. &Manlapit to Governor General Frank Murphy, June 29, 1933, in 644, reel 6& Manlapit attributed the walkouts to Filipino discontent over the unreasonable reduction in wages, the violation of the labor contracts through reduction in working days, and the unjustified discharge of Filipino employees to replace them with citizen labor. His argument seemed to be supported by the report of HACO’s manager, who noted that "the Filipino laborer is a little touchy at present and small things appear to irritate him, which formerly passed unnoticed," and traced general labor unease to the increase in the price of staple foods; the manager recommended scrapping the plan to reduce skilled salaries by 10%, giving enough work to married men who had to earn money to feed family, and establishing a ten per cent bonus. The last was instituted on August 1, 1933. &HACO to C. Brewer, July 18, 1933, in HACO&

Filipino labor organizing took a different turn at this time, mainly because Taok and Manlapit pursued their own distinct goals. Taok was primarily concerned with the issues which affected mainly the Filipinos, most especially unemployment in Honolulu, and he articulated this concern at the public meetings he held. He held meetings in June on Oahu, in mid-July on Kauai, and in mid-October on Maui, to demand that the unemployed either be sent home, given jobs in Hawaii, or provided relief. He also called for an end to many forms of Filipino discrimination: the unfair ringside decisions against Filipinos at boxing matches, the denial to Filipinos of federal relief, the barriers to employment of Filipinos in public work projects, the lack of reciprocal rights for Filipinos as those enjoyed by Americans in the Philippines. &Taok to Quezon, November 21, 1933, Quezonian Papers&

Manlapit, on the other hand, articulated general labor issues which had concerned him from the very beginning: hours, wages and working
conditions. While he acknowledged the seriousness of the Filipino unemployment situation in Honolulu, he sought to attack its roots: the factor of excess labor in Hawaii in general. It was this factor which also led to other problems: the low wages, the attack on Filipinos leaving for California where they became "a menace and direct competition of American labor." Manlapit, thus, advocated two solutions: curtail the arrival of excess labor and repatriate the unemployed. &Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934, BIA 227 and in Quezonian Papers& These views coincided with Lincoln McCandless' and so Manlapit naturally joined McCandless' campaign for delegate to congress, speaking for the candidate at various rallies. &Star Bulletin, November 3, 1932&

WORK THIS INTO THE TEXT--THIS WAS THE CONDITION PRIOR TO FLU AND MANLAPIT'S RETURN: In Hawaii, the period between 1922 and 1934 was one of inaction and retrogression for trade unions. Company unions were prevalent, and the AFL craft organizations became increasingly exclusive, raising barriers against the Japanese instead of accepting them. &Liebes thesis, p. 66-67& The victory of the Pacific coast maritime workers in 1934 gave renewed impetus to the labor movement in Hawaii. Yet as Representative Crozier of the territorial legislature noted in his testimony before the US Congress: "... any workingman who tries to organize and bargain collectively to better the condition of himself, wife and children is looked upon as a communist, a radical, socialist and red ... The unions have been very weak. The employers discharge men in Hawaii for joining unions." &Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, 74th Congress., 1st Session, 1935, p. 70&

Manlapit’s going off on his own, away from the Filipino Labor Union, was precipitated by the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933. The act, by forbidding employers to interfere with the organization of labor unions and requiring employers to comply with minimum hours, wages and other employment conditions approved by the president, encouraged labor organizing all over the United States. Upon passage of the NIRA, Manlapit organized the Hawaii Labor Federation with the broad aim of uniting all persons in territory at all trades and occupations in pursuit of labor goals like wages, hours and compensations for death or disability. &Circular, HLF, 1934, HSPA Archives& Its officers consisted of people from various ethnic groups.

It had four locals—one each in Honolulu, Hilo, Lahaina and Kapaa. (HLF dues of $1 down and $1 a month, the representatives to collect these dues, and report in writing to Manlapit at least once a month, the representatives to keep 15¢, send 25¢ to the Hilo local and 60¢ to main office, and enjoined the representatives to strict honesty and discipline. &Manlapit, Instructions to Representatives, Hawaiian Labor Federation, 1933, HSPA Archives&

But its secretary was M.L. Alverne who conveniently collected circulars and other materials and sent them to the HSPA. It was so easy to track down Manlapit’s activities, as M.L. Alverne, an HSPA stooge, was the secretary of the Hawaiian Labor Federation. The HSPA had all the details and circulars of the organization. Both the Star Bulletin and the Advertiser attacked Manlapit for using the labor racket under the NIRA to organize, collect dues and exploit laborers. &Star Bulletin, August 30,
Upon assuming the presidency of the Hawaii Labor Federation, Manlapit went on his lecture circuit, holding mass meetings in the second half of October 1933 on the big island, on Maui on the second half of November, talking about higher wages and shorter hours. By the end of the year he had formulated a form letter to be signed by laborers demanding from the HSPA president and trustees the basic wage increase from $1 to $2 a day, the 8-hour day, higher pay rates for overtime and Sunday holiday work, and the recognition of collective bargaining. Circulars, form letters, Hawaii Federation of Labor, HSPA Archives & In 1934 Manlapit held meetings in the various islands talking to the plantation laborers about these issues.

The Honolulu police were always present at the various meetings both of the HLU and the HLF, intimidating laborers and noting down the identity of those present. Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934, in BIA 227, also in Quezonian Papers and in Poindexter Papers, AH & They also harassed the Filipinos in Honolulu regularly; Manlapit cited instances when the police regularly went on a round up, picking up vagrants among the Filipinos, and members of the HLF and the FLU were rounded up by the police and jailed. Manlapit accused the HSPA of using the Honolulu Police Department and the Public Prosecutor's office to frame up charges against labor organizers. Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934, in BIA 227, also in Quezonian Papers and in Poindexter Papers, AH & The common practice by the HPD of rounding up unemployed Filipinos, charging them as vagrants or as undesirables, and committing them to the HSPA immigration station where they were forcibly sent back on the first available boat was also protested by Manlapit in this same letter. Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934, Quezonian Papers & The round ups of Filipinos were led by detective Juan Oxiles; Honolulu policeman Juan Oxiles, who had originally been brought to Hawaii from the Philippines to start the HPD fingerprinting section. Oxiles was believed to have been paid by the HSPA to conduct surveillance on Filipino labor organizers, and thwart their efforts; he was assisted by a young recruit named Roland Sagum. Oxiles was eventually dismissed from the police force for embezzlement. Interview, Roland Sagum &

At one of the round ups on the evening of March 2, 1934, Oxiles arrested several Filipinos during a demonstration led by Taok. Oxiles claimed that all the vagrants he arrested had in their pockets the receipts for dues to the Filipino Labor Union. All but nine of those he arrested were taken to the HSPA immigration station and shipped to the Philippines; the nine, all agreeing to testify against Taok, were held incommunicado pending their testimony as the witnesses against Taok. Manlapit to Roosevelt, March 28, 1934, Quezonian Papers & The principal witness, Aquilino Soriano, filed the complaint that he was gypped when on December 5, 1933 he paid Taok $5 to join the Filipino Labor Union with the understanding that he would obtain free transportation to the Philippines; he accused Taok of fraudulent representation. Warrant of Charges in Micro 644, reel 7 & Taok was arrested while attending a local church organization activity but was released on a $250 bond. Hawaii Hochi, March 24, 1934, in 644, reel 2 & A trial by jury found Taok guilty
of gross cheat on April 17, 1934 &Star Bulletin, April 18, 1934&; the Filipinos protested, raised a defense fund and claimed that Taok had been railroaded by well trained witnesses and hirelings of the HSPA as in the 1909, 1920, and 1924 strikes. He was sentenced to 9 months in jail but on appeal the lower court decision was reversed on September 14, 1935.

Manlapit proceeded to direct the Hawaii Federation of Labor toward collective bargaining issues. He addressed large meetings in early May, 1934, to protest the railroad ing of innocent people, the use of vagrancy laws against unemployed Filipinos who were repatriated involuntarily, and planned for a strike if his call for higher wages and lower hours were not heeded. The following month, the officers of the Hawaii Federation of Labor repudiated his activities. In a resolution of June 9, 1934, the officers declared that the federation "was not created to foment discord or hostility between itself and the HSPA--that it was merely created to organize laborers for their mutual benefit, and assist them in getting jobs, obtaining adequate wages, etc." &Hawaii Labor Federation, Resolution S-9, June 9, 1934, BIA 227& They removed Manlapit from office and accused him of many things: his refusal to abide by by the majority rule of the board of directors, who were conservative; his refusal to have his collection and expense accounts audited; his refusal to submit financial reports, and his refusal to comply with the board’s request to turn over files of minutes, correspondences and other properties of the HFL. &Hawaii Labor Federation, Resolution S-9, June 9, 1934, BIA 227& The HFL general organizer, Melvin De Lonais, attacked Manlapit as an exploiter of the laboring class and accused him of misappropriating the membership fees. &Melvin De Lonais to Governor General Frank Murphy, October 10, 1934, Quezonian Papers&

On September 23, 1934 he was charged in federal court for collecting an excessive fee ($90.50) for assisting a Filipino to obtain a $170.50 war veteran’s claim; the chief witness against him was the HSPA spy M.L. Alverne. The charge carried a maximum penalty of one year in city and county jail. On October 3, 1934 a jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended leniency. Manlapit, noting the exception to the verdict, asked for a new trial but because his only income was as manager of the Hotel Kingsburg, a fleabag in downtown Honolulu frequented by Filipinos. However, he was financially unable to carry out another trial. Instead, he agreed to be placed on probation with the understanding that he leave the territory on October 10. &Star Bulletin, October 8, 1934&

With Manlapit gone, Filipino discontent became unfocused. In January 1936 Filipino cane cutters walked off at Onomea plantation when refused their demand for 5¢ a ton increase for cut cane; the Hilo police simply sent patrolmen to force them to return to their jobs. &Voice of Labor, January 9, 1936& In mid-March 1936, while a team of six University of Hawaii student debaters toured the US mainland telling audiences that Hawaii’s plantation workers, the best paid agricultural workers in America, were satisfied and contented, some two thousand Filipinos at Ewa plantation told manager George F. Renton to raise their pay by April or ship them back to the Philippines; they were better off in the Philippines they were not discriminated against even though the working opportunities were not too good. They said they had no intention of striking; they merely asked for better conditions and if denied they
would leave. The deadline of April 9 came and went. Voice of Labor, March 21, 1936 & The Filipinos were tired of eviction, being slugged by musclemen and plantation police and targets of Hawaiian marksmen, and they wouldn’t strike, they would just quit and be repatriated.

The Filipino Labor Union died from neglect. In March 1936, Taok formed the Filipino League to replace it and he held a series of meetings March 18-29 on Oahu to inform the Filipinos of the organization whose purpose was "For Unity of the Filipinos," "Understanding of Each Other," and "duties toward Philippine Freedom." HSPA spies noted the sparse attendance: at the March 18 Kalihi meeting, merely 30 attended, and the following day at Kakaako only two men came. The adviser of the organization was Pedro T. Victoria, HSPA stooge who collected the materials and turned them to the HSPA. &Filipino League, Circulars, pamphlet, 1936, HSPA Archives.& The main project of the league was to solicit funds to send a Filipino representative to the Commonwealth and Philippine assembly, and to work for the appointment of Moncado as labor commissioner in Hawaii to look after the interests of the Hawaii Filipinos. In its fund drive, which was to collect for the National Defense and Military Training Fund among the Filipinos in Hawaii, with the money to be collected to be turned over to the various island planters' association, to be transmitted to the treasurer of the Philippine commonwealth. &Filipino League pamphlet, July 27, 1936, HSPA Archives; Jorge Vargas, Quezon’s secretary, to Filipino League, April 16, 1936, HSPA Archives.& In the pamphlet the Filipino League was more a mutual help organization than anything else--help sick members, pay funeral expenses, help member dependents financially, assist members in legal trouble, operate free employment bureau, train members for skilled and common labor; it also urged Filipinos to patronize Filipino businesses and work for Philippine independence. &Filipino League pamphlet, July 27, 1936, HSPA Archives.& The Filipino League for the next three years continued to pursue establishment goals--fund drive and donations to the Phil. commonwealth, and endorsing Moncado as a candidate for the Philippine national assembly, and endorsed the policies of the HSPA and the Pineapple Packers’ association. &Filipino League handbill, 1938, in Poindexter Papers, AH & The Filipino League also sponsored the Filipino Territorial Labor Convention at Nuuanu YMCA on July 31, 1938, and had as representatives the elite Filipinos: Cariaga, Alverne, Evaristo Fernandez, Franco Manuel, etc. although it was supposed to be a convention of Filipino labor leaders. It claimed that it was convened because of the Failure of the conference of June 25-26 by Varona to include a labor committee in the program. The convention endorsed the policies of the HSPA and the Pineapple Packers’ Association. &Filipino League handbill, 1938, in Poindexter Papers, AH &
member of the Labor Advisory Board, then field executive officer of the Labor recruitment Agency under the ministry of Health, Labor and Public Welfare. After liberation he worked for the US army as labor recruiter, and then was labor adviser for the US Navy in the Philippines. In 1945-46 he campaigned for Roxas for president; in Jan. 1946 to 1947 he was an agent of the Philippine senate. From January 1948 to January 15, 1950 he was technical assistant, then superintendent of a project at the National Land Settlement Administration. He was laid off because of lack of funds. &Manlapit, Autobiography& In June 1949 he came to Hawaii to visit his children and grandchildren. The immigration authorities held him at the office of immigration; he was excluded on the basis of his 1924 conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. He was released to the custody of the Philippine consul general. &Star Bulletin, July 1, 1949. This was at the time of the dock strike& Manlapit visited his family and left two weeks later. &Advertiser, July 9, 1949. &The Philippine consul guaranteed his return to the Philippines. He was made to sign an agreement that he could not’t address any meeting, speak in any radio station, attend church mass, write any newspaper. &Various newspaper accounts& In August 1950, he organized the National Civic and Patriotic League, an anti-Communist organization, a red baiter. In 1953 he organized the United Labor Political Action to fight graft and corruption in Philippine government. &Manlapit, Autobiography& In 1952 Governor Oren E. Long pardoned Manlapit so he might return to visit his family in Hawaii but Long said the pardon did not mean that Manlapit could come to Hawaii and do business here, that he would need quota admission if he wished to live in Hawaii. &Advertiser, November 6, 1952&


THE VIBORA LUviminda

It was Antonio Fagel, the secretary treasurer of the Filipino Labor Union, who tried to carry on Manlapit’s work of union organizing among the Filipinos. Ilocos-born Fagel left for the US mainland in 1917 in order to complete his high school education, which he finally did as a self-supporting student ten years later. Active in the labor movement, Fagel met Manlapit in Los Angeles in 1930 and immediately became closely associated with the labor leader. He came to Honolulu with Manlapit in 1932. &Antonio Fagel, Voice of Labor, April 8, 1937, p. 1& He immediately became known to the HSPA as an agitator. While campaigning for members at Lihue plantation in October 1933, Fagel was arrested for trespassing and sentenced to banishment for 13 months in Honolulu; on appeal, the sentence was reduced to five months and he served his banishment sentence. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 27&

With Manlapit banished and the Filipino Labor Union defunct, Fagel tried to hide his identity while working as a busboy at the Alexander Young Hotel. His connection with the Filipino Labor Union discovered, he was fired for smoking on the job, although he was a non-smoker. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House
Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 27 & The best jobs he could find were temporary ones at Hawaiian Pineapple Company cannery and as extra busboy at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 27 &

On November 12, 1935, at the invitation of Esteban Cabanada, Fagel went to Maui where he had not been known as a labor leader. He visited several plantations and found out that despite the depression the planters were making large profits. The largest plantation, Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company at Puunene, made a net profit of over $1.5 million in 1935, almost $2 million the next year, and $1.5 million in 1937. Yet when he looked at the pay envelopes of Filipino laborers, he found that in many cases the cane cutters could hardly make $1 a day, and the day laborers and piece workers even less. It was this, he claimed, which inspired him to set up the Vibora Luviminda, which he named after General Artemio Ricarte Y Vibora, a nationalist general who resisted the American takeover of the Philippines at the turn of the century. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 95 &

Fagel tried to be as inconspicuous as possible but he was followed by spies everywhere and was beaten up severely on two occasions. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 28 & He disguised the Vibora as merely an association, with a coop store for members. His work of signing up members at pineapple camps, however, resulted in the firing of Esteban Cabanada, his associate, who was forced to leave the island so hurriedly that he did not even have the time to pack up his belongings. His association with Manlapit too well known, Fagel brought the organization into the open. Florentino Cabe, an organizer, Federico O. Peralta was the secretary, Fagel the president. The motto: naimbag ti matay a sidadayao ngem ti agbiag a mauy-uyaw (Better to die with honor than to live with dishonor). &Vibora Circular, no date, HSPA Archives. &Fagel, Voice of Labor, April 8, 1937 & On June 10, 1936, he called a mass meeting at Puunene and hundreds of Filipinos signed the resolution for higher wages and shorter hours. When hundreds more joined, the plantations grudgingly increased wages slightly. &Fagel, Voice of Labor, April 8, 1937 &

His success merely resulted in more plantation harassment. A January 12, 1937 meeting on a government road at Puunene's Camp 5 at Puunene was dispersed by plantation agents, who also assaulted Fagel. Fagel accused Puunene of coercing laborers from exercising their right to collective bargaining, and of threatening him personally into leaving the island. &Voice of Labor, April 1, 1937 & He filed charges in Honolulu with the National Relations Board, and so its director, E. J. Eagen, investigated Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company at Puunene for beating, terrorizing and spying on laborers. Star Bulletin, April 1, 1937 &
CHAPTER 10

1937 &

Fagel also sought help from the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, longshore union organizers, and as a consequence, Jack Hall and William Bailey, a seaman, had been sent by the Communist Party to Hawaii to do some political work and was also the editor of Voice of Labor, went to Maui to help Fagel organize. &Fagel, article, Voice of Labor, April 8, 1937 & Between April 11 and 19, Fagel, Hall and Bailey held rallies all over Maui, signing up hundreds at the meetings on government roads. Bailey in his speech attacked the bosses like the Baldwins and the boto-boto—the stool pigeons and spies. At evening meetings, often merely depending on flashlights, at Puunene, Paia, Lahaina, Haleakala, Haiku, Wailuku and Puukolii, hundreds of Filipinos showed up at the meetings even though the plantations showed free movies to lure the workers away. Despite the presence of members of the Industrial Association and the police and plantation, the Filipino laborers elected in each camp an organizing committee to recruit Vibora members. &Voice of Labor, April 22, 1937 &

Hall tried to persuade Fagel to take other nationalities into his labor organization but Fagel was stubborn. First he had to organize the Filipinos, then the others. &From Zalsburg, After Hall and Bailey returned to Honolulu on April 19, 1937, Fagel planned to continue organizing and then negotiate his demands with the management. However, events got beyond his control.

On April 20, 1937 at Puunene, Calixto Damaso led a delegation of cane cutters to Frank F. Baldwin, the president and manager of Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company, Ltd., to ask for higher rates for cutting thick cane. Baldwin refused to meet with the delegation, so four hundred workers asked to be paid off and returned to the Philippines. By the end of the day, a total of a thousand Filipinos from one HC&S division had joined the walk out.

The strikers outlined their demands. Cut cane wages were merely 7¢ a row of 30 feet in length, while cane loaders were paid merely 20¢ per ton. They demanded a minimum of 10¢ for thin cane per row and 12¢ for thick cane, and for cane loaders, 25¢ per ton. They asked for the dismissal of some lunas and identified four Japanese lunas in particular, Tomo, Kawachi, Hongu, and Kumira, for abusing the workers and blatantly cheating on the record of the workers' earnings. They also demanded the dismissal of the company spies, identifying among them four Japanese, three Portuguese, a haole, and several Filipinos, including Philip Gamponia and his associates. &Fagel, testimony, Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938) p. 95; Star Bulletin, April 24, 1937 &.

The plantation refused to negotiate, recruited 100 WPA workers as strikebreakers, hired 150 more guards, and received from the county an army of special deputies on horseback with high powered rifles, pistols and clubs. The strike was at first confined to one division of HC&S, but
when Baldwin fired twenty six leaders of the Vibora and evicted them by force from the plantation camps, the Filipinos on the other division walked out too, so that the entire plantation was now struck. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 96& Three weeks later, Baldwin met with the laborers' representatives and agreed to a slight pay increase, to discharge any luna caught cheating or browbeating workers, and to meet with the representatives of the men to settle grievances. &Voice of Labor, May 13, 1937; Star Bulletin, May 12, 1937& The strikers, however, rejected the wage offer as being inadequate; furthermore, they insisted on Baldwin reinstating the twenty six Vibora leaders. &Star Bulletin, May 18, 1937&

Up to that time, the Vibora was a weak organization, and it had been unprepared for this turn of events. Its main leaders, Fagel, Florentino Cabe, and Calixto Damaso, were inexperienced with labor organizing. They had no funds to carry out the strike. The trade unions in Hawaii gave no support. The Honolulu Longshoremen's Association and the Marine Fireman's Union wrote letters of support but only the Hilo Longshoremen's Association raised funds for the strikers. &Voice of Labor, April 29, 1937, May 6, 1937& At the urging of Pablo Manlapit, Manila labor leaders held mass meetings to support the strike but were able to raise no money to help the strikers. &Circular, Mass Meeting, June 6, 1937 at the Manila Opera House, HSPA archives; Voice of Labor, July 1, 1937& The only direct help came from William Bailey, the editor of the Voice of Labor, who went to Maui to help Fagel and boost morale among the strikers.

The Vibora was so weak that Bailey told NLRB regional director E.J. Eagen, who had gone to Maui on May 8 to investigate charges of plantation espionage, harassment of the union, and intimidating the workers with the use of force, that the strikers would accept any arrangement which could allow the men to go back to work and strengthen the organization first. Eagen tried but failed in his talks with Baldwin and his two lawyers. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 28&

A month into the strike, the situation was at a stalemate. No cane had been harvested, and the mill was shut down. No violence had taken place among the twelve hundred strikers in HC&S' twenty six camps, which were watched carefully by the regular police and over a hundred special deputies. As early as May 6 Fagel had written Governor Poindexter to help settle the strike, but he did not do anything. &Fagel to Governor of TH, May 6, 1037 in Poindexter Papers, AH&Baldwin declared his resolve, saying that the planters would not give in and that the strike was a test for the sugar industry, that capitulation at Puunene would mean that other plantations in Hawaii would have to follow suit. &Star Bulletin, May 19, 1937& Fagel announced that he had lined up Filipino workers throughout Maui to join a general walkout if there was no settlement soon. &Star Bulletin, May 18, 1937& Then the top Vibora leaders were arrested for kidnapping a Filipino.
The kidnapping incident took place on May 17 at Puunene's Camp 6. The strikers wanted to bring Anastacio Manangan, the camp president, to the strike headquarters at Wailuku to clarify his stand on the strike because although he had earlier agreed to the strike, Manangan continued to report for work. Manangan resisted going to Wailuku so the strikers had to chase him and bind him. Unknowingly, a car had followed them to Wailuku. At the Vibora office, Manangan promised in writing to Fagel and a dozen other strike leaders not to work anymore until the strike was over. Manangan was released unharmed and given a ride back to his house. Unknown to the Vibora leaders, the whole incident had been observed from the very beginning, and shortly after, ten men were charged for kidnapping: the five men who brought Manangan to Wailuku, and Vibora leaders Fagel, Calixto Damaso, Rufo Booc, Macario Quicho, and Florentino Cabe, who were all present at strike headquarters. &Star Bulletin, May 19, 1937&

Despite the arrest of the Filipino leaders, the strike dragged on. The strikers and their families continued to live on the plantation houses, and the camps were calm; the plantation continued milk deliveries to the strikers’ families with small children. &Star Bulletin, May 26, 1937& The US Department of Labor sent William G. Strench, the US immigration director in Hawaii, to mediate but he did not get anywhere. Hilario Moncado tried and failed to convince the Vibora leaders to back down, and he helped prevent the spread of sympathy strikes on the other plantations. &Strench to Department of Labor, June 21, 1937 in BIA 5999& The strikers learned that help was not forthcoming from the Philippines.

Manila labor leaders asked Commonwealth officials to look into the Maui strike situation but Quezon’s assistant, Jorge C. Vargas, refused to act, "we must presume Filipino laborers on strike in Hawaii will be dealt with fairly and justly." &Star Bulletin, May 17, 1937& The labor leaders also failed to secure from Manila city officials the permit hold a mass meeting expressing sympathy with Hawaii strikers. &Star Bulletin, May 24, 1937& On the other hand, HSPA representative convinced President Manuel L. Quezon and his secretary, Jose Yulo, to stop a plan to send labor inspector general Jose Figueras to Hawaii to investigate, arguing that sending Figueras would merely encourage the laborers to prolong the strike; they also convinced Quezon that Fagel was merely an irresponsible agitator engaged in the strike merely for selfish ends. &Yulo to Vargas, Cable, May 5, 1937, Quezonian Papers.& The HSPA representative in WDC also convinced Quentin Paredes, the Philippine resident commissioner in the United States, that Fagel and Manlapit were misleading the workers. &Secretary Torres to McNutt, Radiogram, May 28, 1937, BIA 5999&

Both Quezon and Paredes sent cables on June 1 urging the strikers to return to work pending the amicable settlement of their demands. &Star Bulletin, June 1, 2, 1937; Paredes to Secretary Torres, June 2,1937, in BIA 5999& These only made the strikers angry; long disillusioned by the actions of Ligot and Quezon, the strikers saw the cables merely a ruse to get the workers back for the harvest season. &Voice of Labor, June 3, 1937&
Instead, in defiance, Fagel on June 3 called a strike for the whole of Maui, declaring: "This is my answer to Quintin Paredes advising my countrymen to return to work without a settlement." &Washington Post, June 6, 1937& The call was successful, and it was now a strike on both the sugar and pineapple plantations on the island, numbering four thousand workers. Only one camp at Wailuku plantation and the Haiku pineapple plantation with merely 75 Filipinos did not join the strike. &Fagel Testimony, Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 96& In response, the plantations at Puunene and Lahaina began evicting several hundred unmarried men from the camps. &Voice of Labor, June 10, 1937; Strench to Department of Labor, June 21, 1937, BIA 5999&

Fagel’s action was very effective, paralyzing the whole island at harvest season, so that the planters agreed to negotiations to settle the strike. On July 1, the negotiators met at the office of Stephen Austin, the manager of the Wailuku Sugar Company, the first negotiation ever conducted by the sugar industry with its workers. The HSPA was represented by General Briant H. Wells, the strikers by Fagel, Calixto Damaso, Charlie Cabe, Macario Quicio, and the planters by W. Cameron of Maui Pineapple Company, Frank Baldwin, and Stephen Austin. After fifteen days, the discussions produced a settlement, although Cameron and Baldwin refused to sign the agreement.

On the average, the strikers gained a 15% wage increase. Fagel urged the strikers to return to work even though the terms were not completely satisfactory. Cane loaders and cutters, specifically, were disgruntled that their rates were increased only slightly. &Fagel, Testimony, Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 98& Furthermore, the settlement was not uniform for all the plantations. Fagel agreed to lower rate increases at Hana and Wailuku, which were small plantations. &Fagel, Testimony, Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 99& The wage rate increase in the long run proved to be illusory, because when sugar prices dropped the following year, the plantations disregarded the agreement, lowered the rates to the level before the strike, and refused to recognize Vibora. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 100&

The plantations also agreed to rehire the twenty six dismissed leaders except Florentino Cabe and Calixto Damaso, and to dismiss the lunas and bosses found guilty of abuses. However, the issue reopened in mid-August, 350 of them refused to go back to work when Baldwin discharged 6 or 7 workers and an overseer, all involved in the strike--the same whom Baldwin had discharged before the strike. &Star Bulletin, August 16, 1937& Baldwin claimed that one of those he
discharged had an altercation with a plantation policeman, but did not explain why he discharged all eight. John Waterhouse, the president of Alexander and Baldwin had to go to Maui to convince Baldwin not to be so bullheaded. &Voice of Labor, August 19, 1937& In late August, some 600 Filipinos were out again, the cane cutters and loaders, upon finding out that their leaders were still being persecuted in the Manangan case. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 100; Voice of Labor, August 26, 1937&

The settlement reached, Fagel called off the strike on July 17. It had lasted 86 days. The Filipinos at the other plantations who had walked out in sympathy also returned to work. It had been a strike free of any violence. &J.R. Steelman, director of conciliation, US Labor Department, to Colonel Donald C. MacDonald, BIA, War Department, July 19, 1937, in BIA 5995&

At the request of the plantations, Fagel was to go to the camps to advise his men not act haughty because of their victory. He did not find time to do that at all because he had to leave at once for Honolulu at the strikeleaders' trial. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 100& The Vibora leaders were surprised to learn that the trial would proceed as scheduled. Fagel, Cabe and Teodorico Cruz claimed that during the negotiations General Wells had promised to drop the case if they settled the strike. A few days after the agreement was reached, Wells had changed his position, saying that the defendants would get off without a sentence if they pleaded "nolle contendere." Fagel had refused, as this amounted to pleading guilty. At a subsequent meeting, Fagel reminded Wells of the promise to drop the case, and Wells responded by calling Fagel a liar and threatened perjury; Wells also sued the Hawaii Sentinel for criminal libel for reporting Fagel's claim. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 103-105; Voice of Labor, March 3, 1938; Fagel to the Hawaii Sentinel, November 4, 1937& The Filipino leaders felt that Wells had betrayed them at the negotiations table.

STRIKELEADERS’ TRIAL

The trial had originally been scheduled at Wailuku, Maui immediately after the strike was settled. Nine leaders (driver of car not charged!) accused of third degree conspiracy to commit unlawful imprisonment, and they asked for jury trial. The HSPA hired Judge William Lymer to assist prosecutor Bevins, William Lymer, the special prosecutor, admitted that he would bill the HSPA around $100 a day for the five week trial. &Voice of Labor, September 9, 1937&. CIO appealed to all friends of labor everywhere. Organized labor appealed to all unions and crew of ships to raise funds for the strikeleaders’ trial. &Voice of Labor, May 27, 1937& But not enough money was raised. The Filipinos were able to
raise the bail but couldn’t afford a lawyer. &Voice of Labor, June 17, 1937& Only three lawyers in Honolulu would take up the case but all asked for exorbitant fees; the rest did not want to take on the HSPA. &Voice of Labor, June 17, 1937& Finally, International Labor Defense Council sent Grover Johnson, a Los Angeles attorney, to defend the Vibora leaders but Judge Daniel H. Case refused to postpone the trial to await his arrival. &Star Bulletin, June 17, 1937&

Judge Case’s court seated only seventy five people; in the anteroom were another two hundred Filipinos, and outside the courtroom four thousand gathered, waiting to hear the proceedings passed on by word of mouth. Grover Johnson questioned each prospective juror and succeeded in establishing that a not guilty verdict would cause each one to lose his job, so the county prosecutor asked for the trial to be moved to Honolulu. &Voice of Labor, June 24, 1937& After a month’s recess, the trial resumed in the court of Judge H.E. Stafford in Honolulu. The defendants were Antonio Fagel, Florentino Cabe, Macario Quicio, Calistro Damaso, Martin Medrona, Marcelo Tolentino, Pedro Gamit, Modesto Baldogo. The tenth, Rufo Booc, pleaded guilty and would appear as a prosecution witness. &Star Bulletin, August 4, 1937& Of the 10 charged, Rudolfo Booc pleaded guilty, while another left the island and has not returned. &Star Bulletin, June 23, 1937&

Grover Johnson, claiming that there was goodnatured bantering all throughout the incident, disputed Anastacio Manangan’s testimony that he had been bound, forcibly driven to Wailuku, threatened by the Vibora Leaders, and then frightened into signing the statement promising to join the strike. &Star Bulletin, August 16, 1937& The trial created a stir with the testimony of Dalmacio Tullao, the driver of the car on which Managan was kidnapped. Tullao claimed that following his arrest he had been held in a small windowless jail for two days, and then forced to sign a statement read by the police to him. &Voice of Labor, August 26, 1937& Wailuku jailer Edward Benjamin testified that each of the defendants had been locked in a dark Wailuku cell bare of any furnishing, forced to sleep on the cement floor, and then taken Rafael Guanzon, a Filipino county policeman, who read their confession in part and threatened to return them to the dark cells if they did not sign. &Star Bulletin, August 31, 1937& Judge Stafford angrily denounced the Maui police and threw out four confessions as having been obtained by inducement, fraud, and intimidation. He also ruled that Elina Suiso, the police interpreter, did not have sufficient understanding of English and Filipino languages and couldn’t follow the thoughts of the men. &Voice of Labor, September 2, 1937&

Judge Stafford found all but one (Macario Quicio) guilty of conspiracy of the third degree, gave them each a 13 month suspended sentence, and imposed a nominal $1 fine. However, Fagel rejected the court offer of leniency; he told the judge that he had led a law abiding life and yet he was easily framed, so he felt safer in the city jail because on probation he could easily be framed again. &Star Bulletin, September 10, 1937& Furthermore, he insisted he was not guilty, and that he had conducted a peaceful and orderly strike; to accept leniency would be to accept a favor of HSPA, which had spent so much money and effort to
prosecute such a minor misdemeanor case. &The Hawaii Sentinel, September 23, 1937& Fagel was sentenced to four months in jail and fined $1.

Upon serving his time in jail, Fagel returned to Maui to resume leadership of Vibora Luviminda but found himself barred from entering the camps. &Fagel, Testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), pp. 102-103& The trial had effectively isolated Vibora’s leaders and, as a consequence, weakened the union. A year after the trial, Vibora membership declined by half to 350 as members left HC&S.

Yet the Vibora strike had an effect on Filipino laborers all over Hawaii. Immediately after the strike, Filipinos on many plantations, especially on Kauai, presented demands and succeeded in getting them. &Voice of Labor, August 5, 1937& They were also organizing to press their demands. On Molokai, they formed the United Pineapple Workers of Molokai, led by Alipio P. Yongson, recruiting as well a few Japanese and Koreans and affiliating briefly with the Honolulu Longshoremen’s Association. In July and August, 1939, twelve hundred of them struck Molokai’s Libby plantation and the California Packing Corporation plantation, demanding higher pay, collective bargaining rights, and protesting the dismissal of their union leaders. &Voice of Labor, July 1, August 19, 1937; Star Bulletin, August 17, 1937& This time, the outcome was different, however. The plantations simply evicted the strikers, brought in from Lanai, Maui and Oahu hundreds of Hilario Moncado’s Filipino Federation of America followers by the hundreds as strikebreakers, and spread the word that thereafter the pineapple plantations wanted only FFA members as common laborers because of their proven industry, peacefulness, respect for the law, thrift, clean moral lives and humility. &Ed Berman, Voice of Labor, January 20, 1938& Despite the inspiration provided by the Vibora, the nature of labor organizing in Hawaii was changing, as a result of federal legislation and West Coast maritime unionization.

The most important of these federal laws was the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), which was passed by congress after the supreme court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act. The law, its validity upheld by the Supreme court in 1937, gave legal force to labor’s right to bargain collectively by supervising elections in factories. It also prohibited the unfair practices of corporations creating company unions, dominating a labor organization, dismissing workers for union activities, or using a spy network. The Wagner Act, however, applied merely to industrial workers, and the rights of agricultural workers were not protected until after World War II.

In Hawaii, the Wagner Act also resulted in the arrival of federal officials to supervise its implementation. In April 1937, E. J. Eagen arrived in Honolulu as the NLRB attorney to investigate the maritime labor conditions in Hawaii, and he stayed on to become the first regional director of the office. A year later, he was joined by Arnold Wills as the NLRB examiner. Labor justifiably felt confident that unlike in the
past, these two federal officials could resist the wiles of the sugar industry's "Hawaiian hospitality" &Voice of Labor, November 11, 1937&

In his report on the labor situation in Hawaii, Eagan did not mince his words; he called the Big Five control of the Hawaiian islands the truest picture of "facism anywhere in the world." &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. ??& The agencies owned directly or indirectly most of the land, controlled all the banks, hotels, transportation, and communication facilities, and handled practically all that was purchased or sold in the islands.

In 1937 there were 38 plantations in Hawaii. Amfac with its ten plantations raised 30.6% of Hawaii's sugar tonnage. C. Brewer came next, raising 24.4% of Hawaii's sugar in its thirteen plantations. Alexander and Baldwin had five plantations, raising 20% of the crops, Castle and Cooke had three plantations producing 14.8% of Hawaii's crops, and Theo H. Davis had four plantations producing 6.1% of Hawaii's crops. Three other agents operated one plantation each: F.A. Schaeffer & Co., Bishop Trust, and Fred L. Waldron, Ltd. Amfac and Theo Davies were wholesalers for a variety of goods; together they imported in 1941 about 70% of the food brought into the territory of Hawaii. They were also dominant in hardware and dry goods. All the agencies operated plantation stores and retail outlets--Amfac with its Liberty House and May's Market, and Theo Davis with its Piggly Wiggly stores. The large lateral integration, whereby the factors for the plantations were also the wholesalers and the plantations were also the merchandizers--with even many independent retailers in Hawaii buying from integrated wholesaler--showed economic dominance of the agencies.

Monolithic structure--sugar money through the Big Five, and interlocking directorates, as early as 1920 George Wright pointed out the extent of that control, which included the control of two newspapers, eight banks, twenty-two public utility corporations, six trust companies and the Audit Company of Hawaii, Ltd, the auditor. In steamship passage there was no competition as the InterIsland Steamship Company bought out Wilder Steamship Company, and Matson Navigation Company the shipper for cargo to and from Hawaii. &George Wright, Memo, June 8, 1920, in Micro 2664&

Their economic dominance resulted in political control as well, especially in the territorial legislature, where the speaker was the chief counsel for the HSPA. The territorial governors, though named by the President of the United States, were beholden to the planters. Eagan identified Frank E. Thompson as the "chief plotter of the trust;" obtaining the appointment of Poindexter as governor in 1933, securing the appointment of the judges in the islands, and operating a blackmail system which kept these men under his control. As many a lawyer who left the islands found out, anyone who took a case against the Big Five soon learned that he could not stay in business. &Washington Daily News, May 3, 1940, in BIA 227&
Eagen accused the HSPA of many anti-union activities. He revealed the use of the police and of the army and navy for anti-union purposes. Army and military intelligence cooperated with the Big Five; "some Army and Navy officers are extensively entertained and put under obligation to the powers that be." Military officers accepted free passage from Hawaii to the West Coast to "investigate labor leaders" and submitted their reports to the the Big Five. Eagan also charged that the HSPA maintained a widespread espionage system headed by Arthur MacDuffey, formerly chief of detectives for the Honolulu Police Department, and Richard Hyland, former Stanford all-American football star, with the Filipino churches being an integral part of it. &Elwyn J. Eagen, Report on the Hawaiian Islands, May 30, 1940. U.S. Congress, House Special Committee to Investigate National Relations Board (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1940), p. 23& INSERT HERE: Arthur McDuffey was chief of detectives for the Honolulu police department. He headed the espionage system for the HSPA and later became the public investigator for the HSPA or one of the Big Five. He was a huge guy. &Interview, Roland Sagum&


The plantations blacklisted radical and dissatisfied workers, used "agents" in the ethnic groups--"leaders," policemen and spies for the company--to report on statements made by workers. &Kiyoshi Ikeda, "Unionization and the Plantation," Social Process in Hawaii, 1951, pp. 14-25& At Waialua in 1945 the company had spies to check on these attending meetings for union organizing. &Justo de la Cruz, ESOTP, p. 162&

Fate of a union organizer could be illustrated in the story of Calixto Damaso, one of the Vibora leaders. Damaso was only 16, though he posed as an 18 year old in order to be recruited, a the son of a rice farmer in San Felipe Zambalez. He worked as a hoe hana man and cane cutter at Olaa between 1930 and 1934. He was the pace setter, and goaded to work faster only to see that the more cane he cut, the less his fellows received as their earnings were proportionally adjusted lower to his higher pace as the normal wage structure. Protesting this, he was fired; The Filipinos at Olaa protested his firing but he was not reinstated, and in fact, was a marked man from then on. Visiting his brother one day at a company camp, he was arrested for trespassing. He found work at Wailuku Sugar but was fired again after a year and a half for organizing workers. He was hired at Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co., and during the Vibora strike he was not rehired. He became a marked man, and the best he could to do survive was to fish at Kaunakakai for five months. When he applied at Waimanalo, the manager had his name and photograph; the same was true at Aeia, Waipahu, Kahuku and every plantation he applied to. So he dug cesspools for a Japanese contractor. It was only after the war that he became a longshoreman, and at the union organizing, he served as an interpreter at meetings for Filipino stevedores.
As the NLRB director, Eagan's decisions encouraged labor organizing. His order to reinstate a gang of twenty men operating the machinery sending sugar down a cliff over a wire to small ships at the port of Kukuihaele resulted in a rash of labor organizing in 1938. These labor organizers came from a new background. In the past, the Hawaii unions had been American Federation of Labor affiliates, and they were mostly in Honolulu, were exclusively skilled craft unions, exclusively haole, and traditionally opposed to Oriental immigration or membership. However, the vast majority of the workers in Hawaii, were on the plantations, were mostly unskilled workers, and Asian in the majority. The AFL unions made one brief attempt to organize on the plantations; at the July 3-5, 1937 labor convention nineteen unions formed the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor with Max Weisbarth as its president, and immediately after, the HIFL organizers on Kauai courted the Filipinos on the plantations. Ben Shear, the HIFL organizer, was immediately attacked by Filipinos, especially Richard Madamba, a plantation stooge. This brief organizing failed and the AFL remained urban Honolulu, craft and haole.

The most active labor organizers were the agents of the maritime unions on the West Coast. The 1934 Pacific Coast Maritime strike had gained recognition for Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen's Association, later to become the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), and its members came to Hawaii as crewmen on the Pacific ships. In 1935, the ILWU organizers began work among Hawaii's longshoremen and stevedores and established the Voice of Labor, a weekly tabloid. The weekly came out with its first issue on November 4, 1935, calling for working class solidarity among all the workers, attacking the charges that the Japanese and the Filipinos were unassimilable, and denouncing the University of Hawaii psychology department's stand on the intelligence test as a measure of innate racial characteristics. When the ILWU went on strike again on the West Coast in 1936-37 over contract renewal, Jack Hall led the stranded twelve hundred seamen in Hawaii on organizing the Honolulu and Hilo longshoremen, resulting in the establishment of the Hawaii Longshoremen's Association in Honolulu, chartered by Harry Bridges with the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO), with three island locals, in Hilo, Honolulu and Port Allen, Kauai.

In mid-1937 Jack Hall, the regional director of the ILWU, secured a charter for the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) in order to begin union organizing on the plantations. UCAPAWA's efforts at plantation organizing were concentrated on Kauai, under the direction of Calixto Piano, who urged his fellow Filipinos in Ilocano and English to "make one big union with the Portuguese, the haole, the Japanese and the Hawaiians and to fight the battle for labor with their combined strength." Piano, Star Bulletin, September 27, 1937 & UCAPAWA agents succeeded in establishing units at McBryde plantation under the leadership of Mauro Andaya, as well as at Kekaha, Lihue and Makaweli.

By March 1938, UCAPAWA started its work on East Hawaii under the direction of Hilo...
At the UCAPAWA organizational meetings, speakers of various nationalities spoke on the CIO program, warned about nationalist tactics and company unions, and emphasized the unity of all workers. However, the units formed consisted mostly of Filipinos, with a sprinkling of Japanese.

Calixto Piano and the other Filipino organizers, competing directly with Vibora leaders for membership among the Filipinos and repudiating the concept of a nationalistic union, attacked Fagel, Moncado and Francisco Varona as fake union leaders and phony messiahs who had the interest of employers at heart.

During the Vibora strike, the advisers from the Voice of Labor sought to convince Fagel to extend membership to other nationalities. In fact, in late June, 1937 during the strike, Fagel’s 3000 plantation and mill workers voted to affiliated with the Honolulu Longshoremen’s Association and to retain Vibora, but also to adopt a constitution to form a union open to all race, creed and color and relegate Vibora to merely a fraternal organization. The jailing of Fagel and the suspended sentence of the other leaders created a vacuum of leadership in the Vibora, and its membership declined rapidly. However, the leaders of the Vibora again took up the campaign to organize the Filipinos on the other islands; in mid-October, 1937 they were on Kauai (Vibora pamphlet, HSPA archives) and in early November they were on the Big Island (HACO to HSPA, November 13, 1937, HACO).

Fagel, upon completing his four month sentence at the county jail in early January 1938, issued a dramatic statement: "I am ready at any time to pour the very last drop of my blood for the welfare of my laboring countrymen. My life is dedicated to their well-being." So he joined the leaders of the Vibora in their recruitment campaign. First he went to Maui in the second half of January, exhorting his followers to work for unity and the reorganization of the Vibora. The following month, he went to Kauai to establish a branch of the Vibora. There he at once ran into conflict with the other Filipinos who were organizing along industrial lines and saw Vibora as a menace to their efforts.

Fagel was thus attacked by his old CIO associates, including the Voice of Labor, was a fame-starved idol aspiring to satisfy his personal prestige, honor and publicity. Nationalism was losing force in Hawaii, and the CIO organizers, targeting the Filipinos as the core of its labor organizing efforts, saw the Vibora's campaign as wrecking class solidarity. Also, the Vibora leaders were not experienced in collective bargaining. Fagel was being passed by new developments; and although he had been able to mobilize discontent earlier into the vibora, appeal to enthusiasm and mutual aid, he did not channel these into union ideas. In the Vibora negotiations with HC&S, his shortcomings became obvious: he did not insist that the
settlement apply to other plantations, just to HC&S. He agreed that the smaller plantations should not suffer and pay more wages; Fagel was misled by the dollar amount on profits rather than the percentage return on investments. Thus his ideas on reasonable and fair wages still took the planters' view of what it would do to profits, rather than the laborers' viewpoint of what it could purchase by way of necessities. He did not see that the real profit picture was to be analyzed at the agency level, taking a big profit from Matson and the sale of goods at plantation stores, rather than at the plantation level. &Fagel, testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 102&

The result of Fagel's and the other Vibora leaders' drive to organize were the small organizations on some plantations on Maui and at Kekaha. These organizations conducted walkouts in 1938, but these were lost; in March 1939 the Vibora also conducted a strike of 200 Filipinos at Honokaa plantation but after three months when a near settlement was almost reached, the manager fired the entire camp. In these, the Vibora revealed its weaknesses: no adequate preparation or clear formulation of demands, narrow base confined merely to Filipinos and to a few camps on the plantations, and the bungling of the negotiations. &Voice of labor, May 26, 1939& The strikers also did not get any assistance from the other organized labor in Hawaii; instead, they had to ask Elizalde, the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the US, for assistance, and Elizalde turned them down. The strike was led by Federico Peralta, and the plantation evicted the Filipinos. &Elizalde, Resident Commissioner, to Manuel L. Quezon, May 6, 1939, in BIA 5999&
Between April and June, 1939 the Vibora conducted meetings on all the islands except at Oahu, and at the Maui meetings on June 10-20, Fagel even mentioned the proposed establishment of an agricultural colony at Davao for Vibora. &Vibora Circulars, 1939, HSPA archives& At the meetings on July 12 to 20 on Maui, it became evident that very few Filipinos were now attending, and the circular said that if the majority did not show any enthusiasm to unite at these meetings, Vibora would leave Maui.

Organized labor had two other enemies among the Filipinos: Attacked Moncado as being anti-labor &Voice of Labor, November 11, 1937&

Also, Varona and his company union. Varona was in the 1930s the Philippine legislature’s lower house chairman of the labor committee. He came to Hawaii under shady circumstances.

On May 5, 1937 the Philippines Herald came out with a blustering editorial about the commonwealth government’s neglect of the welfare of the Filipino laborers in Hawaii. Ligot’s office had been abolished; the law creating the office of the Inspector of Labor to replace Ligot’s office required the labor inspector to visit Hawaii every six months to study the needs of Filipino laborers, report to Manila authorities, and assist laborers in advantages within the law. Since Figueras was sent in 1933, not once had he returned as labor inspector, in violation of the law creating his office. Yet many complaints had been received at the Department of Labor of the Philippines about unjust treatment of Filipino plantation workers in Hawaii. Among these complaints: the denial or discontinuation of compensation for injuries and death in the line of duty; the plantations dispensing with the written contracts; the plantations withdrawing the privileges of free return of laborers after completing their contract; Filipinos being cheated in the weighing of their cane; and others. The Philippines Herald editorial urged the immediate dispatch of Figueras. &The Philippines Herald, May 5, 1937, in Quezonian Papers&

The National Federation of Labor in Manila endorsed the editorial and urged Quezon to act. &P.M. Esqueras to Quezon, May 7, 1937, Quezonian Papers& Many in the Philippines, not just the labor leaders but also the high government officials and educators, however, believed that Quezon had already long ago sold out to the HSPA, financially or otherwise; as he had in many instances yielded to HSPA suggestions, closed his eyes and ears to labor protests. As a recent example, they cited the fact that Quezon nominated Herminigildo Cruz to be reinstated as director of labor, as desired by the HSPA, despite widespread protest from labor interests. In fact, a few months before the editorial, Figueras was already on board a steamer to take him to Hawaii on his annual inspection trip when Quezon refused to let Figueras to take his annual inspection trip to Hawaii and the mainland as required by the law creating his office. Figueras was labelled by the HSPA as a labor agitator, despite Governor General Murphy telling Butler on a trip to Manila that Figueras had followed Murphy’s instructions. &Labes, Hawaii Sentinel, April 8, 1937&
Quezon, instead, substituted Varona for Figueras. When Figueras heard about this plan, he wrote a letter to Quezon, invoking a filial relationship, addressed as "My dearest Daddy," posing as a son running to his father in times of stress, and pointing out that his office would be humiliated if Varona was sent instead, and suggested that both he and Varona go or else send no one. &Figueras to Quezon, March 2, 1937& Figueras even promised to compromise; in an interview he said his office appreciated the improved program of social welfare and congratulated the HSPA for better housing, program, water supply, profit-sharing bonus and the 8-hour day, e tc. and acknowledged the Filipino laborer in Hawaii was better off than the common tao in the Philippines. &Figueras, interviewed by Ric Labez, in Star Bulletin, March 2, 1937&. Quezon prevailed, despite editorials and public opinion in the Philippines that someone other than Varona be sent.

Varona arrived in Hawaii on August 6, 1937 on a special commission by Quezon to make a special labor survey and to write a special recommendation, and after doing so for Hawaii, to proceed to the US mainland to do the same. &Star Bulletin, August 6, 1937& In Honolulu, Varona associated with the Filipino reactionary elite in general; these elites assembled a meeting for him on August 16, 1937 at which he shared the podium with NC Villanueva, Cariaga, Clemente V. Reyes representing Ti Silaw, and Maximo Sevilla representing the Philippine News Tribune. Fagel asked to speak but was prevented from doing so, and he virtually got on the floor and started to speak when he was cut off. &Star Bulletin, August 16, 1937&

Varona toured the plantations and found a different mood among the Filipinos than during his earlier visit. At HACO and on the other plantations, he found the Filipinos now more open in their criticism of plantation conditions. HACO Filipinos complained about discrimination, about the Filipino interpreter being a spy, and submitted to Varona their request for higher rates &Campsie to C. Brewer, September 4, 1937, HACO&. His activities were not to make a survey, however; as he went around the various plantations, he urged the Filipinos not to join the CIO or any organization which did not have 100% Filipino leadership. He asked the Filipinos to be reasonable in their demands because the plantations were doing all they could to improve working and living conditions. &Voice of Labor, October 14, 1937& He proposed instead that the Filipinos from a union which would retain its identity as a Filipino organization &Hawaii Sentinel, September 9, 1937& On Kauai where the AFL was organizing, he said the Filipinos "should not join the Hawaiian Islands Federation of Labor because if they did they would lose the direct interest of their home government on them." &Voice of Labor, October 14, 1937&

On the various plantations, the Filipino interpreters, lunas and ministers and camp policemen tried to work out Varona's version of a company union. He continued to hammer away at ethnic divisiveness in order to prevent a class-based union from emerging. He urged the Filipinos to avoid the CIO or other unions; these were composed of the laborers who despised and caused the dismissal of Filipino laborers, sailors, musicians, and others from merchant ships. They were composed of the laborers who persecuted the Filipinos in California and Pacific
Coast, they were the men who wished to exclude the Filipinos from the US. In other words, they played the divide-and-rule game to the hilt. He urged the workers to become friends with and work in unison with the plantation managers. "You must discuss and think first with your managers if you have any problems," he urged the Filipinos naively. "Think that when you strike, your government and the Philippines, your country, are affected and your families suffer." &Star Bulletin, October 28, 1937&

Indeed Berman had good reasons to warn them of company unions. At Makaweli the company tried to set up the "Filipino Community Workers Association, in the Varona style, under the manipulation of the plantation welfare director T.B. Miles and his Filipino assistant; the workers ignored it and proceeded to pay union dues and elect officers. &Voice of Labor, December 9, 1937&

Varona’s report was to recommend three things to the HSPA. One was that Filipinos formed a bank--a recommendation which was not within the purview of the HSPA trustees. A second recommendation was that the HSPA allow the Filipinos who were able bodied and had worked on the plantations for 10 years or more, a chance, until June 30, 1938, to a new work contract which could qualify them for return fare if they worked no less than 20 days a month for three consecutive years, and others for 5 consecutive years. The HSPA made a big deal of this, as a way of pointing out to the Filipinos that Varona could, indeed work to get concessions from the HSPA, although only a handful were now affected by this new work contract. &Star Bulletin, October 17, 1917& The third was the plan for company unions on the various plantations, asking the plantation managers to confer freely with elected employee representatives of Filipino associations.

Varona proceeded to California, where he similarly tried to organize the Filipinos at a Conference in Sacramento and then on his way back to Manila, passed by Honolulu again, where he announced calling a territorial civic conference for June 25 and 26 to discuss the plans for organizing the Filipinos--this was at a June 14, 1938 luncheon with such elites like Ocampo, Ligot, Cariaga, Victoria, Collado, Fernandez and Enrique Alba. &Star Bulletin, June 14, 1938& The conference was dominated by the elite; the topics covered were now those considered irrelevant by the Filipinos on the plantations--what Filipinos could do for their home government, crime among Filipinos, encouraging savings, sound investment and business among Hawaii Filipinos, education and literacy campaign, and caring for the indigent and the destitute--and did not include any labor committee at all in the program.

Varona in 1939 went on to Washington D.C. as assistant to Commissioner Elizalde assigned to work toward improving the Filipino situation in the United States, and he tried to manipulate in California the Filipino Agricultural Labor Association, and even sought to affiliate FALA with his hated AFL. He died June 28, 1941.

The Filipino League with Taok as chairman, called the Varona conference a failure because it failed to include a labor committee in the program, and so it arranged for an alternative conference, the First
Filipino Territorial Labor Convention at the Nuuanu YMCA on July 31, 1938. It was attended by Cariaga, Alverne, Fernandez, Franco Manuel and others who were non-plantation, and the Honolulu Filipinos, as representatives. The conference, claiming to be a convention of Filipino labor leaders, asked for the creation of the Philippine commissioner to Hawaii, Ligot's job, and endorsed Moncado as a candidate; also endorsed the policies of the HSPA and the Pineapple Packers' Association. This indicated how unrealistic Filipino organizations had become to the needs of the majority, that of the plantation laborers.

Circular, Filipino League, 1938, in Poindexter Papers, AH& The following year again, also with Taok as chairman and Moncado was the guest speaker, and Moncado's message, which he repeated in full page advertisements in the Advertiser, was to arbitrate. &First Filipino Territorial Labor Convention and 3rd Anniversary of the National Defense Fund Campaign in Hawaii, Program, July 30 and 31, 1939, Honolulu, HSPA Archives.&

FOR THIS PART, OUTLINE THE REASONS WHY UNIONIZATION DID NOT WORK.

The Mainland unions did not succeed in obtaining a foothold in Hawaii until 1939. Despite the flurry of organizing, none of the unions was recognized by employers as a bargaining agent in 1939.

Only a few achievements: On most plantations the unions were not strong enough to call an NLRB elections. The election held at McBryde sugar plantation, where the non-agricultural employees designated UCAPAWA, local 76, CIO as their sole and exclusive bargaining agent, resulted on August 6, 1941 with the signing of a collective bargaining agreement, the first in the sugar industry. &Arnold Wills, Labor-Management Relations in Hawaii (University of Hawaii Industrial Relations Center, 1955), p. 15& On the waterfront, the Filipinos at Ahukini on Kauai, all the Filipino longshoremen went on strike, demanding wage guarantee of $15 a week; the employers tried to move the ship to Port Allen where the longshoremen were entirely Japanese but the Japanese respected the picket line. The Ahukini strike was lost. But the first written contract was achieved June 12, 1941 between the ILWU and Castle and Cooke terminals. &Arnold Wills, Labor-Management Relations in Hawaii (University of Hawaii Industrial Relations Center, 1955), p. 13&

1. The old reasons, of inertia from the past hard to overcome. The Shoemaker report in explaining the weakness of unions in Hawaii, cited the following: opposition of employers, lack of union experience, racial differences among plantation laborers, racial dissent within unions, lack of support by mainland parent unions. &Shoemaker, 1939, p. 202&

There were few successes because of the history of management's antagonism to labor organization. "There is a tendency on the part of management to assume that unionism is synonymous with dangerous radicalism, possibly because the labor movement in Hawaii has not always been wisely led." wrote the Bureau of Labor Statistical Report, 1939, p. 197 "The result of this attitude is the feeling that labor unionism is a common menace to all Hawaiian enterprise, and that the duty of combating its development is a common problem of the management of all industries whenever labor troubles occur. Thus, although management has done much for labor in Hawaii, it has also used every influence at its command to restrict labor organization." &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1939, p. 198& "Whether it is justified or not, there is a prevalent feeling
among the majority of Hawaiian workers that a bad record with any important concern in the Territory makes it difficult to obtain employment in any other concern, and that to be associated with labor-union activities is certain to weaken their employment opportunities, if not destroy their economic future." &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1939, p. 198

2. Rapid improvement of wages, hours and working conditions. &Shoemaker, 1939, p. 202

3. There were problems: camp police surveillance, the trespass law of 1925, and police surveillance. The union leaders were often put out of circulation by a law which empowered the police to arrest a person without warrant on suspicion that such person intends to commit an offense. This placed the union leaders out of circulation. Much of labor legislation was anti-labor, making it hard to organize. &Arnold Wills, Labor-Management Relations in Hawaii (University of Hawaii Industrial Relations Center, 1955), pp. 14-15

The HSPA maintained an intricate spy system and a blacklist system in Hawaii. William Crozier, a representative in the territorial legislature, told a special subcommittee of the territorial legislature that in the 1920s and 1930s "Any working man who tries to organize and bargain collectively to better the condition of himself, wife and children is looked upon as a Communist, a radical, a Socialist and red.. The employers discharge men for joining unions in Hawaii." &1949 Hearings, p. 152; in Bouslog, p. 27& Situation continued to be true until after World War II.

Company Unions: The arrangement was for the Filipinos in a camp to form a camp committee under the supervision of the plantations. The heads of the camp committee would then constitute the executive committee. They would choose a head man, and the would be the one who brought the complaints and requests to the management. This was true of the C. Brewer plantations on the big islands and of many plantations in Hawaii in general. &W.L.S. Williams, manager, Olaa Sugar Co., testimony, in Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 330

In 1939 the Hawaii legislature passed the law creating the territorial department of labor and industrial relations, which is responsible for the enforcement of the labor laws of the territory of Hawaii. Also in 1939 the territory of Hawaii placed control of all labor laws in the department of labor and industrial relations; the act establishing it also provided for mediation and conciliation of labor disputes and the regulation of child labor. &Shoemaker report, p. 204

The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act required that corporations producing goods for interstate commerce meet required minimum wages and 44 hour week (reduced to 40 per week in 1940); also time and a half for overtime, and forbade employment for children below 16 years of age.

2. the trend toward federal regulations arising out of the new deal
situation. The social security act was signed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt on August 14, 1935 to provide for old age benefits, unemployment compensation, assistance to blind, dependent children, child services, and public health and vocational rehabilitation. To qualify for grants to states and territories, states passed legislation for social security. So in 1937 Hawaii's legislature passed an unemployment compensation law (though it did not cover agricultural labor and domestic service in a private home) and the public welfare law. Hawaii's old age assistance law in 1933 was intended for Hawaiians only, and it required citizenship of 30 years and residence of 15 years; this law was amended in 1935 to comply with the social security act. In 1938, however, Hawaii still had no adequate child labor law, minimum wage law, no legislation protecting women in industry. &Liebes, p. 89&

Soon, however, martial law ended the union organizing activities in Hawaii.

THE CHANGING SUGAR ESTABLISHMENT

Eagen described the autocratic powers of the sugar establishment in the islands, yet it was actually for the planters a time when they felt they had less control over developments in the industry, and when they felt most defensive than at any time in their history. Probably the most important reason why unionization did not work was because in the 1930s sugar had become a very highly regulated industry.

This regulation began with the passage of the Jones Costigan Act of 1934, establishing quotas for various sugar producing regions of the United States, for continental beet and cane sugar. Because it was a territory with access to cheap labor from the Philippines by continuing special legislation, Hawaii was relegated to the secondary position with foreign sugar producers, who were allocated a quota only after the mainland growers' quotas were satisfied. Alaska, Puerto Rico and Hawaii were in the same category, and Hawaii's sugar quota had to compete with worldwide supplies. Hawaii felt discriminated against. Its quota was restricted to 3% of the total sugar quota, and was given benefits payment in compliance. The Jones Costigan Act was a three year legislation. It was renewed as the sugar act in 1937? Same compliance payment benefits.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act--representatives of the US Department of Agriculture conducted hearings on the major islands relating to sugar industry wages and prices paid by the plantations to independent growers, and it had to deal with all phases of plantation life and work in the process. The testimony was to be used by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in determining the sugar industry's qualifications for the annual federal benefit payments. Thus the Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938) report. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration determined even the acreage, the amount of chemical fertilizer per acre and other farming practices--this
was how intrusive the AAA was.

The 1937 Sugar Act, the secretary of agriculture would make wage determinations to sugar producing areas.

In 1939 the minimum was $1.40 a day for males and $1.05 for females.

In 1937 the secretary of agriculture’s determination on wage rates said that the sugar plantations could receive benefit payments if they paid their workers an average of $2.10 a day. This was not the minimum per day per man; it was the average for the period. &Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938), p. 101&

In 1938 the plantations received $4 plus for observing the terms of the 1937 sugar act; only $600,000 of this amount was paid to labor. It is expected that in 1939, the plantations would receive about $8.5 million, but even after this, the plantations still expected to lose some $3 million.

In 1936 under contract with the secretary of agriculture the sugar industry agreed to prohibit child labor (below 14), limit to 8 hours a day the employment of children 14-16 years old, and to comply with the minimum hours of work determined by the secretary of agriculture. &H.A. Walker, 56th HSPA Meeting, December 7-10, 1936&

In 1938 the secretary of agriculture Wallace ruled that the sugar plantations increase wages or lose Agricultural Adjustment Act benefits. &Frank Hewlett, secretary, Hawaii Newspaper Guild to Ernest H. Gruening, director, Division of Territories, Department of Interior, April 20, 1938, in BIA 227& Wages increased 13% as dictated by the wage determination hearing of the secretary of agriculture despite the fact that plantations that year saw sugar prices sink low.

The sugar industry in 1938 complained of the wage rates as prerequisite for the receipt of benefits. "The workers who would benefit from the proposed increased minima are the aged workers or the untrained youthful beginners as well as the workers of indifferent quality who are now being carried unproductively on the plantation payrolls. A minimum wage requirement ..." penalize plantations for keeping marginal workers on payroll rather than abandon them to relief or unemployment. &John E. Russell, HSPA presidential address, 58th annual meeting, December 5-8, 1939, pp. 3-16, p. 7&

In 1940 there was the continued fair determination hearings and instructions, with the USDA determining the wages, and that for females to be no less than three-fourths of the male wages.

3. The trend toward mechanization, especially with the closing of previous labor sources.
One impact of the Jones Costigan Act was on labor. Hawaii had been discriminated against because of cheap labor, and continued to suffer potential discrimination because of the special provision allowing it to import cheap labor from the Philippines. The sugar industry, therefore, sought to mechanize rather than get cheap labor. Yet cheap labor was like an addiction the sugar industry could not easily get rid of--thus there were always the exploration of getting cheap labor, including from the Philippines.

1935 Tydings McDuffie Act placed quota of 50 Filipinos a year--thus Hawaii sugar industry now able to seek labor only within the United States, and approaching period of complete dependence upon native-born citizen laborers. This is a new environment for the sugar industry as a whole.

Cane cutting and harvesting equipment, especially, saw rapid mechanization--the areas where labor was needed in large numbers. In harvesting, the plantations used the cultivation men plus many more who were carried on the payroll during the slack season--so as not to make them leave the area, and for this reason, harvesting became the focus for searching for labor saving devices. The engineer of the Labor Saving Devices Committee of the HSPA reported in 1937 that "The year 1937 had seen some rather drastic changes in plantation practices. The engineer admits that development has been so rapid that he has had considerable difficulty in keeping up with them. In fact, he wonders if he will ever be able to catch up." &Report of Committee, Proceedings, 1937, p. 6& Such new improvements as the cane grab; all kinds of tractors and plows.

4. taxes--in the annual address of the president for the years, so much complaint about this year after year.

5. low sugar prices. True in 1938 and several plantations reduced or suspended dividend payments. In 1938 the price for sugar expected would be $11 a ton less than the average cost of sugar production; the industry hoped to make up for this loss when the compliance payment int he Sugar Act of 1937 is made. Because of depressed sugar prices, the plantations were carried by the agencies on overdrafts. &John E. Russell, Presidential address, 58th annual HSPA meeting, December 5-8, 1938, pp. 3-16, this on p. 12& Also, the plantations withdrew the turnout and price bonuses but wages increased by 13% as dictated by the wage determination hearing of the secretary of agriculture. &John E. Russell, Presidential address, 58th annual HSPA meeting, December 5-8, 1938, pp. 3-16, this on p. 7&

Yet the industry made money. The money to be made was not in plantation stocks but in the agency stocks, and the Castle and Cooke stocks controlling the steamship lines--only the rich could afford the high price of these agency stocks. Even from the marginal plantations, the agencies made money from commissions, interest on loans, payment for services, etc. &Elizabeth Bolles, Stenographic Report of Hearing on Fair Wage Rates in Sugar Cane for 1938. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1938) p. 122& In addition, the Crockett refinery was a money mint, refining and marketing sugar at a profit.
In 1939 price of sugar sank to a low of 2.75¢ as an absolute bottom; all plantations in 1938 showed deficits and losses. War was declared in Europe and as buyers rushed in anticipation of future shortages, the price of sugar jumped. But most of Hawaii’s sugar had already been sold. Prices sank again quickly, however, as the president suspended sugar quotas and inventories piled up and there were few buyers in the market—the lifting of the quotas resulted in sugar surpluses.

&John Waterhouse, presidential address, 59th annual meeting of the HSPA, December 47, 1939, pp. 3-18. This on p. 7&

In 1940, new record low in sugar prices at 2.77¢ per pound—President Roosevelt suspended the sugar quota in December 26, 1939 and so Cuban surplus sugar entered the American market, resulting in high inventory.

In these years from 1930 on, a sense of gloom in the addresses of the HSPA presidents each year—low sugar prices, and increased wages required for compliance by the secretary of agriculture, the higher taxes, higher freight rates, higher prices of bags, fertilizers, etc. Also the loss of control over foreign labor sources. Plus labor agitation, and the new deal. And all kinds of federal rules, like the ones on wages, unemployment compensation, etc. Then came the war. With the war, the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply issued the price schedule prohibiting the sale of sugar at higher than a certain price per pound. And the industry complained of inflation, and the taxes which had to be raised with the expenditures for war. The successive presidents, into the war years, really sounded like gloomy Guses. War also drained labor, workers needed for defense.

The sugar industry all throughout this period disillusioned with the federal policy, through the sugar quotas, to stabilize prices.

BACKGROUND: The American Federation of Labor, consisting mainly of skilled craft unions, unsuited to the organization of such a corporation like car manufacturing where the workers fell within the jurisdiction of more than one craft union. At the 1935 Atlantic City convention of the AFL, the progressive wing declared the need for an industrial organization rather than a craft organization. This resolution was defeated, so the progressive faction seceded and organized the Committee for Industrial Organization, chaired by John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers. The AFL expelled these unions in 1937 so the Congress of Industrial Organization was formed.