ters as a constructive investment, particularly at the secondary, upper-secondary, and tertiary levels, there will need to be significant shifts in practice for these economic and social impacts to be realized.

The analysis of female participation rates in tertiary education continues in Crocombe and Crocombe’s book, which is an extraordinarily thorough compilation of the range of tertiary educational opportunities that exists in the South Pacific. It covers government, nongovernment, and work-based education programs, and most readers will be surprised at the range and complexity of the opportunities that exist across the Pacific nations. The Crocombes highlight a number of fundamental issues and trends that need to be addressed if tertiary education is to deliver all that is expected of it in the next decade. How are the Pacific nations going to best meet the growing needs and expectations of tertiary education? There will need to be an intricate balancing act between concentrating resources at particular sites that will provide access for all potential students in the region and the growing nationalistic demands for tertiary education to be provided in each country.

A feature of some concern is the observation that the huge bulk of the funding for Pacific tertiary education comes from overseas governers, making it increasingly difficult for particular island states to determine precisely what they require. The external acceptability of qualifications awarded at the tertiary level, and the difficult issues of the balance between local and international influences on the curriculum, have yet to be rigorously addressed. The shift of influence from the traditional colonial powers of Europe, Australia, and New Zealand to an engagement with the countries of Asia is also being felt. How the Pacific economies and education systems realign will be interesting to observe.

Both these books provide detailed information about education in the Pacific and facilitate a greater understanding of the complexities of providing educational services in this region of the world.

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The end of the cold war has opened up the international system to a variety of influences that were suppressed by its ideological rivalries. Whether these changes will prove to be a reversion to type (older patterns of relationships) or whether they presage some new configurations of international relations yet hangs in the balance. Nevertheless the obvious importance of understanding the post–cold war order continues to encourage a minor industry in political speculation. The apparent emphasis on regional association and a growth of economic rationalism are two early developments to emerge from among
the many changes in train in the post–cold war world. Given the significant influence both seem to be having on the shape of international relations, an assessment of the two themes comes as a timely study.

Andrew Axline and his team of contributors have attempted to correlate the relevance of state economic objectives with the multilateral constraints of regional cooperation. *The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation* builds its analysis around four case studies—the Andean Group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (*ASEAN*), the Caribbean Commission (*CARICOM*), and the South Pacific Forum. These four were selected not only because they share similar characteristics but also because they differ in some important respects. The primary shared features are that they are all intergovernmental organizations located in developing areas of the world with the purpose of achieving common goals for their members but limited organizationally to consensual decision making. The last factor was particularly important because it insured a veto for participating states should the collective interests of regional members for change seek to challenge the perspectives of state interests by individual members.

Axline’s contribution to the work centers on the theoretical aspects of regional cooperation, which he addresses in a preface, the introductory comparative methodology chapter, and a concluding chapter assessing the findings of the four case studies in terms of the agreed comparative approach, which relies heavily on dependency theory for its intellectual roots. The influence of dependency theory is clear from the opening advice that “there is often a failure (in post–Cold War analyses) to distinguish between regionalism as a manifestation of neo-mercantilist policies . . . of industrialized countries . . . and as a development policy on the part of non-industrialized countries.” From this, Axline argues that the objective of developing states in pursuing regional cooperation may not be formal integration, as is often perceived in the case of the customs unions of the industrialized states.

The differences among the four case studies naturally vary from region to region, but include size, population, level of development, and origins of their respective associations. Gordon Mace, with his chapter on the Andean integration system, and Anthony Payne, through his review of *CARICOM*, assess two bodies that began with a hope of pursuing classical economies of scale through regional economic cooperation but have failed to achieve the outcomes that might once have been expected. Pushpa Thambipillai and Greg Fry present the other end of the functionalist-political continuum by considering two cases inspired by political aims rather than economic goals. Thambipillai explains the origins and course of *ASEAN*, while Fry tackles the “collective diplomacy” of the South Pacific Forum. Unsurprisingly, both authors find that these regions also have not embarked on significant economic integration.

Axline draws a number of conclusions from these case studies. The primary set revolve around the importance of state interests as an
impediment (influence?) on the urge to integration. Generally he finds that developing states did not achieve their independence in order to give it away to regional associations. Their national interests remain strong, and thus, in cost-benefit terms, only those acts of cooperation that return more to the participating state than they cost will be acceptable. Naturally, a requirement that all participating members achieve such individual gains works to limit the speed and progress of cooperative activities significantly. Further complicating these calculations are the broader global changes of the post–cold war order. The intensifying economic rationalism of this emergent order makes more problematic the regional strategies for maximizing economic self-reliance, because more control rests in global processes beyond the reach of regional arrangements.

In considering the implications of this book, it is difficult not to return to its initial assumptions about political economy. One might ask with Shakespeare: “A rose by any other name?” Perhaps the rose would smell as sweet, but at least we can argue the toss because there is a concept of a rose to begin with. The concept of “political economy” has been stretched over the past two hundred years to encompass what can only be regarded as polar opposites. The original implication of a social reductionism such that economic imperatives can be expected to explain other social phenomena (eg, that capitalism requires liberalism) seems to me a vastly more defensible use of the term than applying it to explanations of the economy grounded in other social phenomena (eg, that the “Protestant work ethic” explains economic productivity). While Axline and his contributors appear to stick to the more traditional usage, this does raise methodological questions about other elements of the work. In particular, the selection of cases to test this work’s central proposition seems arguable.

Axline adopts David Mitrany’s functionalism as a basis for predictions about regional cooperation, but then chooses ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum as tests of functionalism. Yet, as Axline acknowledges and Thambipillai and Fry point out in their respective chapters, neither was formed as Mitrany would have espoused—to meet specific technical needs—but rather, quite contrary to Mitrany—to achieve political objectives. More fundamentally, all of the case studies are from third world areas where the levels of economic interdependence for regional members do not reach the basic standards demanded by Mitrany (a point made some twenty years ago by Joseph Nye). It is difficult to see why or how these four cases could test the explanatory power of economics for regional cooperation. There is more than a hint of a straw man argument throughout this work and perhaps a tendency toward verificationism as well.

In the case of the Pacific Islands, for example, the absence of any integrationist objective—and this would include even the oldest of the regional bodies, the South Pacific Commission—does not deny the possibility of the unintended consequences of cooperation predicted by Mitrany. If one looks beyond the South Pacific Forum to the entire regional system in the
Pacific Islands, there is a remarkable
degree of interaction emerging. With
the passage of a reasonable amount of
time (a key but often neglected factor)
economic development that will con-
duce to the levels of interdependence
that Mitrany argued would make func-
tional integration an option. Already
evident are signs of harmonization
across the region of laws dealing with
fisheries, customs and immigration,
transport, and the environment. While
these are not all located in the Forum,
proposed changes to the South Pacific
Organizations Coordinating Commit-
tee are likely to give the Forum much
more responsibility for such integrative
processes. Other examples could be
found for the Pacific Islands and
perhaps also for some, if not all, the
other regions canvassed.

As noted at the outset, this is a
timely book and a thought-provoking
one. One need not agree with all its
premises or conclusions to find it well
worth the time to read and consider.
Serious scholars of international rela-
tions and development studies will en-
counter much to challenge them. The
work is readable throughout, making
its content accessible to students and
others with an interest in the issues cov-
ered—both theoretical and substan-
tive. Of course, area specialists will be
attracted to chapters focusing on their
specific interests, but it is to be hoped
they will allow themselves to be drawn
into Axline’s worthy attempt to pursue
cross-regional comparisons as well.

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La Nouvelle-Calédonie au tournant
des années 1990: Un état des lieux,
by Louis Arréghini and Philippe Waniez.
Montpellier/Paris: ORSTOM-RECLUS/
La Documentation Française, 1993.
ISBN 2-11-002987-0, 236 pages,
tables, figures, maps, bibliography.
F220.

Atlases, for the French, are not mere
pedagogical aids designed for school
classrooms, family reference collec-
tions, and, eventually, the coffee tables
of wealthy nations. They are working
tools, of crucial importance in the
planning process. Governments, con-
cerned to draw accurate portraits of
the territories under their jurisdiction,
make frequent use of them in order to
formulate development policy and
strategies in all domains in which
spatial organization is an essential
parameter.

It is thus hardly surprising that the
business of map and atlas making is a
very dynamic one in that country. Car-
tographers are concerned to develop
new forms of graphic representation,
 juxtapose image and text in a creative
manner, and produce static (paper)
and interactive (computer) versions of
the same documents.

It is also hardly surprising that by
far the best Pacific Island atlases are
produced by the French. Their monu-
mental Atlas de Nouvelle-Calédonie
(1981) and the Atlas de la Polynésie
française (1993) bear ample testimony
to this fact, as does Benoît
Antheaume’s and Joël Bonnemaison’s
Atlas des Iles et États du Pacifique
(1988). (This last, I should add,
urgently awaits translation—and
updating—to fill an unjustifiable gap