A significant body of post-war scholarship in Pacific History has focussed on the impact of Euro-American contact upon the indigenous inhabitants of the Pacific Islands. Interpretations have varied. Broadly speaking, these interpretations have tended to polarize around two distinct schools of thought. On one hand the so-called "fatal impact" school asserts that Pacific Islanders were unable to adjust to Euro-American inroads and collapsed under the strain. Two classic examples of this line of argument are Harrison Wright's 1959 study New Zealand, 1769-1840: Early Years of Western Contact, and Alan Moorehead's 1969 publication The Fatal Impact: An Account of the Invasion of the South Pacific 1767-1840. Both of the above authors claim that Western contact had devastating implications for indigenous Pacific societies. In particular, epidemics resulting from the introduction of exotic diseases, and a new, uncontrolled form of fighting caused by the introduction of firearms into traditional systems of warfare are said to have dramatically increased the mortality rate. Traditional systems of beliefs and practices could not control or explain these new circumstances. Decimated by epidemics, torn apart by unrestrained warfare, and with the basis of their system of beliefs undermined, these societies became demoralized and consequently less resistant to Western penetration and domination.¹

Since the publication of these theories a number of scholars have sought to show that indigenous societies in the Pacific displayed a considerable degree of resilience and adaptability to Western contact. In this school of thought culture contact is seen not as the domination of Pacific Islander by European, but as a more positive interaction between two vibrant cultures.²
In her 1971 article in the *Journal of Pacific History* "Guns and Men in Melanesia" Dorothy Shineberg examined the impact of firearms in the Pacific. Shineberg demonstrated that despite technological developments firearms were limited in range, accuracy, reliability and rate of fire up until the late 1860s. Only with the development of the Martini-Henry rifle of 1871 were all of these problems effectively overcome.³

Focusing on the 1567 Mendana expedition in the Solomon Islands Shineberg shows how Melanesians soon overcame any initial awe they might have had for firearms and began to exploit the limitation of these weapons. Open combat was quickly abandoned for reliance on fighting in the bush where natural cover could be exploited for concealment, and for protection from projectiles. Within six weeks of first experiencing gunfire some warriors from Guadacanal had realized that they could exploit the tell-tale flash of the ignition system's priming pan, which occurred just before the release of the projectile from the gun barrel⁴, by diving under water to avoid being shot. Ramparts of sand were constructed to act as cover from arquebus fire, although no effective strategy was devised to counter the Spanish culverin which was able to breach this rampart.⁵

The longer the Solomon Islanders were exposed to gunfire, the greater their adaptations to it and the less effective its power. Shineberg felt that with time they would very probably have even gone underground to counter artillery as the Maori did two centuries later.⁶ But the Spanish stay was "too short for the ultimate in adaptations; which was for the Islanders themselves to acquire firearms."⁷ It was not until the Nineteenth Century that contacts with European and American vessels were sufficiently regular or sustained enough for such a process to occur. Firearms were among the
earliest and most eagerly sought items of Western material culture by Islanders throughout the Pacific. At the same time effective adaptations to the firearms of the time were devised rapidly, just as had occurred earlier in the Solomons. For example, as has already been noted, the Maori developed superb fieldworks to counteract European artillery while in New Caledonia warriors learned to draw volleys, dodge, and then set upon their musket-armed foe with clubs and spears before they could reload. 8

This adaptability, combined with the technical defects of firearms prior to 1870 brings into question the degree to which the introduction of firearms did lead to increased fatalities in indigenous warfare. In a later article Shineberg noted that while the use of muskets did not appear to cause increased casualties on Espiritu Santo, the introduction to Tanna resulted in more deaths in hostilities than occurred in the pre–firearms' era. On Ponape muskets are said to have acted as a deterrent to hostilities. 9 This variety in response led Shineberg to suggest that more precise case studies of individual societies were required before a general conclusion upon the impact of firearms could be made. 10

In 1974 in an article entitled "Firearms and Indigenous Warfare: A Case Study" Kerry Howe stated a similar opinion of future research directions into European weaponry in the Pacific islands. 11 Howe's article concentrated on the Loyalty Islands. He concluded that, in the Loyalty group at least, "...Europeans and their technology did not change the tactics and techniques of warfare as long as it lasted, and, in particular, firearms were responsible for killing only a small portion of those who died in the fighting." 12 A number of reasons are given to account for this. The poor quality and technical shortcomings of the guns used made them unsuitable for the guerrilla
warfare practiced in the Loyalty's.\textsuperscript{13} The function of warfare did not change so that there was no reason to increase the number of casualties inflicted.\textsuperscript{14} Few studies have been devoted specifically to substantiate or repudiate Shineberg and Howe's conclusions on firearms in the Pacific Islands. Firearms are usually only referred to in generalized terms as part of more wide ranging studies of island groups or themes. Clearly, more detailed studies are required. A study of firearms on Malaita in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century is particularly useful for a number reasons. Malaita is a large, populous island in the southeast of the Solomon Islands. Much of the groundwork for this period on Malaita has been covered in Peter Corris' book on the Solomon Islands' labor trade, \textit{Passage, Port and Plantation}. However, a more detailed focus on firearms in indigenous warfare on Malaita in this period serves to link Shineberg's study of the first conflict between Europeans and Solomon islanders with Peter Corris and Roger Keesing's \textit{Lightning Meets the West Wind - The Malaita Massacre}, which examines one of the last conflicts between Europeans and islanders in the form of the final 'pacification' of the Kwaio of Malaita in 1927.\textsuperscript{15} Shineberg's studies concentrate on a period notable for relatively impotent firearms, whereas by 1870 firearms are becoming highly effective, deadly weapons. By 1927 the age of modern firepower had well and truly arrived.\textsuperscript{16} By examining the use of firearms in fighting between indigenous groups, this study is useful for contrasting with hostilities between Malaitans and Europeans. As specific island case study, this paper is not only useful for chronological comparisons within Malaitan history, but also for comparisons with studies of other geographical entities. Mendana's expedition had only limited contact with Malaita when their brigantine constructed for coastal exploration briefly touched upon the
southern coasts of Malaita and South Malaita in April 1567. The brigantine never spent more than one day at any one place on these coasts. There was little chance or need for adaptation to the initial shock of encountering gunfire for the first time. Three separate encounters occurred on the first three days, all ending in hostilities. The only friendly interaction occurred on South Malaita after these hostile meetings. Each time the Spanish opened fire with their arquebusiers the islanders retired. The Spanish narratives are vague as to how panic-stricken these withdrawals were. On two occasions the Spanish bullets struck one or more of the islanders, but in the other hostile action the islanders retired upon receiving a volley that caused no casualties. This suggests that the Spanish firearms were initially intimidating not solely because of their ability to strike invisibly.

With the departure of the brigantine Malaita returned to its former isolation from Western contact. On August 20, 1767 the English explorer Carteret 'discovered' Ndai island. From Ndai he could see the nearby island of Manoaba to the southwest and beyond that the northeast coast of Malaita. After foiling what he perceived to be an attempted ambush by the inhabitants of Ndai, Carteret sailed away to the northwest on August 21 without investigating his sightings to the southwest. At Ndai Carteret felt that the inhabitants "seemed to have had some knowledge of firearms by their signs to us." Carteret's observation may have been real or imagined. More recently Charles E. Fox has noted that in oral traditions there "seems to be no memories of Spaniards' visits unless the sea ghosts of San Cristobal, who fire at canoes, or the big sailing canoes of Santa Cruz with a deck and a house on them, called Tepuke, are memories of Mendana's big ships." Of course, these
phenomena may also have been inspired by ship visits after Mendana's expedition.

When the French explorer Surville came to the southeast Solomons in 1769 he found the people of Ulawa, not unnaturally, initially suspicious and apprehensive about coming aboard. Ulawa had been visited by the same brigantine that had touched upon Malaita in 1567 and had had a similar encounter with Spanish firearms. When one of the islanders aimed his bow menacingly at the French they opened fire with muskets. One of the islanders was hit, whereupon the Ulawans fled back to shore. But this episode did not deter twenty canoes of warriors paddling out a few hours later and challenging the ship. They were soon put to flight by four rounds of grapeshot from the ship's cannon. Surville's only encounter with Malaitans was when a few canoes came well offshore and traded with his vessel as it cruised south along Malaita's eastern shore.

European visits to the southeast Solomons continued to be fleeting and sporadic after Surville's visit well into the Nineteenth Century. In the 1830's traders and whalers began to frequent the Solomons in increasing numbers. But, as in the past, Malaita's contact with the European world remained very limited. All this changed in the 1870's when European ships began visiting the Solomon Islands in pursuit of cheap labor for the newly emergent plantations of Queensland and Fiji. By the mid 1880's most islands in the Solomon group had been visited by labor recruiters, with Malaita being the most fruitful source of recruits. Through gifts from recruiters to facilitate recruitment and compensate for the absence of recruits from their communities, and through the purchasing power of their indentured wages Malaitans were introduced to a wide variety of western goods.
At the same time as the labor trade was beginning in the South West Pacific a series of independent inventions in Europe and North America were radically advancing the technical capabilities of firearms. From the 1730's until the 1830's the standard service arm of the armies of Europe and the Americas were smoothbore flintlock muskets. Percussion muskets took over this role in the 1830's. By the 1850's percussion muskets were still in service but increasingly muzzle-loading rifles were coming into general service. Although firearm's technology had evolved since Mendana's day many of the same basic problems still existed. Smoothbore muskets had generally similar characteristics regardless of whether they had a flintlock or percussion ignition mechanism. A trigger mechanism was used to ignite a small powder charge on an external pan which in turn ignited a larger powder charge in the base of the musket barrel. The force of this latter ignition propelled a projectile out of the barrel. The ball had a smaller diameter than the smooth barrel to allow for loading of the projectile down the muzzle. Because of this it bounced from side to side in the barrel when fired and thus tended to curve in flight in the direction of the side of the barrel it had last struck. Furthermore, these projectiles were of relatively slow velocity and tended to drop away very quickly in flight, and to be blown off course in strong winds. The external priming mechanisms were very vulnerable to dampness. As a result of all of these factors smoothbore muskets were generally unreliable at any range over one hundred yards, and were preferable used at ranges of fifty yards or less. The complicated loading procedure and the tendency for the inside of the barrel to become clogged with used powder charges meant that even in skilled hands the rate of fire was relatively slow and after prolonged use the muskets were prone to misfiring.
But by the end of the 1860's bullets were being inserted directly into a breech at the base of the barrel rather than having to be pushed down the barrel. This radically increased the rate of fire. In 1867 Colonel Boxer, superintendent at the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich Arsenal, invented the all metal cartridge. This contained a percussion cap in its base as well as the projectile, thus doing away with the need for open powder charges and all their inherent problems. The metal cartridge also allowed the breech to be sealed at the moment of firing to prevent the usual leaking of hot gases at the breach. All of these developments meant that projectiles could now be tighter fitting in gun barrels, and that these barrels could be grooved, or rifled, to impart spin on the projectile. This process improved both the speed and accuracy of the projectile. By 1870 rifles such as the single shot Snider were becoming formidable weapons, already highly accurate at ranges of many hundreds of yards. The Martini-Henry rifle adopted by the British army in 1871 exemplified the new dominance of the rifle on the battlefield. "Fast, accurate, tough, impervious to the weather," it was "...a weapon that made every other gun obsolete." Yet it in turn was soon outdated by the development of quick-firing repeating rifles.

These rapid advances in firearms technology meant that every few years waves of discarded obsolete weapons flooded the international arms' markets. In this way many smoothbore muskets had found their way to those Pacific islands in contact with Europeans and Americans. Now it was the turn of Malaita and others. In the 1860's attempts were made to keep up with the advancing technology of the day by converting recently issued muzzleloading rifles to breechloading rifles by adding breech block mechanisms. The British army, for example, converted its muzzleloading
Enfields by adding the breech block mechanism invented by Jacob Snider of New York. This greatly increased the capabilities of these Enfields but in 1869 the Snider-Enfield, as the converted model was known, was abandoned for the new Martini-Henry rifle. Through the medium of British Imperial connections and the advance of military technology, entrepreneurs in Australia and Fiji were thus given access to large numbers of Snider-Enfields at a time when they sought to expand their labor recruiting activities in the Solomon Islands. The Snider-Enfield might be outdated in Europe, but in the Pacific Islands it represented a major improvement on the smoothbore muskets that were the predominant trade firearm in the Pacific up until this time.

As in most of the Pacific islands, firearms became much sought after among Solomon islanders as the labor trade developed. When the Queensland Government attempted to impose limitations upon the quantity of guns and ammunition that recruits could take with them back to Melanesia, the Premier of Queensland, John Douglas, was confronted by a delegation of two hundred Melanesians who told him that if such a restriction were imposed "no more boys come along Queensland. Boys altogether go Fiji. Plenty guns along of Fiji." Nevertheless a complete ban on firearms and ammunition sales to Pacific islanders was imposed in 1884 in areas under British control. The result was that recruiters for Fiji and Queensland lost out greatly to French and German rivals who were still free to entice recruits by offers of firearms. A Snider rifle was a significant investment, costing the equivalent of about one year's wages in the 1890's. Many Malaitans went to New Caledonia or Samoa instead where large number of Winchester, Snider and Spencer rifles were available. Many laborers in Queensland simply returned to Melanesia with their wages intact and then bought guns into Malaita after
the 1884 ban despite the risk of confiscation of guns without compensation if they were discovered by Colonial authorities. 45

Prior to the banning of firearms and ammunition sales in 1884 many muskets and rifles were introduced into Malaita. By 1883 Commander Moore of the Royal Navy's Australian Squadron estimated that no fewer than 100 rifles and 1500 muskets annually, with appropriate supplies of ammunition, went into the New Hebrides from Queensland alone either as recruitment "gifts" or as purchases by time-expired laborers. Moore felt that the Solomon Islands, and particularly Malaita were no less well equipped. 46 That same year Bishop Selwyn, a leading church figure in the South West Pacific, reported that every recruit brought back one or more guns and three to four hundred rounds of ball cartridge. One chief on Ysabel had "upwards of one hundred stands of arms, many of them breechloaders, and a few Winchesters." 47

After 1884 firearms continued to come into Malaita, albeit on a significantly smaller scale, through smuggling or through the medium of French and German recruiters. In 1890, for example, the German recruiting vessel Maria secured seventy-two recruits from Port Adams alone, each of whom received one Snider rifle and a quantity of ammunition. The next year a French recruiting vessel had no trouble attracting recruits with its offer of two Sniders and ammunition per recruit. 48 In 1897 the British Resident Commissioner in the Solomon Islands, Charles Woodford, was informed that over fifty rifles were smuggled into Malaita onboard one ship in the previous year. 49 As late as 1908 cases of gun smuggling were still being reported. 50 In fact the illegal trade in Sniders and Winchesters continued into the 1920's on Malaita. 51 In 1927 one district in north Malaita surrendered 1070 rifles to Colonial authorities during their attempt to disarm the island. 52
The main weapons involved in the labor trade were tomahawks, old smoothbore muskets, Snider-Enfield rifles, with some modern repeating rifles on occasion. In 1884 the recruiter William Wawn mentioned that "smoothbore muskets and very often even Snider rifles" were the most common forms of recruiting inducement offered. Commander Moore's estimate of a fifteen to one ration for muskets to rifles in the labor trade is probably correct up to the mid-1880's. Writing in 1887, Bishop Selwyn felt that most of the guns involved were breechloaders. From the mid-1880's Snider rifles were the predominant trade guns coming into the Solomon Islands.

A number of contemporary European authorities felt that this influx of firearms was causing severe disruption to Malaita. By 1887, J.B. Thurston, the Assistant High Commissioner to the Western Pacific, felt that these weapons were "demoralizing the Natives of the Pacific and bringing about their rapid destruction." In 1888 some members of the Colonial Office were of the opinion that if arms and liquor sales were not prohibited the islanders would be wiped out. Some believed that European arms had exacerbated intergroup fighting and murder because they made killing easier. Inherent in these perceptions were the beliefs that firearms were superior to the traditional armory, and that indigenous societies were incapable of or unwilling to regulate their use of firearms.

Prior to the introduction of firearms the main weapons in the Malaitan armory were spears, lances, clubs, and bows and arrows. Most projectile weapons had sharp flint tips capable of inflicting a disabling wound. Large, thin wicker shields were often carried by Solomon Islanders. In skillful hands these shields were sufficient to ward off projectiles. For fighting at close quarters Malaitan warriors relied on lances and a variety of clubs.
Spanish found the warriors of Malaita's southern coast armed with clubs consisting of a stone head the size of an orange attached to a wooden shaft. Other clubs consisted of four to six foot long pieces of very hard timber, shaped so that one end was somewhat flattened, tapering down to two sharp edges. In a fight on Santa Isabel in 1769 one of Surville's men received a blow to the head with such a club which cut open his hat and split his head down to the bone. During the same fight other Frenchmen were wounded by deep thrusts from lances, some penetrating as much as five inches into the body. Only one man died from his wounds however. While skilled warriors could dodge or parry clubs, lances and traditional projectiles, the Snider-Enfield and other firearms of its time struck invisibly and carried immense hitting power, even at some distance. Wicker shields and nimble footwork were of little use against such weapons in the right hands.

From an early date, Melanesians had a reputation as "savage" and warlike people. Within Melanesia, some islands were particularly notorious. Malaita was one of these islands. Malaita men had a reputation among Europeans for being truculent, self assertive and treacherous, and were regarded with caution by most outsiders, including other Solomon islanders. The island appeared to many observers to be in a continual state of turmoil. The population of Malaita was highly fragmented linguistically, geographically and politically. Settlements on Malaita ranged in size from ten to two hundred people, with political units correspondingly small and localized. A distinction was made between the inland people and the coastal dwellers. Whereas the people of the interior tended to live in small, scattered hamlets practicing swidden agriculture and rearing pigs, the coastal peoples tended to live just offshore on small, densely populated, islands in the shelter of the various lagoons lining Malaita's coastline. Some of these islands were man-made.
A more or less continual state of tension existed between inland and coastal peoples. This did not prevent the existence of regular market days between the two groups. Such markets were held on the coast opposite the Lau and Langalanga lagoons every few days. Kinship ties also linked the two peoples. Kwaisulia, a prominent figure in the Lau lagoon, was born out of a union between a coastal mother and an inland father. Such links gave the coastal peoples access to garden land and fresh water on the mainland. Larger trade networks also existed. For example, the inhabitants of North Malaita used ebony from Isabel for their spears and bows. Links outside of localized units tended to be very tenuous, even between neighboring groups.

Warfare was not a way of life on Malaita; rather it was a part of a way of life. Fighting was to a large degree formalized, with a number of social restraints acting upon it. Warfare was intimately associated with certain beliefs and customs central to the cohesion of society. All insults and injuries, perceived or real, or infractions of social tabus such as adultery required the seeking of compensation for the affront to community mana or prestige. Revenge could be exacted upon the perceived guilty party, or his kin, as a policy of collective responsibility was pursued. Killings might be conducted by individuals without community sanction for personal reasons. The perpetrator's community would support and protect him, unless he was believed to be a sorcerer, in which case he would be handed over to the aggrieved party. This sense of collective responsibility and group prestige served to strengthen social cohesiveness. On occasion revenge was sought through the offering of rewards for the death of certain individuals. Such rewards were known as blood money. This system of order led to an endless round of revenge killings and caused continual tension between groups.
Hostilities were characterized by weeks of anxious waiting with many threats and little action. Fighting might be heralded by a formal declaration or simply begin with a surprise attack or the ambush of an unsuspecting victim. When a death occurred there would be a combination of confusion and excitement, or threats of revenge combined with fear. The aggrieved party might rush out of the village to tear up gardens or do some other damage, or seek a quick counterkilling of some harmless connection of the suspected instigator. Both sides might simply shut themselves up in their villages, enduring sleepless nights and neglecting their crops. Gradually the tension would die down and normal life would resume until the next affront or until redistribution could be executed. Then the process would begin again.

The actual number of killings was relatively small. Open fights were practically unknown. Where they did occur they followed the general pattern of hostilities, being characterized by demonstrations of force and threats of attack that rarely materialized. The first casualties would usually decide the issue, although fierce battles might rage over the possession of a corpse, which carried great social significance in terms of mana. The more usual forms of hostilities were ambushes of unsuspecting victims or surprise attacks on villages. Some European observers such as Captain Simpson of H.M.S. Blanche found the Malaita method of warfare somewhat cowardly. But such a judgement fails to put warfare on Malaita in its social context. Malaitan warriors could be extremely brave as the castaway John Renton discovered. On one occasion one warrior remained firing arrows into a raiding party when the rest of his village had fled. Despite the obvious danger of encirclement he stood firm until he was surrounded and dispatched.
In a society of highly fragmented, mutually suspicious communities, tensions were never far from the surface. A number of factors operated to reduce the intensity of intergroup relations. Attempted mediation between hostile groups by third parties or elected mediators such as the aofia of the Lau lagoon show that warfare was not the sole means by which compensation was sought. Peace ceremonies sought to resolve conflict by appeasing both sides. This usually involved material compensation for injuries inflicted, or ritual exchanges. Social bonds and economic needs imposed controls of inter-group hostility. Killing had no rationale in itself. It was a means of maintaining individual and communal prestige by assuring that all deaths were avenged. At the same time the fear of retaliation tended to tone down the level of this revenge. Arthur Hopkins, a missionary on Malaita, noted that there was little hostility in their feuds and that they rarely fought with the lust to kill.

Although notions of hereditary power existed, in general leaders on Malaita did not rule by any given right. Rather they exerted influence by virtue of their ability in various fields of socially valued endeavors such as martial prowess, manipulation of magic, oratory, and the ability to acquire and distribute wealth. Such non-institutionalized leadership was highly fluid and dependent on constant reassertion of the skills for which these leaders were valued. In warfare leaders earned their status through their ability to direct the community's war efforts and for their own fighting abilities. Such men were known as rano. They acted as the chief avengers in the system of blood feuding that prevailed on Malaita. Much of their power and wealth, and the loyalty of their followers depended on their collecting blood money and redistributing it.
In the decade or so before firearms became widespread certain coastal groups were able to use their relative advantage in access to guns to assert themselves over their enemies. In particular coastal groups gained a temporary ascendancy over their enemies. Prominent leaders called passage masters were able to extend their influence beyond the usual localized limits of traditional society. Passages were safe ports of call for recruiting ships, usually at places where tracks from the interior met the coast thus giving access to recruits from inland communities as well as coastal settlements (assuming that the coast people were agreeable!). The passage masters gained influence through their manipulation of contacts with recruiting ships which they sought to monopolize. Such interactions gave them access to western goods, including firearms.

Peter Corris' study of the passage master Kwaisulia of Ada Gege has shown that while firearms aided in defeating Ada Gene's rivals Manaoba and Fuana Fou, the manipulation of traditional roles was of major importance in his influence. Kwaisulia was a ramo who also possessed some hereditary standing in Ada Gege. It was not so much his access to western goods but his manipulation of their distribution that earned him influence. There are indications that Kwaisulia overstepped traditional limitations in a number of instances. His conduct of warfare against his enemies was more vigorous than was usual and forced them to flee. He seems also to have appropriated rights accorded only to hereditary Lau chiefs. He soon eclipsed all local leaders in his mana and was de facto leader of his area from the 1880's until his death in 1909.

For all his achievements he did not leave any enduring power. Kwaisulia was, in essence, using a new means to pursue traditional aims based on a system that lacked any mechanisms for ensuring the continuity of power beyond
any individual's lifetime. Although information is lacking on other Malaita passage masters such as Billy Mahualla of Alite Bay and Foulanger of Port Adam, they seem also to have owed their influence to traditional practices as well as to association with recruiting ships.90

The coastal peoples of Malaita no longer sought to monopolize the Queensland and Fiji labor trade after 1884. The demand for firearms seems to have been satisfied in certain coastal areas of Malaita by this time, meaning that there was less incentive to seek recruitment.91 Some coastal communities were becoming increasingly discerning in their tastes by 1883. In that year the Daphne had trouble obtaining recruits on Malaita because it only offered poor quality rifles.92 Other reasons for this move are evident, such as the social disruption of the long-term absence of many of the young males of these communities.93 With the sale of firearms to islanders banned it may have no longer seemed dangerous to allow enemies access to the recruiting ships.

As a result Malaita men from the interior became increasingly prominent on the recruitment lists after 1884. Although many still went to Australia and Fiji despite the ban on firearms, the desire to own a gun still figured strongly in their motivation for volunteering for indentured service.94 French and German recruiters managed to get Malaitan labor despite the poor conditions on the plantations they recruited for because of their inducements of rifles and ammunition for volunteers.95 By the 1890's the distribution of firearms was becoming more equitable. Coastal dwellers and inland peoples previously lacking in guns were soon arming themselves with Snider-Enfields, often giving them an advantage over their former tormentors who generally had less modern guns. The coastal settlements were upset at the arming of the interior communities.96 But the continued influence of Kwaisulia despite the
rise in firepower of his enemies like Manoaba suggests that firearms were not as influential as has been generally asserted.\textsuperscript{97}

In adopting firearms Malaitans became dependent on an external force of weaponry over which they had limited control. The 1884 firearms' ban severely curtailed, but by no means halted, the flow of firearms into Malaita. Without a plentiful, accessible source of firearms Malaitans were forced to learn how to repair and maintain their original trade guns or rely on gradually deteriorating weapons. Most of the muskets and rifles that came into the hands of Pacific islanders had been bought cheaply by Euro-American entrepreneurs from discarded army stocks as trade items.\textsuperscript{98} Walter Ivens, a missionary on Malaita, felt that the Snider carbines used there were "...not very serviceable weapons."\textsuperscript{99} A number of European observers on Malaita in the 1920's felt that by this time the Islanders' guns were more of a danger to their possessor than to the targets they were aimed at.\textsuperscript{100} However, the condition of Malaitan firearms was more complex than these observers suggest. The Kwaio of the interior of Malaita kept their guns well oiled, polished and dry above the men's house fires at night.\textsuperscript{101} In the late 1920's the former inspector of labor R.F. Thomson noted that the locals (i.e. Malaitans) seemed to have a "...natural facility for bringing old blunder busses up to date with hair triggers and other attachments they fashion."\textsuperscript{102} At the same time Ivens claimed that relatively good quality tower rifles were damaged by the Lau lagoon mens' habit of filing off part of the barrel to allow for easier storage in their canoes.\textsuperscript{103}

The end of free access to Euro-American weapons' technology in 1884 and the end of the labor trade in the early 1900's must have severely curtailed Malaita's access to ammunition. Walter Ivens thought that there were no
cartridges available on Malaita by the 1920's. It is more probable that there was an irregular trickle of cartridges in these later years.\textsuperscript{104} This scarcity caused grossly inflated prices. For example, Snider cartridges smuggled onto Malaita from nearby Gela could sell for as much as 3 per cartridge in the early 1900s.\textsuperscript{105} Accordingly ammunition tended to be used judiciously and Malaitans became adept at converting cartridges from more modern rifles for use in their old firearms.\textsuperscript{106}

It is debatable whether the level of violence in this period was greater than in pre-firearms' times. While Peter Corris suggests that firearms caused a rise in casualties and stimulated hostilities on Malaita, Deryck Scarr has questioned this viewpoint.\textsuperscript{107} There certainly are indications of an unsettled state of affairs on Malaita after 1870. Walter Ivens felt that whereas killings had social meaning in earlier times men now killed either for the sake of killing or in order to get some desired object owned by their victim.\textsuperscript{108} In a six week period in 1900 Arthur Hopkins reported twelve killings in his area alone.\textsuperscript{109} The succession of the aofia in the Lau lagoon is said to have ended in this period, removing a check on an already escalating level of bloodshed.\textsuperscript{110} This dislocation of the aofia title may have been a sign of Kwaisulia's rising influence over the lagoon area or the result of a rising level of conflict discrediting the role of the aofia.

The power of the ramo apparently increased during the period of the labor trade. Missionary accounts refer to disruptive bands of "bravoes" and independent professional killers who terrorized the population and eagerly sought to collect any blood money that was in the offering.\textsuperscript{111} These descriptions may be more than just missionary bias. Malaita was disturbed by the return of time-expired indentured laborers who tended to arrive
well-armed, self-confident, and alienated to various degrees from their old
customs and conventions. It may also be a result of a preference to pay
for "professionals" rather than seek redress on one's own accord because of
the dangers that firearms now introduced into warfare. Certainly firearms are
claimed to have made the job easier for ramo, some of whom built up large kill
tallies. For instance, Irokwato of Malaita is said to have killed at least
forty men and maybe as many as one hundred in his career as a ramo. He
usually shot his victims from a concealed position. This trend towards the
use of specialists contradicts the general pattern in Polynesia where the
introduction of firearms tended to act as an equalizer, making all combatants
potentially lethal.

The use of firearms may have led to an increasing reliance on
fortifications. Manmade defenses were used on Malaita prior to the
introduction of firearms, and any adjustments that occurred to compensate for
gun fire, were usually variations of traditional defenses rather than new
types of fortifications. Sieges occurred both before and after the
introduction of firearms, although evidence on the relative frequency of
sieges is lacking. There is mention of a heavy, close-set palisade built
to shelter the inhabitants of Ada Gege from rifle fire from the mainland which
was only a few hundred yards away. At night the landing places were closed
with logs and sentries kept watch. Such defenses were not new. Prior to
the introduction of firearms Renton mentions that the coastal village of "sulu
Fou" was surrounded by a decaying breastwork of logs sometime around 1870.
This breastwork had served as a defence in an earlier siege. The
transition from breastworks to full palisades cannot be definitely attributed
to firearms, as double lines of log palisades, loopholed for archers, were
used to defend hill settlements in traditional times. Ivens states that the use of palisades in the Lau lagoon area hailed from the hills.\textsuperscript{118} Hopkins describes one such hill settlement palisade as being from eight to ten feet high and constructed of heavy tree trunks. He added that the space between the two palisades of one village had been filled in with soil, possibly as an added protection against bullets.\textsuperscript{119}

Rannie's account of Ada Gege in 1886 and Wawn's description of artificial islands at Auki in 1888 both refer to thick stone walls on the outside of these islands.\textsuperscript{120} Ivens refers to the construction of a stone wall around the island of Funaa Vou as protection from rifle bullets in anticipation for an expected attack by Sulu Vou sometime between 1888 and 1890.\textsuperscript{121} These stone walls were not necessarily adaptations to gunfire. Renton mentions stone breastworks on the artificial islands of the Lau lagoon prior to the introduction of firearms.\textsuperscript{122} Accounts by Ivens and Renton of the construction of artificial islands suggest these stone walls may have served a primarily structural role that later proved useful as fortifications.\textsuperscript{123} In contrast to the adaptation of existing features, Kwaisulia also used barbed wire in the defences of Ada Gege.\textsuperscript{124}

Ivens' and the castaway John Renton's accounts of warfare show a great deal of continuity in the conflicts that occurred in north eastern coastal Malaita before and after the introduction of firearms.\textsuperscript{125} Massacres occurred in Renton's day as well as in the post-firearms era of Ivens', but in general both depict an intermittent series of low-level conflicts, occasionally punctuated by more bloody encounters. Possibly the scope of alliances expanded with the introduction of firearms, with warriors from as far afield as Port Adam fighting in the conflicts of the Lau lagoon in the firearms era.\textsuperscript{126}
The use of firearms seems to have been modified to suit existing approaches to fighting. Projectile weapons had existed in the traditional arsenal, but much of the actual killing was done at close range with clubs, lances or projectiles. In the dense bush environment of Malaita the field of vision was restricted, and assailants could approach their victims undetected. Even in open fights the antagonists were in close proximity to each other. In the 1870's the rifle replaced the club as the favorite weapon of Malaitan warriors. Most killings continued to be enacted at very short range with either rifle or club, thus neutralizing the chief advantage of the rifle — its ability to kill at a distance.

Shortages of ammunition were probably a major reason for the use of close range firing after the end of the Labor trade in the Twentieth Century. But internal cultural factors also seem to have influenced the use of firearms. It is perhaps significant that when the Kwaio ramo Basiana killed District Officer Bell in 1927 he did so by using his rifle to club Bell to death, rather than to shoot him. Attacks on visiting recruiting vessels in the 1880's were conducted with metal tomahawks rather than firearms.

In traditional times weapons had much symbolic value. Some weapons were handed down from generation to generation, linking their possessor to his ancestors. In Malaitan religion ancestral spirits were believed to be able to influence worldly affairs. Weapons, including tomahawks and firearms procured in the era of labor trade were often consecrated to ancestors. In many ways the rifle was as much a status symbol as a weapon. Amongst the Kwaio at least, rifles were kwanga, or lightning, — a term reflecting their awesome potential as tools of revenge. Weapons were extensions of the warriors' arm and manifestations of his potency and a sign of his manhood.
In some parts of the Solomon Islands large numbers of firearms were accumulated by certain men. Such caches could bring an individual a great deal of prestige and influence through their judicious redistribution within his community. By the 1890's trade goods had received equivalent values in indigenous currencies. Some goods were even being used directly in exchange systems such as bride-price payments. Rifles were amongst the items included in the latter group.

Firearms were not exploited to anything near their full military potential despite the fact that many warriors were good marksmen. Ivens never saw the Malaita men use sights to aim at an enemy. Sniders were often fired from the hip without any attempt to take aim. When a person was shot deliberately it was generally only because the rifle was thrust close to his body and the trigger pulled. Even at close range misses were recorded.

On the rare occasions that general confrontations occurred rifle fire tended not to cause much damage. For example, in the sieges of Sulu Vou and Ada Gege by Funaa Vou and Manaoba in the late 1880's both sides fired many rounds of ammunition but no casualties resulted on either side. The only deaths occurred when a helpless straggler and child were discovered on the mainland opposite Ada Gege and promptly dispatched. However, on another occasion a canoe-borne attack on Funaa Vou by Sulu Vou and its allies was driven off "with loss" by rifle fire from the shore.

Much of the reasons for the ineffective use of firearms occurred as a result of the large degree of continuity in Malaitan attitudes to warfare. There was no need to kill more victims than was necessary for adequate satisfaction for insult or injury. To do so only invited future retaliation on a similar scale. No leader or community was able to forge any permanent political units beyond the localized level of traditional society. The power
of firearms was not enough to overcome the divisive elements of Malaitan culture. The chance of creating more centralized rule through force declined as firearms became widespread.

Some thirty years after the introduction of firearms hostilities were still being conducted along traditional patterns and for traditional reasons. On the death of Kwaisulia in 1909 Ada Gege sought revenge on the "sorcerer" who was perceived to have caused his death. The accused man was a chief of Sulu Vou, a neighboring island a few hundred yards away. This chief's community refused to hand him over, however. Every day at low tide the Ada Gege men would march out over the lagoon towards Sulu Vou and vociferously challenge the Sulu Vou people to surrender the accused man. Despite their exposed position no volleys seem to have been exchanged. Rather, the antagonists contended themselves with raids on each others' gardens. Every day envoys arrived from the bush to each island offering alliances — at a price! The accused man managed to flee from Sulu Vou until the storm blew over. Although he returned to Sulu Vou and tensions declined the threat of eventual retribution still persisted.¹⁴¹

As the above example shows the British declaration of a protectorate over the Solomon Islands in 1893 did not lead to an immediate end to fighting on Malaita. Coastal Malaita, with its growing Christian enclaves and rising awareness of the advantages of participating in the white man's world, became less of a problem with time for the British administration. In any case, troublesome coastal villages were relatively accessible for punitive measures. But the population of Malaita's interior caused the British authorities particular trouble. In response to perceived missionary attempts to challenge traditional ways and ideas, many inland ramo retaliated with
intimidation of Christian converts and teachers. Often this took the form of slayings.\textsuperscript{142}

The efforts of the Solomon Island's administration to protect Malaita's Christian population and to "pacify" the interior was continually hampered by a lack of finances. The District Officer on Malaita had only thirty to forty native troops at his disposal. His transportation was limited to one whaleboat.\textsuperscript{143} It is not surprising therefore that blood feuds continued and mission stations were raided with impunity. Almost daily Malaitan Christians fell victim to some lurking warrior. Even the District Officers' headquarters at Auki was submitted to sniping.\textsuperscript{144}

Under the direction of District Officer Bell much effort was put into "pacifying" the island in the years following his arrival at Auki in 1915.\textsuperscript{145} In response to this mounting pressure, and influenced by the realization that their days of autonomy were numbered, elements of the Kwaio killed Bell, his assistant, and a number of accompanying native police at Gwee'abe in October, 1927. It was a symbolic last blow for their threatened way of life and much loved independence.\textsuperscript{146}

The resultant backlash brought much death and suffering to the Kwaio. A punitive expedition of Solomon island planters, naval personnel from the Australian naval vessel \textit{Adelaide} and Solomon islanders soon arrived at Malaita. The European portion of this force proved ineffective in the rugged, bushclad interior so that the job of hunting down the Kwaio fugitives was soon left to native police and Melanesian volunteers.\textsuperscript{147} Many of these men were from north Malaita. Their prime motivation for hunting down the Kwaio was to avenge past grievances against them rather than any feeling of loyalty to the whiteman.\textsuperscript{148} They were as skilled in tracking and in bush warfare as their
quarry, but had a major advantage in that they had been issued with modern repeating rifles. In comparison the Kwaio possessed a limited number of single shot rifles and were probably short of ammunition. They could not hope to win a stand up fight. Their only hope of evading their foe "... lay in constant mobility; in cooking wild yams and drinking at night; and hiding in the wild bush by day...". With European control of field operations negligible, shrines were desecrated, pigs killed, houses burnt, women and children murdered and prisoners shot by the revenge-seeking north Malaitans.

By the end of 1927 most or all of the Kwaio fugitives were dead or had surrendered. Many more died afterwards of dysentery while in captivity at the Protectorate's capital Tulagi. Those who remained on Malaita fared little better. Demoralized by the desecration of their shrines, and denied subsistence by the destruction of their pigs and taro many Kwaio died in the year following the bloody retribution which so brutally ended their old way of life.

The success of the Kwaio in resisting British attempts to control them had proven to be their undoing. Remaining outside of the new emerging order, resulting from European penetration, they were placed at a major disadvantage to their coastal counterparts, who gained a decisive lead in coming to terms with the whiteman's ways. The Kwaio could not win; their resistance merely delayed an inevitable process. The final blow came when their traditional rivals combined with a global power and its superior technology of destruction to attack a common foe whose cultural conservatism had incurred their hostility.

The Malaitan response to firearms does much to support the conclusions of Shineberg and Howe. Despite the dramatic improvement of firearms technology,
the use of guns in indigenous fighting on Malaita was successfully modified to suit traditional attitudes towards warfare in the late part of the Nineteenth Century. While the function of warfare remained the same, the form of warfare required modification to accommodate the use of firearms. Specific case studies, be they temporal and/or spatial, run the risk of presenting a false impression of the wider reality. Case studies must be viewed in a more generalized context to reveal their real significance. Malaitans were now more dependent on an external source of supply for their favored weaponry. Their suppliers had differing attitudes and objectives. This was merely one aspect of a general era of change as European penetration progressed. Pacific islanders could still have much influence over their own destiny. But if the initial cultural resilience that many displayed was not followed by cultural adaptation and flexibility in the long term, very real problems loomed in the future.154
ABBREVIATIONS

J.P.H. = Journal of Pacific History
W.P.H.-I.C. = West Pacific High Commission-Inward Correspondence

NOTES

This paper was researched and written in the Fall Semester of 1985 and the Spring Semester of 1986 using material from the Pacific Collection of the Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii. The staff of the Pacific Collection have been very helpful during this time. The other contributors to this monograph and Dr. Brij Lal made useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am grateful for their constructive criticism.


4. See illustration one for the mechanics of firearms.

5. Shineberg "Guns and Men", pp. 71-72. A culverin was a piece of light artillery.


7. Shineberg, "Guns and Men", pp. 73.


10. Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood, pp. 152-3.


16. The evolution of firearms is discussed later in this paper pp. 6-7.
18. For example, in describing the Malaitan's first encounter with the Spanish the Report to Mendana states that after being shot at the Malaitans "fled back again" (p. 45). Catoira's narrative, by far the most detailed account of the three, implies the Malaitans only slowly retired after one of their number was shot, and that it required a second volley to make them withdraw (pp. 281-2).
19. Malaitans were shot during the first encounter and the third one at the southern end of Maramasike passage. But in the encounter between these two the local Malaitans fled upon receiving a volley that did not kill anyone. (Catoira's Narrative, p. 283).
24. For example, see Amherst and Thomson, The Discovery of the Solomon Islands, pp. 47-48.
25. Dunmore, The Expedition of the St. Jean-Baptiste, pp. 113-4 (Surville) and pp. 217-8 (Labe).

29. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 37.


38. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 37.


41. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 38, and W.T. Wawn, The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour Trade, P. Corris ed., (Canberra, 1973), p. 310, and Scarr, Fragments of Empire, p. 196, who cites Thurston in 1886 as saying that the ban was not working as non-British traders were filling the vacuum created by this restriction on British traders.

42. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 112.


45. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 112.
46. Moore to Erskine, 7 November 1888, Royal Navy Australian Squadron XVI, in D. Scarr, Fragments of Empire, p. 139.

47. Great Britain - Parliamentary Papers; Western Pacific-Correspondence Relating to Proposals for an International Agreement Regulating the Supply of Arms, Ammunition, Alcohol, and Dynamite to Natives of the Western Pacific, vol. 38, (1887), p. 37.


49. C.M. Woodford, Report on the British Solomon Islands Presented to Parliament April 1897, Colonial Reports, misc. no. 8, Western Pacific, p. 25.


51. Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 76.


53. Scarr, "Recruits and Recruiters", p. 22.

54. Wawn, The South Sea Islanders, p. 310.

55. Moore to Erskine, 7 November 1888 in Scarr, Fragments of Empire, p. 139.


58. J.B. Thurston, Great Britain - Parl. Papers, 1887, p. 1. See also Romilly, p. 5 and Selwyn, p. 37 of the same Parl. Paper. In later years, Ivens made similar judgements (Island Builders, p. 23, 43.)


62. See illustration two.
63. For an account of this fight see Dunmore, The Expedition of the St. Jean-Baptise, pp. 195-6.

64. For example, see Rannie My Adventures, p. 117, Amherst and Thomson, The Discovery of the Solomon Islands, p. 181, J. Boutilier "Killing the Government: Imperial Policy and the Pacification of Malaita" in The Pacification of Melanesia M. Rodman and M. Cooper, eds. 1972, p. 48.


68. Iven, Island Builders, p. 184.


70. Hopkins, In the Isles, p. 211, Ivens, Island Builders, p. 185, Marwick, John Renton, p. 34.


73. Ivens, Island Builders, pp. 198-99.

74. C.H. Wedgewood, "Some Aspects of Warfare in Melanesia", Oceania, vol. 1, p. 6

75. Ivens, Island Builders, pp. 198-9.


79. Woodford, A Naturalist Among the Head Hunters, p. 43.


82. Wedgewood, "Warfare in Melanesia", pp. 24-5.


90. For Billy Mahualla, see Wawn, The South Sea Islanders, p. 414 and Corris, Islanders, p. 405, and Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 65.


95. For example, Wawn, The South Sea Islanders, p. 353, p. 425.


100. Corris and Keesing, *Lightning Meets the West Wind*, p. 117.
117. Marwick, John Renton, p. 34.
122. Marwick, John Renton, pp. 52-3.
125. Marwick, John Renton, pp. 34-5; Ivens, Island Builders, pp. 188-92.

126. Ivens, Island Builders, p. 190.


128. For example, see Hopkins, In the Isles, pp. 171-3; Ivens, Island Builders, p. 200; Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 20.

129. Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 20.


131. For examples, see Rannie, My Adventures, pp. 180-81, 189, 191, 263-64 for 1886. Rannie also gives a good account of the massacre of the crew of the Young Dick in 1884 (p. 203). Also see Wawn, The South Sea Islanders, pp. 418-9 for attack on vessels at Manoaba in 1888.

132. Ivens, Island Builders, p. 112.

133. For example, Marwick, John Renton, p. 30; Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 117, mention the consecration of weapons to ancestors. Ivens, Island Builders, pp. 129-33; Hopkins, In the Isles, p. 205, and Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 8 discuss the Malaitan perception of their ancestor spirits.

134. Ivens cited in Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, p. 112; Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, pp. 9, 116-7.

135. For example, see Great Britain, Parl. Report, 1887, p. 3 (Melbourne Argus, 26 January 1884 cited) and p. 39 (Bishop Selwyn).

136. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation, pp. 113-4.

137. Corris and Keesing, Lightning Meets the West Wind, p. 20 make the point that many Malaitans were good marksmen.

138. Ivens, Island Builders, p. 191.

139. Ivens, Island Builders, p. 191. In A Naturalist Among Head Hunters, Woodford refers to a battle on Savo between Savo men and bush peoples from Guadacanal in which a bush chief called Sulakava rushed into the midst of the Savo men, but remained uninjured, despite the fact that his enemy are said to have fired 40 revolver shots and 60 rifle shots at him from close range (p. 185).

140. Ivens, Island Builders, p. 191.


147. For the campaign up until the withdrawal of the white component from field operations, see Corris and Keesing, *Lightning Meets the West Wind*, pp. 155-64.


154. This trend towards a balance between the fatal impact thesis and the revisionist argument of islander resilience and adaptation has been noticeable in recent years. In particular, Greg Dening's *Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land, Marquesas 1774-1880*, (Melbourne, 1980) did much to counter the trend towards emphasizing islander resistance to European inroads by showing the very real violence and disruption that occurred in the Marquesas.
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