THE BITTER AND THE SWEET

At a meeting in 1895 of American sugar cane producers and members of Congress at Ebbitt House in Washington D.C., California's sugar magnate Claus Spreckles sternly told the Hawaii sugar planters: "If you wish annexation you've got to swallow the bitter with the sweet. The bitter is the labor laws of the United States." ¹ Recalled by Henry T. Oxnard, Vice President of the American Beet Sugar Company, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Labor Problems in Hawaii, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 158 and 171, June 21-August 12, 1921, 67th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1921, p. 580; also by Samuel Gompers, ibid., p. 813.

The Hawaii sugar planters found Spreckles' words hard to accept but it seemed the only way out of uncertainty. For many years, Hawaii had enjoyed a favored relationship with the United States in the 1876 treaty of reciprocity, which gave the islands' products duty free entry, but the 1890 McKinley tariff cancelled that advantage by removing the tariff on all foreign sugar. Although the Wilson-Gorman tariff restored the duty on foreign sugar four years later, the fear persisted among the Hawaii planters of another McKinley tariff or, even worse, the repeal of the treaty of reciprocity. The only way to assure that they obtained the same privileges and protection as domestic sugar producers was for Hawaii to be annexed by the United States.

When annexation did come about in 1898, the planters, confident now that their product had unrestricted entry into the American market, expanded their plantations, opening up even marginally productive acres. In a matter of two years, they harvested 57% more cane, and in another ten years, 300% more than their 1898 crop of 230,000 tons.¹ "A History of the Progress of the Sugar Industry Since the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876," Planters' Monthly (December 1908), vol.22, pp.485-507. By 1905, declared the US labor commissioner in 1905, the territory had become "practically one vast sugar plantation."¹ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1905, p. 9. With three fourths of the arable land converted to its cultivation, sugar cane comprised 97% of Hawaii's products in 1905; it provided all but a million of Hawaii's $35 million export income.
The sugar industry quickly evolved into a highly organized and concentrated industry. Through consolidation, the 93 sugar plantations in 1893 had been reduced to about half that number in 1910 and further down to merely a third in 1945.

At the core of the industry were the The Big Five (Alexander and Baldwin; Hackfeld and Company, later to become Amfac in 1918; Castle and Cooke; C. Brewer; and Theo H. Davis). Three other agencies W.G. Irwin and Company, Bishop and Company, and F.A. Schaefer and Company, played a minor role in the sugar industry in the first decade of the century. From their original functions of merely keeping the books and marketing the sugar for the plantations, the agencies in time ended up owning or controlling them, and directing all their functions except the growing and milling of the sugar cane. The heads of the Big Five also comprised the board of trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association (HSPA), the most evident manifestation of concentration and cooperation in the industry. They controlled practically all of the association’s 10,000 votes on matters of industry policy, and each year, by rotation, one of them served as the president of the HSPA. The HSPA formulated policies for the industry, conducted technical research and experiments, recruited labor, and undertook lobbying activities.
CHAPTER 1

LABOR PROBLEM: THE BITTER

June 15, 1900 was a critical day on the Hawaii plantations, it being the day that American labor laws became applicable to Hawaii. Since 1852, the Hawaii planters had recruited Chinese, Japanese, Iberian, Northern European, and South Sea islanders under the 1852 Masters and Servants Act, a system of labor contract which stipulated the conduct, wages, and terms of service of the recruited laborers. Contract labor was prohibited by the Foran Act, and on June 15, as their contracts with the plantation became void, the laborers laid off from work, celebrating their freedom. They continued to celebrate for the next few days and when they settled down, they went from plantation to plantation to look for the best wages and working conditions. This was merely the beginning of the plantations' problem with labor that Claus Spreckles had warned about.

To prevent laborers from moving about, the planters introduced the cultivation contract, which obligated a group of laborers to tend an assigned field of cane to maturity in return for compensation based on the weight of the harvested cane, and the turn out bonus, which was awarded to those who worked beyond a minimum number of days each month. But the problem also involved preventing them from leaving Hawaii for other opportunities elsewhere, a phenomenon which had existed way before annexation.

In fact, the majority of the laborers brought to Hawaii under contract labor did not stay at all. Merely 23% of the 184,000 laborers recruited during the second half of the previous century had remained in Hawaii in 1900. Lorrin Thurston Sr., the publisher of The Advertiser, attributed the low retention to such factors as the little home feeling and poor living conditions in the camps, the treatment of the laborers as an anonymous mass, and the singularly male labor force which bound it to no home life or local sentiment in Hawaii. E.O. Tenney, Castle and Cooke's trustee on the HSPA board, was more blunt, pointing out at the 1906 annual HSPA meeting that on the plantations the laborer had no prospect of "bettering his conditions except to work such time as is necessary to enable him to acquire a sufficient amount of money to go elsewhere to better his conditions."
Low wages, coupled with the high cost of living in the plantation camps, made it difficult for the laborers to better their lot. It did not help that the plantation store, often the only store around or the only one which offered him credit, charged exorbitant prices. The plantation store at Laupahoehoe plantation sold Hawaiian rice at 42% profit in 1904 and Theo H. Davies & Co. asked the plantation to charge less because it was causing many laborers, especially the Japanese, to leave. "Of course we realize that your profits will be small on this basis," advised Theo Davis, "but we are very much afraid that if some active measures are not taken toward making the laborer better satisfied than they are at present, the exodus which is now going on at a tremendous rate will still further increase."1 Theo H. Davis and Co., to C. McLennan, Manager, Laupahoehoe Sugar Company, October 17, 1904, Laupahoehoe. The high prices prevailed as well on most Hawaii plantations, and the 1905 bureau of labor survey reported that half of plantations stores showed a 28% net profit upon capital invested.1 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1905, p. 97.
Between 1898 and 1905, large shipments of Japanese, Korean and Puerto Rican laborers arrived, doubling the number of plantation laborers to 48,000, but in that same period every other laborer who arrived also left Hawaii to try out opportunities in north America. The exodus was fueled by advertisements in the Japanese language newspapers in Hawaii and by emigrant agents describing opportunities in the farms, orchards, railroads, builders and contractors in the west and northwest United States, and it was so great that enterprising individuals made money chartering special steamers when the steamship lines couldn’t meet the demand for passage to San Francisco and Vancouver. The outward flow of laborers was not stopped by a 1905 territorial law licensing emigrant agents and imposing a large ($500) fee for anyone engaging laborers for employment away from Hawaii.
The end of contract labor forced the plantations to compete among themselves by offering higher wages. Paying field hands $12.50 a month shortly before annexation, they had to raise it to $20 two years later and to as much as $26 in the more isolated plantations where fewer laborers desired to locate.¹ Commissioner of Labor, Report, 1901; Senate Document 169, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1901, pp. 17-20. ¹ In 1901 the expanded acreage led to a fierce wage competition and to the practice of each plantation sending a runner to Honolulu hotels and dock to recruit arriving Japanese laborers, and the HSPA had to mediate conflicts, impose a uniform wage rate, and itself undertake the role of the runners by recruiting and distributing the arriving laborers.¹ Hackfeld To Wilcox, Nov. 20, 1901, Nov. 22, 1901, Grove Farm. ¹ As the labor shortage persisted in 1906, the plantation runners reappeared as did the open squabbling over the higher wages on the outer island plantations.¹ Proceedings, 12th Annual HSPA Meeting, 1906, pp. 184-187; Hackfeld to Wilcox, Grove Farm, September. 28, 1906.
CHAPTER 1

A close look at Hutchinson Sugar Company on the southern slope of Maunaloa illustrated the labor shortage problems in 1906. Hutchinson had difficulty attracting and keeping laborers because of its isolation, and at the same time, it could not afford to match or top the wage rate on the other plantations because it incurred high costs because of its poor soil, its field sections made inaccessible by lava flows, and its lack of port facilities nearby. As a result, the plantation lost so many laborers to other plantations that manager C. Wolters could no longer prevent some mature cane wither unharvested and newly planted cane smothered by weeds. In May, 1906, for example, Hutchinson lost its Portuguese laborers to other big island plantations and Kahuku plantation on Oahu offering $24 a month, a big increase over the $15 to $19 that they were receiving at Hutchinson.

Desperate for more laborers, Wolters employed a runner in August, Kitagawa, who spoke Okinawan, to direct arriving Japanese laborers in Honolulu to Hutchinson. Kitagawa failed to attract recruits, however, because other runners, such as those from the Kualoa and Kekaha plantations on Kauai, offered higher wages of $21.50 and $22, respectively, a month, and, in addition, offered the laborers free hotel accommodations while waiting for passage to the outer island plantations. Meanwhile, Wolters continued to lose more laborers to runners from Ewa and Kahuku plantations on Oahu, who, in offering women a wage rate of $14 a month, which was $2 more than Hutchinson’s rate, successfully stole away many married laborers as well.1 &1Wolters to Irwin, Aug. 1, 11, 15, 22, 29, 1909. Hutchinson. He also found himself wrongfully accused by Hackfeld as one of the big island plantation managers who had sent runners to Kauai plantations.1 &1Wolters to Irwin, May 30, 1906; July 25, 1906, Hutchinson.

Meanwhile, Wolters had to contend with raids from neighboring plantations and fend off the runners from nearby independent cane growers, homesteaders, and road construction companies. In September he began the practice of distributing two pounds of beef to every laborer who worked a full week in order to induce him to remain, Olaa Sugar Company simply countered with a bag of flour each month to men who worked 20 days or more a month.1 &1Wolters to Irwin, September. 12, 15, 1906. Hutchinson. By November, Wolters prepared to engage his neighbor, Pahala’s Hawaiian Agricultural Company manager Ogg, in a shooting war for being accused of sending runners to steal Ogg’s laborers. More and more sections of his cane fields had to be left overgrown with weeds as he continued to lose laborers.1 &1Wolters to Irwin, Nov. 7, 1906. Hutchinson.
THE FEAR OF THE JAPANESE

Clearly the planters needed to bring in more laborers to Hawaii to relieve the situation at Hutchinson and other plantations. The Chinese and the Japanese constituted the major sources of labor for the plantations but both had drawbacks. The Chinese had comprised the majority of the laborers during the last two decades of the previous century, to the point that the planters feared such a dependence on them and passed Hawaii's Chinese exclusion laws. The planters welcomed the Japanese, saw them as law abiding, docile, industrious, and assimilable, which the Chinese were not, but the welcome faded once they became the largest group on the plantations. In 1905, when the Japanese now comprised 66% of the plantation labor force and the Chinese merely 9%, the planters now saw the Chinese as law abiding, docile, industrious, and assimilable, which the Japanese were not. Each year after annexation, the governor of Hawaii urged in his annual report that Hawaii be exempt from the Chinese exclusion act so as to allow the importation of Chinese coolies and thus destroy the solidarity of the Japanese. 1

"Nearly all plantations," warned H. Hackfeld in 1900, "are dependent on Japanese laborers, who are more skillful in getting up labor combines than any other nationality," and that they "would likely take advantage of their position to ask for higher wages and other concessions, or strikes on a large scale." 1

Hackfeld to G.N. Wilcox, May 15, 1900, Grove Farm A. It was this fear which led to the HSPA instructed the planters on each island to form an association in order to fix wage rates and control the movement of laborers. Hackfeld to Plantation Managers, July 24, 1901. Grove Farm A. Between 1900 and 1905 there were 35 major strikes on the plantations, almost all inevitably involving the Japanese simply because they comprised the vast majority of the laborers. The planters saw these strikes as an evidence of a racial conspiracy under the leadership of a newly arrived educated immigrants in order to take over the industry, although they were really over higher wages, contract disputes, reduced hours, and the curtailment of supervisory abuses. 1

In fact, the planters saw Hawaii being overrun by the Japanese, a vision reflected in the 1902 and 1905 reports on Hawaii by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Victor S. Clark was mainly responsible for compiling the data and writing the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports for Hawaii for the years 1902, 1905, 1910 and 1915. These reports were required under Hawaii's organic act. Clark was the Territorial commissioner of immigration and labor statistics from 1910 to 1913. The reports saw the end of civilization in Hawaii by the sheer predominance of the Japanese, who were basically unassimilable and who confined trade and interpersonal relationships exclusively to their own kind, and the overwhelming predominance of their children, who outnumbered the white children in the schools by a ratio of two to one. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1902, pp. 47, 109, 119; 1905, p. 26.

The planters came under attack from two sources for the presence of the Japanese in Hawaii. They were attacked by urban white labor who felt threatened by Japanese entry in the skilled labor market, depressing the wages of white tradesmen in Honolulu. The HSPA sought to appease them by establishing an employment bureau to recruit them to skilled plantation jobs, a move which white labor skeptically viewed merely as token effort in order to dampen labor opposition to the ban on Chinese labor importation. E.F. Bishop, C. Brewer secretary, to Ogg, HACO, December 7, 1904.

The planters were also attacked by federal officials for "Orientalizing Hawaii," a charge which came from such diverse sources as the Bureau of Labor, the Commission on Immigration, and even from President Theodore Roosevelt himself. To these officials, "Americanizing Hawaii" meant forcing the planters to repopulate the islands with whites from the US mainland and to encourage them to settle on fee simple homesteads. Advertiser, July 26, 1907; January 7, 1906. To the planters, intent on seeking cheap labor and preventing the loss of sugar lands to homesteading, it meant simply introducing white labor on the plantations, which they reluctantly undertook even though it ran counter to their belief that the white man was unfit for tropical work, couldn't stand long labor under the tropical sun, and would not demean himself by working side by side with Asiatics. Hackfeld to Grove Farm, September 15, 1905.

All these labor issues, tied to the fear of the Japanese, the token recruitment of white labor, and the search for additional cheap labor from Asia, came to a head in the 1906 Waipahu sugar plantation strike.
THE 1906 WAIPAHU STRIKE

On January 16, 1906, the cane loaders at Waipahu plantation, walked out to protest the automatic deduction of a certain weight from each carload, a practice which the plantation justified as a normal adjustment to the trash included among the cane stalks. This account is reconstructed from the Advertiser, January 17-23, 1906. A few hours later, the entire 1,700 Japanese labor force at Waipahu, adding other grievances, joined the walkout. Manager E.K. Bull called out the county police but the thirty-two policemen, armed with rifles and ball cartridges, found the situation calm and settled down at the plantation office to enjoy the cigars and tobacco furnished by the plantation.

The Japanese consul in Honolulu could always be relied upon to take the side of the planters; Miki Saito, who had just returned to Japan, had condemned strikes as "the doings of unruly children" and "the acts of barbarians rather than of civilized men." Hackfeld to Grove Farm, June 29, 1904. Saito had also served the HSPA well through his Central Japanese League, which sought to promote feelings of obligation between employees and the sugar industry, as well as to prevent Japanese laborers from leaving for the mainland or moving from plantation to plantation. Miki Saito to HSPA, September 21, 1903, Grove Farm. Saito's successor, consul general Matsubara, heeded Bull's call to mediate, but after conferring with the Waipahu strikers, he expressed puzzlement why his countrymen were on strike; after all, he said, they had all reasons to be grateful because they had good homes, the plantation piped water and delivered firewood to their homes. The laborers, however, greeted with ridicule and disapproval his advice to return to work.

To keep the mill running, the HSPA rushed to Waipahu 150 newly arrived Japanese on the SS Mongolia and, at wages twice the going rate, many eager Hawaiian strikebreakers. Bull also successfully induced with higher wages some Chinese and Korean plantation strikers to return to work. When the strike went into its sixth day, Bull issued the order to evict the strikers, but with merely 50 county policemen to carry out the order and with reports that the Japanese on the other Oahu plantations were preparing to strike as well, Bull and the HSPA had no choice but to negotiate. On the 22nd of January, seven days after it began, the strike ended; the Japanese laborers obtained small increases in contract payment and an end to the automatic deduction in the weighing of cane.
The planters found the outcome of the Waipahu strike distasteful. They feared more strikes forthcoming, such as the June strike by a thousand Japanese workers at Onomea plantation for a 25% wage increase, as a result of having conceded, and saw the urgency of bringing in other nationalities. They watched with interest James B. Castle's experiment with 150 Russian Molokans from California, which, if they adapted well at Kauai's Makee Sugar Company, could result in the importation of as many as two hundred thousand Molokans directly from Russia, but after four months, Makee George H. Fairchild gave up on the Russians, declaring them too individualistic to accept supervision and too unreliable as laborers.\cite{Advertiser, January 24, March 19, April 11, 1906.} The planters had many reservations about importing Europeans, in general. These laborers were intractable, they had to be brought in family groups rather than as single adult males, and they had to be provided better accommodations than the Asian laborers. Furthermore, the native Hawaiians, the largest voting bloc, opposed their importation because the new immigrants qualified to become citizens and vote.\cite{HSPA, Proceedings, 26th Annual Meeting, 1906, p. 178.}

Despite these reservations, the planters grudgingly decided to bring in Europeans because of the Japanese threat, federal criticism, and the shortage of plantation labor. In fact, the labor shortage was likely to get worse as the Japanese continued to leave for the US mainland and Canada in large numbers, and the plantation workforce of 41,303 in July 1906 was 7.5% less than the year before. Furthermore, fewer Japanese laborers would be coming in because effective April 1 Japan's premier reduced the number of immigrants to Hawaii to merely a thousand a year, including women and children.\cite{Advertiser, April 18, 1906.} Given all these considerations, the planters in April helped set up the territory's board of immigration to recruit white immigrants, and their contributions became the sole source of its funding. The board immediately sent to Europe Edward R. Stackable, who took a leave from his post as customs collector in Honolulu, to secure Portuguese and Italian immigrants. But the ideal solution to their problems was to locate a cheaper labor source from the East.

THE JUDD MISSION

In April 1906 two natural calamities made the headlines worldwide: the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius and, immediately after, the San Francisco earthquake. For days, Honolulu worried about the safety of friends, kinsmen, and assets in San Francisco vaults because the earthquake had snapped the cable line and dispatches had to travel a circuitous route through New York and Manila. The Chinese and Japanese communities in the islands devoted their energies to raising relief for compatriots rendered homeless by the earthquake. Preoccupied with these concerns, hardly anybody noticed that Honolulu lawyer Albert F. Judd boarded the America Maru on April 21 on a special mission for the HSPA to recruit in the Philippines.
Even before American possession of the Philippines in 1898, the Hawaii planters had eyed it as a likely labor source. Four hundred years of exploitive colonial policies by Spain had left it largely rural and undeveloped, and while it seemed to be underpopulated, its density of 66 persons per square mile being merely half that of sugar producing areas of the world, it had two particular regions, the Ilocos region in the northern end of the country and the Visayan region in the center, with very high populations. The planters scrapped their recruiting plans because of objections that Chinese laborers might mix in among the Filipino recruits, thus violating Hawaii's Chinese exclusion laws.1

&lEvening Bulletin, March 21, 1906.& New plans in 1901 to recruit merely ran into the opposition of the US secretary of war and the commanding general of the American army in the Philippines, who claimed that the Filipinos had no desire to emigrate.1 &lSecretary of War to Luke E. Wright, Vice Governor of the Philippine Islands, December 9, 1901; Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chafee to Secretary of War Elihu Root, August 28, 1901; William Heywood to Secretary of War Root, June 19, 1901; Bureau of Insular Affairs, Memo: Emigration of Filipino Laborers to Hawaii or the United States, January 5, 1932; all these in BIA 5999.&

At that time the HSPA did not press hard for Philippine recruiting because laborers were still coming in from Japan, Korea, and Puerto Rico. Besides, reports generally derided Filipino labor as unreliable and expensive when compared to Hongkong workmen; in fact, dissatisfied with native labor, the American and other foreign businessmen in Manila had brought in Japanese laborers at high costs and also sent a lobbyist to Washington D.C. each year to work for the repeal, or at the very least, a Philippine exemption to the Chinese Exclusion Act.1 &lPhilippine Commission, Report, 1901,p. 151; ibid., 1902, pp. 303-304; ibid., 1903,pp. 512-514.&

When Albert F. Judd left for Manila in 1906, however, the HSPA had fresh reports that Filipino laborers could be employed productively. One of these was a prominent article, "Filipino Labor Supply" by George H. Guy, which appeared in the March 19, 1906 Advertiser. Guy reported the success of the New York firm J.G. White in utilizing Filipino labor for the construction of Manila's trolley car and electric service. Starting with the assumption that the Filipinos were a barbaric people, Guy proudly announced that "the industrial invasion" by American corporations, which had followed at the heels of the military in the Philippines, had done wonders to civilize the Filipinos. This was true with regards to labor as well. Under Spain's conscription system labor had been a mark of peonage rather than for gain. The Filipinos had also been cheated out of their pay, and, unable to secure justice in a Spanish court, refused to work unless paid in advance. Furthermore, they had been victimized by the practice of the native foreman taking a cut out of their meager pay.
Guy proudly listed the instances of American ingenuity in teaching the Filipinos to become efficient and reliable workers. A manager gave his small and half starved laborers extra allowance for hot lunch, and soon they became strong workers. Another, faced with a family oriented people who left work for days at a time in order to be with their families in distant villages, built temporary shacks near the construction site and encouraged his laborers to move their families there. He also succeeded in attracting many laborers by providing distractions; he "organized a series of variety shows, and even put up a couple of cockpits, and in fact made a little Coney Island for the settlement." Guy reported dramatic changes among the Filipino workmen, especially their adeptness in learning to use tools and equipment in a short time. "These commercial organizers," Guy exulted, "are great civilizers."

In more restrained terms, W.H. Hoogs, who had just returned from an observation trip to the Philippines, confirmed the potential value of Filipinos as good plantation laborers. "From what I saw and heard of the Filipinos," he told a Honolulu reporter, "they are good workers when handled properly. They will do a good day's work and are not as lazy as some people try to make them out." The HSPA trustees also received reports from Victor S. Clark, who had earlier looked at labor conditions in the Philippines, and Joe Marsdan, both of whom endorsed the Philippine recruiting plan during their meetings with the trustees in mid-March. The HSPA trustees chose Oswald A. Steven to go instead because he had had "some considerable knowledge of the Philippines from having been in the wars there," and the Advertiser reported that Steven was set to go, having already obtained a three-month leave of absence from his job with the J.F. Morgan's real estate and auctioneering firm. All these plans, however, were carried out in secrecy, for fear that bringing in more Asians would merely evoke federal ire against the planters for adding one more to the many "impossible races now densely impregnating the population of these islands."
However, Steven would not make the trip because his boss, J.F. Morgan, had gone on a business trip to New York and had left him in charge of the firm. Marsdan, having accepted an HSPA mission to recruit in Puerto Rico, could not go, either, even though the HSPA had abruptly cancelled that mission while already enroute in mid-April. George H. Fairchild, the Makee plantation manager who discredited the Russian Molokan experiment, declined the offer by the HSPA trustees.

On April 12, Three trustees, Frances M. Swanzy of Theo H. Davis, William Pfothenhauer of Hackfeld and Co., and J.P. Cooke of Alexander and Baldwin, went to Albert F. Judd's law office to talk him into going to the Philippines. It was a short walk, as the HSPA offices were also located in his family's Judd Building as the Atkinson, Judd and Mott-Smith law firm where he was a successful 31 year old corporate lawyer representing the sugar interest. Like most of the trustees and the sugar elite, he was of impeccable missionary descent. His grandfather Gerrit P. had been a medical missionary and then a cabinet member and advisor to the Hawaiian kings, and his father, Albert Francis, a former chief justice of the Hawaii supreme court. He had received his bachelor's degree and his law degree from Yale.

Judd was initially taken aback by the offer: there were merely nine days before the America Maru sailing, he had no knowledge of the Philippines nor of labor recruiting, and besides, his wife had just given birth to a daughter the week before. Judd finally agreed to undertake the task when the three trustees persisted and explained that unlike other foreign recruitment which entailed legal and transportation problems, this Philippine mission was a simple matter. "The idea," Judd recalled, "was for me to go, spend a few days in Manila, fix things up, and return, bringing my hombres." Judd, Sidelights, p. 65.

When he boarded the America Maru, Judd had only his family and a few close friends to see him off, his mission having been kept under wraps. He found the voyage to Hongkong a pleasant routine of shuffleboard and evening dances. In Hongkong, he boarded the Yawata Maru and arrived in Manila on May 21. Unless indicated otherwise, the succeeding account of Judd's mission in Manila draws from the journal he kept. A.F. Judd, Journals, manuscript, Bishop Museum Archives.
At the time Judd arrived in Manila, it was now certain that the United States would keep the Philippines as an insular possession. Eight years before, the Filipinos had fought to throw off four hundred years of Spanish rule, only to discover that they had to keep on fighting, this time the Americans who betrayed their hope for independence. When Judd arrived, most of the 70,000 men in khaki or faded blue cavalry uniforms who conducted the "pacification campaign" of relocating whole villages in order to undermine grassroots support for the Filipino independence fighters had returned stateside. Much of the Philippine countryside had been taken, and although General Macario Sakay, insisting on Filipino sovereignty, still eluded his pursuers it would be a matter of two months later that he would sue for peace so that the Philippine assembly, a representative national legislature, could be established. Sakai would be humiliatingly charged as a common bandit and hanged.

The American community of six thousand in Manila were aghast at what the Spaniards had left behind. Spain had not bothered to educate the Filipinos nor established a public health system—two developments held dear by the Americans. Manila itself had no public sanitation system, no pure water supply or a good hospital. In its government monopoly of trade and its persecution of entrepreneurial or educated Filipinos, Spain also did not develop commerce or agriculture. The backwardness that the Americans saw in the Philippines gave them a sense of superiority and an alertness to opportunities. There were the positions, from the lowliest clerk to the bureau heads, to be filled in the government to be set up. There were lucrative contracts for construction, roadbuilding and dredging. There was wealth to be made in exploiting the resources of the islands. There were, for others, different rewards in the task of civilizing the natives by teaching them English, Protestantism, and the ideals of America. There were opportunities for everyone. An observer noted that ex-corporals became overnight business magnates, ex-sargeants became school superintendents, ex-soldiers who had never studied law became court judges and trial lawyers, ex-company clerks found fortunes in mining claims, and any ex-private who had accumulated a small fortune in poker opened a bar or a restaurant. 1 E.C. Ross, in Gleck, The Manila Americans, p. 15.

Building outward from Intramuros, the old Spanish walled city encircled by a sewage-filled moat, the Manila Americans had already established the familiar institutions of home. They worshipped at their Protestant churches and met regularly at Clarke's ice cream parlor to make deals, invest in mining claims, or negotiate construction contracts. They shopped at the American Bazaar which stocked all the familiar items from home. They had a choice of four English language newspapers—the Manila Times, the American, the Cabelnews, and the Freedom. They had their clubhouses—the Eagles, the Red Men, the Kings of Pythias, the Army and Navy, the Odd Fellows, the American, and others. The most prestigious of these was the University Club, with its swimming pool, athletic courts, bowling alleys, reading room, meeting rooms and card room; William Howard Taft himself had sponsored it when he was governor general of the Philippines prior to accepting a cabinet post in Theodore Roosevelt's administration in 1904.
The Manila Americans had been quick to take up the trappings and rites of the colonizer. Even for the lowliest government clerk, white drill suits became de riguer, as were a carriage, a stable boy, maids and a Chinese cook. The Americans took easily to the practice of long coffee breaks and afternoon teas, as well as afternoon promenades in a carriage and pair at the Luneta, the main park. At gatherings, they invariably brought up the latest encounters with the natives, incidents which illustrated the common knowledge that the natives were generally lazy, unreliable, and immoral in the way they accepted bribes and kept queridas (mistresses).\(^1\) Gleeck, The Manila Americans, p. 30. At the clubs, they sang songs from the "days of the empire." A popular song, "Little Brown Brother," ended with the verse "He may be a brother of William H. Taft but he ain't no brother of mine." Another popular song intoned:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos,
Crosseyed kakiak ladrones
Beneath the starry flag
Civilize them with the Krag
And return us to our beloved homes.\(^1\) Judd, Sidelights, p. 70.

Although Judd found in Manila many of the things he had been accustomed to, he also found something he had not faced before: a barrage of editorials in the Manila papers condemning his mission to induce 300 families to go to Hawaii. The most vehement were the Spanish language newspapers El Adelanto, La Democracia, La Independencia, Renacimiento, La Vida Filipina and El Mercantil, all objecting to the potential drain of labor needed to develop the country. The major American newspaper, the Manila Times, announced on May 22: "Judd's Name is Mud." The Cablenews editorial on the same day was milder, merely predicting the failure of Judd's mission because the Filipinos were "constitutionally and superstitiously opposed" to leaving their homeland, and suggesting instead that Judd take with him to Hawaii the imported 2,000 Japanese skilled workers, carpenters, road builders and machinists who had been receiving wages as much as five times the rate paid Filipino laborers. The American's May 25 editorial was the only one to laud Judd's task, regarding it as an opportunity for ambitious natives to learn modern practical agricultural methods. Judd dutifully clipped the editorials and all printed accounts for his scrapbook.\(^1\) Judd, Scrapbook, Bishop Museum Archives.

Judd gained easy entry into the Manila social scenes because old acquaintances opened doors for him. Most helpful during his initial days in Manila was his Yale classmate, Philip E. Dudley, who sponsored him to membership at the University Club and introduced him to other Americans who, in turn, introduced him to others. Within a week's time Judd had also gained membership to the Manila Club, the English Club, and the Army and Navy Club. Former Honolulu residents also proved to be helpful, especially those in the media such as Frederick O'Brien, formerly with the Advertiser and now editor of the Cablenews, Philip B. Dankey, formerly with the Honolulu Republican and now editor of the Manila Bulletin, and George Sellner, now publisher of the Manila Times.
Judd's immediate objective, like that of the other Manila Americans as well, was to present his case before the Philippine Commission. The commission, whose members were appointed by the U.S. President to govern the Philippines, was the chief purchaser of goods and services, the dispenser of lucrative contracts, and the benefactor of office positions and mining claims. At that time, the commissioners were with the governor general on an inspection tour of the country and were stranded by a typhoon in Baguio, north of Manila. For two weeks, Judd impatiently waited for their return, and when they did not, he would have pursued them in Baguio were it not for the fact that the proper tropical suits he had ordered from a native tailor were not ready. So he carried on with his usual dinners and tiffins with Manila men, soliciting their opinion on two matters: the nature of the Filipino as a laborer, and the possibility of investing Hawaii capital in Philippine sugar.

On the first matter the Manila Americans held set views and thought it a joke when they first learned of Judd's plan to recruit 300 families. Charles Swift, the president of the Philippine Railway Company, recalled that Judd was "looked upon as a little short of lunatic when he announced his intention of recruiting Filipinos for the Hawaiian sugar plantations." In clubs and offices, he said, the Americans delighted in "pounding the Filipino into a gloriously disreputable impossibility shorn of every virtue that goes to make a man, one of the failings that we most love to smite is his worthlessness as a laborer."1 Manila Times, February 27, 1907, reprinted in the Advertiser, April 1, 1907. Only rarely did Judd find anyone who held a better opinion of the Filipinos, and even that person told Judd they would not leave because they loved their homeland and became homesick if moved.

Yet Judd collected enough evidence to go against the prevailing opinion. "The whole thing with the Filipino as far as I have been able to learn," he declared upon his return to Honolulu, "is that if he is treated right he is a first class laborer. Possibly not as good as a Chinaman or a Jap but steady, faithful and willing to do his best for any boss for whom he has a liking." Judd concluded that gratitude was one worthy Filipino trait; offers of higher pay would not induce him to leave a place where he knew he was well treated and where his employers took an interest in his welfare.1 Judd interview, Advertiser, December 21, 1906.

On the second matter of investing in the Philippine sugar industry, Judd learned that the best place might be in the Visayan island of Negros, where the land was still fertile and there were few crop diseases. He found Filipino planters and officials who wished to see Hawaii capital invested in a sugar central on that island.
When governor general Henry C. Ide finally returned from Baguio, he was well disposed to meet with Judd because Ide, earlier as chief justice of Samoa, knew well Judd's father, the chief justice of Hawaii. Ide carefully listened to Judd's presentation and then helpfully suggested two ways to get the proposal approved: that Judd present it in the form of a resolution to be acted upon by the Philippine Commission, and that Judd approach the commissioners individually to gain their support. Ide also insisted on a written contract between the laborer and the Hawaii plantation, and, in another conversation 10 days later, a safeguard of the recruits' return to the Philippines upon completion of the contract.

Following Ide's suggestions, Judd worked on the resolution and on the contract between the laborer-recruit and plantation, using the existing recruitment contracts of the HSPA and merely adding the stipulation that $2 be withheld out of every month's wage for the laborer's return fare. Then he contacted the commissioners individually. He found the American commissioners easy to deal with. W. Cameron Forbes took an instant liking to him, invited him over for dinner several times, and pronounced the recruitment a good scheme. In fact, Forbes thought that Judd did not need the commission's consent to recruit because the Filipinos were free to travel anywhere in the United States and its territories, although he did add that the commission could pass a law stopping it anytime that the opposition to the recruitment got too intense. Dean C. Worcester, who had been a commissioner since 1901, when the HSPA had also applied to recruit, agreed with Forbes and recalled that earlier the commission had, indeed, taken the view that the Hawaii planters could recruit in the Philippines without the its consent.

Judd was confident of the support of the American commissioners, especially Forbes who assured Judd he would help in an unofficial way, including taking him twice to governor general Ides to discuss the project. However, Judd was unsure where the two Filipino members of the commission stood. On a first visit on June 15, Judd found Trinidad Pardo de Tavera favorable to the proposal, as could be expected of one who had always allied his views with the other American members of the commission and had always derided the ilustrado (educated Filipino) opposition to labor immigration or the introduction of American capital. As an early proponent of the American regime, head of the Federalista Party which advocated the conversion of the Philippines into an American state, and a believer of the superiority of American culture, Tavera was the target of intense criticism by Filipino nationalists, who also were opposed to Judd's scheme. Twelve days later, Forbes warned Judd that Tavera might waver in his support of the plan because of the intense nationalist attack, and could make trouble if Tavera wanted.
Judd gained an introduction to Jose Luzuriaga, the other Filipino in the commission, through George Bronson Rea, the publisher of the Far Eastern Economic Review. Four months earlier, in March, Rea had testified before the Philippine Island committee of the U.S. Senate that the Filipino laborers could not be induced to go to Hawaii or anywhere else at any price. The following month, Rea took a different stand, recommending to the secretary of war the approval of the planned recruitment, as a way of making the Filipino laborers apprentices in the Hawaiian sugar industry, and, thereby, benefitting the Philippine sugar industry upon their return. Rea did not fully endorse the plan, though, because he was skeptical that the Filipinos would be given a chance to train for skilled positions, and that more likely they would end up merely manual laborers unable to get out of the planters' debt. When Judd met Rea on June 27, however, Rea had evidently overcome his skepticism about the Hawaii recruiting plan, arranged Judd's meeting with Luzuriaga, and enlisted Luzuriaga's support of the Judd proposal.

By late June, Judd had presented three documents to the Philippine commission: the resolution approving the recruitment, the agreement between the HSPA and the Philippine commission as to the terms of the recruitment, and the contract between the laborer and the Hawaii plantation. But the commission had more pressing matters to consider, especially the appropriations bill, and did not act on Judd's proposal until a month later. In the meantime, Judd kept himself busy as best as he could. He engaged in the endless round of tiffins and dinners, read a lot of novels, met with people at the clubs, played golf, went on a boat excursion with Forbes, looked at native plants (horticulture being his hobby), and toured the countryside. There were occasional highlights, such as the dinner at Malacanang Palace hosted by the governor general, at which Judd noted that the colonial splendor resembled the old palace days in Honolulu. Yet all in all Judd was so bored that on June 28 he sought the HSPA's permission to return to Hawaii and recommended the hiring of George Wagner to complete the work. Wagner, formerly an employee at Honolulu Plantation in Aiea, was now winding up his work in a construction project and had time free to take over Judd's work. The disappointing reply was for him to remain in Manila and complete his mission.
And so Judd chafed and it did not help that the days had been dark and rainy. On July 6 he wrote in his journal: "Dozed in room for want of something better to do." For a month now, in fact, he had indulged in a daily siesta, which he easily got used to for lack of anything else to do. He read a lot of novels but that did not help, and often he "fumed with impatience which often lapsed into ennui." In desperation, on July 9 he asked Forbes to be put to work without pay. Forbes, who was also the commissioner for the police and commerce, happily obliged him, and for the next few days Judd was at work drafting laws, among them the road laws, a leper law, and the charter for the city of Manila. The Manila Americans came to suspect Judd of more sinister purposes, including spying for Theodore Roosevelt, because he had no activities regarding the Hawaii recruitment project, instead was constantly at Forbes’ office and had the use of the Philippine Commission’s carriage.
CHAPTER 1

THE RECRUITMENT PROJECT’S APPROVAL

On July 23 W. Cameron Forbes hosted at his house an exclusive gathering of the Harvard/Yale dinner. Except for Judd, all the nine men present were high colonial government officials. They were all Republicans, pleased that America was holding on to the Philippines and firm in their belief that it would be a very long time before Filipinos became capable of self-governance. The Harvardmen like Forbes and General Leonard Wood, the military commander, outnumbered the Yalies like Judd. The after dinner program included verses containing political and mildly sexual innuendoes sang to the tunes of Gilbert and Sullivan. As usual in the gatherings he attended, Judd was asked to play his ukulele and sing Hawaiian songs. Amidst the genial ribbing, friendly college rivalry, and the girlie jokes, Forbes made a surprise announcement: the Philippine Commission earlier in the day had passed unopposed Judd’s resolution. In an expansive gesture, Forbes asked Judd to quit the Bay View Hotel where he had been staying since his arrival and be Forbes’ house guest for the duration of his stay in Manila. Judd promptly accepted.

The Philippine Commission resolution was the one drafted by Judd with the help of Forbes, authorizing the Secretary of Commerce and Police (Forbes himself) on behalf of the Philippine Commission to sign an agreement with the HSPA representative (Judd) allowing the HSPA to recruit laborers. It also permitted vessels chartered by the HSPA to touch at ports other than the open ports, in order to board the recruits. ¹ Minutes of Proceedings of the Philippine Commission, Executive Session, Monday July 23, 1906, in BIA 5995. The resolution is also reprinted in Judd, Sidelights, pp. 68-70. &
The Philippine Chamber of Commerce and other Filipinos accused the commission of encouraging Filipinos to go to Hawaii because of the line in the resolution stating that "The Philippine Commission is of the opinion that it is desirable that such laborers as may consider it in their best interest to accept the above offer should go for this purpose to Hawaii." Forbes and the two Filipinos rose at once to defend the resolution. W. Cameron Forbes argued that the commission could not restrain Filipinos from entering into a contract to go to Hawaii, anyway. W. Cameron Forbes to Luke W. Wright, November 13, 1906, in Judd, Scrapbook. Both Tavera and Luzuriaga, feeling the burden of the attack by their fellow Filipinos, lamely justified the resolution as a way of protecting the Filipinos. W. Cameron Forbes to Luke W. Wright, November 13, 1906, in Judd, Scrapbook. Yet this was not altogether true. When the HSPA applied to recruit in 1901, William Howard Taft, who headed the commission at that time, insisted that the plantations execute a bond to the insular government to assure that the laborers received good treatment, safe transportation to and from Hawaii, medical attendance, food, clothing, the right to take families with them, and adequate wages. Taft to Sec. War Root, October 17, 1901, in BIA; Memo, "Emigration of Filipino Laborers to Hawaii or the United States, January 5, 1932, BIA 5999. The Philippine Commission in 1906 did not ensure such a protection at all.
The contract between the Filipinos and the Hawaii plantations was similar to the HSPA's standard recruiting contract. It guaranteed free transportation to the Hawaii plantation for the laborer, his wife and children, three years of employment, housing, fuel and water, medical care and medicine. It obligated the laborer to work diligently for 10 hours in the field or 12 in the mill each day, 26 days a month. It pegged wages at $16 a month the first year, to be raised by a dollar a month each year up to the third year, with lower rates for women and boys for the same hours of work. Out of each month's pay, an amount was deducted for the return fare, as governor general Ide had suggested, but Judd subsequently added the condition that the laborer forfeited the amount if the laborer violated the contract, in effect making it similar to the illegal Masters and Servants Act. The Philippine Commission designated the Bank of Bishop and Co. in Honolulu as its agent for the collection and disbursement of these funds.
"The people here believe I had done a hard job," boasted Judd in his journal, because the Manila Americans doubted the approval of his resolution, especially "after the howl that arose after my arrival." The howl resumed, however, once word of the approval leaked out, and in the next two weeks, Judd dutifully collected the editorials from the major Filipino newspapers, El Renacimiento, La Vida Filipina, La Independencia, La Democracia, El Mercantil, and El Adelanto. Also mentioned in BIA memo, "Emigration of Filipino Laborers to Hawaii or the United States, January 5, 1932, BIA 5999." The editorials argued that the recruitment was an anomaly because the laborers were needed to undertake development of the country, and that the existing labor supply in 1906 was not enough to construct the needed roads, bridges, schools, health centers, and other structures. They pointed out that rice and vegetables, which could be easily grown locally, were still imported from China, fresh milk was unavailable in Manila, and the beef, pork and mutton sold in Manila were brought in from the United States. The country needed the labor in order to expand the cultivation of export crops, especially sugar, tobacco and hemp, and to develop new plantations of coconut, coffee and cacao on the friar lands which the Philippine Commission had just acquired.
The most vehement attacks came from an American paper, the Bulletin, edited by former Honoluluan Philip B. Dankey. On August 2, the Bulletin called attention to the fact that even without the Hawaii recruitment, the labor needs of a single major project alone, the five year railway construction, would soon create a labor shortage which could require the Philippines to import labor, too, possibly from China. The next day, the paper questioned the assertion that Judd’s project would train Filipinos in modern cane cultivation and return them with money and skills to benefit immeasurably the Philippines. It quoted a Honolulu Bulletin report of June 26 that "if the Filipinos are of any use to Hawaii it will be as a laboring element that will behave itself and stay put," and predicted that in view of the rigid racial stratification on the Hawaii plantations, the Filipinos would merely be used as common laborers, unable to acquire skills or save enough to return home.

The newspaper attacks did not change matters and so Judd now turned to the task of securing the three hundred families to bring to Hawaii. He decided not to be directly involved in recruiting because he was not familiar with the Philippines. Besides, he wrote: "it was quite apparent to me that my place was Manila, for I had become--without my wish--a very notorious person, and for me to take the field would bring down around me the violent hostility of the press and the politicians." \&lJudd, Sidelights, p. 72.\& For the same reason, he also voluntarily moved out of Forbes’ house to spare him as well of the attacks. Out of the solicitations and applicants for recruiters, he chose two men: George Wagner and A.L.B. Davies. George Wagner was to be trained to take over as the HSPA representative upon Judd’s return to Hawaii and Davies, a former captain in the 33rd US Volunteers and now the local agent of an American grain, hay and flour merchant, would supervise the actual recruiting.

Out of his conversations with the Manila Americans, he decided to recruit only Ilocanos and so he had the labor agreement translated into Ilocano and Spanish. \&lJudd, Sidelights, p. 71.\& The Ilocanos, he said later upon his return to Honolulu, were the ones most ready to accept the idea of emigration, were the best workers, and had the reputation of sticking to their agreement. \&lHawaiian Star, December 21, 1906; Advertiser, December 21, 1906.\&
In the first two weeks of August, Judd and Davies, who knew the Ilocos as a result of his military service, planned the details of the actual recruiting, a task which took longer than Judd wished because he came down with fever during the second week. Their plan called for two hundred families to leave on a chartered ship from an Ilocos port. In the third week of August, Judd went to Hongkong to arrange for the steamer charter and realized that the plan would not work at all because the shipping agents there were not familiar with American regulations regarding food, bunk space, health and sanitation aboard ship, and other matters relating to the large scale transport of people. Furthermore, he realized that such a huge gathering would simply invite attacks from Filipino newspapermen and politicians, and so he concluded that the best way was to send small groups of recruits on regular shipping schedule across the Pacific. Judd also had the contracts printed in Hongkong, a thousand copies each in Ilocano and in English, and five hundred in Spanish, rather than in Manila where his critics watched his every move.

Back in Manila at the end of August, Judd finalized his recruiting plants. On Davies' recommendation, he choose Lino Abaya, a storekeeper in Candon, Ilocos Sur, to undertake the actual recruiting of 200 men, their wives, 100 children over 12 years old, 100 between the ages of 5 and 12, and another 100 below the age of 5, all these the equivalent of 552 adult fares to Hawaii. Abaya was to go first to Vigan to get printed copies of "A Frank and Noble Invitation" which he wrote in flowery Ilocano describing the terms of the recruitment. With these copies and an impressive looking certificate from Judd authorizing the recruitment, Abaya was to start at the southern end of the Ilocos and work his way up from town to town. He would assemble his recruits in Candon, where he would ship them to Wagner in Manila. Abaya was to receive $1.50 for each person recruited, out of which he would pay his own helpers $.50 for each family who passed Wagner's inspection. Abaya also asked Judd to give each family $5 so they could treat their friends to goodbye feasts, and Judd readily agreed, finding it smaller than the $10 that the HSPA had given as gifts to other recruits as early as 1870 before the ship sailed. Judd sternly told Abaya "that I wanted nothing said or promised that cannot be carried out neither here or in Hawaii." Abaya assured Judd that many Ilocanos, because they could not get work or even earn their daily meals, were ready to go to Hawaii, and that by the end of September, he would have the two hundred families ready for Hawaii.

Having dispatched Abaya to the Ilocos, Judd once again had nothing to do but wait. The whole of September he could think of nothing else but home. What was to have been a matter of a few days' work in Manila had stretched, by mid-September, to four months. He missed his family, and awaiting him in Honolulu was also the prospect of a new, more lucrative law partnership. Arguing that the task from here on was simply routine, that Abaya would successfully recruit the 200 families, and that Wagner could effectively take his place, Judd cabled the HSPA to allow him to return; the reply came on September 13 that he was not to quit now but to see the matter to its completion. Stung by the cable, Judd wired his law partner Atkinson: "I am no quitter. Believed I was needed in office. Never agreed planter to stay here if office or family needed me."
Once again Judd ended up loafing at the clubs. He began to hear snide remarks again: that he had created for himself a lifelong task, recruiting the first Filipino; that he could have accomplished more simply by going back to Honolulu and doing the work that the recruits were meant to do. This time, the remarks annoyed him. He sought a few diversions: playing golf, which he found surprisingly enjoyable, studying Philippine fishpond culture and orchid cultivation, and attending occasional official receptions at Malacanang Palace. But all in all, he was bored and homesick. Furthermore, he had not heard from Abaya at all, and when word finally came on the first week of October, it was bad news: Abaya had run into an intense attack by the Ilocano press, the most vocal being La Nueva Era of Vigan, calling Abaya "Judas" and warning the Ilocanos to "Beware of Villainy." But Abaya had been slowed down by heavy rains and typhoons, which snapped the telegraph wires to the Ilocos and washed away some of the roads.

Wishing to return to Honolulu immediately with a first group of recruits, Judd sent Davies to Abaya to get the first fifty families which would sail away with him on the steamer China at the end of October. But he also did not hear from Davies after several days, so he sent Wagner on the 17th of October. Wagner’s cable five days later crushed his spirit: "Give up idea of trying to make connections with China. Will look around to see what has been accomplished." Wagner had found out that Abaya had done very little other than playing the grand siegneur in the towns he visited.

Judd’s new goal was to make the Pacific steamer Doric, which was set to leave Manila on November 18 and get him home in time for Christmas. He decided not to trust Abaya with the task; reflecting the way he had easily absorbed the prejudices of the Manila Americans, Judd wrote in his journal: "Abaya altho a good man is still a googoogoo and would not bring results by himself unless a white man stood behind to see that he did it." This time he sent both Davies and Wagner to the Ilocos with instructions to send him all recruits by the 15th so as to make the Doric departure.

Wagner and Davies proved to be no less effective, however. On November 11, Davies wired from Candon: "No families probable to go." Later in the day came a more encouraging wire from Davies: "Prospects are twenty five men and no families." Judd at once cabled the HSPA, requesting permission to bring the twenty five men to Honolulu and explained that it was difficulty recruiting because the Ilocanos had much work in the fields and plentiful rice, but that after the harvest, in February and March, the planters would likely get the families they needed. He suggested that the first twenty five men he brought be employed for a short while in Hawaii and then returned home to tell about plantation life so as to facilitate future emigration of families. Judd then awaited the reply, complaining in his journal: "This waiting is hard."
Two cables, however, soon made Judd rejoice. The first, from Wagner, confirmed that twenty five men could leave on the Doric with Judd, and that there was the prospects of 100 families willing to leave at the end of the harvest. "Felt like a colt," Judd wrote in his journal. The second, from the HSPA, gave him permission to bring the 25 men to Hawaii on the Doric and turn over his duties to Wagner. "This cinches my home going in Doric. Thank God," he wrote.

The Doric was to sail for Hongkong at 4 p.m. on the 18th. Judd fretted. What if Wagner couldn’t get the recruits to Manila in time for the Doric sailing? Why did Davies’ cable of November 16 contain only fifteen names rather than twenty five? Indeed, only fifteen would accompany Judd to Hawaii instead of 25 as had been promised earlier. Judd did not sleep at all, worrying that the steamer Churruca, which had arrived in Vigan late and had to spend the night there, would not be able to bring the 15 recruits in Manila in time for the Doric’s departure. Nonetheless, the day before departure, he went about as though he and the 15 recruits would leave. He closed his bank accounts, transferred HSPA funds to Wagner’s custody, and paid up his bills at the various clubs. When word came that the Churruca was going to arrive after midnight, with enough time to make the Doric’s sailing, Judd hurried his preparations for departure. He engaged a launch to transport the laborers from the Churruca to the Mariveles Quarantine Station and then to the Doric. He secured blankets and some clothes for the men. "This has been a hell of a day" he wrote in his journal, "no other way to express it."

On the day of the Doric’s departure, Judd was already up at half past four and within an hour he was on the rented launch speeding toward the Churruca. He had the men measured for shoes, distributed blankets, sweaters, coats and pants, and then impatiently dispatched the launch to Mariveles for health inspection and fumigation, offering the launch driver a bonus if he made the Doric’s sailing schedule. He felt relieved when the launch finally showed up and deposited his 15 recruits on the Doric. All that anxiety proved needless, however, because the Doric’s departure was pushed back 18 hours due to a delay in loading cargo. As the Doric finally sailed Judd wrote in his journal: "Nobody ever left the Philippines more happy and more sincerely thankful that his job is over and well done."

The Doric arrived in Hongkong on the 21st and for the next nine days lay idle for refitting and loading cargo. In all that time, the Filipinos stayed aboard while Judd solved new bureaucratic tangles: the harbormaster balked at the use of improper departure forms for the Filipinos, and the Pacific Mail agent balked at how the Filipinos were to be listed in the passenger manifest. Judd wanted the Filipinos listed as American colonials but the shipping agent, in order to release the shipping company from any liability for the care and return of these men should the immigration and quarantine authorities in Honolulu refuse them entry, insisted on listing them as Asiatics, making them subject to American immigration laws, alien tax, and exclusion if diseased.
Finally, the matters resolved in his favor, Judd continued the voyage with his recruits. At Shanghai, Nagasaki, and Yokohama the ship picked up 9 Chinese and 288 Japanese bound for Hawaii, as well as 130 Chinese and a few Sikhs for California. Judd observed his recruits to be generally popular with their fellow steerage passengers; "they talk and make friends with the Chinee, Japs and Indians," he wrote in his journal. Always solicitous about his 15 wards, he constantly visited them and told them things about Hawaii. He had the notion that the Filipinos would be pleased to learn that Oahu had coconuts and told them so. It had been cold and damp all throughout the voyage, and he thought the men looked funny in their oversized sweaters and misfit clothes. He assured them that he too found the weather too cold and that Hawaii would be warmer. He took note to recommend to the HSPA trustees that it would not be advisable to ship large number of Filipinos to Honolulu during the winter months. In general, he noted in his journal, his 15 Filipinos seemed content and eager to get to Hawaii.

The long voyage had been uneventful. The sky had been overcast all throughout, and the ship on a continuous long slow roll. Impatiently, Judd kept track of each hour bringing him nearer to home and read Tocqueville's Democracy in America. His birthday, December 20, went by uneventfully but the following day was different, as Kauai was sighted at early dawn and, by mid-morning, the island of Oahu. At 2:30 that afternoon, Judd was finally reunited with his wife and family at the dock. He turned over custody of the 15 Filipinos to Royal D. Mead, the HSPA secretary and happily went home. He closed his journal with a verse from Rudyard Kipling:

God gave all men all earth to love
But since our hearts are small,
Ordained from each one spot should prove
Beloved over all.

A few days later, Judd made his report to the HSPA trustees. He assured them that with Wagner supervising the recruitment, they could get all the laborers they wanted. Just before he left Manila, Wagner had reported that the HSPA recruitment had aroused much interest in the Ilocos barrios. Judd, Journal, Nov. 18, 1906. Wagner had said that half the 2,500 souls in Santa Maria, a town near Candon, wished to follow Abaya and his wife to Hawaii, that their children had already discarded their books in anticipation of leaving. Wagner had also explained that the Ilocano women had a strong fear of steamers, a fear Wagner traced to 1885 when the Spaniards forcibly took some of the girls and women into concubinage and moved 500 families to Isabela, west over the mountains, to resettle.

Judd turned over to the HSPA trustees his notes, newspaper clippings, maps and expense account, and had no further association with any subsequent Philippine recruitment. But for a long time after, he endured being called A. Filipino Judd.
A crowd of curious onlookers gathered at the docks as Royal D. Mead marched Judd’s recruits down the gangplank. The fifteen were not the first Filipinos in Hawaii, though. There was even speculation, although no evidence supported it, that one of Spain’s galleons regularly plying Manila and Acapulco, with Filipinos on board as regular seamen, might have run aground in Hawaii. The first record of Filipino presence in Hawaii was the 1853 Hawaii census, which mentioned five Filipinos among the 2,119 foreign residents in Hawaii, possibly having come through the small scale Hawaii-Philippine trade conducted through Canton.¹ &Lind, Island Community, pp. 104-105.

Just before annexation, a few Filipinos had ended up in Hawaii, either singly or in groups. The most known were the musicians in the San Francisco based Chiarini’s Royal Italian Circus, which had made an annual tour of the Pacific rim countries since 1868. In mid-October 1889, the circus manager refused to pay the Manila band’s salary until upon return to San Francisco so as to make sure the Filipinos did not decamp in Honolulu. In protest, the musicians left the circus anyway and of the four who found immediate positions with the Royal Hawaiian band, Macario Mendoza stayed on for 25 years and Lazaro Salamanca for at least 33 years before retiring.¹ &R. Cariaga, “Lazaro Salamanca,” Star Bulletin, May 15, 1935. Also, Advertiser, October 2, 1915; Advertiser, October 14, 1889. ¹ In addition to these musicians, other Filipinos somehow managed to arrive in Hawaii, mostly while serving as crewmen on the Pacific steamers. In 1905 there were seven Filipinos listed among the workers in Hawaii, three of them on the inter-island steamers and the rest on the sugar plantations in skilled positions as locomotive brakemen, engineers and carpenters.¹ &Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report, 1905, pp. 196-204.

At the time Judd arrived with his 15 recruits, Hawaii had already developed some stereotypes of Filipinos. One stereotype came from soldiers and travellers in the Philippines who sensationalized their adventures by describing wild primitive life and headhunting ways, a stereotype reinforced by the display of Igorots and Muslim Filipinos at the 1904 St. Louis expedition. Another stereotype derived from the stranded musicians and the Filipino bands on board the Pacific steamers, and reinforced by the Philippine Constabulary band which gave concerts in Honolulu. In the minds of Honoluluans, the Filipinos were either violent primitives or naturally gifted musicians.

Judd’s recruits came from Candon, Abaya’s hometown. Five of them belonged to a single family: Simplício Gironeña, 56, and his sons Mariano, 23, Vicente, 19, Francisco, 18, and Antonio, 14. All the men understood a few English words, but Francisco understood more than the rest and so served as the group’s interpreter.¹ &Judd, Sidelights, p. 76. Aside from Simplício, three others were married: Cecilio Sagun, 27, Prudencio Sagun, 28, and Emiliano Dasulla, 26. The rest of the group consisted of Martin de Jesus, 22, Mauricio Cortez, 21, Marciano Bello, 28, Filomeno Rebollido, 30, Apolonio Ramos, 26, Celestino Cortez, 19, and Julian Galmen, 26. All fifteen returned to their hometown eventually, except Marciano (aka Feliciano) Bello, who remained in Hawaii, retired from Hilo Sugar Company, and resided in Hilo until he passed away at age 99 in 1977.¹ &Hawaii Herald Tribune, Dec. 30, 1977.
After fumigation, Royal D. Mead took the fifteen Filipinos to a Japanese hotel on Beretania street for the night and brought them back to the pier the following afternoon to board the Claudine for the big island. Judd showed up in the rain with his wife to see them off. Mead decided to send the Filipinos to Olaa plantation, five miles south of Hilo in a general area where, because of the scarcity of labor, neighboring plantations constantly raided each other's labor force. Olaa had just been established out of forest lands and small coffee farms during the expansionist mood which accompanied annexation and thus required as many new laborers as it could get. Mead thought that Olaa, being humid and rainy, was most like the Philippines; furthermore, its manager, John Watt, was known among the planters as being good at harmonizing the various laborer nationalities in his employ.

Three weeks after getting his new laborers, John Watt wrote that they had come up to his expectations; though weak at first, they shortly after were performing as much work as the Japanese and doing even better than the Puerto Ricans and the Koreans. &John Watt to Bishop and Co., January 17, 1907, quoted in S.M. Damon to W.H. Taft, Feb. 18, 1907, BIA 5999.& He also reported that they did not have any complaint, and then a week later, wrote again to blame the Japanese for the way the Filipinos, whom he had placed in a cluster of homes in the main Japanese camp, had already picked up the Japanese complaints about plantation work. A month later he reported to the HSPA that he had succeeded in having the Filipinos stand up well against such influence and, having learned that Wagner had collected more Ilocano recruits, asked for these new recruits at once so that a larger Filipino presence at Olaa would be better able to ward off the bad influence of the Japanese. &Evening Bulletin, Feb. 21, 1907.&

The HSPA planned to give Simplicio and his youngest son Antonio a taste of Hawaii plantation life and then, with a book of photographs, return them to the Philippines in order to assist Wagner by testifying about the joys of plantation living and by refuting stories of cannibalism in Hawaii. The plan was speeded up by Simplicio's asthma being aggravated by the wet Olaa weather, and so, a month after he arrived, he and Antonio were sent by Watt to Honolulu for eventual return to Manila. &John Watt to Bishop and Co., Jan. 21, 1907, in S.M. Damon to W.H. Taft, Feb. 18, 1907, BIA 5999.& Just before boarding ship for Manila, Simplicio had asked for and was granted a collection of knickknacks, hatchets, and knives which, he said, would dazzle the eyes of his townmates. On January 24 Simplicio and his son sailed for the Philippines, vowing to return with his wife because, he claimed, he liked Hawaii very much. &Evening Bulletin, Feb. 21, 1907.&

Simplicio was more useful to the HSPA in the Ilocos than at Olaa because Wagner's work, contrary to his earlier reports, was not going well. Wagner wrote that because the rice harvest had been bountiful "the Filipinos here had enough to occupy their time and mind, and enough to eat for sometime to come," and didn't want to leave. The women, especially, doubted that Hawaii was a good place for respectable ladies but they were willing to hear Simplicio's description of plantation life. A favorable report from Simplicio would make it easier to induce the women to come. &Evening Bulletin, February 21, 1907&
Wagner succeeded in sending thirty Filipinos (including two women and two children), who arrived on the S. S. Nippon Maru on February 25, 1907, and another forty three (including eight women and eight children) on the Nippon Maru's next trip on July 29. Despite Simplicio's help, Wagner was able to sign up few women and children, and for the whole year 1907 he sent to Hawaii a total of 188 males, 20 females and 12 children.1 &"Report of the Board of Immigration to the Governor of Hawaii," in Advertiser, April 28, 1909. & These Filipinos went to Watt and to Hawaiian Agricultural Company (HACO) at Pahala, Watt's neighbor to the south. The planters deemed it important that these Filipinos, like the first shipments of previous nationality groups to Hawaii, be coddled because the success of further recruiting depended on their word to the Ilocos. "We want these people to write often to their friends at home," C. Brewer instructed HACO, "and if some itinerant Jap photographer happens along you may even have some pictures taken of your Filipinos at their quarters so these may be sent along with the letters. Give the married people rooms away from the single element and make them comfortable as circumstances permit."1 &Robertson to Ogg, August 2, 1907, HACO. & They were also paid higher, at $18.50 a month was the rate for the Japanese, than the $16 stipulated in their contract.1 &Robertson to Ogg, Aug. 6, 1907. HACO. & However, C. Brewer warned the plantation: "No doubt they will have to be coddled in a degree for a time, yet this should not be overdone."1 &E.F. Bishop to Ogg, Aug. 12, 1907 &

HACO's experience with the Filipinos was different from Olaa's. Only two months after receiving the Filipinos, C. Brewer already expressed regrets doing so. "We allowed ourselves to be influenced by the hearsay of the satisfactory manner these Filipinos at Olaa were working and knowing you are very short of labor we even used considerable argument to secure the lot for Pahala."1 &Robertson to Ogg, September 17, 1907, HACO. & HACO found the Filipinos slow in learning the tasks and also had trouble with Pio Reyes, the group's interpreter. Because Reyes was intelligent and educated, the plantation gave him a preferred job at the mill or the commissary.1 &Robertson to Ogg, Aug. 2, 1907, HACO. & Manager Ogg, however, found Reyes to be "the smart alecky type" who developed a big head and used his influence on the other Filipinos to make more demands for himself. Ogg had to give Reyes, a trained musician (and, in his later years, a Honolulu Symphony violinist and teacher), a gift of a violin in order to get his help in in preventing discontent among the Filipinos.1 &Robertson to Ogg, Feb. 6, March 10, 23, 27, 1908. & Ogg, finding Reyes still too demanding, was relieved to get rid of him when he left for Honolulu shortly after to seek an office job, and no longer wished to employ a replacement who might similarly be manipulative.1 & Robertson to Ogg, Aug. 9, 1909, HACO. &
Like previous newcomers among the other nationalities, the Filipinos at Olaa and HACO complained about working and living conditions and soon left to explore other opportunities in Hilo.¹ &Robertson to Ogg, Feb. 6, 1908.& Their complaints prompted Philippine authorities in 1909 to ask a Bishop and Co. representative to investigate. The Advertiser reported that the investigator found the Filipinos to be well treated, but were unhappy over the the deduction of two dollars because they found it difficult to live on their $18 monthly wages; the same issue carried a story about Agnes Judd, a teacher, testifying at a hearing on the wages of teachers that their $50 to $60 monthly salary was not enough for decent clothes, for the support of a family, and for any savings provision for old age.¹ &Advertiser, March 23, 1909. & The investigation resulted in the stopping of the two dollar deduction.

At the annual meeting of the HSPA in November 1907, E. Faxon Bishop, the outgoing president, announced that although laborers from Asian no longer voluntarily came to Hawaii and the United States because of the general anti-Oriental immigration feeling in the United States, the HSPA nonetheless would not fill the gap by recruiting anymore in the Philippines to fill the gap.¹ &E.F. Bishop, Presidential address, HSPA 27th annual meeting, Nov. 11, 1907, in Planter's Monthly, vol 26, Nov. 1907, p. 383.& The planters judged the project a failure because despite the expense they had failed to establish a regular migration flow to Hawaii.

Judd's critics were right. The labor shortage had become so severe in Manila that in May 1907 Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. managed to recruit merely 150 of the 1,000 men it needed for sewer and water works construction.¹ &Manila Times, May 30, 1907.& At the time that E.F. Bishop made his announcement, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce introduced in the newly created Philippine Assembly a bill preventing Filipino labor from leaving for Hawaii.¹ &Manila Times, Nov. 25, 1907.&