ity? Malaria? Diarrheal and pulmonary diseases? Are people living for a longer or shorter length of time? The authors of this monograph, although not addressing these issues directly, paint a bleak picture. This contrasts to the reviewer’s impressions gained from working and research trips to small towns and remote villages made from 1962 to the present. I have noted many of the same deficiencies alluded to in the monograph—insufficient staffing, insufficient funding for public health projects, too great a dependence on missionaries for health services and training. Nevertheless, my impression has been one of progressive improvement of health services—particularly at the village level. I have found adequate health care being provided even in the most isolated villages. Even the beleaguered health services of the less economically developed provinces are performing heroically.

I strongly recommend this monograph to all those interested in the interplay between politics and the health of the public. Let us not be blinded by our elegant biomedical technology; in many aspects of health services and policies, we in the United States are a Third World nation also. The lessons from Papua New Guinea are instructive as we grope toward the resolution of problems of access to quality health care.

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Gary Smith’s excellent monograph provides a nuanced and well-researched analysis of the complex and Pentagon-driven relationship between the United States and its (former) Micronesian wards. Smith has managed to organize an impressive array of obscure documents into the most concise compendium to date on the United States’ postwar stratagems in the 2100 Micronesian isles, along with rich accounts of the Islanders’ sociopolitical responses, especially during the protracted negotiations designed to move Micronesia into a post–trusteeship status with the United States.

Beginning with an overview of the general themes developed further in the book, Smith recounts the inherent tensions between US strategic policy and the Islanders’ pursuit of self-determination in the former Japanese Mandated Islands, islands placed under an unprecedented “strategic” United Nations trust at the close of World War II.

Smith describes in painstaking detail how the desire for true self-determination in Micronesia was consistently thwarted by the realpolitik ambitions of the United States during the Cold War. From the massive nuclear weapons testing program conducted in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and
1958, to the CIA training base in Saipan (in the Northern Mariana Islands) for counterinsurgency in mainland China, and including the ongoing Star Wars missile testing programs at Kwajalein in the Marshalls, Smith lays bare the unvarnished and tumultuous history of the asymmetrical and often disastrous relationship between the United States and Micronesia.

In his account of the arcane negotiations that led to a post-trusteeship status for the Micronesian entities (except for Belau), Smith delineates the four key and intransigent US objectives: (1) the strategic denial of Micronesia to the armed forces of hostile nations; (2) access for US military forces; (3) unhampered use of the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshalls; and (4) contingency use options for Belau.

Smith devotes considerable space to the plight of Belau, the miniscule island nation of 15,000 which became an international cause célèbre with its principled antinuclear constitution, a constitution that has resulted in the violent deaths of Belau’s first two presidents, along with the murder of the father of two key pro-constitution advocates, and other unseemly acts of terror in the tiny but troubled oceanic republic.

One of the main contributions of Smith’s monograph is his reasoned analysis of the Pentagon’s inflated rationale for preserving military authority over the Micronesian “stepping stones” leading from the Hawaiian Islands to the Asian mainland. Specifically, Smith questions the necessity of securing one-third of Belau’s territory (for fifty years under the proposed Compact of Free Association) as part of the “fallback arc,” that is, the string of island outposts ranging from Guam, Saipan, Tinian, Rota, and down to Belau.

Smith argues persuasively—especially in the wake of the New Zealand Labour Party’s 1984 antinuclear policy—that the Reagan administration overreacted to the perception that the Pacific was becoming a Soviet beachhead, especially in the case of Belau. In its internationally publicized David and Goliath contest with Belau, Smith alleges that the United States lost the moral high ground over its exaggerated claim that Belau was crucial for its forward-basing strategy in the East Asian region. The bankruptcy of US policy in Belau, asserts Smith, came about as the result of “an inability or unwillingness to impose some political order on military priorities.”

Marshallese Senator Ataji Balos poignantly remarked some years ago that “We have the trust and the US has the territory.” This might have been a suitable subtitle for Gary Smith’s concise primer on how Machiavellian manipulation and bureaucratic bungling marked America’s postwar tutelage over Micronesia.

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