CHAP 4
THE 1920 STRIKE
ADVERTISER COMPETITION, LABOR PROBLEM IN HAWAII, MARCH 24, 1919

The Advertiser held an essay competition in 1919 about the solution to the labor problem in Hawaii. Fifteen articles were picked out for recognition by the newspaper. All the essays pointed to the need to improve plantation conditions. Many suggested shortening the work day, improving the plantation housing, sanitation facilities. All the essays in general point to the undesirability of further immigration to Hawaii, and the importance of the youth in Hawaii as a source of labor.

The first prize winner was the essay by K. Shibayama who made the same point as the issues brought up by the strikers. Wages remained at $20 a month but living expenses had risen from $50 to 100% after the war. Shibayama asserted the need to raise lowest wage by 50% to $30; "evidently," he wrote, "no person can now make a living on less than $30 a month."&K. Shibayama, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii, Honolulu, Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919, p. 10& He also argued that all laborer quarters be improved to the same condition as the model camps.&K. Shibayama, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii, Honolulu, Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919, p. 11& And he asserted that on the plantations there was the tendency to hold Oriental labor in contempt.&K. Shibayama, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii, Honolulu, Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919, p. 11&

The second prize essay was by W.R. Farrington, the publisher of the Star Bulletin and who was to be the next governor. Farrington advocated: "Humanize the sugar industry, and the labor problem will solve itself automatically." Among his suggestions for humanizing the industry were the following: making work conditions more attractive, giving a better return in exchange for loyal and intelligent service, regarding his home as permanent and making him see a future for himself and his children, "a voluntary and equitable standard of wages, irrespective of race should be maintained. If there is any partiality let the basis of difference be efficiency and not race," and improving living quarters.&W.R. Farrington, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii, Honolulu, Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919, pp. 20-21& Farrington stressed the need to transform Hawaii from "a collection of people living in 'boarding houses,' to an American commonwealth of men and women who . . . take pride in establishing homes in this land of opportunity."&W.R. Farrington, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii, Honolulu, Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919, p. 20.&

As last comers, the Filipinos occupied the lowest status among the various ethnic groups in Hawaii. They were regarded as inherently inferior in mind and body to the other laborers. W.R. Farrington, at the time the publisher of the Honolulu Star Bulletin (the major afternoon Honolulu daily) and in 1921 the governor of Hawaii, called the Filipinos "the most un-American specimens of humanity in the Territory" and depicted their life in the plantation camps as one of criminality and drift. The Filipino, he wrote, worked merely long enough to earn his
daily bread; he was content being crowded with five or six others in a single room and subsisting on a breakfast of just "a loaf of bread dissolved in a bucket of water." Farrington typified the tendency in Hawaii to blame the Filipinos for their miserable life on the plantations, although unlike most he regarded their degraded condition as the result of their illiteracy and ignorance rather than their essential inferiority or vulgarity as a people. & W.R. Farrington, in The Solution of the Labor Problem in Hawaii (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Company, 1919), pp. 22-23.

MAINLAND US BACKGROUND

In late October, 1919, federal court judge J.B. Poindexter, returning to Honolulu after an extended trip through the US mainland, complained: "There seems to be some sort of strike in every city, town and hamlet in the country." & Advertiser, October 28, 1919 & Over four million American workers were involved in strikes and lockouts. In many cities, isolated strikes threatened to erupt into a general strike or an industry-wide strike, and the police engaged the strikers in pitched battles. & Advertiser, September 12, 20, 25, 1919 & The Advertiser saw imminent the triumph of Bolshevism and the death of capitalism as a result of these strikes. & Advertiser, editorial, October 6, 1919 &

The end of World War I was a time of crisis for labor in general. A pro-business sentiment took over with the return to peacetime production. The US supreme court issued rulings which were unfavorable to labor: it upheld the validity of the yellow dog contract (compelling, in order to keep the job, an employee to sign a promise not to join a labor union or to strike), allowed courts to restrict picketing, and denied Congress the power to pass minimum wage laws for women and children in Washington D.C. The economy had to accommodate two million soldiers seeking civilian jobs. Under President Harding, the industrialists withdrew the labor protection and concessions (such as collective bargaining, union wage rates, and the eight hour day) which labor, under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, had obtained from President Woodrow Wilson in exchange for its support of the war effort. They now busted unions and affirmed the open shop principle. Labor leaders and industrialists abandoned a two month long, bitterly disputed conference in 1919 when the industrialists, raising the specter of Bolshevism, rejected labor's right to organize and bargain collectively.

The strikes were over two major issues. One was the need to raise wages commensurate with the wartime increase in the cost of living, and the other, the right of the workers to collective bargaining.

The U.S. Steel strike which began on September 22, 1919 typified the nature and outcome of many strikes. The company refused to recognize the coalition of 24 craft unions in the industry as the workers' bargaining agent and blacklisted its members. It hired black strikebreakers to run the mills and drove a wedge between the immigrant and the American-born workers, the skilled and the unskilled, and the craftsmen and the laborers. Company spies told the Italians that the Serbians had abandoned the union program, and the Serbians that the Italians had defected to the company's position. U.S. Steel refused to
negotiate and merely waited out the strike; meanwhile, the union leadership was undermined by dissension and jealousy. The American Federation of Labor and other labor unions contributed little support to the strikers. Three and a half months after it began, U.S. Steel declared the strike over as more and more strikers individually returned to work each day. The Interchurch Commission of Inquiry, a group of Protestant clergymen investigating the strike, concluded that the strikers' cause was just but US steel had too much financial power, too many allies among businesses, too much support from the government and too strong an influence in the press and the pulpit. In response, the company accused the clergymen of Bolshevism.

As other strikes ended similarly, union membership declined sharply throughout the twenties as a result of the anti-labor atmosphere, as well as the general prosperity of the early 1920s.

In Honolulu in 1919 and 1920, similar strikes took place among the city's telephone operators, electrical workers, streetcar operators and conductors, teamsters, railway firemen, and industrial machinery workers. The companies simply refused to deal with the unions, discharged the strikers and union members, and brought in strikebreakers of a different ethnic ancestry. & Richard A. Liebes, "Labor Organization in Hawaii: A Study of the Efforts of Labor to Obtain Security through Organization," Master's thesis, University of Hawaii, 1938, pp. 59-63.

The Hawaii unions were mostly craft unions, exclusively Caucasian, anti-Oriental, and small in size; they were mainly concerned with keeping Orientals on the plantations, away from Honolulu's skilled and trades jobs. & U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii: Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921 (Washington D.C., 1921), p. 698.

Like the unions on the US mainland, the Hawaii unions were weak, with the AFL membership totalling merely 1500 in many craft locals. craft unions dominated by the American Federation of Labor. In Honolulu, there were three union councils: the Central Labor Council, AFL, consisting of various kinds of craftsmen, the Building and Trades Council, AFL, and the Metal Trades Council, consisting of civilian workers in the army and navy installations. They were organized along specific jobs and companies, and they generally ignored unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Like their parent unions on the mainland they were exclusively white in membership and anti-Oriental. Some unions consisted of one nationality exclusively, such as the Hawaiian Stevedores' Association, a company union, or the AFL's teamsters, consisting solely of Portuguese. Many of the Hawaii unions, in fact, had been concerned mainly with keeping Orientals in plantation labor and away from urban skilled and trades jobs. & U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 698 & Hawaii's most important industry, the sugar industry, recognized no union at all.

FILIPINO UNION ORGANIZING
Like workers all over the nation, the Hawaii plantation workers felt the impact of wartime inflation also. In 1917 the Japanese newspapers led by the Hawaii Hochi, now published by Fred Makino, took up the campaign for a 20 to 25% increase in plantation wages in order to compensate for wartime inflation. Royal Mead to dismiss it as merely a press-created demand rather than coming from the laborers themselves. & Royal D. Mead to Manager, HACO, July 30, 1917, HACO; Hackfeld to Grove Farm, August 8, 1917, GFA & When the Advertiser publicized Mead’s claim that the wage agitation was but a mere effort to keep up the trade of Japanese merchants rather than a legitimate demand coming from the laborers themselves, the head of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and the representative of the Yokohama Species Bank, withdrew their support, thus weakening the movement. & Advertiser, August 31, 1917, September 4, 1917 & Hackfeld’s investigations, however, found that the agitation for higher wages came from the laborers themselves. & Hackfeld to Grove Farm, August 8, 1917, GFA & In any case, the campaign ended when the nation mobilized for war and the plantations paid high bonuses.

In September 1919 the major Japanese language newspapers in Hawaii began a publicity campaign for higher wages on behalf of the Japanese laborers on 41 sugar plantations. The HSPA simply ignored the newspapers' call for higher wages because it believed that the agitation would similarly die out naturally once the workers received their bonuses. There was something different this time, however, and it was the fact that both the two largest ethnic groups on the plantations were organizing in order to press their demands.

The Filipinos were the first to do so, with three individuals, Nicolas C. Dizon, Pablo Manlapit and Juan Briones Sarmiento, contending for leadership. Dizon was a Methodist minister who, upon completing his studies on the American mainland, decided to work at the Methodist Filipino mission in Honolulu. He established the Filipino National Association which, he claimed, had a membership of 2,000. Dizon was vague about the organization’s program. He said that the organization stood for justice and understanding, the only virtues which would lead his countrymen on the right path. He urged its members to humble themselves to the limit and to work hard on the plantations. & Advertiser, October 6, 1919. & Because the Methodist mission had been allied with plantation interests, Honolulu Filipinos suspected Dizon of being an agent of the plantations and his newsletter, Ang Mithi ni Rizal (Rizal’s Ideals), as a means of advancing plantation interests. Dizon defensively proclaimed his support of the Filipino demand for higher wages. "I am really a friend of the laboring class," he professed, "and I can sympathize with them." He ruled out a strike for higher wages but he indicated his willingness to help the laborers if a strike was called. & N.C. Dizon to the editor, Advertiser, January 16, 1920. &

Pablo Manlapit had mobilized Hawaii Filipinos as early as 1913 when he led demonstrations to protest the dismissal of many Filipinos from Big Island sugar plantations because of depressed sugar prices. Born in Lipa, Batangas, Manlapit left for Manila upon completing his intermediate schooling and worked in various government offices. Then he engaged in
union activities, which resulted in his dismissal as a timekeeper in an American construction project. & Pablo Manlapit, "Autobiography," handwritten, 1959.& On February 17, 1910, he arrived on the S.S. Mongolia as an HSPA contract laborer and was assigned to the Hamakua Mill Company on the Big Island. He claimed that in a week's time he had been promoted to luna (first line supervisor) and, shortly after, to timekeeper; in three months' time, he had also initiated a walkout among his fellow Filipino workers when Hamakua Mill reduced without notice the harvesting contract pay from $4.50 to $4.00 per acre; evidently, the "ruckus" was serious enough to bring over Royal D. Mead, the HSPA bureau of labor director, to investigate the incident. 7 &7Manlapit, "Autobiography"; W. Babbitt, HSPA, to E.F. Bishop, C. Brewer And Co., November 19, 1914, in Hawaiian Agricultural Company (HACO) records, microfilm, University of Hawaii Library.

Evicted from Hamakua Mill Company, Manlapit went to Hilo where he worked at various jobs, including interpreting at the local courts. He also misrepresented himself as an agent of Royal D. Mead assigned to keep track of Filipinos, and so was able to enter the plantations as a salesman with Wall, Nichols and Company selling gramophones and sewing machines to Filipinos. 8 W.G.Ogg to C. Brewer, October 31, 1914, in HACO records.& Exposed, Manlapit changed his story and claimed to be a Philippine Commission agent assigned to deal with Mead and the HSPA, a claim which also proved to be false. 9 Ogg to C. Brewer, November 14, 1914; Babbitt to E.F. Bishop, C. Brewer, November 19, 1914, in HACO records.& The HSPA undertook close surveillance of Manlapit, suspecting him of peddling small arms to Filipinos at Pahala, but failed to find evidence which could convict him of any crime and put him out of circulation. 10 Robertson to Ogg, November 28, 1914; Ogg to C. Brewer, November 26, 1914, in HACO records.

In Hilo, Manlapit published a weekly paper, Ang Sandata (The Sword), which tried to bridge local Filipinos and Hawaii society by instructing Filipinos (in the Tagalog section) in the laws and customs of the territory and by portraying them (in the English section) as law abiding contributors to Hawaii society. 11 Advertiser, February 12, 1913.& He sold the paper when he left Hilo but resumed publishing it in Honolulu for two more years when his buyer went broke. 12 Pedro T. Victoria to Editor, Advertiser, October 19, 1915.& In 1914 Manlapit moved to Honolulu and established the Filipino Laborers Association of Hawaii in order to reach a wider audience for his message that the HSPA either give jobs to unemployed Hawaii Filipinos or return them to the Philippines. 13 Advertiser, May 19, 1914; Star Bulletin, May 16, 1914; Manlapit, "Autobiography." & He continued to be watched by the HSPA, and to be attacked publicly. The attack on his character was led by B.F. Makapagal, a Methodist worker, who accused him of being an exploiter out to use the Filipino organization merely to enrich himself. 14 Advertiser, October 17, 1915.&

The reports about Manlapit's activities in Honolulu were vague and inconclusive. One mentioned that during the 1916 dock strike the Filipino strikers called him a company stooge, worked him over, and broke his glasses. 15 John E. Reinecke, "The Big Lie of 1920: How the planters and Press Used the Big Lie of 'Japanese Conspiracy' in Breaking the Oahu
Sugar Strike," typescript, 1958, no pagination, University of Hawaii Library. Another, traced to HSPA's labor director Royal D. Mead, claimed that Manlapit worked for the HSPA, a report likely intended to discredit Manlapit among unionists because years later the HSPA, in reviewing its files, denied that Manlapit ever worked for it. 16 Advertiser, August 19, 1919; R.L. Cushing, to John E. Reinecke, January 6, 1976, HSPA Archives. Manlapit's claim to have helped governor Lucius E. Pinkham organize Filipinos in the Hawaii national guards just before World War I couldn't be verified in the Hawaii archives. 17 Manlapit, "Autobiography." & In 1917 the HSPA accused Manlapit, two other Filipinos, and two whites of recruiting without a license and bond some Filipinos for Alaskan salmon fisheries and canneries but the city prosecutor dropped the case against Manlapit and the three other defendants once he got the main recruiter from Seattle, E.S. Snyder, convicted and heavily fined. 18 Advertiser, June 14, 26, 1917.

Manlapit worked as a janitor and Filipino interpreter in the law office of William J. Sheldon, a job which gave him an opportunity to read law, and on December 19, 1919 he was licensed to practice law in the district courts in Hawaii.

On August 17, 1919, at the Filipino Club at 1024 Smith street in downtown Honolulu, Manlapit, Juan Sarmiento, and six representatives from several Oahu plantations organized the Filipino Mid-Pacific Laborers Association. 19 Advertiser, August 18, 1919. Manlapit and Sarmiento had differing ideas about the organization. Sarmiento in 1919 was the editor of Ang Filipinas, and was closely tied to the Methodist Mission and had been called by Klinefelter reliable regarding labor matters, and so Klinefelter recommended that people read his paper Ang Filipinas. Sarmiento saw the organization as mainly working to improve the laborer camps. He also wanted it to work for the return of many Filipinos who were stranded in Hawaii because they came before 1915 (when their contract with the plantations did not provide for a return passage to the Philippines) or they were unable for one reason or another to fulfill their contract provision of working for 720 days of work in three consecutive years so as to qualify for return passage.

Pablo Manlapit, on the other hand, saw the organization pursuing labor goals: higher wages and shorter working hours. His primary concern was to do away with the bonus and, instead, ask for higher minimum wages. The basic plantation wage, at 77¢ a day, or $20 a month, had stayed the same since the start of World War I. This basic wage was supplemented by a bonus which paid the laborers a percentage of their daily wages for each dollar that sugar prices rose above a specified price in the New York market. Although the cost of living had gone up sharply during and after the war, the laborers had not previously protested the low minimum wages because high sugar prices had yielded them large bonuses.

Manlapit articulated the laborers' wish to do away with the bonus system in favor of a higher daily minimum wage. Higher wages would protect them at times when plunging sugar prices reduced the bonus to the point where it no longer made up for the increased cost of living. Furthermore, the laborers feared that the planters might arbitrarily change the base price which triggered off the bonus. Indeed, this fear
came true in 1917 when the planters raised the trigger price from $71 to $84 per ton, a change which effectively dropped the bonus from 76.5% to 57% of wages. The bonus being paid in full only every six months, the laborers ended up each month indebted to the plantation stores, and, at times when sugar prices were volatile, uncertain that the forthcoming bonus would be sufficient to pay off their debts. The years 1919 and 1920, in particular, saw drastic fluctuations in the price of sugar. In November 1919 sugar was at the government controlled price of $145.60 per ton; although by May 1920 it had jumped to $471.40 per ton, before the year was up the price had dropped to merely $115.20.

The planters, on the other hand, resisted abolishing the bonus. If they did so and increased wages, it would be difficult for them to cut wages again in the years when the industry suffered from a bad harvest or low sugar prices. Furthermore, the bonus given as a gratuity rather than an earned right in exchange for labor enabled the planters to control the laborers. The plantation could, for example, effectively prevent a laborer from leaving until the end of the bonus term when it was fully distributed.

Manlapit differed from Sarmiento also in desiring the new Filipino organization to take up vigorously some laborer grievances against the plantations. He had received complaints that some plantation lunas arbitrarily discharged the laborer about to complete 20 days of work each month, the minimum required to qualify for a bonus, or one about to complete the days required to earn his return passage to the Philippines. He also brought up complaints of exorbitant plantation store prices.

A direct conflict between Manlapit and Sarmiento was avoided at the August 17 organizational meeting of the Filipino Mid-Pacific Laborers' Association by electing Hugo Ritaga as a compromise president and Pedro M. Esqueras as the secretary. Manlapit was named legal adviser and chief spokesman, and Sarmiento the editor of Ang Filipinas, a monthly newsletter to be issued by the organization. Sarmiento's conservatism, however, prevailed: the organization declared as its primary purpose the drafting of a petition to the Philippine legislature for a ship to return stranded Hawaii laborers and rejected Manlapit's goals of working for shorter hours and higher wages.

The struggle for leadership between Sarmiento and Manlapit could only be postponed, not avoided. At a mass meeting of a thousand Filipinos on August 31, 1919 at Aala Park, even with Sarmiento presiding, the Filipinos did away with the conservative Mid-Pacific Laborers Association, replaced it with the Filipino Labor Union (FLU), and elected Manlapit as president and his lieutenant, P.M. Esqueras, as treasurer.

Manlapit had definite plans about the FLU. He wished to build it up as a labor union, extend its base by encouraging the Puerto Ricans, Spaniards and Portuguese to organize and affiliate with the FLU, and
after that, begin a higher wage campaign. In so doing he emerged a strong labor activist focusing on economic issues which affected all plantation laborers, regardless of ethnic background, rather than on narrow nationalistic issues. This was evident in other ways. He planned to stop the continuing HSPA recruitment of Filipinos because even though it opened up opportunities in the Philippines for wage employment in Hawaii, with many healthy unemployed Filipinos in Honolulu unable to get plantation jobs it created an excess labor supply and kept wages low on the plantations.24 & Manlapit interview, Hawaii Shimpo, October 8, 1919 & When the workers at the two largest mill machinery builders in Hawaii went on strike, Manlapit proposed taking plantation Filipinos out on a sympathy strike.25 & Advertiser, September 15, 1919 & Such thinking identified Manlapit early as the most dangerous enemy of the HSPA, one less vulnerable to the sugar industry's divide and rule tactics, and so labor director Mead proclaimed that the HSPA would not deal with the FLU or any organization headed by Manlapit.26 & Advertiser, August 19, 1919 & The Advertiser branded Manlapit the most dangerous person in Hawaii because he fomented class hatred and advocated sympathy strikes, a move the newspaper considered un-American.27 & Advertiser, editorials, September 6, 16, 1919 &

Manlapit spent the whole of September and the first half of October signing up members on the Oahu plantations. He found the response encouraging (he had also received reports that the Filipinos on Kauai and Maui were similarly agitating for higher wages), but the task of recruiting difficult because he was prevented from entering plantation grounds. While speaking at Waimanalo, Manlapit, Sarmiento, and two other Filipino leaders were asked by plantation manager Chalmers to leave even though they were on government road rather than on plantation property. Threatened, the four Filipinos left. On their way back to Honolulu they were arrested by Honolulu Sheriff Rose and held overnight without any charges; later, they sued Chalmers and won an out of court settlement for several thousand dollars.28 & Takashi Tsutsumi, Hawaii Rodo Undo Shi, tr. by Umetaro Okumura, 1922, vol. 1, microfilm, University of Hawaii Library, p. 66 &

By mid-October there were evident signs that the Filipinos were preparing for a strike. The FLU issued an appeal for financial assistance and Manlapit went on a house to house canvas of the Oriental section of Honolulu to solicit contributions.29 & Advertiser, October 15, 1919 & The plans were prematurely revealed when Sarmiento made an unauthorized announcement to the Nippu Jiji, a Japanese daily, that the Filipinos would go on a territory-wide strike on December 1 if the HSPA refused to grant their request for a $2.50 daily minimum wage, the elimination of the bonus, and the eight hour day.30 & Advertiser, October 17, 1919 & The actual Filipino demands, however, were yet to be formulated five days after Sarmiento's announcement, on October 21, at an FLU executive meeting. At that meeting, the 24 Filipino representatives from various Oahu plantations demanded, in addition to those which Sarmiento had announced, double time pay rate for all overtime and holiday work, no child labor employment, and improved sanitation conditions in the plantation camps. They also instructed Manlapit to present these demands at the HSPA annual meeting on December 8 and, if the petition was ignored, to call a strike for December 15.
1919.

JAPANESE LABOR ORGANIZING

Manlapit set aside this timetable when the Japanese announced a convention on December 1 to 4 in Honolulu to establish a Japanese labor federation. Manlapit had always sought cooperation with the Japanese. He had sent (through the Hawaii Asahi Shim bun and then in person) to the October 19 Japanese Young Men's Association convention in Hilo, where the idea of a Japanese labor federation was first proposed, a message stating that the Filipinos had already organized a union and wished to work with the Japanese in a higher wage campaign.3232Tsutsumi, p. 67. In late October Manlapit had also attended a meeting of Honolulu Japanese businessmen, newspapermen, and language school principals who supported the Japanese higher wage movement, but his plea for cooperation received only a vague reply. He had also written the Japanese Chamber of Commerce but it declined to make a donation.3333Tsutsumi, p. 79-80.

Undeterred, Manlapit continued to attend Japanese meetings. In mid-November, he went with Takashi Tsutsumi, the editor of the Hawaii Mainichi, to Big Island plantations and succeeded in attracting a few Portuguese and Spanish laborers to his higher wage movement.3434Tsutsumi, p. 66. He was less successful, however, in obtaining the support of the Japanese and the Puerto Ricans. The president of the Puerto Rican Welfare Association stated that they were satisfied with plantation conditions, did not feel discriminated against, and did not wish to join any labor movement.3535Advertiser, November 8, 1919

As scheduled, on December 1 the Japanese convention of 30 delegates from all the islands (except Molokai and Lanai, which did not send any delegate), 18 Japanese newspaper editors and language school principals, and some visitors convened in Honolulu. A long bitter dispute over the accreditation of delegates was followed by much squabbling over the amount of minimum wage to ask the HSPA.3636Tsutsumi, p. 83-90. On the third day, the delegates finally got around to establishing the Federated Association of Japanese Labor (FAJL), which consisted of the labor union on each island, which, in turn, would consist of the labor unions yet to be organized on each plantation.3737Tsutsumi, pp. 71-77.

On the last day, Manlapit received permission to address the delegates, and he expressed the Filipino wish to coordinate a higher wage campaign with the FAJL. He then asked the Japanese what they would do if the planters accepted the Japanese demand but rejected an identical Filipino demand. Takashi Tsutsumi, one of two newly elected secretaries of the FAJL, responded that the Japanese would not hesitate to support the Filipinos. Unhappy with that vague response, Manlapit pressed for a definite answer but was told that there couldn't be one because the FAJL deferred to each island association.3838Tsutsumi, pp. 90-91. Manlapit left the meeting without the firm commitment he had sought. When he had gone, the FAJL directors decided to pursue the wage demand simultaneously with (but separately from) the Filipinos. They believed in cooperating with the HSPA and Manlapit had already been identified by Mead as its most dangerous enemy. They decided to press the higher wage issue by
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conducting two or more negotiations with the planters and rejected the Filipino idea of a strike ultimatum.\textsuperscript{39}\textsuperscript{39}Tsutsumi, p. 91.

At 10 a.m. on December 6, 1919, Manlapit, Sarmiento and Jose D. Diaz, the FLU secretary, went to HSPA's Royal Mead to present their petition; after they left, five FAJL delegates came half an hour later to present theirs.\textsuperscript{40}Tsutsumi, p. 91; Advertiser, December 7, 1919.\& Manlapit had toned down the FLU demands to conform to the FAJL's. The identical Filipino and Japanese petitions now asked that the daily minimum wage be increased from 77¢ to $1.25 and the other laborer scale wages be increased proportionately. They asked to keep the present bonus system but to qualify laborers for the bonus after having worked 15 days instead of 20 days a month. In addition, they sought an eight hour day, double rate pay for Sunday, holiday, and overtime work, and the improvement of health and recreation facilities on the plantations.

On December 11 the HSPA announced a new bonus payment schedule in which each month the planters would advance 75% instead of 50% of the bonus.\textsuperscript{41}Advertiser, December 12, 1919.\& The HSPA was confident that the payment of a large bonus, now likely because of high sugar prices, would derail the Filipino and Japanese higher wage movement.\textsuperscript{42}Advertiser, editorial, December 12, 1919.\& Five days later, in a letter by Mead to the FAJL, the HSPA rejected the petitions.

The Japanese laborers, convinced of the justness of their demands, were shocked. The Japanese convention was supposed to have been conducted in secret, yet the HSPA had the details of the proceedings. Tsutsumi, the FAJL secretary, believed that the HSPA rejected the petitions because the Japanese, had squabbled over the amount of minimum wage to ask and did not appear firm about wage demands. The planters also knew that the Japanese were not united, and that the Japanese and the Filipinos were not together.\textsuperscript{43}Tsutsumi, pp. 91, 155.\& Discouraged by the rejection of their petition, the FAJL directors dallied over formulating a response to Mead's letter.\textsuperscript{44}Tsutsumi, pp. 150-151.

The Filipinos were incensed at Mead's answer, and the FLU meeting that Manlapit called at Phoenix Hall in downtown Honolulu drew such a large crowd that a policeman had to be posted at the door. Manlapit, 13 Filipino representatives from the Oahu, Kauai, and the Big Island plantations, as well as three Spaniards from Waialua, wanted to go on strike immediately. Sarmiento, the only dissenter, would agree only if they raised a strike fund first. Hoping to convince Sarmiento of Japanese support in a strike, Manlapit asked the Japanese newspaper representatives at the meeting and one of them, editor Sasaki of the Chocho, replied: "I cannot say positively what will be the attitude of the Japanese Federation of Labor or the Japanese newspapers toward the Filipino strike, but we can say this much: we will not hesitate to assist your strike as much as we can." The statement in general and the reference to "we" were unclear but heartened by the response, Manlapit called for and got a unanimous vote for a strike.\textsuperscript{45}Tsutsumi, p. 156; Nippu Jiji, December 14, 1919; Advertiser, December 15, 1919.\& He appointed a committee of four to coordinate with the Japanese and set December 20 as the tentative date for the strike.\textsuperscript{46}Advertiser, December 16, 17, 1919.
After much delay, the FAJL finally called a conference for Sunday, December 21, to formulate a response to Mead's letter. That day being after the FLU strike date, Manlapit called off the strike again and hoped for a joint action with the Japanese. By this time the Japanese had become badly divided, as there was dissension among the Japanese newspapers, and between the newspapermen and the FAJL directors. Fred Makino, who had led the 1909 Japanese strike, quarreled with the FAJL directors, and his Hawaii Hochi spread the false rumor that the federation funds were being misused by its officers. & The Oahu Japanese union fought with the outer island unions, whom it accused of stirring up Oahu laborers to strike, and angrily proposed the dissolution of the FAJL. & The FAJL board itself was badly split. The nationalists, the larger faction, were interested in slowly building up the FAJL into a lasting organization which would unite all the Japanese in Hawaii. They regarded the economic issues, though important, as a secondary to this aim. They likely saw in the FAJL a successor to an earlier organization, the Japanese Association. Established by the editors of the major Japanese newspapers in 1914, a time when the Japanese encountered widespread prejudice as they moved out of the plantations for better opportunities in Honolulu, the Japanese Association had changed its original purpose (to seek better wages) to one of obtaining the respect and esteem of the white community. In doing so, it had even been able to unite two leaders, longstanding bitter enemies: Fred Makino, who campaigned for equality in pay and living conditions between Japanese and European plantation laborers, and editor Sugetaro Sheba, who protested the way quarantine, immigration, and other government officials treated the Japanese as "indistinguishable monkeys." In 1919, the Japanese still faced severe discrimination and prejudice by the Caucasians who feared their large presence, decried their increasing birth rate, and distrusted their language schools and newspapers. 

The minority faction, the labor activists, on the other hand, considered the FAJL mainly as a means of obtaining higher wages. Like Manlapit, the labor activists desired to include laborers of all ethnic background in the campaign for higher wages. & They favored going with the Filipinos on strike, and argued that by alienating the Filipinos the nationalists played into the planters' divisive tactics. & But the nationalists prevailed and refused to consider a strike. Some of them had participated in the 1909 strike and felt that it had merely resulted in the humiliation of the Japanese. They argued that Hawaii had enough soldiers and policemen to crack down on any Filipino intimidation of non-striking Japanese. 

Thus the FAJL directors voted to resubmit the petition to the HSPA. They also adopted a resolution ("That Filipinos be made to obey and
follow the policies of this labor federation") to ignore any Filipino threat to strike. "On the question of the Filipinos," wrote the FAJL secretary Takashi Tsutsumi, "the directors decided it was best not to seek any cooperation, but to welcome them if the Filipinos obeyed the policies of the Japanese Labor Federation Headquarters."57&57Tsutsumi, p. 167.& The nationalists even went so far as to suggest that someone associated with the sugar interests was pulling the strings of the FLU in order to destroy the FAJL's nationalistic aspirations.58&58Tsutsumi, p. 176.&

The Filipino union was equally fraught with dissension; at a December 22 meeting, Juan Sarmiento accused Manlapit of having been employed by the HSPA until three months before, and, in fact, of still being in the pay of the HSPA. He submitted no proof but his accusations succeeded in undermining Manlapit and in getting himself appointed treasurer to replace Manlapit's lieutenant, Esqueras.59 &59Advertiser, December 23, 1919. &

On December 27 the Filipinos and the Japanese sent their second petitions to the HSPA, this time carefully backing up their demands with data.60 &60Tsutsumi, p. 168. & They pointed out that while wages had remained at pre-World War I level, the price of their basic staples (rice, miso, and shoyu) had increased 400% and the other basic commodities at least 170%. Between May 1916 and November 1919, the cost of living had increased 41.8% for a single laborer and 44.5% for a married couple with two children. These increases especially caused hardship among the Japanese because they were now raising families on the plantations.61 &61Hawaii Laborers' Association, Facts About the Strike on the Sugar Plantations in Hawaii (Honolulu: Nippu Jiji, 1920), p. 8~ &-

Still skeptical of the petition's success without a strike threat, Manlapit once again asked the Japanese to join a strike scheduled for January 19 if the HSPA ignored the laborers' demands.62 &62Star Bulletin, January 2, 1920; Advertiser, January 4, 1920. & "This is the opportunity," he wrote the FAJL, "which the Japanese should grasp to show that they are in harmony with and willing to cooperate with other nationalities of this territory concerning the principles of organized labor."63 &63Manlapit to FAJL, January 3, 1920, quoted in Tsutsumi, p. 175.& In reply, the FAJL wrote: "The Hawaii Federation of Japanese Labor is constantly endeavoring to achieve its ends through peaceful methods. It has not entertained even a least desire of calling out a strike on Jan. 19th. This Labor Federation firmly believes that the Planters Association would listen to reason and would accept our just and legitimate demands for wage increase."64 &64FAJL to Manlapit, quoted in Tsutsumi, p. 176.& Undaunted, Manlapit wrote again and again but the Federation directors merely returned his letters without any reply.65 &65Tsutsumi, p. 177. &

The HSPA rejected the second petitions. Royal D. Mead argued that higher sugar prices did not make up for the higher cost of producing sugar, and that the 41 HSPA plantations were getting a return of merely 8.18% on capital invested. He denied that the laborers were hard up, alleging that the Filipinos had been able to save fantastic sums and the Japanese to send large remittances to Japan; in any case, he hinted that
blame should be placed on the Japanese for being unable to save the way the Filipinos did. The large bonuses, especially the forthcoming one for 1920 which was expected to be 144% of the laborer’s wages, he argued, would more than make up for the increase in the cost of living.66&66HSPA to FAJL, January 7, 1920, in Advertiser, January 15, 1920. &

The Filipino and Japanese laborers were angered by Mead’s letter, and some Japanese who had earlier denounced the Filipino wish to strike as outrageous now clamored to strike.67&67Tsutsumi, p. 195. & The FAJL directors felt in a bind: if they went with the Filipinos, they would be accused of instigating the strike but if they did not act, the angered Japanese and Filipino laborers would accuse them of being planters’ dogs. The directors dallied, and then planned for a third petition, which they sent to the HSPA on January 17. They told the Filipinos to drop their strike talks and follow the FAJL actions.68&68Tsutsumi, pp. 197-199.& Manlapit postponed indefinitely the strike he had called for the 19th. In doing so, however, he lost the confidence of the Filipino laborers. He had already called and withdrawn strike notices twice before, and the plantation lunas had been taunting the Filipino laborers for merely bluffing about a strike.69&69Tsutsumi, pp. 202, 214, 217.& This time the Filipino plantation laborers decided to ignore Manlapit.

THE STRIKE

At 6 p.m. Sunday, January 18, in a torrential rain, the Filipinos at Kahuku plantation met and voted to strike. The next day, the Filipinos at Waipahu, Ewa, Aeia and Waialua followed suit. Manlapit promptly withdrew his peace orders and re-issued his call to strike. The effectiveness of the strike, however, was in doubt because, except at Kahuku, the plantations still had enough laborers to continue operating even without the Filipinos.

Table 1: Plantation Labor Force Profile, January 192070&70Tsutsumi, p. 333. Waimanalo plantation was the only plantation not on strike on Oahu.&

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantation</th>
<th>Laborers</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ewa</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeia</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahuku</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waipahu</td>
<td>2582</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>23/6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waialua</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waianae</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The FAJL directors ignored the Filipino strike; instead, they asked to meet with the HSPA trustees directly. Mead arrogantly denied their request but they persisted in the belief that the proper move was not to strike but to convince the HSPA of their cause. The Filipinos became angry when the FAJL did not call a strike. At Waipahu, 70 Filipinos mobbed the Japanese leaving for the cane fields and at Ewa, 400 Filipinos attacked the Japanese at work and the policemen protecting them.71&71Tsutsumi, pp. 219, 226. &
The planters’ tactic to drive a wedge between the Filipinos and the Japanese through the haole press (as the English language newspapers, the Advertiser and the Star Bulletin, were commonly known) was particularly effective. The Advertiser portrayed the Filipinos as the dupes of the Japanese: by egging on the Filipinos to strike, the Japanese would automatically benefit from any HSPA concessions; but if the strike were lost, they would simply sit back, disclaim responsibility for the strike, and blame the Filipinos for any violence and lawlessness. The haole press editorials incited Japanese anger toward the Filipinos: the Japanese were good, obedient laborers but the Filipinos were inherently lazy, and, therefore, were to blame for the plantation requirement of a 20-day minimum (rather than the petition’s demand of a 15-day minimum) to qualify for the bonus.

Two Japanese language newspapers, the Chocho and the Hawaii Shimpo, advocated an immediate strike with the Filipinos but many Japanese laborers were against it. Hawaii Chocho, January 24, 1920. At Aeia and Waipahu plantations, 80% of the Japanese laborers voted on January 20 against a strike because they had no savings and feared for their families’ welfare. The editors of the Hawaii Chocho and the Hawaii Shimpo accompanied Manlapit to the FAJL board meeting to seek support for the strike. When Manlapit accused the FAJL of not fulfilling a promise to support the Filipinos, Tsutsumi challenged him to specify who among the FAJL directors had made it. Manlapit had to admit that no one in particular on the board had done so, and Tsutsumi then scolded him for dealing with and listening to the words of the Honolulu Japanese (especially the newspaper editors) and then expecting the FAJL to fulfill them.

Mead ignored the third petition and declared that nothing more could be gained by discussing the cost of living and wage disputes. He also refused to meet with delegations sent by Japanese business and civic organizations attempting mediation. At this point, the FAJL was left with no recourse to pursue the higher wage demand but a strike, yet it continued to be indecisive. The Oahu Japanese union finally forced a decision; at a meeting on January 31, with the FAJL directors as invited guests, it quickly passed a resolution declaring an immediate strike on the Oahu plantations and then instructed the FAJL directors to stop any strike on the outer islands so that these laborers could support the Oahu strikers. Prodded by this move, the FAJL called for a lay off, rather than a strike, for the following day, February 1, at Waimanalo, Aeia, Waipahu, Waialua and Ewa plantations. The Japanese at Kahuku had not been included in the call to stop work because they comprised a small percentage of the workforce but they stayed away nonetheless to protest the dismissal of their union officers.
Up until the end of January, when the Filipinos were the only ones out, the plantations could still operate normally. With the FAJL orders for a layout, however, the strike became a real threat because the Japanese and the Filipinos, together, composed 79.5% of the laborers at the six struck plantations. This time the haole press concentrated its attack on the Japanese rather than on Manlapit. It portrayed the strike as solely the result of intimidation and coercion of the laborers (who were basically content and reluctant to strike) by outside agitators—the Japanese language press, Japanese language school principals, and Buddhist priests. It also proclaimed the hand of Tokyo to be behind the strike and accused Takashi Tsutsumi, the secretary of the FAJL and an adherent of the Industrial Workers of the World, of having been sent by the Tokyo government to run the strike. 

In a full page advertisement, Mead called the strike un-American and portrayed it as an attempt by the Japanese to wrest control of the sugar industry. 

The haole press saw the Hawaii Japanese community being solidly behind the strikers and providing financial and moral support. In reality the Japanese community was bitterly divided. The representatives of the language schools, churches, newspapers, small independent businesses, and prefecture associations generally supported the strikers but the major businesses, the professionals, and the larger organizations (such as the United Japanese Association, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and the Sumitomo Bank) opposed the strike. The planters, in fact, exploited this division and secured a committee of Japanese businessmen to urge the laborers to call off the strike. 

Despite these indications of Japanese disunity, the Advertiser initiated a boycott of Japanese businesses and the planters began importing goods directly from Japan in order to undercut the Japanese merchants in Hawaii. 

Governor Charles J. McCarthy was in Washington D.C. lobbying for Hawaii’s exemption from the Chinese Exclusion Act in order to bring in Chinese laborers. Curtis P. Iaukea, the acting governor, showed extraordinary courage in standing up to the HSPA and the haole press. "From the first," he declared, "it has been evident that the American dailies here were the voice of the planters and that they would take no neutral stand. I am convinced that the racial issue has been deliberately emphasized to cloud the economic issue."
challenged the planters to prove that Tokyo directed the strike and resisted their prodding to call out military forces against the strikers.\textsuperscript{88}\textsuperscript{88}Tsutsumi, pp. 361-362. \& He angered the planters for suggesting that they negotiate with the strikers.\textsuperscript{89}\textsuperscript{89}Advertiser, editorial, February 4, 1920. & 

On Saturday, February 7, Manlapit met with Iaukea and Dr. Frederick H. Trotter, the territorial board of health president. He claimed that the Aeia Filipinos had been given merely an hour's notice and evicted from their plantation homes, that most of them ended up sleeping on the government road, and that the few who had made it to the Filipino Club, the headquarters of the Filipino union on Smith street in downtown Honolulu, had been driven out to the streets by the board of health. Manlapit also claimed that Waialua had already issued eviction notices. Iaukea and Trotter were concerned about any eviction because of a serious outbreak of influenza in Hawaii.

Manlapit described to Iaukea his predicament: "My position now is that I can't advise them to return to work and I can't advise them to continue the strike unless they get houses. If I advise them not to go back to work and sickness comes, then I am most responsible. If I advise them to go back they may not want to go back." Told that his best move, anyway, was to ask the Filipinos to return to work, Manlapit responded: "That would be just like cutting the throats of the Japanese who are striking with us."\textsuperscript{90}\textsuperscript{90}Transcript of Meeting, Saturday, February 7, 1920, in Strike Data, McCarthy Papers, Archives of Hawaii. & Warned by Trotter that unless he called off the strike he would be responsible for illness, death, and crime, Manlapit replied: "As far as I am concerned, I should like to call off the strike. I have thought it over and over, and I can't sleep anymore for thinking of it. I will try to feel these people out and see what they think about going back. There is only one question: the Japanese have pledged themselves to cooperate, and I don't want to break faith with them. I want to be fair to them and to my own people--to everybody."\textsuperscript{91}\textsuperscript{91}Transcript of Meeting, Saturday, February 7, 1920, in Strike Data, McCarthy Papers, Archives of Hawaii. &

Manlapit asked Iaukea for a letter ordering him to call off the strike because of the flu epidemic.\textsuperscript{92}\textsuperscript{92}Transcript of Meeting, Saturday, February 7, 1920, in Strike Data, McCarthy Papers, Archives of Hawaii. & The letter in hand, Manlapit and the FLU directors presented to the plantation laborers the case for calling off the strike but when less than a third of the Filipinos heeded his call, he once again declared the strike to be on and dismissed the whole FLU board, whom he unfairly blamed for the decision to call off the strike.\textsuperscript{93}\textsuperscript{93}Tsutsumi, p. 312; Advertiser, February 11, 12, 1920. & Manlapit ended up alone at the FLU; he had earlier relieved Sarmiento as treasurer for deserting the FLU cause when Sarmiento, without authorization, had told Kahuku Filipino strikers on February 1 that it was useless to struggle because they had no funds to support the strike.\textsuperscript{94}\textsuperscript{94}Advertiser, February 3, 5, 1920. & Manlapit lost his credibility among the territorial officials as well when Iaukea, upon learning that he had lied about an eviction order having been issued, refused to meet further with him.\textsuperscript{95}\textsuperscript{95}Curtis P. Iaukea, to McCarthy, February 19, 1920, in McCarthy Papers, Archives of Hawaii. &
Furthermore, Manlapit found out that the Japanese had sought to undermine the FLU. As early as January 28 the FAJL had secretly planned to form on each plantation a separate committee of Filipinos, and proceeded to do so on February 3. 96 & 97 Tsutsumi, pp. 273, 305. &

When on February 8 Manlapit called off the strike at Iaukea's behest, the FAJL had told its island affiliates that the FLU had collapsed but that the Filipinos, with its support, would continue the strike. Manlapit was stung by this repudiation of his leadership. He was also angered by the FAJL response to his appeal for help. He had earlier taken K. Miyazawa, one of the FAJL secretaries, to the FLU headquarters to see for himself the misery of 380 Aiea Filipinos sleeping on the sidewalk and Miyazawa had simply rebuffed Manlapit, loudly proclaiming that the FAJL had nothing to do with the Filipino strike and that it was the entire responsibility of the Filipino leaders to house and feed their strikers. 97 & 97 Advertiser, February 10, 1920. &

Manlapit angrily issued a statement, which the Advertiser promptly printed, accusing the FAJL of failing to carry out its agreement to back the Filipinos. He echoed the HSPA line that the FAJL was involved in a conspiracy to take over Hawaii's industries, and so he urged the Filipinos, as Americans, to help Hawaii's people break the Japanese stranglehold. He had called off the strike, he said, when it became obvious that it was for racial and not economic reasons, and that the Japanese were merely using the Filipinos. 98 & 98 Advertiser, February 10, 1920. & The next day, Manlapit lamely tried to retract, claiming that he had been duped into signing the statement. 99 & 99 Hawaii Hochi, February 11, 1920. &

THE ALLEGED BRIBERY AND THE EVICTION

Manlapit found himself in more trouble with the expose by the Hawaii Hochi of an alleged bribery attempt. 100 & 100 Hawaii Hochi, February 11, 21, 1920. & The story, citing Manlapit as the source, recounted how he was invited to dinner at the home of a prominent planter and offered a bribe of $50,000 to call off the strike. When Manlapit refused the offer, Frank Thompson (a very powerful lawyer who controlled the police commission, wrangled judicial and governorship appointments for the HSPA, and on a retainer for the HSPA to counter the strike) went to Manlapit's office and warned him to leave Honolulu immediately or the Filipinos would assassinate him; a Chinese boy later brought Manlapit $500 and a reservation to sail on the Matsonia for the U.S. mainland. Thompson immediately provided his version of the incident. According to him, Manlapit had asked to come to his house and asked for $50,000 to call off the strike, to which he replied that he wouldn't even give Manlapit 5¢ for cab fare. Thompson alleged that at a subsequent meeting Manlapit had asked for $500 to take care of his family while he left the territory because of threats from angry Filipinos, but that Manlapit changed his mind and returned the money at Thompson's office that evening. 101 & 101 Star Bulletin, February 12, 1920; Advertiser, February 13, 1920. &
Manlapit disputed Thompson's version. It was Thompson, he claimed, who had asked him to come to the lawyer's house, who had tried to get him drunk, and who had offered him $25,000 to leave the islands and call off the strike, but Manlapit had asked for $50,000 instead in order to doublecross the planters, use the amount to continue the strike, and feed the strikers. Thompson had subsequently offered $5000 and a ticket to San Francisco, he added; however, when challenged to repeat the charge in Thompson's presence, Manlapit changed the amount to $500. His explanation, which appeared as though he was trying to doublecross both the Filipinos and the planters, merely got more people skeptical of his version.

The facts about the attempted bribery couldn't be ascertained at all. Thompson, despite his claim that his stenographer took notes during the meeting with Manlapit, did not come up with proof of his allegations. The territorial supreme court dismissed disbarment charges against Manlapit, citing insufficient facts to allege that Manlapit had solicited a bribe from Thompson, or attempted fraud or deceit. A dozen years later, an unnamed high territorial government official who held his job through Thompson's influence admitted hearing Thompson, the Honolulu chief of detectives, and others conspire to frame Manlapit. During the first two weeks of February, the FAJL, over the protest of the Japanese laborers, sheltered the Filipino strikers in Honolulu temples and churches and gave each one a rice allowance. These Filipino strikers left Aiea and the other plantations at their own volition. When they first went out on strike, D.H. Klinefelter, the head of the Methodist Episcopal Mission for Filipino works, advised Royal D. Mead to act firmly and authoritatively by ordering the Filipinos either to work or else leave the plantations. Mead accepted the advice but waited until February 18 to evict the striking Japanese and Filipinos. R.D. Mead, Strike Memorandum, Thursday a.m., January 22, 1920, McCarthy Papers, Archives of Hawaii. In mid-February, the plantations issued the ultimatum, telling the strikers to return to work by February 18 or else vacate their plantation homes. The ultimatum upset territorial officials because of the crowding and the flu epidemic in Honolulu, but the six Oahu plantations carried out the eviction orders nonetheless. The plantation police went into the laborer homes, threw out the laborers' belongings, and nailed the doors shut. At once 10,500 Japanese and 1,472 Filipinos were rendered homeless. The laborers at Aiea and Kahuku headed for Honolulu and the rest for makeshift homes all over Oahu. Hardly any Japanese or Filipinos remained on the struck plantation. Congestion, insufficient food, and the flu took its toll among the strikers. By April 20, when the epidemic was almost over, 55 Japanese had died and 1056 ill with the flu; the toll was even higher among the Filipinos, at 95 death and 1440 stricken with the flu. Feigned Necessity: Hawaii's Attempt to Obtain Chinese Contract Labor, 1921-23 (San Francisco: Chinese Material Center, 1979), p. 109.
All throughout February, four out of every five laborers were out on strike, yet the plantations did not shut down. The other ethnic groups continued to work. The Chinese and the Koreans, resenting Japan's invasion of their homelands and having been pitted constantly against the Japanese in the plantation camps, refused to support the strike. The Koreans offered to work overtime, if necessary, if it helped to break the strike. Advertiser, February 8, 1920. Hawaiian, Portuguese, and Chinese strikebreakers were signed up at premium pay, as were women and schoolchildren for the lighter tasks, and large shipments of new Ilocano recruits were sent to the struck plantations. Advertiser, February 7, 1920; U.S. Congress, Labor Problems in Hawaii, p. 367. As a consequence, by early March the plantations were already operating at two thirds of their normal capacity. John Waterhouse, president, address, 40th Annual HSPA Meeting, November 29-30, 1920, Proceedings of Annual Meeting, 1920, pp. 4-11.

By this time many strikers had become discouraged. Their action had little effect because heavy rains in January and February watered the growing cane. None of the AFL unions in Honolulu helped with money. George Wright, testimony, U.S. Congress, Labor Problems in Hawaii, pp. 731, 753. Samuel Gompers stated at the same hearing: "I am not proud of the fact that the Caucasian workers of Honolulu gave such little attention, such little sympathy, and such little support to these men who were engaged in a strike on the plantations." Samuel Gompers, testimony, Ibid., p. 811. The Japanese were fighting among themselves. The FLU had collapsed; whatmore, the FAJL directed the anger of the Filipino strikers toward R.D. Mead and Manlapit rather than toward the plantations where the laborers hoped to return once the strike was settled. Tsutsumi, p. 273. Faustino Aguilar, the Philippines' director of labor, wrote Manlapit, urging the Filipinos to return to work or else face persecution by the HSPA for violating their contract; the fact that these contracts were not legally binding (and were, in fact, nullified by American laws forbidding contract labor) did not prevent the haole newspapers from publishing and widely circulating Aguilar's letter anyway. F. Aguilar to Manlapit, January 28, 1920, reprinted in Advertiser, February 27, 1920.

In March the strikers began drifting back to work, and by the end of April, with the plantations already operating at 75% of their capacity, Mead declared the strike over. Advertiser, April 29, 1920. But the Japanese leaders denied Mead's allegation that the FAJL had collapsed and threatened to extend the strike to outer island plantations. They also changed their organization's name to Hawaii Laborers Association, tried (unsuccessfully) to organize branches among the other ethnic groups, and sought (unsuccessfully) to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor, all as a way of countering the HSPA charges that it was narrow and exclusive; these moves alienated the nationists all the more. Advertiser, April 23, 1920; U.S. Congress, Labor Problems in Hawaii, p. 442. The Filipinos were similarly in shambles. Sarmiento, long suspected by Filipinos of sabotaging the strike, left permanently for Solano county, California, to devote the next two decades editing a Filipino newspaper. Nicolas Dizon, forced by his supervisor to resign his ministry for supporting the strike as he had
pledged if it broke out, tried to establish a Filipino labor federation under the auspices of the FAJL but failed when one of his organizers was exposed as a known plantation spy who had induced strikers to return to work.116&116Advertiser, March 13, 17, 1920; Tsutsumi, p. 377.&

The strike formally ended on July 1 when HSPA president John Waterhouse shook hands with the Japanese representatives of the strikers (who were there, Waterhouse insisted, as individuals rather than as leaders of the FAJL, which the HSPA did not recognize). The FAJL issued a statement: "To our capitalists who have been separated from us for over 150 days, necessitated by the strike which was initiated by us, we wish to announce our warm-heartedness and joy for this understanding and solution, and for being able to meet you once more with open hearts and welcoming hands." &Hawaii Laborers Association, Facts About the Sugar Strike, p. 25. The HSPA was not as magnanimous in victory; it brought up one lawsuit after another against 15 FAJL leaders, and succeeded in having them indicted for conspiracy and convicted to prison terms of four to 10 years. Waterhouse offered no concessions and said that the strikers could return to the plantations only if they did not displace any present worker. &Advertiser, July 2, 1920.&

For the plantations, the strike was very costly. Among the individual plantations, the losses varied from $3.9 million at Waipahu's Oahu Sugar company to a mere half a million at Kahuku and Waimanalo. But in sum, the six struck plantations lost $12 million.&Amfac to Grove Farm, January 12, 1921, GFA& As agreed upon by the HSPA trustees, the whole sugar industry bore the loss, prorated among all the member plantations of the HSPA.&Amfac to Grove Farm, January 30, 1920, GFA& Despite these losses, however, the plantations still showed a net profit because of the high price of sugar in 1920.&Reinecke, Feigned Necessity, p. 117&

Once the strike was settled, the planters raised the wages and bonuses. In October, 1920, the sugar industry announced a 50% increase in the base rate of laborers to $30 a month (based on a 26-day month), which at $1.15 a day was merely a dime less than what the Filipino and Japanese strikers sought; the rate for women was $22.50 and the rates were adjusted accordingly for semi-skilled and contractors. While increasing the wage rate, however, the planters also decreased the bonus. The base of the bonus was lowered from $84 to $80 per ton but for every dollar above the base, the laborers now received merely .5% instead of 1.5%. The planters also introduced the turnout bonus giving laborers a bonus if they worked at least 20 days.&Advertiser, October 16, 1920& Hawaii Laborers' Association urged that basic wages be increased to $40.&Advertiser, December 1, 1920& Manlapit led a delegation of Filipinos and presented their demand for basic wages at $55 and the 8-hour day.&Advertiser, November 30, 1920& However the HSPA refused to consider any change in bonus or wage schedule, both the Japanese and Filipino demands.&Advertiser, December 1, 1920&

A year later, however, the planters took back what they had given. The HSPA reduced the base pay of unskilled labor from $30 to $26 a month, or at $1.15, a decline of 13%. They also lowered further the bonus which the laborers would receive. Instead of the bonus paying 10%
at $80, now they paid merely 5% on a base price of $100 per ton sugar. Although the turnout bonus was kept, now laborers had to learn less than $60, instead of $75, and also work 23 days instead of 20 days, in order to qualify. &quot;HSPA Announcement to Employees and the Public," October 13, 1921, HACO&

In announcing the lower pay and bonus, the HSPA claimed that the sugar industry faced a crisis, that the New York price of sugar was less than the cost of production, and the expectation was for continuing decline in sugar prices. The HSPA claimed that all the plantations were operating at a loss, and there was an over supply of sugar worldwide, and thus the low price. &quot;HSPA Announcement to Employees and the Public," October 13, 1921, HACO&

Indeed the mood in the sugar industry was sombre. At the 1921 annual meeting of the HSPA the outgoing president, E. Faxon Bishop, glumly announced that low sugar prices, because of world oversupply, came at a time also when high labor cost and material cost--thus the sugar industry was operating at a loss. Furthermore the 1921 crop at half a million tons was the lowest of record in the past 10 years, because of the delay in harvesting, because of the shortage of labor. &E. Faxon Bishop, presidential address, 41st annual HSPA meeting, November 28-30, 1921, pp. 5-8.&

The plantation laborers accepted the cut without any major incident. In the first place, the cut affected all the sugar industry employees, from the agencies on down to the plantations, from the managers on down. &Adviser, October 25, 1921& It was also bad times nationally as well, as everywhere wages were being cut and union membership was declining. In the second place, the other businesses were also cutting wages and laying off workers, because of the general economic slowdown, and dock workers, tradesmen, skilled and unskilled labor in all also suffered wage cuts. &Adviser, October 25, 1921& The Hawaii Laborers' Association denounced the reduced wages scale, claiming that it was impossible for a plantation laborer to support himself and his wife on the present income as he and his wife needed $46.42 in necessities alone. &Hawaii Laborers' Association, "Announcement Against Wage Reduction," November 1, 1921, HSPA Archives.; Adviser, November 2, 1921& However, the Advertiser predicted that the Japanese would not strike because of the cut but that many would return to Japan rather than work for lower wages. &Adviser, October 15, 1921& Manlapit protested the wage cuts but nothing happened. The cut in daily wage fell mostly on the Filipino newcomers.

DISPLACEMENT OF THE JAPANESE BY FILIPINOS: In this context, discuss the following issues: 1. Continuing fear of the Japanese, and thus replacing them with Filipinos. 2. Continuing fear led to suppression of foreign language newspapers. 3. Continuing fear led to the stricter surveillance of labor and union-organizing activities.

Indeed, the returning strikers found themselves treated like new applicants and given work only when available; the skilled workers among them were permanently replaced by Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and Spaniards. &Adviser, July 3, 11, 1920.& As a result, the number
and proportion of Japanese workers on the plantations declined thereafter. Meanwhile, because of large importation of Filipinos during and after the strike, they had become the largest group on the Hawaii plantations, comprising 40% of the workforce by June 1922. Between 1920 and 1925, the planters shipped in 39,051 Filipinos, mostly Ilocanos in order to counteract the Visayans who had participated in the strike, compared to 33,272 in the previous 11 years.

The strikers returned to the plantations hoping to get their old jobs and homes back only to find that they were treated simply like new applicants for jobs, given whatever work was available but that the strikebreakers would be allowed to stay on plantation employment as long as they desired. &Advertiser, July 3, 1920& In fact, the skilled Japanese workers found their old jobs already taken, as the plantations placed whites in these positions. &Advertiser, July 11, 1920& Because the Japanese couldn’t get their jobs back and the HSPA brought in Filipino recruits, the profile of the plantation labor force changed. In June 1919 the 24,791 Japanese comprised 54.7% of all plantation laborers. However, by June 1921, their number had declined to 17446, or 45% of the total. A year later the number increased slightly to 17,833 but at 38.5% the proportion of Japanese on the plantation labor force continued to decline. On the other hand, the 10354 Filipinos in June 1919 comprised only 22.9% of the labor force, and this had increased as a result of heavy importation during the strike to 12271, comprising 31.7% of the labor force by June 1921 and to 18,600 or 40% by June 1922. In fact the most dramatic increase in the Filipino portion of the plantation labor force took place after the strike, between June 1921 and June 1922. &H.A. Walker, HSPA, to Governor Farrington, February 17, 1922, Farrington Papers, AH; Reinecke, Feigned Necessity, p. 141, table 1&

The importation of large number of Filipinos during and after the strike was evident at HACO. During the strike, the needs of the outer island plantations were backstopped, as the incoming laborers were shunted to the struck plantations. As the strike progressed and the HSPA Manila office was able to send many Filipinos to Hawaii at the beginning of April, the HSPA sent large shipments of Filipinos, to the point that "we believe that the HSPA would be sending out requests for the plants to take additional Filipinos." &R.A. Cooke to Campsie, April 3, 1920, HACO& Even when the strike settlement appeared near and the Oahu plantations were operating near their normal capacity the HSPA continued to import large number of Filipinos because of its belief that not all the striking Japanese would return to the plantations. &R.A. Cooke to Campsie, April 3, 1920, HACO& HACO itself continued to request many Filipinos after the strike and for the next year. Its Labor Request Form continued to indicate that the plantation desired "100 single men, Ilocanos preferred" for the whole of 1921. &HACO Labor Request Form, 1921, HACO&
As a result, the number of Filipinos increased by June 1922 to 40% of the plantation laborers, an increase from 12,271 in June 1921 to 18,600 in June 1922 (Get the percentage increase).

Table 2, Filipino and Japanese Plantation Laborers & H.A. Walker to W.R. Farrington, February 17, 1922, Farrington Papers, Archives of Hawaii; Reinecke, Feigned Necessity, p. 141, table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1919</td>
<td>24,791</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>10,354</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1921</td>
<td>17,446</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>12,271</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1922</td>
<td>17,833</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unhappy about its dependence on Filipino and Japanese labor, the HSPA tried to bring in Puerto Rican, Chinese and other ethnic groups. When these attempts failed, it was left with the Philippines, a territory controlled by the United States, as its only viable source of plantation labor. Just before World War II, the Filipinos comprised as much as three quarters of the plantations' workforce and found themselves regarded a threat the way the Japanese had been earlier.

The strike also resulted in the tighter control of labor activism by the sugar establishment. The territorial legislature passed laws regulating the language schools and monitoring all foreign language newspapers in Hawaii. It also passed the criminal syndicalism act which provided for a 10-year imprisonment, a $5,000 fine, or both, for anyone advocating crime, violence, sabotage or other acts of terrorism to accomplish industrial or political ends; the law was so broad that it was used to prohibit free speech and militant unionism. The HSPA monitored closer than ever the movement of union organizers, who complained of an informal blacklist in the sugar industry. George Wright, testimony, U.S. Congress, Labor Problems in Hawaii, p. 686. The 1920 strike had brought up the possibility of a class-based labor movement, advocated by Pablo Manlapit. At a time when employers all over the United States used ethnic divisiveness and stratification to control labor, however, the movement failed. Ironically, the Filipinos were later to find themselves in the same position as the Japanese: after the successful 1937 Vibora Luviminda strike on Maui, Antonio Fagel and the other Vibora leaders sought to extend the influence of this nationalistic labor organization to the other Hawaiian islands. But times had changed. New Deal legislation now supported the organization of industrial unions.

Why was this excess of labor being created in Hawaii?
For one, there was the continuing fear of the Japanese.

This fear of the Japanese was part of the US racism at that time. This racism was illustrated by the testimony of Dr. Alec Hrdlicka of the Smithsonian Institution at the US House Committee on Territories as an authority testifying that the Japanese were not assimilable, and that it would not be many years before the Japanese would constitute the majority of the population of the islands, their birth rate being higher than any people. He said the yellow race represented but merely 95% of the potential of the white race, and blacks only 80% of the potential of whites, and no intermarriage or else dilute the potential of
whites. This was the hearing which led to the national origins quota system. Similar attitudes prevailed in Hawaii. An indication of the attitudes of the Hawaii elite was the address of Governor Farrington to the joint session of the territorial legislature in 1923 which argued that the "Japanese problem" had to be dealt with, especially the violence and arrogance of the aliens must be curbed.

The American Legion was at the forefront of the Americanism movement, both nationally and in Hawaii. The organization aimed to foster 100% Americanism, which was a strong sentiment as at that time there was a strong anti-immigration feeling nationwide, a strong anti-Japanese on the mainland. The Hawaiian department was organized on September 4, 1919 and firmly controlled by the upper class, the powerful in Hawaii. The commander was John K. Butler, the HSPA secretary, and in another year was Philip L. Rice, lawyer and of missionary stock. Walter F. Dillingham was a national committeeman. The American Legion was obsessed with the Japanese problem. In the 1920 national convention of the American Legion in Minneapolis a resolution passed that Hawaii would Americanize with speed. It led the attack on the 1920 strike as a racial contest, which also led to the attack on the Japanese press, the schools, Buddhism, picture brides and the boycott of Japanese firms.

The fear of the Japanese had several forms. One form took shape in the laws to regulate the language schools. The basic law passed in 1920 to control these schools required the board of education to license teachers and prescribe the course of study, textbook and hours of opening, a 1923 amendment requiring primary grade completion before attending a foreign language school, and another 1925 amendment requiring language schools to pay fees and which led to the closing of the schools. In 1927, however, the supreme court declared these laws unconstitutional.

Another indication of the fear was the Press Gag Bill, the control of the Japanese newspapers. The sugar industry had always blamed the foreign language press for laborer agitation on the plantations, and had always sought to control it. In 1920 this attack on the foreign language press was led by the American Legion, led by John K. Butler, major, American Legion, who was also the HSPA secretary. The 1921 law required all foreign language newspapers and periodicals to register with the territorial treasurer and file a copy with translation with the office of the attorney general; and also prohibited the publication of any material "of a nature contrary to the public welfare." But the law was used to censor and gag all labor publications; no publication had been charged with the violation of this law until the next strike took place on the plantations but the existence of the law served as a suppressant to labor militancy. It defined anarchistic publications those which restrained a person from engaging in lawful business or profession, created distrust and dissension between people of different races. It was so broad a law, however, that it could mean it was unlawful to conduct any kind of industrial dispute.
Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Hearings, pp. 443-446, 737-739. The Advertiser during the strike attacked the Japanese press as "dangerous to the peace and prosperity of Hawaii. It will always be dangerous. The only thing to do is to scotch it. Putting a muzzle on it isn't enough. That would be like muzzling a mad dog. It should be exterminated." & Advertiser, February 8, 1920.

The American Legion, with Butler also taking credit for it, was responsible for the inclusion in the Rehabilitation bill the provision that aliens could not be hired in contract work under the army (Scholfield Barracks construction going on). Thus, 2000 Japanese laid off; and Butler proud of the fact that these men released would be immediately available for plantation work. & Wright Testimony, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Act, p. 681-2.

But this lead to a dependence on Filipino labor. In fact, by June 1922, almost equal number of Filipinos and Japanese (18,600 Filipinos and 17,833 Japanese) laborers on the plantations—the two most volatile group.

The fear of the Japanese and the Filipinos was the fear that they would get together and act in unison, especially as the class conscious labor movement had already started on the mainland United States. In reality there was little to fear, from either the Japanese or the Filipinos. The Hawaii Laborers' Association was racked with dissension, penalized by a heavy defense expenses as an aftermath of the strike, and disillusioned, it had no program at all. & Reinecke, Feigned Necessity, p. 317. In fact, there was serious infighting going on among the Japanese, and it dragged on despite the end of the strike. Fred Makino blamed the leaders of the FJL/HLA for the strike and its failure and accused them as crooks and grafters. He claimed that the planters would have been liberal had they not followed the grafter and crooked leaders. & Advertiser, October 20, 1920. He called the JFL leaders "aburanushi" (cockroaches) and accused them and the Nippu Jiji of having misled the laborers. & Advertiser, December 15, 1920. In the meantime, the strike leaders, 15 of them, were indicted for conspiracy and were convicted to prison terms of four to 10 years by March 1922, and other cases also piled up against them until the FJL finally folded as each of the plantation units dissolved. The leaders were also blacklisted by the plantations. After the strike the HLA became powerless, became the target of community hostility. In fact, it had become dangerous because it attempted to build it into a militant interracial union. They invited Filipinos and all nationalities to join, but they got only a few Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. & Mead, Testimony, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Hearings Act, p. 385. They sought affiliation with the AFL but they were turned down. & S. Gompers, Testimony, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Hearings Act, p. 385.
The Filipinos and the Japanese also were not getting together because as a result of the strike, each side charged that the other had not supported them. The Filipinos charged this, and the Japanese charged that the strike had to fail because the Filipino recruits continued to come in. The U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Hearings, p. 825.

In any case it was difficult for them to organize, and for any union in general for a number of reasons. For one, the sugar industry sought to implant in the laborers the fact that the laborers were betrayed by their leaders, that vast sums lost by laborers and money dissipated by the leaders, and that the laborers could only lose by following the lead of agitators. This was the message of Waterhouse about the strike. John Waterhouse, presidential address, 40th Annual meeting, November 29-30, 1920. Proceedings, pp. 4-11. Furthermore, the labor leaders claimed that there was in Hawaii a fear of being discharged or blacklisted if they came out publicly with any statement that might be misconstrued. This fear led to claims that there was a blacklist system in Hawaii. George Wright, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, Labor Act Hearings, p. 686.

Indeed, the HSPA was monitoring even more closely the activities of Filipinos after the strike, the movements of suspected troublemakers and individuals. This was especially true of organizers of groups and societies.

After the strike the territorial legislature enacted the criminal syndicalism. Like the other states on the mainland who had the same law but Hawaii's statute was broader in scope than any other states. The law provided for a ten year imprisonment or $5000 fine or both for anyone who orally or in writing advocated crime, violence, sabotage, or other unlawful methods of terrorism to accomplish industrial or political ends. An anti-labor judge could, therefore, prohibit free speech or militant trade union action. This law was only superseded by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

To the planters the most threatening was the concept of a class conscious labor movement, one which transcended nationalistic lines. Therefore, the planters watched carefully when the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) caused strike son the Pacific coast and fearing that they might similarly cause problems in Hawaii, kept careful watch. S. O. Halls, HSPA, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Hackfeld and Company, July 18, 1917. The IWW sought an alternative to the unionization of workers along the American Federation of Labor's craft lines, and it appealed to immigrant labor, unskilled and unorganized workers. It also favored seizing privately owned factories and running them for the nation. The IWW dream of "One Big Union of Toilers" was one of the triumph of the working class through a general strike. Persecuted by the government for opposing world War I, the organization thus crumbled.
The attempt to organize workers by deemphasizing craft lines and achieving racial cooperation was the dream of George W. Wright, the president of the AFL's Central Labor Council in Honolulu, to open its membership to any working man, skilled or unskilled, of whatever race. This was the United Workers of Hawaii, or nicknamed One Big Union, formally organized on December 15, 1921, although its plan of organization was along different departments based on languages such as the Japanese language department the Filipino language department, etc. Advertiser, January 30, 1922 & The Hawaii Laborers' Association endorsed Wright's proposal. Advertiser, December 9, 1921 & The Filipino Labor Union was also a member, with a Filipino vice president among the other racial vice presidents. At first Manlapit was cool to the ideal, saying that the Filipinos, although wishing to join the One Big Union, did not wish to do anything to upset the present friendly relations between the Filipinos and the sugar planters. Star Bulletin, January 4, 1922 & He, however, changed his mind and in March 1922 he was with Wright campaigning on Oahu, and in April on the big island, and all through December, 1922. & Hawaii Shimpo, March 8, April 28, 1922; Star Bulletin, December 11, 1922 &

The plan failed, however. The union applied for a corporation charter, and Governor Farrington turned it down, saying that the activities of the organization to be un-American, the worry being that the admission of the other racial elements (the Japanese and the Filipinos) would result in the combination of these elements to the detriment of the Caucasians. Advertiser, March 8, 1922 & Few members also signed up, and especially opposition from white labor unionists, including from Wright's Central Labor Council which ousted him as president. Advertiser, April 15, 1922 &

Therefore, the attempt to bring in other laborers to Hawaii. First the Puerto Ricans, half-hearted and meant to fail.

The Puerto Rican contract was superior to that of the Filipino contract. It guaranteed permanent work at $30 a month for males and $22.50 for women—a third higher than the $20 a month for males in the Filipino contract. It required the HSPA to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, for judicial intervention in any case of violation or dispute in the contracts, as well as for any investigations conducted in connection with the emigration. Agreement between R.D. Mead, representing HSPA, and the Acting Chief of the Bureau of Labor, as representative of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor of Puerto Rico, May 31, 1921, HACO & The Puerto Rican recruits were to be permanent settlers and as such, a high percentage was to bring wives and children. HSPA Butler, to All Plantations, June 23, 1921, in HACO and GFA & The first group of 430 arrived at the end of August 1921 and the Advertiser announced their arrival in a story entitled the "Advance Guard of Labor Army to Relieve Hawaii" even though the article itself indicated that the HSPA was uncertain if additional laborers would be brought in. & Advertiser, August 29, 1921 & After the arrival of a second shipment at the end of November, the HSPA stopped recruiting. Butler, HSPA, to HACO, November 26, 1921 & There was little indication that the plantations actually seriously considered Puerto Ricans for labor. In 1923 the secretary of war, John W. Weeks urged Hawaii employers to recruit Puerto Ricans and even
offered the use of an army transport to bring them to Hawai'i, but Governor Farrington declined, saying that Hawai'i's past experiences with Puerto Rican labor was not favorable. & John W. Weeks, Sec. of War to Governor Farrington, April 23, 1923, BIA 227; Farrington to Weeks, May 14, 1923, in BIA 227; Farrington to Weeks, June 2, 1923, in BIA 227 &

The Puerto Ricans were brought in in order to validate the HSPA claim that a labor shortage existed in Hawai'i and the industry was doing its outmost, including recruiting from US territories, in order to solve the labor shortage. The planters could then argue that the Puerto Rican experiment did not work out, that the Filipinos were not reliable workers, and therefore, that only the importation of Chinese laborers would sold Hawai'i’s problems. Therefore, the sugar interests sought an exclusion for Hawai'i in order to bring in Chinese laborers. Thus the Labor Importation Plan.

The desire to import Chinese laborers was not peculiar to Hawai'i. On the US mainland in 1917 and 1918, employers sought to scrap the Chinese Exclusion Act, bring in Chinese laborers temporarily and then deport them at the end of the war, justifying such an action in order to meet the food shortages. A resolution was, in fact, introduced in the US senate in December 1917 to allow Chinese farmers to come in, even though the American Federation of Labor and other labor groups argued that not a single gain of harvest had been lost due to the lack of laborers. & U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 819 & The same argument of food shortages and yet there were large acres of idle and unimproved land was invoked by the Hawaii territorial legislature in 1917 in order to pass a resolution to import Chinese for use in rice production and also to use army transports to bring in more Filipinos. & Advertiser, April 3, 17, 1917 & Acting on this delegate Kuhio introduced a resolution in May 1917 to admit 30,000 Chinese to Hawaii. & Advertiser, June 12, 1917 & Because of vigorous opposition to the Kuhio bill by organized labor Congress did not take any action.

In the next two years, the same arguments of labor shortages, this time the arguments being backed up by the fact that men were drafted into the military service, were used in the proposals to bring in Chinese laborers. The argument was false, however, because many of the 3600 draftees in the Hawaiian infantry returned to the plantations upon their discharge & Advertiser, June 4, 10, 1919; Campsie to C. Brewer, July 12, 1919, HACO & The facts about labor shortages in Hawai'i were unclear in 1919. On the one hand, some plantations complained of labor shortages, and the HSPA had comparatively small shipments of Filipinos. & R. A. Cooke to Campsie, May 3, 1919, HACO & On the other hand, at plantations like HACO, dry weather (the lack of rain) forced the plantation to lay off laborers each Saturday and in March to the summer months, increased the days each week that the laborers were laid off. & Campsie to C. Brewer, February 6, March 13, 1919, HACO & Also putting doubt to the claims of labor shortages was the fact that the HSPA was not alarmed at reports of Filipinos and Spaniards leaving the canefields for the mainland, a flow which was limited only by the capacity of shipping lines, because the HSPA was bringing in new
laborers faster than they were leaving. \textit{Advertiser}, May 13, 1919

In fact, reports from the Philippines indicated that the HSPA could get all the laborers it wanted. There were reports of food shortages in the Philippines with the resulting higher living cost, while wages remained low, causing hundreds of Filipinos to register for work in Hawaii. The Manila Times report of July 7, 1919 pointed out that in a single day 300 registered in the Hawaiian section of the Philippine bureau of labor, and that only the limited passage space, not the number of laborers available, limits the number of shipments of laborers to Hawaii. \textit{Advertiser}, August 12, 1919

It was clear, however, that the planters wished another group of laborers, in particular the Chinese, rather than get more Filipinos. In order to push for the importation of Chinese laborers, though, the planters had to debunk the Filipinos as laborers, because of arguments that the planters could always get their laborers from the Philippines, anyway. This the Advertiser willingly did. An unsigned article reported like a news item appeared in the January 4, 1918 issue of the newspaper which blamed Filipinos for the fact that white labor left Hawaii. "With the coming of the Filipinos there has been an exodus of Spanish and Portuguese labor and departures of these races are to be noticed every year. It is hard to get any race that will work side by side with the Filipinos and that race does not remain permanently." The article then went on to claim that "there is no getting away from the fact that Filipino labor is not giving full satisfaction in the Islands. The laborers who work steadily enough to secure bonuses are soon ready to return home or go to the mainland. those who do not secure enough money are the more undesireable element who do not work steadily and who are largely responsible for such crimes of violence as are committed in the Islands. Whence will come the new labor supply?" \textit{Advertiser}, January 4, 1918

It was wrong, stated the Advertiser in another editorial, "to continue flooding these islands with Filipino coolies. This class of labor has nothing to recommend it over Chinese, Japaense or Koreans, and it has very very much against it. The criminal statistics of Hawaii offer all the evidence required to demonstrate that the Filipino as we know him is not a desireable citizen. The further fact that a large proportion of the Filipinos are probably eligible to citizenship after a residence of five years is a most potent reason why these islands should not be flooded further with this class of coolies, who may be able within a few years to take political control of the Territory without any of the qualificatios that make American citizens and intelligent voters." \textit{Advertiser}, August 22, 1918

During the strike, the \textit{Advertiser} advocated getting Chinese labor. \textit{Advertiser}, editorials, January 21, 24, 1920. Chinese labor, claimed the \textit{Advertiser}, didn't strike. It was industrious, peaceful and reliable labor. The Chinese were good residents of the islands. \textit{Advertiser}, editorial, January 21, 1920. Thus the clamor that the resolution introduced year after year by Kuhio be acted upon favorably by congress. The groundswell for the importation of Chinese took strong form in 1921. In April the territorial legislature, acting on Governor McCarthy's special message about the need for oriental labor importation or the economic life of Hawaii would be threatened, passed
another resolution asking the US congress to bring in Chinese laborers but return them after five years. The legislature also authorized the governor of the territory of Hawaii to appoint a special commission, the Hawaiian Emergency Labor Commission, to which the governor named Walter F. Dillingham as chairman and territorial senator Charles F. Chillingworth and Albert Horner as members, to be sent to the nation's capital to work for Chinese importation. Delegate Kuhio introduced the resolution on June 20, 1921 based on claims that there was a shortage of agricultural labor in the islands. This time the campaign was mounted deliberately. The editors of the two major haole newspapers, the Advertiser and the Star Bulletin, were appointed to coordinate the publicity and support campaign of the Dillingham commission. Each plantation also was visited by someone collecting signatures endorsing the emergency labor legislation. The Advertiser, August 2, 1921. Each plantation also was visited by someone collecting signatures endorsing the emergency labor legislation. Butler to All Plantations, December 30, 1921. The HSPA and the Chamber of Commerce also created an office to send telegrams, letters and radio messages to congressmen and influential friends in Washington DC. International Molders' Union, to Federal Finance Committee, Washington D.C. August 17, 1921, in BIA 227.

The Dillingham commission claimed that the emergency relief was needed because of a shortage of 14000 laborers, comprising of 6000 in sugar, 3000 in pineapple and a similar amount in the rice fields. This shortage existed because with the bonus, laborers depart and others set up their own small businesses, which in turn, were now also luring away employees. Furthermore, the Japanese were now no longer efficient, wishing instead to take control of the agricultural industries of the islands. Hawaiian Emergency Labor Commission, to President of the United States, May 19, 1921, in BIA 227; also U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, pp. 214-215. However, the commission failed to back up its claim of shortages with facts, the only facts it put forward were those furnished for the plantations by Albert Horner. Also, the only indisputable fact was that the recent sugar crop was 20 to 40% less than the output in previous years. However, critics argued that the shortage of crops might not have been due to shortage of men but to other causes such as the drought in 1919. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 647. Critics also argued that the labor shortage did not exist although there was a shortage of men wishing to do low paid field labor, the work not desired by any nationality brought to Hawaii, in which case the solution, higher wages, was not acceptable to the planters because they had to compete with Cuban and world producers. The planters also rejected the alternative, that with some high unemployment on the US mainland, the planters could bring in mainland laborers, by saying that such laborers won't work in the fields.

The actual congressional hearing on the Kuhio resolution in 1921 was dominated by the sugar industry's claim of the nationalistic chargater of the 1920 strike and by the fear of the Japanese. Hence the hearing tended to point to the political rather than the economic rationale for the resolution. That this was the intent of the resolution
was obvious in the statement of the Dillingham commission: the imported labor would "neutralize, as far as possible, the effect of the preponderance of any one nationality, and which, further, will stimulate higher efficiency among the labor in the Territory."&Hawaii Emergency Labor Commission, to the US President, May 19, 1921, BIA 227& Failure to provide Hawaii relief, warned Dillingham, could only result in the industrial and political control of the territory in the hands of the "preponderating Japanese population." &U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 218& By a strange twist of logic, proponents of the importation argued that the arrival of the Chinese would enhance Americanization, in that it would prevent the Japanese who were unassimilable, clannish, and owed loyalty to Japan rather than to the United States from controlling the islands' industries. Even the labor testimony at the hearings made similar points about the fear of the Japanese. George Wright testified that the opposition to the resolution came from the fear that the lower grade of oriental coolies would crowd the Japanese out of the plantations, forcing them into the city and federal construction work, where there was a shortage of labor, and that the white labor effort was really to keep the Japanese on the plantations as far as possible.&Wright, testimony, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 687&

Governor Farrington pointed out that the resolution for Coolie Labor was to admit the Chinese in order to make them compete with the Japanese, and also whites "to break the growing power of the Japanese; also, to get an exemption for Hawaii for Whites because the southern Europeans were illiterate and too poor to finance his journey to Hawaii--this Hawaii to be except from literacy requirements and also from the payment of these fares to Hawaii. &W. R. Farrington, Gov. to Hywell Davis, Commissioner of Conciliation, Dept.of Labor, October 31, 1922, in Commission on Labor Report, 1922, Reel 2665& Thus, Farrington wanted to admit Chinese and Europeans and restrict them by statute to field labor and domestic service; this was to be done granting Hawaii special privileges not given to other states and territories; that the Filipinos were not competitors of nor adequate replacement of the Japanese; that only PR and Fils. were now available but that the Filipino laborers were inadequate laborers; and that these aliens were restricted to field labor as aliens not eligible for citizenship were not employable in public works. &W. R. Farrington, Gov. to Hywell Davis, Commissioner of Conciliation, Dept.of Labor, October 31, 1922, in Commission on Labor Report, 1922, Reel 2665&

When the studies failed to validate any kind of labor shortage in Hawaii, and the 1922 Commission on Labor report stated that there existed no labor report in Hawaii, a twist was again tried by the establishment, which succeeded in having the secretary of Labor James Davis say that this statement of no labor shortage was included or else the Japanese government would mean it as a release from its obligation in the Gentlemen's Agreement to assume it could now issue passports to
Hawaii. In the Gentlemen’s agreement the Japaense government voluntarily assumed no passport issued to laborers to Hawaii as along as no labor shortage existed. &Letter of Sec. of Labor James Davis to secretary of State, February 7, 2923, in Reel 2665&

The Kuhio resolution failed to pass, despite the intensive campaign by the sugar planters and by supporters on US mainland. It simply ran contradictory to many many American laws, not just the Chinese Exclusion Act itself but the laws prohibiting coolie labor and contract labor, the immigration laws on the general exclusion of aliens and the literacy tests, the law banning peonage, and others, in effect making Hawaii a special case.&U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 781& A department of labor commission of five came to Hawaii toward the end of 1922 to look into the real situation of labor shortages in Hawaii. the commission concluded, despite being feted by the planters, that there was no shortage in sugar and pineapple and the only shortage was in the rice fields.&Report of the Hawaiian Labor Commission to the Secretary of Labor, Washington DC, January 5, 1923, AH& The report, however, catered to the planters’ fear of the "menace of alien domination," and that Hawaii must be American in its control of political, industrial, social and educational life of Hawaii.

With the death of the plan to bring in Chinese laborers, the HSPA imported large number of Filipinos so that by the end of 1922, the importation was cut down because the plantations were now well supplied plus the fact that the large importations had drawn opposition comments in the Philippine legislature.&R.A. Cooke to Campsie, February 3, 1923, HACO& Even Wallace R. Farrington, a supporter of the plantations, wrote: "I find a growing feeling that the importation of Filipinos is approaching the saturation point, in other words, we have enough."&W.R. Farrington, governor, to Secretary of War John W. Weeks, June 2, 1923, in BIA 227& Left with the Filipinos as the primary source of labor, the plantation changed its evaluation once again, claiming that they were satisfactory workers.&Butler to Farrington, June 9, 1923, Farrington Papers, AH&