CHAPTER 5
THE 1924 STRIKE

The Japanese abandoned unionism altogether with the failure of the 1920 strike but the Filipinos, led by Pablo Manlapit, continued to organize. In November 1921 Manlapit organized the Filipino Labor Union by appointing a representative on each island and on each plantation; HSPA’s Butler denounced it as a mere graft game, especially the collection of an entrance fee of $1 and monthly dues of 50¢. &Butler to all Plantation Managers, November 12, 1921, HACO & Manlapit worked closely with George Wright.

Butler kept very close surveillance on Manlapit, who was once again a serious threat because he was now slowly regaining the prestige that he had lost during the 1920 strike. &Alvah Scott, Supervising Inspector, C. Brewer, to Campsie, HACO, April 20, 1923; Cooke to Campsie, April 27, 1923, HACO & He also kept track of the activities of George Wright, and knew that in early 1922 Manlapit, George Wright and the other allies of the One Big Union, held meetings on several plantations. &Butler to Grove Farm, January 30, 1923, GFA; Butler to Farrington, May 7, 1924, Farrington Papers, AH &

In 1922 Manlapit abandoned the goal of organizing a formal union in favor of a loose and elastic High Wage Movement (HWM), which had no constitution or laws or fixed initiation fees or monthly dues, merely voluntary membership. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 12 & He went to the various plantations, careful to keep on the government road rather than on plantation premises, and standing on a small wooden box which he always carried with him he haranged his audience. He sought to tap Filipino discontent with plantation conditions. They found it hard to save and send money home or return home; like the Japanese in 1909, the Filipinos now had a higher aspiration than what the sugar planters merely regarded their worth in terms of "oriental wages." Manlapit did not set up any formal organization. Instead, he encouraged individuals to talk to others, convince others of the need to demand better wages so they could support their families better in Hawaii or in the Philippines.

At these meetings, the basic demand began to take shape: $2 a day minimum wage and the cancellation of the bonus, eight hour workday, time and a half for overtime work and twice the normal rate for Sundays and holidays, recognition of collective bargaining and the right of employees to organize for mutual benefit and protection, and the appointment of Manlapit and George Wright as agents to negotiate with the employers. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 35 &. The petition was presented to the HSPA president on April 10, 1923 but the HSPA refused to recognize the higher wage movement, regarding it as the creation of outside agitators, merely ignored the petition and dismissed the signatories and the leaders on the Oahu plantations. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 36; Liebes, p. 41 &
The Filipinos now composed a majority of the plantation laborers and, with Manlapit’s leadership, were now a threat in the way that the Japanese were earlier. In 1923, J. M. Dowsett, the HSPA president warned of a repeat of the 1920 strike, this time by Filipinos because of their predominance on the laborforce. This dependence on the Filipinos was threatening all the more because the immigration laws the following year barred the immigration of Japanese and imposed a general immigration quota based on national origins. 

To try and restrict the Filipino agitation, the territorial legislature passed the anti-picketing law, which forbade unlawful assembly and provided for a stiff fine of $1,000, a year’s imprisonment, or both. Sponsored by Roy Vitousek, the head of the judiciary committee of the territorial house, a corporation lawyer who admitted frankly later that the Filipino agitation on the plantations was the impetus behind the anti-picketing law. Voice of Labor, October 14, 1936. It was upheld in Hawaii court in 1928 but was superceded by the NLRB act of 1935. Bouslog, Memo, p. 31

Furthermore, in early 1924, the Honolulu police led by Captain of Detectives Kellett, regularly rounded up Filipino "professional loafers, vagrants, gangsters, bootleggers," and return them to Manila at HSPA expense. The HSPA claimed that these Filipinos, because they were well dressed, slick, though with no visible means of support, merely preyed on plantation laborers and bootlegged oke (okelehao, distilled from sugar cane) Manila Times, February 2, 1924 & The police raids continued, with the police rounding up vagrants and procurers during the strike to be returned to Manila. &Advertiser, April 4, 1924 & despite the doubtful constitutionality of such.

Manlapit stopped his Higher Wage Movement when it became evident that a Filipino labor commissioner would be appointed and would make things right between the laborers and the plantations. &Star Bulletin, December 13, 1922 &
spokesman for the Filipino sentiment for immediate Philippine independence was regarded by the Hawaii Filipinos as the person to whom they could turn to for help. (Ironic, because Quezon betrayed them—as will be discussed later).

In 1922, a commission appointed by the US secretary of labor to look into the conditions in Hawaii in 1922 reported: "These Filipinos being largely the wards of the United States should have the supervision and interested care of the Federal Department of Labor in equal if not greater degree than that extended to labor citizens of the mainland." The commission recommended that the secretary of labor appoint a representative in the territory of Hawaii whose duties would include the supervision of the Filipinos and to watch out for their welfare. &Report of the Hawaiian Labor Commission, L.E. Sheppard, chairman, to the Secretary of Labor, Washington D.C. January 5, 1923, Archives of Hawaii.

These statements comprised an indictment of the Philippine colonial government in its neglect to look after the Filipinos in Hawaii. This neglect was all the more evident because in the 1915 law regulating the HSPA recruitment mandated the creation of the office of a resident labor commissioner in Hawaii to look after the needs of the Filipino laborers in Hawaii. Instead of a resident commissioner who would receive complaints of Filipinos abroad, arbitrate differences between the laborers and their employees, safeguard their contracts, and in general, to look after the interest of Filipinos in Hawaii, Philippine colonial officials merely sent a visiting commissioner who conducted a few weeks of survey and wrote general reports about conditions of Filipino labor in Hawaii. Governor General Leonard Wood refused to fund an office and sent a Philippine investigator to Hawaii whenever the Filipino complaints became magnified.

From 1920 on, the Filipinos in Hawaii intensified the campaign to appoint a commissioner actually resident in Hawaii. They held mass meetings regularly and solicited signatures for their petitions. &Resolution, to Create Resident Labor Commissioner to Hawaii, Mass Meeting at Aala Park, August 13, 20, 1922, Quezonian Papers& Pablo Manlapit also wrote Quezon to appeal for the passage of a law creating the office of a resident commissioner to Hawaii. &Pablo Manlapit to Quezon, October 25, 1922, Quezonian Papers& The Kauai Filipinos also wrote a petition.&Liga Filipina to Quezon, February 10, 1923, Quezonian Papers&

They argued that a labor commissioner actually present in the islands could do a lot to help the Filipino laborers. He could monitor the plantation contracts; The Filipinos complained that the plantations violated the terms of agreement, reduced their work to merely 20 days each month during periods of drought, thus making them ineligible to a bonus for not having worked 23 days or more a year, or ineligible to free return passage. A resident labor commissioner could also take up the cause of injured or ill laborers with the plantations. He could also assist those not being proficient in English bring up matters with the Hawaii authorities and mediate with plantation management. &M.A. Fonseca to Manuel L. Quezon, May 29, 1922, Quezonian Papers&
The Filipino clamor in Hawaii led to the 1913 law creating the office of the labor commissioner in Honolulu. The law charged the resident commissioner to hear complaints and settle these with the employers, to see compliance of contracts and look after Filipino interests; to secure employment for the Filipino laborers in the Territory of Hawaii, to hear complaints about free passage, and to inspect the plantations and receive the petition of laborers. (Sixth Philippine Legislature, 2nd session, S. no. 297, no. 3148, in BIA 5999). It required him to make a report every six months to the governor general. A sum of $4000 was provided to run the office.

RESIDENT COMMISSIONER LIGOT

Governor general Leonard Wood appointed Cayetano Ligot, a small, thin nervous man, respectful of authority and highly conservative in his views. Born in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, Ligot studied pharmacy at the Jesuit college Ateneo, and then tried out several jobs as a public school teacher, principal, pharmacy instructor at his alma mater, census inspector, rural bank administrator, and a newspaper publisher. At the time of his appointment he had just finished a term as governor of his home province.

Ligot arrived in Honolulu on April 27, 1923, and at once he had to decide between two banquets in his honor, one hosted by the Filipino laborers and the other by the sugar industry. "I pleased first the Planters' party, where the Governor of this island is included," Ligot noted, in what was to be a prophetic characterization of his whole tenure in office. (Ligot to Cruz, Philippine Bureau of Labor Director, May 22, 1923 in Quezonian Papers.) After the planters' banquet, he proceeded to the gathering of several thousand Filipinos at Aala Park. Ligot was displeased with several speakers at the gathering because they "uttered insulting and injurious words to the planters and called 'pusa-pusa' or pussycat the Filipinos who sided with the planters." (Ligot to Cruz, Philippine Bureau of Labor Director, May 22, 1923 in Quezonian Papers.)

In his talk, therefore, he enjoined the Filipinos to be polite to the planters.

In the next days, Ligot met with HSPA secretary John K. Butler and other HSPA officials, and toured their facilities. At the HSPA receiving station, he dismissed the complaints that the Filipinos "were kept and fed like pigs and dogs" on the mere fact that "the nurse, Miss Cagayat, a very friend of mine, was entirely opposed to information of ill treatment or bad administration and dealings." (Ligot to Cruz, Philippine Bureau of Labor Director, May 22, 1923 in Quezonian Papers.) On his tour of the various plantations, he heard complaints about some "Camp Bosses and policemen who are not gentlemen-like" but was completely satisfied with Butler's assurance that such plantation bosses would be dismissed if found guilty of serious offenses on the laborers. (Ligot to Cruz, Philippine Bureau of Labor Director, May 22, 1923 in Quezonian Papers.)
Ligot’s policy of "pleasing first the Planters’ party" became evident early. He refused Manlapit’s various entreaties to meet with the high wage movement proponents; a month after his arrival, he had already discredited Manlapit and the other Filipino leaders to his superiors in Manila. He issued a circular warning the Filipinos not to contribute to the Higher Wage Movement and urging them to direct their whole energy instead to their job and service on the plantation; Butler sent 30,000 copies of the circular, dated June 2, 1923, to all the plantations. \[54\]

Then he went to the outer island plantations to warn the Filipinos about Manlapit; he also discouraged them from contributing to the defense of Filipinos tried for crimes, as such funds were not necessary because the local courts were fair and the innocent were acquitted while the guilty were deservedly punished. \[55\]

On his tour of the plantations, his agenda invariably began with "Visit to the Manager; inquiry for difficulties of Manager to handle the Filipino laborers or troubles among the chief subordinates and laborers; or among the laborers themselves." After a tour of the plantation facilities, Ligot then lectured the Filipino laborers on the theme "Mutual understanding and effective cooperation between labor and capital." He outlined his talk as followed:

II. Mutual understanding and effective cooperation between labor and capital.
   a. To care for their dwellings as their own.
   b. To make the land and plants assigned to their care as their own.
   c. To close the electric lights in the daytime or when not needed to avoid expenses on the part of the company with the hope that out of its economy by so doing they might be given higher pay. (Occasional)
   d. To close the water pipes when water is not needed for the sake of others who are living farther below. (Occasional)
   e. To be steady workers, and should not stop from work without previous information to whom it may concern.
   f. Not to leave the plantation without notifying the Manager.
   g. Not to move easily from plantation to plantation in order to get practical knowledge and easiness of the job, which means money for both, capital and labor.
   h. Any controversy or discrepancy should be referred to the man in charge or to the Manager or to me respectively when appreciation of righteous complaints requests cannot be secured. \[59\]

Ligot then repeated his warnings about crooks like Manlapit, exhorted the laborers to be at their best behavior so as to gain the favor of the manager, to respect authority, and to practice morality. \[59\]
Ligot held several assumptions which the Filipinos did not share. To begin with, he held that the Filipinos were undeserving, and would receive better treatment on the plantations only if they deferred and curried favors from the managers. He also assumed that the plantations were fair, that "in general, Managers are kind, just, and reasonable. They give good treatment to laborers who are also good." Abuses and ill treatment, he explained away as the product of uneducated, subordinate plantation officials; to correct these, all that Ligot had to do was to ask the Managers to advise their subordinates on cooperation and understanding. Ligot also assumed that the Filipinos were like children who needed constant discipline and supervision. "I found out that in most of the plantations where Managers are very democratic," he wrote, "that is no discipline, or there is but it is too loose, our laborers are not steady, and very apt to become gamblers, loafers, and vicious, particularly when the Camp Boss or Policeman is not a Filipino." & Ligot to Governor General Leonard Wood, September 10, 1923, Quezonian Papers.

In other words, Ligot assumed that social disorganization was caused by bad plantation conditions or ill treatment but by the lack of Filipino discipline. The Filipinos were given poorer housing and positions "because they stir up trouble on the plantation, protest wages, hence alienate managers unlike the Japanese who are loyal in backing up the sugar industry." & Ligot to Governor General Leonard Wood, September 10, 1923, Quezonian Papers. & Where Remigio in 1919 protested that laborer grievances ended up nowhere because the laborers were complaining to the people who were directly or indirectly responsible for abuses, Ligot wanted the Filipinos to bring up their grievances before the plantation officials based on his naive belief that these complaints would be looked into fairly. Where Remigio called attention to the plantation's failure to provide 20 days of work a month, making it difficult for the Filipinos to earn their return passage, Ligot instead wrote that "the Filipino laborers are more likely to break the contract by not working steadily 20 days in a month as agreed. This is the cause of so often discharge." & Ligot to Governor General Leonard Wood, September 10, 1923, Quezonian Papers.

Ligot classified the Hawaii Filipinos into four categories. The worst were Manlapit and other self-appointed leaders of the High Wage Movement, and when told by Butler and the plantation managers that they would rather see the plantations close than give in to Manlapit's demand, Ligot quivered and vowed to the Philippine governor general he would "double up my effort and energy to the risk of my health in placing the laborers in good terms with the Managers and capitalists." The second category were those the HSPA labelled the "bad eggs"--the loafers, rascals, insubordinates, criminals and gamblers; Ligot went to the governor of Hawaii to ask for secret investigators to help rid the islands of the bad eggs. The third category he praised highly as the honest, educated Filipinos in welfare work, lunas, interpreters, and ministers and nurses, all ridiculed by Manlapit's group as the planters' lap dogs. The last category he also praised as the humble, steady and honest workers. & Ligot to Governor General Leonard Wood, September 10,
After six months in office, Ligot reported that the plantations fulfilled their contract with the laborers. He paid glowing tribute to plantation facilities. Although he mentioned in passing that some plantations provided poor accommodations and inadequate fuel to Filipinos, he quickly went on to say that these were the results of the negligence or partiality of some camp boss or policeman rather than a general plantation policy.

Ligot considered his most challenging task as resident commissioner the stopping of coboy coboy, because such incidents brought dishonor to Filipinos. He went to the extent of appearing at the HSPA immigration station and ordered sent back the couples he suspected of not really being married together; he attributed the practice of women posing as the recruit’s wife to their unlettered, unenlightened state rather than to a means by which women could join their husbands on the plantations free of transportation expense. He also asked Philippine officials to pressure the recruiters not to accept those who had not been married for a long time. Ligot also complained about the inadequacy of his office allowance; he said that previous visiting Philippine labor investigators like Varona did not incur the expenses Ligot did because they did not maintain an office in Honolulu, lived with the managers during their visits and dined with them and got around by using their cars, etc.

Ligot enjoyed the confidence of his superiors in Manila. Both Cruz and Quezon were indebted to the HSPA, and also shared Ligot’s assumptions. "It is truly sad," replied Quezon to Ligot "to hear the unenlightened conduct among certain Filipino residents in Hawaii but I cannot hope otherwise for them, given their ignorance. For this reason, I applaud your idea of giving them constant fraternal advice to follow the right path and consequently, through your tact and experience, make them honorable men." Quezon’s full support of Ligot’s assumption and activities was characteristic of the illustrado’s perception of the peasants in the Philippines. The illustrados had emerged out of the middle class mestizo families who had profitted from the trade once the Suez canal opened, and they were on the forefront of nationalism and reform. But they were educated in Europe, many of them, and imbibed the same kind of class prejudice as the colonials whom they replaced, and so the illustrados assumed a patronizing role in their leadership of the peasantry—a belief that the lack of discipline, ignorance, unlettered status, the moral unpreparedness of the common people, led them to insist on reforms and discipline. Ligot was embarrassed at the refusal of the sakadas to accept the legalistic nature of the contract, a refusal which he attributed to their lack of education, in favor of what they considered justice through long service on the plantation as the basis for fulfilling the obligation of the free return passage.

It became obvious to Manlapit immediately that Ligot was working for the HSPA in derailing the Higher Wage Movement. In fact, Ligot planned a labor conference in order to draw the Filipinos’ loyalties away from
Manlapit. He asked each plantation manager to send two Filipinos and bear the expenses of these delegates to his conference set for November 15 to 17, 1923 at the Nuuanu YMCA. Butler, endorsing Ligot’s request, explained that the conference, similar to Varona’s earlier, aimed “to hold a kind of ‘get-together’ meeting in order to establish relations with Mr. Ligot and also to overcome the Manlapit idea of making demands upon us and agitating trouble.”

The plantations sent their Filipino welfare worker, interpreter, camp police, or minister. With Ligot directing the events, the group elected Pedro Victoria, a clerk at Aeia plantation, as president; Teodorico Samonte, an HEA welfare worker at Waipahu plantation as the secretary; and Pedro Racelis, the Protestant minister at Waialua, as sargeant at arms. When Manlapit and his cohorts tried to join the conference, Ligot and Victoria at once transformed the meeting into a a closed session.

Butler prepared the convention program and Ligot made sure that the delegates followed it. Things went awry every now and then, however. A committee charged to study the structure of plantation wages discovered that most of the plantations listed in the Manual of Hawaiian Securities paid very high dividends in 1923 (HACO paid 67%, Ewa plantation 30%, Oahu Sugar 30%, and Waimanalo 67%) and wished to demand wage increases on the plantatations. However, Ligot and the officers quickly stirred the attention of the delegates to the fact that some plantations supposedly incurred losses actually because of the 1920 strike, the weather and other factors. 

Despite Ligot’s opposition to demands for higher wages and the eight hour day, the delegates passed resolutions to raise wages from $1 to $1.25, to qualify for the bonus after completing 20 days of work instead of 23, and to increase the rest periods from 30 minutes to one hour each day. They also passed resolutions urging the plantations to hire more interpreters and Filipino nurses and to build more homes and clubhouses for Filipinos. 

At first Manlapit sought accommodation with Ligot. He asked Ligot in August 1923 to explain his stand on the Higher Wage Movement’s proposals or Ligot’s alternative plans, if any, and asked for a meeting. He carefully explained that he sought to avoid factional differences and petty jealousies among Filipinos, so he sought to work with Ligot. Ligot refused to meet with Manlapit. 

Manlapit to Ligot, August 7, 1923; Ligot to Manlapit, August 20, 1923, in Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, pp. 41-42

Ligot in all his reports to his Manila superiors discredited Manlapit as a racketeer, a self-proclaimed leader, a troublemaker for the plantations, and tool of the Japanese labor leader. At this time Ligot and Manlapit had become competitors in providing other services for or
representing the laborers for a fee: buying tickets for the mainland United States of the Philippines, getting the laborer’s pay from the plantation, getting the laborer reinstated by the plantation, help in securing jobs, getting compensation for accidents, getting a lump sum for returning to the Philippines, obtaining or depositing savings in banks, Japanese and Chinese stores, assistance in cashing checks or transmitting money to the Philippines, dealing with governmental agencies, seeking admission to hospitals, commutation of sentences, divorce decrees, legal decrees and others.

On October 23, 1923 the Higher Wage Movement drew up a list of charges against Ligot: that he sowed discord by smearing their leaders. That he accepted money from the HSPA, a charge which was based on an affidavit by Reverend Fajardo of the Filipino Mission and who, while working for the HSPA, witnessed Ligot receiving the money from Butler. &In another formal charge against Ligot filed with the Manila Bureau of Labor, Victoriano Dominques, an HSPA employee, swore in a notarized affidavit that on August 11, 1923 he witnessed Butler give Ligot a large check. Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, pp. 42-43& That Ligot failed to secure redress from plantation managers and so the Filipinos had to submit to further injustices. That Ligot created factional antagonism by pitting Ilocanos against Visayans. That Ligot accepted without question the information the HSPA furnished him.&Higher Wage Movement Petition, October 23, 1923, Quezonian Papers&

In a cover letter to the petition, Manlapit wrote labor director Cruz that Ligot conducted his office in an arbitrary, despotic manner and was incompetent in handling grievances. "I charge that Mr. Ligot has become the meek and subservient tool of the Hawaii Sugar Planters' Association, accepting without question the statement furnished him by their office while refusing to cooperate with those who have been fighting for the laborers for years."&Manlapit to H. Cruz, October 23, 1923, Quezonian Papers&

Ligot, meanwhile, continued to attack the High Wage Movement through his weekly paper, Ti Ling-et (Sweat), which later became Ti Silaw (The Light). Using the HSPA line, he warned that if Filipinos continued to agitate, the planters would simply bring in Chinese laborers and evict the Filipinos from homes and jobs.&Manlapit to Cruz, October 23, 1923, Quezonian Papers&

The Filipinos continued to demand the recall of Ligot. At a mass meeting in Aiea on January 10, 1924, 950 Filipino laborers signed a resolution demanding Ligot’s recall, and the resolution was sent to Governor General Woods, Quezon, and the press in Manila and Honolulu.&In Quezonian Papers& A Filipino detective in the Hilo police force, Rufino Luna, wrote of Quezon that "The Filipinos do not like him and do not even want to hear his name in any public meeting. Most of his time is devoted to favoring the planters and that he does not seem to be interested in any reports that the Filipinos make to him." Luna also accused Ligot of sending false reports to governor general Wood.&
Individual Filipinos themselves sent complaints about Ligot. A barely literate laborer sent a letter to Quezon, addressed as "Dear Sir In-Charge of Our Country, the Philippines," saying that he complained to Ligot about his house and kitchen badly in need of repairs, and got a response saying the laborer should be the one to fix it because the plantation had already incurred too much expenses as it were. & To Quezon, August 18, 1923, Quezonian Papers & The letter continued to complain about Ligot being entertained often by plantation officials, accompanied on his visits by them. It pointed out that since the arrival of Ligot the Filipino workers were worse off, because whereas before only the Hawaii business interests oppressed them, now it was also through Ligot that they were oppressed.

Manila labor leaders also attacked Ligot and demanded his recall, pointing out how poorly he performed his duties, emphasizing the negative qualities of the Filipino laborers and encouraging sectionalism. & Manila Times, October 15, 1923 & Manlapit also attacked him, accusing Ligot of incompetence, failing to obtain redress for the laborers, and promoting conflict among the Tagalogs, Visayans and Ilocanos. Manlapit also accused Ligot of accepting money from the HSPA, to which Ligot claimed that he had been forced to borrow money from Butler because his check had been misdirected and did not arrive on time. & Manila Sunday Times, October 14, 1923 & The HSPA meanwhile continued to support him. Butler pointed out to acting governor R.C. Brown that the opposition to Ligot was merely because of Manlapit, "a self-chosen and self-styled leader," that the U.S. Army's Intelligence Department kept track of Manlapit's activities, and that there was constant exchange of information between the HSPA Filipino department and the Hawaiian department of the army. & Butler to Acting Governor R.C. Brown, October 23, 1923, Farrington papers, AH & Butler also tried to repudiate Manlapit by pointing out that both Quezon and Osmenia had already been briefed on the HSPA's regard of Manlapit's character and that both in their addresses to the Hawaii Filipinos warned against Manlapit's activities, especially in the collection of funds. & Butler to Acting Governor R.C. Brown, October 23, 1923, Farrington papers, AH. The director of the Philippine Bureau of Labor, H. Cruz, received also the charges against Ligot by Hawaii labor leaders asking for Ligot's recall, and Cruz recommended that Ligot gave publicity to his answers to these charges. & Cruz to Ligot, October 25, 1923, in BIA 5999 & SEE NOTE ELSEWHERE WHEREBY WOOD REFUSED CRUZ' DEMAND TO HAVE LIGOT RECALLED.

After a year in office, Ligot wrote his report, which he pompously entitled "Authoritative Statement," to Governor General Leonard Wood. It contained data furnished by the HSPA on on wages and the turnout of Filipinos on the 42 plantations. Ligot deceitfully took credit for many changes implemented by the HSPA: the promotion of a handful of Filipinos to semi-skilled and skilled positions, the completion of some new homes, and the employment of a few Filipino hospital workers. He described an idyllic situation on the plantations: the wages were better than stipulated in the recruitment contracts; the managers were fair, strict and kind; housing and recreational facilities were good; the Filipinos were able to save money and only the spendthrifts, irresponsibles, and the vice-happy were unable to save. He cited no single instance of
CHAPTER 5

plantation deficiencies or problems but he had a list entitled "Filipino laborers' defects" which included the irregularity of their work turnout, their drifting from one plantation to another, their tendency to listen readily to bad leadership, etc.)

The day after he wrote his report, the Filipinos went on what was to be up to that time the longest strike in Hawaii.

THE HIGHER WAGE MOVEMENT RESUMES ITS WORK

Once it became evident that Ligot was more of an enemy than an advocate of better wages, the Manlapit's Higher Wage Movement resumed its activities immediately. In November, 1923 Manlapit visited plantations on the various islands in order to to secure laborer support. At the HSPA meeting a few days later, he presented the HWM's demand. When it was ignored, Manlapit decided to change tactics. Previously, he had dealt with the HSPA; as such, he had to deal with the sugar interests as a single entity. Furthermore, it was not a legally incorporated body so that any agreement it signed with the laborers would be void. Manlapit, therefore, decided to bypass the HSPA and from here on conduct a plantation to plantation negotiations. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 61& In its manifesto of January 16, 1924, HWM announced that it would ignore Ligot, whom it accused of corruption, misconduct and incompetence, and the HSPA, which it accused of engaging in in unlawful conspiracy in having no legal status. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 60&

The HWM being a movement rather than a formally organized union. In February 1924 Manlapit called delegates from all plantations to a meeting in Honolulu to choose the executive committee of the HWM and to delegate to it all decisions about the strike date and tactics. The delegates elected Manlapit, George Wright, Cecilio Basan, secretary, Patricio Belen, Prudencio Gabriel, Emigdio Milanio, and Pedro Valderama. This committee immediately met and proclaimed April 1 as the strike date, appealed to all nationalities to join the strike, but instructed outer island laborers to stay on the job. It also warned the laborers against breaking the law, and alerted them to framed up crimes, provocations by scabs and strikebreakers, traps set by stool pigeons, and acts like burning cane or beating up people by provocateurs to discredit the strike. &Manlapit, Filipinos Fight for Justice, p. 62. Strike proclamation is also in Governor's papers, AH&

Manlapit assured Sheriff David K. Trask that the Filipinos would observe the law and asked for police protection for Filipinos. &Advertiser, March 14, 1924&

Manlapit's plan was to gradually escalate the strike, starting on the weaker plantations where it would cause hardship and extending it to the outer islands until a settlement was reached. First Manlapit would call out the Filipinos on the Oahu plantations. If no negotiations took place with these plantations, he would call out more strikers on other Oahu plantations, and then the Filipinos on the outer islands.
On April 1, as planned, Manlapit called out the strike at Waipahu and Waialua and the following day, those at Kahuku joined as well. Sheriff Trask calculated the number of strikers at two thousand. Manlapit diligently informed Trask of all rallies, meetings and developments. &Advertiser, April 2, 5, 1924& Trask hired special police officers at HSPA expense, and hundreds of Hawaiians, attracted by an easy job which paid $5 a day plus board, lined up to apply. &Advertiser, March 30, April 4, 9, 1924& Kauai’s Sheriff Rice swore in 20 special police officers as well, even though there was no strike there; in fact it was the special policemen who went on strike in mid-April for being served merely two meals a day. &Advertiser, April 3, 14, 1924. These special policemen were carried upon the payrolls of the Sheriff’s office but their salary, uniform, food, and other expenses were repaid by the HSPA. R.A. Cooke, chairman, HSPA Strike Claims Committee, to Plantation Managers and Agencies, September 4, 1924, HACO& The plantations simply evicted the strikers. On the evening of April 7, Kahuku plantation manager Douglas E. Baldwin gave the strikers less than six hours notice to vacate, and then loaded their household goods on a special train which brought them at midnight to the Oahu Railway depot in Honolulu. &Advertiser, April 5, 8, 9, 1924&

Prevented by the Board of Health from establishing a tent city in Kalihi, Manlapit desperately renovated a deserted warehouse near Fort Shafter, and agreed to the board of Health’s order to to connect a sewer system, build lavatories, install sanitary cooking facilities, etc. &Advertiser, April 10, 1924& This was the home for the strikers for the next few months. The board of health inspectors regularly prodded Manlapit about the sanitary conditions of the camps and other things; the police came regularly to guard those it claimed has been merely intimidated and now wished to leave camp. As the strike dragged on by July, the overflow was directed to Watertown and into Korean tenements on Kukui street. &Advertiser, July 24, 2924& Pressures to close down the strikers’ camp, however, failed; except for the fact that more plumbing and toilets needed to be installed, the chief inspector of the board of health found the camp clean. &Advertiser, August 16, 1924&

April went by without any settlement so Manlapit called out the Filipinos at Ewa on May 1. The HSPA, which had increased its Filipino importation as early as the beginning of March in anticipation of the strike, simply sent incoming Filipinos to the four plantations, and so by June these plantations were able to resume their harvesting operations. On June 1 Manlapit was preparing to escalate the strike. He continued to hold mass meetings at Aala Park, sharing the platform with Chinese, Spanish, Japanese, Hawaiian, and Haole speakers &Advertiser, June 2, 1924& He went to the other islands, accompanied by speakers in Ilocano, Tagalog and Visayan languages, to inform the laborers about the strike and to raise funds. &Advertiser, June 9, 1924& He was on the big island on June 13 when he was arrested for the Baby Inayuda case.
The case had to do with Ang Bantay, the newspaper which edited and published to disseminate information about the strike. Previously, authorities tried to frame Manlapit twice. The first time was for violating a law which required newspapers to publish the place of publications, for which he was given merely a suspended sentence for 13 months when it was discovered that the two haole newspapers, the Advertiser and the Star Bulletin, were also guilty of the same violation and their publishers given the same suspended sentence. &Advertiser, May 13, 1924& The second time was to try him for criminal libel in the Baby Inayuda case.

The Baby Inayuda case concerned a claim by Ang Bantay that an infant child had died when denied medical care because the father was a striker. The newspaper claimed that Waipahu plantation manager Ernest W. Green and plantation doctor R. J. Marmod were to be blamed for the death of baby Inayuda, who was put out of the plantation hospital because Pantaleon Inayuda, was evicted early in April while his infant child was critically ill of pneumonia at Waipahu hospital. Inayuda had said he insisted on leaving the child at the hospital as it was too sick to be moved, but the plantation hospital authorities took the father, mother and baby to the railroad station at Waipahu and ordered to board the train for Honolulu. Shortly after going to Honolulu, the child died. The handout issued by the strikers said that a tiny baby critically ill with pneumonia at Waipahu hospital was evicted with its parents, and the Filipino community organized a funeral on Easter Sunday.&HSPA archives&

Waipahu plantation denied the charges and accused Manlapit of criminal libel. Manager Green testified in police court that Inayuda’s name was not on the eviction list and that his house was not entered by the plantation police. The plantation nurses said that the baby was not put out but was taken by the father from the hospital. The headnurse claimed that despite her warning of the baby likely to die if removed from the hospital, the mother took the baby away. However, Inayuda testified having told Marmod the baby was sick and asked to leave the child in the hospital, to which Marmod said: “You are not working at plantation, you have to take your child away.”&Advertiser, May 16, 1924&

Manlapit was arrested on the indictment of a territorial grand jury, with the industrialist Walter F. Dillingham, foreman, on the charge of subornation of perjury. The indictment claimed that Manlapit and Cecilio Basan, the HWM secretary, conspired on April 22, 1924 to induce Inayuda to falsely testify in police court that the plantation hospital officials had informed him to take away his baby because he was not working on the plantation. The grand jury claimed that Inayuda hired a car and drove to Honolulu on his own will, and that he had taken the baby away against advice of the plantation hospital authorities.&Star Bulletin, June 14, 1924& The jury also handed down a second indictment charging Basan, Manlapit, and two strike leaders, Patricio Belen, HWM treasurer and Valentin Camacho, leader of strike at Waipahu, with preventing the Oahu sugar firm from conducting its business and to impoverish it by damaging its mill, maliciously burning canefields,
assaulting Filipino employees and menacing and threatening them.

&Advertiser, June 15, 1924&

On the big island when the indictments were announced, Manlapit returned to Honolulu greeted by a thousand Filipinos and loaded with leis. The throng accompanied him to the police station where he was booked, bailed, and then released, and then borne him on their shoulders, to his office. The indictments merely made Manlapit a hero. &Star Bulletin, June 16, 1924&

Manlapit proceeded with his escalating strike plan. He called out the Filipinos on the big island on June 21, 1924, and two thousand Filipinos at Hawi plantation, Union Mill, Niulii and Halawa joined the strike. &Advertiser, June 22, 1924& In a month’s time, as more plantations were struck, thousands of Filipinos poured into Hilo, sleeping on the sidewalk, and piling a mountain of baggage on the sidewalk. They held noisy parades daily, but marched in silence at the funeral of an infant who had perished because of exposure. &Advertiser, August 4, 5, 1924& With 4000 strikers congregating in Hilo, the police docket showed no increase in crime and the strikers well behaved but the HSPA paid attorney H.E. Stafford to prosecute any striker arrested by the police and soon the Hilo police was arresting strikers for carrying anything which appeared to be a weapon in their possession. &Advertiser, August 7, 15, 1924& By the end of August, 80% of the big island Filipinos were on strike; the ones at work were the newly arrived Ilocanos. &Advertiser, August 23, 1924&

Manlapit next called out the Filipinos at Kekaha, Makaweli, Koloa and Lihue plantations on Kauai at the end of July and set up camps for them at Hanapepe, Koloa and Kapaa. &Advertiser, July 21, 1924& Disturbing incidents forbode bad happenings to come. At Hanapepe on August 17, Sheriff William H. Rice, feeling that he had to intimidate the strikers in order to earn their respect, surrounded the strikers with a force of fifty men. &Advertiser, August 4, 1924& At Kapaa on August 28, two Filipino employees of Makee Sugar Company were taken captive by the strikers, who claimed the two were sneaking around their building; the two claimed that they were on their way to Pueo camp along the government road when captured. One of them escaped and called the sheriff. During the rescue, a policeman stumbled in the dark and fired a shot, which led to the others shooting as well; fortunately no one was hurt. No arrest was made.&Advertiser, August 28, 1924& Sheriff William H. Rice prohibited Filipinos from holding meetings and threatened to arrest them for violating the 1919 law prohibiting criminal syndicalism, being defined as advocating crime, sabotage, violence or terrorism to accomplish industrial or political ends. The attorney general, John A. Matthewman, however, told Sheriff Rice that the Filipinos had the rights of assembly and free speech.&Advertiser, August 18, 1924&

Manlapit then went to Maui at the beginning of August for the next phase of the strike. The leaders there, J. Manalo, Manuel Castro, Marcelino Mirosal, Paulo Matanares and Pedro Villamore, had planned well the care and feeding of the strikers but were in jail during the strike, accused of the the riot and unlawful assembly and of holding a former
striker captive and threatening him bodily harm. The Maui leaders said the striker had offered no resistance, had been free to go, and took the car back to his camp. &Advertiser, August 23, 1924&

Manlapit’s strategy of increasing the pressure gradually, of calling out on a staggered increasing basis the strikers on the different islands, worked well. The HSPA had never dealt with such a strike before. It had been able to confine previous strikes to a single plantation or to a few on Oahu. It had been able to effectively undermine the strikers’ organization; in this instance, the HWM had no organization nor tight coordination on the plantation level. Its anti-picketing law was not effective because the workers did not establish any pickets; they simply stayed away. It had been able to neutralize leaders before, but despite the arrest of leaders, the strike went on. In fact, many times the strikers did not even know who the leaders were; in some cases, there were no leaders, merely individuals collecting donations and distributing aid to the strikers. The strike leaders, as on Kauai, required the mobility to go from plantation to plantation to organize and collect donations; Isidro Baring, who made a living ferrying people in his car, had that mobility, and so he became identified as a coordinator of the strike. The HSPA attacked people like him as outside agitators; there was no way the strike could have been coordinated from the plantation camps, except by the plantation priests and ministers, nurses, camp policemen, interpreters and social workers who were coopted and antagonistic to the strikers.

THE HSPA STAND

A.W.T. Bottomley, the HSPA president, released a statement defining the planters’ position. First, he argued that the Filipinos had no cause to strike because they were better off in Hawaii. In the Philippines work was seasonal, and the laborer was employed at planting and harvesting merely a total of 170 days and then discharged. His total income amounted to $42.50 in cash and $21.25 in rice, out of which he still had to pay the capataz, the agent who recruited them, a commission of $8.50. Bottomley brought out the fact that the Philippine sugar plantations paid a turnover bonus of merely $5 for completing 150 days of work, or $10 for 170 days, and did not provide the facilities found on the Hawaii plantations. &A.W.T. Bottomley, Statement on the 1924 Strike, Advertiser, November 12, 1924& Laborers in Hawaii earned more than the average farm laborer in the United States. The demand, which was twice the present rate, would double the labor cost of the plantations. The pay and benefits of year round employment in Hawaii, on the other hand, the best in the world for any agricultural laborer, enabled the Filipinos to buy not simply necessities but also luxuries such as watches, suitcases, shoes, good clothes, and automobiles, as well as accumulate some savings. &A.W.T. Bottomley, Statement on the 1924 Strike, Advertiser, November 13, 1924&

Bottomley also said that the Filipinos had to cause to strike because the laborers in general were treated fairly on the plantations; this fair treatment showed in the way not all the nationalities struck and not all the plantations were struck. The strike was called by outside
agitators, who coerced laborers to join them. The High Wage Movement, said Bottomley, had no members, no rules, no by laws, and consisted merely of self appointed leaders.

Manlapit rebutted Bottomley’s claim, citing official US government figures to show that Hawaii’s wages were, in fact, lower than mainland farm wages. He said the strike was not forced on workers by agitators but by the arrogance of the HSPA in not listening to the economic plight of the laborers. Two research reports made public by the National Industrial Conference board measuring real earnings and cost of living supported the strikers’ position; they showed that in July 1923 the cost of living had risen 61.7% since 1914 and while nationwide real earnings in the same period rose 35 to 40%, plantation wages remained the same. Manlapit pointed out that the ones suffering the most were the day laborers, who in the main were Filipinos; thus this became a Filipino strike because the other nationalities were given better jobs and higher pay.

Other voices took up a stronger line of attack for the HSPA. Governor Wallace R. Farrington was convinced by the HSPA that there was an organized program (threats, violence, persecution, backed by knives and revolvers) by the strikeleaders to prevent laborers from returning to work so he directed the attorney general to exercise strict control. He saw the strike as an attempt by the leaders to take over and "to establish a government of their own." The Star Bulletin portrayed Manlapit as part of a Communist conspiracy to create anarchy in Hawaii; thus it portrayed the strike as a battle between law abiding Americanism on the one hand, and "criminal labor conspiracy, communist agitation and anarchistic propaganda" on the other.

In general the haole press ignored the strike and treated it as a non-event. The strike was hardly covered by the newspapers, and Governor Farrington at a cabinet meeting pleaded for more publicity on the Filipino strike situation. He also disapproved the hiring of attorney Harold E. Stafford as special counsel for the HSPA acting as deputy of County attorney Beers on the big island. Also the governor and cabinet members criticized Hawaii county police for "the apparent indisposition of the police of that county to do much else than play politics." But all this was in secret and revealed by Attorney General John A. Matthewman to the press, after which Farrington barred Matthewman from further cabinet meetings about the strike.

The HSPA responded to the strike the way it did in previous strikes. It identified the agitators and instructed the plantations not to employ them. If the plantations needed men, however, Butler allowed them to employ strikers without prejudice based on his assumption that they had been merely influenced by fear or persecution by the leaders.
1924, HACO& As in previous strike the employment of such tactics as framing charges against leaders, using spies and stool pigeons, police raid on striker camps, use of agent provocateurs urging the strikers to violence, sabotage and destruction, board of health persecutions, in strictly interpreting the sanitary code, strike supporters watched by police and dismissed if caught donating food or money solicited for the strikers.

As in the past strikes, the HSPA employed all means to break up the strike. As early as a month before it began, the HSPA had already increased the shipment of Filipinos to Hawaii, and during the strike Butler arranged for additional space on boats from the Orient. &Amfac to Grove Farm, March 3, 1924, GFA; R.A. Cooke to Campsie, May 19, 1924, HACO& The HSPA also tried to prevent any solidarity or assistance between the Filipinos and other nationalities, especially the Japanese. It sent the Reverend Take Okamura to the plantations "to offset propaganda" of the HWM. &Alvah Scott to Campsie, July 6, 1923, HACO In his meetings with the Japanese laborers, Okamura advised them to practice "capital-labor cooperation," and deny support to the Filipinos. &Amfac to Grove Farm, March 10, 1924, enclosing memo from JK Butler, HSPA sec. regarding Rev. Okamura's survey. GFA& When the Japanese language press solicited contributions and sympathy for the Filipinos, the Advertiser accused them of being actually behind the strike in order to destroy the Filipinos and benefit the Japanese. &Advertiser, editorial, May 19, 1924& The English press also spread the rumor of recruiting Puerto Ricans and importing Chinese laborers. &Star Bulletin, June 18, 1924&

The HSPA also had the support of police powers to counteract the strike. All the the counties hired special policemen at HSPA expense and sent to the plantation camps. &Butler, HSPA Secretary, to All Plantations, December 3, 1924, HACO& In Honolulu, the sheriff maintained a special force to keep track of the strike leaders. Detective Juan Oxiles was in charge of spying on the activities of the strikers. He had a checkered background, having been convicted in the Philippines of a serious statutory offense and sentenced to a long prison term, though pardoned by the Philippine governor general. &Advertiser, December 3, 1925. In Hawaii, Oxiles continued to transgress the law. In 1925 he was indicted of perjury for having threatened to arrest Alfred E. Ocampo, an interpreter in circuit court and was a brother in law of Manlapit, if he visited the Filipino camp at Iwilei; Sheriff Trask, declaring he "would not believe any Filipino under oath," refused a recommendation to suspend Oxiles for a month for using wrongfully his police powers but the civil service commission took action and suspended him. Advertiser, July 7, December 11, 1925& Oxiles again later arrested Ocampo for being present at a gambling game and held him incommunicado at the city police station until the federal magistrate heard about the occurrence and obtained Ocampo's release; the district magistrate found Ocampo innocent of the charge. Advertiser, December 3, 1925 In another case, in which a jury acquitted Juan Oxiles of perjury, former attorney general John Albert Matthewman accused the attorney general's office of hampering the the persecution of Oxiles and preventing Matthewman from calling witnesses about Oxiles' bad reputation. John Albert Matthewman to Charles B. Dwight, deputy attorney general, in Advertiser, December 8, 1925. A few days after his acquittal, Oxiles was convicted for tampering with a
government witness in his court trial; the attorney general’s office also filed additional criminal charges against him, including the attempt to commit subornation of perjury. Advertiser, December 22, 1925.

Sheriff Trask, giving as a reason for disallowing any mass meeting at Aala park the possibility of a riot because of intense conflict between the strikers and the leaders, and yet contradicted himself the next day by stating that Manlapit and his leaders were fully supported by the strikers. &Advertiser, July 28, August 3, 1924& After three weeks, Trask again allowed the Filipinos to hold meetings.

The HSPA made full use of Ligot in order to attack Manlapit and the Higher Wage Movement. In April, 1924, Ligot reported to Wood the falsehood that Manlapit was directly connected with the Japanese leaders, and that Manlapit was merely a self-appointed leader and had asked for $50,000 from the HSPA to stop the strike. &Manila Times, April 24, 1924, HSPA Archives clipping& Ligot’s attack was most vicious in Ti Silaw, a weekly with Tagalog, Ilocano and Visayan sections, published by Ligot and sent to the plantation laborers by the HSPA. The April 19th 1924 issue was solely devoted to crude, ad hominem attack on Manlapit with drawings and satirical poems. It portrayed the labor leader as one who lined his pocket with the laborer’s contributions, called him Judas Escariot, and ridiculed his promise that a ship would come to take Filipinos back to the Philippines. A crude drawing showed Manlapit at his regular weekly meetings now able to collect merely a few pennies for the strike and Ti Silaw captioned it: "Pity Amboy, nothing with which to buy chopsuey or pay for foolish things." &Enclosed in Butler, to all Plantation Managers, April 23, 1924, HACO&

Wherever Manlapit went, Ligot preceded him, extracting the Filipinos’ promise not to give money to Manlapit and not to join if called to strike. At the beginning of the strike, the Ilocanos and the Tagalogs, and Visayans went out together. Ligot appealed to the Ilocanos to prevent the strike, &Advertiser, April 3, 1924& As an alternative to the HWM, Ligot organized the Hawaii Philippines Labor Association, got the delegates from the various plantations to pledge their support to him and decline to contribute to the strike, and with the president, the HEA mission’s Reverend Santa Ana an treasurer Jose Alba went to the plantations to counteract Manlapit. &Advertiser, June 14, 1924& Sheriff Trask arranged a meeting between Ligot and the strike leaders in order to get the strikers to recognize Ligot as the official head in Hawaii; it failed.&Advertiser, June 11, 1924& Ligot also sought to divide the Ilocanos and the Visayans, telling the Ilocanos not to back up the strike. The Ilocanos were newly arrived, hungry and eager to work; the Visayans now aspired for more things, having been on the plantations longer. On the plantations, the ministers also had much influence in trying to break the strikes. And Ligot had the backing of the ministers. On Kauai, Catalino Cortezan talked the strikers into returning to work.&Charlies Fern interview, ESOHP, p. 518&
CHAPTER 5

THE HANAPEPE MASSACRE

The strike on Kauai, called by Manlapit on the last week of July, was the least effective among the various islands. By the end of that month, 600 strikers were out at Lihue, Koloa, Makee and Hawaiian Sugar Company but the plantations kept operating because newly arrived Ilcoanos were assigned to field work while the Japanese were in harvesting and field work. The few strikers had the sympathy of the Japanese, who contributed food and money. &Fern interview, ESOHP, p. 520& The biggest strikers' camp was at Hanapepe, the two hundred strikers living at the rented Japanese language school or in temporary structures on the beach with merely an iron roof over their heads; most lived by fishing. Hanapepe, the freest town on Kauai, had independent stores and property owners, no plantation.

Kauai also continued to have disturbing incidents. At the start of September, the strikers at the Kapaa Hee Fat Strike camp caught two Filipinos trying to burn down the rice mill; the agent provocateurs were turned over to the police, who did not persecute them. &ESOHP, II, pp. 65-67&

On September 9 (?) the strikers caught two Ilocanos, Marcelo Lusiano and Alipio Ramel on bicycle into Hanapepe and held them at the Japanese language school camp. It was unclear how deputy sheriff William Olin Crowell found out but he and a policeman went to get the Ilocanos released. When the Ilocanos refused to go with Crowell, Crowell claimed the two had been intimidated. The next morning, invoking a little known law that allowed Ilocanos to be arrested for their own protection, Crowell returned to the strike camp with the arrest warrant. &ESOHP, II, p. 449& He accompanied by a larger force of Hawaiian cowboys and hunters deputized as special policemen, and Crowell deployed them up on a hill overlooking the road and the camp. The strikers reluctantly released the Ilocanos, and as Crowell led them out, on the public highway, to the car about 500 yards away from the strikers' camp at 11:15 a.m. the strikers followed closely and pressed around Crowell and the Ilocanos, arguing with Crowell.

It was unclear who fired the first shot but in the heat of the situation, the police up on the hill opened fire. The strikers dispersed, ran into a short height banana patch (the Brodie banana patch) and were trapped by the barb wire enclosing the patch. Nobody could go through the barb wire, so the cowboy policemen from the hill just picked the Filipinos out on target when they tried to scale the fence. &Eyewitness account, ESOHP, p. 594& The special police were told not to use the steel pointed bullets but the lead tip flat bullet. &ESOHP, II, p. 744& The police continued sniping and shooting. Lindsay Faye, the manager at Waimea Sugar Company arrived at the scene at around 2:30 p.m., more than three hours after the shooting started, he found the policemen up the hill were still taking pot shots at strikers hiding behind the banana trees; only the police were shooting, and Fay called it a slaughter. Whenever the policemen saw anybody moving in the banana patch they took pot shots. &ESOHP, pp. 469-472& Most Filipinos had knives; The Filipinos had but a few pistols... &ESOHP, II, p. 273&
When the shooting stopped, 16 Filipinos were dead, mostly shot in the back as they tried to flee, according to Reverend Jacinto Runes, who helped examine the bodies. &ESOHP, II, p. 273& Four other Hawaiian special deputies were also dead. Twenty five, including two officers, were wounded. &Advertiser, September 10, 11, 1924. The Advertiser accounts came from Fern, who in turn received the information from the plantations. Fern interview, ESOHP, pp. 529, 534-35.& The police bulldozed a ditch at Hanapepe and dumped the Filipino bodies there.&Advertiser, September 10, 1924; ESHOP, pp. 270-271&

The police rounded up the strikers and packed 133 of them in two cells at the Lihue county jail in Nawiliwili. They included known leaders of the Kauai strike who were not at the Hanapepe shooting. The HSPA sent lawyers from the firm of A.G.M. Robertson, AmFac's lawyers, as special prosecutors to assist Philip Rice and Kauai county attorney Abraham Kaulukou in prosecuting the case. &ESOHP, I, pp. 145-146& 76 were indicted for rioting. &The statutes on unlawful assembly and riot declared unlawful the assembly of three or more persons with disturbance, violence, striking terror, menacing act or language. A three man federal court declared this unconstitutional, overruling the territorial supreme court, in the ILWU vs Walter D. Ackerman, Jr. case, and the decision criticized the application of this statute in the 1924 strike, and the fact that the territorial government allowed the HSPA to pay the special prosecutors, in effect making the Big Five the court, judge and jury. In 1929 the prison term for violating the unlawful assembly and riot act of Hawaii was raised from 5 years to 20 years, the sentences of the convicted strikers had just expired and the legislature feared that upon returning to Kauai some labor trouble might ensue.& 47 pleaded guilty to assault and battery, released on 13 months suspended sentence. Four of the 76 indicted pleaded guilty but the rest did not. At the trial at Lihue, two defendants were sentenced to 4 years 11 months for rioting, another 58 to four years, and 16 were acquitted. Two years later, the sentences of 48 Filipinos were commuted when they agreed to leave the islands, never to return.&Advertiser, June 3, 1926& Nobody knew what happened to the two Ilocanos, Marcelo Lusiano and Alipio Ramel who were closely guarded by the police and used to identify the leaders and instigators of the riot.

Many questions remained unanswered about the incident. Why did the strikers grab the two Ilocanos? Conflicting versions of the incident existed, according to who told the story. The two Ilocanos claimed they went to Hanapepe to buy shoes and stockings, and while on the way back, they had been captured and taken to the strikers' camp, punched on the head and stomach. &Advertiser, September 12, 1924& The strikers claim that the two provoked the strikers since early in the morning by riding back and forth in front of the camp. &ESOHP, p. 792& Another eyewitness claimed that that the Visayan guard at the strike camp hailed the two passing Ilocanos, asked for some tobacco and then grabbed the two and dragged them into the camp.&ESOHP, p. 827& Did Crowell, who was reputedly an intimidating man with a temper, strict, feared even by his own
officers, provoke the incident? &ESOHP, I, pp. 138-39, 147 & Was he high handed, in going into the camp and demanding the two Ilocanos' release, leading them out while his special police aimed rifles at the strikers, as an eyewitness claimed? &ESOHP, II, pp. 376-77

Immediately, the planters blamed Manlapit for the incident. &R.A. Cooke to James Campsie, September 12, 1924, HACO; AWT Bottomley, A Statement Concerning the Sugar Industry in Hawaii, HSPA, November 1924, p. 38. & Governor Farrington wrote Philippine Governor General Leonard Wood blaming the "riot" to agitators like Manlapit who, by urging the strikers repeatedly to refrain from violence actually turned their thoughts in that direction. &Farrington to Wood, September 17, 1924, AH & Ligot did likewise, and added that the Hawaii authorities were carefully protecting Filipinos’ rights; in reply, Wood asked Ligot to "continue cooperation with Hawaiian authority in the establishment of order, respect for the constituted authorities and the best interest of workers." &Advertiser, September 12, 1924; "Ligot to his Fellow Countrymen," Circular, September 15, 1924, HSPA Archives &

Wood squashed an appeal by the Hawaii Filipinos to the Philippine legislature to investigate the strike situation, and instead asked Governor Farrington to appoint a commission and to send a full report to Wood. Farrington did not act on Wood’s request. &McIntyre, BIA chief to Secretary of War, September 16, 1924, BIA 5999 & Wood was satisfied merely with Farrington’s word that the situation in Hawaii was under control, that the riot was due to Manlapit’s radical actions, and that Ligot was doing his job well. &Wood to BIA, Cable, September 15, 1924, BIA 5999 & Quezon also supported the non-intervention of the Philippine legislature. &Quezon to General Frank McIntyre, chief, BIA, September 20, 1924, BIA 5999 &

Ligot issued a manifesto on the Hanapepe massacre and the HSPA printed 5000 copies for distribution in the strike camps. &Butler to Plantation Managers and Agencies, September 25, 1924, HACO & The manifesto denounced the strike and blamed Manlapit for the dead Filipinos "who fought against the Government on Kauai." It urged the Filipinos to return to work quickly: "I call upon you all to disband as strikers, go back to work wherever you may find it, and to work faithfully in restoring the good name of Filipinos in Hawaii." &"Ligot to his Fellow Countrymen," Circular, September 15, 1924, HSPA Archives &

The Hanapepe Massacre merely strengthened the Filipino resolve, and so the planters added pressure, this time by legal action against the strike leaders. Immediately after the massacre, HSPA secretary John K. Matthewman met with Governor Farrington and attorney general John A. Matthewman on how to deal with the strikers. As a result of that meeting, Farrington ordered Matthewman to prosecute the strikers vigorously. &Advertiser, September 13, 1924 & Matthewman appointed special attorneys, paid by and under employment contract with the HSPA, on all the islands to persecute the strikes and their leaders.
On the big island he appointed Seba C. Huber, former district attorney of Kauai, who filled the court dockets in Hilo with charges of picketing, carrying weapon, interfering with labor going to work, trespassing (being in the striker camps), and vagrancy in order to harass the strikers. &Advertiser, September 13, 16, 20, 1924& Most of these cases, however, were dropped for lack of sufficient evidence.&Advertiser, September 26, 1924& Huber was tougher in prosecuting the leaders for either criminal syndicalism or violating the anti-picketing ordinance passed by the territorial legislature in 1923. Hugo Ritaga, the strike leader on the big island was charged with picketing but the drawn out trial ended with the jury failing to reach a verdict. &Advertiser, September 26, 1924& Four others charged with criminal syndicalism, E. Melanio, M. Marinas, B. Javier, and F. Raymundo, were acquitted after the jury met for less than an hour, and the HSPA lost what it considered one of the most important strike cases.&Advertiser, September 27, 1924&

On Maui less than half a dozen of the many cases instituted by special attorney H.E. Stafford against the Filipino strikers ended in convictions in the circuit courts. &Advertiser, September 28, 1924&

On Kauai, former judge Alexander G.M. Robertson’s major task was evicting the strikers from their makeshift camps. &Advertiser, September 13, 1924& Three hundred strikers, mostly Visayans, camped on a Kapaa government lot and went fishing for sustenance; this fact was reported by the Advertiser as an outright challenge and defiance of government authority. &Advertiser, November 23, 1924& The newspaper prodded Robertson and the board of health to act, and advocated jailing the whole lot and making them work 10 hours a day at hard labor as the only solution which would not make the territory ridiculous. &Advertiser, December 9, 1924& The strikers defied orders to vacate and Matthewman ordered their eviction of the Kapaa strikers camp, but the strikers had nowhere to go and the HSPA did not want them. At end of December Manlapit asked property owners to lease a site for the strike camp but everyone he approached was of the plantation interests. &Advertiser, December 22, 1924&

In Honolulu, the persecution of Manlapit and the other leaders continued. Two weeks after the Hanapepe massacre, Manlapit and Cecilio Basan were tried for subornation of perjury, conspiring to induce Pantaleon Inayuda to testify that Waipahu plantation authorities had ejected his sick child. At the trial the HSPA detectives who shadowed Manlapit denied that the Filipino leader was anywhere near Enayuda on the day in question. Nonetheless the jury returned a guilty verdict in less than half an hour. &Advertiser, September 28, October 12, 1924&

Supporters of the Filipino leaders were outraged. Hawaii Hochi editor Fred Makino charged that Manlapit was indicted by a "millionaire grand jury" in an atmosphere of hostility, race prejudice and hatred. He wrote that everyone had expected an acquittal because the testimony against Manlapit was discredited by competent witnesses and the whole case seemed a frameup. &Fred K. Makino to Manuel L. Quezon, November 16, 1925, Quezonian Papers.& The witnesses against Manlapit, including
Pantaleon Inayuda himself, were hurried out of the territory after their testimony but Manlapit's father was able to secure an affidavit from Inayuda, the chief witness for the prosecutor, to admit he had been paid by the HSPA for the testimony. Inayuda also identified seven other witnesses as having been paid $10, given a free trip to the Philippines, and paid $100 upon arrival in Manila for testifying against Manlapit. Despite these affidavits, judge James J. Banks denied the motion for a new trial. &Fred K. Makino to Manuel L. Quezon, November 16, 1925, Quezonian Papers.& "Pablo Manlapit is an innocent man," declared Makino, "who has been deliberately railroaded to prison on framed up evidence and perjured testimony." &Fred K. Makino to Manuel L. Quezon, November 16, 1925, Quezonian Papers. & Judge Banks sentenced Manlapit and Basan to two years to four years at hard labor at Oahu penitentiary. Basan, who did not plan to appeal, began serving his sentence right away. Manlapit lost his appeal. The territorial supreme court in a unanimous decision turned down Manlapit’s appeal because his bill of exception was filed a day too late and also dismissed as without merit Manlapit’s claim for a new trial, so Manlapit began serving his sentence in mid-1925. &Advertiser, May 30, 1925& The Advertiser rejoiced that Manlapit ended up in jail, and deserved to remain there as a revenge, and even the jail term wouldn’t repair the disruption and damages he caused during the strike. &Advertiser, editorial, May 5, 1925& His appeal for a pardon from governor Farrington for a pardon in November was ignored. &Advertiser, November 14, 1925& Basan’s arrest in another case in which he was not originally a defendant came as a surprise. The grand jury secretly indicted him and Gregorio de la Cruz for malicious burning in a July Ewa plantation cane fire. A third Filipino, Esteban Fernandez, turned state’s evidence, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, and got off lightly with a sentence of 13 months. &Advertiser, September 15, 23, 1924& But Basan was sentenced to hard labor for 3 to 5 years and de la Cruz for 5 years. They dropped their appeal to the supreme court and, as rumor had it, were pardoned and conveniently returned to the Philippines after serving several months of their sentence. &Advertiser, January 29, 1925& One aspect of the case infuriated attorney general Matthewman: when he was arrested, de la Cruz was held 54 days in the county jail without charge while chief of detective John R. Kellett searched for a witness against de la Cruz. The limit to hold a person without charge was merely 48 hours, and Matthewman called the jailing "the most astounding violation of the guarantee of personal freedom pledged by the Constitution that I have come across in months." &Advertiser, August 26, 1924& He threatened to prosecute Kellett and Sheriff David K. Trask for maliciously imprisoning de la Cruz but did not carry out the threat. &Advertiser, August 20, 1924& Basan was also charged, along with leaders Patricio Belen and Ciriaco Borja in a plot to plant dynamites at the homes of Ligot and other HSPA officials; although city and county attorney William Heen relentlessly pursued the case, it was dismissed for lack of evidence. &Advertiser, July 23, 24, 1924&
The strikes on the various plantations continued despite the persecution of the leaders. It had the strongest support on the big island under the leadership of Hugo Ritaga, who went to the various plantations to call out the Filipinos to strike. &Campsie to C. Brewer, October 15, 1924, HACO& The results of his efforts was evident at HACO, as a specific example. Ritaga called out the Hamakua coast plantations, including HACO, to go on strike in mid-October. He and another strike leader, E. Milanio, held a meeting there, and as a result only 12 Filipinos reported for work the following morning. &Cooke to Campsie, October 17, 20, 1924, HACO; Campsie to C. Brewer, October 22, 1924, HACO& The plantation evicted the strikers and those who sympathized with them, 417 men in all, and trucked them to Hilo. &Campsie to C. Brewer, October 25, 1924 HACO& Upon completing that task, the plantation loaned its truck for the same purpose to its neighbor, Hutchinson Sugar. &Campsie to C. Brewer, October 22, 1924, HACO&

The strike at HACO did not disrupt the harvesting operations; the HSPA simply sent 210 newly arrived Filipinos at the end of October and 183 more after a few days. &Cooke to Campsie, November 7, 1924, HACO& But to the planters it was frustrating as the strike continued to drag toward the end of the year. It was also frustrating because Ritaga and the other strike leaders, rather than the plantations, were in full control. &R.A. Cooke to Campsie, September 19, 1924, HACO& "It seems that no matter how Filipinos are treated," C. Brewer's R.A. Cooke wrote in anger when Ritaga called out more plantations to the strike, "if the agitators order a strike at least some of them will walk out." &R.A. Cooke to Campsie, October 20, 1924, HACO&

In November the plantation trucks still arrived in Hilo daily with their full load of strikers, and the rumor was in the air for further strikes. &Advertiser, October 26, 1924& The HSPA kept track developments there by maintaining an office, staffed with Filipinos like the Reverend Victorino (CHECK THIS FIRST NAME) Fajardo, to conduct surveillance on the activities of Ritaga and the other leaders and by relying on the Hawaiian department of the Army intelligence report to Governor Farrington. &Butler to Plantation managers in Hawaii, November 21, 1924, HACO; W.A. Andersen, Major, 298th Infantry, to Farrington, September 19, 1924, Farrington Papers, AH& There were 23 strike camps in Hilo, housing 3000 strikers, but these soon filled to capacity and so the sidewalks were jammed with the strikers and their baggage, beds, trunks, oil stoves and other possessions. Prodded by the Advertiser, which called the strikers "a living disgrace to Hilo," Hilo residents turned against the strikers; the Hilo Women's Club urged that the squatters and vagrants be run out of town, and protested the many indigent patients among the Filipino strikers treated at the county hospital. &Advertiser, December 8, 1924&

At the end of November, four months after the strike began on the big island, the situation remained unchanged, with all but four stricken plantations having evicted the strikers. But the plantations were well supplied with fresh importation from the Philippines and when the December grinding season began the plantations were operating normally. Because of that, by the first week of December many plantations had
disbanded the special police force and relied mainly on their regular camp policemen for security and surveillance. This was the case at HACO. On December 10, only 37 of its strikers had returned to work and its Filipino laborers had arrived from the Philippines in the past two months. &Campsie to C. Brewer, December 10, 1924, HACO&

Despite the resumption of plantation operations the strikers continued to stay out rather than seek to return to the plantations. Manlapit held one meeting after another to encourage the strikers and energize the strike. &1924 Strike Circular, HSPA Archives& In many localities, walkouts occurred spontaneously, caused by discontent with plantation conditions. Rumors of a general strike cropped up regularly. &Advertiser, November 30, 1924& Ligot continued to serve the plantations well. Although none showed up at the meeting he called on Kauai right after the Hanapepe massacre and the strikers in general had repudiated him, he continued to visit all the islands to urge the Filipinos to end the strike. &William Henry Rice to Farrington, September 20, 1924, Farrington Papers, AH; Horace Johnson to Campsie, December 6, 1924, HACO& He remained useful to Butler, who asked him to counteract Manlapit's plans to collect donations and rally the Filipinos at the various Rizal day celebrations. &Butler to All Plantations, November 1, 1924, HACO&

As 1925 began, it seemed to the planters that the strike was all finished but Manlapit made bold moves to focus attention on the strike. On January 11, 2000 Filipinos marched at Aala Park to present an ultimatum giving the planters until January 20 to accede to the demand of wages at $2 a day. Unless they did, the Higher Wage Movement would call a general strike of all the 17,000 laborers in Hawaii. &Advertiser, January 13, 1925; Cooke to Campsie, January 17, 1925, HACO& This was followed by 1500 strikers in Hilo marching on the 20th and the 21st, which resulted in the walkout by the laborers at Hilo Sugar Company and Olaa Sugar Company to walk out.

This incident showed that the strike had not been broken yet. Governor Farrington placed the national guard on alert and the Hawaii county attorney ordered the police to stop any further parades and assembly. &Advertiser, January 21, 22, 1925& Manlapit did not call out a general strike as he threatened but he went to the plantations and remained successful in calling out strikes. At Lahaina, Maui, after telling the laborers about new reports showing that the sugar companies earned high profits and paid very low bonuses while rice was at a record high $8 a bag, Manlapit called a strike for February 2 and 600 Filipinos at Puunene heeded him; they were evicted and replaced by incoming Filipinos. &Advertiser, January 29, February 1, 3, 7, 1925&

In March the strike had lasted a year and about a thousand Filipinos, half-starved, continued to hold out at beaches, vacant lots, and government lands. The board of health and community groups pressured to evict them, and to bring them to court for petty crimes. &Star Bulletin, February 3, February 20, 1925& By the beginning of May, only a few strikers' camps remained. The most visible was the camp on government land at Kapaa, Kauai, occupied by 250 strikers. The camp, consisting of
make-shift structures of burlap, canvas, wood and tin cans in an area less than two acres, was now merely a symbol of the resistance to plantation control. The new attorney general, William B. Lymer, formerly a special prosecutor paid by the HSPA, personally led the raid on the camp, arrested 77 Filipinos, burned the shacks. He arrested 77 Filipinos for violating a new law making it a criminal offense to trespass on cultivated or improved land; the strikers were sentenced to ten days in jail, and five leaders were given passage to leave Hawaii &Advertiser, May 16, 17, 1925&

**THE STRIKE CONSEQUENCE**

The strike was the longest strike ever in Hawaii and the most widespread, involving 24 of the 45 plantations.

The strike assessment was at $2.3759926 per ton multiplied by the total tonnage in 1924.&Amfac to Grove Farm, January 19, 1925& The plantations which were not struck suffered more from the shortage of labor than those who were struck, because the unstruck plantations had men leaving for mainland, the Philippines, or other kinds of jobs and they were not replaced, whereas the struck plantations received a steady stream of incoming Filipinos. The incoming Filipinos were sent to the struck plantations so the other plantations' orders could not be filled.&AmFac to Grove Farm, July 17, 1924& Hence, unlike in the 1920 strike, all the plantations suffered from losses, and the HSPA Strike Claims Committee recommended to the trustees to pay the losses, and the trustees accepted the recommendation.&Butler, HSPA Secretary, to All Plantations, December 3, 1924, HACO&

The strike led to the very dramatic increase in the number of Filipinos in Hawaii. For the year ending June 30, 1924, there arrived 5915 Filipinos to Hawaii, and for the next fiscal year there arrived 10,509 or almost double. In contrast, for 1925 there left 4179 Filipinos, 3344 to the Philippines and only 835 to the mainland. &Advertiser, July 28, 1925&. Discuss this in the importation of Filipinos to replace the strikers.

The dismissed strikers lost their right to return passage. In fact it penalized many, because according to the HSPA trustees policy, if the Filipinos left the plantation, despite the warning that they would be considered strikers, the Filipinos were considered to have broken the contract and were not entitled to free transportation to the Philippines.&HSPA to Grove Farm, June 22, 1927, GFA& The HSPA kept track of these Filipinos who went on strike, maintaining a blacklist. This was the case of a laborer at Grove Farm "perhaps this man was placed on he blacklist the same as some of the other men whom were called strikers merely because they happened to shift from one plantation to another."&Groove Farm to HSPA Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 21, 1929&

The Filipinos did not receive assistance from any organized labor groups in Hawaii. Labor organizing in Hawaii declined further, so that by 1929, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in its Report, noted that labor organizations in Hawaii "are few in number, small in membership, and,
with the exception of the barbers' union, have no agreements with the employers." Most of these were in the trades—the machinists, molders, boiler makers, machine shops, carpenters, plasterers, plumbers and others.\textsuperscript{117}

The trespass act was passed. The trespass law was passed and approved by the governor on April 18, 1925 and Butler explained to the managers in notifying them of this act: "You will notice that provisions of this Act will enable you to better protect property against trespass by unauthorized persons and may be of immediate interest in case of inroads upon camps by agitators and others intending to disturb your labor."\textsuperscript{117} The trespass act made it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine or three month imprisonment or both, anyone who entered improved or cultivated land if forbidden to do so directly or by posted notice. The act made the plantation police work much easier from then on, and the ones at Ewa patrolled day and night the camp, keeping careful watch over who came and went, kept out salesmen, labor agitators, political candidates not supported by plantations, and labor control.\textsuperscript{117} It was voided only in 1936 in Hilo Circuit Court case bought up by a salesman and court said the employee had the right to purchase from whomever he pleased, and may invite salesmen to his home and sellers had a right to enter.\textsuperscript{117}