because they hold them to be somehow tainted by the insidious odors of international exploitation.

The final Part F includes the editor’s description of how the Development Studies program at Massey University has been built up (very largely through his own efforts, though he does not draw attention to this in any way), as well as a paper by John McKinnon on the wider possibilities for such studies elsewhere in New Zealand.

The volume is eccentrically paginated, a consequence of haste in getting it to print, and would have been better without the self-congratulatory quotes adorning the title pages of the separate parts. It is difficult to sum up such a diverse collection. A number of the papers are naive, covering lack of analysis with idealism; most are at least workmanlike and contain a lot of valuable information; and a few are truly illuminating. Overall, though, the collection has a vitality, directness, and intellectual honesty that is unfortunately not common in the huge literature on development in the Pacific, even that produced by much more prestigious and lavishly endowed bodies than Development Studies at Massey University.

ANTONY HOOPER
*  *  *


When John C. Dorrance died in 1991 the United States lost a leading Pacific Islands specialist. In 1989, he retired early from the State Department: he had slim hopes of the kind of post he merited, because of the odd custom of filling ambassadorships with friends of the president. Characteristically, he accepted this reality without outward bitterness, plunging into a new career as a consultant. This book is the product of that final period of his life, but also reflects a deep understanding, based on rich experience, of strategic and political issues in the Pacific Islands region. It provides a lucid introduction, from an American perspective, to regional strategic issues and helps illuminate the key assumptions and the evolution over recent decades of official United States thinking about the region.

After opening chapters considering the regional strategic environment and the main regional security and political issues, the book examines United States interests and objectives in the region, United States policy in the North Pacific (Guam and the components of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands), and United States policy in the South Pacific. Next it discusses “Australia, New Zealand, and Other External Powers,” and “The Soviet Union and the Pacific Islands.”
Against this backdrop, a concluding chapter considers “U.S. Policy: Recommendations and Conclusions.”

Dorrance is often frank about the weaknesses and errors of United States policies, although his phrasing is generally diplomatic. He points out that failure to limit Greenhouse emissions may have disastrous effects on the standing of the United States in the region, should fears about rising sea levels prove soundly based. He reveals the fuzzy thinking behind the failure of the United States to accede to the Treaty of Rarotonga. He shows how what was seen as “resource piracy” (57) in relation to tuna fishing created major tensions between island governments and the United States, until the negotiation of a regional fisheries agreement. While adamant that the suspension of ANZUS in relation to New Zealand will continue until New Zealand revises its antinuclear policy, he argues for more high level contacts between the United States and New Zealand, and for other measures intended to ensure constructive relations.

Dorrance’s comments on the evolution of United States policy in relation to the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and its successor entities are of particular interest. He was closely involved at an early stage of the negotiations and subsequently followed their development closely. United States policymakers failed to acknowledge that the United States “had become a colonial power” (80), ignored or misunderstood Micronesian attitudes and aspirations, and in some respects overestimated the centrality of these islands to United States defense and strategic interests. The logic of his argument (83) suggests that it would have been far better for all concerned, lawyers excepted, if the various Trust Territory entities had proceeded promptly to full independence, with treaties guaranteeing development aid and securing essential United States defense interests.

His comments on the French presence in the region are also insightful. He knew the issues well: his University of Hawai‘i master’s thesis on the nationalist movement in French Polynesia led by Pouvanaa a O’opa, prepared in 1964 while on leave from the State Department, remains a useful study. The French authorities ordered him to leave Tahiti in the early 1960s, after he had been sent there to reopen the American Consulate, because they did not wish an American official to observe the development of the French testing program at first hand. Dorrance used to comment wryly that this was perhaps the only instance in which an ally had in effect refused the United States permission to operate a diplomatic post. He protests too much, however, in his efforts to distance the United States from French policy in the region. In fact, American administrations have consistently given good relations with France much greater priority than they have given Pacific Island concerns, and so have been loath to criticize French policy.

John Dorrance completed the draft of this book in early 1991. His fatal illness prevented him from revising the manuscript, and it has been only lightly edited for publication. Some rough edges, grating phrases, and overstatements, notably in relation to the role of...
Soviet front organizations in the region, remain. The documentation is illustrative rather than comprehensive. There is an occasional lack of coherence, as a diplomat and analyst schooled in the cold war era grapples with changing global and regional circumstances. Presumably he would have remedied some of these deficiencies had circumstances permitted.

The last time I saw John Dorrance, at a conference in 1989, he remarked that he sometimes found it difficult to do justice to the character and complexity of Pacific Island politics and simultaneously make his message comprehensible and relevant to Washington. In this book, another tension is that between the author's commitment to accuracy and balance and his preoccupations as a former diplomat and a patriot. Dorrance tells the truth, but not always the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It is a tribute to his knowledge, wisdom, and skill however that these tensions surface only intermittently. I do not share his apparent assumption that more sensitive American diplomacy and policies can resolve all the conflicts that may emerge between the island countries and the United States. Nonetheless this book, as well as being of great interest and value to students of regional affairs, offers many insights and much useful advice to Washington policy-makers.

STEPHEN HENNINGHAM
Australian National University


In Greek mythology, sailing between Scylla and Charybdis required skillful navigation and, traditionally, a little luck, because few survived. Steve Hoadley attempted a contemporary intellectual equivalent of this feat when he undertook to produce a readable general reference text on the international relations of the South Pacific. On one side he faced the broad rocky shoals of travelogue superficiality on which prowled the hungry six-headed Scylla, while on the other side lay the danger of a pedantic preoccupation with minutiae waiting to suck the unlucky author into the devouring maelstrom of Charybdis. Hoadley deserves credit for accepting the risky charter and congratulations for making the passage successfully.

The South Pacific Foreign Affairs Handbook is a reference book and therefore necessarily a compendium of facts. However, compiling current data about any issue from all twenty-two political entities in the ambit covered by the handbook is such an enduring problem that virtually all the region's rich ecology of regional organizations include it as a central activity in their terms of reference. Hoadley acknowledges the reality of this challenge, and his ability to draw such a quantity of useful and usable data together is one of the real strengths of this work. For a