AMERICAN WOMEN'S DESTINY, ASIAN WOMEN'S DIGNITY:
TRANS-PACIFIC ACTIVISM OF THE
WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, 1886-1945

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To my parents, Ogawa Shin’ichirō and Ogawa Kazuko
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ABSTRACT OF THIS DISSERTATION

American Women's Destiny, Asian Women's Dignity: Trans-Pacific Activism of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 1886-1945

By
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Doctor of Philosophy in American Studies
University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2004
Professor Paul F. Hooper, Chair

This dissertation examines the trans-Pacific activism of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and its overseas affiliates, particularly the Japanese Union. Unlike many previous studies of transnational women's activities that focus on trans-Atlantic interactions and Western women, this research highlights the agency of Asian women and transnational exchanges of women in the United States, Japan, China, and other Asian nations.

Through the analysis of the multidirectional and multilayered flows of institutions, ideology, and practices of social reforms from the United States to Asia, from Asia to the United States, and within Asia, this study demonstrates how
American and Asian women negotiated the assumed universal applicability of American style reform plans, challenged prescriptions about power and hierarchy, and yet still strived to construct a transnational sisterhood despite their own nationalistic concerns. Even though the WCTU women ostensibly promoted global sisterhood under the maternalistic slogan, “organized mother’s love,” the networks of the WCTU developed hand in hand with imperialism promoted by male leaders. Its close identification with realpolitik often left power relations and hierarchies untouched and even reproduced ideas about the center and margin along the lines of imperialism — as evidenced by Western women’s domination and peripherization of Asians in an international women’s community and by Japanese women’s self-acclaimed leadership in Asia. The trans-Pacific sisterhood developed with tensions of racism, imperialism, rivalry, and resistance to colonization.

By treating women of both America and Asia as active agents in global interactions, this dissertation examines both the strength and weakness of the trans-Pacific sisterhood through analysis of what elements hindered them from constructing an international sense of “we,” and how, if at all, they overcame them from the late 19th century to the end of World War II.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the course of this project, I have received generous support and heart-warming encouragement from many institutions and individuals. Although I have spent many solitary hours at a computer writing, this dissertation is the product of cooperation with my mentors, friends, and family on both sides of the Pacific Ocean and on an island in the middle of it.

I express my special thanks to Professor Paul F. Hooper, my chair. He introduced me to the world of trans-Pacific interactions and stimulated me to explore private segments of diplomacy. Professor Mari Yoshihara has provided a thorough reading and given me insightful critiques and sound advice. Professor Naoko Shibusawa has been my “cheerleader” and showered me with her intellectual passion. I am also deeply grateful to other committee members; Professor Mark Helbling and Professor Patricia Steinhoff for commenting astutely on this manuscript.

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I owe great debts to Takahashi Kikue, Yamaya Shinko, and Kuriki Junko of
the Japanese Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Kawada Sadako of the Jiairyō, Segawa Kazuo and Nohara Kenji of the Kōbōkan, and Ikeda Michiko of the Airinkan for allowing me to interview them and quote from materials in their collections. Their wishes to pass on their past experiences to the next generation impressed me and implanted a sense of responsibility as a scholar to immortalize the many forgotten heroes who might otherwise sink into oblivion.

The staff at Imadegawa Library and the Faculty of Theology of Doshisha University, Flora Lamson Hewlett Library of Graduate Theological Union, and Rev. Dr. Theodore T. Ogoshi Memorial Archives of Makiki Christian Church generously allowed me to access their collections. Tokiko Yamamoto Bazzell of Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, broke the deadlock of my research by introducing me to rare documents that I would have never encountered without her. William K. Beatty and Virginia L. Beatty of Frances E. Willard Memorial Library patiently assisted me over years of visits and queries. They also made my research trip pleasurable and productive by taking me out for lunch and coffer breaks, and arranging a special tour to the Rest Cottage that had long been a center of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. William passed away in December 2001, but he still lives in my memory.

I have been blessed with many friends since I came to Hawai'i. Among those in Hawai'i with whom I had parties, dinners, coffees, conversations, arguments, tears and laughs were Parichat Jungwiwattanaporn, Monobe Hiromi, Mōri Akiko, Tsuzuki Hiroko, Heather Diamond, Nitta Toshitake, Edward Kim, Yonezawa Shioko, Li Jinzhao, William W. Dressler, and many more. They have doubled my joy, halved my sorrow, and
have changed Honolulu from a foreign town to a place dear to my heart.

Despite my decade-long absence, I have enjoyed friendship and many forms of support in Japan. In particular, I am especially thankful to Hatakeyama Satoshi who has offered crucial encouragement and academic support at various stages along the way. I would also like to acknowledge Hayashi Hideki who took time out from busy schedule and taught me the value of trans-Pacific friendship. Suzuki Atsuko, Rumi Yasutake, Etsuyo Mamamoto, and Taniguchi Shinko greeted me with “okaerinasai” whenever I went back to Japan and encouraged me by exchanging numerous letters and e-mails.

Lane H. Ogawa in Leyte, the Philippines, brightened my days with wonderful pictures and stories of the Filipino children he works with during my depressed moments, and has constantly reminded me that adults have a duty to leave the world better and safer to posterity. Kajikawa Mihoko deserves special thanks. We had lunch together, listened to political speeches together, and shared the joys and hardships of writing a dissertation as an international student in the United States. We were together for only a short time, but her sincere academic attitude deeply impressed me. She went to heaven in April 2003. It is my deepest regret that I cannot see her radiant smile any more. Nevertheless, I still feel her warm friendship. She has taught me that there is something strong and significant that even death cannot destroy.

Finally, I express my special thanks to my family. My father Ogawa Shin’ichiro and my mother Ogawa Kazuko have encouraged me to do what I believe is important and to hold on to my dreams with all of my might. There are no words to describe their
unswerving love and unconditional support. Makiko, my younger sister, once said when she was a medical student, “let's become Dr. Ogawa together!” She became Dr. Ogawa years ago; now I can report that I have fulfilled her words. Our intellectual and professional journeys have been enabled by Mayuko, my youngest sister, who helped and comforted my parents all the time when her two siblings were absorbed in studying.
EDITORIAL NOTE

Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are rendered surname first, given name second. Exceptions to this order are references to individuals who follow the Western form (the given name first followed by the surname) and/or have published their writings in English with the names in the Western form.
Fig. 1. Frances E. Willard.

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Fig. 3. Anna A. Gordon.
Gordon, *The Beautiful Life of Frances E. Willard*.

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Fig. 8. Moriya Azuma. JWCTU, *Mede miru hyakunenshi*, 14.


Fig. 10. Shih Meiyu (Mary Stone). Emily T. Sheets, “The Little Doctor of Kiukiang,” *Union Signal* (April 15, 1920): 6.
Fig. 11. Christine I. Tinling.  

Fig. 12. Kara G. Smart.  

Fig. 13. Flora E. Strout (left) and Ruth F. Davis (right). Flora E. Strout and Ruth Frances Davis, “Personal Letter from World’s W.C.T.U. Representatives to Japan,” *Union Signal* (September 23, 1909): 3.

Fig. 14. Ella A. Boole.  
Ella A. Boole, “... All Around the World,” *Union Signal* (November 4, 1944): 18.

Fig. 15. Berthalee Broyles.  
Fig. 16. “The four daughters from Seattle,” or Miyagawa Taeko, Miyagawa Tokiko, Okazaki Sumire, and Kimura Kimiyo. “Akogare no hitomi o kagayakasete,” *Fujin shinpō*, no. 315 (April 1, 1924): 25.

Fig. 17. Three Chinese delegates to the first Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference in Honolulu. Ting Me Iung, Ellen Leong, and Kyong Bae-ysung. *Mid-Pacific* xxxvi, no. 6 (December 1928): 402.

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Fig. 23. The Kōbōkan Settlement (1935).

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Courtesy, Ikeda Michiko.

Fig. 29. Industrial Department, The Airinkan Settlement.
Courtesy, Ikeda Michiko.
## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Institute of Pacific Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCCW</td>
<td>National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War</td>
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<td>PPWA</td>
<td>Pan-Pacific Women's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPWC</td>
<td>Pan-Pacific Women's Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Woman's Christian Temperance Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women's International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
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<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women's Christian Association</td>
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INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 1930, representatives of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy attending the London Naval Conference at St. James's Palace in London met a group of women from various women's organizations. These women lobbied the attendants to reach an agreement to curb the arms race, and ultimately, to avoid war. These women were never officially invited to the Conference. Diplomacy was considered an elite men's business; it was a matter of strategy, geopolitics, military planning, and power struggles among nation-states. Indeed, public diplomacy was exclusively conducted by top politicians, diplomats, high-ranking military officers, advisers, and so on. The men negotiated with delegates of other nations, signed international treaties, conducted war, and governed colonies; women remained outside of such processes. Nevertheless, some women organized themselves into a significant political force and sought the potential to influence international politics. The presence of the uninvited female guests at the London Naval Conference signified their challenges to the domination of international political power by the elite men's club and pressure to incorporate their voices into the agenda of international affairs. Interestingly, it was Japanese women who initiated this petition for disarmament and influenced women of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France to take action in London. At St. James's Palace, unlike her Western sisters, Gauntlett (née Yamada) Tsune from Japan wore a kimono and handed two bamboo baskets with
petitions signed by 750,000 Japanese women to the conference representatives. It was Gauntlett and her Japanese colleagues who initiated this campaign; later, the women of other nations joined them in their petition for disarmament.

Reflecting the exclusivity of the official diplomatic processes, non-official elements of international politics have received little academic attention in comparison to official ones. However, more and more scholars have given attention to the non-official aspect of diplomacy, exploring the ways in which private individuals and groups have related to the formation of public diplomacy. In addition to discussing the impact of private diplomatic efforts to manage the relationships between nations, these studies analyze international relations in frameworks of geopolitics, economic mobilization, security, and strategy, the transnational expansion of culture, and formation of mutual images and perceptions. They not only examine state-to-state relations but also demonstrate that domestic race, gender, and class arrangements have been closely tied to international affairs.


2 I owe this analysis of the historiography of diplomacy to Michael J. Hogan. According to his categorization, notably, the interpretation of Michael H. Hunt that he cites, there are three groups of historians in diplomacy: the first group puts geopolitics at the top, the second group interprets diplomacy with progressive and revisionist theories, and is concerned with connections between American diplomacy and the domestic sphere; the third group of historians connect American diplomacy to domestic systems as well as to international circumstances. Although Hogan and Hunt understand that the “third group” is still nation-state-centered, works of scholars I cite below give attentions to state-to-state relations as well as the connections of the domestic spheres to international affairs, especially to the U.S.-Japan relations. Harold R. Issacs, Scratches on our Minds: American Views of China and India (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1958); Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Paul Hooper, Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in
The frameworks of transnational historical studies that focus on social and cultural aspects are highly useful in examining women's commitment to international affairs. Since women have been collectively excluded from official foreign policy-making institutions until recently, they have been segregated into the private, unofficial segments of foreign affairs. Recently, various scholars of history have reconceptualized the ideology of women's domesticity in international contexts and have deconstructed the assumption of women's indifference in international affairs and diplomacy. Among many kinds of non-governmental organizations with transnational aspirations, scholars have researched on collective and individual

activism of women in the global arena. These works demonstrate the ideologies and strategies that women have employed to influence diplomacy. In addition to the discussion of secular women's activities, the scholars have incorporated women's contributions to global Christian missionary works in the study of international relations. Since recent studies demonstrate that the number of women in the Protestant missionary force had grown to exceed the number of missionary men at the turn of the 20th century, the analysis of gender has become essential to the comprehension of missionary enterprises and their impact on the lives of host nations.

and regions. These studies shed new light on the comprehension of diplomatic history and international affairs.⁴

These scholars of women's transnational activism, in general, share a view that women from Western nations took initiative in the construction of women's international identity and in the quest of world peace since the late 19th century.⁵ They tend to focus on trans-Atlantic interactions and minimize the agency of Asian women in the international community.⁶ Even when researchers include Asian women in the picture of transnational activism, they are apt to highlight the motives and strategies of the senders of Western cultural messages and the dissemination of Western influence into its colonies or sphere of influence, while describing Asian women as the monolithic passive receiving "end" of either liberation or oppression by the West. Such an assumption discouraged scholars from explaining why there was a Japanese


⁵ In this dissertation, the word "West" refers to the continent of Europe and to regions dominated by European culture elsewhere, regions like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

woman at St. James's Palace among the Western women at the London Naval Conference.

The lack of attention given to Asian women or the denial of their agency in the research on women's transnational activities partially derives from the assumption that ideas of human rights, democracy, equality, and other egalitarian concepts are Western values and ideas. Non-Western worlds are, in this scheme, regarded as unchanging sites of male dominance and female subordination. The improvement of their social and political status is, in this view, possible only by the absorption of Western feminist theory and practices. The bipolar interpretation of the West as a theorizing agent and the non-West as an object being theorized promotes the ahistoricization of non-Western culture in the name of "tradition" and the apoliticization of non-Western women as mere consumers of the political achievements in the West. Yet, this assumption obscures the various forms of inequality in Western society as well as the variety of the non-Western practices. After all, the "Western doctrine" of equality and human rights coexisted with the institutions of slavery and colonialism and systematic denial of citizenship rights to ethnic minorities and women within the West and all subjects of colonized territories. In fact, it was political struggles of these various peripherized groups in both Western and non-Western regions that secured for many the doctrine of equality and rights. Therefore, as Uma

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Narayan asserts, it is more accurate to assert that equality and rights are “products of such struggles against Western imperialism” (italics original). As J. M. Blaut points out, however, textbooks of world history still describe Westerners as the “makers of history” who “diffuse” their cultural innovation, while depicting the rest of the world as stagnant or merely imitating the Western model. An increasing number of scholars have defied such Eurocentric studies of transnational women’s activities that adopt the model of Western women as centers of invention and innovation, and have demonstrated the dynamics and diversity of women’s lives outside of Western nations.

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It is undeniable that the West, the United States and its European allies had influenced the minds of non-Western women through their missionary enterprises, social reform, and educational, research, and conference activities in various parts of the world.¹¹ Yet the one-sided interpretation of cultural flows from the West to non-Western countries tells little about reception and limits our understanding of transnational activism.¹² To reexamine notions of unilateral dissemination from the West to the “rest,” this dissertation highlights the transnational activity of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and its oversea affiliates in Asia. The WCTU was born in 1874 in the United States and expanded internationally to cover more than 50 nations and regions in the 1920s.¹³ Since the WCTU undertook its organizational efforts in Asia and attempted to integrate Asian women under its aegis earlier than any other similar association of women, it offers an appropriate space to examine how the Asian receivers accepted ideologies and practices of its reform


¹² Indepal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, eds, Scattered Hegemonies, 10-12.

¹³ After the World’s WCTU was organized and the “National” WCTU of the United States became one of its national branches, the American chapter called itself the “National” WCTU. Since this dissertation deals with more than one “national” chapter of the WCTU, it uses the “American WCTU” in order to avoid confusion.
plans. Although the American members unquestionably believed in the universal applicability of their scheme, the women of Asia who formed the national branches of the World's WCTU did not uncritically embrace the ideas of their mother organization. Instead, Asian women always reconceptualized and translated WCTU principles to fit into their own cultural and social contexts. Moreover, the Asian women attempted to influence the United States with various messages seeking racial equality, a recognition of their homelands' national identity and prestige, financial, material, and personal support, cultural and educational exchanges, and many other aspirations that their Western sisters often neglected to address.

The activities of the WCTU in the global theater indicates that Asian women were never the silent and obedient receiving “end” of schemes offered by Western women, or lifeless entities waiting to be represented by Western men and women. Contrary to such Orientalistic assumptions, Asian women were active cultural agents who dispatched to the world a diversity of their own designs for ideal international

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14 The international Council of Women, the International Alliance of Women, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom sought collective identity and international women’s connections. A large majority of their members were, however, Europeans and neo-Europeans (Americans, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders). The Pan-Pacific Women’s Association, established in 1930, (the Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women’s Association after 1955) focused exclusively on the Pacific Basin. For the history of the Honolulu-centered women’s international institutions, see Paul Hooper, “Feminism in the Pacific: The Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women’s Association,” Pacific Historian 20, no. 4 (Winter 1976), 366-377; Paul Hooper, Elusive Destiny, 91-93; Han Taiheiyo Tōnan Ajia Fujin Kyōkai, Han Taiheiyo Tōnan Ajia Fujin Kyōkai rokujūnenshi (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppān, 1993).  
15 Mohanty, Feminism without Borders, 66. For instance, women of the West rarely engaged questions of immigration despite that it was one of the primary concerns of the Japanese Union women during the 1920s.
communities and offered alternative self-representation of themselves and their nations as a working power.¹⁶ This dissertation examines the transnational activism of the WCTU to revise the "from the center to the periphery" model of ideological, strategic, personal, and material flow across the Pacific Ocean and to show that Asian women participated as active agents in such exchanges.¹⁷

In addition to focusing on the agency of Asian women, this study deconstructs the polarized framework represented by the "West" and the "rest" by highlighting the transnational activism of Japanese women who formed the Japanese WCTU. Unlike nations such as India, which anti-Eurocentric studies of women often adopt as a model


of examination, Japan never fell victim of colonization. It had not only avoided being colonized by Western powers but also developed into a colonial power and established itself as an empire in Asia by the late 19th century. Politically, Japan belonged to the West; at the same time, racially and culturally, it remained a part of the “rest” because it lacked racial and cultural roots in the West. Japanese women, constantly oscillating between the two categories as member of the only non-white empire, diversified the transnational dialogue of the WCTU.

Indeed, the relationship between transnational women’s activism with national politics and the question of whether it is appropriate to use the term “internationalism” to characterize the former are one of main subjects of inquiry of this research. Some scholars assert that women (and men) of transnationally oriented voluntary associations that grew in the 20th century gave priority to “internationalism” over “nationalism,” developed an alternative community of geopolitics, and facilitated mutual understanding transcending the narrow perspectives of nationalism. 18

18 Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 424; Rupp, Worlds of Women, 119; Rupp, “Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women’s Organizations, 1888-1945,” American Historical Review 99 (1994): 1590-1591. As an indication of the “internationalism” of Japanese women, Rupp quotes an “apology” of Kôra (Wada) Tomi toward her Chinese sisters after the Manchurian “Incident” in 1931. Kôra was a respected pioneering female medical scientist, and a member of the Japanese WCTU and the Japanese section of the WILPF. Yet she did not hold any influential positions in either society. Kôra’s words Rupp quotes in her two works were weak evidence of internationalism representing the general sentiments Japanese women. The majority of the Japanese WCTU, some of them members of the WILPF Japan branch, supported the “Incident” and the following creation of Manchukuo in 1932 as liberating efforts for the Chinese, as the forth chapter of this dissertation will reveal. Unlike Rupp’s assumption, the political/social/cultural/emotional situations of Euro-American connections that facilitated the creation of a variety of collective identities among white women were not directly applicable to East Asian settings.
However, the close examination of the transnational activism of the WCTU and other women's organizations refutes the idea that women as child bearers had a particular passion for peace and tended to prioritize international concerns over national ones. Essentialized notions of motherhood did not always run counter to the nationalist aspirations and agendas which male leaders shaped, because women often tried to promote cross-national negotiations by connecting domesticity to foreign affairs. Some women even believed that the acquisition of new territory and markets were essential for the security of the "national family." 19 The ideology and practices of women's transnational activism was, therefore, not completely divorced from masculinist nationalist agendas, including empire-building and even war. Indeed, the WCTU expanded globally hand in hand with the frameworks of imperialism, particularly U.S. and British imperialism, as Ian Tyrrell has pointed out. 20 In fact, the leaders of the World's WCTU effectively utilized American and British imperial and colonial structures as the medium of its external expansion. In Asia, the Japanese Union also spread its sphere of influence by establishing bastions in Japan's new colonies; it grew along with the Japanese empire and constantly collaborated with colonial regimes. The WCTU women of both America and Asia frequently assumed the role of private diplomats who worked for the sake of their own nations. The vision of transnationally

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19 As Amy Kaplan reveals, women in the United States accepted the transnational works as an extension of their domestic responsibilities as a home protector and attempted to extend the middle-class ideology of "respectable" morality and sexuality into public life. Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity."

20 Tyrrell, Woman's World/Woman's Empire, 148, 186, 286,
active women did transcend national borders, but they still upheld the values and politics of particular nations. They sought the development of a genuine world community, but under auspices of their own particular states. The sense of global sisterhood was not strong enough to overcome the realpolitik. Rather, it strongly shaped the contours of women's transnational activism, because the WCTU women often prioritized political reality over moral principles or ideas. It was to advance the interests of specific nations that women of the WCTU created social spaces for contestation over the reality of politics.\(^{21}\)

The close relations between women's transnational activism and imperial politics demand a discussion of how the WCTU integrated notions of cultural and racial hierarchy into their trans-Pacific dialogue. The political relations between the dominating power and the dominated subjects produced an unequal sisterhood among women of the Pacific. The strong sense of superiority of the Anglo-American culture and race as well as evangelical zeal motivated the American women of the WCTU to disseminate its cause throughout the world.\(^{22}\) These women, most of whom were

\(^{21}\) Dick Stegewerns has pointed out that there has been a new trend in the academic debate since the mid-1990s to stress the complementary character of nationalism and internationalism. More and more scholars have argued that nationalism and internationalism are not opposite value systems but intricately intertwined throughout the time period, both in Japan and elsewhere. See Dick Stegewerns, “The Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism in Modern Japan: National Interest, Asian Brotherhood, International Cooperation or World Citizenship?” in Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan, ed. Dick Stegewerns (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3-21.

middle-class and white, proclaimed their own racial and cultural superiority and pursued a self-appointed destiny to "civilize" and "uplift" helplessly victimized Asian sisters. Asian women also constantly referred to the standard of Western ideologies to judge the "progress" of their own cultures. Furthermore, obtaining recognition and membership in women's global organizations, which were actually dominated by Western white women, shaped the direction and process of Asian women's transnational activism, since they deemed it indispensable to boost the prestige of their nations. They always sought endorsement and support from the leaders of the World's WCTU which Anglo-American women dominated. In that sense, they were also complicit in the construction of Western superiority.

While they had clear respect for the achievements of women's political and social movements in the West, Asian women who participated in the WCTU community never discarded their sense of dignity. Their sense derived not only from national pride but also from a desire to be treated with proper respect from their Western sisters. They disagreed with and challenged the racial arrangement that placed Anglo-American women on top of the ladder, Japanese women in the middle due to the modernization and Westernization of Japan, and women of other Asian nations at the bottom. The Japanese women's protest against white racism represented by the Japanese exclusion act of 1924 in the United States and Chinese women's tenacious resistance to Japan's cause of escalating military aggression in the 1930s were manifestations of the strong sense of dignity deeply anchored in the consciousness of Asian women. The interplay between American women's self-
acclaimed sense of destiny to save Asia and Asian women's determination to stand with dignity in the global theater in defiance of their alleged "inferiority" and submissiveness characterized the trans-Pacific activism of the WCTU from the late 19th century to the end of the Pacific War.

By treating women of both America and Asia as active "agents" in global interactions, this dissertation examines the trans-Pacific activities of the WCTU in multidirectional and multilayered political and cultural contexts. The first chapter explores the social, political, and ideological circumstances of 19th century America that produced the WCTU and promoted its expansion across national boundaries. Then, it examines the transplantation of the temperance cause into Japan by the emissaries dispatched by the World's WCTU. This chapter discusses the negotiation over the temperance activities between American women and Japanese women who gathered around them. It reveals that the interaction between American and Japanese women reflected an unequal power balance in which the former assumed the role of a "mother" treating the latter as her "child." The central logic implicit in the mother-child relationship was not only marked by the guidance, protection, and affection of the mother for the child, but also the mother's mastery over the child. At the core of this framework were the relations of power and hierarchy. Discussion of how the American and Japanese women applied American style ideology and practices of social reform activism to the social and political situations of Japan and how they reinforced
or reciprocated the hierarchical between the two groups is the main theme of this chapter.

While the first chapter primarily reveals dialogue between American and Japanese women over the social reform agenda at a national level, the second chapter focuses on local perspectives of social reform enterprises by the North American and Japanese WCTU members. This chapter primarily focuses on two institutions, namely, the *Jiaikan* rescue home established in 1894 to accommodate the former prostitutes and other socially ostracized women and the *Kōbōkan* settlement house established in 1919 in the slum districts of downtown Tokyo. Both institutions were introduced by the female North American resident missionaries of Japan who formed the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU. The Foreign Auxiliary attempted to introduce rescue work to Japan and the type of settlement projects existing in the United States. Originally, both the rescue homes and settlement houses were developed in the U.S. to support the smooth incorporation of foreign immigrants and “pagans” into the mainstream of the U.S. society. In Japan, it was foreign missionary women who had to overcome a cultural gap to be accepted by the native people in Japan. The process of the establishment and development of a rescue home and a settlement house in Japan necessitated the nativization of the American style social reform activities to make them acceptable to the Japanese. The chapter demonstrates the negotiation between the missionary women and the Japanese, as well as between the middle-class members of the WCTU and working-class recipients of the services, and demonstrates how social reform schemes developed in the United States were arranged and accepted
in Japan.

In contrast to the previous two chapters highlighting the dissemination of the U.S. social reform movement to Japan, the third chapter reverses the direction and discusses the personnel and ideological flow from Asia to the United States and its Western allies. This chapter reveals how women of Asia and their white sisters interacted with one another until rising militarism and fascism in the 1930s hindered the smooth dialogue. This chapter also examines tensions between nationalistic concerns of each national WCTUs and the construction of global sisterhood and the promotion of world peace under the white ribbon, a symbol of the World's WCTU during the politically stable period between two world wars. The inter-war period was often described as an era of internationalism characterized by active transnational exchanges. Yet, the interactions among women of the Pacific during this period were not always harmonious. Friction in the international discourse included: Asian women's challenge to about a Eurocentric path to world peace which marginalized non-Westerners, the rising anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States that culminated in the immigration act of 1924, and the growth of nationalism in the colonized and semi-colonized nations and regions. During a politically stable period, the construction of a global sisterhood promoted by the World's WCTU and other similarly oriented women's organizations included tensions of racism, imperialism, and resistance to the status quo of international politics dominated by the imperial
powers. This chapter examines the tension inherent in transnational exchanges of women.

The fourth chapter continues the theme of the third chapter and analyzes the wartime activities of women on both sides of the Pacific after the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1931 until the end of World War II. During this tumultuous period, the WCTU members prioritized the victory of their nations over the promotion of global sisterhood and aggressively participated in the wartime efforts. They also conducted private diplomacy by using global personal channels. After the all-out war between China and Japan drove a wedge between women of the two nations, winning the favor of the American members became one of the primary agendas of both the Japanese and the Chinese Unions. When World War II split the World's WCTU into the Allied and the Axis powers and pitted them against each other, the American and Chinese women collaboratively fought against Japan. The Japanese WCTU increased its involvement in Japan's empire-building and participated in the construction of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." The wartime activism of the WCTU eloquently indicates its agreement with male realpolitik. Nevertheless, the strong strategic, emotional, economic, and personal connections that the WCTU had developed did not completely disappear and remained a part of its subconscious during the war. This chapter examines both the strength and weakness of the white ribbon that bound women of the Pacific through analysis of the wartime activism of the WCTU and explores what elements hindered them from constructing an international sense of "we," and how, if at all, they overcame them.
As a work of transnationalized American Studies and women's history, this dissertation situates the experiences of American as well as Asian women in a comparative context and reveals their transnational activities on global stages. The inclusive examination of the trans-Pacific interaction of women requires overcoming what Akira Iriye called "linguistic Eurocentrism" and calls for the inclusion of non-European language resources into research. 23 This dissertation includes not only English but also Japanese language sources. Admittedly, the exclusion of other Asian language documents in this study places certain limits on the scope of this transnational research and places the primary focus on American and Japanese WCTU women. A broader study that incorporates the voices and perspectives of Chinese and Korean women is much desired for future work.

The voices of rank-and-file members of the WCTU are also underrepresented in this study partially because of limitations of primary historical materials. In order to describe the Japanese Union, this dissertation mainly relies on its monthly magazine, *Fujin shinpō* (Women's Herald), since other historical records and documents of the Japanese Union were lost when air raids destroyed its headquarter buildings and other properties during the Pacific War. 24 Due to the unavailability of


24 The headquarter buildings of the Japanese Union suffered war damage due to air raid during the Pacific War and lost its all property. However, Shinohara Kimi of the Union
resources except *Fujin shinpó* in which the major contributors were the elite executive members in Tokyo, the non-elite constituents and Japanese of the least privileged class were underrepresented in this research. The tendency to highlight "elite" women is also obvious in narratives of American, Chinese, and Korean women; only a handful of women had the privilege to represent their nations, go abroad, and interact with people of other nations by speaking English. Transnational women's activities were, indeed, luxuries for working-class minorities, even though the WCTU primarily worked for the cause of the least privileged groups of society. Acknowledging these limitations, this dissertation attempts to reveal how the WCTU tried to reshape the lives of American and Asian women and defined the features of trans-Pacific women's activism from the late 19th century to the end of World War II.

carried *Fujin shinpó* by hand to Karuizawa before the escalation of air raids. Thanks to her, all copies of *Fujin shinpó* survived the war. Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai, ed., *Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai hyakunenshi* (Tokyo: Domesu shuppan, 1989), 687.
CHAPTER 1

FROM THE TEMPERANCE UNION TO THE KYÔFÛKAI:
THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Introduction

We are one world of tempted humanity; the mission of the White Ribbon women is to organize the motherhood of the world for the peace and purity, the protection and exaltation of its homes. We must send forth a clear call to our sisters yonder and our brothers too. We must be no longer hedged about by the artificial boundaries of states and nations; we must utter as women what good and great men long ago declared as their watchword: The whole world is my parish and to do good my religion.

Frances E. Willard, 1895

The Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in Japan began with the visit of Mary Clement Leavitt (1831-1912) in 1886. In that year the World's WCTU headquartered in Evanston, Illinois, dispatched Leavitt as a round-the-world missionary. The World's WCTU president Frances E. Willard (1839-1898) entrusted Leavitt with a special mission in her voyage to Japan and beyond to “uplift” their “oppressed” sisters to the values of Christianity through evangelical reform. Leavitt's visit and the ideology and rhetoric supporting it symbolized the dawn of new

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interactions between American and Japanese women. From then on, the WCTU women on the both sides of the Pacific Ocean have developed intriguing and intricate relationships.

This chapter briefly examines the development of the Worlds’ and American WCTUs, their ideas about Japan, and their vision for their trans-Pacific activism. Unlike most other international women’s organizations, which primarily developed American and European connections, the WCTU expanded in western and southern, rather than eastern and northern, directions. Although the WCTU turned to Great Britain as a source of inspiration and considered the Anglo-American connection as the core of its transnational activism, the Union stretched into Asian countries earlier than any other Western women’s organization, with the exception of the Christian missionaries. The Union women poured extensive personal and financial aid into Japan until the Japanese WCTU had laid a firm organizational foundation between the late 1880s and the early twentieth century. This chapter will explore the ideological and social backgrounds of women in the WCTU for clues on what inspired them to embark on organizational efforts in East Asian countries including Japan. I will also highlight the WCTU’s specific agenda, strategy, and training methods used to imbue Japanese members with the Western ideology of Evangelism and the temperance cause.

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This examination of American social institutions' expansion into Japan cannot be accomplished without analyzing the process of Japanese women's nativization of the Victorian ideology of womanhood the WCTU embodied. The middle-class, Christian notion of ideal womanhood that embraced purity, piety, domesticity and submissiveness, and that emphasized the mother's role in the late 19th century was at the foundations of the WCTU agenda. The Japanese women who met Mary Clement Leavitt shared many of her notions of womanhood, but also holding striking differences about the ideal roles women should play in Japanese society. The Japanese name of the Union, "Kyōfūkai," or literally, the "Association for Reforming Customs," adopted after a heated discussion among its members, symbolized such strategic differences between the Japanese and American WCTUs. This change of name is a critical indicator of the nativization or "Japanization" of American ideology of temperance and womanhood. This chapter will examine the strategic development of the World's and American WCTU women toward Japanese women at the turn of the 20th century, how the Japanese Union women interpreted the most pressing concerns for themselves, and how both the American and the Japanese Union women evaluated and related to each other.

The Birth of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and its Concerns for International Enterprise

The WCTU developed as a response to the widespread consumption of alcohol and subsequent suffering among women and children from alcoholism that was
prevalent in the United States in the last half of the 19th century. Since the first half of the 19th century, American women had joined temperance societies, such as the Sons of Temperance organized in the 1840s, and formed an auxiliary, the Daughters of Temperance. Gradually women formed independent female voluntary associations. Although Victorian womanhood confined women into a "woman's sphere," in the temperance movement, women did not play a subordinate role; rather, more women participated in the temperance pledge than men, and they formed an essential component of temperance societies in the 1850s. The direct predecessor of the WCTU was the Women's Temperance Crusade (WTC), which existed between 1873 and 1874; initiated by Protestant, Midwestern women of middle-class families who walked out of their homes and kneeled in the streets at the doors of saloons, the symbol of male culture and vulgar masculinity, the WTC protested the sale of alcohol. Their advocacy of protecting morality and home values with which they identified, and their fight against liquor industries developed into the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, formed in Cleveland, Ohio in 1874. Soon the WCTU expanded to become one of the largest women's organizations in the United States at the time, especially under the

4 Ruth Bordin explains that widespread alcoholism stemmed from the 19th century American belief that alcohol, available at a cheap price, was a food, a hygienic substitute for unsanitary water in urban areas, medicine, and a source of energy for physical labor and internal warmth. Blocker demonstrates that the liquor business expanded rapidly since the late 1860s, especially during the Crusade period. Ruth Bordin, *Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty, 1873-1900* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 57; Jack S. Blocker Jr., "Give to the Winds Thy Fears": The Women's Temperance Crusade, 1873-1874 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 97-99.

5 For the social environments of late 19th century America and the development of the Woman's Temperance Crusade, see Blocker: Jack S. Blocker Jr., "Separate Paths: Suffragists and the Women's Temperance Crusade," *Signs* 10, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 460-476.
leadership of Frances E. Willard (1839-98) who succeeded its presidency from Annie Wittenmyer in 1879.⁶

In addition to increasing consumption of alcohol, there were other factors that fueled the rapid development of the mass women's movement in that period, including the WCTU: urbanization, industrialization, the development of universal education and growing leisure time of middle-class white women.⁷ The acceleration of urbanization in the 1870s and the 1880s prompted the development of women's community in urban areas where they could gather easily. The emergence of a large body of middle and upper-middle-class women who performed child-care and homemaking duties on a full time basis was also particular to these decades. These women were freed from the necessity of contributing to the family economy and from child bearing due to the falling birth rate. The great number of Irish immigrants in the North and freed blacks in the South provided domestic service, allowing these women

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⁶ Ruth Bordin believes that the WCTU had grown to be the largest organization of women until the General Federation of Women's Clubs surpassed it in 1900. Patricia Hill refutes her argument by crediting the women's foreign mission movement with being the largest organization in the 19th century. Bordin, Woman and Temperance, 3-4; Patricia Hill, The World Their Household: The American Women's Missionary Movement and Cultural Transformation, 1870-1920 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985), 195.

⁷ Bordin, Woman and Temperance, 12-13. Ruth Schwarts Cowan and Nancy Hewitt disagree with Bordin about her interpretation of "growing leisure" in middle-class women's lives of late 19th century America. Cowan reveals that industrialization and technological advances eliminated much of the physical burden of domestic work, but also have increased the amount household tasks to be performed by women. Hewitt indicates that the majority of middle-class women had to struggle with ever-expanding duties originating from the expanding consumerism and home entertainments, and they had little leisure time. See Ruth Schwarts Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Nancy Hewitt, "Beyond the Search for Sisterhood," in Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in U. S. Women's History, eds. Vicki L. Ruiz and Ellen Carol DuBois (New York: Routledge, 2000), 10-11.
more leisure time to participate in social reforms. The expansion of education, elementary and secondary as well as higher education for women, laid the groundwork for the institutional development of the Union. Frances Willard herself served as the president of the Evanston College for Ladies; when it merged with Northwestern University, she became the dean of the women’s department. The WCTU attracted many new college women and offered them opportunities to utilize their knowledge and intelligence. Another major cause of the institutional expansion of the Union was the effective use of the members of church-networks. Since almost all of the members of the WCTU were church-going women, the presence of church networks functioned for the promulgation of temperance causes. Thus, the consignment of women to a special

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8 Joseph Gusfield states that the temperance movement represented a form of social control by middle-class Protestants to preserve their status quo from Catholic immigrants and social evils produced by industrialization and urbanization. Bordin appraises his interpretation of temperance in the reformist tradition, refuting his analysis by indicating the ecumenicalism of the WCTU that embraced Catholics and transcended class and racial differences. See Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Policies and the American Temperance Movement*, 2d. ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Bordin, *Woman and Temperance*, xxiii.


10 Patricia Hill explains that the WCTU and women’s missionary societies sympathized and cooperated with each other since both shared the common ideology that Christian womanhood was the only agent to save the world. However, there was a sense of rivalry between the two over the lion’s share of influence. See Hill, *The World Their Household*, 55.
ghetto or "woman's sphere" empowered women and created a women's culture that "formed a source of strength and identity and afforded supportive sisterly relations."  

Moreover, the similarity of the temperance cause with the Victorian notion of womanhood functioned as the major vehicle for the expansion of the WCTU. The Victorian doctrine of a separate women's sphere that allocated women the role of moral protector of their husbands and children, shared by many middle-class women of the post-Civil War society, made women's involvement in the temperance movement and their activism to be accepted as a socially sanctioned "maternal struggle."  

Since the beginning of the Woman's Crusade and other temperance movements, women advocates argued that alcohol abuse and the waste of money at the saloons of their husbands and fathers caused the "victimization of women" by violence and poverty.  

Even though the women's temperance movement was interconnected with the women's suffrage movement in the 1880s and 1890s, the WCTU avoided such defiant phrases as "the rights of women."  

Rather than challenging the dominant values of the time, Willard used the "cult of true womanhood" to maximize her influence and that of her organization.  

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12 Ibid., 18.  
14 Ibid, 147.  
defense of the family and made the temperance movement non-threatening so that she
could make progressive arguments more acceptable to a larger number of women and
men.\textsuperscript{16} When Willard expanded her scope from the fight against the "Whiskey War" to
many other social problems of the day by providing the slogan "Do Everything" in the
1880s, she added women's suffrage and labor's movement to the agenda of the Union.
At the national convention in 1891, Frances E. Willard proclaimed that the realm of
philanthropy had replaced prayer and expanded the range of interest to cover most of
the social evils in the United States. The Union women attempted to remedy the double
standard by opposing licensing and medical inspection of brothels, and encourage the
authorities to enforce legislation against male patronage as well as prostitutes,
although their concern never grew to be the primary concern of the American Union.\textsuperscript{17}
Expressing "Prohibition, Woman's Liberation, and Labor's uplift" as the "blessed trinity
of movements," she treated the issue of the women's vote as "part and parcel of our

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{16} Carol Mattingly reveals that the Union leaders made women's suffrage and other equal
rights for women acceptable to a large number of women by utilizing comfortable, familiar

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{17} Bordin, \textit{Women and Temperance}, 111. There was the argument that prostitution was a
menace to the happiness of home life in the United States. See Nancy F. Cott, \textit{The Bonds of
Womanhood} (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1977), 152-3; Allan M. Brandt, \textit{No Magic
Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States Since 1880} (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter I. However, social reformers had not always viewed
prostitution as an urgent problem until the early 20th century. Ruth Rosen, \textit{The Lost
Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900-1918} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1982), chapter 1.
Prohibition cause— the two sink or rise together.” Thus, the WCTU developed “protofeminist politics” that deemed the vote a weapon for the defense of home values. Its national convention in 1877 adopted the white ribbon as its emblem symbolizing unblemished purity and peace. The WCTU urged its members to wear white ribbons or the pins that imitated its form and color as the single silent witness to observe the Union’s principles, and even the term “white ribboner” became synonymous with a WCTU member.

Embracing the dominant ideology of the separate sphere of Victorian womanhood, the WCTU consisted only of women; it accepted men only as “honorary members” and charged them double the regular membership fee. Unlike other

18 Willard, Do Everything, 6 and 45.
19 Epstein, The Politics of Domesticity, 1-2. Bordin characterized the activism of the WCTU as “feminism on reform” or “social feminism.” Nancy F. Cott argues that social feminism and hard-core feminism or the suffrage movement were often inseparable, since even the most militant suffragists were frequently social workers and settlement house residents. Mattingly also challenges such binary analyses and questions Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s judgment of WCTU women as conservative for refusing to work exclusively for women’s votes. Many women of 19th century America believed that woman’s rights and the temperance causes were inextricably intertwined. Nancy F. Cott, “What’s in a Name? The Limits of Social Feminism; or, Expanding the Vocabulary of Women’s History,” Journal of American History 76, no. 3 (December 1989): 809-829; Mattingly, Well-Tempered Women, 6-23.
21 Willard rationalized this double fee for men as follows, “a man usually has a better hold on the business world, and can spare two shillings with less self-denial than a woman can spare one.” Willard, Do Everything, 111. For the strong comradeship of middle-class women during 19th century Victorian America, see Kathryn Kish Sklar, Catherine Beecher (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1973); Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America (New York: Knopf, 1985).
Christian organizations, especially women's missionary boards, which were under male control, the WCTU expected men to join them solely to provide financial assistance while it excluded them from its decision-making positions.\textsuperscript{22}

Willard shifted the mother's role as a moral guardian of the home, nucleus of the Victorian domesticity of late 19th century America, to the public arena. She defined the "Organized Mother Love" as "the best definition of the White Ribbon Movement" and that it symbolized the maternalism of the Union. The emphasis on motherhood by the Union as a major catalyst to advance women's solidarity reflected the strong relationship between mothers and daughters in middle-class families of Victorian America. In an all-female society, the Union women applied family metaphors to describe their companionship, such as "sister," "mother," and "daughter." The mother-daughter relationship went beyond the biological one; it was used for referring to the emotional commitment of women, especially between older and younger women of the Union. Moreover, the metaphor of the love bond included uneven power arrangements between a matured "mother" and her dependent "daughter"; the former protects as well as dominates the latter, while the latter obeys the former.\textsuperscript{23}

As a follower of the Social Darwinist doctrines that developed simultaneously

\textsuperscript{22} Willard explains the women-only policy, "First of all it was formed exclusively of women, because they felt that if men had an equal place in its councils, their greater knowledge of Parliamentary usage and their more aggressive nature would soon place women in the background, and deprive them of the power of learning by experience ..." Willard, \textit{Do Everything}, 19.

\textsuperscript{23} For the discourse of maturity and hierarchical relations, see Naoko Shibusawa, \textit{America's Geisha Ally: Race, Gender, and Maturity in Reimagining the Japanese} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
with the WCTU, Willard believed in the idea that Anglo-Saxon Protestant women were the best conservators of racial traits and the conveyers of advanced civilization.\textsuperscript{24} Since the demand for woman's rights and social reforms in the United States occurred simultaneously with the growth of Social Darwinism and imperialism, many American women, including Willard, believed in the Social Evolution theory.\textsuperscript{25} Just as white men's power stemming from the idea of white supremacy endorsed their dominance over other racial groups in the United States and beyond, Anglo-Saxon supremacy functioned as the source of authority of white middle-class women's organizational activism at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{26}

Anglo-American superiority in terms of race and civilization inspired the early pattern of WCTU international activism. Willard and her Union colleagues identified themselves as the former colonial "daughters" of British women who were on the top of the Social Darwinist hierarchy, despite the fact that it was American women who actually "mothered" or created the WCTU.\textsuperscript{27} The colonial "daughters" envisioned using Anglo-American ties for the regeneration of the world according to Evangelism and temperance and formed an International Woman's Christian Temperance Union during

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ian Tyrrell, \textit{Woman's World Woman's Empire}, chapters 1 and 6.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Newman; Gail Bederman, \textit{Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{27} The WCTU's deference toward British women lasted until around the 1920s. When the United States passed the 18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment in 1919 outlawing all liquor production and consumption and instigated women's suffrage in 1920, American Union women renewed their self-acclaimed roles as moral leaders of the world. They became fully independent from their British "mother." The third chapter will explore such a change in consciousness by the American WCTU members.
\end{itemize}
the first decade of the organization. The International WCTU hosted international conferences attended by representatives of a limited number of nations. Such attempts did not bear fruit because “the time was evidently not ripe for such a movement.” Yet the relation between the American WCTU and its British allies was strengthened with the passing of time; Willard turned more and more to Britain as a source of influence. By the 1890s, Anglo-American unity had evolved into Anglo-American cultural domination under the banner of Evangelism and temperance. In Willard’s mental global map of the human race, London was the capital.

The Formation of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union and the Ideology behind Its Growing Interest in Japan

Embracing the belief of Social Darwinism that put Anglo-American race and culture on top of the hierarchy and the idea of Great Britain as the “mother” of the American Union, Willard revived an earlier plan of establishing an international association in 1884. With the help of Lady Henry Somerset, her British cohort, she formed the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, an international companion organization to the American WCTU. At this time, Willard directed her eyes Asia.

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28 Tyrrell, *Woman’s World Woman’s Empire*, 20.
30 Tyrrell, *Woman’s World Woman’s Empire*, chapter 1.
Willard expressed what inspired her vision to spread out her arms to Asian women repeatedly during her trip to Chinatown in San Francisco in 1883. When she went on an organizing tour to the Pacific Coast, she had a striking experience that was one of the major turning points in her life. She addressed the great shock that her visit to Chinatown,

We [Willard, Anna A. Gordon, and Rev. Dr. Gibson] there saw the opium den in all its loathsome completeness, and next door stood the house of shame. Respectable Chinese women were not allowed to accompany their husbands to California, but here were Chinese girls, one in each of many small cabins with sliding doors and windows on the street, constituting the most flagrantly flaunted temptation that we have ever witnessed. In presence of these two object lessons, the result of occidental avarice and oriental degradation, there was borne in upon my spirit a distinct illumination resulting in this solemn vow: But for the intrusion of the sea the shores of China and the Far East would be part and parcel of our own. We are one world of tempted humanity; the mission of the White Ribbon women is to organize the motherhood of the world for the peace and purity, the protection and exaltation of its homes. We must send forth a clear call to our sisters yonder and our brothers too. We must be no longer hedged about by the artificial boundaries of states and nations; we must utter as women what good and great men long ago declared as their watchword: The whole world is my parish and to do good my religion. 32

This quote from her book, *Do Everything*, is an ambitious declaration to expand her organization abroad and to reorganize the world in her own image. Although Willard realized “occidental avarice” as well as “oriental degradation” allowed for the heinous growth of social evils in the Chinese community on American soil, her concern for the latter far surpassed the former. Instead of denouncing the immigration law that banned Chinese women’s entry into the U.S. that resulted in the immense unbalanced

ratio of the sexes in the Chinese community, she projected the pitiful situation of Chinese women in Chinatown onto all women in Asia. Such a presumption about women’s downtrodden status in East Asia gave her reason to intervene in a place she had never been. How could the pitiful Asian women be saved from the “heathen” customs? She believed that the only way for Chinese women to find salvation from the trammels of “oriental degradation” was to become a part of “my parish and to do good my religion.” In other words, they could be liberated only through embracing her organization, the WCTU, and its mission based on Christianity.\footnote{Protestant home missionary women shared her argument that Chinese women could be saved only by accepting Victorian gender values and religion, and established rescue homes. See Peggy Pascoe, \textit{Relations of Rescue: The Search for Female Moral Authority in the American West, 1874-1939} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).}

Thus, the sense of mission and Christian duty were important elements of the Union’s global expansion. America’s mission to mold the world in the American image, along with presumptions about the racial and cultural supremacy of the white Protestant middle-class, functioned as an ideological medium for American continental and global expansionism\footnote{For the American sense of mission, see Edward McNall Burns, \textit{The American Idea of Mission} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957); Reginald Horseman, \textit{Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Michael H. Hunt, \textit{Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), chapters 2 and 3.} Many American women responded to the call to be “civilizers” by characterizing themselves as agents of change. Before the birth of the American WCTU, various Protestant denominations established woman’s boards of missions, and dispatched female missionaries abroad. These women had already inaugurated evangelical enterprises in Asia and other parts of the world, and conveyed...
the temperance cause in their fields. The WCTU, then, as a Christian women's organization, followed the footsteps of female missionaries in seeking to influence a wider world. For Methodists like Frances Willard, aspiration for internationalism was particularly strong because they were enthusiastic about global missionary enterprises.

Moreover, the WCTU reaffirmed the domestic discourse and maternalist politics as a foundation for expanding her organization in non-Christian countries and the means to bring them to what the Union women believed to be a superior ethical system. Optimistically assuming that all women, regardless of nationality and culture, shared common gender characteristics and had gender roles to fulfill, Willard saw the ideology of Victorian motherhood as exportable anywhere in the world and firmly believed the "protection and exaltation of home" vindicated going beyond the "artificial boundaries of states and nations."

Such expansionist logic of domesticity had already been developed before the advent of the WCTU. Major spokespersons of the woman's sphere in the first half of the

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35 Congregational women organized the Woman's Board of Missions in 1868; Methodist Episcopal women founded the Woman's Foreign Mission Society in 1869; Presbyterian women created the Ladies Board of Foreign Missionary Societies in 1870; Baptist women formed the Woman's Baptist Foreign Missionary Society in 1873. These societies were not created from the feminist concern of evangelical men and women to achieve women's independence. Instead, the norms of "piety and patriarchy were interwoven principles in the governance of these organizations," and female missionaries and the wives of male missionaries were assigned subordinate status within the denominations. Line Nyhagen Predelli and Jon Miller, "Piety and Patriarchy: Contested Gender Regimes in Nineteenth-Century Evangelical Missions," in Gendered Missions: Women and Men in Missionary Discourse and Practice, eds. Mary Taylor Huber and Nancy C. Lutkehaus (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 67.
19th century, such as Catherine Beecher and Sarah J. Hale, believed in the expansive potential of domesticity abroad and advocated domesticating pagan immigrants by imbuing them with the discourse of the woman's sphere. The domestic discourse in the United States was developed contemporaneously with the discourse of Manifest Destiny, the notion that the United States had been destined to move westward popularized in the first half of the 19th century. In the time of Willard, the old feelings of Manifest Destiny were replaced with the imperial impulse of late 19th century America, and the blend of domesticity with national expansion evolved from a speculation of thinkers into a specific agenda of transnational activism.36

Willard's "discovery" of the enslaved Chinese women was also a reflection of the pervading Western feminist discourse since the late 18th century. Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman characterized Eastern, actually Middle-Eastern, women's experiences as soulless, confined, uneducated, and inactive. Their condition reduced them to the level of animals and children; Wollstonecraft believed the excessive sexuality of the harem, embodied in polygamy and prostitution, was another important element of Eastern culture.37 Associating the East with despotism and tyranny as a spurious "fact" of Eastern lives and labeling any objectionable aspect of the European treatment of women as Eastern, she advocated the elimination of "Eastern elements" from Western practices as a key to the

improvement of women's status.\textsuperscript{38}

American women who lived decades later than Wollstonecraft inherited such negative attitudes toward the East.\textsuperscript{39} In the United States, Margaret Fuller, Susan B. Anthony, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for instance, expanded Wollstonecraft's definition of the East to include East Asia as well, and illustrated Eastern culture with the repulsive image represented by harems and the degradation of womanhood.\textsuperscript{40} Anthony and Stanton even found solace in the remarkable contrast to the brutality of the East and believed the impossibility of a woman who, "growing up under American ideas of liberty in government and religion, having never blushed behind a Turkish mask, nor pressed her feet in Chinese shoes, can not brook any disabilities based on sex alone, without a deep feeling of antagonism with the power that creates it."\textsuperscript{41}

Likewise, Frances Willard shared this view of "oppressed" Eastern women with their "liberal" American and British counterparts with her contemporaries, although she differed from Anthony and Stanton in conceptualizing strategies for increasing women's influence in society and the nation. The confirmed sense of Western "superiority" vis-à-vis their sisters in the East spurred Willard into spreading her organization throughout the world, especially Asia. Soon, she set about shaping a concrete plan and selecting an appropriate emissary who would carry out her wishes.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 599-602.
\textsuperscript{39} Zonana calls such discourse as "feminist orientalism."
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
The Woman's Christian Temperance Union Meets Asia in 1886

Every White Ribboner in those far-off countries stands bearing a torch of purest light, whose gleams shall yet, united with many others, dispel the darkness that now rests upon the Orient.\textsuperscript{42}

This sentence summarizes Frances E. Willard’s strong sense of mission and Christian duty inspired by a repulsive image of the “Orient” represented by the degradation of its women, and her strong determination to spread her institution to Asia. The first torchbearer in the “Orient” was Mary Clement Leavitt (1830-1912). Leavitt was born in a middle-class family and was educated in Boston. After working as a secondary school teacher, she married a businessman. Her marriage lasted for ten years. After her divorce, she raised her own children by tutoring others’ children. When her children grew up to be independent, she started her second career as an active WCTU member in Massachusetts. When Willard took a trip to the West Coast in 1883 and realized the necessity of organizing in that region, she requested Leavitt to assume its responsibility. Thereafter, Leavitt left the East Coast and busied herself organizing in California, Oregon, and Washington.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} Minutes of the Executive Committee and Convention of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, (1895): 182.
she was the first one to answer the call to organize abroad. Her appointment as the WCTU’s first round-the-world missionary and her trip to the other side of the Pacific may be seen as an extension of her national organizational work on the West Coast. Through her temperance work in the Pacific states, she extended her organizing work to Hawai‘i and beyond, as Willard’s experience in San Francisco shaped her vision to undertake her new enterprises on the other side of the Pacific. Leavitt’s firm sense of mission can be seen in her refusal to accept money from the Union for her expenses. She stated, “I’m going on God’s mission, and He will carry me through.” Her dramatic rhetoric suggests that Leavitt and the World’s WCTU held an optimistic expectation of financial and personal support from Christian missionary communities in the places she visited. She purchased a ticket to reach Hawai‘i with money she earned from teaching and sailed from San Francisco on the fifteenth of November in 1884. This was the first step of a journey that finally covered more than forty nations and regions.

44 Frances E. Willard and Mary A. Livermore, ed. American Women, 455.
45 Tyrell, Woman’s World Woman’s Empire, 84.
46 Willard and Livermore, American Women, 455-456.
47 She went to Hawai‘i, New Zealand, Australia, Tasmania, Japan, China, Siam, Straits Settlements, Singapore, Malay Peninsula, Burma, Hindustan, Ceylon, Mauritius, Madagascar, Natal, Orange Free State, Cape Colony, England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Congo Free State, Old Calabar, Sierra Leone, Madeira, Spain, France, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greece, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. [The names of nations and regions are quoted from an article of American Women.] In her nearly one-hundred-thousand mile trip, she had the services of two-hundred-twenty-nine interpreters in forty-seven languages, and organized eighty-six WCTUs. As she anticipated, her expenses were all donated in the places she visited. She came back to the United States in 1891 and wrote the pamphlet, “The Liquor Traffic in Western Africa.” Thereafter, instead of settling down in the United States, she embarked on another organizing trip to Mexico, Central and South America. In 1891, Leavitt was named World WCTU honorary president for life. For her journey, see Janet Giele, “Mary Clement Greenleaf Leavitt”; Patricia Ward D’Itri, Cross Currents in the International Women’s Movement, 1848-1948 (Bowling Green,
In Honolulu, Leavitt successfully organized the WCTU primarily among American and British missionaries. Moreover, she raised enough funds to sail to her next destination, New Zealand, thanks to the cooperation of Mary Whitney, the first president of the Honolulu WCTU and other white ribboners.\(^48\) Leavitt planted trees of temperance on the fertile soil in New Zealand and Australia. Her trip to New Zealand and Australia, instead of traveling directly to Japan from Honolulu, symbolized the confirmation of organizational ties with other "daughters" of Great Britain. In Australia, Leavitt received a gift of money from local Unions. Thereafter, she ventured into Yokohama, a major port city of Japan. Japan was the first Asian country she visited. She stepped onto Japanese soil on June 1886.

The group of American missionaries in Japan greeted Leavitt. She stayed at seminaries in Yokohama and Tokyo. Then, she visited Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Wakayama, Okayama, and Nagasaki, all of which had American missionary communities. As she did in Hawai'i, New Zealand and Australia, she made the best possible use of American Protestants for her organizational enterprises in Japan.

The Christian evangelization venture had already been initiated in Japan in 1859, soon after the Harris Treaty went into effect.\(^49\) Yet, the strong feeling of


\(^{49}\) The Treaty for an exchange of ministers, including the opening of several cities to trade and foreign residence, moderation of limitations on import and export duties, and extraterritorial privileges for Americans, symbolized the end of Tokugawa regime's
anti-Christianity did not easily disappear from the minds of both the people and the
government officials of Japan. Removal of official prohibitions of Christianity and
recognition of the Western religion by the Meiji government did not occur until several
years after the toppling of the Tokugawa regime in 1868.\(^50\) The period between 1873
and the late 1880s, however, was aptly termed the “flowering period of mission
activities in Japan” and was the result of the government’s eager acceptance of
Westernization and the Japanese people’s enthusiasm for learning Western knowledge
and cultures.\(^51\) Protestant churches mushroomed throughout the country. Many
denominations established mission schools in various parts of Japan. Among such
schools, mission schools for girls had a great significance for Japanese women.
Although the Meiji government gave special attention universal elementary education
and higher education for men as an indispensable ingredient of Westernization, it paid
scant attention to women’s education above the elementary courses. Missionary schools
filled the gap between the governmental indifference in women’s post-elementary
education and Japanese women with a strong interest in learning.\(^52\) Americans were

\(^50\) The lifting of the ban on Christianity in 1873 was not the result of considering Japanese
Christians but rather of Western countries that opposed the governmental anti-Christian
policy. There were sixty Protestant missionaries when the Meiji government officially
admitted evangelical enterprises. See Takahashi Kei, “Kumiai Kyōkai to Kindai Nippon,”
in *Nihon no Kindaika to Kirisutokyō*, ed. Dōshisha Daigaku Jinbunkagaku
\(^51\) Ibid., 74.
\(^52\) Kohiyama Rui, *Amerika fujin senkyōshi: rainichi to sono eikyō* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1992), 183–252.
the dominant power among such Protestant enterprises in Japan. By 1888, eight of the major American denominations, except the Southern Baptist, had entered the Japanese field, and these organizations dominated throughout the 1870s and the 1880s. The remarkable feature of the American Evangelist community was the predominance of female missionaries. The number of married and single female missionaries from the United States far surpassed that of males. These American missionary women supported the travel of Leavitt by offering her accommodations, obtaining permission from government officials to travel and making her public speeches possible outside cities opened to foreigners.

Japanese Christian men and women took special notice of Leavitt's advocacy of temperance. Japanese Christian men converted in the early Meiji period developed connections with Christianity through English learning, studying at mission schools and abroad. Unlike converts in other countries in Asia who were generally from the lower classes and were mainly attracted to Christianity's egalitarian teachings, many Japanese male Christians came from former samurai families who had traditionally

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54 Ibid, 89. The eight denominations were the Northern and Southern Methodist, Protestant Episcopal, Congregational, Northern Presbyterian, Northern and Southern Baptist Churches, and the Disciples of Christ.
55 Kohiyama, *Amerika fujin senkyōshi*, 186-187. Kohiyama reveals that the numbers of female and male Protestant missionaries, most of whom were Americans, were 127 and 186, or a two-three ratio in 1883.
56 For the support of missionaries Leavitt received, see Rumi Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in Japan and Beyond, 1858-1920*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles, 1998, 85-86.
served in the Tokugawa government. They approached Christianity as a part of learning the Western culture that the missionaries presented. The attraction to Western learning, coupled with the search for spiritual reform to replace pre-modern feudalism, was the major reason of their conversion. Later, Christianity spread to wealthy farmers, merchants, and soon after the urban middle-class. Most of the Christian Japanese men who offered Leavitt financial and logistical support by publishing and arranging meetings, and serving as her interpreter were from former-samurai families. For these men, the temperance cause did not sound novel. Japanese Christian men had already organized a temperance association, called "Kyöfukai" (矫風会), or literally, "the Association for Reforming Customs," before the arrival of Leavitt.

Major topics of her talks were the hereditary nature of drinking habits and illness caused by drinking, and the importance of the mother's role as moral guardian of children. Moreover, she condemned Japanese culture and religion for worshiping an

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60 Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism*, 89-98.
61 Ibid, 94. In addition to the Kyöfukai led by Rev. Ögimi Motoichirô, the male temperance society was born in Yokohama. In Hokkaido, William Smith Clark and his prominent students Uchimura Kanzô and Nitobe Inazô of Sapporo Agricultural School established the Temperance Union. In Kyoto, young Buddhist priests of Nishi-Hongwanji formed hanseikai, the "society of self-examination" for the temperance cause. The organ of hanseikai, *Hanseikai zasshi* later developed into *Chûôkôron*, still published as one of the leading intellectual magazines in Japan. Takemura Tamio, *Haishô undô: kuruwa no josei wa dou kaihô sareta*. (Tokyo: Chûôkôronsha, 1982), 20.
“idol,” such as the statue of Buddha in Nara, for the widespread smoking habits among women, and for women’s lack of modesty in public bathing. She also contributed serial essays geared to Japanese women that emphasized the importance of expanding women’s higher education and job opportunities and denounced those who criticized women making public speeches. Her speeches and writings conveyed the temperance cause from a scientific perspective by quoting the most recent scientific discoveries on the negative effects of drinking and smoking on health. She also outlined the role of women according to Victorian standards and criticized “heathen” culture and customs. However, she took the anti-Christian feelings among the Japanese into consideration and did not push Christianity. Thus, she carefully deleted religious language from her speeches and highlighted scientific and empirical aspects of the temperance cause.

Leavitt inspired the birth of women’s temperance unions by visiting various cities with large Christian populations until leaving for China on October 6, 1886. In Tokyo, Kimura Tōko played a leading role in preparing the new women’s society. Kimura was well known for co-founding Meiji Jogakko (Meiji Girl’s School), with her


64 Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism, 87-88.
husband, Rev. Kimura Kumaji, one of the leading Christian intellectuals. Meiji Jogakkô was a liberal women's Christian school and attracted progressive Christians. Its principal Iwamoto Zenji, for instance, challenged the oppressive ideology of women's roles through his journal called Jogaku Zasshi (the Journal of Women's Learning). Kimura Tôko was a leader of such progressive Christians in early Meiji Japan. In addition, her husband Kumaji was a friend of Ôgimi Motoichiro, the president of the male temperance union. Interactions with the male temperance activists and Christian intellectuals inspired Tôko to establish and represent a women's temperance union. However, Tôko's sudden death from cholera temporarily stranded the burgeoning plan of such an organization. On November 9, forty-three Japanese Christian women, Kate Youngman of the Presbyterian mission, and two Japanese Christian men of the (male) Reforming Society gathered in Tokyo to prepare for a women's temperance union in Tokyo. At this meeting, attendees agreed to form a women's "KYÔFUKAI" (矯風会), or an Association for Reforming Customs.

The Birth of Kyôfukai in Tokyo and the Japanese Women

The WCTU Tokyo, or "Tokyo FUJIN KYÔFUKAI", literally, Tokyo Woman's Association for Reforming Customs, officially came into existence on December 6 in 1886. Yajima Kaji (1832-1925), then the acting principal of a women's mission school,
Sakurai Jogakkō (Sakurai Girl's School), was selected to be the first president. The story of the temperance cause presented by Leavitt awoke Yajima to the fight against alcohol abuse and other social evils. Yajima had suffered life-threatening abuse at the hands of her drunken husband, and had been criticized by many, including her family members, for divorcing him. Moreover, her sexual relations with a man who had not disclosed that he was married and the birth of her illegitimate child had added another layer of disillusionment to her. Because of her personal distress due to a harsh marriage experience and the remorse of adultery, Yajima turned to Christianity. She became a teacher at a mission school, joined a circle surrounding Leavitt, and met other women who had similar experiences.

Like Yajima, other founding members experienced agony in their lives. Watase Kame, who translated Leavitt's English speech with her baby on her back, had also suffered abuse from her alcoholic husband. Ushioda Chiseko (1844-1903), who later served as the president of the Union, was widowed at age thirty-nine by the sudden death of her husband. From that moment on, she struggled to raise her five children by

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68 Sakurai Jogakkō was a Presbyterian mission school for girls founded in 1876; later, it was combined with another girls' mission school and developed into Joshi Gakuin (Girls' Academy) in 1890.
69 This illegitimate affair had been kept secret for a long time until her nephew Tokutomi Roka (Kenjirō) publicly disclosed it in newspapers and journals. When Kubushiro Ochimi, her grandniece, noticed this story, she criticized Yajima. Yajima replied to her, “after that affair, I, though with unsteady steps, went to the path of salvation.” Her words of regret and remorse with tears appeased Kubushiro’s anger, and let Kubushiro comprehend Yajima’s anguish with which she lived for decades. After the death of Yajima, Kubushiro published an article regarding the “secret” of Yajima in the organ of the Japanese WCTU, and wrote an apology for the sake of her grandaunt. Kubushiro Ochimi, Haishō hitosuji (Tokyo: Chūkōronsha, 1973), 187-192.
70 Ibid, 36 and 89. Watase was one of Yajima’s students at Sakurai Girls’ School.
herself.\textsuperscript{71} Sasaki Toyoju (1853-1901), one of the young members in the Union, had already had a life full of ups and downs. Born into a samurai family without any male children, she enjoyed the privilege of receiving the best education available in those days, including attending Mary Kidder’s school in Yokohama, the oldest missionary school for women. The education she received allowed her to develop a strong Christian ethic and the belief that an ideal male-female relationship should be based on mutual love. She turned down a marriage by arrangement and had a relationship with a married Japanese Christian man with a child, even though her unconventional behavior brought societal censure.\textsuperscript{72} As Kubushiro Ochimi (1882-1972), Yajima’s grandniece and later the president of the Japanese WCTU, aptly expressed the birth of the Union, “Kyōfūkai was created not from strength, but from weakness [of women], weakness. Indeed, it was born in order to reduce allurements and make the course of lives as easy as possible.”\textsuperscript{73}

By “weakness,” Kubushiro did not refer to Yajima’s adultery; she meant the Union attracted women who had experienced sorrow and harbored anger against conditions that adversely affected women. They did not find existing religions appealing enough to be their spiritual guide. They thought that Confucianism was not influential and did not deny concubinage. Meanwhile, Buddhism regarded women as

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{71} She developed her interest in Christianity when her former parents’ house was rented to a Christian church. She was baptized one year before the death of her husband. Abe Reiko, “Ushioda Chiseko,” \textit{Kindai Nihon no joseishi}, vol. 8. (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1981), 4-82; Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin Kyōfūkai, ed., \textit{Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin Kyōfūkai hyakunenshi}. (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1986): 309-311; cited hereafter as \textit{Hyakunenshi}.

\textsuperscript{72} Yasutake, \textit{Transnational Women’s Activism}, 104-148

\textsuperscript{73} Kubushiro, \textit{Haishō hitosuji}, 192.
\end{footnotes}
evil, and many of its followers and high-ranked priests had concubines. In sharp contrast, Christianity seemed a powerful spiritual instrument to advocate sexual purity. A woman who later became one of the leading members of the Japanese WCTU talked in retrospect, "When I listened to the teachings of Christianity, I learned that it esteems chastity of both men and women. This was the only reason that I converted to Christianity immediately." These words aptly summarize what connected Christianity to certain Japanese women. For these women, Christianity functioned as a liberating spiritual instrument from oppressive practices. They were attracted to Christianity for different reasons from men who perceived Christianity as an indispensable spiritual element for Westernizing and modernizing Japan. Through Christian ethics, in which a husband and a wife were bond by mutual love, women found consolation and freedom from their bitter marriage and sought alternative values replacing feudalistic conventions. They came from the samurai, wealthy farmer or merchant families, all of whom emulated samurai ethics that considered women

75 *Hyakunenshi*, 64.
76 Fred G. Notehelfer has argued that the former samurai embraced Christianity to fill a moral vacuum caused by the Meiji Restoration that destroyed the former lord/retainer relationship. They expressed absolute loyalty to their feudal lords. After the Meiji Restoration, they found a God that demanded loyalty, life-long commitment, and self-sacrifice that were identical to bushido ethics. In other words, Christianity provided the samurai with a source of continuity. Sekioka Kazushige and Jon Thares Davidann, however, argue that Japanese male Christians regarded Western Christianity as an intrinsic part of national progress and the advancement of its morals. Fred G. Notehelfer, *American Samurai: Captain L. L. Janes and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Sekioka Kazushige, *Kindai Nihon no Kirisutokyô Juyô* (Kyoto: Shôwadô, 1985): 34; John Thares Davidann, *A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930* (London: Associated University Presses, 1998).
little more than "borrowed wombs" to produce male heirs.\textsuperscript{77} While tolerating male promiscuity for the reason of obtaining offspring and maintaining a patriarchal household or \textit{ie}, Samurai morals imposed strict limitations on women's pre- and extra marital sexuality and the possibilities of women's autonomy and authority in household. The WCTU women raised within this ruling class in the late Tokugawa period rose in revolt against customary gender relationships and attempted to carve out their own future.

The new organization, which started with fifty-one female members and two special male members, soon developed agenda different from its mother organization in the United States.\textsuperscript{78} The Japanese name of the organization represented the "translation" of the American temperance cause into the pressing demands of Japanese women at that time. The principal issues that the Tokyo WCTU targeted were the concubine system and prostitution. The drinking problem, a primary focus of the

\textsuperscript{77} Samurai women were more oppressed than women of other social classes. Both farmer and merchant class women contributed to the family economy through their work, their house management, and even their running of a business. Such financial contributions resulted in certain wider authority for women in their households. Moreover, women of farmers even initiated divorce from their husbands for various reasons. Samurai women, on the other hand, could be sent back home or divorced arbitrarily by their husbands or in-laws, but they could not initiate divorce. Yajima's case was, therefore, unusual. Although Yajima was not from the samurai class, her family background as the daughter of a village headman followed the ethics and morals of the samurai. For women's status in farmer and merchant class families during the Tokugawa period, see Ann Walthall, "The Life Cycle of Farm Women in Tokugawa Japan," in \textit{Recreating Japanese Women}, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein (Los Angeles and Berkley: University of California Press, 1991); Joyce Chapman Lebra, "Women in an All-Male Industry: The Case of Sake Brewer Tatsu'uma Kiyō," in \textit{Recreating Japanese Women}; Takagi Tadashi, \textit{Mikudarihan: Edo no rikon to josei tachi} (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987).

\textsuperscript{78} "Fujin Kyōfukai," \textit{Jogaku zasshi}, no. 44 (December 15, 1886): 75-76.
American WCTU, got “little more than a passing nod” from the Tokyo Union.\textsuperscript{79} The Tokyo members deliberately shifted their object.

The call for broader social actions that Frances E. Willard took under the slogan, “Do Everything,” and the previous existence of the male Kyōfūkai whose members acted as intermediary between Mary C. Leavitt and Japanese women influenced the formation of the Tokyo Woman’s Kyōfūkai.\textsuperscript{80} Iwamoto Zenji (1863-1943), one of the major male patrons of the Tokyo WCTU, articulated even before its official inauguration,

\textit{\begin{quote}
Despite the name of the Worlds’ WCTU, their activism covers reforms in general . . . A new woman’s society should be named the woman’s reform society (kyōfūkai). Those who desire to advocate the strict temperance cause and correct customs in general in Japan should meet the demands of Japan today and clarify the spirits of the World’s WCTU.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}}

Nevertheless, it was the Tokyo members of the WCTU that chose the name and its principal agenda based on the idea that the temperance issue was only a small part of the various social evils that existed in Japan.\textsuperscript{82} Sasaki Toyoju persuaded her senior colleagues, including Yajima and Ushioda, who emphasized the temperance cause, that the abolishment of prostitution was its foremost concern. She also asserted that the

\textsuperscript{80} Yasutake demonstrates in detail how Japanese Christian men were committed to the formation and activism of the WCTU in Japan. Their contribution to the Union was essential to its birth, but these men believed that the Japanese WCTU was the woman’s department of their movement, or that it was under their control. See Yasutake, \textit{Transnational Women’s Activism}, chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 16:17.
association should be called “kyōfūkai” to embrace broader social issues rather than remaining as “kinshukai” or temperance union.83 Thereafter, she justified her argument for the “anti-prostitution first policy” in public speeches and writings. Her concern, however, came not out of great sympathy for the predicament of the prostitutes but out of her concern for the national prestige of Japan as a “civilized” state. She argued, “If the pleasure district scattered to various places in Tokyo, Japan can not claim to be enlightened and civilized.”84

Sasaki’s argument for emphasizing prostitution problems and for naming the organization kyōfūkai, not kinshukai or the temperance union, remained controversial. Indeed, most branch organizations of the WCTU in Japan other than Tokyo, organized on Leavitt’s trip, chose the name of “kinshukai” the temperance union. The Osaka, Kobe, Okayama, and Nagasaki WCTUs, for example, named their organizations “temperance union” until being dissolved into a new national organization. More than a decade after the birth of the Kyōfūkai, Yamaji Taneko, the chief editor of the Japanese national WCTU organ, refuted the criticism of the name by arguing that temperance


84 Sasaki Toyojuko, “Fujin bunmei no hataraki,” Jogaku zasshi, no. 65 (May 21, 1887): 87-88. Willful and energetic, Sasaki formed a radical faction within the union that forcefully challenged the subordinate positions of women in society and at home and advocated the expansion of women’s rights. For detailed information of Sasaki’s activism at the WCTU, see Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism, 104-148
could not be achieved without reforming morals. In 1917, Kubushiro Ochimi again defended the decision of the Kyōfūkai in her reply to Hiratsuka Haru (Raichō) (1886-1971), one of the leading feminists. Hiratsuka harshly criticized the temperance activism of the WCTU as perfunctory, claiming that this "half-hearted attitude toward the alcohol problem" originated from the "slow reactions of its founding members," except Yajima, to the speeches of Mary C. Leavitt. In her counterargument, Kubushiro highlighted the difference of domesticity in the United States and Japan. Home in the United States, she argued, suffered from excessive consumption of alcohol, and thus necessitated the temperance activism. Yet, the United States celebrated monogamy and had different social conditions from Japan.

Kubushiro argued that the officially endorsed sexual double standard and rampant prostitution reflected the lack of morality in Japan and its backwardness in sharp contrast to its modern Army and Navy. As Sasaki Toyoju had claimed, Kubushiro referred to the negative image of Japan in the international community as the "nation of prostitution." She justified the agenda of the WCTU by arguing the importance of preserving the national dignity and pride by eliminating the negative, distorted image of Japanese women. Kubushiro did not downplay the temperance movement, but the correction of the sexual double standard and the realization of marriage based on

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mutual respect and love between a man and a woman dominated her concerns.\textsuperscript{88}

The Tokyo WCTU or Kyôfûkai published its prospectus in August of 1887, eight months after its birth, proclaiming that the Union would fight against customs that “respect men while derogating women, and take women into men’s service as the latter pleased.”\textsuperscript{89} With the strong sense of loyalty to the Emperor, Yajima, the author of this prospectus, denounced the subjection of women as against the will of Emperor and Empress, and emphasized the close connection between the subject’s family and the nation.\textsuperscript{90} Her conceptualization of Emperor Mutsuhito came from his “Five Articles Oath” or “Charter Oath” issued on April 8, 1868. The Articles stated that deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion; the common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may be no discontent; evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based on the just laws of nature; knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. Then, she questioned whether families of the “subjects” of the Emperor had “pure” relations

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 6-9.
\textsuperscript{89} Yajima Kajiko, “Tokyo Fujin Kyôfûkai shuisho,” Jogaku zasshi, no. 70 (August 6, 1887): 190-192.
\textsuperscript{90} Yajima’s reverence for the emperor was not uncommon among the rural elite class to which Yajima belonged. The Meiji government constructed the imperial institution as the symbolic center of the unified nation and perpetuated the image of Emperor Meiji as the embodiment of the progressive doctrines of Meiji Japan. According to Carol Gluck’s analysis, Emperor Meiji was associated with progress, national and social integration, international prestige and moral virtue. The ideologies of the Emperor and the general outlines of the people’s view of the imperial institution continued through the prewar reigns of his son, Yoshihito, and grandson, Hirohito. I will discuss the association of the Emperor with moral virtue and benevolence further in the following chapters. Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), chapter 4.
between husband and wife, or had difficulties between wife and her in-laws. She considered marriages arranged by parents as "an evil practice from long-long time ago." Moreover, the prospectus denounced prostitution as lowering women's status in general. The Union also attacked liquor and tobacco consumption coupled with other oppressive customs of women in society that would harm family life, weaken the nation, and hinder women's progress; eliminating such social evils and correcting bad customs were the will of the Emperor and the Empress.91

Despite the expectations of Yajima, the "Charter Oath" was not entirely a promise to create democratic institutions; rather, the Meiji leaders sought to achieve wealth and power vis-à-vis the West through establishing oligarchical systems of politics, economy, and military. Civilization and Enlightenment were supposed to serve the same purpose. The Tokyo WCTU women, on the other hand, utilized the "Five Articles Oath" as a manifestation of Emperor Mutsuhito to "offer people freedom and equality, and let both men and women receive benefit from the Restoration." Emperor Mutsuhito and his Oath were, thus, turned into the metaphor of enlightened ideology on which they based the pursuit of their causes. The tone of this prospectus is moderate and indirect rather than boldly challenging customs which oppressed women. Yajima's expression of high respect for the Emperor adds to the tinge of conservativism.92 Her conceptualization of the Imperial family as the cornerstone of ideal morality and use of their authority to justify the cause of her society was passed on to the leaders of the

91 Ibid.
92 Yasutake, Transnational Women's Activism, 109.
next generation as one of the primary strategies for the activism of the WCTU. This blend of God with Emperor as the source of morality was another aspect of “Japanizing” the WCTU agenda which helped to make the organization more acceptable to the Japanese in general, and enabled its rapid organizational expansion in the following decades despite the deep-rooted antipathy against Christianity in Japan.

Yajima’s statement also included the elements of Victorian domesticity. She posed the question whether a woman as a wife who manages the home and as a mother who educates her children carried out her duties appropriately. She believed that nurturing virtue, supporting her husband and helping men outside the home were parts of women’s duties. Such an interpretation confining a woman’s domestic role to wifehood and motherhood, and assigning her to be a supportive contribution to men with her high virtue, reflects the direct influence of the Victorian domestic ideology and Christian ethics that Yajima acquired through her interactions with American missionary women.

Confining women’s contributions to domesticity and emphasizing wifehood and motherhood was not consistent with the Japanese interpretation of ideal womanhood before the advent of the ideology of ryōsai kenbo, or a “good wife, wise mother” at the turn of the 20th century. During the Tokugawa period and the first couple of decades of

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Meiji Japan, the male head of the household often made important decisions about the care of children. Women’s devotion to child-care and child-rearing was even discouraged by the Confucian ideology embraced by samurai and upper-middle class farmers and merchants. Popular Confucian writings of the time, such as Kaibara Ekken’s “Onna Daigaku” (Greater learning for women), instructed that a young wife’s primary duty was to serve the in-laws in her new household. Meanwhile, women of the working class were expected to engage in various productive activities such as agriculture, wage labor and family businesses. The women’s role as educator of her children was the product of modernization that separated the spheres of production and reproduction.

In late 1880’s Japan, the notion of ideal womanhood was still in the formative process. Some Christians, enlightenment thinkers and Popular Rights Movement activists who demanded a modern parliamentary system had introduced the Western ideology of the women’s separate sphere and a modern idea of home. It was not until the late 1890s when Japan experienced the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), in the period of the rise of industrialization and urbanization that ryōsai kenbo or “good wife, wise mother,” took shape as the bedrock of women’s education. This ideology, under the guise

of tradition, connoted a “new” view of womanhood that expected women to devote their children to the nation, as the “Republican Motherhood” of revolutionary America encouraged women to confine themselves at home and play a political role through the raising of a patriotic child. The “good wife, wise mother” of modern Japan integrated political values into the _ie_ or the household and expected women to contribute to the process of the nation-state and empire building in the twentieth century.95

Prior to the advent of the official ideal of womanhood as the “good wife, wise mother,” invented by the officials of the Ministry of education, Yajima developed her idea of womanhood that blended the sense of loyalty to the Emperor with the Western elements of womanhood. Though she avoided the overt integration of political values into the domestic lives of women, her position on “evil” practices that they would “harm a family life” as well as “weaken the nation” indicated the possibility of associating her organization with political issues both within and outside of the nation. Her strong consciousness of national strength was combined with the concern about the wealth of

the home and the improvement of the status of women. Yajima's plan indicated that the WCTU in Japan might soon develop as an entity of aggressive political activism in both domestic and international arenas through its anti-prostitution and other social reform campaigns, women's suffrage movement, and private diplomatic efforts to enhance Japan in the eyes of Western and Asian nations.

The Modernization and Diffusion of Concubinage and Prostitution in Japan

The Meiji restoration of 1867 had brought changes in the ie or household system in regards to concubinage in the samurai class. The Meiji government lifted the ban on trans-class marriage in 1871: until that time, a wife from a lower social position had been officially treated as a concubine. During the Tokugawa period, the samurai class's ie system determined the official hierarchy for a fief.96 The modernization of the Meiji era had stripped this official meaning from the ie and transformed it into a private element represented by the family name and ancestor worship; official positions and salaries were now determined based on the abilities of individuals, no longer on the ie. The social changes triggered by the Meiji Restoration eliminated the primary rationale for concubinage: to secure male heirs for an ie through trans-class male-female relations. Concubinage now became merely a licentious matter and ceased

96 The primogeniture or patrilineality was not indigenous to Japan. The conditions of family had been changed over different times, regions, and classes, and the ie system had been historically constructed. My argument of the ie here is a rough outline of the samurai class of Tokugawa Japan, which was only seven percent of the whole population.
to serve for the maintenance of the ie. 97

Nonetheless, in the law created in 1871, the Meiji government positioned the status of concubines as the same as wives, and officially endorsed concubinage despite the loss of its political rationale. The government also legislated against adultery committed by the wife in the criminal law enacted in 1880, while condoning male promiscuity as long as his partner was unmarried. The Civil Code of 1898 that replaced the old law ostensibly professed monogamy to keep up appearances of being "civilized" in the eyes of the West and thus securing the independence of Japan. 98 Yet, the new Civil Code gave priority in inheritance to male children mothered by a concubine over legitimate female children, and tacitly endorsed concubinage as a generally accepted practice. 99 Civil and criminal codes which modified the ie based on the primogeniture in the name of tradition and the Meiji leaders furthermore extended patriarchy to all subjects of the nation. The ie became the social, ideological, and institutional foundation of the modern nation-state system that put the Emperor on top of the oligarchical social structure of the entire nation. A patriarch was deemed as a small

98 Koyama, “Meiji keimōki no mekake rongi to haishō no jitsugen.”
99 The Imperial Household Law also legitimized an illegitimate male succeeding to the throne. Emperor Yoshihito (1879-1926) who succeeded Emperor Mutsuhito in 1912 was a child born out of wedlock but acknowledged by his father Mutsuhito. For the controversy over creating the Civil Code of 1898, see, Koyama, “Meiji keimōki no mekake rongi to haishō no jitsugen”; Igeta Ryōji, “Meiji minpō to josei no kenri,” in Nihon joseishi, 41-76.
Emperor of the ie. 100

The Meiji government established a modern licensed prostitution system by reforming the pleasure districts that had existed in the premodern period.101 It was, however, Western nations that taught Japan the modern style of licensing and confining prostitutes and how to carry out medical examinations to avoid spreading venereal diseases. The Russian Navy that arrived in Nagasaki in 1860 requested that the magistrate in Nagasaki of the Tokugawa Shogunate carry out a medical check for syphilis for the prostitutes its seamen had come in contact with.102 A British medical doctor proposed to the officials in 1867 to establish hospitals specializing in the treatment of syphilis in port cities recently opened to the West; later, he and his doctor colleague made tours of inspection in these new hospitals.103 Soon after the Meiji

100 Igeta, “Meiji minpō to josei no kenri”; Hirota Masaki, “Bunmei Kaika to Josei Kahiōron,” in Nihon joseishi, 4-5.
103 Ibid., 63-64 and 200-201. Although Sheldon Garon asserts that the “Japanese government attempted to shape how ordinary people thought and behaved to a degree that would have been unthinkable in Anglo-Saxon societies,” Anglo-Saxon nationals also contributed to the shaping of the modern licensed-prostitution system of Japan. Furthermore, Great Britain carried out the regulation of prostitution in its colonies and concessions in China and Singapore to protect its nationals from venereal diseases. Most prostitutes regulated were Japanese and Chinese consigned to brothel-slavery. Sheldon Garon, “The World’s Oldest Debate? Prostitution and the State in Imperial Japan, 1900-1945,” American Historical Review 98, no. 3 (June 1993): 711; Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), chapter 1. For the double standard of Great Britain and the WCTU’s criticism toward it, see Kate C. Bushnell and Elizabeth Andrew, “Joint Report of Dr. Kate C. Bushnell and Mrs. Elizabeth Andrew,” in Minutes of the Third Biennial Convention and Executive Committee Meetings of the World’s Woman's
Restoration of 1868, a Dutch army surgeon suggested the new government carry out syphilis tests.\textsuperscript{104} The Meiji leaders consolidated the “modern” system of registered prostitutes (shōgi) by introducing regular medical examinations for venereal disease following the instructions from the Westerners.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, modern Japan had become integrated into a part of an “international system” of registration and inspection policy that originated in France, became an integral part of British imperialism, and was copied from one empire to another.\textsuperscript{106}

As a matter of public security policy, Meiji Japan soon integrated the regulation system since they presumed unmarried men needed sexual release from their stress. The Japanese leaders were particularly concerned about those who were mobilized as workers and soldiers to carry out the Meiji government’s policy of fukoku kyōhei, or “enriching the nation, strengthening the military.” Licensed prostitution was intended as a safety valve to divert male discontent and stress and to avoid the spread of venereal diseases among young men, especially soldiers.\textsuperscript{107} The suppression of clandestine prostitution was another major argument to which pro-licensed prostitution authorities and house owners resorted. Erwin Bälz (1849-1913), a German

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\textsuperscript{104} Yamamoto, \textit{Nihon kōshōshi}, 201.
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\textsuperscript{105} For close relationships between imperial powers and the registration and inspection policy in general, see Briggs, \textit{Reproducing Empire}, 21-30.
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\textsuperscript{106} Briggs, \textit{Reproducing Empire}, chapter 1.
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medical doctor who came to Japan at the request of the Meiji government, supported this argument that the abolishment of licensed quarters would cause the expansion of unlicensed prostitution.\textsuperscript{108} Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), the Meiji era’s most famous intellectual, coined a popular slogan, \textit{bunmei kaika}, or “civilization and enlightenment,” and publicly advocated monogamy and the humane treatment of women. But even he asserted that prostitution was “the only way to preserve social peace” by satisfying the needs of increasing numbers of single men who lacked the wealth to marry.\textsuperscript{109}

The authorities also utilized the licensed quarters for crime control. The police force ordered brothel owners to report suspicious people to a nearby police station. Criminals often spent the profits they obtained in these brothels. Meanwhile, house owners sought police for the protection of their businesses and for suppressing illegal unlicensed prostitution. Thus, the close relationship between the police and owners of the houses was developed through mutual dependence.\textsuperscript{110} It was the Paris police that

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\textsuperscript{108} Yamamoto, \textit{Nihon kōshōshi}, 327-330. Bâlz praised the high public security of Tokyo compared to other cities in the world. He attributed the public peace and order of Tokyo to the existence of the licensed prostitution system.


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offered the Tokyo metropolitan police a model for licensing and regulating prostitutes.¹¹¹

The advent of the new era by the Meiji Restoration symbolized by “civilization and enlightenment” generated an atmosphere for liberalizing men’s sexuality. Many leading government officials, including the first Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909), frequented brothels and openly married a former geisha. With the strong protection by such authoritative figures who uncritically embraced the idea of male sexual prowess as the symbol of manliness, power, and the beginning of the modern era, licensed prostitution bloomed in Japan. Among the 580 pleasure districts recorded nationwide as of 1881, 243 or 41 percent of them were authorized by the government after the Meiji Restoration of 1868.¹¹² Moreover, the expansion of licensed prostitution triggered the advent of unlicensed pleasure quarters, despite the speculation of pro-regulation ideologues. Such districts usually developed around the official areas and attracted less affluent customers. The total number of licensed and unlicensed prostitutes kept increasing throughout modern times. Tokyo, for instance, had 2,946 prostitutes in 1877, and the number grew to 4,338 in 1887, one year after the birth of the Tokyo WCTU.¹¹³


¹¹² Ohinata, “Nihon kindai kokka no seiritsu to baishō mondai,” 99.

¹¹³ Although there were minor vicissitudes, the number of prostitutes kept constantly
The Japanese leaders promoted modernization at the cost of welfare of people, which resulted in and encouraged the expansion of the licensed prostitution system. Most prostitutes were lured by the false promises of pimps or were sold by their parents or guardians to save their families from poverty with the little money paid in advance. As Itô Hirobumi praised the filial piety by which women allowed themselves to be sold to brothels for "noble purpose," the Japanese male leaders were indifferent to their sorrow.\textsuperscript{114} The licensed prostitutes were confined in a district and not allowed to leave without permission from their owners. Brothel keepers often took advantage of the mostly uneducated prostitutes, and manipulated the amount of advanced money and other "costs" of clothes, food, and other miscellaneous expenses that accumulated and made it difficult for prostitutes to pay back all their debts and free themselves. If a prostitute suffered from venereal disease and took medical treatment, she had to pay all of the medical fees; sick leave and hospitalization resulted in the prolongation of her contract.\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Kago no naka no tori}, or caged birds, was the term often used to describe the situation of licensed prostitutes. Those who offered men "pleasure" were nothing increasing throughout modern times in Tokyo from 6,705 in 1907 to 7,549 in 1932, (the next year of the Manchurian Incident). In 1937, the number slightly decreased, but there were still 7,207 prostitutes despite the beginning of the full-scale war in China that forced all Japanese people to live under the atmosphere of a tense situation. Orii, "Kindai Nihon no kôshôsei to kaishun," 115.

\textsuperscript{114} Quoted in Yoshimi, \textit{Baishô no shakaishi}, 52.

\textsuperscript{115} For the age, economic and educational backgrounds of prostitutes, see Yamamoto, \textit{Nihon kôshôshi}, 389-391. For the accumulating debts of prostitutes, see, Takemura, \textit{Haishô undô}, 8-12; Yoshimi, \textit{Baishô no shakaishi}, 31-39. For the average term of contract, see Yamamoto, \textit{Nihon kôshôshi}, 390.
more than indentured sexual slaves.\textsuperscript{116}

**The Nascent Movement of anti-Concubinage and anti-Licensed Prostitution**

The misery of prostitutes became an international concern with the *Maria Luz* Incident that occurred in June 1872. When the *Maria Luz*, a Peruvian ship on the way from China to Peru, landed at Yokohama Port, about 230 Chinese workers sought refuge on a British battleship. This incident soon developed into an international issue. A British charge d'affaires who examined the situation of these Chinese requested the Japanese government to release them following an international anti-slavery law. Ōe Taku (1847-1921), then the governor of Kanagawa Prefecture, became involved as the chief justice of this special case and delivered a judgment to release them.\textsuperscript{117} Peru opposed Ōe's decision and asked Emperor Nicholas II of Russia to act as an arbitrator. Emperor Nicholas II supported Japan for the reason that its judgment was based on the laws and customs of Japan, and it did not contradict any international laws and treaties.\textsuperscript{118}

However, the counterargument of the Peruvian minister that Japan condoned the slavery of prostitution while accusing Peru of enslavement of the Chinese workers astonished Japanese government officials. Concerned about Japan's international

\textsuperscript{116} The next chapter will explore more about the relationship between prostitution and nation-building.

\textsuperscript{117} Ministers from Portugal, Germany, France, and Denmark opposed Japan's meddling in the matters of Peru. Governor Ōe rejected their pressure. Ito Hidekichi, *Nihon haishō undō-shi* (Tokyo: Kakuseikai, 1931; reprint, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan: 1982), 74-75.

\textsuperscript{118} Yamamoto, *Nihon kōshōshi*, 87.
reputation, the government soon announced opposition to slavery in all its forms.\textsuperscript{119} A week after the Peruvian minister's charge, the Ministry of Justice issued an official notice to cancel the contracts and debts of prostitutes to the houses they served. This notice implied that prostitutes had already lost rights as human beings like cows and horses so that they no longer owed any debts. People often called the law \textit{gyūba tokihodoki rei} or the law of "releasing cows and horses." This law and the notice, promulgated as a reaction to international pressure, did not prohibit prostitution in general. The government soon returned to the position of supporting the regulation system as a "vital element in its policies to manage the economy, sexuality, and gender roles."\textsuperscript{120}

Some male intellectuals who had studied or traveled in Western countries objected, however, to the officially endorsed sexual double standard. In the early 1870s, they developed positive concerns about elevating women's status to advance Japan's progress toward Western civilization. The translation of Herbert Spencer's \textit{Social Statics}, Sheldon Amos's \textit{Differences of Sex}, and John Stuart Mill's \textit{On the Subjugation of Women} inspired discussions about women's issues among the enlightenment thinkers who went in and out of the government and academia who formed the \textit{Meirokusha}, or the Meiji Six Society. Mori Arinori (1847-89), for instance, condemned

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\item \textsuperscript{119} Itô, \textit{Nihon haishō undō-shi}, 71-84; Yamamoto, 74-109. Ōhinata Sumio reveals that before the Maria Luz Incident, the Ministry of Justice had already set out to prohibit the traffic of human beings, including prostitutes, as against the custom of international community. Ōhinata, "Nihon kindai kokka no seiritsu to baishō mondai," 76-81.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Garon, "The World's Oldest Debate?" 717.
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widespread concubinage and the use of women as sexual toys. Such attitudes toward women, Mori argued, would make foreigners deride Japan an “outrageously dissolute nation on earth.” He believed in conjugal relations as the source of all morality for the foundation of the nation. Fukuzawa Yukichi also opposed concubinage on the grounds that it would unbalance the equal numbers of men and women. Tsuda Mamichi (1829-1903) advocated the abolishment of licensed prostitution. Tsuda started his article by considering how his argument might draw ridicule from the public, including politicians and even other intellectuals, for his lack of “human feelings.” His careful introductory remarks reveal that most people in Japan, including politicians and intellectuals, took men having concubines and using prostitutes for granted and even thought it was a natural expression of human nature. Nevertheless, he refuted the putative idea that a great increase in the number of prostitutes and pleasure quarters was the “advancement of enlightenment” since the Meiji Restoration; on the contrary, he argued, the spread of prostitution should be perceived as “a couple of steps back” from enlightenment. He warned that promiscuity would impoverish and weaken people, and make it difficult to maintain national independence vis-à-vis civilized powerful nations.

123 Fukuzawa, however, did not support equal rights for men and women. As I mentioned before, he took a compromising position toward concubinage and prostitution issues. He asserted that men should be allowed to keep concubines and use prostitutes, if it was impossible to abolish them both. Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Danjo dōsūron,” Meiroku zasshi, no. 31 (March 1875): 8-9.
Thus, the enlightenment thinkers of the early Meiji period, primarily discussed women's issues from the viewpoint of national independence, respect from the Western powers, and the advancement of Japanese "civilization." They paid much less attention to individual morality and the situation of a wife who was forced to accept the promiscuity of her husband, or of the woman sold into sexual slavery.

It was not until the late 1870s that the collective abolitionist movement emerged. The major participants were Protestants in Gunma Prefecture, the rural northern end of the Kanto region. When Niijima Jō (a.k.a. Joseph Hardy Neesima) (1843-90), a pioneer Protestant educator born in Gunma and educated at Amherst College, witnessed the spread of prostitution in his native town after coming back to Japan, he inspired the youth to fight against registered prostitution. His pupil Yuasa Jirō became a member of a prefectural assembly in 1880 and challenged the prefectural government that had issued licenses since January 1, 1876. The anti-regulated prostitution sentiment indicated a gradually growing challenge against the official endorsement of male licentiousness and the legitimization of the traffic in

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125 Japanese Catholics generally supported regulated prostitution as did most of the Catholic nations of Europe, and did not participate in the abolishment movement. 126 As of 1881, Gunma prefecture had 917 prostitutes and twelve licensed quarters, including Annaka where Niijima was born. Ōhinata “Nihon kindai kokka no seiritsu to baishō mondai,” 103.
women from Gunma to both Christian and non-Christian populations nationwide. As women's organizations for social reform in the United States enabled women to cooperate with male reformers without submitting to the latter's control, the WCTU in Japan functioned as a go-between between its members and male reform societies. Among them, the Salvation Army was its best partner organization for pursuing the goal of correcting sexual double standards in the line of Christianity.

The sexual double standard that permeated the modern state surrounded the newly organized WCTU. Early Meiji Japan was not free from alcoholism, but Meiji contemporaries did not view it as a serious social problem. In addition to indigenous sake or rice wine, the opening of the country to the world had brought the rapid expansion of liquor importation. The domestic production of beer was also inaugurated under the tutorship of the Americans and the Germans. Both imported liquors and domestic beers, however, were high-priced and out of the reach for most Japanese. The total amount of transactions of sake in the City of Tokyo between

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128 I will discuss the nationwide antiprolstitution movement in the following chapter.
130 The total amount of imported liquor had tripled between 1868 or the first of the Meiji era and 1886, the year that the Tokyo WCTU was born. Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, ed., Dainihon gaikoku bōeki gojūrokunen taishō-kyō (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1925), 176-180.
131 The consumption of beer did not increase rapidly during the Meiji period. The domestic beer industries created beer bars called biahōru in downtown Tokyo at the turn of the 20th century in order to advertise their products. It was during World War I that the production of beer expanded when the Japanese beer industries found that exportation from Europe to their market in Southeast Asia had been stopped. Several pioneer Japanese began the domestic production of wine almost simultaneously with beer. However, due to the difficulty of raising grapes suitable for wine and lack of governmental support, the domestic wine
1899 and 1924 actually declined.\textsuperscript{132} The rapid expansion of prostitution and the official endorsement of polygamy rather than the alcohol issues seemed to be the most pressing social concern.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{The Activism of the WCTU in Japan in its Early Days and the Development of its International Concerns}
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The challenge that the Tokyo WCTU faced, however, looked formidable. Tsuda Mamichi anticipated ridicule for his anti-licensed prostitution proposal, and this meant that polygamy and prostitution were deeply embedded notions and practices in Meiji Japan, but the formidable challenge did not dissuade the women of the Kyōfūkai from fighting against the prostitution policy.

The Tokyo WCTU sent 1,000 copies of its prospectus to various groups and individuals, and attempted to raise the consciousness of society by hosting speech meetings. Furthermore, the society submitted a petition demanding the abolition of polygamy to the \textit{Genrōin}, a consultative body before the establishment of a national assembly in 1889. The petition bore eight hundred signatures of men and women. The points it raised were the following: polygamy destroys the natural population balance of men and women; it is against the mutual love of a husband and wife, the foundation of production did not smoothly develop before the end of World War II. Meanwhile, Torii Shinjirō started selling domestic whiskey produced in Yamazaki, the suburb of Kyoto, in 1929. The production of genuine brandy was begun in the late 1960s. Matoba Haru, "Yōshu no ayumi," in \textit{Shokuseikatsu kindaiishi}, ed. Ōtsuka Tsutomu (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1969), 139-190.

of a conjugal relationship; it damages the happiness of family life and causes family disputes over succession; the family is the foundation of the nation and its disturbance may affect the peace and order of the whole nation; polygamy is against the custom and laws in international communities. 133 The petition also reproached the immoral behavior of those who were on top of the social, political, and economic ladders by saying, “every action of a leader in society influences lives of a village, a town, and even the nation; his relations with several women would spread the vices of promiscuity in society.” Then, the petition proposed an amendment of the existing criminal law and the civil law that unilaterally blamed adultery on a wife into bilateral ones to make adultery of her husband also punishable. 134

After the establishment of the national assembly in 1891, the Union submitted a petition with seven hundred signatures on it. This document demanded the redefinition of adultery of the Civil Code to include married men having concubines and relations with prostitutes. The gist of the petition did not fundamentally differ from the previous one, except a newly added phrase condemning the existing law that ignored the human rights of women who comprised half of the whole population. The petition concluded with a reference to the possibility of revising unequal treaties with the Western powers, the long-cherished desire for the Meiji leaders; widespread immorality and inhumane treatment of women endorsed by the legal system would not only make a negative impression on foreigners but also bring shame to the nation. The

133 Hyakunenshi, 62-65.
134 Ibid, 64-65.
WCTU women also expressed their great longing for mutual love, support, and lifetime commitment between a husband and a wife.\textsuperscript{135}

The speaking, writing, and petition movements of the Union caused criticism and ridicule; some called the union "otenba kai" or tomboy society and wrote an anonymous letter addressed to kyōfūkai (狂風会), substituting kanji to create a homophone that meant "crazy custom society."\textsuperscript{136} The parliament ignored these petitions. These negative reactions from men did not discourage the Union; its members tirelessly re-submitted petitions for the same cause annually for decades. Without suffrage, women's only hope was to lobby men in authoritative positions to bring changes in the status of women. The Tokyo, later Japanese WCTU, developed its activism to cover tobacco and liquor problems, anti-public nuisance, natural disaster rescue work, and many other social issues. It also challenged the disfranchisement of women in the 1889 Constitution by petitioning the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, and successfully lobbied to repeal the rule forbidding women from visiting the Diet in session. Sasaki Toyoju played a leading role in such actions.\textsuperscript{137} The matter of sexuality, however, remained the primary concern of the kyōfūkai.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid, 77-78. These petitions conveyed the influence of enlightenment thinkers. Ueki Emori (1857-92), one of the former leaders of the Popular Rights Movement, supported editing the petition. Popular Rights movements that rose in the early 1880s struggled to establish political alternatives to the authoritarian government and to share powers more widely. While the Meiji government responded to those discontented people with preparing a new constitution and parliament, this functioned to strengthen an oligarchy.

\textsuperscript{136} Yajima Kajiko, "Warera no shuchō," Fujin shinpō, no. 65 (September 25, 1902): 13. The Tokyo WCTU published its own magazine on which the Union members expressed their opinions and concerns.

\textsuperscript{137} Hyakunenshi, 70.
In addition to tenacious and fearless petition campaigns, the Japanese WCTU repeatedly appealed to Meiji leaders’ concerns about Japan’s nascent international prestige by arguing that polygamy and prostitution were remnants of a feudal society and they hindered the modernization process. They were aware that male political and ideological leaders regarded the national survival and regeneration of the state in the line of Western powers as the supreme task, and that political pressures from the West were one of the most effective means to bring about a drastic change in their policies.

The "karayuki-san" phenomenon also opened the eyes of the Japanese WCTU to international concerns. “Karayuki-san,” literally “person going to China,” came to denote Japanese prostitutes who accompanied Japanese immigration overseas.138 The destination of karayuki-san covered almost all corners of the globe, including Korea, China, Southeast Asia, Africa, Oceania, and South and North America, including Alaska.139 These prostitutes were expected to play the role of forerunners for the Japanese advancement abroad and to earn foreign currency.140 WCTU members were

138 The name of Karayuki-san was a corrupted form of Karahito-yuki (person going to the Chinese) or Karahito-kuni-yuki (person going to China and the Chinese), described for a prostitute who worked for the Chinese in Nagasaki which was the only port opened to foreign trade during the Tokugawa period. Yoshimi, Baishō no shakaishi, 3-4.
139 Ibid., 10-12.
140 Fukuzawa Yukichi praised work of the karayuki-san and stressed the necessity to liberate the migration policy, including traffic in women. Prostitutes were, he believed, indispensable to human society; even centers of civilization like London, Paris, Berlin, and New York had prostitutes. According to Fukuzawa, such an opinion that prostitutes abroad would harm the national prestige was the product of parochialism. He argued that prostitutes should be encouraged to go abroad and stabilize immigrant communities by meeting the demands of single male immigrants. Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Jinmin no iju to shōfu no dekasegi,” Jiji shinpō (January 18, 1896), quoted in Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), 15: 362-364.
appalled by stories from overseas returnees of “karayuki-san” about living in wretched conditions when they were overseas.141 After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), they brought action by drawing up a petition demanding the government to exercise stricter control over the international traffic in women and submitted it to the National Diet in the late 1890s.142 This document asserted that prostitutes abroad were stranded in “indescribably awful conditions worse than slaves,” and that their existence would harm the “prestige of the Japanese Empire which was about to spread a great principle around the four seas as the military and economic leader of Asia.”143 From then on, the WCTU submitted this petition to the National Diet every year together with the one challenging this sexual double standard for decades.

The sympathy toward prostitutes abroad, together with the consciousness about national prestige as the rising imperial power in Asia, motivated the Japanese Union women to initiate their international activism. Yet, their middle-class urban background limited the extent of their sympathy to the lower class prostitutes from rural regions. Antipathy and hostility toward prostitutes for spoiling the face of the nation far surpassed the concern for the hardships the prostitutes endured. In order for

141 Ishigami Tóru, a naval surgeon, told Yajima about stories of Japanese prostitutes he witnessed. He convinced Yajima and her fellow members of the Union that this matter should be a part of their agenda. See Hyakunenshi, 75-76.
142 The Shimonoseki Treaty at the conclusion of the war demanded that China cede Taiwan, the nearby Pescadores Islands, and the Kwantung Peninsula in South Manchuria and pay 200 million taels indemnity, recognize Korea’s independence, and give Japan other prerogatives. However, Russia, France, and Germany pressured Japan to return the Kwantung Peninsula. Japan complied, receiving 30 million taels of additional indemnity.
Japan to obtain equal status with the Western powers and fulfill a respectable role in
the international community, Japanese Union women argued, the cause of “national
shame” should be eliminated.\textsuperscript{144}

Thus, the incipient stage of Japanese women’s international concern was
generated from the negative motivation to get rid of kokujoku (国辱) or “national
shame.” In other words, the image of “ideal nationhood” complying with Western
standards was their fundamental motivation. This sharply contrasted with the driving
force of Americans and Britons in the World’s WCTU who nurtured a positive belief in
the universality of ideal womanhood and the cause of temperance. However, both the
World and the Japanese Unions shared a common strategy. As American and British
women of the World’s WCTU made the best use of imperialism for its global expansion,
the women of the Japanese Union embraced the expansionist ideology of Japan. Their
enthusiasm for “cleaning up” society within the nation and in immigrant communities
abroad came from a strong sense of nationalism and concern for Japan’s international
status. In this sense, the Japanese WCTU was consistent with male officials’ and
intellectuals’ desires to build a Japanese empire and to obtain equal status with the
United Stated and Great Britain.

The Ideology of the “Mother’s Role” in the World’s WCTU

Nemoto Shô, then studying at the University of Virginia, informed Frances E.

\textsuperscript{144} The following chapters will discuss more middle-class urban Union women’s attitudes
toward the prostitutes.
Willard of the establishment of the Tokyo WCTU. Willard and the Tokyo Union exchanged pictures as a token of friendship; the latter also sent her a copy of its prospectus. Willard was delighted at the birth of a branch in Japan with little concern about how the Tokyo branch transformed the strategy of the WCTU. She expressed her gratitude to Mary C. Leavitt.

In Japan her success was so great that a leading missionary wrote home to his church paper, declaring that what Commodore Perry's visit was to the commerce, Mrs. Leavitt's has been to the women of Japan.

This comment reflects a common view in the United States that the Perry Expedition ended Japan's seclusion and integrated it into the world community, although many Japanese were actually horrified at and even humiliated by its high-handed "gunboat" diplomacy. Willard was very enthusiastic about Leavitt's achievements and welcomed Japan's opening up to her organization.

145 Nemoto acted as an intermediary for the Tokyo and the World's WCTUs and supported the former organization by sending it information about the United States regarding the temperance cause. He acquainted himself with the Kyôfûkai by Iwamoto Zenji, one of its major male patrons. "Nemoto Masashi-shi," Jogaku zasshi, no. 145 (January 19, 1889): 78.
146 Hyakunenshi, 50.
147 However, Willard was annoyed at the tepid response from Japan to her pet project, the Polyglot Petition, the worldwide request appealing to world leaders to take a stand against the liquor traffic and opium trade. Two years after Mary C. Leavitt introduced the Petition to Japan, she received no response. Then, she wrote a letter to Tokyo and prompted the reluctant Tokyo WCTU members to collect "hundreds of thousands signatures on it." This letter sparked argument among the Tokyo Union members. Sasaki Toyoju argued against those who worried about whether women could participate in such a grand undertaking. Soon the Tokyo Union collected signatures and sent it back to Willard. This project collected over 7,500,000 signatures from fifty countries, but it did not receive much attention in Japan. “Kaihou,” Tokyo fujin kyôfû zasshi, no. 1 (April 14, 1888): 10-12; “Tokubetsu kokoku,” Jogaku zasshi, no. 109 (May 12, 1888): 327.
148 Willard, Glimpses of Fifty Years, 431.
149 Henning, Outposts of Civilization, 17-20.
Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War enhanced Willard's view of Japan. She expressed that "the opening of China and the independence of Corea [sic] are events of great significance in the work we have before us. Japan has risen like a star from the horizon towards the zenith among modern nations." Executive members of the Worlds' WCTU shared her impressions of Japan and China. Kate C. Bushnell and Elizabeth Andrew, the World's WCTU round-the-world missionaries, inspected its branches in England, France, Italy, India, Burma, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Japan, and reported that Unions in Burma and China were "isolated." Meanwhile Japanese women impressed them with "eager enthusiasm and promise of usefulness" and "what has already been accomplished on W.C.T.U. lines by themselves..." 

The success of Leavitt's efforts to create branches in Asia inspired Willard and the World's WCTU to take further action to complete the organization of its outposts all over the world and fulfill its self-appointed duty as the "mother of all reform." Willard harbored an idea to send peripatetic missionaries abroad to "develop local talent and bring it to the front of work" so that the work would be "deeply rooted and

150 "Address by Frances E. Willard, President," in Minutes of the Third Biennial Convention and Executive Committee Meetings of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union: 18. Stars shining on the "zenith" among modern nations were the United States and Great Britain.
151 Kate C. Bushnell and Elizabeth Andrew, "Joint Report of Dr. Kate C. Bushnell and Mrs. Elizabeth Andrew," 182.
grounded in its own environment rather than dependent on outside guides.” 153 Stationary missionaries, she believed, might be in danger of “yielding to prejudice and habit by long association.” 154 However, in those countries that “most greatly need help, especially when a foreign language has to be acquired,” the residence of a missionary should be prolonged. Thereafter, the World’s WCTU followed the policy to send out two types of missionaries, “one on tours of inspection and inspiration, the other to specified countries to remain as long as seemed mutually desirable.” 155 They were expected to “carry with them the best expert knowledge of methods worked out in the countries where the reform originated, and where the most study and experience have been applied to perfect its methods of work.”156

Since Japanese culture and language were completely different from the United States and Great Britain, Willard adopted a policy of sending both peripatetic and resident missionaries to nurture “local talent”; the World’s WCTU dispatched missionaries to Japan one after another in order to “mother” the work in Japan. 157 They were Jessie Ackerman (visited Japan in 1890), Mary A. West (1892), Clara Parrish (worked as a resident missionary in Japan between 1896 and 1898), Kara G. Smart (1902-6), Flora E. Strout (1908-10), and Ruth F. Davis (1909-1913). The intensive human and financial assistance from the World’s WCTU to Japan reflected

153 "President’s Address," in Minutes of the Second Biennial Convention and Executive Committee Meetings of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (Chicago: Woman’s Temperance Publishing Association, 1893): 114.
154 Ibid.
155 Willard, Do Everything, 15.
156 Ibid.
the organization's belief that the Japanese branch would be a key to the "orient." The Japanese WCTU behaved as a good "daughter" in the eyes of the World's WCTU compared to its neighboring organization in China.

This concentration on Japan triggered frustrations from the WCTU constituents in China who were headquartered in Shanghai, and American and British missionary women spearheaded this complaint. L. Ruth Shaffner, who then serving as its president, stressed in her letter to the World headquarters in 1893 that China was "one of the most if not the most difficult mission field in the world" with widespread anti-Christianity and anti-foreigner feelings, serious opium habits, alcoholism, and other social vices.158 Yet, Shaffner believed that there was "a harvest full and golden with a population of four hundred million" in the country she served. She referred in her letter to its people's industriousness, frugality, politeness, capability, and the growing younger generation with excellent knowledge of English. She attempted to convince the World's WCTU that China had "such an opportunity for aggressive movement." Then, she wrote, "If it is thought impossible to furnish a worker for China alone, then let us have one for China, Corea and Siam, but do not include Japan."159

The World's WCTU planned to send one missionary to China in 1891 and again in 1893 at the request of Shaffner.160 Willard and other executive members were aware

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158 "Letter from China, from Miss Ruth Shaffner," in Minutes of the Second Biennial Convention and Executive Committee Meetings of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 199-205.
159 Ibid., 204.
160 "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meetings," in Minutes of the Executive Committee and First Convention of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 19:
of the desperate need in China. Willard regarded the Chinese woman as a “typical”
victim of oppression who was “lame in body and halt in mind.” 161 Katharine Lent
Stevenson, the superintendent of the World’s Missionary Fund Department, argued in
1913 that China “should have at least a half dozen [missionaries] to cover its vast
area.” 162 However, the Chinese WCTU had to wait until 1920 before receiving a
resident missionary from the headquarters. In the eyes of the World’s Union, with a
limited budget for international activism, it was Japan rather than China in East Asia
that was chosen as a favorable field for an experiment to transplant the seed of
temperance. Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War seemed to
demonstrate that Japan’s pace of modernization and industrialization far surpassed
that of China.

Thus, the World’s WCTU anticipated a smooth organizational growth of its
excellent Japanese “daughter” in their own image, compliant to the agenda and
practice of her “mother.” Frances Willard sent Jessie Ackerman as a round-the-world
missionary to carry out the mission of quickening the expansion of the Japanese Union,
although Japan was not the exclusive destination of her trip. When Ackerman arrived
in Yokohama in 1890 via Honolulu, the women of the Tokyo Union went down to
welcome her and invited her to Tokyo. Although she noticed that they changed the

160 “President’s Address,” in Minutes of the Second Biennial Convention and Executive
Committee Meetings of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 114-115.
161 “President’s Address,” in Minutes of the Second Biennial Convention and Executive
Committee Meetings of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 54.
name and agenda of the WCTU, Ackerman harbored a positive impression of them for "they are fond of meetings, and sometimes sit patiently two and three hours" and their temperance cause is "one of their departments of work." However, what delighted her more than seeing the Japanese Union women was her reunion with male Christian temperance workers, including Andô Tarô, whom she had met in Honolulu. During her stay in Honolulu, she associated with the Japanese temperance society created by Andô, who was then the consul general of Japan, and his wife. As her career of working at a male-led temperance organization was longer than at the WCTU, her contribution to Japan was more directed to male temperance activists than to women. Her interaction with the Japanese male temperance activists ended up in the formation of Tokyo Kinshukai (Tokyo Temperance Society), a male-led organization presided over by Andô.

Mary Allen West, a chief editor of the *Union Signal*, the organ of the American WCTU, also enjoyed associating with Japanese male Christian temperance workers, such as Andô Tarô, Nemoto Shô, and Tsuda Sen, more than with female WCTU constituents when she visited Japan two and a half years after Ackerman's visit.

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163 Jessie Ackerman, "Out Second Round—the world Missionary in Japan," *Union Signal* (July 24, 1890): 5.
164 Ibid., 4-5.
165 According to a letter from Mary S. Whitney, the president of Hawai'i WCTU, 1,400 out of 5,000 Japanese residents joined Andô's temperance organization and welcomed Ackerman. Nakagawa Eiki, "Akkaruman jô," *Jogaku zasshi*, no. 161 (May 11 1889): 68.
166 For the interaction between Ackerman and Japanese male Christians, see Yasutake, *Transnational Women's Activism*, 136-140.
167 West repeatedly referred to the support from Japanese Christian men in her reports to the United States. See Mary West, "Japan's Welcome," *Union Signal* (November 24, 1892):
Her favorable impression of these Japanese men coincided with her dissatisfaction with the “Japanization” of the temperance measures carried out by the Tokyo WCTU. Unlike the male temperance organization that exclusively stuck to temperance work, officers of the “so-called Japan union” had “gone off in many directions, modifying their constitution and the pledge itself till they no longer required total abstinence and so could not be considered a W.C.T.U.” Her unshakable belief in the “universality” of the temperance cause prescribed by the World’s WCTU urged her to repeatedly stress in her speeches the importance of the temperance movement and the negative effects of alcohol on people’s well being. Meanwhile, she rarely mentioned social and cultural context peculiar to Japan.

West also found it problematic that Japan lacked a national organization. She believed that a “real Japan W.C.T.U.” should have “an English-speaking Japanese president” and “a Japanese foreign president” to smooth the communication

15; Mary West, “Japan’s Welcome,” *Union Signal* (December 1, 1892): 4-5; Mary West, “Work in Japan,” *Union Signal* (December 22, 1892): 5; Mary West, “Work in Japan,” *Union Signal* (December 29, 1892): 5. Tsuda Sen was a former member of Meirokusha (the Meiji Six Society) and one of the earliest Methodist converts in Japan. He was also well known as the father of Umeko. Tsuda Umeko, Yamakawa (Öyama) Sutematsu, Nagai (Uryû) Shigeko, and two more young women went to the United States for education with the Iwakura Mission in 1871. Umeko graduated from Bryn Mawr College, and founded *Joshi Eigaku Juku* (Women’s English School), which later developed into one of the leading institutions for women’s higher education in Japan. She also supported Mary Allen West by translating her speech at the welcome party. For Umeko’s life, see Barbara Rose, *Tsuda Umeko and Women’s Education in Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). For Yamakawa’s life, see Kuno Akiko, *Rokumeikan no kifujin Oyama Sutematsu* (Tokyo: Chuôkôronsha, 1988).

with the World's Union. 170 Although she praised President Yajima for her efficiency in
the management of the Tokyo Union and described her as a “remarkable woman,”
Yajima and all of the officers of the Tokyo Union did not understand English. 171 West
attributed the digression of the temperance measures to this lack of knowledge of
English and argued that close communication with the World’s Union by reducing the
language barrier could redirect the activism of the “so-called” WCTU to be in line with
its mother organization. Thus, an English-speaking woman should preside over the
“real” Union representing Japan. 172 She regarded the communication ability with
English-speaking executives in Evanston as important as dialogue with native people,
and thought much of obeying the “universal” rule more than acting on the most
pressing concerns of the local society.

West did not completely ignore social problems peculiar to Japan. She
comprehended the mercilessness of prostitution when she passed through Yoshiwara,
the largest and probably the most famous licensed quarter in Japan, and witnessed a
dozen girls sitting behind lattices through which men were peering and making their
choices. 173 She wrote that it was “the saddest sight I [she] ever saw.”174 Such a
shocking impression, however, did not allow her to accept rewriting the temperance

171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 This practice was called “harimise,” or displaying prostitutes behind lattice, enticing
and helping customers to make their selections. The practice of harimise was the ultimate
form of dehumanizing women. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police banned it in 1916; Osaka and
other cities followed. Takemura, Haishō undō, 60-64.
174 West, “Japan’s Welcome” (December 1, 1892): 5.
policy of the WCTU Tokyo. In her understanding, English proficiency and keeping in line with the "mother" Union were the absolute criterion for evaluating the organization. She appealed to her American sisters by using the familiar metaphor of "motherhood," claiming that male and female temperance societies in Japan were "most loyal to the [American] W.C.T.U., looking to it as their mother . . ." 175 This baby of the American WCTU, born in Japan with the assistance of Leavitt and Ackerman serving as midwives, had now grown to stand on its own feet but, in her opinion had started to walk the wrong way. It was the mother's task and responsibility to show this toddler the right direction.

Her appeal did not bear fruit. During her 79 days in Japan, West traveled 3,600 miles: she addressed 97 public meetings and about 40,000 people, but her sudden death from sickness in Kanazawa on December 1, 1892 ended her chance to attain her objectives. 176 This tragedy attracted sympathy from Japanese men and women. Nemoto Shō praised her work in Japan by calling her "the mother of the Temperance work in Japan." 177 Interestingly, Nemoto shared the motherhood metaphor that actually sugarcoated the hierarchical relations between the World's Union and its branches in Japan. Since the organization in Japan had not been firmly established, Nemoto and many other Japanese male and female temperance workers admitted the

175 West, "Japan's Welcome" (November 24 1892): 15.
177 Ibid.
unequal relation between Evanston and Tokyo. However, expressing appreciation to West by calling her “mother” did not indicate Japanese women’s meek obedience to her design.178 The Tokyo WCTU, The Tokyo Woman’s Temperance Society, Kobe, and Okayama Women’s Temperance Societies merged into *Nihon Fujin Kyōfūkai* or the Japan Woman’s Association for Reforming Customs (the Japan WCTU).179 This new name implied that the Union women in Japan preferred the general *Kyōfū* work to exclusive temperance activism, and elected Yajima Kaji, a non-English-speaking Japanese, as the first president.

The Japanese name of *Kyōfūkai* dropped the word “Christian” from its name and reflected another aspect of nativization. Anti-Christian feeling and backlash against the rapid Westernization and modernization during the early Meiji period became strong in Japan in the first half of the 1890s. During this period, the conservatives and reactionaries attacked Christianity, western values of individuality, and the ideology of womanhood, as destroying the more virtuous Japanese traditions. The hostility toward women’s social activism surged up and “drove Japanese WCTU

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179 The Tokyo WCTU was not free from internal struggles over ideology, politics and strategies. Sasaki Toyoju, who had radical ideology regarding women’s issues compared to Yajima and was dissatisfied with the activism of the mainstream members in the WCTU, formed *Fujin Hakuhyō Kurabu* (Woman’s White Ribbon Club) in 1889. Ushioda Chiseko joined it. Thereafter, they joined the male-led *Tokyō Kinshukai* (Temperance Society) led by Andō Tarō and Nemoto Shō. In 1891, the women’s department of the society became independent and developed into *Tokyō Fujin Kinshukai* (the Tokyo Woman’s Temperance Society); Ushioda assumed its presidency. For power and political struggles in the Tokyo WCTU and its split, see Yasutake, *Transnational Women’s Activism*, 110-146.
women back into their households.” The WCTU women were conscious of such negative feelings against western religion and values, and deliberately dropped the word “Christian” from its name.

The disagreement between the Japanese and American WCTU emissaries over the priority of reform work indicates that the former group did not accept the latter's characterization that women faced common challenges everywhere. Ackerman and West embraced the notion of the sameness of women's oppression that all women, regardless of geographical, cultural, social, and political context, shared the experience of oppression. The WCTU members in the United States initiated their activism because they suffered from social problems derived from liquor consumption. Therefore, they argued that its Japanese “daughter” organization should follow the step of its “mother” by sharing her perspective and goals. Indeed, the Japanese women in Tokyo of the late 1880s and the early 1890s lived in completely different circumstances from the mid-Western women of the United States. They saw the rapid expansion of licensed quarters that also triggered unlicensed prostitution and the sexual double standard become integrated into the modern political, social, and economic system of Japan. Although women of Japan were not free from problems derived from alcohol abuse, they still regarded publicly endorsed prostitution as the center of all forms of women's oppression. The strong nationalistic concern to elevate Japan's national status to that

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180 Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism, 154.
181 For anti-Christianity feeling and backlash against the modernization in the first half of the 1890s, see Chapter 2.

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of Western civilization by eliminating disgraceful elements of society also buttressed their “anti-regulation first” policy and legitimized the transformation of the Temperance Union into Kyōfūkai. Pejoratives about being the “so-called W.C.T.U.” by the missionaries dispatched from the World’s Union did not stop the WCTU in Japan from rejecting the sameness of women’s oppression. The elimination of “Christian” from the Japanese official name of the Japanese WCTU also derived from their concerns for the social and political environment of Japan. The friction between the American and the Japanese WCTU members over the concrete strategy of social reform activities and leadership lingered on.

“We Are Now a Living, Working Power”: The Development of the Japanese WCTU

The World’s WCTU sent Clara Parrish, born and raised in Illinois and the former Organizer for the Young Women’s Branch of the American WCTU, to Japan as the seventh round-the-world missionary in 1896. The Japan WCTU welcomed her “with genuine hospitality.”182 Impressed with such a welcome from the Japanese, she was determined to “find and train [a] Frances Willard who will carry our beautiful W.C.T.U. truth to the hearts of her sisters as only a daughter of the Empire of the Mikado.” The first task she carried out was to vitalize the Union by Americanizing, or

182 “Kurara Parisshu joshi,” Fujin shinpō, no. 22 (October 15, 1896): 2. The Japan WCTU, Tokyo Temperance Society, and missionaries held a magnificent welcome party for her at a famous garden of Count Ōkuma Shigenobu, one of the major patrons of the WCTU. One hundred and eighty Japanese and foreign missionaries attended it and expressed welcome to her. “Kurara Parissho joshi Kangeikai,” Fujin shinpō, no. 22 (October 15, 1896): 35-37;
to revert the Japanized agenda of the WCTU Japan to the "authentic" one. She expressed her dissatisfaction with the Japan WCTU that promoted "petition work, purity work and the publications of a magazine" and had "really never been organized very much along the lines of our work.”

The strategy she adopted, unlike the ideas of West, was not to belittle the previous work of the Japanese Union but to "broaden its policy somewhat" according to Frances E. Willard's "Do Everything Policy." She recognized the necessity for an "organized protest against the system of concubinage" and getting rid of "all law and social customs that do not hold man at least equally guilty with woman for the licentiousness that is sapping the very soul life of the human race." Based upon such comprehension, she pressured executive members of the Union to establish fifteen departments with superintendents that covered both challenges to licensed vice and the temperance issue. These departments were the Loyal Temperance Legion (the children's work), Mother’s Meetings, Scientific Temperance Instruction in the Public Schools, Social Purity, Work among Young Women in Schools and Colleges, Work among Soldiers, Legislation and Petitions, Evangelistic Narcotics, Sabbath Observance, Sunday School Work, Literature, Heredity, and Unfermented Wine at the Sacrament.

When Mary Allen West stayed in Japan, the Union had six departments, namely,

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185 Ibid.
186 Ibid, 251.
Extension and Organization, Education, Social Purity, Health and Physical Culture, Reform Laws, and Literature and the Press. There was, as Parrish said with regret, no temperance department, no superintendents appointed, and "nothing was attempted." She also saw that the national convention held in 1897 adopted a suggestion from a male guest of the YMCA that the Japanese name of the Union should contain the word Christian; from then on, the Japan WCTU became *Nihon Fujin Kirisutokyō Kyōfukai* (Japan Christian Woman's Association for Reforming Customs), although the Union postponed officially including "Christian" into its Japanese name until 1905 because of its concern that anti-Christian feelings were still prevalent in Japan.

As the fifteen departments represent, Parrish opened up a new field of work by enlisting children and students, and strengthened connections with missionaries. Her aggressive recruitment of students brought many new members despite prevalent anti-Christian feelings: 250 members with 5 local chapters increased to 1,100 members from 25 branches in 1897. The rapid expansion of its membership delighted Frances E. Willard. In 1897, she awarded the Japan WCTU with the Banner at the World's WCTU Convention held in Toronto.

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188 Parrish, "World's WCTU," May 1897, 252-253; *Hyakunenshi*, 214.

189 Furthermore, she recruited missionary members into the Foreign Auxiliary of the Union that was born in 1886. For the activism of the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japan WCTU, see the next chapter.


191 According to Parrish, Willard even desired to visit Japan. In the letter to Parrish,
Along with the numerical growth of the Japanese WCTU, the “unusual success” of the first national convention deeply moved Parrish. She saw that the white ribboners of Japan “took their places as chairmen, in speech or in song” with “grace and dignity,” and proudly reported to Evanston “how quickly they caught the spirit of our great reform.” Moreover, her visit to Burma, via China, to engage in organizing the Union branch there after her two-year-term in Japan, strengthened her high-evaluation of the Japanese WCTU. The comparison between Japan and other Asian nations made her aware of what she believed to be the excellence of Japan. She wrote to the Japanese Union, “women’s status of your country is far more advanced than that of Burma.” Parrish also reported her achievement to the World’s convention and mentioned Japan’s great possibilities as a mission field because Japan had “wonderful ingenious people,” though the prejudice against woman’s public work was “greater than the West.” She praised Yajima as “the Frances Willard of the East” and expressed that the native society in Japan grew “from a molehill to a mountain of success; from a little, cold, starved, hibernating band to a great, strong

Willard asked, “What is the very best season of the year for foreigners, like ourselves, to come to Japan, and when would we find the people in the centers?” Parrish rejoiced at this remark and wrote, “the ‘Land of the Rising Sun’ has for some time held a very special place in her thought,” and publicized “Miss Willard’s Possible Coming to Japan.” Willard’s demise in 1898 collapsed this possibility. Clara Parrish, “World’s W.C.T.U.,” Japan Evangelist 4, no. 9 (June 1897): 280.


organization of recognized power.”

Parrish’s high praise of the Japanese WCTU and the “advancement” of Japanese society, however, did not arise from a sense of respect for the nation and people or from an equal evaluation of its civilization with those of the Western nations. She primarily focused on the marketability of Japan in comparison to other Asian countries. She urged the World’s WCTU conference held in Geneva in 1903 to “take advantage of the many open doors and wonderful opportunities awaiting the bearer of our White-Ribbon Gospel in this land.” Simultaneously, she reminded her audience, mostly Americans and British, of the self-acclaimed “obligation” and “responsibilities for its [Japan’s] ultimate salvation” by Christian Temperance in the dark society of Asia, “Japan is not a civilized country yet . . . Many, many long years will come and go before it will be of a truth [sic] a civilized country.”

In order to open the door to Japan wider, the World’s WCTU sent Kara G. Smart, a Corresponding Secretary of the South Dakota Union, to Japan as another missionary in October 1902. The Japan WCTU and its local branches greeted her with grand welcoming parties, as they did for Parrish. While Parrish recognized the fundamental strategy of the Japanese Union that covered both temperance and anti-licensed prostitution problems, Smart too believed that the temperance cause

197 Ibid, 72.
198 For her career in South Dakota, see “WCTU Department,” Japan Evangelist 4, no. 11 (November, 1902): 365-6.
should be the core of its scheme. Smart was a woman of method, and drilled parliamentary management and effective skill into the Union officers all over Japan by mail. The content of her guidance included such phrases as, “the expansion of our cause by the increase of membership is our duty,” and “all members have to recruit at least one new member within three months.” She also included “obeying the rules of the World’s WCTU by practicing a daily noon prayer, carrying a white ribbon all the time, and paying a membership fee” in her letter to the local branches.

Smart regulated the relationship between the national headquarters and its local offices, strengthened the Loyal Temperance League, and made the bylaws. She used Gauntlet Tsune as her interpreter and even took her to her organize trips.

Gauntlet was born as the eldest daughter of the Yamada, a descendant of a samurai family. She went through a harsh childhood because of her father’s debauchery. Little Tsune saw him bringing his mistresses home, making her mother take care of these women, and beating her whenever she disobeyed him. The premature death of her father when she was nineteen years old placed her with the heavy burden to support her mother, sisters and brothers by teaching English at a mission school. President Yajima, annoyed at what Gauntlett called the “eccentrically punctilious character” of

199 “Sumatójó no shokan ni tsuite,” Fujin shinpō, no. 70 (February 25, 1903): 11-12.
Smart, asked Gauntlett, her former student at Joshi Gakuin, to work for Smart at the national convention held in Kobe in 1903. Deeply impressed with Gauntlett, Smart recruited her to the Japan WCTU.\textsuperscript{202} The recruitment of Gauntlett was of great significance to the Union. As the first Japanese woman \textit{legally} married to a British man, Gauntlett brought her strong passion for the women’s cause and her fluency in English into full play at the Union.\textsuperscript{203} More importantly, Gauntlett contributed to tightening the bond between Smart and the Japanese Union members. Unlike the previous WCTU emissaries who associated with temperance men more comfortably than with women, Smart attempted to approach women more than men. Thanks to Gauntlett, Smart could act independently from the male temperance activists.

With Gauntlett’s support, Smart aggressively reorganized central as well as local offices, and recruited numerous women and children into the WCTU. Her strong confidence in her strategy and training methods was evident in her statement: “we [Gauntlett and Smart] established rules, printed and distributed it to newly established organizations. Thereby, we offered clear guidance regarding our organization, its enterprises, and management skills. I became a leader and trained the members who

\textsuperscript{202} Gauntlett, \textit{Shichijû-shichinen no omoide}, 77-78.
\textsuperscript{203} When Yamada Tsune and Edward Gauntlett, then an English teacher at a high school, attempted to marry, the Japanese government had no law for international marriage. As a last resort, Yamada’s lawyer fabricated a report of her “disappearance” from Japan by a disaster at sea. After a while, Yamada, then not legally a Japanese citizen anymore, applied for citizenship of Great Britain. She successfully acquired British citizenship, and legally married Edward. This was the first legal international marriage of a Japanese woman. Although there were certain relations between the Japanese and Westerners, namely, Japanese women and Western men before Yamada’s marriage, all of such relations were illegitimate. For her marriage, Gauntlett, \textit{Shichijû-shichinen no omoide}, 61-63.
are not familiar with these guidelines at every meeting.” Smart reported to the World’s WCTU that the Japanese women had “learned to look to her as their teacher in the work, and take from her instructions and criticism with a willingness that would not be readily yielded to a stranger.”

Despite Smart’s self-acclaimed leadership and her special role as a “teacher,” the Japanese Union women’s awareness had gradually changed and they became less willing to allocate to her the leading role of their activism. Gradually, the Japanese had become uncomfortable with Smart’s over-assertive leadership and presumptuousness. Their dissatisfaction came to the surface in an editorial article of the New Year issue of the Fujin shinpō in 1904. It declared that the Japanese members would hereafter be less passive and regain leadership from Smart since the Japan WCTU was no more “a mere infantile and weak” organization. Unlike Smart’s scheme aiming at sudden and large organizational reform and expansion by strictly following her manual, the article encouraged its readers to adopt gradualism by starting with an “immediate problem while gradually learning and working.” This was the first time that the Japanese Union publicly rejected Smart’s plan and declared that they would take over the leadership of work from her. Its executive members clarified that the supposed role of the World’s WCTU missionary was to “assist” the native organization and never to

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“dominate” and even to “pursue her own enterprise by using our help.”

This declaration did not remain simply the armchair plan of the editor. A tacit coup was carried out at the executive meeting. The Japanese members nodded at Smart’s “suggestions,” yet avoided making an instant decision in front of her by leaving those issues for “further discussion in some other time.” This action was an implicit rejection of her opinions. The executive members covertly eliminated her influence from the Union without insulting her. She could no longer control her Japanese clients who were uncritically “looking to her as their teacher” and “taking from her instructions and criticism with a willingness.” Nothing could be decided anymore without the full consent of the Japanese. The small executive meeting in 1904 demonstrates that the Japanese members finally obtained true leadership in their work from their American “mother.”

Smart, however, did not yield easily to her “students.” She soon contributed an article entitled “Fujin kyōfūjigyō no kōan (a plan for the women’s temperance work)” to the Fujin shinpō. It contained even more than ever meticulous instructions to the members: “all meetings should be opened punctually; do not wait for late-comers”; “spend the first fifteen minutes at meetings to pray”; “officers should read loudly a report at monthly meetings”; “local presidents should always carry a pocketbook and jot down any valuable information for the society on it”; “recording secretaries should record meetings then and there, and should not rely on their memories”; “treasurers

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207 Ibid.
should collect membership fees, or even visit members’ homes according to circumstances”; and “visit a member's home who took leave from meetings more than twice.” Until she went back to the United States in 1906, she stuck to her self-acclaimed teacher’s role and continued issuing meticulous guidelines to the Japanese. The Japanese Union carefully avoided her dominance, while paying full respect to her so as not to offend her. When she became ill because of accidents and the World’s WCTU had decided to send her back to her native country, the Japanese Union prayed for her recovery and sent a petition to Anna A. Gordon, the World’s WCTU president, for her to remain in Japan. Such diplomatic treatment of Smart by the women of the Japanese Union resulted in maintaining good relations with her through correspondence after her term in Japan, and with the World’s WCTU. Her successful mission in Japan and the request of the Japanese Union urged Anna A. Gordon to send more missionaries to Japan. Although the Japanese Union did not want go under the domination of missionaries, it still needed support and guidance from Evanston.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Union had already expressed its desire for


\[210\] “Sumato-jō ryūnin seikyū ni tsuite,” Fujin shinpō, no. 108 (April 25, 1906): 5. Smart’s horse wagon had an accident when she was on a trip to Hokkaido. Soon afterward, she was thrown into a freezing river from her jinrikisha by its drunken puller on January 7, 1904. Without changing her wet clothes, she had to answer the police’s questions for two hours. Then, she fell ill. Since her illness did not improve for years, the World’s WCTU decided to send her back to the United States. “Sumato-jō no sōnan,” Fujin shinpō, no. 81 (January 25, 1904): 5-6; “Sumato-jō no kibei,” Fujin shinpō, no. 108 (April 25, 1906): 3-5.


independence and treatment as a matured entity by its American sisters even before the arrival of Smart. Mitani Tami, a national corresponding secretary, reported its institutional development to the World’s WCTU Convention in 1900 with a completely different perspective from Parrish and Smart. Mitani declared,

The little babe, born thirteen years ago, when Mrs. Mary Clement Leavitt came to Japan with her message from the White Ribbon sisters of America, has grown out of her swaddling clothes. . . . We are now a living, working power. 213

The Japanese Union struggled to stand on its own feet to become an organization independent from its “mother.” When Smart was unable to attend the National Conference in 1906 because of illness, the editorial column of the Fujin shinpō stated, “we should not be a baby bird with weak wings; we should have power to fly independently from the mother.” 214 After Smart went back to the United States, Flora E. Strout and Ruth F. Davis came to Japan in 1908 and 1909, respectively. The Japanese Union welcomed their assistance, not their leadership. The women of the Japanese Union did not let their society be the passive and submissive follower of the American “mothers” or “teachers” anymore.

Conclusion

The World’s WCTU was born out of a strong sense of mission by the Anglo-American women to liberate the “pagan” women of non-western nations whom

they believed were suppressed by oppressive customs and traditions. Influenced by the Social Darwinist ideology that placed the Anglo-American race and culture on the top of the hierarchy, missionaries of the World's WCTU attempted to create a miniature organization in Japan by imposing what they believed were universally applicable causes. The World's WCTU defined progress as a unilateral flow from the West to the East, especially from the United States to Japan.

However, Japanese Christian women rewrote and nativized the idea and strategy of the WCTU in their own terms, and targeted licensed prostitution problems more than alcohol-related issues after lively discussion.215 This shift of concerns came from deliberate interpretation of social, cultural, and political circumstances in Japan, not from a lack of bilingualness or misunderstanding among Japanese, as Rumi Yasutake addresses.216 The Japanese Union women defended their own decision even when the WCTU missionaries frowned at their choice. When Hiratsuka Haru (Raichō) rekindled the controversy over the priority of Union's activism in 1917, Kubushiro Ochimi, a young leader with a bachelor's degree from a seminary in the U.S., endorsed the choice of her predecessors.

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215 Other internationally oriented Christian reform organizations, the YMCA in particular, shared similar definitions of progress, from the United States to Japan, as Jon Thares Davidann has demonstrated. The YMCA missionaries' idea of progress as the unilateral dissemination of their message into other parts of the world also caused a dilemma for Japanese male Christians who sought a way to improve their own nation without losing their own national identities. They redefined Christian progress in terms of their own cultural style and fiercely sought independence from the domination by Americans of the Japanese YMCA. In that sense, the WCTU women of Japan had similar negotiations on the sense of "universal" scheme of progress and tensions between foreign and indigenous leadership. See Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress.

216 Yasutake, Transnational Women's Activism, 96 and 260.
The process of their negotiation over the institutionalization of Japanese Kyōfūkai not only denied the universal applicability of the WCTU's agenda but also added new arguments to the existing controversy over the policy of the American WCTU. The WCTU missionaries who worked in Japan before the demise of Willard were strictly loyal to the realization of prohibition and frowned on the anti-regulation-first policy of the Japanese Union. Ironically, the Japanese Union legitimized the shift of its primary concern by referring to the "Do Everything" policy, promoted by Frances E. Willard. The "Do Everything" policy enabled the flexible translation and transformation of American style temperance activism to fit their own social, political, and religious circumstances.

The Japanese Union women also disagreed with the hierarchy that placed the Japanese below Anglo-Americans and the dismissive treatment of the Japanese by their American sisters. The founders and successive round-the-world missionaries of the American and World WCTUs had always described the Japanese Union as their "baby" with fragile institutional footings in an "uncivilized" society and expected their white ribbon "daughter" to act on advice given by her "mother." They also regarded

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217 Historian Ruth Bordin argues that the WCTU in the United States under the leadership of Frances E. Willard pursued broader aims of social reforms that included social, economic, and political "evils" under the slogan, "Do Everything." Opposition to licensing and medical inspection of brothels was part of its agenda. After her demise in 1898, however, prohibition became the Union's single goal. Another historian Alison M. Parker disagrees with Bordin's interpretation and reveals the continuation of the WCTU's "Do Everything" policy and its activism on a wide range of social concerns throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to argue the continuity or discontinuity of the "Do Everything" policy in the American WCTU's domestic activism. Ruth Bordin, Woman and Temperance, preface to the paperback ed., xvi.
Japan as a promising student that modernized and westernized its nation much more rapidly than any other Asian nation. Such evaluation resulted in offering intensive personal support to Japan, although branches in other nations, the Chinese Union in particular, opposed the favorable treatment of Japan and demanded more attention from the World Union.

The treatment of the Japanese women as immature and inferior objects savable only by their benevolent “mothers” had become a source of discontent in the Japanese Union. Although it owed a lot to the missionaries for its organizational expansion, its members were highly conscious of national dignity from the very beginning and unhappy with being dominated by Americans. Especially at the turn of the 20th century, subjugated positions vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain sugarcoated with benevolent terms had gradually become unacceptable to the Japanese white ribboners. Japan’s victory over China in 1894 triggered the Western powers to relinquish extraterritoriality. Japan also regained complete control over its own tariffs. The Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, the first military pact on equal terms between a Western and non-Western nation, and victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 generated a new consciousness that Japan had finally obtained the status of a full-fledged empire, equal to that of Western nations.218

218 The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 1905, recognized Japan’s “paramount interest” in Korea, restored China’s “sovereignty” and administration in Manchuria, gave Japan the Russian lease on the Kwantung Peninsula and the Manchurian Railway as far north as Changchun. Although Japan failed to obtain indemnity from Russia, it extracted the southern half of Sakhalin.
descriptions such as a "baby" or an "uncivilized country" by the Americans. Rather, the Japanese Union started seeking an honorable position as a matured "working power" in the international community of the World's WCTU that covered more than fifty nations and regions.

However, the American Union women were insensitive to such desires of their Japanese sisters. The World and American WCTU missionaries viewed the victory of Japan over Russia favorably. Anita McGee, who organized a "temperance nurse" group and served the Japanese Army by working at a military hospital in Hiroshima, credited the victory to the soberness of the Japanese military.219 But other missionaries asserted that "a nation of forty-seven million people is looking up to us" and that Japan was eagerly anxious to learn the "superior experience" of America and Europe.220 In the eyes of the American white ribboners, Japan remained an immature nation that should humbly accept teachings from the West. Such a gap of consciousness between the United States and Japan over Japan's position in the world still remained large. Soon, the Japanese WCTU started not only accepting missionaries from the United States but also sending their delegates to international conferences held in the United States and Europe to offer their own words on issues. At the same time, Japan embarked on creating outpost organizations in neighboring Asian countries and communities of Japanese immigrants. The so-called "baby" organization of the World's

WCTU reached adulthood in the early 20th century and explored her own life, while its "mother" did not notice such growth of the Japanese Union and kept treating it as inferior. The disagreements between the WCTU members in the United States and Japan also existed among the native and foreign, namely, American and Canadian, members of the Japanese WCTU. The next chapter examines the interactions between missionary women from North America and the Japanese women in social reform enterprises.
CHAPTER 2

THE RESCUR HOME FOR JAPANESE WOMEN AND
THE "HULL-HOUSE" OF DOWNTOWN TOKYO:
THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE JIAIKAN RESCUE HOME AND
THE KÔBÔKAN SETTLEMENT

Introduction

The missionaries dispatched from the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union worked together with Japanese women to create a branch organization in Japan. Their relations, however, evolved not only with friendly feelings of transnational sisterhood but also serious gaps in consciousness: the Americans expected the Japanese to uncritically accept the theory and practices of their temperance scheme, whereas the Japanese always nativized or Japanized social reform plans to fit their unique needs. Moreover, American members of the Union always treated the Japanese as inferior and immature nationals of a less civilized nation and attempted to "uplift" them. Women of the Japanese Union, on the other hand, felt uncomfortable with the role of submissive disciples prescribed by their American sisters and disagreed with the assertive leadership of their American counterparts.

Such negotiations over the universal applicability of social reform plans imported from the United States get the stage for interactions between the
missionaries stationed in Japan and the Japanese women. Unlike the WCTU emissaries who primarily associated themselves with middle-class, well-educated Japanese Christian women and men, the missionaries in Japan formed the Foreign Auxiliary (gaijinbu) and devised their own programs for social reform—namely, "rescue" works for prostitutes and settlement movements in slum districts in addition to playing supportive roles for the Japanese Union.

Both "rescue" work and the settlement movement originated in late Victorian and Progressive America.¹ Rescue homes and settlement houses in the United States rescued "pagan" women and poor immigrants by Christianizing and "Americanization" them, whereas the underprivileged Japanese whom the Auxiliary tried to support did not have to adopt American values, ethics, and religion in order to survive in their own nation. Unlike settlement houses in the United States that aimed to bridge the gap between the native nations and the adopted nation of immigrants, a settlement in Japan necessitated its North American administrators to overcome a cultural gap between themselves and the working-class Japanese. How these missionary women devised and developed their rescue mission and settlement enterprise and how the Japanese accepted both programs are the primary concerns of this chapter. The chapter first examines how the North American missionaries interpreted sexuality, family, marriage life, and other social customs specific to Japan and how they tackled the negative byproducts of modernization such as urbanization and poverty. Then, I will

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¹ Since Jane Addams hyphenated the name Hull-House, I follow that practice in this chapter.
explore how Japanese women, both working and middle-class, engaged in the process of the birth and development of these social reform institutions. Through the analysis of the rescue home and the settlements, this chapter highlights how the native as well as foreign members of the Japanese WCTU participated in nation building efforts of modern Japan from the late 19th century to the end of World War II.

The Formation of the Foreign Auxiliary and its Inchoate Plan for the Rescue Work

The World’s Woman's Christian Temperance Union recognized the need to organize resident missionaries when it embarked upon the creation on its plan to create branch Unions all over the world. Soon after organizing WCTU branches among Japanese women, the World's WCTU started recruiting female Protestant missionaries living in Japan. Frances E. Willard, the president of the World Union, turned her eyes toward Mary Florence Denton, a missionary in Kyoto who had been an active member of the Southern California WCTU before the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions sent her to Japan. Upon a recommendation from Willard in 1895, Denton was appointed as a resident missionary for the Union in Japan and started her “aggressive work” among missionaries. She regularly contributed articles on the aims and practices of the WCTU to the *Japan Evangelist*, an inter-denominational English monthly journal for missionaries stationed in Japan, and attempted to organize the

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WCTU among women connected with missionary societies.

Denton, living in Japan since 1888 and teaching at Dōshisha, which was established by Niijima Jō, emphasized the temperance cause advocated by the WCTU among both foreign missionaries and the Japanese. From the beginning, however, she warned her readers not to uncritically adopt the schemes of the American and British Unions in Japan. Seeing concubinage as a significant problem, Denton believed it was indispensable to rouse a “strong public sentiment in favor of strict monogamy” in Japan instead of focusing on the battle against alcohol as the American and British Unions did.4 She expected that “wise readers” would “select what is most needed” from the “Do Everything Policy” of the American and British Societies.5 Unlike missionaries from the World’s WCTU, Denton emphasized selective application and arrangement of the temperance cause according to the social conditions of Japan. Her denial of the “universal applicability” of Anglo-American social reform plans and awareness of social environments different from those of the United States strikingly resemble the positions of the Japanese WCTU members, although she was rarely associated with the Japanese Union leaders. Her sensitive comprehension of gender problems in Japan was developed from her keen insight into the lives of Japanese people through interactions with her students and their families at Dōshisha.6

Denton’s efforts to organize female missionaries soon became too burdensome

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5 Ibid.
6 Clapp, Mary Florence Denton and Doshisha, chapter 5.
to carry out alone. Therefore, she consulted Maria True, the pillar of the Sakurai Girl's School whose principal was Yajima Kaji, the president of the Japanese WCTU. True raised the issue of recruiting missionaries to the WCTU at a meeting of the Ladies Christian Conference of Tokyo and Yokohama held in 1895. Soon the Conference, attended by interdenominational Protestant missionary women stationed in Tokyo and Yokohama, formed a preparatory committee to create a Foreign Auxiliary (Gaijinbu) to the Japanese WCTU. The committee, consisting of about ten female missionaries, reached the conclusion that an independent body might do more efficient work and that a separate society from the WCTU in Japan should be organized. The Foreign Auxiliary WCTU of Japan, organized by single female missionary women or wives of missionaries from various denominations located all over Japan, was thus directly affiliated with the World's WCTU, though its constitution provided for cooperation with the Japanese Union.

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8 Ibid.
9 Matilda A. Spencer of the Methodist Episcopal Church, East Japan Mission, was selected to be the first president. The Auxiliary started with eight departments: Scientific Temperance Instruction; Social Purity; Literature; Sunday School; Evangelism; Health and Physical Culture, Sabbath Observance; and “if practicable,” Work among Foreigners [non-Japanese] in Open Ports. The World’s WCTU, on the other hand, adopted twenty-one departments as of 1895: Evangelism; Bible Readings; Organization; Juvenile Work; Scientific Temperance Instruction in Schools; Sunday School Work; Press; Literature; Fairs and Expositions; Penal, Charitable and Reformatory; Purity; Peace and International Arbitration; Legislation and Petitions; Franchise; Systematic Giving; Anti-Opium; Work among Sailors; Work among Policemen; Saving Banks; Parlor Meetings; Young Woman’s Branch. For the selection of the first president, see, M. A. Veazey, “W.C.T.U. Department,” *Japan Evangelist* 8, no. 12 (December, 1901): 380. For the eight departments, see Denton, “World’s W.C.T.U.,” (February, 1896). For the departments of the World’s WCTU, see Frances E. Willard, *Do Everything: A Handbook for the World’s White Ribboners* (Chicago: the Woman’s Temperance publishing Association, 1895), 91-104.
The members of the Auxiliary, all of whom were women, developed networks that linked missionaries of the same denomination in different cities and established interdenominational connections between missionaries in the same city.\(^{10}\) The birth of nation-wide networks for women missionaries allowed them to not only strengthen gender solidarity but also to bypass the patriarchal structure of missionary organizations that allocated women only subordinate status.\(^{11}\) The birth of an umbrella organization covering women of various missions and churches created a small space in which they could seek autonomy from male control and use their energy and creativity beyond a limited sphere. In establishing an arena for independent action free from male domination, the notion of gender separatism that characterized Victorian ideology endorsed the birth of the Auxiliary and helped to shape its strategies. By adopting the "women's sphere" ideology which dominated the cultural and theological attitudes of the woman's missionary movement in the late 19\(^{th}\) century, Auxiliary members planned to remold the domestic lives of the Japanese which they believed to be oppressive. As the slogan "women's work for women" succinctly indicates, they assumed that reaching Japanese women in their homes and improving their social

\(^{10}\) Rumi Yasutake, “Transnational Women's Activism: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in Japan and Beyond, 1858-1920,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 161.

positions was women's work in which male missionaries should not meddle.  

Through their organizational network, female missionaries of the Auxiliary turned their attention to Japanese daughters sold into brothels. Consequently, they developed unique activities different from both the World's WCTU and from the Japanese WCTU: the former primarily promoted the temperance cause and the latter focused on the realization of monogamy through the elimination of licensed prostitution and the custom of concubinage. The missionaries of the Auxiliary, on the other hand, harbored a desire to "rescue" and "rehabilitate" prostitutes in Japan along the lines of late-Victorian womanhood; the creation of a rescue home was the medium through which they would execute their plan.

The underpinning ideology of "rescuing" and "rehabilitating" Japanese prostitutes came from a rescue mission run by Protestant home missionaries in the United States. The rescue homes developed in the West of the United States accommodated ex-prostitutes, including Chinese and Native Americans, and inculcated them with middle-class Victorian values with an assumption that all women, regardless of race, class, and culture, wanted to share the Victorian notion of womanhood and desired to convert to Christianity. The home missionaries of rescue

homes also pursued the salvation of “fallen” women’s souls. The rescue enterprise of home missionaries in the United States inspired the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU to initiate similar activities in Japan.

**Prostitution and Rescue Work in the United States**

A sexual double standard that rationalized sexual commerce was not a social phenomenon unique to the Japanese, as the previous chapter examined. The United States had similar social problems of prostitution and tolerance toward male sexual promiscuity. The Auxiliary missionaries modeled their rescue operations on the social reform movement to eliminate various social evils in American society.

A Victorian sexual ideology that regarded male sexual desire as strong, passionate, and even destructive while classifying middle-class and upper-class women as asexual and passionless justified prostitution. According to Victorian logic, prostitution functioned as a safety valve that protected the Victorian home by allowing men to fulfill their irrepressible sexual desires while protecting their wives from unwanted sex and pregnancy. In short, much of Victorian America regarded

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prostitution as a necessary evil. One of the paramount concerns of medical and religious authorities in this period was to shield white middle-class women's alleged "purity." Those same authorities, presuming these women to be sexually "immoral." These women, unlike their "respectable" sisters, were necessary to provide an outlet for male sexual desire that would otherwise be directed toward "respectable" white women. Victorian sexuality and the ideology of prostitution were thus "intricately bound up with class, gender, and racial systems."  

Those who accepted prostitution as a fact of life and a necessary evil to protect the purity of the home campaigned for state and national regulations to contain sexually transmitted diseases. These regulationists referred to the governmental control of prostitution practiced in major European countries and the "Orient" in their lobbying efforts. Starting in the late 1860s, they attempted to introduce regulations in New York State (1867), Chicago (1871), Pennsylvania State (1874), and Cincinnati (1874). St. Louis implemented the nation's first system of registered prostitution in 1870: Detroit, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Douglas, Arizona followed the example of St. Louis.

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16 England practiced some form of regulation. Belgium, France, Austria, Hungary, Russia, Italy, Spain, Portugal, most of Germany and Scandinavia, and Japan practiced official regulation of prostitution. Great Britain abolished regulation during the 19th century. Josephine Butler led the anti-regulation movement. However, Great Britain did not suspend regulation in its colonies and concessions outside of country. Rosen, *The Lost Sisterhood*, 9-10; Degler *At Odds*, 285.

17 Rosen, *The Lost Sisterhood*, 9-10; D’Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 139. Regulation meant confinement of prostitutes to the "red light districts" of the city, and
Meanwhile, growing concerns about official regulation of prostitution inspired an anti-prostitution campaign. Motivated by religious zeal, the growing women's rights movements, and their goal of expanding their maternal authority beyond the home and into the public sphere, the purity leaders attacked regulated prostitution, lobbied for the reform of the regal system to penalize men who "corrupted" women, and tried to "rescue" prostitutes by providing them with a "loving, homelike atmosphere" and transform them into respectable, "true" women through conversion to Christianity.18 Through such activism, sexual reformers expanded their rescue work for prostitutes and lobbied for introducing a minimum age of consent. They succeeded in abolishing regulated prostitution and prevented it from taking a firm hold in the United States.19

required licensed prostitutes to pass a periodic inspection for venereal disease and receive a health certificate.


19 The abolishment of licensed prostitution did not lead to the elimination of prostitution itself. The rapid urbanization in the late 19th century and the financial reward that prostitution brought to many powerful interest groups—owners of saloons, landlords, real estate agents, and even politicians and police—promoted the segregation of vice and produced so-called red-light districts in urban communities. Officials tolerated the districts. Moreover, the social purity campaign had limiting as well as liberating results for the lives of women. For instance, the Comstock law of 1873, forbidding the mailing of obscene, lewd, lascivious, and indecent writings, stifled to spread of information about contraception and abortion. This law limited women's autonomy over sexual expression and reproduction, and was arbitrarily utilized to attack suffragists and free-lovers. Anthony Comstock, the architect of this law, served as the superintendent of Pure Literature for the WCTU upon the request of Frances E. Willard. See Degler, *At Odds*, 287; Rosen, *The Lost Sisterhood*, chapter 5; D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 156-167. For the relationship between the WCTU and governmental censorship, see Alison M. Parker, *Purifying America.*
The rescue enterprises that developed from the 1870s on included vocational training and secular studies to enable self-sufficiency for rescue home residents so that they would not go back to their previous lives. In addition to developing training and “rehabilitation” methods, social purists in the late Victorian period asserted that non-white, non-Christian working-class women could acquire Victorian values. They challenged racial biological determinism that culture and civilization were the sole property of white middle-class Americans. Instead, they argued that social environment determined individual development. Belief in the universal applicability of middle-class sexual morals and in the malleability of women regardless of race, class, and culture buttressed rescue home enterprises in the United States. The practices and ideologies of rescue operations in the United States inspired missionaries of the Foreign Auxiliary in Japan to help Japanese prostitutes by developing their own rescue plans.


Pascoe, Relations of Rescue, 114-115.

Working class women, however, did not remain passive victims merely reflecting the values of middle-class women and men; rather, they formed their own community for mutual support and collectively responded to male abuse. Moreover, less privileged women even sought their own voices within the constraints of gender and class dependency, and their public presence through wage work contrasted with middle-class women who glorified domesticity. Middle-class sexual reformers were, however, unconscious of such working-class culture and womanhood. See Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York, 1789-1860 (New York: Knopf, 1986).
The Enterprise of Jiaikan in its Path-Finding Days

It was Kate Youngman who first proposed a collective rescue action in Japan. She came to Japan in 1873 as a Presbyterian missionary from the United States and joined the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU. Deeply disturbed by the enslaved situation of prostitutes in Japan, she took the initiative to incorporate the rescue operation into the Foreign Auxiliary's primary agenda.22 A year earlier, she had "saved" or prevented nine girls from being sold to brothels in the aftermath of the great earthquake that had hit Gifu Prefecture. Youngman raised this issue among female missionaries gathered at the Ladies Christian Conference in Tokyo and Yokohama in 1893. The Conference declined her request for collaborative support because a clause in its constitution prohibited organized works requiring time and money, and this prevented immediate collective action. Indeed, the Conference promised sympathy and aid to the project at the individual level.23

However, the "much startling information as to the immoral condition" in Japan prodded missionary women to take an aggressive step toward rescue work.24 The newly organized Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU succeeded the new

22 On her first furlough, Youngman became acquainted with E. Merritt, a woman who put her heart into saving young women in New York City from a life of prostitution. From then on, Merritt had given her fifty dollars each year to use in Japan for the same purpose. J. K. McCauley, "W.C.T.U. Department," Japan Evangelist 9, no. 7 (July 1904): 225.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. Although the documents did not reveal the content of the "startling information," it seems that the rapid expansion of licensed prostitution with the strong endorsement of the authorities, the practice of selling off young girls under the pretext of filial piety, and the slavish conditions of prostitution sparked their righteous and religious indignation into greater efforts. The missionary women of the Auxiliary repetitively expressed their resentment against such "customs" of Japan.
rescue project of the Conference. Its members—Kate Youngman, Mary Kidder, Maria True, and Matilda A. Spencer—were appointed to communicate with the native members of the Japanese Union. Thereafter, the Japanese Union and the missionary women started a fund-raising campaign for the purchase of land and the building a house. They found desirable land consisting of fifteen hundred tsubo and a house with four rooms in Ôkubo, near Shinjuku and close to a railroad station. Women of the Kyôfûkai and missionaries believed it desirable to have a home in a remote place rather than at the very center of Tokyo where the cost of maintenance might be too high. In addition to the lower price of the real estate in Ôkubo, the great promise of future development and accessibility to railway stations encouraged them to purchase it in 1894. Ushioda Chiseko named the site Jiaikan, the home of mercy and love. Prior to the purchase, True showed a map of Tokyo to Yajima, and convinced her that Shinjuku, then a rural town, would soon turn into a central part of Tokyo; Ôkubo is only a short distance from Shinjuku and a good location for the rescue home. As True predicted, Tokyo expanded westward, and Shinjuku quickly became urbanized.

Clara Parrish, a missionary from the World's WCTU, praised this transnational cooperation in her report to the Union Signal. By the time of the Foreign Auxiliary's first annual meeting on November 23, 1896, some of its seventy members had already raised several hundred yen for a rescue home for women “whose virtues,

25 1 tsubo = 6 ft. X 6 ft.
26 “Hakuai naru shokei shimai ni uttau,” Fujin kyôfû zasshi, no. 9 (July 2, 1894): 2.
outside of Christian circles, are often made merchandise of by parents, just as truly as
the silks they weave."28 Parrish's statement represented other Protestant missionary
women's recognition and condemnation of patriarchal control in the Japanese
household that was a prerequisite for the system of prostitution. Emphasizing the
sexual exploitation of women by non-Christian or "heathen" cultures also connoted the
assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority central to Victorian values. These feelings of
repulsion toward Japanese customs of family life and the belief in the supremacy of
Victorian morality characterized missionaries' attitudes toward the Japanese and their
rescue works.29 The new enterprise of the Auxiliary aimed at saving women from lives
of prostitution and enabling them to support themselves through vocational education
and regenerating them through Christian morality and virtue.30

Although there was considerable zeal for the new enterprises among
missionaries, Mary Denton observed that the native Unionists made "little response to
their earnest appeals" despite published requests for support and contributions in its
official monthly organ.31 For years, the list of financial contributors carried few
Japanese names. Officially, the home belonged to the Japanese WCTU. When the
Union purchased the land for the price of ¥1,812, Yajima and Ushioda had to make

28 Clara Parrish, "Impressions of Japan," Union Signal (January 28, 1897): 4; M. M. Kuhns,
29 The missionary image of Japanese women had much resemblance to that of the "Chinese
slave girl," shared by Protestant home missionaries in the United States. They saw that
Chinese daughters were born into patriarchal household and sold into prostitution or
forced to marry to men their parents chose. See Pascoe, Relations of Rescue, 54.
30 Mary F. Denton, "The Woman's Christian Temperance Union," Japan Evangelist 2, no. 6
(August 1895): 352-353.
31 Ibid., 352.
temporary payment on its behalf because of the minimal donations from the Japanese. These two women had located the site and had provided most of the funds to buy it, as the other Japanese Unionists did not share their enthusiasm for rescue enterprises, yet.

Moreover, the Union's lack of funds limited native participation in its projects. The small Japanese membership made it difficult to contribute much financially to the new enterprise. Unfamiliar with rescue work, the Japanese Unionists made them indifferent and further detached from the Jiaikan. Japan did not have an equivalent Christian organization dedicated for prostitutes, except a few individual efforts, such as Ushioda Chiseko's industrial school for destitute women. Most of the Japanese members lacked knowledge and experience in rescue work.

The prejudice of the middle-class Unionists toward the sexuality of prostitutes also hindered them from full engagement in the operation of the Jiaikan. Some members of the Japanese Union argued that prostitutes lowered the morals of Japanese women as a whole, corrupted male youths with bright futures, created adulterers, and spawned other social evils. The editorial column of Fujin kyōfū zasshi, the organ of the national Union, even called prostitutes dokumushi, poisonous insects that would destroy the nation. Although Yajima, Ushioda, and a few other executive

33 Ushioda Chiseko, "Jiaikan no koto ni tsuite," Fujin shinpō, no. 18 (October 20, 1898): 14.
35 "Hakuai naru shokei shimei ni uttau," 1.
members felt more sympathy for prostitutes, most of the Japanese WCTU constituents blamed prostitutes for their own "immorality" and perceived them as a vagrants responsible for social problems. For those who had never confronted the economic hardship that the prostitutes and their families faced, the salvation of a prostitute with "rotten" soul seemed almost impossible. Rather, the prevention of prostitution was the more imminent, important, and productive mission in their eyes.

Along with middle-class Japanese constituents of the WCTU, Protestant missionaries shared this repulsion toward women's sexuality of the least privileged class: both groups assigned "immorality" as the primary cause of prostitution. However, there was one striking difference in attitudes toward prostitutes between the Japanese and the missionaries: the former saw prostitutes the "victimizers" of innocent men with their nonnegotiable immorality, while the latter deemed prostitutes as the "victims" of "pagan" Japanese social customs that enslaved women.\(^{36}\) The missionaries also believed in the "savability" of prostitutes through the moral guidance of Christianity and Victorian womanhood. This fundamental difference over the causes of prostitution resulted in different anti-prostitution strategies.\(^{37}\)

Faced with this general unwillingness of the Japanese Union to collaborate

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36 Middle-class Protestant women involved in sexual reform works in the United States adopted a model of female victimization, maintaining that a licentious male seduced many women into prostitution. The Auxiliary missionaries living in Japan adopted such an understanding of prostitutes. See D’Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 143.

37 See Miyagawa Shizue, "Shiberia shisatsu no ki," *Fujin shinpō*, no. 261 (April 13, 1919): 12-13. Miyagawa’s essay was written about prostitutes living in Siberia she met on her investigational trip. Her pessimistic opinion toward the rescue of prostitutes represented the majority of the Japanese WCTU women.
with them, the Foreign Auxiliary turned to the Florence Crittenton Mission, a philanthropic society with headquarters in Washington D.C. The Auxiliary wrote letters to Charles N. Crittenton, its president, who had already established various rescue homes and social reform institutions in the United State.\(^{38}\) He also had been connected with the WCTU through sponsoring a rescue home endeavor of the Colorado branch union, so he was deemed the most likely to offer them help.\(^{39}\) As the Auxiliary missionaries expected, Crittenton with a "very cordial letter" that said, "Our hearts have long turned to Japan and I believe we shall feel led to help you."\(^{40}\) It was the Mission's first venture in foreign lands.\(^{41}\) Crittenton's promise of financial support was a breakthrough for the success of Jiaikan, although reliance on a philanthropic organization in the United States further distanced the rescue home from the Japanese Unionists.

The Foreign Auxiliary modeled the Jiaikan program after the rescue missions of Protestant home mission women in the United States. Like the rescue homes for "pagan" and foreign women in the United States, the Jiaikan installed native, Japanese Christian women, as intermediaries between the ex-prostitutes and the Western mission women.\(^{42}\) The Auxiliary missionaries expected Japanese Christian

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women to serve as role models for former prostitutes. However, just as the rescue homes in the U.S. preserved the racial hierarchy by not allowing non-white women to own or to dominate the home, so the Foreign Auxiliary members did not expect the Japanese women to control the home.

The Auxiliary was careful to choose a Japanese matron who had "more than ordinary ability," with previous experience as a matron for large girl's mission schools.43 The Japanese matrons whom the Auxiliary found, however, successively died in short periods of time. At the request of Clara Parrish, the home eventually came under the superintendence of Eliza Spencer Large, the senior agent of the Women's Missionary Society of the Methodist Church of Canada.44 Large moved the Jiaikan to her house in Tsukiji in central Tokyo in 1899, and the little house of Ôkubo was put up for lease.45

Large was then the principal of Tôyô Eiwa Girl's School. Although she was, in Clara Parrish's words, "a thorough business woman" who was well known for her excellent administrative skills and fluency in the Japanese language,46 she was busy

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43 Ibid., 226. These matrons were Yokoi Tamako, and Mrs. Saigô.
46 Clara Parrish, "World's W.C.T.U.," Japan Evangelist 5, no. 4 (April 1898): 116. Large was also famous for her "sharp tongue," "cruelty" and "abrasive personality." The Japanese WCTU highly praised her business talent and knowledge of the Japanese language, but the editor of its organ unhesitatingly indicated that "her character lacked harmoniousness." Because of her administrative ability, the Board of Managers of the Canadian Methodist permitted her to carry on as principal of the School after her marriage, despite its rule. Rosemary R. Gagan, A Sensitive Independence: Canadian Methodist Women Missionaries in Canada and the Orient, 1881-1925 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 83 and 91; "Lâji fujin o okuru," Fujin shinpô, no. 46 (February 25, 1901): 3.
with the many tasks she carried on her shoulders. She trained Kawahara Masu in "economy, frugality, promptness," and "exactness," and made her the matron of the rescue home. Despite the expectation of her continuing work at the home, Kawahara left her job five months later for "family reasons," and all of her successors remained in the position for only one to five months. Financial problems also haunted Large. American and Canadian missionaries compensated for the insufficiency of financial support from the Crittenton Mission of Washington D.C.

Yet "the hardest work" (italics original) for Large was the "character building" of the residents of the home. As of 1899, the rescue home accepted six former prostitutes as students, and offered them an education. Industrial training, enabling them to earn "an honorable livelihood" in the future, was also included in its program. Since most of the ex-prostitutes had received little formal education, the Jiaikan offered them basic writing, reading and other elementary level education. Furthermore, its five-year course of instruction included "general Christian teaching," the industrial training included "housemaid's duties, foreign cooking and laundrying as well as

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50 Ibid., 49.
sewing, both native and foreign," and baking "bread, muffins and buns." Through this industrial training, the home intended to remold the characters of residents and help them to "stand against the storms of temptation," although the vocational training they received was simply preparation for another type of service. Behind the program was the assumption that the women's "loss" of their purity was the result not only of abusive male lust and oppressive societal conventions for women but also of the women's moral vulnerability to "temptation." The key for their salvation was Christian womanhood, and the instruction of foreign (actually, Western) domestic skills were seen as an instrument of redemption.

The prostitutes who took refuge in the Jiaikan, however, did not necessarily endorse such suppositions nor blindly comply with the prescriptions of the WCTU missionaries. Despite the lure of free tuition, free food, and even wages, ex-prostitutes whom the missionaries tried to "rescue" by vocational and moral training backed away from them. Only a small number of prostitutes took refuge in the home, and few of them stayed there for long. According to Large's observation, her students "do not want to do manual work" (italics original). Yajima lamented, "If they can sit behind a desk and study only, they will be satisfied to stay" (italics original). These words succinctly express the discrepancy between the administrators' expectations and those of the

53 Large, "Florence Crittenton Home of Love and Mercy," 49.
54 Protestant home missionaries who engaged in rescue work in the United States shared such assumptions. Pascoe, Relations of Rescue, 50
56 Ibid.
residents over the program at the home: the latter saw the industrial training as nothing but forced labor and considered it irrelevant to the education they craved. One resident claimed that her “benefactor” had deceived her by saying that the Jiaikan was a “fine school where she could study only” (italics original). Disappointed at the imposed domestic chores, she left the Jiaikan. She was not the only student who deserted the rescue home. On October 21, 1900, for instance, there were six in the home; the next morning, two of them fled. Large lamented over these dropouts because one of them “gave little indication of any real desire to do right” (italics original) and the other runaway girls’ “case seemed hopeless.”

Thus there were cultural obstacles to the rehabilitation program. Large and Yajima attributed the malfunction of the home to the laziness and immorality of its residents, when the more direct problem was that Western forms of domesticity—cooking, baking, laundry, and sewing, coupled with Bible study—were foreign to many Meiji Japanese. Although Japanese modernization was accompanied by the introduction of Western foods and dress, most Japanese still wore kimonos or native garments and ate Japanese food during the Meiji era. Baking bread, eating animal meat, and sewing Western attire were completely alien practices to many ex-prostitutes raised in poor rural families. It is not hard to imagine that such women

57 Ibid.
58 Large, “Florence Crittenton Home of Love and Mercy,” 48-49. Those who escaped from the Jiaikan with no other place to go often went to the house of Tanaka Yoneko, the editor of Fujin shinpo. Tanaka did not explain why ex-prostitutes of the Jiaikan rescue home chose to stay with her. Presumably they were less frustrated at the guidance of a Japanese. See Ayumi, 42.
resented the imposition of Western domesticity. The prostitutes had little interest in learning Western domestic skills.

However, the Auxiliary missionaries believed that the Western style of eating and clothing were crucial means of enriching Japanese life styles. H. Frances Parmelee, a missionary of the American Board and the Superintendent of the Japanese WCTU Food Reform Department, expressed the widely shared assumptions by women missionaries in her letter to the World’s WCTU,

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59 Meat eating, for instance, did not spread among the Japanese easily because of the influence of Buddhism that regarded eating animal flesh as impure conduct. In particular, agricultural communities hesitated to eat meat. For those who engaged in agriculture, animals such as cows and horses were indispensable to the work force and even became objects of animistic worship. Japan had widespread worship of cows and horses as *ushi-gami* (the god of cows) and *batō kannon* (a statue of Buddha with a horse head), respectively. These animals could never be used as food. The Japanese living in mountain areas during pre-modern era ate deer, wild boars, rabbits, raccoon dogs, and monkeys for medical reasons. Among these animals, wild boars were widely used in Japanese cuisine. *Inoshishi*, wild boars, were also called as *yamakujirā*, or mountain whales. Since the Japanese considered a whale as a fish, they did not have to break the taboo by eating a “mountain whale.” Therefore, they did not break Buddhist taboo. Bread also took a long time before being integrated into the dietary habits of the average Japanese since the Westerners introduced it at the dawn of the Meiji Restoration. At first, the Japanese used it as military food because it was convenient and easy to transport. However, breads were primarily consumed as snacks, not staples, in urban communities during the Meiji period. In 1918 the military intervention in the Bolshevik Revolution caused a sharp rise in the price of rice, and triggered the so-called “rice riot” that swept the whole nation. For the first time in Japan, bread attracted serious attention as a new staple food that could be substituted for rice and became integrated into the Japanese diet. Wearing western dresses was a foreign custom to many Meiji Japanese as well. Okada Akio, “Bunmei kaika to shokumotsu,” in *Shokuseikatsu kindai shi: shokuryō to shokuhin*, ed. Ōtsuka Tsutomu (Tokyo: Yūzankaku, 1969), 19-20; Ōmori Shirō, “Kome to mugi: Shushokuryō no henka,” in *Shokuseikatsu kindai shi*, 70; Kodama Shinta, et al. ed., *Zusetsu Nihon bunkashi taikei*, vol. 11 (Tokyo: Shōgakkkan, 1967), 360 and 366; Kosuge Keiko, *Kindai Nihon shokubunka nenpyō* (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1997), 130-132; Kawabata Sanehide, *Kimono bunkashi* (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyūsho Shuppan, 1966), 208-221.

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Formerly, the Japanese used no animal food other than fish and fowl, although they never had simple, natural ways of living. . . . We civilized, flesh-eating foreigners have taught the Japanese to eat meat, as an enlightened art.60

Western missionaries rarely accepted the Japanese native lifestyle. The World’s WCTU missionaries, for instance, lived in Victorian style during their stay in Japan. Only the last two World’s WCTU representatives, Flora E. Strout and Ruth Frances Davis who came to Japan in 1908 and 1909 respectively lived in a Japanese-style house (fig. 13). They wrote to the World Headquarters that they rented a “Japanese house” first of all to ease the budget; in Tokyo, renting a Japanese house was cheaper than renting a Western one. The other reason for adopting a “Japanese home life” was to urge the Japanese to “come to visit us much more freely, not only because we are in a home of our own, but because we are in their kind of a home.” Strout and Davis strove to “win the hearts of the Japanese women” by meeting Japanese guests in a room that was “furnished entirely in Japanese style, which means cushions on the floor and a hanging or two on the wall.”61 Trying out a Japanese house was news unusual enough to report to the world headquarters.

60 May Yates, “Food Reform Department,” in Report of the Fifth Biennial Convention of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 180. Actually, the self-acclaimed contribution of foreigners to spread the habit of eating meat was a little bit exaggerated. Meat eating rapidly spread among urban communities and could be partly attributed to the Japanese government as a part of its Westernization policy and defiance of Buddhist taboo. To combat Buddhist beliefs that eating animals was an impure act, government officials emphasized that Shinto had tolerated the eating of flesh in ancient times and that eating meat had been a part of Japanese dietary culture. Okada, “Bunmei kaika to shokumotsu,” 23-24.


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Yet, except for Strout and Davis, most missionaries in Japan chose to reproduce Western style domesticity. Their homes resisted the indigenous culture surrounding them and demonstrated, they believed, the “superior” Christian way of life. 62 They were eager to remold the Japanese in the image of their own culture, rather than to accept the Japanese lifestyle to make themselves more accessible to the Japanese. Transforming the Japanese home implied spreading middle-class Protestant culture, which spanned topics from Victorian compassionate marriage to the menu of a dinner, since they presupposed that “only by Christianity” the Japanese women would be emancipated “from oppression and degradation.” 63

Moreover, many Japanese harbored strong anti-Christian feelings and held negative impressions toward Christian institutions in reaction to the excessive Westernization promoted by the government during the early Meiji period. Xenophobia was fueled by the unequal treaty imposed by Western powers, which allowed extraterritoriality and deprived Japan of control over tariffs; by the governmental proposal to use foreign and Japanese judges in cases involving Westerners; and by the planned opening of all of Japan to foreign residence. When Tôyô Eiwa Girls' School was robbed in 1890, Eliza Spencer Large was seriously wounded, and her husband, Thomas Alfred Large, was murdered. This unnerved missionaries in Japan because they were


convinced that the murder had been provoked by anti-Christian feelings. The following year, Uchimura Kanzô, a Christian teacher at the First High School, was ousted from his post because he did not salute the Emperor's signature on an Imperial Rescript of Education. After this fukei jiken (incident of disrespect), attacks increased on Christianity as a religion incompatible with the Japanese national polity and Japanese tradition. Incidents in which Christian schoolteachers were dismissed and Christian students were harassed occurred one after another all over Japan.64

The Auxiliary missionaries were sensitive to the anti-Christian, anti-Western feelings and to the rising sense of nationalism that dominated the first half of the 1890s.65 They observed that the little house of the Jiaikan in Ôkubo created a feeling of “terror in the neighborhood.”66 Even when it was for lease and no one related to the WCTU stayed there, its neighbors were frightened of the renters: “Because the occupants had been placed there by Christians, they too were supposed to be Christians.”67 Missionaries sensed that the Japanese in general did not welcome the Jiaikan.

With such a hostile environment surrounding the rescue home, the missionary staff members of the Jiaikan reexamined its training curriculum. Large noticed, “Our methods and ways of dealing with the girls were not always approved of.”68 Despite

67 Ibid.
68 Large, “Florence Crittenton Home of Love and Mercy,” 49.
her awareness, she was not allowed to develop more acceptable methods for the home since she had to leave Japan soon.\textsuperscript{69} After her resignation in November 1900, the home was given over to the care of a special committee of four, two from the Auxiliary and two native Union members. The home was moved from Tsukiji back to its original location in Ōkubo.\textsuperscript{70} Soon, Jane K. McCauley, the wife of an American Presbyterian, succeeded to the management of the Jiaikan.\textsuperscript{71}

"We are really established": The Development of the Jiaikan

Between 1900 and 1912, under the directorship of Jane K. McCauley, the Jiaikan succeeded in laying a solid foundation and grew steadily, and McCauley could report in 1906 that "We are really established" (italics original).\textsuperscript{72} During this period,

\textsuperscript{69} There was a quarrel between Large and the male-dominated Canadian Methodist Church, triggered by Large's challenge to the patriarchal structure of the Church. For detailed information of this problem, see Gagan, \textit{A Sensitive Independence}, 83-96.

\textsuperscript{70} Veazey, "W.C.T.U. Department," 381.

\textsuperscript{71} J. K. McCauley, "Report of the Foreign Auxiliary W.C.T.U. 1900-1901," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 9, no. 1 (January 1902): 19. Large placed the residents in the hands of Kawahara Masu, a former matron who worked under Large, and left for Great Britain. She visited the British Women's Temperance Association and met its prominent women. Then she went to the United States where she visited her former colleagues of the Auxiliary and inspected rescue homes in New York City. She intended to return to Japan independently and use information obtained in the United States for the Jiaikan. Yet she did not have such a chance. Later, she settled in Pennsylvania and stayed there until her death in 1933. For Large's life after leaving Japan, see Gagan, \textit{A Sensitive Independence}, 96; "Zakken," \textit{Fujin shinpō}, no. 51 (July 25, 1901): 29-30. For the activities of McCauley between 1901-1903, see Bertha Clawson, "W.C.T.U. Department," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 8, no. 9, (September 1901): 283; McCauley, "Report of the Foreign Auxiliary W.C.T.U. 1900-1901," 18-20; J. K. McCauley, "To Editor of Japan Evangelist," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 10, no. 6 (June 1903): 200; "Farewell for Mrs. MacCauley [sic] As Superintendent of the Florence Crittenden Rescue Home," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 19, no. 6 (July 1912): 343.

the Auxiliary raised enough funds to build a new house to accommodate a larger number of residents. They built the new house in 1904 and held its formal opening on the Empress's birthday.\footnote{The Foreign Auxiliary had advocated celebrating not only Emperor's but also Empress' birthday. J. K. McCauley, "Subscriptions to Florence Crittenton Rescue Home," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 11, no. 1 (January 1904): 24.} In 1901, the Jiaikan had only four residents; in 1911, twenty-two young women stayed for their year-long or shorter residencies.\footnote{Bertha Clawson, "W.C.T.U. Department," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 8, no. 9 (September 1901): 283; J. K. McCauley, "Report of Mrs. J. K. McCauley," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 18, no. 7 (July 1911): 334.}

The fundamental instructional curriculum during this period still consisted of secular and religious instruction, as well as Japanese and Western domestic housekeeping.\footnote{The curriculum of the Jiaikan during McCauley's supervision included one-and-a-half to two-hour Bible lessons, one-and-a-half to two-hour elementary-level secular study, and general house work, which included cooking, sewing, knitting, gardening, washing, ironing, and housemaid's work. Baking was suspended and not resumed until the late 1910s. J. K. McCauley, "Report of Mrs. J. K. McCauley," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 13, no. 12 (December 1906): 427; J. K. McCauley, "Rescue Home," \textit{Japan Evangelist} 15, no. 10 (October 1908): 376.} In addition to providing training in domesticity, the Jiaikan set a new goal: to encourage the residents to marry Christian gentlemen and make Christian homes. One missionary ironically described the "ideal" Japanese family life: "A husband should have the right to life (that of his children), liberty (to do as he pleases), and the pursuit of (his own) happiness."\footnote{George P. Pierson and Ida G. Pierson, \textit{Forty Happy Years in Japan 1888-1928} (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company: 1936), 65.} The Auxiliary observed that the Japanese home allowed husbands to arbitrarily rule over wives and children. Instead of submitting to such patriarchical control by husbands, Jiaikan residents were expected
to nurture the "liberating individualism of Christianity" and to create "the holy office of Motherhood."

The individualism the staff advocated, however, did not mean "a bold, self-assertive, independent" womanhood of "suffragettes." Instead, "she has the ideal of husband and wife... albeit in different spheres of activity." The Jiaikan idealized Victorian notions of commitment based on mutual affection between spouses, and supported gender-segregated role fulfillment with women as affectionate mother and moral guardian, although romantic attraction between spouses did not mean gender equality and same legal and economic powers between husbands and wives. The administrators of the Jiaikan rescue home regarded cases of conversion, marriage with Christian men, and the creation of a Victorian home life as major achievements of their rescue work, and proudly reported such cases to the Japan Evangelist. Many residents who did not marry went into domestic service at Christian homes and prepared to be wives and mothers in the future.

78 Pierson and Pierson, Forty Happy Years in Japan 1888-1928, 65
79 Pascoe, Relations of Rescue, 34-37.
80 J. K. McCauley, "Annual Conference of the Foreign Auxiliary, August in Karuizawa," Japan Evangelist 10, no. 8 (August 1910): 319. The Japan Evangelist reported that the fruits of rescue works during McCauley's supervision were, "one-fourth have been baptized and united with some church... One-tenth of all have been happily married and none of them divorced. One fourteenth have been expelled for incorrigible behavior, but no one is known to have returned to a life of shame." R. F. D., "Farewell for Mrs. MacCauley [sic] As Superintendent of the Florence Crittenden [sic] Rescue Home," Japan Evangelist 19, no. 7 (July 1912): 343.
The political and societal environment surrounding the Jiaikan drastically changed under the supervision of McCauley, and this transition enabled the steady development of the home. First, the native Union and its Foreign Auxiliary officially united, and the WCTU rapidly expanded. Second, governmental attitudes toward the status of registered prostitutes had become more favorable to those who wished to quit their trade. Third, the anti-foreign, anti-Christian feelings softened and the Christian population increased. Fourth, rising public sentiment against the licensed quarters developed beyond the narrow Christian community, and many non-Christian social reformers started to fight collectively against the system.

Since the late 1890s, the Foreign Auxiliary had been closely associated with the Japanese Union despite its direct affiliation with the World’s WCTU. Clara Parrish from the World’s WCTU recommended that the Auxiliary members “identify themselves with the Japanese unions, thereby strengthening the hands of their sisters and fellow workers.”82 Indeed, the distinction between the membership of the Foreign Auxiliary and the Japanese Union had been arbitrary. Large cities with many missionaries, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagasaki developed their own “circles” of the Auxiliary. Rural areas with few missionaries did not develop such communities. Instead, the Auxiliary missionaries worked together with the Japanese at local branches. Some of them even represented the native branches while maintaining their membership in the Auxiliary. At the annual convention held in 1898,

the Foreign Auxiliary switched its direct connection from the World's WCTU to the
Japanese WCTU. Afterwards, it officially became a part of the Japanese Union.

The rapid expansion of the Christian population in Japan in the early Taishó
Period (1912-1927) worked in the favor of the Jiaikan. The resolution of the first World
Conference of Mission and Evangelism, held in Edinburgh in 1910, inspired Protestant
churches in Japan to stress aggressive mission work. As a result, the Protestant
population more than doubled between 1910 and 1920. The growth of Christianity
brought new membership to the Japanese WCTU and its foreign equivalents. In 1904,
there were 73 members of the Auxiliary; by 1916, membership had expanded to about
200—one third of the roughly 600 women missionaries in Japan. This expansion
resulted in increased contributions to the Jiaikan. McCauley reported the list of names
and amount of contributions to the Japan Evangelist almost every month. Through the
regular publication of contributors, she inspired fellow Auxiliary members to
competitively subscribe to the rescue home.

The expansion and enlarged membership of the Union triggered the founding
of other rescue homes. Sister institutions were created in Hakodate, Osaka, and Tokyo.

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84 Gono, Nihon Kirisutokyōshī, 292.
85 “Nihon Kirisutokýó Fujin Kyōfukai shibu ichiranhyō (ge),” Fujin shinpó, no. 87 (July 25)
1904: 32; E. A. Balderston, “Great Enthusiasm Marks Convention of Foreign Auxiliary of
86 McCauley’s detailed reports reveal that 33 missionary women and one mission school
contributed between 1 and 25 yen in June 1903; seven years later, the number of
subscriptions had expanded to 168 individuals and organizations contributing amounts
between 0.35 and 28.50 yen. J. K. McCauley, “To the Editor of Japan Evangelist,” Japan
Evangelist 10, no. 6 (June 1903): 200-201; J. K. McCauley, “Additional Subscriptions to the
Rescue Home,” Japan Evangelist 17, no. 10 (October 1910): 386-388.
These rescue homes, run by the WCTU and by other Christians, influenced and inspired one another. The rescue home in Hakodate was under the management of male and female missionaries from various denominations who were stationed there.Originally, this home was not directly related to the WCTU. Ida Goepp Pierson (1862-1937), the wife of an American Presbyterian missionary and a member of the Asahikawa branch Union, connected these two organizations. Pierson and her fellow Unionists were inspired to participate in rescue work when they heard a speech given by "Miss Hatcher" from the Salvation Army at the Rengō Inori Kai (United Prayer Society), an interdenominational organization of Christian women, the predecessor of the Asahikawa WCTU.

Although the speech in Asahikawa is not on record, it is not difficult to guess the content of the story that inspired her audience to undertake rescue work. The Salvation Army had fought against sexual slavery through direct action and had also operated rescue works for prostitutes. The history of the Salvation Army in Japan began in 1895, when its founder in London, William Booth, sent its officers to Japan. Soon they determined the rescue of prostitutes to be their primary mission. In 1900,

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87 "An Explanation," *Japan Evangelist* 9, no. 10 (October 1902): 331. The Hakodate rescue home taught its residents Japanese and foreign sewing, the use of a sewing machine, foreign cooking, Chinese embroidery, Japanese writing and reading, the Bible and Christian hymns. All of the clients did not welcome this program; sometimes one third of the students ran away. Ida Goepp Pierson, "Account of the Asahigawa Kyofukwai Rescue Work," *Japan Evangelist* 9, no. 9 (September 1902): 301.


the Salvation Army borrowed a home behind the Hongwanji Temple in Tsukiji and used it as a shelter for ex-prostitutes.\textsuperscript{90} This organization practiced aggressive rescue operations, daring to march loudly into the pleasure districts with blaring bugles, tambourines and drums. Its members distributed bulletins that appealed directly to prostitutes to give up their trade and take refuge within the Salvation Army. Enraged brothel owners hired ruffians who assaulted the Salvation Army’s soldiers and officers. Nationwide newspapers reported the organization’s vigorous rescue efforts.\textsuperscript{91} As a result, the works of the Salvation Army stood “at the forefront of the battle against licensed prostitution.”\textsuperscript{92}

Soon after the encounter with the Salvation Army, women of the Asahikawa local Union started placing advertisements in newspapers urging prostitutes to leave their trade and offering them shelter. Since the Asahikawa branch did not have its own rescue home, it sent prostitutes it received to the Hakodate rescue home.\textsuperscript{93} Pierson

\textsuperscript{90} The supervisor of the home was Yamamuro Kieko, a wife of Yamamuro Gunpei, the first Japanese officer of the Salvation Army. For Yamamuro Kieko’s life and her involvement in rescue work, see Yamamuro Gunpei, \textit{Yamamuro Kieko} (Tokyo: Kyûseigun, 1916), 52-78.

\textsuperscript{91} Takemura Tamio, \textit{Haishô undô: kuruwa no josei wa dou kaihô saretaka} (Tokyo: Chûôkôronsha, 1982), 21-24; Yoshimi Kaneko, \textit{Baishô no shakaishi} (Tokyo: Yûzankaku, 1984), 97-100 and 132-6. Shimada Saburô, then the president of Mainichi Shinbun (Daily Newspaper), supported the rescue work by regularly reporting the miserable living conditions of the prostitutes and raising funds of rescue them. Shimada was Christian and was later elected to the House of Representatives. He became one of the major patrons for the WCTU.

\textsuperscript{92} Takemura, \textit{Haishô undô}, 22.

\textsuperscript{93} About forty members of the Asahikawa WCTU, including seven Ainu women, covered all the expenses for these rescue works. But the Union could not raise enough funding to safely escort all prostitutes to Hakodate: some of them were kidnapped by \textit{gorotsuki}, or ruffians, hired by their former keepers, due to insufficient protection. Pierson, “Account of the Asahigawa Kyofukwai Rescue Work,” 300-302.
was also a superintendent of the Rescue Work Section of the Foreign Auxiliary, and she developed an interpretation of temperance activism that emphasized the different cultural environments of Japan and the United States or England.\textsuperscript{94} She argued that Japan did not have the heinous saloon that damaged the latter two countries, but that "\textit{the Japanese Saloon is the Kashizashiki}" (italics original).\textsuperscript{95} Kashizashiki was a room rented for sexual purposes and generally referred to a licensed brothel. Pierson urged that, "against this must we begin our 'Woman's Crusade.'"\textsuperscript{96} She thus reinterpreted the temperance cause, originated and developed in the United States and Great Britain, and gave priority to prostitution issues over alcohol-related problems. Pierson's reinterpretation of the WCTU's mission coincided with the native Unionists' "anti-prostitution-first" strategy.

Other members of the Auxiliary, including the World's WCTU missionary Kara Smart, did not endorse Pierson's ideas. The 1905 annual meeting of the Foreign Auxiliary reaffirmed the "unwavering loyalty to the basic principles of our organization — total abstinence [from alcohol] for both sexes" and decided to "urge upon our Japanese sisterhood a closer adherence to this principle."\textsuperscript{97} This discrepancy over the priorities of the Auxiliary shows that it was far from a monolithic organization that stuck to one cause. Rather, it was split into two factions, the social-purity-first and the

\textsuperscript{94} The assistant superintendent of the Rescue Work Section was J. K. McCauley.
\textsuperscript{95} Ida Goepp Pierson, "To The Rescue!" \textit{Japan Evangelist} 10, no. 11 (November 1903): 369-370.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 370.
temperance-first groups. Members of the former faction, represented by Pierson and McCauley, devoted themselves to abolition of prostitution and to rescue works, while the temperance-first faction promulgated information on the harmful effects of drinking and smoking among children and adults, and pressured railroad companies to adopt non-smoking coaches. These purity and temperance campaigns formed the core activities of the Auxiliary and were reciprocally supported. Those who took the stance of temperance-first often donated money to the Jiaikan, while Pierson attacked Kashizashiki, partially because “this is where the greater part of the drinking of the Nation is done.”

Japanese women also took the initiative in establishing a rescue institution, *Osaka Fujin Hōmu* (Osaka women’s home). The Osaka WCTU, led by Hayashi Utako (1865-1946), created the home in 1907 to serve multiple purposes for needy women, including rescue operations. At the home, Hayashi and her Union colleagues helped women coming to Osaka find decent workplaces and offered lodging and counseling services to those who “needed just a friendly touch, a bit of sympathy.” The home also sheltered prostitutes who had escaped from brothels. Hayashi Utako, the superintendent of the home, was well known as a champion of the anti-registered prostitution campaign in Osaka.

The works of the Osaka Women’s Home reflected a growing consciousness of

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98 Pierson, “To The Rescue!” 370.
100 For the first half of Hayashi’s life, see Kubushiro Ochimi, *Anata wa dare* (Osaka, Makiguchigomei Shoten, 1932), chapter 1.
rescue and rehabilitation work among Japanese women. The home in Osaka, the largest industrial city in Western Japan, made the executives of the national Union in Tokyo feel a sense of "hazukashii (shame)" for their indifference to the Jiaikan rescue home, as if its work were not a part of the WCTU. Although the majority of the native Unionists concentrated on the abolition of licensed prostitution, they became more attentive to rescue work, especially among the local branch members; soon the Kobe, Kyoto, Akita, and Tokyo branches also established women's homes.

Behind the expansion of the rescue work, within the WCTU and beyond, was a changing attitude on the part of government authorities toward registered prostitution. Sakai Futa, a licensed prostitute in Hakodate, opened the door to a new trend of jiyyū haigyō, (freely giving up the trade) by suing her owner for trapping her in the expanding debt that made it impossible for her to obtain freedom. This case went to the Daishin’in (Supreme Court). In 1900 the court handed down a decision that supported Sakazaki and voided the contract between her and her owner on the grounds that it restricted bodily freedom. Ulysses G. Murphy, a Methodist missionary from the United States who was stationed in Nagoya and who sheltered escaped prostitutes, also set legal precedents. The WCTU supported his struggles and paid necessary expenses. One of these cases, over an issue of debt paid in advance, went to the Supreme Court. The court supported the cessation of licensed prostitution, although the 1902 judgment stated that the debt of the original contract should be paid off in full.102

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102 Yoshimi, Baishō no shakaishi, 94-99.
Another incident forced the Japanese government to stop ignoring the abolition movement and take a further step in securing the freedom of licensed prostitutes. When ruffians hired by the brothel keepers attacked and severely wounded a British officer of the Salvation Army on his way to a pleasure district, the government was appalled. The Japanese government was in the process of forming the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and was desperate not to offend Great Britain or damage the Anglo-Japanese relationship. In 1900 it issued new regulations that simplified the process for a licensed prostitute to quit her trade and prohibited anyone from obstructing this process. Consequently, 618 prostitutes in the Yoshiwara pleasure district freed themselves between September and December 1900.

These changing regulations and legal interpretations gave hope to rescue workers. As Pierson stated, “this woman [prostitute] is now at liberty to leave her ‘business’ at will.” However, the intensified backlash from owners of brothels and from those who benefited from licensed prostitution dispelled these optimistic sentiments. As Pierson realized, both licensed and unlicensed prostitutes remained ignorant of such legal and political issues. Their keepers also misled them, telling them that Christian rescue workers would send them to America. Furthermore, as Pierson observed, prostitutes’ sense of *giri* (obligation) to their debt and “fear of vengeance of their keepers and the *gorotsuki* [ruffians]” deterred prostitutes from leaving

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103 For the details of this order, see Itô Hidekichi, *Kōtōka no kanojo no seikatsu*, (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon, 1931; reprint, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1982), 235-238.
105 Pierson, “To the Rescue!” 372.
brothels. Along with ignorance, fear, and a sense of obligation, police collaboration with the keepers hindered prostitutes from following the necessary procedures to obtain their freedom.

The WCTU missionaries also feared violence from the brothel owners and distrusted the police officials, recognizing that many were “still very unwilling to side against the keepers and for the girls.” Pierson therefore gave a pep talk to raise the morale of her fellows. “Don’t be afraid. . . . It is God’s work we are doing, and He is pledged to help us. . . . Don’t fear the police, or the keepers, or the gorotsuki [ruffians], but make them afraid of you” (italics original).

The foe against “God’s work,” however, was a mighty one. After the 1880s, the economic policies for establishing a system of modern capitalism came at the cost of the people’s welfare. The rapid expansion of the military during the 1890s and 1900s to wage the war with Russia devastated numerous farmers and changed their status from landowning farmers to tenants. The number of licensed prostitution houses increased during this period. Various cities attracted newly created army and naval divisions by providing new pleasure districts for servicemen. Thus, military buildup accompanied the growth of licensed quarters. Prostitutes were never in short supply; poverty drove tenant farmers to sell their daughters to brothels.

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108 Pierson, “To the Rescue!” 372.
109 Ibid., 372-373.
110 Fujime Yuki, “Kindai nihon no kōshō seido to haishō undō,” in Jenda no nihonshi (jō): shūkyō to minzoku shintai to seiai, eds. Wakita Haruko and S. B. Hanley (Tokyo: Tokyo
The voice of abolition was drowned out by an empowered prostitution industry that developed its connections with the modern military system. In 1911, the WCTU and the Salvation Army lost their campaign against the rebuilding of the burnt-down Yoshiwara pleasure district. Although Yoshiwara was not connected to the military, the authorities saw it as vital for the Tokyo metropolitan community and immediately approved its reconstruction. The failure of the campaign to prevent the reestablishment of Yoshiwara made the WCTU and the Salvation Army fully realize the necessity of unified work beyond narrow Christian circles. The WCTU, the Salvation Army, and other Christian and non-Christian men and women in influential positions in the domains of politics, journalism, academia, and social reform societies merged and formed a new organization in 1911. They named the society *Kakuseikai* (League for Purifying the Pleasure District). Shimada Saburō, then the president of the *Mainichi Shinbun* (Daily Newspaper), was president, and Yajima Kaji was vice-president. Former Premier Count Ōkuma Shigenobu joined as an adviser. The presence of a former highest-ranking government official gave the society authenticity and authority.111

The formation of *Kakuseikai* showed that the fight against registered adultery, which had found little acceptance in the early Meiji period, now had the endorsement of Japanese citizens outside Christian communities. Strong anti-Christian feelings had gradually lessened by the late Meiji period. Japanese Christians’ expression of

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patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor combined with their wartime collaboration with the government during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) reduced people's skepticism about Christians. McCauley reported in 1911 that some neighbors of the Jiaikan in Ōkubo, once "terrorized" by Christianity, now came to join its evening prayers. Furthermore, parents of the community sent their daughters to sewing and knitting lessons and paid the tuition fees. These students from the neighborhood indicated the growing acceptance of the Jiaikan by the community. The sewing and knitting lessons that the residents had once rebuffed as too "foreign" were now recognized as useful skills that were worth paying for. With the passage of time, Western forms of domesticity were gradually accepted by Japanese society.

**Japanese Women's Work for Japanese Women: the Japanization of Jiaikan**

After McCauley resigned in 1912, Christine Penrod of the Japan Evangelistic Band became supervisor of the Jiaikan. During Penrod's administration, between 1912 and 1920, the number of residents at the Jiaikan expanded rapidly, from about 20 to roughly 100. It also added new buildings, a hospital room, an oven, a laundry, a poultry

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112 Japanese Christians' patriotism and support of Japan's military actions during the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War will be discussed in the following chapter. 113 The *Fujin shinpō*, for instance, carried an article on the instruction of western style cooking using butter, potatoes, and bread in 1914. Since the *Fujin shinpō* was geared toward middle-class urban women, it is hard to imagine that the Japanese in poor rural communities at that time cooked and ate the salmon sandwiches and fried potatoes that this article presented. However, this cooking instruction suggests that the Japanese gradually accepted Western cuisine. Iwamura Yasuko, "Sake no sōzai," *Fujin shinpō*, no. 210 (December 28, 1914): 21.
farm, a vegetable garden, and other facilities. Penrod restored baking lessons and added laundry-work, gardening, sewing, knitting, and raising chickens.\textsuperscript{114} This great institutional development was the result of Penrod's strenuous efforts in fund-raising and management. Soon after assuming the administration of the Jiaikan, she went back to the United States and collected contributions for an extension of its enterprises.

The new project of the rescue home was to separate young women rescued from a “dangerous environment” from “fallen women.”\textsuperscript{115} In other words, the home planned to set daughters of “respectable” families who “strayed from the path of virtue” by becoming pregnant or having illegitimate children apart from former prostitutes.\textsuperscript{116} The new buildings erected with the money Penrod raised accommodated only “respectable” women whose salvation was “relatively easy,” while the old building with its “thatched roof” took in women who “sank in the world of muddy water.”\textsuperscript{117}

The segregation of ex-prostitutes from their “respectable” sisters indicates that the Jiaikan functioned as a vehicle for disgracing and punishing the former group. This discriminatory treatment of former prostitutes reflected the WCTU missionaries' classist view that “respectable and pure” women should not be mixed with


\textsuperscript{115} “Florence Crittenton Rescue Home, Okubo, Tokyo,” \textit{Japan Evangelist} 20, no. 2 (February 1913): 116.


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
ex-prostitutes whose “character-building and salvation of soul were extremely hard.”

They regarded prostitutes as deviants from the Victorian ideology of sexuality, which denied and even despised female sexuality. The new program that separated middle-class women from former prostitutes embodied missionary women's revulsion toward the “promiscuous” sexuality of ex-prostitutes. This rationalization of segregation reflected their ignorance of the interconnecting economic, social, and psychological factors that directly or indirectly pressured women to practice prostitution.

In addition to frowning on the sexuality of ex-prostitutes, Penrod was critical of the sexuality of Japanese men and their consciousness about the issue of prostitution. She frankly expressed her distrust of Japanese men, even lawyers and pastors, in front of her missionary colleagues at a convention held in 1918 in Karuizawa, a mountain resort where foreigners often stayed during the summer.

The rescue work, she argued, should be placed in the charge of missionaries, for it was

118 “Jiaikan no isai,” 20.
119 Yosano Akiko, a famous poet, clamored against the discriminatory treatment of ex-prostitutes by the WCTU. She stated, “they [the Japanese WCTU members] inhumanely despise some of our countrywomen who are prostitutes. . . . For a long time, I have been disgusted at the exclusiveness of their love.” Although the WCTU refuted Yosano’s accusation by stating that the WCTU had never held prostitutes in contempt, their activism did not support this counterargument. Yosano Akiko, “Jiko ni ikiru fujin (1): Ooku no fujin wa keisō no sanbutsu,” in Osaka mainichi shinbun, (June 5, 1920), 3; Nishikiori Kurako, “Kyōfūkai wa keisō no sanbutsu ni arazu: Yosano Akiko joshi ni atau,” Fujin shinpō, no. 275 (July 20, 1920): 4-6. For the relationship between the Japanese WCTU and Yosano Akiko, see Katano Masako, “Fujin Kyōfūkai ni miru haishō undō no shisō: futatabi tennōsei-ka no sei to ningen o megutte,” in Nihon joseishi o josei to shūkyō, ed. Sōgo Joseishi Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Yoshikawakobunkan, 1998), 207-225.
120 “Summary of Discussions at Conference of Federated Missions: Karuizawa, August 4-9, 1918,” Japan Evangelist 25, no. 9 (September 1918): 335.
a “mission problem.” In other words, Penrod trusted only her Western missionary colleagues to work together, dismissing Japanese men as unreliable. Such overt distrust of Japanese men distanced her from the society in which she was stationed and excluded Japanese men from joining the rescue project. Meanwhile, the Japanese Union collected only one sixth to one quarter of the money needed for management of the Jiaikan rescue home, despite repeated fund-raising campaigns. The Japanese women were, in the eyes of Penrod, not very reliable partners for her project.

Moreover, Penrod failed to recognize the gradually changing attitude of the Japanese to the rescue home that occurred in the late 1910s. In particular, a lawsuit filed by Penrod to secure the freedom of Misawa Chiyono in 1917 encouraged the native Union to reconsider its abolition campaign, which excluded rescue works. Her employers duped Misawa, a sixteen-year old girl from a poor family in Yokoyama, into prostitution. The Jiaikan rescued her and brought a suit against Misawa’s former owners. Penrod and the Auxiliary regarded it as a “test case which may mean so much

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121 Ibid.
122 Pascoe reveals that home missionaries who ran the rescue homes often lapsed into racist rhetoric against minority men. Pascoe, Relations of Rescue, 121.
124 The strategy for abolition that Kubushiro Ochimi, the executive of the National Union, planned in 1917, consisted of two elements: the educational movement to arouse public interest and increase the growing sentiments of anti-prostitution, and direct action in opposition to licensed quarters by lobbying the authorities. Her vision did not include extending a helping hand to prostitutes. Kubushiro Ochimi, “Kaiko to tenpō,” Fujin shinpô, no. 238 (May 10, 1917): 5-7.
in the future for unwilling prostitutes all over the [Japanese] Empire."\(^{125}\) Despite Penrod's skepticism about Japanese males, a Japanese male attorney, Nishimura Kan'nosuke of the Kakuseikai, voluntarily represented Misawa.\(^{126}\) The joint case lasted for five years and finally went to the Supreme Court, which finally deemed that this case was too trivial and too common to be addressed.\(^{127}\)

This case, known as "Misawa-jiiken" (the Misawa case), triggered anger among Japanese Union members about the predicament of unwilling prostitutes. Members of the Japanese WCTU became conscious that powerlessness and poverty had more to do with a prostitute's fate than her morality. Gradually, they started thinking seriously that they should work for destitute Japanese women and no longer leave rescue enterprises in the hands of foreigners.

A disagreement over management between Penrod and the native Union members propelled the elimination of missionaries from decision-making positions and the increase of Japanese involvement in management of the Jiaikan. What annoyed the Japanese was Penrod's principle of fund raising: she accepted donations only from Christians and rejected money raised by music concerts or other performances. This policy limited opportunities for the Japanese Union to raise large contributions through fund-raising.\(^{128}\) Moriya Azuma, an executive of the WCTU, observed that the


\(^{127}\) "Hidari Jingoro no saku - Fujinjido Jitsujo Chosaiin raicho to Kyōfūkai," *Fujin shinpō*, no. 400 (July 1931): 20.

\(^{128}\) Moriya, "Jiaikan to nihon kyūsaidan," 10.
Japanese were taking an increasing interest in the Jiaikan and assuming a critical attitude toward its management.129

Much more controversial than the fund-raising problem was the fact that Penrod challenged the interdenominationalism of the WCTU’s constitution. She severed her relations with the Japan Evangelistic Band and joined the Japan Rescue Mission, headquartered in Australia, which promised financing for her rescue mission.130 Since the Japan Rescue Mission did not allow its affiliates to be connected with any other denominations or religious organizations, she had to comply with this policy.

Penrod’s request for affiliating the Jiaikan with the Japan Rescue Mission caused a sensation among both national and foreign missionary constituents of the WCTU, and especially among the Jiaikan’s trustees.131 After repeated discussions and an inquiry to Anna A. Gordon, the president of the World’s WCTU, about the endorsement of the Japanese WCTU’s constitution, the Union rejected Penrod’s request. As a result, Penrod resigned from the WCTU and the directorship of Jiaikan

129 Ibid.
130 Penrod was dissatisfied with her Christian colleagues. After seven years work at the rescue home, she deplored the pitiful contributions from other “major” denominations, both Japanese and Western. Penrod and her two co-workers at the rescue home were from the Japan Evangelistic Band, a British based and relatively small denomination compared with other “major” Protestant denominations of North America. See, Moriya Azuma, “Ōkubo no Jiaikan,” Fujin shinpō, no. 285 (June 10, 1921): 3.

131 In 1903, soon after the Japanese government legalized land ownership for foreigners residing in Japan, the foreign and national members of the WCTU made the Jiaikan a zajidanhōjin (juridical person) and a legally incorporated foundation in 1903. Fourteen trustees consisting of seven Auxiliary and seven national members formed the board of directors. J. K. McCauley, “Rescue Home,” 228; Ayumi, 55-64.
in 1920. She then asked the Union to sell the Jiaikan to the Japan Rescue Mission. The Union again rejected her request, although it allowed Penrod, her staff, and the residents to use Jiaikan property until they moved to a new home in March 1921. 132

Through the controversy over the management and ownership of the Jiaikan, the Japanese WCTU recognized that rescue work had become an integral part of its reform strategy, so that it could not sell Jiaikan. Realizing its significance for the first time during this conflict with Penrod, the Japanese Union decided to install a Japanese superintendent and treasurer to hold the purse strings of Jiaikan. Moriya affirmed:

The more we cry for the abolition of licensed-prostitution and the traffic of prostitutes abroad, the more we need a place to help and rehabilitate such women. . . Japanese women should take the responsibility for the enterprise of Jiaikan! 133

After March 1921, when Penrod moved out with both her co-workers and all the residents, the Jiaikan stood empty. After more than one year's inactivity, it reopened on a smaller scale and was inhabited by only seven women and four infants as of May 1, 1922. Moriya Azuma assumed its directorship. 134 Thereafter, the Union rented the building of Jiaikan to the Tokyo Women's Home, which functioned as a shelter for

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ex-prostitutes and for women who gave birth to children out of wedlock, and as a center for religious training. It also provided counseling services about personal affairs, offered shelter, and found jobs for women who had nowhere to go and no means supporting themselves. Through these activities, the Jiaikan truly became truly integrated into the Japanese WCTU.

The Rising Tide for a Settlement Work among Missionaries

A couple of years before the missionaries of the Foreign Auxiliary completely pulled out of the Jiaikan rescue projects, its Tokyo Circle members became interested in settlement enterprises in a slum district of downtown Tokyo. The prime mover in their new work was John Marle Davis (1875-1960) of the YMCA. He made a speech in front of them revealing the shocking results of his research in slum districts of downtown Tokyo that "one out of every three babies dies down there." This remark "struck fire in the hearts of forty Tokyo women" and urged them to undertake a new project to remedy the hardships of the slums where social problems were most

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135 The American YMCA in Japan was inaugurated in 1889, three years after the creation of the WCTU branches in Japan. As a Christian organization originating in the United States, the YMCA joined the English-speaking Christian community and associated itself with the WCTU. The YWCA Japan was established in 1905 and was presided over by Tsuda Umeko. The YWCA soon developed a close connection with the WCTU. For a detailed history of the American YMCA in Japan, see Jon Thares Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930 (London: Associated University Press, 1998).

concentrated. Soon they formed a Board of Directors with three Japanese members, rented land in Matsukurachō of Honjo Ward, spread straw mats on the ground, erected a straw matting roof for shade, and opened a kindergarten for the children of very poor families in 1919. This small kindergarten was the beginning of the Kōbōkan, or the “Door of Hope” named by Kubushiro Ochimi. The staff members dreamed that the

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137 Ibid. The Hyakunenshi, edited by the Japanese WCTU, explains that the shift of concern from rescue work to the settlement was the result of the Foreign Auxiliary members recognizing their ignorance of prostitution in Japan. When the Auxiliary edited an English pamphlet entitled What is the Geisha to expose the harsh realities of geisha to foreign visitors who had nothing but an idealized image of her, Kubushiro Ochimi pointed out that this brochure included inaccurate descriptions that equated a geisha with a prostitute. The Auxiliary postponed its distribution and decided to correct several mistakes. The Hyakunenshi and Kubushiro’s autobiography on which the Hyakunenshi relied use this controversy as the major indicator of the Foreign Auxiliary’s “shift” of concern. However, before the content of this pamphlet received attention from both foreign and native members of the Union in August 1920, the Kōbōkan had already inaugurated its settlement work as I reveal above. Because of this time lag, I refute the interpretation of Hyakunenshi and Kubushiro. I doubt if there was a drastic “shift” in concern for the Foreign Auxiliary. Even after the pamphlet controversy, its members were very concerned about prostitution problems, and supported the native WCTU in their fight against the licensed prostitution system. The twenty-fourth annual convention of the Foreign Auxiliary, held immediately after the pamphlet controversy, resolved to inform foreign visitors to Japan of the “true status of ‘geisha’ and to abolish the custom of employing ‘geisha’ for the entertainment of foreign guests.” Taking measures to “prevent the export of women for vice purpose” was also included in the resolution. Moreover, the Tokyo circle members of the Auxiliary primarily carried out the settlement work. Therefore, the creation and management of Kōbōkan does not indicate a “shift” of the Foreign Auxiliary’s concern in general. See Yajima Kaji, “Mondai ni natta shozasshi (geisha towa nanzoya)” Fujin shinpō, no. 278 (October 14, 1920): 1-2; Kubushiro Ochimi, “Seiyōjin panfuretto mondai,” Fujin shinpō, no. 279 (November 13, 1920): 4; Mrs. G. P. Pierson, “The twenty-fourth Annual Convention of the Foreign Auxiliary of the W.C.T.U.,” Japan Evangelist 27, no. 12 (December 1920): 346; Kubushiro Ochimi, Haishō hitosuji (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1973), 144; Hyakunenshi, 385-386.


139 Kubushiro, Haishō hitosuji, 144.
Kôbôkan would develop into a “miniature copy of Hull-House by Jane Addams.”

Unlike the Jiaikan rescue home which had operated without any equivalent institution for decades in Japan, the new enterprises of Kôbôkan, or a “Hull-House” in downtown Tokyo, enjoyed strong support from fellow missionary communities. Indeed, the new enterprise of the Tokyo Circle members of the Foreign Auxiliary was a product of a rising tide of settlement work that swept the whole missionary community in those days. Since Japanese society of the Taishô Era (1912-1926) suffered from the negative by-products of rapid industrial development and urbanization, social problems such as poverty, malnutrition, and unsanitary living conditions became concentrated in the expanding slum districts of urban communities. Missionaries living in Japan became highly attentive to these social problems; some of them initiated social scientific investigations into the living conditions of slum districts and initiated social works. William Axling (1873-1963), a U.S. Baptist missionary, for instance, started kindergarten and day-care services in poor districts of Misaki, Tokyo, in 1912. He empirically investigated the working and living conditions in industrial suburbs of Tokyo in 1918, and published the results in the *Japan Evangelist* in 1918. His article strongly urged his fellow missionaries to make pragmatic application of Christianity to

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social and educational reform. 143 John Marle Davis, the “daddy” of the Kōbōkan settlement, also inspected the living conditions of Tokyo’s East side, namely, Honjo, Fukagawa, and Asakusa where slums rapidly developed as the result of post-World War I depression. 144 This research convinced him that these communities desperately needed playgrounds for children, medical services, and educational programs for adults, and mothers in particular. Not satisfied with only publishing his research results, he encouraged missionaries in Japan, including the Tokyo Circle of the WCTU Foreign Auxiliary, to initiate settlement works. Charles B. Olds (1872-1971), an American Board missionary who had lived in Japan since 1903, also inspired missionaries through his essay published in the Japan Evangelist to embark on “religious movement making for social betterment,” primarily through the fight against tuberculosis, alcohol and tobacco consumption, improving sanitation, creating public playgrounds, devising indoor recreation and amusement programs, and opening diet and cooking classes. 145

Obviously, ideas of Axling, Davis, and Olds came from the social welfare ideology of Progressive America that produced “Social Gospel,” the wedding of Christian ethics to the products of social sciences. 146 Inspired by the English

146 Before conducting his research in downtown Tokyo, Davis visited the Palama
settlements such as Toynbee Hall in East London, Jane Addams and other Americans started their own settlements that closely linked "theory and practice, the personal and the political, facts and values, experience and experimentation" in the United States. The men and women who ran the settlement movement in the United States adopted new social scientific approaches to social problems, made empirical investigations of living and working conditions, and emphasized environmental causes of poverty. By embracing the idea of reciprocity between the middle-class and needy people, settlement workers attempted to break down the class differences and build trans-class interactions. Unlike charity workers who stressed individual causes of poverty, settlement workers focused on the social and economic conditions that made certain people poor, and attempted to eliminate poverty rather than simply comforting the least privileged.

This attitude toward poverty inevitably challenged the existing Settlement in Honolulu that practiced educational, recreational, health and hygiene programs among people of multi-ethnic groups. The Palama Settlement evolved from the Palama Chapel and was opened by Central Union Church in 1896. From then on, the Palama Settlement pioneered the public health and nursing program in Hawai‘i; distributed pasteurized milk; developed adult education and citizenship classes; and provided camping, recreation, family planning, and sports programs. For his impression of the Palama Settlement, see Davis, "Tōkyōshi ni okeru hinmin jōkyō shokan," 8-9. For the Palama Settlement, see Palama Settlement House (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, Hawaiian Collection); Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, eds, Handbook of Settlements (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1970), 303. For general information about "Social Gospel," see Mina Carson, Settlement Folk: Social Thought and the American Settlement Movement, 1885-1930 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 11-15.


148 Davis, American Heroine: 74; Allan F. Davis, Spearheads for Reform: The Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement 1890-1914 (New Brunswick: Rutgers
economic and social arrangements. The new social settlement movements rapidly spread throughout the nation. By 1910, the number of settlements expanded to more than four hundred.

The wave of settlement movements in the United States reached Japan by the late 1910s. The formation of large slums in urban areas compelled the missionaries to search for pragmatic solutions in addition to providing spiritual salvation to destitute people, and the settlement work in the U.S. seemed like a good model. However, they did not completely agree with the new trend of social reforms in the United States. Charles B. Olds, for instance, expressed his regret for the recent professionalization and secularization of settlement works. While Hull-House and other major settlements were nondenominational and culturally pluralistic, many settlements in smaller cities were affiliated with churches. Around the 1920s, however, the training sites for settlement workers were shifted to schools, often graduate school programs, and the major focus of social work was changed from reforming the community as an organic unity to psychiatric counseling and the individual adjustment of "clients." This


149 Some scholars point out that settlements in the United States assigned the lower classes a passive role dependent on the leadership of Anglo-Saxon middle and upper-middle class settlement workers. The settlement leaders aimed to discipline and modernize the urban poor, disarm the working-class of their class-consciousness and hostility toward the mainstream element of society through educational, social, and cultural programs and promote communication between different classes. The activism at Hull-House was an atypical phenomenon and not representative of the general settlement enterprises in the United States. See Rivka Shpak Lissak, Pluralism and Progressives: Hull House and the New Immigrants, 1890-1919 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 19-24.

150 Davis, Spearheads for Reform, 12.


152 For the professionalization of settlement work, see Davis, American Heroine, 275; Davis,
trend of professionalization and the reduction of crusading enthusiasm in social reform work back in the United States frustrated Olds. He asserted,

It would be a great misfortune to the cause of Christ if the church should repeat in Japan the mistake made in America of allowing a social movement that is non-Christian, sometimes anti-Christian, to grow.¹⁵³

Five months after the appearance of Olds' article, the eighteenth annual meeting of the Conference of Federated Missions in Japan held in Karuizawa resolved that all missions in all centers were “urged to undertake either jointly or individually the establishing of social settlements or community houses with accompanying programs within the next years.”¹⁵⁴ A fund-raising campaign to build a modern social settlement in the Honjo slums by the Foreign Auxiliary of the WCTU attracted the attention of conference attendants, since this enterprise epitomized the will of the Protestant missionary community.¹⁵⁵ Reflecting on the “mistakes” of professionalism and de-Christianization of settlement work in the United States, the Protestant community in Japan determined to strive as a body to fight against social problems while embracing Christianity and the original principle of the settlement to become good “neighbors” of needy people. Before and after the conference, the missionaries

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
established settlement houses one after another primarily in highly industrialized cities, such as Tokyo and Osaka.\textsuperscript{156}

When the missionaries embarked on new social reform work, Japanese Christians also established settlement houses. Leading Christians, such as Katayama Sen and Kagawa Toyohiko, established settlements in downtown Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka. The settlement movements influenced non-Christian Japanese who were concerned about the problems of poverty. The movements went beyond a narrow Christian community and were widely accepted by socially conscious people in Japan.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, the tiny enterprises of the Kōbōkan settlement seized the current of the times in the Christian and non-Christian social reform communities. Although the American WCTU had settlement houses, the Frances E. Willard Settlement in Boston, for instance, the Tokyo Circle of the Auxiliary rarely referred to these WCTU institutions.\textsuperscript{158} They did not have to do so, since they could receive much more influence and support from other settlement colleagues in Japan.

The Nascent Stage of the Kōbōkan Settlement

Settlements in the United States primarily served immigrants who had poured into the United States since the late nineteenth century and formed poor

\textsuperscript{156} Kōbōkan, \textit{Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue}, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 14-26; Sheldon Garon, \textit{The State and Labor in Modern Japan} (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 25.
\textsuperscript{158} For the enterprises of the Frances E. Willard Settlement, see Woods and Kennedy, \textit{Handbook of Settlement}, 132.
communities in urban industrialized cities. The settlement workers saw their role as “interpreters” between the alien culture and the natives who felt they were being entrenched by the former. Jane Addams wrote, “Hull-House ought to be able to devise some educational enterprise which should build a bridge between European and American experiences in such ways as to give them both more meaning and a sense of relation.” By innovating new conceptions of cultural pluralism that praised the diverse culture of immigrants, Addams attempted to build a bridge between immigrants and Americans.

Contrary to its American model, the settlement in Japan worked for its native people; the potential “neighbors” of the settlement did not have to acquire American culture and language to cross over the bridge to be incorporated into mainstream society. Various cultural and language programs that settlements in the United States devised to help neighbors of foreign origin to get out of poor living conditions were not necessary for the impoverished Japanese. It was, as in the case of rescue work, foreign missionaries that had to overcome cultural and language barriers and cross the bridge that separated them from the Japanese.

The Tokyo Circle of the Foreign Auxiliary members offered kindergarten and day-care services on straw-mats, and later, at a small rented building a short distance from the leased land. However, they were still not sure how they could effectively

159 Carson, Settlement Folk, 53.
161 Walser, “The Door of Hope,” 92; World Woman’s Christian Temperance Union White
reach the needy Japanese in slum districts, and how missionary women, most of whom were American and Canadian nationals, should gain access to Japanese children. Charles B. Olds put forward a suggestion to solve such problems. He urged the missionaries to train and trust the Japanese leadership so as to make their settlements more acceptable to the Japanese. In his essay published two months before the opening of the Kōbōkan, Olds stated:

The Japanese can be expected to take up suggestions quickly and become leaders in the work of reform. . . . We may expect them soon to pass beyond the need of our assistance in inaugurating social movements . . . .

Olds suggested that the missionaries assume a supporting role and focused on nurturing Japanese leaders rather than dominating the social reform themselves. The management of settlements by the Foreign Auxiliary followed this direction.

The prominence of Japanese workers at the Kōbōkan's enterprise also facilitated the settlement's hospitable reception by the neighborhood. Unlike the Jiaikan rescue work which remained under foreign directorship for a long period, the Kōbōkan put the Japanese in a position to come in direct contact with people in the community from the very beginning. It was a Japanese woman who directly ran the "straw-mat" kindergarten. She took the responsibility to "call upon the families of the neighborhood, and to hold various meetings in the rented building." During summer of 1921, young female students of missionary schools volunteered to tell stories and

*Ribbon Bulletin* (February 1924).

163 Walser, "The Door of Hope," 92.
teach songs and games to one hundred fifty to two hundred children. Meanwhile, the Tokyo Circle of the Foreign Auxiliary confined their contributions to financial aspects and advisory roles instead of dominating the work. Such attitudes of missionary women alleviated the anxiety of parents to leave their children in a new institution's care.

This pattern of interactions with the Japanese of the Kōbōkan missionaries indicates a significant change from the previous distrust of the Japanese leadership and the domination of the administration at the Jiaikan rescue home. Unlike the racial ideology of late-Victorian America that heavily influenced the management of rescue work, the Kōbōkan developed simultaneously with the advent of pragmatic approaches that argued for the "horizontal linkage of persons" and challenged top-down approaches to solving social problems. The missionary members of the new settlement avoided taking drastic "top-down" approaches with the Japanese and let the Japanese staff members directly interact with the local community as much as possible.

The Kōbōkan's enterprises also received the endorsement of Robert Woods, one of the pioneering settlement leaders in the United States and founder of Andover House in Boston (South End House after 1895). During his stay in Japan in 1919, he delivered an address at the monthly meeting of the Tokyo Circle. His remarks were "listened to with keen interest" by "a large number of the members." In his speech, he emphasized the importance of reaching children first, because the child was the key to

opening the door to a family and gaining access to the housewife, a key figure of a household. In addition to suggesting this reach-children-first policy, Woods encouraged the Tokyo Circle to start its settlement work “on a small scale.” The expansion of the settlement, he argued, would be accompanied with the growth of the community. In the eyes of Wood, the nascent “Kōbōkan” was on the right track; it started its work by approaching children on a small scale.

The previous social work in the Honjo community undertaken by the Salvation Army and other Christian groups also made the Kōbōkan enterprise acceptable to its neighbors. The Salvation Army established a temporary shelter for poor individuals in 1906 in Hanachō, Honjo. Other Christian organizations also ran similar facilities in the first decade of the decade of the 20th century. In 1915, the Salvation Army created a settlement called “Airinkan” (Love of Neighborhood Home), and devised social reform programs including offering libraries for children, Sunday school, religious speech, home visits, and counseling services. The Airinkan functioned effectively until it moved out to a different place in 1929. For the residents of Honjo, social reform works by Christian organizations were neither new nor strange. In addition to the pioneering work of Airinkan, the people’s receptivity and open-mindedness toward outsiders enabled the smooth inauguration of settlement work by the WCTU missionaries.

167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
Despite mutual support and consideration among Honjo residents, the community hardly had the healthy family life that the middle-class embraced. The high mortality rate of children that John Marle Davis revealed indicated the harshness of poverty in the community. Those people who entrusted their children to the settlement's care were so destitute that they even requested all-day care.\footnote{Gauntlett, "Kōbōkan Setorumento nijūnen kinen," 22-23.} If these needy parents were freed from the responsibilities of taking care of small children, they could devote themselves to work. The large attendance at the day nursery and kindergarten impressed the staff members with the desperate need of the neighborhood.\footnote{Walser, "The Door of Hope," 92.} In contrast to the state-sponsored ideology of "good wife, wise mother" that expected women to be full-time care-takers of future citizens and home-managers relying on financial support from male family members, poor urban men and women took for granted women's participation in income-labor or family enterprise to make ends meet.\footnote{As noted in the first chapter, it was Ministry of Education officials that made "good wife, wise mother" the core of women's education, and diffused this idea primarily through education at the higher girls' schools at the turn of the 20th century. The Ministry of Education also used books and magazine articles to disseminate the new ideology of womanhood. However, working-class women rarely attended the higher girls' schools and read women's magazines. Therefore, the notion of "good wife, wise mother" was not disseminated evenly among middle-class and working-class women. The Ministry of Home Affairs recognized that lower-class mothers could not abandon productive work to concentrate exclusively on domestic chores and unwaveringly supported day-care. The state's definitions of womanhood were ambiguous. See Kathleen S. Uno, \textit{Passages to Modernity: Motherhood, Childhood, and Social Reform in Early Twentieth Century Japan} (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 145-147.} Day-care services alleviated the parental burdens of child-care and expedited their jobs.
Furthermore, the customary acceptance of multiple caregivers of children helped smooth the expansion of Kōbōkan's child-care programs. The Japanese of the early modern period, regardless of class, accepted a wide range of kin and non-kin household members as caregivers for children. Unlike the Victorian ideology of womanhood that emphasized the maternal role of women, the Japanese often entrusted children in the hands of various ie, or household members that consisted of not only a kin group of multiple generations but also servants and apprentices. Mothers of poor and ordinary households were not the sole caregivers of infants and small children. Her involvement in agriculture, sales and management, manufacturing and wage-work left little time for child-care. The retired household head, senior wives, older children, servants, apprentices, and wet nurses hired by rich families shared child-care responsibilities. Fathers were not excluded from childcare; rather, they took responsibility of socializing male children. This existence of multiple caregivers for children made it easier for people to accept day-care institutions.\textsuperscript{174}

The strategies that the Kōbōkan settlement adopted, aggressive recruitment and the use of Japanese as service providers, practical advice from missionary fellows as well as from the leading figure of settlement movements in the United States, the pioneering reform and religious work of the Salvation Army in the same community in which the Kōbōkan stood, the sense of humanity and tolerance of the Honjo residents, and child rearing customs of the working-class Japanese enabled its instant acceptance

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 19-36, 132-136, and 139-140.
by the neighbors. First of all, parents who suffered from harsh poverty had no choice but to leave their small children in someone else's care and did not have the luxury to reject foreign Christians. Although the Kōbōkan in those days did not even have a building, its service perfectly met the demands of its neighbors. Unlike the Jiaikan that took several decades before being accepted by the community, the Kōbōkan was able to gain immediate acceptance.

**Typhoon and Earthquake: An Ordeal of the Newborn Kōbōkan**

The settlement work of the Tokyo Circle had been extremely smooth. The day-care service was always filled up with applicants. The enterprises of the Kōbōkan soon expanded to offer sewing and reading classes to housewives and female factory workers. As Robert Woods suggested, the settlement first reached out to children and then to their mothers and sisters. Meanwhile, the matron and nurses went around the slum districts, consulted needy people and took care of the sick. Through these works, the staff members gradually won trust in the community. 175

The Board of Directors of the Kōbōkan purchased the adjacent land to accommodate its expanding work. 176 In addition to fundraising by both foreign and native members of the WCTU, the Tokyo Circle raised money by sales of candy, pencils,
tea and cakes. Furthermore, they convinced their friends, industrialists, and government offices of the significance of the projected social programs, and succeeded in receiving financial support from them. With these funds, the Tokyo Circle centered all attention on the “great and ultimate object, the presenting of a modern well-equipped home” to the Kōbōkan.

However, the project soon confronted its first severe trial. In May 1923, a typhoon completely shattered the framework of the building and yielded “a setback of 7,000 yen to the project.” Thanks to support from various sources, the Settlement soon recovered from the disaster. However, a much more serious tragedy was in store for the Kōbōkan. The day after the building was completed, the Great Kanto Earthquake destroyed it and reduced all of its contents to ashes, at a cost of 60,000 yen. The

178 In April 1922, the Ministry of Home Affairs granted the Kōbōkan project 20,000 yen. Tokyo-fu (prefecture) promised regular help in maintaining the work. The City of Tokyo and Honjo Ward promised to give more than 10,000 yen respectively. The largest gift of 5,000 yen came from Baron Mitsui, a powerful zaibatsu industrialist. See Mrs. A. M. Pinsent, “Report of the Foreign Auxiliary John 3: 26-38,” Fujin shinpo, no.308 (June 1923): 3; “Prohibition and Purity the Main Objectives of the Foreign Auxiliary of the W.C.T.U. Japan,” 7.
179 Covell, “Twenty Years in Tokyo’s East Side – the Kobokan,” 252. Furuhashi Ryūtarō, a Christian architect, designed the building with modern equipment.
180 The headman, chairman, vice-chairman, and other officials of Honjo Ward recognized the necessity of Kōbōkan for the sake of the working-class residents. Soon after the devastation of the typhoon, they circulated a prospectus for its support. Covell, “Twenty Years in Tokyo’s East Side – the Kobokan,” 252; “Kōbōkan kensetsu josei shushisho,” quoted in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 81-82.
181 Sato Matsuko, “Gaijinbukai no doryoku de Kōbōkan shinshiku naru,” Fujin shinpo, no. 381 (December 1, 1929): 44. The building destroyed by the earthquake had the following facilities: kindergarten classrooms, offices, a medical clinic and a drugstore, a waiting room, a reading and rest room, a dining room, a kitchen, a food depository, a bathroom, a laundry, a classroom for manner lessons, a sewing room, a room for expectant mothers, a day-care
The earthquake had struck a deadly blow to Tokyo, Kanagawa, and other neighboring cities; more than 120,000 houses were destroyed, 450,000 houses were completely burnt, and more than 140,000 people were dead or missing. The Japanese WCTU also suffered considerably; its headquarter building in Akasaka, a central part of Tokyo, was completely burnt. Yajima Kaji took refuge in the surviving Jiaikan Rescue Home in Ôkubo. The Japanese WCTU was fully occupied with rescue work for the victims of the earthquake and the reconstruction of its own facilities; little time was left to spare for the Kôbôkan. Thereby, the Tokyo Circle members were left to their own resources without possible financial support from the national Union. Isabella S. Blackmore (1863-1942), a Canadian Methodist missionary, assumed leadership in the critical years of the Kôbôkan. She sold her summer cottage in Karuizawa and contributed 5,800 yen, all of its proceeds, to restart the interrupted enterprises. Her sacrifice inspired the board members, and encouraged them to rise up from the ashes and participate in the reconstruction.\textsuperscript{183} They built a temporary shelter with lumber received from Tokyo prefectural government, and opened day-care and kindergarten service on December 1, three months after the disaster. In October 1924, the Ministry of

\footnotesize{room, and a dormitory for teachers. These facilities indicate the large scope of projected works. See, Esu Emu, “Shôshitsu sita Kôbôkan,” Fujin shinpô, no. 311(October 1923): 32.\textsuperscript{182} Due to the loss of the building, the financial support of a total of 40,000 yen from Tokyo-fu and Honjo Ward that was supposed to cover construction fees was cancelled. The sum of 40,000 yen thus turned into the amount of debts. See “Hojokin shinseisho tenpu,” 83-84.\textsuperscript{183} Covell, “Twenty Years in Tokyo’s East Side – the Kobokan,” 252.
Home Affairs granted the Kōbōkan 50,000 yen. This money cleared off all the debt.

For the next six years, the Kōbōkan operated in barracks. As of October 25, 1924, all fifteen members of the Board, who were all single missionary women and the wives of missionaries from various denominations, concentrated on the reconstruction of the building. This project, however, proceeded with difficulty because of a lack of funds and the rezoning of land by the government. After the earthquake, the government promoted the replanning of the devastated capital on a large scale. The drastic readjustment of town lots was expected to reduce the property of the Kōbōkan. The earthquake also brought demographic changes in communities surrounding the Kōbōkan. Many residents of Honjo Ward who lost their homes moved to the less-damaged Mukōjima Ward, next to Honjo. Soon Mukōjima quickly developed slum districts formed by refugees who poured in from contiguous communities. With such demographic shift, the Kōbōkan changed its original plan of remaining in the same place and prepared to move to Terajimachō of Mukōjima Ward.

The great earthquake also brought changes in consciousness among the missionaries. It raised their awareness about work for social improvement and mobilized them to join the Foreign Auxiliary; its membership expanded from 250 in 1920 to 384 in 1925. In the next year, 1926, the Auxiliary reorganized itself:

184 "Hojokin Shinseisho Tenpu," 84.
187 J. S. Kennard, “Zainippon gaijinbukai,” Fujin shinpō, no. 328 (June 1, 1925): 34.
membership that had been divided into various “circles” was reorganized into two sections, the Kansai·bu (the western section) and the Kantō·bu (the eastern section). The reorganized Kanto·bu of the Auxiliary, empowered with new membership, strenuously engaged in fund-raising campaigns for a new settlement property. In 1928, the Kōbōkan purchased land with 647 tsubo in a “needier district” of Terajimachi. A barrack built on the newly purchased lot offered nursery and kindergarten services and medical treatments to its neighbors by volunteer doctors and nurses from St. Luke’s Hospital.

In the following year, 1927, a new building was completed. The long-sought Kōbōkan building was a two-story concrete-reinforced building with a modern, Western exterior (fig. 25). The splendid appearance of the new building standing in the middle of the shabby slum seemed out of place to most of its neighbors and gave them the false impression that it was a “hotel.” Nevertheless, they gathered at the Kōbōkan for its opening ceremony on November 16 and voluntarily assisted its guests. Among the

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189 Satō, “Gaijinbukai no doryoku de Kōbōkan shinchiku naru,” 44.
190 Rudolf Bolling Teusler (1876-1934), a young American missionary doctor of the Protestant Episcopal Church, established St. Luke’s Hospital in Tokyo. From the very beginning, the hospital encouraged philanthropic works based on Christianity. Since 1923, the doctors and nurses of the hospital offered health consultation services to pregnant women and children in Fukagawa and Asakusa districts upon the request of the City of Tokyo. When the Kōbōkan opened its daycare service in 1928, it collaborated with the St. Luke’s Hospital and inaugurated medical service with its doctors and nurses. Kōbōkan, *Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue*, 85-86; Ichibangase Yasuko, et al., *Gendai shakai fukushi ron* (Tokyo: Gakubunsha, 1982), 113.
191 Furuhashi Rūtarō designed it again.
193 Working-class residents of the Nankatsu region, including the city wards of Honjo,
guests was Satō Matsuko from the national WCTU, who reported the ceremony to *Fujin shinpō*. Her article briefly explained its history on behalf of “most of the readers who were not familiar with the Kōbōkan.” Satō noticed that the newer members of the Union, including herself, did not know “the old days of the WCTU” and had “little or no concern about the Kōbōkan.” Her words reveal that the settlement project since the Great Kanto Earthquake had been exclusively carried out in the hands of the Foreign Auxiliary, especially its Tokyo members. In addition to overcoming disastrous experiences and completing the construction of the building, these missionaries had already accumulated additional money and made a 5,000 yen deposit. Far from being satisfied with this achievement, they harbored an ambition to inaugurate a handicraft industry so that the settlement could achieve economic independence and not have to rely on contributions. Their “sense of victory pervaded the service of dedication,” and their enthusiasm overwhelmed Satō.

The glorious new Kōbōkan building might have attracted the neighbors’

Fukagawa, and the adjacent villages and towns of Minami Katsushika County were never silent victims of the economic exploitation of labor and poverty. Rather, they collectively worked for “social respect and belongings, for equality, for the radical transformation of society, [and they] secured a small portion of their demands in changed treatment at work and broader political participation.” Their constant participation in labor movements and support for political parties representing the interests of the working-class indicates that they functioned as significant elements of Japan’s imperial democracy. The support of the Kōbōkan by the neighborhood community seems to reflect their will to improve their lives. See Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, 331; Hastings, *Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937*, chapters 5 and 6.

194 Satō, “Gaijinbukai no doryoku de Kōbōkan shinchiku naru,” 44.
195 Ibid.
attention and caused curiosity. Yet, its Western exterior with modern equipment did not mirror the daily lives of the surrounding community at all. About ten percent of all the population in Terajimachō were factory workers.\(^{197}\) Post-World War I economic fluctuations were felt most keenly in the cities.\(^{198}\) In addition, the influence of the Great Depression that occurred in the United States hit Japan's economy harshly and devastated people's lives in the slum district. The results of investigations conducted by the city and prefectural government of Tokyo in the least privileged community of East Tokyo in the 1930s revealed that a large number of the residents surrounding the Kōbōkan lived in appallingly unsanitary conditions, "the level of which was completely beyond description."\(^{199}\) They lived in crowded houses built on marshy grounds that were slightly above sea level. Drains in this area were full of dirty water from factories that constantly emitted a nauseating odor. Because of such geographical conditions, heavy rains frequently triggered floods and scattered polluted water, including human waste overflowing from cesspools. Such a harsh living environment resulted in a high infant mortality rate; in 1934, the community had 1,078 births, of which 116 were stillbirths

\(^{197}\) The community offered its workforce to various plants of rubber, ironwork, soap, medicine, cosmetics, spinning, fertilizer tanneries, slaughterhouse and other animal-related industries. Terajimachō and nearby towns were industrial areas with numerous large and small factories. The City and Prefectural Governments of Tokyo, "Tokyo-shi, fu shakaikyoku chōsahōkokusho," quoted in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshi-mi Shizue, 87-95; Hastings, Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937, 124-129.

\(^{198}\) Hastings, Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937, 36-38.

\(^{199}\) The Municipal office of Tokyo, "Terajima shiminkan o chūshinto suru kankyō chōsa," quoted in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshi-mi Shizue, 96.
and another 285 resulted in infant death.\textsuperscript{200} Despite the desperate necessity for medical treatment, 1,456 residents shared only one doctor. Meanwhile, the Azabu district, an exclusive residential district of Tokyo, had one doctor per 776 residents.\textsuperscript{201}

It was no wonder why the elegant Western style building of the Kōbōkan standing in the middle of shabby slums gave its nearby residents the false impression that it was a "hotel." This building symbolized enlightened middle-class life shaped by Western ethics and religion, knowledge and experiences of modern social sciences, including education, nutrition, domestic skills, hygiene, and medical science. By introducing the latest fruits of Western civilization and modernization in the middle of the shabby community, the staff members expected the new building to function as a medium to narrow the gap between its poor neighbors and the middle-class communities.

Japanese bureaucrats did not remain indifferent to the negative by-products of modernization. Since they believed there was an inexorable relationship between economic conditions and social order, the bureaucrats investigated the economic conditions of the urban poor and tried to improve them by cooperating with private reform organizations. Their collaboration with the missionaries at the Kōbōkan suggests that they were more interested in providing social services than in restricting religious thought.\textsuperscript{202} The ongoing financial support from the governmental offices to the

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{202} Hastings, \textit{Neighborhood and Nation in Tokyo, 1905-1937}, 199.
settlement inevitably brought the government officials representing the City and Prefectural Governments of Tokyo, and the Vice-Grand Steward of the Imperial Household Agency, to its opening ceremony.\textsuperscript{203} Their presence reflected the increasing concern for social problems and enthusiasm for settlement work of the authorities they represented. However, the government officials only supplemented and never replaced private reformers.\textsuperscript{204} The Great Kanto Earthquake triggered the expansion of settlement institutions, but it was private bodies that led the development of social work enterprises.\textsuperscript{205} As of 1929, Japan had ninety-seven settlement institutions; eighty of them were under the management of religious groups, hōjin or corporative bodies, university students and faculties, individuals and other private groups, while only seventeen of them were under public management.\textsuperscript{206}

As the small number of governmental social institutions indicates, the Japanese government did not develop a social security system in the 1930s despite the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{205} For the numerical expansion of settlements since the Great Kanto Earthquake, see Ikeda Yoshimasa, \textit{Nihon shakaifukushi-shi} (Kyoto: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 1986), 581-582; Kōbōkan, \textit{Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue}, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{206} Ikeda, \textit{Nihon shakaifukushi-shi}, 582. Among various private individuals and organizations, \textit{Chūō Shakaijigyō Kyōkai} (the Central Social Work Association), a semi-governmental organization of scholars, government officials, and private relief specialists, played the leading role in promoting social welfare and social work. The Association was originally organized as \textit{Chūō Jizen Kyōkai} (Central Charity Work Association) in 1908. Influenced by the rising labor and other social movements and the ideology and practice of social work in the United States, the Association was reorganized into \textit{Chūō Shakaijigyō Kyōkai} (Central Social Work Association) in 1921. See, Ikeda, \textit{Nihon shakaifukushi-shi}, 519-520; Ichibangase Yasuko, “Shakaijigyō no seiritsu, tenkai, henshitsu,” in \textit{Kōza shakaifukushi 2: Shakaifukushi no rekishi}, eds. Takashima Susumu and Ichibangase Yasuko (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1981), 43.
\end{footnotesize}
economic devastation caused by the Great Depression. Progressive bureaucrats in the Social Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs and urban politicians in Kenseikai/Minseitō Party already developed an instrumental vision of social policy between World War I and 1923 and aimed to stabilize the social order through national health insurance, a stronger factory law, unemployment insurance, and a union bill. However, they lacked the political clout to implement these plans. The first law creating public aid to the needy passed the Diet in 1928, but it was full of loopholes and far from sufficient to meet the needs of the poor. Nevertheless, the government neglected to appropriate enough funding for the enforcement of the law. It was in 1932 that the government finally put the law into action, ostensibly upon the “request” of the Emperor.

The involvement of the Emperor in the first public aid law signaled that Japan’s welfare policy was developed from a strong sense of benevolence, especially that of the Emperor. Since the Meiji period, the government had used the Emperor to confront social issues by treating him as a source of moral virtue and associating him


\[208\] The perfunctory attitude of the government irritated the Central Social Work Association, leading to take drastic action. In 1927, Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931), a philanthropist and one of the major architects of Japanese modern capitalism, presided over the Association. He left his sickbed and led the Central Social Work Association to directly appeal to the Ministry of Home Affairs, but such action did not succeed in achieving his goals. Irritated by the unenthusiastic reaction of the Ministry, the Association directly appealed to Emperor Hirohito who ascended to the throne in 1927. Astonished at such action, the government granted this appeal. Ichibangase, “Shakaijigyo no seiritsu, tenkai, henshitsu,” 60-63.

with benevolence. The establishment of a relief association with an imperial grant and private funds, frequent charitable donations to victims of natural disasters and social institutions, including hospitals, the Red Cross, orphanages, and patriotic associations, were public statements of imperial concerns about social issues. The government attempted to meet social threats, such as socialism, with token social relief from the imperial institution. 210

This paternalistic, top-down ideology of charity was symbolically expressed as the mercy of the Imperial Family and was incorporated into the works of Kōbōkan via imperial gift. 211 After the completion of the new building, money kept coming from both the Imperial House and the Keifukukai (Auspicious and Fortune Society) Foundation, established by the Imperial Household on the occasion of the wedding of the Crown Prince in January 1924. 212 In 1939, Prince P’u Chieh, the young brother of the Emperor of “Manchukuo,” and his Japanese wife, Hiro, visited the Kōbōkan, and sent shikishi.


212 The Imperial Household offered 300 yen to the Kōbōkan on Kigensetsu, or the National Foundation Day in 1937 and 1938. “Minutes of Kobokan Board,” February 17th, 1937; “Minutes of Kobokan Board, “February 16th, 1938.
square of cardboard with calligraphy, cakes and toys to the children.213

In addition to royal money and visitors, financial aid from the municipal, prefectural, and national governments, zaibatsu industrialists played a vital role in the reconstruction of buildings and expansion of settlement enterprises.214 The Japanese business community had remained remarkably hostile to the progressive factory registration law demanded by the labor union movement. Instead of granting better working conditions or higher wages, the business leaders believed that the solution lay in reemphasizing the paternalistic philosophy and traditional values of mutual cooperation between capital and labor. The zaibatsu's financial support to the settlement symbolized such principle of harmony and conciliation.215 The acceptance of aid from the Imperial Household, government agencies, and zaibatsu industrialists contradicted the founding principle of the Kōbōkan, "To help the neediest to help themselves."216 This original purpose to work for self-reliance and to develop an autonomous consciousness in the community was analogous to the ideology and practice of Jane Addams whose Hull-House functioned as a center for the improvement of living

213 Minutes of Kobokan Board,” March 9th, 1939, Kobokan Collection. Prior to the royal visit, the Kōbōkan accepted two “Manchurian” students studying social work, for one week training. “Minutes of Kobokan Board,” November 10th, 1938.
214 By 1939, the settlement received contributions of 3,500 yen from the Imperial Household Department, 39,000 yen from the Keifukukai Foundation, and 72,700 yen from the Ministry of Home Affairs including the Red Cross. The Settlement also asked zaibatsu-related foundations for assistance and obtained grants from Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo-related foundations that paid 11,800 yen, 6,800 yen, and 2,100 yen respectively. “Kobokan Settlement 1919-1939.”
conditions and enriching the souls of needy people, formulating legislative proposals, and lobbying for various protective laws for women, children, and workers. Addams even allowed the House to be used as a meeting place for labor unions and nurtured autonomous leadership in the community.

In sharp contrast, the Hull-House of downtown Tokyo discouraged the working-class from raising their class-consciousness and challenging the status quo of social, economic, and political arrangements. The frequent support from bureaucrats and industrialists to the Kōbōkan reflected their concern for the enhancement of efficiency in labor, the promotion of social control, the achievement of social stability, and preventing the spread of communism. In other words, they expected social reform institutions to serve empire building and the sound development of industry. The ostensible benevolence of the Imperial family and the industrialists inhibited those who received the aid from comprehending the “close connection of their own difficulties with national and even international movements” that Jane Addams promoted.217 Such a unilateral, non-horizontal relationship between the merciful gift-givers and their compliant receivers had the potential to transform the character of the Kōbōkan into an institute for philanthropy and betray its original purpose.218 The list of attendants from government agencies at its opening ceremony symbolized these characteristics of

217 Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull-House*, 152.
218 Ikeda, *Nihon shakaifukushi-shi*, 583-584. Jane Addams visited Japan in 1923. Her primary purpose of this trip was to form a women’s peace association. Soon after leaving Japan, the Great Kanto Earthquake destroyed many records of her speeches. Unfortunately, no documents conveying her impression of “Hull-House” in downtown Tokyo survived.
Hull-House in downtown Tokyo.219

Yoshimi Shizue and the Development of the Kōbōkan

In front of the approximately one hundred attendants at the opening ceremony of the new Kōbōkan, Yoshimi Shizue made a speech as its first Japanese superintendent. In September 1929, two months prior to the ceremony, Yoshimi succeeded the foreign missionaries as superintendent. From then on, she mediated between the privileged people and the working-class, the government agencies and the private social reformers, and the foreign missionaries and the Japanese. At the new modern building, she devised various programs to meet the immediate demands of neighbors. As Hull-House depended on the personal magnetism of Jane Addams for its survival and success, Yoshimi's personality contributed to the establishment of the Kōbōkan.220

Since the Great Kanto Earthquake, the missionaries had concentrated not only on the reconstruction of the settlement building but also on "the selection of a competent

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219 Sheldon Garon argues that many middle-class women's groups who committed themselves to moral reform, education, philanthropy, and women's suffrage cooperated with and even urged the bureaucracy in its programs of social improvement. By so doing, the middle-class women's activists expected to expand the sphere of women into public arenas and obtain political influence and power. State officials and local authorities also sought to integrate women into public roles to solve social problems and strengthen the Japanese state and society. According to Garon's explanation, the collaborative relations between the Kōbōkan and state and local governments followed patterns of other women's reformists and suffrage groups. Sheldon Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese States: Contending Approaches to Political Integration, 1890-1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19, no. 1 (1993): 5-41.

220 For the importance of a leader's personality to the success and survival of a settlement house, including Hull-House, see Carson 56-57.
superintendent."\textsuperscript{221} However, the board members had not decided yet whether they
would install a Japanese or foreign superintendent.\textsuperscript{222} Although the Kōbōkan
missionaries avoided dominating the social reform themselves, it should also be noted
that the directorship of the settlement remained in hands of missionaries until 1927.
They had not installed a Japanese superintendent until they found and trained an
appropriate Japanese native. Mary D. MacDonald, an American Presbyterian
missionary, approached Yoshimi Shizue, then teaching Japanese language to
missionaries.

Before making a drastic decision that completely changed her life, Yoshimi had
gone through harsh life experiences. She was born as the youngest child of an elite
banker's family in Tokyo in 1897. When she was two years old, her mother passed away
from an illness. Since her father could not raise Shizue by himself, he let her be adopted
as the daughter of her mother's younger sister and her husband. She did not become
aware of this arrangement until the death of her foster-father when she was fifteen
years old. Raised as the only child of her adoptive-family, she went to the English
Literature Department of Japan Women's College. After graduation, she chose a
teaching career rather than immediately getting married, as most of her classmates
were doing. Her career, however, did not last for long. Ostensibly, "illness" forced her to

\textsuperscript{221} Covell, "Twenty Years in Tokyo's East Side – The Kobokan," 252.
\textsuperscript{222} W. D. Cunningham, then a chairwoman of the Kōbōkan Board, addressed at the Annual
Convention of the Foreign Auxiliary in 1924 that the board greatly needed "a strong
consecrated Christian worker, foreign or Japanese" to live in the Kōbōkan's neighborhood
and "superintend the work." Her words indicate that the board members had not decided
yet whether they would install a Japanese or foreign superintendent. Mrs. W. L. Pearson,
leave her work at school. Actually, she had fallen in love with her colleague teacher and
gave birth to a child out of wedlock. Since both Yoshimi and her lover were the only
children of their parents and inevitably had to succeed their ie or household, they had to
give up marriage under the pressure of social custom and filial duties to their parents.

Yoshimi left her workplace with her illegitimate son, and started teaching
Japanese language to foreign missionaries. At this Japanese language school, Yoshimi
made two important decisions that completely changed her life: converting to
Christianity and becoming a social worker. When MacDonald and other the Foreign
Auxiliary members persuaded her to join their settlement enterprises, she was
perplexed at first. She deemed herself to be unqualified for the settlement project that
had just started burgeoning in Japan, because she had received little education and
training for such work. However, the strong determination and enthusiasm that the
missionaries showed towards the Kōbōkan touched Yoshimi. Moreover, she felt that “as
a Japanese, I [Yoshimi] could not adamantly reject their request.” The passion of the
missionaries and the sense of nationalism that a Japanese should work for the sake of
the Japanese people convinced Yoshimi to overcome her original hesitation. She decided
to give up her teaching career, left her pre-school age son in the care of her sister, and
went to New York in 1927 to study at the New York School of Social Work.223 This school,
a predecessor of the School of Social Work at Columbia University, was the product of
the “professionalization” of social work that shifted the training ground from settlement

houses to institutions of higher education. Many graduates from the New York School of Social Work took leadership roles in social work projects in the United States. After completing two years of study, she returned to Japan; the new buildings of the Kobókan welcomed her back. Coincidentally, the new Kobókan launched a new chapter in its history when Yoshimi started her second life as a settlement leader with the knowledge she obtained in New York.

Her workload as the superintendent was extensive. In order to support distressed neighbors who were thrown into the turmoil of economic depression, she devised programs that included nurseries, clubs and classes for schoolchildren and youth, handicrafts and cooking classes for mothers, health, and industrial programs. Religious training in Sunday schools for children, adults, and the Korean children, and special programs for Christmas was also incorporated into the settlement’s curricula. Although it was not directly related with the Kobókan’s work, she organized a Mukójima branch of the WCTU with twenty-nine members. While organizing the middle-class oriented WCTU branch, Yoshimi also included philanthropic programs such as rice stations selling rice dispensed by the government, miso (soybean paste),

224 Kobókan, Kobókan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 174-177; For the Korean Sunday school service, see “Miss Yamamuro’s Report,” Kobókan Collection; “Minutes of the Kobókan Board, April 17th, 1935,” Kobókan Collection. Yamamuro Tamiko was the daughter of Yamamuro Gunpei and Kieko, the founding members of the Salvation Army in Japan. As a member of the survey committee for the Kobókan neighborhood, Yamamuro Kieko regretted that a special Sunday school for Korean children was carried out only by Korean students, and suggested that Japanese teachers should join it. Later, Yoshimi reported to the Board committee that the Union service of Japanese and Korean Sunday schools at the Kobókan was conducted, although it is not sure if Sunday schools were separated according to nationality. But such a service dedicated to Korean children indicates that the neighborhood of the settlement included Korean residents.

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shōyu (soy sauce), mochi (rice cake) for new year. The Kōbōkan sold used clothes and other miscellaneous goods at reduced prices for destitute.225

Among these programs, Yoshimi attached the greatest importance to young children on whom urban life had the harshest effects. Many parents of crowded East Tokyo had to work for long hours at factories and do piecework at home. Their minds were too occupied with survival to take care of their children, and their lack of knowledge of nutrition and concern about hygiene often damaged the health of their children. Yoshimi planned two programs for children: providing nutritious and improving a medical clinic. Furthermore, she tried to inculcate knowledge of nutrition in their parents by offering classes on nutrition and hygiene.226 For children with diseases, medical doctors from St. Luke’s Hospital offered them medical advice. After the suspension of medical services from St. Luke’s Hospital, Yoshimi opened an independent medical clinic. This clinic offered medical treatment with free or discounted services to those who could not afford it.227 She also opened a playground equipped with swings, slides, a sandbox, horizontal bars, and other playthings to schoolchildren of the community; the Kōbōkan staff members supervised these children and offered medical care, if necessary. During summer vacation, the Kōbōkan opened summer school camps in seaside and mountain areas, allowing the children to take refuge from the scorching heat in polluted urban environments.228

225 Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 142-161.
226 Ibid., 176-178.
227 “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” June 6th 1940, Kōbōkan Collection.
228 “Kyanpu fükei: Kyōfūkai gaijinbu Kōbōkan no maki,” Fujin Shinpō, no. 414 (September
By the time Kōbōkan celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 1939, it had grown to have fifteen departments, sixteen staff members, and a 1,500 yen monthly budget. It took care of over 100 children every day, attracted over 130 children to the summer camp and treated 5,409 patients at the clinic in one year. In addition, the settlement offered clubs and classes for school children, a reading room equipped with books for all ages, a playground, summer school camp, nutrition classes, home visitation provided by nurses, industrial help, savings banks for both children and adults, religious training, and a rice station.229

The board members, consisting of ten foreigners and five Japanese as of 1938, trusted Yoshimi's leadership and personality.230 They left the work of the Kōbōkan in Yoshimi's hands and limited their contributions to supportive roles by giving her advice, encouragement, exchanging opinions over the programs and management at monthly meetings, and engaging in fund-raising efforts for the expansion of the settlement.231 Such attitudes toward Yoshimi impressed a Japanese staff member: "they offer only money without intruding their opinions on her."232 During the 1930s, the board solicited

230 They described her as having "[g]entle courtesy, quiet dignity, a profound sympathy for the under-privileged, and the rare gift of wisdom added to her highly specialized training abroad . . ." Covell, "Twenty Years in Tokyo's East Side – The Kobokan," 253.
231 Yoshimi often visited Annie W. Allen (1878-1978), a supervisor of a settlement in Kōbōkan's neighborhood, Kameido. Allen was one of the Board missionaries from the Canadian Methodist church, and gave Yoshimi advice, encouragement, and shared problems derived from their work. Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 189-90; Segawa Kazuo, personal interview, July 25, 2001.
232 Yamada Sakae, "Kōbōkan no katsudō naiyou," quoted in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan
funds from both Japanese and foreigners, diplomats, business enterprises, and zaibatsu foundations, and purchased adjoining property and a permanent summer camp facility in Kutsukake, Nagano prefecture (fig. 26).

The missionaries of the board also played an instrumental role in the expansion of the industrial department, a part of the Kōbōkan program. They not only provided Western handicraft lessons to women but also opened a thrift shop in Azabu, one of the most affluent communities with a large foreign population in Tokyo, in 1935 with the Ladies' Benevolent Society, an organization formed by the wives of diplomats and foreign businessmen in Tokyo which assisted foreigners in distress, mainly white Russians. This shop provided a precious outlet for the settlement's products, handcraft works in particular. They also boosted sales at the thrift shop by offering

setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 266.

233 The name of contributors included Joseph C. Grew, the U. S. Ambassador, and his wife. Interestingly, Mrs. Grew's contributions exceeded those of her husband; she gave 200 yen while he donated 150 yen. The Kōbōkan staff members and those who used its services made large donations. The neighbors also formed a supporting society and raised 759.80 yen. See, “Kōbōkan Setsurument zōkaichiku narabini tochi kōnyū-hi shūshi kessan hōkokusho,” Kōbōkan Collection. For the process of purchasing the Kutsukake summer house, see “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” September 18, 1935, Kōbōkan Collection; May Hennigar, “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” June 8, 1939, Kōbōkan Collection; Mary Doan, “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” June 15, 1939, Kōbōkan Collection. Minnie P. Bowles, a missionary's wife dispatched to Japan from the Society of Friends with her husband Gilbert in 1901 took leadership of a fund-raising campaign and collected 25,000 yen from an equal number of Japanese and foreigners. See “Minutes of Kobokan Board,” June 6, 1940, Kōbōkan Collection.


235 Ibid. Gladys D. Walser, the wife of a Presbyterian missionary from the United States, assumed the chairpersonship of the thrift shop committee. Walser also opened knitting class at her home. “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” May 15th, 1935, Kōbōkan Collection; “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” November 20, 1935, Kōbōkan Collection.
goods purchased in the United States and by opening summer sales at mountain resort areas, Karuizawa, Nojiri, and Takayama, in particular.\textsuperscript{236} By 1939, the shop had brought a dividend of 4,713.92 yen to the Kōbōkan.\textsuperscript{237} During the year of 1939, the shop constantly turned over 500 to 900 yen a month to the settlement.\textsuperscript{238} Compared with the total amount of 3,500 yen that came from the Imperial Household Department between 1919 and 1939, the sales of the shop were far from negligible. Although the budget of Kōbōkan still heavily relied on the government and large capitalists as well as on wealthy foreign and native individuals, it was slowly developing into a self-supported, independent institute.

**Surviving the War**

The progress of the war in China and the increasingly tense relations between Japan and the United States in the late 1930s soon made it difficult for the Kōbōkan to achieve its independence from public financial support. During this period, the government improved public assistance for strengthening the nation's human resources for war and for improving the health of draftees and the mass production of soldiers.\textsuperscript{239} The Welfare Ministry, established in 1938, was the product of such concern.\textsuperscript{240} It promulgated a series of laws and conducted new policies to support the war-bereaved,

\textsuperscript{236} "Minutes of Kobokan Board," October 21, 1936; December 15, 1937; September 15, 1938; September 14, 1939, Kōbōkan Collection.
\textsuperscript{237} "Kobokan Settlement 1919-1939."
\textsuperscript{238} "Minutes of the Kobokan Board," December 5, 1939, Kōbōkan Collection.
families of the sick, wounded soldiers and war-sufferers. Through these relief measures, the government shifted its previous policies of passive poverty-relief geared to only a limited number of people to more aggressive public support. The war period between 1937 and 1945 was the “most innovative period in the development of public welfare in Japan, comparable to the 1880s in Germany, the 1908-14 era in Britain, and the 1930s in the United States.”

However, the expanding budgets for welfare were always accompanied with some “strings.” The government enacted *Shakaijigyo-ho* (the Social Work Law) in 1938 to support private social work institutions that operated more than 80% of all social and welfare institutions as of 1937. The new law promised public support and benefits for such private organizations in exchange for strengthening governmental control and increasing supervision. Complying with the increasing demands from the authorities, the Kōbōkan accepted war widows and let them take kindergarten training courses provided by the government. From 1940 on, it functioned as the “natural meeting place” for semi-governmental women’s patriotic organizations, the *Aikoku Fujinkai* (Patriotic Women’s Association) and the *Kokubō Fujinkai* (National Defense Women’s

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244 “Minutes of the Kobokan Board,” February 8, 1940, Kōbōkan Collection.
Yoshimi served as a chief of the Patriotic Women's Association's local branch.246

Such massive mobilization and incorporation of women into support activities for the smooth conduct of the war at the insistence of the government authority was executed under the system of *Kokka Sōdōin-hō* (National Mobilization Law). This law, promulgated in 1938, authorized the government to mobilize capital, labor, education, media, and any other human and material resources to serve the national policy. *Kōbōkan* could not withstand the pressure of the times. Under the National Mobilization Law, the government reconstructed social reform enterprises, both public and private, and subordinated them to serve the national purpose. The growing public demand inevitably curtailed the founding purpose of the *Kōbōkan* to nurture the autonomy of the neediest. Instead of encouraging autonomy of the poor and remedying social problems derived from the "overaccumulation at one end of society and the destitution at the other" as Jane Addams' Hull-House stated, *Kōbōkan* became an organization to make the destitute docile and compliant to the national mission.247

In addition to inflating public involvement in the program of the settlement and

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245 Ibid. The Aikoku Fujinkai was established in 1901 with assistance from the Ministry of Home Affairs and rapidly expanded during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5); the Kokubō Fujinkai was formed by the strong support of the Imperial Army in 1932, immediately after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. By the end of 1935, the Patriotic Women's Association had 2.2 million members, while the National Defense Women's Association developed into the largest women's organization in Japan with 2.5 million constituents. The fourth chapter will explore women's involvement in war in detail.


247 Addams, "Twenty Years at Hull-House," 83.
weakening its independence, increasing hostility to Americans and Canadians, the rising trend of nationalism, and deteriorating political relations between both sides of the Pacific at the turn of the 1940s made the management of a Christian settlement with a strong affiliation with North American missionaries troublesome. Changing international relations made it hard for North American denominations to support their missionary enterprises in Japan. The expected withdrawal of all missionaries necessitated a quick restructuring of Kōbōkan's management and securing its own financial resources without relying on the support of missionaries. A board meeting held in 1940 discussed the problem of its disposition under the “new order,” and decided to investigate the possibility of forming a Kōbōkan zaidan (foundation). The attendants even argued for the possibility of directly incorporating it into the Ministry of Welfare. The idea of abandoning its independence reflected not only its closeness with the Ministry of Welfare but also the desperate financial situation of the settlement on the eve of the Pacific War. With the dissolution of the Foreign Auxiliary in April 1941, all foreign members of the board retired from the administration in April 1941, and Japanese women, mostly from the Japanese WCTU, took their positions. Yet, the new

248 "Kobokan Settlement 1919-1939." From 1939, all the printings and publications of the settlement decided to adopt the name of “Showa” Era, from the Emperor Showa (Hirohito), in dating and ceased to use the Christian Era. Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 208.
249 "Minutes of the Kobokan Board," October 10, 1940, Kōbōkan Collection.
250 Ibid. An application document submitted to Mitsui Hōonkai (Society of Repaying an Obligation), a zaibatsu-related foundation, for financial support expressed the drastic decrease in income from foreigners in the fiscal year of 1940. “Keijōhi josei ni kansuru shinsēisho oyobi chōsho,” July 1941, quoted in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue.
all-Japanese board members were not experienced enough to conduct all the works the missionaries had performed. Five missionary wives continuously attended the board meetings and supported the new all-Japanese board members as long as they could. Their private assistance made the nativization of the institution smoother. By the beginning of the Pacific War, the Kōbōkan was ready to function without support from missionaries.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, broke off all official ties between the Kōbōkan and North America. Most of its enterprises turned into more philanthropic endeavors under the pressure of the authorities and it coped primarily with the welfare of mothers and children. The primary works of the Settlement during World War II were as follows: expanding day-care services for working mothers offering job opportunities to women whose husbands were off at the front; counseling the needy for economic stability and providing educational guidance for parents; organizing patriotic societies and encouraging savings; providing milk and supplemental food to children with weak constitutions; offering scholarships to the youth. Once the air raids began, the Kōbōkan renovated its summer house for year-round use in order to accept evacuated children and mothers. The thrift shop from which the Ladies Benevolent society pulled out in 1941 was placed under the Kōbōkan's management.

251 Their names were Minnie P. Bowles, Gladys D. Walser, Frances Lucinda Mayer (Evangelical Church of North America), Mrs. Charles W. Hepner (United Lutheran Church in America), and Mrs. Charles W. Iglehart (Methodist Episcopal Church). Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 197.
252 Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 207-214
alone and was used to exchange second-hand goods among members. Meanwhile, the settlement obtained independent status as a *zaidan*, a legally incorporated foundation, and severed official ties with the Japanese WCTU in December 1943.253

The drastic reduction of the population in the neighborhood as the result of air raids urged Yoshimi to move the settlement works to a Kutsukake summer house that accepted war evacuees. A semi-governmental incorporated foundation, *Senji Kokumin Kyōjogikai*, (the Society of War-time National Support) and the Tokyo metropolitan government commissioned the Kōbōkan to accept evacuees in exchange for financial support for the renovation of the summer house into a year-round facility. The intrusion of public authority limited Christian services, including the act of saying grace before meals.254 Yet, public money poured into the Kōbōkan enabling it to survive the war. Not only the government but also neighbors supported its wartime enterprises. The relief work under the leadership of Yoshimi strengthened support and cooperation from the neighborhood community. When Tokyo suffered severe fire bomb raids that destroyed 90 percent of the buildings in Mukōjima Ward on March 9th and 10th in 1945, the Kōbōkan's staff members and neighbors relayed buckets of water and protected its buildings from fire. All of its facilities miraculously escaped war damage and functioned as a center for

253 Since the Japan WCTU was integrated into the newly created United Church of Christ in Japan by the national mobilization policies, it went under the control of the Ministry of Education. Settlement enterprises observed the Social Work Law that the Ministry of Welfare controlled. The discrepancy of ministries over jurisdiction made the Settlement and the WCTU incompatible and resulted in the independence of the Kōbōkan. Kōbōkan, *Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue*, 202-205.
bombed-out people. When the settlement moved to Kutsukake, the neighbors carried its numerous belongings and loaded them onto a train.255

While becoming compliant to demands of the times, the Kōbōkan preserved the founding ideology of Christianity in its rulebook of management.256 Furthermore, the settlement tacitly maintained a strong emotional attachment to North America, contrary to rampant public discourses full of mutual prejudice and discrimination on both sides of the Pacific. Yoshimi and other staff members believed that the survival of the settlement's property from aerial attacks was the result of "orders and good wishes from the United States and those who were connected with it," although there is no evidence to support such a speculation.257 Former missionaries who worked for the Kōbōkan also repaid their friendship that even the madness of war could not destroy. Several missionaries of the Kōbōkan came back to Japan soon after the war and joined in its postwar reconstruction. After Yoshimi left the settlement to become the first female chief of the newly established Nursery Section in the Ministry of Welfare, these missionaries continued to work for the rehabilitation of war-devastated communities and the expansion of the settlement with its Japanese staff members.258

256 Article 3 of its donation rule states that the foundation aims to carry out settlement enterprises based on the spirit of Christianity.
257 Takayanagi Hiroko, "Sentou ni tatte mi o ko ni shite hataraita," in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 268; Hatano Kōichi, "Boku o wagako no youni kawaigatte kureta," in Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to Yoshimi Shizue, 280-281. Nohara Kenji, the current director of the Kōbōkan, said that the staff members still believe that the U.S. forces avoided bombing the settlement because of its connection with American missionaries. Nohara Kenji and Segawa Kazuo, personal interview, July 25, 2001.
258 For the establishment of the Children's Bureau, see Kōbōkan, Kōbōkan setsurumento to

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Conclusion

Both the Jiaikan Rescue Home and the Kōbōkan Settlement were the products of the Foreign Auxiliary members of the WCTU, consisting of female missionaries and wives of missionaries primarily from Canada and the United States. Through these institutions, the Auxiliary missionaries engaged in rescue work for prostitutes and a social reform project to which the WCTU of Japan paid little attention. By so doing, they complemented ideologies, strategies, and practices of the Japanese WCTU. Moreover, these activities brought the Auxiliary missionaries into close association with the men and women of the least privileged class in Japan.

The Jiaikan was established in 1894, and the Kōbōkan was created a quarter of a century later, in 1919. This time gap resulted in many contrasts over the ideologies, strategies, practices, and consciousness of Auxiliary missionary women. Both institutions were troubled with a serious shortage of funds. In the 1890s, the small membership of the Japanese WCTU, both native and foreign, the absence of an equivalent Christian institution in Japan, and class-consciousness hindered the mobilization of the majority of Japanese Union members for the operation. Financial dependence on foreigners resulted in the detachment of the Japanese members of the WCTU from the management of the Jiaikan and strengthened the idea of rescue work as missionaries' job. The majority of Japanese Unionists did not mind their exclusion

Yoshimi Shizue, 254-255.
from the rescue home, for they did not share the goals of rescuing and rehabilitating enterprises for prostitutes. Instead, they focused more on the abolition of licensed prostitution.

A discrepancy of consciousness also existed between the missionaries and the residents whom they attempted to "save." As a pioneering rescue home without any equivalent institution in Japan, the missionaries followed the model of rescue missions in the United States. They directly imported the Victorian notion of womanhood, including domestic skills and dietary habits, on the unshakable assumption that Japanese women wanted to share in Western culture. They believed that only by acquiring Victorian morality and domesticity and by conversion to Christianity could "immoral" women save themselves from "the life of shame" and regenerate themselves as "respectable" women. Belief in the universal applicability and superiority of Victorian domesticity shaped their dismissive attitudes toward the Japanese. They did not allow the Japanese to assume positions of responsibility, such as management of the home, and sometimes even overtly distrusted the Japanese.

Contrary to the assumed "universality" of the programs, the uncritical imposition of Western notions of womanhood, practice of domesticity, and Bible training on the residents of the Jiaikan aroused antipathy and made the rescue home less acceptable. Meanwhile, the Japanese women members of the WCTU gradually recognized the significance of the Jiaikan around the 1920s and became discontented with the overassertive management of its missionary director. With strong remorse over their past indifference toward the rescue works and nationalistic concerns that the
Japanese should take care of the Japanese women, the native Unionists took over the management of the Jiaikan in 1921. Consequently, rescue work became incorporated into its agenda for the social reform campaign.

Unlike the Jiaikan Rescue Home, the process of the Kōbōkan Settlement enjoyed more collaborative and smooth acceptance by the natives. The Kōbōkan started out in a much more hospitable environment. The missionary community as a whole, inspired by social gospel ideology and practice and expanding settlement movements in the United States, paid special concern to the problems of urban poverty, and paved the way for settlement enterprises in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese, both Christian and non-Christian, started settlement works in Tokyo and other urbanized areas one after another. From the very beginning, the Kōbōkan was thus not an isolated enterprise and enjoyed instant acceptance by the neighborhood. The high demand for day-care services among working parents and the traditional acceptance of multiple caregivers for children led to acceptance of the settlement's child-care programs by the neighbors. Additionally, the Kōbōkan missionaries nurtured Japanese leadership and installed Japanese women in supervising positions. Unlike the Jiaikan, the missionary members of the settlement limited their roles to supportive ones.

Yet, the existence of the Kōbōkan came into jeopardy when it was hit by multiple natural disasters during a short time period. The Great Kanto Earthquake brought the heavy burden of debts to the major architects of the settlement, most of whom belonged to the Auxiliary's Tokyo Circle or the Kanto Section after 1926. The financial crisis compelled them to ask the Japanese government, both national and local,
and large capitalists for economic assistance in addition to collecting contributions from Japanese and foreign individuals and groups. The acceptance of financial support from government authorities, including the Emperor, and zaibatsu-related foundations alleviated the financial crisis of the institution. Yet, the sense of authoritative benevolence attached to these financial supports diminished the character of the Kōbōkan as a settlement with the purpose of eliminating, not simply alleviating poverty, and strengthened philanthropy as the aspect of its enterprises. With the rising fear of war between Japan and the United States, the settlement had to reduce its financial dependence on American and Canadian missionaries. Yoshimi Shizue, the superintendent of the Kōbōkan, and the missionaries of its board choose to develop a strong commitment to the government to obtain public endorsement and support, even at the cost of autonomy of management. The increasing collaboration with the government inevitably dragged the settlement into the support of Japan's militaristic aggression. Unlike Hull-House in downtown Chicago, another “Hull-House” in downtown Tokyo had weakened its potential to challenge the social, economic, and political arrangements that produced the unequal distribution of wealth and poverty.

Compliance with the authorities, however, enabled the Kōbōkan to survive the Pacific War. Created by American and Canadian missionary women, the settlement had developed strong emotional as well as financial ties with them and their countries until the outbreak of the war. During the war, Yoshimi, a Christian woman educated in New York, supervised the Kōbōkan and manipulated the militaristic environment. The government allowed her to remain in her position because of her expression of
patriotism and collaboration with war efforts by accepting war evacuees, taking care of war victims, and assuming leadership of the semi-governmental patriotic organization.\footnote{Despite her compliance, the Special Higher Thought Police kept a watch on Yoshimi, and often visited her office without any notice and had a “chat” with her. Segawa Kazuo, personal interview, July 25, 2001} Ostensibly supporting the Japanese national mission to fight against the United States, Yoshimi and her Japanese colleagues inwardly appreciated their American contacts for saving the Kôbôkan from aerial attacks. She may be blamed for selling out the Kôbôkan to Japanese militarism and transforming it into a compliant institution. Yet, it was Yoshimi's maneuvering during the harshest years of its history that secured the institution's survival. And this permitted it to keep servicing the community. As Jane Addams stated, the flexibility, quick adaptation, and readiness to change methods in order to meet the demands of the environment and community were also crucial characteristics of settlement work.\footnote{Addams, "Twenty Years at Hull-House," 84-85.} In that sense, Kôbôkan remained a settlement, since it always put the highest priority on meeting the imminent requests of the neighboring community.

The history of the Jiaikan and Kôbôkan reveals the shifting strategy of North American missionary women to introduce reform enterprises from the United States and their changing attitude toward the Japanese, both the working and middle class. Negotiations between the two groups included rivalry for leadership, different priorities and concerns for the solution of social problems, the relationship with government authorities, and the collaboration with war efforts. Although the missionaries and
Japanese who were involved in the Jiaikan and Kōbōkan projects participated in this dialogue at the local level, the topics they discussed reflected negotiations between American and Japanese women on the global stage. The following chapters examine the Japanese WCTU women's entry into the international women's community and encounter with their American and other Western sisters.
CHAPTER 3

THE POWER AND HIERARCHY AMONG
WOMEN OF THE PACIFIC AND
THE CREATION OF THE "WHITE RIBBON LEAGUE OF NATIONS"

Introduction

From the beginning of the 20th century, the Japanese Women's Christian Temperance Union started dispatching its members to the United States and Europe to attend international conferences. By promoting direct communication with Western women, the Japanese Union developed a close affiliation with international women's organizations and claimed full membership in elite Euro-American women's communities. A growing sense of national prestige supported its new transnational enterprises. As Japan self-consciously crafted an identity as one of the leading imperial powers in the world after victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Japanese white ribboners embarked on a campaign to win full recognition from the international women's community. Unsatisfied with the unilateral cultural, ideological, and personal flow from the United States to Japan, they attempted to reciprocate relations and demanded respect from the Western nations through transnational interactions.

The Japanese WCTU's new ambition to obtain full membership in the international women's club led to another cause of transnational activism: eliminating prostitution in the Japanese communities abroad, especially in the U.S. When they
encountered the mounting anti-Japanese sentiments on the West Coast of the United States in the first decade of the 20th century, they hesitated to attribute it to American racism. Instead, the Japanese Unionists translated the disputes into a moral issue and attacked the presence of social vices in the immigrant communities. They also directed criticism to Japanese settlers in Asia and worked for the elimination of what they believed to be a blot on the reputation of Japan as a nation. Highly conscious of national prestige, they endorsed the expansion of the Japanese empire as not only enhancing Japan's international status but also conducive to the improvement of Asia. However, the Japanese Union disagreed with the exportation of prostitutes that accompanied the advancement of the Japanese military and colonization. Through creating outposts among the Japanese settlers in Korea, Taiwan, China, and "Manchuria (Northeast of China)," the Japanese Union worked to "clean" the Japanese communities and "uplift" their own nationals as respectable leaders of Asia.¹

White ribboners of the United States and Europe welcomed the Japanese women's debut on the global stage. They warmly greeted the visitors from afar, invited them to numerous formal and informal gatherings and arranged meetings with important figures, including presidents of the United States. The ostensible friendliness that characterized the encounters between the Western and Japanese women, however, did not mean that the former accepted the latter as their equals.

¹ The Japanese called the northeast region of China "Manchuria" since its imperialism reached this area after winning wars with China and Russia at the turn of the twentieth century. The Chinese government, however, refuses to use this term and calls the region Dongbei (東北), northeastern region.
Instead, the Japanese women’s appearance in the global arena evoked Orientalist
curiosity that had been deeply embedded in Western popular discourse.² In the United
States and Europe, the Japanese women constantly received requests to wear native
costumes, strike a pose for pictures and add “international” flavor to gatherings.

In sharp contrast to the marginalized, exoticized, and tokenized status of
Japanese women, the American members dominated the World’s WCTU. Two
monumental achievements of their long-term activism, the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment (1919) and women’s enfranchisement (1920), reinforced their
self-acclaimed role as the moral leaders of the world. Inspired by the birth of the
League of Nations, they called the WCTU the “White Ribbon League of Nations” and
rekindled their global mission to “uplift” women of less “advanced” nations to their own
standard. In Asia, they singled out China and Japan as major recipients of their
intensive support. China, whose women had been rapidly politicized and mobilized into
collective actions since the 1910s, drew a great deal of attention as a new field for the
spread of the WCTU. Through providing financial and personal aid as well as training
native leadership, the WCTU nurtured its Chinese branch. While receiving support

² Edward Said’s Orientalism and most other studies on Orientalism primarily focus on
European discourse about the colonial territories in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Mari
Yoshihara and others redefine the term Orientalism specifically in reference to U.S.
discourse about China and Japan. Although the U.S. did not take the blatant way of
conquest over China and Japan, it held a predominant political and economic position over
these nations through the Open Door policy, unequal treaties, and the expansion of
commercial and cultural influence. In such a historical and political context, the U.S. had
shaped Orientalist discourse in the particular context of the Pacific Rim. Edward W. Said,
from Evanston, the young leaders of Chinese women soon developed their own agenda reflecting the political circumstances of their own nation, including an affirmation of their national sovereignty and freedom from imperial exploitation. When they started sending their representatives to international meetings, they openly challenged imperialism and rejected subordinated status vis-à-vis imperial powers.

These interactions among women of the United States, Japan, China, and other Asian nations transformed the flow of women's activism from a unilateral influence of the West upon the rest of the world into a more multi-directional, multi-vocal exchange. Women of each nation sought to facilitate transnational friendship and worked for world peace. Yet, the strength of the white ribbon to keep women together was tested primarily by two elements. The first obstacle that white ribbon sisterhood confronted was national interest. Women's transnational activism that the WCTU supported closely tied itself with the national interests of each nation and its imperialist discourse. American Union women supported the imperialism of the United States and affirmed their superiority over non-Western nationals; the Japanese white ribboners endorsed their nation's hegemony over Asia; the Chinese women disagreed with the presence of imperial powers in their own land and fought for national sovereignty. Their nationalism was manifested differently in their WCTU activities because of the historical and political circumstances of their nations, and their concerns often conflicted with the promotion of global sisterhood. Whether transnational activists could prioritize international interests over national ones determined the strength of the white ribbon.
The second obstacle that challenged the “White Ribbon League of Nations” was racism. The dialogue among women in an international stage often ended up affirming the racial hierarchy that placed Americans on the top of the racial ladder, Japanese in the middle, and people of other parts of Asia at the bottom. The Japanese women played a crucial role in constructing the three-layered hierarchy of women. Their aspirations to great power and status in the international women’s community confirmed Western superiority; simultaneously, their self-consciousness as the leader of Asia produced dismissive views of their neighbors. In this way, the transnational activism that the WCTU supported explicitly aimed at promoting mutual understanding and respect among women of different nationalities, it endorsed the agenda of their male contemporaries. In this climate, women of “weaker” nations resisted and challenged the inferior status imposed by “powerful” nations and attempted to rearrange the racial hierarchy.

Women of the early 20th century were, regardless of their nationalities, collectively excluded from public arenas of diplomacy. They were not allowed to officially represent their governments in international conferences. The major architects of diplomacy consisted exclusively of male politicians, diplomats, and military officers. Nevertheless, women were always concerned about international issues and constantly present in internationalist movements. As active agents of private diplomacy, they developed their own international community and worked for the promotion of international friendship. Through the close examination of women’s international organization, represented by the World’s WCTU and its fellow groups,
this chapter reveals how women of the East and the West carried out private diplomacy through international networks of the WCTU and other women's organizations in the first decades of the 20th century. The inter-war period is generally known as the era of international cooperation; yet it was also the time when imperialism was at its height and racism profoundly affected trans-Pacific relations, as indicated by the anti-Japanese immigration acts in the United States and the progress of colonial domination over Asia by Japanese and Western powers. This chapter examines both aspects, the ascent of internationalism and the increasing tensions over racial, cultural, economic, and political disputes among women from the East and the West. Exploring how these international circumstances affected the transnational interaction of women and how women tried to have an impact on world politics is the primary purpose of this chapter.

The Japanese WCTU Meets America: Yajima's Trip to the United States

Since its inception, the Japanese WCTU members were heavily concerned about national honor in the international community and worked for the elimination of what it deemed national shame, namely, the exportation of Japanese prostitutes to foreign lands. Its ambition to improve Japan's status in the world through uplifting national morality strengthened when Japan established itself as a new imperial power after winning the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). The Japanese Unionists rejoiced in the victory of Japan and shared the proclamation made by their male contemporaries that Japan had grown to be the leader of Asia and one of
the great world powers. The new imperial project of Japan stimulated the Japanese
white ribboners to pay more attention to international affairs. Indeed, Japan's foreign
relations at the turn of the 20th century operated in a new presumption of "Japan in the
world,"—that is, continentalism or the enhancement of economic penetration, strategic
expansion, and migration to the United States, Korea, China and Siberia.3 Japan's
enlarged sphere of influence through the acquisition of colonies and the expansion of
Japanese migration, however, produced the new problems of exporting the Japanese
prostitutes, popularly known as "karayuki-san," as well as increasing alcohol
consumption and the spread of various other social vices throughout the empire.4
WCTU officials expressed anxiety that "karayuki-san" would damage Japan's national
honor. The concern for national prestige in the international community inspired the
WCTU to submit a petition for the strict control of trafficking in women to the National
Diet every year starting in the late 1890s. After the turn of the century, the WCTU
wanted to take more aggressive action.

The actual contact of the WCTU officers with the Japanese abroad increased
their anxiety about the "low morality" of the latter groups. In the United States,
especially on the Pacific Coast and in the western states, Japanese prostitutes existed

3 Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japan and American Expansion, 1897-1911
4 Morisaki Kazue argues that different names from karayuki-san according to their
destinations were also used at the beginning of the Taishō era (1912-26), such as
amerikayuki (those heading for the United States), shinayuki (those heading for China),
shiberiayuki (those heading for Siberia), chōsenyuki (those heading for Korea). In this
chapter, I use karayuki-san. Morisaki Kazue, Karayuki-san (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha,
even before the Japanese government legalized immigration in 1886.\textsuperscript{5} The appearance of Japanese prostitutes stimulated the California legislature to repeatedly approve acts to prevent and prohibit the importation of Japanese and other Asian women for the purpose of prostitution at the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{6} In 1875, the U.S. Congress also passed the Page Law to forbid the entry of women for the purpose of prostitution, Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian contract laborers, and felons. In 1891, the U.S. Congress amended previous enactments regulating immigration to prohibit the entry of certain classes of aliens, including prostitutes.\textsuperscript{7} The American press also paid attention to the foreign prostitutes and disseminated news that Japan imported women for sexual slavery.\textsuperscript{8} Although the early Japanese immigrants were composed of women from various social backgrounds, the conditions of immigration, anti-prostitution legislation and negative press coverage stigmatized and stereotyped early Japanese immigrant women as prostitutes regardless of their occupation.\textsuperscript{9}

The Japanese government was well informed of the arrival and presence of

\textsuperscript{5} Although no reliable figures on their numbers and geographical distribution exist, statistics of the Japanese and U.S. governments indicate that there were about one thousand Japanese females in the U.S. in 1900. Some of them were classified as laborers. But many of them engaged in the sex trade. See Yuji Ichioka, "Ameyuki-san: Japanese Prostitutes in America,"\textit{ Amerasia} 4, no. 1 (1977): 2-3; Yuji Ichioka, \textit{The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885-1924} (New York: Free Press, 1988), 28-29.

\textsuperscript{6} On March 18, 1870, the California legislature approved "An Act to Prevent the Kidnapping and Importation of Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese Females for Criminal or Demoralizing Purposes." In 1893, the California Legislature approved "An Act to prevent compulsory prostitution of women, and the importation of Chinese or Japanese women for immoral purposes, and to provide penalties therefore."

\textsuperscript{7} Ichioka, \textit{The Issei}, 38.

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 36-37.

Japanese prostitutes and pimps in the United States. Chinda Sutemi, a consul stationed in San Francisco, warned Tokyo that the sex trade prevailing among Japanese abroad would stain Japan's honor and be used as pretext of Japanese exclusion. Sensitive to the American image of Japan and afraid that the Japanese would have the same fate as Chinese residents, government officials attempted to curtail the flow of prostitutes to the United States through stricter passport-issuing and cooperating with immigration officials. These measures merely reduced the number of new arrivals and did not completely stop the flow. Japanese male politicians were not serious about this issue. Despite repeated petitions from the WCTU, the National Diet did not take action to prevent the flesh trade. Rather, popular opinion regarded prostitution as a necessary evil to stabilize the Japanese bachelor immigrant community and even as a means of bringing foreign currency to Japan. Even among those who opposed the traffic of women, few opposed it because of their sympathy for the plight of the prostitutes.

The Japanese WCTU shared indifference for the welfare of the poor with male Japanese policy makers. When Kosaki Chiyo, an executive of the Japanese WCTU, visited the West Coast of the United States in 1906, she was dismayed at the presence of prostitutes and described her impression of Japanese communities in the West Coast in negative terms:

11 For the idea of prostitution as necessary evil in Japan, see chapter 1.
We heard that the reason why the Japanese were expelled from the white race was that there were not so many educated Japanese with good manners, many of whom were from the countryside and never been even to Tokyo... Their shameful behavior caused criticisms from the whites.\(^\text{12}\)

She revealed clear prejudice against Japanese immigrants, criticized the large population of prostitutes, and blamed their rural and poor educational backgrounds as the principal reason for exclusion.\(^\text{13}\) Kosaki's condemning accounts of Japanese immigrants succinctly represented the opinions of other Japanese Union leaders. As shown by their original indifference to the Jiaikan's rescue project, they scapegoated prostitutes abroad as they did at home. Instead of attacking institutionalized anti-female practices that forced certain women to barter their sexuality for survival and the well-developed system of the global flesh trade, they blamed women's sexual promiscuity as the cause of prostitution. Moreover, the WCTU members' well-educated, middle and upper-middle class, urban backgrounds hindered them from aligning themselves with Japanese immigrants, many of whom were poorly educated and came from agricultural prefectures.\(^\text{14}\)

Female American missionaries of the Foreign Auxiliary shared opinions with their Japanese fellows who linked Japanese exclusion with prostitution. H. F. Parmelee,

\(^{14}\) The bulk of Japanese emigrants were from southwestern Japan, such as Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Okayama, Wakayama, Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Saga, and Kagoshima. These prefectures were not the country's poorest, but not as urbanized as Tokyo and Osaka. Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (New York: Twayne, 1991), 10-11.
founder of Matsuyama local branch Union, for instance, stated that the anti-Japanese controversy in California was neither merely a matter of economy nor racial prejudice but an issue of morals:

Geishas are rampant in public life and noises they create are everywhere in Japan. Moreover, geishas are invited in the home and expose their beautiful faces to innocent children ... Americans cannot endure Japanese immigrants with such vulgar morals moving freely into California.15

Based upon exaggerated and even distorted understandings of Japanese social life, she oversimplified Japanese exclusion in the United States as a matter of morality. Irritated by the spread of prostitution at home and abroad, WCTU members, both native and foreign, assumed the school dispute in San Francisco (1906), the Gentleman's Agreement (1908), and the first Alien Land Law enacted in California (1913) were punishments for "evil deeds" that the Japanese had committed. As consul Chinda Sutemi was preoccupied with the preservation of national honor, the WCTU's opposition to trafficking in women derived not from sympathy for the prostitutes, most of whom had less-privileged, rural backgrounds, but from the paramount concern for the prestige of Japan.

In sharp contrast to this oversimplified interpretation of Japanese exclusion, sexual "immorality" of the Japanese was not the sole malefactor provoking the white population in the West Coast. Organized anti-Japanese agitation originated from economic factors, a nativist perspective, racial prejudices, and cultural concerns of

“yellow peril” that the flood of the yellow race would “contaminate” Anglo-Saxon purity. The outbreak of anti-Japanese feelings was an expression of frustration over the fact that sizable numbers of the “undesirable” and “inferior” aliens remained even after exclusionary laws had been passed. Members of the WCTU in Japan did not acknowledge such factors and even confirmed the racial and “moral” ideologies of white Japanophobes by exclusively blaming the Japanese immigrants, prostitutes in particular.

However, not all white ribboners in Japan endorsed the idea of moral corruption among immigrant communities in the United States and blamed prostitutes as the primary cause of the Japanese exclusion. Okubo Otowa, the niece of Yajima Kaji in Oakland, California, refuted such claims about the least privileged women and sympathized with them as the “victims of animal lust.” Her argument condemning men more than women for the cause of loose morals derived from her experiences living in Honolulu and in Oakland and working among the Japanese communities as the wife of a clergyman. As she argued, some prostitutes were sold by impoverished rural households, and others were abducted or lured under false pretenses of high wages and transported across the Pacific by procurers. Many of those who engaged in the flesh trade were Japanese men. After they landed, the women ended up in prostitution and were put under the control of pimp-gamblers called Amegoro (American thugs). Such

16 Daniels, Asian America, 111-126; Chen, Asian Americans, 54.
17 Chen, Asian Americans, 54.
18 Ichioka, The Issei, 29-35.
a system of prostitution in the Japanese communities of the United States urged Okubo to attack the men who exploited prostitutes. However, her argument remained a minority opinion within the Japanese WCTU. Most of its members believed that Americans disliked the Japanese people because of their vulgar ethics. If the sex trade disappeared, they speculated that Japanese immigrants would be welcomed in the United States.

The burning desire to improve Japan's status in the international community motivated the Japanese WCTU to dispatch its president abroad for the first time. In 1906, the Japanese WCTU sent Yajima Kaji to Boston to attend the seventh World's WCTU conference. Earlier Japanese representation at the World's WCTU gatherings occurred when Japanese women who happened to be in the United States attended at the request of the Japanese Union. Yajima's trip was the first venture to send its

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19 Okubo Otowako, "Nihon fujin to teisou," Fujin shinpô, no. 125 (September 25, 1907): 5-7.
21 Initially, the Japanese Union was reluctant to send a delegate to the conference. Yajima convinced other members to go to the United States with all her life savings. See, "Yajima kaitô no tobei," Fujin shinpô, no. 111 (July 25, 1906): 1.
22 Sono Teru (Tel Sono) attended the first World's WCTU conference held in Boston in 1891. Sono was a self-supported student in the United States and affiliated with the California WCTU's local Union in San Francisco. Sakurai Chika, a former principal of Sakurai Girls' School, went to the United States to raise funds for the construction of the Union's office buildings, and attended the second World's WCTU conference in Chicago in 1893. At the conference, she made a speech and expressed appreciation for the work of the late Mary A. West in Japan. Then she appealed for sisterhood from the audience. For Sono Teru, see Minutes of the Executive Committee and First Convention of the World's Woman's Christian Temperance Union [cited hereafter as Convention Report] (1891): 17; Tel Sono, Tel Sono: The Japanese Reformer, and Autobiography (New York: Hunt and Eaton, 1892). For Sakurai, see "Sakurai Chika-joshi," Fujin kyôdô zasshi, no. 4 (February 2, 1894): 27-28; The Second Convention Report (1893): 8-9 and 18-19. For Inoue, see The Forth Convention Report (1897): 9, 78, 97, 99, 102, and 103.
representatives to the World conference and “introduce the Japanese Union to the
world.” The Japanese white ribboners regarded Yajima’s expedition to the United
States as a great opportunity to gain international recognition and to validate Japan’s
growing national prestige since winning the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).

Yajima, then seventy-four years old, left Yokohama Port in the summer of 1906.
As the missionaries of the World’s WCTU relied on English-speaking missionary
communities when they came to Japan, Yajima received support from the Japanese
communities in the United States as well as from former missionaries with whom she
had been acquainted. On the way to San Francisco, she stopped by Honolulu and
attended a welcome reception arranged by her former student and other issei women’s
groups. In sharp contrast, the Japanese in San Francisco did not arrange any
reception for Yajima. The issei women in San Francisco were angry with the “Japanese
noble ladies,” such as Kosaki Chiyo, because these “ladies” grouped the issei
middle-class women together with prostitutes and justified the Japanese exclusion
based on the alleged moral deficiencies of Japanese women. These issei women in San
Francisco responded to Kosaki:

Since two years ago, ladies in San Francisco always have been holding
receptions to welcome noble ladies from Japan and listening to their
talks. However, why do these noble ladies from Japan denounce women
in San Francisco to an extreme, and make cold remarks as if among
Japanese women living on the American West Coast there were none

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23 “Yajima kaitô no tobei,” 1.
who were of good conduct or who were not shameful as a Japanese woman? 26

This tension between “noble ladies” or the leaders of the WCTU and issei women indicates that Unionists in Japan failed to acknowledge the diverse class and vocational backgrounds of issei communities on the West Coast. Their negative depiction of these women deeply offended issei women and resulted in a boycott of welcoming Yajima. Moreover, the great earthquake in San Francisco occurred in 1906 and its aftermath might have preoccupied the Japanese residents in that city so as not to leave enough time for them to greet her.

Although the issei community in San Francisco did not welcome her, Yajima obtained accommodation at Ôkubo Otowa’s home in Oakland and left for Boston accompanied by Ôkubo’s daughter, (after marriage, Kubushiro) Ochimi. 27 Later on, they joined Hayashi Utako of the Osaka branch Union who came to the United States to raise money for her orphanage. 28 Yajima’s presence at the World’s WCTU conference impressed other attendants. The Union Signal described her as an “uncrowned queen from the land of the rising sun, [Yajima] traveled 8,000 miles to ‘catch the spirit of America’—a spirit which, it was obvious, she possessed in large measure before she

came."29 Yajima seemed a good student of American experiences. However, in the United States, Yajima did more than learn the "spirit of America" by absorbing the newest theory and practice of temperance work; as the Union Signal described, she represented Japan by joining various gatherings. On the platform, Yajima put up a huge banner of the Japanese WCTU that she brought from Japan. She explained that her nation, her people, and her Union were small, so she brought a "large banner" (italics original) to proclaim its presence in the world.30 Hayashi Utako added: "Our Japanese women came here just as a younger sister; we have great hopes of being an older sister to you some time."31

This bold assertion reflected their ambition to become internationally preeminent. Contrary to the description of the Union Signal, Yajima and her Japanese company did not make the pilgrimage to the United States only to become a docile student of the "spirit of America." When President Theodore Roosevelt gave a special reception for delegates of the World's WCTU convention, who were in Washington en route to their respective countries, Yajima and her fellows used this opportunity to conduct private diplomacy. At the reception, Yajima expressed to Roosevelt deep gratitude for his intervention in the war between Japan and Russia.32 Her high

30 Ibid. This banner was created with the money donated by a late Union member. Yajima explained to the Japanese Union members that she put up this banner at a platform for one week to remind her of her colleagues and to encourage her to not be intimidated by the 5,000 person audience. See "Danjô no kaitô," Fujin shinpô, no. 116 (December 25, 1906): 10-11.
evaluation of Roosevelt's diplomatic initiative and the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, did not correspond to major public opinion in Japan. Russia rejected paying the indemnity that Japan had craved; instead, it ceded the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan. This compromise disappointed the Japanese public who bore the financial burden by suffering high taxes. In Tokyo, an angry mob rioted against the Portsmouth Treaty which Roosevelt set the stage for. Nevertheless, Yajima appreciated Roosevelt for saving Japan and Russia from a war that exhausted the resources and capital of both nations.33

Outside of the convention rooms and the White House, the Japanese Unionists stimulated WCTU activities among the issei women of the West Coast. Despite the tension between the Japanese Union women and the Japanese immigrant communities as evidenced in San Francisco, the "Japanese noble ladies" had personal magnetism, connections and money enough to mobilize Christian issei women. Kosaki Chiyo and Hayashi Utako organized branches of the Japanese WCTU among women of the issei communities in Seattle, Portland, Oakland, Los Angeles, and Riverside.34 The birth of the WCTU in Japanese communities in various West Coast cities indicates the presence of middle-class women who could spare time for temperance work and belies

33 Tokutomi Sohó, Yajima's nephew and a leading journalist, had similar recognition with his aunt. In his newspaper, Kokumin Shinbun, Tokutomi admonished the public from desiring too much. His argument provoked the public to attack his newspaper company. See, Sawada Jirō, Kindai Nihonjin no Amerika-kan (Tokyo: Keiōgijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), 39-40.
stereotypical understanding of Japanese women as prostitutes.

The encounters between the Japanese and American WCTU leaders at the turn of the 20th century through immigration issues, an appearance at the platform of the World's WCTU convention, and actions of private diplomacy at the White House reflected their wishes to make Japanese women visible and respectable members of an international women's community. Americans welcomed Japanese delegates with kimono costumes and treated them with a tutorial manner with the supposition that Japanese women came to learn from them. The interactions between the two groups started hospitably, yet they simultaneously confirmed hierarchical relations. The first encounter of Yajima and her Japanese fellows with American women duplicated imperial power relations that treated Japan as a latecomer to an elite international club. In the women's international community, Japan was not on an equal footing with its Western sisters. Simultaneously, the Japanese Union established another hierarchical order among the Japanese. The Union despised the Japanese immigrants in the United States and attributed anti-Japanese movements to their moral degradation, class and rural backgrounds, while ignoring other factors, such as racial ideologies and economic factors that fueled the Japanese exclusion. This dismissive argument infuriated middle-class Christian issei women in San Francisco, which Kosaki called the most "immoral" place of all Japanese communities on the West Coast. By exclusively blaming Japanese immigrants, the Japanese WCTU took part in the exclusionist movement. Its assumption that the improvement of morality would reduce anti-Japanese feelings and increase the reputation of the nation and people of Japan
encouraged its leaders to organize various branch Unions on the West Coast. As this move indicates, the main concern of Japanese Unionists was the preservation of national honor, which was identical with that of some male diplomats and bureaucrats who worked to curtail the traffic of women. Soon, the Japanese Union turned its eyes to Asia, to Korea and Taiwan which Japan acquired and colonized. The Union applied the strategy of boosting national reputation to its activities in these new colonies.

The Japanese WCTU Meets Asia: The Creation of its Outposts in Korea and Taiwan

The expansion of the Japanese Empire entailed the development of Japanese communities in Asia and stimulated trafficking in women. New territories obtained by victory in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars soon developed new pleasure quarters. In western Siberia, for instance, Japanese brothels existed wherever military forces were stationed. The Japanese WCTU was alarmed at such an exportation of prostitutes accompanying the expansion of the Japanese Empire. The opening essay of the Fujin shinpō in May 1906, for instance, attacked the flesh trade for the reason that it would harm the face of the Empire. The article affirmed that Japan had now obtained worldwide fame and the world expected Japan to cultivate and train other nations of the East. In order to shoulder obligations as a self-appointed leader in Asia, the Japanese Union formed a partnership with other

transnationally active Christian organizations to fight against the traffic in women on the continent. When Masutomi Masasuke of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and board member of the Kakuseikai (League for Purifying the Pleasure District) organized the Manshū Fujin Kyūsaikai (Society of Women's Salvation in Manchuria) in Darien, a gateway port city of Manchuria, with the purpose of “purifying” newly acquired territories of Japan, the WCTU decided to patronize his project with the Young Women's Christian Association and other women's organizations. Masutomi's new enterprise in Darien aimed at supporting “healthy” national expansion through “rescuing” women who were ex-prostitutes, unemployed, sick, or had other troubles.

The collaboration with Masutomi and support of his Society of Women's Salvation, however, did not satisfy the WCTU of Japan. Soon after the annexation of Korea in 1910, it started an independent action in the colony. In the year following


39 Ibid. Its program covered lessons in kimono-making, spiritual education based upon Christianity, and fundamental reading and writing. If necessary, the Society planned to transfer women to a shelter for ex-prostitutes run by the Salvation Army and the Jiaikan rescue home of the WCTU. See also “Manshū Fujin Kyūsaikai genkyō,” 5, 19-20

40 The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 recognized Japan's paramount interest in Korea. Yet, the formal annexation of Korea to Japan was finalized when the Treaty of Annexation was
the annexation, the Japanese Union created its first branches in Korea. Ruth F. Davis, a World's WCTU missionary to Japan, took the initiative to advance into Korea. When she was in Europe attending the Thirteenth International Congress on Alcoholism in the Hague, she wrote to Watanabe Tsune, the president of the Kobe branch, to meet her in Korea which Davis planned to visit on her way back to Japan and to jointly organize branches of the Japanese Union. Educated at Kobe Women's College and Carlton College in the United States, Watanabe had a good command of English. Moreover, Watanabe had experience working in Korea through her evangelical work with the Kumiai Church (Japanese Congregationalist). Therefore, Davis believed her to be a perfect partner for her new enterprises in Korea. 41

Davis and Watanabe deemed Japan's annexation of Korea a golden opportunity to expand the Japanese WCTU. 42 Its executive members also endorsed their plan. In Korea in 1911, they visited six cities, including Seoul and Pyongyang, and held numerous "temperance meetings" in churches, hospitals, companies, schools, the YMCA and Aikoku Fujinkai (Patriotic Women's Association). Watanabe primarily appealed to Japanese residents and succeeded in organizing a branch in Seoul with thirty Japanese women. Meanwhile, Davis worked with American and British

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42 Davis was not the only American missionary to identify herself with the nation she served. The American missionaries in the YMCA also took the side of the country they served. See Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress, chapter 5.
missionary women and formed the Foreign Auxiliary of the World's WCTU in Seoul.43 As the name indicates, the new missionary organization was directly related to the World's WCTU.44 Since about twenty American and British missionary women who joined the new group had been WCTU affiliates in their home countries, their connections with the World Union gave them a sense of "happy renewal of an old-time friendship."45 Their attachment to the World Union, not the Japanese one, was identical to the pattern that the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU initially adopted. But the Auxiliary in Japan which later switched its direct connection from the World to the Japanese Unions, the American and British women in Korea kept their direct connection with the World's WCTU until it was crushed by the colonial regime in the 1940s. Their rejection of incorporation into the Japanese Union enabled them to have an independent position from the Japanese. At the same time, their detachment from the Japanese implicitly reflected a sense of Western superiority over Japan and a tacit rejection of Japanese control over them and Korea. The World's WCTU did not question the direct affiliation with the foreign organization in Korea and never encouraged its incorporation into the Japanese Union. Instead, the World Union accepted the juxtaposition of the two newly established branches in Korea and

welcomed both by offering a grant to assist their work.46

In December 1912, Davis and Watanabe went to Taiwan (Formosa) which had been ceded from China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War. Watanabe, then conducting evangelical work in Taiwan, asked Davis to join her to organize a branch. They held public meetings at schools, Red Cross Hospitals, Women's Patriotic Societies, attended church services and joint gatherings with the Men's Temperance League and the YMCA, and succeeded in creating new outposts among Japanese women in Taipei and Tainan.47

The joint ventures of Davis and Watanabe opened a new chapter of the history of the Japanese WCTU. The birth of new outposts in Korea and Taiwan symbolized the inauguration of its new transnational enterprises and the establishment of bridgeheads for its further continental expansion. Davis and Watanabe also received support from the colonial administration and built amicable relations with authoritative figures in public offices. The WCTU’s opposition to the exportation of licensed vice to Japan’s colonies did not mean that it opposed colonialism per se. Rather, its members embraced Japanese hegemony over Korea and Taiwan, for they believed that Japan brought benefits of progress and development. When Hayashi Utako of the Osaka Union stayed in Taiwan in 1907 to raise money for her orphanage, she

expressed gratitude for the “pioneering” Japanese leaders who had laid the foundation of colonial administration. In Korea, Watanabe and Davis visited the office of the Governor-General and gave an address of appreciation for the improvement of morality among residents of Korea. Davis extolled Taiwan under Japan’s rule:

In this particular Japanese colony, as is the case with colonies of the world over, there is a freedom from restraint, a throwing off of many of the prejudices which hamper in the homeland, and cordiality on the part of the government officials, and an unbounded hospitality, which make a brief sojourn there a novel and altogether enjoyable experience.

Taiwan impressed Davis that it was the land of “freedom from restraint” without “prejudices” despite the fact that the annexation of Taiwan was accompanied by the brutal oppression of anti-Japanese forces and human rights violations committed against the natives. Nevertheless, the great hospitality of the colonial officials impressed upon her that Taiwan had great possibilities for temperance work and freedom for women from the yoke of oppression. Japan's colonial regime in Taiwan provided her and Watanabe with enough facilities to make their trip enjoyable by presenting them first class passes for railway travel throughout the island. In Korea, high-ranking officials of the colonial government including the surgeon general and a mayor welcomed the establishment of the WCTU. In Seoul, the wife of the chief justice

49 Watanabe, “Taiwan kikou,” Fujin shinpō, no. 189 (March 25, 1913): 27.
50 Davis, “A Temperance Tour in Formosa,” 111.
51 Takenaka Nobuko, Shokuminchi Taiwan no Nihon josei seikatsushi: Meiji-hen (Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1995), chapters 4 and 8.
52 Ibid.
of an appellate court became the first president of the new branch Union.53

The colonial regime in Korea welcomed the Japanese WCTU because it feared the rapid expansion of Christianity by Western missionaries and suspected that these missionaries would join hands with Korean nativists and agitate anti-Japanese feelings. The extraterritoriality of the Westerners hindered the colonial regime from meddling in their activities, so the colonial officials expected Japanese Christian organizations to function as a counterbalance to the Western Christian churches and schools.54 Moreover, the “low morality” of the Japanese settlers in Korea and Taiwan was a constant headache to the colonial governments. The officials frowned at the Japanese in Korea and Taiwan who did nothing but make profits by tyrannizing native people. Japanese women who prostituted themselves to the natives also became a subject of their discussion. These women represented the poverty of the underprivileged class of Japan and manifested unbalanced relations with wealthy native males. The colonial regimes were afraid that such vertical relationships between the Japanese and the natives would damage the national pride of the Empire and its authority over the colonial subjects. It was urgently necessary to control “undesirable” Japanese not only for preventing the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment among the natives but also preserving the dignity of the Empire.55 Therefore, they

55 Ibid., 75 and 202.

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encouraged the Japanese WCTU and provided facilities for its activities. Thus, the new outposts of the Japanese WCTU in Korea and Taiwan were established in close liaison with Japanese colonialism, and Davis and Watanabe involved the Japanese Union in the process of Japan's empire building.

The Japanese Union was not an isolated Christian organization in its support of the colonial expansion of Japan and endorsement of its colonial regimes. Especially during the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese Christian leaders competed with other religious leaders and intellectuals in expressing loyalty to the Emperor. They believed that Japan fought for the independence of Korea and peace in Asia. During the Russo-Japanese War, elite male Japanese Christians endorsed the war with hopes that it would spur liberation and national progress in Korea and Manchuria, and some of them even fulfilled self-proclaimed roles as private diplomats and explained the legitimacy of Japan's position in Europe.\textsuperscript{56} Protestant missionaries stationed in Japan encouraged Japan's challenge against Russia and favorably looked at the patriotic actions of their Japanese Christian colleagues.\textsuperscript{57} The Japanese WCTU refuted domestic anti-Christian allegations that Christianity was incompatible with \textit{kokutai}, the national polity, and that Christians were deficient in patriotic feelings. In order to express patriotism, the Unionists adopted an idea of \textit{imon-bukuro} (comfort bags) from

the United States and sent numerous packages containing miscellaneous goods, Japanese sweetmeats, Bibles, and temperance and religious leaflets to soldiers in the battlefield. The comfort bag campaign soon received wide attention and spread beyond the organization. Other women's organizations followed the WCTU and participated in making and sending comfort bags to the fronts.

Christian communities' collaboration with Japan's military actions and support for the imperial expansion changed the negative attitudes of the government toward Christianity as a religion in conflict with national tradition, morals, and the Emperor system. The government now started to take advantage of Christianity as an instrument for stabilizing society. In 1912, the Ministry of Home Affairs demanded religious leaders representing Shintoism, Buddhism, and Christianity to work for uplifting national standards of morality. In other words, the government authority treated Christianity, Shintoism, and Buddhism equally. The colonial regime in Korea also used Christianity as one of its spiritual instruments for depriving Koreans of their nationalist consciousness and promoting their spiritual "Japanization" or the adoption of Japanese values and ideologies. During the early years of Japanese rule in Korea,

60 Ibid., 160-161.
61 Iinuma Jirō, “3・1 jiken to Nihon kumiai kyōkai—tokuni Watase·Kashiwagi ronsō ni tsuite,” in *Nihon no kindaika to Kirisutokyō*, ed. Dōshisha Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku
the colonial administration pursued an appeasement policy toward Christian churches and organizations and used them for social stability. The Kumiai Church (the Japanese Congregationalist) and the Korean YMCA, for instance, received financial support from the colonial government.\textsuperscript{62} Japanese Christian leaders appreciated such public endorsement and carried out aggressive evangelization in Japan's colonies. The Kumiai Church with which Watanabe Tsune was affiliated actively worked among both the Japanese residents and Koreans.\textsuperscript{63}

The Japanese WCTU also earned a favorable reputation through the success of its “comfort bag” campaign and became a “welcomed and respected organization in Imperial Japan.”\textsuperscript{64} Official endorsement of the Japanese WCTU, however, distanced it from the native people. In Korea, Watanabe and Davis rarely communicated with Koreans. In Taiwan, they visited what they called a “savage” school for Taiwanese aboriginal children in a mountainous region and saw most of the children ragged and unkempt. This inspired Watanabe to collect and send gifts of kimonos to children.\textsuperscript{65} Watanabe thought that racial minority children of Taiwan had to abandon their customs and behavior and replace them with Japanese ones, symbolized by the kimono. Such attitudes toward native customs had striking parallels with those of Western

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 59-61.
\textsuperscript{64} Yasutake, \textit{Transnational Women's Activism}, 185.
missionaries who tried to reform the Japanese in line with their own values.

The Japanese women of the WCTU focused much more on working among the Japanese residents in the early stage of its expansion in Asian colonies, yet Japan’s empire-building in East Asia dramatically increased contact with Chinese and Koreans and resulted in the reconstruction of “racial” and cultural boundaries between Japanese and other Asians. Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1907 strengthened the idea that other Asian nations were “backward” vis-à-vis Japan and in need of Japan’s guidance.

The Japanese WCTU welcomed the ascendancy of Japan, and at the same time, it also feared that Japan’s alleged “superiority” was vulnerable to accusations of

66 The integration of non-Japanese into the Japanese Empire sparked arguments about the origin of the Japanese “race” and their relations with other Asians. Oguma Eiji reveals that the majority of Japanese intellectual leaders regarded the Japanese “race” as a mixture of various ethnic and racial groups of Asia. Since ancient times, Japan had accepted and assimilated many people of various ethnic and racial origins without discrimination. Thus, Japanese continental expansionism was like “returning home” and the Japanese were adaptable to the environments of both the northern and the southern parts of Asia. The Japanese government never called Korea and Taiwan “shokuminchi” (colonies). Instead, it used “gaichi” (overseas territories) in contrast to “naichi” (home territory). This ideology, however, does not mean that Imperial Japan treated the colonized people without discrimination. By using patriarchal household ideology, Japan treated Koreans, Taiwanese, Okinawans, and Ainus as “adopted” children so that it expected them to respect their fathers/elder brothers and follow their family customs. Simultaneously, Japan treated them as “non-Japanese” when they became unnecessary. For instance, the Japanese government originally treated the Korean residents in Japan as Japanese nationals. After the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, it deprived them of Japanese nationality. As this case indicates, Japan arbitrarily treated these people as Japanese or non-Japanese at its convenience from the early Meiji period on. Oguma Eiji, Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: “Nihonjin” no jigazō (Tokyo: Shin'yōsha, 1995); Oguma, Nihonjin no kyōkai.

67 For the construction of racial identity of the Japanese and their position toward Koreans, Taiwanese, and Ainu, see Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-War Japan,” in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, ed. Frank Dikötter (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1997).
social vices. The Union repetitively attacked the inhumane treatment of women in Korea and China who were victimized by what they called “feudalistic” remnants such as concubinage, polygamy, and the flesh trade.⁶⁸ An essay published in *Fujin shinpō* in 1895, for instance, denounced the highly oppressive “customs” of Korean women that did not allow them to see male doctors and go outside of the home. While condemning discriminatory customs of Korea, the Japanese WCTU rationalized Japan’s war with China for the “independence” of Korea and the enhancement of its civilization.⁶⁹

Japan was, however, not free from promoting the oppressive and exploitative “customs” of women in its neighbors. Although Taiwan originally had no system for licensed prostitution, the Japanese colonial administration introduced it and quickly made licensed quarters omnipresent among both Japanese and native communities of Taiwan.⁷⁰ In such cases, the Japanese presence ironically promoted the commercialization and exploitation of women’s sexuality rather than mitigating discrimination against women. A huge gap between the expected role as moral leader of Asia and the gross reality of Japan’s imperial policy annoyed the Unionists. Since they regarded women’s status as the measure of progress, they did not tolerate the integration of the sex trade into empire building. Their new outposts in Korea and Taiwan were expected to launch a special mission to make the Japanese worthy of

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leading Asians by eliminating negative aspects of Japan's imperialism.

The Strengthened Tie between American and Japanese White Ribboners and the Rise of the Chinese WCTU

While Ruth Frances Davis and Watanabe Tsune were developing connections with Asia by organizing chapters in Korea and Taiwan, the international affiliation that the WCTU had developed between Japan and the United States was also strengthened by frequent personal interactions and financial flow. After Yajima's trip to the United States in 1906, the Japanese Union regularly sent its delegates to conventions of the World's WCTU until the dawn of World War I. In 1908, The WCTU welcomed the "Great White Fleet" from the United States as a great opportunity to strengthen U.S-Japan friendship and succeeded in convincing the authorities not to have geisha entertain at welcome receptions for American crews. The news from Japan conveying social purity campaigns and the steady growth of the Japanese Union

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71 Ruth F. Davis and two Canadian Methodist missionaries of the Foreign Auxiliary attended the 8th Conference of the World's WCTU held in Glasgow, 1910. In 1913, Iwasawa Tokiko, a teacher of Friends School represented the Japanese Union with two missionary women at the 9th conference in Brooklyn, New York. Thereafter, the World's WCTU conference was not held until after World War I.

constantly appeared in the *Union Signal* with favorable phrases, such as “Brave Japan.”

The missionaries from the World Union contributed to the development of a harmonious relationship between the Japanese and the World/American Unions. Flora E. Strout and Frances E. Davis frequently wrote for the Union Signal and reported to the World headquarters positively about the strenuous efforts of their Japanese white ribboners. Strout and Davis also repeatedly appealed to the World and American WCTUs that Japan was full of opportunities to spread the temperance cause and requested financial support by stating that “every cent of money and every year of service given by your representatives have been eminently worth while.”

The World Union responded to their appeal with generous grants to Japan. From 1907, Japan received money to pay for the salaries of Japanese officers, travel, publishing, office expenses, and other miscellaneous purposes in addition to salaries for missionaries. The total amount of financial support from the World Union to Japan between June 1st, 1908, and May 31st, 1909, reached $2,567.57. This number far surpassed the sum of money sent to other national chapters. During the same period, Mexico, the second largest financial recipient, got $689.50. India received $628.66, and China obtained only $30.00.

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After Strout and Davis went back to the United States in 1910 and 1913, respectively, the Japanese WCTU requested money to hire a Japanese officer rather than another missionary. The World Union granted this request. With financial aid from the world office, the Japanese Union recruited Kubushiro Ochimi who came back from the United States as a new executive member. The generous support to Japan from the World Union even continued during World War I. The World Union treated Japan with exceptional favor due to its perception that Japan was receptive to Western influence and guidance; it regarded Japan as a crucial strategic point for the spread of its outposts and to "win the Orient." In 1915, the World headquarters decided to celebrate April 24th, Yajima's birthday, as "Japan Day" and informed its branches all over the world to observe it. This decision brought great joy and honor to the Japanese WCTU which regarded it as a token of international acceptance and respect.

Such favorable treatment of Japan by the World's WCTU made a striking contrast with the scant sum of support afforded to China until the middle of the 1910s. Although the WCTU in China was established almost simultaneously with the WCTU

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77 The World WCTU expended $1292.00 to support works in Japan between June 1st, 1915, and May 31st, 1916, when Burma, the second largest recipient of financial support, received only $300. The World's WCTU paid $900 for Yajima's salary and $100 for traveling expenses. Moreover, the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese Union donated money for the construction of new headquarter buildings. "Treasurer's Report from June 1st, 1915, to May 31st, 1916," in The Tenth Convention Report (1920): 77; Anna A. Gordon, "Brave Japan," Union Signal (May 9, 1912): 3.
78 Katharine Lent Stevenson, "Leaves from a Traveler's Notebook: Japan, Union Signal, (February 25, 1909): 14
in Japan in 1886, it primarily developed among English-speaking, Protestant, missionary communities. Due to different political, social, economic, and educational circumstances from those of Japan, the Chinese Union initially attracted only a small number of native women. In the late 1880s, China was still under the strong influence of customs promoted by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), which did not allow women to join organized activities. It was not until the end of the Qing dynasty that collective actions of women emerged.\textsuperscript{80} The absence of native women in the branches in China impressed the World Union that China was less fertile than Japan.

Nevertheless, the WCTU in China gradually expanded in its vast land. Just as various cities in Japan produced independent Unions before they merged into one national organization, the Chinese WCTU started as separate local organizations. The WCTU Shanghai was, for instance, established in December 1886 with twenty-four missionary women and wives of missionaries as the result of the visit of Mary Clement Leavitt who went there after her productive tour in Japan.\textsuperscript{81} These missionaries in Shanghai seriously considered the training of young native women and created Unions in connection with girls' missionary boarding schools.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{81} At first, Leavitt attempted to organize two Unions, one for missionary and Chinese women, and the other for those outside of the missionary circle. However, Leavitt and women whom she met decided to have only one Union because they believed it more practicable. \textit{Report of Two Years Work of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union} (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1889): 1; \textit{The Woman's Christian Temperance Union: A Brief Historical Sketch} (Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1887).
\textsuperscript{82} Mary C. Robinson, "Chin·kiang, China," in \textit{The Sixth Convention Report} (1903): 44;
One of the results of such organizational work by the Shanghai WCTU was
the creation of Zhenjiang (Chinkiang) WCTU in 1887, attached to an M.E. mission’s
boarding school for girls.\textsuperscript{83} The Zhenjiang WCTU, under the presidency of Mrs. B. C.
Wang, set about to crusade against alcohol consumption and the use of opium among
the Chinese, as did the Shanghai Union.\textsuperscript{84} Being active in the WCTU as a great
admirer of Frances E. Willard, she gave her daughter, Liming, an English name
“Frances Willard.” Despite the early death of her husband and subsequent economic
hardship, Wang sent Liming to school. This educational opportunity changed Liming’s
life and prepared her to be a future leader of the WCTU in China. When Liming was
still a middle-school student at Knowles Bible Training School at Jiujiang (Kiukiang),
she joined and became the president of the local WCTU. Her leadership and great
academic ability attracted the attention of Sarah Boardman Goodrich, then president
of the Chinese WCTU.\textsuperscript{85} Goodrich reported her “discovery” of a Chinese “Frances
Willard” to the World’s WCTU as “a capable young woman from whom we hope
much.”\textsuperscript{86}

When Goodrich informed the World Union of Liming, the executives of the
World Union were planning to give “special help” to China.\textsuperscript{87} Since missionary

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{“China,” \textit{W.W.C.T.U. Bulletin} (July 1909).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.: \textit{Report of Ten Years Work of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union}, 4-5.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 5-7.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{85} When Katharine Lent Stevenson visited China, she appointed Goodrich of Beijing as
General Superintendent of the work in China. Since then, Goodrich represented the
Chinese WCTU. “China,” in \textit{The Eighth Convention Report} (1910): 76.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{86} “China,” \textit{W.W.C.T.U. Bulletin} (September 1914).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{87} “China,” \textit{W.W.C.T.U. Bulletin} (December 1913).}
\end{footnotes}
members of the Chinese Union had been pressuring the World Union for years to send a missionary to China, the world executives finally recognized the pressing demands for support in China and started thinking seriously about that nation.\textsuperscript{88} Instead of sending a resident missionary as they did to Japan, the World WCTU Executive Committee resolved that "the salary and traveling expenses of a Chinese young woman be given to China."\textsuperscript{89}

The strategic difference of spreading national branches between China and Japan derived from the American women's observation that China was not fully conditioned yet for the expansion of temperance work among native women. When Katharine Lent Stevenson, a round-the-world organizer of the World's WCTU, visited Japan in 1909, and China in the following year, she reported to the world office: "Unfortunately, according to Chinese etiquette, the time seems not yet to have come when Chinese women can organize and carry on an independent work, as their sisters in Japan have done."\textsuperscript{90} As she observed, the Japanese women had spearheaded a reform campaign and initiated collective movements since the late 1880s. Although higher education for women had not yet fully developed, Japan had already had at least a secondary-level educational system for women and a large enough Christian population which were prerequisites for WCTU activism. Japan also had certain social


\textsuperscript{89} "Executive Committee Meetings," in \textit{The Ninth Convention Report} (1913): 43.

conditions which allowed women to go out for gatherings. These circumstances helped Japanese women assume leadership since the inception of the Union. In contrast, China lacked the conditions conducive to the development of a middle-class Christian women’s movement. Sarah Boardman Goodrich wrote in 1910: “the moral energies of China’s women hitherto have never been used in a united form for their country’s betterment.”

Considering these pessimistic reports from China, the World Union decided to make an investment in the future of China through the training and education of young Chinese women who had just started unbinding their feet. Upon the recommendation of Goodrich, Wang Liming was chosen as the recipient of a scholarship by the World’s WCTU to study at Northwestern University. At age nineteen, she came to the United States in 1915 and lived with the world president, Anna Addams Gordon, in a building called “Rest Cottage” where Frances E. Willard had lived.

In the meantime, Goodrich aggressively recruited young Chinese women into the WCTU. She sensed a dramatic change in the political and social climate since the middle of the 1910s. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the increased influence of Western imperialism urged progressive Chinese to abandon repressive conventions and advocate women’s participation in the process of regenerating the nation as virtuous and wise mothers of future citizens. Hence, China

borrowed the “republican motherhood” ideology of post-revolutionary America. The spread of women’s education, the denial of Confucian social order, including gender hierarchy (husband guides wife), and the increasing demand for women’s equal rights among the progressive sectors, however, far exceeded the scope of “republican motherhood.” The Revolution of 1911 that ended the Qing dynasty further stimulated an offensive against Confucianism. Progressive intellectuals promoted women’s emancipation as one of the solutions to the national crisis. New ideologies of women’s emancipation imported from Western nations and Japan awakened Chinese female students and encouraged them to join women’s movements. The social reform cause of the WCTU attracted such young intellectual women. The increase in the number of native members and the subsequent “nativization” of the WCTU, thus, accompanied incorporating nationalistic concerns into its primary agenda. They saw the improvement of women’s status as an essential process in the regeneration of China into a modern, powerful nation which could stand face to face with other imperial powers. The close connection between the reform agenda of the WCTU and nation building came to characterize the Chinese Union.

With the increase in the number of native members, the WCTU in China ceased to be an organization consisting only of foreign missionaries. By the time Goodrich resigned from her official position in the Chinese Union in 1919, the young Chinese women had been trained enough to succeed her leadership. Among the

Chinese women who joined the WCTU, Mary Stone (Shih Meiyü), a medical doctor educated at the University of Michigan, and her cousin Mei Renyin who also studied in the United States, turned out to be the most prominent. In 1915, Stone became the first native president of the Chinese Union. Mei conducted organizational work by making numerous speeches all over China. In 1920, Wang Liming graduated from Northwestern University and was ready to go back to China with Christine I. Tinling, a British woman whom the World Union appointed to be an organizer in China. It was the first time that the World's WCTU sent a resident missionary to China. Liming was expected to interpret for Tinling. They sailed in March 1920 from San Francisco. En route to China, they stopped in Japan and stayed there for three weeks.

During their days in Japan, both Japanese and Foreign Auxiliary members of the WCTU welcomed Wang and Tinling by offering accommodations at the headquarters buildings and inviting them to the national conference of the Japanese WCTU and various other meetings. The Japanese Union arranged for Wang to speak before the Chinese YMCA in Japan and meet other Chinese students. The enthusiastic welcome that Wang and Tinling received in Japan let them feel that "we did not feel like strangers, for 'the tie that binds' united all our hearts." Through praying together with Japanese Christians by interchangeably using English and

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98 Ibid.
Japanese every morning and celebrating together on Easter Sunday, Tinling and Wang felt a strengthened sense of sisterhood with the Japanese Union women.99

Such friendly feelings toward the Japanese sister organization, however, did not mean that Wang sanctioned Japan's diplomatic and military policies toward China. A great shock soon replaced her original excitement after returning home from a five year absence. She discovered that tons of opium and other drugs were smuggled into her homeland from Japan and that Japanese officials functioned as the chief agents for carrying on this nefarious trade.100 She also saw American brewers who lost their market in the United States due to the Eighteenth Amendment come into China and tap its market to compensate.101 What disturbed her even more were the poverty of people and the overflow of women and children beggars onto the streets.102 The dual predicaments of poverty and vice among her people were, Wang believed, by-products of national weakness. This belief strengthened her determination to seek "the best way to make our country strong" so as not to be vulnerable to adverse influences from imperial powers.103 Like other young Chinese female reformers, Wang also deemed national regeneration and the fight against imperialism as indispensable to the

100 Frances Willard Wang, "Campaigning for Temperance in China," Union Signal (March 17, 1921): 5.
103 Frances W. Wang, "Campaigning for Temperance in China."
improvement of women's social and economic status. Her marriage with Liu Zhan'en (a.k.a. Herman C. E. Liu) did not deter her from aggressively working for women's causes.104 Having changed her family name to Liu·Wang, she founded and chaired the Shanghai Women's Suffrage Association and led the Shanghai Committee to Promote the National Assembly in 1924 with other prominent Chinese women. In 1927, the Kuomintang government appointed her to its committee on the women's movement, though the WCTU took a non-partisan stance.105 Above all, she mostly involved herself in the WCTU through speaking tours, collaborating with students' social reform organizations, and establishing institutions for women and children.

In addition to the youthful leadership of Liu·Wang, Ren Yinmei, and other Chinese organizers and support from Christine I. Tinling, another great surge of political movements brought about the rapid expansion of the WCTU in China. The May Fourth movement that occurred in 1919 in protest of the humiliating Twenty-One demands made by Japan stimulated debates on the improvement of women's status in the midst of the nationalist movement.106 Female students who joined patriotic actions such as mass rallies, strikes, boycotts of Japanese goods, and vigorous protest in the

104 Liu·Wang Liming, Zhongguo funü yundong (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1933), 1.
105 Wang, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment, 136-137.
106 Japan seized the opportunity of World War I for its continental expansion. In 1915, the Ôkuma Shigenobu cabinet presented to Yuan Shih-k'ai, the dictator of the Republic of China, Twenty-One Demands in five groups. Yuan accepted most of the first groups that confirmed Japan's dominant position in Shantung, South Manchuria, and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Japan was also acknowledged to have a special interest in the Han·Yeh·P'ing industrial base in Central China. The purpose of these demands was basically economic, but they brought about political effects in China. They aroused nationalism and caused patriotic, anti-Japanese movements.
press crossed the gender boundary previously imposed by feudalism and turned their attention to the issue of uplifting women's status in order to strengthen the nation.\textsuperscript{107}

The WCTU of China absorbed the gush of patriotic feelings and passions for women's emancipation from the May Fourth movement and rapidly expanded its membership. When the Chinese Union held its first annual conference in the rooms of the Shanghai YWCA in 1922, it had 6,000 members and 194 local unions in the different cities of China.\textsuperscript{108} Having grown to become one of the largest women's organizations in China, the Chinese WCTU developed strategies that were different from those of its Japanese and American counterparts. The Chinese Union aimed at abolishing the opium traffic which was a byproduct of imperialism, uplifting the beggar class, bettering home life, which included promoting the welfare of concubines and deserted wives, and promoting the temperance cause.\textsuperscript{109} Unionists in China incorporated the indirect rejection of imperialism and overtly challenged the anti-female practices of Confucianism that they believed legitimized the inhumane treatment of women. Its challenge to imperialism especially distinguished the Chinese Union from its American or Japanese counterparts. Both American and Japanese white ribboners not only endorsed imperialism but also used it to expand their outposts. Imperialism of both the Western powers and Japan was, they believed, a blessing of

\textsuperscript{107} Wang, \textit{Women in the Chinese Enlightenment}, 12-14.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{An Appeal from the W.C.T.U. of China}. Frances Willard Memorial Library, China Collection.
progress. They did not share the ideas and practices of Chinese sisters who took a completely different stance toward imperialism. This difference between the two groups soon became obvious once the Chinese Union grew enough to enter into the international women's community.

The Construction of the "White Ribbon League of Nations"

The Chinese WCTU experienced rapid growth in the late 1910s and the early 1920s and received full recognition from the World Union as one of the "chief auxiliary national organizations" in Asia paralleled only with those of Japan and India. This categorization, however, did not indicate that the Japanese and Chinese Unions had achieved a status equivalent to Britain or the United States in the world strata. The World Union, whose presidency was exclusively occupied by either American or British women, still indicated that "Orient Follows Pace Set by Occident." Although the national chapters of the World's WCTU in Japan, China, Korea, Burma, and India that had "depended largely upon the instruction on the temperance question given by our fine Christian missionaries" had grown so that they were capable of making

110 In 1919, the World's WCTU declared that its chief auxiliary national organizations were: the British Women's Temperance Association of England, the Scottish W.C.T.U., the Dominion W.C.T.U. of Canada, the National W.C.T.U. of the United States, the W.C.T.U.'s of Australia and New Zealand, India, Japan, China, Burma, France, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, South Africa, and two of our South American republics [sic], Argentina and Uruguay. The World Union rated the following countries as "the W.C.T.U. has a strong foothold": Madagascar, Straits Settlements, Bulgaria, the Bahamas, Egypt, Madeira, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Mexico, Finland, Belgium, Ireland, Turkey, Syria, Ceylon, Palestine, Bermuda, British Honduras, Cuba, West Africa, and Korea. Union Signal (March 20, 1919): 2.

spontaneous efforts, the World Union did not treat these organizations as mature enough to stand on their own feet without instructions from the Occident to follow.112

Among such Occidental nations, the United States offered to act as a role model to Asia and the world. The passage of the 18th Amendment outlawing all liquor consumption and production in 1919 and women's enfranchisement in 1920 freed the energies of the American WCTU for transnational work. Subsequently, the American Union women shifted their attention to more global rather than domestic goals and renewed their self-acclaimed role as a moral leader of the world by declaring that "America Sets Standards for the World" by which "every other nation on the globe must hereafter be judged."113

The revitalized notion of America as a world champion of morality prompted the American WCTU to break new ground on a transnational crusade. Rejoicing in the ratification of the federal prohibition amendment, it started new missions to spread prohibition throughout the world.114 As a part of its global strategy, the American Union inaugurated vigorous campaigns to raise money for South America, Japan, and China in particular—areas it deemed "threatened by invasion from American brewers"

112 Ibid.
that had lost their domestic market. American white ribboners feared that producers and dealers of alcoholic beverages in the United States would make inroads into foreign markets, which urged them to set a new goal to spread the Eighteenth Amendment throughout the world. As a result of such concerns, the American Union established the Jubilee Foundation in 1919. Japan and China were among the major recipients of the Foundation. With the money received from the Jubilee Fund, the Japanese Union established the Yajima Kaji Scholarship for Women's Christian College, while the Chinese branch used its money for the works of Christine I. Tinling, Liu-Wang Liming and five native organizers, and other miscellaneous purposes. Later, the American Union extended its financial contribution to Malaysia, France, Belgium, Italy, the Philippines, Burma, and Palestine in order to "hasten the coming in all the world of total abstinence, prohibition, purity and peace."

The rejuvenated global concern and actions of the WCTU were connected to the rising internationalist sentiment during the inter-war period primarily in the Euro-American arena. The devastation of World War I and subsequent establishment of the League of Nations sparked numerous individuals and non-governmental voluntary groups from different lands to seek an alternative community of nations through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly communications, and through efforts facilitating cross-national understanding. Women's international

115 Ibid.
116 "Sound the Jubilee!" Union Signal (December 18, 1919): 7.
118 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
organizations, such as the International Council of Women (since 1888), the
International Alliance of Women (since 1904), and the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom (since 1914), also became actively engaged in constructing
transnational gender solidarity and enhancing mutual understanding during the
inter-war period. Women of these organizations and members of other international
women's groups, such as the YWCA and the Inter-American Commission of Women,
successfully pressured the League of Nations and the International Labor
Organizations to open positions to women and establish special committees for dealing
with women's concerns, including traffic in women.\textsuperscript{119} Through such actions, they
sought freedom from male control and attempted to fulfill the role of responsible
citizens not only domestically but also internationally. For them, peace meant more
than a mere absence of war. They worked for world peace through overcoming
international conflicts by making friends and forming quasi-families across national
borders.

What bound participants in women's international organizations together and
overcame national boundaries was an essentialized notion of motherhood that

\textsuperscript{119} The League of Nations established the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and
Children, consisting of representatives of nine countries and of international
nongovernmental organizations. Japan became one of the representatives of the committee
and ratified the International Convention on Traffic in Women and Children in 1921.
However, the Japanese government ratified the convention with several reservations,
lowering the age of women and children without the need of protection from 21 to 18 years
old. Japan also did not apply this the convention to its colonies. Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin
Kyofukai, ed., \textit{Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin Kyofukai hyakunenshi} (Tokyo: Domesu shuppun,
1986), 614; Nitza Berkovitch, \textit{From Motherhood to Citizenship: Women's Rights and
International Organizations} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 75.
presumed that women, with their biological capacity as child bearers, had a particular passion for peace. Because of their maternal concerns, they expanded domestic concerns into diplomatic issues by taking a pro-consumer, pro-housewife stance that disarmament and collective security would bring lower consumer prices and price stability. Moreover, they believed that all women were, regardless of national, class, and ethnic differences, allocated to subordinate status and under the potential threat of institutionalized oppression including physical violence of slavery, rape, and other forms of abuse and psychological, economic, and political oppression. They hoped that women from all corners of the world would be brought together and challenge their universal status as second-class citizens and believed that differences of race, religion, and culture would be overcome by the commitment to a common cause. The creation of universal sisterhood was their common purpose.120

The WCTU adopted a similar discourse of domesticity and ideology of motherhood to pursue its international goal.121 Anna A. Gordon, president of both the


World and American WCTUs, argued that the nations grouped in the WCTU were "family." While Lella A. Dillard, the director of the Department of Peace and International Arbitration of the American Union, regarded the WCTU as the "mother of all reforms" and promoted an all-inclusive social reform project under the policy of "Do-Everything." These metaphors indicate that the celebration of motherhood and family that Frances E. Willard devised in the late 19th century still remained essential for the transnational activism of the WCTU.

In addition to working for the realization of worldwide prohibition and purity as they had previously, the WCTU reinterpreted its mission in the context of the internationalism of the inter-war period. As the president of an international organization that involved more than 40 nations in 1922, Anna A. Gordon termed her organization a "White Ribbon League of Nations" which would work for "world peace" and appealed to the necessity of "cultivating the international heart as well as the international mind." As a newly recognized women's League of Nations, the WCTU pursued the organization of the women of the world under the banner of the white ribbon, its symbol.

The international bonds of sisterhood that the "White Ribbon League of Nations" and other similarly oriented women's organizations promoted during the


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inter-war period were, however, not free from Euro-American centristm. The emergence of the spirit of universalism coincided with the heyday of European colonialism in which most of Africa and large parts of Asia were under the direct control of European nations. Latin America was not under colonial rule, but it maintained only a marginal position within the international system. These conditions directly reflected transnational women's movements. Elite women from Europe and North America who could afford to travel around the world and attend international conferences led these movements.\textsuperscript{125} When they constructed a collective identity within the world of women based on the common assumption of maternalism and disadvantage relative to men that seemed to transcend national and regional differences, they overlooked issues relevant only to non-Western women. Problems such as the impact of colonialism, poverty, wars waged against non-Western people in the Pacific, Africa, and the Caribbean, nationalism and national identity in the nations whose sovereignty was encroached upon by imperial powers, and anti-Asian immigration movements gaining strength in the United States were not integrated into the major agendas of the Western dominated women's community. Measuring women's status solely in terms of their involvement in public life manifested by women's suffrage and other civic opportunities, Western women regarded themselves as more "liberated" than their non-Western sisters. This myopic ideology of women's liberation produced a belief that Western women were knowledge producers and they established hierarchical

\textsuperscript{125} Berkovitch, \textit{From Motherhood to Citizenship}, 19-20.
distinctions between themselves and non-Westerners. Assuming that colonialism was beneficial for indigenous women and a harbinger of “progress,” they reproduced the global relations between imperialist and colonized countries. It was Western women who dominated international communities, while non-Western women were peripheralized despite the slogan of global sisterhood.126

The WCTU also preserved hierarchical notions of the West and the rest. It particularly highlighted American values and the American agenda. Even though the “organized mother’s love” of the “White Ribbon League of Nations” transcended the nation, its major participants were American women. Empowered by the success of national prohibition and women’s suffrage, they saw that the world needed their guidance and envisioned a world in their own image.127 Their claim to superiority was supported by the assumption of American women as the vanguard of progress in comparison to the helpless and victimized “other” women. As male private internationalist organizations, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, identified internationalism as Americanization after World War I and set about spreading the

127 Tyrrell, Woman’s World Woman’s Empire, 255.
American message represented by Woodrow Wilson's ideas of freedom—free trade, self-determination, and democracy—the WCTU also developed an Amerocentric agenda. However, Japanese became skeptical that internationalism might serve Western ends when Wilson refused to insert the racial equality clause into the Treaty of Versailles, and Japanese white ribboners started questioning the racial and cultural hierarchies of the WCTU that put them below Americans and their white allies.128 As Japanese men sat as the only representatives of a non-Western nation at the Versailles Peace Conference as one of the victorious Five Great Powers after World War I, Japanese women also developed their own designs to be accepted as equals by the West at the “White Ribbon League of Nations.” While paying special respect to the United States as their moral leader and seeking guiding principles from it, the Japanese WCTU women tried to be present in the World’s WCTU and other international organizations, not as disciples or victims who should follow Occidental guidance, but as active agents to work together with their white sisters.

Japanese Women in Women’s International Movements of the United States and Europe

Anna A. Gordon’s letter to the Japanese WCTU opened a new chapter in its post-World War I transnational activism. In this letter, she encouraged Japan to send

its delegates to the forthcoming conference of the “White Ribbon League of Nations” in London in 1920. As other international women’s organizations, particularly after World War I, sought to recruit members and sections from parts of the world where they were not well represented and make the movement “international,” the WCTU also wanted a broader representation at its world conference. Upon the request of Gordon, Yajima Kaji volunteered for a trip to London, despite her age of almost eighty-eight. Gauntlett Tsune, chief of the Youth Section, and Watase Kame, vice-chief of the Legislation Section, accompanied her. The strong will to overcome parochialism and to break the silence that had been imposed as a “virtue” of Japanese women inspired them to go to London.

The appearance of Japanese women in London, especially Yajima’s courage to go across the Pacific Ocean, the American continent, and the Atlantic Ocean impressed other delegates, though the number of Japanese women was minor compared to those of other nations. There were 88 delegates from the United States and the 134 representatives from England and Wales. The Union Signal reported that “Japan’s venerable president, Madam Kaji Yajima, eighty-eight years young, and her interesting interpreter, the charming Mrs. Gauntlett, told of the brave fight against

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130 Rupp, World’s of Women, 77.
strong drink and social vice in their country."133

In addition to the courage of Yajima, another element of the Japanese representatives attracted attention in London. At the convention, these Japanese women were also objects of exotic interest, as the "delegation from the Orient was naturally the most picturesque and most often photographed by the newspapers."134 Their non-white faces with indigenous kimonos were enough to satisfy the curiosity of Western women inspired by the European vogue of Japonism and American Orientalism that highly valued "exotic" Japanese commodities.135 Unlike the elderly Yajima who always wore a kimono at home, Gauntlett rarely wore it back in Japan and led a Western style life with her British husband. At the request of the conference, she borrowed a kimono from a Japanese woman living in London and always wore it when she made speeches.136 The audience welcomed these Japanese delegates in kimonos with handshakes and kisses.137 This enthusiastic response from Western women culminated in the celebration of Yajima's eighty-eighth birthday by the attendants. The

warm welcome she received from Western women impressed Yajima and her fellows. 138

The Japanese delegates did not recognize the political and gendered messages the kimono embodies. Orientalist discourse frequently equated Japanese women in kimonos with geisha who conveyed stereotypical images of Japanese women as docile, gentle, and compliant to male sexual demands which were completely opposite to the image of middle-and-upper-middle-class Western women's suffragists. 139 By requesting Yajima and Gauntlett to wear kimonos, Western women depoliticized these Japanese women in an international stage and changed them into mere objects for gaze. They did not pay attention to what these Japanese women said at the platform as much as to what they wore and looked like. By transforming the Japanese delegates into muted and apolitical commodities to satisfy Orientalist curiosity, Western women confirmed their superiority and power vis-à-vis them and reinforced their dominance of the international women's community. Meanwhile, Yajima and Gauntlett did not challenge the imposed role as marginalized and exoticized guests. It seems that Yajima and Gauntlett did not comprehend the meaning of the kimono in Western settings, so they deliberately used the kimono to make themselves noticeable in international gatherings that were predominantly controlled by white women. 140

139 For geisha girl image of Orientalist discourse, see Yoshihara, Embracing the East, chapter 2.
140 Gauntlett advised Koshio Kanji, a male temperance activist, to wear a formal dress in public when he attended the World’s WCTU conference in Stockholm in 1934. Following the example of Gauntlett who won instant popularity thanks to her colorful kimono, Koshio also wore a kimono with a hakama to make himself noticeable. His costume made him a
Despite their failure to be accepted as fellow powerful agents by Western women, Yajima and Gauntlett’s trip to London expanded the Japanese Union’s alliance with international feminist groups and broadened its horizons of activism. Especially, new contacts with the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) inspired the Japanese Unionists to think seriously about women’s suffrage for the first time. Although Japan had already had women’s suffrage movements by Shinfujin Kyōkai (New Women’s Association) since 1919, by Hiratsuka Raichō, a major figure of a women’s literary magazine, Seiō (bluestockings), Ichikawa Fusae, Oku Mumeo and other socialist as well as conservative women, Gauntlett Tsune had not been sympathetic to “aggressive” woman’s political movements. She was not free from the influences of hostile media coverage and distorted images of women’s suffragettes as destructive to moral virtue and social order. Such prejudices constructed by patriarchal discourses detached her from the “radicalism” of women’s suffrage movements.

Unlike Gauntlett, the elder Yajima had already recognized the indispensability of women’s suffrage in order to implement reform plans as early as 1915, five years before the birth of the New Women’s Society.141 Yajima convinced Gauntlett to accept an invitation to the IWSA’s Geneva Conference presided over by famous figure as “Mr. Nippon” at the conference, and he was the only man allowed to step on the platform. This is a significant case because a Japanese deliberately manipulated Orientalism and catered to exotism in order to achieve the goal of receiving attention from the Western audience. Koshio Kanji, “Ōshû miyage,” Fujin shinpō (January 1, 1935): 31. 141 Yajima Kajiko, “Fujin sanseiken no hitsuyou o omou,” Kakusei 5, no. 12 (December, 1915): 5.
Carrie Chapman Catt.\textsuperscript{142} The IWSA's main platform linked women's enfranchisement and the happiness of family and world peace. This association transformed Gauntlett from a reluctant women's suffrage supporter to an aggressive suffragist. Because of her own British nationality by marriage, she nominated Kubushiro Ochimi to the position of the first superintendent of the newly organized National Woman's Suffrage Association within the Japanese WCTU; the IWSA endorsed this new organization as its affiliate. At the inauguration meeting of the new Association in 1921, only 36 Christian women were present. In the following year, aggressive recruitment brought over 100 men and women, including non-Christians, to its special meeting.\textsuperscript{143} Later, the Association united with several other groups for women's suffrage and steadily grew.

International peace also occupied the interest of internationally oriented Japanese women. The promise of the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson's ideal of internationalism and democracy, inspired them to contribute to the world peace movement.\textsuperscript{144} Gauntlett shared a search for international peace and organized the

\textsuperscript{142} Kawai Michi of the Japanese YWCA also attended this conference.


\textsuperscript{144} Jon Thares Davidann argues that Japanese Christian identity underwent a transformation after World War I when it began to search for international peace, democracy, and industrial equity at home. Gauntlett was one such Japanese Christian who became conscious of the issue of world peace. Davidann, \textit{A World of Crisis and Progress}, 159-161.
Nihon Heiwa Fujin Kyōkai (Women's Peace Association of Japan) with other prominent female professors, educators, leaders of women's Christian organizations, and wives of diplomats and military officers in 1921. This new group aimed at raising "the general standards of women, and to bring about better international understanding and permanent peace." Jane Addams' International League for Peace and Freedom gave recognition to the Society. Since membership was open to women of all nationalities, several female missionaries also joined this Association. Professor Inoue Hide of Japan Women's College became the first president. The Association was exclusively an elite, academic organization with a small membership and primarily conducted research and information activities.

Yajima's peace envoy to the Washington Naval Conference in 1921 was also

145 The founding members included Inoue Hide, Hani Motoko, Jōdai Tano, Kawai Michi, and Nitobe Mariko, a wife of the under-secretary of the League of Nations, Nitobe Inazō.
146 E. G. Owen, "The Women's Peace Association in Japan," Japan Evangelist 32, no. 6 (June 1925): 204.
147 Jane Addams' visit to Japan in 1923 "helped greatly to give an understanding of what could be done" by the Association. It primarily conducted research on tendencies of thought among youth, population problems, and examined school textbooks regarding peace education. It also negotiated with the Ministry of Education concerning the results of such research. What Gauntlett calls "minkan gaikō" (private diplomacy) was also a part of its work. With the recognition that Japan marked the "border line of the East and the West," English-speaking members of the Association made contacts with foreigners by inviting them to tea ceremonies and flower arrangement with some well-known Japanese families. They also approached embassies of various nations, the Red Cross, and other organizations and worked to disseminate information about Japan. As of 1937, the Association had three hundred members. The league continued these works until being crushed by the authorities in the second year of the Pacific War. Jōdai Tano, "Jikyoku gūkan," Fujin shinpō, no. 289 (October 10, 1921): 11-13; Owen, "The Women's Peace Association in Japan," 203-205; "Shōwa jūichinen fujin dantai gyōseki ichiran (8)," Fujo shinbun, no. 1925 (May 2, 1937): 9; Gauntlett, Shichijū shichinen no omoide, 127-128
the fruit of rising consciousness of world peace in Japan. Yajima and Moriya Azuma, the chief of the Children’s Section, carried a message of peace to the White House that stated “Japanese womanhood prays for the success of the Washington Conference and the dawn of a new epoch of higher and better understanding between nations,” signed by 10,224 women of Japan. This message did not explicitly demand the universal abolition of arms and military forces, as American women of the Women's Peace Party, the Women's Peace Union, the radical pacifist minority of the National Council for the Prevention of War, and the WILPF did. Nevertheless, their moderate cry for transnational friendship received support from Anna A. Gordon. She introduced Yajima and Moriya to President Warren G. Harding; representatives of the Missionary Societies, the Federation of Women’s Clubs, the League of Women Voters, and the YWCA accompanied them. Harding, surprised at Yajima’s age, warmly greeted the

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148 Originally, the Japanese WCTU planned to encourage the American Union to lobby for the Washington Conference. What motivated the Japanese to take more direct action was an appeal by Watanabe Kinzo, husband of a Union member and advisor for Ushijima Kingo (George Shima), a successful agricultural entrepreneur known as the “potato king” in California. Watanabe visited the headquarters office in Tokyo and talked about the significance of the forthcoming Washington Conference. He urged the WCTU to send its representatives to express the peace-loving sentiments of the Japanese. His argument moved Yajima Kaji, then eighty-nine years of age, and convinced her to venture out for her third and final trip to the United States. N. O. K. [pseudonym of Kubushiro Ochimil, “Bankoku heiwa no tame ni shisha o okuru,” Fujin shinpó, no. 289 (October 10, 1921): 1-2.


151 “National W.C.T.U. President Received by President Harding at White House—Madam Yajima Presents Petition from Japanese Women,” Union Signal (November 10, 1921): 8; “Madam Kaji Yajima and Miss Moriya Honored Guests in Three Cities: Being Peace
visitors from Japan with handshakes and saying, “I thank you for coming” at the White House.\(152\)

Contrary to the welcoming voices given to Yajima from American and Japanese individuals and organizations, \(153\) some newspapers treated her journey derogatorily by calling her “Jap.”\(154\) This hostile reaction to her envoy indicates that racism against Japanese was making rapid gains in the United States at the very moment when internationalist movements also prospered in the 1920s.\(155\) Helen Topping, a former Baptist missionary who had lived in Japan for twenty-five years and

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152 Moriya, “Heiwa no tabi ni shitagoute,” 15.

153 The Japanese Christian community in Seattle raised money and introduced Helen Topping as a translator and guide. On the way to the national capital, they found in Minneapolis that the governor of Minnesota, district officers of the WCTU, and members of other women’s societies interested in the reduction of armaments, such as the League of Women Voters, were waiting to welcome them. In Evanston, Anna A. Gordon arranged a reception in which sixty-nine of that city’s women’s organizations participated. Former U.S. Vice-President James Marshal joined the Sunday service held for special guests from the East and extolled their contribution to a U.S.-Japan friendship. In Washington D. C., New York City, Chicago, Columbus, and Atlantic City, Yajima and Moriya received invitations from a number of organizations, including Jane Addams’ peace association and church services, and busied themselves with making speeches and attending receptions and prayers. The Japanese officials also took notice of them. Soon after their meeting with President Harding, Prince Tokugawa lesato, representing the Japanese government at the Washington Conference, held a reception in honor of Yajima at the Japanese Embassy. Moriya Azuma, “Shiyatoru Kirisutokyō shinjya keishi narabini Nihon Fujin Kirisutokyō Kyōfūkai honbu oyobi shohibu onchū,” Fujin shinpō, no. 291 (December 10, 1921): 12-13.


155 Iriye, Cultural Imperialism and World Order, 40.
traveled together with Yajima as her interpreter and guide, took offense at the slur, but Yajima did not take it seriously. She did not see this small incident as a sign of the anti-Japanese feelings that would culminate in the Immigrant Act of 1924. The welcomes and friendliness that American male and female leaders expressed to her made mounting anti-Japanese feelings less noticeable.

Yajima's trip to Washington D.C. seemed successful in the eyes of the Japanese white ribboners. One result of the Conference, known as the Five Power Treaty, established a ratio for capital ship tonnage among the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in order to stabilize the economies of the imperial powers by reducing military spending. Some Japanese naval leaders denounced the inferior naval ratio to those of the United States and Great Britain as a national disgrace.156 The outcome also dissatisfied radical female peace activists in the United States who hoped to completely eliminate the armed forces.157 Contrary to these two groups, Yajima and her followers welcomed the Pact, for they were satisfied by the very fact that disarmament was brought up for discussion among major powers. Yajima's trip inspired younger Union members. Since Yajima became seriously ill due to exhaustion from the long, busy trip, she never went back to the international arena.158 The younger leaders of the WCTU took over her task of transnational activism and followed in her footsteps in crossing the oceans. In 1922, Kubushiro

Ochimi, Hayashi Utako, and three other representatives attended the World's WCTU conference in Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{159} They explained the growing sentiment for national prohibition and the passage of the new law in March 1922 that prohibited liquor consumption by minors of 19 years and younger. They also demonstrated on-going campaigns against prostitution by showing a mammoth roll of paper on which many five\textsuperscript{-sen} bags were attached. The five\textsuperscript{-sen} bag was used as a petition against licensed vice and collected a small amount of five\textsuperscript{-sen} coins as contributions.\textsuperscript{160} She repeated her presentation and demonstration of five\textsuperscript{-sen} bags at another temperance conference.\textsuperscript{161} These speeches reflected Kubushiro's remorse over the "stained honor of Japanese women by the world"\textsuperscript{162} As a leader of the anti-prostitution campaign, she was desperate to remove the stereotypical image of Japanese women as geisha girls, perpetuated throughout the world by Japanese prostitutes abroad and amplified by the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[159] The representatives from Japan, other than Kubushiro and Hayashi, were Itô Kin, wife of Itô Hidekichi, general secretary of Kakuseikai (the League for Purifying the Pleasure District), Asa Matsuoka, student of Northwestern University, and Kishi Nobuko, student studying in the United States.
\item[162] Kubushiro, "Kaigai dayori," 45.
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Orientalist curiosity of Westerners. The cry for the temperance cause was, she believed, meaningless without eliminating distorted images attached to her millions of Japanese sisters.163

Kubushiro's irritation at stereotypical images of Japanese women originated from her first confrontation with Japanese prostitutes in Oakland more than a decade before. After graduating from the school run by her great-aunt, Yajima Kaji, she went to Honolulu to help her father's work as a priest. Then, she followed her parents to Oakland and supported her father's church activities while attending Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary in Berkeley. Her discovery of Japanese brothels in the Asian community of the Bay Area shocked her and awoke in her a staunch anti-prostitution activism.164 After she went back to Japan and joined the WCTU as the general secretary, she led its campaign against licensed vice. When she returned to the United States as a delegate of the WCTU Japan, she attempted to demonstrate an alternative image of Japanese women as respectable individuals working for temperance and social purity.

The transnational activism of the Japanese WCTU in the early 1920s brought about a rapid expansion of its scope and agenda. Through their trip to the United States and Europe, its members developed personal connections with international women's organizations other than the WCTU.165 The Japanese Union

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165 After attending the World’s WCTU Conference, Kubushiro made good use of this trip, financially supported by the Japanese Union, to absorb knowledge and experiences of
also involved itself in the Washington Conference through collecting signatures and submitting its message to President Harding. Yajima Kaji, a pioneer of its transnational activities, was conspicuous at the White House and other international conferences primarily because of her novelty as an “exotic guest” from afar despite her old age. Gradually, the younger members of the Japanese Union became aware of the prevalent image of the geisha girl in Western nations and Orientalist ideas attached to it. Although they did not overtly challenge requests to wear kimonos at international meetings to satisfy the appetite of Western participants to become “the most picturesque” objects of photographs, they sought to present themselves as contributors to social reform movements. The United States and Europe still offered them models for their activism, but they did not want to become a passive subject waiting to be saved by Westerners. The demonstration of “five-sen bags” at the conference of the “White Ribbon League of Nations” reflects their will to fight against social vices and to deconstruct the stereotypical image of the Japanese woman as a geisha girl, a term used interchangeably with prostitute in Western discourse.

Europeans and Americans about movements of temperance, purity, peace and women’s suffrage. In Geneva, she met Nitobe Inazo, then Undersecretary of the League of Nations, and witnessed the role of the League in the international community. Her trip to the United States and Europe made her realize that the highest priority on the Japanese agenda should be the acquisition of the great principle of women’s suffrage and nurturing international consciousness. Kubushiro, “Tadaima kaerimashita,” Fujin shinpō, no. 306 (April 10, 1923): 7-8; Mrs. A. M. Pinsent, “W.C.T.U. Delegates Returns from Abroad,” Fujin shinpō, no. 306 (April 10, 1923); Kubushiro, Haishō hitosuiji, 149.
The Expanding Outposts of the Japanese WCTU in Asia

In the interwar period, another facet of transnational actions came to the fore in the Japanese WCTU: spreading its outpost organizations in Asia and promoting social reforms among Japanese communities. If the Japanese Unionists sought to eliminate the stereotypical image of the geisha girl in the international community and uplift their national reputation, they had to reform the imperial structure of Japan in which the flesh trade was incorporated. Influenced by the racial and cultural discourse spread in Meiji Japan, portraying other Asian nationals as “inferior” according to the Spencerian interpretation of social development and international relations, the Union women saw the spread of Japanese prostitutes delegitimizing Japan’s claims for Asian leadership. Saving the dignity of Japan from being spoilt by these women was a watchword of their activism in Asia.

The WCTU started to investigate prostitution within and outside of the nation soon after World War I. In 1919, the WCTU dispatched Hayashi Utako, Miyagawa Shizue, and M. A. Clagett, an American Baptist missionary and one of the directors of the Jiaikan rescue home, to Siberia for the investigation of Japanese prostitutes. Their trip revealed that the most frequent customers of Japanese brothels were American servicemen who were sent there to intervene in the Bolshevik Revolution. This discovery made the Union women feel more “sorry” for American mothers and sisters than the Japanese prostitutes and worry about insults to Japan’s international image.
and prestige.\textsuperscript{166} This feeling reveals that the Union members perceived the prostitutes as vagrants responsible for moral corruption, not victims of social injustice and the sexual exploitation of American servicemen, and viewed the latter with sympathy as victims of the "lust" of the Japanese prostitutes.\textsuperscript{167}

Their respect for the achievements of the United States in social reforms blinded them to the responsibility of American troops for the prevalence of the sex trade. Japanese reformers lauded the venereal disease control program among the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) developed by the Woodrow administration during World War I. Since President Woodrow Wilson was concerned with preserving the idealized image of the American Expeditionary Forces as the knight in the crusade for democracy in addition to a more down-to-earth concern for preventing the drain of manpower due to venereal diseases, his government issued orders to prevent the AEF from having access to prostitutes. The act, called the "American Plan," included arresting and detaining women suspected of prostitution and contaminating soldiers with V.D., and conducting sex education among soldiers.\textsuperscript{168} The imposition of punitive policies did not completely divorce U.S. troops from brothels, as indicated by the

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\textsuperscript{166} Miyagawa Shizue, "Hatsutabi no omoide," Fujin shinpô, no. 269 (December 15, 1919): 14-15.
\textsuperscript{167} The medical faction within social hygiene in the United States also blamed the prostitute as a prime agent for the spread of venereal diseases, and urged the federal government to develop wartime neoregulationism of prostitution. See David J. Pivar, Purity and Hygiene: Women, Prostitution, and the "American Plan," 1900-1930 (Westport: Greenwood, 2002).
\textsuperscript{168} For wartime prostitution and venereal disease control in the United States, see Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), chapter iii: Pivar, Purity and Hygiene.
\end{flushleft}
profligacy of American servicemen in Siberia. Nevertheless, the Japanese Unionists admired this neoregulationist program and failed to recognize the huge gulf between the lofty Wilsonian ideal and the vulgar reality; the Japanese prostitutes remained the sole malefactor of the flourishing sex trade in Siberia.169

The shocking discovery in Siberia inspired the WCTU to form a special committee for the prevention of the traffic of women and inaugurated aggressive research into Japanese brothels abroad. Simultaneously, they directed their attention toward the Shimabara and Amakusa districts of Kyushu, the birthplace of many prostitutes abroad. Meanwhile, it sought to incorporate the flesh trade problem in Asia into the agenda of the World Union and to find a solution in an international framework. At the World's WCTU conference in London in 1920, the Japanese representatives, Yajima, Gauntlett and Watase submitted a request asking for the World Union to establish an “Oriental committee” to investigate the sex trade and install Yajima as its director. The World Union rejected this request for the reason that the Japanese Union had the capability and human resources sufficient to independently conduct such work.170

Without help from abroad, the Japanese Unionists independently carried out an anti-sex trade campaign. In 1927, the Union sent Moriya Azuma and another


member to Singapore to bring back Japanese women who were engaged in the sex trade. The British colonial government was about to expel these women without offering travel expenses to go home or any other alternatives to quit their trade. This bold action delighted the Japanese Union, yet confused its members who were afraid that these women would continue clandestine prostitution or move to another place to continue their trade. With financial support of Shibusawa Ei'ichi, a founding father of Japan’s modern economy and a millionaire philanthropist, the Union sent Moriya to Singapore.

As soon as Moriya landed in Singapore, “dark-skinned, less civilized barbarians” mistook her for a prostitute. This experience harmed her pride, for she was lumped together with the prostitutes accessible by native men she deemed inferior. Not only her hostile attitude toward Japanese prostitutes but also possible sexual interaction with wealthy native men overturned self-acclaimed hierarchical power relations between Japan and other Asian nations/regions; Japan was, unlike Singapore, ranked only with other Western imperial powers.¹⁷¹ When she encountered prostitutes, she appreciated the male British colonial officer for his decision and jointly admonished a group of Japanese prostitutes for their “promiscuity” and “shamelessness” for defaming Japan by sleeping with native men.¹⁷² An ideology of

¹⁷¹ Treating a Japanese woman as a prostitute was not a phenomenon peculiar to Singapore. A young Japanese immigrant man in Manila saw Chinese and Filipinos stare at and verbally malign Japanese women as prostitutes, regardless of their marital status or vocations. Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900-1944* (Quezon City: Ateneo De manila University Press, 1992, revised, 1999), 59.
normative sexuality aligned Azuma with the British colonial officer who was acting as a prime agent to expel and “purify” Singapore, while hostility toward non-normative sexuality distanced her from Japanese prostitutes, her fellow countrywomen.

Moriya’s attitude simply reflected the majority of other WCTU leaders. Its research and investigation, conducted with the support of specialists from outside of the Union, revealed that low wages from family labor, the absence of women’s legal rights, low status of women in social customs, and the sexual double standard produced prostitution.\textsuperscript{173} Especially, Amakusa and Shimabara from which many prostitutes in foreign nations came suffered from over-population, lack of modern industries, and limited cultivable land. The peoples of Amakusa and Shimabara developed unique relationships with foreign countries through work in other regions, especially in Nagasaki, the only port opened for foreign trade with China and the Netherlands during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). In Nagasaki, they were employed by the Chinese and Dutch residents to do house chores and provide sexual services. In addition to such geographical and historical backgrounds, highly organized flesh trade networks that linked Japan with Asia, Australia, and Africa abetted the exportation of women. Potential prostitutes were deceived with honeyed words, kidnapped by flesh dealers, or impressed by stories of other successful prostitutes. In either case, a cruel fate was waiting for them. Since Japanese women began their trade with a heavy debt that included pre-payment to parents, travel costs, costs of bedding and other living

expenses, they could receive little money during the period of bondage. Even if they succeeded in quitting their trade, they could not find a decent job and became concubines to European, Chinese, or other men. Such situations made prostitutes remain in their trade even after both the colonial officials and the Japanese Consul abolished licensed prostitution. However, the Union women still firmly shared the alternative explanation of poor morality as the primary cause of social evils and blamed sex workers, as was manifested by Moriya's interaction with Japanese prostitutes in Singapore.

Moriya's solidarity with an agent of the British Empire symbolized the close ties the WCTU had with imperialist politics. The Union women viewed British control of Singapore favorably and corroborated to "purify" it with the British agent. The Japanese Union had always worked to reform the imperial structure but had never developed an anti-imperialist critique. Assuming that imperialism and colonialism were conducive to reform, the WCTU strengthened its rendezvous with the Japanese colonial regimes. In 1921, Yajima and Kubushiro took the opportunity to make a trip to Manchuria via Korea at the invitation of the South Manchurian Railway Company. In Manchuria and Korea, they worked among the Japanese and organized more than ten new local Unions. In the following year, Moriya Azuma made a lecture tour of

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Manchuria and Korea and added four more branches. The South Manchurian Railway Company offered her free transportation and supported her work.\textsuperscript{176} Established in 1905 by Japan as a semi-governmental agent that operated extensive lines of railways, the South Manchurian Railway Company managed the "attached areas of lands" to the railway lines, and developed numerous industries. Such endorsement and support from the South Manchurian Railway Company led to incorporation of the WCTU's activism into colonial management.\textsuperscript{177} In Korea, the Japanese colonial regime sent Aikawa Nobuko, a schoolteacher, to the World's WCTU conference in 1922. Covering her travel expenses seemed necessary for colonial policy.

The Japanese WCTU even advanced into the central part of China. Kubushiro Ochimi regretted that Japanese women had scarcely developed relations with China. In sharp contrast, American and British women had worked as "teachers and older sisters" for the Chinese. She deplored the fact that Japanese women had related themselves with the Chinese only through "prostitution."\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, American and British missionary women had already spearheaded educational and social works among the Chinese and the Chinese WCTU was one of their products. Such activities of Anglo-American missionaries in China set an example for Japanese Christian women. In 1923, the Japanese Union sent Watanabe Tsune to Shanghai where more than

\begin{footnotes}
\item[177] The South Manchurian Railway Company also acted co-opt with other Christian reform organizations, such as the YMCA. Davidann, \textit{A World of Crisis and Progress}, 138-141.
\end{footnotes}
20,000 Japanese resided. She successfully created the Shanghai branch of the Japanese Union in June 1923, which attracted more than fifty new members in one month.

The new branch of the Japanese Union in China produced a close association with the Chinese Unionists. The Japanese branch and the Chinese WCTU in Shanghai seemed to have developed a friendly relationship throughout the 1920s. The works of both organizations in China rarely overlapped, for the Japanese branch primarily worked among the Japanese in foreign concessions that were out of reach of Chinese sovereignty. The Shanghai branch of the Japanese Union reported to Tokyo that it facilitated mutual friendship and cooperation with the Chinese Union for the advancement of temperance work. The Chinese Union recognized the intention of its Japanese sisters and reported their friendly relations to the World WCTU.

The friendship between the Japanese and Chinese white ribboners was, however, not based upon a horizontal relationship. Kubushiro Ochimi, for instance, rationalized the hierarchical positions of each member in the world's household where

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181 At the inaugural ceremony, the new organization received not only congratulatory addresses from the Japanese Consul-general, the Japanese branch of the YMCA, and educational institutions, but also from the Chinese WCTU headquartered in Shanghai. The day following the ceremony, Watanabe and her colleagues paid a visit to the Chinese Union. After that, they treated the Japanese guests to a Chinese style dinner. Liu-Wang Liming, Zhongguo funü yundong, 3; Watanabe, "Minami shina o tazunete," 44.
Great Britain was treated as the “eldest brother or son”\textsuperscript{183} She interpreted British involvement in World War I as an expression of the eldest brother or son’s obligation to preserve world order. In Asia, Kubushiro positioned Japan as the “elder brother” of other Asian nations and legitimized Japan’s military interference in China as an expression of the “kokusaiteki anigokoro” (international sense of elder brother).\textsuperscript{184} China was, she deemed, enslaved by premodern customs and political instability. Japan had to fulfill its civilizing mission of guiding the Chinese militarily, politically, and culturally as an “elder brother.” In her imagination, the Chinese were infantilized in need of tutelage from their “older brothers” and should be reprimanded, if necessary.

Her translation of the world order into a patriarchal and patrilineal home structure was different from the late-Victorian matriarchical terms that the white ribboners of the United States and its European allies adopted to interpret global relations. Both Kubushiro and Western Union members adopted the metaphor of fictive kinship and portrayed the relationship between colonizers and colonized more like a tie between a parent and child or siblings. As Kubushiro ignored the exploitative aspects of Japan’s expansionism and sugarcoated empire building as liberation from political chaos, her Western sisters also eulogized Anglo-Saxon imperialism as bringing civilization to “inferior” natives and utilized it to spread “organized mother’s love” throughout the world. Yet, there was a striking difference in gender ideals between the


\textsuperscript{184} Kubushiro, “Sekai to tomoni Eikoku wa nazeni tatakaishika,” 6.
two. Unlike the Western white ribboners who highlighted the mother’s role as a moral
guardian of the home and viewed Asians as their “daughters,” Kubushiro emphasized
the patriarchal responsibility to discipline delinquent younger brothers. The Western
WCTU members emphasized motherhood to stabilize the world and attempted to tie
the global community together with a white ribbon, a “feminine” accessory. But
Kubushiro adopted a viewpoint of paternal authority and endorsed senior men who
established order forcefully.

Her interpretation of Japan’s imperialism had a point much more in common
with the ideology of kokutai, the national polity that translated imperial rule into an
ideological family in which each member was united by affection.\(^{185}\) In the fictitious
“household” of the Japanese Empire, with the Emperor symbolically represented as the
father, female and junior male members remained excluded from the legal
decision-making process while senior male members were authorized to settle disputes
and bring domestic peace. As a Christian, Kubushiro never publicly called the
Japanese and the natives of Japan’s colonies as tennō no sekishi (children of Emperor),
even though popular discourse in Japan adopted this metaphor to emphasize the
emotional bonds between Emperor and the Japanese, especially after the late 1930s.
When she described the geopolitics of Asia, she selectively adopted the gender
hierarchy and seniority of the family nation ideology advocated by many Japanese

\(^{185}\) For the formation of kokutai ideology, see Oguma Eiji, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no
intellectuals in those days. By associating the war with masculine responsibility, she distinguished herself from radical female peace activists in the United States. Instead of asking for an unconditional denouncement of war as these groups of American women did, she endorsed military action when the “eldest/elder brothers,” moral as well as physical vanguards of the household, justified it. Her Union colleague, Moriya Azuma, supported her ideology of imperial masculinity. She explained that in World War I the Allies preserved their spirit as “the eldest son” by observing international laws and admonished Germany when it behaved as a “bad son.” In their imagined world household, the senior male members were responsible for conducting martial politics and punishing delinquent younger brothers, such as Germany and China; mothers and sisters were excluded from this process.

In addition to endorsing the hierarchical order between Japan and China by using the metaphor of vertical relations among male siblings, Kubushiro also emphasized a sense of special intimacy between the two nations. When she explained the closeness of Japan-China relations, she borrowed the concept of “dōbun dōshū” (same language, same race) that stressed their shared ethnic and intellectual heritage. The “same language, same race” ideology indicated a way of promoting

186 Ibid.
188 Kubushiro Ochimi, “Nihon fujin no kokusaiteki kakusei,” 6. Satō Kazuki, however, argues that the concept of “dōbun dōshū” was also persuasively used to rationalize Japan’s entry into China and meddling in the latter’s internal affairs. Such attitudes of Japan toward China culminated into a vision in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. See Kazuki Satō, “Same Language, Same Race’ the Dilemma of Kanbun in Modern Japan,” in
emotional bonds and confirming cultural as well as ethnic closeness between Japan and China. Especially after 1924 when the United States shut its doors to Japanese immigrants, the feeling of exclusion from the West further turned Kubushiro and her Japanese fellows to embrace the spirituality of “same language, same race” with the Chinese. In order to resolve ambivalent and contradictory attitudes toward China that ranged from friendliness as congenial kin to contempt as a less modernized nation being constantly distressed by political turmoil, the Japanese Union adopted a household metaphor in which the Japanese and the Chinese treated each other as “brothers.” They were all children of God, yet the hierarchical order between the “brothers” was also strictly preserved. The younger brother must obey his elder brother; if not, he should be punished. Such interpretation of realpolitik colored the Japanese WCTU’s feelings for China in the 1920s.

The Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 and its Aftermath

As the Japanese WCTU developed contacts with American women and their Western sisters through the peace envoy and participation in international conferences, it inevitably became conscious of racial issues. Kubushiro Ochimi, like many other Japanese, lamented over the failure of the Versailles Conference to insert a racial-equality clause into the League of Nations Covenant. At the same time, she and other Japanese Unionists nurtured the idea of the Japanese as the representative of all

_The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan_, ed. Frank Dikötter (Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1997).
colored races. Japan's ascendency as the only non-Western imperial power confirmed the idea of the Japanese as the champion of non-whites. Kubushiro called Japan "a point of contact between Western and Eastern civilizations." Neither white nor black, she argued that the Japanese as a yellow race had to overcome insularity and nurture virtues in order to be respected in the international community. The rise of the anti-Japanese movements on the West Coast of the United States that resulted in Alien Land Acts of California in 1913 and 1920 and Washington State in 1921 caused serious anxiety to the transnationally active Japanese. Exclusionists on the West Coast included representatives of labor, farmers, and middle-class patriotic and fraternal organizations; the California Federation of Women's Clubs also joined this group.

The WCTU of Japan was concerned with Japanese exclusion in the United States, yet its members underestimated the tenacity of exclusionist movements. Rather, they cherished the memory of Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, Protestant clergymen, and business leaders successfully blocking nativist pressure for the complete exclusion of the Japanese during the early 20th century. The Japanese Unionists expected that these factions would favorably work for the Japanese again. They also rehashed their decades'-old idea that the improvement of Japanese morality and demographic changes in the United States would soothe the

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190 Ibid.
anti-Japanese feelings. The Japanese communities no longer consisted only of young male bachelors and prostitutes in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{192} When Kosaki Chiyo visited the United States again in 1920 as the second president of the Japanese WCTU, she was pleased to discover many "old excellent ladies and gentlemen" among isseis and well-educated, healthily grown niseis.\textsuperscript{193} The economic success of the Japanese immigrants with their strenuous effort, endurance, and sacrifices impressed her.\textsuperscript{194} When Moriya Azuma visited a vegetable market in Los Angeles, observing "the fruits of hard labors made by my fellow countrymen," she admired their power and prayed for them from the bottom of her heart.\textsuperscript{195} It seemed hardly possible that Americans were willing to expel such respectable and industrious Japanese.

These Japanese women shared an unshakable belief in Americans and a sanguine trust of their conscience and religion so that they made an optimistic estimate regarding the resolution of the anti-Japanese movement. When Gauntlett Tsune inspected San Francisco, she witnessed some anti-Japanese sentiments. However, she asserted that "the Japanese exclusion movements are not as tremendous nor as powerful as reported in Japan."\textsuperscript{196} "Since a pro-Japanese faction in opposition to

\textsuperscript{192} For the changing sexual ratio of the Japanese American population, see Daniels, \textit{Asian America}, 152-154.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{195} Moriya Azuma, "Heiwa no tsukai ni shitagoute," \textit{Fujin shinpò}, no. 294 (March 10, 1922): 23.
anti-Japanese sectors even emerged, peaceful solution can be possible,” she reported. Kubushiro Ochimi, who had lived in the West Coast for more than a decade, disagreed with the pessimistic tone of the domestic press regarding the immigration issue in Japan. When she returned to the United States, she found almost no prostitutes among the Japanese immigrants. She believed that such demographic changes would convince Americans to collaborate with the Japanese. Kubushiro argued that “the Japanese in the United States should well comprehend the founding spirit of their adopted country, cultivate moral and religion of California, and work for the construction of the United States.” “The Japanese in Japan,” she appealed to her colleagues, “should establish the national policy based on the great spirit of world peace and support the fellow countrymen in the United States by truth and speech.” She affirmed that these efforts would certainly open the eyes of Americans, increase the number of pro-Japanese friends, and lead to a harmonious solution.

These words indicate that the Japanese women who visited the United States observed the Japanese exclusion movement simply as a moral issue as they did in the first decade of the 20th century. If the Japanese worked hard to improve their standard of living, established sound family lives, and purified their communities, Americans would discard anti-Japanese feelings and accept the Japanese as fellows. Actually, the

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197 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
diligence of the Japanese, for instance, forced certain Americans to claim that Japanese farmers were driving out whites. The sound families that the Japanese men were creating with their wives who came to the United States as picture brides and the birth of niseis caused fear among the exclusionists. They were fearful that the expansion of the Japanese population would one day take over the United States. Indeed, the restriction of picture brides was one of their anti-Japanese agendas.\textsuperscript{201}

The adoption of Christianity, English, and leading an “America style” life did not alleviate anti-Japanese sentiments. The case of Takao Ozawa v. the United States in 1922 ruled that Ozawa, who had lived almost all of his life in the United States, attended the University of California, used English in his home, and believed Christianity, was not eligible for U.S. citizenship. The Supreme Court declared that white meant “Caucasian” and Ozawa was not Caucasian. Japanese immigrants were disqualified regardless of their education, religion, and “morality.” The anti-Japanese movement was neither cultural nor religious but primarily a racial matter. The Japanese Exclusion League called for an amendment to the Federal Constitution to deny the rights of American citizenship to children born in the United States if both parents were of a race non-eligible for citizenship.

Despite such a court decision and racial argument, the Japanese WCTU clung to the moral argument and innocently expected Americans to make rational decisions. Its direct contact with the United States strengthened their reverence for the moral

\textsuperscript{201} Daniels, \textit{Asian America}, 144-145.
achievement of Americans manifested by the Eighteenth Amendment. President Kosaki was impressed with the result of the prohibition law that wiped out saloons and drunkards from the streets and was moved by the “truly beautiful spirits” of American society that stood together for the improvement of society. Moreover, she celebrated that the enfranchised American women selected “Harding, Hughes, and other personnel inheriting the brood of noble-minded Puritans.”

The disaster relief that poured from the United States to Japan soon after the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923 confirmed the positive emotional attachment to Americans by the Japanese Union. The earthquake completely destroyed its headquarters buildings and the amount of damage was enormous. Kubushiro Ochimi wrote to Anna A. Gordon about the “at least one million and a half who were burned out and turned homeless, foodless, and naked.” The American WCTU immediately donated $1,000 to its Japanese sisters and encouraged its members to send clothes. In appreciation of this support, Yajima Kaji sent a message to the people of America: “For your wonderful sympathy in our time of terrible need WE THANK YOU! For your guidance in the paths of the Prince of Peace WE TRUST YOU.”

However, the great shock and disappointment soon swept away the appreciation and trust toward Americans. The passage of the Immigration Act of 1924
in the Congress, excluding all persons racially "ineligible to citizenship," a euphemism for Japanese and other Asians, terribly surprised and even enraged the Japanese Union women. President Kosaki was "stunned at the news as too heartless." For the first time, she publicly stated that the new Immigration Act originated from "racial prejudice" and "ignorance of Japan among Americans." Kubushiro worried that the United States would take a further step and strip nisei of their citizenship. Gauntlett expressed that the passage of the Act based on "nothing but racial distinction" was "extremely painful" and an "unbearable insult." Wada Tomi, a pioneering female psychiatrist of Kyushu Imperial University and Union member, argued that the new anti-Japanese clause was "terribly lamentable." An anonymous contributor to Fujin shinpō was worried that the exclusive, discriminatory treatment produced by racial prejudice could be a cause of war. As many other Japanese saw the passage of the Immigration Act as a deadly blow, the Unionists accepted it as an outrageous insult to their friendly feelings for the U.S.

These women, however, unanimously avoided the unilateral accusation of the United States; instead, they called on their compatriots to reflect on their past conduct.

208 Ibid., 2-3.
209 Kubushiro Ochimi, "Nichibei kankei no konponteki kaiketsu: fujin no tachiba kara," Fujin shinpō, no. 322 (June 10, 1924): 4-11.
210 Gauntlett Tsuneko, "Beikoku no iminhōan o nanto miruka," Fujin shinpō, no. 322 (June 10, 1924): 15.
211 Wada Tomiko, "Jikyoku ni taishite hito futakoto," Fujin shinpō, no. 318 (June 10, 1924): 16.
212 Esu Emu, "Hitokoto," Fujin shinpō, no. 318 (June 10, 1924): 21-22.
213 For the immediate reaction of the Japanese to the Immigration Act of 1924, see Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice, 21-51.
Kosaki wrote that people of both nations should teach each other to nurture friendly feelings.\textsuperscript{214} Kubushiro strongly criticized the inconsistent, ad hoc measures that the Japanese government had taken to cope with systematic and consistent movements of the anti-Japanese forces.\textsuperscript{215} Gauntlett warned the Japanese against undertaking reckless acts against the anti-American movement and appealed to them to humbly admit their own fault.\textsuperscript{216} Wada self-reflectively criticized the prevalent infringement of human rights of Japan's legitimating the trade of women, not granting women's suffrage, discriminatorily treating laborers, and looking on foreigners, both Asians and Westerners, with suspicion. Such a nation, Wada argued, was not qualified to lecture on humanity to Americans.\textsuperscript{217} These self-accusations, however, did not include the reproach of the Japanese population in the United States as they did in the first decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Japanese immigrants were not a vanguard of "immorality" represented by the sex trade and delinquency of youth but a respectable working power in the eyes of the Japanese white ribboners.

The Japanese Union immediately set about working out countermeasures against the Japanese exclusion by using its international connections. It sent a cable to Anna A. Gordon asking her to work for justice and humanity. The Tokyo and Osaka branches also sent cables to Secretary of State Hughes and Jane Addams who visited

\textsuperscript{214} Kosaki, "Ataeraretaru naiko no toki," 3.
\textsuperscript{215} Kubushiro, "Nichibei kankei no konponteki kaiketsu: fujin no tachiba kara," 8-9.
\textsuperscript{216} Gauntlett, "Beikoku no iminhōan o nanto miruka," 15-16.
\textsuperscript{217} Wada, "Jikyoku ni taishite hito futakoto," 17-19.
Japan immediately before the disastrous earthquake. 218 Other local Unions allied themselves with various women's organizations and protested at the American consulates. 219 At the individual level, Wada Tomi privately wrote a letter to Jane Addams and informed her of the negative effects of the new Act on the Japanese. 220 When the national Union called an Executive Committee Meeting on June 17 and 18, 1924, to discuss and study problems arising in connection with the Immigration Act, members from all over Japan hurried to the special gathering held in Tokyo regardless of the distance from their hometowns. The meeting passed five resolutions. One of the resolutions declared:

In order that Japanese immigrants and residents in America, as well as in other countries, may secure equal rights, the women of Japan will continue to protest and use every means toward the desired end. 221

The resolution called “these more than 100,000 Japanese and their children” “the touchstone of our racial value.” The Japanese Union was determined to give them cooperation and support. 222 The Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese Union felt more

221 “Nichibei mondai ni kansuru ketsugibun,” Fujin shinpō, no. 319 (July 1, 1924);
“Resolutions Regarding American Immigration Act,” Fujin shinpō, no. 320 (August 1, 1924).
222 Ibid. The other three resolutions were: “with the cooperation of their Japanese sisters, they will solely in a spirit of amity and peace, do their utmost toward bringing the affair to a desirable conclusion”; “realizing that these more than 100,000 Japanese and their children constitute the touchstone of our racial value, we should give them our cooperation and support in order that they may be raised to a higher level, and to the height of the principles of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (Prohibition, Purity, and Peace)”; “in order to bring about the realization of the above resolutions, we should aim at the
confusion and anger than did their Japanese sisters toward the new U.S. immigration act.  

Alice L. Pearson, retiring president of the Foreign Auxiliary, denounced it in her speech at the Auxiliary's annual convention at Karuizawa in the summer of 1924:

> A portion of American citizens has disregarded international courtesy and justice and offered unjustifiable insult to Japan. As messengers of goodwill and members of the W.C.T.U., we are called to active measures to help make all these wrongs right.  

The WCTU constituents, both Japanese and foreign missionary members, were relieved to a small extent when they received a long cablegram sent from New York to Yajima Kaji on the Fourth of July, 1924. The sender was the Institute for a Christian Basis for World Relations, representing the WCTU, the YMCA, League of Women Voters, Foreign Policy Association, Committee for Cooperation in Latin America, and Christian Way of Life. When the representatives of these organizations met at Vassar College between June 14 and 20, they adopted a motion to send a message to the women of Japan. It expressed their regret at "the misunderstanding over the exclusion bill passed by Congress" and their pledge to "support in furthering friendly relations between peoples of the two countries." This cablegram moved elevation of the moral standards of this country, and call on all women throughout the world to unite their forces in order to increase friendly relations and understanding among all nations and races, and to secure worldwide peace and goodwill."


224 "Mrs. Pearson Speaks," Fujin shinpō, no. 322 (October 1, 1924).

225 Jane Harris, "Institute for Christian World Relations," Women and Missions (August
Yajima to tears. The sympathy and friendship expressed by Christians in the United States were a great reward for Yajima’s pioneering transnational activism to build a bridge between Japan and the United States.

The indignation at the exclusion act as an overt disgrace of national honor, sympathy for the plight of Japanese immigrants in the United States, and appreciation for the friendship of Christians in the United States drove the Japanese Union to express enthusiastic welcome to four young nisei women from Seattle soon before the passage of the controversial immigration clause. This trip was triggered by Yajima’s peace envoy to Washington D.C. When Yajima stopped over in Seattle on her way to Washington D.C. in 1921, ten young nisei women gathered around her and expressed their desire to visit Japan. These nisei earned their travel expenses by themselves. In the meantime, six of them gave up their plans due to family circumstances, sickness, and various other reasons. At first, they planned to visit Japan in the fall of 1923. Because of the earthquake in September 1923, they postponed the trip until the following spring. The change of the schedule had transformed their trip from a journey of nostalgia for their parental motherland to a tour with a strong political message. Because they came to Japan from Seattle, one of the hotbeds of exclusion, the Japanese public greeted these young women with great sympathy. The Japanese Union introduced them as “kichôsha” or those who returned home from abroad, despite that

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226 Moriya Azuma, “Konogoro (tsuzuki),” *Fujin shinpô*, no. 320 (August 1, 1924): 38.
227 The names of four nisei women were, Miyagawa Toki, Miyagawa Tae, Okazaki Sumire, and Kimura Kimiyo.
they were born and grew up in the United States. This word signifies that the Union treated them as their own people.

The strong association between these visitors and Japan shaped their itinerary. Moriya Azuma organized their travel plan to include the following special places that she believed represented the essence of Japanese culture: Ise and Atsuta Shrines which had special relations with the imperial family, the old Imperial Palace of Kyoto, the Imperial Mausoleum for the late Emperor Meiji (Mutsuhito), the Naval Academy in which Prince Takamatsu, the younger brother of Emperor Hirohito, was enrolled, and old temples and castles. Even though this trip was a private conduct of four young nisei women, high-echelon officials including the mayors of Osaka and Kyoto, the governor of Osaka and his wife, and a vice admiral and principal of the Naval Academy, gave warm receptions to the guests from Seattle. Their youth and gender contributed to their identity as the innocent victims of racial discrimination in the United States and evoked sympathy from the public. Newspapers in Japan called them the “four daughters born in America” and frequently covered their trip.

Numerous press releases on the trip of the “four daughters” made them famous among the Japanese communities in Seattle. With the recommendation of a Japanese clergyman, they made a speech to Japanese audiences who were upset by the derogatory treatment by the white population and were experiencing the contempt of

229 Moriya Azuma, “Konogoro,” Fujin shinpō, no. 319 (July 1, 1924): 15-22;
230 Ibid., 15-22, 32.
being considered nationals from a “poor small island.” These young women talked about the picturesque beauty of the country, kindness of people, and “a proud history of 2,500 years,” which convinced their audience that the blood of the Japanese was “far from being shameful.” They concluded their stories by expressing their determination to grow into “fine Japanese Americans” by blending the strong points of the two nations. Their speeches were so well received by the Japanese audience that they subsequently made a speech tour covering almost all of the major cities and towns with large Japanese populations on the West Coast.

The Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 made a deep impact on the relationship between the Japanese white ribboners and the United States. The Act belied the moral arguments that the Japanese Union had previously developed, since the United States closed its doors to further immigration from Japan despite a rise in the moral, economic and educational status of Japanese communities. The new immigration policy of the United States was a slap in the face of the Japanese who regarded themselves as the nationals of a first-rate nation. The Act awoke the Japanese Union workers to racial prejudices in the United States and drove them to appeal to the United States against the gross affront for the first time. Their burning desire to recover their broken pride accelerated their reform activities within and outside of the

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231 Senbongi Michiko, “Yonin musume to Taiheiyō engan no ryokōki,” Fujin shinpō, no. 324 (January 1, 1925): 38.
232 Ibid., 40-41.
233 Ibid., 42.
234 Ibid., 42-43.
nation. For the sake of preserving national dignity, the WCTU had to sweep away disgraceful elements from the empire and change Japan into a truly "respectable" nation in order to convince the United States to stop the Japanese exclusion. From the middle of the 1920s, the Japanese WCTU experienced the heyday of its transnational activism.

Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and American Women at International Gatherings

Japanese Unionists continued to publicly denounce the exclusion clause and incorporated this issue into one of their primary agendas of international as well as domestic action. They regarded the clause as an indication of American racial discrimination. But at the same time, the Japanese Union accepted the immigration controversy as punishment for licensed-vice and other institutionalized anti-female practices still prevalent in Japan. Women's exclusion from the process of policy making motivated the WCTU to work for women's suffrage in order to quicken the realization of needed reforms.235 The Union also played a leading role in forming an umbrella suffrage organization in 1925, known as the Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei Domeikai (League for the Realization of Women's Suffrage), affiliated with the International Women's Suffrage Association.236 The League renamed itself the Fusen Kakutoku Domei (Women's Suffrage League) the following year.237 Meanwhile, the

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237 In 1925, the Universal Suffrage Law was enacted. The Japanese term fusen was a
Union gained momentum and expanded remarkably in the liberal political current of the Taishô era (1913-1927) that produced a number of women’s organizations. The membership campaign turned it into an organization with 155 local branches and more than 8,000 members in the middle of the 1920s. By the time Yajima Kaji passed away in June 1925, the WCTU had grown to be one of the largest women’s organizations in Japan. The Japanese Union did not need financial aid from the World headquarters.

The significant growth of the Union reinforced the greater ambition to seek for a respectable position in world arenas. Gradually, they began to realize that presenting a national banner on platforms and sitting in chairs as exotic guests in kimono at international gatherings reinforced the hierarchical relationship between the West and Japan and the Orientalist description of Japanese women, represented by geishas. While constantly sending its representatives to the World’s WCTU conventions throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, the Japanese Union tried to play a more aggressive role in the international community. It futilely planned to invite the homophone meaning both “universal suffrage” and “women’s suffrage.” As a protest against the “universal suffrage” that excluded women, the League adopted the word *fusen* that had the same pronunciation but different characters, meaning women’s suffrage.

240 Senbongi Michiko, former treasurer of the Union, and Matsuoka Asa, student at the University of Pennsylvania, attended the World’s WCTU conference held in Edinburgh in 1925. In 1928, Watase Kame represented Japan in Lausanne. Japan sent Totoki Kikuko, president of Kure local Union, to Toronto in 1931. May Hennigar, a Methodist missionary residing in Japan for more than three decades and founder of Matsumoto Union, attended the Stockholm conference in 1934. Gauntlett Tsune represented Japan at the Washington
World president Anna A. Gordon in 1923 and 1927. Although the Union made scrupulous plans to welcome her and arranged a meeting with Emperor Taishō (Yoshihito), she cancelled her trips at the last minute in both 1923 (to involve herself to the forthcoming presidential election) and 1927 (because of political turmoil in China which was her primary destination).241 These cancellations not only considerably disappointed the Japanese Unionists but also confirmed the Euro-American centrism of the World Union that frequently sent its successive presidents across the Atlantic Ocean but had yet to send one to Asia.242

Unlike the highly Euro-American centered WCTU, the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference (PPWC; continuing today as the Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women's Association) offered Japanese women the chance to play more than a token role on the global stage. The PPWC was held in Honolulu in 1928 with the purpose of cultivating

conference in 1937. After that, the World's WCTU conference was not held until 1947 because of World War II.


242 Meanwhile, some Japanese Union members even attempted to host a World’s WCTU convention which had been exclusively held in the United States and Europe. This plan did not obtain support from the majority of members. “Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai dai sanjū nanakai zenkoku taikai kiroku,” Fujin shinpō, no. 362 (May 1, 1928): 23.
mutual understanding and friendship among women of the Pacific region. The PPWC was, unlike other pan-Atlantic women's organizations, unique in paying special attention to the new concept of "Pan-Pacific," centered in Hawai'i or the "crossroads of the Pacific." The PPWC was the product of the Pacific-centered internationalism advocated by ruling male elites in Hawai'i. These men, critical of Euro-centered internationalism, established the Pan-Pacific Union in 1917, the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1925, and Pan Pacific Clubs, and hosted conferences, research activities, and events to facilitate Pacific-region communications.\(^{243}\) The PPWC was also an outgrowth of the Pan-Pacific Union, directed by Alexander Hume.\(^{244}\) Jane Addams, who was renowned not only in the United States and Europe but also in Asia through her successful world trip, including Japan, China, and the Philippines, took the position of the PPWC's first president.

Participation in the PPWC with 274 women representing eleven countries and regions enabled animated discussions between Asian and Western women as well as among Asian representatives.\(^{245}\) The first PPWC conference attracted more than twenty delegates from Japan with diverse social and class backgrounds consisting of members of the WCTU, the YWCA, the Suffrage League and other women's

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\(^{243}\) For the Pan-Pacific Internationalist movement, see Paul Hooper, *Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawai'i* (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 1980).

\(^{244}\) A New Zealand parliamentarian attending the 1924 Pan-Pacific Food Conference suggested that a women-only sub-group should form. For the brief history of the PPWC and the PPWA, see Paul F. Hooper, "Feminism in the Pacific: The Pan-Pacific and South Asia Women's Association," *Pacific Historian* 20, no. 4 (Winter 1976): 367-377.

\(^{245}\) The United States, Hawai'i, Australia, Canada, Fuji, India, New Zealand, the Philippines, Samoa, Japan, China, and Korea sent delegates to the first PPWC.
organizations from both the Tokyo and the Kansai area and individuals, such as a medical doctor, professors, a newspaper reporter, and primary school teachers. Among them, the younger members who had been educated abroad played visible roles by presenting papers, joining round-table discussions, and serving as committee members. Gauntlett Tsune was among such a “visible” group. Familiar with the Anglo-American style of conducting a conference and fluent in English, she delivered an address representing the Japanese delegation. Among the Japanese members, she offered special lessons in western style manners of dining, living, and communication for her fellows who had never been abroad and were unfamiliar with such matters.

The involvement of Gauntlett and the WCTU in the PPWC lasted until the late 1930s. When the second PPWC, held in 1930, reached a resolution in establishing a permanent organization of the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (PPWA), it nominated Gauntlett as the second vice-president. Gauntlett lost the

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246 The Pan-Pacific Union, ed., Women of the Pacific (Honolulu, the Pan-Pacific Union: 1928), 16-17 and 279-280; Han Taiheiyō Tōnan Ajia Fujin Kyōkai, Han Taiheiyō Tōnan Ajia Fujin Kyōkai rokujūnenshi (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1993), 123. It is also worth noting that Hawai‘i sent more than fifty delegates separately from the U.S. mainland. This group included women of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Hawaiian ethnicity.
248 The Pan-Pacific Union, Women of the Pacific, 15-16.
250 The Pan-Pacific Union, Women of the Pacific, iii and 393. The Association elected Frances M. Swanzy who led preparations for the two conferences as honorary president and Georgia Sweet, an Australian professor and the head of the YWCA in Australia, as the first president.
vice-presidency to Mei Iung Ting, a Chinese medical doctor of Peiyang Women's Hospital in Tientsin. Yet, the WCTU did not publicly denounce the result of the election and maintained relations with the PPWA through working for the formation of Kokusai Renraku Fujin Iinkai, the Japan Women's Committee for International Relations, together with other women's groups primarily based in Tokyo. The Committee was organized in 1929 in order to select delegates for upcoming Pan-Pacific Women's Conferences and other international women's organizations. The third conference of the PPWA was held in 1934 in Honolulu and elected Gauntlett to be the president. It was the first time that a Japanese woman, though she was a British citizen by marriage, took the presidency of an international women's organization.

The PPWA's effort to include Asians in its executive positions was progressive in comparison with other Euro-American-centered international women's organizations that marginalized non-Western members with an unwavering conviction that there was nothing to learn from, and everything to teach to, non-Western women. However, the PPWA was still not free from a Euro-centric treatment of women. The first conference forced delegates from non-English speaking nations to use English and adopt Anglo-American social and cultural codes, which hindered some

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251 The result of the election that included no Japanese as executive members of the PPWS became a political issue. The Japanese consulate in Hawai‘i urged the PPWS to pay more attention to Japan. Yasutake, “Feminism, Nationalism, Regionalism, and Internationalism.”
252 Ibid.
253 Chinese delegates strongly opposed the result of the presidential election and declared a boycott of the fourth conference. For more on this issue, see the next chapter.
representatives from non-English speaking nations from active participation in the conference. Moreover, the conference requested women from the East to wear "traditional" costumes at social events alongside Western women who wore modern, Western suits. In numerous group photographs that were incorporated into cultural exchange programs of the conference, "traditional" costumes worn by delegates from Asia created an "authentic" expression of their identity and a token of "cultural diversity" among Western women who wore "universal" modern costumes. The Conference positioned Asian delegates as objects of Western gaze that never rose above their Western sisters who alone became the subjects. Language and cultural barriers muted women from Asia and their "native" costumes turned them into commodities only useful for taking pictures.

When Yajima Kaji appeared on the platform of the World's WCTU conference in Boston in 1906, she wore a kimono as she did at home; kimono did not have specific meanings other than a part of her daily life. When Watanabe Tsune sent kimonos to Taiwanese aboriginal children in the early 1910s, the kimono was used as a token of Japan's "progress" vis-à-vis Taiwan's "backwardness." In the late 1920s, the Japanese women at international gatherings had different attitudes toward kimonos. Some

255 Because of the white, English-speaking women's hegemony, Angela Woollacott argues that the PPWC reconstituted in some ways "other or older forms of imperial feminism. Angela Woollacott, "Inventing Commonwealth and Pan-Pacific Feminisms: Australian Women's Internationalist Activism in the 1920s-30s," Gender and History 19, no. 3 (November 1998): 442.


257 Ibid.
Japanese women started to suspect that kimonos would reinforce geisha girl images which connoted licentiousness, exoticism, and difference from the West. Gauntlett Tsune explained at the PPWC about the enslaved circumstances of prostitutes and geishas, argued for the anti-vice campaign that the WCTU of Japan had conducted, and denounced the stereotypical representation of Japanese women: “We stand horror-stricken when we hear yoshiwara and geisha girls mentioned together with cherry-blossoms, Nikko, Mt. Fuyi [sic] and colored prints as the unique products of our country.”

Indeed, the Japanese white ribboners had become highly sensitive to the representation of Japanese women in the West as romanticized geisha girls. When the Chamber of Commerce in Washington D.C. decided to invite a group of geisha from Japan to perform Japanese traditional dances at a Cherry Blossom Festival in 1930, the Japanese Unionists pressed numerous other women’s organizations in Japan, missionary boards, and the American and World’s WCTUs to collectively protest the plan and succeeded in the cancellation of the invitation. Unlike cherry-blossoms, a geisha was the product of the licensed-vice system that the Japanese Union had attacked from the very beginning. Its members noticed that a kimono reminds the Westerners of a geisha girl and stopped wearing it in international stages. Gauntlett

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258 Tsune Gauntlett, “Anti-Vice Movement in Japan, in Women of the Pacific, ed, The Pan-Pacific Union (Honolulu, the Pan-Pacific Union, 1928), 244.
regularly wore Western clothes during her PPWA work. When Kubushiro Ochimi attended the Jerusalem Christian Conference in 1928, she firmly rejected a request from a Westerner to wear kimono.260

The kimono was also turned into a token of restriction for some transnationally active Japanese women. Japanese delegates at the first PPWC shared negative views toward kimono primarily from its impracticality; dressing in kimono was, they thought, time-consuming and limiting of the movement of the body.261 Another woman who had just come back from abroad confessed that wearing kimono with several strings was “nothing more than a restriction”; western dresses, on the other hands, “make me feel liberated.”262 A kimono, especially a formal one, was cumbersome to put on and the obi, a belt for a kimono, was restrictive of body movement. For them, abandoning kimono and adopting mobile Western costumes was an overt challenge to what curtailed women’s freedom as well as the denial of the allocated role as the exotic “other” in international settings.

The Japanese women’s struggle to divorce themselves from geisha-discourse in the West, however, failed to convince their Western sisters to abandon their prejudiced views of Japanese women. The London Disarmament Conference in 1930 manifested Western insensitivity toward Japan. When the Japanese WCTU collected signatures from 180,000 Japanese women on an appeal for disarmament and sent

260 Ibid., 41.
262 Ibid., 40.
Gauntlett Tsune and Hayashi Utako to the scheduled disarmament conference in London via the United States, such actions moved Carry Chapman Catt and her organization, the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War (NCCCW). Inspired by the idea from Japan, the eleven organizations which made up the NCCCW, one of which was the American WCTU, voted to send its delegates to London. Women of Great Britain and France joined the envoy and jointly submitted their petition for universal disarmament to the representatives of the Conference. Women from the United States and its Western allies, however, pressured Gauntlett to wear a kimono, though she was reluctant to do so, to meet the Conference delegates at St. James' Palace. Since she was the only woman who wore “ethnic” dress among the deputation, she became a major focus of picture-taking (fig. 6). By forcing a kimono on her, Western women transformed and depoliticized Gauntlett into a mere exotic spice for their activities instead of esteeming her as the initiator of the internationally acclaimed peace mission.

In addition to the pressure to comply with geisha girl discourse, immigration issues and racism bothered the Japanese Union. On her way to London, Gauntlett and


264 Hayashi Utako, “Heiwa no tabi,” 6-11.
Hayashi attended the fifth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War held in Washington D.C. in 1930. Conscious of the racism that she had personally experienced and indignant over the exclusion of Japanese immigrants, Gauntlett censured the Immigration Act of 1924 in her presentation. Although some of the six-hundred audience said, “yes, yes” to her, she heard some saying, “I never knew anything about it.”265 This reaction taught her that Americans outside the Pacific Coast remained relatively indifferent and ignorant of the problem. Thereafter, she had to repeatedly refer to the immigration issue during her one-week speech trip in the United States.266 This incident indicated that white women who reacted strongly to the second-class status of women had little awareness of racial issues.

As this episode reveals, women of the West did not always favorably or sympathetically react to the Asian women's accusations regarding colonialism, imperialism, and racism in the late 1920s. At the first Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1928, for instance, Kyong Bae-tsung, industrial secretary of the Shanghai YWCA, denounced a policy that “provides for prohibition of importation of cheap labor into countries with capital, but does not limit the exportation of capital to countries with cheap labor.”267 Another Chinese delegate, Mei Iung Ting declared that Chinese

266 Ibid. Izumi Hirobe argues that most Americans outside of the Pacific Coast were indifferent to the immigration dispute. See Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice.
267 Kyong Bae-tsung, “China’s Industrial Women,” in Women of the Pacific, ed. The Pan-Pacific Union (Honolulu, the Pan-Pacific Union: 1928), 76.
women would speak for themselves “without the intervention of foreigners in China.”

Some attendants of the Conference cheered at her “sensational declaration” that overtly challenged the hypocrisy of the “Open Door” policy and other exploitative imperial policies. However, others thought of these Chinese women as “too accusing.” For those who were free from the discriminatory immigration policy and never had to question their nation’s self-determination, it was hard to accept such an issue as a prerequisite for transnational sisterhood. Women of imperial powers were willing to challenge inequality of gender, but they were unwilling to confront the reality of inequality among nations and races.

Japanese women were not free from accusations of racism and imperial exploitation of Asian neighbors. Helen Kim, principal of Ewa Women’s College and founder of the Korean YWCA, blamed Kubushiro Ochimi, whom she met at the Jerusalem Christian Conference in 1928, for racism. She questioned Kubushiro and her Christian friends in Japan about why they kept silent about the massacre of Korean residents by panic-stricken citizens and vigilante groups which occurred amid the destruction and disorder of the Great Kanto Earthquake. Kim’s statement shocked Kubushiro and made her realize that she had no intimate friends in Asia, though she

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269 Ibid.
had plenty in the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{272} Indeed, the WCTU of Japan paid scant attention to the Korean people, despite the fact that it had established branch organizations among the Japanese and Western Protestant missionaries in Korea. While the Japanese Union bypassed native Koreans, Christine I. Tinling, the World’s WCTU organizer to China, approached Korean women. The Japanese colonial regime in Korea supported the organizational work of Christine I. Tinling at schools.\textsuperscript{273} In August 1924, the Korean WCTU was born.\textsuperscript{274} When Gauntlett Tsune visited Korea in 1929, she showed great concern about this new group that had developed independently from the Japanese WCTU. Through frank exchanges of opinions with officers of the Korean national Union, she began to consider allowing the Korean Union to represent Korea, as Canada, India, Australia and New Zealand of the British Commonwealth had national WCTUs.\textsuperscript{275} By 1931, the Korean national Union had grown to over 1,000 members and 70 branches distributed all over the Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{276}

As Gauntlett espoused a more relaxed attitude toward the colonial relationship with Korea, interactions among Japanese, Chinese, and Korean women in the late 1920s had the potential to promote horizontal relations among them. In

\textsuperscript{275} Gauntlett Tsune, “Chôsen mezashite,” \textit{Fujin shinpô}, no. 379 (October 1, 1929): 34.  
Shanghai, the Chinese and the Japanese white ribboners nurtured cooperative relations through mutual visits to the WCTU offices in Shanghai. At the PPWC in Honolulu, Gauntlett Tsune was sympathetic and even paid her respects to the young Chinese delegates who challenged the infiltration of imperial powers into China, while many Western delegates reacted negatively to them.277 Such amicable attitudes between Japanese and Chinese women became apparent at the third conference of the Institutes of Pacific Relations held in 1929 in Kyoto.278 Male Chinese and Japanese delegates had intense exchanges of opinions over the highly controversial subjects of extraterritoriality in China and the Manchurian problems.279 After that, the Chinese female delegates, most of whom were in their 20s and foreign-educated, visited the Japanese female delegates and expressed that they did not share the same view as their countrymen.280 They thought building friendly relations with Japanese women was much more important than arguing with each other over a pending political

277 Gauntlett, "Hantaiheiyō fujin kaigi o owatte (2)," 38.
278 The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) was the product of Hawai‘i-centered, pan-Pacific internationalism established in Honolulu in 1925. The IPR brought together scholars, journalists, businessmen, politicians, and many others not only from the United States and Europe but also from Asia to study and discuss Asian Pacific issues. See Hooper, Elusive Destiny; Paul F. Hooper, ed., Rediscovering the IPR: Proceedings of the First International Research Conference on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Department of American Studies, Center for Arts and Humanities Occasional Paper No. 2 (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, 1993).
280 Mitani Tamiko, "Taiheiyō Chōsakai," Fujin shinpō, no. 381 (December 1, 1929): 37.
problem between Japan and China. The Japanese female representatives, including Mitani Tami of the Japanese WCTU, welcomed them. These Chinese and Japanese women mutually treated each other to dinners and became friends. These stories reveal that national concerns did not always shape women's transnational actions in the 1920s; some Japanese and Chinese women even divorced political controversy from their activities and gave each other inspiration. The interactions among women of East Asia made Kubushiro and other Japanese white ribboners realize their previous ignorance toward Asia. The geographical proximity and cultural closeness often functioned positively to nurture friendly relations among the women of East Asia. Such aspirations for transnational friendship, however, did not survive into the 1930s. The dark clouds of war caused by Japan's military aggression in the 1930s brought about drastic changes in the relations among Japanese, Chinese, and Korean women. The military turmoil in Asia and the rise of fascism in Europe posed a serious challenge to the “White Ribbon League of Nations.”

Conclusion

The inter-war period, known as the era of cooperation, produced numerous

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groups for the enhancement of transnational understanding and friendship. Leila Rupp's research on large international women's organizations, namely, the International Council of Women, the International Women's Suffrage Association, and the Women's International League of Peace and Freedom reveal that transnational women's movements had "lurched slowly into motion in the years before 1914, gathered steam at the end of World War 1, and nearly screeched to a halt in 1939."282

This pattern of the rise and fall of the spirit of internationalism and transnational activism is only partially applicable to the WCTU. Unlike the organizations that Rupp examined, the WCTU had already embarked on aggressive transnational activism in the late 19th century, as the first chapter revealed. After World War I, the American members of the WCTU reinvigorated the global efforts of the previous century. Enfranchisement and the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment strengthened their self-image as the leader of the world and the founder of the "White Ribbon League of Nations." The renewed sense of mission to spread their moral influence throughout the world urged them to embark on new global enterprises, manifested by the formation of the Jubilee Foundation. Especially, they singled out Japan and China together with other nations as the major recipients of their financial and personal support in the 1920s. For those who judged women's status exclusively by the public visibility of women through their integration into the political arena and the national endorsement of the temperance cause, Japanese and Chinese women were

more oppressed than their American sisters and in need of their help.

Meanwhile, Japan's imperial expansion and the ascent of its international status facilitated the Japanese Union in refuting their perceived inferior position as the passive recipients of support from their white sisters. It severed financial support from the World headquarters in the mid-1920s and became a financially independent organization. As the Japanese Empire expanded, the Japanese white ribboners created their own outposts in Korea, Taiwan, and later, Manchuria and China. The Japanese union also participated in both secular and religious international conferences and affiliated themselves with international women's organizations that Americans and Europeans exclusively dominated. Simultaneously, they desperately worked for the elimination of geisha girl images from Western discourses by trying to "purify" Japanese immigrant communities abroad. When the immigration controversy arose in the United States in the first decade of the 20th century, the Japanese Union exclusively blamed Japanese immigrants, especially prostitutes as the primary agents harming the national honor and provoking Japanese exclusion. Improvement of morality was, they believed, the key to be accepted into the Euro-American-dominated women's international community.

Japanese women's aspiration for equal treatment was, however, betrayed by the Immigration Act of 1924 that slammed the door of the United States shut to Japanese immigrants. While the Japanese Union women were fiercely concerned about this issue, many American women whom they encountered in the United States remained ignorant of it. Moreover, the Western treatment of Japanese delegates as
picturesque guests in kimono at international conferences reinforced the racial hierarchy that put Japan beneath the West. Meanwhile, Chinese women who entered the global stage in the late 1920s took up what women from long-established and imperialist nations ignored, that is, national liberation. However, the women of imperial powers paid scant attention to the anti-militarism argument of the Chinese. The construction of a global sisterhood in the 1920s was, thus, full of flaws and limitations. American women considered themselves to be less oppressed, and hence more progressive than Japanese women. Japanese women were offended by this insulting labeling and exclusion by Americans. At the same time, they looked down on Chinese and Korean people as immature younger brothers who were in need of stabilization by imperial powers.\textsuperscript{283} The active interactions among these women often reinforced the three-layered hierarchical relations that placed the United States on the top, Japan in the middle, and China and Korea at the bottom of the ladder. In this sense, dominant ideas and practices of women's "internationalism" functioned to secure the prerogatives and privileges of imperial powers.

Despite the tendency to prioritize nationalistic concerns over international ones, efforts to enrich friendships, exchange ideas and representatives, and facilitate cross-national understanding were striking characteristics of the women's

\textsuperscript{283} The YMCA in Japan had a similar pattern of development at home and abroad. As American YMCA missionaries attempted to impose their own standard of Christianity on Japan in 1890, Japanese Christians in the YMCA sought hegemony to spread Christianity in Korea and Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War. Korean Christians defied Japanese rule and were committed to their own form of nationalism. See Davidann, \textit{A World of Crisis and Progress}. 
transnational activism of the WCTU and other international women's organizations in the 1920s. The Japanese Unionists did not blame the United States for the immigration dispute and directed their anger at their own supposed domestic immorality instead. Some leaders of Christian women in the United States as well as missionaries in Japan expressed sympathy toward their Japanese sisters and attacked the immigration clause. In China, missionaries of the WCTU aggressively recruited and trained young women who gradually became politicized and visible in the rising nationalist movement. While no Chinese principals of mission schools were in place previous to the 1920s, as Jane Hunter argues, missionaries of the WCTU gave up their presidency to a Chinese woman as early as 1915.284 Young Chinese female leaders shelved controversial political problems such as extraterritoriality and Manchurian issues and nurtured friendly relations with Japanese women. A Japanese WCTU executive paid respects to the independent activities of the Korean WCTU. The international sisterhood was fragile with unequal political, economic, and military power relations among the nations. Yet, hope for cooperation and mutual respect were also evident on both sides of the Pacific and in East Asia.

The global sisterhood developed in the 1920s began to collapse in the next decade. After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Chinese women stiffened their attitudes toward the Japanese. American women gradually drifted towards a pro-China stance. The Japanese women, on the other hand, unilaterally blamed China

for its anti-Japanese propaganda and took steps to absorb the Korean WCTU. The transnational friendship ended with the outbreak of the Pacific War. The next chapter examines in detail the process of the collapse of the "White Ribbon League of Nations."
CHAPTER 4

WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT
OF THE WOMAN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION

Introduction

The international exchanges based on aspirations for transnational friendship by international organizations after the end of World War I soon gave way to rising militarism in the 1930s. Regional military disputes in both European and Asian theaters, the global depression, tariff increases, and the rise of hatred deriving from violent conflicts gradually made it harder for these organizations to achieve their anticipated ends. The Institute of Pacific Relations and the Pan-Pacific Union that had fostered close relations between units in the United States and Japan saw the sense of trans-Pacific unity largely disappear during that period. After the Pearl Harbor attack, its American members enthusiastically supported the Allied force, while the Japanese unit supported its nation’s agenda.¹

Women’s international organizations, including the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), were also not immune to the deteriorating international relations in the 1930s. The World’s WCTU that had once tried to become the “White

Ribbon League of Nations” and connect the entire world with a white ribbon faced a great challenge when Japan initiated a war to assert control over Manchuria, the northern part of China, in 1931. The war impacted the relationship between the Japanese and Chinese white ribboners and ended their friendship. The Japanese Union welcomed the expansion of the Japanese empire, because the military advancement of Japan facilitated its pursuit of continental expansion. In sharp contrast, the Chinese Union members harshly denounced Japan's encroachment into their native land and its escalating military aggression. The substantial difference over the interpretation of Japan's imperial policy between the WCTUs of the two nations pitted them against each other. Their deteriorating friendship placed the American white ribboners in a dilemma regarding whether it should support China, as the majority of the American public did, or take a neutral position so as not to offend Japan and, at the same time, to preserve the White Ribbon League of Nations.

The Chinese WCTU, led by an outspoken leader, Liu-Wang Liming, sharply criticized the political aloofness of the WCTU and urged Americans to provide support to China through English publications and interactions with American Union women. Meanwhile, the Japanese Union women grew increasingly concerned about the militant nationalism of the Chinese women and what they deemed their aggressive approach to American women. Although the Japanese women still looked down on the Chinese women as less advanced and therefore, in great need of Japanese guidance, they acknowledged the ability of educated Chinese women represented by Madam Chang Kai-shek: unlike their Japanese counterparts, they were enfranchised and held
prominent positions in government bodies. Moreover, they wielded excellent public relations skills to sell positive images of China to the American public. Such political circumstances belied Japan's self-acclaimed advancement in terms of women's status and discredited its self-acclaimed role as the leader and model of Asia.

As the Japanese Union feared, the WCTU members in the United States gradually drifted to the China side. In particular, the escalation of war between Japan and China after 1937 and the tragic death of Liu-Wang's husband played determining roles in boosting pro-China sentiments among the American white ribboners. They increased financial support for Liu-Wang's social reform enterprises and the fight against Japan. Feeling abandoned by its American sisters and offended at the negative images of Japan promulgated by Chinese and pro-Chinese Americans, the Japanese WCTU gradually increased its involvement in reform works in China and promoted its collaboration with Japan's empire-building. By establishing a medical settlement in downtown Beijing, educational facilities in other large cities in China, and developing other social welfare programs for the least privileged Chinese and children, the Japanese Union not only implemented Japan's imperial control by molding its "benevolent" image, but also attempted to appease anti-Japanese feelings in China and the United States. However, the Chinese Union rarely appreciated these activities of the Japanese Union and the American white ribboners ignored them.

The outbreak of World War II divided the World's WCTU, which in 1941 included affiliates in over fifty nations and areas, into the Allied Forces and the Axis Powers. In the Pacific Rim, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor drove the United States to
enter into an alliance with China. The American WCTU supported the Allied Forces and strengthened ties with the Chinese Union by patronizing its enterprises for women and children. Meanwhile, the American Unionists censured Japan as the primary cause of moral degradation throughout Asia and the rest of the world through alleged dissemination of alcohol and drugs. The Japanese WCTU, on the other hand, collaborated with the military authorities by embracing the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" propagated by the government, and supported their troops as agents of moral improvement.

The wartime activities of the WCTU were a clear departure from its previous transnational exchanges. Instead of promoting mutual respect and understanding, the wartime WCTU was full of racial prejudice, hatred, and accusations. Nevertheless, the World's WCTU's long-time cherished idea of transnational sisterhood did not completely vanish even during this tumultuous period. As the war came to a close and the Allied victory became certain, its aspiration for the restoration of peace and international exchange came to the surface and later enabled it to repair the broken sisterhood. This chapter explores how the WCTU women, especially those of the United States, Japan, and China, lived through the war period and examines the vicissitudes of the white ribbon sisterhood from the 1930s to the middle of the 1940s.

Deteriorating Sisterhood: The Japanese Military Aggression in China and the WCTU

The financial avalanche initiated by the collapse of the New York stock market in 1929 devastated Japan's economy. During the economically hard times, the Japanese
leaders assumed that Manchuria, comprised of China's three northeastern provinces, with a population of 30 million and rich in raw materials, was enormously important as an overseas market for Japan. Securing Japanese hegemony in Manchuria became crucial in order to save Japan from an economic crisis. In September 1931, the Kwantung Army of Japan blew up the South Manchuria railway near Mukden Station in order to have a pretext to seize Manchuria by military force. The fight between the Japanese and Chinese military forces ended in an almost complete Japanese victory. Tokyo named the territory Manchukuo (満州国), an ostensibly autonomous state, but under de facto control of the Kwantung Army. Japan's assaults were not limited to Manchuria. In January 1932, Japanese troops invaded Shanghai in order to suppress anti-Japanese movements and distract the attention of the world from Manchuria.

The "undeclared war in Shanghai" seriously damaged the property and lives of the Chinese. The horrors of war were, as Liu-Wang Liming of the Chinese WCTU reported, "indescribable." With a high alert that the Republic of China was facing the most difficult national crisis since its birth, the Chinese Union sheltered war refugees, beggars, slave girls, and deserted concubines at its refugee camp and settlement house. Meanwhile, Liu-Wang severely denounced Japan in the Union Signal and expanded her sphere of activity. She chaired the founding meeting of the Shanghai Women's National Salvation Alliance and called for a boycott of Japanese products and the unification of China. Liu-Wang believed that the foreign invasion further distressed

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women and incorporated fighting against Japan into one of her most crucial agendas for women's liberation.

The outbreak of war in China stunned U.S. officials. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson issued a non-recognition doctrine that urged Japan to respect the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed war, and the Open Door policy. He also threatened to fortify Guam and build up the U.S. Navy in the Pacific if Japan did not halt its aggression. But the United States did not take action bolder than this moral exhortation and lecturing. Meanwhile, the League of Nations set up a Commission led by A. G. R. Lytton of Great Britain to investigate the Manchurian crisis. The Lytton Commission Report, released in 1932, chided Japan for its misconduct and refused to recognize the Manchukuo regime, although it also blamed Chinese extreme nationalism and disorder. Stimson and Stanley K. Hornbeck, the chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, supported the report.4

The breakout of hostilities in East Asia drove American Unionists into an awkward position between their Chinese and Japanese fellows. Faced with such a difficult situation, they refrained from blaming Japan, as the U.S. government and the Lytton Commission Report did. The only action the American Union took was to recall a long-cherished phrase, "organized mother's love." The American Union prudently avoided becoming entangled in the crisis by favoring either China or Japan.5 Its

(March 5, 1932): 4.
aloofness from the Manchurian disputes during the early 1930s protected the White Ribbon League of Nations from disintegration. When its male counterpart, the League of Nations, denounced Japan with the Lytton Commission Report, Japan walked out of the League. Meanwhile, the American Unionists, who still constituted 57% of the membership of the World Union, desisted from blaming Japan. As a result, the White Ribbon League of Nations preserved its Japanese branch. Throughout the early 1930s, the American Union kept praising the splendid advancement of temperance and purity causes in Japan. Simultaneously, it avoided touching on politically sensitive issues, much less blaming and insulting Japan's puppet state, Manchukuo.6

In sharp contrast to the retreat of the American Union from the realpolitik of

6 When Helen Byrnes visited Japan immediately after the Manchurian conflict, she reported several "delightful" things that she discovered in Japan in the Union Signal. Her letter conveyed her joyful reunion with the Japanese Unionists whom she had met in the United States, the kindness of taxi drivers and rikisha men that she found, the beautiful atmosphere of Kyoto, and church services attended by English-speaking residents that scarcely made her feel that she was in Japan. Above all, her letters from Japan revealed the efforts of the Japanese Union to disseminate the temperance cause through educational institutions, its interest in the world questions of peace, purity, and prohibition and their eagerness to learn from Americans. In her next destination, China, she preserved distance from political issues and limited her observation only to achievements of the local WCTU. From Shanghai, she reported settlement works and war refugee camps of the Chinese Union managed under the leadership of Liu Wang Liming. Although these institutions were dedicated primarily to war victims of Japan's military acts, she rarely mentioned war itself. Helen Byrnes' silence was mirrored by other anonymous articles on Japan published in the Union Signal that dropped political issues except for brief mention of the expanding war budget of Japan as well as of other Western powers. Rather, they focused on the spread of prohibition, rising anti-licensed vice sentiments, and the heroic fight of the WCTU against social evils and women's suffrage activism in Japan. The Union Signal even repetitively referred to the teetotalism of Emperor Hirohito with an expectation for him to be a good role model for the youth. See "Miss Byrnes Visits Japan's W.C.T.U. Headquarters," Union Signal (December 12, 1931): 4; "Helen Byrnes Visits China" Union Signal (January 34, 1932): 4; "Helen Byrnes in the Orient," Union Signal (February 6, 1932): 11; "The International Outlook," Union Signal (November 11, 1933): 11; "Young People's Branch," Union Signal (November 11, 1933): 5.
the Far East, both the Japanese and Chinese WCTUs aggressively involved themselves in the Manchurian crisis. A letter from Chinese women in Shanghai triggered a heated dialogue between the two groups. The letter was predicated on the fact that the Manchurian Incident was against the Washington Conference agreements and requested the Japanese Union to lobby the government not to escalate military aggression. The Japanese Union, however, declared that the Manchurian dispute was nothing more than a defensive action and never violated the Washington Conference agreements, although the Union would endeavor for peaceful resolutions of international disputes. In addition to making a public statement, the Japanese Union sent Hayashi Utako and Kubushiro Ochimi to China to inspect Manchuria and negotiate with Chinese women leaders, including Ting Shu-ching, the national secretary of the Young Women’s Christian Association in China, which had about 14,000 members; Wu Yifang, the female president of Ginling College; and Liu-Wang Liming of the WCTU and the Shanghai Women’s National Salvation Alliance. These Chinese women greeted guests from Japan with great anger and accused Japan of assaulting the fragile new Republic that had already been torn apart by domestic political turmoil and numerous natural disasters.

Indeed, the Chinese women were already busy fighting against legal arrangements and practices hostile to women. The fires of civil wars between the

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8 “Jikyoku ni taisuru honkai no taido,” Fujin shinpō, no. 405 (December 1, 1931): 6-7.
Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also tormented them. Japan's aggression added insult to their distress. Through tackling the unfair treatment of women, as well as working for victims of worsening civil wars, they learned that the fight for gender equality in China should go hand in hand with the national salvation movement: women's rights included not only the right of women to move into the public arena that Western women promoted, but also the right to work for the country. The national crisis triggered by Japan's invasion inspired women in China to join into collective action for national survival. For them, the protection of national territory was inseparably wedded to women's causes. They challenged Japanese aggression not only for national salvation, but also for their own sake. They never agreed with the Japanese explanation of its actions in Manchuria as defensive.

The Chinese women's bold attitude deeply shocked Hayashi and Kubushiro. Since they linked Japan's expansionist logic with the welfare of colonized women, uncompromising condemnation of Japan's acts by Chinese women confused and annoyed them. Instead of accepting Japan's actions as endeavors driven by paternalistic concern to restore order and protect property and personnel, the Chinese women firmly demanded that Japanese troops withdraw. Kubushiro was disappointed at what she deemed fruitless dialogues with the Chinese women. Although she said that the Chinese were like kin to the Japanese and that Japan should not give up communication with China, the gulf dividing the two seemed unbridgeable.

What annoyed the Japanese white ribboners more was that some women's organizations in the United States stood behind China and initiated political actions to put pressure on Japan. The U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), for instance, lobbied the White House, the State Department, and politicians to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty and pressure Japan through economic sanctions and an arms embargo. Such actions led Japanese women to make an international statement that they were the victims of mounting anti-Christian feelings within Japan after the Manchurian dispute, not perpetrators of rising militarism. Kubushiro Ochimi and Kawai Michi, the general director of the YWCA, co-authored a book in English, *Japanese Women Speak*, and argued that Japanese Christians were "closely watched and severely criticized by the non-Christian elements of the country, as well as by the Christian peoples of the West." Addressing the international audience, *Japanese Women Speak* argued, "Morally speaking we cannot say Japan is all wrong, but religiously speaking *we must acknowledge and confess we are wrong*" (italics in original). She also suggested that, "the three hundred thousand Christians in Japan ought to speak out clearly against war." This statement revealed a departure from her original legitimization of Japan's

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14 Ibid., 173.
military actions in Manchuria as purely defensive.

Gauntlett Tsune more explicitly stated her opposition to the war. Unlike Kubushiro's softened condemnation of Japan for the military entanglement with China, the Women's Peace Association, of which Gauntlet Tsune was the executive, sent a more direct, pro-Chinese message to the YWCA, WCTU, Women's National Council, and Women's Suffrage League in China in 1932:

We the members of the Women's Peace Association in Japan, are burdened with agonizing grief over the present rupture between your country and ours . . . In so far as there is truth in the report of the unfortunate events which have occurred in your country through the faults of our people, we are ready to ask your forgiveness and we trust that you are willing to take the same attitude toward us.15

This straightforward expression of apology written in English acknowledging the "faults" of the Japanese and imploring forgiveness from the Chinese was a significant shift from the original justifications of Japanese military actions. At the same time, it should be noted that this message was also published in a missionary journal Women and Missions and quoted in Japanese Women Speak, both of which came out in the United States. The Association addressed the letter to both Chinese and English-speaking people, especially Americans, with the specific political intention to abate accusations of Japan and offer an alternative image of the Japanese as peace-loving members of the international community. Their efforts bore some fruit. The American WCTU referred to Japanese Women Speak in the Union Signal and

15 "Program for March Meetings Japan and Foreigners in America," Women and Missions (February 1934), 383.
introduced the peace activism of the Women's Peace Association in Japan.  

The published apology was, however, not made in the Japanese language; Kubushiro and the Women's Peace Association did not publish these statements at home. They aimed primarily at an international audience, not a domestic one. Rising militarism accompanied by increased oppression of peace movements and mounting suspicion of Christians as foreign spies might have made it difficult to overtly challenge the national policy and publish critical statements within Japan. In order to cope with these sociopolitical situations, the Japanese Union and its allies directed a peace-loving image toward the international audience while meeting the expectations of the authorities at home.

Liu-Wang Liming extended certain sympathies to these Japanese women who were caught in difficult circumstances between public pressure and the aspiration for the reparation of estranged relations between Japan and China. In particular, the letter of apology from the Women's Peace Association moved her to resume a dialogue with the Japanese women. In the spring of 1934, Liu-Wang made a daring trip to Japan in spite of opposition from her family and friends. During her stay in Japan, she spoke in many places, attended prayer meetings and missionary gatherings, met many

16 “In the Sunrise Kingdom,” *Union Signal* (November 10, 1934), 5.
influential Japanese women, and reunited the WCTU leaders. Her old and new Japanese friends gave her a hearty welcome. She discovered little anti-Chinese sentiments in Japanese society and felt sorry for "a great many Japanese men and women who were helpless with their militarists and who desire universal brotherhood just as much as peace-loving people do in all other parts of the world."\(^{19}\)

While cultivating mutual understanding and friendship with the Japanese women, Liu-Wang carefully examined the status of women in Japan and the system of women's education, and discovered that Japanese women were more present in public arenas than their Chinese counterparts.\(^{20}\) This positive impression of Japanese women induced Liu-Wang to reexamine the notion of Western superiority in terms of women's liberation. Women of China and Japan had, she argued, also been instrumental in uplifting women's status through social reform, education, and political action, and their efforts never lagged behind those of the women in the so-called advanced countries. She wrote,

> Because of narrow Nationalism, business depression and unemployment, women of the so called advanced countries, especially Europe, to our great surprise, are forced to go back to their eternal seat—the kitchen. While these franchised women are emerging from society, the female sex of the far east, on the contrary, are coming to the battle front, battling for equal chances of the two sexes and a better society in which all may live.\(^{21}\)

Through her trip to Japan, she rediscovered the significance of social reform and

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\(^{19}\) *A Record Year of Achievement*, 2; Tsuneko, “Nichi-shi kan no kakehashi to narumono: Shanhai Kyōfūkai soukanji Liu fujin to kataru,” *Fujin shinpō* 433 (April 1, 1934): 44-45.

\(^{20}\) Tsuneko, “Nichi-shi kan no kakehashi to narumono,” 44.

\(^{21}\) *A Record Year of Achievement*, 1.
nation-building activities of women in the Far East, namely, China and Japan. The sense of coalition between women of Japan and China built by Liu-Wang's trip, however, did not completely eliminate disagreement with each other. Despite the friendliness nurtured between Liu-Wang and her Japanese friends, the smoldering discord between the women of China and Japan remained deep in their minds and occasionally came to the surface. The eruption of the discontent of the Chinese with Japanese rule took shape at the presidential election at the Pan-Pacific Women's Association in 1934. When the Association elected Gauntlet Tsune as the next president, out of ten nations and regions, only the Chinese delegates voted against her. After the election, China decided not to send any delegates to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference (PPWC) as an objection to the Japanese presidency. Apparently, the conversation between the Japanese and Chinese representatives at the PPWC was harmonious. Yet, the presentations and discussions of both parties revealed that they

22 Not only Liu-Wang but also other Chinese intellectual women had a passion for learning from the experiences and knowledge of Japanese women in the 1930s. The publications of the Chinese YWCA, for instance, carried an increasing number of articles written about Japan and Japanese women after the Manchurian Incident. For them Japan was their enemy as well as their model to learn from. See Ishikawa Teruko, “Chūgoku YWCA (onna seinenkai) no Nihon kan: Zasshi Nüquingnien no Nihon kankei kiji no kōsatsu,” Rekishigaku kenkyū 765 (August 2002): 29-31.
23 Gauntlet Tsune, Shichijū shichinen no omoide (Tokyo: Ozorasha, 1989), 146. These ten nations and regions were new Zealand, Australia, China, Japan, Korea, Fiji, the Straits Settlements, Canada, the United States, and Hawai‘i.
24 Ibid., 147. As the president of the Pan-Pacific Women's Association, Gauntlet visited China and convinced the Chinese female intellectuals to send delegates to the next conference in Vancouver.
25 Gauntlet insisted that the Japanese and the Chinese delegates at the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference held in Honolulu in 1934 promoted friendly relations to "unprecedented degree." Anne Seesholtz, an executive secretary of Council of Women for Home Missions in New York City, also observed that "Chinese and Japanese women talked
embraced different visions of international relations. The Japanese women manifested their desire for peaceful resolution of international disputes primarily by collecting signs and petitioning as they did at the London Naval Conference.\textsuperscript{26} They did not, however, deny Japan's leadership on the continent. Meanwhile, the Chinese representatives expressed more concrete and stronger demands for peace, support of the League of Nations, observation of the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the outlawing of all force and aggression, and the implementation of an embargo on export of arms to belligerents.\textsuperscript{27} The rejection of Japanese control at the PPWC symbolically revealed the strategic differences between the Japanese and Chinese ideas about transnational sisterhood. The former sought the absence of war and preservation of peace under the hegemony of Japan, while the latter completely denied Japanese control.

As interactions between the Japanese and Chinese delegates at the PPWC revealed, the war in Manchuria pitted the Japanese and Chinese women against each other. The Japanese women embraced the nation's continental expansionism as a

\textsuperscript{26} The Japanese delegates at the PPWC mentioned that the women of Japan lobbied the government for peace and against war by submitting petitions signed by 180,000 names at the time of the Manchurian crisis. Actually, they submitted the petition to the London Naval Conference that was held before the Manchurian disputes. The Pan-Pacific Women's Association, \textit{Women of the Pacific: Being a Record of the Proceedings of the Third Pan-Pacific Women's Conference which was held in Honolulu from the 8th to the 22d of August, 1934, under the Auspices of the Pan-Pacific Women's Association} (Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1935): 49.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 47.
defensive act in the national interest and an effort to stabilize the continent. The Chinese women saw Japan's challenge as a gross violation of international law and a threat to women's welfare. During the political turmoil, American women of the WCTU did not take any aggressive action to repair the damaged relations between Japan and China. Their priority to preserve the "white Ribbon League of Nations" persuaded American white ribboners to take a noncommittal position on political issues. Their general reluctance to directly address the realpolitik of disputes in the Far East weakened the effectiveness of the American Union as an organization working toward improving women's lives in the warring lands. Unlike the American Unionists, the Japanese and Chinese women became the primary agents to fill the vacuum of power in the Far East created by the retreat of the Americans and played subjective roles in influencing ongoing conflicts in Asia, through the exchange of letters, trips, participation in international conferences, and publications in English.

The Estrangement of Japanese and Chinese White Ribboners and Increasing Pro-Chinese Sentiment in the United States

When Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge, south of Beijing, on July 7, 1937, Gauntlett Tsune was in Vancouver preparing for the forthcoming Conference of the Pan-Pacific Women's Association as its president. The newspaper headline reporting the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese troops greatly shocked her. She and the other executives of the association decided not to discuss the new hostilities at the forthcoming conference. As a result of
the exclusion of the issue of the new all-out war in Asia from the agenda, the meeting proceeded smoothly.28 The farewell dinner, to which Gauntlett invited both Japanese and Chinese consuls, ended in a "pleasant atmosphere."29

Although the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference avoided direct reference to the new military clashes that soon escalated into all-out war between Japan and China, apprehension about the future cast a cloud over Gauntlett. In her presidential address at the conference, she said,

We are standing perplexed to know what the future has in store for us. It seems today that the disruptive forces working everywhere threaten the very existence of our civilization. . . . How can we build up a world where international disputes can be settled by peaceful means?30

As she predicted, the "disruptive forces" rampant on the continent ran counter to her expectations. The intensification of fighting in China entailed snowballing suspicion, fear, and hatred between Japan and China. In August and September 1937, Japanese forces badly wounded the British ambassador to China and bombed civilians in Nanking. In the following year, Japan occupied and installed its own puppet government in Chiang Kai-shek's capital of Nanking, to which the United States had

28 The Chinese and the Japanese delegates, most of whom were college professors and students, editors of a women's magazine, officers of YWCA, WCTU, and other women's organizations, jointly engaged in discussions about international affairs, health, education, peace movements, media, labor, population, traffic in arms, and traffic of women and children. For the names of the delegates who attended the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference, see Women of the Pacific, 13-16.
29 Gauntlett, Shichijū shichinen no omoide, 149-151.
sent many missionaries since the 1830s. Chiang refused to discuss peace terms. The conflict turned out to be a quagmire for both sides.

Japan's military action and the shocking report of its atrocities against civilians as the "Rape of Nanking" received considerable attention from the American public and excited sympathy for the Chinese. In addition, Japan's bombing of the U.S. gunboat *Panay* infuriated Americans. The notoriety of the Japanese force grew along with the positive Chinese reputation. China's heroic resistance became a major story that year. Americans were even more troubled by what Japan was doing in China than at Germany's seizure of Austria.\(^3\)

Behind the expanding sympathy for China's plight and the growing belief in Japan's culpability, there were pro-Chinese individuals and groups who promoted pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States. Pearl S. Buck, author of the best-selling novel *The Good Earth* (1931), and Henry Luce, owner of an influential media conglomerate, Time Inc., were representative spokespeople who disseminated positive images of China. The nominal unification of China under Chiang Kai-shek and his conversion to Christianity, and the presence of American-trained Chinese in his regime also improved China's image in the United States. Furthermore, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, a Wellesley graduate, Christian, beautiful, intelligent, charming, and Westernized, captivated Americans and presented a picture completely opposite to that of Japan, represented by brutal Japanese male soldiers. Unlike her

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husband, she spoke flawless English and developed ties with prominent Americans who were later called the "China Lobby."

These positive notions of the Chinese symbolized by Madam Chiang Kai-shek compelled more and more Americans to support China. Since the late 1930s, certain Americans had engaged in relief efforts in China that merged to become United China Relief by late 1940. In early 1939, the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression was organized in New York to bring influence upon legislation preventing the sale of war supplies to Japan. Its membership list included former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson as honorary chairperson; Roger S. Greene, former American Consul-General at Hankow as chairperson; Josephine Schain, head of the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War (NCCCW) as vice-chairperson; Carrie Chapman Catt of the NCCCW; Mrs. Edgerton Parsons, a chair of the U.S. delegates to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1937; Mildred McAfee, president of Wellesley College, and Mary E. Woolley, President-Emeritus of Mount Holyoke College.32

The presence of Schain, Catt, and Parsons at the Committee signaled the women's peace organizations' increasing concern about hostilities in Asia and rising compassion towards China. Indeed, the WILPF, dissatisfied with the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 that aimed at isolating the United States from the military crises, pressured the Roosevelt administration to take stronger action and strove to sway

public opinion to support their demands.  

The Chinese WCTU moved to make the most of it and increased its presence in the United States. In her answer to letters from Americans who were anxious about the safety and the condition of the WCTU in China, Liu-Wang harshly attacked Japan's invasion of China as an attempt to crush China and establish itself as a continental empire. At the same time, she denounced the hands-off policy of the American Unionists. By cynically asserting that her patriotic efforts to save the nation might have seemed "very stupid to many American friends, especially those who called themselves pacifists," she urged Americans to take immediate action to end destructive militarism and abandon their fence-sitting neutrality.

As the numerous letters that poured into Liu-Wang's office revealed, more and more American white ribboners backed the Chinese. However, the American Union as an organization refrained from officially condemning Japan even after the beginning of the all-out war, and to Liu-Wang's frustration, did not call for stronger actions to halt Japan's militarism. Instead, the American Union kept portraying the Japanese as peace lovers and separated the militarists from the rest. When the Union Signal printed Liu-Wang's letter that vehemently attacked Japan's policy, Ida B. Wise Smith,

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33 Foster, The Women and the Warriors, 237.
35 Ibid.
36 Right before the skirmishes at the Marco Polo Bridge, the Union Signal reprinted an article on the life of Hayashi Utako written by J. Kenneth Morris, a missionary stationed in Kyoto. In his serialized essay, he also applauded Emperor Hirohito's teetotalism that he "set a high standard of purity for his subject" and that "he is also an ardent supporter of world peace." J. Kenneth Morris, "Samurai's Daughter Dedicates Life to Christian Welfare Work," Union Signal (June 19, 1937): 14.
the president of the American WCTU, attached a small note that “the people of Japan do not desire war, but in this situation, as in similar ones, not only in Japan, but in other countries as well, the militaristic powers dominate and fix the national policies.” In the next month, the Union Signal carried news that some Japanese recruits killed themselves because of their complete refusal to fight. Through introducing such an episode, the executives of the American Union counterbalanced the increasing anti-Japanese feelings and preserved an impartial position toward the two warring Asian nations.

The balanced representation of the Japan-China disputes and the careful ideological separation of militarists from the rest of the Japanese, were, however, soon overwhelmed by the tragic death of Liu-Wang’s husband in April 1938. This incident not only turned her into a celebrity as a symbol of Chinese patriotism but also brought a drastic change in the neutral and noncommittal position of the American white ribboners. Liu-Wang’s husband, Liu Zhan’en or Herman C. E. Liu, was president of Shanghai University and the chair of the Shanghai National Salvation Association. When the Japanese puppet government in Nanjing tried to recruit him as the minister of education, he refused the post and continued his resistance against Japan. On April 7, 1938, Chinese secret agents working for Japan assassinated Liu. Liu-Wang skillfully used this personal experience to obtain sympathy and support from the

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international community. Soon after the death of her husband, she published a book, *The Death of My Husband, Dr. Herman C. E. Liu*, in both Chinese and English. In this book, she highlighted the brutality of the Japanese militarists in their treatment of the Chinese. In sharp contrast, she described her husband as a saint-like patriot who sacrificed his life for national salvation “like Lincoln, like Jesus, [to] die in his work of saving others.” Then, she expressed her indomitable determination to follow in his footsteps. In her narrative, she did not clearly state who actually shot him to death even after the arrest of two Chinese suspects. Instead, she obscured the puzzling political situation of China, which was torn into pro and anti-Japanese factions.

Liu-Wang’s self-representation as a celebrated martyr’s widow seemed decisive in propelling the previous neutral position of the American WCTU to the side of China. After the death of her husband, the American Union became predominantly supportive of China and against Japan. In December 1938, the *Union Signal* carried news entitled “JAPS LAND BEER AFTER FALL OF HANKOW” and critically reported that Japan unloaded 2,000 cases of Japanese beer on the Hankow Bund. This was the first time that the *Union Signal* used a racial slur in referring to Japanese. Having been persuaded that Japan was fundamentally to blame for the ravages of China and the dissemination of alcohol, American temperance workers switched their previous neutral position to the Chinese side. Liu-Wang succeeded in letting the White

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Ribbon League of Nations discard a hands-off policy regarding regional conflicts, even at the risk of offending its Japanese members.

The death of Herman C. E. Liu also sent ripples through Japan and created sympathy for Liu-Wang. Among the letters of overflowing sympathy and love sent from abroad, she found a letter from her Japanese friend, whose name she kept secret: “My heart has ached for you, for you are one who cares as your husband did for your people.” The letter from Japan, however, did not represent relationships between the Chinese and the Japanese WCTUs. The Japanese WCTU did not make an official statement on the death of Liu-Wang’s husband. Moreover, as an organization, it supported the military actions of Japan in China as an unavoidable effort to reprimand China for spreading anti-Japanese propaganda and obstructing Japan’s cooperation with China. The Japanese Union’s all-out support of the military actions in China was consistent with the stance of the *Nihon Kirisutokyō Renmei* (Japan Christian Federation). As a segment of the Christian women’s community in Japan, the WCTU understood Japanese policies as a solution to the problem of population pressure and acquisition of food and resource production, and finding markets for Japanese products.

At the same time, the Japanese Unionists grew less patient with the rapidly increasing pro-Chinese sentiment in the United States and Great Britain. Kubushiro Ochimi deplored that “Japan has been changed from a hero of international community

42 Ibid., 35.
into a hated person since the Manchurian Incident in 1931. After the Incident of China, Japan has been treated as a consummate villain."43 Restoring Japan's international honor became a primary objective of the Japanese Union.

The Strengthened Tie between the Temperance Women of China and the United States

When Fujita Taki, a Bryn Mawr-trained professor of Tsuda College, visited the United States a year before the Marco Polo Bridge skirmishes, she witnessed that the American image of Japan was that of a war-mongering nation and that sympathy toward China prevailed amongst the Americans.44 Especially after the outbreak of all-out war in China, the Japanese women discovered a rapid spread of anti-Japan and pro-China sentiments in the United States. They thought that such an unbalanced reputation was produced because Japan lacked the equivalent of Pearl Buck. Unlike China, Japan did not have a popular and sympathetic messenger to defend Japan.45 Kubushiro began publishing a monthly English journal entitled *Japan Through Women* in the beginning of 1938 and started conveying Japanese voices to Americans. This journal carried articles about the social reform movement in Japan of which the Japanese WCTU had been the vanguard. It also published stories of the Bible, biographies of Kubushiro's late husband, who dedicated his life to religious work, and

various news regarding prominent Japanese women and their church activities. Through the narratives of the Japanese who dedicated their lives to the cause of the least privileged people and world peace, Kubushiro endeavored to present an alternative to the image of the Japanese as brutal warmongers. However, this journal, with little circulation, was far from influential enough to rival Buck’s *The Good Earth*.

The Japanese women also attributed the popularity of Madam Chiang Kai-shek and the ascendancy of other intellectual Chinese women to the pro-Chinese sentiments of Americans. When Yamada Waka, a prominent feminist, visited the White House as a peace envoy sponsored by a woman’s magazine, *Shufu no tomo* (Friends of Housewives), she noticed that Eleanor Roosevelt only listened to her intimate friend, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, and did not respect the Japanese voice. As Madam Chiang’s noticeable influence in international politics indicated, the Japanese recognized the prominent contributions of Chinese intellectual women to various aspects of politics and social reforms at home and abroad. Ishihara Kiyoko, a female reporter for *Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha* (Eastern Economic Journal) reported her

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46 Yamada Waka had a humble class origin, unlike many other Japanese women who engaged in private diplomacy. Having little formal education, she had been taken in by the honeyed words of a broker and cheated into being a sex worker in the Japanese communities of the West Coast. After being rescued by Donaldina Cameron’s House in San Francisco, she had gone back to Japan and had educated herself with the support of her husband. Yamada was deeply influenced by the Swedish thinker Ellen Kay and put her heart into the movement for the protection of motherhood. Although Yamada was well known and respected in late 1930s Japan, the Japanese immigrant communities in the West Coast still remembered and despised her as a former prostitute whom some of her audience had slept with. For Yamada’s life, see Yamazaki Tomoko, *The Story of Yamada Waka: from Prostitute to Feminist Pioneer*, trans. Wakako Hironaka and Ann Kostant (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1985).
impression of her trip to China: intellectual Chinese women were well educated and much more aggressively engaged in important works than Japanese women.47 Her conversation with Chinese female leaders made her aware that the Chinese women, whom many Japanese still regarded as helpless slaves of old-fashioned customs, had in fact “unbound their feet, bobbed hairs, obtained suffrage,” and engaged themselves in the social reform and national salvation movements together with men. With regard to women's public presence, Ishihara observed that Japanese women were much more backward than Chinese women.48 Although Japanese women still looked at the Chinese as inferiors in need of their guidance, they became aware that middle-class, educated Chinese women could rival Japanese. This discovery challenged the modern assumption of the Japanese that positioned themselves above other Asians in terms of the “progress” of women.

Japanese WCTU members and their allies became highly apprehensive about the rise of Chinese women when they heard that Madam Chiang Kai-shek was about to attend the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference in New Zealand scheduled in January 1940. The WCTU Japan dispatched Gauntlet Tsune, then the first vice-president of the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association and well known in the women’s community of the Pacific Rim, to the United States for the preparation of the forthcoming conference.49 They were afraid that the presence of Madam Chiang at the PPWC would further

strengthen pro-Chinese sentiments and disadvantage Japan in the Pacific community. She was, they admitted, a popular and powerful token of China’s “virtue” and the noble resistance against Japanese imperialism. The Japanese women expected Gauntlett to counterpoise Madam Chiang and manipulate the conference procedure so that the discussions would not be taken over by her. An expected confrontation between Gauntlett and Madam Chiang, however, never occurred. The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the declaration of war by New Zealand against Germany led to the cancellation of the conference. The PPWC was adjourned until 1949.

Germany's invasion of Poland and the beginning of World War II in Europe soon involved Asia. Nazi Germany's sweep over Europe fascinated Japanese policy-makers who were looking for raw materials and markets in the South Pacific. The Japanese occupation of northern Indochina and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy compelled Washington to place an embargo on aviation fuel, top-grade scrap iron, and later, all scrap metals. The Japanese WCTU looked upon the deteriorating relations with the United States with mixed feelings. Its members still held emotional ties to the United States and Great Britain, especially to the former. During the 1930s and the early 1940s, the organ of the Japanese Union constantly referred to prominent American women and the achievements of their social reforms and inspired its members to learn from their prominent American sisters. In sharp contrast, American women exhibited increased antipathy to Japan and sympathy for China. The chasm of feelings between the women of the two nations grew wider and wider with the worsening diplomatic relations. The deteriorating relations
between Japan and the United States compelled Japanese women to interact with American women to redirect their anti-Japanese agenda. When war broke out in Europe, Gauntlett Tsune was in the United States and on her way to Europe. Instead of going to the war zone, she decided to remain in the United States and exchange ideas with her old acquaintances, Carrie Chapman Catt, Ella A. Boole, and other prominent leaders of women's movements, the academy, and religious groups.

Her interactions with American leaders were, however, far from frictionless and comfortable. Strong anti-Japanese feelings pervading various aspects of American society, depressed her.50 Carrie Chapman Catt, for instance, expressed sympathy for Japanese women who were in a dilemma between collaboration with the national mission and working for international friendship and peace.51 Yet, she did not stop public denunciation of Japan for its military actions in China. Her organization, the NCCCW, supported Roosevelt's policy of withdrawing economic aid from Japan and giving aid to China.52 The Program of the NCCCW for 1940 included giving economic aid to China and renouncement of U.S. special rights there.53 This program was adopted in the presence of Chinese guests; the Japanese were absent.54

While Gauntlett carried out fruitless private diplomacy in the United States,

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Liu-Wang and her Chinese fellows of the WCTU deliberately strengthened U.S.-China ties through her constant presence in the publications of the American Union. She kept informing American readers of the indescribable suffering caused by the Japanese invasion and of her people’s “beautiful spirits which are vital to the upbuilding of New China.”\(^{55}\) The new policy that the World’s WCTU adopted after the outbreak of World War II favored her projects. Although the World’s WCTU remained neutral toward hostilities and still attempted to empower a community of women that transcended cultural characteristics and geographic boundaries, it added a new clause to its rulebook that “as individuals, with few exceptions, our members will doubtless be patriotic citizens of their own countries . . . .”\(^{56}\) Thus, the new policy legitimized its members whose nations had been invaded by the Axis powers to resist hegemonic occupation and engage in patriotic activities.

At the same time, in Asia, China received sizable grants and financial support from the World’s and American WCTUs. Upon the request of Liu-Wang, between 1937 and 1940, the World Union granted the largest amount of financial support it had ever given to China. In 1937, $700 or about 16.7% of the total appropriation to its member nations went to China; the amount jumped to $1800 or 20% in the next year, 1938. In 1940, the total budget of the World’s WCTU shrunk due to the outbreak of war in


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Europe. Yet, 24% of all money sent to its branches was allocated to China. The American Union also called for donations and sent money and gift packages to China. Liu-Wang used the aid from the World and American Unions for her social reform projects.

The Women's Version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

The increasing support to certain nations manifested a departure from the World's WCTU's original policy of neutrality. Through massive amounts of financial support to China, the World Union was indirectly involved in the war and fought against Japan. The WCTU of Japan unhappily looked upon the strengthening emotional and economic ties between China and the U.S. in the late 1930s. The editorial column of its journal written by Kubushiro Ochimi stated that the United States had pointed a finger at Japan and exclusively accused it as an egregious invader since the Manchurian Incident. Instead of seeking the favor of Americans, possibly in vain, it seemed more productive to build a more solid and better bridge with China. The rejection by the United States convinced the Japanese Union to draw closely together within the Japanese Empire after the late 1930s. Unlike previous decades when the Japanese white ribboners in Asia worked primarily among the Japanese

58 After moving to Chungking with the westward retreat of wartime capital, she spent most of her time in organizing the Western Chinese WCTU and establishing an industrial school for war refugees and an orphanage. She also planned to support the farmers and wipe out illiteracy. Frances Willard Liu, “Greetings, White Ribbon Comrades!” 5.
residents, they expanded their scope to reach the local people.

Their new enthusiasm to approach Asians coincided with the birth of a new idealistic national mission. Japan coined a fresh political slogan, "Tōa-shinchitsujo" (the New Order of East Asia), and declared the ouster of Western imperialism and the creation of a self-sufficient Asian bloc united economically and racially. In Manchuria, the ideology of "Gozoku-kyōwa" (harmony of five races) produced heavenly images of the Japanese and Chinese, including racial minorities. In 1940, Prime Minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro articulated his new governmental plan, "Daitōa Kyōeiken" (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), a vision to unite East Asia under the leadership of Japan and eliminate the Western powers. These Asiatic causes captured the minds of transnationally active Japanese women. For those who had been offended by the racism of Americans and irritated by the anti-Japanese propaganda in China, Pan-Asianism had a strong appeal. These Pan-Asiatic slogans emphasizing benevolence, development, unity, and racial equality advocated that Japan distinguish its colonialism from Western colonial practices. Through such rhetoric, Japan aimed to pacify the indignation of the colonized people.

Inspired by these colonial ideologies, the WCTU of Japan expanded its sphere of influence not only in Manchuria, Northern China, Korea, and Taiwan, but also in Sakhalin and Brazil, and developed personal connections with the Japanese residents and natives in the South Pacific islands that came under the aegis of the Japanese Empire. The Union also co-hosted with other Christians a meeting to promote mutual friendship and disseminate temperance causes. They invited native delegates from
India, Manchuria, Korea, the Pacific islands, and Ainu, indigenous residents of Hokkaido. As the presence of public officials indicated, this meeting had the backing of the Japanese government.60

The more the Japanese Union was isolated from the white ribbon world community, the more it approached its authorities and became their propaganda wing. The construction of the women's version of the “Co-Prosperity Sphere” was most drastically carried out in Korea by absorbing the Korean native WCTU. Around 1939, the Korean WCTU under the presidency of Kakkyung Y. Lee had four thousand members.61 At that time, the Korean Union had remained independent from any organization except the World's WCTU, conducted its own temperance activities primarily at schools, and even dispatched its representatives to the World's WCTU conferences. However, the growing pressure from the colonial regime infringed on its independence. In 1939, several articles appeared in Fujin shinpō reporting that the Korean Union “asked” for unification with the Japanese WCTU “on Korean initiative.” According to Fujin shinpō, the Japanese Unionists had no reason to reject the request from Korea and granted the annexation with the promise of financial support.62

Behind the “voluntary” renouncement of independence by the Korean Union, there was pressure from the colonial government that promoted the unification of

Japan and Korea under the slogan, "Naisen ittai" (the unification of Japan and Korea). Apparently, the unification of the two WCTUs was carried out as part of the colonial policy that intended to confirm hierarchical relations between Japanese and Koreans and increase control of the former over the latter. The Japanese authorities intervened in the independent activities of some Korean Christians and merged Korean Christian churches and organizations into Chosen Kirisutokyo Rengokai (the Federation of Korean Christian Churches) in 1939. The Federation included more than 1,700 leaders representing 47 Christian organizations. These political circumstances undermined the independence of Korean church activities and pressured the Korean WCTU to be incorporated into the Japanese WCTU. After that, the Korean white ribboners became members of Chosen Rengo Bukai (Korean General Section) of the Japanese WCTU. The YWCA of Korea, the Korean Sunday School Association, the National Christian Council, and other associations having international relationships were also dissolved or amalgamated with equivalent Japanese organizations.

Contrary to the public announcement of the Korean WCTU, Ethel Underwood, the president of the Foreign Auxiliary of the Korean WCTU, wrote to the World’s WCTU that it was the colonial government that took the initiative to combine the Korean Union with the Japanese one. The Union Signal also reported, “the Japanese

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63 Wi Jo Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule (Lewiston/Queenston, the Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), 39.
64 Charles A. Sauer, “Why Missions are Leaving Korea,” Japan Christian Quarterly 16 (January 1941): 42-43.
government has ordered the W.C.T.U. of Korea to combine with the W.C.T.U. of Japan.\textsuperscript{66} Implying a forced merger under the pressure of colonial authority and tacitly refuting the argument of the Japanese Union, the World's and American Unions denounced Japan's colonial policy, which had crushed the independence of the Korean Union. Ethel Underwood, a Presbyterian missionary who came to Korea in 1912 from the United States, led the Auxiliary as its president and promoted independent temperance work by preserving direct affiliation with the World's WCTU.\textsuperscript{67} The World Union supported the Auxiliary through continuous appropriations.\textsuperscript{68}

The colonial government of Korea frowned at the independent work of foreign missionaries and intensified its interference with church affairs. In February 1941, the authorities imprisoned Alice Butts of Pyongyang and brought another twenty missionaries to the police station for interrogation when they observed the Women's World Day of Prayer at Butts' home. The police explained that these missionaries intended to prevent Koreans from supporting Japan's war effort through their prayer service. As manifested by this round-up, the colonial officials escalated the harassment of foreign missionaries by imposing severe restrictions on their activities. In 1941,

\textsuperscript{66} "World's," \textit{Union Signal} (September 6, 1941): 10.
Underwood wrote to the World's WCTU saying that "the organized WCTU work is stopped" and only individual efforts were carried on.\(^69\) However, even individual activities became jeopardized with the increase of Japanese control over Christian churches in Korea: meetings could no longer be held without the endorsement of the police. The authorities did not allow foreign missionaries to hold any administrative positions in the church.\(^70\) Such circumstances compelled practically all missionaries who made up the Foreign Auxiliary to give up their work. Moreover, the aggravation of U.S.-Japan relations accelerated the evacuation of Americans in Korea.\(^71\) In the spring of 1941, the missionaries in Seoul were depleted. The repatriation of Ethel Underwood and her family in 1942 virtually ended the history of the Foreign Auxiliary in Korea.\(^72\)

In China, the construction of the "White Ribbon Co-Prosperity Sphere" under the pressure of Japan's colonialism took a much milder and indirect form in absorbing the native Union. Unlike Korea, China never fell under the complete colonial control of Japan. The Chinese WCTU was active and enjoyed strong backing from its American sisters. The Japanese Union already had branches in cities with large Japanese populations in China, but they worked primarily among Japanese residents; the Japanese branch Unions in China were not influential and powerful enough to


\(^70\) Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule, 40-41.

\(^71\) "World News and Events," Union Signal (November 21, 1942): 4. The State Department of the United States informed missionaries via Gaylord Marsh, then the U. S. Consul-General, to evacuate all Americans, especially women and children, in October 1940. Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule, 41.

overwhelm the Chinese Union. Yet, the Japanese WCTU and its continental branches moved to fulfill Japan's self-appointed role as the leader of Asia and embarked on benevolent works for poor Chinese. Among various new enterprises, the creation of a medical settlement called *Airinkan* (the hall of neighborly love) in the slum district of Beijing was the best manifestation of such an attempt.

The establishment of the Airinkan was the collective project of the Japanese Christian women's community, and the WCTU took the initiative in this new medical settlement project. In 1938, Hayashi Utako, the new president of the Union, made a proposal at the Japan Christian Federation to create a permanent medical facility in Beijing. The YWCA and other Christian women's organizations joined to work together on the new project. Ikeda (née Toriumi) Michiko of the YWCA, then in her early twenties, responded to Kubushiro Ochimi's voice that "women should serve China as nurses while men are cleaning it." This new project also attracted Shimizu Yasuzō,

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73 The Japan Christian Federation had already established a house to comfort Japanese servicemen in Tianjin. This institution, called *Ikoi no ie* (the house of recreation and relaxation), served Japanese green tea, offered entertaining services, prepared the Japanese-style bath, received and sent mail to Japan. About 12,500 servicemen per month used this house. This house was, however, for the exclusive use of the Japanese military. William Axling, a Baptist missionary from the United States and one of the major promoters of settlement movements in Japan, urged the Japanese Christians to work for the Chinese people. *Fujin shinpō* carried the synopsis of his presentation delivered at a Christian club and reminded its readers of the responsibility to work for peace in Asia. "Nichi-shi no yūwa to Kirisutosha no shimei," *Fujin shinpō*, no. 483 (June 1938): 14-17. 74 "Kurisuchan fujin no tede Pekin ni iryōsetsurumento o" *Fujin shinpō*, no. 484 (July 1938): 14.

75 Ikeda (Toriumi) Michiko, interview by author, Kiyose-shi, Tokyo, 27 July, 2001. Her attendance at Tōyō Eiwa Girls' School ran by a Canadian Methodist and her volunteer works at the Kōbōkan Settlement had nurtured her willingness to serve for the least privileged people.
founder and principal of Sūtei Gakuen Girls’ School in Beijing, and his wife, Ikuko, as patrons. Shimizu undertook fund-raising in Japan, organized a special committee, and recruited the Japanese wives of a banker, a medical doctor, and government officials living in Beijing.  

Ikenaga Hideko, a Christian dermatologist, gave up her career at a Sumitomo zaibatsu-related hospital in Osaka and went to Beijing to work at the new institution with “the mind of a soldier going to the front.”

The collaborative work of the Japanese in both Beijing and Japan resulted in the completion of Airinkan buildings in 1939. At its opening ceremony, not only the women who were involved in the project, but also high-ranking officers of the Japanese military, representatives of the Japanese embassy, and Chinese officials of a puppet Japan-oriented Provisional Government attended and/or delivered congratulatory addresses. The Airinkan thus began with the deep involvement of Japanese imperialism. Ikenaga and Toriumi’s words that “we have to stroke the Chinese, since other Japanese strike them on their heads” aptly represented the ideological underpinning of this new project. While their male counterparts were taking up arms and eliminating rebellious elements with violence, Japanese Christian women also took steps to support the national mission through fulfilling the gender specific role of caretakers. Although the idea of a medical settlement was novel for most of the

76 Ibid.
Japanese, the Japanese Christian women were already familiar with a settlement house project: the Kōbōkan Settlement in downtown Tokyo was a good example of transnational exchanges and reform works in the poor neighborhood. As missionary women from North America imported a settlement house from the United States and developed the Kōbōkan project for the least privileged Japanese, Japanese Christian women planned to offer poor Chinese people Airinkan as a “present of love.” Through assuming responsibility as an affectionate and benevolent neighbor and expressing the Christian spirit of love, they created the Airinkan as a beachhead from which they participated in the national project of empire building and modified imperial exploitation.

The young female staff members of the Airinkan, Ikenaga and Toriumi, were trail-blazers of the new enterprises of Japanese Christian women. Soon after settling in the slum districts of Beijing near Tiandan, they started struggling at the frontline of the “White Ribbon Co-Prosperity Sphere” to make it accessible and acceptable to Chinese. At the opening day of the medical clinic, only four patients came; soon the number of patients expanded to between thirty and forty a day. Regardless of the close association between the Airinkan and Japanese militarism, the impoverished neighborhood desperately needed it. The youth and gender of Ikeda and Toriumi also reduced the anxiety of the poor Chinese. Toriumi and Ikeda wore humble cotton

82 Ibid., 43.
Chinese dresses and learned Mandarin, but the strong accents of patients, many of whom were from various parts of the nation, often hindered smooth communication. Then, they hired a native apprentice nurse and let her translate various dialogues into standard Mandarin. The Airinkan also dug a well in order to solve the serious insufficiency of water, and shared it with the neighbors. The community welcomed the new well. Ikeda and Toriumi chose to live at the Airinkan building instead of commuting from a wealthier and safer place. The tight budget did not allow the Airinkan to surround its buildings with a wall and left it vulnerable to theft and robbery. Despite the lack of security, no one assaulted its Japanese residents, or broke into it. Gradually, this medical settlement expanded its projects to include departments of industrial education for women, education for children, charity sales, and mission work. It also added new buildings and recruited one more woman from Japan, Kaneda Kuwako, a nurse.

The Airikan projects grew in a similar way to the Kôbôkan settlement in Tokyo. Foreign Christian women established both in the slum districts of capital cities. As North American female missionaries stationed in Japan primarily shared the burden of financial support for the Kôbôkan, the majority of contributors for the Airinkan consisted of Japanese Christian residents of Beijing, and many of them were

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83 When the pump of the well was stolen, neighbors searched for and took it back from a market where many stolen goods were traded. Ikeda, interview.
women. Although the nominal president of the Airinkan was a male educator, Shimizu Yasuzō, Japanese Christian women played the principal role in planning, establishing, and expanding the Airinkan. As the Kōbōkan used Japanese women as intermediaries with its neighbors and was careful not to impose American lifestyles on the local residents, the Airinkan also hired a Chinese woman to overcome the language barrier and its Japanese staff members tried to adopt the local clothing style, food, and language. Unlike many settlement workers in the United States who lost interest in living in a working-class neighborhood, commuted from the suburbs, and started calling their neighbors “clients” in the early 20th century, workers of both the Kōbōkan and the Airinkan resided in the impoverished communities and kept close ties with their neighbors. These patterns made the two settlements less foreign and more accessible to their neighbors. Their compliance with Japan’s aggression was also a common character of these two institutions. As the Kōbōkan collaborated with the militaristic government in the late 1930s, the Airinkan also functioned as an agent of colonialism to appease China and propagandize Japan’s benevolence. As the Kōbōkan won recognition from the government officials and even received Imperial gifts, both

87 Ikeda, interview; “Shōwa jūrokunendo kaikei hōkokusho,” Airin, no. 6 (December 15, 1942): 5-6.

the Imperial Household and the *Kōain*, the colonial administrative office for the development of Asia, subsidized the Airinkan.  

The Airinkan seemed to run well because of its acceptance by both its Chinese neighbors and the Japanese authorities. Yet, its smooth enterprise soon snagged on two difficulties. First, the heavy workload and the hostile living conditions of the slum neighborhood seriously damaged the health of Ikenaga. She gave up her work and went back to Japan in 1941. The absence of a doctor limited Airinkan's enterprises as a medical settlement. Second and more seriously, harassment by the Japanese military led to the demise of the Airinkan. The sudden arrest of Ikeda's husband who worked at the YMCA in Beijing in 1942 and the ensuing order for him to go back to Japan forced her to give up her work and leave Beijing also.  

Ikeda's arrest and expulsion from Beijing indicated the increasing military hostility toward Christian organizations after the Pearl Harbor Attack.  

In addition to the creation of the Airinkan, the WCTU established other educational and social reform institutions in China. In the middle of Shinkyō, the capital city of Manchukuo, the Manchurian branch planned to construct buildings to serve as a nerve center of the WCTU in Manchuria. The Union also patronized a girls' school and a kindergarten with about one hundred and twenty women's

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89 “Airinkan nisshi bassui,” *Airin*, no. 6 (December 15, 1942): 8.
90 Ikeda Arata, *Kumoribi no niji: Shanhai Nihonjin YMCA 40 nenshi* (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1995), 341-345. The ostensible reason of his punishment was that he worked only for the YMCA and neglected to serve for Emperor; less than two weeks later, the military police changed his "guilt" to the newly fabricated "embezzlement of enemy's property."
organizations in areas along the line of the Manchurian Railway. The Shanghai branch
opened Japanese, English, Mandarin, and Shanghai dialect language classes, operated
dormitories for single men and women, and ran a medical clinic for poor Chinese.\textsuperscript{92}
The WCTU also supported an orphanage in Kunshan. The manager of the orphanage,
Kusumoto Yasuko, was a young nisei woman from Los Angeles. Her father, Rokuichi,
used to work at Hayashi Utako's orphanage in Osaka and later opened his own
institution in Los Angeles. His devotion to orphans motivated Yasuko to pursue her
father's career. The news of the suffering of children in China after 1937 emboldened
her to go there and work for the unfortunate children. Because of the connection
between her father and Hayashi, the WCTU supported Kusumoto's project.\textsuperscript{93}

These WCTU enterprises aimed to alleviate the distress, not to eliminate the
cause of the suffering —i.e. Japan's imperialist thrust into Manchuria and China. The
Union supported Japan's military offensive as a punitive action for China's "irrational
resistance" and accepted the propaganda of the Japanese military force as an agent for
bringing stability and prosperity to China. During the escalation of full-fledged war on
the continent, the Japanese Union members praised the alleged high morality of the
Japanese military and constantly expressed their appreciation of and sympathy for the
sacrifices made by the Japanese soldiers. Word of civilian casualties, including news of
the "Rape of Nanjing," did not reach their ears, partially because press censorship

\textsuperscript{92} Hayashi Utako, "Chūshī ni natsu no ikkagetsu," \textit{Fujin shinpō}, 510 (September 1940): 16.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 17; Hayashi Utako, "Kunshan Chūnichi shōjien," \textit{Fujin shinpō}, no. 528 (April
suppressed any negative information that might undermine the legitimacy of Japan's actions. But the women's firm belief in the righteousness of the national mission also blurred their vision to the brutality of the war.

Similar to the way the World's WCTU took advantage of U.S. and British imperialism to spread its international networks, the Japanese Union supported the Asiatic national slogans and established its outposts wherever the Japanese military advanced. The enforcement of discipline and tightening of morality promoted by the authorities under national emergency also pleased the Union women. They even trusted the chastity of the Imperial force, even though the Japanese military actually facilitated the expansion of the traffic in women and victimized women. Thus the reality was incongruous with the expectations of the Union, but the women believed that the "virtue" of the Japanese military's supreme commander, Emperor Hirohito, offset the vices of his men. The WCTU women hailed stoic Emperor Hirohito, who did not drink, smoke, nor have a concubine, as the apotheosis of their ideal manhood. They found no reason to oppose spreading his authority through his expanding empire.

Contrary to their expectations, their reform projects did not mitigate the strong public indignation of the Chinese toward Japan, nor did it thwart the rising sympathy of Americans toward China. Although the WCTU of Japan created medical settlements, opened schools, and supported social welfare institutions in China, the

95 Hayashi Utako, "Fujin no kakugo," Fujin shinpō, no. 478 (February 1938): 29.
Chinese white ribboners did not pay attention to such actions. Their American sisters also ignored such Japanese enterprises in their publications. The American WCTU complemented U.S. imperialism and inspired the Japanese Union to follow its steps, but its sympathy to China discouraged its members from endorsing and evaluating Japanese reform projects in China.

After the death of Liu·Wang's husband, the U.S.-China bond became stronger. The Chinese white ribboners mocked Japan's efforts to sell its benevolence. The white ribbon binding China and the United States jointly refuted Japan's dream of becoming the moral leader of Asia and shattered its intention to win the recognition of Americans. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941 confirmed the estranged relations between the "White Ribbon Co-Prosperity Sphere" and its rivals, the United States and China.

The Clash between the White Ribbon Allies and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Neither the majority of the Americans nor the Japanese desired the outbreak of the Pacific War, despite the disagreement over the issue of China. Japan's continual belligerence in China made the Nine Power and Kellogg-Briand acts meaningless, and the rise of European aggression in the 1930s presented Americans with questions of

war and peace. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress produced a series of three neutrality enactments beginning in 1935 to isolate the nation from the crises. After the beginning of World War II in October 1939, the Roosevelt administration drifted toward interventionism by lifting the arms embargo and supplying Great Britain with military supplies through lend-lease. The United States also pressured Japan by imposing an embargo on scrap iron, steel, and later, petroleum when it signed a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and when it advanced into French Indochina.

Although the American public was sympathetic toward the victims of aggression, the sense of isolationism still remained strong among the Americans, including the American WCTU. In the years preceding Pearl Harbor, the American Union adopted special peace resolutions at the national conferences and requested President Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress to "keep his nation from being involved in the world conflict." American white ribboners, who were composed of "loyal citizens of the United States," deplored the "creation of war psychology and hysteria" that might lead to war. Their abhorrence of war was amplified by the fear of expanding liquor sales in canteens, training camps, and territory adjacent to the camps.

Many other peace and women's organizations, both liberal and conservative, also opposed U.S. entrance into the war. Among them, the idea of neutrality flourished and they worked to keep the U.S. neutral. These groups included the WILPF, the Keep

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98 Ibid.
America Out of War Congress, and the National Peace Conference, as well as networks of right-wing mothers' groups, such as the America First movement of 1939-1941, the Mothers of Sons Forum, and the Mothers Organize for America. The NCCCW also opposed U.S. involvement in war. Their sympathy toward China, as well as apprehension about the expansion of fascism in Europe, did not necessarily validate the U.S. involvement in World War II. The feeling of "Keep America Out of War" was still prevalent in these organizations, including the WCTU of America.99

Meanwhile, other women's organizations took a more hawkish stand against Japan. Six women's organizations, namely, the national League of Women's Voters, the American Association of University Women, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the National Board of the YWCA, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the National Women's Trade Union League favored the imposition of boycotts and/or embargoes on Japan, even though they anticipated that the policies they embraced would lead to war between Japan and the United States.100 The opinions of women's organizations in the United States were split into pacifist, neutral, and bellicose.

For the Japanese WCTU, the military clash between Japan and the United States was the least favorable choice. Its members held their breath watching the diplomatic process between Washington and Tokyo oscillate between war and peace. In

March of the year of the Pearl Harbor Attack, the WCTU gave a hearty send-off to a special peace delegation. This group consisted of William Axling, a Baptist missionary from the United States; Kawai Michi of the YWCA; Kosaki Michio, the son of former WCTU President Kosaki Chiyo; a famous Japanese Christian leader Kagawa Toyohiko; and four other Japanese Christians. The WCTU expected them to smooth U.S.-Japan relations. They visited Los Angeles, Riverside, Atlantic City, Chicago, and thirty more large cities in the United States. Christian communities in the United States enthusiastically received them, but this private diplomacy was not powerful enough to change the collision course of the two nations.101

While U.S. and Japanese diplomats continued their last-minute negotiations over whether the two nations should go to war or Japan should pull out of China, the Japanese temperance women kept praying together with a Christian organization in Washington D.C. day and night for a week prior to the opening of hostilities.102 Their prayer for peace in the Pacific, however, did not signal their disapproval of war in general. Rather, their disagreement of war was limited to that between Japan and the United States. Unlike their American counterparts, the Japanese WCTU members expected the advancement of the Japanese military in Asia as an act to wipe out social ills and uphold morals. As the government of Japan and the United States had inextricable disagreements over fundamental policies toward China, the WCTU

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women of both nations also had an unbridgeable gap between their interpretations of the war.

The failure of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States and Japan's stunning victory at Pearl Harbor triggered racialized arguments among the Japanese white ribboners. Giving a standing ovation to the Japanese victory, Kubushiro Ochimi declared that the time had come to challenge Anglo-Saxons for their arrogant sense of racial superiority over the past three hundred years. Until the outbreak of war, she had refrained from blaming the United States for racism against the Japanese, even when controversy over the exclusion of Japanese immigration was fierce. After the failure of negotiations between Japan and the United States at both inter-governmental and private levels, Kubushiro bitterly looked back at the history of the Japanese exclusion movements in the U.S. beginning at the turn of the 20th century; from then, anti-Japanese feelings caused the school disputes in 1906 and escalated to the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924. During the increasing hostilities with China, the United States toughened its critical attitudes toward Japan. Although both public and private agencies in Japan tried every possible means to ease hostilities and normalize relations with the United States, Kubushiro argued that such efforts had become futile. She now stated that war between the two nations seemed to be an "inevitable" result of American hostilities toward Japan since 1900. Other Japanese Union officers also attributed the cause of the war to the United States. They accused

103 Ibid., 1-2.
104 Ibid.
the United States of bluntly turning down Japan's sincere efforts for peace.\textsuperscript{105}

The news of Japan's great victory in Hawai'i brought the Union women an indescribable joy and inspired the reassessment of the international disarmament treaty that the Union had previously supported. Moriya Azuma referred to the Five-Power Treaty of 1921 that privileged the U.S. and British Navies and thus praised the outstanding job of the Japanese Navy at Pearl Harbor, blessing it as the paragon of ideal Japanese manhood. According to her interpretation, Japan had never publicly complained about the unequal battleship ratio imposed by the United States and Great Britain; instead, the Navy men compensated for their numerical inferiority with hard training and silently empowered themselves to the fullest potential.\textsuperscript{106}

Apropos of the Washington Conference, it was Moriya and Yajima Kaji that made a pilgrimage to Washington D.C. and lobbied for the success of the conference. The WCTU of Japan initiated a petition campaign for disarmament at the London


\textsuperscript{106} Moriya Azuma, “Konogoro,” \textit{Fujin shinpô}, no. 525 (January 1942): 18; Moriya Azuma, “Konogoro,” \textit{Fujin shinpô}, no. 534 (September 1942): 19. As Moriya stated, the Japanese Navy did not clamorously denounce the Five Power Treaty that established a military equilibrium in the Pacific, but the 1930 London Naval Conference that agreed on a 5:5:3 ratio in heavy cruisers with the possibility of Japan rising to 70 percent in 1935 fueled the fire of naval officers, such as Admiral Katô Kanji, then a military command section chief. He and his fellow officers claimed that Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi had violated the right of the Emperor and infringed on the right of the Navy to determine military matters. In the years that followed, the Japanese Navy strengthened itself without infringing on the 5:5:3 capital ships ratio through a program of weapons development. In 1935, Japan withdrew from the international disarmament system as a result of pressure from anti-Treaty factions in the Navy and started a larger program of naval construction. The Japanese Navy did not remain a silent victim of the unequal ratio imposed by Anglo-Saxon English speaking nations.
Naval Conference. Moriya and her temperance colleagues had welcomed these agreements of international disarmament when Japan signed them. However, the new hostility with the United States made them reevaluate the agreements of these conferences. The inferior ship ratio of Japan that they once regarded as a relief measure from a rapid increase in the military budget was transformed to an attempt to oppress a colored-race, Japan, by the two Anglo-Saxon countries. The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese Navy was, therefore, a great victory by Japan that upset Anglo-Saxon racism. Japanese temperance workers legitimized “Daitōa Sensō (Great East Asian War)” as a holy war to liberate Asians from the yoke of Western racism. The United States and Great Britain, the former mentors and models of the Japanese WCTU, had become rivals. The Japanese Christians, they believed, had to stand up and take the place of these nations as the leader in religious and social reforms in Asia.

With the intention of facilitating empire building, the Japanese temperance women moved to inaugurate a new seminar series, “Kōa joshi shidōsha kōshūkai” (a lecture class for female leaders in Asia), where they aimed to train new female leaders in Asia. Lectures covered Japanese spirituality and womanhood based on Christianity, immigration issues, cultural and natural climates of Asia, Asian native languages, and temperance and hygiene issues. This curriculum clearly aimed at training and promoting the immigration of “respectable” Japanese women into all parts of the empire. The Colonial Ministry of the Japanese government patronized this program,

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and other Ministries offered it support by dispatching lecturers. The series attracted young, well-educated, Japanese women and prospered enough to be held every month in Tokyo, the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area, and later, various towns of Kyushu.109

The new training program, geared to middle-class, “respectable” Japanese women, was a countermeasure against the exportation of prostitutes. The Union was afraid that the expansion of the empire might encourage the traffic of prostitutes to cater to Japanese as well as native men. Indeed, these prostitutes, often called “(fu)joshi-gun” (women’s troops), went into even the far corners of the Japanese Empire. The WCTU was worried that the dissemination of disrespectful Japanese women would blemish the national honor and hinder the construction of the Sphere.110 It also incorporated the nurturing of “respectable” young adults into its wartime agenda. The Union women lobbied the government and politicians to raise the minimum drinking age from 20 to 25 years. They justified this agenda by arguing that protecting the youth would increase the efficiency of the military, and that the poisonous influence of alcohol would damage servicemen and future soldiers. The Union was also worried about the negative effects of alcohol on health in the tropical climates into which the

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Co-Prospertity Sphere stretched. The wartime plans of the WCTU, anti-traffick in women and anti-liquor consumption for the youth, derived from concerns about national honor and the healthy development of the Japanese empire. The temperance women blamed prostitutes and alcohol for the hindrance of the healthy construction of the empire and the corruption of the military.

Their trust in the military authority also characterized their wartime activism. In the eyes of the Union women, the Army and Navy were patrons of their reform enterprises. Indeed, ex-military members of the Diet were supportive of their new prohibition plan. Kubushiro Ochimi and Hayashi Utako visited Prime Minister General Tōjō Hideki at his official residence and handed a note to him. The note suggested the immediate policy of abstinence, by both youth and adults, and the prohibition of exporting women who might "disgrace the honor of a Japanese woman." In reality, however, the Japanese military functioned as the vanguard of sexual exploitation not only of Japanese women, but also of other women collected from all areas under Japan's control. Recently, historians have revealed much evidence of sexually enslaved women, called "Jūgun ianfu" (comfort women attached to the army). They were women from Japan, Korea, China, Holland, and other nations. Yet, negative news that might blemish the record of the Japanese Imperial force was censored, and

111 "Shasetsu" (September 1943): 2-3.
only heroic tales of good behavior and strict moral discipline reached the WCTU. The Union also welcomed military officers as guest speakers at its meetings. In their speeches, the military officers stressed that women in the home-front should reject Anglo-American individualism and selfishness. The military regarded women's suffrage as nothing more than the manifestation of Anglo-American egoism and as incompatible with the national interest and tradition, or simply, as too American. It suffocated the suffrage movements in which the Union was also involved. Without granting the vote, the military regime expected women to collaborate with the war efforts.

The increasing influence of military personnel in the activities of the WCTU

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114 When Takahashi Kikue worked together with Kubushiro Ochimi in her latter years at the WCTU after the war, she asked Kubushiro how the Union coped with the problems of comfort women. Kubushiro replied that she did not know about that issue at all. However, it would not be denied that Kubushiro and other Union leaders acknowledged the brutality of the Japanese military, contrary to their official announcements. Historian Kunitake Masako reveals that Ichikawa Fusae, one of the leading suffragists, disclosed the atrocity of Nanking that she witnessed in her trip to Nanking to the students of Tokyo Women's Collage. Ichikawa said that the on-going hostility was far from a "holy war"; it was a hopeless fight sinking into a quagmire. Due to the severe restriction of freedom of speech and powerlessness of women in politics and military, Ichikawa could not publicly express such a story. The meeting was held in a locked warehouse-like room in the innermost part of the campus with a limited number of students. Ichikawa's episode indicates that some women leaders who publicly buttressed the national mission may have harbored a different view deep in their hearts. So far, a similar story of the WCTU leaders has not been found and the possibility of tacit denial of war remains speculative. Takahashi Kikue, *Fukushi ni ikiru: Kubushiro Ochimi* (Tokyo: Özorasha, 2001), 85; Kunitake Masako, "Senjiki no Ichikawa Fusae," *Rekishihyoron*, no. 552 (April 1996): 39-40.


during the Pacific War mirrored the growing collaboration between the battlefield and the home front. The Union made the best use of the stoic wartime situation to implement their long-time plans of abolishing prostitution and promoting prohibition, even at the cost of suffrage. The military government needed as many healthy soldiers as possible. Both parties feared that intemperance and exposure to licensed vice would damage national strength and hinder the smooth construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The expectations of both sides matched. The agreements between the Union and the military over moral issues resulted in their frictionless cooperation.117

The WCTU's collaboration with the military led it to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and pay respects to the spirits of the dead servicemen enshrined there. It also severed its affiliation with the World’s WCTU.118 Despite such actions, the authorities maintained their doubts about the loyalty of its members. The Special Thought Police suspected that the patriotism of the Japanese Christian churches and organizations was a camouflage.119 The WCTU fell under suspicion. Gauntlett Tsune and her

117 Historian Suzuki Yûko accuses the WCTU of collaborating with the wartime militarism and treats female war collaborators as culprits, not victims of the war. Yui Masaomi even argues that women's participation in support of the military regime was particularly prominent among social movement activists. Yoneda Sayoko refutes these arguments by highlighting that women did not have rights which were granted to male participants of labor and peasant movements. Instead of exclusively blaming women for not firmly confronting authority, Yoneda stresses the powerlessness of women that hindered them from challenging the power. See Suzuki Yûko, Feminizumu to sensô (Tokyo: Akashi Shobô, 1994); Yui Masaomi, “1940 nendai no Nihon—Sekaiseiha no zasetsu,” in Iwanami Kôza Nihon tsushi kindai vol. iv (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995): 127-131; Yoneda Sayoko, Hiratsuka Raiteu no 'sensô sekinin' jôsetsu,” Rekishihyöron, no. 552 (April 1995): 46-56.
118 Kubushiro Ochimi, Haishô hitosui, 252.
husband completely lost their freedom due to constant observation by the Special Thought Police and the Military Police, as well as harassment from members of the community. The pressures from both public and private sectors made her and her husband give up their British citizenship and become Japanese citizens. The Cabinet Information Bureau suspected Kubushiro for her “strong dependence on foreign nations.” Because of that reason, the Bureau did not allow Kubushiro to join the peace delegation of March 1941 to the United States. The Special Thought Police secretly examined the contents of her public speech. The authorities also kept a close eye on the activities of the WCTU, on both a national and local level after 1937. Even when Union women gathered for patriotic actions, the Special Thought Police always saw them as suspect. In 1940, the military police arrested the officers of the Salvation Army, claiming that they spied for a foreign nation. The Salvation Army was the long-time ally of the WCTU in the fight against prostitution. The government pressured this organization to break away from its world headquarters in London and change its semi-military name into Nihon Kyōseidan, Japan Salvation Society.

Thereafter, Protestant denominations in Japan connected with the United States and Great Britain were forced to sever ties with foreign missions. The Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy that Japan signed in September 1940 branded Protestant

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122 Ibid.
Churches from the United States and Great Britain as agents of hostile countries and put them under strict observation and control by the police. In 1943, the WCTU, as well as the YMCA and the YWCA, was incorporated into Nihon Kirisutokyōdan (the Japanese Christian Church). This organization, in which thirty-four Protestant denominations merged, was established in 1941 under strong pressure from the militarist government. The authorities curtailed the independent work of Christian churches and organizations.  

The suspicion of the WCTU and its leaders as spies of enemy nations was a false accusation, yet there was some evidence to show their implicit emotional attachment to their former fellows. Despite its official separation from the World's WCTU and its substantial support for the war against the Allied Powers, the Japanese Union did not completely suppress subconscious favor for the American and the English upon whom it had modeled itself for the past half century. Whether for emulation or rejection, the United States and Great Britain still remained a model for the Japanese white ribboners. The anger against the racism of the Anglo-Saxons was the other side of the coin of their longing for full acceptance. Such ambivalent love-and-hate consciousness occasionally became apparent during the Pacific War. When Kubushiro Ochimi published a biography of Yajima Kaji in 1942, she mentioned a firm friendship between Yajima and Maria True that only death could separate. In her article on venereal diseases published during the war, she heavily quoted

124 Gonoi, Nihon Kirisutokyōshi, 300-301.
information obtained from her research trip to the United States.\textsuperscript{126} When Gauntlett Tsune argued about depopulation issues of Japan, she even encouraged her readers to learn from the efforts of consecutive British Cabinets to solve the problems of the shrinking population in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{127} In the middle of the trans-Pacific hostility, the Osaka branch held an annual meeting on February 17, 1943, the forty-fifth anniversary of Frances E. Willard's death.\textsuperscript{128} The Osaka Union never officially announced that they had gathered to commemorate Willard, but it was obvious why they had chosen that particular day to assemble.

After the Japanese force started losing to the Allied Powers, the government authority tightened thought control to eliminate American and British elements from all aspects of Japanese lives. The tacit emotional attachment to these enemy nations and people was not acceptable anymore. Thereafter, the names of Americans and Britons completely disappeared from the publications of the Japanese Union. The Japanese white ribboners refrained from subscribing to popular wartime propaganda that often called Americans and Britons "kichiku" or demons, even when they publicly cried out for Japan's victory over the United States and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{129} In 1944, due to a paper shortage, the government denied allocation of paper to the WCTU. This new policy killed the monthly magazine that the WCTU had issued for almost sixty years.

\textsuperscript{126} Kubushiro Ochimi, "Junketsu Nihon kensetsu tojô ni okeru seibyô mondai," \textit{Fujin shinpô}, no. 536 (November 1942): 4-5.
\textsuperscript{128} "Osaka bukai dayori," \textit{Fujin shinpô}, no. 540 (April 1943): 8.
After May 1944, the WCTU completely lost its independent voice. The intensification of air raids in Tokyo and other large cities, as well as small ones, severely curtailed temperance work.

Temperance Racism in the United States

Japan's Pearl Harbor attack dispelled the previous American WCTU's demand for neutrality. Its national, state, and local organizations assumed responsibility as patriotic citizens and collaborated with authorities as did the Japanese white ribboners. The Executive Committee of the American Union adopted action plans that included cooperation in war activities: purchasing defense bonds and stamps, contributing to the well-being of the armed forces, cooperating with local branches of the Red Cross and Defense Council, and supporting women in war industries and servicemen's wives. The dissemination of wartime prohibition and the prevention of juvenile delinquency were also a part of its primary agendas. Through these works, an American white ribboner gave "my best service to home and country." 131

Although it was not incorporated in the official agenda, the American WCTU participated in perpetuating bestial images of the Japanese, as many other popular

130 Thereafter, Fujin shinpō was merged into Shinseimei published by the Japanese Christian Church.
131 “Plans for the Year's Work as Adopted by the Executive Committee,” Union Signal (August 28, 1943): 4. Between April 1942 and May 1945, the WCTU raised $47,177.80 for Red Cross mobile vehicles, ambulances in particular. Local Unions also provided blood banks, mobile canteens, station wagons, and a club mobile. Margaret C. Munns, “Gifts of Mercy World War II Style,” Union Signal (June 2, 1945): 14.
wartime writings portrayed the Japanese as immoral pagans.\textsuperscript{132} American Unionists accused Japan primarily for two reasons: first, Japan's paganism; second, Japan's alleged practices of spreading narcotics and alcohol within and outside of the nation. The \textit{Union Signal} introduced opinions that the war in Asia was "started by men who did not know Christ."\textsuperscript{133} However, the article ironically said that "pagan Japanese" acted like "Christian" nations, such as Great Britain and the United States, because the Japanese also forced the sale of opium upon China and developed a liquor-license system.\textsuperscript{134} The \textit{Union Signal} also denounced the incorporation of the Japanese WCTU into the Japanese Christian Church as the "Nipponese interpretation" of Christianity.\textsuperscript{135} These explanations implied that the absence of Christianity or the nativization of Christian ethics and teachings drove Japan to war.

Quite contrary to the expectation of the Japanese Unionists, the American white ribboners assumed that the Japanese military advancement would be accompanied by moral corruption and the perpetuation of liquor and drug abuse. They alleged that the Japanese force in Attu fell before the U.S. attacks because the former drank too much sake, Japanese rice wine, before going into battle.\textsuperscript{136} They also shared news that Japan brought "medicines" and "vitamins" such as morphine, cocaine, and heroin, in order to "improve the people's health" in Thailand.\textsuperscript{137} The \textit{Union Signal} also

\textsuperscript{132} Dower, \textit{War without Mercy}, chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
\textsuperscript{133} "Lest We Forget," \textit{Union Signal} (January 8, 1944): 9.
\textsuperscript{134} "Unfortunately Not Very Different," \textit{Union Signal} (January 8, 1944): 9.
\textsuperscript{135} "Hope for Christian Activities in Japan," \textit{Union Signal} (March 13, 1943): 4.
\textsuperscript{136} "Japanese Lose Through Sake," \textit{Union Signal} (July 1943): 3.
\textsuperscript{137} "Japan Drugs to Siam," \textit{Union Signal} (February 1944): 13.
introduced stories about Japanese agents who had attempted to peddle spurious "American" brands of liquor, some of which were poisoned, to American troops. The American Union argued that intemperance and sneakiness were inherent in Japanese culture and essential characteristics of the Japanese people. When they reported that some Japanese in the "Jap Relocations" rejected drinking beer and set a new order of prohibition, they asserted that the initiator of the new rule "must be American born." This statement insinuated that Japanese raised in Japan could not resist the lure of alcohol. The only precarious reasoning that they could find to explain such a lofty action was that these Japanese were "American born."

Judge Twain Michelsen of the San Francisco Municipal Court made a more sensational attack on the "Japanese narcotic invasion" in the Union Signal. His article, which appeared with his picture, asserted that stimulating the narcotics trade was a part of Japan's national policy. This practice, he argued, posed a much more serious threat to world peace than military aggression. The military assaults, he suggested, were only temporary and merely changed national boundaries. Rather, he stressed that the Americans should arouse themselves to the present dangers of Japan's "insidious program of human destruction." He appealed to the racial pride of Americans by repetitively quoting a paragraph from a pamphlet that had allegedly been given to Japanese soldiers,

The use of narcotics is unworthy of a superior race like Japanese. Only inferior races that are decadent like the Chinese, Europeans, and the East Indians are addicted to the use of narcotics. This is why they are destined to become our slaves and eventually disappear.\textsuperscript{141}

He printed these sentences with bold-faced type and asserted that this quote succinctly summarized the "philosophy of the hell-bent chieftains of the Japanese military butchers."\textsuperscript{142} People under the “Nipponese rulers” were corrupted and despoiled by the illicit use of drugs. At the time, Japan was contemplating the subjugation of the Western hemisphere, including the White House. He concluded his provocative essay arguing that it was the aim of Japanese diplomacy to build a “gigantic narcotics monopoly that bids fair to undermine and corrupt a large part of the world.”\textsuperscript{143}

These stories and opinions blended temperance issues with highly racialized arguments. By repetitively referring to the Japanese by derogatory terms, these writings reaffirmed the racial and cultural hierarchy allocating the Japanese subhuman status. The temperance Americans always identified the Japanese as Japs and Nipponese, whether they were military officers in China or detainees at a relocation camp in the United States. Historian John Dower revealed that the popular wartime discourse in the United States tended to distinguish between good and bad Germans and portrayed German atrocities as “Nazi” crimes, while the “Japanese brutality was almost always presented as being simply “Japanese.” Temperance activists developed similarly essentialized arguments regarding the Japanese and

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 19.
portrayed them as the source of moral corruption. They dehumanized the Japanese by associating them with drugs and liquor meant to pollute the purity of white nations and argued that the spread of Japanese rule meant the spread of poisons.

In contrast to the repeated references to narcotics and alcohol, the American Union dropped sexual issues from its argument. The prostitution problems that haunted the Japanese Union and sexual violence by Japanese soldiers were a life-or-death problem for many women in Asia. But the American Unionists paid not the slightest attention to these sexual issues. These problems were part of the life experiences only of women on the other side of the Pacific and not of American women. Japan's “narcotic invasion” seemed much more threatening to them. Highlighting only what posed an imminent threat to their own lives weakened the effectiveness of the American Union as an organization working towards improving their Asian sisters' lives.

The WCTU also lost its influence on American lives on the home front, as well. Temperance activists in the United States began losing their fight against alcohol and started to become ineffective even before the war with the repeal of the 18th Amendment in 1933. Liquor consumption was stimulated during the war through tremendously frequent advertisement and increased production. The declining membership of the WCTU during the war mirrored people's declining concern about temperance issues. The decreasing sense of temperance among Americans became

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144 Dower, War without Mercy, 34.
145 Doris Weatherford, American Women and World War II (New York and Oxford: Facts
obvious to Liu-Wang Liming in Chungking. The drinking habits and associated bad
customs of American aviators stationed in China annoyed her.\textsuperscript{146} She frowned at the
American volunteer aviators who were creating a negative impression in the minds of
the Chinese public and warned Americans, “if the allied countries want to win the war,
they must remove such obstacles as drinking from their path.”\textsuperscript{147} Edith Fredericks, a
former missionary to China, deplored the spread of drinking in Christian homes in the
United States. She cautioned that people in the Orient constantly saw dishonorable
aspects of American life through motion pictures that glorified drinking and home
bars.\textsuperscript{148} These reports conveyed that Americans failed to serve as a good model of
temperance for people in Asia.

However, the American Union often redirected their frustration over domestic
problems to Japan and pin-pointed it as the primary agent corrupting Asia and the
United States with liquor and narcotics. For them, Japan was a convenient scapegoat
to cover up their ineffective attempts to restrain their own people from intemperance.
Their Japanese counterparts also blamed Western racism and colonialism as the
primary cause of the predicaments in Asia. Yet, it was also true that the Japanese
white ribboners preserved tacit respect for the United States and Great Britain during
the war. Contrary to the use of derogatory terms and the dehumanization of the

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\textsuperscript{146} In 1937, Captain Claire Chennault, retired from the U.S. Army Air Corps, joined the
Chinese air force as chief adviser. By 1940 he organized his “Flying Tigers” units with
American volunteer pilots.

\textsuperscript{147} Munns, “The Money You Sent for China’s Orphans,” 23.

\textsuperscript{148} Edith Fredericks, “Edith Fredericks—For Many Years in China and Interned at Camp
Japanese by the American Union, the Japanese Union did not adopt popular discourse that demonized Americans. When the American Union looked down on Japan, the Japanese Unionists looked up to American and British women as their model at least until they were completely muted by the military regime. This sense among women of both nations coincidentally reinforced the idea of Anglo-American superiority over Japan.

The Celebration of a Great Humanitarian in China: Confirmed Friendship between the Chinese and American White Ribboners

The elevated description of the Chinese accompanied the degrading representation of the Japanese by the American WCTU. American WCTU women bestowed an encomium on Liu·Wang Liming, or “Frances Willard” of China, for her dedication to the welfare of women and children and her patriotic zeal. They often referred to her spiritual strength to stand up to the tragic loss of her husband and to her works for the least privileged women and children. Liu·Wang was, as Margaret C. Munns, treasurer of the American Union, described, “a constant source of inspiration of the Chinese women.” Therefore, supporting Liu·Wang led to supporting all Chinese women. Munns aggressively fulfilled an intermediary role between Liu·Wang and white ribboners in the United States. She constantly introduced Liu·Wang’s letters, reported her latest ventures, and collected and sent money to China. The American

white ribboners helped Liu-Wang's work through generous donations. Her facilities for women and children, an institute for refugee children, an around-the-clock nursery to care for the children of working women, and a vocational school for young women refugees, soldiers' families, and poor girls, always suffered from skyrocketing prices. Only money sent from the United States enabled her to continue these enterprises.

Liu-Wang's work for the welfare of needy women and orphan children and her unshakable determination to resist invaders paralleled idealized images of women in wartime America. Lack of manpower caused by the mobilization of men to the front drew women into the workforce and even into the military. The celebration of "Rosie the Riveter" and the creation of "GI Jane" in the popular culture, however, did not upset the primacy of domesticity for women or bring discontinuity to the prevailing gender roles. The chief propagandists reaffirmed the familiar values of devotion to family despite the war-generated depictions of women in nontraditional pursuits. Women's presence in the U.S. Army was allowed with the condition that military women clung to prewar norms and respectability. The wartime emergency also boosted women's patriotism and utilized their domestic skills, such as canning, knitting, and even the management of personal finances, to the war effort.

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150 Ibid., 10.
“mothering” orphans and “caring” for war victims, Liu-Wang carried out patriotic activities without undermining that ideology of women’s primary role was devotion to home and mothering. She always directed her energy as a leading activist to care for women and children. In other words, she extended women’s domestic roles into the arena of public service. The name of her institution, “Victory Nursery” in Chungking, represented an ideal combination of patriotism and the celebration of motherhood. Liu-Wang perfectly fit into the idealistic wartime gender roles of the United States. The WCTU members in the United States did not hesitate to support her patriotic, yet feminine, mission.

Liu-Wang’s personal connection with Madam Chiang Kai-shek buttressed her high appraisal among American women. Aware that Madam Chang was the most popular and celebrated Chinese woman in the United States in those days, Liu-Wang prudently dispatched messages that highlighted close associations between the Chinese WCTU and Chiang’s regime. For instance, she reported in 1942 that the chairperson of the WCTU board of directors was the wife of a high-ranking government official who was second in honor and power only to Generalissimo; and the husband of the Union’s vice-chairperson was the head of the International Publicity Department of his government.155 She also noted the presence of H. H. Kong, brother-in-law of Madam Chiang Kai-shek, when she dedicated a new building for her nursery.156

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The appearance of such news in the *Union Signal* coincided with Madam Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States. Her trip created tremendous public appeal among Americans. Reactions to her speeches delivered at both the U.S. Senate and the House were overwhelmingly favorable, and her month-long speech tours in New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles created a highly favorable impression of her nation. The WCTU exalted her for her religion and patriotism, "she had charmed all with her sincerity and her Christian character. Her love for her own country has endeared her to Americans." Her religious conviction, her close ties with the United States, her fluency in English, her concern for orphans, and her patriotic support of the works of her husband, but with a softer touch matched the "appropriate image of the Americanized foreign woman." The American WCTU juxtaposed Madam Chiang with Liu-Wang: "we pray God's blessing upon Madam Chiang and upon Frances Liu and are happy that these two great women uphold Christian ideas."  

Contrary to the fact that the Union women in the United States highlighted points in common between Madam Chiang Kai-shek and Liu-Wang Liming, Liu-Wang actually held a firm nonpartisan position during the war. When she was selected to be one of the few councilors to the National Political Council formed by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1938, she dared to criticize KMT corruption openly. Meanwhile, she supported the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), acquainted herself with

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158 "China," 5.
Zhou Enlai and his wife Deng Yingchao, and sent her eldest son to the CCP-run military college. She also sent her younger son to a KMT-run military school.\textsuperscript{159} Despite her connection with both the KMT and the CCP, she emphasized exclusively her relation with the former without mentioning her association with the latter in her letters to the American Union. She portrayed the KMT leaders and its military force as if they were paragons of virtue and wrote to Margaret C. Munns that the Chinese had been able to resist Japan for so long because no soldier was allowed to either drink or smoke; in Chungking, the base city of the KMT, no hotel or restaurant was allowed to sell liquor.\textsuperscript{160} Obviously, the clean image of the KMT contrasted sharply with the depiction of the Japanese as the prime agent spreading the vices of liquor and narcotics.

Liu·Wang’s English publications catered to the interests of temperance women in the United States. The temperance of the KMT, her close partnership with its celebrated leaders, and her self-representation as the “mother” of orphans and care-taker of war victims appealed to American women. As a result, generous financial support kept pouring in from the United States and enabled her to carry out her projects throughout the difficult wartime.\textsuperscript{161} By supporting her humanitarian works,}


\textsuperscript{160} Margaret C. Munns, “The Money You Send for China’s Orphans,” \textit{Union Signal} (September 5, 1942): 23.

\textsuperscript{161} From April 1942 to May 9, 1945, the WCTU distributed as follows: China, $21,657; English children, $2,329.86; clothing for refugee children, $679.60; Korea, $50; Russia, $35; Greece, $40; France, $45; Poland, $25; India, $10; Norway, $4. Margaret C. Munns, “Gift of Mercy World War II Style,” \textit{Union Signal} (June 2, 1945), 14.
American women indirectly participated in the war against Japan and stood face to face with the Japanese Empire. Such joint actions indicated that the rivalry between the Japanese and Chinese Unionists for the support of their American sisters since the beginning of the 1930s ended up in a victory for the Chinese Union. Yet, the increasing collaboration between China and the United States had negative effects on China, in the long run. The unilateral financial flow from the United States to the Chinese Union made the latter dependent on the mercy of its patrons. Moreover, the efforts of the Chinese WCTU to win the favor of Americans reinforced the hierarchical relationship between the Chinese and American women. Its decade-long rivalry with its Japanese counterpart for the favor of Americans resulted in the confirmation of American superiority. It was a coincidence that the white ribboners of China and Japan reinforced unequal sisterhood between the American and Asian women during the Pacific War. Despite the fragmentation of the white ribbon community, Americans remained central in it and the Japanese and Chinese women affirmed American hegemony.

**Toward the Reparation of Broken Sisterhood: Works of Former Missionaries Stationed in Japan**

The vocal obloquy of Japan and the celebration of China became the dominant discourse of the American WCTU after the Pearl Harbor attack, as aforementioned. Yet, when the tide of the war shifted in favor of the Allied Powers and U.S. troops started to gain the upper hand over Japan in the Pacific theater, the publications of the American
WCTU carried more and more news and articles that defended Japan and even challenged the malicious depiction of Japanese religious culture and its people. Toward the end of the conflict, especially after 1944, the sympathetic attitude toward Japan became stronger and enabled the reconciliation of the broken sisterhood of the Japanese and the American WCTUs after WWII. These favorable narratives of Japan took three forms: first, a reminder of the past achievements of the Japanese WCTU in promoting temperance and world peace; second, opposition to racism against the Japanese that had culminated in the internment of Japanese on the West Coast; third, rising passion for lasting world peace. Former missionaries in Japan, the Department of International Relations for Peace of the American Union, and some executives of the World's WCTU were the primary architects of these sympathetic arguments toward Japan.

Anti-Japanese discourse in the United States after the late 1930s spurred some missionaries in Japan to offer alternative images of the Japanese. They described the Japanese as peace-loving people and emphasized the suffering of Christians in Japan from social and political pressures. Howard D. Hannaford, a former Presbyterian missionary in Japan, deplored the prevalent usage of the word “Jap” in the United States. He criticized the American tendency to despise the Japanese as childish and undervalue their achievements. Although it was natural to sympathize

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162 Howard D. Hannaford, “Are They ‘Japs’?” *Women and Missions* (March 1938): 400-402. Hannaford's wife served the presidency of the Foreign Auxiliary, the WCTU of Japan, in 1924.
with Chinese war victims, he warned Americans not to confuse righteous indignation with wholesale condemnation of the entire Japanese nation. He urged Christians in America to "cultivate a feeling of fellowship with the Christians in Japan, not 'Japs' but Japanese." Helen O. Reishauer, the long-time executive member of the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU, also defended Japan. In her article in *Women and Missions*, she argued that Americans should not be too occupied by the awfulness of the wars that Japan was waging. She revealed the devastating effects of war on the common people of Japan, especially women and children: Japanese women and children, suffering from a paucity of resources and food, carried the burdens of hard physical work while men were at the fronts. She asked her fellow Christian Americans to embrace Christian love and not to succumb to hatred, a definite power for evil. Other missionaries in Japan also highlighted these heartwarming interactions with Japanese friends and stressed the Japanese preservation of strong faith in Christianity despite the severe restrictions of the totalitarian government. Americans should, one former missionary said, "keep faith with our brothers in the Japanese Church." Gertrude E. Ryder, former executive officer of the Foreign Auxiliary, introduced Japanese culture through dozens of public talks at churches and YWCA camps after

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163 Ibid., 404.
165 Willis Lamott, "What of Japan?" *Women and Missions* (March 1940): 397-398; Emma E. Dunlop, "Goodbye, Beloved Japan!" *Women and Missions* (March 1940): 399-401. Dunlop was a former executive member of the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese WCTU.
she returned to the United States.\footnote{Gertrude E. Ryder, “Nihon Kyōfūkai riji sonota shoshi e,” Fujiin shinpō, no. 521 (September 1941): 28-29.}

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, strong anti-Japanese feelings in the United States drowned out these pro-Japanese arguments. Yet, when the U.S. and its allies assumed the offensive and Japan’s surrender became definite, positive representations of Japan reappeared in WCTU publications. “Whatever we may think of Japan and the Japanese in these wardays, the story of the development of the temperance propaganda in that country is one of the most remarkable in modern times,” C. Burnell Olds said.\footnote{C. Burnell Olds, “Temperance Was Basic in the Active Christian Movement in Japan,” Union Signal (May 6, 1944): 11.} As an American Board missionary who had lived in Japan for thirty-six years, he argued that Japan had developed strong temperance sentiments at both private and public, local and national levels since the missionaries first landed in Japan in 1859. Contrary to some anti-Japanese arguments that the expansion of Japanese control was accompanied by the spread of alcohol consumption, he argued that the Japanese government applied the law prohibiting alcohol consumption by minors to Taiwan, Korea, Manchukuo, and all territories over which Japan had jurisdiction. He credited this pervasion of temperance ideas and practices to the “unflagging zeal of hundreds of earnest and determined Christian men and women,
both native and foreign, who, little by little, set the nation on fire on the temperance cause."169

Other missionaries stationed in Japan also offered pictures of the Japanese as peace lovers. They addressed the lives of Yajima Kaji, Hayashi Utako, and their presence at international disarmament conferences with petitions signed by many Japanese women.170 Through narratives about the leaders of the WCTU and their fellows’ efforts for social reform and world peace, these missionaries rejected the essentialistic and monolithic description of the Japanese and distinguished the “good” Japanese from the rest. Japanese women were, according to these narratives, victims of militarism that suffocated their desire for peace and mobilized them into patriotic duties. In these missionaries’ eyes, the Japanese Christian temperance women preserved their religion with great courage despite the mounting hardships of the time.171

One former female missionary in Japan acted more aggressively for the sake of the Japanese in the United States. Gladys D. Walser, former Foreign Auxiliary member of the Japanese WCTU, challenged the racism of the United States by trying to help Japanese Americans in internment camps. Walser was one of the few foreigners who worked for the Kōbōkan Settlement in downtown Tokyo prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War. After being arrested and then deported from Japan to the United

169 Ibid., 21.
171 Ibid.
States, she learned about the relocation of 110,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry. The WCTU of the United States, however, did not collectively respond to this issue. Then, Walser found the stage for her action in the WILPF. As the chair of the WILPF’s Committee on Japanese in America, organized in early 1943, she succeeded in convincing the WILPF to support the Japanese in and out of the camp through providing needed items and supporting evacuees who left the camps for resettlement.\(^{172}\)

In addition to former missionaries in Japan, American white ribboners concerned with the restoration of world peace stood up against racism targeted against the Japanese. As the Allied powers defeated the Axis in both Europe and the Pacific and the war drew gradually to a close, they started thinking seriously about how to restore world peace. The most prominent of this group was Berthalee Broyles, National Director of the WCTU Department of International Relations for Peace. She was one of the few American Union women who criticized the relocation of Japanese Americans on the grounds of race.\(^{173}\) She also deplored the treatment of the Japanese in American journalism where “the words ‘ape-men’ or ‘monkey-men’ were among the milder of favorite epithets.”\(^{174}\) She believed that the “machines of hate” would never lead to the reconstruction of world peace; instead, she argued, it would expand the war and bring

\(^{172}\) Foster, *The Women and the Warriors*, 299-300.
about the final destruction of the race. 175

Ella A. Boole, president of the World’s WCTU, joined Broyles’s argument about the reconstruction of world peace. She reminded white ribboners that the World’s WCTU was established as a world organization to bind together women all around the world with the love of a common cause, and Japan was one of the many destinations to which Mary Clement Leavitt and other American white ribboners sailed. 176 Even after the Japanese Union severed itself from the World Union, the World’s WCTU preserved its membership along with other branches of the Axis powers. These organizations were classified as organizations that “[the World’s WCTU] do not hear from.” 177 This treatment implied that the severance of communication due to the war was never permanent; once the worldwide hostilities were over, the World Union would restore associations with these branches. During World War II, its small monthly brochure continued to convey the news of temperance movements and achievements in both Axis and Allied nations without making any subjective judgment. Through such treatment, the World Union laid the groundwork for post-war activism. The World Union also worked with other prominent women’s international organizations, such as the WILPF, the International Council of Women, the Associated Countrywomen of the World, the

175 Ibid. The progress of war stimulated Broyles to seek lasting peace and to develop post-war planning. In 1943, she began to make a blueprint of the post-war world and develop a new strategy. Her post-war agenda included ending the exploitation of races and colonies, imposing no punitive reparations and no decrees of war guilt. The creation of a world government and international police force was also a part of her post-war vision. See Berthalee Broyles, “Choosing a Point of View: For White Ribbon Women in the the [sic] Field of International Relations,” Union Signal (June 1943): 18.
176 Ella A. Boole, “... All Round the World,” Union Signal (November 4, 1944): 18.
International Business and Professional Women's Clubs, and the International Nurses Association, and discussed post-war planning.\textsuperscript{178}

Interest in the post-war world was evidently growing in the American WCTU, as its president Ida B. Wise Smith admitted.\textsuperscript{179} Plans for the year's work adopted by the executive committee in 1943 included not only patriotic actions but also a post-war agenda to awaken people to the need for "just and durable peace." This national agenda prescribed these objectives: not resorting to retaliation; working for the fair international distribution of natural resources; setting up international organizations; creating international administration and self-government of colonies; realizing international disarmament; preserving the essential freedoms of speech, religion, and academics; and respecting the rights of minorities.\textsuperscript{180} As a Christian organization of a potentially victorious nation, the American Union had started developing a post-war vision to regenerate the war-torn world prior to the end of war.

Its post-war plan indicated that the American Unionists had regained a sense of mission to reconstruct the world according to their ideals and to work for world peace. They still continued to support the Chinese Union, but their vision gradually shifted from how to fight back against Japan into how to reintegrate it into the white ribbon international community. When the war ended in August 15, 1945, the

\textsuperscript{178} Ella A. Boole, "Passed by the Censor," \textit{Union Signal} (September 30, 1944): 9.
\textsuperscript{180} "Plans for the Years' Work as Adopted by the Executive Committee," 5. This agenda for international peace and stability was identical to ideas that Berthalee Broyles harbored. Her private idea about post-war activities was integrated into the mainstream ideologies of the American WCTU.
American and the World’s WCTUs were ready to welcome back their former enemies. The wartime preparation for peace and the reevaluation of the Japanese white ribboners paved the way for the reparation of broken sisterhood. Former missionaries in Japan and several executive members of the World and the American Unions played a pivotal role in redirecting the agenda. The number of these individuals was small, but they effectively gained influence in the WCTU and contributed to making its long-term cherished desire for world peace resurface toward the end of the tumultuous period.

**Conclusion**

The Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the ensuing military conflict created an antagonistic relationship between Japan and China, and posed a serious challenge to the sisterhood between the Japanese and Chinese WCTUs. The Japanese side endorsed Japanese military action as an unavoidable act of self-defense and collaborated with the military regime. Meanwhile, the Chinese women rebuked Japan for its imperialistic aggression and rejected Japanese arguments as self-serving and self-righteous. They interpreted national sovereignty as an integral part of women’s welfare and demanded that the Japanese force withdraw. The two parties disagreed with each other.

The American white ribboners, who still dominated the White Ribbon League of Nations, remained aloof from the Japan-China military disputes. Unlike the League of Nations, from which Japan withdrew as a protest against accusations for its military
action in Manchuria, the American white ribboners preserved its women's equivalent by maintaining a neutral position. At the same time, the aloofness of the American Unionists from the realpolitik of international relations weakened its effectiveness to work for women in East Asia. Through frequent correspondence with the American Union, the Chinese WCTU regularly asked the United States for support for its fight against Japan. Meanwhile, the Japanese Union women also sought the endorsement of the Americans for Japan's continental policy and promoted personal interactions with their American sisters. Japan also developed social reform programs aimed at the Chinese with the clear political intention of lessening anti-Japanese feelings in China and selling a benign image of Japan's expansion to the international community. In short, the WCTU members of both nations rivaled each other for the favor of their American sisters during this tumultuous period. By wooing the United States, both WCTUs affirmed the centrality of Americans in the white ribbon international community and reinforced the hierarchical relations between the American women and their Asian counterparts.

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 transformed the United States into an official ally of China. Complying with the national mission, American white ribboners participated in patriotic actions. They also indirectly joined in China's fight against Japan via generous support for their Chinese sisters' wartime enterprises. The unilateral financial flow from the United States to China invigorated Chinese Union workers, but simultaneously increased the latter's dependence on the benevolence of American women. American white ribboners also disseminated highly
racialized accusations of the Japanese as subhuman ringleaders of the contamination of the world by liquor and drugs. Such “temperance racism” against the Japanese confirmed American superiority to Japan.

The Japanese Union reinterpreted the failure of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States as an ultimate rejection by Americans. Its members positioned themselves as victims of anti-Japanese propaganda initiated by the Chinese and racism of Americans after the immigration disputes. The feeling of isolation from the United States and China led them to embrace the Asiatic cause of the war propagated by the Japanese authorities and to engage in the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, their long-term desire for full acceptance by Americans was inherent in their wartime ideologies and practices. Indeed, the Japanese Union tacitly preserved respect for its prominent American sisters despite the sweeping anti-American discourses in wartime Japan.

The reinforced hierarchical relations between the American and Asian women during the Pacific War paved the way for the post-war reconstruction of the World's WCTU. As the Allied Powers seemed assured of victory toward the end of the war, hostilities toward Japan were gradually replaced by a new plan of reintegrating Japan into the World's WCTU. When Japan ceased to be a menace to the United States with liquor and narcotics, the American Union members regained a sense of leadership of the world and started thinking seriously about reconstructing the war-torn world. Soon after the hostilities ended, Ella A. Boole, president of the World WCTU, wrote to Gauntlett Tsune, “even though a nation fought against a nation, our mutual friendship
based on Christianity has never changed. We, members of the WCTU prayed for you during the war. . . . Please remember that we pray and work for the realization of world peace.”

This letter deeply touched the heart of Gauntlett, then the president of the Japanese WCTU. Its tacit emotional attachment to the American women preserved during the war made it easy to accept their leadership. Ashamed of having supported the war and having betrayed the sense of peace, she resumed her work at the Union. The World Union welcomed back its Japanese branch and moved to post-war activism.

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182 Unlike the World’s WCTU, the American Association of University Women did not allow its former Japanese branch to resume affiliation because Japan was a “former enemy.” Thus, the Japanese female graduates of universities in the United States established their own organization. Fujita Taki, “Joshi kōtōkyōiku e no adobaisu,” in Senryōka no Nihon fujin seisaku, ed. Nishi Kiyoko (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1985), 81-82.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined exchanges of transnationally oriented women and the flow of institutions, ideology, and practices of social reform enterprises between the United States and Asia by placing a particular focus on the transnational activism of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union and its branches in Asia. The first and the second chapters addressed the flow from the United States to Asia, especially Japan, while the third and the forth chapters highlighted flows from Asia to the United States and its Western allies as well as exchanges among Asian women. These chapters revealed that all of the exchanges among American, Japanese, and Chinese women evolved from a desire for transnational sisterhood and mutual understanding, but their agenda also underwent constant negotiation of racial and cultural hierarchy that always empowered one group while devaluing another. The exchanges of women on both sides of the Pacific had developed inseparably with contests for power.

The flow from America to Asia represented by the transplantation of American-born temperance movements and social reform institutions to Asian soil began with the smug Orientalist ideology of the WCTU in which passive and powerless Asian women were subject to “Oriental degradation” and were waiting for “help” from their Occidental sisters. The uncritical belief in Western superiority tied with the Christian sense of mission inspired Frances E. Willard, the first president of the World Union, and her followers to rescue “pagans” from darkness by exporting temperance activism to Asia. Japan especially seemed to be a “key” to the spread of their
organization in Asia because of its quick adaptation of Western products since the beginning of the Meiji era (1868-1912). The World Union sent missionaries to Japan, a gateway to Asia, one after another and nurtured its Japanese branch.

The Japanese women who gathered around the emissaries from the WCTU complied with their expected role of earnest “students.” However, they also defied the presumed universal applicability of the American temperance scheme. Instead of welcoming the WCTU’s agenda and embracing their “salvation” by passively and uncritically following the guidance of their American sisters, they rewrote, rectified, and selectively accepted their teachings. They welcomed Christianity and the social reform agenda from the United States because they found the potential for the liberation of women in this new religion and activism. Unlike the WCTU missionaries who deemed liquor the major foe of family life and advocated a temperance-first policy, the members of the Japanese WCTU attacked the licensed prostitution system that had rapidly developed hand in hand with the modernization and militarization of Japan. Translating “Temperance Union” into “Kyōfūkai” (association for reforming customs), the Japanese women transformed the late-Victorian temperance strategy according to their own cultural and social situation. Japanese women had always adapted and nativized the product of the American women’s movement to make it serve their own ends. Unlike Rumi Yasutake’s argument that the Japanese Union women did not fully understand Frances E. Willard’s vision of reforming society by promoting temperance, this dissertation has demonstrated that their preference of Kyōfūkai over Kinshukai (temperance association) and its anti-prostitution-first policy were not the
products of misinterpretation or miscomprehension of American temperance schemes but their determination to maintain their own vision.\(^1\) The Japanese Union women carefully compared situations of Japan and the United States and intentionally adopted ideas and practices brought from the West. When the WCTU missionaries defied the nativization of the temperance ideas and practices and pejoratively called the Japanese Union the “so-called W.C.T.U.,” the Japanese Union women justified themselves by referring to Willard’s “Do Everything” policy covering various issues, not only temperance and prohibition but also the sexual double standard, prostitution, suffrage, international arbitration, peace, and many others.\(^2\) They knew that condemning the double standard and prostitution were part of Willard’s reform vision, even if it was not her highest priority.

Adopting American models into Japanese practices also characterized the creation and development of the Jiaikan rescue home and the Kôbôkan settlement. The North American resident missionaries who formed the Foreign Auxiliary of the Japanese Union regarded prostitutes as the victims of oppressive social and domestic customs in Japan and attempted to “save” them by introducing the rescue home model from the United States. At the Jiaikan rescue home, they accommodated former prostitutes and less privileged women and taught them ideas of Victorian womanhood.

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The working-class Japanese women who took refuge at the home, however, rejected the direct transplantation of reform programs from the United States which failed to consider the cultural and religious specificity of Japan. Despite the lure of free tuition, free food, and even wages, only a small number of them took refuge in the home, and few stayed there for long. The WCTU's middle-class Japanese women also rebelled against the American women's self-appointed role as the sole implementers of reform and eventually expelled them from Jiaikan's directorship. A couple of years before the Foreign Auxiliary of the WCTU completely pulled out from the administration of the Jiaikan, its Tokyo members started the Kōbōkan settlement in 1919. Heavily influenced by U.S. progressivism and cultural pluralism, they developed much more comprehensive programs to fit the native customs and leadership without causing serious friction with the Japanese. Its adaptability to the Japanese social arrangement enabled smooth acceptance by the surrounding community. Yet, its heavy dependence on financial resources from the government and capitalists inevitably increased authoritative involvement in its activities and allowed its incorporation into the war effort during the 1930s and 1940s.

The Chinese WCTU also saw a similar transformation of the American style of social reform activism. When native women took the leadership of the Chinese WCTU in the 1910s, they added as goals the preservation of national sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and the ending of anti-female practices of Confucianism. Unlike their American and Japanese counterparts, the Chinese WCTU regarded overcoming national weakness and stopping imperial exploitation as prerequisites for improving
women’s status and promoting women’s welfare. Such association between the temperance cause and national sovereignty formed the distinctive character of Chinese WCTU activism.

The constant negotiations on the universal applicability of American style temperance and social reform movements, therefore, colored the diffusion of the WCTU from the United States to Asia. Both the Japanese and the Chinese women who joined the WCTU digested and nativized the idea of the temperance cause and reforms from the United States. Asian women also resented the American women’s belittling and patronizing attitudes. The Japanese were always unhappy about being treated as inferior objects saved only by the guidance of their benevolent Western “mothers.” The Chinese women made sarcastic remarks about Western women who retreated to domesticity after the realization of suffrage.

The second flow of trans-Pacific activism, from Asia to the United States and Europe, entailed a more heated discussion about Western superiority. The Japanese WCTU women initiated this flow by making their debut on the global stage at the turn of the 20th century. Through their transnational activism, Japanese women sought a respectable position in a Western-dominated women’s international community. Japan’s victories in war with China in 1895 and Russia in 1905 and the subsequent colonial acquisition had transformed Japan into a latecoming imperial power. Such drastic geopolitical change in Asia placed Japan, the only non-white empire, in a subtle and ambivalent position in the world that made distinctions between “Western, civilized, and white rulers” and the “Asian, uncivilized, and non-white ruled”; to gain
full acceptance by Westerners, the Japanese Union women dispatched their delegates to the World’s WCTU conferences and other transnational women’s gatherings from the beginning of the 20th century.

The American WCTU members and those of other transnationally oriented women’s organizations in the West welcomed the international debut of Japanese women, but they accepted them not as their peers but as good “students” of Western teachings. They greeted delegates from Japan as “exotic” guests, as perfect objects for photographs, and as tokens of “diversity” among delegate bodies. Even though they promoted the transnational exchange and solidarity of global sisterhood, they reinforced a hierarchy between the West and the rest and confirmed the prejudiced view of Japanese women by relegating Japanese women into second-class status in their international women’s club. The marginalization of Japanese women reflected not only Orientalist idiom but also the dominant ideology that only Western women could be models of activist womanhood. Meanwhile, they excluded problems of racial inequality, the imperial and colonial exploitation of women, and national sovereignty, all of which were crucial to non-Western women. When a Japanese woman referred to the Japanese exclusion in the United States in the 1920s, some of her American audience expressed gross ignorance. When Chinese women challenged imperialism and the hypocrisy of the U.S. Open Door policy at the Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, Western delegates took offense at such an argument, seeing it was too aggressive. In contrast to the explicit intention to build coalitions and solidarity across borders, the transnational exchange of women was constructed as Euro-American in origin and
development. Women’s lives and struggles outside this geographical context were marginalized, ridiculed, or simply ignored.

Yet, Asian women also participated in the construction of Western supremacy. Their constant challenge to Western hegemony and domination was mixed with their inferiority complex towards the West. The domestic ideology upheld by the Japanese Union women, for instance, tended to affirm Western superiority, since they adopted Western standards of legal, economic, religious, and familial structures by which the “progress” of a nation was to be judged. Internalizing Western beliefs about women’s status in Japan, they worked to eliminate what they called the “national shame” of licensed prostitution and sex workers abroad. Although the Japanese WCTU women protested Japanese exclusion in the United States, their class prejudices hindered them from adequately addressing the issues of the peasants who largely comprised Japanese immigrant communities in the United States. The U.S. anti-Japanese Immigration Act of 1924 was, for instance, a harsh blow to their national pride and the Japanese Union strongly protested against the U.S. new immigration policy. These women, however, unanimously avoided the unilateral accusation of the United States. Instead, they regarded the act as punishment for Japan’s “low” morality symbolized by the public endorsement of prostitution and disenfranchisement of women instead of attacking the racism inherent in the Japanese exclusion movements. By accusing Japan of “vulgar morality,” they endorsed the white supremacist argument. It was not until the beginning of the Pacific War that Japanese women became aware of the race factor inherent in the exclusion of Japanese from the United States.
The Chinese women's constant reference to national strength and disagreement with imperial hegemony reflected their recognition of Western strength. They regarded the improvement of women's status as an indispensable precondition for the empowerment of the nation. In this way, the transfer of the reform plan from America to Asia accompanied the arguments about Western superiority.

The constant claim of Japanese and Chinese women for patronage and support from Americans confirmed U.S. hegemony over the women's international community and even contradicted their previous demand for equal partnership with American women. The increasing political tension between the United States and Japan over Japan's military aggression and the subsequent trans-Pacific exchanges of Japanese and Chinese women affirmed Western, especially U.S., superiority over Asia. Since the women of both nations thought that winning Americans over to their side was indispensable to winning international endorsement of their national agendas, they aggressively contended for the favor and the attention of Americans until the outbreak of the Pacific War.

The third personal and institutional flow among Asian women began almost simultaneously with Japan's imperial expansion. Concerned about the spread of social evils to newly acquired territories and the trafficking in women, the Japanese WCTU started creating outposts in Korea, Taiwan, and later, Manchuria and China with the endorsement and support from the colonial regimes. Originally, these branches worked among Japanese settlers, and their efforts rarely overlapped with those of the Chinese and Korean WCTUs. The relationship between the Japanese branches in China and
Korea and the native Chinese and Korean Unions was outwardly friendly in the 1920s. Ironically, however, the Japanese women who resented American women's presumed leadership replicated this hierarchy with other Asian women. The other Asian women, of course, disagreed with the Japanese women's presumptions, and they defied Japanese women. The Chinese women's rejection of the Japanese presidency at the Pan-Pacific Women's Association and a Korean woman's rage at the Japanese WCTU's indifference in the massacre of Korean residents in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake were signs of disagreement between the Japanese and other Asian women during the 1920s.

The Manchurian Incident in 1931 widened the chasm between the Japanese and Chinese women. The former endorsed Japan's military action as defensive, while the latter censured it as an act of territorial aggression. The discrepancy between the two seemed to have widened to an unbridgeable level, but continual negotiations between Japanese and Chinese women in the following years improved relations to some degree. Through personal exchanges and correspondence with Japanese women, Chinese women recognized Japanese women's significant public presence and contributions to educational and social reforms. The Japanese women also greeted guests from China with great hospitality.

The all-out war between Japan and China which began in 1937, however, dispelled the potential to restore transnational friendship. From then on, mutual accusations dominated Japan-China relations between women until the end of the Pacific War. The escalation of war in the continent also brought changes to the idea of
Japan's superiority vis-à-vis China. The wartime interactions between Japanese and Chinese women reveal that the Japanese women of the WCTU developed a racial discourse legitimizing Japan's rule over non-Japanese people in Asia and promoted its pan-Asiatic platform. However, close examinations of the interactions among WCTU members in Asia shows that Japan's self-acclaimed leadership over other Asians was under constant challenge. The Chinese elite women's assertiveness in domestic and international political arenas and women's enfranchisement in China discredited Japanese women's leadership in Asia. In addition to the absence of women's suffrage, the spread of “vice” throughout the Japanese empire represented by the traffic in women and dissemination of licensed prostitution also invalidated Japan's notion of leadership of China. The Japanese Union developed a training program of women's leadership and planned to replace prostitutes with “respectable” Japanese women. Unlike their male counterparts who never counted women's political rights and the absence of prostitution as measures of national progress, the Japanese WCTU women always measured the level of national advancement from women's political and social status. As a consequence, Japan's claim for superiority was undermined by the comparison to enfranchised Chinese women and the presence of Japanese prostitutes throughout the Empire. The Japanese Union women explicitly claimed the Chinese in general as “backward” and in need of Japan's guidance and reprimand, if necessary.

3 For the general argument of the Japanese three-tiered hierarchy before the end of the Pacific War, see Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 7-8
However, their sense of hierarchy was not firm, for they implicitly recognized their own "backwardness" regarding political rights and morality vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts. The contradiction between the ideal leadership and the actual low status of women represented by the absence of suffrage and the prevalence of prostitution was the major problem to be solved.

Unlike the Chinese elite women, the Korean women did not contest their Japanese sisters because of political reasons. Unlike China, Korea had been under Japan's complete control for decades. Nevertheless, the Korean WCTU had developed independent of Japanese control until it forced integration into the Japanese Union in 1939. The Japanese Union welcomed this merger and segregated former Korean Unionists into its subordinate Korean section. The colonial regime crushed the Foreign Auxiliary of the Korean national Union immediately before the beginning of the Pacific War. At that moment, the Korean Union lost its independent voice.

The negotiation of hierarchy of the trans-Pacific exchanges of the WCTU women reveals that their trans-Pacific exchanges were closely identified with male nationalism, even though they ostensibly promoted transnational sisterhood. Their close identification with male national plans left power relations and hierarchies untouched and even reproduced ideas about the center and the margin along the lines of imperialism. Women's activities through the WCTU supported and complemented, rather than resisted or challenged, the national agenda of their male counterparts. Their transnational exchanges and ideologies reveal how individuals and groups of women from different countries were still deeply embedded in the national unit and
how the pursuit of national interests took precedence over international concerns. The American Union women, for instance, legitimized Anglo-American imperial control and used its framework to spread their organization throughout the world. As American men developed hierarchical racial ideologies to validate their imperial mission, the American white ribboners also affirmed their hegemony over their Asian sisters by adopting the imperial rhetoric, such as "uplifting," "training," and "mothering" them. As the male leaders of Japan struggled to obtain equal status with the West by promoting rapid modernization, industrialization, and militarization, the Japanese WCTU members also worked hard to uplift their national prestige by improving the morality of the people and sought a respectable position in an international women's community. The Chinese Union women integrated national defense into their agenda and fought side by side with men against Japan's invasion.

The rise of trans-Pacific hostilities and military confrontations since the early 1930s strengthened the WCTU women's association with male national policies. The Union women of America, Japan, and China were aggressively involved in the war effort. Women's endorsement of war as a defensive act for the welfare of the home and homeland challenges the essentialized assumption that women have a particular passion for peace. There were no distinguishable differences between platforms of

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international women's organizations and their male-dominated counterparts; the temperance women in the United States, China, and Japan developed highly nationalistic wartime agenda that complied with the expectations of male leaders in each nation. Of course, the WCTU women did not completely agree with the national plans of each nation. They influenced and advocated change. The Japanese Union disagreed with the integration of the sexual double standard into empire building. The Chinese women sometimes put aside hostilities with their Japanese "enemies" and prioritized dialogue with Japanese women during the tumultuous 1930s. However, they did so within the context of their particular social and international circumstances that occasionally ended up reinforcing middle-class women's privileges in imperial powers. The welfare of the least privileged women, such as prostitutes and victims of military violence, were often left out of the reform agenda of the WCTU.

The end of World War II and subsequent changes of political environments...

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5 Patton-Wash, "Women's Organizations, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1937-1941," Pacific Historical Review 70, no. 4 (2001): 606. As for Japan, Sheldon Garon argues that progressive individuals and groups, including the WCTU members, regarded the state, including the emperor, as a progressive agent of change in the modernization of Japanese life and many of the alliances with the state arose before the Fifteen Years' War (1931-1945). Although there were disagreements and tensions between various social reform groups and the state over the definition of modernity, both parties embraced modernization. The WCTU endorsed the states' policy of modernization and Westernization and its programs of empire-building. Although this dissertation agrees with Garon's argument, it should be noticed that the Japanese WCTU and the state disagreed over the licensed prostitution system, women's suffrage, and other gender-specific issues which the former group regarded an integral part of modernization while the latter did not. Sheldon Garon, "Rethinking Modernization in Japanese History," Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 2 (May 1994): 345-366.
brought many changes to the trans-Pacific dialogue of the WCTU. Japan's surrender to
the United States deterred the Japanese Union from challenging U.S. hegemony in the
WCTU world. The American white ribboners who had already started making post-war
reconstruction plans and rebuilding the broken sisterhood before the end of war
welcomed back its Japanese branch and stretched out a helping hand by sending
clothes and food which were in short supply. The Japanese in Hawai'i played an
especially crucial part in the reconstruction of the Japanese Union. Since air raids
wiped out the headquarter buildings in Tokyo, the Japanese Union asked in April 1948
the Japanese community in Hawai'i via the Hawai'i branch of the American Union to
collect contributions. Unlike on the West Coast, the Japanese society of Hawai'i was not
targeted for mass evacuation and internment and its response to the Japanese Union
was quick and generous; within less than six months, the Japanese of Hawai'i collected
$3,509.18. The Japanese Union established a building with this money and named it
"Hawai'i Hall." Thanks to this financial and material support from Hawai'i and the
continental United States, the Japanese Union resumed its reform campaigns in the
aftermath of the war. There was no more rivalry between the two nations.

The post-war programs of the Japanese WCTU still focused on social reforms.
The recovery from war damage and the growth of the Japanese economy had not
eliminated the various social problems that plagued women — poverty, domestic
violence, physical and psychological illnesses, and limited job opportunities. Although

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6 "Nihon Kirisutokyō Kyōfūkai no kansha: Honolulu iin no hōkoku," Hawai'i Herald
(October 20, 1948): 2

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post-War reform abolished the licensed prostitution system, prostitution and other sex industries were still prospering, and a sexual double standard remained deeply ingrained in Japanese society. These social problems necessitated the Japanese Union. The Japanese WCTU has constantly undertaken many tasks to promote the social, economic, and political equality of gender.

The significant difference between the pre-war and post-war activism of the Japanese Union in addition to its relationship with the United States has been its attitude towards other Asians and its political advocacy of pacifism. The remorse over the previous negligence of other Asian women's welfare moved the Japanese Union to work for governmental compensation and apology to war victims, in particular, the comfort women. The Japanese Union also established a shelter for Asian women. Japan used to export prostitutes to Asian neighbors, but now it absorbs many women from abroad. The shelter offers these women not only free accommodation but also legal support, interpreters, and many other necessities to secure their freedom from violence and exploitation. The Japanese Union also engages in aggressive anti-war campaigns, such as its fight against the Vietnam War, the U.S. military bases in Japan and the violence of American servicemen against Japanese, and the expansion of the National Defence Force of Japan. It insists on protecting Article 9 of the Constitution which renounces war forever. These activities have resonated with women of other Asian nations. Furthermore, the pacifism of the WCTU has garnered support from liberal politicians and many Japanese who are weary of war. These elements have enabled its survival until today.
The Jiaikan rescue home and the Kōbōkan settlement house also remain active today, unlike rescue homes in the United States and Jane Addams' Hull-House in Chicago. Jiaikan changed its name to *Jiairyō* (the dormitory of affection) and became independent from the WCTU of Japan after World War II. It offers to needy women, both Japanese and foreign, a shelter and counseling service, and helps them to become able to support themselves.\(^7\) As of 1995, the *Jiairyō* had fourteen staff members, including two part-time workers, and sheltered sixty-eight residents.\(^8\) The Kōbōkan functions as a settlement house at the same place where Yoshimi Shizue worked. The buildings that Yoshimi and her neighbors saved from air raids were replaced by new ones after the war. But the huge wooden signboard that was put at the entrance of the settlement before the beginning of the war still remains in the same place. As of 2001, the Kōbōkan is staffed with fifty-three full time and twenty-six part-time workers. It has a nursery program, schoolchildren's clubs, counseling services for parents, parent clubs, summer camp programs for children and youth, health and fan programs for senior citizens, piano, calligraphy, art, tea ceremony lessons, and a baseball club. The dormitories of the Kōbōkan and its former summer house shelter ill-treated children, youths who are mentally handicapped or troubled. Several hundred children, teenagers, and senior citizens of the neighborhood community use Kōbōkan programs every day.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) *Jiairyō ni ikita onnatachi*, 175.

In sharp contrast to the post-World War II prosperity of the Japanese counterpart, the Chinese WCTU, especially its celebrated leader Liu-Wang Liming, succumbed to a cruel fate. Unlike in Japan, the end of World War II in China did not mean the restoration of peace, but the intensification of civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After World War II, Liu-Wang went back to Shanghai and revived the Union. She also played a prominent role in the Chinese Democratic League and worked for the end of the civil war. But the KMT deemed it illegal and crushed it. Liu-Wang escaped from Shanghai to Hong Kong. After the CCP took over Beijing in 1949, she went to Beijing and resumed her work at the Chinese WCTU while holding official positions of the CCP. However, the anti-rightist campaign that began in 1957 stripped her of all titles and honorary positions and changed the WCTU into an organ to support the party. During the Cultural Revolution, Liu-Wang was arrested on charges that she was a secret agent of the CIA of the United States. Labeled a rightist, she died in a Shanghai prison on April 15, 1970, after more than three years of imprisonment. Her children did not receive even her ashes, so in a tomb they buried her comb that she left behind.10 In 1980, as the result of her children's appeal to the central government, her honor as a patriot was redeemed.11

The end of hostilities in 1945 ended Japan's control of Korea. Soon, both

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Korean Christian women and missionaries began reorganizing the WCTU and started anti-prostitution and anti-liquor campaigns. Yet, the Korean Union also paid a price for reconstruction. Ethel Underwood, the former president of the Foreign Auxiliary, played a crucial role in reorganizing the Union. Her work was, however, unexpectedly interrupted when two armed men assassinated her in 1949.12

The American WCTU exists today with about a membership of 50,000 and promotes anti-alcohol, anti-tobacco, and anti-illegal drug causes. In addition, its post-World War II program includes the protection of the heterosexual home as a countermeasure against the rise of homosexual communities.13 Since the reaffirmation of a healthy nuclear family and homophobia were integrated in the cold war discourse of normative domesticity, as historian Elaine Tyler May argues, the post-war strategy of the WCTU fit perfectly with the demands of U.S. policy-makers.14 Since the WCTU functioned as an organization to promote family stability as a bulwark against communist contamination, it escaped accusations during the McCarthyism era that censured individuals and non-governmental organizations which had promoted trans-Pacific exchanges and developed deep connections with China, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Unlike other similarly oriented organizations that fell victim to McCarthyism and disintegrated, the American WCTU survived.

13 For updated information of the American WCTU, see http://www.wctu.org/
Indeed, patriotism and support of governmental cold-war policies were one of the primary concerns of the American Union. Unlike the postwar Japanese WCTU which took position against war and U.S. military action and protested the U.S.-Japan military alliance, the American WCTU performed patriotic duties and endorsed the national military policy by supporting American servicemen during the Vietnam War. As the disagreement between the American and Japanese WCTUs over military issues indicates, both WCTUs have developed during the cold-war era without heavily influencing each other. The American Union did not enjoy strong influence and hegemony over its Japanese equivalent any more. The Japanese Union women stopped looking forward their American sisters for endorsement and support. Rather, the Japanese Union functions independently from American intervention. Although further research needs to compare the post-World War history of these two WCTUs, it can be said that the WCTU of Japan, once portrayed as a “daughter” of American temperance women, has outgrown its “mother” and stands today on its own feet.

<table>
<thead>
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興亜女子指導者講習会
Kóbókan 興望館
Kokka Sódóin-hó 国家総動員法
Kokubó Fujinkai 国防婦人会
Kokusai Renraku Fujin Inkai 国際婦人連絡委員会
kokutai 国体
Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿
Kozaki Hiromichi 久保田利之
Kubushiro Ochimi 楠本白郎
Kusumoto Rukuichi 楠本六一
Kurumoto Yasuko 櫻本安子
Liu·Wang Liming 劉(劉)王立明
Masutomi Masasuke 益富敬助
Manshú Fujin Kyúsaikai 満州婦人救済会
Meirokusha 明六社
Misawa Chiyono 三沢千代野
Mitani Tami 三谷民
Miyagawa Shizue 宮川静枝
Mori Arinori 森有礼
Moriya Azuma 守屋東
Mutshito 陸仁
Muraoka Hana 村岡花
Naisen Ittai 内鮮一体
Nemoto Shó 根本正
Nihon Fujin Kyófúkai 日本婦人婦会
Nihon Fujin Heiwa Kyókai 日本婦人婦平和協会
Nihon Kirisutokyó Fujin Kyófúkai 日本キリスト教婦人婦会
Nihon Kirisutokyó Renmei 日本キリスト教連盟

Nihon Kyûseidan 日本教世団
Nijima Jó 新島襄
Nishimura Kan’nosuke 西村勘之助
Nitobe Inazó 新渡戸稲造
Nitobe Mariko 新渡戸萬里子
Ōe Taku 大江卓
Ókuma Shigenobu 大隈重信
Osaka Fujin Hómu 大阪婦人ホーム
Rengô Inori Kai 連合祈り会
ryósai kenbo 良妻賢母
Sakai Futa 坂井フタ
Sakurajogakkó 桜井女学校
Sasakì Toyōju 佐々木豊寿
Sató Matsuko 佐藤まつ子
Seitó 青社
Senji Kokumin Kyójo Gikai 戦時国民協助義会
Shakaijigyô hó 社会事業法
Shibusawa Eiichi 渋澤栄一
Shimada Saburó 島田三郎
Shimizu Ikuko 清水郁子
Shimizu Yasuzô 清水安三
Shin’ei Jogakkó 新栄女学校
Shin Fujin Kyókai 新婦人婦会
shôgi 夫政
shufu 主婦
shufu no tomo 主婦の友
shûgyôfu 醜業婦
Sûtei Gakuen 崇徳学園
Tanaka Yoneko 田中米子
Tôa·shinchitsujo 東亜新秩序
Tôjô Hideki 東條英機
Tokugawa Iesato 徳川家達

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東京禁酒会
東京婦人矯風会
鳥海（池田）道子
東洋経済新報社
津田真道
津田仙
植木枝盛
潮田千勢子
渡辺金三
渡辺常
渡瀬香芽
呉贻芳
矢島楫
山田わか
山口荘吉
山室軍平
山室機恵子
山室民子
靖国神社
横井玉子
嘉仁
吉見静江
吉原
湯浅治郎
APPENDIX 1: THE WORLD'S WCTU
AFFILIATES (AS OF 1928)

(the year of affiliated.)

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APPENDIX 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE WCTU (JWCTU) AND ITS BRANCHES IN EAST ASIA

The World's WCTU (est. 1884)

The WCTU Tokyo (Japan) (est. 1886)

The Foreign Auxiliary (est. 1886) (1903) (became affiliate with the JWCTU)

The JWCTU, Seoul (Korea) (1911) (1945) (ceased to exist)

The Foreign Auxiliary of the JWCTU (Korea) (1940) (ceased to exist)

The JWCTU, Taihoku (Taiwan) (1913) (1945) (ceased to exist)

The JWCTU, Dairen (Manchuria) (1921) (1945) (ceased to exist)

The JWCTU, Shanghai (China) (1923) (1945) (ceased to exist)
APPENDIX 3: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WCTUS IN EAST ASIA

The American WCTU (established in 1874), The World's WCTU (est. 1884)

Japan
- The WCTU Tokyo (Japan) (est. 1886)
- The Foreign Auxiliary (1898) (est. 1886) (became affiliate with the JWCTU)
- (ceased to exist)

Taiwan
- The JWCTU Taihoku (Taiwan) (est. 1913) (ceased to exist)

China
- The WCTU Shanghai (China) (est. 1886) (Mary Stone, the first native president)
  - Foreign Auxiliary (The WCTU China) (est. around 1921)
  - The JWCTU, Dairen (Manchuria) (est. 1921) (ceased to exist)
  - The JWCTU, Shanghai (China) (est. 1923) (ceased to exist)

Korea
- The JWCTU, Seoul (Korea) (est. 1911) (ceased to exist)
- The WCTU Korea (est. 1924) (ceased to exist)
- The Foreign Auxiliary (The WCTU Korea) (est. 1911) (ceased to exist)
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   China Collection
   Jessie Ackerman Papers
   Mary A. West Papers

Kōbōkan Collection

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Japan Evangelist
Missionary Herald
Minutes of the Executive Committee and Conventions of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union
The Japan Christian Quarterly
The Mid-Pacific
The Missionary Herald
Pan-Pacific Union Bulletin
Union Signal
Woman’s Home Missions
Woman’s Work for Woman and Our Mission Field
Women and Missions
Women and the Way
Women of the Pacific
World’s Women’s Christian Temperance Union White Ribbon Bulletin

Periodicals (Japanese)

Airin
Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi
Fujin Shinpō
Fujō Shinbun
Fukuin Shinpō
Fusen
Jogaku Zasshi
Kakusei
Kuni no Hikari
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(Archival sources are cited in the notes.)


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