elections suggests a potential for dramatic changes to the judicial system and land laws. Unless such issues are addressed, the future for the ethnic Māori of the Cook Islands looks uncertain.

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Reference

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Two overriding issues stand out in the past year or so in French Polynesia: another change of statute, this time to a supposedly more autonomous “overseas country” of France rather than an “overseas territory,” and a surprising assembly election in May 2004, which ended the twenty-year reign of Gaston Flosse as president and brought into office his longtime pro-independence rival, Oscar Temaru. No local leader, however, can easily escape the harsh reality of severe economic dependency caused by the introduction of nuclear testing in the 1960s. French military spending distorted the communal Polynesian society and created a middle class that fed on French-subsidized government jobs and patronage and enriched itself through corrupt business monopolies and real estate investments at the expense of the laboring majority.

French Polynesia, whose capital Papeete is on the populous main island of Tahiti, is still in quest of a post-nuclear economy, since French funding for the former Centre d'Experementation du Pacifique (CEP) ended in the late 1990s. France continues to transfer massive aid for development, as much as US$1 billion a year (PIR, 26 Aug 2002). Flosse built himself a monumental presidential palace that houses “623 employees and courtiers” and invested public money in many grandiose projects in Tahiti and overseas, but Temaru’s demand for a referendum on independence is necessarily tempered by a vision of ongoing French subsidies and compensation for the impact of nuclear testing. Editor Alex W du Prel of Tahiti-Pacific Magazine called the situation a “social and economic fiasco” due to “cut and paste programs prepared in Paris for a great industrial country, which French Polynesia is certainly not.” The Flosse administration, which du Prel said encouraged only a “consumer society of privileges, of ecological looting and corporatist castes [and] above all made the rich more rich and marginalized the part of the population that remained authentic,” at one point even asked the local people for “fresh ideas” (TPM, July 2004).

The number one local industry remained tourism. In 2003, the number of visitors was over 200,000 (nearly equaling the local population), which represented a recovery from the negative impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on air travel. North America, and mainly the United States, provided the largest number of visitors, with 77,000 or 40 percent of the market (and also the largest single increase over 2002, about 25 percent); it was followed closely by Europe, with 74,000 or 38 percent of the market; then Japan with 20,000 (10 percent); Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia with 16,000 (8
percent); and South America (mainly Chile) with 3,800 (2 percent). Despite special efforts to cater to the Japanese market, such as increasing Tahiti Nui service to three flights a week to Osaka and Tokyo and holding a scuba-diving exhibition, the number of Japanese visitors—mainly wedding couples (who spend on average twice as much as other tourists and especially enjoy the over-the-water bungalows for honeymoons)—did not quite match the previous year (PIR, 4 April 2003; 5 Jan 2004).

The number two industry, cultured black pearls from the Tuamotu atolls, declined drastically in 2003, as prices dropped by 80 percent. Despite government regulatory reforms aimed at controlling quality, informal trading to foreign buyers evaded taxes and undercut sellers. The local government continued to promote tuna fishing, by increasing the country’s fleet size, as well as vanilla production, a once-profitable export for which world prices were increasing (PIR, 24 June 2002; 18 Feb, 13 May, 10 June 2003). State-funded infrastructure construction continued to grow, and scholarships for overseas training increased, but government efforts to curb rising deficits in public health insurance and civil service pension funds pushed doctors to strike for a month in 2003 over reduced payments, while public workers demonstrated against extending the required number of years for pension contributions (PIR, 1 May, 29 May, 9 June, 12 Aug 2003).

French Polynesia has received several statutes of autonomy, notably in 1977 and 1984, but French notions of “autonomy” are usually defined through the lens of a political system that is more highly centralized than many others in the western world. Although the relationship between French Polynesia and Paris has been described as “similar to that of the Cook Islands and New Zealand” (De Deckker 1994, 272), many would dispute just how “self-governing” Papeete really is. Temaru complained that France still controlled foreign relations, immigration, external communications, currency, finance, defense, courts and police, and higher education, among other things (1988, 279–282). Flosse managed to get the statute changed twice, first in 1984 when he became president of the new government (and New Caledonia was in rebellion), and in 1996 after the last round of nuclear tests and anticolonial protests, when more nationalist symbolism was added (Von Strokirch 2001). In 1998, when New Caledonia’s Noumea Accord promised gradually expanding autonomy with a prospect of voting on independence, Flosse proposed further expansion of French Polynesia’s autonomy, to include the favoring of local citizens in hiring and establishing businesses, as well as increasing the authority of the president and Territorial Assembly (TA). French President Jacques Chirac agreed in May 1999, and negotiations began over a new statute that would confer the high-sounding but ambiguous label of “overseas country” within the French republic (PIR, 1 June 1999; Von Strokirch 2000).

During a visit to Papeete in August 2002, French Overseas Territories Minister Brigitte Girardin said, “Without French Polynesia, France would
not be a great power, and France never failed to help Tahiti when needed.” She promised more financial support from the post-nuclear Economic Restructuring Fund created in 1996, tax exemptions to encourage outside investment, and “new political evolution” that would upgrade local administrative power so that new French laws would not infringe on bills passed by the local assembly as long as the latter conformed to the French constitution and the European Union courts. Flosse, a career Gaullist closely allied with Chirac (who had been newly reelected in 2002), complained about the meddling in French Polynesian lawmaking by the previous Socialist government in Paris, but he got along well with Gaullist Premier Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who supported his desire to expand self-government. “Independence would lead to dictatorship and misery,” Flosse said, “[but] our autonomy statute was meant to evolve” (PIR, 24 June, 24 Aug 2002). By March 2003, the French Parliament passed some “decentralization” amendments to the constitution, which called overseas territories “overseas collectivities.” Flosse said he would request a further name change to “overseas country” and sponsor an organic law that would allow the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly to pass its own “laws of the country,” protect local job hiring, enable French Polynesia to share more governing powers with Paris, and contest any new French laws that interfered with its own authority (PIR, 20 March, 27 May, 7 July 2003).

In July 2003, the Territorial Assembly began to debate the proposed new statute but Flosse wanted to limit the discussion of its 194 articles to only four days. The opposition threatened to boycott the proceedings if all the articles were not debated, since the new laws would affect the territory for decades, but Flosse’s absolute majority of 28 of 49 TA seats passed the statute as he wished, while the opposition sang a nationalist song in the public gallery in protest (PIR, 2 July, 7 July 2003). Flosse also wanted Paris to grant French Polynesia a second senatorial seat in the French Parliament by 2004, in order to mimic New Caledonia, but the additional seat will not take effect until 2007 (PIR, 14 July 2003). Also in July, Chirac came to the South Pacific, visiting not only the French territories but also anglophone ex-colonies and powers. He said that he wanted France to be a “player” in the region’s security and development, one that could provide additional assistance directly or through the European Union. Old superpower rivalries were a thing of the past, he said, and now a spirit of cooperation should guide the Pacific countries. He supported Australia’s intervention in Solomon Islands, but Prime Minister John Howard was reluctant to allow France to take part in that peacekeeping operation in order to avoid making the exercise appear “neocolonial” (PIR, 3 July, 29 July 2003). Chirac suggested that French Polynesia be given observer status at the Pacific Islands Forum, as New Caledonia had, but at their Auckland meeting the Forum countries expressed mixed feelings. Temaru and Rock Wamytan of New Caledonia had criticized France’s “checkbook diplo-
macy” and warned that the Flosse regime was a “Trojan horse” for French interests. Unlike New Caledonia, whose Noumea Accord specifically mentioned the prospect of independence, French Polynesia’s new statute contained no such option, and Temaru countered Flosse’s anti-independence ploy by continuing to call for his country to be inscribed on the United Nations decolonization list (PIR, 25 July, 4 Aug, 22 Aug 2003; ABC, 15 Aug 2003; IB, May 2004).

In Papeete, Chirac said that because Polynesia had hosted nuclear tests for thirty years, France was forever in its debt and would provide the territory with about US$150 million a year in compensation for “lost revenues.” In response to protests during his visit by people from the contaminated atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa, he also said that France would take responsibility for any test-related health problems if proof could be provided that such a link existed (PIR, 28 July, 29 July 2003). In fact, the director of France’s Atomic Energy Commission, René Pellat, had already admitted in May 1999 that the nuclear tests had caused cracks in the coral atolls, and since August 2002 former French Pacific test site workers had been demanding a complete medical investigation into their abnormally high rates of cancer (PIR, 5 May 1999; 21 Aug 2002). Instead, Chirac presided at a France-Oceania Summit in Papeete that was attended by the leaders of twenty Pacific Island countries, where he promised to double France’s Pacific Fund for financial aid: “Oceania is today at the heart of a new basin of world development.” Flosse donated another US$1 million of French Polynesia’s “own” money to the fund, though he was already under investigation for trying to spread influence by “humanitarian” aid giving in the region (PIR, 30 July, 4 Aug, 8 Aug, 12 Nov 2003; NC, 30 July 2003).

In late November 2003, the opposition in the Territorial Assembly criticized Flosse’s deficit spending, in particular an additional US$1 million requested by the president and his cabinet to cover “outside works and services” and “subsidies to diverse associations.” Nicole Bouteau called that waste “scandalous,” and Tamara Bopp-Duppont of Tavini said it was “shameful,” adding, “You throw public money out the windows. When will you think of the little people?” Meanwhile, French military veterans were joined by a Polynesian association, Moruroa e Tatou, in filing a formal lawsuit, backed by the French Green and Communist parties, against the French state for “involuntary homicide” by exposing nuclear test site workers to harmful radiation (NT, 29 Nov 2003). Despite his history of corruption convictions, revenge against media criticism, and well-known clientelism (Von Strokirch 2002; Le Monde, 22 May 2004), Flosse continued to push the new statute through French legislative and legal channels until the Senate approved it just before Christmas. He also called for public bids to construct, at government expense (“outside works”), a statue of Charles de Gaulle in the garden outside his presidential palace (PIR, 31 Oct, 11 Dec, 19 Dec 2003).

In January 2004, the French National Assembly approved the
new autonomy statute, which Flosse vowed would allow French Polynesia to establish its own diplomatic and trade missions abroad to promote economic growth. His opponents countered that it would also concentrate more power in his own office, to the point of allowing the head of the government to propose laws without Ta initiative and making it theoretically possible for the president to be chosen without consulting the assembly, thus creating a quasi-monarchy without a popular referendum (PIR, 31 Oct 2003; 16 Jan, 30 Jan 2004).

While awaiting the final verdict of the Constitutional Council in Paris, some French legislators lodged an appeal against the new statute, arguing that it vested too much power in the territorial president (PIR, 4 Feb 2004). Flosse had argued for a strong, stable executive that could run the country effectively and represent it abroad, much as in France; in 1958, de Gaulle had created a strong presidency with emergency powers when the Fifth French Republic replaced the weak, coalition-bound Fourth Republic. But socialists and even some Gaullists saw danger in creating a potential banana republic in Papeete. The president of French Polynesia, they warned, as opposed to the Ta-elected president of the government of French Polynesia, might someday be chosen directly by the people and thus bypass the established democratic process, as in some African ex-colonies. Defenders of Flosse in the French Parliament said it would be “neo-colonial” to do otherwise, but Socialist Deputy René Dosière said, “This ‘presidentialization’ is not a good thing for Overseas, any more than it is good for the métropole [mother country]” (TPM, March 2004).

Flosse assured his metropolitan backers and local loyalists that expanded autonomy was definitely “not a first step towards independence. French Polynesia wants to remain French. It is French, it is even more French than Polynesian.” In early March, the Constitutional Council formally approved the revised autonomy statute, but it also deleted key provisions, such as restricting land tenure in French Polynesia to local-born inhabitants or their descendants, putting police under local government control, and granting the local government the right to hold a referendum without French permission. Most importantly, it deleted a provision allowing the Territorial Assembly to pass “laws of the country” without prior approval from the French Parliament—New Caledonia received that last power in 1999, but the now-country of French Polynesia would not (PIR, 5 March 2004). In the March 2004 issue of Tahiti-Pacifique Magazine, du Prel published a detailed analysis that revealed several points about which Flosse seemed less than candid. First, the term “overseas country” meant nothing in French constitutional law, so it was only a cosmetic name change, as was the change in title of Ta members from “territorial counselors” to “representatives” (Flosse had wanted “deputies”). The provisions for recognizing and preserving Tahitian identity were essentially already part of the previous statute, and the Tahitian language had become co-equal to French in court proceedings the previous year. The “country” government
could “participate” with the French State in a list of powers over the territory but not control them unilaterally; foreign relations conducted by French Polynesia still had to have the approval of Paris; and, as Girardin had made a point of emphasizing to the Senate, “laws of the country” were simply “administrative acts,” which did not carry the same authority as those in New Caledonia. The local government could, however, practice affirmative action in favoring local residents in hiring, and the president of the country could name his own cabinet of ministers, with the approval of only the French High Commissioner (not of the elected assembly, as in New Caledonia) (TPM, March 2004). In a sense, Flosse was really seeking more autonomy for himself, not necessarily for French Polynesia, except in some nationalistic-sounding terminology.

What was perhaps more significant was the modification of the electoral laws, by means of amendments slipped into the statute by Flosse without any discussion in the French Parliament. The number of TA seats expanded from 49 to 57, giving 5 more to the populous Windward Islands (Tahiti and Moorea), 1 more to the Leeward Islands (Huahine, Raiatea, Bora Bora), 2 more to the Tuamotus-Gambiers (which were divided into two districts with 3 seats each), but the Australs or Marquesas would retain 3 seats each. Although the Tuamotus received 2 more seats and the Leeward Islands 1, and Flosse was most popular in the rural outer islands where he was born (the Gambiers), the increase of 5 seats in the urban Windward Islands, which already had 32 (three-quarters of the total population lived in Tahiti-Moorea), actually favored Temaru’s Tavini Huiraatira, by 37–20 or a net gain of 2 seats. The new rules also gave a one-third “bonus” of seats to whichever list won the majority in a district and set a minimum of 3 percent of votes cast to win a seat in the assembly, theoretically eliminating the need for a second round runoff vote and enabling larger, stable majorities to rule the country (TPM, March 2004).

Also in March 2004, only two years after he had crushed the left in his reelection to the French presidency, Chirac’s party experienced a disaster in the metropolitan regional elections, losing twelve out of fourteen regions that it had previously controlled. This amounted to a very negative referendum on Premier Rafarina’s administration, in part because of a sagging economy (L’Express, 29 March 2004). In spite of this setback to his patron in Paris (or perhaps because of it), Flosse urged Chirac’s cabinet to dissolve the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly and call for new elections two years early, arguing that the change of statute made new elections appropriate, as in 1985 (PIR, 7 April 2004). Temaru’s Tavini Huiraatira party, which in 2001 had won only ten out of forty-nine TA seats, joined with three other opposition parties in requesting that the French Council of State delay the new election, but to no avail. Tavini then formed coalition lists of candidates with the pro-independence parties Ai’a Api, Here Ai’a, and Ia Mana Te Nunaa. In May, this Union for Democracy (UPD) organized marches
into Papeete of about 6,000 people, who rallied around the statue of Tahitian nationalist Pouvanaa a Oopa outside the TA hall. “Our objective,” Temaru said, “is to do like the French in France during the recent regional elections—to overturn the government in place and install a political change.” The French Socialists, who had just made a comeback in the regional elections, signed a partnership agreement with Tavini (PIR, 21 April, 3 May, 17 May 2004; TPM, June 2004). Temaru said that the UPD had only one opponent in the election, Flosse’s Tahoeraa Huiraatira party, and he denounced the “abuses and waste of a single man” (Le Monde, 21 May 2004).

On 23 May, 78 percent of registered voters went to the polls, an increase of 10 percent over the 2001 election. Flosse’s gathering of one thousand supporters in his palace took heart when Tahoeraa Huiraatira won most of the outer islands (whose polls closed earlier), and it wound up with twenty-eight seats, more than any other party. But the UPD won twenty-seven, due mainly to votes in the Windward Islands, which left two autonomists holding the balance. Flosse had been president for twenty years, but this outcome threatened his status as a pillar for Chirac overseas; in fact, Jacques Lafleur of New Caledonia had already met defeat earlier in the month. Flosse had scoffed at the UPD marches but now called for a referendum on independence to remind voters of what Temaru really stood for. Equally ironic, Temaru said on television that independence needed to be prepared for, especially economically, for another ten or fifteen years (a formula similar to that proposed in New Caledonia’s Noumea Accord). There appeared to be a stalemate, since neither Tahoeraa nor Tavini-UPD had a clear majority, but the two small autonomist parties, Philip Schyle’s Fetia Api and Nicole Bouteau’s No Oe E Te Nuna, did not want to ally with Flosse (PIR, 26 May 2004).

Chirac’s cabinet in Paris was not amused by the prospect of another defeat overseas, after the surprising defeat earlier that month of pro-Chirac lists in both Guadeloupe and New Caledonia, as well as a setback in the French Antilles in December 2003 (where voters in Martinique and Guadeloupe had been asked to choose between their present “department” status and a vaguely defined unification of the two entities with more autonomy; they had rejected the “unknown” details). Chirac’s political empire overseas, like his party structure in France, depended on very personal ties to loyal clients—despite the problems that arose from subsidizing a class of overpaid civil servants and politicians with “free money” from the “big mother hen,” as journalist Eric Conan put it, and thus promoting economic dependency instead of production (L’Express, 27 Nov 2003; 28 June 2004). Girardin warned the Socialists not to celebrate prematurely over the UPD success in the election and, according to the newspaper La Dépêche de Tahiti, she told Flosse that France would “turn off the taps” if Temaru took power (Girardin later denied that quote and said she was only concerned about the negative effect on outside investment if the pro-independence leader won). When
Flosse claimed that the UPD success had “opened a crisis,” Girardin sent 300 extra police to Papeete—in order, she told Dosière in the National Assembly, to ensure a “serene” climate for the electoral process (PIR, 28 May, 3 June, 4 June, 9 June 2004). Flosse said on television that the election results had only expressed a warning from the people, not a real desire to get rid of him (ABC, 1 June 2004). Wallis and Futuna’s senator in Paris, Robert Laufoaulu (who represented the pro-Chirac government of that very dependent overseas territory), wrote a letter of support to Flosse, calling the election result “unfair” but urging him to learn from it and “rectify your policies” (PIR, 4 June 2004).

The first test of which party would find enough allies to muster a majority in the assembly was the election of the TA president on 3 June. Both sides courted partners, but Schyle and Bouteau decided to support the UPD against Flosse. Those two autonomist votes should have given the UPD the twenty-nine-seat majority it needed to elect Antony Géros as TA president. But Emile Vernaudon, who had been on the UPD list in the May elections but was also a former Flosse ally, oddly ran as the Tahoeara candidate in the TA ballot, a move that even the official French media called a “destabilization” maneuver. With Vernaudon’s crossover, the UPD needed an additional vote from Chantal Flores of the Austral Islands to elect Géros, 29–28, to cries of joy in the public gallery. Schyle and Bouteau said they would also support Temaru’s candidacy for president of French Polynesia but did not immediately agree to be part of the UPD. Flosse then tried another maneuver: he did not apply to run for the presidency by the required deadline and instead said he would appeal to the French Council of State to nullify the 3 June election of TA officers, which he said violated “public rights and liberties” by not giving Tahoeara five of the ten positions. He would also try to have an administrative tribunal postpone the presidential election, which was scheduled for 10 June. The Council of State quickly rejected the first petition, and Temaru won election to the new presidency on 14 June—unopposed, with thirty votes, and against a Tahoeara boycott. He said he still wanted independence but would wait ten to twenty years until the “political, economic and social conditions are ripe” to seek it (PIR, 4 June, 8 June, 9 June, 15 June 2004; RFO, 7 June 2004).

Because Temaru had to depend on the support of autonomist or independent parties to keep his TA majority, and opinion polls showed that the majority of the population of French Polynesia did not support complete independence, he said he would ask France to negotiate an agreement similar to New Caledonia’s Noumea Accord of 1998, which gave that autonomous territory the right to organize a self-determination referendum after fifteen to twenty years. He also supported Flosse’s efforts to adopt the Euro as the local currency instead of French Pacific francs, and vowed to promote tourism and cultured pearl sales to boost the local economy (ABC, 16 June 2004). By mid-June, he announced his presidential cabinet, which he reduced almost in half, from sixteen to nine ministries, in order to cut administrative
Temaru himself took charge of foreign relations and municipal development, with Jacqui Drollet of the pro-independence Ia Mana Te Nunaa as vice president and minister of tourism, the environment, air transport, and handicrafts. Other cabinet members included Emile Vanfasse, a retired official of the French revenue department in Paris, who became minister of finance and commerce; Jean-Marius Raapoto, a Tahitian language professor, who became minister of education, culture, youth, and language policy; Keitapu Maamaatuaiahutapu, a marine biology professor, who became minister of natural resources, the pearl industry, fishing, and farming; and the lone woman on the team, Marie-Laure Vanizette, who became minister of health, human services, and women’s affairs. The resilient Vernaudon became minister of communications, decentralization, outer islands, and sports (PIR, 17 June 2004; TP, 6 July 2004).

Temaru hoped to gain observer status at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Apia in August 2004, because he wanted the Forum’s help in gaining independence for his country, including support for getting French Polynesia onto the United Nations decolonization list the way New Caledonia had been added after the Kanak uprising in the 1980s (PIR, 21 June 2004). He also planned to travel to Europe in July, to meet with Chirac and Girardin to discuss development aid, nuclear compensation, and decentralization, and to discuss the Euro issue with European Union officials in Brussels (PIR, 22 June 2004). Drollet told Nic Maclean on ABC’s Go Asia Pacific program that when the new government conducted a financial inventory it found that France had not yet paid the US$250 million promised as compensation for nuclear testing, as well as other amounts pledged for infrastructure improvement. Drollet expected France to live up to commitments it had made to the previous regime: “We’re obliged to be partners as we have years of shared history and things don’t change that much from one day to the next” (ABC, 30 June 2004).

Temaru also met with Moruroa e Tatou (French Nuclear Weapons Test Veterans) and agreed to create a subcommittee to look into the impact of nuclear testing (PIR, 6 July 2004). As the annual Heiva i Tahiti festival was about to begin, he met with French High Commissioner Michel Mathieu and said he was “glad we’re on the same wave length” (TP, 11 July 2004).

The June issue of the independent monthly magazine Tahiti-Pacifique carried several analyses of the Temaru “revolution,” calling it a vote not for independence but against the “Flosse system.” Temaru’s slim TA majority depended on cooperation with autonomists, though he did inherit Flosse’s reinvented presidency. Editor Du Prel highlighted several factors that helped to explain Flosse’s setback. For example, his own electoral reform backfired (by giving the bonus of seats to the UPD rather than to Tahoeraa in the populous Windward Islands), as did his decision to call an early election instead of waiting until 2006. In addition, the nuclear-testing era had disrupted French Polynesia, which had languished under benign neglect before 1965 and thus maintained its communal, rural traditions until the influx of CEP money and metropolitan personnel with high salaries changed...
everything. The autonomy statute that Flosse himself achieved in 1984 kept the outside money flowing in and created new class divisions, which for the majority meant a “loss of dignity, and that is not accepted by the Polynesians” (TPM, June 2004, 10).

Thus Tavini came to represent the have-nots, who had migrated to the capital but had been excluded from the Flosse patronage system and from the high salaries that raised prices for everyone. In 2001 alone, Flosse’s ministers received pay increases of 42 percent, which, combined with the extra pay that metropolitan civil servants earned by working on contract in the overseas territories, forced local families to pool their resources to survive. Ultimately, Flosse was trapped in his own ivory tower, surrounded by yes-men and cut off from reality. Even the expatriate business community turned against him because of high taxes. Political scientist Sémir Al Wardi noted that under the old voting system Tahoeara would have preserved its absolute majority, that the very lack of debate over the details of the new statute had allowed a determined opposition to misunderstand or misrepresent some of its provisions, and that the more Flosse created nationalist symbols to defuse a desire for independence, the more he made that concept itself less dramatic. As the mass marches in Papeete of 15 May showed, Flosse had enabled the UPD to become the champion of democracy, defending republican liberties against tyranny and privilege, the autonomy of “them, not us” (TPM, June 2004).

DAVID CHAPPELL

References


<http://www.lemonde.fr/>

<http://www.lexpress.fr>


Hawaiian Issues

On 7 September 2003, Native Hawaiians and supporters from all walks of life flooded Waikiki, Hawai’i’s tourism Mecca, with a sea of red shirts symbolizing the red ‘āweoweo (a school of small red fish seen as predicting a big change). Clad in t-shirts that read “Kū i ka Pono!” (Stand for Justice), an estimated 8,000 people marched in support of native rights and institutions and in protest against efforts to dismantle them (Bernardo 2003). The primary sponsors, ‘Ilio’ulaokalani (a coalition of kumu hula [hula masters]) and the Kamehameha Schools, were able to rally often-disparate voices within the Hawaiian community. Students, teachers, community leaders, representatives from several ali‘i (chiefly, royal) trusts, state offices, and civic clubs stood together as one to face a common threat.

Other notables participating in the march were Governor Linda Lingle and Lieutenant Governor Duke Aiona, who delivered a speech from atop a makeshift podium. Even University of Hawai’i President Evan Dobelle, UH Manoa Chancellor Peter Englert, and other supportive university administrators made the trek down the tourist-lined streets.

The 2003 Kū i Ka Pono march was organized in response to the numerous lawsuits challenging the existence of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, as well as the Hawaiian-preference admissions policy of the Kamehameha Schools—in particular, the Arakaki v Lingle, Mohica-Cummings v Kamehameha Schools, and Doe v Kamehameha cases. Since the march, the Mohica-Cummings case has been settled out of court, allowing the student in question to stay at the school provided he remain in good standing. The Kamehameha Schools prevailed in the Doe case. In Arakaki v Lingle, the courts ruled that the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, a US federal agency, could not be included in the litigation; the case is still pending.

‘Ilio’ulaokalani was planning another Kū i Ka Pono march for 6 September 2004, the one-year anniversary of the original march. But this time, one man would be noticeably absent from the ranks of marchers. As a result of a controversial decision by the University of Hawai’i Board of Regents, Evan Dobelle was unceremoniously fired from his position as the university’s president.

Evan Dobelle came to Hawai’i with a substantial reputation for enacting change and reinvigorating stagnating institutions. Born in Washington, Dobelle earned his bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD degrees from the University of Massachusetts and an additional master’s in public administration from Harvard. He went on to occupy such positions as mayor of Pittsfield, Massachusetts; chief of protocol for the White House; assistant secretary of state during the Carter administration; chief financial officer of the Democratic National Committee; president of Middlesex Commu-