In 1907 federal government officials, unhappy about the predominance of Asian laborers in Hawaii, continued to pressure the sugar planters to bring more whites to Hawaii. President Theodore Roosevelt himself again decried the planters' failure to encourage homesteading among white plantation hands, and so Frances M. Swanzy, Theo H. Davis' trustee on the HSPA board, urged the sugar industry to fund in full the territorial board of immigration project to recruit European laborers. "As long as we continue to introduce Europeans," he argued, "it is hoped that the Administration at Washington will overlook such efforts as have to be made to supply our wants in addition from the Orient."1 &Swanzy, Theo H. Davis, to McLennan, January 7, 1907, Laupahoehoe.

The territorial immigration board's agent in Europe, Edward R. Stackable, competed for immigrants with the southern American states and with Central American countries, in particular Chile, Argentina, and Cuba, which were offering immigrants generous land grants. He tried Italy first but ran into government opposition there. In Portugal he succeeded in securing a group of 459 men, 383 women and 382 children, which arrived in Hawaii on the S.S. Suveric merely a few days before Judd's Filipinos.1 &Board of Immigration, Territory of Hawaii, "First Report," in Planter's Monthly, vol. 26, March 1907), pp. 49-60.& In Andalusia, Spain, he also secured 700 immigrants but when their chartered ship, the Heliopolis, docked at Malaga to pick up more immigrants, half the Andalusians, complaining about the food and accommodations on board, camped out at the wharves and refused to reboard. The Spanish authorities, accusing the planters of recruiting merely to offset the Japanese predominance rather than sincerely to settle people on the land, threatened to prevent the departure of all laborers altogether.1 &Advertiser, March 10, 1907; editorial, March 27, 1907.;& Stackable was able to resolve the matter and the Heliopolis arrived in Hawaii on April 26, 1907 with the 608 men, 554 women and 1084 children on board. He sent his third shipment of 333 Portuguese men, 306 women and 475 children, on the Kumeric, which arrived in Hawaii a month and a half later. The Kumeric shipment was also fraught with controversy, as the Portuguese newspapers demanded that the territorial board improve shipboard conditions and hire a Portuguese commissioner to look after the immigrants during the voyage.
In a year's time, Stackable had sent to Hawaii a total of 4700 Portuguese and Spanish immigrants, a third of them men and nearly half children. Because of the women and children, the per capita cost for the laborers was high, ranging from $153.55 on the Suveric shipment to $235.22 on the Heliopolis, about three times the cost of Japanese laborers.\(^1\)\(^\text{Territorial Board of Immigration, "Report to the Governor," in Advertiser, April 28, 1909}\) The cost proved to be even higher in the long run, considering that they refused to remain long on the plantations. Within a month of their arrival, many had left for other plantations and for Honolulu, and some had even managed to leave for the U.S. mainland.\(^1\)\(^\text{Hackfeld to Grove Farm, October 8, 1907, GFA}\) They continued to do so in the months ahead; by May 16, 1908, less than a year after the arrival of Stackable's last shipment, 67% of the Iberian laborers, 52% of the women, and 47% of the children had left for the Pacific coast.\(^1\)\(^\text{E.A. Mott-Smith, head, Territorial Board of Immigration, to Governor Frear, July 29, 1908, in Micro. 6027-1.}\)

The Iberians, in general, found plantation conditions intolerable, and the Spaniards complained about high prices at the plantation stores and about being forced to work from 4 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. instead of the 10 hours promised by Stackable.\(^1\)\(^\text{Harry R. Bogard, Business Manager, Associated Charities of San Francisco, to Governor Walter Frear, Frear Papers, June 26, 1909, AH}\) The plantations were not happy to get the Iberians either, and the Big Five had to force the plantations to accept a quota out of each arriving shipment. At Hutchinson Sugar Company, the manager complained about the 50 families from the Suveric shipment being "dumped" on his plantation. Like the other managers, he objected to the higher cost of perquisites (housing, fuel, water and medical care) for the families, compared to that for single male Asian laborers, especially the $300 it cost to build the family cottage which the territorial board asked each plantation to provide for the Iberians, a cost twice that for an Asian laborer's cottage. "How can we adopt such elaborate schemes as bringing in white laborers with families," he complained, "when we are in the race against other sugar producing countries where the laborer's house can be made for the extravagant figure of from $8 to $25?"\(^1\)\(^\text{Manager, Hutchinson Sugar Co., to W.G. Irwin, March 7, 1907, Hutchinson&}
The plantations also griped about having to pay the Iberian laborers higher wages, about 22% more, plus an additional monthly bonus for turning out no less than 20 days a month. George Robertson, C. Brewer manager, to Ogg, HACO manager, March 28, 1905, HACO. Furthermore, as stipulated by the territorial immigration board, the plantations had to give each Portuguese laborer a house and an acre of land for a homestead, unless he chose instead to receive an additional $2 more a month. Swanzy, Theo H. Davis, to McLennan, Laupahoehoe manager, January 22, 1907; March 15, 1907, Laupahoehoe. The Spaniards were also entitled to the homestead but only upon completion of three years of work on the plantation. The plantations, reluctant to give away any of their private landholdings, objected loudly to the homesteading requirement. Swanzy, Theo H. Davies, to McLennan, Laupahoehoe manager, June 13, 1907, Laupahoehoe. Furthermore, they feared that giving the white laborers special privileges merely aroused resentment among the Asian laborers, and they saw this fear confirmed when the HSPA trustees asked them to improve the Asiatic camps, distribute some provision, and allocate space for truck gardens, all these in order to forestall resentment among the Asians.

It was the 1907 general immigration act, not plantation opposition, which ended Stackable’s recruitment by disallowing the recruitment of laborers whose passage had been paid for by corporations and individuals. In fact, Hawaii’s territorial governor George R. Carter had had to ask Theodore Roosevelt an exception for the Heliopolis and Kumeric shipments, which arrived in Hawaii after the act took effect. Advertiser, March 21, 1907. Now prevented from recruiting directly abroad, the territorial immigration board confined its activities to posting an agent in New York to induce newly arrived immigrants to proceed on to Hawaii but two years of work resulted in the recruitment of merely a hundred men who were "absolutely worthless," in the words of Richard Ivers, the secretary of the territorial board of immigration, and costly at $250 per person, the high cost incurred from having to return undesirables to the US mainland. Richard Ivers, Secretary of the Territorial Board of Immigration, interview, San Francisco Chronicle, July 18, 1910. On its part, the HSPA unsuccessfully sought to induce the Japanese and the Hindus enroute to the US mainland and Canada to remain and work for the plantations instead. It also hired Pooram Singh to recruit Hindus in California but abandoned the project when Singh demanded too much money; the few he recruited also did not take a liking to plantation work and were mostly gone from the islands by 1909. Robertson to Ogg, HACO, May 12, 18, 25, June 8, Nov. 12, 1908; March 6, 1909. HACO.
The voluntary arrival of Japanese laborers ended in November, 1907, with the signing of the Gentlemen’s Agreement, which limited the issuance of passport to former Hawaii residents and their families. But this did not bother the planters at all because the Japanese already comprised 68% of their laborers; the only other significant groups were the Portuguese at 8%, the Chinese at 7% and the Koreans at 6%. They did not wish to acquire more Japanese laborers but they desired to keep those already in Hawaii from leaving the plantations. This was a challenge because the Japanese, having to work alongside newly arrived European laborers who received higher pay and lived in better homes, justifiably felt discriminated on the plantations and sought opportunities on the American continent.

In fact, Honolulu Japanese chartered the Kumeric, after dropping off Stackable’s Portuguese recruits, to carry laborers to Vancouver and found out the many ways the planters used their influence to derail the scheme. To begin with, the Honolulu press falsely reported that the Kumeric would arrive two weeks earlier than its scheduled June 27 arrival, and as a result hundreds of plantation Japanese left their jobs for Honolulu sooner than was necessary. Furthermore, because three passengers had died of smallpox during the voyage from Europe, the Kumeric was held in quarantine for another two weeks while other vessels with the plague had been allowed to sail away again after being held for merely a few hours. The long delay left a thousand Japanese laborers stranded in Honolulu, sleeping at Aala Park and using up their meager savings while waiting to board the ship for Vancouver. The Kumeric finally sailed on July 13, losing merely 200 of the laborers who had originally booked passage; contrary to the scare stories by the planters to discourage the voyagers, all 1190 passengers were permitted to land and to obtain employment within a month upon arrival in Vancouver.
The opportunities for Japanese laborers on the American continent, however, were gradually closing down. Race riots on the West Coast led On March 14, 1907, Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order barring the entry to the United States mainland of Korean and Japanese laborers whose passports had originally been issued for Mexico, Canada and Hawaii. Two months after the Kumeric's arrival in Canada, the race riots which had resulted in the exclusion of Asians from the US mainland had spread to Canada. In particular, a very large riot in early September forced 2000 Chinese to flee Vancouver, subjected the Japanese and the Hindus to mob attacks.1 &Advertiser, September 9, 1907& As a result of the riots, Canadian authorities stopped admitting Japanese laborers from Hawaii by mid-October. By late 1907, the Advertiser gloated that the Hawaii Japanese who wished to go elsewhere was now limited to Mexico, where the opportunities were not attractive.1 &Advertiser, October 12, 1907&

Because of all these developments, the HSPA at the end of 1907 had direct access to merely two places for labor, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, both being under American control. Neither was satisfactory. The planters had declared Judd's recruitment a failure and, based on a previous experience, had not been happy with Puerto Rican recruits. Earlier, between December 1900 and October 1901, they had brought in eleven shipments of Puerto Rican laborers. The planters had not recruited carefully, however, and had shipped many who were weak and anemic, having been driven out of mountain growing areas by a hurricane into the coast, and also "a considerable number of petty criminals, wharf rats and prostitutes from Ponce and other coastal towns."1 &Bureau of Labor And Statistics, Report, 1902, pp. 26-28.& Unfit for plantation work, the Puerto Ricans had wandered around in Hawaii rather than work on the plantations despite inducements of a bonus and superior quarters, and had embarrassed the planters for their reputation as petty thieves.
THE HIGHER WAGE MOVEMENT

Each year in late November or early December, all of Hawaii watched as the Big Five executives, plantation managers, and HSPA technicians gathered for the HSPA annual meeting, three days of committee sessions on labor, new scientific techniques, mechanization, welfare, and many others, capped by a formal banquet. The annual HSPA meeting invariably opened with the address of the outgoing president, reviewing the highlights of the year and providing a glimpse of the hopes and fears of the sugar men. At the 1908 meeting, HSPA president F.A. Schaeffer began on the happy note that it had been a year of record crops and good sugar prices, and ended on the apprehensive note that labor problems loomed because the plantations depended largely on one nationality.¹ &F.A. Schaeffer, Address, HSPA Annual meeting, in Advertiser, November 10, 1908& He needed not be more explicit because everyone at the meeting had been anxiously following the agitation in the Japanese community.

The agitation began on October 11, 1908 when the Japanese Retail Merchants' Association of Honolulu passed a resolution urging the HSPA to raise the wages of plantation hands immediately. The Japanese community in Honolulu took up the resolution in a public opinion campaign and the Higher Wage Consumption Association was organized in mid-December to act on the resolution. On December 19, the Higher Wage Consumption Association presented the HSPA with a petition that the wages of Japanese plantation hands be raised from $18 to $22.50 a month so as to equal that of other nationalities, and conditions in the Japanese camps be improved. It argued that better pay and living conditions were necessary now that the Japanese were raising families on the plantations.¹ &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1910, pp. 726-762.&
The planters rejected the petition outright, pointing out that even at the existing wage rates, the Japanese managed to send money to Japan. The HSPA trustees refused even to call a meeting of plantation managers to discuss the movement, as such a meeting might be interpreted by the Japanese as giving heed to the agitation.1 &Robertson to Ogg, January 9, 1909, HACO& Furthermore, they believed that the higher wage movement was merely the work of Honolulu agitators, without any support among the Japanese laborers on the plantations.1 &Robertson To Ogg, November 13, 1908, HACO& The planters identified the agitation leaders as Frederick Kinzaburo Makino, the chairman of the Higher Wage Association, and his lieutenant, Motoyoki Negoro. Makino, of English mother and Japanese father, came to Hawaii at age 22 just before the turn of the century and ran a drugstore in downtown Honolulu. Negoro had just moved to Hawaii after earning his bachelor of laws from the University of California at Berkeley and as the associate editor of the Nippu Jiji, had become in a short time an intense cruzader for Japanese causes. He started the campaign to recall Consul Miki Saito for siding with the planters against the Japanese laborers and protested the dirty tenement conditions in the Japanese section of Honolulu.

Negoro's fiery articles in the Nippu Jiji branded the newspaper as the voice of the higher wage movement. Two other Honolulu Japanese language newspapers owned by Sumetaro Sheba, the Hawaii Shimpo, a 10-page morning paper founded in 1893, making it the oldest and best known of the Honolulu Japanese papers, and the Jiji Shim bun, a 4-page evening paper, were very conservative and gave the planters little trouble, as was the fourth Honolulu Japanese newspaper, the Hawaiian Japanese Chronicle. The HSPA closely monitored the Nippu Jiji articles about the higher wage movement, reprinted in translation and rebutted the most incendiary ones in the Advertiser. When a Nippu Jiji article called "traitors, enemies of our laborers and of the 70,000 Japanese in Hawaii," the Japanese opposed wage raises, the Advertiser warned: "The people whose capital is invested will continue to run the business and if the coolies object to that, it will simply remove all local objections to the importation of European labor through the United States and, in the end the Japanese, to keep from being starved out, will be ready to work for anything they can get. Is it not best for them to let well alone enough?"1 &Advertiser, January 12, 1909&
The Advertiser accused the Nippu Jiji of threatening harm to the editors of the conservative Honolulu Japanese newspapers, advocating violence against opponents of the higher wages movement, and calling for the extermination of the lunas (plantation foremen), charges which resulted in the indictment of Yasutaro Soga, Nippu Jiji’s editor, by a territorial grand jury on a misdemeanor charge for being a disorderly person responsible for the threatening attitude of the Japanese High Wage Consummation Association. All in all, though, the Advertiser misrepresented the reports in the Japanese press. Exploiting the war scare with Japan and the anti-Japanese agitation on the mainland United States, the Advertiser, for example, reported that the Hilo Shimbun, a radical newspaper, had advocated Japan sending warships in order to back up the demands of the Japanese laborers during a strike; yet The Hilo Shimbun story, which the Advertiser reprinted, merely pointed out that if the laborers met with little success in their demand for wage increases, they might petition the Tokyo government to send ships to take the laborers to possible opportunities in Korea and Manchuria. The Advertiser warned that if the Japanese persisted in their agitation for higher wages the planters would merely bring in Puerto Ricans, contrary to earlier HSPA portraits claiming that "From the reports of the plantations with experience with Porto Rican labor, the majority of these Islanders have proved to be efficient laborers." It also warned that the planters would bring in more Filipinos because those who had been tried out had shown themselves to be industrious and fairly efficient. The Advertiser threats provoked even the conservative the Hawaii Shimpo in its March 28, 1909 English edition to attack the Filipinos as lazy and the Puerto Ricans as vicious: "The Filipinos are of Malay extraction and inferior in intellect, brawn and industry to the Japanese or Chinese. The Porto Ricans are of a mongrel race and have inherited the vices of a dozen inferior peoples with the virtue of none."
This new Japanese threat prompted the planters to plan to recruit laborers, ideally from Asia. But it faced federal criticism if it did so, unless it first showed efforts to bring in white laborers. The planters first had to demonstrate to federal officials its efforts to settle whites in Hawaii. They found a way around the 1907 immigration law which prevented the recruitment of labor through private contributions but allowed states and territories to use public funds. On March 8, 1909 the one hundred leading men in the territory, all connected with the sugar industry, met with Governor Walter Frear and pushed an immigration bill through the territorial legislature, a bill which would raise more than half a million dollars over two years through a 2% tax on incomes above $4000 (which practically meant solely the plantation companies). They disguised it as a conservation bill by setting aside for conservation a fourth of the amount raised. There was popular opposition, mainly among the native Hawaiians, who not only felt threatened politically by the arrival of Europeans but also claimed that many Hawaiians were actually available for plantation labor if only the planters would pay decent wages; they argued that immigration would merely perpetuate the two class system in Hawaii—the capitalist planter class and the pauper class.1

Advertiser, March 11, 1909.

Other opponents of the bill objected to the institution of an income tax. However, the opposition faded before the power of the sugar industry, and the bill passed the legislature in a matter of two weeks. By mid-April the territorial board of immigration had already sent A.J. Campbell to recruit in Europe.1

Advertiser, April 14, 1909.
THE JAPANESE STRIKE

On May 9, 1909, after an all night meeting, the entire force of 1300 Japanese laborers at Honolulu Plantation Company at Aeia walked out. They were joined by 250 Chinese who, however, returned to work two days later when the Chinese consul convinced them that they had no cause to ally with the Japanese. The next day, the 2000 Japanese at Waipahu plantation also went on strike, followed by the Ewa plantation Japanese on May 15, the Kahuku plantation Japanese on the 21st, and the Waialua Japanese on the 24th. By May 25, 7000 Japanese on the five major Oahu plantations had gone on strike, a situation the planters had not faced before as previous strikes had been confined to a single plantation. More troubling were the rumors that the Japanese on the outer island plantations would also strike, though they proved to be false.¹ 

¹This account of the strike was constructed from the Advertiser, May 20 to 28, 1909.

At Aeia, the strikers sent a letter to Manager George Ross. After expressing their appreciation for his kindness and favor, the letter stated that "it has become our painful burden to hereby respectfully present to you our request for reasonable increase in wages."¹ 

¹Advertiser, May 14, 1909. It asked for a $2 increase in the common laborers' monthly wages and proportional increases in the other jobs. The letter also asked for the replacement of old plantation homes, the repair of roads leading to their camps, the punctual departure of the trains carrying the laborers to the cane fields, and the notification to the Higher Wage Association by any plantation intending to dismiss a laborer. The demands were similar to those presented by the other strikers on the other plantations.
The Advertiser dismissed the demands as unrealistic, portrayed the laborers "living contentedly and getting better wages than they ever dreamed of at home," and accused the agitators, Makino, Negoro, and Nippu Jiji's editor Yasuțaro Soga of having called the strike in order to line their own pockets. All throughout the strike the Advertiser published unverified, unfounded articles maligning the strike leaders: the leaders were collecting strike funds merely to emnrich themselves; Makino demanded payment of $50 each time he went to the plantations to advise the strikers; the leaders called the strike in order to profit as emigration agents directing the Japanese to South America; Makino deposited a large amount of the strike fund to his own account at the Yokohama Bank in Honolulu; the leaders blackmailed Japanese house servants in Honolulu into contributing to the strike fund; Makino sought to call off the strike if the planters employed him at $12,000 a year.

From the beginning the planters refused to negotiate with the strikers. They did not see the main issue as one of wages. E.F. Bishop, expressing the sentiment of his fellow HSPA trustees, pointed out that if the planters gave in to the $2 a month increase demanded by the Higher Wage Association, the total cost would amount to a mere $60,000 a month on all the plantations, a small matter for the sugar industry. What mattered to Bishop and the trustees was the danger that giving in to an organized demand would merely encourage the Japanese and other groups to press for further demand. While admitting that "it is unjust that the brown man gets less for his labor than the white who works alongside him and often behind him," Bishop would not recognize the strike by the Japanese laborers.

Joseph Lightfoot, the strikers' lawyer, urged the plantations, currently enjoying the high price of sugar and paying an average of 20 to 30% dividends to their stockholders, to be generous and concede to the strikers' demands but the HSPA trustees and plantation managers at a joint meeting on May 27 resolved to make no concession whatsoever.
Instead, the strikers were given the ultimatum: return to work or else vacate their homes and move out of the plantation premises. On May 20 and for the next four days, the scene on the plantations resembled a wartime exodus as the Japanese lined the plantation roads with their baggage and then began the long march to Honolulu's Chinatown. At the Aala Lane soup kitchen, long lines of hungry strikers and their families waited for a place on the tables. At first some strikers were able to find employment on the outer island plantations; by the end of May, however, the Big Five had instructed all plantations not to hire striking Japanese.\footnote{Robertson to Ogg, May 29, July 14, 1909, HACO}\footnote{Robertson to Ogg, May 29, July 14, 1909, HACO} The blacklist was extended to new Japanese laborers as well. It was only three months later, on August 24, 1909 when the outer island plantations suffered serious labor shortages, that the HSPA trustees secretly withdrew the ban on hiring Japanese workers.\footnote{Robertson to Ogg, May 29, July 14, 1909, HACO}\footnote{Robertson to Ogg, May 29, July 14, 1909, HACO}

As plantation critics suspected, many in Honolulu would turn out for plantation jobs if the wages were attractive enough. Each morning a special train with a long canvas streamer proclaiming its mission left the Honolulu depot with 1500 strikebreakers for the plantations, attracted by wages of $1.50 a day, twice the regular plantation laborer wages. The HSPA had to turn away a fourth of the men who showed up at the depot, and fights often broke out as the Chinese, who sought to be first at the gate leading to the train shed, were forced by the police, by the Hawaiians and the Portuguese to the rear. At the end of the month, Waialua and Kahuku plantations had found an additional 1700 strikebreakers from the windward side of the island.\footnote{Advertiser, May 18, 20, 24, 30, 1909}\footnote{Advertiser, May 18, 20, 24, 30, 1909}

The strikers had few sympathizers. White tradesmen, contemptuous of Oriental labor and threatened by its incursion into urban jobs, did not provide any assistance. Within the Japanese community opinion was divided along class lines. Except for a few who advised the strikers, the Japanese community leaders took the planters' side. Japan's consul general Uyeno, like his predecessors, also supported the planters and on May 25 issued a proclamation urging the strikers to return to work. Several times during the strike he visited the plantations in order to exhort the men to return to work. The strikeleaders, he wrote in his report to Tokyo, were mere irresponsible agitators.\footnote{Advertiser, May 25, 1909}\footnote{Advertiser, May 25, 1909}
June 6, June 10, 1909

Because the sugar industry had virtual control over the main shipping, distribution and financial resources of the islands the Japanese merchants faced considerable economic pressure. "The planters," warned the Advertiser, "have it in their power to fix the local price of rice by what they are willing to pay for that product. Dear rice would soon exhaust a strike maintenance fund." The Japanese storekeepers, fearful of white pressures and of considerable loss if the strikers were not rehired, refused to give credit and dealt only on a cash basis with the strikers. On May 25 the Japanese Merchants Associations passed two resolutions, one urging the strikers to return to work, and another seeking to prevent the strike from spreading to the other plantations. Short of cash because they had not been paid by their customers while creditors were pressing them for payments, many Japanese merchants couldn't pay for their goods awaiting delivery at the pier. Such pressures forced the two associations, the Japanese Retail Merchants Association and the Japanese Wholesale Merchants Association, on June 6 to renew their back to work call to the strikers.

At the start of the strike, Fred Makino boasted that the Japanese Higher Wage Consummation Association could raise $40,000, enough to feed the strikers for months, but the organization had raised merely a tenth of that amount by the end of May and it was spending $600 a day on food and support of the strikers and their families. By the first week of June the planters' strategy of waiting out the strikers began to pay off, as suffering dented the will of the strikers. On June 4 a third of the Waialua plantation strikers returned to work, and the rest followed by June 10. On the 7th, the Ewa strikers also returned after being told by a Japanese Christian minister and a Buddhist priest that the strike was wrong. Throughout June and July the workers on the other plantations slowly returned to work. The strike ended on August 4 when the Higher Wage Association at a secret meeting passed a resolution advising the Japanese to return to work unconditionally; four days later the association disbandes. With the strike settled, the wages of the strikebreakers were reduced to the regular rates and once again the Oahu plantations faced a labor shortage.
The end came fast when the planters immobilized the strike leaders. On June 10, without a warrant and without the approval of Governor Walter Frear (who had been on the outer islands) nor of territorial attorney general C.K. Hemenway, the sheriff of Honolulu, William Henry, acting under the direction of the HSPA legal counsel firm of Kinney, Ballou, Prosser and Anderson, arrested Makino, Negoro, Soga and the other leaders. Directed by the HSPA lawyers, Sheriff Henry searched the stores and rooms of the Japanese leaders and dynamited open Makino’s safe. No due process of law had been followed in the arrest and in the collection of evidence; when these were carried out, lawyers Kinney and Prosser, who directed the moves, had not been commissioned deputy attorney general. The Japanese leaders had been illegally held under investigation for 48 hours by Mr. Kinney and county attorney general Cathcart.1 &C. K. Hemenway, in Advertiser, October 1, 1913; Governor Frear to Secretary of the Interior, November 14, 1911, in 644 no. 3.2 Furthermore, though obtained illegally, the account books and papers of the labor association, the personal correspondence of Makino and Negoro, and the papers of the Nippu Jiji were ruled admissible evidence by the territorial supreme court. The strikeleaders were tried by a statement of Honolulu Sheriff Henry rather than by an indictment of a grand jury. All throughout the incident, the power of the planters became manifest.
The leaders were charged with conspiring, through the strike, to prevent the plantation from carrying their business and the HSPA counsel of Kinney, Prosser, Ballou and Anderson, arguing that the strike was conducted in order to confiscate the wealth and power of the plantations, conducted the prosecution. Charges after charges were filed against each of the leaders in order to overwhelm the sole defense counsel, Joseph Lightfoot. The main witness against the strike leaders, the newspaper publisher Sumetaro Sheba, also translated the evidence for the court. The trial's outcome was determined by an unfortunate incident on August 4 when T. Mori, a Wailuku Japanese, tried to stab Sheba; the incident was taken as proof that the incendiary propaganda of the higher wage movement incited violence. After a quick 21 day trial, the Japanese leaders were found guilty of third degree conspiracy, fined $300 each, and sentenced to 10 months in prison, although the sentences were later commuted. The trial coverage was in the Advertiser, June 21-22, July 18, 21, 24-25, 30, August 5, 8, 23, 1909. The judge, Thomas De Bolt, was promoted to the territorial supreme court three months after the trial, which also sustained his decision shortly after, Advertiser, March 6, 1910. In 1915 in an out of court settlement Makino withdrew his $50,000 damage suit against HSPA lawyers for illegally carting away his safe, Advertiser, July 9, 28, 1915. S. Sheba denied charges of HSPA control. "I lost quite a bit of money during that period," he said about the strike, "and when the strike was over the planters made good the deficit. I have never denied it; but that doesn't mean that I was bought," Advertiser, November 11, 1912. His Kauai newspaper had been subsidized by the Kauai Planters Association, Report of the Treasurer, Kauai Planters Association, March 19, 1908, GFA. Because of the trial, Joseph Lightfoot gained the unwelcomed reputation of being "the only Democratic attorney in Hawaii," a reputation he was eager to repudiate, Advertiser, February 16, 1917. On January 4, 1911 he took out a large advertisement in the Advertiser protesting the employment of a Japanese in the Department of Public Instructions. His seventh grade child at Central Grammar School had a Japanese teacher: "Think about it!" said the ad. "A Japanese teaching white children in the schools. I never heard of such an outrage." He was referring to Miss Tokie Miamoto, an honor graduate of the Normal School, who had been raised by a prominent haole family and who spoke not a word of Japanese. But all these did not matter to Lightfoot: "I don't care how qualified the girl may be, she is a Jap and no Jap can be properly qualified to teach white children," Advertiser, January 4, 1911.
The 1909 strike was more serious than any previous strikes. First it involved several plantations. Secondly, the strike had mobilized Japanese laborers at all levels of plantation work—day laborers, long term cultivators, skilled workers and mill workers. There was danger in depending on a single ethnic group at all levels of plantation work, disrupting field and mill operations at the same time. Even before the strike ended, therefore, the Big Five began to place different ethnic groups on the different occupational levels. C. Brewer instructed its plantations to "place the whites (the Portuguese and Hawaiians) into sugar houses and let out the Japs into the fields," and "replace all or part of the mill gang with some other breed than the Jap. I am sure we can get a number of young Scotchmen for machinists' work and Hawaiians or Portuguese for centrifugals and other duties about the boiling house."

Robertson, C. Brewer to Ogg, July 21, 1909, HACO & The HSPA also sought to reduce the Japanese presence on the labor force. "As the Japanese leave the plantation for one cause or another," reported the Advertiser, "their place will be filled with men of other nationalities, so that the proportion of any one class of labor here may never again be so great as in the past."

Advertiser, August 6, 1909.
Such a strategy required a workforce of many diverse nationalities. During the strike, therefore, the territorial immigration board sent A. J. Campbell, former territorial treasurer, to Europe and A. L. Atkinson, former territorial secretary, to Harbin, Manchuria. The Russian government, having encouraged farmers from the Ural district to settle at Harbin, had more applicants than it could settle; in addition, some settlers, unhappy about the isolation of their new home, wished to come to Hawaii. Atkinson sent an initial group of 225 Russians, originally from Kiev, Volga and Poltana provinces, to Hawaii on October 22, 1909 and this initial group was followed by a larger lot of 1535 on February 17, 1910. Although a relatively high 60% of these Russians accepted plantation employment, they soon grew disillusioned, complained to the Russian consul in Seoul and Yokohama, and hired Joseph Lightfoot to take up their grievances with the authorities. They charged deception in many ways: they claimed that they had been brought to Hawaii by a trust (the HSPA) rather than by the territorial government; they were paid wages lower than promised; they were assessed for items like the bango or metal number tag, the use of the hose, and accountbook; they were paid in credit at the plantation store rather than in cash. In turn, the plantations complained about their Russian allocations: for each 1000 tons of sugar produced in 1909, a plantation had to build a house for a Russian family; furthermore, it had to pay the Russians a high rate of $22 a month plus perquisites. & Hackfeld to G.N. Wilcox, February 11, 1910, February 21, 1910; E.D. Tenney to Governor Frear, March 31, 1910, in Frear Papers, AH&
Between 1909 and 1913, the territorial board brought to Hawaii 5449 Spaniards, 2758 Portuguese and 2121 Russians. Like before, the cost per male laborer proved to be very high: $177.26 for each Russian adult male and $239.54 for the Iberian male.\(^1\) Governor Frear, Annual Report to the Secretary of Interior, 1913, Frear Papers, AH. Also in Advertiser, August 12, 1912\(^2\) Few also remained on plantation employment. Only nine per cent of the Russians still remained on plantation employment by July 1912, prompting the HSPA trustees to oppose emphatically any further plans by the territorial board to get more from Manchuria.\(^1\) Advertiser, July 12, 1912\(^2\) The Iberians did not remain either; nine out of ten who came each year between 1905 and 1914 had left for California within a year or two of their arrival.\(^1\) Governor Pinkham to Secretary of the Interior, April 20, 1914, Micro 644, Reel 7\(^2\)

By 1913 the continued recruitment of European laborers had brought about several problems. The Hawaii planters' desire to bring merely illiterates went against national legislation, and an exemption for Hawaii would only be misused as a precedent for later discriminatory legislation. The planters' opposition to homesteading made it difficult to attract immigrants to the islands. Worldwide overproduction of sugar and canned pineapple in 1913 resulted in widespread unemployment on the plantations. The drift of Spanish and Portuguese laborers to California compelled labor leaders there to seek an executive order barring these Iberians from Hawaii, similar to Theodore Roosevelt's order for the Japanese and Koreans in 1907.\(^1\) Advertiser, February 7, 1913.\(^2\) As a result of all these problems, Lucius Pinkham, upon assuming the governorship of Hawaii in 1913 stopped the territorial board's importation of European laborers.\(^1\) Pinkham to Secretary of Interior, April 20, 1914, Pinkham Papers, AH\(^2\)
SAKADA 1909

The Honolulu newspapers widely publicized the arrival of the Iberian and Russian laborers during the Japanese strike but did not pay attention to the steady arrival of Filipinos out of fear that it would draw federal criticism.

It was in early February 1909 when the HSPA sought permission from the Philippine Commission to resume recruitment. The Commission, adopting a "hands off policy," responded that it would not pass any rules controlling the movement of Filipinos to Hawaii. Immediately the HSPA sent Lucius E. Pinkham to Manila to set up the recruitment.

Massachusetts-born Pinkham had come to Hawaii in 1892 to set up a coal handling plant and stayed on to become the manager of a hardware company, and later, the president of the territory’s board of health. He had frequently been the center of controversy, being notoriously anti-Japanese and pro-sugar. In 1905 he headed a commission funded by the planters purportedly to look into the labor question in Hawaii but white unionists exposed the commission’s work as one of drawing support for the sugar industry’s plan to import Chinese laborers.

As head of the HSPA recruitment in Manila, Pinkham smoothed matters with government officials, arranged transportation for the recruits, and supervised the recruiters. He used the same contract that Judd had designed, eliminating only the deduction of $2 a month for the return passage. GFA has a copy of the 1909 agreement. Because contract labor was no longer valid, the agreement was not enforceable in court; however, the HSPA considered the terms of the agreement morally binding, even though the laborers could abnegate on the terms of the contract. For the HSPA Manila office, Pinkham purchased an old seminary in San Nicolas street in the old district of Tondo, and he turned it into offices, three sleeping dorms, a gymnasium, a dining room and a medical clinic.
From the Manila office, Selden W. Taylor and his Filipino assistants fanned outward in the adjacent Tagalog provinces to sign up people for Hawaii. After a short stay in this dorm, the recruits from Luzon were shipped on three 3000-ton steamers, the Tean, the Taming and the Kaifong, under contract with the English firm Butterfield-Swire, to Hongkong where they were housed in a four story boardinghouse near the waterfront while awaiting further passage on the Pacific Mail steamers or the Toyo Kisen Kaisha. Pinkham contracted with Hongkong tailors to make a set of clothes and underwear for the Filipinos and he also provided each recruit a blanket, towel, soap, and dining articles for the long voyage to Hawaii via Japan.  

The largest shipments to Hawaii, however, came not from the main island of Luzon but from the Visayas, a group of small, heavily populated islands at the center of the Philippines, where Oswald Steven directed the recruiting. In fact, Pinkham credited Steven in the Visayas with opening up the 1909 recruitment. The Visayans had been used to going elsewhere, to pioneer or to find employment in the rubber, copra, and hemp plantations in Mindanao, the large island immediately south. They found it difficult to earn a living at home, where the islands were predominantly hilly, with little flat arable coastal land so that even slopes of 40 to 45 degree angles were cultivated. The island of Cebu, shaped like a fat cigar, 120 miles long and 20 miles wide at the bulge in the middle, with a mountain spine down the center, lay at the center of the Visayas. Like the other Visayan islands, it was overpopulated and most were tenant farmers. Oswald Steven established his recruiting office in Cebu City, careful to stay away from Negros in order not to incur the ire of the sugar planters there, Steven regularly visited the islands of Bohol, Panay, Leyte and Siquijor and, using a steamer he bought in Hongkong, transported his recruits to Cebu for eventual shipment to Hawaii.
Steven hired three Filipino assistants, a married couple from Cebu and a man from Siquijor island, and carefully coached them on "how they have made out in Hawaii," though never having been there. The three told how they wore rags when they left the Philippines but were now well dressed, "sporting clothes of the latest cut, American shoes, watch and chain, and everything else that goes to make up what they understood by being well dressed. They look strong and healthy, and no trace is visible of the pangs of hunger."1 

Steven, in Advertiser, August 10, 1910 & Adapting to the many languages spoken in various islands, Steven and his assistants described how laborers could earn in Hawaii four to six times their customary annual earnings. "Mr. Steven," commented the Manila Daily Bulletin, "had the reputation of luring many a hard, round dollar from a reluctant fist through his persuasive eloquence on the auction block in Honolulu. He is also meeting with the same degree of success in his efforts to enlist Filipinos for the cane fields of Hawaii."1 

&Reprinted in the Advertiser, August 11, 1911, p.2&

Steven sent his recruits directly to Hongkong to avoid the attention and criticism that large shipments of laborers through Manila would attract.1 &Advertiser, August 6, 1909, from a Manila Times dispatch.& Their arrival in Hawaii also went unnoticed by the press. His first shipment, consisting of 42 men and three women destined for the stricken Kāhuku plantation, arrived on the S.S. Korea on July 20, 1909, at the time of the trial of the Japanese strike leaders. His second shipment arrived a week later, consisting of 124 men, 14 women and 2 children bound for the other stricken Oahu plantations.1 &W.O. Smith to Ed Towse, March 3, 1911, in Report of the Committee on Agriculture and Immigration, House of Representatives, Territory of Hawaii, Session 1911& Each month thereafter, Pinkham sent two to three shipments of Filipinos from Manila and Cebu, for a total of 809 in 1909 and 3,349 the following year.1 &HSPA, compiled from steamship figures&
From then on came a steady stream of Filipino laborers to Hawaii through two streams. One stream consisted of Steven’s recruits sent from Cebu to Hongkong, where they boarded Japanese steamers to Honolulu, stopping at Shanghai and Japan ports. The lesser stream consisted of those from Manila and adjacent Tagalog provinces, leaving Manila on the Pacific Mail steamers for Nagasaki and on to Honolulu, and while it had fewer stops, the arrangement was not totally satisfactory to the HSPA either because on the Pacific Mail line the Filipinos were handled like cattle and the ships had no heat in steerage. Despite the dissatisfaction with these travel arrangements they remained unchanged for the next two decades.

The large numbers sent each year belied the difficulties that Steven and Selden Taylor encountered in signing up the laborers. They heard in the barrios stories of monsters, lions, and cannibals in Hawaii, as well as reports of starvation among Judd’s recruits. They found the Filipinos reluctant to emigrate, a fact Pinkham attributed to the Filipinos being fatalists, present-oriented and home-loving, as well as to their timidity and suspiciousness. Despite the dissatisfaction with these travel arrangements they remained unchanged for the next two decades.

In late July 1909 Steven found his shipment of 500 Iloilo laborers held up by the townspeople who invoked an old Spanish law which allowed only adults to emigrate. In late December, 1910 Steven faced the townspeople of Tacloban Cebu lined up at the docks armed with clubs and sticks to prevent the embarcation of a hundred recruits; despite the constabulary coming to his rescue, Steven lost all but 38 of the laborers. This incident was repeated in several other towns in the Visayas as well.
Deception played a role in the recruitment of some laborers as well. Like the other nationalities, the Filipinos brought up charges of bad faith and misrepresentation against the HSPA recruiters. On December 31, 1909 a group of 94 newly arrived Filipinos claimed that they had been promised wages to begin from the time they sailed from Manila. Upon arrival in Honolulu they went to Royal D. Mead at the HSPA labor bureau to collect their first wages but Mead pointed out to them that the written contract did not specify receiving their wages starting with their departure from Manila. The Filipinos then pointed out that the written contract did not agree with what they had been verbally promised; furthermore, they claimed that the contract, hastily thrust before them for signature just before the ship sailed from Manila, was written in a combination of Spanish and two other Filipino languages, none of which the group could understand. Unable to get any satisfaction from Mead, the group went to Attorney General Charles R. Hemenway, who sought to clarify matters. Mead "with his usual courtesy intimidated that it was none of Mr. Hemenway's business and none of the territory's business. The Filipinos were not brought to Hawaii by the territorial board of immigration but by the labor bureau of the planters' association and neither Mr. Hemenway nor the government of Hawaii had anything to say about it."

Advertiser, January 1, 1910

Many complaints of deception persisted. Some schoolboys seeking summer work claimed that they had been deceived by the recruiters into boarding the ship for Hawaii on the pretext that the students were merely going to Zambales for jobs; others, that Hawaii was so near that they could come back every weekend to visit parents; and still others, desirous of going to school on the US mainland, that they could first raise the money in Honolulu to pursue their schooling and from there it was a simple matter of taking the train to San Francisco. Nicolas Dizon, Daguiti Filipinos Ditoy Hawaii, pp. ___
In the fall of 1910 Roque Payumo and a dozen other laborers signed up with Gregorio Santos, an HSPA subagent, to be recruited. The laborers thought that the agreement was for work in Cavite, a province adjacent to Manila. After a short stay at the Manila HSPA dormitory, they were shipped on the Taming on what they thought would be a short trip to Cavite. They were confined in the forehold and allowed on deck only on the third day, nearing Hongkong. A passenger on the Taming, E.J. Kappler, intervened on behalf of 19 year old Macario Macarinas, and in Hongkong, Kappler went to court to petition Macarinas’s release and to file charges of kidnapping against the HSPA. Meanwhile Payumo and the other laborers claimed that HSPA agents prevented them from seeking help from the American consul in Hongkong and tricked them into boarding the S.S. Manchuria for Hawaii. S.W. Taylor, the head recruiter in Manila, instructed his Hongkong agents to turn loose any laborers who did not desire to go on to Hawaii but Kappler objected to the way the Filipinos would be cast adrift and penniless in the colony. Taylor accused Kappler of being a meddler, of being responsible for the laborers’ rebellion; however, a Manila Times editorial praised Kappler, a disinterested bystander for calling attention to an evident wrong. Although the laborers, upon their return to Manila, filed a complaint, they felt ignored by the authorities because they were merely ignorant laborers. One of the laborers, insisting he had been induced to sign a contract under false representation, made confused statements and when threatened with perjury decided not to pursue his charges. The judge acquitted Santos because the laborers could not prove that they had signed the contract under false pretense; furthermore, the judge ruled that the laborers, having stayed at the HSPA station in company of others going to Hawaii, should have known about the Hawaii recruitment and should have seen copies of the contract posted at the HSPA station.
Pinkham and his recruiters found themselves defendants in other suits for violating American and Philippine laws. In February 1910, Pinkham and a Filipino subagent were hailed in court for signing up two boys, both 16, in violation of a Philippine law forbidding the inducement of a minor to abandon the house of his parents or guardian.1 &Advertiser, February 8, 1910. & A few months later, a recruiter, Jose Alba, was sued for inducing pupils at a Protestant industrial school in Iloilo to enter contract labor in Hawaii. Pinkham, on two occasions, had to defend himself on charges of violating American laws—once for signing up a Chinese for contract labor in Hawaii and the other for offering two Macao boys plantation employment.1 &Advertiser, March 2, 1910, February 6, 1911&

However, the success of recruitment was due to two factors. First it was a time of dislocation for the Filipinos. There was the change from the Spanish to American rule and the youth sought opportunities else by leaving their villages, and even their country. Thus they ended up in the cities. This was the case with the recruits of Pinkham until 1913.

The first shipments of Filipinos included many who had been recruited from Philippine cities, "wharf rats." It was a time of restlessness among Philippine youth, a restlessness brought about by new opportunities and the change in the political order from the static Spanish rule to the American rule, and the Filipino youth sought education, employment or both in the cities of Manila and Cebu. This was the story of many of Pinkham’s recruits.
One of them was Charles Richie, born in a small island in the Visayas but left for Manila to attend public schools and the Philippine Normal School and then working as a machinist with an American company. Ritchie came in 1910 as an HSPA recruit, worked for merely six months on a Maui plantation before leaving for Hilo, and eventually ended up in Honolulu as a movie operator. Mariano Amboy had a similar story, leaving the remote island of Batanes to seek opportunities from place to place and worked in Manila for 10 years before signing up for Hawaii in 1913. He stayed but a year on a plantation, and ended up in Honolulu selling dry goods to plantation Filipinos. He later left for New York to study design and upon returning to Honolulu, he opened a tailor shop. Manila-born Maximo Manalo, a 1912 sakada, had studied lithography and decoration, and then apprenticed himself to a well known Manila artist, and ended up in Honolulu as a salesman and cafe owner. Crispin de Lara attended Spanish school in Manila and worked at an iron works factory before coming to Hawaii in 1909 and after a few months left the plantation he was assigned to in order to work as a mechanic at Kahului railroad. &From Cariaga, Prominent Filipinos in Hawaii, and other sources& Other early recruits had similar stories to tell. Daniel Rosario and Lope Deang left their hometown, moved to Manila for schooling and jobs, and came to Hawaii in 1909. Lorenzo Sequito, and Enrique Antonio, both 1912 sakadas, had worked in city businesses in the Philippines. Sequito ended up an interpreter at Honolulu police courts. A mere one fourth of the passengers on the S.S. Mongolia’s controversial voyage in 1910 were listed as farmers; the rest had been earlier engaged in such urban occupations as firemen, tailor, chauffer, mason, carpenter, and even as an engineer. &trace this source, a BIA document, I think&
Some of the early sakadas had even travelled outside the Philippines in search of opportunities. Simon Blasco had been to China and Japan before coming to Hawaii in 1911. He stayed at Olaa plantation for four years, and then ended up in Honolulu for night schooling, and then in Hilo to operate a meat market. Remigio Perida left his hometown to attend public schools in Manila, and then signed on with a Japanese ship which took him to Australia and South America. When he was recruited by the HSPA in Manila in 1913, he had already spent a year in Stockton, California. After a year's work on a big island plantation, Perida moved to Honolulu to open his own tailor shop.

THE CONTINUING MIGRATION STREAM

Having begun the migration stream, Pinkham, Steven and Taylor kept up the large shipments of Filipino recruits even though the Japanese strike had already been settled. They did so for several reasons. For one, laborers continued to leave in large numbers for other opportunities in Hawaii, for their homeland, or for the American west coast. The Japanese continued to leave Hawaii in large numbers. There were 31,477 of them on the plantations in 1908 but by 1911 there remained merely 27,039 (or a 16.4% drop). By 1913 the number had dropped further by 30% to 24,282. To replace the Japanese, the HSPA stepped up the Filipino recruitment; where there had been merely 644 Filipinos on the plantations in 1909, there were 8101 or an increase of almost 13 times by 1913.

Furthermore, the planters were not really convinced that the end of the 1909 strike meant the end of Japanese agitation. In fact, the fear of the Japanese persisted well into the early 1920s. For 10 years after the 1909 strike, false rumors cropped up every now and then that the Japanese were once again organizing. One of these was a 1912 rumor that the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was organizing the Japanese and Filipinos together into a strong union to replace the Higher Wage Consummation Association.1 &Advertiser, November 11, 1912&.
In addition, the planters shipped large numbers of Filipinos because the plantations, whenever they were displeased with any laborer group, simply replaced it with the newly arrived Filipinos. This was clearly the case at HACO in 1911. When the Japanese cultivation contractors asked for higher wages, manager Ogg simply asked for more Filipinos. C. Brewer’s Robertson happily obliged: "We hope," he wrote, "that bunch of Filipinos will prove a good set of workers (for Filipinos) and be of some use in holding the Japs in line at least."\(^1\) &Robertson, C. Brewer, to Ogg, Jan. 27, 1911; Feb. 6, 1911. HACO\& A few months later, Ogg found his Spanish and Puerto Rican laborers difficult to supervise: "Pretty soon we shall have to take our hats off and say Please when we want them to work," he complained, and threatened to replace them with Filipinos.\(^1\) &Ogg to Victor Clark, TH Commissioner of Immigration, Labor and Statistics, September 23, 1911, HACO\& Ogg also preferred Filipinos, who were paid cheaper at $18 a month, to newly arrived Hindus, at $22, or newly arrived Iberian laborers, at $24.\(^1\) &Bishop, C. Brewer, to Ogg, September 27, 1910; Robertson, C. Brewer, to Ogg, Oct. 21, 1910.&

In addition, the HSPA shipped in many Filipinos because HACO and other remote plantations carried more laborers on their payroll than needed. Because of its isolation, HACO had always had a hard time keeping its laborers; in fact, it suffered during the 1909 strike because its laborers and those at neighboring Hutchinson plantations left and presented themselves at the stricken plantations.\(^1\) &Wolters to Irwin and Co., September 8, 1909; Dec. 22, 1909, Hutchinson\& Unlike the plantations on Oahu which could draw on a pool of unemployed from Honolulu and the countryside, HACO and most outer island plantations had no nearby source of ready laborers. Thus, in January 1909, even though a drought and the slack season had reduced manager Ogg’s need for laborers, he refused to release his excess laborers because they would simply leave the area and he would have difficulty getting replacements once work picked up. Nine months later, when the rains came, Ogg desperately sought replacement and additional laborers to keep the weeds from choking his young cane.\(^1\) &Robertson, C. Brewer, to Ogg, Jan. 18, Sept. 27, 1909, HACO\& The ready availability of labor from the Philippines relieved Ogg of worries about not getting laborers when he needed them; it also dispelled his worry that other employers, notably the road repairs and construction in Kona in 1911 which drew off his Japanese plantation workers, could deplete his labor force.\(^1\) &Ogg to C. Brewer, HACO, August 16, 1911&
INSERT HERE THE WHARF RAT STORY OF RECRUITING? IN OTHER WORDS, THE FACT THAT THEY WERE WHARF RATS MEANT THEY WERE NOT ADAPTABLE TO PLANTATION WORK. TIE IN WITH NEXT PARAGRAPH, THAT PINKHAM COULD BE CRITICIZE FOR THIS AND THAT BABBITT INITIATED THE RECRUITMENT OF ILLITERATES AND BARRIO PEOPLE.

Pinkham’s tenure as head of the Manila HSPA office ended abruptly because of recruiting criticism. On December 23, 1910, the S.S. Mongolia, the largest ship at 27,000 tons on the Pacific Mail Line, docked in Honolulu harbor, and among its passengers were 111 Filipino laborers, 6 females and 8 children. Daniel Keefe, the US commissioner of immigration who happened to be in Honolulu at this time, accompanied by the chief quarantine official in Honolulu and the press, inspected the Filipinos at the docks, and accused the HSPA of importing mentally unbalanced, physically undesireable, deseased Filipinos. As a result, 26 Filipinos were returned to the Philippines. The incident, which mobilized opposition in Honolulu over the importation of Filipinos, cost Pinkham his job.

Winfred Howard Babbitt took over Pinkham’s position. Born in Vermont, Babbitt had come to Hawaii in 1896 to teach at Punahou school and just prior to joining the HSPA on a cancelled Puerto Rican recruitment project in 1910 had been the superintendent of Hawaii’s public schools for five years. Babbitt first went to Manila in 1911 with instructions to institute stricter health inspection of the recruits; hereafter, before leaving the Philippines all recruits were to be examined at HSPA cost for all deseases debarred under US immigration laws, and each one furnished a certificate of health. Furthermore, upon arrival, all laborers were again checked for for hookwork and amoebic dysentery, and treated or returned to the Philippines, and their personal effects disinfected. Babbitt was to remain as head of the HSPA Manila office for the next 44 years, which enabled him to cultivate valuable relationships with Filipino officials, leaving his post only during World War II when he was interned by the Japanese forces at Los Banos prison.1

Honolulu Star Bulletin, July 14, 1964, Obituary
Babbitt increased the number of Filipinos sent to Hawaii. In 1912 he sent a total of 6,251 Filipinos, more than the total for the past three years. The following year he shipped another 4000 Filipinos. By this time the HSPA Manila office had perfected its recruiting machinery. Steven worked in Iloilo, Panay and Cebu, assisted by H.C. Coburn who recruited in Siquijor and the other Visayan islands. G.G. Kinney replaced S.W. Taylor in Manila, and the HSPA also now boldly took out advertisements in the Tagalog newspapers. A large advertisement on the front page of the Taliba, the leading Tagalog daily, on March 27, 1913 emphasized that Hawaii consisted of islands, like the Philippines, with no winters, monsters, snakes or poisonous plants. In Honolulu, the HSPA began construction of a new detention/receiving station for the Filipinos. The structure, which was completed in 1916 adjacent to Atkinson Park in Kakaako, was made of concrete and consisted of two floors. The upper floor contained three sleeping rooms: a men’s sleeping room with 176 cots, a room for married couples able to accommodate 80 people, and a third room for 80 single women and children. Its ground floor had two kitchens, two dining rooms, dressing rooms, bathrooms and showers for men and women separately, a medical clinic and a waiting room.

In 1909 the HSPA regarded the Filipino importation merely as an expedient way of keeping the Japanese in check. By 1913, however, it now used the Filipinos as cheap labor and their presence as a way of lowering wages. Predicting lower world sugar prices, the big island planters reduced by 20% the payment for contract cultivation, contracted out its poorer lands, and used cheaper day laborers to cultivate its most fertile fields. As a result of these cost saving moves, "the Japs are leaving rather than accept the rates offered under the present conditions and the demand now for incoming Filipinos is becoming keen." Robertson promised the planters large shipment of Filipinos, which would force the Japanese to accept lower wages for cultivation contracts.
Babbitt had to keep replacing the Filipino plantation workers because, like the others, they did not stay for long on the plantations. A fourth of the Filipinos he had sent had left the plantations by September 30, 1914. Babbitt, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Pinkham, December 15, 1914, Pinkham Papers, AH. He was also sending more Filipinos than the plantations actually requested. Hackfeld to Grove Farm and Other Plantations, October 1, 1912, GFA. In 1914, 75 Filipino contractors at HACO walked out of their job so C. Brewer, its agent, secured from Babbitt 300 newcomers to replace them; with excess labor on hand, C. Brewer ordered HACO to reduce the existing cultivation contract payments from $.50 to $.425, per ton of sugar and replace with new Filipinos those who refused to accept the lower rate. Robertson to Ogg, February 17, 1914, HACO. In the monthly request for his allotment of incoming Filipinos, HACO manager Ogg consistently overstated the numbers he needed, reasoning that they would not remain for long on the plantation anyway. Ogg to C. Brewer, December 13, 18, 1913, HACO. Also, he noted: "I find that in order to have anything like a fair number of these people at work daily, we must be prepared to house and take care of at least 50% more than the number actually required at work each day." Ogg, to C. Brewer, November 8, 1913, HACO. HACO being in a colder district than most plantations, Ogg complained: "It is most exasperating the way these Filipinos go to pieces the minute they feel the least bit cold. Just as soon as they get good and wet here they begin to tremble all over and their jaws and teeth rattle together and then it is all off as far as working goes. They simply strike out for their camp no matter what time of day it is and nothing will stop them. We have had several cases of pneumonia amongst these people in the past few weeks." Ogg to C. Brewer, November 18, 1913.
In 1914 the HSPA had to curtail its recruiting to a mere 1300, compared to 4000 the previous year; Beginning March 1, 1914 the Manila office was instructed to reduce the recruitment to equal the number of Filipino plantation laborers returning home.\footnote{&R.D. Mead, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics director, to Governor Pinkham, April 15, 1914, Pinkham Papers, AH&} The immediate reason was the high unemployment in Hawaii, especially on the plantations, a phenomenon that the sugar industry faced for the first time. This unemployment was brought about by several factors. One was a drought which resulted in a low yield for the 1913 crop. Another was the depressed price of worldwide sugar because of a large European beet crop, a large Cuban sugar crop which also entered the US market with a very low tariff, and Philippine sugar now on a duty free unlimited entry into the American market. A third reason was the Underwood Tariff Act which, by automatically removing all tariff on sugar in May 1916, forced the planters to reduce wages, cut the number of workers, and abandoned poor lands and marginally productive areas.\footnote{&Advertiser, September 13, December 25, 1913&} The crisis was shortlived, however; by the end of July the price of sugar had recovered when the war broke out in Europe and the HSPA resumed its heavy recruitment of Filipinos. The depression proved temporary, though, as by the end of July 1914 the war had broken out in Europe, disrupting the beet production there, and all throughout the war years the price of sugar rose.
PHILIPPINE RESPONSES TO HSPA RECRUITMENT

After opening up the Philippines for recruitment, the HSPA was next faced with the major task of neutralizing any kind of opposition to its undertaking. In the beginning, it was able to avoid criticism by working fast. Pinkham and his recruiters worked so quickly and quietly that the Philippine press did not learn of their work until after the first batch of recruits had been constituted and about ready to leave the Philippines. Upon discovering it, the Philippine newspapers came to the attack fast and furious. &The Advertiser reprinted a sampling of Philippine newspaper editorials in its September 4, 1909 issue.&

Press opposition to the HSPA recruiting could be classified into two categories. One category was the criticism by the native language press and the Spanish language press, and they reflected the opinion of the illustrados (the native intellectual class) as well as the local merchants. These newspapers opposed the recruitment as being detrimental to the laborers themselves, claiming ill treatment of the laborers and exorbitant plantation store prices. In order to placate these non-English newspapers, Steven in 1910 invited them to a banquet so he could explain the advantages of Filipinos going to Hawaii but merely four newsmen, all representatives of Spanish newspapers, showed up and all four ignored Steven's offer to send one of them to Hawaii at HSPA expense in order to look into the life of plantation laborers. &Advertiser, March 3, 1910&

Steven was more successful in winning over the second category of press opposition, consisting of the American newspapers and reflecting the interest of American businesses in the Philippines. These newspapers opposed labor recruitment by pointing out that the recruitment was an anomaly because of an existing labor shortage in the Philippines, a shortage which necessitated the employment of 1000 Japanese and 2000 Chinese workmen in various industries. &Advertiser, March 29, 1909& Furthermore, at the time that Pinkham resumed the recruitment in 1909, the Philippines' attorney general, Alexander Sidney Lanier, was in Honolulu on his way to Washington DC to ask for a Philippine exemption from the Chinese Exclusion Act, arguing that the urgent internal projects could not be done without bringing in Chinese labor. &Advertiser, March 30, 1909& The HSPA recruitment merely exacerbated the existing labor shortage, and so Philippine industries had to offer higher wages and suffer from lower profits.
Steven succeeded in winning over the American-owned Cebu Chronicle to his point of view, making the newspaper one of the rare advocates of HSPA recruiting in 1909. The newspaper aggressively attacked the opponents of recruiting as demagogues interested merely in "lining their own pockets with the people's money," by keeping laborer wages low in the Philippines with an oversupply, and presented the recruitment as a way of giving the unemployed an opportunity at profitable employment. It also presented a new argument: in the event of a war with Japan the "loyal, peaceable, law abiding labor element such as the Cebuanos" could replace the Japanese and thus preserve the Hawaii plantations, as well as Hawaii, for the United States, as well as enable the United States to concentrate its troops in "the upholding of the present government of the Philippines, the protection of Philippine homes, families and institutions and the defense of religion and religious beliefs."¹ &Cebu Chronicle, editorial, reprinted in Advertiser, August 8, 1910

In time, the HSPA also succeeded in gaining the support of the most influential English daily, the Manila Times. The newspaper had vigorously opposed Judd three years earlier; in 1909, it was still opposed on the grounds that the HSPA recruitment threatened the rebuilding of the sugar industry in the Philippines but was willing to allow the HSPA to recruit in Cebu, Ilocos and Bohol where labor could be spared but not in the areas where the sugar industry needed to be rejuvenated.¹ &Manila Times, editorial, reprinted in Advertiser, October 4, 1909 & The newspaper, however, recommended that the insular government take a more active role in looking after the welfare of the Hawaii recruits, supervising their contracts, and sending a representative to look after their rights and avoid their mistreatment.¹ &Manila Times, editorial, reprinted in Advertiser, April 5, 1910.
The newspaper soon became an HSPA advocate because of the well cultivated Hawaiian hospitality. In late 1910, the managing editor of the Manila Times, Martin Egan, and his wife stopped over in Hawaii on their way around the world. The Egans became the guests of HSPA secretary W. H. Babbitt, who took them sightseeing and showed them a Filipino model camp at Ewa.\textsuperscript{1} Advertiser, December 21, 1910. Egan repaid the hospitality well. In Washington D.C., Egan sought an audience with President William Howard Taft in order to explain the advantages of Filipinos going to Hawaii, and with Secretary of Commerce Nagel in order to argue against any attempt to introduce legislation excluding Filipinos from Hawaii.\textsuperscript{1} Secretary Dickinson to President Taft's secretary, February 1, 7, 1911, in BIA 5999. The Egans were again the guests of the HSPA on their next visit in early 1912. From then on, the Manila Times became the fiercest defender of the HSPA recruitment. This support was most valuable in 1915, when opposition intensified in the Philippine assembly. The newspaper went on the counterattack for the HSPA, accusing the assemblymen of shamelessly disregarding the rights of people to travel by introducing laws restricting Hawaii immigration.\textsuperscript{1} Manila Times, editorial, December 1, 1915, BIA 227. It also published a suspiciously laudatory article of interviews with Filipinos returning from Hawaii; all the interviewees voiced no complaints, labelled as the laggards and slackers their fellow laborers who criticized the plantations, claimed the sugar plantation work became easier and even pleasant once they got used to the hard work, and asserted that the HSPA lived loyal up to its contracts with the laborers.\textsuperscript{1} Manila Times, reprinted in Advertiser, June 8, 1915. None of the Filipinos were identified or quoted in the article, however.

These criticisms came from organized labor in Manila, whose primary concern was the mistreatment of the Filipinos on the plantations and their inability to save the fare for their return passage. The first major mass meeting was held in Manila in May 1910 led by labor leader Herminigildo Cruz to raise funds for the rescue of these stranded laborers in Hawaii, to which the Advertiser sarcastically commented: "About the only Filipino languishing whose present addresses in Hawaii are known are serving sentences in this penitentiary and it is hardly those whom the home subscribers will want to rescue.\textsuperscript{1} Advertiser, June 24, 1910."
Led by organized labor in Manila, the critics of HSPA recruiting sought protection for Filipino plantation laborers. They managed to get a bill introduced at the annual session of the Philippine assembly requiring the Philippine colonial government to supervise the recruitment. A resolution introduced on October 24, 1912 called for a committee of three to investigate the conditions of Filipino laborers in Hawaii, but the government took no action. An annual journal of the Sessions of the Philippine Assembly, October 24, 1912, volume 8, p. 54, in BIA 5999. At this point Lucius Pinkham took the initiative. He invited Joaquin Balmori, the Philippine assembly’s chairman of the committee on labor and immigration, to visit Hawaii. Balmori’s visit was not officially sponsored by the Philippine colonial government; the HSPA paid for his travel expenses and a salary. An annual journal of the Sessions of the Philippine Assembly, November 21, 1915, Pinkham Papers, AH. Pinkham meant Balmori’s investigation to be a public relations act. He wanted Balmori’s report to be widely circulated in English, Spanish and several Philippine languages so everyone could see that Hawaii had no wild animals, reptiles, nor subject to ice, cold, nor extreme heat, and that the laborers had good comforts and educational opportunities. An annual journal of the Sessions of the Philippine Assembly, November 21, 1915, Pinkham Papers, AH.
Joaquin Balmori was accompanied by Jose Valenzuela, who was also funded by the HSPA so that he could tell his people in the Ilocos about opportunities on the plantations, and the pair arrived on March 23, 1912. For the next 39 days they were taken on a visit of 28 plantations on the four major islands (they did not visit Molokai and Lanai). Balmori wrote his report in Honolulu just prior to returning to Manila, and it contained everything positive, as Pinkham expected, about Filipino life and work on the plantations. He claimed that the Filipinos plantation laborers were completely satisfied and had no complaints. The living expenses, he declared, amounted to merely half the average monthly wage so they were able to save money and send remittances home. He found the Filipinos living in good homes and enjoying good medical facilities. Balmori unequivocally endorsed the HSPA recruitment, using the same arguments used by the HSPA: the recruitment would benefit Philippine labor by making wages rise, the Filipinos could not be deprived of their right to travel within the United States, and the laborers would learn new methods of cultivation and sugar manufacturing.  

Yet Balmori's report did not silence the opponents of recruitment and the native press and assemblymen sought drastic legislation to control it. They continued to introduce bills in the Philippine assembly to control labor migration because there was no escaping the argument that there was no labor surplus in the Philippines. In fact, the primary Philippine export, hemp, began to suffer from the labor shortage. In the abaca areas of Mindanao, Leyte and Luzon in 1912 thousands of acres of hemp could not be stripped because of the lack of labor, and the labor available allowed only the harvest of just enough to pay the running expenses of the hemp plantations. Yet Babbitt persisted in his public opinion campaign to convince the Filipinos that the recruitment was beneficial to them and asked the HSPA to compile data on Filipino wages and bonuses.
In the early years the HSPA was free from any criticism or opposition from Philippine colonial officials. Judd's friend, William Cameron Forbes, became governor general and William Howard Taft the president of the United States, both of them Republicans who opposed Philippine independence, supported American interests in the Philippines, and generally held a low opinion of Filipinos. In 1913, however, Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, succeeded to the presidency and appointed as governor general, Francis Burton Harrison, who served until 1921. The Democrats under Wilson sought to grant the Philippines its independence upon the institution of a stable government, and in pursuit of this goal, Harrison staffed the civil service with Filipinos and replaced some executive department heads with Filipinos. He also appointed them to the Philippine Commission, which served as the upper chamber of the legislature, thus avoiding the deadlock between the Philippine commission and the Philippine assembly.

The new Filipino ascendancy in the legislative and in some executive bureaus resulted in the introduction of several bills to control the recruitment of laborers: one which sought to create an officer to investigate Hawaii Filipino labor, another to authorize the bureau of labor to inspect at all hours the laborer dormitories and to approve all labor recruitment contracts, and yet another to penalize shipping companies and their agents for transporting any laborer whose work contract had not been approved by Philippine authorities. At the bureau of labor, for the first time a Filipino, B. G. Monreal, assumed office as director and took interest in the plight of Filipinos in Hawaii.

Monreal's office had received reports of Filipino destitution in Hawaii because of illness or the lack of work on the plantations, particularly during the 1913 depression in the American sugar industry. Sugar prices fell so low as a result of a worldwide glut in sugar and many beet sugar farms in California and large plantations in Louisiana shut down in 1914. In Hawaii, the planters, anticipating that the Underwood Act would automatically remove all tariff on sugar by May 1916, reduced employment, cut back on planting, lowered wages, and abandoned poor lands. The depression proved temporary; World War I brought about shortages in sugar which led to high prices.
While it lasted, however, the depression caused serious unemployment which fell hardest on the big island plantations, which had also received little rainfall for two years. Many Filipinos there found themselves out of a job, and so they held a series of mass meetings in Hilo in order to draw attention to their plight. Led by Pablo Manlapit, who organized the Filipino Laborers Association of Hilo, the Filipinos attacked the HSPA for continuing to bring in more Filipinos despite the growing number of unemployed; they also demanded that the HSPA give the 2000 unemployed Hilo Filipinos jobs on the plantations or return them to the Philippines, or if not either, stop altogether the recruitment to Hawaii. W. O. Smith, the HSPA secretary, denied any responsibility for the unemployed; "the planters are neither legally nor morally bound to assist them or transport them back to their homeland," he said, because the Filipinos had given up their contract by leaving their jobs voluntarily.

The Filipinos denied that they had left the plantations voluntarily. One laborer, stranded without any savings and reduced to foraging for wild fruits, complained at a mass meeting in Hilo that he had been summarily discharged for no cause; the crowd advised him to get a lawyer although none could tell him how, if indeed he managed to find a lawyer willing to take up his case, he would pay for legal services.

R.W. Kearns, the secretary of the territorial board of immigration, went to Hilo to investigate, and saw hundreds without jobs. Despite the Filipino complaints about managers discriminating against them in job assignments and hiring, he concluded that the plantations were living up to the contract. Royal D.Mead also investigated and claimed, contrary to Kearns, that the unemployed Filipinos in Hilo numbered less than a hundred; contradicting Kearns, he also admitted to contract violations, explaining that some plantations, prevented by low rainfall from harvesting and fluming their cane, offered less than the usual amount of work but that with the return of the normal rainfall the plantations would once again offer full time work.
In Honolulu the Filipinos similarly complained of unemployment and of being given merely three or four days of work a week. The Associated Charities reported the unemployment situation to have reached an acute stage but Royal D. Mead disputed the report, claiming that of the few Filipinos who were out of work, not one came to his office to complain that he had been discharged by a plantation company; the unemployed Filipinos, he said, were the ones who left the plantations of their own accord in order to secure a better or easier job. \( ^1 \) \&Advertiser, May 21, 24, 1914\&

Despite Mead's dismissal of the complaints as the mere gripings of loafers and slackers, reliable details of actual Filipino suffering reached Philippine officials. \( ^1 \) \&Star Bulletin, April 30, 1914\& "Many appeals have been received by us from our countrymen asking that we protect them from the mercenary power of the plantation managers," wrote labor director Monreal. \( ^1 \) \&B.G.Monreal to Leopold Theodore, in Advertiser, October 10, 1914\& As a result, on August 4, 1914 Monreal issued a circular instructing his regional officers to warn potential recruits about the Hawaii offer. \( ^1 \) \&B.G. Monreal To Superintendents, Free Employment Agencies, Bureau of Labor, Philippines, Circular # 31, August 4, 1914, BIA 5999\& As an alternative to Hawaii, he pointed out that the Philippine government had established agricultural colonies, especially in the fertile fields of Cotabato in Mindanao and of the Cagayan Valley in Luzon and furnished the settlers everything they needed to cultivate their 16 hectares of homestead. \( ^1 \) \&B.G. Monreal To Superintendents, Free Employment Agencies, Bureau of Labor, Philippines, Circular # 31, August 4, 1914, BIA 5999\& Motivated by his desire to see the Hawaii Filipinos protected, Monreal also asserted the right of his office to supervise the HSPA contract with the laborers. \( ^1 \) \&Cablenews American, October 7, 1914, BIA 227\&
The vernacular press in Manila went further and demanded that the HSPA recruitment be stopped altogether. Based on letters from Hawaii Filipino laborers, the Philippines Free Press and the La Vanguardia asked the insular government to investigate the situation.\textsuperscript{1} &Philippines Free Press, April 11, 1914, in BIA 227; Star Bulletin, April 30, 1914& One of the letters came from a Filipino reporter on the Advertiser, addressed to the White House. The Filipinos, wrote Leopold Theodore to Woodrow Wilson, faced a hard life in Hawaii. Most being illiterates, they had no clear idea of their labor contract with the HSPA. They were forced by the abuses of plantation foremen to flee to Honolulu where, unable to find jobs, they were further driven to theft and other crimes. They suffered prejudice from other nationalities, especially the Hawaiians and the Chinese. Many ended up stranded in Hawaii, unable to raise their fares to return home. Theodore recommended that the US congress stop Filipino immigration to Hawaii.\textsuperscript{1} &Leopold Theodore, to Woodrow Wilson, July 28, 1915, in BIA 5999.&

The HSPA successfully kept the shipments coming, however. It argued that work in Hawaii enabled Filipinos to acquire valuable experience for use in the Philippine sugar industry, the same argument that Judd had used in opening up the recruitment in 1906, and the Philippine assembly continued to buy the argument without question.\textsuperscript{1} &Moe Kilmer, "The Outlook for the Filipinos in Hawaii," Honolulu Mercury, October 1929, p. 47& In actuality, the laborers did not work on the sugar haciendas upon their return nor did they learn much other than manual labor. But the HSPA promptly added that the returning laborers brought home large amounts of savings. In 1913 W.H. Babbitt called a press conference in Honolulu to say that he had bought return tickets for 26 Filipinos and that these men had in their possession savings which ranged from $30 to $200.\textsuperscript{1} &Babbitt, Advertiser, September 15, 1913& A few months later, Mead added that for the 15 months ending December 31, 1913, 205 Filipinos returning to Manila had in their possession an average of $84.85 and some of them reported even having sent ahead to their families additional sums.\textsuperscript{1} &R.D. Mead, HSPA Bureau of Labor and Statistics, to Governor Pinkham, April 15, 1914, Pinkham Papers, AH& From then on, the HSPA regularly released figures on the amount the laborers had remitted or possessed during their trip back.
THE DEBATE OVER FILIPINO IMMIGRATION

The arrival of Filipinos raised questions about their place in Hawaii. The questions, however, were not systematically introduced and discussed openly in the political process because of the tremendous influence of the sugar industry.

This political influence was established very early. Immediately after the defeat of the planters' Republican Party by the Home Rule Party during Hawaii's first election as an American territory, the HSPA trustees instructed the managers on each island to organize politically, "to interest themselves in local politics, get together and select the best men that can be agreed upon, and then work afterwards to get them elected." &E.F. Bishop to W.G. Ogg, HACO, August 1, 1904; also found in Hackfeld to Grove Farm, August 1, 1904, GFA& The planters set up a campaign committee on each island, employed a campaign manager, and assessed the plantations their pro-rata share of the expenses of the committee. &E.F. Bishop to Ogg, February, 25, 1910, HACO& From then on to the beginning of World War II the planters were a major influence in local elections, electing their candidates among the Republicans, who held an overwhelming majority of the seats in the territorial house and the senate, and influenced the election of the territorial delegate to congress. They also usually had a hand in the selection and naming of the governor, whenever the US president appointed the governor, even when a Democratic party president held office. The HSPA maintained a lobbying office at Washington DC.

"The plantations have to view laborers primarily as instruments of production," stated the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Report in 1915. "Their business interests require cheap, not too intelligent, docile, unmarried men. The interests of those who are bent upon making present profits are thus inevitably more or less antagonistic to the highest civic and economic development of the islands." &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1915, p. 40& This conflict was most evident in the issue over the re-population of Hawaii, one which focused at this time on the importation of the Filipinos.
The planters disguised the importation of Filipinos in melioristic rhetoric, and S.M. Damon typified this rhetoric. In his presidential address at the annual meeting in 1909, Damon declared: "Hawaii has been aptly termed the 'Crossroads of the Pacific' where people of all nationalities meet and enter into commercial and agricultural competition. We bring from the Philippines several thousand laborers and their families, many of whom will return later to their country imbued with American ideals, having a better knowledge of labor as practiced away from their home surroundings and among people of all nationalities, and better fitted to meet the new conditions which must surely come to their own country, which has been for centuries isolated." Damon saw the Filipino learning American democratic ideals and behavior in Hawaii and as a result, the Filipino "returns to his country a better man physically and intellectually and, we hope, politically." &S.M. Damon, President, Annual meeting, in Advertiser, November 16, 1909; also in Planters Record, volume 2, January 1910, number 1, pp. 1-6, p. 3.

The anti-immigration issue, which by this time had become an anti-Filipino immigration issue, was taken up by the weak Democratic party in Hawaii. The Hawaiians, who comprised the majority of the voters, justifiably saw the importation of cheap labor merely pressed down wages to unattractive levels for them. The Democratic party was weak, however, and did not articulate the position well. On the other hand, the Republican party had the territorial governors as well as the delegate to the US congress, long time incumbent Kuhio Kalanianaoele, Kuhio personally opposed Filipino immigration and urged the plantations to hire the Hawaiians but he was helpless when it came to opposing the planters' interests. The immigration issue was never fully brought out for political debate in Hawaii because of the Republican party's domination. The most open questioning about the dangers of immigration of cheap labor came from federal officials.

The criticism by federal officials centered on two negative effects of the importation of cheap labor: one, in the way it discouraged homesteading; the other in the way it discouraged the arrival and employment of white labor in Hawaii.
The first was well articulated by B.F. Newell, the director of the US Reclamation Service, in his investigations in 1909. &B.F. Newell, "Conditions in the Territory of Hawaii," Planters Monthly, March 1909, volume 27, pp. 93-109. Extracts from this report were published in the Advertiser, April 14, 1909& Newell blamed the arrival of oriental labor, renting land at a high price and content with a small earnings, for driving out the white man from homesteading in Hawaii. He also indicted the sugar industry for opposing the subdivision of large landholdings, for failing to develop transport and marketing of produce and good credit facilities for farmers.

The Organic Act of Hawaii contained a provision withdrawing lease lands from sugar cultivation upon expiration of the lease if 25 homestead applicants requested it, as a way of protecting Hawaiian homesteading rights. The planters opposed this provision, and the various territorial governors were reluctant to implement this provision. Governors Frear and Pinkham dragged their foot on homesteading; and in 1918 when many land leases expired, McCarthy, buying the sugar industry’s arguments that the war had made sugar an essential food, allowed the planters to continue cane cultivation instead of opening up homesteads. McCarthy also reduced the payment to the government, from 10% of the harvest to merely 5%. Not satisfied with such favorable terms, the planters would have wished no homesteading at all, to the point that the HSPA president in 1919, E.H. Wodehouse, threatened to withhold the cooperative knowledge and resources of the sugar companies if there were continuing pressures to convert the land to homesteads. &E.H. Wodehouse, presidential address, 39th HSPA annual meeting, December 8-12, 1919, pp. 4-9, p. 7& The issue of homesteading carried over into recent years.

Where Newell led the attack on the sugar industry for not encouraging homesteading, Daniel J. Keefe, the US commissioner of immigration, led the attack against labor importation being detrimental to the employment and immigration of whites. Keefe arrived in Hawaii in December 1910 and inspected 21 plantations in order to see how conditions could be improved in order to attract European and American immigrants to plantation work. His report was a strong indictment of the sugar industry’s failure to attract white laborers. The planters, he wrote, could make conditions attractive enough by increasing wages, reducing the prices at the plantation stores, and improving the laborer camps, and still get good returns on their investment. Keefe blamed the importation of Filipinos for the low wages and living standards on the plantations, making it unattractive for white immigrants.&Keefe, Report, reprinted in the Advertiser, December 13, 24, 1910, April 12, 1911&
Governor Walter Frear, married into the Dillingham family and a pillar of the sugar establishment, came to the defense of the sugar industry. Increasing wages and lowering store prices, he declared sarcastically, were matters foreign to the US immigration bureau and these regulated themselves according to supply and demand; the Filipinos, regarded by the sugar industry as good workers, were too few in Hawaii for Keefe to raise the specter of their becoming citizens and gaining political power. &Advertiser, December 14, 1919&

Just before returning to Washington D.C., Keefe, with the press in tow, went to the quarantine to look over a shipment of Filipinos who arrived on the S.S. Mongolia on December 23, 1910. The group of 111 Filipino males, 6 females and 8 children had been detained because serum taken from a Chinese passenger had shown smallpox. After looking over the Filipinos, Keefe declared to the press: "As immigrants they are a most undesirable class. None of them seem quite right in the head--I don't mean to say they are insane, but they somehow or other do not seem to be all here. They are stupid and dull." Keefe added that the Filipinos were all paupers--not one had a dollar--and none admitted having done any manual work at all.&Advertiser, December 24, 1910&

Carl Ramus, the chief quarantine officer in Honolulu added his comments. "It would appear as if the jails, hospitals and insane asylums have been depleted in the Philippines. I never saw such a poor looking lot of people and they are a wretched lot." &Advertiser, December 24, 1910& Ramus claimed that 15 were afflicted with trachoma, another 15 had active cases of syphilis, and 30 showed evidence of the disease. Thirty had amoebic dysentery and three or four were in an advanced stage of tuberculosis. Half of the group had hookworm, four out of every 10 had the itch, and two were afflicted with beriberi, and another two were ill with pneumonia. Ramus felt outraged that he could not prevent 50 or 60 diseased Filipinos from entering the US the way he could any Japanese or Portuguese with trachoma or a scalp disease. No territorial or federal law regulated the arrival of Filipinos in Hawaii. At once, others joined Keefe and Ramus in attacking the Filipino recruitment. The Portuguese mutual benefit societies, the Lusitana and the San Antonio societies in particular, joined the protest, stating that the infection of their members with the Filipino deseases would drain the societies' resources in increased sick benefits. &Advertiser, December 31, 1910&
The Advertiser absolved the HSPA of any blame, seeing it as the victim of a switch or duplicity by recruiters. E.D. Tenney, the HSPA president in 1910, finding it strange that the group included those too young and too old who would not have passed the Manila HSPA agents, speculated that the Mongolia passengers might have been substituted for the ones who had passed the examination by the Marine Hospital Service in Manila. &Advertiser, December 29, 1910, editorial, December 30, 1910&

Royal D. Mead, who had just returned from a three month visit to the Philippines, claimed seeing the group embark in Manila and they looked a good lot; therefore, the reports of their diseases must have been exaggerated. The HSPA recruits, he explained, had been routinely examined by the HSPA doctor in Manila before being shipped to Nagasaki while those from Cebu were examined by the surgeon of the US Marine Corps before shipment to Hongkong.&Advertiser, December 31, 1910&

The territorial house of representatives also came to the defense of the sugar industry. In a mock investigation, the house committee on agriculture and immigration, a body generally representing the sugar interest, visited Filipinos at a model camp in Kahuku, solicited from the high sheriff and the plantation doctors highly favorable reports about the crime and health aspects of Filipino life in Hawaii, and solicited letters from plantation managers about the character of Filipinos as laborers and plantation residents. Based on these materials the committee described the Filipinos, to be of average character, usually peaceful, tractable and industrious, cleared the HSPA of the charge that it was bringing in undesireable and defective labor, and declared itself in favor of continuing Filipino immigration. &Territory of Hawaii, House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture and Immigration, Report in Response to Resolution . . . , Ed Towse, chairman, Session 1911&
The Mongolia furor resulted in the return of 26 Filipinos, and the stricter inspection by the quarantine service of each Filipino shipment. Investigations by the Philippine colonial government, however, gave credence to the Mongolia furor as merely a publicity gimmick by Keefe and Ramus in order to gain support for their opposition to Filipino immigration. The Philippine governor general, W. Cameron Forbes in his investigation, found Dr. Carl Ramus out of line in calling the Mongolia Filipinos paupers when, in reality, they were all under contract with the HSPA to work on the plantations. &Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, to Secretary of War, August 9, 1911, BIA 5999& He also accused Keefe of being prejudicial, of misstating facts in claiming that 52% of the Mongolia Filipinos were afflicted with hookworm. &Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, to Secretary of War, August 9, 1911, BIA 5999& Ramus’ official report "Certificate for Passengers" on the Mongolia showed no entry on hookworm and only one case on amoebic dysentery, and yet Ramus had cabled his Washington D.C. Superiors and told the newspapers of about 30 cases of amoebic dysentery and 60 hookworm cases. Ramus, it turned out, had done no microscopic or laboratory exam and had based his remarks on projections on the Mongolia Filipino passengers the results of the rate of occurrence of a study done in the Philippines on a few thousand individuals. &Dean C. Worcester, to Governor General Forbes, August 4, 1911, in BIA 5999& The Mongolia incident in retrospect, appeared more sensational than real, with the Filipinos being the victim of general unhappiness about the sugar industry bringing in cheap labor to the islands.

The Mongolia incident made Hawaii quick to blame Filipinos for any outbreak of a disease or epidemic. When cholera broke out in Hawaii in March 1911 the newspapers blamed the Filipinos for bringing in the disease. &Advertiser. March 6, 1911& The cholera epidemic in March, also proved to be wrongly attributed by the Honolulu newspapers to Philippine arrivals by Donald H. Currie, the surgeon of the US Public Health Service and the Marine Hospital Service in Hawaii. Currie and Dr. Moses T. Clegg, the assistant director of the USPH-MHS in Honolulu both denied ascribing the epidemic to arriving Filipinos as the newspaper had done. The director of the Manila Bureau of Health also protested the newspaper reports, there being no cholera case int he Philippines just prior to and at the time of the Hawaii epidemic. &Donald H. Currie, to Ed. Towse, March 7, 1911, in Territory of Hawaii, House Committee on Agriculture and Immigration, p. 14; Moses T. Clegg to Towse, March 9, 1911, ibid., pp. 15-16; Advertiser, March 4, 1911&
Back in Washington D.C., Keefe continued to attack the free entry of Filipinos and advocated their exclusion. He urged his superior, Secretary of Commerce and Labor Nagel to secure a ruling allowing the deportation of diseased or undesirable Filipinos because they were aliens not exempt from immigration laws. Keefe characterized the Filipinos as shiftless and indolent, and warned that their "natural" incapacity to meet the changed conditions of life in migration would make them easy prey to tuberculosis. He warned against the brown peril, of these Filipinos coming in large numbers through Hawaii to the US mainland. &Keefe to Secretary of Commerce and Labor Nagel, May 16, 1911, in BIA 5999 & Keefe's campaign to exclude the Filipinos did not gain any support. He was opposed by the Philippines Governor General Forbes, by the Bureau of Insular Affairs which supervised the administration in the Philippines, and by the secretary of war; they all protested any move to exclude the Filipinos unless such a move also excluded Americans from Philippine territory, and they were supported by President Taft, who had always affirmed the right of Filipinos to travel freely within the United States. &General Clarence Edwards, BIA, to Secretary of War Dickenson, October 25, 1911, BIA; Governor General Forbes to Secretary of War Dickenson, August 9, 1911, in BIA 5999; BIA Memo, "Emigration of Filipino laborers to Hawaii and the United States," January 5, 1912, in BIA 5999 & The main outcome of Keefe's protests was the strict medical examination of laborers before leaving the Philippines. &Secretary of War to Secretary of Commerce and Labor, May 21, 1911, BIA 5999 & With this system in place, J.S.B. Pratt, the president of the territorial board of health declared that fears of diseased Filipinos were now groundless, that the laborers were inspected and treated for hookworm at the planters' shed and those with amoebic dysentery, few and far in between, were returned to the Philippines. &Advertiser, April 23, 1912 &
In 1913, Commissioner Keefe renewed his attack on the Filipino recruitment, complaining that a portion of his report, the portion dealing with the undesireable character of Filipinos and their unfitness for plantation labor, had been suppressed after a conference between Secretary of Commerce and labor, the Secretary of War, and President Taft. To back up the claim that little had changed since his inspection in 1910, Keefe produced a letter from Richard L. Halsey, head of the immigration service office in Honolulu, noting that the plantation stores were still being operated for profit, that wages had not increased, and that the plantations, belying their claim that they couldn't pay better wages in order to attract white labor, were still paying large dividends on their stocks. Halsey added further accusations: because of the continuing importation of Filipinos, the Japanese left for Honolulu's building trades and thus depressed further the wages of white skilled labor. &Halsey to Keefe, April 3, 1913, in Keefe, Report, pp. 42-43&

Halsey remained a major critic of the Filipino importation. In 1918 he charged that the white population in Hawaii was decreasing because they could not secure land in Hawaii, and that the Filipinos were poor workers and their arrival in the islands merely meant an increase in vice, crime and murder. He also attacked the sugar establishment as preventing desireable labor, whites, from going into inviting fields and thus limiting the hopes of labor. &Advertiser, January 30, 1918&
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What Mead and Babbitt omitted to say, however, was that there were even more Filipinos who were stranded in Hawaii because they were not able to save the $45 return fare. This was true especially if the laborer was supporting a family on the plantation. The U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics in 1910 stated that "when a man has a large family of young children not old enough for field work, his earnings are not adequate in Hawaii to rear and educate them properly and allow any margin of error for savings, and in some instances even the most frugal laborers find it difficult to make both ends meet." &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1910, pp. 692-693.&

This was the case with Nicolas M. Contreras. He arrived as an HSPA recruit on March 16, 1912 and was assigned to the Hawaiian Sugar Company at Makaweli, Kauai. When he got married, he found his daily wage of $.77 insufficient to support a family so he searched for better jobs in Honolulu. Unsuccessful, he sought but received no assistance from the territorial government. In desperation, he asked President Woodrow Wilson for space for him and his wife on the army transports bound for the Philippines. &Nicolas and Mercedes Contreras, to Woodrow Wilson, March 2, 1915, in BIA 5999.& Although the secretary of war had given authority to return by army transport the destitute Filipinos in the United States and Hawaii, Contreras and his wife were denied free transportation by the Hawaiian department of the army on the grounds that as an able bodied man he could get a job on the plantations. &Quartermaster General to BIA chief, January 6, 1915, in BIA 5999; Hawaiian Department to Adjutant General of the Army, Washington D.C., April 23, 1915, in BIA 5999.&

Leonardo de Jesus also failed to get space on the army transport; Being too feeble for field work, he left for Honolulu but was unable to support his wife and son on his wages of $4 a week. &Leonardo de Jesus, to Woodrow Wilson, April 7, 1915, in BIA 5999; Acting Chief, BIA, to Leonardo de Jesus, May 13, 1915, in BIA 5999.& Desperate to return, some Filipinos, like the 30 penniless stowaways caught on one ship, tried to sneak into the hold of ships. &Advertiser, SEptember 15, 1913.&
Some of the stranded Filipinos, like Filemon Dagondon, had tried to save for their return fare but failed because out of meager earnings were deducted fines for such offenses as spilling water or jumping off the cane train before it had completely stopped, fines equivalent to a day and a half of wages. Dagondon, on behalf of many others left destitute for having left the plantations in order to avoid mistreatment, pleaded for Philippine officials to send a ship to rescue them.¹ &Filemon Dagondon to M. L. Quezon, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Quezonian Papers& In 1914, two Filipino organizations in Hawaii took up the cause of returning destitute Filipinos in Hawaii; both the Rizal Society and the Filipino Laborers' Association registered those who needed public assistance and held regular mass meetings in October 1914 to urge the Philippine legislature to appropriate funds for the return of stranded Filipinos.¹ &Advertiser, October 18, 1914&

The appeals prompted the Philippine legislature on February 5, 1915 to pass Act 2486 regulating recruitment activities in the Philippines for the first time. The law authorized the Philippine Bureau of Labor to supervise all Hawaii contracts. It also asked for an annual tax of $3000 for every recruiting agency or person, and $250 for each province where the HSPA conducted recruiting activities. By this time, the HSPA was recruiting in the Ilocos provinces of Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, and La Union, in the Visayan areas of Cebu, Romblon and Capiz, and in the city of Manila. The HSPA also desired to recruit in the Central Luzon provinces of Tarlac and Pangasinan but failed because of the shortage of farm hands and a fledgeling sugar industry.¹ &Advertiser, April 16, 1915& Despite no authority to recruit there and in other provinces, however, the HSPA sent to Hawaii those who turned up at its recruiting centers in Manila or in the Ilocos and Visayas.
The 1915 law also contained two provisions intended to protect the Filipinos in Hawaii. One authorized the Philippine governor general to appoint a commissioner to receive and hear complaints by Filipino laborers in Hawaii and to oversee the compliance of their contracts. The other required the HSPA to furnish each recruited laborer and his family free transportation back to the Philippines. This requirement led to a new contract, which reduced by $2 the basic wage rate of $20 and granted free return fare to the laborer who was injured on the job or had completed 720 days of work in three consecutive years on the plantation where originally assigned. See Prudencio A. Remigio, Report, for a comparison of the old contract and the 1915 contract. On the plantations, the managers mistakenly thought that the 720-day work requirement on one plantation would be an effective way to keep the Filipinos from moving about but it did not work out that way. At HACO, manager Ogg reported that within a month upon their arrival "nearly all our $18 Filipinos have left us," as there was simply no attraction in working for three years at $2 less a month for the sake of getting the free passage to Manila. Ogg to C. Brewer, April 6, 1915, HACO; Ogg to C. Brewer, October 16, 1915, HACO; Ogg to Robertson, C. Brewer, September 30, 1915, HACO. In May 1916 the HSPA restored the basic wage rate among Filipinos on the plantations to $20 a month. Advertiser, May 4, 1916.

From 1915 to 1918, the Filipinos arrived in Hawaii at an average of 2300 a year, and their percentage on the plantation workforce increased sharply. In 1910, they comprised merely 7.7% of the plantation employees; in 1915 it was up to 18.6, and in 1918 still further to 23%. Each month the plantations were still requesting the HSPA Manila Office, through their respective agencies, an allotment larger than their actual needs because they assumed that some of the Filipinos in the camps would be laying off. Campsie to C. Brewer, HACO, March 15, 1917. They tolerated the Filipinos who congregated in Honolulu and Hilo as a pool from which the other industries, such as the road construction companies, could draw, rather than complete with the plantations.
In fact, during the war the HSPA still sought to increase the number of Filipinos coming to Hawaii. Because of the limited steerage space between Manila and Hawaii, it requested, through Governor Pinkham, to ship Filipinos on the army transports which had some empty bunks anyway, with the HSPA offered to deposit the difference between the commercial and transport fare of the laborers into an account to be used for the care and return of Filipinos. E.F. Bishop to Pinkham, April 25, 1917; E.F. Bishop to Pinkham, April 25, 1917, Pinkham Papers, AH; Pinkham to Secretary of Interior, April 26, 1917, May 12, 1917, Pinkham Papers, AH. The proposal failed to gain the support of military authorities.

On the US mainland, federal officials sought to import Puerto Rican and Mexican laborers for temporary work in order to prevent shortages of food and fuel. The proposal included Filipinos for farm work as well in early 1917, although nothing came of the proposal. &Advertiser, February 23, 1917. During the war, Joseph Harigan, the U.S. commissioner of weights and measures, proposed importing cheap Filipino labor for farms in early 1917 in order to prevent shortages of food and fuel, a proposal which had the backing of the other agencies, especially the U.S. Food Administration and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the approval of the U.S. commissioner of immigration as well as the Philippine resident commissioner to the United States. Hawaii, however, did not suffer from the labor shortages that the US mainland did. At the HSPA annual meeting in early December 1917, E.D. Tenny told the assembled planters: "Generally speaking, the labor supply has been sufficient to meet the needs of the plantations. The large earnings possible under the prevailing system of compensation have attracted to the plantations a large portion of our floating population, with the result that the aggregate number of laborers is greater than heretofore." &HSPA annual meeting, Dec. 5-7, 1917
Suddenly, the following month, when the plantation laborers began to agitate for higher wages in order to make up for wartime inflation, the Advertiser began reporting a labor shortage in Hawaii. On January 24, 1918, the newspaper misleadingly captioned a story "Labor Shortage Growing Evident;" it was about a few Spaniards who, attracted by higher wages on the mainland, sought to leave for California. From that day on, the planters and the Advertiser claimed a labor shortage in Hawaii, arguing that Portuguese and Spanish laborers were leaving for promised higher wages on the munition factories and other mainland industries, while the Filipinos were leaving for Alaska fish factories. On January 24, 1918, the newspaper misleadingly captioned a story "Labor Shortage Growing Evident;" it was about a few Spaniards who, attracted by higher wages on the mainland, sought to leave for California. From that day on, the planters and the Advertiser claimed a labor shortage in Hawaii, arguing that Portuguese and Spanish laborers were leaving for promised higher wages on the munition factories and other mainland industries, while the Filipinos were leaving for Alaska fish factories. 1 &Advertiser, March 15, 1918& Few laborers actually left because of the lack of steerage accommodations; plantation laborers often ran out of funds and returned to the plantations because of the long wait for passage to California and the high prices in Honolulu. 1 &Advertiser, January 2, 1918& The claim was never backed up by any reliable study or data and the federal government's Bureau of Labor and Statistics didn't believe the planters' claim of a labor shortage. 1 &Advertiser, February 8, 1918&

If indeed a labor shortage existed, the US Labor Department, having brought in 110,000 Puerto Rican and Virgin Island laborers for mainland industries, offered to supply Hawaii with Puerto Rican laborers, assuring the sugar planters that this time it would draw men from rural areas rather than from cities. But Royal D. Mead turned down the offer, saying that the planters did not know how many the industry would need in the future (thus contradicting the claims of a labor shortage) as it would all depend on the mobilization of the national guard and the military draft. 1 &Advertiser, April 12, 1918& When the draft and mobilization did take place, the planters once again claimed a labor shortage but the many stories in the Advertiser which claimed a labor shortage contained no facts at all. 1 &Advertiser, July 5, 12, 13, 15, 19, 26, 1918, Aug. 2, 1918& In the July 13 issue of the newspaper Mead publicly endorsed an Advertiser story suggesting that Honolulu residents do their own yardwork so as to release hundreds of yardboys for plantation work; that the story, aimed at generating support from Honolulu's homeowners inconvenienced by a labor shortage, would not appear until two days later.
The real motive behind the claim of labor shortage soon came to light: to gain support for the importation of Chinese laborers. In an Advertiser story entitled "Labor Shortage and Rice Famine Threaten Hawaii," the newspaper reported that delegate Jonah Kalanianaole Kuhio, Hawaii’s delegate to Congress, met with Governor Charles McCarthy to introduce a bill allowing Hawaii an exemption to import 30,000 Chinese. On September 25, 1918, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution supporting the Kuhio bill. Mead added that the denial of the HSPA request to use army transports to bring 200 additional Filipinos a month to meet the labor shortage strengthened the argument for the Chinese importation. In mid-1918, the HSPA had made such a request and so did the BIA for 10,000 Filipinos for ship construction, railroad work, factory work and foundry work; however, Philippine Governor General Benjamin Harrison objected to the use of army transports and to any recruitment because of insufficient labor in the Philippines, especially at a time when the recruiting for the national guard in the Philippines had just began. The Kuhio bill, however, did not pass Congress.
The passage of the 1915 act regulating HSPA recruiting did not lessen the number of complaints by Hawaii Filipinos to officials in Manila. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison himself was opposed to Filipino emigration, but the Philippine colonial government was also unable to oversee the conditions under which Filipinos labored in Hawaii. In 1919 he appointed Prudencio A. Remigio, a lawyer and officer of the dominant Partido Nationalista in the Philippine legislature, to investigate the Filipino complaints in Hawaii. This was the first time ever that a representative of the Philippine government looked into the conditions of labor among Filipinos in Hawaii, a full decade after Pinkham and Steven began the migrant labor stream.

Remigio arrived in Hawaii on May 14, 1919. He paid his courtesy call to Governor McCarthy and then met Royal D. Mead who briefed him about the HSPA and gave him a letter of introduction to the various plantation managers. Meanwhile his arrival stirred up fervid speculation in Hawaii about his role: Would he merely inspect and report on Hawaii plantation conditions? Or would he act like an ombudsman, taking up the Filipino complaints with the planters? The Filipino laborers, hoping he would, held many meetings to collectively draw up their grievances and present them to Remigio upon his arrival. Remigio inspected 25 of the 45 HSPA plantations on Maui, Oahu and Hawaii, accompanied by Dr. Antonio P. Rosa, a Honolulu physician. Pressed for time, he was unable to visit Kauai but Dr. Rosa proceeded alone there after Remigio returned to the Philippines on June 20.
The HSPA, confident that Hawaiian hospitality would work its usual spell, was shocked when Remigio submitted his report to Governor General Harrison, and this time it did not translate from Spanish nor call attention to Remigio’s report the way it did Balmori’s earlier. Supporters of the sugar establishment, like the Methodist minister D.H. Klinefelter, at once mobilized to discredit Remigio. Klinefelter wrote Governor General Harrison that Remigio was not to be trusted, that the Filipinos were making good money on the plantations, and that plantation conditions were exemplary. He claimed that Remigio initially gave favorable reports while in Hawaii so everyone was surprised when his report came out.1 &D.H. Klinefelter, to Harrison, October 7, 1919, BIA 5999&

Contrary to Klinefelter’s claim, Remigio did not give a favorable report of plantation conditions while he was in Hawaii. He took up with Mead his criticism of plantation conditions with the understanding that these be corrected at once without the need anymore to bring them to the attention of Governor General Harrison. He also publicly took offense at the portrayal, in the prize winning essay by K. Shibayama on Hawaii labor conditions in the May 1919 issue of the Hawaii Educational Review, of the Filipinos as an undesirable race to bring to Hawaii because of their high criminality.1 &Advertiser, June 17, 1919, June 3, 1919& His formal report was generally critical of the conditions of Filipino labor on the plantations and of HSPA recruitment in general.

Remigio portrayed Filipinos life in Hawaii as one of sacrifice and privations because of the high cost of living.1 &Remigio, Report, p. 16& He portrayed Filipino life on the plantations as one reduced to bare existence, the laborers leading a monotonous, dreary exhausting life especially on the remote plantations, with few satisfactions and amusements. This explained the high turnover, and the fact that only few remained of the thousands who came to work in Hawaii.1 &Remigio, Report, p. 21& Disillusioned upon finding out that their aspirations for better lives could not be fulfilled, "the situation becomes odious for some, forced for others, desperate for all."1 &Remigio, Report, p. 18& Remigio criticized the sugar establishment for controlling the importation of laborers and putting up legal and economic barriers to their emigration; he described Hawaii as a prison with doors open for entry and closed for departure."1 &Remigio, Report, p. 00&
Remigio was referring to events in 1911 when agents of Alaska and West Coast firms recruited laborers in Hawaii. Despite a law making it a misdemeanor to solicit laborers within 30 days of their arrival in Hawaii, a law hurriedly passed to prevent the diversion of newly arrived Portuguese to the US mainland, the labor agents continued to recruit. Their two ships, the Senator, chartered by recruiters of the Alaska canning industry, and the Korea by the California fruit packing houses, waited just outside the three mile limit waiting to board laborers, including 150 Filipinos. The HSPA’s law firm of Kinney and Prosser, invoking a controversial law allowing the arrest of any person if the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that such a person had committed or intended to commit an offense, led law enforcement officers on board the two ships and arrested 400 laborers. The detention of the laborers effectively kept them from leaving Hawaii. &Advertiser, March 25, 27, 31, April 2, 8, 12, 1911; October 1, 1912& Meanwhile, Albert F. Judd and Charles A. Rice rushed a law through the territorial legislature making it a misdemeanor, punishable by a $500 fine and imprisonment of six months, to recruit labor for outside the territory if the laborers were already bound by written or oral contract to any employer; later, a stronger law was passed requiring recruiting agents to post a bond of $25,000, as well as a large bond for every recruited laborer. Such impossible requirements effectively stopped recruiting in Hawaii.

In urging the the restriction of Filipino emigration to Hawaii, Remigio appended to his report a draft of a stringent law patterned after Hawaii’s law exacting a heavy bond on recruiters and a high tax for each recruited laborer. In a cover memorandum to his report, he called governor general Harrison’s attention to the hundreds of Filipinos stranded in Hawaii, awaiting Philippine government help to return to the Philippines.1 &Remigio, Report, p. 18& These stranded Filipinos consisted of those who came before 1915 when the HSPA did not yet provide such a return passage in the contract, as well as those who, coming after 1915, failed to qualify for return passage because they left the plantation before the three year term.1 &Remigio, To Governor General Harrison, July 25, 1918; Governor General Harrison to BIA, November 12, 1919, in BIA&
Remigio's report did not result in any changes at all. His proposed law restricting recruiters was not introduced to the legislature at all. By this time, the HSPA had already established alliances with powerful Filipino officials through its investments in the Philippine sugar industry.

THE TARIFF AND THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR INDUSTRY

 Philippine sugar industry had been destroyed during the Philippine American war and it was only in 1912 that the total sugar production had returned to a level attained during the last years of the Spanish regime. Extensively cultivated in Negros and Panay in the Visayas, sugar was not as technologically advanced as in Hawaii. Much of the work was done by hand and only the payment of low wages enabled the Philippine planters to sustain the industry with its low profitability and efficiency. Having neither the capital to buy new machines nor the credit to improve cane processing, the Philippine planters were still using rollers drawn by carabaos to extract the juice and the outmoded technology of boiling the juice. The long and tedious process resulted in the loss of much cane juice and the product was of poor quality.¹ W.C. Lelborn, "Philippine Sugar Production," Planters Monthly, vol. 26, January 1907, pp. 28-34

The result was muscovado, a low grade of raw sugar which brought a lower price than the better quality vacuum pan centrifugal produced in Hawaii and Cuba. They entered into a new arrangement where by the cane growers would abandon their antiquated muscovado factories and sign a contract to supply the HSPA mill with cane for processing. The mill owners and the planters would divide the processed sugar according to a fixed formula in the contract. This planter/central arrangement in the Philippines contrasted with the plantation system in Hawaii whereby the plantations owned the land, the resources for growing the crop, and the mill.
Americans, attracted by the low cost of producing sugar there (in the first decade of the century, Hawaii laborer wages were five times that of the Philippine sugar laborer wages) were interested in investing in the Philippine sugar industry during the early years but held back for fear that the islands would become independent, especially if a Democratic party president was elected. Furthermore, until 1909 the entry of Philippine sugar to the United States had been hampered by taxes and limitations, as American domestic sugar growers, including the Hawaii planters, lobbied to keep it out altogether. In 1909, however, the Payne Aldrich tariff allowed the duty free importation of Philippine sugar up to 300,000 long tons. The Payne Aldrich act, in general, established a colonial economic relationship between the United States and the Philippines. American goods entered the Philippines in unlimited quantity and free of duty, whereas Philippine goods were subject to quota entry, especially where the products competed with American products. Rice, a potential source of Philippine export income, was shut out of the American market completely. As a consequence of this colonial relationship, the Philippines became a market for American industries, and the Filipinos became avid consumers of American manufactured products to this day. In 1913 the Underwood tariff abolished the quota limit on Philippine export altogether and effected a free trade. This stimulated the growth of the Philippine sugar industry. Capital began to come in from Spanish entrepreneurs and from California and Hawaii. Then, especially as the war had pushed the price of sugar higher.

Hawaii's sugar planters had been investing their excess profits in the western United States, Formosa, the West Indies, and other places. In fact, Judd had explored such investments in the Philippines. As early as 1911 rumors in Hawaii circulated that the Hawaii planters would wrest control of the Philippine sugar industry and that President Taft would welcome this development. In fact, Alfred F. Thayer, a representative of the Dillingham company, secretly purchased 10,000 acres of sugar land and he offered this former Dominican Order estate first to Honolulu planters, who declined, before selling it to the San Francisco sugar trust.
Sugar being the primary export crop, Philippine officials were eager to develop the sugar industry as a major revenue source for the insular government. Unidentified high ranking politicians approached Montague Lord, the office manager of the Manila HSPA, to explore the possibility of putting up a central in return for the support of the HSPA recruitment. Filipino businessmen, landowners and politicians also approached HSPA men individually for assistance in putting up a sugar central. The HSPA wished assurance that if it did so, the emigration of laborers to Hawaii would not be interrupted.\textsuperscript{1} R.D. Mead to Hackfeld, August 2, 1917, GFA\textsuperscript{4} In 1912, once it became evident that congress would make sugar duty free the Hawaii planters began planning to finance and build a large mill at San Carlos, Negros Occidental.\textsuperscript{1} Advertiser, May 7, 1912\textsuperscript{6} The initial contributions of the Hawaiian sugar industry to the Philippine sugar industry, however, was in the form of exported expertise, capital and technology. In fact, by 1917, Hawaii had contributed so many sugar men on the staff of the Philippine plantations and mills, considerable capital investment in individual plantations and centrals, as well as the fact that the centrals were often built by the Hawaii firms of Honolulu Iron and Catton, Neill and Company Limited. The Philippine sugar industry had become dependent on Hawaii's technological and capital contributions that Royal D. Mead could threaten: "If the emigration of Filipinos to Hawaii is cut off, the Philippines could not expect any further assistance from Hawaii to develop the sugar industry."\textsuperscript{1} R.D. Mead to Hackfeld and Co., August 2, 1917, GFA\textsuperscript{4}

The major project of the Hawaiian sugar industry in the Philippines, however, was the construction of a central. In the fall of 1917 a group of Hawaii sugar men consisting of Alonzo Gartley, Jr. of C. Brewer, Frank Atherton, John T. Moir, the manager of Onomea Sugar plantation, and John Searby, a superintendent at Puunene plantation was sent by the HSPA to the Philippines. Their trip had been "at the request of interests in the archipelago" about their desire to put up a central and the men would view the proposal "from a purely cold-blooded business standpoint."\textsuperscript{1} Advertiser, January 9, 1918\textsuperscript{6}
In Manila, Manuel L. Quezon, the highest Filipino government official, threw a dinner for them. The committee visited Negros, Panay, Cebu in the Visayas as well as several Luzon provinces, and they were impressed by the soil, the climate, the transportation potential, and the overall investment potential—the safety of the capital, the favorable laws, and the ample labor supply. As a result of the favorable committee report, the HSPA trustees finalized the plans to finance a sugar central in the Philippines, not just to invest profitably but "in order to allay the opposition to the Filipino emigration to Hawaii." Under the plan the HSPA raised shares among the member plantations by assessing each one $2 for every ton produced in the 1915-1916 crop. The Hawaiian Philippines Company was organized with the HSPA plantations owning all the shares of the company and Winfred Howard Babbitt, the head of the HSPA Manila office, became its president and treasurer until he retired in 1945. The sugar central at Silay, Negros Occidental, began operating in 1919 and in 1922 became, after the Spanish owned La Carlotta central, the largest producer in the Philippines. It weathered the post World War I depression when other centrals in the Philippines went bankrupt and gave the Hawaiian planters excellent returns on their capital until World War II.
The Hawaii investment in the Philippine sugar industry strengthened the ties between the Philippine officials and the Hawaii capitalists. The HSPA hosted the Philippine officials stopping in Honolulu on their way to or from Washington D.C. Babbitt's long tenure in Manila enabled him to cultivate important personal relationships with the Filipino officials. Furthermore, Hawaii's sugar men were extensively employed in the Philippine sugar industry. George H. Fairchild, formerly manager at Makee plantation, moved to the Philippines and was one of the many responsible for brokering Hawaii capital in Manila. Robert Renton Hind, another Honolulu man, was responsible for the formation of the Philippine Sugar Producers' Association, the HSPA counterpart. In 1922 the Advertiser crowed that Hawaii had done more to keep the Philippines a permanent American protectorate through the sugar industry than by the entire government machinery. The Hawaii planters had built the sugar factories, sent its best engineers, chemists, agriculturists, executives and capital. In fact, the Advertiser could confidently threaten that no independence should be granted to the Philippines or else no more Hawaiian capital would be invested in the development of Philippine industries.1 &advertiser, August 21, 1922&

Thus, the HSPA was able to keep open the flow of cheap labor to the plantations.