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HISTORY OF THE U.S. TRUST TERRITORY
OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Edited by Karen Knudsen

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These six papers are derived from the Pacific Islands Studies Program's ninth annual conference which was held on April 19, 1984 on the Manoa campus of the University of Hawaii. Dr. Richard A. Herr, political scientist, University of Tasmania was a Visiting Colleague with the program during calendar year 1984. He served as a discussant for the conference, and his comments serve as a preface to the proceedings. Dr. Eugene Ogan, Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota, was also a Visiting Colleague with the program during the spring and summer months of 1985, and he graciously read and made suggestions regarding the six papers. His help was appreciated.

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HISTORY OF THE U.S. TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Edited by
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PREFACE

by

Richard A. Herr

The common thread which runs through each of these papers is spun from their shared concern with the process of American decolonization in the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Perhaps even more, this thread tends to be colored with a recurrent tint — the cultural appropriateness of various U.S. activities from the end of World War II to the present. Such a preoccupation is, of course, as justifiable as it is predictable. Culture is the key to nationhood and nationality has become almost synonymous with statehood. Thus, clearly the issue of cultural vitality can have important implications for the course, pace, and direction of decolonization.

Yet, inevitably as the concentrating lens of scrutiny is focused ever more tightly, the circle of examination excludes larger amounts of information. It is this phenomenon which provides much of the basis for my commentary since, in their substance, these six papers are highly commendable. Indeed, overall the conference papers both singly and collectively are a worthy addition to the literature of contemporary Micronesia.

Robert Kiste's "Overview of U.S. Policy" cogently argues the case against interpretations of American administrative practice in the TTPI which accord these practices the status of a coherent and deliberate
"policy." His attack on the "zoo" and/or "entrapment" theories is difficult to fault. Nevertheless, it may be that the emphasis on deliberateness unnecessarily precludes the affect of unintended consequences. Many, if not all, the elements of the alleged "zoo" theory, for example, would be compatible with Kiste's alternative explanation of military convenience as an unintentional effect. Thus, while there may have been no deliberate policy of isolating the Micronesians from Western influences, the same result may have occurred as a consequence of the practices favoring military interests.

"Quo Vadis" by William Tagupa maintains that colonial powers control the basic resources of time and space which set the agenda (or perhaps even determine whether or not there is to be an agenda) for decolonization. Since colonialism is inherently an asymmetrical relationship, the logic of the assertion is persuasive. Nevertheless, the observation leads one to wonder where the threshold is which separates the colonies which seize control of the decolonizing agenda by violence and those which are able to work toward independence using more pacific measures. Such an indicator might even assist the few remaining metropoles and their colonies to assess the implications of their approaches to decolonization.

The value of a practitioner's reflections can scarcely be gainsaid and this is all the more true when the practitioner is Leonard Mason and the reflections concern his experience of applied anthropology in Micronesia. Perhaps the only useful observation, therefore, I can make
on his paper is that neither the process nor the problems are novel to
the TTPI. The British employed applied anthropologists for nearly a
century to pursue indirect rule in various parts of the empire.
Similarly, the problems of serving as an applied anthropologist are
basically the same as those faced by academic policy-advisers from other
disciplines such as political science and economics. Still, Mason has
recourse to the rejoinder that the cultural dimension in anthropology may
make the responsibility greater than for the other policy areas. Those
of us from the disciplines might cavil but "culture is the key to
nationhood."

While the three preceeding papers treat broader themes in the
U.S.-TTPI relationship, the final three papers serve as case studies into
specific issues. Craig Severance's review of the Peace Corps experience,
the assessment of American education policy by Karen Peacock; and Don
Topping's examination of linguistic manipulation, however, do reveal
common perceptions on the dilemma of development. How do outsiders
effect change without changing things? The answer is clearly that this
cannot be done and therefore the maximum consultation and cooperation of
the developing peoples is essential.

Severance expressed the judgement that with regard to the Peace
Corps such interaction did not always occur; that all too often it was a
case of "doing for" rather than "doing with." Similar observations
appear in the studies by Peacock and Topping. Again, the personal
knowledge and the depth of scholarship in these three works are of an
order that makes their observations compelling. Thus the interesting questions center on what altered factors may have made for different results. What ought the U.S. have done to have prevented the tortured and tortuous path to decolonization we have witnessed to date? The alternatives are more implied than argued in these papers.

The fact that the U.S. never had a Colonial Office is crucial here; not just because the absence of such an institution created administrative and managerial problems but even more because this absence represented a form of national amnesia. The U.S. experienced colonial domination and a bloody war for national liberation. It is often said that those who forget the past are condemned to relive it. The message in all six of these conference papers seems to be that a nation which forgets its past might well inflict it on others.
A TRIBUTE TO
DR. ROBERT E. GIBSON
- EDUCATOR IN MICRONESIA -

Probably few people in Hawaii are aware that Dr. Robert E. Gibson, before he settled into "retirement" in Waimanalo, had achieved a distinguished career in international education. In that capacity, he was honored in April 1984, as a special guest at a conference on "The History of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI)," held at the University of Hawaii/Manoa and sponsored by the University's Pacific Islands Studies Program and the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council.

In a conference paper on Micronesian education, Ms. Karen Peacock, a doctoral candidate in Pacific History at the University of Hawaii, recalled from her own family's long association with Bob and Ida Gibson in Micronesia that he was the first civilian director of education in the U.S. Trust Territory following World War II. He came to that post with many years of experience in the California school system; during World War II he had been director of the education program for interned Japanese-Americans; and he served as education advisor to the U.S. occupation forces in postwar Korea. In his new assignment, he worked out of temporary TTPI headquarters at Fort Ruger. His first activity was to undertake a familiarization tour of the trust area which included the Marshall, Caroline, and northern Mariana islands.
In those days, Micronesians were still recovering from a war that ended three decades of Japanese colonial rule. Most islanders had already returned to a way of life that moved from one event to another. Daily routine in the small, isolated communities meant cultivating taro and catching fish, building and repairing thatched homes and sailing canoes, and caring for children, the elderly, and the sick. Birth and death were causes for special gatherings of family and community and, like first birthdays, a chief's installation, or the dedication of a new meeting house, they called for sharing of large amounts of food and renewed attention to social obligations. It was a strange new world for Bob Gibson. The challenge he faced was awesome, yet exciting — he had been commissioned to develop a program of public education for all Micronesian children.

As Peacock writes, Gibson came to TTFI with a philosophy based on the needs of the community. He developed the theme of an island-oriented education with teaching in the local language. He urged community participation in public meetings and school boards, he supported preparation of classroom materials suited to local values and customs, and he promoted recruitment and training of Micronesians as teachers. He worked diligently with his Micronesian and American educational staff to develop curricula which recognized local crafts and customs and environment, but students were also introduced to other Pacific islands and to the world through their classroom studies. Indigenous languages
were used in the early grades. Only in the higher grades was English introduced to meet the need to communicate with outsiders who were bringing change to Micronesia.

In the early 1960s, policy directions from Washington demanded a shift in educational goals in Micronesia. Education was to play a larger role in persuading Micronesians to abandon their traditional cultures and to become part of the U.S. family. Big budgets and huge programs in education soon eclipsed the island-oriented, community education approach espoused by Gibson and his school colleagues. In protest, he resigned from the TTPI administration in 1964.

Peacock concludes that the Gibson years saw "some of the most innovative and creative thinking" ever applied to education in Micronesia. The political future of the region is now in the final stages of negotiations and is concerned mainly with the issue of Micronesian independence vs. an increasing dependency on the U.S. The external question asked everywhere today is "Education for What?" Bob Gibson, to his everlasting credit, tried to find the answers to that question during his administration in the 1950s.

Leonard Mason
Emeritus Professor, Anthropology, UHM, and Consultant in Pacific Island Affairs
I have recently written a couple of papers about American policy, or the lack thereof, in the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I have argued that the United States has never had a consciously conceived or a coherent policy that has actually been implemented and then actually followed in the islands. I have also attempted to counter the notion that there have been two policies, each with its own 'time frame. What are these two supposed policies?

For the first period, it is sometimes claimed that the United States had and followed a policy that has been referred to as the "ethnological zoo policy." The time frame was from immediately after the second World War until the early 1960s, or one could say, the "zoo" was maintained during the first one and one half decades of the American administration. It is claimed that the Americans wanted to keep the islands out of the mainstream of world events and wanted to protect and preserve Micronesian cultures. Now it seems to me to be quite obvious that the United States has never been particularly concerned about the preservation of other societies. I feel reasonably certain that American
Indian peoples know this. With regard to European immigrants within the United States and since the last century, a "melting pot" philosophy has prevailed, and the attendant notion has been that everyone should become 100% American. With regard to peoples and cultures abroad, the general American lack of sensitivity to other societies was the concern of a popular book, The Ugly American, about a quarter of a century ago.

The second period began during the John F. Kennedy administration, about 1962 or 1963, and it continued until the late 1970's. It is argued that the zoo policy was cast aside, and a new policy of entrapment was initiated. The notion is that the United States set out to entrap the peoples of Micronesia in a vast web of dependency in order to keep the islands firmly within the American sphere of influence. There are better reasons for arguing that there was indeed such a policy of entrapment rather than the zoo notion.

In the early 1960's, the United States had fallen under severe criticism by the United Nations. The U.N. had sent a visiting mission to the Trust Territory, and the results were devastating from the American point of view. The destruction of war remained evident in many places. Almost nothing had been accomplished in the way of economic development. There had been little movement in the direction of self-determination. No attempt had been made to foster a pan-Micronesian identity. In general, things were judged to be in a deplorable condition, and it correctly appeared that the U.S. lacked any sense of real direction for the territory.
President Kennedy was clearly embarrassed, and the situation was further complicated by other matters. In the post war years, it was no longer respectable to have colonies, and Kennedy had gone on record that the U.S. opposed colonialism. The U.N. team essentially had said that the U.S. was maintaining a colony and doing a poor job of it at that. Further embarrassment occurred when a polio epidemic swept through the Marshall Islands and out of neglect or lack of foresight, vaccine had not been made available in Micronesia.

Kennedy wanted some positive action, and he appointed a study commission to be headed by Dr. Anthony Solomon, a Harvard economist. Solomon was instructed to make an investigative tour of the territory and come back with a set of recommendations. Solomon went out to the territory in the early part of 1963, and it was assumed from the outset that it was absolutely necessary for the islands to remain in the U.S. camp. Upon the completion of his study, Solomon believed that if the U.S. initiated greatly improved education and health systems, launched an ambitious scheme of capital improvement projects, and stimulated economic development with a substantial emphasis on agriculture, then the Micronesians would easily be persuaded to elect to remain under the protective wing of their benefactor. He urged that all of this be accomplished quickly and that a plebiscite be held early. Indeed, he believed that it could all be settled within five years. With the wisdom of hindsight, Solomon's optimism seems quite naive today.
Some observers now claim the Solomon Commission's recommendations were actually followed. Journalist David Nevin in his book, *The American Touch in Micronesia*, outlines the incorrectness of such a claim. First of all, Kennedy had already begun to launch some new initiatives in the territory prior to Solomon's involvement. Kennedy had authorized increases in expenditures for the territory to augment programs in education and health. The point is, the flow of U.S. dollars which was to become massive in scale in future years had commenced prior to and without the advice of Solomon. Solomon submitted his report in late 1963, and very soon thereafter, John F. Kennedy fell to the assassin's bullets. There is no evidence that the subsequent administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson took the report seriously. A third period of the American administration of the TTPI was to begin in the very late 1970's when self-government began to be achieved by the four separate political entities that were to emerge in the territory.

Prior to the late 1970's, however, there were two distinct and quite different eras of American rule in Micronesia, and they were as I have briefly described them above. The first period lasted from the end of World War II to about 1963; it has been labelled as the period of the ethnological zoo, or alternatively, the period of benign neglect. The second period has been referred to by some as the one in which the U.S. pursued a policy of entrapment, and it continued up until the late 1970's. Each of these two periods may be examined in greater detail.
With regard to the first period, it must be understood that the territory was not like most colonies of former times. The islands had no economic resources that were valued by the United States. America's main concern was strategic, and this was very clear after the war. Indeed, Micronesia was the only strategic trust territory of the eleven that were created within the framework of the U.N. following World War II. As long as its military interests were served, the U.S. had no other particular concerns for the area. The Marshalls were used for the U.S.'s nuclear testing programs, and the northern Marianas, particularly Saipan, were used for covert C.I.A. operations. Foreign nationals were kept out, and even the entry of U.S. citizens was restricted. There were no pressures from other sources to do anything else with regard to the area. Most Americans did not know that the U.S. had a trust territory, and those who did evidenced little in the way of tangible concern. There certainly was no political lobby or interest group concerned with Micronesia, and the U.S. Department of Defense had what it wanted.

Nonetheless, and even though there was little direct concern shown about the islands [outside of the military], American values played a crucial role in determining what occurred. This was manifest in two ways. First, the manner in which Americans thought about themselves had important consequences for the administration of Micronesia. Secondly, American values helped to determine the kinds of programs that were actually initiated.
How did Americans see themselves? Certainly at the end of World War II, Americans saw themselves as the defenders of democracy and the free world. The war had been fought to defeat the imperialistic expansion of Japan and Germany, and there was some justification for the image that the Americans held of themselves. But this is only part of the story. Gaining possession of the bulk of Micronesia from Japan was not thought of as an act of colonialism. Most Americans have never thought of their nation as being a colonial power. The U.S. was born with a war of independence, a revolution to throw off the shackles of British colonial rule. Early in their schooling, Americans are taught that their country has only fought to defend freedom, independence, and democracy. All nations have their myths, and the American myth makes it inconceivable for the vast majority of Americans to perceive themselves as citizens of a colonial power. That the original thirteen colonies expanded across much of the North American continent incorporating the indigenous inhabitants into their nation is not viewed as an act of colonial expansion by most Americans. The acquisition of the Philippines in island Southeast Asia, American Samoa, Guam, and Hawaii in the Pacific, and several entities in the Caribbean has not been viewed as colonial expansion. Alaska was not viewed differently.

The point is, the vision of Americans has been obscured by their myth. As one consequence, the nation has never seen the need to create a colonial service. It follows that there was never a need to develop a
colonial policy. In part, all of this explains why a clear cut policy was never formulated and implemented for the Trust Territory. Reflecting American notions about the U.S. as a colonial power, the Secretary of War argued in 1946 that:

"Acquisition of (Micronesia) by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts." (Quoted from Fluker, et al., 1978:89)

Turning to the impact of American values, those programs that were launched early in the American administration were very dear to the hearts of Americans. The U.S. Navy administered the Trust Territory until 1951 when it was turned over to the Department of Interior and thus civilian control. With regard to military rule, the Navy's charter was very vague; there were no clear instructions. Nonetheless, programs were initiated in three areas which reflected values at the core of the American character.

First, Americans are committed to universal education. It is simply assumed that education is absolutely essential for happiness and success in the world. Navy officers assumed that an American model of education was suitable for the small island communities of Micronesia, and the possibility that some modifications might be more appropriate for
island life was apparently not raised. Actually, education amounted to little at the time. Navy enlisted men attempted to train Micronesians to serve as classroom teachers; the training was quite brief, and it is an understatement to say that the teachers were little equipped for their chores. Nonetheless, most communities had small one room schools built of local materials, and children spent a few (often a very few) hours some days in those structures. The important thing, however, was the fact that the notion became implanted that every Micronesian child had the right to be educated in a Western style.

Secondly, there are similar values with regard to medical care. It was inconceivable to Navy personnel that medical care would not be available in every community. Accordingly, a health aide was trained and placed in most every village and settlement. The training was modest, but for the first time, some medical care was immediately at hand for Micronesians. Along with the modest skills of the health aides, penicillin and other drugs and medicines were made available. Death rates, and most importantly, infant mortality rates were reduced. The rate of population growth rapidly increased, and universal medical care came to be accepted as the due rights of all.

Thirdly, and holding true to their cherished myth, Navy men felt that they had no alternative but to attempt to introduce American forms of democratic government. They started at the village or community level. Young naval officers informed Micronesians that they should elect
local magistrates and councils to govern their communities. The Navy administration wanted to conduct its relations with the people through such elected leaders and felt uncomfortable with the notion of hereditary chiefs. Quite commonly, the Americans thought they were successful when they were not. Chiefs and other traditional leaders appointed themselves as magistrates and councilmen, and the Americans were pleased that the Micronesians were so quick to grasp the essentials of democracy. Nonetheless, the seeds were planted, and eventually, Micronesians would prove fervent in their desire to elect legislative bodies at the local, district, and territory wide levels.

The important point is, some very important trends were begun early in the first period of American rule. There was no overall plan or conception of what should be done. Rather, initiatives rooted in American values were launched with a faith in their correctness. The entire enterprise was certainly not thought of as a colonial venture. Also important for later years, no attention was given to economic development.

In the second period of the U.S. Administration of the Trust Territory, there are several things which help us explain what occurred. There was an increased commitment to efforts in the areas of education, health care, and the fostering of democratic institutions. Also, there was a very marked increase in the number of capital improvement projects. These increases reflected another very basic American notion. There is the idea that almost any problem can be solved if enough money
is spent. In many respects, this was the notion behind John Kennedy's "New Frontier" and Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." In both cases, it was thought that social problems could be solved if only enough money were made available. Both programs spilled over into Micronesia.

An increase in funding initiated by Kennedy was continued under the Johnson administration. Around 1960, there was a ceiling of 7.5 million dollars in the Trust Territory budget, but the actual funds appropriated by the U.S. Congress never reached that amount. In 1962, funds were more than doubled and reached $16 million. By 1967, the budget had risen to $25 million, and it was doubled to $50 million by 1970. By the end of the 1970's, the Trust Territory budget was in excess of $100 million dollars.

Somewhere around the middle 1960's, the effort to develop the Trust Territory literally went out of control. In 1966, Peace Corps Volunteers were sent to Micronesia, and their numbers were greater per capita than any other place in the world. Federal welfare programs continued to increase, eventually numbering 166 separate programs. The Peace Corps and the federal programs were in addition to and not included as part of the territorial budget.

What were some of the results? In education, a massive amount of money was spent. American teachers were recruited to teach the English language and a public high school was created in each administrative district. Project Head-Start was implemented for tiny youngsters, and college scholarships became easily available for those freshly out of
high school. No thought was given as to what all the education was for, and educated youths returned home to unemployment and disappointment.

In the area of health care, again massive sums were spent on sophisticated equipment which often as not went unused and eventually deteriorated. Almost nothing was initiated in the area of preventive medicine, and overall, it is an unfortunate fact that health care has probably gone down in quality in the last decade or so.

In the political arena, district legislatures were founded in the 1950's. They began as advisory bodies, but eventually evolved into true legislatures. In 1965, the Congress of Micronesia was established. One of its earliest actions was to inaugurate negotiations regarding the future political status of the territory. Those negotiations have led us to the current political situation. Three Micronesian entities, the Marshalls, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia (Kosrae, Ponape, Truk, and Yap) will probably become states in free association with the United States. The Northern Marianas will become a U.S. Commonwealth.

Numerous capital improvement projects were funded with the flow of federal funds. Schools, airports, roads, and water catchment systems were built. However, there was little or no coordination of what was constructed, and one community in Truk District was equipped with fire hydrants with no water supply system. No thought was given to long term maintenance of the physical plant. Money was being spent, and there was a notion that progress was being made.
A third period of the American administration may also be identified. This is the era of self-rule. In the late 1970's, the four political entities noted above began to assume some measure of self-rule. As noted earlier, it appears likely that there will be three states in free association with the U.S. and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas. The Micronesians have taken to heart the lessons about democracy, and they are understandably anxious to take more control over their own affairs.

To sum up, I have attempted to provide a review of the United States' administration of the Trust Territory. I have tried to put two myths to rest. The United States has never had a clear policy regarding Micronesia. There was no "zoo policy" and there was no conscious plan to entrap Micronesia into a state of dependency. I have argued that an American myth has prevented Americans from seeing themselves as a colonial power, and that some very basic American values shaped the courses of action that have been implemented. Those values and their appropriateness for island life were never questioned.

It is ironic that while little was actually planned, the end result of American rule is that the Micronesian states are very dependent upon the United States - much as the Solomon Report envisaged. While there was no conscious design, it is certain that some observers in Washington, D.C. were aware of the direction that events were taking. No one blew the whistle, and the new political arrangements with the Micronesian states do provide the strategic requirements wanted by the Department of Defense.
REFERENCES

The decolonization process for the Pacific islands has been operative for more than two decades. Yet there remain two metropolitan powers which have yet to complete this often complex exercise — France and the United States. The urge to compare their historical signatures in French Polynesia and Micronesia is decidedly irresistible. While such an exercise would necessarily include a variety of viewpoints and a litany of events and scenarios, this essay's purpose is to focus on one feature which has dominated the destinies of these two areas in different ways — that is how time and space have influenced perceptions and reactions to the challenges of the past and the history of the future. Awareness is essentially a cultural characteristic which often distinguishes one particular society from another.

There are many ways in which men are made aware, or rather make themselves aware, of the passage of time — by the changing seasons, the alternations of the moon, or the progress of plant life; by the measured cycling of rites, or agricultural work, or household activities; by the preparation and
scheduling of projected acts and the memory and assessment of accomplished ones; by the preservation of genealogies, the recital of legends, or the framing of prophecies (Geertz 1973:389 emphasis added).

Things are placed in time as to the order of succession and in space to the order of situation. It is within the character of persons and groups to affect situations and the succession of events according to their own aspirations and sensibilities. This process determines how the past exists in the present or is predicted for the future.

It is the belief in a common history which creates the feeling that "people like us" have a future as well as a past. If the people of Oceania are to have a future in which they are something other than servile underdogs in an economic system which is run for the benefit of expatriate Europeans and white Americans then they need a history. But it must be a history in which the white skinned permanent residents of the region can also participate and likewise accept with pride.

... It follows from all this that the local archaeologists and ethnohistorians are not just exploring the past in a detached, objective, "scientific" atmosphere. They are creating something which relates to the political present and the political future (Leach 1983:102,103).

What is suggested by the foregoing and what is being asserted here is that the manipulation of time and space is as important as the manipulation of persons and events. With both the French Polynesian and Micronesian experiences in mind, this contention is especially applicable. To provide at least one example, one commentator observed:
... Ponapean accounts of their own history seem to emphasize distinctions in space over temporal chronology. Individuals, events, and changes seem to be linked together by variations in spatial organization. Events are marked by where they occur, and epochs are known by names that usually refer to particular groupings of places rather than periods (Peterson 1983).

It is proposed here that recent events, negotiations, and transactions in both French Polynesia and Micronesia were, if nothing else, exercises in the manipulation of time and space to secure particular results or to satisfy particular sentiments in fundamental political relationships. Any analysis of style and circumstances in either French Polynesia or Micronesia makes for good copy, but must by necessity distinguish the differences which characterizes these two unique areas of the Pacific.

The circumstances of official American involvement in Micronesia are generally well-known. Beginning with the American victory at Manila Bay in 1898, the Spanish began to withdraw from their centuries-old position in the insular Pacific. With the expulsion of the Germans in 1918 and likewise with the Japanese in 1945, the United States came to administer Micronesia as a "strategic trust." Significantly, since then, Micronesia, especially the Northern Marianas, has encountered an extraordinary variety of colonial administrations and all within a comparatively brief period of time. These colonial administrations left a remarkable legacy of cultural, economic and biological intervention in island societies. The uncertainty of the past thus created the certainty
of the future in that change extends the time and space of the present. If Micronesians are to assume control of their future, they must manipulate time according to their own schedule, thus commanding a position of advantage. Indeed, the manipulation of the time and space of one people by another lies at the heart of any definition of colonialism. If nothing else, the American interest in Micronesia's future has been marked by a series of plans, that unique phenomenon or administrative ritual of predicting the future by analyzing the present (Kent 1982:1-25). Perhaps the most notorious one of all, the Solomon Plan of 1963 noted:

American and Micronesian officials in the area appear still to be thinking in terms of independence for Micronesia as an eventual, distant goal and there appears to have been little attempt to direct Micronesians toward thinking about eventual affiliation with the United States. In the absence of further action, the Mission believes that the momentum of previous attitudes and policies which did not involve the concept of affiliation will be hard to overcome.

It can be stated quite unequivocally that the masses of Micronesia are not only not concerned with the political future but also are not even aware of it. They simply live in the present reality of the "American time" that has replaced the "Japanese time." The earlier German and Spanish times are dimly, if at all, remembered (McHenry 1975: Appendix 1).

Though the impact of the Solomon report upon U.S. decision-makers is not determinable, it nonetheless underscored a feeling that the nature of time and space for Micronesia was changing. In retrospect, the planning
process was probably the single most unique feature of American decolonial policy. Through such a mechanism the future, it was hoped, could be better ordered to achieve or avoid particular results. Such plans, in effect, became the proposed charters of the future.

The establishment of the Congress of Micronesia in 1967 was significant for a variety of reasons. First, it marked the hope that there could be some "unity in diversity" among the Micronesian political elites. Second, the Congress became a ready forum for the initiation of proposals for the future political status of the islands. Third, it legitimized the new political leaders vis-a-vis their respective constituencies and the Administering Authority. As one experienced commentator remarked:

The educated elite of Micronesia is, in a sense, an innovative group. They are revolutionary in character; they are demanding changes. Circumstances have thrown them into the role of opponents of the status quo and the Trust Territory bureaucracy, thus making them instruments of change. Because Micronesia has long been a static society, there is a need for innovators who can help bring about changes and make plans for the future. ... No society is likely to renew itself unless its dominant orientation is to the future. This does not mean ignoring the past completely, but the society that is capable of continuous growth and renewal not only is oriented toward the future, but looks ahead with some confidence. This is to say that an attitude of hopelessness will not bring about change. A society capable of continuous growth and renewal not only feels at home with the future, it accepts, even welcomes, the ideas that the future may bring (Heine 1974:65-66).
By 1967, the future became the subject of the present. The establishment of the Congress of Micronesia's Future Political Status Commission created a vehicle (or oracle) for Micronesian aspirations concerning change and its work product would serve as the predictions of the mythical realities of the "alternative destinations" open to Micronesia (deSmith 1970:172). In that same year, the United Nations Visiting Mission commented:

During its visit to Washington D.C., the Mission was told by an official of the Department of State that the United States Government anticipated that the inhabitants of the Territory would be called upon to decide their political future within a reasonable period of time. This did not mean, he said, "in the distant future." The precise timing of the act of self-determination would depend largely upon the wishes of the people expressed through the Congress of Micronesia. The rate of development of a sense of community among the many islands and the progress of the Congress of Micronesia would be relevant to this. The United States Government believed it would be premature to make any definite recommendations regarding the Territory's future status...

The Mission took every opportunity to test public opinion in the Territory about the possible future status to which the people aspired. The result showed that many had no clear idea about the possible alternatives open to them nor about the implications which the various options would carry for them. Most of them realized the extent of their heavy dependence upon the Administering Authority and seemed to have a genuine appreciation of the United States administration, but were glad of the special consideration and protection afforded them by their status as a Trust Territory. Perhaps the most common reaction was to ask "Why is the United Nations rushing us? We are in no
hurry." ... And many said they would like the United Nations trusteeship to continue without being prepared to suggest any definite period. They repeated the question: "Why is the United Nations rushing us? What is the hurry?" (1967:T/1668.47 emphasis added)

It thus seems clear that while Micronesian elites were anxious to precipitate change, many other Micronesians were still situated in a "motionless present, a vectorless now," in a state of permanent transition. As the Nathan report of 1967 observed:

The Trust Territory is in the process of reevaluating its major politics and programs and expanding its role in development. Political conditions in Micronesia are now beset with uncertainty as the traditional political structures yield to the impact of modern economic pressures and burgeoning education needs. The newly created District Legislatures and the Congress of Micronesia are still feeling their way, deciding what they are going to do and how...

Some of the leaders realize that the recent expansion in mass "American type" education will rapidly erode the ancient traditions and institutions, and they voice concern about the kind of economic and social system that will replace the one being rapidly destroyed. They wonder if a new system for providing social, economic and political harmony will emerge to fill the void (Nathan 1967:47).

Once the direction of their future political status was established, the process of drafting constitutions and negotiating political relationships began in earnest. The process was a period of minimal time, the prologue of denouement, for Micronesian elites who if nothing
else, realized that the charters for the reordering of Micronesia's time and space were being decided. It is important to emphasize that both sides of the negotiating table were under no definite time pressures to procure a final work product. Samuel McPhetres, the Program Developer and Researcher for the Education for Self-Government Program, Trust Territory Government explained in 1976:

We have no fixed deadlines to work against. If you take any African country, if you take any of the places under the British or French colonialism where this type of process took place, you'll find that one of the great advantages of it was that they knew already, the date which the status they were in would terminate and the new one would begin. It would be administrative fiat. The colonial power would tell you, "You will be independent by 1977. Now go to work!" And so they'd mount a program aiming at that particular thing and you'd know ahead of time when the plebiscites and the referenda, and so forth, were to take place. We don't know any single date for sure (Nufer, 1978:97).

Such sentiments as expressed permitted procrastination in the process. The efforts to draft a Micronesian constitution was undertaken with a spirit of optimism, but with the intention by many of the Micronesian delegates to manipulate time to their own advantage. The withdrawal of the Northern Marianas from the convention met with no opposition and little comment, though such a move marked a significant change in American policy. In retrospect, one participant intimately familiar with the proceedings, noted that underlying the whole constitutional effort "was the tension of nearly a decade of inconclusive
negotiations between Micronesian and United States' representatives over the unresolved future status of Micronesia." It seemed that the entire logic of drafting the political charter of the future "was probably premised as much upon necessity as upon the compatibility with the widespread Micronesian tendency to temporize when confronted with matters of the moment, relying on the passage of time as an element of itself to contribute to their mitigation if not solution" (LeMonde September 1, 1970).

By mid-1976, the Administering Authority, through then Director of Territorial Affairs Fred Zeder, announced to the Congress of Micronesia that the Trusteeship Agreement would be terminated in 1981. Whether this policy announcement was made as a corollary to the Northern Marianas separation from the Trust Territory is uncertain, but it did signify that the United States was attempting to regain control of time and space as it affected the future status negotiations. In mid-1982, Zeder, now the ambassador and personal representative of the President of the United States, signed the Compact of Free Association with Palau, the Marshalls, and the Federated States of Micronesia. In this respect, the divisions of space were clearly determined and the parameters of time delineated in precisely worded provisions.

While the Micronesian case may be termed as the "management of space through the manipulation of time," the French Polynesian example could be characterized in almost obverse terms — the "management of time through the manipulation of space." Unlike most of Micronesia, the nature of
colonial rule in French Polynesia has been singularly unitary. The imposition of the French protectorate over Tahiti and the Marquesas in 1842 marked the beginning of "direct rule." Traditional authority declined rapidly and by 1888 was administratively eliminated by the annexation of the islands by France.

French colonial rule may be distinguished from its American counterpart in Micronesia in several ways. Aside from the obvious differences in scale and time, Tahiti became a permanent settlement of expatriate transients, who for the most part, came to exercise political control of major institutions, the most important of which were the public and private school systems. Within the past two decades, another source of metropolitan intrusion into the islands appeared in 1963 with military and technological infrastructure created by the nuclear testing program. The activities and facilities of the test project enhanced the perception that France clearly intended to monopolize the time and space of the islands to suit its own national and international objectives. The acquisition of the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls from territorial control and the construction of permanent facilities on Hao and Mangareva were the advance measures of space manipulation. Additional infrastructure created at Fa'a'a and Pirae districts were indications that the testing program would be an effort of long duration. The extensive public works projects initiated with metropolitan funds and equipment had additional effects. Access to and from the outer islands improved considerably, thus extending by way of metaphor, the beach to the horizon.
French Polynesian aspirations for greater political autonomy have included the meaning of time and space management in their rhetoric, though greater emphasis has been placed on utilizing institutional means for effecting change and for pressing their case for either autonomy or independence. Curiously however, those very institutions, spelled out in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, are the time and space charters which preclude change. More precisely, unlike the Trusteeship Agreement which contemplates some movement towards change in political status, the present French Constitution provides no mechanism for independence. There are, however, examples of political flexibility which bear on this subject. When Djigouti and the Cormoro islands in eastern Africa moved from territorial status to internal autonomy and eventual independence, the interested leadership in French Polynesia (and New Caledonia) took particular delight that such a scenario could convincingly be adopted with respect to their own circumstances.

Several distinguishing factors were articulated by the metropolitan government which rejected the extension of internal autonomy to the French Pacific territories. First, the eastern African territories were predominately Muslim and assimilation had been negligible or non-existent. Second, the wishes of French colons in the Comoros have been accommodated by separating the island of Mayotte from the new independent state. French Polynesia (and perhaps New Caledonia) was unilaterally determined to be an assimilated territory whose patriotism to France had been clearly demonstrated during the course of two world
wars. Lacking the constitutional means of change, the French Polynesian autonomists have had to rely upon ideology and political opportunities to press their case. The remarks of then French Polynesia deputy Francis Sanford were especially instructive of this:

I accuse the French government of despising the Tahitians and ridiculing their representatives. For three years I have voted in support of the government...I and my friends have struggled to gain internal autonomy for the territory. We have asked for no more than... an executive elected wholly by the (territorial) assembly and for regional competence for internal affairs... Can it be reasonably assumed that our problems can be regulated in Paris?... For three years we have met with a refusal on the part of the central government to carry on a dialogue... Patience has its limits and today these limits have been reached (Meller 1983:58).

With time comes some change. Independence as a political goal became illusory as the nature of economic dependence (or perceptions thereof) expands to fill the time allotted.

... a segment of the Polynesian population then and perhaps even now, has been very timid about the idea of independence. It is this timidity that the French have played on to keep Polynesia tightly bound to them (Finney 1979:20).

To cast this matter in considerably larger terms and in greater perspective:
... relations with colonial peoples are the result of past history and not of the application of roles or performance of a contract. It is a fairly simple matter to alter a contract, but it is well-nigh impossible to forecast what effect this alteration will have on the course of events (Mannoni 1956:196).

The psychology of dependence is not only a matter of attitudes, but clearly a state of mind induced by a reluctant loss of control over one's time and space to another. French Polynesian autonomists and even the advocates of independence have resisted the idea of preparing a temporal agenda, but rather have left that matter to the French administration. At least by 1977, the metropolitan government enacted a territorial bureaucracy.

There is yet another facet to real and perceived notions of economic dependence. While territorial-metropolitan dialogue has been a rhetorical mirror-image, the French authorities have argued that political independence cannot succeed in view of island dependence on metropolitan subsidies. The local leadership has argued the obverse, but admittedly in less convincing terms. Both sides of the debate, however, fully recognized that the time matrix for economic prosperity is less subject to control than an agenda for political independence. The making of economic conditions is a primary feature of such systems as is currently operative in the territory. Thus as long as a dominant segment of the island population can be mesmerized by the lure of material goods, its advocates can manage time to its advantage by prolonging the present.
Returning to the issue of the French nuclear testing program and its relationship to greater local autonomy, a salient feature emerges as significant. While local (and even regional) opposition to the tests have been vocal, they have been only intermittently so. There appears to be a definite uncertainty as to whether an end to the tests will come when French Polynesia is independent, as was the case with Algeria, or whether Tahiti will become independent when the tests end. It is clear that as far as the French military interests are concerned the latter scenario is preferable. That would mean that a prolongation of the present is the prevailing scenario on the political agenda. As the present is extended, the number of French colonis in Tahiti will increase and their political and economic weight will create another dimension to the situation.

As with Micronesia, French Polynesians have had considerable difficulty in overcoming the influence of national defense interests, especially when such interests are inaccessible or otherwise veil themselves behind another administrative agency. These parallels aside, colonialism and the colonial presence in the Pacific creates the boundaries of the past and the present, and the space where the future can not begin.
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Le Monde, September 1, 1970.


APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE TTPI

by

Leonard Mason

Applied anthropology is a very personal endeavor for those of us who get involved in it. Within this paper I will mention the names of a number of American anthropologists to illustrate one kind of applied activity or another. Many of these who have contributed significantly to the application of anthropology in non-academic problem areas are at least as well regarded within the discipline of academic anthropology. Others, however, are not as well-known for writing in professional journals because they have directed their primary efforts toward applying their anthropological training to the better understanding of Micronesian concerns in the present context of rapid social and cultural change.

As preface to my remarks, I must cite three definitions in order to clarify the limits I wish to set for the scope of this report. The first has to do with the formal discipline of anthropology which can have different meanings for different people. It may include archeology, linguistics, and physical anthropology as well as social and cultural anthropology. The second definition will distinguish the application of anthropological training and experience toward problem-solving in contemporary Micronesia from the conduct of basic research aimed
primarily at enhancing the investigator's scholarly status and advancing the development of the discipline. In applied anthropology, furthermore, the practitioner usually is employed or works on contract with a client, who may represent the U.S. territorial administration, a Micronesian community or other indigenous authority, or an American organization in the private sector. Finally, I am defining Micronesia (i.e. TTPI) in the common usage today to include the Marshalls, Carolines, and northern Marianas, which are now better known politically as the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Belau, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and the Federated States of Micronesia (Kosrae, Ponape, Truk and Yap). By definition of the Conference "History of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," the U.S. Territory of Guam is not included.

THE PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II (1941-1945)

On the day after the Pearl Harbor attack, the faculty and graduate student staff of the Cross-Cultural Survey (CCS), Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, was diverted by order of its director, anthropologist George Murdock, to the task of collecting and organizing all available materials on the Japanese Mandated Islands. These materials included German, Japanese and American publications from the mid-19th century to the present, which could serve as a possible aid to
intelligence and occupation forces of the U.S. in the eventual rollback of Japanese defenses in that part of the Pacific. As a doctoral candidate at Yale, I worked on that project, until Murdock and two other anthropologists from CCS, Clellan Ford and John Whiting, were recruited by U.S. Naval Intelligence to produce handbooks on the Marshalls, East and West Carolines, and Marianas to be based on CCS files as well as other documents from Navy sources, in anticipation of a U.S. military government when the islands had been secured (U.S. Navy Dept. 1944a, 1944b, 1944c, 1944d). This was my introduction to a career in research and applied anthropology in the Marshall Islands specifically and Micronesia generally.

U.S. NAVY ADMINISTRATION (1946-1951)

After the occupation by U.S. forces of major islands in the Marshalls, Marianas, and western Carolines in 1944, and the surrender of Japan in 1945, the U.S. Navy assumed responsibility for administering the island populations. The School of Naval Administration (SONA) was established at Stanford University in April 1946 under contract with the Hoover Institute. Directed by anthropologist Felix Keesing, SONA's mission was the training of naval officers assigned to administrative duty in the islands, in the history, geography, and anthropology of Micronesian peoples (U.S. Navy Dept. 1948). While other countries with
colonial territories, notably the Dutch in the East Indies and the British in Africa, had already accumulated much expertise in the application of anthropology to the administration of indigenous peoples, this was a relatively new challenge for the U.S. Navy Department. Guam and American Samoa had been ruled as U.S. naval stations since the turn of the century without appreciable anthropological input, although Laura Thompson (Guam) and Felix Keesing (Samoa) had researched those areas before the war on their own initiative (Thompson 1941; Keesing 1934).

About the same time that SONA was getting underway, the Navy Department contracted with the U.S. Commercial Company (USCC), a government-sponsored trading company in the postwar Pacific, to conduct an Economic Survey of Micronesia intended as a basis for development planning. The project was directed by Douglas Oliver, an anthropologist who was then director of USCC in Honolulu, and it involved the field researches of four anthropologists, an economist, a geographer, and some fifteen specialists in natural resources for the best part of 1946. Their reports appeared as separate volumes but were summarized with recommendations in Planning Micronesia's Future, edited by Oliver (1951). The anthropologists on the team were John Useem (Palau and Yap), William Bascom (Ponape), Edward Hall (Truk), and myself (Marshalls).

In July 1947 the Japanese Mandated Islands formally became the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (administered on behalf of the United Nations) and the Navy Military Government was renamed Civil Administration but continued under Navy control until 1951.
From 1947 to 1949, forty-two anthropologists, linguists, and geographers from twenty-one universities and museums in the U.S. conducted individual and team projects in the islands as part of the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA). This program was organized by the Pacific Science Board (National Academy of Science-National Research Council) with financial assistance from the Office of Naval Research. Overall direction was provided by George Murdock, working with Harold Coolidge of the Pacific Science Board. The findings which emerged from this activity, while not properly of an applied nature, did result in some voluntary comments and recommendations by CIMA participants at the invitation of the Navy administration. Publication of research studies and dissertations was arranged individually by the researchers (Pacific Scientific Information Center 1963).

Another spin-off of Navy interest in recruiting civilian professional aid for its administration of the islands was the creation in 1947 by the Trust Territory High Commissioner (HICOM), who was also Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINPAC), of an Advisory Committee on Education on Guam and the TTPI which was composed of Hawaii-based educators. Meetings of this group were held twice a year, once in the TTPI and once in Honolulu, when the committee met with Navy education administrators to discuss current problems in the Navy's elementary school program for Micronesians. Anthropologists on that committee were Kenneth Emory from the Bishop Museum and myself.
In 1948 the High Commissioner required a study of the plight of the Bikini Marshallese, then living on Rongerik Atoll after resettlement from Bikini in 1946 to enable U.S. testing of atomic weapons. At his invitation, I spent two weeks on Rongerik and recommended immediate removal of the community to a more suitable site (Mason 1948, 1950). The islanders were temporarily moved to Kwajalein and later that same year they chose Kili Island from several possible options in the Marshalls. In 1949 I was able to visit Kili briefly and reported favorably on their resettlement at that time.

Probably the most important development for applied anthropology during the Navy period was the establishment of a cadre of anthropologically trained men at the HICOM staff level and at five district centers in the Carolines and Marshalls. The first-named post was filled by Philip Drucker, then a Lt. Cdr. USNR. District anthropologists were Thomas Gladwin (Truk) who came out of the CIMA program, John L. Fischer (who followed Gladwin in Truk, and later went to Ponape), Frank Mahoney (who succeeded Fischer in Truk), John E. Tobin (Marshalls), Harry Uyehara (Palau), Shigeru Kaneshiro (who followed Uyehara in Palau), and Francis Mahoney (Yap). Their duties were a mix of short-term field studies of specific problems and service as intermediaries between the administration and island communities (Richard 1957, (vol.3):578-579).

In 1949 as an extension of CIMA and again financed by a grant for basic research from the Office of Naval Research, Scientific
Investigations in Micronesia (SIM) was launched by the Pacific Science Board. The central focus of SIM was the Coral Atoll Project, conducted in consecutive years in five Pacific atolls. Three of these were in American Micronesia and the others were sited in the British Gilberts and in French Polynesia. Investigative teams were made up predominantly from the natural sciences in order to insure a broad approach to coral atoll ecology. Anthropologist Edwin Burrows, who had taken part in CIMA on Ifaluk Atoll in the western Carolines, returned there for SIM, and I worked with the team assigned to Arno Atoll in the Marshalls. The researches were reported in professional journals with no obligation to Navy sponsorship (Pacific Scientific Information Center 1964).

In preparation for the planned transfer of responsibility for the Trust Territory administration from the Navy to the Department of the Interior in 1951, a Management Survey team was sent to Micronesia in 1950 to collect data for use in developing Interior's first budget proposal to the U.S. Congress for the islands' administration. The team consisted of specialists in finance, public works, personnel, and human services. I spent a month with this team, having the responsibility for health, education, and economic affairs. All district centers were visited in this attempt to assess the scope of the Navy's program and to plan for the take-over by Interior (Taylor, et al 1951).
U.S. INTERIOR ADMINISTRATION (1951-1961)

The first decade of Interior Department administration, while more truly a civilian administration compared with the Navy's prior Civil Administration, saw a continuation of many of the same policies in health, education, economic, and political development of Micronesians. Interior's budget for TTPPI operations was a very modest one which permitted no significant efforts to change the general postwar life-style of islanders. Years later, critics who assessed this first period of Interior's administration from the vantage point of the 1960s and 1970s were prone to charging the TTPPI government with deliberately maintaining an "anthropological zoo."

It is true that Interior did continue the staff and district anthropologist slots initiated by the Navy following the heyday of the CIMA program, but by the end of the 1950s all of these posts were either abolished for reasons of economy during the Eisenhower administration or were not refilled when incumbents left to continue their own careers elsewhere. It is also true that during this period the influence of the anthropologists on administrative policies waned perceptibly as the administrators themselves became more familiar with Micronesian customs and attitudes and decided they no longer needed advice from the anthropologists.
The first civilian Staff Anthropologist was Homer Barnett (on leave from the University of Oregon) who served in 1951-1953. He was followed by Saul Riesenber (University of Hawaii) for one year after which Allan Smith (Washington State University) took over for two years. John deYoung, another anthropologist who earlier had done research in Thailand, followed Smith in 1956 and remained longer than any of the others, during which time the role of the post changed from that of anthropologist to program officer and close adviser to the High Commissioner. At the district level, a few new names cropped up — Richard Emerick in Ponape, Robert Solenberger briefly in Saipan, and Robert McKnight in Palau until he moved to TTPI headquarters in Saipan as Community Development Officer. DeYoung edited a series of Anthropological Working Papers from 1957 to 1961 with contributions written by anthropologists and their Micronesian assistants in the districts. In one volume on Land Tenure Patterns (1958), he noted that only one of the American authors still remained in the TTPI.

Under Barnett's direction, annual conferences were held with the district anthropologists. The main intent was to prepare, district by district, studies of the effect of acculturation on the islanders and the impact of government programs on their cultures. Duties of the district anthropologists continued to be both administrative and research-oriented, but the primary emphasis was on the former. As Field Trip Officers visiting the outlying islands, they were concerned with such matters as land claims, adjudication of minor disputes, community
court actions, and translation of directives from the government. Some years later, Barnett wrote about the problems facing anthropologists who work for administrators in a colonial context (1956). Another book, by a former district anthropologist assisted by his wife, became a useful introduction to traditional and modern customs of islanders in the Truk and Ponape districts where they had lived (Fischer 1957) and was used in briefing newly recruited TTPI employees from the U.S. mainland.

CONSULTANTS AND ACTIVISTS (1961–present)

After the demise of applied anthropology in the TTPI administration, the year 1961 marks the start of the Kennedy presidency and the acceleration of U.S. interest and financial aid in Micronesia. Field research continued at a brisk pace with new sources of funding from the National Science Foundation and other government and private organizations. Students of the older generation of anthropologists began to appear in the islands. Primary interest was retained in basic research in traditional cultures, but some investigations concentrated on changes accompanying modernization and carried implications for the resolution of problems affecting cultural stability and mental health in Micronesia. Some in this new generation of researchers, though generally lacking in formal client relationships, were aroused by perceived inequities in U.S. administration of the TTPI and they published or lobbied on behalf of their Micronesian study communities.
A five-year Study of Displaced Populations in the Pacific was launched in 1962 by Homer Barnett and his graduate students at the University of Oregon with National Science Foundation funding. Four communities in the TTPi were studied (there were others located elsewhere in the Pacific). These were Kili Island (the former Bikinians), Ujelang Atoll (resettled from Enewetak Atoll), Kapingamarangi colonists on Ponape Island, and the Lib Marshallese who had been relocated on Ebeye in Kwajalein Atoll. Publications on the first three were produced by Robert Kiste (1974, 1976) and Michael Lieber (1968).

Ward Goodenough (University of Pennsylvania) who had participated in CIMA in the 1940s later wrote a book, Cooperation in Change, which drew upon his experiences in Truk and the other islands in the Pacific for a searching analysis of the process of social and cultural change to be used in training Americans for employment overseas (1963). The U.S. Peace Corps program was introduced to Micronesia in 1966 and Goodenough, Frank Mahoney, and John Tobin were contracted by the Corps to administer the area briefings in orientation sessions for PC Volunteers which were conducted in Florida and in Hawaii. They recruited other anthropologists with Micronesian experience to assist as lecturers. In 1967 Frank Mahoney, then studying at Stanford for his doctorate, was employed as a consultant with a team from the Stanford Research Institute to prepare a study on planning for education and manpower in Micronesia requested by the TTPi administration (Platt and Sorensen 1967).
As part of a training program in field methods for community development planning, the University of Hawaii's Anthropology Department in 1967 and 1968 enrolled Micronesian employees of the TTPPI for course credit along with Hawaii graduate students in projects in Majuro (Marshall Islands) and Moen (Truk) with financial support shared by the University (Graduate Division), East-West Center (Institute for Technical Interchange), and the TTPPI administration. Micronesians and Americans were paired to work together on specific research problems suggested by the local communities. Reports of the research in each project were published by the Anthropology Department and copies were distributed widely in Majuro and Moen for local consumption (Mason 1967; Boggs 1969).

In 1973 the U.S. Air Force was challenged in court by the Marshallese of Enewetak (then living on Ujelang) in regard to a plan to conduct Pacific Cratering Experiments (PACE) on Enewetak to compare TNT blasts with nuclear weapon testing in 1947-1958 on that atoll. Robert Kiste, who had researched the Enewetak resettlement at Ujelang in 1964, was asked by the Air Force to be an intermediary in public hearings. He opposed the plan itself and later in Honolulu testified with John Tobin (who had researched the Enewetak resettlement as his doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley) and myself. PACE was cancelled in the face of public opposition (Kiste 1976).

Also in 1973, the Society for Applied Anthropology convened an "Across Generations" symposium at its annual meeting held in Tucson, Arizona. Several "classic cases" of applied anthropology in various
parts of the world were selected for review, each by a young applied scholar and an older applied anthropologist who had been directly involved. The intent was to critique the record toward a more standardized case reporting of such situations. The TTPI was one of seven cases examined. Roger Gale, then editor of the *Friends of Micronesia Newsletter* which aggressively supported the Micronesian struggle for self-determination vis-a-vis the United States, criticized the activities of applied anthropologists in the TTPI since World War II. I responded from my own knowledge and experience of that period. Both statements were later reprinted by permission in the newsletter of the Association for Anthropology in Micronesia (1973).

The personal policies of those in applied anthropology have at times led them along widely divergent paths in their relationships with Micronesians and with fellow anthropologists. Thomas Gladwin, a CIMA participant and the first TTPI district anthropologist, pioneered in studying Micronesian personality (Gladwin and Sarason 1953) and later applied his interest in cognitive processes to an excellent analysis of traditional navigation in Puluwat (1970). In the 1970s, however, he redirected his energies in Micronesia to become an active supporter and adviser for independence movements in Truk and Palau. He criticized American modernization policies in favor of safeguarding traditional values and subsistence economics, and in due time he came to deny his identification with applied anthropology as being the handmaiden of modernization.
At the other end of the spectrum, one may cite Felix Moos (University of Kansas) who in the course of his career in East Asian studies had formed close ties with officials in the U.S. Defense and State Departments. In the early 1970s, he was active in advising U.S. negotiators on future status issues with Micronesians. He also directed a program of graduate research at the University of Kansas assisted by a grant from the Defense Department to study the effects of rapid acculturation in U.S. Pacific territories, including Palau and the Marshalls where American strategic interests had been defined. His philosophy of "big power" relationships with the insular Pacific is well expressed in a book authored by a group of Kansas academicians and financed by private foundations in the U.S. and Japan, in which the benefits of closer links in economic and foreign policy matters between Japan and the U.S. and Micronesia and Papua New Guinea are explored (Goodman and Moos 1981).

Other anthropologists in the 1970s and early 1980s were addressing various social problems in Micronesia either as part of their own research or on contract with some administrative agency. Daniel Hughes (Ohio State University) and Sherwood Lingenfelter (State University of New York at Brockport) edited a volume of essays on political development which included studies of local politics and reviews at the territorial level (1974). Francis Mahoney, onetime district anthropologist in Yap and district administrator in Palau, later undertook two assignments requested by the TTPI administration, one on alcohol abuse among
Micronesian youth (1974) and one on the U.S. program for the aging in Micronesia (1975), the latter as a staffer with the South Pacific Commission.

Michael Levin, after completing his doctoral research on Eauripik Atoll in the western Carolines (1976) continued his interest in population dynamics in Pacific communities and joined the U.S. Bureau of the Census, supervising census counts in Micronesia in 1980. Mark Borthwick earned his doctorate by studying the aging process on Lukunor Atoll in the Truk District (1977) and later presented a paper on that topic at a conference on U.S. Federal Programs in Micronesia convened on Ponape by the Micronesian Seminar. Other conferences sponsored by the Micronesian Seminar, which is directed by Father Francis X. Hezel S. J. of the Catholic Mission on Truk, have been held on social, economic, and political issues with invited participation by knowledgeable anthropologists in the Micronesian field. Currently, Donald Rubenstein (University of Hawaii) is involved in a longterm study of suicide among Micronesian youth and is working closely with Geoffrey White (East-West Center) and Father Hezel.

In the late 1970s, William Alexander (Upsala College) conducted research on Ebeye Island in the Marshalls, focusing on wage labor and culture change associated with the neighboring Pacific Missile Range facility on Kwajalein Island (1978). He submitted a report at the request of the Marshall Islands government, but then became unpopular with both the TTPI and the U.S. Army authority on Kwajalein by testifying
adversely during a U.S. Congressional hearing about disadvantaged Marshallese in the local labor situation. He has since spoken on behalf of the "Focus on Micronesia" Coalition of the Pacific Conference of Churches at hearings of the U.N. Trusteeship Council in New York regarding conditions in the U.S. trust area.

Mac Marshall, who did his doctoral research on Namoluk Atoll, Truk District, returned in 1976 to investigate cultural changes experienced by outer islanders who had migrated to the district center on Moen. His principal publication from this research was on alcohol abuse among youth (1979).

In 1980-1981, I contracted with an organization representing the U.S. Administration on Aging to write three monographs on the status of the elderly in Micronesian jurisdictions, which I later summarized in a journal article (1982).

At the annual meeting of the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania (ASAO) in 1978 at Asilomar, California, I organized a symposium on The Role of Anthropology in Contemporary Micronesia, aimed at developing a dialogue between Micronesians and anthropologists (applied and otherwise). This lasted for two and a half days and involved between thirty and forty anthropologists in discussion of four principal topics — cultural conservation, social problems, relations with Micronesians and their government representatives, and relations with American organizations and government agencies. Arrangements were made for four articulate Micronesians to present their views on the subjects debated.
A principal conclusion of the symposium was that anthropologists, whether conducting applied or basic research, must become more involved in the search for solutions to current problems in the TTPI in collaboration with Micronesian communities and their political leadership (ASAO 1978).

Earlier, from 1971 to 1973, a group of concerned anthropologists in the U.S. had organized the Association for Anthropology in Micronesia with the primary aim of exchanging information and opinion about (1) the study of traditional Micronesian languages and cultures, (2) the investigation of social and cultural changes taking place at the moment, and (3) the application of such researches to the amelioration of contemporary problems in the region. Toward those ends, a newsletter was published (six issues were produced over two years) which encouraged the participation of Micronesian reporting and editorializing about current happenings in anthropology in the islands. The newsletter (and the Association) ceased operations in 1974 for lack of time and interest on the part of American anthropologists to maintain such a dialogue. The ASAO symposium at Asilomar in 1978 was an attempt to revive such an exchange.

More recently, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) established a committee, consisting of Ward Goodenough (chair), Mark Borthwick, and myself, in response to a membership resolution adopted at the annual meeting of AAA in December 1982 to "review ... the probable effects of termination [of U.S. trusteeship] and implementation of the Compact [of Free Association] on the people and cultural systems of
Micronesia" (AAA 1983). The report, submitted by the committee to the AAA in September 1983, dealt at length with the changes which had taken place in the Trust islands, the strategic relations between Micronesian political entities and the U.S. government, and Micronesian concerns about their own identity and self-respect. While recognizing U.S. self-interest in the region as part of its defense planning in Asia and the Pacific, the report did place primary emphasis on this country's responsibility under the trusteeship agreement to promote the well-being of Micronesians and urged that this should be a continuing obligation during implementation of the Compact.

In March 1984, at the annual meeting of the Association for Social Anthropology (ASAO) on Molokai, Hawaii, a group of seventeen anthropologists with research experience in the TTPI met on an ad hoc basis to discuss the report. Opinions reportedly varied widely — from a position that anthropologists should not become involved in a matter so obviously political to charges that the report did not adequately convey the observations and perceptions of those experienced in Micronesia in regard to the U.S. government's failure to meet its responsibility under the trust. Although no formal action by ASAO was sought by the group, a letter signed by all present was sent to the AAA president recommending that the report be tabled. No further action on the entire matter has been reported to date.
At the same ASAO meeting, an all-day working session was co-chaired by Daniel Hughes (Ohio State University) and Stanley Laughlin (OSU Law School) on Emerging Legal Systems in Pacific Societies. The morning was taken up entirely with papers on Micronesia presented by anthropologists, other social scientists, and legal practitioners. The theme which developed was the blending of indigenous and introduced elements, which was proposed as the sub-title of a symposium on the same topic at the next ASAO meeting in 1985 and intended for publication in the ASAO monograph series (ASAO 1984).

REFLECTIONS ON THE-changing ROLE OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS

Some general comments about the working conditions faced by applied anthropologists may be in order at this point. Their relationships with more academically inclined members of the discipline present one kind of problem. Frankly, applied anthropology has never been well regarded in the profession and it usually adds little to the status of the individual within the discipline. Most anthropologists do not want to get involved, although nowadays some are seeking employment outside as jobs become increasingly difficult to locate in the academic setting. The more critical challenge, however, is the applied anthropologist's relationship with the client whether this be a government agency or other vested interest. The preparation of report material can be extremely
demanding. Academic language has to be avoided and brevity is required. There is constant pressure to complete research in a short space of time. An investigation that would ordinarily occupy an academic anthropologist for a year may have to be completed in a month or less. Sensitive material may have to be presented orally in closed sessions with the client, and this raises certain ethical questions if one wants to maintain credibility among his or her more academic colleagues.

The whole question of neutrality or impartiality is a constant problem. Micronesians suspect the investigator who works for the TTPI administration, and American officials question research findings when they obviously favor a Micronesian point of view. Some applied anthropologists have lost their effectiveness as intermediaries when they were perceived to be biased toward one side or the other. This problem is compounded today by the fact that there is no "Micronesian" clientele (if there ever was one!). Now one deals with Palauans or Marshallese or Ponapeans. But even this categorization is no longer realistic, for there are sharp differences which prevail within each ethnic group or political entity. Here is where the applied anthropologist begins to question the possibility of maintaining any objectivity when he or she gets caught up in the maelstrom of local politics.

Another change in the past decade presents a new challenge. Since TTPI administrative functions have been transferred to the several self-governing Micronesian entities, localization policies have reduced the numbers of Americans in office. When Americans dominated the island
administration, the anthropologist could at least deal with them in the framework of American social and political norms. Now it is necessary to relate to Micronesian incumbents who may resent or reject advice about island cultures and social traditions which are their own heritage, and which no anthropologist could ever claim to represent no matter how long he or she had studied the local customs. Many younger Micronesians have prepared themselves in education overseas to be lawyers, doctors, planners, and educators and have thereby reduced the need to hire expatriates in those professions. The pressure is increasing to require anthropologists doing research in the islands to include in their programs (and their budgets) opportunities for local people to acquire the expertise needed to study their own cultures.

The question that now concerns us is this — what should be the role of anthropologists conducting research in Micronesia? And here I include both the academic and the applied practitioner. As part of my own philosophy while I continue to work in Micronesia, I will quote two paragraphs I wrote back in 1973, but first recognizing that Micronesians make the decisions today about their own destiny in terms of their own cultural values except as they compromise those ideals in order to gain what they may perceive as benefits through involvement in economic and political worlds of which Micronesia is only a very small part.

"I believe it is essential to keep in mind that each anthropologist is first a human being, with his own family culture, his own beliefs about his obligations to his country and to humanity, his own experience
with anthropological training in the graduate schools attended, his own abilities to relate to other people be they Micronesian or American in a field work situation, and his own evaluation of his responsibilities as an anthropologist. What performance he will produce in the field (or what he might be expected to produce) cannot be dictated by the fact of his profession as anthropologist or of his nationality as American. It is a complex thing which must be worked out by each individual according to the conditions under which he is working and how he responds at the time.

"Generalizations about appropriate behavior for anthropologists in Micronesia may be verbalized ..., but the final performance will emerge for better or for worse from the uniqueness of each anthropologist, from the individual person that he is. [Guidelines may be established], but I believe that the result in the field will be determined inevitably as a personal choice. We can only hope that the choice will be based on common sense and an awareness of all the circumstances, toward a performance which will reflect well on the integrity of the field worker and the dignity of the "Micronesian community" (1973:30-31).
REFERENCES


ADDENDUM

After the above article had been completed, I received a copy of a new publication which reports recent researches in health and social problems in contemporary Micronesia. Edited by Catherine Lutz (State University of New York, Binghamton), the collection includes articles by anthropologists, among others, who have conducted fieldwork in the islands. The anthropologists are William J. Alexander (Upsala College), Leslie and Mac Marshall (University of Iowa), Donald H. Rubenstein (East-West Center), Glenn Petersen (Baruch College, City University of New York), and Richard A. Marksbury (Tulane University). The publication was sponsored by Cultural Survival, a non-profit organization concerned with human rights issues among ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples throughout the world, as a timely commentary on the Micronesian situation just when status negotiations between the U. S. government and Micronesian entities are entering a final stage of review by the U. S. Congress.

BEING BETTER AMERICANS AND DOING IT FOR THEM:
THE PEACE CORPS IN MICRONESIA

by

Craig J. Severance

There is a tired but potentially historic adage about the successive colonial powers in Micronesia which states: The Spanish came for God, the Germans for gold, the Japanese for glory, and the Americans for good. Each power, of course, had multiple and conflicting motives, as did the individuals involved. To go to Micronesia "for good" in the American period includes being good and doing good, and is thus an expression of the basic American values Kiste refers to in this volume. To go to Micronesia "for good" also includes or has at least resulted in America being in Micronesia for good, meaning permanently.

My argument perpetuates this ambiguity of American motives by suggesting that a number, but by no means all, of the Peace Corps Volunteers who came to Micronesia were able to be good in the humanitarian sense and were able to do good in the educational, political, social, and economic development arenas. In the process, their activities supported the expanded programs and raised expectations, particularly in the outer islands, which have helped keep the U.S. in Micronesia for good.
Peace Corps burst on the Micronesian scene in October of 1966 with a promotional effort that set a contrast between the volunteers as the "better Americans" who were going to do good things for the Micronesians, and the civil service and Trust Territory personnel who were subtly characterized as being somewhat aloof and segregated in their subsidized government housing. There is suggestive evidence that the Peace Corps - Washington staff finally agreed to institute programs for Micronesia (originally perceived as a domestic responsibility) under political pressure from the State Department and the White House because they perceived an opportunity to make a dramatic impact in Micronesia. Such an impact would improve the organization's ability to justify its annual appropriation requests before Congress.

A full history of the political decisions to send in the Peace Corps and an assessment of the actual impact of the Peace Corps in the different districts of the Trust Territory is a practically impossible task because of the uniqueness of the personnel and the communities involved, and the lack of detailed statistical data on the number of volunteers and projects operating at any time. This preliminary overview will hopefully encourage further research into this massive and "crash" program of social change.

The paper first briefly sketches the history of the Peace Corps as an organization, and then looks at the political decision to send Peace Corps Volunteers to a "domestic area." This is followed by a more detailed sketch of the initial thrust of the Peace Corps in Micronesia.
and of significant changes from early programming to the present. A critical look at the Truk Program under its first two directors (1966-1970) will show a sample of the types of projects that volunteers attempted. The paper ends with a preliminary assessment of the overall Peace Corps impact.

THE PEACE CORPS IDEA

In its initial conception, the Peace Corps idea embodied an inherent conflict between perceived national needs and international humanitarian deeds. The Peace Corps was to be an apolitical organization that would promote international understanding and demonstrate the goodness and effectiveness of volunteers, thus countering the "Ugly American" image. Humanitarian deeds and success of the Peace Corps were expected to have a positive and thus, ultimately political, impact on the American image abroad.

The Peace Corps idea captured the imagination of the New Frontier personnel that came to Washington with the Kennedy administration. The concept was sold to John F. Kennedy by Hubert Humphrey, Sargent Shriver and other close advisors, and it was sold to Congress at least partly on the grounds that it would be an inexpensive solution to a major international image problem. It also would provide a cadre of returned volunteers with foreign language skills, knowledge, and cultural sensitivity.
The initial intent of the Peace Corps idea to use pilot programs and cautious experimentation abroad was countered by the confidence "that almost any right-spirited American could accomplish some good overseas" (Lowther and Lucas, 1978). The Wiggins memo, "The Towering Task," which was originally written for the International Cooperation Administration, convinced Shriver that the Peace Corps could only establish itself in the Washington competitive hierarchy if it committed enough manpower to meet the real need abroad. In the words of a pair of friendly critics, "the numbers game" substituted for careful programming and developed a momentum of its own as country directors competed for funds and for the better "volunteers" (Lowther and Lucas, 1978). Volunteers for whom jobs had not been adequately planned or programmed were simply assumed to be self-starting enough to create their own placements.

Shriver's personal enthusiasm and charisma appears to have been a substantial factor in initially convincing many host countries to accept volunteers. Peace Corps staff were recruited for their youth and enthusiasm and soon projected an image opposite to that of the staid career bureaucrat in Washington and abroad. This image was epitomized by Shriver's "in-up-out" principle (1964-1970), whereby staff members could hold positions for no longer than five years, lest they put more energy into keeping their jobs than doing them. Such a staff image and style couldn't help but ruffle the feathers of experienced administrators in competing Washington agencies and eventually in the Trust Territory as well.

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In 1966, Shriver was replaced by Jack Vaughn, a quieter but overseas-experienced administrator, who began slowly to institute more careful programming and evaluation. He also gave more autonomy to area directors to reduce internal competition for funds and volunteers. During this period, the concept of "community action" and "community development" had evolved from the idea of "aided self help" to an almost mystical act of faith that when challenged or stimulated, communities would take action to help themselves. Volunteers without carefully programmed or necessary jobs could thus easily shift to "doing" community development.

The national experience of the later 1960s included a reassessment of what it means to be involved in doing "good" overseas, especially among the AB generalists (liberal arts graduates) who formed the bulk of the pool of potential volunteers. The Nixon administration replaced Vaughn with Blatchford, whose partisan style led to a massive resignation of experienced Washington and country Peace Corps staff. The period of the seventies under Blatchford and Balzano witnessed a shift from playing the "numbers game" to an emphasis on host country defined needs, appropriate numbers of technically experienced older volunteers, and a careful weeding out of political idealists.
Peace Corps-Micronesia was a unique program, and in the 1960s, it may well have become the extreme case of the numbers game. The idea of sending Peace Corps Volunteers to Micronesia appears to have been considered as early as 1962, when the Trust Territory budget ceilings were increased to accommodate the accelerated educational programs. These were at least partly a result of criticism by the 1961 United Nations Visiting Mission and Kennedy's personal anger about the polio epidemic in the Marshalls. High Commissioner Goding's administration ushered in a major shift in educational and language programming from that of the Gibson years. A modest initial proposal of 60 volunteers in education and community development was opposed by at least one congressman on fiscal grounds in 1962 (Ballendorf and Seay, 1976). Postponement of this proposal may have been partly the result of Peace Corps Washington's concern with its relations with Congress, because as an independent agency it had to annually justify appropriations requests.

A modest proposal for volunteers was also incorporated in the Solomon Report, and additional legal problems about the definition of "domestic area" caused by OEO legislation were sorted out by 1965. It appears from the public sources that a variety of continuing criticism of the Trust Territory administration, particularly over health conditions, and fear of an adverse report from the forthcoming 1967 U.N. Visiting Mission led to a resurrection of the planned Peace Corps-Micronesia
program. The administration approached the Congress of Micronesia and the district legislatures and received an immediate endorsement of the Peace Corps idea in spring of 1966 (Nufer, 1978).

In May, the program was announced, and a massive and successful recruitment campaign was begun. The incoming country director brought some experienced volunteers from elsewhere, but most trainees responded to a brochure mailed to graduating college seniors' home addresses just before summer vacation. The brochure: "Peace Corps Goes to Paradise" admitted that there were serious problems in Micronesia, but also made it easy to apply with an abbreviated application form and no required test. The Pritchard Memo appears to have set the stage for Micronesia programming: "The Peace Corps intends to alter substantially in a relatively short period of time, say three to five years, the twenty year record of neglect and dismal achievement." Pritchard seems to have recognized the potential program impact of large numbers of volunteers on small islands and to have justified the proposed program size by saying that program guidelines developed from the Micronesian experience would be useful elsewhere (Ballendorf and Seay, 1976).

This preliminary sketch of a history of decision-making in a geographically dispersed bureaucracy assumes that more general phases and program goals are reinterpreted as they trickle down to the levels of action. It is clear that some staff members and some volunteers perceived themselves as a different kind of American who would do more "good" for the Micronesians, and that they consciously and publicly
projected the image to the Micronesians. The initial promotional efforts within Micronesia sought to get community acceptance of volunteers and community support for the housing and feeding of volunteers. The promotional effort gained initial community support (or at least it was interpreted that way) and succeeded in raising the level of expectations about what the volunteers could do to an impossibly high level. It also placed heavy psychological pressure on individual volunteers to accomplish something with visible impact before the end of their tour. Volunteers were not only competing with T.T. personnel for the respect of the Micronesians, they were competing with each other for extremely scarce resources, including teaching manuals, building materials, etc., to support their activities.

I have the impression, primarily from the Truk experience, that Micronesian communities were also occasionally caught up in this competition, so that volunteers with language skills or visibly successful projects were sources of community pride, and volunteers who had difficulty adjusting or simply wanted to go slow enough to develop appropriate projects with full community participation were sources of community shame and disappointment.

The sheer number of volunteers in the early period, 1967-1969, was bound to have substantial impact. More than 3,000 responded to the initial recruiting effort to send the Peace Corps to Paradise. There was a high rate of no-shows at the Florida training sites and, possibly because of Vaughn's emphasis on quality, a high rate of de-selection of
trainees by training staff. In spite of the attrition of recruits (only a very few were drafted out of training for military service), nearly 400 volunteers arrived in Micronesia in October 1966. One hundred of these were partially trained, but not skilled in public health. Some of the health volunteers were rapidly transferred to an elementary level of teaching English as a second language (TESL), partly because few health-related jobs existed and some volunteers recognized that they lacked the skills to be effective in health. The second contingent arrived in January/February 1967, and by the Summer of 1967, there were more than 600 active volunteers in the Trust Territory.

The "numbers game" peaked in 1968 with approximately 940 volunteers, a ratio of nearly one volunteer to every 100 Micronesians. A widely cited claim is that it would have taken five million volunteers to achieve the same ratio in a country like India, which after assessing volunteer impacts, imposed a ceiling of fifty volunteers for the whole country in 1974 (Gale, 1979).

The great bulk of volunteers in this early period were in education related placements, having been trained in TESL/CD (Teaching English as a Second Language/Community Development), since they were usually AB generalists by prior academic training. Of this group, nearly 30 percent terminated early, and another 10 percent transferred to other countries. A number of volunteers, however, liked Micronesia well enough to stay on for second tours, or to become Trust Territory personnel. By 1973, one-sixth of the expatriate T.T. personnel were former volunteers.
A much smaller percentage of the early volunteers had specialized skills in engineering, architecture, agriculture, fisheries and law. The Peace Corps lawyers probably had the most far-reaching impact. They became immediately involved in suggesting and drafting legislation for the Congress of Micronesia and the various district legislatures, and in preparing court briefs. In Yap, for example, the primary impact of the Peace Corps lawyers was getting the political system to function or work properly on the U.S. model by training Yap district legislators. In the process, the Yap Council was substantially weakened (Lingenfelter, 1974).

The education (TESL) volunteers arrived at a time when the Public Works departments had been stretched to their limits building classrooms and individual houses for regular U.S. contract teachers under the Accelerated Elementary School Program (AESP) that had begun in 1962-1963. The volunteer teachers filled a critical manpower need, because the T.T. administration had continuing difficulty in recruiting and retaining contract teachers. There were attempts to place volunteers in every school, and a significant departure from T.T. practice was the placement of volunteers in practically every outer island community.

Peace Corps staff fears about volunteer isolation and safety on outer islands were lessened through the purchase of Peace Corps radios to be run by generators provided through PL 89-10 funds for audiovisual equipment for schools. The value of the Peace Corps radio net to Micronesians soon became apparent and the rate of expensive Medivacs (including a few false alarms) dramatically increased. Magistrates soon
began to rely on "their" volunteer to transmit messages, order supplies, and write grant-in-aid proposals.

For many of the outer island communities, "their" volunteer was also their first resident American. The volunteers who adapted well to outer island living tended to have some language proficiency and to live local style, eating local food and treating Micronesians with open, friendly respect. I believe that a great deal of the successful personal adjustment, when it occurred, (there is no objective way to measure this) must be attributed to the resiliency and the cultural pattern of hospitality of the Micronesians towards visiting strangers. This is especially the case with those communities where volunteers continued to be accepted, housed and fed after their predecessors had been severe disappointments.

The saturation of volunteers and relatively free shifting of placements made careful programming impossible. Peace Corps staff also simply lacked the detailed knowledge of dispersed island sites. The unrealistic promotion of an image of the volunteers as "better Americans" and the volunteers' increasing demands on Trust Territory services for "their people" led to tensions between volunteers, staff, and the T.T. personnel. Volunteers had the freedom to be critical and to assert their political idealism, and on occasion, political activism. This activism triggered a sense of unease at headquarters and in Washington, and the perception grew that some volunteers were acting in ways that might be
detrimental to the trend, created by the Kennedy administration, toward permanent incorporation of Micronesia.

Increasing criticism of the T.T. administration by Micronesians, petitions to the U.N., etc., were sometimes attributed to the encouragement of activist volunteers. There are examples of volunteers who helped draft petitions to various bodies, including the United Nations, or who provided information on legal rights, etc. These volunteers were a convenient target for those in Saipan and Washington who feared increasing Micronesian political expression, although I believe that it is unrealistic and quite unfair to the Micronesians to assume that they would have remained quiescent without stimulus by volunteers. Articulate and overt Micronesian political expression was increasing before the volunteers arrived.

This fear about the independent agents of the Peace Corps reached its high point with the 1969 visit by Marine Lieutenant-General Walt, who used the White House to try to pressure the Peace Corps into terminating the lawyers program. He was reacting to a resolution by the Palau District Legislature expressing opposition to a military training base, a position that he seems to have assumed was the pet idea of a particular volunteer. The lawyers stayed, but they were warned to remain strictly non-political (Stern, 1969; Fite, 1970).

By the early 1970s, the changing programming thrust in Washington, increasing Micronesian complaints and disillusionment about ineffective volunteers, and a growing sense of boredom among the TESL volunteers
themselves, led to a greatly reduced Peace Corps presence. Responsibility for teaching English as a Second Language was passed to partly-trained Micronesians, and a programming emphasis on teacher training and curriculum development in the post-elementary schools prevailed. Limited numbers of volunteers in health, agriculture and fisheries also served (Mason, 1975). The number of volunteers ranged between 200-300 through the late 1970s, and dropped to approximately 80 in 1980-81. The programming thrust since 1980 appears to have re-emphasized rural development by placing small numbers of skilled volunteers in outer communities and the private sector (U.S. Department of State, 1981).

PEACE CORPS - TRUK 1966-1969

The more detailed and critical overview of Peace Corps programming presented below is based largely on personal experience and is admittedly impressionistic. It is meant to give a sample of programming thrust and ideology at the height of the "numbers game." Peace Corps - Truk under the first director may be the extreme case of shock tactics in community development and "doing it for them" in Micronesia. Recent informal conversations with returned volunteers from Palau and Yap suggest that there was also a similar emphasis on getting things done for the people, but I have no way of judging if the Truk case was at all typical.
The Truk director, having observed Trukese hospitality first hand, relied on it as a way of providing housing and feeding support for volunteers, thus freeing a portion of the volunteers' $80 a month living allowance to be matched by unpublicized Peace Corps - Truk program funds and invested in material for projects. Renting of volunteer housing was possible and a figure of $20 a month was suggested, but there was an implicit understanding that communities that were willing to house and feed a volunteer rent-free should benefit in terms of a monetary investment in projects with visible material impact. This director publicly projected an image of volunteers as "the better Americans", who would accomplish great things and would be unlike the aloof and overpaid T.T. personnel. TESL volunteers were therefore not allowed to live in the empty contract teacher houses adjacent to their schools in some lagoon communities. Volunteers visiting Moen were not allowed to sleep or even shower in contract housing, even if invited by sympathetic T.T. personnel. The "good" volunteers were those who spent their time with their people, rather than with other Americans. There were so many volunteers that this was sometimes difficult. For example, in 1967 Moen had 29 assigned volunteers. Etal, an atoll in the Mortlocks, had three volunteers for 300 people. In order to avoid conflict, these three quickly agreed not to start any projects without checking first with each other.
The initial community development emphasis was on water projects of various scale, including pumps, catchments, tanks, showers, and waterseal toilets. The first major project was on Toloas (Dublon) in Truk Lagoon, where an old Japanese water catchment was to be resurrected by digging it out, covering it and extending piping to the village below. The volunteer folklore surrounding the Dublon water project is extensive, but the version I'm familiar with is as follows.

The first group of volunteers for Truk and Ponape were simply taken off the plane and put on the M boat to Toloas so they could start on the water project. Although a staff member had been scouting the project, there was little advance notice of the volunteers' arrival and no formal housing and feeding arrangements had been made. The people of Toloas responded graciously by housing and feeding on the second and third days after their arrival, but did not simply pick up shovels to join the volunteers in digging. There simply weren't enough shovels in Public Works or the Truk Trading Company! Meanwhile, the Ponape PC director was so incensed at this use of his volunteers, that he had them pulled off Toloas and placed on emergency ship transportation to Ponape.

The volunteer who inherited this project did obtain a $30,000 Trust Territory Grant-in-Aid for pipe and cement on the grounds that the people of Toloas would match the contribution with labor. Problems over land use, rights-of-way for the pipes, placement of the spigots and labor commitment soon became apparent. The volunteer finally made an agonizing decision to cancel the project and return the money to Saipan. By this
time, some Truk volunteers had begun to argue for more of a felt needs approach where community support was evident, although the need to accomplish something visible was still felt by most volunteers.

The second Truk contingent of new volunteers was sent from the plane to Fefan Island to install a variety of wells and pumps, and again the Trukese generously responded with free housing and food, and stood by as the volunteers tried to find labor and material for their projects. Problems with land and water rights arose again. One volunteer finally became exasperated enough when his villagers didn't show up to install the pump where he wanted it, that he dug the well himself. He inadvertently installed "his" pump just over the boundary of the next village.

The third major project disaster in the eyes of the more critical Truk volunteers was the Udot Peace Corps training program in August 1967. The Peace Corps provided materials to families who would build the houses, feed and work with the trainees and then inherit the houses in exchange at the end of the training program. A series of miscommunications and an unrealistic deadline for completion of the houses led the Udot people to expel a volunteer involved with the project. Unprepared recruits were greeted with hostility rather than hospitality and another crash program "to do it for them" simply crashed. Score: 46 houses, 2 outboard boats, more children speaking English phrases, and a residue of community hostility and disillusionment (Molinsky, 1968).
Lest I paint too dismal a picture, there were many projects which received the backing of the community and a tremendous amount of volunteer labor and donated materials. These kinds of projects have been described by Ballendorf and Seay (who was the second director of Peace Corps Truk) as social brick and mortar projects. They were more in line with the original conception of aided self-help and they often made ingenious use of local materials. The famous Onei school was built with T.T. grant-in-aid funded labor, but locally contributed material in the form of coral blocks that were hand hewn. Architecturally, the open air buildings were a dramatic contrast to the dilapidated concrete block AESP schools (Kluge, 1968).

The Peace Corps School Partnership Program provided limited funds (up to $2,000) for matched labor and materials whenever aggressive volunteers could obtain cooperation or interest from their magistrates and communities. Smaller grants-in-aid from T.T. and district legislature sources were also obtained for dispensaries, water tanks, etc. Here, the more successful volunteers cooperated relatively closely with their island or village councils and performed the role of writing the grant proposals with, rather than for, "their" magistrate. Some magistrates learned enough from this process so that subsequent small scale grants-in-aid for municipal public works continued to be successfully obtained without the aid of a resident volunteer. This visible contribution was relatively small in comparison with the much larger scale construction activities in the administrative center,
especially the Truk hospital and courthouse. These small scale
grants-in-aid for schools, dispensaries, catchments, etc., occurred
primarily in the outer islands. They may have succeeded in giving some
of the poorer and politically less powerful outer island communities a
sense of participation in the overall construction growth of the period.
These smaller scale municipally sponsored projects were subsequently
overshadowed by T.T. sponsored school and dispensary construction in the
seventies that included payment for island labor.

Other kinds of projects more in keeping with the notion of training
the people to help themselves were also attempted. The Fefan farmers'
co-op struggled along while trying to establish a market on Moen as a
volunteer kept the books. The co-op continues to provide some fresh
produce for Moen even today. Two of at least three salt fish producing
cooperatives on the outer islands failed as soon as the sponsoring
volunteer left.

Volunteers in teaching English as a second language had a less
visible and perhaps unmeasurable impact. They gave repetitive drills
using the oral-aural method and used a variety of materials that had both
patterned practices and dialogues. There was no apparent consistency in
the language materials available to the TESL volunteers at this time.
Some outer island volunteers adapted the Tate South Pacific Commission
materials, and combined them with Crouch's adult education dialogues that
had been adapted to the sound contrasts of Lagoon Trukese. Much of the
English language learning probably took place outside of the classroom.
Paradoxically, volunteers who lacked Trukese language skills may have had a somewhat greater teaching impact because they constantly spoke in English.

I lack detailed information on volunteer activities after 1968, although my impression from participating in a training program in Truk in 1972 is that the overall quality of the recruits, with some exceptions, had significantly declined. By this time, the super saturation of Moen with resident and visiting volunteers and the accompanying inflated expectations had generated disillusionment, hostility and some verbal harassment on the part of the Trukese youth. A much lower volunteer profile was in evidence.

OVERALL IMPACTS

In sketching the early Truk experience, I do not mean to imply that the Peace Corps in other districts was either as defective or effective. Individual volunteers in Micronesia sometimes established close personal friendships with Micronesian individuals and host families. Many of these friendships have continued and have occasionally included educational sponsorship of Micronesian youth. This represents the person-to-person communication and understanding that was a major part of the original Peace Corps idea. I believe that most of the infrastructural developments that have been concentrated in the urban
centers would have occurred without the presence of the Peace Corps. On the other hand, I suspect that the remoter outer island communities would have received less of the overall development funds if they had lacked resident volunteers. There appears to be a greater reservoir of good feelings towards Americans in outer communities.

There is a very mixed assessment of Peace Corps impacts by Micronesians and returned volunteers, depending on whom you talk to and what their expectations of the Peace Corps may have been (see Nufer, 1978). Lawyers may have helped the legislatures and courts to begin functioning more smoothly. TESL teachers may have given more exposure to standard English, both inside and outside the schools. Individual volunteers may have shared their political convictions - about freedom and independence and the American military - in the local language with close Micronesian friends. They may also have encouraged Micronesians to demand and expect more from the Americans.

The most significant overall impact may well be, as Ballendorf and Seay suggest, in the area of education, since Micronesia now seems to have a higher percentage of educated inhabitants than almost any other colonial area in the world. For Americans, education is such a self-evident good that it is rarely questioned. In retrospect, I have come to agree with Fran Hezel's conclusion that "the major adverse effects of education are economic rather than socio-cultural—that is, the expensive system, with a goal of almost universal education, costs so much and leads to such further costs that it makes the hope of any partial self-reliance all the more distant." (Hezel, 1984)
Perhaps because there were so many volunteers who came to Micronesia to do good, enough stayed to help foster the rapidly expanding programs and the Micronesian belief that education equals success in the form of a government job. Since such jobs come from American fundings, it appears that the ultimate, if individually unintentional, impact on Micronesian expectations and demands has supported the ambiguous American goal of a U.S. presence in Micronesia for good!
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In the early years of Micronesia's contact with foreigners, education centered around the key role of Protestant and Catholic missions, where islanders learned literacy in vernacular languages to promote Bible reading. With few exceptions most schools were church-related until the Japanese established the first public school system in 1915 (Hezel 1984:19). During the mandate period the schools stressed Japanese language with limited opportunity for Micronesians to go beyond the five grades of public school. As Fr. Hezel has noted, the most important fact about pre-World War II era education may have been, "...that schools became an indispensable part of Micronesian life...and school began to be recognized by Micronesians as an invaluable means of achieving status and other more tangible rewards" (Hezel 1984:21).

World War II brought the United States to the islands of Micronesia, and after the bloody battles ended, the Navy set up its administration of the islands. Navy government was formalized by the creation of a UN trusteeship. With the signing of the Trusteeship Agreement in 1947 the U.S. had a statement of purpose:
...the administering authority shall:

1. foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the trust territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants toward self-government or independence...

2. promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants...

3. promote the social advancement of the inhabitants...

4. promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall take steps toward the establishment of a general system of elementary education; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and shall encourage qualified students to pursue higher education, including training on the professional level. (United Nations, 1947:3).

Navy policy set in effect a compulsory education system for Micronesians aged six to fourteen. The educational program was to "...benefit the many and to assure a progressive development of each community within the local cultural pattern" (Richard 1957:965). The Navy regulations stated that schools would foster and encourage native language, history, arts and crafts; would provide instruction in English language; and would provide professional training in such areas as medicine, nursing and teaching.

In creating such a school system the naval authorities felt that they needed outside assistance and they sought it in the formation of an Advisory Committee on Education. The Committee consisted of naval
personnel and persons from the University of Hawaii's College of Education and other university departments as well as educators from the Hawaii Territorial education system. The Committee, formed in 1947, set about making a plan to approach education in an island-oriented style, utilizing teaching in the vernacular in the first few years of schooling to provide literacy in the native tongue before attempting English. Teaching materials were to relate to local environment and lifestyle. Although "Dick and Jane" readers appeared in some schools, the Navy staff with assistance from Micronesian teachers, produced a "Micronesian Reader Series" and Supervisor of Education Publications Eve Grey wrote the two volume set, Legends of Micronesia. Micronesian language readers were also published.

Although much of the advice of the Committee regarding content and methodology was accepted, the Navy balked at the idea of change in the administrative structure. The Advisory Committee had its last conference in 1950 and from then on its participation in educational affairs in Micronesia declined. Dorothy Richard notes that "The recommendations of the more voluble members became increasingly unrealistic and at times highly critical of administration policies so that the initial enthusiasm of the Navy for professional advice faded" (1957:965).

When Interior took over the administration of the Trust Territory (T.T.) in 1951, the Navy had in place an educational system headed by a Director of Education with an educational administrator in each district. Americans served as principals of the intermediate schools
with Micronesian superintendents of schools and teachers in the elementary schools. Teacher-training had been a major matter of concern and the Navy had created the Pacific Islands Teacher Training School (PITTS) offering a two year program which prepared teachers for the elementary schools. In the summer, training sessions were held for Micronesian teachers already in the system. PITTS also offered a School of Communications which served to provide a nucleus of radio operators and a School of General Education for those who sought additional educational opportunities. The first Micronesian to attend a university abroad was Dwight Heine, who in 1948 attended the University of Hawaii for two years.

The U.S. Department of the Interior entered Micronesia at a distinct disadvantage. The Navy had been administering Micronesia with a very low budget and Interior, thereafter, had difficulties in asking Congress for more money. From 1951-1961, the Education Department of the Trust Territory functioned on a budget of approximately $300,000 (Gibson 1974:11). But if Interior continually lacked funds it did have a group of creative, dedicated employees.

The first Director of Education under the Interior administration was Dr. Robert Gibson, a man with many years experience in the California school system who had headed the educational program for interned Japanese-Americans during World War II and then had gone to work as an educational advisor in Occupied Korea. Gibson came to T.T. Headquarters in Honolulu with a philosophy of education based on community needs. He
placed primary importance on relating learning to an organismic whole rather than on presenting specialized courses divorced from each other. He quickly developed the theme of island-oriented education with teaching in the vernacular as a keystone.

Gibson's first activity was to take an extensive field trip throughout the Trust Territory. Out of this trip came a Report on Education Conditions. Observations in that document make fascinating reading today. Gibson noted in a visit to a Saipan school, for example, that American folk dances were presented. "After some persuasion," he wrote, "one of the students led the rest in singing a Chamorro song. After a few days of practice some Carolinian students presented some of their native dances. This point is important, for there is considerable evidence that the Saipanese are being too rapidly acculturated at the expense of their own culture...It seems necessary that we assist them to identify the things that are good in their own culture and help them to be not so anxious to accept our traditions and learning without regard to their fitness or usefulness" (Gibson 1951:2).

In his overall observations and recommendations, Gibson commended the Navy for creating almost-universal elementary education teacher-training, and organizing the schools. He went on to call for an integration of subject matter and to bring into the schools the experience and surroundings of the islanders, for teacher education and for the preparation of teaching materials to be done locally and mimeographed. Gibson also stated the policy of municipal support for elementary
education through taxes (which had been part of the Advisory Committee's recommendations).

The staff in the field was well-equipped to work with Gibson. Educators like Vitarelli, Ramos, King, Halvorsen and Bender showed innovation and eagerness in trying to create a Micronesian-oriented school system. Gradually, Micronesian educators, such as Dwight Heine from the Marshall Islands and the late David Ramarui from Palau, were added to the staff.

Educational programs were unfortunately continually hampered by lack of funds. In these days of million dollar budgets it is hard to recall just how tight the purse-strings were in the 1950s.

The educational administration in the 1950s continued to follow the basic pattern devised by the Navy. Each district educational administrator was responsible to the Director of Education and had a small staff of American teacher-trainers. The Education Department continued to stress indigenous participation in the schools by means of village meetings and school boards, and to work for further teacher education, usually through summer school sessions. Development of curriculum materials proceeded in each district based upon the problems, needs, values, and interests of each culture (U.S. Department of State 1958:111). The elementary schools, staffed entirely with Micronesian teachers, drew financial support from local and district funds. The High Commissioner established a grant-in-aid program for the construction of school buildings. Goals of the elementary education policy included
developing skills in communicating and calculating; training in vocational skills such as agriculture, carpentry, and weaving; improving homemaking skills; stimulating self-expression in indigenous arts and crafts; promoting better health education; imparting knowledge of the physical environment through geography and practical science, and of the human environment by teaching economic and social organization, law and government; learning about other areas of the world; developing an understanding of individual and group duties and of civil responsibilities within the immediate society and to the world at large (U.S. Department of State 1958:117).

The elementary school curriculum centered on a "core curriculum" through all the grades. The core curriculum worked with a social studies setting in which students progressed from a study of the family to local community, the districts, the Trust Territory, the larger Pacific area, and lastly to the rest of the world. For the first four years all instruction was held in the vernacular, with some English introduced in the fifth and sixth years.

Intermediate schools covered the seventh, eighth and ninth grades and followed a policy of providing vocational education for the majority and general education for a select minority of students who would go on to secondary school. The intermediate schools stressed teaching English as a second language, with more English reading materials used. Students
learned local government, general arithmetic and health education with science integrated throughout the curriculum. In all areas except Saipan the intermediate schools were boarding schools.

Those select few who went on to secondary school usually attended Pacific Islands Central School (PICS). PICS had its origins in the Navy institution of PITTS. In 1948 PITTS had moved from Guam to Truk to provide an environment closer to that which students knew in their home islands. At that point two classes—Junior and Senior—were created. Training programs for teachers moved into the district spheres and PITTS became PICS to offer a general educational program.

In 1957, PICS began a third year program and in 1959 moved to a new campus on Ponape. The move brought many changes to the PICS curriculum. The High Commissioner installed a fairly traditional American curriculum, against the wishes of the Director of Education. The new PICS opened with a staff which included two Micronesian teachers who had been educated abroad. Until the early 1960s PICS was the only government secondary school in Micronesia. It consciously served as a meeting ground for students from all the districts and played a role in the Administration's policy of furthering Micronesian unity. The few who attended PICS often moved on to become part of a new educated elite; many of today's Micronesian leaders are graduates of either PICS or the Catholic high school, Xavier.

From the earliest days of the American Administration in Micronesia a few students were sent to institutions outside the Trust Territory. For many years the Medical School in Fiji prepared Micronesian medical
officers. Some Micronesians attended tertiary institutions in the Philippines and the connection with the University of Hawaii that began with Dwight Heine continued.

Trust Territory policy had students return home after two years of education abroad lest long exposure to American culture make re-entry to island society difficult. At first the T.T. sent one student per year from each district on scholarship; this became two and then three, only to move back down to two with budget cuts. Many of the early students took a few courses geared towards their needs in jobs back home rather than focusing on a standard degree program.

One of the interesting early experiments encouraged by Dr. Gibson was the training of a community development officer for the island of Kili in the Marshall Islands. A Marshallese, James Milne, worked with Dr. Leonard Mason in a special program of reading, discussion, and independent study as well as some coursework, all tailored to fit the requirements of the situation on Kili (Gibson 1959:222). For most Micronesians, however, attending a University meant coursework, and as the years passed, the two year limit was lifted to allow for regular degree study.

At first, Micronesians who came to the University of Hawaii attended the University High School to improve their English and gain additional course work background. When the UH became concerned about the time needed to prepare Micronesian students for University coursework, it was suggested that Lahainaluna School on Maui be used as an appropriate
intermediate situation for Micronesian students. Gibson and Halvorsen investigated the site and were pleased with the agricultural emphasis and the helpful attitude of the faculty. To Gibson, any Micronesian student could find some study of agriculture useful, regardless of his specialization. It then became the pattern for a student to spend a year or two at Lahainaluna followed by movement into courses at UH Manoa.

It should be mentioned that during the 1950s, large numbers of Palauan students attended George Washington High School on Guam. These students went on their own through arrangements with sponsors who gave them room and board and pocket money in return for light housekeeping or babysitting chores. The T.T. Education Department kept an eye on the situation and had the Educational Administrator from Palau do a study of Palauans on Guam. The findings showed that most students adjusted well and that few difficulties arose in the sponsor relationship. But the increased turnout for Guam disturbed T.T. educators who felt that schooling in the home environment was more relevant to Micronesian needs. Attention again focused on Guam late in the 1950s when the T.T. began to look towards the College of Guam as a close-to-home site for providing Micronesians with advanced studies.

There was never a complete agreement on the proper course of policy for education in Micronesia and the changes in the PICS set-up in 1959 heralded an entire shift in educational emphasis in the 1960s. The coming of the Kennedy administration and a new High Commissioner brought an expansion of the education budget. The Accelerated Elementary School
Construction Program (AESCP) began with an approximate budget of $3,000,000. A large part of the funds went to the construction of state-side type schools equipped with American contract teachers. The aim was to bring English to the entire educational system. In words echoing the Solomon Report, Dr. Gibson writes that a high official in the Administration informed him that the Education Department, "must play a larger role in preparing Micronesians for 'finally becoming American citizens'" (Gibson 1974:11).

This brave new world of big budgets and huge programs eclipsed the island-oriented community education Gibson represented, and in 1964 he retired from his Trust Territory position. Proponents of the new emphasis could point to much support from Micronesians who had for years been clamoring for increased English in the classrooms. To Micronesians, English and further education meant the chance for government jobs and a secure future for their children; there was even some feeling that Americans were withholding English instruction to keep Micronesians from advancing. The promise of the schools extended as the 1960s saw the creation of high schools in each district and the T.T. moved towards universal education through secondary school. Money for scholarships to attend college grew by leaps and bounds. In 1950/51 eighteen Micronesians went abroad for schooling; by 1960/61 the figure was 132; in 1970/71 it grew to 664 and in 1978/79 (the last T.T.-wide figure available) there were over 2500 students away at college (U.S. Department of State 1950/51, 1960/61, 1970/71, 1978/79 statistical tables).
Within Micronesia efforts to create institutions of higher learning produced the Micronesian Teacher Education Center (MTEC) on Ponape which evolved into the Community College of Micronesia with a two-year program which then became part of the present College of Micronesia system. In the 1970s, the Palau vocational program pinpointed its efforts with the building of the Micronesian Occupational Center (MOC). The long-established School of Nursing continued in quarters on Saipan but medical students eventually went off to U.S. medical schools rather than to the Fiji program. Federal programs entered Micronesia with dollars for such programs as school lunches and work with the aged. Education had become a huge and growing concern.

Drastic changes in the education program in the Trust Territory had been spelled out in the policy and the planning efforts of the 1960s. In 1967, High Commissioner Norwood said, "...it shall be the responsibility of the Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to set educational standards and to support an educational system which will enable Territory students to develop educationally to a level comparable to U.S. standards" (Pearse 1970:43).

In the 1950s educators had looked to create a specifically Micronesian education which would be different from and not comparable to American schools. A range of planning studies emphasized the new outlook. In a study of feasibility for T.T. use of the Samoan-type educational TV set-up the authors stated that "...the success of...educational development will depend upon the speed with which they
(Micronesians) are able to use the English language. In other words, the learning of English is the most basic and significant item of educational development" (National Association of Educational Broadcasters 1967:11). In statements like this there was no room for the former stress on indigenous language use.

The 1960s were a prime time for planning documents. Nathan Associates had been commissioned by the T.T. to do an economic development study in 1965 and by December 1966 the report was done. It called for seeking capital, management, and labor from outside the T.T. whenever local supplies limited expansion. In the area of education the Nathan report saw a need for a more intensive effort in teaching language and basic mathematics. The major suggestion, however, was for vocational education. The authors said that vocational education had been "...almost completely ignored" and that it "...must become a major part of the total education effort of the Trust Territory" (Robert R. Nathan Associates 1967:13). The Nathan report was criticized for leaving the people out of the development picture. As then educational administrator Pete Hill stated, "...it would appear that significant participation by Micronesians in development...would be limited to hewing wood and hauling water" (Hill 1967:4).

A Stanford Research Institute group who developed an education plan for Micronesia at that same time also criticized the direction of the Nathan report, and recommended that Micronesians participate in the defining of educational training objectives. The Stanford team observed
that such objectives "...need to be closely suited to unique Micronesian needs, rather than stress U.S. equivalency as they have in the past (Platt and Sorenson 1967:1). The report cites secondary education as top priority and pointed to the expected severe manpower shortages for college trained personnel. Vocational needs were highlighted in the proposal for an Occupational Training Center (which did emerge as MOC) and interestingly, a call for a Territory-wide college prep school resembling the original PICS concept.

The Congress of Micronesia entered the arena of education planning and examination with work such as the 1968 Senate and House Committee report on education. Committee members described a shortage of AESCP-type classrooms. The Committee also underlined the policy of providing free universal education through the twelfth grade, and criticized the Education Department for its focus on the lack of job opportunities after graduation. "The Administration," the Committee said, "maintains that the standard of secondary education can best be maintained by limiting the enrollment...The end result...will be to intensify the shortage of skilled manpower which is already felt in some districts, and the lack of a trained educated labor force will make very difficult if not impossible the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Nathan Report" (Congress of Micronesia 1968:4-5). Micronesian leaders continued to exhibit faith in education as the road to progress and prosperity.
AESCOP had had four years of expenditure when the T.T. re-examined the program and decided that the efforts should be modified. The new version in 1967 had children learning to read in their local languages with English taught through the TESL method. Peace Corps Volunteers trained in TESL were used throughout the school system. At the University of Hawaii, important work on island orthographies, dictionaries and grammars went on with Micronesian collaboration. In the 1970s further funds for language work came with the bilingual program (Trifonovich 1974:106).

In 1974, the Congress of Micronesia examined an HEW report on the programs going into the Trust Territory. This time, the Congressmen involved showed concern for the graduates of the T.T. education system by calling for the study of manpower needs and for a formulation of long-range educational policies. The report suggested that scholarships be tied to manpower needs. Education, the authors wrote, should "...create self-identification as Micronesians, to enhance national unity, to emphasize traditional and cultural values, and to include political education" (Tun and Sigrah 1974:11). But the study went on to state, as had the Congress' 1968 report, the urgent need for additional classroom spaces in the elementary and secondary schools. At the end of the report Representative Joab Sigrah sounded a note of caution regarding federal programs, saying that he feared they might "...encourage further defection by Micronesians from traditional to western ways of problem-solving" (Tun and Sigrah 1974:21).
The questions and worries over the role of education had led earlier that year to a conference organized by the Catholic Micronesian Seminar. The conference was titled "Education for What?" Educators from across Micronesia gathered and discussed the purpose of their work. Fr. Hezel from Xavier High School on Truk explained the need for such analysis, saying, "Let us not pretend that we can simply speak of 'good education' without considering those for whom the education is intended, the kind of society in which they live, and the goals of the people as a whole" (Conference on Micronesian Education 1974:7). At the end of the conference a tension had emerged between the two views of education. For some participants education served to prepare students for the modern world and inevitable changes; others saw education as a means of preparing students for living in a relatively stable traditional island community. The range of differences expressed in this 1974 meeting continued to divide opinion in the 1970s and '80s.

The Congress of Micronesia again examined education in a House of Representatives report in 1978. The Committee began its report with an introduction quoting Dr. Douglas Harlan's report on the College of Micronesia. In that document Dr. Harlan says that Micronesians are discovering that obtaining an education does not guarantee a job. He says, "...if the consequences of the present system are to be avoided, Micronesia's schools must be oriented to prepare young people for satisfying activity in Micronesian society, whether wholly or partially within the money economy or wholly outside it" (Congress of Micronesia
1978:5). Dr. Harlan posed the choice for Micronesia of either severely cutting back the education system or of putting it on a new track. The Congressmen made some attempt at this in their report by recommending that scholarships go only to the best of students and that these recipients be required to study in fields coordinated with Micronesian needs. The Committee also called for increased community involvement in the schools, in words which would have been familiar to the educators of the 1950s.

With the achievement of education through secondary school for over two-thirds of Micronesia's high school aged youth, the question of what would happen to the increasingly large number of graduates has continued to perplex educators in Micronesia. Fr. Hezel studied the "education explosion" as it applied to the Truk area and commented that, "...the proportions of the high school boom in Truk are simply staggering, far more so than the population explosion in the district that has aroused such serious concern" (Hezel 1978:3). Even more impressive was the increasing numbers of students going on to college; the growth had zoomed in the early 1970s when Micronesians became eligible for U.S. Federal education grants for the economically and socially disadvantaged. As college students returned to Truk they were absorbed into a growing economy, but as greater numbers went off for further education, doubts arose over the ability of the area to provide jobs upon their return. CETA funds provided an answer in the '70s but as Hezel points out, there may not be another such economic miracle. While high school graduates
generally move back to their home areas (over 60% of Trukese graduates went back to their home islands) the question is whether or not college graduates will be able to return to village life. If not, Hezel suggests that we may see a "brain drain" situation in Truk. This study of the education explosion in Truk may well be applicable to the other areas of Micronesia on a somewhat reduced scale. Education cannot be separated from the problems of economic development and social change; as Dr. Gibson pointed out in the early 1950s, educational programs must be approached in an interdepartmental fashion. Despite attempts over the years to relate schools and manpower needs, to tie education to community aspirations, Micronesia has always lacked communication and a firm connection between administrative departments.

Examining the history of education in Micronesia lends itself to reflection on the earliest period of American involvement in the schools of the Trust Territory. Even as the education explosion brought problems and perplexities to Micronesia, the bilingual and bicultural program were "re-discovering" the principles set forth in the 1950s, and the idea of community education based on the needs and culture of the people emerged once again. Most of the writing on Micronesia dismisses the bicultural efforts of the 1950s, and presents the period instead as a time of stagnation, when the U.S. kept Micronesia in a protective "zoo".

Actually the years from 1951-1961 saw some of the most innovative and creative thinking yet applied to education in Micronesia. This is not to say that the 1950s were a sort of golden age to which we can attribute
all virtues. Problems certainly existed. Lack of funds, lack of cooperation between departments, high staff turnover, and low pay for indigenous teachers contributed to the hinderance and sometimes demise of programs. Educators deeply committed to teaching in the vernacular and to fundamental education also faced opposition from many Micronesian parents who, from the very beginning, saw in the schools an avenue of success for their children. Many Micronesians demanded increased English language teaching in the schools and a "standard" curriculum which would facilitate movement to U.S. universities. But as Micronesia ponders the problems of unemployed graduates who may not fit back into the island cultures they left for further studies, the time may be ripe for a return to the island-oriented, community supported schools of the past. The concept of self-sufficiency so often a part of the ideology of the 1950s has great political implications in the Micronesia of the 1980s.
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The islands of Micronesia were historically the first of the island groups in the Pacific to have their territories claimed by a European country. They have also been claimed by more foreign powers than any other island group in the Pacific: Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. With each of these different colonial governments came a different governing language, each of which left its mark on the indigenous languages, vocabulary, idioms, and in the case of Chamorro, grammatical constructions. Each successive colonial government also brought its own language policy to the islands.

In 1968 Gregory Trifonovitch wrote a comprehensive paper on the language policies of Micronesia, which was published in 1971. In that paper, he gave an overview of language policies in Micronesia for the period up to World War II, and a detailed account of the American period up to 1968. This paper will therefore simply highlight some of the major features of the earlier period, and then focus on the events of the past decade which relate to language practices and policies.

Basic geographical and linguistic data for the area are provided by Table 1. By any standards the islands are small, as are their
### Table 1

**Principal Languages of Micronesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number of Speakers (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshallese</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponapean</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosraean</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trukese</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yapese</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palauan</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamorro (excluding Guam)</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saipanese Carolinian</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woleaian</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulithian</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokilese</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingalapese</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngatikese</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nukuoro</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapingamarangi</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
populations. They are also remote, from each other as well as from any continent. These are probably the principal reasons why they still linger as the last remaining Trust Territory in the world today. The other eleven trust territories established under United Nations charter after World War II were terminated years ago. On the other hand, it was probably Micronesia's smallness and remoteness that saved them from being inundated by colonizers, as was the case in Hawaii, New Zealand, New Caledonia, and to a lesser extent, the other Pacific islands.

Spain established a colonial government on Guam as early as 1668, and her influence was spread, mainly, through the Roman Catholic Church, to the rest of the Marianas and to other parts of Micronesia, especially Ponape. Active colonial rule, however, did not come to most of Micronesia until 1898 when Germany "bought" Micronesia from Spain, the same year that the United States annexed Eastern Samoa, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines.

**OVERVIEW OF THE PERIOD UP TO WORLD WAR II**

Prior to the German period of rule, language policies were never articulated, only practiced. Whatever schooling the mission stations offered was in Spanish, which was also the language of government, such as it was in Micronesia. The Spanish government had no schools except on Guam.
Under the German administration (1898-1914) a mission school was established on Kosrae (formerly Kusaie), where English was taught, and a communications school on Yap, where the languages used were English and German. But there was little or no effort on the part of the colonial government to develop education for the Micronesians other than those modest efforts of the Protestant missionaries from Germany and North America.

The relatively brief period of German rule, coming at a time when Germany was beset with internal problems and preoccupied with her immediate neighbors, hindered the development of a colonial system. Aside from the production of copra, little effort was made to exploit the islands. Consequently, very little was done to develop manpower or institutions, such as schools. Under the German administration, Micronesia never quite made it as a colonial enterprise. The indigenous people and their languages were pretty much left alone.

When the Japanese took control of Micronesia, by Mandate of the League of Nations in 1920, their purpose was to colonize, exploit, and fortify. To accomplish these ends, hundreds (and later thousands) of Japanese nationals moved to the islands to carry out the overseas work of private companies as well as the government. Schools were established in all major centers for the children of Japanese expatriates. Sons of favored Micronesian families were also allowed to attend at least the first three years of instruction; long enough to become functionally fluent and literate in Japanese. A Japanese carpentry school for native
boys was established in Palau, with all instruction in the colonial language.

The Japanese government actually viewed Micronesia as an extension of the motherland, and therefore extended its domestic policies eastward into the ever-expanding horizon of the rising sun. The Japanese language would follow the flag. Anyone wishing to deal with the Japanese in Micronesia had to do it in the Emperor's tongue. A surprisingly large number of Micronesians—mostly males—did just that.

Although there are no published records of the number of Micronesians who attended Japanese schools, the percentage could not have been high. Most schools were in urban centers; most Micronesians lived "in the bush." Yet, Japanese became a widely used lingua franca throughout Micronesia, and is still used by men fifty years and older when communicating with other Micronesians from different language groups. They also communicate with an increasing number of Japanese travellers in Micronesia. A smaller number of Micronesian women, most of whom were employed as domestics by the Japanese, also learned to speak the language quite well.

Aside from one series of linguistic descriptions in the 1920s by Tanaka and Matsuoka (and a later one by Izui), the Japanese showed no recognition of Micronesian languages. For the Japanese businessman, bureaucrat, field laborer, or soldier, Micronesia was under the same flag as Honshu, and therefore, should be treated linguistically the same.
THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEESHIP

When the Americans first occupied Micronesia in 1944, they became immediately aware of the importance of language. Initial communication with Micronesians was made possible only through the services of the nisei (American-born children of immigrant Japanese parents) who were serving in the Armed Forces. A few Micronesians who had learned English while attending mission schools in Kosrae and the Marshalls became interpreters. (Some went on to choice places in the early United States Administration.)

Immediately after the surrender of Japan, the United States Navy became the first American administrative organ for Micronesia under the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement in 1947. One of the Navy's first moves was to set up an interpreter's school on Guam, to which it sent young men who had been identified one way or another as being "linguistically gifted," meaning they had shown an eagerness to "get ahead" and some ability to learn English.

Although the Navy showed no intention of using any Micronesian language as the language of the administration, they did commission a serious linguistic and anthropological survey known as CIMA (Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology). Some of the members of this team are among the best known Pacific scholars today.

Except where noted, the following discussion of the early TTPI does not include the Northern Mariana Islands, except Rota, which alone among
the islands of the new Commonwealth, came under the administration of the TTPI during the 1950s. The islands of Saipan, Tinian, and the smaller northern islands continued under military administration, complete with strict security regulations due to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency which used the islands as a training base for Nationalist Chinese being prepared to invade the mainland. The schools on Saipan followed the American curriculum provided by the Navy administration.

Since the United Nations Charter for the TTPI stipulated that English would be taught as a subject in the earliest grades of the Trust Territory schools, and was to be the medium of instruction as early as possible, the Navy began to implement the policy early on. However, the emphasis on English was not meant to exclude the fostering of indigenous languages. Indeed, Section 3.01 of the Supplement of the Navy's 1951 Interim Regulation states:

"Instruction in the English Language for all pupils is a prime necessity. The emphasis on English shall not discourage instruction in the several indigenous languages and dialects."

What this policy meant in theory was that English would be used in schools where an English-speaking teacher was available; the indigenous language would be used elsewhere. What it meant in practice was that the Micronesian languages were used as the medium of instruction in virtually all schools outside of the district centers where the only English-speaking teachers were found.
In 1951 the responsibility for the TTPI was transferred from the Department of Navy to the Department of Interior, where it is still administered today. During the first decade of civilian administration, using Micronesian languages as the medium of instruction, was widely supported in the revisions of the policy which were made possible through the efforts of the first civilian Director of Education, Dr. Robert E. Gibson. Dr. Gibson was a rare visionary whose thinking was at least twenty years ahead of his time.

With deep understanding of the problems inherent in rapid social change, and the role that education plays in that process, Dr. Gibson formed a six-man committee (three from the University of Hawaii and three from the TTPI) consisting of two linguists, two anthropologists, and two fellow educators, whose job was to make policy recommendations to the High Commissioner. Not surprisingly, their report supported Gibson's position that early childhood education should be in the child's first language, and that English would be taught as a subject of study, but only after the following conditions were met.

1. a problem in communication is recognized by the people;
2. a knowledge of English is found to be a solution to that problem;
3. pupils have learned to read and write in the mother tongue;
4. teachers who can teach English are available. English shall then be taught as a foreign language" (Gibson 1961:2-3)

Although Gibson's policies were later denounced as conservative, preservationist, and "zoo-theory" oriented, they served as the basis for a sound and stable language policy throughout the decade, during which numerous primary readers were produced for all of the major languages of Micronesia. It was an admittedly conservationist policy, reflecting Dr. Gibson's belief that the earliest years of formal schooling should enable the child to relate his educational experiences to his own family, community, and natural surroundings, and that the proper medium for doing this is the language of the child and his world. In Gibson's view the use of a foreign language (in this case, English) could only serve to increase the gap between the schools and the communities they served.

The Gibson policy had implications for language use in other parts of the government as well. Public notices, print and broadcast, were mostly in Micronesian languages. All oral communication in government offices, except that conducted with the American civil servants, was in vernacular languages. Local government councils conducted their business, oral and written, in the local languages. In virtually all corners of the society, Micronesian languages were used and recognized as the languages most appropriate for the times.
PRESSURE FOR AN ENGLISH ONLY POLICY

This policy was abruptly halted in the early 1960s when it was determined by the TTPI headquarters, on orders from Washington, that schools should follow an "English only" policy:

"During the year under review a major and far-reaching policy was the adoption of a new policy establishing English as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level in contrast to the former policy which held that all instruction should be conducted in the vernacular" (Fifteenth Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands).

The motivation for this policy change was never publicly articulated. Certainly, the great majority of Micronesian parents wanted their children to be taught English in the sincere belief that this would enable them to climb the proverbial ladder of success. Community leaders likewise believed that English-language schools would offer the best education for Micronesia. No doubt, most of the high level American bureaucrats, both in Washington and Saipan (where the headquarters of the TTPI has been located since 1962), also believed that a complete education in English, beginning as early as possible, was the best thing they could offer. If it was good for the States, it must be good for the territories.

Undoubtedly, one of the reasons for the policy change was the evolving political picture in the Pacific during the early 1960s, when
the colonies of the region began the move towards becoming independent, sovereign states. The United Nations committee of Twenty-four on Decolonization had also been established in 1960 to ensure that self-determination would come to all corners of the Pacific, including the tiny islands of the TTPI. "Self-determination" was added to the political vocabularies of many Pacific islanders during the course of the decade.

In the eyes of the new United States' administration under John F. Kennedy, there was no time to waste. The Trust Territory arrangement could not last forever. In fact, it was already under critical scrutiny in the United Nations as well as in the rest of the Pacific. Sooner or later the Micronesians would have to choose their own political status by some form of popular vote. In the eyes of top-level administrators, an American school curriculum in the English language was the best method of preparing Micronesians for eventual self-determination.

In spite of the pressures for an English-only policy, certain amendments were made by the Department of Education in order to render the policy more in keeping with the realities of the situation. In a 1961 memorandum, Dr. Gibson (1961b), seeing the beginnings of the headlong rush towards Americanization in Micronesia, attached the following qualifications to the policy:

"English shall be taught where there are teachers who are qualified to teach it, and every effort will be made by this administration to provide the teachers."
English shall be used as the medium of instruction after it has been taught using the 'oral approach' and when both pupils and teachers are ready to profit from this method."

The pressures for an English-only curriculum did not subside. Parents wanted it. Micronesian leaders wanted it. Most of the Trust Territory administrators wanted it, and so did Washington officials who were more concerned with the political aspects of the education program than with sound educational practices or the preservation of cultures. This attitude was stated with great clarity in the report of the Solomon Committee, a secret report commissioned by President Kennedy in his search for advice on how to deal with the far-flung, poorly understood islands of the TTPI.

The Solomon Report, which was concealed from the public for nearly a decade, got straight to the point. Not only should English be the sole medium of instruction, the schools should also teach "patriotic songs and rituals" of the United States. Such efforts were admittedly designed to ensure a vote favorable to the United States when the time came for a plebiscite.

As educators in Micronesia know only too well, such a policy was easier to draft than to implement. The available manpower was simply not there. The great majority of the teachers were Micronesians whose English skills were limited. Although the three trained linguists in the Department of Education worked long and hard at providing in-service training sessions, there were simply not enough fluent English speakers...
to carry out the English-only policy. As a result, the policy was followed in schools where English speakers were available, usually in the district centers. Otherwise, it was ignored.

In an effort to correct the deficiency, the Trust Territory government in 1963 (the year of Dr. Gibson's retirement), embarked on the Accelerated Teacher Program. With additional appropriated funds, the administration launched a massive, ill-conceived building program to provide genuine, first-class American housing, complete with refrigerators, freezers, and washers and dryers, for more than one hundred new American teacher families. These teachers and their families were to be posted outside the district centers, some on very remote atolls. Some teachers lasted for the full two-year contract. Many did not. The frustrations and loneliness of Pacific island life was more than most of the American educators, recruited directly from the mainland United States, could bear.

Undaunted by the failure of the Accelerated Teacher Program, the Administration in Washington next turned to the United States Peace Corps to supply its manpower needs. The idea was proposed to President Kennedy shortly before his assassination in 1963, but was ruled out on the grounds that it was perceived as a competition between two federal agencies. The idea was seized upon by President Johnson, however, as the answer to the problem of getting Micronesians to read, write, talk and think American. By the end of 1966, more than 600 Peace Corps volunteers were scattered from one end of Micronesia to the other, the great
majority of them hastily-trained teachers of English.

Under these conditions, policies again began to change. Trifonovitch (1971:1079) reports that, after lengthy consultation with Dr. George Pittman, an English language specialist from the South Pacific Commission, the Department of Education

"... reaffirmed its policies on teaching English in schools by issuing an administrative directive to all the districts stating that 'English shall become the general language for communication and instruction in the Trust Territory.'"

In another major effort to implement this policy, the Department of Education called on various experts from the burgeoning new field of Teaching English as a Second (Foreign) Language (TESL/TEFL). In addition to Dr. Pittman, "experts" were brought in from the University of Hawaii to conduct workshops, courses, and institutes in the philosophy and pedagogy of this presumably specialized field. Micronesian and contracted American teachers were sent abroad for special courses. The classrooms of Micronesia became inundated with ESL books from the South Pacific Commission, Dade County Florida (materials for Cuban immigrants), and various other parts of the United States which produced texts for TESL. The push for spoken English became stronger than ever before; the echoes of the voices of thousands of island children in villages throughout Micronesia, shouting in confused unison, "This is a pencil! That is a book!" were deafening testimony.
For the remainder of the 1960s, as Trifonovitch has documented, the emphasis continued to be on the teaching of English in the schools, a practice which effectively set the policies for language use in general. English was still the official language of the TTPI, and more and more of the snowballing army of Micronesian bureaucrats and politicians began to use it in their work and, for some, in their homes.

GROWING INTEREST IN THE VERNACULARS

Even though the Peace Corps was sent to Micronesia to promote the teaching and use of English, it was probably the Peace Corps volunteers who triggered off a major shift in attitude with respect to the indigenous languages of Micronesia. Prior to the Peace Corps, the only foreigners to learn Micronesian languages were the durable missionaries, and an occasional odd-ball educator. The sound of a "white" man speaking a "brown" language was indeed rare. When the first volunteers stepped off the plane in Micronesia babbling long rehearsed strings of Micronesian syllables (hastily and superficially acquired during a three month training stint in Hawaii or Key West Florida), the Micronesians were impressed, not so much by the fact that these young people could speak the languages, however haltingly, but that they wanted to. It was the ultimate form of flattery which no doubt caused some Micronesians to begin to see their own languages in an entirely new light.
Although policies did not change very much until the middle of the 1970s, attitudes did. The Peace Corps experience involved a sizeable number of Micronesians in basic linguistic analysis and experiences. Scores of young Micronesians became aware of the orderly grammatical complexities of their languages through trying to teach them to mono-lingual Americans. The dog-eared mimeographed Peace Corps language texts found their way into many Micronesian households where they became objects of considerable interest, amusement, and pride. Children and adults took great delight in the distortions of the staccato beats of Palauan syllables as they trailed from the drawling tongue of an American Southerner. On the other hand, Micronesians were duly impressed by the way a few of the volunteers came to sound like native speakers, a source of intense jealousy on the part of some of the veteran missionaries.

No doubt, the Peace Corps language experience marked the beginning of the changes in attitudes of Micronesians toward their own languages. Thus, when the educational programs in Micronesian languages, provided by the United States Bilingual Education Act, were made available in the later 1970s, they were all well received by the population at large, and by government leaders.

The language policies and practices of the 1970s began to reflect changes from those of the previous decade, changes which were also going on in the United States among minority groups. Ethnicity, with all of its political overtone's, began to rear its head.

In 1970, the Congress of Micronesia passed a resolution directing the
Department of Education to make use of Micronesian Languages and Cultures in the schools. This resolution set the stage for policy changes. However, the changes have not been uniform, with each new emerging political entity forming its own government and set of policies. Language policies, where they have been formulated, are often vague and inconsistent with actual practices. In all cases where policy statements have been made, they focus on the language of education, assuming the appropriate language for the media, law, and government will somehow be used.

INTRODUCTION OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Although the formal articulation of new policies was not forthcoming, practical changes were taking place. With financial support from the United States federal government, a pilot project in bilingual education was begun on tiny Rota Island in the Marianas in which the Chamorro language was the subject matter as well as the medium of instruction in the lower primary grades (K-3). By 1975 there was at least one such bilingual education program in every district of the TTPI. It was these programs that marked the beginning of the return to the old practice of using the vernacular languages of Micronesia in the government schools even prior to stated changes in policies.
At one of the last conferences of educators from the TTPI, held on Truk March 8-11, 1975, the following statement was issued:

"In the face of the rapid cultural change taking place throughout the Trust Territory, Micronesians feel that their children are losing many traditional values and skills and that they are learning and understanding less and less of their own heritage.

Realizing this, however, and recognizing that their children spend a significant number of waking hours in school, parents, Parent Teacher Associations, Parent/Community Advisory Councils, and legislators have all strongly expressed a desire for the educational system to shoulder part of the responsibility for teaching children about their cultural and linguistic heritage.

Educators, too, both from within and from outside of the Trust Territory, are in agreement that study of Micronesian languages and cultures should be included as a formal part of the school curriculum. (1975:89)"

At another Micronesian-wide meeting held in Saipan in 1978, after the breakup of the TTPI was well along its course, the statement from the Truk meeting was strongly reiterated. Bilingual education, which meant the use of vernacular languages in the primary grades, had gained acceptance at least by the various departments of education. Still, there were no changes in government policies, other than to approve of the use of Micronesian languages in the expanding, well-funded bilingual programs.
What this means in practice is that the Micronesian languages are taught and used in the lower primary grades in those schools included in the bilingual programs. The number of schools participating in the program varies from one part of Micronesia to another. The extent to which Micronesian languages are taught depends largely on the availability of text materials and the inclinations of the individual teachers. Throughout Micronesia, many teachers and educational administrators are ambivalent about teaching in the indigenous languages in the schools, while others strongly support it. The absence of firm language policies seems to encourage these divergent attitudes and practices.

LANGUAGE COMMISSIONS AND EDUCATION TASK FORCES

Although the governments of the new political entities of Micronesia have yet to issue language policy statements, they have, in some places, established a language Commission or an Education Task Force to address the question of languages.

Language Commissions were established in Palau and the Northern Marianas. The Palau Commission met three times to discuss and recommend spelling conventions, considered its work done, and disbanded. The Marianas Commission has been inactive since its creation due to vacancies in its membership and, perhaps, lack of interest.
Education Task Forces were established by the Governments of the Marshall Islands, Truk State, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Each of these has met and issued a formal statement regarding the language policy of the individual departments of education.

The Marshall Islands Task Force on Education issued a Progress report dated December 1, 1980, which makes specific mention of language in the curriculum:

"We take great pride in our Marshallese language, skills, and teachings and they should be the basis for our educational system."

The Report goes on to recommend that "instruction and training should be provided to all students in Marshallese language: oral, reading and writing" as one of the basic skills. Advanced studies, as recommended in the Report, should include the Marshallese language.

In Truk State, the Language Arts Curriculum Committee of the Department of Education met on September 16, 1980, and issued some very ambitious statements regarding the position of the Trukese language in the education system of that state. In the minutes of the meeting the following statement appears:

"Trukese Language Arts (based on the new Trukese Orthography) and English Language arts courses will be required from grades 1-12 for the issuance of a high school diploma."
The Committee further recommended that the study of Comparative Trukese Dialects be included as an elective course at the secondary school level.

The recommendations of the Truk Committee appear highly ambitious and probably unrealistic, given the fact that so few materials now exist in Trukese. Another problem is the considerable dispute over which dialect and orthography of Trukese should be the standard.

At the Third States and National Leaders Conference of the FSM, held in Ponape, February 18-21, 1980, the following resolution was passed:

"Language—Be it resolved that English shall be used as the medium of instruction in the schools of the FSM. Each state shall determine the grade level to commence instruction in English."

Implicit, though not stated, in this resolution is the notion that the indigenous Micronesian languages may also be used in the schools. However, such vagueness does not serve as a guideline for policy.

These recent statements regarding language use in education are vague, and, in some instances, too ambitious to permit systematic implementation. The statements were undoubtedly motivated by rising nationalistic feelings and the sincere desire to support, dignify, and preserve the indigenous languages of Micronesia by bringing them into the realm of education. However, they remain weak as policy statements because of their vagueness, and because they remain today as statements awaiting some form of implementation. Still, they are the only
statements of policy, and they address only the question of language in education.

THE CURRENT SITUATION: GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND THE MEDIA

Outside the area of education, language policies are being determined by day to day practices which have been, for the most part, carried over from the Trust Territory government. Some of these important areas of language use will be mentioned here.

All of the new constitutions for the emerging political entities of Micronesia, the Draft Compact of Free Association, the various "subsidiary Agreements," and all statutory laws have been and are drafted first in English, and then translated by untrained Micronesians into the languages of Micronesia by Micronesians who are, however, untrained in legal translation. In cases of disputes over meaning in any of these documents, the English versions "shall be definitive", as states in each of the documents.

The arguments presented in support of English as dominant in language policy include the following:

1. The Constitution must be reviewed by international bodies, and therefore must be written in a "world" language.
2. The Constitution and legislation are drafted with the assistance of expatriate experts who do not understand Micronesian languages.

3. Expatriate judges who preside over Micronesian courts do not understand Micronesian languages.

Throughout Micronesia efforts are being made to distinguish between traditional (custom) law and statutory law as enacted by elected legislative bodies. According to policy, disputes that have in the past been settled by traditional systems of problem resolution will continue to be so handled, with vernacular languages used as the means of communication. Disputes arising from statutory laws will be taken to either a lower court or a high court, depending on the nature of the dispute.

Lower courts may be conducted in vernacular languages, but summarized and recorded in English, in the event of an appeal to a higher court. High court sessions are conducted and recorded in English.

In principle, such an approach to a judiciary system seems plausible. However, it appears that the line dividing the types of cases between traditional and statutory is unclear. For example, disputes involving family relationships and land titles would seem to warrant traditional arbitration, following patterns established through traditional practices. Yet the largest number of cases handled by the courts, and argued (in English) by the lawyers of the Micronesian Legal Service — an agency funded by the United States, have to do with divorce and land disputes.
Clearly, disputes that are traditional in nature are now being resolved in a western court involving American lawyers and judges using the English language. Such practices are likely to continue to undermine any vestiges of Micronesian problem-resolution with regard to regulating Micronesian societies.

The statements on language policy that do exist make no mention of language of the mass media. Practices, however, are fairly uniform, except in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, where English is used in all radio and TV broadcasting, local newspapers, and government publications.

In all the other entities of Micronesia, the following general practices include:

1. Television—All television transmissions are in English. Palau, Yap, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Marianas have broadcast television. (The Palauan language TV news program was discontinued in spite of its popularity among its Koror viewers).

2. Radio—Local radio programs (mostly music and local events) are broadcast in Micronesian languages. International news programs are broadcast in English, and partially translated into Micronesian languages. Public announcements are broadcast in Micronesian languages and in English.

3. Newspapers—At the present time, there are four newspapers published and circulated in Micronesia. They are: The Marianas Variety, The Commonwealth Examiner, The National Union (for FSM), and The Marshall Islands Journal. Of these, only one, The Marshall Islands
Journal, publishes in any language other than English, aside from occasional public notices. Guam's *Pacific Daily News* is also distributed sparingly in Micronesia. It recently started a daily comic strip in Chamorro, which has proved to be extremely popular.

4. Public Notices—Public notices issued by the Micronesian governments are, for the most part, printed in the indigenous languages of Micronesia. Public signs pertaining to traffic, restricted areas, and identification of public property are almost entirely in English, except those items bearing the logo of the government of the Marshall Islands.

Clearly, English is the dominant written and spoken language of the public media, with the exception of local radio broadcasting.

CONCLUSION

Current language practices in Micronesia indicate that English is the dominant linguistic force in the very critical areas of education, government, law and the media. In the absence of firm and clear language policies, the position of English will likely become even more dominant and firmly rooted.

The heavy reliance on English as the official language will no doubt further the Americanization of Micronesia at an ever-increasing pace. When education, law, commerce, and government are conducted in an alien language then one can expect alienation of the citizenry to result. The
ultimate consequence of this process is language loss and feelings of alienation, such prevail among Hawaiians, Maoris, and dozens of American Indian groups today.

Throughout Micronesia, English has been given the dominant role during the period of the Trusteeship and at present. The results, measured in terms of the number of fluent speakers, readers, and writers of English are not good. Vernacular languages receive a great deal of lip service. Everyone is supportive of the idea of preserving, respecting, and promoting the use of Micronesian languages. However, aside from those education programs supported by federal Bilingual Education Act funds, the Micronesian languages are being ignored.

Language policy goes far beyond the language of the classrooms. It affects all aspects of the lives of the people, especially those from small populations which are experiencing strenuous and rapid social changes. The absence of policy regarding the position of vernacular languages is likely to encourage the continued growth and dominance of the colonial language in Micronesia, with all of its ramifications.
NOTES

1. This paper discusses the islands of the political group known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI,) which includes all of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Mariana Islands and excludes Guam. The term Micronesia is used in this paper interchangeably with TTPI. Even though the islands of Kiribati and Nauru are considered part of cultural and geographic Micronesia, they are not included in the discussion here.

2. The Solomon Report was first made public by a Micronesian student at the University of Hawaii who obtained it from a still confidential source.

3. The former TTPI has divided itself into four separate entities: the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas; the Republic of Palau; the Marshall Islands; and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), consisting of the former districts of Ponape, Kosrae, Yap, and Truk.
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