LOSS, EMERGENCE, AND RETRIBALIZATION: THE POLITICS OF LUMAD ETHNICITY IN NORTHERN MINDANAO (PHILIPPINES)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 1994

By

J.R. Nereus O. Acosta

Dissertation Committee:

Belinda A. Aquino, Chairperson
Robert B. Stauffer
Sankaran Krishna
Jonathan Okamura
P. Bion Griffin
We certify that we have read this dissertation and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Belinda A. Gourd

Robert B. Neustadt

Jonathan M. Mumm

Thelma

SB}
© Copyright 1994
by
J.R. Nereus O. Acosta
To Day-day and the hardy souls
of the Bukidnon hinterlands,

for expanding my
spheres of understanding
Like a light you illumine me
Like a torch you light my way
Like a candle with incense you guide me
Like a resin torch you light my way
In retelling a disorderly story
In narrating a topsy-turvy tale
Enter, all you listeners
You who eavesdrop, come nearer
To my story in my mind
To the tale I am thinking of.

From the Pamara (Invocation)
in the Bukidnon epic, Olaging
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As with most other pieces of academic work, this dissertation was accomplished with institutional support and the help of numerous individuals. To recognize all would entail an endless litany of profuse thanks. There are, however, those few who behoove special mention, to whom my debts are pressing.

I express gratitude to the East-West Center, particularly the Program for Cultural Studies (formerly the Institute of Culture and Communication) for providing me with the splendid opportunity to pursue a doctorate program at the University of Hawai'i, and for the financial assistance accorded me for my fieldwork and other academic-related activities. Very special thanks go to Dean Larry Smith of the Program for Education and Training and to my Program Officer, Helen de Leon Palmore, for their counsel, support, and invaluable friendship.

To Dr. Belinda Aquino, for her scholarly guidance and kind encouragement, I extend a note of sincere appreciation. I am also very thankful to the other members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Robert Stauffer and Dr. Bion Griffin who have been supportive mentors; Dr. Sankaran Krishna, who also served as my Department advisor, for many an inspiring word of advice; and to Dr. Jonathan Okamura, whose valuable comments and suggestions helped sharpen many of my arguments.
I am, and will always be, deeply grateful to my family -- Tay, Nay, Didick and Malou. During fieldwork, whenever I left for remote (and quite unsafe) areas in northern Mindanao, their faces often betrayed bewilderment and worry, but never did I hear a word from them any less than encouraging, supportive, or loving.

I appreciate the many long hours I spent conversing with Datu Mandimate Conrado (Kuya Dadong) Binayao, my key informant, who opened for me a fuller understanding of the world of the Lumads. I am thankful as well to the many datus and baes and other Lumads who welcomed me to their homes and offered me nothing but human warmth. I am particularly indebted to Odissima Suclatan (Nang Oding), who was my guide and interpreter of sorts, who helped make each trip to the hinterlands a welcome and enriching adventure.

My travels around the rugged terrain of Bukidnon were made much easier with the company and friendship of Robert Olaivar (Uncle Bobby). I thank him for a "jeep-ful" of fond memories. Daghang salamat as well to Myma Bornidor and Along Piloton for such willingness to help me with various tasks.

Friends in Hawai'i have been unstinting in their generosity and time -- helping me with some computer work, lending me materials, giving me morale boosts and cheerful votes of confidence. Especially to Hesy Rahmasari and Oona Paredes, a big thank you. Mahalo also to Evelyn Ho of the
Political Science Department and Kim Nakamatsu of the East-West Center, for unfailingly extending a helping hand.

And to my fiancée and best friend, Carina, I express my loving gratitude. She edited my drafts with care and provided incisive critique -- plus enormous inspiration. In goading me towards a resolute finish, she was never lacking in faith and good cheer.

To these individuals and those not mentioned here, my heartfelt maraming salamat. For the inadequacies and flaws that inhere in this work, I alone assume responsibility. But for whatever meaning this opus is able to give -- to a body of scholarship or to the Lumads of northern Mindanao -- this is as much their work as it is mine.
ABSTRACT

Any study that deals with indigenous peoples will invariably evince a metanarrative of loss or a disintegration of culture. Indigenous peoples have been often called "victims of progress and modernization" -- i.e., state penetration and capitalist expansion. It is, however, not always a saga of helpless displacement. In many cases and various historical conjunctures, there is also the phenomenon of invention and emergence among indigenous communities, when syncretic and novel ways of coping with culture change and the influences of modernizing forces are found. In other instances, inventive reappropriations of indigenous customs, values, myths, symbols, and ceremonials are parlayed to political capital. These constitute forms of retribalizations, ways by which tribal or ethnic identities are reconsolidated to better attain collective goals -- such as the claim to land; a resistance against incursions of the state, capitalist interests, or settler immigrations; or the organization of movements for autonomy and secession.

The politics of ethnicity involves the organization and mobilization of groups based on specific identities largely based on ties of blood, kinship, common ancestry, language, or territory. This essentially concerns culture as becoming an object of debate, manipulation, emotional attention, or political struggle.
This study looks into all these concepts and phenomena -- loss, emergence, modernity, retribalization, ethnicity, culture -- as they relate to the Lumads of northern Mindanao. As a central question, this study asks: in the face of modernizing forces, how have Lumads been responding, reacting, or as this work propounds, retribalizing? In what ways has Lumad ethnicity become an object of debate, affective attention, manipulation, and political struggle in the context of a rapidly changing environment? This study argues that retribalization processes among Lumads assume various forms and are bestowed different meanings by actors in different instances and settings. A number of particular cases are discussed to shed light on the variety of retribalizations -- from overt court battles and vigorous political lobbying to lay claim to ancestral land, to the emergent and more subdued attempts to creatively fuse or incorporate modernizing influences into a framework of indigenous cultural idioms and practices.

In grappling with the main problem, a host of related concerns and issues are discussed in varying lengths: an overview of Mindanao's history as a frontier; state-minority relations and ethnic minority policy in the Philippines; the legal ramifications of the claims to ancestral lands; the role of non-government organizations; policy implications on autonomous development for indigenous peoples within the framework of a modern Philippine state; and the argument
that conventional notions of modernity, development, nation-state, and ethnicity are in need of serious re-evaluation.
# Table of Contents

**Acknowledgments** ................................................. vi  
**Abstract** ...................................................... ix  
**List of Tables** ................................................ xvi  
**Maps** ............................................................. xvii  
**List of Abbreviations** .......................................... xix  
**Preface** ........................................................... xx  
**Introduction** ..................................................... 1  
   Endnotes .......................................................... 15  

**Part I. Assembling a Framework of Theory**

**Chapter I. Why Ethnicity?: Questions in a Context of Modernity** ............ 16  
   Modernity, Development, and Ethnicity ........................................ 18  
   Development as a Function of Modernity ....................................... 20  
   The Construct of a Nation-state ............................................... 22  
   Organizing Along Ethnic Lines ............................................... 25  
   Indigenous Peoples and Development ........................................ 28  
   Minoritization and Marginalization ......................................... 29  
   Dynamics of Otherness ..................................................... 32  
   Endnotes .......................................................... 37  

**Chapter II. Retribalization: Recreating Community Among Indigenous Peoples** .............. 41  
   Rebuilding Community .................................................. 42  
   Instrumentalist vis-à-vis Primordialist Ethnicity .............................. 46  
   Retribalization as a Central Concept ....................................... 49  
   Retribalization and Theories of Social Change .................................. 50  
   Endnotes .......................................................... 57  

**Part II. Land, Life, and Lumads**

**Chapter III. Images from Ma’i to Mindanao: An Introduction to the Lumads** ............. 61
Katutubo: The Indigenous Filipino........... 67
The Lumadnon of Northern Mindanao ....... 72
   Lumads and the Uplands .................. 76
   Mindanao and Lumad Ethnography ......... 78
Endnotes .................................... 84

CHAPTER IV. MINDANAO: CONQUEST OF A FRONTIER .... 87

Populating the Frontier ..................... 88
Capitalist Expansion ....................... 90
State Penetration .......................... 92
Environmental Costs ....................... 97
Frontier Politics .......................... 99
Intensified Violence ....................... 101
Post-Marcos Mindanao ...................... 103
What Chances for the Margins? ............. 105
Endnotes .................................... 108

CHAPTER V. FROM TRIBALS TO PEASANTS:
   LOSING AUTONOMY .......................... 111
   Routine Contact and Culture Change in
      the Uplands ............................. 117
      Continued Settler Inmigrations ....... 117
      Corporate Invasions ................... 121
      Official Colonization ................. 122
      Missionary Influences ................ 124
   Shock Phase: Dependency
      and Destitution ........................ 125
   Forms of Coping .......................... 133
Endnotes .................................... 136

CHAPTER VI. STATE-MINORITY RELATIONS .......... 140

Integrationist Policy ....................... 140
PANAMIN: A Selling Under
   False Pretenses .......................... 146
   Para-Military Forces ................. 153
   Cooption of Leaders ................. 154
   Suspect Motives ....................... 156
Constitutional Contradictions ............... 159
Ancestral Land Issues ...................... 163
A Clash of Concepts ....................... 164
Regalian Doctrine ........................ 165
Judicial Guarantees, More
   Contradictions ......................... 170
Towards Regional Autonomy ................ 174
Endnotes ........................................ 179

CHAPTER VII. VARIANCES IN THE RETRIBALIZING
PROCESS ........................................ 186

Datu Lumintong and the Higa-onons ............ 188
The Manobos and the Bukidnon
Sugar Company .................................... 191
Millenarian Movements and Other
Strains of Resistance .............................. 194
Recapturing a Sense of Belonging ............... 199
Politicized Lumads and the NGO Factor ....... 206
Environmentalism .................................. 212
Compromise and Co-optation ..................... 214
The Problem of Political Power ................. 220
Emergent Symbols: The Upper Pulangi
Tribal Council ..................................... 222
Dependency Quagmire ............................. 226
"Thick Descriptions" .............................. 232
Endnotes ........................................ 235

PART III. TRADITION, MODERNITY, AND BEYOND

CHAPTER VIII. CONTACT ZONES: EXPANDING PARADIGMS
OF CULTURE CHANGE ............................ 240

Tradition vs. Modernity ......................... 240
Lumads and Sites Contact ....................... 244
Paradoxes in Ethnic Politics .................... 248
Healing, Customary Law, and Values .......... 253
Looking Past Modernity .......................... 257
Endnotes ........................................ 265

CHAPTER IX. RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNITY:
A SEARCH FOR NEW APPROACHES ............... 267

Development, Discipline, Democracy? .......... 267
Ethnic Struggles Against Development ........ 271
Alternative Paths to Development .............. 274
The Post-colonial Nation-state ................. 275
Beyond the Nation-state? ....................... 278
Incremental Advances ............................ 281
A Search for New Political Forms ............... 284
Legal Systems ..................................... 287
The Question on Ancestral Lands .............. 289
Autonomy and Measures of Self-
Determination .................................... 293
Local Government Code .......................... 295
Education ........................................ 296
Environment ...................................... 300
Ideology of Participation .......... 303
The End of Living, the Beginning of Survival? ........... 305
Endnotes .................................. 307

EPILOGUE .................................. 313
Endnotes .................................. 319

LIST OF INFORMANTS ..................... 320

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................. 322
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provincial Locations and Estimated Population for 1990 of Major Upland and Non-Muslim Indigenous Groups in the Philippines</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population Growth in Mindanao-Sulu, 1903-1990</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map of the Republic of the Philippines

Legend:
- Provincial Boundaries
- Regional Boundaries
- Region X

Source: National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
Medium Term Northern Mindanao Region Development Plan, 1987-1992
Provinces and Major Cities of Mindanao

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BATO</td>
<td>Bukidnon Association of Tribal Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFI</td>
<td>Bukidnon Forests, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSCO</td>
<td>Bukidnon Sugar Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHDF</td>
<td>Civilian Home Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Commission on National Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECS</td>
<td>Department of Education, Culture, and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>Department of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of the Interior and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECTF</td>
<td>Ecumenical Council for Tribal Filipinos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDEC</td>
<td>Ethnic Studies and Development Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMP</td>
<td>Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBL</td>
<td>Kilusang Bagong Lipunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Legal Rights Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIM</td>
<td>Mindanao Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCP-FACT</td>
<td>National Council of Churches-People's Action for Cultural Ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONCC</td>
<td>Office of Northern Cultural Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCC</td>
<td>Office of Southern Cultural Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFID</td>
<td>Philippine Assistance for Intercultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANAMIN</td>
<td>Presidential Assistant for National Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANLIP</td>
<td>Tanggappang Panlegal ng Katutubong Pilipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Reform the Armed Forces Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL</td>
<td>Summer Institute of Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABAK</td>
<td>Tunay na Alyansa ng Bayan Alay sa Katutubo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFCD</td>
<td>Tribal Filipino Center for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRICAP</td>
<td>Tribal Association of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"There is much to learn and appreciate if only we (Lumads) understand our culture more deeply," Datu Makapukaw Adolino Saway's voice trails off and betrays a tone of melancholy. He does not seem embittered as he relates how the younger members of the Talaandig tribe now fail to imbibe many of the customs and traditions his ancestors have long sustained. "Maybe the government must give us more attention," he muses. On this crisp afternoon, Datu Makapukaw does not belabor the points which concern the dwindling resources of the environment or a fast-changing native culture, but instead relishes the sharing of his people's legends, epics, beliefs. His father, Datu Kinulintang, was a raconteur non pareil, living up to an appellation that denotes vibrance, a sparkling personality, a brilliant mind. Datu Makapukaw is more subdued, but his father's influence on him seems clear. He speaks with a sense of calm, his speech almost measured. He gazes wistfully into a distance, a rough moustache lending his weather-beaten face an avuncular mien. He laments the fact that many of his people's traditions have been whittled and the young now "prefer to watch Betamax" than listen to the Olaging, his people's ethnoepic chanted in rambling prose. He speaks about the importance of the "spirits," the light they give, the wisdom they help provide. "The Spirit shall ultimately make our people's culture survive," he says with
quiet conviction. "I would believe the illiterate more than the politicians," he pauses, and then further reflects, "Some of the uneducated seem closer to a truth than many of our politicians, ... politics is so divisive."

There is a candor and sincerity to Datu Makapukaw that somehow disarms the cynical researcher. In long conversations with people like him, one is left wondering whether, indeed, those who we, denizens of the modern world, call "primitive" or "backward" know many simple truths we do not. This thinking may be dismissed by some as a mere offshoot of our so-called politically-correct times, when sundry minorities and people like the Lumads are readily romanticized and enshrined. Be that as it may, extended contacts and engaging conversations with several persons like Datu Makapukaw in the mountains of northern Mindanao manage to do just what his name suggests: makapukaw, to awaken, to rouse, to open.

The experience of fieldwork (and the laborious stage of writing a dissertation that ensues) indeed awakens and ushers one to an appreciation of the vastness and complexity of human knowledge, history, and experience. In this light, a dissertation project truly becomes a humbling endeavor.

I could not be fully certain as to how this work contributes, however little, to a universe of human thought. In the course of research and writing, I often wondered whether I was paying any heed to vaguely established
boundaries in the social sciences by trying to be a fledgling anthropologist, a critical political scientist, an inquisitive sociologist, or an analytical historian -- all at the same time. By varying criteria I may have modestly succeeded in becoming all these -- or may, in some respects, largely failed. At this point I can only say that this work over the last two years has been rewarding. I believe this has been my own way of trying to bestow value on a people's experience, or as Eric Hobsbawm would have it, a small way of "winning a place for the history of ordinary people, common men and women." This is a story, albeit incomplete, about the Lumads, interpreted though it may be from my own normative vantage. My reasons for choosing this as the subject for a dissertation project lay in some desire to break down complacent readings of the colonized Filipino past, and to somehow challenge a myopic and superficial understanding of the so-called tribal minorities by a Christianized majority and the modern Philippine state. On a personal level, returning to my home country and region for fieldwork and writing this dissertation gave me a more meaningful and deeper appreciation of the diversities of the country, its many cultures, its manifold histories -- and what it means (or can mean) to be Filipino.
INTRODUCTION

In the course of research for this dissertation, three events offered sufficient assurance that the work in progress was relevant to the times. These events also gave a sense that the need was ever present to raise fundamental questions about the complexities of ethnicity and the issues that surround the realities of tradition and modernity. Though this work was brought to focus on how the politics of ethnicity is played out in a particular region in the Philippines, the appreciation of these events also occasioned a broader, more general exploration of future directions for societal survival in the approaching century.

From 1990 to 1992 the debate over the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus' "discovery of the New World" rose to a crescendo. Planned celebrations of the quincentennial were marred by protestations from various camps in the academe, from private groups, and, significantly, from many indigenous peoples' organizations all over the Americas. This was, after all, the age of multiculturalism and political correctness, a time when many campuses began to question the very foundations of liberal, Western education. Western ideals and culture were recast in new light and deemed reprehensible for many of the ills of modern society. At the helm of this dominant cultural malaise were so-called "DWMs": dead white males, and Columbus, the argument
averred, was certainly one of them. The argument furthered that Columbus' entry to the Americas forebode the demise of native American cultures and the destruction of the natural world, debunking the long-enshrined belief that with Columbus the seeds of modern democracy and progress were sowed.

As 1992, the year of the Columbian quincentennial, drew to a close, two inspired developments occurred, seemingly interrelated. The year's Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Guatemala's Rigoberta Menchu, a Quiche Maya Indian activist who has worked tirelessly for the rights of indigenous peoples in Central America. In the United Nations, the General Assembly declared 1993 the United Nations Year of Indigenous Peoples. Perhaps in a stroke of symbolic posturing, this declaration was made on December 10, United Nations Human Rights Day. These developments may well have been a natural offshoot of the polemical controversy surrounding the Columbian anniversary. But it seemed the expected course: with the breakup of Eastern Europe, postcolonialism had decidedly come of age and the world was celebrating the end of empires. With this mood of multiculturalism came a reappreciation of cultures trampled upon by the march of imperial conquests. Moreover, these cultures' perceived close identification with nature and their largely reverent stewardship of the earth and its bounties shed new light on the emergent discourse on
environmentalism. In the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, better known as the Earth Summit, many indigenous groups adopted a high profile and took part in the Summit's various forums and activities.

Then at our very doorstep in Hawai‘i, the movement towards indigenization and a reconstruction of histories made a strident call to arms, so to speak. In early 1993 the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement made its presence felt in the 100th commemoration of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani by annexationists aided by the U.S. Marines. Various sources say the gathering of native Hawaiians at the overthrow centennial was the largest ever. The demand for a measure of sovereignty and self-determination among native Hawaiians may still be far from realization, but the debate generated by these events have pointed to a closer reexamination of existing policy and social arrangements vis-à-vis the state's native Hawaiian population.

These events of 1992 and 1993 stand in striking contrast to those a century before. In 1893 the World's Fair in Chicago, which became better known as the World's Columbian Exposition, paid a glowing tribute to Columbus, then reinvented as a champion of Anglo-Saxon values. Columbus was made an icon via an imposing statue of him driving an imperial chariot. Yet this was more than just a paean to the discoverer of the New World. This was to be a
searing symbolism of America's own "discoveries" of other "new worlds." The Columbian Exposition in Chicago was, as writer Garry Wills points out, "the heralding of the American Century." Historian Frederick Jackson Turner was said to have proclaimed at that Chicago Fair that the internal frontier was closed. But before the century was over, America, the incipient imperial power, had acquired Hawai' i, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, Samoa and Wake Island, while occupying Cuba. America had expanded its frontiers beyond the wild West, and as with the native American Indians, other native cultures were destroyed or disrupted in the process.

Colonizing other lands meant viewing the colonized as a primordial Other, a subject to be taught in the ways of the master. The Philippines was to be America's first colonial experiment, having bought the archipelago from Spain for 20 million dollars after the Treaty of Paris in 1898. The Philippine population was around 10 million at that time, so every Filipino was virtually sold for about two dollars each. And to introduce these new colonials to the American public, people from the Cordillera highlands and the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao were brought to the 1905 World's Fair in St. Louis, Missouri.

It was perhaps the first time provincial, though incipiently imperial, America had come to view its colony in the so-called Far East. The 1905 World's Fair featured a
Philippine Pavilion which displayed Felix Resurrecion Hidalgo's prize-winning art work, "La Tragedia del Gobernador Bustamante," and "live Igorots" and other "tribesmen" from the "headhunting forests" of the Philippine islands. The Igorots in G-strings gained more public attention than the ilustrado's painting.² To the American spectator the barely clad tribesmen must have been a sight both fascinating and frightening, an image of distinct Otherness.

This visage of primordiality may have well reinforced in the American mind a colonial impulse of a mission civilisatrice. Here were primitive people, Calibans who had to be taught in the language and ways of Prospero, as William Shakespeare's The Tempest would have it. The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the early days of American colonial rule in the Philippines made clear policy along these lines. The office's task was declared thus: "the systematic investigation of their social organizations and their languages, beliefs, manners, and customs, with a special view to learning the most practical way of bringing advancement in civilization and material property."³

The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes later became the Commission on National Integration, which in turn became the forerunner of the PANAMIN (Office of the Presidential Assistant for National Minorities) during Ferdinand Marcos' rule. The present offices tasked to deal with cultural
minority issues and concerns are the Office of Muslim Affairs, the Office of Southern Cultural Communities and the Office of Northern Cultural Communities. All these years the thrust of these offices has been to seek the integration of "cultural minorities" to the mainstream, Christianized culture. Even so, a measure of cultural preservation has always been made a policy cornerstone of these offices, a call to do least harm and destruction to the richness of indigenous cultures. In this light what is often reflected is an evoking of a pristine pre-Hispanic past where a sense of "Filipino-ness" is rediscovered. In straining for a national mythology -- out of a diversity of ethnic groups and cultures -- histories are retold and the "otherness" of traditional cultures are valorized to depict a semblance of an unadulterated, pre-colonial Filipino.

State policy dealing with indigenous peoples has, however, been ambiguous at best, exploitative and insensitive at worst. Government has been quick to speak of "our ancestral past" and apotheosize the tribal Filipinos, uncorrupted by colonial rule for centuries, whenever concepts of "nationhood" are bandied. In cultural shows ethnic art, music and dance are exalted as mirrors of "Filipino culture." These become as well tourist attractions, not unlike the 1905 World's Fair where the tribesman is depicted as representative of an exotic nation in the distant Orient. Bukidnon's yearly Kaamulan festival,
the Cordillera's Grand Cañao and what used to be Imelda Marcos' cultural extravaganzas in the Folk Arts Theater in Manila are but examples of this exoticization of indigenous cultures. Many of the natives of Mindanao's indigenous groups recall how they were brought to Manila under Imelda's behest to perform their ritual dances for various foreign visitors or sundry social occasions at the Malacañang Palace.4

To the state, the exoticization of native culture proves convenient and less cumbersome than dealing with the real problems of indigenous peoples -- problems as urgent as ancestral land claims, and as fundamental as survival and life itself. Somehow this has provided a cosmetic shield against the ugly realities in the Philippine hinterlands where capitalist exploitation is brazen, where grinding poverty reigns, where issues of ancestral domain fester, and where the continuing of tradition is threatened and uncertain. Traditional moorings on land and life, the wellsprings of culture upon which ritual is anchored, collide -- at times violently -- with state policies and philosophies on development and progress. Thus, on a dimension of an imagined, romanticized nationhood, the tribal Filipino untouched by colonialism is somewhat enshrined; but on a real level of survival, in the sphere of political economy, the indigenous communities are a sector
largely oppressed as they stand in the way of modernity and state-sponsored development.

The ambiguity of state policy on cultural minorities is reflected as well in the 1987 Constitution itself. Almost in the same breath, the call to respect the rights of indigenous groups and yet condone -- though perhaps unwittingly -- their neglect is curiously made. Article XII, Section 5, for instance, makes clear the need to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being." But in Article XII Section 2 the wording on state ownership of all lands is hardly minced: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, ... and other natural resources are owned by the State." The latter provision is a carry-over from the Spanish colonial rule when the Regalian doctrine made all lands in the archipelago public -- that is, owned by the state and thus disregarding any native claims to ancestral domain.

Since the time of the imposition of the Regalian doctrine, the march of modernity has often left in its wake the destruction of native habitats and the natural environment. This has in turn paved way for the disintegration of indigenous cultures. As modernity makes its way into the recesses of the hinterlands in countries like the Philippines, important questions need to be raised: how are indigenous peoples now reacting, responding, or, as
this study propounds, retribalizing? This is supposedly the
day and age of myriad "indigenizations," when cultural
revivals and revisionisms are cutting a wide-ranging swath
across the Americas and around the Asia and Pacific region.
It is a time when indeed culture has increasingly become an
object of emotional and political attention, as sovereignty
movements like Ka Lahui Hawai‘i move to the fore. Moreover,
the climate of anti-Eurocentrism and political correctness
that has swept academic milieux of late has, for better or
worse, ushered in a rethinking, a rewriting of native
histories, a requestioning of Columbus and the conquistadors
of the Old World in that so-called Age of Discovery. It is
largely against this backdrop that this work has unfolded.

What the momentous events mentioned above make manifest
is the phenomenon of rethinking old concepts and remolding
old contexts. In a post-colonial, post-imperial world, new
realities make imperative new approaches to the ways
humankind should live -- within particular communities as
with other peoples and other nations. The lexicon of rights
propagated by Western culture and institutions is, by force
of new realities and understandings, now being redrawn to
include many of those heretofore excluded, exploited
sectors, not least the indigenous peoples around the world.

***

This work's focus is on the Lumads, the indigenous non-
Moslem, non-Christian peoples of northern Mindanao in the
southern Philippines. The central concern of this study is how the Lumads are retribalizing, how they are politicizing their ethnicity to assert group claims that serve to negotiate or challenge existing state structures. To carry out a discussion on the politics of Lumad ethnicity, however, entails expositions of a number of other closely related subjects and issues: theories concerning ethnic politics; the opening of Mindanao as a vast frontier and the region's political economy that evolved; an historical overview of state-minority relations in the Philippines; culture change as it is particularly played out in certain areas observed; the dynamics of complex ethnicities and the creative, syncretic restructuring of traditional social organizations; and how ethnic minority policy can and should be recast.

The primary research conducted for this study was qualitative, involving hours of interviews and conversations with various informants. Many of these interactions were in largely informal settings and formats -- over a meal with a datu, in a circle of elders gathered for an afternoon of story-telling, with women and children going about their daily chores, in stimulating exchanges with academics, government officials, activists of different sorts. Periodic visits were made to remote regions in northern Mindanao, especially in the mountainous province of Bukidnon, over a period of ten months (from February to
December 1992). In these places contact with ordinary Lumads came in many forms and ways -- from participating in the Dugso, the traditional dance of the Bukidnon Lumads performed in different rituals or ceremonies, to observing a datu healing a member of the community through invocations of the spirit world. In many of these interactions in the hinterlands, tape recorders as well as pen and paper were sparingly used so that the subjects were not distracted or intimidated. The absence of such conspicuous research tools was believed to be more beneficial in terms of encouraging informants to speak and relate their stories and experiences. Notes were then frantically scribbled after each interaction -- away from sight of the informants.

What underpinned this study on the politics of Lumad ethnicity was an interpretive approach, highlighting meanings intrinsic in culture and human actions. Culture is seen not as ahistorical or static, but as dynamic and functioning in relation to a wider social, political and economic environment. The underlying given is that the Lumads are acting subjects rather than behaving objects -- "as persons in situations, as agents acting within a public world of understandable norms, conventions, and rules."5 This premise generates certain important methodological prescriptions, not least the forms of open-ended interviews, free-flowing conversations, and other sources of qualitative data. Interpretive social inquiry, after all, requires
sensitivity and attention to the subjects' self-understandings, seeking to see events through the eyes of those who live in and through them. As such, there ought to be more than just an enumeration of facts or a cataloguing of observations and information. Descriptions "must draw connections, assign emphases, tease out the nuances of style and the ambivalence of intention, recapture the emotional tone and ambiance of a situation"⁶ -- all to be enlivened in the medium of the researcher's language.

This work, therefore, is in a simplistic sense, a sequence of narratives. The researcher's aim has been to tell a good, theoretically-informed story. Information gathered from the field, ideas and concepts drawn from secondary sources, theoretical considerations found in relevant literature, and the researcher's own analyses and reflections were all woven into the succeeding text. The discussion of structural factors and theories of ethnopolitics were interspersed with stories of particular events and about real Lumad individuals. From these, new and broader abstractions were made that largely reflect an emergent epistemological landscape in the social sciences -- a departure from a positivist-empiricist-predictive position to one more cultural-interpretive. This latter stance has in turn led to conceptualizing new objectives and goals for public policy related to indigenous cultures, as well as to
understanding some of the sociological and cultural ramifications of state actions.

The work that follows is divided into three parts. The first portion is devoted to a review of the theoretical literature on ethnicity and ethnic politics. This section lays out the conceptual framework which the entire work employs, establishing the vantage from which analyses are made. Descriptions from fieldwork comprise the second part. This section includes an elaboration of structural dynamics that have unfolded in a frontier like Mindanao, providing an overview of transnational capital penetration and the entry of state-sponsored development projects into the region. Such structural factors are shown to have caused rapid culture change among indigenous communities and given rise to the sorry conditions the Lumads find themselves in. Discussions are made on the role of the state and how it has utilized ethnicity to suit its self-preserving purposes. The central issue of ancestral lands is elaborated in this section. Forms of retribalization among Lumad groups in northern Mindanao, particularly in Bukidnon, are explored with some specific examples drawn from fieldwork. Analyses of such configurations are made in light of the theoretical considerations discussed in the initial chapters. The third part constitutes the attempt to bring together the two foregoing portions into broader abstractions on culture change and indigenous responses to it. This work draws to a
close with reflections on how state policy must be rethought and redesigned vis-à-vis indigenous peoples in the Philippines, and how the present construction of the so-called Philippine nation-state must be refigured in view of forces like ethnic mobilization that virtually challenge its own legitimacy.
PART I

ASSEMBLING A FRAMEWORK OF THEORY

"We are global citizens with tribal souls."

Piep Hein, Danish poet
CHAPTER I

WHY ETHNICITY?: QUESTIONS IN A CONTEXT OF MODERNITY

Marshall Macluhan, the Canadian writer and communications theorist, may perhaps be forced to agree with Piep Hein's maxim if he surveys the present global landscape. Despite the phenomenal advancements in the field of telecommunications, the world is not in all respects a "global village," as Macluhan once declared. Although the last few decades have seen the forging of supranational organizations -- from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the European Economic Community -- many regions of the world are more than ever mired in ethnic strife. Nation-states break down into smaller units based on more specific identities, often in terms of primordial ties of blood, descent, kinship, race, birthplace, or territory of origin. Yugoslavia, the former republics of the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon are but some of the societies that have yet to know the meaning of harmonious co-existence. These places are sites of unrelenting conflict, examples of ethnic-based factionalism descending into anarchic proportions. In this post-Cold War, interdependent world; it would seem unthinkable that some states could still enforce "ethnic cleansings," policies that bespeak of abominable inhumanity.
Despite mounting interdependence -- even a movement towards a universalization of global culture via telecommunications and mass media -- cultural specificities continue to be stressed, and cultural identities and traditions are becoming more and more objects of political and emotional attention. Why such phenomena? Why do groups cohere primarily on the basis of ethnicity as they advance their political and economic struggles against a modern state or against other groups in society? The establishment of a body like the United Nations and all efforts toward common markets and political incorporations notwithstanding, humanity is perhaps without any clear, definitive answers. Ethnicity is, after all, a complex phenomenon and explanations can be slippery and imprecise.

A simplistic answer may lie, however, in the so-called "survivalist" position in studies on ethnicity. Survivalists argue that ethnicity will not simply disappear. It may, however, take new forms in modern societies because it answers basic communal affective needs that the state and other associative organizations cannot meet. As Anthony Smith avers, "while the revolutions of industrial capitalism, the bureaucratic state and secular mass-education represent a watershed in human history comparable to the Neolithic transition, they have not obliterated or rendered obsolete many of the cultures and identities formed in the pre-modern eras."
Ethnicity -- or the politicization of such -- is often identified as a "pre-modern" phenomenon. Thus, its assertions or reassertions that find expression in forms that range from cultural revivals in the arts to fervent nationalisms or secessionist movements, are regarded by modern nation-states as atavistic and destructive of the ideal of modernity. But what, in the first place, is modernity?

**Modernity, Development, and Ethnicity**

Modernity, although defined in myriad ways, underscores an increasing interdependence of complex organizations, the integration of economies, the expansion of state education systems, the extension of political rights, and the achievement of popular participation and equal opportunity. Modern society has always been premised on the establishment of a "rational" order. Modernity, as such, has necessitated "rational" behavior to make a modern economy and polity function effectively. Rational in this sense is taken to mean non-ethnic. S. N. Eisenstadt has theorized that modernization is essentially composed of social differentiation and social mobilization. For society to adapt and be flexible to constant change integral to the modernization process, the political sphere must be differentiated from the religious or traditional, the latter being taken as "non-rational." Social mobilization, on the other hand, entails a process of breaking down traditional
social and psychological loyalties so as to allow new rearrangements of society and economy. These rearrangements pertain to administrative centralization and technological advancements.

The maintaining or reviving of smaller units based on ethnicity is thus considered a hindrance to modernity or to this progression towards the expansion and extension of sectors and rights. It has been a prevailing perception among policy-makers and scholars that assertions of ethnicity are opposed to modernity. Modernity and ethnicity, as such, are seen to be inversely related.

The pervasive reach of modernization into traditional societies has been seen by many theorists in the social sciences as attenuating the importance of ethnicity. Clifford Geertz, for one, forwards the idea of an "integrative revolution" whereby ethnic ties would eventually disappear in the face of expanded civil sentiment.6 Theories on modernization in the main underscore the convergence of cultures and an expectancy of diminution of ethnic diversity with modernization.7 These theories based on Weberian premises assume that ethnicity and change towards modernity are mutually exclusive. Up through the 1960s "liberal" expectations of ethnicity suggested, as Glazer and Moynihan point out, a fading of differences into a common civic culture.8 Moreover, Marxist
expectations about ethnicity was that class would obliterate background distinctions of any kind.

Yet even any cursory survey of the global political landscape at present will evince that these theories do not necessarily obtain. In what are often called transitional or modernizing societies, ethnicity's role has not been lessened; in fact, it tends to be heightened. Even in multi-ethnic societies like America which are intent on creating a "melting pot" of races and cultures, Glazer and Moynihan argue that ethnic attachments would grow more, not less, pronounced.

From the vantage of modernity, conflicts that rage in Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sri Lanka are viewed as perplexing and aberrant, if not outrightly menacing. The politicization of ethnicity has thus been alternately seen -- either by modern states or by Western scholarship -- as disintegrative, a threat to state policies on integration; as mere atavistic movements impeding the advances of modernization; or as epiphenomenal to Marxist analyses of class structure and conflict.

**Development as a Function of Modernity**

Development is said to be a function of modernity, and often modernization and development are used synonymously. A clear distinction must be made, however. Development is a process of change from one stage to another towards a putatively higher, more desirable, end -- particularly
modernization. The neoclassical or liberal perspective of development sees this as a specific transitional process, holding the view, as enshrined by Walt Rostow, that societies would pass from a traditional stage to a society of mass consumption. Marxist and neo-Marxist schools of thought regard development also in a process towards something supposedly better, in this case a classless society. Both stress the centrality of industrialization as key towards such desired states.

Ethnicity vis-à-vis these development paradigms is viewed in two ways: in a political dimension ethnicity is seen as stymied political development, and in socio-economic terms ethnicity's prevalence is proof of underdevelopment. In either case, ethnicity is taken as a hindrance to further development in the direction of modernization. As Karl Deutsch maintains, ethnic movements are a disjunction between social mobilization and assimilation to state-building culture. Even so, Deutsch optimistically sees ethnic conflicts as a function of incipient development, but would disappear in time as modernization increases. A derivative argument from the theoretical premises of Deutsch and others would forward that the various forms of ethnic mobilization, especially in modernizing or developing societies, are fueled by the failure of these paradigms of development to address adequately the needs of these societies.
The Construct of a Nation-State

In these less developed countries modernization is upheld as the overarching goal within the construct of a new "nation-state." The nation-state, after all, is conceptually an integral part of modernity. Governments often proclaim that development towards an increasingly modern society is the national, collective interest, the end-all for the "nation" which the state must actively pursue. The nation is supposedly an aggregation of individuals sharing a conscious identity and loyalty. The state is a bureaucratic administrative unit extending over an identifiable geographic territory and monopolizing legitimate forces of violence. When sentiments and culture overlap with such an administrative unit, the nation-state comes into existence. In a modern context, nation and state are seen as interchangeable. This definition of a nation-state is, however, more fiction than reality. Benedict Anderson calls the shaping of such national identities within the framework of a state "imagined."

The nation-state is a concept born out of the Western experience. The French Revolution had led to the idea that the nation-state -- the state being the vehicle of a single nationality -- was the rational, progressive, and desirable form of organization for all peoples. As Peter Worseley explains, "'national identity' involves a relationship
between the individual and the state, a relationship initially (in the age of absolutism) conceived of as one of subject, and only later, with the rise for the modern bourgeois state, as one of citizenship.\textsuperscript{16} It was Rousseau who averred that citizens of a state should have a uniform relationship to the state, in turn reflecting their general will.\textsuperscript{17} Those intermediate organizations such as ethnic communities or associations came to be regarded as irrational and undesirable -- which the state discouraged or even outrightly suppressed. The idea of nation-state was integral to European imperialism and colonial rule in the other continents from the 18th century, so much so that the political boundaries set (often arbitrarily) by colonial powers in conquered territories have been largely retained in the post-colonial era. These are the nation-states the United Nations unproblematically recognizes and those which are recognized as having the rights to self-determination. However, the populations within these constructed nation-states are ethnically diverse -- especially in the former colonies of Asia and Africa. Yet these peoples with distinct histories and cultures are rarely considered "nations"; they are, instead, referred to as "minorities."

What states call "nation-building" is an integral part of a process of creating a "modern society." E.K. Francis defines the creation of a "modern society" as entailing two processes: nationalization in the political dimension and
industrialization in the economic dimension.\textsuperscript{18} The former entails the "general homogenizing processes through which traditional and particularistic identifications and solidarities, including those based on shared ethnicity, are replaced by the nation as the principal focus of societal identification and solidarity, providing legitimacy for political actions."\textsuperscript{19} It is thus not surprising to note that integration has been the overriding policy of new nation-states vis-à-vis indigenous ethnic communities within their bounded political territories. In the rivalry between ethnicity and nation within the context of a modern nation-state, the latter is considered the legitimate actor.\textsuperscript{20} Industrialization, on the hand, entails the integration of local economies and the incorporation of a national economy into the global capitalist economy. Smaller societies and their resource bases within the territorial confines of given nation-state are thus usurped in the name of greater industrial development.

Whether capitalist or socialist, states in the modern era have aimed for both nationalization and industrialization. Both systems fundamentally differ in approach to attain such goals, one stressing individual liberties, the other equality. But the end is clearly the same: a stable, unified nation-state and a society of economic prosperity. All other issues are to be subordinated to this supposedly collective vision.
Ethnicity is one such phenomenon that can be easily invalidated and, if deemed necessary, squelched in the name of national development. The creation of the nation-state, as Worseley contends, involves not only the economic centralization of the market, or the concentration of political power in the hands of a dominant class and the establishing of a centralized bureaucracy. It also integrally involves cultural standardization, the subjugation of "primitive tribes" or "subaltern" ethnic communities.21

Organizing Along Ethnic Lines

Whether in capitalist or socialist systems, the push for both integral components of modernization -- nationalization and industrialization -- collides in tumult with the realities of ethnicity. Ethnic struggles, whether they be deemed directly a function of modernization or not, take place not only within groups in industrial societies or large, urbanized centers where inter-ethnic conflicts can turn bloody and violent. It is happening as well in the peripheries, away from centers of commerce or government, in remote regions where the fight for access and use of resources like land form a core of struggle. In the latter case, the main actors are indigenous groups -- tribes, in common parlance. Through perpetuated state control and capitalist expansion, patterns of demographic dislocation and impoverishment occur among these groups. As dependency
is heightened and integration is carried out, these "tribes" who continue to work on the land become increasingly known as "peasants." Eventual relocation to urban areas supposedly make them "ethnic minorities." 22

Ethnicity is thus taken to be broadly synonymous with tribalism. This is so because strict distinctions are not made between the terms "ethnic group" and "tribe." Ethnic groups could be seen as part of industrial society. In most cases, however, "tribe" is used to denote a primitive state, occupying a lower niche in a primitivity-civilization continuum. The term "tribe" has been conveniently used by states for administrative purposes. In any case, the terms "ethnic group" and "tribe" presuppose, as Wallerstein argues, the existence of deep loyalties at various levels. These are loyalties to the family, to the community, to the tribal government and chief. 23 The concept of ethnicity, therefore, assumes certain characteristics which could be prevalent in both urban and far-flung, rural settings. Specifically, the roles of culture and locally-based interests are paramount. 24

Ethnicity, therefore, becomes an informal organizing principle, as "an answer to basic communal affective needs that other associative organizations cannot meet." 25 When theorists speak of "associative" organizations, they decidedly refer to formal organizations. Groups that organize on formal bases do so with clearly specified aims,
with their organizational functions rationally planned along bureaucratic lines. Max Weber argues that this kind of organization or association is the most efficient and effective of human organizations. As for ethnicity, the realities of kinship, friendship, ritual, ceremonial, and other symbolic activities -- instead of rational, bureaucratic approaches -- are employed to articulate the organization of the group. Some political scientists have used the term "non-associational" to refer to such groups organized along informal lines.

The organization of groups along formal lines usually occurs in industrialized societies while ethnic fragmentation or tribalism has been associated with the postcolonial societies of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Class, for instance, as a basis for collective organization can thus be expected in more defined capitalist formations. In such cases different ethnic groups interact politically and economically and become involved in new cleavages that cut across ethnic identities, in the process diminishing the primacy of the latter.

Modernity and traditionalism do not always determine how groups organize themselves, however. Ethnic activism and separatism cuts across the First and Third Worlds. There are groups in so-called modern, industrialized countries that organize along the (informal) lines of ethnicity. Even in many advanced industrial societies the
ethnic group is a significant basis for group cleavage because ethnic identity is an effective means of group mobilization. The ethnic group becomes an effective vehicle for expressing demands for group advantage -- power, status, wealth -- in the political system. As such, the ethnic group combines utilitarian interests with affective attachments. Ethnicity has become a crucial social and political variable in industrial societies because other bases of group mobilization -- particularly ideological and class ties -- have declined. 28

**Indigenous Peoples and Development**

The processes towards a modern society especially impact greatly on sectors like indigenous peoples. The drive for homogenization rides roughshod over their own cultures and traditions while the drive for industrialized development pushes them to oppressive margins of economic existence.

The problematization of development is central to any discussion of indigenous cultures because it is often in the name of development that such cultures are disrupted or ultimately eradicated. Development as it has come to be known in modern contexts has in the main brought social disorganization, a decline in the quality of life, and resource depletion in tribal territory. 29 As Bernard Nietschmann posits,
What is called "economic development" is the annexation at gun point of other peoples' economies. What is called "nation-building" is actually state expansion by nation-destroying. Territorial consolidation, national integration, the imperatives of population growth and economic progress are phrases used by Third World states to cover up the killing of indigenous nations and peoples.  

The invalidation of indigenous cultures -- ancient universes of thought and tradition -- is tied to the functioning of a political economy that is loath to recognizing cultural specificities. Development in the prevailing context of a modern political economy aims towards a universalization of a capitalist economic order, and with it the structures of state and cultural values necessary for its maintenance. The theories of Immanuel Wallerstein on the dominance of a world capitalist order support this argument. The existence of metropoles (core countries) that dominate and exploit peripheries characterize this world system. Indigenous societies are the outermost peripheries in modern nation-states; in poor, underdeveloped Third World countries, which are peripheries of the industrialized Western metropoles, marginalized indigenous peoples are what various scholars refer to as the "Fourth World."  

Minoritization and Marginalization

The philosophy that undergirds the discourse of development assumes a Benthamian premise of doing the
greatest good for the greatest number. The corollary implication is that the good for a greater number is sought at the expense of a few. Ethnic mobilizations, as pointed out earlier, are viewed as irrational, atavistic impediments to attaining this greatest good. Darwin's theorizations may likewise be called to bear upon this development philosophy: insofar as development represents a progression in human evolution, weaker cultures in the face of a dominant one will not be fit to survive -- a cultural Darwinism of sorts. Marx's own arguments of dialectical materialism point as well to a linear, unidirectional process of historical development, whereby class struggle assumes predominance and eradicates primordial affinities of any kind.

Whether ethnicity be seen from the utilitarian optic of the greatest good for the greater number or the Marxist vantage of fundamental class conflict, the fact remains that indigenous peoples always bear the brunt of industrial development -- capitalist or socialist. These groups of people become the most marginalized sectors of society -- dislocated, discriminated against, oppressed and most "minoritized."

The term minority has always been used to refer to groups subjected to prejudice and discrimination. A common definition in the social sciences of a minority is that of Louis Wirth:

[a] group of people who, because of their physical or cultural
characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority in a society implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group enjoying higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status therefore carries with it exclusion from full participation in the life of society.\textsuperscript{33}

This does not necessarily underscore a numerical or statistical concept since some minorities are those who are dominant in a society -- like the white minority in a predominantly black South Africa. Rather, this definition presupposes asymmetrical power relations, the concept minority being equated with subordination.

The concepts of majority and minority are, as Benedict Anderson posits, recent constructions. There are, for instance, no traditional words for either concept in any indigenous language in Southeast Asia. The dichotomy of majority-minority is noted as having emerged from the maturing of the colonial state.\textsuperscript{34} The European colonial administrators in Southeast Asia were the first to conduct censuses which classified people according to "ethnic groups." Colonial rulers then sought to build majority coalitions around themselves. These were composed of those who were effectively colonized and Christianized.\textsuperscript{35} During the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines the creation of a majority was contingent on the conversion of colonized subjects to the Christian faith. Historian
William Henry Scott writes that the Christianization of various indigenous groups created a Filipino majority — those who had the same king, the Spanish monarch. Those groups which changed least, who had resisted colonial influences, were "infieles" (heathens) who now comprised a minority. The term minority is thus not so much a cultural term as it is a political category; it refers to people who resisted integration into a culture and dominant political structure. This was carried over into the American colonial period in the Philippines as provinces in Mindanao with indigenous populations were classified as "non-Christian." The religious label was employed to denote minority status vis-à-vis the Christianized, civilized Filipino majority. This mindset has prevailed as a colonial educational system continues to discriminate against native, non-Christian cultures. It is thus not surprising to have even an illustrious Filipino statesman, Carlos Romulo, declare that the "Igorots (indigenous people of the Cordilleras) are not Filipinos."37

**Dynamics of Otherness**

The concepts of linearity and development stages preponderant in modern society have relegated indigenous peoples to lower niches in a progression of development. Nineteenth-century theories in anthropology postulated a unilineal social evolution leading from savagery to barbarism to civilization, or from animism to polytheism to
monotheism.\textsuperscript{38} The premises were akin to Rostow's "stages" theory of modernization that traces society as evolving from traditional formations to an "age of mass-consumption."\textsuperscript{39}

The latter stage is represented by the industrialized countries of the West, just as the unilineal model of social evolution supposedly culminates in the apex of Western civilization. In most, if not all, modern or modernizing societies, minority indigenous peoples are pejoratively regarded as "primitive," "tribal," unlearned in the ways of civilization, unsophisticated.

This condescension and typecasting of indigenous peoples have been often employed by states as a convenient justification for their often forcible subordination -- from the oppressive structures of colonialism of the past, to the neo-colonial practices of state-sponsored development in the present. The assigning of such groups of people to the lowest positions in a primitivity-civilization continuum has sealed for these people a fate of extreme Otherness. Since the so-called 'Age of Discovery' to the present, the "Other" represented the entity divorced and distinct from the colonial/colonized, European/Europeanized, Christian/Christianized Self. Like the Africans traded as slaves for a growing Europe-centered world economy since the 17th century, native peoples have been thought to be less than fully human. What Henry Louis Gates, Jr. says about Blacks in his writings on race in literature, may be said of
native peoples everywhere. With the Enlightenment, Gates writes, came the systematization of human knowledge which, relegating Blacks to a lower place in the great chain of being, an ancient construct that arranged all of creation on a vertical scale from plants, insects, and animals through man to the angels and God Himself.40

The Enlightenment, as the term itself indicates, was supposedly characterized by man's ability to reason, and reason, René Descartes forwarded, was above all human characteristics. Blacks were devoid of reason, so the argument went, and by extension, native peoples of pre-literate societies were viewed in such light as well. Writing was seen as the visible sign of human reason and writing was simply absent among these peoples. Thus, as in the Philippine case, Spanish colonialists had to refer to the natives of the archipelago as "indios." The appellation was a derivative of the Columbian label for the "Indians" of the Americas, the connotation being that as colonial subjects such people were lesser in their humanity.

This thinking was a hallmark of colonial conquests, a raison d'être for grand projects of subordination and imperium. The Spaniards in the Philippines would seize it as a reason for Christianization, Americans would call it "benevolent assimilation," a catchy euphemism for the Americanization of the native ethos through colonial education. In any case, this was believed to be a mission civilisatrice, or what Rudyard Kipling unabashedly declared,
"the white man's burden." Dean Worcester, head of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the American colonial administration, was said to have loved the "savage" Filipino, "frozen in time and culture, unconscious of nationality and statehood." Historian Rodney Sullivan writes that in debating the question of eventual Philippine independence, Worcester made the point that the "Philippine question was not one of politics but of ethnology." Ethnology, Sullivan explains, antedated anthropology in its focus on primitive societies and was concerned "not only with the description and classification of peoples outside Western civilization, but also with the relationship between primitive and civilized man." This becomes apparent when the renaming of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1903 to the Ethnological Survey of the Philippines is noted. Ethnology, as such, was arguably a justification for American colonialism in that,

[Nineteenth century ethnologists believed that civilization -- the mix of commercialism, industrialism, Protestant Christianity and democracy which predominated in Northern Europe and America -- was a universal cultural mode to which all humanity, no matter how primitive, could and should aspire. Primitivity, understood as an early stage of humanity's upward movement towards civilization, was subject to analysis by ethnologists, confident of their cultural location on the summit of human achievement but anxious to understand the processes involved in cultural progress. Primitive man was living evidence that culture and civilization were distinct, that
Civilization was the product of cultural growth over time.\textsuperscript{44} Civilization in the Western or colonial context has, however, wrought its own perils. A litany of the ills of modern society may readily suggest that the "upward movement towards civilization" has not necessarily contributed to the well-being of many "primitive" indigenous peoples. If anything, many groups and communities have only known the dark underside of civilization -- socio-economic oppression and a loss of human community. The "primitivities" modern civilization has sought to demolish are, in fact, being rediscovered and reconstructed in various ways and forms. Primordial bonds of kinship, language, common ancestry and history are revived or seized to assert political claims against embodiments of civilization, primarily the modern state. The concept of "tribe" is thus reappropriated from a derogatory connotation of a rudimentary socio-political system to one that signifies a reaffirmation of communal anchorage; this renewed sense of identity and community is then embraced to better cope with -- or even stave off some of -- the persistent influences of modernity. In many areas of the world various indigenous peoples' "retribalizations" suggest that the subjugated, primitive Other has come of an age when it impinges on the civilized Self.
ENDNOTES


42. Ibid., p. 384.

43. Ibid., p. 87.

44. Ibid.
CHAPTER II

RETRIBALIZATION: RECREATING COMMUNITY AMONG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

There are an estimated 200 million indigenous peoples all over the world today. They are commonly, if not pejoratively, known as "tribes," in reference to the features of their small-scale societies -- self-contained, kinship-based, semi-nomadic, preliterate. The origins of tribes, scholars point out, lie in the earliest stages of human evolution, when humans emerged as hunter-gatherers. As anthropologists posit, the origins of basic human behavior patterns -- kinship, marriage, taboos, territoriality, ways of social interaction -- are manifested in tribes.¹

Tribal cultures are, however, vanishing from the face of the earth. Modernity has ridden roughshod over tribal cultures, and the dazzle of "civilization" continues to pull tribal peoples away from native lifeways. In various cases worldwide small tribes have been completely assimilated into dominant structures, while others have been herded into reservations with inadequate natural resources that are barely able to sustain their cultures. Many now face the breaking down of community brought about by forces of modernity -- expanding state and capitalist interests into heretofore isolated domains.
Rebuilding Community

Despite the incursions and rapid social changes, tribalism persists -- albeit in new forms. As society modernizes and becomes increasingly heterogeneous, people tend to recreate the "tribe," forging social units in which a sense of "belonging" is still possible. This process of "retribalization" is thus a rebuilding of community carried out through an assertion of a distinct identity tied to an ethnic, cultural past. The demographic and cultural dislocations of indigenous peoples are readily contrasted with a pristine, if mythical, past, an image of communal unity and stability. Joseph Rothschild makes the succinct point that,

[Under contemporary conditions of rapid change, intrusive yet remote state apparatuses, weak functional-interest groups, and diluted political consensus, people often cleave to, or rediscover, or even invent, their ethnicity -- putatively rooted in "primordial" bonds -- for personal identification, emotional security, and communal anchorage.]

Retribalization in the context of modernity is thus not a return to being contained cultural isolates, in the mold of !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari who have retained their traditions of past centuries up to the present. The !Kung Bushmen, because of unique environmental conditions of seclusion, have been largely spared the fate of most other indigenous peoples. In the face of dramatic culture
changes, as has been the case for most indigenous peoples, the recreation of the tribe today entails new frameworks and redefinitions.

The breaking down of community does not necessarily mean that traditional structures cease to exist or that rootlessness and anomie always follow modernization; in various instances traditional groups restructure themselves or old structures are reoriented towards new goals. Immanuel Wallerstein points out that detribalization is simply the decline in chiefly authority; it does not mean that "an individual who is no longer loyal to his chief has rejected as well the tribe as the community to which he owes certain duties and from which he expects a certain security." Colin Legum concurs as he reasons that "traditional systems may pass away while tribal affiliations remain strongly entrenched in the defense of ethnocentric interests." As George De Vos notes, ethnicity is at its deepest psychological level a sense of survival tied to the survival of the group. The breakdown of community occurs because of the subjugation of land and culture, which in turn gives rise to the need to maintain or establish a unique and recognizable identity. After all, those whose identities are rarely questioned or who have not known such subjugation have little need for an assertion of ethnic identity.
The breaking down of community becomes a crisis of communal identity, which makes indigenous peoples more aware of their marginalization and oppression. In some instances, this marginalization may lead them to accept a minority, inferior status -- or be greatly vulnerable to assimilation or absorption into a dominant culture. In many other cases, however, this allows them to define themselves symbolically, "creating a positive view of their heritage on the basis of cultural as well as racial distinctions, thereby establishing a sense of collective identity." Identity, therefore, is forged not only from within the group itself, a self-definition, but out of a sense of solidarity devolving upon groups that find themselves different from other groups and cut off from society.

The various patterns of ethnic formation and transformation, which Eric Casiano refers to as ethnogenesis, then leads to political action, as "ethnographically autonomous communities become ethnicized in response to external stimuli." Various scholars on ethnic studies have concurred with this argument that under certain conditions, modernization creates and sustains contemporary ethnic movements. Ethnicity is thus said to grow reactively in the context of competing groups or in that of a larger society organized as a state or empire. Ranji Kothari explains that,

The culturally homogenizing, socially fragmenting and atomizing processes of
modernization, induced largely through state intervention, create conditions of social and economic vulnerability and insecurity in which the state takes on the role of manager of those vulnerabilities and insecurities. In a period of apparent growth (benefiting a minority) but real shrinkage (which displace millions from their homes and livelihood), people compete for scarce resources and benefits, and to do this they must organize.14

Based on his study of the Hausa of Nigeria and their efforts to reemphasize the tribal unit in a rapidly expanding city of Ibadan, Abner Cohen offers an instructive definition of retribalization:

A process by which a group from one ethnic category, whose members are involved in a struggle for power and privileges with the members of groups from another ethnic category, within the framework of a formal political system, manipulate some customs, values, myths, symbols, and ceremonials from their cultural tradition in order to articulate an informal political organization which is used as a weapon in that struggle.15

Similarly, Eric Casiano expounds thus:

Politically motivated ethnic groups can use cultural, economic, territorial, and emotional arguments to advance socio-political ends. However, to maintain their visibility and viability in the face of competing groups, ethnic communities consolidate themselves by rituals and cultural symbols that express their distinctive identity.16

The formation of collective organizations around ethnicity presupposes a given conceptualization of ethnic action and awareness in terms of instrumental political and economic interests and strategies. Ethnicity as a political
strategy aims to secure or deny access to social goods and services, resources that are controlled or sought after by the centralizing authority or other dominant groups.17 The study of ethnicity is in fact, as Abner Cohen argues, the study of "intensive struggle between groups over new strategic positions of power within the structure of the (new) state."18 In this context of identity reassertion and ethnic conflict, David Horowitz maintains that every issue becomes a survival issue attended by the search for both symbolic (assertion of group worth, status and rights) and practical solutions (authority positions for the elites, communal stability for the masses).19 In more advanced ethnic struggles this ethnic consciousness has become ideologized and has even evolved into salient nationalism or even secession. As David Brown contends in his discussion on state and peripheral ethnic communities in Southeast Asia, "once the ideology of ethnic nationalism has been articulated by ethnic elites and adopted by peripheral communities as an element in their communal consciousness, then political confrontation with the state was signalled."20

Instrumentalist versus Primordialist Ethnicity

The phenomenon of ethnicity has been studied from various angles. The scholarship produced over the years have no doubt enriched the understanding of such a complex
reality: in multi-ethnic societies like the United States ethnic groups have been defined as racial or cultural groups and their behavior analyzed within the context of cultural change and assimilation; other studies have primarily employed the framework of "situational analysis" -- such as those viewing ethnic groups as interest groups in the purely political sense; others have emphasized the subjective dimensions of ethnic ties and stressed concepts of fluid boundaries. The different approaches imply imprecisions and inadequacies in fully understanding the reality of ethnicity.

A great deal of the imprecision may lie with the obvious fact that ethnicity is in various ways very subjective. The concept of the ethnic group as a situationally constituted identity or as an organizational design for the pursuit of collective goals,\textsuperscript{21} overlaps with the conception of an ethnic groups as primordially constituted entities based on ancestry and kinship. This latter position sees ethnic groups as basically pre-rational, fixed and bounded; ethnic identity, as such, is seen as an independent variable determining interests and strategies rather than being determined by them. The "instrumentalist" position, on the other hand, emphasizes the utilitarian and rational bent of these groups whose internal dynamics reflect changing conditions.
Many in the social sciences have reservations about the seemingly culturally determinist emphasis of primordiality and the infusion of some kind of romantic, emotional dimension to it. But the non-rational dimensions of ethnicity are, as John Stack affirms, "an undeniable aspect of contemporary ethnic mobilizations throughout the world." Nathan Glazer contends that ethnic conflict is seen as being "more effective in reaching and drawing upon the more emotional layers of human and social personality than class conflict." Class conflict is considered as rational in that it is based on the defense and expansion of interest; ethnic conflict is likewise rational in this sense, but combines with it a less rational appeal that is linked with powerful emotions.

This study maintains that primordial attachments do exist, derived from "assumed 'givens' of social existence" -- communities based on shared religion, language, and social practices. This is, however, not an exploration of these attachments and sentiments, a concern more likely to be that of a psychologist. The social-psychological nature of the primordial perspective is, after all, an "intangible essence" that remains "shadowy and elusive," as Walker Connor describes. More than just the recognition of ethnicity as an enduring psychological phenomenon, this study focuses on the uses of ethnicity in the conduct of social relations. Its main thrust is an exploration of the
ways ethnicity — and its attendant body of ritual, symbol, custom, and practices — in a particular region is utilized and manipulated in the context of state and capitalist penetration and in the competition over scarce economic and, to some extent, political resources. What is underscored, therefore, is the assumption that the social context or environment becomes more significant than the "primordial ties" and "assumed givens" of ancestry in the process of retribalization and the construction of ethnic identities.

Retribalization as a Central Concept

Retribalization is employed in this study as a core concept. Retribalization here is taken to mean a specific form of ethnic politicization, underscoring Abner Cohen's definition of customs, values, symbols, and myths being manipulated and used for political ends. Cohen's arguments deal with the articulation of an informal political organization used for the struggle for power and privileges vis-à-vis members of other groups — particularly since he studied (and coined the concept) retribalization in the Nigerian context of competing tribes.

This study broadly redefines Cohen's concept of retribalization on two levels. First, it departs from Cohen's particular context of struggle for power and privilege among different ethnic groups and instead attempts to use the concept in the context of indigenous peoples whose core of struggle involves and revolves around the
claims for (or ownership of) land. Secondly, this work argues that retribalization is manifested in the ways a community struggles to mitigate its absorption into dominant structures, and to negotiate modern, externally-produced influences, like capitalist interests or state-sponsored development projects, by tapping into wellsprings of tradition and ritual. In both cases the need is for communal anchororage and a sustaining of culture and community based on continued ties to traditional territories or so-called ancestral domain.

Retribalization and Theories of Social Change

For most of this century theories of social change have been centered on liberal and Marxist schools of thought. Liberal theories have pushed for a modernization paradigm which informs the Western democratic/capitalist infrastructure. This paradigm upholds the nation-state as the central unit of analysis and focuses on the internal dynamics of the developmental process; it is also partial to market solutions and the transnational corporate penetration of Third World economies.27

Marxist theories, on the other hand, are founded on the concept of historical materialism, and argue for a dependency paradigm. Marxist theories critique modernization theories for their failure to account for the structural factors at the national and international levels; the dependency paradigm stresses the tightening of global
integration and the increasing dependency of poor, Third World countries on industrialized, capitalist economies. The world capitalist system is used as this paradigm's main unit of analysis and focuses on the core-periphery dynamics of development, of which Immanuel Wallerstein is a leading theorist.

Another perspective on social change is offered by Majid Tehranian, which he calls "communitarian." This perspective has evolved from a long theoretical tradition critical of the processes of modernization and industrialization and focuses on "the loss of community in modern industrial societies and the felt need for reconstruction of community." Those belonging to this school may include Rousseau, Durkheim, Emerson, Thoreau, Gandhi, and various leaders of the peace, environmentalist and Green movements of today.

In discussing the process of social change, Tehranian speaks of ideology and how modernization, Marxist and communitarian approaches view it. Both Marxist and modernization theories treat ideology as a "residual category," whereas the communitarian approach views ideology as central to understanding social change. Both Marxist and liberal schools of thought reveal a bias for the rational, scientific discourse as ideology is taken as a tentative phase prior to the flourishing of modernity or the classless society. A communitarian perspective on ideology, however,
places high value on human agency and presupposes that "human experiences are perceived and framed through conceptual categories that are socially constructed."

The experience of retribalization fits into this perspective. The concept of ideology here could be readily substituted for "ethnicity." Insofar as retribalization is a function of modernization processes and its dynamics constructed out of the needs of the present, the politicization of ethnicity could be considered an ideational configuration. The recreation of the tribe or the reinvention of ethnicity are ideational formations. This postulation finds support in Geertz' own assumptions that ideological constructions are steeped in cultural traditions.

As noted in the previous chapter, ethnicity is treated by both modernization and Marxist schools of thought as indicative of an uncompleted process of modernity and of a false consciousness, respectively. This is the same way ideology is viewed by both paradigms as elaborated by Tehranian -- as a "pathology of transitional societies" by modernists and as "false consciousness perpetrated by the ruling classes" by Marxist or neo-Marxist literature.

This is not saying, however, that in the study of ethnicity and its politicization, modernization and dependency paradigms are invalid. Both are useful frameworks in understanding the dynamics of the development
process and how they affect small societies. Modernization theories explain how many modern nation-states find their *raison d'être* in homogenizing their population, in consolidating their boundaries and securing their territories, and in expanding their economic base through industrialization and capitalist expansion. The dependency paradigm affords an appreciation of the interplay of structural factors and provides the optic of political economy. The world systems theory, for instance, explains the intensification of global integration and the pervasive reach of capital which serve to define relations of dominance and dependency between rich and impoverished economies. In this light small, indigenous societies, especially those in the Third World, are readily seen as peripheries within peripheries. As societies within constructed modern nation-states, they become hostage to state and transnational interests that seek to exploit the resources within their domains.

Yet while these paradigms may be helpful tools in explaining the conditions many indigenous peoples today find themselves in, they do not fully grasp the dynamics of retribalizations and ethnic mobilizations. As cited in preceding sections both paradigms invariably put these peoples in a somewhat disabling position. Modernists would consider these cultures as inevitably liable to being absorbed and assimilated into a larger formation of nation
and state. Marxist-based theories would readily identify these peoples as victims of capitalist progress. When some resistance to modernity is manifested, modernists would argue that this is temporary. Marxist theorists, on the other hand, would have to situate such resistance in class terms for it to be given validation; otherwise, it is yet again considered a form of false consciousness. Moreover, the dichotomies of tradition and modernity or capitalism and socialism, which both paradigms create, overlook the needs for cultural continuity. The dichotomization of tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive categories has made the modernization process appear as a zero-sum game: the more modern a society, the less traditional it becomes. This view fails to appreciate that "tradition is constantly modernized and modernity constantly traditionalized." 33

It is thus the communitarian perspective that offers a broader comprehension of retribalizing processes. As Tehranian underscores, "a communitarian perspective views culture as a verb, not a noun ... [t]he community is constantly engaged in the processes of actively negotiating those visible and invisible bonds of meaning that tie it together." 34 Views of other theorists fit neatly into such perspective. Charles Keyes likens ethnic identity to a gyroscope which alters form, content, and boundaries over time. 35 Frederik Barth conceptualizes ethnicity as a collective identity whose boundaries are made fluid in
relation to distinct external stimuli. This underscores the understanding that human beings, as Renato Rosaldo avers, "continually construct, manipulate, or even recast the social worlds into which they were born and within which they will die." Views such as these form the basis for interpretive social inquiry, which emphasizes the "meaningfulness of human action." Interpretive social inquiry essentially sees human beings as "makers of meaning, purposive agents who inhabit symbolically constituted cultural orders, who engage in rule-governed social practices, and whose self-identities are formed in those orders and through those practices." Thus, the explanations of human actions must, in the interpretive approach, be situated within their specific cultural contexts. Whereas positivistic social science is inductive, subsuming particular events under general laws, interpretive analysis is not linear. Rather, this is likened to a web, whereby a particular event is placed in an ever-widening network of relationships, seeking to "transform thin particularity into thick particularity." This is akin to what Max Weber has said of persons as "suspended in webs of significance they themselves have spun." Clifford Geertz has used this concept of webs in reference to culture and calls his analysis of it "thick descriptions," which would constitute
"not an experimental science in search of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning." 42

***

The interpretive understanding of ethnicity and culture is the vantage from which this work was undertaken and the thread that weaves through the text. The foregoing theoretical considerations serve to ground this work on the politicization of Lumad ethnicity in northern Mindanao. This study maintains that many Lumads are feeling, thinking, acting subjects. Many of their groupings and communities are undoubtedly weakened and disrupted by the persistent and overpowering forces of modernization, and several hinterland communities cut images of anomie and severe destitution. Various accounts and experiences suggest, however, that they are not in all instances necessarily passive or inert victims. There are clearly situations of loss in culture, but so are there emergent cultural forms. The conditions of poverty and displacement certainly warrant outside intervention and assistance, but ultimately the answers to their cultural survival and sustenance may well reside in their ethos -- and its attendant reconstruction in social milieux that exist in a state of rapid flux.

2. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


28. Ibid.

29. This is the foremost concern of communitarianism although it is, as Tehranian notes, also concerned with the preservation of individual freedom, social equality and national security and social order.


33. Ibid., p. 8.

34. Ibid.


39. Ibid., p. 27.

41. Quoted in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Chapter 1.

42. *Ibid.*
PART II

LAND, LIFE, AND LUMADS

Resounding like a drum
Like an agong resounding
Like an agong loudly beating:
The fame of the people of Yandang
The prestige of the citizens of Linawan
Resounded till the borders
Re-echoed till the limits
Reverberated the fame
Rang out the prestige
Of the natives of Yandang
The aborigines of Nalundangan

From the Bukidnon epic, Olaging

What sets the world in motion
is the interplay of differences, their
attractions and repulsions. Life is a plurality,
death is uniformity. By suppressing differences
and peculiarities, by eliminating different
civilizations and cultures, progress weakens life
and favors death, impoverishes and mutilates us.
Every view of the world that becomes extinct,
every culture that disappears, diminishes a
possibility of life.

Octavio Paz, Mexican poet
CHAPTER III

IMAGES FROM MA'I TO MINDANAO:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LUMADS

Some of the earliest known written records dating as far back as the Sung dynasty in the tenth century show that seafaring Chinese merchants referred to what is now the Philippine archipelago as Ma'i -- an island world of great natural beauty.¹ Just as the Spanish conquistadores and the American colonizers centuries later would see, the island world of Ma'i was a "brilliant tapestry of land, sea and sky, fields, forests, mountains, wildlife and peoples -- all so dazzling and diverse."² The inhabitants of this island world lived close to its bounties, their cultures atuned to the cycles of nature and the logic of the seasons. Hunting, fishing and shifting cultivation were primary occupations. Animism was the religion of these peoples, venerating a pantheon of gods of agriculture, fire, war, death and love, invoking spirits residing in fields and streams and practicing elaborate ritual to propitiate them.

What Filipinos of today know of their distant past before the coming of Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 are scant and sketchy descriptions of idyllic settings -- self-contained and economically self-sufficient tribal communities, at times at war with other groups, but on a whole living in peace and harmony. The first conquistadores
from Spain produced chronicles of life in an archipelago they later named after their king, Felipe II. Antonio Pigafetta, who accompanied Ferdinand Magellan on his expedition to the so-called Far East, is the most known. These chronicles at the time of contact with the West reflected notes on a rich diversity of native cultures. Many of the customs and traditions of these peoples were, however, in the Spanish mind, heathen and primitive. Philippine historians and anthropologists, on the other hand, write of indigenous populations -- "early Filipinos" as they would be commonly called -- developing their own cultures and social and economic organizations. Many of these scholars unfailingly extol the skills and craftsmanship of these peoples -- from navigational and engineering skills to fairly extensive literary, oral and religious traditions. The Banawe rice terraces in the Cordillera highlands of northern Luzon, carved centuries ago out of steep mountainsides, are invariably taken as a shining example of the superb engineering prowess of an indigenous people.

These "early Filipinos" were said to have lived in scattered barangays or communities of around 30 to 100 families. These communities were based largely on kinship and each barangay was a social, economic, and political unit unto itself governed on a whole by generally egalitarian values. The datu was a paternal protector and a political
leader. The datu's relationships with the rest of the barangay rested on the "reciprocity of rights and obligations and by (his) authoritarian responsibility and power to impose accepted rules of conduct in the community." 4 The datu served as a focus for unity, maintaining peace and restoring social equilibrium within the group, and providing for the material wants of followers. 5 Succession to the datuship was hereditary along the male line, although exceptional leadership abilities and bravery in battle could also qualify one to be a datu. 6

Within larger barangays structures were highly stratified, though not rigid. At the apex were datus who had wealth, power, prestige and following. The maharlikas were next in social standing; these were warriors, "born of noble blood who served their chieftains in war and provided them with counsel in peace." 7 Third came the timaguas, the commoners who neither had the privileges of the datus nor the obligations of the alipins, the subordinate and dependent groups. Horacio de la Costa writes that the alipins were not quite chattel and "had certain rights assured them by remarkably well developed customary law." As for the freemen, they owed their allegiance to their datus and to each other in much the same way as that of early medieval Europe; "the fierce loyalty of comrades in arms and comrades in the common tasks of field and stream." 8
Some barangays would forge alliances based on kinship among their leading families for their mutual protection. These alliances would be sealed in blood compacts among the leaders. Feuding chieftains would settle disputes through negotiations, if not in battle. Datus administered justice together with a council of elders during times of peace. The legal system included laws on public and private ownership of property, inheritance, marriage, rights and obligations, crimes against property, and many aspects of personal and institutional behavior. Social position, however, determined the extent of sanctions. On a whole, "early Filipinos" had developed, as de la Costa expounds, free village communities, tilling their own land, governing themselves according to their own customs and traditions, fighting each other on occasion, and combining in loose confederation under the precarious suzerainty of feudal princes.

Many of these self-contained communities, however, began to change with the establishment of trade with the Chinese from the 10th to the 15th century. Trade also came with the Indianized commercial empire of Srivijaya in Sumatra around the seventh to 13th centuries. Contacts with Indonesians came with the Hindu-Buddhist state of Madjapahit in eastern Java before 1400. The local economies and ways of life were profoundly altered by these external influences. Commercial centers grew along coastal areas and big rivers. Manila was known as a common entrepôt where
traders from India, Japan, and China bartered their wares for foodstuffs, fabrics, gold, pearl, and ironware. Around Sulu in Mindanao, Cebu in the Visayas, and Manila Bay, Laguna Lake and Pangasinan Gulf in Luzon, wealthy families settled.12

Islam came to Sulu and other parts of Mindanao in the 14th century as it spread throughout the Malay and Indonesian world. In Mindanao the Sulus, Maguindanaos, Buayans, Kabuntalans, and Maranaos adopted the Muslim sultanate as their political system.13 The Islamization of Mindanao by Arab missionaries was the initial project by foreign traders and missionaries to establish a religious-political suzerainty on the islands.14

The advent of Magellan in 1521 and the Christianization of the archipelago from 1565 followed. When the Spaniards came in the 16th century many parts of the Philippine archipelago were characterized by "interbarangay and inter-island rivalry and warfare; and hostility often existed between highland and lowland, inland and coastal groups."15 Natives, however, were on a whole seen as "candid, loyal, simple and sociable...of a happy disposition," as Jesuits who first arrived in Luzon in the 16th century discovered.16 These people reveled in banquets and festivals and activities like cockfighting -- which survives well into today. There were no great architectural feats like Borobudor in Indonesia or Angkor in Cambodia, but they were
skilled artisans in handicrafts like wood carving and weaving. Their literature blended music with poetry in sagas of love and legend and epics of heroism, allowing for nights of rambling oratory. Writing was made on bamboo or tree bark which hardly kept in the damp tropical heat, or were burned by the Spanish as they sought to eradicate paganism.17

Many of these features and characterizations of early Philippine life still find traces among the Filipinos of today. Precolonial law was overlaid with Spanish legal structures but as David Wurfel posits, "a substratum of values, a remnant of that once-comprehensive body of custom, persists, sometimes interfering with the acceptance of contemporary judicial decisions under civil law borrowed from Spain."18 Obligations to family and kin are still strong, even to the point of avenging harm or insult to a member of one's family or clan. The inter-tribal feuding of the precolonial period was not unlike the vendettas that still persist among political clans in the Philippines now. Blood compacts in the days of the precolonial datu resemble the bonds of compadrazgo or compadre relationships that link factions together in the Philippines. Cultural expectations of leaders resemble those tied to the datus centuries ago. Politicians in the Philippines still fill the roles of conflict mediator, patron, provider for material wants, and counselor; at times some leaders are even regarded as having
certain spiritual powers, like the belief among many that Ferdinand Marcos was protected by an effective talisman or anting-anting. The animistic rituals of old coexist with the Christian faith and still echo in certain practices among Filipinos today: when passing through a forest or any heavily wooded area, an apology of sorts is muttered to spirits who might be disturbed; or when celebrating a feast a plate of food is often set aside as offering to the souls of ancestors and various deities. The propensity for gaiety, frivolity and celebration in the Filipino is clear, as is the penchant for flamboyant oratory -- all these echoing ancient ways of commemorating life-cycles with music, dance, and the recitation of long oral epics. 19

KATUTUBO: THE INDIGENOUS FILIPINO

Yet for the most part what has been often pieced together as aspects and features of early Filipino life find clearer resonance in the remaining indigenous populations of the country. The communities which hardly established contact with the Arab or Chinese traders from the 10th century onwards were also largely unaffected by the coming of colonization. They moved further inland through the centuries and remained in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao and the Cordilleras and other hinterland regions. Some groups had developed more complex social systems than others, but they all had maintained distinct ways of life from a colonized, Christianized lowland majority. These
small, homogenous societies were not swept into the waves of Islamization or Christianization that emanated from foreign lands. And so it is that these groups of people are today labelled as "indigenous" and "native," or in Filipino, katutubo -- "springing from the land" or "natives of the land," quite simply, the original inhabitants of a particular place. Anthropologists employ similar terms like "aboriginal" or "autochthonous" to refer to such groups.

Through the centuries indigenous peoples in the archipelago were known by different labels. To the Spaniards bent on Christianizing "heathens," they were called "infieles" or "paganos." To the patronizing American colonialists these groups of peoples were "wild tribes," "uncivilized," and "non-Christian tribes." In the last few decades government, non-government organizations, church and academic circles and institutions have referred to them in various contexts as "cultural minorities," "tribal minorities," "cultural communities," "tribal Filipinos," "indigenous cultural communities," and "tribal peoples."

It is estimated that indigenous communities comprise about eight per cent of the Philippine population of 65 million. An estimated population in 1990 of 48 non-Moslem indigenous groups in the 13 administrative regions of the Philippines was 5,184,622. The table below illustrates this great diversity of ethno-linguistic groupings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Group</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cordillera Tribes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ifugao</td>
<td>Ifugao</td>
<td>243,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bontoc</td>
<td>Mountain Province</td>
<td>178,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kankanaey</td>
<td>Benguet, Mountain Province</td>
<td>150,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalinga</td>
<td>Kalinga-Apayao</td>
<td>144,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isneg</td>
<td>Kalinga-Apayao</td>
<td>139,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaloi</td>
<td>Benguet</td>
<td>112,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tingguian</td>
<td>Abra</td>
<td>53,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>177,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,199,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caraballo Tribes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungkalots</td>
<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td>
<td>38,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaddang</td>
<td>Quirino</td>
<td>58,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikalahans</td>
<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td>
<td>40,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibanag</td>
<td>Cagayan</td>
<td>453,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isinai</td>
<td>Nueva Vizcaya</td>
<td>37,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>628,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mangyans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraya</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>48,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alangan</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>18,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagaydon</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>12,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukid Batangan</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>48,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanunuo</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>25,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratagnon</td>
<td>Mindoro</td>
<td>14,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>167,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Provincial Locations and Estimated Population of Upland and Indigenous Groups in the Philippines (Continued)

### Palawan Tribes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tagbanwa</td>
<td>Palawan</td>
<td>81,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>Palawan</td>
<td>9,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>90,805</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Negrito

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agta, Dumagat, Pugot</td>
<td>Isabela</td>
<td>5,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agataynon</td>
<td>Cagayan</td>
<td>12,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ita, Aborlin</td>
<td>Bulacan, Zambales</td>
<td>84,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulaga, Dumagat</td>
<td>Bataan, Tarlac</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abiyan, Negrito</td>
<td>Rizal, Quezon, Laguna</td>
<td>10,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeta, Remontado, Dumagat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agta, Isarog</td>
<td>Camarines Norte,</td>
<td>34,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pullon, Mayon, Abiyan</td>
<td>Camarines Sur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ati, Ata</td>
<td>Negros Occidental, Panay</td>
<td>8,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ati, Magahat, Ubot</td>
<td>Negros Oriental, Cebu</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamanwa</td>
<td>Agusan del Norte,</td>
<td>12,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agusan del Sur,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surigao del Norte,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surigao del Sur,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samar, Davao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>169,033</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Visayan Tribes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bukidnon</td>
<td>Negros, Iloilo</td>
<td>1,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulod, Kiniray-a</td>
<td>Panay, Iloilo</td>
<td>11,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magahat</td>
<td>Negros</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14,810</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lumads (Non-Manobo Tribes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bagobo</td>
<td>Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat</td>
<td>142,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansaka</td>
<td>Davao del Norte</td>
<td>133,864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. Provincial Locations and Estimated Population of Upland and Indigenous Groups in the Philippines (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province/Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandaya</td>
<td>Davao Oriental</td>
<td>312,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subanon</td>
<td>Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga</td>
<td>474,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'laan</td>
<td>Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat</td>
<td>350,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'Boli</td>
<td>South Cotabato</td>
<td>297,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiruray</td>
<td>North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,821,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lumads (Manobo Tribes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Province/Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manobo</td>
<td>Agusan del Sur/Norte, Davao provinces, Cotabato provinces</td>
<td>340,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higaanon</td>
<td>Agusan del Sur/Norte, Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon</td>
<td>143,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukidnon</td>
<td>Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental</td>
<td>103,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talaandig</td>
<td>Bukidnon</td>
<td>12,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matigsalug</td>
<td>Bukidnon, Davao del Sur</td>
<td>229,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umayamnon</td>
<td>Bukidnon, Agusan del Sur/Norte</td>
<td>12,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dibabawon</td>
<td>Agusan del Sur/Norte, Davao provinces</td>
<td>36,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banwaon</td>
<td>Agusan del Sur/Norte</td>
<td>33,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talaingod</td>
<td>Davao del Norte</td>
<td>96,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagakaolo</td>
<td>Davao del Sur</td>
<td>34,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubo</td>
<td>South Cotabato</td>
<td>7,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasaday</td>
<td>South Cotabato</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B'lit</td>
<td>South Cotabato</td>
<td>9,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangguawangan</td>
<td>Davao provinces, Cotabato provinces</td>
<td>4,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>29,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,093,651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Provincial Locations and Estimated Population of Upland and Indigenous Groups in the Philippines (Continued)

| Total          | 5,184,622 |


Anthropologist Marcelino Maceda has divided indigenous, unhispanized upland peoples into five groups according to stages of cultural development: 1) traditional Negrito hunters and gatherers and the Tasadays of Mindanao; 2) Negritos with transitional cultural forms and the Badjaos of Sulu; both cultures forge settlements that indicate a shift from pure hunting and gathering, or in the case of the Badjaos, from drifting on sea as "gypsies"; 3) the upland shifting cultivators (of rice, corn, and various rootcrops), characterizing most Lumad groups of Mindanao; 4) the upland wet-rice cultivators, like the Cordillera peoples; and 5) various Islamized cultures of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.20

The Lumadnon of Northern Mindanao

In the area of this study, northern Mindanao, the indigenous communities are collectively called Lumadnon. It is a Visayan term that generically refers to all non-Moslem,
non-Christian peoples of Mindanao. Lumad means "grown to the place," or in common parlance, "native." Visayan is the lingua franca of the northern Mindanao region and is spoken by many Lumads, especially those who have contact with urbanized Christian settlements. Binukid is the language native to many Lumad groups although the Manobo groups have their own distinct tongue. In linguistics, however, Binukid and the branches of Manobo are all part of the larger Manobo language complex. 21 The term "Lumad" is a recent appropriation propagated by Lumad-Mindanao, a multi-sectoral coalition of Lumad local and regional organizations formed in 1985 to pursue actively issues on ancestral land claims and cultural self-determination. 22

The island of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago that stretches towards Sabah, and the long strip of Palawan are often divided into three broad categories, namely, (a) the area inhabited predominantly by Moslems and occupied by the 13 Islamized tribes and/or encompassed within any one of the sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, Buayan, Kabuntalan and Canassi until 1898; (b) that portion inhabited by a mix of Islamized tribes, Lumadnon and Christian Filipino settlers; and (c) that portion inhabited solely by the Lumadnon and the Christian Filipino settlers. 23 It is the third category that has been this study's focus -- presently the administrative region of northern Mindanao, or as commonly known, Region 10. This region comprises seven provinces --
Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, and Surigao del Norte. Region 10 has a total land area of 2,832,774 hectares or 28,328 square kilometers, which is equivalent to 9.4 percent of the country's total land area; in 1990 the region's population was 3.4 million.24

In Region 10, except for the island of Camiguin, Lumadnon tribes can claim uninterrupted occupancy. Except for some Bukidnon towns bordering the predominantly Muslim province of Lanao del Sur, no other place within this category has been occupied by any Islamized group. Historical accounts reveal Maguindanao dominance over settlements in Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental and Surigao at various periods in the 16th and 17th centuries, but these were short-lived.25 Northern Mindanao, as such, is where many of the Lumad groups of today lay claim to their ancestral domains, centuries after colonial intrusions from the Spanish era to the American rule and decades after Christian immigrations.

As the table above shows, Lumadnon tribes consist of Manobo, Bukidnon, Higa-onon, Talaandig and Umayamnon scattered around the province of Bukidnon; the Manobo, Banwaon, and M'manwa in the two Agusan provinces and the two Surigaos; Higa-onons in Misamis Oriental, and the Bukidnon and Subanons in Misamis Occidental.26 The Lumads number roughly one million in the northern Mindanao region. In the
whole of Mindanao they are administratively classified into roughly 16 groups and altogether number close to three million. Lumad groups refer to themselves and to each other on the basis of physical-geographical boundaries. Umayamnons, for example, call themselves such because they inhabit the area by the Umayam river that cuts across the Bukidnon, Agusan and Davao borders. Higa-onon and Bukidnon mean roughly "people of the mountains or highlands," as "bukid" or "higa" means mountain. The classifications of these groups are imprecise and vary depending on the institution or organization dealing with them. In the days of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for National Minorities (PANAMIN) under Ferdinand Marcos, it was found administratively convenient to label as many groups as possible -- a "meaningless nomenclature," as Bukidnon's Governor Carlitos Fortich notes.27 Many of these present tribal names are a carry-over from the PANAMIN days. As the table shows, Lumads are generally classified into "Manobo" and "non-Manobo," as some Philippine anthropologists would ethnographically refer to the indigenous groups of Mindanao. The Umayamnons, for instance, who live around the area of the Umayam river are ethnologically part of the Manobo group; but PANAMIN had chosen to designate this group as different.

As anthropologists are wont to do, Lumads today are classified according to levels of integration into the
dominant society. Madronio Lao identifies three levels: 28
1) Lumads who have been educated and largely assimilated
into the dominant mainstream; 2) those who are undergoing
rapid culture change in the uplands and are most affected by
the intrusive forces of official colonization, settler
immigrations and capitalist interests; and 3) those
communities still secluded in the remaining mountainous
forest regions of Mindanao. It is on the second level of
integration that most Lumad communities are situated, the
site of disorienting culture change, where anomie develops
and incipient rettribalizations are formed; it is also the
arena where adaptations and readjustments to dominant
influences are negotiated.

Lumads and the Uplands

In the uplands, poor settlers from the outlying lowland
areas -- or even from as far as the Luzon and the Visayas --
have, in the last few decades, sought land to till. In a
land with a burgeoning population, peasants and settlers
continue to seek land to farm and the immigration to the
uplands increases every year. In these areas interactions
between Lumad and non-Lumads take place. Disputes and
conflicts arise occasionally between groups, some more
violent than others. Lumads learn to speak Visayan and some
settlers in turn learn Binukid or Manobo. Assimilation is,
however, more apparent in the case of Lumads vis-à-vis
Visayan settler culture. Intermarriages between Lumads and
non-Lumads are many. Visayan settlers introduce in various ways the dominant lowlander colonial ideology to these Lumads, an ideology which embraces Christianity and values (or at least aspires to) literacy. Small makeshift chapels are built in these far-flung regions, and missionaries of various hues proselytize to these Lumad groups.

In many areas close to larger Christian villages or towns many Lumads live compartmentalized lives, assimilating external influences and, at the same time, strongly maintaining essential aspects of their traditional heritage, such as those related to agriculture and religion. Many still practice swidden agriculture, farming small parcels of land for the community's subsistence. Shamans and those who perform religious functions in the community are highly revered; this role is in many cases filled by the datu himself or the bae (woman leader) herself. A reverence for ancestors and the spirits of the world around them is embraced, although it is not rare to see a Bible in a Lumad home today. External influences are evident as well in manners of dress, as blue jeans and shirts are often worn. Moreover, some houses incorporate a "sala" or receiving room with lower stilts, which differ from traditional rectangular houses built on high stilts adaptive to intertribal warfare. The compartmentalization of lives is often most apparent among Lumad children who are able to venture to and study in populated centers like Bukidnon's capital of
Malaybalay or the city of Cagayan de Oro in the neighboring province of Misamis Oriental. These youngsters lose, as some elders complain, a sense of their heritage, and in some cases shun or deny their being Lumad. Genevosa Naval, a nurse with the Office of Southern Cultural Communities, laments how many of the young Lumads who live in and around the provincial Bukidnon capital of Malaybalay can now barely speak Binukid.30

Mindanao and Lumad Ethnography

Ethnographic work on the Lumads of Mindanao is scant, owing in large part to a general fixation with "Muslim Mindanao." Since the time of Spanish colonial rule Mindanao was the "land of the Moros," heathens who resisted the proselytizing efforts of the Spaniards. By the turn of the twentieth century, as American colonization took hold, Mindanao was seen as the Philippines' new frontier, a land rich enough to be ravaged and exploited. The Moslems31 had to be pacified since they stood in the way of this conquest of the frontier. If brute force failed for the Spaniards, education and its cooptational thrust would work for the Americans. In the 1970s Mindanao was pushed to the fore of the country's consciousness when the Moslem separatist movement escalated and brought the Philippines to the brink of civil war.

It is thus this heavy association of Mindanao with Moslem culture and society that ethnographic literature has
been predominantly on the large Moslem groups -- the Tausug, the Maguindanao, the Maranao. A number of American anthropologists did extensive work on Moslem groups in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, J.F. Ewing in the 1950s worked among the Tausugs of Jolo studying religious rituals and customs. He was followed in the 1960s by T.M. Kiefer who dealt more with the practices of warfare and armed conflict among the Tausugs. Caesar Adib Majul wrote extensively in the 1960s on the Moslems and much later, Peter Gowing and Robert McAmis.

Mindanao, however, is ostensibly not only Moslem. In its hinterlands dwell a number of the different Lumad, non-Moslem groups. Only scant attention has been paid them and ethnographic research on their cultures and lifeways is decidedly not extensive. The indigenous peoples of Luzon, particularly the better known "Igorots" of the Cordillera region, have been objects of far more anthropological studies over the years. William Henry Scott, an American missionary, was one who lived and worked among these different groups of people and studied their cultures and traditions. The fascination with the Igorot as "noble savage" is made clear in the works of Dean Worcester, a member of the Philippine Commission at the incipient stage of American colonial rule in the Philippines. Worcester made trips to Mindanao as part of his tasks as Secretary of the Interior from which he supervised the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes. But these "non-Christian" tribes of Mindanao, the Lumads, did not receive the kind of ethnological attention, let alone some form of administrative control, that the Cordillera peoples received.

The earliest accounts of one of the largest Lumad groups, the Manobos, is that of Father Pedro Francisco de Asis, who in the late 1600s wrote of "a nation of Indian heathen for the greater part, called Manobos, meaning robust or numerous people.\textsuperscript{33} Two centuries later Jose Maria Clotet, a Spanish priest, wrote about the Bukidnon tribe in \textit{The Bukidnon of North Central Mindanao}. Written in 1889 this work was translated from Spanish to English by Father Frank Lynch, S.J. in 1967.

One of the early 20th century ethnographic accounts of peoples in the area is that by Fay-Cooper Cole. Cole, as part of the R.F. Cummings Philippine Expedition for the Field Museum of Natural History (now the Chicago Natural History Museum), wrote on the "Bukidnon of Mindanao" in 1913. This was a time when American colonial administrators began making headway into Mindanao, establishing schools, setting up local governments, introducing new crops. Cole spent several weeks in the high plains of the Bukidnon province making a detailed study of the everyday life, customs and beliefs of the Bukidnon. His detailed descriptions include "making a living" -- hunting,
agricultural practices, village and household industries like basketry, pottery, weaving; the "life cycle" -- birth, marriage, death; social and political organizations -- the datu (chief), warfare, slavery; the "spirit world" and ceremonies; music and dances; and stories and legends. Later Cole traveled to southern Mindanao where he produced an even more extensive ethnography on what he called the "wild tribes" of Davao.

Another early work on the Lumads is that of John Garvan. Garvan focused on the Manobos of Eastern Mindanao and presented his work to the National Academy of Sciences in 1927 in Washington, D.C. Like Cole, Garvan worked at a time when the American colonial government was making its presence felt in Mindanao, when the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under the Philippine Commission was establishing contact with tribal communities in Mindanao. Garvan used the term "Manobo" in a generic sense, perhaps much in the same way "Lumad" is presently appropriated. Thus his study included many sub-groups in the region such as the Banwaons, the Mandayans, the Mansakas, the Bilaans. With the help of historical references on the Manobos from as early as 1521 (the year Magellan reached Philippine soil) all through 1910 -- many from the writings of Spanish friars -- Garvan constructed a very detailed ethnographic account of these peoples.
Garvan laid the groundwork for much later works on Lumad groups. The following are examples: Juanita Galang, 1978 (Bukidnon general material culture); William Biernatzki, 1973 and Francisco Claver, 1973 (Bukidnon datuship; traditional laws and symbols); Vincent Cullen, 1973 (Bukidnon animism and religious practices); Dionisio Yumo, 1978 (Manobo general material and sociological culture); Marcelino Maceda, 1975 (M'manua culture); Emmanuel Nabayra, 1972 (Mandaya religious practices); John Banayal, 1978 (Talaandig religious and socio-political institutions); Carmen Unabia, 1980 (on the ethnoepic of the Bukidnon, Olaging).

There have been a number of other articles and papers written on different Lumad groups over the years, but even these hardly form an extensive anthology of works on the Lumad cultures of Mindanao. To many urbanized Filipinos the existence of Lumad peoples is hardly known. Lumads live on the fringes of Philippine society. They receive attention in Manila-based daily papers only when "sensationalized" news items are aired -- such as outbreaks of violence between Lumad groups and the military over control of a piece of land. Moreover, they only gain some form of recognition in carnivalesque "cultural festivals" like the yearly Kaamulan in Bukidnon staged for a domestic and international tourist market.

***
This work was not designed to be ethnographic, at least not in the strict anthropological sense of describing or cataloguing in detail material and symbolic cultural forms. Insofar as the main focus of this study is the politicization of Lumad ethnicity, a discussion is instead made on the social conditions of the Lumads. This in turn cannot be done without a corollary discussion on the workings of the region's political economy and how this is inextricably linked with a world capitalist system. The transformation of Mindanao from being a distant, forbidding region during the Spanish colonial times to a frontier of relentless capitalist expansion, state penetration and settler immigrations since the turn of the century, has greatly affected Lumad cultures and has everything to do with the disintegration or the refiguring of native social organizations. The following chapter thus elaborates on the opening of the Mindanao frontier since the turn of the century and the political tensions and social instability that have come to characterize the whole region. This forms a backdrop against which an understanding of Lumad ethnicity and retribalization is made.
ENDNOTES


11. de la Costa, op. cit., p. 18.


17. Ibid.


19. See Kayamanan, *Ma'i-Panoramas of the Philippine Primeval*.


24. See "Northern Mindanao Region: Heading for Boom or Doom?" *Mindanao Focus Journal*, Issue 27, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (Davao City, 1990), pp. 6-7.


26. Ibid.

27. Governor Carlitos Fortich, Interview, October 26, 1992, Provincial Capitol, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.


31. "Moslem" is also interchangeably spelled "Muslim."


34. See Garvan, op. cit.
CHAPTER IV

MINDANAO: CONQUEST OF A FRONTIER

Even as the minerals and forests of Luzon were being thoroughly exploited by the turn of the century, the state and large commercial interests turned their sights southward, to what seemed like limitless economic potential. At that time the sparsely populated island of Mindanao -- all of 102,000 square kilometers -- was bruited as "the land of promise." The promise lay in the land's fertile plateaus, mineral-rich mountains, mighty waterfalls, vast rain forests and a climate free from the periodic typhoons that sweep through the Visayas and Luzon. As early as 1910, after a decade of American colonial presence in the Philippines, 97 major plantations were already established in Mindanao. B.F. Goodrich established its first rubber plantations in Basilan in 1919. One of the largest agri-business multinational corporations in the Philippines, the pineapple-growing Del Monte Corporation, began operations in northern Mindanao in the 1920s.

From 1913 immigration was encouraged through government resettlement programs. The National Land Settlement Administration facilitated the transfer of 357 families each year from 1918 to 1934. Many other settlers from the landstrapped regions of Luzon and the Visayas journeyed to the south in search of proverbial greener pastures. Up to the
Second World War and beyond, Mindanao had become the locus of the country's frontier expansion.

**Populating the Frontier**

The rapid transformation of Mindanao came with American colonization. Pacification campaigns were conducted by the Americans in Moslem areas at the time of the Philippine-American War in 1899. The Moslems were the dominant population in Mindanao when the Americans took over from the Spanish, and the subjugation of Moslem society was necessary before extensive colonization, large-scale commodity production and corporate profiteering could be carried out. That the Americans were successful in this regard, far more than the Spaniards ever were, had to do with three factors: sheer force; a new model of colonial administration (where the local governments were allotted considerable administrative powers); and the demographic model of colonization.³ This latter model of colonization entailed the transfer of populations from Luzon and Visayas to create Christian enclaves amidst Moslem populations, on lands that Moslems claimed to be their own. Public land laws in 1913, 1914, and 1919 invited landless peasants from the north to become settlers in "agricultural colonies" in Mindanao. As such, the colonial contradiction between Filipinos and Americans was, as Aijaz Ahmad notes, "obscured by the more immediate Muslim/Christian contradiction, expressed in bloody conflict over agricultural land."⁴
State-sponsored migration was continued in earnest before and after independence from the United States in 1946. This was part of a political purpose of diffusing tensions in Mindanao arising from land disputes. The Organic Charter of Organized Land Settlement of 1935 declared that "land settlement work is the only government activity that will furnish effective solution to the Mindanao problem." The Mindanao frontier became a safety valve in times of acute land pressure and peasant unrest in Luzon. Under the administration of President Ramon Magsaysay in the 1950s the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was established to facilitate the inmigration of families from Central Luzon to Mindanao. Many of those relocated were former members of the Huk peasant rebellion in the rice plains of Central Luzon; thus the term "rehabilitation," an allusion to the intent of government to transform Huk rebel surrenderees into "good farmers." By 1963, the NARRA was administering colonies including over 25,000 families and 695,000 hectares of land. Since then legions of settlers from other parts of the country have come on their own, fleeing from poverty and hoping to find better opportunities for livelihood in Mindanao.

The settler inmigrations increased Mindanao's population from 670,833 in 1903 to 10,905,243 in 1980. The region's population had grown from a mere 8.8 percent of the
country's total number of inhabitants in 1903 to a full 22.7 percent in 1980. Data show that Mindanao has grown at a faster pace than that recorded for the Philippines as a whole. In the immediate post-war period Mindanao grew by over 5 percent each year.

Table 2. Population Growth in Mindanao-Sulu, 1903-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density (persons per sq. km.)</th>
<th>Intercensal growth rate (geometric)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>670,833</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,061,159</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,244,421</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,943,324</td>
<td>28.60</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,384,164</td>
<td>52.79</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7,962,932</td>
<td>78.07</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9,146,994</td>
<td>89.68</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10,905,243</td>
<td>106.92</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>14,080,000</td>
<td>138.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: National Economic and Development Authority 1986: Table 2.10)

Capitalist Expansion

Mindanao was not only opened to the resettlement of populations. It was made a setting for the expansion of capitalism. Mindanao became a focal point for government planning in agricultural and industrial development. Prime agricultural land was allocated for the benefit of American companies and a domestic elite. The state, in fact, increased incentives for foreign investments by amending
land laws to expand land holdings for foreign investors and encouraging the cultivation of cash crops on a large scale. The National Development Corporation (NDC) was formed during the Commonwealth administration under Manuel Quezon to enable foreign corporate agribusiness interests to use land beyond the 1,024 hectare limit outlined in the 1935 Constitution. The NDC, as a government corporation, leased land to foreign companies, a scheme designed primarily to circumvent this constitutional stricture. Transnational corporations (TNCs) like B.F. Goodrich, United Brands, Castle and Cooke, Del Monte, Goodyear and others made Mindanao a base for their operations in the country. Today there are 89 foreign and foreign-affiliated firms in Mindanao in 21 categories of product and industry lines -- from wood products to fresh fruit to manufacturing. Many of these TNCs have gained a stronghold in the development of Mindanao and now control thousands of hectares of land. Up to now these TNCs enjoy tax breaks and credits, protection from government competition and liberal repatriation of profits to their countries of origin. In Mindanao they have ready access to sources of raw materials and cheap labor. Their presence in Mindanao has clearly brought the region into the orbit of the world capitalist system.

Extractive industries have also been entrenched in Mindanao where natural resources are abundant. After formal independence from the United States the Philippine state
embarked on a path of developmentalism that put premium on the export of raw materials. Mindanao's forests and minerals were exploited to feed the timber and mineral markets of the industrialized West. In 1972-73 almost five million hectares were under 156 logging concessions, 13 percent of which were American companies. Until the late 1980s logging concessions in Mindanao totaled 141, covering 5.7 million hectares. This means that 56.01 percent of Mindanao's total area has been open to plunder. Logging moratoria have been recently imposed on various areas by the government, but these have not deterred rapacious loggers from cutting down Mindanao's remaining forests. Pasture concessions account for 179,011 hectares divided among 296 individuals, most if not all of whom are pioneer settlers and members of the country's economic elite.

State Penetration

So-called development projects of the state have also dramatically changed the face of Mindanao. Physical infrastructure -- roads, dams, bridges, irrigation systems, telecommunication facilities -- were made to hasten agricultural and industrial development. These infrastructural facilities have been largely funded by foreign loans and made primarily for the benefit of foreign investors. The Agus and Pulangi rivers in Bukidnon and Lanao have been dammed for hydroelectric power plants. Large-scale irrigation projects have been undertaken in
Agusan and Davao. Mt. Apo, the country's highest mountain, is now being ravaged by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) for geothermal energy. The state also has agro-industrial projects like the Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI) which plants fast-growing trees for commercial purposes in an area of 14,000 hectares.

State penetration in Mindanao has been most ostensible through militarization. In the 1970s, at the height of the Moslem rebellion and during martial law, massive troops were sent to Mindanao to quell the secessionist movement under the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In the 1980s military counter-insurgency campaigns were carried out against the New People's Army (NPA) all over Mindanao. In areas controlled by Marcos cronies, like the Bukidnon Sugar Company, military troops were used to protect the lands and plantations from "squatters" and insurgent activities. It was also not uncommon for military men to guard some logging concessions run by powerful politicians. Civilians -- including several members of tribal groups -- were also recruited into paramilitary units, the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), to help counter the influence of the New People's Army in the countryside.

**Costs and Effects: Who Gets What, When and How?**

The demographic changes through settler immigrations, capitalist expansion and state penetration into Mindanao have all wrought devastating consequences for both the
Moslems and the non-Moslem, non-Christian Lumad groups of Mindanao. In southern Mindanao the Moslem population used to comprise 98 percent of the region's population in 1913, but declined to only 40 percent by the late 1970s. They controlled all land on the eve of American colonization but by the 1980s had less than 17 percent, most of it in remote and infertile mountain areas which lack marketing and infrastructure. As settlers came for land the Lumads retreated into the hinterlands of Mindanao. In a span of two decades Lumads were significantly outnumbered by settler populations. In Bukidnon, which was one of the heaviest areas of immigration, the population rose from 63,470 in 1948 to 194,368 in 1960 to 414,762 in 1970 with the Lumad Bukidnons' proportion falling from 64 to 33 to 14 percent. Where settlers have come in contact with Lumads, conflicts have resulted over resource competition.

With capitalist expansion into the heartland of Mindanao, Lumads and Moslems have been displaced from their original habitats, and many now live in poverty and malnutrition. The entry of large companies has given rise to numerous cases of outright landgrabbing and attendant land disputes. The Senate Committee on National Minorities in 1963 made a report that noted the pressing land problems in the Mindanao provinces of Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and Basilan. The report indicated that "natives in these provinces complained that they were being driven away by
influential persons and big companies who have been awarded rights to lands which have long been occupied and improved by members of the cultural minorities. State development projects have likewise caused evictions of Moslem and Lumad communities from their lands. The BFI is embroiled in controversies surrounding Lumad land claims within the identified project area. The construction of dams from the Agus and Pulangi rivers has flooded several communities and forced the evacuation of people from ancestral lands. Native lifeways and cultures have thus been threatened by various development projects. The militarization of the hinterlands in the last two decades has wreaked havoc on the lives of indigenous groups all over Mindanao. The Moslems of the south have been brutalized by the civil war in the 1970s, and the Lumads have suffered in the crossfire between the military and the communist insurgents.

It is clear that the promise of Mindanao benefited only those who came to exploit its resources and link the region with the capitalist world economy. Foreign capitalists and the domestic elite of a semi-feudal economy, supported by a state embracing and enforcing inimical schemes of development, have conspired to make Mindanao a land of "broken promises" for its native inhabitants and the countless peasant and other settlers who have sought a better life in the region. The wealth generated from the industries and resources of Mindanao are siphoned off to the
more developed economies of the world, as well as to other centers of the country, especially Manila. Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, who was a vocal anti-Marcos mayor of Cagayan de Oro City during martial law, has often referred to Mindanao as the country's "milking cow." The region contributes an estimated half of the country's Gross National Product but receives a trickle in basic social services and local government assistance from the central government.17

The presence of transnational corporations in Mindanao has only served to make the region dependent on export markets. This means that prices of such products as coconuts, wood, fish and fresh fruit are subject to the vagaries of international trade and are therefore unstable. As such, local needs are sacrificed; the export of fish and fruit, for instance, makes these commodities expensive and beyond the reach of the poor families in Mindanao. Moreover, capitalist production of cash crops for world markets has undermined food production for the local populations of Mindanao. Lands that could have been used for rice and corn production have instead been converted to sugar, pineapple and banana plantations. The Bukidnon Sugar Company (BUSCO), the Del Monte Corporation in Bukidnon and the Tagum Development Company (TADECO/United Fruit) in Davao are but a few examples of agri-business corporations that
have taken over expansive prime lands for the production of crops for export.

Despite the state's much-vaunted goals to bring agricultural and industrial development to Mindanao, the region is beset with widespread poverty. The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) has shown that on average the incidence of poverty in Mindanao is higher than the national average of 59.3 percent.\textsuperscript{18} In 1985 NEDA studies showed that of Mindanao's 2.13 million families, 64.3 percent were living below the poverty line. Northern Mindanao, where most Lumads live, registered the highest poverty incidence in Mindanao, 66.2 percent.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Environmental Costs}

Nothing is perhaps more staggering a cost of Mindanao's colonization than the destruction of its natural environment. A present survey of the landscape will yield specters of despoilation and ecological disaster. Mindanao's forests are being denuded at the rate of one hectare every three minutes.\textsuperscript{20} The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) says that for Mindanao to be environmentally viable it must have 54 percent forest cover; at present Mindanao only has about 18 percent remaining forest cover.\textsuperscript{21} One unmistakable sign that the environment has been so ravaged is the near-extinction of the majestic Philippine Eagle (\textit{Pithecophaga jefferyi}), which has the widest wingspan of all eagles in
the world. There are only 33 left in the wild today, an indication of their dwindled forest habitat.

In the last three years widespread drought has occurred over long periods all over Mindanao. The dry spells have been largely caused by denudation of forests and even critical watershed areas. In 1990 Lake Lanao, which generates hydroelectric power for most of Mindanao, receded below critical levels. In 1992 the drought destroyed 3.1 billion pesos worth of agricultural products and caused the deaths of 44 Moslem and Lumad children. Wanton logging operations have degraded watersheds and caused serious erosion of topsoil and siltation of rivers and streams. In 1990 alone such erosion was estimated to cost 150 million pesos in productivity losses. The drought as well as the floods during the rainy season cost the country an estimated 10 billion pesos in 1990.

Extensive monocropping agriculture which large agribusiness transnational companies engage in have also been environmentally destructive. Such practices necessitate high levels of chemical applications and have caused the depletion of soil nutrients. Banana and pineapple cultivation patterns erode the soil and affect adjacent farmlands. If such monocropping were discontinued the soil would likely be unable to sustain other crops. In a country like the Philippines people are generally primary producers, with large subsistence sectors like the
Lumads wholly dependent on natural resources. Natural-resource degradation -- from forests to topsoil -- thus becomes an immediate crisis, threatening their life and livelihood.

**Frontier Politics**

The conquest of a frontier like Mindanao by the state, corporate interests, and various groups and individuals from other parts of the country inevitably gave rise to simmering social tensions. By the early decades of the century disputes and outbreaks of violence over land had already occurred. Sporadic anti-government revolts were staged, and millenarian movements which assumed forms of resistance arose among early settlers and indigenous communities. As pioneering landlords maintained feudal arrangements in vast haciendas, political dynasties arose, like the powerful Fortich family in Bukidnon.

As early as 1903 some indigenous people in the Davao area resisted the influx of settlers and planters by forming "fanatical bands" with religious or millenarian overtones. A planter was killed in 1903 and a district governor assassinated in 1906. By 1938 around 600 Japanese abaca workers in Japanese-run abaca plantations were killed by Lumad Bilaan, Tagacaolo, Manobo, and Bagobo members, mostly over agrarian disputes. Anti-government "disturbances" in the Moslem provinces were frequent throughout the 1920s and
1930s as Moslems fiercely resisted incursions into their land.

The Japanese occupation only served to exacerbate tensions in Mindanao. The brutalities of the war period reinforced a tradition of violent confrontation and guerrilla warfare and left large quantities of firearms and weapons. Moslem uprisings escalated as datus challenged government troops. The prolonged conflict led to the 1957 creation of the Commission on National Integration (CNI), which sought primarily to solve the "Moro problem."

The "Moro problem," however, only worsened. The unabated influx of migrant settlers and the expansion of big business ventures escalated land disputes. In the course of the next two decades the "Moro problem" became a "Mindanao problem." Soon enough constant skirmishes and bloody fighting occurred among different groups: Moslems against settlers, tribals against settlers, old settlers against new ones, landlords against peasants, insurgents against the state's army. Alliances overlapped and crisscrossed. In Cotabato and Lanao, Ilonggo settlers allied with the tribal Tiruray formed the "Ilaga" group; the latter fought against the Moslem "Barracuda" and "Blackshirt" armies linked to Moslem leaders like Ali Dimaporo and Udtog Matalam. The Ilagas were said to have been organized by Christian politicians and the Philippine Constabulary to weaken effectively Moslem politicians in their own strongholds.
In the 1970s and through the 1980s, anarchy seemed to rule all over Mindanao. Cattle rustling and raiding became common as some peasant groups and poor settlers turned to banditry. Kidnappings became commonplace. Outright landgrabbing by rich settlers and big companies was frequent; Moslems, tribal communities and pre-war settlers were further dispossessed of landholdings. In some areas local datus "taxed" new settlers. Wealthy and powerful landowners and politicians hired armed goons and formed their private armies as new political rivalries developed. Illegal logging operations became rampant. The communist insurgency burgeoned and militarization intensified.

**Intensified Violence**

The "Moro problem" increasingly became a threat to the state itself as Islamic consciousness took hold among Moslems. This consciousness was translated into political capital and ideologized into Moro separatism. In the 1970s the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed and became the bastion of the Moslem separatist struggle. The war that was waged between the Moslems and the Philippine state claimed over 50,000 lives and displaced around 200,000 people, forcing some 140,000 to seek refuge in neighboring Sabah.29

The secessionist movement (or the overall conflict in Mindanao) was one of the main reasons Ferdinand Marcos used for imposing martial law in 1972. Martial law, however, did
little to improve the situation and temper the social tensions in Mindanao. If anything, authoritarian rule and brutal militarization in the countryside pushed the region into even deeper turmoil.

In the late 1970s up to the early 1980s provinces like Bukidnon, Cotabato and Davao became sites of violent confrontation between business and political interests favored by the state, dispossessed indigenous groups, the NPA, the military and "fanatical" or millenarian sects which were later coopted by the military and became right-wing "vigilante" groups.\(^{30}\) Mindanao society, as R.J. May described, was increasingly pulled into a "vortex of intensified violence." A description of Bukidnon in 1982 by historian Ronald Edgerton mirrors what was transpiring in other parts of Mindanao:

 Philippine Army and Constabulary soldiers everywhere, tearing around in ramshackle jeeps, Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) encamp for training on random hillsides, New People's Army (NPA) 'night visitors' haunt barrios as well as the dreams of the rich (who hire armed guards to accumulate small but lethal arsenals with the help of soldiers willing to sell their armalites for P1,500), armed sects terrorize barrios in the south, Manobos and Bukidnon (the two tribal minorities in the province) conduct sporadic raids in retaliation for the loss of their lands to settlers and agribusiness, Army renegades or 'Lost Commands' maraud along the southern border, and bandits -- posing as NPA or Army -- still further confuse this picture of growing violence and insecurity.\(^{31}\)
Post-Marcos Mindanao

When Corazon Aquino visited Mindanao as the opposition candidate against Ferdinand Marcos in early 1986, she called Mindanao "a land of unfulfilled promises, a war zone, a land forced into fratricidal strife, a land where everyday Filipino kills brother Filipino, a land of avaricious exploitation." The descriptions were correct and eloquent. Throughout Aquino's term, however, the social tensions and conflicts in Mindanao society persisted. The change of government in 1986 did little to improve a highly volatile situation. The fall of the Marcos dictatorship and the opening of democratic spaces had allowed heretofore repressed voices to be heard anew. But the easing up of political repression and increased democratization opened a new "Pandora's box" of problems.

One problem was the revival of movements for an independent Mindanao apart from the Moslem separatist goal. The Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was launched in April 1986 by a motley group of politicians led by erstwhile Cagayan de Oro assemblyman and mayor, Ruben Canoy. The MIM sought the establishment of a Federal Republic of Mindanao and denounced the Manila government as "illegitimate." The MIM sought ties with the MNLF and members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM); the latter had earlier, in December 1989, staged the bloodiest of all coup d'états against the new government. In northern Mindanao army
colonel Alexander Noble staged a joint civilian-military coup in October 1990 supporting the MIM. Big landowners in Mindanao averse to the implementation of agrarian reform were reportedly supportive of a coup and ideas of a separate Mindanao republic. The rebellion was quelled and Canoy was arrested. The MIM soon after died down, but the conditions of instability that have caused such movements remain.

In 1987 anti-communist vigilante groups in Mindanao proliferated. The Alsa Masa in Davao was said to have 10,000 members who patrolled the city, manned road checkpoints, and conducted intelligence work for the Philippine Constabulary. Such vigilante groups, many of which evolved from religious sects and millenarian organizations, were known for their bizarre practices, such as beheading enemies and drinking their blood. The vigilante groups were credited for the decline of NPA support in Davao. President Aquino herself had hailed Alsa Masa in 1987 for its contribution to peace and order. Human rights groups, however, accused vigilante groups of extortion, illegal "arrests," harassment of non-supporters (church workers, labor organizers, etc.) and "extra-judicial execution." The vigilante groups still remain although their influence and activities have waned, just as the overall influence of the NPA has been declining.

All over Mindanao the spate of kidnappings and armed confrontations between various groups continue, though less
frequently than at the height of unrest and repression in the 1970s and 1980s. In Davao the banana plantations are under fire from militant labor groups. Corrupt politicians and businessmen engage in illegal logging despite congressional moratoriums on logging operations. Private armies are still in existence; out of an estimated 152 armed groups and private armies in the country, 102 are said to be in Mindanao.\(^{37}\) In December 26, 1993 a devastating bombing occurred at the San Pedro Cathedral in Davao City during a crowded Sunday service. Seven people were killed and several others injured. Initial reports alleged that this was the doing of Moslem extremist groups. A few days later three mosques in the Davao area were similarly bombed. By the New Year officials like Senator Blas Ople raised speculations about a new "ethnic war" in Mindanao.\(^{38}\) The peace and order situation areas may have, by various accounts, considerably improved, but judging from such incidents as the Davao bombings, this may well be uncertain and tentative. The structural factors that have produced the instabilities in Mindanao remain firmly in place and uncorrected.

**What Chances for the Margins?**

Despite the tensions -- both latent and overt -- Mindanao continues to be the site of settler immigrations and corporate agribusiness expansion. In the municipality of Talakag in Bukidnon, for example, about 4,000 hectares of
public land have been identified by the central government as the relocation site for over a thousand families displaced by the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruptions in Central Luzon; much of the area is claimed by the Lumads as part of their ancestral domain. For the Philippine state Mindanao is still a focal point for industrial and agricultural development, an identified arena for sustained economic growth. Business and government leaders, for instance, drew an economic plan to bring Mindanao to the status of a newly industrialized economy by the end of the century. The plan was called the Mindanao Integrated Development Agenda (MIDA). The much-vaunted Cagayan-Iligan Corridor is a state-led drive towards rapidly industrializing the area that links the coastal cities of Cagayan de Oro and Iligan, a thrust that seeks to bring increased foreign investment and infrastructural development to the whole region of northern Mindanao. Such prospects have in turn led to a mad scramble for government lands, with buyers anticipating future declarations of such areas as "alienable and disposable." In the Bukidnon, Davao and Cotabato borders, for instance, land speculation is high; in December 1993 numerous reports of government officials buying land surfaced in the media, prompting the Ramos administration to order an investigation of the matter. The alleged seizing of tracts of land by powerful businessmen and government officials from Davao City has reportedly triggered violence
in some areas, especially where so-called ancestral lands and Lumad areas are encroached upon. 39

As all these transpire, social tensions will predictably continue to fester and the pressures on the already fragile environment will increase. For sectors already on the margins of Mindanao society, the struggle to survive will heighten. The continued "frontierization" of Mindanao will increasingly absorb native inhabitants like the Lumads into dominant structures and assimilate them to the cultural values of the dominant society -- or perhaps force them to adapt and adjust in various ways while keeping group identifications and identities somewhat intact. In a frontier environment like Mindanao many Lumads have inevitably lost their autonomy as contained and self-reliant communities. In an immensely rich area like Mindanao the forces of competition for land and resource have pressed on such communities from all sides. For the few other Lumad groups that have lived in relative isolation in the remaining mountain fastnesses of the region -- such as the Umayamnon people living in the forests that cover the area where the boundaries of Bukidnon, Agusan del Sur and Davao del Norte intersect -- the relentless stretch of the Mindanao frontier is bringing them increasingly in contact with the forces of modernization integral to the conquering of such frontiers.
ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

6. The NARRA was created on June 18, 1954 under the Magsaysay administration. The NARRA was a land settlement program tasked "to open and develop untapped agricultural lands of the public domain for distribution to landless farmworkers and pioneer settlers." See Madronio Lao, Bukidnon in Historical Perspective (Cagayan de Oro City: John Offset Press, 1992), p. 42.

7. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 9.


9. Ibid.


11. Ahmad, op. cit., p. 12.


17. Mindanao has 56 percent of the total Philippine commercial forest land; 100 percent of the country's banana and pineapple exports are from Mindanao, comprising 90 percent of all fruit exports of the country; more than 60 percent of the Philippine copra and coconut oil exports come from Mindanao; about one-fourth of the Philippine output of mineral products are from Mindanao. See Tadem, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-20.


19. Ibid. The "poverty line" is defined by the NEDA as "the monthly income required to satisfy 100 percent of nutritional requirements and other needs of a family of six."


22. Atillo, *op. cit.*

23. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p. 128.

28. Ibid., p. 129.

29. Ibid., p. 130.

30. The most notorious of these vigilante groups was the "Alsa Masa" in Davao City. For a discussion of such groups, see Ronald J. May, Vigilantes in the Philippines. From Fanatical Cults to Citizens' Organizations (Philippine Studies Occasional Paper Series, 12, University of Hawaii, 1992).


33. See May, Vigilantes in the Philippines.

34. One of the vigilante groups, for instance, called themselves "Tadtad," which is the Visayan word for "chop." Those who were victimized by the Tadtads were literally chopped and mutilated.


36. President Ramos legalized the Communist Party of the Philippines in late 1992. There have been rifts within the CPP leadership; the ongoing peace negotiations under the National Unification Council (formed by Ramos) have also weakened the party's mass-based support.

37. National Peace and Order Council Report, Manila Chronicle, November 7, 1989. In October 20, 1993 Secretary of the Interior and Local Government Rafael Alunan reported that certain congressmen had private armies. Congressman Jose Zubiri of the Third District of Bukidnon was named one of them. Zubiri lambasted Alunan on the floor of the House of Representatives that week.


CHAPTER V

FROM TRIBALS TO PEASANTS: LOSING AUTONOMY

The trek to the hinterlands of Cabanglasan in the eastern edge of Bukidnon province is long. A jeep or any sturdy four-wheel vehicle can only reach a certain point on the rugged mountain roads. Beyond that the way is accessible only by motorbike, but on wet days walking is the only safe bet. The small town of Cabanglasan is about 50 kilometers away from Malaybalay, the capital of Bukidnon. The town is nestled on the foothills of the Puntaron range. Beyond Cabanglasan, in the mountains which span a distance, are the habitats of the small Umayamnon tribe, a group identified with the larger Manobo family. The motorbike ride along narrow, craggy paths is arduous and after an hour or so, getting on foot is the only way to go. The foliage thickens as one trudges farther; the dense forest cover gives a sense of primeval beauty. It takes about a day of walking to reach the settlements of the Umayammons.1

The first clearing reached is situated by a gurgling stream. Umayamnon women, mouths red with betel nut chewing, are scraping the surface of rattan2 stems with crude knives. The sturdy, straight stems are horizontally set on wooden stands for easy cleaning and drying. Makeshift homes propped on short stilts and covered with tree-bark and dried banana leaves are close by. Smoke rises from crude stoves. Children frolic by the limpid stream. The vignette seems by conventional accounts "primitive" and strikingly tranquil and idyllic. It is a small band, isolated and seemingly self-contained. But the observation is not bound to hold for too long, for one sees the beginnings of significant culture change. The rattan they gather from the forest is for a lowlander businessman who supervises the whole activity of scraping, drying and tying them into bundles.

Yet for now the Umayamnon is perhaps the tribe in Mindanao closest to what anthropologist Robert Redfield3 would call "the folk society." Redfield characterizes the
folk society as "small, isolated, nonliterate, self-sufficient and homogenous, with a strong sense of group solidarity." A "folk society" is thus a "little world off by itself." The Umayamnons could still fit this description.

The Umayamon tribe belongs to the Manobo family and speaks a language closely related to the Manobos of Agusan del Sur. They number around a hundred families and live in the remaining forest fastnesses of the area encompassing the nexus of the Bukidnon, Agusan del Sur and Davao del Norte provinces. It is through this area that the Umayam river flows, thus the tribal appellation. In this last patch of Mindanao wilderness one of the very few remaining Philippine eagles can still be occasionally sighted, an indication that the forests here are still largely intact. The Umayamnons live off the bounty of the forest by some hunting and gathering methods, but they also practice swidden agriculture purely for the consumption needs of their community. Their appearance would readily seem primitive to a lowlander: some men and women are still scantily clad and wear tattoos. They walk barefoot and earnestly chew betel nut mixed with lime, a description that could well have been Antonio Pigafetta's when he chronicled aspects of Philippine life after Magellan had set foot on the islands in 1521.

It certainly would all seem fairly idyllic and self-contained, perhaps approximating what Marshall Sahlins calls...
the "original affluent society." The term affluent society is a common reference to a society in which people's wants are easily satisfied. Sahlins has argued that small, tribal societies with simple economies -- like hunting-gathering bands -- may not necessarily be seen as leading a precarious existence. The conventional view has been that life in tribal societies with subsistence economies has always been harsh and difficult. But Sahlins forces the point of "affluence" and presses the question: who is to say that hunter-gatherers or semi-nomadic groups like the Umayamnons are not satisfied and happy simply because they have not partaken of the fruits of modernity and industrial civilization?

Breaking the isolation of the Umayamon "folk society" by the introduction to an outside world may, indeed, threaten their "affluence," as it has done to numerous other small tribal societies the world over. The inroads of lowland influences into Umayamon territory are, in fact, showing. Logging roads that cut through the forest, many of which were made in the mad rush for Mindanao's timber in the 1950s and 1960s, have brought more contacts with lowlanders. Although the roads have as yet reached their habitats, they have considerably penetrated their larger forestal domain. Today, even while the Bukidnon province is placed under a logging moratorium, the exploitation of the resources of the forests continues. As the Umayamnons are
brought into this activity, a process of culture change is started. The subsistence economy gives way to arrangements that are cash-based.

The harvesting of rattan in this area is a glaring case in point. The sturdy stems of rattan are raw material for the fashioning of furniture exported to Japan and the West. Lowlander businessmen venture into this far-flung area and pay some Umayamnons to gather rattan. The Umayamnons are now beginning to see the lucrative returns of this undertaking. Some of the young men and women clamber on the trees to cut the stems. Then they meticulously scrape the outer covering and set the poles to dry. The middleman buys each bundle of about a dozen ten-feet poles for about five to eight pesos each ($ .20 or $.25). This amount is a pittance compared to the sales he will get from the furniture manufacturers, who in turn make a fortune from the export of the finished product.

The contact of the Umayamnon with the lowlander businessman has been their initiation into a cash-based, market economy. The presence of a road that could take them to towns and settlements a number of kilometers away has opened for them a world of even more contacts, guaranteed to alter in time their lifeways. One elderly woman would speak of her excitement in buying brass bracelets and trinkets from town with the money she earned from rattan-gathering. A boy would boast of his plastic toy gun acquired from a
flea market in town. A young girl with a colorfully beaded Lumad headband would gleefully sport an imitation-Seiko wristwatch. For them, these novel items could well constitute an initial understanding of "progress."

Yet contact with the "civilized" outside world almost always results in a loss of political autonomy and leads to economic dependency. These changes form prerequisites for further economic development. The issue here, however, is not contact per se, as John Bodley clarifies, but the loss of autonomy that ensues after contact. The Umayamnon case will predictably bear this out. The Umayamnons are going the way many other tribal societies around the world have gone: towards rapid culture change and acculturation to the ways of modernization. The introduction to a market economy and the use of cash undermines a communal structure. The "affluence" of traditional tribal society is diminished as the loss of autonomy increases. The self-sufficiency of their community will give way to dependency and impoverishment as the resources of an already dwindled forest habitat decrease even more.

This highly unequal relationship between a highly organized, complex system and a less organized one is what ecological theory underscores. As Ramon Margalef explains, the less organized system always suffers a loss of organization, while the more organized system gains more energy and information. In this particular case intrusive
outside forces benefit from the extraction of resources from the Umayamnons' habitats, and these are simultaneously able to influence the indigenous community to adopt many of the ways of the outside system. In any case it is the indigenous community that is disadvantaged since the natural ecosystem with which it directly interacts is disrupted and exploited.

The "affluent society" can thus only be sustained if the natural environment upon which it is dependent for its sustenance is protected and sustained as well. With a growing market for rattan furniture, gathering these stems will likely continue. Contacts with lowlanders will not only have to do with the buying and selling of forest products such as rattan, but will increasingly include interactions with peasant migrants from the lowlands. If the destruction of the forests of Mindanao continue unabated the Umayamnons will in time be robbed of the land and environment that sustain life and culture. In time they would become peasants dependent on lowland towns or cities for goods and who look to the state for basic services. The Umayamnon will likely experience what many other Lumad communities in northern Mindanao have undergone or are still undergoing -- sustained contact and the often disruptive processes of rapid change.
Routine Contact and Culture Change in the Uplands

Continuous contact between previously self-contained tribal people and representatives of the national society or state results in what Bodley calls a "shock phase." It is in this phase when rapid cultural collapse and even the physical extinction of the tribe are potentially high. This "shock phase" takes place in the uplands of the Philippines, where sustained contact with the tribal communities is made by the state, commercial interests, migrant settlers, and other outside groups like missionaries.

The uplands are where most of the so-called tribal minority groups live. The uplands comprise 16.6 million hectares, or 55.4 percent of the country's entire land area of 30 million hectares. In these regions threats to tribal lands and culture are acute. John Bodley identifies four categories of such threats: a) spontaneous colonization; b) missionary colonization; c) official colonization; and d) large-scale corporate development.

Continued Settler Immigrations

The uplands are a geographical space to which continuing waves of migrant settlers gravitate. As a direct result of landlessness and an exploding population growth rate, tenants and poor, unemployed lowland families increasingly push towards the upland frontiers in search of parcels of land to till. The mountains and plateaus of
Bukidnon have become sites of heavy immigrations in the last two decades. People from the islands of Panay and Negros in the Visayas, for instance, flee intolerable working conditions in the vast sugar haciendas and opt to become peasants in Mindanao. The numbers were particularly large when the sugar industry, on which Negros is largely dependent, collapsed in the 1980s.

This exodus to the hinterlands is often made on the heels of logging companies, who leave logged over forest areas open for migrant settler groups to convert to farms. The influx of settlers disenfranchise indigenous communities, restricting their traditional economic pursuits. These new colonists deplete resources through direct overexploitation, ultimately forcing the native inhabitants to buy food and other goods instead. In many cases these people become marginal farmers as well, or work as laborers for some of the settlers.

In northern Mindanao upland populations, both Lumad and migrant, resort to illegal logging in remaining patches of forest. Both societies in the uplands now compete for limited forest and land resources. Conflicts between the two groups develop and outbreaks of violence occur on occasion. Settlers are quick to file legal titles to their claims on the land; Lumads have scant understanding of such legal mechanisms. In various cases, settlers have hoodwinked unsuspecting Lumads into "selling" their lands in
exchange for canned goods, clothes, tobacco and the sort. In the periodic hunger months that mark the upland agricultural cycle, many Lumads use their land to borrow money or rice from settlers. Land is also used as "collaterals" for debts during emergencies. Their inability to pay their debts to settlers results ultimately in the loss of their lands. Datu Fidel Tumbalang of San Fernando, Bukidnon relates how his fellow Manobos of the area are now steeped in debt to the "dumagats" (lowlanders); he says it will cost about two million pesos to be able to buy back most of their own land.12

As in many other regions of the country, the growth of the upland population in northern Mindanao has been rapid. By 1990 estimates, close to two-thirds of the region's upland population of around 1.8 million are migrants encroaching into what was for centuries predominantly Lumad lands.

Table 3. Migrant and Indigenous Upland Population Estimates for 1990, Per Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Indigenous Population</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
<th>Migrant Population</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>349,245</td>
<td>19.99</td>
<td>1,392,137</td>
<td>80.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,495,575</td>
<td>97.98</td>
<td>30,910</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>84,020</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>1,006,663</td>
<td>92.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>267,932</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>1,496,794</td>
<td>84.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>34,509</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1,184,108</td>
<td>97.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23,038</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1,713,745</td>
<td>98.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Migrant and Indigenous Population (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>8,192</td>
<td>11,108</td>
<td>12,702</td>
<td>14,441</td>
<td>17,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>4,401</td>
<td>5,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IX</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region X</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XI</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XII</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increase of upland populations in the last four decades has reached close to 300 per cent. In Mindanao, where the administrative Regions 9, 10, 11 and 12 are located, the increase has been five times over from 1948 to the end of the 1980s. The table below reflects this rapid demographic change.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>5,868</td>
<td>8,192</td>
<td>11,108</td>
<td>12,702</td>
<td>14,441</td>
<td>17,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>4,401</td>
<td>5,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IX</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region X</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,254</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XI</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XII</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corporate Invasions

The uplands have become a territorial space for the expansion of capitalism. As was pointed out in previous sections, the drive to feed the international timber and mineral markets has led corporate interests deep into the hinterlands. When forests are cleared of the timber, the areas are used for crop production (for coffee or sugar, for example), cattle raising, or industrial tree plantations. In the 1970s the Kitanglad Development Corporation in Bukidnon converted the denuded foothills of the Kitanglad mountain range into coffee plantations. The small farmers and Lumads were forced to grow coffee on their lands.

Large-scale corporate interests greatly affect indigenous populations because of their technology and the ways by which they are able to influence the state in their favor. Many of the logging concessions and corporations in northern Mindanao were associated with the Marcos regime. Military men forced many Lumads out of their lands. In turn, many Lumads were forced to work for the large companies as wage laborers. In the Pontian plains of Bukidnon, for example, some Lumad families, eased out of their small corn farms by the plantation expansion programs of the giant Del Monte Corporation, have been absorbed as planters and harvesters. In a few logging concessions in Bukidnon datus were used as security guards in designated forest areas.13
Official Colonization

The state’s projects in the uplands have only served to worsen the dispossession of indigenous lands. Roads have facilitated the entry of settlers and commercial interests. Programs like land reform or land leases favor farmers and are prejudicial to indigenous groups; the state, after all, sanctions more market-oriented, productive utilization of land than it does traditional subsistence practices. Officially sanctioned colonies are still being established, such as the 4,000-hectare area in Talid-talid, Talakag, Bukidnon for families displaced by the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruption in Zambales. The area is within a municipality with a large Lumad population.

Ambitious state projects like the Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI) abet the colonization of the uplands. The BFI aims to reforest 14,000 hectares in eastern Bukidnon with fast-growing, industrial trees. The project may be helpful to the environment, but many Lumads claim ancestral rights to areas within the project site. Enrique Dagawasan, Provincial Officer of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) in Bukidnon, claims that "the government through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) favors the BFI more than the Lumads, and the BFI does not respect the Lumads." Some Lumads claim that the BFI forced them out of their lands, and several of those employed by the BFI report of "back-breaking labor."
Seventy-nine Lumad families within a portion of the project site were summoned by the Municipal Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon in November 1992 for a case filed by the BFI concerning "the destruction of forests and illegal entry." 16

The uplands are also viewed by the state as territories that must be controlled strategically. This is so because the hinterlands of the country provide sanctuary for the communist and various Moslem, or incipient and less organized non-Moslem, insurgencies. Military presence in the upland regions of the country is thus seen as a neutralizing force vis-à-vis anti-state movements. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for National Minorities (PANAMIN) during the Marcos era, in fact, employed elaborate mechanisms for anti-insurgency campaigns, not the least of which was coopting native leaders and mobilizing tribal communities against the communist New People's Army.

State penetration in these regions is carried out due to strategic and economic considerations. States rarely allow the existence of sovereign tribal nations within national boundaries. The state polices certain areas to bring tribal minorities into direct control. This is particularly so in areas where tribal conflict is present or where tribal resistance to outside control is imminent or open. In such areas tribal resistance could play into the hands of or join forces with more organized insurgencies, all the more reason for the state to establish strategically
its military presence in the uplands. Economic imperatives, on the other hand, drive the state to acquire raw materials in lands traditionally claimed by Lumads as ancestral domain. Commercial capitalist expansion into ancestral lands is thus favored by the state insofar as it ties in with goals of national economic development. Thus, while government exercises a "policy of neglect" towards indigenous communities in the uplands, as Jonathan Okamura argues, it can ill afford -- for political and economic considerations -- to ignore the lands that these groups of people occupy.

Missionary Influences

Though clearly less of a threat to their survival than outright landgrabbing and displacement, missionary presence in the uplands imposes acculturative pressures on indigenous people. Religious missions -- some more than others -- have been known to be powerful influences in the reshaping, if not eradication, of certain indigenous cultural practices. In northern Mindanao, the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), which has operated in the region since 1953, is the most prominent. American Protestant missionary groups affiliated with this institute translate the Bible into Binukid and the local vernaculars and aim to convert the Lumads. The SIL missionaries interact extensively with the Lumads; in the remote areas of northern Mindanao the SIL could be seen as having more of an
influence on Lumads than a government that can hardly deliver basic social services.

The proselytizing to the Lumads paves the way for significant culture change. Datu Mandimate is a Bukidnon Lumad leader who is now a practicing Baptist. Even as he upholds many customs and rituals of old, he claims he has learned to relinquish certain Lumad practices he now believes are incongruous to his Christian faith. But religious conversion, as John Bodley states, is not inherently destructive of traditional cultures because healthy syncretic blends could well evolve. It is not uncommon, for instance, to see native ritual coexist with Christian religious traditions. A Christian invocation can be made by a datu shortly before a Lumad ceremony is performed, like a pamuhat, killing a sacrificial chicken to propitiate the spirits of the natural world.

Shock Phase: Dependency and Destitution

The impact of routine contact in this "shock phase" is clearly indicated in the deterioration of living standards among indigenous communities. The loss of autonomy and territory hastens a breakdown of traditional tribal structures. The "affluent society" Sahlins describes gives way to increasing impoverishment. Many of the Lumad communities in the hinterlands of Bukidnon and all over northern Mindanao appear to be in this "shock phase." In the barrios of Miarayan, Pigtauranan, Sinuda, Culaman,
Katablaran, Sungco, and Mindagat\textsuperscript{22} the conditions are strikingly alike: abject poverty and malnutrition, illiteracy, marginal farming, lingering illnesses. Most of the children and even several adults have never seen a medical doctor. The physical surroundings largely reflect an ambient anomie on the part of many: the mountains around these places are mostly denuded. Charred tree stumps and some discarded logs dot the undulating hillsides. A few crooked rows of corn compete with wild grass and tall weeds.

Datu Melecio Man-ubil,\textsuperscript{23} a Matigsalug datu in Sinuda, Bukidnon near the border of Davao province, laments how he now has to walk many kilometers to the nearest health center for medicines; just a few years ago curative herbs and plants were within reach in the jungles around them. But the hills and mountains that surround their community are now bare. In a span of ten years, he says, the loggers had ravaged the forests. The Bukidnon Sugar Company (BUSCO), established in 1976 by Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto, had converted forest areas as well as corn and rice fields in southern Bukidnon to vast sugar plantations. Settlers have also come in droves to find livelihood in the logged-over areas. For a number of years the limbs and branches of remaining trees and small, discarded logs were gathered by both Lumad and non-Lumad families and sold to BUSCO to fuel its mills. Pieces of wood were chopped and bundled and placed along the sides of the logging roads; BUSCO trucks would then lumber along these paths and haul the bundles, each of which would cost about one peso. By the early 1980s there was nothing to cut, chop or sell to the sugar mill. The poverty situation worsened. Malnutrition, especially among children, became
prevalent and access to basic health care was nil.

The transformation of the Sinuda environment and the impact this had for the Lumad Matigsalugs is replicated in many other areas in the Philippine uplands. Datu Sabuluan Teodoro Itong of Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, for instance, relates how he did not realize the extent of the environmental damage the logging companies had done until all the fish in the streams and the fauna in the forest were gone. Now they buy some bulad (dried fish) from the lowlands. When the loggers had left, the roads that cut through their forest lands were not maintained and it became difficult to go to the lowland towns to sell rootcrops, like camote (sweet potatoes). Datu Sabuluan and his community had to revert to subsistence farming, albeit in a far harsher way because of the ravaged environment.  

A survey of Philippine indigenous groups now will abundantly reveal that they are the most "minoritized" sector of Philippine society. Minoritized, that is, in the conventional sense of being deprived of benefits that accrue to members of a dominant majority or being denied rights that are largely upheld for the members of such majority. In this new state of dependency tribal communities find themselves in dire need of outside assistance. Overall government neglect, however, exacerbates these conditions of destitution; the delivery of basic social services is few and far between. The present Office of Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC) under the Office of the President, for instance, operates on a meagly annual budget of 67 million pesos (about $2.3 million in 1992) supposedly to take care of the needs of close to three million indigenous people in the six administrative regions from Mindoro in southern Luzon to the Visayas and Mindanao.

Lumad cultures appear to be of interest to the state or the outside society only when these are exoticized. Every year the local office of the Department of Tourism sponsors the Kaamulan festival in Bukidnon province. Tourists flock to the capitol grounds of Malaybalay, the provincial capital, to view the spectacle of rhythmic dances and folkloric chanting. There seems to be a faint enchantment to all this, but there is also a certain sadness. Lumad groups are fetched from different remote areas of the province, hauled in government-owned trucks often used to transport cattle. They are housed in makeshift shacks or tents and fed with rationed meals. For a week, their cultures become specimens, opened for romanticized exhibitions of "noble savages." The ancestral cultures are thus taken as symbols of quaintness instead of experienced realities, their dances and art largely devoid of their ritual meaning. Meanwhile, for the rest of the year, the fundamental structures of land, kinship, and community that sustain these very manifestations of culture get steadily eroded by unmitigated forces from outside.
In northern Mindanao ordinary Lumads seem to have nary a concept of an established ethnic identity save for the crude understanding that they are different from the "dumagats" or lowlanders, most of whom are Visayans. They only know that the influx of these dumagats into Mindanao has relentlessly driven them farther and deeper into the mountains. While retaining some of their customs, rituals and traditions of old -- and keeping their own language -- these people in the remaining mountain strongholds of the region inhabit a social and cultural limbo. The unremitting sounds of chainsaws threaten their already dwindled forest habitats, and soon there will be no more place to retreat.

Lowland, Christianized Filipinos see the ennui among tribal peoples as sheer indolence, the absence of any motivation to work or be productive. The perception, of course, is based on a whole different set of standards and values. Essentially, the egalitarianism which characterizes tribal social formations is not found in the competition for resources common in cash-based economies. Subsistence economies, where people's wants are easily satisfied, are the opposite of market economies which embrace Galbraithian assumptions -- that is, that people's wants are great and even infinite, whereas their means are limited though improvable. Industrial production, as such, supposedly narrows the gap between means and ends. In contrast to Galbraithian premises, indigenous communities uphold what
Sahlins calls a Zen solution to scarcity and affluence. The latter philosophy believes that human material ends are few and finite and technical means constant, but on the whole adequate. This allows for people to enjoy material plenty though only having a low standard of living.26 When the conditions that sustain this subsistence economy and the communitarian values that attend such a mode are lost, communities are thrown into a state of disorientation. So beyond this surface visage of "laziness" that lowland Filipinos see among tribal communities, there is something dire to be said about the impact of drastic culture change that saps the inherent vitality of native lifeways.

This weakened state makes the indigenous communities extremely vulnerable to further incursions by migrant settlers, more state-sponsored development projects and natural calamities. In Mindanao alone, the Lumads suffer the most. The long, harsh drought of 1991-1992, for instance, brought hunger to the hinterlands and claimed the lives of many Lumads. One striking report noted how some Lumads in Bukidnon and Cotabato resorted to eating soil in abject desperation.27 Almost a year into the dry spell, President Aquino belatedly declared many Mindanao provinces affected by the drought as "calamity areas." This, however, did little to alleviate the Lumads' plight. Calamity areas, by virtue of government imprimatur, necessarily receive emergency aid and funds from the state. Bureaucratic
imbroglios and the covert shuffling of government funds for the May 1992 national elections, however, left Mindanao unattended. Aid in terms of rice supplies for hunger-stricken Lumad communities never materialized.

Lumad communities are also hapless victims of the crossfire between the military and the communist insurgents. In March 1992, a military offensive was launched against New People's Army (NPA) bases in Agusan del Sur, in retaliation to an earlier NPA ambush of 47 soldiers in Surigao del Norte. In the mayhem, 6,000 families left in haste, including many Manobos and Higa-onons. Datu Marciano Cerna, Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) Director, noted that the Lumads had to leave villages, otherwise "they might be suspected of being communist rebels or sympathizers by the military, and as military informers by the NPA."28 As in many other areas, the Lumads in the Agusan del Sur had no way out.

Widespread ignorance and illiteracy exists as well in many Lumad communities. In the May 1992 synchronized national and local elections, many of these people openly sold their votes to local candidates for sums of twenty or fifty pesos ($0.75 to $2.00). Many of the politicians who readily dispense patronage reinforce a thinking that electoral processes are largely froth and frivolity -- and yet another chance to make a few extra pesos. The abstractions that speak of the sanctity of the ballot or the
right of suffrage become mere material for florid rhetoric. In Baungon, Bukidnon, a depressed municipality with a large Lumad population, some candidates were witness to a number of Lumads in far-flung barrios lining up for a share of electoral bidding. Showing forefingers yet untainted with the mandatory dab of indelible ink (which precinct officials place on the nail of the index finger to indicate that they had already cast their votes), many of these people approached local candidates for a price affixed to their assured votes for the latter. 29 Various accounts had it that similar incidents took place in many other areas of the Bukidnon province. In such remote places Lumads, most of whom could not read or write, would tell "poll-watchers" who their preferred candidate was; the "poll-watcher" would then write the candidate's name on the Lumad voters' ballots and then have them imprint their thumbmarks (in lieu of signatures) on record books. However, some "poll-watchers" or precinct officials, who were under the payroll of a powerful candidate, would write the latter's name despite the Lumads' indication of a different choice, and still have them affix their thumbmarks. The Lumads would then have no inkling as to whether his own choice of candidate was the one written on the ballot.

The depressed condition of the Lumads explains in various ways their massive dependency on outsiders and local authority figures apart from their own datus. The
dependency is not only in terms of protection but also in terms of urgent economic and financial assistance. The pleas for rice, medicine and clothing are many. Their marginalization over the years has led many of them to assume a minority, inferior status vis-à-vis the rest of society.

Forms of Coping

The impact of routine contact in this "shock phase," however, goes beyond the grim indicators of grinding poverty and a self-defeating resignation to their depressed conditions. The transformation of the uplands through the control and use of land and various acculturative pressures have certainly altered the social organizations of indigenous communities. Cultural traits from the outside are adopted and customs are borrowed, though in varying degrees from community to community. Yet out of a morass of acculturation and outside intrusions, new movements among some of these communities do manage to emerge at various historical conjunctures.

The intrusion of more complex systems and forces pushes the indigenous social unit to enter into what Bernard Nietschmann calls "a period of intense rearrangement and restructuring of social and ecological relationships." These movements constitute forms of coping with rapid, disorienting culture change. Some of these resistive responses are visceral and often spontaneous, expressed in
sporadic revolts or sudden outbreaks of violence. The dispersion of the kin group and a disintegration of social support systems drive communities to seek new avenues for security and social anchorage. In negotiating this social and cultural limbo religious movements and various forms of tribal resistance evolve. In a number of cases the movements that grow are varying combinations of religious formations and armed resistance. Some others become more organized in the sense of creating political affiliations with class-based, religious or regional ethnic movements. In such instances the indigenous community relies on sympathetic outside forces -- academic institutions, private or non-government organizations, activists or volunteers of sorts -- to mediate between their group and the state. These currents of what may be considered resistance movements develop foremost out of the rebuilding of community, the revitalizing of the tribe as a collective unit.

***

These dynamics of retribalizing among indigenous communities, particularly in the region of study, will be examined in closer detail in a succeeding chapter. Before this latter exposition, however, a discussion of state-minority relations is needed in order to shed more light on the policies perpetrated by the Philippine state on its designated "cultural minorities." The central issues that
surround the exploitative dynamic of state-minority relations will be explored. This will constitute important groundwork from which policy implications can be drawn and attempts towards prescriptive ethnic minority policy changes and directions can be made, all of which the final chapter will evince.
ENDNOTES

1. I visited the remote area of Cabanglasan from September to December 1992. I was accompanied by a Bukidnon Lumad, Odissima Suclatan, on all my trips.

2. Rattan is a tall palm tress (genera Calamus and Daemonorops) with long, slender, tough stems. (Webster's World Dictionary, 1988).


4. Ibid., p.11.


6. Ibid., p. 16.


12. Datu Fidel Tumballang, Interview, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, November 27, 1992. Datu Tumballang is the Executive Tribal Chief of the Municipal Tribal Council of San Fernando, Bukidnon. In June to July 1990, Tumballang relates, Ilonggo settlers threw hand grenades in Barangay Palakpakan, San Fernando to drive out the Manobos. Many of the earliest settlers to this area came in the 1960s when
logging roads were made. Conflicts of this sort date as far back as the 1960s when settlers and loggers found their way into San Fernando. The Philippine Constabulary would then be involved and exacerbate the situation. Raids and killings were not uncommon.

13. Datu Sabuluan Teodoro Itong, Interview, Butay, Katabalaran, Cablanglasan, Bukidnon, October 14, 1992. Datu Sabuluan says that many of these datus who were hired as security guards were provided with arms by the logging concessions of the Valderamas and Labradors, wealthy lowlanders.


17. Okamura, op. cit., p. 22.


19. The Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) has literacy programs among various Lumad communities in the hinterlands. Some of those in the SIL argue that it is the introduction of a written alphabet that ensures the preservation of non-literate cultures. Oral epics and folklore, for example, are thus put into written form, guaranteeing its survival despite the fact that many of the younger generation do not fully know this corpus of folklore anymore.

20. Datu Mandimate Conrado Binayao was one of my key informants all throughout fieldwork. Datu Binayao was a schoolteacher in the hinterlands for a number of years before joining the staff of the provincial Governor and later of the Mayor of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon in the 1970s and 1980s.


22. These places used to be PANAMIN reservations. I visited all of them in the course of fieldwork in 1992 and observed how poverty-stricken all these places were. There is a significant decline in the quality of life, reflected clearly in health and nutrition. When logging operations
had slowed down or stopped (after much of the forests' timber was gone), the logging roads were not maintained; thus the little produce they had from their marginal farming could not be taken to the towns to be sold.


24. Datu Sabuluan, Interview.

25. Kaamulan is from the Binukid word meaning gathering. I witnessed the Kaamulan in September 1992 and September 1993. In both years, not only Lumads danced and participated in the various events. Many of the personnel of the provincial government of Bukidnon dressed in bright Lumad-inspired costumes and took part in an "ethnic dance contest" held on the capitol grounds. Each group would render a number that was supposedly drawn from Lumad ritual. There seemed little concern for sensitivity to "authenticity" inasmuch as the criteria for the competition had more to do with theatricality -- the elaborate costumes and headdresses, the little "stunts" of clashing knives, the live birds perched on bamboo floats and the sort. Energetic prancing and stomping of feet seemed to be the underlying tenor of all dances; this, it was adjudged, always gave the impression of being "primitive" enough. In the 1993 festival a movie star and a basketball hero were in attendance. The crowd was agog with delight. When it came to a finale number involving the participation of the crowd, the movie star was called to dance with the public to the rhythm of gongs being pounded wildly. The multitude had swooned over the celebrity. Meanwhile, on a corner of the plaza, Matigsalog Lumads from faraway Sinuda were hardly noticed as they pounded sturdy poles on a large log, called the Bangkakaw, producing rhythms that had been with them for ages. When the Kaamulan was first held in the 1970s, the Lumads were "specimens," but now, non-Lumads are the ones who even appropriate Lumad cultural forms and ritual and trivialize them as material for such "ethnic dance contests." As Datu Makapukaw Adolino Saway laments, the Kaamulan has "bastardized our rituals." He adds that it would be all right if the Kaamulan indeed gives the Lumads recognition, but if it is carried out by those have scant understanding of their culture, the results are unsavory. Interview, Songko, Lantapan, Bukidnon, September 8, 1992.


27. See "15 More Tribal Children Die in South Cotabato," Philippine Star, April 10, 1992. See also "Drought in Mindanao Kills 70 Tribesmen," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 4, 1992, p. 12. The drought was reported to
have killed 70 Lumads in northern and southern Mindanao. Gastroenteritis and typhoid fever broke out due to unsafe water in nearly dried-up wells and rivers.


CHAPTER VI

STATE-MINORITY RELATIONS

Integrationist Policy

Integrating tribal minorities into the dominant political and economic framework of a modern nation-state has been the overriding policy of governments towards indigenous peoples throughout this century. Integration has been a solution to the challenge posed by the existence of indigenous peoples when direct extermination, brutal pacification campaigns or blatant exploitation were acknowledged to be inhumane.\(^1\) In the Philippines pacification or isolation was largely the state policy vis-à-vis indigenous cultures under colonial rule. During the Spanish times the *encomienda* system of forced tribute was a way of subjugating the natives and converting them to Christianity.\(^2\) When the encomienda system collapsed by the turn of the 17th century, the friars replaced the colonial officers and sought to resettle and convert native populations through a process of *reducción*. This consolidation into permanent settlements was designed to establish mission control since native communities were widely scattered and hilltribes were semi-nomadic.\(^3\) Conversion, however, was not only in terms of Christian proselytizing, but also involved submission to the Spanish King.\(^4\) The *reducciones* were, however, more effective for
the lowlander natives. Many groups resisted Spanish control; raids on lowland villages near mountain regions were occasionally made. Military expeditions were sent by the Spanish authorities to quell such uprisings. Other groups fled and retreated to mountain strongholds. The influence of the Spanish colonizers in the mountain regions of the country was thus minimal.

American colonial rule, in contrast, reached the hinterlands of the country and was able to impose its control on many indigenous communities. The Americans forged administrative grids over regions like the Cordillera and Moslem provinces in Mindanao, establishing schools and building roads in many remote areas. The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was created by the Philippine Commission on October 1901. The Special Provincial Government Act of 1905 divided provinces into Christian and non-Christian, with those provinces with large indigenous populations classified as the latter. These special provinces were placed under the control of the Secretary of Interior, who was at the time Dean Worcester. The policy of early American colonial rule towards indigenous groups was that of isolation and control. The Department of Interior wanted direct supervision of the minority hilltribes, which later was delegated to local governments. The control was in keeping with the expansion of American business interests into the frontier areas of the country which were abundant
with natural resources. The Americans had, in fact, followed the Spanish example of *reducciones* to resettle groups into reservations, not unlike their own treatment of Native American Indians. But the colonial administrators declared that the purpose of supervising the "wild tribes" was to "bring about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." 

By 1917 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was reorganized from an ethnological research and policy-making body for minorities to one that worked for the eventual assimilation of all indigenous groups into the political and economic mainstream of a society under a colonial order. During the Commonwealth period (prior to formal political independence) President Manuel Quezon abolished the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and transferred the task of administering the tribal minorities wholly to the Department of the Interior. Recognizing, however, the difficulty of integrating the Moslems in Mindanao, an Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu was created. In 1957 the task of integration was transferred to the newly created Commission on National Integration (CNI). The CNI was charged to "effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral, and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural communities and to render real, complete, and permanent integration of
all said national cultural communities into the body politic. 9

The CNI's operations were saddled with failure and ill-conceived projects. The minorities' economic, social or political advancement was hardly effected. Instead of protecting the ancestral landholdings of indigenous communities, the CNI legitimized settler occupation and in various cases even supervised the takeover of ancestral lands by outsiders. The Commission was more inclined to reduce interethnic conflict and oversee land transactions and transfers inimical to the welfare of indigenous groups. Disputes over land were often left unresolved. 10

The CNI also re-established programs of resettling indigenous communities into reservations. Development aid in terms of education (scholarships), protective legislation, health and welfare programs were given with the aim of integrating the different groups. These functions were carried over into subsequent government agencies tasked to oversee "cultural minorities" -- from PANAMIN to the present Offices of Northern and Southern Cultural Communities (ONCC/OSCC). The latter offices include among their several avowed functions the promotion of economic livelihood projects, educational advancement, medical assistance, and cultural preservation. 11 The prevailing mindset among development planners in the Philippines has been that given more roads, bridges and a host of other
social services the indigenous communities could be readily integrated and become more like Christian Filipinos.\textsuperscript{12}

Though these may have had positive results in some cases, integration policies pursued without a clear understanding of the original features of the indigenous community that contribute to its well-being in the end, as John Bodley contends, do more harm than good.\textsuperscript{13} The work of the CNI, the PANAMIN and up to the present ONCC/OSCC have been largely characterized by insensitivity to the needs of communities, imposing many projects and programs hardly attuned to particular conditions and generating dependency by a dole-out system of goods and services. Bodley elaborates thus:

\begin{quote}
A major problem with development policies promoting integration is that their aim is usually to benefit individuals, often at the expense of the community. When development undermines a community's ability to defend and manage its own resources, or when it is imposed by outsiders, genuine benefits can hardly be expected.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

State integration policy, especially in the martial law years, was intended to strategically keep tribal minorities from being organized by the various insurgencies fighting the state. Moreover, integration was a pretext with which the incorporation of minority lands into the national economic development plans could be facilitated. Rather than the actual integration of minorities themselves into the larger society, this thrust allowed instead for their
integration into the economy as a source of cheap labor, and also so that they would not pose obstacles to the economic development of minority areas. A case in point was the state's reclassification of 1.5 million hectares of logged-over upland areas (where most indigenous communities live) as "alienable and disposable" through Presidential Decree 2282 in 1982. Over 100,000 hectares in Bukidnon were included in this reclassification. This was in line with the Marcos regime's Land Resource Management Program under Imelda Marcos' project, the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (Movement for Livelihood and Progress). These areas were designated for "agro-industrial estates." The tribal communities were thus driven out of these areas or absorbed as laborers in some agro-industrial ventures. In the areas where lowland migrants settled and usurped land, indigenous people likewise found themselves forced to work as tenants in what had become settlers' lands, tilling the soil as impoverished peasants in semi-feudal tenurial arrangements.

The damage done by integrationist policies to indigenous communities is most clearly seen in those carried out during the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos. The agency tasked to implement the Marcos government's policy of integrating tribal minorities into the dominant state society and economy was the Office of the Presidential Assistant for National Minorities or PANAMIN, which replaced the defunct Commission on National Integration. PANAMIN's
statement of policy spells out, however, the principle that "every minority group has the right to preserve its traditional way of life or, if it so desires, to change it at the pace and direction it chooses." The same statement of policy underscores the protection of such groups from those who encroach on their domains. The written policy statement sounds noble, but the realities of PANAMIN's activities in Mindanao indicate otherwise. To examine the operations and activities of PANAMIN is, in fact, to delve into the excesses of minority exploitation as perpetrated by the state.

PANAMIN: A Selling Under False Pretenses

In the post-Marcos era independent scholars have averred that PANAMIN was sold under false pretenses. The agency, it is argued, used the putative goal of "upholding the welfare of tribal Filipinos" as a shield for nefarious and exploitative interests -- both military and commercial -- in the hinterlands of the country. In its sixteen-year existence, PANAMIN was involved in counter-insurgency campaigns related to tribal minorities and in various activities concerning the exploitation of mineral and timber resources in the ancestral domains of different indigenous peoples.

PANAMIN was formed originally as a private, non-profit foundation in 1968 by Manuel Elizalde, Jr. A year prior to PANAMIN's inception Elizalde was appointed by President
Marcos as Presidential Adviser for National Minorities. The PANAMIN Foundation Board of Directors included some of the wealthiest and most prominent figures in Philippine business and political circles. Elizalde, his father (Manuel, Sr.), Jaime Zobel de Ayala, Andres Soriano, Jesus Cabarrus, Sixto Roxas, Carlos Romulo and American aviator and hero Charles Lindbergh comprised the Board of the PANAMIN Foundation. Almost all members were of Spanish lineage, descendants of the colonial elite whose families have long dominated various industries in the Philippines. The Elizaldes have business interests in mining, sugar production, distilling, insurance and steel manufacturing. The Zobel de Ayalas oversee a vast corporate empire in the country with interests in major industries -- construction, real estate, hotels and resorts, communication, food, mining, logging, and agribusiness. Soriano can claim rival wealth from major investments in mining and the giant conglomerate, San Miguel Corporation. Cabarrus and Roxas control interests in logging and mining, particularly in Mindanao. Romulo was once Foreign Minister and director of San Miguel Corporation.\(^\text{17}\) The business profile of the PANAMIN Board members thus reads like a "who's who in Philippine big business," a gravely ironic situation for a foundation created to serve and protect the interests of indigenous cultures in the country. Needless to say, not one member of PANAMIN was of any indigenous lineage.
The composition of the PANAMIN Board was yet again illustrative of the condescension of a dominant culture on the "primitivity" of the people this group had putatively sought to help. It was altogether another clear example of a dichotomization of the civilized Self vis-à-vis the primitive Other. Elizalde and his PANAMIN group of the 1970s were the Worcesters of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in the early years of American colonial rule. The membership, in fact, of a foreigner of such stature as Charles Lindbergh lent emphasis to the patronizing stance of PANAMIN, a carryover of colonialist mentalities. The formation of PANAMIN was in essence carried out in the paternalistic notion of assisting the "less civilized" native cultures, the "noble savages" of the Philippine mountainous frontiers.

PANAMIN's operations were considerably extensive in Mindanao, where over half of the indigenous population of the country live. PANAMIN began by giving food, clothing and health care to different indigenous groups, functioning as a social welfare agency of sorts. In 1975, however, PANAMIN was made a full government agency by presidential decree and Elizalde's position as PANAMIN head was elevated to Cabinet rank. The reason behind this had to do with Elizalde's proposal to utilize PANAMIN as a vital part of the national counter-insurgency program. Elizalde had written a memorandum to Marcos which outlined
recommendations on dealing more effectively with non-Moslem hilltribes, the bottom line argument being that the state must have the tribes' loyalty before the New People's Army would infiltrate their communities and use the hinterlands as communist rebel sanctuaries. Marcos had apparently bought into this proposal and within months PANAMIN's "national security and information campaign" received a lion's share of the entire agency's budget. Elizalde received a round-the-clock detail of constabulary men as he mobilized PANAMIN and helped facilitate the militarization of tribal strongholds around Mindanao and the rest of the country.  

Tribal communities were resettled into "strategic hamlets" for easier control; men were mobilized by way of para-military training as part of the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF). PANAMIN worked in close coordination with the military and local coordination with the military and local governments, brandishing its security program as a major accomplishment in its customary annual reports. PANAMIN also hired military personnel to effectively administer its counter-insurgency/security program. Juan Artajo and Oliver Madronal were military officers assigned to oversee PANAMIN operations in Mindanao. Both had served in Vietnam and were involved in the counter-insurgency campaigns of the Central Intelligence Agency among the Montagnards, the hilltribe people of northern Vietnam. The
Montagnards were herded to resettlement sits and trained and armed to fight the communist Viet Cong; the same strategies were to be replicated by PANAMIN in dealing with the Philippine indigenous groups.¹⁹

In a personal interview, Madronal revealed that despite the heavy anti-insurgent thrust of PANAMIN and its elevation to the status of a government agency, PANAMIN had to remain a foundation for covert reasons.²⁰ PANAMIN was thus Janus-faced: one private and one government, employing one position as was suitable in particular situations. For funding purposes from sympathetic institutions abroad, PANAMIN presented itself as a foundation dedicated to helping "tribal Filipinos." This was especially convenient when Elizalde had supposedly "discovered" the existence of a tiny band of stone-age people called the Tasaday in the rainforests of southern Mindanao in the early 1970s; the phenomenon had caught worldwide attention and interest.²¹ For political expediency and military concerns, PANAMIN found it necessary to act as a government agency. Government monies channelled to PANAMIN for anti-insurgency purposes were thus difficult to subject to general auditing because PANAMIN would always reason that as a private foundation it was only receiving contributions. Judge Benjamin Estrada, former Assistant Regional Director for PANAMIN in northern Mindanao, explained that the reasons for PANAMIN's dual personality had to do with efficiency: being
private meant more efficiency, avoiding the bureaucratic red
tape "to meet the needs of the minorities." This, he added,
meant "immunity from malversation." Madroñal related that
at one instance he had a large duffel bag full of freshly
minted hundred-peso bills which he handcarried all the way
from Manila to Zamboanga for one of the hamletting
operations among the Subanons, the indigenous groups in the
area. This was just one glaring indication of PANAMIN's
largesse at the height of martial law.

Numerous "service centers" or "strategic hamlets" were
established all over the country, euphemisms for forcible
relocation of communities. In Bukidnon alone there were
eight "service centers." The hamlets were made up of a
cluster of makeshift huts and small vegetable gardens, and
families were provided with farming implements with which
they could tend their small plots of produce. Agricultural
training was even provided in many of these sites. Medical
teams from PANAMIN would make regular visits and hand out
medicines. Food, particularly rice and canned goods, was
also distributed on occasion. The self-sufficiency and
sense of contentment among those in resettlement areas which
PANAMIN crowed about in its yearly "accomplishment reports"
were not, however, prevalent. The displacement of families
gave rise to a feeling of anomie among many; the dole-outs
of food and medicine reinforced a dependency relationship
with PANAMIN.
Hamletting was necessarily exercised to contain tribal communities so as to allow military troops to carry out their anti-insurgency operations in the hinterlands. In 1980 PANAMIN has set up more than 455 service centers in 50 provinces involving 2.9 million tribal members; three years later there were 685 of these centers. Among a general populace, however, hamletting had become associated with reports of military brutalities and human rights violations -- especially among those tribal communities which resisted forcible relocations. Tribal members suspected of being communist sympathizers faced the grim specter of heavy-handed militarization -- from cruel interrogations to outright torture or killing. Moreover, hamletting was not confined to tribal communities alone; peasants and other upland settlers all over the country were subjected to coercive displacements. Some reports, such as that from the church-based Ecumenical Commission for Displaced Families and Communities, noted how 330,000 persons had been displaced at the height of anti-insurgency operations in 1981 alone. Half of this number were reportedly in Mindanao.

PANAMIN's vast functions gave rise to resentments among local officials. Judge Estrada notes how PANAMIN burst into the political scene as "an independent body, with its own military unit, hospital/medical unit, teachers, etc., pushing itself without obstacles." This threatened some
local politicians, prompting Governor Fortich to openly complain about the lack of coordination with other local government agencies. 28

Para-Military Forces

Murillo Agsulay of Cabanglasan, Bukidnon relates, in a discernibly proud manner, how he was part of the PANAMIN Integrated Civilian Defense Forces (CHDF) in the jungles of central Bukidnon. Agsulay would "monitor the activities" of those who lived within the Katablaran hamlet. Agsulay states that he had to make sure that those who ventured out of the confines of the hamlet were identified and had to sign their names in his record book; their return was also recorded and they had to be questioned about their affairs. The same procedures were followed in Pigtauranan, Miarayon, and Sinuda, three of the other larger PANAMIN-formed hamlets around the vast province of Bukidnon. 29 In many of these areas, especially in the so-called "critical areas" where NPA activity was strong and frequent, tribal community members were even required by PANAMIN para-military units to buy identification cards for ten pesos each; those who did not have such cards were open for suspicion as "insurgents," or as common parlance had it, "rebelde." 30 Alejandro Culiantes, who worked as an "intelligence inspector" under Juan Artajo during the PANAMIN years, says that he had to monitor PANAMIN projects and had to always ensure that "no
rebels were infiltrating the resettlement hamlets."

PANAMIN's functions, he noted, were "semi-military." 31

In various cases counter-insurgency campaigns thus pitted tribal members against their own group, or one tribe against the another. The tactic was part of a "divide and rule" approach to "stabilizing the hinterlands." Involving tribal communities in the military business of containing insurgencies was essential for two reasons. First, indigenous groups had to be kept away from the "infiltrations" of anti-state movements. Secondly, their resettlement into contained hamlets or reservations allowed for the systematic exploitation of ancestral domains which underpinned a state-sponsored program of development.

Cooptation of Leaders

PANAMIN's successes in subordinating indigenous communities were in great part due to the cooperation it was able to get from the leaders of different tribes. In its different reservations or hamlets PANAMIN ensured administrative control through "tribal councils." These councils were comprised of datus who supposedly oversaw the affairs of the communities in reservations. Not all of the council members were real datus; some were designated as datus by PANAMIN for expedient political purposes. These council members received a handsome monthly salary of up to 3,000 pesos in 1979 (about $450 then) and were required to attend occasional meetings with PANAMIN representatives.
This arrangement gave the impression of democratic participation within the Lumad communities, but the "datus" were in fact paid to virtually keep the people within the settlements and coerce them, if need be, to follow the orders of the resident PANAMIN director.32 Some other datus were paid between 120 to 300 pesos ($15 to $40) every month up to the early 1980s.

Many datus still believe that PANAMIN was well-intentioned and that it had the best interests of the Lumads in mind. The shortcomings of the agency, they claim, had to do with some corrupt officials. PANAMIN activities are almost always compared with those of the present Office of Southern Cultural Communities; many datus and ordinary Lumads feel that they do not get as much attention or enjoy as many benefits now as they did in the days of Elizalde.33 There are those Lumads, however, those who believe otherwise. Lorenzo Dinlayan, a Lumad schoolteacher who rose to prominence as Vice-Governor of Bukidnon and then as Assemblyman during the Marcos administration, thinks that the PANAMIN "pampered the Lumads and made them capital for commerce and tourism," alluding to the yearly Kaamulan festival which "exploited our native-ness."34 Datu Fidel Tumbalang of San Fernando, Bukidnon, similarly notes how PANAMIN "taught tribes to be lazy and dependent through its dole-outs," and how the datuship was "cheapened and
bastardized by many of the spurious datus PANAMIN
appointed. 35

What PANAMIN and Elizalde did was reminiscent of the
workings of the Spanish colonial government: playing one
tribe against another, rewarding "allies" and coopting local
leaders to subjugate communities more effectively. The
labelling of various tribes was considered more convenient
for administrative purposes, all the better for a "divide-
and-rule" approach. Among datus a competition for positions
of privilege arose and like the principalia class (local
elite) of the Spanish times, their interests became more
identified with the colonial power. The American colonial
administrators did not operate any differently. The Moslems
of Mindanao, in particular, were brought into American
tutelage and control through the cooptation of leaders and
the dispensing of patronage. PANAMIN continued in this long
tradition of colonization, reaching the populations that had
been largely untouched by centuries of foreign colonial
rule.

Suspect Motives

The agency's operations were often shrouded in secrecy.
PANAMIN's policy statements often contradicted its own
activities in the field. Its policy statement stressed that
the general aims of the agency were "knowledge, assistance,
advice and protection." However, independent
anthropological research, especially on the Tasadays, was
discouraged, if not prohibited, under the pretext that such cultural minority groups needed utmost "protection." Where it called for a preservation of traditional lifeways, PANAMIN introduced minority groups into various agricultural projects disruptive of indigenous swidden practices.\textsuperscript{36} Where it called for protection from outside encroachments, the state though PANAMIN facilitated the entry of extractive industries into ancestral lands. Many \textit{datus} were even provided with arms and made concession guards of logging companies in the forests of Mindanao.\textsuperscript{37} The hamletting of communities into "service centers" was synonymous with military operations in the hinterlands. Where there was high-sounding talk on appreciating the "indigenous soul of the Filipino," PANAMIN trivialized native cultures and made them exotic specimens to exhibit before foreign audiences. For the yearly "Kaamulan Tribal Festival" in Bukidnon the PANAMIN had even provided "authentic" costumes to Lumad groups with a small "PANAMIN" patch sewn onto the clothing. In 1975 Imelda Marcos directed the PANAMIN to bring representatives from various "tribes" around the country and showcase them in a parade in Manila to welcome visiting US President Gerald Ford. No Tasaday was flown in at that time for the parade so Elizalde, sources say, paid some T'boli Lumads to wear leaves and carry a placard with "TASADAY" emblazoned on it.\textsuperscript{38} Some Lumads who had taken part in such occasions would relate how they would be housed in
Elizalde's sprawling suburban home in Manila and treated lavishly; one account has it that Lumads would queue before a seated Elizalde, who would then one by one distribute cash gifts. Felix Casalmo's evaluation of PANAMIN in 1980 paints an unflattering picture of the agency:

PANAMIN's avowed aims are contradicted by its tactics. It has undermined traditional leadership patterns, set natives against natives, treated cultural communities as wards, exploited their traditional trust, herded them to reservations to better control them as logging companies, construction projects and agri-business take over their traditional lands. In arming them for its own purposes, it has aggravated the peace and order situation in Mindanao. What is worse, even natives on the reservations will know no security.

In 1983 Elizalde suddenly left the country and with his departure PANAMIN soon disintegrated. The country had entered a period of increased social turmoil in the mid-1980s as the economy collapsed and popular resistance against Marcos heightened. PANAMIN was reorganized into the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities (OMACC) in 1984 but the country's tribal minorities were increasingly neglected. After the Marcos government fell in 1986 and Corazon Aquino rose to power, the OMACC was reorganized into three separate offices: the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), the Office of Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC). The latter offices may not have the same clout or largesse as PANAMIN, but they largely maintain the same policies, programs and
activities of PANAMIN. As Jonathan Okamura explains, Philippine ethnic minority policy "continues to be compromised by national economic development policies which are export-oriented and (foreign) capital dependent ... and minorities continue to occupy a marginal and subordinate position in Philippine society."41

Constitutional Contradictions

The Philippine state has, at least in written policy and constitutional provisions, recognized the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. Philippine law acknowledges, though vaguely, the right of these communities to cultural self-determination, free from dictates of centralized government structures and the encroachments of external forces. The 1973 Constitution was in fact the first time a recognition of the unique character of indigenous peoples in the country was made. Article XV, Section 11, under General Provisions, states that "[T]he state shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies."42 Given the Marcos government's drive for development schemes favored by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, this provision was, however, virtually flouted. The planned construction of the World Bank-funded Chico River Dam in the Cordilleras and the damming of the Pulangi River in Bukidnon, for example, threatened to inundate tribal
villages and ancestral lands. Presidential Decrees pertaining to ancestral lands were ultimately inimical to the interests of indigenous communities. Presidential Decree 410 of 1974 which decreed that all identified ancestral lands occupied for the preceding ten years were alienable and disposable, i.e., open for registration and titles, was never implemented. Even so, the decree itself stipulated numerous bureaucratic strictures and heavy requirements (survey teams, investigations, presenting evidence of occupancy, etc.) and would have entailed long, cumbersome procedures. All of these would have virtually precluded any claimant from obtaining any land title. The decree was only designed to create the false impression that the Marcos regime was protecting the rights of the cultural minorities. Furthermore, Presidential Decree 705, or the Revised Forestry Code, summarily decreed that all lands with 18 percent slope or higher were part of the public domain and not alienable and disposable, and thus not subject to private ownership. Since most indigenous peoples live in mountainous regions like the Cordilleras and northern Mindanao (all apparently above 18 percent slope) this meant they were "squatters" on public/state land.

When the Marcos regime fell in 1986 and a democratic government was restored under Corazon Aquino, sectoral interests like those of indigenous communities fought for increased recognition. The 1987 Constitution, putatively
reflecting this variety of sectoral interests in reopened
democratic spaces, include more provisions relative to
indigenous cultural communities. On closer examination,
however, such provisions essentially offer nothing new in
substance and reveal the same predilection of the state to
subordinate concepts of communal property under indigenous
customary law to the prevailing laws governing land
disposition. The 1987 constitutional provisions indicate an
ambiguity of ethnic minority policy, exhibiting doublespeak
in the way statements are constructed. Note, for instance,
the following provision:

Article XII, Section 5 (on National
Economy and Patrimony): The State,
subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social and
cultural well-being. ... The Congress
may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights
or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral
domain. [underscoring supplied]

As Rudy Rodil argues, the wording of these provisions
reveals a lack of conviction on the part of the state to
actually "protect the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands." The qualifiers are, after all,
explicitly made: "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and
programs." He notes that the choice of the auxiliary verb
"may" in "may provide for the applicability ..." indicates that the applicability of customary law with respect to property rights and ancestral domain is left to the discretion of Congress.\(^4^3\) The irony is not lost when the composition of the Philippine legislature is noted: a majority are huge landowners who, though wielding power in the name of the majority, more often than not are inclined to exercise such power to protect their own elite interests. Moreover, the pronouncements of protecting indigenous peoples' rights lose their validity when juxtaposed with a categorical assertion of state-ownership of all lands of the public domain. Article XII, Section 2 on National Economy and Patrimony stresses that:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are *owned by the State*. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. [underscoring supplied]

This provision effectively denies Lumads and other indigenous groups the right to define and delineate ancestral domain in accordance with customary law.\(^4^4\) Even in a putative recognition of minority rights, state interest is invariably upheld, having state domain unmistakably prevail over ancestral domain.
Ancestral Land Issues

The 1973 Constitution was virtually silent on ancestral domain and under the existing 1987 Constitution, provisions on rights to ancestral lands are at best ambiguous. Yet nothing defines state-minority relations in the Philippines more clearly than highly contentious issues related to ancestral lands. For the dominant politico-legal and economic system, land is, after all, the most valuable commodity. The need for land is especially acute in a country that is only about the size of the state of Arizona but has one of the highest birth rates in the world and is the 17th most populous country on earth. The expansion of capitalism to the frontiers of the country and the pressure of lowland immigrations thus generate fierce competition for limited land resources.

In either case indigenous peoples are pushed out of their habitats. In this competition over land it is the survival of the indigenous peoples that is at stake because they are dispossessed of the very resource that provides them the symbolic and material bases of their cultures. The fight for ancestral land rights thus forms the core of various tribal resistance movements. The conflicts that rage in Mindanao, for instance, trace their roots to disputes over the use and control of land. The source of the conflict lies in the oppositional concepts of property
ownership and an overall orientation to land use between indigenous peoples and the modern state.

A Clash of Concepts

Lumad groups, as most indigenous cultures the world over, have been largely governed by communitarian values and a close identification with the natural environment. The modern state, in contrast, enshrines the values of progress and economic development and subordinates nature to such ends. Land itself is seen through disparate optics. Before the coming of the Spaniards, private property in land was absent:

Landowning was communal in character, with the actual title vested in the barangay. Wealth was determined by how many dependents a chieftain could muster to cultivate the communally-owned lands. Essentially a self-sufficient agrarian economy in which commerce with one's neighbors played only a minor role, Philippine agriculture was based upon the cultivation of rice and root crops and was supplemented by fishing and the raising of swine and fowl.45

John Garvan's extensive work on the Manobos of Agusan from 1905 to 1909 illustrates this communal aspect of land ownership clearly. As based on customary law, the territory over which the chief maintains his jurisdiction is recognized as being the collective ancestral property of the clan or family.46 Access to land was thus generally controlled by the complex network of kinship relationships; the concept of ownership other than the collective or tribal
level was nonexistent, as land was to be used by individuals and not owned in the conventional sense. John Bodley expounds thus,

Access to and use of land was virtually guaranteed to all tribal members. Even though the specific rights were often overlapping and subject to numerous conditions, land allocation remained both well regulated and flexible. It was highly adaptive to have a variety of cultural mechanisms of land allocation to ensure an equitable balance between land resource and population. Aside from its obvious economic significance, the land itself often held important symbolic and emotional meaning for ancestral remains, clan origin points, and other sacred features important tribal mythology.47

All this was bound to change dramatically when the Spaniards set foot on Philippine soil in the 16th century. Soon after Ferdinand Magellan sailed in 1521 into what is now the Visayas, he claimed all land in the archipelago in the name of the Spanish Crown (Regalia). Spain’s “discovery” of the islands had supposedly given the Spanish Crown the right to arrogate unto itself control and ownership of the entire archipelago. The practice was vintage 15th and 16th century imperialism when European powers exercised colonial rule over conquered territories in different parts of the earth.

Regalian Doctrine

The "Regalian Doctrine," as this came to be known, takes land as a commodity to be owned and exploited. The
system. In indigenous custom title to land is not obtained through written registration but by actual use and occupancy. The preservation of the land and its spiritual element is what is paramount to indigenous communities; modern property law only treats land as "alienable and disposable." The present national land law is, as Roan Libarios points out, essentially Western in origin and orientation and "generally responds to the specific demands of a capitalist economy for greater trade and commerce as well as fast circulation and accumulation of capital." This irreconcilability underlies the persistent conflict over land rights as asserted by both indigenous communities on one hand and private individual owners and the state on the other.

The Regalian Doctrine and the Torrens system, which have formed the basis of the Philippine legal and constitutional system operative until today, have thus been described as the "outright legalization of wholesale land-grabbing of ancestral lands." The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (Republic Act 6657), which has often been bruited as the Aquino administration's hallmark legislation, adheres to the strictures of the Regalian/Torrens mold. Section 9 of the Act is on ancestral lands and states that "ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall include, but not be limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the
community and its members: Provided, that the Torrens System shall be respected. [underscoring supplied]

Land classification also greatly prejudices indigenous cultures. Only agricultural lands are "alienable and disposable," and thus subject to private ownership. Forest and mineral lands which largely comprise ancestral domain are considered inalienable public land. This ruling was first included in the Philippine Bill of 1902 to ensure that the American colonial administration would have full control of the country's natural resources. This law was retained in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and was incorporated as well into the 1987 Constitution, as Section 2 of Article XII provides. Related laws concur with such provisions. The current Public Land Act specifies only agricultural lands of the public domain as open for titles to those who have had continuous and exclusive possession since June 12, 1945, alluding to indigenous communities. The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines -- which declares all public lands 18 percent or more in slope as not alienable and disposable and thus not subject to titles and private ownership -- implies that agricultural lands open for individual titles can only be those below 18 percent slope. Both laws automatically exclude indigenous peoples since much of their ancestral domains are above 18 percent and thus not agricultural. Thus, the upland forest and mineral lands (all above 18 percent slope) are not considered for private
ownership no matter how long claimants have occupied such lands.

Judicial Guarantees, More Contradictions

Despite the sorry record of unjust official policy vis-à-vis so-called cultural minorities, there have been precedents in Philippine law that guarantee the protection of their rights to their ancestral lands. When the country was under American colonial rule the United States Supreme Court recognized in the 1909 case of Cariño vs. Insular Government that indigenous Filipinos have native title to their ancestral lands by virtue of continuous occupation as "far back as testimony or memory goes." This ruling has been upheld at least six times by the Philippine Supreme Court. The executive branch of government, which has the power to classify lands as agricultural, mineral or forest through the Bureau of Forest Development, has, however, largely ignored these rulings on native title. Where there are measures to recognize native title, these are first subjected to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. Presidential Decree 410 (Ancestral Land Law of 1974) and even present Administrative Orders of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which call for delineations and definitions of ancestral lands, stipulate numerous roundabout requirements which virtually preclude any effective granting of ancestral land titles. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 excludes the
forestal and mineral-rich uplands from disposition, thus denying many indigenous communities the opportunity to obtain ownership titles. Maria Elena Lopez is succinct in her overall evaluation of land policies affecting indigenous ethnic communities which, she maintains, "reflect state elites' Westernized and assimilative orientation." Lopez further contends:

Community-based rights to land are not recognized; instead, private property is imposed upon indigenous ethnic groups. It is further assumed that members of such communities will permanently settle on bounded farms, but most of them remain shifting cultivators. Individual registration, surveying and titling procedures are lengthy and complicated, and disadvantage those with little formal education, limited access to urban-based bureaucracies and few financial resources.58

Lopez forthrightly argues that indigenous communities must have paper titles or equivalent documents to secure land tenure and to close ancestral lands to competing claims. While this may be ostensibly beneficial to these groups, to grant members of indigenous communities individual titles -- in written documentation and all -- does not necessarily mean they will henceforth be shielded from further incursions detrimental to their cultural well-being. To speak of granting of titles of ownership and reclassifying land from forest or mineral to alienable or disposable (i.e., agricultural) so as to subject it to private ownership is to gravely miss the entire point of
protecting the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands. To reclassify the uplands (above 18 percent slope) as alienable and disposable does not guarantee the preservation of ancestral lands. In the context of indigenous customary law and concepts of property, these state measures are ultimately irrelevant and ill-suited to the particular needs and demands of self-determination among indigenous communities in the country. Of what concern is it to them whether land is "alienable," "disposable," "foresta", "mineral," "unclassified," or what not? They are alien and alienating constructs, so removed from their reverential treatment of land and the spiritual dimension attached to such a resource. What Macli-ing Dulag, the Kalinga leader killed by the military at the height of the resistance against the Chico River Dam project, said about their bond to the land finds resonant echo in every indigenous group in the country. When human rights lawyers like the late Senator Jose Diokno offered to fight for the Kalingas and Bontocs in Philippine courts, Dulag had said in defiance that,

If we accept, it will be as if we ever doubted that we belong to the land, or that we question our ancient law... If we accept, it will be recognizing what we have always mistrusted and resisted. If we accept, we will then be honor-bound to abide by the decisions of that tribunal. Long experience has shown us that the outsiders' law is not able to understand us, our customs and our ways. Always, it makes just what is unjust, right what is not right.59
To grant individual titles in the first place means that indigenous groups are absorbed into the dominant legal system which upholds individual ownership. The procuring of written land titles militates against the very concept of communal property among indigenous cultures. Individual ownership implies the recognition that land is commodified and alienable, open to transfer from one individual to another rather than being kept from one generation to the next of a collective unit like a family, clan or kinship-group. As such, individual ownership opens the grim possibilities of indigenous people being coerced or hoodwinked into selling their land to enterprising settlers or unscrupulous and land-hungry capitalists -- in many cases for measly sums of money.\textsuperscript{60} Land titles in these cases thus ultimately amount to nothing.

This is a point that has been often overlooked in the debate on ancestral lands. The case of Cariño vs. Insular Government which was decided by Oliver Wendell Holmes has been regarded as a "landmark" decision because it accorded recognition of claims to native title to land.\textsuperscript{61} While this may be beneficial for indigenous peoples it is in the final analysis insufficient, if not altogether irrelevant to the societies concerned. The recognition of native title in effect imposed a concept of property and ownership different from that of the Ibaloi (Cordillera tribe) culture to which Cariño belonged. The court focused only on the issue of
ownership and not on the kind of property tenure Caríño had
with respect to the land involved.\textsuperscript{62} Marvic Leonen, a
lawyer working on Philippine indigenous law, lucidly
expounds this basic tension between contrasting concepts of
property:

If particular human associations evolve
unique property relationships for their
survival, then any law which would seek
to protect these associations should
recognize and protect their internal
property relationships. When an
externally imposed law merely insists on
its own conceptions, the legal issues
raised and the resolutions reached in
every ordinary problem will, to a
certain extent, be either irrelevant
and/or often oppressive to the societies
affected.\textsuperscript{63}

\textbf{Towards Regional Autonomy}

To give substance to the constitutional precepts on
protecting indigenous ethnic communities, the Philippine
state must then do nothing less than define and delineate
ancestral lands and exempt these from what is treated as
"public land." As such, lands designated as ancestral and
belonging to distinct groups and cultures could not be
subjected to the workings of the prevailing national land
laws which undergird private ownership and the transfer of
land as commodity from one individual to another.

The Organic Laws creating the autonomous regions in the
Cordilleras and the Moslem south signalled a policy shift
towards this direction. The Philippine Congress was
mandated by the 1987 Constitution to enact Organic Acts for
both regions. Regional consultative commissions were formed to draft Organic Acts which would be the basis for legislative acts on the final laws on autonomy for both regions. The recommended acts were drafted by the consultative commissions in 1988; within the next year Congress deliberated on both acts and passed Republic Acts 6734 and 6766 for Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera region, respectively. President Corazon Aquino signed both acts into law in 1989 and plebiscites were held in the cities and provinces concerned as to whether they wanted inclusion in the autonomous regions. Out of the 13 provinces in the region of Moslem Mindanao, only four opted for inclusion. Out of the five provinces in the Cordilleras, only one chose to be part of the autonomous region. These results may have been seen by many as an embarrassment to the Aquino government, but the overall picture of centralized control reveals that this may have been ultimately advantageous to the state.

Both final legislative acts have often been criticized as flawed and politically not viable. The drafts of the consultative commissions were watered down and significantly revised by the legislative body. Provisions on the definitions of ancestral domain were particularly equivocal. Despite statements that the Regional Government of the Autonomous Region would have the "authority, power and right in the exploration, development and utilization of its
natural resources," and that "indigenous cultural
communities shall have priority rights in areas designated
as parts of the ancestral domain," the foregoing clause
clearly notes that these are "subject to the provisions of
the Constitution and to national development policies and
programs." The provision of the Constitution that
obviates such measures of autonomy is that of Article XII,
Section 2 which categorically declares all lands of the
public domain as owned by the State. In this case, the
state has shown once again its reluctance to meaningfully
accord the regions concerned full control over their natural
resources. Granting autonomy and yet retaining full state
control over resources necessarily found within designated
ancestral lands appears as a blatant contradiction, which
ostensibly resides in the Constitution itself.

The dismal failure of the autonomy laws lends credence
to more radical positions which maintain that regional
autonomy within the context of the present Philippine state
system is bound to fail, or is bound to serve only the
interests of traditional political structures and elites. To make autonomy substantive and meaningful requires nothing
short of amending the constitutional provisions on state-
ownership of all public lands and providing for clear
precepts governing ancestral land claims based on customary
laws. Moreover, autonomy must not be limited to regions of
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras but must involve as well
the numerous other indigenous ethnic communities all over
the country, not the least of which are the populous Lumads
of Mindanao.

Be that as it may, the efforts toward the creation of
autonomous regions have opened avenues for more dialogue and
the prospects for more effective measures in the future --
not only for the Moslem and the Cordillera peoples but for
all other "cultural minorities." For instance, the inter-
sectoral consultations and other public forums that were
conducted during the drafting of the organic act for
Mindanao by the consultative commission shed light on the
existing prejudices and perceptions among the Moslems,
Lumads and Christians. This opening of spaces for
recognition, accommodation and negotiation has augured well
for the possibilities of transforming a tense social
atmosphere to one more harmonious.

As for the Lumads of Mindanao, the road towards
autonomy is still long. Owing in large part to their lack
of political organization, the Lumads of Mindanao have not
been regarded as seriously by the state as the Cordillera
and Moslem peoples. The struggle among northern Mindanao
Lumads has not threatened the state in the same way the
politics of ethnicity in the two other regions has. It was,
after all, the festering insurgencies in both regions that
eventually led to the inclusion of sections in the 1987
Constitution regarding the creation of two autonomous
regions. Lumads are more dispersed over a physical terrain and politically, have been far less organized than the groups in the two regions. The weaker political cohesion among Lumads is attributed to the fact that these semi-nomadic, swidden agriculturist groups are not well-defined or well-established political units, petty chiefs or datus notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, the years of PANAMIN control markedly diluted more organized resistance among Lumads. When Elizalde was asked to interfere in the Chico River Dam controversy, he reportedly demurred, suggesting that the recalcitrant Kalingas and Bontocs were unlike the Lumads of Mindanao who were "on our side."\textsuperscript{69}

Even so, the yearning for the rights to ancestral lands and for the right to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect their lives and communities is ever present among many Lumads. Some of their voices may have been muted in the din of state-sponsored development schemes, or their struggles coopted in a rush of modernizing forces. But for many others this aspiration is what fuels the drive to retbralize -- in all its various forms and dynamics. In recreating the tribe they build upon community and work towards a process of determining futures for themselves.
ENDNOTES


2. Militarization was heavy, for instance, during the early American colonial period in the Cordilleras. Fields were burned and houses destroyed as gold-hunting expeditions were made in the region. See William Henry Scott, The Discovery of the Igorots (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1974).

The encomienda was a triangular system of relations among the King, the encomendero (a military officer) and the natives. The encomendero had the royal right to collect tribute from the natives. He also had to render military service to the King and make the natives subservient to the Spanish Crown and provide religious instruction to them. The friars depended on the encomienda system because the tribute collected supported missions. [See Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga, Peasants in the Hills (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1983), p. 20-23.]

3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.

6. Lopez-Gonzaga, op. cit., p. 38. Bukidnon, with its many indigenous communities, was one of the provinces classified as non-Christian.


20. Oliver Madroñal, Interview, Cagayan de Oro City, July 20, 1992. I also interviewed Juan Artajo at the same time.

21. See Nance, *op. cit.* The Tasaday had soon become a household word. *National Geographic* devoted two issues on this group of "stone-age" people. In 1987, however, reports emerged that said the Tasaday phenomenon was a hoax. This group, it was alleged, was made up of members of other tribes in the area which Elizalde had ordered to act like stone-age people. Marcos and Elizalde, it was said, used the discovery of the Tasaday for international fame and to divert world attention from the political repression under martial law.


23. Madroñal, Interview.
24. Many of the accounts of the ordinary Lumads I talked with in the course of fieldwork concerned the "dole-outs" and social welfare functions of PANAMIN.


27. Estrada, Interview.


29. Murillo Agsulay, Interview, Katablaran, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, October 12, 1992. I visited these areas and interacted with datus and several Lumads during the fieldwork.

30. Agsulay, Interview. Conversations with other Lumads.


32. Okamura, op. cit., p. 13. Corazon Itchon, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, October 2, 1992. Ms. Itchon was an Administrative Officer of PANAMIN in Bukidnon for eight years. She says that supreme datus like Datu Gawilan of Sinuda, Datu Kinulintang of Sungko, and Datu Ladlaran of Miarayon (all in Bukidnon) received the highest "stipends."

33. Itchon, Interview. Ms. Itchon says that the PANAMIN was "more effective" and "did more things" than the present OSCC. Many Lumads, she says, "had a place to turn to for their needs." Many Lumads I spoke with agree with this view. They blame the downfall of PANAMIN on the corruption of lower officials like Regional Director (for northern Mindanao) Pepita Ongkiatco -- never on Marcos and Elizalde. Datu Sabuluan, for instance, relates a story of PANAMIN officials who malversed PANAMIN funds allocated for a bridge over the Pulangi River in Bukidnon. On their annual reports these officials were said to have included photos of a bridge, identifying it as the Pulangi project itself, when in fact, Datu Sabuluan says, these photos were of another bridge elsewhere. (Sabuluan, Interview) I interviewed Mrs. Ongkiatco in Cagayan de Oro City in December 1992 but she evaded some of my more direct questions, like those dealing with land disputes and the political controversies PANAMIN was embroiled in. She had advised me to speak instead to the Assistant Regional
Director at that time, Judge Benjamin Estrada. Ongkiationco mentioned that PANAMIN did enormous good for the Lumads and said that the pamphlet she handed me about PANAMIN's accomplishments were "all true." Judge Estrada upheld this view, saying that many Lumads at the time of PANAMIN felt a "sense of protection" and felt there was a place to go to when they needed help. (Estrada, Interview.) This may largely explain why many Lumads supported the candidacy of Imelda Marcos for the presidency in the May 1992 elections. Many saw in her candidacy the revival of PANAMIN-like programs and the attention from government. Some Lumad candidates for local positions allied themselves with Imelda's revived party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), or New Society Movement which Marcos had formed during martial law. Odissima Suclatan relates how some Lumads would be flown to Manila to perform in various affairs like birthday parties for Imelda. They would be billeted in "nice hotels" and be given the chance to see "artistas" (movie stars). To many Lumads, Imelda was a "goddess" (sic). Suclatan, Conversations in the field, 1992.

34. Lorenzo Dinlayan, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, November 9, 1992. Dinlayan is also acknowledged as the Supreme Datu of the Lumads in Bukidnon.

35. Datu Fidel Tumbalang, Executive Tribal Chief of the Municipal Tribal Council of San Fernando, Bukidnon, Interview, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, November 27, 1992.


39. Odissima Suclatan, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, October 12, 1992. Also Alejandro Culiantes, Jr., Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, October 12, 1992. Also culled from interviews and conversations in the field, 1992. Elizalde, some said, relished the way the Lumads would "pay him homage." Suclatan and others say that the rumors that used to float around about Elizalde's harem were true. It is said he would bring the fairest women from some of the tribes and house, feed, school -- and take sexual advantage of -- them. "Scholars" is what Elizalde would euphemistically call his beauteous, nubile, virginal wards. The Regional Director of PANAMIN at that time, Pepita Ongkiationco, was said to have helped "recruit" some of these women for Elizalde. Ricardo Manapat also alludes to some of these stories in his book, Some are Smarter than Others.


42. The 1973 Constitution was also known as the "Marcos Constitution." This was putatively "ratified" by citizens' assemblies. The voting was a mockery: crowds were asked whether they favored the constitution by raising their hands. It is said that government agents asked the crowds whether they wanted rice; those who did had to simply raise their hands. The government-controlled media presented photo spreads of assemblies with raised hands as a show of massive support for the constitution.


44. Ibid.


47. Bodley, op. cit., p. 10.

48. The Bill of 1902 was enacted in the U.S. Congress on July 1, 1902 as the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands until the Jones Law of 1916.


51. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

52. Ibid.
53. 1987 Constitutional Commission member and Ateneo de Manila University President, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. has noted how the national patrimony provisions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions express the strict adherence to the Spanish Regalian Doctrine. See, particularly, Bernas’ primer on the 1973 Constitution.


55. Oliver Wendell Holmes of the United States Supreme Court wrote that "When as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land." Cited in Okamura, "Politics of Neglect," p. 20. Also cited in Libarios, p. 43.


57. Administrative Order No. 8 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, for instance, ask for the following proofs of claims to ancestral lands: tax declarations, survey plans, Spanish documents, ancient documents, written and oral testimonies, genealogic surveys, anthropological data, photos of old improvements such as stone wallings, ricefields, orchards, houses, etc. These requirements appear ludicrous inasmuch as they are alien to the Lumads and the procedures are heavily bureaucratic and beyond their comprehension.

58. Maria Elena Lopez, op. cit., 129.


60. In various cases Lumads have been duped by settlers into "selling" their lands in exchange for goods like sardines and clothing. This was the case, for example, in Sumilao, Bukidnon where a pioneering family from Luzon acquired vast tracts of land from Lumads. The family now "owns" much of the municipality; the father and two sons are mayors of three adjacent towns. This family makes clear their opposition to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act 6657) on grounds that it is "confiscatory."
This seems a twist of irony for people who had first confiscated land outrightly from original inhabitants.

61. Owen Lynch has called these decisions on ancestral lands "landmark decisions" in that they recognized "native title." Roan Libarios, however, points out that this has not been the case; such legal precedents are shortsighted, he argues, because they fail to appreciate the essential differences in property concepts between indigenous customary law and prevailing legal frameworks.


63. Ibid., p. 61.

64. See Article X, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

65. The four provinces which opted for autonomy were Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. In the Cordilleras, only the province of Ifugao voted for the Autonomous region.


CHAPTER VII

VARIANCES IN THE RETRIBALIZING PROCESS

Retribalization occurs in various ways and at different levels. The most advanced struggles would involve secession or autonomy within the nation-state. The Lumad struggle is not of this sort. It is not of the magnitude or intensity of movements like the Moslems of Mindanao, the Pattani Malay of southern Thailand, or the Shan and Karen of Burma. A clear, organized call for measures of autonomy and independence is not as yet present among the northern Mindanao Lumads. As discussed previously this owes in large part to the dispersed habitats of Lumads and their less centralized social organizations. The Moslems of Mindanao and the peoples of the Cordillera region of northern Luzon have more defined and cohesive social structures which have allowed them to challenge the Philippine state through insurgent movements. The protracted struggles of these two regions have grown significant to the point where the state has allowed them a measure of regional autonomy.

The most organized retribalizations in the northern Mindanao region go as far as confronting the state over issues on ancestral land. Often, linkages with other groups in the dominant society are made. In many instances the alliance-building is forged with non-government organizations sympathetic to or concerned with Lumad rights.
and issues. In other cases political participation is sought, as in Lumads seeking elective positions at the local government level. In the national and local elections of 1992 some Lumads who ran for mayor in a few municipalities in Bukidnon used their "Lumadness" and pandered to ethnic pride as ways of attracting votes from the hinterlands.

For the most part retribalizing on this level is a call for recognition and acceptance as indigenous cultural communities within the larger framework of the Philippine nation-state. Full autonomy is not necessarily a primary goal. Even so, in this sphere of retribalizing, reinventions of ethnicity are likewise made, and as in autonomy struggles, the functionality of ethnic group identification is invariably made manifest. In other words, ethnicity is also politicized; a struggle is ideologized, however inchoately, and a discourse of indigenous rights roughly articulated. This is usually the domain of (formally) educated Lumads who feel a need to strengthen group identity, who become spokespersons in a drive to revive traditions or preserve culture. In the Lumad case many of those who spearhead a move towards a stronger community seek to forge a niche within the larger national structure and acquire improved status as a minority group. This means the raising of living standards and the control over land use and tenurial arrangements in what is considered their ancestral domain.
The small municipal court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon is jammed with people. Some onlookers at the end of the room crane their necks to catch a glimpse of the proceedings and see the cynosure for the day, Datu Ligden Luminton. Datu Luminton is the self-proclaimed chief of a Lumad Higa-onon community in Malaybalay, the capital town of Bukidnon. On this day, he is dressed in a green shirt and dark pants, but on his head is draped a bright-colored native turban and around his neck a long traditional beaded necklace dangles. Encircling his waist is crude twine on which is attached a wooden saber with a noticeable bolo, a native knife. Minutes before the hearing Datu Luminton summons a number of his followers and in a booming voice assures them there is nothing to fear. He struts around the adjacent office and mutters that his fight is right, to the obvious consternation of the legal staff present. Luminton cuts a picture of a confident chieftain and projects a flair for braggadocio.

What is being heard in court is a case pertaining to the Kimambong reforestation area. The area is classified "public land" (i.e., state-owned) and has been under the supervision of the provincial office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In the 1980s the DENR transferred its supervision of the area to the Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI), a joint Philippine-New Zealand project on industrial tree plantations covering 14,000 hectares. The Kimambong reforestation area of 400 hectares is now part of the identified BFI lands.

Within the Kimambong domain are about 170 hectares of a putatively Higa-onon hamlet comprising about 400 families. Datu Luminton is the leader of this community, and for the last few
years he has encouraged more people of his tribe to settle within the contested area. Luminton claims he has all the right to do such because this land belonged to his tribe's ancestors and they are merely returning to lay claim to what is theirs. On a pine tree leading to the settlement, a wooden plank displays a stern, crudely-painted warning: "OUTSIDERS KEEP OUT. THIS IS ANCESTRAL LAND!" Luminton allegedly collects dues and fines from each member of this growing community. What is clear, however, is that not all members of this group are ethnically Higa-onon. Many families are settlers from the Visayas and pose as Lumad Higa-onons. Luminton does not seem to mind this because, as he maintains, it is his prerogative to accept other non-Higa-onons into this new community as he sees fit.

The "occupation" of Kimambong has, however, been a sore point for the provincial government. The case has dragged on for a few years now. The DENR is fighting for the eviction of these people they refer to as "squatters" in government property. In the meantime, the hamlet is growing; new settlers, putative Higa-onons in some way or other, make their way to the land Datu Luminton avowedly declares is ancestral. Luminton and his followers seem intransigent, occasionally displaying a touch of swagger among DENR personnel and municipal court employees, as he does in this day of yet another hearing of the case. He says it is the government who has no right to be in Kimambong. Judge Florentina Villanueva, who is charged to handle this case, thinks he is disoriented and slightly ignores him.

After the hearing is adjourned for the day, Datu Luminton walks out of the courtroom with his lawyer and a crowd of anxious Kimambong residents swarm around him. He commands his following to meet in their barrio hall in Kimambong, a
short tricycle ride away. There, he reassures them in impassioned tones that they are going to win this case and not face eviction from their homes.¹

For the Kimambong residents the immediate political stakes in this situation are high: a judicial decision rendering them "illegal squatters" will serve to disempower them dramatically. The makeshift homes they have assembled would be torn down and they would be forcibly displaced. More importantly, the cultural argument for ancestral domain claims would not obtain and would be outrightly rejected by the court. Once again, the state would have demonstrated its might vis-à-vis a group demanding a measure of respect for basic rights. Ethnic minority policy would have reared its ugly head again: issues like the reclaiming of ancestral lands would have to be subordinated to prevailing legal considerations and the more pressing demands of "national development."

But beyond the political stakes, what is revealed by the unfolding of this case in Kimambong is a rich, though ambiguous, arena of cross-cultural dynamics. What is evident is the fact that ethnic identity -- in this case, being Higa-onon -- is parlayed into political capital to substantiate a claim to ancestral land. This claim is made most apparent by the sign that unequivocally declares symbolic ownership: "outsiders keep out." To herald "this is ancestral land" underscores Higa-onon identity as tied to
a physical space and suggests a defining of parameters of belonging. This mustering of political capital is carried out in the context of a dominant culture as represented in the structure and institution of the court. The allegations of the court that a large number of the residents are not Lumad Higa-onons but Visayans raise the element of authenticity and the conscious effort that is employed by the Higa-onons to prove or affirm such authenticity.

The Manobos and the Bukidnon Sugar Company

Another case of emergent resistance employing a politics of Lumad retalization is that among Manobos in Quezon, southern Bukidnon. These Manobos have been fighting powerful sugar barons to regain control over their land. The area in contention has been part of the land occupied by the Bukidnon Sugar Company (BUSCO). The BUSCO was established in 1974 by close Marcos associate Roberto Benedicto in keeping with the Marcos government's policy of increasing sugar production for the world market. By 1974 16,000 hectares of Bukidnon lands were under milling contracts with BUSCO; by 1976 land used for sugar increased to 23,000 hectares. The lands of Manobos who farmed rice and corn were converted to sugarland. In Barrio Paitan alone about 200 families were violently evicted from their own farms by Philippine Constabulary men and security guards of BUSCO, with the knowledge and acquiescence of PANAMIN officials. In the mayhem that transpired PANAMIN resettled
the Manobos in a "service center" in the next municipality, cramming numerous evicted families in small makeshift shelters.\textsuperscript{4}

Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreements (AFFLA) were given to Benedicto and members of the country's elite closely associated with Marcos -- landowners in Bukidnon and other areas of Mindanao such as the Escaños, the Fortich and Ozamiz families, the Nietos, the Lobregats, and the Cuencas. The Silangan Investors and Managers Incorporated, the Rangay Farms Incorporated, and the Escaño Hermanos Incorporated -- all created by these wealthy families -- were given AFFLAs in the early 1970s totalling over 1,800 hectares in southern Bukidnon.\textsuperscript{5} These leases granted through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were supposedly for agro-forestry purposes, with the companies paying a token amount of about 50 centavos per hectare per year.\textsuperscript{6} All three corporations, however, used all these lands for sugar production which reaped millions of pesos in profits. Even 25-year pasture leases granted much earlier to powerful ranchers like Jose Escaño were converted to sugar plantations.

After the fall of the Marcos government in 1986 these lands were sequestered by the new Aquino government and all three AFFLAs were cancelled in August 1988. Seizing the opportunity to regain their lands, the Manobos of the barrios of Butong and Nabanganan in Quezon, Bukidnon
organized the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Manobo Pulangihon Incorporated (SAKAMPU) in 1989. The SAKAMPU then applied for a Community Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA) with the DENR within the three cancelled AFFLA areas. The Manobos proceeded openly to lobby local officials to bring their grievances and demands to national attention.

The Manobo community's uphill battle to regain a portion of this land from the government was led by a fiery middle-aged bae (woman chief) by the name of Bae Dayang Macaria Bagas. In early 1987 she sought an audience with President Aquino through the intercession of the provincial Governor at that time, Ernesto Tabios. Bae Dayang solicited the help and support of various government line agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. Human rights lawyers offered their services and one NGO, the Philippine Assistance for Intercultural Development (PAFID), facilitated the Manobos' claim through lobbying efforts with the DENR, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Department of Justice and the Philippine National Police. Bae Dayang was also able to seek an audience at separate times with DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, then Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, and then Senator Joseph Estrada (who was Chairman of the Senate Committee on National Cultural Minorities) to air her people's plight. Her audience with Secretary Ramos resulted in the turning over of the military buildings within the contested area (which were built during
the martial law period) to the community. She worked tirelessly for this cause over the next three years. The media attention she received aided her cause. Benedicto, Nieto, Escano and their group had petitioned for a reconsideration of their cancelled leases. This request, however, was denied by the DENR. In the meantime Benedicto's men had continued to harass Bae Dayang and her community as they moved back to the land. In 1990, as Bae Dayang relates, a few of them were thrown into jail for a few weeks; the police had been paid by these sugar barons to arrest them on grounds of illegal entry into the contested lands. On November 25, 1991 the DENR formally granted Bae Dayang and the Manobo community of 300 families "certificates of stewardship" under the Integrated Social Forestry Program. These certificates stipulate a lease for 50 years over 412 hectares. The sugar lands, as SAKAMPUL plans, will be used for food production and reforestation.

Millenarian Movements and Other Strains of Resistance

Retribalizing can also be more spontaneous and visceral. Agrarian disputes and redressing grievances can bring about rapid group mobilization and outbreaks of violence. Landgrabbing and forcible evictions from the land have driven many Lumad communities to stage sporadic revolts -- against figures of authority and agents of government. The unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s in various parts of Bukidnon are striking examples of mass-based
revolts arising from agrarian-based conflict; such uprisings were, however, readily quelled by military force. A violent response to conditions of subjugation is often met with even more force on the part of the state. At the height of the communist insurgency in the 1970s such native revolts fell easily into the hands of more organized anti-state insurgencies like the New People's Army (NPA). This in turn escalated military operations in the hinterlands. These avenues of resistance, therefore, do not usually have the same kind of successful results as that of the Manobos of southern Bukidnon. The sad result has usually been fuller control or cooptation of Lumad communities by local government units or the military.

In other instances dispossessed Lumad groups turn to millenarian movements, which originate from Christianized lowlanders (who migrate to the uplands as settlers), for a sense of belonging. These revolts and millenarian movements are virtual responses to rapid culture change and are forms of coping with detribalizations and the breakdown of community. As Filipino social historians Reynaldo Ileto and Vicente Rafael10 would posit, these forms of resistance are anchored on indigenous concepts and expressed in terms of their own social experience. The Lumad identification with millenarian visions of earthly paradise provide a sense of elemental continuity from what has been disrupted by external forces. Vincent Cullen, an anthropologist who has
conducted numerous studies on the indigenous Lumad of Bukidnon, notes how the *libung* myth of the Lumad Bukidnon, which concerns the regaining of a lost paradise, parallels millenarian notions and beliefs. The profound respect for the *baylan* (shaman) in Bukidnon society, who mediates between people and the spirit world, is translated to the charismatic leader of a millenarian movement perceived to have preternatural powers. These supernatural powers are then supposedly conferred by the leader to the members. Cullen also notes that the Bukidnons' fear of angering the *migbava*, the host of ruling spirits, by introducing anything new tends to fit into the millenarian concept of restoring something that was destroyed or altered, in this case ancient communal patterns of life.¹¹

Millenarian movements tend to be syncretistic, fusing beliefs in Christ, the pantheon of Catholic saints, historical figures like Jose Rizal, and animistic spirits. It is thus common to have magic *libretos* (amulets), rings, oil and clothing which supposedly render believers invincible.¹² The *ating-ating* or magic charm is believed to make those who use it invulnerable to attacks and putatively serves to protect them from a hostile world. This guarantee of invincibility provides religious validation for more aggressive action against forces like the military. In times of great stress these members of millenarian movements, often called Rizalians in the region
because of their veneration of the national hero Jose Rizal, can erupt into violence due to their belief in the protective power of the anting-anting.

These violent uprisings often occurred among indigenous communities in northern Mindanao in the 1960s to the 1970s. (Towards the 1980s militarization in the countryside had well escalated, largely suppressing any new outbreaks of violence.) In 1966 the Lumad revolt in Talakag acquired millenarian overtones, with the leader, Victorino Sihagan, claiming supernatural invincibility in the face of military force. In July to September 1975 the Talaandig Lumads of the Kitanglad mountain range in Talakag, Bukidnon again staged a "Rizalian" rebellion against military agents. The conflicts that arose in the 1970s were among families, and as one datu relates, began with a small incident of one family stealing another family's chickens. The dispute had turned into sporadic incidents of one group inflicting damage on another group's property. Violent clashes also transpired over overlapping agrarian disputes with encroaching lowland settlers.

Given the atmosphere of conflict the state had the perfect pretext for military intervention and control. The military rationale was openly to pacify the "unruly" natives, but it was in actuality linked to the anti-insurgency drives in the countryside, as this was the height of martial law. The inter-familial conflict had shifted to
a battle that Lumads found themselves waging against the armed soldiers of the state. The Lumads of Talakag forged alliances with other Lumads from south Bukidnon. This was the point where the Lumad fight was laden with millenarian beliefs, fearless Lumads armed with crude guns, bolos (native daggers) and anting-antings fighting the armed might of soldiers. Accounts have it that many of these people were convinced they were going to prevail with their anting-antings and their bodies bathed in supposedly magical lana (native coconut oil). The violence stretched on for a few months, prompting Governor Carlitos Fortich of the province to intervene and negotiate a surrender of the Lumads. Fortich flew by helicopter to the area and showered leaflets urging them to lay down their arms. The uprising was soon squelched and the PANAMIN facilitated the Lumads' surrender on October 15, 1975.

In southern Bukidnon at about the same time -- from April to September 1975 -- the Manobo Lumads (who also call themselves Matigsalugs because they live near the Salug river) and various "Rizalians" attacked logging camps in retaliation for their being evicted from their lands by BUSCO and the timber companies in the area. Many Manobos had also been killed by cowboys of the powerful ranchers in the area who considered the Manobos as "squatters." These uprisings were led by Lumad datu Lorenzo Gawilan. The violence escalated with the involvement of the military.
Millenarian groups like the *Caballeros de Rizal* also challenged the military in firefights in Songko, Lantapan and San Fernando, Bukidnon. All of these revolts were crushed and the leaders coopted by the military or government agents. The Philippine Constabulary transformed the *Caballeros de Rizal* into the Higa-onon Datus Association. Many of the coopted millenarian groups in time became the brutal right-wing vigilante groups fully supported by the military.  

The Matigsalugs led by Datu Gawilan surrendered with the intervention of Elizalde and PANAMIN and were resettled into a hamlet in Simod, near the Davao-Bukidnon border. In late 1975 Datu Gawilan was flown in Elizalde's helicopter to Manila to meet with President Marcos. The Marcos government readily used the event as another media coup: tribal leaders pledging allegiance to the state and affirming loyalty to the regime.

*Recapturing a Sense of Belonging*

What underlies the resistive strategies of Datu Luminton, Bae Dayang, or even the other Lumad groups which resort to violent outbreaks and in time succumb to state might, is the emergence of forms of group identification that become foundations for political action. The levels of organization and success vary from case to case. Yet in the face of culturally destabilizing factors Lumads invariably seek to recreate the tribe: they (re)shape for themselves
natural units in which a sense of "belonging" is still possible.\textsuperscript{17}

As the Kimambong case shows, there is a reassertion, rediscovery or invention of Higa-onon identity that provides basis for a claim to survival; in this particular situation what is fought for is the right to abode and land. The stark sign, "outsiders keep out," defines territory and affirms identity at a symbolic level. The state, as represented by the municipal court, becomes the target of a resistive strategy, however ambiguously defined. Datu Luminton adamantly insists that he will muster everything in his power to remain where he is. "The government shall see what we are capable of doing if they push us too far," he avers.\textsuperscript{18} He notes with pride that he comes from a lineage of valiant bagani, or ancient protectors of the tribe, a warrior class of sorts.

As a way of consolidating the Kimambong community, Datu Luminton has initiated communal occasions like a "Kimambong Day" where Higa-onon dances are performed and epic songs are sung. The Visayans among his constituency adapt to their reinvented collective identity and along with the Higa-onon members, look up to him for protection -- both from outside forces considered threatening (in this case, the evictions the DENR or the provincial government want to carry out) or from all perceived evils, seen or unseen. The makeshift barrio hall where the community congregates for meetings and
other social functions is a virtual extension of Datu Lumintong's home. There appears a steady stream of people who visit him, many simply seeking reassurances that their homes would not be bulldozed by the agents of the provincial government. Conversely, Lumintong does not miss any opportunity to assert his datuship. He earnestly presides over simple rituals like the *pamuhat* (sacrificial offerings) on occasions like marriage or burials, or in *singampo* (supplication to the spirits) rituals to propitiate spirits and those to ask for favors and good fortune.¹⁹ Lumintong knows that he draws upon a long tradition of the datuship perceived over time as having many roles: judge, mediator (both functions referred to as *palaghusay*), warrior, priest, medicine man (*haylan*). He largely fulfills -- and even capitalizes -- on these combined secular and religious roles of a datu in Kimambong. The influence he is able to wield solidifies a hold on the community, thereby strengthening a mass base in the fight to remain in the disputed Kimambong area. When Datu Lumintong speaks of reviving and strengthening the datuship as a highly respected position in Lumad society, it is discernibly an argument for survival, integral to sustaining a claim to land. He decries the devaluation of the datuship over the years by the state, as if to indicate that his leverage in bargaining with the state over such an issue as land ownership is markedly reduced.
In Bae Dayang's case, she reflects on how she and the Manobos succeeded as a group because they drew upon a reservoir of tradition and ritual, a corpus of symbolic meanings that goaded them to pursue their course of action. Bae Dayang, for instance, speaks of the time when she had to gather members of her community at the height of their fight against the wealthy and powerful Escaños, Nietos and Lobregats; on a takdol (full moon night) they sang age-old chants and with ten chickens as offering, implored the intercession of their ancestors in this struggle for survival. Bae Dayang relates how through mag-ulin (a kind of dreaming), she had to look for signs from ancestral spirits whether she had to proceed with her fight. At one point in these gatherings, she says she entered a trance-like state and was able to envision a positive outcome in this struggle. As her followers would affirm, a male voice, believed to be that of an ancestor, spoke through her. This occurrence gave the community firm confidence to carry on with their fight. To her community, Bae Dayang embodied both the baylan and datu -- the shaman and the leader. Gatherings such as this were held frequently, and as she and her group reflect, strengthened bonds of community. Even when she and a few other leaders were imprisoned by the military for fabricated charges of illegal entry into the disputed land, she relates how the unflinching support of fellow Manobos emboldened them even more. She notes that a
few other Manobo groups in the area sought to likewise reclaim land from the powerful sugar barons, but failed because they had not anchored their struggle on ritual and the call for "spiritual guidance from our ancestors." 20

What is manifested among the Manobos of Quezon is what anthropologists would regard as the close interweaving of belief systems with everyday life in indigenous societies. Respect for the forces of nature and for other people is essential to maintain harmony, a central concept in this belief system. 21 When this harmony is disrupted by sickness, natural disaster, or in this case the incursions of capitalist interests and state development plans, ritual is seen as restoring this harmony. The (re)connecting with the spirits of their ancestors becomes a way of reaffirming community. This is in turn elevated to a level of political action directed against forces seen as inimical to their collective interests.

As for the various millenarian and Rizalista movements that took hold among Lumad groups, these may have appeared as religious "fanaticism" to the state and the rest of society. On a deeper level, however, these reveal attempts to recreate community and restore communal anchorage amidst invasive forces. Like Rafael Ileto's seminal work on the folk sources of the Philippine revolution of 1896, the millenarian movements among Lumads suggest some mythological and cultural bases for resistance. The millenarian struggle
finds parallels in the Lumad epic *Olacing*, which speak of *Nalandangan*, a mythical home of the tribe, where perfect peace and harmony reigns. Cullen notes that joining millenarian movements has provided many Lumads with certain advantages. There is, first of all, a return of a sense of social solidarity, which is diminished once their culture is disrupted by outside forces. Moreover, the use of the *baylan* (shaman) motif and the *libung* (regaining lost paradise or the *Nalandangan*) myth appeal to the Lumads' need for security without violating their sense of deep respect for the *migbaya*, the host of ruling spirits. The putative guarantees of invulnerability or invincibility validate a more fearless and aggressive stance against forces deemed hostile. These provide a springboard from which resistance is carried out, in various cases -- like those in Talakag and Songko in Bukidnon in 1975 and 1976 -- in an outrightly violent fashion.

What is thus developed in these cases -- from Datu Luminton to Bae Dayang to the *Rizalistas* -- are varying levels of ideologization, albeit largely unself-conscious or unsophisticated, of their identity and culture. This rudimentary ideologization is made for the purposes of attaining defined goals. Various, the Lumad struggle is clothed in elements of their cultures, not the least in terms of ritual and folklore. New Lumad leaders echo teachings and stories of old *datus* and find these applicable
to present situations. The process of retribalizing may at
the most practical level be tied to the regaining of
tenurial rights over traditional territories, but it is also
linked to a process of regaining the verities of Saluduan
(tribal respect), Aduna (wealth), and Kawaluan da Olog
(eighty folds of fame). These aspirations are found in
the oral traditions of the Lumads, notably in their
ethnoepics and basahanan, a collection of proverbs and wise
sayings. It is not uncommon to hear from a Datu Luminton or
a Bae Dayang an occasional reference to a figure like Agyu,
the legendary hero of the Olaging, and the olangingon, the
protagonists of the ethnoepic, as they hurdle obstacles and
surmount odds in their journey towards Nalandangan. This is
not entirely unlike the perceptions of preternatural
strengths among those in millenarian movements. Lumad
retribalization suggests a mythical element of deliverance,
a promised land of cultural redemption, as it were, just as
much as it aspires for an earthly, concrete Nalandangan of
land and territory. Datu Luminton emphatically remarks that
he finds it inconceivable to move out of the area where his
own forebears once lived and believes his Kimambong
community will prevail. Bae Dayang sees a delineated tract
of land, in finite hectarage, as a piece of her own people's
Nalandangan.
Politicized Lumads and the NGO Factor

The Lumad struggle is not, however, self-contained or carried out independently of outside groups. In numerous cases the Lumad cause is forwarded and sustained by those sympathetic to their plight. The articulation of a discourse of indigenous rights is made by those who have a critical understanding of the workings of social forces -- Lumad or non-Lumad. It is these people or groups who mediate between regimes and ethnic groups and place the Lumad struggle within wider social contexts. They are the ones who help organize the politicization of Lumad ethnicity. The concerns for ancestral land, for instance, are understood in light of historical factors and state structures and policy.

Many non-government organizations take up the cudgels for marginalized sectors like the indigenous communities. It is through the mediation of NGOs that sectors like the Lumad communities have been able to make their cause heard. Many of these NGOs conduct advocacy, community-organizing and social work. They utilize the media to make the public aware of the conditions groups like the Lumads find themselves in -- from land disposessions to militarization in the countryside. They engage in some lobbying, seeking to influence policy vis-à-vis minorities. Others embark on livelihood projects and various socio-economic activities to alleviate poverty in these communities. The formation, for
instance, of Lumad-Mindanao in 1985 as an umbrella organization of all Lumad organizations, was initiated by Church-based groups.

In the Philippines the banner of indigenous peoples' rights has been collectively hoisted by various church groups, sundry social activists, environmentalists, lawyers, academics, and other professionals. In most cases these groups have datu or members of indigenous communities themselves, schooled in the formal educational system and who now have chosen to serve their own people. Some of these groups in the forefront of the "indigenous peoples' struggle" in the country are: the Ecumenical Council for Tribal Filipinos (ECTF); the National Council of Churches in the Philippines-People's Action For Cultural Ties (NCCP-PACT); the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference; the Tunay na Alyansa ng Bayan Alay sa Katutubo (TABAK); the Legal Rights Center (LRC); the Tribal Filipino Center for Development (TFCD); the Ethnic Studies and Development Center (ESDEC); the Tanggapang Panlegal ng Katutubong Filipino (PANLIPI); the Philippine Assistance for Intercultural Development (PAFID); and the national federation of indigenous peoples of the Philippines, the Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas (KAMP). In the dark days of the Marcos dictatorship many of these organizations drew attention to social justice issues and human rights problems, especially among Moslems and Lumads.
In northern Mindanao some local-grown groups like the Sildap-Sidlakan, and the Kahugpongan sa Lumadnong Kalingkawasan, and the Mindanao Lumad and Moslem Development Center at Xavier University (Ateneo de Cagayan) are actively engaged in advocacy and socio-economic work for the Lumad communities. When the LUMAD-Mindanao was established, non-Lumads formed a parallel support group called the KADUMA-Lumad, which means in partnership with the Lumads. In 1989 the Mindanao Peace and Development Center in Xavier University sponsored a major conference on ancestral lands, inviting Lumads, non-government organizations and government agencies to the gathering. Many Lumad organizations have been formed in the last few years as well, some more cohesive than others: Lumadnong Buskot sa Agusan ug Surigao Alang sa Kalingkawasan (LUBUSAN); Supreme Council of Higa-onon Datus of Ginoog City; Katibuyusan Tomgo Lumad of the Manobo, Mamanua and Higa-onon Tribes of Agusan del Norte; Lumad Mindanao; and the Bukidnon Association of Tribal Organizations (BATO).

With the help of groups like these many of the Lumads are able to search for symbolic solutions and redefine themselves out of a sense of solidarity that comes from finding themselves apart from other groups or separated from the rest of mainstream society. They display a desire to claim group worth, status and rights, as shown by the curious proliferation of so-called development foundations
in northern Mindanao, all of which are putatively dedicated to the "enhancement of tribal culture and the socio-economic uplift of its members." Moreover, they seek practical solutions, as in the reviving of datu authority, or among educated Lumads, increased political participation in the mainstream, such as running for public office in local elections.

These are Lumads, who despite the conditions of marginalization of their fellow Lumads in the hinterlands, define themselves symbolically to create "a positive view of their heritage on the basis of cultural as well as racial distinctions, thereby establishing a sense of collective identity." Vic Saway, a Talaandig Lumad who graduated from the Jesuit-run Xavier University of Cagayan de Oro City, relates how he tries to instill pride in his community in terms of their being Lumad. Saway now works as a coordinator of a farmers' NGO in southwestern Bukidnon, and he speaks proudly of how he is starting to link Lumad traditional values and cultural practices to modern concepts of cooperativism and credit schemes, the better to suit Lumad ways of adapting to new conditions.

Tommie Labaon is another Lumad in the forefront of a fight for Lumad causes. Labaon was elected in 1992 as a member of the Provincial Board of Bukidnon and now heads its Committee on Indigenous Communities Cultural Development. Labaon is also the Assistant Secretary-General of the Tribal
Communities Association of the Philippines (TRICAP). To effectively mobilize Lumads, he notes that community organizing ought to be based on tribal customs. Like Saway, Labaon speaks of tapping into the wellsprings of their culture, using concepts like the linbun (common jar) and emphasizing values like pangasuha (roughly translated as egalitarianism or sharing) and the value of gagaw sa kag-ila (love for fellowmen) for more effective cooperative movements.26

Fundador Binahon, Jr. is a young Lumad and aspiring lawyer. As the Higa-onon Tribal Executive Director under the OSCC, Binahon has written a "Primer on the Restoration of the Higa-onon Nalandangan."27 This primer stresses "autonomy at the level of vandang (tribe)" and the "politicization of the masses towards indigenous socialist orientation." Binahon speaks in broad, if not vague, generalities that include "observing traditional practices of direct democracy and collective leadership," and "preserving the communal social order and economic system." These, however, indicate a deeper ideologization of Lumad retribalizing, situating the Lumad cause within a larger context of autonomous governance over the long term. Binahon now runs a small Binukid school for both children and adults in the Culaman area. He has taken over from Leo Dahinog, another young and educated Lumad, who initiated this project on establishing tribal schools to bring
literacy and non-formal education to Lumad communities in the hinterlands.

The politics of Lumad ethnicity, insofar as the more organized components of network-building and advocacy are concerned, is real not so much for those groups most affected by the onslaught of modernization -- those in the hinterlands who face displacement -- as for those who have established contact with the dominant culture. Political scientist James Scott incisively maintains that "formal, organized political activity, even if clandestine and revolutionary, is typically the preserve of the middle class and the intelligentsia."28 Joseph Rothschild posits further that,

The ideologization of ethnicity through the sacralization of ethnic markers (i.e., religion, language, tribal membership) and the mobilization of the sharers of these markers is the achievement of the ethnic leaders and elite. It occurs in times of strain, competition, and confrontation, when the ethnic leaders persuade the bearers and sharers of ethnic culture markers to perceive their fate in ethnic, rather than individual or class, terms and convince them that without ethnic communal solidarity their distinctive values, customs, and traits are endangered, their personal life-aspirations are jeopardized, and the very survival of their group imperiled.29

The articulation of grievance and the employment of strategies of empowerment and resistance reside in NGOs as well as educated, politicized leaders (datus) or individuals
who profess ethnic affinities with the Lumad cultures. Datu Luminton himself is a former grade school teacher, worked as Project Director in PANAMIN, and was a Provincial Officer of the OSCC in Bukidnon before retiring and devoting his time to his struggle to keep Kimambong. Bae Dayang relied on outside groups to help sustain her people's fight. Even the millenarian movements were first introduced by bright, charismatic, baylan-like settlers from the lowlands.

Yet while ethnic consciousness is heightened among politicized Lumad individuals like Datu Luminton and Bae Dayang or those like Vic Saway, Tommie Labaon, Fundador Binahon, Jr., and Leo Dahinog, this is still far from an articulation of a clear, strident and unified demand for self-determination. The retribalizations carried out by these individuals largely reflect particular needs at the level of local communities. They amplify grievance as well as the desire to have land and the intangible spaces of freedom and measures of cultural integrity. Their retribalizations suggest a negotiating and managing of their acculturation to dominant structures, but hardly do these bespeak of actions that seek to seize control of -- or secession from -- established state structures.

Environmentalism

The discourse of retribalization is invariably dovetailed with environmentalist causes, underscoring the close identification of native cultures to the earth and its
bounties. The destruction of native cultures has been inextricably tied to the despoilation of a natural environment revered by indigenous cultures. Non-government groups working on Lumad issues always embrace an environmental component. As the various Lumad organizations and NGOs would espouse, the oft-bandied push for "sustainable development" must be anchored on indigenous wisdom and ecological reverence. Environmentalist groups like Green Forum and Haribon, which have bases all over the country, are involved in issues related to ancestral domain and the sustainable management of natural resource bases. Even the government has, at least on surface, noted the close connection between the environment and indigenous cultures which are closely linked to it. Under the Aquino administration the DENR created a section on Indigenous Cultural Communities with an NGO desk to network with groups working on both environment and indigenous peoples issues.

In April 1993 various environmental groups and indigenous peoples' organizations from all over the country sponsored an international "earthsaving conference" in Manila. The conference sought to map out ways by which the Agenda 21 of the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro could be implemented in the Philippines and other countries -- with the active and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples. During the conference in Manila seminars and forums were held that brought forth discussions
on ancestral lands, traditional practices of healing and agriculture, and ecological preservation among others. Datu Lumintong and other Lumad leaders participated in the week-long conference, speaking principally on ancestral land issues and the protection of their embattled local environments.

The environmentalist advocacy is alive as well with those in the arts. Many theater groups around Mindanao mount productions that eloquently depict the Lumad struggle. At the National Theater Festival in Manila in February 1992, theater groups held symposia on "the pedagogy of indigenous theater contemporarization." In their plays and scripts a certain romanticization of native cultures was underscored. Enshrined in their showcases is the aboriginal attachment to and reverence of the natural world, celebrating the native ethos that decidedly stands as antithetical to capitalist development. As such, these productions, in laying claim to an understanding of the indigenous soul, also launch a critique against the forces of modernization and progress that putatively adulterate the spiritual essence of indigenous cultures.

Compromise and Cooptation

The foregoing section expounds that the realities of the Lumads are in numerous ways appropriated by outside entities. They serve as linkage mechanisms between that condition where community is broken down and where
retribalization is incipient. Essentially, retribalization and resistance, more than just phenomena that flow from within the Lumad groups themselves, are encouraged, promoted, or even carried out in their name by many of those from the outside.

This reality, however, can pose dangers largely because in various instances groups from the outside who ally themselves with the Lumads forward different agenda. In advancing a cause of social justice for the marginalized communities of indigenous peoples, many of these NGOs have been regarded with suspicion by the state. Especially in the authoritarian climate of the Marcos regime, groups like the ECTF and TABAK were readily deemed "subversive" or "communist-inspired." Such charges did not appear patently baseless as ideological persuasions were ostensibly part of some of these groups' articulated goals. Agenda cloaked in a rhetoric of "real development" or "national liberation" have, after all, found common ground with the language of cultural autonomy or self-determination. As Joseph Rothschild argues, "politicized ethnicity marches in step with movements of the left that emphasize participation, autonomy, local power, and suspicion of the contemporary state."31 The left, especially in the dark days of the Marcos dictatorship, all too readily claimed sympathy for tribal peoples. The recognition of their plight implied a partnership of sorts. The fight for ancestral lands and the
condition of marginalization were readily linked to the class struggle. One writer in a progressive newsmagazine, for example, averred in 1985 that minorities are "learning to stand up for their rights and taking the path of political action." In a generalized, sweeping statement he added that the assertion of ethnicity among minorities "is moving towards a more politicized and class-based definition within a larger national framework." In a similar vein, social activist Joel Rocamora noted in 1982 that the tribal Filipinos supported the NPA and proudly declared that they are "fighting together with other Filipinos ... and participating in the creation of a national community they can be proud of."

In any event, the responses of the state or corporate establishments to so-called "left-leaning" stances on ancestral land or indigenous peoples' rights are, in many other instances, glaringly reactionary. Any sign of Lumad empowerment is taken to be "communistic" or a result of "NPA infiltration" in the hinterlands, as the dogged PANAMIN counter-insurgency campaigns all throughout Marcos' rule showed. One clear case in point is that of the highly controversial Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI) in Bukidnon. Since its inception in 1985 the project has been besieged with complaints from Lumad groups who charge the BFI of forcible eviction from their lands within the identified project sites. In a 1989 BFI memorandum an
extension officer reported that the BFI information drive (public relations with the Lumad communities around or within the project area) was something the Kahugpong sa Lumadnong Kalimkawasan (KLK), an affiliate of the Tribal Filipino Apostolate of the Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro City, was interested in carrying out for the BFI. The BFI memorandum expressed alarm, however, that the church-based KLK was "left-wing and under the umbrella of the National Democratic Front." The BFI in the end formed its own public information task force.

It is small wonder then that Lumads -- or many other indigenous communities around the country, for that matter -- have been caught in the ideological and literal crossfire of the military against the insurgents, as was repeatedly the case during martial law. As discussed in chapter 6 on PANAMIN, the Lumads have also been vulnerable to the ideologization of the state -- or to right-wing causes. The conscription of Lumad men into the para-military Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) formed to fight the communist insurgency, and the cooptation of Lumad millenarian groups by the Philippine Constabulary (some of which became the dreaded right-wing vigilante groups) are two stark examples.

The mutiny in northern Mindanao of renegade colonel Alexander Noble in 1990 is another case in point of Lumads being hoodwinked into supporting questionable causes. Noble had gained the support of Lumad communities in Agusan del
Norte by promising them full control of their ancestral lands as soon as Mindanao broke away from Manila, the latter being the goal of the Mindanao Independence Movement (composed of old politicians and ragtag followers), which Noble openly endorsed. The rebellion, however, was swiftly quelled and had degenerated into something of a comical episode when Noble and his men marched through the streets of Cagayan de Oro in a strangely festive mood (and not with any revolutionary fervor), with people cheering and laughing. Noble had become a caricature and all his promises to the Lumads amounted to naught. The Lumads of Agusan were left with nothing but false hopes. These cases point out that whether from the left or right indigenous peoples can often become unwitting partners in an ideologization that attenuates their goals of ethnic integrity and autonomy.

As for the legions of NGOs presently working for Lumad causes, these are not free of problematizing as well. The proliferation of such groups in the country point to active mobilization in the grassroots, which is arguably a function of a weak state. But the espousal of "noble" causes and meaningful socio-economic development among many NGOs does not mean that they can be unquestioningly enshrined as always more responsive and responsible than the state. Neither should they be viewed as immune from the corrupt practices that characterize state bureaucracies. NGOs are,
after all, not necessarily independent of state control insofar as some of their motives may lie embedded in state policies. The term itself -- non-government organization -- implies that the government or the state is still the center, the locus of power and control. The presence of an NGO Desk at the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may on the one hand indicate positive cooperation between government and non-government groups, but on the other, this may also open the possibilities of compromised stances on the part of the NGOs. In such cases they become tools of the state, powerful interests, or their external funding sources. Some NGOs are even formed on the guise of helping sectors like the Lumads, but are actually more interested in obtaining funds from sympathetic donors abroad. The plight of peoples like the Lumads are thus used by some groups for self-serving purposes.37 Some Lumad leaders view this with alarm. Marciano Cerna, Undersecretary of the OSCC, asks, "Why do NGOs keep speaking for us when we can well speak for ourselves?"38

The shenanigans of some NGO groups, however, do not imply that all the Lumads involved in retbralizations are never suspect or involved in anomalous activities. All downtrodden sectors are not necessarily made virtuous because of their predicament. In many cases harsh economic circumstances and the lure of quick fixes and money deals drive Lumads to different levels of compromise. One example
is that of a Lumad development foundation (registered with
the Securities and Exchange Foundation) in Bukidnon which
has allegedly diverted funds from a foreign grant for
livelihood projects to a business venture of a datu's own
family. Another instance is that of a Lumad leader in the
foothills of the Kitanglad mountain range who has been known
to engage in illegal logging -- in collusion with corrupt
military personnel.

The Problem of Political Power

The alliances with other groups -- whether they be
ethnically different neighboring groups or those from the
dominant society -- are forged primarily because of
political power problems. The undervaluation and
destruction of Lumad culture is carried out because they
lack the political power to defend themselves and articulate
their own demands. Within the larger state their
integration is sought at the expense of everything they
value -- the land and culture which form the very bases of
their material and symbolic life. As stateless societies
they seek ways of regulating political power -- forming
power bases that could confront states without sacrificing,
as far as possible, elements of their culture and identity
in the process. 39 But being numerically weak and
marginalized makes them more prone to sacrificing their
egalitarian and communal characteristics as they try to mobilize and ally themselves with other groups.

In the last few decades, especially during martial law, tribal organization among Lumads has had minimal impact on social practice. The displacement from tribal lands and the demographic changes in the course of colonial and recent history had given rise to a situation wherein many tribes continued to exist only as "nominal organizations without an infrastructural foundation and concomitant influences on social classification and interaction."40 For PANAMIN, for example, the Lumads were simply seen as comprising various administratively classified tribal units dependent on the government and with hardly any political capital.

The last few years have seen significant changes, however. Among the Lumads, tribal organizations have reemerged, although in new and inventive ways. The direction of Lumad identity reconstruction was not in the strict sense of tribal group affiliation, but in terms of a broader -- decidedly stronger -- pan-Lumad identity. The multi-sectoral Lumad-Mindanao organized in June 1986 is a huge step in this direction. The Lumad-Mindanao is an umbrella organization of 18 different ethno-linguistic Lumad groups in Mindanao, which, as mentioned earlier, first adopted the term "Lumad" to refer to all indigenous peoples in Mindanao. In 1992 the Bukidnon Association of Tribal Organizations (BATO) was formed, a conglomeration of the
almost 30 different Lumad foundations and organizations in the province. The overriding aim of these pan-Lumad organizations is to make the Lumads a viable interest group with impact on the larger political arena. The influence they may have at present may be far from powerful — that is, threatening to the state, as the ethnic mobilizations in Moslem Mindanao and the Cordillera region were. The mere realization of such formations, however, points to the promise of a new politics in the margins of society, what Hannah Arendt would call an expansion of the "public spaces of freedom." 41

Emergent Symbols: The Upper Pulangi Tribal Council

Even in instances where an overt fight (as in Kimambong or Quezon) is not actually staged and Lumads seem content to be, if not helplessly, absorbed into a dominant political framework, an interplay of symbols of tribal reassertion can emerge and make itself evident. In Culaman, Bukidnon in the Upper Pulangi region that borders Agusan del Sur and Bukidnon, a meeting of the Higa-onon Tribal Council provides a venue within which a rich variety of symbolisms that point to a "new politics" is observed.

Culaman is a small Lumad Higa-onon village deep in the northeastern section of Bukidnon. Much of the surrounding mountains are still covered with thick forests. The destructive practices of commercial loggers have, however, left their mark in the denuded hills leading to Culaman. The Pulangi river, also known as the Rio Grande of Mindanao,
finds its source in this area. On this crisp November day the village has prepared itself for a big event: the induction of the members of the Upper Pulangi Higa-onon Tribal Council. The council is a body of tribal leaders from around the area formed under the aegis of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC). The council, as in the days of PANAMIN, is tasked to be a conduit of the Lumad communities to the government, virtually a political arm of the OSCC.42

On this day,43 OSCC and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) personnel from the regional office in Cagayan de Oro City have journeyed to this remote corner of the province. Academics of Lumad ancestry from the Bukidnon State College in Malaybalay are also present. Staff from the Bukidnon-based Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) are also in attendance; they are culminating a short-term literacy program among the villagers. Around the premises of the village plaza are several men in military fatigues, some toting machine guns; these are Lumads from the area who will also be inducted as tribal defense forces, not unlike the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) of the Marcos years.

The proceedings begin with an old datu chanting a seemingly interminable pamara, or invocation. In the vernacular, Binukid, he gives thanks to Magbabaya, the Supreme Being. Later, a younger datu leads a brief Christian invocation -- but in Binukid. The small crowd then rises to sing the Bayang Magiliw, or the Philippine National Anthem, in Binukid, as written out on a blackboard positioned on one side of a makeshift stage. On the other corner of the platform a Philippine flag is draped. A short program follows. A group of housewives face the crowd and croons songs in Binukid culled from the Bukidnon/Higa-onon epic Olaging.
extolling the virtues of the legendary hero Agyu and describing the beauty of Nalandangan, the tribal paradise.44

The datus assembled on stage take their oaths to serve in the tribal council. The oaths are said first in Binukid and then in Visayan. While pledging allegiance to the national government, the oath includes a clause that indicates a profession of faith in the Bungkatol Ha Bulawan, the body of Lumad customary law. The same is done for the men in military fatigues who pledge to serve faithfully as members of the tribal defense forces; these forces are called Alima-ong, in reference to the ancient warriors of the Higa-onon. The staff from the DILG and the OSC take turns announcing programs that would benefit the Lumad communities. They speak of infrastructure -- the construction of roads and bridges and schoolbuildings -- and increased educational programs for literacy and the sort. A few datus rise to speak one after the other. One of them is Datu Ligden Luminton, adorned with a vibrant Lumad turban and a colorful beaded necklace. In eloquent Binukid he exhorts his Lumad audience to be proud of their ancestry and declares that they must be economically secure to survive in this day and age. Showing his flair for oratory and making known his position as a highly literate Lumad, he pledges to advance the Lumad fight with his "pen and typewriter." The academics from the Bukidnon State College follow in this spate of spiels. One Lumad professor underscores the importance of education, encouraging his listeners to serve fellow Lumads who will help preserve their culture. Another professor preaches self-reliance and stresses that Lumads "rely too much on government; Lumads must organize by ourselves, for ourselves." The gathering ends with a datu declaiming in dasang, what the Higa-onons call their royal language of expression. A bae
then follows with a limbay, a royal song.

What transpires in this setting is a curious interplay of the indigenous and the modern, a meshing of old traditions with new forms. The appropriation of customs and native language in a proceeding initiated and sponsored by government agents indicates a (re)valuation of ethnic practices within a modern context. The ancient pamara, the limbay and Binukid songs from the legendary oral epic of their culture, the national anthem sung in Binukid, and the oratorical allusions to ethnic pride all reveal a negotiated acculturation to the forces of the modern nation-state. The inclusion of portions of the ethnoepic Olaging in this tribal council meeting makes manifest anthropologist Arsenio Manuel’s argument that such epics express strong cohesion within the community. The ethnoepic, a collection of tribal stories sung in life-cycle celebrations, were, as Manuel notes, a major binding force in native society. By connecting with this ancient practice the Lumads of Culaman are able to retain a sense of continuity with the past. Lumad identity is thus asserted in subtle ways even within a framework of modernity. The people of Culaman are managing to recreate the tribe while holding on to (some of) its cultural moorings.
Dependency Quagmire

In areas of extreme privation and dependency, however, retribalization may seem nigh impossible. Lumads in a state of destitution, living in ravaged forest habitats, would tend to be listless and unable to organize in any cohesive sense. But even in some places where Lumads inhabit a social and cultural limbo, the identification as Lumads can still be used to their advantage. Curiously, Lumad claims of "destitution" have been used to seek dole-outs and protection from government. During the years of PANAMIN some Higa-onons claimed Talaandig affinities; the Talaandig tribe was supposedly the most impoverished of all groups and to be Talaandig, as some sources say, meant receiving greater assistance and protection from the government. Younger, more assimilated Lumads who can hardly speak Binukid now or have weak connections with their heritage, parlay their "Lumadness" when competing for sundry cultural minority scholarships from the government.

Their resignation as a minority group of inferior status is thus utilized for their own benefit. To identify as Lumad is made for short-term purposes and concrete benefits. Another example is that of claiming datuship to avail of some privileges like having access to or use of public land or having one's children eligible for minority scholarships. Many Lumads today say that there are several of these datu who are actually spurious; these datu
supposedly obtained their status because of political connections with PANMIN and the present OSCC. This suggests a process of "working the system to their minimum disadvantage," as Eric Hobsbawn argues, which "subordinate classes" engage in.\textsuperscript{47} If Lumads may be considered a subordinate class, they could be seen, as James Scott contends, as being more interested in "'working the system' than in actually changing the larger structures of state and the law."\textsuperscript{48}

The identification as Lumads for immediate benefits is apparent in cases where cooptation has taken place and forms dependency on outside forces and resources have become great. Tribal leaders who now toe the government line brandish their Lumad identity when presenting various demands, when it can be advantageous to procure immediate material rewards. The call for the creation of a new Matigsalug municipality in south Bukidnon, for example, seems to be fueled by narrow political interests. Tribal leader Datu Gawilan, now a follower of Congressman Zubiri of the Third District of Bukidnon, thinks the Matigsalug tribe should have its own land as was promised during the PANMIN days. Congressman Zubiri has filed a bill in the House of Representatives regarding the creation of such a municipality. This appears to be in keeping with Zubiri's own zealous moves to partition the province of Bukidnon into two units, where he could better control the southern half.
Gawilan, a former mayor of the municipality of Kitao-tao who rose to such position under Zubiri's patronage, supports the division of Bukidnon into northern and southern provinces. What seems at play here are divide-and-rule tactics led by a politician and supported by Lumad groups beholden to the latter. Ethnic retribalizing in such cases does not appear to be of the type that is necessarily anchored on ethnic pride or positive group identification. Lumad identity is thus subsumed under political patronage. The Matigsalugs find a new source of communal anchorage through the patronage of a powerful politician like Zubiri. Zubiri is seen as a carryover from the PANMIN heyday when the Matigsalugs, like so many other indigenous groups around the country, received much attention from the government and figures like Manuel (Manda) Elizalde, Jr.

Datu Gawilan is still the supreme chief of the Matigsalug community in Sinuda (formerly known as Simod), one of the "strategic hamlets" established by the PANMIN in Bukidnon in the 1970s. In his humble two-storey home in Sinuda, Bukidnon Datu Gawilan, an aging man of seventy years, speaks in a soft baritone. On a wall darkened with soot hangs a laminated black-and-white photo of Gawilan, in full Lumad regalia, shaking the hand of President Ferdinand Marcos in the Malacañang Palace at the time of his surrender in 1975. The photo seems the most prized decor in his abode. He is proud of this event in his life, a watershed occurrence for him and his people. He speaks of the "glory days" in the 1970s when Manda Elizalde and PANMIN officials would land by helicopter in Sinuda and visit the Matigsalug community. Medicines, food
and other goods would be distributed. On occasion Elizalde would take Gawilan to Manila. "PANAMIN did a lot for us," he relates.

These days the people of Sinuda work in the canefields of the nearby Bukidnon Sugar Company (BUSCO). The remaining wood in the logged over areas around Sinuda have all been gathered and chopped by the Matigsalugs and sold by bundles to BUSCO for its sugar mills. The surrounding hills are now bald and parcels of eroded land are used for marginal farming of corn and rice. Many young Matigsalugs venture to Davao City, about a hundred kilometers away, to seek their fortune. Many from Sinuda travel to Davao to purchase basic goods. Another datu relates how difficult life has become. He remembers how bountiful the forests were some years ago where they could gather herbs and medicinal plants for various ailments. "Today medicines can only be bought in town and are very costly," he adds.49

In the early 1970s Datu Gawilan valiantly led his people to fight the cowboys of the Bueno ranch which had taken over their lands. In 1975 Gawilan had led the attacks on the logging companies.50 In 1980 Datu Gawilan, who can hardly read or write, ran for mayor of Kitatoa-tao, Bukidnon and won with Zubiri's full support. Zubiri at that time was Benedicto's assistant who oversaw the operations of BUSCO. In 1988, under the Aquino administration, Gawilan ran for mayor again and lost. The largesse that PANAMIN and Zubiri had at their disposal during the Marcos years was not there anymore. PANAMIN's promise to give the Matigsalugs a whole reservation of 14,000 hectares was not fulfilled. Today Datu Gawilan and his group entirely depend on Congressman Zubiri to fight for a separate Matigsalug municipality.
What appears in the Sinuda case is the absorption of an indigenous group into the dominant political, economic and legal system, albeit in a subordinate, disadvantaged status. The conditions of dependency that the Matigsalug Lumads have found themselves in have led them to accept an inferior status vis-à-vis the dominant society. The years of PANAMIN dole-outs have led many of them to expect that the government or powerful figures like Zubiri owe them protection and material benefits because they are poor and destitute. For the Matigsalugs, retribalization thus becomes, in effect, a pining for PANAMIN's better days when they were recognized (if only nominally) and patronized as a separate Lumad community.

The same can be said of the Talaandigs of Miarayon in the municipality of Talakag in northern Bukidnon. After the isolated revolts over land disputes and the pacification measures undertaken by the Philippine military in the area since the 1970s, the Lumads now remain secluded and impoverished. Miarayon was formed as another PANAMIN "strategic hamlet" in the 1970s. The place is accessible only by foot or horse and is situated in the highlands of the Kitanglad range that straddles north and central Bukidnon. Their leader, Datu Ladlaran, is beholden to local politicians. During elections these politicians or other rich candidates offer him money in exchange for the promise of delivering the vote of the communities around Miarayon en
masse. Most, if not all, of the members of the community are illiterate and have hardly any access to basic social services. Infant mortality is high. Children are undernourished and receive no primary health care. The people grow crops like potatoes and vegetables such as lettuce and carrots that thrive in the cooler climate of the area. These crops are sold in a town downriver, sacked and transported on carabaos. Ironically, these people do not consume any of these crops but instead buy dried fish, sardines and cheap wine from town.

Following the surrender of the Talaandig Lumads of Miarayon, Talakag on October 15, 1975, PANAMIN also resettled them into PANAMIN-organized "hamlets." Since 1975 these Lumads have celebrated October 15 of every year as "Talaandig Day." The day is akin to the lowlanders' annual fiestas. Lumads don their best traditional costumes, perform dances and chant songs from old. The celebration of "Talaandig Day" each year by the Talaandig Lumads of Talakag may well indicate that tribal autonomy is largely lost. It is curious to note that what is celebrated in all the display of Lumad finery is in fact the "surrender" of the Lumads to the agents of the Philippine state. In this particular case it involved the datus' capitulation to the control and influence of the provincial government, to the military forces deployed in the area, and to the regime itself as represented by PANAMIN. As such, the process of
incorporating the Lumad community into the prevailing juridical structures of the state is virtually validated by the observance of "Talaandig Day." The surrender in October 1975 was in effect a failure of the community to regulate its internal affairs and a major step towards integration into the dominant state society and economy.

With sites like Sinuda or Miarayon it is easy to see a cause of Lumad retribalization compromised. People are mired in conditions of abject poverty, many of them appearing listless and in a state of anomie. Leaders become coopted and dependent on politicians or become wards of warlords or wealthy settler patrons. Some of those who own parcels of titled land sell these (or are hoodwinked into selling such) for measly sums to outsiders. The Lumads in such cases appear to become virtually party to their own exploitation.

"Thick Descriptions"

It is easy to write off all Lumad struggles as ultimately futile in the face of the omnipotence of modern forces. This may be so particularly if retribalizations are necessarily placed in contexts of organized rebellions -- let alone revolutionary secession or autonomy movements -- that confront the state. Numerous cases of indigenous resistance have, after all, been crushed mercilessly by dominant forces throughout modern history. If retribalizations are to be viewed this way, the struggles of
a Datu Luminton or a Bae Dayang may be dismissed as easily
as many have dismissed millenarian movements -- as ephemeral
"flashes in the pan." The reviving of old traditions in new
settings, as revealed in Culaman, could thus also be seen as
preordained eventually to fade and disappear.

To remain, however, in this optic is to fail to read
into "thick descriptions," as Clifford Geertz would have it,
that inhere in cultural forms and practices. "Thick
descriptions" look into "symbolically mediated cultural
contexts within which intentions are formed, interpersonal
relationships are negotiated, and human projects are carried
out."51 To say that retribalizations in an overpowering
context of modernity are inevitably doomed is to overlook
the dynamism of culture. In the final analysis, culture is
not easily collapsible into categories, as there are always
ambiguities that attend its various interpretations.
Moreover, culture change occurs in diverse and even
contradictory currents in countless settings and within
various communities, as was suggested in the second chapter
discussing the perspective on communitarianism. Even
something so seemingly compromised like the "Talaandig Day,"
where Lumads celebrate their "surrender," could be
interpreted as one avenue where they are able to touch base
with customs and traditions of old. In this yearly
gathering of song, dance, and traditional story-telling,
they embrace fragments of a rich past of rite and ritual,
somehow reconnecting with an ancestral core -- even in the dramatically changed context of absorption into prevailing structures.

Just as James Scott chose to look into the everyday forms of resistance among peasants in Malaysia as against the larger, more organized manifestations of political activity,\textsuperscript{52} so has this study chosen to view retribalizations in the context of day-to-day dynamics and seemingly more mundane occurrences. This latter approach validates the various processes of recreating the collective unit -- not just those which are more politically organized and defined, but even the incipient and the emergent, the resurgent and the recurrent. In taking this more interpretive vantage what may be observed are new possibilities that exist for peoples like the Lumads to cope with the ravages of culture change and to manage the tensions between modernity and tradition -- tensions which develop in what can be known as "contact zones."
ENDNOTES

1. The court hearing described was held September 9, 1992 in Seventh Municipal Circuit Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Tenth Judicial Region. The case was classified as Criminal Case 7757, People of the Philippines vs. Peligrino (Ligden) Luminton, for violating Section 69 of Presidential Decree 705 as ammended by Presidential Decree 1559 (revised Forestry Code of the Philippines). Section 69 provides for the establishment of forest reserves within lands of the public domain. The occupation of Kimambong reforestation area is deemed unlawful since the latter is declared land of the public domain (state-owned). Judge Saria of the neighboring municipality of Impasug-ong had ruled earlier in favor of the occupants of Kimambong, noting that it was not unlawful. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), however, refiled the case in the Malaybalay Municipal Court, seeking the eviction of all the estimated 300 families from the reforestation area. The Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI) has been the one prodding the DENR to pursue the evictions. Enrique Dagawasan, a Lumad who heads the provincial office of the Office of Southern Cultural Communities, says that the DENR "sides with the BFI at the expense of the Lumads," and violates Republic Act 7586 which provides for the establishment and management of national integrated protected area systems. (Dagawasan, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, December 15, 1992). Section 13 of RA 7586 states that "ancestral lands and customary rights and interests arising shall be accorded due recognition. Provided, the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent."

2. Benedicto headed the Sugar Commission under the Marcos regime, which monopolized the sugar markets.


4. Ibid., p. 49. The "service center" was in Dalurong, Kitao-tao, Bukidnon which I visited in October 1992. Datu Lorenzo Gawilan and other Lumads in Sinuda, Quezon, Bukidnon related to me some of their accounts of the displacement of communities that took place as BUSCO made its entry into southern Bukidnon.

5. From the files of the Philippine Assistance for Intercultural Development (PAFID), Quezon City.

7. The SAKAMPU was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-government organization. The PAFID had helped draft the SAKAMPU by-laws and related papers and facilitated its registration.

8. Bae Dayang is unschooled (she says she only reached second grade), but exudes distinct confidence and a calm demeanor. Dayang, she says, means strong, brave, helpful -- the embodiment of a leader.

9. Bae Dayang now lives in the former barracks with her family. The adjacent buildings are where other Manobo families have moved in.

10. See the seminal work on mass movements and social history of Reynaldo Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1979). See also Vicente Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1988).


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


19. See Cullen's works for more detailed discussion on Lumad (Bukidnon) rituals. See Vincent G. Cullen, "Bukidnon


23. One established Lumad organization is the Nalandangan Tribal Datus Association, Inc. which oversees Lumad communities all over Bukidnon. The SAKAMPU in Quezon is another example of a Lumad organization formed as a development foundation.


30. I attended this Theater Festival and watched a number of their plays with indigenous culture themes.


34. In 1992 some former employees of the BFI demonstrated against the project. Leaders Eric Cacay and Jimmy Sawinhay, both of Lumad ancestry, point out that workers in the BFI have been abused and underpaid and that the BFI has grabbed Lumad lands. Cacay says that in 1990 BFI even threw to jail one Lumad for farming within BFI area. He also notes how outsiders, especially from Manila, come to the area and become managers and then disregard Lumad interests. The BFI project director, Allan Gonzalez, claims they have permits from the DENR to reforest the areas in contention, but the Lumads say the BFI needs to ask permission from them first. The complaints of both Sawinhay and Cacay were brought before the Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon in October 1992. I had separate conversations and interviews with Cacay, Sawinhay, and Gonzalez from October to November 1992. I also spoke at length with Enrique Dagawasan about the problems and conflicts between the BFI and the Lumads.

35. From files of the BFI. Allan Gonzalez, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, November 19, 1992.


37. There are reports all over the country about "NGO scams" whereby spurious groups are formed to avail of external funding.


42. Datu Mandimate Conrado Binayao says that tribal councils are only used for elections when Lumad communities are mobilized to vote -- particularly for government-supported candidates. The tribal councils, he says, are simply creations of government agencies like the OSCC and have no real development plan for the Lumads. Interview, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, April 29, 1992.
43. This event was held November 6, 1992.


45. Cited in Sylvia Mayuga, "Journey to the Center," in Diwa: Buhay, Ritwal at Sining: Museo ng Kalinangang Pilipino (Manila: Cultural Center of the Philippines, 1989), p. 120.


52. Scott, op. cit.
PART III

TRADITION, MODERNITY AND BEYOND

No amount of rhetoric, decisive policy and decision-making, clear and resolute legislation, sustained inter-agency coordination can bring about upliftment for the tribal members if the vast majority of our people remain indifferent to their problems and woes. Unless all necessary social forces and components unite and forge under a common, collective effort, the tribal people will remain enslaved to their poverty and misery.

Datu Jose B. Lopez
Undersecretary, OSCC, 1992
CHAPTER VIII

CONTACT ZONES: EXPANDING PARADIGMS OF CULTURE CHANGE

Tradition vs. Modernity

In any study that deals with ethnicity, the fundamental dichotomy between tradition and modernity surfaces. Politicized ethnicity is a function of modernization and industrialization, as suggested in the initial chapters, but it implies the valorizing of ascriptive, culturally specific solidarities in contradistinction with the values of universalism, development, science, and modernity. In any tradition-versus-modernity debate two dualisms seem to hold. On one hand, a dualism is made that views ethnicity as subversive of civic order, as against the "rational" -- that is, nonethnic -- behavior needed for the functioning of the modern economy and polity. On the other, ethnicity is romanticized as authentic, intimate, organic, pristine and contrasted against the malaise of a modern, capitalist, consumeristic, industrialized, rational world.¹

Ethnicity is thus seen by many scholars as a dialectical phenomenon whereby subjects like the Lumads are caught in "a continuous state of tension between the influences of tradition and the demands of modernization."² A special issue of Time magazine on the vanishing of native cultures all over the world, ponders on this reality:
Indigenous people have been threatened for centuries as development encroaches on their cultures and traditions. What is different about the present situation, however, is that it goes beyond basic questions of native land rights into more ambiguous issues, such as the prerogative of individuals to decide between traditional and modern ways.3

The politicization of ethnicity is, however, not a matter of strict dichotomizations: reclaiming "authentic" pasts or rejecting native lifeways. To retribalize does not mean the return to a "pristine" past and the outright rejection of everything "modern." Tradition and modernity need not be seen as mutually exclusive, as social science scholarship has often viewed phenomena like ethnic revivals. Similarly, culture change need not be understood in the usual linear continuums: tracing states of primitivity to stages of civilization and the influences of a dominant culture over a weaker one, from a colonial core to a colonized periphery. By overemphasizing universal aspects of the transition to modern society, social science theories have, as Majid Tehranian contends, underestimated the "uniqueness and resilience of cultural traditions in the process of social change."4 Renowned Peruvian writer, Pedro Vargas Llosa, for example, is locked in this dichotomization when he speaks of the plight of the Indians in his country. In alluding to the unfortunate crossroads of modernity and cultural preservation, he notes how in the ultimate analysis the vanishing of Indian cultures must reach a completion
because "the first priority is to fight hunger and misery." Vargas Llosa fails to see, let alone appreciate, this "resilience of cultural traditions" that may well inhere in various Indian communities; thus the quick suggestion of choosing assimilation to the ways of modernity as a way of alleviating grinding poverty.

This is not to argue, however, that asymmetrical power relations do not exist in these contexts of transculturation. Moreover, this is certainly not to gloss over the realities of hunger and misery among indigenous communities. Culture change and the process of modernization certainly occur in neocolonial and oppressive conditions, as discussed in previous chapters. The Lumads of northern Mindanao -- like the Indians of Peru and all other indigenous groups in the world -- have in some harsh way or other been real "victims of progress." State penetration and capitalist expansion have robbed Lumads of their lands and gravely threatened the foundations of their traditional cultures. As ecological theory posits, a less organized system always expends more energy and resources than the more organized system when both systems come in contact. This was shown in the discussion on the Umayamnon Lumads of Bukidnon who are now facing dispossession and rapid culture change (Chapter 5). But as previously illustrated in various sections, some Lumad communities are able to engage in different ways of coping with the changes
in culture. As James Clifford argues, "if the victims of progress and empire are weak, they are seldom passive."6

What is thus overlooked from this vantage of seeing tradition and modernity in dichotomous terms is the richness of novel syncretisms in culture that are formed in the face of a persistent onslaught of external forces. What is not viewed from this optic is how Lumads respond and adapt to changing circumstances and how they cope with and manage the strains of change. Retrivalizations unavoidably entail changes in the social organizations of these groups of people, restructuring many of their social relationships and redefining cultural moorings. Nietschmann has pointed this out as "a period of intense rearrangement and restructuring of social and ecological relationships."7 Ethnicity is not something simply to preserve or defend, as anthropologist Renato Rosaldo avers, but something that "must be viewed as an array of cultural practices from which each successive generation can select, discard, revise, modify, revise, or combine with traditional, borrowed, or invented practices."8 Clifford expounds:

Throughout the world indigenous populations have had to reckon with the forces of "progress" and "national" unification. The results have been both destructive and inventive. Many traditions, languages, cosmologies, and values are lost, some literally murdered; but much has simultaneously been invented and revived in complex, oppositional contexts.9
Lumads and Sites of Contact

The appropriation of indigenous symbols -- from as simple as Datu Ligden Luminton's donning of traditional wear in the court hearing over the Kimambong controversy or Bae Dayang's use of age-old rituals to summon her people to fight sugar barons -- is instructive of how ethnicity changes its dynamics in different settings. In Bae Dayang's struggle, the return to ritual is particularly compelling. Rituals are performances, Marian Pastor-Roces notes, "with a moral charge, often in pursuit of individual and collective healing."¹⁰ In the case of Bae Dayang and the Manobos, ritual retains its moral charge and becomes a channel for resistance, the element of collective healing translated to a form of empowerment. Vic Saway's and Tommie Labaon's appropriation of Lumad idioms in the Lumad cooperatives they have helped establish in their own communities illustrates what John Hutchinson calls "modernization from within."¹¹ In this regard a sense of distinctiveness of indigenous traditions is combined with modern forms (in this case cooperative and credit schemes) through a regeneration of indigenous cultural practices (in this case communitarian traditions of sharing and pooling resources). Fundador Binahon's conceptions, however inchoate, of autonomy in the tribal level and a "Higa-onon Nolanandangan" suggest attempts to locate indigenous cultural realities and experience within the larger setting of a modern Philippine state.
The rallying behind Datu Luminton and Bae Dayang and the ways by which a community is forged based on an ethnic factor -- whether imagined, assumed or not -- point to a process by which the assaults of outside influences on culture and identity are managed. The embrace of other settlers into a "larger Higa-onon" community in Kimambong is ostensibly to increase their number and sense of solidarity and communal security. But in a deeper sense it is a way of reviving something that has been eroded in an invasive world and reveals a "reinvention" of ethnicity (being Higa-onon) to suit the demands of ethnic politics. Singing the Philippine national anthem in the Binukid vernacular and pledging allegiance to both the state and to the Lumad Bungkatol Ha Bulawan in the tribal council induction at Culaman reflects a restraint, however possible, in the inevitable absorption into a dominant politico-legal system. In this instance the recognition of the overarching socio-political development sponsored by the state is made along a modicum of indigenous lines.

Such examples of politicized ethnicity occur in sites of contact with a dominant culture. Northern Mindanao is, after all, a setting where a plurality of interests produce contact situations between various ethnic, cultural and social groups. Urbanization, industrialization, Christianization, and education further enhance conditions of culture change and contact. The present sites of
tension where tradition is sought to be upheld in modern contexts are frontiers of cultures, nations, and identities. Emergent discourse in cultural studies refer to these as "contact zones." To see culture and acculturation in terms of "contact zones" is to understand them as intersystemic and dynamic -- and not as organic or linear, respectively. Contact zones imply spaces of colonial encounters, spaces in which peoples "geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict." This implies a "complex, dialectical process of cultural/political interaction in areas formerly simplified by expansionist projections as 'frontiers.'" As opposed to "colonial frontier" which is based within a perspective of European/Western expansionism -- as Mindanao had become throughout this century -- a "contact" perspective emphasizes "how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other, foregrounding the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters so easily ignored or suppressed by diffusionist accounts of conquest and domination." The argument furthers that this "contact" perspective treats relations among colonizers and the colonized "not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction,
For Dr. NERIC
ACOSTA
Provincial Board Member
Bukidnon

Please call him: 931 5369
But I will remind him to
pick it up. I think he’s
in Bago.
interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power."^{17}

In the study of present-day Lumads -- as in all other indigenous cultures -- this perspective becomes valuable insofar as it goes beyond the established realities of tribal exploitation and state domination. Such an optic affords a broader appreciation of the dynamics of ethnic politics, not necessarily in the overt, confrontational sense of revolts and uprisings, but in the subtleties of day-to-day responses and reactions. Such a perspective allows for an understanding that transcends the paradigms of dichotomizations and binary oppositions and recognizes the syncretic and the novel, the enormous array of possibilities of the proverbial "grey areas." This perspective is a departure from a naturalistic paradigm that has guided Western common sense, which presumes that an unchanging core of ideas and customs is always handed down from the past. As such, society as defined by distinctive traditions is modeled after a natural object -- bounded, essential, and objectively knowable.\textsuperscript{18} This is akin to the structural-functionalist school in anthropology which has viewed tribal societies myopically -- that is, as bounded, ahistorical and synchronic units.
Paradoxes in Ethnic Politics

For long ethnic politics and retribalizations have been ultimately regarded as futile. In the face of an overpowering march of modernity such retribalizations were viewed as liable to complicity and compromise, ultimately undermining the integrity of the ethnic struggle. Given the state's power through its coercive, financial and educational institutions, it has been easy to see such struggles as doomed to fail. It is with this paradigm shift, however, that the phenomenon of ethnic politics is better seen in its many dimensions.

For as long as group distinctiveness primarily based on primordial and affective elements (kinship, descent, shared tradition, and so on) is dynamically sought or maintained, complicity and compromise in ethnic struggles become immaterial. Complicity can be raised as an issue when the premise is that there is indeed something genuinely indigenous, pure or essentialized in these cultures -- that there is a tradition that is real and authentic as opposed to something spurious. Compromise may be an issue as well when, as Western thought is wont to do, tradition and modernity are strictly dichotomized. In a dialectical process of culture change, complicity in effect is invalidated.

Social life is said to be always symbolically constructed, never naturally given, as Jocelyn Linnekin and
Richard Handler posit. Arguing against the preoccupation of Western thought on the naturalistic paradigm which presumes boundedness and essence, they maintain that,

Traditions thought to be preserved are created out of the conceptual needs of the present. Tradition is not handed down from the past, as a thing or collection of things; it is symbolically reinvented in an ongoing present. 19

The cultural symbols and myths that are evoked by the Datu Lumintons and the Bae Dayangs and the Lumads in places like Culaman may all derive from an idealization of the past, but the meanings these symbols and myths hold are obtained from a modern context of state and capitalist penetration into their domains. These symbols and myths operate within a "contact zone" between a metropolis and remote peripheries. For Datu Luminton and the Kimambong residents, it is the contact with the court and the provincial government that produces an intense reassertion of custom and tradition. To underscore group distinctiveness and solidarity a pamuhat (native ritual) is usually performed -- as in the sacrificial killing of a chicken to bring forth auspicious circumstances -- before community assemblies. The same can be said of Bae Dayang and the gathering of her community; through traditional ritual they would invoke spirits of ancestors and forbears, imploring supernatural assistance in their fight against the BUSCO. Her linkage-building with non-government organizations and government agencies was forged in the
"contact zone" of modern society and largely traditional lifeways.

What remains clear in such cases is that because of these contacts and how they are managed, the tribal world is in a state of flux. Even if the indigenous group gains access and more secure tenurial arrangements over land, it can never be a social or political isolate again. The Manobos of Quezon, for example, will continue to move into a monetized economy as they produce crops from the land they now have control over. Manobo children will continue to be incorporated into schools. The community will continue to have interactions and contact with settlers and the larger world. Even so, the chances of holding on to ethnic ties to the past and to traditions of old will remain as well -- and may even be heightened in a process of securing political capital as a group. This is so because the politicization of ethnicity in a fast modernizing world necessarily involves a dialectical process -- and entails a paradox which Joseph Rothschild succinctly describes:

[The politicization of ethnicity] stresses, ideologizes, reifies, modifies and sometimes virtually recreates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilizes -- precisely at the historical moment when these groups are being thoroughly penetrated by the universal culture of science and technology. The politicization of ethnicity is thus a dialectical process that preserves ethnic groups by emphasizing their singularity and yet also engineers and lubricates their
modernization by transforming them into political conflict groups for the modern political arena, where they must deploy cosmopolitan skills and resources. These two aspects of the dialectical process facilitate and reinforce each other. The result is a hybrid global tendency toward the universalization of scientific norms and of economic interdependence and yet also toward ever more particularistic ethnopolitical loyalties.  

For the Lumads, their retribalization efforts are constructed according to the demands of ethnic politics. This does not necessarily mean these efforts are complicitous with the forces they seek to resist. For a Bae Dayang to meet with Governor Tabios, Senator Estrada, other government officials and even the head of state, President Aquino herself, does not automatically make the Manobos' retribalization a compromise on authenticity. Neither is the use of Binukid in song and speeches in a government-sponsored event such as the Culaman tribal council meeting necessarily compromised or less "authentic." As Linnekin contends, "authenticity is always defined in the present." She adds that it is not "pastness or givenness that defines something as traditional; rather, the latter is an arbitrary symbolic designation, an assigned meaning rather than an objective quality."  

This is not to say, however, that groups retribalize and reconstruct tradition in all modern, present contexts. In cases of rapid modernization, especially for much smaller and weaker groups, marginalization to the point of
absorption, complete assimilation or extinction could well occur. Some of the seemingly blank, vapid stares of a number of Lumads in Sinuda or Miarayon could readily suggest a state of weakness and utter destitution. Moreover, this is not to say that linkages with other groups from the dominant culture would never cause a loss of cultural distinctiveness or result in clear assimilation or cooptation to that dominant culture. Again, in cases of smaller, weaker communities, the involvement of outside groups in their struggle may eventually usurp or pre-empt ethnic or cultural independence, as in forming a collective definition of themselves as an economically oppressed and politically marginalized class instead of an ethnic group.

But for as long as a community is in a process of acculturation and not as yet fully assimilated into a dominant system, the possibilities for inventive cultural change exist. William Sturtevant distinguishes between acculturation and assimilation in that the former is a matter of degree involving the adoption of cultural traits and the borrowing of customs. Assimilation refers to relations between societies entailing the absorption of one group into another. When one group is fully assimilated, it ceases to exist.22 It is essentially the acculturative processes of adopting and borrowing that characterize retribalizations. Among some Lumad communities this is still underway, evolving hybrid forms of cultural idioms.
Healing, Customary Law and Values

In the "contact zones" among Lumads there is indeed real tension between the influences of tradition and the demands of modernity. Three areas where this tension is evident are in: healing or health; the use of customary law in settling disputes and keeping order within communities; and in overall value systems. Despite measures of acculturation to modern lifeways, indigenous communities find themselves tied to many traditional practices which still make more sense to them than a new order imposed from outside. Even among supposedly more educated or urbanized members, the indigenous form and essence can still hold sway.

In matters of health, for instance, the village healer is still regarded with reverence in a community. In many cases it is the datu who is also the recognized healer. Traditional health practices are still largely followed in tribal societies. The use of locally available herbs is considered essential. The use of modern medicines or treatment is resorted to, but in a limited way. Such modern medical attention may be had to alleviate symptoms of certain ailments, but the use of traditional healing is based on beliefs that sickness is caused by spirits. For the Lumads the medical doctor does not really replace the role of the traditional healer. The spiritual component of
healing is something that Lumads feel only the traditional healer is able to give.

Customary law is an important aspect of indigenous cultures which embodies legal precepts and precedents and forms the basis for the settlement of conflicts and the enforcement of legal sanctions. As mentioned earlier, the Lumads of northern Mindanao call this corpus of customary laws and traditions the *Bungkatol Ha Bulawan*. Many communities still have greater reliance on customary law given its familiarity and availability. The recourse to settle disputes in court may be an option but the complications and fees involved can readily prompt out-of-court settlements using customary law. When conflict between an indigenous community and outside individuals or groups arises, customary law is clearly superceded by the modern legal system. In this regard customary law is outrightly invalidated. This results in confusion among indigenous communities and gives rise to two standards of behavior. What may be illegal in modern law may be expected in customary law. The use of the resources of the forest may not be wrong in the mind of a Lumad but he may be liable for charges for possessing no government permit to enter or exploit the area. Datu Mandimate clarifies that for many of the older *datus* a settlement in the Lumad context is always considered more beneficial in that no party necessarily wins or loses, as is the case with the prevailing legal system of
the state; instead, an amicable outcome or overall harmony (again, the central concept of *husay*) is always sought.\(^{23}\)

Customary law is closely tied to the institution of the datuhip. The changes in culture brought about by the forces of the state and a dominant cash-based economy have hastened a decline of both the influence of the datu and the Bungkatol Ha Bulawan in Lumad society. The datu is considered a highly important figure among the Lumads. The Bukidnon, for instance, believe that datu have powerful guardian spirits called dumaalongdon who will punish those who do not properly respect the datu. Punishment can come in the form of habay or gaba (roughly, a retribution from the spirits), like a lingering sickness. There is, in fact, an elaborate hierarchy of datuhip, a long process of attaining status as a leader. Among the Bukidnon this is particularly in terms of the taqulambong ho datu (first recognition) to gologondo ho datu (lordship), followed by inuluban (final absorption of all attributes of datuhip) and finally, linangkuban (the tally of datuhip).\(^{24}\)

The modern state and outside interests have, however, failed to understand meanings attached to all this and have thus virtually desecrated the whole institution of the datuhip. In the days of PANAMIN, spurious "datus" were arbitrarily appointed for political purposes. In various cases, real datu were hired (or pressured) by logging companies around northern Mindanao to work as concession
guards. Lumads who always had access to the resources of the forest were suddenly prohibited from doing so by these datus. In such cases, both the datu and his people are placed in a state of tension: the datu is forced to protect the logging company's interests at the expense of his own people's needs, while the ordinary Lumads are bound to obey and respect the datu for fear of having gaba befall them. In any case, the stability of the indigenous belief system and political structure is attenuated by the very existence of such tension.

Within the tribal setting kinship is central. Responsibility to the family, the kinship group, and the community is paramount. This generates numerous obligations to the collective unit, as the well-being of the group takes precedence over individual concerns. The older members of the community are respected and held in high regard because they embody the traditional norms and values of society and represent important links with the past. This is particularly so in such societies which rely on oral traditions to transmit cultural values and norms. The advent of modern educational systems, however, has brought many Lumads to a shift in value systems. Educated Lumads learn to value individual achievement, as the educational system underscores, more than the discharge of family and kinship obligations. This creates tension in terms of obligations and expectations. The same is true in relation
to ownership of property. In traditional societies the relationship is defined in terms of the family rather than of individuals. Communal ownership is thus the key feature in this relationship to property, which preserves family property through generations more than individual ownership.

These spheres of traditional practices collide with modern forms and ways and ostensibly generate dilemmas and difficulties. But in other ways, these also offer vast opportunities to readjust modern ways and practices -- in health, law and education, as in overall policy and developmental thrusts -- to fuse both the old and the new. In a fast modernizing world the question is how traditional values -- from indigenous ecological wisdom and native healing to customary law, native institutions and kinship/communal value systems -- can be tapped to undergird new approaches for the future.

Looking Past Modernity

The ways by which the tensions between modernity and tradition in these zones of contact are managed differ from community to community, from one Lumad individual to another. But what is common among many of these is the fact that tradition, in the broader sense alluded to in this discussion, is affirmed and maintained, not necessarily in its past and "authentic" forms but in new and syncretic ways. Whether it be the longing for the "spirituality" of
native healing, the recognition of the validity of aspects of customary law, the revitalization of the datuship, or the respect for abiding obligations to the family kin group, many Lumads are able to reinterpret the old idioms in the contexts of new and modern ones.

The work done by many educated Lumads in the spheres of literacy and education, in health and local government, for instance, reflect a desire to attain agpangan, a balance between good and evil, or between opposites. Lumads like Vic Saway and Tommie Labaon speak of a need to find this agpangan between cultural preservation and modern development. What they claim to achieve are negotiated positions vis-à-vis the government, not so much outright resistance as managed incorporation. There may be a resignation to state dominance, but a belief in their own traditions is firmly kept. There is no doubt a need to adapt to changed environments and contexts, but what is needed is "development from the inside," where some kind of model, Saway explains, can be fashioned based on their own culture, even as they interact with outside political systems.

Saway, for instance, reflects on a local government unit consisting of his Talaandig community wherein a "politics of our elders" is revived, where tribal institutions like the datuship are substantially incorporated into the framework of a local government
structure. A Lumad barangay captain, for example, should exercise "parental leadership" -- like the datuships of old -- which would virtually treat a constituency as part of a large kinship group. This way, he says, "the responsibilities are wider and the commitment deeper." As for education and literacy programs, Saway explains that models for teaching should be culturally grounded. Literacy materials should constitute folktales, riddles, and the ethnoepic Olaging. He notes that the folktales and storytelling develop eloquence, the riddles sharpen the mind, and listening to long oral epics enhance "discipline and creative imagination." Non-formal education is also essential, which is what Leo Dahinog did in the Upper Pulangi region. Older tribal leaders were made a part of the program, passing on vital knowledge about herbal medicine and traditional healing practices; women would teach the younger members of the community various handicrafts; both adults and children would have reading materials with illustrations of the flora and fauna peculiar to their place or the artwork and artifacts of their community.

With regard to cooperative schemes, Saway and Labaon speak of translating customs from the past into present economic settings. The age-old practice, for example, of everyone in the community helping the datu from planting to harvesting and then keeping what they can harvest can be
employed in the implementing of a cash-based cooperative for farming or small sari-sari (variety) stores. The amount of time and resource one is able to put into the enterprise determines one's share, but a fixed percentage is automatically set aside for the whole cooperative (again, the concept of linbun, communal jar). This also ties in with the Lumad concepts of property emphasizing stewardship -- the stronger or more fortunate sharing with the less privileged, through traditions they call pangalawat and kag-ila. Labaon states that in Binukid and other native dialects there is no word for "thank you," an indication that these Lumad cultures are characterized by "sharing" and egalitarianism. Labaon notes how an understanding of aspects of Lumad culture and customary law is essentially used in operating two of the tribal cooperatives he established since 1991, and how the provisions of the government's Cooperative Development Authority are followed only insofar as formal registration and accreditation purposes are concerned.26 Vic Saway's sari-sari store cooperatives have grown to seven outlets over the last two years, with each having an initial Capitalization of 1,500 pesos. He stresses that Lumads "must find the wellsprings of innovation and creativity and find those ways which suit us and our culture best." The Lumads' concept of survival, Saway notes, is to (ideally) "manage the structures and not be managed by them...otherwise, we get totally absorbed."27
In a similar vein, Lorenzo Dinlayan says that Lumad culture can be enriched in various ways through integration into the mainstream, that "culture is not lost even in integration." Specifically, Dinlayan sees opportunities for education as opening ways for Lumad advancement, with educated Lumads "returning to their roots and helping their own people." Among several other datu in Bukidnon, however, a lamenting of the loss of "Lumadness" among those of the younger generation is invariably made. Yet in the same breath, they express a faith in the continuing of some of their traditions, as if aware of the constant factor in ethnicity -- that of being (what various scholars see as) an enduring psychological phenomenon. For instance, Datu Siliban, a Banwaon leader in Impasug-ong, Bukidnon, reflects on how "our cultures can live on in the face of many changes, for as long as we still follow many of the values we learned from our ancestors."

Programs like those initiated by Saway and Labaon—from education to cooperativism -- are what the PANAMIN or OSCC should have concretely done, they aver. Instead of using dubious tribal councils for their own self-serving purposes, there should have been a clearer "reinstitutionalization of the Lumad value systems." These are ways, Lumads like Saway and Labaon say, by which Lumads are able to adapt and survive culturally in a world of
economic dislocation and greatly diminished natural resources.

For groups who have significantly mobilized themselves via their own cultures -- as in Kastom in Melanesia, Maoritanga in New Zealand, the sovereignty movement in Hawai‘i, the Moslems of southern Mindanao and the peoples of the Cordillera highlands, or perhaps in time a pan-Lumad movement in northern Mindanao -- the interpretation and "invention" of tradition in present zones of contact becomes essential. Otherwise, it can be concluded that culture, as Linnekin argues, is static and change necessarily originates from the outside -- a point that is illustrated by conventional assumptions of cultural authenticity and complicity with outside forces in a process of indigenous resistance. The argument forwarded is that culture, cultural identity and retribalization efforts of myriad forms are to be understood as "creative, dynamic and processual," an understanding only made possible with a doggedly symbolic concept of culture.³⁰

This paradigmatic shift in understanding tradition and culture change allows for a deeper appreciation of indigenous peoples as active, dynamic subjects, not bounded, essentialized objects. Similarly, this gives a better sense that cultures are not static and primitive systems operating within a vacuum, but are functioning and changing in relation to a wider social, political, economic environment.
With this perspective, the modern world may yet find new ways of valuing these peoples as belonging to communities with living cultures, with the capacities and the agency to transform their material realities as they see fit. Then they can be appreciated not as mere objects of integrationist state policies or obstacles to the expansion of capitalist interests and state-sponsored development into their lands. More importantly, this heightened appreciation of their cultures augurs well for the inventive possibilities of alternative paths and modes of development. In challenging the legitimacy of the nation-state itself, ethnic politics can open avenues for the creation of viable political units. Moreover, the politicization of ethnicity can be better understood as an integral factor of -- not an obstacle to -- new forms of political and economic development. This challenge falls on the scholar as well as the policy-maker. As Rothchild reflects, "scholarly recognition of ethnicity's political potency, and scholarly acknowledgement that it is neither vestigial nor obsolescing, nor definitionally reactionary, will also entail scholarly reexamination of conventional academic notions of political integration, development, and modernity."31

***

This entire work has sought to keep this thematic focus on reexamining the conventional notions -- both of the
academe and the state -- of political integration, development, and modernity as they particularly relate to the Philippines and the Lumads of northern Mindanao. The chapter that follows takes this reexamination to a level of policy implications. By way of concluding this text the subsequent discussion endeavors to draw prescriptions, however inchoate, for new directions in ethnic minority policy. Moreover, it opens the field to what may be more radical questions of thinking beyond the modern constructions of an "imagined" Philippine nation-state and extrapolate on the possibilities of creating viable political units that are based on the realities of resurgent, politicized ethnicity.


27. Saway, Interview.


CHAPTER IX

RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNITY:
A SEARCH FOR NEW APPROACHES

Development, Discipline, Democracy?

When former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew went to the Philippines in late 1992, his visit was hailed by the local media as momentous. In many ways it was as if the renowned leader of the city-state had come to bring tidings of great import and reveal the secrets of his country's economic success to the Filipino public. Lee Kuan Yew spoke on various occasions to large assemblies of government officials, business leaders, academics and various non-government groups. His message was clear: democracy, or how it operates as a whole in the Philippines, was not the answer to the country's woes. Discipline, he said, was key to development. There were cries of amor propio (taking umbrage) on the part of some of his Filipino listeners, but these were largely muted in an overall toast to the "Singapore economic miracle." It seemed like a public consensus was built around how the country must follow in Singapore's footsteps and become more "developed." There were only a few voices of skepticism, like one newspaper columnist who decried the hoopla over Lee Kuan Yew's economic advice and wondered: instead of all the preoccupation about how to be developed like Singapore, why not ask, what sort of development and at what cost?"
The same question could be raised again in the present drive of the Ramos government for a "Philippines 2000." The latter is a grand vision to change the country's poor status as the region's "sick man" and propel the country to the status of newly industrialized economy by the turn of the century. The impetus for an economic take-off is believed to lie in, among others, the entry of foreign investments, rapid industrialization, export-oriented agriculture and forestry, and liberalization of trade policies. In line with "Philippines 2000" a 1993 economic summit of government and business leaders, academics, labor leaders and non-government organizations was held in Manila to formulate a socio-economic plan to transform the country into a "tiger" economy by the year 2000. Together the assembly signed a social pact pledging inter-sectoral cooperation in eight priority areas that would put the economy in a "fast-forward mode."

The goals identified in the summit were: ensuring national unity, justice, peace and security; investing in human resources and creating more jobs; ensuring infrastructure support and adequate energy supply; reducing the budget deficit; creating a favorable business climate that would attract foreign investments; conserving the environment and ensuring sustainable growth; accelerating agri-industrial development and promoting food security; and energizing the bureaucracy. The goals drawn are laudable,
but given the gargantuan economic difficulties the country is facing, these may offhand appear lofty and grandiose — especially since the year 2000 is a mere six years away. Moreover, the social pact signed is wanting in concrete programs of action. The generalities are all in place but the details are not. In any case, there seems to be a near-obsession in both the government and private sectors with emulating the booming economies of Singapore, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, a desire for the country to embark on a rapid development process its neighbors have successfully begun.

In this drive for rapid industrialization Mindanao has especially been earmarked as a "champion for growth." Like the immediate period after the Second World War Mindanao today is still regarded as a "land of promise." Mindanao's economic potential is still bannnered as enormous, the damaged environment notwithstanding. In 1991 a gathering of business leaders and local government officials from all over Mindanao worked to draft a proposal for Mindanao's development goals by the year 2000. The proposal came to be known as the Mindanao Integrated Development Agenda (MIDA) and speaks of vague aims such as "integrated intra-Mindanao market systems." The MIDA calls for an aggressive private sector mobilization plan which entails development of new technologies and large-scale industries, the establishment of innovations in the banking sector, extensive
infrastructure, and the supply of adequate electric power for burgeoning industries.5

The MIDA has been criticized by various academic and non-government circles as "conspicuously silent on agrarian reform."6 Agrarian reform should, after all, be the crucial factor in resolving the conflicts and problems that have long festered in a frontier like Mindanao. The MIDA is likewise unclear on the role of the region's different sectors: farmers and fisherfolk, labor and women and the urban poor, and the populous Lumads all over Mindanao.7

Yet it is in this light that development must indeed be rethought. No one can argue against the necessity of raising standards of living, alleviating widespread poverty, and providing employment for many. But a mad rush to modernity without careful thought and enlightened policy may, as the Marcos years had shown abundantly, result in waste and countless debacles. The fact that Mindanao at present has only 18 percent forest cover (recall that environmentalists say it needs at least 54 percent cover to be environmentally viable) is just one blatant example of the enormous costs of mindlessly exploiting a natural resource base in the name of development. The denudation of Mindanao's once abundant forests has contributed to periodic droughts, which in turn have caused massive energy crises like the intermittent blackouts all over the region in 1990 and 1991. Thus, the seemingly hackneyed questions of
development for whom? and at what price development? still bear urgent meaning -- for policy-makers as for scholarship that assumes a sense of social responsibility. These become more pointed when raised in light of the plight of indigenous peoples and the destruction of the natural environment within which such cultures thrive and on which the country's patrimony lies.

**Ethnic Struggles Against Development**

One has only to review the controversy over the World Bank-funded Chico River Dam project in the late 1970s in the Cordillera highlands to note the ill-effects of a development philosophy that disregards the value of native lifeways. This project was designed to build a series of dams in the Chico River to produce hydroelectric power for the whole region of northern Luzon, but in the process would have inundated Kalinga and Bontoc villages and hundreds of hectares of their ancestral lands. The tribal communities were to be relocated and uprooted from their ancestral domains. There was great resistance to the project from the communities concerned. The resistance against this project mounted with the involvement of the insurgent New People's Army. This in turn exacerbated the militarization in the area and the violent nature of the conflict. The project was in time shelved after massive costs in lives and human property.
Another jarring example of a warped scheme of developmentalism is the ongoing exploitation of the Mount Apo National Park in southern Mindanao by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). The PNOC has been determined to exploit the geothermal resources of the country's highest mountain despite protestations from various sectors and the absence of a clear permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Mt. Apo has been home to many Lumad communities for generations and the mountain itself is revered by the Lumad Bagobos as the dwelling place of their god, Apo Sandawa. The mountain, an expanse of lush rainforests and host to numerous flora and fauna, has been included in the ASEAN Heritage list and thus designated as a protected area. Tapping into the geothermal resource of the area has to date caused massive environmental devastation: roads cut their way through the forest, hectares of dense jungle are bulldozed, streams and pools are muddied. The dogged efforts at constructing geothermal plants in Mt. Apo are carried out with the tacit approval from the state. President Ramos has in fact intimated that geothermal plants will help boost Mindanao's industrialization. All this illustrates a stark insensitivity to the indigenous communities and to the ecological balance of the area. The cries of Lumad protest and mounting resistance from environmentalists are largely unheeded; at one instance,
PNOC officials were even able to beguile some Lumad leaders into accepting the project as ultimately beneficial.9

Cases like that of the Chico River Dam and Mt. Apo question the premium states have placed on development and the avenues of modernization. Development projects such as these are challenged in view of the toll they take in human and environmental terms. The threatened existence of peoples like the Kalingas, the Bontocs, and the Bagobos pose serious questions about the direction of state-sponsored development schemes geared towards increased industrialization. An important question that needs to be raised is: are some groups in society necessarily expendable in a drive towards modernization?

In recent history the factor of ethnicity and ethnic struggles, particularly of indigenous peoples, has become a major lever for thrusting doubts about modernity into the open. Ethnic spokesmen, leaders of retribalizing movements, non-government organizations, and activists among others increasingly challenge the unproblematic nexus between modernization and development. Given individual alienation, centralized injustice, and environmental despoilation in the name of rational planning and modern development, modernization may well be antithetical to genuine development -- for the Lumads of the world, as for other sectors on the margins of society.
Ethnic mobilizations may well force nation-states to redefine their understanding of the imperatives of national homogenization and economic growth. Cynthia Enloe offers comment in this regard:

Loss of boundaries, not just territorial but social and psychological, may be at the core of the current outbreak of communal versus nation-state tensions. The fact that the struggle to establish new boundaries for meaningful political action is going on in countries at several stages of modernization warns against relying on the inevitability of the nation-state or assuming that political development leads to modernity.10

**Alternative Paths to Development**

Beyond the rhetoric of the Constitutional precepts on protecting the rights of indigenous communities in the country, there is clearly a need to alter in a significant way the historical relations of inequality between the Christianized lowland majority and the indigenous minorities. This does not simply mean that the delivery of basic services to the hinterlands must be improved or augmented, or that the budget for the OSNC/ONCC/OMA be substantially increased, or that more minority scholarships be given to poor Lumad youth, and so on. The latter are apparently important in helping alleviate the plight of many of these long oppressed communities. But there must be something even beyond the provisions of social services. In an ideal sense, an alternative path to development must be
taken if sectors like the Lumads are to have the space and freedom for meaningful participation in decisions that affect their communities, or if they are to have the chances to effect a real measure of self-determination.

Various alternative paths to development have emanated from the Third World which have been, by various accounts, considered plausible, even viable: autonomous development, delinking, bottom-up strategies, self-reliance, and the socialist path to development in its many permutations. Most of these paths have, however, failed, and their failure, as Herb Addo argues, lies in the inability of these alternative paths to be independent of Western conceptions and models. Addo contends that these paths failed "because the Western Road to Development, the functional handmaiden of the Eurocentric philosophy of developmentalism, and its achievements to date remain the implicit assumption and objectives of these alternative paths." 11

The Post-colonial Nation-State

What is most emblematic of this "Western Road to Development" is the post-colonial nation-state. In its structures is embodied the Eurocentric philosophy of developmentalism that submits to the imperatives of homogenization of smaller populations and the industrialization of an economy tied to world markets. In an age of modernity, states and institutions have on a whole essentialized the nation-state as a given reality. Thus,
smaller nations and peoples with distinct histories and cultures are subordinated to the overarching notion of a homogenized nation coinciding with a dominant administrative framework called the state. Whether fascist, democratic, or socialist, states consider the nation-state the norm of modern political organization. In the Philippines, Marcos' ideologization of his "New Society" called for the "acceptance of the nation-state as the paramount focus of the loyalties of citizens, with all other loyalties subordinate to it." The Philippine communist struggle also envisioned the making of a "new socialist nation" where sectors such as the indigenous communities would be integrally a part. Both cases enshrined the concept of a nation-state, which various smaller groups and communities would have to embrace.

The United Nations, a supranational organization of most of the existing modern nation-states, is itself locked in these conceptions. The U.N. proclamations are, in fact, freighted with some contradictions. The U.N. Charter of 1945, for instance, declares that "all people have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and integrity of their national territory." The 1960 U.N. Resolution 1514 on the "Declaration in the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People," on the other hand, makes clear that "any attempt aimed at partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." This statement implies that all political boundaries of present states inherited from the colonial period necessarily obtain. This also virtually endorses the policies of the new post-colonial elites of these "imagined communities" -- which include the suppression of indigenous peoples' rights and the exploitation of their lands. As such, this runs counter to the U.N. Charter's own affirmations of upholding the right of a people to shape their own political, economic, and cultural destinies. Apparently, "people" in the sense used in the U.N. Charter means "nations" in the modern context, of populations living within arbitrarily delineated political boundaries of a state.

If the U.N. Charter is to be understood, Lumads and other indigenous populations are readily seen as "ethnic groups" or "cultural minorities" and not as "a people," or "a nation." Some Philippine scholars are wont to concur with these distinctions. In a discussion on Philippine ideologies, Jose Abueva, for instance, places "early Filipinos" under a rubric of "indigenous ideologies and pre-nationhood." Abueva notes how Islamization in Mindanao catalyzed Moro national consciousness and how Christianization "triggered the evolution of a Filipino national consciousness and Filipino nationhood."15 Such
thinking overlooks the fact that many "tribes" are nations -- a people who see themselves as united in common history, ancestry, territory, language and so on -- but lacking in the formal, specialized institutions of a modern state. Many scholars even conclude that the only difference between nation and tribe is a matter of scale.  

Referring to indigenous peoples as mere minorities or groups and not as "a people" denies them meaningful recognition of their rights to self-determination and control over resources within their ancestral lands. This is what modern nation-states have veritably done. As mentioned in earlier sections, the categorization of "minorities" has been a tactic to annex the identities of distinct peoples so as to better incorporate their lands and resources.

Beyond the Nation-State?

To allow indigenous peoples and their cultures to flourish in this modern day and age entails no less than moving out of the confines of the given conceptions of a nation-state and ultimately refiguring its present dynamics. If development must take new directions, it must be pursued not with the end goal of universalizing values anchored in Western assumptions of national homogeneity and cultural standardization but with the view of allowing plural societies to exist. Development must be shifted towards increased valuation of people and communities over mere
indicators of economic growth. There are, however, no models to these new alternative paths to development, no defined formulae to follow. As Herb Addo posits, each society is its own model, an experiencing model unto itself. Each society must build alternatives out of its own cultural strengths and out of the recognition of its own cultural weaknesses. Development must thus be conceived in terms of what he calls "different cultural roads to modernity." 17

This is carried out, however, with the stark, if painful, recognition that the phenomenon of global interdependence alongside capitalist development is inevitable and that any attempt to disengage fully from a world of modernity is futile. The forging of new syncretisms and inventive approaches to development, however, is not impossible. Addo cites how the economic tigers of Asia (Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Japan) modernized without unquestioningly imitating Western European culture but making "clever adoptions of aspects of it, founded, scripted, and inked in their own specific cultural sense and contexts of transitions to their varied ends of modernity." 18

For the Philippines, these arguments have numerous implications. There is indeed no singular, specific cultural sense in the case of the Philippines. If a meaningful Filipino cultural road to modernity has to be forged, it has to take into account the many sectors long disadvantaged -- the peasantry, urban poor, labor and not
least, the over one hundred ethno-linguistic groups in the country, many of them constituting the "cultural minorities." If a meaningful alternative path to development must be chosen, a rectification of the historical inequities between majority and minority populations is needed. On the macro level, this entails nothing short of restructuring society: from the redistribution of wealth via a serious land reform program benefiting a large peasant sector, to a substantive devolution of power to the local government units; from a strengthening of population programs to the implementation of a sound environmental protection and conservation policy; and significantly, a serious reevaluation of economic plans which have only benefited dominant socio-economic classes. The prevailing structures operative in the modern Philippine "nation-state" have served to disadvantage sectors like the Lumads the most. The concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a dominant class perpetuates control over and poverty among the many; the maldistribution of land pushes poor farmers to the upland regions where Lumads live; exploding population growth rates make the need for land acute, thereby driving even more settlers to the hinterlands; these immigrations to the uplands and the state's relentless drive to extract from a natural resource base destroy the environment, the life-source of Lumad culture; economic policies that favor foreign-led, export-
oriented development are carried out at the expense of weaker groups and communities.

Given the political, economic and social realities in the country, however, these goals of restructuring a whole society remain largely quixotic. To begin with, serious implementation of programs and policies not only needs political will but economic wherewithal, which is beyond the reach of an underdeveloped country like the Philippines. Considering the realities of an impoverished and dependent economy, the specter of dashed hopes and failed goals loom menacingly. In an overall scheme of "national development" the demands of a world capitalist system and the needs of a central state to rein in disintegrative factors still hold sway.

Incremental Advances

Nevertheless, small steps in policy changes matter. The considerable non-government organizing in the Philippine grassroots could be seen as a movement of civil society with multivariate possibilities for change.\(^{19}\) Coalition-building among such groupings serve to press the state to respond to demands from "subaltern" sectors like the indigenous ethnic communities. The recent steps of government to decentralize functions of executive departments or to enact autonomy laws for two regions based on ethnicity are significant developments, their limitations, inadequacies and flaws notwithstanding. The active lobbying efforts of indigenous
organizations and sympathetic non-government groups during the 1987 Constitutional Commission suggest a heightened consciousness in the body politic; their cause was in part translated into the present provisions relating to regional autonomy and the protection of the rights of indigenous communities. The growing importance given to issues pertaining to indigenous rights, ancestral lands, and sustainable development in government, academic and non-government circles point to avenues for more meaningful directions of altering what has long been unjust relations between the state and its minority constituents. In 1989, Proclamation 250 of the Aquino administration called for an observance of "National Cultural Communities Week" every first week of July. In the Philippine Congress, a sectoral representative for indigenous cultural communities has been appointed by President Ramos.20

In the international arena, the increasing prominence of such issues are also cause for some hopeful portent. The United Nations observed 1993 as the Year of Indigenous Peoples, which the Philippine government followed by declaring 1993 the "National Year for Filipino Indigenous People."21 In the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil, indigenous peoples adopted a high profile and left their mark on the drafting on the Declaration on Environment and Development, a broad statement of principles outlining the rights and responsibilities of states towards the environment, and
Agenda 21, a far-reaching blueprint for action. At the 1993 Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, over 200 representatives of indigenous peoples were in attendance. A significant accomplishment of the conference was the outlining of clearer distinctions between ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, the latter recognized as having rights to self-determination and nationhood. The conference drafted as well a Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that would chart the U.N. Human Rights Program into the next century. Since its adoption in 1989, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 is now the only international treaty that stresses the protection and advancement of the rights and welfare of indigenous peoples, a stark contrast to the ILO Convention of 1957 which emphasized assimilation of "tribal peoples" into mainstream societies.

These declarations, constitutional provisions, conferences, and initial attempts towards forms of ethnic-based regional autonomy perhaps still constitute superficial concessions or remain in the domain of rhetorical flourish and unimplemented laws. But if only for the symbolic currency of such developments, these can be deemed consequential. After all, these are now a far cry from, say, the exhibition of "tribesmen from the Philippines" at the 1905 World's Fair in St. Louis or from the classification of such peoples as "infieles" by the
Spaniards or "non-Christian wild tribes" by the Americans. The opportunities for more substantive action now exist -- for civil society as well as for the state. In the Philippine setting, the indigenous struggle has reaped some concrete rewards -- like the shelving of the World Bank-sponsored Chico River Dam project -- but the tasks ahead are still many and large. In concrete ways, the needs of the state and the aspirations of indigenous ethnic communities can perhaps, under prevailing conditions and structural realities, be made to accommodate each other.

A Search for New Political Forms

In the context of a modern nation-state, forms of retribalizations must be given significant attention and not be dismissed as simply atavistic impediments to "national development." Development policy and planning must in the least figure in a cultural factor beyond given economistic cost-benefit analyses. These must be designed with a sensitivity to norms and values which inhere in traditional cultures. Throughout most of this century, there has been no doubt a lack of historical and anthropological understanding of the complex relations between indigenous land rights and other aspects of indigenous culture -- native ecological adaptations, family and social organizations, health, psychological well-being and religious beliefs. This lack of understanding clearly
needs rectification. Public policy must have a deeper, more sensitive comprehension of the sociological, cultural and psychological implications of governmental actions. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the nation-state shall be continually challenged because, contrary to Deutsch's view that fuller development eradicates ethnic movements, ethnic revivals will persist. This is so simply because modernity -- insofar as it pushes for the industrialization of the economy, secularization, and the creation of formal, rational social organization to replace traditional ones -- will not be able to address adequately basic communal needs.

For the Lumads and all other indigenous cultural minorities in the Philippines, the mobilization of ethnic groups may reflect the traumas of casting off (aspects of) tradition, but it may also portend, as Enloe projects, "innovative political forms for the future, beyond modernity."\textsuperscript{23} As Dov Ronen states, ethnicity must be incorporated in the creation of viable political units.\textsuperscript{24} After all, ethnic mobilizations have proven to be a way of bargaining with the state. In creating new political forms for the future, integrationist state policies should be debunked and indigenous wisdom and cultural values taken into account in the formulation of policies that affect indigenous communities. This requires nothing less than for the Philippine state to adhere faithfully to the constitutional mandates to protect indigenous communities
and uphold their communal rights to ancestral lands. It also means nothing less than the fundamental rethinking and rectification of the contradictions that reside in the constitution itself, such as the provisions that still declare state possession of all lands of the public domain -- including all ancestral lands, whether recognized by the prevailing legal system or not.

But what does protection of ethnic cultures entail? A creation of sanctuaries or reservations -- in the primitivist-environmentalist sense -- that would seek to isolate indigenous groups from the encroachments of modernity? Or a practice whereby such groups may still be introduced to "development" and "modernity" albeit in measured and non-disruptive ways? But how can culture change be "measured," made "non-disruptive," or "engineered"? Since culture is a functionally integrated system, a change in one aspect is bound to produce changes in other aspects of the culture. How much of "development" is good? To what extent can "measured development" be had to still retain elements of indigenous life? To what point is integration manageable? Questions of this sort may be raised *ad nauseam*. These are complex problems with several ramifying elements, as culture change assumes diverse and even contradictory currents. Each setting and group will certainly need different answers and each community will have to decide ultimately the answers for themselves.
The basic issue that needs urgent addressing, however -- especially so in a country like the Philippines -- is that of having a measure of tribal autonomy over territory and resources. Ownership of land and decentralized government control are key to constructing new approaches to development vis-à-vis indigenous communities. Moreover, to bring sectors like the Lumads into the rethinking and reshaping of policies on important fields as education and environment augur well for the construction of new ideologies on development. The rethinking of development must thus be carried out primarily in three broad areas: legal systems, education, and environment, under which related issues and concerns are subsumed. What follows are general prescriptions that would need further study and concretization (as this could be the focus of a separate work altogether). What is pertinent here is outlining a set of recommendations that could be building blocks for the forging of more meaningful policy-making that pertains to indigenous peoples in the country.

**Legal Systems**

From ancestral land rights to struggles for self-determination, the issues and problems that now concern both states and indigenous communities emanate from the fact that there is a yawning, seemingly irreconcilable, gap between modern laws and systems of customary law among these
communities. Since these communities are non-literate, customary law is not written. It follows, too, that they have no constitutional or statutory law. Since there are no courts or judges, there are no laws based on judicial decisions. The sources of indigenous law are in custom and taboo. The customs embodied in these systems vary from one tribe to the other, but they all comprise a corpus of precepts and rules of the group. For generations these have guided their ways of settling disputes and conflict and regulated behavior within their communities, thereby sustaining traditional culture itself.

The colonial administrations of both Spain and the United States instituted legal grids over a vast diversity of traditions, customs and taboos. The superimposition of a modern legal system over customary law has only produced confusion and various injustices. One example is that of the matter of marriage under the Civil Code approved in 1949. The Civil Code provides that customary law on marriage is not valid; in other words, marriage contracted under customary law does not have legal status under the legal system of the Philippine state. Since customary law allows divorce and the Civil Code does not, legal problems are created as in cases of bigamy.

Customary law varies from one tribal society to the next but fundamental themes are common in these kinship-based societies. A codification of some kind of all
customary laws of the different indigenous groups must thus be undertaken by members of indigenous communities with the assistance of law experts, government personnel, academics, and non-government groups. This codified body of customary law should serve as guide in the formulation of sound ethnic minority policy, a virtual tool for sensitizing state policy and making it more atuned to the particular needs and conditions of indigenous communities.

The Question on Ancestral Lands

The biggest area of contention between two different legal systems involves the matter of ancestral lands. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the problems generated over ancestral land are caused by conflicting legal systems on ownership: modern law treats land as a commodity that could be individually owned, while customary law does not recognize private ownership of land. Customary law places value on land usage and the concept of communal ownership. Land ownership under modern law is based on the Regalian Doctrine since the Spanish colonial period and reinforced by the Torrens system of land registrations and issuing titles under the American colonial administration. Even in recent administrative measures designed to identify ancestral lands, the superimposition of modern precepts over customary ones surfaces blatantly. Administrative Order 8 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, for example, stipulates a number of pointers to help classify
land as ancestral. Lumads are supposed to produce legal paperwork such as tax declarations and sworn statements by elders indicating the veracity of ancestral ties on the part of claimants to a particular piece of land. These requirements still reflect the application of modern standards and concepts and the invalidation of customary law. These presuppose that Lumads have a full understanding of the existing legal framework pertaining to land ownership.

The absence to date of a well-developed legal framework to settle ancestral land disputes has caused many rural development projects to be stymied and has perpetuated the marginalization of Lumad groups. It will have to take a legislative act under the present governmental set-up to institute a system of identifying ancestral lands and adjudicating land claims. Various bills have been filed in both houses of Congress with regards to this -- 37 were passed since 1987 -- but none has been enacted into law.27 In early 1992 a bill that would have created a Commission on Ancestral Domain (House Bill 33881) was opposed by legislators who are big landowners. On the day the bill was scheduled to be deliberated on, groups from the Cordillera region filled the galleries of the House of Representatives Session Hall to press for its passage. Garbed in their traditional wear, their large appearance before the legislative body signified yet another attempt of indigenous
peoples to forward a struggle long frustrated by the interests of the state and big business. A legislator from the Cordilleras spoke on the crowd's behalf. Another legislator from southern Mindanao, a big landowner of areas considered part of Lumad ancestral domain, spoke next. He questioned the bill's provisions and argued passionately against its passage on grounds that the proposed commission would arbitrarily define ancestral domain. This, he stressed, would be prejudicial to Christian landowners. An altercation ensued. The bill was recommitted to the House Committee on Rules, a euphemism for killing the bill altogether. The people in the galleries walked out in dismay.28

Even within the branches of government, there appears to be a lack of coordination on the issue of ancestral lands itself. In different instances the Department of Environment and Natural Resources has issued administrative orders calling for the recognition of ancestral land claims and even the delineation of ancestral land boundaries in some provinces. The legislature, however, maintains that it alone can identify and institutionalize the delineation and granting of ancestral domains. Decisions rendered by the Supreme Court regarding the right of indigenous communities to the lands they and their forebears have inhabited for generations have been hardly followed by the executive branch.
One may argue for the need for closer coordination among the branches of government in addressing the ancestral lands issues. But as discussed in Chapter 6, no amount of legislation and judicial action will help if the prevailing system of land ownership is upheld and employed in attempting to resolve this problem. The only way for indigenous communities to have full protection of their rights to their ancestral lands is for such lands to be exempt from the prevailing legal system. For ancestral lands to remain essentially in the communal ownership of indigenous peoples, these must be excluded from the power of the state and must not be subject to conventional legal procedures relative to land ownership. The recognition of ancestral land rights means that Lumads are treated as having original vested right to the land, and not as any other individual settler entitled to a parcel of land. This is, after all, what Article II, Section 5 of the constitutional provision would call for: "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." Customary law is essentially different from the existing national law, and if the former is to be recognized fully, indigenous property concepts should be honored and upheld.

Arguably, it is the definition of ancestral lands that would lay the fundamental groundwork towards resolving many
of the other conflicts that attend the plight of indigenous peoples and cultures. Some scholars even argue beyond the exclusion of identified ancestral lands from the national legal system. Philippine national law, a legacy of the colonial experience under Spain and America, remains heavily Western-based; a truly meaningful resolution to the festering disputes and conflicts over land ownership and the sort, these scholars contend, entails a virtual "indigenization" of Philippine law.29 This means that customary laws of indigenous populations that predate colonial contact must to a considerable extent form the basis for an emergent national law. In other words, the whole fabric of the present national legal system must be reevaluated and revamped in some way. But the conflict between what is indigenous and foreign in the present context is intractable, a minefield of polemical struggle. Even so, the matter of indigenization should not be readily dismissed as not feasible; rather, it ought to be seen as constitutive of a long process of redirecting policy -- and rethinking modernity.

Autonomy and Measures of Self-Determination

Granting ancestral land to indigenous peoples would be substantiated by allowing them a measure of autonomy. To regain control over ancestral domain is an essential component of a process of self-determination. This means that the rate of modernization is slowed down and that
people like the Lumads are allowed the space and time for adaptation to culture change at their own pace and manner. This way the "contact zones" are made less disorienting and more hospitable to interactions. This means Lumad communities, weak as they are, receive forms of protection and guarantees of security within their identified ancestral lands.

Autonomy should be operationalized through a process of devolution. This was what was embodied in the organic acts for regional autonomy for both Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera region. Devolution involves a transfer of decision making power from a center of government, not only a mere transfer of executive duties from the national to the local levels of government. As mentioned in Chapter 6, autonomy for the Lumads will have to take different forms from that conceived for the two other regions. The social organizations of Lumads are, after all, less distinct than those of the Muslims and the Cordillera peoples. In matters that directly affect their communities -- like the management of local ecosystems or the fostering of formal education -- Lumads should have a clear say beyond what the central government remedially calls "consultations." As Bruce Jennings forwards, "individuals to whom policy is directed must be actively brought into the deliberative process in which goals and values of the policy are formulated." 30
Local Government Code

One of the opportunities the Lumads can harness for measures of self-determination lies in the significant enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code. The Code, despite major flaws and loopholes which many public administrators or political scientists can readily pinpoint, is still an important step towards decentralization -- and perhaps eventually, fuller devolution of state power. The Local Government Code provides for the inclusion of some non-government organizations in local development councils, including those concerned with indigenous rights. In Bukidnon, for instance, a Lumad NGO now sits in the Provincial Development Council. Whether or not such groups would actually become effective partners in policy-making and not serve merely as symbolic entities in putatively democratized structures of local governance, is perhaps too early to determine. The dangers of cooptation into heavy-handed development thrusts will continue to exist for these marginal sectors now brought into the ambit of decision-making. Nonetheless, the possibilities for impact, however modest, on the structures of government and the direction of policy exist for heretofore excluded and exploited sectors like the Lumads, primarily because of widened spaces for participative decision-making. From here, the viable ethnic-based political units Ronen speaks about can perhaps evolve more fully.
Education

In invalidating customary law dominant politico-legal systems also fail to recognize and appreciate the rich differences in world view and values that reside in indigenous cultures. If ethnic minority policy is to be sound and enlightened, a deeper understanding of native lifeways is necessary. The relegation of such cultures to the margins of society stems from ignorance of indigenous cultures and a bias against forms of "primitivity." There must, for instance, be more than the superficial valorizing of native cultures in a supposedly nationalist discourse, hailing the ancestral pre-colonial past as the source of the nation's "Filipino-ness." So must there be knowledge of these people and their universe of thought beyond the fascination with exoticized tribal festivals and museum pieces.

To instill this awareness among the dominant majority will require nothing short of an overhauling of a still heavily colonial educational system. Curricula from the primary levels of education must be revised to incorporate subjects on indigenous cultures and histories. A rethinking of educational approaches is decidedly necessary. This involves nothing less than the effective implementation of the Constitutional provision which stresses that "the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop
their cultures, traditions, and institutions . . . and shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. 31

Formal education or the school structure can be a major acculturating mechanism. The introduction of schools into remote areas has brought social and cultural change. This has posed numerous dilemmas in the field of education, especially in terms of indigenous peoples preserving aspects of their own oral, non-literate cultures. Education in the hinterlands has in many ways brought tribal communities closer to the modern world and further disrupted traditional social organizations. Many young Lumads are inclined to speak Visayan more than Binukid and readily embrace modern practices at the expense of the old ways. But given the state of detribalization and the social and cultural limbo many of the Lumads now inhabit, it would likely be more harmful to leave them unschooled and illiterate.

Many educated Lumads who assume leadership in Lumad organizations underscore the right to education, the need for fellow Lumads to be more self-reliant and less dependent on government or figures like the local politician or patron. 32 Some of these leaders, however, think nothing of the acculturating influences of the existing educational system. Their children and the succeeding generations, they claim, would still retain a sense of being Manobo or Bukidnon. 33 What seems clear in such cases is a desire
among some Lumads to be "model minorities" integrated into a dominant culture. Education, it is unproblematically assumed, will lead to a better life for their children. There is scant talk on how this education should ideally be suited to their particular needs as minorities or the conditions in which they find themselves.

There is, however, an emergent drive to make education more responsive to the needs of sectors like the indigenous communities. Some educated Lumads have gone back on their own to the hinterlands to bring functional literacy to these communities. Simple textbooks in illustrative form and in the Lumad vernacular have been printed.³⁴ Such educational devices show promise in light of the decentralization of functions of government departments to the local level under the Local Government Code. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) must, by its own name, work towards enriching school curricula within localities. Bukidnon's history and that of the original inhabitants of the province, for instance, must be a significant component in curricula in all levels of formal education within the province. This way the dominant culture of Christianized Filipinos will not readily undervalue indigenous cultures or be condescending of their "primitive-ness." In the remote Lumad villages literacy programs for both children and adults should be pursued. Such programs, however, must be designed first and foremost
to teach Lumads to write in their own language, Binukid. The sustaining of a native language is, after all, key to preserving a culture. Literacy in the hinterlands must essentially adhere to indigenous idioms that reinforce appreciation of their cultures instead of shunning them in favor of the lowlander, Christianized ideology.

A national symposium on "education toward self-determination" in 1989 provided some concrete answers to how education for the indigenous minorities should be carried out. This symposium was held among educators, anthropologists, indigenous community leaders, non-government organizations, and church groups. Specific recommendations were drawn along the following lines: with regard to the kind of education to be developed for indigenous minorities; on educators (should speak language, must undergo skills training); on the kind of textbooks to be developed (illustrative, written by minorities, culturally relevant); on values education for indigenous minorities (pride in own traditions, environmental preservation, use of own languages/dialects); on mechanisms to be instituted to make minority educational system accepted and recognized by the mainstream (establishment of an Institute of Ethnic Minorities made operational in all state colleges/universities, a Bureau of Ethnic Education created within the DECS, recognition by the DECS of non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs in the
Sinahon also notes how the old practices of swidden farming among Higa-onons would follow cycles of seven seasons, allowing adequate time for the patches previously cleared and burned to regrow, before burning them again for new planting. As Datu Mandimate reflects, "We who have lived in the forests are the best rangers, we treat each tree as sacred since some of the migbaya (migbaya ukayo, rulers of the trees) make the trees their dwelling places."  

The articulated goal of protecting indigenous peoples is significant not only because it calls for a preservation of native cultures, but also because it recognizes these cultures' potential contributions to the forging of an overall Filipino philosophy on environmentalism. This contribution would flow from these peoples' own traditional understanding of sustainable development. In other words, what this means is a recognition that mainstream culture has indeed much to learn from traditional cultures; that these are not simply communities and groups that must be fully integrated into a larger society or that can be so outrightly dismissed as atavistic hurdles to the march of modernization. This humbling perspective -- for those in the dominant, so-called scientific-rational world -- affords an awareness of the vanishing of native cultures the world over. This in turn gives cause for lamenting the loss of an immeasurable treasure trove of knowledge about the natural
environment, particularly traditional methods of curing and healing.

Ideology of Participation

Out of a present morass a new ideology of development must be constructed. This should be an ideology that stresses empowerment and participation. Owen Lynch suggests that upland development schemes should include "small-scale, inexpensive, participatory and culturally appropriate strategies geared towards first enhancing the quality of life on a local level."42 As Celso Roque propounds:

The local communities must be given an active and decisive part in the formulation of natural resource policies that affect their domains. They must be given the freedom of autonomous action about the resource base on which their ultimate destiny depends. In areas still unindustrialized, natural resources play the central and pivotal role in the life of a society. They must be liberated from the control of unsympathetic and autocratic planning authorities before they flounder and disintegrate. It is for this reason that ecological self-determination must be one of the most important tenets of Filipino environmentalism.43

For too long state penetration into tribal lands and state domination over indigenous cultures held sway. The flow of development was top-down and environmental impact assessments were made by outside consultants. Indigenous peoples and their traditional knowledge and practices about resource management and conservation measures were undervalued and largely overlooked. But for this new
ideological approach to development to succeed, modern resource management and conservation practices must, as Luciano Minerbi emphasizes, be based on traditional practices. Traditional knowledge, he posits, is "built on observations made over generations, is site-specific, small-scaled, and is more attuned to particular ecosystems, plants and animals, than modern surveys."\textsuperscript{44}

Consultation and participation, if not autonomous decision-making process with regards to resource management and preservation, are highly essential in this development process. Moreover, conflict of interests is reduced or avoided. No matter how well-intentioned a project may be on the part of the state or outside planners, the absence of participation or consultation of people directly affected creates discordant situations. The Bukidnon Forests Incorporated (BFI) mentioned earlier is again another case in point. While laudable in an ecological sense of reforesting denuded mountains, the project is rendered oppressive when seen as bestowing more value on industrial trees than indigenous communities and their native homelands. The initial planning stages of this Philippine-New Zealand industrial tree plantation project did not actively involve Lumad communities within the expansive project site. Lumads like Datu Ligden Luminton and former Assemblyman Lorenzo Dinlayan continue to express vocal opposition to the project.\textsuperscript{45} Many Lumads claim that the BFI
is outrightly dispossessing them of their own land, something akin to the New Zealanders' own conflicts with their indigenous Maori population. Many Lumads perceive the BFI to be exploitative, a situation that perhaps could have been avoided had the BFI understood concepts pertaining to indigenous land use and property, while managing to make the Lumad communities understand the possible environmental and economic benefits of massive reforestation. Moreover, the festering conflict could have been mitigated had the BFI worked to involve the Lumads in the project in ways that did not prejudice their own culture and interests. As Enrique Dagawasan would stress, "we are not entirely against the BFI, but they must respect our ways, too." The End of Living, the Beginning of Survival?

The integration of environmental planning with socioeconomic development planning (especially in the sphere of rational land use) calls for the clear recognition of the value of indigenous knowledge and practices concerning the natural environment. This becomes urgent in a country like the Philippines with diverse indigenous groups, many of which have long coexisted harmoniously with nature and the seasons, and which may have long understood what the modern world now knows as "sustainable development." Beyond a mere romanticizing, these peoples ought to be recognized as struggling communities who have a fundamental human right to traditional home territories. These groups of people may
still, with their ancient ways and cultures, impart some lessons for societal survival: the Ifugaos and Bontocs of the Cordilleras who carved the Banaue rice terraces with superb irrigational systems; the swidden cultures of the Mindoro and Palawan; the Maranaos who have lived around Lake Lanao; the Lumads who have inhabited the rich forests of northern Mindanao. The modern Philippine state has pushed them to the margins of their own domains, their environments ravaged and, as may be clear in their consciousness, desecrated. Today, the dominant society must learn that it needs to return to these "early Filipinos" for some of the answers to help secure the viability of the country's land and resources. It must return somehow to various forms of indigenous systems of environmental adaptation -- just as it must appreciate and rediscover repositories of old customs, traditions, and lifeways that the present world merely echoes -- and still save itself from that point that would, as one native American chief said at a time when the American frontier was undergoing exploitation, "mark the end of living and the beginning of survival."49
ENDNOTES


3. The Philippines' real Gross Domestic Product growth rate was .4 percent (1993 figures), way below its Southeast Asian neighbors. The country is saddled with a 30 billion-dollar debt, suffers from high rates of unemployment and underemployment, has an annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent, and two-thirds of its population live below the poverty line. An IBON Databank 1992 report showed that only 30 percent of Filipinos live below the poverty line, while another 30 percent live just below it and the remaining 40 percent wallow in absolute poverty.


6. Ibid.


8. President Ramos visited Bukidnon in September 10, 1993 and spoke before a gathering of local officials and non-government organizations. I attended the assembly held at the Bukidnon State College.


17. Addo, op. cit.

18. Ibid., p. 16.

19. There are an estimated 18,000 NGOs in the Philippines today, of which about 2,000 are engaged in development work. See "Agents of Change," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, p. 20.

20. Datu Joseph Sibug, a Manobo from Mindanao, was appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos as Sectoral Representative of the National Cultural Communities in 1993. Datu Sibug was President of the Tribal Association of the Philippines (TRICAP) prior to his appointment. He passed away last February 1994.


23. Enloe, op. cit.


27. Philippine House of Representatives, Committee on National Cultural Minorities, 1993.


32. Dr. Menilo Pechora, Speech, Higa-onon Tribal Council Upper Pulangi Induction Program, Culaman, Bukidnon, November 6, 1992. Former Assemblyman Lorenzo Dinlayan, Interview, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, November 11, 1992. Both Pechora and Dinlayan are Lumad Bukidnos. Dr. Pechora is Vice-President of the Bukidnon State College. Dinlayan has had a long political career spanning four decades. In the 1992 local elections he ran for Governor but lost to Carlitos Fortich.

34. Leo Dahinog, a Lumad and former staff member of the provincial Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), initiated a literacy program in Culaman in the late 1980s. He was instrumental in designing education programs for both Lumad adults and children in the hinterlands. He died in 1991, but his work has been carried on by other like-minded educated Lumads. In the Culaman tribal council induction rites, he was honored posthumously for his work.


37. Ibid.


41. Datu Binayao, Interview.


43. Quoted in Adolfo Revilla Jr., *op. cit.*

44. Luciano Minerbi, "Integrating Environmental Planning and Management with Socio-Economic Development Planning: A Framework," Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai'i, (Fall 1989), p. 16.

45. Dinlayan has been quoted as once challenging the BFI: "Unless the BFI stops its exploitative and oppressive activities against the natives immediately, the long suffering natives would resort to People Power of violent proportions." See "BIPP Charged with Oppression; Warned of 'Violent People Power,'" in *Nowday*, Cagayan de Oro City, January 29, 1990, p. 1. Dinlayan was reacting to reports of BFI (formerly known as Bukidnon Industrial Plantation
Project, BIPP) evicting Lumads from their homes along the seven-kilometer road along the BFI site near Malaybalay, Bukidnon. Despite BFI projections of 16,500 jobs generated for the local economy, Luminton and Dinlayan are skeptical. Dinlayan was also quoted as saying that the BFI was merely interested in mining abundant deposits of chromite and (possibly) gold within the project areas -- at the expense of the Lumad communities. See "Tribal Groups Set Protests Vs. Reforestation Program," Malaya, September 26, 1989.


48. Some recent studies point out that this stance may be short-sighted and given to blind romanticization of native cultures. The argument is that not all indigenous cultures necessarily have a "conservation ethic," that some foraging native groups are even wanton and destructive of forest areas. Even so, this should not be taken as a convenient justification for continuing state policy that rides roughshod over indigenous rights to land. As one argument further, "indigenous peoples have a basic right to land regardless of how they manage this land or what their future patterns of use may entail." See Allyn MacLean Stearman, "Revisiting the Myth of the Ecologically Noble Savage in Amazonia: Implications for Indigenous Land Rights," Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Central Florida, 1994. Stearman also makes the point that whether or not a conservation ethic is operative among native peoples, "indigenous territories still offer the best hope for conservation." This is so because, as argued in sections of this text, the concept of communal ownership of land gives indigenous patterns of land use better promise for conservation than Western systems of individual property rights.

49. Chief Seattle, 1854. His words were thus: "Every part of this earth is sacred. We are part of the earth and it is part of us. We know the white people do not understand our ways. One portion of land is the same to them as the next, for they are strangers who come in the night and take from the land whatever they need. This we know. The earth does not belong to humans. Humans belong to the earth. All things are connected like the blood which unites one family. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the children of the earth. Humans do not weave the web of life, they are merely a strand in it. Whatever they do to the web
they do to themselves ... When the thicket and the eagle, the swift pony and the hunt are gone from the land, it will mark the end of living and the beginning of survival."
EPILOGUE

Modern ethnographic histories, as cultural studies and history professor James Clifford writes, are likely to be "condemned to oscillate between two metanarratives: one of homogenization, the other of emergence; one of loss, the other of invention."¹ This work sought to reflect this movement between narratives of culture being eroded and then somehow reconstructed. The chapter on the Umayamnons, the discussion on Mindanao, PANAMIN and state integrationist policies all suggested a disintegration of indigenous social organizations. In this regard this work roughly assumed a Lumad world "in need of preservation, redemption and representation,"² following a predilection among many anthropologists who see the non-Western world as "vanishing and modernizing,"³ or what Walter Benjamin refers to as "the tribal world conceived as a ruin."⁴ Anthropologist Robert Murphy has even said, perhaps wryly, that "in the name of science, we anthropologists compose requiems."⁵

It was, however, not a requiem for the Lumads that this work wanted to compose -- neither was it a simplistic straining for "Paradise Lost." If anything, its aim was to cast the "tribal" in a different light, to see more of our Selves in the Other, and herald the various indications of cultural survival inherent in these peoples' adaptations to modern society. Beyond indications of loss and cultural collapse are rich stories that speak of emergence, of
ethnicities and identities that are reformulated in order to cope with rapidly changing social conditions. With the Lumads as focus, this work has sought to affirm the contemporary significance of culture. As the end of the century nears, culture is increasingly becoming an object of emotional attention, debate, manipulation, and political struggle. Indeed, the concepts of "culture," "ethnicity," "tradition," "identity" and "nationalism" are gaining more recognition in many parts of the world as idioms for self-definition, political negotiation, and international trade and diplomacy.\(^6\) This work has grappled with some of these concepts as they particularly relate to the Lumads of northern Mindanao. Thus, accounts of Lumads like Datu Luminton, Bae Dayang, and of millenarian movements in Bukidnon assuming Christian forms but essentially informed by indigenous idioms and self-understandings, have been discussed.

With this recognition of the dynamic quality of culture in the present, it was pointed out that the conventional notions of modernity, development, nation-state, and ethnicity are in need of serious re-evaluation. The resurgence of ethnic mobilizations has highlighted the phenomena of indigenous cultures as integrally a part of modernizing societies, and not as fading realities. In the face of various retribalizations, what is said of the modern nation-state as "the undisputed foundation of world order,
main object of individual loyalties, chief definer of man's identity," does not necessarily obtain. As this work has shown, self-identifications and loyalties are founded on more basic ties of kinship, common ancestry, tradition, history, and so forth that predate more modern constructions of state and nationalism. In the modern setting, wherein these age-old familiarities of tradition are threatened, or in many cases even eradicated, forms of revival and invention still occur.

In taking a clear cognizance of these realities, a process towards the reshaping of state policies that impact on indigenous cultures may be occasioned. It can also be significant in changing the conceptions a dominant majority holds of the "primitivity" of other cultures and human beings consigned by structural factors to live in the fringes of society. Most importantly, it may pave ways for the gradual refiguring of some of these structures. This may allow, for instance, for the possibilities for these peoples to live in more democratized, plural societies where they are able to determine better their collective destinies -- beyond the confines of modern creations like the post-colonial nation-state.

This latter point becomes pointedly relevant for the Philippines as the country prepares to mark the centennial of its revolution in 1896 against Spanish colonial rule -- an event that ushered in the putative beginnings of its
"nationhood." Filipinos now must begin asking what, after all, constitutes the Philippine nation, or what Philippine nationalism means. It was Jose Rizal, the Philippines' avowed national hero, who first propounded the idea that people of the archipelago think of themselves as one people, transcending boundaries of clans and regions to embrace the "nation." Rizal's idealization of nationhood was based, however, on the idioms of colonialism and the ilustrado (local elite) culture in that it assumed that this was to be comprised of the Hispanized, Christianized majority. It is doubtful whether Rizal had any of the infieles (heathen) groups in mind when he spoke of the "Filipino nation."

Rizal belonged to the elite class during the Spanish colonial period; since that time it has been this elite which has put its imprint on everything -- from culture to the imperatives of national development. As social historian Reynaldo Ileto avers, the masses are hardly encouraged to be a part of what is often bruited as a need to define the Filipino personality, social system -- or, for that matter, the "nation." Their presence is limited to "idealized portraits of rural life or as quaint non-Christian tribes." The non-Christian Ifugao or Lumad or Maranao, for instance, is glorified and showcased through the dances of the country's foremost dance company, the Bayanihan, which presents itself in world tours as depicting "Filipino culture."
What works like this seek to impress is the real need to bring the Lumad, the Ifugao, the Maranao and all other indigenous peoples in the Philippines out of the image of primitivity on one hand and the idealized depictions of quaintness on the other. The understanding of these peoples must ultimately go beyond the museum, theater or dancing ground. If they are to be a part of larger Filipino community, the terms of inclusion ought not to be imposed on them. Rather, their own cultures should help shape and define conceptions of a Filipino nation, as well as leave them with the choice of negotiating the extent of their inclusion into this larger societal configuration.

Today "nation-building" remains an unproblematic buzzword in government circles and is bruited as integral to the functioning of a new democratic system. But just as the meaning of "nation" ought to be rethought, so must the meaning of democracy as it applies to the conditions of the country. If the restoration of a democratic infrastructure under the Aquino regime (now carried over into the Ramos administration) is something that must indeed be hailed, this must be substantiated by arrangements that are not heavily elite-based or largely predicated on individual civil liberties. A fuller democratization in the Philippines necessitates a wider understanding of rights -- not only in the context of individual freedoms (which flow from the Enlightenment and is a colonial copy of the
American system), but more so in terms of group rights. These collective rights -- such as to land and self-determination -- essentially apply to the basic communitarian make-up of indigenous communities and are recognized in international charters like the United Nations Declaration of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. These rights, 1992 Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchu says, must go beyond symbolic recognition and superficial concessions and must be effective at all levels -- local, regional, national.9 Making these rights effective may entail outside help and intervention, but ultimately they call for measures of autonomous development. These communities should in time be largely left alone so that their own adaptations to an ongoing culture change are enhanced and can proceed at paces they can be comfortable with. Peoples like the Lumads need to carry on with their emergent retobalizations without the constant dislocations caused by external forces. As Congressman William Claver of Kalinga-Apayao clearly reflects,

The basic principle of ancestral domain is opposed to assimilation. Yet its objective is not for us, tribespeople, to develop separately, but to fuse indigenization to more progressive concepts compatible to it. What the tribals are seeking today is a way to come to terms not only with the lifestyles of the modernized Christian majority, but to seek their own within the context of a greatly changed world.10
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 200.


6. Culled from the informational pamphlets of the Program for Cultural Studies (formerly Institute of Culture and Communication), East West Center, Honolulu, Hawai'i, 1992.


LIST OF INFORMANTS

Northern Mindanao (Bukidnon/Cagayan de Oro City)

Datu Mandimate, Conrado Binayao
Datu Lorenzo Gawilan
Datu Ligden Luminton
Bae Dayang, Macaria Bagas
Datu Bagani, Romeo Sinahon II
Datu Sabuluan, Teodoro Itong
Datu Siliban, Conrado Maniano
Datu Melecio Man-ubil
Datu Makapukaw, Adolino Saway
Datu Ladlaran
Datu Lauriano Sulatan
Datu Fidel Tumbalang
Datu Andamon
Datu Andabao
Datu Moises Umala

Datu Marciano Cerna, Jr., Undersecretary, OSCC
Datu Elpidio Amarles, Regional Officer, OSCC, Region X
Datu Enrique Dagawasan, Provincial Officer In-Charge, OSCC-Bukidnon

Colonel Juan Artajo, Former PANAMIN Military Officer, Cagayan de Oro City
Major Oliver Madroñal, Former PANAMIN Military Officer, Cagayan de Oro City
Pepita Ongkiatco, Former Regional Director of PANAMIN, Region X, Cagayan de Oro City
Judge Benjamin Estrada, Former Assistant Director, PANAMIN, Region X, Cagayan de Oro City
Murillo Agsulay, Former Civilian Home Defense Forces Member, PANAMIN
Alejandro Culiantes, Jr., Former PANAMIN Intelligence Staff
Corazon Itchon, Former Administrative Officer, PANAMIN, Province of Bukidnon

Tommie Labaon, Provincial Board Member, Bukidnon, Chairman, Committee on Indigenous Communities
Vic Saway, Talaandig Lumad, Coordinator, Farmers' NGO-Cooperative, Pangantucan, Bukidnon
Fundador Binohon, Jr., Higa-onon Tribal Executive Director, Upper Pulangi Region, Bukidnon
Irene Saway, Mindanao Peace Center, Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City
Genevosa Naval, Staff Nurse, OSCC-Bukidnon
Governor Carlitos Fortich, Province of Bukidnon
Lorenzo Dinlayan, Former Assemblyman and Vice-Governor, Bukidnon
Rudy Ching, Office of the Governor, Bukidnon
Florentina Villanueva, Judge, Municipal Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
Flores Alunan, Former Mayor, Talakag, Bukidnon
Victor Dumotan, Municipal Councilor, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon/Candidate for Mayor, 1992
Jocelyn Janioso, Candidate for Vice-Mayor, Baungon, Bukidnon 1992
Odissima Suclatan, Staff, Provincial Planning and Development Office, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
Ella Barrios, Officer-in Charge, Department of Tourism, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
Professor Erlinda Burton, Anthropology Department, Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City.
Renato Reyes, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), DENR, Province of Bukidnon
Ernesto Tobaco, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), DENR, Malaybalay, Bukidnon
Allan Gonzalez, Project Manager, BFI, Malaybalay, Bukidnon

Metro Manila

Atty. Jefferson Plantilla, Structural Alternatives for Legal Assistance in the Grassroots (SALAG), Makati
Donna Gasgonia, NGO Desk, DENR, Quezon City
Joey Austria, Head, Indigenous Cultural Communities Affairs, DENR, Quezon City

Nea Salcedo, Former PANAMIN Researcher, Quezon City
Adora Pueblos, Committee on National Cultural Minorities, House of Representatives, Quezon City

Grace Saguinsin, TABAK, Quezon City
Ben Clamor, ECTF, Manila
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Edgerton, Ronald. 1977. "Bukidnon and the Bukidnons Under Martial Law." History Department, University of Northern Colorado. (Typewritten.)


International Labor Organization Convention 169.


Ravanera, Roel. 1990. *Impact of an Agri-based Transnational Enterprise on Peasants and Peasant Community: The Case*
of Del Monte in Bukidnon. Los Baños, Philippines:
Institute of Agrarian Studies, University of the
Philippines.

and Development Issues. Edited by John Bodley. Mountain
View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company.

Republic Act 6657. 1989. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Revilla, Adolfo, Jr. 1988. "An Attempt to Crystallize and
Operationalize the Philippine Philosophy of

International Social Science Council.

Rocamora, Joel. 1979. "The Political Abuses of PANMIN."
Southeast Asia Chronicle, 67, 11-21.

Rocamora, Joel. 1982. "Agribusiness, Dams, and Counter-
Insurgency." Southeast Asia Chronicle, 67, 2-10.

Lumad Struggle." Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled

Rodil, Rudy. 1990. "Solving the Mindanao Problem Through the
Constitutional Approach." Paper presented at the
National Conference on the State of the Law on Cultural
Communities. University of the Philippines Law Center,
November 29.

in Mindanao." PSSC Social Science Information. Quezon
City: Philippine Social Science Council, (July-
September).

Rodil, Rudy. 1990. "Whose Ancestral Land is Mindanao-Sulu
and Palawan?" Mindanao Focus Journal, 18. Davao City:
Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao.

Ronen, Dov. 1986. "Ethnicity, Politics, and Development: An
Introduction." Ethnicity, Politics, and Development.
Edited by Dennis Thompson and Dov Ronen. Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Organizations." Paper presented at the Fourth
International Philippine Studies Conference. Canberra,
Australia, July 1-3.


United Nations Declaration of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. (Also assorted United Nations Resolutions, Conventions, and Declarations.)


