By 1920, the HSPA had brought to Hawaii a total of 30,000 Filipinos, some 82% of them adult males. During the two strikes, from 1920 to 1925, the HSPA brought another 42,167, of whom 84% were adult male laborers. For the rest of the decade, with the national origins quota system closing the door to foreign labor sources, in effect making the plantations dependent completely on the American territories, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, as their only outside source of laborers, the HSPA brought even more Filipinos. In fact, the peak year for Filipino arrival to Hawaii was 19[____], when a total of [____] came to Hawaii. Get figures here for the total arrival from 1926 to 1929.

The HSPA also maintained recruiting stations in Cebu and in the Ilocos cities of Vigan, Bacarra, and Laoag. Since the 1920 strike, more Ilocanos than Visayans were shipped to Hawaii, so the Cebu station did not see the heavy active recruitment that it had when Steven headed the recruiting station a decade before. The hundreds of Filipinos recruited each month were processed in the Manila facilities, at the main office, the former Jesuit San Beda College which Lucius Pinkham in 1909 had converted into dormitories, medical clinic, and offices. There the recruits from the barrios were checked by doctors and nurses, suited with work clothes, and provided the basic equipment for eating and sleeping.
The HSPA shipped the recruits on the steerage space of their ships. Life on board was generally pleasant; many laborers spent a great part of their time gambling with Chinese stewards and mess boys, mornings they organize themselves into calisthenics classes and evenings into groups for entertainment. &Advertiser, Nov. 23, 1930& Arriving in Honolulu, the recruits were taken to the Receiving Station and then assigned to various plantations. Each month the various plantation requests for incoming laborers were filled from each shipload, with the outer plantations getting their allocation first because labor was harder to obtain there. The HSPA accommodated as best as it could the request of the new arrivals to be assigned to the camps where they had relatives who had paid their fares to Hawaii. By word of mouth, the incoming Filipinos learned of a few choice plantations: the ones on Oahu because of their proximity to the excitement of Honolulu, as well as those which, though not favorably located, offered good conditions of employment, like Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company, Hilo Sugar Company.&Butler to Campsie, May 29, 1930, HACO&

The majority of the recruits were coming to Hawaii for the first time but a few of them, noted as "Ex-Haw" on the ship manifests, were coming back to Hawaii for a second work stint. Some were coming back after having exhausted their savings from their first work stint; others were like Matias Tubalado, who accompanied his wife and children back to Cebu in 1925 and lived alone at HACO so as to save more of his wages. &H.A. Walker to HSPA Manila Office, August 29, 1925, HACO& It was not easy to come back as an "Ex-Haw," however; only after a careful check of his work record, the completion of his work contract, and his general character was the laborer furnished a letter from the manager attesting to his loyalty and reliability and enjoining the HSPA recruiting office to assist in the return of the laborer to Hawaii. &HACO manager to Whom It may Concern, December 4, 1920, HACO& At the HSPA recruiting station, the agents again carefully checked his work record, checked his physical condition, and grilled him closely. He had to be 44 years old or younger in order to be allowed to return. HSPA secretary John K. Butler stated that because an older man was a risk for field labor and could become a case for medical attention and care, no one at age 45, even in good health, was accepted for the second three-year stint unless the manager certified his coming back for a special position or qualification. &Butler to HACO, Oct. 17, 1923&
Despite the extra shipments during the strike, the HSPA continued to send many more after 1925 because the plantations made a habit of requisitioning each month more new recruits than they actually needed as a result of the age old problem of turnover in plantation employment. 

&Butler to All Plantation Managers, June 22, 1927, HACO& At HACO, for example, the manager expected about a tenth of his Filipino laborers to "slip away"--some going home, to the coast, or to town--and always sent in a request for more than the replacement rate, asked for single males only, and added the notation "Ilocanos preferred (sic)." &Campsie to C. Brewer, May 30, 1923, HACO& He sent in a larger than usual request at the times when a large bonus was due, because many laborers left or desired to return to the Philippines, or stayed away from work, a practice which the plantation had come to expect as normal. &Campsie to C. Brewer, December 30, 1920& Even the newly arrived recruits joined the exodus in search of better opportunities elsewhere. &HACO to HSPA, January 8, 1920, HACO&

HACO had fewer laborers in the first months of the year than in the second half. From 1926 to 1928, it had an average of 1250 employees, of whom 1150 were adult unskilled males, and an average turnout of 85%. In July, the average increased to 1300, with 1100 of them adult unskilled men, and an average turnout of 83%. Its harvesting operations required the largest manpower. In these three years, the plantation needed 700 men for its harvesting operations alone, cutting cane, fluming the cut cane, packing the cane (get this as a percentage of the average unskilled laborers in July and November) and in order to meet this need the plantation had to pull out cultivating men so that the weeds were neglected, especially after a heavy rain which facilitated fluming at the same time as encouraging growth of weeds. &Campsie to C. Brewer, May 16, 1928, HACO&
A drought hit HACO's fields from 1925 to 1928, and forced the plantation to lay off men. The plantation also laid off its laborers an average of six days a month. &Bishop to Campsie, June 18, 1926, HACO&. The plantation was unable to prevent the departure of many laborers, returning to the Philippines or going to the West Coast. Despite its inability to employ them, the plantation still continued to request large shipments of laborers, averaging 150 in 1927, and also continued to see them leave HACO. The plantation sought to keep more men because of its isolated location. "Here we have no floating labor who come around looking for work. Once they leave Kau they leave for good, as a great many prefer to work near a town or where the opportunity to move around is more convenient."&HACO to C. Brewer, May 16, 1928, HACO&. Thus the plantation lost men regularly who left for town, and sought to keep its men around.

The plantation did this by assigning some to strip the field, which was expensive and unnecessary as the fields were usually burned before harvesting, merely to keep them employed and earning enough to live on. &Campsie to C. Brewer, March 9, 1926, HACO&. The plantations employed the men at such work as clearing lantana on ranch lands "so that our men could at least earn enough to live upon and retain them on the plantation." &Campsie to C. Brewer, June 9, 1927, HACO&. From 1925 to 1928 the plantation suffered from low rainfall and could not flume the cane from the fields to the mill. It was unable to keep the mill grinding for long, and thus to offer enough work for its engine and water tenders, oilers, evaporators and pan men; it couldn't send them to field work, which they hated and which did not have enough work either. In order to keep them around, the plantation had to employ them as a road construction gang. &Campsie to C. Brewer, June 9, July 30, Aug. 6, 1927, HACO&.
In 1926 the HSPA stopped paying the passage of Filipinos to Hawaii. The plantations had enough laborers because of the large importation during the strikes. The HSPA, however, continued its work of attracting Filipinos to Hawaii. In the Philippines, the HSPA recruiters still continued to go to the countryside armed with stereopticon lantern and slides of plantation life. &Philippine Island Tribune, September 4, 1930, HSPA archives& Butler continued to plant articles in the Manila papers about the amount of checks cashed in Laoag, the idealized description of plantation life by returning workers, etc. &Clippings of Philippine newspapers, HSPA Archives.& At the recruiting offices, the possessions of returning workers were prominently displayed for all to see the wealth generated by a stint in Hawaii. &Dorita, p. ?&

The HSPA generated much publicity release about the enormous amount that the Filipinos had saved. Articles periodically appeared in the Honolulu English press about how well off the Filipinos were, giving details about savings sent to the Philippines. The governor, W.R. Farrington claimed that the Filipinos had deposited over a million dollars, or an average of $208.77 for each depositor in 1927 &Advertiser, September 27, 1927&, and the superintendent of the United Filipino Community Center chimed in that this large bank deposit was due to the training that the US had given to Filipinos.&Advertiser, September 27, 1927& In 1926 the HSPA president claimed that 723 Filipinos who returned between September and October 1926 after 2 to 5 years on the plantations had saved $441.58 each on the average.&F.C. Atherton, presidential address, HSPA 46th annual meeting, Nov. 15-18, 1926, p. 15. This is on pp. 9-24& Calculate what this is by way of the annual income of the Filipinos.

Butler noted that "it is such a good business for us for the Filipinos to go back to the Philippines with his money in his pocket as a usual evidence of successful work in Hawaii," that the HSPA took care to safeguard that money by remitting through the HSPA the money to be picked up by the laborer upon his return home.&Butler to Manager, September 10, 1926, HACO& In 1925, Ligot, who claimed credit for the Filipinos now putting their money in savings banks instead of with Japanese or Chinese storekeepers, estimated a cost of $30 a month for a single man and $50 for a couple with two children. But he said that because Filipinos were thrifty, they could get by with a mere $12 a month by meeting their need by vegetable gardens and fishing Sundays. &Press Clipping, unidentified, January 1925, in BIA 5999&
That these savings were the result of scrimping rather than of surplus was evident in the observations of Thomas Keay, a physician at Pepeekeo on the big island. He noted that in his 15 years as a medical officer on the big island, interviewing each Filipino he examined and in groups through interpreters, these Filipinos saved every possible penny and return to the Philippines. "This intensive saving was going to be at the expense of their physical selves. Rice was to be their chief and often only food." He further said that "Many of the Filipinos became victims of sudden death from beriberi, and many were laid up with symptoms of this disease. Swollen legs and failing vision, caused by beriberi, was an everyday complaint." Keay urged the men to spend more money on vitamin-rich foods.

In Hawaii, Butler encouraged plantation Filipinos to pay the fares of their Philippine relatives, and asked the managers to spread the word that the HSPA was ready to receive the fares and forward these relatives to Hawaii at the earliest date. Butler to All Plantations, August 25, 1927, HACO. The fare for adults from Manila to Honolulu was $61.25, Laoag to Honolulu $69, and Cebu to Honolulu $68.46. S.O. Halls to All Plantations, April 19, 1927, HACO. Also Butler to all Plantations, August 25, 1927, HACO.

The HSPA campaign was successful. For the five years after 1927 a total of 43,637 Filipinos came to Hawaii. About half of the Filipinos on board ships to Hawaii in August 1927 had their passage paid for by Hawaii relatives. Butler to All Plantations, August 25, 1927, HACO. The new arrivals came from merely a few places in the Ilocos; the HSPA now confined its activities as a "shipping organization" to the provinces of Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra, and Pangasinan, and only in the towns which held a highly favorable view of work in Hawaii. Butler, To All Plantation Managers, June 22, 1927, HACO. Because of having to pay their own fares, the new recruits now consisted of 96% adult males.

The HSPA attributed the large voluntary migration to improvements in housing and comforts and to satisfactory earning opportunities under the short contract system. E.H. Wodehouse, presidential address, 47th Annual HSPA meeting, November 16-19, 1927, p. 10. This is on pp. 8-12 of proceedings.
CHAPTER 6

Upon arrival in Hawaii, these laborers were given an employment contract known as the Honolulu Labor Agreement (whose numbers were prefixed by the letter P), which was similar to the previous contracts except in the omission of the free passage and maintenance to Hawaii. They were still eligible to return fare if they completed the terms of the contract, 720 days of work in three consecutive years. &H.A. Walker to HACO, July 13, 1926&

In February 1932, the NS contracts were changed so that instead of the three-year requirement to earn free passage, it now required 5 years. Because of the depression, many Filipinos left the plantations and broke their contract after 1932. In 1937 Varona negotiated a contract made available between December 1937 and June 30, 1938, in which the worker who had served less than ten years on a plantation was eligible to earn a free return passage by working for an additional five years; three years for those whose service totalled ten years or more.

The HSPA hoped that the new arrangement, whereby Hawaii Filipinos would get their friends and relatives to join them on the plantation, would reduce their movement from one plantation to another. &H.A. Walker to Manila HSPA, August 31, 1926, HACO&. It also tried to join men coming from the same hometown together in a plantation "with the belief that men who are working with their townmates to move as a gang are more likely to be settled and quickly satisfied." &Butler to Campsie, May 29, 1930, HACO& It believed that the presence of families and friends would stabilize the Filipinos on the plantations. Thus it facilitated their requests to bring families over, and even went as far as offering to transfer at HSPA expense the Filipinos to the plantations where they had relatives. &H.A. Walker to HACO, February 19, 1926.& It was obvious, however, that the planters were more interested in having cheap labor than stabilizing families in Hawaii, in the way that it would occasionally pay for the passage of adult male relatives, but not female relatives, to Hawaii. &Walker to HACO, August 30, 1926& In any case, the cause of the high turnover among Filipinos was dissatisfaction with the working conditions on the plantation they were assigned to, and so the presence of families and relatives did not discourage them completely from leaving. In October 1928 a new Filipino employment contract, the NS (New Serial) Contracts, now prevented laborers from leaving the plantation where originally assigned for another plantation without the permission or consent of the employers; these who moved without permission were regarded as having violated the contracts and thus ineligible for return passage to the Philippines.
INDEPENDENT ARRIVALS

Since 1911 when Babbitt took over as head of the HSPA Manila Office, the recruiters had been concentrating on getting the laborers from the barrios. They were careful to check the background of the recruits, making sure they did not have much schooling and were used to farm work. The HSPA exercised control over the type and the number of laborers coming to Hawaii by controlling the sale of steerage space on the Dollar Line ships between Manila and Honolulu. Anybody wishing to buy a steerage ticket to Honolulu on the Dollar Line ships could secure them from the HSPA Manila Office only. The HSPA was the sole agent for steerage passage on the Dollar Lines, and it bought the space en bloc.

&Babbitt to Director H. Cruz, September 25, 1929, in Quezonian Papers

The laborers in Hawaii wishing to return home at their own expense had to report at the HSPA Honolulu office in order to book space on the ships and then at the HSPA immigration station in Kakaako for final checking before being allowed to board ship.

&Pfleuger to HACO, July 27, 1928

Between 1927 and 1933 enterprising Manila Filipinos saw opportunities in chartering steamers to bring the laborers to Hawaii and g steamers and, given the shortage of space, to book those returning to Japan and the Philippines. The most uproar over such activities was the chartering of the Consuelo. The Consuelo was a direct result of the success of the HSPA propaganda about the wealth to be obtained by coming to Hawaii. The steamer had been chartered by promoters for $25,000 from Madrigal Shipping Company in Manila to carry 776 Ilocanos to Honolulu; the promoters planned a regular shipping line between Hawaii and the Philippines if the Consuelo charter was successful. The ship left Manila on July 3, 1927, dropped off the Ilocanos, and on its return voyage took on passengers at reduced rates to Yokohama and Manila, accommodating the many in Hawaii who had found it difficult to book passage home.

&Advertiser, September 7, 1928

The Consuelo charter drew the intense objection of the HSPA and its allies in Manila and Honolulu. The Philippine bureau of labor and other Philippine officials tried to block its departure but found no legal grounds to prevent the emigration of Filipinos to Hawaii. Labor director Herminigildo Cruz tried to prosecute the charter promoters but the Philippine attorney general found no legal ground for him to do so.

&Manila Bulletin, July 4, 1927 in BIA 5999&
In Hawaii The Advertiser raised fears of a general exodus of farm laborers to Hawaii and the Pacific Coast. &Advertiser, June 27, July 4, 1927& Butler cited the disadvantages of flooding Hawaii with labor not controlled by the HSPA, which would leave laborers in Hawaii stranded helplessly, without a job awaiting them, whereas the HSPA recruitment assured them of a plantation job and screened the laborers for their suitability for plantation work. &Advertiser, July 6,7, 1927.& He raised fears that independent charters like the Consuelo would bring to Hawaii those physically unfit and likely to become public charges. Furthermore, such charters would not adjust their shipments to take into account the seasonal needs of Hawaii. &Star Bulletin, July 7, 1927&

The HSPA was unable to legally prevent the disembarkation of the Consuelo passengers but Butler instructed the plantations to employ only the Filipinos shipped by the HSPA and, so as to discourage further independent charters, to blacklist the Consuelo Filipinos. &Butler to All Plantations, July 19, 1927& The Consuelo passengers, however, found jobs cutting cane for homesteaders. &Horace Johnson, C. Brewer vice-president, to Campsie, September 7, 1928&

The success of the Consuelo prompted Agapito N. Formoso, one of its promoters, to charter the Norwegian steamer Sandvicken, which arrived in early September 1928 with 638 laborers, looked after by a Chinese doctor and three nurses. &Advertiser, Sept. 3, 4, 1928& At the docks, they were given a difficulty time by health and customs inspectors, who ordered 12 deported for diseases and 50 detained for skin trouble. &Advertiser, Sept. 4, 1928; Star Bulletin, September 3, 1928& One of the passengers, Exudio Masilongan, explained that he and his fellow travellers saw Hawaii as the land of opportunity, in contrast to Philippine wages of 20¢ a day for plantation labor and 30¢ for public works. &Star Bulletin, September 3, 1928& The HSPA again blacklisted these Filipinos; upon learning that homesteaders had received 45 men of the shipment, HACO manager Campsie unsuccessfully sought to prevent the homesteaders from employing any more of them. &Campsie to C. Brewer, September 6, 1928&
The Sandvicken charter intensified the opposition against independent recruiting. In Hawaii, Governor Farrington asked the Philippine governor general Harry L. Stimson (check first name) in 1928 to tell the Filipinos that they would not find jobs on the plantations if they came independently. &Farrington to H.L. Stimson, in Star Bulletin, August 21, 1928& Cayetano Ligot warned Philippine provincial and municipal officials to watch out for unlicensed brokers but not to interfere with HSPA recruiters. &Manila Bulletin, April 9, 1928, in BIA 5999& Ligot also asked Philippine officials to stop the immigration of laborers who had no assured jobs or funds, and to require labor agents to post stiff bonds assuring the return of laborers who did not find work in Hawaii. &Advertiser, September 13, 1928& Butler went to the Philippines to secure legislation to stop the activities of the charter promoters and to ask Philippine officials, the press, and organizations to join together in stopping the promoters. &Star Bulletin, August 30, 1928&

In the Philippines, H. Cruz systematically harassed independent shipping brokers by constantly summoning them to his office. Between July 5, 1927 and July 8, 1928, he filed five criminal cases against them for recruiting without a license but all were acquitted because as ship charterers rather than recruiting agents, they needed no license. The prolonged litigation, however, forced the men, including Agapito Formoso of Consuelo, into bankruptcy. &Ildefonso K. Romey, Memorial to His Excellency, the Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.regarding Irregularities Committed by H. Cruz, director of Labor, December 12, 1932, pp. 16-18, HSPA library&
The HSPA was less successful in preventing the independent arrival of Filipinos on board the regular passenger lines, and they comprised the larger portion of the Filipinos who came to Hawaii without going through the HSPA. (See Table) These Filipinos evaded HSPA control by going to Hongkong and then boarding Japanese ships to Honolulu, especially on the ships of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. Butler was unable to prevent such independent arrivals at all. Butler to Nippon Yusen Kaisha, October 7, 1931, Judd Papers, AH& These Filipinos who came by charter or by individual means outside the HSPA supervision comprised 17% of the total number of Filipinos arriving in Hawaii between 1927 and 1933. There were a few, like Sabas Dumlao, who came as an independent laborer to Hawaii and did not pass through the Manila HSPA office and its immigration station in Honolulu; and thus he was not given a work contract like the ones who had gone through the HSPA. Actually they and those who volunteered for employment at the Honolulu HSPA immigration office were given a work contract with a prefix L but this employment contract did not contain a free return passage clause. Butler to Campsie, November 24, 1928, HACO

Table: Filipinos arriving independent of HSPA

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<td>1927</td>
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<td>1928</td>
<td>2807</td>
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<td>1929</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1298</td>
</tr>
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<td>1932</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
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<td>1933</td>
<td>405</td>
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Source: HSPA Archives

The departure of thousands of young men brought out always the debate over the propriety of allowing the HSPA to recruit in the Philippines. One fact in the debate was no longer debated: the existence of a shortage of labor in the Philippines.
The consequences of such a labor shortage were evident. The Congress of Philippine Agriculturists in 1920 pointed out that because of the lack of labor rice, the staple food, had to be imported in large quantity and sugar cane, the major export crop, lagged behind other countries in growth, and large stretches land suitable for cane lay undeveloped in Central Luzon, Mindoro, Panay and Mindanao. &Advertiser, Nov. 10, 1920&. R. Renton Hind, formerly of Honolulu and now managed in 1921 a large sugar plantation in PI and edited the Philippine Sugar News, made the same point and added that in the fields today, one can see only old men, women and children; the young men were conspicuously absent as they have received the benefits of education and left for cities. &Advertiser, Jan 9, 1921& In fact, in 1921 there were 15,000 Japanese in the Philippines, 10,000 of them in Mindanao which needed labor to open up that frontier region. &Advertiser, Jan 9, April 23, 1921& Until 1935 when the Philippine Commonwealth finally developed an intensive program to develop it, they controlled towns in Davao province.

The shortage affected badly the government’s homesteading program. In 1929 only 2% of the 30 million hectares (74 million acres) of public domain had been homesteaded; less than 12% of the Philippine lands were in cultivation; a third of the potential agricultural lands were subject to settlement; and the country had an enormous natural resources undeveloped. Thus there was plenty of opportunity in Philippines. Indeed frontier areas of the Philippines had vast potential. Mindanao had rich land and was outside the typhoon belt; Cagayan Valley, Nueva Ecija, etc. also had good lands for pioneering. This in a message by Gov. Gen. Dwight F. Davis in a message to the Philippine legislature advocating the restriction of the emigration of laborers. &Star Bulletin, July 20, 1929&
Opponents of the HSPA recruitment, therefore, harped on the way emigration hindered the development of the Philippines. It hampered government efforts to speed up homesteading and settlement of public lands. Proposals to control emigration was always linked up to proposals to speed up internal development of the Philippines. &Lasker p. 284& When, In 1931, Filipino emigration to Hawaii finally slowed down, the departures for Hawaii were still three times more than the number of Filipinos going to Mindanao. But diverting the emigration from Hawaii to Mindanao, as advocated by opponents of HSPA recruitment, was difficult because the Filipinos saw advantages in going to Hawaii. In Hawaii they would find regular job, with no risk of crop failure and unforeseen expenses. &Philippines Herald, May 1, 1931, in BIA 5999& In homesteading, they needed capital for work animals, for leaving and settling; suffer many years before getting started; lose land to a land grabber; Malaria in these places; poor tao helpless. Hawaii thus looked good in comparison, safer, not cheated, no capital needed, a healthy place, steady employment. &Moe Kilmer, "The Outlook for Filipinos in Hawaii," Honolulu Mercury, August 1929, p. 21-22& Solution to emigration would be more liberal homestead laws, better industrial development, higher wages, proving work and also new opportunities for homesteading good lands.

There were other push reasons for Filipino emigration, however: the situation of the peasantry improved little under American rule. There was still a maldistribution of land and wealth; the masses had no voice; the kasama or tenantry system was unfavorable; there was the emphasis on large scale (plantation agriculture) as a result of free trade relations with US and plantation control of export crops. In addition, in 1923-24 were the colorum revolts, which were peasant secret societies in arms against rental increases, tenant exploitation--these were found in Central Luzon, Mindanao, Leyte and Cebu.

Opponents of Filipinos leaving point out the departure of its young men, or their return with tastes and desires which could not be gratified at home and thus made for unrest or re-emigration.
Social class positions now also began to emerge aligning opponents and proponents of emigration to Hawaii. There were two ways this was so. In one way, the agriculturists and industrialists who acknowledged the shortage of labor but they were not interested in preventing the outflow of laborers. If they were, they would have offered better wages and more attractive working conditions. Instead, they were more interested in bringing in cheap labor from China. The other was the way the emigration to Hawaii had created a social revolution in the Ilocos.

The agriculturists acknowledged the shortage of labor but were not interested in keeping the laborers at home. Instead, they had their eye on cheap imported Chinese labor. & Advertiser, Nov. 10, 1920&. These also included not just the Americans but also the landed aristocracy, who sought to keep the peasants down, working for a few centavos a day. Wealthy landowners also, now competing with producers for other countries, exporting coconut oils, copra, and sugar. It was in fact ironic & Philippines Free Press, January 5, 1929, p. 8. this issue contained two pictures taken at the Manila Customs House, on p. 16 of Chinese coming to the Philippines and on p. 8 of Filipinos for Hawaii and US mainland& the Advertiser which pointed out the ridiculous situation of each month a thousand Filipinos leave for Hawaii or the Pacific Coast, and each month a thousand Chinese arrive in the Philippines from Amoy and Foochow, smuggled in the long coastline of the Philippines.&Advertiser, Aug. 24, 1927&

The most interesting argument concerned the way immigration opened up mobility in the Philippines, enabling the poor to better themselves through means other than acquiring an American formal education. &Lasker, pp. 280-281&
In fact, some observers already saw this social revolution already happening in the Ilocos as a result of the inflow of money from Hawaii. The landed or propertied class was cash poor. Their wealth was mainly in land and harvest; a harvest of 200 cavanes of rice a year meant one was well off, more than that and one was rich. The landowners had no other occupation, and were content with steady farm income. They thus left the land work to tenants and became lazy at home. Their wants increased, however, for car, furniture, stylish clothes but their income did not increase, as the land did not yield more than formerly.

A few days after the arrival of the mail from Hawaii, the post offices in the Ilocos were crowded with the relatives of laborers in Hawaii cashing in postal money orders; often the main post office in Manila had to send cash to Laoag and Cabugao in order to redeem such a large number of money order, with an estimate of a million pesos a year coming to the Ilocos Norte from Hawaii.

The landlords, requiring cash to indulge in their new desires, approached the Hawaiian families for money. The landlords secure these loans with the land or sold their land at low prices. Ablan, "From Shirt Sleeves to Shirt Sleeves," Philippines Free Press, January 5, 1929, p. 8. The landlords in Laoag borrowed heavily from former tenants and servants, using the money to support their family in Laoag and Manila. In 1926 - 27, 95% of the mortgagees were families of laborers in Hawaii or Cagayan. Ablan estimated that more than half of the money from Hawaii was spent buying off these landlords in Ilocos Norte. The same situation prevailed in Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Abra. Ablan, "From Shirt Sleeves to Shirt Sleeves," Philippines Free Press, January 5, 1929, p. 8.
CONTROL OVER THE PHILIPPINE BUREAU OF LABOR

Whatever the merits of the arguments advancing or opposing HSPA recruitment, the most important fact was that the HSPA was able to keep the door open for recruiting. This it did through its influence, its ability to develop good contacts in order to assure a steady supply of laborers from the Philippines and to neutralize criticism of the conditions of Filipino laborers on the plantations. As early as 1917, Royal D. Mead could boast: "The Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association has good friends among some of the influential Filipinos who have realized that there is a surplus of labor in the Philippines and that no harm is being done to the country by the taking away of a number of men and training them to be efficient sugar plantation laborers. That we have escaped thus far from serious restrictive laws is almost entirely due to the influence of our Filipino friends." &R. D. Mead, Director, Bureau. Lab & Statistics, HSPA to H. Hackfeld and Co., Ltd, Aug. 2, 1917. GFA

In addition, from 1922 on "influential Filipino officials have collaborated with the sugar planters in discouraging a movement of Filipino laborers from Hawaii to the mainland. Today, the planters, through the HSPA, do all they can to keep steerage traffic between Hawaii and the mainland at a minimum."&Lasker, p. 206

That influence was even easier when Republican Warren G. Harding appointed General Leonard Wood as the Philippines' governor general in 1921. Wood's predecessor, Francis Burton Harrison, had been opposed to the emigration of Filipino laborers because he wanted to develop the Philippines. During World War I, he tried unsuccessfully to control emigration because of mobilization for defense work and the shortage of agricultural labor.&BIA 5999, Memo: Emigration of Filipino Laborers to Hawaii& Throughout his term of office from 1913 to 1921, the opponents of emigration introduced many bills in the Philippine legislature to stop altogether or hinder Filipino immigration by imposing a large bond requirement for recruiters. &Mead to H. Hackfeld and Co., Aug. 2, 1917, GFA&. They also sought to place control of emigration under the Filipino-dominated Philippine senate rather than in the bureau of labor. &J.K Butler to L.E. Sheppard, chairman, Hawaiian Labor Commission, December 14, 1922, in Micro 2665&
General Leonard Wood, however, was different. Ignoring Woodrow Wilson's 1920 farewell message to congress recommending immediate PI independence, Harding and Wood instead tightened American control over the Philippines. Unlike Harrison, Wood was skeptical of the Filipinos' ability to govern themselves, and his administration was marked by intense conflicts with the Filipinos, who protested his highhandedness, acting beyond the head of the legislators, and making a mockery of their institutions. They also protested his policy of releasing control and ownership of the resources and industries of the Philippines to foreign capital. &Advertiser, July 30, 1923&

Wood was favorably disposed to the HSPA recruitment. In 1923, Salvador Laguda, his secretary of commerce and communication, announced that because emigration was a good source of income; the government would encourage emigration.

The influence of the HSPA on Philippine officials was due mainly to the work of three men: W.H. Babbitt, whose long stay in Manila from 1912 until he was captured and imprisoned by the Japanese at the start of the second world war enabled him to be on intimate terms with Filipino officials; John K. Butler in Honolulu, the HSPA secretary, and Royal D. Mead in Washington D.C. who was in close contact with federal officials and Filipino representatives. The influence of all three of them was obvious on Manuel L. Quezon, the highest Filipino official. All three were intimate friends of Quezon.

As the president of the Philippine senate, Quezon was the most influential Filipino in the colonial government. As the spokesman for the movement to obtain Philippine independence, Quezon commuted between Manila and Washington DC to organize American support for Philippine independence; opposing Wood's anti-Filipino policies, he also went to the American capital regularly to appeal to the US president and congress to reverse Wood's action. Quezon's close ties with the Hawaii sugar planters had been established earlier through his desire for capital investment in the Philippine sugar industry. This close tie was further firmed up during his many stopovers in Honolulu en route to Washington D.C. Most of the time, during his stopovers, he did not even bother with Filipino requests to meet with him and hold a banquet in his honor; he merely confined his contacts with the planters and territorial officials. &E.H. Wodehouse, president's. address, 39th annual meeting, HSPA, December 8-12, 1919, Proceedings, p. 6; Star Bulletin, July 25, 1928.&
His trip to Washington DC in 1922 illustrated the way he dealt with the planters and the Hawaii Filipinos during his stopover. Supporters of the independence cause among the Hawaii Filipinos had already scheduled a banquet in Quezon’s honor but Quezon cancelled it when it conflicted with a formal dinner in his honor at the Nuuanu valley home of J.W. Waldron, the president of the HSPA. John K. Butler had accompanied Quezon and his party from Manila to Honolulu, and in Honolulu took charge of their activities. Butler and Waldron took the group sightseeing. &Advertiser, May 29, 1922& Quezon finally set aside the time to address the Filipinos at a mass meeting conducted by Manlapit. He told the assembled Filipinos to save their wages and to learn all about advanced methods of cane cultivation so as to enable them to develop the vast resources of the Philippines. He also advised them to behave, to harmonize with the life in these communities away from the Philippines, especially because all Filipinos were being judged by the way they behaved. &Advertiser, May 29, 1922&

Such Hawaiian hospitality during Quezon’s many visits to Honolulu enabled the planters to be on intimate terms with him. He was simply "Casey" to Butler, and being "a friend of long standing" allowed even such intimacy as being teased by Butler. &Butler to Governor General Frank Murphy, February 26, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH& It also enabled the planters to get Quezon’s assistance in getting matters solved their way. This was evident in the case of Serafin Macaraig.
In mid-1926, Macaraig, a University of the Philippines instructor in sociology, stopped in Hawaii for a few weeks on his way to the University of Wisconsin for his doctoral studies. He gave an interview with the *Star Bulletin* on September 9, 1926 in which he stated that the Filipinos were underpaid and looked down upon. He asked for an end to Filipino discrimination and urged that everyone in Hawaii be grateful, instead, that the Filipinos, who comprised the majority of the laborers, toiled on the plantation. After that interview, Macaraig was shadowed everywhere he went. On August 10, 1926, Jack Butler wrote W.H. Babbitt in Manila that Macaraig roused the Filipino laborers on the plantations, that he had the audacity to claim that the reports filed by Ligot and the HSPA about Filipino conditions in Hawaii were false, and that the Filipinos in Honolulu were unjustly discharged from their jobs and blacklisted. "I am advising you of this," Butler wrote Babbitt, "in order that you may advise Mr. Cruz, also if you care to and think it advisable, Mr. Quezon and the University authorities." &Butler to Babbitt, August 10, 1926, Quezonian Papers& Babbitt forwards Butler’s letter to Quezon, who took up the matter with the University authorities. &Quezonian Papers& As a result, Macaraig toned down his comments, as evident in the section on Hawaii Filipinos in his book *Filipino Problems*; the section merely mentioned general demographic data and the adjustment problems associated with immigration. &Macaraig, Filipino Problems, &

The Filipinos in Hawaii saw Quezon, highest Filipino official in the colonial government, as their savior in regard to their complaints. And so they wrote Quezon regularly about their problems. Quezon’s staff, however, directed these complaints to Herminigildo Cruz, the director of the bureau of labor, who would then merely forward it to the HSPA Manila office for comment. Babbitt, the head of the Manila Office, would then merely forward it to the HSPA in Honolulu to look into the matter and report on the action to be taken. Thus the HSPA was able to neutralize the information reaching Filipino officials. Or in more serious cases, Quezon would forward the Hawaii laborer’s letter to the governor general who would ask the Hawaii governor to comment on the matter. The Hawaii governor would simply ask the HSPA to look into the matter.
A 1924 striker on Maui had since served four years on a plantation and therefore requested free passage to the Philippines. Unable to get any help from resident commissioner Cayetano Ligot, the laborer wrote Quezon and labor director Cruz for assistance in the matter. Ligot to Eleuterio F. Benedicto, September 12, 1928; Benedicto to Quezon, September 19, 1928, Quezonian Papers; Benedicto to Quezon, September 19, 1928, Quezonian papers. A few days later, the laborer was summoned by his plantation manager at Pioneer Mill Company, and on three occasions contemptuously treated, and told that the government of the Philippines had nothing to do with the Hawaii Filipinos' request for free passage. Benedicto to Quezon, October 19, 1928, Quezonian Papers.

Butler also had access to the influential officials in Quezon's party. When the Hawaii Filipinos in 1926 protested loudly about the trespass law and gained the ears of a delegation of Filipino officials, Butler simply wrote Elpidio Quirino, a high official in the delegation whom Butler knew intimately, to justify the law as necessary to protect the Filipino workers from phony salesmen, greedy grafters, solicitors and gypsters, and to depict the opponents of the law as the Filipino grafters, agitators, pimps or bums. Butler to Quirino, Quezonian Papers.

The HSPA was also able to use the Hawaiian hospitality to gain the favor of the Philippine investigators sent to look into plantation conditions. In most of these cases, the HSPA paid for the travel to Hawaii of these investigators, entertained them in Honolulu, and took them on a tour of the plantations. After Prudencio Remigio's investigation, the HSPA made sure that the next labor investigators sent to Hawaii would not make the same mistake.
VARONA VISIT, 1920-21

Francisco Varona was merely 26 years old when he came to Hawaii after the 1920 strike to look into conditions on the plantations. At that time he was the editor of El Debate, a Manila daily. He also claimed to be a labor leader, although the other labor leaders dismissed the claim because of his conservative views.

Varona arrived in Honolulu on October 20, 1920 and his first interview with the Advertiser at once made clear his conservative outlook. Even before he had started his investigations, he had already concluded that there was nothing specifically wrong on the plantations. He acknowledged that Hawaii Filipinos had made complaints about conditions in Hawaii but they had also made positive remarks and "when it all boiled down, it depends a great deal upon the temperament of the people themselves." By that, he meant that some Filipinos became simply homesick, and, in being so, expressed discontent of plantation conditions and sent home biased reports. &Advertiser, October 20, 1920&

Varona, with HSPA industrial relations director Donald Bowman always at his side, visited 36 HSPA plantations. On Kauai, Varona couldn’t meet his appointment as the guest speaker at a Chamber of Commerce dinner so Bowman read the speech for him, one which commended the welfare work on the plantations. The speech said that the Filipinos came to Hawaii to learn and earn; "Encourage this spirit and you improve the morale of the Filipinos. We have considered Hawaii a training ground for our men sent over as immigrants." &Advertiser, November 17, 1920&

After his plantation visits, Varona presented his findings at an HSPA dinner at the end of November. He startled the planters by starting his speech with: "My impression of your Filipino laborers as a whole is that they are dissatisfied and discontented." &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 4& But he quickly passed over that statement by saying that the discontent was due to racial prejudice by some lunas and the other ethnic groups. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p.5&
The main bulk of his speech delighted the planters. He condemned Manlapit and the 1920 strike. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p.18& He said the Filipinos joined the strike not because of low pay but because of miscommunication between the workers and the management. If so, more money would not induce Filipinos to work better, and instead he proposed that the plantations provide such incentives as rewarding those who worked more days a month with priority placement on the long waiting list for space on the boats returning to the Philippines. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, pp. 26-27&

Varona also praised highly the welfare program on the plantations and asked the managers to hire more Filipino interpreters, welfare workers and nurses. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 14& As an example of the value of such employees, Varona mentioned the case of a Filipino plantation minister with the Hawaiian board of Missions who opposed the strike and influenced Filipinos not to join. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 28&

After his speech one of the managers asked why married Filipinos did not bring their wives to Hawaii. Varona’s reply completely ignored the low wages and poor living conditions in the Filipino camps which prevented the men from bringing over their families; instead he blamed the women, saying that the women did not work and end up merely a burden to their husbands, that they were extravagant in buying nice clothes in contrast to the Japanese women who were satisfied with two or three articles of clothing all their life. He said that the women were a handicap to their husbands and it was proper that they did not come to Hawaii. As an aside, he suggested that the plantations could give married men better jobs. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 13&
Varona's recommendations to the HSPA trustees consisted solely of how the HSPA could best handle and control Filipino labor. He recommended the hiring of interpreters who would instruct Filipinos of their responsibilities and hear their complaints. He recommended that the plantations challenge the Filipinos to work harder through competition, each month posting prominently in bulletin boards and clubhouses the names of the best worker at the mill, or in field work. He recommended that the plantations identify and cite for special mention those who turned out most, as well as those who were habitual loafers. &J.K. Butler To All Plantation Managers, February 2, 1921, HACO& All these recommendations assumed that there was nothing basically wrong on the plantations, that conditions were ideal, that the problem lay in the men, in motivating them to work properly, and that the Filipinos were basically slackers unless goaded or motivated.

Varona also naively shared the HSPA assumption of the benevolent paternalism of the planters. He recommended that managers visit hospitalized Filipinos, a gesture which he said would generate the Filipino's loyalty and gratitude, and Butler agreed: "Mr. Varona understands that this quality of Filipino mind is different entirely from the Japanese, who do not appreciate or desire this fathering and fostering by the plantation manager, whereas the Filipino thrives on it and works best where such spirit is in vogue."&J.K. Butler To All Plantation Managers, February 2, 1921, HACO& Varona suggested that the lunas act likewise. As an aside, he mentioned that the lunas treated the men kindly at the beginning of the year but toward the last month of the bonus year, they became strict and sought every opportunity to discharge the men in order to save the plantations the cost of a bonus and wages; naively, he said that this matter could easily be solved with merely a few words to the lunas. &J.K. Butler To All Plantation Managers, February 2, 1921, HACO&
Being careful not to offend the planters, Varona said that Filipino complaints did not arise from plantation conditions but from some abuses by the lunas, some misunderstanding by the Filipinos, and by Filipinos exploiting their fellow Filipinos. &Advertiser, February 9, 1921& As an example of misunderstanding, Varona cited the weighing of sugar cane. The Japanese and the Filipinos believed that they were not getting a square deal but Varona assumed that they were, that the Filipinos were merely being suspicious out of their past experience of being exploited during the Spanish regime in the Philippines. He recommended, however, that the Filipinos be given the same privilege as the Japanese in having a gang member present during the weighing. &J.K. Butler To All Plantation Managers, February 2, 1921, HACO&

Varona stayed three and a half months in Hawaii but only a third of that time was spent on his inspection of plantation conditions. The rest of his time was spent in working with the HSPA officials to control Filipinos.

First, he met with the HSPA trustees about his plan for placing coopted Filipino leaders on the plantations. He called a conference and the HSPA instructed each plantation to send two leaders to Honolulu. Varona, Butler and J.M. Dowsett, the HSPA trustee in charge of the labor committee, addressed the Filipinos about efforts to increase harmony on the plantations, and the Filipinos then returned to the plantations to fulfill their duties: to act as go-between between the manager and the laborers, and to explain laborer complaints and difficulties to the management. &J.K. Butler, to All Managers, January 15, 1921, HACO&. The full text and content of Varona's recommendations to the HSPA trustees was not made public. &Butler was happy about the conference: "The conference with Mr. Varona, I believe, will produce good results and is in line with increasing cooperation between the plantations and the laborers, to which end Mr. Varona has been helping us very much."

&J.K. Butler to Campsie, January 15, 1921, HACO&
Second, Varona tried to establish an organization, the Filipino Association, which would offset the influence of Manlapit and his kind. &S.O. Halls, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Grove Farm, March 28, 1921, GFA & The HSPA, however, had not confidence in Varona's choice to head the organization, Vicente Boiser, at the Methodist mission in Honolulu. &S.O. Halls, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Grove Farm, March 28, 1921, GFA & Varona then wanted to bring back from the Philippines Nicolas Dizon, who had left for Manila under a cloud and the HSPA agreed, stating: "Mr Dizon was reprimanded by the Methodist Mission here for his middling in connection with the recent strike. It was thought that he would have learned his lesson and that he would make a good leader if given a second chance." &S.O. Halls, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Grove Farm, March 28, 1921, GFA & When the Filipinos started forming the organization, however, the plantations withheld their cooperation, hesitant to encourage any organizing at all among its Filipinos laborers, even for innocuous purposes. "&Broadbent to Butler, March 26, 1921, GFA &

Varona also worked with Butler to settle problems with Filipinos. He went with Butler to trap a Filipino attracting Honolulu laborers to Kauai with false claims of high wages. &J.K. Butler, to Grove Farm, January 13, 19, 1921 & He issued a notice in Tagalog asking Filipinos to stay on the plantations, keep working, and not leave for Honolulu hoping for steamer space to leave Hawaii. &Butler, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, To All Agents and Plantation Managers, No Date, GFA & He also gained the confidence of Honolulu Filipinos, and several of them, including Pablo Manlapit, signed a resolution praising Varona for establishing the harmony between the planters and the Filipino laborers. &Star Bulletin, February 9, 1921 &
On February 9, Varona left for San Francisco to make a similar study of Filipino conditions. "&Advertiser, February 9, 1921& In California, he acknowledged racism against non-whites but declared: "I find that there is much hostility against my people over here, some of it being deserved, I am afraid, for there are bad Filipinos as well as good ones here, the same as at home. However, I find that the Filipinos are placed in the same category as Japanese, and you know what that means here in California." He placed the blame on exploiters who lured plantation workers for the unemployment among Filipinos in California. &Advertiser, February 28, 1921&

On June 2 Varona was back in Honolulu and at once proclaimed that it was unwise for Filipinos to leave for the US mainland, where as many as 30,000 Filipinos were without jobs, an exaggerated claim because there were even not that many Filipinos there. He then proceeded to praise himself highly. "I will say frankly that I am surprised myself at the results that have come out of the conference I had with the plantation owners on my last visit here," he declared to the Advertiser. "Everything is working out splendidly, and when I say this I mean it is not only well as far as the Filipinos are concerned, but my statement refers equally to plantation officials." &Advertiser, June 8, 1921& He shamelessly took credit for changes which the HSPA had initiated even before his arrival, such as the welfare program and the hiring of nurses. The Advertiser happily went along, lauding Varona profusely, stating that the Filipinos were now happy as Varona had righted some wrong conditions. &Advertiser, editorial, June 8, 1921&

Varona also took credit for obtaining the right to earn return passage for Filipinos on the plantations.
During his plantation visits, Varona found many elderly still stranded in Hawaii, having come before 1915 when their employment contract did not yet include a return passage provision. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 10& He also found those who came after 1915 having difficulty earning the return provision privilege; only 8% to 10% of them had managed to qualify for the free return fare. &Francisco Varona, Address before the HSPA, Honolulu: Star Bulletin, November 30, 1920, HSPA archives, p. 8& Varona did not seek the reasons for the failure to qualify for free return fare. He simply asked the HSPA to give these Filipinos a second chance to earn the privilege, by entering into a new contract with the plantations to earn the privilege by working 720 days each year for the next three consecutive years. &Star Bulletin, January 14, 1921&

This was widely publicized in Hawaii as the Honolulu Contract, and it enabled the pre-1915 recruits, dismissed strikers in 1920, and those who broke their employment contracts to start all over again and earn the privilege. Varona was allowed to take credit for it although the HSPA had already implemented the Honolulu Contract six months before he arrived in Hawaii. &HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Grove Farm, April 21, 1920& After the strike of 1924 the HSPA retracted the Honolulu contract; Butler instructed the managers, "WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO LABORERS" [sic], to discourage the Filipinos from entering the Honolulu contracts because they went on strike, and "Further, the liability from signing additional contracts with Filipinos already here is considerable particularly as these Filipinos have large families." [sic] &Butler to All Plantation Managers, April 30, 1925, HACO&

Thus the HSPA returned to the Philippine homeland the following classes of sakadas: 1. class 1--the sick and disabled. class 2--the men who completed their contract. class 3--those who were returned as a reward for long service among the pre-1915 sakadas who completed 240 days a year for five years.&Butler to All Plantations, July 7, 13, 1921, HACO&
The HSPA also adopted another new policy which allowed the laborers to transfer within the first year of employment, a factor which had caused violation of contract in the past. \&Butler, HSPA secretary, to All Plantations, June 17, 1921\&

Just before Varona returned to the Philippines, the Filipinos tendered a farewell dinner in his honor at the Alexander Young Hotel. The many speakers, among them B.T. Makapagal, a strongly pro-HSPA Methodist minister and welfare worker, HSPA trustee J.M. Dowsett, Pablo Manlapit, Soledad Abary, representing the Filipino nurses in Hawaii, and Governor McCarthy, praised Varona highly. Dowsett said the planters would like nothing better than to welcome Varona back as a permanent resident commissioner. \&Advertiser, June 18, 1921\& McCarthy said: "I consider Hawaii a great agricultural university for the Filipinos and I believe that those Filipinos who have taken a course of study in this university are grateful for what it has taught them," said McCarthy. In response, Varona declared that when the results of his mission are published in the Philippines, the doubt about how Filipinos were treated in Hawaii would be dispelled and Filipinos would flock to Hawaii in increasing numbers. Varona ended by saying "I can assure the planters that there will be no more trouble from the Filipinos in Hawaii." \&Advertiser, June 18, 1921\&
CHAPTER 6

CRUZ' VISIT

After the 1924 strike, the HSPA needed another favorable report about conditions on the Hawaii plantations, and so it paid the travel of Philippine bureau of labor director Herminigildo Cruz to Hawaii. &Butler to Governor General Frank Murphy, February 26, 1934, Poindexter Papers, AH& Cruz had come at HSPA invitation, and at HSPA expense, and with the consent of Quezon, Governor General Wood. &Butler to Quezon, November 6, 1925, Quezonian Papers& Like Varona, Cruz had been a labor leader and a newspaperman, having founded El Renacimiento, a Manila daily.

Earlirer, Cruz had been highly regarded as a pioneering labor leader, a radical and progressive Filipino. He was one of the founders of the first labor union, the Union Obrera Democratica de Filipinos, in 1902, a pro-independence, socialist-oriented union, and he headed the Workers' Congress of the Philippines, a labor federation, at a time when the American colonial government suppressed labor unions. In his later years, however, as assistant director of the bureau of labor in 1918 and director since 1923, Cruz had become conservative and no longer enjoyed the trust of labor leaders.

Cruz arrived in Honolulu on October 1, 1925. In the reception by Filipinos, it became immediately obvious that he had taken the HSPA side. He advised the Filipinos to avoid a strike because of their lack of unity, their suffering, and poor leadership. In any case, he pointed out that a strike was not necessary because they received wages better than what they would have gotten in the Philippines, and that they should not expect American scale wages. He wanted the Filipinos to cooperate with the plantation interests. &In Dizon, Dagiti Filipinos Ditoy Hawaii, p. ?& He said of the Filipinos in Hawaii: "Here they learn new methods in agriculture and they also learn new kinds of manual labor. They save their money and come back bringing with them new ideas." &Advertiser, October 2, 1925&
Accompanied by Cayetano Ligot and Donald Bowman, Cruz visited the plantations on Oahu, Maui, Kauai and Hawaii. Bowman snapped pictures of Cruz in conference with the laborers, and these pictures became part of his report. John Hind, presidential address, 44th annual meeting, HSPA, November 16-20, 1925, Proceedings, pp. 7-18. This quote is on p. 10.

Cruz' report contained the usual data furnished by the HSPA on Filipino workers on the plantations, and was neither analytical nor critical. He merely listed certain things: that workers were paid more than in the Philippines, that the plantations provided free conveniences of housing, medical care and others, and that workers had legal protection. He observed that the Filipinos on the plantations were better off than those in Honolulu and Hilo. Cruz, Report, p. 8

Many of the complaints he heard were the same as those which Remigio had listed earlier: the inability to return to the Philippines even after working on the plantations for a long time, the homes being poorer than the ones given other nationalities, the unequal pay for equal work, the HSPA not returning incapacitated laborers if the accident was not work-related, the denial of return passage, the lack of diversion in many camps, etc. He also solicited the managers' complaints about the Filipinos: their transiency, they way they collect contributions to gyp others, the agitation of non-plantation Filipinos, their lack of care in their dwellings. Cruz, Report, p. 10

Cruz also heard the complaints from city Filipinos, among them, that many were discharged from work without any explanation or notice—which he explains away by saying that the jobs were temporary and so dismissals were necessary as the work ended; in actuality, the Filipinos were talking about arbitrary dismissals from the plantations. He also heard the Filipinos talk about the dismissal of Filipinos who were not American citizens from public works jobs and from the navy yard. Cruz, Report, p. 9.
He heard married men complain that their wages of $1 a day were not adequate. His own calculations verified the complaint; for a single man, the expenses for necessities alone took up $18 of his wages, and for the married man, the expenses required an additional 50%, plus 15% for each child. Cruz was satisfied with the HSPA assurance that the plantations wished to help the married men by giving them more opportunities in the better paying jobs, and downplayed the complaint as one affecting only a few Filipinos, in the sense that few had families with them to begin with. He did not bring up the possibility that all the Filipinos, especially those with families to support in the Philippines, could benefit from higher wages. &Cruz, Report, pp. 13-14&

Cruz blamed the Filipinos for their complaints about free return passage. Cruz said that he favored the free emigration of Filipinos, that because they were free citizens, they were entitled to free movement. Instead of inquiring into the proper process of shipping all sick, disabled, aged and infirm laborers, for example, he merely cited the number shipped, as provided by the HSPA.&Cruz, Report, p. 14&

Cruz claimed that in talking to the laborers they did not have any complaint about the treatment of overseers, camp bosses and managers, and he attributed the peace and mutual tolerance to religion.&Cruz, Report, p. 16& "I have been informed that hard and insulting words are never employed because their use is prohibited absolutely on the plantations." He also said there was no blacklisting of the laborers who committed faults, denied that the laborers were fined, penalized or punished for errors, that there were "no disciplinary rules detrimental or prejudicial to worker"&Cruz, Report, pp. 15-16&

In his summary Cruz listed the problems as--keeping the Filipino laborers from leaving the plantation work, remedying the lack of women, returning laborers who came before 1915, and assisting the laborers with families because their wages were low.&Cruz, Report, p. 19&
Cruz mentioned that he discussed the contents of the report with interested parties and after some discussion he changed some points, and that the result was that the report received the approval of these parties. He did mention that Butler of the HSPA and the decapacitated High Wage Movement both agreed with the report. & Cruz, Report, pp. 19-20 &

Cruz sent a copy of his report, with copies for each plantation manager, and his host in Hawaii, Butler, wrote to the managers that Cruz would be much pleased to have a personal letter of thanks from them. & Butler to Plantation Managers, May 15, 1926, HACO &

Before returning home, Cruz sought to bring the Filipinos into Ligot’s fold. He arranged for a conference on October 19 at his hotel, attended by 13 leaders of the High Wage Movement and executed a document of understanding. The memo said: All complaints would be submitted to Ligot, for the sake of unity of the Hawaii Filipinos so that their social and economic conditions may advance; and Ligot, with the help of the 13 signatories, would then act on these complaints. & Cruz, Report, pp. 11-12 &

When Cruz returned to Manila, he issued a statement to the press denying that the would present a legislative measure to restrict Filipino emigration to Hawaii when the legislature convened in July. & The Tribune, June 17, 1925, HSPA archives.&

Upon Cruz departure for Manila, J.K. Butler, the secretary treasurer of the HSPA informed Quezon: "A feature of of Mr. Cruz’ visit has been his thorough cooperation with Mr. Ligot, the Resident Commissioner of Labor here, and as a result of this and of his dealing with the intown element which has caused so much trouble without warrant, I believe Mr. Ligot’s influence will be increased here and the influence of the malicious and unworthy elements in the town will be lessened." & J.K. Butler to Quezon, November 6, 1925, Quezonian Papers & The letter was handcarried by Babbitt in Manila to Quezon’s office. Not finding Quezon there, Babbitt left a note dated on "Sunshine Day." "Dear Manuel," Babbitt began familiarly, and then, teased Quezon about his reputation for being fond of women, attributed his absence to being in the arms of someone as to keep him in bed that morning. Babbitt wanted to invite Quezon and his family to his apartment and hoped that Quezon was still disposed toward other "shows and conquests." Babbitt enclosed Butler’s note about Cruz’ investigation and wrote: "Hope the enclosure will please you. . ." Babbitt’s note ended with "Though I don’t see much of you I still love you--Babs." & Babbitt to Quezon, Sunshine Day, Quezonian Papers &
Evidently the enclosure pleased Quezon because he responded "My dear Bab, I have just received your little note, together with the letter from Mr. Butler. We have apparently done something in the interest of all. Sincerely yours, Manuel" &Quezon to Babbitt, December 5, 1925&

The Hawaii Filipinos were unable to get any help from their homeland government. Yet they were the target of all kinds of fund drives and donation campaigns by the Philippine government. In the 1920's the government solicited donations to the tuberculosis fund and to the Leprosy fund which Governor General Wood sponsored, and in the 1930s to the national defense fund. These collections were made through the plantation managers, and the amount deducted from the laborers' wages were transmitted through the HSPA or through Ligot to the Philippines.

THE DUCKWORTH-FORD REPORT

The next labor investigator hosted by the HSPA, Lt. Colonel R.A. Duckworth-Ford, governor general Leonard Wood's own aide and the assistant chief of the Philippine constabulary, arrived the year after Cruz. He arrived in Honolulu on October 14, 1926 and was met by John K. Butler. In the next five days, he received the HSPA data on plantation workers, met with the HSPA trustees and Ligot, and visited 12 plantations on Oahu and Hilo. He did not meet with the laborers. He then spent the next seven days writing up his report and sightseeing on Oahu.

His report merely reflected the HSPA viewpoint. &Lt.Col. R.A. Duckworth-Ford, Report on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations and Filipino Labor, November 4, 1926, in Farrington Papers, AH; also in HSPA archives& He concluded: "It is fair to assert that, almost without exception, any Filipino who finds employment on these great plantations is given something better than a square deal." &Duckworth-Ford, Report, p. 6& He condemned Manlapit and the other self-appointed leaders in Honolulu, praised Ligot, dismissed the demands for higher wages as "mere claptrap," mentioned no laborer grievance, and highlighted the large savings among Filipino laborers. Fascinated with military intelligence service in general, Duckworth-Ford found impressive the sugar industry's "intelligence service" as "performed by the overseers, lunas, and other trusted employees."&Duckworth-Ford, Report, p. 4& In his report, he profusely thanked Bowman and Butler for their generous assistance and hospitality. &Duckworth-Ford, Report, p. 4&
The most important office the HSPA had to influence was the Philippine bureau of labor. Its section on emigrant laborers was responsible for inspecting the contracts signed through HSPA and the cedula; listed the contracts, stamped them and filed them merely; collected statistics; assisted locating the relatives of Hawaii laborers who had died. &Cruz Report, p. 27&

It was also to answer the complaints of Filipino laborers in Hawaii. However, it was evident early on that it did not. For one, it did not have the capacity or interest to follow up complaints or send investigators to Hawaii. This was the case with the complaints in the Quezonian letters. Furthermore, serious cases which were brought to the attention of the Philippine Governor General were often sent to the Governor of Hawaii; who, in turn asked the HSPA to look into the matter.

Among the directors of Philippine bureau of labor, only B.G. Monreal took a strong stand to protect the interest of Filipinos in Hawaii and oppose the HSPA recruitment. His successor, Faustino Aguilar, as early as 1918 took the stand that the Philippines had excess labor and that the recruitment to Hawaii was an indication of abundant labor in the Philippines.&BIA 227; Philippines Free Press, September 7, 1918 attacked Aguilar in its editorial& In the 1920 strike, he took the side of the planters and, in a message printed by Butler in Spanish, Tagalog, Ilocano and English for distributed to the plantations, ordered the Filipinos to return to work; &Butler to All Managers, August 9, 1922, HACO& He also discouraged Manlapit in 1922 from organizing the Higher wage movement and any movement which tended to create friction between workers and plantation interests. &Star Bulletin, January 4, 1922& When the planters reduced the wage rate in 1922, he asked the Filipinos to accept the lower rate because the plantations were incurring heavy loses; he also pointed out that Filipinos should be thankful that they were receiving the minimum rate $26 a month plus bonus and turnout bonus although their recruitment contract stipulated merely $20 a month. &Advertiser, January 5, 1922&
The Philippine Bureau of Labor nominally supervised the recruitment of Filipinos, through the 1915 law requiring the HSPA to secure a license to recruit. This license was automatically renewed, except for one particular incident. This was in 1930, at a time when vigilante groups on the West Coast, attacked Filipino camps. As a result of the Watsonville riot, Fermin Tobera died, a bullet lodged in his heart. &Star Bulletin, January 23, 24, 1930& Fermin Tobera's body was shipped to Manila and became a symbol of the brutality and inhumane treatment Filipinos received in America. As a result, Filemon Perez, the secretary of commerce and communication, ordered labor director Herminigildo Cruz to suspend the HSPA permit to recruit, pending the outcome of investigations on labor conditions in Hawaii and California. On March 1, Babbitt had asked Cruz to renew license and issue a general license covering all Philippine provinces so as to extend labor recruiting all throughout the various islands. The investigation, however, merely consisted of Perez requesting information from Ligot and Governor Judd of Hawaii and Governor Young of California. &Advertiser, March 4, 6, 9, 1930& The order to cancel also had no impact, as the Filipinos were merely signed up by the HSPA and processed on their way to Hawaii, coming voluntarily and at their own expense; it did not prohibit the laborers from leaving, merely direct or indirect recruiting without a license. Butler and Babbitt held frequent conferences with Cruz and Perez during the California riots. &Advertiser, March 5, 1930& Indeed, Cruz even admitted that many Philippine plantations were unable to obtain sufficient labor, especially Tarlac, because of the labor drain to Hawaii. &Advertiser, March 5, 1930& In any case, "Cruz said he was gratified to know that HSPA officials were satisfied with the settlement." &Advertiser, March 12, 1930&
This was a mere gesture, however, because six days later, Cruz signed the permit, the only change being prohibiting the HSPA from recruiting in Tarlac; he adopted the HSPA line that the Hawaii plantation work was training for the Filipinos in the Philippine sugar fields; that returning workers would improve conditions in the Philippine sugar industry in that they would demand similar conditions of work as in Hawaii. &Advertiser, March 10, 1930& Cruz' investigation showed the HSPA enjoyed a monopoly in labor recruiting in the Philippines, and there was a labor shortage in the Philippines. It also insisted on new terms, such as the payment of a bonus upon fulfillment of the contract, payable to laborer upon his return to the Philippines as an incentive for him to return.&Lasker, p. 211& Yet Cruz backed down, said these were not conditions for renewing license but merely recommendations. These were not followed. &Advertiser, March 10, 1930&

Cruz stayed in office for a long time. Cruz had long been the target of critics among the labor leaders and judicial officials in the Philippines, especially by the Philippine supreme court justices, in his oversight of contract labor to Hawaii. His critics in the Philippines filed charges against him for abusing his position as director of labor in connection with the HSPA recruitment. Justice George A. Malcolm of the Philippine Supreme Court accused Cruz of creating a monopoly for the HSPA in recruiting by issuing a directive on March 17, 1927 instructing his subordinates not to assist any laborer who wished to go to Hawaii despite a charge for his office to assist laborers. Cruz was also accused of denying assistance to those asking the HSPA for help with regards to passage to and from Hawaii, or relieve or aid from his office. &Philippines Herald, December 20, 1934, HSPA archives; Ildefonso K. Romey, Memorial to His Excellency Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Regarding Irregularities by H. Cruz, December 12, 1932, p. 13, HSPA archives.&

Furthermore, he was accused of systematically persecuting the independent labor agents, and creating a monopoly of steamer passage to Hawaii through the HSPA-Dollar Line connection. &Ildefonso K. Romey, Memorial to His Excellency Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Regarding Irregularities by H. Cruz, December 12, 1932, pp.15-18, HSPA archives.&
His critics pointed to fact that Cruz had been able to build a house worth $25,000 on November 1927, a sum impossible to acquire from his salary alone. Ildefonso K. Romey, Memorial to His Excellency Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Regarding Irregularities by H. Cruz, December 12, 1932, p. 18, HSPA archives.

Finally, on January 1935 his position was abolished. Star Bulletin, January 15, 1935. He did not suffer, however, as he was immediately rewarded with a high position in a big sugar central in Luzon Philippine Tribune, March 21, 1935, HSPA Archives.
Hawaii Filipinos complained about Ligot during the 1924 strike. Governor General Leonard Wood asked Farrington on July 18, 1924 to investigate the complaints against Ligot. &Wood to Quezon, November 5, 1924, Quezonian Papers& Farrington simply assured Wood that the attacks on Ligot stemmed mainly from the fact that Ligot was "on reasonably friendly terms and has courteous relations with the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association." &Farrington To Leonard Wood, July 26, 1924, Farrington papers, AH&

When the Hanapepe massacre occurred, labor leaders in the Philippines lobbied in the legislature and the executive branch to remove Ligot; the committee heading the campaign included two former Hawaii investigators, Prudencio Remigio and Joaquin Balmori, as well as two prominent labor leaders, Lope K. Santos and Jacinto G. Manahan. &Cecilio Basan and Pablo Manlapit, Strike Circular, September 30, 1924, HSPA Archives& A the Philippine lower house committee hearing on the matter brought the testimony of Francisco Varona, Herminigildo Cruz and others that Ligot should have displayed more interest in the suffering of Hawaii Filipinos. &Manila Times, September 8, 1924& The petitions from Hawaii Filipinos and the criticism by Philippine labor leaders led Labor director Cruz to ask Governor General Wood to recall Ligot. &Advertiser, September 13, 1924& Wood refused but asked Farrington to investigate.
Farrington refused an open investigation during the strike because it "would serve to injure his [Ligot's] usefulness and put him at a disadvantage in the midst of a very critical situation." Also, Farrington begged that he had no funds for an investigator. Instead, Farrington assured Wood that the attack on Ligot was groundless; the Hanapepe massacre, Farrington wrote: "resulted from the Filipinos being misled through inflammatory counsel or speeches of their leaders, and from our present information this attack on the police and the resulting fatalities was the result of reckless leadership by those sponsoring a strike among Filipino laborers on the plantations; and these same leaders are the ones who have been most outspoken in their attacks on Commissioner Ligot. This incident alone, it seems to me, tends to raise a real serious question as to the judgement and sincerity of Commissioner Ligot's principal critics." &Farrington To Wood, October 6, 1924, Quezonian Papers& Farrington continued: "So far as I can learn, Commissioner Ligot has done very well. If you wish a man who will travel among the Islands more frequently, he must have more money with which to do this work. If a more aggressive or abler representation is desired, I should judge that it will be necessary to allot a larger sum than $3,000 a year for salary. &Farrington To Wood, October 6, 1924, Quezonian Papers& Wood passed on Farrington's comments to Quezon. &Wood to Quezon, November 5, 1924, Quezonian Papers&

Ligot stayed in office for a long time, enjoying the support of the HSPA officials and Farrington in Hawaii and the confidence of Quezon and Wood in the Philippines.
MOVE THIS SOMEWHERE HSPA support of him and his activities, including fund drives for the Philippine government. Also, Ligot’s Report to Governor General Wood for the year ending March 24, 1924 was sent to all managers. &Butler, to All Plantation Managers, February 4, 1925, HACO& In turn, the HSPA contributed to his causes. Ligot was always collecting money. General Wood campaigned for TB funds in 1923 and Ligot issued an appeal to the Filipinos to contribute. He sent a circular letter, pointing out that he was proud that the HSPA contributed $5000 and told the Filipinos: "Do not forget the sincerest sympathy of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters to this cause...we have to thank them with honest labor and sincere cooperation in the achievement of success in their enterprise." &Ligot, to His Countrymen, Circular, October 4, 1923, HACO& In actuality, the HSPA did not contribute, it merely coordinated the collection, instructing the plantations to deduct from their wages the pledges of Filipino laborers, and the amount would be given to Butler who would turn it over to Ligot. &Butler to All Plantations, October 29, 1923, GFA&

After the 1924 strike, Ligot consolidated his position in Hawaii. He continued to favor his fellow Ilocanos, who were now coming in large numbers. He published Ti Silaw, a weekly in Ilocano and English sections. The charges continued: Ligot created distrust and conflict between the Ilocanos and the Visayans. &Bulatao to Quezon, September 21, 1931, Quezonian Papers; Taliba, December 19, 1925, p. 1 & With the help of the HSPA, he built up a network of Filipinos loyal to him, and they were well rewarded with good positions on the various plantations. Though still new on the job and his loyalties untested in December 1923, the HSPA started helping him build the network at HACO. The head of the agency wrote HACO: "It seems that Mr. Ligot has no reliable representative on your plantation, and we believe, with reservations, that it would be desirable for him to have one. The HSPA will be sending you one by Monday’s boat. If you can give him somewhat of a preferential job, so much the better, but otherwise he will be perfectly satisfied with an ordinary day job." &Cooke to Campsie, December 19, 1923, HACO&
The conference Ligot organized just before the 1924 strike became the basis of the HSPA's extensive network of Filipino spies on the plantations. The network was coordinated by Victorio Fajardo, formerly the minister at the Filipino Methodist Church in Honolulu until he joined the HSPA in 1924 to inform on Filipino labor leaders, Pedro Victoria, who chaired Ligot's territorial convention in 1923 and served as Herminigildo Cruz' secretary on Cruz' visit in 1926; Maximo Sevilla, who was a writer and businessman, and Juan Valentin, the Filipino interpreter-clerk at the HSPA office in Honolulu. &James I. Muir, Major, Office of Military Intelligence Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, U.S. Army, to General Creed F. Cox, BIA, in BIA 5999& The network consisted of the various lunas, camp policemen, welfare workers, nurses, and ministers on the plantations. Ligot's strongest support came from the Filipino Christian ministers.&James I. Muir, Major, Office of Military Intelligence Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, U.S. Army, to General Creed F. Cox, BIA, in BIA 5999&

Ligot constantly discredited not just Manlapit and labor leaders but also the Filipinos who did not transfer their loyalties to him. One object of his harassment was N. C. Dizon, the pastor of the Filipino community church in Honolulu, who complained about the way Ligot constantly maligned him and the other Filipinos in his reports to the home government. &Dizon to Quezon, June 3, 1929, Quezonian Papers& Dizon explained why Ligot attacked him: "The plantation people might not like me because they feel that I am not on their side because of my sympathy for the laboring man. This is also one reason that led me to resign from the Methodist Mission here, for whom I worked for ten years."&Dizon to Quezon, June 3, 1929, Quezonian Papers&
Ligot also had a falling out with his former secretary, Pedro M. Esqueras. Esqueras, as Manlapit’s right hand man during the 1920 strike, had arranged for the meeting with David Thompson in the bribery case and abruptly left for the Philippines under cloudy circumstances. He returned he returned as Ligot’s private secretary. &Manila Times, April 24, 1924&

Four years later, Esqueras accused Ligot of being an HSPA stooge, of being more interested in enriching himself with a printing press, a taxi service, and a pawnshop, than in helping the Filipinos, and of dividing the Filipinos. Esqueras also exposed the fact that Ti Silaw was subsidized by the HSPA. &P.M. Esqueras and NC Dizon, to Quezon, July 24, 1928, Quezonian Papers&

Esqueras also exposed the fact that Ligot asked plantations to dismiss strikers in 1924 and Honolulu employers to dismiss Filipinos who supported the strike. In fact, Ligot sought to stop the coming of schoolboys to Hawaii. In 1925 he wrote Governor General Leonard Wood that Honolulu was crowded with Filipino students, teachers and white collar job seekers, and asked Wood’s help in advising such persons not to come to Hawaii. But Ligot welcomed laborers. "All Filipinos of the field who come to Hawaii on their own accord and paying their own way have easily obtained work on the sugar plantations. Their kind of Filipinos are always welcomed in Hawaii." &Advertiser, October 8, 1925&

Ligot investigated and monitored the activities of Filipino organizations because the HSPA was suspicious of them. In 1923, Filipinos in Hawaii complained to H. Cruz that Hawaii authorities sought to destroy the organizations. One such organization was the Dimas Alang Association, a fraternal order whose goal was to instill patriotism and unity among Hawaii Filipinos. Ligot and the HSPA managed to have a committee in the fraternal order investigate and bring a suit against the president and the secretary of Dimas Alang for asking the wives of members during initiation proceedings to disrobe as proof of their willingness to sacrifice their lives, even their honor for the Philippines. Despite the lack of witnesses and the unwillingness of the woman involved to testify, the executive secretary, Filemon Serrano, was asked to leave on the first boat for the Philippines but formal court charges were dropped against the president, Patricio Belen, &Ligot to Cruz, September 12, 1923&
When the Association of Di-masalang applied for a charter, Governor Farrington referred asked the HSPA, which had the network to carry out an investigation, to look into the nature of the organization. Di-masalang, established by disgruntled members of Dimas Alang in the Philippines, was denied a charter on Butler’s recommendation that it was being promoted by Manlapit and other dangerous people. &Butler to Farrington, April 13, 1923, Farrington Papers, AH

Filipino laborers counted as Ligot’s most serious failing the fact that he did not vigorously pursue their grievances. An incident at Grove Farm in 1926 illustrated this complaint. Field work was already tense because the white lunas relentlessly drove the men to work harder. When two laborers paused in order to remove dirt which had gotten into their eyes, the lunas accused them of slacking and arbitrarily reduced their rate of pay from $1.70 to $1.25 a day. The entire gang quit work in protest, so the two laborers were fired; the firing merely led the entire gang to ask to be fired, too. When asked, Ligot did not investigate or protest the arbitrary action of the lunas, he merely pleaded with the plantation manager for "your kindness to see and settle properly this trouble."&Ligot to Broadbent, May 13, 1926, GFA&

He also did not vigorously follow up the laborers’ request to be given free passage home. Eleuterio F. Benedicto had served faithfully at Lahaina, Maui’s Pioneer Mill for four years after being induced by Ligot to return to work after merely a few days as a striker in 1924. Because of his good work record, Benedicto thought he deserved consideration for either receiving free passage home or entering into a new contract so that he would work toward such a privilege. He asked Ligot’s help but Ligot refused, flatly stating that "all Filipinos who went on strike, even merely for a few days, are recorded as having been on strike, and therefore lost their right to a return passage," even though the contract did not state such terms. &Ligot to Eleuterio F. Benedicto, September 12, 1928; Benedicto to Quezon, September 19, 1928, Quezonian Papers.& There were many Filipinos like Benedicto whom Ligot could have helped. One of them, Matias Quinto, though leaving a plantation to where he was originally assigned when he first arrived in Hawaii, had accumulated a good work record for five consecutive years at HACO. The HSPA would not award him, or the many Filipinos with a good work record because of the large expense involved if it did. &Slator Miller to HACO, September 28, 1928, HACO&
Unable to get any assistance from Ligot, Benedicto wrote labor director Cruz to call attention to this problem which affected many Filipinos in Hawaii as well; the only response he was from his plantation manager scolding him on several occasions for writing Cruz. In desperation, Benedicto complained to Quezon: "It is the practice here that the plantation authorities simply blacklist every Filipino who ever attempt to work for the welfare of its countrymen and treated with contempt." &Benedicto to Quezon, October 19, 1928, Quezonian Papers

In the case of Cipriano Marinas, a plantation laborer on Maui for nine years, Ligot felt embarrassed going to the HSPA office to check on Marinas' work record to find that Marinas had joined the strike in 1925, and complained about having to follow up unfounded claims from ignorant laborers. &Ligot to Cipriano Marinias, March 19, 1929, Quezonian Papers& Marinas, arguing that his long service could have been an argument for receiving free passage home while the HSPA provided free passage to laborers who, though having worked merely a few days, were incapacitated, complained to Cruz that Ligot's appointment merely meant the Filipino laborers' (especially the Visayans') oppression by both the HSPA and Ligot now, whereas in the past it was merely by the HSPA. &Marinas to Cruz, March 27, 1929, Quezonian Papers&

Governor General Wood, Ligot's main support in the Philippine colonial government, died in 1927 but with Quezon's help, he remained in office for the next seven years, through the governorship of Henry L. Stimson in 1928-29, Dwight F. Davis in 1929-32, and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 1932-33. In his reports, he unfailingly portrayed plantation life as ideal, the Filipinos as content, and the planters as generous in providing new houses, clubhouses, churches, recreational facilities being built for the laborers. and the absence of racial prejudice against the Filipinos in Hawaii. He continued to attack the Filipinos in the cities as parasites and "much inclined to robbery, larceny or any crime of stealing." He revealed a racist outlook toward Filipinos in writing that "the crimes which are more likely to be committed by the Filipinos are murder for their natural hot temperament and carnall access for scarcity of Filipino women." &C. Ligot to Dwight F. Davis, governor general of the Philippines, in Judd Papers, March 6, 1930, AH& Cadiente Interview, Ewa, August 28, 1981&
In listing his accomplishments in office, Ligot claimed credit for HSPA-initiated changes: better housing after the 1924 strike, a better image for Hawaii Filipinos, the hiring of more lunas and more contract cultivators, the higher savings rate among Filipinos, the better health of the laborers because of the employment of nurses, physicians and welfare workers, and higher moral and religious state because of the work of ministers and welfare workers. He also mentioned continuing Filipino problems— their molestation of minor girls and married women, their lack of unity and mutual respect, the unemployment and poverty in Honolulu among those who did not come through the HSPA or wish to seek employment on the outer island plantations. &Cayetano Ligot, in Philippine Free Press, February 15, 1934, p. 11. &

The Filipinos in Hawaii, backed by labor organizations in Manila which circulated petitions demanding the recall of Ligot in 1928. &Advertiser, February 21, 1928& continued to ask the Philippine government to recall Ligot. By this time, they knew that Ligot no longer helped the Filipinos, and so they went to the HSPA directly to settle their grievances rather than through Ligot. &Jose Bulatao, secretary Filipino Economic Movement, to Quezon, October 1, 1931, Quezonian Papers& Others continued to seek help directly from the Philippine legislature, especially for the fact that on Kauai some Filipinos were being fined or jailed without due process of law; "We envy the Japanese, the Chinese and the other nationalities who are residing in Hawaii who are fully protected by their Home Government. We also appeal to your legislators in the Home Land for protection from maltreatment and oppression." &G.B. Moscoso to Quezon, September 24, 1929, Quezonian Papers& Fewer Filipino laborers brought up their complaints before Quezon after 1924 as it became obvious that their efforts were futile and Quezon had not made any move to look into charges against Ligot. The Filipinos were now taking up their problems directly, forming their own protective associations and their union.
In 1933, ten years after Ligot assumed office, a new governor general, Frank Murphy decided to conduct an impartial investigation of the many complaints against Ligot. Lacking funds to send an investigator to Hawaii, he requested that an impartial officer in the Hawaiian Army to investigate but the war department refused to make the investigation. &Governor General, Philippine Islands, to BIA, August 5, 1933; BIA to Governor General, August 5, 1933, BIA 5999& Aside from the many charges that Ligot was too friendly with the HSPA, Ligot and his wife, whom he appointed his secretary, were accused of selling unregistered stocks to Filipinos dependent on Ligot’s office.&Advertiser, November 8, 1933& Mrs. Ligot and three others were convicted of selling shares of Haphil and Company, a Filipino trading firm, in violation of territorial laws requiring the registration of securities; HE Stafford, Mrs. Ligot’s lawyer, contending that the law was unconstitutional, appealed the case in the territorial supreme court. &Star Bulletin, April 21, 1934& Governor General Murphy decided that the many complaints hindered Ligot’s effectiveness as a labor commissioner and abolished the office after December 31, 1933. He also censured Ligot for accepting $150 a month from the HSPA as a subsidy for Ti Silaw, a subsidy which Ligot himself admitted receiving. &Star Bulletin, November 7, 1933&. Murphy wrote: "It is obvious that this arrangement gives weight to the charge so frequently made that the Philippine labor commissioner in Hawaii is too closely allied with the sugar planters’ association in Hawaii to represent properly the interests of the Filipino laborers in Hawaii." &Murphy to Ligot, quoted in Advertiser, November 8, 1933&

Yet although no longer in office, Ligot remained in Hawaii and continued to serve the HSPA cause. In 1936, he and Vicente Fajardo went to Franco Manuel, then editor of the Filipino Commonwealth Chronicle, to offer a job with the HSPA in return for stopping the criticism of bad plantation conditions and wages in Manuel’s newspaper. &Interview, Franco Manuel, March 20, 1981&
FIGUERAS RUCKUS

When Ligot's office was abolished in 1933, the Philippine legislature created the office of the Labor Inspector General of the Philippines to check the conditions of Filipino employment in Hawaii and the United States mainland. Governor General Murphy appointed Jose Figueras to the office, and he assumed Ligot's former duties. In late 1933, with only a few hours' notice, Figueras left Manila on the President Coolidge for Hawaii and was seen off by a crowd of 50,000 people. &Star Bulletin, December 16, 1933&

John K. Butler, a frequent visitor to the Philippines, was worried about Figueras, a popular labor leader who identified with the laborers, having been a day laborer at age 18, an oiler on a ship, and a bookkeeper before being elected a Manila city councillor. Butler was concerned that Manlapit and the other Honolulu leaders would gain Figueras' sympathies. In a long intimate letter to Quezon, after promising to compile the the Honolulu press accounts of Quezon's recent visit and justifying the trespass law, Butler instructed Quezon: "I hope you have given Figueras a little picture of the situation here so that he will make no mistake that will cause him and us and all the Filipinos a lot of trouble." &Butler to Quezon, November 27, 1933, Quezonian Papers& Butler had further information that Francisco Varona had asked Manlapit and Taok to cooperate with Figueras, and that the two Filipino labor leaders had already planned a big welcome reception for Figueras. &Butler to Quezon, December 2, 1933, Quezonian Papers& Later, Butler wrote another intimate letter, indicating his plans to join Quezon on the President Coolidge on its return trip to Manila, although "the only change in my plans that might likely occur would be if your new labor inspector, Figueras, is liable to create any upset. Then I will have to wait." &Butler to Casey Quezon, December 5, 1933, Quezonian Papers&
Figueras arrived in Honolulu December 15, was met by two groups, described by Butler as "Ligot and other respectable Filipinos" and "the dishonest agitators of the town." &Butler to Governor General Frank Murphy, February 26, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH& As Butler had feared, Figueras chose to attend Manlapit's reception, and sent a cable the following day through Babbitt's office in Manila asking the Philippine government to withdraw Figueras, followed five days later by a cable from Governor Judd to Governor General Murphy supporting Butler's request. &Butler to Poindexter, March 24, 1934, Poindexter Papers, AH&

Figueras proceeded to do everything wrong, in Butler's eyes. Accompanied by "a group of discredited dishonest Filipinos from the cities," he bypassed the managers and went directly to the camps to hear the laborers' complaints. In Honolulu, he made his headquarters at the office of Manlapit and Taok, whom Butler described as Figueras' "main counsellors, advisers and friends." After his visits to the big Island, Kauai, and Maui, "strikes began to develop on our plantations." &Butler to Gov. Gen. Frank Murphy, February 26, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH&

Figueras was seen by the Filipinos as their hope for a hearing of their grievances and complaints. As illustrated by an incident at Olaa plantation's Mountainview camp, they were not to be disappointed. The cane cutters walked out to protest the abuse by Manuel Martin, their Portuguese luna, of three Filipinos and Manager Watt tried in a friendly way to ask the Filipinos to forget what had been done, but the Filipinos felt deeply aggrieved and stayed out for two weeks. Jose Figueras arrived, heard about the walkout, and proceeded directly from the docks to the strikers' camp, instead of to the manager's office. He let the leaders talk first while he listened. Then Figueras spoke: "It is clear to me you have been wronged," he said. "I am going over to see your plantation manager right away and I want you all to wait for me here. I am not promising anything but I am assuring you that I will do all I can to help you." &Faustino Respicio, Eyewitness account, Philippine Press, January 15, 1934, pp. 7&
Figueras went to Watt, introduced himself, presented as factually as possible the laborers' position, and then he listened to Watt present the plantation's side. After the two discussed the issue for half an hour, Watt agreed to reassign the luna who had maltreated the Filipinos and appoint a Filipino luna in his place. Figueras then drove back to the strikers' camp, announced the results, and was immediately hailed as a hero. &Faustino Respicio, Eyewitness account, Philippine Press, January 15, 1934, pp. 7, 20&

D.F. Nolasco, a Filipino student at the University of California, Berkeley, observing Figueras' actions in Hawaii, noted that the "oppressed" Filipinos looked upon Figueras as a savior, the one to help them find jobs, secure their return passage, and take up their grievances. &D.F. Nolasco, in Star Bulletin, January 13, 1934& Filipino community groups passed resolutions giving him their vote of confidence and sent letters to Governor General Murphy praising Figueras at the same time that Babbitt and other HSPA officials in Manila conferred with Murphy to protest Figueras' activities. &Star Bulletin, February 21, 1934; Filipino Laborers Association, Resolution of January 6, 1934 by the Philippine community in Aeia, Quezonian Papers&

Unlike other labor investigators, Figueras was also very vocal about his criticism of plantation conditions. In Hilo, he gave a newspaper interview saying that the houses for Filipinos were in very bad condition, their surroundings unsanitary, and the water supply filthy. He also said the Filipinos wished to be paid directly at the plantation office because the contract bosses who distributed the pay out in the fields cheated the laborers. &Unidentified newspaper source, Clipping, sent by Butler to Quezon, Quezonian Papers&
There had been many strikes in mid-1933 and early 1934 because of the depression but the Honolulu newspapers did not report them in order to avoid worsening a general feeling against Filipinos. Despite the fact that the strikes began six months before Figueras arrived, a military intelligence report blamed him for the strikes. A pattern began to emerge in the strikes: the laborers would quit work, demand the discharge of lunas, ask for more pay and other demands, ask to see Figueras, and then return to work once he had promised to take up their grievance with the plantation manager. Based on rumor and unsubstantiated reports, military intelligence claimed that Figueras had an active hand in these strikes, inspiring them and then promptly working out their settlement in order to enhance his own prestige with the HSPA and with the governor general of the Philippines. &US Army, Hawaiian Department Headquarters, Fort Shafter, Military Intelligence, March 12, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH& Indeed, Figueras was constantly going from one island to another to arbitrate these strikes. &Philippine Press, February 15, 1934, p. 26&

In a KGU radio address to the Filipinos over KGU radio, Figueras announced: "I am now working on a plan of cooperation in the sense that there should be formed and established a code of well defined rules and regulations to govern the relations of the Filipino workers with their employers in the mills and plantations." In his plan, he sought to clarify the contract rights of the laborers, the nature and terms of their work and wages, and the best way of mediating and achieving understanding between the laborers and the management. In effect, he was preempting plantation control and proposing collective bargaining, and that made him a dangerous man despite his admonitions to the Filipinos to render loyal and proper service to the employer, to beware of self-styled leaders, to cooperate with their employers, and to use strikes and lockouts only as a last resort. to engage in collective bargaining by employers through their lawfully constituted authorities. &Figueras, KGU radio address, in Advertiser, January 29, 1934&
Butler sought to discredit Figueras to Governor General Murphy. He said Figueras presented the plan, which proposed the institution of collective bargaining, the supervision of HSPA recruiting by the Filipino labor bureau, the hiring of more Filipinos in supervisory position, and the signing of new contracts which would enable Hawaii Filipinos to earn the right to return passage. Butler claimed that Figueras, after being yelled at by Butler, agreed to attack Manlapit and the other agitators and to go to the outer islands for the HSPA, accompanied this time by HSPA spies. Butler portrayed Figueras as an opportunist who wished to be either a labor leader in Hawaii or to exact considerable tribute from the HSPA to keep from disturbing conditions, who allegedly told Butler: "Write my report, put anything you wish and I'll sign it." Butler also claimed that Figueras expected a bribe similar to one given Herminigildo Cruz, wished the HSPA grant him a small thing which would show that he was able to do something for Filipinos in Hawaii, and threatened to return to Hawaii with four of his goons in order to run things and manhandle or eliminate his opponents the way he did in Manila. &Butler to Governor General Frank Murphy, February 26, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH & Evidently, Butler had lied about being able to coopt Figueras. Just before boarding his ship for the Philippines on February 28, 1934, Figueras addressed the Filipinos, saying that he had asked the sugar planters to improve living and working conditions on the plantations, and when he got no reply, he cabled the Philippine government that because of discontent, a general strike of Filipinos in Hawaii was a likely. &Hawaii Shimpo, March 3, 1934, clipping, in Poindexter Papers, AH & After the address at the Capitol grounds, Figueras was accompanied by Taok and Manlapit to his stateroom on the President Lincoln. The way the HSPA and military authorities interpreted it, however, Figueras attacked the HSPA and the plantation managers, threatened a general strike, and told Manlapit to carry out a prearranged plan for the strike within sixty days. &US Army, Hawaiian Department Headquarters, Fort Shafter, Military Intelligence, March 12, 1934, in Poindexter Papers, AH &
Upon his arrival in Manila, Figueras said he would urge the halt of labor immigration to Hawaii and the repatriation of unemployed Hawaii Filipinos. *Star Bulletin, March 19, 1934* He also said the plantation Filipinos did the hardest work but received the worst treatment of all the races. *Star Bulletin, March 31, 1934* Butler, also in Manila on his routine inspection of the HSPA’s Hawaiian Philippine Company sugar mill, filed administrative charges against Figueras with Governor General Murphy but Murphy ignored the charges. *Star Bulletin, April 11, 1934*

Figueras’ report to Governor General Murphy was an indictment of the HSPA. 4. He wrote that the condition of the laborers in Hawaii was fair, and then noted the following exceptions: The HSPA complete control over all industry and business in TH, the suppression of all labor unions and organizations, trespass law restricting visits to plantation Filipinos, Filipinos discriminated against in the employment of citizens first, violations by the HSPA of contract between HSPA and the laborers, inadequate low wages on all the plantations, and lack of Filipino representation in the political processes in Hawaii. He said that Filipinos complained about housing, particularly at Aeia where the management was indifferent to the repair and upkeep of houses. Although he said there were no general unemployment in the sugar industry, he wrote that the Filipinos felt insecure and discontent "due to restrictions imposed on individual rights and unsatisfactory wage schedules, housing and working conditions on some plantations." he said the strikes were caused principally by unfair dealings and rough treatment by lunas, and misunderstanding with plantation managements." Figueras accused the HSPA and the territorial government of Hawaii "of showing during times of stress and depression very little interest, if ever, for the welfare of the Filipinos." It also pointed out that the prices of basic foodstuff in Hawaii was twice that in the Philippines. He recommended funding a Filipino commissioner’s office in Hawaii. *Advertiser, April 14, 1934*
Figueras submitted a supplemental report on the treatment of Hawaii Filipinos, attacking Ligot for not establishing policies on laborer relationship with employers and thus allowing the HSPA to decide unilaterally labor cases. Furthermore, many laborers were obliged to work without contracts with the HSPA, depriving them of the opportunity to earn free return passage. The HSPA’s inquisitorial summary dismissal system was prejudicial to the rights of laborers and contract privileges; Filipinos were summarily dismissed to make way for “preferred citizens”, although Filipinos were paying excise tax on their income they were not entitled to federal aid or unemployment relief. &Advertiser, April 17, 1934&

The HSPA response was predictably to attack Figueras and undermine his credibility. In the Advertiser, although it admitted that sugar affected all businesses and also tried to justify the anti-trespass law. &Star Bulletin, April 14, 1934; Advertiser, April 15, 1934& In Manila, Butler had lunch with Governor General Murphy at Baguio and refuted Figueras’ report. &Star Bulletin, April 17, 1934&
In 1935, Quezon commissioned Teodoro Sandiko, a scholar who was on his way back to the Philippines after his travels, to survey the conditions in Hawaii. Sandiko visited merely five plantations. The first few parts of his report, written June 5, 1935, contained the HSPA statistics on labor contracts, average earnings, type of work on the plantation and other employment data. Sandiko claimed that he talked with Filipinos in the streets, but his report merely contained the regular HSPA general statements about Filipino plantation labor conditions. He concluded that the Filipinos were satisfied and content with plantation treatment. "They are treated very well and equally as the other nationalities. There is no discrimination," he wrote. He was pleasantly surprised that he had received no complaint of any sort from the Filipinos in his conversations with them. He claimed that the door to the plantation managers' offices was always open for laborer complaints or requests. The Filipinos were content in their homes, which were well built and sanitary. All stores and recreational facilities were superlatively described. In general employers were kind and helpful to Filipino laborers. Sandiko followed the HSPA line, attacking the city crooks and swindlers and justifying the anti-trespass law, denying any Filipino unemployment, being admitted to public works although not a citizen. Justifying the HSPA’s suppression of Filipino organizations of all kinds, not just the labor organizations, Sandiko attacked the various Filipino organizations, including mutual savings societies, going home societies, mutual aid societies, fraternal orders and even Moncado; he considered them as merely for the benefit of the organizers. His only suggestions were to shorten the work hours from the 60 hours a week, higher production bonuses and giving Filipinos a chance to re-write their contract so as to earn free return passage. His report contained the standard HSPA attack on the "self-appointed leaders "who established organizations, like Manlapit. And he praised the generous hearts of the people in Hawaii, particularly the plantation managers and the HSPA trustees to do right, as always. &Teodoro Sandiko to Quezon, June 5, 1935, Quezonian Papers&
Apparently nobody believed Sandiko's whitewashed report by now, because in late 1935 the Philippine government wanted to send a labor inspector to Hawaii. Quezon cabled the Bureau of Insular Affairs to check if it had any objection. &George H. Dern, Sec. of War to Sec. of Interior, December 28, 1935, in BIA 5999& The matter was referred to Poindexter, who indicated that if an inspector be sent, it shouldn't be Figueras. &Poindexter, Telegram, to Acting sec. Interior Charles West, January 5, 1936, in BIA 227& Quezon agreed that Figueras would not be the one to be sent. &Murphy to Secretary of War, January 20, 1936, in BIA 227&

LAW SUITS AGAINST THE HSPA

In 1934, several suits were filed against the HSPA; in essence, the lawsuit charged that the HSPA, in accepting the license to recruit, agreed to provide free transportation to and from the Philippines. However, since 1925 the HSPA stopped paying the passage to Hawaii, although it paid return passage to the Philippines upon completion of contract. Several of these suits were dismissed in 1934 and 1935 because by then the HSPA had no one in the Manila office in charge. The suits were brought up again and again, when John K. Butler visited Manila in 1934 on. These suits however, were thrown out of court because the HSPA, not being an incorporated body, lacked legal entity and couldn't be sued, a decision both the Philippine Supreme court ruled, and the US supreme court, in refusing to review the case, upheld. &Star Bulletin, April 27, 1936; Advertiser, June 17, 1935& Additional suits were brought up with the same results up to 1938 &Star Bulletin, October 12, 1938& Another set of suits, claiming that the HSPA, being judicially non-existent in the Philippines and immune from suits, should not be allowed to enter into contracts and renew its license to recruit. &Advertiser, March 21, 1935& The supreme court of PI, however, said the secretary of labor of PI could issue the license in his authority. &Star Bulletin, October 12, 1935&