warrior woman. The most important aspect about the exchange among a group of Pacific Islanders in Aotearoa was the issue of indigenous representation and accountability. Like all good works of art, this film created dialogue within its own community and its point of reference, like that in the film, was indigenous.

Generally, I found any essentializing and claims to authenticity came from outside receptions of the film. And who can control that? Hereniko makes it clear from the very first headline that this is “A film for Rotuma.” As such, it serves a variety of purposes. It is pragmatic in terms of its stated ethnological purposes in creatively archiving cultural practices of the day for posterity. It is political in terms of indigenous selves representing and seeing themselves on screen as active subjects rather than as native objects, an outcome preceded by the observation of Rotuman protocol both inside and outside of the filmmaking process. Finally, it is creative; we see Rotuman myths, legends, and local stories enacted and their universal threads unraveled.

Whatever medium Hereniko uses, his tireless love for storytelling permeates his work and saves it from being reduced in filmic circles to the purely ethnographic. The opening sequence of the film reveals one of humanity’s oldest and universal scenes: stories being told over the fire, stories handed down from one generation to the next. This film, while situated in a specific cultural and geographical context (as noted by the headline locating Rotuma “300 miles north of Fiji”), works so well as a story because it crosses cultural divides and because of the centrality of its universal themes: corruption and injustice wrought upon an innocent, the often uneasy negotiation between traditional values and Western colonial values, the weaker eventually overcoming the stronger, the strength of a girl-child and the power of a woman warrior.

_The Land Has Eyes_ has its own informative Web site at <http://www.thelandhaseyes.com>. This is a film of high quality, a labor of love, and a work of art. It is a huge step for filmmaking, particularly indigenous filmmaking, and one that adds to the films before it, as it continues to shift critical paradigms and create new ones.

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These two books are timely additions to the available literature, since both optimism and apprehension mark current initiatives designed to enhance regional cooperation in the Islands Pacific. Central here has been the Pacific Islands Forum Pacific Plan, underway since 2004, and comprising
a series of interlocking implementation strategies due for interim review by 2008. Among other topics, they address intra-regional market expansion, transportation and communications, conservation and energy, health and education, vocational training and youth programs, governance, comprehensive security, enhanced financial regulation, international treaty ratification, poverty eradication, human rights, special needs of small island states, cultural identity questions, and civil society participation. Readily conceded at official levels is the fact that the effective advancement of these objectives will require matching national capacities, since current deficiencies at that level are highlighted by an increasingly ubiquitous, generally essential, but not always comfortable Australian assertiveness in the region.

Dave Peebles, a staff member of the Australian Labor Party, claims in his ambitious, well-documented prescription that the Australian presence is indispensable for providing leadership for badly needed, fundamental regional reordering. The boldness of this assertion, reflecting the confidence of an assumed hegemony, aims for nothing less than a complete new deal for the region. While enhanced cooperation is not the full answer to the region’s problems, Peebles believes that it remains its biggest missing piece. As a guide he looks to Europe, in particular the severity of a post–World War II crisis of confidence that forced governments to look beyond the space of sovereign statehood toward the supranational regional institution-building endeavor that subsequently widened and deepened. Obvious discrepancies involved in any comparison with Europe aside, has the regional experiment in the Islands Pacific now reached a stage where a similar infusion of vision is needed for its revitalization? If so, what is recommended here?

First, and however difficult, the principle of shared sovereignty requires realization. If the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean have moved down this path to some effect, why not the Islands Pacific? Assuming that the region’s governments are serious about wanting the advantages of fuller trade and economic complementarities, then for Peebles a commitment to wider and deeper integration cannot be avoided. Here he sees a Community of Oceania comprising distinct but related orders evolving toward an eventual common market; a monetary union (joint measures to target inflation control and monetary union); security cooperation (a crisis management center, a standing peace monitoring group); human rights (a standing commission); a legal structure (regional court system dealing with rights, environmental, and constitutional cases); political incorporation (a regional parliament); and outreach strategies (commitment to pursue regional integration in the wider region). These objectives would assume institutional form—an envisaged Parliament, Court, and Human Rights Commission as companions to a Heads of Government Forum (delegating powers to ministers meeting according to policy responsibilities), and an Oceania Commission, headed by a Secretary-General, and comprising functional divisions managing the regional order sectors identified.

Second, much of the prescribed and comprehensive Oceanic Commu-
nity appears to hinge on a changed set of Australian attitudes and policies. For Peebles, Canberra has continued to view the region through an unduly narrow security perspective, ignoring to its longer-term cost any internal causes of instability. As the region’s key player, Australia must act as catalyst for change, being “an integral, intimate partner in the change effort and this demands a new phase in Australia’s Pacific relations” (260).

Yet just how realistic is this possibility? Beyond immediate damage control, and an already extensive development assistance commitment, is there any evidence of Canberra’s willingness to engage in a long-term project of regional institutional development? Does Australia have a Jean Monnet, who had the vision needed to launch European integration in the 1950s? And would it follow a policy of benevolent hegemony in guiding and bankrolling such an ambitious project of order creation? Clearly more is needed than the cautious tone of a cited 2003 Australian Parliamentary Committee report recommending that the idea of a Pacific economic and political community deserves (wait for it) further research, analysis, and debate. The key question, then, as to what priority an ambitious program of Oceanic order building might receive from any Australian government thus goes inadequately addressed.

Third, and to underpin the objectives identified, a shared commitment to the goals of sustainable economic development, security, the rule of law, and democracy are deemed operative necessities among all intending participants. However, this poses the problem of whether existing power-holders are prepared to see the political systems under which they operate reconfigured to further intergovernmental objectives, or retained primarily as bailiwicks used to gratify private, tribal, and subnational interests, with state resources allocated accordingly. Often it is the latter, acutely so in Melanesia, but evident elsewhere. These perspectives shape public responses toward outsiders offering the prescriptive ordering of the kind advanced by Peebles. Notwithstanding the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands intervention three years later, perceived external interference within Oceania’s domestic affairs retains potency to derail cooperative initiatives deemed inhospitable to the interests of those claiming to speak on behalf of the region’s cultural and political dispensations.

Putting the issue differently, can the rhetoric of partnership disguise Australian and New Zealand dominance of agendas, budgets, and intergovernmental systems of regional management? If not, is the case for accepting an Australian hegemony, warts and all, now unavoidable, given years of public policy abdication by too many of the region’s ruling elites? That is the awkward (and for several capitals, doubtless unwelcome) message at the heart of the Peebles prescription.

Doubtless the scale, ambition, and unadorned hegemony of this Australia-driven blueprint will find ready critics, and Powell’s comments reviewed below are apposite. Raising doubts as well will be the Peebles claim that the Pacific Islands Forum needs to engage in integrative pro-
cesses with bigger Asia-Pacific players. This envisages integration extending beyond Oceania to embrace an Asia-Pacific community capable of performing as a global player. Yet even should a call for a community of Oceania driven by Australia prove unacceptable, then this study’s individual chapters, recommending trade enhancement, comprehensive security (including overdue attention to international humanitarian law obligations), human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, provide a substantial challenge for any future domestic reform agenda.

Several of the essays in the collection edited by Satish Chand write around rather than directly to issues of regional integration and governance in Oceania. Overall, this is an offering that fails to provide a comprehensive introduction to the possibilities of regional integration; it is better suited to experts concerned with specific features of that agenda and its comparative aspects. In a brief introductory overview, Chand proffers the view that the Pacific has lagged in attempts to further regional integration and shared sovereignty—processes that he believes can deliver local economic competitiveness, reduce isolation costs, and build regional public goods of environmental protection, air and maritime safety, sustainable management of deepwater fisheries, and control of cross-border crime.

Neither of the two following chapters by Alan Winters (policy challenges facing small economies) and Lino Briguglio, Gordon Cordina, Nadia Farrugia, and Stephanie Vella (conceptualizing and measuring economic resilience) directly address Pacific issues, although their findings resonate. Winters opposes industry protection and business subsidies for small economies, and does not believe regional trading arrangements increase market opportunities. He asserts, moreover, that the governance of such economies risks capture by special interests. Should the international community fail to support very small economies, he adds, “we need to be prepared eventually to let their people move elsewhere if incomes fall too low to compensate for advantages of small society living” (25). What the inhabitants concerned might think about such drastic relocation goes unconsidered.

Briguglio and his coauthors outline a vulnerability index designed to ascertain degrees of economic resilience, incorporating macroeconomic stability and microeconomic efficiency, governance capacities, and social cohesion. Although this work is preliminary and its data on the Pacific incomplete, the indices provided offer a useful means for gauging the impact of externally derived economic shocks. Luca Monge-Roffarello, Michael Swidinsky, and David Vanzetti assess the impact of agricultural liberalization on small island states, claiming that trade liberalization stands to erode the preferences provided to small island economies, significant for those with quota rents—sugar and banana exporting being prominent examples.

Greg Fry’s contribution on the historical lessons of shared regional governance in the Pacific sees such initiatives conditioned by attempts to negotiate the region’s engagement
with globalization. The contested legitimacy of past regional practice has seen Australian ambivalence toward identification in a region where Island assertions of sovereignty and interest have restricted functional effectiveness—the disappointing record of cooperation in aviation is a good example.

Ron Duncan ponders a common currency for the Pacific Island economies and concludes that adopting the Australian dollar as a common currency is feasible. Deserving attention, he asserts, is the threefold dilemma of attempting to simultaneously peg the exchange rate, maintain an open capital market, and exercise monetary policy autonomy, with only two of these objectives considered possible at any given time. Although central banks have operated tolerably well in the Pacific, they use the skills of those perhaps better employed in treasuries or finance departments, while too often fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. Moves toward a common currency would require appropriate sequencing with labor mobility, property rights, and contract enforcement policies. Considering deeper Pacific Island integration with Australia and New Zealand, Robert Scollay sees scope for a positive, development-oriented agenda, experiences of economic partnership negotiations with the European Union proving instructive. This would embrace market access for goods, trade facilitation and promotion, trade in services, investment, a development of key tradeable sectors in Pacific Island economies and, not least, rules of origin allowing for new product development. Overall, this would provide a more holistic approach, moving beyond the narrower and often mercantilist market-access approach that has been adopted by Australia and New Zealand.

Hannah Parris and R Quentin Grafton assess the critical issue of fishing and its future impacts on regional Pacific cooperation. Of value is their table 9.3, comparing what is desirable with what has emerged through the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Convention (157). Evident here is the Convention Secretariat’s lack of adequate resourcing; the Convention’s failure to require member states to legislate its provisions into national laws; the absence of a mechanism designed to prevent further entry into the fisheries concerned; the inadequacy of mechanisms for dispute resolution; and the inadequate linkage between resource ownership or control and actual economic return. In addition to an obvious need to eliminate corruption and governmental mismanagement in the fishing industry, greater effort is needed to support participation in multinational institutions that follow policies of harvest reduction, increased transparency of access-fee arrangements, and transferability of harvesting rights across countries and vessels.

Other contributions to this study include those from Vinaye Ancharaz and Sanjeev Sobhee (globalization and governance from an African and Mauritius perspective); Christopher Findlay, Peter Forsyth, and John King (developments in Pacific Islands’ air transport); and Satish Chand (on preference erosion, in the case of Fiji sugar). After surveying what has been a poor record of regional cooperation,
the chapter on air transport sees some basis for hope through a discussion that embraces the impact of the Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement, the entry of low-cost carriers, moves to privatization, and questions of needed infrastructure development.

Finally of note is Philip Powell’s skeptical contribution (“Too Young to Marry”), asserting that a Pacific economic and political community, as envisioned by Australia and other regionalists, might achieve integration in form but not in substance. Required in the first instance are stronger states, endowed with national legitimacy, and no longer beholden to the levels of external subsidy and assistance currently in place. An imposition of relatively advanced regional institutions on Pacific economies that have no more than partially evolved “would generate inefficient complexity and impede the region’s ability to break its underdevelopment bottleneck” (237). Powell’s advice to foreign donors keen to further Oceania’s regional integration is to look first to a reformulation of national aggregations—decentralizing and federalizing powers, weakening the dominance of corrupt capital city elites, and forcing states to cooperate with indigenous institutions. The Pacific Islands Forum (Dave Peebles take note) should avoid association with Australian assertiveness keen to hurry shared governance in the Islands Pacific.

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Events in Bougainville would challenge even the Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (1873), who sometimes believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. In 2004 the arch-secessionist Francis Ona, ignoring seven years of peacemaking and the election of an Autonomous Bougainville Government within Papua New Guinea, had himself crowned king of an independent Bougainville. His ally Noah Musingku, another fantasist and creator of fraudulent pyramid schemes, conducted the rites and became Prince David. But when Ona died, he received a state funeral from the state he did not recognize, subsidized (the ultimate insult?) by Australian aid.

Early in 2006, veterans of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and their once implacable enemies in the Resistance united to denounce Musingku’s dishonest fund-raising. The Autonomous Bougainville Government demanded that the Papua New Guinea Defense Force arrest Noah and disband and deport his Fijian soldiers. Meanwhile, the Bougainvillean minister for mines in the Papua New Guinea government offered to negotiate with multinational companies to resume copper mining at