SUGAR-COATED FORTRESS: REPRESENTATIONS OF
THE U.S. MILITARY IN HAWA'I.

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ABSTRACT

Hawai‘i is the most militarized state in the nation. There has always been opposition to the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i. However, critics of the military face a difficult task in getting their message across. Militarism has been so ingrained in Hawai‘i that, to a large extent, the U.S. military presence has come to be seen as “natural,” necessary, and almost totally beneficial. A result of this is that it has become both easy and comfortable to view current militarism in Hawai‘i as natural, normal, ordinary, and expected. This dissertation shows how this seemingly normal state of affairs came to be. By examining various representations of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i – in newspapers, movies, memorials, museums, and military writing – I expose how, in forms of representation, places of remembrance, and the construction of how we speak and write about the military, militarism becomes the norm and, in turn, silences counter-narratives.

The dissertation examines four distinct time periods, 1778 to 1898 (from Captain Cook to the annexation of Hawai‘i by the U.S.), 1898-1927 (the period in which the U.S. consolidated its hold on Hawai‘i through cultural imperialism and military build-up), 1927-1969 (which saw the growth of mass tourism, the Massie Case, the attack on Pearl Harbor, martial law and Statehood), and 1965-present (covering the post-Statehood years, the Vietnam War, increasing militarization of Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement, and the *Ehime Maru* tragedy). Each section examines how the military is portrayed (and, in some cases, actively seeks to have itself portrayed) through different mediums: section one deals with military writing, section two war memorials, section three, movies, and section four, newspapers.
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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military plays a large role in the State of Hawai‘i. Despite the popular tourism-promoted image of Hawai‘i as an idyllic paradise, the islands are, in fact, home to one of the largest military arsenals in the world. Hawai‘i is a vital American strategic possession, and it today holds the dubious distinction of being the most heavily militarized state in the nation. It owns or utilizes 25 percent of the land on O‘ahu alone. The 78,346 military personnel and their dependants comprise almost seven percent of the population, and when added together with 112,000 veterans who live in Hawai‘i, they have the potential to act as a powerful voting block and influential special interest group.¹ Contrary to the American national narrative, which holds that the United States became a colonial power almost by accident,² this militarization of Hawai‘i did not happen by chance.

U.S. military involvement in Hawai‘i has been evident from as early as 1826 when the USS Dolphin was sent to Honolulu with orders to investigate and recover debts owed by the ali‘i to American merchants. However, the one single act by the U.S. military that remains most historically resonant for Native Hawaiians is the U.S. Marine-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy in 1893, which led to the annexation of the kingdom to the United States in 1898. As a consequence of that act, Hawai‘i today is the home of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which has been described as “[p]ossibly the largest unified military operation in the world” (Albertini et al, 2). The military hardware the U.S. now has at its disposal in Hawai‘i includes Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines, the Fifth and Seventh U.S. Fleets, large amounts of personnel and equipment at Schofield Barracks, Tripler Army Medical Center, Hickham Air Force
Base, Wheeler Air Force Base, Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Air Station, and various other military installations, tracking facilities, radar posts, training grounds, firing ranges, and research facilities. The military owns or controls vast swaths of fertile land, including training grounds at Pōhakuloa on the Big Island and Kawaiola on O'ahu totaling 161,000 acres (Albertini et al, 7). The island of Kauai is the home of the U.S. military’s Pacific Missile Test Range Station at Barking Sands, established in 1966.

In 1960, soon after Hawai'i became the 50th State of the Union, National Geographic assured Americans that Hawaiians welcomed the U.S. military. The magazine stated, “The community, having gone through one Pearl Harbor, gains reassurance from the presence of these combat ready forces.” However, there has always been opposition to the U.S. military presence in Hawai'i. Native Hawaiians, in particular, have fought with, and demonstrated against the military. Many Native Hawaiians see the U.S. armed forces as an “occupying army,” like the Israeli Defense Forces in Palestine, or the British Army in Northern Ireland. For example, author and activist Haunani-Kay Trask compares the position of Native Hawaiians to that of “other displaced, dislocated people, such as the Palestinians and the Irish of Northern Ireland” (Native Daughter, 18). Trask refers to the “American military invasion and occupation of Hawai'i” (31), thus identifying herself with Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican movement, which sees the British military role in Northern Ireland as that of an “occupying army.” She states:

Hawaiians are not engaged in identity politics, any more than the Irish of Northern Ireland or the Palestinians of occupied Palestine are engaged in identity politics. Both the Irish and the Palestinians are subjugated national groups committed to a war of national liberation. Hawaiians, although not in the stage of combat, are nevertheless engaged in a kind of liberation struggle. (“Settlers of Color” 6)
Trask’s analogy asks us to consider Hawai‘i from a different perspective – that of a land under foreign military occupation. She states, “Hawai‘i is a militarized outpost of empire, deploying troops and nuclear ships to the south and east to prevent any nation’s independence from American domination” (Native Daughter, 17). Americans, who have historically been generally sympathetic to Irish nationalism, either ignore or are unaware of the similarities between Northern Ireland and Hawai‘i, and it is this double standard that Trask draws attention to with her comparison.

Many non-Native Hawaiians take exception to the military presence due to economic, environmental, and cultural reasons. If the military were gone, for example, it would free up a quarter of the island of O‘ahu for civilian use. Gone too would be the trappings of militarism, such as helicopter over flights, military convoys on the roads, and war ships cruising off tourist beaches. Practical and logistical problems caused by the military, such as live fire exercises in the Mākua Valley, or the pollution of the Pearl Harbor estuary, would no longer be an issue. Tragic accidents such as the submarine USS Greenville’s destruction of the Ehime Maru would also be avoided. Supporters of the military presence argue that demilitarization would have a significant detrimental impact on Hawai‘i’s economy. The military does, after all, provide jobs for 15,000 civilians, spending $3,731 million in the year 2000 alone (Schmitt, Hawai‘i Data Book, 158). However, as authors Jim Albertini, Nelson Foster, Wally Inglis, and Gil Roeder note, the military is essentially a massive Federal program. If the money invested in what is euphemistically called “Defense” was, instead, spent on job creation, many more civilian jobs would be created than those presently supported by military spending.
Furthermore, most of the land on O‘ahu that is currently controlled by the U.S. military was donated by the State of Hawai‘i either free of charge or for a nominal amount. The state does not, therefore, profit from renting land to the military. Nor do military personnel contribute as much as one might think to the economy of Hawai‘i. Much of their purchases take place at on-base “PX’s” (which do not pay state taxes). In this respect, the military is actually competing with local business rather than supporting them. Furthermore, because 20% of military personnel live off base, they add to the general housing shortage in the state and to overcrowding, particularly on O‘ahu (Albertini et al, 63-64). In 1960, National Geographic declared that the U.S. military presence aided the tourist industry, which competes with military spending as the State’s main source of income. If it was ever true, as the magazine states, that, “Their presence...does much to generate tourist travel to the islands” (Simpich Jr., 9), the extant relationship between the military and the tourist industry is one of competitors fighting over dwindling resources such as land and water. The tourist industry relies on the continuing physical beauty of the islands, whereas the military is concerned primarily with its own interests, which may not coincide with the interests of either the tourist industry or Hawai‘i as a whole.5

However, critics of the military face a difficult task in getting their message across. Militarism has been so ingrained in Hawai‘i that, to a large extent, the U.S. military presence has come to be seen as “natural,” necessary, and almost totally beneficial. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is, perhaps, the main reason for this: the deaths of over 2000 military personnel have been eulogized as a sacrifice made by Americans for Hawai‘i. However, other less obvious factors have contributed to the
narrative, and some of these predate the Pearl Harbor attack. For example, Hawai‘i has been “encoded” with militarism in its landscape. Aside from military bases, O‘ahu, in particular, is also strewn with military graveyards such as the massive National Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl, and war memorials such as the Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium and the USS Arizona Memorial. There is even an Army museum located incongruously amidst tourist beaches and hotels in the heart of Waikiki.

Non-Natives have traditionally written the history of Hawai‘i. In these histories, militarism is usually presented as beneficial and normal, and the U.S. military a welcome, protective force that provides security, order, and economic prosperity. History is a series of stories and whoever gets to tell those stories, and has the power and influence to sustain them, will ensure that certain narratives prevail over others. For example, the U.S. military’s role as supposed “defenders” of Hawai‘i from real and imaginary internal and external threats overshadows counter narratives such as those of Native Hawaiian sovereignty activists who might emphasize instead the U.S. military’s role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy in 1893 or its continuing destruction of the Mākua Valley.

Powerful political forces are also an obstacle to productive discussion about the militarization of Hawai‘i. Such issues are not often raised in mainstream Republican/Democratic Hawai‘i politics, (and are almost completely ignored by politicians on the U.S. mainland). One reason for this is, as Professors Kathy E. Ferguson & Phyllis Turnbull of the Political Science Department at the University of Hawai‘i note, that Hawai‘i has become so imbued with militarism that neither politicians or the general public notices or thinks about its role or the problems it causes. They state,
For something to be in plain sight it must mark a variety of spaces, projecting itself into a number of landscapes. For something to be hidden it must be indiscernible, camouflaged, inconspicuously folded into the fabric of daily life. The key to this incompatibility is a series of narratives of naturalization imbricate military institutions and discourses into daily life so that they become ‘just the way things are.’ The narratives of reassurance kick in with a more prescriptive tone, marking the military presence in Hawai‘i as necessary, productive, heroic, desirable, good. (xiii)\textsuperscript{6}

It must come as somewhat of a surprise to outsiders to find the same outward manifestations of militarization in Hawai‘i that one might find in Palestine or, until recently, Northern Ireland, since Hawai‘i is usually portrayed in tourist brochures and guidebooks as a “paradise of the pacific.” Being “outside” the system somewhat (as women and haoles), Ferguson and Turnbull note that the military is both highly visible in Hawai‘i, but also seemingly invisible in terms of critical media coverage or anti-military political activism. They argue that there is a colonization of the mind taking place in Hawai‘i, and through a process of propaganda, disinformation, and limiting the political debate, the same U.S. military that helped overthrow the Hawaiian Monarchy has, paradoxically, come to be seen as a beneficial, protective force that is almost beyond criticism.

The idea that the U.S. military’s role is as defender of Hawai‘i from foreign threats can be traced back to American Eighteenth Century racial paternalism towards “lesser” races. However, the present-day results of that “protection” tell a different story. The economic and social gap between Native Hawaiians and non-Natives of Hawai‘i is large - a product of the seemingly inevitable imbalance of fortunes that result when one society, which is technologically advanced and considers itself “civilized,” meets another society that it considers to be primitive. On the eve of first contact with Captain James Cook in 1778 there were perhaps 800,000 to one million Native Hawaiians in Hawai‘i.\textsuperscript{7}
By mid-Nineteenth Century, however, only 40,000 Native Hawaiians remained. Today, after two centuries of disease and diaspora, there are only 10,000 people in Hawai‘i who classify themselves as “pure” Hawaiian, and a further 220,000 who are of “mixed” Hawaiian lineage. Those Native Hawaiians suffer disproportionately from a variety of social ills compared to other inhabitants of the state. For example, life expectancy in Hawai‘i is approximately 78 years but for Native Hawaiians it is closer to 68. Infant death rates for Native Hawaiians are double the overall state average. In fact, as Professor David Stannard of the University of Hawai‘i points out, “In every age category up to age 30 the Hawaiian death rate is never less than double, and often is triple, the equivalent general mortality rate in the islands” (“The Hawaiians: Health, Justice, and Sovereignty,” 16).8

Native Hawaiians compose approximately one-fifth of the state’s population but rent or own only one-tenth of its housing units. Over a quarter of those domiciles have reported incomes below the state’s poverty line – which makes sense given the prohibitive cost of property in Hawai‘i and the fact that Hawaiians have the highest unemployment rate of all the ethnic groups in Hawai‘i. Even those Hawaiians who do own property tend to live in poor quality homes in the more unfashionable neighborhoods. Native Hawaiian property owners are also almost twice as likely to be below the state’s poverty threshold than non–Native Hawaiian property owners.

In the area of education, Native Hawaiians are disproportionately disadvantaged. At the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, for example, Native Hawaiians compose less than nine percent of the student body and a Native Hawaiian earns only one out of every two hundred graduate degree awards. In the area of criminal justice Stannard notes that
Native Hawaiians “persistently rank at the bottom of virtually every index of social well-being” comprising almost 40 percent of state prison inmates even though Native Hawaiians comprise only 20 percent of the state’s population and despite the fact that they are arrested only in proportion to that ratio.

Clearly foreign (or haole) influence in Hawai‘i has had devastating consequences for the Hawaiian people, and over fifty years of American statehood has not given Native Hawaiians the promised “American Dream.” Rather the extant state of the Native Hawaiian people is, as activist and scholar Haunani-Kay Trask laments, that “Hawaiians remain a politically subordinated group suffering all the legacies of conquest: landlessness, disastrous health, diaspora, institutionalization in the military and prisons, poor educational attainment, and confinement to the service sector of employment” (Trask, “Settlers of Color” 3).

Similarities between Hawai‘i and other colonized lands exist on a number of political, social, and racial levels. For example, any discussion of Hawai‘i must make a distinction between the original inhabitants of the islands, commonly referred to as Native Hawaiians, and inhabitants of the state of Hawai‘i somewhat uncomfortably known as Hawaiians. As Helen Geracimos Chapin notes, haole businessman newspaper publisher Thomas G. Thrum once asked, “Who is a Hawaiian?” His answer was that people like himself and Lorrin Thurston were Hawaiian ‘by birth...[or] by education, sympathies, early association, and subsequent career’” (80). Yet the term Hawaiian is also often used to describe the native inhabitants of Hawai‘i and their descendants. Haoles tend to refer to themselves as “from Hawai‘i” rather than Hawaiian, or if they are
recent immigrants as from their original mainland state – Hawai‘i just being somewhere where they currently reside.

These awkward and contested descriptors are commonplace for people residing in disputed territory. For example, when asked to describe “what they are,” Northern Irish Unionists usually answer “Northern Irish,” “Ulsterman,” “from Ulster,” “from Northern Ireland,” or most commonly, “British.” The term “Irish” is rarely used. Just as Northern Irish Unionists are uncomfortable with their association with the Gaelic Irish and feel the need to distinguish themselves from that group, Hawai‘i is one of those few states in the Union (such as North Dakota, South Dakota, and New Mexico) where non-indigenous Americans feel uncomfortable naming themselves in reference to the name of their state. The common thread here is that both Northern Irish Unionists and haoles in Hawai‘i are newcomers, settlers, or colonists, even if they do not recognize their identity in those terms.

While non-Native politicians seem preoccupied with luring more tourists to Hawai‘i and placating the U.S. military, many Native Hawaiians speak out on issues such as sovereignty, colonialism, land issues, and the removal of U.S. military bases. Such a polarized dialog leaves little room for middle ground, in that it is not a part of the American national narrative for Americans to think of themselves as colonists or imperialists. A politician like Senator Daniel Inouye, for example, may work within the framework of the United States to further the welfare of Hawaiians – Native and non-Native – but it is not a part of his vision to suggest that the United States should consist of only 49 states instead of 50. The ultimate authority Inouye is responsible to is the United States Constitution, whereas an activist like Haunani-Kay Trask will instead
appeal to international organizations such as the United Nations to exert pressure on the U.S.A. over sovereignty issues. She states,

[The Constitution of the United States - that is, the document from which civil rights emanate within the boundaries of the United States - has nothing to say to Chamorros, Samoans, Hawaiians, Inuit, and American Indians. As indigenous peoples, we are all outside the Constitution, the settler document that declares ownership over indigenous lands and peoples. Since the Constitution is an imposed colonial structure, nothing therein prevents the taking of Native lands or the incorporation of unwilling Native peoples into the United States...As intended, the single greatest injury to my people caused by the United States cannot be raised within the context of the U.S. Constitution. (Native Daughter, 26)

That difference in perspective is at the heart of the current and future debates over the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands.

Hawai‘i is a fascinating and instructive example of how, to serve American foreign policy interests, the economic and military might of the U.S. armed forces has been used against the interests of an indigenous people, in this case, Native Hawaiians. Other ethnic groups on the Islands have felt this pressure too – the Japanese during World War Two, for example. However, the Japanese were also able to use military service to their advantage. Senator Inouye served in the all-Japanese 442nd Regimental Combat Team and used that experience as a “rite of passage” to gain access to the heart of the American political establishment. In short, no one could criticize his loyalty, or the loyalty of other Japanese inhabitants of Hawai‘i after the 442nd Regimental Combat Team became the most decorated unit of the American Army. However, as can be seen in the vitriolic anti-Japanese reaction of many haoles in Hawai‘i to the sinking of the Ehime Maru, racist views of the Japanese in Hawai‘i have not gone away. The irony here is that while the Japanese community in Hawai‘i has benefited greatly in terms of local politics - benefits derived, in part, from ongoing support for the U.S. military - from a Native
Hawaiian point of view, the Japanese have simply joined the ranks of their colonial oppressors. That is why Trask declares “For our Native people, Asian success proves to be but the latest elaboration of foreign hegemony” (“Settlers of Color,” 2).

American tourists may see the U.S. armed forces as a comfortable reminder of “home.” However, Trask’s comparison of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i to that of the British military in Ulster and the Israeli Defense Forces in Palestine, demands that the U.S. military be seen in different light - as the occupying army of a foreign power. This is a deliberately provocative comparison, and an attempt to move the traditional discussion about Hawai‘i state politics to a higher political arena. Now is the time to deal with these issues, before the discontent of Native Hawaiians manifests itself in something less pleasant than political rallies, discussion papers, and PhD dissertations. There is an implied threat of force, for example, in Trask’s remark, “Hawaiians, although not in the stage of combat, are nevertheless engaged in a kind of liberation struggle” (“Settlers of Color,” 6). The use of the word “stage” infers progression, as if a violent uprising is the next stage of the Native Hawaiian “liberation struggle.” She may well have said “Hawaiians, although not yet in the stage of combat….” Indeed, some Native Hawaiians have already suggested violence as a tactic, as journalist Viveca Novak has noted:

A few years ago a group of Hawaiians squatted on their ancestral lands – then owned by others, though vacant. A SWAT team was dispatched to evict them, and some in the group took up arms. “We were able to avoid violence then,” says [Mililani] Trask, describing the incident, “but I am concerned that we will not be successful again.” (27)

Journalist John Heckathorn, in an article written from the fictional standpoint of 100 years in Hawai‘i’s future, writes, “Some said Hawaii’s tourist industry died July 3, 2017, when 14 tourists in the pool of the Westin Kauai were gunned down by terrorists” (54).
Language and images like these raise the specter of violence in paradise, and are thus a huge threat to the Islands’ tourist industry. One need only look at the effect of the violent anti-nuclear protests that occurred in Tahiti in September, 1995 for an indication of what may happen to the tourist industry in Hawaiʻi should violence become a tactic of the sovereignty movement. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Native Hawaiians are actually threatening violence to further their cause. Haunani-Kay Trask’s choice of words instead serves to demonstrate the huge political and intellectual gap between Native Hawaiians and non-Natives: to non-Native residents, Hawaiʻi is a state every bit as American as Virginia or New York. It has earned that status not just through the electoral process but also symbolically, through the blood sacrifice of Americans at Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, many Native Hawaiians consider Hawaiʻi to be a colony of the United States, a colonial possession every bit as oppressed and exploited as any held by the “Old World” colonial European powers. From that perspective, the U.S. military is an occupying force. It is, nevertheless, conceivable that Hawaiʻi could at some stage follow the example of both Northern Ireland and Palestine. These models show that whenever such oppressed ethnic groups are denied a voice, or denied a political or democratic means of attaining their goals, violence may eventually follow.

Hawaiʻi remains a fascinating case study in examining race relations in America, and those liminal spaces where racial and national identities are contested. Although Hawaiʻi is geographically, culturally, and politically at the margins of American life, it is at these margins where we find complicated, disordered definitions and interactions of nationality and race. Hawaiʻi is where, for example, almost 1,500 Japanese were interned during World War Two (Daniels, 48). However, Hawaiʻi’s Japanese community also
provided some of the U.S. Army's most heroic combatants in the all-Japanese 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Furthermore, Hawai'i has played a role in the American national consciousness out of proportion to its size. It is in these contradictions to the normal discourse of the role of the U.S. military in Hawai'i that a more holistic view can be attained.

It is both easy and comfortable to view current militarism in Hawai'i as "natural," normal, ordinary, and expected. My intention here, however, is to show how this seemingly natural state of affairs came to be. By examining various representations of the U.S. military in Hawai'i – in newspapers, movies, memorials, museums, and military writing – I will expose how, in forms of representation, places of remembrance, and the construction of how we speak and write about the military, militarism both becomes the norm and, in turn, silences counter-narratives. Houston Wood argues, for example, that, "foreigners [to Hawai'i] have clothed their acts of conquest in a rhetoric that aims both to justify and to disguise the consequences of their acts" (9). This rhetoric shapes how we view the past and therefore affects present and future political, economic, and social trends. For example, if we believe that the role of the U.S. in Hawai'i has traditionally been to "defend" the Islands from an external threat (Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.S.R, rogue nations, terrorism) then we are less likely to view the American military itself as an interloper. War Memorials in Hawai'i rewrite and reshape the landscape in a process that hides and replaces Native Hawaiian history and culture. For example, the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium is built on land that was once part of a sacred but now long forgotten Native heiau. The Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium remains, however, a very visible symbol of American "sacrifice" on behalf of Hawai'i and a
reminder to Hawaiians that they too must answer America’s call in time of war. These processes are not so much misrepresentation, as instead carefully chosen, created, and maintained narratives that promote militarism, patriotism, and Americanism and marginalize the counter narratives of anti-militarists, peace activists, and Native Hawaiian sovereignty advocates.

The dissertation examines four distinct time periods, 1778 to 1898 (from Captain Cook to the annexation of Hawai‘i by the U.S.), 1898-1927 (the period in which the U.S. consolidated its hold on Hawai‘i through cultural imperialism and military build-up), 1927-1969 (which saw the growth of mass tourism, the Massie Case, the attack on Pearl Harbor, martial law and Statehood), and 1965-present (covering the post-Statehood years, the Vietnam War, increasing militarization of Hawai‘i, the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement, and the *Ehime Maru* tragedy). Each section examines how the military is portrayed (and, in some cases, actively seeks to have itself portrayed) through different mediums: section one deals with military writing, section two war memorials, section three, movies, and section four, newspapers. Each of these mediums conveys information differently. Memorials are permanent markers on the landscape, solid and unchanging. They transmit information in tactile and visual ways. Movies, however, entertain while bombarding the audience with visual and auditory stimuli. Museums use a variety of methods of conveying information, including visual, audio, and tactile – whichever mode will best encourage visitors to both respect and trust their version of history. Each medium complements and reinforces each other in promoting militaristic propaganda. Jacques Ellul argues that for propaganda to be truly effective it must be total. He states, “The propagandist must utilize all of the technical means at his disposal—the press, radio,
TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing. Modern propaganda must utilize all of these media” (9). Hawai‘i, the most isolated group of islands in the world is, in many ways, a captive audience for such total propaganda.

The theme of Chapter One is “War Stories.” It will examine military narratives of early Hawai‘i and the role of the U.S. military in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy. The language and labels chosen to represent history are an important means of shaping it. For example, the synecdoche “gunboat diplomacy” has specific connotations that imply imperialist or colonial ambitions. The term is often used in discussions of British imperialism. However, in mainstream debate about the U.S. role in Hawai‘i, or the U.S. military presence, the term “gunboat diplomacy” is notable mainly by its absence. Yet gunboat diplomacy is exactly the policy used by the United States in the Nineteenth Century to enforce its foreign policy decisions and further its economic interests with regard to Hawai‘i. Why is such appropriate terminology not permissible? Americans traditionally see their country as anti-imperialist, even if others do not, and in traditional discourse about Hawai‘i some narratives dominate others and much is left unsaid.

Educationalists and anthropologists have traditionally portrayed indigenous peoples as races from an earlier time in history, who have been conquered by a combination of white superiority, “natural” extinction, and the supposed will of God. These views typify the way that Western historians, social scientists, academics, and administrators write about Hawaiian history. They repeat misguided notions of a dying Hawaiian culture in order to avoid dealing with the problems that Westerners have caused, and still cause, in Hawai‘i today. Perhaps those guiltiest of these faults is,
however, that group of historians that emanates out of the U.S. military – those who write military histories and seek to excuse, confuse, and disguise the truth about the U.S. military’s role in colonizing Hawai‘i. For example, prominent in military writing are themes such as “paternalism,” “restoring order,” “progress,” “creating civilization in the wilderness,” “patrolling the frontier,” “protecting America’s women,” “‘us’ and ‘them’” (the “other”), and “teaching the natives the values of Americanism.” This chapter exposes some of these discourses that serve only to mask American colonialism, advance patriotic narratives and to glorify war and militarism.

Chapter Two discusses the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium. Situated in Kapi‘olani Park, the World War One memorial gives the impression that 101 men from Hawai‘i died fighting in the Great War, seventy-nine died fighting under American arms, and twenty-two in the British Army. Since the memorial provides only limited written information, one is meant to assume from the inscription that all of those who died were killed in action, that is, as a result of enemy action. In fact, however, only eight were killed in actual combat. Why is the memorial so misleading and why did its designers choose a neoclassical theme incompatible with its Pacific Island setting?

War Memorials do not simply recollect past sacrifices. Instead, they shape attitudes in the present and thus act as a guide for the future. In examining those who advocated and built the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium, the reason for the discrepancy between actual casualty figures and those inscribed on the Memorial becomes clear: the War Memorial was built to further the “100% Americanism” of Hawai‘i and to celebrate militarism. While it claims to commemorate those who died in World War One, in fact it simply venerates the war itself. In celebrating the war as a
“noble cause” and silencing potential counter-narratives, the memorial also celebrates Hawai‘i’s colonization by the United States. The Memorial constitutes a political statement of ownership. It is a symbol of the dominance of Western culture over Polynesian, a solid, concrete and unchanging reminder that Hawai‘i is a colonial possession of the United States.

Chapter Three looks at cinematic representations of the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i. My research focuses on two main themes: (1) film as propaganda, and (2) Hawai‘i’s role in Tom Engelhardt’s “American war story.” Jacques Ellul’s work on propaganda offers a key to understanding the role that movies play in disseminating and perpetuating stereotypes of Hawai‘i, and Engelhardt’s analysis helps explain why Americans feel so little guilt about their role in the nuclear destruction of two Japanese cities (because “they” (the “savages”) attacked “us” (Fort Hawai‘i) first and any revenge we took is therefore justified). Although movies about the military in Hawai‘i vary greatly in style and content, when considered together as a genre they can have a simple narrative: America was unprepared for the “sneak” attack on its citizens; the Japanese in Hawai‘i cannot be trusted; the U.S. military is Hawai‘i’s protector; war is honorable, exciting, sexy and fun. This chapter also examines the role of war movies in perpetuating racial stereotypes and historical myths, not the least of which is that of the “sneak” attack on Pearl Harbor.

Movies about Hawai‘i can be divided into three categories: (1) Pre-Pearl Harbor (2) 1942-1955 (3) 1955-1973. In the first period, Hollywood movies emphasize the otherness of Hawai‘i and provide stereotypical and racist views of Hawaiians. In period two, Hollywood films portray Hawai‘i as part of America, to emphasize the fact that the
Japanese attacked "America" and not simply a U.S. colony. In period three, films about Hawai‘i utilize images of the melting pot and "rainbow state" as a paradigm and lesson for American race relations on the U.S. mainland.

Chapter Four examines local media coverage of the U.S. military, and focuses on newspaper coverage of the Vietnam War and the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* by the *USS Greeneville*. I compare mainstream news media coverage of military matters with, for example, anti-war underground press coverage of those same issues, examples of which are held in the Hawai‘i Pacific Collection of the University of Hawai‘i and include *Carrion Crow* (1967-68), *Roach* (1968-69), *Hawaii Free People's Press* (1969-70), *Gathering Place* (1971-72), *Liberated Barracks* (1971-74), and *Another Voice* (1972-75).

The news media in Hawai‘i is complicit in either concealing the true costs of the U.S. military presence, or it simply "toes the line" by being almost totally non-critical of military actions. Furthermore, the military’s community liaisons groups usually consist of business leaders such as bank officials, tourism chiefs, and newspaper employees or owners. Politicians and influential civilians are invited to various military functions, parades, briefings, and ceremonies, and are rewarded for their support with free rides on PACOM equipment. Local politicians, business leaders, and news media moguls have no interest in alienating the military and even tragedies such as the *Ehime Maru* sinking do not raise questions about the overall role of the military in Hawai‘i. This conflict of interest leads to constraint of the debate about the U.S. military presence. The seemingly all-powerful forces of the military and the media continue to combine to justify the U.S. military’s position in Hawai‘i and rarely criticize that institution.
The relationship between the local media and the military is symbiotic rather than the adversarial one that is essential in a functioning democracy. An analysis of mainstream newspaper coverage of the Vietnam War shows, for example, how the news media distorts history by omission and spin. Contrary to the myth that Hawai‘i is a docile and willing home to U.S. troops, analysis of underground newspapers published during the Vietnam War shows a very active and vociferous anti-war and anti-draft movement, much of whose activities were not reported by the mainstream media.

I do not pretend in this dissertation to speak for Native Hawaiians, because that only adds to their problems. Instead I simply want to add my voice to theirs in what, I hope, will be a helpful way. I intend to take Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s advice, namely that “Foreigners can serve Hawaiians by educating other foreigners and teaching them to be humble” (326). By revealing how militarism has come to be imbued in Hawai‘i, and exposing, where possible, alternative ways of looking at militarism, this dissertation will ask those foreigners to view both Hawai‘i and the U.S. military presence from a different and uncomfortable perspective - Hawai‘i as a colonial possession of the United States, with that status quo maintained, at least in part, by a huge U.S. military presence. Dee Brown asked of his audience for Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee that they reconsider their traditional historical perspective. He stated, “Americans who have always looked westward when reading about this period should read this book facing eastward.” I ask of my audience that they too make that same leap.
CHAPTER 1. WAR STORIES: A MILITARIZED HISTORY OF HAWAI‘I

Much has been written and recorded about certain episodes in the United States military’s occupation of Hawai‘i, such as, for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. There is, however, a surprising shortage of analysis of the historical input of the United States and other foreign military forces to Hawai‘i, specifically the role of those militaries in coercing Native Hawaiians into accepting decisions made by foreign governments and merchants. One tends to find, instead, military historical writing filled with omissions, errors, and excuses, all of which are designed to portray the military in the best possible light, as a benign institution that provides employment opportunities for Islanders, economic benefits for local businesses, defends the Islands from external threats, and restores internal order in times of civil unrest. In all sorts of military writing, whether it is military histories, ship’s logs, websites, ROTC manuals, documentaries, or museum narratives, the military accepts no responsibility for the disinheritance of Native Hawaiians, for the overthrow of their kingdom, or for continuing problems associated with the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i. It is tempting to describe these histories as a form of amnesia. However, as Marita Sturken points out, history is not as much about forgetting the past as it is about replacing some uncomfortable narratives with more tranquil and convenient ones:

American political culture is often portrayed as one of amnesia, and the media seem complicit in the public’s apparent ease in forgetting important political facts and events. However...American culture is not amnesiac but rather replete with memory, [and] cultural memory is a central aspect of how American culture functions and how the nation is defined. The “culture of amnesia” actually involves the generation of memory in new forms. (2)

This “memory in new forms” is crafted and shaped by carefully chosen rhetorical devices. For example, the synecdoche “gunboat diplomacy” has specific connotations
that imply imperialist or colonial ambitions. Anthony Preston and John Major define gunboat diplomacy as "the use of warships in peacetime to further a nation’s diplomatic and political aims." "By this definition," the authors claim, "the whole of the nineteenth century was an age of gunboat diplomacy" (3). The term can be found in numerous texts about British and French foreign policy in the Pacific and it is, indeed a perfectly apt description of, for example, French naval Captain C.P.T. Laplace’s threats to bombard Honolulu in 1839 (Daws, 103) or of the tactics of the British Royal Navy’s Captain Lord George Paulet, who annexed Hawai‘i to Great Britain in 1843 (Daws, 112-118).

However, in the histories of the United States military in Hawai‘i written by American military historians or their apologists, the term “gunboat diplomacy” is nowhere to be seen. Yet force, or the threat of force, was the unmistakable policy of the United States in its dealings with Hawai‘i in the Nineteenth Century.

The United States chose force or coercion for two reasons: firstly, Native Hawaiians were not considered as equals. They were, in the view of many Americans, similar to Native Americans as a vanishing race of primitive, childlike savages who needed to be “taught” the lessons of civilization. Secondly, the availability of military might ultimately leads to an impulse to put it to use, especially against an enemy less well armed or inferior in numbers. Nations use violence or the threat thereof, Elaine Scarry concludes, because they believe the outcome of warfare “carries the power of its own enforcement; the winner may enact its issues because the loser does not have the power to reinitiate the battle, does not have the option to further contest the issues or to contest the nature of the contest” (96).
Why then is such an appropriate term as “gunboat diplomacy” absent from discussions of the United States and Hawai‘i? Perhaps the answer lies in Marita Sturken’s observation that history is “a narrative that has in some way been sanctioned or valorized by institutional frameworks” (4). Despite much evidence to the contrary, Americans traditionally see their country as anti-imperialist. This “blindfold” means that some narratives, such as that of the United States being a friendly neighbor to Hawai‘i, dominate over others such as those of Native Hawaiian sovereignty activists who see the United States as a colonial power. Edward Said has written extensively on the power of the narrative, that is, whichever group gets to tell its stories about history will dominate how we view the past. He states,

stories are at the heart of what explorers and novelists say about strange regions of the world; they also become the method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the existence of their own history. The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course, but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future-these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided in narrative. The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them. (xii-xiii).

In this respect, military historians complement many Western anthropologists and ethnographers. For example, Mary Louise Pratt argues that a typical strategy of an anthropologist is to paint a “portrait of a conquered people, simultaneously acknowledging the innocence and pathos of their condition, evaluating their potential as a labor pool, and legitimizing their domination on the grounds that they do not know how to manage themselves” (47). Anthropologist James Clifford notes, “The theme of the vanishing primitive, of the end of traditional society...is pervasive in ethnographic writing” (112). Both of these approaches are typical of the way that Western historians,
social scientists, academics and observers study Hawaiian history. Ann Winslow, for example, was the wife of an Army officer. In 1909 she describes a reception she attended held by ex-Queen Lili‘uokalani as like “a tremendous funeral,” and that it “all looked to me like the final gasp of a dying order of things” (86). Military historians repeat misguided notions of a dying Hawaiian culture in order to avoid dealing with the problems that Westerners have caused, and still cause, in Hawai‘i.

American military historians not only repeat these notions of the “vanishing primitive,” they also have their own narratives which include themes of “paternalism,” “restoring order,” “progress,” “creating civilization in the wilderness,” patrolling the frontier,” protecting America’s women,” “us” and “them” (the “other”) and “teaching the natives the values of Americanism.” Military discourse about Hawai‘i in the period 1778 to 1898 acts almost like a tactic to further notions of Americanism and to glorify war and militarism. There are different types of military writing concerning Hawai‘i, including biographies, novels, military histories, accounts of battles, museum narratives, and collections of empirical data about bases, units and other institutions. Each of these narratives has an inherent bias or slant, a “message” about the military that has real political consequences for those interested in representing or remembering the United States military’s role in the conquest and occupation of Hawai‘i. Historian Paul Fussell has shown, for example, in Wartime and The Great War and Modern Memory, there are methods of writing that celebrate war and the military as noble and honorable, and certain recurring themes in military writing that can be identified and analyzed to show how limiting those discourses can be. For example, “‘[R]aised,’ essentially feudal language,” as Fussell calls it, is the language of choice for military writers, military historians, and
war memorials (Great War, 21). This is the “high diction” of nineteenth-century English literary tradition, words and phrases like “steed” instead of “horse,” “strife” instead of “warfare,” “breast” instead of “chest,” and “the red wine of youth” in place of “blood” (Great War, 22). This style of writing deflects attention from the cruelty and sadness of war and instead elevates it to the status of “noble cause.”

Similarly, Ferguson and Turnbull show that military discourses are male dominated and work only if Hawai‘i is designated as a vulnerable and welcoming female paradise. They argue, for example, that the traditional image of a dark-skinned, seductive female native that is so prevalent in books, travel literature, and movies, is a racist and demeaning representation that consigns native women to the role of sexual objects:

Western intrusions into Hawai‘i – from early explorers, traders, and missionaries, to planters, diplomats, and military leaders, to travel agents, airline companies, and foreign visitors – have seen Hawai‘i as a welcoming feminine place, waiting with open arms to embrace those who come to penetrate, protect, mold, and develop, while simultaneously lacking that which would make it fully realized (and which the intruders conveniently believe themselves to possess). Maps of Hawai‘i from Captain James Cook’s expeditions represent Hawai‘i with soft, curved, breast-like mountains and mysterious coves and bays... Missionary accounts of “the natives” emphasize their darkness; naked, unashamed, promiscuous. (6)

In male-dominated military discourse, the army, navy, and air force provides protection for a weak, feminized Hawai‘i.

Like Fussell, Ferguson and Turnbull note there is a certain type of language used by the military and its apologists and supporters that justifies military actions and inevitably judges it as honorable and indispensable. Opposing dualities such as them/us, safe/dangerous, benevolent/cruel, innocent/suspicious, brave/cowardly, fanatical/reasonable, diabolic/humane and uncivilized/civilized are utilized to frame the discussion and restrict what can and cannot be said with regard to war and the military
In view of this, a careful reading of military writing (writing that eminates both from within the military itself, and from without, in the form of military histories, museum narratives, literature, diaries etc.) can reveal these hidden narratives that perpetuate certain types of remembering, all of which, of course, make the military look rational, brave, and honorable. These narratives play a continuing role in the ongoing colonization of Hawai‘i.

This chapter, which covers the time period of 1778 to 1898, focuses on Lyndall and Daniel Landauer’s *Pearl: the History of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor*, and the military narratives exhibited at the Fort DeRussy Army Museum. The Landauers’ account of Hawaiian history and the U.S. Navy’s role therein, has been chosen because it contains, in one text, almost all of the errors, distortions, and excuses that apologists for the U.S. military use to justify American militarism in Hawai‘i. A detailed analysis of this book, which, after all, boldly asserts itself as “the” (and not “a”) history of the U.S. Navy in Hawai‘i, will therefore provide a better picture of how military writing works than an analysis of any other single military history of Hawai‘i, which may contain only some of the faults previously mentioned. The Fort DeRussy Army Museum deserves critical academic attention because of its physical and psychological presence. Like the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium, its presence in an area of Honolulu mostly dedicated to tourism and, therefore, ersatz reproductions of Native Hawaiian culture, is a reminder of both militarism and colonial ownership. Inside, the museum tells a version of history that is dedicated to both the preservation and promotion of American militarism.

My intention here is to demonstrate how and why such military writing is incomplete,
biased, and replete with errors and inaccuracies, and how such writing acts as an agent of ongoing American colonialism.

The U.S. Army Museum of Hawai‘i (Fort DeRussy)

Museums are in some ways the “official” depositories of history. Their versions of the past are given weight by the assumption that a museum is a permanent fixture and is thus anchored both in time and space. In a world where the past is often swept by the rough seas of revisionist history, this sense of permanence adds credence to the museums display of historical “fact.” James Mayo notes “visitors expect public museums to present coordinated, accurate collections that record history, preserve objects, and further education. People trust that museum exhibits will be legitimate portrayals of history, because the museum serves the public history rather than itself” (37). What happens then when that “trust” is broken?

As Mike Wallace points out, “[History] museums generate…conventional ways of seeing history that justif[y] the mission of capitalists and len[d] a naturalism and inevitability to their authority. More importantly, perhaps, museum narratives generate “ways of not seeing” (24). In Lies Across America, James Loewen notes that our historic sites omit many pertinent historical facts and therefore present skewed views of historical events or characters. Contrary to the general public’s view of museums as repositories of a supposedly official version of history, museum exhibits and narratives are often contentious. The Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg, Texas, for example, is notable according to Loewen more for “things not mentioned” than its actual contents. These omissions include visual images – a lack of photographs or representations of dead bodies - and also historical events or narratives that contradict the commonly held view
of World War Two as “the good war.” Loewen concludes that “The Nimitz Museum not only prettifies the Pacific War, it also prettifies America’s role in it” (188-95).

Rarely though do museum controversies reach beyond the spheres of scholars and professionals. A rare example of a dispute that did raise public consciousness, however, occurred in 1995. To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War Two, the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum planned to exhibit the Enola Gay, the airplane which was the delivery vehicle in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945. The theme of the exhibit was that the bombing not only ended World War Two but also, in effect, started the Cold War. Conservative politicians and commentators such as Senator Bob Dole, Rush Limbaugh, Newt Gingrich and Pat Buchanan claimed the exhibit was divisive and unnecessarily "political." World War Two was the "good war," after all, and the divisive arguments of Vietnam-era politics should not be brought to bear on the "greatest generation." Conservatives argued that the proposed exhibit made America the villain and the Japanese the victims of World War Two. Furthermore, the inclusion of a narrative about the beginning of the Cold War brought into question the decision to drop the bomb. If allowed to proceed, conservatives argued, the exhibit would dishonor America's war veterans. Under pressure from politicians, the American Legion, and a section of the general public that had been motivated to act by the controversy, the museum eventually backed down and its director resigned.

As Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt note in History Wars, “The fiftieth anniversary of any major event that put large numbers of people in peril naturally tends to establish a protective membrane around the commemorative moment. This accounts for
the outrage" (4). However, it also seems clear that at least some of the uproar occurred because of the public’s fear that “revisionist” history (in the negative sense of the word) had penetrated the hallowed halls of the Smithsonian Museum, which, until that moment, had been seen as a metonymy for historical integrity and truthfulness. While the American public assumes and expects that other historical mediums such as movies, books or, to a lesser extent perhaps, television documentaries may be contentious, it does not expect controversy in its history museums. In fact, some research has shown that visitors come to historical sites not to learn but simply to be reassured. William Alderson and Shirley Low state, for example, that “nostalgia is one of the prime motivations” for visitors. They conclude,

Many people have a romantic view of a past that they believe was less hurried and more relaxed than the time in which they now live. They minimize or ignore the hardships of the past...For many visitors...the historical site is a form of escape. Other visitors appear to be searching for their cultural roots and for a sense of belonging. They want to experience the sense of continuity that the site can help provide as a tangible link with the past. (24)

Unlike the general American public, however, indigenous peoples under the control of the United States - Native Americans, Native Hawaiians - have contested the contents of museums and other receptacles and mediums of historical and cultural knowledge. For example, Native American intellectual Vine Deloria Jr. criticizes scholars who “become very competitive with Indians, believing that because they have studied an Indian tribe they therefore know more than any of the tribal members (65). Similarly, Ward Churchill takes issue with “the discipline of anthropology [which] churns out what might be best described as ‘disinformation specialists’” (172). Haunani-Kay Trask concludes that the anthropologist “is a taker and a user” and that “No moral or ethical responsibility attaches to the anthropologist or the archeologist” (Native
Daughter, 127). The voices of indigenous peoples offer very potent criticism of colonial practices. Because these peoples have traditionally been marginalized and their voices silenced, they are therefore perfectly positioned to comment upon what Mike Wallace calls the “unwritten understanding” that museums impose “limits on what can be said, even if they have not been laid down explicitly” (123).

The Fort DeRussy Army Museum is guilty of many of the omissions and misrepresentations noted above. Its darkened halls are not only a “form of escape” for Waikiki tourists, but also offer a “sense of continuity” between past, present and future. DeRussy communicates revealing insights into the forces of militarism and, in particular, illustrates how a militaristic version of history marginalizes or silences more holistic and controversial narratives. In constructing one particular “military” history of Hawai‘i the museum creates and reinforces harmful narratives such as that Western culture is superior to Native Hawaiian, and that events that took place in the Pacific from the time of Cook to the present happened as a result of the inevitable forces of history rather than the carefully constructed foreign policy decisions of European powers and the United States.

Formally a gun emplacement during World War Two and a “rest and recreation” center for soldiers returning from Vietnam, the United States military turned DeRussy into a museum that not only glorifies militarism but also interprets the society around it purely in terms of what the military requires to justify its presence. As Ferguson and Turnbull note, Fort DeRussy acts as a mirror of the military’s understanding of itself. The museum accomplishes this primarily by creating an internal and external threat to the Islands and by coding them feminine and, therefore, sexually vulnerable. Ferguson and Turnbull state, for example, that feminized islands and people “continue to be re-
inscribed with meanings according to the needs of the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century colonists and the present day military" (44). The museum is replete with images of smiling Polynesian women hula dancing and welcoming soldiers with gifts of leis. This image of a dark skinned seductive native is a racist and demeaning one, that consigns natives to stereotypical roles of passive children or sexual objects. Since children and women need to be “protected,” the museum thus creates a reason for its own existence. It produces a Hawai‘i the United States military needs in order to justify its presence in the Islands and in so doing acts as an agent of colonialism.

Like all museums, DeRussy is a mixture of artifacts accompanied by historical or cultural text that helps visitors interpret what they see. Because it was originally designed for use as a fortified gun emplacement, the museum is dissimilar to many modern museums. It utilizes, for example, one long corridor to exhibit its artifacts and tell its story in strict chronological order. The museum’s mission is clearly laid out in the first text box:

Hawai‘i’s military heritage is richly diverse. Military institutions, events, and technology have affected Hawai‘i’s people since ancient times with political, social, and economic impact. Our story tells of the men and machines which shaped that heritage: warriors who built a kingdom, soldiers who defended an island, citizens who served their country and sacrificed to keep it free. Hawai‘i’s many ethnic groups share this proud heritage. Each has contributed in some way to the fabric of Hawai‘i’s military past. This is their story, and the story of the U.S. Army in Hawai‘i.

Furthermore, a publicity leaflet available at the museum states that it is “dedicated to the preservation of the military history of Hawaii and its people” (The U.S. Army Museum of Hawai‘i: A Most Unusual Glimpse into the Past). By claiming that what its visitors are about to see is “their story,” the museum claims to speak not only for the military but also for Native Hawaiians and Hawai‘i’s “many ethnic groups.” The museum thereby ensures
that counter narratives to militarism and colonialism can be completely ignored. These limitations are "hidden in plain sight" (to use Ferguson and Turnbull’s apt phrase) by the supposed authenticity of a narrative which claims to speak for everyone. For example, who are those who “sacrificed to keep [Hawai‘i] free?” Are they the Native Hawaiians who fought with unscrupulous foreign traders in the post-Cook era? Or are “they” the Japanese who fought for America in World War One? Clearly, the museum is not talking about those groups: to the hordes of tourists who visit, those who fought for Hawai‘i’s freedom are the soldiers, sailors and airmen who died at Pearl Harbor. The freedom of Native Hawaiians to control their own destiny is thus submerged not only by the museum’s claim to speak for them but also by the visitors’ association of “freedom” with the success of America’s armed forces and not with anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist narratives.

The sins of omission continue as the visitor ambulates quickly forward though nineteenth century history. Historian and Museum Director Tom Fairfull states that DeRussy is not an instrument of propaganda and aims only to present the facts. He wants the museum to be “used to support the education, training and recreation of Army personnel, and as a community resource” and the way to accomplish this is to simply “show the way that it was” (Ferguson & Turnbull, 45). However, historical facts are always being revised, and Fairfull’s claims of authenticity are disputable. James Mayo, for example, notes that “By presenting [only] the facts, museums avoid controversy about war, and conveying honor enables museums to legitimize their designed scenes of war” (43). Many of DeRussy’s “facts” are presented without context, and much of its
terminology is problematic. A display entitled "Sugar and Soldiers: Reciprocity Treaty
Of 1876," states, for example:

The American Civil War, 1861-1865, stimulated Hawai‘i’s sugar industry. Reciprocity, duty-free export of sugar to the United States, became a goal for Hawai‘i. In 1872, General John Schofield reported the strategic value of Pearl Harbor to U.S. interests: reciprocity in exchange for cession of Pearl Harbor seemed mutually advantageous. King David Kalakaua granted the United States use of Pearl Harbor as a naval base and thus secured Congress’ approval of reciprocity on August 15, 1876. Hawai‘i and the United States were linked formally by military and economic issues.

The text does not state to whom Schofield reported. In fact, he was an American spy, eying up Pearl Harbor for possible American military use. His “report,” which was kept secret for twenty years, recommended that Pearl Harbor be acquired in “whatever manner possible” (Tabrah, 82).

According to the text, “Reciprocity…became a goal for Hawai‘i” but what or who does “Hawai‘i” represent in this narrative? Is it the Hawaiian government of the time, the King, the people, or, more accurately, big business interests in conjunction with the United States military? In fact, the Hawaii legislature that negotiated the Treaty was representative only of the Islands’ 3000 haoles, most of whom were American nationals, and only a few wealthy natives (Tabrah, 83). Native Hawaiians disputed the authority of King Kalakaua, who rubber-stamped the Treaty. When Lunalilo died, a dispute arose between David Kalakaua and Queen Emma over genealogy and, therefore, over who was next in line for the throne. Kalakaua apparently won the legislative vote and Emma’s supporters rioted. Foreign Affairs minister Charles Bishop and O‘ahu Governor John Dominis asked for “protection” from three docked warships, USS Tuscarora, USS Portsmouth, and HMS Tenedos. Some 230 American troops landed and suppressed the protest. In effect, haoles asked foreign troops to interfere in a Hawaiian Royalty dispute
because they feared Emma’s anti-Reciprocity, pro-British stance (Kent, 45). The threat of U.S. military intervention would remain as the Tuscarora, Portsmouth, Benicia, Lackawanna and Pensacola were ordered to visit Honolulu on a continual basis from then on. Clearly Fairfull’s claims to “show the way that it was” are only tenable if many opposing facts such as these are omitted.

This becomes clearer when the museum is forced to deal with the potentially narrative-disrupting issue of annexation. An exhibit entitled “Annexation: Pacific Strategy” states, for example:

The United States became a world power and acquired overseas holdings as a result of the Spanish-American War. Hawai‘i’s strategic location made it critical to the military interests of the United States. Hawaii would serve as an outpost to protect the west coast from any foreign threat. Hawaii would also serve as a coaling station and naval base to fuel the Navy’s steam-powered warships. Hawaii would be a crucial link to the United States’ new possessions, Guam and the Philippines, ceded by Spain, and to the economic markets of Asia. On August 12, 1898 the United States ratified the treaty of annexation offered by the government of the Republic of Hawaii. Hawaii became a territory of the United States.

The opening sentence uses passive voice as if the United States played no part itself in “becoming” a world power and in “acquiring” the coyly named “overseas holdings” (colonies). The narrative makes it seem like this happened accidentally and the United States is almost an unwilling victim, abruptly tasked with the “white man’s burden” of paternalism over native peoples in Cuba, Hawai‘i, the Philippines, and Guam. It is disingenuous for the museum to refer to the “government of the Republic of Hawaii” without explaining that this was an illegal government which existed only because of a conspiracy and rebellion which overthrew Hawai‘i’s last monarch, Queen Lili‘uokalani, as noted by the United States government’s official investigation commonly known as the Blount Report. Investigator James H. Blount concluded that the overthrow was an illegal
act perpetrated by big business interests with the help of United States Minister to Hawai‘i John Stevens and United States marines. To state ambiguously that the United States ratified a treaty of annexation “offered by the government of the Republic of Hawaii” without providing the proper context results in pseudo-history or propaganda that the museum can only get away with if it completely ignores the Bayonet Constitution and later overthrow of Liliuokalani. Indeed, a booklet published in 2000 by The Hawaii Army Museum Society seems to acknowledge this point. It reprints all the text of the “Annexation: Pacific Strategy” exhibit except the last two lines about the treaty “offered by the government of the Republic of Hawaii” (Mills, 16). In the museum’s chronological exhibit, this missing section of Hawaiian history is hidden in plain sight by the almost laughable placement of a fire escape door (Ferguson & Turnbull, 59). Perhaps though an anxious museum felt a fire door was needed: after all, if, amongst its maze of disinformation, natives were reminded of the illegal overthrow of their nation, it might lead them to “burn down their master’s house.”

In the language of military writing the phrase “imposing order” is frequently used. The museum continues this tradition by imposing a chronological rather than thematic order on its narrative. In fact, however, this leads to a disordered historical narrative that confuses rather than enlightens. For example, DeRussy is an Army museum that also purports to tell the story of Hawai‘i’s military heritage. Completely missing from this military heritage though is the Nineteenth Century gunboat diplomacy of the United States Navy. While the museum displays Hawaiian warships from that period, and also discusses United States naval policy with regard to Twentieth Century events such as Pearl Harbor, there is no mention whatsoever of the actions of Captain “Mad Jack”
Percival, Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, or the Marines from the *USS Adams or USS Boston*. The museum chooses carefully its narrative of continuity, as it does not want to place the United States military in Hawai‘i before “the United States ratified the treaty of annexation offered by the government of the Republic of Hawaii.” To do so would suggest, correctly, that the American military was an agent of change. However, by showing pre-contact and early Nineteenth Century Hawaiians only as warlike (and by not showing non-warlike activity) the museum indicates that Hawai‘i was and is a militarized space and thus justifies the United States military’s presence as being a “natural” progression.

Projecting a sense of continuity is obviously a major goal of the museum. A publicity leaflet available at the museum states, for example:

A little over two hundred years ago the young warrior Kamehameha dreamed of enfolding all of the Hawaiian Islands into one great lei-creating a nation which could take its place among the other nations of the world. Hundreds of canoes pierced the sands of Waikiki and thousands of warriors rushed ashore to commence the attack on the defenses of Oahu. Today a museum stands on the ground that could have been the very center of the gathering. (*The U.S. Army Museum of Hawai‘i: A Most Unusual Glimpse into the Past*)

To emphasize this point, at the front exterior of the museum are five carved wooden figures that represent Kunuiakea or Ku, the Hawaiian god of war. Furthermore, each chronological exhibit of Hawaiian history in the museum’s long corridor is accompanied by a comparison with events that took place in the United States. For example, the “Sugar and Soldiers” exhibit is accompanied by the text “1876 Custer defeated at the Little Big Horn,” “Annexation: Pacific Strategy” is accompanied by the text “1898 Remember the Maine! – War with Spain,” “Hawaiian Warfare - Ancient Military Systems” is accompanied by the text “1492 Columbus sails to the New World,” and so on. While it
may argue that a comparative narrative is necessary if visitors are to get some sense of a world timeline, an alternative hypothesis is that the museum wants to create links to the United States where none previously existed. Many foreign powers had interests in Hawai‘i, and the American annexation is sometimes justified by the argument that Hawai‘i as an American colony is better than, say, a Hawai‘i under Japanese colonial rule. By making these textual connections between events in Hawai‘i and seemingly unrelated historical events on the United States mainland, the museum seems to be retroactively and metaphorically planting an American flag to counter the one raised by Captain Cook in 1778.

Military continuity is maintained also by painting the ancestors of today’s Native Hawaiians as a warlike race. The museum first displays native weapons such as sling stones and then later in that exhibit shows how the natives have become “civilized” by appropriating and utilizing flintlock muskets. The “Sling Stones” exhibit states, “Before the arrival of western technology, Hawaiian warriors used slings to hurl missiles at the enemy. Range and accuracy were limited by the strength and ability of the slinger." The text’s focus on the physical attributes of Native Hawaiians, the brute strength needed to hurl the fist-sized stones exhibited, is unfortunately typical of centuries of racist discussion of “backward” races whose intellect was supposedly inferior to that of Westerners and who could only be admired for their physicality. The contrast between a supposedly stone-age civilization and the sophistication of European weaponry is underlined by the image that accompanies the “Sling Stones” exhibit, a drawing of a Neanderthal-looking Hawaiian. To the uninformed tourist, the message of the exhibit is
demeaning and misleading, that Native Hawaiians were violent, Stone Age barbarians, and the arrival of Western technology and ideas acted as a catalyst for civilization.

The exhibit entitled "Flintlock Musket," for example, contrasts the sophisticated technology of European warriors with the previously shown primitiveness of the natives. The text states, "A typical firearm adopted by Hawaiians after 1775 is the British "Brown Bess" .69 caliber. Sparks from flint striking steel ignited the gunpowder primer. Accurate range for this smooth-bore muzzle loader was only about 50 yards, but the blast, fire, and smoke were terrifying." As if to underline this superiority, the text is accompanied by a cutaway diagram of the gun, which serves to further contrast the technical design of Western warfare with that of natives who, it seems, simply picked up stones and threw them. In fact, a sling stone was probably at least as good a weapon at that time as the musket. The text suggests, however, that guns terrified Native Hawaiians who were too primitive and superstitious to understand such advanced technology. In fact, however, there is much evidence that Native Hawaiians quickly got over the novelty of guns. A century earlier, Captain Cook fired point blank into the chest of a native, but the bullet failed to penetrate the Hawaiian’s heavy protective matting (Daws, 20). This is hardly the awe-inspiring technology suggested by the museum.

In a display entitled “Hawaiian Warfare: Ancient Military Systems” the museum highlights the supposedly primitive and savage nature of natives:

Hawaiians sailed to their islands nearly a thousand years before Columbus’ time, and developed military systems. Preparations for war were elaborate. Temples were built and the gods were consulted for auspicious times to fight. Trained warriors, armed with weapons of wood, stone, sharks' teeth, and bone, deployed on open ground in dense crescent formations. Before battle was joined, sacrifices, prayers, and orations were offered to the gods. At the attack signal, the armies rushed forward, throwing spears and sling-stones to loosen the enemy's formation. They met with daggers, clubs, and fists, using brute strength in hand-to-hand
combat. The army whose formation broke, took flight. The victors' pursuit was intense and deadly.

This description is accompanied by an engraving of a fierce-looking Hawaiian warrior. The text seems to suggest that the first thing Hawaiians did when they discovered the islands was to establish "military systems." The focus of the museum's gaze is on warfare and not, for example, the incredible accomplishments of ancient Hawaiians in navigation and agriculture. The reference to Hawaiian religious practices (gods were consulted and temples were built) is off-hand and dismissive. There is no attempt to explain Hawaiian religion, and the visitor is likely to dismiss ancient Hawaiian society as heathen and barbaric. Interestingly, if the museum had chosen here to compare European or American events of that time period to the events taking place in Hawai'i, it could have mentioned, for example, the ongoing religious crusade against Native Americans. Clearly, however, only those comparisons that serve the overall narrative of "primitive" Hawai'i are displayed. Hence, the only reference to Native Americans in the museum is at the "Sugar and Soldiers" display where it states, "1876 Custer defeated at the Little Big Horn." Just as Custer's death has been told in the language of "savages" and "massacres," one get the impression that DeRussy wants to surround its American visitors with images of savage, warlike Hawaiians, and to remind those visitors that a United States military presence is still required at "Fort Hawai'i" if such massacres are to be avoided in the future.

One of the major difficulties of claiming that DeRussy "just want[s] to show the way that it was" is the museum's interpretation of Hawaiian society. In the "Ali'i: Ruling Chiefs" display, for example, the museum claims "Captain Cook found a feudal society in Hawaii, like Europe of the Middle Ages." However, in her authoritative book *Native
Land and Foreign Desires, author Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa seems to establish rather conclusively that Europeans tend to interpret the Hawaiian system in terms of their own history and that such comparisons between European social systems and pre-Cook Hawaiian are based on superficial similarities only. Kameʻeleihiwa explains in detail that the relationship Hawaiians had to their land was not feudal but symbiotic. She states, “Control of ‘Āina is not the same as ownership of ‘Āina, in the Western capitalist sense. In traditional Hawaiian society, ‘Āina was given from one person to another, but was never bought or sold” (51).

In theory, the Mōʻi (the premier chief on any island) was the head of a land distribution system dedicated to the welfare of all Native Hawaiians. Land was parceled out in various sizes such as Moku (the biggest land division) ‘Okana (an area containing several ahupua’a), ahupua’a (a triangular area of land usually running from the mountains to the sea), ‘ili (an area of land smaller again), Mo’o‘āina (smaller than an ‘ili), paukū‘āina (smaller again), kīhāpai (smaller again) and several other divisions of land such as, koʻele and hakuone which were parcels of land cultivated by the kama‘āina for the Aliʻi. Although land could be redistributed at any time at the whim of the Mōʻi, for example if a land owner broke a kapu (sacred or prohibited) law, or through Kū (war) or Lono (marriage/love/children), the main division or perhaps sharing of land took place at the kālai‘āina, the distribution of land at the death of a Mōʻi. Kameʻeleihiwa makes it clear that the Mōʻi and Aliʻi were not deciding who should own the land but instead who would be the guardian of the land and who would best use it (that is, who had the most mana or power) for the benefit of all Hawaiians. It was not only pono for the Mōʻi to be generous with his gifts of land, it was also sensible. For example, if a series of natural
disasters happened in the islands, this could be used as a weapon against an unpopular
Mo‘i. If he was not pono he could be removed.

There was, therefore, an amount of give and take in the relationship between the
rulers and their people. For example, in the time of Liholiho the system for distribution of
lands was in flux, partially resembling a Western capitalist system in that the large
amounts of land were now in the hands of the Ali‘i without any input from the Mo‘i.14
Because Liholiho had few lands to distribute, he could not be generous and could not
gain mana. Kame‘elehiwa opines that, “these factors further undermined his ability to be
pono (84). In this respect, Hawai‘i was not a feudal society as many historians, military
and otherwise, have maintained. In feudal societies it was impossible - short of rebellion -
for a peasant living on land owned by a noble to seek redress for grievances. In fact, the
closest Hawai‘i came to feudalism was after the Māhele when the “Big Five” owned most
of the land and wealth, and Native Hawaiians, and other disenfranchised non-Caucasians
were valued only for their labor. As Lawrence Fuchs points out, in this period Hawai‘i
resembled “the post-Civil War South, with a small and powerful oligarchy in control of
economic and social prerequisites, and large masses of dark-skinned laborers whose
direct contact with Caucasians was limited to working under haole overseers in the field”
(22).

The issue of whether or not Hawaiian society used to be feudal is not simply some
ivory tower academic debate. Instead, it is a way of thinking that continues to pigeonhole
pre-Cook Hawaiians as culturally less advanced than European-Americans, and also
suggests that the extant capitalist economic system, which is European in origin, is
somehow a natural progression from earlier feudal times. Haunani-Kay Trask berates
haoles for “characterizing our chiefs as feudal landlords and our people as serfs” as being “malevolent in design.” This invention “degrade[s] a successful system of shared land use” and transforms “a spiritually based, self-sufficient economic system of land use and occupancy into an oppressive, medieval European practice of divine right ownership” (Native Daughter, 115).

The museum continues this “malevolent design” by painting Native Hawaiian ali’i as dictatorial tyrants who conscripted their serf-like “tenants” into military service against their will:

Ali’i, powerful warrior chiefs, controlled the islands through heredity and kapu, a rigorous system of socio-religious rules. Wars were fought for land, wealth, and power. The ali’i required military service from the tenants on their land, and trained them regularly in the arts of war. Powerful ali’i mustered armies of several thousand men: alliances added more. There was a constant struggle among the rival chiefs and kings for advantage and dominance.

In case the point is missed, the ali’i are made comparable to King George III by a reminder that, as the events above were happening, in 1775 in the United States the “U.S. Army [was] born in Boston.” Further references to “chiefs” and “kings” are misleading in that they impose European cultural labels on a society that was perhaps as different from feudal European society as any that has ever existed. In addition, the museum cannot resist comparing Kamehameha with George Washington in its display entitled “The Rise Of Kamehameha The Great.” Although there are no obvious connections between the two men beyond superficial comparisons of them both as “nation founders,” DeRussy creates its own. Visitors are asked to contrast America’s greatest hero and military strategist -“1789 Washington inaugurated as President”- with “King” Kamehameha, whose victory, we are told, was ensured only by a stroke of good luck “when Keoua’s army, marching past Kilauea volcano, was decimated by a timely eruption.”
One of the more prevalent tactics of military discourse is to designate an area in need of protection in order to justify military intervention. Hawaiians, of course, had every reason to fear foreign intervention in their affairs. However, the museum incorporates Hawaiian fears of foreign influence with the fears of the United States that the French, British, or Japanese would establish a colony in Hawai‘i. The museum labels the French, British, and Japanese as foreign, but declines to include the United States in that category. Its description of Honolulu Fort is, therefore, deliberately misleading:

As a statement of independence for the Hawaiian monarchy, Kamehameha directed the construction of a fort to protect Honolulu Harbor and symbolize his strength. Honolulu Fort, was built of coral blocks, completed in 1817, and mounted forty canons of various size, to deter foreigners, English, French, and Russian, from attempting to seize control of the island. It remained a viable fort until 1857 and served as a military garrison, police station and a prison. Honolulu Fort foreshadowed the Coast Artillery of the U.S. Army in the defense of O‘ahu.

A color diagram of fort, surrounded by grass huts, accompanies this text. While there are also European ships shown, the big ship in the foreground flies the Stars and Stripes flag of the United States. Punchbowl Fort is shown in the background. Both forts are shown out of proportion to their actual size, as if to exaggerate Hawaiian military prowess. As well as denying that the fort also protected against an American seizure of O‘ahu, the final sentence imposes a fake continuity between past and present military usage. By the time the Coast Artillery of the U.S. Army was plying its trade, Hawai‘i was a colony of the United States.

Despite its air of disinterest, nobility, and authenticity, all of which are enhanced by its “official” ties to the U.S. military, the museum is under the same pressure to draw in visitors as other tourist attractions in Hawai‘i. Mayo notes that commercially minded museums such as this “must have a legitimate appearance to attract customers. Such
museums must be located near historic sites not only to capture the attention of those who wish to visit an actual place associated with a war but also to attempt to legitimize their own existence. Mayo concludes, “Commercial museums are parasites to authentic places” (47). The museum attempts to make this connection by reminding its visitors on a publicity leaflet that it was ON THIS VERY BEACH [sic] that Kamehameha and his warriors arrived 200 years ago (The U.S. Army Museum of Hawai‘i: A Most Unusual Glimpse into the Past). The title of this leaflet is worth noting: there is nothing too “unusual” about the museum except, perhaps, that it is located in a disused gun battery. The leaflet is obviously designed to pique the curiosity of visiting tourists in the same way that “unusual” freak shows and displays of death attract those with a morbid disposition.

To be successful, a museum must know what its visitors expect from it. Edward Relph asserts that “for many people the purpose of travel is less to experience unique and different places than to collect those places” (qtd. in Mayo, 46). The museum therefore attempts to create what it calls a “‘you were there’ experience” to cater to these tourists (The U.S. Army Museum of Hawai‘i: A Most Unusual Glimpse into the Past). This authenticity includes actual weapons and documents but also miniatures of ships and of Battery Randolph. Mayo notes that in such scenes, “tourists are expected to accept that the quality of toy soldiers is equivalent to authentic history” (48). Because Hawai‘i is a tourist-driven economy, and the number of tourists fluctuates depending on national economic trends, the museum also needs to attract local residents. By 2001, visitor numbers had fallen from 140,000 annually in 1999 (Ferguson & Turnbull, 44) to 100,000 by 2001 (Ting, 50). According to Peter Schall, senior vice president and managing
director of the Hilton Hawaiian Village, and a financial contributor to the museum, “It’s very important for the people in the community to show their appreciation to the military and to support them because, after all, they are very generous and very loyal” (Ting, 50). For his services, the Hawaii Army Museum Society rewarded Schall with an Ihe award, which is “given to the person who supports the military” and who is “alert and concerned about his people” (Ting, 50). The reciprocal relationship between big business interests and the military could not be clearer.

The gift shop, filled with military memorabilia and tourist paraphernalia, completes the task of the museum in promoting a monoglossic narrative of the military. For sale are t-shirts, postcards, key chains, books, models, toys and videos, most of which have a military theme. For example, one can buy a copy of the December 7th, 1941 newspaper, a bullet key chain, or Army teddy bears (available in three styles: Drill Instructor, Special Forces Green Beret, and Regular BDU Uniform). Also available are t-shirts featuring “Rosie the Riveter,” “The Sinking of the Battleship Arizona,” or "Dogfight Over Oahu." One postcard features a drawing of U.S. soldiers with the legend “Vietnam A Noble Cause.” James Mayo states that it is in commercial museum gift shops that “inauthenticity is clearest” (48). This is clearly seen in the Fort DeRussy gift shop book selection. Available here are superficial, patriotic, heavily-illustrated, coffee-table books such as *Enemy On Island, Issue In Doubt* by Stan Cohen (116 Pages), *I Can Never Forget: Men of the 100th/442nd* by Thelma Chang, *Hawaii Goes to War* by DeSoto Brown (160 pages), *Destination Tokyo* by Stan Cohen (80 pages), *The Rise and Fall of the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Concise History of Hawai'i and its Rulers* by Richard Wisniewski (115 pages). There are no history books for sale that would shatter the
patriotic, sanitized narratives carefully created by the museum. Visitors would have to
look elsewhere to find, for example, John Dower’s *War Without Mercy*, Cynthia Enloe’s
*Bananas, Beaches & Bases*, Jim Albertini et al.’s *The Dark Side of Paradise: Hawaii in a
Nuclear World*. Beth Bailey and David Farber’s *The First Strange Place: Race and Sex
in World War II Hawaii*, Francine du Plessix Gray’s *Hawaii: The Sugar-Coated Fortress*,
Ferguson and Turnbull’s *Oh, Say, Can You See?*, Theon Wright’s *Rape in Paradise*, H.
Bruce Franklin’s *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, or Ron Kovic’s *Born on the
Fourth of July*.

Fort DeRussy Army Museum’s exhibits of the pre-Cook to 1898 period in
Hawaiian history are, to use Mike Wallace’s phraseology, “inescapably political” (122).
The museum mixes pseudo-history and entertainment with propaganda and
commercialism. James Mayo concludes that military museums that cater to tourists are
“inauthentic experiences of war memory. Facts of battle may be told, but it is dramatized
history without the intricacies of real events. These places develop and fine-tune their
acts according to what the public will buy. They are parasites of authentic landscapes and
have the atmosphere of a circus sideshow rather than a museum of authentic artifacts”
(49). The Army Museum tries to be all things for all people: it also wants to lionize the
United States Army in Hawai‘i. However, because that military narrative may seem out
of place on a supposedly “island paradise,” DeRussy also wants to minimize the impact
of American militarism by recounting Native Hawaiian military displays. After all,
militarism seems natural if an area is designated as hostile, fought-over, savage, and
vulnerable to attack. DeRussy claims to speak for everyone - Hawai‘i’s
“warriors...soldiers...[and] citizens.” In doing so, it silences counter narratives and
justifies American militarism. Military museums need to reach a wide audience: they do not want to appeal only to aficionados – “button collectors and rivet counters” (Ferguson & Turnbull, 45). In imposing a military interpretation of events on non-military affairs, however, the danger is that militarism, rather than peace and democracy, is seen as the natural state of affairs. Mayo notes that in military museums, “War is not questioned, and it is often treated as inevitable” (43). DeRussy makes the American military presence in Hawai‘i seem not only inevitable, but also necessary, and, not least of all, fun.

“The History of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor”

Author Donald Landaeur served in the U.S. Navy on the battleship USS Iowa during World War Two and now teaches courses on U.S. Navy ships. His wife, and co-author, Lyndall Landaeur has a doctorate in history and teaches that subject in college. In their collaborative book, Pearl: The History of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor (1999), the authors attempt to write “the” history of Hawai‘i, the U.S. Navy, and the history of Pearl Harbor. It is evident that this task was beyond them, and, perhaps, beyond anyone. This book’s ostensible purpose is to put the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i into some sort of historical context even if, as will be shown, their version of that history is a controversial and misleading one.

All histories are contentious but one should be naturally suspicious of a book written by ex-military, middle class haoles who purport to write the history of Hawai‘i. For example, they state that the ruling order of pre-haole Hawaiian society was “similar in structure to European systems” (4) and that commoners worked and produced food for their ali‘i “just as serfs in medieval Europe had done” (98). As noted previously, pre-Cook Hawaiian society was not feudal in nature. Repetition of that assertion without
offering evidence to contradict, for example, Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s authoritative scholarship is simply unacceptable, especially since the authors do show, at times, that they are aware of the controversial nature of historical writing about Hawai‘i. They report, for example, the controversy that has arisen over the size of Hawaii’s pre-haole population, which some historians estimate at 300,000 and others 800,000, saying that the figures they quote “are estimates and vary widely among historians” (5). However, it is revealing that the Landauers choose not to accept, for example, Professor David Stannard’s figure of at least 800,000 and his evidence for same, which is well documented in his book Before the Horror. A careful reading of the arguments for and against Stannard’s figures reveals that the “controversy” over his arguments arises not because of the quality of Stannard’s research, but mainly because, it seems, some older historians object to the author’s use of the term “haole.” This is, in itself, a statement of their refusal to acknowledge and accept some of the newer writings on Hawai‘i that tend to show American involvement as a colonial enterprise rather than the “benevolent paternalism” narrative that seems to dominate most historical writings about the islands. Stannard states, “If...the population of Hawai‘i was less than 800,000 in 1778 it is now incumbent on those who would hold this position to demonstrate – in specific scholarly detail – precisely how it came to be less than what all the evidence suggests is a minimum” (80). It is this “scholarly detail” that the Landauers lack.

Like the narrative at Fort DeRussy, Pearl is a chronological history covering the period from the first American military intervention in Hawai‘i in 1794, when Captain John Kendrick of an armed merchant ship helped the ali‘i mai of O‘ahu to defeat his enemy Kaeokulani (28), through to the era of nuclear powered submarines. At an early
stage, the authors create an outside threat to which powerful men must respond with
decisive military action: “It has been said that if Kamehameha had not united these
islands under his strong rule when he did, they would have been swiftly grabbed and
partitioned by foreign, mainly European nations or individuals” (20). Although a source
is provided for who “said” this, it is clear that despite the Landauers’ use of passive voice
this is the version of events they wish the reader to believe. Not only are Americans, once
again, absent from the list of threatening “foreigners” the Landauers provide, the authors’
version of events is also disputed. For example, University of Hawai‘i political science
professor Noenoe Silva states, “Kamehameha uniting the islands was not about fear of
American or English onslaught; Hawaiians were working out their own stuff in their own
world” (Kelly, A. 8).

That they do not include Americans in their list of “foreigners” is a fairly common
rhetorical device used to deflect attention away from American colonialism.
Kamehameha may have been a strong leader of the type so beloved by the military, but
he was still a native. The Landauers remind us of this by stating that the kapu laws that
Kamehameha upheld were “onerous and brutal” (22), “oppressive, rigid and brutal,” and
also “arbitrary” in nature (50). Having established the barbarism of the Hawaiian system
of justice, the authors then defend its supposed brutality as “the only law that existed in
the islands and it curbed, if not controlled, the worst abuse that human beings bring on
each other” (47). The only language the natives understood, according to this narrative, is
brutality and violence. In listing the many ways that violators of kapu were killed, such as
by clubbing, strangulation or burial alive, the Landauers seem to be saying that Hawai‘i
was a land in savage disarray, which required the “order” and “stability” that only the

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United States military could bring. The effect of this selective look at law in Hawai‘i is to make Hawaiian cultural practices look brutal. Of course, a similar unbiased look at English law of this period would show hundreds of laws on the statute books that carried a death sentence. Strangulation at Tyburn Hill was only one of a number of brutal ways in which English lawbreakers were punished. In earlier times criminals were tortured and hung, drawn, and quartered and then their heads were impaled and exhibited on a spike. No comparison of this type is attempted, however.15

A familiar theme of colonial apologists is to blame Native Hawaiians for the influx of foreigners into their country and government. Landauer and Landauer state, for example:

[By 1792] the islands were overrun with British and American traders, brawling seamen and pirates of many nationalities. They disdained island customs, brought disease, brawled in the streets and sold rum and guns to anyone who had the asking price in trade or women. Not the least of the problem was the Hawaiian himself [my emphasis]. Tales of other lands had reached him along with knowledge of technology that was superior to his. And he saw the untold wealth that all newcomers lavishly displayed. (16-17)

There is no doubt that Native Hawaiians were tempted by the new and intriguing goods brought to them by foreign traders and also no doubt that many of those Hawaiians unwisely became mired in debt to foreigners. However, the “complicity” argument ignores the almost constant threat of violence from foreign governments that Hawaiians had to deal with from the beginning of Western contact. Blaming Hawaiians assumes that the relationship between the two cultures was equal. After all, to share the blame, both parties have to be equally responsible for their roles. However, to make this point, the Landauers have to reverse their previous narrative, which labels Hawaiians as unequal and inferior. David Stannard correctly labels this type of analysis as “blaming the victim”
is both unfair and disingenuous. As historian Sally Engle Merry points out, “this narrative ignores the devastating consequences of the infusion of European guns, ships, and military technology into Hawaiian society” (43). And according to Daws, “Without constant pressure from foreigners…transformation [in Native Hawaiian society] would certainly not have come about so quickly” (107).

The authors’ choice of language is that of triumphant militarism. American sailors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sailed in “magnificent” or “splendid” ships and “triumphed” over adversity. They were acclaimed as “the best, most accurate gunners in the world” (acclaimed by whom, we are not told) (65). American crews were “gallant,” “courageously sailed into danger,” and “bravely carried the flag of the United States to all the ports of the world” etc. (44-5). American sailors always act with the best of intentions and appear to have had impeccable morals. The Landauers’ version of history is painted in broad strokes of good and bad, and they use only primary colors of red, white, and blue.

“Restoring order” and “bringing stability” are commonly used and repetitive themes of militaristic discourse. Order has positive connotations, of course. However, frequently a discourse of “order” is used to mask policies of economic or military control. For example, when General Leonard Wood was asked what exactly “stability” would mean in one of America’s imperialist adventures in Cuba, he stated, “When money can be borrowed at a reasonable rate of interest and when capital is willing to invest in the Island, a condition of stability will have been reached” (qtd. in Jacobson, 40). As Jacobson notes, this “stability” was defined “on U.S. terms and secured, increasingly, by
U.S. military might” (55). The Landauers liberally use narratives of order and stability to justify U.S. military interventions. For example, they state that the role of the U.S. Navy in Honolulu was to “assist...local police in dealing with errant American seamen.” In return for this “service” the Navy was “respected for fair treatment and their decisions were generally popular” (80). The Navy “settled” local disputes (81) or acted as “arbiters” (112). The role of the U.S. Marines in Hawai‘i was, apparently, “quell[ing] trouble” in Honolulu and at Pearl Harbor (183). However, there are no references cited to support these assertions and nor is there any questioning of the Navy’s role in enforcing “order” in a place which was not at that time a U.S. possession. What sort of disorder was occurring and what sort of order was subsequently imposed? There is an assumption here – made through the authors’ choice of either neutral or misleading descriptors - that the U.S. Navy was somehow outside of history - an impartial observer and fair arbiter that created order from chaos in an uncivilized land. James Loewen calls this, “standard textbook rhetoric: chaos seems always to be breaking out. Other than communism ‘chaos’ is what textbooks usually offer to explain the actions of the other side” (Lies My Teacher Told Me, 223). The authors see the role of the military in providing order as a natural state of affairs, rather than as a policy dictated at the highest level of American government.

In military discourses of “them” and “us,” the “other” tends to act barbarously, unthinkingly, and without apparent acknowledgment of the consequences of their actions. Political or nationalistic factors rarely invade military discourses about unthinking savages. Because there are few, if any, incidents of Native Hawaiians acting out these stereotypes with Americans, the Landauers marshal data from other regions of the Pacific
instead. For example, the authors describe a native attack on U.S. sailors in Sumatra in 1832 in the charged language of a “massacre.” However, the sailors’ revenge for that attack, in which 150 islanders really were massacred, is described with the more civilized words, “chastise” and “killed.” The authors excuse this slaughter as being “de rigour” (sic), once again suggesting that military slaughter of natives is “natural” given their obvious inhumanity, and also “effective,” although the only evidence provided to support that assertion is a vague claim that no further “unfortunate incidents occurred there” (80).

In fact, individual naval bombardments may not have been effective at all in influencing the outcome of disputes between natives and sailors. Jane Samson states, “Islanders might acknowledge a warship’s destructive potential, but they did not necessarily consider themselves either educated or defeated by it (131). It certainly was “effective” if we accept the Landauer’s theory that killing disproportionate numbers of supposedly inferior natives might save the lives of a small number of Americans, but it is certainly also immoral. The infliction of death, destruction, and coercion on native peoples is a tactic that Europeans and Americans used to devastating effect. Greg Dening points out, for example, in The Death of William Gooch, that when Hawaiian warriors killed 22-year-old astronomer William Gooch at Waimea Bay, O‘ahu, in 1792 the English sailors launched cannon fire indiscriminately at the village on shore (7-9). While they insisted on “justice,” they were later satisfied with the deaths of three probably innocent Hawaiians who were offered up by the Ali‘i. In such circumstances, ideas of justice or keeping order are simply not factors and they cannot be used centuries later to support militarism. This was retribution, vengeance, and blood lust. James Loewen notes, “Historians used to say, ‘Civilized war is the kind we fight against them whereas savage
war is the atrocious kind they fight against us’” (Lies My Teacher Told Me, 116). Loewen is incorrect however: Landauer and Landauer are still producing offensive ideological cant like this. Clearly, from the Landauers’ viewpoint, native lives are not as highly valued as the lives of U.S. sailors. They see history from a purely American point of view, and there is no analysis of opinions or views outside this orbit.

This can be clearly seen in the author’s descriptions of United States gunboat diplomacy (a phrase they choose not to use). For example, in January 1826, USS Dolphin arrived in Honolulu. It was commanded by Lieutenant John “Mad Jack” Percival who had been ordered to investigate and, if possible, recover alleged debts owed by the Ali‘i to American merchants. Percival, however, spent most of his short time in Hawai‘i trying to coerce the Hawaiian monarchy and missionaries into removing the Christian kapu on prostitution. In this respect, Percival differed from many British Naval Captains in the Pacific who seemed, in general, to support the aims of British or other Western missionaries over local business interests. As Jane Samson notes, “even British consuls found themselves under attack by naval officers for sympathizing with British subjects rather than islanders” (5). By 1870, for example, the Earl of Pembroke had denounced “the astounding liberties taken by sentimentio-religious [sic] captains of men-of-war” (Samson, 2).

Percival not only sided with local business interests but also wanted the kapu lifted so that his increasingly unruly men could take advantage of Hawaiian women, as many sailors had done before and have since. Percival warned of “severe measures” (Landauer & Landauer, 72) and “terrible consequences” (Landauer & Landauer, 73) if his demands were not met. On Sunday, February 26th, a crowd of sailors surrounded the
house of Kalanimoku, a friend of the regent, where Hiram Bingham was preparing to hold a service. They demanded women and smashed all the windows. Bingham made his way home and was there joined by some native supporters. When the sailors arrived Bingham warded off blows with an umbrella. When the female Ali‘i Lydia Namahana was hit, the Hawaiians attacked and subdued the sailors. Bingham had to restrain the Hawaiians from seriously hurting or killing at least one sailor. When Lieutenant Percival and his officers eventually arrived, he locked up the ringleaders and apologized. However, when he again demanded that the kapu be lifted, Governor Boki relented, and boatloads of women resumed their immoral and probably fatal trade with the sailors (Daws, 78-80).

In most accounts, Percival is painted as an arrogant boor, and the actions of the USS Dolphin and its captain described as the epitome of nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy. Frank W. Gapp states, for example, “Reluctantly the chiefs gave in, not only because of the violence of the sailors, but also because of the veiled threat that Mad Jack might turn his guns on the city” (The Commodore and the Whale, 31). However, the Landauers call Percival “a ‘sailor’s sailor’” who “worked as hard as his crew” and “shared wine with his men.” The authors describe Percival’s faults in neutral terms. He had, for example, “colossal pride” and his “fiery temper was legend.” Percival’s actions were, according to the Landauers, a result of “misunderstandings” and “perceived insults” to both “his honor and to that of the United States” (70). The Landauers even try to portray him as an American Henry II: King Henry, enraged at the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Beckett in a dispute over power, allegedly said, “Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?” Four of Henry’s knights took him at his word and hacked
Beckett to death. Henry claimed innocence, stating that although his words led to
Beckett’s death, he did not actually order it. According to the Landauers, Percival said to
his men, “the sailors would serve the missionaries right if they were to tear down their
houses” (72). At a later court of inquiry, ship’s master Alfred P. Edwards, testified that
Percival said, “I wish to Christ that they had murdered the damned rascal and torn his
house down” (Gapp, “The Kind-Eyed Chief,” 103). The Landauers describe this as “an
offhand comment” that some sailors used as license to attack missionaries. In view of
Percival’s well-documented threats of retaliation, and his disrespect for regent
Ka’ahumanu, whom Percival called a “liar” and a “damned old bitch,” it is difficult to
imagine such a set of circumstances occurring by accident in the way the Landauers
describe.

The Landauers describe Percival’s assignment as a success: his mission “had been
to rescue two marooned sailors and settle the disputes between the Hawaiian chiefs and
the merchants. He did both,” the authors conclude. He was firm in dealing with “easily
manipulated island chiefs” (73) and resolute in dealing with missionaries who got in the
way of hardheaded men like Percival and the western traders. According to Robert
Stauffer, however, “Percival never got very far with his orders and only managed to add
to the general problems of the town” (46). Although Percival’s actions led to a court of
inquiry, the Landauers insist that “‘Mad Jack’ had done his duty” (74).

Later in 1826 the USS Peacock, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby
Jones, docked in Honolulu. Despite the presence of an American consul in Hawai‘i,
Jones’s warship was the real power behind the enforcement of American authority. His
orders were to “clean up the rat’s nest of beached sailors at Honolulu” (Daws, 79). Jones
was a career sailor who had fought against the British on a number of occasions. He battled British smugglers and slave traders in the Gulf of Mexico and at the Battle of Lake Borgne in December 1814 was seriously wounded and captured. Jones was a Virginian who used slaves as labor on his 140-acre farm. He also kept a slave as a servant aboard ship, as he was unable to dress himself due to injuries caused by the British (Gapp, *The Commodore and the Whale*, 6-16). Jones naturally had bad feelings towards the British and resented their perceived influence in Hawai‘i. No doubt, also, his attitude to dark-skinned Hawaiians was colored by his views on owning slaves.

Jones again raised the question of the Aliʻi’s outstanding debts. He wanted the present Aliʻi to take responsibility for debts owed by earlier rulers. Faced with the threat of a gunboat in the harbor, and with Jones’ veiled warnings about trade agreements that the “[United States] has the will as well as the power to enforce” (Kelly, M. 16), the Aliʻi had little choice but to agree to Jones’ terms. Native Hawaiian commoners would collect sandalwood, half of which they could keep, and half paid as a tax to the Aliʻi. As Daws states, it was due to the coercion of Jones that the “burden of collecting more wood passed as a matter of course to the commoners, under a new tax law” (79). Captain Jones also signed a “commerce and friendship” treaty with the chiefs. Although he had no authority to do this, and the treaty was never ratified by the U.S. Congress, the “Convention of 1826” was the first treaty between the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi and the United States. The Aliʻi held to their part of the agreement and observed the terms of the treaty for many years. Whether this was out of respect or, more likely, fear of another intimidating visit by a U.S. warship is impossible to assess. What this incident does show,
however, is that the U.S. military used the threat of force to coerce Native Hawaiians into accepting one-sided economic agreements. As Marion Kelly points out, the very earliest experiences of the Hawaiian Nation with the sandalwood trade reveal a direct relationship between foreign investment and local indebtedness. The value of the goods received by the Hawaiian chiefs had been paid for, perhaps several times over. With sandalwood resources exhausted, recovery from debt within any foreseeable future was impossible. (16)

The Landauers, however, paint a very different version of these events, and of Jones:

he made a marvelous impression. His bearing, stature and manners bespoke the carriage and breeding of a gentleman. This impression was accurate. He was the product of an affluent family whose residence was a plantation in Virginia. His educated, intelligent manner pleased merchants. His attitude and restraint pleased the missionaries, and most of all, his quick smile and dark eyes pleased the natives...His manners were courtly, his dress impeccable, his penetrating eyes and dazzling smile marked him for Hawaiians as an ali'i in his own land. (75)

The authors blame the “chiefs” for their “unwise indulgences in ships, uniforms, and other luxuries” which were “part of the legacy of profligacy left by Liholiho years before” (75). No attempt is made to contextualize the agreements made between Hawai‘i and the United States, and the authors ignore the threat of force and the imbalance in power between the two parties. The terms of the agreements are glossed over and made to seem beneficial to both sides. However, as Robert H. Stauffer points out, the agreements are one-sided in favor of the United States. For example, the “commerce and friendship” treaty “forc[ed] the Hawaiian government to provide protection that the United States Navy...was unable to...provide,” “extended[ed] rights of claims to the businessmen against the natives...under foreign rather than local law,” “got the relatively bankrupt Hawaiian government to provide protection for American commercial interests on behalf of his Navy” and “laid the foundation for claims to be enforced in the 1830s against the
Hawaiian government in the gunboat diplomacy of the United States, Great Britain, and France” (52).

At times, the Landauers make it seem like the U.S. Navy’s role in coercing Hawaiians into repaying alleged debts was coincidental. The Navy is the made to seem like a naturally disinterested and impartial arbiter. For example, in 1829 the USS *Vincennes*, commanded by Captain William Bolton Finch, arrived in Honolulu. According to the Landauers, the *Vincennes* simply “sailed” as if by accident into Hawai‘i. As if coincidentally, Captain Finch “had in his possession” a “complimentary, friendly, and cordial” letter from the Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard which was to be given to the Hawaiian King. Instead of stating that Finch was ordered to impose a settlement on Hawaiians, the Landauers assert instead that Finch was merely “confronted” with “familiar problems” (79-80). In fact, Finch had been ordered to the Pacific to look after American whaling and merchant interests in the Marquesa Islands, Tahiti, and Hawai‘i. His orders with regard to Hawai‘i arose specifically, as Robert Stauffer notes, “when the promised payments under [Thomas ap Catesby] Jones’ *Decree* were not made to American commercial interests on time” (62). Finch delivered Southard’s letter, which condescendingly congratulating the Ali‘i for their progress towards civilization and Christianity. However, he also followed orders and raised questions about allegedly outstanding sandalwood debts. Finch reminded the King that,

> The general objects of a cruising ship, or man-of-war, are the care and presentation of lives and property of our citizens, where governments do not exist for that purpose, or where governments are unmindful of their obligations...I must urge the perfect liquidation of your debts, at the period promised; and a care not to contract others. Unless free of debt, or with ability to discharge it, no nation takes its equal place among others. (Stewart, 252)
The underlying threat of annexation in the last sentence was not lost on the King. In November 1829, Finch “convinced” the King, Boki, and four other ali‘i to accept responsibility for debts amounting to $50,000 and to “liquidate the whole within the ensuing nine months” (Stewart, 213). This episode shows clearly the gunboat diplomacy of the United States with regard to Hawai‘i: an American Naval officer would not have addressed a British or French Regent in the way that Finch and others addressed Hawaiian monarchs. This was not the kind of diplomatic relationship one might see between countries who were equally powerful or respected, and this incident shows that the Hawaiians remained at the mercy of foreign powers.

Throughout the book the Landauers show an almost childlike fascination with the pomp and ceremony of the military. They are clearly the “button collectors and rivet counters” that the Fort DeRussy Army Museum supposedly wants to avoid. Whether it is admiration of Kamehameha III’s gold epaulettes (80), the “spotless, splendid uniforms” of U.S. Marines, or ships which were “splendidly dressed stem to stern with all flags flying” (195), the authors descriptions betray not only their military backgrounds but also a tendency to focus on triviality – superstructure over the core of serious debate about the role of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i. The authors’ unconscious childishness is in marked contrast to their deliberate portrayal of Hawaiians as infantile in their innocence and ignorance of Western ways. For example, they describe Hawaiians as only being “avidly interested in restoring Liliuokalani to the throne” (147) and then assert that Hawaiians gave little support for restoring the Queen” (149). Native Hawaiians were more than just “interested” in the fate of Liliuokalani, they saw in her the last chance to retain sovereignty over their lands. The effect of the Landauers’ choice of words makes
Hawaiians incidental players, too busy surfing and lazing around to get involved in politics. Similarly, when the future of Pearl Harbor was being discussed, rather than become involved in decision making, the authors assert that Hawaiians instead “worked, played, hiked..., fished and swam” (191). Of course, linking these two things may not be a conscious decision on the part of the authors, but unconscious racism should still be unacceptable. It may, however, also be a result of their often clumsy segues between one subject and another, which is an inherent structural problem when one tries to tie military affairs too closely to unrelated civilian matters.

There is a tendency in those who wish to excuse Western involvement in the affairs of smaller cultures to see history in terms of inevitability, that events which happened in Hawai‘i were destined to happen that way instead of being the results of particular U.S. foreign policy decisions backed by the threat of military force. Loewen states that this is typical of the rhetorical style of textbooks, “which present events so as to make them seem foreordained along a line of constant progress” (*Lies My Teacher Told Me*, 172). In order to justify this point of view, the authors tend to see connections between the past and present that do not really exist. For example, when Governor of O‘ahu Boki was invited onto the *USS Dolphin*, Captain Percival greeted him with a gun salute and an announcement. The authors state, “How the announcement was worded is not recorded, but today it would be the honorary ‘Oahu, arriving’” (71) This comparison invites readers to view history as an unbroken chain of events and from a U.S. military point of view, one in which military order has always been established. The authors describe the course of events in Hawai‘i as “irreversible” (150) and state, “Some observers may view these relentless changes [in Hawaiian society] as a series of debacles
for the Hawaiian people. Others may recognize and accept the inevitable forces of change and describe the European and American influences as a better alternative to what might have been” (106). It is clear from their choice of the word “recognize” that the authors support the latter point of view.

Part of the mythology of the U.S. military is their role in “defending” Hawaii from foreign attack. For example, when discussing the American victory at the Battle of Midway, the Landauers state that, “The American Navy had once again...protected Hawaii from foreign interventions it had before from the Russians, the British and the French” (277). By creating enemies, the Landauers provide justification for the American annexation of Hawai‘i. However, while the French and the Russians may have had inchoate and vague designs on the islands at various points in the nineteenth-century, the one major power in the region that was most likely to remove Hawaiian sovereignty was the United States.

The British, in particular, had no real interest in making Hawai‘i a colonial possession. Native Hawaiians realized that they needed to make alliances with foreigners if they were to maintain control over their islands. In 1794, Kamehameha negotiated an alliance with British Naval Captain George Vancouver that the British could, but did not, use as an excuse for annexation. M. Paske-Smith’s comment, “the attitude of the British Government was to encourage the different islanders to maintain their independence and to develop their lands along civilized lines,” although condescending, is essentially accurate (230). Thus, when King Liholiho (Kamehameha II) traveled to Britain in 1824 his purpose was, according to Boki, to ask for British protection against American power:

We have come to confirm the words which Kamehameha the First gave in charge to Vancouver, thus, ‘Go back and tell King George to watch over me and my
whole Kingdom. I acknowledge him as my landlord and myself as tenant; for him as superior and I as inferior. Should the foreigners of any other nation come to take possession of my lands, then let him help me.

The British monarch’s reply was, “I have heard these words. I will attend to the evil without. The evils within your Kingdom it is not for me to regard, they are with yourselves” (Paske-Smith, 231). Clearly the Hawaiians were negotiating their own interests, which at that time seemed to be to allied with Great Britain. The Hawaiians saw that they could only gain respect from Westerners if they copied Western ways. Thus, Kamehameha became a “king” instead of a Mō i, Hawaiian ali’i began to dress like European elites, and the Hawaiians adopted a flag that incorporated the British Union flag. These facts contradict the Landauers’ assertions that the United States “protected” Hawai’i from British conquest. In fact, if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. In the middle of these great powers, the relatively powerless Native Hawaiians cleverly negotiated for their own interests and played each side against each other.

One of the problems faced by Native Hawaiians in the Nineteenth-Century was, as Daws points out, “a self important foreigner could summon up a warship just by shaking his fist, or so it seemed to Hawaiians” (107). There was no one more self-important than the British Consul to Hawai’i, Richard Charlton. Bad tempered and haughty, he had once dragged a native behind his horse for shooting one of Charlton’s cattle that had been trespassing on and damaging the Hawaiian’s property. Trouble arose when Charlton claimed in April 1840 that he had a lease dating from 1826 granting him some valuable waterfront land. When King Kauikeaouli refused to give Charlton what he wanted, the Consul made veiled threats about British military action and wrote to the British Foreign Office asking that a warship be sent to enforce his claim.
After eighteen months of inaction, Charlton sailed to England to press his case. His deputy Alexander Simpson was left to deal with one of Charlton’s outstanding debts. He argued that Hawaiian courts had no jurisdiction in the matter and he too wrote to the British Navy asking for help. In Mexico, Admiral Sir Richard Thomas ordered the frigate *HMS Carysfort* to Honolulu to investigate. When the ship arrived on 10th February 1843, its inexperienced Captain, Lord George Paulet, issued a series of demands to King Kauikeaouli under threat of force. These included the recognition of Simpson as Consul, honoring Charlton’s dubious lease, and a number of other directives limiting Hawai‘i’s rights to enforce laws against British subjects. When these demands were quickly met, however, Paulet and Simpson simply pressed for more concessions.

Paulet, though, was acting beyond his authority and against standing British orders in the Pacific, which were “to refrain from interfering in local politics, even if requested to do so, and to demonstrate respect for indigenous society ‘strictly to the established Regulations & Customs of the Place’ and by taking care that no offense be given ‘to the peculiar habits, religious ceremonies, or even to, what may appear to be the absurd prejudices of the Inhabitants’” (Samson, 43). On 25th February, after seeking aid from France and America that was non-forthcoming, the King was forced to concede sovereignty of Hawai‘i to Paulet. On 26th July, however, Sir Richard Thomas arrived in Honolulu aboard the flagship *HMS Dublin*. Acting on delayed orders from Britain, he announced that Hawaiian sovereignty was to be restored, which was formally done on 31st July. Suitably chagrined, Paulet left Honolulu on 23rd August. However, he returned later in the year and, after being ignored by the Mō‘ī, he had his crew fire blank shells close to Honolulu before leaving for Hilo. Paulet’s actions brought discredit to the
British, although the quick restoration of sovereignty by Thomas led to him being honored by Hawaiians with the renaming of a park on Beretania as *Thomas Square*. The Hawaiians had a friendly if wary relationship with the British dating back to King Kamehameha’s time. They were also aware that Hawai‘i could maintain its sovereignty by playing the great powers against each other. This incident showed, once again, how powerless Hawai‘i really was in the face of aggressive and militarily advanced *haoles*. However, it also shows, contrary to the assertions of the Landauers, that Britain had no designs on Hawai‘i, and that Hawaiians did not need to be “protected” from Britain by the United States.

The French were another matter entirely: in September 1836, Father Arsenius Walsh, a British subject and member of a French missionary order, was ordered off the islands because the converted protestant *Ali‘i* did not want any Catholic preaching. Due to the coercive intervention of British Consul Charlton and the coincidental arrival of *HMS Actaeon* and the French man of war *Bonîté* he was allowed to stay but warned not to teach Catholic doctrine (Daws, 94-5). On July 9, 1839 French frigate *L’Artémise* arrived from Tahiti commanded by Capt C.P.T. Laplace. Although King Kauikaouli knew he was coming and had already issued a directive that Catholics should no longer be persecuted, as Daws relates, “Without even coming ashore [Laplace] issued a “manifesto” demanding complete religious freedom for Catholics, a bond of $20,000 from the chiefs to guarantee compliance, and a salute to the French flag... he threatened to bombard Honolulu if his terms were not met. Foreigners [except Protestant missionaries] were offered asylum aboard *L’Artémise*” (102-3). The *Mō‘ī* was away so the *Ali‘i* raised the cash. On July 14th the *Mō‘ī* returned and he spent three days
“negotiating” a “commerce and friendship” treaty with the belligerent Laplace. This treaty overturned the Hawaiian policy of total abstinence by forcing the Mo'ī to allow imports of French alcohol with low import duty. It also dictated that French nationals accused of crimes had to be tried by a jury handpicked by the French Consul.

This was not the last French military intervention in Hawai‘i. In 1842 the warship L’Embuscade, commanded by Captain S. Mallet, visited the islands, and in 1846 the Captain of La Virginie, Admiral Ferdinand-Alphonse Hamelin, returned the $20,000 bond Laplace had collected. In 1849 Rear Admiral Leogoarant de Tromelin made a second visit to Honolulu in his flagship La Poursuivante, accompanied by a second ship, Le Gassendi. In 1846 Hawaiian foreign minister had been forced to renew the “commerce and friendship” treaty with new French Consul Guillaume Patrice Dillon. Dillon, however, continued to make extreme demands from the Hawaiians. When Dillon explained these demands to de Tromelin, the Rear Admiral threatened to use force against the Hawaiian government. On 25th August French troops landed and proceeded to wreck the fort, free prisoners, spike cannons and destroy munitions. They ransacked the Governor’s home and stole his possessions, and in the harbor, they confiscated the Mo’ī’s yacht. French troops were stationed at important buildings. However, the French commander backed down from opening fire on Honolulu.

The Landauers state it was a joint action “show of force” by both the British and Americans that led to the French climb down. However, as Paske-Smith points out, it was almost entirely due to the diplomacy of British Consul Miller. In 1844 Britain asked both France and the United States to pledge “never on any grounds, or pretext, to take possession of the Islands,” a pledge that France made but the United States refused (246).
Miller defused the situation in 1849 by reminding the French of their non-aggression pact and by offering asylum to the Hawaiian King in the British Consulate building. In view of Miller’s actions, and the recognition by the French that any further aggression would then be seen as an act of war against Great Britain, the French backed off. De Tromelin and Dillon left Honolulu on 5th September having accomplished nothing but destruction of Hawaiian property valued at $100,000.

Despite the actions of the British and French in agreeing not to annex Hawai‘i, and despite British threats and diplomacy on Hawai‘i’s behalf to force the French to keep their end of the agreement, the Landauers state that in the 1850s “Hawaii had still not been accepted as a sovereign nation among the family of European nations,” and that Hawai‘i’s sovereignty was being maintained only by “the protection of American naval forces” (101). In fact, the opposite was the case: it was the United States that did not accept Hawai‘i’s independent status. The Landauers completely ignore the British-French agreement to maintain Hawai‘i’s independence and instead assert that, “At times the situation became so bad that surrendering sovereignty to the United States seemed to be the king’s only way out” (102). They also neglect to mention the Tyler Doctrine of 1842, (an extension of the Monroe Doctrine of 1840) in which President John Tyler asserted that Hawai‘i was in the U.S. “sphere of influence” (Trask, Native Daughter, 6). In fact, no better example of U.S. territorial claims on Hawai‘i exists than the Tyler Doctrine. President Tyler had visions of America’s “Manifest Destiny” to sweep westwards to the Pacific and beyond. He was responsible for stealing Texas from Mexico and his Doctrine was nothing but a declaration of U.S. intentions to control the destiny of Hawai‘i and Hawaiians.
However, empire builders require bogeymen to convince the masses of the need for military action, and to provide the emotional investment required to ensure the military is given a free hand to complete its task. Lawrence Fuchs points out, for example, that during the annexation crisis of 1873, “Hawaiian planters…sent a drumfire of rumors to friends on the mainland alleging growing British influence in the Islands and had them circulate a report in Washington concerning an alleged movement to import Hindus as plantation labor under British supervision” (20). In this way, Americans in Hawai‘i attempted to create an internal and external British enemy that would require U.S. Navy protection.

The Navy was happy to go along with this charade. For example, Congressman Fernando Wood was in charge of the bill to implement the Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty of 1875. When he asked Vice Admiral David D. Porter for his estimation of the situation in Hawai‘i, Porter replied that the British “have long had their eyes upon them [as] a principal outpost on our coast where they could launch forth their ships of war upon us with perfect impunity…[T]he taking of the Fijis is but the preparatory step to occupation of Hawaii.” Echoing the sentiments of the Tyler Doctrine, Wood concluded that “The Pacific Ocean is an American Ocean” and Hawai‘i, “the future great highway between ourselves and the hundreds of millions of Asiatics who look to us for commerce, civilization, and Christianity” (Hagan, 24-25). Clearly both the U.S Navy and U.S. politicians regarded the Pacific in the same way the Roman Empire regarded the Mediterranean, as *mare nostrum*. In reviewing the effects of the Reciprocity Treaty Lawrence Fuchs concludes, “Praise the British bogeyman” (21). To ignore these facts and instead claim that the United States was “protecting” Hawai‘i from Great Britain belies
the Landauers' real intentions of excusing the actions of Americans in Hawai‘i and hiding the role of the U.S. Navy in eradicating Hawaiian sovereignty.

This can be clearly seen in the various annexation and sovereignty crises that arose in the second half of the nineteenth-century as haole residents of Hawai‘i began pushing for the imposition of U.S. territory status on the islands. In 1854 there were over 2000 white U.S. citizens in Hawai‘i. U.S. Commissioner David Gregg alarmed King Kamehameha III with threats of Californian pirates and land grabbers. Gregg hoped to force the King to sign an annexation treaty. However, it was “fought strenuously” by British Consul General Miller, who argued that the U.S. was a racist, slave-owning country in which Hawaiians would be an oppressed minority (Paske-Smith, 256). Of course, it is difficult to gauge just how genuine Miller’s motives were: although Britain had turned against slavery in the 1790s it was still the center of the largest Empire in the world and Queen Victoria was hardly an enlightened monarch. Nevertheless, the presence of HMS Trincomalee and the French warship L’Artémise partially negated the threat from the USS Portsmouth and three other U.S. warships in the Honolulu Harbor. The Landauers avoid using the phrase “gunboat diplomacy” by asserting that Hawaiians interpreted the presence of the U.S. Navy as menacing rather than by saying that the Navy deliberately used the threat of force: they state “Such a large concentration of U.S. ships was seen as [my emphasis] intimidating by islanders” (111).

The sovereignty crisis was finally averted, however, only when Kamehameha III died on December 15, 1854 and his nephew Prince Alexander Liholiho became the next king. Unlike Kamehameha III, Liholiho and his wife Queen Emma were pro-British. Paske-Smith states, for example, that “The reign of King Kamehameha IV and Queen
Emma marks a period when the influence of the English in Hawaii was as great as in the times of Vancouver" (258). In 1862, for instance, Church of England missionaries baptized Queen Emma, whereas American missionaries had always refused her that privilege. Queen Emma also helped build a branch of the Church of England in Hawaii. Kamehameha IV had disliked the United States partly because of the reasons articulated by Miller, that is, that the U.S. was a racist country and that Hawaiians would be treated as "niggers." Traveling in the United States at the age of 15, for example, Alexander Liholiho was a victim of this ugly racial prejudice. As Tabrah notes, a "conductor on a Pullman car had mistaken the Prince for someone’s colored manservant and summarily ordered him to leave. Alexander reacted thusly: "Confounded fool! The first time I ever received such treatment, not in England or France, or anywhere else. But in this country I must be treated like a dog to come and go at the American’s bidding....They have no manners, no politeness, not even common civilities" (Tabrah, 63-64).

Some of the Landauers’ interpretations of Hawaiian history are almost laughable in their naivety. They state of the 1848 Māhele that, “By this time the Hawaiian Islands were too small, with too many residents, to continue to live by the old ‘feudal’ system” (99). Stating that simple geography and demographics caused the Māhele and not the greed and manipulation of haoles is certainly a novel approach to history but hardly one that should gain much support, especially in view of factual data which shows that the population of the islands had been falling dramatically since 1778. Similarly when the Landauers state that the Hawaiian League was created “to avoid government scandals and misadventures by taking control themselves” (127) they are very coyly excusing the actions and motives of a power-hungry and ruthless group of haole business men, who
acted in secret because they knew their actions were illegal. The authors contend that the Hawaiian League wanted “reform not revolt” – reform being a euphemism in this case for grabbing power. They describe the plotters’ march on the Iolani Palace as follows:

“Though they expected to have a reasonable conversation with [King Kalākaua], they made sure they had several units of the Honolulu Rifles at their backs when they arrived. This show of force may have intimidated Kalakaua and it may be one reason the resulting document is called the ‘Bayonet Constitution’” (127). Remarkably the Landauers then state that the “Reform Cabinet” (the cabinet imposed on the King by the Hawaiian League) “knew it was imperative that order and tranquility be restored,” without mentioning that it was the League that had caused the “disorder” in the first place.

The “Bayonet Constitution” stated that ministers were no longer responsible to the Mōʻī, and voting restrictions were imposed by way of property restrictions. Almost all Native Hawaiians were disenfranchised by a series of voting tests and qualifications similar to those that disenfranchised African-American voters in the U.S. South. Incredibly, the Landauers claim that the “idea” that Native Hawaiians were disenfranchised is mistaken, as many were simply no longer “eligible” because they did not own property. Such arguments are nothing but obtuse excuses for the immorality, greed and racism of the Hawaiian League. Although the “revolutionaries” used the language of the U.S. War of Independence, Gavan Daws explains that this was a conservative revolution of businessmen. He asks, “where was liberty?” (251). An armed attempt to restore Native Hawaiian liberty began on 30th July 1889. Significantly, because they had declined to use this terminology in reference to the Hawaiian League, the Landauers call this event a “revolt” and those involved “revolutionaries” (137). Under
the leadership of Robert W. Wilcox, a group of armed pro-Kalākaua supporters took up positions in the grounds of Iolani Palace. The next day they opened fire on opposing government militia troops at the Opera House. The militia was given 10,000 rounds of ammunition by the crew of the USS Adams, which was docked in Honolulu Harbor. They quickly repelled the rebels and took them prisoner. Marines from the USS Adams also came ashore and took up positions around town. The "rebellion" was over as quickly as it began.

Despite his prominent role in the Hawaiian League, Sanford Dole is described by the Landauers as being "respected by Hawaiians, including many of the natives" (145) which is not only debatable but also illustrates once again the authors problematic use of labels. When the authors want to minimize American connivance they refer to those responsible by their national origins: for example, they point out that only two members of the "Reform Cabinet" were American, and "[a]ll the rest...British" (127). However, when the authors want to legitimize American military actions, they refer to the alleged support of "Hawaiians" when they really mean "haoles." The backlash against the Reform Cabinet is described as "harmless" and, strangely, as less "pleasant" than the authors' report of the first U.S. Navy ship to enter Pearl Harbor (137). It is as if the authors are slightly offended at having to report this armed resistance against American interests.

In 1891 Queen Liliʻuokalani became monarch on the death of Kalākaua. It quickly became apparent that she was a threat to the new ruling elite. Although she had sworn an oath to uphold the 1887 Constitution, she clearly wanted it abolished. She began to impose her will on the legislature by appointing her own representatives. Haole
businessman Lorrin Thurston saw his chance and organized a “Committee of Safety” to overthrow the monarchy. With the aid of Marines from the *USS Boston* (they had earlier enlisted the support of its Captain, G. C. Wiltse), Thurston and his supporters imposed martial law. As Marion Kelly points out, Thurston, “[u]nder U.S. military protection,” was committing an act of treason against the Hawaiian government (19). The Queen was told by her advisors not to resist, and Lili‘uokalani surrendered her authority to U.S. minister John Stevens. She correctly gauged that he was behind the overthrow but she expected it to be reversed once Washington found out exactly what had happened. Sadly for her, and the Hawaiian monarchy, this never took place. Hawai‘i was declared a Protectorate of the United States and officially incorporated as a territory in 1898.

Lawrence Fuchs concludes sadly that this whole affair shows once again that force prevails, that “once again American rifles proved more effective than Hawaiian votes or legal decisions” (30) and that “military rather than popular rule prevailed” (33).

The Landauers excuse the overthrow of the popular Hawaiian Queen, however, because she had an “imperious attitude” (140), was “self-serving” (150), “corrupt, inefficient and unreliable” (141). Furthermore, the authors state that after the rebellion, “The United States Navy was again ready to serve the legal government,” without any commentary at all of the ethics of the United States in supporting the illegal overthrow, or “end” as they euphemistically call it (138), of the monarchy in order to establish this so-called “legal” administration (137). When Hawai‘i was annexed as a territory of the United States, the authors describe it in neutral terms as a simple change of status in which Hawai‘i was “brought...under the protection of the US” (138). President Cleveland appointed James H. Blount to go to Hawai‘i to report on the overthrow.
Blount's subsequent report slammed the American-backed overthrow of the monarchy and recommended that the Queen be restored. Blount's report is generally seen as impartial and accurate. Haunani-Kay Trask calls it "the single most damaging document against the United States [and] the missionary descendants" (Native Daughter, 13). However, the Landauers describe it as having "shortcomings" and of being "one-sided" (147). In view of these comments, and what has gone on before, the authors' remarks that they "felt the anguish of the Hawaiians at the time of annexation, but could understand the reasons for it" (351) seem disingenuous, self serving and paternalistic.

Four decades earlier, in 1843, Captain Lord George Paulet of the British Navy acted well beyond his authority and annexed the Hawaiian Islands to Great Britain. A few months later, however, the British returned sovereignty to King Kauikeaouli. Queen Lili'uokalani expected the American government to do likewise. However, American colonial and military ambitions precluded such an altruistic act of justice. To excuse these factors, the dominant, colonial discourse of annexation maintains that Native Hawaiians either actively welcomed or were simply uninterested in the loss of their national sovereignty. In response to annexation, the Landauers state for example, "the Women's Hawaiian Patriotic League collected more than 20,000 signatures on petitions against the annexation. Whether this constitutes an angry protest, as some writers imply, depends on your point of view" (157). Author Ruth Tabrah's "point of view" is that, "For [Native Hawaiians] Annexation Day was a day of lamentation and despair. In vain, thirty-seven thousand of them – nearly every man, woman, and child of Hawaiian ancestry – had signed a petition to the United States Congress and to the American president [to] protest..." (5). Notwithstanding the discrepancy in the two figures, it is clear that Native
Hawaiians did, in fact, make energetic and prolonged objections to their annexation to a foreign power. The Landauers, however, spend a lot of time trying to convince the reader that the process of militarization in Hawai‘i is a marriage of toleration between both sides rather than a coloniser-colonised relationship. They state, for example, that, “the Hawaiian people are supportive of their neighbors, the US Navy” (349), that “The Navy spends a great deal of its budget in Hawaii and is also a good neighbor to the citizens of Hawaii...[t]hat’s cooperation” (339), and that “both the Navy and Hawaii were benefiting” from the U.S. Navy’s activities at Pearl Harbor (330). To support these assumptions, the authors go to some length to list the supposed financial and economic benefits of the U.S. military’s presence in Hawai‘i. They never acknowledge an alternative viewpoint in “The History of Hawaii” nor do they discuss in any depth or with any real conviction the many problems that the military brings to the islands, such as unaffordable housing, pollution, water and land use, etc. They completely fail to mention the objections of those within the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement who see Hawai‘i as a U.S. colonial possession.

As a work solely of military history, Pearl: The History of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor contains what one might expect, namely stories designed to boost military pride and to validate military actions. However, when it tries to broaden its scope to include a wider view of Hawaiian history, the book’s bias and distortion become transparent. Page by page, the authors create a mythology about weak, defenceless islands threatened by hostile Asian and European colonial powers. This myth making portrays the United States as a non-colonial or non-imperial nation that is only interested
in bringing progress, democracy, and civilization to heathen natives. In doing so, the authors create a Hawai‘i that the American military needs to justify its presence. 

And the Band Plays On...

Many other sources of military history repeat the same harmful narratives noted above. For example, in *Guardians of Empire* acclaimed military historian Brian Linn (a graduate of the University of Hawai‘i) begins his account not with annexation or the Blount Report, but instead with the role the “young Hawaiian Republic” took in hosted American troops on their way to another American colony, the Philippines. The new “Republic” “offered its facilities,” claims Linn, and “lavishly entertained” American soldiers (8). Of course, any analysis of who comprised this Republic and whom it represented would introduce the discordant voices of disinherited Native Hawaiians and disenfranchised ethnic groups. As has been shown previously, use of passive voice in some circumstances glosses over uncomfortable historical facts. Linn states, for example, “On 12 August the Hawaiian Islands formally became [my emphasis] part of the United States” (9). No attempt is made to show how and why Hawai‘i “became” part of the United States. Linn claims that the first garrison troops to arrive received “an enthusiastic reception,” but he does not say by whom. Instead he weakly asserts that “local entertainers greeted troop ships,” calling this an “enthusiastic ‘aloha’” from Hawai‘i (9).

Linn follows in the wake of other military writers on Hawai‘i by inventing an internal enemy that therefore required the presence of U.S. forces. He states, for example, that the fidelity to the United States exhibited by Filipinos and Hawai‘i’s Japanese in 1941 does not, by itself, prove that this loyalty existed in 1911 or 1921 or 1931, or that army suspicions were merely racist or paranoid. There was ample documentation – however ambiguous, inconclusive, and biased – to suggest that the local
populations must be watched. Thus, the U.S. Army in the Pacific had to look inward as well as outward, to guard as much against rebellion and sabotage as invasion. (xiii)

Gary Okihiro, whom Linn lists in his bibliography, notes “army intelligence and the FBI planted a nisei counterpropaganda system within the Japanese community to negate Japanism, exacerbate the tensions between issei and nisei, and stir up white racism” (191). Linn must therefore know that the Army’s “ample documentation” of disloyalty was false since the Army invented most of it to provide ammunition against the Japanese community. Linn, however, maintains that the presence of this false or, at best, inaccurate documentation is still justification for suspicion towards Hawai‘i’s ethnic minorities. Linn does not entertain the thought, nor analyze why the military may have needed an enemy to justify its presence or to persuade mainland politicians that more money must be spent.

In blaming a small number of soldiers for their behavior in Hawai‘i, Linn avoids an institutional analysis of the problems the military cause for the community. He also shifts attention away from both the U.S. government, which was responsible not only for sending U.S. forces to Hawai‘i in the first place, but which also made the policy decisions that determined the course and nature of their stay. If Linn concentrated his analysis on the majority of soldiers rather than a minority of offenders that would entail asking difficult questions about how those soldiers were representative of wider American society at that time and, in particular how they viewed issues of race and the supposed superiority of Western civilization. It was the white man’s burden after all to civilize lesser races and make them ready for self-government.
Instead, Linn minimizes instances of violence committed by military men against Hawai‘i’s local community. For example, he details how in 1898 American soldiers “raided local gardens, bilked merchants...harassed the army’s provost guards [and committed] a number of attacks on local Chinese.” Linn describes these events as “isolated incidents of fraud and violence” (9). The issue of context is all-important: frequently military historians will excuse even ordinary, non-war-related crimes such as these as being typical in type and extent as crimes committed in the wider population from which those soldiers are drawn. Yet there is a contradiction in this approach; as shown with the Landauers, military historians tend to distance the military from the historical, social and political context in which the military operates. This choice allows military historians the freedom to discuss military campaigns as if whether they are won or lost in itself determines the rightness/righteousness of the war. In Guardians of Empire, Linn uses this approach to divorce the military from any political blame for imperialism in Hawai‘i. The military only does what it is told to do, after all, and cannot therefore be an “occupation” or "colonial" force if it is kept distinct from political arguments over its use. Yet, at the same time, Linn seeks to excuse crimes committed by the military by categorizing them as part of wider society’s problems. The author cannot have it both ways: either the military is seen as part of wider systems of power or it is not. One cannot "pick and choose" context to support some actions and excuse others.

The role of the military in Hawai‘i is usually defined as being to protect against internal and external threats. In the early part of the twentieth-century, the supposed internal threat was the Islands’ Japanese community. Not only was the role of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i to be on guard against any potential disloyalty from the Japanese, but
also, whether it was stated openly or otherwise, to defend the honor of Caucasian American women against the internal threat of Hawai‘i’s “half-breed hoodlums” (Stirling, 245). According to a 1923 Federal Commission, the Japanese created an atmosphere of “danger and menace” to “White and Hawaiian” women, who lived in an “atmosphere of fear” (Okihiro, 96). In the context of the infamous “Massie Case” in the 1930s, which involved the alleged rape of a Navy wife, Admiral Yates Stirling, commandant of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard said “American men will not stand for violation of their women under any circumstances” (Wright, 101). In the aftermath of that divisive trail, Stirling concluded, “The dark-skinned citizens have been taught how far the American white man will go to protect his women from brutal assaults by men. There has been forced upon the Islanders a greater respect for the armed forces of the United States quartered in the Islands for their defense” (Stirling, 269).

Did the U.S. military and its apologists exaggerate the threat? Perhaps the attitudes and actions of Army wife Anne Winslow offer some clues. Winslow was the wife of captain Evelyn Winslow, U.S. Corps of Engineers. Top of his class at West Point in 1889, Winslow was assigned to O‘ahu in 1908 to design and construct coastal fortifications at Diamond Head (Fort Ruger) and Waikiki (Fort DeRussy). They arrived aboard the transport ship Sheridan in November and stayed until April 1911, by which time the fortifications were nearly complete. Mrs. Winslow wrote a series of letters home to her mother about military life in Hawai‘i, a selection of which is collected in the book Fort DeRussy Days: Letters of a Malihini Army Wife, 1908-1911.

According to the Federal Commission report, white women were “very...outspoken” about the sexual threat that supposedly existed (Okihiro, 96). And
yet, in Anne Winslow’s letters spanning thirty months in Hawai‘i, there is no hint at all of any danger. While it could be argued that due to propriety Winslow would not have mentioned such a thing even if it existed, Winslow does in fact linger at times on other sexual matters – a scantily-clad Frenchman, for example, or the fact locals spend so much time in their bathing suits that she has “grown so familiar with the contours of the human form” that even nudity would not shock her anymore (75). After staying a few weeks at the Moana Hotel, on 31st December 1908, the Winslows moved into a large house at Fort DeRussy adjacent to Battery Randolph. It was the responsibility of an Army wife to set up a home that was not only livable but also suitable for entertaining Army officers. Given that responsibility, Anne Winslow hired local Japanese and Chinese to do her housework, washing, and cooking. While Mrs. Winslow had no real idea what to make of the ethnic diversity of her neighbors, she had nothing but praise for their behavior. She concluded, “I am so in love with the Orientals and their sense and reasonableness” (111). Winslow’s letters totally contradict military warnings of the supposed sexual threat posed by non-Caucasians towards white women.

What would a U.S. soldier think about Hawai‘i and its inhabitants, given the alarming lack of honesty that prevails in military writing? A short history of Hawai‘i written in a 1956 ROTC manual states, for example, “In 1884 the United States acquired a coaling and naval maintenance station at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii” (295). How or why the Harbor was “acquired” is not stated. Of the overthrow of Hawaiian Monarchy, the ROTC manual is only slightly more revealing. It states, for example, that when Queen Lili‘uokalani “sought to reorganize her government and end the [Pearl Harbor] concession, local Americans with the support of a naval force set up a provisional
government” (295). The ROTC manual is deliberately vague about Liliuokalani’s motives. However, the threat to take back Pearl Harbor would resonate in the minds of soldiers and sailors whose comrades had died there only fifteen years before. No attempt is made to contextualize events or provide a deeper, more nuanced analysis.

The Army Times is the official magazine of the U.S. Army. In 1971 it published a book entitled Pearl Harbor and Hawaii: A Military History. Chapter one, which is all of twelve pages long, half of which are illustrations or photographs, offers a condensed history of the Hawaiian Islands from their volcanic birth in the distant past until the beginning of World War One. In such a short space it is notable what the writers choose to include and omit. For example, the reader is reminded once again of an outside threat that the U.S. Navy must protect against, in this case, Lord George Paulet’s successful, albeit short-lived annexing of Hawai’i to Great Britain. The narrative asserts that the presence of the USS Constitution “had something to do with protecting the neutrality of the Islands and guaranteeing the continuance of the Hawaiian flag” (3). This is, of course, entirely false: Paulet played out his fantasies in spite of the presence of the USS Constitution, and it was a British foreign policy decision that renounced Paulet’s territorial claims. The Bayonet Constitution is excused because King Kalakaua “was in the process of suggesting a marriage alliance between his family and that of the Emperor of Japan” (10). This alliance, we are told, “would have presaged no good either for Hawaii or the United States.” No evidence is presented to support this assertion. Furthermore, Kalakaua “was seeking too many royal prerogatives.” His “subjects forced him to sign a new constitution.” Left unsaid, of course, is that these “subjects” were
comprised of Hawai'i's *haole* business elite and not Native Hawaiians. In a final insult, Queen Lili'uokalani is described as Kalakaua's "corpulent sister" (10).

In a similar vein, military websites communicate to their soldiers an inchoate, decontextualised, and sometimes dishonest version of Hawaiian history. For example, the Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard website contains an "About Us" section with some historical notes. The first section is entitled "Historical Summary: 1820-1887." The next section is entitled "Historical Summary: 1901." The official Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard website thus avoids controversy and "slippage" of the military narrative of "protection," "defense," etc. by skipping the overthrow of Hawaiian sovereignty and the U.S. Navy's role therein. The historical "facts" presented in the narrative of the years 1820-1887 is in itself problematic: for example, it states, "With the exception of a few unfortunate episodes, American prestige tended to increase in the islands." American gunboat diplomacy is thus described as exceptional instead of the norm. In the wake of Paulet's annexation and subsequent rebuff, the British and French invited the United States to form a three-way agreement not to annex Hawai'i. The United States declined to take part, we are told, "because the time had not arrived for her 'to depart from the principle by virtue of which they had always kept their foreign policy independent of foreign powers.'" This bizarre and disingenuous excuse has been correctly described as "illogical" (Walsh, 67). The United States had, by this time, signed a number of treaties with "foreign powers" including the Treaty of Paris (1989) with Spain and Treaty of Ghent (1814) with Great Britain. Clearly the United States did not want to sign a treaty that would limit its options with regard to a possible future takeover of Hawai'i. Lastly, in stating that naval officers "served as arbitrators in business disputes, negotiators of
trade agreements and defenders of law and order,” the historical narrative presented in this section of the website repeats a familiar and disingenuous theme of military writing, that the military restores “order” and has acted as an independent authority in Hawai‘i.

**Conclusion**

Military versions of history often act as propaganda, which works not only to support specific policies of the military, but also create a climate wherein the military’s presence is deemed necessary for “protection” or “keeping order.” Counter-narratives, or uncomfortable historical events that would threaten military discourses of protection and order, are either ignored or glossed over. The Fort DeRussy Army Museum ignores American gunboat diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century, for instance. Landauer and Landauer’s *Pearl* pretends that whereas the British, French, Russians and Japanese are seen as foreign to Hawai‘i, Americans, however, are not. Brian M. Linn begins *Guardians of Empire* in 1902, neatly sidestepping American military involvement in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy. And so on. Taken as a whole, American military writing about Hawai‘i acts both as a defender and an agent of American colonialism. That term is never mentioned, of course. Instead, military historians talk of the natural progression of history or civilization, the role the U.S. military plays in “restoring order” amongst Hawai‘i’s restless and dangerous inhabitants, and the protection the military provides for Hawai‘i against some unnamed outside threat. Alternative narratives can only be unearthed when the misleading and self-serving historical writings of military historians are exposed for what they are – a type of military propaganda.
CHAPTER 2. THE WAIKIKI WAR MEMORIAL PARK AND NATATORIUM

On the western slope of Diamond Head, commanding a majestic view East towards Waikiki, Honolulu, and further towards Pearl Harbor, there once stood a Native Hawaiian structure known as *Papa 'Ena 'Ena Heiau*. Clearly visible from nearby Waikiki village, the *heiau* measured 130 feet in length and 70 feet in width. It consisted of a *mana* house approximately 50 feet long, an oven house (*hale umu*), a drum house, a *waiea* house, an *anu ‘u* tower, a *lele* altar and twelve large images. The *heiau* was bordered by a rectangular wooden fence approximately 6-8 feet tall with an 8-foot wide base which narrowed to 3 feet at its apex. On the *heiau*’s western side there were three small terraces, on the highest one of which were planted five *kou* trees at regular distances from each other. The *heiau* was the center point of an area of land considered sacred or spiritual to Native Hawaiians, which may have stretched across what is now Kapi‘olani Park as far as to the Kupalaha *heiau* situated near the present day intersection of Kalakaua and Monsarrat Avenues.

It is likely that the *heiau* was built in 1783 by Kahekili, the *Mo‘o* of Maui, as part of a victory celebration following Kahekili’s conquest of O‘ahu. After King Kamehameha’s victory at the Battle of the Pali in 1895, Kamehameha ordered the sacrifice of the defeated *Ali‘i* of O‘ahu at *Papa‘Ena ‘Ena Heiau*. The *heiau* was probably used for sacrificial or sacred purposes for 35 years. However, following the death of Kamehameha and the subsequent diminishment in status and practice of Hawaiian religious beliefs the *heiau* was leveled along with many of the other traditional religious *heiau* and monuments. Its ruins lay relatively undisturbed until the 1850s when the stones...
that comprised the *heiau* were carted off to build roads in Waikiki and walls at Queen Emma’s estate (Weyeneth, 48-52, 62, 67; “Heiau found at La Pietra”).

In sharp contrast to *Papa‘ena‘ena Heiau*, and nine other sacred structures in and around Kapi‘olani Park, there now stands an incongruous *beaux-arts*-style, neoclassical memorial, another *place de memoire*, called The Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium. Although it has fallen into disrepair since opening in 1927, in its prime the memorial was an impressive structure. The swimming pool was over 100 meters long, twice the size of an Olympic pool, the *mauka*-facing wall was composed of an arch at least 25 feet high, flanked by two 12-foot arches each topped with four large eagle sculptures. Approximately 9,800 of Hawai‘i’s citizens served in the U.S. Armed Forces after America’s entry into the war in 1917 and the names of 101 of those who died are inscribed on a plaque attached to the “Honolulu stone” situated *mauka* of the Natatorium and unveiled in 1931 (Burleigh, 13).

There is, however, some considerable doubt as to the veracity of those casualty figures. According to the *Hawaiian Journal of History*, of the 9800 Hawai‘i residents who served in World War One,

102 died – 14 overseas during the war, 61 in Hawai‘i or North America or after the armistice, and 27 in unknown circumstances. Twenty-two of the 102 recorded deaths occurred among Island residents serving with the British. Actual battle deaths of persons in the U.S. armed forces whose preservice residence was Hawai‘i numbered six: seven others were wounded. (Schmitt, 172-73)

These figures are not entirely correct: 101 names are listed on the memorial not 102; eight soldiers were “actual battle deaths,” not six. Nevertheless, these figures raise questions about the purpose of the Memorial. Since only eight Hawai‘i residents died by enemy action under the U.S. flag - the others having died of other causes before and after
the war’s end - the Memorial obviously exaggerates the death toll, thus magnifying the
sacrifices made by “Hawai‘i’s sons”.

Memorials are an important way of remembering. They are not just part of the
past, they help to shape attitudes in the present and thus act as a guide for the future. As
such, they have power: in his book Lies Across America, James Loewen asks,
“Where...do Americans learn about the past?” He argues persuasively that it is “surely
most of all from the landscape” (15). From America’s West Coast to its East, Loewen
examines on a state-to-state basis some of the lies and omissions of the U.S.’s memorials.
One recurring theme is the importance of memorials as a political statement. By
examining those who advocate for memorials and exploring the reasons why they are
built and what form they eventually take, Loewen is able not only to interpret the designs
of various memorials for overt and hidden meanings but also discover why they are built
beyond superficial discourses of “remembering” or “honoring.”

In using Loewen’s investigative and interpretative techniques to discover who
advocated and built the Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium, and why they chose
an architectural style so incompatible with its Pacific Island setting, the reason for the
discrepancy between actual casualty figures and those advocated by the Memorial
becomes clear: the War Memorial was built to further the “100% Americanism” of
Hawai‘i. It commemorates not only those who died in World War I, but also Hawai‘i’s
colonization by the United States. In a way the Memorial constitutes a political statement
of ownership. It is a symbol of the dominance of Western culture over Polynesian, a
solid, concrete and unchanging reminder that Hawai‘i is a colonial possession of the
United States, and a channel for Hawai‘i’s American settler community to express their nationalistic pride.

**Consolidating Empire**

In first two decades of the Twentieth Century, Hawai‘i was adjusting to its new, enforced status as a U.S. territory. This was a time of American empire building and Hawai‘i acted as an important stopping-off point for US troop ships on their way to the Philippines to suppress a Filipino uprising against American rule. Indeed Hawai‘i became an essential element in U.S. military thinking about the region. In 1890 Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the U.S. Navy published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. He believed that whichever country controlled the sea-lanes would also lead the world economically. Mahan foresaw a time when a war would come between East and West and Hawai‘i would be vital to U.S. interests. He therefore supported a large U.S. Navy and fortification of American possessions in the Pacific. This became known as the Mahan Doctrine (Okihiro, 17-18).

The Mahan Doctrine provided U.S. policy makers with another reason to expand the U.S. Navy’s role in the Pacific and to begin fortifying the new U.S. colony in Hawai‘i. Fort Shafter, which opened in 1907, was the first permanent U.S. military base in Hawai‘i. Evelyn Winslow, U.S. Corps of Engineers, was assigned to O‘ahu in 1908 to design and construct coastal fortifications at Diamond Head (Fort Ruger) and Waikiki (Fort DeRussy). Fort DeRussy comprised an area of 72 acres, which was acquired by the government in a series of twelve land purchases between 1904-15. The major armament of the fort was Battery Randolph - two fourteen-inch guns that could shoot “a 1560 pound projectile to a range of 14 miles” (Winslow, xii). Other coastal defense guns were
placed along the southern coast at Forts Armstrong, Kamehameha, and Weaver. A new infantry base was built on O‘ahu to house ever growing numbers of American troops. The new base, named Schofield Barracks, would eventually become the biggest army base in the United States and is now the home of the 25th Infantry Division. The U.S. military dredged the Pearl River and from humble beginnings as a coaling station in 1908, the site eventually became the biggest military installation in the Pacific, occupying over 1200 acres of valuable real estate adjacent to Honolulu. Pearl Harbor would become the home of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and, to the Japanese Navy, also, of course, the biggest U.S. military target in the Pacific. Hickam Air Force Base was completed in 1938 and Wheeler Air Force Base in 1939. Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Air Station opened in 1939, and Barber’s Point Naval Air Station, west of Pearl Harbor, was commissioned a year after the Japanese attack. Tripler Army Medical Center has occupied a commanding view from the Monalua Ridge since 1948 (Cragg).

This military build up went hand in hand with continuing “development” and “Americanization” – two terms that are, in fact, almost interchangeable. Lawrence Fuchs describes Americanization as “going to Christian churches, playing American sports, and eating apple pie; there was nearly complete accord that it did not mean labor unions, political action, and criticism of the social order in the Islands” (51). Part of this effort was connected to the “City Beautiful” movement that was inspired by the 1893 Columbian Exposition (Mayo, 80). Civil War and Great War memorials provided young, inchoate cities like Honolulu, Cleveland and Indianapolis with “way[s] to express civic improvement (Mayo, 181). However, another motive of developers was profit mixed with ideas of civilization and progress that were specifically associated with Western notions.
of expansion. For example, Honolulu Harbor was dredged in 1908 to encourage further trade. A lighthouse was built at Makapuu to facilitate a new inter-island steamer, the *Mauna Kea*. Mānoa Valley became the first area in Hawai‘i to get electric lighting. By 1910 the Nuuanu Dam and Beretania pumping stations were established to bring water to parched Honolulu (Grant, *Introduction* xi). Much of Waikiki’s wetlands were to be dredged to provide reclaimed land for construction. A 1920 article in the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* outlined Territorial Governor of Hawai‘i, Charles J. McCarthy’s vision of the future of Honolulu:

> I have looked down on Honolulu from the hills and observed the shining rice fields, taro patches and duck ponds; and I have imagined how soon all these will be done away with, and in their place shall arise alternative, wellkept [sic] homes, the handsome mansions of the wealthy and the comfortable cottages of those who are making good livings in a prosperous country. (“Actual work on Waikiki Project almost in sight”)\(^\text{18}\)

McCarthy’s plans for the area were supported by such notable local organizations as the Outdoor Circle, Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, Ad Club, Free Kindergarten, Hawaiian Historical Society, Child Welfare Commission, Humane Society, Outrigger Club, Pan-Pacific Club and Daughters of Hawai‘i, many of which were also involved in the plans for the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium (“Governor’s Plan To Reclaim Duck Ponds Approved”). “Reclaiming” land was, in many cases, doublespeak for appropriating it from small landowners, who were mostly Asian and Native Hawaiian. This lack of concern for small-ownership land rights was not unusual for either the rich elites in Hawai‘i or for the *Advertiser*. Some 20 years before, when thirty-eight acres of Chinatown was destroyed by fire, the *Advertiser* had stated that “the fire would give the white man’s business district room to expand” (Daws, 303).
In Hawai‘i baseball was fast becoming the national sport. Ex-patriot Americans enthusiastically celebrated Lincoln’s birthday and the Fourth of July. In 1909 the first movie house was opened, and as the years progressed, Native Hawaiians could watch Western misrepresentations of themselves and other Polynesians in movies such as D.W. Griffith’s The Idol Dancer (1920) and Hula (1927), which features Clara Bow as an “unconquered island girl who comes face to face with love!” (Schmitt, Hawai‘i in the Movies, 29). In the movie, Bow dances her version of a hula to the accompaniment of classical piano music.

A small minority of haoles controlled much of the economy of the Islands, which were in the grip of an economic boom caused by the sugar industry. Because sugar was a labor-intensive crop, many foreigners had been imported to Hawai‘i to work the land. In 1872 Native Hawaiians constituted nearly 83 percent of the plantation work force. However, by 1882, Chinese immigrants composed the largest group at 49 percent. They were replaced as the largest group in 1890 by Japanese workers who constituted 42 percent of the plantation work force. However, by 1922 it was Filipinos who comprised the highest percentage of plantation workers at 41 percent (Okihiro, 59).

As a result, the Islands’ racial mix became more diverse. However, with the increasing militarization of Hawai‘i, particularly during and after World War One, there also arrived the malihini haoles – mostly Caucasian U.S. military men and their families from America’s racially divided South – who brought with them inbred hostility to those they considered as racially inferior. In this respect, malihili haoles were different from “local” haoles: mainlanders were inclined to see Native Hawaiians in terms of mainland racial classifications. If they were dark-skinned they were niggers, in other words. Local
haoles, while still paternalistic and condescending in attitude to the “inferior” Native Hawaiians, judged themselves able to distinguish between well-bred natives (those descended from royalty or from good families) and the lower class of natives who had interbred with other ethnic groups. As Jane Desmond points out, “one [mainland] political cartoon from the Spanish-American War caricatures Native Hawaiians, like the inhabitants of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, as black-skinned pigmies with kinky hair and big lips” (55). These prejudices soon caused trouble. A riot in Downtown Honolulu in 1919, involving 200 or so malihini military men and Native Hawaiians, erupted when the uniformed men “appl[ied] the term ‘nigger’ to two natives who were seated on their doorsteps playing ukuleles” (“Sailors, Soldiers and Hawaiians Stage Riot At Midnight”).

It was against this background of racial tension, augmented by the influx of malihini U.S. soldiers, that the Memorial and other monuments to American militarism and imperialism in Hawai‘i were introduced. Western ways were being imposed at the expense of Native Hawaiians and other non-Caucasians and non-Americans. Virtually every effort was made to eradicate non-American traditions and to install American symbols, flags, emblems, buildings and traditions. In this period of American history all the forces of a modern Western state were being utilized to destroy the remnants of Native Hawaiian culture and to Americanize all of Hawai‘i’s inhabitants. The Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium was, and to a certain extent remains, part of this propaganda and Americanization effort.
A Citizens' Memorial

Local citizens and groups formed their own War Memorial Committee in 1918. It appears that this was a response to the group that first advocated a memorial to Hawai‘i’s war dead, the “Daughters and Sons of the Hawaiian Warriors.” However, there were a number of interested parties involved including the Daughters of Hawai‘i, the Rotary Club, the Outdoor Circle, the Pan-Pacific Union, Central YMCA, Hawaiian Societies, Junior Auxiliary, Hawaiian congregation, St Andrew’s Cathedral, War Camp Community Service, Hawaiian Women’s Guild, Kamehameha Alumni Association, Hawaiian Civic Club, Order of Kamehameha, Longshoremen’s Mutual Aid Association, Knights of Pythias, House of the Chiefs of Hawai‘i, and the Ad Club among others. Notable interested individuals included former territorial Attorney-General W.O. Smith and territorial tax collector Colonel Howard Hathaway. As historian Kirk Savage has noted, they were following a relatively new trend in monument building that began in the Nineteenth-Century:

In the expansive era of the nineteenth century, monuments were not bestowed by the state on the citizenry, or at least they weren’t supposed to be...What gave monuments their particular appeal in an era of rising nationalism was their claim to speak for “the people”...Most monuments therefore originated not as official projects of the state but as volunteer enterprises sponsored by associations of “public-spirited” citizens and funded by individual donations. These voluntary associations often had direct links to officialdom, but they received legitimacy only by manufacturing popular enthusiasm (and money) for the project. (6)

Who were these organizations and individuals and what was the political outlook? Some clues can be gleaned from various Advertiser articles of the period: on 13 August, 1919 for example, the Rotary Club had as Guests of Honor at one of its receptions, “Four of the principal officials of the government of the Republic of Hawai‘i who participated in the transfer of the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States” namely
President Dole, Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry E. Cooper, Attorney-General W.O. Smith, and Hawai’i’s representative to Washington F.M. Hatch. Also present at the reception were Governor McCarthy, Mayor Fern, and two military officials Major-General Morton U.S. Army, and Rear Admiral Fletcher U.S. Navy. At the Fourth of July celebrations in 1919, representatives of both The Rotary Club and the Ad Club sang “America” and participated fully in a parade in which the white gowns of the girls representing Uncle Sam’s children were seen through the trees. Headed by Uncle Sam, the representatives of the states, beginning with Virginia and Massachusetts, marched in single file, each girl carrying a state flag. After the 48 states came Alaska and then Hawai’i with her ensign...The girls made a pretty sight as they circled the bandstand and then crossed the platform in single file, each maid placing her flag on a table before Uncle Sam. Then grouping themselves on either side and behind him, they repeated the pledge of allegiance to the flag. The Star Spangled banner, sung by the entire audience, was the closing number of the program. (“Birth Of Nation Observed By City In Fitting Rites”)

One wonders if the title of this article was intended to remind readers of D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915), a movie that championed white supremacy.

In September 1919, military representatives including Colonel Howard Hathaway addressed the Ad Club. Hathaway warned, “men of responsibility and thought must organize to meet the rising tide of Bolshevism and anti-Americanism” (“Ad Club Warned Americans Must Fight Radicals”). The YMCA made time and forums available for pro-American propagandists. For example, it gave a platform for Federal Judge Horace W. Vaughan to voice his opinion that “foreign language schools [in Hawai’i] must be abolished” (“Vaughan To Tell Why He Opposes Nippon Schools”). In October of that year the YMCA allowed Colonel Hathaway to give a talk on the dangers of organized labor and the dangers of “unprincipled aliens who are not and never can catch the spirit of Americanism” (“Men Of Action Needed To Save Nation”). Not every organization
involved in the advocacy or planning of the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium acted solely in the interests of the U.S. rather than their adopted home. However, it is clear that most of them were avidly pro-American and that they worked in very practical and concrete ways to bring American customs and American institutions to Hawai‘i.

Debate over the design of a Memorial

From its inception in Hawai‘i the American Legion acted as a force for militarism and the consolidation of American empire. It became involved in many aspects of Hawai‘i’s political and social life, and it was not long before it came to dominate the War Memorial project as well. The design of the present memorial in Kapi‘olani Park owes much to the influence of the Legion, although they cannot be held responsible for its design flaws. The Memorial has been plagued with problems since its inauguration in 1927. Although popular with locals and tourists alike, problems with Natatorium’s design meant that seawater would not flush away and be replaced as planned. Before long, swimmers could not see the bottom of the pool through the stagnant water. Concrete walkways soon began to peel and crack, the diving board became unsafe, and the stands began to crumble. Renovations in the 1940s could not solve the original design shortcomings and in the 1960s the pool was temporarily closed for health and safety reasons. In 1973 the City and County of Honolulu and the State of Hawai‘i planned to demolish the Memorial. However, opposition to these plans came from patriotic organizations like the American Legion, and ordinary citizens who formed a Natatorium Preservation Committee and got the structure listed on the State Register of Historical Places.
The Natatorium has been closed and fenced off since 1980, and in the years since then a lively and sometimes acrimonious debate has taken place over whether it should be refurbished, demolished, or perhaps transformed for other usage such as a beach volleyball court or car park. In 2001 the City and County of Honolulu controversially decided to refurbish the Natatorium at a cost of $10.8 million. The debate over the wisdom of that decision continues but it is interesting that in today’s heated deliberations over the very existence of The Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium, there has been no mention of the structures that could have been standing in Kapi’olani Park instead of the extant design, if a long-forgotten design competition had turned out differently.

The first designs for the memorial had no connection whatsoever to the extant construction. In fact, there was considerable support at one stage for either a memorial designed by Roger Noble Burnham to be erected in Palace Square close to the statue of King Kamehameha or for a Memorial Hall of some kind (“Proposes Aid For Memorial Funds”). Burnham suggested that his design would “symboliz[e] Hawai‘i’s contribution to Liberty. It consists of three figures, the central one typifying Liberty while beneath are a Hawaiian warrior and a Hawaiian maiden. The warrior offers his spear, while the maiden extends in outstretched hands a lei” (“Proposes Aid For Memorial Funds”). As Burnham explained it, the monument would be the 24-foot high central figure of a 50-foot long structure. Perhaps as a compromise to those seeking the erection of a memorial hall, Burnham also made allowances for a rostrum or stand enclosed on three sides by a wall, where an audience might be situated to hear a public speaker. Inscriptions on the wall would include Hawai‘i’s civilian population and their contribution to the war in
buying bonds and helping the Red Cross, and the other walls would depict military activities. On two foreground pillars there were to be representations of both a sailor and soldier. A tablet with the names of war casualties was to be placed in the center of the monument at its base. Burnham was also conscious of the question of race, and he assured his listeners that the sculpture “would be large enough...to depict the activities of the various nationalities in the Islands who had given their sons for the cause of Liberty” (“Proposes Aid For Memorial Funds”).

Opposition to the memorial hall design, or some other suggested structures such as an auditorium or civic center, came from a faction led by Mrs. Walter MacFarlane and was mainly based on what she believed the commemorative nature of a memorial should be. She was concerned that a “memorial hall would commercialize the memory of the men who had paid the supreme sacrifice.” On the other hand, supporters of the hall design believed that it would become a center of civic life where “people could go and hear enlightening talks and entertaining music” (“Proposes Aid For Memorial Funds”). One other suggestion at this time by the Chamber Of Commerce was for the memorial either to be placed in a prominent position at the entrance to Honolulu Harbor or on Sand Island where “it would be the first thing that would greet the arriving traveler, and the last thing he would see” (“Promotion Body Talks Memorial”). Clearly the Chamber Of Commerce hoped that the memorial would be a tourist attraction of sorts. These early deliberations over the purpose of the monument, as a “statue” or “living building” would characterize the nature of the debate for many years.
In early February 1919, further designs were considered; Burnham exhibited sketches of a design that incorporated his original sculpture into a larger design that also included a memorial hall. As the *Advertiser* reports,

The monument utilizes the Burnham model, to be treated as an archway leading to the memorial hall rotunda. The sketch showed a triumphal arch. There would be life-size figurants, also, of Hawaiian soldiers and sailors on the arch pedestals, while the panels would disclose suggestions of Hawai‘i’s chief industries which the young men defended. Entrance to the building would be through two outer archways. In the rotunda arrangements would be made to display war relics, tablets containing names of the dead heroes and other places wherein the history of Hawai‘i’s participation in the war would be shown. Behind the rotunda would be two halls, one an auditorium with a capacity of 2000, arranged for large assemblies. Adjoining would be a smaller hall. This would be equipped with a stage so that the hall could be used for lectures and small gatherings. A pipe organ would be so arranged that its music could be played directly into one half or the other. In the upper story would also be a lecture hall. ("Mass Meeting To Pass On Memorial")

The cost of this project would be somewhere in the region of $750,000 ("Rotarians Interested In Plans For Memorial For War Dead"), the equivalent today of $7,674,333.33 (Economic History Services). Another suggestion at this point was for a very practical memorial that would comprise one new wing of the Queens Hospital ("Mass Meeting To Pass On Memorial"). Yet another design by T.H. Ripley & Davis architects envisaged an impressive memorial hall surrounded by large Grecian columns and containing a large lobby or rotunda in which could be placed statuary tablets, etc., thus being brought to the eye of the thousands who enter the building, a grand auditorium for the gatherings of the public, having corridors, foyers, lobbies [sic], retiring rooms to accommodate all visitors; committee rooms where any organization seeking the public good [may] have places of meeting. ("Proposed Memorials For War Heroes Are Widely Discussed")

By the end of February 1919 the general consensus of the War Memorial Subcommittee was shifting towards the idea of both a monument and memorial hall, although nothing definite had yet been agreed. At one point, however, someone raised the
idea of erecting a memorial fountain instead of Burnham's memorial design. Mr. J.D. McInerny, spokesman for a promotion committee, supported this particular plan. He had been influenced by a letter from Avard Fairbanks of Salt Lake City, Utah, who had designed part of the Mormon Temple at Laie on O'ahu. Fairbank had suggested that a fountain be erected at the entrance to the Capital grounds as follows:

The theme I have worked out is a fountain with the central figures representing the “Liberty of the World” being upheld and sustained by the efforts of the Allied Nations. Then the fountains that are placed around the central group represent the fountains of Knowledge, Faith, Life and Energy, all putting forth their strength to the development of the World. Around the pool of water will be groups of sculpture that will represent the devotion of the different islands in the recent great struggle. These groups will be placed in such a manner that they will beautify and complete the setting for the central figures. I would suggest that each island be given an opportunity to present a sculpture group, and that each also keep a replica of the same for the adornment of its own island. This will bring more prominence and feeling of respect for the large memorial. I would also suggest that Liberty should be executed in marble and that the other groups be in bronze. ("Memorial Project Takes Real Shape")

Some dismissed Fairbanks's design for being too general, the type of monument that might be suitable in Washington, for example, but not one that represented local involvement in the war. It was suggested that, “Hawai‘i’s memorial should have sculpted themes which symbolize her own participation, using Hawaiian figures principally for the main group and using the other nationalities as studies for bas reliefs on panels” ("Want Sculpture For War Memorial"). Since only The Daughters of Warriors and the Rotary Club had by this stage offered definite proposals for the memorial's design, the subcommittee felt unable to offer a proposal to the main War Memorial Committee. They therefore decided once again to ask for views from representatives of local institutions ("Memorial Project Takes Real Shape").
On March 24, 1919 it was reported in the *Advertiser* that the War Memorial Committee was finally going to announce that a general design had been agreed upon for a monument and memorial hall to be situated on a “strip of land along Punchbowl Street, between King and Queen Streets, now occupied by the Pond Garage.” This was to be the majority report’s proposal. A dissenting minority report led by Alice MacFarlane complained about the cost of the proposed memorial and suggested once again that it be limited solely to a monument without the additional expense of a memorial hall. MacFarlane complained that the monument should “emphasize the spiritual side of victory, rather than...show the wealth of the community” (“Final Decision On Memorial Is Expected Today”).

Details of both reports had obviously been pre-released to the *Advertiser*. However, the newspaper had prematurely exposited. The next day it reported that the memorial would not be situated on Punchbowl and, in fact, proposals had been made to approach the Irwin estate to buy the Irwin property at Kapiʻolani Park instead. For some time Mr. John Guild had been in correspondence with the Irwin Estate about buying the property for use as a Pan-Pacific Peace Palace. However, at the War Memorial Committee meeting Guild suggested that the land be purchased for a War Memorial Park instead. In some ways this was a compromise to ease the tensions raised between those responsible for the majority and minority reports. Although no details of cost were released in the majority report, it was likely that Burnham’s design of a monument and memorial hall was being envisaged. It had been estimated that this would cost $750,000. McFarlane was concerned that this money could be better spent on improving Honolulu Harbor, building roads, and other improvements to Honolulu’s infrastructure. Guild,
however, suggested that the Irwin Property would cost only $220,000 and that Mrs. Irwin might be persuaded to contribute half of that if the community raised the other $110,000 (“Irwin Property On Beach Sought For Memorial”). Notwithstanding the further cost of building a memorial, there was already a saving of $640,000 on the original proposal. It was a compromise the Committee eagerly accepted. On March 28th, the Advertiser attempted to save face by saying that it too opposed the proposed memorial hall on basis of cost and it called the suggested Irwin Estate purchase “neutral ground” and a “compromise” (“Park As A Memorial”).

In a letter to the Legislature, Guild described now as a representative of the “Beach Park Memorial Committee” rather than of the “War Memorial Committee” stated that it would be in the Territory’s interest to purchase the Irwin land as “this might prove to be a solution of the memorial question and also might help solve the difficult problem now before the public for the securing of more beach property” (“Memorial Park Proposal Wins Warm Approval”). Obviously either Guild’s attempts to persuade Mrs. Irwin to pay a $110,000 contribution to the War Memorial Park had failed, or he had simply spotted an opportunity that would avert the public in Honolulu from paying, at least directly, for any of the land since the cost would be borne by all the county districts of Hawai’i as a whole (“Bill For Buying Site For Memorial Park Is Prepared”). The Legislature agreed with Guild and it moved smoothly and quickly to provide money to buy the land. In 1919 the Legislature of the Territory of Hawai’i passed Act 191 to appropriate $200,000 for the purchase (CJS Group Architects, 2). This was a further saving of $20,000 on Guild’s estimate. However, since Mrs. Irwin was not now contributing anything towards the cost of the Memorial Park, the land actually proved to
be $90,000 more expensive than his original estimate. The cost of the erection of the monument was to be borne by the public ("Memorial Park Proposal Wins Warm Approval").

The site of the memorial had now been resolved but the debate over its design had not. Guild’s letter to the Legislature envisaged a Memorial Park with an “arch or statue” as opposed to a memorial hall ("Memorial Park Proposal Wins Warm Approval").

Perhaps it was believed that the open spaces of the park would provide a natural amphitheatre and that a hall was no longer appropriate. Or perhaps there was no way to overcome the objections of Mrs. MacFarlane and still maintain a consensus. In any event, Guild was insistent that the memorial plans be given due consideration and that they should not rush into accepting a design. He worried that,

*We do not want to erect a monument which shall at some future date be looked upon as a thing of bad taste. Too many of the soldier’s monuments of the past have been of this character. I believe the memorial should take a form that will express the spirit of Hawai‘i and be in harmony with the wonderful tropical surroundings of the proposed site.* ("Irwin Property Makes Ideal Site For Park As Memorial To Men Of Hawai‘i Who Served")

However, he was extremely pleased that the memorial would be situated in Kapi‘olani Park:

*The tropical settings are expressive of the country, the background of Diamond Head and its fortifications is appropriate to a military memorial and the sea on which the property fronts is a constant reminder of those who served in the naval establishment. The surf which beats upon the reef is a constant reminder of the manly sports of the island boys which they turned into such good account in their war endeavors.* ("Irwin Property Makes Ideal Site For Park As Memorial To Men Of Hawai‘i Who Served")

It was at this stage that Burnham began to publicize his design, which had always been under consideration anyway, by presenting it to the Pan-Pacific Committees of Artists and Architects and also by placing a model in the Pan-Pacific window of Thrum’s
The Advertiser seemed in favor of Burnham’s design. They concluded that it would be difficult to express, artistically, in any more vital or beautiful way, the passionate enthusiasm and patriotic devotion with which the people of these Islands throw themselves into the cause of liberty and justice. [Burnham] took advantage of the opportunity to use Hawaiian figures and symbols and thus have a monument that would be distinctly expressive of this locality and that could not be duplicated anywhere else in the world, nor designed by anyone to whom conditions and types of Hawai‘i were unknown. (“Burnham Design For War Memorial Expresses Spirit Of Brave Hawaii”)

The Advertiser also reminded its readers, without overstatement, that throughout the various discussions and proposals for design of the war memorial, it had always been generally accepted that Burnham’s sculpture would form a centerpiece. Furthermore, they argued that the Pan-Pacific Committees of Artists and Architects had rejected the idea of a memorial arch in a park setting as unsuitable and they had, instead, endorsed Burnham’s design as the most appropriate yet available. The design would also include various tablets or panels that would bear inscriptions and data giving a general history of all that Hawai‘i did in the war, such as the numbers enlisted and drafted from the different islands and from the great variety of nationalities and races represented in this Territory. There would also be a record of our going “over the top” in all Liberty Loans and other drives and the accomplishments of the women in Red Cross work. (“Burnham Design For War Memorial Expresses Spirit Of Brave Hawaii”)

However, when the War Memorial Committee met once again on May 28, 1919, with no consensus as to what would be the most appropriate design, and with some even suggesting again that a memorial hall be built in Downtown Honolulu, the committee decided that the only way to break the impasse over choosing a design was to appoint yet
another committee this time simply to choose a site in Kapi'olani Park within the borders of the newly-purchased Irwin estate on which the memorial would be sited. Debate over the design of the memorial was left open and this compromise of forming another committee simply gave the appearance of progress without actually accomplishing anything. After all, how could they decide first where the memorial was to be situated if they did not yet know its dimensions or form? What they did agree upon was that Burnham’s design was the most appropriate so far but that a design by Avard Fairbanks for a memorial including a fountain would also be considered as soon as Fairbanks could present it to the committee. In the event, the design was first aired in the *Advertiser* when J.D. McInerny, a long-time advocate for Fairbanks, submitted sketches. The *Advertiser* entitled the design, “Mother Hawai‘i sending forth her sons to battle on sea and land.”

**Colonialism by Design**

Of particular interest in some of the designs submitted thus far for the memorial is the hieratic scale. As Loewen points out in *Lies Across America*, “[t]he word ‘monument’ comes from the Latin *monere*, to remind, admonish, instruct (43).” In some cases this “reminder” is racial in nature - Caucasians in dominant positions over non-Caucasians perhaps – or it is gender-related - male images dominating female. While Burnham’s original design manages to include both of these traits, Fairbanks’ “Mother Hawai‘i …” reverses the traditional male dominance but instead substitutes a maternalistic Mother Hawai‘i /Lady Liberty image.

Like most of the proposed memorials, including the extant one, Fairbanks insisted on the inclusion of some Hawaiian words. In this case he wanted the memorial inscribed with the words “Hawai‘i nei”, which, in one sense can be seen as a tribute to Native
Hawaiians, but in another can be interpreted as a typical Western appropriation of the image/language of the “savage” or of the noble masculinity of the native. Houston Woods states, “Settler adaption of the Hawaiian language...often masqueraded as a validation of Native traditions, when the actual effect was to encourage their destruction” (166). When seen in that light, the inclusion of some Hawaiian words on a statue benefits only the dominant American culture since their part of this “bargain” enables them to associate themselves with what they perceive to be the better, more manly aspect of the “noble savage.”

The period between the end of Reconstruction and the start of America’s Great Depression was perhaps the nadir of race relations in the United States. The change in the social and economic order caused by the Civil War, and the perceived threat to white hegemony led, for example, to a record number of lynchings - 49 African-American men were lynched in 1882, for instance, and 161 in 1892 (Bederman, 47). While Caucasians feared the supposedly “primitive” nature of African-American men, especially the “black beast rapists” (Bederman, 47), Caucasians were, at the same time, attempting to appropriate the nobler aspects of the primitive. Gail Bederman notes, for example, that, “White men joined fraternal organizations like the ‘Improved Order of Red Men’ in order to perform elaborate weekly rituals imitating their fantasies of American Indian adventures. Interest in camping, hunting, and fishing – seen as virile survival skills of primitive man – flourished....” (22-3). This “back to nature” trend manifested itself in Hawai‘i also: in 1918, for example, an “Aloha Parade” organized by haole businessmen as a patriotic send off for a contingent of local volunteers featured “The Daughters of Warriors of Hawaii” – an all-haole group – who “gave a distinct touch of Hawai‘i of olden
days” by dressing in “the feather cape or robe of royalty” (Kuykendall, 89). In view of such role-playing, the inclusion of Hawaiian words in various proposed memorial designs can be seen more as an appropriation of Native culture rather than as a tribute to it.

Also included in Fairbanks’ memorial park idea was to be a lagoon, a block of lava, and an “Ali‘i of the ancient Hawaiian regime decked in his feather cloak and helmet of war” (“Mother Hawaii‘i sending forth her sons to battle on sea and land”). Clearly Fairbanks means to imply that the men from Hawaii‘i who fought in World War One were a continuation of the supposed warrior spirit of the “ancient Hawaiian regime,” a narrative which suggests not only a seamless view of history but also one which portrays Native Hawaiians as nothing more than warriors, noble but uncivilized – but with the potential to be civilized by the superior Anglo-Saxon culture. The entire use of Native Hawaiian imagery in the designs is problematic, especially since it appears that Hawaiians were excluded from the whole process. With the exception of Prince Jonah Kuhio, whose name appears in only one early account of the War Memorial Committee, there does not appear to be any input from the Native community at all (“Statue Or Memorial Hall Issue Must Be Determined”).

Despite this, Fairbanks utilized as many Hawaiian images as possible. He wanted a monument of “majestic proportions” set in a large lagoon (“Mother Hawaii‘i sending forth her sons to battle on sea and land”). The monument would be “an imposing shaft of rugged lava” - to symbolize Hawaii‘i’s volcanic past – framed against a backdrop of Diamond Head Crater, which would “tower above the trees, making it visible from many points of interest about Honolulu.” The centerpiece of the memorial was to be a boat whose prow was in the shape of an American eagle, in which “youths from the Hawaiian
Islands” would be situated posing with an American flag, symbolizing their “read[iness] to defend the rights of mankind”. Fairbanks’ boat would “symbolize…the crossing of the seas when the sons of Hawai‘i assisted in fight for the freedom of their fellow mankind over there.” On the shaft itself, Fairbanks envisaged a relief of “an Alii [sic] of the ancient Hawaiian regime decked in his feather cloak and helmet of war. He will be in low relief which will suggest that the spirit of the ancient warriors breathes from the very rocks of the Islands, and that they prompt and inspire the youth of today to struggle for universal liberty.”

There was also a pseudo-religious element to Fairbanks’ design. He foresaw the memorial as an altar-like formation around which pedestals representing “each island’s loyalty to the cause of freedom” could be placed. He hoped that this would lead to “feelings of reverence to the big monument from the people of the different islands.” To ensure that everyone for miles around would be reminded of the importance of the monument and all it represented, Fairbanks suggested that it be illuminated at all times by a “battery of lights” screened by reflectors of stained glass decorated with the Hawaiian coat of arms. Maintaining his Biblical allusion, Fairbanks spoke of the monument appearing “as a pillar of light.” This proposed monument of “colossal proportion” was designed to memorialize the combat deaths of, at most, eight people.

Fairbanks’ design was out of all proportion to the relatively minimal casualties sustained or the sacrifices made by the people of Hawai‘i in the context of either the overall casualty figures for the First World War (excluding civilian deaths) of over six million or even those solely of the United States, which amounted to 116,000 (Schaefer, 161). The proposed construction of such an imposing structure therefore must have had
underlying motives unconnected to the War. Fairbanks’ proposal that the “monument will tower above the trees, making it visible from many points of interest about Honolulu, and in the distance, appearing as its back-ground, will rise the famed crater of Diamond Head,” is symbolic not only of man’s general conquest of nature but also the triumph of technological Western civilization over Native Hawaiian culture. Fairbanks’ intention to “prompt and inspire the youth of today to struggle for universal liberty” is an obvious reminder that the monument was meant to *monere*, to remind, admonish, instruct the people of Hawai‘i that in the future their role was to patriotically defend liberty, the personification of which was their colonial rulers, the United States.

Fairbanks’ phallic design is also a symbol of American masculinity in a place that has traditionally been designated by foreigners as a female gendered paradise: “Hawai‘i is ‘she,’ declares Haunani-Kay Trask, “the Western image of the Native ‘female’ in her magical allure” (*Native Daughter*, 136-7). In this respect, Hawai‘i becomes, in the minds of white explorers, both an extension of the primitive, feminized New World - a “virgin land” vulnerable to conquest - and also just another step in the manifest destiny of Americans to sweep forever west, brushing aside native peoples in the process of “civilization.”23 John Higham notes, for example, that not only it was the artistic convention of sixteenth-century Europeans to illustrate the world’s continents as female, but only the New World female was portrayed as a primitive:

To differentiate America from Africa and Asia, artists relied chiefly on her partial or complete nudity. Asia was always fully clothed, often sumptuously so. Africa, attired in sometimes revealing but always elegant dress, was supposed to look Moorish, since Europeans were most familiar with the Mediterranean littoral. America alone was a savage. (Qtd. in Stannard, *American Holocaust*, 229)
Perhaps the most enduring stereotype is that of the lascivious female native who is willing to share her body with white explorers or seamen. Some of the movies made about “the South Seas” when the Memorial was being constructed, such as D.W. Griffith’s *The Idol Dancer* (1920) and *White Shadows in the South Seas* (1928) are good examples of this kind of wish fulfillment. Movie stereotypes like these relied on prejudices present in much of the literature and history of Hawai‘i written by outsiders, prejudices which have a long history in the European imagination. David Stannard notes, for example, that as early as the Eleventh-Century, “non-Christian women were viewed as defiled and wanton whores and seductresses” (*American Holocaust*, 179). By the sixteenth-century, when English adventurers began exploring (plundering) Africa, Elizabethan Englishmen noted the physical differences of blacks and whites but particularly the color of the Africans’ skin which was associated in England with impurity and uncleanness. On the other hand, in English culture, white and red were seen as beautiful; when a woman blushed she was considered to be particularly attractive (Jordan, 6). This imagery persists today: in her book *Hawaii: The Sugar-Coated Fortress*, author Francine du Plessix Gray frequently refers to Hawai‘i in gender specific terms such as the “rape of any paradise” (that paradise obviously having then being judged as feminine), the “narrow diaphanous, feminine” and “broad and vigorously masculine” waterfalls, and the “rape tactics” of businessmen of Hawai‘i’s “Big Five” (109-113).

Marianna Torgovnick argues that this trend is “typical...of Western thinking about the primitive [i.e.] the circularity between the concepts of ‘female’ and ‘primitive’” (Qtd. in Desmond, 5). Similarly, in *Oh, Say, Can You See? – The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i*, authors Kathy E. Ferguson & Phyllis Turnbull argue that the
traditional image of a dark-skinned, seductive female native that is so prevalent in books, travel literature, and movies, is a racist and demeaning image that consigns native women to the role of sexual objects:

Western intrusions into Hawai‘i – from early explorers, traders, and missionaries, to planters, diplomats, and military leaders, to travel agents, airline companies, and foreign visitors – have seen Hawai‘i as a welcoming feminine place, waiting with open arms to embrace those who come to penetrate, protect, mold, and develop, while simultaneously lacking that which would make it fully realized (and which the intruders conveniently believe themselves to possess). Maps of Hawai‘i from Captain James Cook’s expeditions represent Hawai‘i with soft, curved, breast-like mountains and mysterious coves and bays...Missionary accounts of “the natives” emphasize their darkness; naked, unashamed, promiscuous. (6)

If, in movies about the Islands, tourist brochures, postcards, letters, maps, novels, history books, and in symbolic representations of Hawai‘i at commemorations such as the dedication of Hawai‘i’s War Memorial Park (where “Hawai‘i” is represented by a haole woman) (“Beautiful Park Is Dedicated To Memory Of Men In Great War”), “[w]oman is an island,” (Desmond, 5) then, Fairbanks’ design of an “imposing shaft” of lava may therefore be construed as nothing more than a huge phallic symbol, a symbolic representation perhaps of Uncle Sam’s paternalistic and therefore incestuous relationship with its forcibly adopted daughter, the Hawaiian Islands. As if to underline that point, a later version of the design included an imbedded globe at the top of the shaft making it appear even more penis-like (“Legion Plans To Erect Monument In Memorial Park”).

100 Percent Americanism

Early deliberations over the erection, placement and design of the memorial took place solely within the haole civilian community in Hawai‘i. However, in August of 1919 a new force for “100 percent Americanism” was fashioned in Hawai‘i (“Veterans Plan to Launch a Post of Legion Here”) in the form of the American Legion. The Legion’s
origins were in France, a creation of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, son of the ex-President, and others as a means of directing disaffected soldiers away from the lure of socialism. As Marcus Duffield reports in *King Legion*, “The American General Staff was seriously concerned about how to keep up morale. American bankers and business men [sic] who visited Europe returned filled with anxiety. What would be the attitude of returning troops?” (5). By early 1921, the Hawai‘i branch of the Legion had wrested control of the Memorial scheme out of the hands of the citizens’ War Memorial Committee. There is no suggestion of conflict or dispute in the historical record - a *Paradise of the Pacific* editorial noted simply that the “American Legion...has charge of the projected War Memorial” (“A Suggestion”) – but it would have taken a very brave or foolish citizen indeed to stand up to military veterans who had so very comprehensively wrapped themselves in the U.S. flag.

Despite the many different ideas as to what design would constitute a fitting memorial and where it should be situated, it appears that by early 1921 the Legion’s views held total sway. CJS Group Architects note in their *Final Historical Background Report* on the memorial, that, “This concept of having a memorial [i.e. one that included a swimming pool] was originally initiated by the American Legion Chapter of Hawai‘i” (2). This despite the fact that the Legion was not involved, did not even *exist*, when some of Hawai‘i’s citizens were submitting plans and raising interest and money for the memorial in 1918.

Of course, arguments over control of projects such as memorials are not unusual: The Daughters and Sons of the Hawaiian Warriors were complaining as early as January 1919 that “they proposed the memorial first and then later on another element steps in
and crowds them” ("Proposes Aid For Memorial Funds"). However, even given that
elected bickering, the question still remains, why did such a new and untried
organization quickly gain such a hold over the Memorial project? Perhaps the answer can
be seen in the preamble to the Legion's Constitution, in which the Legion pledges not
only to "preserve the memories and incidents of our associations in the Great War" but
also to "foster and perpetuate a one hundred percent Americanism" (Rumer, intro).
Coming so soon after the end of a devastating World War in which 50,000 or so
Americans were killed, it is hardly a surprise that a veterans' group would quickly attain
a position of influence. However, what made the Legion so powerful was that its aims
coincided with those connected to the powerful U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i, with
some of the haole elite who were pushing for statehood, and with others who did not
want statehood but did want to make Hawai‘i less alien to their American sensibilities.
These powerful groups were comprised of Island elites and representatives of pro-
American interests. Members of these elite groups sat on numerous Boards of Directors
def local companies, constituted members of the Territorial Government, owned local
media interests, or were involved in the types of clubs, societies and organizations that
became involved in projects such as the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium. Their
aims were seldom purely altruistic, and they often quite openly advocated aims and
policies that coincided with pro-American interests at the expense of local Hawaiian,
Asian, and other local interests. 25

In this time period the Legion was instrumental in pushing for unquestioning "100
percent" Americanism. For instance, in March 1920, a spokesman of the newly-formed
Legion addressed the Ad Club and "outlined the plans of the Hawaii Americanism
Commission...and called for the cooperation of the Ad Club in the effort to make Hawaii 100 percent American” (“Legion Objects And Ideals Told To Ad Clubbers”). On a national level, it actively campaigned for an increase in the size of the U.S. military and against Peace Conferences and arms reductions talks. It actively worked for the exclusion of Japanese, the deportation of foreigners, and the prosecution of “slackers”, draft dodgers and conscientious objectors. It also attacked those it considered as “Red,” “Bolshevik,” or anyone seen to be talking or acting in an un-American way.

Whereas today one view of the Legion might be that it is a harmless institution, which is comprised mostly of elderly men dedicated to remembering their dead comrades, in the 1920s the Legion’s members were young and tough, recent veterans of a vicious World War. They quickly became involved in some rather unsavory incidents. For example, in Centralia, Washington on Armistice Day, 1919, the American Legion set out to destroy the union hall of the left wing, staunchly working class, International Workers of the World (IWW) - also known as the “Wobblies.” However, when the attack came, IWW members responded with gunfire that killed three Legionnaires and wounded eleven others. One of the gunmen, Wesley Everest, was later dragged from a police cell and taken to the edge of town where Legion members “cut off his testicles, then his penis...hanged him from a bridge and then shot him” (Loewen, Lies Across America, 79). The Legion actively campaigned against freedom of speech for those whose views differed from their own. On one infamous occasion the Los Angeles branch of the Legion seriously considering taking action to stop Albert Einstein from visiting California, calling him “a pacifist traveling in the guise of a mathematician...a propagandist against the best interests of the country” (Duffield, 218). The Legion’s National Commander
from 1922-3, former Texas assistant attorney general Alvin Owsley said, apparently without irony or any sense of foresight, “Do not forget that the Fascisti are to Italy what the American Legion is to the United States” (Duffield, 169).

The Hawai‘i branches of the Legion did not use violence to further their aims—they did not have to. There were no “wobblies” in Hawai‘i, and the economic power of the “Big Five,” backed by the authority of the police and criminal justice system, were enough to ensure both social control and, for the most part, worker cooperation. Instead of violence, the Legion used its contacts with local power bases to influence local politics and achieve its goal of “100% Americanism.” The Legion in Hawai‘i acted as an agent of U.S. colonialism, asserting power and influence, pro-actively countering non-haole authority, campaigning against non-English language schools, and building memorials dedicated to its intrinsic Western values. Legionnaires in Hawai‘i had many of the same traits that Albert Memmi noted of European colonists in Africa:

He loves the most flashy symbols, the most striking demonstrations of the power of his country. He attends all military parades and he desires and obtains frequent and elaborate ones; he contributes his part by dressing up carefully and ostentatiously. He admires the army and its strength, reveres uniforms and covets decorations. Here we overlap what is customarily called power politics, which does not stem only from an economic principle (show your strength if you want to avoid having to use it), but corresponds to a deep necessity of colonial life; to impress the colonized is just as important as to reassure oneself. (59)

No one wanted to impress the colonized in Hawaii at this time as much as the American Legion.

Since its inception in Honolulu on September 4th, 1919 the Legion was faced with what the Advertiser called “some knotty problems, conditions found nowhere else in the United States” (“Hawaii To Have Organization Of American Legion”). Those “knotty problems” were, of course, the various non-Caucasian races that were perceived as a
threat to the continuing Americanization of Hawaiʻi. The Legion therefore enthusiastically, and with military discipline and planning, set about undermining the status of those groups. Called “an outpost of Americanism in the Pacific” by the ever-supportive Advertiser (“American Legion To Meet Tonight”), the Legion concentrated its efforts “to develop and maintain a thoroughly American civilization in Hawaii, and for the securing of legislation to insure that result including the encouragement of immigration to these Islands of Americans and races whose loyalty to and assimilability in American institutions is sure” (“100 Percent Of Americanism Is Demand Made By U.S. Legion”).

Many in Hawaiʻi did not meet the high standards of the Legion, especially in the most obvious manifestations of difference or “the other” such as language. The Legion therefore advocated the abolition of non-English language schools, “favoring the passage of legislation locally and nationally preventing the operation of schools in any language other than English” (“100 Percent Of Americanism Is Demand Made By U.S. Legion”). The Legion also demanded preferential treatment for its members in Territorial civil service jobs stating openly that “We favor preferment to ex-service men and women for all civil service positions and that liberal provisions be made to permit them to secure public lands” (“100 Percent Of Americanism Is Demand Made By U.S. Legion”). In an island colonial situation such as that which existed in Hawaiʻi at this time, where both land and respectable employment opportunities were in short supply, these demands were particularly important and especially harmful to both non-veterans and the Islands’ already disadvantaged non-haole majority.
By 1935, for example, Fuchs notes that “haoles, comprising about one-fifth of the population of the Islands, constituted less than 1 per cent of the agricultural labor force and filled more than 40 per cent of the professional services” (59). Not every member of the Legion was haole, of course, but they did constitute a majority. Furthermore, despite Legion claims that a member’s former military rank played no part in the hierarchy of the organization, in practice those Legion members who were formerly of officer rank tend to get deferential and preferential treatment. Not by coincidence, all those officers were haoles. While Filipinos, Native Hawaiians, Chinese etc. were acceptable as rank and file soldiers, to act as laborers and occasionally cannon fodder in the Great War, only Caucasian officers were trusted to comprise the officer class.

On a national level the Legion was concerned about the education of America’s youth. Specifically, they wanted to introduce their brand of military-inspired patriotism into the school system by supporting ROTC programs. However, this was just the tip of the iceberg: at the Legion’s first National Convention it was recommended that “all schools be required to devote at least ten minutes each day to patriotic exercises, and to fly the flag whenever weather permitted” (Gellermann, 200). In 1933 the Legion urged its members to get involved in their local school systems, “to cause to be adopted in the schools of their communities regular courses of study in patriotism...Make it your business to see that the schools of America are American” (Gellermann, 202). The Legion introduced a National Essay Contest in 1922, with a suitably patriotic subject chosen beforehand. It even went as far as to condemn many American history books as unpatriotic and even subversive, and to commission its own history book, *The Story of Our American People*, “to express to the rising generation a faith in our country and a
BELIEF [sic] in it that shall inspire confidence in our laws and loyalty to our Government” (Duffield, 273).

The Hawai’i branch of the Legion adopted many of these national policies, but when translated to Hawai’i they took on a different meaning. In a national setting they can perhaps be considered as harmlessly patriotic. On a colonized island, however, they represent the cutting edge of foreign domination, imperialist tactics designed to destroy Hawai’i’s unique pluralism and further marginalize Native Hawaiians and the Japanese community. Hawai’i has, for example, a rich, multi-cultural history. However, the Legion wanted to impose a monoculture and it saw the school system as an ideal place to start its “children’s crusade.” For example, in a letter to the territory’s Superintendent of Public Instruction in March 1920, Henry J. Ryan, a Legion official from Massachusetts responsible for spreading Legion cant in America’s schools, asked “if there is any law on the statute books making the study of American history and civics compulsory” (“American Legion Wants Schools To Teach U.S. Ideals”).

In May 1920 Miss Mary Lawrence, children’s librarian of the Library of Hawai’i, published an article in the Advertiser entitled “Americanism is Part of Library Work”. Described by the Advertiser as her “contribution to American Legion’s propaganda for 100 percent [Americanism],” Lawrence’s article describes the aim of the Americanization of Hawai’i’s “foreigners” to be “to create in this inner soul life of the individual a feeling of loyalty for America and a desire to work toward accomplishing the ideals for which it stands.” She personally hoped to encourage this by utilizing the library and ensuring that there “should be branch libraries in the schools with enough books of the right kind [my emphasis] for every child” (“Americanism Is Part Of Library Work”).
As well as the previously mentioned action the Legion took against foreign language schools, it also actively campaigned against Hawai‘i’s foreign language press. The issue was first raised publicly as the Legion prepared for its Territorial Convention in February 1920 (“Legion Convention To Take Action On Language Press”). On February 18, the Honolulu branch agreed to propose a resolution at the Convention “demanding federal legislation requiring the publication of English translations of matter appearing in foreign language newspapers and territorial laws properly regulating such papers” (“Legion To Demand Translation Of Japanese Papers”). While not going so far as to advocate abolition of foreign language newspapers (as it did foreign language schools), the Legion clearly wanted them brought under control. At the Convention, where in his keynote address Departmental Commander Leonard Witherington referred to Hawai‘i as of “great importance as a commercial center of the Pacific, as a great military and naval base on the last frontier of civilization,” the Legion not only adopted the foreign language newspaper resolution as policy, but also such other colonialist policies as anti-alien land laws forbidding foreigners from owning land in Hawaii, and anti-alien labor laws.  

These were not simply ineffectual resolutions passed by some insignificant pressure group. Within days of the end of the Territorial Convention the Territory’s Acting Attorney-General Joseph Lightfoot was inviting Legion members to a conference to discuss how these resolutions could be adopted and implemented (“Lightfoot Calls Legion Members Into Conference”). Such was the import of the Legion’s propaganda and influence in this area that the British Consul in Honolulu, William Massy Royals wrote both to Hawai‘i’s Acting Governor, Col. Curtis P. Iaukea and also to the British diplomatic mission in Washington to ask what action was going to be taken about the
Legion’s proposals to discriminate against foreigners, including a significant number of Britons (“Legion Action On Alien Employes [sic] Arouses British”). Eventually, however, the British protest was withdrawn without explanation. One can only presume that assurances were given that such discriminatory actions would only be directed at non-\textit{haoles}.

The heartening thing about all this is that the local population did not sit idly by while the Legion, the U.S. military, and Hawai‘i’s \textit{haole} population asserted control. Locals fought these powerful interests in the courts and sometimes with their fists in the streets.\footnote{Despite a century of population decline, the destruction of their religion, theft of their land, and attacks on and appropriation of their culture, Native Hawaiians fought for and retained many of their traditions and practices. And in 1927, perhaps not coincidentally the year in which the war memorial opened, lawyers for Hawai‘i’s Japanese language schools won a U.S. Supreme Court victory over the Territorial Legislature’s attempts at regulation.\footnote{The Legion and the Memorial}}

\textbf{The Legion and the Memorial}

It was in the midst of these battles over Americanism that the American Legion became involved in the war memorial debate, and the final design of the memorial itself has to be seen in the context of this conflict. At the Memorial Park’s formal dedication on Armistice Day, November 11, 1919, the same day as the Legion attack on the IWW hall in Centralia, Governor McCarthy symbolically handed over possession of Park to the Legion whose Honolulu Branch had only been formed barely two months earlier. The Legion’s chaplain Father Valentin read prayers at what the \textit{Advertiser} described as a “semi-military ceremony not without its lessons to present and future generations”\footnote{117}
At this time, however, the War Memorial Committee was still no closer to coming to a decision on the actual design of the Memorial itself. In the summer of 1919, however, a swimming carnival was held on O‘ahu, which was described as “the biggest and most successful ever held anywhere. It served to put Honolulu more conspicuously on the map” (“Boost The Game”). Swimming was a major attraction for Hawai‘i, helped by the fame of Duke Kahanamoku who had been celebrated for his swimming prowess throughout the decade. This was important to the city’s businessmen who saw the promotion of the Islands as a tourist destination as essential for their future wealth. It may well have been as a result of this carnival, and the forces of the tourist industry, that the first thoughts of building a Natatorium at Kapi‘olani Park emerged.

Why, the question may be asked, would anyone want to build a natatorium on a swimming beach? Firstly, it was an attempt to manipulate and conquer nature – a major theme of the European conquest of North America. Westerners associated Native Hawaiians with primitivism, as if they were as part of nature like animals and trees as surely as Westerners themselves were above such things on the Great Chain of Being. For example, according to Jill Lepore, “When John Foster engraved a map of New England to accompany William Hubbard’s Narrative, he marked English territory with
tiny houses and church steeples, and Indian territory with trees” (83). With regard to Hawai‘i, Desmond notes that in early Twentieth-Century *National Geographic* photographs, *haoles* would be photographed in contrast to natural backgrounds whereas Native Hawaiians would be photographed as a part of those natural backgrounds: “While Caucasians are pictured as Lilliputian hikers amid gigantic ferns or as plantation experts, the photographs of Hawaiians show ‘natives’ in grass huts, grass skirts, fishing in brief loincloths, or, in the case of three children, lying naked on the beach” (85-6).

These photographs, of clothed white explorers dwarfed by nature, is a familiar theme of American photography and painting. Thomas Cole (1801-47), for example, was a member of the Hudson River School of American artists. This was the first batch of American artists who focused on painting American landscapes instead of European. Cole’s painting *Pastoral* (1836), from his quartet of paintings *The Course of Empire*, shows, for example, a toga-clad and bearded man who embodies white civilization fore grounded against uncivilized nature - massive trees and threatening mountains and skies. Similarly, Asher Brown Durand’s "*Kindred Spirits*", shows two white males peering over a cliff against a mountainous backdrop. And Thomas Moran’s "*The Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone*" shows two miniscule white travelers contrasted with the vastness of the Grand Canyon.

Desmond refers to these portrayals of Native Hawaiians as “a tone of celebratory primitivism - bronzed skin, near nudity…, imitations of natural (native) physical prowess, the surfer at one with the forces of nature…In tourist discourse there were rarely any competing representations of Native Hawaiian men, no natives in suits, no Natives working” (125). Other races would also be photographed with nature as a backdrop –
Fillippinos or Japanese working on a plantation, for example. When seen in this light, the Natatorium can be viewed as yet another example of Westerners acting out the militaristic conquests of Manifest Destiny, rescuing underutilized “virgin land” from less civilized races, and taming nature in the process.29

Although the Legion had endorsed the natatorium project, they had no vested interest in the proposal beyond a shared interest in the geographical link between the natatorium and the War Memorial Park (“Legion Decides Against Action On Land Measure”). Less than three months later, however, the Legion offered prizes for proposed designs which might include “the development of Memorial Park at Waikiki...an open air auditorium, a natatorium built out into the sea, and a dignified monumental feature which shall emphasize the memorial nature of the park” (“American Legion Plans Memorials At Waikiki Park”). Although the Legion may have had plans to develop the park, it clearly had not solved the problem of the design of the war memorial itself. In that respect it had made no more progress than the War Memorial Committees from which it had ousted control.

In this one sided power struggle, the Legion attempted to disarm its critics with the help of the Advertiser. It assured its readers that

[the Legion] desires to work out its plans in cooperation and with the full approval of the public, and without the appearance or reality of forcing its own ideas on the people. Nevertheless it is felt that the comrades of the war dead, and those whose living sacrifice is also commemorated, should have a large part in the decision as to the nature of the memorial. (“American Legion Plans Memorials At Waikiki Park.”)

The Legion, however, ignored previous designs and schemes and published a rough outline of its own proposals:
an arch or other memorial feature at the shore. To the landward would be an open space under the trees, carefully landscaped and prepared for seats so that memorial exercises, band concerts or other similar events may be held with the arch or monument as the stage and background. To the seaward would be a natatorium, but with its concrete walls rising only high enough above the waterline to keep their tops above the surf...By the plan suggested the views along the beach would not be obstructed in any way and yet all the features of other plans, and more, would be preserved. ("American Legion Plans Memorials At Waikiki Park")

Clearly the Legion was trying to defuse any potential protests by stating that it was incorporating other designs in its proposals. However, there was no evidence of either Burnham’s or Fairbanks’ designs in their plans. It is telling that although the Legion was offering prizes for new designs, it had already established what the rough outline of the memorial should be. In fact, their outline is remarkably close to the extant memorial, the only real differences being the incorporation of the arch into the actual natatorium and the omission of the landscaped area on which now stands the Honolulu Stone and plaque. Rather than the main arch that now exists, the Legion’s plan would also have included a large portico leading to the entrance of the Natatorium with a roof supported by four columns. Lastly, in the Legion’s design, the mauka-facing wall would have been in arcade style, with fifteen arches topped by a decorative cornice. It is interesting that in the extant memorial the mauka wall is much higher than the Legion’s original stated intent. This wall also obstructs the view of the beach, breaking another Legion promise.

Obviously when the plan was for a simple natatorium the Legion was free to make aesthetic promises of this sort. However, when the memorial became an integral part of the natatorium’s structure, aesthetic promises that would have served to diminish the stature and grandeur of the memorial were quickly forgotten.
At a Legion meeting on August 24th, plans had been further crystallized. There now appeared to be three main options:

1. A lofty monument with sculpture as one of its features.

2. A municipal organ in an architectural memorial.

3. A natatorium in the ocean just off the park area ("Threefold Plan For Memorial Is Heard By Legion").

However, after those proposals were aired, a structure combining all three designs was contemplated. It was hoped that it might be “an artistic and dignified structure... built at the edge of the water, forming a background for the natatorium on the sea side, and for the great organ on the other side, with a greensward arranged for seats for those attending the concerts” ("Threefold Plan For Memorial Is Heard By Legion"). This was perhaps the first time that the natatorium and the memorial were envisaged as being part of the same structure, and from this point on, the Legion’s design for the combined memorial and natatorium became the only real option on offer. When, in 1921, the Territorial Legislature authorized the appointment of a “Territorial War Memorial Commission” to hold a competition to find an appropriate design for the memorial, the Legislature insisted that a swimming pool be part of the project. Governor McCarthy asked the Legion to put together the Memorial Committee, effectively handing it total control over the project.

The Competition

In 1921, Act 15 of the Territorial Legislature authorized the construction of a memorial that must include a 100-meter swimming pool. The Territory was to pay for the memorial, with no contribution from the public expected. The budget for construction was $250,000. Act 15 also authorized the appointment of a “Territorial War Memorial
Commission” which was to hold a competition under the rules of the American Institute of Architects to find an appropriate design for the memorial (Final Historical Background Report, 2-3). Governor McCarthy invited the Legion to submit names for the Memorial Committee and the Legion responded on March 25, 1921 in a letter to the Governor asking him to appoint A. Lester Marks, John R. Gault and A.L.C. Atkinson (Butler). McCarthy asked Louis Christian Mullgardt to be the Territorial War Memorial Commission’s advisory architect. Mullgardt was well-known both locally and nationally: he had designed the Honolulu Commercial Center (1919-1921) and, along with Bernard Maybeck, Mullgardt was on the Architectural Commission the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco (February 20 - December 4, 1915).

In choosing Mullgardt and, later, the other architects who would judge the competition, Governor McCarthy and the American Legion, were virtually ensuring that a neoclassical-style memorial would win the design competition. As can be seen from their work up to that point, all the architects favored neoclassical designs. For example, Mullgardt designed the Panama-Pacific International Exposition’s “Court of the Ages” and “Tower of the Ages.” While the Exposition’s purpose was, ostensibly, an “expression of America’s joy in the completion of the [Panama] Canal...commemorating the peaceful meeting of...nations” (Macomber, 5), as Brian Hack notes, there were other perhaps more sinister themes underlying Mullgardt’s design:

American figurative sculpture, equally infused with idealized forms embodying human perfection, is typically perceived as classical or as Beaux-Arts-inspired rather than as emblematic of current biological thought. Representational sculpture in the age of Modernism was, however, not merely a carryover from the century past, but an active response-albeit one of desperation-to what was perceived as the degradation of form. Its advocates-convinced that the cubist and futurist butchers were mentally and morally degenerate-worked in silent collusion with the promoters of eugenics. The Panama-Pacific International Exposition,
held in San Francisco in 1915, served as one of the clearest national expressions of eugenic philosophy. Promoted as a celebration of the completion of the Panama Canal, the exposition showcased the decade of human progress since the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis. Among the advancements noted by one exposition reporter were the wireless, the aeroplane, the automobile, and "selective breeding."

Matthew Frye Jacobson calls the Exposition “one great paean to evolution and hierarchy” which “popularized current anthropological, psychometric, and eugenic thinking on questions of race and the relative merits of the world’s peoples” (151 & 181).

Of Mullgardt's Court of Ages (later known as the Court of Abundance), Hack notes that it was centered on the theme of evolution through natural selection...Mullgardt's Tower of Ages, adorned with Chester Beach's Altar of Human Evolution, illustrated the progress of humankind from the primordial muck to the Middle Ages and upward to the age of mortal divinity. Finial sculptures of Primitive Man and Primitive Woman by Albert Weinert traversed the top of the tower, which Mullgardt had ornamented with sculpted tadpoles, crawfish, and other forms of aquatic and floral life.

Clearly, there was more at stake here than a simple argument over architectural styles. In the Gilded Age, many white Americans felt threatened by the massive influx of immigrants into the United States. Most of these “tired...poor...huddled masses” originated from Eastern and Mediterranean Europe, and were considered to be inferior peoples when compared to the Nordic or Aryan northern Europeans – the ruling class in the United States. In choosing neoclassical styles of architecture, as opposed to “modernist” architecture, which was based on the idea that “form follows function” - American Architecture should be based on American function, not European traditions - the white American elite was, in a sense, joining the American Legion in its efforts to push back the tide of the undesirable “foreign” influence on American life. In following American ideas of a new “democratic” style of architecture, and abandoning classical
Greek and Roman designs, the modernists were rejecting those very races upon which America's ruling class derived their supposed authority. The problem inherent in choosing a neoclassical design, especially in Hawai'i, is that it brings forth outdated notions of chivalry and honor, concepts that the slaughter of World War One should have consigned to the past. As James Mayo notes, "Classical symbolism gave architects the historical remembrance and notions of valor that they wished to depict, but in so doing it virtually ignored the reality of modern technological warfare" (96).\textsuperscript{30}

The Territorial War Memorial Commission nominated three architects from the mainland, Ellis F. Lawrence of Portland, Bernard Maybeck of San Francisco and W.R.B. Wilcox of Seattle, to judge the competition ("Memorial Architects To Look Over Plans"). However, the winning design would have to conform to Mullgardt's plan for the Memorial Park, in which the war memorial "was to consist of a temple of music, plaza, and collosseum with swimming basin" (Kuykendall, 451-2). It is very clear even at this stage that the Legion had in mind a certain style of architecture for its memorial, a mode in the neoclassical or Greek Revival tradition, both of which were inspired by the \textit{beaux-arts} style.\textsuperscript{31} The Legion chose those particular judges because it believed they were practitioners of that style. For example, Lawrence established the Department of Architecture at the University of Oregon. From 1914 to 1922, this Department was heavily influenced by the \textit{beaux-arts} style. Ironically, when Wilcox became Head of the Department of Architecture at the University of Oregon in 1922, he introduced a new, more radical philosophy — as noted in the University of Oregon Department Of Architecture's 2002-2003 advising handbook:
Wilcox believed it is incumbent upon the architect that s/he have a broad understanding of the culture and times in which s/he works, and, beyond this, to be an influence in forging those values, aspirations and character. The educational objectives follow logically from these premises...the focus of [his] approach was on the problem and the problem-solving rather than on the solution. It is this orientation that sets it in sharp contrast to the Beaux Arts System.

Although no records exist of the deliberations of the Legion in choosing those particular judges, in all probability they were unaware of Wilcox's "radical" ideas and they simply expected him to be a product of the University of Oregon's beaux-arts-influenced Department of Architecture. Maybeck is the most well known of the trio of architects, and has been described as "a truly monumental figure, ranked with Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright" ("Saving the Natatorium."). Maybeck too, was a noted beaux-arts devotee, and he utilized that architectural style in his creations, which include the First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Berkeley, California, and Palace of Fine Arts at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco in 1915.

Beaux-arts architecture was very popular in the USA in the late nineteenth, and early twentieth century. This style is named after the École des Beaux Arts in Paris, where some of America's most famous and successful turn-of-the-century architects studied (both Maybeck and Lewis Hobart, the designer of the extant memorial, studied there). Beaux-arts-style buildings include the Nebraska State Capitol in Lincoln (1916-28), Charles McKim's Boston Public Library (1888-95), Carnegie Hall, Grand Central Station, the Rush Rhees Library at the University of Rochester, and the New York Public Library.32

When the judges arrived in Hawai'i in June 1922 to award the prize they were met by officials of the American Legion under whose auspices the memorial was to be

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built. Within a few days the judges awarded the first prize to Lewis Hobart of San Francisco ("Successful Architects Conception Of Hawai‘i’s $250,000 Memorial"). Neither Burnham’s or Fairbanks’ designs were considered. Between 1922 and 1927 when the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium was finally opened, Hobart’s original design, described as a “dream plan” by Maybeck, was twice pared down to stay within the $250,000 budget. The original plan for a natatorium, temple of music, ticket booth, dressing rooms, and some very elaborate friezes, busts and murals could not be built within the budget, and after attempts to appropriate more money failed, the temple of music became the cost-cutters’ main casualty. Strangely, this cost cutting meant that Hobart’s extant memorial is less like his award-winning design and more like the Legion’s earlier guiding sketch.

Hobart’s Folly

Like most beaux-arts constructions, the Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium is grandiose and pompous. The entrance is composed of a grand arch flanked by two pilasters projecting slightly out from the wall (pilasters are rectangular supports resembling a flat column). The top of the arch features typical classical ornamentation - a medallion and frieze topped with a round pediment in the Greek Revival style of architecture. Two large symmetrical eagles on either side flank the medallion. Adjacent to the main entrance arch are two smaller arches, above each of which is a decorative cartouche set into the wall, topped with elaborate cornices. The effect of the entrance is to present a symmetrical façade, an imposition of order, structure, and planning into the natural disordered surroundings of sea, beach, and parkland. In its imperial grandeur, it means to instruct viewers of the benefits of the stability and order that European
civilization can provide. William Jordy states "the idea of stability was...implicit in the
traditionalism of the Beaux-Arts esthetic; in other words, its academic point of view
which held...that the past provided vocabularies of form and compositional themes from
which the present should learn" (279).

Memorials can only work as designed when the shared memory of the past is
uncontroversial. As historian Kirk Savage points out, for example, memorials to the
American Civil War avoided controversy by memorializing soldiers from both sides but
not, however, the disputed causes they were fighting for. Hence, memorial makers erased
from their reconstructed history images of slaves and slavery. Conversely, the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial is controversial because its design reflects the arguments over the war
it commemorates. Even the addition of the "three soldiers" statue and flag, considered by
many conservatives as a more patriotic design than the wall itself, caused controversy -
Maya Lin referred to it contemptuously as "drawing a moustache" on her design (Young,
328). Indeed, it is hard to imagine any design for a Vietnam Veterans Memorial that was
imbued with such ceremonial importance as to be situated in Washington DC, the
nation's capital "which was consciously designed as the ceremonial center of the nation"
(Linenthal, Sacred Ground, 2). American World War One memorials avoided such
controversy by narrating that war as a noble cause, a clear-cut fight between good and
evil, freedom and despotism – the evil "Hun" verses the freedom-loving, democratic
nations of England and the United States.

While comparisons between war memorials dedicated to different wars can be
problematic, some use can be made of comparing and contrasting the Vietnam War
Memorial in Washington to the Waikiki War Memorial. It should not be expected, of
course, that the Waikiki War Memorial should in any way resemble the Vietnam Wall: the former is a product of a victorious war with relatively few American casualties (compared to other Allied losses), the latter is a product of a bitterly divisive war that America lost. However, rather than making any comparison between the two memorials inappropriate, those differences in historical context can actually serve to illustrate the functions of memorials in a society at any given time.

Unlike the self-reflective Vietnam War Memorial, the imposing entrance of Hobart’s structure has most of its decoration and inscriptions well above eye level, and thus demands that its audience step back, crane their necks and look up to the two American eagles. The Vietnam War Memorial is made with black reflective granite instead of the triumphant white marble or stone of beaux-arts monuments. Whereas the façade of the Waikiki War Memorial demands that viewers remain passive in contemplation of its majesty, onlookers at the Vietnam War Memorial can see themselves reflected in the stone, which seems to mirror the self-reflective mood associated with the “Vietnam Syndrome.” The names on the Honolulu Stone are arranged in a rigid and anonymous way: top and center is an eagle holding laurel leaves. Below that there is a five-pointed star in whose center is a circle with the letters "US". Below that on a banner is the legend "FOR GOD AND COUNTRY". Below that is the legend "ROLL OF HONOR" and below that again is the line [in quotation marks] "DULCE ET DECORUM EST PRO PATRIA MORI." Below that are the words "IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES". The names are listed in three columns and split into Army and Navy. Below that, also in three columns are the names of those who died IN THE SERVICE OF GREAT BRITAIN.
The result of these categorizations is to group the soldiers together as if they died in a common cause, and to make them anonymous servants to the greater glory of war. Compare that to the Vietnam War Memorial, where the soldiers' names are arranged chronologically by date of death instead of country, rank or regiment. This has the effect not only of verisimilitude – making it real – but also of making it a more democratic "people's" memorial rather than a regimented military monument. In order to find a name on the memorial, relatives of those killed would need to come prepared with a certain amount of historical information about the war, including the date of the death of their loved one. Whereas most war memorials function as designed only if they remain vague about actual details of a war and its causes, in contrast, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial works only when precise historical details are present.

This method of listing names is, however, not without its critics: a National Review editorial complained that "[t]he mode of listing the names makes them individual deaths, not deaths in a cause: they might as well be traffic accidents" (Sturken, Tangled Memories, 52). Clearly, from the viewpoint of this magazine, the purpose of the Vietnam Memorial is not remembering, since bereavement either by traffic accident or death in combat is no less painful to the relatives of the dead. Rather, the National Review sees the Memorial as an instructional tool to be used in the cause of national unity. As Charles Griswold notes, memorials are "a species of pedagogy" that "seeks to instruct posterity about the past and, in so doing, necessarily reaches a decision about what is worth recovering" (Qtd. in Sturken, Tangled Memories, 48). Unlike the interactive Vietnam War Memorial, which asks visitors to reflect on the causes of the war and the folly and waste that war entails, the façade of the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium means to
inspire awe and respect for Euro-American achievements, to excuse warfare as a legitimate and honorable way of solving disputes, and to glorify the U.S. military and its role in the conflict.

The extant memorial is smaller and less elaborate than Hobart’s original plans and other proposed plans, but it remains an anachronistic white elephant, a structure totally incompatible with its natural surroundings. When author Henry Miller noted in the 1930s that “We have war memorials in our public squares that must make the dead in whose name they were erected squirm in their graves” he was surely talking about over-elaborate tributes to war such as the Waikiki War Memorial (35). Why, one might ask, on one of the most popular swimming beaches in the world, would one need a walled-off, polluted saltwater pool? That question remains relevant today. Many residents of Honolulu feel that the $10.8 million refurbishment costs could be better spent elsewhere. However, given that so much of Hawai‘i’s past has been destroyed by hideous modern developments and, compared to what might have been standing in place of the present structure – Fairbanks’ phallic monstrosity for example - perhaps the present-day citizens of Hawai‘i should give thanks for what they have.

Why Not a Peace Memorial?

The Great War, as it was then known, caused carnage in Europe on a scale not previously imagined. Louis Napoleon allegedly wept at the carnage caused by and to his victorious troops at the Battle of Solferino in 1859. A few years earlier, British civilians were shocked when they read the reports of war correspondents, which for the first time detailed very graphically the conditions in which wars such as the Crimean were fought. The massive casualties produced by the U.S. Civil War illustrated that modern weaponry
brought destruction on a grand scale, blurred the distinction between combatant and non-combatant, and rendered older notions of chivalry outdated and useless. And yet the Western world still waged war both against itself and against less well-armed peoples around the world. This aggressiveness, allied closely with rampant nationalism and doctrines of racial superiority, set the conditions that allowed the Great War to come to pass. However, when that war ended in Armistice, having produced millions of casualties on both sides, and a “lost generation” of Americans, it may seem appropriate to ask why those advocating a war memorial did not, instead, campaign for a peace memorial. After all, John Guild had tried to purchase the Irwin Estate for use as a Pan-Pacific Peace Palace. However, at a War Memorial Committee meeting Guild apparently changed his mind and suggested instead that the land be used for a War Memorial Park (“Irwin Property On Beach Sought For Memorial”).

There are literally thousands of war memorials in the United States and a much smaller number of peace memorials. Of those peace monuments, however, only a handful date to before World War Two. These include Perry’s Victory and International Peace Memorial (1915), South Bass Island, Ohio, the Frank A. Miller Peace Tower and Bridge, Riverside, California (built in 1925), the Fountain of Time in Chicago (dedicated in 1922), the International Peace Monument, Belle Isle Park, Detroit (dedicated in 1931), the Vision of Peace sculpture, St. Paul City Hall, Minnesota (1932), and the Civil War Peace sculpture in Capital Square near the Ohio Statehouse, which was designed by Bruce W. Saville and erected in 1923. Part of the reason for the relative lack of early Twentieth Century peace memorials lies in the USA’s view of itself as a non-warlike nation. Why should it build peace monuments when it is itself a peaceful country? In the
American national narrative, the United States is the attacked and never the aggressor.

Tom Engelhardt calls this “America’s war story”:

> From its origins, the war story was essentially defensive in nature, and the justness of American acts was certified not only by how many of them died, but by how few of us there were to begin with. The band of brothers, the small patrol, or, classically, the lone white frontiersman gained the right to destroy through a sacramental rite of initiation in the wilderness. In this trial by nature, it was the Indians who, by the ambush, the atrocity, and the capture of the white women... became the aggressors, and so sealed their own fate. (5)

The opposing viewpoint to this argument is that of America as an aggressor nation. When viewed from this perspective American military involvement in other countries becomes more sinister. For example, the Spanish-American War can now be seen as colonial in nature; American big-business interests led to its involvement in World War One; the American oil embargo on Japan was effectively a declaration of war on that nation and directly led to the Pearl Harbor attack. In any event, America was only trying to stop Japan having the kind of Empire in Asia that America had itself.

Furthermore, by 1941 America had already chosen sides in the European theatre of war and was actively arming Great Britain; the Korean War was an unnecessary war fought with a long-term aim, after North Korea was defeated, of “liberating” China from the Communists; Vietnam was a pointless, racist war of annihilation against a legitimate Vietnamese Nationalist Movement; the Gulf War was either a cynical attempt by President Bush to deflect attention away from his ailing domestic policy, or an exercise in keeping one of America’s pet dictators in line (similar to the Panama invasion and Manuel Noriega), or both.

Other arguments such as those by historian Howard Zinn, political commentator Noam Chomsky, and essayist Gore Vidal contend that the American attitude towards war
is instead driven by hardheaded, ruthless, political and economic practicalities. In his book *Perpetual War For Perpetual Peace*, Gore Vidal lists over 200 instances of American military incursions from the Berlin Blockade until just before the World Trade Center attacks (22-41). Historian Howard Zinn is amazed to find in a 1962 State Department Document a list of 103 US military interventions in the affairs of foreign countries between 1798 and 1895 (220). In the wake of the World Trade Center attacks, political commentator Noam Chomsky reminded Americans that “we should recognize that in much of the world the United States is regarded as a leading terrorist state, and with good reason” (9-11, 23).

Still, the image of America as a peaceful nation, as victims of other nations’ war-like tendencies, is an enduring one. In fact, it was not until the threat of nuclear holocaust entered the public consciousness that peace monuments, rather than war monuments, began to be built. Thus we find, from the end of the Second World War onwards, memorials such as the Samantha Smith Statue in Augusta, Maine, dedicated to the schoolgirl who became famous after writing to the Soviet Union to appeal for peace; the Pacifist Memorial dedicated in 1994 at the Peace Abbey, Sherborn, MA; the Jeannette Rankin Statue, Helena, Montana, dedicated in 1985 to the noted peace activist and only member of Congress to oppose the declaration of war on Japan; the Prairie Peace Park, near Lincoln, Nebraska, which opened in 1994; and the J. William Fulbright Peace Fountain and Statue at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, dedicated in 2002.

The United States has always been an inward-looking nation, and some of its peace memorials celebrate peace from internal social strive. These include Civil Rights memorials like the Orangeburg Massacre historical marker at the University of South
Carolina, which commemorates the 1968 shooting deaths of three students by state police on the campus of South Carolina State University; the Medgar Evers Statue, which was erected in Jackson, Mississippi in 1992; and the May 4 Memorial at Kent State University, dedicated in 1990 to the Kent State Massacre which occurred two decades previously. Another inward-looking monument memorializes peace from gun violence; the Guns to Plowshares monument in Washington, DC is a giant plow made from the metal of 5000 handguns.

Not only is the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium dedicated to war and not peace, it is also dedicated to victory. As James Mayo points out, “War memorials to victory are trophies that not only keep us mindful of who won, but also assure us that the war was honorable. God was on the side of the victors, and therefore their cause was righteous” (61). The Waikiki War Memorial fits neatly into Mayo’s analysis of victory monuments: it is made to be “steadfast and solid,” of those “good materials [that] are practical expressions of permanence.” The main design on the mauka-facing wall is above head level, a technique, Mayo notes, that “works as a metaphor, since we look ‘up’ to people we respect” (61). A major theme of this memorial is the sacrifice that Hawai‘i and its citizens make for the greater glory of America. Advocating “peace” instead of victory was seen as weakness; war was a rite of passage to manhood.

At times, some designers seemed confused between peace and war memorials: Sam Hill’s replica of Stonehenge in Washington State, for example, probably holds the distinction of being the most tasteless and incongruous memorial in the United States. Built in the 1920s as a “peace” memorial to US soldiers from Klickitat County who died, “sacrificed to the heathen god of war,” the replica of Stonehenge was created (obviously,
unlike the original) by pouring concrete into a mold. Hill's cast concrete columns are sixteen-foot high, but the memorial's original meaning is lost in confusion over context and design (Least Heat Moon, 249).

Despite Hill apparently being a pacifist, (he proposed and led fundraising efforts to build the International Peace Arch at the American/Canadian border alongside the Pacific Highway) the legend on the memorial is bombastic and jingoistic. It reads "In memory of the soldiers of Klickitat County who gave their lives in defense of their country. This monument is erected in the hope that others inspired by the example of their valor and their heroism may share in that love of liberty and burn with that fire of patriotism which death can alone quench" (Stonehenge Memorial To The Dead Of World War I).

However, just because it is in less bad taste than some other World War One monuments, the design of the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium is still nothing to be particularly proud of. Its overblown "high purpose" can be compared, for example, to the type of memorial created in Kings Park, Perth, Australia, to commemorate Australia's war dead. The Australians lost 60,000 dead and 150,000 injured in World War One and yet the citizens of Perth chose not to create some grand memorial but instead planted, according to writer Bill Bryson, "a long, lovely avenue of tall white gum trees...Each tree bore a small plaque giving the details - unexpectedly moving when read one after another down a long walk - of an abbreviated life" (276-77).

It is, perhaps, unrealistic to expect those advocating a war memorial to have considered a memorial to peace instead. Although, as James Mayo states, war memorials “represent failure, the failure to prevent war” (58), the purpose of the Waikiki War
Memorial and Natatorium was only on the surface a memorial to Hawai‘i’s Great War dead. In fact, the dead were used in death as they were in life, as sacrifices to phony gods of war, militarism, colonialism, and nationalism. This is evident in the memorial’s scale and in its deliberately vague and secretive inscription. In the final analysis, the choice was not simply a war memorial or a peace memorial. Instead, the choice for those who advocated a memorial was either an honest “war” memorial, which would surely have been either a small token affair in keeping with Burnham’s vision, given the relatively small number of casualties and minor role played by Hawai‘i, or a tribute to Western notions of honor, civilization, colonialism and progress. The supporters of the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium chose the latter option.

**Bring Out The Dead**

It is clear that both local haoles and the American Legion used the deaths of soldiers from Hawai‘i to pursue their own interests. Local haoles attempted to Americanize Hawai‘i, to make it more like home, and to maintain their dominant social position. The American Legion too pursued a policy of 100% Americanism, but another aim was the promotion of militarism. What is not clear from the Memorial is exactly who these soldiers were and what their motivations were for going to war. The legend of the Memorial does not make any bold or precise statements about those it commemorates. There are no phrases, for example, like “killed in action” or “killed by enemy fire”. Instead, the memorial is coy and evasive about where and why these soldiers died. It utilizes non-specific phrases such as “For God And Country,” "Roll Of Honor," "Dulce Et Decorum Est Pro Patria Mori," “In The Service Of Great Britain” and "In The Service Of The United States," all of which could refer to any war. Clearly the overall impression
the memorial wishes to convey is that the soldiers died for a noble cause, which is why
the legend does not linger on any specific reasons for the war, or mention any battles. The
effect of this is, as James Mayo notes, “facetious,” as the high minded and abstract ideals
mentioned “are not grounded in the ugly realities of war” (88). In this respect, the
memorial is ahistorical. This narrative is, as historian Paul Fussell points out,

typical of popular histories of the war written on the adventure-story model: they
like to ascribe clear, and usually noble, cause and purpose to accidental or
demeaning events. Such histories thus convey to the optimistic and credulous a
satisfying, orderly, and even optimistic and wholesome view of catastrophic
occurrences—a fine way to encourage a moralistic, nationalistic, and bellicose
politics. (Wartime, 21-22.)

Whereas the British public knew by the end of the war that the battlefields of
Belgium and France were slaughterhouses, an epiphany which was reflected in the
disillusioned literature of the period, Americans, who had suffered far less casualties, and
had been fighting for only about six months from March 1918 until the Armistice, were
still inclined to think of the war as a “noble cause.” Historian David Kennedy states,
“Almost never in the contemporary American accounts do the themes of wonder and
romance give way to those of weariness and resignation, as they do in the British” (214).
This desire by Americans, to remember the war as dignified and purposeful is also why
Latin was chosen as the language of the most forthright statement on the tablet. Such
“[R]aised,’ essentially feudal language”, as Fussell calls it, is the language of choice for
memorials (Fussell, Great War, 21).

By the end of the war, British writers left behind the “high diction” of nineteenth-
century literary tradition – words and phrases like “steed” instead of “horse”, “strife”
instead of “warfare”, “breast” instead of “chest”, and “the red wine of youth” in place of
“blood” - and instead described events in a more down-to-earth and realistic way
(Fussell, *Great War*, 22). However, memorials were a different matter: whereas it seemed appropriate, given the high death tolls and brutality of World War One, for writers to change to a more factual and graphic idiom, "high diction" remained the language of monuments and memorials. It seemed somehow inappropriate and disrespectful, given the solid dignified presence of a concrete or marble memorial, to tell the undignified truth about wartime deaths, a truth that would involve grisly descriptions of severed limbs, burst intestines, decapitations, and other bloody injuries. Moreover, if the purpose of Waikiki War Memorial was to inspire Native devotion to the greater glory of the state (the United States)—to be, as John Bodnar relates, "reminded of 'love of country' and their duty to their 'native land'"—it would be self-defeating to remind Hawaiians of the butchery of Flanders (78).

In view of its ambiguity, the memorial cannot be trusted to reveal information about those it commemorates. So who, then, are the anonymous names listed on the Honolulu Stone? Does the way in which their deaths have been utilized contrast with why they went to war and how they actually died? The following information has been extracted from document reference M-477 "United Veterans' Service Council Records" (UVSCR), at the Hawaii State Archives and from various newspaper sources. The United Veterans' Service Council was a veterans' aid service active in Hawai‘i from 1934 to 1949, established and provided for by the Spanish War Veterans, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion. As the Archives state, "Records of deceased veterans of the Civil, Spanish-American and World War One were received as a gift from the United Veterans' Service Council in May 1950."34
By employing a writing device known as enthymemetic argumentation, the memorial gives the impression that 101 persons from Hawai‘i died in France - seventy-nine died fighting under American arms, and twenty-two in the British Army. In enthymemetic argumentation, the speaker builds an argument with one element removed, leading listeners to fill in the missing piece. Since it provides only limited information, one would assume from the memorial that all of those who died were killed in action, that is, as a result of enemy action. This is, however, not the case. Let us, for a moment, concentrate on those seventy-nine who served in the U.S. armed forces. It can be ascertained that only eight were killed by enemy action - seven in France and one, Private Manuel Ramos, on the way to France, when his troopship was torpedoed in the Atlantic Ocean. The seven soldiers killed in action in France are Private Louis J. Gaspar, Sergeant Apau Kau, Private Antone R. Mattos, Private John R. Rowe, Private Henry K. Unuivi, Manuel G.L. Valent Jr. (rank unknown), and Captain Edward Fuller. The cause of death of the other seventy-one soldiers and sailors is more mundane and not as heroic as the memorial would have us believe. Thirty-six died of flu and/or pneumonia in the great epidemic that ravaged the world in 1918, five in accidents, one of suicide, two of heart attacks, eight of unknown causes, and nineteen of other natural causes including tuberculosis, cancer, appendicitis, meningitis, blood poisoning, peritonitis ulcer, intestinal obstruction, and brain hemorrhage. Eight of the seventy-one non-combat-related deaths occurred in France: four of those soldiers died of flu, two in accidents, and two of unknown causes.

Of the seventy-nine members of the U.S. military named on the memorial, twenty-one were born outside the United States - sixteen were born in the Philippines,
three in Europe, one in Korea, and one in Canada. Only thirty-four, or less than half, were born in Hawai‘i. Although this is not unusual, since the United States is, of course, a nation of immigrants, and the late Nineteenth Century was a period of unprecedented immigration to the U.S., it is, however, important in trying to determine the motivation of those who died. After all, we are told, they died for their country, but which country was that? Twenty-five of the seventy-nine have surnames than can be identified as northern European in origin (Catton, Chapman, Cornelison, De Roo [born in Holland], Dolin, Dwight, Evans, Green, Hedemann [father was Danish Consul in Hawaii], Kana [born in Cardiff, Wales], Marr, Mills, O'Connor, O'Dowda, Riley [a Canadian citizen], Scholtz, Thomas, Turner, Watson, Withington, Auerbach, Fuller, Graham, Raymond [born in France], and Warren); sixteen are Filipino by birth (Agar, Arozal, Bega, Bueno, Castillo, Ciempoon, Daguman, De La Cruz, Esbra, Eugenio, Monsieur, Orbe, Quibal, Sarsosa, Tenebre, Tingking); twenty-three of the names can be identified as Hawaiian (Aki [Adam], Aki [Frank], Ezera, Hauli, l(o)e(pa), Iskow, Kaea, Kahokuoluna, Kainoa, Kalailoa, Kino, Kuaimoku, Makua, Moke, Naia, Puali, Rowe, Unuivi, Waialeale, Waihoikala, Bal, Kaaukea, Kauhane); ten are probably Portuguese (Arcilo, Gaspar, Mattos, Ramos, Rodrigues, Santos, Valent, Viera, Gouveia, Silva); four have Chinese surnames (Char, Kau, Lee, and Tom); and one is Korean (Chuy). Of course, it can be argued that anyone enlisted in the U.S. armed forces is de facto fighting for America, no matter their country of origin. However, assigning a blanket motive such as this ignores the more complicated social, economic and political intentions of the enlistees.

Of the seventy-nine non-Navy United States deaths, forty men served with the 1st or 2nd Hawaiian Infantry. These units were, in effect, the Hawai‘i National Guard,
federalized and sent to Fort Shafter and Schofield for garrison duty to release other more professional troops for war service. A soldier in these units had no chance whatsoever of being sent to France. Many of them worked as laborers in the sugar plantations, and Washington recognized that Hawai‘i’s sugar was more important than any contributions in terms of manpower that it could make to the war:

The National Guard had been organized with the idea that it would be used only for the defense of the Islands and would never be sent overseas. A large proportion of its ranks was composed of men who were indispensable to the sugar industry of the Islands, which had been greatly expanded during the war in Europe. If the National Guard of Hawaii were mobilized when the United States went to war it would seriously cripple the sugar industry. (Warfield, 72)

Twenty-two of those who died served with other U.S. forces, and a further five served with unknown units. Only one of those soldiers listed as killed in action, Private Louis J. Gaspar, may have served in the Hawaiian Infantry – possibly with the volunteers known as the “Aloha” unit. But from the information that is available, even that is uncertain. The other seven served in Regular Army units and knew when they enlisted that there was an even chance they would see some fighting. As David Kennedy notes, by Armistice Day “almost four million men were to be in uniform, half of them in France” (169). Furthermore, a military draft that applied to all residents of the United States between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, whether native born, naturalized, or alien, was introduced in Hawai‘i on July 31, 1918. This was expanded in October 1917 to all male residents between the ages of nineteen and forty. In total 4336 of those who registered for the Draft were called up to serve in the 1st and 2nd Hawaiian Infantry (Warfield, 78). Twenty-five of those non-Navy soldiers who are named on the memorial enlisted after July 1918, and thirty-six of the sixty-seven men enlisted in non-naval forces were attached to the 1st and 2nd Hawaiian Infantry. In other words, nearly one third of those
who died while serving in the U.S. military may have been unwilling draftees, not
volunteers, and almost one half may have joined the Hawai‘i National Guard specifically
to avoid having to go overseas to fight in the World War.36

From these statistics, it can be seen that only sixteen, or less than one sixth, of the
U.S. deaths, combat-related or otherwise, actually occurred in a war zone. Of the
remainder, forty-two died in Hawai‘i, fourteen on the U.S. mainland, two at sea, one in
Canada, one in England, one in the Panama Canal Zone, and two in unknown locations.
Furthermore, only fifty-three of the seventy-nine actually died during the time period in
which the United States was involved in the War, that is, from April 6, 1917 to
November 11, 1918. Twenty-six died after the War ended of non-combat-related causes.
These figures show that there is, in fact, less to the memorial than meets the eye. Rather
than the seventy-nine soldiers who fought and died “sweetly and nobly” for the United
States, it emerges that only eight at most died “killed in action,” and no doubt their deaths
were gruesome and painful, as there were few clean Hollywood deaths in World War
One. These facts did not, however, stop Hawai‘i’s haole businessmen, economic and
social organizations, and newspapers, from creating their own war stories about the
soldiers who died.

Sergeant Apau Kau lived in Honolulu. He worked for Bishop & Co. and was
manager and pitcher of the “Chinese University” Baseball Team from Honolulu that
toured the United States in 1915. Kau was, evidently, something of a minor sensation, as
this Waco Morning Star game review notes:

Apau Kau, of the Chinese University of Honolulu, yesterday afternoon pitched a
perfect game against Baylor [Texas], allowing not a single hit, walking nobody,
hitting not a man and allowing not a Bear to reach first base. Behind him his
teammates played errorless ball, and put four runs across as a reward for his
wonderful pitching. It sometimes happens that a pitcher will get through a game without allowing a hit, but the records are particularly short of perfect baseball, and that is what the clever young American citizen of Chinese descent played yesterday. *(Our Letter Box)*

When war came, he was living in Pennsylvania and was a member of that state’s National Guard *(Purnell, 131)*. He enlisted in 315th Infantry in Philadelphia on Sept 18, 1917 and was sent to France in May 1918. He died six months later, killed in action in Argonne, France on Nov 4, 1918.

Kau was born in Kohala, Hawai‘i, the fourth of seven sons. His parents, Kyau and Loy Sanf Kau of Kwangtung Province in China, came to Hawai‘i to work as contract laborers *(Purnell, 131)*. They were among approximately 46,000 Chinese laborers that were brought to Hawai‘i prior to 1898 to work on sugar plantations. There is no record of why Kau joined the Pennsylvania National Guard or the regular U.S. Army. While his attitude towards the United States, and assimilating American customs is unknown, American attitudes towards the Chinese in Hawai‘i are, however, well documented. For example, the Hawaiian Board of Immigration made the following remarks circa 1900 about Chinese immigrants to Hawai‘i: “A Chinaman is unprogressive. He remains a Chinaman as long as he lives, and wherever he lives; he retains his Chinese dress; his habits; his methods; his religion; his hopes; aspirations and desires. He looks upon foreign methods, appliances, and civilization with scorn as inferior to his own” *(Fuchs, 86)*. However, by 1920, as historian Gavan Daws relates, in the view of Hawai‘i’s haole population, “the Chinese had become ‘trustworthy, upright and honored...law-abiding, law-respecting, thrifty, industrious, and respectable’”—at least, in contrast to the Japanese, whom the haoles saw as an increasing threat to social stability in Hawai‘i *(314)*.

Historian Lawrence Fuchs notes that by 1930,
The Chinese, more than any other immigrant group, had already acquired those characteristics which foreign observers think of as "typically American." Among second-generation Chinese, the English language, Christian religion, and American business and political methods had been energetically adopted. (Fuchs, 86)

Was Kau one of these "assimilated" Chinese? He was, after all, obviously very interested in the American sport of baseball. It is also significant that he chose to enlist in Philadelphia knowing that, unlike most of those who enlisted in Hawaiʻi in the 1st or 2nd Hawaiian Infantry, there was a fair chance that he would be sent to France and would come under fire. There is, unfortunately, no conclusive answer. It is ironic, however, that the American-influenced Chinese were not regarded in the same positive light that they may have viewed Americans. For example, University of Hawaiʻi Professor Stanley Porteus stated, "Hawaiian blood brings with it a certain temperamental strength which the Chinese lacks" (297). Haole-owned magazines such as Paradise of the Pacific referred in 1905 to the "wily Chinese" who "euchred our unsophisticated Territorial father out of a handsome annual income" (by starting a business on worthless property which later became valuable) ("A Natatorium").

The racial attitude of haoles towards Hawaiʻi’s Chinese residents during World War One is thus hard to pin down. At different times, the Chinese were despised as "coolies" or compared favorably to the Japanese who were threateningly superior in numbers to both the Chinese and haoles. None of this ambiguity affected newspapers of the day however. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported Kau’s death in an article headlined "Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields: Manhood of Isles Sacrifice Life on Land and Sea in Cause of Liberty." Clearly, whatever Kau’s motivations for joining the
U.S. military, and whichever way he died, the *Star-Bulletin* had created its own war story, the sentiments of which would later appear on the memorial.

In the same article, the *Star-Bulletin* reported the death of Private Louis J. Gaspar in a similar vein: “Not alone were the Chinese, English and Hawaiian boys represented at the front for Hawaii, but a Portuguese boy, Louis Gaspar, fought the good fight for his country.” Was it really for his country that Gaspar died? He was born in Honolulu in 1898, probably the son of one of the 114 Madeirans that arrived aboard the ship Priscilla in 1878, or the 800 Portuguese immigrants that arrived in Hawai‘i in 1881 from Sao Miguel, or, in any event, one of the 12,000 Portuguese that arrived in Hawai‘i between 1878 and 1887 (Fuchs, 52). It is unlikely that his family were earlier settlers in Hawai‘i since by the mid-nineteenth century there were less than a hundred Portuguese, or Pokiki, resident there (“History of Hawai‘i: The Pokiki: Portuguese Traditions”). Gaspar enlisted at Fort Shafter, on April 1, 1918, and was attached to the Hawaiian Infantry. He died, killed in action, in the Argonne region of France on November 1, 1918, just ten days before the Armistice.

The Portuguese in Hawai‘i were in a strange position, racially speaking. Viewed as not quite “white” because of their swarthy skin and Southern European origins, the Portuguese were, nevertheless ‘white enough” to be viewed in favorable terms by Hawai‘i’s *haoles* in relation to the Islands’ other ethnic groups. As Fuchs points out, Americans and northern European *haoles* were always positioned in high managerial or ownership roles, whereas Portuguese immigrants became the *luna* or supervisor class, and “acted as day-to-day buffers between the *haoles* and Oriental laborers” (Fuchs, 57). Did Gaspar join the U.S. Army to gain acceptance into the exclusive *haole* social club?
Given that his parents were, in all likelihood, first-generation Portuguese, and since the Portuguese are renowned for keeping close social and religious ties, it is unlikely that Gaspar was particularly pro-American in outlook. Nor would he have been particularly pro-British: Portugal had been allies with Britain since the Treaty of Windsor in 1386. However, the British viewed the Portuguese as racially inferior, and had humiliated that nation in 1890 with an ultimatum of war if Portugal did not withdraw its troops from Rhodesia. Given these assumptions, there is no way to confirm that Gaspar died for “Liberty,” as the Star-Bulletin maintains, nor that he died for “America,” as stated on the Memorial.

Private John R. Rowe holds the dubious distinction of being the first Hawaiian soldier killed in France. He was killed by shellfire on July 31, 1918 (which was also his mother's 50th birthday) in an advance on the Vesle River and buried near Chery Chartreuse. The Star-Bulletin states, “he met his death in action and gave Hawaii a place on the honor roll of America” (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”). While the first part of the statement may be an accurate factual account, it is the second part that engages in myth making and is evidence of the way Hawai‘i’s haoles tried to use World War One to further the Americanization of the Islands. Rather than the high motives assigned by the Star-Bulletin to Rowe, there is, in fact, some evidence that Rowe joined the U.S. military only at the prompting of others.

The Honolulu Advertiser refers to him as “Private John R. Rowe, Hawaiian.” Before the war Rowe went to the Royal school and worked as an office boy at the Pacific Commercial Advertiser. He is described as having had “a fine singing voice, and being part Hawaiian, he yearned for a musical career and went to the mainland, traveling with a
company of Hawaiian singers.” The teens was a decade in which Americans discovered Hawaiian music, and Rowe must have felt there was an opportunity to forge a career for himself outside of Hawai‘i. According to the Advertiser, while on the mainland, he was given a Selective Service Questionnaire whereupon he then traveled from Texas to New York to enlist in the 39th Infantry on Feb 2, 1918. Rowe trained in North Carolina and was soon sent to France, arriving in May 1918, just two months before his death (“Hawaii’s First Victim of War Here For Burial”).

The haole-owned Advertiser is coy about just who “gave” Rowe the Selective Service Questionnaire, and also as to why he was chosen. Perhaps one clue might be gleaned from studying the reaction of American mainlanders to other Native Hawaiians such as Duke Kahahamoku. Kahahamoku, three-time Olympic gold medal winner, experienced racism first-hand when traveling the United States in the days of segregation. Because of his dark skin, he was mistaken for a “nigger,” and on a few occasions had to endure questions and insults about his race. Even Hawaiian royalty were not above being insulted in this way, as Desmond notes: “while King Kamehameha V (who ruled from 1863 to 1872) and his brother Liholiho were traveling in the United States, they were referred to as ‘niggers’” (55). Was Rowe too harassed to enlist because of the color of his skin? In 1917, the Bureau of Investigation, forerunner to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, set up the American Protective League, a semi-vigilante organization that consisted of 250,000 Americans who vowed to “sp[y] on neighbors, fellow workers, office-mates, and suspicious characters of any type” (Kennedy, 82). The League played its part in Bureau of Investigation raids against Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) halls in September 1917. The raids were politically motivated, but many of the charges
against IWW members that ensued were related to draft dodging. The League later took part in the March 1918 “slacker raids” to round up draft dodgers.

Was Rowe caught up in the League’s sweeps? Was it a League member who handed Rowe his Selective Service Questionnaire? We may never know the answers to these questions. So much is supposition, reconstructed from fragmentary personal information and based on broad social trends of behavior in the early part of the twentieth-century. The waters are further muddied when one considers a letter Rowe wrote home to his mother a few days before his death. In it he states, "Don't worry, Mother dear. We have got to win this war. If I fail do not mourn for me as I will have done only my duty. All of us won't come back. I hope I shall. However, if I do not, always remember me as having done my full duty for my country" (Kuykendall, xvi). These words would seem to suggest that Rowe did consider America as his country and that he genuinely did feel a duty towards the United States. Of course, Rowe may simply have been trying to comfort his mother during a period of intense fighting. Paul Fussell notes, for example, the reticence of British troops, the “refusal of the men to say anything in their letters home” (Great War, 181). He warns of the unreliability of using soldiers’ letters as a historical source: “Clearly, any historian would err badly who relied on letters for factual testimony about the war” (Great War, 183). Whatever Rowe’s motivations were, however, there is enough doubt over his actions to question the self-serving remarks of the Advertiser, and the high motives assigned to him on the memorial.

Rowe’s body was disinterred after the war, at his family’s request, and was shipped home to Honolulu on Sep 10, 1921 aboard Transport Buford. In one of those strange quirks of history, this ship, which was built in the Harland and Wolff shipyard in
Belfast, Northern Ireland, had previously been used to ferry American troops to the Philippines to quell a native insurrection against American rule. Now it was being used to carry another “native” home from an imperialist war. The Buford had been pressed into service as temporary storehouse of emergency supplies during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the event that gave young architect Lewis Hobart the opportunity to make his name. Furthermore, the Buford became infamous in December 1919 as "The Soviet Ark": the U.S. government’s political crackdown in 1919, known as the Palmer Raids, led to the arrest of thousands of undesirables. The United States deported many foreign-born radicals, 249 of whom set sail on the Buford for Russia. Among their number was dissident Emma Goldman. Of course, Rowe played no part in any of these machinations. He was a minor participant in a grand political and economic game beyond his control. In fact, even after his death, the forces of militarism would not relinquish control over his body. He was reburied at Nuuanu cemetery on Sep 15, 1921, in a ceremony under the auspices of the American Legion.

Private George B. Tom was born in Honolulu in 1898. He enlisted at Fort Shafter on Apr 1, 1918 and was attached to Company A, 6th Engineers. He died of pneumonia in France on Oct 18, 1918, less than four weeks before the war ended. The Honolulu Advertiser refers to him as “Private George B. Tom, Chinese.” The paper states that he was “a member of the famous ‘Aloha’ contingent, composed entirely of men under or above the draft age, whose desire to serve their country manifested itself in a direct enlistment” (“Honolulu Will Pay Tribute To Soldier Dead”). The Advertiser exploits this fact, and encourages a familiar narrative of young men from different ethnic groups putting aside their differences and sacrificing their lives for America.
The Advertiser also makes a great deal of the fact that Tom is a “Honolulu Chinese boy,” describing his mother as “of the old style of Chinese women.” The paper makes much of the maternal affection shown by Mrs. Tom and noted that she was “very motherly...as brave as any American mother. She cried a little, but smiled through her tears, just like many other mothers in Honolulu who received like sad news.” Of course, the Chinese were considered racially inferior to Americans. They usually were not assigned the full range of emotions that Americans possessed. In this case, however, Tom has sacrificed himself for America and has thus earned his humanity. Similarly, Tom’s father, known as “Young Kit Tom,” is described as “an old and respected Chinese merchant” and not as “an inscrutable coolie,” which was the paper’s other label for Chinese people.

While the Advertiser may wish to use Tom’s death to further a patriotic agenda, we learn however that Tom had less lofty motives for going to war. Tom had married a young schoolteacher just before leaving for France, and when he volunteered in the Engineer Corps he told his parents that “it was a good chance to learn all about autos and machinery, so that when he came back he would be equipped for his real battle in life.” Tom’s employment before the war was as a “chauffeur on the Bishop Park stand” and he could not possibly hope to provide for his new wife while working such a low-paid and unskilled job. Contained therefore within the pages of its own description of Tom’s motives is the real reason for his enlistment in the U.S. Army. Although that motive was less lofty than the one ascribed to Tom by the newspaper and the later memorial, it did not stop both from using Tom’s death for their own purposes.
Perhaps the most controversial name on the memorial is that of Captain Francis J. Green. Born in New York City, in 1863, Green enlisted on Jan 10, 1918. His first appointment was as rank of Major but he was later called into service as Captain in the Infantry Reserve Corps. Green had alcohol problems but apparently had been sober for two years. Six months previous to his death he was given an appointment in charge of registration for the selective draft. However, when he went to Maui for draft registration purposes, he got drunk and put unexplained items on his expenses account. It appears that he was not short of money – he had never worked until his appointment in charge of registration and that alcohol was the cause of the error/misdeed. After he returned from Maui his work deteriorated badly. He gave his resignation to the Governor on Jan 10, 1918 due to “ill health.” However, he had met with the Governor and U.S. District Attorney Huber and was told that he would have to answer charges of embezzlement. He was given time on Friday to make preparations and tell his wife. Instead, however, he told her he needed a rest and took the train to the Haleiwa hotel that afternoon. The trip to the Haleiwa, and the hotel itself, was apparently something of a special occasion, as this newspaper report notes:

Perhaps the top tourist draw of the day was the journey by train from Honolulu to Haleiwa, a famed 44-mile trip around Kaena Point that brought visitors from around the country. A round-trip two-day excursion was $10, which included an overnight at the Haleiwa Hotel and a trip through the Waialua Sugar Mill, followed by an afternoon carriage ride to Wahiawa to inspect the pineapple plantations. Promised a 1910 railroad brochure: ‘Haleiwa Hotel is regarded by persons from the Coast as one of the finest hostries in the territory, and equal in many respects to those of the highest standard of the mainland.’ (Borreca)

Green told the manager of the hotel that he was having chest pains but that he had ordered his car to be sent so that he could drive to Honolulu the next morning. However, it turned out that he had not ordered the car at all. He was found the next day, Jan 11,
1918, dead in his bed with his nightclothes on and a book under his arm. A Federal warrant for his arrest was unknowingly issued several hours after he died for misappropriating government funds of $29.00. His cause of death was given by doctor as “nothing to indicate any possible cause of death but heart failure.” Some circumstances point, however, towards suicide: his trouble with the law, lying to his wife and the hotel manager. However, although a newspaper report mentions that his organs were sent for an autopsy, there is no further record of this and heart failure remains the official cause of death. His ashes were scattered in the ocean on May 7, 1918 (“Tragic Death Comes to Captain Green and Forestalls His Arrest Yesterday”).

Does Green’s name belong on the memorial along side Private Rowe’s? He did not die in combat, or even abroad. His death by suspected suicide is a less than honorable one, and there is certainly no hint of the circumstances in the memorial’s narrative. So why was his name included? Firstly, it seems that everyone who was enlisted in the U.S. armed forces between April 6, 1917, when the U.S. declared war on Germany, and November 11, 1918, war’s end, and who later died were listed on the memorial. It did not matter if they died in combat or of influenza or of suicide. The memorial makes no distinction between those who died before or after the war, or who died in a combat zone or in a hotel bed in Haleiwa. The effect of this unrestricted memorializing serves only to inflate the role that residents of Hawai‘i played in World War One.

Seaman 2nd Class Manuel Jr. Gouveia was born in Kealakekua, Hawai‘i in 1897. Described by the Star Bulletin as a “young Portuguese-American,” Gouveia enlisted in Honolulu on April 28, 1917 (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”). He served on two ships, the USS Alert and USS Schurz, USS Schurz was originally a German
ship called *SMS Geier*, which was interned in Hawai‘i and then incorporated into U.S. Navy. It sank on June 21, 1918 with the loss of one life - the unfortunate Gouveia - after a collision with the oil tanker *SS Florida* in heavy fog off the coast of North Carolina. The ship drifted for about twelve miles after the collision and then sank in about 100 foot of water. Twelve other sailors were injured, and Gouveia’s body was not recovered. In its own way, the ship is a living memorial like the natatorium in that it has become a popular scuba diving attraction. Gouveia’s misfortune, to avoid serving in a war zone only then to be the sole victim of a collision at sea, is one of those cruel ironies of life that make the study of history both interesting and, at times, poignant. When removed from the emotion of his death and the tragedy it must have been to his next-of-kin, the irony is almost comical. It certainly seems to have served no lofty purpose. And yet, the memorial utilizes his death for its own causes, none of which are even remotely humorous.

Again and again, Hawai‘i’s *haole* elite sought to use the deaths of soldiers to suggest a purpose to the war and to further patriotic feelings towards the United States. For example, the death of Captain Edward Fuller, U.S. Marines Corps, is described thusly: “Chateau Thierry: Who can ever forget that wonderful time when America’s brave marines turned the tide of battle in favor of the allies? Asleep on that battlefield lies Captain Edward Fuller of Honolulu who, commanding a company of U.S. marines, laid down his life in the struggle to turn aside the Hunnish horde” (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”) Similarly, Private Henry J. Evans, who enlisted at Fort Shafter on December 17, 1917 and died of pneumonia at Fort Sill, Oklahoma on February 5, 1918, is described in that article as having expired “before he attained his heart’s desire of licking the Hun.”
Because the Germans, or "Huns," were portrayed as uncivilized hordes, raping and pillaging their way across France, those from Hawai‘i who died in the British armed forces could also be used to support the narrative of "civilization" that was brought to Hawai‘i by Americans and whose progress could not be impeded. For example, Private Gideon Potter enlisted in the Canadian forces in the 201st Seaforth Highlanders in August 1914 along with two life long friends, Bill Lanquist and Frederick Gosling. He died of unknown causes in Belgium on October 28, 1917. The Star-Bulletin transforms Potter's death into a "sacrifice" for civilization: "Potter occupies a grave in devastated Belgium where he fought to keep back the horde of Huns threatening the world" ("Hawaii Men Who Wear Wound Stripes"). However, like the memorial, the paper does not linger long on the fate of Potter's friends. Lanquist was severely injured and had to undergo two years of operations to remove shrapnel from his body. Gosling was wounded three times, once by a sniper who put him in hospital for five months. The circumstances of Potter's death are, however, left undescribed. Perhaps that information was unavailable. If so, it was certainly convenient for the Star-Bulletin: whereas commemorating or celebrating deaths in a battle for civilization is clean and convenient, describing wounds and a long, lingering convalescence detracts from the high moral tone set by those who utilized the war deaths for their own purposes. So when Captain Clair B. Churchill, who was attached to Canadian forces serving with the British Army, died at Amiens in August 1918, the Star-Bulletin imagined his finals moments in terms that made war seem noble, and death purposeful: "Honolulu knows he met death in battle with a smile" ("Hawaii Did Her Part on France's Blood-Red Fields").
The reality of war is somewhat different to newspaper reports or monument inscriptions. Private Manuel Ramos was from Maui. He was attached to US Army 20th Engineers, 6th battalion, E Company and died when a German U-boat torpedoed the troopship *Tuscania* off the Northern Irish coast on February 5, 1918. His body was recovered and either taken to Arlington for burial after the war or buried at Kilnaughton on the island of Islay, Inner Hebrides, Scotland on Feb 9, 1918, or at the American War Cemetery, Brookwood England. Ramos' death must have been particularly horrific.

The sea off Northern Ireland in winter is too cold to survive in for more than a few tens of minutes. This young man, used to warm Hawaiian waters, must have been terrified and totally out of place – an outsider who would die before seeing the face of his supposed enemy. This account of the ship's sinking gives some idea of the horror of that night:

Panic was apparent, the soldiers decided not to wait for anyone to help them lower the lifeboats. They did not want to be on the ship should it decide to take the plunge, they did not want to be near the ship should the U-boat decide to finish the ship off. Before the lifeboats were lowered, the soldiers filled up the lifeboats which seat about sixty. This was too much weight for the davits to support. The lifeboat loaded with men simply broke away from the davits and fell to the ocean surface disintegrating the boat and placing all the occupants into the cold waters of the Northern Channel. This did not seem to deter the soldiers from lowering the boats, they just allowed less men to enter the boat before lowering it. The ropes that lowered the boats have winches that have to be lowered uniformly. One boat being lowered down became uneven and one of the winches having too much slack released the ratcheting latch, the boat then supported at one end by a tight rope, the other end of the boat swung downward dropping its occupants out of the boat like a sack of beans...Another lifeboat that was over loaded with men broke from its davits, and lands on another fully loaded boat below them, killing most of them. Screams of pain were all about. The men on the Tuscania shining their flashlights into the water could see bodies floating everywhere. *(The Final Voyage of the Ocean Liner, Tuscania)*

Even for those who did manage to escape the sinking ship in a lifeboat, there was a cruel twist of fate waiting. Some boats headed for the lights of Rathlin Island, unaware that the brightest light was that of Altacarry lighthouse warning them away from the
jagged rocks of the island. The bodies of some soldiers who had jumped ship, or had been dumped into the water by toppling lifeboats, were washed up on the Mull of Kintyre. Ironically, most of those who stayed aboard – the ones who did not have life vests, or could not make it to a lifeboat in time – were rescued by British warships. Ramos was just one of 200 American soldiers who died that night. We are left with no indication as to why he joined the U.S. Army or what he felt about dying in such a senseless and terrible way. The Tuscania was the first American troopship in World War One to be torpedoed and sunk, but hardly the last. In 1937, the Nye Committee’s report to Congress blamed American big business’ exploitative and excessive profits as the main reason for America’s entry into World War One. In other words, 50,000 American soldiers died so that big business interests could prosper through arms sales and loans. Of course, the memorial was built a decade before the report. However, doubts had already been expressed by Americans in the 1920s about how and why the Great War was fought. Is it right, in those circumstances, to commemorate the deaths of these soldiers as part of some great fight for liberty? In death, the soldiers have no say in their commemoration, and they must rely on others to honor their memory fittingly. Clearly, Hawai‘i’s newspapers and memorial builders failed in that task.

No doubt, however, some of those who died deserved and would have wanted to be commemorated in the lofty way of the memorial. Lieutenant Henry Henley Chapman, for example, was a career soldier. He was a cadet at the U.S. Military Academy from June 14, 1913 to April 20, 1917 whereupon he accepted his appointment on April 20, 1917 as 2nd Lieutenant of Infantry at Catasauqua Pennsylvania. He served with the 120th
Infantry from May 10, 1918 until his death in France on Sep 29, 1918 of causes unknown ("Hawaii Did Her Part on France's Blood-Red Fields").

Similarly, Corporal Edmund Hedemann enlisted at Fort Shafter, on May 14, 1918 and was attached to the 2nd United States Infantry. He died of pneumonia at Camp Dodge, Iowa on March 19, 1919 after a previous attack of influenza. A graduate of Punahou Academy and Stanford University, Hedemann had worked for the shipping department of Castle & Cooke. Many of his friends had gone to Officer Training Camps and were then attached to local regiments. However, Hedemann believed there was little chance of him seeing action in France through this route so he enlisted as a Private in the regular army instead. Although he never made it past Camp Dodge, Hedemann seemed highly motivated to go to war. Assuming, since his father was consul for Denmark in Hawai‘i, that Hedemann too was Danish, there is however no way to tell exactly who he was fighting for or for what reason ("Edmund Hedemann Dies In Service").

Private George K. Dwight enlisted at Fort Shafter and was attached to the Gas and Flame Corps. 30th Engineers. He died at Annapolis, Maryland on Jan 27, 1918 of lobar pneumonia. In letters home to his mother, which were received the day after he died, he talked of enjoying training and not being bothered by the bitter East Coast winter weather ("Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields"; "Service Flag Bears White Star For George K. Dwight"). As stated previously, letters home cannot be taken at face value. However, there is here at least some indication that Dwight enlisted in an army unit that he knew had a fair chance of seeing battle, and also that he seemed to enjoy army life. Similarly, Captain Philip Overton Mills was a civilian candidate in training for a commission at Plattsburg from May 12, 1917 to Aug 14, 1917. He accepted his
appointment as Captain on August 15, 1917 at Plattsburg Barracks, New York. He was attached to the 308th Infantry, and served overseas from April 6, 1918 until he was killed in an accident in France on July 26, 1918.

Private Antone Mattos, from Maui, enlisted in San Francisco on October 6, 1917. This, in itself, assured that he would have a much higher chance of seeing action than if he had enlisted in Hawaiʻi, for example, in the 1st or 2nd Hawaiian Infantry. Instead, he was attached to the 58th Infantry 4th Division. He served overseas from May 7, 1918 until he was killed in action on July 18, 1918 ("Back Home"). Similarly, Private Henry K. Unuivi was attached to a combat unit – the 146th Infantry, 37th Division - and was subsequently killed in action in the Meuse Argonne region of France on September 30, 1918.

Captain George O'Connor's links to Hawaiʻi seem tenuous. He was born in New York City in 1892, and although his home address is stated as Honolulu, his next of kin is listed as his wife, who lived in San Francisco. O'Connor was attached to the Quartermaster Corps and served at Camp McClellen and Camp Forrest in Georgia. He was appointed Field Clerk on January 2, 1917 until commissioned on January 14, 1918 at Camp Mills, New York. He died in France on October 18, 1918 of pneumonia.

2nd Lieutenant John Stephen O'Dowda was born on Oʻahu, and lived in Ewa, O'Dowda went to St. Louis high school, was a graduate of Punahou Academy (1914) and formerly an assistant sports writer for the Advertiser. He moved to the mainland in 1916 to go to college in Reno. But when war broke out, he enlisted on August 10, 1917 and entered an officer training camp. He joined the aviation section of the University of California and within three months was sent to Garden City, New York to await shipment
across the Atlantic. His orders were changed however and he went to Gerstner Field, Louisiana to continue training. In July 1918 in Dallas Texas he married a girl he met at university in Reno. O’Dowda, it seems, had options other than military service. Even if he did feel any pressure to enlist, it seems probable that he could have avoided action had he wanted to do so. He served with the Air Service from August 10, 1917 until his death on November 13, 1918 in an airplane accident. The *Star Bulletin* described him as “one of that daredevil crew of Uncle Sam’s, a soldier of the air force” (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”).

Colonel William Russell Riley is another whose name appears on the memorial in dubious circumstances but undoubtedly he would not have wished it otherwise. Born in Smith Falls, Canada, in 1863, he moved to Hawai‘i in the 1890s. He was Commanding Officer of 1st Infantry National Guard unit when it was renamed 1st Hawaiian Infantry and drafted into Federal service on June 1, 1918. In June of that year, the 1st Hawaiian Infantry was sent to Fort Shafter for garrison duty while the Fort’s regulars were sent to the mainland (in July) (Warfield, 76). Eventually Riley was forced to give up his command and enter base’s hospital where he was diagnosed with cancer. He died at Letterman General Hospital San Francisco on September 8, 1920 of carcinoma. Although he was still in service when he died almost two years after the war’s end, he could not in all honesty be considered a war casualty. Undoubtedly it was his rank and status not just in the military but also as a member of Hawai‘i’s *haole* social elite that ensured his name appeared alongside the likes of Rowe and Gaspar. Riley was not only a Colonel but also a Freemason and a member of the Honolulu Lodge of Elks and the Eagles. No doubt as a
career officer he would have been happy to be remembered as the memorial portrays him, fighting for liberty and for his country.

There are others who, it could be argued, enlisted to fight for their country in the way the memorial envisages. Private Clarence J. Watson, for example, enlisted at Fort Shafter on March 29, 1918 and was attached to the 116th Engineers. He saw overseas service from Jun 15, 1918 until his death of lobar pneumonia in a hospital at Anger, France on November 7, 1918 (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”). Acting Corporal David Little Withington was a graduate of Punahou, and a local athletic star with four older brothers also serving in the U.S. military. Apparently he was on his way from Harvard to join the Officers Training Camp when he died at Plymouth, Massachusetts on October 6, 1918 (“David Withington Dies in the East: Honolulu Boy Falls Victim to Spanish Influenza”). Like others mentioned above, Withington appeared to have options but instead chose to enlist, knowing he in all probability would be sent to France.

It is not, therefore, the case that all of the soldiers who are listed on the memorial were drafted, or did not want to fight, or were fighting for reasons other than those stated or implied by the memorial. Clearly there is enough doubt about that to allow some leeway in interpretation. Nor is it the case, or my point, that any of these men were unworthy of commemoration. In fact, at least one Lieutenant James Henry R. Bryant, deserves more attention than the memorial gives him. Born September 15, 1898 in Hana, Maui, Bryant went to school in California from 1912-15. From 1915-17, he went to Hitchcock Military Academy in San Rafael. After graduation he returned to Kailua, Hawai‘i for a short time but left for Canada in August 1917. That next month he enlisted
in the Royal Flying Corps. He arrived in London in March 1918 and was then sent to
Italy, arriving on June 10, 1918 to join up with 28th Squadron RAF. His time spent in
battle was short – he was, in fact, killed in action less than four months later on October
4, 1918 after his Sopwith Camel single-seater fighting scout crashed during a bombing
attack on Austrian forces at the Campoformido aerodrome in north east Italy.

According to a doctor who treated Bryant in an Austrian Military Hospital, after
the crash the airman shot five Austrian troops then collapsed and died of wounds received
and loss of blood. He was buried with full Austrian military honors on October 7, 1918 in
the hospital cemetery. However, his body was disinterred after the war and reburied at an
English cemetery at Tezza, Italy (“Hawaii Boy Dies Fighting: Details of Death of Lieut.
James Bryant Are Learned”). Bryant’s story has all the hallmarks of a “Boys Own”
action adventure. Although he served with British forces, he was born in Hawai‘i and
obviously intended to get into the war as soon as possible. Some individuals who
exhibited qualities like Bryant’s were commemorated with individual rather than group
war memorials. A statue of Colonel “Paddy” Mayne of the British Special Air Service
stands in Ards, Northern Ireland, for example. It seems odd, at least, that Bryant has not
been singled out for any special memorializing, and that his acts of valor have been
largely forgotten.

Where the memorial is misleading is not in commemorating some of the dead in
its own high-minded way, but in commemorating them all as having one purpose and
dying for one single cause, namely for America’s freedom. A majority of those whose
names are listed had only a tenuous relationship with the war itself. Indeed, some never
went abroad, died of influenza or cancer long after the war, and yet still ended up being
commemorated as war heroes from Hawai‘i. Take Chief Boatswain Mate Frank Raymond, for example. Born in France in 1884, Raymond enlisted at Pearl Harbor on April 6, 1917. He was attached to USS Navajo at Pearl Harbor but released from active duty on March 27, 1918, eight months before the war ended. He died of influenza at Pearl Harbor on March 12, 1920, sixteen months after the war ended and while he was on inactive duty. The only reason Raymond’s name is on the memorial is, presumably, because he was in the U.S. Navy for a few months while a war raged thousands of miles away in Europe. It may be argued that Hawai‘i and the pacific were part of the war – some minor incidents of aggression did occur between American and German forces – but certainly Raymond’s part in all of this was negligible. It is ironic that the memorial, overblown though it is, would not have lost any impact by being more honest and only listing the sixteen or so names on the American side who can be directly connected to the war. By being vague about who and what it is commemorating, and by inflating the numbers of those who can honestly be said to have died for the purposes stated on the memorial, the once opulent Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium betrays the real motives of its creators – glorifying war, celebrating militarism, and cementing colonial rule.

**Public and Private Memory**

When it was in its heyday, the memorial was a grandiose, dignified, and, above all, an ordered and disciplined reminder of World War One. As Ferguson and Turnbull have shown in their astute analysis of Punchbowl Cemetery, the military tries to retain control of its men even in death. This is an important part of the militarization process because that type of hierarchic, ordered system of control is unnatural to a civil society
and thus needs to be continually underpinned. In concluding that Hawai‘i is a militarized state, Ian Lind notes that “militarization is a dynamic and continuing process [that] must be continually reinforced and recreated, its rewards reasserted, rituals reenacted” (41). Its attempts to impose discipline and order post-mortem were not always successful: the U.S. government wanted to keep U.S. dead buried in France, for example. However, many relatives of the slain wanted their men returned to the United States for private burial and mourning. Historian David Kennedy notes, “Many families had begged the War Department in 1919 to ship the bodies home, but most had eventually consented to leave the dead where they lay” (367).

Many relatives of the fallen from Hawai‘i did, however, insist that their relations be returned to the Islands. Among those returned were four out of the eight soldiers who were killed in action (Apau Kau, Antone Mattos, John Rowe, Henry K Unuivi (Unuiwi?)), and, four out of the eight who died in France of non-combat-related causes (Daniel K Io(e)pa, George B. Tom, John Stephen O'Dowda, Clarence J. Watson). In total, at least eight out of the sixteen who died in France were returned for burial in Hawai‘i—an amount out of proportion to the overall repatriation and reinternment figures, and a clue, perhaps, as to the families’ attitude to the war. Were they less enthusiastic about the sacrifice of their men than the memorial would have us believe? Do the final resting places of those men whose bodies were returned from France offer a different, private, and less martial narrative?

The resting places of the seventy-nine men listed on the memorial as having fought for U.S. forces are widespread and varied. Nineteen are buried at Schofield Barracks; two are buried at Puea Cemetery in the Kapalama district of Honolulu; fourteen
at O‘ahu Cemetery (formerly known as Nuuanu Memorial Park); four at Kawaihao Church cemetery in Honolulu; three at other O‘ahu graveyards; thirteen on other Hawaiian islands apart from O‘ahu; one was cremated; five are buried on the U.S. mainland; two are buried in the United Kingdom; one was lost at sea; and the remaining resting places are unknown. The style of graveyards varies much: some are dignified and well kept, others dilapidated and over grown. Apart from those buried at Schofield, all gravesites are on civilian-owned and civilian-used property.

As Ferguson and Turnbull note, military cemeteries and civilian cemeteries differ greatly: military cemeteries are tributes to order and control. These “sites for the commemoration of mass death” produce “a set of stories that pacify death, sanitize war, and enable future wars to be thought.” At Punchbowl National Cemetery, for example, “control abounds.” Warning signs notify visitors of forbidden behavior and items: “no animals, no stray saplings, no unapproved flowers” (109). A tourist brochure, breathlessly entitled “Hawaii’s NO. 1 Attraction” lists among its guidelines for appropriate behavior at the cemetery, the following orders:

- The Cemetery will not be used as picnic grounds
- Visitors will not…conduct themselves in a manner not in keeping with the dignity and sacredness of the cemetery.
- All graves will be decorated during the 24 hour period preceding Memorial Day with small United States flags which will be removed immediately after Memorial Day. Flags are not permitted on graves at any other time.
- Plantings are not permitted on graves at any time.
- Potted plants will be permitted on graves ONLY [sic] during the 10 day period before and after Christmas and Easter.
- Statues, vigil lights, glass objects of any nature or any other type of commemorative items are not permitted.
- Installation of one permanent floral container is authorized on each grave. (Singletary, 4-5)
Types of markers and stones vary among national cemeteries. The granite headstones at Punchbowl are arranged in symmetrical lines and are placed flat for practical reasons including to enable grass cutters to quickly go about their business. The type of headstone, and the inscription upon it, is strictly regimented: today, the Department of Veterans Affairs supplies, when requested, a free headstone or marker for the unmarked grave of a qualified veteran in any burial ground in the world. Relatives can choose one of 29 symbols from an approved list to put on the headstone. These include variations of the Christian Cross (Presbyterian, Russian Orthodox, Lutheran, Episcopal, Greek etc.) the Star of David, a Native American Church of America symbol, the Muslim crescent and star, a Buddhist Wheel of Righteousness, and a Mormon symbol. The inscription on the headstone can only be the name of the soldier, the branch of service, highest military rank achieved, any war service, civilian or veteran affiliations, personal message or appropriate terms of endearment, medals received, date of death, and (upon request) the deceased's hometown or state.41

In summary, as Ferguson & Turnbull note, although “there is a great deal of open, quiet space in the [Punchbowl] cemetery...there is nothing peaceful about it” (109). In contrast to this ordered, soldierly space, the civilian cemeteries where most of Hawai‘i’s Great War dead lie are often cluttered and messy, attributes that promote a decidedly non-military type of remembrance: “civilian cemeteries in Honolulu and elsewhere often reveal a certain acceptance of jumble, of differences in the size, scale, inscription, and tilt of headstones, the placement of trees, the arrangement of flowers. Community cemeteries often present many invitations to enter; they allow memory to grow” (Ferguson & Turnbull, 109). Many of the non-military or community gravesites of Hawai‘i’s war dead
offer a different, more personal and less ordered remembrance of military sacrifice than the War Memorial’s monoglossic narrative. As James Mayo notes, “A statue in a park represents patriotism, but a grave is a resounding reminder of the consequences of war” (33).

O‘ahu Cemetery was founded in 1844 as a site for the graves of Hawai‘i’s burgeoning foreign population. O‘ahu Cemetery contains the graves of, and memorials to, many of Hawaii’s most prominent citizens - sugar barons, bankers, artists, politicians, soldiers, and sailors. Taking their place alongside casualties of the U.S. Civil War, and World War Two, are fourteen World War One victims, two of whom (Sergeant Apau Kau, and Private John R. Rowe) were killed in action. Kau died on November 5, 1918 and was originally buried in his “battlefield grave” in the Ravine de Molleville, France. However, his body was brought home on March 15, 1922 on the transport ship Logan. Kau was reburied at Nuuanu cemetery in a military funeral with firing squad. Members of the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars were present, together with members of the Chinese baseball team that he was once a member of (“Back Home”). His headstone is of simple construction: a rectangular block of white marble approximately four feet tall, on a solid square base. The legend on the headstone states “Sergeant Apau Kau, killed in action during world’s war at Argonne, France.” Alongside the grave is a staff of the American Legion, which is topped with a U.S. flag. Kau’s grave is directly behind John Rowe’s, and behind and slightly to the side of George Tom’s. Tom and Rowe were buried beside each other on September 15, 1921 in a ceremony under the patronage (or control) of the American Legion. The ceremony featured a
double firing squad, which was provided by the U.S. Army ("Honolulu Will Pay Tribute To Soldier Dead.").

John Rowe died on July 31, 1918. His body was disinterred after the war, at his family's request, and was shipped home to Honolulu on Sep 10, 1921. He was reburied at Nuuanu cemetery on Sep 15, 1921. Originally, his grave marker stated only Rowe's name, rank and unit. Some 80 years later, however, this would change: Rowe's descendents, niece Theola Silva and grandnephew National Guard Lieutenant Colonel Kenrock Higa, commander of the 29th Infantry Brigade's 2nd Battalion, felt that the bare facts listed on Rowe's grave marker did not reflect or recognize his "service and sacrifice" and that only a new headstone and inscription would give the family "closure and recognition." Silva contacted both Democratic Senator Daniel Akaka, and Prince Perrera, who was once commander of American Legion Post 17, which is named in Rowe's honor. As a result of these actions, on Memorial Day, May 22, 2002, a new marble headstone bearing the inscription "First WW I combat casualty from Hawaii" was erected to replace the old marker. At the ceremony, Akaka stated:

[S]ince annexation, Hawaii has sent her sons to fight in every one of America's wars. Today we honor the service and sacrifices made by ordinary men and women who lost their lives in defense of freedom and democracy. Their heroism and patriotism reminds us of the fundamental truth our nation has understood since the Revolutionary War, and which holds great relevance for us today: The freedom, liberty, and peace we cherish carries a dear price (Kakesako).

The urge to provide a new headstone for Rowe is, in all probability, a product of the patriotic upswing in America after 9-11. For 80 years it seems, Rowe's plain headstone was accepted as a dignified symbol of his life and death. However,
Rowe's grandnephew, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. military, obviously felt a more martial remembrance would be appropriate. In this respect, Higa is employing a logical device typical of military writers and thinkers, that is, to connect all wars in which Americans have fought, as if history is an unbroken stream of military conflict between "us" and "them." In this monoglossic narrative, the individual reasons for, and character of each war are neglected, and prominence is given instead to traditional military narratives of "defending America" (as opposed to attacking America's enemies), honor, duty, obligation, and pride in military (masculine) prowess. Akaka too, used Rowe's memory to further patriotic military adventure. He stated,

> When Pvt. Rowe was laid to rest here in 1921, the people of Hawaii were reminded of his sense of honor and duty to country. Today, few Americans recall the horrible events or heroes of World War I, with the exception of families, generations removed, who lost a loved one in that war over 80 years ago; historians; and our nation's veterans service organizations. Today's ceremony honoring Pvt. Rowe is also a remembrance of the sacrifices made by hundreds of Hawaii's sons and daughters. Our freedom has been preserved, strengthened and consecrated because of their great sacrifices, and on Memorial Day we remember each of them with respect and gratitude. On this Memorial Day, we honor all of the men and women who have paid the ultimate price of freedom and security throughout our country's history, Americans who helped change the course of history and helped preserve a world in which freedom and democracy could flourish. Let us also remember that today, as we honor our nation's fallen heroes, we have called upon our armed forces to stand alert to the new challenges that threaten our freedom and security in the war against terrorism (Kakesako).

Given that the goal of Rowe's descendants was to erect a new marker that would reflect Rowe's status as "First World War I combat casualty from Hawaii," it is notable that the new headstone is not an elaborate affair. It is rectangular in shape, about three feet in height and fourteen-inches in diameter. Near the top of
the stone is a circle containing a cross, and below that the new inscription. On the rear of the marker is an inscription paraphrasing Rowe’s last letter home to his mother. It states, “I have done my duty for my country.” Due of its modern construction and erection, the marker is clean and less weathered than the markers of other World War One casualties Apau Kau and George Tom that stand close by. A small Hawaiian flag sits at the base of the headstone. Apart from the new legend, it does not appear to be that much different from the previous marker, which listed only Rowe’s name, rank and unit.

The reason for the less elaborate marker than one might expect is perhaps found in an almost unnoticed comment in the Star-Bulletin’s narrative of the events that led to the Memorial Day ceremony. Gene Castagnetti, director of the National Cemetery of the Pacific at Punchbowl, remarked that “the law does allow the VA [Veteran’s Association] to provide headstones for veterans buried in private cemeteries.” No funding was forthcoming, it seems, from the military, the State of Hawai‘i, or any patriotic organization. The Star-Bulletin neatly avoids this issue by moving directly from Castagnetti’s remarks to an account of the unveiling of the new marble headstone. The paper does not reveal who paid for this headstone, and we must therefore assume from this lacuna that this financial burden fell on Rowe’s remaining family members.

Private George B. Tom died of pneumonia in France on Oct 18, 1918. His body was disinterred after the war at his family’s request, and he was buried under the auspices of the American Legion on Sep 15, 1921 in Nuuanu cemetery at the same time as Private Rowe. His headstone is a simple affair, approximately
three feet high and one foot across. On top is a crucifix, and on the main body of the stone the inscription reads,

George B Tom
Co A 6TH ENGS AEF
DIED IN FRANCE
1893-1918

Tom’s headstone is weathered and shows signs of natural aging. In other circumstances it would be just another marker in the corner of a rural cemetery. However, the U.S. military had other plans: in 1928 Chinese veterans set up the Kau-Tom American Legion Post #11. The members of this post hold a yearly remembrance service for these men, proving that even in death the military and its offshoots seek control over how and why Hawai‘i’s war dead are remembered and commemorated (Purnell, 131).

John O’Dowda died in an airplane accident in France on November 13, 1918. Like Rowe and Tom, his body was disinterred at his family’s request and returned to Hawai‘i for reburial on August 8, 1921 at Nuuanu cemetery in an elaborate military ceremony. The American Legion, Spanish War Veterans, British War Veterans, and the St. Louis College Alumni Association attended this service. Although buried by the military, O’Dowda’s headstone is not military issue (History of Government Furnished Headstones and Markers). It is placed flat to the ground, and sits on a rough stone base. At approximately twenty-inches across by twelve-inches in length and eight-inches in height, the marker is both of non-military design and dimension. Its inscription reads,

O’ DOWDA
LIEUT. JOHN S 1896-1918
One can assume that this is a family plot and O'Dowda is buried beside his father and mother. The plot is well-kept and tidy, but unlike the graves of Rowe, Kau, and Tom, there are no military trappings such as American Legion markers. Given that O'Dowda was buried by the military, he may well have had a standard military headstone and when his parents died in later years, family members replaced the military headstone with a private family one. It is also possible that this is the original headstone and that the inscription was added on the occasion of the deaths of Thomas and Lulu O'Dowda. Whichever is the case, the headstone offers a very different and perhaps more poignant remembrance of war. 2nd Lieutenant John Stephen O'Dowda was only 22 when he died an accidental death in France just a few days after the Armistice. His father outlived him by two years and his mother by 41 years. That tragic story is one that militarists do not want remembered. Behind the jingoism are victims and personal tragedies that cannot be written into victorious narratives of sacrifice, honor, and patriotism.

Edmund Hedemann died of pneumonia at Camp Dodge, Iowa on March 19, 1919. He is interred in a family plot with ten other relatives but has his own grave marker. On it, there is a spare inscription,

EDMUND HEDEMANN

DECEMBER 25, 1886
MARCH 19, 1919

The headstone is dark, squat and, it has to be said, rather ugly. It has weathered badly and, although the family plot is not overgrown, it does not look particularly well-kept.
either. There are no flowers or other signs of personal remembrance, but also no signs of militarism. Remembrances of the war, Hedemann’s military career, or his death are missing. His is an anonymous, secretive marker in keeping with his rather pointless and ordinary mode of death. In this respect, his marker is perhaps more truthful about the nature of the “Great War” than the narrative on the memorial. It is perhaps for that reason that the Legion chooses to commemorate the deaths of Kau, Tom and Rowe rather than of Hedemann. To maintain the illusion that all 101 names on the memorial died “in action” requires a continuing effort of omission. In remembering only those soldiers who actually died in France either killed in action or in a combat zone requires less effort than to explain why a Hedemann’s death of influenza on the U.S. mainland should still be considered as a “sweet and noble” affair.

As with Hedemann, there is no comfortable way to remember the death of Yeoman 1st class Frederick Char. Born Waipahu, Hawai‘i in 1895, Char lived in Honolulu until his enlistment at Pearl Harbor on April 20, 1917. He served on the USS Navajo until his death at Pearl Harbor on Oct 31, 1918. His cause of death is listed only as amputation of legs, arms, and a fractured skull. It seems likely that he was involved in an accident with some sort of heavy machinery to cause such horrendous injuries. Char is buried amongst other sailors and marines, all of whose graves are marked with identical headstones. The type of marker used is unusual in that it is modeled on, but not exactly the same as, the authorized U.S. Civil War marker which was intended for members of the Union Army only. It is a slab design approximately thirty inches in height (about twice that of standard Civil War markers). The top of the marker is slightly curved, and on its face is a sunken shield in which the bare inscription

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appears in bas-relief. This minimalist mode of inscription is unusual in that official war
graves policy allows for much more information to be included including “the number of
the grave, rank, name of the soldier and the name of the state” (History of Government
Furnished Headstones and Markers).

Most of the headstones accompanying Char’s offer only limited information on
the men interred here. That is, perhaps, unsurprising in Char’s case, given the nature of
his death. However, in general, military narratives of remembrance tend not to focus on
the chaotic nature of war and death, nor do they focus on its bloody realities. Accidental
death serves no purpose, only death as sacrifice in a common cause. This section of the
graveyard is set aside for U.S. Navy burials, presumably up until Punchbowl National
Cemetery was opened in 1949. There is evidence of military remembrance here, not just
in the conformity of the headstones, or their minimalist, secretive inscriptions, but also in
their layout in rows, very unlike the civilian graves around them. This layout suggest a
unity of purpose in the deaths of these men, even though they died in different time
periods, in different wars, and also in times of peace. The only thing connecting them in
life and death is their usage by the military to further a narrative of order and common
purpose. A white flagpole stands in front of the grave markers as if to remind the dead
they still owe an allegiance to the flag. The effect is spoiled somewhat by the absence of
the flag itself, which is, I am sure, unfurled on special occasions of remembrance such as
Memorial Day.
Carel Justus De Roo was born in Holland, in 1846 or 1847. He lived in Honolulu, until his enlistment there on January 2, 1918. He was attached to the Quarter Master Corps in the rank of Field Clerk until his death by cancer at Honolulu on May 25, 1918. De Roo is buried in a plot of land reserved for Freemasons. His headstone is one of many in that area that have the symbol of a square and compass enclosing a letter “G” or some other similar symbol that indicates a Masonic affiliation. His inscription reads only,

CAREL JUSTUS DE ROO
NOV 6 1846
MAY 25 1918

Again here, there is little room for a victorious military remembrance of a deceased soldier. Firstly, he was in his early 70s when he died-hardly the image of a youthful “son” of Hawai‘i or America that is required for sacrifice. Secondly, he died not in action in a combat zone but of natural causes in Hawai‘i. Lastly, De Roo was a “paper pusher” and not a combat soldier, a role that by its very nature lacks the danger and glory required for sacrifice.

Clarence Watson served overseas with the 116th Engineers from Jun 15, 1918 until his death of lobar pneumonia in a hospital at Anger, France on November 7, 1918. His body was presumably disinterred after the war and returned to Hawai‘i for burial at O‘ahu Cemetery on December 29, 1920. He has a standard military-donated headstone authorized for use by the military after World War One:

This stone was of the slab design referred to as "General" type, slightly rounded at the top, of American white marble, 42 inches long, 13 inches wide and four inches thick. The inscription on the front face would include the name of the soldier, his rank, regiment, division, date of death and state from which he came. For the first time a religious emblem was adopted for use on Government
headstones. The religious emblem was authorized for use at this time only on the general type stone. ([History of Government Furnished Headstones and Markers])

The inscription on Watson’s marker follows exactly this pattern. It reads,

CLARENCE

JACOB WATSON

HAWAII

PVT 17 ENGRS.

NOVEMBER 7, 1918

The religious symbol is a plain Christian cross inside a circle. Watson was a volunteer who chose an Engineer unit in the hope that he would see combat quicker than if he enlisted in a local unit. The inscription on his headstone so conforms to military guidelines that it appears Watson is following orders even after his death.

According to the map located in the cemetery’s main office, Herman Kaaukea is buried in the same section as Kau, Tom and Rowe. However, there is no extant marker for his grave. No trace could be found either of the markers for five other soldiers buried in the cemetery, namely Auerbach, Catton, Dwight, Evans, and Scholtz. These men, whose deaths were, not coincidentally, of flu, lobar pneumonia, pneumonia, and intestinal instruction— all non-heroic, “ordinary” deaths - have either escaped or been discharged from military duty. The military either has lost track of their burial sites or has decided that the memories of their death cannot be put to use. The narrative offered by those interned in O‘ahu Cemetery with regard to militarism and remembrance of war depends on a number of factors including the design of headstones, the inscriptions on the headstones, and the patriotic paraphernalia connected to memorial services. The American Legion or the U.S. military or its representatives chooses to remember and
parade only those individuals whose deaths further familiar themes of order, duty, sacrifice etc. They retain control over the memories of the deceased as long as those memories remain useful. In those cases where the deceased do not fit into the military narrative, such as De Roo’s death of cancer, Hedemann demise from pneumonia, or Char’s gruesome accident, it appears that little or no effort is made at memorializing.

With no military cemetery in which to bury its World War One casualties, O‘ahu Cemetery’s peaceful, orderly setting must have seemed the most appropriate site on the island for those burials controlled by the American Legion. 44 Because of its rural location, O‘ahu Cemetery was considered as a more dignified site than, for example, Kawaiahao Cemetery. Although, the coral-stone built Kawaiahao Church was at one time known as “the church of the ali‘i, or royalty” - a sign of distinction that never failed to impress island haoles, as long as the royals held no political power - the cemetery attached to the church was also the final resting place of many “common” Native Hawaiians, who were buried in both marked and unmarked graves (Damon, 99). It is telling, and not just a bit ironic, that Native Hawaiians considered Kawaiahao to be a very dignified final resting place and thus many haole sailors, whalers, and other fortune seekers were denied burial there because they were not considered respectable enough. Nanette Napoleon Purnell notes that the church “only allowed members of ‘good faith’ to be buried there, effectively excluding many of the foreign population” (15). This Church and cemetery, where in 1917 the body of Queen Lili‘uokalani lay in state, was perhaps not the place for an American Legion ceremony honoring American war dead, as it contains too many reminders of the people the U.S. military helped dispossess of their land and sovereignty.
Although four of those named on the memorial are buried there, none of those burials were under the control of the Legion. Only one headstone still stands, that of Edward N. Kahokuoluna. This is perhaps the most poignant of all the burial sites discussed, not only because to its setting and history, but also due to the design of Kahokuoluna’s grave marker. Although the inscription itself is fairly basic three-line dedication -

EDWARD N. KAHOKUOLUNA
1895-1918
REST IN PEACE

- a small black and white photograph has been lovingly added just below the deceased’s name. In it, Kahokuoluna wears a uniform that may be his military one, in which case it was in all probability taken between his enlistment date of April 8, 1918 and his death of pneumonia on July 10, 1918. This is not a military headstone, as it does not match the design or dimensions of any of those authorized. Furthermore, the photograph is a civilian touch that would be in violation of approved military designs. The reason for this is very clear: whereas anonymous names promote the idea of a common cause and mask individual pain and suffering, the effect of seeing Kahokuoluna’s face promotes quite the opposite emotion. One cannot help but think of this young man’s pointless death and of the pain and suffering of his family.

Unlike the memorial, which, because of its scale, asks viewers to step backwards and away to get a better view, this grave marker has a haptic quality that draws one towards it. Although the marker is weathered, it is still in fairly
good condition, which is in contrast to the markers of the other three soldiers burled here whose gravesites cannot be found. Although this suggests that Kahokuoluna may have had family members attending to his grave until relatively recently and the others did not, it may also simply be that Kawaiahao graveyard is a disorganized civilian site that also has to compete with the demands of a modern city. For example, many headstones were lost with the development of Queen Street makai (in the direction of the sea) of the cemetery. In any event, the Legion and the military play no role in remembering any of these casualties partly because their deaths are not still usable to promote militarism and patriotism, but also because Kahokuoluna’s family asserted control over his memory, thus offering a very different narrative than that of either the military or the memorial.

This point is further illustrated when one considers those soldiers buried in Puea Cemetery, a compact cemetery on the corner of School and Kapalama streets, situated close to the Bishop Museum. Puea is one of four cemeteries on O‘ahu owned by the State of Hawai‘i. It is in a residential neighborhood and although unfenced, is enclosed on all sides by roads and houses. It is divided into three parts, one owned by the state, one by the City and County of Honolulu, and one by the Kaahumanu Society (Hawaii State Cemeteries, 8). The two parts run by the State and the City and County are overcrowded and dilapidated: many headstones are broken or have fallen over, and the site lacks grass due to poor watering. The State’s portion is the larger of the two, and it is there that two of Hawai‘i’s Great War dead are buried – Adam Young Aki, and Frank K. Aki Jr. (it is not known if they are related). The part owned by the City and County of
Honolulu looks totally uncared for, which is unfortunate in that it appears to contain many of the oldest graves. This portion of the burial site predates the Territory of Hawai‘i as an “old native burying ground [in which] the only way to locate graves in the old portion is to find sunken spots” (Hawaii State Cemeteries, 31). In contrast, the part of the cemetery run by the Kaahumanu Society is clean, neat, and well looked after. Its green grass offers a remarkable contrast to brown dirt that marks the rest of Puea.

Private Adam Aki was born on Kona, Hawai‘i in 1896. He lived on O‘ahu, however, until his enlistment in Honolulu on July 12, 1918. While attached to the 1st Hawaiian Infantry he fell ill and died of peritonitis and appendicitis at the U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor on December 12, 1918. Fortunately, Aki’s gravesite is surrounded by a 6-inch concrete border, which has perhaps protected it slightly over the years from the effects of visiting mourners, vandals, weather and neglect. His headstone is a standard government-issue white marble slab, approximately twenty-eight-inches in height by twelve-inches across. A Christian cross is engraved near the top of the stone, and below that a faded inscription reads,

ADAM YOUNG

AKI

CORP 1 HAWAII INF

DECEMBER 12, 1918

The marker is chipped, weathered, and lists a little. There are no signs that anyone has visited here in the recent past. In a few years the headstone will probably fall over and fracture like so many around it.
Private Frank K. Aki, Jr. was born in Honolulu in 1895. He lived in Hilo, until his enlistment there on July 18, 1918. Although he was attached to 2nd Hawaiian Infantry, Frank Aki only served for a grand total of twelve days: he died of pneumonia at Schofield Barracks on July 30, 1918. Although it appears from the map and guide in *Hawaii State Cemeteries* that in 1987 Frank Aki’s grave was marked with a headstone and wire border, there is no trace of it today.

Adam Aki was only twenty-two when he died and Frank Aki twenty-three. In all likelihood, both were conscripts who would much rather have been somewhere else than dying pointless deaths in military hospitals. Because there is no glory in these deaths, there is no need for the military to maintain control over these men’s memories. Indeed, Puea cemetery contains many military headstones, quite a few of which are in a poor state of repair. Like most civilian cemeteries, there is little order here. Graves are not set out in rows and instead face in various directions. Borders are either unmarked, or delineated with a variety of materials including stones, wooden or plastic fences, and cinder blocks. Puea is a very ethnically diverse cemetery and space abounds for many types of remembrance. The overall atmosphere of Puea is, however, neglect. Puea appears to promote a lack of memory, rather than serve as a space for remembrance or contemplation. Any attempt at military remembrance here, any attempt to impose order, is destined to be defeated by disorder and disarray.

King Street Catholic cemetery is the final resting place of Private Kuulei John Kaea. Born in Honolulu in 1892, Kaea enlisted in Honolulu on July 7, 1918. While attached to the 1st Hawaiian Infantry, Kaea caught pneumonia and died at Fort Shafter Hospital on March 16, 1919. King Street Catholic is a short walk from my home. One hot
Saturday afternoon in the summer of 2003 I set out to look for Kaea's grave. I spent a few hours walking around headstones and grave markers, backtracking constantly to ensure I had not missed anything. However, there was nothing to find. All trace of Kaea's physical remains is gone. His name is preserved only on casualty lists and as an anonymous name on the war memorial. There is no way now to know what caused him to enlist in the United States Army, except to say that he was, in all probability, an unwilling draftee. Like most of those named on the memorial, he never saw combat, or even left Hawai'i's shores. His death of natural causes occurred four months after the war was over. None of these bare facts fit comfortably with the narrow memory of Kaea that the war memorial acknowledges. However, one thing is certain – if Kaea and the rest of these young men deserve to be remembered for anything, one would hope that it is more than just sacrificial lambs to the glory of an imperial war.

Conclusion

Without even touching on the fact that due to poor design work by Hobart the Natatorium fell into disrepair almost as soon as it was opened, the War Memorial represents a grand, overstated tribute to the relatively small number of casualties sustained by residents of Hawai'i. But that, of course, is not what the true purpose of the memorial was – as is evident in its scale. The message that it symbolizes is one of submission to Imperial forces and glorification of both war and the American military. This is exemplified by the legend on the Honolulu stone which reads (in Latin), "Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori," or "it is sweet and noble to die for one's country," from Horace's Odes. This phrase would not only have been familiar to those with a classical education, but also to a wider audience who had read popular war novels. As historian
David Kennedy points out, “one of Edith Wharton’s characters [in her 1918 book The Marne] tearfully meditated on the ancient phrase from Horace: ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’” (179). However, at that time, the more topical and relevant use of that quotation was by British soldier and war poet, Wilfred Owen. His poem entitled Dulce et decorum cautions against the very same triumphant patriotism that the Waikiki War Memorial Park and Natatorium represents:

My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.

Both Hobart and the American Legion would have known of Owen’s poem. Like Siegfried Sassoon, he was well known and widely publicized at that time. They chose, however, to use the quote in its original context - as an obsequious and jingoistic tribute to war.

While it was natural, given the patriotic aims of the American Legion, that they would choose to use this quotation to further those aims, there was possibly another reason for ignoring Owen. Unlike the Army, the Legion has no rank structure. It is, therefore, ostensibly an organization composed of equals. In reality though, the Legion is rank-conscious and class conscious. Wilfred Owen was a second lieutenant in the British Army when he died, the lowliest rank an officer can have without actually being an enlisted man. Furthermore, his poetry appealed to the lower ranks rather than the officer class who made all the decisions but did little of the actual fighting themselves. He was looked on with disdain by many of his superiors. To such men, “the wartime sufferings of such as Wilfred Owen were tiny…and whiny” (Fussell, Great War, 26). It is quite
possible that the officer corps who made the decisions in the American Legion shared similar feelings about Owen as their English peers.

When viewed from a feminist perspective, the debate over the design of the memorial—Fairbanks’ rejected design for an “imposing shaft” of lava for example, and his decision to include text memorializing “the accomplishments of the women in Red Cross work”—tends to reinforce traditional gender structures of power, sex and position in regard to a woman’s role in both war and remembering war. Because men fought the wars, women were expected to play lesser supporting roles as homemakers, healers and family builders. These wartime roles were a continuance of peacetime power structures within the family and within society as a whole. In a patriarchal society “a ‘real man’ will become the protector…and step forward to defend the weak women and children. In the same ‘dangerous world’ women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers and husbands, real or surrogate” (Enloe, 12-13).

Given this, it is therefore unsurprising that the first to advocate a World War Memorial in Hawai‘i would be a woman, Alice MacFarlane of the “Daughters and Sons of the Hawaiian Warriors.” Not only was she playing the role of devoted mother to Hawai‘i’s mortally wounded sons, she was also—consciously or unconsciously—appropriating a supposed tradition of Polynesian culture, namely that the women would remember their male warrior dead. For example, Herman Melville’s travel narrative Typee offers a semi-fictional account of a mid-Nineteenth Century native ceremony in the Marquesas Islands. Melville documents the appearance of “four or five old women who, in a state of utter nudity, with their arms extended flatly down their sides, and holding themselves perfectly erect, were leaping stiffly into the air, like so many sticks bobbing to
the surface, after being pressed perpendicularly into the water.” Melville learns that these women were “bereaved widows, whose partners had been slain in battle many moons previously; and who, at every festival, gave public evidence in this matter of their calamities” (190).

Again, it is important to note here that ethnographic truth is less important to consider than are the images that Europeans received from novels, tourist brochures, movies, etc. Europeans dealt with the imagined Polynesian rather than the real thing. As a work of ethnography, Typee should not be taken at face value. However, where it is valuable is in the insight it offers to the culture and thinking of the colonial observer.

While there is, of course, no evidence to suggest that MacFarlane had ever read Typee, nor wished to emulate its Natives’ naked antics, like Melville she was a colonist and an interloper with no qualms about imposing her culture on another, nor about appropriating whichever elements of Native culture - genuine or not – that she believed suited her purposes. Colonists like her were, at times, outwardly sympathetic to Natives in a maternal or paternal way. Inwardly, however, the colonists needed concrete symbols and reminders of Western civilization to maintain their superiority. The Waikiki War memorial and Natatorium was one such reminder.

One-hundred-and-one persons from Hawai‘i died during the Great War. Who can know now what their motivations were in enlisting? Certainly for some it was not to defend the United States, as thirty or so of them enlisted with the British Army before the U.S. even entered the war. In 1917-18, 72,000 residents of Hawai‘i were registered for the Draft as eligible to fight. Of those, 29,000 – or 40 per cent – were issei and nisei. Of the total that actually did serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, 838 – approximately nine
percent-were of Japanese descent (Odo and Sinoto, 208). Since Japan was at war with
Germany at this time, who can say with any certainty that those from Hawai‘i were
fighting for either America or for Japan? If they were fighting for the U.S., like the
famous 442nd Regiment of World War Two, how many enlisted to prove their loyalty in
an unwritten test that should never have been enacted? Undoubtedly, those involved in
the advocacy, planning, design, and building of the War Memorial were mostly haoles.
There is no record, for example, of the involvement of Native Hawaiians or Japanese
residents of Hawai‘i. Indeed, it is ironic that 838 Japanese residents of Hawai‘i
volunteered to fight in France yet the American military, which in 1919 had asked the
Hawai‘i State Legislature to pass a bill regulating Japanese language schools, and the
American Legion which gave that bill its full support, were extremely antagonistic in
both rhetoric and action to Japanese culture in Hawai‘i (Okihiro, 108).

Just how representative of Islanders as a whole were pro-militarism groups like
the Legion? Perhaps some clue can be gleaned from a Advertiser headline which
complained that “not enough Hawaiians are on hand at the railroad depot when the
mustered-out soldiers arrive there each day from Schofield Barracks to form a real
welcoming committee. Representative citizens are in a feeble minority in the crowds.”
This was in contrast to the U.S. mainland where “every town that has a railroad depot has
its crowds on hand when a train comes in and the returning boys are given the biggest
kind of welcome” (“Weak Welcome Is Given To Soldiers”).

Albert Memmi has noted that it is the colonialist’s “nation’s flag which flies over
the monuments” in a colonized country and that the colonialist “never forgets to make a
public show of his own virtues, and will argue with vehemence to appear heroic and
great” (13, 54). Both of these descriptions aptly fit the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium. It glorifies war and acts to consolidate the American imperialist presence in Hawai‘i. Its celebration of the deaths of men for “freedom and democracy” masks the fact that the First World War was fought between Imperial powers, many of which were governed by monarchies. The U.S. entered the war only after its businessmen had invested so much in the allies that defeat for Britain and France would mean financial ruin for many of the U.S. elite. This message was not lost on the businessmen of Hawai‘i, as a report in the *Advertiser* recounts:

> On the day the ‘Aloha’ contingent marched through the streets of Honolulu to the transport which started them on their way to France, Honolulu’s business men left their offices and marched shoulder to shoulder to express their appreciation of the voluntary service offered by the young men. The bands played merrily that day and people shouted their adieus to the young soldiers. (“Honolulu Will Pay Tribute To Soldier Dead”)

Many firms also put “Service flags” in their windows with stars to indicate how many of their employees had enlisted in U.S. forces. Lewers & Cooke, for example, put a white star on the red flag border of their flag to indicate the death of Private George K. Dwight. Similarly, T.H Davies & Co. put a star on their service flag when a former employee, and Englishman, Lieutenant Harry L. Davies died on October 26, 1914 in the Battle of the Marne (“Hawaii Did Her Part on France’s Blood-Red Fields”).

After the war those same businessmen, through their Native Hawaiian spokesman Prince Jonah Kuhio, used Hawai‘i’s military enlistment and casualty figures as evidence of Hawai‘i’s patriotic American credentials and suitability for statehood. Hawai‘i’s businessmen had reaped many of the benefits of the Islands’ territorial status. However, although it paid taxes to Washington like a state, the Territory of Hawai‘i constantly fought for its full share of federal funds. Road building and improvements to Hawai‘i’s
harbors were necessary to increase trade and profit, but without Federal funding they were an expensive and unwelcome burden for Hawai‘i’s businessmen. Full statehood would not only solve this problem but would also eliminate the lurking threat of Washington imposing a commission form of government on Hawai‘i, as it had in American Samoa. World War One gave Hawai‘i’s businessmen ammunition in their arguments for statehood. The war, Kuhio argued, “had proved Hawaii’s loyalty. His people had become Americans worthy of full membership in the Union” (Tabrah, 135). It was not to be, however. Soon the sacrifices made by Hawai‘i’s soldiers were forgotten. The Natatorium, supposedly erected in their memory, fell into disrepair. If, indeed, statehood was the reason they fought and died, then they gave their lives in vain. In fact it would take a direct attack on Hawai‘i in 1941 and the loss of thousands of lives before Washington would give serious consideration to statehood.

There is no better tribute to those fallen than to remember the futility of war rather than glorify it. Historian Jonathan Schell argues, “every political observer or political actor of vision has recognized that if life is to be fully human it must take cognizance of the dead and the unborn” (122). But what is the proper way to remember the dead of a senseless World War? Should they be used, as the American Legion and others seem to think, to perpetuate patriotic, pro-militaristic narratives? Or should Hawai‘i’s small numbers of World War One dead be allowed to rest in peace? Honolulu today is a city filled with memorials. Indeed there are so many memorials in the city and on the island of O‘ahu that one is reminded of historian Schell’s commentary on Pericles’ funeral oration: “Pericles offered a similar, though not identical, vision of the common life of the
generations in his funeral oration, in which he said that all Athens was a “sepulchre” for the remembrance of the soldiers who had died fighting for their city” (121-22).

In a way, the whole island of O‘ahu has become a memorial to America’s war dead. It is almost as if Hawai‘i’s politicians have some subconscious need to emulate Washington as the site of tributes to America’s military. For example, Honolulu’s latest monument is a small 9-11 memorial, erected outside Honolulu City Hall in 2001. After that attack, the city also spruced up its World War Two memorial on King Street (facing the Honolulu State Library). A set of railings were added, perhaps because in the wake of 9-11, the city realized it had somewhat neglected the often graffiti-covered memorial. It is notable that it took an event 5,000 miles away in New York to spur Honolulu City Council into action over the World War Two memorial. The supposed rise in patriotism after 9-11 suddenly imbued in that memorial a weight that it obviously did not have earlier. It is notable also that the World War Two memorial was supposed to be a temporary affair and that Hawai‘i’s politicians are either too stingy, or perhaps too afraid of veterans groups to either tear it down or build a more dignified and more expensive structure. Honolulu City Council’s belated concern reflects not only a sense of guilt over its previous neglect, but also shows a very practical interest taken by politicians, aware of concerns from mainland-based tourists about the lack of “Americanism” shown by the people of Hawai‘i in the wake of 9-11, to present to residents and outsiders alike a message that Hawai‘i is as at least as patriotic as mainland states.

In light of the mood of militarism and excessive patriotism promoted by some in Hawai‘i who have their own continuing agenda, it would perhaps be well to reflect on this thought: perhaps if the full text of Wilfred Owen’s poem was inscribed on the tablet
attached to the Honolulu Stone then the Waikiki War Memorial and Natatorium might be less of a force for colonialism and jingoism and more a genuine monument to the fallen. Just for once, why not commemorate peace instead of war?
CHAPTER 3. HOORAY FOR HAOLEWOOD?

Stories of “The Islands”

Hollywood movies about “islands” tend to rely on a number of recurring stereotypical images or situations. Hollywood islands represent mystery, romance, danger, adventure, opportunity, and utopia. For example, movies such as *Jason and the Argonauts* (1963) and *Warlords of Atlantis* (1978) contain the romantic and adventurous notion of mysterious islands that can be plundered by Western adventurers. The idea of “adventure” is explored in its purest form in *Treasure Island* (1934), based on Robert Louis Stevenson’s pirate book of the same name. The less magical acquisition of treasure is depicted in movies such as *White Shadows in the South Seas* (1928), *The Island of Desire* (1917), and *Vengeance of the Deep* (1923). In these movies, Westerners cheat and exploit natives while sating their rapacious desire for pearls.

In some movies, natives are depicted as in a less advanced stage of civilization. For example, *King Kong* (1933), *Robinson Crusoe* (1954), *Enchanted Island* (1958) and *The Land That Time Forgot* (1975) feature plotlines about headhunters, cannibals, and even evolutionary throwbacks. In other movies, natives are portrayed as semi-civilized. They may have a veneer of a civilized, ordered society, but at any moment those same natives may revert to primitivism and savagery. Houston Wood states, “Paradoxically, although Hawaiians are repeatedly idealized in American films, they are often simultaneously represented as a threat to Euroamericans” (109). For example, in *Bird of Paradise* (1951) the Frenchman Andre (Louis Joudan) is shocked and disgusted when his otherwise demure Polynesian girlfriend Kalua (Debra Paget) throws herself into a volcano as a sacrifice to a pagan god (Reyes, 65). Wood points out that these natives
speak Hawaiian and their god is named Pele (11). Similarly, in *Joe Versus the Volcano* (1990) white adventurer Joe Banks (Tom Hanks) is offered up for sacrifice to yet another volcano god by the same natives Banks had previously tried to help. Floyd Matson whimsically states, “Audiences learned to beware of the placid surfaces of the blue lagoon: it could turn black and there might be creatures in it. One could never be quite certain beforehand whether it would be Devil’s Island or only Gilligan’s that one was about to visit” (40).

In all of these movies the moral seems to be that escape from the pressures of “civilized” Western society is sometimes necessary. However, the closer Westerners return to their “state of nature,” the more their social restrictions will break down and anarchy will prevail. For example, in the primitive environment portrayed in Hollywood movies, where natives supposedly live close to a savage state of nature, even civilized Westerners will revert to savagery if they are exposed to such primitive desires for too long. This “return to nature” theme is the basis, for example, of the movies *Lord of the Flies* (1963) and *The Beach* (2000). Perhaps the most enduring stereotype, however, is that of the lascivious female native who is willing to share her body with white explorers or seamen. After all, we are often told in the movies that natives consider European explorers as “gods,” and what primitive woman would not want to please her god? We can see such women in movies such as *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1962), and *The Idol Dancer* (1920). Even the supposedly superior Caucasian woman is influenced by the sexual freedom of island life. For example, *The Revolt of Mamie Stover* (1956) features a white Honolulu “madam,” and in *From Here to Eternity* (1953) a Commanding Officer’s
wife risks all in an adulterous affair with a lowly Sergeant, set against the backdrop of pounding waves and swaying palms.

Films about Hawai‘i feature all of the familiar stereotypes of islands that the Hollywood “South Seas” script formula seems to require. However, one aspect of Hawai‘i films remains under-examined – that of a Hawai‘i that meets the needs of mainland Americans and acts as a paradigm example of how they should behave. Floyd Matson states, “To people who live anywhere else, as we know, Hawaii is a state of mind. But it is not always the same state of mind...[T]here is doubtless a kind of ‘monomyth’ at the heart of the matter-one which has much to do with islands but little to do with these islands” (40). As Matson notes, the reality of Hawai‘i and the Hawai‘i that exists in the American mind, are two separate entities. Moreover, the way Hawai‘i is portrayed in Hollywood movies changes over the years to meet the requirements of a mainland audience. Although some stereotypes and themes are present throughout, three distinct phases can, however, be detected: before World War Two, Hawai‘i and its people were portrayed as exotically different to America; after World War Two, Hollywood movies still portrayed Hawai‘i as exotic, but in various ways Hawai‘i is made to seem similar to, or connected to the rest of the United States; and from the mid-1950s through the 1960s, Hawai‘i was displayed as a racial paradigm, an example the troubled mainland ought to follow.

In each distinct period, Hawai‘i has been reshaped by Hollywood to meet the needs and expectations of a mainland American audience. Hawai‘i and Native Hawaiians were imagined and then reimagined to meet the requirements of their colonizers, just as the New World and Native Americans were invented then reinvented by European
colonizers to meet their needs. Tom Engelhardt refers to this “invented” aspect of the conquest of America as the “American war story,” a narrative that acts as a “builder of national consciousness” (5). Engelhardt argues that the American national narrative is based on war stories about “savage,” uncivilized Indians and “peaceful,” civilized settlers. In *The Searchers* (1956), for example, John Wayne declares, “There’s humans and then there’s Comanches” (Parenti, *Make Believe Media*, 15). Stories Americans tell about their past reverse the role of invader and invaded, and offer a comfortable historical narrative that is free from unsettling themes such as genocide, colonialism, and imperialism. With regard to Hawai‘i, Americans tell stories of uncivilized, savage natives, and have thus reversed the roles of aggressor and victim. Michael Parenti states that in television and movies, “The homeland, the safe place, is American White Anglo-Protestant, or at least White. It is inhabited by people who are sane and care about life. The enemies are maniacal and careless with lives, including their own” (*Make Believe Media*, 14). In cowboy films the intruder changes places with the intruded upon when Indians are shown attacking forts, wagon trains, and homes. Seldom do these movies portray Westerners attacking Indian homes and villages because, as is evident in movies such as *Little Big Man* (1970) and *Soldier Blue* (1970), such images remind viewers that they are the descendants of intruders and invaders.

The main body of this chapter examines Hawai‘i’s role in Engelhardt’s “American war story” through the medium of cinema. It concludes with an examination of the role of movies about Hawai‘i as propaganda in ongoing cultural and political debates. In attempting to make sweeping statements about a large number of movies across a number of decades, it is perhaps useful to recall Parenti’s disclaimers in his
wide-ranging examination of film and television in *Make-Believe Media*. Parenti states, “Do I select only the [movies and television shows] that paint the entertainment media in the worst possible light? If anything, I give disproportionately greater attention to the relatively few quality films and programs of progressive hue” (vii). In this study, I focus on those movies about Hawai‘i and the Pacific that are generally considered as the best examples of the genre - *White Shadows of the South Seas*, for example, or *From Here To Eternity* - or those made by highly regarded film directors such as D.W. Griffith, who is considered a giant in the field of early cinema.

Parenti also reminds his critics that, “For almost every criticism I make of the “make-believe media,” one could find some exceptions” (vii). In this study, which deals with general trends of filmmaking over several decades, exceptions are also to be expected. For example, while I argue that pre-World War Two cinema about Hawai‘i (and the “South Seas”) depicts the islands as isolated frontiers that are “other” than, and different to the United States, one also finds, for example, *Enchanted Island* (1958) from the post-World War Two era, which depicts islanders who practice human sacrifice to their volcano god. The film’s publicity poster states, “He dared to love a cannibal princess,” and lures potential viewers with promises of “cannibal love rites” and “sacred secret taboos.” Nothing could be more “other” than that. Furthermore, due to Hollywood confusion over cultural issues and geography – French accents in Hawai‘i in *Blue Hawaii* (1961), and Hawaiian language and cultural practices in Tahiti in *Bird of Paradise* (1932), for example - most Americans could not differentiate between Hawaiian and other Polynesian cultures. Floyd Matson notes, “cinematic images of Hawaii were generally blurred by submergence within the murky depth of the ‘South Seas’” genre.
For this reason, this study makes no distinction between movies set in Hawai‘i and movies set in other Pacific islands.

The issues raised here are not simply part of an academic debate. Cinema shapes how Americans see Hawai‘i, and if those depictions further narratives of colonialism and militarism through the aforementioned “war story,” then that has real, everyday consequences for the people of these islands. Parenti argues, for example, “We are probably far more affected by what we see than we realize” (Make Believe Media, 6). For instance, after The Deer Hunter began showing in 1979 at least twenty-five people in the United States emulated the infamous “Russian roulette” scene and killed themselves (Make Believe Media, 7). It may well be that few Americans can now differentiate between the pseudo history of John Wayne’s Alamo (1960) or Mel Gibson’s The Patriot (2000) and the real historical events and people depicted in those movies.

Parenti argues that the movie and television industries disseminate “images and themes that support militarism, imperialism, racism, sexism, authoritarianism, and other undemocratic values” (Make Believe Media, vii). President Ronald Reagan’s chief press spokesman, Larry Speakes, once stated, “Underlying our whole theory of disseminating information in the White House was the knowledge that the American people got their news and formed their judgments based largely on what they see on television” (220). Although the medium of television is different in some important ways to that of cinema, it appears that most Americans are getting their information not from what they read, but instead from visual images. In fact, Americans may be so influenced by television that they are no longer able to imagine a world without visual imagery. Robert Sklar states, for example, “It may be...that few late-twentieth-century Americans are capable of
grasping the changes in American culture that movies wrought. Are we not all members
or offspring of that first generation of movie-made children whose critical emotional and
cognitive experiences did in fact occur in movie theaters? American culture for us may be
movie culture” (140). The impact of Hollywood’s visual depiction of Hawai’i is, as
Houston Wood affirms, “most of what EuroamERICANS today know about Hawai’i they
have learned from movies and television” (103).

Engelhardt and America’s “War Story”

In The End of Victory Culture Tom Engelhardt traces the history of the war story
as “a builder of national consciousness.” He argues that war and remembrance of war,
more than any other single factor, shapes America’s foreign and domestic policies.

Engelhardt states:

From its origins, the war story was essentially defensive in nature, and the
justness of American acts was certified not only by how many of them died, but
by how few of us there were to begin with. The band of brothers, the small patrol,
or, classically, the lone white frontiersman gained the right to destroy through a
sacramental rite of initiation in the wilderness. In this trial by nature, it was the
Indians who, by the ambush, the atrocity, and the capture of the white
women... became the aggressors, and so sealed their own fate. (5)

Engelhardt traces the war story back to frontier times when captivity narratives depicted
settlers victims and Indians intruders in their own land. “Massacre” stories – the wagon
train in a circle, the homestead being attacked – reverse the roles of invader and invaded.

Historian Patricia Limerick notes a similar pattern of inversion in modern times:

Ranchers... fac[ing] pressures from urban and recreational developers and from
expanding coal companies... cast themselves as the natives resisting invasion. “I
have become, for all practical purposes, an Indian,” said one white Montana
rancher. “Like the Indian, I am standing in the way of progress because I live and
work above part of the world’s largest known reserves of fossil fuel.” Ranchers,
he argued, “are the new vanishing race.” (158)
In cinema, Mike Wallace traces this narrative back to D.W. Griffith’s influential *The Birth of a Nation*. He states,

A central mythic image was the wagon train drawn up in a defensive circle against hordes of screaming redskins until rescued by the Seventh Cavalry. This iconography (borrowed from D.W. Griffith’s *The Birth of a Nation*, which depicted a band of whites holed up in a cabin and surrounded by hordes of screaming blacks until rescued by the Ku Klux Klan) not only inverted the reality of the historical and moral relations between whites and Indians, but once it was widely accepted, it provided a latent set of images and values that could be detached from their original context and deployed to lend an aura of self-righteousness to other foreign policies. The most notorious case in our lifetime was Vietnam. (262)

Such has been the enduring quality of this mythology that it has been repeated endlessly in high school history textbooks, continuing for present and future generations comforting, self-righteous war stories that Americans like to tell about themselves. James Loewen notes, for example, “[T]extbooks give readers no clue as to what the zone of contact was like from the Native side [and] invert the terms, picturing white aggressors as ‘settlers’ and often showing Native settlers as aggressors” (*Lies My Teacher Told Me*, 115).

In the traditional frontier war story, the outnumbered settlers are destined for slaughter, which makes the inevitable retribution against the savages all the more sweet. Engelhardt argues that these early tales of slaughter and revenge act as paradigms for how Americans write their history and how they are expected to respond. The story of the besieged Alamo, for example, reverses the roles of invader and invaded and led to military retribution against Mexico complete with its own catchphrase, “Remember the Alamo!” Similarly “Remember Custer” became the excuse for the 1890 massacre of Sioux at Wounded Knee, “Remember the *Lusitania*” an excuse for American involvement in World War One, nuclear retribution against Japan was accompanied by
the slogan “Remember Pearl Harbor,” “Remember Tonkin” became the justification for
the Vietnam War, and “Remember 9-11” is the battle cry for the “war against terror.”

When seen from this perspective the trespasser reverses roles with the trespassed.

When viewed from the standpoint of a descendant of the original inhabitants however, a
different side of the “war story” is revealed:

Their [American] illegal invasion [of Texas] forced Mexico to fight a war to keep
its Texas territory. The Battle of the Alamo, in which the Mexican forces
vanquished the whites, became, for the whites, the symbol for the cowardly and
villainous character of the Mexicans. It became (and still is) a symbol that
legitimized the white imperialist takeover. With the capture of Santa Anna later in
1836, Texas became a republic. Tejanos [native Texans of Mexican descent] lost
their land and, overnight, became the foreigners. (Anzaldúa, 6)

In Hawai‘i too, the role of invader and invaded has been transposed. During the 1930s,
for example, the infamous Massie rape and murder case provoked reactions like this from
one New York newspaper: “The situation in Hawaii is deplorable. It is an unsafe place
for white women outside the small cities and towns. The roads go through jungles and in
these remote places bands of degenerate natives lie in wait for white women driving by”
(Wright, 195). It is as if mainland newspapers envisaged the cities and towns of Hawai‘i
as being white fortresses, civilized outposts of empire. Outside these civilized areas,
however, is the mythical savage frontier, where white women are in danger of attack
from savage, lustful natives. This theme can be traced back to early American captivity
narratives - Mary Rowlandson’s, for example - which Engelhardt considers as “the origin
myths of the war story.” Such narratives, Engelhardt asserts, put “the Indians in the
position of invaders, violently intruding on a settled world, they made the need for certain
types of explanations unnecessary. In a sense then, history in North America begins with
the capture of white women and the idea of white victimization...captive narratives
instantly turned the invader into the invaded and created the foundation for any act of retribution that might follow” (23).

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many Hollywood movies about Hawai‘i served to further this aim of Americanization. It did this by eliminating non-haoles from the screen and replacing them with an almost all-white cast, and emphasizing the normality of everyday American life in the islands. Even the titles of movies about Hawai‘i changed: before the war many movies had titles with colors in them, perhaps to emphasize racial differences between white and black, and to suggest the possibility of forbidden inter-racial liaisons. Desmond notes that between 1920 and 1939, “more than fifty feature films were made in or about Hawai‘i. A genre of South Seas island romance was particularly popular, often featuring interracial romance between native women and Caucasian men (businessmen, shipwreck victims) visiting the islands” (109). Some examples of movies with color-laden titles are *The Black Lili* (1921), *The White Flower* (1923), *Beware of Blondes* (1928), *The Black Camel* (1931), *The Blonde Captive* (1931), *White Heat* (1934), and *Mutiny on the Blackhawk* (1939). In contrast, not one movie listed in Schmitt’s *Hawai‘i in the Movies* that was made after Pearl Harbor, has a color in the title.

The exotic locales of pre-war movies were replaced, for a time, in post-Pearl Harbor movies with backdrops of military bases, built-up urban areas, factories, shipyards, yacht clubs, city scenes, and modern technology. For example, the 1956 movie *The Revolt of Mamie Stover* does not focus on palm trees, beaches, or the scenic majestic of Diamond Head. Instead, it tells the seedy story of a Honolulu prostitute. Most of the action in that movie takes place indoors, at a nightclub, a residential home, or in
restaurants or hotels. One scene is set on a golf course and country club. Similarly, *From Here To Eternity* (1953) chooses, with one notable exception, not to feature exotic locales and instead centers on indoor scenes at Schofield Barracks or at River Street brothels.


Pre-Pearl Harbor movies also tend to have specific Hawai‘i or Hawaiian place names in their titles. In the pre-war years, such titles evoked images of an idyllic island paradise that mainland Americans could escape to for the price of a ticket at their local cinema. Examples includes *Hawaiian Love* (1913), *It Happened To Honolulu* (1916), *Happy Hawaii* (1928), *Waikiki Wedding* (1937), *Wings Over Honolulu* (1937), *Hawaii Calls* (1938), *Hawaiian Buckaroo* (1938), *Charlie Chan in Honolulu* (1938), *Honolulu* (1939), *Hawaiian Nights* (1939), *Moonlight in Hawaii* (1941), and *Honolulu Lu* (1941).
In contrast, between 1942 and 1956 only one movie, *Ma and Pa Kettle in Waikiki*, has a Hawai‘i place name in its title. This may reflect a change in how mainland Americans thought about Hawai‘i. In the post-Pearl Harbor years, Americans no longer considered Hawai‘i as a place apart from the rest of the country. While it was still a distant territory, geographically and politically, the Japanese attack had foregrounded Hawai‘i in America’s national consciousness.

The year 1955 seems to be somewhat of a turning point in these trends. Combined, of course, with other media, political policies and social factors – not the least of which was a push for Statehood - fourteen years of Hollywood movies emphasizing Hawai‘i as American seemed to have had the desired effect. Engelhardt’s “war story” was successfully in place: Hawai‘i was now part of the United States and Americans were the victims of a sneak attack on the “Homeland.” This, in turn, diminished American guilt for the atomic attacks on Japan: a Japanese military attack on an American military base in an American colony is, after all, less of a “shock” than an attack on America proper - the United States mainland. No amount of historical evidence to the contrary would affect the veracity of that narrative. It seems almost heretical to say, for example, that with war raging in Europe between 1939-41, it was perfectly clear to both the U.S. government and its citizens that it was only a matter of time before the United States would become drawn into the conflict. It was with an impending sense of doom, for example, that the *Honolulu Advertiser*’s headline on 30 November, 1941 read “JAPANESE MAY STRIKE OVER WEEKEND KURUSU BLUNTLY WARNED NATION READY FOR BATTLE” (Anthony, 5).
The U.S. also made many obvious and well-documented preparations for war before the Pearl Harbor attack, such as the establishment of a blood bank in Hawai‘i, an emergency medical plan, funding of a reserve volunteer police force, and an extensive military building program in Hawai‘i, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and other islands that J. Garner Anthony calls “the most stupendous building program ever undertaken in history” (3). Of course, conspiracy arguments rage as to whether the U.S. Government had any specific knowledge before hand that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. However, those arguments are different from, and irrelevant to whether the attack on Pearl Harbor should be considered “surprise” or “sneak”: the implication of using such loaded terminology in relation to the attack is a clear attempt to portray the Japanese as devious and underhanded, and to imply that the U.S. government and the U.S. military had no clue whatsoever that their biggest military base in the Pacific could possibly be a target – despite much evidence to the contrary. In portraying American military personnel as totally unprepared for war, the sneak attack narrative not only demonizes the Japanese, who are coded as “war-like” in comparison to the images of peaceful, vacationing American troops, but also hides in plain sight the American war machine in Hawai‘i and the hard-headed military and economic foreign policy aims of the U.S. government. The government and the American people did know, however, that war with Japan was imminent, even if they thought the first attack may come in the Philippines rather than in Hawai‘i.

With the “war story” embedded in the American consciousness, perhaps now the image of an American Hawai‘i might be used in a different way. The year 1954 saw the momentous Supreme Court Case Brown versus Board of Education. Its outcome
threatened to undermine America’s whole social structure. Perhaps then Hawai‘i could be
utilized as a successful example of the melting pot, of different races living together in
harmony. From 1955 onwards, many Hollywood movies about Hawai‘i deal with issues
of inter-racial relationships and racial intolerance albeit, for the most part in a deliberately
frothy and lightweight way. This reverses a recognized Cold War trend in Hollywood
movie making of relegating social issues to the sidelines. As Dennis McNally notes,
“Raging anti-Communism clawed at American culture and disemboweled, among other
things, American films; nearly one third of them had dealt with serious social themes in
1947, but in 1952 it was one eleventh” (108).

Many films in the “South Seas” genre reverse this Hollywood trend of demoting
social issues. For example, South Pacific (1958) features an inter-racial relationship
between a young American officer and a native girl. Blue Hawaii (1961) has haole Chad
Gates (Elvis Presley) marrying a half-Hawaiian half-French girl named Maile Duvall.
Diamond Head (1963) features an oppressive haole rancher named Richard Howland
(Charlton Heston), who tries to stop his sister Sloan (Yvette Mimieux) from marrying
Native Hawaiian, Paul Kahana (James Darren). At the same time, as Luis Reyes and Ed
Rampell point out, Howland is “Blind to hypocrisy and disclaiming racial discrimination”
as he “carries on a clandestine love affair with the lovely Chinese Mei-Chen, who is to
bear his son” (128). Midway (1976), a war movie about the Battle of Midway, features a
sub-plot about race and prejudice concerning an American pilot and his Japanese-
American fiancée.

Of course, inter-racial relationships feature also in pre-World War Two movies
about Hawai‘i, but there is a different dynamic at work. Rarely do relationships between
dark-skinned men and white women occur in these movies, such was the racial climate of
the time. Houston Wood identifies only one movie, *White Heat* (1934), in which a
Caucasian woman is attracted to a native man. Another is *South of Pago Pago*, which
features a native man who has a "torrid love affair" with a white woman (Reyes, xxviii).

On the other hand, non-white females are paraded as obstacles of desire. In *The Idol
Dancer* (1920), for example, native girls are described in terms only of being heathen and
sexually available counterparts to white missionary women. The best of these early
movies, *White Shadows of the South Seas* (1928), makes a determined effort to show how
Polynesians were being exploited by western capitalist ways. Yet in many ways this
silent movie simply reinforces sexual stereotyping of Polynesians. For example, at one
point in the film there is a titillating scene in which a white doctor gets massaged with
coconut oil by six scantily-clad native girls to the legend “The white god must lie
still...soon Fayaway will take away all the ache from his bones.”

In Hollywood movies therefore, Hawai‘i acted as a role model for the turbulent
mainland society of the late 1950s and onwards. Racial strife and civil unrest can be
overcome, these movies suggest, if Hawai‘i acts as a paradigm for the way Americans
handle racial issues. Ironically, this lesson went generally unheeded on the mainland. In
fact, movie images of the Islands as a racial paradise led many white Americans to visit
Hawai‘i as tourists to *escape* from racial tension on the mainland. Hawai‘i became the
personification of an idealized, Arcadian America, sufficiently different from the
mainland so that Americans could leave behind their everyday worries, but also
sufficiently “American” as to be familiar and non-threatening. Desmond notes, for
example:

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Add to this sense of escape from domestic U.S. tensions a feeling of still being in the United States (English predominates, no passport required for U.S. citizens, U.S. currency, U.S. brand names in hotels and products, etc.), and Hawai‘i provides a truly safe exoticism for white mainlanders. This experience reinforces their sense of still being the “core” of the American nation. (140)⁴⁹

While Hollywood movies about Hawai‘i attempted to instruct mainland audiences on how to behave, they instead simply contrasted the mythologized racial harmony of Hawai‘i with the racial divisiveness of the mainland. Noting that the vast majority of tourists to Hawai‘i are white, Desmond further asserts that,

Hawai‘i beckons white mainlanders because of its union of beautiful landscape, temperate weather, and “American-ness” (which guarantees a safe encounter with exotica) and because it is perceived, even today, as solely the home of welcoming natives (in the dehistoricized sense) whose cultural distinctiveness is what distinguishes Hawai‘i from competing beach destinations and from the mainland. (136)

Pre-Pearl Harbor: emphasizing Hawai‘i’s “Otherness”

The South Seas Islands of the Pacific are usually portrayed by Hollywood as places of restful relaxation away from the rigors of life on the mainland United States, and as places where one can easily find romance. Hawaiian political activist and author Haunani-Kay Trask has scathingly attacked Americans for their idealized view of Hawai‘i. To them, she insists, Hawai‘i is “[m]ostly a state of mind...[t]his fictional Hawai‘i comes out of the depths of Western sexual sickness that demands a dark, sin-free native for instant gratification.” The image and attraction of Hawai‘i, Trask believes, comes in part from “slick Hollywood movies” (From a Native Daughter, 136-7). In the early years of film, Hawai‘i was depicted as being different to, or “other” than the United States. Hawai‘i was exotic, primitive, and dangerous. Common themes that emphasize this difference include plots about volcanoes, savage and perhaps man-eating natives, sexually available native women, explicit displays of licentiousness, strange social
customs, and pagan religious practices. Movies such as *Aloha Oe* (1915) and *A Fallen Idol* (1919) portray their leading native ladies as royalty (Wood, 113), a reminder that Hawai‘i was different, feudal, and anachronistic. In as much as their budget would allow it, many of these movies linger on the beautiful, exotic landscapes of Hawai‘i and other Pacific islands, another factor that emphasizes difference from America. Robert Schmitt states, for example, that, “At least 11 of the pictures made in or about Hawai‘i featured volcanoes, either real (usually Kilauea) or fictional. Most of these volcanoes were filmed in fiery eruption, often in studio simulation, threatening either to claim the heroine, overrun a village, or even blow up an entire island. One Hawai‘i-made movie, *South of Pago Pago*, contained a smoking volcano that did not erupt, to the astonishment of several reviewers” (*Hawaii in the Movies*, 5). Schmitt’s study of Hawai‘i movies that were released between 1898 and 1959 illustrates that ten out of eleven “volcano movies” were made before Pearl Harbor, out of a total of seventy-five movies made between 1898 and 1941 inclusively. In contrast, only one was released after Pearl Harbor, namely *Bird of Paradise*, and that movie was a remake of an earlier one.

Like the tourist literature of the period, Hawai‘i was deliberately marketed as a place where the sexual rules of American society were either relaxed or completely absent. Hollywood relied on blatant sexual stereotyping of native women to emphasize this difference. Westerners directly associated the physical racial characteristics of native women with this supposed sexual wantonness. Even today, Desmond notes, tourists expect *hula* dancers to be young, slender, attractive, dark-skinned, longhaired brunettes. This look, Desmond affirms, “communicate[s] the notion of ‘Hawai‘i’ as different from the United States” (135). Native women are, according to these movie scripts, unlike the
supposedly chaste and “civilized” American women of the time. In contrast to these reserved females, native women are portrayed alluringly as sexually available. For example, when Robert Flaherty, maker of the successful documentary *Nanook of the North* (1922), was tasked by Paramount to go to Samoa to make a similar documentary, his resulting work, *Moana* (1926), proved to be a disappointment to the Studio as it portrayed none of the stereotypical images that American audiences had come to expect. As film critics Thomas and Vivian Sobchack point out, “In commercial desperation, Paramount misguidedly advertised the film as ‘the love life of a South Sea siren’ and the film, not delivering what it promised, proved to be a box office flop” (344).

Hollywood perpetuated the image of Hawai‘i in particular as a peaceful paradise: in *Honolulu* (1939), for example, in response to a character saying that he would like to go to New York, actor Robert Young states, “And I’d like to go to Hawai‘i. It’s quiet and peaceful there.” Also in that movie actress Gracie Allen, in pseudo Hawaiian garb, plays a ukulele and sings “I know it’s gonna be, a great big blow to me, unless I find romance in Honolulu.” The 1927 film *Hula* features Clara Bow as an “unconquered island girl who comes face to face with love!” (Schmitt, *Hawaii in the Movies*, 29). In *Tin Pan Alley* (1940) actresses Alice Faye and Betty Grable dance, and sing “Hawai‘i, a lovely Hawai‘i. It’s like Heaven on the blue Pacific shore. Oh won’t you let me go-a, to the land of sweet aloha, won’t you let me linger there forever more.”

Other movies are based entirely on racist premises. To a large extent, American audiences of that time period simply imposed mainland racial attitudes onto Hawaiian society. Yet, the idea that Hawai‘i was poly-racial also served to remind those mainland audiences how different Hawai‘i really was. For example, *Bird of Paradise* (1932) is
based on a 1912 Broadway musical written by Richard Walton Tully that has been described as infused with “deeply offensive racism.” For example, one white character states that even though he is a beach bum at least he “kept his soul, his white soul, pure from contamination with the brown race.” The musical also features “the phony concept of human sacrifices leaping into hot lava in Hawai‘i” (Brown, 6). Bird of Paradise begins with a dramatic scene in which Dolores Del Rio, playing a native girl, saves a white sailor from a predatory shark. Immediately the stereotypical images of both the danger and romance of “The Islands” are shown. The movie also features a poor version of a hula set to pseudo-Hawaiian drumming more reminiscent of a Tarzan movie than Hawai‘i. Like the 1952 remake, this version of Bird of Paradise features a ludicrous volcano sacrifice scene that reminds viewers of the primitive, barbaric and thoroughly un-American nature of the natives.

Flirtation Walk (1934) stars actors Dick Powell and Ruby Keeler. In one scene the couple stumble across, firstly, some Native Hawaiian fishermen, and then a native luau. These scenes serve to remind the audience that Hawaiian customs are different to American. The fishermen, for example, are “torch fishing,” described by Powell thus: “the fish see the torch, they come to the surface, the fishermen spear them.” The luau is composed of “a chorus line of 100 Hawaiian dancers” (Schmitt, Hawai‘i in the Movies, 40) who form two concentric rings, the men kneeling on the outside ring, and a troupe of exotically dressed women facing a lone dancer in the center of the circle. Keeler asks Powell “What do they do at a love feast?” and Powell replies coyly “Oh they just eat and, uh, stuff and things.” When, after a suitable period of condescending anthropological study, the natives are allowed to notice the haole couple, the natives giggle and squeal in
childlike fashion, and invite the duo into their circle. Powell sings a (surprisingly good) version of a traditional Hawaiian song in Hawaiian, which is at the same time both impressive and slightly unsettling. One wonders why a native Hawaiian is not shown singing in his/her own language. The answer is, of course, that Flirtation Walk is not about Hawai‘i or the Hawaiians, who serve only as a backdrop to the affairs of Westerners. They provide “color” but because they are “colored” they cannot take center stage.

By appropriating Hawaiian culture in this unapologetic way, Hollywood contributed to Hawai‘i’s ongoing cultural colonization. For example, as Wood recounts, “Powell explains to newcomer Keeler that the luau is a feast ‘in honor of love.’ He further suggests, in the highly censored language of the time, it is a place for ravenous lovemaking” (105). In this particular scene the haole couple are not part of the action. Instead, they view the Hawaiians’ performance from a safe distance, as if viewing wildlife. They, like the movie audience, retain their power as voyeurs of “safe savagery” (Wood, 115). This scene suggests that because Hawaiians are supposedly closer to nature and more primitive than Americans, one is likely to see in Hawai‘i the kind of hinted-at group sexual encounters that would be unthinkable on the mainland.

Waikiki Wedding (1937) stars Bing Crosby and features similar elaborate Hollywood-style hula dancing set to slack key guitar and orchestral music. Crosby’s version of “Sweet Leilani,” sung in Hawaiian, instantly became a big hit and the song won “Best Song of 1937” at Hollywood’s Oscar ceremony. The story behind the song offers insight on the parasitical workings of the Hollywood studios:

Paramount studios, like all movie companies, preferred to have the music in its films written by staff employees to keep the royalties in house. Thus they resisted
putting "Sweet Leilani," a song by Harry Owens, bandleader at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel and not in their employ, in the film. But Bing Crosby, star of the film and the most popular singer in the country, insisted. (Brown, 7)

The main plot of Waikiki Wedding, however, features a romantic adventure tale with all the ingredients that made Hawai‘i in this period exotic and different to mainland American audiences. Where in America would one find, for example, "mass native hula dances and one striking thigh-grinding sequence by a mixed team on gigantic tom-toms"? (Variety) or Bing Crosby "in a welter of grass skirts, tropical sunsets...and a razor-back pig"? (New York Times Film Reviews).

The plot is a mixture of crime, adventure, and romance. A gang of Native Hawaiian men kidnaps actress Shirley Ross. Although she is rescued by Crosby, a bizarre and unbelievable plot twist that entails Ross having to throw a pearl into a volcano, leads to Ross being held captive by a Hawaiian priest. Again, Crosby comes to the rescue and the couple makes their escape as the volcano erupts in the background. Waikiki Wedding features many of the familiar plot themes of the early Hawai‘i or South Seas movies, including volcanoes, threatening natives, pearls and adventure. While it might be considered pretentious to read too much into such artistically inconsequential films as these, visual images conveyed to large groups of viewers can create powerful mythologies. Both Flirtation Walk and Waikiki Wedding were released in the aftermath of infamous and racially inflammatory crime cases. In 1928, for example, Myles Fukunaga, a Japanese, abducted and murdered a 10-year-old haole boy called Gill Jamieson, a crime for which he was subsequently executed. Furthermore, in 1931, Navy wife Thalia Massie accused five local men of raping her. The subsequent trial sparked a racial controversy and eventually led to the kidnapping and murder of one of the five
accused by Massie’s husband, mother, and a U.S. naval seaman. While audiences today may laugh at such portrayals of gangs of threatening Hawaiians in vintage movies, in the late 1930s these scenes would have resonated strongly with mainland audiences, reminding them of the supposedly dangerous and primitive circumstances that white settlers faced living amongst “natives.”

_Hawaii Calls_ (1938) begins in San Francisco, with shots of passengers boarding a cruise ship, and the ship sailing out under Golden Gate Bridge. The effect of this is to remind viewers that to get to Hawai‘i one must first leave America and then travel by ship for days to reach this foreign destination. As if to reflect this, the first twenty minutes of the movie are set aboard ship. A musician and passenger called “Strings” finds two pre-pubescent stowaways, _haole_ Billy Coulter (Bobby Breen) and Native Hawaiian Pua (Pua Lani). Like other “primitives” in film, from Tarzan and Cheetah to Nanook, Mowgli, Moana, Wando or Tonto, natives are not allowed the privilege of a second name. Indeed, the audience is asked to laugh at native cultural practices when Strings tells Pua that his name sounds like a bad smell. Similarly, the audience is required to marvel as Pua points out his full name is about twenty syllables in length.

Strings relates that all he knows about Hawai‘i is “Honolulu, Waikiki, bananas, pineapple, hula dancers [and] sunshine.” This exotic imagery is reinforced when the ship arrives in Honolulu and dozens of native boys swim alongside waiting for passengers to throw money overboard. When Pua high-dives into the water, Billy “goes native” and emulates his friend’s athletic feat. On the run from the ship’s Captain and the law, the two boys are taken in by a Native Hawaiian lady named Hina (Mamo Clark). Again, to emphasize cultural difference, every native speaks Hawaiian when they are with their
own cultural group whereas haoles speak only English. When Hina speaks English ("Me go Maui") it is less like Pidgin and more like the staccato speech of Tonto and other Hollywood Indians. As if to emphasize racial difference, the native boys stain Billy's skin brown to hide him from the police. Within its limited budget, Hawaii Calls also makes the most of Hawaiian exotic scenery and cultural practices with montage scenes of female hula dancers, a luau, pineapple plantations, surfing, torch fishing, mountains, a cave that is supposedly the burial ground of "Hawaiian kings," and a backdrop in one scene of what appears to be the windward islet locally known as "Chinaman's Hat."

Furthermore, the attractive Hina gives Strings, a middle-aged haole, lorni-lorni, described in the movie as "Hawaiian massage," and throughout, the plot is interspersed with musical numbers associated solely with Hawaii including, "Aloha `Oe," "Hawaii Calls," "Down where the Trade Winds Blow," "That's the Hawaiian in Me," and "Song of the Islands."

The plot of Hawaii Calls, such as it is, centers on a plot to steal U.S. Naval officer Commander Milburn's secret plans that are "valuable to the safety of the Hawaiian Islands." A Caucasian (possibly German) spy called Muller from the ship recruits locals criminal elements including Julius, a Japanese man who works as driver and servant for Milburn's fiancé's family. In this plot we have all the military excuses for American involvement in Hawai'i, namely the internal and external threat of disloyal Japanese and a concerted effort on behalf of "foreign" Axis powers to obtain plans for the defense of Hawai'i. Julius, a servant of four years to the Millburns, does indeed steal the plans. The movie consequently asks the audience to gaze not in the direction of the obviously incompetent Milburn or at the wisdom of sending supposedly top secret plans with a lone
naval officer on a civilian cruise ship, but instead at the disloyalty and treachery of the previously trusted Japanese man - a metaphor for the overall situation of the Japanese in Hawai‘i and their relationship with America. The end of the movie relieves the audience however. With the help of Billy, the conspirators are discovered and shot to death by the police. A headline in “The Hawaii Times” wraps up the story stating, “Island Defense Plans Saved: Foreign Agents Taken in Huge Espionage Plot.”

A sub-theme of Hawaii Calls is concern by haoles such as Strings, Captain O’Hare, Commander Milburn and his fiancé, for the welfare of Billy in Hawai‘i. He is, as the audience has been reminded on a number of occasions, a white boy who is in danger of going native. Billy himself is aware of this fact, given that he asks Milburn if he is “disappointed” in his behavior. Milburn tells him, “Captain O’Hare says he wouldn’t be surprised if you went back [to the United States] of your own accord.” The movie’s message is that Hawai‘i is a good place for a holiday, is strategically significant and therefore needs the “protection” of the United States military, but is also filled with dangerous foreigners and criminal elements. Although he is an orphan, Billy is still cultured: he sings beautiful songs throughout and is mindful of his manners. In contrast, Pua lives with an extended Hawaiian family and yet is almost feral in nature. Obviously, therefore, Hawai‘i is no place for a Caucasian boy. As he leaves the islands on O’Hare’s ship, Billy, now dressed in a miniature navy uniform, sings “Aloha ‘Oe.” Ashore, Pua and Hina bid him a tearful farewell as he heads home to America, the homeland, and the place Hawaii Calls tells us, where he really belongs.

Honolulu (1939) is about a mainland movie star Brooks Mason (Robert Young) who trades identities with a double, George Smith (Robert Young), a plantation owner in
O‘ahu, so that he can go on vacation. Mason tells Smith, “All I know about Hawai‘i is pineapples and ukeleles.” As if to emphasize the racial otherness of the Hawaiian Islands, on the outward boat journey a bandleader introduces Dorothy March (Eleanor Powell), in blackface, who performs “a tribute to the islands” as “a natural drum dance, of hula and her version of a native dance, ‘done with taps.’” Powell proceeds to tap dance through a bizarre Hollywood interpretation of Hawaiian dance and music that Variety describes as “combining Hawaiian drum dance, a hula, and tap version of native dance.” When the ship arrives in Honolulu a montage of images including Diamond Head, surfers, palm trees, beaches and local fishermen set the scene and remind the viewer that this is, indeed, a foreign paradise.

Honolulu also features a Chinese man in a prominent role, Smith’s servant, Wong (Willie Fung). Although Wong provides only “brief but hilarious contributions” (Variety) in a stereotypical role where the audience is asked to laugh at the “foreigner” who speaks such broken English as “Me Know, me know,” it is worth noting that, unlike post-Pearl Harbor movies, foreign, different-looking characters are at least visible on screen and are given dialog. It is also telling that Wong is Chinese, not Japanese. Whereas racial stereotypes existed about both races, Americans did not regard the Chinese with quite the same suspicion as the Japanese. As Engelhardt notes, the Chinese were once admired for being “hardworking, honest, brave, religious, and intelligent,” and it was only during the Cold War that they gained the wartime “Japanese” faults of being “ignorant, warlike, sly, treacherous and cruel” (58).

Honolulu makes full use of the image of Hawai‘i as a paradise by showing many “outdoor” scenes, even if they were shot on a soundstage. For example, one scene
features a waterfall, at the base of which is a luau featuring a circle of Hawaiian and haole diners. Native Hawaiian dancers, singers, and musicians entertain this group. The scenes remind viewers that Hawai‘i contains people, customs, and scenery that are not American. Indeed, the very reason Smith goes to the mainland is because his girlfriend has become “sophisticated” during her travels in Europe and she thinks he has spent too much time in Hawai‘i where he has become unrefined. For example, at a dinner party Smith’s double, the urbane movie star Brooks Mason is quizzed as to why he is wearing evening clothes “in the tropics?” Mason replies, “It’s something I learned in Hollywood.” Honolulu is so bad, according to the New York Times, “if things are the way the picture makes out [Hawai‘i] should be freed before the Philippines.” A comment such as this would be near impossible in the post-Pearl Harbor world.

Two particular films stand out, however, in this pre-Pearl Harbor era. The Idol Dancer (1920) was directed by the acclaimed and controversial D.W. Griffith. Griffith was a pioneer of early American cinema. As Sobchack and Sobchack note, techniques such as the “close-up” “did not become commonplace until D.W. Griffith began to use them regularly at the Biograph Studios between 1908 and 1912” (7). Griffith was also one of the first directors to use other innovative techniques such as tracking shots and split screen. Griffith’s groundbreaking use of technology and editing attracted audiences to Birth of a Nation (1915) and Intolerance (1916) and, as Sobchack and Sobchack acknowledge, the former is “now usually acknowledged as the first film masterpiece” (7). Birth of a Nation is, however, a deeply racist movie, which lionizes the Ku Klux Klan and features scenes of miscegenation and attempted sexual assault of white women by black men that are deeply offensive. Intolerance was an expensive movie and it made
only a small profit. Griffith, although still popular, was therefore forced to make some lower budget movies. He made two South Seas stories in 1920, *The Idol Dancer* for First National and *The Love Flower* for United Artists.

**The Idol Dancer (1920)**

*The Idol Dancer* is described in the film’s opening credits as “A story of the Southern Seas.” Although filmed mostly in the Bahamas, the ideological “location” of the movie is in writer Gordon Ray Young’s mind; the islands are on a sort of lower rung of the ladder of civilization, the “Great Chain of Being” in which Caucasians topped the hierarchy and so-called “lesser” races languished beneath. Griffith stated that he “went to such trouble and expense to reproduce a certain phase of nature and of life, and I think we succeeded in our attempt” (Gatchell). However, much of *The Idol Dancer* is pure melodrama with demeaning and stereotypical portrayals of indigenous islanders that offer unfair and deliberately racist comparisons with the (mostly) noble and “civilized” Caucasians portrayed in the film.

With Griffith’s skill for cinematography, much of this melodrama could possibly have been hidden by the *mise en scene* of tropical backgrounds and exotic locales. However, *The Idol Dancer* is so racist and so poorly scripted that it is almost impossible to see past the stereotypes. Even by the standards of the time, the film was considered to be a critical (if not a financial) failure. (According to one source, *The Idol Dancer* cost $93,000 and made $963,000 gross – a phenomenal achievement then and now) (“Griffith’s 20 Year Record”). Reviewers in Hawai‘i’s newspapers, for example, watched with amusement films such as *The Hidden Pearls* (1918) with its Hollywood hula described as “a Broadway cake-walk,” and, as Robert C. Schmitt relates, “its casting of
obvious *haoles* in Polynesian roles (Brown, 23). So even by the racist standards of its time *The Idol Dancer* was in some ways anachronistic. A 1919 review in *The New York Times* described the film as only “moderately good” and another *Times* reviewer in 1920 stated that although Griffith “went all the way to the Bahamas for the local color [he] brought little of it back.”

All the elements of the stereotype of Polynesians or of native cultures are used in *The Idol Dancer*. In the opening credits the movie describes itself as “A tale of love and adventure...of lotus eaters in ragged garments.” The lusty native girl, the titillation of easily available sex or, at the very least, the hope of seeing some naked flesh, are all easily recognizable labels attributed to Polynesians. At this early stage, all the elements of a genre movie were being developed. For example, native girls are described in terms of being heathen counterparts to white missionary women. Dressed only in “a few beads and a very little grass” native girls played by white actresses cavort around the island as if their sole purpose is to tease the white missionaries. Pansy (Florence Short) is described as “a savage flower who yields to missionary clothes but wriggles free from all other conventions.” She is the “daughter who wears too little, to the horror of...obstreperous missionaries” (*Variety*). Pansy though is also a counterpoint to the beautiful “White Almond Flower” (Clarine Seymour). Pansy looks more savage; her hair is wild and she shakes uncontrollably and wiggles her hips when she gets excited. Indeed, if she had a tail it would wag when she came into contact with white men. White Almond Flower, on the other hand, is more refined. She is described in racial terms as having “the blood of vivacious France, inscrutable Java and languorous Samoa” running through her veins. Because she has some European origins she is portrayed as being more civilized than
other “natives.” As a result, she “keeps aloof from the natives wandering about lonely, shunning friendship.” According to the dialog boxes in this silent movie, White Almond Flower speaks reasonably good English, in contrast to Pansy who speaks in language more reminiscent of the American Deep South. She has dialog such as “Me be good girl, missy.” When she dances it is nothing remotely like a hula, more like an awkward little girl learning to dance for the first time. In contrast, White Almond Flower dances a more refined if equally incorrect hula. A clear racial contrast is being shown here: White Almond Flower, the sexy native girl who is guiltlessly “available” to white men because of her European ancestry, and Pansy is the primitive native. This can be seen in the relationships that develop: two white men compete for White Almond Flower’s affection but for Pansy, a native “chief” called Wando, played by the white actor Walter James in black face, is the best she can hope for. Wando is described as a headhunter and cannibal. It is no coincidence that his skin is much darker than anyone else’s in the film as at this time in the United States there was believed to be a direct correlation between darker skinned peoples and savagery and lighter skinned peoples and civilization. 50

Nevertheless White Almond Flower is still a native. When she dances for a white missionary’s son, the accompanying dialog states, “the mystic visions of her people move through the exotic coloring of her dance. Note: - Hers are an old people – so old they know the follies of civilization. They sold ivory peacocks to the Pheonicians in the time when Solomon built his temple.” As if to prove this point, White Almond Flower then demonstrates a hapa-hula, half Hollywood Egyptian dance. She is available and acceptable to an extent because she is not fully a native. However, the viewer is reminded that no matter how civilized she might become, White Almond Flower will never be
“white.” She is “tainted” by her color and therefore limited in what relationships she can have or what she can achieve. She exists as a cardboard cut out character for the sexual and racial titillation of the American audience.

Native culture is treated with disdain and natives are there simply to be mocked. Peter, a converted native minister, dresses in missionary clothes and wears spectacles without lenses. He is a comical figure. The audience is perhaps being invited to evaluate that natives such as Peter can be converted but they will always be inferior. He follows the Reverend Blythe around like a lapdog. When he tries to force White Almond Flower to wear missionary clothes a white beachcomber appears on the scene, kicks him in the backside three times, and then throws him out. Peter’s conversations with and actions towards White Almond Flower are indicative of a “black” man verbally assaulting a white woman, thereby breaking the rules of etiquette between the races. The white beachcomber is a symbol of white masculinity protecting a white woman.

In a similarly condescending way, native religious practices are judged as heathen. When White Almond Flower dances in the ruins of “a native house of idolatry” it symbolizes that the native religion is a thing of the past and that the missionary religion is the future. Traditional tribal mating rituals are also mocked. When Wando courts Pansy by beating his arm madly, a legend appears on screen stating “the tender answering love call” and “The etiquette of tribal matrimony (actual custom).” At this point, the audience is being asked to laugh at the primitive culture but also to judge it: when Wando punches out one of Pansy’s teeth and she seems to enjoy the violent encounter, the audience is invited to be repulsed by the grotesque caricatures of native life. This is hardly high art or thoughtful entertainment and nor does the audience expect it to be. However, in the
absence of any non-racist ethnography about Polynesians at this time, and considering the impact of the visual representations, the images portrayed in this movie may have been considered as truthful reflections of native culture, with all the damaging, negative consequences that entails.

The superiority of the white race, white religion and culture is reinforced by this movie. For example, there is only one white child on the island, named Donald Blythe. When he gets into an altercation with a native kid he is soundly beaten. Later, however, after some boxing lessons described as "a secret course of training," Donald is able to trounce the native boy. Donald then forces the boy to wear long trousers and drags him off to church. Similarly when Wando tries to kidnap White Almond Flower he is confronted by the white beachcomber and he retreats. The moral here is that white men are stronger and more virile than colored men by virtue of the "natural" superior position of their race. Finally, the missionaries convince White Almond Flower to abandon her "heathenism" and convert to Christianity. She throws her wooden idol into the sea and abandons her old ways.

When the men of the island, including all of the Westerners, leave on a fishing expedition, the savage Wando returns and the women of the island are forced to take refuge in the church. Not only is the Christian church presented as a place of safety and refuge (home), the audience is once again reminded of the stereotype of the black sexual predator who will take advantage of the absence of white laws and the white men who enforce them. One stereotype seems to be suitable for all native peoples. Wando speaks lines such as "me stick one man." His language is similar to the language of Hollywood's Indians, Tonto or Tarzan. Even when speaking to each other in their own language, both
Pansy and Wando speak in broken staccato tones of broken English. Clearly, showing natives having their own language was not an option for the screenwriter.

_The Idol Dancer_ is a deeply racist and offensive film even by the standards of its time. The colored characters are portrayed as inferior to whites. Wando is described as “chief of the Solomon Islands” thereby implying that those islands have an inferior system of government in comparison to American democracy (Filipino insurgent leaders of the so-called Spanish-American War of 1898–1902 were similarly described as “chiefs” rather than be given a military designation or described by their local title). Most disturbingly, the people of the Solomon Islands in this movie are shown as headhunters and fierce cannibals. Even the score of the movie superimposes Western classical music on an island setting which is in contrast even to other films from the period such as _White Shadows in the South Seas_ (1928) which features local Hawaiian ukulele music.

**White Shadows in the South Seas (1928)**

_White Shadows in the South Seas_ is commonly considered one of the finest silent movies ever made. _Variety_ praised its “superb camera work,” “strong story,” and “closely knit” plot. In fact, the movie won the Best Cinematography Award at the 1930 Oscar ceremony. Certainly, in terms of cinematography, acting, and the overall “look” of the film, it deserves that accolade. The script too is laudable in its attempt to show the perfidy of Western capitalism and its effects on Pacific Islanders. However, the movie also reinforces negative stereotypes about natives even as it purports to be “on their side.”

Filmed in the Marquesas Islands, _White Shadows in the South Seas_ begins with a scene in which a white trader called Sebastian persuades a naïve native named Makia to part with a pearl in return for a cheap watch. Sebastian tells Makia “you’ll always find a
fair and generous trader. Catch me a bigger pearl next time and I'll give you an alarm clock.” In the next scene a drunk is told that he is a “disgrace to the white race.” The drunk, actually a disgraced medical doctor called Lloyd (actor Monte Blue), replies, “When I see what my race has done to these natives here, I am ashamed—ashamed of being white... What has the mighty white race done to these people except cheat, rob, and exploit them?” He continues: “You’ve wrecked their bodies diving for your pearls... given them your diseases... doomed them to extermination!” Clearly this is not a typical film in the South Seas genre. It shows examples of the effects on natives of diving for pearls and suffering decompression sickness (the bends), and it makes a point of showing how unscrupulous the trader Sebastian is. This is a laudable stand to take, especially in 1928 when racism was perhaps at its zenith in America. However, while showing the problems that Western culture causes for Pacific Islanders, *White Shadows in the South Seas* also perpetuates all of the stereotypes of those same people it tries to help.

*White Shadows in the South Seas* accepts the inferior position of native peoples even as it tries to help them. In the process it reinforces such stereotypes as the Eden-like paradise isle, the primitive native and the lascivious native girl. The complainant and agent of change is a Westerner. Natives are passive and seemingly unable or unwilling to help themselves. Their voice is not heard in advocacy of their own interests. While Lloyd is sympathetic to native injustice, whatever happens, the natives will have their future decided by foreigners. Added to that, their Western advocate is hardly a traditional hero or leading man. He is a drunken ex-doctor described in the movie as “a derelict of the South Seas”.

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*White Shadows in the South Seas* starts with the premise that the second island the doctor discovers is an Eden of sorts, beautiful, lush and unspoiled by contact with corrupt Westerners. The film begins with the legend:

The coral atolls of the South Pacific...for happy centuries the last remnant of an earthly paradise...Islets ‘fresh from the touch of God’...Memories that lingered from the Morning of Creation...But the white man, in his greedy trek across the planet, cast his withering shadow over these islands...and the business of civilizing them to his interests began...Today the results of ‘civilization.’

However, by no stretch of the imagination can pre-contact Hawai‘i or any other Polynesian society be described as an “Eden.” Whatever their merits or demerits, these island societies had many of the problems or benefits of any other extant society. By condemning Hawaiians and Polynesians to the Edenic past, Westerners can thus avoid dealing with them *in the present.* A concrete example of this is the efforts of the Territory of Hawai‘i in the 1920s to “rehabilitate” Hawaiians by returning them to the land. In criticizing Hawaiians for accepting some Western vices and attempting to consign them to a mythical agricultural past as a cure for perceived ills, Western colonists in Hawai‘i were only acting on stereotypes that already existed, images which had been propagated in the media, by historians, scholars, and in the movies.

The idea of “The Islands” as a place where danger lurks under the surface is shown on a number of occasions in the movie. For example, we are shown a scene of a swimmer diving for pearls. Not only does he suffer from decompression sickness, he is also under threat from such other exotic dangers of the filmmaker’s imagination as giant razor-edged clams, sharks and an octopus. In a later scene, when the doctor tries to touch Fayaway (Raquel Torres) during a sexy dance routine (another Hollywood *hula*), he earns the wrath of the village. He is grabbed by the natives and told “Fayaway is
lapu...the virgin bride of the temple." There is a mixed message here: one could either interpret this scene as showing respect for the islanders’ customs or, more likely, it is another reinforcement of the idea that the islanders are basically uncivilized and inherently dangerous. As if to emphasize this innate weakness in the character of native men, at the end of the film those same dangerous warriors run off at the sound of a gun leaving the doctor to his fate at the hands of Sebastian. Again, mixed messages: the islanders are innocent and afraid, but they could also be interpreted as acting in a stereotypically cowardly way – like Wando in *The Idol Dancer*.

The movie contains the stereotype of sexually available native girls. As in many movies and stories about Polynesians, natives treat Westerners as gods. Mary Louise Pratt calls this act of apotheosis, “a utopian scene of first contact that acquired mythic status in the eighteenth century and continues with us today in the popular mythology pf the South Sea paradise...Far from being taken for a suspicious alien, the European visitor is welcomed like a messiah by a trusting populace ready to do his or her bidding” (36). Similarly, Gananath Obeyesekere argues in his book *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook* that the supposed reverence of white explorers by Native peoples is a condescending European myth. When the doctor stumbles upon this new island, which has been untouched by Western contact, the first scene he sees is a lagoon full of near-naked native girls. He can see them but they cannot see him. In this voyeuristic scene the power is in the hands of the spectator and the natives are rendered passive. At one point, the film contains a titillating scene in which the doctor is massaged with coconut oil by six scantily-clad native girls to the legend “The white god must lie still...soon Fayaway will take away all the ache from his bones.” As with many other films that portray
Polynesians, Fayaway is a non-native made to look like a native. This tactic by filmmakers avoids some of the serious questions posed in that time period by interracial relationships while at the same time promoting images of “Romance...love...[which] seem to be everywhere on this island Mother Earth forgot.”

Although *White Shadows in the South Seas* appears to be celebrating traditional Polynesian culture in its documentary-like portrayal of a traditional feast, the movie could also be read in a different way. As in other movies of the genre, perhaps the audience is being invited to compare disparagingly the traditional feast of turtles and baby octopi with western cuisine. For example, when the feast is being shown the legend states “A toothsome hors d’ouvres...baby octopi salad” and “spinach a la Polynesia.” Can this really be interpreted as celebrating native culture? Or is it simply another joke for a Western cinema audience to enjoy about the inferiority and savagery of the islanders.

Ideas of western cultural and technological dominance are perpetuated in the movie. Even though the doctor is a drunkard he is able to save the lives of some of the natives. Despite his lowly position in Western culture (as a drunk), he is still the agent of change in the Polynesian culture. He assumes a dominant position and is considered as a god. Although in the end he betrays the islanders and reveals their wealth of pearls to Sebastian, he is killed and we are therefore asked to consider him as a tragic hero – a man who tried to do the right thing but is brought down by a weakness in his own character. The islanders fall under the dominance of Western culture and they are left to their fate. However, it is debatable whether the audience will remember the natives rather than the compelling story of the tragedy of the Western leading man.
White Shadows of the South Seas makes a determined effort to show how Polynesians were being exploited by western capitalist ways. Based solely in terms of its aims in the time period, and the talents of the cinematographers in capturing the beauty of the Marquesas Islands where the film was shot on location, White Shadows of the South Seas rates as one of the best silent movies made by Hollywood. However, in hindsight, the movie appears only to reinforce many of the harmful, misleading stereotypes that already existed about Polynesians as different, exotic, pagan, lustful, superstitious and primitive.

Hawai‘i as America: From Pearl Harbor to Brown versus Board of Education

Before World War Two Hawai‘i was a marginal part of the United States. Leila Reiplinger, a Hawaiian hula dancer who traveled to New York in 1940, remembers a history teacher who thought, “we were still the Sandwich Islands” (Desmond, 108). (In contrast, a 1942 article in Asia Magazine referred to the Hawai‘i as “American Hawaii” (Desmond, 119.) The territory returned only four Electoral College votes, all of which were guaranteed to be Republican. The Depression had not hit Hawai‘i as badly as on the mainland. Furthermore, the blatant racism and segregation of the U.S. was not as pronounced in Hawai‘i as it was in America’s southern states. It was a territory of the United States but in many ways it was the most atypical of territories. Nearly two fifths of the population was of Japanese origin and haoles were numerically a minority group alongside Filipinos, Chinese, Portuguese, Native Hawaiians and other Polynesians. Authors Beth Bailey &, David Farber state, “Hawaii is about as far from ‘representative’ as one can get in 1940s America. Hawaii was at the margin of American life as well as of the war” (19). No single incident would change the course of American history in the
Twentieth Century more than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941. Almost 2,500 U.S. servicemen and civilians were killed and a severe blow dealt to U.S. military and national prestige. The attack would have wide-reaching effects on life in Hawai‘i, but it would also effect change in Hollywood and the “South Seas” genre of film.

Pre-Pearl Harbor movies emphasize how different the United States was to the supposedly exotic, primitive, and dangerous Hawaiian Islands. They achieve this by frequent use of recurring thematic elements and visual reminders, including an emphasis on nature, wildlife and landscape, plots about volcanoes, savage natives, cannibalism, sexual obtainable native women, explicit displays of nudity and passion, odd social customs, and pagan religious rites. In the years after Pearl Harbor, however, Hollywood movies served to remind mainland Americans that Hawai‘i was part of the United States, as American as apple pie and baseball. (This was not an easy task, given that decades of movies had already coded Hawai‘i as different and exotic. Furthermore, events such as Japanese internment reminded Americans of Hawai‘i’s otherness. Out of a total of 120,000 Japanese interned in the United States as a whole, less than 1,500 were interned in Hawai‘i (Daniels, 1, 48). These figures are proof that different circumstances existed in Hawai‘i compared to the U.S. mainland). There is no conspiracy here. It is a fact that the United States government and military involved themselves explicitly in Hollywood and its productions to ensure the movie industry was sufficiently patriotic and pro-war. As Thomas Cripps and David Culbert state, “By the time of Pearl Harbor both civilian and military leaders in America recognized motion pictures as a significant propaganda
medium: they believed film could instill in citizens a spirit of patriotism and a will to fight” (110).

The post-Pearl Harbor change in the image of Hawai‘i was not, however, a result of some secretive conspiracy by a cabal of American political leaders and captains of industry. Rather, Hollywood simply responded to changing audience expectations. The “feel good” factor played a large part in shaping what audiences expected to see on screen. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor led to such vicious retaliation by the United States that many commentators and historians view the war in the Pacific as being essentially different to the war in Europe. John Dower points to the racial nature of propaganda and newspaper coverage as evidence that Americans viewed the Japanese as vicious, subhuman savages, and that the Pearl Harbor attack released “emotions forgotten since our most savage Indian wars were awakened by the ferocities of the Japanese commanders” (33).

American audiences needed to feel that such ferocity was justified: no one wants to be seen as a racist, after all, and no one wanted to be reminded of the American colonization of Hawai‘i. Therefore, if Americans convinced themselves that they were the innocent party, that they were attacked at Pearl Harbor, and that the attack was more pernicious in nature than simply two colonial armies tussling over their governments’ colonial possessions in the Pacific, then attention could be drawn away from the racist nature of the retaliation and from the fact that the Japanese attacked only military targets on the “American Gibraltar” (Dunne, 48). Noam Chomsky points out, for example, that comparisons between the 9-11 attack and Pearl Harbor are misleading because “On December 7, 1941, military bases in two U.S. colonies were attacked—not the national
territory, which was never threatened. The U.S. preferred to call Hawaii a 'territory,' but it was in effect a colony" (9-11, 11-12).

If Hawai‘i could be made more American and less different to America, then a cinematic sleight of hand could be achieved. If this was to be accomplished, however, the exotic other had to be hidden from view. Hawai‘i had to fully become a part of the national territory, or "homeland," as American as California or New York, if the traditional war story of "settlers attacked by savages" was to be maintained. Indeed, in the post-war years, as American guilt about the atomic bombings of Japan threatened the narrative of the "Good War," it became even more imperative to paint the Pearl Harbor attack as "sneak" and the Japanese as subhuman and vicious. Writing in *Atlantic Monthly* in February 1946, veteran Edgar L. Jones criticized American amnesia about the war:

> We Americans have the dangerous tendency in our international thinking to take a holier-than-thou attitude toward other nations. We consider ourselves to be more noble and decent than other peoples, and consequently in a better position to decide what is right and wrong in the world. What kind of war do civilians suppose we fought, anyway? We shot prisoners in cold blood, wiped out hospitals, strafed lifeboats, killed or mistreated enemy civilians, finished off the enemy wounded, tossed the dying into a hole with the dead, and in the Pacific boiled the flesh off enemy skulls to make table ornaments for sweethearts, or carved their bones into letter openers. We topped off our saturation bombing and burning of enemy civilians by dropping atomic bombs on two nearly defenseless cities, thereby setting an alltime [sic] record for instantaneous mass slaughter. As victors we are privileged to try our defeated opponents for their crimes against humanity; but we should be realistic enough to appreciate that if we were on trial for breaking international laws, we should be found guilty on a dozen counts. We fought a dishonorable war, because morality had a low priority in battle. The tougher the fighting, the less room for decency; and in Pacific contests we saw mankind reach the blackest depths of bestiality.

The result of such amnesia is, as Engelhardt states, to paint "our" soldiers, tactics, and motives as saintly and the behavior of "their" soldiers as inhuman: "Those rare instances when slaughter visibly tilted in the other direction-like the Alamo and Pearl Harbor-were
inversely immortalized as illustrations of the enemy’s incomprehensible infamy and deceit. Their aberrant nature ingrained them in the national memory as proof of the righteousness of subsequent acts of vengeance” (39). The push for Hawaiian statehood in the post-war years, and the continuing Americanization of Hawai‘i needs to be seen in that light.

In Hollywood movies, Hawai‘i’s Americanization was achieved through subtle changes in recurring themes and imagery, and also by omission. Pre-war movies usually featured native village activities such as feasts, ceremonies, religious practices etc. These social customs emphasized how different native society was compared to Western. However, as Houston Wood notes, at the beginning of World War Two “Native village life all but disappear[s], a tropological development that reaches its contemporary form in the Elvis films of the 1960s” (117). Whereas exotic and sometimes threatening native men, dressed usually in native attire, played major roles in early Hawai‘i films, in post-Pearl Harbor movies such masculine native exoticism disappears from the screen. There is no post-Pearl Harbor equivalent of Duke Kahanamoku, for example, who features in many early Hollywood films and television shows (Brennan). In most of these movies Hawaiians are either entirely absent, or they play small roles as waiters, barmen, or musicians. In From Here to Eternity (1953), for example, the only Hawaiians on view are servants, waiters, and entertainers, all of who are dressed in non-native apparel or non-threatening aloha shirts.

Americanization in Hollywood movies also operates by focusing less on nature and landscapes and more on urban and industrial Hawai‘i, or on the U.S. military. For example, ten Pre-Pearl Harbor movies about Hawai‘i had military themes – Excuse Me

Not only do these movies focus on Americans and American culture and omit Hawaiians and their culture, many of them also perpetuate myths about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that serve to make the Japanese look savage, devious and barbaric. Engelhardt states,

> At the heart of the war story lay the ambush, extraordinary evidence of the enemy's treacherous behavior. While all ambushes involved deceit, none was more heinous than the "sneak attack," that surprise assault on a peaceful, unsuspecting people...The ultimate ambush was the "last stand," for it offered up in miniature a vision of the fate the enemy had in store for all Americans, a fate implicit in every unsuccessful ambush, in any sneak attack. In their hearts, they desired our total annihilation. (39)

Such "sneak attacks" occur in movies such as *Submarine Raider, December 7, The Final Countdown* (1980) and *Pearl Harbor* (2001), where civilians are attacked as well as military targets. In fact, much if not all of the damage caused to the city of Honolulu was
a result of spent U.S. Navy shells that had been fired into the air and had then fallen on
civilian areas. For example, an explosion at the Governor's Mansion that killed one
civilian was actually caused by a Navy five-inch anti-aircraft shell (Editors of the Army
Times, 101).

In the movies, however, showing historically incorrect attacks on U.S. civilians
perpetuates the image of the Japanese as devious and savage. In Submarine Raider, for
example, an American woman “survives the shelling of her luxury yacht in Hawaiian
waters by a Japanese aircraft carrier” and a Federal agent fights “suspected spies and
saboteurs in the Islands” (Rampell and Reyes, 15). In Task Force, Japanese warplanes
attack three American women playing tennis. In Harm’s Way contains a scene in which a
Japanese plane attacks a civilian couple on a beach. In Pearl Harbor, a Japanese pilot
attacks a civilian convertible car. In John Ford’s documentary December 7, Japanese
citizens in Hawai‘i spy on the U.S. Fleet from diesel powered sampans and then report
back to the Japanese Embassy. When the Japanese finally attack in December 7,
warplanes attack civilian targets as well as military. According to Rampell and Reyes, the
movie Air Force “claims there were Japanese snipers on Maui and that Japanese
vegetable trucks from Honolulu smashed into the planes at Hickam Field” (11). The plot
of Jungle Heat (1957) involves labor disputes and Japanese spies on Kaua‘i, where,
according to Schmitt, “war veterans’ groups strongly objected to its portrayal of
disloyalty among Japanese residents” (Hawaii in the Movies, 71).

These movies dehumanize the Japanese and paint them as totally immoral,
deviant, underhanded, and barbaric. Engelhardt states “The Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor fit the lineaments of this [war] story well. At the country’s periphery, a savage,
nonwhite enemy had launched a barbaric attack on Americans going about their lives early one Sunday morning” (5). Clearly Hollywood was determined to play its part in forming this narrative and it is now clear in hindsight that such misinformation and propaganda had the desired effect: the New York Times notes, for example, that a 1942 theater audience for Submarine Raider “was in fine hissing form” at the movie’s “scrupulously fair…portrayal of the enemy” [my emphasis].

Engelhardt notes in the war story that when a savage enemy massacres Americans, rumors often spread that either traitorous Americans were involved, or perhaps, the savage enemy was part European in heritage. After all, what else could explain how and why savages could defeat a civilized people? Thus, when Custer’s Indian killers were defeated in 1876, rumor spread that white men dressed as Indians were leading the attack, or that Sitting Bull was a “half-breed” Frenchman (Engelhardt, 39). Engelhardt notes that when General Douglas MacArthur heard the news that his air force in the Philippines had been destroyed from the air, he “refused to believe that the pilots could’ve been Japanese. He insisted they must have been white mercenaries” (39). Paul Fussell points out that in any war, “one’s defeats and disasters are caused by treasonous traffic with the enemy rather than by one’s own blundering amateurism is always a popular idea” (Wartime, 39-40). At Pearl Harbor, Fussell notes, “it was believed that Japanese working on Oahu had cut big arrows in the fields to guide Japanese planes toward their target.” In the aftermath of the battle, “a dog barking on the beach at Oahu was said to be barking in Morse, conveying treasonous messages to a Japanese submarine listening offshore” (Wartime, 40). Movies such as Submarine Raider and Air Force perpetuate the myth of treasonous Americans of Japanese descent helping the enemy. The
documentary *December 7* goes even further in depicting a German intelligence officer helping to coordinate spying operations with Japanese Embassy staff in Honolulu.

*December 7* is, perhaps, the best example of Hollywood’s attempts to portray pre-Pearl Harbor Hawai’i as different to the United States. In the film’s narrative, Hawai’i was once primitive but has now been “civilized” by American influence. The narrator states, for example, “Where once was a village of grass huts, a modern American city now stands.” The “Big Five,” mostly American and *haole* business interests are described as the “backbone, big brain, and nerve center” of the Territory. “Uncle Sam” states, however, “My islands are of many races, many colors,” thus touching on American fears of miscegenation and otherness. The Japanese had grown to be a rival to American interests in Hawai’i. They had their own “Big Five” and the Japanese outnumbered Americans in the islands by two to one, a demographical fact that is important in perpetuating the war story. As Engelhardt notes, “inferior American numbers were invariably translated into a numerology of Indian destruction” (5). So too was the “sneak” attack on outnumbered Americans in Fort Hawai’i translated into a numerology of Japanese destruction. *December 7* portrays Hawai’i as a tourist paradise with its guard down. “On a hilltop Uncle Sam lay fast asleep,” it states, thus perpetuating the “sneak attack” narrative that Engelhardt posits as an essential part of the “war story.” Engelhardt states, for example, that “[John] Ford drew on last-stand imagery to display a fleet (and a nation) caught in the oceanic equivalent of a box canyon and nearly wiped out” (47).

However, where the movie most emphasizes how different Hawai’i was to the United States is in its depiction of the Japanese. In *War Without Mercy*, John Dower illustrates how Americans reduced the Japanese to a status of subhuman in order to make
their destruction easier and more palatable. They were racially different – “yellow” not white, and more akin to animals than humans. Thus, American newspapers began referring to the Japanese in simile and metaphor as monkeys, baboons, gorillas, dogs (or mad dogs), mice, rats, vipers, rattlesnakes, and cockroaches. They had no mind of their own and were, instead, herd-like, like sheep or cattle (77-93). As subhuman “yellow dwarf slaves” (84) or “robots” (86), the Japanese were dehumanized and therefore made suitable for slaughter. Illustrations of hybrid insect-like Japanese in Leatherneck magazine were accompanied by such instructional text as, “the breeding grounds around the Tokyo area must be completely annihilated” (91). As insects – bees, ants, spiders, and beetles – the Japanese were effectively dehumanized in much the same way as the Nazis dehumanized Europe’s Jewish population as “rats” or “mice” to prepare the way for the holocaust.

In December 7, by careful framing, editing, and special effects, Ford creates images of the Japanese in Hawai'i as insect-like hordes threatening to overrun the outnumbered American population. For example, he uses montage, quick editing and fast-paced music to suggest the ant-like Japanese are overwhelming whites. Furthermore, Ford uses lots of close-ups of Japanese as a reminder of physical racial otherness. A Japanese official is shown as a bowing, grinning fool, similar to the Vietnamese murdered by Bunny in Oliver Stone’s Platoon (1986). Japanese kids sing “God Bless America” but, the audience is told, this is “a hyphenated loyalty.” The narrative also focuses on the alien religious practices of the Japanese: it states, for example, “Shinto...keeps alive the fires of nationalism.” Finally, December 7 lays the groundwork
for the internment of Japanese civilians by stating, “U.S. Intelligence has a ‘grab book’ of known spies and saboteurs.”

Finally, it should be noted that the first 83-minute length version of *December 7* was banned by the War Department because, the story goes, the U.S. military objected to its portrayal of ineptitude. Indeed, Rampell and Reyes call the documentary a “harsh indictment” of military capabilities (12). An Oscar-winning 30-minute version of the documentary, without references to racial differences and Japanese espionage, was eventually released in 1943. It is possible, however, that it was the original version of *December 7*’s portrayal of Hawai‘i as a unique place, quite unlike the United States, that U.S. authorities objected to. Such a depiction would have reminded wartime American audiences that Hawai‘i was, in essence, a U.S. colony, and may have called into question the scope and extent of American retaliation.

Recurring thematic elements and visual images of early Hollywood movies about Hawai‘i or the South Seas emphasize the exotic and primitive otherness of islands. In contrast, films such as *From Here To Eternity*, *The Revolt of Mamie Stover* and *Big Jim McLain* de-emphasized such otherness by ignoring familiar plot devices about volcanoes, savage natives, and cannibalism. Furthermore, post-Pearl Harbor movies tend to show urban rather than rural life, in contrast to earlier movies that focus on themes of nature, wildlife and landscape. Gone too were Hawaiians with their “odd” social customs, strange language and pagan religious rites. Instead we have plots that focus on Americans and the Americanization of Hawai‘i in areas such as technology, politics, culture, and the military.
Big Jim McLain (1952)

As Gary Wills notes, John Wayne's highest popularity as an actor coincided with the restrictions, suspicions, pressures and rhetoric of Cold War America in the 1950s, '60s, and '70s (23). Wayne is, in fact, more than a bit-part player in Engelhardt's war story, as Wills tangentially notes:

John Ford had come out of World War II in love with the Navy, with military units in general, and with America's new imperial role in the world as the asserter of freedom everywhere. The three "Seventh Cavalry" films he made with Wayne from 1948 to 1950 reflect this attitude, and put Wayne at the center of Cold War sensibility striving for social discipline in time of trial. In 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atom bomb and Communists won their war for China. In 1950, President Truman escalated the nuclear competition by deciding to create the hydrogen bomb. The image of cavalry units surrounded by hostile Indians echoed the fears of Americans trying to remain steady as peril increased. Wayne became the cool but determined model for Americans living with continual danger. (147)

Big Jim McLain is a documentary-style work of anti-communist propaganda in the same vein as other "anti-Red" movies as The Red Menace (1949), I Married a Communist (1950), and I Was a Communist for the FBI (1951) and many others (Parenti, Make Believe Media, 42). This documentary technique adds weight to a flimsy script and authority to otherwise laughable portrayals of supposed communists who, Wills notes, "abjure smiles [and] cannot speak without sneering" (184). Wayne (whose character shares initials with Senator Joseph McCarthy) is an investigator for the House Committee on Un-American Activities who is sent to Hawai‘i to find communist agitators. Their mission is codenamed "Operation Pineapple." A younger, impetuous sidekick called Mal Baxter, played by James Arness, accompanies him. It is not necessary at this juncture to dwell on the film's see-through plot, cardboard characters, and poor acting. Instead, the
focus here will be on how the movie transforms earlier images of Hawai‘i as different and exotic into a Hawai‘i that is loyally American.

Wayne’s villains are untypical of earlier Hawai‘i movies. In those early movies, criminals and rogues are typically either natives or of mixed race. In *Big Jim McLain*, however, the villains are mostly Caucasians. In other words, they are un-American because they are communists, not because of their skin color or racial origin. This reflected a new Cold War trend in film making that played off fears of “reds under the bed,” the McCarthy hearings, blacklists, and paranoia about foreigners. These villains are involved in a plot to disrupt shipping and stop supplies to U.S. troops fighting the Korean War. Their methods are both modern and devious: they plan to use not only labor disputes, but also bacteriological warfare spread by rats. Such imagery could only remind the viewing audience of earlier dehumanizing propaganda about the Japanese. The plot had no basis in fact, of course, but it did play off irrational fears about labor unions such as the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, and economic strikes such as the sugar workers’ strike of 1946, a pineapple workers’ strike of 1947, and an ILWU strike of 1949. Of the 1946 strike, one labor union leader stated, “This victory makes Hawaii part of the United States for all Hawaiians, especially the workers. It is no longer a feudal colony” (Kent, 135). The ILWU was, in fact, expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) for alleged communist activities, in what was more of a power struggle than a genuine anti-communist witch hunt. In April 1950 the House Committee on Un-American Activities conducted hearings on supposed communist activities in Hawai‘i and in 1951, the year before the release of *Big Jim McLain*, a
celebrated trail of suspected communists dubbed the “Hawaii Seven” made international headlines (Takaki, *Strangers*, 406-411; Kent, 137).

Wayne’s mission, like that of the American Legion and other patriotic organizations and business interests through the years, was to find what or who was un-American, and to eliminate it, thus drawing Hawai‘i even closer into the American fold. For example, *haole* business interests, including local newspapers, painted the plantation workers’ strike of 1920 as race based and not class based in order to demonize the Japanese and raise fear among *haoles*. Their were two ideologies at work: the first was practical in that it suited Hawai‘i’s ruling elite not to encourage the locals to think in class terms as that could lead to pan-ethnic and pan-racial working classes uniting together to pose a threat against the elites. However, by the 1950s, when genuine race-based politics emerged in the form of Japanese voting as a group in their struggle for equality, it became more suitable for the elites to blame worker unrest on communist infiltrators to counter this new threat. In short, class-based politics superceded race-based politics as that was seen as a way of keeping the locals in their place. Traditional methods of “restoring order” through the police and military could then continue to be utilized without the obvious racial overtones that were becoming increasingly unacceptable after the social upheaval caused by World War Two. Waving the “Stars and Stripes” and labeling enemies as un-America was a primary method of “keeping order,” a euphemistic phrase that meant, in reality, maintaining control. *Big Jim McLain* is a work of propaganda that perpetuates these ideas.

The movie tries to dispose of earlier stereotypes about Hawai‘i as backward and rural. For example, unlike earlier movies in which travelers arrive on ships and alight at
the Aloha Tower dock, Wayne travels in a state of the art commercial jet and arrives at
the newly built Honolulu International Airport. There are no native urchins on view
begging for coins as in Hawaii Calls. Instead there are carefully orchestrated hula girls to
welcome tourists with *leis*. When Wayne and Baxter arrive at their duplex, Baxter
displays more modern technology when he sets up a listening device to spy on the
occupants of the next apartment. That the occupants are honeymooners adds to the well-
worn theme of titillation and male-gaze voyeurism of this genre of movies. However,
Wayne’s comment to Baxter, “Who do you think we’re working for – Dr. Kinsey,” adds
to the modern “cutting edge” feel of the movie. Professor Alfred Kinsey produced the
Kinsey Reports on male and female sexuality that revolutionized how Americans think
about sex (Montague & Matson, 33-36). Later we are told that the contents of a suspect’s
luggage are “microscopically photographed,” and that “The security agencies have been
listening to some very interesting conversations.” This information not only conveys that
the security services are on top of the communist problem, but also illustrates that all the
modern technological resources of America in the 1950s are also available in Hawai‘i.

Unlike earlier films, evident in *Big Jim McLain* are a contemporary, tiled hospital
(the Kalaupapa Settlement for Hansen’s disease victims), a psychiatric hospital, a modern
doctor’s office, and the clean, tourist-filled Royal Hawaiian Hotel. As well as the native
outrigger canoes of *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1933) and many other early movies, in *Big Jim
McLain* we also have scenes set at the Outrigger Canoe Club, where modern American
yachts seem to predominate. Furthermore, in mentioning that she “attends a course of
lectures at the university on Saturdays,” Wayne’s love interest, Nancy Olson (actress
Nancy Vallon) subtly reminds the audience that Hawai‘i is no longer the culturally
"backward" island of earlier movies and is now a modern, sophisticated state like any other.

The movie contains many trappings of militarism: Olsen’s husband was a Navy carrier pilot killed on a mission. Wayne states "My partner...hates these people, they shot at him in Korea." Wayne also mentions that he spent time in uniform, “island hopping” with the Marines: He states, “It's like when I was in uniform. I shot at the guy on the other side of the perimeter 'cause he was the enemy." The two agents also take a trip to the wreck of the battleship Arizona, which stirs memories of the Pearl Harbor attack and allows the movie and the U.S. Navy to display the power and trappings of the American fleet. To further this Americanism, the accompanying music is “Anchors Away,” one of a number of patriotic or militaristic anthems in the movie.

Like no other film before or since, Big Jim McLain reverses the role of invader and invader, or colonist and native. A prime example of this is the movie’s portrayal of the Honolulu Police Department, which is very different to how the HPD was viewed before World War Two. For example, in the 1930s during the infamous Massie rape case, island haoles, the military, and mainland newspaper and political interests criticized the Honolulu Police Department as corrupt and prejudiced against Caucasians. Most Honolulu policemen were Native Hawaiians. As with many police departments across America, bribes and kickbacks were common. There was a great deal of political interference in police matters and also some racial factions that were exposed and exacerbated by this case (Daws, 329). There were not many rape cases in Hawai‘i, and the alleged rape of a prominent haole woman was, therefore, a considerable event. The fact that the accused were non-Caucasian opened up many of the racial prejudices that
Caucasians had about the inability of colored people to control their sexual urges, and about the ability of a colored police force to protect Caucasian women or to effectively prosecute accused rapists.

The Honolulu Police Department did make mistakes: they had convenient suspects and in the face of political and military pressure for quick justice, they made little attempt to explore any other line of investigation. There was no evidence to place the accused at the scene of the crime, and the only basis of the case was the victim's contradictory accusations. When the alleged victim's husband, naval officer Tommy Massie, and two other sailors subsequently kidnapped, interrogated, murdered, and then tried to hide the body of defendant Joe Kahahawai, Admiral William Pratt, Chief of Naval operations in Washington, excused the murder and criticized the police. Pratt said, "they have taken the law into their own hands repeatedly when they felt the law had failed to do justice" (Wright, 194). Just two decades later, in Big Jim McLain, Wayne assures the audience that the Honolulu Police Department "rates A1 on an FBI list of municipal police departments." This image is reinforced by actor Dan Liu's competent and assured performance as the Chief of Police who, at the end of the movie, rescues Wayne from a beating and probably death at the hands of a communist gang.

As for the native population of Hawaiʻi, gone are earlier images of bare-breasted warriors as in South of Pago Pago (1940), topless hula-dancers like Delores Del Rio in Bird of Paradise (1932) or the more modest but still sexy Clara Bow, with her naval showing in Hula (1927). Instead we have native men in Aloha shirts, long pants or a suit and tie, and female hula dancers dressed conservatively with their midriffs covered, who include in their troupe, cute children providing wholesome "nuclear family"
entertainment. All of the natives have a *hapa-haole* look, and there are no really dark-skinned actors on display. There are no inter-racial romances for the lead characters, and only one example of this in the whole film - a minor character *haole* married to a briefly glimpsed Japanese woman. Indeed, the color white dominates in this movie, whether it is the white of sailors' uniforms, the "whiter-than-white" motives of Wayne and Baxter, or the Caucasian actors who play virtually all of the lead character roles. For example, Madge (Veda Ann Borg), a loud *haole* woman tells Wayne "I wanna show you how we *kamaainas* live" as she takes him to both the Royal Hawaiian Hotel and a restaurant whose patrons are predominantly *haole* also. Madge's contention that she is a *kamaaina*, a "child of the land," reverses the role of native and interloper, and is a common appropriation of both Hawaiian culture and political rights.

Even the Japanese are recruited into this reversal: while many suspects in the "sneak attack" murder of Baxter are Japanese, it is clear in the movie that the Japanese community has already been recruited as an American ally in the Cold War. Engelhardt states, "With remarkable speed in the immediate postwar years, three enemy nations, Germany, Japan, and Italy, became 'Free World' allies" (58), more like "us" and less like "them." For example, when a communist complains that Wayne attacked him without provocation, Police Chief Dan Liu states, "We all have provocation to attack you, [we're] all Americans." Similarly, the Japanese wife of communist spy Willie Namaka is portrayed sympathetically and now works as a nurse on a leper colony to atone for her earlier communist leanings. Like the old Japanese priest at a Shinto temple, Mrs. Namaka volunteers information willingly, as in the film's narrative all loyal "Americans" should. Just eight years earlier, John Ford in *December 7* was using these very same images to
suggest the foreign, un-American nature of the Japanese in Hawai‘i. In a final bizarre twist, a Polish immigrant who has immigrated to the islands tells Wayne, “I came here to the West Coast,” thus moving Hawai‘i thousands of miles east, and closer to America.

*Big Jim McLain* begins with the question, "Neighbor, how stands the Union?" and ends with Wayne’s patriotic affirmation “There stands the Union” as row after row of U.S. troops file onto troop ships on their way, presumably, to Korea. In this instance “The Union” retains its traditional meaning but also signifies that the union of the United States and Hawai‘i has been solidified. There is no escaping that conclusion given the very deliberate setting of the story in the islands, how the movie recruits Japanese Americans into Cold War allies, and with the references to World War Two and Pearl Harbor attack. When U.S. naval personnel raise the Stars and Stripes over the sunken Arizona, it is a symbolic but very clear statement of ownership over the islands. This theme of togetherness is evidenced by Wayne’s violent attack on a communist which is sparked by the villain’s racist comment, “Choppin’ cotton is for white trash and niggers.” Wayne thus defends the honor of African-Americans in an attempt to recruit them also into the battle against communism, a “battle” which was in actuality the superficial face of attempts by American elites to maintain social control over the increasingly rebellious American working class and various racial and ethnic groups. (The recurring image in movies and documentaries of African-American Dorrie Miller, a mess boy who won the Navy Cross for valor at Pearl Harbor, also attests to the efficacy of this propaganda effort. Forgotten in this effort to portray African-Americans as equal citizens in the battle against totalitarianism is the fact that the U.S. military was segregated and deeply racist) (Takaki, *Double Victory*, 22-23: Dunne, 46-54).
From Here to Eternity (1953)

*From Here to Eternity* is based on James Jones' controversial novel of the same name. The novel was, in fact, too controversial to be translated directly to screen and a toned-down screenplay by Daniel Taradash was used instead. The movie starred Burt Lancaster as first Sergeant Milton Warden, Ernest Borgnine as "Fatso" Judson, Montgomery Clift as Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt, Frank Sinatra as Private Angelo Maggio, Donna Reed as Lorene, Deborah Kerr as Karen Holmes, and Philip Ober as Captain Dana Holmes. Directed by Fred Zinnemann, *From Here to Eternity* was nominated for thirteen Academy Awards of which it won eight.

Set in Schofield Barracks just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, *From Here to Eternity* examines the relationships of two soldiers and their women. Sergeant Warden pursues a dangerous relationship with his Commanding Officer's wife Karen Holmes risking court martial, and Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt (or "Prew") falls in love with Lorene, a "hostess" in a Honolulu private club called the New Congress Club. Obviously the inference here is that Lorene is a prostitute and the club a brothel. However, this type of explicit subject matter was considered too risky for inclusion in a movie in 1953 and the roles were, consequently, toned down.

Neither of these relationships are the typical clean-cut affairs that one might expect, however. There are some subdued gray areas regarding prostitution, adultery, abuse, and drunkenness -- not what audiences had come to expect from Hollywood's mythical Hawai'i. The Apollo [Movie] Guide states "While it's set on the eve of the Pearl Harbor invasion, *From Here To Eternity* has less to do with the Second World War than it does with the stress of social change -- something that was jump-started by the onset of
war.” Social change in *America*, that is. The movie is not about Hawai‘i as such. It is, instead, a very conservative and macho movie that serves to reinforce traditional social structures both within the U.S. military and more widely in America as a whole. Critic Brandon French states “In Zinnemann’s movie, American society, the capitalist economy, and various social institutions—such as marriage, motherhood, and the Army—are taken off the hook. There may be a bad marriage, or a corrupt officer or two, but the basic structures are sound” (56). *From Here To Eternity* thus serves to reinforce traditional American values using Hawai‘i as a backdrop and Pearl Harbor as a rallying call for Americans (and Hawaiians) to forget their personal problems and rally behind the flag.

Despite this, the U.S. Army is not shown in quite the heroic, patriotic fashion that one might expect of a 1953 film (released during the Korean conflict) that deals with events in Pearl Harbor. We find out that Prewitt asked for a transfer to “G” Company because, although he was the best bugler in his previous post at Fort Shafter, his Commanding Officer replaced him with a personal favorite. In the first five minutes of the film therefore, the audience is told that something is not quite right. Then Prewitt is asked by his new Commanding Officer to take up regimental boxing again even though Prewitt had retired from the sport after accidentally blinding a close friend. When Prewitt refuses, his Commanding Officer orders members of the boxing team to make life difficult for him. Prewitt is given constant KP (kitchen patrol) and is confined to camp. Here the Army is shown to be brutal and unjust. This theme would have resonated with many veterans, especially the unflattering portrayal of the officer class. However, these plot twists are, one feels, half-hearted residues of the stronger, more critical elements of
Jones’s novel. For example, in the movie, Captain Holmes is disgraced when his superiors discover how he treats his men. In the novel, however, his superiors reward Holmes for that very same treatment.

The movie also omits the racial issues present in the novel and in the military. For example, in the novel Prew says to Violet, “Why in hell would I marry you? Have a raft of snot-nosed nigger brats? Be a goddam squawman and work in the goddam pineapple fields for the rest of my life? Or drive a Schofield taxi? Why the hell do you think I got in the Army? Because I didn’t want to sweat my heart and pride out in a goddam coalmine all my life and have a ratf of snot-nosed brats who look like niggers in the coaldirt” (112). Prew’s reluctance to marry a non-Caucasian was also fueled by examples of disastrous inter-racial match-ups. For example, Jones describes Prew’s views on “Dhom, the G Company duty sergeant, bald and massive and harassed, crossed his eyes, trailed by his fat sloppy Filipino wife and seven half-caste brats; no wonder Dhom was a bully, condemned to spend his life in foreign service like an exile because he had a Filipino wife” (111). These scenes and viewpoints are entirely omitted from the movie, as are virtually all references to race and racism in the military or in Hawai‘i. *Variety* states, “The bawdy vulgarity and the outhouse vocabulary, the pros and non-pros among its easy ladies, and the slambang indictment of Army brass have not been emasculated in the transfer to the screen, but are certainly shown in much better taste for consumption by a broader audience.” *The New York Times* also praises the movie’s “job of editing, emending, re-arranging and purifying a volume bristling with brutality and obscenities,” which made the movie “a shining example of truly professional moviemaking.”
These racial and sexual omissions make *From Here To Eternity* distinct from earlier movies that focus on these very themes to attract viewers. The movie hides racial difference and smooths over Honolulu’s sex industry and the military’s role in it. There is a long history of prostitution in Hawai‘i going back at least as far as Cook (Tabrah, 18-20). However, even the scale of prostitution during Hawai‘i’s whaling boom in the nineteenth century, when 600 ships a year docked in Honolulu, paled in comparison to the officially authorized (although also officially illegal) vice trade during World War Two. Before the war, the Honolulu Police Department “regulated” prostitution and treated vice girls with a mixture of contempt, violence and uneasy tolerance. During the war, prostitution was extended because it was seen both as a safety valve for frustrated servicemen and as a way of regulating sexually transmitted diseases. Prostitutes were each “servicing” up to 100 soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilians war workers per day (Bailey and Farber, 100). On any particular day on Hotel Street over 30,000 servicemen killed time. As many as 250,000 soldiers per month paid for the services of the 250 prostitutes available (Bailey and Farber, 95). When, in April 1942, the Honolulu police threatened a crackdown, the military, which by now held the real power in Hawai‘i under the terms of martial law, firmly ordered the police to ease off. This caused friction between the two organizations and, for a time, both forces worked against each other with regard to imposing law and rules on prostitutes.

The girls themselves were caught in the middle of this struggle for power and, increasingly frustrated, they went on strike! They picketed police headquarters for nearly three weeks before General Emmons and police Chief Gabrielson came to a compromise agreement - the police allowed prostitutes to live and travel outside Hotel Street and the
military took over the responsibility of ensuring that prostitutes kept their regular medical appointments and that brothels remained clean and sanitary (Bailey and Farber, 124). Clearly Hawaiʻi’s sex trade that so attracted early moviemakers and, in World War Two, was officially sanctioned by the U.S. military, marked Hawaiʻi as different. To sailors, soldiers, airmen, and tourists, Hawaiʻi represented a place other than America, a place where sex was readily available and inter-racial sex possible. When From Here To Eternity sanitizes or omits altogether these facts, it makes Hawaiʻi less out of the ordinary and unusual, and instead transforms it into just another American community with everyday American problems.

The movie focuses not on the exoticism of Hawaiʻi or Hawaiians but instead on issues that a mainland audience could identify with, particularly class differences between military ranks and what it means to be a man. In contrast to Captain Holmes, Sergeant Milton Warden earns the accolade from a colleague as “the best soldier I ever saw.” Furthermore, we learn that unlike Holmes, Warden is a combat veteran. This is important as many war films use combat experience as a “rite of passage” into manhood. Holmes is, therefore, not a real man and the problems he has with his wife reflect this. On the other hand, Warden’s successfully courts Holmes’ wife. The fact that it is done in secret makes Holmes look even more the cuckold. Warden does not like Holmes’ treatment of Prewitt. He convinces Holmes not to court martial him and to give him KP duty instead. Warden does this even though he knows that Prewitt will blame him rather than Holmes. Furthermore, Warden’s role as the alpha male is reinforced when he breaks up a fight between the brutal Judson and Prewitt’s friend Private Angelo Maggio. Warden forces Judson to back down in front of a crowd and then reminds everyone of his combat
experience when he dismisses both Judson and Maggio for knowing nothing about fighting. The difference between Warden and Holmes is, in one way, based on class division. Any enlisted man watching the movie would recognize the high-handed, arrogant traits of Holmes. As historian Howard Zinn notes,

The literature that followed World War II, James Jones’s *From here to Eternity*, Joseph Heller’s *Catch-22*, and Norman mailer’s *The Naked and the Dead*, captured the GI anger against the army “brass.” In *The Naked and the Dead*, the soldiers talk in battle, and one of them says...“There ain’t a good officer in the world.” (306)

Like Prewitt, Maggio’s role in the film is to demonstrate the injustice of life in the Army. He is forced to do guard duty when he should have been on a weekend pass. He goes AWOL and states, “Can’t a man put his lousy hands in his lousy pockets in the street? I ain’t no criminal. I ain’t no coward.” He is quickly arrested and sentenced to six months in the Stockade under supervision of the sadistic Judson. Even pragmatist and career soldier Warden recognizes the injustice of the system. He tells Prewitt, “Life’s crummy. Miserable.” He warns him also not to be a loner as, “Maybe back in the days of the pioneers a man could go his own way. But today you gotta play ball.” Just as the Office of War Information asked Americans to come together for the war effort, Warden reminds potential loners that the days of the rugged individual are over and that everyone must now pull together for America.

Maggio escapes after being beaten on a daily basis by Judson. However, Maggio dies from injuries inflicted during the escape. Judson pays for his brutality however when Prewitt corners him in an alleyway and stabs him to death with his own knife. In a sense, Prewitt is forced into this action and the audience is thus invited to show understanding. However, within the system established in the film, Prewitt will face a court martial and
perhaps death. He goes AWOL and Sergeant Warden covers up his absence. Events overtake both men. The Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and in an attempt to return to his Company, Prewitt is mistaken for a saboteur and killed. Warden fulfills his destiny as “super soldier” by downing a Japanese “Zero” with a machine gun and the tensions within the military disappear as everyone comes together to fight the common foe.

The resolution of both men’s relationships with their women is interesting. Warden, a heroic “everyman” hates the Officer class. However, to continue his relationship with Karen Holmes he will have to apply to the Officer Corps. In the end he cannot escape his destiny. He will go on to fight the Japanese and win the war. She will return to the mainland alone. Prewitt asks Lorene to marry him. However, she makes it clear that she does not want to marry a soldier. She wants enough money to return to Oregon, build a house and look after her mother. She wants a “proper” life as she says through gritted teeth, “When you’re proper you’re safe.” However, when Prewitt tells her he is returning to his Company, she predictably relents and pleads that she will marry him. In the end we never get to find out if she has earned enough to fulfill her dreams. The inference is that she has not. In terms of the film, like Karen Holmes she is “damaged goods.” Whereas Warden is a hero and Prewitt dies a tragic hero - “He loved the Army more than any soldier I ever knew” eulogizes Warden – both of the women are left with an uncertain and probably painful future.

It is unfortunate that the theme of injustice in the Army is undermined largely in the last portion of the movie. We learn that the Inspector general’s Office has investigated Captain Holmes’ persecution of Prewitt and the Captain is forced to resign or face court martial. Similarly, Prewitt’s patriotism leads him to forget about past
injustice in the Army. When Lorene asks him why, he replies, “What do I want to go
back into the Army for? I’m a soldier.” Despite everything, he believes that the Army
will take care of him. Besides, there's a war to fight with the Japs. He states, “They’re
pickin’ trouble with the best Army in the world.”

*From Here to Eternity* has been praised for how successfully it evokes the sense
of Hawai‘i in pre-war days. Such praise is deserved to the extent that the military scenes
ring true. However, despite references to Kaneohe, the Kalakaua Inn, the Royal Hawaiian
Hotel, and Kuhio Beach Park, and apart from the occasional Hawaiian or Chinaman
appearing as a waitress or passer-by, it is difficult to tell whether this is Hawai‘i or
California. There is the occasional glimpse of Hawai‘i, such as a Hawaiian band playing
in a restaurant, but even with the film’s music the predominant song played throughout is
“Re-enlistment Blues,” sung by a Caucasian soldier. Neither does this movie feature the
exotic scenery of earlier movies. Most of the action takes place inside Schofield Barracks
or in Honolulu. Only one scene - Lancaster and Kerr’s memorable romp at Kuhio Beach
Park - reminds viewers of the exotic. This scene, described by French as “one of the most
famous moments in the history of American film” (48), overshadows the rest of the
movie. While the audience remembers the exotic beauty of Hawai‘i and the passion of
the participants, this one memorable scene tends to deflect attention away from the rest of
the *mis en scene*, which is anything but exotic or different to a movie that could have
been staged on any military base on the mainland United States.

**Hawai‘i as Racial Paradigm**

An enduring image of Hawai‘i and the South Seas is that of welcoming, sexually
available natives who inhabit warm, feminized, welcoming islands. These thematic
elements are present in every period of Hawai‘i’s cinematic history. In *Ma and Pa Kettle in Waikiki* (1955), for example, one character states “Hawaii Waikiki, palms swaying in the moonlight. Oh it’s just too romantic and wonderful.” In *Mister Roberts* (1955), joyous natives sing and cavort as they row out towards actor Henry Fonda’s ship, causing Fonda to remark, “the natives are noted for their congeniality and hospitality.” Although this scene is set in the mythical “liberty” port of Elysium, the Greek heavenly paradise, it is typical of the mythological Hollywood Polynesia that is projected into the American consciousness. If it was an overstatement that “Everybody wants to go to Hawai‘i” as actor James Darren states in *Gidget Goes Hawaiian* (1961) it is certainly true that Hollywood, with its constant images of half-dressed natives and soundtracks of romantic songs, was doing its very best to promote Hawai‘i as an idyllic, welcoming paradise.

In the late 1950s and 1960s these invented traits served as background for the type of inter-racial romances that had disappeared from this genre of movies decades before. In the early era of cinema, many films about Hawai‘i or the South Seas featured inter-racial romances. As Wood notes, many of these movies include female Hawaiians of Royal ancestry who fall in love with the flotsam and jetsam of Westerners who wash up on Hawai‘i’s shores: “The films suggest that Hawaiian women of such esteemed blood are worthy of the average American Davids and Keiths who pursue them. The dangers inherent in racial mixing are at the heart of these films, but they include acknowledgement of the possibility that these dangers can be surmounted if the Native is royal” (113). Wood’s observation that, by the 1930s, “racial mixing had become unequivocally unacceptable. When the racially tolerant *Aloha Oe* was remade as *Aloha* in 1931, the notion of a successful racial intermarriage was no longer offered in the final
reel” (113), is only partially true. Wood deals specifically with movies about Hawai‘i. However, a broader analysis of movies about the “South Seas” reveals that Never the Twain Shall Meet (1931), Bird of Paradise (1932), White Heat (1934), and South of Pago Pago (1940) all feature “race mixing.” However, there were certainly less movies featuring inter racial romances in the 1930s than in the decades before.

This trend was reinforced by the Pearl Harbor attack, as it seemed that proof now existed that those deemed “foreign” (the Japanese), or “different” (brown-skinned Hawaiians), were as dangerous and devious as we had always been led to believe. In the movies, the disappearance of inter-racial romance continued throughout the 1940s and into the mid-1950s. However, as the Brown Supreme Court judgment began gradually to effect changes in American society, partially in the late 1950s and more extensively in the 1960s, the theme of interracial romance again began to permeate Hollywood’s Hawai‘i movies. While Caucasian characters remain foregrounded in these movies, and familiar stereotypes remain in portrayals of non-whites, the dramas and melodramas of inter-racial relationships began to reappear.

Enchanted Island (1958) is based loosely on Herman Melville’s novel Typee. In the novel, Tom, a thinly-disguised Melville, blames the natives for their own downfall. For example, in Tahiti the “voluptuous character of these people” and their lack of marriage ties led to sexually transmitted diseases that “visited them like a plague, sweeping them off by the hundreds” (217). Clearly, according to Melville, Westerners cannot be held responsible for controlling their lusts when the Natives insist in flaunting their naked sexuality in such ways. Enchanted Island emulates this assuagement of guilt. The crew of a whaling ship land in the Marquesas Islands where they are greeted by
beautiful, scantily clad native women. When their puritanical Captain orders them back to the ship, Abner Bedford (Dana Andrews) refuses. A fight ensues and Bedford and another sailor, Tom (Don Dubbins), run off into the undergrowth. After a short time, friendly natives take in the sailors. Soon, Tom begins a passionate relationship with a beautiful native girl called Fayaway (Jane Powell). As in *White Shadows in the South Seas*, a Caucasian actress portrays Fayaway. John Cutts calls Powell “the most unlikely blue-eyed Polynesian yet, with her maidenform bra always clearly visible beneath her Saks sarong” (Reyes & Rampell, 298).

The sailors begin to suspect that the Typee are cannibals. When Tom disappears, and natives are seen wearing items of his clothing, Bedford turns away from Fayaway in disgust, believing her to have covered up Tom’s grisly death. However, he overcomes these feelings, realizing that he should not judge the Typee’s customs, even if they appear abhorrent. Eventually, however, Fayaway and Bedford flee the Typee. Fayaway pays the price for her interracial romance when she is speared by the tribe’s medicine man. Bedford, however, returns to the ship from which he fled and is, for some unexplained reason, promoted to first officer.

The novelty of interracial romance in *Enchanted Island* is lessened somewhat by this genre’s traditional custom of employing a non-native actress in the role of a native. As in earlier movies, the audience is more accepting of miscegenation if the native does not display the physical characteristics of the supposedly inferior race. Nevertheless, unlike most movies about Hawai‘i or the South Seas made between 1941 and the mid-1950s, an interracial romance does at least occur. It may well be that in the racially aware atmosphere of the post-*Brown* era, Warner Brothers chose for that reason to release a
movie based on a book that is considered in some quarters to be sympathetic to natives and non-judgmental about inter racial romance.

In *Mutiny on the Bounty* (1962), a Tahitian native girl called Māimīti (actress Taritātumi Teraipaia) falls in love with a British Naval officer, Fletcher Christian (Marlon Brando). The manner in which Christian abandons the girl is described as “casual condescension” by a New York Times reviewer, whose own prejudice is obvious as he then states, “The only vindication of this is that the girl...is beautiful but dull.” The fact that the main love interest for Christian, native girl Māimīti, is played by a real-life Polynesian woman is a significant change in direction for Hollywood. Luis Reyes states, “The producers felt from the start that a pure Polynesian should be selected to portray Māimīti...After an exhaustive search that covered several South Pacific islands and interviews with more than 200 girls, Tarita, a dark-haired 19-year-old dancer from the island of Bora Bora was chosen” (Reyes & Rampell, 214). In countless previous movies, native girls that have sexual or romantic relationships with Western men are played by non-native substitutes. Sometimes these actresses are obviously Caucasian, such as Dorothy Lamour in *Aloma of the South Seas* (1941), and sometimes they have the *hapa-haole* look and are played by Central or South American actresses such as Raquel Torres in *White Shadows in the South Seas* and Rita Moreno in *Pagan Love Song* (1950). It is perhaps because of the changing racial climate of the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s that *Mutiny on the Bounty*’s promoters made such efforts to cast a genuine, dark-skinned native to play the role of an indigenous person.

That *Enchanted Island* and *Mutiny on the Bounty* are set in the historical past is perhaps a sign that Hollywood was still, however, treading carefully in the area of inter
racial romance. These movies did not cause race riots, or upset the social order, a fact that seems to have emboldened filmmakers. Most movies from this point on feature contemporary Hawai‘i, instead of historical Hawai‘i, and persist with the theme of miscegenation. For example, *Gidget Goes Hawaiian* is a contemporary movie and an advertisement for Hawai‘i’s the tourist industry in 1961. While the movie is primarily about the romantic antics of a group of Caucasian American tourists, in one scene Gidget (Deborah Valley) surfs with a muscular, dark-skinned Native Hawaiian man. There is a sexual edge to their frolics: at one point Gidget kneels on all fours at the front of a surfboard as the Hawaiian puts his head between her legs to lift her onto his shoulders. This scene is a carbon copy of the real-life frolics of female Caucasian tourists with native beach boys in the 1930s. One Waikiki beachboy recalled a conversation with an American tourist in which she said “When I was nineteen, you took me in tandem. Can you imagine what it was like for me, going to a Catholic school on the mainland, to have a man take me surfing? To sit on top of me, on the back of my legs. The thrill I had. Skin to skin” (Desmond, 126). That night, Gidget’s boyfriend Moondoggie (James Darren) sings a song that seems to be an ode to inter-racial romance:

You hear the native boys all sighing, down on Mauna Loa Bay
Cause when the Gidget goes Hawaiian, she goes Hawaiian all the way.
Now there’s a rumor on the island, she flirts with every passer-by,
Cause when the Gidget goes Hawaiian, she catches each Hawaiians eye.

A trio of Elvis Presley movies - *Blue Hawaii* (1961), *Girls, Girls, Girls!* (1962), and *Paradise Hawaiian Style* (1966) - is also set in contemporary Hawai‘i. *Blue Hawaii*, the only movie of the trio of any note, features Presley as haole Chad Gates. Like the character White Almond Flower in *The Idol Dancer*, who had “the blood of vivacious France, inscrutable Java and languorous Samoa” running through her veins, Presley’s
girlfriend Maile Duvall (Joan Blackman) is half-Hawaiian and half-French. However, when she states, “My French blood tells me to argue with you and my Hawaiian blood tells me not to. They’re really battling it out inside me,” she is reversing the stereotype of early movies in the genre. For example, in The Idol Dancer it is White Almond Flower’s French blood that makes her “civilized” and keeps her base “native” desires under control. In Blue Hawaii, however, Duvall’s French side is problematic, while her Hawaiian blood supposedly gives her the welcoming, friendly characteristics that make her a personification of a contemporary, tourist-friendly Hawai’i.

Floyd Matson notes that the movie “trotted out nearly every confused stereotype of ‘island’ life and culture that had accumulated through the career of the South Sea syndrome” (40). The plot of Blue Hawaii is indeed lightweight and predictable. The movie’s racial themes are, however, worthy of note. Houston Wood states, rather harshly, “In being associated with another racial minority...Elvis was but expanding the role he was already playing in sanitizing African American rhythm and blues to make it acceptable for a wider, racist, white American audience” (108). While this may be true to an extent, to label all Americans “racist” in this period is an exaggeration. Caucasian performers such as Presley, Buddy Holly, and Bill Haley did indeed copy those elements of African American music that made it exciting and attractive. And it is certainly true that many music companies benefited financially at the expense of African American performers. However, these white artists were talented in their own right. Holly directly influenced much of the early work of The Beatles, for example.

An argument can be made that although African American artists were initially exploited, artists such as Holly and Presley opened the doors of the music industry for
many later talented African American performers. In Dangerous Crossroads, George Lipsitz argues that, “White Americans have demonstrated many times a pathological need to control, contain, and even take credit for Black culture” (54). However, he notes also Presley’s influence on Japanese musicians (14), Punjabi Indian musician Steve Kapur (15), Hispanic artist Baldemar Huerta (64-65), Australian aboriginal artist Dougie Young (143), and French-Canadian singer Diane Dufresne (149). This seems to prove that while Presley appropriated facets of African American music, this was a “two-way-street” as his music crossed cultures. Inter racial romance in Blue Hawaii was an early “first step” for Hollywood in the 1960s that would lead directly to the first inter-racial kiss between a European-American and an African-American on American television, between Captain James Kirk (William Shatner) and Uhura (Nichelle Nichols) in a 1968 episode of Star Trek entitled "Plato's Stepchildren."

Midway (1976) is an account of the 1942 battle that turned the tide of the war in the Pacific in America’s favor. The movie mixes actual war footage with staged battles, and also “borrows” scenes from another war movie entitled Tora! Tora! Tora! Midway is male-dominated and action-driven. Some of the most well known male actors of the “Greatest Generation” star, including Charlton Heston, Henry Fonda, Glenn Ford, James Coburn and Robert Mitchum. To balance this over-abundance of testosterone, a subplot has Heston’s son Ensign Tom Garth (Edward Albert) engaged to a Japanese-American girl called Haruko Sakura (Christina Kokubo). To add to the melodrama, Kokubo is a suspected spy and her parents are soon to be shipped to an internment camp on the United States mainland. Heston wrestles with his conscience about whether to help his possible
future daughter-in-law. Eventually he decides to call in favors with military intelligence and she is released.

Although Variety calls this a “phony subplot,” this is more than a simple plot diversion. The context of this movie, made twenty-five years after the Pearl Harbor attack, was both ongoing Cold War animosities and a triumphant reminder of the values of America in the post-Vietnam War era. Like its predecessor Tora! Tora! Tora!, Midway allots significant portions of the movie to show the Japanese side of the battle. Neither do these movies feature racially demeaning stereotypes of the Japanese, as had many previous Pacific war movies. While this is laudable, of course, both of these movies focus only on battle, and neglect to provide any social, political or historical context. There is no discussion in the movie of, for example, the prelude to war or of the subsequent American response that ended at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, Midway reminds its audience that the atomic bombings were justified and that Hiroshima was a legitimate military target. On three separate occasions, the film connects the Japanese military to Hiroshima by use of subtitles. Not only is it where Admiral Yamamoto resides, the movie narrates, the Japanese Navy also leaves from Hiroshima Bay to attack Midway Island.

By focusing only on displays of military hardware, battle and heroism, these movies tell a depoliticized, deracialized version of the war. For example, when a Japanese Admiral empathizes with a destroyed squadron of American planes and their “fourteen brave crews” who died like “our Samurai,” the very real racial hatred felt by both sides in the conflict is erased from history. In fact, no one hates anyone in this movie, and war is portrayed as a passionless exercise conducted by masculine men just “doing their jobs.” Lack of context means expunging also Japanese imperialism and
events such as the “Rape of Nanking” in 1937 when perhaps as many as 200,000 Chinese lost their lives (Dower, 43). This movie is very much a product of its time. In the post-World War Two years Japan was an ally of the United States: cinematic reminders of Japanese military barbarity would have been an unwelcome distraction from the Manichean Cold War narratives of good/bad, communist/democratic, red/red, white and blue that the U.S. government encouraged in the cinema and media. In these films it was now acceptable to show the Japanese military as professional and brave. David Desser notes,

It was not until after the war that the United States could undertake a reconsideration of its opponents. Thus we find, years later, films that attempt to separate the Wehrmacht officer from his Nazi superiors, with such figures as Erwin Rommel emerging as ambiguously tragic heroes. And although it is significant in terms of how racism found its way into the Vietnam era, and into Vietnam War films, that we find more portrayals, more personifications, of our European former antagonists than our Asian enemies, we can still point to such films as *Hell in the Pacific* (1968), *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970), *Midway* (1976), and even the more recent *Farewell to the King* (1989) as endowing some human subjectivity to the Asian objects of America’s aggression and blood-lust. (87)

When at the end of the movie Henry Fonda asks, “Were we better than the Japanese or just luckier,” *Midway* is non-judgmental and instead lets its audience answer the question.

The interracial love affair in the film needs, therefore, to be seen in the context of the Cold War. Americans and the Japanese were allied against the Soviet Union and in *Midway* issues such as the unjust internment of over a thousand Japanese-Americans in Hawai‘i are whitewashed and sanitized. The internment camp looks more like a community center than a prison, and Kokubo’s parents are docile and respectful towards Americans. Kokubo has the only raised voice of resistance and anger. She states, “Damn it, I’m an American! What makes us different from Italian-Americans or German-Americans?” The answer is racism, of course. However, Heston replies, “Pearl Harbor, I
suppose," thus excusing Americans from blame for internment by making it seem a
"natural" reaction. *Midway*'s American audience had been preconditioned to accept such
a sleight-of-hand by years of exposure to "sneak attack" narratives about Pearl Harbor.

In the post-Vietnam era, the theme of reconciliation – healing a divided nation –
was prevalent in all aspects of American life. The American people elected as President
Jimmy Carter, a relatively unknown Washington outsider, untainted by the Vietnam War
or political scandals, partly on his promise to heal America's wounds. In the movies, the
main characters in *The Deer Hunter* (1978) sing a unifying, patriotic anthem, "God Bless
America," in the film's climactic scene. Director Michael Cimino intended the movie to
be a unifying force. Film critic Gilbert Adair states, for example, Cimino's intentions
were...to restore his audience's confidence in their country's regenerative powers" (90).
The interracial relationship in *Midway* also serves as a healing act. In Vietnam,
Americans waged war on an Asian people. However, in *Midway*, the audience is
reminded of the compassionate nature of Americans. Heston calls in favors and puts his
career on the line to free Kokubo. The internment policy is portrayed as, at worst, an
understandable precaution, and compassionate Americans in authority like Heston allow
the love affair between Kokubo and Albert to blossom, thus healing the wounds caused
by war.

**Conclusion**

Cinema, like all other forms of media in a technological society, acts on a number
of different levels. It is a form of art, it can provide information, it can be mindless
escapism, but it can also act as a tool of propaganda for the dominant forces in any
society. Jacques Ellul argues that Americans are particularly vulnerable to manipulation
because of their reliance on, and constant exposure to, the mass media for information.

He states:

all modern mass propaganda profits from the structure of the mass, but exploits the individual’s need for self-affirmation; and the two actions must be conducted jointly, simultaneously. Of course this operation is greatly facilitated by the existence of the modern mass media of communication, which has precisely this remarkable effect of reaching the whole crowd all at once, and yet reaching each one in that crowd. (8)53

Cinema offers an ideal opportunity for the propagandist to ply his trade because, Ellul argues, the individual is alone in a crowd, vulnerable, with his defenses lowered. He states:

The movie spectator also is alone; although elbow to elbow with his neighbors, he still is, because of the darkness and the hypnotic attraction of the screen, perfectly alone. This is the situation of the ‘lonely crowd,’ or of isolation in the mass, which is a natural product of present-day society and which is both used and deepened by the mass media. The most favorable moment to seize a man and influence him is when he is alone in the mass: it is at this point that propaganda can be most effective. (8-9)

Furthermore, Ellul argues, different mediums are conducive to certain types of propaganda. He states “movies and human contacts are the best media for sociological propaganda in terms of social climate, slow infiltration, progressive inroads, and all-over integration” (10).

The United States also has such inequality of wealth that those without political or financial power, such as Native Hawaiians, are particularly vulnerable to the stereotypes portrayed in the media. While it is evident that Hollywood was not solely responsible for either creating or spreading stereotypes of Polynesian native peoples, it is clear that the images shown in Hollywood movies acted as a form of propaganda: the portrait painted by Hollywood of the Japanese as sneaky, foreign, inscrutable, and suspicious aliens helped lay the groundwork for internment of the Japanese in Hawai‘i after the attack on
Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the deliberately inaccurate portrayals in these movies of Hawai‘i and its people, and of Polynesians helps contribute to the current image of Hawai‘i as a feminized, sexually-vulnerable paradise populated by exotic, but essentially powerless, non-threatening natives.

Assigning motives to a broad range of films released over a number of decades is a risky and imprecise venture. Noting that much of the “South Seas” genre fits neatly into Engelhardt’s “war story” does not imply a structured plan or design by filmmakers. Instead, these themes illustrate how Hawai‘i has been imagined throughout the years and how it has been reshaped to fit the requirements of the American public. On the other hand, movies have the power to shape how we remember history, which is of interest to those who would prefer that one version of history be remembered over another. Marita Sturken acknowledges the role of movies in making history: “The process of history making is highly complex, one that takes place in the United States through a variety of cultural arenas, including the media, Hollywood narrative films, and museums in addition to the academy. This means that memories, artifacts, images, and events often get marked as historical [italics in original] without the aid of historians” (Absent Images, 33-34).

The United States military is, for example, aware of the power of the moving image. Variety notes the propaganda value of Flirtation Walk’s plot, with its “Background of West Point [that] allows the army to cop nice publicity and the picture to possess some snappy drill and brass button stuff.” Nor was this accidental: The New York Times review of the movie noted, for example, that “an American Legion band set the mood for the evening with a stirring military air.” The movie served as “A rousing recruitment poster”
and "had a packed and ululant house howling with patriotic fervor." The *Times* notes also that the movie was made "with the full cooperation of the United States Army."

It has long been recognized that the cinema can play a vital role in the formation and spread of propaganda, especially in times of war. As Kristin Soroka points out, the relatively new medium of cinema was used for propaganda purposes as early as 1898:

On April 21, 1898—the day the United States Congress declared war against Spain—two New York City motion picture entrepreneurs sat in their office looking down upon the jubilant crowds filling the city streets, waving the American flag, and shouting nationalistic slogans. The two men realized their country was ready for a strong dose of instant patriotism. Within a few hours, the entrepreneurs assembled a film crew and hacked out a one-reel film entitled Tearing Down the Spanish Flag. Soon, thousands of New Yorkers sat in makeshift theaters at vaudeville houses, watching Vitagraph Company's version of the seizure of a Spanish government installation in Havana by U.S. Army troops—an event that was, historically, many weeks away. For the viewers, the fact that the film was entirely fictitious did not matter. Through the flickering images, moviegoers fulfilled their desires for adventure and victory, and rejoiced [sic] in the military prowess of the United States. Thus began the relationship of motion pictures and propaganda.

During World War Two the role of the U.S. government in Hollywood became official: the White House announced the creation of the Office of War Information whose purpose was to preview Hollywood scripts for signs of anti-war or unpatriotic behavior. The general public is astute enough to know in times of war that the cinema is not impartial. However, what about in times of peace? When their guard is down, audiences are particularly vulnerable to misrepresentations, lies and half-truths. Patriotic organizations like the American Legion have, in the past, used cinema as a toll of propaganda and as a way of spreading racist stereotypes. In 1919, the Legion set up a Film Division to rent out its own super-patriotic films. As Marcus Duffield points out, films such as *Flashes of Action* and *Where Poppies Bloom* were distributed to Mexico to combat, as the Legion put it, "German anti-French and general allied propaganda" (201). In 1920 the Legion
released *Shadows of the West* as part of its ongoing campaign against foreigners and against Japanese immigrants and workers. As tenBroek, Barnhart and Matson point out, the film “invoked all the malevolent aspects of the [Japanese] stereotype, the film described the Japanese in California as spies and cutthroats plotting to monopolize the vegetable market; and the climax was reached, not unpredictably, with the kidnapping of two white girls, followed by a dramatic chase and rescue on the part of the Legionnaires” (31).

Post-Pearl Harbor movies tend to feature the military in central roles. Some deal directly with the attack, as in *In Harm’s Way* (1965), *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (1970), and *Pearl Harbor* (2001): some feature conspiracy theories about the attack, as in the documentary *December 7* (1942) or *Jungle Heat* (1957); some concern themselves with incidental stories related to the attack, such as *Air Force* (1943), *From Here To Eternity* (1953), or *The Revolt of Mamie Stover* (1956). Taken together though, these movies form a narrative that implies America was unprepared for the “sneak” attack on its citizens, the Japanese in Hawai‘i were untrustworthy but are now allies in the Cold War, the U.S. military is Hawai‘i’s protector; war is honorable, exciting, sexy and fun.

Movies that act as recruitment ads for the military, such as *Flirtation Walk, The Green Berets* (1968), *Top Gun* (1986), *Armageddon* (1998), *Air Force One* (1997), and *Pearl Harbor* (2001), are most likely to receive military cooperation. Whether the military chooses to cooperate or not, limits what is seen on the screen: war films rely on military cooperation to provide equipment, ordinance, and, occasionally, extras. As Tom Engelhardt has noted, “[In the post WW2 years] the war film returned to the screen...in almost every case supported by and with script oversights from the Pentagon (73). The
military will not aid a movie that it deems anti-militaristic or anti-war. This may include
films where soldiers are shown to be acting irresponsibly, as in Taps (1981), or
Heartbreak Ridge (1986), where military leadership is shown as incompetent or weak, as
(1996), or where the military is shown in any way to be acting in a cowardly or
dishonorable way, as in Full Metal Jacket (1987). In G.I. Jane (1997), for example, one
scene that the military thought distasteful had to be cut from the script before military
support would be considered:

In G.I Jane, the 1997 film starring Demi Moore, one scene in a foxhole originally
showed a male serviceman having difficulty relieving himself in her presence.
"While addressing issues related to the presence of women in front-line ground
combat, the urination scene in the foxhole carries no benefit to the US navy,"
wrote US navy commander Gary Shrout to the director, Ridley Scott. Scott wrote
back that "this scene has been eliminated" and agreed to other changes but the end
result was still unacceptable. (Campbell)

Until the computer generated image (CGI) special effects revolution of the late
1990s, it was simply not possible for any relatively low-budget Hollywood movie to
make a convincing war movie without official military help. The only alternative for film
makers who care about their art and who do not want to operate under the military’s
restrictions is to find private or foreign funding: Oliver Stone tried for almost a decade to
get both funding and military cooperation for his film Platoon (1986) and eventually he
had to go to Rank, a British distributor, and Hemdale, a joint British-French production
company to ensure his film would be released. Because of the lack of military
cooperation, Platoon was made on a very limited budget (Corliss).

Francis Ford Coppola had similar problems and had to rely on the Army of the
Philippines for help in producing Apocalypse Now (1979).54 By the time the makers of
Patton (1970) had persuaded the U.S. military that the movie was going to show the General in a favorable light, the US military had already updated all its older World War Two equipment. The filmmakers therefore used older Spanish military equipment and were thus freed from the constrictions that would have been imposed on them by the U.S. military. As a result, Patton was a more subversive and controversial movie than originally planned (Toplin, 158-160). Because Tora! Tora! Tora! and Pearl Harbor were given full military support, it is, therefore, unsurprising that the set pieces in those movies outdo much of what has gone before. The price for the military’s cooperation in presenting war as spectacle is, however, that a sanitized version of history is presented. Pearl Harbor refuses to discuss American imperialism in the Pacific, the role of the military in colonizing Hawai‘i, or historical facts such as the U.S. oil and steel embargo on Japan that led to war (Ambrose, 39-40; Takaki, Double Victory, 16). Both movies perpetuate the “sneak attack” theory that allows the U.S. military “off the hook.” Both movies present war as exciting and act as multi-million dollar recruitment ads for the military.

Cinematic depictions of Hawai‘i, in war and peace, are less concerned with accuracy than they are with portraying Hawai‘i according to the needs of those on the U.S. mainland. According to these representations, until Western settlers arrived Hawai‘i used to be a desolate frontier inhabited by savages. It was their Manifest Destiny to “develop” a “virgin land” that was underutilized by its primitive, godless inhabitants. Westerners brought to Hawai‘i civilization, laws, technology, “progress,” and Christianity. These settlers have written the story of Hawai‘i in a way that justifies their actions as beneficial and natural. In the Twentieth Century, the newly arrived medium of
cinema reinforced these narratives and exploited these stories for financial gain. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the idea of “American Hawai‘i” helped Americans cope with their guilt at the atomic bombings of Japan, and deflected attention away from the racist nature of the Pacific war. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Hawai‘i acted as a paradigm for the mainland on inter-racial harmony. It is little wonder the thought of Native Hawaiian Sovereignty is presently an anathema to the United States. For it, Hawai‘i is the gift that keeps on giving.
CHAPTER 4. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE MILITARY IN HAWAI'I

In a functioning democracy the news media should play an adversarial role to those in positions of power, including the U.S. military. However, as social commentator Michael Parenti notes in Make-Believe Media, "in school text books, mainstream academic research, political life, and news media...the United States' global, military and economic empire is nowhere to be seen; instead we have America the innocent, the just, [the] threatened" (55). The news media in Hawai‘i is complicit in either concealing news about the true costs of the U.S. military presence, or it simply acts as a conduit for military propaganda, helping to recruit local youths into military ranks, and pretending that the U.S. military played no role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Much of this has to do with the traditional role of newspapers in society, which is, as Parenti notes in Inventing Reality, "maintaining the hegemony of the corporate class and the capitalist system" (3). Parenti explains how this arrangement works: "To maintain the system that is so good to them, the rich and powerful devote much attention to persuasion and propaganda. Control over the communication field and the flow of mass information, helps secure the legitimacy of the owning class's politico-economic power. We don't have a free and independent press in the United States but one that is tied by purchase and persuasion to wealthy elites and their government counterparts" (6).

The role of American-run newspapers in Hawai‘i has traditionally been an imperialist one, tied to American capitalist and strategic military ambition. For the most part, early newspapers supported the process of Americanism. In the 1840s, for example, American James Jackson Jarves ran the Polynesian. Jackson despised Native Hawaiians, and celebrated the supposed superiority of American culture:
Hawaiians, Jarves believed, were inferior and unable to compete with whites, who were their racial superiors. Polynesian culture had little value. Hawaiian speech was "rude and uncultivated, destitute of literature" and not worth preserving. Hawaiians had "only a few misty traditions, oral records of the sensualities and contests of the barbarous chiefs, the rites of inhuman religion." In a classic example of blaming the victim, Jarves declared the Hawaiians at fault for beginning to die off after Captain Cook's arrival. (Chapin, 27)

It was with such attitudes as these, Helen Geracimos Chapin points out, that "it is print that has enabled imperialism to spread its power across continents and oceans. The imposition of print upon the Hawaiian Islands coincided with the rise of America as an imperialist Pacific power. American-style newspapers were a major contributor to this expansion" (15).

Today such outward manifestations of racism are gone, but underlying themes of "Americanism" and conformity to the dominant patriotic narrative remain. Today, as Haunani-Kay Trask affirms, "there are no critical news stations or radical magazines in Hawai'i" (From a Native Daughter, 162). As part of that patriotic narrative, the U.S. military remains almost a taboo subject, above criticism and beyond reproach. Structural problems, such as the military's role as an "occupying army," and super structural problems such as competition for land and water usage, are "hidden in plain sight" by patriotic narratives that make the U.S. military presence seem both natural and desirable. As far as Hawai'i's newspapers are concerned, the U.S. military is the 400-pound gorilla at the tea party that no one wants to talk about. A local media critic notes, for example, that the local press is "rarely critical" of the military (Albertini, 84). Indeed, the military's community liaison groups usually consist of business leaders such as bank officials, tourism chiefs, and newspaper employees or owners. Politicians and influential civilians are invited to various military functions, parades, briefings, and ceremonies, and are
rewarded for their support with “red-carpet tours” and “free rides on PACOM equipment” (Albertini, 14). In February 2001, one of these “freebies” led to tragedy: the U.S. nuclear submarine USS Greeneville, carrying a number of civilians on a “fact-finding” trip, accidentally sunk a Japanese training ship Ehime Maru killing nine Japanese civilians, including a number of high school students. Despite (or because of) an official military enquiry, the exact circumstances of the accident still remain unclear.

Local politicians, business leaders, and news media moguls have no interest in antagonizing the military and even disasters such as the Ehime Maru do not raise questions about the overall role of the military in Hawai‘i. This conflict of interest means there are limits to the debate about the U.S. military presence. In fact, by allotting much time for pro-military news items and virtually no time for anti-military points of view, the news media continually justifies the U.S. military’s position in Hawai‘i. Take Midweek, for example, which is a special culprit in giving unstinting support for the U.S. military, and which fails entirely to do its job as an investigative newspaper. Midweek is what Chapin calls a “weekly hybrid newspaper-magazine” (255) whose entire editorial content is composed of columns by nationally syndicated personalities and local experts. It is rare to find viewpoints in Midweek that are critical of the U.S. military. Hardly a week goes by without it endorsing the Army, Navy, USAF, or ROTC programs. One recent issue contains, for example, a cover story entitled “Are we in danger of losing a good neighbor? The Army in Hawaii,” in which it complains of “overzealous activists” who are “forcing” the Army, which has made “extraordinary contributions to both our economy and ecology,” to “reduce or eliminate its presence in Hawaii.” This issue also contains a celebratory story about an ROTC graduate and a 16-page pullout supplement.
entitled “Hawaii salutes the military” which includes an article entitled “Why Hawaii is lucky to host U.S. military.”

Other issues feature biographies of well-known, locally based soldiers such as U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, or Admiral Dennis Blair, both of whom feature prominently on the covers of recent Midweeks. Shinseki’s interview with Bob Jones quickly develops into a “why Hawai’i needs the 25th Light Infantry” propaganda piece, with Jones stating, “If the Army pulls up stakes here, it will be devastating to an island fighting back from more than nine years of stagnation” (“The Army’s Point Man”). Dan Boylan prepares readers for the Blair interview by first establishing the limits of the debate: for example, the interview is titled “Keeping Peace in the Pacific,” and the introductory paragraph states, “Adm. Dennis Blair is responsible for keeping the peace in half of the world.” Unsurprisingly, no difficult questions follow, and Boylan concludes the piece by calling Blair “a visionary.”

Perhaps the only inharmonious voice at Midweek, at least as far as the military is concerned, is Bob Jones. Jones was a Vietnam War correspondent for the Honolulu Advertiser and calls himself a “military-orientated reporter” (“Surfacing ‘Greenville’ Questions”). George Chaplin notes, “In January 1966 the Advertiser opened a bureau in Vietnam, with Bob Jones as its chief. Five weeks later the thirty-year-old reporter was hit in his back, one leg, and both hands by mortar fragments…” (297). Jones’ experience “under fire” gives him some legitimacy in matters concerning the military. While he is not anti-military, nor a strident voice against the political policies that keep Hawai’i militarized, Jones’ tentative, sometimes unclear criticism at times stands out when set against Midweek’s almost total pro-military point of view. For example, in a column
entitled “Surfacing ‘Greenville’ Questions,” Jones criticizes submarine commander Scott Waddle for failing to rescue Japanese sailors from the water. Jones asks, “If [Waddle] had hit and destroyed a U.S. Navy ship and American sailors were in the water, would [Waddle] still have said [his] submarine was not a rescue vessel? Would [Waddle] still have stood off?” For daring to question the official military line, Jones was called, in a letter to the Editor, “Tokyo Bob,” “shameful,” and a “washed-up, small-market hack who was willing to talk stink about his country’s servicemen and military to the Japanese media” (Marshall, J.).

However, Jones is not always so “controversial.” For example, in another column entitled “Paying Respect To Our Military,” Jones criticizes the American public for wanting “an armed forces on the cheap,” which is a familiar and ongoing military complaint. Jones column entitled “It’s Time For The Army To Move Out” at first glance seems like one of the few occasions when Hawai‘i’s press have supported the views of local activists over the views of the U.S. military concerning live-fire exercises in the Mākua Valley. Or, at least, that’s the way the column begins. It becomes clear, however, that Jones’ initial support for the activists is tinged with resentment and bitterness. He states, for example, that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld should “call the hand” of “anti-military” activists and “crabby I-no-like ‘em people.” He states that the message of activists is “Army Go Home. We No Want You.” Jones’ analysis depicts activists as “anti-military” rather than, say, pro-Hawaiian, or pro-environment. His fake pidgin condescension is reminiscent of the words attributed by Whites to fake natives like Tonto, a fact not lost on an irate reader who stated in a follow-up letter to Midweek that “The racist undertones [of Jones’ article] rang loud and clear” (Fletcher). Finally, Jones
reveals that his support for the Army “mov[ing] out” is only to spite the locals because of their supposed economic dependence on the military – the same type of threat and bribe, carrot and stick approach that the military and its supporters have traditionally used to ensure their presence is “welcome.” Jones states, “the Army’s been a good, environmentally responsible neighbor” and that it has been “pushed and shoved and dissed on this whole Makua matter as far as a reasonable agency should be expected to take it and keep its cool.” Of course, the U.S. Army cannot “lose its cool” and take out its ire out on the locals. However, it does not need to when it has such ardent supporters in the media as Bob Jones.

To summarize, *Midweek* is basically a vehicle for advertisements. It is delivered free in the mail, for example, and it is magazine-sized for convenient reading. Its news content is delivered through editorials and interviews rather than real investigative journalism. *Midweek* is a strong supporter of the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i, and it frequently acts as a conduit for the official military point of view. *Midweek* also acts as a recruitment tool: through stories such as “Saluting UH’s ROTC Program,” it promotes the idea that the military is a good career choice for Hawai‘i’s youth (Zimmerman). Interviews with locally based, high-ranking Officers reinforce this impression. *Midweek* does not want to alienate the military, its dependents, and supporters because it does not want to lose advertising revenue. It cannot afford to be controversial in this respect. However, it also loses any semblance of journalistic integrity in the process.

The bias of *Midweek* pales, however, to that of Hawai‘i’s two main newspapers, the *Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, if only because *Midweek* is primarily an advertising vehicle that does not want to offend a large section of its readers.
(the military and their dependents), whereas the *Adviser* and *Star-Bulletin* are considered to be respectable newspapers. Even before there was a permanent U.S. military presence in the Islands, the *Pacific Commercial Adviser* (as *The Honolulu Adviser* was originally known) was pro-American and pro-military. Chapin notes that its first owner, a descendant of American Protestant Missionaries named Henry M. Whitney, had “a total belief in American culture and values. Or, as he boasted in his reminiscences, the *Adviser* ‘was independent in politics always, but an ardent advocate of annexation to the United States’” (54). The *Honolulu Adviser*, like many other Hawai‘i newspapers, has had a special section of its pages set aside for military matters since the early part of the Twentieth Century. Chapin states, for example, that, “The Polynesian introduced what would become standard fare in society pages after 1900 - write-ups of the entertainment of military officers by the host community” (24).

In those early years of the U.S. military presence, the *Adviser* gave its total backing to “100% Americanism” campaigns, whether it was the hounding of German owned businesses during World War One (Wagner-Seavey) or the efforts of the American Legion to close Japanese language schools and non-English newspapers. In the 1930s, during the infamous Massie case both the *Adviser* and *Star-Bulletin* printed messages by Admiral Yates Stirling Jr. that were basically an enticement to his men to lynch the defendants (Wright, 101). The *Star-Bulletin* further warned “that any cancellation of naval fleet activities would bring great financial loss to the business community” (Chapin, 154).

During World War Two, as Chapin explains,

[the *Adviser*] had a cozy relationship with the military—Thurston became public relations adviser to the military government, and the powerful business leader,
Walter Dillingham, part owner of the Advertiser, testified before Congress on the oligarchy’s willingness to go along with military rule-[and] the morning paper defended military rule even after the U.S. Supreme Court in 1946 declared its imposition on Hawai‘i to have been unconstitutional. (175-76.)

This was one of those few occasions when the Star Bulletin differed from the Advertiser in its attitude to the U.S. military. As J. Garner Anthony relates, the Star Bulletin “recognized the threat to Hawaii” of military rule, whereas the Advertiser “stoutly defended the military regime” (109). The two newspapers also differed vociferously at times in their views on the legality of military trials for civilians, and on the trustworthiness and patriotism of the islands’ Japanese community. Chapin contends that the Advertiser’s grudging and negative attitude towards the Japanese at this time “contributed to the morning daily’s decline in readership and profits into the 1960s” (187).

It is clear that the relationship between the local media and the military is symbiotic rather than confrontational. Mainstream newspaper coverage of the anti-Vietnam war movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a prime example of how the news media distorts history by omission and spin. There is, for example, a belief that Hawai‘i was (and is) a docile and willing home to U.S. troops. According to journalist Francine du Plessix Gray, Hawai‘i was almost untouched by the same anti-war protests that occurred on the mainland. She cites, for example, a rally held to protest the firing of University of Hawai‘i faculty member and anti-war protester Rev. Larry Jones, when only about fifty students attended, most of whom were “half asleep on the grass” (11). However, even a brief survey of underground newspapers of the time shows a very active and vociferous anti-war and anti-draft movement, much of whose activities were not reported by the mainstream media. Chapin states, “There is the general notion that
resistance to the Vietnam War was exercised locally by a vocal but small minority. To the contrary, Hawai‘i, which was a staging area for the war, generated a higher ratio of underground papers than the national average" (269). What historian H. Bruce Franklin notes of America as a whole, can also be said of Hawai‘i:

the role of the underground press during the Vietnam War soon disappeared into the black hole of national amnesia that has swallowed much of our consciousness. Although there has been serious debate about the absurd proposition that the establishment press helped lose the war by not loyally supporting it, everybody seems to have forgotten that the established press eventually lost its monopoly on reporting the war, as millions of Americans began to rely primarily on the unabashedly disloyal movement press for accurate and truthful reporting” (90-91.)

This concluding chapter deals with the time period 1965 - present and looks at local media coverage of the U.S. military, with a focus on newspaper coverage of the Vietnam War and the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*. This chapter begins with a comparative analysis of mainstream news media coverage of military matters with anti-war, underground press coverage of those same issues, such as *Carrion Crow* (1967-68), *Roach* (1968-69), *Gathering Place* (1971-72), *Hawaii Free People's Press* (1969-70), and *Liberated Barracks* (1971-74). I will then examine alternative press coverage of the military in areas such as selective service, desertion, and the war in Vietnam. The chapter ends with an analysis of mainstream press coverage of the *Ehime Maru* incident.

**Mainstream and Underground Press Coverage of The Vietnam War**

From the beginning of American involvement in Indochina in the 1950s, the American news media failed to do its job as an investigative body and acted instead as a conduit of official government and military propaganda. As Herman and Chomsky note, neither then, nor before, was there any detectable questioning of the righteousness of the American cause in Vietnam, or of the necessity to proceed to full-scale "intervention." By that time, of course, only questions of tactics and costs remained open, and further discussion in the mainstream media was largely
limited to these narrow issues. While dissent and domestic controversy became a focus of media coverage from 1965, the actual views of dissidents and resisters were virtually excluded. These individuals were presented primarily as a threat to order, and while their tactics might be discussed, their views were not. (172)

The U.S. military should have been a legitimate topic for investigation. C. Wright Mills' book *The Power Elite* (1956) had, for example, laid out, in some detail, the inherent dangers of a militarized society. Furthermore, in 1961 no less a person than President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of a "military-industrial complex" that threatened American democracy. Eisenhower stated:

> Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.

Yet early press coverage of the U.S. military in Vietnam was essentially uncritical, as Marilyn Young explains:

> The American press at the time [late 1950s] in effect served as a branch of the U.S. enterprise in South Vietnam, cheering Diem's successes and praising his efforts to defeat communism in his country. The critical news reports of Scripps-Howard correspondent Albert Colegrove, which led to Congressional hearings on Vietnam in the summer of 1959, focused almost entirely on the inefficient and wasteful use of American aid. Colegrove, like many members of Congress, called for a closer supervision of funds rather than a reexamination of policy...Wisconsin Democratic Representative Clement Zablocki...wondered
aloud if the public shouldn't be informed of the way in which Colegrove’s criticism had given aid to the Communists. (61)

In the chill of the Cold War, McCarthy Hearings, and anti-communist witch-hunts, few journalists questioned the failure of the United States to live up to its promises made at the Geneva Peace Conference. In 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson committed American troops to Vietnam to take part in a full-scale ground war, editor of the Honolulu Star Bulletin A.A. Smyser was concerned only with the effects of war on the Hawai‘i economy, not with the righteousness or morality of that action, and certainly not with the endless casualties that were sure to ensue. Smyser interviewed a leading banker who reassured business interests that “there is a long-term U.S. military commitment to the Pacific and to Hawaii that will make government spending a continuing important element in the Hawaii economy for a decade or more ahead” (Smyser, “Vietnam and Hawaii”). The Advertiser also constantly assured readers that the end of the war was in sight. For example, it published a regular column by Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall as “Military Affairs Analyst” in which Marshall relayed to readers an endless series of American victories, twenty-to-one combat fatalities in America’s favor, and an unfailingly cheery and optimistic analysis that completely ignored the facts on the ground in Vietnam (Marshall, S. “Our Viet Forces See The Improvements).

Aside, however, from the political climate and the selfish concerns of the business community which had inter-locking ties with the media, the American press had underlying structural problems that prevented it from fully investigating events in Vietnam, the result of which was that the press “kept - and keep - closely to the perspective of official Washington and the closely related corporate elite, in conformity
to the general ‘journalistic-literary-political culture’ from which ‘the left’ (meaning
dissident opinion that questions jingoist assumptions) is virtually excluded” (Herman &
Chomsky, 171). In the documentary *Manufacturing Consent*, filmmakers Mark Achbar
and Peter Wintonick explore why the media in the United States acts the way it does.
Their conclusion is that the media basically believes in the established political and social
system, and it sees its role not as opposing that system but instead in defending it from
criticism. The result of this culture of conformity is, as Michael Parenti concludes, “Much
of what is reported as ‘news’ is little more than uncritical transmission of official
opinions to an unsuspecting public” (*Inventing Reality*, 51).

Achbar and Wintonick list six ways that Noam Chomsky has identified as to how
the news media sets the agenda for what is discussed. These are: (i) selection of topics,
(ii) distribution of concerns, (iii) emphasis, (iv) framing of issues, (v) filtering of
information, and (vi) bounding of debate. During the Vietnam War, these restrictions
helped keep the reality of the war hidden from the American public. To give just one
example, with regard to “selection of topics,” only on a few occasions did the mainstream
press cover issues that were important to the underground press and the counterculture.
Michael Parenti notes, for example, that “On various occasions during the Vietnam era,
the *New York Times* would not sell space to citizens’ groups that wanted to run
advertisements against war taxes or against the purchase of defense bonds. A *Times*
executive turned down the antibond advertisement because he judged it not to be in the
‘best interests of the country’” (*Inventing Reality*, 71). On another occasion, Parenti
notes, lack of mainstream media coverage meant anti-war protesters were forced to buy
space in the *New York Times* to highlight police, army, and federal marshal violence against protesters (*Inventing Reality*, 235).

The way newspapers are run closely resembles the hierarchy of the military, as Herbert Gans notes: ‘News organizations are not democratic; in fact, they are described as militaristic by some journalists’ (85). Journalists are foot soldiers, editorial staff the officer class, and the newspaper owners the “top brass.” Like the military, newspapers are also run primarily by men. It is unsurprising, therefore, that two organizations that resemble each other would empathize in such areas as command structure, “following orders,” and the need for secrecy. In the final analysis, however, the press’s unstinting support for the U.S. military was due to a misplaced sense of patriotism. It was simply beyond comprehension to most journalists that U.S. soldiers could behave in the kind of barbaric behavior that Americans had always associated with the enemy (or that their government would go to war for any reason other than the official one). When incidents such as these were reported, they were such a threat to this “head-in-the-sand” attitude that journalists were pressured into conformity. For example, when Morley Safer’s report of a U.S. Marine attack on the undefended Vietnamese village of Cam Ne was broadcast by CBS in 1965, the nation was shocked by images of U.S. troops behaving in the type of immoral actions that had previously been associated only with the enemy. President Lyndon Johnson personally phoned the President of CBS to complain, and then ordered a witch-hunt against Safer through FBI and CIA investigations (Engelhardt, 187-193).

In contrast to the establishment press, the alternative or underground media is adversarial to those in positions of power and imposes few, if any, limits on what can or cannot be said. Its only constraints are lack of money and fear of libel suits. As the
editors of *Carrion Crow* (1967-68), Hawai‘i’s first underground newspaper of the 1960s, stated, “The *Carrion Crow* will be totally irresponsible, dealing with whatever we feel like and published whenever we get around to it” (“Statement of Policy”). Thirteen issues of *The Roach* were produced from May to December 1968. The paper was edited by John Olsen and had a staff of about a dozen (Chapin, 273). It described itself as, “one of the 100 or so underground presses which have grown up recently in the United States to print news which the Establishment Press sees fit to ignore or minimize” (Jun 4, 1968: 1).

Olsen was also involved with *Hawaii Free Press* (1969-70), whose declared aim was to “liberat[e] our media” and to create “a new world, a new people” (Editorial, Jun 1969). *Gathering Place* (1971-72) described itself as “an underground newspaper to the extent that we will use traditional underground sources – Liberation News Service, other underground papers – and in that we aren’t controlled by any corporation.” Its favorite subjects were, “ecology, dope, peace, liberation, food, music, and meaningful ways to live” (“What Gathering Place is all about”). *Liberated Barracks* (1971-74) was a “GI Paper” written and produced by disaffected U.S. servicemen and local civilians. Its declared aim was to fill a void, “the lack of a place where G.I.’s could get together and collectively work on solutions to problems that are a daily part of military life” (“The Liberated Barracks Grew Out”).

Collectively, these papers offered an alternative view to the mainstream media on a wide range of issues. They challenged the authority of traditional journalism, and its claims to be accurate and neutral. They were also stylistically very different. Some practiced “New Journalism” in the style of Tom Wolfe, or tried to emulate the “Gonzo” journalism of Hunter S. Thompson. Todd Gitlin states, for example, “New Journalism
really began in the underground, with first-person accounts of news events -
demonstrations, press conferences, street scenes; writers began to treat their own notions
and responses as part of the story, in revolt against the spurious objectivity of the
mainstream” (22-23). In the traditional sense of the term, the alternative press was not
journalism at all. Journalists were supposed simply to convey information, and opinions
about that information were left to the editorial section. However, New Journalism
challenged the idea that mainstream journalists were impartial or neutral. Instead, it
recognized that a journalist would always filter what he/she sees, consciously or
unconsciously. New Journalism more honestly embraced this filtering process, and
insisted instead that the journalist’s views were an essential part of the story.

Underlying this idea was the belief that mainstream journalism and journalists
were falsely perceived as impartial because they presented “only the facts.” New
Journalism was, however, based partly on author William Faulkner’s idea that great
fiction is truer than journalism could ever hope to be. Truth is, of course, subjective, and
New Journalism is no more truthful or untruthful than the medium it challenged.
However, New Journalism was a more honest medium in that it recognized and flaunted
its subjectivity, letting its readers decide on the truthfulness or accuracy of its news or
opinion. Finally, New Journalism was a form of rebellion against a media system that
many thought had failed them. Robert Glessing opines,

Since most underground editors assume the traditional media incapable of telling
the truth about anything important, they reason, ‘What’s the point of objectivity?’
It is perhaps its total distrust of American institutions that frees the underground
press to attack anything and everything related to the American establishment. (6)

Although some of these stylistic issues were political in nature – rebelling against
traditional modes of journalism, or embracing simplicity as a protest against big business

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professionalism - much of it was also driven by financial considerations. Because large business interests did not fund them, alternative or underground papers were forced to use the cheapest and most basic materials. The technology behind Carrion Crow was, for example, “a typewriter, a glue pot...and an old press” (Chapin, 272). Robert Glessing states that, “After all his copy is ready for the camera, the fledgling underground publisher simply rubber cements, or waxes, his copy blocks and art work to layout sheets and he is ready to go to the printer” (43). The resulting paper looked amateurish and non-traditional, two factors that were undoubtedly attractive to potential readers who were disillusioned by mainstream American newspaper coverage. These traits also appealed to a new, younger audience that was unlikely to buy the traditional newspapers that their mothers and fathers read, and more likely to read rebellious and exciting journalism that was, according to author and Rolling Stone journalist Hunter Thompson, “as close to the bone as I could get, and to hell with the consequences” (Fear and Loathing: on the Campaign Trail ’72, 18).

Carrion Crow made its views on the military and the Vietnam War clear in its inaugural issue. Although this issue is only four pages long, the Crow devotes a full page to anti-war issues. One effective technique of the anti-war movement was to give voice to military men who criticized the war. This issue of the Crow features a letter/poem by a soldier on leave from Vietnam. In it he states, “I’m really a kid...I don’t want to kill. Military discipline is coercion of the moral sense” (“Letter From Vietnam”). Below the letter is a cartoon drawing of the White House with the caption “black is white, night is day, war is peace.” This ideology can be compared to the prevailing version of the truth given in Hawai‘i’s mainstream press at this time. For example, the Honolulu Advertiser
gave seemingly unlimited space to an apologist for U.S. policy in Vietnam, Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, to warn Advertiser readers that “If America stops bombing North Vietnam it will lead to more Americans being killed” (“Halt To Bombing Is Error: Sharp”). Sharp also told his Chamber of Commerce audience that “There is no cause for gloom or pessimism. We are winning a war essential to the security of the free world.” In that same article, the president of the Hawai‘i Chamber of Commerce assured readers his colleagues that the Vietnam War was doing great things for the local economy: “military expenditures here had made marked advances, the garment industry should have its finest year, the pineapple industry [is] holding its own [and] [t]ourism has set a record pace.”

Soon afterwards, the Advertiser’s “Southeast Asia Correspondent” Denis Warner quoted the U.S. military command, which claimed that it had “broken the initial Viet Cong summer offensive in and around the demilitarized zone” (“Hanoi Troops Take Initiative”). This was typical of the failure of many mainstream journalists who blithely accepted the “official” military or political view of events. Herman and Chomsky state, “it was standard practice throughout the Indochina war for journalists to report Washington pronouncements as fact, even in the extreme case when official statements were known to be false” (176-77). And Michael Parenti concludes, “Much of what is reported as ‘news’ is little more than uncritical transmission of official opinions to an unsuspecting public” (Inventing Reality, 51)

For many reporters, however, the evidence in front of their eyes could not be reconciled with official military pronouncements. Warner adds to his reproduction of the “official” news his own analysis of the situation. Calling the official view either “bland” or a distortion, Warner reports that the war is escalating from U.S. defense of the South
Vietnamese government against “an externally-initiated and supported insurgency” into a full-scale war “between the United States, the government of South Vietnam and its allies against North Vietnam...Communist China, the Soviet Union and its allies.” However, Warner’s analysis is misleading and does not deviate as much from U.S. government reports as he believes. For example, successive U.S. administrations used a number of rhetorical devices to slant how and why it waged war. One of these was to label the enemy “Viet Cong,” rather than “National Liberation Front,” which was a more accurate term given U.S. duplicity at the Geneva Peace Conference. The term “Viet Cong” was, according to historian Marilyn Young, coined by President Diem in the 1950s and was “the Vietnamese equivalent of ‘Commie’” (63). In using the terminology of the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments to describe the enemy, the mainstream U.S. media was shaping the news into a Manichean battle of “good versus evil,” or “communism versus democracy.” Vietnamese nationalism, and the long history of Indochina’s oppression under colonial rulers, was conveniently omitted from this narrative.

In choosing the language of the debate, newspapers affected, in a very real way, how much the general public would support the war. For example, in dehumanizing the Vietnamese as communist drones or “Reds,” newspapers excused, to an extent, some of the more inhumane aspects of American policy. It is after all easier to kill a color than it is a person. James Dawes notes that if we call the opposition “‘enemy,’ ‘criminal,’ or ‘animal,’ we enable ourselves to feel about and act toward them in a certain way; if we instead call them ‘combatant,’ ‘prisoner of war’ or ‘civilian’ (agent-neutral terms that could easily be used to describe us or our own families), we are forced by the pressure of our own lexicon to think about and act toward them in a drastically different fashion.”
Herman and Chomsky conclude, "The enemy of the U.S. government was the enemy of the press, which could not even refer to them by their own name: they were the "Viet Cong," a derogatory term of U.S.-Saigon propaganda, not the National Liberation Front, a phrase 'never used without quotation marks' by American reporters" (177).

Warner's analysis paints the South Vietnamese insurgency as a foreign-led communist uprising when, instead, there was much evidence available at that time that showed the corruption of South Vietnamese government officials, and of President Diem, America's reneging on the Geneva Accords, and the goodwill of South Vietnamese nationalists. Despite being a communist, Ho Chi Minh had, for example, declared Vietnamese independence after World War Two using the terminology of the American Declaration of Independence (Young, 10-11). Not unnaturally, given the history of colonialism in his country, Ho saw communism and nationalism as intertwined ideologies. John Stoessinger concludes that Ho "was as much a Vietnamese nationalists as a Communist" (100). Furthermore, as shown by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 to defeat the Khmer Rouge, and its military victory over Chinese communist forces in 1979, Ho was not prepared to allow outside communist powers to threaten Vietnam's independence. It seems clear now, as indeed it did to many dissident voices in the United States at the time, that if Vietnam had been allowed its independence according to the terms of the Geneva Accords, it would have taken the form of an independent, nationalistic state, perhaps similar to Tito's Yugoslavia, and not just a puppet state under the control of either China or Russia.

Such an analysis was obviously beyond Warner. At the same time as reporters in the underground press were talking of an "American invasion" of Vietnam (Hill), Warner
was ignoring facts such as the National Liberation Front (NLF) was almost entirely composed of South Vietnamese. Instead, Warner was reporting that it was foreign-controlled (even though "foreign" meant North Vietnamese). Warner accepts without hesitation the entirely arbitrary and fake great-power imperial division of Vietnam into two separate and sovereign countries, and ignores historical and cultural reality in differentiating between "communist" North Vietnamese and "democratic" South Vietnamese. Only by framing the story in this way can U.S. military intervention in Vietnam be viewed as anything other than an invasion of a sovereign country. Instead, Warner describes North Vietnam as an aggressor that "intends to continue its conventional war on a much bigger scale." As Herman and Chomsky state, "from the point of view of the media...there is no such event in history as the U.S. attack against South Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. One would be hard put to find even a single reference within the mainstream to any such event, or any recognition that history could possibly be viewed from this perspective" (184).

Carrion Crow continued its anti-war, anti-military theme in issue two. Bill Jaworski wrote an editorial entitled "Plato's Column," in which he explained why he refused to enlist in the U.S. Army and why he chose to fight his case in the U.S. courts rather than "dodge" the draft by crossing into Canada. Jaworski explains, "I choose [to] stay here and fight in the courts where the people will be informed of the reasons for objection through the news media." Support for conscientious objectors, and those who refused to fight in Vietnam (dismissively called "draft dodgers" by the mainstream press) was a constant theme of the underground press on the mainland and in Hawai‘i. In a section entitled "Travel Tips from Abroad," for example, Roach journalist Bill Boyd
advised potential deserters as to which foreign countries would welcome them and which
would extradite them back to the United States. The paper mixed humor with practical
advice, stating that this was "a regular Roach column for military personnel who may
wish to take extended vacations from their units, and for civilians who find this country
politically uncomfortable." In ways such as these, underground reporters were able both
to tap into a groundswell of resistance against the war, to provide advice for those who
did not want to be inducted, and also help mobilize disjointed protesters into a national
movement. Michael Parenti concludes that, "sectors of the public developed an
opposition to U.S. intervention through means other than the mainstream press; these
included campus teach-ins, lectures, radical publications, progressive unions, and
religious groups. Eventually the small groups grew into large demonstrations, and the
demonstrations into sit-ins, civil disobedience, draft resistance, and even riot" (Inventing
Reality, 89-90).

Compared to the Roach, coverage of issues such as conscientious objectors or
draft evasion in the mainstream Hawai‘i press was generally neutral – or, to be more
precise, those newspapers avoided the responsibility of discussing the issues to their
readers by presenting instead "only the facts" in the emotionless, sleep-inducing prose
that passes for "neutrality" or "objectivity" in the mainstream. According to the Index to
the Honolulu Advertiser and Honolulu Star Bulletin 1929 to 1967 there were ten articles
on Vietnam War era draft evasion published in the Advertiser and Star Bulletin up until
1967. In 1968, however, in the wake of Tet and growing anti-war feeling, there were
close to a hundred stories printed about the draft or draft evaders. Whilst most of these
articles maintained the same factual air as earlier articles, if there was a bias expressed, it
was in support of those who criticized draft evaders. For example, the *Star Bulletin* covered a speech by Senator Inouye with the headline “Inouye fires blast at draft dodging”). A few days later it followed up with the full text of the speech (“Text of Inouye’s speech”).

Similarly, in its coverage of the trial of Heavyweight Boxing Champion Mohammad Ali for alleged draft evasion, the *Advertiser* maintained a neutral tone when relating the facts of the proceedings (“Cassius Clay Goes To Trial Tomorrow”). However, it gave prominence in its sports pages to remarks by boxer Jerry Quarry that “Convicted draft evader Cassius Clay is acting like a man who has been ‘brainwashed’... Clay seems to be reciting things that have been drummed into him by a brainwashing technique.” The article, entitled “Quarry Says Clay ‘Brainwashed,’” dredges up long-held American fears about the irrationality of foreigners and people of color (Engelhardt, 38). How could they possibly be critical of the American Dream? Like the Soviets who labeled dissidents “insane,” surely Clay must be out of his mind to want to avoid fighting for the United States. (Incidentally, both major Honolulu newspapers refused to call Ali anything other than Cassius Clay, a name Ali had rejected because of his religious beliefs and because of its slave connections). Such reporting seems to confirm Chapin’s conclusion that, in Hawai‘i, the “Establishment journalists’ basic premise...was that the draft was necessary” (273).

Also in issue two of *Carrion Crow*, Jaworski lists some of the main criticisms of the war that were to haunt pro-war politicians and supporters until the United States was forced to withdraw from Vietnam. He states, for example, that “War in itself is basically wrong and immoral because people fighting the war are usually deprived of something
that is basic to existence – whether food, shelter, or the rights of man...[T]hese grievances are overlooked by the governments and those in...power.” By creating the artificial state of South Vietnam and denying the Vietnamese the national elections promised in the 1954 Geneva Agreement the United States basically denied to the Vietnamese their right of self determination (Stoessinger, 86-87). Jaworski criticism of the “staggering expenditure of some $500 a second...spent on the war effort,” highlights the war’s impact on President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” program. Historian John Blum states, for example, “the Vietnam War and its costs gravely compromised the programs of the Great Society and their potential effectiveness” (250). Jaworski’s conclusion, that “our government doesn’t want peace” is a jarring contradiction of mainstream media analysis of the war, much of which simply repeated information given at government press conferences.

In this respect, the alternative or underground press was years ahead of its mainstream counterpart. Because there were few if any limits on their debate, the alternative press could say the unthinkable – that the U.S. wanted war in Vietnam, not peace. Recent scholarship has been more forthright in asserting that viewpoint. For example, historian Marilyn Young argues that President Johnson took full advantage of the “Gulf of Tonkin incident” to initiate military action against North Vietnam (117-123), and she concludes that “war continues to be a primary instrument of American foreign policy and the call to arms a first response to international disputes” (preface). Similarly, political commentator Christopher Hitchens argues that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prolonged the war for partisan political purposes. Hitchens states:

In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixon and some of his emissaries and underlings set out to sabotage the Paris peace negotiations on Vietnam. The means they chose
were simple: they privately assured the South Vietnamese military rulers that an incoming Republican regime would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. In this way, they undercut both the talks themselves and the electoral strategy of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. The tactic "worked," in that the South Vietnamese junta withdrew from the talks on the eve of the election, thereby destroying the "peace plank" on which the Democrats had contested it. In another way, it did not "work," because four years later the Nixon administration concluded the war on the same terms that had been on offer in Paris. The reason for the dead silence that still surrounds the question is that, in those intervening four years, some twenty thousand Americans and an uncalculated number of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians lost their lives. Lost them, that is to say, even more pointlessly than had those slain up to that point. The impact of those four years on Indochinese society, and on American democracy, is beyond computation. (6)

Hitchens calls this, "an open secret that is too momentous and too awful to tell. Though it is well known to academic historians, senior reporters, former cabinet members and ex-diplomats" (6). The anti-war movement and the counter culture or underground press openly discussed this "open secret," just as it was kept hidden by the mainstream media of the time.

_The Roach_ actively encouraged soldiers, sailors and airmen to desert their posts. For example, it published a letter from a former University of Hawai‘i student who was involved with "Info 67," a Canadian organization that helped both deserters and those evading the U.S. military draft. The letter assuaged fears that Canada would deport deserters and assured potential deserters and "dodgers" that they would get jobs, accommodation, and Canadian citizenship. The letter also offered advice on how to avoid the FBI and how to determine if a phone is wiretapped ("Resisters, Deserters Welcome In Canada, However Living Costs Higher Than US"). The paper also advertised a "Draft Resistance" meeting in which the issue of draft card burning was to be discussed ("What’s Happening?"). In a clever and subtle way, _The Roach_ was also able to subvert traditional militaristic narratives of bravery and honor for use in its campaign against the
draft. Senator Daniel Inouye had expressed doubts about the war but was a supporter of
the military draft ("Inouye fires blast at draft dodging."). The Roach quoted from
Inouye's pro-draft speech to the graduating class at St. Francis Convent at the Mid-
Pacific Institute, in which the U.S. Senator reminisced about his military service in World
War Two: it "converted me into a killing machine...[I experienced] a sense of great joy
and elation whenever I killed my first German soldier. After that I killed many, many
more. Much as I try, I find that I cannot erase these dark pages from my life" ("What’s
Happening?"). Such talk would hardly inspire the younger generation to join the Army.
The Roach knew that despite his professed reservations about the Vietnam War, Inouye’s
“Greatest Generation” rhetoric was as out of date as John Wayne’s attempt in The Green
Berets (1968) to portray the Vietnam War as a World War Two lark.

The Roach covered the trial of draft resister Dana Park ("What’s Happening?
Resistance Memo"; "Dana R. Park Imprisoned"). The respective coverage of this trail by
The Roach and by Honolulu’s two mainstream newspapers demonstrates one of the major
differences between the underground and the conventional press – that of the supposed
objectivity of the mainstream press. While both the Advertiser and Star Bulletin covered
the arrest, hearings, and trial of Park, they did so by reporting only the very basic and
bland proceedings of the case. The newspapers made no effort to describe the background
to Park’s moral decision and instead reported the case as it would any other criminal
proceeding. However, on the front and editorial pages of virtually every edition, both
newspapers were reporting the Vietnam War as a patriotic “noble cause,” a fight for
democracy by heroic GIs against a demonic communist enemy.
The *Star Bulletin* would, for example, describe a successful combat operation against American troops as a "massacre," yet actual massacres carried out by American forces against civilians would be reported as successful military operations against communist troops. For instance, in an article entitled "Tactical errors blamed for ambush and massacre," the paper gave a harrowing account of the combat deaths of thirteen American soldiers who were preparing an ambush but were, themselves, ambushed. Presumably, if the operation had gone as planned, there would have been no mention of a massacre. Tom Engelhardt has pointed out that framing of stories in this way, from frontier times to the present, reverses the roles of invader and invaded. He states, "it was the Indians who, by the ambush, the atrocity, and the capture of the white women...became the aggressors, and so sealed their own fate" (5). Thus, the *Star-Bulletin* frames the story within acceptable boundaries, depicts the National Liberation Front as "foreign," and places emphasis on American suffering rather than Vietnamese.

Jacques Ellul argues that propaganda such as this is "effective [when it] short-circuit[s] all thought and decision. It must operate on the individual on the level of the unconscious. He must not know that he is being shaped by outside forces" (27). Consequently, when readers of the *Star-Bulletin* or *Advertiser* read what looks like a purely factual account of a "draft dodger," they have already been prepared or conditioned by the newspapers to think of Park and other draft evaders in negative terms, as cowards or shirkers unwilling to fight along side heroic GIs in a war for "freedom." The *Roach* made no such pretense of objectivity. Instead it simply gave its support to Park and other draft evaders, and urged its readers to do all they could to help. Like most underground newspapers, The *Roach* viewed the mainstream press' supposed "honesty"
as a sham. Robert Glessing states, “Since most underground editors assume[d] the traditional media incapable of telling the truth about anything important, they reason[ed], ‘What’s the point of objectivity?’ It [was] perhaps its total distrust of American institutions that free[d] the underground press to attack anything and everything related to the American establishment” (6).

*Roach* also covered anti-war demonstrations such as that which took place at Fort DeRussy on May 13, 1968. The good-natured protest disrupted a National Guard convey and the police subsequently arrested nine students and a university professor for “loiter[ing]...loaf[ing] or idl[ing]” (“Ten Arrested for Fort DeRussy Sit-In”). Like many in the anti-war protest movement, *The Roach* saw its stance not as unpatriotic, but as an attempt to reclaim American values from militarist who had wrapped themselves in the U.S. flag. It therefore used the rhetoric of the Founding Fathers and the U.S. Constitution to that effect. On the front cover of the June 18, 1968 issue, for example, it quoted in full the text of the Declaration of Independence alongside a photograph of police arresting a protester at a “Students for Academic Freedom” march (“This Means Revolution!”).

Mainstream newspapers, however, tried to persuade readers that such protests were unpatriotic, dangerous to military morale, and harmful to soldiers fighting in Vietnam.

Michael Parenti has identified six methods used by the mainstream press to marginalize, trivialize, and damage the reputation of protesters (*Inventing Reality*, 99-102). These are, “Scanting of Content”: omitting the meaning of the protest and treating it as a ‘spectacle.’ “Trivialization”: reporting superficialities such as how protesters are dressed rather than discuss the central political or social issues. “Marginalization”: portraying protesters as abnormal and marginal characters with abstract, superficial ideas.
that are unrepresentative of the American people. "False Balance": to appear evenhanded and present a false sense of objectivity, the mainstream press gives disproportionate consideration and coverage to counterdemonstrations, many of which are much smaller than the main demonstration. "Undercounting": underestimating the numbers of protesters at a demonstration the newspaper is unsympathetic to, or alternatively, overestimating the numbers of counter demonstrators. "Omission": failing to report what the demonstration is actually about.

Honolulu’s two main newspapers were guilty of all of the above in their coverage of a 1966 anti-war protest march. For example, the Star Bulletin ran a two-column-wide story entitled “Rival marches are scheduled” directly beside a much more extensively reported story entitled “Tension mounts as protesters march.” The larger story is replete with lurid warnings and innuendo about violent protest marches on the mainland, although upon closer reading it becomes apparent that little or no violence occurred. The paper ensured that its readers would understand which “side” to be on by detailing the “hecklers [who] spat at the marchers and shouted ‘chicken, scum, cowards, commies!’” The smaller story about the upcoming Honolulu demonstration suffers from “guilt by association” with the mainland reports, as the Star-Bulletin had prepared or conditioned its readers into expecting violence from the Honolulu anti-war protesters. The Star-Bulletin also gave equal coverage to a counter demonstration even though it appears clear that the “pro-war” group’s march was a token gesture, involving an insignificant amount of people.

The Advertiser’s coverage of this march is headlined, “Isle’s Peacenik March Is A Calm One.” The newspaper automatically assumes that violence is the norm for protest
marches and the “news” is that this march passed peacefully. This point is reinforced as
the paper uses a “guilt by association” tactic, by referring to the “egg-throwing, police
arrests and feverish speeches” of some mainland protests. The fact that there were no
signs of violence at all did not stop reporter, David Butwin from creating a sense of
menace that was kept under control only by the vigilance and professionalism of the
authorities. He states, “If violence was brewing beneath the peaceful surface yesterday,
the police kept it there. Some 50 Honolulu police officers, many in casual aloha dress,
escorted the marchers...with the care of mother hens.” No plaudits were offered to the
anti-war protesters for successfully marshalling their own peaceful demonstration.
Butwin also suggests that violence is the norm in his choice of words. “[P]assion and
violence took a holiday,” he states, as if this protest was unusual for being non-violent.

The Advertiser also gave prominent coverage to a counter demonstration that was,
according to the newspaper’s figures, only a third the size of the main anti-war protest.
Butwin used a childish “heads I win, tails you lose” verbal trick, in stating, “Some people
heckled the anti-war group and some cheered the smaller body favoring U.S. policy in
Viet Nam.” Butwin’s palpable slanting of the protest is evident in his description of the
“pro-policy” (pro-war) group, one of whom he described as “one of the most attractive
sights” there. Butwin’s shameless manipulation of his readers’ emotions continued as he
described a little boy who, upon seeing the pro-war marchers allegedly said, “Here comes
the good guys.” Significantly, while Butwin failed to mention exactly what the protest
was about, or to provide any context, his keen eye spotted a protester’s “straw sombrero”
and a woman “crocheting,” the triviality of which seems to confirm Parenti’s analysis
that the mainstream press uses “selective details to make light of [the protesters’] dress,
age, language, styles, presumed lack of seriousness, and self-indulgent activities"
(Inventing Reality, 99-100).

Such coverage also confirms Parenti’s conclusion about “the media association of
protest with violence” (Inventing Reality, 98), and his overall thesis about the role of the
mainstream press during the Vietnam War, namely that it “spent more time attacking
those who protested the enormities of the world than those who perpetrated those
enormities” (Inventing Reality, 90). For example, the Advertiser gave space and first page
prominence to Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp to opine, “peace demonstrations merely prolong
the fighting” (“Adm. Sharp Believes Peace Protests Harmful”), thereby both ignoring the
reasons why “the fighting” occurred in the first instance, and also blaming the peace
protesters for wanting peace.

Underground papers like the Roach were also more inclusive in their attitude
towards women. Unlike Vietnamese women, American females were not allowed to join
combat units. American women served as nurses in the U.S. Army Medical Corps, or
joined the Red Cross and other voluntary services. Perhaps as many as 55,000 of them
worked in Vietnam during the war. Despite this, as Marilyn Young relates, “For women
veterans the[ir] problem[s] [were] compounded by the initial inability of anyone…to
acknowledge that they too were combat veterans” (322). The Vietnamese, however,
gladly acknowledged that females were as capable of combat as men, as was evidenced at
Dien Bien Phu against the French and during the Tet Offensive against U.S. forces.
American newspapers, however, failed to acknowledge the role of women on both sides
of the war. This is not surprising given that the newspaper industry was a male-

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dominated profession with few female reporters. Furthermore, those that were hired were
treated with condescension. Helen Geracimos Chapin notes, for example,

When the men returned after World War II, and unlike many of their mainland
counterparts, women kept their jobs, even when married to colleagues. They
continued, however, to be underrepresented as reporters, and in news
management, not to mention the back shop that is still largely male. When they
were represented, they were often trivialized, as in the Star-Bulletin's description
of its [283] excellent reporters, Helen Altonn and Harriet Gee, as "little jewels in
[the] newsrooms." (284)

Female American war correspondents were few and far between. When the
Advertiser hired Denby Fawcett in May 1966 as its Vietnam correspondent "specializing
in feature stories in and around Saigon" (Chaplin, 297), it already had two reporters, Bob
Krauss and Bob Jones reporting from the front lines. The Advertiser described Fawcett as
"An attractive 24-year-old" and admitted she was hired not to be objective as such, but
instead to "do articles on men and women who are lending their teaching, building and
medical skills to winning the peace" ("Newswoman, 24, Joins Advertiser's Viet Staff").
A later article further patronized the reporter by describing her as a "shapely, green-eyed
blonde about 5-feet, 4-inches tall" and "a very pretty girl-many say the prettiest of the 10
or 12 women correspondents in Vietnam" ("For Denby, Rigors of War Are Tempered By
Kindness").

The condescension and sexism of mainstream newspapers towards women who
served in the U.S. military and their own reporters contrasts greatly with underground
newspaper coverage of women's role in the National Liberation Front. For instance, the
Roach published stories such as "VN Women Liberation," in which it stated, "in the
course of the struggle against colonialist invaders, the Vietnamese women contributed
greatly to the fighting... and in the process are transforming their roles and
consciousness.” Underground G.I. paper Liberated Barracks frequently published positive, non-sexist photographs of Vietnamese women including one photo of a female National Liberation Front soldier with the accompanying text, “A Veteran of the Vietnam War” (“Who Is The Real Enemy?”). Not every underground newspaper was as enlightened as the Roach or Liberated Barracks, of course. As Todd Gitlin has noted, many papers were “stupidly sexist” (23). However, some of the outward manifestations of this sexism were forced upon the underground press by the actions of governmental agencies. Geoffrey Rips points out, for example, that the FBI pressured Columbia Records to withdraw its advertisements from the Berkeley Barb, which meant that the paper had to “survive...on lewd sex ads” (Mackenzie, 166).

Prior to 1967, the focus of the underground press in the United States was on cultural issues such as drugs, gay rights, music, sex, and religion, with occasional focus on political topics such as civil rights or the war in Vietnam. However, as the war progressed and its violence was reflected in the streets of America, the underground press became more political. This swing from cultural to political emphasis was not permanent, however. After Tet in 1968, amendments to the draft laws, and state-authorized oppression of the most political and influential underground newspapers, subsequent alternative papers shifted their focus from politics back to cultural issues. Robert Glessing notes, for example, “By 1969 many underground editors were disillusioned and depressed by the failure of the Peace and Freedom Party, SDS, or the Black Panthers to get the youth movement together...Many of the underground press’s leaders had given up on cities, schools, and American institutions in general and were trying alternative ways of living” (66). Gathering Place is a prime example of this trend.
Chapin concludes that the main focus of *Gathering Place* was on “drugs and sex, gay news, and psychedelic art” (277). Certainly the front covers of early editions would support this assertion. For example, unlike the amateurish and sometimes badly drawn covers of the *Roach*, the covers of *Gathering Place* have artistic merit. *Roach*’s covers are mostly political cartoons, whereas the covers of *Gathering Place* tended to be psychedelic scenes that include depictions of butterflies, a frog, flowers, naked women, and a temple or hippie commune. The content of *Gathering Place* reflected the cultural and artistic tenor of its covers. However, the paper also found space to criticize the war in Vietnam and the U.S. military in Hawai‘i. For example, while the first issue of *Gathering Place* featured the above-mentioned cover of psychedelic flowers, frogs and butterflies, and a teaser stating “inside: a study of 1000 Honolulu pot smokers,” also contained inside is a well-written analysis of the rise of military General Nguyen Cao Ky, a man whose murderous exploits were known and supported by the U.S. government (“Who is Nguyen Cao Ky?”). Allegations of drug smuggling leveled against Ky, whether true or not, exemplify the type of areas that an underground newspaper would examine, that the mainstream newspapers chose not to cover. As far as the mainstream press was concerned, America’s South Vietnamese allies were freedom-loving democrats, and President Johnson had personally embraced Ky at a 1966 Honolulu conference (Herring, 156).

Unlike its mainstream counterparts, *Gathering Place* was prepared to criticize the U.S. military presence in Hawai‘i. “The first windmill I’m going to attack is the US Army,” declared journalist Bob Shipley (“Crash, Burn and Wipeout Dept.”). Shipley was a keen off-road motorcyclist who was annoyed at the amount of land used by the military
that was out of bounds to in Hawai‘i residents. Shipley criticized the Army’s destruction of the environment and its unwillingness to compromise with local residents. He stated, “Various groups of responsible citizens have tried for years to play ball with the Army…but the Army has consistently refused to even listen to what we have to say.”

Unlike the conventional press, Gathering Place was not prepared to act as a propaganda organ for the military or the Pentagon. For instance, when news of the Song My (aka My Lai) massacre finally broke in the mainstream newspapers, long after the alternative press had covered the story, Gathering Place’s Jon Olsen was able to declare, “My Lai, as most of us know, was not an isolated instance, but far too typical of US policy toward Asian people in practice, which is quite different from official pronouncements. Radical papers reported events like My Lai years ago, but because of rampant anti-communism, such reports were not given much credibility by non-radicals” (Olsen, 11). Hawai‘i’s radical military newspaper Liberated Barracks also made this point, declaring, “My Lai was not a single isolated incident but part of a general policy of genocide against the Vietnamese people which is promulgated very high up the chain of command” (“VVAW Winter Soldier Investigation”).

In 1969, as reports of this massacre began to appear, the Star-Bulletin gave considerable space to General Lewis Walt to deny the story. Under the headline “U.S. General Discounts Massacre,” the paper declared that Walt “believes reports of an alleged massacre in Vietnam exaggerated the civilian death toll for Communist propaganda purposes.” Walt stated, “in any case, whatever may have happened at Song My would be contrary to any battle orders he, Gen. Westmoreland or Gen. Creighton Abrams ever put out.” Walt’s words were not challenged by any reporters, and were
of course, Walt was lying: My Lai did happen and not only was it officially sanctioned, the U.S. military also tried to cover it up. As H. Bruce Franklin states, My Lai “was not an aberration but a sample of how the United States conducted its genocidal warfare against the people of Vietnam...this was part of an official policy of terrorizing and massacring all civilians deemed sympathetic to the insurgents” (39).

_Gathering Place_ also told its readers of what has since become one of the great forgotten stories of the Vietnam era, namely that of U.S military spying on civilians. In its coverage of peace group Catholic Action’s “almost daily” anti-war leafleting campaign at the gates of Hickam Air Force Base, _Gathering Place_’s journalists noticed that the leaflet distributors were being photographed by U.S. military intelligence, probably the 710th Military Intelligence Unit (Chapin, 275). The paper reminded its readers that, “Back in 1970 military intelligence agents admitted to Sen. Sam J. Ervin’s subcommittee on constitutional rights that they had been spying on civilian protest groups for several years...Soon the Army said they would stop this perfidious practice and told Ervin in March of 1970 that their data bank on civilians had been ‘discontinued and destroyed’” (“Propaganda Guerillas Invade Hickam”). In actual fact, the espionage activities of U.S. military intelligence was exposed some time before that, as journalist Aryeh Neier explains:

It was a revelation in January, 1970, that the United States Army was compiling dossiers on the political beliefs and associations of Americans that finally made political surveillance a matter of great public controversy. The revelation came in a magazine article by Christopher Pyle, a lawyer and a former Captain in the United States Army. Pyle...eventually persuaded more than a hundred former military intelligence agents to join him in revealing publicly that they had spied on the peaceful political activities of their fellow Americans. (15)
This exposure led to the Congressional investigation mentioned in *Gathering Place*, and also to an ACLU lawsuit. Although the lawsuit failed, the unwanted publicity generated by the Congressional investigation prompted the military to promise to desist from further spying on civilians. As Geoffrey Rips explains, however, the military did not keep that promise: “When restrictions placed on military intelligence in 1971 called for destroying files on civilians, Army agents in Chicago, Cleveland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.D., gave the files instead to local and state police” (57). Furthermore, if *Gathering Place* is correct in its reporting of military intelligence spying on peace activists in Honolulu, it is obvious that the military continued at least some of its espionage against civilians, in defiance of the U.S. Congress.

The inaugural issue of *Hawaii Free Press* in July 1969 attacked the University of Hawai‘i for its role in the Vietnam War. It assailed the university for accepting military research contracts such as, “chemical-biological warfare research, ROTC, and the many other defense-stimulated projects being conducted at our universities” (“The New Look At The U of H”). The paper also alleged that “personnel associated with the CIA” staffed many university departments. To many at the time such statements must have seemed like bizarre conspiracy theories. In fact, however, a small alternative magazine called *Ramparts* had already broken the story, as Michael Parenti relates: “many important and revealing stories are broken by small publications with only a fraction of the material resources and staff available to the mass media. The startling news that the CIA was funding cultural, academic, and student organizations was first publicized by the now defunct *Ramparts* magazine” (*Inventing Reality*, 53). At the request of the CIA, *Ramparts* was then audited by the IRS. (Rips, 75; Mackenzie, 161).
In time, the Hawaii Free Press was proven correct on an issue that the mainstream press would not investigate. Robert Witanek of the Peace Center of Central Jersey states, for example,

Professors and CIA operatives with academic cover have worked extensively on campuses around the world...they have written books, articles, and reports for U.S. consumption with secret CIA sponsorship and censorship; they have spied on foreign nationals at home and abroad; they have regularly recruited foreign and U.S. students and faculty for the CIA; they have hosted conferences with secret CIA backing under scholarly cover, promoting disinformation; and they have collected data, under the rubric of research, on Third World liberation and other movements opposed to U.S. intervention.

According to Noam Chomsky, the Political Science Department at Massachusetts Institute of Technology was connected to the CIA. He states, “Around 1960, the Political Science Department separated off from the Economics Department. And at that time it was openly funded by the CIA; it was not even a secret... In the mid-1960s, it stopped being publicly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, but it was still directly involved in activities that were scandalous” (The Cold War and the University, 181).

Also, Haunani-Kay Trask has stated that the Chair of the American Studies Department at the University of Hawai‘i, “By his own proud admission...had worked for the Central Intelligence Agency prior to his appointment at the East-West Center and the university” (Native Daughter, 153).

The Hawaii Free People's Press also revealed the chasm in thinking between pro-war supporters and anti-war activists, many of whom were in the military. For example, in an article entitled “Making the Military Mind,” the paper relates a meeting at Tripler Army Hospital between army representatives and what the paper calls in the colorful language of the time, “student worker slaves of the military machine.” By 1969 military officials realized that they were fighting not only the Vietnamese but also a war for the
“hearts and minds” of its own soldiers. The military therefore began a series of meetings that were ostensibly attempts to address soldiers’ concerns, but which were, according to the Hawaii Free People’s Press, a calculated plan to have “a series of chaplains, lawyers, and doctors speaking ‘man to man,’ hoping to steer the troops to programmed conclusions, parroting Establishment dogma.”

The first speaker was a Company Commander who had no idea how alienated he was from a section of his troops. When he asked what his men wanted to talk about, the first question he received from a “black militant” was why soldiers should have to salute officers and stand to attention. This soldier compared such military trappings to “prostrating oneself before the emperor.” When the Company Commander tried to reassure soldiers about racial issues, by asking the black soldiers attending if they agreed that the condition of the “Negro” in American has improved, he was, according to the paper, met first with silence before one apathetic soldier replied, “Naw, nothing much has really been changed.” One soldier asked the Company Commander what his feelings were about war. His reply, which including such military-speak as “specific objectives,” “progressive execution,” and consummating in a tangible victory, fulfilling the specific objectives,” highlighted the gap not only between the soldiers and their officers but also between the casual, “hip” language of the alternative newspaper and the cold, machine-like language that was (and is) the official military mode of verbal communication. James Dawes argues that such terminology “replaces the aversive incomprehensibility of war’s inhuman scale with a finite collection of clean, containable units of information” that he calls “disposable...information” (32). Such disengaged language was a world away from the youth generation that had turned on, tuned in, and dropped out.
Underground newspapers such as the *Hawaii Free People's Press* also gave a voice to Native Hawaiian activists and exposed American military abuses towards Pacific Islanders. In a piece entitled “An Open Letter to my Brothers and Sisters of Hawaii,” one activist noted that out of frustration and a sense of powerlessness Hawaiians had “take[n] out our anger and frustration on defenseless servicemen, hippies and tourists.” In a plea for Native Hawaiians to recognize the cause of their frustration is American imperialism and the theft of Hawaiian sovereignty, the writer reminds Hawaiians that their “fear of the haole is... shown by our irrational patriotism. We look upon draft avoiders, flag burners, and political activists as cowards and traitors.” This misplaced anger is the natural result of decades of exposure to militaristic narratives of U.S. patriotism.

“[M]ilitary order is heavily written into Hawai‘i” (Ferguson and Turnbull, xiv) in the Waikiki War Memorial, The Army Museum of Hawaii, and in many other purveyors of military history in Hawai‘i that link the sacrifice of Native Hawaiians to the cause of American freedom. To a certain extent (some) Native Hawaiians had come to see themselves as others demanded, namely, as loyal patriotic Americans. Sociologist Charles Cooley calls this effect “the looking-glass self” (Montagu & Matson, xxxi).

Whereas the mainstream press remained virtually silent about the effects of U.S. nuclear testing in the Pacific, the underground press covered the story in depth. A Roach article, entitled “Micronesians Demand Decent Conditions,” highlighted the plight of the people of Eniwetok [sic] who suffered as a result of U.S. nuclear testing “Micronesians Demand Decent Conditions”). The 142 impoverished islanders of Enewetak agreed to let the U.S. use their island for atomic tests in return for $175,000 compensation. They were evacuated by the U.S. in December 1947 and relocated at Ujelang. Ujelang was,
however, a smaller island than Enewetak, which had a lagoon that was 37 kilometers in
diameter, and provided less food and fresh water. Stuart Firth states that the islanders
"looked back on their life in Enewetak as a golden age" (34).

As for Enewetak itself, the U.S. military exploded three "low yield" atomic
bombs there in 1948. However, the island was totally transformed when the U.S. decided
to use it as a permanent nuclear testing facility. An urban infrastructure was built and the
island became almost unrecognizable to its pre-war state. The U.S. developed the world’s
first hydrogen bomb there and on November 1st 1952 an H-bomb the strength of 800
Hiroshimas was exploded on the island’s northern side. Ten nuclear tests also took place
on Enjebi Island to the north, which remains heavily contaminated and cannot support
human habitation. Until 1968, Enewetak was also used as a target for U.S. missiles
launched from California. By that time, two of the atoll’s islands had been completely
vaporized.

The *Roach*, showing not only an investigative vigor missing from the mainstream
papers, but also some much-needed compassion, concluded that “the past twenty years
have been miserable for the people of Eniwetok” and demanded that they be returned
from exile. In part, the failure of the mainstream press to report on the plight of Pacific
Islanders affected by nuclear testing can be explained by what Paul Boyer has called a
“stifling blanket of official secrecy” (*By the Bomb's Early Light*, 304) in the early years
of atomic testing. Although, as Boyer has shown, there was significant media interest in
the tests, with continuing articles in magazines such as *Time, Colliers, Reader's Digest*,
as well as significant press coverage and scientific debate, the victims of American (and
French and British) atomic testing were largely forgotten about.
Like every other alternative or underground newspaper in Hawai‘i in the 1960s and early 1970s, the *Hawaii Free Press* opposed the military draft and actively encouraged “draft dodging” and desertion. The paper began circulating in 1969, in the wake of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, when even pro-war establishment newspapers were beginning to have doubts about the efficacy of the war, if not the ideology behind it. By this stage, there was no real need to appeal to its readers to avoid the draft, as many young people were politically aware enough at this stage to know the issues involved. The paper therefore provided information that would help those who had already chosen to avoid military service. In an article entitled “Canada Welcomes Deserters,” the paper assured military deserters and draft avoiders that “Deserters from the U.S. Armed Forces will be welcome immigrants to Canada.” The paper advised those interested that they should “enter Canada as a visitor or tourist and get in touch with one of the anti-military groups for counseling. Deserters should not apply at the border for immigration – even though such application is now permitted because it is essential that they be properly prepared to make application.” The paper then lists a contact address and provides a phone number that deserters or draft avoiders could use. Such detailed, practical information on how to disrupt war planning and militarism shows just how far the anti-war movement had progressed by 1969. No longer were there calls to revolt as, to a certain extent, it had already happened. Instead, the paper provided matter-of-fact information on how to make the revolt go smoothly.

The U.S. Army that began the Vietnam War was vastly different to the U.S. Army that ended it. In 1965, the U.S. troops that too part in the first large scale military operations against the Vietnamese, were professional soldiers. They made up an all-
volunteer army that had won an unprecedented series of battles from Revolutionary times until the Korean War. By the end of the Vietnam War, however, the U.S. Army was almost unrecognizable. In a 1971 article published in Armed Forces Journal entitled, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces," Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr. concluded:

The morale, discipline and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are, with a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at anytime in this century and possibly in the history of the United States. By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and non commissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous.

As casualties mounted, so too did the number of unwilling conscripted soldiers. Many of these very young men were anti-war to begin with, and they were unwilling to take risks or obey orders from officers that would put them in danger. Such "combat refusals" became increasingly common in Vietnam in the later years of the war. Some soldiers would “frag” (shoot or hand-grenade) a senior officer they did not like. Race played a part in these events. For example, Black veteran Don F. Browne, who helped retake the American Embassy in Saigon after the Tet offensive, recalls: “When I heard that Martin Luther King was assassinated, my first inclination was to run out and punch the first white guy I saw” (Terry, 167). Vietnam veteran and author Wallace Terry states, “The war, which had bitterly divided America like no other issue since the Civil War, had become a double battleground, pitting American soldier against American soldier. The spirit of foxhole brotherhood I found in 1967 had evaporated” (xv).

Veteran Philip Caputo states that he was, “seduced into uniform by Kennedy’s challenge to ‘ask what you can do for your country’ and by the missionary idealism he had awakened in us” (xiv). He was convinced that he was doing something, “noble and good.” He gradually realised, however, that, “the men we had scorned as peasant
guerrillas were, in fact, a lethal determined enemy” and that war which had, “begun as an
adventurous expedition had turned into an exhausting, indecisive war of attrition in which
we fought for no cause other than our own survival” (xiv). Caputo criticizes American
strategy. He states that General William C. Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition turned
men into cold blooded killers and put unreasonable pressure on unit commanders to
produce results: “This led to such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong. It is not
surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for human life and a
predilection for taking it” (xix). Caputo concludes this his comrades were “out there
lacking restraints, sanctioned to kill...we sank into a brutish state” (xx).

Underground newspapers were not the cause of G.I. unrest, but they did act as a
catalyst and a conduit for it, as Howard Zinn explains:

Near Fort Jackson, South Carolina, the first ‘GI coffeehouse’ was set up, a place
where soldiers could get coffee and doughnuts, find antiwar literature, and talk
freely with others. It was called the UFO, and lasted for several years before it
was declared a ‘public nuisance’ and closed by court action. But other GI
coffeehouses sprang up in half a dozen other places across the country. An
antiwar ‘bookstore’ was opened near Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and another
one at Newport, Rhode Island, naval base. Underground newspapers sprang up at
military bases across the country; by 1970 more than fifty were circulating.
Among them: About Face in Los Angeles; Fed Up! In Tacoma, Washington;
Short Times at Fort Jackson; Vietnam GI in Chicago; Graffiti in Heidelberg,
Germany; Bragg Briefs in North Carolina; Last Harass at Fort Gordon, Georgia;
Helping Hand at Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho. These newspapers printed
antiwar articles, gave news about the harassment of GIs and practical advice on
the legal rights of servicemen, told how to resist military domination.” (484-85)

Hawaii had its own G.I. paper in the Liberated Barracks, which began printing in 1971.

By this time, unrest among soldiers in Hawaii had been ongoing for at least four years.

Soldiers, sailors, and airmen had taken part in anti-war protests, written letters of support
to underground papers like Roach, and participated in personal acts of dissent such as
wearing peace signs or buttons on their uniforms or displayed on their cars. In 1968,
thirty-six members of the military sought asylum in local churches (Chapin, 277-78). In 1969 soldiers and civilians marched from Kapiolani Park to Ala Moana Park to demand a “bill of rights” for military personnel. In the aftermath of the march, up to fifty servicemen sought sanctuary at the Church of the Crossroads and the First Unitarian Church of Honolulu (Blanco).

*Liberated Barracks* began life as a G.I. coffeehouse for military men like these who were “taking a stand against what they feel is a futile and senseless war” (Norwood, 7). The coffeehouse opened in April 1971, and by September 1971, the first issue of the new G.I. paper, *Liberated Barracks*, was printed. The paper ran until 1974, and covered numerous topics related to military life in Hawai’i and to the war in Vietnam. In the first issue, a column entitled “Hawaii: why so much military,” made for an interesting alternative to the mainstream media’s adoration of the U.S. military presence in Hawai’i. For example, unlike the mainstream *Honolulu Advertiser* or *Star Bulletin, Liberated Barracks*, in admitting that Hawai’i is “very dependent upon defense in general and the military in particular,” also talked of the social and economic “sacrifice[s]” that military dependence brings, which include being asked to support the U.S. military even when it fights unjust wars against “people fighting for their self-determination and freedom.” *Liberated Barracks* also pointed out that “38% of the land on Oahu is controlled by the military, bottling land we need for food and housing. Our schools and other social institutions are pressured by the increased military migration of dependents, as is our housing crisis and work opportunities.” “Hawaii: why so much military” became an ongoing column, and in later editions would discuss other topics that were and are seemingly still “off limits” to the mainstream press, including nuclear weapon storage at
Pearl Harbor (Feb 1972: 4), and how the presence of the military promotes prostitution (Mar 1972: 11).

*Liberated Barracks* also promoted Native Hawaiian cultural and sovereignty issues. For instance, it advised its readers to buy the Hawaii Pono Journal as “Our G.I. struggle in Hawaii is very closely related to the over-all problems and struggles of Hawaii’s people...we must understand clearly our Hawaiian brothers and sisters problems and struggles” (“Hawaii Pono Journal”). The paper also supported pressure from students and activists for the University of Hawai‘i to institute an ethnic studies program to counteract damaging historical myths propagated by non-Native Hawaiian historians. It stated, “From the time of the missionaries, Hawaiian history has been written by White people who thought that the Hawaiians were ignorant savages, and completely ignored the rich and beautiful culture that was already here.” An ethnic studies program was needed to counteract “a school system based on Western values and thinking” (“Ethnic Studies ”).

*Liberated Barracks* also disproves the myth that anti-war activists such as Jane Fonda were universally hated within the military because of their supposedly anti-American views. For instance, in its November 1971 edition, the paper promoted and sponsored a “Free The Army” (FTA) show featuring Fonda, actor Donald Sutherland, and musician Country Joe McDonald among others. The show took place at the Civic Auditorium on November 25th, 1971, in front of an audience comprised of 4000 military personnel (“I Said ‘Keep On Truckin’...’”). According to the *Advertiser*, however, “Of the 4,000, about 2,500 were servicemen and their wives” (“A Rapping Good Time With Jane”). The *Star-Bulletin* claimed only 3,500 people were in attendance (“F.T.A. Show Is
Biting, Disrespectful, Well Done”). This discrepancy may be due to what Michael Parenti argues is the mainstream media’s “regular practice of undercounting the size of demonstrations” (*Inventing Reality*, 97), in this case, undercounting the number of military personnel to minimize the scope of military dissent against militarism and the war in Vietnam. According to *Liberated Barracks* publicity material, the show was intended to “reflect the attitudes, sentiments and feelings of the servicemen and women who struggle against the dehumanizing oppression of the American military machine” (“FTA Show Comes To Hawaii”). Despite some moping in the run up to the event about mainstream press exclusion from private meetings between Fonda and *Liberated Barracks*, the *Advertiser* and *Star-Bulletin*’s overall coverage of the show itself is fairly even-handed, the result perhaps of prevailing anti-war attitudes in 1971 even among former “hawks.”

Military authorities despised G.I. newspapers and did their utmost to make life difficult or impossible for those military personnel involved in producing, distributing, or simply receiving the papers. Geoffrey Ripps notes, for example,

> To control these underground publications, the command used disciplinary, judicial, and surreptitious tactics. Intimidation by rank and threats of prosecution by military courts often provoked self-censorship among writers in the military. Those who exercised their right to publish and write were harassed and verbally abused by their superiors. Sometimes they were transferred without advanced notice, demoted to menial assignments, and followed by military police and intelligence. (139)

The military hierarchy faced two problems however. Firstly, the imposition of blatant censorship might prove to be counterproductive to troop morale. Robert Glessing states, for example, “The problem for the military has been the risk of increasing the interest in antiwar literature by banning such literature or by declaring it dangerous” (141).
Secondly, even those in the military retain some Constitutional rights, as Chapin explains: “In 1969, the U.S. Army issued a ‘Guidance on Dissent,’ which all of the services supposedly followed. This stated that the ‘publication of underground newspapers by soldiers off post, and with their own money and equipment, is generally protected under the First Amendment’ (279-80). As both Chapin and Ripps point out, however, such is the power of the officer class in the military that such guidelines could be ignored at the local level without fear of official retribution.

**Media Coverage of the Tet Offensive.**

Perhaps the main point of contention regarding media coverage of the Vietnam War has been coverage of the Tet offensive, which began on Jan 30, 1968. In 1967, President Johnson waged a propaganda offensive in America to try to maintain support for his policies in Vietnam. He recalled General Westmoreland to the United States so that Westmoreland could give optimistic briefings to the media about American “progress” in the war. Westmoreland said, “We are now in a position from which the picture of ultimate victory success may be viewed with increasing clarity” (Hallin, 165). Westmoreland’s outward optimism belied the private fears of many in the Johnson administration that the Vietnam War was actually going very badly indeed. For instance, by 1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had decided basically that the war was unwinnable (Herman & Chomsky, 217), was asking Johnson to scale down his expectations, refuse to send more troops, and begin real negotiations with North Vietnam (Herring, 176-77).

In January 1968, anti-American forces launched a huge offensive across all of Vietnam, including attacks on fortified military bases such as Khe Sahn, and on cities
such as Saigon and Hue. This was a major change in tactics from guerrilla warfare to full-scale frontal assaults on American and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. The attacks were planned so that they would have maximum military and political impact, both in Vietnam and the United States. Militarily, the National Liberation Front used the Tet New Year ceasefire and holiday as cover for the attacks. Politically, the offensive coincided with the initial stages of President Johnson's reelection campaign. In its initial stages, the Tet offensive achieved the element of surprise and caused wide scale American military casualties and disruption. The American Embassy in Saigon was briefly over-run; Saigon's Tan Son Nhut airport was attacked; Khe Sahn was under permanent siege; the ancient citadel at Hue was recaptured from the Americans; five out of six major cities were assaulted, as well as thirty six out of forty four provincial capitals (Herring, 186). While American forces gradually regained much lost ground, at huge cost both to themselves, Vietnam's civilian population and infrastructure, and to the enemy, the political fall out from the Tet offensive would be long-lasting. Just a few months before, General Westmoreland had been assuring the American people that the war was almost over. Events during Tet proved that to be over-optimistic at best, and at worst, incompetence or outright deception.

American militarists and conservatives argue that media coverage of Tet made the situation look worse than it was. They argue that the media misrepresented or failed to report that Tet was a resounding military victory for America and its allies, and that the media turned the American public against the war. They argue Tet was a desperate gamble by an almost-defeated enemy, and that, as Westmoreland and his supporters maintain, "a hostile and all-too-powerful media seized defeat from the jaws of victory by
turning the public against the war and limiting the government’s freedom of action just when the United States had a battered enemy on the ropes” (Herring, 200). Certainly the Tet offensive “failed” if one considers it only in terms of land won and lost, or casualties inflicted balanced against casualties received. However, the National Liberation Front showed that they were able to strike almost anywhere they wished and, more importantly, they struck a devastating psychological blow to those Americans who thought victory was in sight.

Moreover, the National Liberation Front freed perhaps as many as 200,000 prisoners, which more than made up for their losses during the offensive (Franklin, 95). Furthermore, American critics of the media have forgotten the lessons of their own revolution. During the American Revolution, British forces won victory upon victory in individual battles and yet still lost the war. American leaders such as General Nathanael Greene knew that if they prevented their forces from being completely defeated they would wear down the British Army and, more importantly, break the resolve of British politicians and the general public. British General Lord Cornwallis is alleged to have said, for example, after his victory at Guilford Courthouse that if he had any more “victories” like this he would soon lose the war. In a similar way, the National Liberation Front showed that they could better tolerate losses than either the American military or the American public.

No amount of factual data shall, however, convince those who blame the media for misrepresenting the causes, conduct, and effects of the Tet offensive. Marilyn Young states,

Those Americans who insist that Westmoreland and Bunker were right, that the United States was winning the war, still see the reporting of Tet, rather than the
event itself, as the crucial factor. Because Tet was reported as an American defeat, they claim, politicians lost heart, rejected making an increased effort, and took the first steps on the slippery slope toward withdrawal and admitted defeat. (222)

That criticism began a few weeks into the offensive and it came directly from the top – the Johnson administration. An Advertiser editorial dated February 18, 1968 quotes a cabinet member who accused the media of “being ambitiously negative” and who asked, “Whose side are you on” ("The Press & Vietnam"). However, a close analysis of media coverage of Tet shows that such conservative criticism of the media is, in fact, totally incorrect. For instance, Tet was not the “sneak attack” that is commonly believed.

The Star Bulletin reported on Jan 29, 1968, the day before the offensive began, that because of a North Vietnamese military build up, the “allies called off the Tet truce in South Vietnam’s northern military sector” ("U.S. Allies call off cease-fire in North").

The accusation that the media reported Tet as a military victory for the National Liberation Front is patently false. Marilyn Young affirms that, “Tet was in fact not reported as an NLF victory" (222). This is evidenced by actual newspaper reports, as opposed to myths that have arisen about them. For example, on the second day of the battle the Star Bulletin reported, without comment or analysis, official military sources that listed enemy casualties as 1,800 and American/ARVN casualties as 40 (“Viet Cong troops seize part of Hue”). On page two, the paper also quoted U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker who said, “Saigon is secure now” – an obvious falsehood given that fighting continued in and around Saigon for months afterward (Franklin, 95). This trend continued as the battle dragged on, the Star Bulletin listing only American military spokespeople’s casualty figures, all of which showed that the National Liberation Front was suffering heavy casualties, whereas American and ARVN casualties were relatively
light. Such reporting reached its apex in a February 12, page one headline that assured readers that the “Reds won the headlines at record cost,” with an accompanying story that begins, “Things are not so bad as they might seem…the Communists won the world’s headlines [but] have suffered a major military defeat.”

With regard to the accusation that the mainstream media misrepresented the truth, then the government must have been lying in that the Star-Bulletin took the official U.S. government and military position. In a February 1st 1968 editorial entitled “Attacks of desperation,” the paper assured its readers that the Tet offensive should not “undermine the assumption that our basic war plan is sound and succeeding.” According to the paper Tet was a “suicidal” effort that was prompted by “desperation.” Furthermore, the Tet offensive was a “climactic final effort” and when it is over the “tide of the war will be flowing in our favor even more strongly than before.” An official military censor could not have written a more favorable editorial in support of the government and Pentagon position. Indeed, the next day the Star Bulletin reported the words of Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak that the attacks were “acts of desperation” and that the Viet Cong had “captured no territory…have not slowed the powerful Allied machine [and] have not altered either our plans or our purposes” (“Krulak calls raids acts of desperation”). A further editorial on February 9 told readers that everyone must “keep our cool,” that the “fact that battles have not gone as expected does not make the cause any less just or the victory any less important” (“Keep the goal in sight.”). The Star Bulletin assured readers that “We are still very much in control of South Vietnam” and that the American people must “rally round and do our utmost to defeat the enemy.” These are hardly the words or
actions of a press attempting to convince Americans that the war was lost or that Tet was a resounding communist success.

The accusation that the American media was undermining the war effort and actually siding with the enemy is also not borne out by facts. For example, if one considers the photographs the Star-Bulletin used to illustrate its coverage of Tet one finds only heart-rending images of supposed National Liberation Front victims. For example, a photograph given prominence on page two of one edition shows an ARVN officer carrying a dead child in his arms. The photograph is entitled “Viet Cong Executed Her,” and the supporting text states, “A South Vietnamese officer carries his dead child from his home. The officer’s family was executed by the Viet Cong when they overran his home in a military compound in a suburb of Saigon. He was out leading his troops in Saigon street fighting.” Another prominent page-two photograph a few days later entitled “Marine Rescues Girl,” shows a U.S. soldier carrying a Vietnamese child with the accompanying text, “A U.S. Marine carries a seriously wounded Vietnamese girl through a shattered wall of her home in Hue during heavy street fighting.”

The propaganda value of these images is obvious. Less obvious perhaps is the paper’s usage of the imagery of the home. Not only do the photographs suggest that the National Liberation Front are the outsiders attacking the homes of the “real” Vietnamese, but also, they show Americans and their allies as protectors of innocent children who are threatened and brutalized by the enemy. Moreover, the image of the home under attack is an enduring one in American culture. As Jill Lepore points out, “When John Foster engraved a map of New England to accompany William Hubbard’s Narrative, he marked English territory with tiny houses and church steeples, and Indian territory with trees”
(83). The home represents civilization, a safe haven from the savage beasts of the forest, in this case, the National Liberation Front. In contrast to the prominence given to photographs sympathetic to the American cause, on Feb 14, 1968 the Star Bulletin relegated one of the most famous photographs of the war, Eddie Adams’s horrific image of the execution of a bound National Liberation Front prisoner by General Nguyen Ngoc Loan of the South Vietnam police, to page E8 where it was unlikely to be noticed. If a reader did come across it, the accompanying text would assure that the National Liberation Front soldier probably deserved his fate, having been captured “Carrying a pistol and wearing civilian clothes.”

It is clear that the militarist, right-wing criticism of media coverage of Tet is nothing but smoke and mirrors. As Marilyn Young asserts, the press “accepted official statements that Tet had been a major military defeat for Hanoi and the NLF” (222). Media coverage did have a profound effect on how Americans viewed the war. However, much of that was due to the obvious challenge Tet made to the unduly optimistic statements of the Johnson administration and U.S. military commanders. Herman and Chomsky conclude that media coverage of Tet “was creditable, sometimes very highly so, in a narrow sense. More broadly, this reporting was highly deceptive in that it was framed within the unchallenged and unrecognized doctrines of the state propaganda system, which impose a severe distortion (227). In this analysis the “big lie” is the reasons given for American involvement in Vietnam, which the mainstream media ignored, whereas the secondary supporting distortions that Tet did much to undermine, plays a less important overall role than the conservative critics of the media would still have us believe.
Conclusion

Herman and Chomsky argue that the media practiced two levels of misrepresentation in its reporting of the Vietnam War. The first was what could be called "the big lie," what Chomsky actually calls the "central and quite devastating criticism: the media’s pervasive, docile, and unthinking acceptance of a set of patriotic assumptions at such a level as to make further commentary of secondary significance, at best (186). The second level of lying is in the details. For example, Herman and Chomsky list the failure of the U.S. media to cover U.S. military activity in Laos as evidence of the media’s voluntary complicity in keeping the real war away from the eyes of the American people. The authors state, “Not only did the media fail to publish the information about the attack against a defenseless civilian society or seek to investigate further for themselves, but they proceeded to provide exculpatory accounts they knew to be inaccurate” (256)

They further assert, “Media failure to report the facts when they were readily available, in 1968, and to investigate further when they were undeniable, by late 1969, contributed to the successful deception of the public, and to the continuing destruction.” (259). Herman and Chomsky’s analysis covers the period up to the end of 1968, and it was only in 1969 that the New York Times finally ran its first story on this “secret” war. The Index to the Honolulu Advertiser and Honolulu Star Bulletin for the period 1929 to 1967 shows that the newspapers ran twenty-five stories on Laos between 1957 and 1967. However, not one of them mentions U.S. military action in Laos. The Index to the Honolulu Advertiser and Honolulu Star Bulletin for 1968 shows that no stories at all about Laos appeared in that year, despite it containing some of the heaviest combat.
These figures would suggest that both newspapers avoided the subject, and that Herman and Chomsky's analysis is accurate.

Hawaiʻi's news media has tangible links with the U.S. military, whether it is through military liaison groups or by accepting free trips on military equipment. The media sees the presence of the military in Hawaiʻi as essential both to the Islands' economy, and also to its own security and well-being. To an extent, these shared interests account for the "free ride" the media gives to the U.S. military, but it is surely not the full story. Consider Vietnam, for example, when on many occasions journalists did not report the actual facts of the war even as they were unfolding in front of their eyes. What else could account for the media's investigative failure?

Tom Engelhardt argues that in the decades after World War Two, "the United States was a triumphalist society that lacked a defeat to make tangible its deepest despairs and anxieties" *(History Wars, 239)*. This triumphalism arose partially out of a seemingly unending series of military successes. However, ingrained nationalism, patriotism, the collective belief in American exceptionalism, and perhaps most of all the fear that monolithic Communism was a threat to American dominance, all of these factors caused journalists to champion their own "side" and to avoid practicing objective journalism. In his exhaustive study of the media in Vietnam, Daniel Hallin states that American reporters in Vietnam were "deeply committed to the 'national security' consensus that had dominated American politics since the onset of the Cold War, and acted as 'responsible' advocates of that consensus" *(9)*. So while individual journalist may have reported incidents and conditions in Vietnam that contradicted official political or
Pentagon statements, overall, the causal reasons for American policy were never questioned.

Undoubtedly too, race played a part. Years of exposure to negative stereotypes of Asians caused journalists to paint “an almost one-dimensional image of the Vietnamese and Vietcong as cruel, ruthless, and fanatical” (Young, 193). Perhaps it was due to this factor that few American journalists ever bothered to report from the side of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (Young, 195; Herman and Chomsky, 177). The Advertiser sent three journalists to Vietnam to report firsthand on events from the American side only. Its top journalists, Bob Krauss and Bob Jones, were so successful in acting as a conduit for the official version of events that General William Westmoreland “wrote in a note of appreciation to the paper that Krauss and Jones were reporting ‘thoroughly and accurately’” (Chaplin, 260). Throughout, the Advertiser and Star-Bulletin performed as a mouthpiece of the U.S. government and the Pentagon. Despite almost unlimited freedom of movement and lack of official censorship, factors that were quite unlike World War Two press coverage, neither paper really criticized the U.S. military or the reasons why the U.S. was involved in Vietnam. Neither raised any questions about the U.S. presence in Hawai‘i, or the morality of using Hawai‘i as a base for waging war on Indochina.

Only towards the end of the war did the Advertiser, in particular, raise some limited questions about the conduct of the war, but not the underlying assumptions of American involvement. Conversely, Hawai‘i’s underground press operated without this self-imposed constraint. Free of ties to the military, the government, or corporate financial interests, the alternative media broadened the debate by fulfilling the role of
investigative journalism that Hawai`i’s two main newspapers so clearly failed to do. Author William Burroughs once remarked, “What the American alternative press did in the 1960s is of inestimable value. Many of the gains in freedom that we take for granted...were won due, in great part, to the efforts of the alternative press” (Qtd. in Ginsberg, 34).

Post script: the sinking of the *Ehime Maru*

Mid-September, 1931, Ala Wai Inn: U.S. Navy Officer Tommie Massie was drunk. His wife Thalia had left the Inn after an argument with her husband, and Tommie Massie chose not to follow. Instead, he stayed to watch a fellow Navy officer who was entertaining a party of civilians with tales of daring and military bravado. The drunken sailor hammed it up for the crowd, “familiarizing his listeners with the operation of ballast tanks and submarine propulsion units, and dramatizing the act of submergence—using a shoe which he had taken off to visualize the submarine’s underwater behavior” (Packer & Thomas, 23). While Massie and his friends were showboating for the benefit of watching civilians, unknown assailants were assaulting Massie’s wife outside. This incident set in motion a series of events that would lead to the murder of one of the accused rapists, the threat of martial law and military rule in Hawai`i, the beginning of the end of the dominance of Hawai`i’s “Big Five” business interests, and a legacy of bitterness between haoles and locals which lasted, some say, for at least another thirty years.

Massie allowed himself to be distracted from doing his “duty” to his wife because he wanted to watch his comrade entertain civilians. Seventy years later, in another act of military arrogance and ineptitude, U.S. Navy Officer, Commander Waddle of the
submarine *USS Greenville* would display those same failings. In February 2001, the *Greeneville* was on maneuvers off Diamond Head. Aboard were dozens of civilians, invited guests of the Navy as part of its “distinguished visitor’s program.” Waddle explains:

> We were asked to do a lot of public relations work through what is known as the Navy’s distinguished visitor’s program. The plan was simple: Take civilians, members of Congress, journalists, or other opinion-makers for a ride on a nuclear submarine, demonstrating its capabilities, all the while subtly reminding the guests of the submarine’s importance in maintaining our national security (Waddle & Abraham, 108).

In other words, after the end of the Cold War the U.S. Navy had to convince those civilians who control or had influence over the Navy’s budget that there was some purpose in keeping a fleet of heavily armed submarines in Hawai‘i, even when there was no “enemy” to fight. *Time*’s Mark Thompson reports that the U.S. Navy “routinely invites dignitaries aboard its vessels to bolster public support for its missions. In 1999 the Pacific Fleet’s subs hosted 1,132 civilians on 45 trips.” (“Driving Blind”). At 1:43pm on February 9, 2001, the *Greenville* initiated an emergency main ballast blow, a procedure Waddle states “that would shoot the seven-thousand-ton *Greenville* from a depth of about four hundred feet to the surface in a matter of seconds” (Waddle & Abraham, 127).

Waddle admits this was an attempt to impress the civilians on board with a “roller coaster ride,” his “finale” designed to “thrill our passengers” (Waddle & Abraham, 126). Waddle may also have enjoyed the ride, having admitted in a subsequent inquiry that an average day spent underwater was “about as exciting as watching grass grow” (Breslau and Thomas, 29).

Tragically, the Greenville’s roller coaster ride resulted in it surfacing directly below the *Ehime Maru*, a Japanese fishing boat manned mostly by high-school kids. The
Greenville had detected the Ehime Maru seventy-one minutes before, but had not detected it in the intervening period. The reason for this is, according to U.S. National Transportation Safety Board member John Hammerschmidt, that the crewmember responsible for tracking sonar contacts was “unable to finish plotting sonar blips because the civilians were in his way” (“Civilians on sub were taken to control room after lunch”). The Greenville rammed the Japanese ship, ripping a huge hole in its keel. The Ehime Maru sank almost immediately. Nine people on the trawler were killed, four of whom were teenagers. Waddle chose not to attempt a rescue of those still in the water due to heavy seas. He chose instead to wait for the U.S. Coastguard to arrive, a decision he admits later led to allegations that he callously “left the scene of an accident” (Waddle & Abraham, 130). In the end, a Coastguard ship did not arrive for another forty minutes.

The tragic deaths of nine people occurred because of the criminal negligence of members of the U.S. Navy. No blame or responsibility whatsoever lies with the victims. Despite these obvious and uncontestable facts, the end result of this tragedy was not hostility towards the U.S. Navy but, instead, frustration and anger directed at Japan and those members of Hawai‘i’s Japanese community who dared ask questions about Waddle’s behavior. One of the main reasons for this remarkable turn of events is national and local media coverage of the tragedy, which portrayed Waddle and the U.S. Navy as “victims” of circumstance, and the crew of the Ehime Maru as collateral damage in the U.S. Navy’s ongoing battle to protect Hawai‘i from some unnamed outside threat. The Greenville’s motto is, after all, “volunteers defending frontiers,” and in the military way of thinking, there is no place more vulnerable on the frontier than Hawai‘i.
National and local media coverage of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i is, generally, sycophantic and non-confrontational, and the sinking of the *Ehime Maru* exposed some of the more obvious elements of this bias. For example, on CNN’s *Larry King Weekend* show aired on May 5th 2001, the host offered an entirely sympathetic view of Commander Scott Waddle. Waddle was fed a series of soft questions, one of which was particularly insulting when King asked why *the Ehime Maru* was training off Hawai‘i and could it not have trained somewhere else instead. At least Waddle had the grace to look embarrassed as King blamed the victims for their own deaths. This show aired in the same week as *Newsweek*’s article entitled “China: a new pacific strategy,” in which correspondent John Barry stated “Pearl Harbor Naval Station...has been so starved of modernization funds that it’s a period-film set. For most of the last half century, the Pacific Command was the military’s orphan child.” The article seems to support the U.S. Navy’s complaints that it is under funded, and also justifies the Navy’s efforts through its distinguished visitor’s program to gain support for its cause.

Dunne notes that NBC’s *Dateline* gave Waddle sympathetic coverage, including a staged scene that had Waddle furnish a farewell salute to the *Greenville* as it went to sea with a new Captain (photographs of this “ceremony” appear also in Waddle’s book). Dunne also argues that *Time* magazine “packaged the sale” of Waddle’s book, with its self-serving excuses and half-hearted acceptance of responsibility for the manslaughter of nine innocent civilians. *Newsweek* called Waddle “the unluckiest sub captain in the world,” while grudgingly admitting that he “focused too much on entertaining” civilians rather than doing his job (“A Captain’s Story”). *Newsweek* does not, however, question
the efficacy or wisdom of such policies, noting only that Waddle had the “people skills” to “convince a doubting public that the Navy still needed multibillion-dollar submarines.”

The Honolulu Advertiser ran an editorial stating “We must not forget that it is the mission of the Greenville and the rest of the Pacific Fleet to keep the sea secure for vessels such as the Ehime Maru” (Dunne, 54). In doing so, The Advertiser performed its traditional role of conduit for official U.S. government and Pentagon version of events. The paper, of course, neglects to mention how exactly the Greenville and the Pacific fleet could protect a Japanese fishing boat, from whom the alleged threat was supposed to come, nor why the U.S. should assume for itself the role of “protector” in the Pacific.

Midweek columnist Susan Page used her column to mold public opinion to support the Navy’s cause (“A Day Aboard the USS Greenville”). For instance, she infers that Japanese accusations that Waddle had been “showboating” are incorrect, although Waddle has admitted that this was basically his role in the distinguished visitor’s program. Page admits, in fact, the she has taken part in this program. She quotes, without analysis, the Navy’s public relations line that “If you’re trying to explain what the Navy does, the best way is to bring civilians out on the ships.” Furthermore, even though Waddle has admitted that his boat was only out at sea that day because of the distinguished visitor’s program, Page allows Admiral Zap Zlatoper unchallenged space to insist that, “ships don’t go out just to give tours. But already scheduled training operations can be observed.” Page asks in conclusion the loaded question, “Will one tragic accident dismantle a program proven valuable and successful for so many years?” It is not difficult to imagine the response of her readers, given the way that the story has been prepared.
It has long been the policy of the U.S. Navy to try to recover, where possible the bodies of its fallen sailors. For example, after a U.S. Navy submarine accident in Honolulu Harbor in 1915, “everyone wanted the bodies [of US sailors] recovered” (Landauer, 204). However, once it became known that the Japanese government had asked the U.S. Navy to raise the *Ehime Maru* to recover any trapped bodies, personal effects and ship memorabilia to be used for a future monument, the local press printed hostile reactions to the suggestion. For example, one letter complained of the “gruesome nature of such an undertaking” and its “extreme difficulty and cost” (Onishi). Another letter writer concluded that the sinking was caused by “politicians and military bean counters,” who had “decimat[ed] U.S. submarine forces” (Watabayashi). Of course it is not possible to assign to a newspaper the views of its readers. However, *Midweek* does get to choose which letters are published and which are not, and very few are ever printed that are critical of the U.S. military. Nonetheless, one letter that did see print sums up the lot of civilians in Hawai‘i compared to the privileged and untouchable U.S. military:

Cmdr. Scott Waddle of the *USS Greeneville* did OK [sic]. His punishment for the accidental deaths of nine Japanese men is being forced into early retirement. A young man in his 40s and drawing $60,000 a year pension for the rest of his life. If only I could get such a punishment. (Rosen)
AFTERWORD. Alternative Futures – a Demilitarized Hawai‘i.

The Pacific Islands are often portrayed in tourist brochures and movies as paradise isles, where life is slower and less complicated than in the United States. To maintain this illusion, however, the American military presence has to be concealed. This is achieved by physical means such as restricting civilian access to military installations. However, such heavy-handed and sometimes obvious actions are inadequate, and must be accompanied by propaganda that makes the military seem natural, welcome, and friendly, and which portrays counter-narratives as unpatriotic, unreasonable, impractical, and dangerous to “national security.” Military mistreatment of Native Hawaiians and their land is not as obvious as its conduct towards other Pacific Islanders, such as the indigenous people of Bikini. However, major problems associated with the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, such as land use issues, environmental concerns, destruction of native archeological sites, misuse of financial resources, sovereignty etc., are all problems extant in Hawai‘i. These problems are ignored or hidden by entities such as the media, Hollywood, Honolulu’s military museum, military histories of Hawai‘i, and in the physical landscape of the Islands, peppered as they are with grandiose war memorials and other tributes to American military might and sacrifice.

It is difficult but not impossible to challenge the effects of decades of pro-military propaganda. Haunani-Kay Trask worries about the psychological damage of colonialism on her people (Native Daughter, 3), arguing, for instance, that many Hawaiians today conform and behave according to the demands of dominant colonialist ideology by joining, for example, the Hawai‘i National Guard. Journalist Francine du Plessix Gray notes that “ROTC training and the wearing of military uniforms have been compulsory at
Kamehameha [school] since 1916” (13). A result of this, one girl student noted, was that “boys are apathetic, they’ve had this military crap beat into them by the haoles since they’re babies to make them docile” (Gray, 15). This type of conditioning trains young Hawaiians for careers in the service industries, as bellhops or doormen, waiters and waitresses, or as policemen and soldiers. In the 1960s and 1970s, some young Hawaiians rebelled against this preordained future by organizing “Kill a Haole Days,” when gangs of high school kids would search out and attack military men. One Native Hawaiian disclosed, “Note that. Only military men. The haoles had imposed a military system on us and that’s how we retaliated” (Gray, 143).

Albert Memmi points out that because the colonialist’s image of the colonized recurs so often in the media, it can become a colonized peoples’ image of themselves. Memmi states, “[the image of] the colonized as seen by the colonialist [is] widely circulated in the colony and often throughout the world (which, thanks to his newspapers and literature, ends up by being echoed to a certain extent in the conduct and, thus, in the true appearance of the colonized)” (55). Michael Parenti argues that some of the basic components of propaganda are “omission, distortion, and repetition” (History as Mystery, 209), and that is exactly what is found in pro-militaristic narratives that justify the U.S. military’s role in Hawai‘i.

However, there are other narratives. Trask argues, for example, that the U.S. military is an occupation force and demands that they leave (Native Daughter, 176) – a viewpoint that is becoming increasingly popular as more is revealed about the true nature, cost, and effects of militarism. Indeed, the Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement has won some notable victories, including stopping the military from using Kaho‘olawé island as
a bombing range (Trask, *Native Daughter* 68) and interrupting or halting military live fire exercises at Mākua Valley ("U.S. Military Out of Mākua Valley"). Other anti-military activists offer practical, economic alternatives to military occupation. Local peace activists warn, for example, "If you are reading these words in Hawai‘i, you are reading them in the most densely militarized state in the nation. If you are reading them in Oahu, you are reading them on a prime nuclear target" (Albertini et al, intro). In *The Dark Side of Paradise*, authors Jim Albertini, Nelson Foster, Wally Inglis, and Gil Roeder argue that, contrary to popular opinion, Hawai‘i would benefit in a number of ways from complete demilitarization, and they suggest ways in which the community can become more aware of the problems caused by the military and how the community can mobilize in protest. The authors contend that rather than making Hawai‘i a safer place to live, the garrisoning of military forces in Hawai‘i makes it a primary target of attack - as Pearl Harbor showed.

Demilitarization would also have both short and long term benefits for the islands. Firstly, however, residents of Hawai‘i must be educated as to the scale of the problem, which means that media complicity with the military must end. So to must the political status quo. The authors suggest that local politicians are not interesting in criticizing militarization as the military and their dependants in Hawai‘i make up some 126,000 voters or 15% of the population. If related workers and veterans are counted then the numbers rise to 239,000 or over 25% of the population (14). Obviously, therefore, local politicians have no interest in alienating the military. Indeed, many of them genuinely believe that a large military presence is beneficial to the Islands.
One of the continuing arguments for the garrisoning of a large section of the U.S. military in Hawai‘i is that the economy benefits. Leroy Laney, vice president and chief economist of First Hawaiian Bank states, “when one balances the known economic contributions from military use against the possible benefits of any proposed civilian use, it is far from clear that the latter is more desirable…As tourism slows, agriculture fades, and diversification into new export industries eludes the state, keeping the military is all the more important” (278). However, as stated previously, a representative from a Hawaiian bank may not be the most disinterested party in this argument. Albertini et al offer a different perspective:

It has long been taken for granted that massive Pentagon expenditures are a great asset to Hawai‘i’s development. A closer examination of the economic facts, however, indicates that Hawai‘i’s military is not necessarily a healthy force in the economy of the Aloha state. (62)

The authors argue only 5% of the companies in the state get 62% of all military contracts and that these companies are multi-national and not solely dependant on military orders. In accordance with national trends, if one compares military expenditure in Hawai‘i with the same amount spent on civilian uses, military expenditure creates far fewer civilian jobs - between 1960-70 only 5% created by the military compared to 32% non-military. Albertini et al note, “almost any other usage of equivalent federal funds [spent on the military] in Hawai‘i would create many more jobs” (63).

Native Hawaiians traditionally have close spiritual ties to their land or aina. There is an obvious conflict of interest, therefore, when the U.S. military controls 25% of the land on O‘ahu. Much of this land was originally intended to build homes for Hawaiians. However, the State of Hawai‘i gave it to the military to use free of charge or for a nominal amount. Furthermore, fresh water supplies on O‘ahu are constantly under threat.
from pesticides and overuse. However, priority seems to be given the U.S. military needs: in 1980, for example, “the Honolulu Board of Water supply was limited to 77 million gallons a day, while the Army and Navy alone took 27 million gallons daily” (Albertini et al, 64). Despite the prevailing feeling that the economy of Hawai‘i could collapse without the military, it actually appears that the military is a significant contributor to the shortage of land, amenities, and resources in Hawai‘i.

Facts such as these have difficulty penetrating the pro-military barriers created by years of propaganda. What would life be like in Hawai‘i after a military withdrawal? One Pentagon survey states that, “the transition from military-dependent to independent economies were remarkably successful: twice as many jobs [emphasis in original] were created to offset the civilian jobs lost by military reductions” (Albertini et al, 64-5). Over 50% of the abandoned military bases examined were converted to other uses. The tourist industry in Hawai‘i would benefit from a military withdrawal as the military controls land that borders some of Hawai‘i ‘s best beaches. Despite problems with its ideology and presentation, there can be no doubt to those concerned with such things that the conversion of Fort DeRussy in the heart of Waikiki into a museum benefits to the tourist industry.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Hawai‘i had a vibrant underground press that offered alternatives to mainstream press coverage of the U.S. military and the war in Vietnam. Due to state-sponsored intimidation, most of these underground papers were forced out of business. However, it will be more difficult to silence the eloquent, compelling and strident arguments of modern-day political activists. Haunani-Kay Trask shows that there is a political alternative to U.S. colonialism. Albertini et al show that
there are economic alternatives to militarism. It remains to be seen if such counter-
narratives to militarism will eventually prevail.
Notes

1 Robert C. Schmitt, Hawai‘i Data Book: a Statistical Reference to Hawai‘i’s Social, Economic and Political Trends (Honolulu: Mutual, 2002) 1. According to Schmitt, the highest number of military personnel in Hawai‘i was 400,000 during World War Two. More recently, the highest number of military personnel and dependents peaked at 134,000 in 1988 (158).


5 The Defense Department has, for example, decided to station the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Hawai‘i, despite the concerns of 2,000 citizens who contributed to a Final Environmental Impact Statement, and three Native Hawaiian organizations. A Stryker is a 19-ton, eight-wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier. This new unit will add 300 of these vehicles to Hawai‘i’s fragile landscape and will require 28 construction projects that will include building work at Schofield Barracks and Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island, and the construction of new road links to and from Schofield Barracks,

6 This is a similar situation to, for example, the image of the British military in Northern Ireland, which, until very recently, was also a militarized society. As in Hawai‘i, military helicopters flew overhead, soldiers in uniform could be seen in the streets, armored vehicles mixed with civilian traffic, and troop movements and other military news were reported in the media alongside civilian issues of interest. To the pro-British Unionist community of Northern Ireland, the military became a reassuring part of the landscape. However, the anti-British Nationalist community perceived the British Army as an intrusive and unwelcome element in society – an “occupying force.”

7 For a full discussion of pre-contact or pre-haole population figures see David E. Stannard, Before the Horror: the Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1989).

8 Unless stated, all other data is from this source.

9 The term haole is more commonly used in reference to Caucasian foreigners, specifically Americans.

10 In the wake of the riots, which lasted for only a week, hotel occupancy rates for Tahiti dropped from 65.5% in 1995 to 58.4% in 1996 and to 53.9% in 1997. Overall tourist arrivals to French Polynesia as a whole dropped by 14,478 people, from 178,222 in 1995 to 163,744 in 1996 – a considerable drop since it reversed a three year trend of rising

11 For a full discussion of these themes, see Kathy Ferguson & Phyllis Turnbull, Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai‘i (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1999).

12 "Revisionist" in a positive sense: as Paul Boyer notes, "all good scholars are "revisionists," continually questioning an revising standard interpretations on the basis of new evidence, deeper analysis, or the fresh perspectives offered by the passage of time."

13 See for example Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture (University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).

14 “partially” because land was still passed down to descendants of the Ali‘i by kauoha (verbal will) as if they were all their own Mōʻi. 


16 A similar argument is made today, as noted in hostile anecdotal newspaper reports or “letters-to-the-editor” about Native Hawaiians spoiling the environment through dumping and littering Barbers Point military base is a case in point. Kept spotlessly clean while under military authority, the now abandoned Barber’s Point is an ugly eyesore. Why,
some non-Native Hawaiians ask, do Native Hawaiians talk so much about their relationship with the *Aina* (land) when anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that Native Hawaiians are the biggest despoilers of the environment? Firstly, anecdotal evidence is not really evidence at all. However, assuming that it may be true, it is helpful to note Calvin Martin’s theory that Indians, despite professing a special kinship with beavers, almost exterminated the animals so that they could trade with whites for their goods. Martin does not blame the Indians for their actions and instead suggests that they declared war on the beaver because that animal “betrayed” them. To the Indians, the epidemics of disease that were decimating Indian villages were proof that the beaver no longer cared for or protected the Indian. Martin’s thesis can be applied also to Native Hawaiians. There is ample evidence that Native Hawaiians once cared very deeply for their *Aina* but they too suffered from the influx of foreign diseases that decimated their population. It may well be that Native Hawaiians have grown apart from the land and now simply emulate destructive Western ways of behavior. Calvin Martin, *The Keepers of the Game: Indian-animal relationships and the fur trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

17 In more ways than one perhaps: in 1992, while visiting the town of Bayeux to see the famous tapestry, I decided to take an unplanned walk around a British war cemetery quite close by. Much to my surprise I stumbled across the grave of my grandfather who, as a soldier in the British Army, was killed in the aftermath of the Normandy landings in 1944. While I knew of his death in the war, I did not know where he was buried and I had no plans to search for his burial place. There are 2500 British war cemeteries in France
and Belgium. The odds of stumbling upon my grandfather’s grave must be astronomical and thus, surely, there were other forces at work rather than pure chance...

18 From this point on the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* will be referred to as the *Advertiser*.


20 Burnham was a well-known architect responsible also for the design of the United Spanish War Veterans Memorial (aka The Spirit of '98) situated at the Wadsworth Hospital Center, West Los Angeles, erected in 1950. Text from the plaque on the memorial reads: "1898 - To Those Who Volunteered and Extended the Hand of Liberty to Alien Peoples - 1902."

21 It cannot be taken for granted that Kuhio represented Native Hawaiian interests on the War Memorial Committee. Although he had been imprisoned for his role in defending Queen Lili‘uokalani during the 1895 uprising, Kuhio later accepted a role in the Republican Party running in opposition to Home Rule candidate Robert Wilcox in the 1902 election for delegate to Congress. Perhaps Kuhio thought that in this role he could best defend the interests of the Hawaiian people. Certainly his efforts as delegate after he was triumphant in the election seem to suggest this. For example, in the 1904 Territorial elections he pushed for devolution of local government powers away from Honolulu and towards the larger individual Hawaiian islands. He was also instrumental in the
establishment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920. However, as a figurehead for Hawai‘i’s haole business elites, Kuhio attracted many Native Hawaiian votes away from the decidedly pro-Native Hawaiian Home Rule Party. Within 10 years of Robert Wilcox’s defeat at the hands of Kuhio, the Home Rule Party was finished. For further information about Kuhio see Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1974) 293-302.

22 All further references to Fairbanks or his proposed monument are from this source unless otherwise stated.

23 In John Ford’s 1943 documentary December 7, “Uncle Sam” describes the process of “civilization” undertaken by haole missionaries and business men as “a pioneering story that compares favorably with the opening of the West.”

24 See Chapter Three.


27 For example, the Massie rape trial.

The Natatorium was a form of control over the uncontrollable - a lesson to the locals perhaps that nature can be defeated by Western know how. It served yet another more practical too: in the 1920s the majority of Americans could not swim. Although ancient cultures like the Egyptians have practiced swimming as long ago as 2400 years, in the West, swimming did not become a popular pastime until the mid-1800s. Indeed, in the middle ages, communal swimming was seen as a way to spread disease and was thus discouraged by organized religion. Swimming did not even become an Olympic sport until the 1890s. In the early 20th Century, the profession of life guarding on open beaches was in its embryonic stages, and some early tactics, such as that of a lifeguard carrying a rope out to a troubled swimmer who would then be reeled in by two other lifeguards, was not successful or practical because it required three lifeguards to save one person (see The History of the Beach: The Turning Tides of History, Dir. Laura Verklan. A&E Television Networks, 2003.). While Native Hawaiians had been surfing for at least a thousand years, and were rightly reputed to be strong swimmers, many tourists stayed away from the water because they could not swim. As authors Lena Lencek and Gideon Bosker note, "In those days, most bathers were seriously unprepared for the sea" (Lencek, Lena and Gideon Bosker. The Beach: the History of Paradise on Earth. New York: Viking, 1998: 147). The spate of natatorium building in the United States in the late 19th century occurred, therefore, as a direct result of the American population's poor swimming skills. In comparison to the open sea, in a natatorium poor swimmers could easily be saved, or save themselves. In that Hawai‘i was being molded into a popular tourist destination in the 1920s, the erection of a natatorium can therefore be seen as,
(with the possible exception of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, opened in 1927), O'ahu's first modern man-made tourist attraction.

30 These atavistic, social-Darwinist ideas were fueled by pseudo-scientific research at America’s universities. For example, Stanley Porteus, head of the Psychology department at the University of Hawai‘i from 1922 to 1948 states in *Temperament and Race*, (Boston: Gorham Press, 1926), “During the last 400 years [western races] have been carrying the burden of an almost endless struggle for liberty” (330). Porteus believed it was the “white man’s burden” in Hawai‘i to educate and “free” lesser races. He repeated Nietzsche’s repugnant arguments about eugenics: “Side by side with the growth of medical science has been the development of this impulse towards preserving and perpetuating the unfit” (331) and advocated selective sterilization as a “sensible measure” in place of natural selection which modern medicine has interfered with (333). Porteus, an Australian by birth, believed that countries such as Canada, United States and Australia “belong to the white race by right of peaceful conquest,” that they are now "Nordic strongholds" and that any lessoning of suspicion towards [for example] the Japanese would amount to “race suicide” (336).

31 A few years later, in 1925, the Legion’s national Headquarters in Indianapolis would be built in that fashion. That building, half of which’s fourth floor is designed to replicate a senate chamber, has been described as “combining all the advantages of Greek beauty and modern efficiency.” See Marcus Duffield, *King Legion* (New York: Johnathan Cape & Harrison Smith Inc, 1931) 14.

32 The Chicago Columbian Exposition of 1893 directly inspired many of America’s beaux-arts-designed buildings that date from the early part of the Twentieth Century. The
master plan was a classic example of *beaux-arts* arrangement, emphasizing symmetry and uniformity of color with a white marble effect. The idea of designers Burnham and Root was to show that America’s past was a European one. In an era of rising immigration by the supposedly inferior Southern Europeans, and of American imperialism in the Pacific, the Exposition’s White City exhibited foreigners in racially derogatory ways. The midway featured ethnological exhibitions, including examples of Native Hawaiians, for the amusement of white Americans. It invited Americans to contrast the “barbarous” and “uncivilized” antics of these supposedly inferior races with the grandeur of the European style architecture in other parts of the Exposition. William H. Jordy notes, “White City conjured a vision of a marble America from the urban styles of Europe...In its Roman and baroque trappings, moreover, the imperial flavor of the White City accorded with the imperial flavor of American culture at the end of the century.” Not only did the Exposition emphasize America’s “civilized” European origins, through the uniformity of its layout it also asked visitors to contrast the refinement and sophistication of the city as opposed to the disorder of nature, rural, and the frontier. Jordy states “It was not merely, or even principally, the imperialism of foreign affairs which the symbolism of the Exposition made concrete, but the hegemony of the metropolis...” See William H. Jordy, *American Buildings and Their Architects: Progressive and Academic Ideals at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1976) 79.

33 Although Fussell was talking about World War Two history books, his remark applies also to World War One.
34 In some cases, the information from newspaper sources and the card file held at the Archives is contradictory; in such circumstances I have attempted to piece together an accurate record of the lives and deaths of each soldier and have stated when the contradictions occur if they are relevant to the discussion. For example, a few of the names listed on the memorial are spelt differently to the UVSCR records. This is important if for example it is only possible to ascertain the ethnic origin of a soldier from his name, as is the case with Private Henry K. Unuivi, as he is named on the memorial, but who is called Unuiwi in the UVSCR cards. There is no further information available for this soldier but it appears fairly clear that from either spelling we can assume this is a Native Hawaiian name. However, since genealogy is such an important part of Native Hawaiian culture it is important to provide both spellings of the name.

35 There is contradictory information about Manuel G.L. Valent (or Valente), Jr. (rank unknown). His home address is listed as Aiea, O'ahu, and he was attached to Co. L. 298th Infantry. He was either killed in action or died in service – on either July 18 or Sept 30, 1918. The Star Bulletin says “Died in Service” in September 1918 but UVSCR card says refers to him as “KIA.” “Hawaii Men Who Wear Wound Stripes: War Leaves Its Mark on 14 Island Heroes,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin May 10, 1919: 3.

36 The figures may be underestimates: there was also a Naval Militia of the Territory of Hawai‘i, which was established in 1915. At the outbreak of war with Germany, the Naval Militia was federalized and fifty enlisted men and officers were accepted into federal military service. See Charles Lamoreaux Warfield, “History of the Hawaii National Guard From Feudal Times to June 30, 1935,” Masters Thesis, University of Hawai‘i, 1935: 69-70.

This racist viewpoint is wonderfully critiqued in Peter Davis’ anti-war documentary Hearts and Minds (1974) where the director poignantly contrasts the view of General Westmoreland that Asians do not have the same regard for human life as Westerners, and a long funeral scene where an Asian family weeps uncontrollably over their dead.

See History of the USS Schurz:
and U. S. Navy Ships Sunk or Damaged from Various Causes during World War I:
http://www.usmm.org/ww1navy.html

There is some confusion since one source refers to Manuel Rames, not Ramos. See The Final Voyage 20th Engineers-Company E at http://renton.50megs.com/log/6thE.html for a passenger list for the Tuscanai.


The first meeting of the Legion in Hawai‘i was on Aug 29, 1919. Most of the soldiers named on the memorial died and were buried before that date. It is, therefore, only possible for the Legion to have taken part in the burials of a maximum of nineteen soldiers. From records available, its participation can only be confirmed in the burials of four of the soldiers who were buried in Hawaii: Kau, O'Dowda, Rowe, and Tom.


Much like the Royal Ulster Constabulary reserve police force set up in Northern Ireland to handle the everyday mundane policing activities and release better trained, full time officers for work deemed more important.

See, for example, John Toland Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1982).

During the 1991 Gulf War tourists from the US mainland abandoned “dangerous” European vacations and flocked to Hawai‘i instead. Hawai‘i served the role of being both
“foreign” enough to warrant a vacation there and yet “American” enough to be seen as a safe vacation spot.


51 Kahanamoku did appear in two post-war movies, Wake of the Red Witch (1948), and Mister Roberts (1955), neither of which are about Hawai‘i.

52 By prostitution I mean sex in exchange for monetary or other rewards. See, for example, Beth Bailey and David Farber’s The First Strange Place: Race and Sex in World War II Hawaii. (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

53 Ellul’s definition of propaganda is, “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization.” Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965) 61.


55 Trask did not mention Honolulu Weekly, which began publishing in 1991, two years before the first edition of her book. The Weekly prints many news items and editorials that are critical of the U.S. military.


Which proves Kurt Vonnegut’s point that in war death can come to even the most professional and well-prepared soldier. In his semi-autobiographical novel *Slaughterhouse Five* (New York: Dell: 1991), two well-trained, and well-armed professional scouts are killed in similar circumstances to the thirteen American soldiers mentioned in the *Star Bulletin* article.

See also the *Advertiser’s* coverage of mainland peace protests such as “N.Y. War Protesters Battle Police in Village” and “Chicago Police Battle Rioters,” both in *Sunday Star Bulletin & Advertiser*, April 28, 1968: A4

Although those figures have dropped considerably since 1980, when *The Dark Side of Paradise* was first published. See Note 1.
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