THE EMERGING PACIFIC ISLAND STATES

The Proceedings of
The Fourth Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference

April 6 and 7
1979

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Pacific Islands Program
University of Hawaii
FOREWORD

The annual Pacific Islands Studies Conferences are projects of the Outreach Program of the Pacific Islands Studies Center, an NDEA Title VI Language and Area Studies Center for Pacific Islands Studies at the University of Hawaii. This series of conferences was initiated to encourage greater cooperation among the faculties of the various campuses of the University of Hawaii, with the objective of expanding Pacific-related academic endeavors throughout the statewide university system. More recently this outreach activity has sought with good success participation by the business and government communities and the public and private secondary teachers and students.

With the publication of these proceedings of the Fourth Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference comes the opportunity to extend our outreach effort to our colleagues at other universities in the Pacific and Europe, to readers in libraries in other Pacific islands, and to libraries and universities on the United States mainland, Europe and Asia.

Under the guidance of a Pacific Islands Studies Center advisory committee comprised of Ms. Brenda Foster, Director of the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council (PAAC), Dr. Robert Kiste, Director of the Pacific Islands Studies master's program, Mr. Donald Shuster, doctoral student in education and myself, Ms. Jane N. Hurd, Outreach Coordinator of the Pacific Islands Studies Center organized and coordinated the Fourth Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference entitled: The Emerging Pacific Island States.

To all those individuals who made presentations, attended the conference, posed valuable questions, offered important suggestions and completed conference evaluations, I extend a personal and heartfelt mahalo.

Carl J. Daeufer, Director
Pacific Islands Studies Center
Honolulu, Hawaii
Summer 1979
THE EMERGING PACIFIC ISLAND STATES

The Proceedings of
The Fourth Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference
University of Hawaii

April 6 and 7, 1979

Sponsored by the Pacific Islands Studies Center
in cooperation with the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council
and the Pacific Islands Studies Program, University of Hawaii

Jane N. Hurd, editor

(1979:2)
Editor's Introduction

These proceedings of the 4th annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference, "The Emerging Pacific Island States," held on April 6 and 7, 1979, at the University of Hawaii, document one event in the on-going effort of the Pacific Islands Studies Program and the federally-funded Pacific Islands Studies Center which supports it, to provide faculty, students and Pacific-interested community members with an update on the implications of the rapid political, social and economic changes taking place today in the Pacific Islands region.

Nearly a score more than the 138 who registered attended portions of the two-day conference which featured 18 speakers from the academic community, government and the press.

This volume includes papers prepared by the conference speakers. The papers presented Friday evening, those of Dr. Daeufer and Mr. Kono, concern Hawaii's role in the future of the changing Pacific horizon.

The Saturday morning remarks of Drs. Finney, Severance and Hamnett offer perspectives on the concept of dependency in terms of their observations on the experience of four Pacific societies.

The participation of Mr. William Bodde of the U.S. Department of State was through the courtesy of an arrangement between his agency's Public Affairs Division and the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council (PAAC). His speech reflects U.S. policy in the Pacific much as that of Fred Rohlfing, Director of the Amerika Samoa Liaison Office in Hawaii, describes American Samoa's assessment of its role in the Pacific's future.

In the afternoon a panel of media specialists related their experiences as journalists in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Guam, Fiji, the Gilbert Islands and here in Hawaii. A summary of their roundtable, "Media's Role in Pacific Islands Politics," has been written by Dr. Thomas Brislin.
Consideration of the changing patterns of Pacific development surely must include discussion of the politics of fisheries in the region. In his paper, "South Pacific Fisheries Politics," originally written for publication in the Summer, 1979 issue of Impulse, the magazine of East-West Center participants, Dr. George Kent presents issues pertaining to jurisdictional rights in Pacific waters. Dr. Scott Allen's paper, "The Pacific and the Law of the Sea," considers the international politics of the Law of the Sea.

Finally, Dr. Donald Topping provides participants and readers alike a thoughtful analysis of the topics that were discussed--and those left untouched--during the conference.

Among those who contributed to the success of the conference were Ms. Brenda Foster and her PAAC staff, who cooperated in the organization of the conference, particularly Ms. Larke Golaski who spent many hours working on this manuscript and Ms. Jan Hiranaka who typed and proofread this manuscript. Ms. Karen Knudsen shared with me the responsibility and effort of putting together both the conference and these proceedings and deserves untold thanks. Any errors in this manuscript are ours.

Jane N. Hurd
Pacific Area Specialist
Pacific Islands Studies Center
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Friday, April 6, 1979
Opening Remarks
by
Dr. Carl J. Daeufer
Director, Pacific Islands Studies Center
Professor, College of Education
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Good evening ladies and gentlemen. Tonight we launch the fourth in a series of annual conferences initiated by the Pacific Islands Studies Center. For those of you who have been with us at each conference you will recall that the first conference occurred in 1976. One of the purposes of these annual systemwide University of Hawaii Pacific Islands conferences is to bring together faculty and students from all campuses of the university system. Additionally, we have encouraged members of the community at-large as well as students and teachers from Hawaii's public and private secondary schools to attend each conference. As in the past, let me take this moment to extend a personal welcome to each of you.

Our first conference in 1976 was designed to identify those faculty and resources throughout the University of Hawaii system and members of historical societies who share the Pacific Islands area as a scholarly and teaching interest. While a strong scholarly community has long existed on the Manoa campus, no one had previously identified and brought together statewide university faculty and individuals representing various historical societies and professional associations concerned with Pacific Islands studies. That afternoon-evening conference in 1976 was a first attempt to create a coordinated statewide appraisal of efforts in Pacific Islands scholarship.
Our second conference in April, 1977, set out to determine how to understand the issues of development in the Pacific Islands region in order to apply these to teaching and/or research design and to explore what pattern(s) of development might be best for setting priorities in developmental planning activities in island countries. That day-long conference-workshop with the theme Development in the Pacific centered on the political, economic, social and demographic implications of development planning in Pacific Island communities.

In 1978, the planners of the third annual conference responded to the previous year's participants' wishes to have a longer conference. Thus, with the theme, Captain Cook and the Pacific Islands, last year's conference scheduled an evening presentation followed by three sessions the next day. Additionally, the Pacific Islands Studies Center ventured into the publication of the conference proceedings, with each registered participant receiving a copy.

The Pacific Islands Studies Center continues to sponsor with pride this annual conference together with the invaluable assistance from both the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council and the Pacific Islands Studies Program and supports the participation of University systemwide faculty. Again, the Center plans to publish the proceedings of this conference and will send a copy to each registered participant.

Last year in my welcome and introductory remarks an offer was extended to those in attendance. An offer that for one reason or another was not taken up by anyone. An offer that should be voiced again.

This offer is motivated by our continuing interest in seeking your suggestions, direct help and important involvement in planning and sponsoring future conferences and by my concern that to obtain this broad-based involvement perhaps we need to establish a Pacific Islands Association, non-profit
in nature, made up of interested faculty, students and community leaders whose
goals and purposes are central to the fostering of understanding and knowledge
of the peoples and cultures of the Pacific Islands region. If you have an
interest in involving yourself in the establishment of such an association,
please contact us directly or write about such an interest somewhere on the
evaluation forms that will be distributed.

Our conference this year, as was the case last year, spans two days.
Following this evening's keynote address, four challenging sessions are sched­
uled tomorrow. All focus appropriately on the theme: The Emerging Pacific
Island States.

Before I introduce our speaker this evening, let me touch ever so briefly
on the current status of the Emerging Pacific Island states. The decoloni­
zation and emergence of self-governing Pacific Island nations is a relatively
recent geopolitical event, and, according to many international political
leaders, scholars and Pacific Islands observers, is also most welcomed. While
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represent a time of active Euro­
pean expansion, or empire building, in the Pacific, the last two decades have
witnessed the birth of numerous independent island states. Of the twenty is­
land countries and/or territories in the Pacific basin who in fact have the
clear option of self-government and/or independence, ten have or will have

As metropolitan authorities, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia
have been in the forefront of this process of political change. In 1962 West­
ern Samoa became the first fully independent Polynesian state. Three years
later, the Cook Islands achieved self-government in Free Association with New
Zealand. Nauru, with astute island leaders and a valuable economic resource,
aquired independence in 1968 and full control over the lucrative phosphate
industry two years later. Fiji, with a population of nearly 600,000 and unsettling ethnic and racial tensions, gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1970. In the same year, Tonga, the only remaining Polynesian kingdom, became completely independent of Great Britain. Tongan political history dates from an 1875 constitution and foreign treaties which recognized the island state's *de jure* independence. *De facto* independence, however, waited nearly a century to occur.

In 1974 and 1975 the small island of Niue and the giant Papua New Guinea each attained new political status. Niue, like the Cook Islands, opted for self-government in Free Association with New Zealand. Papua New Guinea, rich in natural resources and diverse cultures, became fully independent in 1975 after 90 years of colonial rule. Last year the Solomon Islands and land-scarce Tuvalu (formerly the Ellice Islands) became fully independent nations. Later this year the Gilbert Islands, the closest island group to the State of Hawaii, will become the independent nation of Kiribati and, from preliminary indications, may be looking north to Hawaii for economic relations and other assistance.

In Micronesia, more specifically the area referred to as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, political events are moving apace. The Northern Mariana Islands are one year into Commonwealth status with the United States and are witnessing their share of different groups seeking internal political power. Palau and the Marshall Islands will, in all probability, soon install constitutional governments in place of the Trust Territory administration. The Federated States of Micronesia, which presently includes Ponape, Truk, Kosrae and Yap, has very recently elected a new Congress and is looking toward 1981, when it and the break-away districts of Palau and the Marshalls will become self-governing states, freely associated with the United States.

With the notable exception of the French territories, political change
has been relatively rapid in the Pacific basin in the last two decades. It is difficult to believe that this process, which appears to have a tone of inevitability to it, will leave the French territories untouched.

This new political character of the islands in the Pacific basin, coupled with advances in modern air travel and telecommunications which brings us all closer together, raises an important question for Hawaii, "What are the ramifications and the potential of Hawaii's present and future relationships with the other Pacific islands?"

To speak to this question, we are fortunate to have with us this evening Mr. Hideto Kono, Director, Department of Planning & Economic Development, State of Hawaii.

Mr. Kono was born in Hilo, Hawaii. He attended Hilo High School, graduated from the University of Hawaii with a BA degree and an MA in Public Administration. He served as a research assistant with the University Legislative Reference Bureau, was Chief Clerk, Senate Ways & Means Committee during two separate legislative sessions, served as Staff Council, Joint Legislative Commission for the Reorganization of Hawaii State Government and was Acting Deputy Director, East-West Center (on loan from the Dole Company for six months). In private industry Mr. Kono served as Vice-President of Dole-Itochu Food Co., Ltd., Tokyo; Vice-President, Jintan Dole Company, Ltd., Osaka and as President, Castle & Cooke East Asia Company for ten years prior to becoming Director, State Department of Planning & Economic Development in 1974. Mr. Kono is a member of the Honolulu Symphony Society and was Director of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau for two years.

We are aware, Mr. Kono, of your outstanding achievements as a public administrator and international business manager. We view your acceptance of our invitation to speak here tonight as symbolic of the State of Hawaii
Department of Planning & Economic Development's mandated responsibility to be innovative and creative in carrying out its planning and economic development functions. We sense your interest in exploring the potential and ramifications of Hawaii's present and future relationships with other Pacific islands and are eager to hear now what you have come to relate regarding "Hawaii's Plan for Future Relations with the Other Pacific Islands."

Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Hideto Kono, Director, Department of Planning & Economic Development, State of Hawaii.
Good evening! I am grateful for the invitation to discuss Hawaii's future relations with the other Pacific Islands. As State Director of Planning for the past four and a quarter years, foretelling the future has been one of my major preoccupations. I would, if I could, prefer to foretell the future far beyond the twenty-first century, as I would then be secure in the chance that I would not be a personal witness to being proven wrong.

Nevertheless, I am required by the nature of my present position to look toward the nearer future, to outguess fate, and to help plant today for tomorrow's harvest. So, with some reservations, I dare to discuss our future relationships with the other Pacific Islands, the presentation assigned to me by your program chairwoman.

Let us first, together, try to grasp the scope of the Pacific Islands. There are, as you know, thousands of them, many vacant and many others inhabited. They represent hundreds of communities of people of different languages, customs, lifestyles, traditions, hopes and fears. A glance at the map of the Pacific shows the enormity of the region, sprinkled with islands as the heavens are sprinkled with stars.

Yet this vastness should not discourage our desire for contact, communication, and working together for the common good. You must recall the miracles of modern technology if you are at first dismayed by the awesome size and distances of the Pacific Islands region. Consider, for example, that on
the mainland there is a United States population of about 220 million persons. Within five minutes, I can reach almost any one of those 220 million people, talk with him or her, confide anything I want to confide, convey messages important or trivial, and even tell a funny joke and have that person burst out laughing 6,000 miles away. Such is the miracle of our age of swift communication. And often within 10 to 20 hours, I can, if I wish, be at that person's side. Such is our miracle of modern transportation.

So it is important to remind ourselves of such marvels and miracles which we now take so much for granted, when we wish to consider our future in the Pacific. Given the grace of God and the ingenuity of man, we can dream dreams of transportation, communication, and other advances which will, in a not too distant future, make our present world seem primitive in comparison.

Among the first and most important steps we must take in preparing for future relationships between Hawaii and the other Pacific Islands is to avoid taking things for granted. We must avoid thinking small, being manini in our outlook, or thinking in stereotypes. For example, we must not take for granted that because Hawaii has millions of income-producing tourists, that all the Pacific Islands would need and would benefit from more tourism. We must avoid--and this is a hard one for us to swallow--requiring that everyone must speak our English language, rather than the native tongue of the Tongans or the Tokelau Islanders. We must not insist that a materialistic culture predominate in lands which have long treasured religious or familial values as supreme. In short, we must learn to live with diversity, relishing differences while working in a spirit of mutual helpfulness toward varying goals. We must avoid at all costs the idea that because Hawaii has been blessed with material prosperity, that we have also cornered the market on wisdom and intelligence.

At the same time, there are practical things we can and should do here and now to foster the spirit of Pacific harmony and community.
Governor George Ariyoshi in his preface to a publication, *Hawaii and the Other Pacific Islands*, published recently by my department referred to the many links Hawaii already had developed with the other peoples in the Pacific region. Noting the newly independent States which have been established, the Governor said,

"In this historical ferment of political, social, cultural and economic change, Hawaii cannot sit passively as an unconcerned spectator. Hawaii has solemn obligations based upon its unique geographical location, its Polynesian roots and pattern of historical development, its present economic leadership among the many Island groups, and its diverse ethnic and cultural ties with other Pacific communities. Hawaii is called to offer itself as a leader, a partner, a friend, a counselor, a cooperating Sister-State to any and all in the Pacific who would desire such a relationship. This special role would be carried out, of course, within the constitutional and legal limitations imposed upon each of the 50 States of the Union. But while there exist certain limitations, there also are many latitudes and freedoms which generate enthusiasm for action."

It was Governor Ariyoshi who, in his interest in expanding our Pacific contacts, last April named Mr. Myron Thompson, the Bishop Estate trustee, as the Governor's Special Assistant for the Pacific Islands. Currently in our State Government, we have a number of activities concerned with the other Pacific Islands, including three in the Department of Planning & Economic Development: Foreign-Trade Zone No. 9, the Hawaii International Services Agency, and the Economic Development Division. There is also the multinationally supported East-West Center; the many University programs with which you are certainly familiar, and of course the private sector's many companies and agencies including the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council.

All of these activities have built upon the hard work and experience of people who have gone on before us, and to whom we owe much gratitude. Hawaii is recognized today as a center for many activities closely related to the
other Pacific Islands. But the future must be planned. It should not simply occur. Our planning should consider a number of potentials for relationships with the other Pacific Island groups which can be mutually profitable. Among these are business and commercial ties including more efficient organization; energy cooperation; tourism and tropical agriculture growth; and cultural and intellectual links.

In the business sector, innovative risk-taking efforts are sorely needed in this Pacific region. There are hundreds of products which thousands of islanders need, but the financing of production, training of workers, marketing and transporting of products, and governmental red tape, all remain formidable barriers. Hawaii could be an ideal test market for products from the other Islands. It could also be a source of supplies for those myriad Islands, provided logistics problems can be worked out. By becoming a central headquarters for what might be called a Pacific Islands cooperative, Hawaii could bring about economies of scale and volume efficiencies which individual Island communities, working alone, could not develop. This is theoretical, of course; making theory work is a very difficult task indeed, but not a hopeless one for enterprising entrepreneurs.

In the field of tourism, Hawaii offers outstanding experience in how to manage a multibillion-dollar industry competently, efficiently and profitably. But our industry and our economic success make other Pacific Island communities somewhat nervous while desirous of participation in its benefits. While some, I feel sure, are envious of the economic benefits tourism brings, they want nothing of a business which seriously threatens to destroy or extensively change the social and cultural patterns of their Island community. Hawaii should have no part in pressing upon such communities our ideas or progress, but should nevertheless be open to whatever exchanges can be mutually beneficial. Above
all, it should be our goal to assist—in ways from which we also will profit—such communities in their desire to upgrade social welfare without harm to the already existing cultural patterns.

Food production and distribution would seem to offer unlimited opportunities to many Pacific Island communities for economic adventures. Hawaii has demonstrated its skills in scientific agriculture and aquaculture, particularly in sugar, pineapple, macadamia nuts, flowers and foliage, Malaysian (now Hawaiian) prawns, and other tropical products. We need to share our expertise with others. We need to link ourselves with Pacific Island areas which can teach us things, too. New Federal legislation provides for Food for Peace funding and additional monies for land-grant and sea-grant universities. The declaration by nearly all Pacific Island States of 200-mile economic resource zones surrounding their Islands adds thousands of miles of fishing resources area for their vessels. Hawaii can serve as a good and continuing market for imported agricultural products from other Pacific Islands, and one hopes the expanded incomes generated by such sales will enable those Islands to buy other products from us in a mutually satisfying trade.

Hawaii's rather remarkable advances in energy should be helpful to other Pacific Island communities. We now have more than 6,000 solar water heaters in Hawaii, and the technology of such solar collectors appears to improve and to become simpler and more efficient with time. Wind energy obtained through technologically sophisticated machinery could bring remarkable improvement in the living conditions of poorer Pacific Island communities. Modern technology has performed production miracles for agriculture all over the world, and we should be alert to the potentials for helping Pacific Islanders through innovative energy producers such as windmills, biomass, photovoltaic cells, and other small-is-beautiful-and-useful technology.
Communications for the vast Pacific Islands region need considerable improvement. This need, incidentally, is an example of economic opportunities for jobs and profits. The satellite era has offered new hope for eventual telecommunication links among the hundreds of scattered island communities. Rapid advances in communication technology using the remarkable improvement in microelectronics give promise of a new era for Pacific communications. The introduction of such technology will, of course, bring mixed results because of the pressures that modern technology-oriented cultures—such as today's Hawaii—impose on the slower tempos of geographically distant Islands. Communications is the forerunner of other developments; knowledge, greater understanding, increased exchange of information and opinion all increase the human desire for change, betterment, and progress. It is probably in the field of increased communication that Hawaii can best serve other Pacific Islands. We already have, of course, the PEACESAT project—Pan Pacific Education and Communication Experiments by Satellite—which uses a NASA satellite and is now in its 11th year of linking Hawaii and other users, notably the University of the South Pacific. It is a forerunner of many other potentials for exchanging facts, knowledge and aspirations. But, such discussion brings us once again to the front lines of philosophical differences about where Pacific Island cultures are to go. Shall the Solomon Islands receive Shakespeare financed by Mobil or Shell Oil, and view the inner turmoil of a New York ghetto subculture, or Hollywood's sex life? Again I refer to my earlier remarks about our own culture intruding as an allegedly superior one on those allegedly more primitive.

It is with such potentials and problems in mind that we must recall Hawaii's heritage as a Polynesian island group, and our roots-relationship with other island cultures. Our previously mentioned Departmental report on Hawaii and the
Other Pacific Islands contains the following interesting reference to cultural exchange:

"At the 1976 South Pacific Festival of Arts in Rotorua, New Zealand, the Hawaii delegation was the smallest of all of the Island groups represented. Nevertheless, the Hawaii group performed a wide variety of chants and dances on stage, exhibited arts and crafts including feather-cloak making, and introduced Hawaiian sports and games to the thousands of New Zealanders and tourists present at the week-long gathering. There were several 'firsts' involved in this Hawaiian presence in Rotorua:

"It was the first time Hawaii was invited to send a delegation. At an earlier Festival of Arts, held in Fiji, Hawaii wasn't really considered to be a part of the Pacific Community, and hence was not invited.

"It was the first time most in the standing-room-only audiences had an opportunity to see and hear traditional Hawaiian chants and dances performed. Most in the audience expected contemporary hula dancing of the Hollywood stereotype variety, and it turned out to be an enlightening experience for all concerned.

"It was the first time many in the Hawaiian group were able to communicate with native speakers using other Polynesian dialects, and to be understood in turn. The New Zealand Maori hosts in Rotorua were excited to find that they could communicate (in Maori) with their far-flung relations across the Pacific. For many Maoris, it reawakened their interest in their cultural heritage and encouraged them to seek additional forms of exchange for the future."

You will also recall the tremendous excitement of the 1976 voyage of Hokule'a to French Polynesia. We in Hawaii cannot fully understand the impact of that canoe's voyage on the canoe conscious societies south of us. We must expand such cultural links for they strengthen the warm human contacts and the mutual understanding and appreciation that form the basis of all social progress and improvement.

In our relationships with the other Pacific island communities, we must not forget how rural they are. This means Hawaii has a special potential for working with them if we remember the pace, lifestyle, and size of our own Neighbor Island communities. For example, Papua New Guinea occupies one half of the second largest island in the world, yet its capital, Port Moresby, has
only 75,000 people—just about the same as the total population of the Island of Hawaii. We would do well to involve our Neighbor Islands more in relationships with other island groups for inter-cultural exchange and for information on patterns of community settlement, water, energy, other utility development and so forth.

To sum up: the future I envision for Hawaii's relationships with the other Pacific Islands is one of a steady increase in links and understanding; a slow but steady growth in business and commercial ties; perhaps a faster growth in communication; an increased sharing of small-scale technology; and a warmer, deeper cultural appreciation of each other, leading eventually to a Pacific Islands regional approach to dealing with the rest of the world. Such relationships will increase Hawaii's importance and stature as a Pacific Islands leader recognized by all, provided we deepen our understanding of our Sister-Islands to the south and west, and hold them in utmost respect.

Mahalo.
Saturday, April 7, 1979
French Polynesia is a colony. In a world that has seen so many former possessions of colonial powers achieve independence, French Polynesia remains an Overseas Territory of France. Yet, in the early post World War II years, there were prospects for political evolution. There was a nascent nationalist movement, a literate citizenry—at least in comparison with many other colonial territories—and a moderately stable economy based on farming and fishing and the export of cash crops. What happened? Why has political evolution in French Polynesia lagged behind most other South Pacific nations, as well as most other French overseas possessions?

This is not meant to be a suspense tale. As you well know, France has been most reluctant to consider independence for French Polynesia. While the South Pacific dependencies of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have progressed to independence, or close to it; while the French colonies in Asia and Africa have gained their freedom; French Polynesia remains an integral part of the metropole in French eyes. France has found this southeast corner of Polynesia to be real estate too valuable to give up, and France has also found that she can easily push the Polynesians around, or at least gain a resigned acquiescence from them for continued French control.

In 1958 French President Charles De Gaulle gave the French Polynesians a choice between voting "yes" to remain in the French community, or "no" for immediate severance from France. The late Pouvanaa A Oopa, the charismatic
Tahitian leader and head of the majority political party, campaigned for a "no" vote. He lost by a 64% to 36% margin. Shortly thereafter he was dismissed from office by De Gaulle. Then he was arrested, tried and convicted of the unlawful possession of arms and of having been an accessory in an alleged attempt to burn down the town of Papeete. Pouvanaa was sentenced to enough years in French jails, and then exile in France, to see him safely dead. Charges that the French denied Pouvanaa transport and radio time to reach outer island electorate and used other pressures to assure a "yes" vote, and charges that the case against Pouvanaa was trumped up, may well be true. But the apparent fact remains that a segment of the Polynesian population then, and perhaps an even larger segment now, has been very timid about the idea of independence. It is this timidity that the French have played upon to keep Polynesia tightly bound to France.

It is tempting, however, to imagine that French Polynesia might have gone the way of the majority of French African territories that voted "yes" in 1958. The African territories have evolved towards independence, while retaining close political, economic and cultural ties with France. The ironic fact, however, is that evolution, and the more violent process of achieving independence in Algeria, meant that French Polynesia had to remain French--to provide De Gaulle with a site for testing his atomic bombs once it had become politically impossible to continue testing in the Sahara.

The decision to transfer testing to the Pacific may well have been taken back in the late 1950's, although it was not announced to the Polynesians until 1963. The announcement was in the form of an offer that could not be refused, a Faustian bargain by fiat. The bomb, after all, was a matter of national defense, and hence beyond the concern of the Polynesians and the limited powers of their local assembly. The bomb was really a blessing,
argued De Gaulle. It would bring prosperity: the metropole would build magnificent new port facilities and undertake other infrastructure improvements; the metropole would assume a larger share of the government budget and would institute many new educational and social programs; and most of all, there would be thousands of well paying jobs for the people.¹

While it might be an oversimplification to argue that opposition to the bomb—and to continued French rule—was bought off, the promise of massive French expenditures and increased economic opportunities was not lost on the Polynesians. I recall one day in 1962 when I was attending a meeting held in a rural Tahitian district. French administrators were explaining to the Tahitians a proposal to have that district, and other districts, transformed into municipalities with locally elected mayors and other officials, and local budgets. Horrified by the thought that this change might mean new taxes, one old Tahitian got up to declare that such a change might be for the good, but only so long as "Mama France" kept footing the bill.

Even then, in 1962, the Tahitians were enjoying a new prosperity in large part paid for by metropolitan taxpayers. Since then the French have, in a manner of speaking, kept their side of the atomic bargain. The tremendous inflow of funds with the bomb has transformed the territory. Agriculture and fishing no longer form the economic base. Most French Polynesians live off wage labor—and now most jobs are on Tahiti, the central island of the five archipelagoes that make up the territory. Out of a total population for French Polynesia of almost 150,000, almost 100,000 live on that island. Tahiti has become virtually one urban-suburban unit, focused on the port town of Papeete,

¹See Bengt and Marie-Thèrèse Danielsson, Moruroa, Mon Amour, Penquin Books, Ringwood, Australia, 1977, for a detailed account of the French testing program and accompanying political maneuvers.
the adjacent airport and nearby military facilities.\textsuperscript{2} Despite attempts to promote tourism and other industries, the testing program is the largest single employer for the Tahitians, the backbone of the economy—at least according to Paul Cousseran, France's High Commissioneer in French Polynesia. Listen to what he has to say:

"One can be intellectually for the CEP [Atomic Testing Program, ed.], or one can be intellectually against it. But the fact is that this country lives off it. Three thousand, two hundred families do so quite directly, not counting Polynesian military personnel. Above all, thousands of families live off it indirectly.\textsuperscript{3}

But salaries paid to Tahitian personnel employed in the testing program is only part of the picture. Especially now that the main construction phase of the testing program is over, France must keep a high level of funds flowing into the territory in order to keep the urban proletariat and the wage economy afloat. Official government transfers, excluding salaries for military personnel and civilians employed in the testing program, probably now exceeds $1,000 per capita per annum.

Two hundred years ago Diderot used Tahiti to argue that man could live free from the constraints then binding French society. However ironic it might seem, this island, so beloved by European philosophers and romantics, has now been transformed into a "military-urban" complex. But that fate is not so unusual for Pacific islands. Hawaii has pioneered this type of development, followed by Guam, the Marshalls and now, it would seem, the Northern Marianas. This is a new type of dependency, different from the commercial arrangements of more typically colonial and neo-colonial relationships. The


\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Pacific Islands Monthly}, April, 1979, p. 7.
islands are not significant producers of export crops for metropolitan profit, nor are they great markets for metropolitan industrial goods. Their contribution to the mother country is to provide real estate for military bases and testing facilities for exotic weaponry, with the rent paid by French taxpayers and their American colleagues.

Have the French Polynesians kept their part of the atomic bargain forced upon them? Have they remained loyal to France? In a manner of speaking, yes. At least 99.9 plus per cent of them have not openly revolted. There are two main political persuasions among the French Polynesians: a Gaullist one and a Nationalist one. The Gaullists are in the minority, although at times with the aid of French voters, including thousands of soldiers and other metropolitan testing personnel encouraged to vote in local elections, they have secured control of the local assembly. Needless to say, this group has basically supported the bomb and continued French rule on the basis that it is best for the Polynesians. While it might be easy to say that these pro-French politicians are but representatives of the local bourgeoisie desirous of maintaining their privileged position, many would appear truly to believe that it would be economic suicide for the territory to sever its ties with France. 4

They are, of course, encouraged in their sentiments by French logic. Let me continue the quote from France's High Commissioner, Paul Cousseran: 5

"I have said before and I repeat: Independence is not the problem faced by this country. On the contrary its problem is its dependence. Polynesia's problem is that it does not produce what it consumes, it does not produce the money necessary to pay for what it consumes, so someone must always be found to pay in its stead."

4This paragraph simplifies a much more complex situation. See, William Tagupa, Politics in French Polynesia, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1976.

5Pacific Islands Monthly, April 1979, p. 7.
The Nationalists, who command the majority of French Polynesian voters, and who have been in power most often during the last decades, have not followed a particularly radical strategy since the defeat and imprisonment of their leader Pouvanaa. Occasionally, their leaders threaten to ask for independence. Mostly, however, they have occupied themselves with protesting the bomb and asking for internal autonomy, or self-government, within the French community.

The Cook Islands next door provide the Nationalists with a model for a type of self-government that greatly loosens the political ties with the mother country but which does not cut off the flow of metropolitan funds. The Cook Islanders elect their own legislature, and their own premier, and pretty much run their own country under New Zealand auspices. Yet they are New Zealand citizens, can travel freely to New Zealand and work there, and continue to receive sizable grants from their obliging metropole. Tahitian Nationalists generally prefer this model to the one with which the French threaten them should they seek independence, the model offered by the French treatment of their former colony of Guinea. When Guinea voted "no" in 1958, the French government pulled out and cut Guinea off without a sou—at least that is what the French love to tell the Polynesians, adding that, should they wish to become independent, they will go the way of Guinea.

The Nationalists' protests against the bomb would appear to have been in vain. Protests and boycotts by New Zealand and Australia have, in contrast, been effective in helping to force the French to explode their bombs under the atolls south of Tahiti rather than in the atmosphere above them. Nor have the Nationalists' pleas for self-government been effective. The French have given way here and there, but never enough to make a crucial difference. A very sick Pouvanaa was returned early to Tahiti from exile—to die at home. And, in
response to the most radical protest staged by the Nationalists—an occupation of the house of assembly in 1976—the French promulgated a new statute which appeared to give the Polynesians a measure of autonomy. The Governor was replaced by a High Commissioner, and a local cabinet with a kind of local prime minister was instituted. However, it has not taken long to see that, despite these changes, the French are still firmly in control.

Will French Polynesia always be an Overseas Territory, a dependency of a European country half a globe away? Will the French Polynesians continue to be split between those who wish to stick tightly to France and those who ask for self-government but do not wish to totally renounce France and her aid? Jean-Claude Guilliband, the foreign affairs editor for Le Monde, has gone on record as unsure of a continuance of the pattern that has prevailed over the last decades. In his 1976 book, The Confettis of Empire, devoted to the tiny fragments of the French Empire scattered around the world, Guilliband ends his chapter of French Polynesia with the sentence: "Tahiti reserves some surprises."6

Actually, four years earlier in 1972, there occurred a seemingly surprising departure from the pattern of Tahitian acquiescence. Six young Tahitians, including one part-American who had served with the U.S. Marines in Vietnam, stole a supply of munitions from the French army to start a rebellion. Though caught in two weeks, they immediately escaped from jail, were recaptured and then promptly instigated Tahiti's first prison riot. Although this affair has its comic opera aspects, the idea of stealing arms from the French to foment a rebellion is definitely something new in recent French Polynesian history.

In 1977 came further surprises. A self-styled commando group calling themselves "The Blood of The Ancestors" dynamited Tahiti's waterfront post office. Then, apparently choosing their victim at random, they shot a French Metropolitan in his bed. The alleged organizer of this commando group, "the serpent in the Polynesian paradise" according to the French prosecutor, was a relative of the late leader Pouvanaa, a 42-year-old Tahitian with the improbable name of Charles Ching. Ching and the other four who actually did the dynamiting and shooting were tried and found guilty this past February.

But they did not pass up the opportunity their public trial offered to publicize their cause. Aided by Tahitian politicians called to the witness stand, Ching, especially, succeeded so well in airing Tahitian grievances against the bomb and continued colonial rule, that the Le Monde reporter offered the following comment which I will use to close this brief talk:

"This trial which was supposed to be about terrorism has become a trial of colonialism. Do these words, in 1979, mean something to the French of France who for the most part have ignored 'the crumbs of their empire'?"

Last year at this conference I recommended that we study the contemporary Pacific in terms of the various interests of the major powers and the dependencies these interests create. My purpose was to call for a rethinking of our conventional wisdom about development assistance (Severance, 1978). I was trying then, as I am today, to play devil's advocate and suggest that certain assistance programs may have the long term effects of creating dependency and underdevelopment. These assistance programs may also control the emerging political elite.

Today, I will describe briefly the apparent effects of United States food assistance programs on a small outer island community called Piis-Losap in Truk District, Micronesia. The community is on a low coral island, one thousand feet across and three thousand feet long, set on an enclosing reef along with some other islets for the resident population of about 230 people to exploit. This is not paradise as we westerners have stereotyped Pacific atolls, but it is home; home to both the residents and to their relatives who form a dispersed squatter community on Moen, the District Center of Truk. It is a home that could probably feed the whole community if enough labor and skill were applied.

This month normally marks the opening of the breadfruit season, and taro must now be conserved. In every cookhouse, however, large pots of white rice
or a sugared flour soup are prepared and eaten with small amounts of canned mackerel or meat. Fresh bread and ship biscuits are either eaten with USDA peanut butter or dipped in sweetened coffee. The central taro patch lies dormant, and some breadfruit remains unpicked since over half the younger men are visiting or are working in Moen, or they are subsisting on basic educational opportunity grants in Hawaii or on the mainland. Those who remain on the island and subsist on a combination of local, purchased and free government food are primarily the very young and the very old.

It is tempting to think of this island as a self-reliant community which could survive if shipping were cut off. Micronesian atolls face occasional resource fluctuation due to typhoons which may simply damage the breadfruit crop or may be devastating. With the exception of true isolates (Alkire, 1978) whose populations seem to level out below carrying capacity, most atoll communities have survived such "disaster" in the past by maximizing their social and economic ties to neighboring islands so that food can be moved to people and people can be moved to food.

The high population density of the island I describe (2000+ sq. mi.) is due to its closeness to the high island complex of Truk and the fact that Truk's resources may legitimately be considered part of Piis-Losap's ecosystem. After the 1907 typhoon canoe loads of fermented breadfruit were sent out from Truk. After recent typhoons, including Pamela in 1976, shiploads of USDA food have eventually arrived. The canoe response time in getting local food to the atoll seems often to have been quicker than the response time for ship-transported government food, and now they have outboard motorboats for even faster shipment of larger quantities of local foods, although the total volume of food is still greater when the ship comes in.

People living here have always been pragmatic and have readily adopted
new customs and new technologies. Their response to the federal feeding programs has been to view them realistically as a new resource to be exploited. We, and they, may therefore ask whether such programs will continue to be available to feed a now rapidly expanding population, or whether they are temporary inputs on which the people are already too dependent.

There are three major programs which have reached the atoll: the school lunch program, various increments of typhoon relief food, and the needy families feeding program. Unlike the elderly nutrition program which made an abortive attempt to utilize local foods in Truk lagoon (Borthwick, 1978), these programs provide the standard USDA surplus commodities. The school lunch program, begun in the nineteen sixties, has additional support for school cooks' salaries from DHEW Title III funds. It usually provides a noon meal for elementary students on days when school is in session. Occasionally, a small amount of the leftovers on students' plates reaches family members, a traditional and adaptive pattern. I believe that this program may well have the side effect of reducing the need for local food production among those family units that continue to have a good balance of younger male and female labor as well as among those family units which now face labor shortages.

Typhoon relief food is distributed to the various islands on the basis of population size and varying damage estimates. The food is presumed to allow the population to remain at home and to rebuild more quickly. Studies of other islands indicate that such aid can speed the rebuilding process if the aid is immediately forthcoming and if it is adjusted to a realistic assessment of needs that includes adequate communication from the local community (Marshall, 1976; Brady, 1978). Naturally, each island in a damaged area is in political competition with other islands for its share of the overall relief pie. Indeed, the size of the relief obtained (usually counted in numbers
of bags of rice and flour) seems to have become a measure of the political effectiveness of individual leaders or brokers at the island and district levels.

One impact of the typhoon relief and needy families food on the island community I have described, and perhaps on other communities as well, has been a reduction in the degree of solidarity and sharing of both labor and resources between members of the traditional, descent-based, land-holding groups (Severance, 1976; Borthwick, 1977). Typhoon relief food was originally divided equally among such groups in a manner similar to feast contributions. Since 1970, however, the food has been divided equally among household heads who no longer need to submit to the authority of elders in their land-holding group. These elders traditionally managed the group resources for all by regulating consumption.

It is worth asking whether subsistence production of local foods has actually declined with the fairly regular increments of typhoon relief food. One observer has argued that "disaster welfare frequently acts, itself, as an agent of disaster by nurturing long term risks through short term remedies" (Torry, 1978). In ecological jargon this is gaining stability at the expense of resiliency.

The new needy families feeding program is much more easily questioned because of its size and political implications (Latham, 1973). This program began last October in Truk only (although Ponape has petitioned for it) and is supposed to end in September. All families qualify on the basis of mainland guidelines for case income and, to my knowledge, no attempt was made by those in the district government who requested the program to estimate the value of subsistence production as a part of family income. Each family (averaging seven persons) is receiving two and one-half tons of food for the
year. It is widely recognized in development circles that food aid can operate as a disincentive to self-reliant development (Isenman & Singer, 1977). A justification for such programs is that they may temporarily free capital used for import consumption so that it may be applied to local investment in development. Justifications for the needy families program in Truk seem to include the freeing of family cash supplies and the provisioning of the outer island communities so that net inmigration to Moen would be reduced.

Report of a survey done by Xavier High School students on Moen indicates that some of the freed cash is spent on meat supplements and some on luxury items. Contrary to statements by those who support the program, the report indicates that subsistence production in fishing has drastically declined (Kiste, n.d.).

The nutritional impact of these programs is difficult to assess although rates of reporting of infant malnutrition in Truk Lagoon are increasing. Ironically, Ambassador Rosenblatt's recent statement that it was basically a United States decision not to commence any new federal programs may have taken some pressure off those politicians in Truk who do not favor the needy families program (Rosenblatt, n.d.). Continuation of the program was an issue in the recent election in Truk. A resolution by the Congress of Micronesia (and the Congress of the Federated States) effectively states that federal programs should support the goals of self sufficiency proposed in the UNDP Indicative Development Plan, while an ensuing resolution by the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia states that these programs should even be frozen.

Yet, it is significant that the government of the most densely populated district has been able to obtain the needy families program, an obviously
popular program that has gained its proponents some political clout. If termination of the trusteeship will mean that block grants will be divided by the Congress of the Federated States so that each district government can then purchase the particular federal programs it "needs" then such a dependency generating program may be a dangerous precedent.

We observers and the Trukese may question whether the United States grant monies might have a greater return in the long run if they are spent on something other than surplus food. The decisions to implement the needy families program were made at various levels in a multicultural bureaucratic hierarchy. Although it is easy to stereotype bureaucratic hierarchies, anthropological studies of them suggest that they are quite variable. The flow of information and resources as well as the decision-making process may vary from level to level, as well as between bureaucracies (Arensberg, 1978; Whyte, 1978; Wallace, 1976).

In order to gain more complete understanding of the impact of United States policy (Ilon, 1978) on local communities, we need to examine carefully the linkages between the municipal and district governments and the Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia. Linkages between these levels and regional and Washington offices must also be considered along with a cultural understanding of the way individual actors perceive each other and each others' needs. This can be done by a methodology that Laura Nader has called "studying up" by means of a "vertical slice". Obviously, a better understanding of policy impact and policy implementation can only come from detailed study of the flow of both information and resources up and down.

If members of this small atoll community truly have come to depend on and trust in continuing access to USDA food in the same way that they have always had access to the surplus subsistence resources of Truk, their local
needs must be adequately communicable to the top. However, these needs must also not conflict with any perceived needs of competing federal agencies. In addition, requirements of various agencies should be mutually adjusted so that the needs of local communities at the bottom are given fair consideration.

At a time when self-reliant development and eco-development are becoming the new buzzwords, I suggest that programs which improve local agricultural and fisheries productivity may provide greater long term adaptability for atoll communities than temporary and massive inputs of surplus food. The choice of assistance programs should be left to the Trukese. The politics of such choice become more difficult when free food distribution provides power and votes to local politicians.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore a topic which has been given considerable attention in the academic literature, in the popular press and in conversation: DEPENDENCE.

The word has been in common English usage for years, but its application to political and economic relations as an analytical tool was first made by South American economists in the 1960s. Basically, those who write about "dependence" or "dependency" assert that the political and economic dependence of the less developed countries of the world on the more developed countries of the world is a result of colonialism and, in the post colonial world, foreign assistance and development efforts. "Dependence" is used as an explanation for why some nations of the world have not followed the expected model of capitalist development.

"Dependence," in this sense of the word, was first used as an analytical concept by academics working in the Pacific Islands in the early 1970s (see Ogan, 1973; Bedford, 1977; Brookfield, 1975). These writers, like those in South America and Africa (eg. Fanon, 1967 and Mannoni, 1964) have applied the concept not only to relations between nations, but to the psychological state of individuals in a colonial situation (Ogan, 1973) and relationships between small island groups in the pre-colonial Pacific Islands (Bedford, 1977).

I do not claim any great knowledge of the development of underdevelopment, nor the psychological impact of colonialism. However, I do see some of the
explanations presented in the dependency literature as useful in trying to make sense out of my observations and experiences in two island communities: Kapingamarangi Atoll, a Polynesian outlier in Micronesia; and Atamo village in Central Bougainville. I spent a total of twenty-seven months on Kapinga as a Peace Corps Volunteer and twenty-two months in Atamo village on Bougainville.

I, along with others who have spent time in Micronesia and in Papua New Guinea, share a concern for the political and economic future of these countries. The dependence of Micronesia on the U.S. was a concern of mine while there from 1969-1972, and it is a concern of mine now as I am sure it is of many people. ¹

Micronesian writers in the 1970s (eg. Heine, 1973: 35-36 and 1977; Uludong, 1973) have bemoaned Micronesia's dependence on the United States. Heine, in a seminar on moral issues related to political status in Micronesia, states that "Micronesians are the victims of dependence ... (and that they) have never put themselves in a subservient position" (1973: 35).

I would like to share some of my observations on the question of dependency in the two communities in which I lived. This is not a detailed analysis of the presence or lack of a dependency relationship between Papua New Guinea and more industrialized countries or between Micronesia and the United States; it is, rather, an assessment of the relationships between two small island communities and the "world beyond." It is a brief summary of what I believe people in those two communities thought about those relationships and an attempt to relate these observations to what has been written about dependency. I will provide comments on the implications of the attitudes of people in these communities for the political and economic future of these communities and, perhaps, for the countries in which they are located.

¹It is ironic that people in the late 1960s and early 70s expressed concern over the political implications of dependence of Micronesia on the U.S. and only now are we academics "analyzing" the situations in these terms.
Kapingamarangi is a Polynesian outlier in the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The atoll has a land area of .426 square miles. The population of the atoll in 1972 was about 411, although there were at that time between 500-600 Kapingas living on Ponape.\(^2\) The atoll population grew most of its own food (taro, breadfruit and coconuts) and depended heavily on fish. There was a coop and a small trade store with sales of approximately $20,000 per year, of which about two-thirds was rice, flour, tinned meat and fish, biscuits and sugar. There were four full time government employees (all school teachers), and the total income from outside jobs was $8,100. Copra income averaged about $7,500 per year. Migration to and from Kapinga was by ship which called at Kapinga every six weeks to three months.

Atamo is a village in an inland valley in Central Bougainville.\(^3\) The land claimed by Atamos, when I was there, was about 27 square miles, much of which was mountainous. The island of Bougainville is a high volcanic island off the coast of Papua New Guinea. With "small Buka" to the north, it is about 130 miles in length and 30 miles wide. Atamos, like Kapingas, grew almost all of their own food but ate primarily sweet potatoes and greens. Opposum, pork, fresh water shrimp and almonds were feast foods, and there was very little protein in the everyday diet. A store opened in the village while we were there, but sales were only about $200 per month. Atamos had access to a store at Manetai Mission eight miles to the north and to stores in the towns of Kieta and Arawa. Atamos produced copra and cocoa for sale with a total annual income of about $8,500, much of which went to local processors.

\(^2\)Kapingamarangi has been described in the anthropological literature at some length by Emory, 1965; Buck, 1950; and Lieber, 1968a, 1968b, 1970.

\(^3\)The Atamo community has also been described elsewhere. See Hamnett, 1977 and 1980.
Movement into and out of the Atamo community was more frequent than on Kapinga, but there was almost no permanent out-migration.

Kapingas were contacted by Europeans in the late 1870s, whereas, Atamos had no contact until the mid-1920s. Although Kapinga, an atoll over 400 miles from the nearest high island, would seem more isolated, Kapingas have had much more contact with outsiders than Atamos. Kapingas were converted to Christianity in 1919, whereas most Atamos did not become baptized until after World War II. Kapingas have had resident Europeans in their community since the 1880s, whereas Atamos had no long-term foreign residents until the 1970s.

This background provides some indication of the similarities and differences of the two communities in terms of their environment and contact history. One more difference bears noting: Kapingas, before contact, viewed themselves as dependent on their gods for survival. They experienced periodic droughts which occasionally resulted in drastic reductions in their meager food resources and in starvation. Atamos, as individuals and as small residential units, saw themselves dependent on their spirits for success in feasting, pig raising and--in the case of potential political leaders--for followers. There was no single community as on Kapinga and hamlet groups of from one to ten households competed with each other, but survival was never an issue for those who lived in the Atamo valley.

Political and economic dependence and independence were discussed in both Kapingamarangi and Atamo during my stay with each community. The political status of Micronesia was being talked about in 1970 and 1971 on Kapinga, and the political status of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea was being discussed in 1974 and 1975, while I was in Atamo. When I was on Kapinga, people said they felt the United States must continue to take care of them. They said the German and the Japanese had looked after them in the past and, after World
War II, "the American Navy took over care of Kapingamarangi" (Chief Tuiai quoted in Emory, 1965: 27). While Europeans, Americans and Japanese introduced new goods, and provided shipping, health care and education, drought relief has probably played a more significant role in influencing the Kapingas' view of their colonial masters.

Prior to contact, the Kapingas' gods were responsible for maintaining an adequate supply of food for the atoll (Emory, 1965: 199-399). Drought, tidal damage and high winds were seen as expressions of the displeasure of the gods and food relief was seen as a sign that good relations with the gods had been restored (Emory, 1965: 200). The chief priest was held responsible by the community for drought and other disasters, and even after European contact aliki (chief priests) were deposed for failing to bring relief from disaster. In many ways, the gods have been replaced by representatives of the colonial powers. They not only provide goods and services unavailable before contact, but also give food relief in times of disaster. Kapingas have sought to maintain good relations with those who "take care of them," (Lieber, 1968: 2) and they do not appear to be bothered by it.

Atamo presents a stark contrast to Kapinga in a number of ways: It is a high island community with more than adequate land to support the population. Atamo has never been threatened by natural disasters and, prior to European contact, the population was dependent on its gods for success not survival. Atamos have had much less contact with Europeans than Kapingas, although I don't think Atamos have been any more or less exploited.

Atamos have been actively involved in efforts to create an independent Bougainville since the mid-1960s. They strongly resented the attitudes of Australian Administration officials and plantation managers prior to Papua New Guinea's independence (see Bedford and Mamak, 1974). When Conzinc Rio
Tinto began developing the copper mine twelve miles south of Atamô in 1969, Bougainvillians, including many Atamos, called for the independence of Bougainville from Australia. In 1975, just prior to Papua New Guinea's independence, Atamos and other Bougainvillians called for secession. The catalyst for secession was the National Government's refusal to give Bougainville the capital work funds it requested. Bougainvillians demanded that they receive the royalties on copper from the Bougainville Copper mine in lieu of funds from the National Government, or they would break with Papua New Guinea.

Atamos talked about secession as a moral issue (cf. Burridge, 1960). Their desire for independence from Papua New Guinea was not simply a matter of keeping the wealth from the copper on Bougainville for Bougainvillians. It was also a question of the inequality in status that the control over "Bougainville's" wealth by "outsiders" represented. Atamos have never been satisfied with being controlled by or dependent on anyone.

The contrast between the Kapingas' attitudes toward dependence and their relationship with the world beyond their community and the attitudes of the Atamos are striking. Atamos seemed to feel independence was important. Kapingas had either come to accept their plight as a community dependent on, and controlled by, colonials, or they had had a dependency orientation prior to contact and substituted foreigners as their gods.

Atamos joined other Bougainvillians in their efforts to break ties with Australia and Papua New Guinea. It could be argued that Atamos were willing to become subservient to a Bougainville National Government or a Government of the North Solomons. However, the ideology of independence was used in the early 1970s when Atamo and five other villages broke with the Kieta Local Government Council to achieve greater local autonomy.

I have implied that the attitudes of Atamos and those of Kapingas toward
dependence and independence are a result of differences in their ecological vulnerability. The Kapingas are in an environment which produces adequate food for a small population, but the atoll is subject to natural disaster. The Atamas live in an abundant environment and are not subject to fluctuations in their food supply. While this may be an over simplification, it appears there is a relationship between ecological vulnerability and attitudes toward dependence.

The two communities have had very different colonial experiences. The Kapingas have had a longer history of European contact than Atamo, and their contact has been more intense. It could be argued that because the Kapingas have interacted more with colonials, and their interaction has been more positive, they have been more willing to accept a dependency relationship with their colonial masters. It could also be argued that Kapingas have been offered so much more than Atamas in the way of material wealth that the Kapingas have been "bought-off." While both these arguments are plausible, I don't think they explain the marked differences in attitudes of people in the two communities.

The U.S. may have "... implemented programs in the 1960s ... designed to make Micronesia dependent on the United States so that the latter could maintain hegemony in the areas" (Kiste, 1974: 197). For the Kapingas, at least, the dependency relationship has been accepted, and they did not appear to be suffering from it in 1971, although this may have changed since that time. Such a relationship would, in my opinion, be unacceptable to Atamos.

This comparison of the attitudes of these two communities sheds some light on the question of whether a dependency orientation is a characteristic of people who became colonized (Mannoni, 1964) or a product of colonialism (Fanon, 1967). In some cases, it may be a product of both, as Ogan (1973)
claims it is for the Nasioi of Bougainville. The comparison presented in this paper would indicate that Pre-European contact populations may have had different attitudes toward dependence before colonial rule.

What are the implications of the attitudes reported here for the political and economic future of Atamo and Kapingamarangi? The disdain Atamos feel for dependence, if it continues, will probably result in a lack of political stability. If this disdain is held by other Papua New Guineans, as I suspect it is, maintaining a unified Papua New Guinea is going to be difficult.

If Kapingamarangi people now feel they can, or ought to, remain dependent on outsiders, they are likely to opt for a continued close association with the United States. For them, the security of their present relationship with the Trust Territory Administration and its relationship with the United States may be more important than greater economic and political autonomy. Whether the Kapingas still feel that security is more important than independence, I do not know. Whether other rural communities in Micronesia also feel that a continued dependence on the United States is acceptable, I cannot say.

One further point bears mentioning. If there is a relationship between a community's attitudes toward political and economic autonomy and the abundance of that community's resources (or at least a stable, ample supply of resources), the future of island nations will probably bring an increasing acceptance of dependence. With the population of Pacific Island nations growing at a very fast rate, the food resources available are going to decline, and the willingness of people to become dependent may increase.
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United States Policy in the South Pacific

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U.S. Department of State

United States participation in the establishment of the South Pacific Commission marked the beginning of the post-World War II political involvement of the United States in the South Pacific. In 1947 the wartime allies with colonies and territories in Oceania signed the Canberra Agreement which established the SPC to promote economic and social development in the islands.

The evolution of this institution reflects the political dynamics of the region. Over the years the Canberra Agreement has been amended and a body of practice has developed which makes the SPC more responsive to the island nations and territories. It is symbolic that for some years now the SPC Secretary General has been an islander. Now the recipient island nations and territories determine the programs, priorities and allocation of the funding contributed by the members. Adapting to changing needs of the South Pacific, the SPC is engaged in such region-wide research efforts as the Skip-Jack Tuna Survey which will provide the islands with detailed knowledge of this key natural resource.

The 1952 ANZUS Treaty is another example of the American involvement in the region following the defeat of Japan. ANZUS has become a useful tool for the United States, Australia and New Zealand to discuss common concerns, assess international and regional developments and coordinate policies in the region.

In the period from the birth of the SPC and ANZUS until the present, the
region has undergone dramatic political change. Since 1962, Western Samoa, Nauru, Tonga, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu have joined the ranks of free and independent nations. They will be joined by the Gilberts (to be called Kiribati after independence) in July of this year and the New Hebrides is expected to become independent in 1980.

While these colonies and states were in the process of becoming independent, the French and American Territories in Oceania gained additional autonomy and self-government. During the same period negotiations began about the future political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. These political developments have taken place free of bloodshed, racial conflict, and great-power rivalry. In fact, decolonization in the South Pacific has taken place with the assistance and encouragement of the former colonial powers.

Since their independence, the island nations in Oceania have turned to regional cooperation as a means of solving common problems. For example, the South Pacific Forum was established in 1972 (among the independent and soon to be self-governing states in the region) to serve as the principal means for the South Pacific nations to discuss and coordinate regional policy. Some attempts at regional cooperation have been unsuccessful and there certainly has not always been a consensus among Forum members, but by and large the Forum has proven to be an effective political institution.

In the first two decades after the war, U.S. policy in the South Pacific was confined to the SPC, ANZUS, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (the United States became the administrating power by agreement with the United Nations in 1947) and the U.S. Pacific territories--Guam and American Samoa. However, the emergence of independent South Pacific nations, a desire on the part of the U.S. territories to play a greater role in their own
destiny, political pressure in Micronesia for a new political status and the proliferation of 200 mile fisheries zones all called for changes in U.S. policy towards the South Pacific.

During this period the citizens of Guam and American Samoa began the journey down the road to self-government and now elect their own legislatures and governors. In the Trust Territory the Northern Marianas opted overwhelmingly in popular referendum to become a U.S. Commonwealth upon the termination of the U.N. Trusteeship. Last year the remaining six districts in the Trust Territory voted in a constitutional referendum; four of them approved the constitution and will become the Federated States of Micronesia, the other two voted it down and will form their own separate constitutional governments.

The United States is presently negotiating a Free Association Agreement with the three Micronesian entities which will give them control over foreign and domestic policy while the United States will retain responsibility for defense policy. We hope to sign The Agreement in the near future beginning a process which would lead to termination of the U.N. Trusteeship Agreement in 1981.

In order to adjust to these new political realities we have made institutional changes in our foreign policy establishment. A resident ambassador with an expanded staff has been assigned to Suva and also serves as the U.S. representative to the SPC. In Washington a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State has been given responsibility for Oceania and a separate office has been set up for the Pacific islands. We have also begun a modest aid program for the area to supplement Australian and New Zealand efforts.

In addition to the organizational adjustments there have been other changes: increased contact with the political leaders of the region through
frequent visits, encouragement of a special role for Hawaii and the U.S. territories in relations with the region and efforts to develop a group of foreign service officers with specialized knowledge and expertise about the South Pacific.

We have also begun the process of resolving the issue of U.S. claims to twenty-six islands in the South Pacific. The United States has concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Tuvalu in which the U.S. relinquished claim to four islands. In a U.S. settlement with the Gilberts, 14 islands in the Phoenix and Line groups will become part of the new Republic of Kiribati (pronounced Kiribas) shortly after the Gilberts' independence in July this year.

Although efforts to establish a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Organization with the United States as a member have not yet been successful we are still hopeful of cooperating in the future with the South Pacific nations in the creation of an international organization to conserve, manage and exploit the marine resources of the region.

We welcome and support the efforts of the State of Hawaii and the American Territories to forge closer links with the nations of the South Pacific. During the transition period we will foster closer cooperation between the Trust Territory and its South Pacific neighbors in preparation for post-Trusteeship status.

Working together with the islanders we can contribute to a peaceful, secure and developing South Pacific. The United States will continue to support regional cooperation in the South Pacific.
First, some brief basic facts about American Samoa. There are seven islands in the Eastern Samoan group located about as far south of Hawaii as San Francisco is from the East coast. American Samoa is the only U.S. possession south of the equator. Her largest island, Tutuila, is 18 miles long and six miles at its widest point. Of a population of approximately 31,000, over half are not American Samoans.

Arable land is insufficient to support significant agriculture. Currently, American Samoa is primarily dependent upon U.S. government financial support and the continued operation of two major fishing canneries. The Government of American Samoa provides twenty-one and a half million dollars in direct salaries and twenty-six and a half million dollars worth of purchase, while the canneries provide five million dollars in direct salaries and fifteen point seven million dollars in purchases.

Despite a seeming lack of resources, and its dependency on U.S. grants, American Samoa has significant economic potential that can be realized through the following means:

1. The expanded exploitation of inshore and offshore fisheries and natural resources from the sea bed.

2. An expanded visitor industry. The existing infrastructure needs improving.

3. The development of a small scale industrial development and
processing center, taking advantage of tariff breaks, low cost long leases on governmental lands and tax incentives, utilizing abundant natural resources from some of the neighboring island states--such as Western Samoa.

4. Serving as a regional transportation, transshipment market and financial center for the South Pacific.

5. Increasing import substitution through increased commercial and subsistence agricultural production.

To assist American Samoa in its development, the United States has made substantial contributions to building an infrastructure which can support industrial expansion. Among the infrastructure assets of which American Samoa can boast are the following:

An international airport with a 10,000-foot jet runway.

An extensive roadway system connecting most potential industrial sites by paved, two-way traffic access.

A 25-acre industrial park including paved roads and utility hook-ups.

A universal 12-year education system and a two-year college available to interested students.

Territory-wide telephone availability with newly established satellite connection as of October, 1979.

Broad-based telecasting and educational television.

Water and electricity to all villages in the Territory.

A deep-water industrial port superior to any other in the South Pacific (but which needs additional warehousing).

A marine repair facility for major and minor boat repairs (which will be upgraded).

A large medical facility.

Solid waste collection and disposal system throughout the Territory, and a sewer system connecting most anticipated industrial sites.
There are many exciting things happening in American Samoa and the South Pacific—if you've got a little vision and some patience. The area that excites me most is often called "Regional Development." To appreciate what I'll be talking about, you need a map. Observe the Polynesian islands scattered in a rough circle around American Samoa: Western Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelaus, Tuvalu, and French Polynesia. All of these micro-states share constraints on their economic development associated with their size and isolation from market, communication and industrial centers; difficulties in competing with large areas that can produce similar products with greater economies of scale (in this league, Fiji is a major power); and former/existing colonial ties.

*American Samoa as a Regional Transportation Center*

Served as a domestic air route of the United States, American Samoa is the least expensive travel destination from the United States to the South Pacific.

American Samoa has suffered from inadequate commercial air service since Pan Am cut its flights in the fall of 1976—eventually to two late night flights. A new day is just around the corner however, with the inauguration by Continental of five daylight flights from Hawaii to Pago every week starting in 3 weeks. As important as the increased frequency between Honolulu and Pago is the resumption of direct service to Australia and the expansion of service to New Zealand. In addition, Fiji-based Air Pacific now has a direct weekly flight to Suva, Nadi, and Pago. South Pacific Island Airways and Polynesian Airlines provide other regional services, and Air New Zealand calls once a week out of Auckland.

American Samoa also receives a significant volume of surface shipping. During 1977, the port of Pago Pago received over eight million pounds of
freight and mail and exported almost four million pounds.

Most important to both Hawaii and Samoa is a reliable regular surface shipping service. Last fall Warner-Pacific Lines instituted a 6 weeks turn-around schedule, but this has fallen apart. The next voyage, for example is now scheduled for June 10. This is a vital need that must be filled by private enterprise.

**American Samoa as a Regional Market Center**

The Pacific islands have long suffered from high prices resulting from an inability to buy in volume. Wholesale markets are virtually nonexistent. Depending on the product, prices may vary as much as 100 percent or more from the cost of the same product in the United States, New Zealand, or Australia. For this reason, island consumers routinely circumvent local markets, buying directly from sources outside the region, thereby draining local economies.

An acute need exists to bring the benefits of the wholesale pricing mechanism to the region. With the highest South Pacific concentration of U.S.-originated ships and aircraft, American Samoa can serve as a wholesale market center for U.S. and Hawaii produced goods. American Samoa can also serve as a distribution point.

Additional warehousing, transshipment and merchandising capabilities are needed.

**American Samoa as a Regional Capital-Intensive Processing Center**

With a few exceptions, the island states in the South Pacific region do not possess all the production factors necessary to export products which can compete with similar products from other regions. In many cases, if island states consolidated resources, problems of scale could be handled so as to make projects viable or more profitable. This is one of the reasons for
Governor Peter Coleman's increased emphasis on American Samoa's participation and leadership in regional organizations. In his vision, the benefits of American Samoa's capital-intensive economy can be combined with labor-intensive economies in the region.

Under the Generalized System of Preferences, the United States grants special duty rates to developing areas, as well as to its own territories. All of the small island states in the South Pacific, including American Samoa, are eligible. However, eligible areas must add at least 30 percent value to products. There is also a provision allowing eligible countries and territories which are members of the same trade union to combine input for the purpose of computing (or satisfying) the value-added requirement.

The duty rate reduction offered under the Generalized System of Preferences however, is not always sufficient to make production worthwhile. Another avenue to be considered relates to the provisions of Headnote 3A of the Trade Act. Under Headnote 3A, U.S. territories may bring products into the United States duty free whenever 50 percent of the value of the product is added in the U.S. territory. Items which are particularly attractive for production under Headnote 3A are those with high rates of duty entering the United States.

Regional Political Leadership

A place as small and as vulnerable as American Samoa must have its wits about it when looking to the future. The people of American Samoa are thus very fortunate to have a man with the governmental background in the Pacific that Governor Peter Tali Coleman possesses.

In the 15 months since he's taken office, together with aggressive and bright Lieutenant Governor Tufele Li'a, Coleman has pushed American Samoa from being a reluctant and silent tail to the U.S. dog to the forefront of South Pacific and Pacific-wide regional activities. At the South Pacific
Commission conference in Noumea American Samoa took a strong leadership stand on civil aviation in the area which was critical of the major metropolitan powers functioning in the area--in particular the U.S. and Australia. In January, 1979, Governor Coleman took the lead again and invited top leaders from Tonga, Niue, the Cooks, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, and French Polynesia, to a meeting of what had been strictly a U.S. show--the Pacific Islands Development Commission. Almost all came. In describing this meeting in a speech to the Hawaii State Senate, Governor Coleman hit these highlights:

"We can work together constructively by lowering our shortsighted barriers to interisland trade and intercourse; by encouraging private enterprise not by talk alone, but by direct measures; by reducing overlapping duplicatory services of regional air carriers; processing plants, etc. American Samoa has two major fish canneries in addition to prime shipping and airport facilities--it makes no sense to duplicate these facilities in Apia, Rarotonga or Funafuti.

Joint Pacific island efforts on controlling immigration, agricultural disease and other threats to the environment will be more productive than individual efforts. There is no sense, too, in duplicating large capital facilities with high overhead--e.g., educational facilities, airports and major harbors."

Also bearing upon our future is the political decision on future status. As a state, Hawaii is a fully integrated part of the U.S. but American Samoa is, as the lawyers say--an "inchoate" territory--unorganized and unincorporated. For you non-Constitutionalists, unincorporated means any territory to which the U.S. Constitution has not been expressly and fully extended. Unorganized does not mean we don't have "our act together," it only means Congress has not written an organic act to govern us as they did for Hawaii in 1900! Our political study commission is now reviewing alternatives, having just completed a trip to the West Coast Samoan communities and Washington, D.C. One of the major considerations in that study is how to obtain greater flexibility for American Samoa in dealing with all regional matters.
Conclusion

American Samoa does not offer you a plumeria garden--but we do offer opportunity for those with vision and guts. The former sleepy, isolated islands--where the "Dukes" of Doonesbury played in the past--are coming of age, whether they like it or not and in my opinion will move more and more to the center stage of the South Pacific region. American Samoa is indeed America's gateway to the South Pacific, and the South Pacific's Gateway to America.

Fa'afetai tele lava.

Soifua!
China as a Pacific Power

by

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Having attracted attention with a somewhat futuristic title, I wish to assure you that China is not about to become a "power" in the Pacific islands region in the terms we usually think of. While her naval forces are expanding, they will not pose a challenge to the United States or increasing Soviet presence in the area. Nor would China really be in a position to out-do the Japanese should that nation, as is likely, redevelop as a seapower. What is more, for a host of geopolitical reasons, China will take a stance in her home waters and the Northwest Pacific long before she ventures into the South Pacific region which concerns the majority of us at this conference. And when she does so, her most concentrated efforts will be reserved for the waters adjacent to the South China Sea. Likewise, whatever technology Peking develops to exploit marine resources will be applied first to her own continental shelf and not to the ocean depths. Nevertheless, as if to emulate some old Taoist maxim, China's very lack of conventional strength is apt to prove of considerable leverage in the newly independent Pacific. At any rate, it is this theme that I wish to comment upon today. On her terms, China will be a factor in the region.

In a recently featured editorial, People's Daily--the official organ of the party and government--affirmed China's determination to play a part in the South Pacific.¹ As might be expected, Peking portrayed the region as one
torn by Great Power struggle and particularly vulnerable to Soviet expansion and intrigue. But the author, in line with major changes in Chinese foreign policy since the Cultural Revolution, stressed China's commitment to support all Third World countries regardless of their social or political system. 

In an effort to combat Soviet--and American--expansion, Peking further urged regional cooperation and encouraged Australia and New Zealand to pursue an active role in the region.

China's interest in the Pacific has, of course, grown up almost overnight together with the mushrooming new nations. In most cases, this may prove an advantage for Peking which seeks to play up her own semi-colonial past. Moreover, by supporting economic cooperation, cultural exchange and the exclusive economic zone concept, China has rapidly gained friends. But, it is her pledge to resist Great Power hegemonism which seems to have struck the most responsive chord. Before belaboring the obvious to tell you of the appeals and also the dangers of any Big Brother approach to peoples so long ensnared in dependency relationships, let me sketch the short history of China's relations in the area.

The first hint of interest came in the fall of 1970 when Zhou Enlai offered his best wishes to a Fiji which had been promised independence. Within two years, China had commenced diplomatic relations with Australia and New Zealand, entered the ping-pong era, and grown even more suspicious of Russian intentions. By the closing months of 1975, a South Pacific strategy was almost fully developed. In September, Zhou announced China's intention to recognize Papua New Guinea and established actual relations with Fiji and Western Samoa in November. In each instance, Peking pledged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new nations while introducing what may well prove to be the most critical themes: along with their peoples, the
Chinese belong to the Third World and must, inevitably, share in the struggle against imperialism. The strange yet important twist, however, was that the Fiji accord was signed in Canberra. But the logic of acknowledging Australia's natural role in the region was made clear the following spring when Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser visited an aging Mao and later, heard Hua Guofeng describe China's growing fear of "the other superpower" and its "expansionist ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region." As Hua continued, "We are both concerned for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and opposed to the seeking of hegemony by any country or group of countries."

This strategy of supporting the regional powers as a means of thwarting greater opponents applied also to New Zealand. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon had, in fact, preceded Fraser in visiting Peking. When the Speaker of the House of Representatives paid a call nine months later, the line had hardened: "Situated in the Asia-Pacific region, China and New Zealand are both naturally concerned ... That very superpower is stepping up its infiltration and expansion in this region. We are very glad to see that the government of New Zealand and some other Oceanic countries are sharpening their vigilance against the superpower's expansionist ambition ..." In the fall of 1977, when Brian Edward Talboys who was carrying several portfolios for Wellington arrived in China, the United States had returned to the picture of a Pacific caught between two contending global powers but, once again, the "social imperialists" received top billing. And the New Zealander could not miss the message that his country was expected to lead the movement against outside intervention.

For those who have followed Chinese foreign policy, Peking's dependency on the resolve of Australia and New Zealand, countries which have strong ties to Western Europe and America, is a dramatic shift of position but, as is usually the case, a change demanded by strategic considerations and explained
to the point of rationalization by the words of Mao. It was, therefore, understandable that the publicity surrounding Chairman Hill of the Australian Communist Party differed in content if not intent from that of his country's formal government when he turned up in Peking at the start of 1978. According to the Australian Communist organ, Vanguard, Chairman Mao's theory of the differentiation of the three worlds has now come to affect the course of revolution in Oceania: second world countries such as those ruled from Canberra and Wellington can be counted on to unite with smaller nations on certain issues and, most critically, share in the struggle to redesign the international order to preclude superpower domination.

Part of the third world by self-definition, China has been on the lookout for common interests and issues. In the South Pacific area, the most obvious of these concern the sea. Throughout the various sessions of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea which commenced in June 1974, China has consistently supported the position of South Seas states. What has been at stake, according to Peking, has been nothing less than "a struggle to defend maritime sovereignty." For her part, China has stood up for the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone, also pushed by the South Pacific Forum, and held out for full international control over the extraction of deep seabed resources. The goal, expressed in a recent issue of *Beijing Review*, while giving congratulations to the Gilbert Island Group upon its independence, is "all 6 million square miles of South Pacific waters under jurisdiction of relevant sovereign South Pacific States." Of course, with her own continental shelf to protect and disputed islands in both the East and South China Seas, the Middle Kingdom is concerned with more than either idealism or propaganda. Nevertheless, China's own interests in keeping the rich and technologically advanced nations from exploiting ocean resources genuinely correspond with those of a region
now riding a high tide of nationalism and can be used to foreign policy advantage.

Back in the 1950s and early 60s, other Third World countries were courted (and occasionally undermined) in an attempt to combat American encirclement. The principles of Peaceful Coexistence enunciated at Bandung in 1955 did make some friends in Asia, but courtship of formerly colonized nations took a back seat to the smoking rhetoric of paradoxically isolationist leaders during the Cultural Revolution. Once the Russians emerged as more than a sparring partner in ideological dispute, and with U.S. rapprochement leading to United Nations respectability, the early hints at a more positive form of world leadership took root. Today, having dropped talk of the "rural areas" spreading revolution to a North America and Western Europe prosaically described as "cities of the world," Peking has worked to create another United Front. This time, the principal enemy is the Soviet Union.

According to one editorialist: "The Developing Countries of the South Pacific region have strengthened their unity with second world countries in the struggle against hegemonism." In the final analysis, however, the ability of all the nations in the area to resist plundering by outsiders depends on the viability of their own regional economy. For this reason, China has attached great importance to the South Pacific Forum and the long-term goal of some sort of Pacific Common Market. As a visiting delegation from Western Samoa learned in Peking in March 1977, China also offers the lure of economic cooperation. New Zealand and Australia have already shown promise of becoming major trading partners with China, but Peking seeks commercial ties with far less lucrative markets. Indeed, the plan of attack sketched by the Chinese delegation before the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific at its summer 1978, New Delhi meetings stressed trade
and the unity thus forged as critical factors in deterring further Great Power penetration. Meanwhile, back in Oceania, the Chinese put theory into practice with the opening of a trade fair at Suva, Fiji.

Clearly, Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara's Fiji is a special case, or rather, the model for the relationships China hopes to establish throughout the area. Embassies have been opened, athletic teams have exchanged visits, and economic cooperation has been stressed. A People's Daily editorial welcoming diplomatic ties in the fall of 1975 pulled together the whole bag of foreign policy themes:

We have always maintained that all countries big or small should be equal ... Both China and Fiji belong to the Third World. Our two peoples have suffered from imperialist aggression and oppression and have always supported and sympathized with each other in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism ... We firmly oppose hegemonism and power politics pursued by the imperialists, the superpowers in particular.

A real clue to the strength of the relationship came later, in early summer 1978, when Mara appeared in Peking for talks with Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Li Xiannian. But the most gratifying news did not become public until after the prime minister returned to Fiji where he announced that his government intended to reject Soviet efforts to set up an embassy. Mentioning his recent trip to China, Mara was reported to have said that the Chinese were sincere and aboveboard while the Russians had only subversion in mind. By the end of June, Fiji legislators concurred by an overwhelming majority which prompted a Chinese commentator to note that "Fiji does not want to become another Cuba."

China was similarly pleased when Tonga, together with Fiji, turned down the Soviet vice minister and commercial attache who toured the South Pacific in 1975 offering aid in an attempt to establish fishing bases. And Beijing Review provided coverage of an incident that Papua New Guinea would probably
just as soon forget: the reported landing of "later-day tsarists" on an uninhabited island claimed by Somare's state.26

Although Peking would like to build a Fiji-type relationship with Papua New Guinea, there are a number of considerations which have complicated the balance of power game. Indeed, the government in Port Moresby, responding to domestic criticism and always reluctant to give anti-communist Indonesia anything to become agitated about, has not yet given permission to either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China to open embassies. Close to a decision in the spring of 1978, the whole matter has been deferred for at least a year.27 It is not that Prime Minister Michael Somare has never played the China card. Fortuitously, the first foreign dignitary to arrive in China after the death of Mao, he was met at the airport by Hua Guofeng, flown to Hong Kong on a special Chinese jet, and apparently basked in the publicity given his infant nation by a Peking which emphasized its own affinities with the Third World.28 There has also been some exchange of cultural groups,29 and a steady, if small, parade of lesser governmental functionaries to rural China to observe the ways in which intermediate technology might be applied to agriculture in Papua New Guinea. What is more, the China trade is clearly on an upswing with Peking providing inexpensive consumer goods in exchange for copper, timber and cocoa. As one scholar of the area has noted, a China connection does offer Somare an opportunity to reduce his dependence on Australia and, despite some dangers, will undoubtedly experience controlled growth.30

Elsewhere in the region, China remains eager for new friendships. In the summer of 1977, a Chinese acrobatic troupe touring Western Samoa drew 80,000 spectators during its stay.31 Even tiny Nauru's picture appeared in People's Daily32 and, when newly independent, the Solomon Islands were the
subject of a series of special articles. Just last November, the Gilbert Islands had their turn. In all these cases, the Peking press—so often the wellspring of diatribe in the past—was entirely objective even when it came to making reference to the colonial heritages. The virulent words are found elsewhere; these are directed not backward to the years before independence but toward "the late-coming superpower" who, with fitting marine metaphor, "wild with ambition is stretching tentacles everywhere in the world."

According to these charges, the Soviet Union is using "every means to infiltrate this region under the signboards 'champion of national liberation' and 'friendly cooperation.'" As a new and dangerous menace, this particular hegemonist must be excluded from the Pacific.

Although there are some who think that the Chinese are secretly eager for American bases to remain in the Pacific, and this is probably true for colder waters, the use of one great power to check another will not sit well with the emerging nations to the South. At this stage, Peking does not seek a balance of power per se, but rather the restriction of Russian influence and maritime expansion. As long as American interests coincide, China will not press for U.S. ouster from either Micronesia or Samoa. The justification, as one Chinese editorialist tiptoed across a sensitive issue: the Americans are really only protecting their vested interests; the expanding Soviets pose a different kind of threat. While the South Pacific region does constitute a "new area of contention for hegemony between the Soviet Union and the United States," the present strategy calls for reliance on second world countries and unity amongst the islanders. Ironically, China even has kind words for Japanese and West German aid which it believes has "to a certain extent contained the infiltration of the Soviet Union in the South Pacific." Thus, all of the former colonial masters have a role to play.
It is certainly no coincidence that the Shanghai Communique between the U.S. and China was the first bilateral statement to contain an anti-hegemony clause: "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony." Since then, the Chinese have attempted to get as many nations as possible to add their names to the list so transparently designed to discourage Soviet expansion. 38

The warming of Sino-American relations has continued to carry the headlines. In December, the Australian prime minister and the general secretary of the French Communist Party, ordinarily strange bedfellows, found themselves quoted in the pages of People's Daily as supporters of U.S.-China friendship. While the first expectedly praised rapprochement as a step toward peace and prosperity, the second suggested that closer relations with the Americans provided additional means to combat "any hegemonist movement in the Asia-Pacific region." 39 Thus, while the United States as a superpower receives mixed reviews, Chinese leaders recognize the value of a powerful ally. It now seems strange to read the word "containment" in the Chinese Communist press, but the time-worn cliché is finding new spokesmen in Peking.

As a consequence, China has been paying particularly close attention to the arms race and the relative strength of the competing superpowers. She is visibly alarmed over Soviet naval superiority and expansion into the Indian Ocean and the Northwestern Pacific. 40 Ironically, Peking has also noted that the U.S. 7th Fleet is no match for the Russians, 41 and has quoted no less an anti-communist source than U.S. News and World Report when statistics published therein confirmed fears. 42 Balance of power is always a tricky business. Obviously, American strength is in China's interests insomuch as it restrains another more dangerous foe. Peking's long-term security can,
however, be obtained only through military modernization and, quite possibly, the eventual extension of her own power overseas. While this speaker believes that China's present effort to help Pacific nations resist exploitation is genuine, it is not improper to speculate about a time when China may have the technological and military wherewithal to stake her own claims in the South Pacific.

There is no question that China, like Japan, is a potential giant in the area. At present the Chinese navy is large but almost exclusively defensive with little ability to project itself far from shore. Although there are some who believe that China's 60 or more submarines (one or two are nuclear) could be used effectively in the insular Pacific, at least as a foreign policy statement, the present international situation will keep these vessels close to home in the defensive front lines. Most experts agree, however, that China has not been utilizing her full shipbuilding capacity. As we move into the 1980s, she will be producing still more attack submarines and adding surface-to-surface missile equipped combat ships which, if constructed to the standards of existing prototypes, will be very much up to date.

The country's merchant marine is likewise expanding. When one counts the surprising number of ships registered under flags of convenience, China's fleet is second only to that of Japan in Asia and ranks 15th in global comparisons. By buying ships abroad (either new or mothballed in the case of much needed tankers), the Chinese can be expected to carry an even greater percentage of their Asian and Pacific trade in ships showing the Chinese flag. Moreover, China's own shipbuilding industry has been producing dozens of seafaring transports in the 10,000 ton range since 1960 with ships four and five times that size beginning to be commissioned.

Growth in all these programs may have some spin-off effect in the South
Pacific when, having upgraded her fleets, China may wish to sell or lease smaller coastal vessels suitable for inter-island work. Even more likely, Peking may provide fast, modern, patrol boats to friendly states as a token gesture in defense of their independence and against Soviet advances.

Another area of likely Chinese activity is oceanographic technology. As she becomes more sophisticated at home, China will be capable of giving modest assistance. Ships with geological and scientific missions have already spent many days exploring the South China Sea and resource-rich northern waters, and on at least one occasion, two research vessels made a seventy-two day cruise crisscrossing the Pacific. Nevertheless, as was the case with her submarines, it will be a full decade before Peking can divert equipment from areas close to home. The one exception to watch will be when China perfects a true ICBM and must test it over ocean swells. Then, as a perceptive scholar of the legal issues has already noted, it will be interesting to see the reaction in South Pacific capitals.

China's most immediate concerns, would, however, appear to be in the South China Sea. The Spratly and Paracel Islands which were targets of gunboat diplomacy back in 1974, are currently of far greater geopolitical importance. Off the coast of rival Vietnam and astride major seaplanes, these dots of sand are crucial outposts from which China can observe Russian movements, explore for oil, base fishing ships and look beyond to more distant waters. Within range of Hainan island's fighter squadrons, the islands—if they can be held—will enable the Chinese to draw a defense net at least partway to the Philippines. In order to consolidate claims, Peking has announced irregular ferry service from Hainan to the Paracels, and more activity should be anticipated. Rumors that the Chinese have finally started to construct landing craft fits this as well as the familiar Taiwan situation.
In any case, as events begin to enfold regarding all of the offshore islands, we will learn a little more about China's capabilities at sea.

For the present, South Pacific nations have little to fear from the People's Republic and can expect Chinese support in international forums. They might, perhaps, keep another ancient Taoist saying in mind: "When a greater nation is humble before a lesser nation, it prevails over the lesser nation." But, then, American policy makers might heed the same advice.
NOTES

For the purposes of this paper, references will be kept simple and in the English language, whenever possible.


2 PR, 10/23/70.

3 For background, see Dillon, Burton and Soderl and, "Who Was the Principal Enemy?" Asian Survey (May, 1977).

4 PR, 9/26/75, 11/14 and 11/21. See also RMRB, 11/7 and 16/75.

5 PR, 6/25/76 and RMRB, 6/20/76.

6 PR, 5/7/76 and RMRB, 4/30.

7 PR, 4/22/77.

8 PR, 11/4/77.

9 PR, 12/9/77, 1/13/78 and 4/7/78. RMRB, 7/5/78.


11 PR, 9/22/78. RMRB, 7/5/78.


13 Beijing Review (title change), 1/19/79.


15 PR, 9/22/78.

16 PR, 3/25/77.

17 PR, 11/4/77.
18 PR, 9/8/78. RMRB, 7/12/78.
19 RMRB, 9/6/78.
20 PR, 10/24/75, 11/14/75, and RMRB, 6/11 and 13/78 and 9/6/78.
21 RMRB, 11/7/75, also cited in PR, 11/14/75.
22 RMRB, 6/10/78 and PR, 6/23/78.
24 RMRB, 7/7/78.
25 PR, 9/22/78.
26 Beijing Review, 1/19/79.
27 FEER, 4/28/78 and 6/9/78.
29 PR, 10/14/77.
30 Premdas.
31 PR, 8/5/77.
32 RMRB, 7/3/78.
33 RMRB, 7/3, 7 and 8/78.
34 RMRB, 11/26/78.
35 PR, 9/8/78.
37 RMRB, 7/5/78 or PR, 9/22/78.
39 RMRB, 12/18 and 19/78.
40 RMRB, 6/13 and 15 and 11/21/78.
41 RMRB, Year end summary of anti-hegemony struggle in the Asian-Pacific region, 12/27/78.
42 RMRB, 11/28/78.
Participants with only a passing interest should consult Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "China in the Pacific," Oceans (May-June 1978). Much of his material is already out of date, but the more serious student should carry the same word of caution to the specialized treatments below.


See the authoritative estimates by George Lauriat in FEER, 1/21/77 and 2/10/78.

Ibid., Uhalley and PR, 1/13/78. One of the latest statements of Chinese intentions is RMRB, 9/12/78.

PR, 8/12/77 and 2/3/78.

Kamminga, 557.

Refer to note 14. For the latest claim, RMRB, 12/29/78.

RMRB, 12/27/78.

Leo Y. Liu, 58.
All South Pacific territories except Tonga have been colonies of major powers, and they have been among the last in the world to gain formal independence. They are also among the last to feel the impact of Western technology and culture. Many face great stresses between rural-based traditional cultures and urban Western styles.

The territories generally have low per capita incomes, high and increasing levels of imports in relation to exports, high unemployment, high rates of emigration, high birthrates, exhausted agricultural lands, and high reliance on external aid.

There are major commercial fishing operations based at American Samoa, Fiji, the New Hebrides, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Palau in Micronesia. These operations are all for the catching and processing of tuna for the export market, and all are based on joint ventures with American or Japanese firms, such as Japan's Taiyo, and the United States' H.J. Heinz (Star-Kist), Ralston Purina (Van Camp), and Castle & Cooke (Bumble Bee). There are also some export-oriented lobster and other fisheries, all far smaller than the tuna operations.

Apart from the fish landed in the islands, large quantities of fish are also taken from the waters of the South Pacific by long distance fishing fleets of other nations, especially nations of the northern Pacific—Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and the Soviet Union—without going through
bases in any of the South Pacific territories.

Much of this fishing in the South Pacific is at the subsistence level, that is, for consumption in the family and in the village. Commercial fishing for domestic markets is seriously underdeveloped. None of the South Pacific territories produces enough fish to meet their own demands. They import very large quantities of fish, often more than half of the amount needed for local consumption.

Problems

Traditionally, people concerned with fisheries management have concentrated quite narrowly on improving the data base available to guide management decisions on increasing production and on conserving the stocks by preventing overfishing. But there are a number of other issues which ought to be of concern to those responsible for fisheries management.

The largest importer of fish in the world is the United States, which imports more fish than all less developed countries combined. The overall pattern in the world's fisheries trade is that the product tends to flow from less developed to more highly developed countries. This is demonstrated by the fact that countries tend to import fish from countries that have lower levels of development than the countries to which they send their fish exports.

This global pattern is the same as that found within nations. Fish, along with other foods, flows from the poorer rural areas to the richer metropolitan areas. The reasons are the same. It is not so much that the needs are greater in the central, metropolitan areas as it is the fact that those in the center, being richer, can easily outbid those in the periphery for those products.

While great quantities of fish follow this pattern, migrating via the trade routes to the more highly developed countries, there is also a very
substantial flow of fish in the opposite direction. Most of this fish is cheap canned mackerel from Japan. This import of fish occurs largely because of the lack of development of commercial fisheries for domestic markets in the South Pacific. The problem is compounded by the fact that the foreign exchange needed for the imports of food requires a strong export orientation to earn that foreign exchange. The imports of great quantities of food, rather than of other, more dispensible commodities, creates great dependency on, and thus great vulnerability to, outsiders.

In many of the fishing operations in the South Pacific much of the employment is taken up by outsiders rather than by local people. The Palau skipjack fishery, for example, employs large numbers of Okinawans and Koreans. Land-based processing facilities are managed almost exclusively by expatriates.

Whether for local people or outsiders, wage rates are extremely low, rarely much more than a dollar an hour. For example, in 1976 the average wage paid to Solomon Islanders working at the Solomon Taiyo cannery was U.S.$686 for the year. This was relatively good by local standards, but very poor from a global perspective.

In not taking a fuller share of benefits, each low income worker who helps to furnish tuna sandwiches for distant Americans or Japanese or Europeans in effect subsidizes their lunches.

There are severe problems of malnutrition in the South Pacific, particularly in Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, and the New Hebrides. This results in part from the decline of traditional fishing and gardening, and barter, and the trend toward urbanization and the increasing dependence on the money economy. The strengthening of local fishing for local consumption can help to meet this problem.
Comparative Disadvantage

The economic doctrine of comparative advantage is part of the larger set of ideas advocating free trade and the division of labor. Supposedly, under a free market, where each party does what it can do best, and then trades with others, everyone is better off. There is high efficiency in production, and there is a good distribution of benefits.

On examination, however, it appears that the argument does not hold in relation to the fishing industry in the South Pacific. The territories of the South Pacific, with very generous endowments of ocean, have no significant commercial fishing industry of their own. The benefits go primarily to those with the advantages of capital and technology rather than to those with the natural advantages.

The system of free access to fishing waters leads to enormous inefficiencies, particularly to overcapitalization (excessive fishing resources chasing any given quantity of fish) and overfishing, leading to depletion of stocks. Moreover, the efficiency of the free market system is an efficiency in the production of profit. The maximization of profit leads at the same time to relative inefficiency in the production of other values such as basic nutritional value.

Fisheries organized to maximize basic nutritional values would be organized very differently. For example, there would be practically no long distance fishing. Also, there would be far less concentration on "luxury" products, such as bluefin tuna which can sell for three thousand dollars per ton, and more concentration on ordinary food fish.

Evidence on the distribution of benefits from the fishing industry indicates that it is of far greater benefit to the richer, developed nations which control the industry than it is to less developed countries like those of the
South Pacific. For instance, fishermen in California get more than twice the amount paid to fishermen landing the same species in Palau in Micronesia. While both price scales have been increasing over time, the prices paid in California have been increasing faster. Thus, the gap between California fishermen and Palau fishermen is wide and widening.

The growth of the tuna business has not led to a broadening of the range of the consumers of tuna. Instead, the rapid growth of production has been accompanied by a corresponding rise of consumption in the United States, Japan, and western Europe. The United States has been consuming an increasingly large portion of an increasingly large total. Describing tuna as a luxury product may help to explain this, but it does not justify it.

**Regional Organization**

The idea of creating a new fisheries management organization for the South Pacific first emerged at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum held in Suva, Fiji, in 1976.

Originally, the organization was conceived by most Forum members as a means of coordinating policies with which to face the distant-water fishing nations. In this approach, the organization would amount to a kind of cartel, demanding higher royalties or licensing fees for access to the waters in their jurisdiction.

As events unfolded, however, this understanding became muddled, largely because the United States was admitted to full participation in the negotiations to plan the organization. The United States nominally represents its non-sovereign territories in the region, but in fact it spoke for its interests as a major distant-water fishing nation and as a major industrial fish processing and marketing nation.

The major divisive issue was the question of whether highly migratory
species like tuna should be recognized as being included within the 200-mile zones of national jurisdiction over fishing. Fearing that the access of its distant-water fishing fleets might be limited, the United States has consistently refused to recognize the inclusion of those species within the 200-mile zones. The South Pacific nations, however, argued that the highly migratory species must be included, especially since they are the only resource of significant commercial value within their zones.

It has become increasingly clear that the less developed nations of the South Pacific also have enormous differences among themselves. The larger nations of the region hope to exploit the fisheries resources themselves, while the smaller nations expect to benefit primarily from royalties and license fees obtained from outside fishing nations.

And with many bilateral negotiations already underway, and the apparent eagerness of some nations to offer their resources to outsiders, the declared intention of the South Pacific nations to coordinate their negotiations with outside nations is open to question. As a result, the provisional agreements for a regional fisheries organization negotiated in Suva fell apart after acrimonious debate in Niue in September, 1978. However, they did agree to create a different organization, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, which excludes the United States.

It is possible that the nations of the region will find specific bases for cooperation in, rather than in spite of, their own interests. At the opening of the November, 1977, meeting in Suva, the Director of the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperation said that "Some of the resources of the ocean belong to the region as a whole. They must be managed by the region as a whole, and the benefits should be shared by the region as a whole." Through progressive cooperation, it could be that the nations of the South
Pacific will slowly move toward the increasingly explicit recognition that at least some of the resources of the region should be regarded as the common heritage of all of the peoples of the region.
Media's Role in Pacific Islands Politics:
A Roundtable Discussion

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Dr. Jim Richstad, East-West Communication
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Ms. Leanne McLaughlin, Honolulu Star-Bulletin
Mr. Floyd Takeuchi, Honolulu Star-Bulletin
Mr. Kuar Singh, Fiji Sun
Mr. Ngauea Utioa, Atoll Pioneer
Mr. John Griffin, Honolulu Advertiser

Introduction

The participants in this discussion agreed to focus on "a review of adversary and cooperative (developmental) press systems in the Pacific: problems and potentials." What emerged as a theme, from the roundtable itself, was a review of the barriers to efficient press coverage of politics in the Pacific islands.

Such barriers range from the geographic realities of isolation, through to the traditional colonial flow patterns of news and finally to information, and government and social pressures, covert and overt, that suppress certain news items.

A cross section of diverse Pacific press models was represented: the American adversary system by the Honolulu Advertiser and the (Guam) Pacific Daily News; the British adversary type by the Fiji Sun; and the government-controlled developmental press by the Atoll Pioneer of the Gilbert Islands. Additionally, academic evidence of flow patterns in the Pacific press was
presented along with anecdotal remarks of specific incidents of press-government conflict in Pacific coverage.

No specific model of press-government or press-politics relationships was advocated by the participants, but each speaker measured his or her experiences with such relationships against the libertarian-free press ideals of the British and American journalistic heritage.

Background

In general, the Pacific has a tradition of the libertarian press system imported from Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. In a libertarian press system, the press is free to print whatever it wants. There is no prior restraint and the only post-publication constraints are those traditionally found in libel statutes, and, more recently, in official secrets acts.

The libertarian press was spawned in Great Britain and its ideals, if not its practices, were imported to the thirteen American colonies as well as to the later Pacific colonies.

From the libertarian system of the press came what has been called the "watchdog function" of the press over government, establishing the adversary relationship between the two.

The concept of the libertarian press, however, was predicated on the availability of a multitude of possible voices in the public forum. In such a multitude, the truth will bear out, and those members of the press dealing in prevarication and chicanery will fall by the wayside--sort of a media kin to Darwin's selection theories: Only the fittest would survive, and in order to be fit, one had to deal with the truth.

Contemporary economics have seriously undercut the "multitude of voices" foundation of the libertarian press concept. It is not nearly so easy, even
in a wealthy country such as the United States, to engage in an independent, successful press operation as it was when the American "founding fathers" applied the libertarian concept to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press.

A similar absence of a "multitude of voices" in the Pacific has cast doubt on the libertarian press there, as well. Such doubts have taken the form of stated desires for the press to take less of an adversary role with the government and more of a cooperative, or joint developmental role.

As Pacific island states develop independence from colonial government control, they also lean toward a desire to gain independence from the imported concept of libertarian, adversary press.

The developing independent states are producing leaders caught between the colonial tradition of libertarianism and the indigenous social leadership system of chiefs, nobles and elders.

Such leaders are calling not for an abolishment of free press systems, but for more of a government-press partnership in determining the ideal presentation of government or political news which would best serve the social development of the state.

Newspapers have, naturally, expressed little interest in such a partnership, as what "freedoms" remain after such a press-government relationship would be academic, at best.

Somewhere between the extremes of the purely adversary and the purely developmental, however, might lie a press system more suited to "the Pacific Way."

Before any such determination might be made, however, an overview must be made of Pacific press systems and their attendant problems in covering governmental and political news, noted.
This was the purpose of the roundtable.

The Dictates of Tradition

Dr. Jim Richstad of the East-West Center's Communication Institute has conducted an extensive study of news flow patterns in the Pacific. The two year study noted the flow of news across the Pacific as well as the flow from island region-to-island region.

Richstad reported "clear evidence" that news flows along colonial lines. The source of news of areas outside of the island's own region is mostly the main country of colonial ties, and that country is also the most common location of the news events reported.

Richstad reported that his study found "very little evidence of news across the (island regions). Very little about Tonga is reported in Saipan; there is little in Tahiti papers about the British or American (island) groups."

Exceptions to this pattern, Richstad noted, occurred with news originating from Noumea about the South Pacific Commission meeting and from limited use of the PEACESAT regional news exchange experiment.

This satellite system, Richstad noted, could cut across regional news flow patterns, and it did. The clearest example, Richstad said, was with the Cook Island News, which is the only Pacific newspaper regularly printing news about other Pacific regions. All of the items in the Cook Island coverage come from the PEACESAT exchanges.

"The satellite can leap over traditional news flow patterns but hasn't been able to leap over political and other constraints," Richstad said.

He cited the example of Fiji, which had to drop out of the news exchange because of sentiment by Fiji Post-Telegraph that the satellite was in unfair competition with commercial news services and common carriers.
Ownership patterns also tend to follow colonial lines, Richstad reported. In Guam, Saipan and even Hawaii, press ownership is centered off-island. In Fiji and Papua New Guinea, ownership is held in Australia. Along with ownership in the metropolitan country comes the provision of international news through wire services from that country, such as the Australian Association Press to Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and United Press International to Guam and American Samoa.

Within common colonially governed groups there might exist other news exchanges. Richstad noted a "newspaper exchange ring" with Fiji at the center, trading newspaper copies as a news exchange method with other former British colonial islands.

The traditional flow patterns do tend to dissipate with independence, Richstad added. After a period of independence, he said, news patterns start changing to take on a "broader view." He noted the Fiji Times, the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier and the Samoa Times were beginning to show a wider view of Third World countries and less reliance on New Zealand for both a source of news and for a location of news events to report.

In discussing the consequences of the Pacific news flow patterns, Richstad said:

"If countries are going to learn how to solve their own problems, one of the best sources is people with the same kinds of problems; and as long as the news--the international news system--is structured so these countries do not exchange news--that their news patterns go through a metropolitan country (which is the present pattern)--they're not getting that kind of news that can help them deal with their political problems.

"In a way it's very dismal to look at, but in another way you can be very hopeful because the old pattern does seem to be breaking up: the
diversity of sources does seem to be available, the technology is readily available and in place to break the pattern completely, but there are still other problems (such as the political) that get in the way."

"The Weakness of the Press"

Even the established adversary press has its weaknesses in covering government. One of them is the fact that it is too often too "established."

John Griffin, editorial page editor of the Honolulu Advertiser and a writer about South Pacific affairs through the editorial sections of his paper, compared the adversary press system with its alternatives by quoting Churchill on democracy: "it's the worst form... except for all the rest."

The American founding fathers saw the role of the adversary press as another check and balance on government, Griffin said, both in reporting governmental affairs and in its opinion function.

The creator and carrier of bad news, however, have often been confused in the American mind. Griffin stated that the First Amendment is probably the least universally accepted part of the Bill of Rights, and that if a national constitutional convention were held, it would probably be the first to be deleted.

Although the nature of island living tends to intensify press-government conflicts, Griffin said, there is still a danger of the creation of an "Establishment Press," one which is "too cozy with government or business" and enters into a "voluntary developmental journalism syndrome" that overrides the adversary relationship.

"Newspapers are in the establishment, let's face it," Griffin said, "but if you get too far in and you lose whatever critical function you have, then you become like a paper in a communist state."
Griffin also commented on the relative "powers" of the press and of government:

"I don't think that the press anywhere is much of a match for government when it comes to 'firepower.' We do get a voice, we do have a platform in American journalism. We can say what we want to editorially. We even have more access than anywhere else. But there's an awful lot of things that we miss--almost all of them by accident.

If the public is going to be concerned about the power of the press I think they should be more concerned with our weaknesses."

The Adversary Sun

Echoing some of Griffin's sentiments on the "Establishment Press" was Kuar Singh, stating that the Fiji Times, up until 1974, had been a benign chronicler of government events. But when the Fiji Sun, of which Singh is the chief reporter, was started, the competition forced the Times to report on developments beneath the surface of government and to take editorial stands often in disfavor of government policies.

Singh is also a Pacific Island News Association-Fulbright (PINA) fellow attending the University of Hawaii Journalism Program.

Singh heralds the introduction of the Sun as the beginning of "muckraking," or investigative reporting in Fiji--the most obvious function of the adversary press.

But government information policies get in the way of this adversarial role, Singh reports, leaving stories unfinished in content but still published because of competition:

"Some government ministries and departments prefer talking to the press only through the Ministry of Information--using it as a shield. To get replies through this channel, it usually takes a long time. Questions have to be
submitted to the ministry which then forwards them to the relevant ministry or department as the case might be. The questions, in most cases, sit on the tables of ministerial and departmental heads for some time before getting any attention.

"So, in this sort of a situation reporters are forced to go ahead with their stories from whatever information they have. By doing this there are accusations against newspapers of thriving on half-truths and not carrying balanced stories. The critics are mostly the ones who are supposed to be giving the needed information. So you could see that newspapers are tried to be made the scapegoat."

Another major problem Singh discussed was the intensely personal reaction by government officials to being criticized in the press. Although the libertarian-adversary model calls for such "muckraking," the social mores call for deference to be shown to such leaders:

"(Investigative reports) greatly upset ministerial, departmental and organizational heads. For some, such stories 'stir up their sensibilities.'"

"In most cases, newspapers and their reporters become subjects of scathing attacks. There are threats of instituting drastic actions against them."

Singh's retort, however, is that most ministers in Fiji have been in governmental service for some time and should now be used to the kind of public scrutiny of their behavior demanded by an adversarial press.

Singh would advise journalists to be absolutely sure of the facts of such a story before going ahead with publication, but once confident of their facts, they should not be deterred by any sense of "Pacific sensibilities":

"There are working journalists who are aware of the sensibilities of leaders in their areas. But when it comes to the question of choosing between this factor and the duty of a responsible journalist, they feel duty bound to select the latter."
Singh's main concern is for increased educational opportunities for journalists in the Pacific. Through expanded education, Singh feels, such concerns over the press-government relationship will be better handled, if not overcome.

Development Press in the Gilberts

The concept of a free press was brought to the Gilberts by Catholic and Protestant missionaries according to Ngauea Uatioa, editor of the Atoll Pioneer. Like Mr. Singh, Uatioa is a PINA fellow attending the University of Hawaii.

After World War II, the government on Tarawa began publishing its own paper in Gilbertese. In the early 50s, Uatioa reports an English language edition of the paper was published, with its main readership among government personnel and educational institutions.

The paper might better have been called a newsheet, according to Uatioa, as it was not until 1975 that the Gilbertese people saw what a newspaper should look like and should do. It was in that year that the Atoll Pioneer began to include such things as pictures, editorial comment and display advertising.

The readership increased dramatically, Uatioa said, but the new format was short-lived.

The government combined the Pioneer and the broadcast division into one information division directly run by government, discouraging many reporters who left their jobs.

There is no "freedom of expression" as such, Uatioa reported, as the press cannot, by authority, write anything against the government.

Even though the information division was made into an independent authority, Uatioa said, there are still official strictures. Quoting from the rules of
government, Uliaoa said:

"The Authority will under a duty to observe impartiality in matters of political controversy...or relating to current public policy. In the discharge of their duty the Authority shall secure the exclusion of expression of their own opinion."

The language of this regulation is an archetypical example of the press-government relationship of the development press.

Guam, Micronesia: Expense, Expanse and Social Pressure

Attempting to cover an area as expansive as Micronesia from Guam has posed certain problems for the Pacific Daily News. Leanne McLaughlin, now an editor with the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, was city editor of the Daily News from 1977-79. From 1974-77 she was a political reporter for the Guam paper.

Floyd Takeuchi, formerly editor of the Islander, Guam's Sunday magazine, covered several Micronesian events for the Pacific Daily News, notably the Marshallese constitutional convention and the repatriation of the Bikini islanders. Takeuchi is also presently with the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

McLaughlin recalled some of the difficulties of covering Micronesia from Guam with essentially only one full-time correspondent, based in Saipan. Plans call for expanding Micronesian bureaus to Palau and Ponape as well, McLaughlin reported.

Although the Pacific Daily News is the only "universal" medium in Micronesia, its total circulation to the islands is less than 1,000, McLaughlin said.

She did point out other island papers that serve their particular districts well, including the Marianas Variety and the Marianas Commonwealth on Saipan and the Micronesian Independent in the Marshall Islands.
McLaughlin also noted that a second daily newspaper is scheduled to debut on Guam.

Guam law provides for access to meetings of public officials and agencies as well as access to public records, McLaughlin said, but no such access legislation exists in Micronesia where information is at times withheld from journalists. Most of the news from Micronesia is the "official view" because of this lack of access, she said.

McLaughlin also pointed out some of the tremendous communication problems in dispatching stories to Guam from Micronesia as well as limited flight and other transport schedules to travel from island to island to gather news on a timely basis.

One bright spot she noted was the plans for journalism education at the Community College of Micronesia on Ponape which will train journalists to cover the islands.

Takeuchi reiterated the communication problems in Micronesia by recounting his difficulties in raising Guam by phone from the Marshalls while covering stories there.

Takeuchi also touched on the social pressures put on journalists not to report news of "internal problems" to other island districts or to Guam.

Takeuchi himself was asked not to write certain stories about the Bikini repatriation. He also told of an incident on Saipan where police officers entered the paper's bureau office and prominently displayed their guns while asking that a story not be printed.

In another case, Takeuchi said, a Micronesian reporter feared for his personal safety in covering the Marshallese constitutional convention.

Even for Micronesian natives, then, the pressures are great--and in the case of social pressures--even greater.
Summary

From the participants' experiences, it can be concluded that regardless of the type of press system in operation, there are problems involved in covering government adequately.

Where the press and government come into an adversary relationship, the conflict is often intensified because of the closeness of island living.

While much of the Pacific press is primarily adversarial, it does not operate in the impersonal context of metropolitan nation newspapers.

The press in the Pacific is still growing, still developing as are the island states in which it exists. Richstad's 1973 "Directory of the Pacific Press" pointed out that over half of the newspapers listed had not been in existence before 1965.

But journalism handles development well. It thrives on what is "new" as a basis for what is "news."

In maintaining the adversarial role it has taken by tradition, the Pacific press will undoubtedly continue to arouse and accept conflict with the government as a way of life.

Summing up the continuing press-government relationship in the Pacific Islands Communication Newsletter, Robert Keith-Reid, a former PINA fellow and chief reporter for the Fiji Times echoed the opinions aired by the participants at this roundtable:

"In coming years, Pacific Island journalists, native and expatriate, without being subservient, will have to develop a style of operation that sees all the news, good and bad, get into print, yet making some allowances for Pacific Island sensibilities.

"They will have to learn how to get local leaders to accept criticism coolly and with the realization that a free press must often be cruel to be kind."
Background Notes and Suggestions for Further Reading


Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, "Ratu Mara Stresses Sensitivity, Constructive Criticism for Press in Developing Countries" in Pacific Islands Communication Newsletter 8:2 December, 1978, p. 3.


Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak with you this afternoon. I recognize that you have reached the latter part of a long and stimulating day of speakers. I am reminded of a statement of Adlai Stevenson under similar circumstances: "My job this afternoon is to speak to you, and yours is to listen to me. I hope I finish my job before you finish yours."

I would like to speak to you briefly about the relation of the Pacific Island nations to the law of the sea. Under international law, each of these new nations, some of them having no more than 7,000 citizens, as Mr. Bodde has indicated, have all of the rights, privileges, and duties of a sovereign nation. They are free to recognize other states or to withhold recognition. Each has a vote in the United Nations, the same as the United States. They can make treaties and abrogate them. They can collect taxes and tariffs, and they can regulate their trade. They can admit industry, and they can nationalize it if that is their wish. They can establish armed forces and navies. They can declare war or they can decline to make war.

Today these islands, which once were isolated by long distances over vast oceanic wastelands, are now bound tightly together by the same oceans. The oceans give them similar advantages and similar problems, and from these grow similar attitudes and ways of dealing with the rest of the world.

Because of the rapid growth of customary international law of the sea,
each of these nations has a twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone over which they exercise their sovereign jurisdiction.

The problem: while the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has been deliberating since December 1973 on a comprehensive rule of law for the oceans, the present and foreseeable state of that law is one of rapid change, ambiguity, and a degree of unpredictability. Thus, there is no binding and authoritative agreement on what the exclusive economic zone is and what it is not. No one can define what precise rights and jurisdiction attach to it. Does it confer control over transit? Under what conditions are entry and overflight limited? Is it subject to advance permission, in much the same way as the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) Convention regulates flight over the territorial sea? Or, as some say, is it really more like the high seas?

The eminent scholar of international law, Dr. Choon-ho Park, tells a story about two truck drivers on a bridge over the Yalu River, one Korean and one Chinese. The bridge is only one lane wide, and one of the drivers will clearly have to back up. They are at an impasse. The Korean takes out a copy of the Sunday edition of the New York Times and carefully reads it from cover to cover. At length he is finished. He puts it down. The Chinese driver asks, "May I borrow it?"

This is illustrative of the current state of the law of the sea negotiations. Delay is a very human negotiating tactic. In a bureaucracy it is usually far easier to delay or to say "no" than to assent to basic change, and basic change is what is now being proposed—and accomplished—in the law of the sea.

From 1608 and Hugo Grotius' *Mare Liberum* to President Truman's continental shelf proclamation of 1945, the law of the sea has changed very slowly. One might venture to say that there has been more change since 1945 than in the
previous three centuries—change driven by advancing technology. Here we have a classic case of cultural lag, in which mankind's rules for regulation of ocean activities have consistently lagged behind the need. Let us be clear: technology is not at fault. The problem is in the ability of human institutions to derive viable rules and policies for healthy implementation of that technology.

Recently the headlines have been full of the accident at Three Mile Island, and this case is illustrative. Here there was no basic technological fault. The technology works. The fault lay in the human organizations which failed to control adequately that technological power, and which, once an accident had occurred, were unequal to the task of adequate timely response. The problems were in policy, in law, in bureaucracy.

We face many repetitions in the Pacific as we test the interface of ocean development and oceanic law, politics, economics, technology, and resource management.

The Pacific, which we have always thought of as a vast place, is now walled in by a continuous line of 200-mile economic zones—zones in which the legal and practical implications are still unclear. Indeed, if the conferees at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea should fail to achieve a comprehensive agreement, these zones—as well as the international straits of the world on which so much of our energy supply depends—may well be the subject of many unilateral claims. We are approaching a period in which there is a great danger of rapid and unpredictable change in the law of the sea.

Unpredictability defeats efforts at ocean development. In every area, the cultural lag reappears: In fishing, the techniques are well known, but full usage of the resource is limited by lack of agreement on regional fishing
regimes. In deepsea mining, the industry tells us that the technology is ready, but that investment and implementation must await clarification of international agreements and legal issues. We have already alluded to the uncertainties of access and passage through the economic zones, which may affect surface and air transportation. In the area of energy, the tropics have special opportunities in a variety of new technologies such as ocean thermal energy conversion, floating platforms for coal or nuclear power plants, and other uses of solar energy, as for food production; but in many cases the rules for regulation of these new techniques will take a long time to derive. Consider, for example, the difference between our current fishing tradition, based on free access to an open hunting territory, and the requirements of open ocean mariculture. Who has the right to harvest "farmed" fish?

In the final analysis, development—whether on land or at sea—comes down to specifics. Specific solutions must be found for specific problems, and generalizations will not serve to solve the intricacies of cultural lag. The issues are often complicated by the logical precedent set for one case which fails to ameliorate a following case. More likely than not, complexity is going to be our lot in this field. In solving problems of development, there are always trade-offs, and agreement requires consensus and compromise.

How is such consensus to be achieved?

In the case of oceanic societies, there is a built-in corrective device which uses the great adaptability of oceanic commerce and industry as its operant conditioner. To use an analogy from John Craven, Director, Law of the Sea Institute, early sea traders making their first commercial contacts with unknown societies no doubt left their goods on the beach. If the response was friendly, and if the goods were rewarded with suitable exchanges, a trading pattern was established. But if the goods were taken without reward, and the
sailors eaten to boot, that society was thereafter avoided. The first oceanic societies developed, if they were responsive, into great trading societies such as Sidon and Tyre. The others were forgotten.

Today we no longer leave goods on the beach. We have exchanges of views, trade conferences, visits of merchants across oceans, etc. To solve the institutional problems, we try methods such as the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. But here, as in the past, if the goods are taken without suitable exchange, oceanic societies will adapt as they have always adapted.

The Law of the Sea Institute is dedicated to the principle that the greatest potential for present and future oceanic societies can be achieved by encouragement of this adaptation process. To that end, the Institute serves as a neutral and objective, interdisciplinary and international forum in which ideas and information can be exchanged on matters concerning the law, the politics, the economics, and the technology of the sea. Further, we have a faith that this sort of consensus building, based on the free exchange of ideas, works.
Summary Remarks

by

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To call these remarks a summary of the conference is presumptive, since it implies that all of those in attendance have forgotten what was said, while I somehow remembered. It will be better to think of my comments as one person's impressions of some of the things that were said, as well as some of the things unsaid.

Before going into the content area of the conference, I will echo Carl Daeufer's second call for a Pacific Islands Association. Anyone interested should get in touch with him. It may be that such an organization already exists de facto through the Pacific Islands Newsletter and the Pacific Islands Interest Group which meets irregularly, but frequently, for the main purpose of meeting with travelers from both sides of the Pacific representing a wide range of interests. Anyone wishing to be put on the mailing list for either the newsletter or the meetings just fill out the green sheet, or get in touch with the PIP office.

Mr. Hideto Kono, Director of the State of Hawaii's Department of Planning and Economic Development, and formerly a high ranking official of one of Hawaii's famous multinational corporations, Castle and Cooke, opened the conference on Friday evening with an overview of the State of Hawaii's role in the emerging Pacific scene.

His remarks were basically a summary of a recent DPED publication titled "Hawaii and the Other Pacific Islands," the title of which is already becoming
a catch phrase. Only recently has the State of Hawaii begun to identify itself with the "other" Pacific islands, rather than as an extension of Los Angeles or Tokyo.

Mr. Kono's theme was that Hawaii stands ready to help show the way to successful development in the other Pacific islands, especially in the areas of:

a. Agriculture
b. Tourism
c. Alternative Energy Sources
d. Communications
e. Free Trade Zones.

There now exists the need to build on these, and more, e.g., cultural exchanges.

Mr. Kono reminded us of the existence of the Pacific Islands Development Commission, whose membership includes the four governors of the American flag property in the Pacific (Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas), and whose function is to "promote." He went on to suggest the need for a Regional Development Commission, but the statement of purpose remained unclear as well as its relationship to the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC).

Mr. Kono's talk failed to include one rather important aspect of Hawaii's new role as a fellow/sister Pacific Island. That is, the image of Hawaii and the Hawaiians in the eyes of those Pacific Islanders to whom Hawaii is offering the helping hand. For example, the following:

1. Unresolved Hawaii land claims against State and Federal governments.
2. State sanction of continued bombing of Kahoolawe.
3. Token Hawaiian representation in the State government.
4. Generally low socio-economic status of Hawaiians, Samoans, and
Tongans living in the state.

5. Low level of support for Polynesian cultural matters (e.g., museum, Hawaiian language instruction.)

6. Minimal support (1/2 position) for the Pacific Islands Studies Program at the University of Hawaii.

7. Use of Hawaiian Islands as a storehouse for armed nuclear warheads.

It would appear that the State of Hawaii needs to get its own house in better order before making overtures to the "other" Pacific Islands, whose citizens are well aware of the history of exploitation of the Hawaiian people.

The day following Mr. Kono's speech, Mr. Fred Rohlfing, Attorney General for American Samoa, presented his vision of American Samoa's role in the Pacific. Not surprisingly, Mr. Rohlfing, a Hawaii-born lawyer and erstwhile politician, sees American Samoa as ready to take a leadership role, following the pattern set forth by Mr. Kono, in the development of the emerging Pacific states.

According to Mr. Rohlfing, American Samoa is already prepared to play a central role in regional development. The requisite infrastructure is already there: island-wide roads, electrification, sewage and water; satellite communications; deep water harbor; international airport; island-wide television reception; and two malodorous fish canneries as a basis for further industrial development.

In addition to the already existing infrastructure, American Samoa now has its first elected governor, Mr. Peter Tali Coleman, who, since his election in November, 1978, has been working to establish closer personal connections with other Pacific Island leaders.

The American Samoa game plan is set. All the pieces are in place. The big question is: Why doesn't it work?
Not mentioned by Mr. Rohlfing is the question of incentive of the people of American Samoa. In spite of all the appropriate conditions for economic development in American Samoa, why do the people continue to leave the island in droves for Honolulu, San Diego, and other Samoan communities on the west coast?

There are, of course, no easy answers to this question, but one might consider the nature of the development of the highly touted infrastructure in American Samoa, which, in fact, is alien in every respect, and was developed with minimal Samoan participation. The infrastructure as described by Mr. Rohlfing is an alien concept, funded by alien capital, and built by alien labor. Is it any wonder, then, that it has not worked well in American Samoa? Could one expect other Pacific Islands states to want to plug into a non-working system that has failed to provide economic development for the people of American Samoa?

Although it was not mentioned by Mr. Rohlfing, there may be a parallel between the American Samoan style of development and the highly criticized dependency programs in Micronesia.

Dr. Ben Finney's portrayal of the state of affairs in French Polynesia, an area that gets little attention in the English language media, described a new type of colonialism, characterized as "military" colonialism. In this relationship the metropolitan power is neither extracting resources nor exploiting the population as targets for consumer goods (although a good bit of the latter is going on in French Polynesia). Rather, in the case of French Polynesia, the colonial power is basically paying a reasonably cheap rental fee for an atomic shooting gallery.

One cannot help noticing the parallel here between Mururoa and the Kwajalein Missile Range, with the attendant problems generated by a highly
artificial (and inflated) economy, and massive population shifts to the centers of Papeete and Ebeye in quest of the western bank note.

Dr. Finney also described past and present movements in French Polynesia for independence. Earlier post-war demands, under the leadership of Pouvanaa, were for independence. These were subdued by draconian measures on the part of the French government. More recently, one hears demands for internal self-government and more autonomy, which the French are willing to consider.

Political activists, such as Charlie Ching, are still carrying the banner against French colonialism, and see the promised new form of self-government as the same old game with the same old rules and the same old players. Only the names have been changed.

Are the political rebels in French Polynesia having any effect on developments there? The fact that the March issue of the Pacific Islands Monthly carried Charlie Ching's picture on the cover may be some indication.

Two anthropologists' views on the question of developing dependency relationships were presented by Drs. Craig Severance and Michael Hamnett.

Dr. Severance, speaking from his work on Piis-Losap atoll in the Truk District of Micronesia, concluded that, all things considered, federal largesse is detrimental to an atoll society. In particular, federal assistance through food and make-work programs serves as a disincentive to self-reliance.

In addition, Dr. Severance observed a clear breakdown in the social order of Piis-Losap resulting from the introduced food distribution system, i.e., equal portions per capita, which stands in marked contrast to the traditional system of distribution by rank. It was also pointed out that the question of continued federal assistance programs in the Truk District has complicated local politics, in that some political candidates, in their bids for public offices, promised continued government welfare programs.
The new U.S. position on terminating federal programs will probably
damage some political careers and foster disillusionment. Could this be
construed as a tactic similar to that described by Dr. Finney, where the
French, on leaving Guinea, tore the phones off the wall and ripped water
pipes from the ground?

Dr. Hamnett's comparison of a Polynesian (Kapingamarangi) and a Melanesian
(Atamo) society raises an important ideological question. If Polynesians, as
he claims, are prone to dependency, as a result of traditional and environmental
factors, does this place a special responsibility on the donors? Is it moral
to knowingly create dependency when the recipient is happy to receive?

According to Dr. Hamnett, the Melanesians he lived with stressed independ­
ence in all phases of life. To them, dependence was a shameful state, one to
be avoided at all costs. On the other hand, the Polynesians of Kapingamarangi,
have always been content with a dependency relationship, whether with the gods,
the missionaries, the traders, or the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Who is to say whether the dependency relationship is good or bad? A happy
dependent society may be preferable to a frustrated but independent one. And
maybe somewhere in between there lies the possibility of a happy medium.

In the area of geopolitics, Mr. William Bodde and Dr. Michael Godley spoke
of the positions of two of the world's super powers, the United States and the
People's Republic of China, and their recent, but growing, involvement in the
Pacific area. The level of activities on the part of both countries is not
large, but it is visible.

Both countries seem to be more or less content with the status quo, as
long as the Big Bear is kept at bay. Both countries seem content with the
concept of strategic denial--long an unspoken policy in Micronesia--with spe­
cific reference to the Soviets.
The U.S. has recently been negotiating with Tuvalu, the Gilbert Islands, and the Cooks over the legitimate claims of twenty-six disputed islands. While the U.S. is prepared to relinquish all claims of ownership—most of them having been based somewhat weakly on the provisions of the Guano Act—Uncle Sam still insists, as in the case of Micronesia, on "defense rights," or the right to defend. However, no one has yet defined the need for defense.

Are the Russians likely to invade Funafuti, Tarawa, or even Canton Island? Or is the defense right another term for strategic denial?

Dr. Godley pointed out that China is taking a very humble approach in the Pacific, and suggested that the U.S. might well do the same.

The theme of Mr. Bodde's talk was that the U.S. is doing exactly that.

The panel discussion on "Media's Role in Pacific Island Politics" dwelt largely on journalism as a relatively new form of communication in the Pacific, which faces many problems as it develops.

The most pervasive problem, as outlined by Dr. Jim Richstad, is that of the continued pattern of news flow along the lines of communication established during colonial times. There is still little movement of news across those political lines. Newly independent countries, according to Dr. Richstad, tend to take a somewhat broader view of the world, and attempt to garner and distribute news from other Third World Countries; however, the ties to the mother country remain dominant.

PEACESAT has helped transcend the lingering political boundaries, but several local governments have prohibited the redistribution of news by the local press, especially in those areas where the newspaper is owned and operated by the government, as was reported by Mr. Ngauea Uatioa, Editor of the Atoll Pioneer (Gilbert Islands). Although a new law (January, 1979) was passed in the Gilberts to grant more independence to the press, the situation
there is still described as restrictive.

The need for an adversary press system was stressed by Mr. John Griffin, of the Honolulu Advertiser, and repeated by Mr. Kuar Singh, of the Fiji Sun, which now offers competition and an alternate voice to the long-established Fiji Times. Without such an adversary system, journalists run the risk of "joining the team," either of business or of government.

Ms. Leanne McLaughlin reported on the forthcoming development of journalistic competition in Guam with the beginning of a new daily sometime in the summer of 1979. Hopefully, it will fare better than previous competitors of the Pacific Daily News.

Related to the political and economic pressures on journalists to join the establishment, there are also social pressures on Pacific Island journalists, as described by Mr. Floyd Takeuchi, of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. The smallness of island societies tends to exacerbate this problem.

All of the media panelists agreed that there is a need for more local and pan-Pacific news coverage, better communication lines among journalists, and an independent adversary press.

Dr. Scott Allen and Dr. George Kent both spoke of the new ocean technology and how it is affecting international ocean policy. What they discussed is really the crux of the whole question that this conference is addressing: "The Emerging Pacific Island States."

While the inevitable course of decolonization finally began to unfold in the Pacific in the 1960s, the technology was being developed for the massive extraction of fish and mineral resources from the sea and its floor. Concurrently, there was the growing awareness of the shrinking and possible depletion of the earth's natural resources. The Pacific Ocean, covering one-third of the earth's surface, may be the last terrestrial frontier.
As long as the islands remained well-behaved colonies, there was no cause for concern. But, as new sovereign states, they must be reckoned with in the international political arena. Although the islands are small, there are many of them. All together, with their 200-mile exclusive economic zones, they have the entire Pacific Ocean well covered.

Who will have access to the emerging Pacific Island states and their waters is a matter of major concern.
Since 1973 the Pacific Islands Studies Program has engaged in duplicating inexpensively various work papers whose contents appear to justify a wider dissemination than that of classroom contact or intra-University circulation. Most of these works consist of student papers submitted in academic courses, and which to some limited extent represent a contribution to existing knowledge of the Pacific Islands. Several works have centered on the preparation of bibliographies; heretofore not published but judged to be of important value to students and scholars engaged in Pacific Islands Studies.

The title, author and date of each publication in the series is listed below. A publication may be presently out-of-print; however, in the event there are sufficient requests, the PISP may consider a reprint. It should be noted that copies have and/or are made available only to institutions and scholars interested and engaged in Pacific Islands Studies.

Carl J. Daeufer, Pacific Islands Studies

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1973:1 Considerations on the Rights of Spain Over the Caroline Islands
Translation and Introduction by Patricia Bieber

1974:1 Bibliography of Hawaiian Language Materials at the University of Hawaii, Manoa Campus - Compiled by Nancy Jane Morris, Verna H.F. Young, Kehau Kahapea, Velda Yamanaka

1974:2 Chapters on Hawaii and the Marianas in V.M. Golovnin's Voyage Around the World - Translated by Ella Wiswell

1974:3 Pacific-related Audiovisual Materials for Secondary Schools
Phyllis Turnbull

1974:4 Pacific Islands Workshop for College Librarians in Hawaii, April 8-9, 1974

1974:5 Russian Writings on the South Pacific (A preliminary edition)
Patricia Polansky


1975:1 The Bougainville Taro Blight - Jerry C. Packard

1975:2 Bibliographies of the Kermadec Islands, Niue, Swains Island and the Tokelau Islands - William G. Coppell

1976:1 Micronesian and Polynesian Voyaging - Three Readings
Lesley Bruce, Patricia Schattenburg, Patricia Price Beggerly
1977:1 A World Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations Concerning the Education of the Peoples of the Pacific Islands (Including the New Zealand Maori) - William G. Coppell

1977:2 The Samoan Archives. An annotated list of the archival material of the various governments of Western Samoa from the middle of the Nineteenth Century to the first quarter of the Twentieth Century Ashby J. Fristoe

1978:1 The Use of Nearshore Marine Life as a Food Resource by American Samoans - Harry Burnette Hill


1978:3 Captain Cook and the Pacific Islands. The Proceedings of the Third Annual Pacific Islands Studies Conference, March 31 and April 1, 1978

1979:1 A Status Study of Commercial Cinema in the Pacific Islands - Floyd K. Takeuchi


1979:3 Urbanization in the Pacific: A Tentative Survey - Donald R. Shuster